[Senate Hearing 114-741]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-741
RUSSIAN VIOLATIONS OF BORDERS, TREATIES, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 7, 2016
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BOB CORKER, Tennessee, Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
MARCO RUBIO, Florida BARBARA BOXER, California
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
CORY GARDNER, Colorado CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
RAND PAUL, Kentucky TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Todd Womack, Staff Director
Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator From Tennessee.................... 1
Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator From Maryland............. 2
Nuland, Hon. Victoria, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European
and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC. 3
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Answers to questions for the record submitted to Victoria
Nuland by Senator Cardin................................... 47
Answers to questions for the record submitted to Victoria
Nuland by Senator Isakson.................................. 50
Answers to questions for the record submitted to Victoria
Nuland by Senator Boxer.................................... 51
Answers to questions for the record submitted to Victoria
Nuland by Senator Perdue................................... 53
Carpenter, Michael, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia, U.S. Department of Defense,
Washington, DC................................................. 8
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Satter, David, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, Washington, DC... 32
Prepared statement........................................... 33
Kara-Murza, Vladimir, National Coordinator, Open Russia Movement,
Russian Federation............................................. 36
Prepared statement........................................... 38
(iii)
RUSSIAN VIOLATIONS OF BORDERS, TREATIES, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
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TUESDAY, JUNE 7, 2016
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
Room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker,
chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Corker [presiding], Risch, Rubio,
Johnson, Gardner, Perdue, Barrasso, Cardin, Menendez, Shaheen,
Coons, Murphy, Kaine, and Markey.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
The Chairman. The Foreign Relations Committee will come to
order.
We thank our witnesses for being here, and look forward to
their testimony.
We are obviously here today to talk about Russia and its
role in the world. Together, our countries have conquered the
Nazis, prevented the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the
1990s, and worked against terrorists in the years after 9/11.
Yet, for most of modern history, Americans and Russians have
found themselves at cross-purposes. Throughout the Cold War, we
trained to obliterate each other. With the fall of the Berlin
Wall, many politicians argued that the difficult days of
confrontation were behind us.
Leaders like Gorbachev and Yeltsin worked to place Russia
on a path towards democracy and peaceful engagement with the
rest of the world. Reagan asked for the walls to be torn down,
George W. Bush had Putin come to his home in Texas, and Obama
sought to reset the relationship in a way that prioritized
communication and cooperation.
Scholars will long argue over exactly when the U.S./Russia
relationship again became confrontational, but looking back,
the Russia-Georgia war in August of 2008 seems to mark the
beginning of a new age. Since that summer, a so-called
resurgent Russia has pushed back on the institutions and allies
of the West. Russia has invaded Georgia and Ukraine, striking
them in ways designed to prevent their integration into the
European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance. Russia
has acted contrary to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, the Open Skies
Treaty, and the Incidents at Sea Agreement. Russia has altered
the human rights landscape within its own country, decreasing
democracy and begging questions about the future of governance,
not just in Moscow, but across the Federation. Moreover, Russia
has joined the civil war in Syria and begun militarizing the
Arctic.
Now when we talk about the U.S./Russia relationship and the
ways that we interact globally, the days following the end of
the Cold War seem very far away as the relationship has once
again grown distrustful and confrontational. As we meet today
to talk about the role that Russia has come to play in the last
several years, we must address these topics through the lens of
realism. It would be easy to simply catalog the events that
have brought us to where we are today, but we are charged with
a higher responsibility, which is not only to diagnose the
problem, but to begin generating prescriptions for where we go
next. Discussions about the violations of norms must be paired
with conversations about ways of effectively setting boundaries
and engaging with Russia in order to make our world more stable
and ultimately to serve U.S. national interests. Our countries
are too powerful and the interplay between us too important to
resign ourselves to the increasing escalation and risk of
confrontation.
I look forward to hearing today how we can recognize the
new realities of the U.S./Russia relationship and implement a
new strategy that puts us on a better trajectory.
And, with that, I will turn to our distinguished ranking
member, Senator Cardin.
STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND
Senator Cardin. Well, Chairman Corker, first let me thank
you for calling this hearing, and let me concur in all of your
comments in your opening statement. I totally agree with the
points that you raised and the challenges we have in regards to
our relationship with Russia.
Today we meet to discuss Russia's efforts to undermine
institutions that have maintained peace and security in Europe
since the end of the Cold War. Russia's actions in Georgia in
2008, support for separationist enclaves in Georgia and
Moldova, invasion of Ukraine, illegal annexation of Crimea, and
the ongoing support for the combined Russian separationist
forces in eastern Ukraine have challenged the security of
sovereign borders, something that has been a mainstream of
relations in Europe since the signing of the Helsinki Accord in
1975. And we have serious concerns about Russia's compliance
with seminal arms control treaties. While I understand that
Russia complies with treaties like New START, it is in
violation of others, like the INF and there are compliance
issues with the Open Skies Treaty. I am concerned about these
violations and look forward to hearing how we can strengthen
our ability to verify and enforce their terms. There are
legitimate questions about the value of such accords as Russia
wantonly disregards its international commitments. This should
not lead us to the conclusion that all arms-control agreements
should be ripped up. While not perfect, these agreements afford
us some visibility into Russia's intentions.
I also want to underscore the importance of these treaties
to our allies, especially Open Skies. As we seek to bolster
European unity in the face of Russian aggression, I believe
that pulling out of Open Skies would send the wrong message to
our friends.
What is often lost in the debate about Russia's negative
behavior abroad is how it treats its own people at home. Last
year's horrific murder of Boris Nemtsov, just steps from the
Kremlin, is the most sobering example of the danger facing the
opposition. Today, we are honored to be joined by Vladimir
Kara-Murza, a prominent member of the political opposition, who
was poisoned in Moscow under suspicious circumstances and spent
months in a coma.
Vladimir, thank you for your courage and all that you do
for the people of the Russian Federation.
New laws targeting foreign agents in undesirable
organizations which label NGOs as traitors of the Russian state
have impeded the work of NDI, OSF, and the MacArthur
Foundation. Putin has fueled corruption by weakening the rule
of law, and his associates know that their fortunes depend on
access and allegiance to the regime. And those who make public
these corrupt acts are threatened, abused, or even worse.
Sergei Magnitsky was one of them, and he paid the ultimate
price for his honesty. As everyone here knows, the Magnitsky
law targets human rights abusers inside Russia. While 40 people
have been sanctioned since 2012, I call on the administration
to hold accountable more human rights abusers in the country.
As human rights violations increase, so should our
response. In summary, Russia under Putin is a kleptocratic
regime intent on undermining democracy at home and abroad. Yes,
we will have shared interests with the Russian regime, and we
need to pursue them, but we can never forget our principles and
turn a blind eye to human rights violations committed by the
Putin regime.
Mr. Chairman, again, thank you for convening this hearing.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much.
We do appreciate our witnesses being here. I do not think
we have had as many people outside trying to get in the
building in quite a while, so it is obviously something people
care about.
And we thank The Honorable Victoria Nuland, Assistant
Secretary of State for the Bureau of European and Eurasian
Affairs, for being here. We look forward to your testimony. And
Dr. Michael Carpenter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia. You all have been here
before. You know you can summarize your testimony in about 5
minutes. We have read your written testimony in advance, and we
look forward to the questions that follow.
But, if you would start, Tory, that would be great.
STATEMENT OF HON. VICTORIA NULAND, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU
OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Chairman Corker, Ranking Member
Cardin, members of this committee, for the opportunity to join
you and discuss the challenges posed to international peace and
security by Russia today and the administration's policy
towards Moscow.
As you all know, for more than 20 years following the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States has sought to
build a constructive relationship with Russia and to support
that country's greater integration into regional and global
institutions and the rules-based international order. Our
working assumption in doing this was that a more integrated,
democratic, secure, and prosperous Russia would be a safer,
more predictable and willing partner for the United States and
our allies.
By 2014, however, we had no choice but to reevaluate our
assumptions, following Russia's invasion of sovereign Ukrainian
territory, first in Crimea and then in eastern Ukraine, which
shattered any remaining illusions about this Kremlin's
willingness to abide by international law or live by the rules
of the institutions that Russia joined at the end of the Cold
War.
Our approach to Russia today seeks, first, to deter further
aggression through the projection of strength and unity with
our allies; second, to build resilience and reduce
vulnerability among friends and allies that are facing Russian
pressure and coercion; third, to cooperate on core security
priorities when our interests and Russia's do align; and,
fourth, to sustain ties to the Russian people to preserve the
potential for a more constructive relationship in the future.
Let me go through these.
First, strength and deterrence. To counter the threat posed
by Russian aggression and deter any military moves against NATO
territory, over the past 2 years the United States and our NATO
allies have maintained a persistent rotational military
presence on land, sea, and air all along NATO's eastern edge:
the Baltic states, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria. As we look
towards the NATO Summit in Warsaw this coming July, allies will
institutionalize a more sustained approach to deterrence,
including by enhancing forward presence in the East to reduce
response times to any aggression. To support this commitment,
the President has requested $3.4 billion to fund the European
Reassurance Initiative. With your support, these funds will be
used to deploy an additional rotational armored brigade combat
team to Central and Eastern Europe, and for pre-positioning of
combat equipment as well as additional trainers and exercises
in Europe. Dr. Carpenter will talk about this in detail.
To press Moscow to bring an end to the violence in Ukraine
and fully implement its commitments under the Minsk Agreements,
we have worked with the EU, the G7, and other like-minded
nations to impose successive rounds of tough economic sanctions
on Russia over the past 2 years, and we are now working
intensively with Europe to ensure that EU sanctions are rolled
over at the end of this month and to support France and Germany
in their lead diplomatic role to push for the full
implementation of the Minsk Agreements, including the
withdrawal of all Russian forces from Ukraine and the return of
Ukraine's sovereign border.
Next, resilience of partners. Even as we defend NATO
territory, we are also working to reduce the vulnerabilities
and increase the resilience of those countries across Europe
that face pressure from Moscow. To help Ukraine, the United
States has committed over $600 million in security assistance,
we have trained 1700 Ukrainian conventional forces and National
Guard personnel, we have provided counter-artillery and
counter-mortar radars, over 3,000 secure radios, and a number
of other pieces of equipment to help Ukrainian troops
successfully resist further advances and to save lives.
To continue our work across Europe and Eurasia to
strengthen democratic institutions, reform economies, fight
corruption, and build the resilience of our partners, we have
requested $787 million in FY17 focusing on our priorities on
those countries that are most vulnerable to Russian pressure.
Our programs and advisors focus on improving governance,
squeezing out graft and fraud, strengthening justice systems,
improving election standards, hardening border security and
homeland defenses, and building energy independence to make
countries more resilient and stronger in the face of pressure.
We are also deepening intelligence cooperation across Europe
and Eurasia to detect and blunt Russia's covert and overt
efforts to manipulate the internal politics of European
countries.
Even as we push back against Russian aggression and support
neighbors that are under pressure, the United States will
continue to look for areas where our interests and Moscow's
align. We have worked with Russia, for example, to remove
Syria's declared chemical weapons, to prevent Iran from
acquiring nuclear weapons, to contain the nuclear threat
emanating from the DPRK, and to negotiate and implement the New
START Treaty. As you all know, over the past 8 months,
Secretary Kerry has led multilateral efforts to try to resolve
the crisis in Syria, establishing the International Syria
Support Group and forging a critical agreement on a cessation
of hostilities, which has reduced violence even as that
agreement is tested every single day. These efforts have all
required hardheaded diplomacy with Russia, and we continue to
call on the Kremlin to bring its influence to bear on the Assad
regime to prevent civilian casualties and to end barrel-bombing
and the regime's obstruction of humanitarian aid deliveries to
the besieged communities.
Finally, we must continue to engage directly with those
Russian individuals, businesses, and organizations who want to
work with us, who share our interests and values, and who are
working for a better future for their country. Despite Moscow's
crackdown on civil society and a free press, our exchange
programs and our scientific cooperation remain hugely popular
with the Russian people. We will also continue to speak out
against laws and policies that impede the work of Russian civil
society and contravene the fundamental rights of freedom of
expression, assembly, and association in Russia and elsewhere
in the region.
The approach that I have just outlined is not without
challenges and contradictions. I will not claim that it has yet
brought an end to Russian aggression in Ukraine or Moscow's
unmitigated support for the Assad regime or its violations of
treaties and global norms. However, I am convinced that U.S.
and allied unity regarding Russia over the last 2 years has
been essential to deterring even worse behavior, to protecting
our own security, and to bringing the Kremlin to the table on
critical issues, from Ukraine to Iran to Syria.
Thank you very much for your attention. I would turn to Dr.
Carpenter.
[Ms. Nuland's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Victoria Nuland
Thank you Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and members of
this committee for the opportunity to join you and discuss the
challenges posed to international peace and security by Russia today,
and the administration's policy toward Moscow.
As this committee knows, for more than 20 years following the
collapse of the Soviet Union, across multiple administrations led by
both political parties, the United States sought to build a
constructive relationship with Russia, and to support that country's
greater integration into regional and global institutions and the
rules-based international order. Our working assumption was that a more
integrated, democratic, secure, and prosperous Russia would be a safer,
more predictable and willing partner for the United States and our
Allies in pursuing shared regional and global goals.
We had some success and some challenges with this approach, which I
won't recap here.
By 2014, however, we had no choice but to reevaluate our
assumptions following Russia's invasion of sovereign Ukrainian
territory--first in Crimea, then in eastern Ukraine--which shattered
any remaining illusions about this Kremlin's willingness to abide by
international law or live by the rules of the institutions that Russia
joined at the end of the Cold War.
Our approach to Russia today seeks first to deter further
aggression through the projection of strength and unity with our
Allies; second, to build resilience and reduce vulnerability among
friends and Allies facing Russian pressure and coercion; third, to
cooperate on core national security priorities when our interests and
Russia's do align; and fourth, to sustain ties to the Russian people
and business community to preserve the potential for a more
constructive relationship in the future.
strength and deterrence
To counter the threat posed by Russia's aggression and deter any
military moves against NATO territory, over the past 2 years the United
States and our NATO Allies have maintained a persistent, rotational
military presence on land, sea, and air all along NATO's eastern edge--
in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and the three Baltic States. All 28
Allies have participated, and the U.S. has used the $985 million in FY
2015 European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) funding that Congress
generously appropriated to increase the number of exercises, training
sessions, and patrols that we are supporting throughout Europe. This
month, over 30,000 U.S., NATO and partner nation troops will exercise
together as a part of a series of military training events, including
the Polish-led ANAKONDA exercise.
As we look toward the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July, Allies will
institutionalize a more sustained approach to deterrence, including by
enhancing forward presence in the East to reduce response times to any
aggression. To support this commitment, the President has requested
$3.4 billion to fund the European Reassurance Initiative. With your
support, these funds will be used to deploy an additional rotational
Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) to Central and Eastern Europe; the
prepositioning of combat equipment; as well as additional trainings and
exercises in Europe.
We also expect significant contributions from all other Allies to
improve NATO's readiness, responsiveness, and interoperability. The
threats we face today demand that all Allies meet the pledges they made
at the last NATO Summit in Wales to reverse the slide in defense
budgets, and commit to spending at least two percent of GDP on defense.
Seventy percent of Allies are already on track, but all NATO members
must do their part.
And, we must make investments that align with future threats.
Russia's own investments in hybrid tactics, electronic and cyber
capabilities, disinformation, and violations of the Intermediate-range
Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty illustrate where we need to respond.
We are also pushing our Allies and partners to prioritize
investment in their own homeland and cyber security and encouraging
increased information sharing to protect against internal and external
threats.
To press Moscow to bring an end to the violence in Ukraine and
fully implement its commitments under the Minsk agreements, we have
worked with the EU, the G7 and other like-minded nations to impose
successive rounds of tough, economic sanctions on Russia over the past
two years.
These sanctions, combined with low oil prices and Russia's
continued structural weaknesses, have imposed significant costs. While
Moscow has not yet changed its approach to Ukraine, our readiness to
toughen sanctions even further has likely played a role in deterring
further Russian efforts to grab Ukrainian territory. We are now working
intensively with Europe to ensure EU sanctions are rolled over at the
end of this month, and to support France and Germany in their lead
diplomatic role to push for full implementation of the Minsk
agreements.
resilience of partners
As we defend NATO territory, we are also working to reduce
vulnerabilities and increase the resilience of countries across Europe
that face pressure from Moscow. This effort is a part of our firm and
deep commitment that countries must be able to choose their own
futures.
To help Ukraine better monitor and secure its borders, deploy its
forces more safely and effectively, and defend its sovereignty and
territorial integrity, the United States has committed over $600
million in security assistance. We have trained over 1,700 Ukrainian
conventional forces and National Guard personnel and 120 Special
Operations Forces (SOF). We have provided counter-artillery and
counter-mortar radars, over 3000 secure radios, 130 Humvees, over 100
armored civilian SUVs, and thousands of medical kits to help Ukrainian
troops successfully resist advances and save lives.
To strengthen democratic institutions, reform economies, fight
corruption, and build the resilience of partners, we have requested
$787 million in funding for Europe and Eurasia, including to those
countries most vulnerable to Russian pressure, especially Ukraine,
Georgia, Moldova, and the Western Balkans. Our programs and advisors
focus on improving governance, squeezing out graft and fraud,
strengthening justice systems, improving election standards, hardening
border security and homeland defense, and building energy independence.
In Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, our assistance is reorienting
economies away from excessive dependence on Russia and toward growth-
spurring markets in Central and Western Europe. In the Balkans, we have
also increased our focus this year on countering violent extremism. And
we're deepening intelligence cooperation across Europe and Eurasia to
detect and blunt Russia's covert and overt efforts to manipulate
internal politics.
Energy diversification also continues to be a key component of our
strategy, and we have seen progress on this front across Europe.
Ukraine has now broken its dependence on Russian gas, ended costly
household energy subsidies, and is making real strides in introducing
full market standards across the sector. In the Baltics and Central
Europe, critical projects and actions have reduced energy
vulnerability, including the opening of Lithuania's and Poland's new
LNG terminals, and the construction of electricity grid connections
between the Baltic countries and their EU partners.
We appreciate the attention so many members of this committee have
paid to these issues, your visits to countries under threat, and your
energy security advocacy, including for the completion of projects like
the Southern Gas Corridor and against schemes like Nord Stream II that
will increase Europe's dependence on single energy sources.
cooperation on shared interests
Even as we push back against Russian aggression and support
neighbors under pressure, the United States will continue to look for
areas where our interests and Moscow's align, and we can work together
to tackle global challenges, including nonproliferation, nuclear and
other WMD security, preventing atrocities and humanitarian crises, and
combating violent extremism and terrorism.
We have worked with Russia to remove Syria's declared chemical
weapons, to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, to contain the
nuclear threat emanating from the DPRK, and to negotiate and implement
the New START Treaty.
For the past eight months, Secretary Kerry has led multilateral
efforts to resolve the crisis in Syria, establishing the International
Syria Support Group (ISSG), and forging a critical agreement on a
cessation of hostilities, which has reduced violence, even as that
agreement is tested daily.
These efforts require hard-headed diplomacy with Russia. While
working in the ISSG for a political settlement, we continue to call on
the Kremlin to bring its influence to bear on the Asad regime to
prevent unnecessary civilian casualties and suffering, and to end
barrel bombing and the regime's obstruction of aid deliveries to
besieged communities.
engaging with russian society
Finally, we must continue to foster direct engagement with those
Russian businesses, organizations, and individuals who want to work
with us, who share our interests and values and are working for a
better future for their country. Despite Moscow's crackdown on civil
society, a free press, exchanges with the West, and political
pluralism, our people-to-people exchanges; health, environment and
cultural programs; and educational opportunities for Russians remain
hugely popular, and continue to promote constructive ties between our
countries. And we will continue to speak out against laws and policies
that impede the work of Russian civil society and contravene the
fundamental rights of freedom of expression, assembly, and association
in Russia and elsewhere in the region.
