[Senate Hearing 114-709]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-709
REVIEWING THE CIVIL NUCLEAR
AGREEMENT WITH NORWAY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 15, 2016
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BOB CORKER, TENNESSEE, Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
MARCO RUBIO, Florida BARBARA BOXER, California
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
CORY GARDNER, Colorado CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
RAND PAUL, Kentucky TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Todd Womack, Staff Director
Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
Rob Strayer, Majority Chief Counsel
Margaret Taylor, Minority Chief Counsel
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Perdue, Hon. David, U.S. Senator From Georgia.................... 1
Markey, Hon. Edward, U.S. Senator From Massachusetts............. 2
Countryman, Hon. Thomas M., Washington, DC....................... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 4
Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted to Assistant
Secretary Countryman by Senator Rubio...................... 20
Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted to Assistant
Secretary Countryman by Senator Perdue..................... 21
(iii)
REVIEWING THE CIVIL NUCLEAR AGREEMENT WITH NORWAY
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THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 2016
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:18 p.m. in Room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. David Perdue,
presiding.
Present: Senators Perdue [presiding], Gardner, and Markey.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID PERDUE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA
Senator Perdue. The Foreign Relations Committee will come
to order.
Today we are here to exercise a statutory responsibility
for Congress to review agreements related to the cooperation on
civil nuclear programs, also known as 123 agreements, between
the United States and foreign nations.
The agreement in question is a renewal of the 123 Agreement
between the U.S. and the Kingdom of Norway. As a part of our
due diligence, we must consider the political, economic, and
security aspects of this agreement and weigh the risks and
benefits before moving forward.
The initial agreement with Norway was in force from July
1984 until July 2014. Since that time, it has been a lapsed
agreement.
The United States and Norway have a longstanding
partnership on nuclear cooperation that goes back for more than
half a century. Today Norway runs the Halden Reactor Project
which serves as a critical asset to the U.S. nuclear industry.
President Obama transmitted the proposed text of a new 30-
year agreement for congressional review on June 14, 2016. Today
we will examine this agreement and how it advances U.S.
strategic, political, and economic interests, if it advances
U.S. nonproliferation objectives and any key concerns that the
administration has about this agreement, as well as how those
concerns might be mitigated.
I am particularly concerned regarding potential issues with
export controls and ensuring that none of our agreements help
bad actors in getting dual-use technology or other sensitive
materials.
I look forward to hearing from our witness, Assistant
Secretary Countryman, who is no stranger to this committee.
Thank you again for being here.
And with that, I would like to recognize the distinguished
ranking member for his comments, Senator Markey.
STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much, and
thank you for having this hearing.
And we thank Secretary Countryman for his visit once again
to our committee. He is definitely in the top five all-time
visitors to this committee. Nobody has bigger issues more
frequently being considered before the committee.
And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for helping to construct a
forum by which we can review this agreement, and it gives us an
opportunity to discuss the difficult and vital issues
surrounding our global nuclear nonproliferation policies.
Since the 1970s, the United States has tried to discourage
other countries from engaging in uranium enrichment and spent
fuel processing. These activities can be used to produce fuel
either for power plants or for nuclear bombs. Without
enrichment or reprocessing, states cannot produce the material
needed for nuclear weapons. So the restriction on these
technologies represents a powerful tool for global
nonproliferation.
Unfortunately, many of our nuclear cooperation agreements
depart from the objective of discouraging the production of
weapons-usable material by permitting countries to reprocess
U.S.-obligated spent fuel.
This recent agreement with Norway is regrettably an example
of such an agreement. The agreement does prohibit Norway from
enriching U.S.-obligated fuel without our consent, but it
provides Norway with advanced consent to retransfer spent fuel
for reprocessing to the United Kingdom, France, or any other
country that we agree to. This is similar to the consent that
we have provided to a number of other countries, including
Japan.
Norway's record with respect to nonproliferation is not an
issue here. As a founding member of NATO, Norway is one of our
closest allies, and it is a member in good standing of
virtually every institution comprising the global
nonproliferation regime, including the NPT and the IAEA. What
is at issue is the decision to sign yet another agreement that
legitimizes the continued use of a technology that threatens
U.S. national security.
Norway is an exemplary ally, but this agreement is far from
exemplary. The United States should not be signing additional
nuclear cooperation agreements that encourage reprocessing.
Even when we sign agreements with trusted allies like Norway
and Japan, we must consider the example that these agreements
set for other countries. We must recognize that this sort of
nuclear trade with Norway could make it harder for us to say no
to the same kind of nuclear trade with other countries. We
should be raising global nonproliferation standards, not
lowering them.
This agreement comes at a sensitive moment for global
nonproliferation. In East Asia, both China and Japan have plans
to construct commercial-scale spent fuel reprocessing
facilities. If completed, these facilities could produce
thousands of pounds of weapons-usable material and trigger a
new plutonium arms race.
As Secretary Countryman rightly informed this committee in
March, reprocessing, quote, has little, if any, economic
justification. And as Secretary Moniz said earlier this year,
China's plan to construct a reprocessing facility in
cooperation with the French firm Areva, quote, certainly is not
a positive in terms of nonproliferation.
That is why Senator Rubio and I introduced legislation
earlier this year to condition U.S. nuclear cooperation with
China. By tightening our control over China's right to
reprocess U.S.-obligated material, we would reinforce Secretary
Moniz's message that reprocessing endangers global security.
Unfortunately, that message is not reflected in this
proposed nuclear cooperation agreement with Norway. Norway does
not even have a nuclear power program. Yet, the United States
is providing Norway with advance consent to transfer our spent
fuel for reprocessing.
If reprocessing is economically unjustifiable and
militarily dangerous, why should any agreement we sign provide
advance consent to engage in this activity?
Mr. Chairman, I sincerely hope that this hearing will
provide the members of this committee the opportunity to
discuss this issue and to discuss broader issues about the
risks that agreements like this one can pose to global
security.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Perdue. Thank you, Senator Markey.
Now we will turn to our witness. Our witness today is the
Honorable Thomas M. Countryman. He currently serves as the
Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and
Nonproliferation. In this capacity, Mr. Countryman leads the
bureau at the head of the U.S. effort to prevent the spread of
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, their related
materials and delivery systems.
Thank you so much for being here again and sharing your
thoughts and viewpoints with us today.
We would remind you that your full statement will be
included in the record, without objection. So if you would
please keep your remarks to no more than 5 minutes to start, I
would appreciate it. And I will turn it over to you, Secretary
Countryman. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS M. COUNTRYMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. Countryman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
you and Senator Markey for taking the time to hold this
hearing. We take very seriously our obligation to keep you
fully briefed on nuclear cooperation agreements both at the
staff level and at the member level, just as I know you take
very seriously your review of these agreements. So I always
welcome these opportunities.
