[Senate Hearing 114-723]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-723
INSERT TITLE HEREPAKISTAN: CHALLENGES FOR U.S. INTERESTS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 8, 2016
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web:
http://www.fdsys.gpo.gov
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
27-233 PDF WASHINGTON : 2017
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office,
http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center,
U.S. Government Publishing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free).
E-mail, [email protected].
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BOB CORKER, Tennessee, Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
MARCO RUBIO, Florida BARBARA BOXER, California
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
CORY GARDNER, Colorado CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
RAND PAUL, Kentucky TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Todd Womack, Staff Director
Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
Rob Strayer, Majority Chief Counsel
Margaret Taylor, Minority Chief Counsel
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator From Tennessee.................... 1
Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator From Maryland............. 2
Dalton, Dr. Toby, co-director, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC.............. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Markey, Dr. Daniel, senior research professor, international
relations, academic director, Global Policy Program, School of
Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University,
Washington, DC................................................. 10
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to
Dr. Daniel Markey by Senator Rubio......................... 38
Grenier, Robert L., chairman, ERG Partners, Washington, DC....... 16
Prepared statement........................................... 19
(iii)
PAKISTAN: CHALLENGES FOR U.S. INTERESTS
----------
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 2016
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m. in
Room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker,
chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Corker [presiding], Risch, Rubio,
Gardner, Perdue, Cardin, Menendez, Shaheen, Murphy, and Markey.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
The Chairman. The Foreign Relations Committee will come to
order.
We thank our witnesses for being here, and I want to thank
our ranking member for continual cooperation and making sure
that these hearings go off as appropriate.
I gave some longwinded opening comments yesterday. So I am
not going to do that today. I will just generally outline the
fact that our relationship with Pakistan has been very
complicated. I think we have gone through a period of time
where we both viewed our relationship as very transactional. We
went through a period of time where we tried to change that and
deal with Pakistan in a different manner and to create a more
whole relationship with them. And from my standpoint, that has
not been very successful.
We have expended about $33 billion of U.S. taxpayer dollars
towards Pakistan since the early 2000s. I think we have
probably all been to the FATA areas and see the expense,
actually tremendous progress that was made there with U.S.
dollars with electricity and roads coming in to really cause
those areas not to be as fertile, if you will, for terrorists.
And I am being a little bit cutting to the chase in saying
this, but whereas at one time we were using our drones to
ferret out terrorists in that region, what ultimately happened
was they moved to the suburbs of Pakistan and they are now
getting medical care. The Haqqani Network leadership has been
living there. The Government of Pakistan knows where they live.
And what, in essence, has happened is where we used to be able
to take them out, to be somewhat crude, in the FATA areas, now
that they are living in the suburban areas, we cannot do that.
As a matter of fact, they have safe haven there.
They are the number one killers of U.S.--or attempted
killers of U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan. It has been of
tremendous concern to our leadership there that we have this
policy where, in effect, we are working with Pakistan and yet
the extreme duplicity that exists with the relationship is that
on one hand they say they want to see a stable Afghanistan. On
the other hand, they are harboring people and through their own
proxies are destabilizing Afghanistan.
So I thank our witnesses for being here. It is a very
frustrating relationship, and working with others on the
committee, I think you all know we have put a hold on resources
relative to the acquisition of F-16's, which I think is
appropriate. I think all of us are becoming more and more
frustrated with our relationship, and I am sure we are going to
hear some pros and cons today. But we thank you for being here
to help us more fully understand how we need to go forward in
our relationship there.
So with that, I will turn it over to our distinguished
ranking member, Senator Ben Cardin.
STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND
Senator Cardin. Well, Chairman Corker, when you indicate
that our relationship with Pakistan is complicated, that might
be the understatement of the day. This is very challenging, the
relationship with Pakistan. It is one of our strategic partners
in our counterterrorism in a very dangerous part of the world.
We look at Pakistan's borders with China, Afghanistan, Iran,
India. And they have been effective in working with the United
States in dealing with Al Qaeda in Pakistan. So it is a
strategic partner in our war against terror.
But as you point out, we have major concerns about that
relationship. They seem to be very selective in the terrorist
organizations that they go against. And the Haqqani Network, as
you point out, has had too much freedom in that country. The
LeT and its impact on India and our relationships in that
region is also a matter of major concern. So we have problems
in our relationship with Pakistan.
This is a very timely hearing and I thank you very much for
calling it.
We went through a discussion in regards to a potential arms
sale, F-16's, to Pakistan. And as you and I both know and
members of this committee, that was very complicated, and there
were many factors engaged in our discussions. And quite
frankly, we did not think we had all the information we needed,
and I think this hearing will help us to fill in some of those
blanks as to how we are going to move forward in the
relationship with Pakistan.
We also know that it is a country in which its military
leadership plays a very important role, and there is a
scheduled change in their military leadership this month. So it
will be interesting to see how that impacts on this
relationship.
In 2018, they have their parliamentary elections. So a lot
is going on.
In addition, at least reports that I have seen, it has if
not the fastest, one of the fastest growing nuclear arsenals in
the world. So it is a country of major interest, a strategic
partner in our war against terror, counterterrorism, to help
degrade Al Qaeda. Certainly they have done that in the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas. But they have selectivity
in how they help in this campaign. In some cases, they have
been counterproductive to our efforts.
So the question is how can we use our tools more
effectively to change the behavior in Pakistan. We do provide,
as you point out, Mr. Chairman, a significant amount of
assistance to this country. Is there a better way of doing
this? We have tried conditionality of aid, but is there a
better way that we can deal with our relationship and all the
tools that we use so we can get a more comprehensive partner in
dealing with the threat of terrorism?
There are some related issues that I hope we will have a
chance to talk about that deal with good governance in
Pakistan, which to me is fundamental to their long-term
security, maybe even short-term security, promotion of
democratic institutions, support for international NGOs and
what they are doing in regards to registration and whether that
will have an impact on their future development of democratic
institutions. Their tolerance for religious freedom is a major
concern, and we welcome thoughts as to how we can be more
effective in instilling upon the authorities in Pakistan the
importance for religious tolerance.
And then we talk about the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas, and we know there has been a cleansing of much of the
terrorist organizations there. But what comes next? I have
heard no real game plan on how that area can be governed. So
how can we rebuild an area and provide the type of longer-term
stability that prevents the return of terrorist organizations
that we may have been effective in the short term in degrading.
So, Mr. Chairman, this is an extremely important hearing,
and I thank you very much. And you have brought together a
distinguished panel, and I look forward to hearing from them.
The Chairman. Well, thank you, and I appreciate your
comments and scene-setting. I will just add to the fact that
they continue to not do the things in their own country to
generate revenues to support their own nation. I mean, you sit
down with the business community there, and it is just a
fascinating discussion.
So, look, I do not think I have had a conversation yet with
leadership on the military side and the ISI side that has not
been full of duplicity. And I cannot say that enough. Again, I
just want to reiterate the fact that they know exactly where
these Haqqani Network leadership members live, they know where
their families are, when they pass through roadblocks, they
give them get out of jail free cards. They provide medical
care. The fact that they are a threat to our Nation and that
what has, in essence, happened through our policies, they have
moved it one more time into the suburban areas where we cannot
get at them, and they are not willing to get at them to me is a
tremendous problem.
Our first witness is Dr. Toby Dalton, the Co-Director of
Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace in Washington. We thank you so much for
being here.
Our second witness is Dr. Daniel Markey, Senior Research
Professor of International Relations and Academic Director of
the Global Policy Program at Johns Hopkins University School of
Advanced International Studies in Washington. We thank you for
being here.
And our third witness is Dr. Robert Grenier, a former
Director of CIA Counterterrorism Center and current Chairman of
ERG Partners in Washington.
I think you all understand you can understand your comments
in about 5 minutes, we hope. Your written testimony, without
objection, will be entered into the record. And again, we
cannot thank you enough for being here and helping us with this
issue today. And if you will just begin and go through in the
order that I introduced you, I would appreciate it. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF DR. TOBY DALTON, CO-DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR POLICY
PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Dr. Dalton. Thank you, Chairman Corker and Ranking Member
Cardin, both for your leadership on these important issues but
also for the invitation to appear before the committee today.
In my remarks, I will try to provide a clear-eyed
assessment of the challenges to U.S. policy posed specifically
by developments in Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and what
they mean for U.S. policy and interests in South Asia.
I would note that in the testimony I submitted for the
record, there is a more expansive discussion on these issues,
including on India's nuclear program, but I'll focus
specifically on Pakistan today.
Let me start by outlining two priorities that I believe
should guide U.S. policy in this regard and then turn to some
analysis of the challenges.
The first priority is to prevent the use of nuclear weapons
which is most likely to occur during a military confrontation.
Successive U.S. administrations have intervened during serious
South Asian crises to contain conflict before nuclear weapons
could be deployed. This is a role that the U.S. should be
expected to continue.
The second priority is to maintain the security of nuclear
weapons and material. The probability of a nuclear terrorist
incident remains low, but the consequences would be severe both
locally and globally, with the added concern that in South
Asia, terrorists might attempt to use nuclear weapons to
precipitate another war between India and Pakistan.
These priorities face growing challenges in the region.
Publicly available information suggests that Pakistan's nuclear
arsenal may number 120 or more weapons and that over the past
decade, it expanded significantly the production of fissile
material such that it could add perhaps 20 nuclear weapons per
year to its arsenal at full production. Estimates such as this
yield the common perception that Pakistan has the fastest
growing nuclear program.
It is also actively developing a number of short- and long-
range missiles to carry these weapons. One of the newer ones
that has caused considerable global concern is a battlefield
missile, the Nasr, which Pakistani Government officials assert
will carry a low-yield tactical nuclear weapon designed to
deter India from carrying out conventional military operations
against Pakistan.
It is important that we try to understand why Pakistan has
expanded the size and scope of its nuclear forces. I think
there are two forces at work here.
The first is a perceived need to meet an expanding set of
threats from India. These threats include growth in Indian
defense spending, development of offensive conventional
military strategies, a burgeoning Indo-U.S. partnership, an
expansion of the Indian nuclear weapons program after the
nuclear deal with the United States. For Pakistan, these
threats, whether they are real or perceived, provide ample
justification for its nuclear buildup.
The second force behind this expansion is I think, for want
of a better term, the black hole of deterrence logic. And by
this, I mean that as Pakistan places increasing emphasis on
nuclear weapons to counter Indian military threats rather than
conventional arms, nuclear deterrence has become a self-
reinforcing phenomenon. Whenever the Indian threat is perceived
to grow, it justifies more or new nuclear capabilities. At some
point, nuclear weapons become a solution in search of a
problem. Today that means short-range battlefield nuclear
weapons but who knows where this logic might lead tomorrow.
South Asia is a region with multiple potential sources of
conflict, unclear nuclear redlines, and considerable room for
miscalculation. Political pressure seems to be growing in India
for a punitive response to the next terror attack attributed to
Pakistan. Should there be another crisis, the potential speed
of escalation may not afford the United States much time to
intervene and attempt to contain the conflict. This
necessitates that American officials and military officers
maintain strong working relationships with our counterparts in
both countries.
The same is true of efforts to secure nuclear weapons and
material. And to be fair, I think Pakistan is not given
sufficient credit for the nuclear security practices it has put
in place. I think they are probably quite good, although not
foolproof. The prominence given to nuclear weapons in
Pakistan's national security strategy means that the government
has a very strong interest to protect them.
That said, the frequency and severity of terrorist attacks
on Pakistani military facilities, including on some thought to
store nuclear weapons, speaks to a high threat environment. In
addition to implementing the best possible nuclear security, it
is also necessary to degrade the capabilities and reach of non-
state groups that might seek to steal or explode a nuclear
weapon. Thus, U.S. policy cannot focus only on improving
security. There is necessarily a counterterrorism component as
well.
Ideally the United States and others should seek ways to
convince Pakistan to flatten the growth curve of its nuclear
program. The honest assessment is, however, that since Pakistan
embarked on a nuclear weapons program, very little the U.S. has
tried, whether sanctions or inducements, has had an appreciable
impact. Recognizing that U.S. options and leverage are limited,
I think one possible opportunity is to incentivize restraints
through something like membership in the Nuclear Suppliers
Group. A process to negotiate benchmarks for membership for
both India and Pakistan might encourage restraint in their
nuclear programs.
In closing, in my analysis, there continues to be a
profound need for the United States to sustain options to
mitigate perceived nuclear threats in South Asia.
Notwithstanding the challenges posed by Pakistan to U.S.
interests, this means preserving, to the extent possible,
patterns of cooperation and institutional relationships that
facilitate U.S. influence.
Thank you.
[Dr. Dalton's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Toby Dalton
Thank you, Chairman Corker and Ranking Member Cardin, for the
invitation to appear before the committee today. The issue you have
selected--the policy challenge posed by Pakistan for U.S. interests--is
both timely and important. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship has
experienced significant highs and lows in recent years. Lamentably, the
signs now point to more challenging times ahead. I'm pleased to have
the opportunity to provide some personal views on this issue, noting
that my employer, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, does
not take institutional positions on policy matters.
In my remarks today I will try to provide a clear-eyed assessment
of the challenges to U.S. policy posed specifically by developments in
Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and what they mean for U.S.
interests in South Asia. Though obvious, it is worth underscoring the
point that Pakistan's nuclear weapons program does not exist in a
vacuum. Nuclear weapons are central to Pakistan's security-seeking
behavior in a region it considers to be enduringly hostile. From
Pakistan's perspective, the trend lines are quite negative. India's
economic growth, blooming strategic relationship with the United
States, and development of nuclear and advanced conventional military
capabilities and doctrines have been and will remain drivers of
Pakistan's nuclear build-up. Experts are therefore understandably
concerned that the 70-year security competition between India and
Pakistan is becoming a nuclear arms race, albeit one in which the
antagonists--unlike the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold
War--have fought four hot wars, still regularly exchange fire over
contested territory, and quite possibly sponsor the activities of non-
state actors who project violence across their shared border.
Considering what we now know of the close calls experienced by U.S. and
Soviet nuclear forces during the Cold War, the nuclear situation in
South Asia is cause for concern.