The approach to Russia that I have outlined is not without its
challenges and internal contradictions. And I will not claim that it
has yet brought an end to Russian aggression in Ukraine, its
unmitigated support for Asad in Syria, or its violations of treaties
and global norms. However, I am convinced that U.S-Allied unity has
been essential to deterring worse behavior, protecting our own
security, and bringing the Kremlin to the table on critical issues from
Ukraine, to Iran, and Syria.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin, members of this committee,
thank you for your careful attention to the challenges that today's
Russia poses. My colleague and friend from the Defense Department, Dr.
Michael Carpenter, will give you further detail on DoD's efforts to
mitigate the threats we face.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Dr. Carpenter.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL CARPENTER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE, RUSSIA, UKRAINE, AND EURASIA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Dr. Carpenter. Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and
members of the committee, I appreciate this opportunity to
update you on the Department of Defense's strong and balanced
approach to deterring Russian aggression, defending the
homeland and our treaty allies, and strengthening the
resilience of our allies and partners to Russian coercion and
intimidation.
Russia's interventions in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in
2014 have demonstrated a blatant disregard for its
international commitments, including the most basic principles
of the international order, including sovereignty, territorial
integrity, and the inviability of borders.
In Syria, Russia has intervened militarily to prop up a
murderous dictator, allying itself with the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps and Lebanese Hezbollah. Russia's
nuclear saber-rattling raises troubling questions about Russian
leaders' commitments to strategic stability and to norms
against the threat of use of nuclear weapons.
With regards to arms-control commitments, Russia's record
has been mixed. It has violated those agreements that pose
impediments to its military modernization plans, such as the
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty or the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces Treaty. However, it has honored others, such as
the New START Treaty, which limits Russian and U.S. deployed
strategic nuclear weapons to historical low levels.
Thanks to a robust military modernization program, Russia
seeks to be a qualitative, if not quantitative, peer to the
United States across the land, sea, and air and space domains,
as well as in cyberspace and across the electromagnetic
spectrum.
Our approach to countering Russian coercion and aggression
involves coordinating efforts across the force to strengthen
our capabilities, posture, investments, and plans. We aim to do
this without foreclosing the possibility of working with
Russia, when it is in our interest.
The most critical element of this approach is ensuring
effective deterrence to support our most vital mission, defense
of the homeland, which is reflected in the President's $583
billion FY 2017 budget request. We are modernizing our nuclear
forces. This recapitalization program includes a new long-range
strategic bomber, ballistic-missile submarine, an air-launched
cruise missile, as well as the Life Extension Program for the
B61 gravity bomb.
We are also moving forward the development of new
technologies to ensure we maintain a qualitative military edge
over potential high-end adversaries. These include new unmanned
systems, enhanced ground-based air and missile defenses, new
long-range antiship weapons, and innovative technologies, like
the electromagnetic rail gun, lasers, and new systems for
electronic warfare, space, and cyberspace.
We will also continue to strengthen our alliances and
partnerships. I thank Congress for its continued support for
the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI). As Assistant
Secretary Nuland has mentioned, since its inception in 2014,
ERI has enabled the Department of Defense to strengthen our
deterrence and assurance missions in Europe. The President's FY
2017 budget proposes quadrupling funding for ERI to more than
$3.4 billion, which will allow us to increase our force posture
in Europe by augmenting two permanently stationed Brigade
Combat Teams (BCTs) with a third rotational armored BCT as well
as a fourth BCT worth of pre-positioned warfighting equipment.
With our non-NATO partners, our goal is to improve their
capabilities and capacity to deal with conventional and
unconventional threats. In Ukraine, we have provided over $600
million to enhance security since the start of the crisis. Our
support has consisted of training programs to enhance Ukraine's
internal defense capabilities, equipment to support the
operational needs of its security forces, and advisors to
advance the implementation of key defense reforms. So far, we
have trained six companies from Ukraine's National Guard and
are in the process of training five Land-Forces battalions and
one Special Operations battalion. While the scale of our
assistance to Ukraine is unique, we are engaged in similar
capacity-building efforts with other non-NATO partners, such as
Georgia and Moldova.
As Secretary Carter has underscored, the Department's
policy towards Russia is predicated on a strategic approach
that is both strong and balanced, leaving the door open to
Russia to return to compliance with international norms and to
constructive engagement with the international community. In
the meantime, in concert with our allies and partners, we will
continue countering Russian coercion and aggression with a
posture that is defensive and proportional. In spite of
Russia's actions, we will also continue to advance our
strategic vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace.
Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.
[Dr. Carpenter's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael R. Carpenter
Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and members of the
committee, I appreciate this opportunity to update you on the
Department of Defense's strong and balanced approach to deterring
Russian aggression, defending the homeland and our treaty allies, and
strengthening the resilience of our allies and partners to Russian
coercion and intimidation.
Today's Russia is increasingly revanchist abroad and repressive at
home. It has demonstrated a blatant disregard for its international
obligations and commitments, both to other countries and to its own
citizens. Outside its borders, Russia has acted aggressively in
violation of the most basic principles of the global order--
sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity within
internationally recognized borders--to seek what Kremlin leaders call a
``sphere of privileged interests'' along Russia's periphery. In Syria,
Russia has intervened militarily to prop up a murderous dictator,
allying itself with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and Lebanese
Hizballah to prolong a bloody conflict that has gone on far too long.
Russia's nuclear sabre rattling raises troubling questions about
Russian leaders' commitments to strategic stability, their respect for
norms against the threat of use of nuclear weapons, and whether they
respect the profound caution that nuclear-age leaders have shown with
regard to the brandishing of nuclear weapons. This behavior is
irresponsible and dangerous. Nuclear threats will neither intimidate
NATO nor make Russia a more influential and respected player on the
world stage.
With regard to arms control agreements, Russia's record has been
mixed: it has violated those agreements that pose impediments to its
military modernization plans, such as the Conventional Forces in Europe
(CFE) Treaty or the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.
However, it has honored others, such as the New START Treaty, which
limits Russian and U.S. deployed strategic nuclear weapons to
historically low levels.
Across the board, Russia's aggressive actions and flouting of
international norms have been enabled by a military modernization
campaign that has benefitted from windfall hydrocarbon revenues over
the last 15 years, as well as from significant internal restructuring,
reform, and technological advances. Russia seeks to be a qualitative,
if not quantitative, peer to the United States across the land, sea,
air, and space domains, as well as in cyberspace and the lectromagnetic
spectrum. Russia is also projecting power in all directions: in Europe,
the Asia-Pacific region, the Arctic, and the Middle East.
Moscow's military modernization has resulted in the development of
new capabilities that must be factored into U.S. plans, strategies, and
our own capability development. Moscow's increasing willingness to use
its military power for aggressive purposes requires reorienting the
Department to counter the challenges posed by a revanchist Russia.
russia's disregard for international principles
Russia's invasion of Georgia in 2008 and its military intervention
in Ukraine beginning in 2014 have not only threatened European
security, but also violated the bedrock principles of the international
order enshrined in such foundational documents as the United Nations
Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and the Charter of Paris for a New
Europe. Russia has likewise shown a brazen disregard for its own
political commitments, such as the 2008 ceasefire between Russia and
Georgia or the February 2015 Minsk agreement. More than a year since
the Minsk agreement was signed, Russia still has not fulfilled the
first three commitments listed in that document: ceasefire, withdrawal
of heavy weapons from proscribed zones, and unhindered access for OSCE
monitors to the entire territory of the Donbas.
Russia's disregard for basic global norms, international legal
obligations, and its own political commitments pose a challenge to the
future of arms control and confidence building in Europe. In 2007,
Moscow unilaterally ceased implementing the Conventional Armed Forces
in Europe (CFE) treaty, effectively withdrawing from the only legally-
binding conventional arms limitation agreement in Europe. While Russia
is currently in compliance with its obligations under the New START
Treaty, it is violating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
(INF) by producing and flight testing a ground launched cruise missile
with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.
We also have concerns about Russia's implementation of other
agreements, such as the Open Skies Treaty, since Russia has placed
restrictions on observation missions over its territory--to include the
region of Kaliningrad, which borders two of our NATO Allies--that are
not permitted under the treaty.
Finally, Russia has undermined confidence and transparency-building
measures by increasing the number of large-scale snap exercises on its
territory, which are exempt from reporting under the Vienna Document on
transparency of military activities within the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Russia's dangerous and
unprofessional intercepts of U.S. aircraft and ships in the Baltic and
Black Seas further undermine confidence and efforts to promote risk
reduction.
russia's military modernization
Russia's ambitious 2010 State Armaments Program aims to replace 70
percent of Russia's military equipment by 2020, prioritizing
investments in strategic nuclear forces, aerospace defense weapons,
high-precision conventional weapons, and command and control systems.
While this modernization effort has been slowed somewhat by Western
sanctions and the recent fall in oil prices, this will likely delay but
not derail Russia's modernization goals. Russian ground forces have
already fielded more than 1,000 new or modernized armored personnel
carriers, main battle tanks, and artillery systems, primarily in the
Western, Central, and Southern military districts. Additionally, Russia
has made significant advances in warfighting technology, especially in
the areas of precision guided munitions, missile technology, and
submarine warfare. In the Ukraine conflict, we have seen Russia deploy
world-class electronic warfare capabilities, and Russia's cyber
capabilities remain formidable. Finally, Russia's military
modernization effort has also expanded its anti-access and area denial
capabilities in an effort to assert control along Russia's periphery in
the Baltic and Black Seas, the Arctic, the Asia-Pacific rim, and now in
Syria as well.
As its military has modernized, Russia has also devoted
considerable resources to developing asymmetric capabilities. As
Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov wrote in 2013,
``The focus of applied methods of conflict has altered in the direction
of the broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian,
and other nonmilitary measures. All this is supplemented by military
means of a concealed character, including carrying out actions of
informational conflict and the actions of special operations forces.''
Nowhere have these asymmetric capabilities been more readily on
display than in Ukraine, where Russia has deployed thousands of regular
soldiers and established command and control support over tens of
thousands of additional separatist forces trained in Russia and
equipped by Russia. Russia has honed its abilities to conduct
information campaigns. In Ukraine, Russia maintains the fiction that
its forces are not present at all, and that the sophisticated air
defense systems and thermobaric weapons deployed on the battlefield are
fielded by volunteers. Russia's $300 million per year state-run
international TV station, RT, is but one tool at Russia's disposal that
is used to promote these myths, in addition to internet trolls, so-
called patriotic hackers, and botnets.
the department of defense's strong
and balanced approach to russia
In order to address the challenges of a revanchist Russia, the
Department of Defense pursues a strong and balanced approach to
countering Russian coercion and aggression. Our approach involves
coordinating efforts across the force to strengthen our capabilities,
posture, investments, and plans to respond to the transregional, multi-
functional, and multi-domain threats we face from Russia. We aim to do
all this without foreclosing the possibility of working with Russia
when it is in our interest, for example on counter-proliferation or
combatting violent extremism. We seek to ensure that the U.S. homeland
and vital U.S. national interests abroad, including the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of our NATO and other treaty allies, are secure.
We seek to ensure a strong, united, and resolute NATO Alliance that is
capable and postured to deter and if necessary defeat Russian
aggression. We are also reinvigorating our alliances in East Asia.
Finally, we seek to develop resilient partners capable of withstanding
Russian pressure and coercion.
The most critical element of this approach is ensuring effective
deterrence to support our most vital mission, defense of the homeland,
which is reflected in the President's $583 billion budget request for
Fiscal Year 2017. While new technologies have allowed us to strengthen
our capabilities dramatically in a number of areas, they have also
created potential vulnerabilities that must be addressed. That is why
we are taking actions to ensure our critical assets are protected
through measures such as hardening and dispersal and by building
greater resiliency into our command and control networks. We are also
moving forward the development of new technologies to ensure we
maintain a qualitative military edge over potential high-end
adversaries. These include new unmanned systems, enhanced ground-based
air and missile defenses, new long-range anti-ship weapons, and
innovation in technologies like the electromagnetic railgun, lasers,
and new systems for electronic warfare, space, and cyberspace.
We are modernizing our nuclear forces because they are beyond their
planned service lives or are reaching the point where they can no
longer be extended. This recapitalization program includes a new long-
range strategic bomber, ballistic-missile submarine, and air-launched
cruise missile, as well as the Life Extension Program for the B61
gravity bomb.
We will also continue to strengthen our alliances and partnerships.
I thank Congress for its continued support for the European Reassurance
Initiative (ERI). Since its inception in 2014, ERI has enabled the
Department of Defense to strengthen our deterrence and assurance
missions in Europe. We have expanded several major exercises, to
include TRIDENT JUNCTURE, the largest NATO exercise in over 20 years,
with participation from over 30 Allies and partners. We have focused on
operational effectiveness within NATO by supporting the Readiness
Action Plan, including contributions to the Very High Readiness Joint
Task Force, and NATO Force Integration Units along the Alliance's
eastern flank. We are funding critical U.S. enablers, such as a
Division Headquarters Mission Command Element, and enhanced allied and
partner capacity and capability through additional training
opportunities, such as the inaugural training deployment of F-22s to
our European Command. The President's FY 2017 Budget proposes
quadrupling funding for the European Reassurance Initiative, to more
than $3.4 billion. This will allow us to increase our force posture in
Europe by augmenting two permanently stationed Brigade Combat Teams
(BCTs) with a third rotational armored BCT and a fourth BCT of
prepositioned warfighting equipment.
With our non-NATO partners, our goal is to improve their
capabilities and capacity to deal with conventional and unconventional
threats. Again, ERI has helped us by funding upgrades to existing host-
nation ranges and training sites to increase capacity for use by U.S.
and Allied forces and to increase the quality of training events with
key partners, such as Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. Our capacity
building efforts with non-NATO partners are exemplified by the security
assistance funding that Congress has appropriated for Ukraine, which
since the start of the crisis in 2014 has exceeded $600 million. Our
support to Ukraine has consisted of training programs to enhance
Ukraine's internal defense capabilities; equipment to support the
operational needs of its security forces; and advisors to advance the
implementation of key defense reforms. We have trained six companies
from Ukraine's National Guard and are currently training its
conventional armed forces as well as its Special Operations Forces.
Over the coming years, we will continue working with our Ukrainian
partners to build more capable and professional forces that can defend
against outside aggression. While the scale of our assistance to
Ukraine is unique, we are engaged in similar efforts with other non-
NATO partners. For example, since Russia's invasion in 2008, Georgia
has received over $481 million in bilateral security assistance
funding. Efforts such as these will continue to improve our partners'
resilience against foreign pressure and coercion.
It is safe to say that Russia has taken notice of our efforts.
However, despite its false accusations that the United States and our
NATO Allies are in violation of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, our
efforts are wholly defensive and proportionate in nature, and
constitute a direct response to Russia's aggressive actions to
undermine the security of its neighbors.
conclusion
Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and members of the
committee, we expect that Russia will continue to modernize its
military, seek to expand its influence along on its periphery, and
operate in aggressive ways. The Department of Defense will continue to
ensure that the U.S. homeland and our vital national interests abroad
are protected and that we support countries' rights to make their own
security and economic choices, free from outside coercion and
intimidation. As Secretary Carter has underscored, United States policy
toward Russia is predicated on a strategic approach that is both strong
and balanced. In concert with our allies and partners, we will continue
countering Russian coercion and aggression with a posture that is
defensive and proportional. In spite of Russia's actions, we will also
continue to advance our strategic vision of a Europe whole, free and at
peace.
Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
We have votes at 4:00 o'clock. We have two panels. So, I
have asked Bertie to put 5 minutes on the clock and ask that
everybody try to stay within that time frame. I am just going
to ask one question and move on to Ben.
Secretary Nuland, we met briefly prior to this hearing.
There is a narrative out there that the U.S. and NATO pressured
Russia by expanding to areas obviously adjacent to their
border, and that is what has generated some of the discord, if
you will, that exists between our countries. You were involved
in those negotiations extensively. Would you give us a brief
summary of your view of that narrative?
Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Senator.
I completely reject this narrative of grievance that it is
somehow our fault. As you know, NATO is a defensive alliance.
As we said to Russia at every stage in the expansion of NATO,
we are not a threat to Russia in any way. And, as you know, as
we--through the various expansions of NATO, we sought also to
deepen NATO's own relationship with Russia, first with the
creation of the Permanent Joint Council, and then the NATO-
Russia Council. I was, as you said, active in those efforts,
both in negotiating and as Ambassador to NATO, to try to
implement those agreements. I, frankly, think that Russia did
not take advantage of the opportunity that NATO put before it
for cooperation. We really could have gotten to a place with a
different attitude in the Kremlin, where much of the
affirmative security that we were seeking in Europe and we were
seeking against terrorists and with regard to dangerous Iranian
behavior could have been done jointly in that structure, but we
could never get there because of old efforts.
Also, in the aught years, we reached out to Russia quite
strongly, the U.S. did, to try to work together on missile
defense programs, to try to cooperate, and the Kremlin was
never willing or able to take us up on those opportunities.
So, I regret very much that we are where we are, but I
really do think that we tried very hard, on the U.S. side,
across three administrations of both parties, to reach out. And
we will continue to try to do that, as I said.
The Chairman. Thank you.
I am going to reserve the rest of my time for interjections
and turn to our ranking member.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To defend ourselves from Russia's behavior and aggression,
it would be nice to know why they are doing what they are
doing. Since 2008, they have used their military in an
aggressive way to violate the sovereignty of other countries.
So, can you just share with me your thoughts as to what
Russia's game is here? Are they trying to get a greater Russia?
Are they trying to take on more territory under the umbrella of
Russia? Are they trying to recreate the Soviet Union? What is
their game plan, here?
Ms. Nuland. Senator Cardin, I would simply say that, as a
U.S. official, I do not think it is particularly productive to
try to speak for Russia, but I would just highlight some of the
things that Russia's President, himself, has said. I would
point to his speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007,
where he very much regretted the loss of control over Soviet
space, the loss of control over the--the failure--the end of
the Soviet Union, et cetera. So, clearly that is something on
his mind. But, I would defer that question to Russians,
frankly.
Senator Cardin. Let me say it is not safe to be in the
political opposition these days in Russia. What is the
administration doing to help political pluralism in Russia in
regards to those who are opposing the Putin regime?
Ms. Nuland. I assume that is for me, Senator?
Senator Cardin. Either one.
Ms. Nuland. Yeah.
Senator Cardin. I am open to a good answer.
Ms. Nuland. Well, obviously we continue to speak out
strongly whenever Russia takes moves to further constrain the
space for the nongovernmental organizations, to restrict human
rights, as I said in my opening, to constrain press freedom. We
have worked with Vladimir and others who are seeking a
different future for Russia. We have programs both inside
Russia and outside Russia to work with those Russian activists
who want to work with us to try to strengthen rule of law, to
try to strengthen a free press. We have a large number of
Russian journalists who have actually fled the--fled Russia
now, who are working with us and with others in Europe to try
to ensure there is independent Russian-language news going back
in to the country. We also work on LGBT rights and other things
inside Russia with those who want to work with us.
Senator Cardin. I will follow up with some questions for
the record in regard to this, but let me move to the Arctic for
one moment. Climate change is changing the Arctic with the ice
melts. Russia has 4,000 miles of Arctic coastline. It is my
understanding they have established six new bases in the--north
of the Arctic Circle, and they have deployed certain weapon
systems there. What are we doing to respond to Russia's
militarization of the Arctic?
Dr. Carpenter. Well, you are absolutely right, Ranking
Member Cardin, that Russia has invested significantly in
capabilities in the Arctic over the last several years,
including trying to create infrastructure in places like Novaya
Zemlya and other parts of the Russian Arctic. We seek to
preserve the Arctic as a space for cooperation on scientific
issues, as we have, in fact, with Russia in the past, working
on things like black carbon and the danger that it poses to the
Arctic environment, as well as other issues. However, we take
very seriously Russia's advancing capabilities in the Arctic,
including the possibility that, over time, Russia will be able
to create, in the Arctic elements of Anti-Access/Area Denial
(A2/AD) bubbles, if you will, that will preclude other nations
from being able to enjoy their freedom of navigation in parts
of the Arctic. And so, we are investing, and the President's FY
2017 budget invests in the types of capabilities that will
allow us to augment our force posture in the Arctic and also
develop the sorts of capabilities that will help us to ensure
freedom of navigation and freedom of flight for our troops in
that region.
