[Senate Hearing 114-726]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-726
IMPROVING STRATEGIC INTEGRATION AT
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
TUESDAY, JUNE 28, 2016
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JACK REED, Rhode Island
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama BILL NELSON, Florida
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
TOM COTTON, Arkansas KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JONI ERNST, Iowa JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska TIM KAINE, Virginia
MIKE LEE, Utah ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
TED CRUZ, Texas
Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_______
Tuesday, June 28, 2016
Page
Improving Strategic Integration at the Department of Defense..... 1
Edmondson, Amy C., Ph.D.......................................... 11
McChrystal, General (Ret) Stanley................................ 19
Locher, James R., III............................................ 26
Questions for the Record......................................... 52
(iii)
IMPROVING STRATEGIC INTEGRATION AT THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
----------
TUESDAY, JUNE 28, 2016
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in Room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe,
Sessions, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Reed,
McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly,
Hirono, Kaine, King, and Heinrich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman McCain. Well, good morning. The committee meets
this morning to receive testimony on improving strategic
integration at the Department of Defense.
Last year, this committee conducted a series of 13 hearings
on defense reform, receiving testimony from many of our
Nation's most respected and experienced national security
leaders. We
determined that perhaps the top organizational challenge facing
the Department of Defense is the subject of today's hearing. We
included important provisions to address this challenge in the
National Defense Authorization Act [NDAA] for the fiscal year
2017, which was recently passed the Senate with 85 votes. Now,
we've done all of this work on a bipartisan basis, in keeping
with the best traditions of this committee.
We're honored to have a distinguished group of witnesses
this morning who are prepared to help us build upon the
committee's important work to date:
Jim Locher, distinguished Senior Fellow at the Joint
Special
Operations University, was the lead staffer on this committee
who helped to bring Goldwater-Nichols into being. We've
benefited yet again from his experience over the past year, and
we're pleased to welcome him back today.
Jim, welcome back.
Dr. Amy Edmondson, Novartis Professor of Leadership and
Management at the Harvard Business School, who has written
eloquently and extensively on breakthroughs in organizational
learning, leadership, and change.
General Stanley McChrystal, former Commander of Joint
Special Operations Command and Commander of U.S. and
international forces in Afghanistan. He is now managing partner
at the McChrystal Group and a leading expert on organizational
reform from the battlefield to the boardroom.
As most of you know, this is General McChrystal's first
congressional testimony since retiring from the military.
General, I know you've missed us.
[Laughter.]
Chairman McCain. So, on behalf of all of us----
[Laughter.]
Chairman McCain.--so, on behalf of all of us, let me
express this committee's gratitude and appreciation to you and
your family for your decades of distinguished service and for
your willingness to join us today. I'm pleased that we will
benefit again from your wisdom and expertise.
As we have stressed from the start of this inquiry, our
Nation is blessed by the many fine hardworking personnel, both
military and civilian, in the Department of Defense. These are
patriotic Americans who wake up every day to do difficult jobs,
often foregoing easier careers and more lucrative opportunities
because they care about the mission of keeping America safe. So
many gave their all to it. Unfortunately, the organization in
which they labor is not optimally structured to take full
advantage of their talents.
In particular, previous witnesses before this committee
have identified the following flaws in our defense
organization: hierarchical planning and decisionmaking
processes that too often
result in lowest-common-denominator recommendations to senior
leaders, what Michele Flournoy called ``the tyranny of
consensus''; misaligned bureaucratic incentives and a culture
that too often
rewards parochialism, inertia, risk avoidance, and the deferral
of decisions; and layering of management structures in
functional silos that too often result in decisions being
forced to higher and higher levels of management. These and
other organizational impediments do not only inhibit
efficiency, they also pose an obstacle to greater
effectiveness.
This is not the world of 30 years ago. America no longer
has the margin for error that we once enjoyed. We no longer
confront a single adversary, which an Industrial Age
bureaucracy could manage. Instead, we face a series of global
and enduring strategic competitions that all cut across our
defense organization, which is often aligned around functional
issues, regional geography, and separate warfighting domains.
As multiple witnesses have testified here, the only
officials at the Department of Defense with the authority to
integrate these activities at a strategic level are the
Secretary and the Deputy. In an organization as vast as the
Pentagon, that is an impossible burden to put on two people, no
matter how capable. We must face the uncomfortable fact that
too often, in too many cases, our enemies are getting the
better of us. It's not that they're better led or better
equipped or better positioned to succeed, or in possession of
better strategies. In fact, the opposite is true. The problem
too often is that we are simply too slow--too slow to adapt to
changing circumstances, too slow to gain the initiative and
maintain it, too slow to innovate, and too slow to do the vital
work of strategic integration, marshaling the different
functional elements of our defense organization to advance
unified strategies and implementing them effectively.
These problems are not unique to the Department of Defense.
Many organizations have adopted reforms to overcome similar
challenges, especially in the private sector, but also in
government, from the National Counterterrorism Center to
General McChrystal's transformation of the Joint--excuse me--of
General McChrystal's transformation of the Joint Special
Operations Command to similar reforms now unfolding at the
National Security Agency and the CIA [Central Intelligence
Agency].
All of these efforts have one idea in common, the idea of
cross-functional teams, or, in military terms, joint task
forces. The premise is simple. To succeed against our present
and future challenges, we need flatter, faster-moving, and more
flexible organizations. We've found that an effective cross-
functional team has a few key things in common. It is focused
on a discrete priority mission, it includes members from every
functional organization and bureaucracy that is necessary to
achieving that mission, and it empowers a team leader to
organize the team's efforts, build a collaborative culture, and
provide clear accountability for results.
As a result, the NDAA would require the Secretary of
Defense to create six cross-functional teams to address our
highest-priority defense missions. A related provision would
direct the Secretary to identify one combatant command and
organize it around joint task force headquarters rather than
service headquarters. The goals of both provisions are the
same, to improve strategic integration.
Now, judging by the Department's histrionic response, you
would think that we had eliminated parking at the Pentagon.
We've been
attacked for micromanaging the Department, when this
legislation is no more intrusive, and arguably less, than
Goldwater-Nichols. We've been attacked for growing this
bureaucracy, when the legislation would not add one billet to
the Department. We've been attacked for not understanding
cross-functional teams, when the examples of such teams that
the Department gives in its defense are anything but. Most
bizarrely, we have been attacked for undermining the
Secretary's authority, when the legislation would do the
opposite. The Secretary would identify the missions of the
teams, pick their leaders, approve their membership, and direct
their
efforts.
Though disappointing, this reaction is not surprising.
Change is hard. Reforms that empower the Secretary and improve
the mission at the expense of entrenched bureaucratic interests
are often resisted. This is how it was with Goldwater-Nichols
and other reforms. But, of all the things that Congress is
criticized for nowadays, often legitimately, this committee, at
its best, has consistently identified strategic problems facing
the Department of Defense [DOD] that it either could not or
would not address on its own. When this committee has
approached these problems seriously and rigorously, and
proposed reforms on a bipartisan basis, even disruptive but
necessary reforms, we've made the Department better in ways
that it could not do by itself. In the fullness of time, it has
often come to celebrate these efforts. I'm confident that the
same will be true of the reforms in this year's NDAA.
I thank our witnesses for helping us with their testimony
today.
My--I apologize for the length of my opening remarks, but I
had to mention the visceral and emotional reaction that we're
getting from these reforms from, particularly, the top levels
of the bureaucracy at the Pentagon.
I thank you.
Senator Reed.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
want to join you in welcoming our distinguished panel of
witnesses.
Thank you all very much. You are uniquely qualified to
discuss these proposals, given your vast expertise in so many
different ways.
As the Chairman indicated, Jim Locher is a former committee
staff member, was the principal author of the Goldwater-Nichols
Act as well as the legislation that created Special Operations
Command. In the period since those seminal achievements, he has
continued to study and document management issues and reform
opportunities for the Department of Defense and for the
national
security interagency process.
We look forward to your testimony and thank you, already,
Jim, for your advice and assistance as we've moved forward.
General Stan McChrystal has significant knowledge and
experience in Defense Department management and decisionmaking
processes from his service as Director of the Joint Staff, the
Commander, Joint Special Operations Command in the battle
against al Qaeda in Iraq, with courage and great personal
example and leadership--thank you--and, of course, Commander of
Coalition Forces Afghanistan, and as a commander in the 504th
Parachute Infantry Regiment. So, all of these things have given
him the
expertise needed for today's hearing. Since that time, as the
Chairman has indicated, he has used his post-Active Duty
service to apply these lessons in the context of other
agencies, and teaching at Yale.
So, thank you very much, General McChrystal.
Finally, we're indebted to Professor Edmondson for agreeing
to share with us her insights about the power of teams and what
it takes to build and sustain them inside--over years of
academic
research at Harvard and reflected in many publications. I
particularly have to thank you, and I think the committee does.
Dr. Edmondson was informed last night that her plane was
canceled, so she scrambled, grabbed her bag, and took off late
last night so she could be here.
So, thank you, Dr. Edmondson, for this.
As the Chairman indicated, this is a very important
hearing. The Office of Secretary of Defense and Department of
Defense as a whole is organized around differentiated
functions, just like most other enterprises. Large-scale
organizations have struggled, since the Industrial Revolution,
to find ways to effectively integrate across these silos of
functional experts. DOD's burden in this
regard is heavy. Its ability to integrate horizontally to
create sound strategies and effectively execute missions
acutely affects the
national security.
During the same time as the Goldwater-Nichols Act was
passed, in an effort to create jointness in the U.S. military,
businesses around the world began to implement effective new
methods for horizontal integration, methods that produced
better outcomes in less time at lower levels of management. A
principal innovation took the form of small empowered teams of
experts from the functional components of an enterprise whose
members were incentivized and rewarded for collaboratively
behaving in the interests of the whole enterprise. These cross-
functional teams ideally are the antithesis of committees or
working groups whose members staunchly defend the narrow
interests of their parent organizations. This teaming mechanism
and the cultural changes necessary to support it has become
highly developed in many organizations, and it's been widely
adopted in the private sector.
Despite this long and broad experience, it still isn't
easy. Even accomplished businesses that purposely pursue cross-
boundary teaming often fail to do it right. But, when it is
done correctly, the results can be remarkable. DOD and the
government generally has not yet implemented such innovations.
There are notable exceptions. General McChrystal has had
success with cross-functional teams, which has enabled agility
and integrated operations across a large-scale enterprise in
his operation in Iraq. Also, Secretary [of Defense] Gates,
himself, created a series of special task forces to address
critical issues when the Pentagon's standard processes failed
him, task forces that closely aligned with classic cross-
functional teams.
Furthermore, the Directors of both the CIA and the National
Security Agency, with the guidance of the consultant group,
McKinsey, have undertaken major organization reforms at their
agencies that have cross-functional teams at their core.
At this time, Defense Department leadership has concerns
with the committee's proposal which is set forth in section 941
of fiscal year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act. They
have stated that the Department already uses cross-functional
teams routinely and that the committee proposal constitutes
micromanagement.
I understand that the Department is going to have concerns
over any external directive for changing its management and
decisionmaking processes. However, I think that many of their
concerns may be from a misunderstanding of the intent and scope
of the committee's provision 941. I believe that the committee
and the
Department have a shared goal, and the committee wishes to see
the Department push the envelope for the teams it already uses,
building upon successful models of cross-functional teams that
have been used in and outside of government. I would hope that
the committee and the Department can have a dialogue to find
common ground on ways to maximize the effect of this proposal
so that national security benefits from an efficient management
tool will be derived by the Department of Defense.
I believe this is a--hearing is an excellent first step in
that dialogue, and I look forward to the witnesses' testimony.
Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Before I call our witnesses, since a
quorum is now present, I ask the committee to consider the list
of 1,676 pending military nominations, including this list of
the nominations of General David L. Goldfein, USAF [United
States Air Force], to be General and Chief of Staff, United
States Air Force; Lieutenant General Thomas D. Waldhauser, USMC
[United States Marine Corps], to be General and Commander,
United States
Africa Command; Lieutenant General Joseph L. Lengyel, Air
National Guard, to be General and Chief of the National Guard
Bureau.
Of these 1,676 nominations, 85 nominations are 3 days short
of the committee's requirement that nominations be in committee
for 7 days before we report them out. No objection has been
raised. These nomination--I recommend the committee waive the
7-day rule in order to permit the confirmation nominations of
these officers before the Senate goes out before the 4th of
July recess. I think there's one additional--one additional
that we may look at--we may ask the committee later on.
Is there a motion to favorably report these 1,676 military
nominations?
Senator Reed. So moved.
Chairman McCain. Is there a second?
Senator Inhofe. Second.
Chairman McCain. All in favor, say aye.
[A chorus of ayes.]
Chairman McCain. The ayes have it.
[Information referred to follows:]
Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee
Which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on June 28, 2016.
1. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Justin C. Legg) (Reference No. 418)
2. BG Matthew T. Quinn, ARNG to be major general (Reference
No.659)
3. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Bethany C. Aragon) (Reference No. 1102)
4. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Brian T. Watkins) (Reference No. 1105)
5. In the Army there are 12 appointments to the grade of colonel
(list begins with Susan M. Cebula) (Reference No. 1109)
6. In the Army there are 89 appointments to the grade of colonel
(list begins with John S. Aita) (Reference No. 1111)
7. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Jason B. Blevins) (Reference No. 1141)
8. Capt. Phillip E. Lee, Jr., USNR to be rear admiral (lower
half) (Reference No. 1241)
9. Capt. Alan J. Reyes, USNR to be rear admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 1242)
10. Capt. Mary C. Riggs, USNR to be rear admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 1243)
11. Capt. Carol M. Lynch, USNR to be rear admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 1244)
12. Capt. Mark E. Bipes, USNR to be rear admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 1245)
13. Capt. Brian R. Guldbek, USNR to be rear admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 1246)
14. Capt. Louis C. Tripoli, USNR to be rear admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 1247)
15. Capt. Robert T. Durand, USNR to be rear admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 1248)
16. In the Navy Reserve there are 6 appointments to the grade of
rear admiral (lower half) (list begins with Shawn E. Duane) (Reference
No. 1250)
17. Capt. Thomas W. Luscher, USNR to be rear admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 1251)
18. RADM(lh) Brian S. Pecha, USNR to be rear admiral (Reference
No. 1252)
19. RADM(lh) Deborah P. Haven, USNR to be rear admiral (Reference
No. 1253)
20. RADM(lh) Mark J. Fung, USNR to be rear admiral (Reference No.
1254)
21. In the Navy Reserve there are 3 appointments to the grade of
rear admiral (list begins with Russell E. Allen) (Reference No. 1255)
22. LTG Joseph L. Lengyel, ANG to be general and Chief of the
National Guard Bureau (Reference No. 1290)
23. Capt. Ronald R. Fritzemeier, USNR to be rear admiral (lower
half) (Reference No. 1295)
24. In the Marine Corps there are 9 appointments to the grade of
major general (list begins with Charles G. Chiarotti) (Reference No.
1331)
25. In the Navy Reserve there are 8 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Timothy M. Dunn) (Reference No. 1351)
26. In the Navy Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Suzanne M. Lesko) (Reference No. 1352)
27. In the Navy Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
captain (Andrew F. Ulak) (Reference No. 1353)
28. In the Navy Reserve there are 3 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Kenneth N. Graves) (Reference No. 1354)
29. In the Navy Reserve there are 3 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Steve R. Paradela) (Reference No. 1355)
30. In the Navy Reserve there are 18 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Charles M. Brown) (Reference No. 1356)
31. In the Navy Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Robert K. Baer) (Reference No. 1357)
32. In the Navy Reserve there are 70 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Brian S. Anderton) (Reference No. 1358)
33. In the Navy Reserve there are 14 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Christopher J.R. Demchak) (Reference No.
1359)
34. In the Navy Reserve there are 3 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Janette B. Jose) (Reference No. 1360)
35. In the Navy Reserve there are 4 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Eric R. Johnson) (Reference No. 1361)
36. In the Navy Reserve there are 6 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Jarema M. Didoszak) (Reference No. 1362)
37. In the Navy Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
captain (Conrado G. Dungca, Jr.) (Reference No. 1363)
38. In the Navy Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
captain (Alexander L. Peabody) (Reference No. 1364)
39. In the Navy Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
captain (Jason G. Goff) (Reference No. 1365)
40. General David L. Goldfein, USAF to be general and Chief of
Staff, US Air Force (Reference No. 1388)
41. LTG Thomas D. Waldhauser, USMC to be general and Commander, US
Africa Command (Reference No. 1392)
42. MG Charles D. Luckey, USAR to be lieutenant general and Chief
of Army Reserve/Commanding General, US Army Reserve Command (Reference
No. 1426)
43. In the Navy there are 5 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Olivia L. Bethea) (Reference No. 1440)
44. In the Navy there are 64 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Roger S. Akins) (Reference No. 1441)
45. In the Navy there are 14 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Richard S. Adcock) (Reference No. 1442)
46. In the Navy there are 31 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Andrew M. Archila) (Reference No. 1443)
47. In the Navy there are 13 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Shane D. Cooper) (Reference No. 1444)
48. In the Navy there are 30 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Johannes M. Bailey) (Reference No. 1445)
49. In the Navy there are 31 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Susan L. Ayers) (Reference No. 1446)
50. In the Navy there are 12 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Michael D. Brown) (Reference No. 1447)
51. In the Navy there are 14 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with John R. Anderson) (Reference No. 1448)
52. In the Navy there are 5 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Rachael A. Dempsey) (Reference No. 1450)
53. In the Navy there are 10 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Ann E. Casey) (Reference No. 1451)
54. In the Navy there are 10 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Claude W. Arnold, Jr.) (Reference No. 1452)
55. In the Navy there are 9 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Albert Angel) (Reference No. 1453)
56. In the Navy there are 9 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Thomas L. Gibbons) (Reference No. 1454)
57. In the Navy there are 215 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with David L. Aamodt) (Reference No. 1455)
58. In the Navy there are 5 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Michael B. Bilzor) (Reference No. 1456)
59. In the Navy there are 15 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Paul D. Clifford) (Reference No. 1457)
60. In the Navy there are 8 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Errol A. Campbell, Jr.) (Reference No. 1458)
61. In the Navy there are 6 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Jeffrey J. Chown) (Reference No. 1459)
62. In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Dewalt Brook) (Reference No. 1460)
63. In the Navy there are 4 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Aaron C. Hoff) (Reference No. 1461)
64. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
general (Robert P. Walters, Jr.) (Reference No. 1464-2)
65. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Shawn R. Lynch) (Reference No. 1480)
66. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Rita
A. Kostecke) (Reference No. 1482)
67. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Helen H. Brandabur) (Reference No. 1483)
68. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Barry K. Williams) (Reference No. 1484)
69. LTG Edward C. Cardon, USA to be lieutenant general and
Director of the Office of Business Transformation, Office of the Under
Secretary of the Army (Reference No. 1494)
70. BG Timothy P. Williams, ARNG to be major general (Reference
No. 1501)
71. Col. Joseph J. Streff, ARNG to be brigadier general (Reference
No. 1502)
72. In the Army Reserve there are 3 appointments to the grade of
brigadier general (list begins with Anthony P. Digiacomo, II)
(Reference No. 1503)
73. LTG David H. Berger, USMC to be lieutenant general and
Commander, US Marine Corps Forces Pacific and Commanding General, Fleet
Marine Force Pacific (Reference No. 1504)
74. In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade
of colonel (Joseph H. Imwalle) (Reference No. 1505)
75. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Douglas Maurer) (Reference No. 1506)
76. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Daniel L. Christensen) (Reference No. 1507)
77. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of commander
(Howard D. Watt) (Reference No. 1508)
78. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of commander
(Daniel Morales) (Reference No. 1509)
79. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain
(Stefan M. Groetsch) (Reference No. 1510)
80. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain
(Jeffrey M. Bierley) (Reference No. 1511)
81. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Michael G. Zakaroff) (Reference No. 1512)
82. MG Jeffrey L. Harrigian, USAF to be lieutenant general and
Commander, US Air Forces Central Command, Air Combat Command (Reference
No. 1515)
83. LTG Tod D. Wolters, USAF to be general and Commander, US Air
Forces Europe; Commander, US Air Forces Africa; Commander, Allied Air
Command; and Director, Joint Air Power Competence Centre (Reference No.
