    [Senate Hearing 114-658, Part 7]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                     S. Hrg. 114-658, Pt. 7

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2017 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 2943

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
       MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
                                    PURPOSES

                                   ----------

                                     PART 7

                                STRATEGIC FORCES

                                   ----------

                         FEBRUARY 9, 23; APRIL 13, 2016

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             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
      2017 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM--Part 7  STRATEGIC FORCES

                                                     S. Hrg. 114-658, Pt. 7

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2017 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 2943

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
       MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
                                    PURPOSES

                                   __________

                                     PART 7

                                STRATEGIC FORCES

                                   __________

                         FEBRUARY 9, 23; APRIL 13, 2016

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

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                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

      JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman         JACK REED, Rhode Island
    JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma                BILL NELSON, Florida
    JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama                   CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
    ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi             JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
    KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire              JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
    DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                    KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas                     RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
    MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota                JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
    JONI ERNST, Iowa                         MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
    THOM TILLIS, North Carolina              TIM KAINE, Virginia
    DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska                     ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
    MIKE LEE, Utah                           MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
    LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
    TED CRUZ, Texas

                        Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
                        Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director

                                   ____________

                       Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,

     JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama, Chairman      JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
    JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma              BILL NELSON, Florida
    DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                  JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
    MIKE LEE, Utah                         ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
    LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina         MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
    TED CRUZ, Texas

                                      (ii)

                             C O N T E N T S
                                 _________

                                February 9, 2016

                                                                       Page

    Nuclear Acquisition Programs and the Nuclear Doctrine............     1
    Scher, Honorable Robert M., Assistant Secretary of Defense for        3
      Strategy, Plans and Capabilities.
    Hopkins, Arthur T., Ph.D., Acting Principal Deputy Assistant          8
      Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological
      Defense Programs.
    Rand, General Robin, USAF, Commander, Air Force Global Strike        13
      Command.
    Benedict, Vice Admiral Terry J., USN, Director, Strategic Systems    22
      Programs.

                               February 23, 2016

    Atomic Energy Defense Activities and Programs....................    45

    Klotz, Honorable Frank G., Under Secretary for Nuclear Security,     47
      Department of Energy.
    Regalbuto, Honorable Monica C., Assistant Secretary of Energy for    59
      Environmental Management, Department of Energy.
    Trimble, David C. Director, U.S. and International Nuclear           66
      Security and Cleanup, Government Accountability Office.

    Questions for the Record.........................................   116

                                 April 13, 2016

    Ballistic Missile Defense Policies and Programs..................   135

    McKeon, Honorable Brian P., Principal Deputy Under Secretary of     138
      Defense for Policy, Department of Defense.
    Gortney, Admiral William E., USN, Commander, U.S. Northern          144
      Command, and Commander, North American Aerospace Defense
      Command.
    Syring, Vice Admiral James D., USN, Director, Missile Defense       148
      Agency, Department of Defense.
    Mann, Lieutenant General David L., USA, Commanding General, U.S.    163
      Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic
      Command and Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated
      Missile Defense.

    Questions for the Record.........................................   196

                                     (iii)

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2017 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                           TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 2016

                                   U.S. Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

             NUCLEAR ACQUISITION PROGRAMS AND THE NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:37 p.m. in
    Room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jeff
    Sessions (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Present: Senators Sessions, Fischer, Donnelly, and
    Heinrich.

               OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

        Senator Sessions. The Strategic Forces Subcommittee
    convenes today to receive testimony on the Department of
    Defense nuclear acquisition programs and nuclear policy in
    review of the defense authorization request for fiscal year
    2017.
        We know from Secretary of Defense Carter that our nuclear
    deterrent is the foundation and the bedrock of our security.
    ``No other capability we have is more important,'' said his
    predecessor, Chuck Hagel.
        We also recognize that a consistent lack of investment and
    support for our nuclear forces over many decades has left us
    with little margin to spare as we recapitalize the force. As
    Secretary Work told Congress just seven months ago in an
    important comment, ``The choice right now is modernizing or
    losing deterrent capability in the 2020s and 2030s. That is the
    stark choice that we face.''
        The case for nuclear modernization is made more urgent by
    recent developments in the strategic environment. In previewing
    the fiscal year 2017 budget request, Secretary Carter warned
    that we are witnessing a return to great power competition.
    That is a historic event that we have to recognize.
        According to the Secretary, Russian aggression in Europe
    and the rise of China in the Asia-Pacific region are two
    primary challenges now driving the focus of the Defense
    Department planning and budgeting, with North Korea and Iran
    following closely behind.
        These are four nuclear nations, all expanding their
    capabilities in nuclear programs.
        In addition to expanding their conventional military
    capabilities, both Russia and China are making significant
    investments in their strategic capabilities, expanding the role
    of nuclear weapons in their overall security strategy. Russia
    has gone so far as to make direct nuclear threats against the
    United States and its allies while President Putin warns, ``I'm
    surprising the West with our new developments in offensive
    nuclear weapons.''
        It is not just China and Russia. Admiral Haney, Commander
    of the Strategic Command, observed in January that, ``For the
    foreseeable future, other nations are placing high priority on
    developing, sustaining, and modernizing their nuclear forces.''
        Obviously, the vision that we had and many had that
    unilateral restraint and even reduction of our nuclear weapons
    stockpile and capabilities would encourage others to follow on
    that path has not proved effective.
        Congress has provided sustained support for the President's
    entire nuclear modernization program, and I expect us to
    continue despite obvious budget pressures. This country can and
    should be able to afford 5 percent to 6 percent of our national
    defense spending to maintain and recapitalize our nuclear
    forces over the next 10 years.
        We should acknowledge, however, that the DOD and the
    Department of Energy nuclear modernization programs over the
    next 10 to 20 years are fragile, in the words of Under
    Secretary of Defense Frank Kendall, and that ``any funding
    reductions at this point could pose unacceptable risk to the
    health of the nuclear enterprise.''
        I believe we have a bipartisan commitment not to make this
    mistake. I really do. I am optimistic about our ability to make
    the right choices. I think the President is proposing
    reasonable goals, and I think our Congress and Senate will
    support that.
        In recent press reports, if they are correct, Secretary
    Moniz, the Secretary of Energy, has warned that underfunding in
    the out-years will put the NNSA [National Nuclear Security
    Administration] budget in an untenable position by 2018.
        But make no mistake, the United States Government will do
    what is necessary to preserve a strong and effective nuclear
    deterrent that should be feared and respected by potential
    adversaries, and welcomed by U.S. allies who depend on the
    United States for their security.
        The venerable principle of peace through strength remains
    true. There must be no doubt that the greatest military in the
    world has the capacity and the will to defend itself against
    any attack, and will not cower or be intimidated.
        I will now turn to my able ranking member for any comments
    that he might have.
        Senator Donnelly?

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOE DONNELLY

        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I would like to thank today's witnesses for appearing at
    this hearing.
        Assistant Secretary Scher and General Rand, I understand
    this is your first appearance. Welcome.
        Today's hearing occurs almost two years after the cheating
    incident at Malmstrom that resulted in Secretary Hagel's
    nuclear enterprise review. While there is much criticism of
    this event, it has, I believe, resulted in a positive effort
    for the DOD [Department of Defense] nuclear enterprise. It
    resulted in a deep discussion of our Nation's ability to
    maintain its deterrence posture by concentrating on our airmen
    and sailors first, and the means to support them.
        I hope today's hearing continues to understand the progress
    in this area.
        We had a hearing two weeks ago with a number of former
    deputy assistant secretaries, going back to 1992, who were
    responsible for the policy of our deterrence mission. I want to
    continue that discussion with those of you to understand your
    views on issues associated with our nuclear posture and with
    recent changes occurring in Europe and NATO.
        I am also looking forward to hearing input from our
    witnesses on how we can best manage costs to undertake the
    necessary modernization of our nuclear triad in the years to
    come. I am particularly interested in hearing your feedback
    today on how we can best leverage commonality across the
    services to reduce risk, enhance capabilities, and manage
    costs, starting with Air Force and Navy ballistic missiles.
        Senator Sessions, thank you for arranging this hearing. I
    look forward to today's discussion.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator Donnelly.
        This is the order that we will go in: Secretary Scher, Dr.
    Hopkins, General Rand, and Admiral Benedict. I will introduce
    Mr. Scher first.
        Mr. Robert Scher has been the Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities since December
    2014. He is responsible for advising the Secretary of Defense
    and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on national
    security and defense strategy forces, contingency plans, and,
    most relevant for today, nuclear deterrence and missile defense
    policy.
        He is well-positioned to understand the relationship
    between nuclear weapons and U.S. defense strategy.
        Mr. Scher, Secretary, we are pleased to hear from you now.

    STATEMENT OF HONORABLE ROBERT M. SCHER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
              DEFENSE FOR STRATEGY, PLANS AND CAPABILITIES

        Secretary Scher. Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member
    Donnelly, thank you for the opportunity to testify on U.S.
    nuclear policy and strategy, and to frame the budget's fiscal
    year 2017 budget request on these issues within the context of
    today's security environment. Your continuing support for
    nuclear sustainment and the modernization plan is essential to
    ensuring the effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent forces.
        As you said, last week, Secretary Carter, in previewing the
    budget, identified five evolving security challenges that have
    driven the focus of the Defense Department's planning and
    budgeting this year. Each, in fact, as you say, does have a
    nuclear dimension that our policy and strategy must address.
        Two of these challenges reflect a return to great power
    competition in these regions where we face nuclear-armed
    potential adversaries that can pose an existential threat to
    the United States and to our allies.
        Russia has undertaken aggressive actions in Crimea and
    elsewhere in Ukraine, adopted a pattern of reckless nuclear
    posturing and coercive threats, and remains in violation of the
    Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty.
        China continues its rise in the Asia-Pacific and is
    introducing qualitative advances into its nuclear capabilities.
        I also must also note that North Korea, a threat both to us
    and our allies, just conducted a space launch and, recently,
    its fourth nuclear test.
        While the President's ultimate goal is a world without
    nuclear weapons, he has been consistent and clear in his
    commitment to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
    arsenal for as long as nuclear weapons exist. Effective
    deterrence requires that our nuclear capabilities and posture
    provide the ability to implement U.S. defense strategy,
    preserve that strategy's credibility, and reinforce overall
    strategic stability.
        Our approach is to maintain a deterrent that is an
    inherently robust and stable rather than one that is simply
    reactive to every action of a potential adversary. This
    approach remains best served by sustaining a full nuclear triad
    and dual-capable aircraft with a diverse range of nuclear
    explosive yields and delivery methods.
        The triad and DCA [Defense Contracting Agency] provide the
    credibility, flexibility, and survivability to meet and adapt
    to the challenges of a dynamic 21st Century security
    environment without the need to mirror every potential
    adversary system for system or yield for yield.
        As the invite letter noted, deterring nuclear use in
    regional conflicts will be one of the challenges that we face
    for the foreseeable future. We must be able to deter not only
    large-scale nuclear attacks, the predominant focus during the
    Cold War, but also limited nuclear attack and deliberate
    nuclear escalation by an adversary that might arise out of a
    conventional regional conflict.
        Our strategy for deterrence of a large-scale nuclear attack
    is well-established, so here I would like to touch on four
    important elements of a regional deterrence strategy aimed at
    minimizing the likelihood an adversary will choose nuclear
    escalation.
        First, the United States extends nuclear deterrence to
    certain allies. These formal security arrangements are both a
    clear representation of our commitment to defend these allies
    and serve as a means to strengthen that commitment in the minds
    of both our allies and potential adversaries.
        Second, we are working to ensure an appropriate level of
    integration between nuclear and conventional planning and
    operations for regional conflicts. Now, this type of
    integration does not mean lowering the threshold for United
    States nuclear use. Rather, integration means conventional
    operations must be planned and executed with deliberate thought
    as to how they shape the risk that the adversary will choose
    nuclear escalation. Similarly, nuclear planning needs to
    account for the possibility of ongoing U.S. and allied
    conventional operations.
        The integration really means also that we must strengthen
    the resiliency of conventional operations to a nuclear attack
    along with being prepared to restore deterrence following any
    adversary nuclear use.
        Third, effective regional deterrence requires a balanced
    approach to escalation risk that deters escalation, but also
    prepares for the possibility that deterrence might fail. We
    accept that plans should not assume that we can control
    escalation.
        There is no doubt that Russia's purported doctrine of
    nuclear escalation to de-escalate a conventional conflict
    amounts to a reckless gamble for which the odds are
    incalculable and the outcome potentially catastrophic. Our
    plans are developed to try to avoid such an outcome, but we
    have to be prepared if Russia creates a conflict and drives it
    across that nuclear threshold.
        If deterrence fails and nuclear use occurs, we do not want
    to simply assume that once the nuclear threshold has been
    crossed, that escalation cannot be limited. Possessing options
    for responding to limited use with nuclear and/or conventional
    means, and making clear we have these options, makes credible
    our message that escalating to de-escalate will ultimately be
    unsuccessful.
        Finally, and as a result of the three previous points, we
    must sustain our diverse set of U.S. nuclear capabilities to be
    credible in ensuring we maintain regional deterrence and
    assurance, as well as the Cold War-era of deterrence.
        The administration's nuclear sustainment and modernization
    plan sustains this broad set of capabilities and is necessary
    for sustaining effective deterrence. Our plans are affordable,
    if prioritized appropriately by the department, the Congress,
    and the Nation, and we seek your help to continuing this.
        To be clear, as you noted from the Deputy Secretary, our
    choice is not between keeping our current forces or modernizing
    them. Rather, the choice is between modernizing these forces or
    watching a slow and unacceptable degradation in our
    capabilities, bringing on degradation in our ability to deter.
        We in the department look forward to your continuing
    support in our collective efforts to ensure the United States
    is able to meet the security challenges we face today and those
    ahead. Thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and I
    look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Robert Scher follows:]

                  Prepared Statement by Secretary Robert Scher
        Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, and distinguished
    Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify
    on U.S. nuclear policy and strategy, and to frame the President's
    fiscal year (FY) 2017 budget request within the context of today's
    dynamic security environment. Your support for the nuclear sustainment
    and modernization plan it funds is essential to ensuring the
    effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent forces.
                              security environment
        Last week Secretary Carter identified five evolving security
    challenges that have driven the focus of the Defense Department's
    planning and budgeting this year. Each has a nuclear dimension that our
    policy and strategy must address.
        Two of these challenges reflect a return to great power
    competition, in regions where we face nuclear-armed potential
    adversaries that can pose an existential threat to the United States
    and our allies. Russia has undertaken aggressive actions in Crimea and
    elsewhere in Ukraine, and adopted a pattern of reckless nuclear
    posturing and coercive threats. Russia remains in violation of the
    Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and remains unwilling to join
    us in discussing further reductions in strategic nuclear weapons below
    the limits of the New START Treaty.
        China continues its rise in the Asia-Pacific, where we continue our
    rebalance to maintain regional stability. China continues to introduce
    qualitative advances into its nuclear capabilities. North Korea--a
    threat to both us and our allies--just conducted its fourth nuclear
    test and conducted a space launch. As we work to counter Iran's malign
    influence against our friends and allies in the Middle East, we must
    also prevent Iran from reversing course on its commitments under the
    nuclear deal. Finally, denying terrorists access to nuclear weapons and
    weapon-usable materials is an absolute imperative in the ongoing fight
    to defeat terrorism.
                              effective deterrence
        While his ultimate goal is a world without nuclear weapons, the
    President has been consistent and clear in his commitment to maintain a
    safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal for as long as nuclear
    weapons exist. The Department of Defense and the National Nuclear
    Security Administration (NNSA) work closely together to maintain the
    safety and security of our nuclear forces at the lowest levels possible
    while still retaining a full set of options to respond to and address
    the potential threats we face. I will focus today on the third of these
    elements--ensuring the effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent.
        Effective deterrence means convincing any potential adversary that
    attacking the United States or its allies would bring risk that far
    outweighs any expected benefits of aggression. This requires that our
    nuclear capabilities and posture provide the ability to implement U.S.
    deterrence strategy, preserve the strategy's credibility, and reinforce
    strategic stability. Maintaining the ability to achieve the President's
    objectives if deterrence fails strengthens the credibility of our
    strategy.
        Our approach to meeting the range of challenges we now face or
    might face in the future is to maintain a deterrent that is robust and
    stable, rather than one that is necessarily reactive to every action of
    potential adversaries. This remains best served by sustaining a full
    nuclear Triad and Dual-Capable Aircraft (DCA) with a diverse range of
    nuclear explosive yields and delivery modes. The Triad and DCA provide
    the credibility, flexibility, and survivability to meet and adapt to
    the challenges of a dynamic 21st Century security environment, without
    the need to mirror every potential adversary, system-for-system and
    yield-for-yield. Further, we believe we can meet current military
    requirements without developing new nuclear warheads or new military
    capabilities and we continue to manage our nuclear modernization
    consistent with those policy directives.
                  deterring nuclear use in regional conflicts
        Deterring nuclear use in regional conflicts will remain one of
    those challenges for the foreseeable future. We must be able to deter
    not only large-scale nuclear attack, but also limited nuclear attack
    and deliberate nuclear escalation arising out of conventional regional
    conflict. I would like to touch on four important elements of a
    regional deterrence strategy aimed at minimizing the likelihood that an
    adversary will choose nuclear escalation. Together, these elements help
    convey that we won't let an adversary escalate its way to victory,
    split our alliances, achieve a favorable military situation, or coerce
    us out of protecting our vital interests.
        First, we extend nuclear deterrence to certain allies. These formal
    security arrangements are both a representation of our commitment and,
    by explicitly putting U.S. credibility on the line, they are a means of
    strengthening that commitment in the minds of allies and potential
    adversaries.
        Second, we are working to ensure an appropriate level of
    integration between nuclear and conventional planning and operations.
    This type of integration does not mean lowering the threshold for U.S.
    nuclear use, turning to nuclear weapons to further a conventional
    campaign, or increasing our reliance on nuclear weapons. Rather,
    integration means conventional operations must be planned and executed
    with deliberate thought as to how they shape the risk that the
    adversary will choose nuclear escalation. Similarly, nuclear planning
    needs to account for the possibility of ongoing U.S. and allied
    conventional operations. Integration also means strengthening the
    resiliency of conventional operations to nuclear attack. Conventional
    resiliency preserves Presidential flexibility in the face of limited
    nuclear use by providing the option of continuing the conventional
    fight even after the adversary chooses to escalate. We should not be in
    the position of forcing the President to choose between a nuclear-only
    response and a conventional-only response, allowing the adversary, not
    us, to dictate the means of the conflict. Finally, integration means
    being prepared to restore deterrence following adversary nuclear use,
    so that failure to deter first use does not translate into failure to
    deter subsequent nuclear use.
        Third, effective regional deterrence requires a balanced approach
    to escalation risk that deters escalation but also prepares for the
    possibility that deterrence might fail. We accept and convey the
    reality that no one can count on controlling escalation. Russia's
    purported doctrine of nuclear escalation to deescalate a conventional
    conflict amounts to reckless gamble for which the odds are incalculable
    and the outcome could prove catastrophic. Any resort to nuclear weapons
    would be the ultimate form of escalation. However, we have to be
    prepared if Russia creates a conflict and drives it across the nuclear
    threshold; we do not want to simply assume that once the nuclear
    threshold has been crossed that escalation cannot be limited. We are
    tasked with providing the President with credible options for
    responding to nuclear threats and nuclear aggression, including
    responding to limited nuclear use as noted, with nuclear and/or
    conventional means. Both aspects of this balanced approach are mutually
    reinforcing. Possessing a range of options for responding to limited
    use makes credible our message that escalating to deescalate is
    dangerous and will ultimately be unsuccessful.
        Fourth, sustaining a diverse set of U.S. nuclear capabilities is
    essential for the role they play in regional deterrence and assurance.
    A strategy of relying on large-scale nuclear response is credible and
    effective for deterring large-scale nuclear attack, particularly
    against one's homeland, but it is far less credible in the context of
    limited adversary use, particularly against an ally or U.S. forces
    operating abroad. Retaining more diverse nuclear options gives us the
    ability to minimize collateral damage in the event the President
    determines that a nuclear response is required. This, however, does not
    mean a lower nuclear threshold or higher likelihood of U.S. nuclear
    use. Indeed, the United States has long maintained a high threshold for
    nuclear use together with a diverse range of nuclear forces and
    response options.
                     sustainment and modernization program
        The Administration's nuclear sustainment and modernization plan is
    necessary for sustaining effective deterrence, and it is affordable if
    prioritized appropriately by the Department, the Congress, and the
    Nation. It is essential that Congress support the President's fiscal
    year 2017 budget request and Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) for
    nuclear weapon-related activities. Further delays to the program would
    put the safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear forces at
    significant and unacceptable risk.
        To be clear, our choice is not between keeping or modernizing the
    current forces. Rather, the choice is between modernizing those forces
    or watching a slow and unacceptable degradation in our ability to
    deter.
        Our systems have already been in use decades past their intended
    service lives. Delaying modernization and warhead life-extension would
    diminish the size and degrade the capabilities of our nuclear forces
    until they age out of service entirely. National security decisions and
    arms control agreements, rather than a failure to sustain and
    modernize, should determine the size and shape of our deterrent
    capabilities.
        The fiscal year 2017 budget request funds warhead life extension
    and sustainment and recapitalization within the strategic submarine
    (SSBN) force, the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force, the
    strategic bomber force, and our DCA. This includes the B61-12 bomb
    Life-Extension Program (LEP), and development of a Long-Range Standoff
    missile (LRSO) to replace the aging Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM).
    The B61-12 and LRSO are necessary to sustain existing military
    capabilities, not to provide new ones.
        The President's approach to nuclear sustainment and modernization
    is consistent with his nonproliferation and disarmament objectives. The
    fiscal year 2017 budget request and FYDP support a program that
    sustains a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent; reduces the
    numbers and types of weapons; retains leverage for future arms control
    agreements; and assures allies they don't need their own nuclear
    arsenals. The current nuclear stockpile is a dramatic departure from
    the Cold War, in terms of both numbers and types of weapons. The B61-12
    LEP will go further by consolidating four existing bomb variants and
    allowing eventual retirement of the B83 strategic bomb, the last
    megaton-class weapon in the stockpile. We are retaining only those
    capabilities we need to sustain stable and effective deterrence.
        We look forward to your continuing support in our collective
    efforts to ensure the U.S. is able to meet the security challenges we
    face today, and those ahead. Thank you again for the opportunity to
    testify. I look forward to your questions.

        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Secretary Scher.
        Dr. Arthur Hopkins is the Principal Deputy Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological
    Defense Programs. He advises Under Secretary of Defense for
    Acquisition, Technology and Logistics in all manners across the
    nuclear, chemical, and biological defense portfolio.
        He supports Under Secretary Kendall in his role as chairman
    of the Nuclear Weapons Council, which we hope continues to
    provide good leadership, and is, therefore, knowledgeable about
    the acquisition schedules for nuclear modernization programs in
    the Department of Defense.
        Dr. Hopkins, thank you.

    STATEMENT OF ARTHUR T. HOPKINS, Ph.D., ACTING PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
       ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL AND
                      BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS

        Dr. Hopkins. Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly,
    and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for
    this opportunity to discuss the department's 2017 budget
    request for nuclear deterrence systems.
        In addition to serving as Principal Deputy Assistant for
    Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, I am the
    acting staff director for the Nuclear Weapons Council. The
    council provides an overarching, coordinated vision and
    strategy for the nuclear enterprise, and it synchronizes the
    Departments of Defense and Energy efforts to ensure a safe,
    secure, reliable, and effective stockpile.
        The Nation's nuclear forces are the department's highest
    priority. The nuclear mission continues to be fundamental to
    our Nation's security strategy, and it ensures that we maintain
    our extended deterrence commitments to our allies.
        The council has developed a strategic plan to integrate all
    three components of the nuclear enterprise--warheads,
    platforms, and infrastructure. Portions of the plan are well
    underway, including production of the W76-1 refurbished warhead
    and the design engineering for the W88 warhead modernization--
    both of those are for the Navy's submarine launched ballistic
    missiles--as well as the B61-12 bomb life-extension for
    strategic missions and extended deterrence.
        In fiscal year 2017, the National Nuclear Security
    Administration, NNSA, will continue to deliver W76-1 warheads
    for the Navy's Trident D5 missiles and will complete production
    in fiscal year 2019.
        The W88 warhead alteration effort, also for the D5 missile,
    is on schedule to deliver the first production unit in December
    2019.
        The B61 bomb life-extension program is also on schedule to
    deliver a first production unit in March 2020. The B61-12 will
    enable a reduction in the total number and types of nuclear
    weapons in the stockpile.
        Modernizing our nuclear delivery platforms is also
    essential to nuclear deterrence. In fiscal year 2017, the
    Defense Department plans to continue funding for several
    delivery systems: first, the Ohio-class submarine replacement
    and its Trident D5 life-extended missile; second, sustainment
    of the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile and its
    follow-on capabilities, the ground-based strategic deterrent;
    third, upgrades to the B-2 and B-52H heavy bombers; fourth, the
    development of a long-range strike bomber; and finally, the
    development of a long-range standoff cruise missile to replace
    the aging air-launched cruise missile.
        The department will ensure alignment of cruise missile
    development with the associated nuclear warhead life-extension
    program, the W80-4, that is being executed by the Department of
    Energy.
        With respect to the Nation's nuclear enterprise, the
    reviews conducted in 2014 identified a number of longstanding
    systemic issues that continue to be addressed. The department's
    fiscal year 2017 budget request includes significant resources
    for enterprise improvements.
        The strategy also requires investment in the Department of
    Energy nuclear infrastructure. The department supports National
    Nuclear Security Administration efforts to achieve a responsive
    infrastructure for the future stockpile.
        Our fiscal year 2017 budget request is critically important
    for sustaining and revitalizing the Nation's nuclear deterrent.
    We ask that you support both the Departments of Defense and
    Energy budget requests in this area.
        My written testimony has more detail, and I ask that it be
    included in the record of this meeting. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Hopkins follows:]

                  Prepared Statement by Dr. Arthur T. Hopkins
        Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, and distinguished
    members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify
    before you today on the fiscal year (FY) 2017 budget request for
    nuclear forces. I am pleased to join Assistant Secretary Scher, Vice
    Admiral Benedict, and General Rand to discuss the Department of
    Defense's (DOD) number one mission: maintaining a safe, secure, and
    effective nuclear deterrent for as long as nuclear weapons exist.
        As the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear,
    Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs and the Nuclear Weapons
    Council (NWC) Staff Director, I work directly for the Under Secretary
    of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L), and advise
    the Department's senior leadership on nuclear matters. The Under
    Secretary has a dual role in overseeing systems acquisition in the
    nuclear enterprise: leading the Department's efforts to acquire the
    strategic nuclear weapons delivery and command and control systems
    required to meet the operational needs of our Armed Forces, and leading
    the NWC to address life extension programs (LEPs) related to nuclear
    warhead sustainment and the aging nuclear infrastructure required for
    component and material production. The NWC is a joint DOD and
    Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration
    (NNSA) council established to facilitate cooperation and coordination,
    reach consensus, and institute priorities between the two departments
    as they fulfill their responsibilities for U.S. nuclear weapons
    stockpile management.
        To ensure the continued credibility and reliability of our nuclear
    deterrent in an increasingly complicated and challenging world, it is
    essential that Congress support the President's fiscal year 2017 budget
    request for nuclear weapons-related activities. This budget request
    demonstrates the Department's commitment to strengthening and
    modernizing the nuclear Triad. Today, I will summarize the DOD and NWC
    perspectives on, and priorities for, warhead life extension, nuclear
    weapon delivery systems modernization and replacement, nuclear
    enterprise infrastructure modernization, stockpile sustainment, and the
    challenges we face today and tomorrow to ensure a safe, secure,
    effective, and reliable nuclear stockpile.
                         nuclear enterprise challenges
        The NWC convenes to ensure synchronization of the Departments'
    vision, strategies, and schedules of the nuclear enterprise programs.
    Specifically, the Council focuses its attention on nuclear enterprise
    challenges in four vital areas. First, we must maintain and strengthen
    our ability to extend the lives of aging warheads, as the majority of
    today's nuclear weapons and delivery systems have surpassed their
    initial design life. This is accomplished through comprehensive
    component reuse, refurbishment, and replacement, while we ensure
    alignment with existing and future delivery systems (Table 1 summarizes
    the current and future nuclear weapons stockpile). Second, we must
    safeguard our ability to provide the rigorous science and engineering
    expertise required to assess the aging nuclear weapons stockpile, and
    certify the safety and effectiveness of that stockpile without
    underground nuclear testing. Third, we must remain steadfast in our
    commitment to sustain and modernize our aging infrastructure that
    provides materials, components, and testing facilities essential to our
    nuclear deterrent enterprise. Fourth, the DOD must address the
    challenges of sustaining and modernizing all parts of our nuclear force
    structure, and we must ensure that the Nation's nuclear weapons
    sustainment programs and delivery system modernization programs are
    funded and aligned.

                                   Table 1.--The Current and Future Triad Composition
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    ICBM                      SLBM                   Air-Leg
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                            Current
                                         ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Weapon System.......................  W87 Warhead               W76 Warhead              B61 Bomb
                                          W78 Warhead               W88 Warhead              B83 Bomb
                                                                                             W80-1 Warhead
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Delivery System.....................  Minuteman III             Trident II D5            B-2A
                                                                                             B-52H
                                                                                             F15/F16
                                                                                             ALCM \1\
                                         ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                            Future
                                         ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Weapon System.......................  IW-1\2\                   IW-1                     B61-12 Bomb
                                          IW-2                      IW-2                     W80-4 Warhead
                                          IW-3                      IW-3
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Delivery System.....................  GBSD\3\                   D5 Follow-on             B-2A
                                                                                             B-52H
                                                                                             F-35
                                                                                             LRSB\4\
                                                                                             LRSO\5\
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Air-Launched Cruise Missile
    \2\ Interoperable Warhead
    \3\ Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent
    \4\ Long Range Strike Bomber
    \5\ Long Range Standoff

                           dod stockpile requirements
        The Administration envisions a future stockpile that is flexible
    and adaptable to technical and geopolitical changes, and to achieve
    this end has endorsed the 3+2 stockpile strategy. This strategy
    includes three interoperable nuclear explosive packages for ballistic
    missiles and two air-delivered warheads. Interoperability will reduce
    the number of different nuclear weapons systems that must be maintained
    and serviced, while providing sufficient diversity among deployed
    systems to guard against potential technical issues in the stockpile.
    The 3+2 strategy simultaneously addresses stockpile obsolescence and
    meets policy objectives of sustaining deterrence through a smaller
    stockpile with fewer weapon types, and a modernized, responsive nuclear
    infrastructure capable of addressing technological and geopolitical
    surprise.
        To support the 3+2 strategy and revitalize the enterprise, in 2012
    the NWC baselined a 25-year integrated schedule for the nuclear weapons
    stockpile--known as the NWC Strategic Plan. It aligns warhead life
    extension plans and infrastructure needs with delivery system
    modernization and replacement efforts. The NWC Strategic Plan
    integrates NNSA nuclear security enterprise requirements and plans with
    military requirements.
        Budget realities have forced changes to the Strategic Plan since
    2012. Specifically, the NWC endorsed deferrals to key warhead LEPs and
    infrastructure modernization milestones, delaying overall
    implementation of the 3+2 strategy. The Council delayed the
    Interoperable Warhead 1 (IW1) and initially the Long Range Standoff
    (LRSO) warhead schedules. For the B83-1 bomb, it adjusted the
    deployment requirement. For the B61-12 bomb LEP, the NWC accepted a
    schedule delay due to the sequestration-related cuts in the fiscal year
    2014 budget.
        Plutonium pit production schedules and supporting plutonium
    infrastructure investments experienced significant delays due to
    shortfalls in the fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year 2015 congressional
    appropriations. The current Strategic Plan includes these and other
    adjustments. Changes include adding high explosive material replacement
    in the W88 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) warhead
    Alteration (ALT) 370; aligning the W80-4 LRSO missile warhead
    development schedule with the requirement for a fiscal year 2025 First
    Production Unit (FPU); and adding tritium production capability to the
    NWC Strategic Plan. The Council remains fully committed to ensuring the
    viability of each of the three legs of the nuclear Triad and
    revitalizing the nuclear enterprise.
        DOD and NNSA are moving forward with several weapon systems LEPs to
    support the Nation's long-term deterrent capabilities. The SLBM-based
    W76-1 warhead and the B61-12 bomb for the air-delivery systems are the
    most urgent warhead life-extension needs in our stockpile, and the
    fiscal year 2017 President's budget request fully funds these LEPs. The
    W76-1 LEP is beyond the halfway mark and is on-schedule to complete
    production in fiscal year 2019. The B61-12 LEP, which includes the Air
    Force-provided Tailkit Assembly, is undergoing development engineering
    and remains on schedule and within budget to meet its March 2020 FPU.
    The Air Force has funded the tailkit development and production to
    synchronize with NNSA bomb assembly work. The B61-12 LEP consolidates
    four variants of the B61 bomb and improves the safety and security of
    the oldest nuclear weapon system in the U.S. arsenal. The B61-12 LEP
    will: 1) result in a nearly 50 percent reduction in the number of
    nuclear gravity bombs in the stockpile, 2) facilitate the removal from
    the stockpile of the last megaton-class weapon--the B83-1, 3) achieve
    an 80 percent reduction in the amount of special nuclear material in
    these bombs, and 4) implement the first step of the 3+2 strategy. These
    missions support both our deterrent and nonproliferation objectives as
    outlined in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review.
        The fiscal year 2017 budget also funds expanded work on sustaining
    our SLBM-based W88 warhead, which is undergoing development engineering
    to replace the aging arming, fuzing, and firing system, and refresh the
    conventional high explosive. That program is on schedule to achieve a
    December 2019 FPU. The IW1 will be the first of three ballistic missile
    warheads under the 3+2 strategy. A full feasibility study is planned
    for completion in the early 2020s.
        The NWC also evaluated and selected the existing W80-1 warhead as
    the basis for the follow-on warhead for the Air-Launched Cruise Missile
    (ALCM) replacement, the LRSO cruise missile. The warhead LEP,
    designated as the W80-4, is now in the feasibility study and design
    options development phase. To synchronize the warhead and delivery
    system schedules, the W80-4 LEP and LRSO cruise missile acquisition
    communities continue to collaborate and align their concurrent
    development efforts. To that end, the W80-4 FPU is planned for 2025
    with the first LRSO cruise missile to be delivered in 2026.
        The greatest challenge for the NWC is to achieve and maintain the
    necessary resources for three critical areas. To allow continued
    certification and ensure our nuclear weapons remain safe, secure, and
    effective, we must be vigilant in sustaining and life-extending our
    stockpile and delivery systems; sustaining and modernizing our aging
    nuclear enterprise infrastructure; and preserving stockpile science and
    engineering. It is imperative that Congress support the full nuclear-
    related budget requests to ensure national security requirements
    continue to be met.
                    revitalizing the nuclear infrastructure
        The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review stressed the importance of an NNSA
    infrastructure that can respond to technical challenges or geopolitical
    surprises and enable the consideration of stockpile reductions. The NWC
    focuses specifically on the plutonium, uranium, and tritium
    capabilities needed to support the current and future nuclear weapons
    stockpile as documented in the NWC's Strategic Plan. Our nuclear
    enterprise infrastructure challenges are two-fold: addressing aged,
    end-of-life facilities maintenance, recapitalization, and replacement,
    and working to achieve a more responsive infrastructure. The Department
    reinforces NNSA's need to develop responsive and productive plutonium
    and uranium capabilities, as well as the ability to produce tritium to
    meet planned stockpile needs.
                             stockpile stewardship
        Science is paramount to the ability to sustain a safe, secure,
    reliable, and effective deterrent. The Stockpile Stewardship Program
    has ensured confidence in the reliability and effectiveness of the
    nuclear stockpile without nuclear weapons testing. NNSA's Stockpile
    Stewardship Program, composed of research, development, testing, and
    evaluation (RDT&E) facilities and personnel, enables the surveillance
    and assessment of the stockpile condition by identifying anomalies,
    evaluating impacts of anomalies on warhead performance, and
    implementing solutions to anomalies. In general, RDT&E supports broader
    national security objectives by providing capabilities to avoid
    technological surprise and to have confidence in system performance.
    The NWC Strategic Plan relies on continued investments in research,
    development, design, and production capabilities.
                        dod delivery system requirements
        In accordance with the Nuclear Posture Review's guidance to
    maintain a Triad within the central limits of the New START Treaty with
    the Russian Federation, DOD has a robust plan for recapitalizing the
    ballistic missile submarines, intercontinental ballistic missiles
    (ICBMs), SLBMs, air-launched cruise missiles, and nuclear-capable heavy
    bombers that comprise our strategic nuclear deterrent. Our budget
    request is consistent with our plans to ensure that current nuclear
    delivery systems will be sustained, and that the modernization and
    replacement programs are executable and on schedule to avoid capability
    gaps. The fiscal year 2017 Request continues to fund: the Ohio-class
    replacement submarine and Trident II (D5) missile life extension; a
    follow-on capability to the Minuteman III ICBM--the Ground-Based
    Strategic Deterrent (GBSD); upgrades to the B-2A and B-52H heavy
    bombers as well as development of a new long range, penetrating bomber;
    and development of an LRSO cruise missile to replace the current ALCM.
        The Ohio Replacement Program requires adequate resources and a
    stable, predictable funding profile to ensure on-time construction
    starts in fiscal year 2021 in order to meet the patrol need date of
    fiscal year 2031. There is no margin left in the Ohio replacement
    schedule. Delays would put at risk the most survivable leg of the
    Nation's nuclear Triad. The Ohio Replacement Program submarines will
    have a service life that enables patrols into the 2080s.
        The Air Force has completed a GBSD Analysis of Alternatives to
    study the full range of options to recapitalize the land-based leg of
    the Triad beyond the extended service life of the Minuteman III ICBM.
    The fiscal year 2017 budget funds initial development work for the
    GBSD. The Air Force's fiscal year 2017 budget request also includes
    funding to continue the development of an affordable, long range,
    penetrating aircraft that incorporates proven technologies--the Long
    Range Strike Bomber. Additionally, the fiscal year 2017 budget contains
    funding for Block 4 of the F-35 program, which provides funds for
    follow-on capabilities for the F-35, including integration of a nuclear
    delivery capability for the F-35A. The F-35A Dual Capable Aircraft
    (DCA) will maintain a critical capability that is needed for non-
    strategic nuclear missions in support of the Nation's extended
    deterrence and assurance commitments.
        The Department's budget request is consistent with plans to ensure
    that current nuclear delivery systems can be sustained and that the
    modernization and replacement programs are executable and on schedule
    to avoid capability gaps. The modernization and replacement programs
    will require increased investment over current levels for much of the
    next 15 years. The Department is taking steps to control the costs of
    these efforts. However, even with success in this regard, we face
    budget decisions entering the 2020s to fund the necessary Ohio-class
    replacement and the Air Force strategic deterrent recapitalization
    programs. The fiscal year 2014 Secretary of Defense-directed Nuclear
    Enterprise and Strategic Portfolio Reviews and the Department's fiscal
    year 2017 budget formulation focused significant attention on
    recapitalization, sustainment, and modernization of our nuclear
    deterrent systems and infrastructure. The nuclear enterprise remains
    the Defense Department's highest priority, and the President's budget
    request for fiscal year 2017 reflects the Administration's emphasis on
    the nuclear enterprise.
        In the near-term, we are making focused and sustained investments
    in modernization and manning across the nuclear enterprise. These
    investments are critical to ensure the continued safety, security, and
    effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent, as well as the long-term health
    of the force that supports our nuclear Triad. To help fund improvements
    across the nuclear enterprise, the DOD has requested an increase of
    approximately $200 million in fiscal year 2017 from fiscal year 2016
    and approximately $10 billion more in the fiscal year 2017 Future Years
    Defense Program (FYDP) relative to the President's Budget in 2016 to
    ensure the continued health of this essential enterprise.
                                   conclusion
        Budget constraints have forced the DOD to annually adjust its
    stockpile maintenance and infrastructure plans to fit within
    appropriated resources, and have caused the NWC to reevaluate
    priorities. These adjustments cause delays, reduce work scope, and
    extend development and production periods. We have reached a point
    where we have removed all flexibility from the nuclear weapons life
    extension and delivery system modernization programs. We must continue
    to field a strong nuclear deterrent that is supported by an agile and
    responsive infrastructure and valued workforce. The President's fiscal
    year 2017 budget request supports our nuclear posture strategy. It
    includes funding for sustaining and modernizing our nuclear forces to
    ensure a safe, secure, and effective deterrent for as long as nuclear
    weapons exist. The Department of Defense remains committed to
    maintaining its close and vital partnership with DOE and Congress in
    meeting the Nation's most fundamental security needs. In closing, I
    respectfully ask that you support the President's fiscal year 2017
    nuclear forces' budget request.

        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Dr. Hopkins.
        Next, we have General Robin Rand. He is the Commander of
    the Air Force Global Strike Command. He is responsible for
    organizing, training, and equipping two legs of the triad, the
    intercontinental ballistic missile and strategic bomber forces.
        General Rand, thank you.

      STATEMENT OF GENERAL ROBIN RAND, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR FORCE
                         GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND

        General Rand. Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly,
    and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for
    allowing me to appear before you today to represent the men and
    women of Air Force Global Strike Command.
        As you know, Air Force Global Strike Command was created to
    provide a focus on the stewardship and operations of two legs
    of our Nation's nuclear triad, while also accomplishing the
    conventional global strike mission.
        I will tell you freely that our airmen are doing a
    fantastic job providing effective nuclear and conventional
    global strike forces for combatant commanders around the globe.
    The key to our continued success will be our ability to
    modernize, sustain, and recapitalize our forces.
        Our mission set is always evolving and growing in order to
    ensure we continue to provide effective forces for these
    combatant commanders. Part of accomplishing this goal is to
    make sure we are right-sized with manpower and resources, and
    balancing those efforts with ongoing modernization and
    recapitalization programs.
        Our airmen in the missile fields are accomplishing a
    critical mission for this Nation. They are operating,
    maintaining, and securing the most responsive leg of the
    nuclear triad.
        However, we must continue efforts to modernize the
    Minuteman III weapons systems, where appropriate, until we can
    bring the ground-based strategic deterrent online. This is an
    absolutely critical national interest that will provide
    strategic deterrence and, if needed, global strike for years to
    come.
        Our diverse bomber forces made up of the B-1, the B-2, and
    the B-52, deter our potential adversaries and ensure our allies
    across the globe. But when that is not enough, they execute a
    variety of missions, ranging from long-range global strike to
    close-air support in-country.
        As you are aware, the B-1s have been departing the Central
    Command area of responsibility to help facilitate needed
    upgrades. These airmen have done an amazing job for many years,
    and I am proud of each and every one of them.
        Air Force Global Strike Command stands ready to support any
    combatant commander with our capable platforms to ensure there
    is no gap in requirements coverage. Therefore, I have directed
    our B-52 wings to be prepared to backfill the B-1s later this
    spring, should they be asked to do so.
        I am aware that one of the big reasons I am here today is
    to answer any questions on the command's progress in addressing
    the nuclear enterprise review findings. We have closed over 300
    action items that complement the ongoing nuclear enterprise
    review efforts. We have reinvigorated the ICBM operations and
    are effecting positive cultural change throughout the
    community. We have also overhauled the bomber program, the B-52
    training, and streamlined other aircrew programs.
        Additionally, Air Force Global Strike Command has been
    declared the lead command for Nuclear Command and Control
    Communications, or NC3, systems throughout the Air Force. To
    recognize the absolute criticality of these systems, NC3 has
    been declared a weapons system, which means it is tracked,
    sustained, and modernized just like the rest of our weapons
    systems in the Air Force.
        But let me be clear, we are not done. Cultural change is
    not something that you can just flip a switch on. We must
    continue to foster a culture where we are not afraid to
    question how things are done.
        Innovative airmen should have a way to push their ideas to
    the top, and I will not lose sight of how far we have come, but
    also that we can never stop working to be better.
        Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you again for the opportunity
    to appear before the committee to highlight the great airmen of
    Air Force Global Strike Command. I look forward to your
    questions, and with your permission, I would like to have my
    written testimony entered into the record.
        [The prepared statement of General Rand follows:]

              Prepared Statement by General Robin Rand, Commander
                                  introduction
        Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, and distinguished
    Members of the Committee; thank you for allowing me to represent the
    over 31,000 Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) Airmen. This is my
    first opportunity to appear before this committee and I look forward to
    updating you on what the Command has accomplished and where we are
    going.
                    air force global strike command mission
        As you know, the Command was created to provide a focus on the
    stewardship and operation of two legs of our Nation's nuclear triad
    while also accomplishing the conventional global strike mission. We
    live in a world that continues to rapidly change and until we have the
    peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons we must never
    forget the stabilizing influence the triad has on our allies, partners,
    and adversaries. The nuclear mission remains our top priority, however
    we must not discount the important work our airmen do conventionally.
    In fact, this past year AFGSC assumed command of the B-1B mission,
    bringing all Air Force bombers under one command. In order for us to be
    effective across the spectrum of conflict from day-to-day deterrence
    and assurance operations to nuclear engagement, our airmen must be
    ready and equipped with the right tools to do the job. Continuing in
    the proud heritage of Strategic Air Command, yet tailored for today's
    evolving world, AFGSC's mission is: ``Airmen providing strategic
    deterrence, global strike and combat support . . . anytime, anywhere!''
        The Command's top priority is to ensure our nuclear arsenal is
    safe, secure, and effective. This priority underlies every nuclear-
    related activity in AFGSC whether it is the maintainer turning wrenches
    or our planners working on future weapon systems. We must never fail in
    the special trust and confidence the American people have bestowed on
    our nuclear warriors. It means that leaders must continue to support
    and advocate for the sustainment and modernization of these weapon
    systems.
        Our conventional bomber forces defend our national interests by
    deterring or, should deterrence fail, defeating an adversary; they also
    assure our allies and partners around the globe. Two capabilities are
    fundamental to the success of our bomber forces: our ability to hold
    heavily defended targets at risk and our ability to apply persistent
    combat power across the spectrum of conflict anywhere on the globe at
    any time. The United States' fleet of heavy bombers provides the Nation
    a visible global warfighting capability that is essential to the
    credibility of America's national security strategy. These bombers
    carry our latest high-tech munitions in quantities to ensure the Air
    Force can meet our Nation's global responsibilities, and therefore are
    in high-demand by the regional combatant commanders.
                     air force global strike command forces
    Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Forces
        Twentieth Air Force (20 AF), one of two Numbered Air Forces in
    AFGSC, is responsible for the Minuteman III (MM III) Intercontinental
    Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and UH-1N helicopter forces. The 450 dispersed
    and hardened missile silos maintain strategic stability by presenting
    potential adversaries a near insurmountable obstacle should they
    consider a disarming attack on the United States. Currently, no
    potential adversary can hope to destroy this force without depleting
    its own arsenal. Every day airmen deploy to our three missile fields,
    executing strategic deterrence and assurance operations, while standing
    ready to execute if called upon. They accomplish this mission in a
    challenging environment and on a massive scale; our missile crews,
    maintenance teams, security forces personnel, and others who support
    this mission traveled over 17.9 million miles last year alone. This is
    a unique and critical mission area that deserves our attention. As part
    of the Air Force's efforts to improve the nuclear enterprise, 20 AF
    assumed stewardship of the 377th Air Base Wing at Kirtland AFB. As part
    of that transfer, the Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance and
    Storage Complex now falls under 20 AF and AFGSC thereby bringing a
    critical mission set under a nuclear focused command.
    Minuteman III
        We continue to sustain and modernize the Minuteman III ICBM. This
    includes upgrading the command, control, and communications systems and
    support equipment. We continue moving forward on the Transporter
    Erector (TE) Replacement Program (TERP) and the Payload Transporter
    (PT) Replacement (PTR) to modernize our existing fleet of large
    maintenance vehicles utilized to transport missile components to and
    from the field. We currently expect TERP to reach initial operational
    capability (IOC) in fiscal year 2018 and PTR to begin production in
    fiscal year 2017.
        We are also equipping ICBM launch control centers (LCC) with
    modernized communications systems that will upgrade or replace aging
    and obsolete systems. The LCC Block Upgrade, expected to begin
    deployment in 2020, is an overall modification effort that replaces
    multiple LCC components to include a modern data storage replacement
    for floppy disks and new Voice Control Panels to provide higher
    fidelity voice communications. We continue to push forward on improving
    Remote Visual Assessment at our remote LFs, a significant security
    upgrade, to improve situational awareness and security. We expect this
    program to be IOC in fiscal year 2019. Another very important program,
    ICBM Cryptographic Upgrade II, is scheduled to begin production in
    fiscal year 2017 and will improve our cryptographic security while
    dramatically streamlining code change operations.
        We conducted four successful MM III flight tests in fiscal year
    2015 that, along with one Simulated Electronic Launch Minuteman test in
    the operational environment, demonstrate the operational credibility of
    the nuclear deterrent force and the AF's commitment to sustaining that
    capability. Operational flight testing is currently funded and planned
    for four operational test launches in fiscal year 2016 to satisfy
    requirements outlined by United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)
    and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). In fact, we
    have already launched one of those and expect to launch the next two
    this month.
    Ground Based Strategic Deterrent
        The Minuteman flight system, currently on its third model, has been
    on continuous alert since the early 1960s and has proven its value in
    deterring our adversaries and assuring our allies well beyond the
    platform's initial 10-year lifespan. ICBM capability gaps were
    identified and validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council,
    and subsequently approved in August 2012 by the Air Force Chief of
    Staff, resulting in an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). The AoA was
    completed in 2014 and concluded that an integrated replacement to the
    MM III weapon system was the most cost-effective approach to filling
    capability gaps. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cost
    Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) reviewed the AoA report and
    validated it as ``sufficient to support a Milestone A decision and
    initiate a program of record.'' SAF/AQ approved the Ground Based
    Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) Acquisition Strategy in December of last
    year and directed the program to proceed to the Milestone A Defense
    Acquisition Board. Additionally, we are engaged with our Navy partners
    to further investigate areas for intelligent commonality between
    potential GBSD systems and future Navy weapons. We hope to find areas
    of overlap with the objective of reducing design, development,
    manufacturing, logistics support, production, and testing costs for the
    Nation's strategic systems while still acknowledging that the different
    weapon systems will have some requirements that necessitate unique
    solutions due to their differing missions. We are also collaborating
    with the NNSA to develop a life extension program for our aging W78
    nuclear warhead, which will operate on both MMIII and GBSD.
        Due to system age-out, the first priority is to replace the missile
    itself. However, command and control (C2) and infrastructure
    recapitalization is necessary to continue safe, secure, and effective
    operations. It is no small task to upgrade the command and control
    systems along with the underlying infrastructure that supports the
    weapon system. For example, at our largest missile field operated by
    the 341st Missile Wing, we must connect and support hardened systems
    across almost 14,000 square miles, an area the size of Maryland. This
    vital nuclear command and control is currently serviced by buried
    copper wire and equipment installed in the 1960s. AFGSC is defining
    approaches to upgrade C2 and modernize necessary facilities. GBSD
    cannot be viewed as just another life extension to our existing MMIII;
    it is time to field a replacement ground-based capability that will
    continue to assure our allies and deter potential adversaries well into
    the future. Thank you for your continued support of GBSD ensuring it
    will lead to a viable replacement for the MM III ICBM.
    UH-1N
        AFGSC is the lead command for the Air Force's fleet of 62 UH-1N
    helicopters. The majority of these aircraft support two critical
    national missions: nuclear security in support of the ICBM force and
    the Continuity of Operations and transport missions in the National
    Capital Region. They also actively participate in the Defense Support
    of Civil Authorities program often being called to help with search and
    rescue activities.
        The UH-1N does not meet the missile field needs for range, speed,
    and capacity as outlined by DOD and USSTRATCOM requirements. We will
    continue to work to mitigate some of these requirement gaps through
    various measures such as arming the UH-1N and providing re-fueling
    stations throughout the missile complex. However, there are certain
    requirements we are unable to mitigate and I am happy to discuss that
    further in a classified environment.
    UH-1N Follow On
        While we can, to some extent, mitigate the UH-1N's deficiencies in
    range, speed, and payload, no amount of modification to this 1960s
    platform will close these critical capability gaps entirely.
    Recognizing that we cannot modify our UH-1Ns to resolve the capability
    gaps, we are dedicated to replacing the aircraft with a medium lift
    helicopter capable of meeting mission requirements. The UH-1N
    Replacement Program was funded in fiscal year 2016 and we are now
    moving out to deliver this capability and closing this critical gap.
    This past January, the Air Force conducted a High Power Team which
    confirmed our most critical capability requirements. Our counterparts
    in SAF/AQ and Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) are evaluating
    acquisition approaches that focus on expediting the fielding of
    replacement helicopters for the nuclear convoy escort and missile field
    support missions. While we work to deliver the aircraft, we must also
    work through support challenges such as infrastructure, maintenance,
    and aircrew training. I can assure you that Secretary James, our Chief,
    General Welsh and I are completely dedicated to delivering the
    replacement helicopters as soon as possible.
    Bomber Forces
        Eighth Air Force is responsible for the B-52H Stratofortress (B-
    52), the B-2A Spirit (B-2), and most recently the B-1B Lancer (B-1)
    bombers. This includes maintaining the operational readiness of the
    dual-capable bombers' nuclear and conventional missions. The B-52 is an
    extremely versatile weapon system providing precision, large payload,
    and timely global strike capabilities both conventional and nuclear.
    Complementing the B-52, the B-2 can penetrate an adversary's most
    advanced Integrated Air Defenses Systems to strike heavily defended and
    hardened targets. Our flexible dual-capable bomber fleet is the most
    visible leg of the nuclear triad. They provide decision makers the
    ability to demonstrate resolve through generation, dispersal, or
    deployment. Our ability to rapidly place bomber sorties on alert
    ensures their continued survival in support of the President and to
    meet combatant command requirements. The B-1 is an incredibly potent
    weapon system that has been in high demand by combatant commanders due
    to its wartime capabilities and mission flexibility as steadily
    demonstrated in conflicts since 2001.
    Global Assurance and Deterrence
        Continuous Bomber Presence (CBP), initiated in 2003, increases
    regional stability and assures our allies and partners in the United
    States Pacific Command (USPACOM) area of responsibility (AOR). We have
    taken steps to increase continuity of operations and maintenance by
    establishing a detachment at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam. While CBP
    is seen as a strong signal to our allies of our commitment to the
    region, it impacts AFGSC personnel and resources. Sustaining a long-
    term presence in USPACOM introduces stress in other areas as our bomber
    force is requested by other combatant commanders. Complementary to CBP,
    our bombers exercise with every combatant command and every joint
    partner annually through the Bomber Assurance and Deterrence program.
    These visible exercises take place all over the globe are a continuous
    reminder to allies and potential adversaries of our Nation's global
    reach.
    B-1
        The B-1 is a highly versatile, multi-mission weapon system that
    carries the largest payload of both guided and unguided weapons in the
    Air Force inventory. It can rapidly deliver large quantities of
    precision and non-precision weapons in support of combatant commanders
    around the globe.
        The B-1's synthetic aperture radar is capable of finding, tracking,
    and targeting moving vehicles as well as having terrain-following modes
    and air-to-air situational awareness. The SNIPER-SE pod provides
    additional capability to engage fixed or moving targets. In addition,
    an extremely accurate Global Positioning System-aided Inertial
    Navigation System enables aircrews to navigate without the aid of
    ground-based navigation aids as well as strike targets with a high
    level of precision. The Digital Communications Initiative (DCI)
    modification to the radios provides a secure beyond line of sight
    satellite connection into the Line of Sight Link-16 network. In a time
    sensitive targeting environment, the aircrew can use targeting data
    over DCI, then strike emerging targets rapidly and efficiently. This
    capability was effectively demonstrated during operations Enduring
    Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and Inherent Resolve.
        The B-1 will be in demand for many more years and avionics and
    weapon upgrades are critical for it to remain a viable combatant
    commander tool. The Integrated Battle Station (IBS)/Software Block-16
    (SB-16) upgrade, the largest ever B-1 modification, includes an
    upgraded Central Integrated Test System (CITS), Fully Integrated Data
    Link (FIDL), Vertical Situation Display Upgrade (VSDU), and a simulator
    upgrade. This marks a fantastic capability upgrade and the associated
    cockpit upgrades providing the crew with a much more flexible,
    integrated cockpit. In fact, the first 15 IBS-modified aircraft have
    been delivered, fully equipping an entire bomb squadron with these
    upgraded capabilities.
        Our B-1 aircrews have been heavily engaged in combat operations;
    since September 11, 2001, they have flown well over 14,000 combat
    missions. As you may have heard already, the B-1s have begun departing
    the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) AOR to help facilitate
    needed upgrades. This is a much needed respite to ensure the aircrews
    and aircraft are ready to support combatant commanders. However, AFGSC
    stands ready to support any combatant commander with our other capable
    platforms to ensure no gap in combatant command requirements. For
    instance, the B-52 can very capably step back into a role it has filled
    in the past in the USCENTCOM AOR; its large payload of precision
    weapons will meet combatant commander needs in theater, and our crews
    constantly train to ensure they are combat ready should they get the
    call. In the event of a bomber-capable ``Request for Forces'' by
    USCENTCOM, I've directed our two B-52 wings to be ready and prepared to
    backfill the B-1s later this spring.
    B-52
        The B-52 may be the most universally recognized symbol of American
    airpower . . . its contributions to our national security through the
    Cold War, Vietnam, Desert Storm, Allied Force, Iraqi Freedom and
    Enduring Freedom are well documented. Our airmen have worked tirelessly
    to keep the venerable B-52 mission capable. The B-52 is able to deliver
    the widest variety of nuclear and conventional weapons. This past year,
    we maintained complete coverage of our Nuclear Deterrence Operations
    requirements while supporting our overseas CBP for Pacific Command.
        I anticipate the B-52 will remain a key element of our bomber force
    beyond 2040; it is paramount that we invest resources into this
    aircraft now to keep it viable in both conventional and nuclear mission
    areas for the next 30 years. Our B-52s are still using 1960s radar
    technology with the last major radar upgrade done in the early 1980s.
    Currently, the mean time between failure rate on the B-52 radar is 46
    hours. The current radar on the B-52 will be even less effective in the
    future threat environment, and without an improved radar system on the
    B-52, there will be increased degradation in mission effectiveness. In
    order to remedy this, the B-52 Radar Modernization Program is
    approaching the conclusion of a Cost Capability Analysis Study and will
    be working toward an AoA sufficiency review in early Spring this year.
    Additionally, we are always looking at cost-effective ways to improve
    efficiency and performance of this important bomber.
        Finally, I want to point out that we are still in work to convert
    30 operational B-52 aircraft and 12 in storage to conventional-only
    configurations. We are on track to meet our New START Treaty
    requirements.
    B-2
        For over 25 years, our 20 B-2s have provided the Nation with an
    assured penetrating bomber capability. In each of our Nation's last
    four conflicts, the B-2 has led the way. This is a direct result of the
    outstanding airmen who work to operate, maintain, and secure the
    aircraft. The B-2 is able to penetrate enemy defenses and deliver a
    wide variety of nuclear and conventional weapons due to its long-range
    and stealth capability.
        We will preserve and improve the B-2's capability to penetrate
    hostile airspace and hold any target at risk without subjecting the
    crew and aircraft to threats. We are striving to maintain the proper
    balance of fleet sustainment efforts, testing, aircrew training, and
    combat readiness. The dynamics of a small fleet continue to challenge
    our sustainment efforts primarily due to vanishing vendors and
    diminishing sources of supply. AFMC is working to ensure timely parts
    availability; however, many manufacturers do not see a strong business
    case in supplying parts for a small aircraft fleet. Problems with a
    single part can have a significant readiness impact on a small fleet
    that lacks the flexibility of a large force to absorb parts shortages
    and logistics delays.
    Long Range Strike Bomber
        The combat edge of our B-2 is being challenged by next generation
    air defenses and the proliferation of these advanced systems. The Long
    Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B) program will extend American air dominance
    against next generation capabilities and advanced air defense
    environments. We continue to work closely with partners throughout the
    Air Force to develop the LRS-B and field a fleet of new dual-capable
    bombers; scheduled to become operational in the mid-2020s. Make no
    mistake--the LRS-B will be a nuclear bomber. However, the platform will
    not be delayed for use in a conventional capacity while it undergoes
    final nuclear certification. The LRS-B is being designed with an open
    architecture which will allow us to integrate new technology and
    respond to future threats for many years into the future. Thank you for
    your continued support for this critical program as it moves forward.
    Air Launched Cruise Missile
        The AGM-86B Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) is an air-to-ground,
    winged, subsonic nuclear missile delivered by the B-52. It was fielded
    in the 1980s and is well beyond its originally designed 10-year service
    life. To ensure the USAF maintains its credible stand-off nuclear
    capability, the ALCM requires Service Life Extension Programs (SLEP).
    These SLEPs require ongoing support and attention to ensure the ALCM
    will remain viable through 2030. Despite its age, last year we
    successfully conducted eight flight test evaluations and have 7 planned
    during fiscal year 2016. Additionally, AFGSC continues to maintain the
    conventional variant (CALCM) to ensure it continues to provide
    conventional stand-off strike capability.
    Long Range Stand-Off Missile
        The LRSO is the replacement for the aging ALCM. The ALCM has
    significant capability gaps that will only worsen through the next
    decade. The LRSO will be a reliable, flexible, long-ranging, and
    survivable weapon system to complement the nuclear Triad. The LRSO
    missile will ensure the bomber force (B-52, B-2 and LRS-B) can continue
    to hold high value targets at risk in an evolving threat environment,
    to include targets within an area denial environment. I cannot
    overemphasize this point: LRS-B without LRSO greatly reduces our
    ability to hold adversaries at risk and to execute the mission. The
    LRSO will be compatible with the B-52, B-2, and the LRS-B platforms and
    we currently expect it to reach Milestone A this fiscal year.
    Additionally, we are synchronizing our efforts with NNSA to develop the
    W80-4 warhead to be fully integrated with LRSO.
    B61
        The B61-12 Life Extension Program (LEP) will result in a smaller
    stockpile, reduced special nuclear material in the inventory, and
    improved B61 surety. AFGSC is the lead command for the B61-12 Tail Kit
    Assembly program, which is needed to meet USSTRATCOM requirements on
    the B-2. The B61-12 Tail Kit Assembly program is in the Engineering and
    Manufacturing Development Phase 1 and is synchronized with NNSA
    efforts. The design and production processes are on schedule and within
    budget to meet the planned fiscal year 2020 First Production Unit date
    for the B61-12 Tail Kit Assembly, and support the lead time required
    for the March 2020 B61-12 all-up round. This joint Department of
    Defense and Department of Energy endeavor allows for continued
    attainment of our strategic requirements and regional commitments.
    GBU-57
        AFGSC assumed responsibility as the lead MAJCOM for the GBU-57
    Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) in the Summer of 2015. The MOP is a
    30,000-pound guided conventional bomb designed to defeat hardened and
    deeply buried targets and is exclusively employed from the B-2. The MOP
    was initially designed as a Quick Reaction Capability following a
    USCENTCOM Urgent Operational Need. Since then it has received several
    upgrades and enhancements based on warfighter requirements. AFGSC,
    USCENTCOM, and AFLCMC (MOP Program Office) are currently conducting two
    more enhancements to increase weapon effectiveness.
                                    security
        Nuclear security is a key function of the Command's mission. A
    major AFGSC initiative to ensure security continues to be the new
    Weapon Storage Facilities (WSF) which will consolidate nuclear
    maintenance, inspection, and storage. We have put forward a $1.3
    billion program ($521 million across the FYDP) to replace all deficient
    buildings across our aging 1960's-era Weapon Storage Areas with a
    single modern and secure facility at each of our bases. This initiative
    eliminates security, design, and safety deficiencies and improves our
    maintenance processes. We included $95 million in funding for the WSF
    at F. E. Warren AFB, WY, in the last year's budget and the MILCON for
    the remaining facilities in future years. These facilities are needed
    to meet requirements for a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.
                  nuclear command, control, and communications
        The ability to receive Presidential orders and convert those orders
    into action for the required weapon system is both critical to
    performing the nuclear mission and foundational to an effective
    credible strategic deterrent. The Air Force took an important step this
    year by declaring Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) a
    weapon system which recognizes the absolute importance of these systems
    that ensure proper nuclear command and control. Declaring NC3 a weapon
    system is no small matter; it begins a process to manage this new
    weapon system's training, resources, and sustainment just like all
    other weapons systems in the AF. AFGSC is the lead command for National
    Leadership Command Control (NLCC)/NC3 which establishes one focal point
    for the weapon system. Since these systems are spread across the
    Government, there are multiple working groups at all levels to ensure
    open communications. In fact, I chair the Air Force NLCC/NC3 Council
    where we bring together MAJCOM commanders to prioritize resources and
    resolve any outstanding issues. I think it is also important to
    highlight the hard work Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center (AFNWC) and
    AFMC have put into this effort to support not only the systems but
    AFGSC as a whole. As I will discuss later, we are codifying these
    relationships to establish clear lines of authority and responsibility
    which will only improve NC3 sustainment and modernization.
        AFGSC has made tremendous gains in efforts to modernize our
    communications and cyberspace infrastructure by leveraging technology
    to make our forces more capable and effective. In our ICBM missile
    fields, the copper cabling that transport voice and data between the
    main base and the Missile Alert Facilities (MAFs) in some cases dates
    back to 1960s technology and equipment. We have undertaken a major
    modernization initiative to replace old cabling with modern technology
    that will realize over a 15-fold increase in data capability and
    improve missile field command and control with unclassified and
    classified networking, wireless networking, and secure digital voice to
    the MAFs. These are important upgrades but they still do not replace
    the buried copper nuclear command and control lines. We are also
    addressing mission assurance for our main bases and have begun to look
    at issues of bandwidth allocation and the routing of long-haul
    telecommunications circuits into our installations to best guarantee
    continuity of service.
        Ultimately, we have taken seriously our charge with sustaining and
    modernizing the NC3 weapon system. In fact, through the Nuclear
    Enterprise Review process we identified multiple areas that have
    atrophied through decades of low prioritization. To remedy that, we
    have advocated for funds such as $16 million to improve long-haul
    communications, $8 million in telephony upgrades, and $2 million in
    radio upgrades. These are just examples of the things we have been able
    to accomplish with the support of those inside and outside the DOD.
    Thank you very much for your continued interest and support in NC3; we
    are in agreement on what needs to be done in the future and I look
    forward to continuing our efforts.
                           nuclear enterprise review
        As this committee is well aware, the Air Force and this command
    have undertaken momentous shifts to support our number one priority.
    Our airmen are beginning to see resourcing balanced against mission
    requirements. They see mid-career leaders mentoring those below them,
    educating them on the importance of their missions. They see their most
    senior leaders in the Administration, in the Department, and here in
    Congress acting on their behalf.
        I will lay out a number of accomplishments that have been possible
    thanks to the support of leadership in all branches of government, the
    DOD, and the Air Force. But first I would like to recognize the hard
    work and leadership of my predecessor, Lieutenant General Stephen
    Wilson; he embraced the challenge and AFGSC is better for it. I sit
    before you today as the first 4-star commander of AFGSC and the AF now
    has a 3-star as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and
    Nuclear Integration. This recognizes the importance of the nuclear
    enterprise within the Air Force and elevates our advocacy.
    Additionally, as part of the Nuclear Enterprise Review (NER) we found
    we needed to link all the disparate nuclear activities within the AF
    into a more synchronized and focused structure to provide direction and
    support for our nuclear forces. The Secretary of the Air Force and
    Chief of Staff directed the AFGSC Commander be the single face for the
    AF for ``all things nuclear''. We are currently in the process of
    implementing that guidance which will culminate with AFGSC as the lead
    command for the nuclear deterrent operations mission and the AFNWC
    restructuring to provide ``direct support'' to AFGSC for all material
    elements of the nuclear enterprise.
        We are shifting our security forces members from PRP to the Arming
    and Use of Force (AUoF) standards. This maintains the high standards
    required in our business while reducing the administrative workload
    driven by maintaining two overlapping reliability programs. This
    ensures our security forces members across the Air Force are held to
    the same standard and improves mobility between bases. Additionally, we
    have improved the equipment and uniforms of our missile field defenders
    through our Model Defender program.
        Across the maintenance, operations, and security forces career
    fields we have implemented the Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) which
    reflects the incredible responsibility placed on our nuclear airmen's
    shoulders. For our enlisted members in critical career fields we have
    implemented the Special Duty Assignment Pay (SDAP). AIP and SDAP are
    but a small way we recognize the hard work our airmen accomplish in
    this demanding and ever-important field.
        For our ICBM operations, we have implemented a number of changes.
    Among them is re-imagining the crew construct altogether. We have
    revamped training to remove the blurring of lines between training and
    evaluating; implementing reforms to increase the proficiency of our
    missile crews. We have also changed how the crew tour works.
    Previously, most crew members would spend four years at their missile
    base, progress through the different leadership positions, and then
    move on to another assignment. Instead we are moving to a ``3+3''
    concept where a crewmember will spend the first three years as a deputy
    and commander becoming an expert on the weapon system. Most of the crew
    force will then move to another ICBM base where they will fill
    instructor, evaluator, and flight commander roles; for those who do not
    move, they will fill those same roles at their current duty station.
        We have been implementing changes for our bomber forces, as well.
    For instance, we have completely overhauled B-52 initial and mission
    qualification training and are advancing B-52 simulator upgrade
    timelines to better support nuclear mission training. Additionally, we
    have developed up our Striker Vista program to advance integration
    between bomber platforms through the transfer of personnel between
    wings. This is not a new concept to the AF but it is something new to
    our bomber forces.
        These are just some of the fundamental changes we have implemented
    in conjunction with the Nuclear Enterprise Review findings. I could
    list literally hundreds of individual initiatives, most of which have
    been completed, that cut across the nuclear mission from standing up an
    independent helicopter group, to significant manpower plus-ups, to new
    vehicles and equipment, to organizational changes to address long-
    standing needs. However, more importantly you should know that we are
    not done. I truly believe we can never return to the previous way of
    doing things; instead we must always look to the future and always have
    open minds. Since the NER reports, we have accomplished bottom-up
    reviews of our bomber forces, airborne launch operations, and the
    headquarters itself. Most recently, I tasked a team to conduct a review
    of our convoy operations to ensure we are accomplishing this absolutely
    critical mission area the best way possible. We are building a culture
    that embraces innovation and change.
                                2016 priorities
        In fiscal year 2015, AFGSC took a deliberate approach with planning
    and executing its mission. Through the successful execution of new
    initiatives, AFGSC was able to earn an additional $214 million from
    initial distribution used to fund NC3, manpower, readiness
    requirements, and Nuclear Force Improvement Program initiatives. But we
    have more work to do and we will move forward in the context of my
    priorities.
        My priorities are relatively simple and they inform every decision
    I make. They are mission, airmen, families all built on heritage and
    core values. We exist to serve the Nation by providing strategic
    deterrence and global strike. However, without our great airmen we
    could never hope to be as successful as we are. In my visits to our
    units, I am always humbled by the dedication of your Global Strike
    warriors and their unfailing drive to do their best. I truly believe
    that while we may recruit airmen, we retain families. To me that means
    we cannot forget the loved ones who stay behind while our airmen deploy
    whether it is overseas or to a missile field. It means supporting the
    families who back up our airmen who work long hours ensuring our bases
    are secure. It means recognizing that no matter the job an airman is
    doing, we must never lose sight of the family who makes it all
    possible.
        I mentioned that Heritage and Core Values are the foundation of the
    priorities I just listed. I think we learn from our history but we are
    inspired by our Heritage. AFGSC and the Air Force as a whole have a
    proud heritage. Eighth Air Force has a proud history dating back to the
    European theater in World War II while Twentieth Air Force did great
    things in the Pacific theater. Our airmen should understand and embrace
    this heritage. Lastly, our Core Values of ``Integrity First, Service
    Before Self, and Excellence in All We Do'' should underpin every
    decision we make each and every day. Without these values we sacrifice
    who we are and then nothing else matters.
                                   conclusion
        Thank you for your continued support of Air Force Global Strike
    Command and our strategic deterrent and global strike missions. The
    President's 2015 National Security Strategy is clear: ``As long as
    nuclear weapons exist, the United States must invest the resources
    necessary to maintain--without testing--a safe, secure, and effective
    nuclear deterrent that preserves strategic stability.'' Fiscal
    constraints, while posing planning challenges, do not alter the
    national security landscape or the intent of competitors and
    adversaries, nor do they diminish the enduring value of long range,
    strategic forces to our Nation.
        Although we account for less than one percent of the DOD budget,
    AFGSC forces represent two-thirds of the Nation's nuclear triad and
    play a critical role in ensuring U.S. national security, while also
    providing joint commanders rapid global combat airpower. AFGSC will
    continue to seek innovative, cost-saving measures to ensure our weapon
    systems are operating as efficiently as possible. Modernization,
    however, is mandatory. AFGSC is operating B-52s built in the 1960s with
    equipment designed in the 1950s; operating ICBMs with 1960s
    infrastructure; and utilizing 1960s era weapon storage areas. We cannot
    afford to delay modernization initiatives across the two legs of the
    Nation's nuclear triad and the NC3 systems which connect our
    capabilities to the President.
        I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Congress for
    your ongoing support of the nuclear enterprise. Your support does not
    go unnoticed and is absolutely critical to ensuring AFGSC provides the
    nuclear and conventional capabilities this Nation deserves. It is my
    privilege to lead this elite team empowered with special trust and
    responsibility. It is truly an honor to be a Wingman to the outstanding
    airmen who make up Air Force Global Strike Command.