Senator Cardin. And I take it we are working with our other
Arctic partners to try to minimize the potential, here, of
conflict, but it does seem like Russia is investing an awful
lot in territorial claims in the Arctic.
Dr. Carpenter. Well, Senator, we do have a good working
relationship with Russia in the Arctic Council, where we try to
preserve, as I said, those areas of cooperation that are
ongoing, including environmental cooperation. But, also,
importantly, our Coast Guard has search-and-rescue agreement
with its Russian counterpart that has worked very successfully
over the years. So, we seek to preserve these areas of
cooperation, but, at the same time, develop our own military
capabilities so that we are not caught off guard and so that we
are keeping track with the types of investments that Russia is
making.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
I am going to be respectful of the Chairman's 5-minute
clock, but I am going to be asking other questions for the
record, including questions on Russia's aggressiveness in
revising history and using its communications to try to change
the narrative of reality, and how we are trying to counter
that. Propaganda can have a pretty strong impact, and part of
our strategies must be to make sure people understand what are
the facts. And I would welcome your response for the record in
regards to those issues.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Perdue.
Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, with the debt crisis we have got and the
popularity of your hearings, I think we might start charging
tickets here. [Laughter.]
Senator Perdue. In all seriousness, though, I really thank
you for this, and I hope we will have many more haerings like
this about Russia and China. I think the rise of these
traditional rivals are really concerning to people back home.
I would like to talk, Dr. Carpenter, first about Russia,
and I have got a second followup on the hybrid warfare. But, I
want to talk about Georgia for a minute, because I think--I
want to know what lessons we think we have learned after 8
years. The Russians have had a history of creating these frozen
conflicts, where, without a peace treaty, everything seems to
be going in the normal, and yet I know next year, in one of
their regions, I think it is Shevali actually, they are rumored
to be having a referendum about joining Russia again. So, I
mean, this is a pressure that Russia keeps putting on there,
and I am very concerned. James Clapper, the Director of
National Intelligence, testified that the nation of Georgia,
despite all its progress on Western integration, domestic
reforms, is at increasing risk from Russian aggression and
pressure. I visited Serbia last year and met the Georgian
Defense Minister, Tina Khidasheli, and heard her concerns about
the ongoing pressure and so forth in Georgia. What lessons have
we learned, in terms of standing up--I know that the Georgia
National--I mean U.S.--has--National Guard--has just had a
forward deployment there. I would like to get some feedback on
that. And also, what are we doing now, from a DOD standpoint,
to put pressure on Russia, relative to Georgia? And what have
we learned there, relative to Crimea and the Ukraine?
Dr. Carpenter. Well, thank you, Senator. And I completely
agree with your assessment that Russia is continuing to place
pressure on Georgia through a variety of different means.
Russia currently occupies about 20 percent of Georgian
territory in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but----
Senator Perdue. But, a third of the population, right?
Dr. Carpenter [continuing]. It is a significant portion of
the population, and those administrative boundary lines that
Russia maintains continue to shift, especially in the South
Ossetia region, claiming ever more pieces, increments of
Georgian territory. Russia is also putting pressure on Georgia
in a variety of other ways, and including the proclaimed desire
by the de facto leader of South Ossetia to have a referendum on
integration with Russia.
Our goal, since the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008,
has been to build Georgia's resilience and reduce its
vulnerabilities to Russian coercion. So, we have spent about
$480 million on security assistance in Georgia since the
crisis. Just recently, 2 weeks ago, I was in Tbilisi to
participate in the Noble Partner exercise that we conducted
with Georgia, where we had about 650 U.S. troops alongside
about 500 Georgian troops and about 150 U.K. troops, where we
had airborne jumps into Georgia, and we had Abrams tanks as
well as Bradley infantry fighting vehicles on the ground,
helping them to develop their self-defense capabilities.
Over the course of the last 10 years, Georgia has
contributed mightily to our NATO efforts overseas, including
especially in Afghanistan, where, up until recently, they have
been the second-largest troop contributor, after the United
States, with 850 troops. And, in fact, they have suffered about
31 casualties, if I am not mistaken, about 282 wounded. So,
they have had major sacrifices there. And a lot of our training
program over the course of the last decade has been focused on
preparing Georgian troops for these overseas deployments,
including Iraq and then, later, Afghanistan. Now we are
starting to position ourselves to devote more attention to
training up Georgia's troops for their self-defense
capabilities.
Senator Perdue. Do we have permanent troops on the ground
in Georgia?
Dr. Carpenter. We do not plan to have permanent troops on
the ground, but we do plan to increase the tempo of our
exercises and training with Georgia.
Senator Perdue. What lessons have we learned, relative to
Georgia, as it relates to Crimea and the Ukraine?
Ms. Nuland. Well, Senator, I think the first one is the one
that Dr. Carpenter highlighted, which is that we, in our
security partnership with Georgia, spent a lot of the last
decade helping Georgian forces prepare for expeditionary
deployments to Afghanistan, et cetera, and probably not enough
focus on strengthening Georgia's own homeland security, which
is what we are now trying to correct, and not just in U.S./
Georgia relations, but also in NATO/Georgia relations.
The other lesson is the abiding one, which has significant
applicability for Ukraine, which is that the best antidote to
Russian pressure is a successful increasingly European
democratic Georgia or Ukraine, and to take maximum advantage of
the association agreements that both of these countries have
with Europe. So, that is why all of the programs that we manage
from the State Department are designed to squeeze out
corruption, improve justice system, et cetera.
Senator Perdue. Well, with due respect--and I have all the
respect in the world for you, Assistant Secretary. I have
watched you--and I am sorry, I am over time--but, I hate to--I
walk away--I have been over there quite a bit, and I walk away
with a feeling that, when we deal with Russia and Ukraine, we
deal with Russia and Georgia--and I do not mean to belittle
this, but it sounds like it is their fault. It is Ukraine, it
is Crimea, it is Georgia's fault. Because they are not quite as
Western as we want them to be, therefore we have not been able
to do everything we need to do to help them. I know the--I know
we have got corruption issues in Ukraine. I know we have got
westernization issues in Georgia. But, we have got an invasion
that occurred, and sovereign territory being possessed, in
violation of the 1972 agreement with Russia. And yet, we are
talking about all this other stuff at the same level of the
invasion issue. So, I am sorry to take issue with that, but I
really think that they are two different----
Ms. Nuland. No question. We cannot blame the victim. I
agree completely, Senator. We have to strengthen these
countries so that they can resist economically, politically, in
security terms.
Senator Perdue. Sorry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Assistant Secretary Nuland, I had an opportunity to meet
with Vitaly Churkin, the Russian Ambassador to the United
Nations, earlier this year. And you referenced the difficult
balance we try to strike between cooperating with the Russians
on a number of important areas, some of our bilateral treaties
containing Iran's aggressive nuclear weapons program and other
areas where clearly we have strongly discordant interests and
where we are working to strengthen our allies, whether in the
Baltics or Ukraine or NATO, in the face of Russian aggression.
I came away from a meeting with Ambassador Churkin convinced
that they will do everything they can to protect Iran and their
ballistic missile launches from action by the Security Council.
Am I wrong? What leverage do we have to sustain Russian
engagement in a concerted effort to put pressure on Iran to
stop some of its activities outside the JCPOA that really are
destructive to Iran's intentions or expressed desire to rejoin
the community of nations?
Ms. Nuland. Senator, I think you are not wrong in your
assessment that Russia has only joined us in joint work against
a nuclear threat from Iran. Having worked with Russia over many
decades to try to encourage them to understand that that
nuclear threat was a threat to Russia, too, I would say that
that is the number-one trajectory we have to work with regard
to the missile threat now, that Russia should not be so secure
in its confidence that it could not be on the other end of said
missiles, and therefore, it has an interest in limiting or
stopping Iran's missile program. That is where we have to work,
and we are continuing to try.
Senator Coons. I would be interested, Dr. Carpenter, as
well, in hearing whether, in your view, the European
Reassurance Initiative is genuinely working and whether our
allies in the Baltics are confident in our commitment to their
security, and what else you think we, here in the Congress, can
and should be doing to provide support across a whole range of
areas of engagement. As the Senator mentioned, there are these
frozen conflicts in Georgia and Moldova, and now, for at least
the time being, in the Ukraine. It is my hope--and you have
both worked very hard on this--that our EU allies will be
advancing and continuing sanctions and continuing to engage
with us. What more can and should we do to strengthen our
Baltic allies?
Dr. Carpenter. Well, thank you for that question, Senator.
I think the ERI is working well. And I think when we begin to
implement the 2017 requested portions of ERI, we will be
dramatically increasing our force posture on the eastern flank
of the alliance, which will have a significant deterrent impact
on Russia. It will also, at the same time, assure our allies
that we have force posture, that we have genuine high-quality,
high-end warfighting equipment in place as necessary in the
event of a crisis.
I think the other piece to this that we cannot neglect is
working with our NATO allies to ensure that those allies also
have skin in the game. And so, as we talk about augmenting
NATO's presence in these countries, a lot of what we are doing
under ERI is bilaterally with each of these allies in the east.
But, as we talk about NATO's footprint, I think we will be in a
better place to have other allies with skin in the game, as I
said, and with additional assets that they can bring to bear,
which they uniquely possess because of their proximity to some
of these countries, that will greatly aid in deterring Russia
in case it thinks about potential aggressive action in any one
of these countries.
Senator Coons. And, Assistant Secretary Nuland, my last
question. As we look forward to the NATO Summit, have we done
everything we need to, to brace up and shore up and fully
engage our NATO allies to provide that deterrent impact so that
we then have a chance at meaningful diplomacy? And how do you
assess Putin's willingness to engage in rational diplomacy
around the Ukraine conflict?
Ms. Nuland. Two big questions. Just to add to what Dr.
Carpenter has said, on the Baltic states, two pieces, here. As
I said in the opening, we, over the past 2 years, have had sort
of an ad hoc approach to put a patchwork together of land, sea,
and air presence in the Baltic. What you will see at the Warsaw
Summit is a sustained approach so that these allies can be
confident that they will have regular, persistent support, and
to make that much more routine and normal, to create joint
headquarters in all of these countries, and to ensure we can
get there.
The other piece on the Baltics that I think deserves
highlighting is that we have worked on the spectrum of their
resilience, so not just hard military, but also border
security, integrated communications across domestic agencies,
et cetera. We have had our Homeland Security folks out there,
and we have really made pretty good progress. But, we need
other allies to be as vigorous and rigorous in their support,
and we are working on that as we head towards Warsaw.
With regard to Russia's readiness, willingness to negotiate
with regard to Ukraine, there is an agreement on the table, as
you know, the Minsk Agreements, which call, first, for a full
cease-fire, access for the OSCE across eastern Ukraine, then a
political package of decentralization for the people of Donbas,
and then the withdrawal of weapons. So, the French and Germans
have taken the lead in trying to see that implemented. We have,
in the last month and a half, greatly increased the role the
U.S. is playing in parallel, working with both Kiev and Moscow.
I think our concern is, whereas we are making some progress now
on the political package for the Donbas, we have not made the
kind of progress that we need to see on the security piece, and
we are going to have to do a lot more to push Russia and the
separatists to end the violence to allow the OSCE fully in.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
And, Mr. Kara-Murza, thank you for your willingness to
testify here today, as well.
The Chairman. Senator Barrasso.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Nuland, good to see you again.
I wanted to talk about the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces Treaty. Russia has been violating the INF Treaty for
quite some time. It was finally made official in public in
2014. In response to questioning on the matter, the
administration said they are exploring their, quote, ``economic
countermeasures in response to the violation.'' You know, in
the President's speech back in April of 2009 in Prague, he
committed to ridding the world of nuclear weapons. He said
that, in order for a nonproliferation regime to work, he said
violations must be punished, and then he said, ``Words must
mean something.'' President Obama, ``Words must mean
something.'' This administration has now said, for years, that
they are considering economic sanctions against Russia for its
violation of the INF Treaty. Is Russia still in violation of
that treaty? And when is the administration finally going to
get around to punishing this violation of the treaty?
Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Senator Barrasso--Dr. Barrasso, as I
like to call you.
As you have said, we have found Russia in violation over
the last 2 years. We are engaged in discussions, negotiations
with Russia to try to bring them back into compliance. We are
also working with allies to bring pressure to bear on Russia
with regard to the violations. We are also working
intensively--and this is part of our package for the Warsaw
Summit--to ensure that NATO's own deterrent, including its
nuclear deterrent, is updated and strong. We are--and this is
about all I can say at this point, in an open hearing--we are
reviewing and working on a full range of options--a full range
of options--to make sure that Russia cannot gain any
significant military advantage from any system that they might
develop outside of the treaty. And we are also investing in
U.S. technologies that are designed to deter and defeat any
Russian provocations. But, I think going further than that, we
would have to be in another setting.
Senator Barrasso. Yeah, but just in terms--in that line of
thought with what we could do, you know, the Open Skies Treaty,
according to the State Department reports on arms-control
compliance. Russia is failing to meet its obligations on the
Open Skies Treaty. It is restricting access to some of its
territories. It has shown a repeated pattern of violating its
arms-control obligations, including, as we have just talked
about, the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces. So, it is now
asking the Open Skies Consultative Commission for permission to
use more powerful collection capabilities on flights over the
United States. You know, it--to me, it says that U.S. should
not be approving such a request for these upcoming--these--
those requested sensors. At least make it contingent upon
Russia first coming into full compliance with the Open Skies
Treaty and the INF Treaty. And I would just be interested in
your thoughts on that.
Ms. Nuland. Well, you are not wrong that Russia has been
restricting some overflights. There is a list of places--
Kaliningrad, low altitude over Moscow, et cetera--where they
have been restricting Open Skies flights. They had been
restricting Open Skies flights over Chechnya in the last couple
of weeks. They have reopened that territory, in part due to the
pressure we have been able to bring to bear from other Open
Skies Treaty partners, particularly the Europeans, who highly
value this. I think you know that the first round of Russian
requests for higher-definition cameras were within the
constraints of the treaty. And so, from that perspective, were
we to unilaterally restrict those flights, we could just expect
they would do the same to us, and that would make us less
capable, ourselves.
With regard to their more recent requests for really potent
visuals, we are still reviewing that internally. I do not know
if Dr. Carpenter has anything to add on that. We can certainly
brief you in a closed setting on that, as well.
Senator Barrasso. Okay.
Doctor?
Dr. Carpenter. Well, I would just add that--to answer your
question, Senator, that, yes, Russia is in violation of its INF
Treaty requirements not to produce, deploy, or flight-test a
ground-launched cruise missile with a range between 500 and
5,500 kilometers. We are looking at this more broadly in the
context of Russia's aggressive behavior. And so, we are taking
a number of steps in that broader context, to include expanding
and modifying air-defense systems, together with our allies. We
are also looking at investments, together with our allies and
partners, in advanced capabilities that will allow us to defend
against complex cruise-missile threats.
On the Open Skies issue, I would just associate myself with
everything that Assistant Secretary Nuland has said. The treaty
process already provides a way forward for certification of the
electro-optical camera that is now being used as wet film goes
out of business, essentially. And so, our ability to use this
same sensor down the road is impacted by the decisions that we
take today.
Senator Barrasso. Yes, that is the followup, in terms of
security risks, and, Secretary Nuland, you said you wanted to
take additional security risks for our country on this, are
there additional security risks and vulnerabilities if, in
fact, these new types of sensors are allowed on Open Skies
aircrafts, for us?
Ms. Nuland. Senator, I am comfortable with the decisions
that we have already made. We are reviewing exactly this set of
issues as we look at the next set of requests from Russia.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, for some context to my question, let me
summarize the current events, as I see it.
As Russia's September 18th primary--parliamentary election
draws closer, the Kremlin is preparing the groundwork for
another victory of Putin's United Russia Party. The current
Duma, itself a product of a fraudulent 2011 election, has
rubber-stamped a slate of new laws targeting the electoral
process from impeding, campaigning, and observation to
authorizing police forces to open fire on protesters. The
state-sponsored ballot-stuffing that sparked those Moscow
protests in 2011 has now evolved. The Kremlin and the Duma are,
instead, barring opposition from registering now. Pro-
government vigilantes have set up attacks on opposition. Putin,
himself, is repeatedly implicated in political assassinations
and assassination attempts, as with Boris Nemtsov, shot outside
the Kremlin--dead outside of the Kremlin, or Mr. Kara-Murza,
who is a witness here, who was poisoned near to death. The
flames of nationalism are burning as bright as Putin's imperial
adventure, seem to be part of a campaign to make Russia great
again.
Whether in Ukraine, where, with the exception of
congressional sanctions that I and others have offered and
passed through this committee and the Congress passed in 2014,
the administration has done relatively little to hold Russia
accountable in meaningful material ways, or in Syria, where we
have been maneuvered into having to coordinate with Russian
forces who neither share common interests nor pursue common
goals while hundreds of thousands have died and millions have
been displaced, or at the U.N., where they resist sanctions on
Iran for missile violations, in violation of U.N. Security
Council resolutions, which they supporting, or their violation
of the INF Treaty for which 2 years we have had discussions,
but no consequences.
I worry that the message that Putin must be taking from our
responses is that his limit-testing aggression and opportunism
is the right approach, particularly when there are relatively
negligible consequences, at the end of the day, for all of the
things that I have listed, among others. And this is certainly
a dry run for the presidential 2018 presidential elections in
Russia, where we would certainly expect Putin to continue to
take advantage of the opportunities that he sees, whether that
is the arbitrary violation of international borders, treaties,
human rights compacts, or whatever he decides that suits his
personal interests at the time.
I am trying to get a grasp of--we pushed the Ukrainians
really hard to meet their four pillars, which you testify here
very hard, but, on the security side of the Minsk Agreement, we
are failing dramatically, but we keep pushing the Ukrainians.
We do not even talk about Crimea anymore. That is, I guess,
gone. We have this violation of the INF Treaty, yet there are
no consequences 2 years later, despite whatever engagement and
conversations are to bring them back. Why are we not more
aggressively engaging in tools of diplomacy that can help us,
hopefully, have Russia understand that there are consequences?
Why are we not using the OSCE, which has--clearly, they are a
signatory to, and have clear violations. Why are we not looking
at more visa denials? Why are we not looking at more frozen
accounts? Why are we not looking at more Magnitsky listings? I
do not get it. Because if everything--if what you are doing--
and I heard your testimony, and I read it before I came, and I
wanted to listen to it again--is still leaving you in the place
that we are at, why is it that we do not seem to step up
towards the challenge that we have?
Ms. Nuland. Senator, I would not take issue with anything
that you have said here with regard to the constraining of
space inside of Russia and ramp-up to the elections and Russian
external behavior. I would take issue with whether Russia is
paying a price for this. We talked about the economic sanctions
that this committee has supported over the last 2 years. I
think Russia has paid a steep price, not simply through
sanctions, but also through its over-dependence on oil. We now
have Russians--you know, 13.4 percent of Russians living below
the poverty line. We have a GDP contraction of 3.7 percent in
Russia in 2015 alone.
Senator Menendez. But, let me--I have 18 seconds. Why not--
answer my core question--why not more visa denials, why not
more Magnitsky listings, why not more refusal to U.S. banks, as
you--we will hear a witness who says, ``Do not let his ill-
gotten gains of his cronies end up in the United States''--why
are we not pursuing all of those OSCE--why are we not doing
that?
Ms. Nuland. Well, we are working on all of those things. As
you know, every year we add names to the Magnitsky list. The
Magnitsky legislation is relatively constraining. It has to go
to that particular case. But, we have denied a number of visas
in the context of Ukraine sanctions, in the context of Syria
sanctions, and we are continuing to look at what more we can
and should do.
The Chairman. Senator Gardner.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, both of you, for being here today.
And I want to follow up on what Senator Menendez just
talked about, and that is consequences of bad behavior. This
past week, a number of us had the opportunity to visit
southeast Asia, where we visited with ministers from Singapore,
government leaders in Myanmar, to new leadership in Taiwan,
participated in the Shangri-La dialogue, where we visited with
leaders from around the world who participated in that defense
dialogue, including our own Secretary of Defense, Ashton
Carter. But, when meeting with foreign governments, when
meeting with leaders, they talk about U.S. leadership, and they
talk about the positions that we are trying to secure,
positions that we are fighting for, like the South China Seas.