1516)
84. MG Stayce D. Harris, USAFR to be lieutenant general and
Assistant Vice Chief of Staff and Director, Air Staff, US Air Force
(Reference No. 1517)
85. MG Gwendolyn Bingham, USA to be lieutenant general and
Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (Reference No.
1518)
86. RADM Michael M. Gilday, USN to be vice admiral and Commander,
Fleet Cyber Command/Commander, TENTH Fleet (Reference No. 1519)
87. RADM Colin J. Kilrain, USN to be vice admiral and Commander,
North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Headquarters
(Reference No. 1520)
88. LTG Glenn M. Walters, USMC to be general and Assistant
Commandant of the Marine Corps (Reference No. 1522)
89. MG Gary L. Thomas, USMC to be lieutenant general and Deputy
Commandant for Programs and Resources, Headquarters, US Marine Corps
(Reference No. 1523)
90. MG Lewis A. Craparotta, USMC to be lieutenant general and
Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force (Reference No. 1524)
91. MG Joseph L. Osterman, USMC to be lieutenant general and
Deputy Commander, US Special Operations Command (Reference No. 1525)
92. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Lisa A. Seltman) (Reference No. 1526)
93. In the Air Force there are 2 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Andrew M. Foster) (Reference No. 1527)
94. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Ronald D. Hardin, Jr.) (Reference No. 1528)
95. LTG Terrence J. O'Shaughnessy, USAF to be general and
Commander, Pacific Air Forces; Air Component Commander for US Pacific
Command; and Executive Director, Pacific Air Combat Operations Staff
(Reference No. 1533)
96. In the Navy there are 26 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Ron J. Arellano) (Reference No. 1534)
97. In the Navy there are 28 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Katie M. Abdallah) (Reference No. 1535)
98. In the Navy there are 31 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Matthew J. Acanfora) (Reference No. 1536)
99. In the Navy there are 44 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Kenneth O. Allison, Jr.) (Reference No.
1537)
100. In the Navy there are 481 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Benjamin P. Abbott) (Reference No. 1538)
101. In the Navy there are 16 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Peter Bissonnette) (Reference No. 1539)
102. In the Navy there are 35 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Mylene R. Arvizo) (Reference No. 1540)
103. In the Navy there are 15 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with David R. Donohue) (Reference No. 1541)
104. In the Navy there are 12 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Randy J. Berti) (Reference No. 1542)
105. In the Navy there are 6 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Jodie K. Cornell) (Reference No. 1543)
106. In the Navy there are 16 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Patricia H. Ajoy) (Reference No. 1544)
107. In the Navy there are 14 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Erin M. Ceschini) (Reference No. 1545)
108. RADM Marshall B. Lytle III, USCG to be vice admiral and
Director, Command, Communications, and Computers/Cyber; Chief
Information Officer, J-6, Joint Staff (Reference No. 1385)
109. LTG Stephen W. Wilson, USAF to be general and Vice Chief of
Staff of the Air Force (Reference No. 1550)
110. MG Vera Linn Jamieson, USAF to be lieutenant general and
Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance, Headquarters, US Air Force (Reference No. 1551)
111. In the Air Force there are 44 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with David B. Barker) (Reference No.
1554)
112. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Edward J. Fisher) (Reference No. 1558)
113. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Thomas W. Luton) (Reference No. 1559)
114. MG Thomas W. Bergeson, USAF to be lieutenant general and
Deputy Commander, United Nations Command Korea; Deputy Commander,
United States Combined Forces Command; and Commander, Seventh Air
Force, Pacific Air Forces (Reference No. 1562)
115. BG Thomas W. Geary, USAF to be major general (Reference No.
1563)
116. LTG John L. Dolan, USAF to be lieutenant general and Director
for Operations, J-3, Joint Staff (Reference No. 1564)
117. MG Richard M. Clark, USAF to be lieutenant general and
Commander, Third Air Force, US Air Forces in Europe (Reference No.
1565)
118. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (David W. Mayfield) (Reference No. 1566)
119. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Michael P. Garlington) (Reference No. 1567)
120. In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Noela B. Bacon) (Reference No. 1568)
121. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Elizabeth M. Miller) (Reference No. 1569)
122. In the Navy Reserve there are 4 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Jennifer L. Donahue) (Reference No. 1570)
123. In the Navy Reserve there are 3 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Steven D. Bartell) (Reference No. 1571)
124. In the Navy Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Nathan Johnston) (Reference No. 1572)
125. In the Navy Reserve there are 11 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Philip Armas, Jr.) (Reference No. 1573)
126. In the Navy Reserve there are 10 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Catherine O. Durham) (Reference No. 1574)
127. In the Navy Reserve there are 13 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with James H. Burns) (Reference No. 1575)
128. In the Navy Reserve there are 3 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with John M. Hardham) (Reference No. 1576)
129. In the Navy Reserve there are 8 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Philip J. Abeldt) (Reference No. 1577)
130. In the Navy Reserve there are 22 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Lauren P. Archer) (Reference No. 1578)
_______________________________________________________________________
TOTAL: 1,677
Welcome, to the witnesses.
Dr. Edmondson, we'll begin with you. Thank you for
appearing today.
STATEMENT OF AMY C. EDMONDSON, NOVARTIS PROFESSOR OF LEADERSHIP
AND MANAGEMENT, HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL
Dr. Edmondson. Thank you so much for the opportunity to
offer my perspective on the use of cross-functional teams. Of
course, I am coming largely, but not exclusively, from research
in the business world. What I hope to do is briefly explain the
extensive use of teams in business, why teams are considered a
necessity for success in highly complex, fast-paced work; and,
second, I want to explain the requirements for success of such
teams, which are not to be taken for granted; third, I offer
some results of successful cross-boundary collaboration; and
finally, a quick assessment of the approach described in
section 941.
So, first, the use of teams in business organizations is
undeniably widespread. Fast-moving global markets, disruptive
technologies, and so forth, have forced technologies to find
new ways to innovate in recent years, and teams play a central
role in such innovation. But, teams are not new in the business
world. In fact, since the 1980s, the implementation of teams
has been recognized by both business leaders and business
academics as a vital strategy. Most workplaces today find that
almost 90 percent of people working in global corporations are
spending at least half of their time in some kind of team or
another. Whether it's production, sales, new product
development, systems innovations, or strategy formation, work
is increasingly carried out in teams.
I think there are two basic motivations explaining the
pervasiveness of teams:
First, and probably most important, certain activities
simply cannot be accomplished by individuals working in
separate functional--in silos. This is because they simply
require integration of disparate information, expertise, or
interests, and hence, require realtime interaction.
Second, research shows that participating in well-managed
teams promotes buy-in and commitment. In large, complex
organizations, people often feel a deep sense of loyalty to
their team, and this loyalty binds them to the organizations.
When they have the chance to work on an effective team, doing
meaningful work on behalf of the organization, it leads to all
sorts of lateral benefits, like engagement and commitment, in
addition to high performance.
Because it's central to my own research, I'll add that
teams are a key mechanism for organizational learning.
Analyzing existing processes and designing and implementing
strategies and changes is fundamentally a team sport. It takes
multiple perspectives to get it right. This is somewhat akin to
the Army's after-action reviews, which, by the way, are widely
celebrated by people in my field.
Change, of course, means anything from small process
improvements to dramatic organizational transformations, such
as those that allow iconic American companies, like IBM and
Ford, to
recover and thrive after extreme industry turmoil threatened
their very existence, while other industrial giants, like DEC
[Digital Equipment Corporation] or American Motors, disappear
into
history.
Now, I think it's important to note that teams come in many
forms. I think the most widely celebrated and noted are self-
managed teams in manufacturing, in service, leadership teams at
the very top of organizations, and, of course, cross-functional
teams, which are the engines of innovation.
So, consistent with section 941, I'm going to focus on
cross-functional teams. These are teams that bring individuals
together from different organizational units, or functions, to
share responsibility for a specific deliverable. It's done
because multiple areas of expertise or interests must be
considered simultaneously in doing the work or solving the
problem.
The clearest example of such work in business is new
product development. Several decades ago, new product
development was accomplished by people in separate functions--
sales, marketing, design, engineering, manufacturing,
accounting, and so on--each completing their respective tasks,
and then effectively throwing them over the wall to another
function to take over. Without back-and-forth discussion across
expert fields, this led to poor-quality products and very long
cycle times, because the complex problems of design,
manufacturing, distribution, cost containment, and so on, can't
be solved--certainly can't be solved in innovative and
effective ways without that realtime interaction.
So, consider what happened when the United States
automotive industry encountered steep competition from leading
Japanese car manufacturers in the 1980s. The Japanese
advantages were based, in part, on faster and higher-quality
product development processes. Ultimately, this sparked--not
quickly enough, mind you, but this sparked a dramatic
revolution in product development in the U.S. carmakers in the
1990s, when cross-functional team approaches were implemented.
As documented by some of my colleagues at Harvard Business
School, cross-functional teams dramatically improved product
innovation and development speed in the U.S. automotive
industry, and brought them back into the game.
Today, to meet market expectations for time and quality,
cross-functional teams are simply considered a necessity in
most industries. No successful company, for example, would
consider returning to the functional hierarchy for new product
development. But, cross-disciplinary teams have also improved
performance in patient care, supply-chain management, airline
service, to name just a few arenas that have been extensively
studied.
Yet, not every business task requires a team approach. For
some activities, individuals, in fact, can work more
effectively in--alone or alongside others in shared silos,
which some people prefer to call ``cylinders of excellence.''
Functional hierarchies work well when problems are well
understood and activities are routine.
As General McChrystal will describe, I am confident, these
management systems were designed based on a principle that
managers at the top had all the information they needed to tell
people what to do, when to do it, and what standards of
performance were acceptable. This principle no longer holds
when leaders lack the full expertise and information to design
and control the work or when situations are moving too fast,
and faster than communication can flow up and down the command-
and-control structures.
So, for problems that are novel or need input or
cooperation from multiple parts of the organization, it calls
for a team approach. This is why people in my field
increasingly call a company's ability to form and lead high-
performance teams absolutely critical to its long-term success.
Now, my second point is more sobering, and briefer. Merely
forming teams is not enough. Many teams fail because the
necessary conditions for their success have not been
implemented. These conditions are not outlandish or
complicated. Rather, they will strike most of you as common
sense. Yet, unless leaders invest the time and effort in
setting teams up for success, the conditions will not be
present.
First, teams must be designed well. This means they must be
given a clear, engaging direction for their work. They must
have appropriate composition, the right mix and size of skills
for the work. They have to have access to resources and
information, and leadership and coaching to help them manage
the process.
Second, teams must have norms and processes and attitudes
that enable teamwork. My own research emphasizes the impact of
team-leader actions on this. For instance, in studies in
several industries, I found that a climate of psychological
safety is critical.
Psychological safety means respect and trust, and basically an
expectation that candor is welcomed. Psychological safety,
however, matter most for teams with diverse backgrounds,
whether that's functions, profession, status, nationality, and
so forth. It matters especially in teams that are working on
innovation projects.
A widely publicized recent study at Google found that
psychological safety was, quote, ``far and away the most
important of five dynamics in explaining team performance.''
The other four, by the way, were team member dependability,
structure and clarity of roles and goals, meaning--meaning that
the people saw the work they did as personally important--and
impact--people believe that the work they were doing mattered
for the organization and,
indeed, for the world.
In this Google study, as in many others, a major factor in
whether teams had psychological safety was leader behavior. For
teams to work, the organization's culture must be supportive of
collaboration and teamwork. In my experience, organizations
that try to change the culture by focusing on the culture often
come up short. Rather, to create a collaborative culture, the
key is to identify
important work that requires collaboration to be accomplished,
assign strong individual contributors to a team with a clear,
engaging directive, and give them support and resources. It is
through doing that kind of work in a new way that a new culture
starts to take shape around it. In my view, shifting the work
drives culture change, rather than the other way around.
Cross-functional teams will no doubt be intentioned with
preexisting functional structures, especially at first. This is
exactly why it should be done. A part of their job is to force
the organization to make changes in how things get done, and it
can work well if the teams are supported from the top and if
they're framed as a way to help educate and shift the
organization from its current to its new state. This may sound
like a lot of work, and it is, but it's good work, and it's--
when it's done well, the results are worth the effort. It's not
just the occasional wild new product development success that
shows what can happen when a group of people work well together
across boundaries to overcome obstacles.
So, my third task is to briefly describe such successes
with the intent to tempt you to follow in their footsteps. The
rescue of 33 miners in Chile suddenly and profoundly trapped
between 2,000--beneath 2,000 feet of solid rock, following an
explosion and collapse of part of the mountain, was one such
example. Considered absolutely impossible at the outset, the
rescue succeeded because of
astonishingly effective and unusual collaboration across
diverse
experts. For 70 days, people from different organizations,
sectors,
industries, and nations worked together to innovate on the fly,
learning fast and furiously, mostly from failure, as they
generated and tested new ideas. Reflecting on the details of
that rescue as--which I studied extensively, it becomes
stunningly clear that a top-down command-and-control approach
would have failed utterly.
What was required, facing the unprecedented scale of the
disaster, was cross-boundary teaming, multiple temporary teams
of people working on different types of problems, coordinating
across these teams, as needed. It also required remarkably
effective leadership at the level of the individual teams and
at the very top of the organization.
The leader of the rescue operation, Andre Sougarret, came
from Codelco, the state-owned copper mining company. He was
invited by Chile's President, Sebastian Pinera, to help.
Sougarret is technically brilliant, but, more importantly, he
has astonishing organizational and interpersonal skills, and he
knew how to lead complex teaming.
In the far less dramatic context of business, companies
like Cisco and Google view cross-disciplinary teams as critical
to their success, to shorten product life cycles, so forth. The
remarkable business turnaround at Nissan in the early 2000s
from the brink of bankruptcy to renewed market leadership is
one of the best examples I know of how a very small number of
cross-functional teams working with clear direction from the
top can accomplish remarkable business results.
Very specifically, CEO Carlos Ghosn formed nine cross-
functional teams early in his tenure. Each was asked to address
a specific
organizational and business problem. The teams were composed of
middle managers and experts from different functions. Each was
headed by a team leader, and each had direct access to two
senior executives for direction, feedback, resources, and more.
Each was challenged to come up with a specific proposal
supported by clearly demonstrable financial impact. They worked
tirelessly for months, and they succeeded beyond anyone's
expectations, except perhaps Ghosn's. Team members reported the
experience as exhausting, but rewarding and meaningful. Within
2 years, the organization was on its way to recovery, with
impressive market and financial success.
Lastly, I briefly comment on the recommendations in section
941, which struck me as highly reasonable and arguably overdue.
Several of the objectives were--are particularly admirable and
consistent with current best practice on the use of cross-
functional teams in business. Notably, the desire to integrate
expertise and capacities for effective and efficient
achievement of Department missions, and to enable the
Department to focus on critical missions that span multiple
functional issues to frame competing and alternative courses of
actions, and to make clear and effective strategic choices in a
timely manner to achieve success.
I do agree that, if well implemented, cross-functional
teams could help the Department to anticipate, adapt, and
innovate rapidly to changes in the threats facing the United
States, and to exploit the opportunities to counter such
threats offered by technological and organizational advances.
It's also reassuring that the section recognizes impediments,
such as sequential hierarchical planning and decisionmaking
processes oriented around functional and bureaucratic
structures, and more. With awareness of these impediments, I
think progress is far more likely through leaders taking
precautions to plan and educate others.
In closing, great leaders in both business and government
recognize the complexity and uncertainty in which their
organizations are forced to operate today. It's their job to
bring the organizational structures and cultures along so that
they, too, can recognize and thrive in this new world. Teams
are, by no means, a panacea; but, when well designed, well led,
and motivated by the greater good, the results can be awe
inspiring.
I hope that this brief perspective from a management
researcher adds something of value to the discussion. It's an
honor for me to offer my insights in the service of this
effort.
So, thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Edmondson follows:]
Prepared Statement by Amy C. Edmondson, Ph.D.
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, Members of the Committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the utility of cross-
functional teams in business as input for the Department of Defense. My
goal is to explain the extensive business use of teams, and why they
are considered a necessity for success in today's highly complex, fast-
paced world. I also wish to explain why many cross-boundary
collaborations fail, along with what is known about the requirements
for success. Finally, I will describe the exciting results of
successful cross-boundary collaboration and teaming in modern
organizations.
As background, my expertise is in Organizational Behavior. I am on
the faculty at Harvard Business School, where I teach and conduct
research on organizational learning, and leadership for the past 25
years.
the extensive business use of teams.
The use of teams in business organizations is widespread. Fast-
moving global markets and disruptive technologies have forced companies
to find new ways to innovate, and teams play a central role in
innovation, as elaborated below. But teams are not new to the business
world. Starting in the 1980s and gaining momentum in the 90s, the
implementation of team-based structures has been long recognized by
business leaders and academics as vital to organizational
effectiveness. By 1998, 70% of workplaces with 50 employees or more
employees had implemented teams. \1\ In a recent survey, 88% of
managers in global corporations reported spending at least half of
their time working in teams. \2\ In sum, work in today's companies--be
it production, sales, new product development, systems innovations, or
strategy formation--is increasingly carried out in teams.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ M. Gittleman, M. Horrigan, and M. Joyce (1998). ``Flexible''
Workplace Practices: Evidence from a Nationally Representative Survey.
Industrial & Labor Relations Review, October 1998 52: 99-115.
\2\ The Ken Blanchard Companies (2006). Research findings: The
Critical Role of Teams. Accessed at www.kenblancard.com, June 24, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Two basic motivations explain the pervasive use of teams in the
private sector:
First, and most important, certain organizational activities cannot
be accomplished effectively by functional hierarchies because they
require people to integrate diverse information, expertise, or
interests, through back-and-forth sharing of ideas, information, and
constraints. When well-managed, diverse teams can accomplish this kind
of work effectively and quickly.
Second, research has shown that participating in well-managed teams
promotes commitment and buy-in. Indeed, teams are seen as a crucial
element of high-commitment work organizations. In large, complex
organizations, people often feel a deep sense of loyalty to their team
members rather than to the company as a whole, and it is this loyalty
that binds them to the organization. When individuals build
relationships across functions or departments by participating on a
team doing meaningful work for the organization, it leads to positive
outcomes including better employee engagement, retention, and
performance. In short, when teams work, both the technical and human
dimensions of the organization are well served.
Teams also function as a key mechanism for organizational learning,
itself a crucial source of competitive advantage in a fast-paced
environment. Most companies use teams to analyze current processes and
performance, and to design and implement necessary changes. This
reflection-action capability is akin to the U.S. Army's after action
reviews (AARs) widely celebrated by organizational researchers. This
collective learning capability is important because today's business
leaders consider ongoing organizational change a necessity for
continued success in a changing world. By organizational change, I
include small process improvements as well as the periodic major
organizational transformations that allow iconic companies like IBM and
Ford to recover and survive after extreme industry turmoil threatened
their very existence, while other firms, such as DEC or American
Motors, disappear into history.
cross-functional teams, collaboration, and collaborative cultures
Teams come in many forms in the corporate sector, most notably
self-managed teams, leadership teams, and cross-functional teams. The
related terms, collaboration and collaborative cultures, describe
attributes of effective teams, but do not directly indicate the
existence of formal teams of any kind. Collaboration refers to the
willingness of people, within and across company functions or
departments, to help each other to solve problems or carry out work on
behalf of the organization, especially in horizontal relationships.
Collaborative culture describes an atmosphere and behaviors of
cooperation trust, and mutuality an organization.