        Senator Sessions. It will be made a part of the record, and
    thank you.
        Vice Admiral Terry Benedict has been the director of the
    Navy's Strategic Systems Program since 2010. I think that is a
    good tenure already.
        We appreciate your service, and I do think, in these kinds
    of programs, it is beneficial if you can have a longer tenure.
        Would you agree?
        Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. These are complex systems, and I think a
    little longer tenure is probably helpful.
        In this capacity, you have been responsible for the
    development, acquisition, and training of the nuclear weapons
    systems carried aboard our strategic ballistic missile
    submarines, the underwater leg of our nuclear triad, and
    perhaps the most secure leg of our triad.
        Admiral Benedict, we would be pleased to hear from you.

      STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL TERRY J. BENEDICT, USN, DIRECTOR,
                       STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS

        Admiral Benedict. Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member
    Donnelly, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for
    the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee on Strategic
    Forces.
        Today, I represent the men and women of your Navy's
    Strategic Systems Programs, or SSP. Your continued support of
    our deterrence mission is appreciated, and all of us thank you.
        My mission as the director of SSP is to design, develop,
    produce, support, and ensure the safety and security of our
    Navy's sea-based strategic deterrent capability, the Trident II
    D5 strategic weapons system.
        My written statement, which I respectfully request be
    submitted for the record, addresses my top priorities. Due to
    time constraints, I would like to briefly address three
    priorities today, nuclear weapons safety and security, the
    Trident II D5 life-extension efforts, and collaboration with
    the Air Force on weapon system commonality.
        First, my top priority is the safety and the security of
    the Navy's nuclear weapons. Custody and accountability of the
    nuclear assets entrusted to the Navy are the cornerstone of
    this program. Our approach to the nuclear weapons mission is to
    maintain a culture of excellence and self-assessment, one that
    produces the highest standards of performance and integrity.
        Second, the Navy is proactively taking steps to address
    aging and technology obsolescence. SSP is extending the life of
    the Trident II D5 strategic weapons system to match the Ohio-
    class submarine service life and to serve as the initial
    baseline mission payload for the Ohio replacement submarine
    platform. This is being accomplished through a life-extension
    program for all of the Trident II D5 strategic weapon systems
    subsystems to include launcher, navigation, fire control,
    guidance missile, and reentry.
        In November 2015, the USS Kentucky conducted her
    demonstration and shakedown operation, launching two D5 life-
    extension missiles marking 157 out of 159 successful launches.
    This milestone continues to ensure a sustainable sea-based
    strategic deterrence capability.
        Finally, I fully support strategic collaboration between
    our services. The Navy and the Air Force are both addressing
    challenges in sustaining aging strategic weapons systems. As a
    result, I remain committed and I believe commonality between
    the ground-based strategic deterrent at the Trident II D5
    systems will improve affordability while reducing risks to
    ensure a safe, secure, effective, and credible strategic
    deterrent.
        Leadership commitment and focus are required to accomplish
    this parallel undertaking.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I am
    pleased to answer your questions, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Benedict follows:]

             Prepared Statement by Vice Admiral Terry Benedict, USN
                                  introduction
        Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, distinguished Members
    of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the
    Navy's strategic programs. It is an honor to testify before you this
    afternoon representing the Navy's Strategic Systems Programs (SSP).
        SSP's mission is to design, develop, produce, support, and ensure
    the safety of our Navy's sea-based strategic deterrent, the Trident II
    (D5) Strategic Weapons System (SWS). The men and women of SSP and our
    industry partners remain dedicated to supporting the mission of our
    sailors on strategic deterrent patrol and our marines, sailors, and
    coast guardsmen who stand watch, ensuring the security of the weapons
    we are entrusted with by this Nation.
        The Navy provides the most survivable leg of the U.S. nuclear triad
    with our ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and the Trident II (D5)
    SWS. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review reinforced the importance of SSBNs
    and the Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). Critically,
    SLBMs will comprise a significant majority of the Nation's
    operationally deployed nuclear warheads. The Chief of Naval Operations
    (CNO) and Vice Chief of Naval Operations continue to reiterate the
    Navy's number one priority is to maintain a credible, modern, and
    survivable sea-based strategic deterrent. Maintaining our Nation's
    capability in this key mission area includes the proper funding of the
    Ohio Replacement Program--along with the propulsion and the SWS--as the
    ``The Navy's #1 acquisitions programs.''
        Ensuring sustainment of the sea-based strategic deterrent
    capability is a vital national requirement today and into the
    foreseeable future. Our PB-17 budget request provides required funding
    to support the program of record in fiscal year (FY) 2017 for the
    Trident II (D5) SWS. To sustain this capability, I am focusing on my
    top priorities: Nuclear Weapons Safety and Security; the Trident II
    (D5) SWS Life Extension Program; the Ohio Replacement Program; the
    Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) Industrial Base; the implementation of the
    Nuclear Enterprise Review recommendations; the newly codified Navy
    Nuclear Weapons Regulatory responsibility; and collaboration with the
    Air Force.
                      nuclear weapons safety and security
        The first priority, and the most important, is the safety and
    security of the Navy's nuclear weapons. Accordingly, Navy leadership
    delegated and defined SSP's role as the program manager and technical
    authority for the Navy's nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons security.
        At its most basic level, this priority is the physical security of
    one of our Nation's most valuable assets. Our Marines and Navy Masters
    at Arms provide an effective and integrated elite security force at our
    two Strategic Weapons Facilities and Waterfront Restricted Areas in
    Kings Bay, Georgia and Bangor, Washington. U.S. Coast Guard Maritime
    Force Protection Units have been commissioned at both facilities to
    protect our submarines as they transit to and from their dive points.
    These Coast Guardsmen and the vessels they man provide a security
    umbrella for our Ohio-class submarines. Together, the Navy, Marine
    Corps, and Coast Guard team form the foundation of our Nuclear Weapons
    Security Program while headquarters staff ensures that nuclear weapons
    capable activities continuously meet or exceed security, safety, and
    compliance standards.
        SSP's efforts to sustain the safety and improve the security of
    national assets continue at all levels of the organization. The Navy's
    nuclear weapons enterprise maintains a culture of self-assessment in
    order to sustain safety and security. This is accomplished through
    biannual assessments by SSP headquarters staff, periodic technical
    evaluations, formal inspections, and continuous on-site monitoring and
    reporting at the Strategic Weapons Facilities. Technical evaluations,
    formal inspections, and on-site monitoring at the Strategic Weapons
    Facilities provide periodic and day-to-day assessment and oversight.
    Biannual assessments evaluate the ability of the organization to self-
    assess the execution of the assigned strategic weapons mission and
    compliance requirements. The results of these biannual assessments are
    critically and independently reviewed through the Navy Nuclear Weapons
    Assessment and provided to the Secretary of the Navy and the CNO.
        We also strive to maintain a culture of excellence to achieve the
    highest standards of performance and integrity for personnel supporting
    the strategic deterrent mission. We continue to focus on the custody
    and accountability of the nuclear assets entrusted to the Navy. SSP's
    number one priority is to maintain a safe, secure, and effective
    strategic deterrent.
                           d5 life extension program
        The next priority is SSP's life extension effort to ensure the
    Trident II (D5) SWS remains an effective and reliable sea-based
    deterrent. The Trident II (D5) SWS continues to demonstrate itself as a
    credible deterrent and exceeds operational system requirements
    established over 30 years ago. The submarine leg of the U.S. strategic
    deterrent is ready, credible, and effective, thereby assuring our
    allies and partners and deterring potential adversaries. However, we
    must remain vigilant about age-related issues to ensure a continued
    high level of reliability.
        The Trident II (D5) SWS has been deployed on our Ohio-class
    ballistic missile submarines for 25 years and is planned for a service
    life of 50 years. This is well beyond its original design life of 25
    years and more than double the historical service life of any previous
    sea-based strategic deterrent system. As a result, effort will be
    required to sustain a credible SWS from now until the end of the
    current Ohio-class SSBN in the 2040s; as well as the end of the service
    life of the Ohio Replacement SSBN in the 2080s.
        The Navy is proactively taking steps to address aging and
    technology obsolescence. SSP is extending the life of the Trident II
    (D5) SWS to match the Ohio-class submarine service life and to serve as
    the initial baseline mission payload for the Ohio replacement submarine
    platform. This is being accomplished through an update to all the
    Trident II (D5) SWS subsystems: launcher, navigation, fire control,
    guidance, missile, and reentry. Our flight hardware--missile and
    guidance--life extension efforts are designed to meet the same form,
    fit, and function of the original system to keep the deployed system as
    one homogeneous population, control costs, and sustain the demonstrated
    performance of the system. We will remain in continuous production of
    large energetic components such as solid rocket motors and Post Boost
    Control System Gas Generators, while continuing an age management
    replacement effort for missile small ordnance and control components.
    We also started initial planning for when a follow-on missile to
    Trident II (D5) will be needed. These efforts will provide the Navy
    with the missiles and guidance systems we need to meet operational
    requirements through the introduction and deployment of the Ohio
    replacement SSBNs through the 2080s.
        While budgetary pressures and impacts of sequestration resulted in
    some deferred or delayed efforts, strategic deterrence remains the
    Navy's highest priority. As such, the Navy is committed to minimizing,
    to the maximum extent possible, impacts to this program in order to
    meet strategic requirements.
        One impacted effort is the change to our flight test program in
    fiscal year 2016. In accordance with Strategic Command (STRATCOM)
    requirements, the Navy is required to flight test a minimum of four
    Trident II (D5) missiles per year in a tactically-representative
    environment. The purpose of flight testing is to detect any change in
    reliability or accuracy. The enacted fiscal year 2016 budget reflects a
    reduction of one planned flight test for affordability. The Navy
    coordinated with STRATCOM to determine that this temporary reduction is
    manageable in the short-term, contingent upon our plan to ramp back up
    to four flight tests per year later in the Future Years Defense Program
    (FYDP). A prolonged reduction beyond what is planned in fiscal year
    2016 would impact our ability to detect changes in reliability and
    accuracy of an aging system with the required degree of statistical
    confidence to meet STRATCOM requirements. The fiscal year 2017 budget
    request reflects the return to four flight tests per year.
        Despite budgetary pressures, the Navy's D5 life extension program
    remains on track. In November 2015, the USS Kentucky (SSBN 737)
    successfully conducted her Demonstration and Shakedown Operation (DASO
    26) by launching two missiles. These missiles successfully integrated
    the D5 Life Extension (D5 LE) Flight Controls Electronics Assembly and
    Interlocks Suite with the D5 LE Guidance System. The D5 LE missiles
    will be available for initial fleet introduction in fiscal year 2017.
        Another major step to ensure the continued sustainment of our SWS
    is the SSP Shipboard Integration (SSI) Programs, which address
    obsolescence management and modernization of SWS shipboard systems
    through the use of open architecture design and commercial off-the-
    shelf hardware and software. The first increment of this update was
    installed on the final U.S. SSBN in April 2014. This completed
    installation on all fourteen U.S. SSBNs, all four UK SSBNs and all
    United States and UK land-based facilities. Installation of subsequent
    increments began last summer, with four installations completed to
    date. The SSI Program includes refreshes of shipboard electronics
    hardware and software upgrades, which will extend service life, enable
    more efficient and affordable future maintenance of the SWS and ensure
    we continue to provide the highest level of nuclear weapons safety and
    security for our deployed SSBNs while meeting STRATCOM requirements.
        To sustain the Trident II (D5) SWS, SSP is extending the life of
    the W76 reentry system through a refurbishment program known as the
    W76-1. The W76-1 refurbishment maintains the military capability of the
    original W76 for an additional 30 years. This program, which is being
    executed in partnership with the Department of Energy, National Nuclear
    Security Administration (NNSA), has completed over 60 percent of the
    planned warhead production. The Navy will continue to work with NNSA to
    closely monitor production and deliveries to ensure there are no
    operational impacts.
        In addition, the Navy continues the design work to refurbish the
    aging electronics in the W88 reentry system. The Navy is collaborating
    with the Air Force to reduce costs through shared subsystems suitable
    for the W88/Mk5 and the W87/Mk21. Additionally, the Nuclear Weapons
    Council (NWC) directed the replacement of the conventional high
    explosive, which will support deployment of the W88/Mk5 for an
    additional 25 years. As directed by the NWC, we have submitted funding
    requests to support the initial feasibility and cost studies (Phase
    6.2/6.2A) for an Interoperable Warhead (IW) to begin in 2020. The Navy
    believes that the NWC continues to effectively balance near-term
    nuclear weapons sustainment and refurbishment priorities and the long-
    term stockpile strategy.

                            ohio replacement program
        The Navy's highest priority acquisition program is the Ohio
    Replacement Program, which replaces the existing Ohio-class submarines.
    The continued assurance of our sea-based strategic deterrent requires a
    credible SWS, as well as the development of the next class of ballistic
    missile submarines. The Navy is taking the necessary steps to ensure
    the Ohio replacement SSBN is designed, built, delivered, and tested on
    time with the right capabilities at an affordable cost.
        To lower development costs and leverage the proven reliability of
    the Trident II (D5) SWS, the Ohio Replacement SSBN will enter service
    with the Trident II (D5) SWS and D5 LE missiles onboard. These D5 LE
    missiles will be shared with the Ohio-class submarines until their
    retirement. Maintaining one SWS during the transition to the Ohio-class
    replacement is beneficial from a cost, performance, and risk reduction
    standpoint. A program to support long-term SWS requirements is planned
    for the future to support the Ohio-class replacement SSBN through its
    entire service life.
        The Navy continues to leverage the Virginia-class program to
    implement lessons-learned and ensure the Ohio Replacement Program
    pursues affordability initiatives across design, construction, and life
    cycle operations and support. The SSBN design team recently achieved
    several critical decisions and milestones. In December 2015, the Navy
    released the Request for Proposals for the final detailed design
    contract. Maintaining the pace of design and submarine industrial
    capability is critical to the continued success of our sea-based
    strategic deterrent now and well into the 2080s.
        A critical component of the Ohio Replacement Program is the
    development of a Common Missile Compartment (CMC) that will support
    Trident II (D5) deployment on both the Ohio-class replacement and the
    successor to the UK Vanguard-class. In 2015 the Program began
    construction of missile tubes to support building the U.S. prototype
    Quad-pack module, the Strategic Weapons System--Ashore (SWS Ashore)
    test site, and the UK's first SSBN. The joint CMC effort is shifting
    from design to construction, supporting production in both United
    States and UK build yards. Any delay to the common missile compartment
    effort has the potential to impact the UK's ability to maintain a
    continuous at sea deterrent posture.
        To manage and mitigate technical risk to both the United States and
    UK programs, SSP is leading the development of SWS Ashore integration
    test site at Cape Canaveral, Florida. This is a joint effort with the
    Navy and the state of Florida investing in the re-development of a
    POLARIS site to conduct integration testing and verification for Ohio
    replacement and UK Successor programs. Refurbishment of the POLARIS
    site and construction of the infrastructure is proceeding at a rapid
    pace, including installation of test bay 1 missile tubes and
    superstructure and several major support systems. Trident II (D5),
    Ohio-class, and Ohio replacement new design hardware will be co-located
    and integrated to prove the successful re-host and redeployment of the
    Trident II (D5) SWS on the new submarines. To mitigate the risk in the
    restart of launch system production, SSP constructed a surface launch
    facility at the Naval Air Station, China Lake, California. This
    facility will prove that the launcher industrial base can replicate the
    performance of the Ohio-class Trident II (D5) launch system. We will be
    launching the refurbished Trident II (D5) test shapes used in the 1980s
    starting in fiscal year 2017. Launch performance is a critical factor
    we must understand at the systems level to ensure we maintain high
    reliability as we transition the weapon system to the next class of
    SSBNs.
        The United States and the UK have maintained a shared commitment to
    nuclear deterrence through the Polaris Sales Agreement since April
    1963. As the Director of SSP, I am the U.S. Project Officer for the
    Polaris Sales Agreement. Our programs are tightly coupled both
    programmatically and technically to ensure we are providing the most
    cost effective, technically capable nuclear strategic deterrent for
    both Nations. Last year marked the 52nd anniversary of this agreement,
    and I am pleased to report that our longstanding partnership with the
    UK remains strong. The United States will continue to maintain its
    strong strategic relationship with the UK as we execute our Trident II
    (D5) LE Program and develop the common missile compartment. Our
    continued stewardship of the Trident II (D5) SWS is necessary to ensure
    a credible and reliable SWS is deployed today on our Ohio-class
    submarines, the UK Vanguard-class, as well as in the future on
    respective follow-on platforms. This is of particular importance given
    the proportion of our nuclear forces that will be deployed on the sea-
    based leg of the Triad under the New START Treaty. The Ohio replacement
    will be a strategic, national asset whose endurance and stealth will
    enable the Navy to provide continuous, uninterrupted strategic
    deterrence well into the 2080s.
                    solid rocket motor (srm) industrial base
        The defense and aerospace industrial base--in particular the solid
    rocket motor industry--is another important priority. I remain
    concerned with the decline in demand for solid rocket motors. While the
    Navy is maintaining a continuous production capability at a minimum
    sustaining rate of twelve rocket motor sets per year, the demand from
    both NASA and Air Force has precipitously declined. Not only did this
    decline result in higher costs for the Navy, as practically a sole
    customer, it also put an entire specialized industry at risk of
    extinction. To allow this puts our national security at risk. The Navy
    cannot afford to singularly carry this cost, nor can our Nation afford
    to lose this capability. While the efforts of our industry partners and
    others have created short-term cost relief, the long-term support of
    the solid rocket motor industry and maintenance of critical skills
    remains an issue that must be addressed at the National level. At SSP,
    we will continue to work with our industry partners, DOD, senior NASA
    leadership, Air Force, and Congress to do everything we can to ensure
    this vital national security industry asset is preserved.
                           nuclear enterprise review
        The Navy remains committed to addressing and implementing
    recommendations of the 2014 Nuclear Enterprise Review (NER). The
    Program and Budget Review for the fiscal year 2017 budget formulation
    preserves all current enhancements to the Nuclear Enterprise, focusing
    significantly on the recapitalization, sustainment, and modernization
    of our nuclear deterrence systems and infrastructure. The NER provided
    the Navy a thorough and unbiased look at our nuclear forces. Overall,
    the report found that the nuclear enterprise is safe, secure, and
    effective today but it also found evidence of systemic problems that,
    if not addressed, could undermine the safety, security, and
    effectiveness of elements of the force in the future. Fortunately, the
    Navy's internal Nuclear Weapons Assessment and the SSP Comprehensive
    Self-Assessment identified most of the issues underscored during the
    NER. In fact, the report validated numerous efforts already underway.
        The Navy continues to address the more than 68 recommendations with
    Navy equity contained in the report. Significant action has been taken
    to implement each recommendation, focusing on the following areas:
    oversight, investment, and personnel and training improvements. With
    respect to oversight, the Navy is clarifying the nuclear deterrent
    enterprise leadership structure and reducing administrative burdens
    imposed on the forces. The Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise Review Group
    (NDERG), formed and led by the Secretary of Defense will continue to
    provide regular oversight of the nuclear enterprise. The Navy Nuclear
    Deterrent Mission Oversight Council is the Navy's mechanism to ensure
    the NDERG recommendations and guidance are properly implemented and
    that investments achieve the intended effect.
        Regarding training and personnel, the Navy is planning a
    significant investment to build a margin in the deterrence force and
    clear the SSBN maintenance backlog. The Navy is matching the right
    responsibilities with the right leaders in order to address the
    recommendations involving long-term cultural and organizational
    challenges. There will be an emphasis on the importance of the
    deterrence mission through updated vision statements, revised campaign
    plans, and methods to eliminate obstacles to enhance moral conduct and
    relieve the pressures on sailors, training, and work-life balance.
        The Navy is developing a 20 year investment plan to ensure the
    continued reliability of critical infrastructure at these facilities to
    support nuclear weapons movement and operations. While the Navy makes
    significant progress through actions taken to date, we recognize much
    work remains to be accomplished. The Navy is confident we have the
    right emphasis, oversight and processes in place to maintain a
    credible, modern, and safe sea-based deterrent.
                 navy nuclear weapons regulatory responsibility
        As a result of the Nuclear Enterprise Review, the Navy implemented
    a centralized regulatory authority for nuclear force readiness. As the
    Director of Strategic Systems Programs (DIRSSP), I have accountability,
    responsibility and authority to serve as the single Flag Officer to
    monitor performance and conduct end-to-end assessment of the Navy
    Nuclear Deterrence Mission (NNDM) elements. These responsibilities are
    defined in SECNAVINST 8120.1B and OPNAVINSTs 8120.1 and 8120.2. Nine
    Echelon 2 level commands directly contribute to the NNDM: U.S. Fleet
    Forces Command (USFLTFORCOM), U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), Fleet Cyber
    Command (USFLTCYBERCOM), Navy Supply Systems Command (NAVSUPSYSCOM),
    Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEASYSCOM), Chief of Naval Personnel
    (CNP), Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED), commander, Navy
    Installations Command (CNIC), and SSP.
        In my role as DIRSSP, I am the the Navy Nuclear Deterrence Mission
    (NNDM) regulatory authority responsible for assessing and reporting
    issues to the Navy Nuclear Deterrence Mission Council and the CNO. SSP
    is tasked with developing, coordinating, and implementing policies
    approved by the CNO; conducting end-to-end assessments of the Navy's
    nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons systems and personnel, including
    Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3), for safe, reliable,
    and effective execution of the NNDM.
        SSP is engaged with the Echelon 2 commands defined above to
    understand current reporting and assessment processes and to define the
    NNDM regulatory assessment policy. The next in-progress review with
    CNO, in February 2016, will provide an update on the significant
    progress made to date by the participating commands, to include:
    reporting and engagement strategies with the NNDM component commands,
    development of archival and analytical tools to assist in performing
    end-to-end assessments, and presenting the initial component self-
    assessments and an independent assessment of the Echelon 2 reporting.
    Further, the upcoming 2016 Biennial Navy Nuclear Weapons Assessment
    will review the implementation and execution of the NNDM Regulator
    processes to date to ensure we are providing the necessary rigor and
    discipline to this endeavor.
                        collaboration with the air force
        The final priority is strategic collaboration between the Services.
    The Navy and the Air Force are both addressing the challenges of
    sustaining aging strategic weapon systems and are collaboratively
    working to ensure these capabilities are retained in the long-term to
    meet mission requirements. In accordance with a July 2015 tasking
    letter from the Air Force and Navy Service Acquisition Executives
    (SAEs), and the commander, U.S. Strategic Command, the Navy and Air
    Force conducted an assessment of the options for commonality for the
    two ballistic missile legs of the Triad. The direction to SSP and PEO/
    SS was to determine whether increasing the commonality between the
    Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) and Trident II life extension
    (D5LE) could improve affordability while ensuring a safe, secure,
    effective, and credible nuclear deterrent. The assessment is
    considering commonality across a wide spectrum, from full system level
    commonality to technology sharing for independent programs.
        Although initial results of the assessment ruled out the possible
    use of a standard common weapons system by both the Air Force and Navy,
    a number of common components and technologies remain. The use of these
    candidates offer significant potential benefits in terms of reducing
    costs and technical and schedule risks to the GBSD and SLBM programs.
    Commonality will provide the Navy and Air Force opportunities to
    eliminate redundant efforts, leverage economies of scale, and sustain
    shared critical skills and capabilities needed by securing the
    industrial base.
        Each leg of the Triad provides unique attributes. Furthermore, a
    sustained and ready Triad provides an effective hedge, allowing the
    Nation to shift to another leg, if necessary, due to unforeseen
    technical problems or vulnerabilities. For this reason, the Department
    is focused on cooperative efforts that maintain affordability and
    reduces risk to both services while retaining essential diversity where
    needed to ensure a credible and reliable deterrent. Many of the
    industries and required engineering skills sets are unique to strategic
    systems. Key to SSP's historical success has been our technical
    applications programs, which in the past provided a research and
    development foundation. We will need to resume these critical efforts
    as we evaluate maintaining this strategic capability until the 2080s to
    match the full service life of the Ohio replacement submarine.
                                   conclusion
        SSP continues to maintain a safe, secure, and effective strategic
    deterrent and focus on the custody and accountability of the nuclear
    assets entrusted to the Navy. Our PB-17 budget request ensures that we
    will sustain this capability in fiscal year 2017. However, we must
    remain vigilant about unforeseen age-related issues to ensure the high
    reliability required of our SWS. SSP must maintain the engineering
    support and critical skills of our industry and government team to
    address any future challenges with the current system as well as
    prepare for the future of the program. Our Nation's sea-based deterrent
    has been a critical component of our national security since the 1950s
    and must continue to assure our allies and deter potential adversaries
    well into the future. I am privileged to represent this unique
    organization as we work to serve the best interests of our great
    Nation.

        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Thank you, all. Those are important opening statements, and
    our subcommittee has some important work to do. I feel that we
    are not coming in to an entirely new situation, but that we
    have been observing developments for some time. We know where
    the danger areas are, and we know we have to avoid those danger
    areas and make the right decisions.
        Dr. Hopkins, last year, you testified before the House
    that, ``We have reached a point where we have removed all
    flexibility for nuclear weapons life-extension programs, and we
    are losing flexibility in our platform modernization
    programs.''
        I assume by that you mean that, financially, we do not have
    any room for error at this point. Would you comment on that
    comment you made previously?
        Dr. Hopkins. Yes, thank you, Senator.
        It is a matter both of financially as well as schedule. The
    modernization schedule is really tied closely to our estimated
    timeout of the systems that are existing today. After several
    years of delaying the modernization--I am sure partially for
    financial reasons, partially for other programmatic reasons--we
    have reached a point where virtually every leg of the triad is
    nearing the end of its anticipated service life. We have
    extended as many as we possibly can, as long as we can.
        What we are seeing now is the requirement for the
    department to modernize the delivery systems and to extend the
    lives of the various nuclear weapon components.
        Senator Sessions. Do you have confidence or can you
    guarantee that at the funding level we are talking about now,
    if we maintain it, we will be able to replace our current
    platforms before they reach the end of their service life?
        Dr. Hopkins. Well, I would say that our budget request is
    designed to support the program to replace the triad, as
    described. I do not think I could guarantee too much at this
    point, just because we are so relatively early in the programs.
    As you know, things tend to change over time.
        However, we are giving careful thought to the timing and to
    the cost estimation, the estimation of the costs of these
    various legs.
        Senator Sessions. Now, is it the view of the Nuclear
    Weapons Council, which you are the staff director for, that our
    out-year funding for the life-extension programs for nuclear
    warheads and bombs, and the new facilities, is inadequate, as
    suggested by Secretary Moniz?
        Dr. Hopkins. I think that the funding for the warhead
    modernization is adequate, but I believe Secretary Moniz was
    referring to infrastructure.
        Senator Sessions. That means?
        Dr. Hopkins. Plutonium, uranium, high-performance
    computing, that sort of thing.
        Senator Sessions. Okay.
        Dr. Hopkins. Those will need additional resources in the
    out-years, in order to keep pace and provide the support that
    is needed.
        Senator Sessions. Well, we did challenge some of the
    structures, building of new structures. I think there was a
    good response to that, and I think it saved us some money.
        Admiral Benedict, one of the things that is talked about,
    sometimes openly, sometimes just around the table, is that we
    are going to reach a crisis with regard to the Ohio-class
    replacement financially, because it is going to pop the Navy's
    budget, and we have to have a plan in place so we can proceed
    at the right pace with that replacement of that critical part
    of the triad.
        Do you have concerns there? Are we reaching a point that
    could be a crisis? What, if anything, do we need to do to deal
    with it?
        Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. Thank you.
        We have worked closely within the Navy. As we discussed
    yesterday, there are three major components to deliver the Ohio
    replacement platform. One is, certainly, the propulsion
    reactor, which is under the auspices of Admiral Caldwell in
    naval reactors. The other one is the platform itself, which is
    the responsibility of PEO submarines, Admiral Jabaley. Then the
    third piece is the mission package, which I, as the director of
    SSP, am responsible to deliver.
        As we have looked at that Ohio replacement program under
    the direction of Mr. Stackley, who is our acquisition executive
    in the Navy, I think we have presented a platform that delivers
    the requirements necessary to meet our leg of the triad at the
    most cost-efficient price point that we can come up with.
        You are well-aware that we took a two-year slip at the
    beginning of the program, which basically removed our float. We
    have done a number of things within the Navy, trying to ensure
    that is the most cost-effective solution that we are presenting
    to the Congress. Our design maturity is higher than any other
    platform that has ever or ever will enter production. We will
    make some requests of other opportunities to reduce the costs--
    economic order quantities, advanced construction authorities,
    things like those, which I am certain that Mr. Stackley will
    address when he comes up here and testifies.
        If we are to replace the Ohio without reducing the number
    of platforms necessary to support Admiral Haney's requirements
    at STRATCOM [Strategic Command], then we must stay the current
    program of record for the Ohio replacement.
        Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. You agree with that, Secretary Scher?
        Secretary Scher. Absolutely.
        Senator Sessions. Senator Donnelly?
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thanks to all the witnesses.
        Admiral Benedict, thanks again for having me aboard on the
    tests on the USS Kentucky. It was a privilege.
        Is the Navy committed to commonality as a means to
    modernize and maintain the triad? If so, what elements do you
    see as most applicable for commonality with ICBM modernization
    program?
        Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. The Navy is absolutely
    committed to commonality. I think we have worked very closely
    with our sister service, the Air Force.
        At the direction of Mr. Stackley and Mr. LaPlante, both the
    acquisition executives for the Navy and the Air Force, as well
    as Admiral Haney, we have been working since this summer to
    identify opportunities for commonality with the Air Force.
        We have five teams that we have stood up. They have done
    detailed analysis of opportunities in areas where we could
    focus with commonality. That report is completed, and we will
    shortly brief out the secretaries, as well as Admiral Haney.
        But commonality is simply a tool. It is a tool to identify
    risks. When you are doing a program as complicated as the Air
    Force is right now with the GBSD [Ground Based Strategic
    Deterrent], or we will do--and we have just come through with
    the life-extension programs--I believe that, in today's
    environment, and the fragile industrial bases that we face in
    some of our niche areas that only we do, the Navy and Air
    Force, that it is a means to address schedule, cost, technical,
    and the industrial base appropriately. It is a risk-reduction
    tool.
        We have been meeting now with Mr. Kendall, the OSD
    acquisition executive, on how we will implement the
    opportunities that these five teams that have been working
    under the direction of the service secretaries, how we will
    implement those opportunities.
        Yes, sir, we are fully committed.
        Senator Donnelly. General Rand?
        General Rand. Sir, I will just echo what Admiral Benedict
    said. We are committed to pursuing commonality in the GBSD and
    the SLBM [submarine launched-ballistic missile].
        I think we are going to brief. Again, I will not be part of
    that briefing, but I think Secretary Kendall will give a brief
    later in March.
        Senator Donnelly. Where are we with commonality on guidance
    systems?
        General Rand. I am going to defer a little bit to the
    Admiral on that question.
        Senator Donnelly. Admiral?
        Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. Thank you.
        As part of the Trident II D5 life extension, we completely
    rebuilt our guidance system. We modernized it in terms of
    instruments, our accelerometers, our gyros, our radiation-
    hardened memory, our radiation-hardened processors, our
    architecture. As we have gone through that effort over the last
    10 years as part of life extension, significant investments
    have been made.
        We have shared that information with the Air Force. The Air
    Force is working with Mr. Kendall on how they would incorporate
    that into their acquisition strategy. Certainly, competition is
    a major player as they move forward in GBSD.
        I think we are collaboratively working with the Secretary
    to find a way to both achieve competition and yet ensure that
    we take advantage of the investments that the Navy has made as
    part of commonality. That is a trade-off right now. As the
    General said, we have had three meetings with Mr. Kendall, and
    there are more to happen.
        Senator Donnelly. Dr. Hopkins, how are you working to
    ensure commonality with the SLBM fleet as you modernize the
    ICBM fleet by 2030?
        Dr. Hopkins. Thank you, Senator.
        As already mentioned, on the acquisitions side, the Under
    Secretary for Acquisition is leading the charge for
    commonality. I think a lot of that is driven by the perceived
    benefit, the anticipated benefit, that commonality will support
    affordability.
        In addition, as the chairman of the Nuclear Weapons
    Council, the Under Secretary will also help to integrate the
    opinions and the guidance and the oversight of all the senior
    leadership within the enterprise.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. Senator Fischer?
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Rand, there has been really a number of calls
    recently for the abandonment of the LRSO [Long Range Standoff].
    We have heard that it is redundant; it is unnecessary; it is a
    destabilizing weapon. That runs directly counter to the efforts
    of this committee and also of the department. We have been
    focused on trying to move that up.
        I realize we are not in a classified forum here, but could
    you comment on the need for the LRSO, and whether there is any
    basis in fact that it is unnecessary?
        General Rand. Certainly, Senator. I am glad to talk on
    that.
        I think it is absolutely critical to our bomber fleet. With
    the advent of the LRSB [Long Range Strike Bomber], that will be
    a primary weapon. The B-52s ALCM needs to be replaced, and it
    needs to go on the B-52 and we need to put on the B-2. Three of
    the bombers need LRSO.
        A major reason why is because the ALCM has outlived its
    usefulness. It was intended to be a 10-year missile. It has now
    been in existence for almost 36 years.
        Unfortunately, the enemy gets a vote, and I think that it
    will not have the capabilities as we get into 2025, 2030, to do
    exactly what it is intended to do.
        In this increasingly contested environment that we will be
    operating in, we need LRSO. The Air Force is committed to this.
    It is in our 2017 budget, and it is funded fairly strongly for
    the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program]. We hope to be able to
    start production in 2026 with an IOC [initial operating
    capability] in 2030.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        Mr. Secretary, would you like to comment on that?
        Secretary Scher. Yes, thank you, Senator.
        I second all the points of General Rand. I think the
    arguments that it is a destabilizing weapon I think are ones
    that--I am glad we have this robust discussion in the United
    States, but I think the LRSO is a continuation of an existing
    weapon. I would argue that it is not inherently destabilizing,
    as it is a weapon that already has existed.
        I also think that it is important to recognize that
    having----
        [Audio Disruption.]
        Secretary Scher. It is something that will be important
    today and into the future.
        Senator Fischer. You believe the flexibility of the LRSO is
    very important?
        Secretary Scher. Absolutely. The goal is to make sure that
    we have, as I said, this full range of capabilities, yields,
    and the flexibility to employ them in multiple ranges and
    options to give the most choices to the President. That gives
    the most credibility deterrent, and, frankly, I think then is
    the most stabilizing.
        Senator Fischer. I would agree.
        Dr. Hopkins, do you have any comments on that?
        Dr. Hopkins. Yes. Thank you.
        I would just reinforce the comment about strategic
    stability, and that is that the United States has had nuclear
    cruise missiles since 1982, so I think it is a difficult
    argument to make that a cruise missile is destabilizing.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        General, you mentioned the funding that is proposed in the
    budget of 2017. Do you think that is on target, online? Will
    the Air Force make that a priority?
        General Rand. Yes, ma'am, I do.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        Gentlemen, I would ask if you all agree with the statement
    that further reductions in our nuclear forces should only be
    made as a result of a negotiated bilateral agreement and also
    one that is verifiable. Would you all agree with that?
        Admiral Benedict. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Fischer. All are nodding yes.
        Mr. Secretary, has Russia taken any steps to come back into
    compliance with the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
    Treaty] treaty?
        Secretary Scher. We have seen no steps that Russia has
    taken to come back into compliance. In fact, we still hear the
    discussions that Russia has not yet said that they believe they
    are out of compliance.
        Senator Fischer. I assume that you are aware of the report
    requirement in section 1243 of the most recent NDAA, and it
    requires the department to provide this committee a plan to
    develop the counterforce capabilities, the strike capabilities,
    active defenses, in response to Russia's violations of that
    treaty?
        Secretary Scher. Yes.
        Senator Fischer. That report, is it on track to be
    submitted by March?
        Secretary Scher. My understanding is that it is, but I can
    assure you that I will go back and make sure that that
    continues to be the case.
        Senator Fischer. I would hope so. As we continue to look at
    the past actions of Russia, dating back to 2008, and their
    current belligerence, I think this report is very valuable, and
    this committee needs to see it. I would encourage you to make
    sure that we receive that.
        The President himself said rules must be binding.
        Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Well, we know that Russia is modernizing, as is really
    every other nuclear power in the world, working on new systems.
    We understand that there are threats to NATO [North Atlantic
    Treaty Organization] from this new Russian nuclear strategy.
        Secretary Scher, what is the administration's assessment
    about the threat posed to NATO by Russia's nuclear strategy and
    new nuclear capabilities, some of which are in violation of
    existing arms-control treaties?
        Secretary Scher. Senator, obviously, the IMF violation is a
    very serious violation to begin with, a treaty that the Soviet
    Union and the United States came to realize, and both countries
    realized that they were better off with this treaty in place.
    The fact that that has broken down and that Russia no longer
    believes that is the case is a serious challenge to the
    environment of arms control and a serious threat to Europe.
        We are, however, looking at it not just as a standalone
    issue but really as part of a broad range of aggressive and
    assertive actions that Russia is taking in Europe and
    elsewhere. We believe that our response needs to be one that
    looks at this holistically as well.
        Clearly, we want to make sure that Russia does not obtain a
    military advantage because of the violation that they have
    pursued in violation of the treaty. But we also want to make
    sure that we look broadly.
        We are looking at operations in conjunction with our
    allies, very closely in conjunction with our allies, on how we
    can strengthen deterrence in Europe; how we can ensure that we
    can protect our forces and our allies in Europe, no matter what
    capabilities Russia brings to bear; and that we can ensure that
    we have the ability both through conventional means, primarily,
    but also nuclear means, if necessary, to address the
    capabilities that Russia has that threaten us, our allies, and
    our friends in the region.
        Senator Sessions. Our committee last week hosted experts
    and thinkers on this subject and went through all the
    difficulties of anticipating what Russia might do, what we
    might do in response.
        Do you feel like those possible responses to Russia's
    actions, some of its niche-type weapons, are adequate now? Or
    do we have much more to do to think through what our response
    would be?
        Secretary Scher. I believe both of those are true. I
    believe they are adequate now, but I do not want to stop and
    rest on that. I want to make sure that we continue to look at
    all the capabilities, understanding Russian doctrine even more,
    and continuing to play out the responses that we could have.
        I do feel comfortable with our responses now. I feel
    confident in the work that has been ongoing in EUCOM [European
    Command] over in Stuttgart, as well as in STRATCOM [Strategic
    Command], to deal with the full range of Russian aggression and
    potential actions they could take.
        I am also comfortable with what we have looked at within
    the Department of Defense and within the administration, in
    terms of games and responses and tabletop exercises to kind of
    understand this issue.
        But I assure you, we are not stopping now. That is
    something that we need to continue to look at as the security
    situation evolves, and as we work closer with our friends and
    allies to see what they can bring to the table on this.
        Senator Sessions. There are a lot of reasons to not sit
    idly by. One of them is, if we are apparently unable to respond
    to these kinds of new challenges, I think our allies and our
    adversaries may get the wrong impression about the willingness
    and capability of the United States to respond.
        Right now, we are not on a path to say we are going to
    develop a new weapon. But I think if it becomes clear that that
    is needed, I hope that you will ask for it. If we do it in the
    right way, perhaps we can have congressional support for that.
        One more point, the President is requesting $3.4 billion in
    fiscal year 2017 for the European Reassurance Initiative to
    reinforce our defense posture in Europe. Is there a nuclear
    component to this initiative? If not, why not?
        Secretary Scher. There is not a specific nuclear component
    to the European Reassurance Initiative. What I would say is
    that there are things ongoing and in the budget as part of the
    nuclear mission for what we are doing in Europe, specifically
    one of the most important ones to point to is the B61 life-
    extension program that is directly related to our nuclear DCA
    mission in Europe that we share with the NATO allies.
        ERI, for lack of a better--we have used to focus on both
    pre-positioning infrastructure and keeping forces rotating
    through, and increasing exercises with our allies. But by no
    means should the budget line for ERI be seen as the full
    spectrum of what we are doing to address Russian activities and
    to ensure the deterrence of Russia or the reassurance and
    assurance of our NATO allies.
        Senator Sessions. I will just wrap up, but I would say a
    couple things.
        First, we need to keep the pressure on Europe to do more
    financially. We are now at 75 percent paying the costs of NATO.
        I mentioned that to a German delegation of parliamentarians
    here six months or so ago, and the leader said it is
    unacceptable that the United States has to pay 75 percent of
    the cost. He did not offer to put up any money.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Sessions. But it is an acknowledgment of what
    Secretary Gates said in his last remarks about leaving the
    Defense Department.
        I am at a point where they have to step up. Every time the
    Russian bear growls, we provide more to reassure Europe. They
    must not be so afraid if they are not willing to put up any of
    their money for this.
        I feel pretty strongly about that, and we will be looking
    at it further. As we go through this initiative, I think some
    of it ought to be contingent on more work from our allies,
    including such things as them deploying some brigade toward the
    east, not just us.
        Secretary Donnelly--Senator Donnelly?
        Senator Donnelly. I already have one job. I do not need
    another.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Donnelly. Secretary Scher, we have seen North Korea
    take a number of actions in recent weeks. There have been
    discussions as to what is the best way to have a deterrent
    effect against North Korea. I would like to hear your opinions
    on what you think are the best deterrent steps in regards to
    North Korea.
        Secretary Scher. This is a problem that has faced multiple
    administrations for a long time, but I do think that, first of
    all, we are not willing to accept that North Korea is a nuclear
    weapons state. That does not mean that we do not believe that
    they have nuclear weapons. But the goal here is for a complete
    and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea, and we believe
    that the international community, in general, supports that
    principle.
        The first effort is really to make sure that we can pull
    everyone together to really put pressure on North Korea to
    denuclearize.
        Separately, we have and will maintain capabilities and
    plans to address the nuclear threat that exists in North Korea,
    so that we have options for the President, should he so choose
    to use them.
        We also want to focus on defense and defense of our allies,
    especially the Republic of Korea and Japan, and making sure
    that we can effectively defend them from North Korea, both
    conventionally and nuclear, if it comes to that.
        It is going to be a long, hard process that we really need
    the international community behind. I know that my colleagues
    in the Department of State are working very hard to try to
    bring everyone together to bring the kind of pressure on North
    Korea that will make it clear to them that they are worse off
    having nuclear weapons than they are now.
        Senator Donnelly. I guess the question I am asking you is,
    what do you think that pressure is that sends that message?
        Secretary Scher. I think, certainly, building up
    capabilities on the peninsula and in Japan are part of it.
    Certainly, we have to bring economic pressure and continue to
    bring it. It has to be from the entire international community.
        I think you have seen a lot of talk about the entire
    international community decrying the latest tests. I think we
    need to see that put into action. I know they are working on
    that at the U.N. [United Nations] and elsewhere, and hopefully
    revival of the six-party talks will get us closer. But clearly,
    that has, up to this point, not worked.
        Senator Donnelly. Without categorizing it specifically this
    way, but it seems that China seems to pull their punches in
    regard to North Korea. Why do you think that is? What do you
    think an active Chinese role to help start moving North Korea
    back to denuclearization would be?
        Secretary Scher. Honestly, sir, I do not know the
    intricacies of our approach to them. I, certainly, do not want
    to characterize what China is thinking.
        But I do believe that a more prominent role and effective
    role from China to live up to the commitments that they have
    made and that the international community has made will put
    pressure on North Korea.
        If you want to pursue this, I am happy to do it in closed
    session, along with some other colleagues from the Asia side.
        But I think there are ways that we can pursue this, but we
    are not there yet.
        Senator Donnelly. We asked this question last week in
    regard to Putin and the Russian leadership, when they talk
    about offensive use of nuclear weapons. Do you think they
    believe that NATO and/or the United States would let that occur
    without response?
        Secretary Scher. Senator, I do not think so, but I also
    know that we need to continue to make that clear, both in our
    declaratory policy and in the credibility of the capabilities
    that we bring to bear on that.
        I cannot imagine that Russia does not fully understand the
    implications of the article 5 commitments of the NATO treaty.
    But again, that is something that we need to both make sure is
    credible from both a policy perspective and a capabilities
    perspective, and that is really our role here.
        Senator Donnelly. What you are saying is that we have to,
    when those things are said, just make it extraordinarily clear
    that nothing will be let to stand without a response and a
    strong and active response in return?
        Secretary Scher. I would never want to prejudge responses,
    but I do think it is fair that, as we see increasing nuclear
    saber-rattling from Russia, we make it clear that we will
    maintain our commitments to the NATO alliance, and that we will
    respond effectively, and that, most importantly, and sort of
    the fundamental piece of deterrence is that the risks to Russia
    from them taking action will be far outweighed because of our
    response. They cannot believe that any advantage will accrue to
    them. They need to understand that we will impose costs that
    will far outweigh anything they might even think that they will
    gain by taking that action. That is the core of deterrence, and
    that is something we must maintain the credibility of.
        Senator Donnelly. One more question. Vice Admiral Benedict,
    you have recently assumed expanded responsibility as the
    regulator for the Navy's nuclear deterrence mission as well.
    How do you see that mission?
        Admiral Benedict. Thank you, sir.
        I see that mission as it is really beginning to pay
    dividends. I have the opportunity to brief the CNO [Chief of
    Naval Operations] on a quarterly basis. Of course, the
    regulator role is one in which I oversee the other Echelon II
    commands within the Navy who have a purpose of ensuring that an
    SSBN can go to sea and basically support Admiral Haney's
    requirements. Fleet Forces Command, Pacific Fleet, the
    submarine force, BUMED who does the personal reliability
    program, our shipyards, all of those entities that have a piece
    in deploying a submarine now all report to me.
        They report four times a year. Two reports are readiness
    reports. Two reports are sustainment reports. We have access to
    all the information that is flowing around the community as it
    relates to the ability to execute.
        I think it is coming together nicely. We have never done
    this before. It is maturing rapidly. I have a meeting with the
    CNO in two weeks to give him the next update. I think it will
    be a very positive report.
        I believe that we are finding niche pieces of the community
    where things could potentially drop between the cracks of nine
    different commands, and we are pointing those out and
    addressing those proactively. I am very pleased with where we
    are.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Admiral.
        Thank you, Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. I want to follow up on that, Admiral. If
    you find a defect or a problem, what would be your role?
        Admiral Benedict. First and foremost, my role is to ensure
    that the individual commanders within those nine commands see
    the same problem that I have identified, as the regulator.
    First and foremost, in the areas of----
        Senator Sessions. ``Regulator'' is an unusual word.
        Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. What does it mean?
        Admiral Benedict. I guess in the broad terms, I look for
    problems in the seams. Every command has authority,
    accountability, responsibility. As Admiral Greenert, when he
    was CNO, was pretty clear with me, identified my job as not to
    go in and fix problems. My job is simply to identify the
    problems, most importantly in the interfaces between the
    various commands.
        To your point, to your question, what would I do, and what
    I have done, is, when I see those, I identify those to the
    commander. I have never had one yet that they have not readily
    identified and gone off and fixed.
        If we had a disagreement that it was an issue, then there
    is an escalation plan within the regulator role where we would
    both go address that with the CNO. Obviously, the CNO would
    have the final authority of what would be fixed and how. But I
    do not ever foresee that happening. It is really a constructive
    tension backup regulator role, in which we are trying to ensure
    that we provide to this Nation the most credible sea-based
    deterrent.
        Senator Sessions. The history of all government agencies
    and even the Defense Department, which, in general, does better
    than most government agencies, is that sometimes it has to be
    kicked upstairs. You be sure to do it, if it is necessary.
        Secretary Scher, Center for Strategic and International
    Studies, a good group, says, as the nuclear shadow has grown
    over the Asia-Pacific region, the credibility of the United
    States security assurances has come under strain for both Japan
    and South Korea. It goes on to say, ``Today, the United States
    lacks a sufficient range of response options to signal, compel,
    and defeat nuclear adversaries facing our allies and, by
    extension, to inspire confidence in the U.S. nuclear
    guarantees.''
        Does the administration share that concern? What, if
    anything, would we do or are we doing to fix it?
        Secretary Scher. As you say, CSIS is an excellent
    organization. I am not sure I would agree quite with that
    entire characterization. I think we are in a good place now. I
    think we bring a full range of conventional and nuclear assets
    that are in the region, or can be deployed to the region, or
    can be operated in the region.
        I also know that we keep very close discussions with the
    Republic of Korea and Japan specifically on deterrence policy
    and on these issue areas.
        Senator Sessions. Would you agree that additional response
    options are needed?
        Secretary Scher. I think we actually have a full range of
    response options now, but I accept that, as our potential
    adversaries develop more, we need to constantly review that. We
    may need to take a look and have additional options.
        But I do believe that the variety of systems, weapons,
    yields that we have in the arsenal now should cover, and I
    believe our allies believe they do cover where we need to
    today.
        Senator Sessions. Well, that is a January 2016 report, this
    year's report. I think it is something you should examine and
    look at.
        Briefly, I think, Secretary Scher, maybe you should be the
    one to answer, but if any of the others would like to answer,
    the United States and certain NATO allies have operating dual-
    capable aircraft. According to unclassified NATO information,
    these aircraft are available for nuclear roles at various
    levels of readiness. The highest level of readiness is measured
    in weeks.
        Is this alert level adequate, given that we now see Russia
    has new nuclear capabilities and is flexing its muscles?
        Secretary Scher. I think, right now, honestly, we are
    looking at that as an alliance. That is one of the key issues
    we are examining together. Dr. Hopkins and I are the chair and
    vice chair of a high-level group in NATO that is charged with
    examining this. We, as an alliance, are trying to determine if
    those readiness levels are what they should be.
        It does place a large premium on indications and warning.
    We do not assume that things will happen out of the blue, so
    there is some ability and time to get to that level of
    readiness, so that these DCA can operate.
        But as I said, I think this is something that the alliance
    is looking at now, and we may have some indications of where
    the alliance wants to go, certainly by the June ministerial.
        Senator Sessions. Well, the alliance is not overly
    impressing me about how it operates. The United States has
    always had to push, and I think maybe more so now in recent
    years than in the past, push to make sure that we do the things
    necessary for real defense capability. For the Russians to
    assume they have weeks before they have a threat, then I think
    that sends a bad signal in itself.
        Secretary Scher. Senator, I am sorry. I apologize. I agree
    with you, Senator. One of the ways that we address that as well
    is that there independent nuclear capabilities of the United
    States, the U.K. [United Kingdom], and France, that can be
    brought to bear immediately. All are ready today, currently.
    The full extent of our nuclear deterrent capability of the
    alliance does not rest solely on DCA. There are other elements
    that back that up as well.
        General Rand. Senator, if I may?
        Senator Sessions. Yes, General Rand?
        General Rand. I cannot resist the opportunity, being one of
    the last people in the Air Force to ever serve alert on a dual-
    capable aircraft, when I did that in the 1980s in the F-16 at
    Incirlik.
        I would agree with Secretary Scher's comment about our
    ability to respond to Russia in many forms, particularly our B-
    2 and our B-52. If I may, in the last two years, we have
    increased the number of what we call BAAD, bomber assurance and
    deterrence missions, that we provided General Breedlove and
    General Gorenc in the region.
        In fact, three B-52s will be going to Moron, Spain, later
    this month for a two-week exercise. The beauty is we can have
    planes take off from Barksdale or Minot or Whiteman and be over
    and spend considerable time on station and even return where
    they do not even need to land in Europe.
        But the effect that that has is it is easy to judge the
    assurance value. The intel community is always scratching their
    head of the deterrent value it has, but we believe it does have
    a deterrent value or we would not do it.
        If I may, when you talked about China and Korea, for the
    last 10 years, we have not taken a single airplane off the
    Republic of Korea. We have put continuously six B-52s operating
    out of Guam, doing a continuous bomber presence.
        Are we doing more today than when I left the Republic of
    Korea in 2004. We have increased our presence in what we are
    doing. I think that has a very calming effect both on the
    Republic of Korea and Japan.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Senator Donnelly?
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Heinrich, do you want to go now? It is up to you.
        Senator Heinrich. Have you had a chance?
        Senator Donnelly. I have.
        Senator Heinrich. Secretary Scher and General Rand, thanks
    for being here today.
        The CBO [Congressional Budget Office] noted that DOD will
    spend about $15.4 billion on nuclear weapons modernization in
    2015, which is about three percent of DOD's entire budget. When
    you look at that together with NNSA's investment, which was
    about $19 billion last year in total, that is around $35
    million, or roughly about 6 percent of the base defense budget.
        In other words, we spend about six cents out of every
    defense dollar on our nuclear deterrent, which, in my view, has
    effectively prevented another world war for over 70 years now.
        What is your current assessment of other nations' efforts
    to modernize their nuclear infrastructure? Do we have a good
    sense of what kinds of investments they are specifically
    making?
        Secretary Scher. Certainly, the full details of this we
    could provide to you in a closed session or an intel briefing.
    But as I mentioned a little bit, certainly, we see
    modernization across Russia and China. To some extent, the
    Russian modernization, they reached a point earlier than we
    did, where they were aging out of their systems and needed to
    modernize. That is not to say that these are not modern and
    fully up equipment. They are. They have modernized across the
    full range, I think we seen.
        China, we have seen that they have made qualitative
    investments in their nuclear forces.
        Those are the main ones we track. Obviously, we talked a
    lot about North Korea and see that they are continuing to test
    both their nuclear weapons as well as potential delivery
    systems.
        Senator Heinrich. How important is the B61 LEP to DOD's
    nuclear policy and the deterrence strategy that you talked
    about?
        Secretary Scher. The B61 as the remaining gravity bomb for
    the nuclear forces is very important to us, from a strategic
    perspective. We want to make sure that we have a full range of
    options, a range of yields and delivery systems. As a result,
    that is a critical piece of the air leg of the triad.
        In terms of the technical advantages of consolidating a
    life-extension program, Dr. Hopkins would know more about that.
    But from a strategy perspective, it is very important.
        Senator Heinrich. Doctor?
        Dr. Hopkins. One of the most significant advantages of the
    B61 modernization, which is going to produce the B61-12, is it
    is going to enable the Nation to eliminate the need for--it
    will take the place of four different variants of the existing
    B61. There is a certain degree of efficiency and a certain
    degree of safety associated with reducing the numbers and types
    of weapons in the inventory.
        Senator Heinrich. Is that largely related to your ability
    to address yield?
        Dr. Hopkins. Yes, it is. In fact, the expected damage from
    a bomb, the utility of a bomb, is primarily a function of its
    yield and its accuracy. They are inversely related, so the more
    accurate a system is, the lower the yield that can be used to
    achieve the desired effect.
        Senator Heinrich. General Rand, do you want to add anything
    to that observation?
        General Rand. No, sir. I think that summarizes it well. I
    think the pragmatics of it is that it is going to be very
    helpful for us. I was at Whiteman earlier in January, and they
    had the different B61s. That just becomes much more difficult
    to manage and to secure.
        This will be viewed, from that very pragmatic point of
    view, as a helpful thing.
        Senator Heinrich. One last question, and then I will turn
    it back over.
        What are the steps that the services are taking broadly to
    improve the morale of the nuclear mission force? How is each
    measuring the effectiveness of those actions?
        Secretary Scher. Obviously, the services will comment on
    this, but I do want to note, first of all, the great job that I
    know each of the services are doing and the fact that we in OSD
    [Office of the Secretary of Defense] are not forgetting that we
    also have a requirement to track this and to make sure that
    that happens. Now, each of the services is doing it, and we can
    track that as well. But it has to be a system- and enterprise-
    wide focus on this, as well as a service-specific one.
        Admiral Benedict. As Secretary Scher said, leadership
    starts from the top on this issue. Certainly, the Secretary of
    Defense and Secretary Work, as a Deputy Secretary of Defense,
    have been leading this effort.
        Within the Navy, we have focused primarily on our
    shipyards, our manning of the shipyards, to ensure that we can
    do the throughput, as well as our strategic weapons facilities,
    which is where we support the SSBNs.
        We are, as I stated in my opening statement, about 79
    percent complete with the tasks that we were assigned and
    accepted under the Secretary of Defense reviews. All the
    remaining ones are really long-term perspectives, which we will
    not be able to complete physically this year.
        It is the number-one priority of the CNO. He tracks it
    personally. We are very committed to stay on course with what
    the cape reports to the Secretary.
        Senator Heinrich. General?
        General Rand. Yes, sir. I can spend the entire session on
    this topic, as you well realize. Senator Donnelly had brought
    it up, of how we were doing to implement the changes that were
    very much needed.
        But if I may, briefly, as we took all the reviews that were
    done in our force improvement program, came up with over 300
    recommendations. We put those into six buckets.
        Those buckets are leadership and organization as number
    one; culture is two; resources and materiel is three; surety is
    the fourth one; and the fifth and sixth are personnel and
    training. We are just mowing through it, sir. We are going
    through each one of these. We are tracking them. Some of these
    we will never be able to say we are done with, because they
    will be just repeating.
        That is how we are doing it. It is, certainly, my number-
    one focus. I would tell you that Secretary James and the Chief
    of Staff of the Air Force, General Welsh, have given me very
    strong guidance on their expectations of the emphasis. We have
    a superb proponent in our chief and secretary.
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, all.
        Senator Sessions. Senator Donnelly?
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Scher, when you look at North Korea, how
    important of a role do think missile defense systems in South
    Korea can play?
        Secretary Scher. I think when you look at the range of
    capabilities that North Korea has, I think there is no question
    that we need to figure out how we can deploy, and we do deploy,
    missile defense to the peninsula. As you saw after the
    potential test of ballistic missile components, but the
    satellite launch, the alliance together decided that it was
    time to look at placing THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area
    Defense] on the peninsula. I think that is an important step
    for the alliance, and one that I hope we can look to figure out
    how we can conclude quickly.
        Missile defense, of course, is never going to be the system
    that protects every place from every kind of missile ever
    coming in. But it needs to be able to be in place to protect
    key assets, to protect critical infrastructure, and to sow
    doubt in the mind of an adversary that they will be successful
    in a quick launch and a decapitation or a strike of getting out
    capabilities.
        We have to balance missile defense with the capabilities to
    ensure that we continue effective deterrence, and continue to
    make the case that, in this case, North Korea will not achieve
    its objectives, that it will not be able to see any benefit
    from taking aggressive action against our ally, the Republic of
    Korea. I believe strongly that we have in place forces now to
    do that, missile defense and offensive forces, but we are going
    to continue to do this as the situation changes.
        Senator Donnelly. Do you think the Chinese pass on the
    message to Kim Jong-un and he just does not listen? What I mean
    by that is, the message of, look, whatever you do will be met
    with significantly more coming back into you. That message has
    been given to the Chinese.
        Does Kim Jong-un not even listen to this? Is this all
    internally related more than externally related?
        Secretary Scher. I think I can give you the----
        Senator Donnelly. We are trying to gain your wisdom here.
        Secretary Scher. I understand. To be very honest, Senator,
    I used to spend a lot of time trying to figure out the ins and
    outs of people's motivation. Right now, I spend a lot of time
    trying to figure out--I do not care. I am looking at their
    capabilities, and I am going to make sure that we can address
    the threats posed by their capabilities and make sure that we
    have effective systems to ensure deterrence.
        I have never made a lot of money being a good predictor of
    what people are actually thinking or doing.
        Senator Donnelly. Is your regular rule basically just, when
    you show them significantly more firepower, significantly more
    deterrence, at some point, all you can do is show them the very
    best that you have, that you would overwhelm them in return?
        Secretary Scher. I personally believe that Kim Jong-un does
    does have a rational side and does think about regime and his
    own survival. Hence, us demonstrating exactly what you said
    goes a long way to ensuring the deterrence on the peninsula and
    overall stability. We still need to do more, as does everybody
    in the international community.
        Senator Donnelly. Let me just close with this, and this is
    like a lightning round, almost. Do the very best you can.
        What keeps you up the most at night in your present
    responsibility? This would be to everyone on the panel.
        Secretary Scher. Miscalculation. The broad answer is
    miscalculation. But it is either miscalculation from North
    Korea, from Russia, from Pakistan and India, the number of
    countries that have at their disposal some of the most
    destructive weapons known to mankind. That keeps me up at
    night, miscalculations about that.
        There are a lot of other problems and a lot of my
    colleagues and I spend a lot of time on those, but none of them
    pose that same existential danger, I think, to the United
    States, to the Western system, to our allies and friends, as
    miscalculation amongst the nuclear powers.
        Senator Donnelly. Dr. Hopkins?
        Dr. Hopkins. In addition to miscalculation, what I would be
    most concerned about is making sure that we have thought of
    everything with respect to potential threats against our
    system. We have an active program to try to stay ahead of
    threats, and we want to make sure that we are staying ahead of
    both terrorist and state threats.
        Senator Donnelly. General Rand?
        General Rand. Yes, Senator, I agree with those concerns
    expressed, but the practicality for me is that we are doing
    operations every day. The movement of nuclear weapons, B-1s and
    B-52s flying combat, those are the reality of doing the
    mission, and the risks associated with that would be what keep
    me up at night.
        Senator Donnelly. Admiral Benedict?
        Admiral Benedict. Sir, I would say it is people. We just
    celebrated our 60th anniversary as a program with an
    outstanding record, and I love to make that statement. Then I
    follow it up with, but we are not halfway done. We have 68 more
    years to go, because we are building a class of submarines that
    will be in the water through 2084.
        We develop hardware, software, I can do all that, and I
    think we have demonstrated that we can do that. It is
    maintaining, training, and putting that fundamental
    philosophical discipline that got us here in those folks for
    the next 68 years. That is what keeps me up.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        I think North Korea needs to know that we may not be the
    best of all times in creating a new government, but we are
    pretty good at taking one down. They need to know that there
    are things we will not accept, and their existence is at stake.
        Sometimes I think, in our desire to try to have a
    rapprochement and work with our adversaries, they may get the
    wrong message. Ultimately, we have to use these powerful
    weapons--hopefully not these--but powerful military force to
    defend the interests of the United States and the world.
        Anything else that you would like to add to the discussion?
        Well, we thank you very much. Our subcommittee will be
    working on this. We have a very good subcommittee that has made
    itself very knowledgeable about the challenges that we face. We
    will try to treat respectfully your requests for funding and
    authority, and do our best to respond as a good Congress
    should. We are adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 3:57 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2017 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                           TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 2016

                                   U.S. Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                 ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES AND PROGRAMS

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 a.m. in
    Room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jeff
    Sessions (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Subcommittee members present: Senators Sessions, Fischer,
    Graham, Donnelly, King, and Heinrich.

               OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

        Senator Sessions. Our meeting will come to order.
        We expect Senator Donnelly to arrive any moment, but I
    would go on and share a few opening remarks.
        This Strategic Forces Subcommittee convenes to hear
    testimony on the Department of Energy Atomic Defense Activities
    and Programs in Review for the Defense Authorization Request
    for Fiscal Year 2017 and the Future Years Defense Program.
        Leading the panel of witnesses is retired General Frank
    Klotz, Under Secretary of Energy and Administrator for the
    National Nuclear Security Administration.
        We thank you, General Klotz. We admire your leadership.
        He is joined by Brigadier General Stephen Davis, Acting
    Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs; Ms. Anne Harrington,
    Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation; and
    Admiral James Caldwell, the Deputy Administrator for Naval
    Reactors. They are joined by Mrs. Monica Regalbuto, Assistant
    Secretary of Energy for Environmental Management; and Mr. David
    Trimble, Director of United States/International Nuclear
    Security and Cleanup in the Government Accountability Office,
    GAO.
        We are pleased to learn that the budget request for NNSA
    [the National Nuclear Security Administration] Weapons
    Activities in fiscal year 2017, some 9.2 billion, is consistent
    with the President's commitment made in 2010 to secure support
    for the New START Treaty. We will examine carefully the
    particulars of this request, but I would agree with our
    colleague, Senator Jim--Congressman Jim Cooper, the ranking
    Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee, who observed,
    when you were before his subcommittee two weeks ago, these
    programs are the Department's top priority and are going to be
    fully funded on a bipartisan basis.
        Nevertheless, there is reason for some concern. According
    to the January 12th, 2016, report in the Wall Street Journal,
    Secretary of Energy, Secretary Moniz, expressed concern to the
    Office of Management and Budget that, quote, ``Without an
    additional 5.2 billion for out years 2018 through 2021, the
    budget will,'' quote, ``lack credibility with Congress and
    stakeholders.'' That's us. Secretary says this budget isn't--
    may not have credibility with us--and that, quote, ``Failure to
    address these requirements in the near term ``now--'' will put
    NNSA budget in an untenable position by fiscal year 2018,''
    which isn't far away--2018. The subcommittee will want to
    examine this and see where we stand.
        Constrained national defense budgets will like--will be
    likely toward the future. There will be a lot of tough choices
    having to be made. But, we must ensure that the critical
    warhead life extensions remain on schedule and within cost,
    that facility construction is reasonable and can be justified,
    and that these programs benefit from stable, sufficient funding
    over the years--we don't want to be up and down, causing you
    more cost than you need; you need to be able to know what
    you've got--which is why Congress needs to look carefully at
    the Administration's recent decision to pursue development of a
    repository for high-level defense waste, separate of the
    development of a repository for civil commercial spent fuel. By
    altering the longstanding policy of maintaining a common
    nuclear waste repository, we are concerned that billions of
    dollars could be added to the defense cost, potentially
    squeezing out modernization and new weapon systems. Some have--
    I've heard the figure $15 to $40 billion is possible for this.
    That's a stunning number.
        With that, I'd like to turn to my able Ranking Member,
    Senator Donnelly, for his opening comments.

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOE DONNELLY

        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to thank our witnesses for appearing today.
        I understand Assistant Secretary Regalbuto and Brigadier
    General Davis are new before our subcommittee. I welcome you.
        This hearing touches on some of the most complex problems
    in our government. We will hear testimony from Administrator
    Klotz on rebuilding our nuclear weapon stockpile to ensure we
    can deter existential threats to our Nation. Meanwhile,
    Assistant Secretary Regalbuto will describe how we will treat
    and dispose of some 55 million gallons of radioactive waste
    that borders the Columbia River in Washington, with a similar
    amount at the Savannah River site in South Carolina. I want to
    understand whether you're meeting the milestones and cost
    estimates that you have outlined to us in prior hearings and
    budgets. The Department has, for a number of years, been on the
    GAO's Major Program High-Risk List, and it is imperative that
    progress be made in getting off of this list. It won't happen
    overnight, but I hope that hearings such as these maintain the
    proper focus on the ability to do so.
        As always, let me thank Senator Sessions and his staff for
    holding this hearing. They've been great partners, and we look
    forward to today's discussion.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        I will just introduce you all here at once:
        Lieutenant General Klotz has been the Department of
    Energy's Under Secretary of Nuclear Security and NNSA
    Administrator since April of 2014. He's responsible for the
    management and operation of NNSA, as well as policy matters
    across the Department of Energy and NNSA enterprise in support
    of the President's nuclear security agenda.
        Dr. Regalbuto has been Assistant Secretary for
    Environmental Management at the Department of Energy since
    August of 2015. She provides the leadership necessary to
    continue the safe cleanup of the environmental legacy brought
    about from five decades of nuclear weapons development and
    government-sponsored nuclear energy research. That's a big
    deal, and it's expensive, and we need to see where we stand.
        Mr. Trimble is the Director of U.S. and International
    Nuclear Security and Cleanup at the GAO, and provides oversight
    and leadership on international nuclear security and cleanup
    issues.
        Admiral Caldwell is the Director of Naval Nuclear
    Propulsion Program, dual-hatted with the Department of Energy
    and the Department of Navy. Have you melted down over having--
    --
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Donnelly. If so, let us know, so we can----
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Sessions. It doesn't look like it. You look fine.
        He's responsible for the command and safe, reliable
    operation of the Navy's Nuclear Propulsion Program and for all
    the current U.S. naval reactors deployed for usage, as well as
    all facilities needed to ensure safe operations.
        Ms. Harrington has been the Deputy Administrator for
    Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation since October 2010.
        We welcome you back.
        She manages NNSA's billion-dollar Nuclear Nonproliferation
    Program to secure vulnerable nuclear material around the world,
    stop nuclear smuggling, and prevent the proliferation of
    weapons of mass destruction, which I'm--we're all nervous
    about.
        Brigadier General Davis is Acting Deputy Administrator for
    Defense Programs at the NNSA. He's also Principal Assistant
    Deputy Administrator for Military Applications for the NNSA,
    ensuring the Nation sustains safe, secure, and effective
    nuclear weapons.
        General Klotz, you want to lead off?