And when we are asking them to take a tough line, perhaps on
something like the South China Sea, they see our lack of
consequences in other circumstances and question whether or not
they should take a hardline position against a powerful nation
or a situation such as their neighbor, China. And so, we cannot
look at things in isolation as how we are responding to Russia,
how--because it affects what is happening and what is on
people's minds in Asia--in southeast Asia, excuse me--in
Singapore. It is--people around the globe are looking at our
lack of response and lack of consequence to--and deciding
whether or not the U.S. is somebody that they should hitch
their wagon to, so to speak, or not. And I think that is the
great challenge.
And so, whether it is Crimea, Ukraine, INF, Syria, Georgia,
they do not see the consequences. And when we ask them to take
a tough position, they do not see the reason why they should,
because they know the United States is not going to follow
through. And that is hurting our leadership around the globe.
And it is hurting our ability to rally our allies to our side
and to create the kind of rules-based order that we need to in
order to counter the behavior of China, the behavior of Russia.
And so, I guess, a couple of questions. In your testimony,
you state that, quote, ``We have worked with Russia to remove
Syria's declared chemical weapons, to prevent Iran from
acquiring nuclear weapons, to contain the nuclear threat
emanating from the DPRK, North Korea, and to negotiate and
implement the New START Treaty.'' Obviously, I think you would
agree that the nuclear threat in North Korea has not been
contained. Is that correct?
Ms. Nuland. It has not.
Senator Gardner. And so, what is it that we are actually
getting Russia to accomplish? Are they following through with
the implementation of United Nations Resolution 2270, the
sanctions bill against North Korea?
Ms. Nuland. As you know, in the context of these--this
latest round of sanctions, we had difficult conversations with
Russia, but we were able to get Russia to join a deeper regime
against North Korea than we have had in the past. We will--you
know, and they had particular interests that they wanted
managed there. But we did better than some expected because of
the pressure from the Asian allies.
Senator Gardner. Are they completely implementing 2270?
Ms. Nuland. I, frankly, do not have the details. My
understanding is that, in the broad strokes, they are. Whether
they are, in detail, I would have to do more work.
Senator Gardner. And what is their position on THAAD in
South Korea?
Dr. Carpenter, if that is more appropriate, to you.
Dr. Carpenter. Russia has traditionally opposed the
advanced air-defense capabilities that we provide to allies,
both in Europe as well as in East Asia.
Senator Gardner. And what is their position--let us just
say, you know, if they are teaming up with China on THAAD and
our efforts to contain the nuclear threat from North Korea,
what are they doing in other areas? Are they teaming up with
China on the freedom of navigation operations, as well, and
opposing our efforts to provide rules-based governance
according to international law?
Dr. Carpenter. Senator, I do not see them teaming up with
China on freedom of navigation, although clearly the Chinese
and other great powers are watching to see what Russia is able
to get away with----
Senator Gardner. But Russia has not supported our
operations in the South China Sea, have they?
Dr. Carpenter. Has Russia supported our----
Senator Gardner. Correct.
Dr. Carpenter. No.
Senator Gardner. Okay. So, they are taking the same
position as China, then, on freedom of navigation operations.
Dr. Carpenter. Senator, I would characterize it as they
have not taken a vocal position, one way or the other. They
have largely remained in the background on this.
Senator Gardner. Dr. Carpenter, while I am with you, I
guess I would just follow up, and we can have that
conversation, as well, in terms of what we are doing to push
Russia to implement 2270 and to agree to a true commitment to a
nuclear-free peninsula.
I want to talk about a report that came out several months
ago. And I am sure you are familiar with it. This is the RAND
report. Looking at an article here that says, ``Russian
invasion could overrun NATO in 60 hours.'' This article was
published in February of 2016. That is about the time of the
report. I am sure you are familiar with this report. Has this
assessment changed, in your mind, since this report was first
published?
Dr. Carpenter. Senator, I would say that Russia clearly
possesses a time-distance advantage, if it were to decide to be
an aggressor in the Baltic states, and that that poses certain
limitations that we would have to overcome, in terms of our
ability to defend our NATO allies. We are making the
investments through ERI and otherwise precisely to have forces
pre-positioned, along with warfighting equipment so that we are
better able to deter Russian aggression in the first place.
Senator Gardner. But, I mean, has this assessment, in your
mind, changed substantially or substantively since this report
came out in February?
Dr. Carpenter. Senator, we have done a number of our own
internal exercises and reviewed our plans, and we have looked
very carefully at the geography of the Baltic Basin and
precisely that advantage that Russia possesses, and we are
taking steps to try to mitigate.
Senator Gardner. What you are saying is, basically, nothing
has changed since this report, substantively. And are you
saying that your reports agree with the assessment of the RAND
report?
Dr. Carpenter. Senator, I would say that, by the end of
2017, when we implement all of the ERI funding that is coming
online, that we will be much better poised to address the
challenges, and much better poised to deter Russian aggression
in that region than we are now. I do not know that we have made
significant----
Senator Gardner. So, the end of 2017 until we are better
poised to deter the Russian threat.
Dr. Carpenter [continuing]. Well, Senator, we are pre-
positioning equipment on a sort of ongoing basis. I do not know
that we are significantly more advanced now than when the RAND
report came out, but I am confident, by the end of 2017, when
we have an additional Armored Brigade Combat Team worth of
force posture on the eastern flank of the alliance, that we
will be.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for being here and for your ongoing
efforts.
Part of Russia's campaign in eastern Europe, in the Baltics
and Ukraine, has been to produce disinformation. They are
spending a lot of money on RT television, in lots of other
ways, to get their message out into parts of eastern Europe.
Can you talk a little bit more about what we are doing to
respond to that propaganda? I do not know which one of you
wants to address that.
Ms. Nuland. Thanks, Senator.
Well, as you know, this has been a line of effort that
been--we have been working on very hard with members of the
Congress and the Senate since 2014. The total appropriation
now--State Department, USAID, BBG, Broadcast Board of
Governors--on the U.S. side is about $100 million to counter
Russian propaganda. That money, as you know, goes for a number
of things, from clean, honest, Russian-language programming
that BBG is now putting out every day, the expansion of Radio
Free Europe, Radio Liberty, VOA, to about $88 million that we
use in State Department and AID money to support civil society,
independent media, journalist training, including outside
Russia for those Russian journalists who have fled. We are also
doing quite a bit to bolster programming inside Russia, to the
extent that we can. But, this pales in comparison to the 400
million, at least, that Russia is spending, and, frankly, to
the levels that we spent during the Cold War on these kinds of
things, which were over a billion dollars a year in the days of
old USIA.
Senator Shaheen. And can you talk a little bit about the
substance of what we are doing and who we are engaging in
working with us on the content? Is it journalists who--or
reporters who have fled Russia, who are helping us look at what
kind of messages we are using? Are there others who are engaged
in that effort with us?
Ms. Nuland. I will be 30,000 feet, if you will allow me, to
protect those who participate in these programs, many of whom
depend on that protection.
Senator Shaheen. Right.
Ms. Nuland. But, we conduct training programs at various
locations in Europe for journalists who have either fled or who
have come out to get training and are planning to go back in.
We support a number of Russian-language news organizations in
the Baltic states and in other periphery countries that are
designed either to address Russian-speaking populations in
those home countries and counter Russian propaganda or to beam
back in. We obviously support Russian-language programming in
Ukraine, which has some impact also in Russia, as well. And
then this good portion that goes to BBG and VOA programming,
which is U.S. Government free news content. We also do quite a
bit to pull together efforts of the EU, U.K., Baltic states,
central Europeans, through consultation, through sharing of
programming, et cetera.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
You raised Ukraine, and obviously there have been a number
of questions around what is happening in Ukraine and Russia's
failure to comply with Minsk II. And there was a period where
there were some countries in Europe that did not seem to
appreciate the extent to which this was a failure on Russia's
part, and viewed it more as a failure of Ukraine. I wonder if
you can talk about where we are with respect to how the EU is
viewing Minsk II at this point and what more we can do to put
pressure on Russia to comply.
Ms. Nuland. As I said in my opening, Senator, I think we
are cautiously optimistic that the EU countries will again roll
over sanctions at the end of June because they see what we see,
namely that Minsk is far from being implemented on--in any of
its components. We have intensified our own diplomacy after the
President's meeting in Hanover with President Hollande and
Chancellor Merkel to support what those countries are doing to
try to get Minsk fully complied with. They are pushing on two
fronts, both to negotiate a fair political decentralization
deal for Donbas, which does not cross over the line of creating
a cat's paw or a permanent enclave of Russia in Ukraine. At the
same time, we are trying to get the commitments that Russia and
Donbas made to the OSCE for full access, pullback of weapons
implemented. As I said at one point, it is this security
package that is not being implemented well. We have had a sharp
spike in attacks over the last 6 weeks, in particular, and we
have had a conscious blinding of the OSCE, disabling of
cameras, shootdown by separatists of two OSCE UAVs. So, in both
our own advocacy at every level, the President, the
Secretaries, my work with the--President Putin's advisor on
this work, we are calling this out. So, we are working on it
very hard. I think the point is for Ukraine to fulfill its
obligations, and then we test whether Russia was ever serious
about these agreements.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
My time is up.
The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Nuland, let me read you a quote, here, from the
same individual. It is the general--General Philip Breedlove.
He said, ``Russia has chosen to be an adversary and poses a
long-term existential threat to the United States and to our
European allies and partners.'' Goes on to say, ``Russia does
not just want to change''--or ``challenge the agreed rules of
the international order, it wants to rewrite them.'' Is that
your assessment of the state of Russia today under Vladimir
Putin, as far as their role in the international scene?
Ms. Nuland. Senator, I do not have a problem with that
characterization at all.
Senator Rubio. So, then let me ask about Ukraine. It--Roman
Sohn, who is a Ukraine activist. He wrote about Minsk II. He
said--he called it a farce, and here is his quote, ``While
Russia does nothing to implement the agreement, the U.S. and
the EU are forcing Minsk II down the throat of Kiev and that
Putin knows that it is much easier for the West to put pressure
on Ukraine to accept bad terms than it is to forge a consensus
on keeping the pressure, including sanctions, on Russia,'' end
quote.
I seem to share those views, given the fact that it appears
that Russia is perfectly comfortable with what they view as a
frozen conflict in the region. Obviously, some of what they are
doing in Syria is distracting attention. We do not talk about
Ukraine around here nearly as much as we once did. Everyone is
focused on the role they are playing in Syria. And I think part
of the calculation Putin had was exactly that. But, it is, in
fact, a frozen situation.
And I walked in late, when Senator Menendez was asking
about this. But, why is he wrong when he characterizes it as a
farce? Why is he wrong when he characterizes it as a situation
where no one is pressuring Russia to comply, but they know that
the West and our European partners are pressuring Kiev,
especially the Germans, to comply?
Ms. Nuland. Senator, I think the largest piece of leverage
that we have on Russia is the sustainment over 2 years of deep
and comprehensive sanctions across the U.S. and the EU
countries, Japan, Canada, et cetera. So, again, this is why we
are advocating, because Minsk has not been implemented, that
sanctions have to be rolled over again. We are continuing to
press, as I said to--in response to Senator Shaheen's point,
that Ukraine cannot be asked to vote on the political
decentralization pieces of Minsk until the prior actions that
are demanded in Minsk--real cease-fire, real access throughout
Donbas for OSCE, cantonment of heavy weapons--has been
implemented. So, that is the frame that we are using. That is
the frame that Germany and France are using. I think Ukraine
does itself a service by being ready with text on an election
law, being ready with special status to implement when those
agreed conditions are met. But, Russia has not, either itself
or with its clients in Donbas, gotten the security conditions
met.
Senator Rubio. So, when you talk about rollover, you mean
the extension of the existing framework. Why not increase
sanctions? These are now violations of an agreement that they
reached, and they have not complied with. And I--I mean, am I
right in guessing--or in stating that your argument is going to
be that we can--we do not want to go any further than our
partners in Europe are willing to go, and they are not willing
to do additional sanctions?
Ms. Nuland. Well, Senator, I would say, I was quite
gratified when the G7 nations that met in Japan just a couple
of weeks ago made clear that we are ready to increase sanctions
if we need to. The United States, as you know, not only
maintains the sanctions, but does regular maintenance to them
to ensure that they cannot be circumvented. We have done that
on two occasions, and we are prepared to do it again.
Senator Rubio. It is--could an argument be met that this
pain threshold is something Putin has--willing to accept? It
clearly has not impacted his behavior. Or do you argue that the
sanctions have impacted his behavior?
Ms. Nuland. Well, all I can tell you is, we have deterred
further land grabs in Ukraine, and that was a real risk when we
first started with sanctions, that they would try to run all
the way to Kiev and to Kharkiv. I will tell you that Russians
are openly talking now about the pain of sanctions, including
when we work with them on the Minsk thing. So, they know what
it is going to take to get these sanctions rolled back, and it
is their choice whether they want to do what is necessary.
Senator Rubio. And what about Crimea? How come we no longer
hear Crimea mentioned? Is it a de facto, now, matter of fact?
Is it something we have just accepted as reality, or does that
continue to be a part of our conversations, that Crimea should
be returned, rightfully?
Ms. Nuland. Senator, I mentioned Crimea here in my opening.
Secretary mentions it every time he speaks publicly in Russia.
We will maintain the Crimea sanctions, which are significant,
both U.S. and EU, until Crimea is returned rightfully to
Ukraine.
Senator Rubio. When they took over Crimea, there was a
sense, and I thought that it would be a boondoggle for the
Russian Government, that it would cost them a bunch of money to
maintain that area. Has it, in fact, turned out--other than the
geostrategic advantage, do we have any sense as to how many
resources they are having to put in to uphold and maintain this
now as part of their national territory?
Ms. Nuland. It is our estimate that Russia is spending
billions of rubles trying to maintain its foothold in Crimea. I
think the most concerning factor, though, is that they are
further militarizing Crimea.
Dr. Carpenter might want to speak to that.
Dr. Carpenter. Well, I would just say that, absolutely,
that Russia is militarizing Crimea. They have put in very
sophisticated A2/AD capabilities there since the start of the
conflict.
The Chairman. Thank you, very good.
Senator Murphy.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, to both of you. Thank you for taking so much time
with us.
I know that there was some conversation with Senator Perdue
over the U.S./Georgia bilateral relationship, but I wanted to
explore that relationship in the context of the upcoming NATO
Summit. We are hopeful that we will continue on track to offer
membership to Montenegro. I think they are ready, and it is an
important signal that NATO still has an open-door policy for
those that are ready, and that, in general, transatlantic
institutions are still open for business, despite the
aggressive tactics of Moscow. But, the Georgians are likely
going to leave Warsaw disappointed, and the question remains
whether there is any future for Georgia inside NATO while there
is still a contest over these territories.
What we know is that Putin's ambition, I do not think--what
I believe is that Putin's ambition is not to militarily own
Ukraine. He wants to continue clouded title over a portion of
that country so that eventually there becomes such economic and
political tumult that a government is reinstalled in Kiev that
is much more friendly to Moscow's interests. And so, it is in
our interests to make it clear to the Russians that, to the
extent that they are successful in Ukraine or other places in
the future of creating clouded title over portions of
territory, that it does not prevent those countries from being
eligible to join transatlantic institutions.
So, I am happy that both of you are involved in this book
of business, so talk to me about what the future of Georgia's
potential NATO membership is. I am someone who supports at
least a Membership Action Plan for Georgia, but--and is
concerned that, without the settlement of these territorial
questions, Georgia will forever be disappointed, walking away
from NATO Summit after NATO Summit.
Ms. Nuland. Senator, I think we expect, at the Warsaw
Summit, that the alliance will reiterate the message that we
have had to Georgia since 2008 regarding our expectations of
membership. One of the things that we are seeking to do as an
alliance for Georgia is reorient NATO/Georgia relations, U.S./
Georgia relations away--in security terms--away from simply
preparing them to deploy with us in Afghanistan or in Kosovo,
and much more towards a focus on their homeland security needs,
their national defense resilience, et cetera. So, we are
working on that.
The best antidote to Russian pressure is a successful,
prosperous, democratic Georgia. That is why we work so hard
with them on justice reform, on rule of law, on strong
institutions, on market access. We are also encouraging Georgia
in its relationship with the European Union as it implements
the trade benefits of that, to reach out to the Abhaas, et
cetera, and make it possible for them, through Tbilisi, to have
the benefits of the trade relationship with Europe so that
someday those parts of Georgia may see stronger benefit from
Tbilisi than anything that is being offered by any external
neighbor.
But, you are absolutely right that it is essential for us
to continue to be strong supporters of Georgia's aspiration.
Senator Murphy. Let me actually ask a different question of
you, Dr. Carpenter, and you can answer this one, as well, if
you would like. We have been obsessive in this place about
military assistance for the Ukrainians. There have been many
members of the Senate who have been disappointed at the level
of military assistance we have provided. But, it is not a
coincidence that the Ukrainians have become much more effective
at rebutting Russian advances. And it is not a coincidence that
this has happened during a time in which, notwithstanding a
question over the future of Javelin missiles, we have been
transferring pretty important technology and important
expertise and training resources to the Ukrainians. There is a
success story to tell here about the integration of the
Department of Defense here and the Ukrainian military, which is
part of the story, as to why the--well, insufficient, the lines
have been able to largely hold over a longer period of time.
Can you just talk to us a little bit about the success of the
partnerships that we have had with the Ukrainian military?
Dr. Carpenter. Yes, absolutely. Thank you, Senator.
So, we have launched, with Ukraine, a substantial training
and equipping program. There is also an advisory component to
this that is focused on defense reforms, which was actually a
fairly substantial effort. But, the training and equipping
alone is hundreds of millions of dollars. For this year, it is
$335 million. Last year, we were focused on the National Guard,
which is within the Ministry of Interior. We trained six
companies. Now we are training Ukraine's Conventional Armed
Forces as well as its Special Operations Forces. All told, by
the time the--this training package is completed, we will have
trained close to 3,000 Ukrainian troops.
And the results on the battlefield have been significant. A
lot of the training process involves taking soldiers who have
fought in the Donbas, forming new units. We train them
primarily in Yavoriv, in western Ukraine. And we train them in
realistic conditions. We run them through basic skills, where
they learn marksmanship and how to emplace artillery, up
through more advanced techniques, and then send them as
coherent units out to the Donbas, where they are able to defend
their territory.
And one of the best examples, as you referenced, Senator,
of Ukraine being able to hold the line came a year ago in June,
when the separatists launched a massive assault on the town of
Marinka, and Ukrainians actually had the capability to detect
surveillance by the Russian-separatist combined teams, and push
back, resulting in significant casualties on the other side.
And so, I think our training and equipping program is very
successful. We would like to be able to continue it, thanks to
support from Congress for this effort through USAI. And we are
very proud of the work that our folks are doing from the 173rd
as well as from the California National Guard to run this
program.
With regards to your earlier question about Georgia, part
of what we are trying to do now in Georgia is to replicate some
of the success that we have had with Ukraine and to implement a
training program that is not just focused on expeditionary
operations that Georgians perform in Afghanistan, which are
primarily counterinsurgency-focused, to training and equipping
that is more focused on territorial defense, because that is
something that clearly Georgia needs, as does Ukraine, after
years of hollowed-out military and mismanagement.
Senator Murphy. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Absolutely.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I am going to ask you three questions, and I will submit
these questions for the record for the second panel, because I
cannot stay to hear their answers to them. But, first, in your
professional opinion, what would the likely effect on Russian
behavior be if the United States dramatically reduced or
withdrew its support from NATO?
Ms. Nuland. As a former Ambassador to NATO, I would say,
Senator, that that would be a strategic mistake for the United
States.
Senator Kaine. Dr. Carpenter?
Dr. Carpenter. Senator, I could think of no greater gift to
Russia, and no greater strategic vulnerability for the United
States and the Euro-Atlantic area, than that course of action.
Senator Kaine. Second question. On the eve of the Warsaw
Summit in early July, how concerned are our European NATO
allies about a potential change in the U.S. level of support
for NATO?