This agreement is straightforward. It contains all of the
requirements that are in the Atomic Energy Act of the United
States legislation. It includes the necessary reference to
additional safeguards under the IAEA, the International Atomic
Energy Agency. It has a 30-year duration. And as Senator Markey
has already noted, it has one clause that is not in every 123
agreement but that is far from unprecedented having to do with
the retransfer of irradiated nuclear material to the U.K. or
France. I will be surprised if you find anything surprising in
this agreement.
It is straightforward, but it is far from insignificant for
two reasons.
First, Norway is an important U.S. ally. Beyond that, I
would say it would be difficult to find a country with a better
record as a model citizen of the world than Norway, not only in
their commitment to the security of Europe as a NATO member,
but in their generosity in helping to address issues as diverse
as environmental, developmental, and nonproliferation issues
around the world.
Secondly, it is significant because the Halden Research
Reactor that you mentioned, which is a center for nuclear
research of benefit not only to the U.S. Government--and
several U.S. agencies under the Department of Energy are
partners with Norway--but also for U.S. commercial industry in
the nuclear field. In this agreement, its primary effect will
be to facilitate that research.
For both these reasons, we consider the agreement to be
important.
If I may take just a moment to address Senator Markey's
concern. First, I would note that the advance consent to permit
transfer of irradiated nuclear material to the U.K. and France
is not unprecedented. As noted, it is contained in other places
in agreements with other countries. In the case of Norway,
there are no power reactors. There is not a significant amount
of waste generated that it cannot be compared to that of a
power generation reactor.
Secondly, the transfer of such material for reprocessing or
for storage to the U.K. or France means it is transferred to
our most trusted partners. It does not become available for any
kind of nuclear weapons use.
I am happy to go into this in more detail, but I look
forward to answering these and any other questions you have.
[Mr. Countryman's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thomas M. Countryman
Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Cardin, good afternoon. It is a
pleasure to testify before the committee today regarding the
President's submission of an agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation
between the United States and Norway. As you know, Norway is a long
standing strategic ally and political partner of the United States, and
this Agreement is an example of the strength of our bilateral
relationship.
The United States and Norway have had a strong partnership in the
field of peaceful nuclear cooperation for more than half a century, and
the United States is pleased to renew this cooperation with an updated
123 agreement. The terms of the new U.S.-Norway Agreement strongly
reaffirm the two governments' shared commitment to nonproliferation as
the cornerstone of our nuclear cooperation relationship. Norway has a
strong track record on and has consistently reiterated its commitment
to nonproliferation. It has been an extremely active partner with the
United States across a wide breadth of bilateral and multilateral
activities designed to ensure the implementation of the highest
standards of nuclear safety, security, and nonproliferation worldwide.
description of agreement
As with all our 123 agreements, this Agreement is first and
foremost an asset that advances U.S. nonproliferation policy
objectives. The President's transmittal of the Agreement, and the
Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement that accompanied it, include
a detailed description of the contents of the Agreement. I will not
repeat that here, but the Agreement contains all the U.S.
nonproliferation guaranties required by the Atomic Energy Act and
common to 123 agreements, including conditions related to International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, peaceful uses assurances,
physical protection assurances, and U.S. consent rights on storage,
retransfer, enrichment, and reprocessing of U.S.-obligated nuclear
material. The agreement establishes the legal framework for the
transfer of information, material, equipment, and components for
nuclear research and nuclear power production. It does not permit
transfers of Restricted Data, sensitive nuclear technology, sensitive
nuclear facilities or major critical components of such facilities.
Norway has no nuclear power program, and no current plans for
establishing one, but the Agreement would facilitate cooperation on
such a program if Norway's plans change in the future. Norway does have
an active nuclear research program and the focus of cooperation under
the proposed agreement is expected to be in the area of nuclear
research. Its Halden boiling heavy water reactor went online in 1958
and continues to operate as a multinational research and development
facility. Operating on low enriched uranium, the reactor is devoted to
many types of safety research including fuel and cladding development,
material research, and plant aging and degradation. The United States
provided the initial heavy water for the Halden reactor, and many U.S.
companies and organizations have utilized the facilities of the Halden
Reactor Project, including the U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge
National Laboratory, and Idaho National Laboratory. Several other
private firms such as General Electric Global Nuclear Fuel,
Westinghouse Nuclear, and research institutions such as the Electric
Power Research Institute have also participated in activities at the
Halden Reactor Project.
One feature of the Agreement that is not found in all of our 123
agreements, although it is also not unusual, is that it provides
advance, long-term (``programmatic'') consent to Norway for the
retransfer of irradiated nuclear material (spent fuel) to France, the
United Kingdom, or other countries for storage or reprocessing subject
to our consent and that of the recipient. The 123 Agreement would give
the United States the option to revoke the advance consent if it
considers it to be required by exceptional circumstances of concern
from a nonproliferation or security standpoint; for example, if it
believes that the arrangements cannot be continued without a
significant increase of the risk of proliferation or without
jeopardizing national security.
The Agreement has a term of 30 years, although it can be terminated
by either party on one year's advance written notice. In the event of
termination or expiration of the agreement, key nonproliferation
conditions and controls will continue in effect as long as any
material, equipment, or component subject to the agreement remains in
the territory of the party concerned or under its jurisdiction or
control anywhere, or until such time as the parties agree such items
are no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point
of view of safeguards.
norway as a nonproliferation partner
Norway has a strong nonproliferation record. It is an original
party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(``NPT''). Its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (``IAEA'') entered into force on March 1, 1972. The
Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement entered into force on
May 16, 2000, and the IAEA has concluded that all nuclear material in
Norway remains in peaceful uses. Norway has been a vocal proponent for
universal accession to the Additional Protocol, which grants the IAEA
expanded safeguards authorities. It is a party to the amended
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear
Facilities, and has signed and ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of
Nuclear Terrorism. It is also a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group,
whose non-legally binding guidelines set forth standards for the
responsible export of nuclear commodities for peaceful use.
Norway has also pledged more than one million U.S. dollars to
support the IAEA's verification activities under the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), makes frequent contributions to
the IAEA's Nuclear Security Fund, and is an active participant in the
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Norway contributed $5
million to the IAEA's low-enriched uranium bank, a mechanism that will
help prevent proliferation by reducing incentives for countries to
pursue uranium enrichment. Additionally, in December 2015, it provided
support valued at approximately $6 million for supply of 60,000
kilograms of natural uranium (uranium concentrate) and its
transportation from Kazakhstan to Iran as part of a broader transaction
related to export of Iran's enriched uranium in accordance with the
JCPOA.