      STATEMENT OF HONORABLE FRANK G. KLOTZ, UNDER SECRETARY FOR
                 NUCLEAR SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

        General Klotz. Yes, sir, I'd be delighted to.
        Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, Senator
    Fischer, Senator Heinrich, thank you for the opportunity to
    present the President's fiscal year 2017 budget request for the
    Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security
    Administration.
        We provided the subcommittee a written statement, and
    respectfully request it be submitted for the record.
        Senator Sessions. We will make it part of the record.
        General Klotz. We value this committee's leadership in
    national security as well as its robust and abiding support for
    the missions and the people of NNSA.
        Our budget request, which comprises more than 40 percent of
    the Department of Energy's total budget, is $12.9 billion, an
    increase of nearly 357 million, or 2.9 percent, over the fiscal
    year 2016 enacted level. The budget request continues the
    Administration's unwavering commitment to NNSA's important and
    enduring missions. These missions are defined in the NNSA
    Strategic Vision, which we released just last year. These
    include to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
    weapon stockpile; to prevent, counter, and respond to the
    threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; and to
    support the capability of our nuclear-powered Navy to project
    power and to protect American and allied interests around the
    world.
        To succeed, NNSA must maintain crosscutting capabilities
    that enable each of these core missions, again, as defined in
    our Strategic Vision. These crosscuts focus on advancing
    science, technology, and engineering, supporting our people and
    modernizing our infrastructure, and developing a management
    culture focused on safety, security, and efficiency, adopting
    the best practices and use across the Government and in the
    commercial world.
        If you'd like, I'd be pleased to offer a copy of this
    document, the Strategic Vision document, for the record, as
    well.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you. We will make that a part of
    the record.
        General Klotz. The budget materials and briefings we have
    provided describe NNSA's major accomplishments last year, 2015,
    as well as the underlying rationale for our budget proposal for
    fiscal year 2017. Let me briefly highlight just a few of the
    points.
        First and foremost, the United States has maintained a
    safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapon stockpile without
    nuclear explosive testing for over 20 years. NNSA's fiscal year
    2017 budget request continues the steady increase of the
    Weapons Activities appropriation. In fact, this account has
    increased more than 40 percent since the fiscal year 2010
    budget request. As a result of the funding provided by this
    Congress and supported by this subcommittee and the significant
    improvements NNSA has made over the last couple of years in
    program management, all of our life extension programs are on
    schedule and within budget.
        NNSA's science and technology base continues to yield
    critical modeling and simulation data and deploy increasingly
    capable high-performance computing in support of the stockpile.
    Last year, for example, the National Ignition Facility [NIF] at
    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory increased its shot
    rate--that is, the number of experiments it does--from 191 in
    2014 to 356 in 2015, almost doubling, including the first-ever
    experiments at NIF using plutonium.
        Our budget request also supports recapitalization of NNSA's
    aging research and production infrastructure, most notably the
    facilities where we perform our major uranium, plutonium,
    tritium, and other commodity operations. Of significance, NNSA
    completed the first subproject of the Uranium Processing
    Facility, called Site Readiness, on time and $20 million under
    budget.
        This year's request for the Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation account, Anne's account, is 6.8 percent lower
    than the fiscal 2016 enacted level, for two reasons. First,
    prior-year carryover balances are available to execute several
    programs in this mission space. Second, we propose terminating
    the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Project [MOX] and
    pursuing a dilute-and-dispose approach as the fastest, less
    expensive path to meeting our National commitment and
    international agreement to dispose of 34 metric tons of excess
    weapons-grade plutonium.
        The request for our third appropriations, the Naval
    Reactors Program, keeps pace with mission needs and continues
    NNSA's commitment to the three major initiatives: the Ohio-
    class reactor plant system development, the land-based S8G
    prototype refueling overhaul in upstate New York, and the Spent
    Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project in Idaho. For each of
    these missions, NNSA is driving improvements in management and
    governance.
        For all of our programs, we have instituted rigorous
    analysis of alternatives, defined clear lines of authority and
    accountability, and ensured that Federal project directors and
    contracting officers have the appropriate skill mix and
    professional certifications to effectively manage NNSA's work.
        Our budget request for Federal salaries and expenses
    reflects an increasing emphasis on improving program and
    project management across all of our mission pillars.
        In closing, Mr. Chairman, the nuclear security enterprise
    continues to make significant progress. Through discipline,
    careful planning, and your continued and strong support, we
    believe we can make smart investments to build on that progress
    and meet new challenges in the future.
        Again, sir, thank you for the opportunity to appear before
    this subcommittee.
        [The prepared statement of General Klotz follows:]

           Prepared statement by Lt. Gen. Frank G. Klotz, USAF (Ret)
        Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, and Members of the
    Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to present the President's
    fiscal year (FY) 2017 budget request for the Department of Energy's
    (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). It is a pleasure
    to be here this afternoon. We value this Committee's strong support for
    the nuclear security mission, and for the people and institutions that
    are responsible for executing it.
        The President's fiscal year 2017 budget request for NNSA is $12.9
    billion, this is an increase of $357.5 million or 2.9 percent over the
    fiscal year 2016 enacted level. The request is approximately 43 percent
    of the DOE's total budget, and 67 percent of DOE's total 050 budget.
        The NNSA has a unique and special responsibility to maintain a
    safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile for as long as
    nuclear weapons exist; to prevent, counter, and respond to evolving and
    emerging nuclear proliferation and terrorism threats; to provide
    nuclear propulsion to our Navy as it protects American and Allied
    interests around the world; and to support our outstanding NNSA federal
    workforce. By supporting overall growth, this budget request represents
    a strong endorsement of NNSA's vital and enduring missions, and is
    indicative of the Administration's unwavering commitment to a strong
    national defense.
        NNSA's missions are accomplished through the hard work and
    innovative spirit of a highly talented federal and Management and
    Operating (M&O) workforce committed to public service. To provide this
    team the tools they need to carry out their complex and challenging
    task, both now and in the future, we must continue to modernize our
    scientific, technical, and engineering capabilities and infrastructure.
    In doing so, we are mindful of our obligation to continually improve
    our business practices, and to be responsible stewards of the resources
    that Congress and the American people have entrusted to us.
        The fiscal year 2017 budget request also reflects the close working
    partnership between NNSA and the Department of Defense (DOD). NNSA
    works closely with DOD to meet military requirements, support our
    Nation's nuclear deterrence capabilities and modernize the nuclear
    security enterprise. I would also note, that as in previous years, DOD
    is carrying in its fiscal year 2017 budget request separate funding in
    fiscal year 2018 and beyond that will be reallocated annually to NNSA's
    Weapons Activities and Naval Reactors.
        I want to thank the committee for its support of the fiscal year
    2016 budget request and look forward to your continuing support in
    fiscal year 2017. We have made some tough decisions and tradeoffs to
    meet both military commitments and nuclear security priorities. Without
    congressional support, modernization of our nuclear enterprise,
    implementation of our long-term stockpile sustainment strategy, and
    sustainment of our nonproliferation and prevention and response
    capabilities could be at risk. The program we have proposed is highly
    integrated and interdependent across the four accounts.
        Details of the fiscal year 2017 budget request for the NNSA follow:
                        weapons activities appropriation
        For the Weapons Activities account, the fiscal year 2017 budget
    request is $9.2 billion, an increase of $396.2 million, or 4.5 percent
    above the fiscal year 2016 enacted levels. This account provides funds
    for the Defense Programs portfolio, which is responsible for all
    aspects of the stockpile stewardship, management, and responsiveness
    programs; the enterprise-wide infrastructure sustainment activities
    managed by our Office of Safety, Infrastructure, and Operations; NNSA's
    physical and cybersecurity activities; and the secure transportation of
    nuclear materials.
    Maintaining the Stockpile
        Last year, the work of the science-based Stockpile Stewardship
    Program (SSP) allowed the Secretaries of Energy and Defense to certify
    to the President for the 20th time that the American nuclear weapons
    stockpile remains safe, secure, and reliable, without the need for
    underground explosive nuclear testing. This achievement is made
    possible each year by essential investments in state-of-the-art
    diagnostic tools, high performance computing platforms, and modern
    facilities, which are staffed by NNSA's world-class scientists,
    engineers, and technicians.
        For Directed Stockpile Work (DSW), the fiscal year 2017 budget
    request is $3.3 billion, a decrease of $57.3 million, or 1.7 percent
    below the fiscal year 2016 enacted levels. These reductions will not
    restrict NNSA's ability to annually assess system performance and
    reliability or maintain the schedule for Life Extension Programs (LEP).
        The major LEPs are a fundamental part of this account. The $222.9
    million requested for the W76-1 warhead LEP directly supports the Navy
    and will keep the LEP on schedule and on budget to complete production
    in fiscal year 2019. We continue to make good progress on the B61-12
    LEP, which will consolidate four variants of the B61 gravity bomb and
    will improve the safety and security of the oldest weapon system in the
    U.S. nuclear arsenal. With the $616.1 million requested, we will remain
    on schedule to deliver the First Production Unit (FPU) in fiscal year
    2020. NNSA is responsible for the refurbishment of the nuclear
    explosives package and new bomb electronics, while the Air Force will
    provide the tail kit assembly under a separate acquisition program.
    When fielded, the B61-12 bomb will support both Air Force strategic
    long-range nuclear-capable bombers and dual-capable fighter aircraft,
    providing extended deterrence to our allies and partners, and allow
    retirement of the last megaton class weapon in the inventory, the B83
    gravity bomb.
        In July 2015, we began Phase 6.2 (Feasibility Study and Design
    Options) for the W80-4 cruise missile warhead LEP. The fiscal year 2016
    budget request included $195 million to accelerate the FPU by two years
    to fiscal year 2025, a decision made by the Nuclear Weapons Council
    (NWC) in late 2014. The fiscal year 2015 budget request included $10
    million to start the program. We had initially planned a ramp-up of
    Phase 6.2 study activities beginning in fiscal year 2016 to support the
    NWC FPU decision. However, as a result of the fiscal year 2016
    continuing resolution, we were unable to begin the planned ramp-up
    activities until just recently. Furthermore, because of the delay in
    receiving fiscal year 2016 funding, the program cannot execute the full
    fiscal year 2016 enacted amount this year. As a result, a significant
    amount of the program's fiscal year 2016 funding will carry over into
    fiscal year 2017. Consequently, the fiscal year 2017 budget request is
    $25.3 million over the fiscal year 2016 budget request, rather than
    $117 million over the fiscal year 2016 budget request, as previously
    projected. While this delayed start will affect planned technology
    maturation activities in Phase 6.2A (Design Definition and Cost Study),
    we still fully expect to meet the planned FPU date in fiscal year 2025
    to support the Air Force Long Range Stand Off (LRSO) program.
        In fiscal year 2015, the NWC approved additional scope for the W88
    Alteration (ALT) 370 to meet an emerging requirement. NNSA is now
    accelerating the new Conventional High Explosive (CHE) refresh work to
    match the original ALT schedule. As a result, we are synchronizing the
    full program to transition seamlessly to the Production Engineering
    phase in February 2017. In preparation for that phase transition, NNSA
    will publish a baseline cost report by the end of this fiscal year.
    This budget request reflects these efforts and includes $281.1 million
    in fiscal year 2017 to support the FPU in fiscal year 2020.
        Also within DSW, the fiscal year 2017 budget request includes $1.3
    billion for Stockpile Systems and Stockpile Services. These programs
    sustain the stockpile pursuant to the direction given in the
    President's Nuclear Weapon Stockpile Plan (NWSP). In doing so, the
    programs deploy unique skills, equipment, testers, and logistics to
    enable the daily operations of the nation's nuclear deterrent.
    Specifically, these programs produce and replace limited life
    components (LLCs) such as neutron generators and gas transfer systems,
    conduct maintenance, surveillance, and evaluations to assess weapons
    reliability, detect and anticipate potential weapons issues such as the
    recent CHE refresh issue mentioned above, and compile and analyze
    information during the Annual Assessment process.
        The pursuit and application of technological advancements to
    enhance safety and security while reducing life cycle costs of the
    stockpile runs through all of these activities. The development of
    Integrated Surety Architectures enhancing transportation safety and
    security is an example of these efforts.
        Within DSW, the fiscal year 2017 budget request also includes
    $577.8 million for the Strategic Materials account to maintain NNSA's
    ability to produce the nuclear and other materials needed to support
    the enduring stockpile. This program includes Uranium Sustainment,
    Plutonium Sustainment, Tritium Sustainment, Domestic Uranium Enrichment
    (DUE), lithium and other strategic materials. Funding for Uranium
    Sustainment will enable enriched uranium operations in Building 9212, a
    Manhattan Project-era production facility at the Y-12 National Security
    Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, to end in fiscal year 2025, and allow
    the bulk of this obsolete building to shut down. The sustainment and
    modernization of enriched uranium capabilities and the acceleration of
    Area 5 de-inventory will reduce safety and mission risks in the near
    term.
        Plutonium Sustainment funds replacement and refurbishment of
    equipment and the critical skills needed to meet the pit production
    requirements as outlined in the National Defense Authorization Act
    (NDAA) for fiscal year 2015.
        Tritium Sustainment ensures the Nation's capability and capacity to
    provide the tritium necessary to meet national security requirements,
    either through production at Tennessee Valley Authority nuclear power
    plants or by recovering and recycling tritium from returned gas
    transfer systems.
        The DUE program continues its efforts to ensure that we have the
    necessary supplies of enriched uranium for a variety of national
    security needs.
        The fiscal year 2017 budget request also includes $69 million for
    Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition, an increase of $16.9 million,
    32.7 percent above the fiscal year 2016 enacted level, which includes
    funds to support the President's goal to accelerate the dismantlement
    rate of previously retired weapons by 20 percent. This will enable NNSA
    to dismantle the weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by 2021,
    rather than the original goal of 2022. It will also result in increased
    Management and Operating staff at both the Pantex Plant in Amarillo,
    Texas and the Y-12 National Security Complex.
        For Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E), the fiscal
    year 2017 budget request is $1.9 billion, an increase of $36.2 million,
    two percent above the fiscal year 2016 enacted level. This includes
    $663.2 million for the Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) Program,
    an increase of $31 million for the Advanced Technology Development and
    Mitigation (ATDM) subprogram that supports high performance computing
    on the path to exascale, and $87.1 million for Advanced Manufacturing
    Development (AMD), a decrease of $43 million. The decrease reflects a
    realignment from technology development investments to address higher
    NNSA priorities. The budget request focuses on continued investment in
    advanced manufacturing opportunities and improving the manufacturing
    processes for components that support multiple weapons to maximize the
    benefits of these investments. Advanced Manufacturing invests in
    technologies that will reduce the time and cost of current
    manufacturing methods, replaces obsolete processes, and supports
    manufacturing developments for future weapon upgrades. Additive
    Manufacturing, also known as 3-D printing, aids in developing and
    manufacturing components for stockpile and weapon technology
    applications. The overall RDT&E request reflects small increases for
    the Science Program ($442.0 million, an increase of $18.9 million) to
    achieve two subcritical experiments per year before the end of the
    FYNSP, and begin alterations to U1a tunnel complex at Nevada to prepare
    for these experiments: Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High
    Yield Program ($523.9 million, an increase of $11.9 million) and the
    Engineering Program ($139.5 million, an increase of $8.1 million).
        The Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield program has
    spearheaded ongoing improvements in management and operational
    efficiencies at NNSA's major high energy density (HED) facilities,
    including the National Ignition Facility (NIF) at Lawrence Livermore
    National Laboratory (LLNL) in California and the OMEGA facility at the
    University of Rochester in New York. In fiscal year 2015, NIF markedly
    improved its shot-rate efficiency with over 350 key experiments
    performed (compared to 191 in fiscal year 2014) in support of the SSP.
    This level of effort represents an 85 percent increase over the
    previous year and an 18 percent increase over its goal for 2015.
        NNSA has taken major steps in high performance computing to deliver
    on its missions and play a leading role to support the President's
    Executive Order on the National Strategic Computing Initiative (NSCI).
    In 2015, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Sandia National
    Laboratories (SNL) received the first hardware delivery for NNSA's next
    generation high performance computer, Trinity. This computer will
    initially have eight times more applications performance than the Cielo
    machine it is replacing. NNSA also continued its CORAL collaboration
    with LLNL, the DOE Office of Science national laboratories at Oak Ridge
    and Argonne, IBM, and other vendors. CORAL will help develop next
    generation computing platforms to dramatically improve our ability to
    run increasingly complex codes and will be a significant step on the
    path to exascale computing.
        NNSA collaborates with the DOE Office of Science while making these
    much needed investments in exascale computing. The fiscal year 2017
    budget request includes $95 million from NNSA for the development of
    capable exascale systems.
        Defense Programs also maintains the vitality of the broader
    National Security Enterprise. An important aspect of this effort is
    investing in Laboratory-, Site- and Plant-Directed Research and
    Development (LDRD/PDRD). Independent reviews have consistently affirmed
    the importance of the program to the long-term vitality of the labs.
    LDRD/PDRD provides basic research funding to foster innovation and to
    attract and retain young scientific and technical talent and is
    critical to the long-term sustainment of our national laboratories.
    Congressional support is essential to ensuring that we have both the
    workforce and the new developments necessary to support the nation's
    security into the future.
    Improving Safety, Operations and Infrastructure
        NNSA's ability to achieve its mission is dependent upon safe and
    reliable infrastructure. The age and condition of NNSA's infrastructure
    will, if not addressed, put the mission, the safety of our workers, the
    public, and the environment at risk. More than half of NNSA's
    facilities are over 40 years old while 30 percent of them date back to
    the Manhattan Project era. The fiscal year 2017 budget request for
    Infrastructure and Operations is $2.7 billion, an increase of $442.8
    million, 19.4 percent above the fiscal year 2016 enacted level. This
    funding will help NNSA modernize and upgrade aging infrastructure and
    address safety and programmatic risks through strategic investments in
    both general purpose infrastructure and program-specific capabilities
    that directly support our nuclear weapons and nonproliferation
    programs.
        To support critical programmatic activities, we are making
    important strides in recapitalizing our aging infrastructure and
    capabilities. In fiscal year 2015, NNSA funded new and continuing
    projects to enhance or replace programmatic capabilities and address
    the risks posed by the aging infrastructure. NNSA's investment in these
    projects is vital to the revitalization of the NNSA enterprise. The
    fiscal year 2017 budget request provides funding for more than 70
    recapitalization projects. The request will also support general
    purpose infrastructure and program-specific capabilities through Line
    Item Construction projects. These projects include, for example, the
    Uranium Processing Facility (UPF), the Chemistry and Metallurgy
    Research Replacement (CMRR) project, the U1a Complex Enhancements
    Project (UCEP) in support of the Enhanced Capabilities for Subcritical
    Experiments (ECSE) portfolio, the Albuquerque Complex Project to
    replace the current inadequate facilities, and a project to expand the
    electrical distribution system at LLNL.
        One of the most worrisome of the NNSA infrastructure challenges is
    the excess facilities that pose risks to our workers, the environment,
    and the mission. While many of these facilities will ultimately be
    transferred to the DOE Office of Environmental Management for
    disposition, NNSA is focusing on reducing the risk where it can. In
    fiscal year 2015, NNSA successfully demolished our second non-process
    contaminated building at Y-12 within the past two calendar years. The
    fiscal year 2017 budget request supports a number of activities to
    continue to address excess facilities. These activities include the
    transition of the Kansas City Bannister Federal Complex to the private
    sector for environmental remediation and redevelopment, risk reduction
    activities at Alpha-5 and Beta-4 at Y-12--both of which are highly
    process-contaminated--and disposition of more uncontaminated facilities
    across the NNSA enterprise.
        Our Secure Transportation Asset (STA) program provides safe, secure
    movement of nuclear weapons, special nuclear material, and weapon
    components to meet projected DOE, DOD, and other customer requirements.
    The fiscal year 2017 budget request of $282.7 million includes an
    increase of $45.6 million, 19.2 percent above the fiscal year 2016
    enacted levels, to continue asset modernization and workforce
    capability initiatives. These initiatives include: (1) restoration of
    federal agent strength levels to meet the goal of 370; (2) the
    Safeguards Transporter (SGT) Risk Reduction Initiatives to manage the
    SGT beyond its design life; (3) development and testing of the selected
    alternative for the SGT replacement, the Mobile Guardian Transporter
    (MGT); and (4) replacement of vehicles and tractors.
        The Office of Defense Nuclear Security (DNS) develops and
    implements sound security programs to protect Special Nuclear Material
    (SNM), people, information, and facilities throughout the nuclear
    security enterprise. The fiscal year 2017 budget request is $670.1
    million, a decrease of $12.8 million, or 1.9 percent below the fiscal
    year 2016 the enacted level of $682.9 million due to one-time dedicated
    increases in fiscal year 2016. After adjusting for an fiscal year 2016
    one-time $30 million designated plus up and $13 million dedicated line
    item construction amounts for each year, the remaining fiscal year 2017
    operating request of $657.1 million is an increase of $17.2 million, or
    2.7 percent above the fiscal year 2016 enacted operating level of
    $639.9 million. The request manages risk among important competing
    demands as NNSA continues to face the challenges associated with an
    aging physical security infrastructure that must be effectively
    addressed in the coming years. To this end, DNS is conducting a Site
    Condition Review (SCR) of the physical security systems at all
    locations to facilitate the development of an enterprise-wide security
    systems upgrade and refresh strategy. This effort will identify and
    manage current and future security improvements and upgrades on a 10-
    year planning cycle and includes determining the condition of critical
    security equipment and infrastructure. A final report of this effort
    will provide DOE/NNSA leadership and Congressional stakeholders with
    consolidated and up-to-date information to enable informed decisions
    for fiscal planning and programming.
        The SCR is being conducted within the context of important
    organizational improvements and management strategies published in the
    June 2015 Security Roadmap. The document establishes a clear vision and
    path forward to correcting identified security issues and promoting
    sustained performance within the NNSA security program. The Security
    Roadmap is a multi-year effort that implements key recommendations for
    improvement identified in past assessments; it includes a total of 57
    strategic initiatives covering culture, process, infrastructure, and
    workforce challenges. As of the end of 2015, DNS has completed six of
    the initiatives and is currently working on another 20 initiatives. The
    remaining 31 initiatives are pending formal initiation.
        For Information Technology and Cybersecurity, the fiscal year 2017
    budget request is $176.6 million, an increase of $19 million, or 12.1
    percent above fiscal year 2016 enacted levels. This increase will fund
    much needed improvement to the Information Technology and Cybersecurity
    program, including Continuous Diagnostic and Mitigation (CDM),
    Telecommunications Security, infrastructure upgrades for the Enterprise
    Secure Computing Network (ESN), Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), Energy
    Sciences Network (ESnet) program, and an increased Information
    Technology budget. This cybersecurity program continuously monitors
    enterprise wireless and security technologies (e.g., identity,
    credential, and access management) to meet a wide range of security
    challenges. In fiscal year 2017, NNSA plans to continue the
    recapitalization of the Enterprise Secure Network, modernize the
    cybersecurity infrastructure, implement the Identity Control and Access
    Management project at NNSA Headquarters and site elements, and
    implement all Committee on National Security Systems and PKI
    capabilities.
                 defense nuclear nonproliferation appropriation
        The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN), fiscal year 2017 budget
    request is $1.8 billion, a decrease of $132.4 million, 6.8 percent
    below the fiscal year 2016 enacted levels. This appropriation covers
    NNSA's nuclear threat reduction mission. DNN addresses the entire
    nuclear threat spectrum by helping to prevent the acquisition of
    nuclear weapons or weapon-usable materials, technologies, and
    expertise, countering efforts to acquire such weapons, materials, and
    technologies, and responding to nuclear and radiological incidents. The
    fiscal year 2017 budget request funds two mission areas under the DNN
    appropriation: the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program and the
    Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response (NCTIR) Program.
    Nonproliferation Efforts
        NNSA made significant progress in nuclear threat reduction in 2015.
    Working with foreign partners, the Office of Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation removed approximately 170 kilograms of highly enriched
    uranium (HEU) and plutonium from several civilian sites; successfully
    down-blended additional HEU to achieve a cumulative total of 150 metric
    tons of U.S. excess, weapons-usable HEU (approximately 6,000 nuclear
    weapons worth of material); recovered more than 100,000 curies of
    disused or orphaned radioactive material; ensured the United States
    remains on track to fulfill the commitments made at the 2014 Nuclear
    Security Summit; and supported the Secretary of Energy's efforts to
    develop the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) by providing
    scientific expertise and technical options to the United States
    negotiating team.
        The Material Management and Minimization (M/3/) program provides an
    integrated approach to addressing the threat posed by nuclear materials
    through a full cycle of materials management and minimization. The
    primary objective of the program is to achieve permanent threat
    reduction by minimizing and, when possible, eliminating weapons-usable
    nuclear material around the world. The fiscal year 2017 budget request
    is $341.1 million, an increase of $24.5 million, 7.7 percent above the
    fiscal year 2016 enacted levels. This funding increase will accelerate
    reactor conversions in Kazakhstan and in the United States, as well as
    initiate the critical decision process to support the dilute-and-
    dispose program for domestic plutonium disposition.
        The Global Material Security (GMS) program works with partner
    nations to increase the security of vulnerable nuclear and radiological
    materials and improve their ability to detect, interdict, and
    investigate illicit trafficking of these materials. The fiscal year
    2017 budget request for this program is $337.1 million, a decrease of
    $89.6 million, 21 percent below the fiscal year 2016 enacted level.
    This decrease is possible because GMS is completing its work to protect
    the remaining International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Category I
    radiological sources in the United States to meet our 2014 Nuclear
    Security Summit commitment, and because GMS is committed to reducing
    its prior year carryover balances.
        The Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC) program supports the
    nonproliferation and arms control regimes by developing and
    implementing programs to strengthen international nuclear safeguards;
    control the spread of nuclear and dual-use material, equipment,
    technology and expertise; verify nuclear reductions and compliance with
    nonproliferation and arms control treaties and agreements; and address
    other nonproliferation and arms control challenges. The fiscal year
    2017 budget request will fund safeguards and export control activities,
    including efforts specifically in support of JCPOA implementation. This
    funding also supports statutorily mandated activities such as technical
    reviews of export licenses and interdiction cases, technical support
    for the negotiation and implementation of civil nuclear cooperation
    agreements (123 Agreements), and upgrades to the 10 CFR 810
    authorization process. The fiscal year 2017 budget request for this
    program is $124.7 million, a decrease of $5.5 million, 4.2 percent
    below the fiscal year 2016 enacted level. This decrease primarily
    reflects a return to baseline funding following the one-time increase
    of $3.5 million by Congress in the fiscal year 2016 budget for
    improvements in the export control process, as well as cost-savings in
    export licensing activities achieved through operational efficiencies.
        The DNN Research and Development (DNN R&D) program supports
    innovative unilateral and multi-lateral technical capabilities to
    detect, identify, and characterize (1) foreign nuclear weapons
    programs, (2) illicit diversion of special nuclear materials, and (3)
    nuclear detonations. To meet national and Departmental nuclear security
    requirements, DNN R&D leverages the unique facilities and scientific
    skills of DOE, academia, and industry to perform research, including
    counterterrorism-related R&D. The fiscal year 2017 budget request for
    this program is $393.9 million, a $25.4 million or 6.1 percent decrease
    below fiscal year 2016 enacted levels. The decrease in funding reflects
    projected savings resulting from a reduction in planned activities for
    arms control-related R&D and a return to the baseline Nuclear
    Detonation Detection (NDD) program after development of an initial
    mitigation path for supply chain interruptions.
        Nonproliferation Construction consolidates construction costs for
    DNN projects. Currently, the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) is
    the only project in this program; however, the fiscal year 2017 budget
    request terminates the MOX project. The Department will complete pre-
    conceptual design for the dilute-and-dispose approach to establish
    Critical Decision-0 (CD-0), Approve Mission Need, and begin conceptual
    design in late fiscal year 2017. The fiscal year 2017 budget request of
    $270 million will be used to bring an orderly and safe closure of the
    MFFF. The scope and costs will be refined in subsequent budget
    submissions when the termination plan for the MFFF project is approved.
    Nuclear Counterterrorism and Emergency Operations
        DOE has adopted an enterprise-wide approach to strengthen overall
    preparedness to respond to a broad spectrum of potential emergencies.
    These emergencies include natural phenomena, such as adverse weather
    events or earthquakes, and man-made events, such as accidents or acts
    of terrorism. To better accomplish this mission, in November 2015, NNSA
    reorganized the Office of Emergency Operations and the Office of
    Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation.
        Both of these organizations are supported under the Nuclear
    Counterterrorism and Incident Response (NCTIR) Program. In fiscal year
    2016, the NCTIR program transitioned to the DNN account in order to
    align all NNSA funding to prevent, counter, and respond to nuclear
    proliferation and terrorism. The fiscal year 2017 budget request
    includes $271.9 million to support the NCTIR program, an increase of
    $37.5 million, 16 percent above the fiscal year 2016 enacted level.
    Within NCTIR, NNSA continues to work domestically and around the world
    to prepare for and improve our ability to respond to radiological or
    nuclear incidents.
        Our counterterrorism and counterproliferation programs are part of
    broader U.S. Government efforts assessing the threat of nuclear
    terrorism and to develop technical countermeasures. The scientific
    knowledge generated under this program ensures that NNSA's technical
    expertise on nuclear threat devices, including improvised nuclear
    devices (INDs), supports and informs broader U.S. Government nuclear
    security policy and guides nuclear counterterrorism and
    counterproliferation efforts, including interagency nuclear forensics
    and DOD contingency planning.
        NNSA's emergency response teams must deploy and respond with the
    most up to date equipment. The current equipment is aging, increasing
    maintenance expenses, and has started to impact NNSA's ability to
    perform its emergency response mission. The Radiological Assistance
    Program (RAP) remains the nation's premier first-response resource to
    assess a radiological incident and advise decision-makers on necessary
    steps to minimize hazards, but its effectiveness is beginning to be
    compromised by obsolete equipment. To ensure that NNSA is able to
    execute its radiological emergency response mission, RAP's equipment
    must be recapitalized regularly. Additionally, NNSA is acquiring state-
    of-the-art, secure, deployable communications systems that are
    interoperable with our Federal Bureau of Investigation and DOD mission
    partners, ensuring decision makers receive real-time technical
    recommendations to mitigate nuclear terrorist threats.
        The Office of Emergency Operations is now aligned to focus on its
    core Department-wide all-hazards and complex-wide emergency management
    mission. The fiscal year 2017 budget request for this office is $34.7
    million, an increase of $9.6 million, or 38 percent above the fiscal
    year 2016 enacted level. This will improve the emergency management
    system through an enterprise-wide approach that effectively increases
    the Department's all-hazards emergency preparedness and response
    capability during complex, cascading, or enduring incidents, and more
    effectively calls upon and leverages the assets, resources, and skills
    across the DOE complex. The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) will
    continue to be the 24/7/365 single-point-of-contact for Departmental
    and interagency notifications regarding situations requiring
    centralized management such as, national emergencies, heightened
    international tension, Departmental emergencies, natural disasters, or
    acts of terrorism. The program also manages the Emergency
    Communications Network, and Continuity Programs for all of DOE,
    including NNSA. The Office of Emergency Operations will continue to
    work within the DOE to develop plans to replace the existing EOC and to
    improve the Department's capabilities to respond to emergencies.
                          naval reactors appropriation
    Advancing Naval Nuclear Propulsion
        NNSA supports the U.S. Navy's ability to protect and defend
    American interests across the globe. The Naval Reactors Program remains
    at the forefront of technological developments in naval nuclear
    propulsion and ensures a commanding edge in war.ghting capabilities by
    advancing new technologies and improvements in naval reactor
    performance and reliability.
        In 2015, Naval Reactors enabled U.S. nuclear powered warships to
    operate for another year safely and effectively, steaming more than two
    million miles in support of national security missions. Initial reactor
    start-up was achieved in the lead reactor plant of pre-commissioning
    unit (PCU) Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), the first new design aircraft
    carrier propulsion plant in 40 years. This historic milestone
    represents the culmination of almost 20 years of dedicated and
    sustained effort by Naval Reactors and its field activities, our
    Department of Energy laboratories, nuclear industrial base suppliers,
    the Navy design team and the nuclear shipbuilders. This is the first
    step in fully testing the integrated operations of the propulsion
    plant, culminating in sea trials this spring. Finally, we continued our
    reactor plant design and reactor core manufacturing development efforts
    in support of the new design Ohio-class replacement reactor plant,
    including the life-of-ship core.
        The Naval Reactors fiscal year 2017 budget request is $1.42
    billion, an increase of $45 million, 3.2 percent above the fiscal year
    2016 enacted level. In addition to supporting today's operational
    fleet, the requested funding will enable Naval Reactors to deliver
    tomorrow's fleet by funding three national priority projects, and
    recruiting and retaining a highly skilled work force committed to the
    Navy and the nation. The projects include (1) continuing design of the
    new reactor plant for the replacement of the Ohio-class SSBN, which
    will feature a life-of-ship core and electric drive; (2) refueling a
    Research and Training Reactor in New York to facilitate Ohio-class
    replacement reactor development efforts and provide 20 more years of
    live reactor based training for fleet operators; and (3) building a new
    spent fuel handling facility in Idaho that will facilitate long term,
    reliable processing and packaging of spent nuclear fuel from aircraft
    carriers and submarines.
        Naval Reactors has requested funding in fiscal year 2017 to support
    these projects, and to fund necessary reactor technology development,
    equipment, construction, maintenance, and modernization of critical
    infrastructure and facilities. By employing a small but high-performing
    technical base, the teams at our four Program sites--the Bettis Atomic
    Power Laboratory in Pittsburgh, the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory and
    Kesselring Site in greater Albany, and our spent nuclear fuel
    facilities in Idaho--we can perform the research and development,
    analysis, engineering and testing needed to support today's fleet at
    sea and develop future nuclear-powered warships. Importantly, our labs
    perform the technical evaluations that enable Naval Reactors to
    thoroughly assess emergent issues and deliver timely responses that
    ensure nuclear safety and maximize operational flexibility. This
    technical base supports more than 15,000 nuclear-trained Navy sailors,
    who safely maintain and operate the 98 nuclear propulsion plants in the
    fleet 24 hours per day, 365 days per year around the globe. It will
    also facilitate delivery, as directed by Congress, of our conceptual
    plan for potential naval application of low enriched uranium.
                nnsa federal salaries and expenses appropriation
        The NNSA Federal Salaries and Expenses (FSE) fiscal year 2017
    budget request is $412.8 million, an increase of $49.1 million, 13.5
    percent above the fiscal year 2016 enacted level. The fiscal year 2017
    budget request provides funding for 1,715 full-time equivalents (FTE)
    and support expenses needed to meet mission requirements. We are
    actively engaged in hiring to that number in a thoughtful and strategic
    manner. The fiscal year 2017 budget request will support 1,715 FTEs, an
    increase of 60 FTEs (25 above the authorized 1,690) above the
    anticipated number of FTEs in fiscal year 2016, and request an
    additional 25 for a total of 1,740 FTEs in fiscal year 2018 and the
    outyears. The exact number of FTEs will be determined following a
    detailed staffing review. It also provides for a 1.3 percent cost of
    living increase and a 5.5 percent increase for benefit escalation. In
    addition, the request provides funding for additional Federal
    Background Investigations for security clearances and provides
    additional funding to the Department's Working Capital Fund, primarily
    for Office of Personnel Management (OPM) credit monitoring and the
    Department's accounting systems (iMANAGE).
        In fiscal year 2017, NNSA will continue its efforts to meet current
    and future workforce needs by analyzing how evolving missions are
    affecting job requirements. Reshaping of the workforce over the next
    several years will be essential, including identifying the right
    staffing size and skill sets and implementing professional development
    plans now and in the future. NNSA will also continue to streamline its
    operations, particularly in travel and support services, to provide a
    lean and efficient organization.
                            management & performance
        To enhance our ability to carry out our mission and execute this
    budget request, we will continue to focus on improving our project
    management and cost estimating capabilities. In keeping with the
    Secretary of Energy's increased focus on Management and Performance,
    NNSA is committed to managing its operations, contracts and costs in an
    effective and efficient manner. The NNSA's Office of Acquisition and
    Project Management (APM) is driving continued improvement in contract
    and project management practices. APM is leading NNSA's effort to
    institute rigorous analyses of alternatives, provide clear lines of
    authority and accountability for federal and contractor program and
    project management, improve cost and schedule performance, and ensure
    Federal Project Directors and Contracting Officers with the appropriate
    skill mix and professional certifications are managing NNSA's work.
    NNSA participates in the Secretary of Energy's Project Management Risk
    Committee as a means to institutionalize and share best practices
    across the Department. NNSA established the Office of Project
    Assessments, reporting directly to the Principal Deputy Administrator,
    ensuring senior leadership visibility and accountability throughout the
    Enterprise for project performance. This office generated $33 million
    in cost avoidances as a result of their independent project peer
    reviews.
        Since 2011, NNSA has delivered approximately $1.4 billion in
    projects, a portion of NNSAs total project portfolio, $70 million (or 5
    percent) under original budget. Significant examples in the last year
    include the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) Site Readiness
    Subproject, which delivered $20 million under budget; Y-12's Nuclear
    Facility Risk Reduction Project, which delivered $6 million under
    budget and 11 months ahead of schedule; and LANL's Transuranic Waste
    Facility Project, which is on track to complete $3 million under
    budget. Using the Department's best practices, the UPF and Chemistry
    and Metallurgy Research Replacement Facility Projects were restructured
    into smaller more manageable subprojects, significantly reducing
    project delivery risk.
        NNSA is committed to encouraging competition and increasing the
    universe of qualified contractors, by streamlining its major
    acquisition processes. The most significant example was the competitive
    award of the Kansas City National Security Campus M&O contract, awarded
    without protest, saving taxpayers $150 million and increasing the use
    of small businesses. As an affirmation of the quality of NNSA's
    acquisition management team, only four out of 103 competitive
    procurements were protested, with NNSA winning all protests. Finally,
    NNSA exceeded its small business goal by over 20 percent, awarding $233
    million to small business in fiscal year 2015.
        NNSA will continue to focus on delivering timely, best-value
    acquisition solutions for all of our programs and projects. NNSA will
    use a tailored approach to contract structures and incentives that is
    appropriate for the unique missions and risks at each site. Our M&O
    contractors are responsible for disparate activities, ranging from
    research and development to industrial production. Accordingly, we will
    work to develop the right incentives for each circumstance and for each
    of our contracts.
                     cost estimating and program evaluation
        The Office of Cost Estimating and Program Evaluation (CEPE)
    continues to develop its capabilities to provide trusted independent
    cost and resource analysis of NNSA's programs and projects. As detailed
    in its implementation plan, the number of CEPE federal staff will grow
    from a target of 15 in fiscal year 2016 to 18 in fiscal year 2017. CEPE
    will conduct independent cost estimates on the B61-12 LEP and W88 Alt
    370 in fiscal year 2016 and the W80-4 LEP in fiscal year 2017. CEPE is
    also institutionalizing best practices for analysis of alternatives and
    leads the corporate process to build the NNSA budget.
                                   conclusion
        The NNSA performs vital activities at home and throughout the world
    in support of the nuclear security mission. Its success in addressing
    21st Century challenges hinges upon the technology, capabilities, and
    infrastructure entrusted to the organization.
        Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.

        [The prepared statement of Admiral James F. Caldwell
    follows:]

                Prepared statement by Admiral James F. Caldwell
        A strong Navy is crucial to the security of the United States. Navy
    warships are deployed around the world every hour of every day to
    provide a credible ``forward presence.'' With over 45 percent of the
    Navy's major combatants being nuclear powered, including 10 aircraft
    carriers, 14 ballistic missile submarines, 55 attack submarines, and 4
    guided missile submarines--it is vital that these ships are ready when
    and where our Nation needs them. In addition to supporting these
    nuclear powered combatants, Naval Reactors has also safely maintained
    and operated two nuclear powered land-based prototypes--both over 38
    years old--to conduct research and development and two Moored Training
    Ships--both over 51 years old--the oldest operating pressurized water
    reactors (PWRs) in the world. These land-based prototypes, Moored
    Training Ships, and Naval Nuclear Power Training Command train over
    3000 sailors per year to operate our naval nuclear propulsion plants.
        Our ballistic missile submarine force remains on patrol, marking
    over 60 years of peacekeeping capability through strategic deterrence.
    The Navy had 34 submarine deployments and 26 strategic deterrent
    patrols during 2015. In addition, at any given time, there were always
    at least 56 of 71 submarines deployed or on stand-by to deploy within a
    few days. Our carriers, USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) and USS Theodore
    Roosevelt (CVN 71) completed successful deployments to the Central
    Command area of responsibility, and the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76)
    turned over with the USS George Washington (CVN 73) to serve as the
    forward-deployed carrier in Japan.
        This past year, we also saw the christening of the attack submarine
    PCU Illinois (SSN 786) and keel laying for the PCU Colorado (SSN 788)
    and PCU Indiana (SSN 789), our fifteenth and sixteenth Virginia-class
    submarines. We've also added another attack submarine to our force by
    commissioning USS John Warner (SSN 785), and began a program that
    delivers two Virginia-class submarines annually. In 2015, we laid the
    keel for the second FORD-class CVN, PCU John F. Kennedy (CVN 79). We
    currently have 12 submarines and one next generation aircraft carrier
    in various phases of construction at our shipyards. Initial reactor
    start-up was achieved in the lead reactor plant of PCU Gerald R. Ford
    (CVN 78), the first new design aircraft carrier propulsion plant in 40
    years. This historic milestone represents the culmination of almost 20
    years of dedicated and sustained effort by Naval Reactors and its field
    activities, our Department of Energy laboratories, nuclear industrial
    base suppliers, the Navy design team and the nuclear shipbuilders. This
    is the first step in fully testing the integrated operations of the
    propulsion plant, culminating in sea trials this spring. Finally, we
    continued our reactor plant design and reactor core manufacturing
    development efforts to support of the new design Ohio-class replacement
    reactor plant, including the life-of-ship core.
        The firm support of this subcommittee last year enabled safe
    operation of the fleet, Naval Reactors mandatory oversight, and
    continued progress on key projects. Naval Reactors' budget request for
    fiscal year (FY) 2017 will continue this work. The funding request is
    for $1.420 billion, an increase of $45 million (3 percent) over the
    fiscal year 2016 enacted funding level. In addition to supporting
    today's operational fleet, the requested funding will enable Naval
    Reactors to deliver tomorrow's fleet by funding three national priority
    projects and recruiting and retaining a highly skilled work force
    committed to the Navy and the nation. The projects are:
          Continuing to design the new reactor plant for the
    replacement of the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine, which will
    feature a life-of-ship core and electric drive;
          Refueling a Research and Training Reactor in New York, to
    facilitate Ohio-class replacement reactor development efforts and
    provide 20 more years of live reactor based training for the fleet
    operators; and
          Building a new spent fuel handling facility in Idaho that
    will facilitate long term, reliable processing and packaging of spent
    nuclear fuel from aircraft carriers and submarines.
        Naval Reactors has requested funding in fiscal year 2017 to support
    these projects, and to fund necessary reactor technology development,
    equipment, construction, maintenance, and modernization of critical
    infrastructure and facilities. By employing a small but high-performing
    technical base, the teams at our four Program sites--the Bettis Atomic
    Power Laboratory in Pittsburgh, the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory and
    Kesselring Site in greater Albany, and our spent nuclear fuel
    facilities in Idaho--we can perform the research and development,
    analysis, engineering and testing needed to support today's fleet at
    sea and develop future nuclear-powered warships. Importantly, our labs
    perform the technical evaluations that enable Naval Reactors to
    thoroughly assess emergent issues and deliver timely responses that
    ensure nuclear safety and maximize operational flexibility. This
    technical base supports more than 15,000 nuclear-trained Navy sailors,
    who safely maintain and operate the 97 nuclear propulsion plants in the
    fleet 24 hours per day, 365 days per year around the globe. It will
    also facilitate delivery, as directed by Congress, of our conceptual
    plan for potential naval application of low enriched uranium.
        The requested increase in funding is also required to support the
    planned ramp up of design efforts for the new reactor plant for the
    Ohio-class SSBN replacement--the Navy's number one acquisition
    priority. Providing unparalleled stealth, endurance, and mobility, our
    ballistic missile submarine force has delivered more than 60 years of
    continuous at-sea deterrence, and continues to be the most survivable
    leg of the nuclear triad. Ohio-class Replacement SSBN activity this
    year includes reactor plant design and component development to support
    procurement of long lead components starting in fiscal year 2019.
    Progress in these areas in fiscal year 2017 maintains schedule
    alignment with the Navy as the program moves forward to construction
    start in fiscal year 2021 while retiring technical risk and targeting
    cost reduction.
        Related to Ohio-class replacement and the Program's training needs,
    the fiscal year 2017 budget request will support the land-based
    prototype refueling overhaul at the Kesselring Site in upstate New
    York. In fiscal year 2017, Naval Reactors will continue the core
    manufacturing work needed for the refueling overhaul, which will also
    enable timely construction of the life-of-ship core for Ohio-class
    replacement. Further, plant service-life engineering design will be
    completed in fiscal year 2017 to ensure that the land-based prototype
    overhaul, performed concurrently with refueling, supports 20 additional
    years of research, development and training.
        The Naval Reactors fiscal year 2017 budget request also contains
    funds to continue the Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project.
    After many years of funding reductions, Naval Reactors greatly
    appreciates Congressional support for this much needed project in
    fiscal year 2016, where we received the full request of $86M.
    Congressional support in 2016 enabled progress, design, and planning
    for site preparations and long lead material procurements in fiscal
    year 2017. We will use the $100M requested in fiscal year 2017 to
    finalize key facility and equipment requirements and advance facility
    design to support establishing the Performance Baseline in fiscal year
    2018 and the start of construction in fiscal year 2019. Continued
    Congressional support will help ensure that the facility in Idaho is
    ready to receive spent nuclear fuel from the fleet in fiscal year 2025.
    Because the new facility's capabilities are required to support
    aircraft carrier refuelings and defuelings, any delay to the project
    schedule would require procurement of additional shipping containers to
    temporarily store naval spent nuclear fuel at a cost of approximately
    $150M for each year the project is delayed.
        At the requested funding level, Naval Reactors can safely maintain
    and oversee the nuclear-powered fleet. Naval Reactors can also continue
    to advance the Ohio-class replacement and Land-based Prototype
    Refueling Overhaul, continue progress on the Spent Fuel Handling
    Recapitalization Project, and meet our environmental responsibilities.
        Naval Reactors is committed to executing our projects on time and
    on budget, and continuing the search for the safest and most cost
    effective way to support the nuclear fleet. I respectfully urge your
    support for aligning funding allocations with the fiscal year 2017
    budget request.

        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        I believe next we'll go to Dr. Regalbuto--Secretary
    Regalbuto.

    STATEMENT OF HONORABLE MONICA C. REGALBUTO, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
      OF ENERGY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

        Dr. Regalbuto. Thank you.
        Good afternoon, Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly,
    and members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to be here today
    to represent the Department of Energy's Office of Environmental
    Management and to discuss the work that we have already
    successfully accomplished and what we plan to accomplish under
    the President's fiscal year 2017 budget request.
        The total budget request for the EM [Environmental
    Management] program is 6.1 billion, which includes 673 million
    of proposed mandatory funding and 5.3 billion for defense
    environmental cleanup activities. The request will allow EM to
    maintain a safe and secure posture across the complex while
    maximizing our work on compliance activities.
        I would like to take this opportunity to highlight a number
    of EM's recent accomplishments:
        At the Savannah River site, the 4,000-canister radioactive
    glass was recently poured. Achieving these milestones enables
    the closure of the seventh high-level waste tank.
        At the Moab site, half of the estimated 16 million tons of
    uranium milling tailings have been removed and shipped to an
    engineering disposal cell.
        At Hanford, we have completed cleanup of the bulk of the
    river corridor, including more than 500 facilities and 1,000
    remediation sites.
        The fiscal year 2017 budget request will allow us to
    continue to make progress in an ongoing cleanup priorities.
    Among EM top priority is the safe reopening of WIPP [Waste
    Isolation Pilot Plant]. EM continues to support recovery from
    the two incidents at the facility that interrupted the
    nationwide program for the disposition of transuranic waste.
    The request will support initiating waste emplacement
    operations by December of 2016.
        At Idaho, the request will support the integrated waste
    treatment unit. This facility is planned to treat approximately
    900,000 gallons of sodium-bearing waste.
        At the Savannah River site, we will complete construction
    and ramp up commissioning activities at the Salt Waste
    Processing Facility, which will significantly increase our
    ability to treat tank waste. In addition, we will also continue
    to receive, store, and process spent nuclear fuel.
        At the Hanford Office of River Protection, the request
    supports continued construction of the Low Activity Waste
    Facility, Balancing Plant, and outfitting of the Analytical
    Laboratory, which are the centerpiece of the Department's plan
    to begin the direct feed of low activity waste as soon as 2022.
        The request for Richland allow us to continue the important
    work in the central plateau and to complete the demolition of
    Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant, once one of the most
    dangerous buildings in the complex.
        At Oak Ridge, the request supports continued design of the
    Outfall 200 Mercury Treatment Facility at the Y-12 National
    Security Complex and complete the demolition of Building K-27,
    the last gaseous diffusions enrichment process building. It
    will mark the first time that a gaseous diffusion enrichment
    site has been completely decommissioned.
        With the most challenging cleanup remaining, we understand
    the importance of technology development in reducing the
    lifecycle costs and enhancing our effectiveness. To help
    address many of the technical challenges involved, the request
    reflects a total investment in technology development of $33
    million. The funding will allow us to continue to integrate
    robotics technologies into our efforts to help improve overall
    worker quality of life by easing the performance of physically
    demanding tasks.
        In closing, I am honored to be here representing the Office
    of Environmental Management. We are committed to achieving our
    mission and will continue to apply innovative strategies to
    complete our mission safely.
        Thank you. Be happy to answer any questions.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Regalbuto follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Dr. Monica Regalbuto
        Good afternoon Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, and
    Members of the Subcommittee. I am pleased to be here today to represent
    the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Environmental Management
    (EM). I would like to provide you with an overview of the EM program,
    key accomplishments during the past year and what we plan to accomplish
    under the President's $6,119,099,000 fiscal year (FY) 2017 budget
    request, which includes $673,749,000 of proposed mandatory funding.
                           overview of the em mission
        EM supports the Department's Strategic Plan to position the DOE to
    meet the challenges of the 21st Century and the Nation's Manhattan
    Project and Cold War legacy responsibilities. The Department will
    leverage past experience, applying best practices and lessons learned;
    identify, develop, and deploy practical technological solutions derived
    from scientific research; and look for innovative and sustainable
    practices that make cleanup more efficient.
        The EM program was established in 1989 and is responsible for the
    cleanup of millions of gallons of liquid radioactive waste, thousands
    of tons of spent nuclear fuel and special nuclear material, disposition
    of large volumes of transuranic and mixed/low-level waste, huge
    quantities of contaminated soil and water, and deactivation and
    decommissioning of thousands of excess facilities. This environmental
    cleanup responsibility results from five decades of nuclear weapons
    development and production and Government-sponsored nuclear energy
    research and development. It involves some of the most dangerous
    materials known to mankind. EM has completed cleanup activities at 91
    sites in 30 states; EM is responsible for the remaining cleanup at 16
    sites in 11 states.
        Since 1989, the EM footprint has reduced significantly. For
    example, the Fernald site in Ohio and the Rocky Flats site in Colorado,
    both of which once housed large industrial complexes, are now wildlife
    refuges that are also available for recreational use. At the Idaho
    National Laboratory, we have decommissioned and demolished more than
    two million square feet of excess facilities, and removed all EM
    special nuclear material (e.g., highly enriched uranium) from the
    state.
        There is less than 300 square miles remaining to be cleaned up
    across the EM complex and progress continues. The remaining cleanup
    work presents some of the greatest challenges.
                      em cleanup objectives and priorities
        EM's first priority is worker safety and at our sites across the
    complex we continue to pursue cleanup objectives with that in mind.
    Taking many variables into account, such as risk reduction and
    compliance agreements, EM has generally prioritized its cleanup
    activities as follows:

          Ensuring that activities are performed safely while
    providing the necessary security framework;
          Radioactive tank waste stabilization, treatment, and
    disposal;
          Spent nuclear fuel storage, receipt, and disposition;
          Special nuclear material consolidation, stabilization,
    and disposition;
          Transuranic and mixed/low-level waste disposition;
          Soil and groundwater remediation; and
          Excess facilities deactivation and decommissioning.

        In particular, the fiscal year 2017 budget request will allow EM
    to:

          Complete activities necessary for resumption of waste
    emplacement operations at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant;
          Commence startup testing and commissioning activities at
    the Salt Waste Processing Facility to support initiation of radioactive
    operations in 2018; and
          Continue construction on the Waste Treatment and
    Immobilization Plant to support direct feed of low activity waste by
    end of 2022.

        Most importantly, EM will continue to discharge its
    responsibilities by conducting cleanup within a ``Safe Performance of
    Work'' culture that integrates environmental, safety, and health
    requirements and controls into all work activities. This ensures
    protection for the workers, public, and the environment
                    key recent and near-term accomplishments
        I would like to take this opportunity to highlight a number of EM's
    most recent accomplishments. Recently, the 4,000th canister of
    radioactive glass was poured at the Savannah River Site Defense Waste
    Processing Facility. Achieving this milestone, along with other
    processing activities, enabled the closure of the seventh high-level
    waste storage tank at Savannah River with closure of the eighth tank in
    progress. At the Moab Site, half of the estimated 16 million tons of
    uranium mill tailings has been removed and shipped to an engineered
    disposal cell. At Hanford, we have completed cleanup of the bulk of the
    River Corridor cleanup, including more than 500 facilities and 1,000
    remediation sites. At Oak Ridge, we are continuing design and critical
    decision reviews for the Outfall 200 Mercury Treatment Facility. The
    budget request enables EM to continue progress in completing buried
    waste exhumation at the Idaho site under the Accelerated Retrieval
    Project.
               highlights of the fiscal year 2017 budget request
        The fiscal year 2017 budget request for EM includes $5,382,050,000
    for defense environmental cleanup activities. The request will allow EM
    to maintain a safe and secure posture across the complex, while
    maximizing our work on compliance activities. The budget request
    supports the continued construction of two unique and complex tank
    waste processing plants at the Savannah River Site, South Carolina, and
    the Office of River Protection, Washington. We are working to ensure
    these facilities will operate safely and efficiently. These two
    facilities are projected to treat tens of millions of gallons of
    radioactive tank waste for disposal.
        Among EM's top priorities is the safe re-opening of the Waste
    Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) outside of Carlsbad, New Mexico. EM
    continues to support recovery from two 2014 incidents at the facility
    that interrupted the nationwide program for the disposition of
    transuranic waste resulting from atomic energy activities. Since
    opening WIPP, EM has sent more than 11,800 shipments of transuranic
    waste for permanent disposal, safely emplacing nearly 90,000 cubic
    meters of waste. The fiscal year 2017 budget request will continue
    corrective actions and safety activities to support WIPP, regulatory
    and environmental compliance actions, the Central Characterization
    Project and transportation activities, and the resumption of waste
    emplacement operations by December 2016.
        In fiscal year 2017, cleanup progress will continue to be made
    across the rest of the complex. At Idaho, the fiscal year 2017 request
    will support the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit. This facility is
    planned to treat approximately 900,000 gallons of sodium bearing tank
    waste. The request also continues exhumations at the Subsurface
    Disposal Area, treatment of legacy contact-handled and remote-handled
    transuranic and mixed low-level waste and safe, secure management of
    spent nuclear fuel.
        At the Savannah River Site, the fiscal year 2017 request supports
    continued production of canisters of vitrified high-level waste, and
    the construction of an additional on-site disposal unit for saltstone,
    the separated and treated low-activity fraction component of tank
    waste. Complete construction to support the planned commissioning and
    start-up of the Salt Waste Processing Facility in 2018. In addition,
    the request supports the safe and secure operation of the H Canyon/ HB-
    Line for the purpose of processing aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel and
    down-blending EM-owned plutonium, ensuring the availability of space in
    K- and L-Areas for the future receipt of materials returned under
    national security summit agreements.
        At the Office of River Protection, the fiscal year 2017 request
    supports continuing construction of the Low-Activity Waste (LAW)
    Facility, Balance of Facilities, and outfitting of the Analytical
    Laboratory of the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP),
    facilities which are the centerpiece of the Department's plan to begin
    the direct feed of low activity to the LAW facility (DFLAW) as soon as
    end of 2022. It will also simultaneously support ongoing efforts to
    resolve the technical issues associated with the WTP Pretreatment
    Facility and the WTP High-Level Waste Facility. The fiscal year 2017
    request is designed to achieve the immobilization of low activity waste
    as soon as practicable while resolution of technical issues continues.
    In support of DFLAW, the request includes funds for engineering scale
    testing and final design of the Low Activity Waste Pretreatment System,
    which will remove cesium and solids from the tank waste and provide
    feed directly to the Low Activity Waste Facility.
        Ongoing cleanup efforts continue at Richland. The fiscal year 2017
    request supports the completion of the Plutonium Finishing Plant
    Facility transition and certain disposition activities in order to
    achieve slab-on-grade and completion of a cap over the site. The fiscal
    year 2017 request also supports continued remediation of the 618-10
    Vertical Pipe Units and planning and technology maturation for the
    remediation of the 324 hot cell facility located over the 300-296 waste
    site.
        At Oak Ridge, the fiscal year 2017 request will maintain EM
    facilities in a safe, compliant, and secure manner; and support
    continuing design and critical decision reviews for the Outfall 200
    Mercury Treatment Facility at the Y-12 National Security Complex. The
    processing of contact-handled and remote-handled transuranic waste
    debris will continue at the Transuranic Waste Processing Center while
    technology maturation and planning continues for the Sludge Processing
    Facility Buildout project. Additionally, the budget request supports
    continued direct disposition of Consolidated Edison Uranium
    Solidification Project material from Building 3019.
        With the most challenging cleanup sites before EM, we understand
    the importance of technology development in reducing life cycle costs
    and enhancing our effectiveness. To help address many of the technical
    challenges involved with high-risk cleanup activities, the fiscal year
    2017 request reflects a total investment in technology development of
    $33,000,000. The fiscal year 2017 budget supports testing multiple
    technologies to solidify/stabilize mercury in soil and building
    materials to minimize the potential of mercury releases to the
    environment when decontamination and decommissioning of excess
    facilities begins at the Oak Ridge site. EM will also invest in
    characterization of and treatment options for Technetium-99, a key
    radioactive constituent in tank waste and in soils at sites across the
    complex; in robotics and semi-autonomous systems required for remote
    access to nuclear, chemical and other high-hazard facilities that are
    inaccessible or restricted to human entry; and in the development of
    test beds for the demonstration of treatment technologies, innovative
    tooling, and other technical solutions.
              budget authority and planned accomplishments by site

                     Office of River Protection, Washington
                             (dollars in thousands)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
              FY 2016 Enacted                      FY 2017 Request
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                            $1,414,000                           $1,499,965
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2017

          Maintain scheduled construction activities for the Low
    Activity Waste Facility, Analytical Laboratory, and Balance of
    Facilities to support the Direct Feed Low Activity Waste approach
          Initiate single-shell tank retrievals in AX Tank Farm
          Complete retrieval of AY-102 double-shell tank
          Complete Low Activity Waste Pretreatment System (LAWPS)
    preliminary design to a design maturity of 90 percent
          Continue resolution of technical issues of Criticality;
    Hydrogen Gas Vessels; and Erosion/Corrosion at the Pretreatment
    Facility

                       Savannah River Site, South Carolina
                             (dollars in thousands)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
              FY 2016 Current                      FY 2017 Request
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                            $1,336,566                           $1,448,000
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2017

          Package 100 to 110 canisters of vitrified high-level
    waste at the Defense Waste Processing Facility
          Operate Actinide Removal Process and Modular Caustic Side
    Solvent Extraction Unit to process 1.7 million gallons of salt waste
          Support planned construction, commissioning, and start-up
    activities for the Salt Waste Processing Facility
          Complete construction of Saltstone Disposal Unit #6
          Continue to receive foreign research and domestic
    research reactor spent nuclear fuel for safe storage and disposition
          Disposition spent nuclear fuel in H-Canyon by processing
          Activities to support implementation plan activities for
    the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 2012-1 to
    mitigate and remedy safety issues at 235-F

                        Carlsbad Field Office, New Mexico
                             (dollars in thousands)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
              FY 2016 Enacted                      FY 2017 Request
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                              $304,838                             $271,000
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2017

          Complete activities necessary for resumption of waste
    emplacement operations at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant by December
    2016
          Continue design and permitting actions for new
    ventilation shaft and on-site storage projects

                   Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico
                             (dollars in thousands)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
              FY 2016 Enacted                      FY 2017 Request
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                              $185,000                             $189,000
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2017

          Address the nitrate salt bearing transuranic wastes
          Remediation of town site (TA-43) cleanup of solid waste
    management units from the 1940s and 1950s production sites
          Complete the investigation of hexavalent chromium
    contamination of the groundwater beneath Mortandad and Sandia Canyons
    including field and bench-scale testing and plume control interim
    measures

                        Idaho National Laboratory, Idaho
                             (dollars in thousands)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
              FY 2016 Enacted                      FY 2017 Request
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                              $396,000                         $362,088 \1\
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The amount reflects Defense Environmental Cleanup portion, the total
      Idaho fiscal year 2017 Request is $370,088,000.

    Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2017

          Continue treatment of sodium bearing waste in the
    Integrated Waste Treatment Unit
          Characterize, package, certify, and temporarily store
    exhumed waste on site pending the resumption of operations at and
    shipments to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
          Complete exhumation of targeted buried waste at the
    Accelerated Retrieval Project VIII facility
          Continue safe storage of spent (used) nuclear fuel

                            Oak Ridge Site, Tennessee
                             (dollars in thousands)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
              FY 2016 Current                      FY 2017 Request
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                              $250,878                         $213,219 \2\
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ The amount reflects Defense Environmental Cleanup portion, the total
      Oak Ridge fiscal year 2017 Request is $391,407,000.

    Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2017

          Continue planning design and preparation of regulatory
    documentation and Critical Decision reviews for the Outfall 200 Mercury
    Treatment Facility
          Continue processing transuranic waste debris at the
    Transuranic Waste Processing Center
          Continue offsite disposition of select Oak Ridge waste
    stream

                     Richland Operations Office, Washington
                             (dollars in thousands)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
              FY 2016 Current                      FY 2017 Request
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                              $988,091                          $797,760\3\
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ The amount reflects Defense Environmental Cleanup portion, the total
      Richland fiscal year 2017 Request is $800,000,000.

    Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2017

          Complete Plutonium Finishing Plant Facility transition
    and selected disposition activities pursuant to achieving slab-on-grade
    including completion of a cap over the site
          Begin project planning for dry storage options for the
    cesium and strontium capsules currently stored at the Waste Storage
    Encapsulation Facility
          Planning and technology maturity for the remediation of
    the highly radioactive waste site 300-296 located beneath the 324
    Building
          Continue remediation of the 618-10 Vertical Pipe Units

                      Nevada National Security Site, Nevada
                             (dollars in thousands)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
              FY 2016 Enacted                      FY 2017 Request
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                               $62,385                              $62,176
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2017

          Complete closure activities for 9 soil corrective action
    sites
          Support safe disposal of approximately 34,000 cubic
    meters of low-level and mixed low-level radioactive waste
                                   conclusion
        Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Donnelly, and Members of the
    Subcommittee, I am honored to be here today representing the over
    20,000 men and women that carry out our Office of Environmental
    Management mission. We are committed to achieving our mission and will
    continue to apply innovative environmental cleanup strategies to
    complete work safely, and efficiently, thereby demonstrating value to
    the American taxpayers. All of this work will, first and foremost, be
    done safely, within a framework of best business practices. I am
    pleased to answer any questions you may have.

        Senator Sessions. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Trimble, I believe I omitted to introduce you. You are
    the Director of U.S. International Nuclear Security and Cleanup
    at the Government Accountability Office, the GAO, and provide
    oversight and leadership and insight on the United States
    international nuclear security and cleanup issues to Congress
    and other institutions.
        Thank you.