For the purpose of today's hearing, I focus on cross-functional
teams, which are teams created for the express purpose of accomplishing
work requiring multiple areas of expertise or interest to be considered
concurrently. A cross-functional team brings individuals from different
organizational units or functions to work together, with shared
responsibility for a specific deliverable. The clearest example of such
work in business is new product development (NPD). Several decades ago,
NPD was accomplished by people working in separate functions--sales,
marketing, design, engineering, manufacturing, accounting, and so
forth--each completing their respective tasks and ``throwing them over
the wall'' to the next function to take over. This was not only slow,
it produced poorer quality products and services. Without what
organizational scholars call ``reciprocal coordination''--or back-and-
forth discussions of merits, constraints, challenges and
opportunities--complex problems cannot be solved in innovative and
effective ways. In the U.S. automotive industry, blindsided by
dramatically faster and higher-quality product development in leading
Japanese car companies, a revolution in NPD occurred in the late 90s,
when a cross functional team approach was implemented. As documented by
Steve Wheelwright, Kim Clark and other scholars at HBS, cross-
functional teams dramatically improved product innovation and speed of
development in the US automotive and other industries. \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Wheelwright, S. C., & Clark, K. B. (1992). Revolutionizing
product development: Quantum leaps in speed, efficiency, and quality.
New York: Free Press.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To satisfy market expectations with respect to time and quality,
cross-functional teams are considered a necessity in most industries
today. No successful company would consider returning to the functional
hierarchy for NPD, for instance. Yet, crossdisciplinary teamwork is not
solely for new product development. Such teams have also improved
performance in patient care, supply chain management, and airline
service, to name just a few that have been extensively studied.
Not every business task requires a team-based approach. For many
activities, individuals can complete work more effectively alone and
teams can slow down progress. Hierarchical management systems were
designed based on the principle that managers had the necessary
knowledge and perspective to tell people what to do, when to do it, and
what standards of performance were acceptable. This principle no longer
holds when leaders lack the full set of expertise and information
needed to design and control the work, or when situations change faster
than communication can flow up and down command and control structures.
Functional hierarchies are a good design for efficiency, scale, cost
control, and accuracy when managing routine and well-understood
problems and activities. But certain problems--those that are novel
and/or need input or cooperation from multiple parts of the
organization--demand a team-based approach. This is why people in my
field increasingly consider a company's ability to form, lead and
nurture high-performance teams as critical to its long-term success.
\4\ Whether a business serves consumers (``B to C'') or businesses (``B
to B''), cross-functional teamwork is increasingly considered vital to
the delivery of high quality products or services in a timely manner to
customers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ J.R. Katzenbach & D.K. Smith, (2006) The Wisdom of Teams:
Creating the high performance organization. New York: Harper Business;
Deloitte University Press: Global Human Capital Trends 2016, ``The new
organization: Different by design,'' accessed at www.deloitte.com, June
24, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Merely forming a team does not guarantee its success. Good design
and good leadership are both crucial to ensuring that a team's
potential performance translates into actual performance.
the requirements for successful cross-functional teams
Even when people agree about the need for teams (and/or the need
for change), teamwork and change are difficult to implement. Existing
culture, habits, processes, systems (including IT systems) and rewards
can be barriers to success. Many people may sincerely agree with the
case for change but fear losing power, or fear feeling incompetent in
the proposed new organization. Or, people may not be given the
resources to implement the change. A frequent culprit is leaders who
fail to ``walk the talk''--to model behaviors that demonstrate that
they value collaboration. It is well known that people attach more
importance to what leaders do than to what they say.
Many teams fail because the necessary conditions for their success
have not been implemented. These conditions are not outlandish or
complicated; rather they will strike most listeners as common sense.
Yet, they cannot be taken for granted in organizations, because leaders
may fail to invest the effort in setting teams up for success for a
variety of reasons.
In short, team success starts with effective team design, including
establishing a clear, engaging direction for the team's work,
appropriate team composition (including the right size and skill mix
for the work), access to necessary resources and information, and team
leadership and coaching to help manage the team process. Next is the
effort to develop the norms (attitudes and behaviors) and processes of
healthy teamwork.
My own research examines both factors, design and process, but has
particularly emphasized process, and the impact of team member beliefs
and behaviors. Specifically, in multiple studies across industries, I
have shown that a climate of psychological safety is an important
factor in shaping team learning and team performance. Psychological
safety refers to a climate characterized by mutual respect and
interpersonal trust, in which candor is expected and welcomed.
Psychological safety matters especially in teams characterized by
diversity (of expertise, status, or demographics), and in teams working
to innovate or create new processes. A widely publicized study at
Google earlier this year found that psychological safety was ``far and
away the most important of . . . five dynamics'' in explaining team
performance at Google. The other four ``dynamics'' were team-member
dependability, structure and clarity of roles and goals, meaning
(people saw work they were doing as personally important) and impact
(people believed the work mattered and created change in the
organization). \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Duhigg, C. (2016) What Google learned in its quest to build the
perfect team. The New York Times Magazine February 28, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cross-functional teams will be in tension with the pre-existing
functional structure, especially at first. This is exactly why they
should be created. A part of their job is to force the organization to
make changes in how things get done. This can work well for creating
necessary changes, if the teams are supported from the top (with
resources and support) and if they are framed as `learning teams' to
help educate and shift the organization from its current to a new
state.
In my experience, organizations that try to change the culture by
focusing on the culture often come up short. Rather, to create a more
collaborative culture, the key is to identify important work that
requires collaboration to be accomplished. Assign strong individual
contributors to a team with a clear and engaging directive, and give
them support and resources. It is by doing the work in a new way that a
new culture starts to take shape. In my view, shifting the work drives
culture change, rather than the other way around.
the impact of successful cross-boundary collaboration on modern
organizations
The results of successful cross-boundary collaboration can be truly
remarkable. The dramatic rescue of 33 miners in Chile in 2010, trapped
beneath 2000 feet of rock was one such example; the rescue involved
collaboration across multiple areas of expertise, organizations and
even industries, in which people had to work together to innovate on
the fly through fast learning cycles. \6\ Reflecting on the details of
the rescue, which I studied extensively, it becomes stunningly clear
that a top-down, command-and-control approach would have failed. What
was required, facing the unprecedented scale of the mining disaster,
was cross-sector teaming--multiple temporary teams of people working
separately on different types of problems, and coordinating across
these teams, as needed. It also required remarkably effective
leadership--at the level of individual teams and at the very top of the
rescue organization.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Edmondson, A.C. (2012). Teaming: How organizations learn,
innovate and compete in the knowledge economy. San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the less dramatic context of business, leading companies like
Cisco and Google view cross-disciplinary teams as critical to their
success--to shorten project lifecycles and ensure that multiple
perspectives are used to identify and serve client needs. In the public
sector, breaking down silos can unleash improvements. A recent study
conducted by Deloitte and the Harvard Kennedy School showed how public
officials can mobilize people from different groups to work across
boundaries to create value. \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Eggers, W.D. and O'Leary, J. The power of cross-boundary
collaboration. Accessed June 26, 2016 from http://www.governing.com/
columns/mgmt-insights/power-cross-boundary-collaboration.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, a growing literature documents collaborations across
companies and sectors that produce innovations and results that would
be impossible for any organization to accomplish alone. \8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ 8 A.C. Edmondson (2016) ``Wicked Problem Solvers: Lessons from
Successful Cross-industry Teams.'' Harvard Business Review 94, no. 6
(June): 53-59.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The remarkable business turnaround at Nissan in the early 2000s--
from the brink of bankruptcy to renewed market leadership--is one of
the best examples I know of how a small number of focused cross-
functional teams, working with clear direction from the top, can
accomplish remarkable business results. \9\ CEO Carlos Ghosn formed 9
crossfunctional teams early in his tenure; each was asked to address a
specific organizational or business problem. The teams were composed of
middle managers and experts from different functions. Each team was
headed by a team leader and had direct access to specific senior
executives for direction, feedback, resources, and more. Each was
challenged to come up with a specific proposal supported by a clearly
demonstrable financial impact; they worked tirelessly for months, and
succeeded beyond anyone's expectation (except perhaps those of the
company's confident CEO!). Team members reported the experience as
exhausting but rewarding and meaningful. Within two years, the
organization was on its way to recovery, with impressive market and
financial success.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ M. Yoshino, and M. Egawa, (2006). Nissan Motor Co. 2002.
Boston. Harvard Business School Case # 9-303-042.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
comments on the elements of section 941.
The recommendations of section 941 strike me as highly reasonable
and arguably overdue. The following objectives in section 941 are as
particularly salient and admirable; they are consistent with current
best practice and theory on the use of crossfunctional teams.
To enable the Department to integrate the expertise and
capacities of the components of the Department for effective and
efficient achievement of the missions of the Department. (p. 694
bottom)
To enable the Department to focus on critical missions
that span multiple functional issues, to frame competing and
alternative courses of action, and to make clear and effective
strategic choices in a timely manner to achieve such missions . . . (p.
695)
To enable the Department to anticipate, adapt, and
innovate rapidly to changes in the threats facing the United States,
and to exploit the opportunities to counter such threats offered by
technological and organizational advances (p. 695)
It is reassuring that the section recognizes the following
impediments:
Sequential, hierarchical planning and decision-making
processes oriented around functional bureaucratic structures that are
excessively parochial, duplicative, resistant to integration, and
result in unclear, consensus-based outcomes that often constrain the
ability of the Department to achieve core missions effectively and
efficiently
Layering of management structures and processes that
result in decisions being made by higher levels of management where the
authority for cross-functional integration exists but detailed
substantive expertise is often lacking or being reduced to lowest
common denominator recommendations to senior leaders that suppress
rather than resolve disputes across functional organizations.
With awareness of these impediments, progress is far more likely,
through leaders taking necessary precautions to plan and educate senior
leaders and others.
I believe this important recommendation (from solutions) provides
essential guidance. The goal should not be to create more task forces
or committees to discuss and advise leadership about organizational
challenges but to create cross functional teams, advised and empowered
by top leadership to make decisions.
``Mission teams are decision-making organizations rather
than advisory bodies'' (p. 699)
Great leaders in both business and government recognize the
complexity and uncertainty in which their organizations must operate
today. It is their task to bring their organizational structures and
cultures along, so that they too can recognize and thrive in this new
world. Teams are by no means a panacea. But when well-designed, well-
led, and motivated by the greater good, the results can be awe
inspiring. I hope that this brief perspective from a management
researcher adds something of value to the discussion.
It is an honor for me to offer my insights in the service of this
effort. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Thank you very much.
Before we continue, there's one additional nomination to be
added to the military nominations. If there's objection--
without objection, so ordered.
[Information referred to on page 6.]
General McChrystal, welcome back before the committee.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL STANLEY A. McCHRYSTAL, USA (RET.),
MANAGING PARTNER, McCHRYSTAL GROUP
General McChrystal. Thank you, sir. Chairman McCain,
Ranking Member Reed, members of the committee, probably not
surprisingly, I've slept very soundly for the last few years.
[Laughter.]
General McChrystal. But, I woke up this morning, about 3:00
in the morning, bathed in sweat, and I sat up suddenly, and my
wife, Andy, reached over, and she grabbed me, and she says,
``What's wrong?'' I said, ``I'm having a nightmare. I think
I've got to go testify in front of the Senate Armed Services
Committee.''
[Laughter.]
General McChrystal. But, thanks for having me here today. I
really appreciate the opportunity to discuss the potential
value of cross-functional teams to the Department of Defense. I
believe they offer great potential for the Department to cope
effectively for what I think is a dramatically more complex
operating environment that it currently faces, and it will face
increasingly in the future.
As background, my experiences on the Joint Staff and in
both Afghanistan and Iraq led me to conclude that we uniformly
move forward with the best of intentions and often develop a
potentially successful strategy, but encounter structural,
institutional, and cultural obstacles to achieving the
collaboration and synergy necessary to prosecute those policies
and strategies effectively. This is not a new problem. Robert
Komer's 1972 narrative on Vietnam, entitled ``Bureaucracy Does
Its Thing,'' argued that, ``Independent of the wisdom or folly
of our strategy, America's inability to effectively execute
largely preordained failure.'' I reread his words in 2009, when
I was in Afghanistan, and it felt like he was writing from
Kabul.
It's not a lack of competence, courage, or commitment.
We've honed a force of seasoned professionals, peerless in the
mechanics of combat. But, Clausewitz reminded me that, at its
heart, war is politics, and there's far more to achieving
victory than tactical skill. We simply cannot forge the
multiple components of our national power together into the
kind of commitment--or teamwork needed.
Cross-functional teams are not the panacea for all the
challenges of national security, but they represent an
opportunity for fundamental change that should not be ignored.
My belief in the power of these cross-functional teams was
strongly reinforced when, in 2003, I took command of the Joint
Special Operations Command, probably the best special
operations force ever fielded. On paper, we had everything we
needed to succeed--quality people, generous resourcing, and
aggressive, thoughtful strategies. In Iraq, we were losing.
Designed to conduct carefully planned raids against targets
that had been exhaustively studied, our force was almost
elegant in its precision, carefully crafted to combat
traditional target sets.
But, 2003's al Qaeda in Iraq was fundamentally different
from its namesake, Osama bin Laden's 1988 creation. Leveraging
information technology to achieve a level of organic
adaptability, they reflected characteristics, attributes, and
capabilities never before seen in a terrorist organization.
Against this constantly changing enemy, we found our insular
collection of exquisitely honed skills unequal to the task. We
were impressively capable for a war different from that which
we found ourselves fighting. To win, we had to change.
So, we changed the way we did business. Traditionally built
around a culture of secrecy, we aggressively shared
information, delegated authority to more junior commanders,
invited liaisons from other departments and agencies into our
force, and formed a range of cross-functional teams. Together,
these efforts enabled us to harness all the resources of the
enterprise in support of our strategy.
But, it's important to make a small caveat. Much of the
historical attention given to this evolution is placed on the
procedural changes I just described. You'll often hear it said
that we became a network to defeat a network. That's a half-
truth. It implies we threw away the hierarchy, which we did
not. Many think there's a binary choice in today's world: be a
stable, but slow, hierarchy or an agile, but less controllable,
network. We actually became a hybrid of both models. We
retained the stability of the hierarchy, but moved with the
speed of a network, when needed. Cross-functional teams enabled
that.
The cross-functional teams that we built during this time
accomplished this feat by lowering the cultural and
institutional barriers that had hampered us during the early
days of the war. Removing these barriers enabled those teams to
push information, share critical assets, such as air support,
and, most importantly, built trust. This trust led to a common
purpose that has historically eluded larger hierarchical
organizations. The combination of trust and common purpose
permeated everything we did as an organization. Information and
asset-sharing would not have been possible without the
knowledge that partners' forces were working toward the same
goal and committed to the same fight. Interagency partners
would not have shared information and resources if they did not
trust our operators and analysts, and also known that we were
all after the same goal. Trust and common purpose were the
foundation upon which we could experiment with new processes.
The result was the evolution of an elite tactical command into
a networked, adaptable team of teams capable of strategic
effect.
Since leaving the military, I've worked with industry
leaders, many of whom have found themselves in complex
environments that have silently overwhelmed their traditional
ways of operating. Twentieth-century business practices,
famously articulated by Frederick Winslow Taylor in ``The
Principles of Scientific Management'' that relied on process
optimization and workforce efficiency, are simply no longer
effective. While Taylorism seems an antiquated relic of the
Industrial Age, effects of this school of thinking have been
surprisingly pervasive and insidious. While there have been
some challenges to Taylorism and its precepts, the central
belief that effective enterprise is a function of efficiency
and the role of management is to provide directions on how best
to advance this enterprise has been, until recently, relatively
unchallenged. Quite frankly, Mr. Chairman, this approach has
worked to varying degrees in a complicated world.
But, the complication has given way to the complex. The
environment we exist in today is radically different from that
of the 20th century. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee,
it's worth spending a bit of time on the significance of
operating in a complex environment, because we've entered into
an age and an environment for which we are dramatically under-
prepared.
We're used to operating in an environment where we expect
that our actions will have a predictable and consistent effect.
We no longer live in that world. In today's complex ecosystem,
events are driven by causes that are so numerous, so
intertwined that they elude our traditional attempts for
prediction and planning. Transformation is essential to
survival.
I've spent the last 5 years witnessing these kinds of
transformations in the private sector, transformations akin to
those that I saw with the Joint Special Operations Command.
But, these transformations begin with a choice. Organizations
that effectively adapt to complexity make the conscious
decision to assess their business and workforce against four
capabilities, and, in my opinion, define adaptable teams:
trust, common purpose, shared consciousness, and empowered
execution. Only when they make the choice to honestly assess
themselves against these criteria can they set the foundation
for structural, institutional, and cultural change.
Before any procedural or structural effects can be taken,
managers that have historically issued directives have to
transform themselves into leaders that empower their workforce.
No longer are they managers of efficiency; rather, they have to
learn how to trust their employees, build trust among their
employees, and enable their workforce, and set the conditions
for their success. These efforts, when coupled with continued
leadership and workforce training, result in an adaptable,
resilient organization and business that has the ability to
harness all the resources of the enterprise in support of a
strategy. In essence, those that succeed in this transformation
have invested in a movement away from a command structure to
one defined by teams.
We've silently entered into a world of complexity, but have
mired ourselves in a legacy approach that is no longer
effective in affecting desired change. Many societal
institutions have not evolved to adapt to this evolution. The
Department of Defense, in particular, has responded with ever-
increasing bureaucracy and procedures. I've seen, time and
again, that additional policies and guidelines will not lead us
to victory; rather, it's time to build the teams we need that
can adapt to ever-increasing complexity. The willingness to
implement these changes from senior leadership will have a--
will determine success from failure in the years ahead.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General McChrystal follows:]
Prepared Statement by General (Retired) Stanley McChrystal
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, Members of the Committee:
Thank you for having me here today to discuss the potential value
of the use of cross-functional teams to the Department of Defense. As a
general rule, I believe strongly that they offer great potential for
the Department to cope effectively with the dramatically more complex
operating environment it faces--and will increasingly face in the
future.
As background, my experiences during two tours on the Joint Staff,
and as Commander of the Joint Special Operations Command, and later
NATO's International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, have led
me to conclude that we uniformly move forward with the best of
intentions, but often focus on the wrong thing. We fixate on finding
optimal solutions to discrete problems, searching for the `right'
policy or strategy to a given challenge, and then find ourselves unable
to effectively execute it.
I've concluded that identifying a compelling answer or clever
strategy is easier than performing the actions necessary to implement
it. The Department of Defense has bright and committed people who are
dedicated to advancing American security interests and are
intellectually capable of devising sensible and effective answers. But
there are structural, institutional, and cultural obstacles to
achieving the collaboration and synergy essential to prosecuting these
policies and strategies effectively.
Let me be clear: this is not a new problem. While in Afghanistan in
2009 I re-read Robert W. Komer's 1972 searing narrative on Vietnam
entitled ``Bureaucracy Does Its Thing'' in which he concludes that
``whatever the wisdom of the various United States decisions to
intervene in Vietnam, there is also much to be learned by the way we
went about it . . . This does much to explain why there was such an
immense disparity between the cumulatively massive effort mounted and
the ambiguous results achieved. It also helps explain why such a gap
emerged between policy and performance--between the guidelines laid
down by the policymakers and what was actually done in the field.'' As
I read his words in 2009, I felt as though Komer was reporting from
Kabul.
A conclusion that I draw from these and other historical examples
is that often it is not the conflict that is unwinnable; or even the
crafting of an effective strategy; rather, it is our inability to
execute that prevents our victory.
To be sure, we rarely struggle with the technical or tactical
aspects of war. We have honed a force of seasoned professionals
peerless in the mechanics of combat. But Clausewitz reminded us that,
at its heart, war is politics, and there is far more to achieving
victory than tactical competence.
Today we are discussing the potential value of Cross Functional
Teams and they are clearly not the panacea for all the challenges of
national security--far from it. But they represent an opportunity for
fundamental change that should not be ignored.