Any nuclear explosion would have catastrophic consequences, which
is why it will continue to be in the U.S. interest to sustain an
ability to mitigate nuclear threats in South Asia even as its role and
presence in the region evolves. The challenge with Pakistan is how to
preserve patterns of cooperation and institutional relationships that
facilitate U.S. influence at a time when Pakistani behavior in other
spheres may be injurious to U.S. interests.
u.s. priorities
U.S. priorities related to nuclear weapons in South Asia have
shifted over time. While the United States first sought to prevent the
development of nuclear weapons in the region, the focus shifted to cap
and rollback of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs after the
countries' nuclear tests in 1998 and then to ensuring the
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and technologies. Today, there are
two priorities above others that should guide U.S. policy.
The first priority is the prevention of intentional or inadvertent
use of nuclear weapons, which is most likely to occur during a military
confrontation. Successive U.S. administrations intervened with India
and Pakistan--during the Kashmir crisis in 1990, the Kargil war in
1999, the crisis in 2001-02, and following the terror attacks in Mumbai
in 2008--in order to contain conflict before nuclear weapons could be
deployed. Although the two states have implemented several nuclear and
military confidence building measures, these are insufficient to temper
their security competition. And substantial differences in their
deterrence practices invite the potential for misperception or
miscalculation.
Second is to maintain the security of nuclear weapons and materials
in order to prevent their theft or diversion. This priority has been
front and center in U.S. global counterproliferation policy since the
9/11 attacks, resulting in efforts such as the Global Initiative to
Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Nuclear Security Summits. The
probability of a nuclear terrorist incident is low, but the
consequences would be severe, both locally and globally, with the added
concern that in South Asia, terrorists might attempt to use nuclear
weapons to precipitate another Indo-Pak war.
The challenges inherent in these priorities continue to grow in
complexity. Increases in fissile material stocks compound the
difficulty of implementing effective and strong nuclear security
practices.Changes in nuclear posture toward greater readiness and
possible deployment especially of tactical nuclear weapons raise
concerns about security and command and control. Evolving nuclear and
conventional military strategies and postures pose greater risks of
rapid conflict escalation. And violent nonstate actors have targeted
government and military facilities; some of the same groups have
expressed interest in nuclear weapons. To be clear: these are
challenges that derive not just from conditions in Pakistan, but also
in India, China, and even the United States. My focus will be more on
Pakistan, given the subject of this hearing, but it is worth
reiterating that nuclear dynamics there have regional and global
aspects.
pakistan's nuclear development
What is known publicly about Pakistan's nuclear weapons program is
mostly what Pakistan wants India (and the world) to know for deterrence
purposes. When it flight tests a nuclear-capable missile, the military
issues a press release. When the nuclear command authority meets to
discuss threats and policies, they issue a press release. But the other
essential facts of the Pakistani nuclear program are fairly elusive.
Public assessments rely largely on analysis of satellite imagery by
non-government organizations, occasional media articles featuring leaks
of governmental information, and the writings and statements of
Pakistani officials and experts. This information suggests that
Pakistan's nuclear arsenal may number 120 or more weapons, but over the
past decade it expanded significantly the production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons. In addition to existing facilities to
produce highly-enriched uranium, Pakistan constructed and now operates
four reactors to produce plutonium. It is not clear whether Pakistan is
concurrently processing all of this material, or that it is going
straight into nuclear weapons, but if it did so, Pakistan could add
perhaps 20 nuclear weapons per year to its arsenal. Estimates such as
this produce the common perception that Pakistan has the ``fastest
growing nuclear program.''
There is somewhat clearer data about the nuclear-capable missiles
Pakistan has tested, based on statements by the government as well as
videos and photos of the launches, but that data does not extend to
missile production rates or deployment status. In recent years,
Pakistan has supplemented its fleet of medium-range ballistic missiles
with a short-range battlefield missile, the Nasr. Pakistani government
officials assert that it will carry a low-yield, tactical nuclear
weapon in order to deter India from carrying out conventional military
operations on Pakistani territory. Pakistan also has tested a longer-
range missile, the Shaheen-III, which could target Indian military
facilities as far away as the Andaman and Nicobar islands. And it has
tested two nuclear-capable cruise missiles, linking these to concerns
about an eventual Indian ballistic missile defense system. The
conventional wisdom is that Pakistan does not deploy nuclear weapons in
peacetime, that it keeps warheads and delivery vehicles separate.
Whether and how long this non-deployed status will remain the case is
an open question.
Why has Pakistan undertaken this expansion of the size and scope of
its nuclear forces? There are two forces at work here. The first is
reactive, based on a perceived need to meet an expanding set of threats
from India. Following the nuclear tests in 1998, Pakistan announced
that it would seek credible minimum deterrence. But then the Indian
economy began to grow, as did its defense spending and along with it
discussion of offensive conventional military doctrines. Concurrently,
the United States and India announced a strategic partnership, under
which the United States would essentially remove the shackles on
India's nuclear energy program. In Pakistan, these developments led
many to believe that minimum deterrence of existential threats was
insufficient for Pakistan's security. Thus, in 2011, Pakistan began to
talk about instead about so-called ``full-spectrum deterrence,'' under
which nuclear weapons will be used to deter not just a nuclear war, but
also other threats such as an Indian conventional military attack. It
is in this context that Pakistani officials have dubbed the Nasr--a
tactical, battlefield nuclear weapon--a ``weapon of peace,'' because it
is supposed to prevent India from seeking space for limited
conventional military operations short of Pakistan's nuclear red-lines.
The second force behind Pakistan's nuclear expansion is, for want
of a better term, the black hole of deterrence logic. By this, I mean
that as Pakistan places increasing emphasis on nuclear weapons to
counter Indian military threats--rather than conventional arms--nuclear
deterrence has become a self-reinforcing phenomenon. From Pakistan's
few official pronouncements on nuclear doctrine and statements by
government officials, it is clear that deterrence is understood to be
elastic: whenever the Indian threat grows, more or new nuclear
capabilities are needed. The expansion of the target set to cover the
full spectrum of nuclear and conventional military threats necessitates
more missiles of various ranges and capabilities, as well as more
warheads, and also greater amounts of fissile material. The bureaucracy
to manage these capabilities grows in size and importance, and demands
more budget. At some point, nuclear weapons become a solution in search
of a problem. Today that means short-range battlefield nuclear weapons,
but who knows where this logic might lead tomorrow. Early hints of this
dynamic seem to be at play in Pakistan, and this state may well be its
future, despite official assertions that nuclear weapons are only for
deterrence against India and that it cannot afford an arms race. The
concern about this logic taking hold is that it becomes exceedingly
difficult to introduce alternative security models that would place
less priority on nuclear weapons.
implications for u.s. priorities
The growth in Pakistan's nuclear capabilities and the broadening of
its deterrence objectives raise thorny challenges for U.S. interests to
prevent a nuclear explosion and to maintain effective security on
nuclear weapons and materials.
The stated Pakistani concerns about India's offensive conventional
military planning are not without merit. Pronouncements from the Indian
military and strategic community make clear that India has been
contemplating ways to punish Pakistan for continuing to harbor and even
support militant groups that have carried out attacks in India. Many
Indians view this search in terms of restoring deterrence. In their
view, Pakistan is unlikely to rein in groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba
unless and until India credibly threatens damage to Pakistan's
interests in ways that don't invoke Pakistan's nuclear doctrine.
Accordingly, the Indian Army has sought to formulate and exercise a
proactive strategy, often called ``Cold Start,'' the point of which is
to be able to rapidly mobilize sufficient firepower to overwhelm
Pakistani defenses and inflict defeat on the Pakistan Army. Even if the
Indian military could carry out such an operation, many experts doubt
that the Indian government would ever sanction it, given the inherent
potential for conflict escalation. But for Pakistan, this threat--real
or perceived--has provided ample justification for its nuclear build-
up.
Pakistani analysts also point out that India is augmenting its own
nuclear weapons, not just its conventional military arms. Publicly-
available evidence indicates that India continues to pursue a triad of
land-, sea-, and air-delivered nuclear weapons in order to provide a
secure second strike capability, while maintaining minimum credible
deterrence in accordance with its announced doctrine. It is possible
India's nuclear posture will change or its arsenal will grow beyond an
estimated 100 or so weapons as it seeks to balance deterrence
challenges posed both by China and Pakistan. Some reports suggest that,
like Pakistan, India is also expanding its fissile material production;
given the opacity of India's nuclear research program and mixing of
civilian and weapons facilities, though, it is not clear whether
additional fissile material would go into an expanded nuclear arsenal
or into some other activity.
The sum of these developments is a region with multiple potential
sources of conflict, unclear nuclear redlines, and considerable room
for miscalculation. It is alarming that, privately, Indian and
Pakistani officials and experts indicate they do not find the other's
nuclear policy credible. Many Indians (and some Pakistanis) argue that
there is no such thing as ``tactical'' nuclear use that can be confined
to the battlefield, that any use of nuclear weapons against India will
result in nuclear retaliation. For their part, many Pakistanis (and
some Indians) believe that India would not actually respond to limited
nuclear use on the battlefield with ``massive retaliation,'' as the
Indian nuclear doctrine calls for. There is no shared sense of where
nuclear redlines might be drawn. Political pressure seems to be growing
in India for a punitive response to the next terror attack attributed
to Pakistan. But given the importance of nuclear deterrence for
Pakistan, its officials will face severe pressure to respond to any
Indian military action, lest the credibility of their deterrent threats
be eroded. Should there be another crisis, the potential speed of
escalation may not afford the United States much time to intervene and
attempt to contain the conflict. This necessitates that American
officials and military officers maintain strong working relationships
with their counterparts in both countries.
The same is true of efforts to secure nuclear weapons and material.
Here it is useful to distinguish between activities to strengthen
security and those to mitigate threats. Both are important. To be fair,
Pakistan is not given sufficient credit for the nuclear security
practices it has put in place. By most indicators, its security is
probably quite good, but not foolproof. It has learned lessons from the
A.Q. Khan affair and it has responded to international fears about
terrorists acquiring weapons by putting in place a comprehensive
security strategy run by a professional branch within the military. The
prominence given to nuclear weapons in Pakistan's national security
strategy means that the government has a very strong interest to
protect them. To date, there is no public information that indicates
any close calls of material going missing, and no hints of further
technology leakage after the Khan proliferation network was dismantled.
But the frequency and severity of terrorist attacks on military
facilities, including on some thought to store nuclear weapons, speaks
to the high threat environment. In addition to implementing the best
possible nuclear security, it is also necessary to degrade the
capabilities and reach of non-state groups that might seek to steal or
explode a nuclear weapon or material. Thus, U.S. policy can't focus
only on improving security--there is necessarily a counterterrorism
component as well. It is a long-standing American (and Indian)
complaint that Pakistan harbors--and in some cases actively supports--
groups that harm U.S. interests in the region. Yet it is still in the
U.S. interest to support Pakistan's fight against groups such as the
Pakistani Taliban to the extent that these groups pose potential
threats to Pakistan's nuclear weapons. This tension is unavoidable.
u.s. influence
What means of influence can the United States employ to address the
priorities described here? Although successive U.S. administrations
have sought to pursue non-zero-sum relations in South Asia, it is clear
that U.S. actions or policies toward one state have effects on the
other. This has important implications for the ability of the U.S.
government to shape the primary challenges to its interests.
If nuclear weapons are most likely to be used during military
conflict, then it makes sense to promote policies to prevent conflict.
Here, the U.S. role in the region has evolved in recent years--U.S.-
India relations have blossomed while U.S.-Pakistan relations have
become more troubled. In the past, Pakistan sought to catalyze U.S.
intervention as a way to internationalize the dispute over Kashmir,
while India actively opposed any U.S. policy interest in a resolution
to the Kashmir issue. India has not been overly welcoming of U.S.
intervention unless it came with promises to coerce Pakistan to crack
down on groups that attack India. Meanwhile, most Pakistanis probably
do not trust the United States to be an honest broker in regional
disputes. Thus, in the abstract, it is difficult to frame the role the
United States might play in addressing likely sources of conflict.
Instead, it may be more feasible for the U.S. government to seed
and facilitate crisis mitigation measures--essentially firebreaks that
could slow escalation. This objective is particularly worth pursuing if
Pakistan demonstrates the commitment to not only investigate groups and
individuals that carry out attacks in India--as it did initially
following the attack in January this year on the Indian air base at
Pathankot--but also to prosecute them.
Turning to the security of nuclear weapons, in addition to
degrading terrorist threats, another approach is to provide direct
assistance when and where possible, utilizing cooperative programs
undertaken by the U.S. Departments of Defense, Energy, and State, as
well as those offered by organizations such as the International Atomic
Energy Agency. Trust is a necessary condition for this kind of
engagement, given the sensitivities involved. Before and after the U.S.
operation that resulted in the death of Osama bin Laden, there was a
prevalent narrative in Pakistan that the United States was trying to
denuclearize it. That kind of story is very corrosive to the trust
necessary to sustain cooperation on sensitive issues such as nuclear
security. Security is not an absolute, nor is security cooperation an
end to itself. And at some point the marginal cost may not produce
marginal gain, but with the continuing threat posed by groups such as
the Pakistani Taliban and possibly the self-proclaimed Islamic State,
it does not seem prudent to risk such cooperation now.
At the same time, as noted previously, the security challenge is
growing because of actions taken by Pakistan, specifically the buildup
and diversification of its nuclear arsenal. Arsenal growth and
effective security run at cross purposes. Ideally, the United States
and others should seek ways to convince Pakistan to flatten the growth
curve of its nuclear program. The honest assessment, however, is that
since Pakistan embarked on a nuclear weapons program in earnest after
it suffered defeat in the 1971 war with India, little the United States
has tried--both in terms of sanctions and inducements--has had an
appreciable impact on the scope and scale of Pakistan's nuclear
development.
As in the past, it is very unlikely today that employing punitive
measures, or even the conditioning of support in other areas such as
financing of military equipment, would have a significant impact on
Pakistan's nuclear program. Moreover, such sanctions would likely
jeopardize the trust necessary to continue security cooperation and
possibly also the relationships integral to intervention in a possible
future militarized crisis. By the same token, and speaking
hypothetically, there is probably no amount of aid or financial support
that the United States could provide that could change the direction of
Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, largely because of the political effect in
Pakistan: no leader could be seen as selling out Pakistan's nuclear
weapons to the Americans.
