    [Senate Hearing 114-658, Part 4]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                     S. Hrg. 114-658, Pt. 4

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2017 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 2943

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
       MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
                                    PURPOSES

                                   ----------

                                     PART 4

                                    AIRLAND

                                   ----------

                           MARCH 8, 16; APRIL 5, 2016

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             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
           2017 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM--Part 4  AIRLAND

                                                     S. Hrg. 114-658, Pt. 4

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2017 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 2943

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
       MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
                                    PURPOSES

                                   __________

                                     PART 4

                                    AIRLAND

                                   __________

                           MARCH 8, 16; APRIL 5, 2016

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

            Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/

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                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

      JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman          JACK REED, Rhode Island
    JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma                 BILL NELSON, Florida
    JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama                    CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
    ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi              JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
    KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire               JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
    DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                     KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas                      RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
    MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota                 JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
    JONI ERNST, Iowa                          MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
    THOM TILLIS, North Carolina               TIM KAINE, Virginia
    DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska                      ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
    MIKE LEE, Utah                            MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
    LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
    TED CRUZ, Texas

                          Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
                          Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director

                                    ____________

                            Subcommittee on Airland

    TOM COTTON, Arkansas, Chairman           JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
    JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma                CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
    JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama                   KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
    ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi             RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
    MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota                JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
    JONI ERNST, Iowa                         MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
    DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska                     MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
    MIKE LEE, Utah

                                      (ii)

                               C O N T E N T S

                                   ______

                                 March 8, 2016

                                                                       Page

    Air Force Modernization..........................................     1

    Costello, Darlene J., Acting Assistant Secretary of the Air Force     4
      for Acquisition; Accompanied by: Lieutenant General Arnold W.
      Bunch, Jr., USAF, Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant
      Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition; Lieutenant General
      James M. Holmes, USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic
      Plans and Requirements; Lieutenant General John W. Raymond,
      USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations.

                                 March 16, 2016

    Army Unmanned Aircraft Vehicle and Air Force Remotely Piloted        43
      Aircraft Enterprises.

    Carlisle, General Herbert J., USAF, Commander, Air Combat Command    44
    Perkins, General David G., USA, Commanding General, U.S. Army        50
      Training and Doctrine Command.
    Farrell, Brenda S., Director, Defense Capabilities and               55
      Management, Government Accountability Office.

                                 April 5, 2016

    Army Modernization...............................................   105

    Williamson, Lieutenant General Michael E., USA Military Deputy      109
      and Director, Army Acquisition Corps, Office of the Assistant
      Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and
      Technology.
    McMaster, Lieutenant General Herbert R., Jr., USA Director, Army    119
      Capabilities Integration Center; Deputy Commanding General,
      Futures, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command.
    Anderson, Lieutenant General Joseph, USA Deputy Chief of Staff of   120
      the Army (G-3/5/7).
    Murray, Lieutenant General John M., Deputy Chief of Staff of the    120
      Army, G-8.

                                     (iii)

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2017 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, MARCH 8, 2016

                                   U.S. Senate,
                               Subcommittee on Airland,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                            AIR FORCE MODERNIZATION

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:31 p.m. in
    Room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Tom Cotton
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Subcommittee members present: Senators Cotton, McCain,
    Inhofe, Wicker, Rounds, Ernst, Lee, Manchin, Blumenthal, and
    Donnelly.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TOM COTTON

        Senator Cotton. This hearing will come to order.
        The Airland Subcommittee meets today to consider Air Force
    modernization in the context of review and oversight of the
    fiscal year 2017 defense budget request.
        I welcome our witnesses, Acting Assistant Secretary of the
    Air Force for Acquisition, Ms. Darlene Costello; the Military
    Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition,
    Lieutenant General Arnold Bunch; Deputy Chief of Staff for
    Strategic Plans and Requirements, Lieutenant General James
    Holmes; and Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Lieutenant
    General John Raymond. Thank you all for your service and we
    appreciate your testimony here today.
        At $18 billion less than last year, the President's defense
    budget request for this fiscal year is disappointing. The
    President has submitted five budgets since 2011. Each budget
    has under-resourced the military, while the President has also
    portrayed the world as safer than it was when he took office or
    asserted that the U.S. needed to step back from the world
    stage. The current budget request has rhetorically acknowledged
    an increase of worldwide threats and that our military's
    capabilities are eroding. However, it still conforms to
    arbitrary budget caps put in place five years ago.
        This is nowhere more apparent than in the Air Force
    modernization program. Atop the service's priorities are the F-
    35A next generation fighter aircraft, the KC-46A air refueling
    tanker aircraft, a replacement for the legacy KC-135, and the
    B-21 long-range strike bomber. While all three are needed, the
    focus on these three priorities could put at risk modernization
    in future years and gives our priorities the appearance of
    being somewhat unfocused.
        For example, they are the highest priority. The President's
    budget cuts procurement of five F-35A fighters. Further, it
    cuts modernization of F-15 fighter aircraft and reduces
    procurement of C-130J aircraft by $724 million.
        Unfortunately, unlike the other services, the Air Force did
    not grow much during the post-9/11 buildup. Rather, it got
    smaller as older aircraft were retired and replacement
    programs, such as the F-35, experienced excessive delays in
    bringing new aircraft into the fleet. For example, air
    superiority is overwhelmingly being supported by the F-15,
    which makes up 71 percent of air superiority platforms but has
    consumed over 90 percent of its estimated 30-year service life.
    The eventual retirement of 438 F-15's in the fleet and the
    replacement by only 177 F-22's, with eventual support from the
    F-35, is a serious gamble.
        We cannot afford to assume that the enemy will resemble
    threats of recent wars, nor can we assume that future fights
    will not require greater numbers of advanced aircraft. We have
    to be ready to fight tonight on any battlefield and with any
    foe. The current investment strategy is too risky and will
    prove only to be riskier in the near future.
        To that end, in January of this year, the Center for
    Strategic and International Studies released a report detailing
    the impending modernization bow wave for the DOD [Department of
    Defense]. When you also include all the other Air Force
    modernization imperatives, the annual price tag for this wave
    peaks in 2023 at nearly $35 billion and accounts for more than
    half of the entire DOD's investment wave.
        Yet, modernization, particularly capability and capacity,
    cannot be placed at odds with readiness or other needs. Simply
    reducing quantities of other aircraft, retiring legacy systems,
    or deferring modernization on other programs will not achieve
    the Air Force the Nation needs for the next fight. Increasing
    the top line of defense spending is the only solution that will
    ultimately blunt the bow wave and achieve the concurrent
    capability and capacity we need.
        After that, we should next consider fencing off funding for
    platforms and systems crucial to the Nation's nuclear deterrent
    and maintaining the nuclear triad. Second, we should continue
    investment and procurement of next generation technologies to
    build capability while also maintaining and upgrading the
    legacy fleets to preserve capacity. Both are essential to
    preserving America's global dominance of the skies.
        Again, I want to thank our witnesses. We look forward to
    your testimony.
        Senator Manchin?

                  STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOE MANCHIN III

        Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, I want to extend the welcome and thank each
    of our witnesses for appearing before this subcommittee today.
        I also want to thank each of you representing the men and
    women of the armed forces for the wonderful jobs they are
    performing in Afghanistan and all around the world. We keep all
    of those who are serving right now in our thoughts and prayers
    and also remember that both they and their families are serving
    and sacrificing every day.
        Our witnesses this afternoon face huge challenges as they
    strive to balance the need to support ongoing operations and
    sustain readiness with the need to modernize and keep the
    technological edge so critical to military success.
        These challenges have been made particularly difficult by
    the spending caps imposed in the Budget Control Act, caps that
    were relieved somewhat for fiscal year 2016 and 2017 in the
    Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 that we enacted late last year.
        However, these caps are scheduled to resume again in fiscal
    year 2018 and beyond. Unless modified for years after fiscal
    year 2018, they will threaten our long-term national security
    interests.
        Every year we are challenged to make decisions balancing a
    number of competing demands for resources, including resources
    for current operations and investment in future modernization.
    In this case, we will be assessing plans and programs regarding
    the current status and future prospects for tactical aviation
    programs. Again, this year, the Air Force is proposing further
    reductions in the future years defense program, including
    eliminating the entire A-10 aircraft fleet.
        The Air Force awarded the long-range bomber, the LRS-B,
    contract last fall. The Air Force has named the bomber the B-
    21. The award just came through the protest with the Government
    Accountability Office, GAO [Government Accountability Office],
    denying the protest. The Air Force awarded a contract that
    provides for a cost plus incentive fee structure for the
    engineering and manufacturing development phase of the program,
    with fixed price contracts for production. I know that Chairman
    McCain has taken exception to this contracting approach. I look
    forward to hearing from our witnesses about why they think the
    Air Force plan represents the best value for the taxpayer.
        There are several other force structure adjustments that
    are of concern. The Air Force plans to eliminate six Compass
    Call EC-30H aircraft in fiscal year 2019. There are other
    reductions, including the AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control
    System] and JSTARS [Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar
    System], that are planned for later in the future years defense
    program. While there is a plan to recapitalize the JSTARS with
    new aircraft and a radar program, I am concerned that the Air
    Force plans to retire aircraft like AWACS and Compass Call with
    no planned replacement in sight.
        There are a number of other issues that we may discuss, but
    in the interest of time, I am going to stop here.
        Again, I want to thank our witnesses. I look forward to
    hearing your testimonies.
        I want to thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
        Ms. Costello?

    STATEMENT OF DARLENE J. COSTELLO, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
       THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION; ACCOMPANIED BY: LIEUTENANT
    GENERAL ARNOLD W. BUNCH, JR., USAF, MILITARY DEPUTY, OFFICE OF
       THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION;
    LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES M. HOLMES, USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
     FOR STRATEGIC PLANS AND REQUIREMENTS; LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN
         W. RAYMOND, USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS

        Ms. Costello. Chairman Cotton, Ranking Member Manchin,
    members of the committee, thank you for your continued support
    of the U.S. Air Force, our airmen, and their families. We
    welcome today's opportunity to discuss the Air Force's current
    and projected operations around the world, our plans for the
    modernization of key Air Force weapon systems, and to allay our
    concerns regarding the programmatic impacts that budget
    uncertainty brings. It is a privilege to be here, and we look
    forward to answering your questions.
        For the past 25 years, the U.S. Air Force has been the most
    globally engaged Air Force on the planet. Within the past year,
    our 24,000 deployed airmen have flown missions over the Korean
    peninsula with F-22's and B-52's to dissuade the North Korean
    regime and demonstrate our resolve to our South Korean allies.
        Our bombers are patrolling the South China Sea to validate
    the right for all nations to maintain freedom of navigation in
    internationally recognized waters.
        Remotely piloted aircraft, combat search and rescue, and
    mobility assets are operating throughout Africa combating
    transregional violent extremist organizations.
        We have invested in building partner capacity with our
    friends and allies in South America, as well as conducting
    counternarcotics operations.
        Of course, we continue our commitment to Europe through our
    strategic partnerships and deployment of theater security
    packages.
        We continue prosecuting operations against the Islamic
    State in Iraq and Syria, and we provide training and
    operational support to the Afghan National Defense and Security
    Forces in Afghanistan.
        The Air Force has done all this while committing over
    200,000 airmen in place to defend the homeland, operate
    remotely piloted aircraft, control our nuclear space and cyber
    forces, and provide rapid global mobility.
        However, during those 25 years of continuous combat
    operations, budget decisions have taken a toll on our ability
    to provide for the joint force in the future.
        For example, the Air Force has simultaneously reduced total
    force military and civilian personnel over 30 percent, cut
    combat-coded fighter squadrons by 59 percent, and slashed
    annual procurement of fighter aircraft by 88 percent, all while
    standing up new ISR [Intelligence Surveillance &
    Reconnaissance] and cyber missions.
        When combined with the fiscal restraints levied by the
    Budget Control Act and our extended combat operations in a
    permissive air environment, our Air Force today stands at less
    than 50 percent ready for full spectrum conflict and operates
    the oldest fleet of aircraft in its history at an average age
    of 27 years.
        Additionally, during that same quarter century, our
    adversaries have shrunk the technological gap. They have
    deployed new air, space, cyber, surface-to-air, and surface-to-
    surface capabilities aimed at neutralizing the American air,
    space, and maritime advantages that underwrite the joint force.
    Iran and North Korea have acquired new capabilities that
    threaten our allies and the stability of the regions where they
    live. Islamic extremists have expanded conflict from the Middle
    East into Africa and created a heart-rending flow of refugees.
    In short, we face new capabilities and new threats that will
    require new ways of thinking and consistent investment to
    counter.
        To frame the discussion of our fiscal year 2017
    presidential budget, it is important to understand the
    environment in which our strategic decisions were made. The
    limited resources available since the Budget Control Act of
    2011 have hampered our ability to balance readiness,
    capability, and capacity. The fiscal year 2017 presidential
    budget trades modernization, particularly the F-35 production
    rate and fourth generation fighter modifications, along with
    delayed recapitalization of the C-130H fleet, to sustain the
    capacity necessary to meet the combatant commanders' urgent
    needs for air, space, and cyber forces and begin recovering
    readiness levels after 25 years of continuous combat.
        While we are grateful for the additional resources the
    Bipartisan Budget Act provides, compared to the Budget Control
    Act caps, we need your support in the form of stable and
    predictable budgets if we are going to build the Air Force that
    ensures the joint force can continue to deter, deny, and
    decisively defeat any enemy that threatens the United States or
    our national interests. Any return to sequestration-level
    funding will force us to chase short-term requirements at the
    expense of long-term strategic planning, modernization, and
    readiness, and our budget problems will only get worse between
    now and the end of this five-year plan.
        On the acquisition front, first let me say that I am
    humbled by the selection to this position by the Air Force. I
    have watched the Air Force from my oversight roles with the
    Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
    Technology, and Logistics, and I have seen a transformation
    over the last few years. Through the development of Air Force
    acquisition priorities, the wholesale adoption of better buying
    power practices, and through their own bending-the-cost-curve
    initiatives, the Air Force has emerged as a disciplined,
    deliberate, value-focused enterprise that is stretching every
    dollar to obtain capability for our warfighters. I am proud to
    now lead this enterprise, if only temporarily, as we all look
    forward to the appointment of a permanent Assistant Secretary
    for Acquisition and Logistics as soon as possible.
        Again, thank you for your service to the United States and
    for your continued support of our airmen, both military and
    civilian, serving our great Nation.
        I would like to introduce the other witnesses you have
    invited today. It is a privilege to be sitting here next to my
    partner in acquisition, the Military Deputy, Lieutenant General
    Arnie Bunch, and two of my distinguished colleagues: Lieutenant
    General Mike Holmes, who leads the development and integration
    of the Air Force strategy, long-range plans, as well as
    operational capabilities-based requirements; and Lieutenant
    General Jay Raymond, who is responsible for Air Force
    operations to include air, space, cyber, irregular warfare,
    counterproliferation, homeland security, and weather.
        You have assembled a broad group here, and we all look
    forward to your questions. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Costello, General Holmes,
    General Raymond, and General Bunch follows:]