    STATEMENT OF DAVID C. TRIMBLE, DIRECTOR, U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL
     NUCLEAR SECURITY AND CLEANUP, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

        Mr. Trimble. Thank you.
        Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, and members of
    the subcommittee, my testimony today is based on past and
    ongoing work and will address challenges facing DOE's [the
    Department of Energy's] efforts to modernize the nuclear
    security enterprise, the growing cost of DOE's environmental
    liabilities, and accomplishments and planning challenges in the
    nonproliferation program.
        Regarding modernization efforts, let me highlight three
    challenges facing DOE: management of the LEPs [Life Extension
    Programs], oversight of contracts and major projects, and
    budgetary issues.
        NNSA estimates that it needs more than $290 billion over
    the next 25 years to support its modernization plans. These----
        Senator Sessions. How much?
        Mr. Trimble. Two hundred ninety.
        These plans include executing seven LEPs and depend on the
    replacement of key plutonium and uranium infrastructure assets.
    To carry out this work, effective management of these LEPs will
    be essential.
        In our February report on the B61, we found that NNSA had
    adopted improved management approaches and has incorporated
    some of these into its defense programs. These are positive
    steps. But, some of these tools are yet to be proven, and the
    B61 program has faced shortages in program staff. These
    challenges must be navigated while the B61 program is operating
    on a constrained schedule with little, if any, margin left to
    deal with program risks.
        Modernization plans also depend on DOE's ability to
    effectively manage its contracts and major construction
    projects. In 2015, we found that NNSA does not have a
    comprehensive policy for overseeing its M&O contractors.
    Notably, its key policy document was incomplete, parts were not
    being followed, and NNSA did not know if it had the staff
    needed to carry out its oversight approach.
        DOE has taken actions to improve its project management,
    such as requiring Department offices to develop project cost
    and schedule estimates according to best practices. However, in
    our last high-risk report, we noted that DOE is currently on
    its third round of corrective action since 2008, and many of
    the same root causes continue to be identified.
        DOE also continues to face challenges with some of its
    major projects. DOE has proposed to terminate MOX after
    spending nearly $5 billion, and is proposing to downblend the
    34 tons of plutonium and potentially dispose of it at WIPP,
    which is currently closed. We have ongoing work to assess
    whether WIPP has the capacity for this volume of plutonium.
        At Hanford, WTP [Waste Treatment Plan] continues to face
    longstanding technical and management challenges, and DOE is
    pursuing two new capital asset projects that will likely cost
    more than $1 billion. DOE has proposed adding 17 years to WTP's
    completion date, but does not know what the final cost will be.
        Modernization plans are also complicated by questions about
    the alignment of NNSA's plans with future budgets and future
    competing demands for funding. In December, we found that
    NNSA's long-term budget estimates for modernization were $4.2
    billion more than what is in the administration's budget
    figures for fiscal years 2021 through 2025. In addition, we
    found that low-range estimates for four LEPs exceeded estimated
    budget amounts in some years, meaning that some LEPs could face
    budgetary shortfalls.
        In addition, funding for modernization activities will take
    place while its standing and new needs compete for resources.
    NNSA faces billions in deferred maintenance, and its current
    spending is below its own benchmarks to keep this problem from
    getting worse. In addition, DOE is pursuing a new strategy to
    build a separate repository just for defense waste. DOE's
    analysis indicates that this approach could cost billions more
    than using a single repository for commercial and defense
    waste. DOE's analysis cites some benefits to this approach, but
    officials have said these benefits cannot be quantified at this
    time.
        Regarding DOE's long-term environmental liabilities which
    future defense budgets will need to fund, DOE faces many
    challenges. Over the past two decades, GAO and others have
    pointed out the need for DOE to take a complex-wide, risk-based
    approach to its cleanup strategy, finding that such an approach
    could reduce costs while also maximizing risk reduction.
    Notably, from fiscal year 2011 to fiscal year 2015, EM spent a
    total of about $23 billion on cleanup activities. Over the same
    time period----
        Senator Sessions. How much?
        Mr. Trimble. Twenty-three billion from 2011 to 2015.
        Over the same time period, its estimates of its remaining
    environmental liability rose by 77 billion. In 2015, EM
    estimated that cleanup of former weapons production sites would
    take until 2075 and cost 240 billion. Our recent ongoing work
    indicates that this figure is likely understated.
        Lastly, in regards to nonproliferation, we have found that
    NNSA has made progress securing nuclear materials around the
    world and met its targets for removing HEU [Highly Enriched
    Uranium] and downblending LEU [Low Enriched Uranium]. While
    progress has been made, our work has found some methodological
    limitations in NNSA's over-the-horizon long-term planning
    effort to assess threats and trends over the next 5 to 10
    years. NNSA agreed with our recommendations in this area and is
    revising its process.
        Thank you. I'd be happy to answer any questions you may
    have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Trimble follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Sessions. Thank you all.
        Mr. Trimble, while you've given us some, I think, grim
    points, let's just briefly mention them without going into a
    lot of detail. You're saying we need an overall strategy to
    contain costs on environmental liabilities, and that, from 2011
    to 2015, we spent 23 billion, but now more accurate later
    estimates are that we expect to spend 77 more billion than we
    previously expected to complete the project?
        Mr. Trimble. Yeas. Over that time period while we've been
    spending billions, our overall liability has continued to grow.
    We're sort of not making up ground, if you will.
        Senator Sessions. Of course, you say, through the final
    completion, 2075, we're looking at 200-and-
        Mr. Trimble. Fourty billion.
        Senator Sessions.--fourty billion.
        Mr. Trimble. Our work indicates that that is--understates
    the actual liability.
        Senator Sessions. We're talking about $240 billion for one
    part of the defense budget. I guess it would be your
    recommendation that this would require the most intense
    evaluation to see if we can make it better.
        Mr. Trimble. Yeah. We have recommended in the past, and
    others have as well, to take a risk--overall risk-based
    approach across the complex to maximize the return on risk
    reduction and also cost efficiency.
        Senator Sessions. General Klotz, the Wall Street Journal
    reported that Secretary Moniz's letter warning us, that I
    quoted previously, that without additional billions in the
    years 2018 through 2021--5.2 billion, in fact--the budget will
    lack credibility with Congress and could put the NNSA budget
    in, quote, ``an untenable position by 2018.''
        Let's talk about that. That's 5.2 billion more than we
    included last year. We had--in our FYDP [Future Years Defense
    Program], we thought that we were on path to modernize our
    nuclear program and that we'd reached a bipartisan consensus
    that we would support, basically, the President's request to do
    that job. Do I understand Secretary Moniz to say now we are
    going to be 5 billion short, and that shortage is going to hit
    as early as 2018?
        General Klotz. Thank you for the question, Chairman.
        First of all, as I indicated in my opening statement, we
    were very satisfied with the budget request for fiscal year
    2017, for the next fiscal year. We think it meets all of the
    needs we have under our three essential and enduring missions.
    However, as we look out towards the budget projections for 2018
    to 2021, we note they still remain subject to the sequester cap
    set in the Budget Control Acts. Added onto that, one of the
    things that we have been working very hard on in the Department
    of Energy and in NNSA is looking across the enterprise and
    trying to identify those things which we are going to need to
    sustain, not just in the NNSA area, but in the science area and
    environmental management. We have a very old infrastructure,
    many buildings that go back to the early days of the Cold War,
    even back to the Manhattan Project, that are going to need to
    be either replaced or significant work done to reduce the
    deferred maintenance, which are associated with it. Right now,
    deferred maintenance for NNSA alone is $3.7 billion, just in
    the buildings that we have now.
        Senator Sessions. Well, you say that, General Klotz, but,
    you know, people get a little dubious about these things. I see
    one of your complaints are that tiles are falling in the
    ceiling. It reminds me of schools that say they don't have
    enough money to have toilet paper, when they're spending $100
    billion on the school--million dollars--and it's like, ``What
    kind of management do you have if you don't fix the tiles in
    your ceiling?'' I mean, we're at a tight budget time. Are you
    sure we need $3.7 billion just to refurbish buildings?
        General Klotz. That's--as we add up the work that needs to
    be done to prevent things like tiles falling or fix water
    systems that are rusting out or to bring electrical systems up
    to code, that's--across the enterprise, that's what it adds up
    to.
        Chairman, this is a perennial problem, not just for us, but
    for the DOD [Department of Defense], as well. In my nearly 39
    years of Active Duty, I observed, as most people do, that the
    first dollar always goes for mission and for people. In very
    tightly constrained budgets, typically what--the practice has
    been to defer those maintenance issues, move them to the right
    and accept risk. At some point, you know, you just have to stop
    accepting risk and get on with the business of repairing the
    facility that you have, because it does create these types of
    safety or security concerns that falling tiles or other
    deficiencies in the infrastructure create.
        Senator Sessions. Well, sometimes it has to be done, and it
    has to be spent, but--just briefly, again, so the 5.2 billion
    was not in the last year's FYDP. This is a new request from the
    Secretary, and he emphasizes infrastructure, which I assume
    means buildings and that kind of thing.
        General Klotz. Our emphasis has been on dealing with the--
    what we see as a coming bow wave in expenses to make sure that
    the nuclear security enterprise is able to be responsive for
    the longer term. We've just--DOD has talked a lot about the bow
    wave that it faces. We have a similar bow wave, although, in
    absolute terms, it's much smaller than the DOD's. But, relative
    to our overall budget, it's fairly significant.
        That's--you know, I think the Secretary--I can't speak to
    what was in the Wall Street Journal editorial, and I can't
    speak to what was supposed to be a private letter between the
    Secretary and the OMB [Office of Management and Budget]
    Director, but I can say that----
        Senator Sessions. This was a private leak letter?
        General Klotz. It----
        Senator Sessions. You don't know.
        General Klotz. I don't know. I have to speak to the budget,
    as presented----
        Senator Sessions. Right.
        General Klotz.--to----
        Senator Sessions. I understand that.
        General Klotz.--by the President to----
        Senator Sessions. So----
        General Klotz.--to this committee.
        Senator Sessions. Well, I've expressed my concern. We'll
    just to look at it, because we're in a tight budget time.
        General Klotz. But, we certainly want to work with your
    subcommittee, your committee, and your staff as we--now that we
    have submitted the fiscal year 2017 budget, we are--these
    people are already hard at work on building the fiscal year
    2018 budget. I commit to work very closely with you and with
    your staff as we parse out these various requirements, as we
    see them, from fiscal year 2018 on.
        Senator Sessions. All right. Thank you.
        Senator Donnelly.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Ms. Harrington, I noted in the budget a significant
    decrease in the funding for nonproliferation activities. When
    you look at that--you know, obviously it has to do with the
    Russians. Could you explain exactly what's driving that and how
    we got to that point?
        Ms. Harrington. The decrease of work with the Russians is
    certainly part of the decrease overall. But, since March of
    2014, when Russia illegally annexed Crimea, and the
    disturbances they have continued to cause in eastern Ukraine
    since then, violations of the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear
    Forces] Treaty,--and the list, unfortunately, goes on and on,
    in terms of Russia's recent behavior--part of that behavior has
    been to declare that they are no longer in need of cooperative
    work with us to secure their facilities. We continue to work,
    where we can, on prior-year money. But, as you know, in 2015
    and 2016, we have a prohibition, in our authorization, against
    using any appropriated funds for projects in Russia.
        Senator Donnelly. Do you think that this slowdown--these
    actions by the Russians--do you think it increases the risk
    portfolio that's out there as to us?
        Ms. Harrington. We believe, absolutely, that that is the
    case.
        Senator Donnelly. Okay.
        General Klotz, in regard to the plutonium facilities at Los
    Alamos, what is the status at the present time? Do we have the
    funding, over the next 5 years, we need for the modules
    necessary to achieve a sustainable range of 50 to 80 pits per
    year?
        General Klotz. The short answer is no, not yet. But, let me
    say that we are in the process of doing a significant amount of
    work at Los Alamos in order to get out of the old chemical and
    metallurgical building where we've been doing a lot of the
    analytical chemistry and material characterization associated
    with plutonium operations. There are two buildings there. One's
    called PF-4, the other one's called the Radiation Laboratory,
    which we are repurposing the space that's there, moving things
    around so that we can get out of that building by 2019.
        For the longer term, we are convinced that we will need an
    approach to have additional space and safety basis in the
    buildings to do--to meet the congressional requirement to do--
    show a capacity of 50 to 80 pits by 2027. We--I have signed
    out, this past year, a--what we call a mission need, critical
    decision zero document, saying that we need to have an--the
    additional capacity. We are launching an analysis of
    alternatives, one of which might be the modules.
        For that reason, the money that you see in the out years
    under the plutonium lines within our budget basically show a
    wedge for what would be necessary to build the modules, of 12
    million a year. We will have to come back to OMB, to the
    Congress, after we have done this analysis of alternatives, and
    after we have done the independent cost reviews of what it
    would cost to do what alternative we feel is the best, before
    we can load in significant numbers that have some credibility.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
        Admiral Caldwell, we are in the middle of working on the
    design and engineering of the reactor and the fuel for the
    Ohio-class replacement submarine, which will have a 40-year
    life of core fuel and electric drive. In regards to this
    program, how are we doing on the timeframe right now, on
    schedule, and when do you expect completion?
        Admiral Caldwell. Sir, thanks for the question. I would
    like--just like to say, this is my first opportunity to appear
    before this subcommittee.
        Senator Donnelly. Oh, we have a bunch of questions----
        [Laughter.]
        Admiral Caldwell. I'm so honored to be here.
        We have enjoyed great support from the subcommittee. That's
    enabled the success of the Naval Reactors Program. Your future
    support will be very important to us to continue that path of
    success. Additionally, we have a great relationship with
    members of the subcommittee and, as well, the staff. I endeavor
    to maintain those strong relationships.
        Now, with regards to your question of the Ohio-class
    replacement submarine. We are on track to support the Navy's
    requirements. Those requirements are to start construction in
    2021, to finish that construction in 2028, and to send that
    ship to sea in 2031. That's a tight timeline, especially when
    you consider the size and the scope of building a ship as big
    as Ohio-class replacement. It's two and a half times the size
    of a Virginia-class submarine, and we're going to build it in
    the same timeframe--as the initial Virginia-class--of 7 years.
    That's a tall order. It's a national priority to make sure that
    we do not gap our strategic deterrence coverage at sea.
        Now, Naval Reactors' responsibility is the design and
    eventual procurement of the components for the reactor plant
    and the engine room. To that end, we are progressing well. The
    first challenge is to build the life-of-ship core. We have done
    the design work and we're actually going to de-risk the
    manufacturing of that by installing a technology demonstration
    core in the prototype in New York in 2019. We're on a good path
    to lead us down to getting that life-of-the-ship core, which
    will last 42 years.
        Additionally, the design work that we've done to date is
    putting us on a good path to procure the heavy equipment in
    2019. The other big challenge is the design and eventual
    construction of the electric drive, which will power the
    submarine. We're on a path now with the design work, building
    on decades of experience and knowledge, to prototype the
    electric drive unit and start actual full-scale testing in
    fiscal year 2018. Those are significant milestones for us and
    we're on a good path to get there. In addition, the fiscal year
    2017 budget allows us to continue to progress along these
    timelines. Your support will be essential in our ability to
    meet the Navy's goal of starting construction in 2021.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Admiral.
        Admiral Caldwell. Sir.
        Senator Sessions. Admiral, just briefly, the Ohio--current
    Ohio-class has to be refueled how often?
        Admiral Caldwell. The current Ohio-class has to be refueled
    once in its lifetime, and we're progressing through those
    steadily. We're going to take the life of those ships out to 42
    years. We've sharpened our pencils, done the study, and we're
    going to seek out as much life as we can from those ships.
        Now, for the Ohio-class replacement, not having to refuel
    that submarine will save the Nation approximately $40 billion
    and will restore the operational availability to keep those
    ships at sea where we need them to meet our National
    commitments in terms of strategic deterrence. It also allows us
    to meet our requirements with 12 instead of--with 12 submarines
    instead of the current 14. Again, your support from this
    committee has allowed us to have the technical base and do the
    design work that's enabling all of these things to happen.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Admiral Caldwell. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. Well, we're glad that looks like to be a
    practical and good solution.
        Senator Heinrich.
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
        Let me start, General Klotz, by just saying thank you
    sincerely for coming out to Albuquerque for the interchange
    between SCMC and small businesses last week. We got a lot of
    very positive feedback on that.
        To Dr. Regalbuto, fair warning, I may be asking for
    something similar to happen in the future at WIPP. People think
    we're a small State, but we're very, very large. It's hard to
    cover those bases sometimes in a very territorially large state
    with two labs as well as the WIPP facility.
        I want to jump on something that the Chairman brought up
    with regard to this old infrastructure and deferred
    maintenance, just to put a very fine point on the reality of
    where some of these very talented folks at NNSA are working.
        General Klotz, you and I had a chance to look at the
    Albuquerque-area complex, someplace that approximately 1200
    NNSA employees work at, last week. It's a complex that was
    largely built as dormitories for the Air Force back in 1951.
    There is asbestos problems. We saw hundreds of broken windows.
    This is not a matter of just replacing a few tiles in the
    ceiling. Can you talk a little bit about what some of the
    factors were that drove your decision to seek authorization to
    deal with some of the deferred maintenance and look at a new
    building to replace the NNSA's Albuquerque Complex?
        General Klotz. Thank you very much, Senator, for the
    opportunity--yeah--thank you again for the opportunity to come
    out and interact with the small business leaders in the state
    of New Mexico. It was both productive and actually quite
    enjoyable to engage with them. Thank you also for coming over
    to visit the Albuquerque Complex.
        As you saw, and as you said, we have buildings that were
    essentially 1950s-era Air Force dormitories that we converted
    into office space, so there are multiple problems associated
    with asbestos, with the HVAC [Heating, Ventilation and Air
    Conditioning] systems that don't work. You saw the sprinklers
    that were kind of dropped down from the ceiling that are
    corroding. It's just not the kind of place that you expect a
    quality workforce to have to work in. We need quality work
    spaces for our quality workforce.
        We had considered, over the years, a number of potential
    options to get better working conditions for our people in
    Albuquerque. One of the things we had pursued for a while was
    the potential of a lease option. That's where I came into the
    picture. One of the things that the Secretary--as Mr. Trimble
    has pointed out--has insisted upon, in terms of our project
    management, a very structured, disciplined approach, in terms
    of how we decide to do projects and how we manage projects. One
    of those is to make sure we do an analysis of alternatives. I
    immediately called for an analysis of alternatives for
    Albuquerque Complex, and it worked out that actually buying--
    the Government constructing a facility there made a lot of
    sense, because we can save money, because the land we'll use is
    land already owned by the Government. It is, as you know,
    adjacent to Kirtland Air Force Base, so once construction is
    finished, you can move the fence around, and you save on the
    cost of perimeter security. There are a lot of reasons to go
    forward and do that.
        I appreciate your support in getting some money recolored
    in the fiscal year 2016 omnibus bill, which allowed us to use
    $8 million to begin the initial design. We're requesting, in
    fiscal year 2017, an additional 15 million for completing that
    design. We have a wedge in there, in 2018, of about 50 million,
    but it's going to cost a lot more than that. But, we'll--again,
    that's part of----
        Senator Heinrich. Well----
        General Klotz.--coming to, you know, these independent cost
    estimates to make sure we've got the best value.
        Senator Heinrich. Exactly. I look forward to working with
    you on that. One of the things I learned, local government, in
    working with rating agencies and bond counsel, is that deferred
    maintenance is not fiscal responsibility, it is a growing
    blackmark on your balance sheet that you have to deal with.
        I want to switch gears real quick to the M&O [Management
    and Operating] contracts coming up at Sandia and Los Alamos.
    One of my concerns is just to ask you what your thoughts are on
    making sure that both of these labs are able to remain
    competitive in hiring and retaining the top scientists and
    engineers in key fields, particularly those fields, like
    cybersecurity and others, where the same talent is going to be
    sought by the private sector, and sending the right signals to
    be able to attract that talent in the midst of a new request
    for proposals for M&O contracts.
        General Klotz. Thank you, Senator. That's a very good
    question. I've had an opportunity to read the letter, which the
    three laboratory directors independently have sent to you, and
    they, all three of them, touch on this concern, whether it's at
    Sandia or Los Alamos or at Lawrence Livermore. As I think you
    will have read in there, you know, one of the key things is
    LDRD, Laboratory Directed Research and Development. You know,
    this is a program which allows the lab directors to have brand
    new graduates of our top physics, chemistry, engineering
    programs do work at the lab while they wait for their security
    clearances, while they get integrated into the work of the
    laboratory. There has been pressure over the past to reduce the
    amount of--the percentage of overhead which can be used for
    Laboratory Directed Research and Development. I would--thanks
    to your leadership, we've kind of staunched the problem there.
    But, again, this is something that we need to work at.
        There are other things in the contracts that we typically
    write with our laboratories. We give them flexibility to offer
    hiring bonuses, retention bonuses, incentives, and to engage in
    other activities, like teaching at the University of New
    Mexico, as some of our people do.
        Finally, on these two particular--if and when we get to
    competition on both of these laboratories, one of our new
    procedures in NNSA over the past couple of years is that we
    will send out a draft request for proposal before we send out
    the final request for proposal. That is the opportunity for all
    stakeholders, whether it is the local community, local academic
    institutions, Members of Congress and their staff,
    contractors--potential contractors--to comment on what we have
    put into the draft RFP before we send it out. We'll do that
    with any M&O contracts that we do from now on.
        Senator Heinrich. Great.
        Mr. Chair and Ranking Member Donnelly, I'm pleased that
    General Klotz brought up LDRD. One of the opportunities that we
    have is to fix the sort of double-dinging them for overhead on
    this LDRD, which is really key for attracting new scientists
    into the complex. I think we have a good work--working proposal
    for that, either through the energy bill, where I'm working on
    an amendment, or potentially through the NDAA. I look forward
    to working with you on that.
        Senator Sessions. Very good.
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you.
        Senator Sessions. I know you're on top of this issue.
        Senator Fischer.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I thank the panel for being here today.
        General Klotz, it's good to see you again.
        In the fiscal year 2017 budget request, General, for the
    W80-4 Life Extension Program, we're looking at about 92
    million, or 30 percent, less than the amount that was projected
    in last year's FYNSP. The justification documents note that the
    program, quote, ``will ramp up at a slower place, and planned
    technology maturation activities will be reduced, but the
    slower ramp-up is not expected to impact planned FPU in 2025.''
        With respect to that statement about the technology
    maturation activities, we know, from previous lessons learned,
    that that early technology--those maturation activities, they
    do reduce the risk over the life of a program. I'm questioning
    when we are looking at cutting back on those--would you say
    that's cost avoidance or cost deference?
        General Klotz. If I could, Senator, let me offer a--an
    initial response to that, and then if I could ask General
    Davis, since we brought him all this way----
        [Laughter.]
        General Klotz.--and he is the expert on this.
        Senator Fischer. Okay.
        General Klotz. First of all, one of the reasons why the
    ramp is not as steep as it was--as we projected last year is,
    quite frankly, what programmers would call a fact of life. The
    amount of money we were authorized and appropriated in fiscal
    year 2015 was $10 million. We had asked for $195 million to
    begin the program in earnest in fiscal year 2016, but, as
    you'll recall, we were in a CR for, you know, a good three
    months of that. As a result, we could only spend--we were--
    annually, 10 million, but what that worked out to was 2.5
    million for that three months, because it's allocated
    quarterly. Thankfully, and thanks to your support, the Congress
    passed the full appropriations we had requested of 195 million
    for 2016, but, since we're already three months into the fiscal
    year and we had only been able to spend 2.5, we know we're
    going to have a significant amount of carryover. Given the fact
    that we had to balance a lot of programs against--in our
    portfolio against a cap, we chose to use--cash flow that into
    fiscal year 2017, and so the ramp will pick up again in our
    submission for fiscal year 2018.
        That's--that was the thinking. It was just a business
    decision. We weren't sending any kind of signal. It's still an
    increase in the overall request for the W80-4, because we think
    both the W80-4 and the long-range standoff capability that the
    Air Force is pursuing are extraordinarily important programs
    for America's strategic deterrence.
        Senator Fischer. Before the General speaks--so, you're
    looking at, still, I think, a decrease in what's needed,
    though, correct?
        General Klotz. We still think----
        Senator Fischer. Doesn't that put the completion date out
    even further?
        General Klotz. There will be some increased risk, but we're
    still fairly confident. I noticed that one of the laboratory
    directors indicated that, as well, in her letter, that we're
    still confident we can meet the fiscal year 2025 first
    production unit.
        Senator Fischer. Okay.
        General.
        General Davis. Senator, I'd just add a couple of points to
    General Klotz's comments.
        First, we certainly agree that the value of putting money
    in tech maturation is very important. It reduces risk to
    programs across the portfolio. Had we had the money, we
    certainly would have liked to--applied it to technology
    maturation.
        In this particular case, the cut in fiscal year 2017 of $90
    million actually helps us to fund other technology maturations
    across the NNSA enterprise.
        Senator Fischer. Now, is that due to the carryover----
        General Davis. Well, that is due----
        Senator Fischer.--that was----
        General Davis.--to the carryover. The program couldn't
    spend it, so we basically harvested it from the W80-4, in the
    short term, to apply to technology maturation and surveillance
    activities in fiscal year 2017. I would also add that, in
    fiscal year 2020 and 2021, we will add money back into the
    program.
        Senator Fischer. You're basically hoping that the cost--the
    revenue will come out in the out years, then, for it.
        General Davis. Well, I mean----
        Senator Fischer. You're kind of banking on that in order to
    complete the project in the future by having more revenue----
        General Davis. Well, in this case, the impact to the 80-4
    is really based on the delay of funding and not based on the
    fiscal year 2017 cut. The fiscal year 2017 cut is really a fact
    of life. There's only so much money that we can spend on the
    program in fiscal year 2017.
        Senator Fischer. General----
        General Klotz. But----
        Senator Fischer.--you want to speak, I can see that.
        General Klotz. But, full and consistent funding is
    absolutely critical. If I can say it now, I've--we've said it
    up here before--long-running CRs [continuing resolutions] also
    can play havoc with schedule on any of these programs, because
    that's money that our laboratories cannot use to staff up to do
    the types of work--the procurement--long-lead procurements that
    they need to do.
        Senator Fischer. If I could, Mr. Chairman.
        When you speak about the impact of the CR and staffing up,
    could you--do you have any idea, just off the cuff here, on how
    many positions that you would be losing due to a CR and not
    being able to move ahead on programs?
        General Klotz. I'd--Senator, I think we would have to look
    at that by individual programs. I know, in the case of the W80-
    4, a lot of that money in the 195 was for Lawrence Livermore to
    begin to staff up to do the work on the W80-4. They had to
    delay some of that until they had the money in the bank to do
    that. Then, oh, by the way, there's also an issue with a
    backlog of security clearances, as well. That's the fact of
    life that they have to deal with.
        Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you.
        General Klotz. As you get further--as the program gets more
    mature, then it becomes an issue of, you know, procuring items
    that you need to actually do--to do the work.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        Senator Sessions. Senator King.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I'm going to take it from the detail to much higher level.
        One of the common questions I get in Maine, people are all
    concerned about the deficit and the debt that we're leaving our
    children. It's scandalous, but that's another discussion. But,
    one of the questions I get is, ``Why are we modernizing nuclear
    weapons? Why are we building brand new submarines, new
    bombers?'' I think I know the answer to that, but, General
    Klotz, you want to take a pass at that? You're talking at a--
    you know, to a group of my constituents in Topsham, Maine. Tell
    them why we need to be spending all this money, $12 billion
    just in your budget, and that doesn't count Ohio-class
    replacement, long-range strike bomber. You know, and they say,
    ``Well, the Cold War was over a long time ago. Why are we doing
    this?''
        General Klotz. Well, Senator, it's true, the Cold War was
    over a long time ago, but we still live in a very dangerous,
    complex world, and nuclear weapons still exist in other
    countries besides the United States. As long as those nuclear
    weapons exist, we need to maintain a capability to deter their
    possible use against the United States or our friends and
    allies across the world. The way you deter the use of nuclear
    weapons that we've--we have--the path we have followed for
    several decades is to have the--a nuclear deterrent of our own
    to act as a repose to that. As long as you have nuclear
    weapons, you have to make sure that--as I've said earlier, they
    have to be safe, we have to have confidence that they will
    not--there will not be accidents resulting with them, that
    they'll be secure, that nobody can steal them, and they have to
    be effective, because a deterrent is only credible if it can
    be--if it's capable of being carried out.
        These weapons that we have now--I'll just talk about the
    warheads, but not the delivery systems--our stockpile, average
    age, is the oldest it's ever been since the beginning of the
    Atomic Age. Nuclear weapons, you know, are made up of an--you
    know, inert material, but it's still material that's subject to
    age and the various effects associated with age.
        Senator King. Of course, it's complicated by the fact that
    we can't test them.
        General Klotz. We can do a pretty good job now, by virtue
    of the Stockpile Stewardship Program, where we conduct
    diagnostic experiments on various components associated with
    the nuclear weapons. We put that data, along with the data from
    1,054 nuclear tests that we did conduct when we were still
    actively testing, up until 1992, and put them together, put
    them in algorithms that we run on high-performance computers,
    and we have a very good sense, based on that, on how these
    weapons age or, if we make a decision that we have to
    manufacture a particular subcomponent of a nuclear weapon
    because the original manufacturer is out of business or the
    material they use is no longer available, or there's a cheaper,
    faster way to make it, that we can certify that--using that
    component as we do a life extension program.
        Senator King. I appreciate your answer. That's essentially
    the answer I give. But, I think it's important for policymakers
    at a high level to have this discussion so the public does
    understand--the only thing worse than nuclear weapons is not
    having them and have other people have them and use them, and
    the deterrent--deterrence has worked for 80 years--70 years.
        Admiral Caldwell, let me turn to a different question. On
    questions of modernization, and particularly with the Ohio-
    class submarine, it concerns me that these projects are now
    taking so long from conception to construction that they are
    obsolete the day they come off the line. To what extent are you
    all considering that fact and building--the term I use is
    modularization--I don't--there may be a better term--but, ways
    that we can upgrade easily without having to go back and say,
    ``Well, we need a third generation of Ohio-class submarine''?
    Do you see what I'm saying? A platform that can be changed out
    and modernized without a new platform being conceived and
    built. Is this part of your design strategy?
        Admiral Caldwell. Well, sir, I can talk about the Naval
    Reactors portion of this.
        Senator King. Right.
        Admiral Caldwell. Then I can give you some thoughts on my
    experience as a submariner.
        I think the proof is in the history of what Naval Reactors
    has done. Our platforms, we are using them much longer today
    than we ever intended to. For example, I talked about the
    current Trident-class that was not designed to be around as
    long as it is today, but we designed it with toughness and high
    quality, and we're taking that out to 42 years of operation. I
    said 40 earlier. I meant--it's 42 years. That's longer than
    we've operated any class of submarines before. Likewise, with
    our Los Angeles-class submarines, we've been able to extend the
    life on those ships, as well. We have a few in the inventory
    now that are out at 36 years and still operating. These were
    ships that were built at the--during the Cold War, designed to
    run in the Cold War, and are now operating all around the
    world, answering the Nation's needs. I think--and then I'll
    give you one final point on that. The two prototype reactors we
    operate in Charleston, where we train students, those are 52
    years old. We are operating those plants much longer than we
    ever thought, in a way we never thought we were going to, to
    train students. They're the oldest pressurized water reactor
    plants in the world, and they're operating well. I've inspected
    them personally.
        Senator King.--would probably recognize them if he stumbled
    into the----
        Admiral Caldwell. Well, they're--no, I would dispute that.
    I think they are in great shape, and they're--they look
    terrific. I've inspected them myself. They're still turning out
    students. This is all because we built them toughly, we
    designed them the right way, and we're manning them and
    maintaining them the right way. The reactor plant, I can tell
    you, we build them to last, and we--and we're doing that with
    the Ohio-class replacement, as well. We're taking the lessons
    that we've learned, and we're making it better.
        On the forward end of the ship, we've done things like
    taking off-the-shelf technology--commercial off-the-shelf
    technology. Our sonar, fire control, and electronic support
    systems are all upgradable. We're taking an old submarine, like
    the one I served when I commanded Jacksonville--that ship has a
    modern fire control and sonar system that would rival any
    submarine in the world. I think we're on a good path, sir.
        Senator King. Good.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Senator Graham.
        Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Let's talk MOX.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Graham. Okay.
        General Klotz. I'm not surprised.
        Senator Graham. All right. Let's inform the committee----
        Senator Sessions. There was a gasp when you came in the
    room.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Graham. Yeah. Yeah.
        General Klotz. We were doing so well.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Donnelly. Actually, Senator Sessions said to me,
    ``Here comes Justice Graham.''
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Graham. Yeah. General Sessions. I like that. You
    know, you used to be attorney general.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Graham. The MOX program is designed to take 34
    metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium and turn it into
    commercial-grade fuel. Is that right?
        General Klotz. That's correct.
        Senator Graham. That 34 metric tons of weapons-grade
    plutonium could create thousands of warheads.
        General Klotz. Yes.
        Senator Graham. Is that right?
        General Klotz. Yes.
        Senator Graham. The Russians are going to take 34 metric
    tons of weapons-grade plutonium and do what with it?
        General Klotz. Under the Plutonium Management Disposition
    Agreement, which you are very familiar with, Senator, that we
    signed with the Russians around 2000, they will do the same.
        Senator Graham. They going to MOX it?
        General Klotz. They're going to----
        Senator Graham. Fast breeder reactor, right?
        General Klotz. Yeah, fast breeder reactor. Or----
        Senator Graham. Okay. They're going to dispose of it, but
    just a different way.
        General Klotz. Yeah, we--we're going to use light water--
    pressurized water----
        Senator Graham. Right.
        General Klotz.--reactors to burn MOX fuel.
        Senator Graham. This is a good thing.
        General Klotz. Getting rid of 34 metric tons of----
        Senator Graham. Yeah.
        General Klotz.--plutonium is a good thing.
        Senator Graham. Yeah, it's a good thing for Russia to
    dispose of their excess weapons plutonium. It's a good thing
    for us to do that.
        General Klotz. Yes.
        Senator Graham. Probably one of the biggest
    nonproliferation success stories in modern times?
        General Klotz. It is--certainly ranks up there.
        Senator Graham. Okay. In 2010, we signed an agreement with
    the Russians, right?
        General Klotz. We modified an agreement----
        Senator Graham. Modified an agreement.
        General Klotz.--in 2010.
        Senator Graham. In 2010, they said they would use the fast
    breeder reactor system, and we said okay.
        General Klotz. Yes, Senator, that is correct.
        Senator Graham. We told them we were to MOX it. We're going
    to take the plutonium pits, we're going to send everything to
    South Carolina, create a MOX facility, lend the weapons-grade
    plutonium down to commercial-grade fuel, and that was our
    pathway forward, right?
        General Klotz. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. Okay. Now we come to find that the MOX
    program is, by some--in some people's estimation, cost-
    prohibitive. Is that right?
        General Klotz. That is correct.
        Senator Graham. Who, in 2010, picked this program? Why did
    they not know it was cost-prohibitive in 2010? Has anybody been
    fired?
        General Klotz. That, I don't know. I was doing other
    things----
        Senator Graham. Okay.
        General Klotz.--in 2010.
        Senator Graham. Here's what I want the committee to
    understand. We had an agreement that's really good for the
    world. We picked a methodology, to dispose of the plutonium,
    that had been vetted for about a decade. MOX was chosen because
    it was an option that would work. The Russians were okay with
    the MOX program. Our government, in Republican and Democratic
    administrations, chose MOX over all other alternatives. Five
    years later, we're talking about canceling the program when
    it's 60 percent complete.
        Have we talked to the Russians at all about what would
    happen if we changed the disposition plan?
        General Klotz. We have had informal discussions with our
    counterparts in Rosatom.
        Senator Graham. Who makes the decision in Russia as to
    whether or not they would accept a change?
        General Klotz. I can only base that based on having served
    in Moscow for two years in our Embassy, and I would say, like
    in the United States, it would be an interagency process that
    would involve Rosatom----
        Senator Graham. We don't know who the final approval
    authority is.
        General Klotz. I would suspect it would be the Ministry of
    Foreign Affairs----
        Senator Graham. Okay, right.
        General Klotz.--because they're the ones who negotiated
    at--with the State Department.
        Senator Graham. Okay. The new disposition plan is what?
        General Klotz. The new--our preferred approach, because we
    think it's faster and cheaper, would be to dilute the excess
    plutonium in a----
        Senator Graham. Would that require the Russians to agree to
    that change?
        General Klotz. The Plutonium Management Disposition
    Agreement says that you will dispose of this by irradiation or
    other means, as agreed by the----
        Senator Graham. Does that require their approval?
        General Klotz. That's a fair reading of the----
        Senator Graham. We'd have to get the Russians to sign up.
    When you dilute it down, where do you send it?
        General Klotz. We would send it to either WIPP or a
    repository like WIPP. We already have----
        Senator Graham. Where is that at?
        General Klotz. The weapon--the Waste Isolation----
        Senator Graham. What State?
        General Klotz.--Pilot Plant----
        Senator Graham. What state is it in?
        General Klotz. In the great state of New Mexico.
        Senator Graham. Have you talked to anybody in New Mexico
    about would they accept this material?
        General Klotz. Yes.
        Senator Graham. What did they say?
        General Klotz. You will find the local communities are
    quite willing to----
        Senator Graham. Do the local communities decide?
        General Klotz. I can't speak to all of New Mexico's----
        Senator Graham. All I'm telling the committee is, you're
    talking about sending it to New Mexico, and people in Mexico
    are at least divided. Have you talked to the two Senators in
    New Mexico?
        General Klotz. I personally have not.
        Senator Graham. Don't you think it would be important to
    get their input?
        General Klotz. That's where we are now.
        Senator Graham. Okay. It's only cheaper if it works.
        General Klotz. Well, we--that is a fair point, but we--
    we're quite confident this will work. There's already----
        Senator Graham. Well, are you quite confident that people
    in New Mexico will accept the product?
        General Klotz. There's already five million metric--five
    metric----
        Senator Graham. That's not the question.
        General Klotz.--five metric tons there.
        Senator Graham. Are you confident that the people in New
    Mexico will buy into what you're proposing?
        General Klotz. If you're asking Frank Klotz's personal
    opinion, the answer is yes.
        Senator Graham. Okay. Tell me what the two Senators said
    when you talked to them about it.
        General Klotz. No, I said I had not yet talked to them----
        Senator Graham. Well, how in the world can you say that
    Mexico--New Mexico's okay, when you haven't talked to the two
    Senators? Because I've talked to both of them, and they're not
    okay. We're going to go from one extreme to the other. What law
    has to be changed to make this happen?
        General Klotz. There would have to be--and, of course,
    Monica, since she has responsibility for WIPP, is probably
    better----
        Senator Graham. Would any laws have to be changed to make
    this accommodation?
        Dr. Regalbuto. It will require program modification and
    approval by the----
        Senator Graham. Okay. Have you told me what it would be? Do
    we have the votes for it? What does it look like?
        Dr. Regalbuto. There has been no record of decision to----
        Senator Graham. Okay.
        Dr. Regalbuto.--do any of this.
        Senator Graham. What we're doing is stopping a program that
    there's questions about the actual cost, we're coming up with
    an alternative that nobody has any idea if it'll work. The
    Russians are not on board. Nobody's really run this through the
    Russian system. New Mexico, which would be the new site for
    disposal, hasn't been consulted. There are legal changes that I
    don't know if we could accommodate, or not. We don't know if it
    works. Other than that, this is a good plan.
        General Klotz. We think it's an excellent plan, in----
        Senator Graham. I think it's a lousy plan.
        General Klotz.--in the sense that----
        Senator Graham. Let me just----
        General Klotz. Okay.
        Senator Graham. I think this is going--this is what's wrong
    with the Government. Somebody five years ago--please indulge
    me----
        General Klotz. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham.--came up with a disposition plan that now
    they say costs way too much, and it's 60 percent complete. Who
    the hell decided that it would work, to begin with? Not one
    person's been fired. Sixty percent of it's done. Now we're
    going to change horses and come up with a plan I don't--have
    zero confidence in. Nobody's run this through the New Mexico
    traps, nobody's talked to the Russians. We don't even know if
    this is--has a remote chance of happening, and we're going to
    stop this program, with no alternative, in my view. This is
    exactly what's wrong with the Government.
        If you could prove to me there's a better, cheaper way to
    do this that meets our goals, I'm all for it. But, what you've
    done to the state of South Carolina is get us to sign up for a
    pig in a poke. I spent a lot of political capital convincing
    the people of South Carolina this is a good mission for us and
    the country, to take 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium,
    which is not a popular thing to ask your state to do, with the
    understanding there was a pathway forward, that we would do a
    certain thing with this weapons-grade plutonium, be good for
    the site, be good for the Nation. We're 60 percent complete,
    and they're going to stop it, with no alternative. This is
    what's wrong with the Government.
        I don't know how we fix this, but somebody needs to be
    fired for putting this in motion. I have very little confidence
    that the Russians are going to agree without a heavy price to
    be paid. This is not the time to go to the Russians and ask for
    a favor. I've got almost zero confidence that New Mexico's on
    board, because nobody's really vetted this. When it comes to
    changing the program, I just don't know how it would work,
    legally. You're going to get sued by everybody when you start
    over.
        We're in a mess. It's not the General's fault, like you
    all. But, this is an example of the Government just completely
    out of touch with reality. Anybody in the private sector would
    be fired. If you had a company, and they made this proposal to
    the company board, and, halfway through, 60 percent through,
    you said, ``Well, it won't work,'' somebody would be fired.
        Somebody needs to be fired.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. Well, Senator Graham has been involved in
    these issues for a long time. He has worked with South Carolina
    to help us save a good deal of money in cleanup.
        Senator Graham. Sixteen billion dollars.
        Senator Sessions. Sixteen billion dollars. We're a long--
    this is not a good deal. Maybe, Mr. Trimble, could GAO tell us
    who made the recommendation, when they made it, and would you
    report back to us to that effect? Or maybe you know already.
        Mr. Trimble. I can take that question back. We may have
    some of the earlier documentation on the Analysis of
    Alternatives that was done in the past. I have some
    recollection of seeing it, but I can't recall the answers to
    that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        DOE's actions to change from the MOX approach to the dilute and
    dispose approach for the disposition of 34 metric tons of surplus
    weapons grade plutonium started with the President's fiscal year 2014
    budget, in which DOE stated that it would slow down MOX Fuel
    Fabrication construction, and culminated with the President's fiscal
    year 2017 budget request, in which DOE requested to terminate this
    project. DOE's major actions and timeframes for its decision are
    explained below:

          In the fiscal year 2014 budget request, DOE stated that
    it will slow down the construction of the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility
    as it will assess the feasibility of alternative plutonium disposition
    strategies.
          In April 2014, the department completed an analysis of
    alternative disposition options in its 2014 Plutonium Disposition
    Working Group Report. This analysis found that the dilute and dispose
    alternative would be significantly less expensive than the MOX approach
    and would face fewer technical risks. The report, however, reached this
    conclusion based on a life-cycle cost estimate for the dilute and
    dispose approach that had a high level of uncertainty and a life-cycle
    cost estimate for the MOX approach that we found to be unreliable in a
    prior GAO report (GAO-14-231).
          In the President's fiscal year 2015 budget request, DOE
    asked to place the MOX facility construction in cold standby, while DOE
    determined an alternative approach. However, in its fiscal year 2015
    appropriations, Congress decided to continue to allocate $350 million a
    year for construction activities for the MOX facility.
          In response to a congressional request, DOE contracted
    with the Aerospace Corporation to assess the validity of the Plutonium
    Working Group's analysis and findings. In April 2015, Aerospace issued
    a report that also found that the dilute and dispose approach would be
    less costly than the MOX approach.
          The Secretary of Energy requested that an independent
    team at Oak Ridge National Laboratory determine what the preferred
    approach for the Plutonium Disposition Program should be. In August
    2015, the resulting report, known as the Red Team report, concluded
    that the dilute and dispose approach was the preferred approach due to
    lower technical risks and lower costs.
          In February 2016, DOE proposed in the President's fiscal
    year 2017 congressional budget request to terminate its MOX facility
    construction project. The request stated that its MOX fuel approach to
    dispose of 34 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium will be
    significantly more expensive than anticipated. Instead, NNSA proposed
    to focus on the alternative approach of diluting the surplus plutonium
    and disposing of it in a geologic repository.

        General Klotz. But, may I say, this is the President's
    proposal. When I used to teach political science at the Air
    Force Academy, the saying was, you know, ``The executive branch
    proposes, the Congress disposes.'' This is the proposal that we
    have made. We've laid out our reasons, in terms of cost and
    risk associated with it. We've tried to make the best case.
    We've done the best we can do----
        Senator Graham. General, I'm not blaming you. I mean, you
    came on after all this happened.
        General Klotz. Yeah.
        Senator Graham. Somebody set in motion a system that they
    completely--either the people now saying it costs too much
    don't know what they're talking about or the person that said
    that it will work didn't know what they were talking about.
    Somebody's wrong. I want to get to the bottom of it, because we
    did save $16 billion, Mr. Chairman, under your leadership, by
    taking high-level waste and leaving part of it in the tanks.
    Instead of scraping it completely clean, we accepted some high-
    level waste by putting concrete in the bottom. It didn't
    pollute our environment. I had to fight every environmentalist
    in the Southeast, but it saved $16 billion, and it was good for
    the Government, it didn't hurt my state. I'm very open-minded
    about being reasonable. I just feel like that we're not being
    treated fairly. That's all I'm saying.
        Senator Sessions. I understand.
        General Klotz--well, we just had, before you came,
    testimony that from 2011 to 2015 we've spent $23 billion in
    additional for cleanup, but now we've got a new estimate that
    said the total cost is going to be 77 billion more than we
    estimated. We didn't make any progress. We're still falling
    further behind.
        But, General Klotz, on--in terms of money expended, what is
    the percentage of the money, do you know, on the MOX facility
    in South Carolina?
        General Klotz. I do. If I could turn to that.
        First of all, the MOX project is more than just the
    facility which we've been discussing, which is the MOX Fuel
    Fabrication Facility. It also includes a number of other
    facilities, one of which has been completed at South Carolina,
    called the Waste Solidification Building. So far, we have spent
    $4.8 billion on the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility itself. The
    estimates of what it will cost to complete that facility alone
    vary as to whether you're using the Army Corps of Engineers or
    MOX Services--that's the contractor--or a series of about three
    different reports which have been done over the last couple of
    years within DOE by a red team chaired by Dr. Tom Mason of Oak
    Ridge National Laboratory and by Aerospace Corporation. Some of
    those numbers vary, you know, as high as $21 billion for the
    total project cost for that.
        Now, we estimate costs complete by virtue of--percentage
    complete--strictly on cost. I know there's different ways of
    doing that. When we say it's a certain percentage, it is that
    4.8 divided by the total amount that is needed for the whole
    project.
        Senator Graham. Mr. Chairman, I don't mean to belabor this,
    but I'd invite everybody to spend--I can show you this. Seventy
    six--70 percent complete, according to the--I can show you the
    facility. It's a big, massive thing. I'll be glad to show it to
    you. If there's a better way of doing it, I want to know what
    that is. Will it actually work?
        Senator Donnelly. We talk about 23 billion spent, 77
    billion to go, and then we talk about 70 percent complete. How
    do the numbers match up?
        Mr. Trimble?
        Mr. Trimble. I would have to--to give you an intelligent
    answer, I'd do it for the record. There's been multiple--as has
    been said, there have been multiple estimates in recent years.
    You have a challenge of doing apples to apples in comparing
    those numbers, because they're at different times, and
    sometimes they're addressing different ranges.
        [The information refereed to follows:]

        EM does not manage the MOX project. DOE's Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation program is responsible for the MOX project and the
    Plutonium Disposition Program. The environmental liability for DOE's
    plutonium disposition plan is $29 billion, but this figure includes
    more than just the MOX construction costs. It also includes the
    lifecycle operations of MOX and other facilities needed to complete the
    plutonium disposition program. Overall, DOE's environmental liability
    increased in 2016 by about $32 billion compared to 2015, and potential
    cost increases to the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility were part of this
    growth in the liability.

        Senator Donnelly. I understand that, and I understand about
    inflation, and this and that. But, if we're 70 percent
    complete, how come we still have 75 percent of the cost to go?
    And----
        Mr. Trimble. Yeah. Well, I think there's disagreement or
    difference of opinion whether it's 70 percent complete.
        Senator Sessions. Well, this is a matter we're going to
    need to wrestle with. But, what I was saying about the 77
    billion in estimated increase in cleanup cost, does that
    include, Dr. Regalbuto, the MOX facility cost?
        Dr. Regalbuto. No, it does not include the cost of the
    activity in that facility at the end of mission.
        Senator Sessions. All right. Well----
        Senator Graham. I share your----
        Senator Sessions. We've got to get a grasp on this. What I
    want you to know, Department of Energy, is that, for $1
    billion, we can maintain 10,000 soldiers. We're giving pink
    slips to people who want to stay in the military, because we
    don't have a billion dollars to keep them on duty. We just
    waltz in and now we go $77 billion more than we estimated, 240
    billion for cleanup by 2075, and we've got this problem in
    South Carolina that I think we need to find out how it
    happened.
        Senator Graham. Yeah.
        Senator Sessions. Who--maybe they've got a perfectly
    reasonable excuse, but I think we just can't blithely walk on
    and waltz into this committee and say, ``We've just changed our
    mind.'' I mean, I just really feel like that. General Klotz,
    I'll let you comment, and anyone else that wants to, but----
        General Klotz. Well----
        Senator Sessions.--we have to stop. But, Senator Graham is
    correctly challenging and asking some legitimate information. I
    know our committee will want to look at it. We may have to make
    a tough decision and say, Senator Graham, sorry. But----
        Senator Graham. I get that, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions.--he's entitled to have a clear answer.
        Senator Graham. Yeah. All I'm saying is, if there's better
    way of doing it, I want to know, Will it work? Stopping the
    program without an alternative is not saving money, it's just
    putting in jeopardy all the things we've accomplished. Nobody
    can tell you, or me, that there is a viable alternative,
    because they haven't run the traps. Nobody's talked to the
    people in New Mexico. Nobody knows what the Russians are going
    to do. At the end of the day, nobody knows what kind of legal
    changes you have to make, and are they possible. Other than
    that, we're in a good spot. We're stopping a program, whether
    it is--go look at it, I'll show you the facility--and saying
    we're going to start all over again. How can that happen, and
    nobody get fired?
        General Klotz. Well, we're concerned about the cost, as
    well. As we look out for the longer term, the reports we've
    done indicate that, you know, this whole thing--not just the
    construction of the facility, but to operate the whole MOX
    chain--could cost us anywhere from 800 to a billion dollars a
    year for many, many years to come.
        Senator Graham. Why didn't they know that in 2010?
        General Klotz. Again, I wasn't here, Senator, in 2010. I
    share your frustration.
        Senator Sessions. Ms. Harrington, you were here in 2010.
        General Klotz. But, the----
        [Laughter.]
        General Klotz. But, it's a----
        Senator Graham. I mean, who----
        General Klotz. But, it's----
        Senator Graham.--signed this deal?
        General Klotz. But, it's an opportunity cost. I mean, this
    comes out of, as you know, an NNSA budget that's only 12 to 13
    billion dollars. There's a lot of other needs in that, as well
    as in the larger defense 050 accounts.
        Senator Graham. But, you agree with me, if you don't have
    an alternative, it's not a good idea.
        General Klotz. Well, we think we do have an alternative.
    There we----
        Senator Graham. I've written----
        General Klotz.--disagree.
        Senator Graham.--a letter about the three questions. Will
    New Mexico take it? Do you need legal changes? Are they--can
    you accomplish it? Do the Russians agree? If they don't agree--
    if they do agree, what price do we have to pay to get the
    Russians on board? We're changing an agreement with the
    Russians. This is a fundamental change in the agreement. I need
    the answer to those three things before I can go back to South
    Carolina and tell the people that I represent that we've been
    fairly treated.
        Senator Sessions. That it?
        Well, thank you all.
        Is there any other question the members of the committee
    have on any other subject?
        Senator King?
        Senator King. I'm--I apologize for being late. We had
    another Armed Services Subcommittee meeting at the same time,
    on personnel. Easy problem: healthcare. Nothing to that.
        Is there a timeline and a price tag on the overall nuclear
    modernization project? In other words, do we have--does there
    exist a, ``Here's what we have to do. Here's how long it's
    going to take. Here's how much it's going to cost''?
        General Klotz. Yes, sir, I believe it is. I assume you're
    including the whole--the DOD part of that, because that's the
    largest part of----
        Senator King. Sure.
        General Klotz.--of this. I don't have it with me, but I
    know, when we testified before this subcommittee last year, the
    DOD came over with a chart that showed their projections of the
    cost, and ours added into it. I will--I hasten to add that the
    NNSA portion of that is a very small percentage of the----
        Senator King. But, I think it would be helpful----
        General Klotz. Yeah.
        Senator King.--for us to see the----
        General Klotz. Yeah.
        Senator King.--the big----
        General Klotz. There is.
        Senator King.--the overall picture of what----
        General Klotz. Yeah.
        Senator King.--what it is that we're biting off, here.
        General Klotz. Right.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Is there a timeline and a price tag on the overall nuclear
    modernization project? In other words, do we have--does there exist a,
    ``Here's what we have to do. Here's how long it's going to take. Here's
    how much it's going to cost''?
        The graph below shows estimates of out-year budget requirements for
    NNSA Weapons Activities in future dollars.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        The figure displays the relative makeup of the Weapons Activities
    program in terms of its major portfolios for the period fiscal year
    (FY) 2016 through fiscal year 2041 by using program Future Years
    Nuclear Security Program (FYNSP) values for fiscal year 2016 through
    fiscal year 2021 and estimated nominal program costs for fiscal year
    2022 through fiscal year 2041. This information shows the potential
    evolution in program makeup and does not represent the precise costs in
    the out years for any of the portfolios show.
        The potential future cost for the program in the years beyond the
    FYNSP should be interpreted as the range between the red ``high range''
    total lines and the green ``low range'' total lines for Weapons
    Activities shown in the figure. The range of total cost is necessary
    because of the significant uncertainties in the individual components
    that make up the estimate, in particular, for the LEPs and construction
    costs.
        The dashed blank line represents the fiscal year 2017 President's
    budget for fiscal year 2017 through fiscal year 2026, with the fiscal
    year 2026 total escalated for fiscal year 2027 through fiscal year 2041
    at the same 2.25 percent rate used in all the budget requirements
    estimates for those years. This line is intended to reflect the level
    of funding the Weapons Activities program might expect to receive for
    these out years, but is subject to annual adjustment based on the
    results of the programming cycle and interactions with stakeholders.

        Senator King. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. Senator Donnelly.
        Senator Donnelly. Admiral Caldwell, as you look at the
    design of these reactors, the 40-year reactors, and they're
    going to be coming out in the years ahead, they're still--do
    you still have anybody working on looking at it as you go as to
    potential improvements to make it even better? I mean, you have
    a design, but--you know, do you sit down and go, ``Okay, here's
    the design, but we've just discovered this, or we've just
    discovered that''?
        Admiral Caldwell. In answer to your question, sir, there
    are different aspects of the propulsion plant and the reactor
    plant, and there are different answers depending on what
    section you're looking at. For a ship like Ohio-class
    replacement, once we put the fuel in the core and lock it in
    there, that's going to be in there for the remainder of its
    life.
        Senator Donnelly. Right.
        Admiral Caldwell. We're not going to do anything with that.
    Of course, along the way, like we have done with the Trident-
    class submarines, and the 688s, we have modernized the reactor
    instrumentation and made improvements along the way. This is
    all founded on a lot of decades worth of experience in the
    program, and looking at how we make improvements, in terms of
    maintenance operability, the ability to train folks. All of
    those things come together. The way that we do that, sir, is
    through what is--what I refer to as our technical base. This is
    the operations and infrastructure part of our budget, the
    developmental part of our budget, and the program direction.
    This technical base is the flywheel or the engine room for
    everything that we do. It allows us to do the design, the
    analysis, the lifetime support, all the way through disposal.
    That's always part of--that's a big part of our budget
    submission for fiscal year 2017, and it enables us to continue
    to advance the technology to do the research and development,
    and then to eventually apply this technology to the fleet.
        Senator Donnelly. When you look at the 40-year life of the
    submarine, obviously there'll be changes as we move forward
    during that life, changes in knowledge, changes in methods,
    changes in materials. This is not a--set in stone. But, is that
    40-year life something that, at the end, you look and you go,
    ``You know, this boat might well be usable for X number of
    additional years''?
        Admiral Caldwell. We could, and we have done that with the
    Los Angeles-class and the Trident-class, where we got to the
    end, and we looked and did the math and did the calculations,
    looked at the usage on the whole, and looked at the core
    expenditure, and decided that we could get more out of it.
        The other part I would add is that we do ship alterations
    throughout the life of a ship. We might find a valve design
    that works better, or a component that needs to be replaced and
    upgraded. This is the way we do business in the Navy, and it's
    just part of our due process. As we find a system that works
    better, that might have been a maintenance challenge or maybe
    it didn't turn out to operate the way we expected, we'll go
    back to the drawing board and draw on all this experience, and
    we'll do a set of ship alterations to modernize the force.
    Those are going on every day throughout the Navy.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Well, weapon modernization is going on around the world.
    Our potential adversaries, let us say, seem to be fully
    convinced that modernizing and advancing their nuclear weapon
    capacity is good for them, both in terms of deterrence, both in
    terms of securing their national identity, and for a whole lot
    of reasons. We just have to understand that.
        We've done--we were--have been the only nation that hasn't
    been advancing our systems. We're beginning to. I just think we
    have to. We've gone this many years. We have got to get this
    done.
        We are facing a financial challenge in this country. We
    don't have a dollar to waste. If I were running the world, I'd
    say, ``I want to build bombs, and I don't want to build
    buildings.'' But, maybe we have to build buildings. We'll have
    to deal with that. But, we need to keep the--we need to be as
    limited as we can be on that.
        General Klotz, a modernized weapon would be more effective,
    more secure and safe, and be able to be protected from
    terrorists or errors better, too, isn't that true?
        General Klotz. That's right, Mr. Chairman. Every time we
    consider how we're going to go about a life extension program
    for one of our weapons, that's one of the first things we look
    at. What can we take advantage of, in terms of the latest
    developments in technology related to safety and related to
    security that can be injected into the weapon as we extend its
    life?
        Senator Sessions. You have no doubt we'll achieve that as
    we go through this modernization process.
        General Klotz. Yes, sir, that's one of our top priorities.
        Senator Sessions. General Davis, the--former Secretary of
    Defense Perry, who chaired the Nuclear Posture Review
    Commission with Secretary Schlesinger in a very important
    bipartisan commission on December 8th, said, quote, ``Russia is
    embarked on a major buildup of their nuclear arsenal. It seems
    likely that they are developing new bombs with new
    characteristics,'' close quote. I know this is not a classified
    hearing. Can you--what can you tell us about that in an
    unclassified level?
        General Davis. Thank you for the question, Senator. I'm
    certainly not an expert, in my current capacity, on--and I'm
    not up to speed on the current intelligence, but I can tell you
    that it's very clear that all of our adversaries are updating
    their nuclear weapons, along with our allies. I would put the
    Russians, the Chinese, the French, and the U.K. all in the
    batch of folks that are looking at how to update their nuclear
    weapons.
        Senator Sessions. To some degree, we've been behind their
    activities. Is that right? They've been doing this for quite a
    number of years, most of them.
        General Davis. Well, so certainly they've been updating
    their weapons. We are certainly, at this point, updating ours,
    as well, making them more safe, more secure, and more reliable.
    The thing that I'd point out--and you mentioned that that's the
    focus--we're in a very different world than we were when we
    originally designed these weapons. The security environment's
    completely different. We certainly have better technology. We
    need to take the opportunity to incorporate those improvements
    into these weapons.
        Senator Sessions. Well, we wish it were different. We
    absolutely do. We wish that things were continuing to go down,
    like we hoped and saw for quite a number of years. The efforts
    on proliferation, Ms. Harrington, seemed to be making a lot of
    progress. Now we've got more and more nations expanding what
    they have, and other nations moving forward to try to develop
    nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, it's just a fact of our life
    and necessary to defend America.
        Senator Donnelly, you have anything else?
        Thank you all. It was a very valuable hearing. We'll submit
    some written questions, I'm sure, and we would appreciate your
    assistance for the record.
        Thank you very much.
        We are adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:01 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
         interoperable warhead-1: the next big life extension challenge
        1. Senator Sessions. In our report accompanying the fiscal year
    2016 National Defense Authorization Act, the SASC expressed concern
    about maintaining readiness to meet the technical challenges associated
    with the first ever interoperable warhead, designed to replace the W78
    and W88 warheads. The 5 year delay of the IW-I program, from 2025 to
    2030, is regrettable, but affords an opportunity to address the
    important technical challenges associated with designing and producing
    a warhead that can be used on both an ICBM and SLBM. What specifically
    is NNSA doing to address the technical questions associated with the
    IW-I approach (for example, assuring the nuclear package can be used in
    both an ICBM and SLBM warhead)? Are you examining how new design and
    production capabilities could save costs?
        General Klotz. NNSA has undertaken a number of activities in order
    to maintain readiness and meet the technical challenges associated with
    the first ever interoperable warhead (IW). NNSA first conducted studies
    on IW concepts. Complex designs help to exercise a broader range of
    skills, and these studies provided a formidable design challenge for
    weapons designers. Additionally, programs such as the Joint Technology
    Demonstrator exercise the workforce throughout the design, develop,
    manufacture, and prototype lifecycle. This collaborative, United
    States-UK effort would exercise capabilities throughout the weapon
    development process. By looking at the entire development cycle,
    weapons designers are able to exercise a myriad of skills needed for
    the continued support of the nuclear deterrent, as well as isolate
    challenges moving through several stages of the design-and-build
    process. NNSA also began ``Certification Readiness Exercises'' to
    examine potential life extension program (LEP) options early to
    identify and reduce technical LEP risks and to enable LEP certification
    processes. These include hydrodynamic experiments to provide a
    technical assessment of proposed LEP options.
        NNSA used the time during the delay to identify key areas for
    continued technical advancement and technology maturation. Specific
    areas of advancement include fuze technology, nuclear explosive package
    pit production capabilities, new concepts for qualification, safety and
    security technology, and advanced manufacturing technologies. These
    areas will enhance NNSA's ability to design and produce warheads with a
    common nuclear explosive package for intercontinental ballistic missile
    (ICBM) and sea launched ballistic missile (SLBM) delivery platforms.
    Additionally, NNSA is leading the technical development work on the W88
    Alteration (Alt) 370 which the U.S. Air Force Mk21 Replacement Fuze
    leverages. The current technical progress being made on the W88 ALT 370
    and Mk21 Replacement Fuze programs demonstrate the common and adaptable
    design, qualification, and production of fuze components for both the
    ICBM and SLBM applications. Common development of these and other
    technologies for use in multiple programs helps further advance the
    feasibility of the IW-1 interoperability concept.
        NNSA continues to examine how new design and production
    capabilities could save costs, especially in the use of additive
    manufacturing. Implementation of this technology could reduce schedule
    risk, cost, and time to develop, assess, qualify, and certify critical
    deliverables for the stockpile. Continued research and development of
    additive manufacturing capabilities at the present time will offer us a
    path to design, produce, and qualify components more quickly and at a
    lower cost in the future.

        2. Senator Sessions. Do you have a specific list of technical
    challenges that you can provide this committee?
        General Klotz. The greatest challenge currently faced by the IW-1
    program is the need to reconstitute the entire team of technical
    personnel for program restart in fiscal year 2020, due to the
    operational gap resulting from the five-year delay.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Donnelly
                            life extension programs
        3. Senator Donnelly. The Stockpile Stewardship and Management
    Plans, from fiscal year 2014 through fiscal year 2016, have shown sharp
    increases beyond the Five Year National Security Program budget or
    FYNSP. Is NNSA continuously deferring budgets for modernization plans
    to out years beyond the FYNSP? What is the impact of these sharp
    increases on NNSA budgets in the out years?
        General Klotz and General Davis. Several factors can cause sharp
    increases in the budget requirement estimates outside the Future Years
    Nuclear Security Program (FYNSP), including the conduct of multiple
    life extension programs (LEPs) or major alterations to weapon systems
    and modernization of key capabilities and infrastructure. As LEP and
    alterations ramp up to peak funding (typically around the first
    production unit), these activities constitute a significant percentage
    of Weapons Activities (WA) budget requirements. In the current FYNSP
    (from fiscal year 2017-2021), LEPs constitute about 16 percent of the
    total WA budget. Over this same period, LEP funding increases by about
    $580 million (to about $1.9 billion), and constitutes 18 percent of the
    WA total in fiscal year 2021. Beyond the fiscal year 2017 FYNSP period,
    LEP funding holds relatively steady at about $1.8-2 billion for several
    years. NNSA has, with this FYNSP and some of the adjustments to LEP
    first production unit dates in previous FYNSPs, now climbed the LEP
    funding ramp and smoothed the out-year LEP costs.
        All program activities, including LEPs and related capabilities-
    focused construction projects proposed during the programming period
    are subject to particular scrutiny, and resources are allocated based
    on priorities and a balancing of all requirements. Among the highest
    priorities are modernization of stockpile warheads through LEPs and
    modernization of key capabilities, such as for plutonium and uranium.
    NNSA must also sustain the stockpile, the supporting infrastructure,
    and the intellectual capabilities that make stockpile stewardship
    possible. If funding is insufficient to support all proposed high
    priority activities and projects, funding may be slated for the period
    beyond the FYNSP (rather than just assuming that the requirement goes
    away). Many of the construction projects on NNSA's Construction
    Resource Planning list are early in their planning and have not yet
    matured enough to be included in the FYNSP. Many, however, have proven
    sufficiently important to merit being slated for the period immediately
    outside the FYNSP. Resources for these projects are in addition to the
    significant funding already required for the Uranium Processing
    Facility and the Chemical Metallurgical Research Replacement Facility
    project in the out-years.

        4. Senator Donnelly. GAO recently reported that the B61-12 Life
    Extension Program faces ongoing risks that include the weapon's
    potentially being incompatible with the F-35 aircraft. When will it be
    known whether or not the B61-12 and the F-35 are compatible, and how
    does the Air Force plan to mitigate the risk of incompatibility?
        General Klotz and General Davis. NNSA is aggressively working with
    the United States Air Force (USAF) to ensure compatibility with the
    future Block 4.1 Dual Capability Aircraft (DCA) version of the F-35A.
    Representatives from NNSA's B61-12 Life Extension Program (LEP) and the
    USAF Joint Project Officer (JPO) jointly participate in B61-12
    technical interchange meetings and interface working groups to collect
    best available data on early Block 2 aircraft environments and
    interface requirements. This information is used by the National
    Laboratories in developing bomb design and qualification requirements.
    Representatives of the B61-12 LEP also are working with the F-35A JPO
    to test on early developmental and Block 2 production aircraft. To
    date, the program has conducted mechanical fit checks, environmental
    flight tests, and aircraft electrical interface testing to reduce the
    risk of incompatibility. The B61-12 LEP will continue to partner with
    the USAF F-35A JPO to provide updated B61-12 test hardware and bomb
    simulators to facilitate integration and development testing until the
    Block 4.1 DCA aircraft is available for integration and nuclear
    certification testing. This currently is scheduled after the March 2020
    B61-12 First Production Unit.
                            plutonium infrastructure
        5. Senator Donnelly. After cancelling the original Chemistry and
    Metallurgy Research Replacement Facility (CMRR) in 2014 after spending
    nearly $500 million on design activities, the President's fiscal year
    2017 budget is now proposing a new alternative for addressing aging
    plutonium infrastructure--referred to as the modular strategy and made
    up of parts of the CMRR project and proposed modular facilities--which
    together could cost as much as $6 billion, based on a GAO analysis.
        To what extent has DOE ensured the plutonium modular strategy has
    been or will be thoroughly analyzed against competing alternatives?
        General Klotz and General Davis. Since the cancellation of the
    Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) Project Nuclear
    Facility (NF) in 2014, NNSA has adopted and implemented a plutonium
    infrastructure strategy that optimizes existing infrastructure to
    provide analytical chemistry and materials characterization
    capabilities.
        These efforts are being executed as subprojects under the CMRR
    Project.
        The Plutonium Modular Approach (PMA) was developed with the
    recognition that the Plutonium Facility (PF)-4 will be 50 years old in
    2028. Given PF-4's age and the need to produce pits at increased rates
    in the late 2020s, NNSA developed the PMA to address PF-4's lifetime
    and to provide infrastructure to support increased pit production
    requirements.
        NNSA has initiated an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) for the PMA as
    part of pre-Critical Decision (CD)-1 activities, in accordance with DOE
    Order 413.3 billion and Departmental project management guidance. In
    addition, NNSA has implemented new business operating procedures for
    conducting AoAs, which establish a methodical and disciplined process
    that follow all GAO best practices for AoAs. It requires oversight of
    the AoA with participation from organizations outside of the program
    office and an independent review by the NNSA Office of Cost Estimating
    and Program Evaluation to ensure alternatives are thoroughly evaluated
    without bias. Through the AoA, the PMA will be thoroughly analyzed
    against competing alternatives modular alternatives. The AoA will not
    consider alternatives to the modular approach. The resulting preferred
    alternative for the PMA will be reviewed by the DOE Project Management
    Risk Committee and their evaluation of the alternative's risk and
    viability will be sent to the Deputy Secretary for her consideration.

        6. Senator Donnelly. NNSA has justified many of its ongoing and
    proposed plutonium infrastructure projects, including its plutonium
    modular strategy, on the need for additional space to support
    programmatic operations. Has NNSA conducted a comprehensive, complex-
    wide assessment of programmatic plutonium needs and existing facilities
    to validate the need for new infrastructure projects? Does NNSA
    consider program needs NNSA-wide or are infrastructure needs
    assessments only conducted by contractors at the sites?
        General Klotz and General Davis. The NNSA performed a complex-wide
    analysis of plutonium manufacturing activities during Complex
    Transformation efforts and determined in the 2009 Record of Decision
    (ROD) for the Complex Transformation Supplemental Programmatic
    Environmental Impact Statement--Operations Involving Plutonium,
    Uranium, and the Assembly and Disassembly of Nuclear Weapons (73 FR
    77644) that ``Manufacturing and research and development (R&D)
    involving plutonium will remain at the Los Alamos National Laboratory
    (LANL) in New Mexico.'' This ROD continues to frame the analysis of
    plutonium infrastructure and capabilities.
        The Plutonium Modular Approach (PMA) proposal addresses two primary
    mission needs: Plutonium Facility-4's lifetime and the need to meet
    increased production demands in the future, which we believe requires
    an additional footprint. The decision to optimize existing
    infrastructure through new sub-projects in the Chemistry and Metallurgy
    Research Replacement project was based on an evaluation of capabilities
    across the enterprise. The PMA will undergo a rigorous NNSA led
    Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). This AoA will include DOD and other
    external participants. The AOA will evaluate the ability to use
    existing infrastructure to support current and future programmatic
    operation.

        7. Senator Donnelly. NNSA has committed to closing the Chemistry
    and Metallurgy Research building at Los Alamos in 2019. Will all
    plutonium research equipment needed to support pit production and other
    missions be established elsewhere in time to ensure that NNSA can keep
    this commitment without any loss of capability?
        General Klotz and General Davis. NNSA remains committed to ceasing
    programmatic operations in the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research (CMR)
    facility in 2019. Current activities under the Chemistry and Metallurgy
    Research Replacement Project optimize existing facilities to provide
    analytical chemistry (AC) and materials characterization (MC)
    capabilities. We expect the necessary AC and MC capabilities to be in
    place to support mission requirements and do not anticipate their
    availability impacting the cessation of programmatic operations in CMR
    in 2019.
                             uranium infrastructure
        8. Senator Donnelly. NNSA plans to cease operations in Y-12's aged
    9212 building by 2025. NNSA, through its Uranium Strategy, plans to
    replace the uranium processing capabilities of 9212 through a mix of
    new facilities, modifications to existing facilities, and the
    installation of new technologies and processes. Does NNSA currently
    have a total cost estimate for this effort program of activities
    (construction, modifications, and technologies)? If not, when will NNSA
    be able to provide the Committee with a total program cost estimate and
    what processes will NNSA use to manage this program of multiple/phased
    activities?
        General Klotz and General Davis. NNSA is committed to ending
    enriched uranium programmatic operations in Building 9212 and
    delivering the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) by 2025 for no more
    than $6.5 billion. To accomplish this, a subset of Building 9212
    capabilities will be relocated to Buildings 9215 and 9204-2E to
    maximize the use of existing floor space. The remaining Building 9212
    capabilities will be provided by the new UPF no later than 2025.
        To further solidify planning, NNSA will ensure the project achieves
    90 percent design maturity for the nuclear facilities before
    establishing the critical decision cost and schedule baseline,
    scheduled for late 2017.

        9. Senator Donnelly. What is the level of risk that NNSA will not
    be able meet the milestone for ceasing operations in building 9212 by
    2025, and what, if any, are the consequences of delays in meeting this
    particular milestone?
        General Klotz and General Davis. In order to cease enriched uranium
    (EU) programmatic operations in Building 9212 no later than 2025, the
    Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) must be operational and three key
    processes must be relocated to enduring facilities--2 MeV radiography,
    chip cleaning and purified metal production. To support the transition
    of 9212 processes, key technologies including a calciner will be
    employed to further enhance uranium operations.
        NNSA will both construct new, separate buildings as part of the UPF
    project and make investments in enduring buildings. UPF will consist of
    a Main Process Building (MPB), Salvage and Accountability Building
    (SAB), Mechanical and Electrical Building (MEB), and other support
    facilities. Buildings 9215 (machining), 9204-2E (surveillance,
    assembly/disassembly) and 9995 (analytical plant lab) are designated as
    either transitional or enduring facilities with planned upgrades to
    electrical systems, HVAC and equipment controllers. Building 9995
    investments were completed in early fiscal year 2016 to temporarily
    extend its life while a long-term replacement strategy for the
    analytical chemistry services it provides can be studied. Through this
    multipronged approach, NNSA is reducing sources of mission and safety
    risk in the existing plant to ensure that long term EU operations
    continue safely. Continued programmatic operations in building 9212
    beyond 2025 significantly increase these safety and operational risks.
        If UPF is not operational by 2025 and we are unable to pre-produce
    the required mission deliverables, then select 9212 operations, such as
    casting and special oxide production would be required to operate until
    UPF is available.
                      aging facilities and infrastructure
        10. Senator Donnelly. DOE and its predecessor agencies have
    conducted research and production of nuclear weapons for over seventy
    years, and significant portions of the NNSA facilities and
    infrastructure are aging; 29 percent of NNSA's buildings are over 60
    years old. Facing $3.66 billion backlogs in deferred maintenance as of
    fiscal year 2015, of which $497 million is for excess facilities and
    $354 million is for facilities to be excess in 10 years, the Department
    has taken steps to stop the growth of this deferred maintenance
    backlog. What impact, if any, have increased efforts to address
    maintenance backlogs had on NNSA operations? Has NNSA made progress in
    accelerating the decommissioning of excess facilities to reduce
    maintenance costs?
        General Klotz and General Davis. NNSA has increased infrastructure
    Maintenance and Recapitalization investments aimed at reducing the
    greatest safety, security, environmental, and program risk. These
    increased investments during the last few years have allowed us to
    address reliability of our facilities and operations as well as improve
    conditions for safety, productivity, and retention of personnel. If
    funded, NNSA's fiscal year 2017 budget request for additional increases
    in Maintenance and Recapitalization resources would have a positive
    impact on NNSA operations by reducing facility/equipment downtime,
    accelerating recovery time, and increasing productivity by replacing
    obsolete technologies. Continuation of this investment strategy is
    required in order to arrest the declining state of NNSA's
    infrastructure.
        NNSA has made progress in accelerating the decommissioning of
    excess facilities to reduce maintenance costs. In fiscal year 2014 and
    fiscal year 2015, NNSA disposed of Buildings 9744 and 9808 at Y-12. In
    fiscal year 2016, NNSA is disposing of Casa 2 and Casa 3 at Los Alamos
    National Laboratory (LANL), 12 facilities at the Tonopah Test Range in
    Nevada, and several trailers at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
    (LLNL). The fiscal year 2017 budget request provides $247.3 million in
    fiscal year 2017 to address excess facilities by:
          Transferring the Kansas City Bannister Federal Complex to
    the private sector for redevelopment (this would eliminate 2.93 million
    square feet of excess facilities);
          Disposing of the TA-16-430 High Explosives Pressing
    Facility at LANL; and
          Disposing of buildings 9111 and 9112 at Y-12.
        In fiscal year 2015, NNSA completed critical roof repairs at three
    buildings (251, 292, and 175) at LLNL. In fiscal year 2016, NNSA is
    currently on track to fund additional roof repairs at Y-12's Building
    9201-5 (Alpha-5), Building 9204-4 (Beta-4) and Building 9206; fund the
    installation of a temporary power system at Y-12's Beta-4; and invest
    in the characterization of four buildings (280, 292, 251, and 175) at
    LLNL. The fiscal year 2017 request includes funding to conduct
    additional major risk reduction activities at Y-12's Alpha-5 and Beta-
    4.