Recognizing that U.S. options and leverage are quite limited, an
alternative approach would be to support the development of an Indian
and Pakistani logic of managing their security competition through
negotiated limitations on nuclear and military capabilities and
postures. Or, to put it in blunter terms: to support arms control. It
is hard to imagine either India or Pakistan signing onto an arms
control agenda today, but leaders in both countries may find the logic
appealing in the future as a way to extricate themselves from their
security dilemma. For mutual restraint to work, it must have an
internal logic and internal constituencies--it can't be imposed by or
be seen as the agenda of external actors. But there may be ways to
incentivize some of the early steps on this path. One possible
opportunity is through membership in international regimes that both
seek to join, and specifically the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). If
there were a process to negotiate benchmarks for membership for both
states, it could encourage them to take steps to temper impulses in
their security competition that exacerbate the challenges described
above.
In this regard, the policy of the current U.S. administration to
support an unconditional and exceptional NSG membership path for India
is problematic. This policy requires no commitments from India to bring
its nuclear weapons practices in line with those of other nuclear
states in return for membership. It also opens no pathway to membership
for Pakistan that would incentivize it to consider nuclear restraints.
It is not surprising that the U.S. policy has encountered significant
opposition from a number of other NSG members, not least China, who
argue that the group should utilize objective criteria when considering
the membership of states like India and Pakistan that have not signed
the international Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Perhaps the next
U.S. administration will rethink this policy approach and the
opportunities it presents to address the two nuclear priorities
described here.
In closing, against the backdrop of an evolving U.S. role and
presence in the region and the challenges to U.S.-Pakistan relations,
but considering the potential consequences of a nuclear incident, there
continues to be a profound need for the United States to sustain
options to mitigate perceived nuclear threats. Notwithstanding the
challenges posed by Pakistan to U.S. interests, this means preserving
to the extent possible patterns of cooperation and institutional
relationships that facilitate U.S. influence.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Go ahead, sir.
STATEMENT OF DR. DANIEL MARKEY, SENIOR RESEARCH PROFESSOR,
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; ACADEMIC DIRECTOR, GLOBAL POLICY
PROGRAM, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS
HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Dr. Markey. Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and
members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify
about Pakistan and the challenges for U.S. interests.
This morning I will focus on three sets of issues, all of
which I have covered at greater length in my written testimony.
Let me begin with the question of U.S. security assistance
to Pakistan. Americans have been, I think rightly, frustrated
by our tortured relationship with Pakistan not least because we
have courted Islamabad with tens of billions of dollars in
assistance since 9/11. And the question that is often raised is
whether we should continue to provide aid at all. I believe we
should but also that our next President should take another
long, hard look at our Pakistan strategy across the board.
Part of my answer to this question is tactical. Pakistan is
a high stakes game for the United States. Washington would be
wise to steer clear of risky policy moves at the tail end of
this administration unless they hold realistic promise of big
gains. This is not an unqualified argument against cutting
Pakistan's aid. It is only an argument for thinking carefully
and acting with purpose. Top U.S. policymakers should
appreciate that the inadequate cooperation we have from
Pakistan today is probably better than none at all. We face
some common enemies, including Al Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban,
and ISIS, even while we do not see eye to eye on other fronts.
In order to justify major policy shifts like eliminating
aid, labeling Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism, or
enacting sanctions, U.S. policymakers should be able to explain
how such actions would make America's strategic predicament
better. They would need to consider the possibility that
coercion could backfire, raising tensions, and making Islamabad
less willing or able to advance any constructive agenda. So our
next President could take a far more coercive approach with
Pakistan, but I think given the likely costs and benefits, I
expect we are more likely to reduce and restructure assistance
to Pakistan than to end it altogether.
Now, in the process, we should find ways to more clearly
link our ends with our means and also to impose appropriate
conditions in ways that more Pakistanis and Americans will
actually understand. And I have tried to sketch out some of
these in my written testimony.
Second, with respect to Pakistan's leadership, I would
suggest that it is difficult to predict who will be running
Pakistan even by the end of this year. Over the past 6 months,
there has been media speculation that Pakistan's prime minister
might step down because of his failing health or because his
family was implicated in the Panama Papers scandal. Political
opposition parties are again campaigning for his ouster. Other
rumors swirl about whether the current army chief, General
Raheel Sharif, might be granted an extension rather than
handing over his baton in November as scheduled.
That said, policy continuity is more likely than change in
Pakistan. This is because despite two rounds of democratic
elections and 8 years of civilian government, the military
remains Pakistan's most dominant national political
institution, the primary decision-maker on core matters of
defense and foreign policy, and the chief steward of Pakistan's
growing nuclear arsenal. The military's policies on issues of
top importance to the United States are slow to change, even as
new faces come and go in Islamabad or Rawalpindi.
Finally, top Pakistani officials claim they are countering
all terrorists and militants on their soil, including groups
that have historically enjoyed the support of the state like
Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, and the Haqqani Network. And
Americans are justifiably skeptical of these claims. But even
if Pakistan were to seriously tackle these groups, it is
possible we would not recognize it, at least not right away. If
Pakistani leaders were aiming to demolish homegrown terrorist
groups, they would have good reasons to hide their intentions
and play a more subtle game of divide and conquer. And shortly
after 9/11, U.S. policymakers were often willing to give
President Musharraf the benefit of the doubt when he said that
he would eliminate all terrorists on its soil but not all at
the same time. At this stage in our relationship with Pakistan,
however, the burden of proof has shifted to Islamabad.
For the moment, that means that we should limit our
expectations, focus our bilateral relationship on where our
security interests overlap such as the fight against the
Pakistani Taliban. And in that common fight, our assistance,
including some relevant military equipment, would be justified.
But looking to the future, U.S. and Pakistani officials
must understand that we are far from a sustainable equilibrium
in our relationship. Fundamental differences persist, and
another bilateral crisis is too easy to imagine. Our next
President will need to undertake a comprehensive review of our
Pakistan strategy to include questions of assistance, the
promotion of democracy and good governance and
counterterrorism, among others.
Thank you.
[Dr. Markey's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Daniel S. Markey \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Parts of this testimony are drawn from several prior
publications: ``Stop Writing Pakistan Blank Checks,'' Foreign Policy,
February 18, 2016, accessed online at http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/
18/pakistan-corker-military-aid-blank-checks-corruption-terrorism/;
``Preparing for Change,'' The Cipher Brief, March 29, 2016 accessed at
https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/asia/preparing-change;
``Pakistan's Insider Threat,'' The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs,
Vol. 38: 1 (Winter 2014): 41-46; ``Superficially Normal,'' The Cipher
Brief, October 7, 2015 accessed at https://www.thecipherbrief.com/
article/superficially-normal-0; and ``The Future of U.S.-Pakistan
Relations,'' Seminar, 664 (December 2014): 69-73 accessed at http://
www.india-seminar.com/2014/664/664-daniel-markey.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and members of the
committee:
Thank you for inviting me to testify about Pakistan and the
challenges for U.S. interests. In my testimony, I will address three
broad issues. First, I will discuss U.S. assistance to Pakistan,
weighing its limitations and its value as a policy tool for inducing
Pakistan to undertake policies that serve U.S. interests. Second, I
will assess the current status of civilian-military relations in
Pakistan, stressing the primacy of the military, the prospects for
civilian democracy, and the implications of political change in the
near term. Third, I will consider the likelihood that Pakistan will
take significant measures against militant organizations that threaten
Pakistan's neighbors, including the Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e-Taiba
(LeT), and Jaish-e-Mohammad.
lessons of u.s. assistance and the way forward
One lesson Washington should have learned from its long experience
with Pakistan is never to overestimate the leverage generated by U.S.
assistance. Despite tens of billions of dollars in aid since 9/11,
Islamabad does not see the world through the United States' preferred
strategic prism, whether in Afghanistan, India, or with respect to
nuclear proliferation. As I will discuss at greater length below,
Pakistan's inadequate effort in the fight against terrorism represents
a fundamental sticking point in its relationship with the United
States.
Then again, history also shows that U.S. sanctions on Pakistan
throughout the 1990s failed to curtail Pakistan's nuclear ambitions,
the political dominance of its military, or the state's support to
terrorist groups like the Taliban and LeT that have engulfed the region
in violence. In short, aid is no panacea. But neither are sanctions.
To appreciate the limitations of U.S. aid to Pakistan, we should
begin by noting that assistance has never been the only--and is rarely
the most significant--policy tool used by Washington at any given time.
Therefore, the consequences of aid must not be judged as if they were
delivered in a vacuum. For instance, U.S. lawmakers should not be
surprised that billions of dollars in development assistance over the
past decade failed to win Pakistani ``hearts and minds'' when the
arrival of that money coincided with a massive surge in violence at
least partly caused by the U.S. war in neighboring Afghanistan.
Worse than being ineffective, U.S. aid to Pakistan can even be
counterproductive. Too often throughout the history of the U.S.-
Pakistan relationship, American money has propped up some of the most
repressive, anti-reformist leaders and institutions in Pakistani
society, including the military and feudal civilian elites.
Unfortunately, many of America's natural allies in Pakistan have been
alienated as a consequence.
In principle, whether provided for military or civilian purposes,
aid can serve one of several basic aims: building capacity, improving
leverage, and buying access. But too often the arguments for U.S. aid
to Pakistan have been unconvincing because the purposes were muddled.
The recent debate over whether to pay for F-16s is a case in point. It
has never been clear precisely what U.S. financing of eight new F-16s
would do to advance U.S. interests. Were they intended to improve
Pakistan's counterinsurgency capacity along the Afghan border? Buy U.S.
officials more time in Army Chief Gen. Raheel Sharif's office? Convince
Pakistan's army to attack the Haqqanis? The lack of clarity on this
point--in a climate of pervasive skepticism about Pakistan--helped to
kill that deal.
This leaves us with two questions: First, why bother to continue
aid to Pakistan at all? And second, if there are good reasons to keep
the aid flowing, can we do it more effectively?
At present, the simplest reason to avoid a dramatic cut in aid is
that it would represent a significant shift from the status quo.
Pakistan is a high-stakes game for the United States. Washington would
be wise to steer clear of risky policy moves, including threats to
curtail assistance and reimbursements, unless they hold the realistic
promise of significant gains. This is not an unqualified argument
against cutting Pakistan's aid, but only for thinking carefully and
acting with purpose.
Pakistan is a frustrating partner, but that does not reduce the
value of its partnership to zero. Pakistan permits--and at times has
enabled-the United States to wage a counterterror drone campaign over
parts of its territory and, even at times of deep bilateral discord, to
continue flying personnel and arms across Pakistani airspace into
Afghanistan. Neither side has been eager to publicize these areas of
cooperation, but even American skeptics must admit their utility. Air
corridors are readily closed and drones are easy to shoot down, so if
Pakistan had really wanted to end what in 2009 then-CIA Director Leon
Panetta called the ``only game in town in terms of confronting and
trying to disrupt the al-Qaida leadership,'' or to further complicate
the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan, it could have done so without
breaking much of a sweat. It still could.
Top U.S. policymakers appreciate that the inadequate cooperation we
have from Pakistan today is probably better than none at all. They also
know that Pakistan and the United States do face some common enemies,
including al Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban, and ISIS, even if we don't
see eye-to-eye on other fronts. In order to justify major policy shifts
like eliminating aid, labeling Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism,
or enacting sanctions, U.S. policymakers should be able to explain how
such actions would make America's strategic predicament easier. In the
process, they would need to consider the possibility that U.S. attempts
at coercion could backfire, raising tensions and weakening Pakistan in
ways that only make Islamabad less willing or able to advance any
constructive agenda.
With U.S. presidential elections around the corner, now would be an
especially poor time for Washington to undertake a tougher coercive
approach with Pakistan. The Obama administration cannot credibly
threaten Pakistan because it will not be in office long enough to make
its threats real. Islamabad would exercise the option of waiting out
any new policy from the Obama administration, hoping that the next
president takes a friendlier approach. Some might argue that the Obama
administration should take a parting shot at Pakistan, demonstrating
its displeasure with Islamabad and then enabling the next
administration to reestablish ties at whatever level it deems
warranted. But such a move would force the incoming president to
grapple with Pakistan immediately, a tall and unwelcome order given the
many other global challenges that await.
It is difficult to imagine that any new White House team would
willingly choose to make Pakistan a top issue for the president's first
few months in office. That said, President Obama's successor is almost
certain to order a thorough review of Pakistan policy upon taking
office. Then, working on its own timeline, the new administration could
decide to implement a restructuring and/or reduction of aid, threats of
sanctions, and other coercive steps.
It is at least conceivable that a potent new combination of U.S.
policies could compel or induce Pakistan's military and civilian
establishment into enacting policies that better serve U.S. interests.
Indeed, the United States has successfully coerced Pakistan in the
past, at least temporarily. The George W. Bush administration's post-9/
11 ``with us or against us'' threat to then-President Pervez Musharraf
forced Pakistan into an early, if fleeting and inadequate, alliance
against al-Qaeda, one that netted several high-profile terrorists
living in Pakistan like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. Of course, the new
administration would also need to recognize that the United States is
rarely as capable of delivering a credible threat as it was in the days
after 9/11. Unless the United States is willing to pick a fight with
Pakistan, it should avoid moves that irritate or weaken Islamabad when
they hold little hope of advancing a serious strategic purpose.
I anticipate that after weighing all the costs and benefits, the
next administration is likely to reduce and restructure assistance to
Pakistan but not to end it altogether. With this in mind, the Obama
administration would do its successor a favor by completing a final
review of all existing and planned aid to Pakistan.
On the civilian side, this should be done with a critical eye to
how each project can realistically contribute to Pakistan's economic
and political development and/or reform. That review will enable the
next administration to cut or reallocate resources in ways that better
advance Pakistan's long term political stability, economic growth, and
security, bearing in mind that U.S. aid alone cannot solve most of
Pakistan's challenges and that the goal is to find areas where targeted
investments of U.S. money or technical know-how can pay outsized or
unique dividends. The review should also assess whether the overall
scale of U.S. aid is appropriate to the task at hand in Pakistan, or
whether a fundamentally different approach--such as the Chinese are
pursuing with concessional loans aimed at promoting infrastructure or
other investments--would be smarter.