Norway is a party to the Biological Weapons Convention and the
Chemical Weapons Convention. It is also a member of the Conference on
Disarmament, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Wassenaar
Arrangement, and a participant in the Australia Group.
conclusion
In sum, we believe the nonproliferation and economic benefits of
this agreement demonstrate that strengthening our nuclear cooperation
with Norway is in the best interests of the United States. Research
conducted at the Halden reactor will benefit the United States and
Norway and advance global nuclear safety, security, and
nonproliferation objectives. Once it enters into force, this Agreement
will be a significant achievement for both our governments and provide
a strong foundation for our shared peaceful nuclear cooperation and
nonproliferation objectives for decades to come.
Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, thank you.
Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Let me follow up on that last comment very quickly, if I
may. This is just my own question. I have got several I want to
get to here, and we will go back and forth. We have plenty of
time. So thank you so much for your remarks and for being here
and for all your hard work in this area. Senator Nunn is a
friend of mine, and he praises the work that you do and you
make our world safer. So thank you.
The transfer you are talking about--there is a coalition
potential, as I understand it, the trilateral agreement
possibility. Is there any possibility that other countries that
this material could be transferred under this potential
agreement?
Mr. Countryman. Spent fuel, that is, irradiated nuclear
material, could be transferred from Norway to another country
with our consent. We have not given advance consent except in
the case of transfer to the U.K. and France.
Senator Perdue. Great.
As you mentioned, the current agreement lapsed. The new
agreement was transmitted in June, and now we are up against a
clock it looks like in terms of the 90-day continuous days in
session, as I understand it.
I have got several questions around that agreement.
A, why did it take 2 years to renegotiate?
Two, how have we been operating in the 2 years while we
have been negotiating?
Three, what are the economic and scientific implications of
that 2-year period?
And then lastly, how would a new agreement benefit both the
U.S. and its security issues but also international trade and
U.S. interests there?
Mr. Countryman. As you were so kind to note, I have been up
here to discuss several 123 agreements, ones that were far more
complex and time-consuming to negotiate than the agreement with
Norway. It was, quite frankly, a low priority and neither the
Norwegian Government nor the U.S. institutions that make use of
the Halden Research Reactor identified it to us as an urgent
priority. As soon as they did, we commenced negotiations. They
were completed faster than with any other country. But you are
correct that they were not completed in time to have the
agreement go into effect by normal procedures before the end of
this year.
This does not have a significant effect either on the
reactor or upon U.S. companies for two reasons.
One, the primary export that we are talking about from the
United States is research material, that is, fuel assembly
plates, for example, that a private U.S. civil nuclear company
would want to test in this reactor.
Secondly, we have the alternative mechanism, which we have
employed in other cases, primarily involving research reactors
where we can do a project supply agreement through the
International Atomic Energy Agency, and the same safeguards and
controls that are contained in our 123 agreement with that
agency are applied directly to the export.
So while I would have been happier to have finished this
sooner, I do not believe it will have a significant effect upon
our cooperation or upon the success of the research efforts
that U.S. agencies and U.S. companies undertake with the help
of Norway.
Senator Perdue. Can we go back to the agreement and what it
says about transferring for storage or reprocessing? The U.K.
and France--those are identified in here. But other countries
or destinations as may be agreed upon in writing is also--I
think that is the specific language. Does Norway have plans to
transfer spent fuel for storage or reprocessing? If not, what
is the purpose of this provision? I am just curious.
Mr. Countryman. It has no plans that I am aware of. I think
that the purpose of the provision is to make explicit that they
will not transfer to another country without our consent. I
would not want to leave it ambiguous that if they went
somewhere other than the U.K. and France, they would not need
our consent.
Senator Perdue. Russia is a member of this consortium I
just mentioned relative to the Halden research facility. I am
not clear on how many countries are in that consortium. But
would the administration support shipping spent fuel to Russia
for reprocessing or China, for that matter?
Mr. Countryman. First, I would note that all research
activities that occur at the Halden Research Reactor are
peaceful in nature. They are in full compliance with the
International Atomic Agency's safeguards, and that includes any
Russian or another country's research projects that occur
there.
Secondly, I am not aware of any intent or any reason for
Norway to seek to send irradiated nuclear material to Russia or
China when they have a satisfactory arrangement for these small
quantities with the United Kingdom and France.
Senator Perdue. Thank you. I have got other questions, but
I will defer to the ranking member at this point. Senator
Markey?
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
Thank you again for testifying before our committee.
Again, I want to start by returning to the issue I raised
in my opening remarks, which is the danger of spent fuel
reprocessing. As you testified in March, reprocessing makes no
financial sense, but it is not only economically unjustifiable,
it is also dangerous. And that is particularly true in East
Asia where additional plutonium stockpiling would destabilize
the region and increase the risk of diplomatic and military
confrontation.
What concerns me about this proposed agreement is not that
Norway could acquire nuclear weapons. Norway has unambiguously
renounced nuclear weapons. And it is deeply embedded in global
nonproliferation institutions.
What concerns me is that by allowing Norway to export our
spent nuclear fuel to other countries for reprocessing, we are
as a country promoting a technology that is bad for
nonproliferation. That makes it even more difficult for us to
persuade other countries, including those in East Asia and the
Middle East, not to pursue this technology or to build large-
scale facilities that use it. And it makes it hard for us to
discourage other nuclear suppliers like France from
proliferating reprocessing technology.
So my first question to you, Mr. Secretary, is do you agree
that discouraging spent fuel reprocessing would strengthen the
global nonproliferation regime?
Mr. Countryman. Yes. If I might make a couple of comments.
I hope you can accept that I agree with many of your premises
but not all of your conclusions.
First, I am previously on the record in this room in saying
that reprocessing, that is, the production of plutonium, has
little economic justification and it raises serious concerns
about nonproliferation. That remains our policy. It remains our
policy to discourage additional countries from developing
enrichment and reprocessing technology when there is no
economic or security need to do so and it only enhances
questions of both nuclear security and proliferation.
I do not agree that this agreement in any way encourages
Norway to pursue such technology. There is no intent of Norway
that I have ever heard of to develop an indigenous enrichment
or reprocessing capability. The fact is that we do trust the
United Kingdom and France because of a long record of operating
transparently and under IAEA safeguards, that there is no
possibility that the minute quantities of spent fuel that might
be transferred from Norway have any risk of ending up as a
proliferation threat.