        11. Senator Donnelly. The fiscal year 2017 NNSA budget request for
    Defense Nuclear Security notes that NNSA now estimates it may need $2
    billion dollars over the next 15 years to address repairs and
    replacement of essential security infrastructure and for PIDAS
    upgrades. Please detail how NNSA developed this estimate? Please
    outline the major elements for repairs and replacement of security
    infrastructure for which this funding is intended.
        General Klotz and General Davis. The $2 billion figure is a rough
    estimate, based primarily upon budget inputs from both Pantex and Y-12,
    with pre-Critical Decision (CD) 0 projects that totaled approximately
    $1.3 billion. NNSA added to that figure a rough estimate of
    approximately $700 million to recapitalize the other six NNSA sites.
    The total cost to refresh all NNSA sites will depend in large part on
    whether that work is conducted through M&O contractors as it is today,
    or awarded to others. The money is to be used in ``refreshing and
    updating'' infrastructure and technology systems or components that in
    many cases are well past their reasonable service life. Work is ongoing
    to assess requirements and prioritize activity. A survey across the
    enterprise has been completed, capturing a detailed list of equipment
    and infrastructure in use at each of our sites, along with its
    condition. Additionally, NNSA has implemented quarterly reporting
    requirements for each site to identify the operational status of its
    equipment with data reflecting adequacy of functionality, such as false
    and nuisance alarm rates.
        All of this information is being assessed to develop a 10-year plan
    to identify replacement/upgrade requirements and to prioritize projects
    for funding and replacement scheduling. The initial focus will be on
    systems elements that are most critical to maintaining our security
    posture for protecting our highest priority assets. Initial costs are
    anticipated to be relatively steep as old systems are identified and
    replaced, with costs eventually leveling out to support a systematic
    refresh plan using life-cycle estimates to ensure high reliability/low
    failure. The 10-year plan to recapitalize the nuclear security
    enterprise's physical security systems is scheduled to be completed not
    later than December 31, 2016. Once the plan is complete, NNSA will
    develop mission need statements and start design activities. As noted
    in the question, major elements for repair and replacement will include
    PIDAS upgrades and associated intrusion detection systems at Pantex and
    Y-12, with other requirements to be based upon analysis of data for the
    10-Year Plan.
                        contract and project management
        12. Senator Donnelly. The Secretary of Energy issued a memo in June
    2015 that seeks to improve the department's less than stellar record in
    managing the design and construction of large nuclear facilities. The
    memo stated that, among other things, all departmental elements were to
    immediately begin using standard, commercial industry best practices
    when developing cost and schedule estimates for its projects. What
    steps are being taken by the department to ensure that the various
    program offices are implementing this requirement? Can you share any
    evidence of improvements in projects cost and schedule estimates?
        General Klotz and General Davis. In response to the Secretary's
    June 2015 policy memorandum, the Department and the National Nuclear
    Security Administration (NNSA) have made changes to various processes
    and policies. First, to address the Secretary's requirement for full
    funding of projects with a Total Project Cost (TPC) of $50 million or
    less, the 2017 budget adheres to this policy. To address the
    requirement of conducting Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) independently
    of the contractor benefiting from the outcome, NNSA has assigned
    responsibility of conducting all AoAs to the responsible Federal
    Program Office with oversight from NNSA's Office of Cost Estimating and
    Program Evaluation (CEPE). A new Business Operating Procedure was
    issued by the Administrator outlining the AoA process and deliverables
    for NNSA.
        NNSA participates in the Department's Project Management Risk
    Committee as a means to institutionalize and share best practices
    across the Department. NNSA also established the Office of Project
    Assessments, reporting directly to the Principal Deputy Administrator,
    ensuring senior leadership visibility and accountability throughout the
    enterprise for project performance. Large nuclear projects will always
    be challenging and NNSA acknowledges that it needs to continue to
    improve its performance in this area.
        NNSA, following the Government Accountability Office (GAO) Cost
    Estimating and Assessment Guide and NNSA's Independent Cost Estimate
    (ICE) Business Operating Procedure (BOP), conducted 8 ICEs during
    fiscal year 2015 and is scheduled to have completed 8 more by the end
    of fiscal year 2016. ICEs are considered an industry best practice.
    These reports provide NNSA senior leadership with assurance that
    estimated project costs are reliable and within the approved funding
    levels.
        Since 2011, NNSA has delivered its approximately $1.4 billion
    project portfolio approximately $73 million (or 5 percent) under
    original budget. The two most recent examples of completed projects
    with improved cost and schedule performance are the $76 million Nuclear
    Facility Risk Reduction Project, which was completed $5.7 million under
    budget and approximately 11 months ahead of schedule and the $65
    million UPF Site Readiness Subproject which was completed approximately
    $20 million under budget and on schedule. Another UPF Subproject, Site
    Infrastructure and Services, is currently on track to deliver under
    budget and ahead of schedule. Both UPF subprojects were acquired using
    Full and Open Competition under Firm Fixed Price Contracts which is
    considered an industry best practice when costs and risks can
    reasonably be estimated and accounted for.
        Independent Project Reviews are conducted at least annually on all
    NNSA projects to ensure they are performing within their cost and
    schedule estimates.

        13. Senator Donnelly. Are there new department requirements also to
    be applied to programs and not just projects?
        General Klotz and General Davis. NNSA has recently established a
    new business operating procedure for conducting an analysis of
    alternatives (AOA), applicable to programs and projects. The new
    procedure establishes a methodical and disciplined process that follows
    all GAO best practices for AoAs. It requires oversight of the AOA with
    participation from organizations outside of the program office and an
    independent review by the NNSA Office of Cost Estimating and Program
    Evaluation to ensure all viable alternatives are thoroughly evaluated.

        14. Senator Donnelly. What is the status of NNSA actions to address
    GAO findings related to NNSA's use of its Contractor Assurance System
    (CAS) to oversee management and operating (M&O) contractors?
        General Klotz and General Davis. NNSA will execute plans to improve
    its governance and oversight of field operations at its laboratories,
    sites, and plants. The new approach will clarify the oversight roles of
    headquarters and field office personnel, placing emphasis on new
    rigorous and dependable CASs. The new CASs more closely mirror the DOE
    Office of Science model, including using peer reviews, incorporating
    corporate parent involvement, and analyzing the strengths of the CASs.
                             international efforts
        15. Senator Donnelly. The Russian Federation and other former
    Soviet states are major partners for the Global Material Security
    program, but recent changes in Russian-United States relations have
    impacted a number of areas of cooperation. In December 2014, Russia
    reduced the scope of work in Russia and announced that an HEU
    downblending program would be discontinued. Over the last year, how
    have NNSA nuclear security efforts changed to mitigate the effects of
    generally reduced United States-Russian cooperation? What is the
    strategy for ensuring that Russia's large nuclear complex and
    stockpiles of nuclear material, particularly at a time when sanctions
    and falling oil prices are damaging the Russian economy? Has NNSA
    experienced other cooperation issues that could affect the success of
    its nonproliferation efforts?
        Ms. Harrington. NNSA continues to conduct activities under existing
    (2014 and prior-year funded) contracts with a limited number of Russian
    entities and to hold technical exchanges on topics of mutual nuclear
    security interest. With limited opportunities to work directly with
    Russian facilities, NNSA has increased efforts to detect nuclear
    smuggling in the regions surrounding Russia by providing law
    enforcement and security agency partners in Eastern Europe, Central
    Asia, and the Caucasus with detection systems and training to detect
    smuggled nuclear and radiological materials.
        NNSA continues to work with more than 100 international partners
    and organizations to meet evolving threats to nuclear security. These
    partnerships are not adversely affected by the current relationship
    with Russia.

        16. Senator Donnelly. GAO has identified a series of challenges
    facing DOE's efforts to secure nuclear materials, including that DOE
    has not completed an inventory of U.S. plutonium inventory overseas.
    Has DOE begun its effort to undertake an inventory of U.S.-obligated
    plutonium worldwide? When is this effort expected to be complete?
        Ms. Harrington. Yes, DOE has begun its effort to undertake an
    inventory of U.S.-obligated material worldwide and expects to have an
    initial inventory completed by September 30, 2016.

        17. Senator Donnelly. Every other year, since 2010, the United
    States has hosted or participated in Nuclear Security Summits, bringing
    together dozens of heads of state. The subcommittee understands that
    the final Summit will take place this year, with future high-level
    dialogue on these matters uncertain. What are the administration's
    plans for replacing the Summit process with a new means to ensure
    nuclear security matters continue to receive high level attention by
    world leaders?
        Ms. Harrington. The first Nuclear Security Summit was held in
    Washington, DC in 2010, and was followed by additional Summits in Seoul
    in 2012 and The Hague in 2014. These Summits have achieved tangible
    improvements in the security of nuclear materials and stronger
    international institutions that support nuclear security. Last year in
    Berlin, the President formally announced his plan to host a fourth and
    final Nuclear Security Summit in 2016. The Summit was held March 31-
    April 1 in Washington, DC.
        The 2016 Nuclear Security Summit continued discussions on evolving
    threats and highlighted steps that can be taken together to minimize
    the use of highly-enriched uranium, secure vulnerable materials,
    counter nuclear smuggling and deter, detect, and disrupt attempts at
    nuclear terrorism. The United States seeks a strengthened global
    nuclear security architecture that is comprehensive, based on
    international standards, builds confidence in nations' nuclear security
    implementation, and results in declining global stocks of nuclear
    weapons-usable nuclear materials. To that end, the outcomes of the
    Summit included a high-level communique highlighting progress made and
    work still to be done to prevent nuclear terrorism. Leaders also
    endorsed ``Action Plans'' to strengthen the enduring international
    institutions and initiatives that sustain and build upon the work of
    the Summits. Participants are also seeking other ways to maintain and
    expand cooperation through continued high-level engagements, including
    the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) International Nuclear
    Security Conference with its Ministerial-level component.
        NNSA and its predecessor organizations have been working to reduce
    the threat of nuclear proliferation and terrorism for well over half a
    century. The Nuclear Security Summit process energized the
    international community on this issue, enabling a significant
    acceleration in NNSA's work with its international partners on nuclear
    threat reduction. NNSA will continue to take actions to sustain
    progress and reduce current and emerging nuclear threats.

        18. Senator Donnelly. NNSA also provides support to the IAEA
    through training programs, technology development, and staff support.
    Has the enactment of the JCPOA affected NNSA nonproliferation
    activities?
        Ms. Harrington. The JCPOA reinforces NNSA's nonproliferation
    activities, including NNSA's longstanding and comprehensive support to
    ensure that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has the tools
    and resources necessary to implement its safeguards monitoring
    requirements under the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear
    Weapons, as well as those derived from the JCPOA. NNSA provides extra-
    budgetary and in-kind technical and technology assistance, training,
    and staff support to the IAEA. While this assistance has strengthened
    the IAEA's ability to implement its JCPOA obligations, it is equally
    important that the United States continue to provide this comprehensive
    support across the IAEA Department of Safeguards to ensure the overall
    effectiveness of the IAEA as a technical organization providing
    credible assurances in the peaceful nature of nuclear programs in all
    IAEA Member States.
                    civilian use of highly enriched uranium
        19. Senator Donnelly. While the use of highly enriched uranium
    (HEU) in civilian installations, such as research reactors and isotope
    production facilities, is considered a threat to national and
    international security, 74 civilian research reactors around the world
    use or plan to use HEU, including 8 reactors in the United States. A
    recent Congressionally-mandated report by the National Academies noted
    that conversion of the remaining research reactors has proven to be
    significantly more difficult than originally envisioned. What are
    NNSA's views on the recommendations contained in this National
    Academies report, particularly the recommendation of an interim
    solution involving downblending the 20 tons of HEU currently designated
    for civilian research reactor use?
        Ms. Harrington. NNSA welcomes the National Academy of Sciences'
    recommendations reaffirming the importance of the United States'
    continued development of a high-density low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel
    for the conversion of U.S. high performance research reactors, and
    reaffirming the importance of our continued support for the European
    effort to develop a high-density LEU fuel for the conversion of
    European reactors. NNSA is reviewing all of the National Academy of
    Sciences' recommendations and exploring their potential political,
    legal, and technical impacts. NNSA supports the underlying premise that
    the goal is to eliminate highly enriched uranium (HEU) usage in
    civilian applications and that nothing should compromise that effort.
                          waste isolation plant (wipp)
        20. Senator Donnelly. In February 2014, WIPP suffered an
    underground vehicle fire resulting in a portion of WIPP being shut down
    and workers being evacuated. In an unrelated incident later that month,
    a radiation release was detected, caused by a chemical reaction in a
    waste drum. Since these events, WIPP has been shut down and has not
    been accepting any additional waste shipments. Partial waste
    emplacement is expected to resume in the first quarter of fiscal year
    2017. The President's fiscal year 2017 budget request states that WIPP
    recovery activities will be completed and waste operations restarted by
    December 2016, or 9 months later than DOE originally estimated in its
    Recovery Plan. What is the status of efforts to reopen WIPP, and has
    DOE worked with sites across the country to develop a plan for
    prioritizing waste shipments once WIPP reopens? What will be the
    initial rate of operations when limited waste operations resume?
        Dr. Regalbuto. The recovery of WIPP and the resumption of waste
    emplacement operations, when it is safe to do so, is among EM's highest
    priorities. The Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) and the WIPP management
    and operating (M&O) contractor are working collaboratively with the New
    Mexico Environment Department on regulatory permit approvals needed for
    resumption of waste emplacement operations.
        To reopen WIPP, the interim ventilation system (IVS), a project
    which was initiated after the February 2014 incidents, is needed to
    increase filtered airflow in the underground to increase work
    activities in the underground. The IVS mechanical construction is
    nearly complete and is scheduled to be operational this spring. The
    remaining activities to reopen WIPP are related to safety improvements,
    including completing an update of the WIPP Documented Safety Analysis,
    and completing the readiness process.
        The Department of Energy (DOE) is in the process of working with
    transuranic (TRU) waste generator sites to develop a plan for
    prioritizing waste shipments to WIPP. Since the 2014 events, EM and
    CBFO have met with the waste generators several times to identify the
    sites' needs and to discuss the National TRU Program and corrective
    actions required for the resumption of TRU waste shipments to WIPP. The
    initial focus for resuming TRU waste operations at WIPP will be the
    emplacement of TRU wastes currently stored on-site.
        The rate of waste emplacement is currently planned to be up to five
    shipments per week. This rate will depend on a number of variables:
    ventilation airflow available; the ability to emplace waste in the
    radiologically contaminated underground facility; execution of the
    revised Safety Management Programs; and the need for mining to ensure
    mine stability for underground worker safety. Worker safety will
    continue to be paramount as waste emplacement resumes.

        21. Senator Donnelly. Given the discussion surrounding sending the
    plutonium at Savannah River to WIPP, has DOE looked at whether the
    current design for the new ventilation system and exhaust shaft to be
    built at WIPP would need changing to handle this new waste or whether
    an expansion to WIPP's underground is needed?
        Dr. Regalbuto. It is expected that the new permanent ventilation
    system and exhaust shaft will handle the DOE inventory of transuranic
    waste of defense origin, including the plutonium material from the
    Savannah River Site.

        22. Senator Donnelly. The accident investigations that followed the
    February 2014 fire and radiological release accidents at WIPP reported
    122 judgements of need to DOE to address deficiencies in safety
    practices that contributed to the accidents. To what extent have DOE
    and its WIPP management and operations contractor completed corrective
    actions to address the judgments and evaluated the effectiveness of
    those actions?
        Dr. Regalbuto. There were over 300 corrective actions assigned to
    DOE and to Nuclear Waste Partnership, LLC (NWP), the WIPP M&O
    contractor, resulting from judgments of need identified in the Accident
    Investigation Board Reports on the fire and radiological release events
    at WIPP in 2014. As of the end of January, over 70 percent of these
    corrective actions have been completed, and are in the process of being
    validated and evaluated for effectiveness.

        23. Senator Donnelly. DOE has emphasized that safety will not be
    compromised in completing the recovery activities at WIPP. However, in
    October 2015, DOE released an assessment of WIPP's recovery operations
    by its independent oversight office that reported concerns with poor
    safety performance at WIPP and ineffective oversight of recovery
    efforts during the period May 2014 through May 2015.The independent
    review attributed the driver of the poor safety performance to schedule
    pressure to achieve the original March 2016 deadline for restarting
    operations. To what extent has DOE taken steps to improve safety
    practices and ensure effective oversight of WIPP since then?
        Dr. Regalbuto. EM and the Carlsbad Field Office appreciated the
    assistance of DOE Office of Enterprise Assessments (EA) in evaluating
    the safety and work performance conditions at WIPP. The Department and
    the WIPP contractor, Nuclear Waste Partnership, LLC, (NWP) take their
    findings very seriously. EA assessments provide independent reviews and
    advice that are an important part of the recovery process at WIPP.
        The referenced October 2015 EA Report evaluated mine safety,
    stabilization, and underground habitability during the period following
    the events. During that time period, many of the issues identified by
    EA field representatives were self-reported by DOE and/or the
    contractor, and have been, or are being, corrected as part of the
    activities required for resumption of waste emplacement. Safety remains
    the highest priority of DOE. We have made significant progress in
    addressing overall safety issues at the facility, including the worker
    health and safety and nuclear safety management issues identified by
    the EA program.
        DOE and NWP recognized that schedule pressure towards meeting a
    perceived deadline for restart was creating stress. In response, CBFO
    continually encourage employees to raise issues and safety concerns.
    Policy and processes have been initiated to reward individuals and work
    teams for pausing work activities to take appropriate corrective
    measures prior to resuming work to ensure those activities are safe.
    While there are milestones for completing the project, operations will
    only resume when it is safe to do so.

        24. Senator Donnelly. DOE is exploring construction of an above-
    ground storage facility for temporary onsite storage of transuranic
    waste at WIPP. To what extent has DOE discussed the above-ground
    storage concept with the New Mexico environmental regulators
    responsible for permitting the storage facility? To what extent has DOE
    identified the cost and schedule estimates for completing the storage
    facility?
        Dr. Regalbuto. DOE has introduced the above-ground storage concept
    in early discussions with the New Mexico Environment Department and is
    currently evaluating the considerations, and developing the
    requirements, functionality, and path forward and the permit
    modification request necessary to establish this capability.
        DOE has not at this time determined cost and schedule estimates for
    this storage capability. DOE plans to pursue the above-ground storage
    facility as a General Plant Project.

        25. Senator Donnelly. Has DOE sought to reclaim damages from the
    contractors for their actions that contributed to the accidents at
    WIPP? What is DOE's estimate of the costs of these accidents? What is
    the total fee that has been withheld and fines imposed on the
    contractors as a result of the accidents?
        Dr. Regalbuto. EM has held NWP, the WIPP M&O contractor,
    accountable for performance under its contract. NWP collected less than
    approximately 7 percent of the $8.2 million in fee that was available
    for fiscal year (FY) 2014. The CBFO Contracting Officer also submitted
    multiple Contractor Performance Assessment Reports (CPAR) in fiscal
    year 2014 to ensure that the lapses in contractor performance that were
    related to the fire and radiological release incidents were made part
    of the contractor's permanent past performance record in the central
    federal past performance rating system. DOE and the National Nuclear
    Security Administration (NNSA) strongly weighted the events that
    contributed to the radiological release at WIPP when determining the
    award fee for the Los Alamos National Laboratory M&O contractor, Los
    Alamos National Security LLC (LANS) for fiscal year 2014; of a possible
    award fee of $63.4 million, LANS received $6.2 million. The $6.2
    million was earned by LANS for work performed for non-DOE agencies. In
    addition to withholding fee, NNSA also withheld two years of award term
    off the contract in fiscal year 2014. The NNSA is planning to re-
    compete the Management and Operating contract for LANL.
        DOE estimates the cost for recovery and resumption of waste
    emplacement operations at approximately $244 million. This includes
    activities such as facility enhancements, revision of the Documented
    Safety Analysis, underground habitability and operations, facility
    upgrades, etc. This does not include the capital asset items that
    currently has an estimated cost range of $270 to $398 million. This
    also does not include activities that occur under WIPP's base
    operations. Of the $244 million total, $22.7 million was reallocated
    from base to recovery operations in fiscal year 2014, and $42.1 million
    in fiscal year 2015.
        As a result of the findings from the Accident Investigation Board
    (AIB) Reports on the fire and radiological release events, EM has held
    the contractors accountable for performance under those contracts. NWP
    collected less than 7 percent of the $8.2 million in total fee that was
    available for fiscal year 2014. DOE and the NNSA greatly reduced the
    award fee for the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) contractor, Los
    Alamos National Security LLC (LANS) for fiscal year 2014. Of a possible
    award fee of $63.4 million, LANS received $6.2 million. The $6.2
    million was earned by LANS for work performed for non-DOE agencies.

        26. Senator Donnelly. The Plutonium Disposition Red Team Report
    from August 2015 assessed the options of disposing of 34 metric tons of
    weapons-grade plutonium, currently planned to be processed through
    DOE's Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility. The Red Team found that
    DOE could implement the relatively simple dilute-and-dispose approach
    with reasonable confidence that the political and regulatory risks
    could be successfully managed. However, the Red Team noted that,
    according to DOE's WIPP inventory--divided between ``WIPP-bound''
    quantities and ``potential'' quantities--the unsubscribed capacity at
    WIPP is approximately 19,000 cubic meters, but that significant
    uncertainty exists regarding this remaining capacity because it is
    derived from a potentially incomplete portrayal of future waste
    generating activities. The Red Team provided examples of future sources
    of TRU waste that are not yet shown in the WIPP inventory numbers, such
    as large-scale actinide processing facilities or a legacy facility that
    has not yet been transferred into EM's cleanup baseline that will
    eventually generate TRU waste during decommissioning and
    decontamination. Likewise, the U.S. will not cease all TRU waste
    generation once legacy TRU waste has been disposed of at WIPP and it is
    not clear that the lifecycle of newly-generated TRU waste from around
    the complex has been taken into account in the calculation of
    unsubscribed capacity at WIPP. In addition, while WIPP is only allowed
    to accept TRU waste originating from defense activities, DOE recently
    proposed to dispose of non-defense TRU waste at WIPP, which would add
    further volumes of TRU waste to the inventory of WIPP-bound material.
    To what extent has DOE taken into account the types of waste streams
    noted in the Red Team report--TRU waste that will be generated from
    facilities during D&D and newly-generated TRU waste--in calculating the
    unsubscribed capacity at WIPP? How much of this material exists across
    the DOE complex and has any of these quantities of waste has already
    been added to the WIPP inventory, either as WIPP-bound quantities or
    potential quantities.
        Dr. Regalbuto. The current unsubscribed capacity at WIPP is 23,652
    cubic meters (m\3\), after taking into account the reported volume of
    transuranic (TRU) waste disposed at WIPP and the volume of WIPP-bound
    TRU waste identified in the 2015 Annual Transuranic Waste Inventory
    Report. DOE has taken into account all TRU waste identified by the
    waste generators as complying with the following criteria, and hence
    determined to be WIPP-bound: (1) meets the Land Withdrawal Act
    definition of TRU waste; (2) resulting from atomic energy defense
    activities; (3) no regulatory restrictions (e.g., meets limits on dose
    rates, does not contain prohibited Resource Conservation and Recovery
    Act hazardous waste, etc.); and (4) complete data (e.g., contains
    adequately described radionuclide activities, final form container
    data, waste stream information, etc.). All TRU waste meeting these
    criteria have been included in the WIPP-bound inventory of waste (see
    part (b) for inventory discussion). If one or more of these criteria
    are not met, the waste is considered ``potential'' TRU waste (see part
    (b) for inventory discussion). Potential TRU waste will reduce the
    unsubscribed capacity, assuming all criteria are eventually met.
        On March 29, 2016, NNSA announced a decision to implement its
    preferred alternative for the disposition of 6 metric tons (MT) of
    surplus non-pit plutonium. When this waste is diluted and packaged to
    meet the WIPP waste acceptance criteria, the 6MT of surplus Plutonium
    from SRS is expected to take the form of approximately 20,000 55-gallon
    drums, which will occupy about 4,000 cubic meters. This volume would be
    counted against the unsubscribed capacity.
        Currently, the 2015 Annual Transuranic Waste Inventory Report
    identifies both WIPP-bound and potential quantities of TRU waste as
    follow below. It should be noted that this report is current as of data
    reported by generator sites as of December 31, 2014.

         1. 61,000 cubic meters of WIPP-bound TRU waste:
            a.  Hanford (21,900 m\3\)
            b.  Idaho National Laboratory (20,800 m\3\)
            c.  Los Alamos National Laboratory (6,210 m\3\)
            d.  Oak Ridge National Laboratory (1,630 m\3\)
            e.  Savannah River Site (8,250 m\3\)
            f.  Small Quantity Sites (2,160 m\3\)
         2. 7,596.1 m\3\ of ``potential'' TRU waste.

        27. Senator Donnelly. What statutory changes would be needed to
    dispose of non-defense origin TRU waste, and what are origins and
    estimated volumes of this waste from around the DOE complex?
        Dr. Regalbuto. A change to the Land Withdrawal Act would be
    necessary to accept transuranic waste that is not a result of atomic
    energy defense activities.
        Of the 7,596.1 m\3\ of ``potential'' TRU waste, some or all of
    those waste streams may have to go through a process to determine if it
    was generated from atomic energy defense activities (i.e., a defense
    determination). Future waste streams that may be included in the
    ``potential'' TRU waste category would go through the defense
    determination process as the annual inventory process continues every
    year moving forward. Approximately 4,000 m\3\ of the potential TRU
    waste identified in Appendix B of the 2015 Annual Transuranic Waste
    Inventory Report is identified as not having a final defense
    determination. This includes primarily West Valley waste.

        28. Senator Donnelly. Related to ``potential'' TRU waste volumes,
    who is responsible for determining whether these potential wastes will
    become WIPP bound wastes, what is the process for making these
    determinations, and what is the specific schedule and end dates for
    making determinations for each of the ``potential'' volumes listed in
    the current inventory?
        Dr. Regalbuto. The transuranic (TRU) waste generator is responsible
    for determining if ``potential'' TRU waste meets the requirements for
    WIPP, and changing that waste to ``WIPP-bound'' waste, providing
    justification and documentation that the waste complies with the
    applicable criteria: (1) meets the Land Withdrawal Act definition of
    TRU waste; (2) resulting from atomic energy defense activities; (3) no
    regulatory restrictions (e.g., meets limits on dose rates, does not
    contain prohibited Resource Conservation and Recovery Act hazardous
    waste, etc.); and (4) complete data (e.g., contains adequately
    described radionuclide activities, final form container data, waste
    stream information, etc.). A determination is made in consultation with
    the waste generator site management, CBFO Manager, DOE's Office of
    Environmental Management, and the Office of the General Counsel, as
    appropriate. There is no defined schedule or end dates for making
    determinations for specific wastes listed in the potential TRU waste
    inventory. The schedules are dependent on waste generator sites' needs
    to disposition the wastes.
                              handford tank waste
        29. Senator Donnelly. The Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant
    (WTP), intended to treat high level waste and part of the low-activity
    waste at the Hanford tank farms, has experienced cost and schedule
    overruns as well as ongoing technical and management challenges, and
    the resulting delays have resulted in ongoing legal activity between
    DOE and the state of Washington. While continuing construction of WTP's
    Low-Activity Waste Facility, DOE is working to resolve technical
    challenges associated with the High-Level Waste Facility and the
    Pretreatment Facility. Even when complete, the WTP as currently planned
    will only treat about 40 percent of the low-activity waste in the
    Hanford tanks. DOE has yet to make a final determination on the course
    of action to treat and dispose of the remaining low-activity waste,
    referred to as supplemental treatment. What is the status of DOE's
    acquisition of an owner's agent to assist in oversight of the WTP
    contractor?
        Dr. Regalbuto. DOE selected and has been utilizing Parsons
    Government Services, Inc. as the Owner's Representative to assist with
    the oversight of the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant Project
    (WTP).

        30. Senator Donnelly. How does DOE plan to proceed in determining a
    course of action for supplemental treatment?
        Dr. Regalbuto. DOE continues to evaluate supplemental treatment
    technologies to support WTP operations. These technologies span a broad
    spectrum of possibilities including process flow sheet enhancements,
    glass loading and future technology development programs. These
    programs are being developed in consort with National Labs, our tank
    operations contractor, and under on-going complex-wide technology
    initiatives with EM Headquarters.

        31. Senator Donnelly. DOE's proposal to modify the consent decree
    with Washington state adds 17 years to the WTP's schedule, for an
    estimated completion date of 2039. DOE annually receives about $690 for
    the WTP, meaning that at this annual funding level it will cost about
    $16 billion to complete the WTP. Is $16 billion a reasonable ``to go''
    cost for the WTP, or can the committee expect a lower or higher number
    when the cost re-baseline is completed? If $16 billion is a reasonable
    ``to go'' cost for the WTP, has DOE explored different waste treatment
    options that could lessen the costs? Other sites, both nationally and
    internationally, have been able to treat radioactive waste for less
    than $16 billion.
        Dr. Regalbuto. At this time it is too soon to provide an estimate
    of the total project cost of WTP due to a number of uncertainties and
    technical and programmatic issues surrounding the WTP Project,
    including resolution of technical issues with the Pretreatment and to a
    lesser extent, the High Level Waste facilities. Note that on March 11,
    2016, the United States District Court, Eastern District of Washington,
    issued an Amended Consent Decree between DOE and the States of
    Washington and Oregon regarding treatment of tank waste at Hanford.

        32. Senator Donnelly. The WTP contractor's earned value management
    system has been suspended for several years, meaning that DOE cannot
    use this standard tool to measure cost and schedule performance. During
    these years, there has been substantial cost growth and schedule
    delays. How is DOE measuring cost and schedule performance at the WTP?
        Dr. Regalbuto. EM has been using alternate Earned Value Management
    System tools to continue to measure the Waste Treatment and
    Immobilization Plant's cost and schedule performance for the near-term
    work that has been scheduled.
        This provides us with comparable performance measurement for
    scheduled work, but cannot provide the estimates to complete the
    project.

        33. Senator Donnelly. Both GAO and the DOE IG have recently
    reported on the failure of the WTP contractor's corrective management
    program to ensure that technical, quality, and management issues are
    appropriately addressed and resolved in a timely manner. How can DOE be
    assured that the contractor will be able to address the serious
    technical and quality issues with WTP's three major processing
    facilities that have, in some cases, remained unresolved for at least a
    decade?
        Dr. Regalbuto. EM's Office of River Protection directed Bechtel to
    develop corrective action plans for each of two Priority Level 1
    findings, and an integrated comprehensive Managed Improvement Plan
    (MIP) to address all systemic quality assurance program and
    implementation issues.
        EM staff have and will continue to monitor Bechtel's actions to
    implement both the Priority Level 1 finding corrective action plans and
    the MIP. Assessment reports have been and will continue to be issued
    documenting implementation of the Priority Level 1 finding corrective
    action plans.
                         risk-informed decision-making
        34. Senator Donnelly. The recent CRESP report, commissioned by DOE
    under direction from the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014, found
    that DOE has been slow to implement industry-standard quantitative
    methods, such as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), to characterize
    nuclear safety risk and support risk-informed decision-making. fiscal
    year 2013 NDAA Section 3161 directed increased used of probabilistic or
    quantitative risk assessment. This CRESP report also noted that site-
    to-site cleanup efforts are inconsistent, with risks at some sites
    being addressed through remedies significantly more costly, but with
    potentially little additional reduction in risk, than those used at
    other sites. What are DOE's plans, if any, to respond to the
    recommendations contained in this report? What factors does DOE
    consider when prioritizing cleanup activities across its sites?
        Dr. Regalbuto. EM continues to pursue its cleanup objectives safely
    within a framework of regulatory compliance commitments and best
    business practices. The rationale for cleanup prioritization is based
    on achieving the highest risk reduction per radioactive content
    (activities focused on wastes that contain the highest concentrations
    of radionuclides and sites with the highest radionuclide
    contamination). EM has used probabilistic risk assessments for a number
    of cleanup projects across the complex. Taking many variables into
    account, EM has generally prioritized its cleanup activities as
    follows:

          Activities to maintain a safe, secure, and compliant
    posture in the EM complex
          Radioactive tank waste stabilization, treatment, and
    disposition
          Spent (used) nuclear fuel receipt and storage
          Special nuclear material consolidation, stabilization,
    and disposition
          Transuranic and mixed/low-level waste disposition
          Soil and groundwater remediation
          Excess facilities deactivation and decommissioning.

        Most importantly, EM continues to discharge its responsibilities by
    conducting cleanup within a ``Safety First'' culture that integrates
    environmental, safety, and health requirements and controls into all
    work activities. This ensures protection for the workers, public, and
    the environment.

        35. Senator Donnelly. What are the primary drivers behind DOE's
    decisions to select its cleanup approaches at different sites? To what
    extent are EM's annual and long-term cleanup decisions driven by
    reducing environmental risks in the most cost effective manner?
        Dr. Regalbuto. EM must pursue its cleanup objectives safely within
    a framework of regulatory compliance commitments and best business
    practices.
        The rationale for cleanup prioritization is based on achieving the
    highest risk reduction benefit per radioactive content (activities
    focused on wastes that contain the highest concentrations of
    radionuclides and sites with the highest radionuclide contamination)
    while meeting regulatory compliance commitments.

        36. Senator Donnelly. What are DOE's plans to improve the use of
    probabilistic risk assessment techniques for environmental cleanup
    planning? How does DOE's long-term cleanup strategy account for the
    various uncertainties that cleanup activities sometimes encounter, and
    how does EM incorporate new scientific information which may suggest
    alternative approaches?
        Dr. Regalbuto. DOE has taken steps to integrate Probabilistic Risk
    Assessments (PRAs) into its decision-making. From a nuclear safety
    perspective, the Department issued DOE-STD1628-2013, ``Development of
    Probabilistic Risk Assessments for Nuclear Safety Applications,'' in
    November 2013. EM will continue to investigate ways PRAs and risk-
    informed decision-making can be further integrated into decision-making
    and identify potential benefits such integration may provide. It is
    worth noting that while PRAs may find routine application at commercial
    facilities, their applicability in the waste-management/cleanup context
    is less than straightforward given the unique characteristics of the
    waste and diverse conditions in which EM operates.
        EM recognizes and understands that uncertainties exist in all
    facets of its cleanup--soil and groundwater, deactivation and
    decommissioning and waste treatment and disposal. The sequential
    critical decision process used by EM is based on moving through a
    number of steps aimed at reducing uncertainties--from conceptual to
    final designs for each project. Within each of these steps, uncertainty
    is reduced and cost estimates and plans mature. In addition, EM employs
    conservative assumptions and contingencies based on experience and
    modeling of known cleanup and waste management challenges.
        EM is committed to new scientific information and technologies that
    may help accelerate cleanup schedules. The EM technology development
    and deployment program funds innovative technologies that help identify
    new ways to accelerate cleanup at reduced costs and improved safety.
    Technology readiness assessments, independent project reviews, and
    external independent reviews are devices employed by DOE to integrate
    new scientific information and technologies into EM's operations in a
    way that is effective, cost efficient, and safe for workers, the public
    and the environment.
                       separate defense waste repository
        37. Senator Donnelly. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) of 1982
    directed DOE to work to identify sites for a repository for high-level
    waste and spent nuclear fuel. In 1985, President Reagan made a
    determination that a separate defense waste repository is not needed,
    resulting in DOE work on a single repository to receive both commercial
    spent fuel and defense-origin waste, resulting in the NWPA being
    amended to identify Yucca Mountain as the site of the common
    repository, to be paid for by a mix of industry and federal defense
    spending. However, in 2015 President Obama found that a separate
    repository for defense waste is required, and DOE intends to pursue two
    repositories--one of which, a defense high level waste (HLW)
    repository, would be fully funded by defense appropriations. Did DOE's
    Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) consult with NNSA and the Navy regarding
    its new plan to separately dispose of defense high-level radioactive
    waste, particularly regarding whether the plan would meet disposal
    plans for defense HLW or Navy SNF?
        General Klotz and Dr. Regalbuto. Yes, the Office of Nuclear Energy
    held discussions with the Office of Naval Reactors prior to completion
    of the October 2014 report, entitled Assessment of Disposal Options for
    DOE-Managed High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel, and
    more broadly with the National Nuclear Security Administration prior to
    the March 2015 finding by the President related to high-level
    radioactive waste from atomic energy defense activities.

        38. Senator Donnelly. Have you had discussions with Colorado,
    Idaho, South Carolina, or Washington regarding DOE's plans to
    separately dispose of defense HLW? What is their reaction to the plan
    and what effects do they think the plan will have on defense clean up
    milestones and costs?
        Dr. Regalbuto. Following publication of the October 2014 report
    entitled Assessment of Disposal Options for DOE-Managed High-Level
    Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel, the Department sought comment
    and reaction from a broad range of state and local government
    officials, industry representatives, environmental organizations, and
    other stakeholder groups. The feedback collected in response to the
    Assessment informed the March 2015 Report on Separate Disposal of
    Defense High-Level Radioactive Waste and the President's finding that a
    defense high-level radioactive waste repository is required. Section 8
    of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act allows the Secretary of Energy to
    develop a defense high-level waste repository using existing authority
    under the Atomic Energy Act if the President finds that a defense high-
    level waste repository is required. In March 2015, the President
    accepted a recommendation of the Secretary of Energy to go forward on
    this path, which allows the Department to develop a defense-only
    repository.
        In fiscal year 2016 and fiscal year 2017, along with developing a
    consent-based siting process, the Office of Nuclear Energy is
    performing planning activities to evaluate a defense high-level
    radioactive waste repository, including organizing information on waste
    forms and repository concepts, identifying and completing reference
    cases for selected geologic media, and assessing the feasibility of
    engineered barrier system concepts in select geologic media.

        39. Senator Donnelly. DOE concluded this approach would cost more
    than a single repository, yet stated in its March 2015 report that cost
    efficiency favors develop of a defense waste repository. Please explain
    why a more expensive option is cost efficient--why pursue a two
    repository approach when DOE has stated this approach will cost
    billions more?
        Dr. Regalbuto. The cost for disposal of radioactive waste in a
    geologic repository is influenced by numerous variables including the
    geologic medium, the quantity of waste, the emplacement method and
    configuration, how heat-dissipation is managed, and the depth of the
    repository. Since we are in the early stages of planning and evaluating
    alternatives for this concept, definitive plans and risk analyses have
    not yet been finalized.
        A defense waste repository could be less expensive and easier to
    design and build than a comparably sized repository for commercial
    spent fuel. The defense waste inventory is colder, easier to handle,
    finite, and suitable for disposal in various geologies. Depending on
    the geologic media selected, there is a significant range of estimated
    costs. Life cycle cost efficiencies could potentially result from
    accelerating site closure by removing radioactive waste that currently
    has no disposition path and avoiding the cost to build additional
    storage facilities. Moreover, a defense waste repository would provide
    experience in repository design, siting, development, and operation
    that may reduce the cost of developing future repositories.

        40. Senator Donnelly. What is known about the costs and
    uncertainties of DOE's plans for a defense waste repository and how do
    they compare to alternatives? What are the key factors that could
    affect cost and schedule? When will the Department produce an estimate
    that includes a full range of costs--including storage, transportation,
    siting, and other tasks--for disposing of defense nuclear waste under
    this approach?
        Dr. Regalbuto. As the DOE moves forward, cost efficiency will
    continue to be examined to ensure that resources are being spent in the
    most effective way. Since we are in the early stages of planning and
    evaluating alternatives for this concept, definitive plans and risk
    analyses have not yet been finalized. As we go forward with the
    planning for a defense repository, more precise cost estimates will be
    developed. The cost for disposal of radioactive waste in a geologic
    repository is influenced by numerous variables including the geologic
    medium, the quantity of waste, the emplacement method and
    configuration, how heat-dissipation is managed, and the depth of the
    repository.
        Another uncertainty for locating any repository is achieving local
    and state consent to host the site. DOE has initiated developing a
    consent-based process that builds a partnership with interested host
    communities. This process will apply to interim storage facilities, as
    well as a repository for defense radioactive waste and a common
    repository, and possible deep borehole disposal.
        We are committed to keeping the Committee informed as we move
    forward.

        41. Senator Donnelly. In its publicly released report on its plan
    to separately dispose of defense HLW, DOE stated that two repositories
    will be more expensive than one. DOE has also stated that it plans to
    pursue both its repositories at the same time, as well as develop
    centralized interim storage facilities and borehole disposal R&D. Do
    you have any concerns regarding sufficient budgetary resources or DOE's
    human resources to pursue defense cleanup and defense repository
    activities simultaneously? Do you have concerns regarding human
    resources or the will of the American people to support defense clean
    up and the various facets of DOE's disposal plans? Are there any long-
    term implications that we need to consider now before DOE embarks on
    its ambitious disposal effort?
        General Klotz. and Dr. Regalbuto. As we move forward, cost
    efficiency will continue to be examined to ensure that resources are
    being spent in the most effective way. We believe that a key element
    for success is to build a partnership with interested host communities.
    DOE envisions developing a consent-based process that builds a
    partnership with interested host communities. DOE recently began its
    consent based siting efforts to gather public input on how to design a
    process that results in consent. This process will apply to interim
    storage facilities, as well as a repository for defense radioactive
    waste and a common repository.

        42. Senator Donnelly. Over successive administrations, the
    Department has had great difficulty in selecting a site for the
    permanent disposal of nuclear waste. Has DOE developed firm plans for
    how it will proceed with consent-based siting? Other countries'
    consent-based siting approaches have taken about 35 years, on average,
    to select a site. Does DOE anticipate a similar length of time for
    siting its defense and commercial repositories? How is this complicated
    by the need to provide siting for two repositories?
        Dr. Regalbuto. DOE recently launched its efforts to establish a
    consent-based siting process that is built on collaboration with the
    public, stakeholders, and government entities at the local, state, and
    tribal levels. DOE believes that a key element for a durable solution
    is to build a partnership with interested, informed, and willing host
    communities. The first phase of this effort involves engaging with the
    public and interested groups to learn what elements are important to
    consider when designing a consent-based siting process. The next phase
    will focus on creating a consent-based siting process to serve as a
    framework for collaborating with potentially interested host
    communities. Finally, DOE will use the resulting consent-based process
    to work closely with interested, informed, and willing communities and
    ultimately site disposal facilities.
        This process will apply to interim storage facilities, as well as a
    repository for defense radioactive waste and a common repository, and
    possible deep borehole disposal.
        In December 2015, DOE published an Invitation for Public Comment in
    the Federal Register to solicit input on important considerations in
    designing a fair and effective process for siting. In 2016, a series of
    public meetings will be hosted by DOE around the country to hear from
    the public and stakeholders on important principles, values, and
    considerations that should guide the development of a consent-based
    siting process.
                             plutonium disposition
        43. Senator Donnelly. The Conference Report for the fiscal year
    2016 NDAA specified that NNSA prepare an analysis of the downblending
    option that includes the answers to several questions, including (1)
    what is the overall lifecycle cost of the downblending option? (2) to
    what extent would WIPP accommodate the downblended material from the 34
    metric tons that was destined for the MOX facility? (3) would the Land
    Withdrawal Act need to be amended to accommodate this additional
    volume? What is the status of completing this analysis and when does
    the department plan to send the results to the committee?
        Dr. Regalbuto. DOE is preparing a Report in response to the Joint
    Explanatory Statement accompanying S. 1356, the National Defense
    Authorization Act for fiscal year 2016 that will address these
    questions and is planned to be submitted in late fiscal year 2016.
             management of doe's office of environmental management
        44. Senator Donnelly. DOE's Office of Environmental Management (EM)
    manages the cleanup work that is critical to the nuclear security
    enterprise and is responsible for $6.2 billion of the $29.6 billion the
    Department received in fiscal year 2016. However, despite playing such
    an important role, EM's top official is an Assistant Secretary while
    other offices that manage a similar level of funding and
    responsibility, such as the Office of Science ($5.3 billion), are led
    by an Under Secretary. DOE has struggled to find the proper place
    within its management hierarchy for EM, moving it under the Under
    Secretary for Nuclear Security in 2011 and moving it yet again only two
    years later under the newly created Under Secretary for Management and
    Performance. Given the significance of EM's role and the amount of
    money involved in EM's environmental liability of at least $240
    billion, does DOE have the right/necessary structure to support the
    environmental liability cleanup efforts? In addition, would you provide
    to the committee any examples of how the Under Secretary for Management
    and Performance has interacted with EM to improve EM's Management and
    Performance?
        Dr. Regalbuto. Yes, DOE feels that placing EM under the purview of
    the Under Secretary for Management and Performance is the appropriate
    structure because it combines, under one organization, DOE's strongest
    project management capabilities, resident in the Office of Project
    Management Oversight and Assessments (PM), directly to bear on EM's
    project management challenges.
        The Secretary's project management reforms have repositioned the
    project review function that EM previously performed through its Office
    of Project Assessments and folded that function into PM. This structure
    assures the independence of the review teams. The project management
    executive for projects $400 million to $750 million is the Deputy Under
    Secretary for Management and Performance and the project management
    executive for projects over $750 million is the Deputy Secretary.
        Also, the fiscal year 2017 Budget proposes to establish a
    statutory, DOE-wide Office of Cost Estimating and Program Evaluation
    (CEPE-DOE) in recognition of a gap in DOE's capacity to independently
    determine accurate costs of programs and acquisitions within DOE.
        This proposal advances the Secretary's ongoing efforts to improve
    DOE project management, a key component of which is to adopt best
    practices equivalent to those implemented by the Department of Defense.
        CEPE-DOE will provide independent analytic advice on all aspects of
    DOE programs, including cost-effectiveness, and the development and
    evaluation of program alternatives. CEPE-DOE will develop cost
    estimating policy and practices, provide timely and unbiased analysis
    and perform independent cost estimation for the Department. CEPE-DOE
    will ensure that the DOE's cost estimation and cost analysis processes
    provide accurate information and realistic estimates of cost for DOE's
    programs and acquisitions.
        This new function would report to the Office of the Secretary to
    ensure consistent policy, procedures and practices across DOE,
    formalize program management practices for cost estimation and review
    to improve outcomes, accountability and efficiency.
        The Under Secretary for Management and Performance has served a key
    role in:

          Developing and implementing the resumption of waste
    emplacement operations at WIPP; and
          Strengthening the project review and assessment function,
    which brings greater focus and discipline to the major projects in the
    EM program, including the WTP project at Hanford, the Salt Waste
    Processing Facility project at Savannah River, as well as numerous
    smaller cleanup projects across the complex.

        The Office of the Under Secretary for Management and Performance,
    as a member of DOE senior cross-departmental boards, councils and
    committees represents the interests of EM in the development of DOE
    policy on cyber security, physical security and employee engagement, as
    well as on the Energy Systems Acquisition Advisory Board (ESAAB), Cyber
    Council and other such bodies.

        45. Senator Donnelly. My understanding is that the Office of
    Environmental Management working with Urenco's Louisiana Enrichment
    Services facility to re-enrich tails in order to support continued
    clean-up at the Portsmouth, Ohio Gaseous Diffusion Plant. Does the
    Department intend to continue this arrangement in order to re-enrich
    the Department's depleted uranium inventory? Are you aware of any other
    cost-effective alternatives beyond this operational facility?
        Dr. Regalbuto. Currently, DOE has no agreement with URENCO to re-
    enrich the Department's depleted uranium inventory, or to do so to
    support clean-up at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant.
        No, URENCO's Louisiana Enrichment Services facility is the only
    operating enrichment plant in the United States.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
                       transition of lanl's em management
        46. Senator Heinrich. Regarding EM's cleanup effort at Los Alamos
    National Lab, I continue to have concerns about the upcoming transition
    in program management to a new contractor(s) and the potential impacts
    on the community and local small businesses. I am pleased EM's bridge
    contract incorporated all of LANS's required community support and
    subcontracting incentives. As EM prepares an RFP for management of the
    cleanup at Los Alamos, can I be assured that both the regional and
    community support and the Regional Purchasing programs from LANS's
    contract will continue to be required in the RFP for the new
    contract(s)?
        Dr. Regalbuto. The RFP will focus on accomplishing the
    Environmental Management (EM) program's mission to protect human health
    and the environment. The RFP will address other policy objectives as
    required and to the extent that they ensure the program is executed in
    a safe and cost-effective manner.
                  laboratory-directed research and development
        47. Senator Heinrich. The recent report of the Commission on the
    Effectiveness of the National Energy Laboratories (CRENEL) recommended
    that Congress restore the cap on LDRD to 6 percent unburdened, or its
    equivalent, noting that this will have the largest impact on LDRD at
    the NNSA laboratories. The recently-enacted fiscal year 2016 National
    Defense Authorization Act increased funding for LDRD with a minimum
    rate of 5 percent and a maximum of 7 percent of the NNSA laboratories'
    operating budgets, which DOE noted is a level more consistent with
    historic NNSA levels. What is NNSA's plan for implementing the new 7
    percent maximum set aside for LDRD at the NNSA labs?
        General Klotz. Currently there is conflicting guidance between the
    fiscal year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act and the fiscal year
    2015 Consolidated Appropriations Act which limits the maximum
    Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) rate to 6 percent.
    The DOE General Counsel in coordination with the NNSA General Counsel
    is still examining the conflicting provisions. Once that is resolved,
    NNSA will work to implement the resulting program.
          revised life cycle baseline and budget plan for lanl cleanup
        48. Senator Heinrich. I continue to hear concerns over the lack of
    progress of cleanup at Los Alamos. I note your written testimony today
    lists EM's recent accomplishments, but none at Los Alamos. The local
    community is also concerned that the budget request for fiscal year
    2017 for LANL is inadequate and requests $66 million in additional
    funding above EM's budget request to make significant headway on all
    cleanup activities, including characterizing sites. In addition, I
    understand a revised Life Cycle Baseline for cleanup at Los Alamos
    still has not been approved. The revised baseline is needed to guide
    near-term planning for cleanup activities and future budget requests.
    What is the current status and timeline for the new Life Cycle Baseline
    to be approved?
        Dr. Regalbuto. Addressing the legacy contamination and wastes at
    Los Alamos National Laboratory is among EM's high priority activities.
    As you know, the New Mexico Environment Department recently released a
    Draft Consent Order for public comment. Once the Consent Order
    revisions are completed, we will update the life cycle cost estimate
    accordingly.
                the technology transfer mission of the nnsa labs
        49. Senator Heinrich. I continue to be a champion of efforts to
    improve technology transfer from the NNSA labs as an engine for local
    economic development and to ensure taxpayers get the full benefit of
    the extraordinary innovations in technology being developed with
    federal funding. The Commission to Review the Effectiveness of the
    National Energy Laboratories released its final report last October.
    One of the commission's recommendations is that all DOE programs and
    laboratories fully embrace the technology transition mission and
    continue improving the speed and effectiveness of collaborations with
    the private sector. Do you agree that technology transfer is part of
    the overall mission of NNSA's National Laboratories?
        General Klotz. Yes. NNSA's primary mission is national security,
    but technology commercialization and transfer is a vital mission
    activity that improves the overall strength and capabilities of the
    laboratories, plants and sites, as well as NNSA as a whole.

        50. Senator Heinrich. How do you suggest NNSA and the labs address
    the difficulties small business have in engaging with the labs to
    commercialize innovative technologies?
        General Klotz. NNSA's Strategic Partnerships Program is developing
    initiatives to facilitate engagement with partners, including small
    businesses. Examples of these engagements include the entrepreneurial
    leave and technologist-in-residence programs which allow laboratory
    personnel to exchange with industry or leave the lab for a period to
    support an existing business or ``spin off'' their own small business.
        In some cases, states that host the labs have programs in
    conjunction with the labs to support small businesses directly. An
    example is the New Mexico Small Business Assistance (NMSBA) Program,
    which grants access to the unique expertise and capabilities of Los
    Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories free of charge to small
    businesses that are facing technical challenges.

        51. Senator Heinrich. With new M&O contracts coming up soon for
    both Sandia and Los Alamos, what are your thoughts on incorporating
    technology transfer as an explicit mission of the labs and including it
    as an evaluation factor in each lab's annual performance evaluation?
        General Klotz. Technology transfer is, and will continue to be, a
    mission activity of all NNSA laboratories. Similarly, technology
    transfer has long been a part of each laboratory's annual performance
    evaluation. NNSA M&O contractors' ability to establish industrial
    partnerships that transfer new technologies from the laboratory to
    private industry and make the laboratory's unique capabilities
    available to private industry, enhance the laboratory's ability to meet
    mission requirements and improve the industrial competitiveness and
    national security of the United States.
                             microlab pilot program
        52. Senator Heinrich. Section 3120 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2016
    established a microlab pilot program to help stimulate open
    collaboration with the NNSA labs and the commercialization of lab-
    developed technologies. I am pleased Sandia National Laboratories has
    proposed a new Center for Collaboration and Commercialization (C3) in
    Albuquerque, in part to meet the goals of section 3120. Is NNSA
    supportive of the C3 and what is the current status and timeline for
    the project?
        General Klotz. NNSA supports commercialization and technology
    transfer efforts and recognizes that technology commercialization and
    transfer is a vital mission activity that improves the overall strength
    and capabilities of the laboratories, plants, and sites, as well as
    NNSA as a whole.
        However, NNSA's national security mission demands a stringent
    security posture that can at times be challenging to those efforts.
    NNSA is working to establish more direct and agile interaction
    pathways, including through ``commercialization campuses.''
        NNSA has been proceeding with the Livermore Valley Open Campus in
    support of Lawrence Livermore and Sandia National Laboratories. NNSA
    intends to employ the lessons learned and best practices while working
    through the required process of mission need and analysis of
    alternatives for a similar effort (the Center for Collaboration and
    Commercialization, or ``C3'') at Sandia National Laboratories. It is
    anticipated that the process could take 6 to 12 months.

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2017 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                           WEDNESDAY, APRIL 13, 2016

                                   U.S. Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m. in
    Room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jeff
    Sessions (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Inhofe, Sessions,
    Fischer, Sullivan, Lee, Manchin, Donnelly, King, and Heinrich.

               OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

        Senator Sessions. The committee will come to order.
        Senator Donnelly is on the way and will be here in a few
    minutes, but I will go ahead and start with some of my opening
    comments. I do not think there will be anything particularly
    controversial.
        The Strategic Forces Subcommittee meets today to receive
    testimony on ballistic missile defense policies and programs in
    review of the defense authorization request--there he is--for
    fiscal year 2017 and the future years defense program.
        We are joined today by Mr. Brian McKeon, Principal Deputy
    Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, to provide the policy
    and strategy foundation for our missile defense programs.
        As Commander of U.S. Northern Command, Admiral William
    Gortney is the principal military officer responsible for
    conducting the defense of the Homeland against ballistic
    missile strikes and has done a good job in that, Admiral. Thank
    you for your service. I do not know. Maybe you can tell us if
    you are going to be leaving us, but we appreciate your service.
    It has been tremendous for the United States of America.
        Vice Admiral James Syring has been the Director of the
    Missile Defense Agency [MDA] for the past two and one-half
    years and has done a remarkable job improving the reliability
    and effectiveness of our Homeland and regional missile defense
    systems.
        Finally, we are joined by Lieutenant General David Mann,
    the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Space and Missile
    Defense Command and the head of the Strategic Command's Joint
    Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense.
        Today the United States and its deployed forces enjoy a
    good measure of protection against ballistic missiles of all
    ranges. However, the Army and Navy Service Chiefs warned in
    2014 in a letter to the Secretary of Defense that, quote, the
    growing challenges associated with ballistic missile threats
    that are increasingly capable continue to outpace our Active
    defense systems and exceed our Services' capacity to meet
    combatant commanders' demand. Close quote.
        Likewise, Mr. McKeon, you told Congress that, quote, as
    North Korea and potentially Iran makes progress on ICBM
    [intercontinental ballistic missile] class missile
    technologies, we must be prepared to address new, more complex
    threats in the next decade. Close quote.
        In other words, despite considerable progress, there is
    still more to do with respect to both Homeland and regional
    missile defense systems. Yet, while the military need for
    missile defense continues to increase, funding for the Missile
    Defense Agency has been on the decline and is projected under
    this budget request to decline further over the next five
    years.
        In fiscal year 2008, MDA funding was $8.8 billion. I
    believe that is reflected in this chart here that is up with
    the jagged green line. We were at $8.8 billion, whereas in
    fiscal year 2017, the request for MDA is $7.5 billion. All
    told, MDA funding has declined 14 percent over the past ten
    years. I believe that is in constant dollars not inflation-
    adjusted dollars.
        Let us see the next chart. This I think gives a visual,
    colleagues, if you see it there, of the fact that we are seeing
    a real reduction.
        The next chart, please. The share of MDA funding going to
    research and development has decreased by 28 percent from
    fiscal year 2008 through 2016, with a rising share of the
    funding devoted to procurement and operations and support. This
    means there is less funding available for advanced research.
        Colleagues, if you all would look at this chart. I think
    you may have a copy. If you would pull it out, I think it is
    worth taking the time to take a look at it.
        What we are seeing is not only has the budget declined 14
    percent, but the blue, yellow, and red represent funding items
    that MDA is now paying for they did not used to pay for. In
    2008, their entire budget virtually was research, development,
    test, and evaluation. You can see the erosion of MDA's research
    and development budget is more significant than I had realized,
    frankly. I would note I am not prepared to criticize, Secretary
    McKeon, the fact that MDA is now doing procurement and other
    things. It might be good. However, it seems to be coming
    straight out of their research budget, which I think is
    something we need to be aware of as we go forward.
        The future years request continues the overall trend of
    reducing both MDA funding and the research and development
    [R&D] share of that funding. MDA top line for the year 2021 is
    8 percent below the fiscal year 2016, another 8 percent drop,
    and the R&D share of that funding declines to under 70 percent
    for the first time.
        I hope to explore with the witnesses the implication of
    these trends and what they mean for addressing ballistic
    missile threats in the next decade and beyond. Without
    sufficient funding for the advanced technologies and new
    approaches to missile defense, I am afraid the United States
    may not stay ahead ballistic missile threats, at least not in a
    cost-effective manner, which in this budget environment is
    certainly critical.
        In any event, these are issues that the next administration
    will have to address in its review of ballistic missile defense
    policy and funding.
        I turn to Ranking Member Donnelly for his remarks. Thank
    you, Senator Donnelly, for your good work on this committee and
    the interest and extra time you have taken to stay on top of
    the many issues we deal with.

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOE DONNELLY

        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
    Senator Sessions for holding this hearing.
        Let me also thank today's witnesses for testifying. We very
    much appreciate your time and the work you do in the service of
    our Nation.
        Protecting our country, our forward-deployed troops, and
    our allies around the world is of the utmost importance. I
    spent a week in the Middle East last month visiting Israel, the
    UAE, Bahrain, Iraq, and Spain to discuss the threat posed by
    Iran's ballistic missile program and to review United States
    and allied missile defense systems in the region. In light of
    the provocative behavior we have seen from both Iran and North
    Korea in the past six months, I believe our investments in this
    area are as important today as they have ever been.
        I am pleased at the improvements we are making in the
    reliability and effectiveness of our missile defense systems. I
    credit that in large part to both the bipartisan support in
    Congress for robust missile defense funding and MDA's committed
    ability to prioritize investments where they are most needed.
        That needs to continue. We need investment in things like
    the redesigned kill vehicle and improved sensor and
    discrimination capabilities to improve the ability of our
    systems to defeat incoming threats. While we must proceed with
    urgency, we have to learn from the mistakes of the past and be
    sure we are conducting smart simulation and testing on these
    systems before we commit to buying and fielding new
    technologies.
        If there is one message that I carried back with me from
    the Middle East last month, it is that while we continue to
    improve our Homeland defense systems, we cannot take our eye
    off the ball when it comes to protecting our deployed troops
    and reassuring our allies and partners overseas. Our Aegis
    ships and THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] and
    Patriot batteries are in high demand from our combatant
    commanders and our allies. We need to consider how best to
    allocate these systems and effectively train the warfighters
    who will operate them to provide the protection that is needed
    in today's budget constrained environment. The critical part of
    that calculus will be how to best build the capabilities and
    capacity of our allies, particularly Israel, and maximize the
    integration and interoperability of our missile defenses with
    partner nation forces.
        Again, thanks for coming today, and we look forward to this
    dialogue.
        Senator Sessions. Very good.
        Secretary McKeon, if you have a statement and your
    colleagues, we would be prepared to hear them at this time.

    STATEMENT OF HONORABLE BRIAN P. McKEON, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER
         SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Mr. McKeon. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator
    Donnelly, and other members of the subcommittee. I appreciate
    this opportunity to testify on the fiscal year 2017 budget
    request for missile defense and the Department's continuing
    efforts to sustain and modernize our Homeland missile defense
    capabilities.
        Let me begin by briefly discussing two key threats that are
    driving our investments. My longer statement for the record
    includes a description of the trends such as a return to great
    power competition with Russia and China that are more broadly
    driving the focus of our planning and budgeting.
        North Korea's weapons and missile programs pose a growing
    threat to the United States and to our allies in East Asia.
    North Korea is seeking to develop longer-range ballistic
    missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons to the United
    States and continues its efforts to bring its KN08 road-mobile
    ICBM to operational capacity. Although the reliability of an
    untested North Korean ICBM is likely to be very low, North
    Korea has used its Taepo-Dong-2 launch vehicle to put a
    satellite into orbit, thus demonstrating technologies
    applicable to a long-range missile.
        Iran has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the
    Middle East and today can potentially reach targets throughout
    the region and into southeastern Europe. Iran is seeking to
    enhance the lethality and the effectiveness of existing systems
    with improvements in accuracy and warhead designs. Iran also
    has an anti-ship ballistic missile that can potentially
    threaten maritime activity in the Persian Gulf and the Strait
    of Hormuz. Although we judge that Iran does not yet possess an
    ICBM, its progress on space launch vehicles provides Iran with
    the potential means and potential motivation to develop longer-
    range missiles, including an ICBM.
        Currently the United States Homeland is protected against
    potential ICBM attacks from states like North Korea and Iran,
    were either to develop an ICBM that could reach the United
    States. To ensure that we stay ahead of the threat, we are
    continuing to strengthen our Homeland defense posture and
    invest in technologies to enable us to address emerging threats
    more effectively over the next decade.
        Our 2017 budget request also continues to deploy missile
    defenses that are tailored to the security circumstances in
    Europe, the Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific region. We are
    continuing to implement the European phased adaptive approach,
    and we have reached technical capability of phase II, which
    includes the Aegis Ashore site in Romania last December. Our
    focus is on developing and fielding missile defense
    capabilities that are mobile and relocatable, which allows us
    to address crises as they emerge. Systems such as Patriot,
    THAAD, and our Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense [BMD] ships
    allow us to have flexible layered missile defense capabilities.
        Additionally, we are seeking to invest in our cruise
    missile defense architecture, especially as it relates to the
    National Capital Region.
        Given the threat facing the United States Homeland, we
    require persistent surveillance and detection of cruise
    missiles. To that end, we are working with the North American
    Aerospace Defense Command headed by Admiral Gortney and others
    to identify technologies that give us this persistent
    surveillance and detection.
        We are also working closely with our Canadian partners to
    examine future technologies to cover the northern approaches.
        Thank you very much for having us, and we appreciate and
    urge your support for our President's budget.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Mr. Brian P. McKeon
        Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, members of the
    Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the fiscal
    year (FY) 2017 budget request for ballistic missile defense and the
    Defense Department's continuing efforts to sustain and modernize our
    Homeland missile defense capability so that we remain ahead of the
    threat while providing effective, integrated, and interoperable
    regional ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability. I am grateful for
    your consistent attention to, and continuing support of, the critical
    mission of defending the Homeland, our allies and partners, and our
    deployed forces from a growing ballistic missile threat.
        I will begin with a discussion of ballistic missile threats and
    trends, and then focus on several key policy priorities: defending the
    United States against limited long-range ballistic missile attacks,
    strengthening defense against regional missile threats, fostering
    defense cooperation with allies and partners, and examining how to
    advance the missile defense technology base in a cost-effective manner.
    I will also briefly address issues associated with other non-BMD tools
    the Department is examining to assist in the broader effort to defeat
    ballistic missiles.
                           ballistic missile threats
        Ballistic missiles continue to pose a significant security
    challenge as nations pursue efforts to make them more survivable,
    reliable, mobile, and accurate at greater ranges.
    North Korea
        North Korea's weapons and missile programs pose a growing threat to
    the United States and to our allies in East Asia. North Korea has
    conducted four nuclear tests. It is also seeking to develop longer-
    range ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons to the
    United States, and continues efforts to bring its KN08 road-mobile ICBM
    to operational capacity. Although the reliability of an untested North
    Korean ICBM is likely to be very low, North Korea has used its Taepo-
    Dong-2 launch vehicle to put a satellite in orbit, thus successfully
    demonstrating technologies applicable to a long-range missile.
    Iran
        The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action reached by the P5+1, the EU
    and Iran last summer effectively cuts off all of Iran's potential
    pathways to developing a nuclear warhead, thereby removing the greatest
    danger previously posed by Iran's ballistic missile program. At the
    same time, Iran already has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles
    in the Middle East and today can potentially reach targets throughout
    the region and into southeastern Europe. Iran is seeking to enhance the
    lethality and effectiveness of existing systems with improvements in
    accuracy and warhead designs. Iran also has an anti-ship ballistic
    missile that can potentially threaten maritime activity in the Persian
    Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Although Iran does not yet possess an
    intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), its progress on space launch
    vehicles (SLV)--along with its desire to deter the United States and
    its allies and partners--provides Iran with the potential means and
    potential motivation to develop longer-range missiles, including an
    ICBM. Iran has stated publicly that it intends to launch the Simorgh
    SLV this year, which would be capable of ICBM ranges if Iran chose to
    configure it as a ballistic missile.
    Syria
        Although Syria does not pose a ballistic missile threat to the
    United States Homeland, the Assad regime does possess short-range
    ballistic missiles, and has shown a willingness to use them repeatedly
    against its own people. Syria has several hundred short-range ballistic
    missiles, all of which are mobile and can reach much of Israel and
    large portions of Iraq, Jordan, and Turkey from launch sites well
    within Syria.
                    other trends, including cruise missiles
        As Secretary Carter noted in his posture hearing before this
    committee, the Department confronts evolving challenges--China, Russia,
    North Korea, Iran, and countering terrorism--that are now driving the
    focus of the Department's planning and budgeting. The first two of
    these challenges reflect a return to great power competition, and both
    China and Russia are investing in anti-access/area denial capabilities.
    China is introducing qualitative advances into its nuclear and
    conventional military capabilities as it continues its rise in the
    Asia-Pacific region, and is making significant investments in anti-ship
    ballistic and cruise missiles, which will improve China's ability to
    strike regional targets at greater ranges.
        Russia is making significant investments in cruise missiles,
    including a cruise missile that violates the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
    Forces (INF) Treaty, which eliminated an entire class of United States
    and Russian missiles nearly three decades ago. In light of Russia's INF
    Treaty violation and overall aggressive behavior, we are developing and
    implementing a strategy to address Russian military actions that
    includes modifying and expanding air defense systems to deny Russia
    offensive capabilities; placing an increased emphasis on working with
    allies and partners to improve our collective capability to counter
    complex cruise missile threats; working with other departments and
    agencies to encourage and facilitate allied acquisition of advanced
    capabilities by those most concerned with Russian behavior; and
    investing in the technologies that are most relevant to Russia's
    provocations.
                            homeland missile defense
        The United States Homeland is currently protected against potential
    ICBM attacks from States like North Korea and Iran if it was to develop
    an ICBM in the future. To ensure that we stay ahead of the threat, we
    are continuing to strengthen our Homeland defense posture and invest in
    technologies to enable us to address emerging threats more effectively
    in the next decade. This requires continued improvement to the Ground-
    based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, including enhanced performance of
    the Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) and the deployment of new sensors.
        We remain on track to deploy 14 additional interceptors in Alaska
    by the end of 2017. These interceptors, along with the 30 that are
    currently deployed, will provide protection against both North Korean
    and potential Iranian ICBM threats as they emerge and evolve. This
    year's budget request also reflects Department of Defense's (DOD's)
    commitment to modernizing the GMD system. It will move us towards a
    more reliable and effective defense of the United States. It includes
    funding for development of a new Long-Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR)
    being installed in Alaska. The LRDR will provide persistent sensor
    coverage and improve discrimination capabilities against North Korea.
    It also continues funding for the redesign of the kill vehicle known as
    Redesigned Kill Vehicles (RKV) for the GBI. Although we have addressed
    the causes of past failures in the GBI related to the Exoatmospheric
    Kill Vehicle, the RKV will have greater performance and discrimination
    capability.
        As directed by statute, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is also
    preparing environmental impact statements (EIS) for sites in the
    eastern United States that could host an additional GBI missile field.
    The EISs will be completed later this year. No decision has been made
    to deploy an additional missile field in the United States. The highest
    priorities for the protection of the Homeland are improving the
    reliability and effectiveness of the GBI and improving the GMD sensor
    architecture, which yield the greatest benefit against existing
    threats. The current GMD system provides coverage of the entire United
    States from North Korean and potential Iranian ICBMs. If an ICBM threat
    were to emerge in numbers that necessitated the deployment of
    additional interceptors, the steps being taken now, including
    conducting EISs, will shorten the construction timelines associated
    with deployment of a new missile defense site.
                                regional defense
        The Department's fiscal year 2017 budget request also continues to
    deploy missile defenses that are tailored to the security circumstances
    in Europe, the Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific region. Our focus is
    on developing and fielding missile defense capabilities that are mobile
    and relocatable, which allows us to address crises as they emerge.
    Systems such as Patriot, Terminal High-Altitude Air Defense (THAAD),
    and our Aegis BMD ships allow us to have flexible, layered missile
    defense capabilities tailored to specific regional threats. We are also
    encouraging our allies and partners to acquire missile defense
    capabilities, and to strengthen operational missile defense
    cooperation. In a regional context, we know that we will not be able to
    purchase enough interceptors to rely purely on missile defense for the
    duration of a conflict. In such a situation, we must protect our most
    valuable assets while also drawing on our other capabilities to provide
    a comprehensive military approach to defeating the threat from
    ballistic missiles.
    Europe
        We are continuing to implement the European Phased Adaptive
    Approach (EPAA), and we are working in close collaboration with our
    North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies to develop an advanced
    network of sensors and interceptors--on land and at sea--to protect
    NATO European territory and our military forces and facilities.
        Technical capability of EPAA Phase II, which includes the Aegis
    Ashore site in Romania, was declared in December 2015. The site is
    undergoing operational readiness testing for integration into the NATO
    BMD architecture. The President's budget request also supports the
    Aegis Ashore site that will be deployed in Poland in the 2018 timeframe
    and the development of the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor that will be
    deployed on land and at sea later this decade. As these capabilities
    become operationally available, they will increase BMD coverage of NATO
    European territory.
        The United States conducts exercises designed to hone our Alliance
    missile defense capabilities and integration. U.S. European Command is
    engaged with NATO in the development of a biennial NATO-led BMD
    exercise event that serves to reinforce and expand upon other, routine
    BMD training evolutions that take place on a quarterly and semi-annual
    basis.
        Many NATO Allies also participate in the Nimble Titan exercise, an
    unclassified, two-year, multinational, BMD campaign. The overarching
    purpose of Nimble Titan is to serve as a venue for collaboration,
    exchange of views, and coordination of BMD policy and operational
    development among participating nations and organizations, along with
    U.S. Government departments, agencies, and military organizations.
    Nimble Titan has 25 participating nations and organizations, including
    NATO.
        Since 2011, the United States has operated a forward-based radar in
    Turkey and maintained a sea-based missile defense presence in Europe.
    We now have a total of four U.S. Aegis BMD capable destroyers forward-
    deployed to the naval facility at Rota, Spain. These multi-mission
    ships support the missile defense mission, as well as other maritime
    missions.
        Spain and Germany have committed Patriot PAC-3 systems to NATO
    missile defense as demonstrated through the ongoing NATO deployment in
    defense of Turkey. Spain recently replaced the Netherlands in the
    defense of Turkey mission through its deployment of a Patriot system,
    and is strengthening its air and missile defense capabilities by
    acquiring additional Patriot systems from Germany.
        France is planning to provide its Spirale satellite detection
    system and a long-range radar for NATO territorial missile defense and
    has offered the SAMP/T air and missile defense system, which was
    fielded in 2013, to NATO BMD.
        Several Allies have modern surface combatant ships that could be
    equipped with BMD sensor or interceptor capability upgrades. The
    Netherlands and Denmark have committed to upgrading the SMART-L radars
    on their frigates to contribute to NATO BMD.
        Beyond hosting the second Aegis Ashore site in Europe, Poland has
    also announced its intention to spend up to $8 billion to acquire
    advanced air and missile defense capabilities.
        The United States will continue to encourage its NATO Allies to do
    more to cooperate and invest in missile defenses that will contribute
    to Alliance security.
    Asia-Pacific
        In the Asia-Pacific region, our force posture includes Aegis BMD-
    capable ships, along with Patriot batteries deployed in Japan and South
    Korea. We have also maintained the THAAD battery deployment to Guam in
    response to North Korean provocations.
        The cornerstone of our security and diplomacy in the region has
    been our strong bilateral alliances, including with South Korea, Japan,
    and Australia. All three of these nations play an important role in our
    regional efforts to achieve effective missile defense.
        South Korea has an immediate, proximate stake in preventing missile
    strikes from North Korea. We have worked closely with South Korea to
    ensure that our alliance maintains the capacity to do just that. The
    United States deploys Patriot PAC-3 batteries in South Korea to defend
    United States and South Korean forces. In addition, South Korea is
    taking steps to enhance its own air and missile defense systems, which
    include sea- and land-based sensors and Patriot PAC-2 batteries. DOD
    has been consulting with South Korea about how it can upgrade its
    missile defense capabilities as part of an Alliance response to the
    growing North Korean missile threat. On February 7, 2016, in response
    to the evolving threat posed by North Korea, the United States and
    South Korea made an Alliance decision to begin formal consultations
    regarding improvements to the alliance missile defense posture,
    specifically exploring the viability of deploying to South Korea a
    THAAD system to be operated by United States Forces Korea.
        Japan has its own layered missile defense system, which includes
    Aegis BMD ships with Standard Missile-3 interceptors, PAC-3 batteries,
    early-warning radars, and sophisticated command-and-control systems.
    Japan is upgrading two ATAGO-class Aegis destroyers to BMD capability
    with certification scheduled for Japan fiscal year 2018 and Japan
    fiscal year 2019, and plans to build two additional Aegis BMD ships,
    which would increase its inventory to a total of eight BMD-capable
    ships. Japan also hosts two United States missile defense radars.
        Additionally, Japan is a critical international partner for BMD
    development. One of our most significant cooperative efforts is the co-
    development of an advanced version of the SM-3 interceptor, the SM-3
    Block IIA.
        The United States and Australia have forged a longstanding
    partnership on missile defense research and development--most notably
    with regard to sensors. In addition, Australia is involved in a
    trilateral discussion on missile defense in the Pacific involving the
    United States, Australia, and Japan.
        We will continue to emphasize the importance of developing a
    regional ballistic missile defense system that includes the sharing of
    sensor data among allies to take full advantage of the benefits of
    system interoperability and integration.
    Middle East
        We also maintain a robust missile defense presence in the Middle
    East, including land- and sea-based assets deployed in defense of our
    forward-deployed forces, and our allies and partners. This is in
    addition to our efforts to build the capacity of those allies and
    partners that will ultimately contribute to their ability to defend
    themselves.
        The United States maintains a strong defense relationship with
    Israel, and our cooperation on missile defense has resulted in one of
    the most sophisticated missile defense systems in the world. Since
    2009, the United States has provided more than $3 billion in missile
    defense assistance to Israel, which has supported the joint development
    and production of David's Sling and the Arrow Weapon System as well as
    joint production of Iron Dome. This support, in conjunction with
    operational cooperation, gives Israel the ability to respond to
    simultaneous missile and rocket attacks from Hamas or Hezbollah, and
    from the longer-range ballistic missiles being developed by Iran.
    During the summer conflict in 2014, Iron Dome had a 90 percent success
    rate and saved countless Israeli lives. Missile defense was also the
    central focus of the Juniper Cobra exercise conducted in Israel last
    month--which is an important United States-Israeli military exercise
    that allows us to work through key interoperability challenges in
    responding to a potential missile crisis with Israel.
        The United States is also working with a number of Gulf Cooperation
    Council (GCC) countries on missile defense, including supporting the
    purchase of missile defense systems through the Foreign Military Sales
    program. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is procuring the THAAD system.
    This is in addition to the UAE's earlier purchase of Patriot systems.
    Saudi Arabia is in the process of upgrading its existing Patriot PAC-2
    batteries to the PAC-3 configuration. Kuwait is also purchasing Patriot
    PAC-3 batteries. Qatar also joined the group of United States Patriot
    partners late last year, a group that includes Kuwait.
        U.S. Air Forces Central Command maintains a series of regular
    exchanges between United States and GCC air defense officers at the
    Combined Air Operations Center located at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar.
    These exchanges provide an opportunity for increased situational
    awareness of missile threats in the region as well as the potential for
    future BMD planning and operational cooperation.
        As the GCC States begin to field more capable systems, the United
    States and its Gulf partners must work toward greater integration of
    those capabilities across the region. Following the Camp David Summit
    in 2015, the United States and GCC States agreed to study Ballistic
    Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) requirements, including sensor and
    command and control architectures. The study will inform potential GCC-
    wide BMEWS acquisition plans. MDA has been working on the BMEWS
    architecture study since September--and is in the process of presenting
    results of the study to the GCC. The desired end-state is a regional
    missile defense architecture in which GCC Member States participate and
    contribute to the extent practical, leading to a networked, layered
    defense of key strategic centers that strengthens deterrence and
    increases our collective ability to defeat a ballistic missile attack.
                             technology development
        We must continue to look ahead. This means ensuring that our
    investment strategy and priorities balance the needs of addressing the
    most dangerous threats we confront today while positioning us to
    respond to threat developments in the next decade. Areas for priority
    technology investment include persistent discrimination in the current
    and future Ballistic Missile Defense System sensor architecture; high-
    power lasers for multiple BMD applications; common kill vehicle
    technology leading to a multi-object kill vehicle; advanced technology
    for high-risk/high-pay-off breakthroughs; and a rail gun to lower the
    cost per kill.
        Additionally, we are looking to invest in our cruise missile
    defense architecture--especially as it relates to the National Capital
    Region. Given the threat facing the United States Homeland, we require
    persistent surveillance and detection of cruise missiles. To that end,
    we are working with North American Aerospace Defense Command and others
    to identify technologies that give us this persistent surveillance and
    detection. We are also working closely with our Canadian partners to
    examine future technologies to cover the northern approaches.
        As we confront the growing complexity and size of ballistic and
    cruise missile threats in the next decade, the Department will continue
    to fund investments in new technologies as well as adapting current
    technologies to new purposes. As Secretary Carter stated in his
    testimony in February on the President's Budget request for fiscal year
    2017, the Department remains committed to continued investments
    directly supporting efforts to defeat missiles by using innovative
    technologies and operational concepts to lower the cost-per-round. This
    includes investments in directed energy/high-powered lasers, rail and
    powder guns, and enhanced munitions as well as employing systems like
    the Navy's SM-6 interceptor that can operate not only against a range
    of tactical missiles (air and ballistic), but can support anti-surface
    ship capacity as well.
        This leads to a larger point the Secretary has made--that today's
    security environment is dramatically different than the one in which we
    have been engaged over the last 25 years. It requires new ways of
    thinking and acting. It also requires new ways of acquiring and
    employing capabilities. Given this new security environment, we must
    also look at new ways to support our U.S. defense strategy. In the case
    of defeating ballistic missiles, we need to develop a wider range of
    tools and that includes the efforts underway to address such threats
    before they are launched, or ``left of launch.'' The development of
    left-of-launch capabilities will provide U.S. decision-makers
    additional tools and opportunities to defeat missiles. This will in
    turn reduce the burden on our ``right-of-launch'' ballistic missile
    defense capabilities. Taken together, left-of-launch and right-of-
    launch will lead to more effective and resilient capabilities to defeat
    adversary ballistic missile threats.
                                   conclusion
        The President's fiscal year 2017 budget request supports our
    strategies for protecting vital U.S. interests. It continues funding
    missile defense capabilities to ensure we remain well ahead of
    adversary ballistic and cruise missile defense developments and lays
    the foundation for investment in innovative programs to lower the cost-
    per-intercept and defeat emerging ballistic and cruise missile threats.
        We request the Committee's support for this budget.
        Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I look
    forward to your questions.