With respect to security assistance, the next administration should
think in terms of three basic categories of aid. Each would come with
different purposes and conditions.
Aid in the first category would support Pakistan's activities in
which there is a nearly complete convergence of American and Pakistani
goals, but where the United States can offer financial, technical, or
other support to lighten the burden on a relatively weaker, less-
developed, and poorer nation. Military assistance in Pakistan's fight
against domestic insurgent groups like the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
would fall into this category, because Washington also views these
groups as dangerous terrorists. In overseeing this aid, Congress would
mainly seek confidence that U.S. resources are being put to effective
use and would not need to impose significant conditions because
Pakistani and U.S. ends and means are aligned.
Aid in the second category would be used to alter Pakistan's
security tactics in areas where Washington and Islamabad agree broadly
about ends, but not means. For instance, funds for counterinsurgency
could be linked to specialized training intended to reduce civilian
casualties. This category of aid should be conditioned by Congress to
make it more likely that it will be put to use in the ways defined by
U.S. officials, but with enough flexibility to show that Washington's
main goal is cooperation, not coercive leverage.
In the third category would be funds offered as inducements for
strategic shifts by Pakistan. Aid in this category would be intended as
leverage, for instance to encourage Pakistan to take action against
terrorists like the Haqqani Network and LeT. These funds would need to
be offered with strictly legislated conditions, structured in ways that
ensure aid delivery takes place only after Pakistan satisfies
Washington's requirements. Here, the goal is to demonstrate the value
that the United States would place on policy shifts by Islamabad while
simultaneously being honest with ourselves and the Pakistanis about the
deep differences that threaten to derail the bilateral relationship.
Across the board, the clearer and more realistic our aims, the
easier it will be to judge whether U.S. assistance is likely to deliver
our desired outcome at a reasonable cost, the more likely it will
garner sustained political support among Americans and their elected
representatives, and the simpler it will be to explain to Pakistanis.
military dominance, civilian turbulence
Despite two rounds of democratic elections and eight years of
civilian government, the military remains Pakistan's most dominant
national political institution, the primary decision-maker on core
matters of defense and foreign policy, and the chief steward of
Pakistan's growing nuclear arsenal. Decisions about how to manage the
state's relationships with violent extremist organizations depend on
Pakistan's military, and within it, the powerful Inter-Services
Intelligence directorate (ISI). In addition, the military has jealously
guarded its perks and resources that insulate uniformed personnel from
many of the economic hardships suffered by their countrymen. If
Pakistan is ever to enjoy a more effective, consolidated democratic
rule, the generals will need to loosen their hold and submit to
civilian authority.
In 2008, the end of the Musharraf regime marked the return of
elected civilian government and a euphoric surge of hope that Pakistan
would set itself on a path of sustainable democracy. By the time the
PPP-led government under president Asif Ali Zardari left office in
2013, however, it was widely perceived to have surrendered core
governing authorities under pressure from the army. That year's
resounding election victory by the PML-N and the return to power of
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif again raised expectations that a strong
civilian team would use its popular legitimacy to check political
encroachment by the military.
Yet during the past several years, Pakistan's army has on multiple
occasions reasserted its dominance over civilian politicians. At least
some of Pakistan's top brass are reportedly unsatisfied with Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif, blaming his government for ineffective rule or
labeling him unfit for a variety of other reasons. Over the past six
months, there has been media speculation that the prime minister might
step down because of his failing health or because his family was
implicated in the Panama Papers scandal, or that the current army
chief, General Raheel Sharif, might be granted an extension rather than
handing over his baton in November as scheduled. Simultaneously,
political opposition parties are once again campaigning for Nawaz
Sharif's ouster. In short, it is difficult to predict precisely who
will be running Pakistan when America's next president takes office.
Under similar conditions in decades past, Pakistan might be ripe
for a coup. Now the military is playing a savvier game, pulling the
nation's strings from behind a curtain so as to avoid the taint of
dictatorship and, perhaps more importantly, to shirk its responsibility
for improving the quality of governance. But this puppet show may not
be so easily sustained. Political turmoil has considerable disruptive
potential in the short run. More worrisome, a sham democracy will have
dangerous vulnerabilities over the long run, depriving the state of
popular legitimacy in the midst of an existential confrontation with
Islamist insurgency.
That said, barring a serious crisis, we should anticipate more
policy continuity than change from Pakistan over the next six months.
In particular, a new army chief is unlikely to alter Pakistan's
strategic trajectory in significant ways--either positive or negative.
This is partly a consequence of the fact that General Sharif (who
nominates a short list of his successors) and Prime Minister Sharif
(who selects his new chief from that list) both have strong reasons to
avoid wild card candidates.
At other periods in U.S.-Pakistan history, U.S. officials have
implicated themselves in Islamabad's political dramas. This was most
notable in the final years of the Musharraf era. Today the cooling of
the bilateral relationship in general and specific U.S. frustrations
with all of Pakistan's leading political figures make that less likely.
U.S. interests are now less personal and more institutional. American
confidence in the benefits associated with civilian democratic rule
will lead U.S. policymakers to support democratic reform and
consolidation in Pakistan, while pressing security requirements will
lead them to pursue certain types of cooperation with Pakistan's most
powerful leaders, no matter who they happen to be.
prospects for a strategic shift
Pakistani officials claim they are committed to countering all
terrorists and militants on their soil, including groups that have
historically enjoyed the support of the state like Lashkar-e-Taiba
(LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed, and the Haqqani Network. Americans are
justifiably skeptical of such promises, having heard them repeatedly
over the past fifteen years without adequate follow-through. One
glaring example of the chasm between rhetoric and reality: President
Musharraf banned LeT in 2002 but the group's leader Hafiz Mohammad
Saeed still addresses large rallies in Pakistan's cities, including the
capital. Many critics of Pakistan--whether Indian, Afghan, or
American--see in all of this a nefarious double game. At best,
Pakistan's leaders have failed to demonstrate to the world that they
possess the will and capacity to implement a truly non-discriminatory
approach toward terrorists.
This raises at least two questions. First, how would we know if
Pakistan were actually in the process of a positive strategic shift on
countering terrorism? And second, until Pakistan's position is clear,
how should Washington deal with Islamabad?
The first question is a serious one because, as some Pakistani
security officials argue in private, if Pakistan did pick a fight with
all of the terrorists and militants on its soil at once, victory could
not be assured. Beyond that, a frontal assault might not be the
smartest approach to rooting out terrorists and unraveling decades of
state support to militants. It could even make a bad situation worse.
By this logic, if Pakistani leaders were aiming to demolish homegrown
terrorist groups, they would have good reasons to hide their intentions
and to play a more subtle game of divide and conquer. As a consequence,
outside observers would find it difficult to discern the difference
between a continuation of Pakistan's old double game and a carefully
calibrated counterterror strategy.
Washington's patience with Pakistan on this score has waxed and
waned. Shortly after 9/11, U.S. policymakers were often willing to
accept such arguments at face value, or at least to give President
Musharraf the benefit of the doubt when he professed his intention to
eliminate all terrorists on his soil, but not all at the same time. By
2011, however, when Admiral Michael Mullen testified before Congress
that the Haqqani network was a ``veritable arm of Pakistan's Inter-
Services Intelligence agency,'' it was clear that the burden of proof
had shifted to Pakistan.
Today administration officials maintain greater equanimity. They
have neither swooned over Pakistani army operations against the
Pakistani Taliban (TTP) in North Waziristan (by, for instance,
reprising some version of the Bush administration's rhetoric about
Pakistan being a ``frontline ally in the war on terror''), nor have
they regularly gone out of their way to belittle Pakistani efforts
because they do too little to tackle America's terrorist enemies. More
often than not, they have praised Pakistani steps in the right
direction without attempting to judge their broader consequences. With
some exceptions, including recent statements by Secretary Kerry in New
Delhi, U.S. criticism tends to be delivered behind closed doors rather
than through public reprimands.
This is the best near-term answer to how the United States should
work with Pakistan, at least until the next administration is ready to
formulate a different approach. In effect, it means accepting a gradual
downward drift in relations with Pakistan while working within the
confines of reduced expectations. Where U.S. and Pakistani security
interests overlap, such as the fight against the TTP, there should be
opportunities for cooperation and even significant U.S. assistance. For
example, the FMF denied for use in purchasing F-16s could be well spent
on weapons more clearly intended for use against the TTP. On other
fronts, such as certifying that Pakistan is making progress against the
Haqqani Network, U.S. officials should hold back until Pakistan
delivers.
Yet U.S. and Pakistani officials must understand that they have
found only a temporary salve for the relationship, not a sustainable
equilibrium. Fundamental differences simmer on the back burner,
unresolved. A relationship built on reduced expectations, diminished
attention, and little trust will likely fizzle out over time, even if
it is not again confronted by any spectacular crisis. And at least as
long as sophisticated international terrorists call Pakistan home,
another crisis is reasonably easy to envision.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Go ahead, sir.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT L. GRENIER, CHAIRMAN, ERG PARTNERS,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. Grenier. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin, I want to
thank you very much, along with the other members of the
committee, for inviting me here today to talk about what is
arguably one of the most difficult, complicated, trying, and I
would also argue most important foreign relationships.
My personal knowledge of U.S.-Pakistani relations is
primarily informed by practical experience as I have engaged
with others in trying to manage those relations dating back to
the mid-1990s. As I began in the early days of the Clinton
administration, I was a special assistant to the then-Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs on loan from the CIA
and was involved in the annual terrorism review involving
Pakistan. I can tell you that in 1993 and 1994, Pakistan came
within a hair's breadth of ending up as a formal member of the
list of state sponsors of terrorism dating back even then.
Later in 1999, I was assigned as the CIA Station Chief in
Pakistan with the responsibility for both Pakistan and
Afghanistan. And I can say that during the 3 years of that
tenure, I saw perhaps the worst U.S. relations with Pakistan in
recent times, as well as perhaps the best ones in the immediate
aftermath of 9/11.
I then returned to that sphere in 2004-2006 when I was then
the Director of Counterterrorism at CIA.
As I look back on the history of U.S.-Pakistan relations
over the last 50 years or so, it is very clear that we have a
repetitive cycle at work here. The reasons for U.S.
dissatisfaction with Pakistan may have evolved over time from
past reluctance to deal with anti-democratic military regimes
to abhorrence of Pakistani atrocities in east Pakistan in the
early 1970s, to concerns over nuclear proliferation in support
of Kashmiri militants in the 1980s and the 1990s, to the
preoccupation that we have just been discussing now with
Pakistani tolerance for the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani
Network.
Throughout it all, however, the U.S. has been willing at
least episodically to overlook its concerns with aspects of
Pakistani behavior and to subordinate those concerns to what we
perceived at the time to be overriding national security
priorities, only to revert then to more contentious relations
when those interests no longer apply.
I will not repeat the history of the 1980s where we were
willing to overlook growing evidence of the Pakistani nuclear
weapons program at the time in deference to our joint efforts
against the anti-Soviet Mujahiddin when in the 1990s, with the
Soviets having essentially withdrawn from Afghanistan, we
instead replaced former rewards with congressionally mandated
sanctions.
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the cycle began again.
Needing a platform for operations in Afghanistan and a partner
to intercept Al Qaeda members who were fleeing from that
country, the U.S. was willing to subordinate its broader
concerns with Pakistani support for militancy in Kashmir and
elsewhere, as well as Pakistan's highly ambivalent relationship
with the Afghan Taliban. And arguably, that is the bargain that
we have maintained ever since.
As U.S.-Pakistani relations have gone through these cycles
of boom and bust and as the U.S. policy toward Pakistan has
alternated between extremes, some things have remained
constant. Pakistan, for its part, has stubbornly clung to its
own perceptions of national interest and has generally refused
to compromise those perceived interests even when their pursuit
has seemed irrational or self-defeating in U.S. eyes, whether
we are talking about nuclear weapons doctrine, the Pakistani
assessment of threat from India, or its calculus regarding both
foreign and domestic militant groups.
Pakistani adherence to its perceived interests in fact has
persisted irrespective of U.S. administered punishments or
inducements. This has generated considerable outrage and
frustration looking back over the years on the U.S. side,
particularly in recent times in the context of
counterterrorism, where the fight against radical Islamic
militancy is seen here in both practical and moral terms.
Pakistani fear of seeing Islamically inspired militants unite
against it and its resulting insistence on making at times
overdrawn, in effect, wishful distinctions among militant
groups based on the degree of proximate threat to Pakistan as
opposed to others has led to U.S. charges, consistent charges,
of double-dealing, particularly when the U.S. believes that it
is paying the bill. To the U.S., the struggle against violent
extremism is a moral imperative, a view which Pakistan, used to
making practical compromises with militancy in the context of
both foreign and domestic politics, simply does not share in
the same way.
U.S. frustration is mirrored on the Pakistani side by its
perception of the U.S. as a fickle and inconstant partner,
which does not recognize Pakistan's heavy sacrifices in a
violent struggle with Pakistani-based extremists, which has
been fueled in large measure by Pakistani support for U.S.
counterterrorism policy. Now, that assertion may sound jarring
to American ears, given the perceived limitations in Pakistani
counterterrorism policy, but it is a view which is firmly held
by the extremists themselves. Pakistani resentment of America
is driven by the perception that the U.S. will never be
satisfied by what Pakistan does, and given the serious
underlying differences between the two, the Pakistanis are
right: the U.S. is unlikely ever to be satisfied and perhaps
justifiably so.
Once again, U.S.-Pakistani relations are at an inflection
point. In recent years, U.S. relations with Pakistan have been
driven largely by U.S. engagement in Afghanistan. But there has
been a qualitative change in the nature and the aims of U.S.
involvement in Afghanistan, and the dynamic of U.S.-Pakistan
relations needs to change along with it. I would argue that
much of the current frustration with U.S.-Pakistan relations is
driven by backward-looking desires and concerns which simply no
longer apply in the same way. The U.S./NATO military posture in
Afghanistan is a small fraction of what it once was. The U.S.
no longer aims to defeat the Taliban. Instead, it hopes merely
to keep the Kabul regime from being defeated.