Ms. Nuland. You know, obviously, allies are watching the
debate here in the United States with a lot of interest, as
they always do. In our conversations, I think they find it very
difficult to imagine that the United States would break a 70-
year treaty commitment which has served us so well.
Senator Kaine. Dr. Carpenter?
Dr. Carpenter. Senator, I will say that, in my
conversations and travels with my counterparts, I have heard
significant concern, but I think a lot of our partners believe
that we will remain committed members of NATO, in fact, and
play a leadership role in the alliance.
Senator Kaine. Third. In your professional opinion, is NATO
obsolete?
Ms. Nuland. NATO is needed now more than ever.
Dr. Carpenter. Senator, I could not agree more.
Senator Kaine. I do not have any other questions.
Thanks, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. I have no idea under--in what context those
questions were asked, but--[Laughter.]
The Chairman. Just to follow up--and I do very much
appreciate you asking those questions--I know that we have had
Madeleine Albright here. We certainly have had people of
various persuasions before this committee. Obviously, the NATO
alliance is very important to us, and very important to Europe,
as we hope TTIP will be over time. As a result, we hope
economically tie our two sides of the ocean more closely
together.
On the other hand, what is it that we can do to actually
leverage our NATO allies? We are, let's face it, a global
entity. Seventy percent of NATO defense resources are spent by
the United States, 30 percent by other members. I realize that
we have other responsibilities around the world outside of
NATO, but what leverage points do we have over those who are,
for lack of a better word, being laggards? What can can we do
to pressure those who are not fulfilling their 2-percent level
of commitment? All of us, on both sides of the aisle, talk with
our counterparts at Munich and other places, but we continue to
be the primary provider of security services. We appreciate so
much what they have done to help us, especially in Afghanistan,
which was a very unusual circumstance. We appreciate their
commitment, but we still only have four countries that are
honoring the monetary portion of the treaty.
Ms. Nuland. Senator, I would say that culmination of the
Kremlin and ISIL have motivated allies in a way that we have
not seen for many years. As we head towards--as you remember,
at the Wales Summit, we got commitments from allies to reverse
defense spending slide. Seventy percent of allies are meeting
those commitments, and I think we will be able to say, at
Warsaw, that most allies are now increasing their defense
budgets, and that, within a few years, we will have--we will be
in double digits on the number of allies who are at 2 percent.
But, we all have to continue to advocate and push, and we have
to create structures in NATO, as we are trying to do as we head
towards Warsaw, where the burden-sharing is built in as the
U.S. is more evident in some countries, others are more evident
in other countries, as we did with Afghanistan.
So, we are going to continue to work on that, but we very
much value the advocacy that you all do when you are in Europe
in--on a bipartisan basis. It is very important for Europe to
know that burden-sharing is expected by all Americans.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Dr. Carpenter, do you wish to add to that?
Dr. Carpenter. I would just say, Chairman, that right now
we have got five allies, including the United States, that are
at 2 percent. I would add a couple of things. One, there is an
additional pledge of 20 percent of defense spending spent on
capital investments and equipment, which is very important to
sustain the capabilities of the alliance, going forward. So, it
is important to accentuate that, as well. I think we need to
talk to allies about this each and every day.
But, the other point I wanted to make is, having just come
from a trip to the Western Balkans, where I met with some of
our allies there, they also do provide troops to some of the
NATO missions that we run in Afghanistan and other places. And
so, it is important to remember that, in addition to their
defense spending, that a lot of our allies are also
contributing troops to the fight.
The Chairman. Thank you.
You all have been outstanding witnesses. People have gained
a lot from your knowledge and your willingness to be here.
The record will close on Thursday at the end of the day. If
you would please respond to questions in a timely manner.
Thank you for your service to our country and for being
here to help us.
And, with that, we will move to the second panel.
Thank you both very much. [Pause.]
The Chairman. We thank our second panel for being here. I
think you'll see that sometimes after our first panel, there is
an exodus. Yet, we often find that our second panel, in many
cases, is more interesting and more enlightening. I am not
saying that is necessarily the case today, but we thank you
both for being here.
Today, we have Mr. David Satter, a Senior Fellow from the
Hudson Institute. Thank you for coming to share your wisdom
with us. Additionally, we have Mr. Vladimir Kara-Murza, and we
thank you so much for being here as well. I know you were at an
earlier hearing we had this year, and all of us wanted to have
you back. We thank you for making the effort to be here.
So, with that, Mr. Satter, if you would begin, with about 5
minutes, we would appreciate it. We will move to Mr. Kara-
Murza.
STATEMENT OF DAVID SATTER, SENIOR FELLOW,
HUDSON INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. Satter. Thank you, Senator. I am very glad to be here
and very anxious to talk about U.S./Russian relations, not only
from the point of view of policies, treaties, and bilateral
arrangements, but also a very important question which informs
all of the latter, which is the spirit of Russia.
Oftentimes, we make policy on the assumption that the
spirit of Russia is actually very little different from the
spirit of the United States. This is one of the reasons why we
often are surprised by Russian behavior. If we take it for
granted that the leaders of a country are dedicated to the
national interest and the welfare of the population of the
country, we find it hard to understand a country in which the
leadership is totally indifferent to the welfare of the
population. If we take it for granted that the human individual
is an end in himself, we find it hard to deal with a country in
which individuals are raw material for the realization of the
political goals of the political leaders. And many of those
goals are very bizarre indeed.
For this reason, there is always a danger that we will
mistake Russian actions. One of the most important things to
bear in mind about Russia is that war is an instrument of
internal policy. The first Chechen war was launched in order
for there to be a short victorious war that would boost the
rating of, at that point, President Yeltsin, who was suffering
because of the aftereffects of privatization and the
impoverishment of the population. The war proved out--proved to
be neither short nor victorious.
The second Chechen war was undertaken in order to guarantee
the succession to Yeltsin. And this is one of the most
important episodes of Russian history, also one about which
Americans are very much in the dark. A terrorist act took
place. It was used to justify a new war in Chechnya. Yeltsin,
who was--Putin, rather, who was very little known, became the
Prime Minister, took charge of that war, and, on the strength
of the successful prosecution of that war, was elected
President.
Later, the bombs that were placed began to appear very
suspicious. A fifth bomb was found in the city of Ryazan,
outside of Moscow, and the persons who put it in the basement
of that building turned out to be not Chechen terrorists, but
actually agents of the FSB. The--war broke out again, as a
result of the events in Ukraine, where a self-organizing
anticriminal revolution demonstrated to the Russian people
potentially how it might be possible to resist the kleptocratic
authorities who were in charge in their own country. A massive,
in effect, diversionary effort was made to distract Russians
from the true lessons of Euromaidan. And when the resistance of
the Ukrainians proved greater than the Russians expected, a new
diversionary operation was launched in Syria to distract the
Russian population from what was going on in Ukraine.
Under these circumstances, one of the most important things
that the United States can do is it reinforce the deterrence to
using war in this manner, and also to make renewed efforts to
reach the Russian people about the true activities and
motivations of their authorities so that they are not just
unwitting instruments in the hands of their leaders, but are in
a position, finally, to make their leaders answer to them. This
is the intellectual challenge that faces American policy, and
over and above, and complementary to, the challenge of
strengthening the purely practical aspects of deterrence on
which, in fact, European stability and world stability depend.
[Mr. Satter's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of David Satter
The leaders of post-Soviet Russia, a supposedly democratic country,
have used wars to achieve internal political objectives. The first
Chechen war was ``a small victorious war'' that was calculated to raise
the popularity of President Yeltsin which suffered because of the
lawless process of privatization and resulting impoverishment of the
Russian people. The second Chechen war was intended to save those who
had pillaged the country and assure Putin's elevation to power. In
perhaps the greatest political provocation since the burning of the
Reichstag, four apartment buildings in Buinaksk, Moscow, and Volgodonsk
were blown up in 1999 and the attack was blamed on Chechen terrorists.
In fact, there is overwhelming evidence that the bombings were carried
out not by Chechens but by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).
This evidence includes but is not limited to the fact that FSB agents
were arrested after placing a bomb in a fifth building in the city of
Ryazan southeast of Moscow and Gennady Seleznev, the speaker of the
State Duma, announced the bombing in Volgodonsk September 16, 1999
three days before it occurred.
The bombings were used as a pretext for a new war in Chechnya and
success in fighting this war brought Putin to power. In other words,
there is overwhelming evidence that Putin rules as a result of an act
of terror against his own people.
The war in Ukraine was also undertaken to distract the Russian
people. In this case, it was intended to blind them to the real lesson
of Maidan revolt--the possibility of a people to spontaneously and
freely organize against a kleptocratic regime. The war in Syria, in
turn, was undertaken in order to distract attention from the lack of
success in Ukraine. The ambitious plans to carve out a ``New Russia''
from sovereign Ukrainian territory were at least temporarily frozen in
the face of Western sanctions and stiff Ukrainian military resistance.
Calls by presidential candidates for a ``grand bargain'' with
Russia which, in fact, only repeat the premise of the ``reset policy''
are therefore naive and misguided. The only bargain that the U.S. can
obtain are on terms that no President concerned to honor American
principles could accept--the right of Russia to suppress its people and
attack its neighbors. If such terms were accepted, the Russian leaders
would immediately escalate their demands.
The following are some of the areas in which Russian actions
represent a danger to the U.S., its neighbors or civilized principles:
ukraine
Russia is guilty of aggression against Ukraine, having deliberately
started a war on an invented pretext in order to destabilize the
Ukrainian Government and discredit the Ukrainian anti-criminal Maidan
revolution. The war in Ukraine is sometimes referred to as a ``hybrid
war.'' But this term is incorrect. What is taking place is a real war
with full Russian participation but under conditions in which Russia's
role is hidden. A better term for what is going on is ``concealed
war.'' Russia is seeking to achieve success with the help of pro-
Russian separatists in Ukraine who, along with Russian volunteers and
regular Russian forces are fighting the Ukrainian Army. But the
operation is a full scale invasion and was organized by Russia from the
start.
In light of the possible destabilizing consequences of Russia's
aggression for international security, the situation requires a greater
commitment on the part of the U.S. to the defense of Ukraine. The
Minsk-2 agreement in which a Russian cease fire was purchased with the
help of a commitment to allow Russia to change the nature of Ukrainian
statehood cannot be the base of a resolution of the conflict. According
to the latest UN figures, more than 9,000 persons have been killed in a
war that has no purpose except to reinforce the Putin regime's hold on
power. Arming Ukraine with defensive lethal weapons to be used on their
sovereign territory and the toughening of the sanctions regime can help
to raise the cost of aggression and restore the international order.
the baltics
Russia is no match for NATO or the U.S. in an all-out war but it
could provoke a localized conflict in the Baltics where it has
strategic superiority and then threaten to use nuclear weapons,
presenting NATO with a choice of escalation or backing down. This is
perhaps the greatest strategic threat to the U.S. at the present time
because a failure to defend one of the Baltic NATO members would
destroy the effectiveness of NATO as a whole.
The Russians are clearly ready to take risks. On April 14, a
Russian SU-27 fighter jet flew dangerously close to a U.S. RC-135
reconnaissance aircraft over the Baltic Sea. It came to within 50 feet
of the plane and conducted a barrel roll starting from the left side of
the aircraft, going over the aircraft and ending up to the right of the
aircraft. This incident came two days after a simulated Russian aerial
assault against the guided missile destroyer U.S.S. Donald Cook in the
Baltic Sea. One of the jets came to within 30 feet of the warship. This
was the most reckless flyover of a U.S. ship by a Russian jet since the
Cold War. Neither of these incidents could have occurred by accident.
The air incidents are a message that the Russians want the U.S. out
of the Baltic region. They have been accompanied by Russian prevention
of U.S. and allied flights over the heavily militarized Kaliningrad
region that are allowed under the Open Skies Treaty, the latest of a
number of violations of that treaty.
Russian intimidation, however, does not need to succeed. The
Russian leaders are not ideological. The effort that they have invested
in amassing personal fortunes attests to this. They will not risk their
hold on power on behalf of a conflict they know they will lose. The
proper response to Russian tactics is therefore a commensurate
strengthening of NATO's Baltic defenses.
indiscriminate violence
The Russian authorities act with a complete disregard for human
life. This is of concern to the U.S. not only on humanitarian grounds
but also because Russian violence can claim the lives of Americans and
can have consequences for Americans.
In Syria, the Russian bombing is indiscriminate. According to the
Violations Documentation Center, which seeks to document the attacks by
all sides, the civilian death toll from Russian strikes by mid-March
was over 2,000. In January alone, according to the Syria Network for
Human Rights, another monitoring organization, Russian air strikes
killed 679 civilians, including 94 children and 73 women. This exceeded
the number of civilians killed by the Syrian Army, which is also guilty
of indiscriminate bombing. For purposes of comparison, the total number
of civilians killed by ISIS in January was 98, the number killed by the
al-Qaeda affiliated al-Nusra front was 42.
Russian forces have intentionally bombed civilian areas to spread
fear and clear areas where government ground troops were preparing to
advance. This is consistent with Soviet military doctrine, employed by
both sides in the Ukrainian war and an important factor in the death
toll in that conflict. The bombing of civilian targets in Syria,
including bakeries and hospitals, also increases the flow of refugees
towards Turkey and Europe, exacerbating internal tensions in those
regions and creating pressure to accept a resolution of the Syrian
crisis on Russian terms.
Americans were among the victims when on July 17, 2014 Malaysia
Airlines flight MH17 was shot down over Eastern Ukraine killing all 298
persons on board. The Dutch Safety Board confirmed that MH17 was
destroyed by a missile fired from a Russian made BUK anti-aircraft
battery. The Putin regime, in complete disregard for the safety of
innocent international air travelers, had transferred missiles capable
of shooting down planes flying at over 30,000 feet to a quickly
assembled army fighting in an area traversed by one of the busiest
commercial air corridors in the world.
There was an American victim, Sandy Booker of Oklahoma, in the 2002
Moscow theater siege in which the Russian authorities flooded a theater
with lethal gas. In all cases, the Russian leaders need to be put on
notice that the indiscriminate killing of hostages in ``anti-
terrorist'' operations will not be tolerated and the deaths of any
Americans will lead to serious sanctions.
The Putin regime is not a normal government but a regime that is at
war furtively with its own people. The Putin regime claims an approval
rating of 85 to 87 per cent but they have found it necessary to create
a 400,000 member national guard for suppressing domestic disturbances
and have passed a new law making it legal for FSB agents to fire
without warning into a crowd.
In fact, the Russian leaders fear their own people and have no
compunction against using violence against them. As a result of the
sanctions and the fall in the price of oil, Russia last year lost 1.5
per cent of its gross national product. The existing sanctions have
made it difficult for Russian banks and enterprises, both state and
private to refinance their debts and have cut off Western technology to
the gas and oil industry. If this state of affairs continues, the
consequences for the economic development of the country will be
catastrophic.
In light of the dangers that the present Russian regime represents,
it is important for the U.S. to understand the importance of
psychological deterrence. Restraining the behavior of the Putin regime
requires creating the impression in both word and deed that violations
will meet with a serious response. One little explored way of doing
this is with truthful information. The Russian authorities have
benefited from the 17 year refusal of U.S. officials to raise the many
unanswered questions about the 1999 Russian apartment bombings that
brought Putin to power and also the delicacy with which the U.S. has
discussed the obvious signs of official involvement in the murders of
such opposition figures as journalist Anna Politkovskaya, Duma deputies
Yuri Shchekochikhin and Sergei Yushenkov and opposition leader Boris
Nemtsov, among others. The U.S. should weigh the example of the court
in the United Kingdom which found that Putin ``probably'' approved the
murder of Alexander Litvinenko, the former FSB officer poisoned with
radioactive polonium in London in 2006 and seek to emulate it.
The ``reset'' policy toward Russia, now largely discredited, could
have been avoided if U.S. officials had considered the significance of
the murders of Politkovskaya and Litvinenko only two years earlier.
The willingness to insist on the truth about the Russian regime's
crimes will not in and of itself deter Russian aggressivity including
the regime's repression of its own people. But insofar as deterrence is
also a matter of psychology, it will reinforce steps at the policy
level to convince the Russian leaders that it is simply not in their
interest to act in defiance of civilized rules.
The Russian leaders need to be convinced that the U.S. is fully
aware of their true character. This will encourage restraint and
discourage miscalculation. It will also act in Russia's long term
interest, encouraging changes that will make it possible for Russia one
day to take its deserved place in the world of Western nations.
The Chairman. Thank you very much for that.
Mr. Kara-Murza.
STATEMENT OF VLADIMIR KARA-MURZA, NATIONAL COORDINATOR, OPEN
RUSSIA MOVEMENT, RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Mr. Kara-Murza. Thank you very much, Chairman Corker,
Ranking Member Cardin, Senator Risch, Senator Shaheen. Thank
you for holding this important and timely hearing.
The Chairman. Senator Markey stepped in, as well. I know he
is hard to see.
Mr. Kara-Murza. Oh. Senator Markey, thank you so much for
being here. And thank you for the opportunity to testify and to
appear before you today.
Twenty-five years ago, at a conference held, of all places,
in Moscow, member states of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe established as a principle that issues
relating to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, and I
quote, ``are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all
participating states and do not belong exclusively to the
internal affairs of the state concerned,'' end of quote.
Through its membership of both the OSCE and the Council of
Europe, the Russian Federation has undertaken clear and binding
commitments with respect to election standards, the freedom of
expression, the freedom of assembly, and other important
aspects of human rights. And all these principles are also
enshrined in the Russian Constitution.
In its 16 years, nearly a full generation in power,
Vladimir Putin's regime has turned these commitments and these
principles into a dead letter. Today, elections in our country
serve as a mere ritual for ordaining the incumbents, with any
meaningful opposition, in most cases, simply disqualified from
the ballot, and with voting marred by intimidation and fraud.
After March 2000, so more than 16 years, not a single
national election in Russia has been assessed as free and fair
by OSCE and Council of Europe observers. And, according to
independent estimates, up to 14 million votes were stolen in
favor of the ruling party in the most recent parliamentary
election, in 2011, which was followed by the largest street
demonstrations under Vladimir Putin's rule, as more than
100,000 people went to the streets of Moscow to protest against
fraud.
And preparations for this September's parliamentary vote
are certainly not promising, with new restrictions imposed on
both campaigning and observation, and with the establishment of
a new National Guard that will be allowed to use force and
shoot without warning in the event of mass demonstrations after
the election.
For more than a decade now, the Russian parliament has been
devoid of genuine opposition, not a place for discussion in the
unforgettable words of its own Speaker. The same applies to
most media outlets.
After taking over or shutting down independent television
networks in the early years of Mr. Putin's rule, the Kremlin
now controls all the national airwaves, which it uses to rail
against the outside world, primarily the West, including the
United States and Ukraine, as well as Mr. Putin's political
opponents at home who are denounced as traitors, foreign
agents, and enemies of Russia.
The few surviving pockets of media independents are under
severe pressure as we saw again recently with the editorial
purges of the RBC Media Group following its coverage of the
Panama Papers.
The police, the prosecuting authorities, and the courts are
used by the Kremlin as tools for suppressing and punishing
dissent. According to Memorial, Russia's most respected human
rights organization, there are currently 87 political prisoners
in our country, a number which is already comparable with the
late Soviet era. These prisoners include leftist politicians,
Sergei Udaltsov; the brother of anticorruption campaigner
Alexei Navalny, Leg Navalny; opposition activist Ildar Dadin,
who was jailed under a new law that targets individual street
protests; and Alexei Pichugin, the remaining hostage of the
Yukos case. And they also include prisoners of the infamous
Bologna case who were jailed merely for the fact that they came
out on the streets to protest against Mr. Putin's inauguration
in May of 2012.
But, those who oppose Vladimir Putin's regime risk not only
their well-being and their freedom, they also risk their lives.
On the 27th of February of last year, Boris Nemtsov, former
Deputy Prime Minister and the leader of Russia's pro-democracy
opposition, was killed by five bullets in the back as he walked
home over the Bolshoi Moskvoretsky Bridge, just 200 yards from
the Kremlin wall. A year on, the investigation into his murder
is stalling. Although they have apprehended the alleged
perpetrators, investigators have been unable to pursue the
organizers and the masterminds. In fact, according to media
reports, attempts to track the higher-ups were personally
vetoed by General Alexander Bastrykin, the head of Russia's
investigative committee. And, despite the obvious links between
the murder suspects and Kremlin-appointed Chechen leader Ramzan
Kadyrov, he has not been even formally questioned in the case.