    Prepared Combined Statements by Ms. Darlene J. Costello, Lt. Gen. James
      M. ``Mike'' Holmes, Lt. Gen. John W. ``Jay'' Raymond, and Lt. Gen.
                              Arnold W. Bunch, Jr.
                                i. introduction
        Chairman Cotton, Ranking Member Manchin and distinguished members
    of the Airland Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to provide
    an update on the United States Air Force's Force Structure and
    Modernization. Today's demand for Air Force capabilities continues to
    grow as airmen provide America with unmatched global vigilance, global
    reach and global power. airmen are engaged defending United States
    interests around the globe, supporting combatant commander requirements
    in response to growing challenges from Russia, China, North Korea and
    Iran, all in addition to the ever present counter-terrorism mission in
    the Middle East and around the world. While our forces have been
    heavily engaged in deterring or addressing these operational
    challenges, our adversaries have taken the opportunity to invest in and
    advance their own capabilities. For the first time in decades, our
    adversaries are closing in on our capability advantage. Our efforts to
    address these increasing challenges have been stymied by reduced and
    unpredictable appropriations.
        The limited resources available since the Budget Control Act of
    2011 have hampered our ability to balance readiness, capability and
    capacity. The Fiscal Year 2017 Presidential Budget balances
    modernization requirements with the requirement to sustain the capacity
    necessary to meet the combatant commanders' urgent needs for air, space
    and cyber forces and begin recovering readiness levels after 25 years
    of continuous combat. We're grateful for the additional resources the
    Bipartisan Budget Act provides compared to Budget Control Act caps;
    however, even at these funding levels, we continue to face difficult
    choices between capacity, readiness and modernization. We need your
    support in the form of stable and predictable appropriations if we are
    going to build the Air Force that ensures the joint force can continue
    to deter, deny and decisively defeat any enemy that threatens the
    United States or our national interests. Any return to sequestration-
    level funding will force us to chase short term requirements at the
    expense of long term strategic planning, modernization and readiness.
                             ii. operations update
        The Air Force flies and fights in air, space, and cyberspace--
    globally and reliably--as a valued member of our Joint and Coalition
    teams. Approximately 200,000 Total Force Airmen are ``committed in
    place'' supporting daily Combatant Command (COCOM) operations to defend
    the homeland, provide command and control of our nuclear forces,
    operate remotely piloted aircraft, provide rapid global mobility, and
    many other requirements. Approximately 24,000 airmen are deployed
    across the globe, including nearly 16,000 in the U.S. Central Command
    Area of Responsibility. The Air Force is an active partner in
    Department of Defense planning that will shift our emphasis from
    today's wars to a broader range of challenges and opportunities. The
    Department of Defense is currently reassessing strategic guidance
    issued last year, but we anticipate continued emphasis on and planning
    for a rebalance to the Asia Pacific region. Our challenge is to provide
    those who deploy in support of our global commitments an Air Force that
    is capable, agile, flexible, ready, and technologically advanced.
        During 2015, Air Force aircraft flew over 295,000 hours in support
    of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). On the home front, Air Force
    fighter, air refueling, and early warning aircraft have flown over
    69,000 total sorties supporting Operation Noble Eagle since September
    11, 2001. As a testament to the capability of our Total Force, the Air
    National Guard and Air Force Reserve have flown more than 70 percent of
    these sorties.
        Today, the Air Force is actively engaged in two major efforts;
    conducting operations against the Islamic State (ISIL) in Iraq and
    Syria as part of Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), and providing
    training and operational support to the Afghan National Defense &
    Security Forces (ANDSF) as part of Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS)
    and NATO-led Operation Resolute Support (ORS).
        Our two main efforts in OFS are continuing counterterrorism (CT)
    operations against the remnants of al Qaeda, and training, advising and
    assisting (TAA) our Afghan partners. The CT and TAA efforts are
    concurrent and complementary. While United States and Afghan forces
    continue to attack the remnants of al Qaeda, we are also building the
    ANDSF structure so they can secure the Afghan people and contribute to
    stability throughout the region. Both of these efforts will contribute
    to a more secure and productive Afghanistan and prevent the re-
    emergence of terrorist safe havens. As an example, the U.S. Air Force
    helped develop the Afghan Special Mission Wing (SMW), which provides
    the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) with the operational reach
    and manned Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) capability
    required to support counter terrorism and counter narcotics missions.
    The SMW is now capable of executing long-range, full-mission profiles
    in low illumination. Working together with the ASSF, the commando units
    and SMW consistently conduct unilateral direct action missions against
    insurgent leaders and facilitators.
        The NATO Resolute Support mission provides training, advice and
    assistance in eight key areas: multi-year budgeting; transparency,
    accountability and oversight; civilian governance of the Afghan
    Security Institutions; force generation; force sustainment; strategy
    and policy planning, resourcing and execution; intelligence; and
    strategic communications. In support of these essential functions,
    United States Air Force advisors work to develop the Afghan Air Force
    across their entire air enterprise--from fixed and rotary wing
    operations and maintenance, to engineering and logistics, and force
    development and budgeting. The Afghan Air Force operates the Mi-17
    transport helicopter, Mi-35 attack helicopter, Cessna 208B basic
    trainer and light lift aircraft, MD-530 light attack helicopter, A-29
    turbo prop light attack aircraft, and the C-130 medium lift Hercules.
    Recently the first four A-29 Super Tucano light air support fighters
    were delivered to Afghanistan. The aircraft are scheduled to go into
    action in early April when four more will be delivered. The Afghan Air
    Force has a total of 20 A-29 aircraft on order. Future Afghan pilots
    are currently in training at Moody Air Force Base. In the last year,
    the Afghan Air Force has taken over much of the mission, providing
    casualty evacuation and aerial attack in support of Afghan ground
    forces and providing the majority of helicopter and much of the fixed
    wing maintenance
        Our two main efforts in OIR are to systematically attack ISIL's
    critical capabilities and support indigenous forces on the ground as
    they take the fight to ISIL. United States Airpower has already
    achieved positive effects in Iraq and Syria. By virtue of the pressure
    we're putting on ISIL from the air, we've disrupted their
    communications, reduced their financial capacity and degraded their
    freedom of maneuver. They've dispersed, they're hiding among the
    population more, and they aren't as free to operate as they once were.
    In Iraq and northern Syria, airstrikes and resupply efforts have helped
    indigenous forces to retake and hold key territory, although the
    situation on the ground remains dynamic. Airstrikes have destroyed ISIL
    command and control (ex: headquarters buildings), logistics (training
    camps & vehicle staging areas), and revenue sources (oil infrastructure
    & bulk cash storage), making it harder for ISIL to sustain itself as a
    fighting force.
        The U.S. Air Force takes great care in everything from our
    intelligence collection and analysis to our choice of weapons used for
    targeting to minimize the chance of harming civilians. No other
    military in the world takes the responsibility to protect civilians
    more seriously than we do. In addition, the United States Air Force has
    alleviated civilian suffering in Iraq through delivery of meals, water,
    and other vital supplies via airdrops and, more importantly, by
    providing advice and training that have enabled the Iraaqi air force to
    continue independent humanitarian relief and operational resupply
    efforts.
        Despite differences, the United States and our International
    Coalition partners are united over the long term against the common
    threat posed by ISIL. More than a dozen coalition nations are
    supporting air operations against ISIL, where they are responsible for
    more than 20 percent of all sorties and more than 15 percent of all
    strikes. As of February 23rd, the United States and coalition partners
    have conducted a total of 10,545 strikes (7,061 Iraq / 3,484 Syria).
    The United States has conducted 8,076 strikes in Iraq and Syria (4,809
    Iraq / 3,267 Syria) and the rest of the Coalition has conducted 2,469
    strikes in Iraq and Syria (2,252 Iraq / 217 Syria) As of February 22nd,
    United States and partner nation aircraft have flown an estimated
    69,877 sorties in support of operations in Iraq and Syria. More than 60
    nations have expressed willingness to participate in the effort against
    ISIL, and more than 30 nations have indicated their readiness to offer
    military support. All 22 nations of the Arab League have adopted a
    resolution calling for comprehensive measures to combat ISIL.
        The ISIL contagion is a transregional threat that extends outside
    of Iraq and Syria and across COCOM borders. As demonstrated by the
    deliberate airstrikes against Islamic State in Libya, the flexibility,
    precision and lethality of United States Air Force airpower continues
    to provide effective options against transregional threats. Despite
    these successes in CENTCOM and AFRICOM, we recognize there are limits
    to what U.S. Airpower can accomplish. Airstrikes alone will not achieve
    our full military objectives. The forces that matter most are
    indigenous ground forces. This is going to be a long, difficult
    struggle that requires strategic patience.
                     iii. force structure and modernization
    Fighters
        Four years ago, based on the 2012 DSG and severe fiscal
    constraints, the Air Force rebalanced our fighter force structure using
    analysis which showed the Air Force could decrease fighter force
    structure by approximately 100 aircraft if it were willing to accept
    higher risk. This resulted in the current fighter inventory of
    approximately 1,100 primary mission aircraft and slightly more than
    1,950 total aircraft. This inventory complies with fiscal year 2016
    NDAA language on the limitation on retirement of Air Force Fighter
    Aircraft.
        The Air Force needs an affordable force structure that meets the
    needs of today's counter terrorism fight while still advancing our
    capabilities to fight the most advanced threats in the future. The Air
    Force is committed to balancing the costs of maintaining an adequate
    number of fighters that can operate across the spectrum of conflict to
    meet strategic guidance and will continue to pursue modernization
    efforts, recapitalization, and multi-domain capabilities that assure
    our freedom to operate in future threat environments.
        The Air Force's fighter fleet is approaching 30 years old on
    average--the oldest in our history. Without recapitalization and
    selective capability upgrades, it will not be possible to mitigate the
    growing risk. Gaining and maintaining air and space superiority in
    increasingly contested environments will be our toughest mission. The
    Air Force is currently pursuing programs that will modernize and
    potentially extend the service life of our existing fleets. The F-35
    acquisition program is key to our efforts to improve our capabilities
    relative to improving threats and maintain capacity as our legacy
    fleets become unsupportable. Any further delay in the F-35 program will
    create a serious shortfall (mid and far-term) in fighter capabilities
    and force structure. Maintaining the 1900 TAI fighter force mandated in
    the 16 NDAA will require selected fourth generation sustainment and
    modernization efforts, F-22 modernization, and F-35 Full Rate
    Production (FRP). Fighter combat is a technologically driven that
    requires constant effort-agility is key. We have to reduce technology
    risks and field advanced capabilities in time to meet the operational
    needs over the long term. Following the top-down, multi-domain Air
    Superiority 2030+ Flight Plan being produced by the Air Superiority
    2030 Enterprise Capability Collaboration Team (ECCT), the Next
    Generation Air Dominance concept development and technology assessments
    will identify concepts and technologies that improve persistence,
    survivability, lethality, connectivity, interoperability and
    affordability. This effort will prove critical to the joint force's
    ability to engage in the most highly contested environments around the
    globe.
        Air Force mission success also depends on efficient management of
    our rated force, the most challenging of which is fighter force
    structure manning. The Air Force is currently 511 fighter pilots short
    of the total manning requirement and our projections indicate this
    deficit will continue to grow to approximately 834 by 2022. The
    shortfall is the result of force structure reductions of Active Duty
    fighter and fighter training squadrons. The remaining Active component
    fighter squadrons do not produce enough experienced fighter pilots to
    meet all of the staff, test, and training requirement. The Air Force
    prioritized overall available rated manpower to fill our operational
    cockpits, at significant risk to institutional requirements. Projected
    impacts include reductions in air-operations expertise during the
    development of war plans and a gradual erosion of fighter pilot
    experience in test and training. Recent programming and policy actions
    raised production and absorption capacities, and the Air Force has
    developed plans for future actions to address the shortfall, but
    current fiscal constraints place the implementation of these actions at
    risk. In addition, the Air Force created the non-rated 13L Air Liaison
    Officer (ALO) career field to reduce fighter pilot requirements in the
    ALO function. However, even with these changes, the Air Force is only
    able to slow the decline in fighter pilot inventory and will be
    incapable of meeting our overall requirement for fighter pilot
    expertise for the foreseeable future. Without these fighter pilots, the
    Air Force will be very challenged to continue to provide the air
    supremacy upon which all our other forces depend.
    A-10
        The fiscal year 2017 budget includes an Air Force decision to re-
    phase A-10 retirement (fiscal year 2018-fiscal year 2022) to sustain
    capacity for the current fight against ISIL while balancing long term
    capability requirements. This re-phase will cost $3.4 billion over the
    FYDP. The fiscal year 2017 budget fully funds the A-10 through the
    planned retirements, to include training, flying hours, depot
    maintenance, and required modernization efforts. The A-10 continues to
    be a steady, cost effective performer in today's permissive
    environment; however, it cannot survive or operate effectively in a
    highly contested environment dominated by more advanced aircraft or air
    defenses.
        The Air Force is funding a Combat Air Force Study over the next
    year, with a portion of this study dedicated to informing the fiscal
    year 2018-22 budget cycle on possible Tactical Air Support (TACAIR)
    Platform Alternatives for Low-intensity/Permissive Conflict. This will
    serve to ensure that other current platforms and future systems meet
    future close air support requirements. As part of this study, the Air
    Force will assist OSD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) and
    USD for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) as they lead a
    joint/inter-service team to assess needed capabilities for prolonged
    operations (greater than one year) in permissive environments, such as
    counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, stability operations, homeland
    defense, and peacekeeping operations. The analysis will address
    readiness costs, operating environment, basing, weapons carriage, time-
    on-station, ISR capability, survivability, and communications
    capability.
    F-16
        The multi-role F-16 comprises 50 percent of our fighter fleet. The
    fiscal year 2017 budget request invests $2.03 billion across the FYDP
    for F-16 modernization and service life extension to meet critical
    warfighter needs to 2030 and beyond. The majority of efforts in the
    FYDP focus on Legacy Service Life Extension Program (SLEP), Operational
    Flight Program (OFP) enhancement, upgrades to the Modular Mission
    Computer (MMC) and Programmable Display Generator (PDG), upgrades to
    the Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS), and a radar
    upgrade to meet a USNORTHCOM Homeland Defense Joint Urgent Operational
    Need (JUON).
        Fatigue testing completed in 2015 shows that Legacy SLEP will
    extend the airframe structural service life for up to 300 aircraft by
    approximately 50 percent from the current 8,000 hours to 12,000+ hours,
    adding about fifteen to twenty years of service life. The fiscal year
    2017 budget request begins initial procurement funding for Legacy SLEP
    needed for the Block 40-52 fleet to remain responsive to the Air
    Force's total fighter requirement. The fiscal year 2017 budget request
    for OFP enhancement will continue the integration of new weapons,
    avionics, improved targeting pods, and airspace compliance systems. The
    MMC and PDG upgrade will resolve processor, memory, and bandwidth
    issues that will allow capability growth through future OFP
    development. The MIDS upgrades will improve operational Link 16
    reliability while also incorporating frequency remapping, crypto
    upgrades and growth capability. The USNORTHCOM Homeland Defense Active
    Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar JUON provides an upgrade from
    the current APG-68 radar to a radar that offers advanced capabilities
    as well as improved reliability and maintainability to support the
    Aerospace Control Alert (ACA) mission.
    F-15
        The fiscal year 2017 budget request invests approximately $6.5
    billion across the FYDP on modernization and sustainment programs for
    the F-15 fleet. On-going structural tests indicate the C and D models
    airframes will reach their service life starting in the mid-2020s, and
    will likely require an airframe service life extension to operate
    beyond that timeframe. The FY17PB includes initial funding in fiscal
    year 2020/2021 for C/D airframe upgrades, but the final results of the
    structural testing and costs associated with a service life extension
    program must be weighed against the opportunity costs of investing in a
    30 year old airframe. The Air Force expects the F-15E to be an integral
    part of the Nation's force through at least 2040. A full-scale fatigue
    test, due to be complete in 2018 will provide data regarding the
    feasibility of a service life extension for the F-15E. Currently, the
    Air Force manages the fleet through scheduled field and depot
    inspections under an individual aircraft tracking program.
        In the meantime, we are continuing to modernize all F-15 models
    with state-of-the-art AESA radar systems with advanced capabilities to
    identify and engage targets. We will equip the F-15Cs with an infrared
    frequency targeting sensor that will vastly improve its targeting
    capabilities. The FY17PB also provides for upgrading F-15 C and E
    models with a more capable aircraft mission computer, a more robust and
    powerful data link, and a new electronic warfare self-protection suite,
    the Eagle Passive/Active Warning Survivability System (EPAWSS). This EW
    system will be absolutely crucial to ensuring the F-15C's and E's are
    able to operate well into the future, especially in contested
    environments. Lastly, the FY17PB request includes funding for the F-15E
    to integrate the latest precision weapons to accurately hit targets
    with reduced collateral damage, and adds a more robust and powerful
    data link to ensure the aircraft can accurately and securely be
    assigned targets when in support of ground units.
    Fifth Generation Fighters
        Fifth generation fighters like the F-22A and F-35 are vital
    elements of our nation's defense and deterrent capability. These
    advanced, state-of-the-art aircraft are absolutely essential in
    maintaining our current global air superiority that permits air, sea,
    and ground forces freedom of action. Each aircraft possess exclusive,
    complimentary, and indispensable capabilities that provide synergistic
    effects across the spectrum of conflict. While our potential
    adversaries continue to modernize, our legacy fourth generation
    aircraft are rapidly approaching the end of their effective service
    lives and are limited in their ability to operate in a highly contested
    environment. Our Air Force must rapidly re-capitalize our fourth
    generation aircraft. At the same time, we must sustain and modernize
    our fifth generation fleet in order to maintain our ability to execute
    our National Defense Strategy in the near to mid-term while looking
    even further into the future at further modernization efforts that
    ensure continued dominance in the air.
    F-22
        The F-22 Raptor is the only operational U.S. fighter currently
    capable of operating in highly contested environments. F-22 attributes
    of stealth, super cruise, integrated avionics and sensors combine to
    deliver the Raptor's unique operational capability. F-22 modernization
    is required to counter advancing threats that specifically target F-22
    capabilities. Focused on maintaining operational superiority against
    the evolving threat, the fiscal year 2017 budget request for F-22
    modernization includes $457.9 million in RDT&E in addition to $354.3