With U.S. ends and means having changed so drastically in
Afghanistan, it is highly unrealistic to suppose that Pakistan
is going to make up the difference. Pakistan cannot succeed in
bringing the Afghan Taliban to heel where 150,000 U.S. and NATO
troops and hundreds of billions of U.S. dollars have failed.
And what is more, they are simply not going to try. Pakistani
influence in Afghanistan, despite longstanding legend to the
contrary, is distinctly limited. Pakistan's leadership
understands that a Taliban victory in Afghanistan would be a
strategic disaster for itself, but lacking the means to
decisively influence events there and continuing to harbor
serious doubts about the strategic orientation of the Kabul
regime, it is disinclined to take the risks involved in trying
to do so.
As Afghanistan settles into a dynamic stalemate of
indeterminate outcome, it is time for the U.S. to refocus on
its long-term fundamental interests in South Asia. The reasons
for America's post-9/11 obsession with Afghanistan are clear
enough. I was present, after all, at the creation. But long-
term strategic interests in Pakistan actually dwarf those in
Afghanistan. Arguably, we have allowed the tail to wag the dog
for too long and it is time to reorient our policy.
Pakistan is now engaged in a long, complicated, twilight
struggle against religiously inspired extremism, both
internally and across its borders. For Pakistan, this is not
simply a matter of finding, fixing, and eliminating committed
terrorists. Ultimate victory will necessitate addressing the
hold which various forms of extremism have long exerted on
large portions of Pakistan's own body politic, and thus the
political environment in which important policy decisions are
made. Long-term solutions for Pakistan will involve social and
educational reforms as much as military action. But I would say
that given Pakistan's importance in global counterterrorism
policy, its status as a nuclear-armed state, its troubled
relations with India, and its location at the heart of a highly
important but politically unstable region of the world, the
U.S. has a considerable stake in the outcome of that struggle
and would be well advised to maintain a constructive engagement
with Pakistan at multiple levels, lest the wrong side win.
In Pakistan, as elsewhere, the U.S. must balance achievable
goals with effective means. This may well dictate a lowering of
overall U.S. expenditures in Pakistan than we see currently,
but the dynamics and motivations behind those spending
decisions must fundamentally change.
The Chairman. Are we coming to a close?
Mr. Grenier. Yes, sir, we are.
Let me just say that limited U.S. means will have to be
calibrated in Pakistan against achievable goals in light of
U.S. priorities going forward.
That said, given overarching U.S. interests in the region,
there will be many worthy candidates for U.S. assistance, many
of which have been touched on here. But in short, the U.S.
dares not turn its back on Pakistan as it seeks to protect its
serious national security interests in South Central Asia. Wise
policy going forward will require the U.S. to rebalance an
overly Afghan-centric policy posture of the past and to accept,
however reluctantly, those aspects of tactical Pakistani
behavior it cannot change, focusing instead on priority long-
term goals which can actually be achieved. Such a policy will
often feel less than satisfying, but in my view it is the only
responsible way forward.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Mr. Grenier's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert L. Grenier
Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank you and the members of the Committee
for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss one of
America's most difficult, complicated, trying--and also important--
foreign relationships. My knowledge of U.S.-Pakistan relations is
primarily informed by my practical experience in helping to manage
those relations, dating back to the mid-1990s.
At the start of the Clinton administration, in 1993 and 1994, I was
a Special Assistant to the Undersecretary of State for Political
Affairs, on loan from CIA, deeply involved in an annual terrorism
review which nearly resulted in Pakistan's being placed on the formal
list of state sponsors of terrorism. In 1999, I was posted to Islamabad
as the CIA station chief for both Pakistan and Afghanistan. My three-
year tenure in that position spanned both the lowest and, arguably, the
highest points in recent U.S.-Pakistan relations, when 9/11 propelled
Pakistan from being a heavily sanctioned, near-pariah state to a front-
line U.S. ally in the then-recently proclaimed ``global war on
terror.''
After leaving Pakistan in 2002, I later returned to active
involvement in U.S.-Pakistan affairs from 2004 to 2006, this time as
Director of the CIA Counter-terrorism Center. At that time, Pakistan
remained, by far, America's single most important foreign counter-
terrorism partner. It is perhaps emblematic, however, of the deep-
seated differences and suspicions which have always lurked just beneath
the surface of U.S.-Pakistan relations even in the best of times, that
in the five years between my retirement in 2006 and the killing of
Osama bin Laden in 2011, we went from a situation where the bin Laden
raid would undoubtedly have been carried out jointly, to one where the
U.S. felt constrained to conduct this operation unilaterally, with good
reason in my view, despite the predictable consequences for bilateral
ties.
As I look back now at the history of U.S.-Pakistan relations over
the past 50 years and more, it is clear that there is a repetitive
cycle at work. The reasons for U.S. dissatisfaction with Pakistan may
have evolved over time--from past reluctance to deal with anti-
democratic military regimes, to abhorrence of atrocities in East
Pakistan in the early 1970s, to concerns over nuclear proliferation and
Pakistani support to Kashmiri militants in the `80s and `90s, to
today's preoccupation with Pakistan's tolerance of the Afghan Taliban
and the Haqqani network. Through it all, however, the U.S. has been
willing, episodically, to overlook its concerns with aspects of
Pakistani behavior and to subordinate those concerns in the face of
what have appeared, at the time, to be overriding national security
priorities--only to revert to a more contentious relationship when
those interests no longer pertained.
Thus, in the 1980s, the U.S. was willing not only to overlook
growing evidence of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program in deference to
joint U.S.-Pak support to the anti-Soviet Afghan Mujahiddin, but also
to provide Pakistan with generous economic and military rewards in the
bargain. In the 1990's, however, with the Soviets safely expelled from
Afghanistan, those rewards were abruptly replaced with Congressionally-
mandated sanctions.
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the cycle began again. Needing
a platform for operations in Afghanistan and a partner to intercept al-
Qa'ida militants fleeing that country, the U.S. was again willing to
subordinate its broader concerns with Pakistani-based militancy in
Kashmir and with Pakistan's ambivalent attitude toward the Afghan
Taliban--which I should note was manifest almost from the start of the
U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan. Once again, the U.S. was
willing to provide extensive financial support to Pakistan, much of it
tied at least loosely to Pakistani support of U.S. operations, and to
Pak military deployments along its western border. And although much
has happened in the interim, that is the essential bargain which has
pertained ever since.
As U.S.-Pak relations have gone through these cycles of boom and
bust, and as U.S. policy toward Pakistan has alternated between one
extreme and the other, some things have remained constant. Pakistan,
for its part, has clung stubbornly to its own perceptions of national
interest, and has generally refused to compromise those perceived
interests, even when their pursuit has seemed irrational or self-
defeating to U.S. eyes--whether in the context of nuclear weapons
doctrine, in its assessment of the threat from India, or in its
calculus regarding both foreign and domestic militant groups. Pakistani
adherence to its perceived interests, in fact, has persisted,
irrespective of U.S.-administered punishments or inducements. This has
generated considerable outrage and frustration on the U.S. side,
particularly in recent times on counterterrorism, where the fight
against radical Islamic militancy is seen in both practical and moral
terms. Pakistani fear of seeing Islamically-inspired militants unite
against it, and its resulting insistence on making at times overdrawn
and wishful distinctions among militant groups based on the degree of
proximate threat they pose to Pakistan as opposed to others, leads to
U.S. charges of double-dealing, particularly when the U.S. believes it
is paying the bill. To the U.S., the struggle against violent extremism
is a moral imperative--a view which Pakistan, used to making practical
compromises with militancy in the context of both foreign and domestic
politics, simply does not share in the same way.
U.S. frustration is mirrored on the Pakistani side by its
perception of the U.S. as a fickle and inconstant partner, which does
not recognize Pakistan's heavy sacrifices in a violent struggle against
Pakistan-based extremists which has been fueled, in large measure, by
Pakistani support for U.S. counterterrorism policy. That assertion may
sound jarring to American ears, given the perceived limitations in
Pakistani counterterrorism policy, but it is a view firmly held by the
extremists themselves. Pakistani resentment of America is driven by the
perception that the U.S. will never be satisfied by what it does, and
given the serious underlying differences between the two, the
Pakistanis are right: The U.S. is unlikely ever to be satisfied, and
perhaps justifiably so.
Once again, U.S.-Pakistan relations are at an inflection point. In
recent years, U.S. relations with Pakistan have been driven by the U.S.
engagement in Afghanistan. But there has been a qualitative change in
the nature and aims of the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, and the
dynamic of U.S.-Pakistan relations needs to change with it. Indeed, I
would argue that much of the current frustration in U.S.-Pakistan
relations is driven by backward-looking desires and concerns which
simply no longer apply. The U.S./NATO military posture in Afghanistan
is a small fraction of what it once was. The U.S. no longer aims to
defeat the Taliban; instead it hopes merely to keep the Kabul regime
from being defeated. With U.S. ends and means having changed so
drastically in Afghanistan, it is highly unrealistic to suppose that
Pakistan is going to make up the difference. Pakistan cannot succeed in
bringing the Afghan Taliban to heel where 150,000 U.S. and NATO troops
and hundreds of billions of U.S. dollars have failed, and what's more,
they're not going to try. Pakistani influence in Afghanistan, despite
long-standing legend to the contrary, is distinctly limited. Pakistan's
leadership understands that a Taliban victory in Afghanistan would be a
strategic disaster for itself, but lacking the means to decisively
influence events there--and continuing to harbor serious doubts about
the strategic orientation of the Kabul regime--it is disinclined to
take the risks involved in trying to do so.
As Afghanistan settles into a dynamic stalemate of indeterminate
outcome, it is time for the U.S. to refocus on its long-term
fundamental interests in South Asia. The reasons for America's post-9/
11 obsession with Afghanistan are clear enough--I was present, after
all, at the creation--but long-term U.S. strategic interests in
Pakistan in fact dwarf those in Afghanistan. Arguably, we have allowed
the tail to wag the dog for too long, and it is time to reorient our
policy.
Pakistan is now engaged in a long, complicated, twilight struggle
against religiously-inspired extremism, both internally and across its
borders. For Pakistan, this is not simply a matter of finding, fixing,
and eliminating committed terrorists. Ultimate victory will necessitate
addressing the hold which various forms of extremism have long exerted
on large portions of its own body politic, and thus the political
environment in which important policy decisions are made. Long-term
solutions for Pakistan will involve social and educational reforms as
much as military action. Given Pakistan's importance in global
counterterrorism policy, its status as a nuclear-armed state, its
troubled relations with India, and its location at the heart of a
highly important but politically unstable region of the world, the U.S.
has a considerable stake in the outcome of this struggle, and would be
well advised to maintain a constructive engagement with Pakistan at
multiple levels.
In Pakistan as elsewhere, the U.S. must balance achievable goals
with effective means. This may well dictate a lower overall level of
U.S. expenditure in Pakistan than we see currently, but the dynamics
and motivations behind those spending decisions must fundamentally
change. Afghanistan will continue to loom large in U.S. calculations,
but it will inevitably recede in importance. As the U.S. navigates this
shift, it will have to accept that in many areas, Pakistan and the U.S.
will simply have to agree to disagree. Although the U.S. and Pakistan
share largely similar strategic goals, both at home and in Afghanistan,
the disparities in perspective, in priorities and in tactical approach
between the two will continue to necessitate an essentially
transactional relationship. That relationship will inevitably be
contentious, but it need not be cripplingly acrimonious.
Quite frankly, one of the most important challenges limiting
effective cooperation between the U.S. and Pakistan will be what I
regard as an endemic deficit in effective national leadership in
Pakistan. The U.S. has a long term interest in encouraging effective
civilian governance in Pakistan, and a military leadership fully
subordinate to democratic control. Our active pursuit of that long-term
aspiration should be limited, however, by two facts: The first is that
U.S. ability to effectively influence the evolution of civil-military
relations in Pakistan is distinctly limited, to say the very least. The
second is that the civilian political leadership in Pakistan has
traditionally been both venal and incompetent, lacking both the moral
will and the capacity to do what is necessary to address religious
extremism and other overarching national challenges. While the military
has not always been distinctly better in this respect, and in fact
considerably worse in the foreign context, the fact is that the
Pakistan Army is by far the most effective and capable institution in
the country. And while the dysfunction at the heart of civil-military
relations in Pakistan would take some time to describe, it is often
driven by an understandable frustration on the part of the military
with the ineffectiveness of its civilian leaders. Frequently, simple
considerations of efficacy will continue to necessitate our dealing
directly with the Army to get things done.
Again, limited U.S. means will have to be calibrated in Pakistan
against achievable goals in light of U.S. priorities going forward.
That said, given overarching U.S. interests in the region, there will
be many worthy candidates for U.S. assistance, both direct and
indirect. Social cohesion and stability require Pakistan to address
serious deficits in water, energy, and social services--particularly
education. Pakistan's National Action Plan against terrorism will
require material resources, as well as political courage and focus.
There is a crying, long-term need to fully incorporate the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas into settled Pakistan, and thus to eliminate
long-standing terrorist safehavens. And Pakistan's conventional
military forces will need to be maintained if we are to avoid quick
recourse to nuclear weapons at a time when Kashmir remains a social and
political tinderbox, and the threat of Indo-Pak war still hangs like an
incubus across the region.
In short, the U.S. dares not turn its back on Pakistan as it seeks
to protect its serious national security interests in South-Central
Asia. Wise policy going forward will require the U.S. to rebalance the
overly Afghan-centric policies of the recent past, to accept, however
reluctantly, those aspects of tactical Pakistani behavior it cannot
change, and to focus instead on priority, long-term goals which can
actually be achieved. Such a policy will often feel less than
satisfying, but it is, in my view, the only responsible way forward.
The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you all for your testimony.
I am going to defer to our ranking member to begin and
again say that, look, I think the relationship with Pakistan is
important. It has been transactional. It has moved to a more
wholesome relationship. Now it is back into, I think, a very
transactional relationship. I think in many ways they generate
aid from the United States by their bad behavior and
threatening issues relative to their nuclear program. But I
would agree that it is a very important relationship and that
is why we are having this hearing.
Senator Cardin?