Senator Markey. And again, it is not about Norway. It is
about an example which is set. It is about a precedent that is
set. It is about further momentum which is created towards a
reprocessing world that ultimately increases the likelihood of
these nuclear materials falling into the hands of those who
would use them for purposes that our nonproliferation policy is
intended to stop.
So if we take the case of France, which will be allowed to
receive the Norway nuclear materials, right now both in China
and Japan reprocessing facilities are being constructed with
the help of France. So from my perspective, we should be trying
to discourage Japan and China. The French are helping to
construct reprocessing facilities in China.
By saying that we give permission for Norway to take our
nuclear materials to France, we are just sending a dual message
that would be hard to miss by the French that with a little bit
of a wink here, it is all fine, we appreciate your business,
and that we are going to actually, I guess at the end of this
session of Congress, somehow or other urgently have to pass a
123 agreement.
And so from my perspective, I think that, again, it raises
these longer-term issues where nuclear nonproliferation is
supposed to be our highest goal, trumping all other issues
because of what the consequences are if we ever face that day.
But simultaneously we just piece by piece kind of chip away at
it and then not expect other countries in the world to just
wonder about the depth of our sincerity and especially when you
are partnering with France that sees this as an area of
enormous commercial benefit for them even though we have
already established that it is not economic as a technology.
So that is the core of my problem, Mr. Secretary. It always
has been and it continues to be where we kind of preach
temperance but from a bar stool, saying do not do it, but yet
here, once again, we are going to allow Norway to take our
materials and take it to France which is itself a country that
does believe in this reprocessing technology. So at the end of
the day, we wind up being part of this with that wink and nod
to this ultimately very dangerous technology that some day very
well could come back to haunt the whole planet.
Mr. Countryman. If I may, I would first note that China, of
course, has long had a capacity for reprocessing. The project
that you referred to to construct a large civilian reprocessing
plant, as opposed to their military reprocessing plants, has
been on the books for a number of years. It has not been
concluded. Construction has not begun. It remains an intent
rather than a construction project.
Senator Markey. Can I just say the same is true for Norway?
Mr. Countryman. No. I do not agree at all.
Senator Markey. Well, they do not have an intent to do it
right now you said. Right?
Mr. Countryman. They do not have an intent to do it. They
do not have a capability to do it. They do not have a need to
do it. They do not have permission to involve U.S. technology
in order to do it. It is a completely different situation.
In terms of what encourages or not, as I said, we do not
see a need for any new country to develop enrichment or
reprocessing technology. If we were to say to countries we do
not want you to have enrichment technology and, in fact, we do
not want you to use the enrichment capabilities that already
exist in other countries, it would be a self-defeating
argument. And the same is true for reprocessing, that if it
would not be effective to say to any country reprocessing is so
horrible that you cannot use existing safeguarded facilities in
order to reduce the level of waste that must be stored.
Finally, I will do my best to get you an accurate number on
what quantity of irradiated fuel is actually produced annually
by this reactor and where it goes to. I apologize. I do not
have that today at my fingertips.
Senator Markey. That is fine.
Now, in your view, do additional advance consent agreements
make it easier or harder for the United States to discourage
other countries from engaging in spent fuel reprocessing?
Mr. Countryman. I would have to know which country you are
talking about and what size of program we are talking about.
Senator Markey. My answer would be, of course, it makes it
harder to discourage other countries, the deeper we get
involved in the industry ourselves even indirectly, as you are
saying here.
How does granting advance consent affect our ability to
discourage nuclear suppliers from signing their own agreements
that allow for reprocessing?
Mr. Countryman. Sorry. Could you say that once more?
Senator Markey. How does granting advance consent affect
our ability to discourage nuclear suppliers from signing their
own agreements that allow for reprocessing?
Mr. Countryman. Well, I think a couple of things got mixed
in that question. Again, there is nothing in this agreement
that says Norway has advance consent to build a reprocessing
facility. And mixing that with advance consent to build
reprocessing, I do not understand the connection, honestly.
Senator Markey. Well, why does nuclear research with Norway
require reprocessing?
Mr. Countryman. I am not aware that it does.
Senator Markey. Why are we considering legislation?
Mr. Countryman. First, the nuclear research--and again, I
will do my best to get you a more detailed description of the
research that goes on at Halden, but it is a wide range of
research, just as at U.S. nuclear facilities as well. And the
research includes important data about health and safety issues
and about the--what do you call it--endurance or wear issues
for nuclear components. Those are essential for the nuclear
industry.
I am not aware that they produce large quantities of waste.
In the United States, most of any spent material from a
research reactor is likely to go to dry cask storage rather
than to reprocessing. I will find out for you if Norway has
done anything that requires reprocessing. I will look into it.
Senator Markey. And I just apologize. I will just finish,
if you do not mind.
Are there other alternatives to reprocessing that we could
suggest to the Norwegians, including the United States playing
a role in the storage of that spent fuel?
Mr. Countryman. I certainly have no authority to offer to
other countries storage of their spent fuel in the United
States.
Senator Markey. Well, again, I would say that we are giving
them permission to reprocess it in other countries. Providing
an alternative to avoid the reprocessing option, which has
proliferation implications, and offering other alternatives, it
seems to me, should be explored as a way of solving Norway's
problem without actually yet creating another exception to the
nonproliferation policy.
Mr. Countryman. Let me make a general statement that
probably needs to be more specific, which is U.S. legislation
would not allow the executive branch to offer other countries
the option to store spent fuel in the United States.
Senator Markey. Would it prohibit us helping Norway to
store it in their own country?
Mr. Countryman. No.
Senator Markey. No. So would that be a safe alternative?
Mr. Countryman. Yes.
Senator Markey. Yes. So we are trying to encourage people,
I would think, to not act in a way that is uneconomic, which is
reprocessing, to also act in a way which can provide a safe
alternative, which I think is available, and to not further go
down this pathway of passing 123 agreements, which
unfortunately send the wrong signal to the rest of the world.
That is what my conclusion would be.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Perdue. Senator Gardner?
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Secretary Countryman, for being here. I
appreciate the opportunity to visit with you again and multiple
times before the committee over the past year, 2 years. So
thank you.
I am wondering if I could shift topics from the current
discussion right now, if you do not mind, to North Korea, if we
could. In light of the recent nuclear detonation again in North
Korea, could you perhaps explain or tell the committee what you
see in terms of the North Korean nuclear program developments
thus far? Do you believe this is fully indigenized at this
point? Have they made advancements? I would appreciate the
opportunity to receive the update.
Mr. Countryman. What if I said I did not want to talk
about--[Laughter.]