My belief in the power of Cross Functional Teams was strongly
reinforced when, in 2003, I took command of the Joint Special
Operations Command--probably the best Special Operations Force ever
fielded. On paper, we had everything we needed to succeed: quality
people, generous resourcing, and aggressive, thoughtful strategies. Mr.
Chairman, in Iraq we were losing.
Designed to conduct carefully planned raids against targets that
had been exhaustively studied, our force was almost elegant in its
precision--carefully crafted to combat traditional target sets. But
2003's al Qaeda in Iraq was fundamentally different from its namesake,
Usama Bin Laden's 1988 creation. Leveraging information technology to
achieve a level of organic adaptability, they reflected
characteristics, attributes, and capabilities never before seen in a
terrorist organization. Against this constantly changing enemy we found
our insular collection of exquisitely honed skills unequal to the task.
We were impressively capable for a war different from that which we
found ourselves fighting.
Iraq held up a mirror to our forces and we realized that we were
incapable of achieving the necessary synergy at the required speed. Our
elite forces, we discovered, would not be able to execute our strategy
unless we fundamentally changed the way that we operated. Like most
organizations, the special operations community was proud and
courageous, but the product of legacy structures, processes, and
culture. To win we had to change.
We set about changing the way that we did business. Traditionally
built around a culture of secrecy, we aggressively shared information
with each other and with our interagency partners. Hierarchically
structured, we delegated authority to more junior commanders and
empowered them to take the necessary action to pursue the enemy.
Historically separated from our interagency partners by an antiquated
set of sclerotic bureaucratic processes, we invited liaisons from other
Departments and Agencies and collocated them with our operators in an
effort to overcome parochial infighting and increase common purpose.
These efforts, when taken in tandem, enabled us to harness all of
the resources of the enterprise in support of our strategy. We would
spend years refining this approach but the ultimate result was a
tapestry of partnerships and information sharing that would fundamental
change the way that we executed the fight.
But it is important to make a small caveat. Much of the historical
attention given to this evolution is placed on the procedural changes I
just described: you'll often hear it said that we became a network to
defeat a network. That's a half truth. It implies that we threw away
the hierarchy--which we didn't. Many think there's a binary choice in
today's world--be a stable, but slow, hierarchy; or an agile, but less
controllable, network. We actually became a hybrid of both models. We
retained the stability of the hierarchy, but moved with the speed of a
network when needed.
The cross-functional teams that we built during this time
accomplished this feat by lowering the cultural and institutional
barriers that had hampered us during the earlier days of the war.
Removing these barriers enabled these teams to push information, share
critical assets such as air support, and most importantly--build trust.
This trust led to a common purpose that has historically eluded large
hierarchical organizations.
The combination of trust and common purpose permeated everything we
did as an organization. Information and asset sharing would not have
been possible without the knowledge that partner forces were working
towards the same goal and committed to the same fight. Interagency
partners would not have shared information and resources if they did
not trust our operators and analysts and also known that we were all
after the same goal. Trust and common purpose were the foundation upon
which we could experiment with new processes. The result was the
evolution of an elite tactical command into a networked, adaptable team
of teams capable of strategic effect.
After I left the military, industry leaders wanted to learn how
they too could create and use cross-functional teams. Many industry
leaders found themselves in complex environments that had silently
overwhelmed their traditional ways of operating. 20th century business
practices that relied on process optimization and workforce efficiency
were no longer effective. Much like my experience in Iraq, today's
complex world held a mirror to industry leaders. They too realized that
they were structurally incapable of operating at the speed required for
success.
Much as we had relied on precision military strikes, many industry
leaders had come to rely on antiquated notions of reductionist
thinking. My team and I found that businesses were also subject to
their environments--and the 20th century was squarely defined by the
precepts of scientific management. This school of thought, epitomized
by Frederick Winslow Taylor, emphasizes the need to optimize business
processes by identifying a singular best practice that maximized
efficiency and would be a requirement for all workers. Under this
paradigm, creativity, flexibility, and the use of historical artisan
practices by individual laborers were be replaced by systematically
studied standards.
Beyond transforming industry processes, Taylor also changed the
relationship between management and workers. In The Principles of
Scientific Management, Taylor leaves little ambiguity regarding his
thoughts on the relationship between the two when he wrote, ``[A
laborer] shall be so stupid and so phlegmatic that he more nearly
resembles in his mental make-up the ox than any other type . . . he
must consequently be trained by a man more intelligent that himself
into the habit of working in accordance with the laws of this science
before he can be successful.''
When said like this, Taylorism seems antiquated and a relic of the
Industrial Age. But the effects of this school of thinking have been
surprisingly pervasive and insidious. While there have been some
challenges to Taylorism and its precepts, the central belief that
effective enterprise is a function of efficiency and the role of
management is to provide directives on how best to advance this
enterprise has been, until recently, relatively unchallenged. Quite
frankly, Mr. Chairman, this approach has worked to varying degrees in a
complicated world. But the complicated has given way to the complex.
The environment we exist in today is radically different than that of
the 20th century.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, it is worth spending a bit
more time on the significance of operating in a complex environment
because we have entered into an age and an environment for which we are
dramatically underprepared. It is easy to focus on discrete problems or
issues but what we are encountering as a society is much more
fundamental.
We are used to operating in an environment where we expect that our
actions will have a predictable and consistent effect. That is not the
world we live in any longer. In a complex system, events are driven by
causes that are so numerous, so intertwined, that they elude our
traditional attempts for prediction and planning.
Many businesses are still structured for 20th century problems. I
come across leadership teams that operate using antiquated management
practices, trying in vain to master a complicated environment that has
silently given way to complexity. Despite their best efforts, they have
found that they cannot scale and adapt at the speed required to stay
competitive. Many have learned what I concluded in Iraq: doing the same
thing, but harder and with more intensity, will not lead to victory.
As the Special Operations community saw in Iraq, complexity cannot
be confronted using antiquated methods. But redefining structures,
processes, and cultures can enable an organization to work as a
network. Building trust and common purpose across a team will ensure
that the foundation is in place to have all resources leveraged towards
the same problem--and any other problems that may arise out of this
newly complex environment.
I have spent the last five years witnessing these kinds of
transformations in the private sector--transformations akin to those
that I saw with the Joint Special Operations Command. But these
transformations begin with a choice. Organizations that effectively
adapt to complexity make the conscious decision to assess their
business and workforce against four capabilities that, in my opinion,
define adaptable teams: trust, common purpose, shared consciousness,
and empowered execution.
Only when they make the choice to honestly assess themselves
against these criteria can they set the foundation for structural,
institutional, and cultural change.
Before any procedural or structural efforts can be taken, managers
that have historically issued directives have to transform themselves
into leaders that empower their workforce. No longer are they managers
of efficiency; rather, they have to learn how to trust their employees;
build trust amongst their employees; and enable their workforce and set
the conditions for their success.
I've come to believe these managers will have learned how to lead
like gardeners by tending to their workforce, providing the conditions
for success, and allowing teams to grow to meet their business
challenges. They know when to get involved and, just as importantly,
they know when to step back and give their teams space and freedom to
operate.
Once leaders have critically assessed themselves, they need to
assess the organization. Leadership needs to understand the level of
trust within the organization because all future cooperation and
collaboration stems from individual and organizational trust. They also
need to honestly assess whether employees and business units are
working towards a common purpose, or whether legacy compensation
structure incentivize individuals and business units to watch out for
themselves. Executive teams should know whether teams have the
requisite information to accomplish their goals, and whether these
teams are empowered to act on timely and sensitive information.
These foundational efforts enable companies to create the processes
and structure that link strategy to execution. Much as the efforts of
the Special Operations community led to the organic creation of cross-
functional teams, building trust and common purpose throughout
businesses allows them to operate as networks. Trust enables teams and
individuals to honestly and constructively assess their goals,
priorities, and efforts against those of the rest of the organization.
Common purpose, built through leadership, education, and time, will
align an organization towards an overall strategy.
I have seen businesses create cross-functional teams using many of
the same tools that the Joint Special Operations Command used in Iraq
and Afghanistan. Businesses create clear plans that outline vision,
mission, and guiding principles. Once they set the true north goals for
the organization, executives encourage their business units to create
supporting objectives, strategies, and initiatives. Following these
efforts to strategically align the organization, leadership teams
conduct an analysis of how to empower the workforce by determining
decision-making roles and delegating authority to the lowest possible
level.
Business leaders then bring this construct to life through the
establishment of information-sharing forums, very much like we did in
the Special Operations community through the daily Operations and
Intelligence briefs. These forums serve as both the lifeblood and
connective tissue necessary to create a networked, adaptable
organization. Executive teams have the opportunity to provide overall
guidance to the organization while business units can provide feedback,
best practices, and critical information to enable timely action.
Much as Special Operations Forces partnered with interagency
counterparts to quickly identify and act upon opportunities, the
aggressive flow of information throughout the organization both enables
the identification of business opportunities that may have otherwise
been missed as well as the quick creation of cross-functional teams
across business units to take advantage of these opportunities.
In a previous life, I saw leads from intelligence community
partners trigger a series of raids against a terrorist or insurgent
network. Now I see sales teams providing insight to developers on
customer requirements; financial advisors from different divisions
collaborating on how best to service an important client; and insular
technical researchers collaborating with one another on which tools can
best advance their collective work.
What is equally important is what I didn't see. During my
leadership of the Joint Special Operations Command, I consciously took
myself out of tactical-level decisions. This enabled my units to
quickly pursue opportunities that my involvement would have otherwise
delayed. Similarly, I see business executives similarly taking
themselves out of lower-level business operations. They are allowing
their teams to react quickly to fleeting opportunities. The rapid
pursuit of these transient openings allows an organization to face
complexity by mobilizing rapid responses based upon relevant and timely
information--not the predilections of an executive team whose position
is based on increasingly obsolete methods of planning.
These efforts--when coupled with continued leadership and workforce
training--result in an adaptable, resilient organization or business
that has the ability to harness all of the resources of the enterprise
in support of that strategy. In essence, those that succeed in this
transformation have invested in a movement away from a command
structure to that defined by teams.
My experience in the military and advising industry has taught me
that we can take the most brilliant people in the world, put them up
against a problem, and they will fail if the structural, cultural, and
institutional conditions do not support effective execution. I believe
this is the case with the Department of Defense.
We have silently entered in a world of complexity but have mired
ourselves in a legacy approach that is no longer effective in effecting
desired change. Many societal institutions have not evolved to adapt to
this evolution. The Department of Defense in particular has responded
with ever-increasing bureaucracy and procedures. I've seen time and
time again that additional policies and guidelines will not lead us to
victory. Rather, it is time to build the team we need that can adapt to
ever increasing complexity. The willingness to implement these changes
from senior leadership, however, will determine success from failure in
the year ahead.
It has been a great pleasure and honor for me to offer my lessons
and experiences in the service of this effort.
Thank you.
Chairman McCain. A very strong and very informative
statement, General, based on many years of experience, and we
thank you.
Mr. Locher, for the benefit of my colleagues, once served
as staff director of this committee and was one of the key
persons in the framing and passage of Goldwater-Nichols. He and
I were together in the Coolidge administration.
[Laughter.]
Chairman McCain. Go ahead. Welcome back, Mr. Locher.
STATEMENT OF HONORABLE JAMES R. LOCHER III, DISTINGUISHED
SENIOR FELLOW, JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIVERSITY
Mr. Locher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm delighted to be
here for this important hearing.
Mr. Chairman, I commend you and Senator Reed for your bold
leadership on section 941. If enacted, this provision would
initiate a long overdue revolution in defense organization. As
with all major change efforts, legislative approval and
Pentagon implementation will not be easy.
Many similarities exist between the Goldwater-Nichols Act
and section 941. In both cases, decades of evidence showed the
need for fundamental organizational changes. Today, as in 1986,
the Pentagon bureaucracy is in denial about its organizational
defects, and is actively resisting congressional efforts. Just
like in 1986, this committee needs to overrule this predictable
initial response from the defense bureaucracy, work directly
with Pentagon top leaders, who should be able to see the merits
of this provision, press ahead with section 941, and revitalize
the Pentagon.
The committee's 13 hearings last fall revealed many
organizational problems hampering Pentagon performance. Section
941 addresses 4 of these problems:
First, the rigid functional structure of the Pentagon which
hampers collaboration, limits a focus on missions and results,
demands more people and more management levels, resists new
ideas, and sub-optimizes decisions. The Pentagon's nearly
exclusive reliance on functional structure denies an ability to
handle the complexity and pace of today's defense challenges.
The second problem, Mr. Chairman, involves processes, such
as the planning, programming, budget, and execution system.
Pentagon processes are sequential, stove-piped, consensus-
driven, and Industrial Age. The Pentagon's bureaucratic culture
and its functional orientation have shaped the design of these
ineffective
processes.
The third problem centers on weak civilian leadership
traditions. The Office of the Secretary of Defense has given
insufficient attention to leadership tasks and leadership
development. The emphasis has been on technical and functional
skills, not leadership skills.
The fourth problem arises from the Pentagon's culture,
which is too rule-oriented, bureaucratic, risk-averse in
decisionmaking, and competitive among components. Although the
Pentagon's culture is typical of most public sector
organizations, it is misaligned with what is required for
effective performance in today's complex, fast-changing
security environment.
Some of the organizational problems were identified at the
time of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, quite a while ago. The
Senate Armed Services Committee staff study observed, and I
quote, ``Lost in the functional diffusion of the current
Department of Defense organization is a focus on the central
strategic objectives and missions of the Department of
Defense.'' There have been efforts between Goldwater-Nichols
and now to create cross-functional teams in the Department of
Defense. Secretary William Perry tried so in 1995, and Deputy
Secretary of Defense Gordon England, in 2006, sought to create
these cross-functional teams, but did not succeed.
In his testimony before the committee and his recent book,
``A Passion for Leadership,'' Secretary Robert Gates registered
his frustration with the bureaucratic hierarchy, its lack of
lateral communications, and its consensus decisionmaking. Gates
observed that the only way he could get things done was to
create special multidisciplinary task forces equivalent to
cross-functional teams. He related, and I quote, ``In every
senior position I held, I made extensive use of task forces to
develop options, recommendations, and specific plans for
implementation. I relied on such ad hoc groups to effect change
instead of using existing bureaucratic structures, because
asking the regular bureaucratic hierarchy almost never provides
bold options or recommendations that do more than nibble at the
status quo.''
Secretary Gates used crosscutting task forces, and I quote,
``because so many different elements of the Pentagon were
involved, and because they were,'' in his words, ``immensely
useful, indeed crucial.'' Significantly, in his testimony last
October, Secretary Gates concluded that periodic intervention
by task forces with the intense personal involvement of the
Secretary was not, to use his word, ``sustainable.'' He
expressed regret that an institutionalized solution to this
problem was not found before he departed the Pentagon.
Mr. Chairman, section 941 provides the institutional fix
that Secretary Gates sought. Four of the five major elements of
section 941 are tightly linked to the Pentagon organizational
problems I described. The other, and the one that appears first
in section 941, is--requires an organizational strategy, an
overarching blueprint to guide the four other elements and all
other required organizational changes.
The second element of section 941 would require the
Secretary of Defense to establish cross-functional teams to
manage major missions and other priority outputs that are
intrinsically cross-functional. These mission teams must be the
centerpiece of any plan for improving Pentagon performance.
The third element of section 941 would require actions to
begin to shape an organizational culture that is collaborative,
team-oriented, results-oriented, and innovative. Culture is so
important and difficult to change, it requires a persistent
leadership emphasis and proper incentives for the rank-and-
file.
The fourth element would prescribe training and personnel
incentives to support these new approaches. Among its
prescriptions, this element would require completion of a
course of instruction in leadership, modern organizational
practice, collaboration, and functioning of mission teams for
Senate-confirmed officials in the Department of Defense.
The fifth element would require the Secretary of Defense to
take appropriate action 1 year after his or her appointment to
simplify OSD's [Office of the Secretary of Defense] structure
and processes. Once it is clearly established that empowered
mission teams will be responsible for cross-functional work
under the close supervision of the Department's top leadership,
it should be much easier to identify unnecessary and
duplicative organizational structures and ineffective
crosscutting teams.
As I mentioned, Mr. Chairman, the Pentagon has not yet
endorsed the opportunity afforded by section 941. To date, the
administration alleges that this provision is overly
prescriptive and would undermine the authority of the
Secretary, add bureaucracy, and confuse lines of
responsibilities. These concerns are entirely misplaced and
suggest a lack of understanding of collaboration and teaming
concepts or a lack of understanding of the intent of section
941. If section 941's prescriptions were faithfully
implemented, they would empower the Secretary, streamline
bureaucracy, and clarify responsibility for cross-functional
integration.
Organizations cannot normally reform themselves. The
Pentagon has repeatedly demonstrated its inability to undertake
organizational change, even when evidence of the need for
change is compelling. As Secretary Gates and other Pentagon
leaders discovered, they could occasionally override
bureaucratic norms, but they could not reform the institution
for lasting improvements in performance.
Mr. Chairman, given the Pentagon's longstanding inability
to correct its organizational defects, Congress would be fully
justified, even obligated, just as it was in the Goldwater-
Nichols Act, to use its constitutional powers to make rules for
the government in regulation of the land and naval forces.
Congress has a right to demand that the Department of Defense
adopt 21st century organizational practices, that it have an
organizational strategy, that it employ cross-functional teams
for cross-functional missions and work, that it have an
organizational culture aligned with operating requirements,
that it provide proper training and incentives, and that it
employ simplified structure and processes.
Section 941 contains the right ideas to launch the Pentagon
on the use of cross-boundary collaboration. It provides better
and faster ways of integrating expertise and making decisions
that are imperative in today's complex, fast-paced security
environment. It also finds the right balance between
congressional mandate and freedom of action for the Secretary
of Defense.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I congratulate the committee
on this historic initiative. This is precisely the sort of
well-researched, well-grounded, empirically justified
intervention by Congress that is needed from time to time. In
due time, it will be widely admired for its impact.
The transformational changes envisioned in section 941
would require inspired, committed leadership by senior Pentagon
officials, and vigorous oversight by Congress. However, once
instituted, pursued, and perfected, the use of cross-functional
teams can have a positive impact every bit as great as the
original Goldwater-Nichols legislation.
To take this historic step, all the committee has to do is
stay undeterred on its current course. For the benefit of those
we send in harm's way and the entire Nation, I encourage you to
do so.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Reed and all the
members of the committee, for your visionary leadership on this
critical issue.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Locher follows:]
Prepared Statement by James R. Locher III
I commend Chairman McCain and Ranking Member Reed for their bold
leadership on section 941 in the Senate's version of this year's
National Defense Authorization Act. If enacted, this provision would
initiate a long overdue revolution in defense organization. As with all
major change efforts, legislative approval and Pentagon implementation
of section 941 will not be easy, but if successful, resulting
improvements in performance would be transformational.
Many similarities exist between the Goldwater-Nichols Act and
section 941. In both case, decades of evidence showed the need for
fundamental organizational changes. In 1986, the Pentagon bureaucracy
was in denial about its organizational defects and actively resisted
congressional efforts. Senior Pentagon officials blasted the Senate
Armed Services Committee's draft of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The
Secretary of the Navy said its proposed strengthening of combatant
commanders ``would make hash of our defense structure.'' The Commandant
of the Marine Corps said, ``I know of no document which has concerned
me more in my 36 years of uniformed service to my country.'' The Chief
of Naval Operations declared that the bill ``was terribly flawed and
certainly not in the best interests of national security.'' The Army
and Air Force Secretaries and Chiefs also criticized the committee's
draft. Even after the Senate approved the Goldwater-Nichols Act by a
vote of 95-0, Pentagon hardliners were urging a presidential veto.
Since then, however, history has provided overwhelming evidence of the
wisdom of Congress in overruling Pentagon objections and mandating
sweeping defense reforms.