Senator Cardin. Thank you, and let me thank all three
witnesses for their testimony.
Let me start by saying that this Congress is not going to
take any definitive actions in regards to Pakistan before the
elections. We are going to probably vote a continuing
resolution that will just continue current policy, and we will
not be taking up any vehicle that could affect--the Congress
affect this relationship.
So this hearing and I hope the testimony will help us
understand what is likely to be considered as we move into the
next administration, working with Congress as it relates to the
policy with Pakistan.
And I do not have any specific recommendation, but I want
to sort of challenge this. Pakistan is one of the largest
recipients of development assistance of any country from the
United States. And as you pointed out, over a long period of
time, we have seen marginal progress in regards to a warm
relationship with the United States and the priorities that we
believe are important in that bilateral relationship.
They certainly have not been helpful in dealing with the
broader issues of counterterrorism. They have been centric to
their own country and not really engaged in helping us deal
with the problems of terrorism against India or the Haqqani
Network and may have been counterproductive, as Chairman Corker
pointed out, in supporting these efforts.
You point out in the testimony that their role in
Afghanistan may be very marginal right now. They may not be
able to do much for us in Afghanistan.
Their anti-American rhetoric is extremely problematic.
They have built up a nuclear capacity far beyond what was
our believed understanding and show no signs of slowing down
their nuclear weapon activity.
They are developing relations with China, which we are
watching, which is not necessarily counterproductive to us, but
we wonder as to where they see their future.
They are affecting our relationship with India, a country
in which we are trying to develop a much more strategic
alliance with.
And their human rights record has been moving in the wrong
direction.
So why should we not consider a fundamental change in
America's relationship with Pakistan and what danger is there?
I want to get an answer to that, but it seems to me that they
are going to fight terrorism in their own country. That is what
they are doing now. They may not have the same capacity without
help from the United States, and we could talk about that. But
they are doing it for themselves. They are not doing it for the
region. They are not doing it for the United States. What are
we getting out of this? Why should we not look at taking a--my
staff told me about $600 million a year we do in development
assistance--and looking at countries in which we can get better
return? Whoever wants to respond. Don't be bashful.
The Chairman. They agree with the assessment. They want to
move on. [Laughter.]
Senator Cardin. If we could have a brief response. Mr.
Grenier, we will start with you.
Mr. Grenier. Yes, Senator, I think that in fact we do need
to review and, if you will, zero-base our relations with
Pakistan. You have already pointed out the many areas in which
the Pakistanis are not moving in concert with our views. In
fact, there are certain areas where they are perhaps
undermining U.S. interests. They do not see their problems in
the way that we think they ought to, and that Pakistani
perception is unlikely to change except slowly.
That said, I think we do have an important stake, given the
broadness of our interests.
Senator Cardin. So how do we direct this? We have tried
conditionality. That has not produced the type of results that
we thought. You say start with a zero game. Well, a start with
a zero game means we start with cutting off all of our
assistance. Is that what you are suggesting?
Mr. Grenier. No. I don't think that we would end up at
zero, but I would recommend that we do a zero-based review. And
I think at the end of the day, we would conclude that in fact
it makes sense for us to support Pakistani military development
particularly in counterterrorism in parts of this country that
are----
Senator Cardin. What do we get out of their
counterterrorism? Remind me. Other than fighting the terrorists
in their own country, what are we getting from them?
Mr. Grenier. Well, sir, for many years, they have helped us
in a very open-handed manner against Al Qaeda. Now, obviously,
the importance of Al Qaeda----
Senator Cardin. And we do operations that are regional.
They continue to blast us for that, being offended that we are
coming into their country to clean up the region.
Mr. Grenier. Yes, sir. And I would say that there are often
domestic political reasons for that.
Senator Cardin. I hear that all the time. There comes a
point where it becomes real when they say it is just for
politics.
Mr. Grenier. Well, again, I think the Pakistani perspective
on these things is necessarily going to be different from ours.
Senator Cardin. Dr. Markey, do you want to comment briefly?
Dr. Markey. Just on the narrow question of security
assistance and Pakistan's behavior on the counterterror front,
I would agree with a lot of the frustration.
There are two points that I make in my testimony about
areas where they have been helpful and I think continue to be
but not in ways that are necessarily public: air corridor into
Afghanistan and drone strikes. There are protests by
Pakistanis, and I agree with you that that is unhelpful. We
would like to get to a place where we can publicly and
routinely cooperate.
Senator Cardin. I have been in closed briefings and I
understand that there is a different perspective. But I am
wondering how different it really is.
Dr. Markey. I am sorry?
Senator Cardin. How useful their quiet help to us is.
Dr. Markey. Well, from someone who is working outside of
government and watching drone strikes as they are reported in
the media, my impression would be that though the tempo of
those strikes has gone down, they do persist. They are useful.
And on occasion, they are done, it seems from the outside,
without their help, but often there are areas where these
strikes----
Senator Cardin. The drone strikes are very important. Do
not get me wrong. And my question is how helpful have the
Pakistanis been in regards to that. Some of this we cannot talk
about in open session. I fully understand that. But I just
raise the value issue. And you look at the investments we are
making and whether there are not alternative ways to get some
of this help without putting up with the support for activities
that are counterproductive to U.S. interests.
Dr. Markey. Right.
Senator Cardin. Dr. Dalton, my time is over. So you have a
minute in response.
Dr. Dalton. Very briefly, Senator.
I think that if you consider the security threats to
nuclear weapons and the potential that there are still groups
in Pakistan that might have interest in nuclear weapons and
capability against the government--we have seen this in attacks
on military facilities over time. It continues to be in our
interest to make sure that those groups are not able to get
anywhere near those weapons.
Senator Cardin. So the more nuclear weapons they produce,
the more money we have to give them?
Dr. Dalton. Not necessarily money, but there is a
pernicious effect there that Chairman Corker pointed out in
terms of threats and rewards.
The Chairman. Yes. We reward their bad behavior by more
money. So they will conduct more bad behavior.
Senator Perdue?
Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate
you calling this meeting. I think Pakistan is in a very
important place geographically and from a time standpoint too.
You know, in my career, I lived in Asia and worked a good
bit in Pakistan in Karachi and Lahore and Islamabad. My friends
in Pakistan have been very concerned about the internal
politics there for a long time and what is going on next door
in Afghanistan.
When I think of Pakistan today, I think of a couple things.
One is the Pashtun instability between India and Pakistan, the
nuclear capability, which scares me to death frankly, given the
anti-democratic ups and downs that you all three have talked
about. I think of Afghan security and the Haqqani Network and
what Pakistan is not doing regarding that effort. And then
Pakistan is a terrorist haven.
There are a couple of reports that have come out. October
2014, the Pentagon report was the first ever to claim that
Pakistan uses Afghanistan-focused insurgents as proxy forces
rather than allowing their presence by providing sanctuary and
support. That was a damning report.
Then in June of this year in 2016, the Pentagon issued a
report on the stability and security in Afghanistan, noting
that Pakistan's vital role in reducing the regional threat
posed by terrorists and insurgents has not been sustained.
Then in August of this year, the Pentagon announced it
would not certify Pakistan's action against the Haqqani Network
as sufficient. What that means is that half of our aid over the
next year, $300 million, will not be released, and it cannot be
waived by the President, as has been past practice.
And so all of a sudden now we are in a situation where,
quite frankly, it is a very confused situation between the U.S.
and Afghanistan in terms of what we are trying to communicate.
And my question is really more in line with, Dr. Markey,
what you said in a Foreign Policy article recently. You said
many experts believe that the U.S. aid is often worse than
ineffective. It is potentially counterproductive. I would like
you to expand on that, but I would like the other two panelists
to also help me with this issue right now of what is our
objective with Pakistan in terms of the objectives we have of
stabilizing Afghanistan. I am very concerned about their lack
of cooperation there. We have plenty of DOD information here in
public documents and a lot more in classified documents that we
know they are not participating, and that is a dangerous threat
in Afghanistan. We know the Pashtun issue creates instability
between India and Pakistan. You know, there are 200 million
people in Pakistan, and the average age is 23. Their birthrate
is very high. This a potential hotbed for terrorism.
So with all of those things bubbling around and our
strategic interest in Afghanistan long-term, Dr. Markey, would
you start it? I would like the three of you just to comment,
though, if money is not the answer and we all agree that
engagement is still purposeful, wherein lies the answer in
terms of how we do--I agree with the zero-based approach on the
money, $19 billion. But only $8 billion of that has actually
been security efforts. About $11 billion has been humanitarian.
So let us put it in perspective. It is not like this is a major
battleground for us in terms of money, but on the other hand, I
do not know what they are going to do given that we are cutting
half of the money, I guess, that we would normally be sending
them this year. Dr. Markey?
Dr. Markey. Yes, very briefly I would say my points about
the potential counterproductive nature of U.S. assistance to
Pakistan relate to observations by many Pakistanis that they do
not see necessarily where the resources are going. And many
Pakistanis who may be in the more liberal, cosmopolitan crowd
often perceive that the money has supported the more
repressive, anti-democratic forces in their country and that
this, they would say, has been happening over decades. So that
is where the counterproductive aspects are.
So what we need I would say broadly is a lot more clarity
on precisely what our aims are, and for every dollar that flows
from the United States to Pakistan, I would want to assign it a
specific use rather than--I would say what we have now is a
much more muddled perception----
Senator Perdue. Would you agree that result versus use
would be reasonable, that a specific result as opposed to a
specific----
Dr. Markey. Yes. What I would say particularly on the
security side is that there should be three categories in the
way we think about our assistance and the way that we condition
it.
Category one, things they want and we want. It was said
earlier that they want to fight the Pakistani Taliban, those
who are threatening them. We want to fight the Pakistani
Taliban. Conditions in that area would be relatively limited
because we want the same thing.
Category two. We and they want similar things but they want
to do it differently than we think is right. We have concerns
about the way they treat civilians in war zones, things like
that. Maybe improve their counterinsurgency capabilities. We
would want to focus our money there, use stricter conditions.
Category three. Areas where we want to tell them what we
think they should do and we believe they are not doing. We hold
our resources as inducements with limited expectations that
those things will change but demonstrating that we are willing
and eager to be partners with them, thereby not closing doors
over the long run, but not delivering assistance for things
that they do not do.
Senator Perdue. Mr. Chairman, could I ask your forbearance
and just ask Mr. Grenier to respond to that quickly? I am out
of time, so I ask for brevity, please.
Mr. Grenier. Senator, I very much agree with what Dan
Markey has just said. When I talk about sort of zero-basing
everything, I think we need to look at our assistance to
Pakistan in a very tactical way, in the same way that Dan has
just described, so that we have clear common purposes to which
we are going to put specific aid and plans and deliverables for
what that aid is actually going to produce. Now, in some cases,
particularly when you are talking about broad economic support,
it's very difficult to point to a specific result. I mean, the
social problems in Pakistan are so vast, and the importance of
our addressing them jointly is so important. But it is very,
very difficult to actually see measurable progress over a short
period of time.
That said, I think we have to get away from the pattern
that we have been in for so many years where we provide them
with broad assistance, which is not accounted for in a very
tactical way, and somehow expecting that we can use that as a
tool, as a lever to get them to change aspects of their
behavior that frankly they simply are not going to change.
Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Mr. Markey, I want to follow up a little
bit on that point because that seems like a fairly
straightforward, relatively easy to pursue way to think about
assistance to Pakistan. So why have we not done that?
Dr. Markey. I think the short answer would be that the
nature of our relationship with Pakistan changed very
dramatically after 9/11, and there were a number of assistance
programs that were quickly put into place, partly to encourage
and partly at the time to reward Pakistan for some significant
changes in its counterterrorism strategy. In many ways what we
have done is we have layered on top of that over the past 15
years other programs, and often as changes have happened on the
ground in terms of the realities or our perceptions of what the
Pakistanis are or are not doing we justify different programs
for different purposes. So F-16's at times initially looked
like a reward for a strategic shift by Pakistan on Al Qaeda.
Subsequently, there became an effort to help them fight their--
to engage in counterinsurgency in the FATA. These
justifications do not necessarily line up very effectively, and
ultimately, as we have seen, they have not been convincing here
at home.
And so I think the problem is that history, history of
changing relations and assistance programs maybe not keeping up
with that, and a desire often to make a political case for
specific pots of money, a political case that will appeal to
the widest constituency but maybe is not internally consistent
in a way that we would like to see.
Senator Shaheen. When you say the widest constituency, are
you talking about here in America as opposed to in Pakistan?
Dr. Markey. In some cases both but mainly in terms of
justifying it here at home. F-16's were justified on a number
of grounds, for instance, including the desire to simply get
face time with senior Pakistani leaders. Which of the
justifications was actually true? Are they actually a useful
counterinsurgency tool and so on? I think for different people,
we have pulled out different reasons. And I think the patience
has worn thin on that.
Senator Shaheen. In my visits to Pakistan as Senator, one
of the things I have heard everywhere I have gone has been the
on again/off again nature of American assistance. Clearly the
Pressler amendment had real implications for how Pakistanis
viewed their ability to count on the U.S.
Are there areas where we can look to our assistance and say
that it has been effective, not military assistance, but
economic assistance, and where Pakistanis have said, oh, yes,
this has been helpful? One of the things that I have heard
mentioned has been our help after the earthquake. That was one
of the times when the Pakistani people really appreciated
American support. Are there other things that we can cite and
ways that we can look where we were successful and we should
think about pursuing those kinds of efforts? Anyone?
Dr. Markey. Yes. Humanitarian assistance in the aftermath
of earthquakes and other natural disasters can pay a dividend.
It is often short-lived, though, in terms of people's memories.
Other examples of positive efforts by the United States.
Support to higher education institutions like the Lahore
University of Management Sciences. This is an area where
generations now of Pakistan's leaders and best and brightest
have been trained and which would not exist, I believe, if not
for significant U.S. startup assistance at the beginning.
Another example would be Pakistan's systems of canals and
dams, which were built in the 1960s and 1970s with considerable
global assistance, but much of it actually coming from the
United States either directly or through multilateral lending
institutions. And those kinds of things have changed the map of
Pakistan. So it is not true to say that we have never done
anything right by Pakistan or that we have not had a long-
lasting benefit to our assistance even on the civilian side.