    million in procurement. Increment 3.1 fielding continues, delivering
    advanced air-ground capabilities including Synthetic Aperture Radar
    (SAR) ground mapping, threat geolocation, and Small Diameter Bomb (SDB)
    I carriage. Increment 3.1 is scheduled to complete in fiscal year 2018.
    Increment 3.2A is fielding concurrently with Increment 3.1, delivering
    critical electronic protection and combat identification upgrades.
    Increment 3.2 billion remains on track to field in 2018, and will
    deliver AIM-120 D and AIM-9 X missile capability and significantly-
    improved ground threat geolocation. The fiscal year 2017 budget also
    implements open mission systems--the essential, common enabler for
    three new programs that accelerate development, integration and
    fielding of 5th-5th / 5th-4th communications interoperability, helmet-
    mounted weapons cueing & GPS M-Code upgrades on the F-22.
    F-35
        During fiscal year 2017, the Air Force will continue to manage risk
    across the global precision attack portfolio by prioritizing investment
    in fifth-generation aircraft while sustaining legacy platforms as a
    bridge to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The aforementioned legacy
    fighter modifications are intended to keep a viable air superiority
    fleet in operation as the F-35 program works toward IOC in 2016.
        The multi-role F-35A is the centerpiece of the Air Force's future
    fighter precision attack capability, and it is of vital importance to
    our nation's security, forming the backbone of U.S. air combat
    superiority for decades to come. In addition to complementing the F-
    22's world class air superiority capabilities, the F-35A is designed to
    penetrate air defenses and deliver a wide range of precision munitions.
    This modern, fifth-generation aircraft brings the added benefit of
    increased allied interoperability and cost-sharing across Services and
    eight partner nations. The fiscal year 2017 budget request includes
    $5.85 billion for continued development and procurement of 43 F-35A,
    conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) aircraft.
        The F-35 program reached several milestones in 2015. Luke Air Force
    Base, Arizona, began training F-35 student pilots on January 23, 2015.
    The 31st Test and Evaluation Squadron's F-35As, from Edwards Air Force
    Base, California, flew close air support during the Green Flag 15-08
    exercise and in June, they worked with soldiers from the 1st Brigade
    Combat Team, Fort Bliss, Texas, to provide Close Air Support; one of
    the baseline missions for our IOC declaration. Also in June, two F-35As
    assigned to the 16th Weapons Squadron, Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada,
    were the first F-35s to participate in a capstone large-force
    employment exercise with the United States Air Force Weapons School.
    Finally, the first external weapons release tests, internal gun tests,
    and the first operational ordnance expenditures all occurred during
    2015, showing clear progress towards operationalizing the F-35.
        Today, the program is on the road to IOC for the Air Force, and we
    expect to declare IOC as planned in 2016. The 34th Fighter Squadron at
    Hill Air Force Base, Utah, the Air Force's IOC fighter squadron, took
    delivery of its first two F-35As on September 2, 2015, and it expects
    to have 12 aircraft by the end of May 2016. On September 23, 2015 the
    Integrated Test Force at Edwards Air Force Base, California, completed
    planned developmental test of the Block 3i mission software, which will
    be the baseline for the Air Force IOC declaration, and F-35A aircraft
    are in place at Nellis AFB to support tactics development for the
    warfighter. Going forward, we will continue to closely monitor progress
    toward IOC including implementation of any required post-DD-250 air
    system modifications, delivery of necessary Mission Data File loads,
    and the continued maturation of ALIS, a system that is critical to F-35
    operations at home and abroad. The Air Force will also continue to
    watch Block 3F (full warfighting capability), which currently has 4-6
    months of schedule risk. Production affordability remains a major
    priority, and the F-35 program continues to make great strides on this
    front. The price of F-35s continues to decline steadily lot after lot.
    For example, the price of a Lot 7 F-35A was 4.3 percent less than a Lot
    6 F-35A aircraft and a Lot 8 F-35A aircraft was 3.6 percent less than a
    Lot 7 F-35A, including the engine and profit for both contractors. We
    expect this trend to continue over the next two lots.
    Air-to-Surface Weapons
        All three mission areas (Stand-Off, Direct Attack, and Penetrator
    munitions) in the Air-to-Surface munitions inventory are short of
    inventory objectives. SDB weapons along with low observable platforms
    are force multipliers in a highly contested environment and their
    shortage could increase friendly force attrition. The shortage of
    penetrator weapons will increase risk to our forces and decrease our
    ability to target adversary critical capabilities. Combat operations
    and support for our coalition partners in Iraq and Syria are reducing
    inventories of JDAM tail kits, Hellfire missiles, and SDB I weapons
    faster than we are procuring them. Future Hellfire shortfalls were
    mitigated by fiscal year 2015 reprogramming for $400 million that
    increased production orders by 4,000 missiles. Those missiles will
    begin delivering in the fiscal year 2017 timeframe. In fiscal year
    2015, the Air Force received approval to replace current operational
    forecasted expenditures of JDAM tail kits and SDB I weapons with
    Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding. However it takes two to
    four years before procured assets make it back to the USAF inventory.
    Hellfire
        The Air Force continues to actively manage Hellfire inventories
    that have been depleted due to high expenditure rates in current
    operations against ISIL. Fiscal year 2015 reprogramming action
    sufficiently funded Hellfire inventories to begin inventory recovery in
    fiscal year 2017, allowing production orders in fiscal year 2016 and
    fiscal year 2017 to the maximum factory capacity.
    JDAM Tail Kits
        Due to current operations, the shortfall in JDAM tail kits will
    continue to increase. The root causes of the problem include extremely
    high expenditure rates--higher than previous contingencies--and a
    starting inventory below the desired objective. Additionally,
    historically low procurements over the past decade (7,758 average),
    driven by restricted budgets, led to diminished industrial capacity.
    The Air Force is mitigating the shortfall with three lines of effort:
    the rebalancing of stockpiles across combatant commands, the employment
    of alternative Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) when possible, and
    increased production of tail kits. The Air Force is negotiating with
    Boeing to increase production capacity from 18,900 units per year to
    36,500 by the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2017.
    SDB I and II
        Prior to current operations, the Air Force was already short of the
    SDB I inventory objective and had ceased procurements. Combat operation
    in Iraq and Syria have expended significant numbers of SDB I. In fiscal
    year 2017, the Air Force plans to procure 4,195 SDB I missiles with OCO
    funding.
        The SDB II will fill a key capability gap by using a multi-mode
    seeker and dual band weapon data link to enable attacks against mobile
    targets at standoff ranges, through the weather, outside of point
    defenses. SDB II will be a force multiplier by increasing the number of
    target platforms that can be attacked per sortie while inherently
    limiting collateral damage. Providing a four-fold increase in load out
    with its carriage system will allow the limited number of survivable
    initial combat forces to achieve operational objectives early in
    conflicts, paving the way for follow-on forces. SDB II is an
    Acquisition Category (ACAT) 1D program with the Air Force as the lead
    service in partnership with the Navy. Initial aircraft integration of
    the SDB II will be on the F-15E (Air Force threshold), F-35B & C
    (Department of Navy threshold), and F/A-18E/F.
        SDB II currently remains in Engineering, Manufacturing and
    Development and successfully received a favorable Milestone C decision
    in May 2015. Subsequently, the Air Force awarded the first Low Rate
    Initial Procurement (LRIP) contract to procure 144 weapons in June
    2015. In fiscal year 2016, SDB II will continue developmental and live
    fire testing and conduct government confidence test shots. The fiscal
    year 2017 procurement plans are to buy 312 weapons with deliveries
    starting in fiscal year 2018. Currently, the Air Force's total planned
    procurement for SDB II is 12,000 weapons.
    JASSM and JASSM-ER
        JASSM (baseline) and JASSM-ER (Extended Range) are currently the
    nation's only stealthy, conventional, precision, launch-and-leave,
    standoff missiles capable of fighter and bomber aircraft employment.
    They are capable of penetrating next generation enemy air defenses to
    strike high value, hardened, fixed, or mobile targets. The JASSM
    (baseline) has a range greater than 200 nautical miles while the JASSM-
    ER has a range greater than 500 nautical miles.
        The JASSM (baseline) weapon is in Full Rate Production (FRP); the
    14th production contract was awarded to Lockheed Martin on December 1,
    2015, for 100 missiles. About 1,520 missiles have been delivered. Of
    these about 1,227 are in the field and 278 at the Lockheed Martin
    production facility for repair, mostly for the surface wrinkling due to
    exposure to high humidity conditions. The repair is fully covered by
    warranty with no additional cost to the Air Force. A new coating
    (starting at lot 8) has corrected the surface wrinkling problem. Fiscal
    year 2016 procurement of 100 is the last JASSM (baseline) buy, for a
    total procurement of 2,034 missiles.
        JASSM-ER started FRP in fiscal year 2015, after completing four
    LRIP lots. As part of the 14th production contract awarded to Lockheed
    Martin on December 1, 2015, a total of 140 missiles were awarded, along
    with an option for an additional 100 missiles anticipated to award in
    March 2016. Currently, 96 missiles have been delivered. In fiscal year
    2017, the combined JASSM production line transitions to JASSM-ER only
    at the maximum and most efficient rate of 360 missiles per year.
    Currently, the last JASSM-ER procurement is planned for fiscal year
    2023, for a total JASSM-ER buy of 2,866 missiles.
    Air-to-Air Weapons
        Air-to-Air missile inventories in their latest variants are also
    short of objectives. The AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air to Air
    Missile (AMRAAM) and the AIM-9X Block II are in limited supply, placing
    reliance on less capable variants to meet combat objectives. These
    weapons enable the joint force to achieve Air Superiority by providing
    a first look first kill capability. A shortage of Air-to-Air missiles
    will increase the number of days required to gain Air Superiority, and
    will decrease the amount of time the Joint Force can maintain Air
    Superiority, which may leave the combatant commander short of their
    campaign objectives. Adversary capabilities and capacity continue to
    challenge the Joint Force's historical advantage in the air superiority
    arena.
    AIM-120D AMRAAM
        The AIM-120 AMRAAM is the Department of Defense's premier beyond-
    visual-range missile, operating at high or low altitude with electronic
    attack capabilities to counter existing and emerging air vehicle
    threats. AMRAAM is a key enabler for gaining air superiority and air
    dominance providing F-15, F-16, F/A-18, F-22 and eventually F-35
    aircraft the ability to achieve multiple kills per engagement. The
    latest evolution of AMRAAM is the AIM-120D, which brings increased
    range and kinematics, improved high off-boresight targeting, and an
    enhanced two-way data link for improved accuracy and lethality at
    range. AIM-120D is an ACAT 1C joint program, with the Air Force as lead
    service in partnership with the Navy.
        The AIM-120D completed operational testing in July 2014. The Navy
    fielded the missile and declared IOC for the F/A-18E/F on 7 January
    2015. The Air Force fielded the missile and declared IOC for the F-15,
    F-16, and F-22 on 9 Jul 2015. In fiscal year 2017, the Air Force plans
    to procure 256 AIM-120D's and the Navy plans to procure 163 AIM-120D's.
    The program will continue to update the AMRAAM technical data package
    to ensure a viable, producible design through the expected production
    life of the AMRAAM program, and to maintain a robust supplier base
    capable of sustaining production for the life of the program.
    Space
        We view our national security as inextricably dependent on space-
    enabled capabilities. At the same time, space has become contested,
    congested and competitive; our space capabilities today are facing
    advanced, demonstrated, and evolving threats, which require fundamental
    changes in the way we organize, train, and equip our forces. Congestion
    has increased the complexity of maintaining space situational
    awareness. There are over 60 active space-faring nations, nine of which
    have indigenous space launch capability. Almost any nation or state
    actor can access space services globally and globalization has made the
    latest technology available to our competitors and adversaries.
        Legacy space acquisitions relied on packing as much capability as
    possible into a few systems creating critical vulnerabilities. Current
    budget realities drive us to rely on legacy systems, while warfighter
    demands have driven the need for more capable systems. We must provide
    space capabilities that assure performance of military space functions,
    regardless of the hostile action or adverse condition. We must invest
    smartly in the highest payoff capabilities that enhance space domain
    mission assurance to include resilience, defense operations, and
    reconstitution of our space systems and architectures to ensure United
    States and Allied use of space through all phases of conflict. We seek
    to balance military and commercial systems and leverage international
    partner capabilities to allow the U.S. to share the cost of space
    power; provide additional coverage in areas the U.S. requires
    assistance in, and create a coalition structure that can promote
    deterrence.
        We recognize a conflict in space would hurt world economies and
    global stability; therefore, to address growing space threats, we are
    focused on sustaining our space capabilities, deterring threatening
    activity, and if necessary, pursuing means to mitigate counterspace
    threats.
    Cyber
        The Air Force continues to build its contribution to joint cyber
    mission forces by adding manpower for offensive and defensive cyber
    operations and equipping them with the right capabilities to ensure
    effective operations. We are building a standard cyber mission platform
    to simplify training and enable full-spectrum operations and continue
    to invest in converged cyber and electronic warfare capabilities. We
    are working with others across the Department of Defense to build a
    persistent training environment, consisting of jointly-interoperable
    ranges, dedicated operating forces, and supporting structures. We are
    enhancing our capacity to test our critical weapon, intelligence, and
    business systems for survivability in the increasingly hostile cyber
    environment.
        Further, we are leading the effort, in partnership with the other
    Services and Department of Defense agencies, to build Joint Regional
    Security Stacks. When fielded, this defensive boundary will provide
    global insight into activity, enabling rapid, coordinated Joint
    defensive operations. The standardized approach will enable sharing of
    Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) across the Department of
    Defense, so that detection of an attack on one Service, and the
    resultant mitigations, can be seamlessly applied across the entire
    Department of Defense. This reduces operational response times and
    mission impact. No individual service could have afforded this level of
    capability with its own resources; it is only by pooling funding across
    the entire department that we can obtain the level of capabilities we
    require to counter the growing cyber threats. This new defensive
    boundary is the foundational step toward a trustworthy, efficient Joint
    Information Environment.
        In short, we are on the path to put Cyber on par with Air and Space
    forces to achieve a multi-domain approach to mission accomplishment.
    Airborne Electronic Attack
        The Air Force is committed to providing airborne electronic attack
    capability in support of operations across all operational warfighting
    domains. The EC-130H COMPASS CALL is required in multiple war plans by
    multiple combatant commanders. House and Senate consensus language in
    the fiscal year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act stated that the
    divestiture, retirement or placing in storage any of the EC-130H
    COMPASS CALL aircraft would present unacceptable risk to ongoing and
    future combat operations. Thus, the Air Force has delayed the
    divestiture of six EC-130H COMPASS CALL aircraft until fiscal year
    2019. The Air Force will continue to investigate alternatives for
    airborne electronic attack capabilities to replace and rebuild capacity
    of the existing EC-130H COMPASS CALL fleet as part of the Joint
    Airborne Electronic Attack Family of Systems concept.
    Rapid Global Mobility and Personnel Recovery
        The Rapid Global Mobility fleet continues to pursue capability
    enhancements balanced by recapitalization and required modifications to
    operate in international airspace and avoid diminishing manufacturing
    source issues. Comprised of 396 KC-135 Stratotankers and 59 KC-10
    Extenders, our tanker fleet provides the backbone of rapid U.S. global
    operations. In addition to ongoing modernization efforts for our legacy
    tanker fleets, the FY17PB requests $2.9 billion to procure 15 KC-46A
    Pegasus tankers. Stability of requirements and funding are the keys to
    KC-46 program success.
        The Air Force is modernizing the C-130H fleet through a four-phased
    approach emphasizing aircraft safety, compliance, modernization, and
    recapitalization. First, we are ensuring that the C-130H is safe to
    operate by keeping the aircraft structurally sound through programs
    such as ongoing center wing replacements. Second, we will focus on
    meeting U.S. and foreign airspace compliance mandates through the C-130
    Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) Increment 1. The FY17PB
    accelerates this program to deliver 172 airspace compliant aircraft by
    December 2019, before the FAA 2020 deadline. Third, C-130 AMP Increment
    2 will improve the fleet's maintainability and reliability by providing
    a new avionics suite, enhanced communications, and electrical
    improvements. It also solves pending obsolescence and DMS issues. The
    FY17PB accelerates AMP Increment 2 to complete installations in 2028.
    Finally, the Air Force will continue to recapitalize the C-130H fleet
    through procurement of new C-130Js. We plan to field 134 total C-130J
    aircraft by fiscal year 2019.
        The strategic airlift fleet of C-5s and C-17s is capable of
    supporting the million ton miles per day metric established in our most
    stressed response scenarios. The Air Force continues to modernize and
    enhance 52 legacy C-5 aircraft to a common configuration to ensure
    fleet viability to 2040. The C-17 fleet of 222 aircraft was completed
    in September 2013 and provides our nation unmatched flexibility to
    conduct direct delivery, airdrop, aeromedical, and special operations
    airlift missions.
        The Air Force is the only Service with a dedicated force organized,
    trained, and equipped to execute theater-wide Personnel Recovery. The
    Combat Rescue Helicopter will replace 112 of our aging HH-60G aircraft
    specifically equipped to conduct Combat Search and Rescue across the
    entire spectrum of military operations. The program remains on schedule
    to meet initial operational capability in 2021 and full operational
    capability in 2029.
        Despite supporting a wide range of missions for five major
    commands, the current UH-1N fleet does not meet speed, range, payload,
    or survivability requirements. The risk created for our nuclear support
    mission by these capability gaps makes replacing the UH-1N a critical
    priority and a vital element of our nuclear enterprise reform
    initiative. A decision on the way forward for procurement of the
    portion of the UH-1N fleet servicing the nuclear support mission is
    anticipated soon.
                                 iv. conclusion
        The United States Air Force continues to be the world's finest Air
    Force across the spectrum of conflict, but but our potential
    adversaries employ increasingly sophisticated, capable, and lethal
    systems. The Air Force must modernize to deter, deny, and decisively
    defeat any actor that threatens the homeland and our national
    interests. A return to sequestration-level funding would result in a
    less ready, less capable, less viable Air Force that is unable to fully
    execute the defense strategy or fully support the joint force.
    Furthermore, the Air Force faces a modernization bow wave over the next
    10 years that requires funding well beyond the BCA caps--this includes
    critical programs necessary to meet our capacity and capability
    requirements across all mission areas. Although we are grateful for the
    Bipartisan Budget Act relief, we still face great uncertainly for
    Fiscal Year 2018 and beyond. Without the funding requested in this
    budget, we cannot meet current demand for Air Force capability and
    capacity without sacrificing modernization.
        Our sister services and allies expect the Air Force to provide
    critical warfighting and enabling capabilities. We remain focused on
    delivering Global Vigilance, Reach and Power, through our core missions
    of Air Superiority, Space Superiority, Global Strike, Rapid Global
    Mobility, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance and Command and
    Control. We look forward to working closely with the committee to
    ensure the ability to deliver combat air power for America when and
    where we are needed.