This scenario is playing out again this year. The Senate Armed
Services Committee has identified major organizational problems and has
proposed in section 941 farsighted solutions. The issue is largely the
same as in 1986, except that the proximate problem is not the inability
to orchestrate cross-service collaboration at the strategic and
operational levels. Instead, the problem is the inability to
orchestrate cross-functional collaboration among the Pentagon's many
bodies of functional expertise. The Pentagon's inability to manage
cross-functional security problems quickly and authoritatively results
in poor direction and support to our deployed military forces around
the globe. This committee is intent on giving the Secretary of Defense
the tools to remedy this deficiency.
In response, the Pentagon has strongly objected to the committee's
proposed provision, alleging it ``would undermine the Secretary of
Defense's ability to exercise authority, direction, and control over
the Department; blur lines of responsibility and control over
resources; require the issuance of numerous unnecessary and burdensome
policies, directives, and reports.'' Just like 1986, the committee
needs to overrule this predictable initial response from the defense
bureaucracy, work directly with the Pentagon's top leaders who should
be able to see the merits of the provision, press ahead with section
941, and renew and revitalize the Pentagon's headquarters.
organizational problems and their causes
Before discussing organizational problems in the Department of
Defense (DOD), I would like to offer two important observations. First,
arguing for dramatic changes in Pentagon organization does not
represent a criticism of defense civilian or military personnel. They
are working extremely hard and with unyielding commitment.
Unfortunately, much of their hard work is wasted in an outdated system.
Measures to enable Pentagon staff to work smarter, not harder, need to
be put in place.
Second, for all of its deficiencies, the Department of Defense is
widely seen as the most capable Federal department. This is in large
part due to the quality and drive of its workforce, and a military
culture that values detailed planning processes to cover ``what if''
and ``what next'' contingencies. But because the Pentagon confronts the
government's most dangerous and diverse challenges, being better than
the rest of the government is not a useful yardstick for measuring
performance. Instead we must ask whether the department is capable of
effectively accomplishing the full range of its missions. The last
fifteen years offer considerable evidence that it is not.
The committee's thirteen hearings last fall revealed critical
organizational problems hampering Pentagon performance. Testimony
addressed many symptoms of these problems:
A steady growth in the number of personnel.
Excessive number of management layers and senior
personnel.
Poor information sharing.
Processes are slow, cumbersome, and frequently over-
centralized.
Inability to make clear strategic choices--Decisions
watered down to achieve consensus. Consensus products avoid and obscure
difficult trade-offs, clear alternatives, and associated risks.
In the absence of a guiding strategy, the budget drives
strategy, rather than vice versa.
Slow rates of innovation--The Pentagon has repeatedly
shown it is not a learning organization.
The Pentagon cannot integrate its functional activities
(e.g., manpower, acquisition, policy) along mission or outcome lines--
There is a weak mission orientation. The focus is on material inputs,
not mission outputs. Limited cross-boundary collaboration has resulted
in duplicative efforts and ``shadow organizations'' (parallel
structures created because of distrust of other offices sharing
information or being responsive). Integration can only be performed at
the level of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and then
only infrequently and often late to need.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is
increasingly unmanageable, unwieldy, and underachieving--Accountability
is unclear, and decision rights are uncertain, especially for cross-
functional issues.
Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries of Defense feel
poorly supported by the OSD staff.
Resistance to change, driven largely by denial about
altered circumstances.
Consequently, and of greatest concern, the inability to
anticipate and prepare well to meet future challenges.
These symptoms evidence four underlying problems. First, the rigid
functional structure of the Pentagon hampers collaboration, limits a
focus on missions and results, demands more people and more management
levels, resists new ideas, and sub-optimizes decisions. Each
headquarters staff in the Pentagon--OSD, Joint Staff, service
secretariats, and military headquarters staffs--are organized
exclusively along functional lines, that is along the major areas of
input activity, such as logistics, intelligence, and health affairs.
Functional expertise is absolutely essential; it provides the building
blocks for more advanced organizational approaches. Thirty years ago,
businesses were also organized exclusively by functional components,
what are more popularly called silos or stovepipes because of their
rigid boundaries and non-collaborative cultures. Since then,
corporations moved away from an exclusive dependence on functional
structure because it was ill suited to the complexity and pace of the
changing business environment. Instead, they now emphasize means for
cross-boundary collaboration and teaming.
Unfortunately, the Department of Defense is still stuck with its
antiquated structure. It is now, and has been for some time,
experiencing the same performance shortfalls that businesses suffered.
The Pentagon's outmoded vertical silos are unable to handle the
complexity and pace of today's defense challenges. In futile efforts to
make this functional structure work, the Pentagon has added personnel,
management layers, and numerous ineffective cross-cutting committees.
The additional people, layers, and unproductive committees have
steadily increased the complexity of OSD's work.
A second fundamental problem involves processes, such as the
Planning, Programming, Budget, and Execution System. Pentagon processes
are sequential, stove-piped, consensus-driven, and industrial age. The
Pentagon's bureaucratic culture and its functional orientation have
shaped the design of these processes. In addition, because leaders put
a premium on coordination and consensus, processes are slow, and their
products are watered down. The resulting outputs are more acceptable to
the larger bureaucracy but at the expense of clarity and utility to
senior leaders.
A third problem centers on weak civilian leadership traditions. OSD
has given insufficient attention to leadership tasks and leadership
development. The emphasis has been on technical and functional skills,
not leadership skills. Many OSD officials in leadership positions are
superb individual achievers (e.g., lawyers, diplomats, analysts) who
have never led and been held accountable for larger organizational
effectiveness. They are incredibly hard working and dedicated, but they
have not been prepared for their demanding leadership responsibilities.
This problem is also exacerbated by promotion criteria that favor
technical and bureaucratic skills and by the failure to make leadership
skills a priority in hiring decisions.
The fourth problem arises from the Pentagon's culture, which is too
rule-oriented, bureaucratic, risk adverse in decision-making, and
competitive among components. Although the Pentagon's culture is
typical of most public-sector organizations, it is misaligned with what
is required for effective performance in today's complex, fast-changing
security environment. Culture--a below-the-surface but important
element of organizational effectiveness--encompasses vision, values,
norms, assumptions, beliefs, and habits and serves as the backbone of
every organization. Of the importance of culture to organizational
performance, Louis V. Gerstner Jr., former IBM Chairman and CEO, said,
``I came to see, in my time at IBM, that culture isn't just one aspect
of the game--it is the game.'' In noting ``Culture eats strategy for
breakfast,'' management guru Peter F. Drucker was observing that even
an excellent strategy would not succeed if the organization's culture
does not support it.
Among many causes of the Pentagon's cultural woes, foremost is a
lack of shared values; it does not have agreement on vision, missions,
or principles. Organizational and individual incentives and management
styles and actions have reinforced the current culture. Excessive
criticism of ``failures,'' especially by Congress, has served to
inhibit justified risk taking. Assumptions shaping Pentagon staff
behaviors have never been explicitly examined. This must be a starting
point for productive changes in culture. It should be noted that
Pentagon culture is long-standing and entrenched and will not be easily
changed. A determined and sustained effort will be required.
long history of these problems
Some of these four organizational problems were identified many
years ago, and in fact understood at the time of the Goldwater-Nichols
Act. In the mid-1980s, the Senate Armed Services Committee (where I was
then working) worried about the lack of mission integration in the
Pentagon's headquarters. A committee staff study observed, ``Lost in
the functional diffusion of the current DOD organization is a focus on
the central strategic objectives and missions of DOD.'' The committee
found much truth in an observation made by Drucker in 1974:
The functional principle [of organizational design] . . . has
great clarity and high economy, and it makes it easy to
understand one's own task. But even in small business it tends
to direct vision away from results and toward efforts, to
obscure the organization's goals, and to sub-optimize
decisions. It has high stability but little adaptability. It
perpetuates and develops technical and functional skills, that
is, middle managers, but it resists new ideas and inhibits top-
management development and vision.
To create a mission focus, the committee considered three options:
mission-oriented under secretaries, mission-oriented assistant
secretaries, and a mission-functional matrix organization.
Unfortunately, the committee was unable to arrive at a viable solution
to the lack of mission integration. Advanced organizational ideas, such
as cross-functional teams, were not then known.
Toyota was the first corporation to decisively tackle the problems
and inefficiencies of a functional structure. It did so in the mid-
1980s, just as Goldwater-Nichols was being enacted. To design an
automobile, Toyota augmented its functional structure by creating an
empowered team of experts from each functional area. When this cross-
functional team produced a superior design with 30 percent of the
effort, the age of cross-functional teams was born. Because cross-
functional teams provided such a competitive advantage, their use
spread quickly in big business worldwide. Effectively employing cross-
functional teams is not easily done. There are many challenges. Yet
today, more than 50 percent of the work and most important work in big
businesses are done in cross-functional teams that operate at all
levels, from field operations to production lines to corporate
headquarters.
In 1989, President George H.W. Bush appointed me to the position of
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity
Conflict ASD (SO/LIC). My experiences as ASD (SO/LIC) reinforced the
Senate Armed Services Committee's observation about the lack of mission
integration. Because I had worked in OSD for ten years beginning in
1968, I had previously experienced the intense competition among the
Pentagon's functional silos. A report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel
in 1970 captured this ongoing organizational characteristic well. It
said, ``Many of the difficulties result from the structure of the
Department of Defense itself, which almost inevitably leads people to
`adversary' relationships rather than toward cooperation in the
interests of the department--and the nation--as a whole.'' This great
insight is as true today as in 1970.
In the Cohen-Nunn amendment, the Senate Armed Services Committee
structured ASD (SO/LIC) to be a mission-oriented official. It assigned
the assistant secretary the supervision of two mission areas--special
operations and low-intensity conflict--including policy and resources.
This mission responsibility brought my office into conflict with the
OSD functional silos. They guarded their turf quite zealously. With few
exceptions, efforts to collaborate with them were futile. Every issue
and initiative resulted in exhausting, time-consuming, bureaucratic
warfare. OSD was rampant with adversarial relationships, leading to a
popular description of the office as a collection of feuding fiefdoms.
ASD (SO/LIC) is confronting the same bureaucratic problems today.
The problems of functional silos did not go unnoticed in the
Pentagon. In 1995, Secretary of Defense Bill Perry directed the use of
Integrated Product Teams (cross-functional teams by another name) in
defense acquisition. Perry argued that DOD ``must move away from a
pattern of hierarchical decision-making to a process where decisions
are made across organizational structures by integrated product teams.
It means we are breaking down institutional barriers.'' Unfortunately,
Perry's mandate for multidisciplinary teamwork bore little fruit. It
contained a fatal flaw: It permitted the heads of functional silos to
carefully control their Integrated Product Team members. Moreover, it
was narrowly limited to acquisition issues.
In 1997, several colleagues and I worked closely with Deputy
Secretary of Defense John White on a study of OSD. As in the Senate
Armed Services Committee's Staff Study, we found functional
differentiation immediately below the Secretary and Deputy Secretary
preventing collaboration on broader issues. But in this instance, we
saw the crippling consequences firsthand. The Deputy Secretary was the
first point of integration for missions and other priority outputs. The
number, scope, and complexity of issues made this an impossible task.
The Secretary and Deputy Secretary could only intervene on a small
number of issues, served up by the bureaucracy as it laboriously
churned through the endless compromises involved in various processes.
My study colleagues and I found ourselves in complete agreement with a
1980 study of OSD by William K. Brehm, which observed, ``Management
activities are also strongly vertical and compartmentalized, with
little horizontal integration and teamwork.'' In our own report, we
noted:
The Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and their immediate assistants
too often find the support provided by OSD--despite staff
dedication and hard work--inadequate to the needs of the two
leaders. Criticisms of staff support and advice center on the
narrowness of perspective, lack of integrated multi-functional
advice, and excessive functional parochialism. OSD leaders
often feel that few on the OSD staff share their perspective
and can provide comprehensive advice on broad, complex issues.
In 2005 to 2006, Deputy Secretary Gordon England favored the
creation of cross-functional teams for major missions. He had reached
this conclusion as a result of organizational performance studies in
support of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Research for
these studies revealed that Joint Staff personnel participated in more
than 860 cross-boundary groups, but only a handful performed well the
small task of sharing information, let alone making decisions. The 2006
QDR report promised transformation represented by, among other things,
``a shift from stove-piped vertical structures to more transparent and
horizontally-integrated structures,'' but it failed to deliver this
result. The department's leadership was unable to overcome the strong
parochial opposition of the heads of the functional silos, and an
effort to create meaningful cross-functional teams was again
frustrated.
secretary gates's experiences
In his testimony before the committee last October and in his
recent book, A Passion for Leadership, Secretary Robert Gates
registered his frustration with the bureaucratic hierarchy, its lack of
lateral communications, and its detrimental tendency to default to
consensus decision-making. Gates observed that the only way he could
get things done was to create special multidisciplinary task forces
(equivalent to section 941's cross-functional teams):
In every senior position I held, I made extensive use of task
forces to develop options, recommendations, and specific plans
for implementation. I relied on such ad hoc groups to effect
change instead of using existing bureaucratic structures
because asking the regular bureaucratic hierarchy (as opposed
to individuals within it) if the organization needs to change
consistently yields the same response: it almost never provides
bold options or recommendations that do more than nibble at the
status quo.
Secretary Gates used cross-cutting task forces ``because so many
different elements of the Pentagon were involved,'' and because they
were, in his words, ``immensely useful, indeed crucial.'' He said
``They break down the bureaucratic barricades to change and . . . can
also help build collaboration and relationships that will result in
long-term benefits.'' He used the task forces to ``accomplish . . .
priority tasks associated with turning the wars around,'' including
``the MRAP vehicles, additional intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance capabilities, shortened medevac times, counter-IED
equipment, and even the care of wounded warriors.'' He noted the task
forces became ``an essential instrument for me not just on matters
relating to the wars but on other problems in the department as well.''
Gates paid a lot of personal attention to the task forces,
including the careful selection of their leaders. He also notes he had
to delegate meaningful authority to the task forces. He said the task
force leaders had to ``provide the freedom for members to offer options
and ideas, incorporate what is helpful, and then gently but firmly . .
. guide the majority to the desired change, even if they come up with a
different way of implementing it.'' Most notably, Gates said he
discovered that it ``routinely required my personal involvement to keep
the bureaucracy from smothering their efforts.'' Finally, it is
significant that in his testimony to the committee last October,
Secretary Gates concluded that periodic intervention by task forces
with the ``intense, personal involvement of the Secretary'' of Defense
to override prevailing bureaucratic ethos was not, to use his word,
``sustainable.'' He expressed regret that an institutionalized solution
to this problem was not found before he departed the Pentagon.
section 941--an institutionalized solution
Section 941 provides the institutionalized fix that Secretary Gates
sought. Four of the five major elements of section 941 are tightly
linked to the Pentagon's organizational problems identified by the
committee. The fifth element is an overarching blueprint to guide the
other four elements and all other required organizational changes. It
requires the Secretary of Defense to formulate an organizational
strategy for the Department of Defense. The Pentagon does not have an
organizational strategy defining how the department needs to change in
order to improve performance and prescribing a plan of action for
achieving that critical transformation. A key element of the required
strategy is the identification of the department's most important
missions and other outputs.
It is worth considering the importance of organizational strategy.
Too many Secretaries of Defense approach the job of running one of the
world's largest bureaucracies as if it were unmanageable. In their
limited tenures, they are faced with innumerable problems, many of
which are exceedingly complex and some of which are urgent. Instead of
taking responsibility for the overall performance of Pentagon
headquarters, they decide, ``I'll do what I can to help solve the most
immediate and important problems.'' This is understandable. It also
explains why manifest Pentagon inadequacies have been left unaddressed
for so long.
If we are to have a better functioning Pentagon headquarters, it is
imperative that the next Secretary approach the job intent on
understanding why the Pentagon behaves as it does and determined to
change those behaviors so that the organization can more routinely
generate alternative, integrated solutions to complex problems and more
routinely solve or at least manage complex security threats well. Only
by translating this understanding and determination into an
organizational strategy for improved performance will the next
Secretary be able to communicate his or her common vision to the
Pentagon's many functional elements and support staffs.
The second element of section 941 would require the Secretary of
Defense to establish cross-functional teams to manage major missions
and other priority outputs that are intrinsically cross-functional.
This work would start with the Secretary of Defense identifying the
missions, other high-priority outputs, and important activities for
which ``mission teams'' and sub-teams would be established. The second
step would be issuance by the Secretary of a directive on the role,
authorities, reporting relationships, resourcing, manning, and
operations of mission teams and specifying that mission teams are
decision-making bodies. The third step would require establishment of
three teams within six months of the Secretary's appointment and
another three teams 90 days later.
These cross-functional mission teams must be the centerpiece of any
plan for improving Pentagon performance. For decades, it has been
recognized that the Pentagon's functional components war with each
other to the detriment of the common enterprise. Cross-functional
teams, which operate at all levels and in many guises, have overcome
similar problems in private-sector organizations. The teams cull
representation from diverse functional entities, are empowered and held
accountable for real, measurable progress against an assigned mission.
Although there are many nuances in precisely how these teams can and
should function, there are a few well-established rules of the road.
They cannot be merely ``advisory,'' or they will tend to make
recommendations that are popular rather than take action to actually
solve the problem at hand. They must be protected from the functional
bureaucracies or they will be hobbled and degenerate into consensus
decision-making. However, successfully managed with the attention,
authority, and active support of the Secretary of Defense, they would
revolutionize decision-making in the Pentagon to the initial discomfort
of some, but the lasting benefit of our servicemen and women and the
entire nation.
The third element of section 941 would require actions to begin to
shape an organizational culture that is collaborative, team-oriented,
results-oriented, and innovative. These steps include preparation of a
departmental directive on purpose, values, and principles for the
operation of OSD. A second directive would specify the required
collaborative behavior by OSD personnel. A third directive would
describe the methods and means to achieve a high degree of
collaboration between OSD and the Joint Staff. I have already explained
why culture is so important and difficult to change. It requires a
persistent leadership emphasis and proper incentives for the rank-and-
file staff. Once in a while, it may also require replacing functional
leaders who prove too hidebound to change for the greater good.
The fourth element would prescribe training and personnel
incentives to support these new approaches. Among its prescriptions,
this element would require completion of a course of instruction in
leadership, modern organizational practice, collaboration, and the
functioning of mission teams for Senate-confirmed officials in the
Department of Defense. It would also require successful service as
leader or member of a cross-functional team for promotion in the Senior
Executive Service above a level specified by the Secretary. This
element is really a corollary to the previous element and the
imperative to transform the Pentagon culture over time.
The fifth element would require the Secretary of Defense to take
appropriate action one year after the date of his or her appointment to
simplify OSD's structure and processes. Almost all Secretaries and
Deputy Secretaries of Defense and innumerable studies support cutting
if not slashing the Pentagon staffs. What must be remembered is that it
is largely the inability of the Pentagon to generate cross-functional
assessments of problems and corresponding solutions that fuels the
growth of bureaucracy. Each functional entity, aware that it needs more
diverse information and expertise, but unable to collaborate with other
functional organizations that have them, tries to build its own ``in-
house'' supplementary bodies of functional experts. This is why so many
regional offices have functional staff elements embedded in them, and
vice versa. Once it is clearly established that empowered cross-
functional mission teams will be responsible for cross-functional work
under the close supervision of the department's top leadership, it
should be much easier to identify the unnecessary and duplicative
organizational structures and ineffective cross-cutting groups where
staff can be cut without hurting the chances of mission success.
isolated cases of cross-functional successes
A few critics of section 941 have argued that cross-functional
teams may work for building a car or some other widget, but they won't
work in the national security realm. This is demonstrably false. On
occasion, the national security establishment has used cross-functional
teams to good effect at all levels and diverse missions. At the
strategic level, President Dwight D. Eisenhower employed cross-
functional teams in Project Solarium, the highly acclaimed effort that
formulated a grand strategy for his administration. President
Eisenhower was personally involved in conceiving the small, seven-
person, cross-functional teams, which had representatives from multiple
department and agencies and unrestricted access to information
throughout the government. He identified their leaders and members, and
once the teams generated their output, Eisenhower personally reviewed
the results with the entire top echelon of his national security
leaders. In retrospect, Project Solarium has been a widely admired and
much commented upon cross-functional model for grand strategy decision-
making. Unfortunately, it is not a frequently repeated exercise because
it made the leaders of the functional departments and agencies
distinctly uncomfortable, something Eisenhower well understood and
embraced as necessary for getting worthy results.