        Senator Sessions. Admiral Gortney?

     STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM E. GORTNEY, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
       NORTHERN COMMAND, AND COMMANDER, NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE
                            DEFENSE COMMAND

        Admiral Gortney. Senator Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly,
    and distinguished members of the committee, it is an honor to
    be with you here today.
        North America is increasingly vulnerable to a vast array of
    evolving threats to include highly capable national powers.
    This complexity and volatility of our strategic environment
    demands that we advance and sustain the capabilities to protect
    our Homeland.
        At NORAD and NORTHCOM, we look at threats to the Homeland
    from those most dangerous to most likely. On the most
    dangerous, the nation states, Russia, China, North Korea, where
    on North Korea, the peninsula is more unstable than it has ever
    been since the armistice, and of course, Iran.
        Many of our potential adversaries are pursuing advanced
    weapons development not seen in decades. Individually they pose
    serious threats to our national security and the international
    community. Collectively they represent a vast spectrum of
    complex and volatile threats that I believe will only continue
    to grow and threaten the Homeland if we hesitate to act
    decisively.
        Our BMD architecture is designed primarily to defend
    against limited long-range ballistic missiles from North Korea
    and Iran. In light of an evolving threat and the increasingly
    unpredictable nature of North Korea's dictator, I believe it is
    imperative that the United States continue to develop more
    capable forces and broader options for effective ballistic
    missile defense.
        I agree with and support the modernization priorities set
    by Vice Admiral Syring and his team at MDA, including
    improvement of our discrimination sensors, lethality of our
    kill vehicles, sustainment of the BMD architecture, and
    development of our kinetic and non-kinetic options.
        In addition, I believe investments in new technologies for
    the BMDS architecture such as directed energy should remain a
    priority to help us stay ahead of the advancing threats. The
    laser technology that Vice Admiral Syring and his team are
    pursuing will enhance our boost phase capability against both
    theater and ballistic missile defense against the Homeland.
        Thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak, and I
    look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Gortney follows:]

             Prepared Statement by Admiral William E. Gortney, USN
                                  introduction
        Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, and distinguished
    members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before
    you today to discuss the posture of United States Northern Command
    (USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). I am
    here representing the Commands' soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines,
    coast guardsmen, national guardsmen, reservists, and civilians
    safeguarding our nation amidst the most diverse and challenging
    security atmosphere in our history. Brave men and women are confronting
    this rapidly changing defense environment head-on. It is an honor and a
    privilege to serve alongside them and I am grateful to the Committee
    for the support you provide.
        North America is increasingly vulnerable to a vast array of
    evolving threats--from highly capable, national powers to disaffected
    individuals who act in response to extremist propaganda. These threats
    are growing and becoming much more diffuse and less attributable.
    Moreover, I believe that many of the crises originating as regional
    conflicts elsewhere in the world are rapidly manifesting themselves
    here at home and they continue to challenge our ability to warn and
    defend.
        The complexity and volatility of our strategic environment demands
    that we advance and sustain the capabilities to protect our Homelands.
    I believe the President's fiscal year 2017 budget represents a balanced
    approach to maintaining our strategic advantage within the realities of
    a fiscally-constrained environment. We are still feeling the impacts of
    sequestration, primarily because the majority of the Services' cuts
    were from the operations and maintenance accounts, which directly
    impedes their ability to provide trained and equipped servicemembers to
    combatant commands. I thank the Committee for your support in passing
    the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, which represents another important
    step toward permanent relief from the sequestration caps in the Budget
    Control Act of 2011.
        We are resolute in our commitment to deter, prevent, and defeat
    attacks against the United States and Canada. We stand ready to provide
    rapid and robust support to the primary lead agencies responding to
    domestic disasters and the law enforcement agencies (LEAs) charged with
    combating transnational organized crime. We continue to strengthen our
    regional and Homeland partnerships; they are our center of gravity.
                             strategic environment
        The expansive complexity of the contemporary security environment
    makes defending the Homeland a continual challenge. The spectrum of
    threats to our national security ranges from traditional nation-state
    military capabilities to individuals with access to increasingly
    destructive technologies. The diffusion of capability, the inexact art
    of predicting intent, and the complications of attribution all
    contribute to a blurring of lines between traditional military threats
    and asymmetric threats that trigger military support or response.
    Technological advances and proliferation coupled with pockets of
    instability will generate a growing array of potential threats against
    which we must posture ourselves. Many of our potential adversaries are
    pursuing advanced weapons development not seen in decades.
    Individually, they pose serious concerns to our national security and
    the international community. Collectively, they represent a vast
    spectrum of complex and volatile threats that I believe will only
    continue to grow and threaten the Homeland if we hesitate to act
    decisively.
    Russia
        A resurgent Russia continues to assert itself on the world stage.
    No longer content merely to pursue primacy within its near abroad,
    Russia's forays into Syria highlight Vladimir Putin's willingness to
    employ military power to advance his agenda outside Russia's near
    abroad. Last year I stated that Russia is progressing toward its goal
    of deploying long-range, conventionally armed cruise missiles
    comparable to Western systems. In 2015 these efforts came to fruition,
    as Russia employed heavy bombers, surface vessels, and a submarine to
    launch advanced conventional cruise missiles at targets in Syria. These
    operations served as a proof-of-concept for weapons systems and tactics
    ultimately intended to provide flexible deterrent options in a future
    crisis.
        Russia's strategic nuclear forces remain the only foreign military
    threat that could imperil our nation's existence, and Moscow continues
    to spend significant resources to modernize its nuclear arsenal and
    delivery systems. While Russia seeks to avoid a strategic conflict with
    the United States, Moscow perceives itself to be threatened by a
    coordinated Western effort to erode its sovereignty, weaken its
    economy, and undermine its regime. I am concerned these threat
    perceptions could prompt Russia's leaders to misinterpret our
    intentions in a crisis, leading to inadvertent escalation.
    China
        As part of its long-term, comprehensive military modernization
    program, China continues to modernize and expand its strategic forces
    with a focus on improving its ability to survive a first strike and
    penetrate United States' missile defenses. Concerned that that United
    States precision strike and missile defense capabilities undermine its
    strategic deterrent, Beijing is working to improve the survivability of
    its nuclear force to ensure a credible second-strike capability.
        China continues to supplement its modest silo-based
    intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force with a growing number
    of road-mobile ICBMs and is now in the process of operationalizing its
    first viable class of ballistic missile submarines, which, if
    successful, would be China's first sea-based strategic nuclear
    deterrent. China is also developing a range of anti-access and area-
    denial weapons which, along with its cyber, counter-space, and
    strategic nuclear capabilities, are designed to discourage United
    States intervention in a regional crisis. Meanwhile, Beijing's
    diplomatic strategy appears to be focused on limiting United States
    options by denying physical and political access in key regions around
    the globe.
    North Korea
        North Korea's recent hostile cyberspace activity, nuclear testing,
    and continued ballistic missile development represent a dangerous
    threat to our national security. North Korea's recent nuclear test and
    satellite launch demonstrate Kim Jong-un's commitment to developing
    strategic capabilities, as well as his disregard for United Nations
    Security Council resolutions. The regime's efforts to develop and
    deploy the road-mobile KN08 ICBM have profound implications for
    Homeland missile defense, primarily because the missile obviates most
    of the pre-launch indicators on which we have traditionally relied to
    posture our defenses. While the KN08 remains untested, modeling
    suggests it could deliver a nuclear payload to much of the Continental
    United States. We assess Kim Jong-un is unlikely to attack our Homeland
    unless he perceives an imminent threat to his regime's survival.
    However, we are concerned the possession of a nuclear ICBM could
    embolden the regime's intransigence below the nuclear threshold and
    complicate our response to a crisis on the peninsula. While I do not
    believe that North Korea's efforts to develop a submarine-launched
    ballistic missile represent a near-term threat to the United States
    Homeland, the program underscores the level of effort and resources the
    regime is willing to devote to developing advanced weapon systems. As
    the combatant commander charged with defending the Homeland, I take
    this threat very seriously, particularly in light of North Korea's
    unpredictable leadership.
    Iran
        Iran poses multiple significant security concerns to the United
    States, and I remain wary of its strategic trajectory. Last year's
    conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was a welcome
    development, but, Iran's continuing pursuit of long-range missile
    capabilities and ballistic missile and space launch programs, in
    defiance of United Nations Security Council resolutions, remains a
    serious concern. Iran has successfully orbited satellites using a
    first-generation space launch vehicle and announced plans to orbit a
    larger satellite using its ICBM-class booster as early as this year. In
    light of these advances, we assess Iran may be able to deploy an
    operational ICBM by 2020 if the regime choses to do so. Additionally,
    Iran has invested in developing advanced offensive cyberspace
    capability and has demonstrated cyberspace operations that could
    threaten our critical civil infrastructure.
                               lines of operation
        In my statement last year, I described the unique aspects of
    USNORTHCOM as the nation's Homeland geographic combatant command (GCC)
    and NORAD as the nation's oldest bi-national command. I explained the
    importance of prioritizing our complementary and individual functions
    with a focus on our shared end states. Our key Lines of Operation are
    more critical than ever to our mission success. We map all of our
    activities to these Lines of Operation, which shape our activities and
    effort.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                              USNORTHCOM and NORAD Lines of Operation

                               Defense of our Homelands
                               Defense Support of Civil Authorities
                               Homeland Partnerships
                               Regional Partnerships
                               The Arctic
                               Professionalism and Excellence
                               Warfighters and Families
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                            defense of our homelands
        As the Commander of USNORTHCOM and NORAD, my primary task is to
    defend the Homelands. Defense of our Homelands is our dominant line of
    operation, and it is the core focus of USNORTHCOM and NORAD primary
    missions. We are ever mindful of the supreme responsibility we have of
    defending the security of the United States, our citizens, and our
    allies and partners. In 2015, we celebrated NORAD's 57th year defending
    North America against attack through our no-fail aerospace warning and
    aerospace control missions. NORAD was born in the Cold War and expanded
    to an internal threat focus after 9/11. By contrast, USNORTHCOM was
    born in the aftermath of 9/11 and shaped by the seminal nature of those
    attacks. Both Commands are ever-adapting within the strategic
    environment, and we work hard to develop our capabilities to outpace
    threats.
                                missile defense
        USNORTHCOM's most prominent Homeland defense mission is Ballistic
    Missile Defense (BMD). Currently, our BMD architecture is designed
    primarily to defend against limited long range ballistic missile
    attacks from North Korea and Iran. In light of an evolving threat and
    the increasingly enigmatic and unpredictable nature of North Korea's
    dictator, Kim Jong-un, I believe it is imperative that the United
    States continue to develop more capable forces and broader options for
    effective ballistic missile defense. Our BMD architecture is comprised
    of a group of independent, yet interrelated components that form a
    complex and unified defensive network. This system of systems cannot be
    modernized and maintained sequentially; each component must be improved
    concurrently to outpace the evolving threat. I agree with and support
    the modernization priorities set by Vice Admiral Jim Syring and his
    team at the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), including improvement in our
    discrimination sensors, lethality of our kill vehicles, sustainment of
    the BMD architecture, and development of our kinetic and non-kinetic
    options. I am grateful to this committee for your support and
    commitment to modernizing our Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).
        We are on the right path to improving our sensors through the
    development and deployment of the new Long Range Discrimination Radar
    (LRDR). This critical midcourse sensor is expected to provide
    persistent sensor coverage and vastly improve our target tracking and
    discrimination capability. The LRDR will help us evaluate our
    countermeasure options and increase the capability of our Ground-based
    Midcourse Defense (GMD) interceptors.
        We remain on track to deploy the final 14 interceptors in Alaska,
    which will give us 44 missiles in the ground by the end of 2017.
    Finishing the inventory is a big step toward the robust BMDS of the
    future, but it is critical that we not stop there. We need to continue
    working on enhancements to the current Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle
    (EKV), and investments in the future Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV). We
    need to invest in the lethality of our kill vehicles, and in ways to
    get us to the right side of the cost curve. Our adversaries are
    developing relatively inexpensive technologies, which we assess can
    reach the Homeland. By contrast, our interceptors are vastly more
    expensive. Today, our BMDS is investing in new technologies and
    adapting current technologies to new purposes which will enable us to
    meet the advancing threat and lower the cost per round.
        I believe that Homeland defense is fundamentally an ``away game'',
    and missile defense is no exception. Today's GMD system is designed to
    intercept incoming threats after the launch is initiated. While that
    approach offers us sufficient decision space, we need to augment our
    defensive posture with one that is designed to defeat ballistic missile
    threats in the boost phase as well as before they are launched, known
    as ``left of launch.'' In concert with our public and private
    stakeholders, MDA is working on an emerging technology that will enable
    us to employ non-kinetic methods to defeat ballistic missile threats
    when we receive indications that a launch is imminent. I believe this
    technology will reduce the overall cost of engagement-based missile
    defense and provide us options to defeat ballistic missiles that
    continue to proliferate around the world.
        We work closely with other GCCs, functional combatant commands, and
    partner nations to leverage capabilities that enable us to protect the
    Homeland. Thanks to agreements with the government of Japan, United
    States Pacific Command (USPACOM) was able to deploy a second Army Navy/
    Transportable Radar Surveillance and Control Model 2, or AN/TPY-2 to
    Japan, which dramatically improved our ability to ``defend forward.''
        In addition to the proliferation of ballistic missile threats, I am
    deeply troubled by the development of advanced long-range cruise
    missiles and the growing threat they represent to North America. Russia
    possesses both conventional and nuclear cruise missiles with the range
    to reach North America and it has proliferated some advanced cruise
    missile technologies to other actors. This threat is real and it is
    imperative that we develop effective response options to outpace the
    threat and enhance our deterrence. We are working with the Joint
    Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization (JIAMDO), MDA, and
    other stakeholders to improve our Cruise Missile Defense (CMD)
    capabilities.
        Effectively countering and defeating cruise missiles requires a
    layered and integrated architecture that can defend across the full
    spectrum of the engagement sequence. Cruise missiles represent a real
    operational challenge because of their increased standoff capability,
    low altitude and small radar signatures. Although no single system can
    counter all cruise missiles, we have confidence in our layered
    architecture to defend the Homeland. To defeat this more capable
    threat, we are working on enhancements to each of the individual
    systems, including our Indications and Warnings capabilities, wide-
    area-surveillance, and advanced fire control infrastructure.
        We are in the first segment of our three-phase Homeland Defense
    Design (HDD) effort, which will improve our capability to find, fix,
    track, target, and engage growing air threats, such as those posed by
    cruise missiles, low-slow aircraft, and long-range aviation. In this
    first phase, we are testing and evaluating advanced sensors as well as
    integrated command and control capabilities. In addition to the new
    STateside Affordable Radar System (STARS), we had begun a three-year
    operational exercise of the Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense
    Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS). This exercise had been an
    opportunity for us to see how well JLENS can fit into the existing
    Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) of the National Capital Region
    (NCR), including deployment of a JLENS Fire Control System aerostat,
    which is designed to work in tandem with the surveillance aerostat.
        Unfortunately, on October 28, 2015, the JLENS Fire Control System
    aerostat detached from its mooring station on Aberdeen Proving Ground,
    Maryland, and eventually grounded in a wooded area in northeast
    Pennsylvania. The Army is now finishing up the last of their
    investigations to determine the root causes of the incident. However,
    with the recent congressional disapproval of the fiscal year 2016
    above-threshold-reprogramming request, termination of the JLENS
    operational exercise is now underway and the Department is working to
    determine the way ahead.
                                   conclusion
        We are very fortunate to be able to depend on the brave men and
    women who choose to wear the cloth of their nation and defend their
    fellow citizens, despite what is likely to be an onerous fight against
    increasingly diffuse threats. We embrace our no-fail mission at a time
    when our unique capabilities are needed most, and with your support,
    together with the exceptional men and women of USNORTHCOM and NORAD and
    our trusted partners, we will remain the greatest force for freedom,
    safety, and security for North America. I look forward to your
    questions.

        Senator Sessions. Next, Admiral Syring.

       STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL JAMES D. SYRING, USN, DIRECTOR,
             MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Admiral Syring. Thank you, Chairman Sessions, Ranking
    Member Donnelly, distinguished members of the subcommittee. It
    is an honor again to testify before you today.
        We request support of our fiscal year 2017 budget which is
    necessary, as I will speak to in detail, to increase the
    capacity and capability of fielded Homeland and regional
    defense systems.
        With the escalation of the threat from North Korea and
    Iran, to include increasingly aggressive ballistic missile
    testing, we are working hard to find more cost-effective ways
    to do the missile defense mission. We need your continued
    strong support to improve the reliability of our Homeland
    defense systems and modernize our ground systems.
        We are moving forward with the redesigned kill vehicle
    program. All the ground-based interceptor upgrades and
    emplacements remain on track to achieve 44 interceptors by
    2017. In fiscal year 2017, we plan to conduct two intercept
    flight tests to more fully demonstrate performance of the
    Ground-Based Midcourse Defense [GMD] system against ICBMs.
        Among our planned Homeland defense improvements to identify
    and track lethal objects, we will begin construction in 2017 of
    the long-range discrimination radar in Alaska. To stay on
    schedule, it is critical that we receive full funding for the
    phase 1 of the military construction in fiscal year 2017 for
    the radar equipment shelter.
        On the regional defense side, in fiscal year 2017, we
    continue to enhance the capability of the Aegis BD [Ballistic
    Defense] system and deliver additional SM-3 IBs. We delivered
    Romania to the warfighter at the end of 2015, and we remain on
    track to deliver the Aegis Ashore site in Poland by the end of
    2018 to improve European NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization] defenses against medium and intermediate range
    missiles.
        Finally, on the advanced technology front, we need to stay
    ahead of the threat by discriminating and killing reentry
    vehicles with a higher degree of confidence in all phases of
    flight.
        Today we are focusing on directed energy, which I believe
    is a game-changer. Our work on laser scaling to achieve greater
    efficiency and lighter weight will enable a low-power laser
    demonstrator in 2021 to determine the feasibility of destroying
    enemy missiles in the boost phase of flight.
        Finally, equal to any threat we face around the world, we
    are very aware of the growing cyber threat and working
    aggressively to ensure the Nation's missile defenses are
    resilient and able to operate in this highly contested
    environment. We are taking steps to ensure the cybersecurity
    infrastructure and the latest security upgrades and everything
    else that needs to happen with the system, supplier level and
    our acquisition processes, is accounted for. We have rigorous
    cyber and supply chain risk management inspection programs. We
    have red team efforts ongoing to examine everything about our
    system from the trusted supply chain to the fielded operational
    capability. I cannot underscore the importance of this more.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the committee's
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Syring follows:]

              Prepared Statement by Vice Admiral J.D. Syring, USN
        Good afternoon, Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly,
    distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I appreciate this
    opportunity to testify before you today. Our current budget request of
    $7.5 billion for fiscal year (FY) 2017 will continue the development of
    defenses for our Nation, deployed forces, allies, and international
    partners against increasingly capable ballistic missiles. The fiscal
    year 2017 missile defense program will continue to support the
    Warfighter and needs of the combatant commanders with the development,
    testing, deployment, and integration of interceptors, sensors, and the
    command, control, battle management and communications (C2BMC) system
    for the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).
                            ballistic missile threat
        The threat continues to grow as potential adversaries acquire a
    greater number of ballistic missiles, increasing their range,
    incorporating BMD countermeasures, and making them more complex,
    survivable, reliable, and accurate. Space-launch activities involve
    multistage systems that further the development of technologies for
    intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In addition to the Taepo
    Dong 2 space launch vehicle/ICBM, North Korea is developing and has
    paraded the KN08 road-mobile ICBM and an intermediate-range ballistic
    missile (IRBM) with a range greater than 3,000 km. Last October North
    Korea paraded a previously unseen, new, or modified road-mobile ICBM.
    North Korea has recently assumed an aggressive posture, having
    conducted rocket and ballistic missile launches in addition to the
    launch of the Taepo Dong 2 space launch vehicle/ICBM this past
    February. Today it fields hundreds of Scud and No Dong missiles that
    can reach United States forces forward deployed to the Republic of
    Korea and Japan.
        Iran has successfully orbited satellites and announced plans to
    orbit a larger satellite using a space launch vehicle (the Simorgh)
    that could be capable of intercontinental ballistic missile ranges if
    configured as such. Iran also has steadily increased its ballistic
    missile force, deploying next-generation short- and medium-range
    ballistic missiles (SRBMs and MRBMs) with increasing accuracy and new
    submunition payloads. Tehran's overall defense strategy relies on a
    substantial inventory of theater ballistic missiles capable of striking
    targets in southeastern Europe and the Middle East, including Israel.
    Iran continues to develop more sophisticated missiles and improve the
    range and accuracy of current missile systems, and it has publicly
    demonstrated the ability to launch simultaneous salvos of multiple
    rockets and missiles. Demonstrating it is capable of modifying
    currently deployed ballistic missile systems, Iran has flight-tested a
    Fateh110 ballistic missile in an anti-ship role. By adding a seeker to
    improve the missile's accuracy against sea-based targets, Iran could
    threaten maritime activity throughout the Persian Gulf and Strait of
    Hormuz.
                           support for the warfighter
        Our priority is to continue to deliver greater missile defense
    capability and capacity to the Warfighter for employment in support of
    Combatant Command priorities. This budget maintains the commitment to
    build out Homeland defenses to 44 Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs) by
    the end of 2017 and enhance GBI reliability. To strengthen regional
    defenses, we plan to deliver a total of 39 SM-3 Block IBs to the Navy
    in fiscal year 2017 for use on Aegis BMD ships and at the Aegis Ashore
    site, for a total of 146 delivered since December 2013. MDA also will
    deliver in fiscal year 2017 61 additional Terminal High Altitude Area
    Defense (THAAD) interceptors to the Army, for a total of 205 delivered
    since May 2011.
        On 18 December last year, we delivered the Aegis Ashore system in
    Romania in support of Phase 2 of the European Phased Adaptive Approach
    (EPAA). The technical capability declaration included the Aegis Ashore
    Romania missile defense complex, Aegis BMD 5.0 (Capability Upgrade, or
    CU) weapon system, as an integrated component of Aegis Baseline 9, and
    Standard Missile (SM)-3 Block IB (with a Threat Upgrade). This is the
    first EPAA land-based interceptor component, and it is mission capable
    today. On 30 December 2015, the United States Navy accepted ownership
    of the Aegis Ashore site in Romania. United States Warfighter
    acceptance is expected in May 2016. MDA will continue to support the
    Navy and NATO through the operation of the system. Also, plans remain
    on track to deliver a second Aegis Ashore site in Poland along with an
    upgraded missile defense system and the initial Standard Missile-3 (SM-
    3) Block IIA missiles by the end of 2018 to support EPAA Phase 3.
        MDA routinely provides Warfighter operational support by performing
    the mission essential functions of BMDS configuration control, asset
    management, and operational readiness reporting and by providing an
    operational-level interface to United States Northern Command
    (USNORTHCOM), European Command (USEUCOM), Central Command (USCENTCOM),
    and Pacific Command (USPACOM) and facilitating increased Warfighter
    participation in development of future missile defense capabilities.
    MDA will continue to lead the integration of evolving MDA, Service, and
    COCOM command and control capabilities through systems engineering
    analysis and development of technical integration requirements and
    interface control documents to address the continued fielding by U.S.
    adversaries of air, missile, and rocket capabilities.
        MDA executes a fully integrated test program that synchronizes the
    system with the Warfighters trained to operate the system under varying
    wartime conditions against current and emerging threats. This ensures
    that BMDS capabilities are credibly demonstrated and validated prior to
    delivery to the Warfighter. We continue to work closely with
    independent testers within DOD--the Director, Operational Test and
    Evaluation; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Developmental Test &
    Evaluation; Service Operational Test Agencies; and Combatant Commands,
    represented by the Joint Forces Component Commands Integrated Missile
    Defense--to develop an Integrated Master Test Plan to execute a robust,
    cost-effective flight test program. Our flight tests feature
    operationally realistic conditions and integrate U.S. Government
    stakeholders--to include soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines--and
    allies to prove BMD capabilities before they are fielded. From October
    2014 to the present, we have executed 25 flight tests. For the
    remainder of fiscal year 2016 we will conduct six more flight tests,
    and in fiscal year 2017 16 flight tests. In addition to 22 element
    level ground tests, we conducted 11 developmental and operational
    system-level ground tests from October 2014 to the present. There are
    three more system-level ground tests scheduled for this fiscal year,
    and four more planned for fiscal year 2017. Last year we also conducted
    or participated in more than 20 multi-event exercises and wargames,
    which are critical to the Warfighter and the intensive engineering
    efforts across the Agency.
              increasing reliability and confidence in the system
        Before I review our fiscal year 2017 program, I want to give you a
    brief overview of what we are doing within the current program to
    increase reliability and confidence in the system and how we are
    developing technologies to get ahead of what is sometimes referred to
    as the kinetic (hit-to-kill) cost curve.
        We are working hard to find more cost-effective ways to do the
    missile defense mission. There are challenging scenarios where
    adversaries will be able to launch large numbers of relatively cheap
    and increasingly complex missiles and our only option is to intercept
    them with very expensive weapon systems. MDA is making critical
    investments in future system development that we believe will
    significantly improve system performance and effectiveness. By
    improving reliability, enhancing discrimination, and expanding battle
    space to make possible a re-engagement firing strategy, I believe we
    can reduce the cost per kill. We also need to investigate solutions
    that help reduce reliance on expensive kinetic intercept solutions.
        Reliability is paramount and a critical part of how the warfighter
    decides upon a shot doctrine, that is, the estimation of how many shots
    it will take to defeat a credible threat. With a highly reliable
    interceptor, fewer shots would be required. As we are able to decrease
    the number of shots we must take against each threatening missile, we
    can increase overall warfighter confidence in the effectiveness of the
    system. The work we are doing to improve GBI reliability and develop
    the Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV) will help us reach this objective. We
    can also improve the missile defense cost curve by increasing the
    number of kill vehicles we place on a single interceptor. This is the
    rationale behind the Multi-Object Kill Vehicle (MOKV) program--the more
    kill vehicles we can put on an interceptor, the greater raid capacity
    our Ground-based Midcourse Defense system will have. I will address
    both of these efforts in more detail below.
        We must also take steps to improve the discrimination and
    assessment capabilities of the system. The better Warfighters are able
    to determine the lethal payload in a target cluster and assess whether
    it has been actually hit, the fewer interceptors they will need to
    expend. With our investments in radars while developing advanced
    electro-optical sensors, we are striving for a diverse sensor
    architecture that eventually will provide highly accurate midcourse
    tracking and discrimination. Development of the Long Range
    Discrimination Radar and our advanced discrimination sensor technology
    and space-based kill assessment programs will improve system target
    discrimination and assessment capabilities. Improved sensor coverage
    and interceptor capabilities will help the warfighter expand the battle
    space in order to reengage threats as needed.
        The development of non-kinetic technologies, such as directed
    energy, and new concepts of operation, such as boost-phase intercept
    and left-of-launch missile defeat, are game-changing and would have a
    dramatic effect on the need to rely exclusively on expensive
    interceptors.
        I will address all of these development efforts and initiatives
    below.
                                homeland defense
        MDA remains committed to operating, sustaining, and expanding our
    nation's Homeland missile defenses and requests $1.32 billion in fiscal
    year 2017 for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) program, or $440
    million below what we requested in PB 16. The fiscal year 2017 budget
    request is lower than the fiscal year 2016 budget due to the fact that
    the fiscal year 2016 budget provided a significant increase to
    historical funding to improve overall reliability and performance and
    extend the service life of the GMD system. Last year's larger request
    was driven by the developmental content required to reach 44 GBIs by
    the end of 2017, the first full year of the RKV program, ground system
    modernization, completion of Capability Enhancement (CE)-II Block 1
    design and full-rate manufacturing as well as CE-II upgrades,
    development, and procurement. This year we will continue efforts to
    expand the GBI fleet to 44 by the end of 2017 for Enhanced Homeland
    Defense, continue flight and system ground testing, undertake RKV and
    C3 Booster development, enhance the Stockpile Reliability Program,
    expand the battle space to enable later GBI engagements, upgrade the
    GMD ground system, and deploy upgraded GMD fire control software to
    enhance our ability to use land-based sensor discrimination data. We
    will continue to add precision and confidence in our reliability
    assessments by performing failure modes and process analyses,
    reliability testing, short-circuit and grounding analyses, and
    verification of our on-going development efforts.
    Increasing GBI Capacity
        We resumed interceptor manufacturing following the successful
    intercept in the June 2014 FTG-06b flight test. Since October 2014 we
    have delivered eight GBIs equipped with the CE-II Exo-atmospheric Kill
    Vehicle (EKV) identical to the configuration flown in that test. We
    have also removed eight previously delivered CE-II GBIs and are
    modifying them to match the FTG-06b configuration. These upgraded GBIs
    began delivery in March 2016. We are completing development of the CE-
    II Block 1 EKV and Configuration 2 (C2)/Consolidated Booster Avionics
    Unit (CBAU) for the Integrated Boost Vehicle (IBV) to address parts
    obsolescence and eliminate several reliability concerns found in the
    older GBIs. Our confidence in the CE-II Block 1 IKV design changes was
    enhanced by the results of the GM Controlled Test Vehicle flight test
    (GM CTV-02+) earlier this year. We expect the FTG-15 intercept test
    planned for the end of this calendar year using a CE-II Block 1 EKV and
    C2/CBAU IBVto boost that confidence level even further. Upon a
    successful FTG-15 flight test, we plan to deliver ten GBIs configured
    with CE-II Block 1 EKV and C2/CBAU IBV.
    GMD Testing
        This past January we successfully executed GM CTV-02+, a non-
    intercept flight test involving the launch of a GBI from Vandenberg Air
    Force Base and an air-launched IRBM target over the Pacific Ocean. We
    were able to exercise fully the new Alternate Divert Thruster in the
    CE-II EKV in a flight environment and undertake an early evaluation of
    near term discrimination improvements for Homeland defense. The EKV
    used SPY-1, SBX, and AN/TPY-2 data for target selection.
        The next intercept flight test of the GMD system will take place
    later this calendar year. FTG-15 will be the first intercept flight
    test for the CE-II Block 1 EKV and the C2/CBAU IBV. It also will be the
    first intercept of an ICBM range target by the GMD system or any other
    BMDS element. A successful test will allow MDA to meet the commitment
    to deliver 44 GBIs by the end of 2017. Following FTG-15, MDA, in
    collaboration with DOT&E, plans to conduct the FTG-11 operational
    intercept flight test in the first quarter of fiscal year 2018, which
    will demonstrate the full capability of the GMD system with a two GBI
    salvo for an engagement of an ICBM.
    Redesigned Kill Vehicle
        The primary objective for the RKV is to improve reliability. Its
    development will make Homeland defenses more robust. We plan to employ
    a modular design made up of mature subsystems and components to improve
    producibility, maintainability, and reduce unit cost. The RKV program
    will strive for performance improvements by incorporating on-demand
    communications between the kill vehicle and the ground, a wide field of
    view seeker, improved data processing and discrimination algorithms,
    and enhanced survivability. We established a cross-industry team to
    develop the RKV. We will then compete the production of an RKV-equipped
    GBI all-up round. The program schedule includes a controlled test
    vehicle flight test of the RKV in 2018 (GM CTV-03) and first intercept
    flight test in 2019 (FTG-17) to demonstrate the RKV, with a second
    intercept flight test in 2020 (FTG-18). We plan initial deliveries of
    the RKV in the 2020 time frame.
        In order to achieve full capability of the RKV, improvements are
    needed in other areas of the GMD program. We will modify the booster so
    that it can fly in either a selectable two-stage or three-stage mode
    and match survivability of the RKV. Additionally, we will upgrade the
    GMD fire control software to enable mixed engagements with RKV and EKV
    capabilities, utilize improved sensor data for on-demand
    communications, and provide improved situational awareness information
    to the Warfighter. We will modify components of the In-Flight
    Interceptor Communications System Data Terminals (IDT) to enable on-
    demand communications.
    Ground System Upgrades
        The Ground System hardware at Fort Greely and Vandenberg Air Force
    Base is 1990s technology installed in the early 2000s. We have parts
    obsolescence challenges and the operating systems are no longer
    supported by the original manufacturers. Without an upgrade, ground
    system reliability would decay and impact GBI availability to the
    Warfighter.
        Plans include the refurbishment of Missile Field 1 at Fort Greely,
    upgrades to the GMD ground system hardware, improvements to the fire
    control software, and substantial reliability testing and assessments
    to characterize the reliability and performance of the system. The work
    on Missile Field 1 began last year. We will complete the refurbishment
    and reactivation of Missile Field 1 in 2016 to provide sufficient silos
    for 44 GBIs. We have cleaned out the rust and mold in the utilidor and
    upgraded the climate control system to match what we have in Missile
    Field 2 and Missile Field 3. (A utilidor is an underground man-made
    structure used in extreme cold climates to run utilities lines between
    facilities. If the utilities--communications lines, power, heating and
    ventilation (HVAC)--were buried into the ground the freeze and thawing
    of the ground would crush the plastic casings.) The old Mechanical
    Electrical Building (MEB) was demolished and the new MEB completed in
    March 2016. We will complete replacement of Command and Launch
    Equipment, GMD Fire Control (GFC) equipment, and IDT equipment by 2017.
    The Fort Drum, New York IDT construction is complete and now
    operationally available to the Warfighter. This new IDT will enable
    communication with GBIs launched from Fort Greely, Alaska and
    Vandenberg Air Force Base in California over longer distances and
    improve defenses for the eastern United States.
        We are also initiating a longer term effort to replace the GMD
    Communications Network equipment by 2019. We will deliver two
    significant upgrades to the GFC software. The first, GFC 6B3, provides
    the Warfighter the capability to operate with 44 GBIs, improves
    discrimination capability, and adds several warfighter requested
    upgrades to improve operational capability. The second, GFC 7A,
    improves fail-over between redundant systems and system availability by
    removing the aging Command and Launch Equipment and streamlining the
    GMD fire control system architecture. Ground Systems Build 7B is also
    underway and will be in full development in 2017. The 7B build includes
    upgrades for two- or three-stage selectable boosters and associated
    flyouts, improved nuclear weapons effects planning, improved battle
    management, additional target discrimination capabilities, and the new
    RKV On-Demand Communications.
    Homeland Defense Sensors
        Last year we integrated, tested, and delivered the capability for
    the Warfighter to manage the second PACOM AN/TPY-2 radar in Japan and
    introduced the boost phase cue capability of that radar site into the
    BMDS. This radar and the new C2BMC capability will enhance the overall
    performance of the two Japan radar sites when operating in a mutually
    supporting AN/TPY-2 dual radar mode, providing improved tracking
    coverage for all ballistic missile launches out of North Korea.
        The Cobra Dane Early Warning Radar is now operating new software to
    enhance object classification for the Discrimination Improvement for
    Homeland Defense (DIHD)-Near Term capability. We will continue missile
    defense upgrades of the Early Warning Radars in Clear, Alaska and Cape
    Cod, Massachusetts. We completed Cape Cod UEWR facilities design in
    August 2015 and began facility modifications in September 2015. We
    expect to complete the Clear radar upgrade in second quarter fiscal
    year 2017 and the Cape Cod upgrade in the fourth quarter of fiscal year
    2017.
        With our budget request of $68.8 million in fiscal year 2017 for
    the Sea Based X-band (SBX) radar, we will continue to support flight
    testing with SBX to demonstrate improvements to discrimination and
    debris mitigation and be available for contingency operations. SBX will
    continue development of Discrimination Improvements for Homeland
    Defense. This past year the U.S. Coast Guard and American Bureau of
    Shipping five-year recertification of SBX vessel was completed. SBX
    also completed significant industrial work, including overhaul of two
    thrusters and three diesel generators, hull preservation, upgrade of
    the radar cooling system, and replacement of obsolete computer
    components.
        In fiscal year 2017 we request $162.0 million to continue the
    development of the Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR), the new
    midcourse tracking radar that will improve discrimination capabilities
    against threats to the Homeland from the Pacific theater. LRDR will
    provide larger hit assessment coverage enabling improved warfighting
    capability to manage GBI inventory and improving the capacity of the
    BMDS. The Deputy Secretary of Defense approved designation of the U.S.
    Air Force as the Lead Service for the LRDR this past August. Supported
    by system trade studies and with concurrence from the USSTRATCOM,
    USNORTHCOM and USPACOM commanders, the Clear Air Force Station, Alaska
    was selected as the future site of the LRDR. We are also requesting
    $155.0 million MILCON in 2017 for construction of the LRDR System
    Complex at Clear AFS, to include the mission control facility, the
    radar foundation, site infrastructure and security, along with the
    necessary utilities to provide initial operations of the radar. We
    request the MILCON be fully funded to ensure an on-time delivery of the
    facilities, which in turn allows the Radar Prime contractor to erect
    the radar equipment shelter and install the radar components to meet
    the 2020 operational requirement. The LRDR System Complex Phase 2
    project is planned in 2019 to provide a permanent shielded power plant
    for the radar system.
    Homeland Defense C2BMC
        We request $439.6 million in fiscal year 2017 for Command, Control,
    Battle Management and Communications (C2BMC). We are fielding C2BMC
    Spiral 8.2-1 capabilities to NORTHCOM and PACOM in the 4th quarter of
    fiscal year 2017 to support an enhanced Homeland defense capability.
    This will allow C2BMC to integrate data from multiple TPY-2 radars,
    SBX, UEWRs, Cobra Dane, and space sensors to increase system raid size
    and tracking capacity by a factor of five. It will also improve the
    system information security posture. We also are developing C2BMC
    Spiral 8.2-5 to support LRDR sensor management and enhanced engage-on-
    remote and support a more robust Homeland defense by December 2020.
                               regional defenses
        Our fiscal year 2017 budget request continues to prioritize
    deployment of regional defenses to protect our deployed forces, allies
    and international partners against SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs in support
    of combatant commanders' near-term and future priorities.
    Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
        We have delivered and started training for the fifth Terminal High
    Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Weapon System Battery and completed
    training on the fourth battery now under Army control. To meet the
    demand for THAAD, MDA recently delivered 12 THAAD interceptors for U.S.
    batteries and 24 for THAAD batteries operated by the United Arab
    Emirates (UAE). This past year we also delivered the latest evolution
    in THAAD software, SW B2.2.1 Debris Mitigation Phase I capability and
    flight-tested SWB2.7.0. MDA continued to provide maintenance and supply
    support of the first deployed THAAD battery (comprising the THAAD
    system and AN/TPY-2 radar) in Guam.
        This past fall THAAD added two more successful intercepts,
    improving its hit-to-kill record since 2006 to 13 for 13. FTO-02 Event
    2a was our first operational test of integrated regional BMD
    capabilities, with the THAAD and Aegis BMD weapon systems sharing
    common defended areas. Two air-launched ballistic missile targets and
    one cruise missile target were launched in this scenario. The THAAD
    battery destroyed the first ballistic missile target, demonstrating its
    advanced algorithm capability and satisfying a condition for the Army's
    materiel release of the THAAD weapon system. Following receipt of the
    remote cue, the Aegis BMD ship, USS John Paul Jones, operating in the
    Integrated Air Missile Defense mode, launched to engage the second
    target, but the SM-3 Block IB Threat Upgrade missile experienced an
    anomaly early in flight. The THAAD battery crew, which also had
    launched a second THAAD interceptor at the medium-range ballistic
    missile, located this second target and destroyed it. The crew of the
    USS John Paul Jones then used the SM-2 Block IIIA guided missile to
    destroy a cruise missile target. The test, conducted at Wake Island,
    also involved the THAAD Terminal Mode AN/TPY-2 Radar, the Forward Based
    AN/TPY-2 Radar, and Aegis BMD Spy-1 Radar, and the C2BMC
    infrastructure, as well as space sensor assets. Warfighters
    representing the entire chain of command operated the BMDS system while
    using tactics, techniques and procedures and successfully defended
    against air and missile attacks. This test was a valuable demonstration
    of the benefits of layered, integrated missile defenses.
        In fiscal year 2017 THAAD will participate in two flight tests,
    FTT-18 and FTT-15. In FTT-18 THAAD will demonstrate an intercept of a
    separating IRBM target using the THAAD radar, launcher, fire control
    and communication, interceptor operations and engagement operations.
    Turbulent weather in the Pacific Ocean precluded the timely execution
    of FTO-02 E2, which forced the delay of FTO-02 E2a. The turbulent
    weather forced the delay of FTO-02 E2 into the FTT-18 window in late
    fourth quarter fiscal year 2015, effectively forcing the re-planning of
    FTT-18 into fiscal year 2017. In fiscal year 2017, we will conduct FTT-
    15 to demonstrate the capability of the system to do an endo-
    atmospheric intercept against an MRBM target with associated objects.
        For fiscal year 2017, MDA is requesting $369.6 million for THAAD
    procurement, which includes the purchase of 24 THAAD interceptors. By
    the end of fiscal year 2017, MDA will deliver an additional 61 THAAD
    interceptors to the U.S. Army, for a total of 197 interceptors in
    inventory (this total does not include interceptors expended in flight-
    testing including two we plan to expend in FTT-18 and FTT-15). We will
    deliver and initiate training for the 7th THAAD Battery and complete
    training for the 6th THAAD Battery and turn it over to the Army by the
    end of fiscal year 2017. We will also complete the training of the 2nd
    UAE THAAD Battery and continue to support the forward deployed THAAD
    battery in Guam.
        We are requesting $270.3 million in RDT&E funding in fiscal year
    2017 as part of the continued development and testing of THAAD baseline
    2.0 capabilities. THAAD will continue activities to explore and mature
    the design concept of expanding THAAD system interoperability with air
    and missile defense systems and expanding the battlespace and defended
    area of the current baseline THAAD Weapon System. We are also
    requesting $72.1 million for THAAD operations and maintenance for
    delivered batteries.
    Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
        Aegis BMD continues to be the backbone of the Nation's regional
    defense for our deployed forces, allies, partners and friends, and
    directly supports and expands our Homeland defenses with long range
    surveillance and track capability. The fiscal year 2017 budget request
    supports continued advancement of the system to counter the growing
    threats.
        In fiscal year 2015, MDA expanded global BMD capability for the
    Aegis Fleet. Together with the U.S. Navy, we completed four BMD Weapons
    System upgrades on Aegis ships--two Aegis BMD 3.6 to 4.0 ships (ships
    with 4.0 can cover a wider threat set compared to the initial weapon
    system), and two Aegis BMD 3.6 to Aegis Baseline 9.C1 (BMD 5.0
    Capability Upgrade (CU)) ships (ships with Baseline 9 and 5.0 CU can
    conduct the anti-air warfare and ballistic missile defense missions
    concurrently). We also commenced four additional upgrades, one from 3.6
    to 4.0 and three from 3.6 to Aegis Baseline 9.C1 (BMD 5.0 CU). All
    upgrades were done to the existing BMD fleet of 33 BMD-capable Aegis
    ships. To meet an ever-growing demand by the combatant commanders, we
    continued delivery of Standard Missile-3s, including eight Block IAs
    and 20 Block IBs. fiscal year 2015 also marked the end of manufacturing
    for SM-3 Block IA rounds. We completed 26 Block IA recertifications and
    will continue to support maintenance for the deployed SM-3 Block IA
    rounds. In 2016, we expect to complete analysis that would support the
    extension of service life of the SM-3 Block IAs from 8 to 12 years,
    leaving these critically needed assets in the Fleet 50 percent longer.
        MDA conducted several critical flight tests this past year to prove
    the operational effectiveness of Aegis BMD and support certification of
    the at-sea and ashore versions of Aegis Baseline 9 (BMD 5.0 CU) Weapon
    System. Starting with FTM-25 on November 6, 2014, we successfully
    executed integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) by intercepting one
    short-range ballistic missile target with an SM-3 Block IB, while
    simultaneously engaging two air-breathing threats with SM-2 Block
    IIIAs. For this test, the Aegis Baseline 9 ship, USS John Paul Jones,
    was configured in IAMD mode, which provides the ship the ability to
    manage SPY-1 radar resources to conduct both anti-air warfare and
    ballistic missile defense concurrently. All three targets were
    successfully intercepted, and we met all primary and secondary
    objectives.
        In FTX-19, conducted in February 2015 off the coast of Virginia at
    NASA's Wallops Island facility, MDA successfully simulated engagements
    against a raid of three short-range targets using the Aegis BMD 4.0
    Weapons System, demonstrating coordinated SM-3 engagements between two
    Aegis BMD ships utilizing the Distributed Weighted Engagement Schema
    between two Aegis ships coordinating engagements. This weapon system
    functionality will be used, particularly in raid scenarios, when more
    than one ship is able to engage inbound threat missiles, and it
    determines a Preferred Shooter solution for SM-3 engagements. During
    this test, an Aegis Baseline 9 (BMD 5.0 CU) ship also participated,
    performing IAMD by simultaneously conducting simulated engagements of
    the three SRBM targets and four simulated anti-air warfare targets.
        In July MDA and the Navy conducted a series of four flight test
    events to verify the Sea-Based Terminal capability. The Sea Based
    Terminal program delivers an added layer of defense for Aegis BMD to
    engage short range threats in the terminal phase of flight and defend
    the sea base and high value assets ashore. During this series, the USS
    John Paul Jones used Aegis Baseline 9 (BMD 5.0 CU) to search, detect,
    track, and discriminate two short-range ballistic missile targets and
    two cruise missile targets. In four separate flight test events we
    verified the Sea Based Terminal capability using the SM-6 Dual I and
    the SM-2 Block IV missiles, successfully destroying the short-range
    ballistic missile and cruise missile targets and demonstrating the
    ability of Aegis Baseline 9 (BMD 5.0 CU) and the SM-6 to conduct both
    terminal ballistic missile defense and anti-air warfare. This campaign
    marked the first flight of the SM-6 Dual I missile, and it was the
    first demonstration of the tactical interface between the Aegis
    Baseline 9.C1 Weapons System and the SM-6 and SM-2 Block IV guided
    missiles. The SM-6 is a dual-use (anti-air warfare and BMD) missile
    that provides an accurate and highly capable BMD capability. It will
    replace the legacy SM-2 Block IV for terminal defense as those missiles
    reach the end of their service life. We are planning additional flight
    tests in 2016 for SM-6 Dual I missiles, which will enter the fleet
    inventory this spring.
        This past December we successfully conducted the Standard Missile-3
    (SM-3) Block IB Threat Upgrade (TU) controlled test vehicle (CTV) test,
    which we launched to engage a simulated ballistic missile target. The
    simulated engagement was controlled by the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense
    Test Complex with Aegis Baseline 9 (BMD 5.0 CU) to verify G-switch
    operation of the SM-3 Block IB TU. This test put us in a confident
    position later in the day to conduct the operationally realistic FTO-02
    E1a intercept test. The Aegis Ashore missile defense test complex at
    the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Hawaii fired the SM-3 Block IB
    interceptor for the first time to collide with and destroy an air-
    launched MRBM target. This operational flight test was the first to
    demonstrate an intercept using the Aegis Ashore test complex and
    demonstrated important modernization updates to the Aegis Weapon
    System.
        In fiscal year 2017, we will continue our commitment to develop,
    test, and deliver global naval capability to the Warfighter and support
    defense of our deployed forces and European NATO allies through
    supporting operational readiness of EPAA Phase 2 and delivery of Phase
    3. In fiscal year 2016, following successful flight testing of the
    redesigned SM-3 Third Stage Rocket Motor nozzle to increase overall
    missile reliability, MDA anticipates a full-rate production decision
    for the SM-3 Block IB. Anticipating that authorization, we request
    $463.8 million in fiscal year 2017 to procure 35 SM-3 Block IBs and
    supporting material, for a total of 256 procured (235 Defense Wide
    Procurement plus 21 RDT&E) and 146 delivered by the end of fiscal year
    2017. To recertify SM-3 rounds that have been previously delivered and
    deployed to the Fleet, MDA requests $38.9 million in fiscal year 2017
    for sustainment of SM-3 assets.
        We request $106.0 million for the SM-3 Block IIA Cooperative
    Development (SCD) effort with the Japan Ministry of Defense. In fiscal
    year 2015, the SM-3 Block IIA executed a controlled test vehicle, in
    which controlled first-stage flight through nosecone separation was
    successfully demonstrated. In December of 2015, a second controlled
    flight test was conducted to further test the Kinetic Warhead and
    Throttleable Divert and Attitude Control System. We will complete
    flight testing for the SCD Project with two intercept tests scheduled
    for the fourth quarter in fiscal year 2016 and second quarter in fiscal
    year 2017. In fiscal year 2017, we will begin transition to testing the
    SM-3 Block IIA within the U. S. BMDS architecture with the upgraded
    Aegis Baseline 9 weapon system and BMD 5.1, for at sea and ashore
    deployment, and we request $254.7 million in RDT&E funding to continue
    manufacturing rounds to support flight testing and EPAA Phase 3.
        MDA is strongly committed to further enhancing capability of the
    Aegis BMD weapon system to give sailors the tools needed to
    successfully execute their mission. In fiscal year 2015, we delivered
    the BMD 4.0.3 weapon system, which further enhances Aegis BMD's
    Homeland defense role by improving long range surveillance and tracking
    capability to provide data to the GMD system for longer range and more
    sophisticated threats. MDA requests $28.3 million in fiscal year 2017
    for the BMD 4 series weapon systems to bring advanced threat and raid
    scenario capability to the legacy Aegis BMD fleet. Having certified the
    Aegis Baseline 9.C1 (BMD 5.0 CU) weapon system in November of 2015, MDA
    is shifting focus towards delivering BMD 5.1 capability on schedule and
    requests $92.4 million to continue software development and testing to
    certify in fiscal year 2018 and meet the delivery timeline of the SM-3
    Block IIA for deployment on ships and at Aegis Ashore sites. In
    addition to weapon system development, MDA requests $50.1 million to
    procure weapon system equipment for installation and upgrade to the BMD
    Fleet and $19.9 million to sustain BMD specific equipment on the
    existing Fleet.
        Adding an additional layer to the Aegis BMD weapon system, we are
    using an incremental development approach integrated within the Navy's
    Baseline 9 architecture to develop and deliver a Sea Based Terminal
    capability. By expanding the capability of the SM-6 guided missile and
    BMD 5 series weapon systems, we are delivering capability to protect
    maritime forces against anti-ship ballistic missiles and provide
    layered defense for forces ashore. We will further test the first
    increment of Sea Based Terminal with follow-on performance testing in
    fiscal year 2016 during FTX-21. Sea Based Terminal Increment 2 is on
    schedule to be certified and operational in the 2018-2019 timeframe.
    European Phased Adaptive Approach
        We will continue to support the EPAA as a United States
    contribution to NATO BMD to provide full coverage and protection of
    NATO European territory, populations, and forces from the increasing
    threat of ballistic missile proliferation from outside of the Euro-
    Atlantic area by investing resources for EPAA development, testing and
    deployment. It is important to emphasize that this capability is not
    capable of threatening, nor is it intended to threaten, Russia's
    strategic nuclear deterrent. EPAA Phase 1 was implemented in 2011 with
    the fielding of an AN/TPY-2 radar in Turkey and stationing of an Aegis
    BMD ship in the Eastern Mediterranean. EPAA Phase 2 achieved technical
    capability declaration in 2015, which enhances United States and NATO
    capabilities with the addition of Aegis Ashore in Romania, additional
    deployment of Aegis BMD ships home-ported in Rota, Spain, more capable
    Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IBs, and an upgraded Baseline 9 weapon system with
    BMD 5.0 CU. With Aegis Ashore Romania turned over to the Navy for
    operations, in fiscal year 2017 we have requested $13.9 million for
    sustainment of the system. To augment needed ship stationing
    requirements of EPAA Phase 2, MDA is providing sustainment support for
    BMD specific equipment to the four ships that shifted home ports to
    Rota, Spain.
        Although not directly in support of the BMDS architecture for EPAA
    Phase 2, MDA assisted the Maritime Theater Missile Defense Forum and U.
    S. Navy in a multi-national, two month long event. At-Sea-Demonstration
    15 (ASD-15) met its objective to prove multi-national interoperability
    for air and ballistic missile defenses. During the seven weeks of live
    fire events, four IAMD scenarios were exercised. The capstone IAMD
    event was an SM-3 Block IA intercept of a short range threat by the USS
    Ross cued by Netherlands' HNLMS de Zeven Provincien, with simultaneous
    engagements of air breathing targets by the USS The Sullivans and
    Canada's HMCS Montreal. United Kingdom and Spanish ships sent track
    data for analysis back to Dahlgren, Virginia. In all, ASD-15
    demonstrated the power of a multinational maritime task force to share
    information and work cooperatively in a complex integrated air and
    missile defense environment.
        EPAA Phase 3 will improve defensive coverage against medium- and
    intermediate-range threats with the deployment of a second operational
    Aegis Ashore site in Poland, equipped with the upgraded Aegis Baseline
    9 weapon system with BMD 5.1 and capability to launch SM-3 Block IIAs.
    These Aegis Weapon System upgrades are further enhanced by spiral
    upgrades to the C2BMC network enabling Engage on Remote capability and
    extended defensive coverage for NATO Europe. In fiscal year 2016 we
    requested $169.2 million for the construction of the Aegis Ashore site
    in Poland. The MDA MILCON contract for the Redzikowo, Poland Aegis
    Ashore site was awarded on February 10, 2016, and construction start
    was March 2016. We request $57.5 million in fiscal year 2017 for
    procurement of Aegis Ashore equipment. We plan to complete this site by
    the end of 2018 and will upgrade the Aegis Ashore Romania site to BMD
    5.1 when operationally feasible.
    Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications and Sensors
        C2BMC provides persistent tracking, cueing, discrimination, and
    fire control quality data to Aegis BMD, GMD, THAAD, and coalition
    partners to support Homeland and regional defense objectives. We
    continue to support Warfighter command, control and battle management
    needs across the globe by providing the strategic BMD planner, which
    provides combatant commanders situational awareness tools to support
    weapons release authority for Homeland defense and control and tasking
    of forward-based AN/TPY-2 radars. C2BMC operators and maintainers are
    deployed forward in some of the world's highest threat spots and
    continue to provide around-the-clock support to the local commanders.
        As the BMDS integrating element, C2BMC has demonstrated proven
    interoperability across regional BMD architectures. Of note this past
    year in the regional defense area, we integrated with Aegis Ashore to
    support Aegis Launch on Remote capability required for EPAA Phase 2
    declaration in December 2015. MDA also fielded Cross-Area of
    Responsibility capability to USEUCOM and USCENTCOM C2BMC, allowing each
    Combatant Command to take advantage of the other's BMD assets. We also
    supported enhancements to the BMDS to keep pace with emerging threats
    worldwide by investing in the development, integration, and testing of
    advanced algorithms to improve discrimination capabilities and enhance
    the use of space-based sensor data using the BMDS Overhead Persistent
    InfraRed (OPIR) Architecture (BOA). MDA's C2BMC engineers continued to
    make progress in the Simultaneous Correlation of Unambiguous Tracks
    (SCOUT) algorithms and Aggregated Discrimination. SCOUT is a multiphase
    activity to develop a physics-based capability to identify the lethal
    object(s) of a threat complex in a moderately complex countermeasure
    environment.
        We will field C2BMC Spiral 8.2-1 to USNORTHCOM and USPACOM in the
    fourth quarter of fiscal year 2017 in support of enhanced Homeland
    defense. Spiral 8.2-1 is a complete hardware update to the C2BMC System
    that will allow C2BMC to integrate data from multiple TPY-2 radars,
    SBX, UEWR, Upgraded Cobra Dane, and BMDS OPIR architecture. It will
    increase system raid size and tracking capacity by a factor of five and
    will improve the system Information Assurance/Cyber security posture.
    Continued development, integration and testing of C2BMC Spiral 8.2-3
    (Engage on Remote) will support the EPAA Phase 3 capability declaration
    in December 2018. Development of C2BMC Spiral 8.2-5 (LRDR Sensor
    Management and Enhanced Engage on Remote) will enable us by December
    2020 to reach a robust Homeland defense capability. Finally, we will
    continue to support incremental improvements to the BMDS to keep pace
    with emerging threats world-wide by investing in the development,
    integration and testing of advanced algorithms to improve
    discrimination capabilities and to enhance the use of space based
    sensor data using the BMDS OPIR architecture.
        We request $32.1 million for continued operation of the Space
    Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) in fiscal year 2017. STSS
    satellites operate in low earth orbit and continue to collect valuable
    test data. STSS collected data on the most complex scenes to date
    during the FTX-20 test event in October 2014. (FTX-20 involved the
    launch of a separating MRBM and the simulation of an exo-atmospheric
    engagement by an Aegis Baseline 9.C1 configured destroyer. GM CTV-02+
    involved a non-intercept test of a Ground Based Interceptor against a
    complex target scene presented by an air launched IRBM.) STSS also
    successfully tracked and collected data during Glory Trips 215 and 212,
    and participated in two other Air Force Global Strike Command flight
    tests of the Minuteman III.
        In fiscal year 2015, we began the process of decommissioning the
    Near-Field Infrared Experiment (NFIRE) satellite that MDA launched in
    April 2007. This satellite captured high resolution phenomenology data
    from the exhaust plumes of boosting ballistic missiles. The NFIRE
    satellite was decommissioned in August 2015 and safely deorbited this
    past November. Looking to the future, we completed the Critical Design
    Review for the Spacebased Kill Assessment (SKA) in January 2015 and the
    SKA Flight Model Manufacturing Review in April 2015; delivered the
    first shipset of flight models to the payload integrator in November
    2015 and the second shipset in January 2016. The SKA experiment is
    comprised of a network of sensors hosted on commercial satellites to
    collect data on missile intercepts, make an independent kill
    assessment, and pass that information on to the BMDS to support a
    multi-sensor kill assessment of the target. In fiscal year 2017 we will
    complete the integration and testing of SKA payloads onto hosted
    payload modules and satellites and conduct on-orbit deployment,
    checkout, calibration and commissioning of the SKA sensor network.
        The Services and COCOMs, with logistical support from MDA, are
    operating forward based X-band radars (AN/TPY-2(FBM)) in Japan, Israel,
    Turkey, and United States Central Command. All of these radars
    contribute to regional defense, and some also provide a significant
    contribution to the defense of the United States Homeland. Last year we
    completed the integration and performance characterization testing of
    the 2nd AN/TPY-2 radar to Japan, located at Kyogamisaki (Site KCS). In
    order to reduce noise levels at a seaside community near the KCS site,
    we completed muffler installation on Mobile Electric Power (MEP)-810
    power generators in March 2015. MDA increased environmental protection
    for the radar equipment by coordinating and receiving approval for
    construction and modification of the Prime Mission Equipment/Rubb
    structure at Site KCS. In fiscal year 2015 we delivered new operational
    mission profiles that provided cooperative coverage/capability for
    USEUCOM and USCENTCOM sensors and successfully completed operational
    flight testing of new capabilities in operational flight tests (FTO-02
    events) and ground test campaigns, improving cross-Area Of
    Responsibility operational mission profiles, debris mitigation logic
    and increases operational availability. Last year we completed the
    THAAD Reliability Growth Test and critical maintenance periods on
    Radars #2, #3 and #5 at Guam. We also delivered Radar #11 to THAAD
    Battery #6 and continued production of Radar #12 (the final United
    States production AN/TPY-2).
        We request $653.4 million in fiscal year 2017 to develop, deploy,
    test, and sustain BMDS sensors (this includes $162.0 million for the
    continued development of the Long Range Discrimination Radar), and
    $172.6 million to sustain the twelve (terminal mode and forward-based
    mode) AN/TPY-2 radars and support the UEWRs and Cobra Dane radar. We
    expect to complete development efforts for the next incremental
    software build (CX3.0), which will expand electronic protection
    functionality and further improve discrimination and debris mitigation
    capabilities to handle more advanced threat set requirements. We will
    also develop common U.S. and FMS software architecture for AN/TPY-2 to
    improve synergy and achieve cost savings for future software builds. In
    fiscal year 2017 we also will deliver the operational Float Antenna
    Equipment Unit (AEU) to improve Warfighter operational/maintenance
    flexibility; continue fleet-wide depot maintenance to retrofit
    Electronics Equipment Units with new signal data processors; and
    retrofit a product redesign for AN/TPY-2 AEU transformers with upgraded
    reliability improvements across the fleet. AN/TPY-2 radars will
    participate in three BMDS flight tests (FTG-11, FTG-15, and FTT-18).
        Developing New Capabilities
        MDA is developing technology to address gaps in the BMDS and drive
    the cost of defending the Homeland down dramatically. MDA's goal for
    these investments is to deploy a future BMDS architecture more capable
    and cost-effective that instills warfighter confidence in the ability
    of the BMDS to defeat missile attacks. Our vision is to shift the
    calculus of our potential adversaries by introducing directed energy
    into the BMDS architecture. This would revolutionize missile defense by
    dramatically reducing, if not eliminating, the role of very expensive
    interceptors. Our long-term goal is to deploy lasers on high altitude,
    long endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) platforms to destroy ICBMs
    in the boost phase. To achieve this vision we must demonstrate two key
    elements: laser scaling with high efficiency and excellent beam
    quality, and high altitude, long endurance aircraft to carry the laser
    system.
        We request $71.8 million in Weapons Technology to continue
    development and test of our high-powered directed energy program to
    build the foundation for the next-generation UAV-borne laser system. A
    UAV-borne laser would be capable of acquiring, tracking and eventually
    destroying an enemy missile at a much lower cost than the existing
    BMDS. Within the Directed Energy project, we will collaborate with our
    Air Force and DARPA partners to develop and demonstrate the technology
    necessary to scale laser power to a level required for speed-of-light
    missile defense. In fiscal year 2015, the Massachusetts Institute of
    Technology's Lincoln Laboratory (MIT/LL) Fiber Combining Laser achieved
    44 kilowatts (kW) continuous power with near perfect beam quality, a
    record for fiber combined lasers. In 2017, MIT/LL will demonstrate a 30
    kW, low Size Weight and Power (87 kg/kW) fully packaged fiber laser.
    They also will demonstrate a flight qualified 1 kg/kW fiber amplifier
    traceable to BMDS high energy laser system requirements. The Lawrence
    Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) achieved similar success with
    their Diode Pumped Alkali Laser (DPAL) system, reaching 14 kW, a record
    for the DPAL system. In fiscal year 2017, LLNL will demonstrate a DPAL
    system at 30 kilowatts average power, more than double the power ever
    achieved by a hybrid laser. The Agency also will make technology
    investments in Divert and Attitude Control Systems for future BMD
    interceptors and kill vehicles.
        In our effort to mature laser technology for missile defense, we
    awarded five contracts with key aerospace partners to produce concepts
    for an airborne low power laser demonstrator. We will use these
    concepts to guide our requirements for the follow-on competitive design
    contracts in fiscal year 2017 under our Technology Maturation
    Initiatives program element. MDA requests $90.3 million in fiscal year
    2017 for Technology Maturation Initiatives to build on the successes in
    weapons technology and discrimination sensor technology. Our vision is
    to add high altitude airborne or space-based electro-optical sensors
    into the BMDS architecture that can acquire, track, and discriminate
    ballistic missile targets.
        One of the goals of the Discrimination Sensor Technology flight
    test development program is to demonstrate that the Aegis Weapon System
    can launch an SM-3, engage and destroy a ballistic missile solely on
    tracks from remote airborne sensors. Test campaigns exercise the test
    analog of the BMDS architecture using operationally proven
    Multispectral Targeting System sensors aboard MQ-9 Reapers as the
    tracking element. During FTX-20, FTM-25, and GM CTV-02+, the Reapers
    received cues, acquired and tracked the target and transmitted these
    tracks to the BMDS C2BMC laboratory at Schriever Air Force Base. C2BMC
    fused the tracks and transmitted them via Link 16 to the Aegis
    Ballistic Missile Test Bed at Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command
    (SPAWAR) in San Diego, CA where the engagements were simulated in real-
    time. During GM CTV-02+ the Aegis Weapon System authorized Remote
    Engage Doctrine within 30 seconds of target burnout.
        Over the next two years, we will incrementally demonstrate the
    value of increasingly more capable electro-optical/infrared sensors
    while developing tactics and procedures for future operational use.
    This work will culminate in a real time Aegis SM-3 engagement using
    tracking information from airborne sensor data in 2017 and again using
    higher precision, advanced sensor data in 2019. These tests are a
    crucial step in developing persistent sensor technology to defeat the
    evolving ballistic missile threat first from aircraft and eventually
    from space. Finally, MDA will contract with industry to begin the
    design of an airborne laser demonstrator to quantify the target
    acquisition, tracking, and handover performance required for boost
    phase missile defense.
        MDA requests $71.5 million for the MOKV effort. We have made
    considerable progress on the development strategy for the next
    generation exo-atmospheric kill vehicles. In fiscal year 2015, we
    awarded three contracts with industry to define concepts for deploying
    multiple kill vehicles from a single booster. In fiscal year 2016,
    industry delivered their MOKV concepts, and we are evaluating those
    concepts. The next step will be to focus on reducing component
    technical risk in critical areas identified by industry, which is
    necessary to make this revolutionary concept a reality. By 2017 we will
    develop and test MOKV command and control strategies in both digital
    and Hardware-in-the-Loop venues that will prove we can manage the
    engagements of many kill vehicles on many targets from a single
    interceptor. We will also invest in the communication architectures and
    guidance technology that support this game changing approach.
    Ultimately, MOKVs may revolutionize our missile defense architecture.
        MDA requests $23.4 million for Advanced Research and development
    that capitalizes on the creativity and innovation of the Nation's small
    business community and academia to enhance the BMDS. We are also
    fostering research between U.S. and foreign universities of allied
    nations through international cooperative science and technology
    projects. We awarded nine new contracts and exercised continuation
    options on ten additional contracts for innovative new research that
    can transition onto the BMDS.
        MDA also requests $17.9 million for the Advanced Concepts &
    Performance Assessment effort, which models the capability of advanced
    BMD technology to address evolving threats to the warfighter. The
    request will fund the digital simulation and hardware-in-the-loop
    framework and models required for testing of the Airborne Advanced
    Sensor, Kill Vehicle Modular Open Architecture test bed, and maturing
    sensor fusion algorithms.
                           international cooperation
        The fiscal year 2017 budget request includes funding for regional
    missile defense capabilities to protect deployed U.S. forces, reassure
    allies and partners, and build cooperative regional security
    architectures. MDA is engaged with over twenty countries and
    international organizations, such as NATO and the Gulf Cooperation
    Council (GCC). MDA is committed to expanding work with our
    international partners, to include conducting joint analyses to support
    partner missile defense acquisition decisions, cooperative research and
    development projects, deploying BMD assets, Foreign Military Sales
    (FMS), and co-production efforts. Our major international efforts
    reflect the Department's goals in the Asia-Pacific, Middle East, and
    European Areas of Responsibility and will enable implementation of
    EPAA, build partner capacity, and support the strategic shift to Asia-
    Pacific.
        The investments of our allies and partners in their own missile
    defense capabilities allow us to build more effective regional security
    architectures that complement U.S. regional missile defense
    capabilities. MDA is currently executing an FMS case with the United
    Arab Emirates for two THAAD batteries and accompanying launchers,
    radars, and interceptors. MDA is actively engaged with several nations,
    particularly those in the Arabian Gulf region, to provide program
    information and cost data that may inform future decisions to procure
    THAAD and other missile defense systems. We are currently conducting a
    Ballistic Missile Early Warning Study for the GCC, analyzing sensor and
    C4I architecture options for defense of the region.
        We continue to have a very strong cooperative missile defense
    partnership with Israel. Over the past year, the Israel Missile Defense
    Organization (IMDO) and MDA successfully completed the third and fourth
    series of tests of the Stunner Interceptor for the David's Sling Weapon
    System (DSWS). IMDO and MDA also achieved the successful first
    engagement of a ballistic missile target with the Arrow-3 interceptor
    in December 2015. This was a major milestone in the development of the
    Arrow Weapon System and provides confidence in future Israeli
    capabilities to defeat developing threats. The Department continues to
    support the critical Iron Dome Program to defeat short-range rockets
    and artillery through co-production efforts.
        We are making significant progress with our Japanese counterparts
    on the SM-3 Block IIA, our largest co-development effort. The
    development work, which remains on track for first delivery in the 2018
    time frame, will expand extended deterrence to our friends and allies
    and establish an important vehicle for closer defense cooperation ties.
    Once deployed at the Aegis Ashore site in support of EPAA Phase 3 and
    on ships, the SM-3 Block IIA will improve and expand defenses against
    MRBM and IRBM threats.
        We continue to work on meeting our EPAA commitments with our NATO
    Allies. In December 2015, we completed major weapon system construction
    and achieved Technical Capability Declaration of the Aegis Ashore site
    in Romania. We anticipate declaring Initial Operating Capability of
    EPAA Phase 2 as well as beginning work on the Aegis Ashore site in
    Poland in support of EPAA Phase 3 this year. In addition to our
    interoperability activities with NATO, MDA continues to work with our
    European allies collectively as we build upon the synergy and lessons
    learned from ASD-15 as well as bilaterally to further individual
    national progress with missile defenses.
                  cybersecurity/ supply chain risk management
        We are very cognizant of the growing cyber threat and aggressively
    working to ensure the Nation's missile defenses are resilient and able
    to operate in a highly contested cyber environment. Potential
    adversaries are developing cyber forces as part of their military
    structure and integrating them into their overall strategy. We are
    working very closely with the Armed Services, the Combatant Commands,
    especially Strategic Command's USCYBERCOM, and other agencies in DOD
    and the Federal Government to counter this growing threat.
        We are improving the cyber hygiene of our missile defense
    capabilities by ensuring our cybersecurity infrastructure has the
    latest security upgrades and patches. We are assessing our systems, our
    suppliers, and our overall acquisition processes. We are ensuring
    robust and secure configurations of our critical software and hardware
    to reduce the risk of malicious activities. We also have a rigorous
    cyber and supply chain risk management inspection program to examine
    everything about our systems from the trusted supply chain to the
    fielded capability. This helps us ensure the highest possible levels of
    compliance.
        In support of the DOD Cybersecurity Culture and Compliance
    Initiative signed out by the Secretary of Defense on September 28,
    2015, we are developing a cybersecurity program that focuses on the
    five operational excellence principles: Integrity, Level of Knowledge,
    Procedural Compliance, Formality and Backup, and Questioning Attitude.
    These principles are fundamental to the DOD cyber enterprise.
        We are also instituting the DOD Cybersecurity Discipline
    Implementation Plan to mitigate risks for the information systems we
    own and manage. Our program implements the DOD campaign four lines of
    effort: 1) Strong Authentication, to degrade the adversaries' ability
    to maneuver on DOD information networks; 2) Device Hardening to reduce
    internal and external attack vectors into DOD information networks; 3)
    Reducing the Attack Surface, to lessen external attack vectors into MDA
    information networks; and 4) Alignment to Cybersecurity / Computer
    Network Defense Service Providers, to improve detection of and response
    to adversary activity. These efforts run across all facets of MDA and
    the BMDS mission systems and general services infrastructures. We also
    created five additional Lines of Effort critical to MDA and the BMDS
    including: 1) Safeguarding BMD information in the defense industrial
    base; 2) Positioning, Navigation, and Timing; 3) Transitioning to Risk
    Management Framework; 4) Cybersecurity Testing and 5) Cybersecurity
    Workforce Management (training and certification).
        We are also increasing efforts to establish additional
    cybersecurity awareness training in support of the DOD Cybersecurity
    Culture and Compliance Initiative to improve the individual human
    performance and accountability within the DOD cyber enterprise. This
    applies to our leaders, service providers, cyber warriors, and all of
    our general users. Our efforts align to the DOD Cyber Strategy program
    and are meant to enable and augment the existing mandated cyber
    training efforts. Our training reinforces DOD training and exists to
    shift cybersecurity cultural norms at all levels to increase
    cybersecurity situational awareness across all personnel and inculcate
    a high level of personal responsibility.
        MDA has established an insider threat program in accordance with
    the DOD Directive 205.16, ``The DOD Insider Threat Program.'' We are
    leveraging computer network defense capabilities, in addition to other
    information streams to proactively detect, mitigate and defeat
    potential insider threats. This program also ensures that only trusted
    individuals have access to MDA program information and systems.
        The MDA Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) continues to
    provide Computer Network Defense (CND) services as an accredited Tier
    II CND service provider to MDA programs of record. The MDA CERT
    executes a battle rhythm that includes daily monitoring and
    collaboration with USCYBERCOM, Joint Forces Headquarters DOD
    Information Networks, and other sources for latest threats to DOD and
    the MDA. As a result, the MDA CERT tracked and managed 109 cyber
    taskings in fiscal year 2015, contributing to the overall cybersecurity
    posture of MDA networks and resources. From August to November 2015,
    the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) inspected MDA. The
    ISOO is responsible to the President for policy and oversight of the
    Government-wide security classification and the National Industrial
    Security Program and is a component of the National Archives and
    Records Administration. In addition to security classification and
    Industrial Security, the ISOO reviewed MDA's cybersecurity program.
    ISOO's review confirmed that the MDA operates a robust CNSI program,
    one that enjoys leadership support and utilizes numerous best
    practices. Nearly all of the program elements are very strong, and the
    personnel who implement the program are dedicated and innovative. The
    Agency's Security Classification Guides are developed and updated
    utilizing a sound process and those that ISOO reviewed were current,
    very well prepared, and included all of the elements required by
    Executive Order 13526 and ISOO Directive 1. As with any program, there
    are areas for improvement. MDA is working those areas for improvement
    based on the findings and recommendations.
        Over the last year we also conducted two Enterprise Cyber Range
    Environment (ECRE) experiments with independent, DOT&E red team
    penetration testing on the Joint Information Operations Range (JIOR).
    The purpose of these experiments is to determine the BMDS cyber
    robustness to both external and insider threats. We are planning an
    additional ECRE for the GMD program in May 2016. MDA also completed 85
    cybersecurity inspections worldwide to ensure compliance with DOD and
    MDA cybersecurity standards. We follow up on these inspections to
    ensure remediation of all identified cybersecurity risks.
        We must build resilient cyber defenses that are capable of
    detecting and mitigating threats without impeding operations in order
    to ``fight through'' the cyber threat. MDA collaborates with the
    Director of Operational Test and Evaluation to conduct cyber
    penetration testing on key missile defense capabilities. We then use
    the results of those tests to conduct risk assessments to prioritize
    cybersecurity improvements, develop mitigation strategies, and improve
    cyber training. We are also working to develop better cyber concept of
    operations to ensure every network defender in every location knows how
    to react to cyber challenges.
        MDA is working hard to incorporate cybersecurity requirements early
    into our acquisition lifecycle. We are focused on ensuring we are
    designing and building cybersecurity into missile defenses, rather than
    adding it after the fact. In addition, we are working closely with our
    industry partners in the defense industrial base to ensure they can
    protect both classified and unclassified information they are
    processing on their systems to ensure that it will not be exposed to
    potential adversaries. We know that malicious cyber actors are
    constantly attempting to exfiltrate information from U.S. Industry. We
    will continue to work with the defense industrial base, the FBI, and
    other partners to identify these issues and raise the costs of this
    behavior to those responsible, in coordination with national
    authorities and in accordance with national policy.
        We are working diligently with the COCOMs, Services, and other
    agencies in the Federal Government to ensure the missile defense
    capabilities we field will operate successfully in a highly contested
    cyber environment. We have structured and continue to improve an
    ongoing robust cybersecurity program to protect information about
    current and future missile defense capabilities and ensure a persistent
    state of enterprise cybersecurity readiness. This ensures that the
    Agency remains a strong mission partner, protects and defends MDA
    information systems and networks, and optimizes cybersecurity
    management and processes at a level commensurate with our critical
    national defense mission.
                               program oversight
        There continues to be significant interest in MDA's development and
    deployment of the BMDS and management of the missile defense program.
    MDA is highly visible and one of the most scrutinized agencies within
    the Department of Defense. Each year, throughout the budget hearing
    cycle and congressional mark-ups and floor debates of the defense
    authorization and appropriations bills, there is intense congressional
    oversight of the missile defense program. MDA is also subjected on an
    annual basis to numerous Government Accountability Office audits, the
    support of which has required MDA to expend significant time and
    enormous resources. Dozens of MDA personnel are engaged in supporting
    21 GAO audits and answering more than 750 inquiries. Just within the
    past year MDA has provided nearly 11,000 pages of internal documents
    and prepared responses. MDA has concurred or partially concurred with
    all 21 GAO recommendations in their annual Mandate Report since 2011.
        In addition, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
    2010 requires that Defense Department financial statements be validated
    as ready for audit no later than September 30, 2017. The Office of the
    Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Financial Improvement and
    Audit Readiness (FIAR) Directorate, initiated the Statement of
    Budgetary Activity (SBA) Examination for the MDA in April 2015 to
    evaluate the Agency's readiness for audit. In December 2015, the audit
    firm conducting the SBA reported that MDA management's assertion is
    fairly stated, which is a successful audit opinion. The Missile Defense
    Agency continues to make significant progress with FIAR initiatives and
    new Department policies. The successful SBA examination confirmed the
    Agency is on track to meet financial statement requirements and full
    auditability by the end of fiscal year 2017.
        MDA also annually delivers the congressionally mandated Baseline
    Acquisition Review (BAR) reports to Congress and GAO. We released the
    latest BAR in early March. MDA and the Department also continue to
    produce and deliver, as required by the annual defense bills, on
    average, over 30 reports to congress on missile defense.
                                   conclusion
        Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, in closing, I want to
    assure Congress that MDA programs are cost-effective, efficient, and
    managed in accordance with the Missile Defense Executive Board process
    set up by the Department to ensure all missile defense programs and
    operational requirements are validated, adhere to sound acquisition
    practices, and can meet warfighter demand in a cost effective manner.
    Our budget request for fiscal year 2017 will continue to increase the
    capability and capacity of fielded Homeland and regional missile
    defense systems and make measured investments in advanced technology to
    reverse the adversary's numerical advantage. I look forward to
    answering the committee's questions. Thank you.