Mr. Countryman. All right. I am happy to, sir.
First, in terms of a description of the North Korean
nuclear program, we would be happy to get the best analysts
from various agencies here for a closed briefing who could give
you far better detail than I could.
What I would say is clearly every time you do a nuclear
test, you advance in knowledge. It is why the United States did
several hundred nuclear tests. What exactly they have learned
from the latest nuclear test, again I would have to get experts
here to talk to you about that.
It is primarily an indigenous program. It does rely upon
supply of some material from outside North Korea, and that is
why my bureau, in cooperation with a number of other government
agencies, work so hard to aggravate at every turn North Korean
efforts at procurement or at earning hard currency to fund such
procurement.
The fact remains that the United States has not, will not
accept North Korea as a nuclear state.
Senator Gardner. There is some material outside of North
Korea. Where is the primary source of that outside material
coming from?
Mr. Countryman. I think primarily from private dealers in
China and Russia but not limited to those two states.
Senator Gardner. And what type of material are we talking
about, if you can here?
Mr. Countryman. I would rather do that in a classified
briefing.
Senator Gardner. Very good.
And in terms of China's provisions, these companies, these
private sources in China, are these front businesses, North
Korean front businesses, or are they actual China businesses
that are being allowed to move forward or just illicit actors
doing illicit things?
Mr. Countryman. I think it is all of the above. North Korea
runs an extensive network of front companies not only in China
but in other countries around the world. Their business
contacts extend to a number of non-state-owned companies in
China, as well as in other countries. And those companies may
or may not be aware that they are dealing with a North Korean
entity.
Senator Gardner. And these sources that are providing
material to North Korea for the nuclear program in China--do
you know if they are currently under investigation under the
North Korea Sanctions Enhancement Act that we passed?
Mr. Countryman. I am sorry. Which entities exactly?
Senator Gardner. The entities that are providing from China
the nuclear material or the nuclear-related material.
Mr. Countryman. The United States has previously designated
North Korean front companies in various countries and will
continue to do so as the evidence warrants.
In addition, we have a regular and I think a productive
dialogue with the Chinese Government about more effective
enforcement of sanctions resolutions.
Senator Gardner. In terms of Pakistan and North Korea, we
had a hearing last week/earlier this week on Pakistan, some
discussion about past activities between the two nations in
proliferation and the A.Q. Khan network. Any indication that
that relationship exists today at a nuclear level?
Mr. Countryman. I do not have any.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Perdue. Thank you.
I want to go back to the Norway deal just a minute. You
know, with the clock being what it is and the 90-day continuous
session situation, is the administration considering a
trilateral supply agreement between U.S., Norway, and IAEA? If
they are, why would they consider that versus resubmitting a
123 agreement in the next Congress?
The second thing is would Norway approve of that?
And could a trilateral agreement be reached in time for
approval in September or at the September or November board
meeting of the IAEA?
And would you predict that this agreement would be approved
by the IAEA board?
And lastly, if a trilateral agreement were accomplished,
what would be our role? Would the Senate be consulted about
that?
Mr. Countryman. Okay. Several questions there.
Senator Perdue. Right.
Mr. Countryman. In what you refer to as a trilateral, I
call a PSA, a project supply agreement. As I noted, we have
used this mechanism previously because it allows us to take the
very strong 123 agreement we have with the International Atomic
Energy Agency and transfer through the IAEA the material in
question with all the controls that are contained in that
agreement.
Senator Perdue. I am sorry to interrupt. Is there any
difference in the quantity and the procedures of transfer under
a 123 versus a trilateral?
Mr. Countryman. We prefer to do it under a 123. It is more
straightforward. You do not need to involve the IAEA, and you
do not need the approval of the Board of Governors of the IAEA.
And that is why we do 123's.
There is a meeting of the Board of Governors next week. The
project supply agreement will not be ready to submit to them. I
expect it will be submitted, and I see no obstacle to it being
approved at a Board of Governors meeting in November. Whenever
we employ a project and supply agreement, we brief
congressional staff on this, as we do on developments under the
123.
Senator Perdue. Sorry to interrupt again. If we were to do
that, if the administration were to do that, would that
preclude then a 123 being negotiated and presented to the next
Congress after the first of the year?
Mr. Countryman. No.
Senator Perdue. Would that be the current administration's
intent? In other words, what I am asking is we have had 2 years
of lapse of this. We have not done a PSA, or a trilateral, in
that 2 years. Why rush into that now relative to the fact that
we are a couple months away from a new administration?
Mr. Countryman. Honestly, I am not trying to rush anybody.
Senator Perdue. Well, I apologize for use of the word
rush.''
Mr. Countryman. No, no, no.
Senator Perdue. But we are in a 90-day period or a period
where we really do not have time to do the normal oversight of
this agreement. So that brings into play the need possibly to
do a PSA, as you say.
Mr. Countryman. Yes.
Why did we submit it now instead of waiting until next
year? First, because it was ready.
Senator Perdue. No, that is not my question. My question is
whether you go to a PSA now versus this agreement. I see the
123 agreement. Then the question is, as I understand it, the
administration is considering a trilateral, or a PSA agreement,
in the interim. And I have two questions. One is would that
preclude us from doing a 123? And the second question is why do
a PSA now at all.
Mr. Countryman. Okay. On the first question, absolutely the
PSA does not preclude the need for the 123.
On the second question, the reason to do it now is because
of specific research projects that U.S. private companies have
made arrangements with the research reactor in Norway. What we
would need to export under the PSA is not a reactor or a reload
of the fuel. It is actually the research material that is going
to be tested in the reactor.
In general, it should be possible to predict those things
longer in advance, and that is why I would have been happier if
we had finished the 123 earlier this year. But it is a need
that will arise not necessarily on a regular, predictable
basis, but will arise more than once over the next 30 years. So
the 123 that allows the direct transfer of research materials
without going through the IAEA is obviously preferable.
Senator Perdue. Have they transferred material during the
2-year period of the lapsed agreement?
Mr. Countryman. Not to my knowledge. We have not done a
PSA, no.
Senator Perdue. Thank you.
Mr. Countryman. And that gives you an indication of how
frequently we need it.
Senator Perdue. Right. That is why I was asking. So there
is a need now. That is the purpose of the potential PSA. I
understand.
Would you be willing to provide an assessment of Norway's
improvements on their export controls? And are you comfortable
with that, given some of their history in recent times?
Mr. Countryman. The short answer is, yes, I am comfortable
with the professionalism and the diligence of Norwegian export
controls. There was one particular case that you may be aware
of that I will not go into detail here that we raised with the
Norwegian Government and the answer was fully satisfactory both
in terms of the action taken in that particular case and in
reviewing their procedures. So I have no concerns about their
capabilities.