        Senator Cotton. General Bunch?
        General Bunch. Sir, we have given the one statement. She
    spoke for all of us. We now look forward to answering the
    committee's questions.
        Senator Cotton. Outstanding. We will have to do that with
    members of the committee.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Cotton. I would like to start, Ms. Costello, with
    the B-21 bomber. As you know, we have had a classified hearing
    last week, in which we explored it. I think we need to explore
    some elements here in this open setting.
        Why did the Air Force choose a cost plus incentive fee
    contract vehicle over a fixed price contract for the
    engineering and manufacturing development phase of the B-21?
        General Bunch. Senator Cotton, if I can sir, most of those
    will come my way. I will just go ahead and let you know that
    now.
        To start off with, sir, the determination of a contract
    type--there is no one-size-fits-all. You have to look at each
    individual acquisition case and you have to look at the risks
    involved with that acquisition and the maturity of the
    technologies and variety of different factors. That is what we
    did in this case.
        After carefully considering the full spectrum of
    contracting options and looking at all the factors that go into
    selecting a contract type, the Milestone Decision Authority
    determined that the most appropriate contract vehicle for the
    acquisition of the B-21 was a cost plus incentive contract.
        The key factors that went into making that decision were
    the technical risk, and that falls into two categories. One of
    those is that we did use mature technologies to meet this
    requirement and deliver this capability, but those mature
    technologies must now be integrated together on a never-before-
    built platform. The risk is in the platform development of
    something that has not been built ever and the integration of
    those mature technologies.
        The other factor that was critical in this was the
    determination of the contractor's ability to continue the
    operation if they were to be put in a loss environment or where
    they were losing profit. In the case of the KC-46 right now,
    Boeing is running at about a 25 percent loss over what the
    contract was. In the case of the KC-46, that contractor can
    capitalize on the commercial market to be able to get
    additional continued sales or they can capitalize on foreign
    military sales to make up any losses that they may have had. In
    the case of the long-range strike bomber with highly classified
    activity going on and highly classified technologies, there is
    not a commercial application.
        Senator Cotton. General Bunch----
        General Bunch. Yes, sir.
        Senator Cotton.--if I can interject here.
        You said something similar last week----
        General Bunch. Yes, sir.
        Senator Cotton.--at the Subcommittee on Seapower. What
    bearing does that particular characteristic have on the
    decision that should ultimately hinge on best value to the
    taxpayer?
        General Bunch. Sir, we believe--well, it is best value for
    the taxpayer, but it is also a capability that we need to be
    able to meet a critical gap, a gap that was identified through
    the entire Department as a way looking at the technologies that
    were out there. It is a balancing act of trying to ensure that
    we get it in the most cost-effective manner and also meet the
    capability gap that we need to meet from a requirements
    perspective.
        Senator Cotton. Some of the things you have cited, though,
    like the mature technologies or stable requirements, specified
    aircraft price, and the inability to recoup cost overseas, when
    you think about it in the context value, I mean, those
    characteristics would seem to point at least as strongly in
    favor of a fixed price contract as they would cost-plus because
    they should give you a fairly definite idea of what that price
    is going to be. Is that wrong?
        General Bunch. Sir, the mature technologies--I believe we
    do have a good idea of what those would be. The risk involved
    is the integration of those technologies and building a never-
    before-built aircraft. That moves it on the risk perspective
    more to the cost-plus arena than it does to the fixed price
    arena.
        Senator Cotton. I have seen reports that during industry
    discussions prior to the bid submission, that one potential
    offeror indicated that they would not bid on the RFP [Request
    for Proposals] if it was a fixed price development contract. Do
    you or any of our witnesses have any knowledge of that?
        General Bunch. Sir, I will take that for the record to make
    sure that I answer that in appropriate classification levels of
    what I am supposed to be doing.
        Senator Cotton. General Holmes?
        General Holmes. I do not have any knowledge of that, sir.
        General Raymond. I do not have any knowledge of that
    either, sir.
        General Bunch. I will take that for the record, sir.
        Senator Cotton. Let me speak hypothetically for a moment.
    What would be the impact on value to the taxpayer if the Air
    Force issued an RFP [Request for Proposals] for such a major
    weapon system under a fixed price contract vehicle and only one
    vendor submitted a bid?
        General Bunch. Under that construct, we would still go into
    the--we would get the proposal in. We would evaluate what we
    believe the performance of that could be, and then we would
    look and make sure that we were getting a fair and reasonable
    price for what we were doing, and we would determine if it was
    a contract that we could let.
        Senator Cotton. In my final question, let me ascend from
    this particular point to a more general question related to
    this matter, General Holmes. In discussions with the committee
    and staff, you have championed a return to developmental
    planning, experimentation, prototyping, and developing future
    capabilities. We all understand the severe budget constraints
    the Air Force has faced for the last seven years. But
    hypothetically, if sufficient funds were available from a
    capabilities development perspective, do you believe that a
    return to prototype development and so-called ``fly before you
    buy'' methodology for large, complex weapon systems before
    down-selecting a winning manufacturer would be the preferred
    approach?
        General Holmes. Senator, thanks for the question.
        I think it depends on the system, both in complexity and
    the cost. We are moving forward, and we hope to continue to
    expand the prototyping and experimentation to look at specific
    aspects and to reduce risk in different programs. If you are
    going to go to a weapon system that has a unit cost of $500
    million, then you would have to weigh the cost of competing
    prototypes built at that initial fly-away cost against what you
    think you could learn in risk reduction in systems first. I
    think it would depend on the aircraft or on the program.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        Senator Manchin?
        Senator Manchin. Just to follow up very quickly on that, I
    think the concerns we might have is because the F-35 strike
    fighter--was it not a cost-plus?
        General Bunch. It was, sir.
        Senator Manchin. You can understand our chairman's
    consternation about that, and I think you have heard it over
    the years. We are looking for every way possible not to repeat
    the mistakes of that type of a contract, and I think that is
    what we are kind of all leading to.
        How can you assure us we are not going to go down that same
    path?
        General Bunch. Yes, sir. That is a valid question because
    we are very worried about cost growth, and it is something that
    we want to make sure we control as we execute the program. The
    two things that we have done--two of the main things--we have
    done more than two, but two of the main things we have done to
    control cost growth on the program--the first of those is we
    conducted an independent cost estimate outside the program
    office, which is something that the SASC [Senate Armed Services
    Committee] was a champion for with SARA [Services Acquisition
    Reform Act] to form an independent cost estimate so that a
    program office that may be optimistic about what it might cost
    to develop a capability would not be able to do that. It is an
    independent cost estimate. In this case, we actually had two.
    Those were very close numbers, and we funded to the higher of
    the two numbers. That is a key indicator, in past studies by
    RAND and others, of controlling costs is to have an independent
    cost estimate to make sure you are not overly optimistic as you
    start.
        The second one is stable requirements, and we have had no
    changes in the requirements since 2013. Our requirements
    control officer is our Chief of Staff of our Air Force. He has
    made that very clear to all of us that he controls the
    requirements and he does not wish to see those change because
    he knows if you change requirements, you can increase the cost
    and you can change what you are trying to get in the technology
    perspective, and he wants to control that.
        Those are the two main drivers that we have seen over the
    years that have driven cost.
        The other piece that we are doing is we are using mature
    technologies. The analogy that I use here is we do not have
    developmental programs going on inside a major developmental
    program for the platform. I am not developing a brand new radar
    at the same time I am building a never-before-built aircraft. I
    am not building a brand new defensive management system at the
    same time I am building an aircraft that has never been built.
    The mature technologies--the risk there is the integration. The
    technologies are proven, and we should be able to do those.
    That is another one to control costs, sir.
        The last of those is we have crafted an incentive structure
    for the contract so that the contractor must perform on cost
    and schedule to be able to garner or gain the profit and the
    fee that is associated with the contract. It is made up of two
    components. It is made up of cost and it is made up of
    performance. The performance aspect is based on schedule. The
    schedule incentive is the heavier weighted of the two, and it
    is not just making a date. It is delivering capabilities and
    meeting requirements. That schedule incentive is loaded toward
    the back of the EMD [Engineering Manufacturing & Development]
    phase, and it goes larger as the program goes forward such that
    if the contractor is not able to make those dates, then they
    will lose a portion of the incentive fee up to the point that
    they will lose it all for that scheduled event. If they do not
    execute on cost and on schedule, they end up executing the
    program at no profit and with no fee.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, sir.
        I want to go to General Holmes real quick. But I want to
    say on that, General Bunch, we would like to compare that to
    the anticipation we had when we started the F-35 strike
    fighter. Some of us who were not there when that started, if
    this was the same anticipation as you have now with this set of
    criteria, it was the same back then. What have we learned? We
    are just hoping that we do not repeat the same. I will get into
    that in more detail with you, sir, if I can.
        General Bunch. Yes, sir.
        Senator Manchin. General Holmes, I mentioned in my opening
    statement, the Air Force is planning to retire some aircraft,
    including AWACS and this EC-130H. Why would they plan to retire
    aircraft in high demand without planning to replace them? I
    think that is about as straightforward as I can make it.
        General Holmes. Thank you, Ranking Member Manchin.
        If we go back to the fiscal year 2012 President's budget
    and we compare the spending levels that we expected to see
    between 2012 and this year, from the President's budget that
    was turned in, the Air Force has lost about $70 billion in
    buying power. From the 2012 budget as it was enacted, which was
    actually a little lower than that, the Air Force has lost about
    $40 billion in buying power. To try to upgrade all of the Air
    Force, the money is just not there to do it. We are forced to
    make some tough choices.
        Senator Manchin. The only thing I say is should we assess
    the risks of failing to meet combatant commander demands. These
    are people on the front lines. These are aircraft they very
    much need.
        General Holmes. Absolutely, sir, we do. Everything I have
    in the Air Force is very much in need by the combatant
    commanders. They participate in the budget review process. They
    participate at every step on the way in building our budget,
    and the budget that we provide you is a combination of the Air
    Force and the combatant commanders' best military advice on
    where to accept risk.
        We are accepting risk in areas we do not want to. We know
    we are accepting risk in areas they do not want to. We are just
    trying to make the best budget we can within the buying power
    that we have left under the BCA [Budget Control Act], as
    modified by the BBA [Bipartisan Budget Act] that we are
    grateful for.
        Senator Manchin. Then why would we eliminate?
        General Holmes. Sir, because we only have enough money to
    do--we do not have enough money to do all of the things that
    you expect the Air Force to do.
        We hope not to eliminate. We have a plan to recapitalize
    the EC-130. We plan to bring that forward to you next year. We
    have brought a plan to you to recapitalize the JSTARS. For the
    AWACS, our plan is to draw down a portion of the numbers so
    that we can make money available to upgrade the rest of the
    fleet to be effective for the combatant commanders and the
    missions that they are expected to do. In general, we are
    trying to do the best we can to provide all the combatant
    commanders' requirements within the budget limit that we have
    and in consultation with them.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Cotton. Senator Inhofe?
        Senator Inhofe. What you are saying is it is budget-driven.
    I think that the other two Lieutenant Generals there with you
    would agree with the statement that General Holmes just made.
    Is that correct?
        You know, I can remember back when the discussion was--we
    were talking about the F-15 and F-16. That was quite some time
    ago. But again, at that time, the argument was always, well,
    you can do it with one or the other, but not both of them. Yet,
    we know now that the missions were different at that time. We
    knew it at the time.
        We are going through kind of the same situation now with
    the F-22 and the F-35. The F-22 has been carrying a load that
    it should not have carried. Originally--and I recall this, and
    each one of the three of you remember this also--there were
    going to be--what--750 F-22's and that slowly went down to--I
    cannot remember who it was. In 2008, it went down to 381. Then
    Gates changed that to 243. Now we are down to 187 operational
    F-22's.
        All we hear about is how great--what a great job they are
    doing. In the statement that was made--let me see who it was
    who made this. I think it was when we had Secretary James and
    General Welsh in here at our general committee. I said I
    understand the F-22 has been deployed against ISIL [Islamic
    State of Iraq and the Levant] in Iraq, Syria, has been deployed
    in the Pacific, Middle East, and Europe. The Air Force chose to
    cut its force structure over the past several years. It is now
    paying for it.
        A lot of us complained about this back when we decided that
    we were going to be downsizing the F-22. I think that probably
    all of you would agree now that probably was not a good idea.
    There was a reason for coming up with the 750 to start with,
    and I have just always wondered what the reasoning was, other
    than the budget, of bringing it down over the last seven or
    eight years. Do you agree that that was the problem?
        General Holmes. Sir, I think it was certainly a budget
    involvement there. Seven hundred fifty is about the same number
    that we built of the F-15A and C in our air superiority role in
    the Cold War.
        The budget came down for a couple reasons, one, budget-
    driven. I think you are right. Also, I think the Department and
    the Congress made a decision that we would not see a near peer
    threat within a number of years, and that decision also proved
    to be--that judgment also proved to be optimistic. We have seen
    both Russia and China develop airplanes faster than was
    anticipated.
        Senator Inhofe. I appreciate that.
        Staying on the F-22, I am not sure who they are quoting,
    but it was in the ``Air Force Times.'' They said the biggest
    challenge for the F-22 Raptor community now is to stretch the
    limited fleet so the Air Force can guarantee air superiority
    until a successor aircraft comes along. That may not happen for
    another 20 years. The biggest deficiency in the F-22 fleet,
    though, has to do with the number of F-22's. There just are not
    enough of them.
        I have often wondered. At least I have not heard the
    discussion in our Senate Armed Services Committee about
    reopening that line. Is there any thought along that line? I
    think we all know we do not have enough F-22's. What are the
    arguments against trying to go back and reopen the line?
        General Bunch. Senator, there have been RAND studies in
    that area. They have looked at it and there are rough order of
    magnitude numbers that are in the billions of dollars and
    years. We viewed it in the light of the balancing act we are
    already doing between readiness and modernization as something
    that would be cost prohibitive, and we would have to take
    something else out that we value right now to try to meet the
    requirements to be able to do that. We have not put any further
    analysis into that.
        Senator Inhofe. As far as the F-35, we really need more of
    those, and cutting it down from 48 to 45, I do not know what
    that amount does to the cost. Was that a decision you agreed
    with, or is it another budget-driven----
        General Bunch. Sir, I will address the cost. It did not
    increase our costs. We are in a different position on the F-35
    program than we were on the single Air Force program on the F-
    22. The Navy, the Marine Corps, our partners and foreign
    military sales have continued to fill the production line so
    that the cost estimates have continued to come down. That is
    still on track. We did not pay increase for the aircraft that
    we got through the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program] at this
    time.
        Senator Inhofe. In his opening statement, Senator Manchin
    talked about the current plan to replace the AWACS. Does anyone
    want to tell us what the current plans are to replace the
    AWACS?
        General Holmes. Senator, we are looking in the long term at
    a replacement. Our short-term plans were focused on upgrading
    the airplanes we have and making them both able to keep flying
    and relevant as they keep flying through the block 40 and block
    45 upgrade. We have taken a recent study to look at our air
    superiority needs starting in 2030. One of the factors that has
    come out of that will be choices in what we need to do with the
    recapitalization program.
        We hope that our JSTARS recapitalization program can
    provide a model for recapitalizing the rest of what we are
    doing now with the wide body aircraft fleet and a way to bring
    the radar--the air battle management and an airframe together
    in a way that is cheaper to be able to continue to do those
    missions.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay. I appreciate it. My time has expired,
    but I am hoping some of the other members might bring up the
    shortage of pilots, fighter pilots, that we are facing right
    now.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cotton. Senator Donnelly?
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        As you may know, Indiana is home to Grissom Air Base and
    the 434th air refueling wing. Our Hoosier Airmen had the
    opportunity to host Secretary James at Grissom a few months
    ago. They were able to share with her the incredible job they
    are doing flying and maintaining the KC-135's they have.
    Grissom was among the Air Force's top candidates in the last
    KC-46 basing round. I expect they will be topping the list next
    time.
        General Holmes, in the last KC-46 decision, the Air Force
    emphasized the importance of Reserve-led associate units. This
    aligns with the recommendation of the Air Force Commission
    report in 2014 that recommended expanding the number of
    associate units in the Air Force. Can you speak to how
    associations are a force multiplier in air, space, and cyber
    and whether you anticipate the Air Force creating more Reserve-
    led associate wings in the future.
        General Holmes. Yes, sir. Thank you, Senator Donnelly. That
    is a great unit you have at Grissom. I have hidden from many a
    hurricane there from the east coast, bringing fighter airplanes
    there.
        Senator Donnelly. I can tell you where you will get a good
    meal, sir.
        General Holmes. They serve a great service to us.
        We have a KC-135 associate that is a Reserve wing with an
    Air Force association on it at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base
    in North Carolina, and that is probably our highest performing
    KC-135 unit. When you combine a Reserve unit with the
    experience that goes with the aviators and mechanics you find
    in a Reserve unit with a small Active Duty component that makes
    the aircraft a little more usable--they can deploy more often
    than a citizen airman can on a more regular basis--then there
    is a synergy there that makes both sides of it more effective.
        Over the last year, we have looked at 100 percent of the
    Air Force's mission areas in our Reserve and Active component
    mix. We have taken steps in each of the last three budgets to
    adjust that mix, and we will continue to do that as we go
    forward in the places where it makes us better or it helps us
    save money.
        Senator Donnelly. Well, let me ask you this again. Do you
    anticipate the Air Force creating more Reserve-led associate
    wings in the future?
        General Holmes. Yes, sir, I do, but I could not tell you
    where they would be yet.
        Senator Donnelly. General Raymond, concerns that warnings
    from our military about growing threats to U.S. air superiority
    posed by advanced adversaries are often dismissed as distant
    and far away. But in fact, while we do have to prepare for
    large-scale conflict, the more immediate concern is the spread
    of advanced Russian and Chinese weapon systems into the wars we
    are already fighting. We are seeing advanced air defenses
    spread to countries throughout the Middle East and Africa,
    including Syria where our pilots are flying as we are here.
        How is the Air Force responding to the proliferation of
    these very present threats to our air superiority?
        General Raymond. Thank you for the question.
        Let me go back real quick, if I could, to the mobility. I
    was just in the AOR [Area of Responsibility], and on the
    mobility piece of it, our mobility aircraft are doing
    incredible work. They are passing over 2.75 million pounds of
    fuel a day to feed that fight.
        On the question that you just asked now on what are we
    doing, clearly the Air Force has a modernization program and we
    say that we fly, fight, and win in airspace and cyberspace.
    There are several things that we are doing. One, you have to be
    able to fly, and that is the SLEP [Service Life Extension
    Program] programs that we have got going on to increase the age
    of our aircraft to be able to maintain those in years to come.
        Then there is the part to fight. We are looking at
    modifications and modernization programs to be able to do a
    better electronic warfare, to have better radars, to have
    better ability to share data back and forth between platforms,
    to have better command and control over those capabilities, to
    have better weapons that they can drop to be able to do that
    fight.
        I agree with your assertion that the technology gap is
    closing, and we need to move on with those modernization
    programs.
        Senator Donnelly. Well, how concerned are you for our
    airmen if they have to face the S-400 in the near future?
        General Raymond. I am very concerned for our airmen against
    the advanced threats.
        Senator Donnelly. General Holmes, would you care to
    comment?
        General Holmes. Yes, sir. Specifically to your question, in
    this budget we will have to continue to spend money to improve
    the capability of both the F-22 and the F-15 while we work our
    way through to a replacement.
        But air superiority is about more than just those air-to-
    air airplanes. It is about being able to attack advanced
    systems like the S-400 or neutralize them with electronic
    combat or cyber attacks. We will continue to try to hold onto
    the gap that we have while we try to work out a way to move to
    the future and start with another higher gap in our air
    superiority capability, a gap between our performance and
    theirs. We need to make that bigger again.
        Senator Donnelly. Ms. Costello, is the Air Force committed
    to commonality as a means to modernize and maintain the triad?
    If so, what elements do you see as most applicable for
    commonality with the ICBMs?
        Ms. Costello. For the GBSD [Ground Based Strategic
    Deterrent] program, we are committed to commonality, and we are
    working with the Navy on how we can achieve commonality in
    there. We are early in the analysis there to find out where we
    can pursue that further. We are heading towards a milestone,
    and we are working closely with the Navy in order to do that
    within that program in particular.
        Senator Donnelly. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
        Senator Cotton. Senator Rounds?
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I would like to follow up on Senator Inhofe's line of
    discussion with regard to the F-22 for just a few minutes,
    recognizing that at one point with the B-1 program we started
    that line up again, and it is a good thing that we did.
        Now we clearly understand that the near peer threats have
    increased over what had been anticipated. I am wondering when
    we talk about a successor aircraft, it may be 20 years in the
    future. But somewhere down the line, we are going to have an
    additional cost with regard to the planning and the layout and
    the modernization that goes into a brand new aircraft. Yet, we
    have taken the F-35 and we have been modernizing the F-22 based
    upon what we learned with the new technologies in the F-35.
        Has there been any analysis as to what the actual costs
    would be to start up that F-22 line with the new systems that
    are currently available with the F-35 and how that would
    compare with the extended life that we might get out of that
    aircraft versus a new aircraft being developed as its successor
    20 years from now?
        General Bunch. We have not analyzed as, again, there were
    some initial rough order of magnitude estimates as to what the
    costs would be. We have not estimated what it would be to
    reopen the line and populate it with more modern technology. We
    have not done that at this time, sir.
        General Holmes. Senator Rounds, the Air Force and the Navy
    have been collaborating on a future capability that was called
    the next generation air dominance platform. We have worked
    together in our studies. We have worked together in providing
    technology together. The Navy has gone ahead and moved toward
    an analysis of alternatives. We delayed a year because we
    wanted to take a broader look at the picture. We will move
    forward next year with a plan on how we want to get after a
    solution there.
        I think because we want to do it faster and we cannot
    afford to do another 20-year development program for a host of
    reasons, we will try to go with technology that is at a high
    readiness level now with manufacturing capabilities that are at
    a high readiness level now. I think it is completely possible,
    as we get to a requirement, that there may be competitors that
    bid on modification of an existing technology or platform like