I can also speak to the dangers that face opposition
activists in Russia from personal experience. Exactly 1 year
ago in Moscow, I fell into a coma as a result of severe
poisoning that led to multiple organ failure that was certainly
intended to kill. In fact, doctors told my wife, who is here
today, that they estimated the chance of survival at around 5
percent. So, I am very fortunate and certainly very happy to be
here today and to be speaking and to be testifying before you.
Our friends in the West often ask how they can be helpful
to the cause of human rights and democracy in Russia. And the
answer to this is very simple. Please stay true to your values.
We are not asking for your support. It is our task to fight for
democracy and the rule of law in our country. The only thing we
ask from Western leaders is that they stop supporting Mr. Putin
by treating him as a respectable and worthy partner and by
allowing Mr. Putin's cronies to use Western countries as havens
for their looted wealth.
The United States has been a pioneer in putting a stop to
this. Nearly 4 years ago, this Congress passed the Sergei
Magnitsky Act, a groundbreaking law that, for the first time
ever, introduced personal accountability for human rights abuse
and corruption by prohibiting those who violate the rights of
Russian citizens and who pillage the resources of Russian
citizens from traveling to the U.S. and using the U.S.
financial system.
And I would like to use this opportunity to thank you,
Senator Cardin, for your leadership and your unyielding
commitment on this issue.
Testifying before this committee--in fact, in this very
room; I was here with him on that day--in June 2013, Boris
Nemtsov called the Magnitsky Act, and I quote, ``the most pro-
Russian law in the history of any foreign parliament,'' end of
quote. It is my sincere hope that this law is implemented to
its full extent without regard for rank or influence, and that
these crooks and these abusers get a clear message that they
will not be welcome here. And that will be the best possible
way to support the cause of human rights in Russia.
Thank you very much once again for the opportunity to
testify.
[Mr. Kara-Murza's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Vladimir V. Kara-Murza
Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, esteemed members of the
committee, thank you for holding this important and timely hearing, and
for the opportunity to testify before you.
Twenty-five years ago, at a conference held, of all places, in
Moscow, member states of the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe established as a principle that issues relating to human
rights, democracy, and the rule of law ``are matters of direct and
legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong
exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned.'' \1\
Through its membership of both the OSCE and the Council of Europe, the
Russian Federation has undertaken binding commitments with respect to
election standards, the freedom of expression, and other important
aspects of human rights. All of these principles are enshrined in the
Russian Constitution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1991 CSCE/OSCE Moscow Document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In its sixteen years--nearly a generation--in power, Vladimir
Putin's regime has turned these commitments into a dead letter.
Today, elections in our country serve as a mere ritual to ordain
the incumbents, with any meaningful opposition, in most cases,
disqualified from the ballot, and with voting marred by intimidation
and fraud. After March 2000, not a single nationwide election in Russia
has been assessed by OSCE and Council of Europe observers as free and
fair. According to independent estimates, up to fourteen million votes
were stolen in favor of the ruling party in the most recent
parliamentary election in 2011, which was followed by the largest
street demonstrations under Mr. Putin's rule, when more than 100,000
people went to the streets of Moscow to protest fraud.\2\ Preparations
for this September's parliamentary vote are not promising, with new
restrictions imposed on both campaigning and observation, and with the
establishment of a new National Guard that will be allowed to use force
and shoot without warning in the event of mass demonstrations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ ``Russia's Dubious Vote,'' The Wall Street Journal, December
28, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For more than a decade, the Russian parliament has been devoid of
genuine opposition--``not a place for discussion,'' in the
unforgettable words of its own speaker. The same applies to most media
outlets. After taking over or shutting down independent television
networks in the early years of Mr. Putin's rule, the Kremlin now
controls all nationwide airwaves, which it uses to rail against the
outside world--including the West and Ukraine--and against Mr. Putin's
political opponents at home, who are denounced as ``traitors'' and
``enemies of Russia.'' The few surviving pockets of media independence
are under severe pressure, as witnessed by the recent editorial purges
at the RBC media group following its coverage of the ``Panama Papers.''
The police, the prosecuting authorities, and the courts are used by
the Kremlin as tools for suppressing and punishing dissent. According
to Memorial, Russia's most respected human rights organization, there
are currently eighty-seven political prisoners in our country--a number
comparable with the late Soviet era.\3\ These prisoners include leftist
politician Sergei Udaltsov; the brother of anticorruption campaigner
Alexei Navalny, Oleg Navalny; opposition activist Ildar Dadin, jailed
under a new law that targets individual street protests; and Alexei
Pichugin, the remaining hostage of the ``Yukos case.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ List of people recognized as political prisoners by the
Memorial Human Rights Center (in Russian) http://memohrc.org/pzk-list
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
But those who oppose Mr. Putin's regime risk not only their
wellbeing and their freedom. They also risk their lives.
On February 27, 2015, Boris Nemtsov, former deputy prime minister
and leader of Russia's pro-democracy opposition, was killed by five
bullets in the back as he walked home over the Bolshoi Moskvoretsky
Bridge, two-hundred yards from the Kremlin wall. More than a year on,
the investigation into his murder is stalling. Although they have
apprehended the alleged perpetrators, investigators have been unable to
pursue organizers and masterminds. According to media reports, attempts
to track the higher-ups were vetoed by Gen. Alexander Bastrykin, the
head of Russia's Investigative Committee.\4\ And, despite the obvious
links between the murder suspects and Kremlin-appointed Chechen leader
Ramzan Kadyrov, he has not been even formally questioned in the case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ ``RBC Investigation: Where the Nemtsov Case Has Led'' (in
Russian), RBC, January 20, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I can speak to the dangers that face opposition activists in Russia
from personal experience. Exactly one year ago, in Moscow, I fell into
a coma as a result of severe poisoning that caused multiple organ
failure and that was certainly intended to kill. Doctors told my wife
that they estimated the chance of survival at around five percent. I am
very fortunate indeed to be speaking with you today.
Our friends in the West often ask how they can help the cause of
human rights in Russia. The answer is simple: please stay true to your
values. We are not asking for support--it is our task to fight for
democracy and the rule of law in our country. The only thing we ask
from Western leaders is that they stop supporting Mr. Putin by treating
him as a respectable partner and by allowing his cronies to use Western
countries as havens for their looted wealth. The U.S. has been a
pioneer in the efforts to put a stop to this. Nearly four years ago,
Congress passed the Magnitsky Act, a groundbreaking law that, for the
first time, introduced personal accountability for human rights abuse
and corruption by prohibiting those who violate the rights and pillage
the resources of Russian citizens from traveling to the U.S. and using
its financial system. Testifying before this committee in June 2013,
Boris Nemtsov called the Magnitsky Act ``the most pro-Russian law in
the history of any foreign parliament.'' \5\ It is my hope that this
law is implemented to its full extent, without regard for rank or
influence, and that the crooks and abusers get a clear message that
they will not be welcome here.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Testimony by Hon. Boris Nemtsov, U.S. Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, hearing held June 13, 2013.
The Chairman. Well, thank you both for your testimony. I
certainly appreciate the deep commitment you have and the
personal experiences you've shared.
We have a vote. I am going to turn over to Senator Cardin
for questions. I think what I will do is go vote so that we can
flip it and you can so the same.
I want to thank you, though. I appreciate your mention of
the Magnitsky Act. And I want to thank Senator Cardin for his
tremendous leadership, for years, on human rights issues, but
particularly in causing this to become law.
Thank you very much.
Senator Cardin [presiding]. Let me, first, thank the
Chairman for his incredible support in regards to this
committee focusing on human rights issues. And let me thank
you, Mr. Kara-Murza, for being here. I know that it was a long
trip from Russia to come and visit. And we thank that your wife
is here, and we are thankful that you are healthy. We know the
personal risks that you have taken.
Let me just update you, first, on the Sergei Magnitsky
global efforts that we are making so that the legislation that
we passed aimed towards Russian can be used to help all
countries protect the rights of their citizens. And you are
absolutely right, the Moscow document in 1990 made it very
clear that the commitments to basic human rights are not an
internal matter for a country, but are legitimate interests of
all the members of the OSCE. So, the Sergei Magnitsky enforces
that by saying that, if Russia does not take action against the
abusers, we are not going to give them the benefits of our
country. And it is--as I indicated in my opening statement, we
have applied that numerous times in the United States against
Russians who have violated human--basic human rights and have
not been held accountable by their government. And we believe
it can be further used.
Today, on the floor of the United States Senate, by a
unanimous consent, all 100 Senators once again, second time,
confirmed that the Magnitsky law should be global. So, we
anticipate, by the end of this Congress, that we will, in fact,
have a global Magnitsky law so that we can take the--our
experience from Russia and use it in other countries. As you
know, Russia's influence is also in other countries, so we--be
helpful.
I want to drill down a little bit on your comments about
personal safety. It is so important to put faces on issues. We
saw that with Sergei Magnitsky. It allowed us to pass a bill.
Otherwise, when you talk about 50 people being in prison, it
sort of rolls off the international news stories pretty
quickly, but, when you put a face to it and recognize what an
individual has gone through--and your personal presence here
today makes a huge difference, and I thank you for doing that.
The elections are September. What type of opportunities do
you believe opposition forces will have in Russia, both
directly participating in the elections and then expressing
their views in regards to the parliamentary elections? Will
there be an opportunity for opposition participation?
And you indicated that the protests after the 2011 was
pretty embarrassing to Russia. What do you anticipate will be
done if the Russian public believes these elections are not
fair and want to express themselves? How will the government
respond?
Mr. Kara-Murza. Thank you very much, Senator Cardin, for
the question. And thank you also for your efforts on the global
Magnitsky Act. I completely associate myself with what you
said. And we know that human rights are universal, and the
protection of human rights is universal. And so, I think the
responsibility for violating human rights should be universal,
too.
On your question about the elections, as I mentioned in the
opening statement, we have not had a free and fair national
election in Russia in more than 16 years, if we take the gold
standard of OSCE election observation and Council of Europe
election observation. And, of course, we have no reason to
believe that the upcoming parliamentary election on September
the 18th will be free and fair. In fact, we are seeing the
preparations already: new restrictions imposed on election
observers, new restrictions imposed on journalists who cover
the elections, new restrictions imposed on the campaign itself,
this new National Guard that is clearly being prepared by the
Kremlin in the event of a repeat of the mass protests we saw on
Bologna and other places in December 2011 and early 2012.
And there is always this ongoing debate within the
opposition whether we should even participate in the rigged and
unfair elections. And I believe that, yes, we should. And my
colleagues believe that, yes, we should, because we can use
even this flawed and manipulated and rigged electoral process
in order to help get our message across, get through that wall
of propaganda and lies that has been built up by the regime,
and also, I think, very importantly, to help this young
generation of pro-democracy and civil-society activists in our
country to go through that process and gain the political
experience that they will need in the future. Because the day
will come when Russia will have a free and fair election, and
we have to start preparing for that, I think, now.
And so, the Open Russia Movement, which I have the honor of
representing, will be supporting candidates in individual
single-member districts for the state duma, across the country.
It is a wide geography from St. Petersburg to Irkutsk. And I am
now going around the country in different regions and taking
part on the campaign events in meetings with voters. I was just
in St. Petersburg a few days ago, and Irkutsk a couple of weeks
ago. And, you know, I am seeing how effective and how
necessary, how important that is.
And I think it is also important to mention that we have
this opportunity to participate in this election this year,
thanks to Boris Nemtsov, because 2 and a half years ago, in
2013, he won the legislative seat in the region of Yaroslava.
And, according to Russian law, a party that is represented in
at least one of the regional legislatures in Russia does not
need to collect signatures in order to have access to the
ballot. And the Putin regime usually uses the signatures as a
filter to get unwanted candidates off the ballot, to disqualify
them. So, because we have that opportunity, the People's
Freedom Party, which was founded and led by Boris Nemtsov, has
this opportunity.
We will be on the ballot--our candidates will be on the
ballot this September. And I think it is also--it will be very
important for our partners in the OSCE, including the United
States, to pay attention to what will be going on, to pay
attention to a potential fraud, to send a robust monitoring
mission, as much as possible. And I know there will be an OSCE
parliamentary assembly session coming up in July, I believe, in
Tbilisi. It will be very important, I think, to raise that
issue, that there should be robust observation of the Russian
parliamentary election this September. And if there are cases
of fraud, they should be publicized, they should be talked
about, they should be paid attention to, because I think the
only thing this regime is afraid of is public reaction in
Russia. We saw how afraid they were during the mass protests in
the winter of 2011-2012. And I think we should--the whole world
should be watching closely as this September election
approaches, especially, as we have both mentioned today,
election status and human rights are not an internal affair.
Senator Cardin. Yeah.
Congressman Smith and Senator Wicker will be leading a
delegation to Tbilisi in July. I will make sure that the
Russian election is part of our priorities for those
discussions. And yes, we will participate within the OSCE on
the monitoring, and we will make sure that we report accurately
what happens in Russia.
We are concerned, though, that--knowing what happened in
the previous election, that there could be some personal safety
issues associated with participation in this election. Do you
have that concern?
Mr. Kara-Murza. Well, as you know, I have had some reason
to worry about personal safety. And I know many of my
colleagues also obviously face this risk on a daily basis. But,
I think, you know, those of us who are, you know, activists,
leaders, public faces of the democratic opposition in Russia,
you know, we have known for a long time that it is a dangerous
location to be in opposition to Mr. Putin's regime. But, you
know, we have accepted that. We think, you know, frankly, that
our country has no future under this regime, that it is--this
regime is driving our country into a dead-end, and, if we want
to fight for our country's future, we have to accept those
risks. And I think there is nothing better this regime would
like us to do than to give up and run away. And I do not
think----
Senator Cardin. Yeah.
Mr. Kara-Murza [continuing]. We should be giving them that
pleasure.
Senator Cardin. Mr. Satter, you raise a very almost
frightening point, that Russia uses war for its domestic agenda
more than it--and not necessarily the importance of the battle
itself, but the political significance or the--how it distracts
from other issues. Do you anticipate that we might see more
military action by Russia to further its overall objectives,
not so much the specific area where the military operations
take place, but to further their domestic support for their
broader goals?
Mr. Satter. That is the key determinant. And that is the
most important thing for the United States to keep in mind in
anticipating possible Russian aggression, that what will
motivate it--the Russian authorities is not the desire to
rebuild the Soviet empire. They are actually, I think,
indifferent to that. What--they go to war to strengthen the
hold on power of a small kleptocratic group which monopolizes
the instruments of power and property in the country. If they
feel threatened, and they understand that the best way to
consolidate their hold on power is to find a pretext for
military aggression, they will look for it. And that is why
the--deterrence is so important. But, not only deterrence in
military terms, but psychological deterrence, something which
is very much neglected by the United States, because we are--
we, with great difficulty, understand the cultural context in
Russia, in the psychological context, what is really going on
there. And all of the goodwill that we show--I was struck, in
fact, by a statement of Secretary Kerry recently in which he
said, about Minister Lavrov, that, ``He lied to me to my
face.'' And I was taken aback by that remark, because I was
surprised that Kerry expected anything different. This is the
indispensable background to policy decisions, an awareness of
the people with whom you are having--with whom you are dealing.
And this, I think, is what is missing. This is what has to be
reinforced. This can also be an important element in
deterrence.
Senator Cardin. Thank you for that answer.
We are going to stay in brief recess til the Chairman
returns so that I can vote on the amendment that is pending on
the floor of the Senate.
So, the committee will stay in brief recess. [Recess.]
The Chairman [presiding]. Gentlemen, it looks like you are
having a nice conversation. Would you like to share any of that
with me?
Mr. Kara-Murza. Please forgive--[Laughter.]
The Chairman. No, no, no. I actually would like to just
leave it open. I know you had 5 minutes for comments and I very
much appreciate your reference to the Magnitsky Act. I wonder
if there is anything else, from a personal standpoint, you
would like to share with us while you are here. You heard the
first two witnesses, from a professional standpoint. I know
there were a number of questions from committee members about
things that we could be doing that we are not doing. Do you
have any observations relative to additional pressure on Russia
or relative to what is happening internally?
I know you did not ask for help. I heard that in your
testimony. And I know you said ``remain true to our values,''
but, are there other things we could be involved in on top of
that?
Mr. Kara-Murza. Thank you, Chairman Corker. Thank you for
the question. And also, thank you for your leadership on the
global Magnitsky Act, which has recently been marked up by the
committee, and also for the Senate Resolution number 78, which
is--was dedicated to the memory of Boris Nemtsov, and which, as
one of its points, tasked the U.S. Government with raising this
question of the investigation and the progress, or the lack
thereof, in the investigation every time they meet with the
Russian Government counterparts. And that is very important.
And thank you for this.
And on your question, I think, first of all, it is very
important to distinguish--and sometimes, you know, even
informed commentators make this mistake; they use a shorthand
by saying ``Russia,'' when what they actually mean is the Putin
regime and the Kremlin and the behavior of the Putin regime.
And obviously, for me, as a Russian citizen, that is a pretty
important difference. And I think these things should not be
confused with each other. And the current regime, of course, is
not the product of a democratic election; it is not the product
of the free will of the Russian people. And I think it is
important to bear this in mind.
And on the question of what could be done, I think,
frankly, a more robust and more active implementation of the
Magnitsky Act is the single most important thing that I would
mention in this regard. Of course, this act targets not just
those implicated in the Magnitsky case itself, but Section 4(b)
of this act widens its scope to other gross human rights
abuses. And, you know, there has been--I think, if I am not
mistaken, there have been 39 people added to the U.S. Magnitsky
list since the law came into force, but most of them have been
low- or mid-level human rights abusers. And, of course, they
should be on the list, too, but, as I mentioned in the opening
statement, I think it is very important not to have any glass
ceilings, in terms of rank and influence.
The Chairman. From your perspective, why do you think
mostly low-level indivivuals have been targeted?
Mr. Kara-Murza. Well, it is probably not for me to comment
on the--you know, on the motivations behind the U.S.
administration's actions. Again, I am not an American; I am a
foreigner. And I do understand----
The Chairman. I'm only asking from your perspective.
Mr. Kara-Murza [continuing]. I do understand that there are
rigid criteria built into the law itself, so there have to be--
there has to be clear evidence. But, I think there, frankly, is
clear evidence about very high-profile and high-ranking human
rights abusers within the current Kremlin regime. And there
have been media reports here in the U.S. that, for instance,
Ramzan Kadyrov, whom I mentioned, and General Bastrykin, the
head of the investigative committee, have both been put on the
classified part of the Magnitsky Act. And, frankly, I think, in
my personal view, the most important aspect of this act is the
public naming and shaming of human rights abusers. I see no
reason why these individuals should not be placed on the open
list.
In early 2014, when Mr. Nemtsov came here for the last
time, he had several meetings here on the Hill with members of
leadership of both parties in both houses, and he suggested
several names of high-profile human-rights abusers in the Putin
regime that could be added to the list. One of those was
General Bastrykin. Another was Mr. Churov, the now former head
of the Central Election Commission who was responsible for
covering up the mass fraud in the 2011 and 2012 electoral
cycle, and earlier as well. And I think--I believe there were
13 names that Mr. Nemtsov suggested be put on the list. And so
far, not a single one has been put on the list.
A year ago, former Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov
and I came here and also had several meetings here on the Hill,
and we suggested that the names of Kremlin propaganda
officials, who call themselves journalists, but who are not,
they are state officials involved in, effectively, state-
sponsored incitement against those who oppose Mr. Putin's
regime--and we suggested that, in particular, those who are
engaged in incitement against Boris Nemtsov, who called him a
traitor, who called him a foreign agent, who called him an
enemy of Russia, who said that he is financed by the U.S., who
said that he would have broken Nazi troops had he been in
Moscow in 1941, and so on and so forth--and I am not making
this up; these are direct quotes--that these people who are
responsible for incitement should also be put on the sanction
list. Well, so far, not one of those has been put on the
sanctions list.