        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        General Mann, thank you. You will be leaving us before long
    too. This may be your last day here. Thank you so much for your
    work. It would please me if Alabama came home.
        General Mann. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. Good.
        Senator Donnelly. I will vote for Indiana.
        [Laughter.]

    STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL DAVID L. MANN, USA, COMMANDING
       GENERAL, U.S. ARMY SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND/ARMY
    FORCES STRATEGIC COMMAND AND JOINT FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMAND
                     FOR INTEGRATED MISSILE DEFENSE

        General Mann. Well, good afternoon, Chairman Sessions,
    Ranking Member Donnelly, and the other members of the
    subcommittee. Thank you for your continued support of our
    soldiers, our civilians, and our families.
        This is again my third appearance before the subcommittee,
    and it is indeed an honor to testify before you today to
    discuss the importance of missile defense to our Nation and the
    need to maintain these capabilities in the face of a threat
    that continues to grow both in complexity and unpredictability.
        Today I wanted to briefly discuss global missile defense
    operations and how Space Missile Defense Command, Army Forces
    Strategic Command executes its role as a force provider in
    support of our Nation and our combatant commands.
        We have three core tasks: number one, to provide trained
    and ready global missile defense forces today; secondly, to
    build future missile defense forces and capabilities for
    tomorrow; and third, to evaluate emerging technologies to
    address future requirements.
        Today we have approximately 300 full-time National Guard
    soldiers located at Fort Greely, Alaska and at Vandenberg Air
    Force Base who operate our ground-based midcourse defense
    system. As you know, this is the Nation's only defense against
    a limited intercontinental ballistic missile attack. These
    trained and ready soldiers fully understand the importance of
    the mission that they execute, and in fact, they like to refer
    to themselves as the 300 protecting the 300 million plus.
        I also represent the Joint Functional Component Command for
    Integrated Missile Defense in support of U.S. Strategic
    Command. Specifically, this component command synchronizes
    operational level planning, supports ongoing operation,
    integrates training exercises and testing globally. It also
    provides recommendations on the allocation of our limited
    missile defense assets in support of our combatant commands.
    Finally, it evaluates future missile defense requirements.
        This committee's continued support of missile defense and
    of our soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, and civilians who
    develop, deploy, and operate our systems is essential.
        Again, I appreciate the opportunity to speak on the value
    of integrated missile defense for our Nation, and I look
    forward to addressing any questions that you may have. Thank
    you.
        [The prepared statement of General Mann follows:]

          Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General David L. Mann, USA
        Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, and distinguished
    Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for your continued support of
    our Service Members, Civilians, and Families. In the same capacity as
    my previous appearances before this subcommittee, I appear before you
    today bringing both a Joint and Army perspective on effective missile
    defense capabilities. Let me again express my appreciation to this
    Subcommittee for its continued support of the Army, the U.S. Strategic
    Command, the Department of Defense, and the missile defense community.
    I am honored to again testify before this Subcommittee along with these
    distinguished witnesses who provide missile defense capabilities to our
    Nation, forward deployed forces, partners, and allies.
        As previously outlined during appearances before this subcommittee
    the last two years, my responsibilities encompass several main areas.
    First, as the Commander of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense
    Command (USASMDC), I have title 10 responsibilities to man, train,
    maintain, and equip space and global ballistic missile defense forces
    for the Army. As Commander of USASMDC, I also serve as the Army's force
    modernization proponent for space, global ballistic missile defense,
    and high altitude forces and capabilities. Second, as the Commander,
    Army Forces Strategic Command (ARSTRAT), I am the Army Service
    Component Commander (ASCC) to the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM).
    I am responsible for planning, integrating, coordinating, and providing
    all Army space and missile defense forces and capabilities in support
    of USSTRATCOM missions. Third, as the Commander of USSTRATCOM's Joint
    Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC IMD),
    I am responsible for synchronizing missile defense planning, supporting
    ballistic missile defense operations, recommending allocation of
    missile defense assets, and advocating for missile defense capabilities
    on behalf of the combatant commanders.
        Lastly, I serve as the Army's Air and Missile Defense (AMD)
    Enterprise Integrator. My responsibility is to synchronize the balanced
    implementation of the Army's AMD strategy across the functions of force
    planning and sourcing requirements, combat and materiel development,
    AMD acquisition and life cycle management, and to orchestrate
    consistent strategic communication messaging themes.
        In accordance with these responsibilities, my intent today is to
    again highlight the most significant missile defense asset--our great
    people; to briefly outline the strategic environment; to emphasize
    USASMDC/ARSTRAT's missile defense force provider responsibilities with
    respect to the Army and the geographic combatant commanders (GCCs); to
    outline JFCC IMD's role as an operational integrator of Joint missile
    defense for USSTRATCOM; and finally to summarize a few of the key Army
    air and ballistic missile defense activities and developments in the
    context of a comprehensive approach to addressing an evolving ballistic
    missile threat.
          the workforce--recognizing and protecting our greatest asset
        The challenges that we face cannot be mitigated without the
    dedication of our greatest asset--our people. Just as I outlined during
    my previous appearances, I feel it important to highlight our workforce
    and my concern of potential out-year sequestration on our workforce. At
    USASMDC/ARSTRAT and JFCC IMD, our people remain our most enduring
    strength. The Service Members, Civilians, and Contractors support the
    Army and Joint Warfighter each and every day, both those stationed in
    the Homeland and those globally deployed. We remain committed to
    providing trained and ready Service Members and Civilians to operate
    and pursue enhanced capabilities for the Nation's ballistic missile
    defense system (BMDS).
        While the 2015 Bipartisan Budget Agreement provides some short term
    relief and stability, the potential future return of sequestration
    causes great concern--especially with regards to its impact on the
    workforce and our overall readiness. Within my commands, any future
    year sequestration will negatively impact the space and missile defense
    enablers our soldiers and civilians provide to the combatant
    commanders. Specifically, readiness, training, and enhancements to
    space and missile defense capabilities will be degraded. Also, a return
    of sequestration will negatively impact the morale of our workforce. As
    stated last year, I believe that a more prudent course of action should
    be identified and implemented to ensure that we can continue to meet
    our current global responsibilities and those of tomorrow.
                              the evolving threat
        Current global trends indicate ballistic and cruise missiles are
    becoming more complex, due in part to the increase in proliferation of
    advanced technologies, resulting in systems with greater ranges and
    accuracy. Additionally, many foreign ballistic and cruise missile
    systems are progressively incorporating advanced countermeasures
    including maneuverable reentry vehicles, multiple independent reentry
    vehicles, electromagnetic jamming, and hypersonics, with the purpose of
    challenging our ballistic missile defense systems. Moreover, ballistic
    and cruise missile platforms are increasing quantitatively, and as most
    are mobile field-based systems, is decreasing our ability to detect and
    track these systems before they are launched.
        Numerous countries are developing ground-, sea-, and air-launched
    land-attack cruise missiles utilizing an assortment of unconventional
    and inexpensive launch platforms. Presently, nearly 30 countries
    possess ballistic missile capability. Together, these countries have
    approximately 50 different variants of ballistic missiles.
    Additionally, there are currently 13 new intermediate-range and eight
    intercontinental ballistic missiles (IRBM and ICBM) variants under
    development. As an example, North Korea, has probably tested ICBM
    capabilities in recent space launches and continues to develop the KN-
    08 road-mobile ICBM and an IRBM variant capable of reaching Guam and
    the Aleutian Islands.
        In the future, our BMD systems will encounter more complex advanced
    electronic and cyber-attacks and will also need to combat directed
    energy capabilities that could significantly degrade U.S. missile
    defense operations. It should also be expected that cyber- and
    electronic-attacks will increasingly be part of an adversary's anti
    access/area-denial (A2/AD) approach.

            ``Maintaining the capability to deter and defeat attacks on the
            United States is the Department's first priority''
                                        --Quadrennial Defense Review
                                                         March 2014

        To meet the objectives of the current Quadrennial Defense Strategic
    Guidance, USSTRATCOM and the Army continue to provide and enhance
    Homeland and regional missile defense. In accordance with the
    Department's strategy to rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, we have
    worked with partners in U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), U.S. Northern
    Command (USNORTHCOM), and USSTRATCOM to review and improve our
    capabilities in the USPACOM area of responsibility. In addition to the
    deployment of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery in
    Guam, we have deployed an additional forward-based sensor in Japan to
    bolster our regional and Homeland defense capabilities. The Army is
    presently working to forward station a THAAD battery on Guam to reduce
    the deployment turbulence and create more strategic flexibility in the
    THAAD force. We have completed the final environmental protection
    submission for the Fish and Wildlife Service and expect to have a long-
    term solution in place this year.
        The emplacement of 14 additional Ground-Based Interceptors at Fort
    Greely, Alaska, scheduled for completion in 2017 and an Inflight
    Interceptor Communications System Data Terminal at Fort Drum, New York,
    will provide improved capability and capacity to defend the Nation
    against a limited ICBM attack. In addition, we continue to work with
    regional partners and allies to increase our information and data
    sharing and develop a global AMD force posture that leverages ever
    growing partner nations' capabilities. This will result in reduced
    strain on our force and enable more timely modernization of our AMD
    assets.

            ``Effective missile defense is an essential element of the U.S.
            commitment to strengthen strategic and regional deterrence
            against states of concern''

                                        --USSTRATCOM Posture Statement
                                                             February 2016

        The Quadrennial Defense Review also establishes a priority to
    maintain a strong commitment to security and stability in Europe, the
    Asia Pacific region, and the Middle East. In conjunction with our
    allies and partners, the DOD continues to maintain forward committed
    PATRIOT, THAAD, and Counter Rocket, Artillery and Mortar (C-RAM) air
    and missile defense forces in order to enhance our current AMD posture
    while sending a strategic deterrence message to potential adversaries.
    The scope and quantity of these deployments result in a highly deployed
    and stressed Army AMD force. We must seek to balance today's
    operational requirements with shaping the force to counter future
    challenges. Our efforts must also include the critical modernization of
    our AMD force over the next five years.
        In summary, enemy air and missile threats continue to develop in
    complexity, quantity and capacity. The evolution of multiple
    sophisticated capabilities requires a holistic approach that
    effectively integrates offensive and defensive, passive, kinetic and
    non-kinetic, and alternative capabilities to defeat air and missile
    threats. The growing complexity of the strategic environment based on
    technological advances of the threat and fiscal realities requires cost
    effective methods to integrate current and future capabilities. We
    continue to prioritize integrated air and missile defense resources to
    optimize all our capabilities in support of the Warfighter,
    particularly in light of the expense associated with traditional
    approaches. We continue to partner with the Missile Defense Agency
    (MDA), Combatant Commands, and Services to pursue a fiscally
    responsible path to keep pace with evolving threats by identifying and
    prioritizing capabilities that provide the greatest operational value.
              providing and enhancing missile defense capabilities
        USASMDC/ARSTRAT, a force provider of missile defense capabilities,
    is manned by multi-component soldiers, civilians, and contractors.
    Commands around the world, including USSTRATCOM, USNORTHCOM, and the
    GCCs, leverage our capabilities. Our title 10 responsibilities include
    operations, planning, integration, control, and coordination of Army
    forces and capabilities in support of USSTRATCOM's missile defense
    mission. USASMDC/ARSTRAT also serves as the Army's global operational
    integrator for missile defense, the Army's proponent for global
    ballistic missile defense force modernization, and the Army's technical
    center lead to conduct air and missile defense related research and
    development in support of Army title 10 responsibilities. As the Army
    AMD Enterprise Integrator, our tasks include working across the AMD
    community of interest to balance priorities, informing resourcing
    decisions, and pursuing innovative approaches in order to enhance our
    strategic flexibility. The AMD Enterprise remains focused on meeting
    operational demands and AMD modernization initiatives. Achieving a
    balance of fiscal resources and force structure between operational
    requirements and timely development and implementation of the AMD
    modernization priorities is imperative. Collectively, the conduct and
    integration of these roles help to set conditions for the protection of
    GCCs and Joint Warfighters while maintaining their freedom of action,
    provide the ability to build and project combat power, and assure
    access to the global commons.
        Our operational function is to provide trained and ready missile
    defense forces and capabilities to the GCCs and the Warfighter--in
    other words, to address the requirements of today. For example,
    USASMDC/ARSTRAT soldiers serving in the Homeland and in remote and
    austere forward deployed locations operate the Ground-based Midcourse
    Defense (GMD) system and the Army-Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance
    Forward-Based Mode (AN/TPY-2 FBM) radars. Highlights of the missile
    defense capabilities provided by our missile defense professionals
    include:
        Support to Global Ballistic Missile Defense: Soldiers from the
    100th Missile Defense Brigade, headquartered in Colorado Springs,
    Colorado, and the 49th Missile Defense Battalion, headquartered at Fort
    Greely, Alaska, remain ready, 24/7/365, to defend our Nation and its
    territories from a limited intercontinental ballistic missile attack.
    Under the operational control of USNORTHCOM, Army National Guard and
    Active component soldiers operate the Ground-based Midcourse Defense
    Fire Control Systems located at the Fire Direction Center in Alaska,
    the Missile Defense Element in Colorado, and the GMD Command Launch
    Element at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. These soldiers, in
    conjunction with USNORTHCOM, also oversee the maintenance of GMD
    interceptors and ground system components. At the Missile Defense
    Complex at the Fort Greely site, 49th Missile Defense Battalion
    military police secure the interceptors and communications capabilities
    from physical threats.

            ``. . . will remain ready to deter and defeat threats to the
            Homeland. . .''

                                        --National Security Strategy
                                                             February 2015

        Recently, MDA completed the fielding of an additional Inflight
    Interceptor Communications System Data Terminal (IDT) at Fort Drum, New
    York. Just last month, the Army completed its title 10 responsibilities
    and, in conjunction with USNORTHCOM, declared the IDT operational. In
    addition to increasing the overall effectiveness of the entire
    inventory of ground-based interceptors, the Nation's only Active
    defense against an ICBM attack, the IDT will also greatly enhance the
    coverage and protection of the Eastern U.S.
        GMD System Test and Development: Soldiers from the 100th Missile
    Defense Brigade actively participate in GMD test activities and
    continue to work with MDA developers on future improvements to the GMD
    system. The rigorous testing regime of MDA, conducted through their
    series of operational flight as well as ground-based tests, emphasizes
    operational realism during test design and execution. Therefore, in
    addition to gaining test data and insight, Soldiers of the 100th
    Missile Defense Brigade gain tremendous training value by executing
    their actual responsibilities while providing Warfighters with
    confidence the system will perform as planned in support of their Joint
    campaigns.
        Support to Regional Capabilities: The 100th Missile Defense Brigade
    also provides GCCs with trained and certified AN/TPY-2 FBM radar
    detachments. These operational capabilities are present today at five
    strategic locations around the globe where they contribute to the early
    warning, cueing, tracking, and discrimination of threats to our friends
    and allies. These forward-based radars also represent a tangible
    contribution to regional defense that is the centerpiece of the
    Administration's Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA). In several instances,
    these soldiers, deployed to remote and austere locations, are the only
    persistent demonstration of our national commitment and resolve to the
    PAA.
        Ballistic Missile Early Warning: Space enabled capabilities are
    essential for missile defense operations. Everything from
    communications, precision navigation and timing, intelligence,
    surveillance, reconnaissance, and early warning are dependent on space
    enabled capabilities. Through the Joint Space Operations Center, we
    routinely coordinate and collaborate with the Joint Functional
    Component Command for Space (USSTRATCOM) to ensure resilience of the
    space architecture that forms the backbone of the missile defense joint
    kill chain.
        In support of the Joint Force Commander, USASMDC/ARSTRAT continues
    to provide ballistic missile early warning within various theaters of
    operations. The 1st Space Brigade's Joint Tactical Ground Station
    (JTAGS) Detachments, under the tactical control of USSTRATCOM's Joint
    Functional Component Command for Space, are operated by USASMDC/ARSTRAT
    space-professional soldiers who monitor launch activity and other
    infrared events. They provide essential information to members of the
    air, missile defense, and operational communities. Our JTAGS
    Detachments are forward deployed around the globe, providing 24/7/365,
    dedicated, assured missile warning to USSTRATCOM and GCCs in support of
    deployed and forward-based forces. We continue to optimize this
    capability and this year we gained support from the Government of Italy
    to relocate the JTAGS in Europe to Sigonella Naval Air Station.
        Our second major task is to build and mature future missile defense
    forces--our capability development function. These are the missile
    defense capabilities we will provide tomorrow. A major component of our
    capability development function is to provide relevant and updated
    training on our global missile defense systems. During the past fiscal
    year, USASMDC/ARSTRAT trained 185 soldiers and was recertified as an
    Army Learning Institution of Excellence for missile defense training.
        The Army uses established and emerging processes to document its
    missile defense needs and pursue Joint and Army validation of its
    requirements. As a recognized Army Center for Analysis, USASMDC/ARSTRAT
    conducts studies to determine how to best meet the Army's assigned
    missile defense responsibilities. With these insights, we develop and
    operationalize the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel,
    Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF-P)
    domains to address evolving threats and potential vulnerabilities to
    the GMD and AN/TPY-2 FBM missile defense systems. This disciplined
    approach helps to ensure limited resources are applied where Warfighter
    operational utility can be most effectively served.
        Our third major missile defense task provides critical technologies
    to address future needs that will enhance Warfighter effectiveness--our
    materiel development function. In USASMDC/ARSTRAT, our technology
    development function is primarily focused on the space and high
    altitude domains. However, while MDA is the principal materiel
    developer for ballistic missile defense capabilities, USASMDC/ARSTRAT
    has a number of supporting missile defense related materiel development
    efforts, to include supporting research and development of an OSD-
    sponsored conventional prompt global strike capability. These technical
    capabilities are at the forefront of developing holistic, cost-
    effective approaches to address the missile defense challenge.
    Following is a brief summary of two of our research and development
    efforts, as well as an overview of the capabilities of an essential
    Army testing range.
        High Energy Laser Technology Development and Demonstration: The
    objective of the Army's high energy laser science and technology
    project is to develop laser system components, ruggedize and integrate
    them onto an Army vehicle, conduct demonstrations to characterize
    performance capability, and transition the technology to a Program
    Executive Office. A solid-state laser weapon system has potential to be
    a low cost, effective complement to kinetic energy capabilities in
    countering rockets, artillery, and mortars (RAM); unmanned aerial
    vehicles (UAVs); and other threats. The project is building upon
    pathfinder demonstrations with a 10 kilowatt-class laser system in 2013
    and 2014, by continuing to develop and integrate technology at higher
    power and technology maturity levels. The next major demonstration will
    occur in 2018 following integration of a 50 kilowatt-class laser system
    onto a High Energy Laser Mobile Test Truck (HEL MTT). In 2015, the Army
    Science and Technology Working Group approved changes to the laser
    project to better align with the Army's Indirect Fire Protection
    Capability Increment 2 Block 1 (IFPC Inc 2-1) program. These changes
    will result in a pre-prototype laser weapon system demonstration, on a
    family of medium tactical vehicles variant, in the early 2020s designed
    to meet counter RAM requirements in the draft IFPC (IFPC Inc 2-1)
    Capability Development Document.

            Providing Future Warfighters with Innovative Missile Defense
            Capabilities

        Low-Cost Target Development: The Army continues to pursue a
    technology effort to develop a suite of low-cost targets for the
    Patriot testing program. The intent is to design threat-representative
    targets at a substantially reduced cost for short-range ballistic
    missile testing. Over the past year, we completed detailed designs for
    three new short range ballistic missile targets leveraging existing
    excess solid rocket motors. The first risk reduction flight of these
    targets is planned for May 2016. The Army will realize significant
    savings conducting operational test events using these new targets
    beginning in fiscal year 2017. We will continue to leverage existing
    missile inventory and technology advancements to develop less expensive
    targets that are representative of real world threats.
        Missile Defense Testing: USASMDC/ARSTRAT operates the Ronald Reagan
    Ballistic Missile Test Site (RTS). RTS, located on the U.S. Army
    Garrison--Kwajalein Atoll in the Republic of the Marshall Islands, is
    critical to both offensive and defensive missile testing requirements,
    such as the GMD system and the U.S. Air Force strategic ballistic
    missile systems. Including the recent successful MDA Warfighter and
    Homeland defense tests, FTO-02E2 and CTV-02 respectively, these tests
    have grown ever more challenging and complex over the last few years,
    providing a means to replicate theater missile defense architectures
    superimposed over these Pacific test sites. Through shrewd and
    efficient resource investments, RTS retains preeminent missile defense
    testing capabilities and personnel to continue to provide critical
    testing support. In concert with its testing mission, Reagan Test Site
    conducts continuous deep space surveillance and space object
    identification operations to further increase national capabilities and
    reduce expenditures for both mission sets. During the past month, the
    U.S. Air Force began construction of their most advanced surveillance
    system--the Space Fence. In a few years, this improved surveillance
    capability will enable proactive space situational awareness while
    complementing existing systems at Reagan Test Site.
      joint functional component command for integrated missile defense--
     synchronizing global missile defense planning, force management, and
                               operations support
        The Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile
    Defense, or JFCC IMD, is USSTRATCOM's missile defense integrating
    element. Like the other Joint Functional Component Commands, JFCC IMD
    was formed to operationalize USSTRATCOM missions and allow the
    headquarters to focus on integration and advocacy. Headquartered at
    Schriever Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, Colorado, the JFCC IMD is
    manned by professional Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Civilian,
    and Contractor personnel.
        As the Secretary of Defense and various combatant commanders have
    previously testified, the Warfighter remains confident in our ability
    to protect the Nation against a limited intercontinental ballistic
    missile attack, even in the face of the changing fiscal environment.
    While resources remain constrained, we continue to increase regional
    and Homeland defense capabilities. We remain partnered with the GCCs
    and MDA to initiate development of future capabilities in the Long
    Range Discrimination Radar in Alaska, development of the Redesigned
    Kill Vehicle (RKV) for the next GBI upgrade, and various other
    improvements in the global missile defense capability.

            Defense of the Homeland Priority Requires Exectuion of a
            Holistic Global Missile Defense Plan

        On behalf of USSTRATCOM, JFCC IMD is working across the DOD
    enterprise to improve the integration of existing capabilities in order
    to maximize our efficiency and effectiveness to protect the Homeland,
    deployed forces, partners, and allies. The key force multiplier is
    ``integration,'' which is a critically important mission area for JFCC
    IMD and directly supports USSTRATCOM's assigned Unified Command Plan
    (UCP) responsibilities for missile defense.
        As an operational and functional component command of USSTRATCOM,
    JFCC IMD has seven priorities for this year in support of USSTRATCOM
    UCP responsibilities:

          Remain postured to provide operational support during all
    missile events of interest and conduct BMDS asset management.
          Incorporate the Global Missile Defense CONOPS (GMDC)
    elements into policy, doctrine, and practice.
          Ensure operational realism and Warfighter priorities in
    tests to support operational acceptance of new capabilities.
          Conduct a holistic operational assessment through the
    Global Integrated Air and Missile Defense Assessment (GIAMDA) for
    advocacy of critical operational requirements to influence the missile
    defense investments.
          Recommend, through USSTRATCOM, the allocation of missile
    defense assets in support of geographic combatant command requirements
    and priorities.
          Evolve Joint BMD training to reflect technical and
    operational changes and improvements and to increase efficiency.
          Strengthen integration with USSTRATCOM subordinates and
    other organizations to improve cross-mission synergies.

        To accomplish these priorities, we maintain close collaborative
    relationships with the GCCs, MDA, the Services, the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, and our allies. We
    continually enhance our deployed capabilities while gaining operational
    experience and confidence in our collective ability to defend the
    Nation, deployed forces, partners, and allies. Some of our key efforts
    to enhance missile defense planning and capabilities for both the
    Homeland and regional architectures follow.
        Expansion and Integration of the Missile Defense Architecture: In
    response to the evolving strategic environment, we continue to bolster
    Homeland and regional missile defense capabilities. Over the past year,
    we have deployed an additional AN/TPY-2 FBM radar to Japan, expanded
    the existing European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) by
    operationalizing the Aegis Ashore capability in Romania, started
    construction of a second Aegis Ashore capability in Poland, upgraded Ft
    Greely, Alaska's existing GBI capability and inventory, and initiated
    key future capability developments in the Long Range Discrimination
    Radar and the RKV. Given many of the challenges associated with
    implementation of these architectures, JFCC IMD, in support of
    USSTRATCOM's global synchronizer role for missile defense, is
    collaborating with the GCCs to assess and address the cross-regional
    gaps in the areas of planning, policy, capabilities, and operations.

            We will maintain ``a robust missile defense capability to
            defend the Homeland against a limited ballistic missile
            attack.''

                                        --Quadrennial Defense Review
                                                         March 2014

        Global Planning and Assessment: Regional and global missile threats
    continue to increase in numbers and complexity. This year, after
    successfully completing a revision to the Global Missile Defense
    Concept of Operations, JFCC IMD operationalized many of the emerging
    processes identified in this seminal document. We led the missile
    defense community in an objective analysis of missile defense looking
    at risk from the lens of impacts across multiple GCC plans given a
    crisis with a single adversary problem set. This assessment will
    identify systemic risk, inform recommendations for shortfall
    mitigation, and improve effectiveness in missile defense planning. The
    output of this analysis directly informs the GIAMDA which serves to
    shape recommendations for global force management and advocacy efforts
    for future capability investments. We have completed the 2015 GIAMDA
    and its findings further underscores the holistic missile defense
    strategy that the Department is undertaking in technology development,
    allied integration, left-of-launch options, and cyber operations.
        Global Force Management: USSTRATCOM, as the designated Joint
    Functional Manager for missile defense, relies upon JFCC IMD to
    evaluate and recommend sourcing of BMD requirements based on assessed
    risk. Due to the high demand, low-density nature of missile defense
    assets, all sourcing decisions have a direct and significant impact to
    other combatant commanders' campaign and contingency plans. This year,
    JFCC IMD participated in a Joint Staff led effort to develop a
    prioritization schema for global assets. This global Prioritized
    Defended List will categorize GCC critical assets based on global risk
    to inform the Global Force Management process and enable senior leaders
    to make more informed decisions on the allocation of low density
    missile defense forces.
        Multi-Regional BMD Asset Management: JFCC IMD, in coordination with
    USSTRATCOM and the GCCs, manages the availability of missile defense
    assets to balance operational readiness postures, scheduled and
    unscheduled maintenance activities, and the MDA and Services' test
    requirements. This important process allows us to continually assess
    our readiness to defend against a ballistic missile attack and to
    recommend adjustments to optimize the overall BMD architecture.
        Allied Ballistic Missile Defense Integration: JFCC IMD continues to
    focus on the integration of allies into regional missile defense
    architectures, enhanced security cooperation between missile defense
    capable nations, and shared regional deterrence and defense
    responsibilities across partner nations. One tool employed to promote
    cooperation is the Nimble Titan campaign, a biennial series of multi-
    national missile defense experiments designed to explore policy and
    operational concepts required for coalition missile defense. The Nimble
    Titan campaign provides a unique venue to advance U.S. missile defense
    policies and combatant command regional security objectives. The Nimble
    Titan community of interest consists of 23 nations and 3 international
    organizations.
        Nimble Titan 16 includes Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry
    of Defense representatives from North America, Europe, Middle East, and
    Asia-Pacific regions, along with Department of State, OSD, Joint Staff,
    MDA, and combatant command representatives. While past Nimble Titan
    campaigns have focused only on Ballistic Missile Defense, Nimble Titan
    16 is the first campaign that expands the focus to Integrated Air and
    Missile Defense (IAMD), a growing area of concern for both the United
    States and many of our partner nations and allies. Other discussion
    topics include national policies and the need for increased regional
    and cross-regional coordination, sensor integration, and multinational
    MD planning solutions.
        As the premier strategic/policy level focused missile defense event
    in the world, this campaign provides participating nations with
    critical opportunities for multi-national discussions and experience in
    information-sharing as well as command and control procedures that
    enhance synchronized missile defense capabilities. Conclusions derived
    from this campaign continue to inform real world policy decisions and
    multinational BMD planning
        Joint BMD Training: In coordination with USSTRATCOM, the Joint
    Staff, Combatant Commands, and the Services, we have developed a
    comprehensive and innovative training program to close gaps between
    Service, Joint, and regional BMD training and education. This past
    September, we declared Final Operational Capability for the Joint BMD
    Training and Education mission. Nine new mission oriented courses have
    been developed and fielded to enhance combatant command and warfighter
    training needs. Online, distant learning courseware offerings are under
    development to improve efficiency in delivery and reduce costs. Over
    the past year, JFCC IMD provided 199 courses to over 3444 students
    worldwide via the Joint BMD Training and Education Center and Mobile
    Training Teams. Additionally, in keeping with Joint Vision 2020, JFCC
    IMD provided training courses to ally and partner nations using both
    Military-to-Military and Foreign Military Sales Training venues. We
    developed and launched our Community of Practice, an interactive
    knowledge portal for the missile defense mission, providing virtual
    problem solving, idea sharing, standards-setting, relationship
    improvement, collaboration, and joint, cross-domain awareness. Over the
    next two years our primary goal is to establish and gain Joint Staff
    accreditation as a Joint Training Center of Excellence.

            ``. . .I believe it is imperative that the United States
            continue to develop more capable forces and broader options for
            effective missile defense.''

                                        --USNORTHCOM Posture Statement
                                                         March 2016
        Warfighter Acceptance and Integrated Master Test Plan: As the
    missile defense architectures mature, Warfighters require a credible,
    comprehensive assessment of new capabilities to inform operational
    acceptance of emerging capabilities into the global BMDS. In 2015, we
    jointly conducted FTO-02 E1a to test the Aegis Ashore system with the
    SM-3 IB interceptor and, with FTO-02 E2a, performed an integrated BMDS
    test with Aegis BMD, THAAD, and AN/TPY-2 FBM simultaneously engaging
    SRBM, MRBM, and cruise missile targets in a layer defense to support
    the operational acceptance of the EPAA Phase II capability. For
    Homeland defense capability, we participated in the January 2016 GMD
    CTV-02, demonstrating the Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle alternate divert
    thruster in support of GBI upgrade efforts and key discrimination
    capabilities for future sensor network improvements. In the coming
    year, the focus of our BMD tests is to begin demonstrating the
    operational capability of the SM-3 IIA interceptor capability for Phase
    III of the EPAA architecture and to test the GMD system's GBI
    Capability Enhancement-II Block I. The Warfighter relies on a robust
    and operationally relevant test campaign to confidently field and
    integrate new capabilities into their existing Integrated Air and
    Missile Defense architectures.
        In summary, JFCC IMD continues to expand our nation's global
    missile defense architecture and explore future capabilities to
    maintain operational advantage against current and future threats. Our
    competitive edge is maintained through our deliberate investments in
    our capability developments by MDA and the Services, investments in our
    warfighters through education and training, and expansion of our
    collaboration with allies and partners.
        army contributions to the nation's missile defense capabilities
        As we transition from an Army at war to one of deterrence, air and
    missile defense (AMD) units have become a key strategic enabler. AMD is
    an enduring Army core function and an essential component of the Army
    mission to provide wide area security and support Joint campaigns. In
    addition to defense against ballistic missiles, the current AMD
    strategy seeks to develop a more comprehensive portfolio of IAMD
    capabilities to provide protection against cruise missiles, unmanned
    aerial systems, and long-range precision rocket, artillery, and mortar
    attacks.
        The Army works closely with MDA and continually supports its
    materiel development efforts to develop and field systems that are
    integral to our Nation's air and missile defense capabilities. To
    ensure the mission of providing trained and ready Army AMD forces, we
    continue to refine and implement the strategic direction of the Army's
    AMD strategy. A summary of the Army's major air and missile defense
    ongoing strategic direction and programs, both specified and implied,
    follows.
        Air and Missile Defense Readiness: Readiness remains the Army's top
    priority and the challenges to sustain the readiness of the total Army
    AMD forces requires constant vigilance and senior leader focus. The
    operational demand on the Army AMD force to meet the requirements of
    the Joint Warfighters continues to stress the force, impacting both
    current and future readiness, as well as modernization initiatives.
    With over 50 percent of the AMD force either forward assigned or
    deployed, the Army has taken steps to mitigate this stress and restore
    strategic flexibility. Implementation of a Sustainable Readiness Model,
    an Army Campaign Plan strategic effort, supported the characterization
    of the challenge. A recent study on striking a balance between
    operational demand and modernization led to the activation of an AMD
    test detachment in fiscal year 2018. This same study supported
    normalization of AMD rotations to nine months vice the current 12 month
    cycle.
        Mission Command: Closely linked to the challenge of sustaining AMD
    readiness is the ability to provide low density/high demand AMD command
    and control elements. The command and control elements are especially
    critical to enable the integration of total Army AMD forces into Joint
    operational and technical architectures. Operationally, the Army
    recently activated a third Air Defense Brigade Headquarters within the
    South Carolina Army National Guard to support command and control
    rotations for the integrated air defense mission of the National
    Capital Region. Additionally, a sixth Active Duty air defense brigade
    headquarters will soon be activated. Beginning next fiscal year, the
    Army will begin fielding five Dismounted PATRIOT Information
    Coordination Centrals (DPICC) to the Army Air and Missile Defense
    Commands (AAMDC), which will mitigate the requirement to deploy a
    Patriot Headquarters element with each 1-2 battery deployment. These
    operational measures are being conducted in concert with technical
    measures, specifically the development of the Army IAMD Battle Command
    System (IBCS), which will facilitate the optimal pairing and provide
    additional time to prosecute tracks to enhance selective target
    engagement and improve combat identification. The Army PATRIOT force
    remains the cornerstone of AMD protection for our deployed forces,
    friends, and allies.
        Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD): As we continue to
    transition from an Army at war to one of deterrence, AMD units remain a
    key strategic enabler. AMD is an enduring Army core function and an
    essential component of our mission to provide wide-area security. In
    addition to providing defense against ballistic missiles, the current
    AMD strategy continues to develop a more comprehensive portfolio of
    IAMD capabilities to provide protection against cruise missiles,
    unmanned aerial systems, fixed and rotary wing aircraft, and long-range
    precision RAM attacks.
        The IBCS remains an Army priority effort and serves as the
    foundation for Army AMD modernization. Modernization is critical to
    stay ahead of the advancement of the threat. The program will field a
    common mission command system to all echelons of Army AMD forces in
    order to defend against cruise missiles, manned and unmanned aircraft,
    air-to-ground missiles, tactical ballistic missiles, and RAM attacks.
    The IBCS network will be capable of coordinating air surveillance and
    fire control across Services and with coalition partners, enabling
    over-the-horizon engagements that provide Joint Warfighters with more
    decision space and time. In 2015, the IBCS successfully executed two
    flight tests. During the March test, the IBCS coordinated the
    engagement of a surrogate tactical ballistic missile utilizing a
    PATRIOT radar and interceptor on the Integrated Fire Control Network.
    In the November test, the IBCS coordinated the engagement of a
    surrogate cruise missile utilizing Sentinel radar data and a PATRIOT
    interceptor. This was a first of its kind engagement with a PATRIOT
    engaging a target using Sentinel radar data. When fielded, in 2019,
    IBCS will componentize the AMD force, breaking the current system-
    centric control paradigm, which will dramatically increase capability
    and also facilitate open industry competition in support of the AMD
    community. Additional efforts are currently underway to integrate the
    Army's IBCS and MDA's BMD System Command, Control, Battle Management,
    and Communications (C2BMC) in order to fully support integrated air and
    missile defense interoperability with the ballistic missile defense
    system.
        The IBCS and inherent integrated fire protection efforts will
    provide the future force with a means to defend against cruise
    missiles, unmanned aerial systems, and long-range precision rockets,
    artillery, and mortars. However, the Army must also be trained and
    ready to fight tonight. Recent conflicts, for example in the Ukraine
    and Israel, have highlighted the growing threat of UAS in support of
    tactical operations. This poses an increasing risk to the Army's
    combined arms team who are operating where the strategic and
    operational advantage of highly technical stand-off weapons have
    limited utility. A coordinated effort involving the Army Staff, the
    Fires Center, PEO M&S, and select ASCCs is underway now to investigate
    holistic approaches to enable the Army to fight tonight against these
    emerging threats. The technical options under consideration run the
    gamut from assessing pre-PAC-3 missiles to leveraging older generation
    interceptors in the inventory to opportunities for the acceleration of
    existing AMD modernization plans. Operationally, the team is assessing
    the ability to leverage capabilities of the other Services, as well as
    the integration of allied contributions. Senior Army leaders
    acknowledge that these options may require reprogramming within the
    current Defense plan and await the team's report this summer.
        PATRIOT/PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3): In support of the
    GCCs increasing air and missile defense demands, operational tempo and
    stress remain high. To meet these demands, reduce stress, and avoid
    adversary overmatch, the Army has implemented a comprehensive
    modernization strategy that replaces PATRIOT's command and control
    hardware while upgrading the radar, launcher, and interceptor
    components through competitive development and procurement. The
    strategy's aim is to increase reliability, drive down operational and
    sustainment costs, in light of an evolving threat. The three
    significant facets of this strategy--the development of IBCS, radar and
    launcher modernization, and the PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement
    (MSE), are critical to our Nation's ability to provide GCCs with
    greater strategic flexibility and enhanced capabilities.
        A number of significant PATRIOT/PAC-3 capability enhancements have
    been accomplished over the past year. Among the accomplishments were
    the completion of the Army's planned fielding of Post Deployment Build
    (PDB) 7 software and the modern adjunct processor to all fifteen
    PATRIOT battalions and achievement of first unit equipped with the next
    generation PAC-3 missile, the MSE, two months ahead of schedule. The
    PAC-3 MSE Initial Operational Capability (IOC) is planned for next
    year.
        PATRIOT must continually modernize through PDBs software and
    hardware upgrades to avoid obsolescence and provide initial launch
    capability of the PAC-3 MSE interceptor. As part of this continuing
    modernization strategy, the Army is in the process of delivering the
    next software build, PDB-8. The PDB-8 software upgrade has successfully
    completed three live fire test events, the most current occurring last
    month, and is on schedule to complete developmental testing this year.
    The PDB-8 software IOC is planned for fiscal year 2018, which when
    fielded, will exploit the expanded kinematic capabilities of the PAC-3
    MSE interceptor. The Army continues to move forward with the next
    generation sensor for the PATRIOT system. An analysis of alternatives
    has been completed for the Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor
    and an Army Requirements Oversight Council review will occur soon.
        Finally, while these Patriot modernization efforts are an
    imperative to retaining an operationally relevant capability and not
    risking obsolescence as threat capabilities seek to outpace the
    Patriot, we still remain committed to balancing modernization with
    operational demand and strategic flexibility requirements. We can point
    to the Army's recent, no-notice, deployment, integration, and
    redeployment of Global Response Force Patriot forces from Ft Bliss,
    Texas to South Korea as evidence of this commitment, and of the
    readiness of the force.
        Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System: THAAD, a key component
    of the BMDS architecture, is designed to defend deployed and allied
    forces, population centers, and critical infrastructure against short
    and medium-range ballistic missiles. THAAD is a high demand, low-
    density asset that is mobile and globally transportable. A fully
    operational THAAD battery consists of 95 soldiers, an AN/TPY-2 radar,
    six launchers, a fire control and communications element, a battery
    support center, and a support element. THAAD has a unique intercept
    capability in both the endo- and exo-atmosphere using proven hit-to-
    kill technology. There are now four available THAAD batteries.
    Equipment training and fielding is on-going for a fifth unit and it
    will be operationally available next fiscal year. In April 2013, one of
    these batteries conducted the first-ever operational deployment of
    THAAD in response to the escalation of tensions in the Pacific region.
    By 2019, the THAAD force is scheduled to consist of seven batteries. A
    new training facility, which enables virtual training for the soldiers
    who will operate the THAAD system, is operating at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.
    The addition of THAAD capabilities to the Army's air and missile
    defense portfolio brings an unprecedented level of protection against
    missile attacks to deployed U.S. forces, partners, and allies.
        Integrated Fire Control Capability Increment 2 Block 1 (IFPC Inc 2-
    1): As the operational life cycle of short-range AMD capabilities such
    as Avenger draw to a close, the Army is developing capabilities to
    defeat cruise missile, UAS, and RAM threats. The IFPC Inc 2-1,
    currently under development, is a mobile, ground-based weapon system
    designed to provide 360-degree protection capability for these threats.
    A block acquisition approach is being used to provide this essential
    capability. The Block 1 System will consist of an existing interceptor,
    sensor, utilize the IBCS for command and control, and the development
    of technical fire control and a multi-mission launcher to support the
    counter UAS and cruise missile defense missions. The Block 2 System
    will develop interceptors, sensors, and technical fire control to
    support the counter RAM mission. The IFPC Inc 2-1 System will be
    compatible with the Army IAMD command and control architecture. The
    IFPC Inc 2-1 System will be transportable by Army common mobile
    platforms and is scheduled to provide IOC capabilities against cruise
    missile and UAS threats in fiscal year 2020.
                                   conclusion
        Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Donnelly, as a member of the Joint
    missile defense community, the Army continues to pursue enhancements to
    the Nation's missile defense system, both at the strategic and tactical
    levels. As a Service, the Army has lead responsibility for GMD, AN/TPY-
    2 FBM, IFPC Inc 2-1, IBCS, PATRIOT, and THAAD. Our trained and ready
    soldiers operating GMD elements in Colorado, Alaska, New York,
    California, and from remote, globally deployed locations, remain on
    point to defend the Homeland against a limited intercontinental
    ballistic missile attack. As a force provider to the GCCs, our soldiers
    provide essential regional sensor capabilities and ballistic missile
    early warning. Our regional forces continue to leverage ally
    collaboration and planning efforts in developing integrated and
    interoperable defenses against the various threat sets. USSTRATCOM,
    through the JFCC IMD, continues to integrate BMDS capabilities to
    counter global ballistic missile threats and to protect our Nation,
    deployed forces, partners, and allies.
        While the operational, doctrine, and materiel development
    enhancements of the BMDS are essential, our most essential assets are
    the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, civilians, and contractors who
    develop, deploy, and operate our missile defense system. I appreciate
    having the opportunity to address missile defense matters and look
    forward to addressing your questions.