    the F-22 and the F-35.
        Senator Rounds. Very good. Thank you.
        Let me go back. Now that we have talked a little bit about
    the items which we add to the cost, I want to just touch base--
    the other day in open committee hearing, there was a discussion
    about the A-10. We did not get very far into it because it
    seemed as though at that stage of the game, it was more a
    matter of sending the message that we wanted the A-10 to remain
    operational.
        Yet, I would like to hear from you, just in terms of--my
    personal opinion is that while we would all like to see F-15's
    available throughout the areas in which right now the A-10's
    are out there, we do not have enough F-15's to go around unless
    we start determining that we have got some that can be in two
    places at the same time. We do not have that. The A-10 seems to
    be working right now in this area where we do not have--or, as
    they would call it, a low-threat environment.
        I understand that long-term you do not want to continue
    down the line where you may very well need an aircraft that can
    handle near peer challenges. But with regard to the A-10 right
    now, it looks to me like we need it right now because the
    demand is there for it in the field of battle today. Yet, you
    are trying to do modernization.
        How do we work these two together? What is your analysis
    about how and where do we go with the A-10 and modernizing the
    other platforms that are there?
        General Holmes. Thank you, Senator.
        You know, I have heard it said that the Air Force wants to
    move away from this mission. What I would tell you from my
    experience, including as a wing commander in Afghanistan with
    the F-15E and the A-10, is that over the last 12 years, the Air
    Force has moved to turn almost our whole combat Air Force's
    fleet into airplanes that are capable in this mission. What
    does that mean? It means we took airplanes that did not have
    all the capabilities they needed and we added the radios so
    that a strike Eagle crew member or a B-1 crew member can talk
    directly to the ground commander, directly to the JTAC [Joint
    Tactical Air Controller], and directly to the air operations
    center. Flying the F-15E in Afghanistan, I can talk on UHF
    [Ultra High Frequency] SATCOM [Satellite Communications] over
    the high mountains there to the command and control element. I
    could have one radio with the JTAC who was in the battalion
    TACP [Tactical Air Control Party] who was looking at the
    picture from my targeting pod next to the battalion commander,
    and then one radio talking to the platoon leader.
        We added advanced targeting pods that combine the
    geolocation capability so that when you type in a coordinate,
    it will look exactly at that spot and----
        Senator Rounds. General, what I am really curious about--
    and I do not mean to interrupt, but I am going to run out of
    time.
        General Holmes. Yes, sir.
        Senator Rounds. Are you saying that you have enough F-15's
    that are capable today of actually doing the jobs that the A-
    10's are doing, that you have got enough aircraft right now to
    replace those one for one?
        General Holmes. All the airplanes that we use have some
    unique capabilities that they bring to the situation. Some are
    faster, some stay out there longer, some carry a bigger load,
    some can get down lower. We are using all those in the right
    place for them.
        My problem is I need no less than about 54 fighter
    squadrons or the 1,900 limit that the Senate gave us in the
    NDAA last year. But I cannot afford any more than 54 fighter
    squadrons either. The problem is, as I stand up F-35 squadrons,
    that would be a 56th squadron and a 57th squadron. Then without
    additional funds, I have to take some squadrons down to go
    through that.
        Our best judgment, as we came forward to this point, was
    that the way to do that was to start to retire our aging A-10
    squadrons, but we know we are going to work with the Congress
    to come up with that what that solution is. We think we need at
    least 55. We are unable to afford more than that. We are not
    retiring any squadrons this year, and we hope to work with the
    Congress to find out what the right answer is as we move
    forward.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Cotton. How many fighter squadrons did we have in
    the Gulf War?
        General Raymond. Sir, we had 134 fighter squadrons in the
    Gulf War.
        Senator Cotton. Wow, astonishing.
        Senator Blumenthal?
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I was struck by the comment in your testimony, and I am
    going to quote it. The Air Force is currently 511 fighter
    pilots short of the total manning requirement, and our
    projections indicate this deficit will continue to grow to
    approximately 834 by 2022. That sounds pretty alarming.
        General Raymond. It is alarming, Senator. It is one of
    great concern for our Air Force. It is one that we are putting
    a lot of attention and focus on. On the one hand, we have got
    the airlines that are hiring about 3,500 fighter pilots every
    month. Our focus is increasing the pipeline, bringing pilots in
    and maximizing the UPT [Undergraduate Pilot Training] that we
    have to ramp up those numbers. We also have to look at
    absorption, being able to season those fighter pilots and
    working total force requirements to put fighter pilots in
    cockpits to be able to do that seasoning. Then we are working
    very closely on retention issues as well to try our best to
    maintain the fighter pilots that we do have in the service as
    we speak.
        Senator Blumenthal. We tend to be focusing here on all the
    hardware and the bright, shiny objects and all the stuff that
    people find glamorous about the Air Force. But if you do not
    have enough good pilots, all this stuff is worthless. Right?
        General Raymond. We are an air force and we need pilots,
    and we need--all of our pilots are good pilots. We need fighter
    pilots as well.
        Senator Blumenthal. I may have overstated it somewhat, but
    that is the way it looks like to----
        General Raymond. Again, it is a big focus item for our Air
    Force. I am 100 percent in agreement with you. We are working
    this hard.
        Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask you what can we do to help
    you with either recruitment or the training or the retention,
    whatever it is. Maybe you have some recommendations.
        General Holmes. Well, Senator, we are going to bring
    forward a plan that will both increase production. We think we
    need to stand up two more fighter training units that train
    students out of undergraduate pilot training and turn them into
    fighter pilots. We are going to work with the Guard and Reserve
    to ask them to absorb more of our Active Duty young pilots into
    their squadrons. Then we will have to increase our UPT
    production also to be able to make that happen.
        We think if we do that, we can start to address that gap,
    and next year we will bring you a plan. We are going to make it
    fit into our budget, but there will be something else that
    falls out. We will bring you a plan next year to address it.
        Senator Blumenthal. Well, if I may just suggest, with all
    respect, I think to have a plan next year is great, but it
    seems to me if we are expecting a deficit of 834 by 2022, the
    sooner the better.
        General Holmes. Yes, sir. In the short term, we will use
    the bonus and the tools that we have to try to retain as many
    of those pilots as we can. We know that their readiness is a
    big part of that. To keep fighter pilots, you need to give them
    a chance to be good at their jobs and be ready, and we are
    working to fund the requirements of readiness as we go through.
    We also think that there is a reduction in tempo that is a part
    of that. We need to give them more time to train and more time
    to have a full career in the airplane. Then we are going to
    work to make sure we absorb every person we can that leaves
    Active Duty into the Reserve or the Guard so that we hold onto
    that experience.
        Senator Blumenthal. I think that is a very important point.
    If I may just make a request from someone who is a supporter,
    not a critic, that if you could give us a plan, even if it is
    only a chalkboard plan, even if it is only scribbles or
    whatever, it is not a final finished product, but just so we
    can reassure ourselves that we are on track to fill this gap.
        General Holmes. Yes, sir. We will be happy to work through
    that with you and your staff and tell you what we are planning
    to do.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
        Let me just quickly ask Lieutenant General Bunch. I think
    you were at last week's Armed Services Committee hearing when
    Secretary James testified that the Air Force believes that
    foreign military sales will protect unit costs from increasing
    as a result of some of the cuts in the F-35 so that, in effect,
    there will be no increase in cost per unit despite a reduction
    to 43 instead of 48 in the procurement in F-35's. I asked the
    question where are those foreign military sales going to go. I
    think that Secretary James said she would produce more
    information about it. Maybe you have some more information now.
        General Bunch. Sir, I was not at the hearing, but I did
    hear the question. It was we are not going to pay an increase.
    The gap of us moving our aircraft out of the FYDP was filled by
    the Navy and the Marine Corps, our partner nations, and foreign
    military sales. I thought I had written down the three nations
    that we were doing the foreign military sales with, but I do
    not have them in my notes--so I apologize for that--that we
    would attribute, and we have other ones that are there. But I
    will get you that information, sir. I apologize.
        General Holmes. Senator, the partners that are buying
    aircraft are the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands,
    Australia, Norway, and Turkey. Denmark and Canada are still
    making up their mind, and they may move in. On the FMS [Foreign
    Military Sales] side, it is Israel, Japan, and Korea. Then the
    combination of all those partners, plus the Navy and the Marine
    Corps--the program manager has assured us that the price will
    stabilize.
        Senator Blumenthal. There will be an increase somewhere in
    that group.
        General Holmes. The quantity is big enough that taking that
    small amount down will not have much of an impact. Then every
    year, each lot--the price is going down, and that also figures
    into it too. The lots that are being negotiated now are at a
    lower price than the previous lots.
        Senator Blumenthal. If you could or maybe she or somebody
    get back to me with a somewhat more definitive answer. I
    understand those are the nations that are buying planes. I know
    that the Marine Corps and the Navy are buying planes also. But
    if you could just give me a rationale and an explanation, I
    would appreciate it.
        General Holmes. Sir, we will take that. That is to me.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
        Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cotton. Senator Ernst?
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Gentlemen and Ms. Costello, thank you for being here today.
    I appreciate it.
        I am going to go back to something that Senator Blumenthal
    was mentioning with our pilots. General Holmes, you mentioned
    moving some of those pilots' capabilities into the Guard and
    Reserve. I just want to address the fact that Iowa--just in
    recent years, our Iowa Air Guard lost its F-15's. Those went
    away. It was replaced with an ISR unit, which is great.
    Unfortunately, we lost those pilots. They had to go elsewhere.
    Now we have RPA [Remotely Piloted Aircraft] capabilities with
    the ISR unit.
        Has there been discussions that we are not aware of with
    the Guard or Reserve, or is this just an idea for the future?
        General Holmes. We have done several specific things,
    Senator Ernst. Thank you.
        One of them is our Air Force Reserve is now taking students
    straight of commissioning that there was not a spot for them in
    the Active Duty Air Force, and they are bringing them straight
    out of ROTC direct into the Air Force Reserve without knowing
    what unit they will go to, send them to pilot training, and
    banking on the fact that there will be a requirement for them.
        On the Air National Guard side, we have associations where
    we are already sticking some of our brand new Active Duty
    pilots there to gain more experience.
        Then we are recruiting hard with our Active Duty pilots
    that are leaving the service. There are vacancies in both
    Reserve and Guards units, more in the Guard than in the
    Reserve, that we are working hard to try to help them fill
    either with Active component airmen that are leaving Active
    Service and want to continue to serve or by bringing in even
    brand new lieutenants into the Guard and Reserve to make sure
    that we keep their roles filled as well.
        Senator Ernst. We still have a need for those pilots. I
    guess going through discussions a number of years ago, I guess
    I am having a hard time following then why we moved away from
    the F-15's in the Guard and the decision behind that.
        General Holmes. Well, so the decision, ma'am, was that
    again in the Department, the Department of Defense believed
    that we had excess capacity in what they call TACAIR [Tactical
    Air], which in the Air Force is our fighter force. They decided
    that we could accept some risks there. The Air Force's answer
    for the Air Force, that meant to go down to somewhere around 48
    or 49 fighter squadrons was the fiscal year 2015 proposal. We
    think that was too small. We are happy to be back at 55, and we
    do not think we can go below that. Of that 55, roughly half of
    those squadrons are in the Guard and Reserve already. We are
    already making really good use of that capability.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, General Holmes. I agree it was
    too low as well.
        I would like to turn to the 400 fighter aircraft that have
    been retired from the Air Force since 2010. We have had delays
    in the F-35A's--those deliveries. This has caused what I
    believe to be a combat fighter shortfall in relation to the
    combatant commanders' operations plans requirements. At least
    that is what it looks like.
        Is there a current Air Force combat fighter shortfall?
        General Holmes. Thank you, ma'am.
        That 55 fighter squadrons, when applied against the problem
    set that the Department asked us to model against, we would say
    is barely enough. There is nothing extra in there to be able to
    meet the requirement. As we go forward beyond this year, then
    because the average age of our fighter force is 27 years old,
    because we curtailed the F-22 buy, because the F-35 is not
    coming aboard in the numbers we expected, and the second FYDP
    starting in fiscal year 2022 is where we will start to run into
    a real problem. It is going to require us to extend the service
    life of older airplanes, hopefully increase the production buys
    on the F-35, and then think about some options beyond that,
    both some higher-end options and some lower-end options that
    might be more affordable.
        Senator Ernst. With the decline in the combat fighter
    squadrons, has this impacted the ability to deploy air power
    assets to prosecute the air campaign against the Islamic State?
    I think that is a large part of why we need these assets.
        General Raymond. Senator Ernst, it has not impacted our
    ability to deploy fighter squadrons for the current fight. When
    we talk about readiness, Air Force readiness, we talk about
    full spectrum readiness, and part of the equation that goes
    into this is that less than 50 percent of our fighter squadrons
    today are full spectrum ready. They are ready to do what we are
    asking them to do today, but they are not ready to cover all of
    the requirements that they may have to be required to cover in
    an operational plan to meet a combatant commander's
    requirements.
        Senator Ernst. That is where the assuming risk comes into
    play is that you focus in one area, but you may not be able to
    cover down in other areas.
        General Raymond. It comes at a cost of readiness in the
    full spectrum, and it would require time to be able to recoup
    that readiness.
        Senator Ernst. Very good. Any other thoughts? General
    Bunch?
        General Bunch. Senator, thank you. I would just add that we
    do have a continuing requirement in the combat in Syria and
    Iraq, and when you put that with the requirements in
    Afghanistan, with the requirements to deploy to the Pacific to
    reassure our allies and to deter potential adversaries there,
    and now we have added an additional requirement in Europe with
    the Russian activity where we are now also deploying TDY
    [Temporary Duty] squadrons there from both the Active and the
    Reserve component, the cost of that is readiness to the force
    that we have. Every time we do that, it makes them less ready
    if they have to go fight a near peer adversary or a very
    capable adversary. That is what the Department has to balance,
    how many they provide and how much opportunity they allow our
    crews to train to make sure that they are full spectrum ready.
        Senator Ernst. Certainly. Thank you very much for being
    here.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Senator Cotton. Senator Lee?
        Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thanks to all of you for being with us today, for all you
    do for our country.
        I want to talk a little bit about the Utah testing and
    training range. As we discuss the modernization of our aircraft
    and of our weapon systems, it seems appropriate to me that we
    ought to discuss the need to make sure that our test and
    training ranges are there and available to be used so that we
    can test fifth generation weapon systems against emerging
    threats that are becoming more and more sophisticated all the
    time and that are sort of closing the gap.
        I am pleased to report that just two weeks ago, an F-35
    with the 34th Fighter Squadron at Hill Air Force Base
    successfully deployed and dropped a laser-guided bomb over the
    UTTR [Utah Test & Training Range].
        I am a cosponsor of a piece of legislation, along with
    Senator Hatch, that would enhance the UTTR, and that I think
    would, in turn, enable the Air Force to more effectively test
    the F-35 and other fifth generation aircraft in the coming
    decades.
        General Holmes and General Raymond, I would like to ask you
    detail for the committee the importance of preparing these
    ranges for testing fifth generation weapon systems and
    protecting them from issues that could compromise our ability
    to use them.
        General Raymond. Senator, it is a great point. It is one
    that we are also putting a lot of focus on. As part of our
    readiness pillars, one of the pillars of readiness that we
    focus on is training. Over the course of this budget, we have
    put forward about a billion dollars extra to focus on that
    training, focusing on making sure the ranges have those
    capabilities that they need to simulate that high-end threat,
    to make sure that we have the airspace required to be able to
    do that. We are working live, virtual, and constructive
    training as well to help with that effort. But it is something
    that is going to be absolutely critical for our readiness going
    forward. We put some funding into it this year to be able to
    start that and to seeing that growth.
        Senator Lee. I am glad to hear that.
        General?
        General Holmes. Sir, we appreciate, Senator, the efforts
    that you and Senator Hatch have made in your act to avoid
    encroachment on the ranges. That is certainly important to us
    to keep that airspace. We will have to move a lot of our
    highest-end training into simulators because we do not want
    people to watch us do that highest-end training.
        Senator Lee. That would be fun for everyone.
        General Holmes. But we are always going to have a need for
    the real ranges to fly real airplanes against real threat
    emitters so we can make sure that things work. That is where we
    are trying to put that money over the next 5 years that Jay
    talked about.
        Senator Lee. Great. Thank you.
        Several of my colleagues and I have expressed concerns
    about hiring issues at Air Force depots, which is a challenge
    faced by depots across the services. The time it takes to hire
    civilian workers for some of these positions, including
    especially things like engineers and some of our maintenance
    technicians, are ridiculously long. I mean, these are time
    frames that would put a private sector business really out of
    business.
        I know this is something the Air Force is working on, and
    we look forward to assisting in any way we can to alleviate the
    problem. How will these hiring issues impact your modernization
    efforts if they are not addressed?
        General Bunch. Senator Lee, thank you for the question.
        Hiring of civilians at our depots is a key concern and one
    we are working very feverishly. I know that we have been over
    and presented information to you and the depot caucus on some
    of those initiatives.
        It can impact. We make decisions based on a number of
    people coming in. We have had an action team going from an FMC.
    We have also got a team at AFPC [Air Force Personnel Center]
    and the air staff, A-1, has rolled into this trying to
    streamline that process, trying to get as many authorities as
    low in the organization as is possible. It is something that we
    are tracking very closely, but it is critical that we hire more
    people in a more timely manner.
        Senator Lee. Well, thank you. I appreciate that.
        Over the last two years, there have been a lot of
    discussions in this committee regarding the Air Force's plans
    to retire the A-10 and move its uniformed maintainers to new F-
    35 units. Now that you have decided to keep the A-10
    operational, what steps are being taken to ensure that the F-35
    has the required maintenance personnel so that we can make sure
    this is covered both in the short term and in the long term?
        General Holmes. Thank you, Senator. We are kind of doing
    everything we can think of, including the suggestions that we
    got from this committee in previous years. We are contracting
    out maintenance in some of our nondeployable squadrons,
    particularly training units. In this budget, we asked to hire
    civilian contractors to do the work at places where we train
    people to fly the fighters so that we can free maintenance
    people up there to go to F-35 school. We are asking our Reserve
    and Guard to help us in several places, notably they are
    primarily at Luke and at Hill, as we change the mission there.
    We are amending our high-year tenure rules so that we can keep
    a tech sergeant skilled mechanic longer than the rule set would
    allow them to stay in the Air Force at that grade. We have
    reviewed the bonuses for maintainers to try to retain more so
    that we have a larger force. Then with the end strength that we
    have requested an increase in this budget, a healthy portion of
    that end strength goes to training more maintainers to fill in
    that gap, and we stood up additional instructors and classroom
    time in our tech training school to try to provide people to
    fill those requirements.
        General Raymond. Could I add? We also made a down payment
    and procured some additional manpower in this budget and
    specifically targeted them to maintainers. One of our big
    readiness levers is having the right folks with the right skill
    set, and we have started that initial procurement of additional
    bodies this year.
        Senator Lee. Wonderful. That is helpful. Thank you very
    much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cotton. Senator McCain?
        Senator McCain. General Holmes, I believe that the 2016
    NDAA required a reporting on the total number of F-35's that
    will be procured. I believe that that information was supposed
    to be submitted to the committee some months ago. Do you have
    any response to that?
        General Holmes. Senator, I believe that the Department made
    that a CAPE [Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation]-led study
    that the Air Force is participating in. I will double check to
    make sure, but I believe we are working with the CAPE to
    provide the answers back in that study.
        Senator McCain. Have you notified the committee as to why
    you have not complied with the law?
        General Holmes. Sir, again, I will check with CAPE, and if
    they have the lead on that study, I would have expected them
    to.
        Senator McCain. You do not know whether they have complied
    with the law or not?
        General Holmes. No, sir, I do not.
        Senator McCain. I am curious why not.
        It is my understanding that you are keeping the cost of the
    program classified. Is that correct?
        General Bunch. Sir, are you addressing the B-21, sir? I am
    sorry. I apologize. I misunderstood the question, Senator.
        Senator McCain. Yes, the B-21.
        General Bunch. Yes, sir. At this time, we have not released
    contract value to everyone. We have released the service cost
    position and the independent cost estimate. We did release
    that. In the base year 2016 dollars, it was $23.5 billion for
    the EMD [Engineering Manufacturing and Development] phase.
        Senator McCain. Why would you not ever want to tell the
    American people how you are going to spend their dollars?
        General Bunch. Sir, one of the things that we are doing is
    we had a closed session with this committee. We are also trying
    to arrange closed sessions with the House SASC.
        Senator McCain. Why should the taxpayers not know? Why
    should the average citizen not know what the cost of a--
    whatever--how many tens of billions of dollars--$80 billion to
    $100 billion program? Should the taxpayers not know that?
        General Bunch. Sir, we are trying to balance the
    transparency that we want do with the public so that they
    understand what we are doing, but we are also trying to protect
    the critical capabilities of this asset.
        Senator McCain. By saying how much it cost?
        General Bunch. Sir, we are trying to prevent the ability of
    individuals to link different pieces that may be unclassified
    together to get an idea of how the money is being spent so that
    they----
        Senator McCain. Tell me another time where we have not told
    the American people the cost of something that they are paying
    their tax dollars for.
        General Bunch. Sir, we have given Congress and we have
    given the taxpayers the amount of money that we are expecting
    to pay--what the acquisition program baseline is and the amount
    of money that we, the Air Force, are committed to get this
    capability delivered so that we can serve the Nation.
        Senator McCain. General, you are not serving the Nation or
    the taxpayers if they do not know how much of their taxpayer
    dollars are being spent. You and I have a very different view
    of our obligation to the taxpayers. Frankly, I have never heard
    of this before, that they should not know how much of their
    dollars that they pay in taxes are being spent because somebody
    might connect the dots? What is that all about?
        General Bunch. Sir, I believe we have shared with the
    public and with the committee----
        Senator McCain. The public knows exactly what the cost of
    it is?
        General Bunch. They know our average procurement unit cost.
    We have released that and we have released our independent cost
    estimate and our service cost position.
        Senator McCain. You have not complied with the laws, the
    total number of F-35's. You do not want to tell the taxpayers
    how much the B-21 costs. We now are finding ourselves in a
    shortfall of aircraft of the F-35 which you say will not
    increase the unit costs because of foreign sales. Is that
    correct, General Holmes?
        General Holmes. The program office says that with the total
    number of aircraft that are being bought that our reduction of
    five will be made up by the other partners and that we should
    not see any increase in cost.