Another example of a strategic-level cross-functional team that
generated incredible results is the Reagan Administration's team that
countered Soviet disinformation. Today, one frequently hears that it is
just too difficult to counter terrorist propaganda effectively. Many
held the same view of Soviet disinformation in the 1970s and 1980s.
However, a small cross-functional team with representatives from the
CIA, DIA, FBI, NSC, Department of State, INR, and USIA produced
reports, briefings, and press releases that exposed Soviet
disinformation at little cost to the United States, but negated much of
the multi-billion-dollar Soviet disinformation effort. I penned a
foreword to a National Defense University study that lays out in
exquisite detail just how effective this group was:
The group successfully established and executed United States
policy on responding to Soviet disinformation. It exposed some
Soviet covert operations and raised the political cost of
others by sensitizing foreign and domestic audiences to how
they were being duped. The group's work encouraged allies and
made the Soviet Union pay a price for disinformation that
reverberated all the way to the top of the Soviet political
apparatus. It . . . changed the way the United States and
Soviet Union viewed disinformation. With constant prodding from
the group, the majority position in the United States national
security bureaucracy moved from believing that Soviet
disinformation was inconsequential to believing it was
deleterious to United States interests--and on occasion could
mean the difference in which side prevailed in closely
contested foreign policy issues. The working group pursued a
sustained campaign to expose Soviet disinformation and helped
convince Mikhail Gorbachev that such operations against the
United States were counterproductive.
Like Project Solarium, this interagency team worked its issues
virtually non-stop with incredible dedication from its small group of
experts. However, in terms of budget outlays, the group cost the United
States almost nothing, demonstrating the amazing efficiency of
collaboration when it is made to work well.
At the operational level, Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)--
South is viewed as the gold standard for interagency collaboration and
intelligence fusion. For over twenty years, the cross-functional
leadership team at JIATF-South has been remarkably effective at meeting
the demanding operational challenge of keeping pace with resource-rich
and creative drug organizations. Year in, year out, their organization
is responsible for 70-80 percent of all U.S. federal, state, and local
law enforcement disruptions of cocaine shipments to the United States.
By one recent count the organization successfully integrated the
efforts of the four branches of the military, nine different agencies,
and eleven partner nations, defying experts who claim such levels of
collaboration are not possible among executive departments and
certainly not on an international basis.
Another cross-functional success at the operational level, albeit
of much narrower scope than JIATF-South's enterprise, is the task
forces orchestrated by Under Secretary of Defense Walter Slocombe in
the Clinton administration during 1994-2001. The failure in Somalia in
1993 and national embarrassment of the USS Harlan County being turned
away from a Haitian port shortly thereafter were both largely the
result of feuding between the Departments of State and Defense and the
inability of the Pentagon to keep pace with events in the field and
coordinate a common Pentagon approach to managing these operations.
When Under Secretary Slocombe took office, he established small cross-
functional task forces to handle such complex contingencies and used
them to good effect for the rest of the 1990s. These task forces were
not as empowered or as cross-functional in representation as JIATF-
South, but they worked their diverse issues full-time and with the
benefit of multiple experts drawn from around the Pentagon. They
managed interagency frictions better and helped the department keep
abreast of fast-moving and complex developments in Haiti and the
Balkans among other places.
In terms of field activities, a well-known example of a cross-
functional team is the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development
Support (CORDS) program in Vietnam. This pacification effort
successfully integrated military and civilian components of the U.S.
Government that previously had worked at cross-purposes. The program is
now widely acknowledged as a major step forward, although it was, in
the words of its dynamic and uncompromising first leader, Ambassador
Robert W. Komer, ``too little, too late.'' It is not surprising in the
least that it took a leader of Ambassador Komer's organizational acumen
to decode and demonstrate the kind of field-level interagency
collaboration that was required to defeat the category of multi-
functional security threat we now widely refer to as a ``hybrid
threat.''
A much more current example of effective field-level cross-
functional collaboration is the High-Value Terrorist Targeting Teams in
Iraq, led by General Stanley McChrystal. We have the great good fortune
and privilege to hear from General McChrystal during this hearing.
Suffice it to say that his exquisite example of the power of cross-
boundary collaboration did not just involve interagency teams in the
field. General McChrystal worked his collaborative approach at the
highest echelons of the U.S. Government and inside the Pentagon to
ensure his field teams received the support they needed from the larger
national security bureaucracy.
Unfortunately, these successes are as rare as they are impressive.
Empowered, cross-boundary collaboration can be made to work at all
levels and for a wide variety of cross-functional problems and
missions. What we need to do is make them more the norm than the rare
exception, and that requires institutionalizing a mechanism for senior
leaders to employ.
administration's concerns with section 941
As I mentioned at the outset, the Pentagon has not yet endorsed the
opportunity afforded by section 941. To date, the administration
alleges that this provision is overly prescriptive and would undermine
the authority of the Secretary, add bureaucracy, and confuse lines of
responsibility. These concerns are entirely misplaced and suggest a
lack of understanding of collaboration and teaming concepts or a lack
of understanding of the intent of section 941. If section 941's
prescriptions were faithfully implemented, they would empower the
Secretary, streamline bureaucracy, and clarify responsibility for
cross-functional integration. Let me address one-by-one the
administration's concerns.
Does section 941 undermine or empower the Secretary? Section 941
explicitly guards against lowest-common-denominator consensus-seeking
by giving the Secretary the wherewithal to ensure cross-cutting groups
are unconstrained by the need to safeguard the equities of group
members' organizations. The teams report to the Secretary and derive
all their authority from the Secretary, who choses their missions,
approves their charters, and specifies the scope of their authority.
The Secretary can approve, reject, or modify team decisions, but if the
teams are established as section 941 specifies, they certainly will not
produce the kind of meaningless consensus outputs that former Secretary
Gates warns against: outcomes where ``everyone agrees to say
collectively what no one believes individually.''
Does section 941 add or roll back bureaucracy? Teams that would be
established under section 941 would be empowered to cut through the
existing bureaucratic processes that protect functional equities at the
expense of accomplishing cross-cutting missions efficiently and
effectively. Section 941 would empower teams to overcome the currently
time-consuming and energy-sapping consensus-building processes that
exhaust so much human capital for so little effect. Consensus processes
enervate not just the rank and file but senior leaders as well,
including the Secretary. Secretary Gates said in his book, A Passion
for Leadership:
I cannot begin to calculate the time I have wasted in
meetings--and task forces--as the person in the chair strives
to get all participants to agree to a single recommendation or
point of view, instead of presenting several options to their
higher-up. This process inevitably yields the lowest common
denominator, the most bland of initiatives, which everyone can
agree to. Pap. A leader who seeks true reform will never get
bold ideas or recommendations from task forces or working
groups if consensus is the priority objective.
Section 941 would obviate the need for activities that masquerade
as horizontal integration but in reality waste precious time and
expensive human capital.
Finally, section 941 would require the Secretary of Defense to take
action ``as the Secretary considers appropriate'' to ``streamline the
organizational structure and processes of the Office of the Secretary
of Defense.'' Thus section 941 actually requires a reduction of
bureaucracy, but does so after the empowered cross-functional teams are
working effectively and producing results not obtainable from
consensus-driven committees. At that juncture, it would be easier for
the Secretary to determine where the staff can best be reduced.
Does section 941 clarify or confuse lines of responsibility? The
Administration expresses concern that section 941 ``would give
directive authority over other elements of the Department and authorize
them to requisition personnel and resources from other parts of the
Department without regard to competing mission requirements.'' The
``without regard'' to competing requirements is not true. Section 941
has a specific provision that allows the head of a functional component
to appeal to the Secretary to review and modify decisions made by one
of the Secretary's cross-functional teams. However, the
administration's concern demonstrates that the bureaucracy correctly
understands that section 941 teams would be truly empowered to pursue
missions, unlike the existing consensus-based committees. Rather than
being concerned that the section 941 teams would confuse lines of
responsibility, the Pentagon bureaucracy is actually worried about the
explicit responsibility and accountability section 941 confers upon the
Secretary's mission teams. These teams would break the functional silos
monopoly on advising and acting on behalf of the Secretary and Deputy
Secretary.
Section 941 specifies that the Secretary ``shall delegate to the
team such decision-making authority as the Secretary considers
appropriate in order to permit the team to execute the strategy;'' that
within that delegated authority, ``the leader of a mission team shall
have authority to draw upon the resources of the functional components
of the Department and make decisions affecting such functional
components;'' and that ``the leaders of functional components may not
interfere in the activities of the mission team.'' That language
clarifies rather than confuses responsibility. The efficacy of such
teams was demonstrated by Secretary Gates, who created multiple cross-
cutting organizations to deal with vital issues that the Pentagon
bureaucracy could not solve, including care for wounded warriors and
priority warfighting acquisition programs. These groups functioned as
genuine cross-functional teams and produced positive outcomes for the
Secretary unconstrained by the functional hierarchy. They had clear
authority to accomplish their missions and did not ``confuse the lines
of authority'' for Secretary Gates.
Does section 941 represent congressional micromanagement or
legitimate use of congressional powers? Once it is clear that section
941 actually empowers the Secretary, rolls back bureaucracy, and
clarifies who will work cross-functional problems for the Secretary, it
is not hard to challenge two more general criticisms aimed at section
941. Asserting section 941 is overly prescriptive supports the
administration's broader charge that the current National Defense
Authorization Act ``micromanages'' DOD. Once it is clear that section
941 is not overly prescriptive, but instead provides the Secretary with
a tool he controls and directs at his discretion, the micromanagement
allegation withers. Congress is simply asking the Secretary to use 21st
century organizational practices well established in the private sector
whose efficacy is strongly substantiated by research literature.
Can Secretaries of Defense achieve section 941's objectives without
a legislative mandate? Thirty years of evidence argue convincingly they
cannot. Even Secretary Gates, one of the most skillful secretaries,
proved unable to engineer an institutional solution for the Pentagon
bureaucracy's tendency to produce least-common-denominator consensus
positions. Even so, both critics who level the micromanagement charge
and supporters, like Secretary Gates, of empowered cross-cutting
mechanisms often wonder whether the use and management of cross-
functional teams ought to be left entirely to the discretion of the
Secretary of Defense. They sometimes add, correctly, that the teams
cannot succeed without strong support and careful oversight from the
Secretary anyway.
However, this point just underscores the importance of
strengthening the Secretary's ability to use cross-functional teams.
Few Secretaries understand the importance of cross-functional teams,
much less how to create and manage them well. Secretary Gates stressed
the critical importance of such groups, but otherwise, senior Pentagon
leaders have largely overlooked their potential.
Legislating the use of cross-functional teams would ensure the
department pays close attention to their potential. It would also
reinforce the legitimacy of the teams and increase the willingness of
career civil servants to support them. Perhaps most importantly,
resistance to their use by functional leaders would diminish, giving
the teams a much better chance to succeed. In short, there is no need
for a trade-off between great leaders and great organizations. We need
great leaders and modern structures, healthy cultures, and other
organizational practices and attributes conducive to high-performance.
Section 941 gives the next Secretary a necessary tool for running a
21st century Pentagon, and if he or she are determined to make the most
of it, so much the better.
overall assessment of section 941
Organizations normally cannot reform themselves. Businesses
typically have to look to outside consulting firms to help overcome
internal inertia and denial. The Pentagon has repeatedly demonstrated
its inability to undertake organizational change even when evidence of
the need for change is compelling. It opposed the two largest
transformations in the last 70 years: the Goldwater-Nichols Act and
creation of U.S. Special Operations Command. It is now opposing the
Senate's encouragement to take teaming and collaboration seriously.
Perry, White, England, and Gates discovered they could occasionally
override bureaucratic norms, but they could not reform the institution
for lasting improvements in performance.
Given the Pentagon's long-standing inability to correct its
organizational defects, Congress would be fully justified--even
obligated, just as it was in the Goldwater-Nichols Act--to use its
Constitutional powers ``to make rules for the government and regulation
of the land and naval forces.'' Congress has a right to demand that the
Department of Defense adopt 21st century organizational practices--that
it have an organizational strategy; that it employ cross-functional
teams for cross-functional missions and work; that it have an
organizational culture aligned with operating requirements; that it
provide proper training and incentives; and that it employ simplified
structures and processes.
Section 941 contains the right ideas to launch the Pentagon on the
use of cross-boundary collaboration. It provides better and faster ways
of integrating expertise and making decisions that are imperative in
today's complex, fast-paced security environment.
Section 941 finds the right balance between congressional mandate
and freedom of action for the Secretary of Defense. It does not
prescribe matters better left to the Secretary. The Secretary would
determine (1) DOD's organizational strategy; (2) the missions and other
priority outcomes to be addressed by cross-functional teams; (3) the
role, authorities, reporting relationships, resourcing, manning, and
operation of the teams; (4) when teams are established and who will
lead them; (5) the charter and strategy of the teams; (6) how OSD would
operate, would build a more collaborative culture, and would train and
incentivize its personnel; and finally, (7) how OSD would be
streamlined in the future. Section 941 gives the Secretary a tool to
use at his or her discretion and provides legitimacy for its use in the
face of certain bureaucratic resistance.
conclusion
I congratulate the committee on this historic initiative. This is
precisely the sort of well-researched, well-grounded, empirically-
justified intervention by Congress that is needed from time-to-time,
and in due time, it will be widely admired for its impact.
I urge the committee to remain steadfast in enacting this
provision. Safeguarding national security must become a more
collaborative enterprise. New Pentagon leaders would be wise to embrace
and use to good effect the tools provided by section 941. Cross-
boundary collaboration should then spread throughout the Department of
Defense and into the interagency, where it is desperately needed.
Once enacted, the two Armed Services Committees will need to
carefully oversee the implementation of section 941, just like they did
the Goldwater-Nichols Act. In this regard, the Senate Armed Services
Committee should refuse to confirm presidential appointees who do not
show a deep knowledge of collaboration and cross-functional teams and a
commitment to their effective use.
The Goldwater-Nichols Act, profoundly shaped by this committee, has
served the nation well. It is time now to enlarge upon that historic
success by expanding cross-functional collaboration to the Pentagon
headquarters, where strategy, plans, operational support, and
acquisition decisions for U.S. forces are made. Our servicemen and
women need and will benefit from a Pentagon headquarters capable of
making the best possible decisions and risk tradeoffs while keeping
pace with the complexity and turbulence of 21st century security
threats. They currently do not have such a Pentagon.
In section 941, the committee mandates the use of exactly the type
of decision-making mechanism the Pentagon needs to overcome its
institutional shortcomings and better execute its missions. The
transformational changes envisioned in section 941 would require
inspired and committed leadership by senior Pentagon officials and
vigorous oversight by Congress. However, once instituted, pursued, and
perfected, the use of cross-functional teams can have a positive impact
every bit as great as the original Goldwater-Nichols legislation. In
good time, the benefits of section 941 will be abundantly manifest,
just as the benefits of empowered joint warfighting commanders are now
clear. All the committee has to do to take another historic step
forward is stay undeterred on its current course. I encourage you to do
so, and thank you for your visionary leadership on this critical issue.
Chairman McCain. Thank you very much, Jim, and thank you
for your many years of service.
Dr. Edmondson, listening to your testimony reminds me of
several visits I've met--I've made to Silicon Valley and other
high-tech organizations, where they're basically working in
open spaces. No longer are there cubicles separating, but
they're all out there in the open, which provides, then, for
the environment, really, of a collaborative effort. Have you
ever seen any office in the Pentagon that looked like that?
Dr. Edmondson. No. I don't want to imply that it's
architecture. I think it's mindset more than architecture.
Chairman McCain. Yeah.
Dr. Edmondson. Structure and leadership.
Chairman McCain. Right.
Dr. Edmondson. And----
Chairman McCain. But, doesn't the architecture somehow
provide the atmospherics?
Dr. Edmondson. It can. It can. It's important, and this is,
of course, a detail. But, it's important to get the acoustics
right. I know people working in these office--and I've studied
some of these open offices, where people are going crazy. Then
there are others where the acoustics are so well designed that,
in fact, they say it's fantastic. They can do their own
thinking, they can do their own work, but they just poke their
heads up and they see someone over here they need to coordinate
with on some complex time-dependent issue, and off they go. So,
it certainly can work. Architecture can shape the mindset,
shape the behavior, and it, too, is not a panacea.
Chairman McCain. But, the mindset shapes the architecture.
Dr. Edmondson. You bet. Absolutely.
Chairman McCain. General, one of the famous stories, of
course, is the story of the MRAP [Mine-Resistant Ambush
Protected Vehicle], where Secretary Gates talks about--he had
to personally take charge--once-a-week meetings. In other
words, the issue was of the transcendent importance, saving the
lives of our men and women in the military who were so
vulnerable to IEDs [improvised explosive devices]. But,
obviously, as he stated before this committee, you can't do
that with everything that comes along. It's just a physical
impossibility, and we also have had Secretary Panetta, who
feels, basically, of the same mindset, and Secretary Hagel.
Now we're getting this reaction from the Pentagon as if it
were the end of Western civilization as we know it. There are
smart and good people over there. There are people who
understand that the system is not working. We had a hearing on
the F-35. The first time the F-35 was recommended was 2002, and
it's still not operationally capable. I mean--and yet, I have
to get one of these every 18 months, and then 18 months--I
understand it, then I have to--anyway. That's a personal issue.
But, the--why is it? Why is it that we are getting this
near-hysterical response to what former Secretaries of Defense,
leaders such as yourself--I've not met a leader with your
background and experience that doesn't say that this kind of
change has to take place. It--help me out.
General McChrystal. It does have to take place, Mr.
Chairman. I think you're exactly right.
I think that----
Chairman McCain. Why the--why such a visceral, emotional
reaction?
General McChrystal. I think all big organizations, people
get set into their equities at different levels in the
organization. They get used to things. They learn the rules,
and when you start to----
Chairman McCain. But, haven't they learned--yeah, I'm not--
don't mean to interrupt, but every time there's a crisis, we
have a Joint Task Force, right?
General McChrystal. That's correct. Every time that I can
think of, you have a very complex, difficult problem, you form
some form of a cross-functional team, you put them in,
typically, open architecture. You work the problem, and then,
interestingly enough, once the problem is solved, we sort of
go, ``Whew, glad that's over,'' and then we go back to our
offices. I think the new normal is, we're living in that
complex world, so I'm--that's why I'm so supportive of 941.
Chairman McCain. Well, let me ask one more question, then,
that is not directly related to this particular issue. You were
commander of the only organization that literally transcends
and crosses geographic boundaries. Do you think we ought to be
looking at the entire COCOM [Combatant Command] structure,
given the nature of the challenges we face today?
General McChrystal. I would argue, I--and I haven't studied
that and given it deep thought--I would argue, everything ought
to be looked at on a constant basis. Anything that was locked
into rules ought to be considered movable.
Chairman McCain. We have a--for example, we have a NORTHCOM
[United States Northern Command] and a SOUTHCOM [United States
Southern Command], with the boundary line being the Guatemala/
Mexico border. Does that make any sense?
General McChrystal. Mr. Chairman, I'm not prepared to
really opine on that today. I would say, though, I'd--all
things like that have got to be looked at, organizationally and
culturally, just constantly.
Chairman McCain. The decisionmaking process--let me just
give you an example. You know, we know the issue of force
levels in Afghanistan is one that has to be decided between
what has already been announced, beginning next year, would be
a reduction from 9,800 to, basically, a very small force at two
bases. Yet, there is no decision. Senator Reed and I have
written to the Secretary of Defense, asking for a decision. Are
we harming our ability and our relationship with our allies by
delaying a fundamental question like that? Does that have any
relation to the bureaucracy?