Senator Perdue. Since Russia is a member of the Halden
research consortium, can you tell us a little bit about how
they interact in that consortium and give us some comfort that
there is no risk to U.S. technology in that relationship?
Mr. Countryman. I did not bring any research physicists
with me.
Let me get you a more precise answer. Let me give you an
unscientific answer, but I think it has the essence of the
situation. And that is, in a research reactor, you normally are
doing one or possibly two or three projects at a time. If there
is a project that is sponsored by an American company, they are
the ones using the reactor in cooperation with the Norwegian
authorities. If it is the Department of Energy that is
researching a particular issue, they are the ones involved. If
it is a Russian research center that is doing it, they do their
thing. Each country that contracts for use of the reactor for a
research project manages their own project.
Senator Perdue. Thank you.
Mr. Countryman. But I will give you an answer with longer
words.
Senator Perdue. Okay. Thank you.
One last quick question before I turn it back over to the
ranking member. Let us move to Norway's role in the JCPOA, if
we could briefly.
You mentioned in your testimony that Norway has pledged
over $1 million to support the IAEA's verification activities
under the JCPOA. You also mentioned the Norway provided support
to swap natural uranium for Iran's enriched uranium in
accordance with the JCPOA in December of 2015.
Given the earlier contribution to the implementation of
JCPOA, how else might Norway participate in the implementation
or otherwise reap benefits of the JCPOA?
Mr. Countryman. I am not aware that Norway is looking to
reap benefits from the JCPOA. I think, rather, it has in
keeping with their generosity to all kinds of important causes
around the world--the fact is that they contribute a higher
percentage of their GDP to development goals than just about
any country on earth. Maybe it is the highest--they saw that
there was a need for funding in order to complete a
transportation process that would make it possible for us to
achieve our goal of moving enriched uranium out of Iran and
allow the Iranians to reach implementation day. And as I know
from experience on other such projects, the Norwegians can
approve funding projects such as that far faster than Brussels
or Washington or any other capital you can name.
Senator Perdue. That is a low bar. [Laughter.]
Mr. Countryman. Well, I meant to make it more impressive.
[Laughter.]
Senator Perdue. Understood. Thank you.
Senator Markey?
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
So the need for the joint research between the United
States and Norway at Halden in Norway appears to be the main
reason for a new 123 agreement. And our projects at Halden
include a Department of Energy-run program for testing accident
tolerant nuclear fuel, testing of aging reactor components and
other safety research by NRC, irradiation testing of advanced
nuclear fuels developed by Lightbridge Corporation of McLean,
Virginia, and the Nuclear Energy Institute, the lobbying arm of
the nuclear power industry in the U.S., has argued that without
a 123 agreement, U.S. access to Halden Research Reactor will be
severely limited.
So tell us a little bit about what this company Lightbridge
will be doing in Norway, please.
Mr. Countryman. I will check and I will get you additional
details, but my understanding is that they are facilitating
testing of fuel assembly plates. Am I off? Yes. Lightbridge has
submitted a request to the NRC, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, here to review a fuel design developed for U.S.
utilities, that is, use in the U.S. nuclear fleet, in
anticipation of an application for the use of that fuel
assembly in a U.S. pressurized water reactor in the near
future.
Senator Markey. Right. And so I guess my question is why
can they not do that in the United States. Why do we have to
pass a 123 agreement that blows another hole through our
nonproliferation policy when it is the--did you say it is the
Nuclear Energy Institute, the Edison Electric Institute? In
other words, the domestic nuclear power industry is the
wealthiest industry in the United States, and they have
research capacity all over this country. Why can they not just
do it here so that we do not have to, in the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, pass a 123 agreement to allow them to do
it in Norway?
I guess what you are saying is they are doing it for U.S.
military and civilian nuclear power plants. Is that what you
are saying?
Mr. Countryman. It is research that is related to the
effectiveness and safety of fuel assemblies for use in civilian
reactors----
Senator Markey. Here.
Mr. Countryman [continuing.] In the U.S.
Senator Markey. And we do not have that capacity?
Mr. Countryman. I do not know.
Senator Markey. I think we do. So I do not understand why,
again, we would move to our nonproliferation policy as a
solution for a private sector problem that is, from the
definition of what they are going to be doing with it, strictly
contained within the United States.
Mr. Countryman. I would line up with you if I thought that
this agreement in any way undermined our strong stand on
nonproliferation, but we will continue to disagree.
Senator Markey. Again, that is a philosophical
disagreement. Every time we do it, there should be a good
reason for it. That is my view. We just should not be doing
this because a company just finds it convenient when you could
probably find a capacity in the United States to do the same
thing. There is a vast industry in America doing nuclear
reactor research work.
And the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is arguing that they
have to go to Sweden in order to test aging reactor components
and they cannot do that here in the United States? We do not
have the capacity? I mean, Norway does not have a nuclear
domestic industry. We have 100 nuclear power plants here in
America, and we do not have a capacity here to test aging
nuclear components?
Mr. Countryman. Normally you do not run tests in operating
nuclear reactors. The Soviets tried that in 1986 in Chernobyl.
It did not end happily.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission does not enter into it.
It is not their decision that Lightbridge ought to do the
testing in Norway or in another location. It is, I presume, a
combination of a commercial and a scientific decision.
Senator Markey. Right. Well, again, the Russians in
Chernobyl did not have a containment dome. So they did not have
safety requirements in Russia at that time. So in the United
States, we have a huge Nuclear Regulatory Commission safety
infrastructure in place in order to actually help countries
like Russia or other countries that might wind up with a
nuclear power plant that has gone awry. So we are infinitely
more sophisticated than the Russians are in this.
You know, the question again--I keep coming back to this--
is why does helping Lightbridge require advance prior consent
of the United States Government. That is a big step to take to
give a country the ability to transfer these nuclear materials.
Would any of these materials be American materials that we are
potentially talking about?
Mr. Countryman. I will find out for you.
Senator Markey. I think we have to know that. We are doing
it for a private sector reason. I mean, the urgency here comes
from it sounds to me like the Nuclear Energy Institute, this
company Lightbridge. They are all up and active and saying, you
know, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, please process this
thing. And I understand they are probably sitting out in the
room right now. There is probably someone from Lightbridge or
the Nuclear Energy Institute sitting out here. But they should
be the ones testifying why they cannot do it here domestically.
You know, it should not be you. They should be the ones making
the case for a 123 agreement, not you. It is a private sector-
driven piece of legislation at the very end of the session.