        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        I believe in order here--let us see. I think Senator
    Donnelly was first on this side. Because he is ranking, he
    would be next. Senator Inhofe and Fischer, Lee--I think you
    were at the beginning of the hearing--and Senator Sullivan. But
    Senator Lee has a conflict, so I am going to yield my time to
    him and we will otherwise be on the same path unless there is
    some suggestion of a change. I know he has got something he has
    got to go to. Thank you for being with us, Senator Lee.
        Senator Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to
    all of you for being here. We are honored by your presence and
    grateful for all you do for us to keep us safe.
        As we look across the array of threats that we face around
    the world, there are two threats that stand out and that cause
    a lot of us to worry. One is ballistic missile attacks and the
    other one is cybersecurity-related threats.
        I am glad all of you are here because you do a lot of work
    in this area, and I am grateful for that.
        Secretary McKeon and Admiral Gortney, I would like to ask
    the two of you some questions about the cost, the cost-benefit
    analysis that we have in this area.
        The United States has spent many tens of billions of
    dollars over the last three decades on missile defenses. It is
    a large sum. It is a sum that has drawn some criticism, and it
    is a sum that, regardless of how you feel about that criticism,
    is one that we have to pay attention to.
        But in much the same way that other technologies like, for
    example, drone technology cost us a lot of money to develop--it
    cost us a lot of money to develop at the outset, but in the end
    has saved us and has even more potential to save us down the
    road a lot of money because compared to other aircraft systems,
    manned aircraft systems, for example, in the long run, we can
    actually save money.
        In the same respect, how and in what respect, to what
    extent could having a reliable missile defense system help us
    save money, save money for the military and for the Government
    over the long haul?
        Admiral Gortney. I guess when you look at the ballistic
    missile threat, there are actually two types of ballistic
    missile threats. It is the theater ballistic missile threat
    that we have servicemembers and servicemembers' families that
    live underneath that threat today. Then we have the ballistic
    missile threat, limited ballistic missile threat, that we have
    designed for the Homeland.
        I think what is important where MDA is moving on the
    technologies is where is there efficiencies to get us on the
    correct side of the cost curve, not just engage in midcourse
    for both those threats, but keeping them on the ground, left of
    launch, having a surveillance to be able to strike them,
    provided we have the rules of engagement to do that, killing
    them in boost phase and then through the midcourse phase. A lot
    of those technologies that you all have provided the funding
    for for the research and development MDA is using. A lot of it
    we will be able to apply to both those particular threats. I
    think that is where we have to really view that is where the
    savings will be because they are different. They differentiate
    by range of a threat, but the technologies to counter them can
    be the same or the necessary technologies can be.
        Senator Lee. Thank you.
        Mr. Secretary?
        Mr. McKeon. The only thing I would add, Senator, I think
    the way we would think about missile defense in a very broad
    sense, both regionally and our Homeland missile defense is it
    is a deterrent against rogue states or nations engaged in
    activity that we disagree with. In addition to our own missile
    defenses, we are encouraging a lot of partners in the Middle
    East and in Asia to acquire missile defenses in the theater.
        For example, in Iran, we are working to counter Iran and
    its missile capabilities. We are working very closely with our
    partners in the Gulf to encourage their acquisition of missile
    defense systems, as well as knitting them together in terms of
    the early warning. That is a deterrent that over the long term
    will save, we believe, money in other respects.
        Senator Lee. Thank you.
        Admiral Gortney, let us talk about North Korea for a
    minute. I would love to get your assessment of where North
    Korea's ballistic missile technology is headed in the next few
    years and then evaluate our ability to keep up with it and
    respond to that.
        Admiral Gortney. The intel community assesses North Korea's
    ability to successfully shoot an ICBM with a nuclear weapon in
    range of the Homeland is low. But as the commander in charge
    that is responsible for defending that Homeland who owns the
    trigger to shoot that down, we do not base our readiness levels
    upon that low probability. We assess--it is the prudent course
    of action as the commander. We assess that he has the ability
    to do that, and we are prepared to engage that particular
    threat today and in the future 24 hours a day, 365 days out of
    the year.
        Eventually we assess that his low probability will
    increase, and that is why the investments to have us outpace
    that technology, his ability to field that capability is
    absolutely critical.
        Senator Lee. Thank you, Admiral.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Senator Donnelly?
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
    all for your service.
        Admiral Syring, based on the current and anticipated threat
    to the Homeland, how would you prioritize where to locate
    additional sensor capabilities to enhance the GMD system?
        Admiral Syring. Sir, we have an ongoing AOA [Analysis of
    Alternatives] in the Department that is looking around the
    world on exactly that question. We will look at areas like
    Hawaii. We will look at areas like the east coast or the
    Atlantic region has gaps that we see in the future based on
    where the threat goes with both Iran and North Korea. But I
    have testified to this committee that sensoring is where we
    need to be, and certainly there are gaps not in tracking and
    classification, but where I see the need for discrimination in
    the future against the much more complex threat that may come.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
        Admiral Gortney, in regards to the prioritization in this
    area, how do you see the threat picture and where do you see
    the necessity for this?
        Admiral Gortney. I am completely in line with my shipmate
    on the other end of the table. You know, we need to make that
    which we have the best we can possibly make it. We need
    improvements in our sensors. We need to continue to test so
    that we have confidence in our weapon system, that the
    operators have confidence in their weapon system, and our
    leadership has confidence in the weapon system. Then we need to
    make those necessary investments to get us on the correct side
    of the cost curve so that we get the best value for it, not
    just the very expensive midcourse solution. That is where MDA
    is moving, and we appreciate your support on that.
        Senator Donnelly. Admiral Gortney, in your view why is it
    important that NORTHCOM have the responsibility for providing
    ballistic missile defense for our country?
        Admiral Gortney. Because I am assigned as the commander to
    defend the Homeland, and with that, that comes with the job.
        Senator Donnelly. Okay.
        Secretary McKeon and Admiral Syring, over the past 10 years
    we have made significant investments in United States-Israeli
    cooperative missile defense programs, including Iron Dome,
    David's Sling, Arrow. I was in Israel last month to review a
    number of these, and I was wondering--and we will start with
    you, Secretary McKeon--how you assess the importance of these
    programs and what benefits we gain from our cooperation with
    Israel on these systems.
        Admiral Syring. Senator Donnelly, our cooperation with
    Israel is part and parcel of a very broad and deep security
    relationship with the state of Israel, and our administration,
    like many before it, has stood with Israel in providing the
    necessary security assistance so that it can protect itself
    against--in a pretty dangerous neighborhood.
        With the R&D work that we do together with them, we
    obviously get some benefit that I think Admiral Syring can
    speak to in a little bit more detail. But we think it has been
    essential--our cooperation with them, and we have seen the
    success of the Iron Dome in some recent conflicts that has
    protected the Israeli people.
        Senator Donnelly. Has it been the concept of this effort
    with the three different system, in effect, layering? Admiral,
    if you would just discuss that for a second.
        Admiral Syring. Senator, thank you.
        I will just pile on to what the Secretary said. The
    importance of those systems, the protection of Israel every day
    just with Iron Dome, and then the fielding soon of David's
    Sling and then Arrow after that will provide them an umbrella
    that I think will be unparalleled in the region and absolutely
    necessary.
        We have had a close partnership and relation with them on
    all their programs with missile defense over the last really--
    you know, beyond several years, way back to Arrow 2 in terms of
    the relationship that we have had with Israel and MDA
    specifically.
        I will, if I can, just transfer now to the maturity of the
    programs. We have worked very closely with them on David's
    Sling in particular. This is the mid-tier level. They were very
    successful. We were very successful together in testing last
    year, and we fully support their readiness for production this
    year. Arrow 3, which is the exosystem, similar to where we are
    with that and Aegis in the upper tier, successfully intercepted
    as well last year. They are progressing at a great pace with
    high success rates.
        What benefit do we get as the United States? We get
    tremendous benefit. In terms of the Iron Dome procurement
    dollars that we and you have appropriated, we have asked for
    and you have appropriated and then added to even, have resulted
    in significant work share for U.S. companies. Thirtyfive
    percent of the procurement in 2014, 55 percent of the
    procurement dollars in 2015 go to U.S. companies. To me that is
    of great value to them.
        We also learn a lot from what they have done in terms of
    choosing components and the engineering they have done on their
    interceptors. They have done a fantastic job of achieving good
    performance.
        Senator Donnelly. Are we picking up tips, in effect----
        Admiral Syring. Yes, sir.
        Senator Donnelly.--of better defense of our country from
    the challenges they face?
        Admiral Syring. We absolutely are in the regional area and
    have learned a lot from the performance and the design of their
    interceptors, which is critically important for why you hear us
    say we need the technical data package, for example, for
    David's Sling so we can take that information and use it to our
    advantage for our systems and our interceptors.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. Senator Inhofe?
        Senator Inhofe. Admiral Syring, I think that is a great
    answer. I am glad that we are--there are so many people out
    there and they think that we are just--that Israel is always
    the beneficiary of everything that goes on. That is not true at
    all. We have ourselves benefited a great deal, along with where
    would we be in that part of the world if we did not have
    Israel? I am glad we are talking about that, and I think it is
    necessary for all of us to do that continuously.
        Senator Donnelly asked the question, Admiral Gortney, about
    why NORTHCOM--now, your answer is accurate. You said we are
    assigned that and we will get it done. I think the thrust of
    his question was there are a lot of options out there to
    protect the United States. NORTHCOM is one. Is that the best
    one? The question was, I think, you know, why NORTHCOM.
        Admiral Gortney. Because it is attached to a longstanding
    NORAD mission, which is ITW/AA [Integrated Tactical Warning and
    Attack Assessment], which is from the Soviet Union days, make a
    declaration of an attack from the Homeland from an ICBM
    against, in this case, the Soviet threat. We still make that
    assessment today and use that architecture to help assess
    against the rogue nation for the ballistic missile defense of
    the Homeland.
        It nests very well with the headquarters for us to make
    those assessments and to be able to hold the trigger, and we
    are manned, trained, and equipped to do it. We do not have the
    personnel. Soldiers, guardsmen predominantly, run those
    particular things, but they answer to me for the shot decision.
        Senator Inhofe. I was not saying it critically. I just
    wanted to hear so I can answer the question when I am asked.
        Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir.
        Senator Inhofe. Admiral Gortney, you wrote in your
    statement that, quote, our potential adversaries are pursuing
    advanced weapons development not seen in decades. I agree with
    that. We can go on and quote James Clapper and Admiral Stewart
    on their assessments of the threat. It is greater than any
    threat that we have faced before. We have had them countless
    times in our committee hearing.
        But at the last one, when General Stewart ended up
    assessing the threat that we have, General Stewart called it
    the new normal. That bothered me when I heard that. I kind of
    put the interpretation of that on there that do not expect
    anything better. What is your interpretation of it being the
    new normal?
        Admiral Gortney. I think we live in the world we live in,
    not the world we would like to live in. With return to great
    power competition, as described by the Secretary, the
    resurgence of Russia, the evolvement of China, the capabilities
    that both are developing--in the case of Russia, advanced, very
    accurate cruise missiles that can be either conventional or
    nuclear warheads that they have employed conventional from
    aircraft into Syria and from ships and submarines TLAM
    [Tomahawk Land Attack Missile]-like weapons from ships and
    submarines into Syria, when they had no operational or tactical
    utility on the battlefield, according to General Austin. They
    were messaging us that they are fielding these capabilities.
    They are weapons that we have been successfully employing for
    the last 20-25 years. They see great value in them. It changes
    the dynamics. Russia today, if they chose--and I think a very
    low likelihood. Whereas before they developed these weapons for
    long-range aviation, they had to come into our battle space in
    order to employ their weapons.
        Senator Inhofe. They are catching up or in some areas even
    passing us. I got the interpretation of that, we better get
    used to it because that is still happening.
        Now, due to the proliferation of technology and the number
    of countries possessing the ballistic missile capability, it
    continues to increase.
        Admiral Gortney. That is correct.
        Senator Inhofe. We know that. Yet, while that is
    increasing, our budget from 2007 to, I think--here, I have got
    it down here--has declined 14 percent between fiscal year 2008
    and 2017. With the threat that is increasing like that, can all
    of you say that this is adequate? We need to be doing a better
    job in terms of the budget. That is kind of what we are talking
    about in this hearing.
        Admiral Gortney. Clearly, sir. There are tradeoffs between
    the near-term threat and the long-term threat, current threat,
    future threat. That is the choices that we have been forced to
    make given the size of the budget.
        Senator Inhofe. We do not need to elaborate on that. I was
    going to get into something else, but I want to at least do
    this.
        When we were initially starting, the first Obama budget in
    2009, it cut missile defense by $1.4 billion. Now, that was
    when they actually addressed the Czech Republic, which had the
    radar, and Poland in terms of the equipment. I can remember
    being with Vaclav Klaus during that time, and I remember prior
    to that--it would have been the year before this new
    administration--he said, you know, we are willing to do all
    this, but if we do, we are taking a lot of risk in terms of
    alienating even further Russia. He said can you tell me that
    you are not going to pull the rug out from under you. I said
    absolutely, and of course, that is what happened.
        Now we are looking at a new setup. Now, something had to
    replace what we had that down for, which was to protect Western
    Europe and eastern United States, along with increasing from 30
    to 44, I understand, ground-based interceptors. What else is
    being done particularly to take the place of what that was
    designed to protect at the time before it was pulled away?
        Mr. McKeon. Senator Inhofe, you are correct that that
    decision was made in 2009, but the context was that we were
    seeing that the Iranian ICBM threat had not materialized in the
    way that people had anticipated. The near-term threat to Europe
    and our European partners and our deployed forces was an
    expansion of their medium-range ballistic missile programs.
        Secretary Gates has spoken to some of this in his book, his
    own skepticism that the Czechs and the Pols were going to be
    able to--at least the Czechs--carry it forward in their own
    government. We replaced it, as you know, with the European
    phased adaptive approach with a radar in Turkey, some ships
    that are home-ported in Rota, Spain, and then two Aegis Ashore
    sites, one in Romania and one in Poland. The one in Romania, as
    Admiral Syring said, is essentially technically capable and
    will be fully operational this year, and the site in Poland we
    are going to break ground on. We have kept the commitment that
    we made to our European partners.
        Senator Inhofe. Mr. Secretary, my time has expired some
    time ago. I am not going to ask you a question except for the
    record from the three uniforms that are here. Do you feel that
    we adequately replaced what we were attempting to do before the
    change was made in Poland and the Czech Republic? For the
    record, all right? Later, not now.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. Senator Heinrich?
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Admiral Syring, to follow up on the question from Senator
    Donnelly and talk a little bit more about our efforts with our
    partner in Israel, we have made significant investments to
    protect our ally Israel from ballistic missile threats in the
    region. When you look back at the last decade, I think our
    contribution has been over $3 billion to those efforts.
        I was very pleased to see a co-production agreement signed
    for Iron Dome. That is allowing American companies here in the
    U.S. to help manufacture that very important capability. I was
    wondering what the status is of the co-production arrangement
    on Iron Dome and what progress might be being made to
    potentially co-produce other systems in the future, for
    example, David's Sling.
        Admiral Syring. The co-production agreement is in place
    with Iron Dome, and we are achieving the savings that were laid
    out in that agreement. I am confident that any additional
    dollars like the Iron Dome request that we have this year and
    2017 will follow that agreement.
        David's Sling is--those negotiations and drafts are
    ongoing, discussions ongoing with Israel. Our objective is to
    achieve the similar outcome with Iron Dome production.
        Senator Heinrich. Great. Glad to hear that.
        Admiral Syring. I am sorry. With David's Sling production.
    Correction.
        Senator Heinrich. I understood what you meant, not what you
    said.
        Moving on to another issue that I know that Senator Inhofe
    cares a lot about--I do as well--directed energy. Last year, we
    saw the appropriators cut technology maturation funding to MDA,
    effectively delaying further progress of a laser demonstrator
    which would have finally gotten the work out of the lab and
    into flight test of that technology. How important is it that
    that funding be restored in this upcoming year's
    appropriations?
        Admiral Syring. Sir, the critical issue that I have spoken
    privately and publicly to members about over the last few
    months is the support for that demonstration. The ability for
    us to get a low-power laser at, we are thinking, in the 100-
    kilowatt range up at altitude to prove the coherency and the
    physics part of the problem, as you are well aware, and to see
    if there is a feasible design, a feasible material solution for
    a boost phase intercept capability.
        We are asking for $278 million, if you look at the out-year
    budget, for that demonstrator between now and 2021. We are not
    asking for a $5.5 billion airborne laser program. We are asking
    for a prototype to go prove the feasibility to give confidence
    to the warfighter that they believe it is feasible and to the
    Department that we believe it is fiscally affordable.
        Senator Heinrich. Well, I think as we see the ballistic
    missile threats that we have all heard talked about here today,
    multiply the number of potential missiles that we could face
    either in theater or intercontinentally continue to increase, I
    think it is going to be more and more important that we look at
    long-term solutions that are actual game-changers like directed
    energy to solve some of those issues.
        Admiral Syring. I agree, sir.
        Senator Heinrich. One last question. This can be either for
    Admiral Gortney or you, Admiral Syring. Two of our foremost
    military leaders, former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral
    Greenert, former Army Chief of Staff, General Odierno, said in
    a memo that our missile defense strategy was, quote/unquote,
    unsustainable and that ballistic missile threats, quote,
    continue to outpace our Active defense systems, unquote.
        Do you agree with that assessment? What do you make of it?
    What needs to either change or what has changed in our
    capabilities, if you do not agree with that?
        Admiral Gortney. Senator, I was in the meeting that
    generated that particular article. At the time, I was the force
    provider for the United States Navy at Fleet Forces Command
    down in Norfolk.
        The fundamental issue is because of our current strategy,
    we are wearing out our Patriot, soon to be THAAD, and our Aegis
    capable platforms, low-density, high-demand. The threat is
    increasing, and we are on an unaffordable path. Very expensive
    rockets to shoot down maybe not so expensive rockets. That is
    why the necessary investments, the laser being one of those, to
    get us on the correct side of the cost curve, not just relying
    on midcourse kinetic engagement. The whole trying to knock down
    the threats throughout the entire spectrum is absolutely
    critical.
        Senator Heinrich. That is very helpful. Thank you very
    much.
        Senator Sessions. Senator Fischer?
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        If I could follow up a little on what the Senator was just
    asking about specifically with the R&D [research and
    development]. As we look at the R&D budget, it continues to
    decrease. Yet, I think all of us realize the need we have for
    these capabilities in the future. If you are going to look
    long-term, the next 20 years, we are going to need these
    capabilities. Yet, we continue to cut back on that R&D budget.
        Admiral Syring, I would ask you how do we get on the right
    side of this? You are saying, well, it is in the budget for
    this. It is in the budget for that. But looking ahead 20 years,
    you and I both have to say it is not in the budget. What do you
    propose to us? Do we stay headed in this direction? How much do
    you really need?
        Admiral Syring. Ma'am, it is a great question. If I can,
    can I point back to the chart that the chairman showed on MDA
    top line?
        Senator Fischer. Of course.
        Admiral Syring. I came into this job in fiscal year 2012/
    fiscal year 2013 time frame. I have been here almost four years
    now.
        If I can just talk about what--let us lift up just a
    second, if we can, in terms of what the R&D is being budgeted
    to and requested for and what we are not doing. I think that is
    the point, Mr. Chairman, of what you are after here in this
    discussion, if I may.
        We came in and everybody knows the sequestration reduction
    that happened, and that is annotated on the chart. But what is
    not shown on the chart in words here is that we made the
    decision in the 2013 time frame to pivot back to the GMD
    program and increase the capacity and capability really of that
    program that had already been fielded several years before. The
    investment here that you see ramping up over these years,
    ma'am, is to that point in terms of improving the GMD
    reliability, getting the radar going in Alaska, improving our
    discrimination capability, and redesigning the kill vehicle,
    which we are not satisfied with its reliability today. That is
    that increase of capability here.
        There was a big, nonrecurring investment actually in 2016
    to add money into the GMD program that had been cut from
    before. I think I have talked to you about this in the past in
    terms of modeling, reliability, stockpile reliability programs,
    things like that that needed to be done to increase the
    warfighters' confidence in the system. All of that got going in
    2016.
        Now let us go to 2017. We actually requested in 2016 $7.8
    billion. When the budget agreement was signed late last year,
    the Department was shorted--not short--it was down $22 billion
    from the top line. My share of that was $300 million. That is
    why you see a request of 7.5.
        Ma'am, if I can just make the point. The last point is,
    okay, what are you not doing? I am continuing essentially four
    new start programs here under this top line and will field them
    in 2020. Now, does that mean that we are done? Absolutely not.
    There are gaps in the system still with radars, sensors,
    directed energy, R&D programs that we are trying to feed at a
    much lower level of funding to go prove whether they are
    feasible or not. I think once we prove that, you will see a
    ramp-up in the request for R&D if we can make the case that it
    is feasible and affordable.
        It is a much different way of looking at it, as let us go
    prove it first and prove to the warfighter, prove to the
    community, prove to the Department that it can be done, prove
    to you that it is feasible before we come forward with a big
    R&D program. There was not one POM 18 [Program Objective
    Memorandum] issue, meaning above the line, that I--I am sorry--
    POM 17 issue above the line that I submitted to the Department.
    Not one. To me, that is us being good stewards of the taxpayer
    dollar and being careful on how far we lean into advanced
    technology if it is truly not ready to go.
        Senator Fischer. As we look at our adversaries, if we look
    at China, if we look at Russia and the arsenals that they have,
    if we look at the developing capabilities of the Iranians and
    the North Koreans, how are we going to stack up against them
    when we look out in 20 years?
        Admiral Syring. Do you want me to take that or maybe
    Admiral Gortney from the warfighter standpoint?
        Senator Fischer. That would be good. Admiral Gortney?
        Admiral Gortney. We are designed against the rogue nation
    right now, ma'am, limited capability against North Korea today,
    Iran, should Iran have the capability today. That is what we
    are designed against. I see the investments designed to outpace
    that particular threat. It is not targeted at Russia. It is not
    targeted to China.
        Senator Fischer. Should it be?
        Admiral Gortney. I will defer to the policy----
        Senator Fischer. I knew you would say that. Thank you, sir.
        I see my time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you. Good questions.
        Let us see. It is now Senator Manchin.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I thank all of you for your service and thank you for being
    here.
        To General Mann, I am a strong supporter of the National
    Guard and its versatile role in supporting national Homeland
    security especially in the area of missile defense. Knowing
    that one of your responsibilities is missile defense, what is
    your assessment of the National Guard's performance in the
    missile defense operations for the Pacific theater? How are
    they performing?
        General Mann. Sir, you are referring to Fort Greely and
    from Vandenberg, the GBI support that we are providing?
        Senator Manchin. Correct.
        General Mann. Quite frankly, I am extremely pleased. Those
    soldiers who have been doing that mission now for many, many
    years are extremely competent and confident. They take this
    mission very, very seriously. Quite frankly, when we talk about
    the ground-based midcourse defense program, that is different
    from THAAD and Patriot. That is a unique system.
        Senator Manchin. Right.
        General Mann. They bring to the table a unique skill set
    that they have been able to develop over time, and they are
    constantly raising the bar in terms of the level of
    sophistication, the difficulty of the scenarios that they train
    against every day. I am very, very pleased with what the
    National Guard is doing.
        I would also like to say that we are very, very pleased
    with the way the National Guard is supporting a lot of other
    activities in terms of air missile defense over in Europe, a
    lot of different rotations, training rotations that are taking
    place over there, as well as throughout the Pacific. I am very,
    very pleased with them.
        Senator Manchin. I would follow up by saying what is your
    assessment of the future missile defense needs for the east
    coast.
        General Mann. I agree with Admiral Syring very clearly that
    I think what is really key is that we maintain a level of
    predictability in terms of our resources, whether it is this
    administration or going into the future. I think the level of
    predictability is extremely important and making sure that we
    maximize that current capability.
        It is more than just how many arrows that we have in our
    quiver. It really is, at the end of the day, making sure that
    we maximize current capabilities, increasing the reliability of
    those current capabilities as we look into the future. The
    sensor piece is critically important to making sure that the
    numbers that we have, 30 going to 44 GBIs, that we maximize
    that capability to the fullest extent possible. That is what
    that sensor will do for us.
        Senator Manchin. Admiral Gortney, you previously assessed
    that North Korea has the ability to miniaturize a nuclear
    weapon and put it in a KN08, intercontinental ballistic
    missile, and shoot it to the Homeland.
        Based on recent reporting, the South Korean government has
    assessed that North Korea is capable also of mounting a nuclear
    warhead on a medium-range Rodong ballistic missile, which could
    reach all South Korea and most of Japan. Do you share the South
    Korean government's views on North Korea's capabilities?
        Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir, I do.
        Senator Manchin. That is a threat that you said that we are
    prepared to deal with?
        Admiral Gortney. That is correct. Yes, sir, it is.
        I would also like to reinforce the General's comment about
    the great work that the Guard are doing in defense of the
    mission and also the guardsmen who are protecting up at Fort
    Greely. It is the Puerto Rican National Guard that has the
    security force up there.
        Senator Manchin. Are you constricted at all by using the
    Guard or asking for that Guard to----
        Admiral Gortney. No, sir. We have worked through those
    authorities. It works seamless.
        Senator Manchin. It is all seamless now?
        Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you. That is all my questions.
        Senator Sessions. Senator Sullivan?
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Gentlemen, thank you for all the hard work that you are
    doing for our Nation.
        Admiral Gortney, I just want to follow up and commend you
    on the way you are laying out the threat with regard to North
    Korea. You mentioned low probability with regard to the ability
    to miniaturize a nuclear weapon and hit the continental United
    States. But it is prudent and smart to make to sure that as the
    warfighter, you are ready.
        Let me ask two questions on that. Is it low probability to
    be able to range Alaska or Hawaii, or is it a higher
    probability from the threat assessment? Do you know if there is
    a difference there?
        Admiral Gortney. We do not treat it any differently. They
    are all States. I am accountable to defend them, and we have
    the ability to defend them.
        Senator Sullivan. Great. I am glad that we do not treat the
    noncontiguous States different from the lower 48 States.
        But you mentioned the low probability right now. But in
    your assessment that is unlikely to stay low. Is that not
    correct? It seems like almost every day we are seeing a news
    story about ICBM engines and other things being developed. Is
    it not prudent to assume that that low probability is going to
    morph into moderate or maybe even high within the next 5 to 10
    years?
        Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir. The reason the intel community
    assesses this as low probability of success is they have not
    seen the tests occurring. However, as the Secretary talked
    about, the TD-2 shows that they have the capability. You put
    that capability with a road-mobile capability with the right
    engines with designing a reentry vehicle with a nuclear weapon
    and a miniaturization, it is only a matter of time before they
    put it together. That is why we watch their test efforts so
    closely because although they have not done the end-to-end
    test, which we would do, they may not be compelled to wait for
    that end-to-end test.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me ask actually, since you brought up
    the issue of testing, with regard to the GMD, Admiral Syring,
    General Mann. In your testimony, you actually emphasized the
    importance of testing our system. How often do we test our
    system, and what are the benefits? Do we need to budget more
    resources to testing our system?
        Admiral Syring. Sir, we are on about an annual test
    cadence, and that can be 10 months. That could be 14 or 15
    months depending when the range is available and when it fits
    in. More importantly, when do we need to test to field a
    capability? A GMD test is very expensive, very intrusive. We
    take up the entire Pacific with the targets that we need to
    launch and the interceptor that is launched from Vandenberg. We
    are testing at a rate that----
        Senator Sullivan. Given importance, though, I think most
    Americans would recognize that a little bit of inconvenience in
    that regard is okay.
        Admiral Syring. Yes, sir, and they do. We are never
    hindered by that.
        But there is a lot of engineering and analysis that you do
    before a test, and then you execute the test and then there is
    post-analysis.
        The test sequence and cadence that we have in our test plan
    that will be signed and has been signed in the past by me and
    Dr. Gilmore has this very detailed mapping to what requirements
    do we need to test and when. We will test against an ICBM this
    year. We will actually salvo test against an ICBM next year,
    and then we will start testing the new kill vehicle in a
    controlled flight and then an intercept flight the following
    year. Given the development that is going on specifically with
    RKV, we are absolutely at the right cadence for that testing
    between now and 2020.
        Senator Sullivan. Do you agree with that, General Mann?
        General Mann. Yes, Senator. We work very, very closely with
    MDA. In fact, the master test plan is coordinated with all the
    services to make sure that we are in agreement. We feel that
    the test cadence right now is appropriate. I would like to
    commend MDA for the fact that we are really looking at
    opportunities where we can test out multiple platforms, whether
    it is Aegis or THAAD or Patriot. There is a lot of very, very
    close coordination that goes on between the services, as well
    as with MDA.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Admiral Syring, you know, I have often talked about my
    state being the cornerstone of America's missile defense. I
    know you were recently up in Alaska, and I apologize for not
    having the opportunity to accompany you. But I am wondering if
    you could provide any insights or observations from your time
    at Clear and Fort Greely and some other locations. I would love
    to, in another setting, get a download from you on your trip.
    But any that you care to offer the committee and educate all of
    us on Alaska would be welcome right now.
        Admiral Syring. Yes, sir. We went to all three. We went to
    three areas. We went to Kodiak. We went to Clear and we went to
    Fort Greely. I talked to the community about the radar that is
    coming to Clear, which will be fielded by 2020, took their
    questions. Very supportive of what we are doing.
        But more importantly for me and the military and Admiral
    Gortney is the strategic importance of that radar in the middle
    of the state and what it will provide him in the future for
    this discrimination capability that is absolutely required to
    stay ahead and keep our advantage against the threat that we
    see coming. The strategic location of Alaska is why we are
    there. Very important.
        I think General Mann talked about Fort Greely. I am a
    material developer, support part of that with Admiral Gortney
    and General Mann. Great work going on there.
        Then finally, down at Kodiak we visited the range facility
    down there for future test opportunities that we might see
    coming and is there a way to more affordably test in the future
    there, for example.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Very briefly, Admiral Syring, for Senator Sullivan's
    benefit perhaps, but why is geographically Alaska a special
    place for missile defense?
        Admiral Syring. Sir, I will try to keep it unclassified, if
    I can. I will get kicked under the table. But the trajectories
    that we are concerned about make it an ideal spot for the
    threats to Alaska and to the United States and to Hawaii.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Senator King?
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Syring and perhaps for the Secretary as well, would
    we be adding capabilities that would be significant by
    deploying THAAD in South Korea and/or Aegis? Mr. Secretary, the
    policy implication is how would China react to such?
        Mr. McKeon. Senator King, as I think you probably know, we
    have announced that we have opened consultations with our
    Korean partners about deploying THAAD to the peninsula. We will
    engage in discussions about a possible site before we reach an
    announcement. The purpose of the THAAD battery would be to
    protect our deployed forces in Korea and our partners in Korea.
    It is not about China. It is not a threat to China, and we have
    made that plain to them and offered to explain it to them.
        Senator King. Have we had any reaction from China?
        Mr. McKeon. They are not happy about it, but we have tried
    to reinforce the point that it is not about them. It is about
    our deployed forces.
        Senator King. I wanted to go back. We have talked about
    directed energy. I am really disappointed that that seems to be
    falling off the budget table when to me it is pennywise and
    pound foolish. Directed energy would be a lot cheaper, if it
    works, than sending a rocket up every time. You are nodding.
        Admiral Syring. We have been trying to get the directed
    energy program ramped up in past budget requests, and I just
    ask for the support this year.
        Senator King. Well, you will certainly have it from myself
    and I think others because that is the next technological
    development, and it would be a lot less expensive and perhaps
    even more effective.
        What about sensors? When we have had these meetings before,
    that has been a high priority. Is that on track? Do we have
    sufficient sensor technology, and is it placed in the right
    place? Is that something that needs to be upgraded?
        Admiral Syring. The first step in that discussion was what
    we did in Alaska, Senator, in terms of your support for that
    and that radar and its strategic importance for the threat from
    North Korea and a much more complex threat than they even have
    today that we are planning for.
        There are other gaps in the sensor architecture that we are
    looking at, and the Department has looked at many different
    alternatives for both radar sensor locations and space sensor
    options. It is both radars and space that will be required for
    the future.
        Senator King. I cannot help but notice. The reason I was
    late to this hearing, we had a Seapower Subcommittee going on
    in the next room where I am sure if Senator Wicker were here,
    he would also want to point out that the Aegis is one of the
    key elements of this whole system, which happen to be--we are
    very proud--built in Maine and Mississippi. Do you see more
    deployment of the Aegis Ashore capabilities, or where does that
    stand? We are sort of testing it in several places. Is that
    right, Mr. Secretary?
        Mr. McKeon. Senator, we have just completed the site for
    Aegis Ashore in Deveselu, Romania, and that will be operational
    later this year. We are going to break ground in Poland and
    finish that by the end of 2018. We do not have any other plans
    or requirements for Aegis Ashore at the moment, nor have we had
    any requests for it from foreign partners.
        Senator King. But it is a nice capability.
        Mr. McKeon. It is a nice capability and it is advancing. We
    will put a more advanced missile in the site in Poland that is
    still under co-development with our partners in the Government
    of Japan.
        Senator King. You mentioned the Government of Japan and
    Poland. How are our allies contributing to this process, much
    of which is designed to defend them? Are we getting cooperation
    and money from our allies on these systems?
        Mr. McKeon. Well, in Japan, they are investing quite a bit
    on the co-development of the standard missile 3-2-A, and they
    have got their own Aegis capable ships. We have put a couple of
    radars there, the TPY-2 radars. In Europe, Romania and Poland
    are, obviously, offering and contributing the sites. Turkey is
    hosting a TPY-2 radar. The Spanish Government is hosting our
    Aegis BMD ships in Rota. Then other governments are
    contributing in different ways. The French have their own
    system. Other NATO partners have Patriots and have deployed
    them in Turkey. I cannot say that all 28 NATO partners are
    contributing to NATO missile defense, but many of them are.
        Senator King. Admiral Syring, I could not hear the full
    exchange with Senator Heinrich. Is the Iron Dome completely
    built here or is it partially? What is the deal with Israel on
    Iron Dome and David's Sling?
        Admiral Syring. The co-production agreement had 35 percent
    work share for the United States in fiscal year 2014 and 55
    percent in 2015.
        Senator King. A growing share of the work is to be done
    here.
        Admiral Syring. That is correct, sir.
        Senator King. That system has been effective. Has it not?
        Admiral Syring. Very effective. I will not go to the
    percentage, but very effective.
        Senator King. Yes. I had a son in Israel during the war two
    summers ago, and I appreciate the effectiveness. He was in
    Ashkelon right adjacent to where those rockets were coming
    from. I know from his observation that it was an effective
    system. I congratulate you and thank you for that.
        Admiral Syring. Yes, sir. As will David's Sling and Arrow
    as well, the follow-on systems after Iron Dome. Their testing
    has been extremely successful.
        Senator King. Is it fair to say that we are gaining
    important insights and experience from that relationship on
    those weapon systems?
        Admiral Syring. Yes, sir, absolutely, not just the weapon
    interceptor itself, but we have learned a lot on what they are
    doing with targets as well.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator King.
        On the Israel question, what was the President's request
    this year? What did we do last year? How many million? What was
    the President's request this year and the President's request
    last year?
        Admiral Syring. Sir, I will talk about numbers I think from
    the top of my head. I asked for--if I am not right, I will
    correct it for the record. But last year, it was roughly $150
    million we requested. What was appropriated and enacted was
    $488 million.
        This year, we requested just under $150 million, and there
    are requests on the Hill that total almost $600 million.
        Senator Sessions. Well, that is quite a contribution to the
    effort. I hope we are working together to gain benefit from
    that. I know we are some.
        With regard to the question of--Secretary McKeon, I think
    it was a good question about contributions of Japan. They have
    got a big economy. The European economy is bigger than ours,
    and their population is bigger than ours. In Rota, Spain, they
    host our ships but it is quite an advantage to them
    economically. I would like to have that fort in Alabama. It
    would be good for our economy.
        There is no doubt about it. There is a growing feeling that
    our allies need to contribute more to the mutual defense of
    what used to be called, I guess, the free world. How do you
    think about that?
        Mr. McKeon. Senator, in a broad sense, we certainly agree
    with you. Our NATO partners have made new commitments to
    increase their defense spending at the Wales Summit in 2014 and
    set targets on both percentage of GDP [Gross Domestic Product]
    that they are supposed to try to hit and investments in R&D.
    Many of them are lagging. That is a fact. I am not going to try
    to sugar-coat it. There is only a handful that have reached the
    two percent of GDP target. The important thing is the trend
    lines are going in the right direction in terms of NATO
    spending by countries, although the financial stress is hitting
    many of them because different countries, particularly in
    southern Europe, have been undergoing significant economic
    disruption like Greece and Italy.
        I should have also said in response to Senator King's
    question, there are a lot of countries in the Middle East that
    are investing in missile defense, the Saudis, the Emiratis, the
    Kuwaitis. They are doing their share in contributing to the
    regional missile defense. We are working to try to encourage
    both them acquiring systems but also cooperating together, and
    that will be the topic of a meeting next week in the Middle
    East. The President is convening a second round of what he
    called the Camp David Summit last year. Secretary Carter will
    have a meeting with his counterparts the day before, and
    missile defense will be one of the issues on the docket.
        Senator Sessions. Well, just to summarize that, we have
    heard this song before. When I have asked questions for the
    last decade and others have, they say the Europeans are getting
    better and they are going to do better. But basically the trend
    line has been negative. Germany is at 1.1 percent I think of
    GDP. They have the strongest economy in Europe. It is a very
    problematic thing.
        It goes beyond even money. It goes beyond how do you have a
    right to demand that we defend Europe when Russia is not on our
    border? You want us to pay two-three times as much as you do.
        Anyway, we have discussed that with the NATO leader last
    week, and I thought it was a healthy discussion and exchange.
    But it is not a little matter, and it is not going to go away
    anytime soon.
        Let me ask you maybe, Admiral Syring--any others that would
    like to comment. The President's budget includes money to build
    a long-range discrimination radar in Alaska.
        The Missile Defense Agency analyst also concludes that,
    quote, additional missile defense sensor discrimination
    capabilities are needed to enhance the protection of the United
    States Homeland against the potential long-range ballistic
    missiles from Iran. Close quote.
        Congress in 2016 directed deployment by December 31st, 2020
    of a long-range discrimination radar or other appropriate
    sensor to support the defense of the Homeland against Iran.
    That is in a mandate.
        While MDA is examining locations best suited for future
    deployment of this advanced discrimination radar, there is no
    funding in that whole five-year spending plan budgeted for such
    a development and deployment, nor has Congress received a plan
    from MDA to meet the deployment deadline as directed in section
    1684 of the act.
        The administration opposed an east coast ground-based
    interceptor site, and we had a big discussion about that and
    acquiesced in that determination. I think it was your
    recommendation we did not need another site. But we did, I
    think, agree that we needed an increased discrimination on the
    east. If we need it for Alaska, do we not need it for the east
    coast?
        How would you respond to that?
        Admiral Syring. Sir, I will respond that we are, obviously,
    very well aware of language that came in the NDAA [National
    Defense Authorization Act] last year. We have started the work
    on siting and looking at the options in terms of where SBX
    [Sea-based X Band Radar], for example, can be home-ported. In
    the follow-on analysis, where are the sites on the east coast
    that could help in terms of sensor capability? Sir, that work
    is going on in parallel with the Department's work that has
    gone on the sensor AOA [Analysis of Alternatives] worldwide,
    and I can tell you this point of what are we going to do with
    an Atlantic radar is part of that discussion.
        It is true today that there is no money in the 2017 budget,
    but I think you will see the Department come through this
    question before 2018 comes over on what are we going to do to
    meet the intent of the language to include a discussion, sir--I
    will let Admiral Gortney jump in here--on what is his ability
    to surge SBX if the Iranian threat did escalate.
        Senator Sessions. It is problematic that there is no money
    in the whole five-year plan. Admiral Gortney?
        Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir. We have the ability to move SBX
    if we need it. But the higher priority right----
        Senator Sessions. Now, the move of SBX--this is not the
    Alaska----
        Admiral Gortney. No, sir.
        Senator Sessions. This will be a new system. This will be
    the one that was in Hawaii.
        Admiral Gortney. This is what is on a very large oil
    platform that was built in Texas and we moved on a heavy-lift
    ship to Hawaii. Should we need, if the threat demanded that we
    needed a site before the study is completed and we put a site
    in, we would be able to maneuver--move SBX to the other coast.
    But right now, the priority is to keep it where it is focused
    on North Korea today.
        Senator Sessions. Senator King, you wanted to follow up.
        Senator King. Yes. We have learned in hearings over the
    past year of a growing anti-satellite capability. I guess the
    question I wanted to ask is to what extent do all these systems
    rely upon satellites because in a war or a hostility situation,
    one of the first things that is going to happen is there is
    going to be a diminution of our satellite capability. You
    understand the question is if satellite capability is
    compromised, does that compromise the underlying effectiveness
    of these various systems or are there alternatives? Admiral
    Gortney, do you want to take a crack at that?
        Admiral Gortney. Sir, I am afraid to do it in this forum. I
    need to come to you in a classified forum and talk to that.
        Senator King. That is fine. Thank you.
        Mr. McKeon. Senator King, the one thing I would say about
    that is, as you may recall, in last year's budget we
    significantly increased our investment in protection of our
    satellites and other investments in the space domain. We are
    very focused--the Secretary and the Deputy--in a big way about
    these investments, and we have sustained them in fiscal year
    2017. We are well aware of the issues that you are raising and
    making the right investments for it.
        Senator King. I am aware of what you are talking about. I
    just want to be sure--for want of a nail, the shoe was lost.
    For want of a shoe, the horse was lost. You know where that
    ends. We will discuss that in another setting. Thank you.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator King. I think that is
    critical.
        I believe we have got Senator Donnelly and Sullivan. We
    will not go in a full round, just ask questions as you feel
    appropriate.
        Senator Donnelly. Two real quick questions.
        Admiral Syring, are you comfortable with the level of risk
    MDA is balancing in order to meet deadlines set in law for
    programs like MOKV [Multi-Object Kill Vehicle] or an additional
    sensor to deploy off the east coast?
        Admiral Syring. Sir, an MOKV--we are putting those gates
    together in terms of where do we think the knowledge points are
    over the next year to prove where we need to be for a full
    program. We do not have a full program requested for an MOKV
    yet. Until I work through that and see where the companies are
    at level of maturity over the next 12 to 18 months, that will
    help me get my mind around when are we ready and what is the
    schedule for it.
        Senator Donnelly. Then lastly, Admiral Gortney, when I
    talked to the Chinese, they talked about how little influence
    they have over North Korea, that it seems to be getting less in
    their mind. I am wondering how much of that is fluff and how
    much of that is real. I was wondering if you could fill us in a
    little bit.
        Admiral Gortney. I think it is safe to say that the
    influence that China used to have they no longer have with the
    current leader. At this level, I would like to leave it at
    that.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
        Senator Sessions. Senator Sullivan?
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Just two quick
    follow-up questions.
        One is kind of a broader on really education for the
    committee and those watching. We talk a lot in acronyms and
    technology.
        Admiral Syring or Admiral Gortney, can you describe,
    particularly given the North Korean evolving threat and even
    the [ICBM] intercontinental ballistic missile pursued by the
    Iranians, why the LRDR [Long Range Discrimination Radar] makes
    sense and why that is so important strategically for the
    country, what that is doing in really kind of a follow-up to
    the chairman's question on that issue? That is one.
        Then I will ask a final one after that.
        Admiral Gortney. It is absolutely critical, and it is why
    Admiral Syring's investments in sensors is so important. One of
    the ways we are going to achieve getting on the correct side of
    the cost curve is to drive our effectiveness up. With better
    sensor discrimination, I may have the ability to shoot fewer
    missiles, or as the threat evolves, I will have a better idea
    to discriminate what the threat is doing, what a maneuvering
    warhead is doing to then drive the probability of kill of our
    existing warheads. You cannot kill what you cannot see, and we
    need to see better.
        Senator Sullivan. It drives up our ability to kill any
    incoming missile?
        Admiral Syring. Both simple and complex.
        Senator Sullivan. Looking at the budget request, from what
    I can see, there seems to be about a $74 million shortfall in
    the BMD midcourse defense account where last year, the
    President's budget was expected and where PB-17 is today. Am I
    reading that correctly? If so, what accounts for that
    shortfall?
        Admiral Syring. The request was down slightly from last
    year from what we were expecting in 2017. Part of that was
    driven by part of the share of the $300 million cut that flowed
    down. It took part of that in that line.
        Also, I would say, sir, there were refined estimates from
    the companies on what it would take to do what they are going
    to do. Obviously, we do not do 100 percent of everything that
    is offered. This is a matter of what do we need to do to do the
    mission-critical work that is important for the program.
        Senator Sullivan. That budget shortfall is not something
    that you or we as the oversight committee should be concerned
    about?
        Admiral Syring. No, sir. We and you have adequately funded
    the GMD program with a big nonrecurring spike last year, and
    all of those efforts are ongoing this year. I am comfortable
    with where we are.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. Mr. Secretary, so the first chart again
    shows a 14 percent overall decline in funding for MDA.
        If you will put back the second chart there. This chart
    reflects an additional troubling trend in that in 2008, 98-99
    percent of the budget went to R&D, whereas in 2016, that number
    had dropped--2015 it went up a little in 2016 and begins to
    drop again in the five-year submission we got this year. It
    dropped down to 19 to a little over $5 billion there, which is
    a little more than half. You drop about 40-45 percent of your
    R&D spending.
        Tell us what is happening. First of all, MDA originally,
    Admiral Syring, was not designed to be a procurement agency. It
    was designed to produce the technology that would be paid for
    by the services who would use it. Is that correct?
        Admiral Syring. That is correct.
        Senator Sessions. Now you are purchasing some of it.
        What I had not ascertained fully was a lot of that is
    coming out of your R&D budget. That is a pretty troubling
    thing. What does that put us on track for for the next several
    years, the next five years?
        Admiral Syring. Mr. Chairman, I was just thinking the
    answer. Let me just provide, I think, some context because I
    have studied the exact problem in terms of we are absolutely
    spending more on procurement than R&D, and there is certainly
    much less than there used to be.
        What I have done, for historical context, is gone back and
    looked at the 2005-2010 time frame when everything in MDA was
    R&D, including the fielding of the entire ground-based
    midcourse defense system. What we have done with that and Aegis
    in particular is done the R&D and now shifted those to
    procurement. That is why you see----
        Senator Sessions. Now you would say that you probably
    incorrectly included the deployment on the system in Alaska as
    R&D when it really was procurement?
        Admiral Syring. Sir, I was not here. We had a mandate and
    had the charter to deliver capability as soon as possible from
    the President to get this in the ground at light speed.
        Senator Sessions. I remember that. The deal was, Senator
    Sullivan, that North Korea proposed a threat, and we decided to
    accelerate the process to actually get these things in the
    ground. We believed they would work and we would prove it as
    time went by. I think it would have worked had we had to use it
    at that time. I think it is probably more effective today than
    then.
        But anyway, so how do you explain this now?
        Admiral Syring. There was also a big airborne laser program
    in that R&D as well that never fielded. It did its mission. It
    proved that we could shoot down a ballistic missile with a
    laser. But that did not become a program. That was R&D.
        There are some big drivers here in terms of where that R&D
    went prior to when you start seeing the blue. What you see here
    is you see us finishing the design, finishing the testing of
    the SM-3 and now procuring it quickly because there is a
    regional combatant commander requirement that they need ships,
    they need missiles, they need batteries, they need missiles for
    THAAD. That is what has happened. Certainly the programs that I
    spoke about are going to be negotiated with the services on
    when do I transfer--which is the question. When do I transfer
    these programs to the services similar to what I did with
    Patriot? That is the question.
        General Mann. Senator, I would like to add, speaking for
    the Army, we are in consultation with MDA on the transfer of
    some of these different programs just to make sure that MDA is
    able to get after exactly the emphasis that you alluded to. We
    are working closely with MDA on how we can transfer some of
    this, when appropriate, to the Army.
        Senator Sessions. Briefly before I go to Senator Sullivan,
    what programs are on track to be transferred from MDA to the
    Army or other services?
        General Mann. Right off the top, THAAD is one of the
    programs that we are looking at and also----
        Senator Sessions. THAAD is included in the MDA budget now?
        Admiral Syring. That is correct.
        General Mann. Yes, sir. As well as the TPY-2, those sensors
    that we have globally we are looking at. Right now, some of
    those are manned by contractors, and as we put in place life
    support capabilities, we will transfer that to soldier-run.
    That will also be assumed by the Army.
        Senator Sessions. Senator Sullivan?
        Senator Sullivan. Let me just ask one more follow-up
    question related to the chairman's question. In that chart,
    very simple, which is should our missile defense budgets be
    flat or really going down when there is no doubt that the
    threat is going up. I will pose that to all four of you. It
    seems to me we have no doubt the threat is increasing. I
    appreciate what the administration was focused on with kind of
    a rapid deployment. But right there, you are looking at either
    a declining budget or at best a flat budget, which does not
    seem to make sense.
        You know, Admiral Gortney, your testimony, which I really
    appreciate--you were talking about staying in front of the
    curve. But I am not sure that is staying in front of the curve
    when we know the threat side is going like this.
        Senator Sessions. Could I just follow up with that? The
    fiscal year 2017 MDA budget request is $300 million below what
    the President anticipated last year in the 2016 5-year budget.
    This is about $300 million, Secretary McKeon, less I believe
    than what we anticipated last year would be the President's
    request.
        Admiral Gortney, I will let you answer that question.
        Admiral Gortney. I am out of my lane a little here since I
    am lucky enough to only own the trigger.
        But I think what you are seeing up there is reluctance of
    investing dollars against the capability using the current
    technology that we are using, that even though we are investing
    in it and we are investing dollars, capability, platforms,
    burning up OPTEMPO, PERSTEMPO of the low-density, high-demand,
    it is not able to outpace the threat.
        Senator Sullivan. But if that were the case, would we not
    still want an increased budget and maybe have you weighted
    towards R&D? Right there, that is just all----
        Admiral Gortney. I am in vehement agreement with you, sir.
    But I am just trying to explain why I think we are seeing what
    we are seeing because on our current process, our current
    strategy, the current technology lacking the R&D investments
    that MDA is making to see if we can get on the correct side of
    the cost curve, reliability, better sensors, multi-object kill
    vehicle, an airborne laser that really works would make those
    dollars more effective. I am just saying I think reluctance to
    fund a program correctly, given the technology that we are
    using. I am not sure if I am articulating it clearly.
        General Mann. Senator, if I could just add to this. In
    addition to new technologies in R&D investments and whatnot, I
    think it is important that we note that we are also looking at
    current capabilities and what can we do to maximize the current
    fleet that we have on the team, whether it is Patriot, the
    Patriot modernization plan. It is more than just leap-ahead
    technologies. Yes, we are focused on that, but we are also
    trying to make sure that we are looking at the current
    capabilities and how can we make that even more effective. We
    talked about the sensors, the sensor upgrades, the
    discrimination side of the equation. I think it is important
    that we recognize the fact that it is more than just new R&D
    programs. It is also how can we be more effective with what we
    have already.
        Senator Sullivan. Mr. Secretary, Admiral, any final
    thoughts on a declining or flat budget and a clear, increasing
    threat?
        Mr. McKeon. I would say a few things, Senator Sullivan.
        First, stepping back and looking at the overall DOD budget
    over the last six to eight years, there has been a decline due
    to the change in the fiscal environment and the limits of the
    Budget Control Act [BCA]. I do not know the number off the top
    of my head, but I think the last budget Secretary Gates
    submitted around 2011 or 2012 projected an over $600 billion
    budget for the Pentagon in fiscal year 2016. Our base budget
    last year was $520 billion.
        Senator Sullivan. I think there is no doubt that the
    Congress and the BCA were part of the issue. But I do not think
    that is what is driving that chart right there.
        Mr. McKeon. Well, sir, in terms of the overall top line, I
    think across the Department, every program has suffered a
    little bit because of the BCA limits and we are still staring
    at them out in the out-years of our current FYDP. You all have
    given us a couple years of relief under last year's agreement,
    but in 2018 to 2021, we have got $100 billion in our program
    that is $100 billion above the BCA limits. We are very worried
    about that in a broad sense.
        Senator Sullivan. Some of us are as well too.
        Mr. McKeon. Yes. No, I appreciate that.
        Secondly, I would say we are not only thinking about
    terminal defense of our ground-based midcourse systems or
    Terminal High Altitude Area Defense [THAAD], as we have talked
    about, we are looking at new technologies and other
    capabilities militarily in addition to missile defense to deal
    with the threat of missiles from either North Korea or Iran.
    Some of that we would have to talk to you in a different venue
    about.
        Then the last thing on the procurement I would talk about a
    little is MDA has different procurement authorities to buy
    things faster than the services. Now, you could obviously give
    the services acquisition authority for missile defense that
    would speed things up if we were to shift procurement to the
    services, but I think part of the reason you see a lot of that
    procurement that MDA has done is because they have got this
    faster acquisition authority that was a demand signal from both
    the President and the Congress.
        Admiral Syring. Senator, I would just reiterate that this
    is today, and we are into some very important concept studies
    right now with directed energy in particular and the importance
    of that demonstrator to get going to inform a much wider, more
    expansive R&D program. That is one example. MOKV, the multiple-
    object kill vehicle, is very important for us to get through
    the next 12 months on feasibility from the contractors, and
    then the R&D requests will go up. There are things here on the
    technology side that you will see come. The last one would be a
    space-based system of some sort to help us with tracking and
    discrimination worldwide.
        There are R&D programs that are not shown here yet that we
    will, through the Department, work and come forward with as
    they compete with everything else in the Department. But this
    is not the end. I do see the R&D requests for the future of MDA
    ramping up once I am to the point of proposing mature concepts
    that I know will deliver on time and within the budget that we
    have.
        Sir, I think it is a shift for us in terms of--Mr.
    Chairman, you made the point of deliver a capability very fast
    with what we were given back in the 2000-2005 time frame, and
    we did that. They put interceptors into the ground.
        Today I do not--and I endorse entirely the threat on where
    it is going. At the same time, we as the program executors must
    be very careful about just throwing money at the problem and
    must be very deliberate on maturity of the technology and the
    progression of the system engineering and the architecture and
    the component testing and analysis that supports a program
    before I bring it forward and ask for billions of dollars. That
    is where we are at. It is not decades away, sir. It is in this
    FYDP that we will be to the point to make the case to the
    Department and make the case over here on the next technology
    in many of the areas that we talked about.
        Senator Sessions. All right. Well, thank you.
        One more question on the airborne laser system. Will you
    have sufficient money this year to do what you would like to do
    with regard to advancing that program?
        Admiral Syring. Sir, the request that we have on the low-
    power laser demonstrator, if supported, will get us started
    down that path to do a competition for that platform in 2017.
    Then some partner will win. Two partners will win. We will
    down-select one eventually, and we will get to a flight in 2020
    with a final demonstration in 2021.
        Senator Sessions. All right.
        Thank you very much. It has been an excellent afternoon,
    and we value your insight and professionalism.
        We are adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:07 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
                            directed energy weapons
        1. Senator Inhofe. How can directed energy weapon systems be used
    to improve our missile defense capabilities?
        Mr. McKeon. The Missile Defense Agency is working to deploy lasers
    on high altitude, long endurance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) to
    acquire, track, and eventually destroy threat ballistic missiles in
    boost phase of flight. When successfully demonstrated and fielded, in
    many operational scenarios, a UAV-borne laser would be able to engage
    an enemy missile at a much lower cost than existing Ballistic Missile
    Defense System interceptors.
        Admiral Gortney. Directed energy weapon systems could help enhance
    our layered approach to missile defense and increase our overall level
    of effectiveness. Equally important, these systems could help get us on
    the right side of the cost curve.
        VADM Syring. MDA's overall vision is to shift the calculus of our
    potential adversaries by introducing directed energy into the BMDS
    architecture. This could revolutionize missile defense by dramatically
    reducing the role of interceptors. Our vision is to add high altitude
    airborne and/or space-based sensors into the BMDS architecture that can
    acquire, track, and discriminate ballistic missile targets.
        In our effort to mature laser technology for missile defense, we
    awarded five contracts with key aerospace partners to produce concepts
    for an airborne low power laser demonstrator. We will use these
    concepts to guide our requirements for the follow-on competitive design
    contracts in fiscal year 2017. The airborne low power laser
    demonstrator supports demonstrating the concept of a UAV-borne solid
    state laser in realistic flight environments in the 2021 timeframe
    capable of acquiring, tracking, and eventually destroying an enemy
    missile at a lower cost than the existing BMDS.
        Additionally, the Agency is exploring two promising high-energy
    laser candidates for a potential future operational capability--the
    Diode Pumped Alkali Laser system and the Fiber Combining Laser system--
    using a system of engineering knowledge points to measure progress. In
    the 2025 timeframe, our goal is to integrate a compact, efficient, high
    power laser into a high altitude, long endurance aircraft to engage
    targets in the boost phase.
        LTG Mann. Within a regional theater of operations, a mobile,
    ground-based high energy laser weapon system capable of acquiring,
    tracking, and destroying low-cost, highly-proliferated rockets,
    artillery, and mortars and unmanned aerial systems is a recognized
    necessary capability. The Army is developing a High Energy Laser
    Tactical Vehicle Demonstrator that employs precision application of
    energy to deliver a low-cost-per-kill capability against these common
    threats. A tactical platform vehicle is being considered for inclusion
    into the Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC) program.
        Regarding intercontinental ballistic missile threats, a directed
    energy weapon system could provide intercept capabilities during boost
    phase, while complementing kinetic energy capabilities and potentially
    reduce the cost of intercepting ballistic missiles. A directed energy
    weapon system for ballistic missile defense applications will require
    significantly greater power levels and high altitude platforms. The
    Missile Defense Agency is pursuing directed energy development
    activities against long range missile threats.

        2. Senator Inhofe. Are current funding levels sufficient to develop
    and rapidly field these weapons systems in support of our missile
    defense requirements?
        Mr. McKeon. Yes. In the fiscal year (FY) 2017 Budget, the Missile
    Defense Agency (MDA) requested $71.8 million in Weapons Technology to
    continue development and testing of the high-powered directed-energy
    program to build the foundation for the next-generation unmanned aerial
    vehicle (UAV)-borne laser system. In its effort to mature laser
    technology for missile defense, MDA continues to partner with industry
    to produce concepts for an airborne low-power laser demonstrator. MDA
    will use these concepts to guide requirements for the follow-on
    competitive design contracts in fiscal year 2017 under the Technology
    Maturation Initiatives program element.
        Admiral Gortney. It is my understanding that development of
    directed energy capability remains a priority for the Missile Defense
    Agency (MDA). MDA is leading this effort and I recommend contacting
    VADM Syring for a detailed explanation of directed energy capability
    development and funding plans.
        VADM Syring. MDA's PB17 request provides adequate funding for
    directed energy weapon research and technology maturation. MDA is
    working to lay the technological foundation for the next generation
    laser system integrated into a high-altitude platform capable of
    defeating advanced threats and raids at a much lower cost per kill than
    existing missile interceptors. MDA's research and development of
    directed energy is structured to incrementally demonstrate required
    components through disciplined technology maturation. It is critical to
    achieve size, weight and power knowledge points in our laser research
    and development to inform future investment and planning. Just as
    importantly, we must work with industry to integrate and test laser
    systems beam control technology on a high altitude, long endurance
    airborne platform
        LTG Mann. Current funding is sufficient to develop and demonstrate
    laser weapon technology capabilities to complement kinetic energy
    capabilities in countering rockets, artillery, and mortars and unmanned
    aerial systems. The highest visibility effort is the High Energy Laser
    Tactical Vehicle Demonstrator (HEL TVD). The Army is developing the HEL
    TVD, a 100 kilowatt-class laser system on a family of Medium Tactical
    Vehicles to demonstrate the means to defeat these common threats in a
    cost effective manner. The current funding level in fiscal years 2017-
    2022 is sufficient to achieve the scheduled fiscal year 2022 HEL TVD
    demonstration and keeps the Army on path for a scheduled milestone
    decision in fiscal year 2024.
        I defer funding level sufficiency to the Missile Defense Agency
    regarding their technology development effort for a UAV-borne laser
    system.

        3. Senator Inhofe. Have we set estimated costs and a timeline to
    fully develop or field this type of weapon system?
        Mr. McKeon. As directed by the fiscal year (FY) 2016 National
    Defense Authorization Act, section 1680(b), the Missile Defense Agency
    (MDA) is preparing a report on the funding constraints, schedule
    aggressiveness, and technical risks of developing a directed energy
    boost phase intercept capability. They expect to complete their report
    in the near future.
        MDA has requested $71.8 million in the fiscal year 2017 budget in
    Weapons Technology to continue development and testing of its high-
    powered directed-energy program to build the foundation for the next-
    generation unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)-borne laser system. I defer
    any further specific questions on this to MDA.
        Admiral Gortney. I believe the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is
    adequately resourced for developing directed energy capabilities. For a
    detailed explanation of directed energy capability development, to
    include funding and timelines, I recommend contacting the Missile
    Defense Agency.
        VADM Syring. The Missile Defense Agency's PB17 request for directed
    energy includes $278 million over the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP)
    to support a low power laser demonstrator for boost phase missile
    defense. This will result in a fully integrated laser demonstrator
    capable of engaging a ballistic missile in flight with directed energy.
    The request also includes $291 million over the FYDP to develop high-
    powered laser technology that will be needed to achieve size, weight
    and power levels for a future operationally effective capability. These
    investments are essential to maturing the needed technology that is
    required to achieve an operational capability.
        LTG Mann. The Army has developed and is executing a program
    schedule, with specified milestones, to demonstrate a 100 kilowatt
    tactical laser capability in fiscal year 2022. However, the Army has
    not yet developed a detailed cost estimate to field a final
    configuration capability that will best align with the Army's Indirect
    Fire Protection Capability Increment 2 Block 1 program.

        4. Senator Inhofe. I understand these weapons still face
    technological challenges to include power, beam control, lethality, and
    platform development. Is the main limiting factor to fielding these
    weapons funding, technology or something else?
        Mr. McKeon. The main limiting factors to fielding these directed-
    energy weapons are related to miniaturization of subsystems,
    specifically power and cooling requirements, while ensuring beam
    coherence and efficiency. I would defer any further questions on the
    specifics of this advanced technology development to the Missile
    Defense Agency.
        Admiral Gortney. My understanding is there are technological
    challenges with the directed energy program, primarily in terms of
    miniaturization of components and power.
        VADM Syring. We assess all of these factors as important. Our
    strategy to address technology challenges is to divide the system into
    components and compete different approaches from industry and national
    laboratories. We will then combine the components into subsystems for
    testing on the ground first and then in the air. Our PB17 budget
    submittal reflects our best assessment as to the proper funding levels
    necessary to move this technology forward. We respectfully request you
    support for PB17.
        LTG Mann. The major limiting factor to fielding directed energy
    weapons is the present maturity of the technology and the ability to
    operationalize this capability in support of the warfighter.
                     ballistic missile threats and defense
        5. Senator Inhofe. Are the threats outpacing our missile defense
    capability given current and projected budgets?
        Mr. McKeon. The President's fiscal year 2017 budget request
    continues funding missile defense capabilities to ensure we remain well
    ahead of adversary ballistic missile threats, and lays the foundation
    for investment in innovative programs to lower the cost-per-intercept
    and defeat emerging ballistic missile threats.
        With regard to Homeland defense, we continue to strengthen our
    Homeland defense posture and invest in technologies to enable us to
    address emerging threats more effectively in the next decade. This
    requires continued improvement to the Ground-based Midcourse Defense
    (GMD) system, including enhanced performance of the Ground-Based
    Interceptor (GBI) and the deployment of new sensors. We remain on track
    to deploy 14 additional interceptors in Alaska by the end of 2017.
    These interceptors, along with the 30 that are currently deployed, will
    provide protection against both North Korean and potential Iranian
    intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threats as they emerge and
    evolve. This year's budget request also reflects the Department of
    Defense's (DOD's) commitment to modernizing the GMD system. It will
    move us towards a more reliable and effective defense of the United
    States. It includes funding for development of a new Long-Range
    Discrimination Radar (LRDR) being installed in Alaska. The LRDR will
    provide persistent sensor coverage and improve discrimination
    capabilities against North Korea. It also continues funding for the
    redesign of the kill vehicle for the GBI.
        Regarding regional missile defense, DOD's fiscal year (FY) 2017
    budget request continues deploying missile defense systems that are
    tailored to the security circumstances in the Asia-Pacific region,
    Europe, and the Middle East. Our focus is on developing and fielding
    missile defense capabilities that are mobile and relocatable, which
    allow us to address regional crises as they emerge. Patriot, Terminal
    High-Altitude Air Defense (THAAD), and our Aegis ballistic missile
    defense (BMD) ships allow us to have flexible, layered missile defense
    capabilities tailored to specific regional threats. We are also
    encouraging our allies and partners to acquire and develop
    interoperable missile defense capabilities. We recognize the need to
    protect our most valuable assets while also drawing on our other
    capabilities to provide a comprehensive military approach to defeating
    the threat from ballistic missiles.
        Admiral Gortney. No, but the ballistic missile threats from North
    Korea and Iran continue to mature. Both countries have demonstrated
    progress in their ballistic missile capabilities in recent years, but
    each country would need to achieve several additional milestones before
    being capable of fielding a reliable ICBM that could target the United
    States. I believe that continued funding of programs such as the Re-
    designed Kill Vehicle, Long Range Discrimination Radar, two-/three-
    stage selectable Ground-based Interceptor, and the Space-based Kill
    Assessment experiment is necessary to maintain our strategic advantage.
        VADM Syring. The Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) President's Budget
    2017 budget request addresses keeping pace with the current and
    projected long-range ballistic missile threat from North Korea and
    Iran. Overall, we continue to work hard to find more cost-effective
    ways to do the missile defense mission. In regional contexts, there are
    challenging scenarios where adversaries will be able to launch large
    numbers of relatively cheap and increasingly complex missiles and our
    only option is to intercept them with very expensive weapon systems.
    MDA is making critical investments in future system development that we
    believe will significantly improve system performance and
    effectiveness. By improving reliability, enhancing discrimination, and
    expanding battle space to make possible a reengagement firing strategy,
    I believe we can reduce the cost per kill. We are also investigating
    solutions that help reduce reliance on expensive kinetic intercept
    solutions.
        LTG Mann. While the ballistic missile threats continue to evolve
    and grow more complex, I believe we are postured to defeat the near-
    term threat. However, the regional threat is becoming more challenging
    and ubiquitous. Continued and predictable funding to improve
    interceptor capacity, reliability, and performance; persistent sensor
    tracking and discrimination; and expansion of Warfighter battlespace
    are necessary to maintain pace with the threat. Additionally, we need
    to continually invest in all pillars of missile defense (passive
    defense, offensive operations, and command & control) to holistically
    address the evolving ballistic missile threats.

        6. Senator Inhofe. Is Iran and North Korea sharing ballistic
    missile technology?
        Mr. McKeon. As Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Clapper
    noted in his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) on
    February 9, 2016, ``North Korea's export of ballistic missiles and
    associated materials to several countries, including Iran . . .
    illustrate its willingness to proliferate dangerous technologies.'' I
    would defer any further questions on the specifics of adversary
    technology sharing to the Intelligence Community.
        Admiral Gortney. There is ample evidence that North Korea and Iran
    have shared ballistic missile technologies in the past. While we
    believe this relationship continues, the extent of Active cooperation
    between the two countries' missile programs is unclear.
        VADM Syring. As Director of National Intelligence James Clapper
    noted in his testimony to the United States Senate Committee on Armed
    Services on February 9, 2016, ``North Korea's export of ballistic
    missiles and associated materials to several countries, including Iran
    . . . illustrate its willingness to proliferate dangerous
    technologies.'' I would defer any further questions on the specifics of
    adversary technology sharing to the Defense Intelligence Agency.
        LTG Mann. Yes, it is the Intelligence Community's assessment that
    Iran and North Korea have collaborated on missile defense technology.
    Dating back to the 1980s, Iran and North Korea developed a close
    working relationship on many ballistic missile programs. During the
    1990s, various Intelligence Community assessments continued to note
    several recurring trends between the two nations. Technical exchanges,
    as well as the transfer of missile-related components, has
    significantly supported Iran's ability to become more self-sufficient
    while improving the quality of their systems. More recent Intelligence
    Community assessments indicate ballistic missile technology development
    cooperation between the two countries has continued during recent
    years.

        7. Senator Inhofe. What North Korea and Iran current and projected
    capability to strike the United States with a conventional ICBM? A
    nuclear ICBM?
        Mr. McKeon. I would defer questions on the specifics of the
    Department's assessment of North Korean and Iranian capabilities to the
    Intelligence Community. I know that Director Clapper provided updates
    on both North Korea and Iran's ballistic missile capabilities in his
    statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 9, 2016.
        Admiral Gortney. North Korea has test-detonated four nuclear
    devices and, through its space program, has demonstrated many of the
    technologies required for an ICBM that could target the continental
    United States. Meanwhile, North Korean military parades have showcased
    road-mobile ICBMs which, if deployed, could complicate our ability to
    provide warning of an attack. However, North Korea's road-mobile ICBMs
    have not been flight-tested and are assessed to have low reliability.
        Iran has likewise committed considerable resources to enhancing its
    ballistic missile capabilities and has begun testing a new booster that
    could serve as a demonstrator for ICBM technologies. However, we have
    no reporting to suggest Iran's leaders plan to field that system as a
    weapon, and we assess Iran is unlikely to deploy an operational ICBM--
    regardless of payload--until at least 2020.
        VADM Syring. As Director of National Intelligence James Clapper
    noted in his statement to the United States Senate Committee on Armed
    Services on February 9, 2016:
        ``North Korea has also expanded the size and sophistication of its
    ballistic missile forces--from close-range ballistic missiles to
    intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)--and continues to conduct
    test launches. In May 2015, North Korea claimed that it successfully
    tested a ballistic missile from a submarine. Pyongyang is also
    committed to developing a long-range, nuclear-armed missile that is
    capable of posing a direct threat to the United States; it has publicly
    displayed its KN08 road-mobile ICBM on multiple occasions. We assess
    that North Korea has already taken initial steps toward fielding this
    system, although the system has not been flight-tested.
        We judge that Tehran would choose ballistic missiles as its
    preferred method of delivering nuclear weapons, if it builds them.
    Iran's ballistic missiles are inherently capable of delivering WMD, and
    Tehran already has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the
    Middle East. Iran's progress on space launch vehicles--along with its
    desire to deter the United States and its allies--provides Tehran with
    the means and motivation to develop longer-range missiles, including
    ICBMs.''
        I would defer any further questions on the specifics of the
    Department's assessment of North Korean and Iranian capabilities to the
    Defense Intelligence Agency.
        LTG Mann. The Intelligence Community assesses that neither North
    Korea nor Iran presently possess current capability to reach any
    portion of the United States with an intercontinental ballistic missile
    (IBCM). However, as many in the Intelligence and Missile Defense
    Communities do, I believe that, left unabated, both countries will soon
    possess the capability to successfully strike the Homeland with a
    conventional ICBM.
        Regarding a nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile, recent
    claims of successful nuclear tests, the stockpiling of weapons grade
    fissile materials, and continued ballistic missile development indicate
    a future North Korean nuclear capability. The Intelligence Community is
    presently not aware of Iran's intent to develop nuclear weapons.

        8. Senator Inhofe. What are we doing to protect our missile defense
    capabilities against a cyber-attack?
        Mr. McKeon. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is very aware of the
    growing cyber threat to our missile defense capabilities. MDA is
    working very closely with the Services, Combatant Commands, especially
    U.S. Strategic Command's U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), and other
    agencies in DOD and the Federal Government to counter this growing
    threat.
        I would defer any other questions on specific efforts MDA is taking
    with regard to cybersecurity to MDA.
        Admiral Gortney. My assigned cyber protections teams work close
    with the Missile Defense Agency to ensure the vulnerabilities to the
    Ballistic Missile Defense System are identified and mitigated. For
    specific details on cyber protection, I recommend contacting the
    Missile Defense Agency.
        VADM Syring. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) remains cognizant of
    the growing cyber threat and aggressively works to ensure the Nation's
    missile defenses are able to operate in a highly contested cyber
    environment. Key goals are to protect MDA program and technical
    information for both government and supporting Defense Industrial Base
    (DIB) networks and systems from our potential adversaries.
        MDA has implemented a comprehensive layered cyber defense strategy,
    which includes key partnering efforts with USSTRATCOM, USCYBERCOM,
    Multiple National, Service and COCOM Cyber Protect Teams (CPT), Defense
    Security Service (DSS), JFHQ DODIN, AT&L, FBI and our missile defense
    industry partners in the Defense Industrial Base. In addition, MDA Co-
    chairs the Global Missile Defense Cybersecurity Integration Steering
    Group (GCSG) which is chartered by CDR USSTRATCOM and Director MDA.
    This group unites RDT&E and operational BMD stakeholders as mandated by
    CJCSI 3295.01, Policy Guidance for BMD Operations. The GCSG takes
    actions and tracks status in four areas: cyber threat, cyber
    assessments, network operations/defense, and certification and
    accreditation.
        MDA has also placed special emphasis on incorporating evolving
    Federal and DOD cybersecurity requirements early in the acquisition
    life-cycle, to include improvements in supply chain risk management and
    bolstering program protection into the BMD specifications. These
    efforts increase our cybersecurity robustness of fielded BMD
    capabilities in fielded systems and supporting networks.
        Finally, we have implemented Active monitoring and are building
    resilient cyber defenses that are capable of detecting and mitigating
    threats without impeding operations in order to ``fight through'' the
    cyber threat. MDA collaborates with the Director of Operational Test
    and Evaluation (DOT&E) to conduct cyber penetration testing on key
    missile defense capabilities. We then use the results of those tests to
    conduct risk assessments to prioritize cybersecurity improvements,
    develop mitigation strategies, and improve cyber training. We are also
    working to develop better cyber Concept of Operations (CONOPS) to
    ensure every network defender in every location knows how to react to
    cyber challenges.
        LTG Mann. Within the Army, as well as the Department's missile
    defense community, we continuously assess technology gaps and potential
    vulnerabilities in our missile defense capabilities. These assessments
    include testing and exercising cyber-attack related scenarios to our
    intrusion detection and protection systems within the integrated fire
    control networks, sensors, shooters, and command and control systems.
    We continuously perform security activities to reduce cyber threats
    introduced through the supply chain, such as malicious tampering of
    commercial hardware or software. We also routinely perform audits of
    our defense industrial base to ensure that they are properly
    safeguarding our critical intellectual property. In conjunction with
    multiple organizations and commands within the Department, we are
    continuing to enhance our cyber-attack defense posture.
        Within the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), we continue to
    collaborate with others to enhance the cyber defense posture of our
    missile defense capabilities. The Joint Functional Component Command
    for Integrated Missile Defense, in coordination with U.S. Strategic
    Command and the Missile Defense Agency conduct the Computer Network
    Defense mission for the BMDS ensuring cyber defenses and operations are
    planned and executed in a coordinated effort.
                            homeland missile defense
        9. Senator Inhofe. What is the status of MDA's efforts on the
    Multiple Object Kill Vehicle? I understand it is currently underfunded
    by approximately $55 million. How does that effect the program?
        VADM Syring. We are on track to establish the technological
    foundation to engage and destroy multiple, credible lethal objects from
    a single Ground Based Interceptor through our (MOKV) program. We are
    currently investing in developing concepts and reducing technological
    risk. In fiscal year 2015 (FY15), we awarded contracts to three major
    kill vehicle primes--Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon--to define
    concepts and identify key areas of technical risk. In the next several
    years, we will invest in reducing the risk so that each of these
    concepts can enter prototype development at a high technology readiness
    level and then progress to flight testing.
        MDA's fiscal year 2017 requested funding is sufficient to support
    this effort at this time.

        10. Senator Inhofe. Do we have enough Ground Based Interceptors
    given the growing threat? If no, will development of the Multiple
    Object Kill Vehicle mitigate any shortage or do we need more GBIs?
        VADM Syring. Yes we currently have enough Ground Based
    Interceptors. In 2013, the Secretary of Defense directed MDA to
    increase the number of emplaced GBIs from 30 to 44 by the end of 2017,
    upgrade Missile Field #1 at Fort Greely, Alaska, and deploy the second
    AN/TPY-2 to Japan, which is already operational.
        In addition, we are currently making critical development
    investments to significantly improve Ballistic Missile Defense System
    (BMDS) performance to counter the growing threat. The Redesigned Kill
    Vehicle and Configuration 3 booster will improve GBI reliability and
    survivability, which will provide greater flexibility for combatant
    commanders when determining BMDS engagement tactics. A highly reliable
    interceptor provides greater confidence for the warfighter when
    determining the number of interceptors required for an engagement
    scenario.
        The MDA is also working to further influence shot doctrine and
    improve the missile defense cost curve by increasing the number of kill
    vehicles delivered by a single boost vehicle, which is the goal of the
    MOKV effort. The more kill vehicles we can deploy per booster, the
    greater capability our Ground-based Midcourse Defense system will have
    in the future to defeat complex threats.
        MDA's current investments in increasing the number of GBIs from 30
    to 44 by 2017, our efforts on the RKV and our plans for MOKV, along
    with other BMDS-wide improvements are planned and funded appropriately
    to pace current threat projections.

        11. Senator Inhofe. What is the status of the new Long Range
    Discrimination Radar in Alaska--funding, planning and timeline? How
    does this radar improve our missile defense capabilities?
        VADM Syring. As a component of the 2020 Ballistic Missile Defense
    System (BMDS), the Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) is designed
    to address both discrimination and operational readiness challenges.
    The LRDR will provide persistent long-range midcourse discrimination,
    precision tracking and hit assessment against complex long-range
    missile threats for Homeland Defense. The increased discrimination
    capability of the LRDR improves Ground Based Interceptor shot doctrine
    and preserves inventory for the BMDS. Additionally, the LRDR can
    support the Space Situational Awareness mission as directed.
        The LRDR funding profile is as follows:
    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        The LRDR contract was awarded in October 2015 to Lockheed Martin.
    Sensors Directorate completed a Systems Requirements Review with the
    prime contractor in February 2016 and system development is underway.
    Initial fielding at Clear Air Force Station in Alaska will occur in
    first quarter fiscal year 2021 (FY21) and transition/transfer to the
    Air Force will occur in fiscal year 2022. Attached is a detailed
    schedule outlining prime contractor radar development activities,
    MILCON Facilities construction, and integration and testing.
        Attachment:

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        12. Senator Inhofe. The fiscal year 2016 NDAA directed deployment
    of a long-range discrimination radar or other appropriate sensor
    capability to support the defense of the Homeland against Iran by 31
    Dec 2020. Without this sensor, the GBIs deployed in Alaska will have a
    difficult time defending against an Iranian ICBM. Are we on track to
    have this sensor in place by 31 Dec 2020? Can you provide this
    committee a detailed planning, funding and operational capability
    timeline?
        VADM Syring. Atlantic Radar options are still under evaluation. In
    section 236 of the fiscal year (FY) 2014 National Defense Authorization
    Act (NDAA), Congress directed the Secretary of Defense and U.S.
    Strategic Command to conduct an evaluation of options and alternatives
    for future sensor architectures for ballistic missile defense in a cost
    and operationally effective and timely manner as part of section 236 of
    the 2014 NDAA.
        In response to the 2014 NDAA language, the Missile Defense Agency
    (MDA) is collaborating with the Department to include U.S. Northern
    Command, U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. European
    Command, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
    Technology, and Logistics), and the Office of Cost Assessment and
    Program Evaluation, on a Global Sensor Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
    Architecture Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) to define the future sensor
    architecture to meet the evolving BMD threat, ``Sensor AoA''.
        The Sensor AoA efforts focus on current and potential future threat
    capabilities from both North Korea and Iran. The AoA will provide an
    analytical comparison of the technical feasibility, operational
    effectiveness, operational suitability, military utility, risk, cost
    and developmental schedule for future Ballistic Missile Defense System
    sensor architecture options.
        Planning, funding, and operational capability options are being
    analyzed within the sensor AoA study that is described above.
    Completion of the Sensors AoA study is anticipated in summer 2016.
    Decisions by the Department will be made after completion of the AoA.
        Progress on addressing the potential future Iranian threat has
    begun. In November 2015, MDA commenced a siting study to identify
    candidate East Coast homeports for SBX. We expect to complete the study
    by December 2016. Working with the Navy's Military Sealift Command and
    other Navy and Combatant Command stakeholders, MDA expects this study
    to identify environmental assessments or impact statements required by
    the National Environmental Policy Act, inform homeport agreement,
    identify pier or other infrastructure modifications, and define
    communications support and other requirements for a potential future
    move of SBX to an East Coast homeport.
        In March 2016, MDA completed an operational area analysis that
    identified potential sensor locations best suited for added
    discrimination capability against potential future long range threats
    from Iran. This analysis supports the siting study for potential
    reassignment of the Sea-Based X-band radar (SBX) as required by section
    1684(b) and the siting study for additional sensor sites for defense
    against Iran as required by section 1684(c) of the fiscal year 2016
    NDAA.
        In fiscal year 2017, data from these efforts will inform siting and
    necessary engineering studies for future Department consideration of
    these and other program options to address the potential future Iranian
    threat.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                 ground-based missile defense (gmd) priorities
        13. Senator Sullivan. Within the GMD missile defense budget, there
    are a number of needs, both near- and long-term. Within the categories
    of 1) Imminent Near-Term Needs; 2) Critical Mid-Term Needs; 3)
    Important Long-Term Investments; and 4) Long-Term Wish List, how would
    you categorize the following priorities and any additional MDA
    priorities within GMD: 44 GBIs, LRDR, new 2-stage GBI Boosters, East
    Coast LRDR-type radar, new Kill Vehicles (RKV/MOKV), Fort Greely ground
    system upgrades, investment in ``left of launch'' capabilities, and an
    East Coast missile site?
        VADM Syring. Our imminent near-term priorities for enhancing
    Homeland Defense are increasing the Ground Based Interceptor (GBI)
    fleet from 30 to 44 by the end of 2017 and upgrading the GMD Ground
    System. MDA's highest priority investments to address emerging threats
    in the mid-term period includes deploying the LRDR at Clear AFB,
    Alaska, developing and testing of the Redesigned Kill Vehicle,
    developing software to permit a 2-Stage mode for our 3-Stage GBI, and
    completing Fort Greeley ground system upgrade.
        The Multi-Object Kill Vehicle (MOKV) and consideration of a
    potential future (Atlantic) East Coast LRDR type radar could address
    the anticipated evolving threat. MDA's fiscal year 2017 funding request
    is sufficient to support concept development and technology risk
    reduction for MOKV. Investment in discrimination and sensor
    capabilities will yield more cost-effective near-term improvements to
    U.S. Homeland missile defense than deployment of an additional
    Continental United States Interceptor Site.
        I defer to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) on Left-of-
    Launch investments and capabilities.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
       utility of west virginia mountain reclamation areas for the u.s.
                             missile defense system
        14. Senator Manchin. The state of West Virginia has conducted strip
    mine land reclamation projects in the state's mountains. These mountain
    sites offer high altitude flat terrain useful for military operations
    such as the Alpha Natural Resources C-130 airstrip in Logan County.
    During the April 13, 2016 hearing, you indicated the need to improve
    missile defense sensors and sensor operations. Has the Missile Defense
    Agency considered reclaimed mountain sites in West Virginia as useful
    for sensor operations in support of ICBM, SLBM, and cruise missile
    defense for the National Capital Region?
        VADM Syring. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has not looked at
    strip mine reclamation sites for missile defense systems. The MDA
    interceptor siting study initiated in January 2013 used the Department
    of Defense Base Structure Report (BSR) as directed with 457 properties
    in the 28-state area of consideration. West Virginia had 10 properties
    on the BSR list. Application of the ``Parcel Size'' exclusionary
    criterion eliminated nine of the West Virginia properties and the last
    property was eliminated based on the ``Useable Land/Space''
    exclusionary criterion. ICBM and SLBM threat trajectories flying toward
    the United States fly over or near the North Pole. Interceptor and
    sensor locations in northern most Continental U.S. provide the best
    system performance. MDA has not examined cruise missile defense for the
    National Capital Region. That mission typically is allocated to Army or
    Air Force air defense systems.