General McChrystal. I think it probably has a relationship
to the bureaucracy, but I also think it just--it brings
uncertainty. Markets don't like uncertainty. Diplomacy doesn't
like uncertainty. Security doesn't like uncertainty. So, I
think the more we can make that transparent and less uncertain
to people, I think, the better response we'll get from our
allies and our enemies.
Chairman McCain. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for very insightful, excellent testimony.
Thank you.
Just to clarify this--I think you've made the point, but--
Dr. Edmondson--that one of the pushbacks we get is, ``Well, we
do this all the time anyway. We have crosscutting teams here,
there, and everywhere.'' But, there's a difference between the
cross-functional teams that we're talking about and working
groups that share information, seek consensus, and never seem
to get either. Is that--I mean, is that your impression?
Dr. Edmondson. There is a universe of difference. Right?
So, it's--a team--a cross---an effective cross-functional team
is not simply a group of people from different units or
functions. It's a group of people from different units or
functions who are charged with a clear directive, a clear,
meaningful directive on behalf of the organization. Specific
deliverables that they, of course, have a very important role
in defining at the level of detail, and a timeframe, and
resources, and support, and empowerment. Right? So, they are
given the license to get things done. That doesn't mean they're
going to go rogue. Right? They still are under the directive of
senior leadership, and they know they are, and they are, doing
meaningful work on behalf of the organization that has to get
done in a timely way.
Senator Reed. One of the aspects of section 941 that Mr.
Locher referred to is a training component, too, and a
preparation component. We have a--this can't be launched
immediately. There has to be a--you know, one, an
identification of the appropriate individuals in the
appropriate organizations, the training of how to do this.
That's all part of this process, the foundation, if you will.
Is that correct?
Mr. Locher. Senator Reed, it is. I should say that the
training part is quite important. Even in business, creating
effective cross-functional teams is difficult. The training is
important. Both of the team members, they need to be trained in
the functioning of a team, conflict resolution approaches. But,
their supervisors have to be trained, as well. They need to
create that safety net for those team members to go off. They
don't have to be accountable to the ideology of their
functional area; they're designed to solve the problem of the
mission team. So, those supervisors need to be trained, as
well.
As I mentioned, there's--has not been enough attention, in
the Pentagon, to leadership, so we're talking about leadership
training, some training on modern organizational practice, and
on collaboration, as well as cross-functional teams.
Senator Reed. One of the other aspects, I think, of making
this work goes to the reward structure. On--General McChrystal,
I think you've been in the--in this atmosphere for a long time,
but that--my impression now is that, when they put together
these teams of different organizations, the reward is back
home. It's either in the Army or SOCOM [United States Special
Operations Command] or the Navy or the Marine Corps, et cetera.
You're there protecting that--you know, that ethic, because
that's where you'll get your----
So, how do we work this reward structure, basically, in
terms of these joint teams, so that you get the proper
commendation and the proper whatever?
General McChrystal. I think if you use Goldwater-Nichols as
one example of where we adjusted a--reward structures, and it
had a very significant cultural effect--I think the same thing
needs to happen here, because there's still a tendency to keep
your talent close to home and reward it because they're around.
As a consequence, I think what we need to do is, first, reward
participation on cross-functional teams, maybe make it
required, like joint duty, but also seek a way in our
evaluation systems, efficiency report systems, to measure who
makes a difference in the effectiveness of a cross-functional
team. When we work with civilian companies, it's always this
tension between individual incentives, ``Did I make my
number?''
Senator Reed. Right.
General McChrystal. Or, ``Does the organization do better
because I helped the organization do better?'' It's challenging
to measure, but it's possible. Those people who the team scores
more goals when they're on the ice are the kinds of people that
we need to recognize and help grow. It's got to do with
leadership training, and it's got to be support of those cross-
functional teams.
Senator Reed. Just a final point, and I--it echos what the
Chairman said and what many have said. I have, you know, a
feeling that we have to do this, because the other guys are
doing it. My impression--again, your leadership in Iraq was
superb, but one of the reasons why your opponents had to be
horizontal is because we had every tool in the book to take out
a hierarchical structure. We just couldn't find it for a while,
and then you started getting horizontal, also. Then, of course,
the communications revolution has made all this much more
feasible.
I'm looking, though, across the globe, in places like
Russia. They seem to be much more adaptive of this horizontal,
cross-functional intelligence offices, tactical offices,
political offices, et cetera. Is that your impression, General?
Because in----
General McChrystal. Sir, it is. The person that had the
biggest effect on changing Joint Special Operations Command was
a guy named Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.
Senator Reed. Yeah.
General McChrystal. Because he put us in a position against
a challenge that we couldn't deal with without changing. So, it
wasn't an optional thing we did.
I think what we see with our opponents is, nobody is going
to take on a disproportionately powerful organization like the
United States where we are best. They are, by definition, going
to go against asymmetrical areas, and they're going to
constantly adapt. Because you no longer have to be a nation-
state to challenge us anymore, you can be as small as--a very
small group, because of technology--they can all be trying from
different angles. The vast majority can fail, but some will
continue to adapt to a Darwinistic process, and so, the big
mechanical beast cannot, almost by definition--it'll be like
Gulliver and the Lilliputians--we'll just be tied down by
people who figure parts of it out.
Senator Reed. Well, I appreciate that, as a Lilliputian.
So, thank you.
[Laughter.]
Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Let's ease off the intellectual plane of
cross-functional teams and cultural obstacles just for a moment
here, and let me ask two questions. It's based on something
everyone does agree with right now. One is the threat that
we're facing.
Mr. Locher, last November you said--and this is your
quote--you said, ``The world in which the DOD must operate has
changed dramatically over the last 30 years. Threats and
opportunities are more numerous, more varied, more complex, and
more rapidly changing.''
Then we had four professors before this committee, and the
professors talked about the challenges and they--United States
national security, and were in agreement that the threats
against the United States and its interests are unlike any time
in history. Heard the same thing from John Brennan, heard the
same thing from James Clapper. You know, I think that people
realize we are in that threatened of a position.
Now, the question I would ask--because Secretary Gates was
here, and he talked about the funding. I mean, he said that
we're now spending one-third of the percentage on defense, of
our total budget, that we did in 1964. He said--which is kind
of counter to what we're talking about here--he said, quote,
``Without proper and predictable funding, no amount of reform
or clever reorganization will provide America with a military
capable of accomplishing the missions it's assigned to.''
So, it's--first of all, do the three of you think that
we're not spending enough, to start with?
Mr. Locher?
Mr. Locher. Senator, this is not my area of expertise at
the current time. I cannot--I've not analyzed the defense
budget.
Senator Inhofe. Okay.
General McChrystal?
General McChrystal. I'm pretty much the same place,
Senator.
Senator Inhofe. Well, but, you know, in--Dr. Edmondson, I
know you'll--probably the same thing. But, this is what
Secretary Gates said. He said a lot of reorganization, all
these things that we're--unless you're spending enough money on
defense, is--they're not going to work. Do you agree or
disagree with his statement? This is Secretary Gates.
Mr. Locher. What I might be able to add to the question
that you're asking is, we can spend more and more money, but if
we don't have an organization that can effectively employ the
resources that are available to us, much of that spending will
be wasted. I think that's a point at which we are today. I
would give more emphasis to these organizational changes than
Secretary Gates did.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah.
Mr. Locher. You know, we have a huge bureaucracy that's
working as hard as it possibly can, but it is in Industrial Age
functional stovepipes----
Senator Inhofe. Okay, but--time is passing here. Let me
just do this, and, Dr. Edmondson, perhaps--kind of take the
statement that was made by Secretary Gates, and just say, for
the record--send it to us after this is over--what you're
thinking about. All right? Whether you agree with that, or not?
[The information referred to follows:]
Mr. Locher. I am unable to make an informed judgment on the
adequacy of the current budget levels for the Department of Defense.
From my current position, it is not possible to assess the best,
integrated options for solving our most pressing security problems and
their associated resource requirements. DOD is currently not performing
well in some key mission areas, and the Pentagon wastes too much of its
resources on poorly managed programs and missions for reasons
identified in my previous answers. One great disadvantage of current
organizational problems is that it makes it difficult to ask the
American people to fund a greater security effort. However, if DOD had
a modern organization that pursued missions efficiently and greatly
reduced waste, making the case for greater resources would be easier.
In short, we should not be forced to choose between allocating
resources to a poorly performing organization or improving the
organization but starving it of needed resources. The United States
needs a high-performing Pentagon headquarters capable of integrated,
timely, innovative, and forward-looking decision-making and sufficient
levels of resources to protect the nation's security.
Dr. Edmondson. I have no basis from which to draw to make an
assessment as to whether the Department of Defense's budget or spending
are sufficient. However, my expertise does allow me to claim that well-
designed, well-led cross functional teams typically prove efficient
structures, which help ensure that available funds are well-spent.
Senator Inhofe. I think it's really significant, because
that's exactly what we're talking about doing right now. He's
saying it doesn't make any difference, because, unless we're
spending more, more resources is not going to work.
The other thing where everyone agrees, and that is, we're
too heavy at the top. The OSD military and civilian staff
increased 20 percent from 2001 to 2013. Military and civilian
staff at Army Headquarters increased 60 percent over that same
period. From 2001 to 2012, the defense civilian workforce grew
5 times the rate of the Active Duty military.
Now, in--to address this, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Robert Work sent all services a memo entitled ``Cost Reduction
Targets for Major Headquarters,'' ordering preparation for a
25-percent cut in appropriations from 2017--that's next year--
to 2020, for all major defense headquarters. This is what we
used to call ``the meat ax approach.'' Frankly, I kind of like
it. What do you all think about it?
General McChrystal. Senator, I think it's sometimes
necessary, but I think you've got to make the changes. You
don't know how head--how big your headquarters need to be until
you get them operating----
Senator Inhofe. In----
General McChrystal.--the correct way.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. You're all convinced that, by making
these changes, that we're going to be able to do that. The
result is going to be less at the top, more Active military. Is
that--do you all agree with that?
General McChrystal. I'm not sure those decisions are being
made, but I can tell you it will enable the opportunity to make
better decisions in that.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah.
Any comment?
Dr. Edmondson. Senator, I would have to agree with that. It
is--what we're talking about here is the use--the best use of
the human resources that the Department has. The experience of
working in these kinds of cross-functional purpose-focused
teams is one that not only gets the job done, generally with
fewer resources than in prior approaches, but also that
develops the people into far more capable and--people with a
greater perspective on the whole system. So, it's a kind of
free education for the people actually doing this important
work----
Senator Inhofe. Okay. Well, I appreciate that, and you will
follow through with sending the----
Dr. Edmondson. I can certainly opine in a general sense----
Senator Inhofe. Very good.
Dr. Edmondson.--that money is not the answer, in general.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Dr. Edmondson. You bet.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. But, when you don't have enough money for
our pilots to fly--they're now flying less than Russian pilots
and Chinese pilots, and they're robbing aircraft to--for other
aircraft to fly, which are facts, then money does matter, at
some point. Right now, readiness and training are the ones
that--aspects of our military that are suffering the most. I
think that General McChrystal would amply testify, when we stop
training people and making them ready, then you put them in
greater danger. That's what our military leadership has
testified.
Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank all of you for your statements this morning.
This is to the entire panel, but recently--I think you all
have heard about the horrific flooding we've had in West
Virginia, devastating as it's been to our State. The joint
interagency responses include the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency], and National Guard.
They're all responding as we speak. During previous natural
disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina, much criticism was
directed to how the agencies coordinated among themselves, or
didn't coordinate among themselves, especially with regard to
the command-control use of DOD and State National Guard assets.
Your statements focused on DOD utilization of cross-functional
teams.
So, I guess I could ask how these teams take the next step
and improve the emergency management planning and coordination
between DOD and other Federal agencies. We're having that lack
of coordination right now going on, and everyone's intentions
are good, but, for some reason, we just can't get our act
together to where we have a clear direction of who's in charge,
of how the assets will be disbursed, and how we can help people
in the greatest need. So, whoever wants to respond to that, and
then----
Mr. Locher. Senator, if I might. I spent 6 years studying
the national security system of the United States, the
interagency system. These cross-functional teams are required
at the national security level, as well, and there's actually a
hope that, if these teams are instituted in the Department of
Defense--section 941 only requires the Secretary to create six
teams. But what----
Senator Manchin. DOD and FEMA is already cross-functional?
Mr. Locher. No, no. I'm saying--this is just inside the
Department of Defense, but I'm saying that, at the next level
up, at the interagency level, we need the same sorts of cross-
functional teams to be created, across the departments and
agencies, pulling them together so that they can be effective,
that we can do effective planning and we can do effective
execution. We do not have that today. The only way we can
integrate that is at the National Security Council. So, there
is a requirement for something very similar to these cross-
functional teams at the next level up.
Senator Manchin. The only thing I can say--you know, the
DOD and FEMA establish a permanent cross-functional team is
something that you would recommend? Because right now we don't
have that. If we have FEMA coming in, FEMA's coming in, who
we're looking for, for support. Then we have all of our
National Guard out. We're looking for our Federal assistance,
and no one seems to be able to, basically, pull the trigger and
get things done quickly as they need done.
Mr. Locher. Senator, every issue that we handle in the
national security arena requires more than one department, and
so, you have to work it across--and many times, we need seven
or eight departments working together. You're talking about the
Department of Defense and FEMA, but there are lots of other
players----
Senator Manchin. Sure.
Mr. Locher.--there, as well, that could be brought together
in an effective teaming approach, and so, I'm hopeful that,
once the committee is successful in section 941, this will
spread and move up to the national security level, where it is
desperately needed.
Senator Manchin. General, if you--on another--I'm a firm
believer in fixed-price--fixed-price contracting, I think, as
our Chairman is, also, and the concept that services should
state what they are looking for in buying a weapon system, and
then pay us that price. Basically, knowing what you need and
what you want, and making sure that the price reflects that.
Can you provide an example to how utilization of cross-
functional teams has improved contracting? Do you think that
use of cross-functional teams would improve the development of
weapon systems acquisition requirements and lead to less use of
cost-plus contracting?
General McChrystal. I'm not an expert in acquisition, but I
will give you my personal experiences and my beliefs.
The first is, the acquisition process, where you have to
identify your requirements many, many years out, and nail those
down, doesn't reflect the march of technology anymore. It is
not what civilian corporations are doing. They have to be much
more flexible and adaptable. Which means, in my view, you have
to form cross-functional teams that are not just the users of
the end piece of equipment, but also those scientists who
create it, all the different people who can help produce that,
because it's going to be an iterative process that's going to
change tremendously from the time someone came up with the
idea.
Senator Manchin. Dr. Edmondson, just finally, Six Sigma was
a big--you know, it's been bantered around for quite some time.
Do you find that morphing into this cross-functional? Is it
part of it?
Dr. Edmondson. Not exactly, Senator. Six Sigma applies well
to work that is extremely well understood and highly routine,
because it allows us to get sufficient data to know exactly how
something should be done repeatedly and effectively and
efficiently every single time. We're look--Six Sigma is
essentially an extraordinarily low error rate, a one-in-a-
million error rate. That's not the case for the kinds of work
we're talking about here, that's fast-paced, unpredictable,
innovating on the fly, and so forth. So, cross-functional teams
are not the perfect tool for Six Sigma-like work activities.
Senator Manchin. The----
Dr. Edmondson. They are a good tool--excuse me--for
innovation and responding to unprecedented issues and
challenges.
Senator Manchin. I guess I would just ask, in followup--I'm
so sorry----
Dr. Edmondson. Yeah.
Senator Manchin.--Mr. Chairman--but cross-functional--why
are we having such a hard time for the cross-functional to
really grab hold and do what it's supposed to do?
Dr. Edmondson. Now, that is one of the puzzles for the
ages. I suppose that the best answer is that organizations do
resist change. Organizations--and General McChrystal did talk
about this--there's a comfort level in what I know, what I know
well----
Senator Manchin. Everybody's fighting back and hunkering
down, covering their own, right?
Dr. Edmondson. We need to learn to change. I think
critical--the critical issues, the critical competencies that
organizations today have is the competency to keep learning.
Senator Manchin. Well, I'll throw this back----
Dr. Edmondson. Yeah.
Senator Manchin.--to the Chairman right now. I'm sure he
has a comment on that.
Chairman McCain. I think an important comment was just
made, ``They need to learn to change.'' I think that that's a
fundamental, here, that we're grappling with, that----
Thank you, Doctor.
Senator Ernst.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, to the witnesses today. This has been a very
interesting conversation.
General McChrystal, I want to thank you, especially, for
your leadership at the 75th Ranger Regiment. Fantastic
organization.
General, I'll start with you. As you may know, the DOD,
under its Force of the Future Plan, is looking at directly
commissioning more civilians at the O6 grade. Do you believe
the Department needs more direct commissioned officers at the
O6 level? Yes or no, sir.
General McChrystal. I do, and I think not just at the O6
level. I actually think lateral entry into the military
services--right now, the military services, by definition, are
a guild. You start at entry, and you work your way up. You get
some great competence, but the reality is, by the time you
reach a certain level, you are a product of that organization,
good and bad. I think fresh air coming in laterally is doable,
and I think it would be very beneficial.
Senator Ernst. Is there something, then, that we're
missing, as a uniformed military, where we cannot fill those
positions with DOD contractors or others that serve in the
civilian force, rather than commissioning them into the
military?
General McChrystal. I think commissioning them in has an
advantage. I think you bring people in, they become part of the
organization; they're not external, like a contractor. I also
think they go back out again, and if you think about America,
what we need is more people in America who have served in
uniform. Maybe they don't do it when they're age 18, maybe they
do it when they're age 45, but they go back out into business
or politics or whatever they do. I think they go out richer,
and I think America's military becomes more integrated with our
society again.
Senator Ernst. Do you think that that should be limited to
specific areas within the military, then? Maybe the CYBERCOMs
or--of course, we do it with doctors, lawyers. Or do you think
an infantry officer could----
General McChrystal. I am not----
Senator Ernst.--get in as an O6?
General McChrystal.--reflecting the opinion of anybody but
me. I think we can bring people in. I've run into competent
executives out in the world who could come in, and they could
be infantry officers. I tell them, ``In 6 months, we could
teach you enough to do what you have to do, and your leadership
skills and your wisdom, and you'd be able to perform.'' Think
of what has happened in our big wars, the Civil War,
Revolution. People came out of the civilian world and did
wonderful service. I think that there's a backbone of
professional military who spend a whole life there, but I think
I--a breathing, a moving in and out of fresh air would be
positive for everyone.
Senator Ernst. I would tend to agree, in certain
circumstances, as well, sir.
I know this is a different topic for another day, but I
know that there have been some challenges with moving females
into infantry leadership roles immediately. But, I think there
are some certain advantages there, as well, and we can talk
about that another time.
But, in your experience, how challenging--and we've talked
a little bit about this. Dr. Edmondson, you said, ``Learn to
change.'' If I could get, from the whole panel, how challenging
it is for the DOD to reform itself.
General, when you, maybe, were a platoon leader, years ago,
and for--to the time you retired, we have become increasingly
complex around the globe with what our military is facing.
Understanding that we have those challenges, why is it so hard
for the DOD to reform itself?
I'd just like all of you to discuss that. Yeah, thank you.
Mr. Locher. Senator, I've had lots of experience trying to
change the Department of Defense. I should say that it objected
to the two biggest transformations in the last 70 years, the
first being the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and the second being the
Cohen-Nunn Amendment that created the U.S. Special Operations
Command.
Today, why is it that the Pentagon leadership has not
looked at what's going on in modern organizations and brought
these concepts into the Department? The first problem is,
they're too busy. They've inherited a Department that's
antiquated. They have all of these problems around the world.
I was there in the transition at the beginning of the
Clinton administration, when Secretary Aspin came in. After he
had been on the job for a few days, he said, ``Mr. Locher,
where do all of these problems come from?''