Senator Shaheen. Mr. Dalton, I only have a few minutes
left, but I want to pursue your issue that you raised with
respect to Pakistan's nuclear program and why that gives us a
significant interest in what goes on there. And I wonder if you
could give us your assessment how secure the program is, and I
assume that it is in Pakistan's interest to make sure that none
of the materials or bombs get into the hands of terrorists and
that they are equally concerned about that as we are.
Dr. Dalton. Thank you, Senator.
I agree with that contention, that they have a strong
interest in doing it. Nuclear weapons are one of the few
symbols in Pakistan that there is political consensus on. Maybe
that and cricket are the only other things that everybody
agrees on. Nuclear weapons are great. They are sort of the
crown jewels, and so they have undertaken I think fairly
significant efforts to make sure that they are well protected.
There is a professional division within the strategic plans
division that addresses security. In my interactions with them,
my sense is that they are a very professional organization.
They understand the challenges that they face. They understand
the threats that they face. And they have put in place I think
as good a system as they can, recognizing the challenges that
they face. The challenges are not insubstantial. We move
nuclear material on our interstate system under heavy guard,
big convoys. You cannot do that in Pakistan because the threat
signature becomes too high. So they do face real challenges
when it comes to moving material, keeping it secure, making
sure that the personnel in the nuclear labs are not having
sympathies with non-state groups and so forth. But I think to
the extent that is observable from publicly available
information, they have done as good a job as they can given
their interests.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Gardner?
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
the witnesses for your testimony today.
Just a quick question on an initiative we have not spent
too much time on this morning, North Korea. According to the
Department of Defense's 2015 report on North Korea's military
power, in addition to Iran and Syria, past clients from North
Korea's ballistic missiles and associated technology have
included Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, and Yemen.
The report also asserts that North Korea provided Libya
with uranium hexafluoride, the form of uranium used in the
uranium enrichment processes to produce fuel for nuclear
reactors and nuclear weapons via the proliferation network of
Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan.
More recently, however, media outlets in India have
asserted that the relationship between Pakistan and North Korea
persists today.
So could the three of you, any of you, all of you address
the relationship, if any, that Pakistan currently has with
North Korea? And do you believe that there are ongoing illicit
nuclear ties between these two nations today?
Dr. Dalton. Thank you, Senator. Why do I not start and then
if others want to join in.
You are absolutely right that there is information to
suggest linkages between the Pakistani nuclear program and
missile programs in North Korea in the past. After the A.Q.
Khan network was dismantled in the early 2000 time frame, most
of those suggestions have gone away, and I think there is no
sort of accepted public information, aside from what we have
seen in Indian media accounts, to suggest that those linkages
are ongoing.
And I think if you look at the steps that Pakistan has
taken since then to put in place a legal framework, to put in
place an export control structure, a system to keep checks on
the scientists so that they are not doing things that they are
supposed to do, I think they have demonstrated a desire and
interest to make sure that this does not happen again. They
understand the damage that the Khan network did to their
reputation, to their desire that their nuclear program be seen
as a legitimate national security tool for the state. And so I
think in that context, although I would not rule it out because
there is a history, I also think it is not as likely today that
we would see that kind of cooperation.
Senator Gardner. Anybody else wish to address this?
Mr. Grenier. Yes, Senator. I think there is an important
point just looking in there as well because it is not an
accident that the relations that Pakistan developed and
specifically A.Q. Khan and the facilities that he controlled
and developed with North Korea and also with Iran, that that
occurred during the 1990s. And that was a period during which
Pakistan was sanctioned about as heavily as it possibly could
by the United States. It was very clear that Pakistan had a
continuing national interest in developing nuclear weapons in
order to maintain a threat against India, given the fact that
there was no way that they could possibly match conventional
military capabilities of India, and absent other means of
pursuing what they saw as an overridingly important national
security goal, they chose to get help where they could find it
in this case, in some cases with North Korea and Iran.
And I would say that to the extent that we can, we need to
be very, very careful that we maintain at least some level of
engagement with Pakistan. If we treat them as a pariah, we
force them into a pariah corner, they are likely to behave as a
pariah.
Senator Gardner. Stepping back a little bit from that
question to a more 30,000 foot level view, what is the
relationship today between North Korea and Pakistan?
Dr. Dalton. I think it is difficult to characterize. There
is not a lot of public information. I did notice recently a
news article that the North Korean airlines were not going to
be permitted to fly into Pakistan any longer. It is not
entirely clear what the basis for that is, but it does suggest
that there is some trouble there and that the trade relations
that they have enjoyed in the past may be souring in some way.
So it is not clear that there is a strong relationship at this
point.
Senator Gardner. And I would just point out too that it is
not just India that is concerned about this. There are articles
in the Japan Times as well pointing to evidence of North Korean
activities increasing between the two nations and the concern
over proliferation activities. I think that is just something
that we could continue to look at and make sure that our
concerns are not overlooked there.
In terms of China and Pakistan, the port opening, the $46
billion economic corridor, how do you see that relationship
growing, changing, and what do you think the likely long-term
ramifications are of that growing relationship?
Dr. Markey. I was in Pakistan back in February/March of
this year, and principally to ask questions about the China-
Pakistan relationship and to learn more about it for my
research. And I would say that it is perhaps the single most
exciting thing that has happened in Pakistan in a semi-positive
way for some time. Pakistanis that I met with were almost
uniformly eager to talk about the opportunities that they
perceive with respect to China, the kinds of investments that
are planned and are, in fact, ongoing by the Chinese, the ways
in which this may contribute to improving Pakistan's investment
climate not just for Chinese activities but for other
international investment, which has been extraordinarily poor
in Pakistan, and the ways that ultimately that may contribute
to growth and economic opportunity.
So from a U.S. perspective, I think we have to take two
looks at this. One is in the short- to medium-term, it is
relatively positive. I mean, we have concerns about Pakistan's
political stability, and part of that is related to its
economic reality. And if they can get more investment, more
jobs, economic growth, there are opportunities to build a
country of now 200 million people, going on possibly 300
million, 350 million people by mid century. These are things
that should be supported. And so where the Chinese are paving
the way, we probably should follow suit.
Over the longer run, we are going to have some questions
about what this is going to mean for China's profile in South
Asia, China's profile leading into Central Asia and the rest of
Eurasia. That will depend in many ways on how the United States
perceives its broader relationship with China, and as we veer
into possibly a more competitive relationship, China's
expansion may come in some ways at our expense. That is how we
are going to have to think about it. But that is the longer-
term strategic framework.
In the short run, I perceive it as relatively positive.
Senator Gardner. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Markey?
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
Dr. Dalton, I am very concerned about the risk of nuclear
war between India and Pakistan. Pakistan's development of low-
yield tactical nuclear weapons intended for use on the
battlefield is especially dangerous. These weapons are meant to
make it easier for Pakistan's military to pull the nuclear
trigger. As a result, they will increase the probability that
confrontations with India end up spiraling out of control and
leading to nuclear catastrophe.
Pakistan has continued to rapidly produce fissile material
and it has refused to lift its veto on negotiations of a
fissile material cutoff treaty at the Conference on
Disarmament. These policies threaten to accelerate the nuclear
arms race in the region.
Pakistan actually has the ultimate responsibility for its
dangerous nuclear policies, but the United States played a
role, as has India. That is especially true with regard to the
deal that we cut with India in 2008 in terms of their continued
production of nuclear materials not under full scope safeguards
and my warning at the time and others' that Pakistan would just
continue to massively produce nuclear materials if that was
going to be our policy. And so that is exactly what has
happened.
And now the administration has sought to further water down
our nonproliferation policy by admitting India to the Nuclear
Suppliers Group despite unambiguous guidelines that Nuclear
Suppliers Group members should be parties to the
Nonproliferation Treaty. Not only are we going to grant India
an exemption from established global rules, but we are actually
seeking to allow India to join the body that decides on those
rules. Obviously, Pakistan will not react well to that, as we
talk about their nuclear threat.
So from your perspective, Dr. Dalton, do you believe
removing the shackles on India's nuclear program worsen the
nuclear competition in South Asia?
Dr. Dalton. Thanks, Senator Markey.
I think there are two points that I would offer in response
there. The first point is the availability of information
regarding the Indian nuclear program that has some credibility
to it makes it quite difficult to come up with an assessment
about whether there has been an actual increase in Indian
fissile material production for nuclear weapons.
Senator Markey. I am talking about the Pakistani response.
Do you think it worsened the race for Pakistan? Did Pakistan
respond to that?
Dr. Dalton. Yes, absolutely.
Senator Markey. And did that make the world more dangerous
in that region?
Dr. Dalton. Yes, absolutely.
And I think the point that I would make there is whether
there is a real reason for Pakistan to respond or their
perception that their security environment is worsening is
important. But for them, they have decided that things look
bad. They need more weapons.
Senator Markey. They said they would do it.
Dr. Dalton. Yes.
Senator Markey. And they did it.
Dr. Dalton. Yes.
Senator Markey. But it was in response to a policy that we
put on the books. Is that correct?
Dr. Dalton. I think that is correct.
Senator Markey. Okay. Thank you.
Now, Dr. Dalton, in your written testimony, you warned that
Pakistani and Indian officials have expressed skepticism that
the other side's nuclear threats are credible. You note that
there is no shared sense of where nuclear redlines might be
drawn. That is a very alarming statement in your testimony. If
both sides doubt the deterrence of the other's threats, then
nuclear deterrence may fail. What role should the U.S. play to
help India and Pakistan prevent unintended nuclear war?
Dr. Dalton. As you pointed out, Senator, the desire by
Pakistan in having tactical nuclear weapons is to create a
perception that there is a lower threshold for use. In their
perspective, that enhances the deterrence value of those
weapons and should discourage India from contemplating sort of
limited conventional military operations, which the Indian army
and others have been contemplating and exercising in recent
years. I think that does create a condition where there is
ripeness for deterrence failure. The Indian establishment does
not believe that Pakistan would use tactical nuclear weapons on
its own territory. They think that is not credible. Pakistani
officials and experts think that it is not credible that India
would use nuclear weapons in response to Pakistan.
Senator Markey. Well, let me just stop you right there. So
then we kind of get into this question of how do we deal with
that issue. Pakistan's foreign ministry recently suggested that
Pakistan would be willing to enter into a bilateral agreement
with India that could bind each country not to conduct
additional nuclear test explosions. Currently both countries
maintain unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing. Neither are
signatories to the CTBT. What are the prospects for India and
Pakistan to agree on a bilateral non-testing agreement?
Dr. Markey? I just wanted to say that word, ``Dr. Markey.''
My wife is a physician. She will not take my name. So I just
wanted to say ``Dr. Markey'' to someone. [Laughter.]
Dr. Markey. It is a pleasure to say ``Senator Markey.''
Senator Markey. So how can we get the U.S. to help to get a
bilateral nuclear test deal between these two countries?
Dr. Markey. I have to say that my read on Pakistan's
statements regarding this desire to make a deal with India
strike me as kind of a diplomatic play on Pakistan's part.
Senator Markey. You do not think they are sincere.
Dr. Markey. I do not. Well, they may well be sincere, but
they know that India is also justifying its nuclear posture
because of India's concerns about China. And so they know that
India will be reluctant and unlikely to take steps merely to
match Pakistan. And so they know that they have a high ground
on this issue and that India will not likely respond the way
that they would like.
Senator Markey. Do the other two witnesses agree with that,
that ultimately it is not something that could ever bear fruit,
that we could have a bilateral agreement between the two
countries?
Dr. Dalton. It is entirely possible. I think the context
depends. In this instance, I agree with Dan that the effort was
to try to show the Indians up when it comes to membership
criteria for the Nuclear Suppliers Group. This was a diplomatic
gambit. On the other hand, one could imagine that if there were
a process by which both states could become eligible for NSG
membership, this kind of thing where they would have to
demonstrate something more than a unilateral test moratorium
might become a requirement, in which case a bilateral agreement
could be useful.
Senator Markey. Okay. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the
panel.
Let me just say as a preface I think our overall posture
towards Pakistan, in addition to the focus of this hearing,
however, is much broader. And our stated policy is to support
and strengthen a more democratic, stable, and prosperous
Pakistan. And I know that many of my colleagues join me in the
belief that to truly do so, Pakistan must take meaningful steps
to strengthen the rule of law, democratic institutions, to
empower civil society actors, and to uphold human rights. And
while I recognize this panel may not be in the best position to
specifically address those concerns, although they may have
views on them, I think we would be remiss not to stress the
importance of these needed reforms and actions.
And I have previously raised concerns with Prime Minister
Sharif about new laws that would hamper the ability of national
and international NGOs that focus on democracy and human rights
to successfully operate in Pakistan. And I think we need to
give a renewed sense of urgency to the process that is going
on--I think the ranking member mentioned it in his opening
comments--because while we must focus on national security and
cooperation with Pakistan against actors who threaten our
interests and Pakistani national security and that of our
allies in the region, including India, we cannot overlook the
role of governance that civil society plays in developing long-
term security. And I hope at some point, Mr. Chairman, we will
have some opportunity to focus on that as well.
So I want to wave my saber to our friends in Pakistan about
what is going on with national and international NGOs because
when we talk about measurements of how we provide security
assistance, in my mind, yes, there is security assistance, but
there is also the longer range set of needs to develop a
populace and civil society underpinnings of what the support
for those security operations need to be. And I am worried
about what is happening in Pakistan in that regard.
Now, with that having been said, in July 2014, Prime
Minister Sharif announced that all foreign fighters and local
terrorists will be wiped out without any exception, which is a
welcome declaration given the rampant terrorist activity in
Pakistan particularly in the FATA and Waziristan regions. What
we have seen, however, is a clear prioritization from Pakistani
security forces of the Pakistani Taliban, which directly and
almost exclusively threatens their interests directly. And I
understand that to some degree.
However, now that we have seen successes in those
operations, I would like to ask the panel--I know this has been
touched upon briefly, but I would like to go greater in depth--
do you believe that Pakistani security forces will actually
take action against other groups, including the Haqqani
Network, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad? These networks pose
a direct threat to the United States and our allies in the
region, but Pakistan seems to have thus far had mixed results
on carrying through its pledge to attack all foreign fighters.