        Senator McCain. It will be met by the other partners. How
    much is five aircraft?
        General Holmes. It depends on which lot we are talking
    about, Senator. But five aircraft are roughly $700 million I
    think.
        Senator McCain. So $700 million of five less aircraft will
    be made up by increased foreign sales?
        General Holmes. Sir, the program office says that total buy
    is big enough that a change in five in 1 year will not have a
    big impact on the price.
        Senator McCain. So $700 million. That will be just chump
    change.
        General Holmes. Well, sir, so we pay by the airplane, and
    we are not buying those airplanes. The impact is on the cost
    spread across all the fleet and there is a factor, the more you
    build in a year, the cheaper they are. But we are not
    amortizing that $700 million over the rest of the airplanes
    that are being bought. We are not spending that money. We are
    not giving it to Lockheed. The price is based on the number
    that you buy in a year and a lot and not on the other parts.
        Senator McCain. Then why do we not do 10 less since it
    would be cheaper then?
        General Holmes. Because it is a capability we believe is
    very important to us. But at the budget totals we were told to
    plan under, that was all we could afford and hold onto the rest
    of the force structure that the NDAA told us to and meet the
    other requirements that we are asked to meet.
        Senator McCain. Now, is there a proposal? I understand
    there is a proposal to transition out of rated pilots for
    operation of drones. Is that correct?
        General Raymond. Yes, Senator McCain, there is. We are
    going, starting in fiscal year 2016 or fiscal year 2017, to
    begin the transition to enlisted RPA pilots for the Global Hawk
    aircraft.
        Senator McCain. But not the rest.
        General Raymond. Not at this time. We have done a similar
    thing. I grew up in space operations. Years ago, we started out
    with engineer officers that flew satellites. We went to
    operator officers. You did not have not have an engineering
    degree, and then we transitioned to enlisted operators. We are
    taking a very deliberate approach to this. We are going to
    start with the Global Hawk. We are very comfortable that our
    enlisted airmen are going to be able to do that. We want the
    ``get well'' plan and the other initiatives that we have for
    the MQ-1 and MQ-9 to take root, and then we will evaluate
    further going forward.
        Senator McCain. Do you think it was a good idea to start
    with to require rated pilots, particularly given the shortfall
    we have?
        General Raymond. I was not in this position or in this job
    at that time, but it is where we are. I think it was important
    that we have a capability. It was a technology demonstrator
    with significant growth, and I think using the pilots that we
    had to do that was a smart move at that time.
        Senator McCain. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cotton. Now we will go into a second round of
    questions. I have some questions first about the tanker
    program, Ms. Costello.
        The delay in the first flight of the first fully
    missionized KC-46 Alpha and subsequent slipping of required
    testing caused a postponement of the milestone C full rate
    production decision until May of this year. How will this slip
    of that milestone C decision impact Boeing's ability to deliver
    its required 18 aircraft by August of next year?
        Ms. Costello. That slip is not expected by Boeing to cause
    a problem with the RAA [Rapid Acquisition Authority]. They are
    holding to their belief and their expectation that they can
    deliver the 18 aircraft on time for RAA. The milestone C is
    currently still planned for May of 2016 and the RAA for August
    of 2017, and we are proceeding on that path.
        Senator Cotton. We can expect 18 aircraft on August 2017?
        Ms. Costello. Boeing is standing by their position that
    they can deliver that, and the Air Force is cautiously
    optimistic that we can, in fact, achieve that, sir.
        Senator Cotton. On an anomaly, I understand there are
    concerns that higher than expected axial loads on the boom when
    in contact with the receiver aircraft that was discovered
    during refueling test flights. Can you explain that a little
    bit further and comment on any schedule impact that it might
    have?
        Ms. Costello. We are currently working with the contractor
    in order to assess that. They have got a CDR [Critical Design
    Review] plan for some fixes. They are looking at the analysis.
    It will be a couple weeks before we know what their recommended
    solution is, and at that time, we will have to figure that in
    whether it has an impact on any of our future decision points.
    They will at least have to do some software work, and we are
    determining what else, if anything, has to happen.
        Senator Cotton. Let us return to today's aircraft,
    specifically fourth generation fighter aircraft. General
    Holmes, in the fiscal year 2017 budget request, you stated
    there were additional fourth generation fighter capability
    upgrades that you lacked sufficient to include in the request.
    Could you please describe the upgrades, the threats they
    counter, and the specific aircraft which would be modified?
    Please do so in layman's terms----
        General Holmes. Yes, sir, I will.
        Senator Cotton.--understood by normal citizens, not
    Appropriations Committee staffers.
        General Holmes. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Cotton. Could also be understood by subcommittee
    chairmen.
        General Holmes. Yes, sir.
        The two primary airplanes we will look at for fourth
    generation modifications are the F-15 and the F-16. On the F-15
    side, we have run a test to see how long the airplanes will
    last. We take a test stand that is built by engineers, and it
    bends the airplane and moves it around, and you can see what
    the service life will be in advance by simulating hours of
    flight. We found that the F-15 will not last in its current
    state as long as we hoped it would. We are going to have to put
    some money in the depot schedule and to repairing parts that we
    predict through that process will fail. That is so that it will
    be around long enough that we can keep flying it.
        Then the capabilities that they will need to stay relevant
    against the threat are they will need a new radar. An
    electronically scanned radar is very important to counter
    advance jamming threats that have been propagated primarily by
    the Russians and Chinese and others. They will need a digital
    radar warning receiver which allows you to know whether an
    advanced radar is looking at you or targeting you. They will
    need advanced electronic combat capabilities to defeat that
    radar. Then they will need a new computer to tie all that
    together and make it work. That is pretty much it for the F-15
    side.
        On the F-16 side, there is some service life left on those
    airplanes, and we had not planned to use it because we thought
    they would be replaced by F-35's, but some of them will not be
    because of the delays in that program. There is a very limited
    number of them that will have to have some service life
    extension to make them last longer, and then we will do the
    same kind of upgrade on them if we can get the money to do it,
    which would be a new radar, a new central computer, a new radar
    warning receiver, and new electronic combat gear.
        We could not get to those as fast as we would like to. We
    do make a down payment on that in this program. If we had extra
    money, we would put money there. Thank you.
        Senator Cotton. Ms. Costello, I want to turn to the UH-1
    November helicopter replacement program. Secretary James
    recently testified that an acquisition decision is due soon on
    the replacement program. She also testified there is a sole
    source option under consideration to replace the current fleet.
    I understand that a request for information was issued to
    industry last year, which would seem to indicate the Air
    Force's intention to conduct an open and competitive bid
    process.
        If the decision is to proceed with the sole source award
    for the helicopter replacement program, are you prepared to
    present this committee with the overwhelming evidence necessary
    that such an award would actually provide best value to the
    American taxpayer?
        Ms. Costello. Yes. We would share the information that we
    can gather along the way. What is going on right now is we have
    gone out and mitigation efforts have been taken over the last
    year, but we believe we still need to look at what we can do
    with the helicopters that support the nuclear mission
    especially.
        We are looking--and we have asked for STRATCOM and for the
    Air Force Global Strike Command to outline the criticality of
    their requirements so we can prioritize which helicopters need
    to be replaced immediately as opposed to in the long term. When
    we get that information, we have asked for our team to put
    together some options. Sole source is one of those options, but
    they are looking at a couple COAs right now. They are supposed
    to come back over the next couple weeks for me to hear what
    they are representing, and then we will make a decision on our
    way forward at that point in time.
        Senator Cotton. I understand--correct me if I am wrong--
    that the helicopter will be used both for the ICBM [Inter
    Continental Ballistic Missile] security mission and then for
    what you might call Washington-centric missions, continuity of
    government, VIP transport, and so forth.
        Ms. Costello. That is part of what we are looking into.
    Right now, we are focused on the nuclear support mission, which
    is the ICBM convoy, and support in that area. We are looking at
    options that might break out the other missions separately and
    consider that for future procurement. It has not been decided
    yet, but these are the type of COAs [Course of Action] that are
    being looked at.
        General Bunch. Senator Cotton, Ms. Costello is exactly
    right. The nuclear deterrent that we have is safe, secure,
    ready to go if needed. Our focus right now is a capability gap
    that the UH-1N cannot quite meet despite the mitigation steps
    that we have taken, and we are going to weigh the risks
    associated with that and the critical nature of that
    requirement against the urgency of need and that would be--I am
    sorry, sir.
        Senator Cotton. Why can it not meet those requirements?
        General Bunch. There is a time to respond and a carriage
    capability they cannot quite meet. I believe those are two that
    we are short in. We are going to look at the urgency of that
    requirement. If we do decide that we wish to go sole source, it
    will solely be focused in those areas to address the nuclear
    mission. It will not be used to address the entire fleet. It
    would be an urgency need to meet that what we would come
    forward with, sir, if the evidence that comes to Ms. Costello
    is appropriate for that.
        Senator Cotton. Some observers might say that a next
    generation fighter or bomber is a uniquely complex kind of
    platform that might need special contracting consideration, but
    a helicopter to fly even long distance with heavy loads is a
    pretty traditional kind of platform. What would necessitate a
    sole source contract for a helicopter?
        Ms. Costello. In this case, what we are looking at is the
    time in which they need it. If they need it to be procured in a
    certain amount of time and the mission requirement is in fact
    validated, then we have to look at how fast we can buy it.
    There are opportunities to buy off existing contracts that are
    one of the COAs as opposed to going off and doing a whole new
    contracting event. Those are the types of things that we have
    asked them to look at, what are the pros and cons of each
    option. A decision has not been made yet. We have got to get
    the data. We have to assess it against the timeliness required,
    weigh the pros and cons, and then make a decision.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        Senator Manchin?
        Senator Manchin. Just very quickly. General Bunch, what
    would be the impact of reforming the contract for the B-21 to a
    fixed price contract?
        General Bunch. Sir, we have looked at it and the assessment
    is we cannot shape the contract that we have to that. We would
    have to terminate that contract. That would have a cost of over
    $300 million to do the termination. We would then have to have
    a recompete. If we did that recompete, that would be somewhere
    in the neighborhood of 24 to 30 months to complete the
    recompete. There would be a commensurate delay in fielding the
    aircraft, sir.
        Senator Manchin. What is the $300 million? What constitutes
    the cost of $300 million?
        General Bunch. We are on contract with a company that has
    gone out and put suppliers on contract and on order, and they
    have started their business case. The analysis that we have
    done to----
        Senator Manchin. There is a penalty clause by them if we
    break it.
        General Bunch. Yes, sir, because the contract that we have
    with Northrup.
        Senator Manchin. Yet, they are on a cost-plus.
        General Bunch. They are on a cost-plus, sir, and they have
    gone out to try to do----
        Senator Manchin. You know it is not real popular here.
    Right?
        General Bunch. I do understand that, sir, and I still
    believe it is the best choice for the contract type with the
    risks associated. We look forward to the discussion on this
    because we realize there are a lot of different opinions.
        Senator Manchin. I respect that. I really do respect where
    you are coming from. It is just that we all have to get there,
    and I think right now there is such a bad taste in everybody's
    mouth that it is going to be a tough one. We will try it. We
    are going to be open-minded and try.
        General Bunch. Yes, sir.
        Senator Manchin. With that being said, I think, Secretary
    Costello, you General Holmes, in your prepared statement for
    the record, you alluded to a possible replacement for the A-10
    and its close air support capability. This is what you all
    said. The Air Force is funding a combat Air Force study over
    the next year with a portion of this study dedicated to
    informing the fiscal year 2018 to 2022 budget cycle on possible
    tactical air support platform alternatives for low-intensity
    permissive conflict. This will serve to ensure that other
    current platforms in future systems meet future close air
    support requirements.
        If the study were to lead to a decision to select the
    material solution for this mission, how long would it take to
    deliver a new tactical air support platform or a new aircraft
    into the operational force?
        General Holmes. I will defer the how long question,
    Senator. Briefly, the Department has directed in one of their
    RMDs and the direction to us that came with the budget for us
    to work with the study to look at low-cost platforms and to
    work through that. We will, and we will evaluate keeping older
    platforms longer, adding new capabilities to existing
    platforms, and developing a new platform. I will defer to
    General Bunch for how long that might take.
        General Bunch. It depends how off-the-shelf we are talking
    about, sir, and what kind of capabilities. We have to look at
    what is out there in off-the-shelf, some of the aircraft that
    we are using in the more permissive environment and determine
    what capabilities they have and if those would fit the
    immediate need. If it was very well developed and did not have
    to have a stretch for the requirements, we could do that in a
    pretty quick manner. If it is a stretch for the requirements,
    then it may take longer, and we would have to look at the
    individual case study as it comes forward.
        Senator Manchin. My final would be--I also mentioned in my
    opening statement concerning the Air Force's plans to retire,
    as we talked about, the A-10. We just talked about it some
    more. As the new F-35A joint strike fighter aircraft replaces
    them on a one-for-one basis, I understand that while there is a
    one-for-one replacement for the aircraft in squadrons under the
    Air Force plan, it is not clear that close air support
    capability of the modernized force will equal or exceed the
    close air support capability of the current force.
        General Holmes or General Raymond, what is the Air Force
    doing to ensure that as the A-10 aircraft basically is retired,
    the Air Force will not be losing that close air support? Do you
    believe that the F-35 will equal or exceed the A-10 in close
    air support? In the past, you have pointed to the F-15 and F-16
    as picking up close air support missions being vacated by the
    retiring A-10's. I guess you believe that the 15's and 16's
    will be able to equal or exceed, and you believe the F-35 will
    be able to fill in one for one.
        General Holmes. Thank you, Senator.
        We do believe that we will be able to maintain the capacity
    that we need to support the close air support mission. All the
    platforms have some different capabilities that make them
    better in one area than in others. But we think we will be able
    to do that. We are working to make sure that we have the
    procedures to do it. We are establishing a CAS integration
    center at Nellis to make sure that those airplanes are ready to
    do that role, both with the tactics, techniques, and procedures
    and the com systems set to do it. Ultimately we are going to do
    it in the same way that the Navy and the Marines are doing it
    with similar platforms.
        We believe the F-35 will be a capable CAS aircraft. It will
    be particularly capable in contested environments like in
    Russian doctrine, if you bring forward your air defenses with
    you, there will be a limited number of airplanes that can
    operate in that role. It certainly would be an expensive way to
    go after a permissive environment mission, and we hope to not
    have to do that. We will look at other options, as you talked
    about before, of how can you do that permissive environment
    role cheaper.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you.
        Senator Cotton. Just a few wrap-up questions here. First,
    returning to some of Senator McCain's questions about the B-21
    program. I certainly understand the need for secrecy among many
    of the programs of our military, as well as our intelligence
    communities, and highly value those. At the same time, I think
    we should try to be as transparent as we can with taxpayers. If
    we cannot say today what this information is--we know it
    because we have had classified briefings on it. But if we
    cannot say today the answer to some of these questions like the
    contract award value, can you tell us when we might be able to
    provide that information to the taxpayer?
        General Bunch. Sir, I think we will be able to provide that
    in the upcoming months. We are still working our way through
    the GAO [Government Accountability Office] reports, and we are
    working our way through looking at the classification of those
    things. That is something the Secretary has asked us to do. One
    of the issues that we have found as we looked and tried to map
    the path forward, we felt that one of the things that was not
    as transparent with the American public was the way the B-2
    program was handled. We are trying not to mirror that. We are
    trying to release as much information and be as forward as we
    can. We just have not gotten to the point that we can release
    that at this stage.
        Senator Cotton. Well, as we discussed in the classified
    setting last week, I hope we do not mirror the B-2 program or
    the F-22 program in the sense that we actually achieve the
    number of aircraft we want to since the Air Force and our
    Nation badly need the B-21 bomber to be a complete success.
        General Bunch. Sir, we believe we have set in place a
    contract structure and a methodology--or an acquisition
    strategy that puts us in a different place than we were on
    those programs with the right oversight, the right incentive
    structure, the right requirements, and the independent cost
    estimate, and holding those requirements firm.
        Senator Cotton. Second, I want to turn to the C-130H AMP.
    Ms. Costello, the NDAA from last year authorized a restructured
    AMP program and segmented the program in two increments. The
    first increment was aimed at upgrading airspace compliance and
    safety requirements, while the second increment provides
    upgraded cockpit display and commonality across the different
    aircraft variants. Can you please explain why there is no
    procurement funding in the C-130H AMP increment one for fiscal
    year 2017, but there are funds for fiscal year 2018 and beyond?
        Ms. Costello. In our budget this year, we do accelerate the
    increment 1 AMP program so that we do meet the FAA mandate. We
    have accelerated so that all 172 H's will have increment one
    installed in time for that to be done. While most of the
    funding is later in the FYDP, it does get that done. We will
    complete all of that work by December of 2019 so that our
    aircraft will meet the mandate.
        For increment 2 AMP, we also have accelerated that in this
    year's budget, and we brought forward 14 years earlier when we
    will complete having install of the increment 2. It will be
    completed by 2028 now.
        Senator Cotton. So all--I am sorry.
        General Bunch. We just released the request for proposal
    for the INC-1 [Increment] yesterday, so we are getting that
    program started. It is early in its phases, but we will
    complete it by the end----
        Senator Cotton. As I understand, the budget tables include
    no funding for fiscal year 2017. Is that right?
        General Holmes. Sir, let me double check that for you. We
    believe we fully funded the program and we are going to get it
    done.
        Senator Cotton. I know the omnibus last year included $70
    million for it. What I am curious about is whether that $70
    million is in your opinion adequate for the entire fiscal year
    2017.
        General Holmes. Sir, can I take that for the record? We
    think it is fully funded.
        Senator Cotton. You may take it for the record as long as
    you answer it for the record.
        General Holmes. Yes, sir, we will.
        Senator Cotton. Okay.
        General Holmes. I will get it back to you right away. If
    there is not money in 2017, I am guessing it is because we are
    spending it in 2016, and then there will be a gap between the
    procurement. But let me double check that and make sure it is
    all there.
        Senator Cotton. What are the Air Force's plans for the five
    operational C-130H aircraft that were upgraded in the previous
    AMP program but are currently stored at Little Rock Air Force
    Base in a non-flying status?
        General Bunch. Sir, they are going to be ones that we
    consider later on in the program, and we will not look at those
    in increment 1 at this time. We looked at the estimated cost to
    get those into the configuration to go INC-1, then INC-2
    [Increment 2], and it is very much more expensive to get those
    into the increment 1 stage first and then to go to the
    increment 2, almost four to five times as much as taking a
    fielded C-130H and getting them to increment 2.
        Our strategy is we are going to look at that as we go into
    increment 2. We will reanalyze where we are at with our
    inventory, and then we will assess it as we go into increment
    2. We are not going to try to address it in increment 1.
        Senator Cotton. Third and final. I have heard a lot from
    commanders around the world in different combatant commands in
    the different services about diminishing weapon stockpiles.
    General Holmes, do you have the appropriate authority to
    procure munitions based on expected expenditure rates, not
    simply past expenditure rates?
        General Holmes. We do this year, Senator, and that is a new
    change in the way OMB is dealing with OCO [Overseas Contingency
    Operations] and we hope that you will too. But they allowed us
    to predict our expenditures this year in 2017 so that we can
    reduce the time it takes us to replace OCO munitions.
        Senator Cotton. When I hear you say we do this year, it
    raises a question of whether you are trying to say we do not
    for future years.
        General Holmes. Sir, I was not trying to avoid that
    question, but the administration decided to do it 1 year at a
    time and give us that authority 1 year at a time. I believe
    they did not want to tie the next administration's hands prior
    to them having a chance to decide. They did it in this year,
    and we expect it to follow.
        Senator Cotton. What munitions, aside from JDAMS [Joint
    Direct Attack Munition], do you anticipate a future need for?
        General Holmes. Sir, I have got a long list of munitions.
    The primary OCO munitions that are being expended are JDAM
    kits, the bomb bodies that go with it. SDB-1 and Hellfire are
    the ones that we are looking to buy in advance as we go
    forward. Then my preferred munitions list to fill up the entire
    kind of magazine of my requirements include also air-to-air
    munitions and some more sophisticated air-to-ground munitions
    as well.
        Senator Cotton. Do you have adequate funding for all those
    munitions?
        General Holmes. Sir, I believe that we could spend more
    money there. It is one of the places that we need to. It is one
    of the areas that, as we balance risk across the Department, we
    are accepting risk there.
        Senator Cotton. Not many examples of something that is more
    suitable for OCO spending than replenishing rounds. Is there?
        General Holmes. No, sir. It is a great one. The problem is
    that our industry's capacity is limited on what they can do in
    1 year. At the OCO rates we are buying now, we are maxing the
    capacity on JDAM. Most of the weapons we are buying we are
    buying at that economic order quantity that the manufacturer
    can build without losing money. To increase that procurement,
    we will have to go back and also pay for increased tooling and
    other things at the manufacturer to be able to buy them at a
    great lot in 1 year. What we would propose, if you would like
    to work with it, would be a multiyear plan that gradually
    increases the amounts so that we can buy back what goes in
    those magazines. But we need more money if we are going to do
    that.
        Senator Cotton. Is that primarily a question of budget
    resources and industry capacity versus your authorities?
        General Holmes. We have the authorities, sir, in our base
    budget to go out and procure munitions. It is a matter of
    deciding where we are going to take the risk. In the OCO area,
    we did not press beyond what industry could do in 1 year. I am
    not sure I can answer that. But we have the authority to go out
    and use the predicted expenditures and buy those in advance.
        General Bunch. Senator Cotton, we are in negotiation with
    Boeing on JDAM to ramp up so that we can meet not only our
    needs but our allies and foreign military sales and other
    requirements. We are doing those negotiations to try to get up
    to a higher production rate.
        Senator Cotton. The Director of National Intelligence
    testified last year that the global threat environment was as
    severe as he had ever seen it in 45 years. He said he expected
    to say the same thing next year, and he did in fact say the
    same thing this year. It is the worst he has seen in 46 years.
    He did not make a prediction for next year. But I will ask you
    if you would expect us to have a lower or a higher need for
    munitions in the coming years.
        General Holmes. Sir, in my opinion, it will continue to be
    at the same way it is now at least for years to come.
        Senator Cotton. Well, thank you all very much for your
    time. Thank you very much for your service. We appreciate
    everything you do for our country, and we look forward to
    working together over the coming months to make sure that our
    Air Force has the authorities and the budget it needs to
    perform all of its missions.
        This hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:04 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2017 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                           WEDNESDAY, MARCH 16, 2016