So, I really think that the most effective way, and,
frankly, the most principled, the most honorable way to deal
with those human rights abusers is to place them on that
sanctions list, because the unique thing, and the
groundbreaking thing about the Magnitsky Act, was that it was
not sanctioning a country. These--they are not sanctions
against Russia. They are not even sanctions against the Russian
Government.
The Chairman. Right.
Mr. Kara-Murza. These are sanctions against specific
individuals personally involved in human rights abuse and
personally involved in corruption. And I think this is the way
it should be done.
The Chairman. In your observation, when somebody is placed
on the list, is it truly a significant punishment to be
sanctioned in that manner?
Mr. Kara-Murza. Thank you. This is a very important
question. And we can talk about many similarities that exist
between the Soviet regime and what we have in our country
today. We have political prisoners, we have media censorship,
we have the lack of free and fair elections, and so on and so
forth. But, for all these similarities, there is also one very
important difference, and that is that members of the Soviet
Politburo did not hold their bank accounts in the West, they
did not send their kids to study in the West, they did not buy
real estate and yachts in the West. Leaders of the current
regime and Kremlin-connected oligarchs do that. And I think
there is a double standard, and this hypocrisy has to stop. And
we certainly know from experience that, when high-ranking human
rights abusers are placed on the sanction list, it has a very
strong effect. And I can give you just one example.
In 2007, when there was this whole controversy about the
relocation of a Soviet war memorial in Tallinn, in Estonia,
members of the Nashi, which was a pro-Kremlin youth group,
engaged in a harassment campaign against the then Estonian
Ambassador to Moscow, Marina Kaljurand. She is currently the
Estonian Foreign Minister. They were following her everywhere,
trying to sabotage her press conferences, throwing things at
her, and shouting abuse, and so on and so forth. And so, the
Estonian Government decided to impose visa sanctions on Mr.
Yakimenko, who was then the serving minister in Mr. Putin's
government, Minister for Youth. And he was the de facto leader
of this group. So, he was placed on a visa ban list. And,
because Estonia is a member of the Schengen Agreement, this
visa ban had a Schengen-wide force, so he could not travel to
any Schengen country, which is most of the European Union.
So, for 9 years that have passed since then, Mr. Yakimenko
has been desperately trying to get himself off that list, off
the visa black list. And, for all those 9 years, for all the
other transgressions and all the other human rights abuses that
are happening in our country, there has not been a single case
of harassment against a foreign diplomat stationed in Moscow.
And I think this is all you need to know about the effect and
the effectiveness of these types of personal targeted measures
against those human rights abusers.
The Chairman. Mr. Satter, do you want to add anything?
Mr. Satter. Well, I think that the future of Russia
depends--I have been involved with Russia for many years, and
have thought a great deal about it. I think the first
priority--the danger of participating in elections, which the
regime controls, although I am not opposed to it, is that it
gives legitimacy to the regime and actually, under controlled
circumstances, gives the impression to the population that what
is taking place is a real democratic process. This is the same
dilemma that people face--for example, I faced it one time when
I was receiving invitations to appear on Russian television,
that I did not want to take part in a performance that, in
fact, was not honest and was--did not conform to normal ethical
rules. I think--but, to--but, the--there is some value in
taking part in these elections, as long as those who do so do
not nurture illusions that this can change the regime. It
cannot. That is a process that is controlled by the regime. The
regime will be changed in other ways.
Most important, in my view, requirement for Russia's future
is something--a Russian equivalent of the South African
Commission on Truth and Reconciliation. The 25 years of post-
communist history are not well understood. And, unfortunately,
the abuses began not with Putin--Putin is the handpicked
successor of Boris Yeltsin--they began with Yeltsin. And the
crimes began with Yeltsin. They began it with the massacre at
the Ostankino television tower in 1993, and the shelling of the
Russian parliament. The carpet-bombing of Grozny in 1995, in
which the--it is estimated 20,000 people were killed, all of
them--almost all of them civilians. Now it appears that the
1996 elections in which Yeltsin was, quote/unquote,
``reelected'' were falsified. And, most important of all, the
circumstances under which Putin became the new Russian
President--he became the President in the aftermath of the
bombing of four apartment buildings in Russia that terrified
the entire country, galvanized support for a new and even more
bloody war in Chechnya, and created the conditions for Putin,
who had a 2-percent approval rating in the country, to become
the national savior and the country's new President. When he
took over as President, he brought with him his KGB-FSB
entourage, and they proceeded to eliminate what was left of the
freedoms that had been tolerated under Yeltsin.
The precondition for Putin's coming to power was the
criminalization of Russia under Yeltsin, because only a
provocation like the apartment bombings could save such a
kleptocratic regime as the one that was put in place by Yeltsin
under conditions of formal democracy. This group that is now in
power will do anything to hold onto power, but one of the most
important instruments at their disposal is the ability to
confuse the population about the population--about the people's
true interests and their true history.
So, the first requirement for Russia's resurrection, in my
view, is to clarify all of the historical episodes--the
apartment bombings, the Nordost Theater siege, the Beslan
school massacre in 2004 in which children and parents in a
gymnasium who were held hostage by Chechen terrorists were
attacked by Russian troops with flamethrowers and grenade
launchers, and burned alive, and, of course, the war--the wars
in Georgia and Ukraine.
Only on the basis of a true--truthful understanding of the
country's history will it be possible to change the
psychological state of the country, making it realistic to
create a genuinely law-based system. And once that
psychological and ethical basis exists, it is important for
Russia to have what it lost in 1918, when the Bolsheviks
dispersed the constituent assembly, a new constituent assembly,
in order to create a real Constitution, not the Constitution
that was created in the wake of the destruction of the Russian
Parliament in 1993 in order to suit the power requirements of
Yeltsin.
Under those circumstances, and with the understanding that
those parts of the Russian Federation, including the Caucasus
that wish to detach themselves and have an independent national
existence, be given the right to do so, the conditions will
then exist for Russia to transform itself into a democratic
country.
It must be pointed out that, as a result of 25 years of
post-communist history, Russia has acquired an educated,
sophisticated, worldly middle class for which this type of
regime is absolutely inappropriate. And that process is going
to continue as globalization continues and as people take
advantage of the exposure to free information, which was denied
them under the Soviet regime.
The Chairman. Well, we thank you both for being here.
We will have a number of questions coming from people who
were not able to be here for the second panel. We will try to
have all those in by the close of business on Thursday. If you
all could, please respond fairly quickly to those, though we do
know you do not have as many staff as the previous two
witnesses.
We thank you for the light you have shed here today, for
your personal experiences, and for your help. We look forward
to having you back again in the near future.
With that, the committee is adjourned.
Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Answers to Questions for the Record Submitted
to Victoria Nuland by Senator Cardin
Question 1. Venerable NGO Golos,\1\ which has monitored every
Russia election since the fall of the Soviet Union, has come under
increased pressure from the Putin regime and may have to close its
doors before September's parliamentary elections.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``Golos'' is the Russian word for ``voice.''
What is the State Department's position on the Putin
regime's targeting of Golos and what diplomatic tools can we
bring to bear to pressure the Putin regime to stop its
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
harassment of the organization?
Answer. We continue to be deeply concerned about increasing
restrictions on the freedoms of expression, association, and peaceful
assembly in Russia. By restricting the work of Golos and other civil
society organizations in Russia, the so-called ``foreign agent law''
law encroaches on the right of every Russian to freedom of association.
Civic organizations such as Golos, AGORA, and Memorial are essential
elements of societies that respect the rule of law and accountable
government. The Russian people deserve a government that values, rather
than undermines, the contributions of civil society.
Recent harassment and fines directed toward Golos are particularly
troubling as Russia prepares for parliamentary elections in September.
A government effort to shutter one of Russia's most important election
watchdogs raises questions about the government's commitment to free
and fair elections. The Department will continue to raise these
concerns at the highest level with Russian government interlocutors and
in our public statements. In the OSCE and other multilateral fora we
will also continue to call publicly on the Russian Government to uphold
the freedoms of expression, association, and peaceful assembly, in
keeping with Russia's international obligations and the rights
enshrined in Russia's own constitution.
Question 2. The New York Times reported last week on the abusive
online harassment by pro-Russian forces of a Finnish reporter whose
work focused on the prevalence of Russian media trolls. According to
the New York Times, these trolls bombard websites and social media with
fake news and commentary denunciating Russia's critics and Western
institutions. This is just one example of Putin's use of soft power
that seeks to discredit and divide the West.
We have put considerable effort into confronting ISIS on the
internet, but I am concerned that we do not have a coordinated strategy
to address Russian propaganda. What is the administration's strategy to
address this onslaught of Russian propaganda, funding of far right
parties in Europe, and other tools of soft power that take aim at the
West?
Answer. The State Department is leading a coordinated effort to
support the free flow of information, build the capacity of independent
local media, and refute disinformation, particularly in countries where
Russian-language television content is dominated by Kremlin-backed
broadcasts.
The Department employs a combination of short-term messaging
strategies and long-term programs to build resilience and the capacity
to recognize and reject Russian Government disinformation. We have
formed a cadre of Russian-speaking officers to engage with the media
and by employing a Russian-language, policy-oriented Twitter handle,
and developed exchanges to encourage independent media voices,
including workshops on digital skills and investigative journalism.
These efforts are focused on three distinct audiences: Western
Europeans, Russian-speaking populations writ large, and Russians
themselves.
In Western Europe, we work to underscore allied unity and bolster
resolve to work together on global challenges that include Russia's
revanchist policies. We also offer journalists from Western Europe to
Central Asia opportunities to have a first-hand view of the realities
on the ground in countries, like Ukraine, where the Kremlin often
distorts the facts.
For Russian-speaking audiences in Eastern Europe and Eurasia, we
offer information and programming alternatives while bolstering the
capacity of civil society and independent journalists to identify and
dispel disinformation. Inside Russia, we work with media--both
traditional and social--to maintain a dialogue with the public through
programs that accurately describe U.S. society and our values. The U.S.
Embassy in Moscow facilitates multiple people-to-people exchange
programs, including Fulbright Scholarships, International Visitors
Leadership Program, the Peer-to-Peer Program; hosts approximately 70
high-level speakers per year; and maintains close working contacts with
a network of more than 75,000 alumni of U.S.-funded exchange programs.
The Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Deputy Assistant
Secretary (DAS) for Public Diplomacy chairs an Interagency Strategic
Communications working group to coordinate messaging between EUCOM,
NATO, State, OSCE, and others. The DAS also chairs the Ukraine/Russia
Public Engagement Working Group within the Department, which meets
weekly to develop media and engagement strategies to highlight the
country's successes.
The Department hosts a Russian language communications platform,
which connects 150 plus officers across the world for rapid information
sharing, analysis, and pushback. The Bureau of Public Affairs manages
the @USApoRusski Twitter handle, which has attracted 8,700 plus
followers in less than a year.
Finally, as part of a broader effort to counter Russian pressure,
and in parallel with our public diplomacy work, in FY 2017, the
Department is requesting approximately $121 million in bilateral ESF
assistance funding to support civil society and independent media in
the Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia regions, in addition to the
funding that is centrally managed by the State Department's Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) and USAID.
Question 3. The Putin regime's corrupt practices, including its
violations of property rights and silencing of NGO's monitoring
corruption, fuels economic and political instability inside Russia and
influences its actions abroad.
Do you support efforts to use U.S. tools, like indictments
in U.S. courts, to pursue corrupt figures in Russia?
Answer. Secretary Kerry reaffirmed the administration's commitment
to combating corruption at the Anti-Corruption Summit in London in May.
Corruption drives political instability, erodes trust between citizens
and government, cripples basic functions of the state like security and
justice, fuels violent extremism, and stifles economic prosperity and
human rights. The administration has deepened its commitment to
increasing fiscal transparency and fighting corruption, including
through initiatives such as the International Anti-Corruption
Coordination Center (IACCC). The United States has also committed to
co-hosting with the United Kingdom the first meeting of the Global
Asset Recovery Forum in 2017 in Washington, DC. The U.S. also remains
committed to collaborating with the international community to fight
against corruption.
We have routinely voiced our concerns about corruption with the
Russian Government, and remain concerned about corruption in Russia at
all levels of the government. We strongly urge the government of Russia
to support efforts, including by civil society and non-governmental
actors, to promote increased transparency and to counter corruption.
Question 4. The Magnitsky Act, in addition to sanctioning those
who were complicit in Sergei's murder, sanctions those who commit gross
human rights violations inside Russia.
Given the deteriorating human rights situation inside
Russia, how will the administration use this authority to
sanction more human rights violators under the Act?
Answer. Over six years after Sergei Magnitsky's death, we remain
disturbed by the impunity for this and other violent crimes against
activists, journalists, and the political opposition, as well as the
growing atmosphere of intimidation for those who work to uncover
corruption or human rights violations in the Russian Federation.
The Department of State continues to fight impunity for human
rights violations in Russia through implementation of the Magnitsky
Act. On February 1, in concert with the Treasury Department, we added
five new names to the list of persons sanctioned under this act,
bringing the total number of publicly listed names to 39. This is a
significant list that will continue to promote accountability for
Russian officials for their role in the Magnitsky case or for gross
violations of human rights.
Work on this list is ongoing, but we cannot comment on specific
potential future designations. Placing a name on this list is a serious
undertaking that requires a determination that a person meets one or
more of the criteria for inclusion on the list, and that determination
must be supported by credible information. The law sets a high bar for
conduct that would qualify an individual for listing under the gross
violation of human rights prong and consequently we look very carefully
at information we receive and assess whether it would support a
determination that an individual fits the criteria for designation.
Where there is insufficient credible information, we are unable to list
individuals.
Question 5. Russia's implementation of its arms control agreements
presents a mixed picture. On one hand, the United States and Russia
continue to successfully implement the New Start Treaty and other arms
control agreements. However, Russia is in clear violation of the
Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and there are compliance
concerns with the Open Skies Treaty. What diplomatic steps have we
taken to address our concerns about Russian compliance with these
treaties and what mechanisms exist to bring the Russians into
compliance?
Answer. Our priority is for Russia to be fully compliant with the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the Open Skies
Treaty to ensure the continued viability of both treaties, which have
long contributed to security and stability in Europe and remain in the
interests of the United States and our allies.
Regarding Russia's violation of the INF Treaty, we have sought to
isolate Russia diplomatically and persuade Russia to return to
compliance. Senior administration officials have raised U.S. concerns
over Russia's violation of the INF Treaty dozens of times with Russian
officials. In consultation with Allies, we are reviewing a range of
appropriate options should Russia persist in its violation and we will
not allow Russia to gain a significant military advantage through its
INF violation.
We continue to have concerns about conduct by Russia that raises
questions about its adherence to obligations under the Open Skies
Treaty--namely, the denial or restriction of flights over parts of its
territory, including Kaliningrad, central Moscow, and near its border
with Georgia, and inadequate air traffic control facilitation for Open
Skies flights. We are working closely with our Allies on an approach to
address these issues with Russia. These issues also continue to be
raised with Russia, bilaterally and through the Open Skies Consultative
Commission (OSCC).
__________
Answers to Questions for the Record Submitted
to Victoria Nuland by Senator Isakson
Question 1. Are there concerns that Russia will not meet its
treaty obligations by February 2018?
Answer. We remain confident that the Russian Federation is
committed, as is the United States, to meeting the New START Treaty's
central limits by the end of the seven-year reduction period in
February 5, 2018.
Question 2. Should Russia fail to meet its treaty obligations--as
it has with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, what will the
repercussions be?
Answer. We remain confident that the Russian Federation is
committed, as is the United States, to meeting the New START Treaty's
central limits by February 5, 2018. If they are not met, any
repercussions would be for the next Presidential administration to
decide.
Question 3. Have there been any repercussions for its failure to
comply with the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty?
Answer. We have conveyed to Russian officials that we expect the
Russian Federation to cease any further development, testing,
production, and deployment of the missile system that is noncompliant
with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and to
eliminate the existing missiles and launchers in a verifiable manner.
We have consulted our European and Asian allies every step of the way
and are maintaining cohesion with them. While this treaty violation is
only one element of Russia's overall bellicose attitude to its
international obligations, it is an element that contributes to
Russia's isolation.
We continue to pursue the diplomatic resolution of U.S. concerns
with Russia, as the INF Treaty benefits the security of the United
States, our allies, and Russia, and contributes to stability in Europe
and the Asia-Pacific region. The priority of the United States is to
return Russia to compliance to ensure the continued viability of the
Treaty, and we continue to engage the Russian Government to resolve our
concerns.
The administration is committed to ensuring that Russia gains no
military advantage from its violation of the INF Treaty. Russia's
violation of the Treaty, and its policies that challenge the European
security order, are not going unanswered. The administration has
determined that we need to consider Russian actions with regard to the
INF Treaty in the context of its overall aggressive and bellicose
behavior that flouts international legal norms and destabilizes the
European security order.
Question 4. As you may know, President Putin made comments in
April stating that the administration's plan to end the MOX program
will deviate from our obligations under the Plutonium Management and
Disposition Agreement (PDMA). Indeed, Putin skipped this year's Nuclear
Security Summit citing the cancelling of the MOX program as the reason.
Are his comments valid?
From the State Department's perspective, does this
complicate our efforts to get Russia's compliance on key arms
control treaties--including New START?
Answer. We regret Russia's decision not to participate in the 2016
Nuclear Security Summit. We hope that Russia still shares the view that
securing nuclear materials and combating nuclear terrorism are
priorities well worth the personal attention of world leaders. The
Summit was a unique opportunity to spur more aggressive action toward
success on these important security priorities.
The Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA), which
the United States and the Russian Federation signed in 2000 and which
entered into force in 2011, provides a path for the Parties to consult
and agree on disposition methods that do not involve irradiation in
nuclear reactors. The PMDA does not set binding timelines. The United
States has not violated this agreement and any suggestions to the
contrary are inaccurate. We remain fully committed to meeting our
obligations under the agreement. In addition, Mr. Putin's suggestion at
the time that the United States seeks to retain a ``breakout
capability'' for additional weapons production is simply false.
As stated in the most recent Annual Report on the Implementation of
the New START Treaty, which was provided to Congress in January 2016,
the United States certified, based on information available as of
December 31, 2015, that the Russian Federation was in compliance with
the terms of the New START Treaty. We do not consider President Putin's
comments regarding the Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX) program have any impact
on New START implementation.
Question 5. Has the United States allowed some areas of
noncompliance to slide in order to gain Russia's support in other
foreign policy objectives, i.e. Iran?
Answer. No. The United States takes matters of treaty compliance
very seriously. We are not afraid to raise our concerns with our treaty
partners or publicly.
Question 6. Russia has failed to recognize the sovereignty of many
of its neighbors, which destabilizes the region. Beyond our engagement
with NATO partners, can you discuss U.S. efforts to counter Russia's
increasing presence and influence in places like Georgia, Armenia, and
Syria?
Answer. Georgia: Despite Russia's warnings to Georgia, the United
States continues to support Georgia's Euro-Atlantic integration
aspirations. The United States provided more than $75 million in
foreign assistance to Georgia in FY 15 to promote democratic, economic,
judicial, and other reforms, and to assist the country in achieving its
goal of integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions. U.S. foreign
military financing for Georgia seeks to enhance ties to NATO by
increasing the interoperability of its armed forces with NATO,
strengthening its institutional capacity to train, field, and care for
its forces, and modernizing Georgia's defense institutions.
The United States also provides assistance to improve access to
independent information in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and to promote
national unity throughout Georgia. We continue to press Russia to give
the EU Monitoring Mission access to both sides of the Administrative
Border Lines. We also participate in the Geneva International
Discussions and work with our partners at the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to support Georgia's sovereignty and
territorial integrity and reach a lasting settlement to the conflict.
Armenia: The United States provided approximately $27 million in FY
2014 and more than $16 million in FY 2015 in foreign assistance to
Armenia in support of reforms that are key to Armenia's democratic
development and European integration. Despite Armenia's decision to
join the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) on December 4, 2014, the United
States will continue to support Armenia's links to Europe, as well as
support its efforts to increase its energy security and economic
prosperity. The United States remains engaged in diplomatic efforts to
resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict peacefully and to reopen
Armenia's borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey. We maintain positive and
constructive military-to-military cooperation, including by supporting
Armenia's contributions to international peacekeeping operations,
helping to professionalize its forces, and inviting select military
officer to train in the United States through our security assistance
programs.