They are just completely overwhelmed. They have a
bureaucracy that's not working, but they have all of these
demands. They are not able to take their time and attention to
try to fix the bureaucracy. That's one of the great benefits of
section 941. The Congress is going to mandate these changes.
You also have the cultural issues. We have a very
entrenched culture in the Pentagon that grew up consensus-
driven. Things get watered down. We're in the functional
stovepipes. We've never been brought together in teams. But, I
think there's also a tendency that they don't understand the
modern organizational practice. They understand what they're
doing, and how hard they are working. As you may know, people
in the Pentagon are working incredibly hard. They're just
working in a very ineffective system.
So, there are lots of reasons, and I think it's imperative
that the committee press ahead and help the Department of
Defense with this particular issue.
Senator Ernst. Very good. Thank you.
Yes, General.
General McChrystal. Senator, I arrived in the Pentagon, for
my first tour, as a brand new major general coming out of
Afghanistan. To get to Jim's point, I was running hard to
figure out how the Pentagon worked. This was the ramp-up to the
entry into Iraq, and so, the reality is, I'm so busy trying to
figure that out--and I was only there 14 months, to the day,
before I moved out. So, the reality is, I think I'm not really
uncommon of a lot of the military leaders that come through.
Then there is a bureaucracy that gets stuck.
So, I think it needed help from the outside to make the
kind of changes that were recommended.
Senator Ernst. Very good.
Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Do you know of many people of your grade
at that time who sought to work in the Pentagon?
General McChrystal. No, Mr. Chairman, I do not.
[Laughter.]
Chairman McCain. Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm very supportive of this concept, as a general
principle. I have some specific questions about execution in
section 941.
I guess I want to begin--Dr. Edmondson, you cited a bunch
of cases from business. Here's my fundamental question. Are
cross-functional team usually an ad hoc response to a problem
or a series of problems, or are cross-functional teams,
themselves, institutionalized within the organization of Nissan
or Cisco or whatever other cases you've cited?
Dr. Edmondson. Yes, Senator.
Senator King. Both.
Dr. Edmondson. Both. So, it depends. So, in Nissan, the
CEO--first of all, you know--and it relates to Senator Ernst's
point, as well, or question--for every successful
transformation, there is a company that dies along the wayside.
For every IBM, there's a DEC. For every Ford, there's an
American Motors. To make it happen--so, Nissan, Carlos Ghosn
said, ``We will have nine cross-functional teams.'' It was his
idea.
Senator King. But, do they still exist? That--my question--
--
Dr. Edmondson. No. So, I'll--so, the--his idea, ``These are
the nine issues''----
Senator King. I have only 5 minutes, so please----
Dr. Edmondson. They do not--they do not still exist. They
do not still exist. They were there to put in--to make some
necessary changes, save the company. Then they ceased to exist.
From their point of view, thank goodness. They had their day
job still to go back and----
Senator King. Well, that's my----
Dr. Edmondson. Yeah.
Senator King. Mr. Locher, that's my----
Dr. Edmondson. But, there are some organizations that
institute cross-functional mechanisms to stay all the time if
there's a recurring set of similar issues.
Senator King. Well, Mr. Locher, that's my question, is,
the--all for our cross-functional teams, but, by writing them
in and requiring that they be established, isn't that almost a
contradiction in terms, that you're creating a new bureaucratic
structure on top of the old bureaucratic structure? When I
think of cross-functional teams as more ad hoc and responsive
to problems as they arise.
Mr. Locher. Senator King, the--as it turns out, a cross-
functional team could exist for 3 days, for 3 weeks, 3 months,
3 years----
Senator King. But, this statute talks----
Mr. Locher.--or 3 decades.
Senator King.--about them being established as an ongoing
part of the organization of the Pentagon.
Mr. Locher. Yes, but it only--it does not say what teams
are to be created. The Secretary of Defense could decide--he
only has to create six teams. That's a minimum beginning.
Eventually, when this gets established in the Department of
Defense, it's going to be used everywhere. The Joint Staff,
where General McChrystal was the Director, will turn and will
employ cross-functional teams. As it--it's saying that this is
a concept that the Pentagon should employ. The Secretary gets
to decide what teams they are. He can change those teams. He
can terminate them when they've served their purpose.
Senator King. So, you feel that this particular legislative
language, which is what we're talking about, is not too
prescriptive, in terms of essentially setting up an alternative
bureaucracy.
Mr. Locher. It is not. It gives a broad mandate from the
Congress, but then leaves it to the Secretary of Defense to
identify which areas he's going to create mission teams in, or
whether there are other priority outputs that he wants to focus
on. He can disestablish those teams when they've served their
purpose. He could create others. He could create many more
teams than the six that are mandated here.
Senator King. Well, it seems to me that what we're really
talking about here is Goldwater-Nichols 2.0, applying the
Goldwater-Nichols principles to the joint commands, which was a
kind of forced integration of the forces, to a forced
integration of the bureaucracy. Is that a fair statement----
Mr. Locher. Well, it's correct. You know, in Goldwater-
Nichols, we sort of did cross-service collaboration.
Senator King. Exactly.
Mr. Locher. Here we're talking about cross-functional
collaboration, primarily at the headquarters level, but it can
be applied in the field, as well. You know, out in the field,
we've done better with leaders who put together--collaborating
across the services. But, our headquarters is 30 years out of
date, and it can be improved considerably by these
collaboration concepts.
Senator King. A friend of mine once observed that Freud
said, ``Anatomy is destiny,'' and Napoleon said, ``War is
history.'' My friend said, ``Structure is policy.'' I think
that may be what we're talking about here, is, if you have a
structure that is overly bureaucratic and rigid, the policy
will be slow, cumbersome, and itself not responsive to
immediate problems. Is that a fair----
Mr. Locher. I think that's absolutely on target. Dr.
Edmondson was talking about a different mindset. We need to get
out of thinking inwardly. In the functional silos, people are
looking inwardly. They're looking to the responsibility of
their office. What we need them to do is think about: What is
the mission of the Department of Defense in this particular
area? How do I collaborate with others who have expertise here
and pull together all of that expertise to solve the problem of
the Department of Defense?
Senator King. Well, I think the Chairman made an
interesting observation about architecture. It's no accident
that the most creative companies--and I go through them--very
rarely do they have walls. It's not because they can't afford
cubicles, but because they found that people having a free flow
of collaboration and ideas, sitting around in a ``living room''
kind of setting is effective. They're--these are very smart
companies that make a lot of money, and they know what they're
doing. The idea of everybody in a little closed box with a door
is not the way modern business is done.
So, I appreciate your testimony very much.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this important hearing.
Chairman McCain. Well, we have a ways to go before the
President signs the defense authorization bill, for a lot of
reasons. But, one of the reasons that was stated in the
statement of administration policy was that they did not--that
they strongly disapproved of this section of the defense
authorization bill. The reaction that we've gotten to it has
been overwhelmingly positive.
This hearing has been very helpful, I think, and we'll see
whether we are able to restructure--I think, frankly, it's a
matter of ``time'' rather than ``whether.'' If this effort
fails, sooner or later the Pentagon is going to have to catch
up with the 21st century. And----
Go ahead, Jim.
Mr. Locher. Mr. Chairman, one thing I should mention. I
don't know how the National Defense Authorization Act is going
to work out this year, but one thing that the committee can
absolutely do is, when it has confirmation hearings next year
for presidential appointed officials in the Department of
Defense, I would insist that every person that comes is
schooled on collaboration, cross-functional teams, modern
organizational practice, and committed to their effective use
in the Department of Defense. That's an area in which I would
question them, and I'd make certain that they're committed.
Hopefully, they'll have this mandate in law to assist them.
But, you do also have that hammer at the beginning of the next
administration.
Chairman McCain. That would be a good way to make America
great again.
[Laughter.]
Chairman McCain. Do you want----
Senator Reed. I can't follow that.
[Laughter.]
Senator Reed. I simply want to thank the witnesses. I--and
we are engaged in a--I think, because of the Chairman's
leadership, we've got this issue in play. It's critical. I
think we have to do it. We can--I think we--with a productive
dialogue with everyone--and you're--have been particularly
productive--but, with DOD, with the administration, we can get
a better product than even we think we have now. I hope so.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:03 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
cross-functional teams
1. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Locher, section 941 of the Senate passed
fiscal year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, would require the
Secretary of Defense to identify the most important missions and other
organizational outputs that cross functional teams would focus on. What
do you believe are the most important missions and outputs that these
cross-functional teams should focus on?
Mr. Locher. The Secretary of Defense should consider the following
missions and priority outputs for cross-functional teams:
i. Missions
1. Combating terrorism
2. Defeating the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL)
3. Stabilizing Afghanistan
4. Deterring Russian aggression
5. Managing the competition with China
6. Deterring North Korea
7. Countering Iran's influence
8. Defending cyberspace
9. Ensuring access to space
ii. Priority Outputs
1. Formulating an organizational strategy for DOD
2. Formulating the Third Offset Strategy
3. Supporting the fighting force
4. Building the future force
5. Reforming the defense institution
6. Reducing excess infrastructure
7. Improving acquisition
dod acquisition reform
2. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Locher, former Secretary Gates said in his
October 2015 testimony, ``I soon learned that the only way I could get
significant new or additional equipment to commanders in the field in
weeks or months, not years, was to take control of the problem myself
through special task forces and ad hoc processes . . . '' He cited the
examples of the MRAP vehicles, additional intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance capabilities, and shortened medevac times. Yet, as
he recognized, the Secretary does not have the ability to devote this
much personal time and attention to more than a few projects at a time.
Doesn't this consistent need to bypass traditional acquisition
processes and offices--and instead utilize rapid equipping and fielding
offices to get our warfighters what they need on time--demonstrate the
need to reform the Pentagon's acquisition processes?
Mr. Locher. Absolutely! The use of special task forces (cross-
functional teams by another name) and ad hoc processes clearly
demonstrates that the existing structure and processes are not working.
3. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Locher, how can the organizational reform
envisioned by Section 941 and cross-functional teams improve the
current acquisition system that produces too many programs that are
over-cost and over-schedule and fail to be responsive to the
warfighters?
Mr. Locher. The potential for cross-functional teams to improve the
performance of the DOD acquisition system was identified more than
twenty years ago. In 1995, Secretary of Defense William Perry created
cross-functional teams, which he called Integrated Product Teams, to
handle individual acquisition programs. As I noted in my testimony, at
the time, Secretary Perry argued that DOD ``must move away from a
pattern of hierarchical decision-making to a process where decisions
are made across organizational structures by integrated product teams.
It means we are breaking down institutional barriers.'' Unfortunately,
Secretary Perry's mandate for multidisciplinary teamwork bore little
fruit. It contained a fatal flaw: It permitted the heads of functional
silos to carefully control their Integrated Product Team members. This
forced each team member to protect the prerogatives of their parent
organization rather than working to provide the best solution to the
product team's acquisition task.
Currently, groups managing acquisition programs are prone to begin
with optimistic assessments of program capabilities and costs. As they
build the program and determine more accurately the technology and
performance options available if the program is to remain on time and
budget, they are faced by difficult choices. They must accept lesser
performance in some marginal areas in order to obtain the most
important program capabilities. However, a group that can only move
forward on the basis of consensus cannot do that. Thus, our programs
tend to be gold-plated and over-budget and take much longer to execute
than desirable. An empowered program manager (team leader) and team of
specialists could make these critical decisions much better. This is
one reason classified programs tend to do better. They are shielded
from the layers of consensus-building groups that normally guide our
acquisition process.
Section 941 prescribes requirements for cross-functional teams that
would enable them to overcome this fatal flaw and successfully fulfill
their missions. It would carefully protect the teams from interference
by leaders of functional organizations and enable the program manager/
team leader and his or her team to deliver a product faster and closer
to original cost estimates and with the most important capabilities
rather than all the capabilities desired by participating
organizations.
offices within pentagon bureaucracy
4. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Locher, if we create new cross-functional
teams, what parts of the Pentagon bureaucracy should be eliminated to
ensure we are not simply adding additional layers of bureaucracy
without eliminating unnecessary or redundant layers?
Mr. Locher. The natural response of an organization failing to
perform well is to increase effort. Some functional leaders in the
Pentagon can see the need for cross-functional solutions, but they
cannot get other functional elements to cooperate. If they attempt to
collaborate, those organizations thwart their efforts. Everyone can say
``no'' and derail a solution, but no one other than the Secretary of
Defense has the authority to integrate a cross-functional solution. So,
functional elements compensate by expanding their offices to include
functional experts from other disciplines, adding people with budget,
technology, or policy expertise. As the office staff expands in size,
more management is needed. These middle managers zealously guard their
prerogatives and naturally compete with other offices vying for similar
functional knowledge. Each office hoards their information rather than
sharing it. Consequently, the overall organization increases in size
and management levels but remains unable to accomplish cross-functional
missions well.
This describes the Pentagon today. In an effort to use the outdated
functional bureaucracy to solve today's complex, cross-functional
defense challenges, the Pentagon has added more personnel and
management levels. These additional managers and personnel work
incredibly hard but to little avail. No amount of hard work can
overcome the obstacles created by a rigid functional structure, non-
collaborative culture, and the wrong organizational and individual
incentives.
Cross-functional teams have been shown to be much more efficient in
formulating effective solutions to complex problems. If the Secretary
of Defense were successful in establishing and empowering cross-
functional teams, it would be possible to identify and eliminate excess
management layers and personnel. Section 941 mandates these actions.
Within a year of the next Secretary of Defense's appointment, he or she
would be required under the subsection (e) of Section 941 to ``take
such actions as the Secretary considers appropriate to streamline the
organizational structure and processes of the Office of the Secretary
of Defense in order to reduce spans of control, achieve a reduction in
layers of management, eliminate unnecessary duplication between the
Office and the Joint Staff, and reduce the time required to complete
standard processes and activities.''
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
formation of cross-functional teams
5. Senator Hirono. Mr. Locher, you mentioned in your testimony that
the Secretary of Defense has control over what cross-functional teams
will be formed and also has control over how long these teams will be
implemented, depending on their purpose. What areas would benefit the
most from the implementation of cross-functional teams? How would
cross-functional teams succeed in the combatant commands compared to
the OSD environment?
Mr. Locher. In an earlier question for the record from Senator
Ayotte, I suggested nine missions and seven priority outputs that would
immensely benefit from using cross-functional teams.
Cross-functional teams could also be successfully employed in
combatant commands. At present, the headquarters staff of each
combatant command is organized around a traditional military staff
structure, such as: J-1 (Personnel), J-2 (Intelligence), J-3
(Operations), J-4 (Logistics), J-5 (Policy), J-6 (Communications), J-7
(Exercises and Assessments), J-8 (Resources), and J-9 (Interagency
Partnering). This is the same type of functional structure that is
hampering the ability of OSD offices to address missions and priority
outputs that cross multiple functional boundaries. For example, the
U.S. Pacific Command's Posture Statement, presented to the committee in
March 2016, prioritized the following six mission areas: North Korea,
natural disasters, territorial disputes, cyber, violent extremism, and
Chinese military modernization and intent. One J-directorate cannot
comprehensively address any of these missions. On the contrary, each
mission will involve many J-directorates. The best organization
approach for comprehensively and rapidly integrating these diverse
functional perspectives is a cross-functional team.
The U.S. Northern Command successfully employed cross-functional
teams under the leadership of Admiral James A. Winnefeld Jr., during
his command tour from May 2010 to August 2011. He created eight teams,
called Focus Area Synchronization Teams, for the following missions:
(1) Counter-Terrorism and Force Protection; (2) Transnational Criminal
Organizations; (3) Defense Support to Civil Authorities; (4) CBRNE
Consequence Management; (5) Aerospace Warning and Control; (6) The
Arctic; (7) Missile Defense; and (8) Maritime Warning and Control.
These teams were directed by a general officer or civilian equivalent
and synchronized efforts across the command and its J-directorates.
Admiral Winnefeld assigned each team clear tasks and made them directly
accountable to him. Some staff observed that headquarters-wide
engagement and conflict resolution were better with the eight cross-
directorate teams than at any other time in Northern Command's history.
After Admiral Winnefeld's departure, the new commander--bowing to
pressure from the J-directorates--disbanded the teams despite their
utility. Nevertheless, this experiment at the U.S. Northern Command
demonstrates that cross-functional teams would enable combatant
commands to more effectively address their missions.
Although Section 941 only mandates cross-functional teams centered
on the Office of the Secretary of Defense, it can be expected that this
advanced organizational practice will quickly spread to the Joint
Staff, military department headquarters, and combatant command
headquarters.
goldwater-nichols lessons learned
6. Senator Hirono. Mr. Locher, you were heavily involved in the
Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and helped to
shape the Department of
Defense as we know it today. Looking back over 30 years, what are some
of your lessons learned from the policies you helped to implement? Is
there anything you wish had been done differently?
Mr. Locher. There are three important lessons that I learned from
the enactment and implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. First,
in formulating reforms, it is imperative to have a precise
understanding of the problem to be fixed and its causes. It is not
possible to devise effective reforms without a full appreciation of the
problem and its causes, because it is the causes that reforms must
target. One Goldwater-Nichols provision where the necessary
understanding of problems and causes was not achieved was the
requirement for the president to submit annually a national security
strategy. The president does occasionally submit a document with that
title, but it falls far short of being a strategy. In Goldwater-
Nichols, the two Armed Services Committees did not understand the
obstacles to the formulation of a genuine national security strategy.
A second lesson is the need for rigorous congressional oversight of
reform implementation. At the time of Goldwater-Nichols, the two
committees understood that 50 percent of the reform battle would be
implementation. Accordingly, the committees wrote reporting
requirements into the law, requested reports from the U.S. Government
Accountability Office, and conducted oversight hearings. All of these
actions were needed in an effort to achieve a high degree of compliance
with congressional intent. In some instances, however, Pentagon
implementation was poor. This was the case for the joint officer
management provisions. The two Armed Services Committees planned to
rely on senior joint officers--the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commanders--to ensure rigorous
implementation. This expectation did not materialize. Senior joint
officers showed no interest in joint officer management. On the other
hand, the four services did, but they had different objectives. They
wanted to advance the interests of their service not the interest of
the joint world. In this case, congressional oversight was not vigilant
enough.
A third lesson is the great difficulty of the Department of Defense
to reform itself. All organizations--business, government, and
nonprofit--are challenged to reorganize themselves when performance is
disappointing. As one of the world's largest and most complex
organizations, the Department of Defense has proven to be especially
challenged. It bitterly opposed the two greatest defense
transformations of the last 70 years: the Goldwater-Nichols Act and
Cohen-Nunn Amendment that created the U.S. Special Operations Command
and forced the Pentagon to begin addressing the irregular warfare that
dominates conflict today. Similarly, the Pentagon is staunchly
resisting the provisions of section 941, which would bring about the
next revolution in defense organization.
As to what I would have done differently, I should note that there
were very few issues that could have been addressed differently.
Goldwater-Nichols was a bitter battle between pro-reform members of the
two Armed Services Committees and the Pentagon and their anti-reform
allies on the two committees. This battle lasted for four years and 241
days. The final bill pushed the reform envelope in 1986 about as far as
it could be pushed.
Beyond political constraints, some organizational concepts had not
yet been developed. It has been noted that the cross-functional-team
concepts that underpin section 941 were unknown in the mid-1980s. Thus,
there was no definitive solution to the Senate Armed Services
Committee's concern about the lack of mission integration in DOD
headquarters.
Recognizing that political and conceptual constraints would have
made it difficult to do things differently, let me identify several
topics that I wish could have been addressed better: (1) development of
solutions to the Pentagon's mission integration problem; (2) civilian
education on leadership, management, and organization, especially for
senior DOD leaders; (3) merging the service secretariats and military
headquarters staffs; (4) better promoting strategic needs in the use of
resources, which are still dominated by service perspectives; (5)
formulation of strategy; and (6) management and oversight of defense
agencies, whose total budget is now as big as a military department
budget.
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