                               U.S. Senate,
                               Subcommittee on Airland,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

    ARMY UNMANNED AIRCRAFT VEHICLE AND AIR FORCE REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT
                                  ENTERPRISES

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m. in
    Room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Tom Cotton
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
    Sullivan, Lee, Manchin, Gillibrand, Donnelly, and Heinrich.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TOM COTTON

        Senator Cotton. The hearing will come to order.
        The Airland Subcommittee meets today to consider the Army's
    unmanned aerial systems and the Air Force's remotely piloted
    aircraft enterprises in the context of our review and oversight
    of the fiscal year 2017 defense budget request.
        I welcome our witnesses: the Commander of Air Combat
    Command, Air Force General Herbert ``Hawk'' Carlisle; the
    Commander of Training and Doctrine Command, Army General David
    Perkins; and the Director of Defense Capabilities and
    Management for the Government Accountability Office, Ms. Brenda
    Farrell. Thank you all for your service, and we appreciate your
    attendance at the hearing today.
        Unmanned aircraft systems are incredibly valuable, yet in
    short supply. These aircraft greatly increase the ability of
    commanders to gain situational awareness, exercise command and
    control, and provide strike capabilities over the modern
    battlefield.
        Our combatant commanders have repeatedly testified to the
    importance of and the increasing but unmet demand for these
    aircraft. Most recently General Breedlove, the Commander of
    United States European Command and Supreme Commander of NATO,
    testified that definitely below 10 percent of his command's
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, or ISR,
    requirements are currently being met. The story is similar
    around the world.
        The Pentagon has long faced challenges with integrating and
    assimilating unmanned aircraft for both ISR and kinetic strike
    missions into its concepts of operations, doctrine, training
    organizations, and personnel processes. Another challenge is
    cultural, namely, moving from primarily manned aviation to a
    big increase in unmanned aircraft.
        The Army and Air Force have taken different approaches to
    integrating unmanned aircraft in their services based on their
    unique competencies, roles, and mission requirements.
        First, the Army employs their UAV [Unmanned Aerial Vehicle]
    systems in support of tactical units and key battlefield
    functions. Most are organized into platoons and are organic to
    brigades and divisions. Others are organized in larger
    formations to support corps and theater commanders.
        The Air Force uses remote split operations to employ both
    their medium- and high-altitude remotely piloted aircraft
    primarily in a theater operational role.
        Second, the Army uses enlisted UAV operators, supervised by
    warrant officers and commanded by officers, while the Air Force
    tasks their rated officer pilots to fly their remotely piloted
    aircraft organized like a traditional flying squadron.
        Despite literally dozens of reviews, task forces, studies,
    and reports on unmanned aircraft enterprises by the Department
    and the GAO [Government Accountability Office], much room for
    improvement remains.
        For instance, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
    remarked in April 2008 that he had been trying to get more ISR
    assets into the CENTCOM [Central Command] theater and, quote,
    because people were stuck in the old way of doing business, it
    has been like pulling teeth. End quote.
        Secretary Gates, therefore, established the ISR Task Force
    during which the Air Force presented a plan to reach 50 combat
    lines of MQ-1/MQ-9 aircraft by 2011 and 65 combat lines by
    2013. Nevertheless, several years later, the Air Force still
    has an enterprise that is undermanned, overworked, and
    demoralized while facing a potential mass exodus of pilots and
    insufficient training infrastructure to replace these losses.
        While I do not personally have fixed or preconceived
    notions about the right policy for either service, it is plain
    that the Department is still struggling with the
    transformation. I am keenly interested, as I know members of
    the committee are as well, in exploring the main issues facing
    the Army and the Air Force and how Congress can assist in this
    critical warfighting area.
        I look forward to the witnesses' testimony.
        I would note that several other subcommittees are meeting
    at this time, so we do expect Senators to be coming in and out,
    to include my ranking member. We will give him an opportunity
    to make his statement, should he arrive in the statement
    period.
        At this point, we will turn to General Carlisle.