Syria: The United States will continue our campaign to degrade and
defeat Da'esh and support a moderate opposition that is essential for a
political solution to the Syrian crisis. We have pressured Russia to
use its influence to compel the Asad regime to stop its attacks against
innocent civilians during the cessation of hostilities and to agree to
a political transition through talks in Geneva with the United Nations.
We have also repeatedly conveyed our concerns to Russian officials that
its intervention in Syria has exacerbated, and will continue to
exacerbate, the sectarian divide and the humanitarian crisis, unless a
political solution can be reached. We are holding Russia to its
commitments, including in the implementation of UN Security Council
Resolution 2254, which lays out the steps for a Syrian-led political
transition, and which Russia supported in the Security Council.
__________
Answers to Questions for the Record Submitted
to Victoria Nuland by Senator Boxer
Question 1. How is the United States working with media
organizations and civil society in Russia to support democracy, free
speech and the rule of law in Russia? How is the United States
encouraging political openness in Russia?
Answer. Despite the closing space for civil society, Russian
organizations and individuals continue to express a desire to engage
with the United States. As long as this continues to be the case, the
United States will support opportunities for peer-to-peer, educational,
cultural, and other regional programs that create opportunities to
exchange views and best practices. It is also our position that free
media and free speech are the best way to fight propaganda. We will
continue to support a number of programs in the region that help build
the capacity of independent media, and provide legal and physical
defense of journalists and activists suffering from government
repression and retaliation.
We will continue to raise our concerns about the human rights
situation in Russia at the highest levels, both in public and in
private. We will continue to speak out against laws and practices that
serve to impede the work of civil society and contravene the
fundamental rights of freedom of expression, assembly, and association.
We spoke out following the tragic murder of Boris Nemtsov, when the
laws on foreign agents and undesirableorganizations were passed, when
the offices of human rights groups have been raided, and when the
Russian Government failed to condemn the threats that Chechen strongman
Ramzan Kadyrov made against journalists and members of the political
opposition. We are heartened that there continue to be human rights
defenders, journalists, and activists willing to continue their work in
Russia, often at great personal risk, and we stand ready to support
them. On March 29, Secretary Kerry presented the Department's
International Woman of Courage Award to Zhanna Nemtsova, Boris
Nemtsov's daughter, for her courageous activism in her father's memory.
As Russia prepares for parliamentary elections in September, we
will continue to call on the Russian Government to foster an
environment in which dissent is tolerated and those who express
dissenting views are protected, in keeping with the rights enshrined in
Russia's own constitution.
We also will continue to fight impunity for human rights abuses in
Russia through implementation of the Magnitsky Act. On February 1, in
concert with the Treasury Department, we added five new names to the
list of persons sanctioned under this act, bringing the total number of
publicly listed names to 39. This is a significant list that will
continue to hold Russian officials accountable for their role in the
Magnitsky case or other gross violations of human rights.
Question 2. What efforts is the United States making to protect
the rights of LGBTQ individuals in Russia?
Answer. The promotion and protection of the human rights of LGBTI
persons is an essential part of the United States' foreign policy. Our
efforts are guided by President Obama's December 2011 Presidential
Memorandum on International Initiatives to Advance the Human Rights of
LGBT Persons, which directs federal departments and agencies to combat
the criminalization of LGBT status or conduct abroad; protect
vulnerable LGBT refugees or asylum seekers; enhance assistance to
protect human rights and advance nondiscrimination for LGBT persons;
and help ensure swift and meaningful responses to human rights abuses
of LGBT persons abroad.
We have spoken out consistently against anti-LGBTI legislation in
Russia, where a law banning the distribution of so-called ``LGBTI
propaganda'' to minors, which effectively limits the rights of LGBTI
citizens and their allies to free expression and assembly. We are also
concerned that this law appears to have emboldened extremist elements
to commit attacks on LGBTI citizens. Our Ambassador in Moscow and other
State Department officials have regularly raised U.S. concerns with
Russian officials. Embassy Moscow also remains in close contact with
the LGBTI community in Russia and includes LGBTI activists in
roundtables, exchanges, and other initiatives. In addition to our
public statements, we repeatedly have also raised restrictive
legislation and hate crimes in Russia against LGBT individuals in OSCE
and other multilateral meetings.
Question 3. Russia's continued support for the Asad regime has
countered the efforts of the United States and our coalition partners
in Syria and the region. While Russia has played a role in the
negotiations to end the conflict in Syria, Russia's military
intervention has bolstered the position of Syrian President Bashar al-
Asad in peace negotiations.
The administration has asserted that Asad's eventual removal from
power will be critical to any long-term solution to the Syrian civil
war.
Given Russia's interests in preserving the Asad regime, are
the Russians undertaking actions to help facilitate Asad's
eventual departure?
How is Russia working with the Syrian Government to allow
for humanitarian relief to areas under the Syrian regime's
control?
Answer. We continue to press Russia to work towards a genuine
Syrian-led political transition in Syria and to persuade Russia to
encourage Asad's departure. Russia voted in favor of UN Security
Council Resolution 2254, which calls for a Syrian-led political
transition that establishes credible, inclusive and non-sectarian
governance and a process leading to a new constitution. Russia's
military and political actions, however, have supported Asad and
tightened his grip on power. Our diplomatic engagement is intended to
persuade all parties that there is no military solution to this
conflict and that we must use the cessation of hostilities to allow
humanitarian access to populations in need and to provide space for the
political process to develop.
We continue to press the Russians to use their influence with the
regime to allow full access for humanitarian aid on the basis of
assessments made by the UN, not the regime. Since the Cessation of
Hostilities (CoH) went into effect, Russia has been helpful in
convincing Asad to allow the passage of some humanitarian aid convoys.
Since the beginning of 2016, the UN--in coordination with the ICRC and
Syrian Arab Red Crescent--has reached over 820,000 civilians in
besieged, hard-to-reach, and other priority locations. One recent
positive development concerns Daraya, where on June 9 convoys brought
food assistance to the town, which had not received humanitarian
assistance since 2012. Despite these successes, far too many
communities in Syria remain in need and Russia needs to do more to
honor its commitments to use its influence with the regime to address
these humanitarian emergencies.
__________
Answers to Additional Questions Submitted
to Victoria Nuland by Senator Perdue
Question 1. As you know, in its 2016 Arms Control Compliance
Report, the State Department found that for the third year in a row,
Russia stands in violation of the INF treaty because it continues to
develop, possess, produce, and test ground-launched cruise missiles
(GCLMs) and launchers with medium-range capabilities. As State's report
tells us, the Department has ``as was the case in previous years . . .
raised concerns'' with Russia on repeated occasions to resolve this
issue. It appears that our efforts to raise our concerns with Russia
aren't working, and they repeatedly deny that they are in violation
with the INF Treaty.
What more can be done to pressure Russia to return to
compliance with the INF Treaty?
What are the implications for U.S. security interests of a
continued failure by the Russians to be in compliance with INF?
Answer. We have sought to isolate Russia diplomatically and
persuade Russia to return to compliance. senior administration
officials have raised U.S. concerns over Russia's violation of the INF
Treaty dozens of times with Russian officials. We continue to engage
Allies and encourage them to tell Russia the importance that they place
on the INF Treaty for European security.
We and NATO believe that the INF Treaty is integral to European
security. In consultation with Allies, we are reviewing a range of
appropriate options should Russia persist in its violation. We will not
allow Russia to gain a significant military advantage through its INF
violation. Russia's violation of the INF Treaty has been factored into
our response to Russia's overall aggressive behavior.
Question 2. We've seen incident after incident in which Russian
aircraft are performing dangerous and irresponsible maneuvers near
American aircraft and naval vessels. This is in direct violation of the
1972 agreement (on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High
Seas), in which Article IV states that, ``commanders of aircraft of
parties shall use the greatest caution and prudence in approaching
aircraft and ships of the other party operating on and over the high
seas, and . . . shall not permit simulated attacks by the simulated use
of weapons against aircraft and ships, or performance of various
acrobatics over ships.''
What diplomatic efforts is the State Department pursuing,
if any, to deter this Russian military aggression?
Does State coordinate with DoD on any efforts to deter this
aggression? If so, can you speak to what is being done at the
DoD to discourage this continued aggressive military behavior
from Russia? Are the Russians aware of the fact that they're
violating this 1972 agreement with us? Do they care?
The Departments of State and Defense routinely coordinate on strong
responses to Russia's unsafe and unprofessional behavior. For
instance, we have vigorously protested the actions of Russian
aircraft over the Baltic Sea on April 11-12, April 14, and
April 29 to the Government of the Russian Federation. I, as
well as Ambassador Tefft and the U.S. Embassy Moscow staff,
formally protested these incidents at senior levels with the
Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the
Russian Security Council. In addition, Secretary Kerry raised
this issue directly with Foreign Minister Lavrov. In
Washington, the Department of Defense has repeatedly protested
the Russian actions to the Russian Ambassador. On April 20, the
United States and several of our NATO Allies protested these
incidents during a NATO-Russia Council meeting. On each
occasion, we have stressed the risk that such behavior could
result in loss of life, and we called for Russia's aircraft to
observe international standards and professional safety
practices.
Bilateral discussions under the 1972 Agreement on the Prevention of
Incidents On and Over the High Seas (INCSEA) were held in
Moscow on June 8. I refer you to the Department of Defense for
details, but we understand the topic of unsafe Russian flights
was discussed in detail and the two sides also considered
measures to mitigate the risks of accidents occurring.
In public remarks and in Russian interactions with us about the
incidents, Russian officials have claimed that they are flying at safe
distances, have inaccurately characterized certain aspects of the
incidents, and have repeatedly asserted that their actions are a
response to our operations in areas they deem politically sensitive.
Question 3. What efforts are being made to encourage a Russian
withdrawal from Georgia?
Answer. The United States strongly supports Georgia's sovereignty,
independence, and territorial integrity within its internationally
recognized borders. We participate in the Geneva International
Discussions, the forum that addresses the ongoing security and
humanitarian consequences of the conflict in Georgia. In Geneva, our
primary objective is to draw attention to Russia's violation of the
August 2008 ceasefire agreement through its continuing occupation of
Georgia's Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions. We strongly object to
Russia's policy of ``borderization,'' through which Russia and the de
facto authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia harden the
Administrative Boundary Lines separating the occupied territories from
the rest of Georgia. We continue to push Russia to end its military
occupation of the territories and reverse its recognition of their
purported independence, permit unfettered international access to the
territories, and facilitate freedom of movement across the
Administrative Boundary Lines for all citizens of Georgia.
Question 4. How can we prevent Ukraine from becoming a similar
frozen conflict?
Answer. The best opportunity to resolve the conflict in eastern
Ukraine is to seek the full implementation of the Minsk agreements. We
continue to work with our Normandy partners to support their efforts to
accelerate Minsk implementation.
At the same time, we must maintain transatlantic unity on
sanctions, which must remain in place until Moscow fully implements its
Minsk commitments.
Question 5. What are the lessons learned from Georgia that could
be applied to Ukraine-both in dealing with Russian aggression, but also
in institution building and countering corruption and propaganda?
Answer. We believe that the Minsk agreements are the best and only
way to achieve peace in eastern Ukraine. Since the start of the crisis
in Ukraine, the United States, EU, G-7, and other nations have worked
in close cooperation to develop sanctions that increase pressure on
Russia and support Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The
pressure of sanctions and the framework of the Minsk agreements provide
an opportunity to confront Russian aggression.
We have been very clear with Moscow that sanctions will remain in
place until Russia fully implements its commitments under the Minsk
agreements and returns control of Crimea to Ukraine. We are prepared to
increase costs on Russia if it takes new aggressive actions in Ukraine.
As in Georgia, the United States will implement long-term
assistance programming in Ukraine to build democratic institutions,
promote economic development, combat corruption, and strengthen Euro-
Atlantic integration. U.S. assistance in anti-corruption and security
has been critical in aiding both Ukraine and Georgia in confronting
Russian aggression. In Ukraine, we have committed over $600 million in
training and equipment since the start of the crisis to help Ukraine's
forces monitor and secure Ukraine's borders, operate more safely and
effectively, and defend their country's sovereignty and territorial
integrity. Our security assistance has saved lives while helping to
build Ukraine's long-term defense capacity.
The Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement achieved one of our most visible successes in U.S.
assistance programming in fostering the establishment and rollout of
patrol police in every major Ukrainian city. This programming is
similar to that implemented in Georgia. The patrol police have become a
symbol of a new Ukraine--a force of highly-trained professionals
(including over 20 percent women) whose mandate is to protect and serve
the public. In a recent nationwide poll, the police have gone from the
least trusted institution in Ukraine to the third most trusted, after
the Army and the Church.
Question 6. This February, James Clapper, the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI) testified that the nation of Georgia, despite all
its progress on western integration and domestic reforms, is at
increasing risk from Russian aggression and pressure. The DNI reported
that, in part, Russia is capitalizing on increasing frustration in
Georgia about the slow pace of western integration. Russia is taking
advantage of the space created due to the seeming ambivalence on
Georgia's NATO membership and upcoming parliamentary elections in
October.
Can you inform us about the administration's current
efforts to support Georgia's western integration? For example,
what more can be done to bring Georgia into NATO and
demonstrate a strong U.S. political and security commitment to
Georgia?
Are we engaging with our EU allies to help support
Georgia's integration into the European Union?
Answer. The U.S. Government stands by the commitment Allies made in
Bucharest that Georgia will become a member of NATO, and we continue to
provide tangible support to move Georgia towards membership. Our
bilateral security assistance, which totaled approximately $60 million
in FY 2015, enhances Georgia's NATO interoperability, enabling Georgia
to deploy with NATO and EU missions and further its integration with
western security institutions. U.S. support for Georgia within a NATO
context includes contributing to a NATO Trust Fund to clear landmines
and explosive remnants of war in Georgia and significant contributions
to the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP). The SNGP was first
approved in 2014, and new projects will be considered at this year's
NATO Summit, such as increased exercises with NATO and support in areas
like strategic communications and cyber defense. One American serves as
Deputy on the Core Team charged with implementing the SNGP and another
heads the NATO Liaison Office in Tbilisi. In addition, the United
States lobbied-and helped secure-a visit by Allied Permanent
Representatives to Georgia later this year. At the last Summit, we also
supported designating Georgia as one of NATO's Enhanced Opportunity
Partners (EOPs). Now that Georgia has this status, they are included in
Alliance activities and political discussions as often as is
practicable. Only five other nations hold this status.
To speed Georgia's integration with the EU, U.S. technical
assistance helps Georgia achieve the reforms necessary to implement its
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area with the EU as part of the
Association Agreement it signed in 2014. Priorities include
accelerating integration with EU energy markets and increasing
generation of hydropower and other alternative energy sources, as well
as promoting sustainable economic growth in the areas of agriculture,
small and medium enterprises, and workforce development. The United
States strongly supports visa-free travel for Georgian citizens within
the Schengen travel zone and has encouraged our European partners to
grant political approval now that Georgia has met all the technical
requirements for visa liberalization.
For FY 2016, the United States plans to provide approximately $80.6
million in assistance to support Georgia's reforms and Euro-Atlantic
trajectory-this represents approximately a $5 million or seven percent
increase above FY 2015 levels. Roughly half of the FY 2016 allocation
will be allocated to security assistance, 28 percent to democracy
programs, 22 percent to economic growth programs, and the remaining two
percent to education programs.
Question 7. How do you assess the stability of the European
coalition, as a whole, on the Russia sanctions issue?
Answer. EU sanctions rollovers require unanimity among all 28 EU
Member States. To date the EU has maintained strong solidarity on
Russia sanctions. We have robust and continual engagement with EU
Member States on the need to maintain sanctions on Russia until Moscow
fully implements its Minsk commitments. Our separate Crimea-related
sanctions will remain in place until Russia returns the peninsula to
Ukraine.
Question 8. Could EU sanctions be rolled back in the next year or
two?
Answer. We have been clear that we believe sanctions must remain in
place until Moscow fully implements its Minsk commitments. President
Obama and other senior administration officials have been clear with
President Putin and European leaders on this issue.
In terms of when they are rolled back, the answer depends on
Russia's behavior. In March 2015, the European Council explicitly
agreed that the duration of sectoral sanctions is linked to the
complete implementation of the Minsk agreements. The Council maintained
this linkage when it extended sectoral sanctions in December 2015.
Question 9. What would that mean for European security? How might
it affect US-EU relations?
Answer. We believe the combined weight of U.S. and EU sanctions
against Russia has prevented further Russian aggression in eastern
Ukraine and raised the costs of Moscow's occupation of Crimea. We
continue to work to maintain our transatlantic solidarity on this issue
so that Russia may be incentivized to implement its Minsk commitments
and end its occupation of Crimea.
It is clear that Russia is trying, without success, to break EU
solidarity, while failing to fully implement its commitments under
Minsk. Despite Russia's efforts, U.S.-EU solidarity on sanctions will
remain strong.
Question 10. We are seeing less of a conventional show of force
from Russia, but an intensification of so-called hybrid warfare. Russia
is using a dangerous combination of cyberattacks, propaganda, and
little green men to destabilize and otherwise subvert Ukraine. Last
December, Russia was behind a cyberattack on Ukraine's power grid that
caused widespread outages, a fact confirmed by Obama administration
officials last month.
How do you think Russia might use cyber warfare going
forward to destabilize Ukraine?
Answer. With regard to the December 2015 attack on Ukraine's power
grid, the United States has not made any judgements on attribution, but
we view malicious cyber activity that targets critical infrastructure
particularly seriously, as it potentially places the public at risk of
harm.
The Director for National Intelligence has recently assessed that
Russian cyber operations are likely to support several strategic
objectives: intelligence gathering to support Russian decision making
in the Ukraine and Syrian crises, influence operations to support
military and political objectives, and continuing preparation of the
cyber environment for future contingencies.
Ukraine has been an excellent partner in identifying cyber events
and sharing information about tactics, techniques, and procedures. We
look forward to continuing to work with Ukraine to build its resilience
in the area of cyber defense.
Question 11. To what extent is the return of Crimea to Ukraine a
part of the discussion among leaders in the U.S. and Europe?
Answer. Russia's occupation and attempted annexation of sovereign
Ukrainian territory, Crimea, disrupts 70 years of international order
and has drawn the condemnation of free, democratic societies around the
globe. The United States does not and will not recognize Russia's
attempted annexation. Ending Russia's ongoing occupation of Crimea
remains a central part of our Ukraine policy.
In response to Russia's occupation of Crimea, the United States, in
coordination with our European partners, instituted sanctions against
Russia in December 2014. The sanctions prohibit U.S. citizens from
engaging in most economic activities with the territory of occupied
Crimea and allow Treasury, in consultation with State, to designate any
entity that operates there. These sanctions will remain in place as
long as Russia continues to occupy Crimea and we are committed to a
long-term non-recognition policy, backed with the force of sanctions.
Since Russia's attempted annexation, the human rights situation in
Crimea has deteriorated dramatically, with mounting repression and
harassment of individuals from minority communities, in particular of
Crimean Tatars, those of non-Russian Orthodox Christian faiths, and
those who oppose Russia's occupation. De facto authorities have
systematically denied individuals their fundamental freedoms of speech,
assembly, and association. Local residents have been detained,
interrogated, and, in many cases, subjected to forced disappearance.
NGOs and independent media have been driven out of the peninsula.
Russian occupation authorities have also banned the Mejlis, the
legislative body of the Crimean Tatars.
The Department of State has consistently raised the human rights
situation under Russian occupation at multilateral fora, in press
statements, and at the podium to shine a light on ongoing abuses and
mobilize the international community to condemn the occupation and
continue to impose costs on Russia. U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations Samantha Power has raised the human rights situation regularly
in her remarks in the Security Council and in public events. Also, U.S.
Ambassador to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
Dan Baer has raised by name the cases of hostages and persons unjustly
detained by Russia in many statements in the OSCE Permanent Council.
The United States will continue to raise the situation in Crimea until
Russia ends its occupation of sovereign this piece of Ukrainian
territory.