Mr. Countryman. No, sir. It is not a private sector-driven
piece of legislation. It is one that the Government of Norway
believes is important and that we believe is important. It is
an agreement that promotes scientific cooperation that has been
beneficial to both countries for 60 years that has both
scientific and commercial applications. If I feel a lot better
about fuel assembly plates that have been tested other than in
an operating civilian reactor, the safety implications are
great. The commercial implications are important. And the
Department of Energy--I am sorry they were not able to be here
today--would tell you as well in far more clarity than I could
what are the scientific benefits that we get from this
agreement.
I do not feel that including the same provision on advance
consent for retransfer to the U.K. and France, the same
provision that we had in the 1984 agreement with Norway, led in
any way to an increased risk of proliferation. If I thought it
did, I would be making a very different argument. But I just do
not see it.
Senator Markey. Well, you know, from my perspective, it is
very disturbing to find that the United States does not have
the indigenous capacity to test aging components.
Mr. Countryman. That is not what I said.
Senator Markey. Excuse me?
Mr. Countryman. I did not say that we do not have the
capacity.
Senator Markey. Well, then that our capacity would then be
used in order to test these aging components in our nuclear
power plants without the need for us to have a 123 agreement
with Norway. So that is my point.
If we are at this point where we need Norway with no
nuclear to help a country that has 100 nuclear power plants and
we have been doing it for 70 years to test aging components in
our nuclear power plants, you are right. We are more like
Russia. We are a lot like Russia. The nuclear industry in
America is a lot like Russia that way because honestly nuclear
power plants are like human beings. You know, they run down.
Their parts internally start to wear out, which is why they
have to replace so many parts inside of nuclear power plants.
But to think from my perspective that Norway has to do it
for us and that we have to have a 123 agreement to have Norway
help us to me, as a justification for this, is pretty low. It
is pretty low. And I just say that quite clearly unless we just
want to keep good relations with them, which is fine, and
Norway wants to have a partnership with this company. That is
fine. Norway wants to have a partnership with the Nuclear
Energy Institute in the United States. That is fine.
But from my perspective, I am shocked that we do not have
the indigenous capacity in the United States to do the testing
of aging nuclear parts in a nuclear power plant. I have
Seabrook serving my constituents, the Pilgrim nuclear power
plant. To think that we are dependent upon the Norwegians to do
this research to make sure that now these aging plants do not
endanger the public is a little bit frightening. I did not come
to this hearing really understanding why we are doing this, but
it is becoming more clear to me what is going on here.
And I guess I would say, again, as an alternative to
reprocessing, I would prefer dry cask storage, some form of
storage for our own materials. We have learned how to do that
long, long, long ago.
The Norwegians actually have a global seed vault on the
island of Spitsbergen. It is very secure. All the seeds of the
world. Maybe we could put a couple of spent fuel casks there
and we would not have to reprocess it. It is such a small
amount, it sounds like, that we would not have to do this kind
of a change in the law.
But this linkage between the Nuclear Energy Institute and
this company, which I never heard of until today, Lightbridge
and its linkage to this, I think it requires its own hearing.
Who are these people? And what do they want? And if there is
anyone from Lightbridge here or Edison Electric Institute--is
there anyone here from Edison Electric Institute by any chance?
Anyone here? Okay. Well, maybe that would be a good hearing for
us to have so that we can discuss why we are making this
exception.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Countryman. If I might, first I just want to make clear
for the record that at no point did I compare the United States
nuclear industry to the Russian nuclear industry.
Secondly, I do not believe I said anything that would lead
the conclusion that the United States has no research reactors
or is incapable of doing the same kind of research here. That
is not something either you or I know.
Senator Markey. I think they do have the capacity. I think
they do. That is why it is called the Nuclear Energy Institute.
They pay for this vast amount of research that is done for the
entire industry, and I think they have the capacity.
Mr. Countryman. Fine.
I strongly disagree that the agreement is intended only for
one company or for one research project. I would be very happy
to come back with a 90-minute presentation about all the
research that has been done at this reactor.
I do not believe that it is in the United States' interest
to pursue an autarchic policy of avoiding scientific and
technical cooperation in the civilian nuclear field. I think
that we have reliable, responsible partners, and Norway is at
the top of the list.
Senator Markey. If I just may add, it is not that--I guess
I would use the world ``apocalyptic,'' not--what is the word
you used?
Mr. Countryman. Autarchic.
Senator Markey. Autarchic. ``Autarchic'' is a good word.
But my side of the argument is apocalyptic. You know, why
do we continue to take baby steps towards that moment in time,
if it is unnecessary? So I think that justification, that
argument just has to be made.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Perdue. Thank you, Senator Markey.
I would like to look at what is coming. I think we have
undressed this one pretty well today.
Can you give us an update on the ongoing negotiations with
Saudi Arabia and Jordan and their 123 agreements? What are the
major issues on those two, briefly?
And then lastly, have rights that have been granted to
Iran, specifically enrichment rights, under the JCPOA come into
play with these conversations with either Jordan or Saudi
Arabia?
Mr. Countryman. First, for both Jordan and Saudi Arabia, I
would say that we continue to be in discussions on this issue
but not in negotiations. We are not working on text at the
moment.
The wonderful thing about discussions as opposed to
negotiations is that all kinds of issues come up, including----
Senator Perdue. For the record, I should say--I just want
to make clear for the record we do not have an existing 123
with either of these countries today. Is that correct?
Mr. Countryman. That is correct.
When you have discussions, all kinds of questions can come
up, including their views of the Joint Comprehensive Program of
Action, of what Iran is doing, of what the U.S. should do in
response. It can be difficult to get down to the actual
business of putting in the technical requirements that need to
be there.
It remains the fact that the JCPOA is not a 123 agreement.
The JCPOA does not create civilian nuclear cooperation between
the United States and Iran. And I think trying to transfer
clauses or arguments from one agreement to an agreement that
has a totally different purpose is not productive. That does
not mean it is not a frequent subject of rhetoric.
Senator Perdue. Have the Saudis brought it up specifically?
And would the administration be receptive to acquiescing on
that?
Mr. Countryman. To having them bring it up?
Senator Perdue. No. To giving them the right or negotiating
the right to allow them to enrich.
Mr. Countryman. No.
Senator Perdue. The administration would not be supportive
of that.
Mr. Countryman. There is no need.
Senator Perdue. What about Jordan? Is that progressing as
well? And what is the anticipated timeline of either of these?
Is anything anticipated there?
Mr. Countryman. Nothing is anticipated in the immediate
future.