So if the answer was, well, we have a domestic challenge and we
have got to take care of our domestic challenge before we can
deal with the foreign fighters issues, now that that largely
has been maybe not totally but largely significantly addressed,
what is the excuse now? What are our expectations and what can
we do as we talk about figuring out how we calibrate this
assistance in a way that we understand that there are mutual
interests here? What can we do to see those specific elements
be pursued?
Mr. Grenier. Senator, I wish there were a simple answer to
a very direct and straightforward question. And I think that as
we sort of peel back the layers of the onion in the likely
Pakistani response to that question--and we have heard elements
of that response any number of times--part of what they say is
true. Part of it is sincere. Part of it is mendacious. Part of
it is self-serving. And it is a great challenge to somehow
compart all of that and figure out what is a proper way
forward, knowing that our track record for influencing
Pakistani behavior in these areas is very poor, to say the very
least.
I think it is true that as the Pakistanis focus as a matter
of priority on those groups that primarily threaten them, they
are legitimately very concerned about the possibility of
different groups which currently do not cooperate with one
another certainly against Pakistani interests in fact
cooperating with one another in the future. I think that has
been a great consideration for the Pakistanis in the context of
North Waziristan. I think that they had to reach certain
agreements with certain groups, perhaps to have included the
Haqqanis before they felt that they were in a position to
actually go into North Waziristan, invade that area, as they
had promised to do for years.
I think at the same time, though, it must be said that
knowing the Pakistanis as I do, I strongly suspect that they
are somewhat loathe to completely undercut the LeT even if it
were possible for them in domestic political terms to do so,
knowing that the LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammad, among others, are
very potent potential weapons that they can use in the context
of Kashmir.
They are very concerned about the future of Afghanistan.
Their tools for affecting events in Afghanistan are not
particularly effective.
Senator Menendez. So you are saying that their interests
diverge from ours.
Mr. Grenier. I am sorry?
Senator Menendez. That their interests diverge from ours.
Mr. Grenier. In a tactical sense, absolutely.
Senator Menendez. Well, okay. So that gives me a lot of
insight as to how I might deal with them.
Dr. Markey.
Dr. Markey. Yes. I would like to make two points.
First, to the extent that they are likely or would ever act
against some of these groups, I think we are less likely to see
an all-out military push of the sort that we have seen against
the TTP than we might see more law enforcement actions and
because particularly LeT does enjoy a certain political clout,
that they will be taking steps and they will be justifying
these moves on the basis of trying to incorporate parts of
these organizations within normal, nonviolent politics in
Pakistan.
And that gets back to your broader point about the need to
promote a more democratic moderate Pakistan and one that is not
inclined to turn to violent militarism or militancy I guess in
so many different ways.
And that is the second point I wanted to make, which is
basically we need a Pakistan that is more democratic long term
to counter the appeal of radical ideologies in that country.
You get a legitimate, popularly elected government that can
actually deliver. That is the only kind of permanent solution I
would imagine to the appeal of a radical revolutionary Islam in
the country. And the problem as I see it--I agree with you I
think--is that while we have a veneer of a democratic process
and we have had, I think fortunately, two rounds of national
elections and hopefully upcoming a third, it has not seeped
down and it has not become a democratic practice that is
necessarily going to provide the kind of legitimacy that the
country--that its leadership, that the state needs in order to
be effective over the long run. So I am very concerned in
exactly the same way.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Murphy.
Senator Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank our witnesses for really fantastic testimony.
I want to drill down a little bit further on this question
of what influences extremism, extremist groups in Pakistan. One
terrorism expert who helped the government come up with its
response to the Peshawar school attack said, quote, terrorism
has different shades, but madrasas have been the nursery.
I know there is no way to paint with a broad brush the type
of learning and the type of teaching that happens in madrasas,
but there are estimates suggesting that a large percentage of
madrasas, many of which have been set up with Saudi money or
Gulf money, are preaching a version of Islam that often becomes
the foundation for extremist groups who come in to try to
pervert those teachings into violence.
And of course, the Pakistanis have recognized this by
planning a campaign of registration for these schools. It has
gone slowly, my understanding is, in part because it is
difficult to pick out the ones that present problems versus the
ones that are legitimately teaching Islam.
I will start with you, Mr. Grenier, just to talk a little
bit about this issue and how it plays into a broader set of
U.S. policies, not just related to the way in which we fund
Pakistan, but the way in which we partner with other
governments that are putting money into those schools which in
many ways are sowing the seeds, becoming the nursery of
extremism.
Mr. Grenier. Yes, Senator. It is a very, very difficult and
intractable problem. And there are a lot of different aspects
to it. I think it is important that you mentioned that this is
something which, as we look at the phenomenon of radical
madrasas in Pakistan, it is not just only a Pakistani problem.
As you say, a lot of the money for construction of these
madrasas comes from outside, and while there are government
elites in other countries, perhaps particularly Saudi Arabia,
who recognize that there is a problem with this, it is a very
difficult political line for them to take with their own people
who feel that they are simply promoting Islam. And what could
possibly be wrong with that?
You are right that the Pakistanis recognize the long-term
threat here and there is now, as there has been in the past, an
effort to try to license these schools, to try to change the
curricula of these schools. Under the best of circumstances,
that would be a very daunting project in a country with a
population the size of Pakistan and the lack of resources that
they have. But these are not the best of circumstances, and the
Pakistani ability to pursue this kind of a program in a
systematic way, in a persistent way is simply nowhere near what
it really ought to be.
And I think one of the other aspects to all of this that is
extremely important is to recognize that these madrasas,
whatever else they may represent, are also a very important
social institution within Pakistan. Many of the children who
attend these madrasas would not get three meals a day but for
their attendance at these madrasas. And so the idea that you
are simply going to go and close down noncompliant madrasas is
simply a political nonstarter in many areas of Pakistan.
Senator Murphy. But let me put it to you, Dr. Markey, in a
simpler way. It is not a coincidence that as these schools have
multiplied, as the Saudis in particular have sent billions of
dollars into parts of Pakistan, that these terrorist
organizations have been more successful than ever before in
recruitment. I understand all of the difficulties in pulling
this apart. But from the standpoint of U.S. policy, we should
at least acknowledge that these two trend lines, the increasing
money going in to fund these schools and the increasing ability
to recruit, is not a coincidence.
Dr. Markey. It is not a coincidence.
I would just step back. There is also a history to this. It
goes back in many ways to the Saudi global response to the
Iranian revolution. Pakistan has been sort of a proxy
battlefield for Iran and Saudi Arabia ever since. And so where
Saudis have funded certain things and certain groups inside of
Pakistan, the Iranians have at times done similar. And so you
have seen bloodletting on both sides.
One other related point. I would not want us to focus too
closely only on madrasas or even Saudi-sponsored institutions,
which include madrasas, but also to look at the public
education system in Pakistan and the curriculum there, which
has been widely cited in a number of different reports as
having kind of anti-Western, anti-Indian, promoting a lot of
narratives that are perhaps not quite the same as promoting
terrorism but do create a narrative of Pakistan's place in the
region, in the world that is one that is not helpful to us.
And then one last point on this. There is some good news
here. Many Pakistanis, in fact, I would think the vast, vast
majority, simply want their kids to get a good education. And
what you are seeing is actual disgust with a lot of the options
that have been available, including public schools that have
been failing, and investments by middle and lower income
Pakistanis into private English language teaching schools,
opportunities for their kids because what they are looking for
is a way for them to actually get decent jobs and compete in a
global marketplace, and they are willing to invest in that. So
we should not think that this is something, whether madrasas or
the school curriculum in the public schools, has the natural
and national support of Pakistanis. They actually, I think if
left to choose, would want something different.
Senator Murphy. This is an incredibly uncomfortable
conversation for us because it puts the United States in the
position of appearing to decide what brand of Islam should be
taught and what should not. And frankly, it is an inappropriate
conversation for us, but it is important. It is important for
us to untangle this because getting this right, trying to
figure out the influences into extremism frankly is much more
important to our battle against these groups than picking who
we strike with drones and who we do not on the back end. So I
appreciate your answers to the questions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Cardin?
Senator Cardin. Mr. Chairman, I just really wanted to make
an observation. I thank the panel again for their testimony.
It seems to me the Nuclear Suppliers Group might give us an
opportunity. Dr. Dalton, I was just impressed by your
observation. It is so difficult to get India and Pakistan to
have substantive trust in each other and substantive
discussions. And the Nuclear Suppliers Group--joining it--it is
not just technical, it is also political. It may very well give
an opportunity, looking a little bit longer term, to get a much
better control over what is happening in India and Pakistan in
regards to their nuclear programs. That is something I think
the United States, working with some of our partners who are
interested in nonproliferation--it may be an area where we can
make some progress.
Secondly, we have not talked about the Pakistani Diaspora.
I think that also could be helpful to us in trying to establish
a more constructive relationship between the United States and
Pakistan.
The last point that Senator Menendez raised on good
governance I think is critically important. Just because you
have elections does not mean you are going to have a government
that is going to be respected by the people as taking care of
their needs. And if you lose confidence, it does present the
void where extremists can prosper. So I do think we need to put
a much stronger priority on the governance issues in Pakistan.
But, Mr. Chairman, I thought this was an extremely
important panel and I thank you very much for calling the
hearing.
The Chairman. Well, thank you. And I want to thank each of
you for being here and sharing your expertise and giving us
additional insights. You know, I do not think we spend near
enough time here. The way the processes work, the
appropriations process happens in a very swift manner, governed
by a few. I am in no way criticizing them. It is just the lack
of staffing that exists there. The authorizing committees,
which have the ability to deal with folks like you in a much
more in-depth manner and others, really do not play the roles
here in the United States Senate that they should. And I think
much of the insight here, as we try to move ahead with aid
issues in the future, is going to be very useful. But thank you
for being here. I thank you for your testimony.
People will want to ask questions in writing. If we could,
we will leave the record open, without objection, till Monday.
If you all could respond fairly quickly, we would appreciate
it. Again, thank you for spending time with us. Thank you very
much.
The meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
responses to additional questions for the record
submitted to dr. daniel markey by senator rubio
Human Rights
Question 1. The State Department's recently released International
Religious Freedom Report focused at length in the executive summary on
Pakistan's deeply troubling blasphemy laws noting that more than 40
people remain on death row for blasphemy in Pakistan, many of whom are
religious minorities. In fact, Pakistan has the highest number of
blasphemy convictions worldwide. Given other strategic interests with
Pakistan, to what extent to you think human rights and religious
freedom issues are sidelined or marginalized in our own diplomatic
efforts? In that same vein, the bipartisan, independent U.S. Commission
on International Religious Freedom has repeatedly recommended that the
President designate Pakistan a Country of Particular Concern for its
severe violations of religious liberty. Successive administrations have
failed to do so despite the realities on the ground especially as it
relates to the minority Christian and Ahmadi Muslim communities. How do
you think Pakistan would respond to being designated a CPC? Are we
using all of the leverage at our disposal to advance these fundamental
human rights?
Answer. Pakistan's religious minorities clearly face enormous
difficulties as enumerated in this question. Although I am unfamiliar
with the specific procedures involved with designating Pakistan a CPC,
I would not be surprised that successive administrations have
determined that doing so would hold relatively little prospect of
changing the reality on the ground inside Pakistan. In other words, in
this case as in others, U.S. leverage to change Pakistan's domestic
policies is limited. Moreover, on an issue that raises enormous passion
within Pakistan--that of the blasphemy laws--pressure from the United
States might even have some potential to make a bad situation worse.
Pakistanis who would like to see the blasphemy laws changed or
abolished might find themselves tarnished by association with the
United States rather than strengthened by the outside pressure. It is
noteworthy that even nominally liberal Pakistan Peoples Party
governments have failed to make serious progress in this area and that
some of their leaders, including slain Governor Salman Taseer and
Minister for Minority Affairs Shahbaz Bhatti, were specifically
targeted for their positions on the blasphemy issue. This raises
serious questions about whether the battle over blasphemy laws and the
oppression of minorities in Pakistan can be won by way of coercive
policies leveled at Pakistan's government, given that changes will
require a wider transformation of Pakistani society through education
and positive social mobilization that is exceptionally difficult to
engineer from the outside. Shedding light on Pakistan's problems, as
the International Religious Freedom Report does, makes U.S. concern
apparent to Pakistani, American, and global audiences. This is
important and constructive. In addition to that publicity, however, it
is at least arguable that quietly lending support--technical,
financial, moral--to Pakistani groups advocating for change will be a
more constructive approach than coercion of Pakistan's government.
Question 2. Pakistan's Supreme Court recently set a hearing date,
the second week of October, for the final appeal of Asia Bibi, the
Christian mother of five sentenced to death for allegedly committing
blasphemy. This appeal is the only thing standing between her and
execution. This case is systematic of the abuses suffered by Pakistan's
minority faith communities and evidence of how the blasphemy laws are
often abused and the most vulnerable suffer as a result. U.S. diplomacy
to date has been unsuccessful in yielding a positive outcome in her
case. Are you following this case? What more could the U.S. government
be doing to advocate for her release and others like her while not
putting them in further jeopardy given the internal dynamics in
Pakistan?
Answer. As I wrote in my answer to the first question, the
challenge for influencing Pakistan's domestic policies on sensitive
matters like the case of Asia Bibi is that even if the United States
could place greater pressure on Pakistan's government, the threat to
Pakistani minorities is widespread in Pakistani society, not simply the
product of current government policies. Unfortunately, even recent
Pakistani governments inclined to take constructive action to protect
minority rights have stumbled with implementation. U.S. diplomats
should express American concerns about Asia Bibi's fate and should make
it clear that how Pakistan handles her case (and other similar issues)
will directly influence how Americans, including powerful policymakers,
perceive Pakistan. Americans are, as I noted in my testimony, already
extremely skeptical about the value of partnership with Pakistan, so
Pakistani leaders must appreciate that the Asia Bibi case will have
international ramifications. Yet it is an open question--given the
internal dynamics in Pakistan noted in this question--whether
conditioning U.S. assistance or taking other coercive steps aimed at
Pakistan's ruling government would strengthen the hand of Asia Bibi's
advocates or play to the advantage of her detractors.
__________
[all]