Senator Perdue. Okay. Thank you very much. That concludes
my questions. Do you have follow-up?
Senator Markey. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
So, again, I would just conclude by saying that we have our
own research reactors in the United States. We have our own
brilliant scientists here in the United States. The Edison
Electric Institute has its own vast research capacity here in
the United States. We can disagree about the cost of advance
consent.
We do not know the benefits or the need for it. We do not
have the answers to those questions yet. Why do we need to do
this? What are the benefits of us doing this? So we still have
not laid that out yet for who they are or what those benefits
are and why we have to act so soon without having a more
comprehensive understanding of why we are doing this except
that we could.
But I just think that that case should be made and why that
domestic capacity does not exist for us to be able to do it if
an exception has to be made and a 123 agreement has to be done.
There must be a compelling reason for this and we should hear
that reason and we should hear about the deficiencies in the
U.S. infrastructure to do that kind of nuclear research
capacity here, especially on a commercial level because that
seems to be most of what this is about. And I would like to
hear that because of this direct correlation between what we
are trying to preach here and what we could perhaps avoid ever
having to give as permission to Norway if we could just solve
the problem here domestically.
So I think it is an energy issue first and a research
issue, and if there is some capacity that Norway has that we do
not have, I would like to hear it. If they have scientists that
have greater capacity than American scientists, I would like
someone to tell us that. If their facility is more
sophisticated in Norway than any we have in the United States,
I would like to hear that as well. That is just the other
argument made and I think that is the precondition to us
understanding why a 123 agreement should be passed.
So I thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much, and I thank you,
Mr. Countryman, as usual. You know, you are the man.
Mr. Countryman. Two quick comments. Just to be clear, I am
not demanding, rushing, pushing, encouraging either body to
take action on this. Take the time you want. If we have not
answered your questions well enough, as I said, we will come
back with a more detailed briefing.
I particularly make that offer because I feel that I have
not served you well today because I do not have the specific
answers to your questions about quantities. It is not hard to
find out what has happened to the small amounts of spent fuel
that have come out of that reactor over the last 50 years. I
will find that out. We can do this again at your convenience.
And I thank you.
Senator Markey. Thank you, sir.
Senator Perdue. It would be nice to put that in
perspective, but I will remind us all that there is no quantity
too small to pay attention to in this area, for sure, as you
well said.
Thank you so much again. And I would ask you to do what you
have always done. You have been very gracious and helpful in
responding to these open issues. Thank you for that.
And for the information of members, the record will remain
open until close of business Monday, including for members to
submit questions for the record.
Again, thank you so much for your work. Thank you for being
here today.
With that, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:22 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted to Assistant Secretary
Thomas M. Countryman by Senator Marco Rubio
Question 1. The previous section 123 agreement with Norway expired
over two years ago. Why did it take two years to renegotiate and
transmit to Congress?
Answer. When the 1984 U.S.-Norway 123 Agreement was on the verge of
expiration in 2014, neither U.S. industry nor the Government of Norway
expressed a strong desire to conclude a new agreement. Since that time,
we have received multiple requests from the U.S. nuclear industry for
the reestablishment of a legal foundation to facilitate exports to
Norway, so we have taken steps to put in place a new agreement.
Question 2. If the clock runs out on the review period before the
end of this Congress, why would the administration choose to conclude a
trilateral supply agreement with the IAEA instead of waiting to
resubmit the agreement to the next Congress? Does Norway approve of
this option?
Answer. If we are required to resubmit the Norway 123 Agreement in
the 115th Congress, we may not receive an adequate number of days of
review to enter the agreement into force until the spring or summer of
2017. At least one U.S. nuclear supplier has indicated it wishes to
send nuclear material for testing purposes to Norway's Halden reactor
in early 2017. Accordingly, a U.S.-Norway-International Atomic Energy
Agency Project & Supply Agreement is seen as a stop gap measure to
allow this early 2017 shipment to occur until the 123 agreement may be
entered into force. Norway supports the establishment of the Project &
Supply Agreement.
Question 3. Please provide an update on other pending 123
agreements the administration is now negotiating.
Answer. The United States continues to be in active 123 agreement
negotiations with both Saudi Arabia and Jordan. The United States has
also conducted one round of 123 agreement negotiations with Mexico in
September. The negotiations made significant progress and we are
hopeful to complete negotiations before the end of the year.
__________
Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted to Assistant Secretary
Thomas M. Countryman by Senator Edward Markey
Question 1. Secretary Countryman, unlike the previous 123
agreement between Norway and the United States, the proposed new
agreement prohibits enrichment of U.S.-obligated material without our
consent. However, like the previous agreement, the new agreement
provides Norway with advance consent to retransfer U.S.-obligated spent
fuel to the U.K. or France for reprocessing.
During our negotiations with Norway, did the United States
seek to remove the provision allowing for advance consent? If
not, why not? If yes, why was the provision not struck?
Question 2. If there is no research need that is fulfilled by
providing advance consent to Norway to retransfer U.S.-obligated spent
fuel for reprocessing, why does the proposed agreement provide such
consent?
Answer. The United States inserts this language into its 123
agreements in order to provide certainty to our nuclear trading
partners that they have an alternative to keeping their spent fuel.
Providing our trading partners with the ability to retransfer their
spent fuel serves as an additional inducement not to consider
reprocessing it themselves and thereby accrue separated plutonium.
Question 3. What, if anything, did Norway disclose to our
negotiating team about its intent to exercise its rights under this
provision by retransferring spent fuel for reprocessing?
Answer. United States and Norwegian negotiators did not discuss
whether or when Norway might send U.S.-obligated spent fuel to the
United Kingdom or France. I would note that only a very small amount of
nuclear material, less than two kilograms, is scheduled to be
transferred from the United States to Norway over the course of the
next year. Further, the United States would need to provide consent to
Norway to receive any separated plutonium resulting from reprocessing
U.S.-obligated material in the United Kingdom or France.
Question 4. What is your understanding of how much U.S.-obligated
spent fuel Norway intends to reprocess under this provision, if any?
Answer. Norway did not state any intention to reprocess any U.S.-
obligated nuclear material. I would also note that only a very small
amount of nuclear material, less than two kilograms, is scheduled to be
transferred from the United States to Norway over the course of the
next year.
Question 5. What will be the intended use for any separated
plutonium that results from such reprocessing?
Answer. Any separated plutonium that might result from any
reprocessing to occur in the United Kingdom or France would remain in
storage in one of those two nations absent written consent of the
United States to transfer it elsewhere, including back to Norway. The
Norwegian government has not indicated any interest in obtaining any
separated plutonium.
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