    STATEMENT OF GENERAL HERBERT J. CARLISLE, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR
                             COMBAT COMMAND

        General Carlisle. Chairman Cotton, Senator Rounds, thank
    you very much for having me today for this what I think is an
    incredibly important hearing. I am grateful for the opportunity
    to participate and give you my views and hear your thoughts so
    we can move forward in the Air Combat Command.
        As the Commander at ACC [Air Combat Command], I have the
    privilege to lead roughly 140,000 of our Air Force's most
    successful airmen and civilians. The air power they provide for
    our great Nation is both immense and absolutely indispensable.
    Air Combat Command is responsible for organizing, training,
    equipping, and the in-garrison employing of our Air Force's RPA
    [remotely piloted aircraft] enterprise.
        The RPA mission is instrumental to achieving decision
    advantage against our adversaries. It is a powerful asset to
    our national decision-makers and our national security and is
    the backbone to the success of our current fights.
        I am grateful that the committee shares our interests in
    the success of the RPA enterprise, and I know our combined
    concern, collaboration, and action will help advance the
    results this enterprise provides to our country.
        As you stated, Chairman, our Nation's combatant commanders
    employ our Air Force RPAs across a range of military
    operations, and they are incredibly high in demand. They are
    employed in a very distinct way. Here again, as you stated,
    Chairman, they provide theater-level air power, primarily
    focusing their potent capabilities on strategic and operational
    functions. They deliver battlefield effects crucial to the
    conduct of our Nation's current fights and their mission is
    perfectly suited to our agile and amazing Air Force crews
    operating them.
        We recognize our RPA's unique mission and its staggering
    importance to our national defense. Our RPAs can find
    themselves conducting a wide array of missions, again as you
    stated, Chairman. They can provide operationally strategic
    effects by monitoring and identifying and eliminating high-
    value targets, and they can deliver tactical air power during
    close air support engagements and in troops in contact
    situations, again often used in that way as well.
        Our warfighters' demand for persist attack and
    reconnaissance through the use of RPAs has skyrocketed. To meet
    this demand, our RPA enterprise has expanded at an
    unprecedented rate over the past 10 years. In 2007, we started
    with seven CAPs [Combat Air Patrol]. Eight years later, we had
    65 in 2015, over a fivefold increase in that time.
        ACC does have a vision and an executable plan for our RPA
    enterprise's future to ensure continued success and, as
    importantly, take care of our airmen and their families.
        First and foremost, we need more manpower in the RPA
    enterprise. Frankly, we are short and we have to plus that up.
    We are increasing our investments in our RPA airmen, their
    mission, and their resources to achieve the stable force the
    Nation requires within that enterprise. Our aircraft upgrades
    and acquisitions will allow us to provide this force with the
    most capable systems possible for the use in the joint
    warfight. The end result is RPAs delivering exactly what our
    combatant commanders are asking for now and in the future. No
    breaks, no reductions, just theater-level air power from this
    enterprise.
        Mr. Chairman, I truly appreciate this committee's
    dedication to our armed forces and in particular in this case,
    the RPA enterprise. I look forward to continued cooperation and
    the success that I know that our collaboration can bring to
    this enterprise.
        I thank you for the opportunity to participate in this
    hearing today and to share our ideas and advance ways that we
    together can make this better. I welcome any questions from the
    chairman and the members of the committee, and I ask that my
    written testimony be entered into the record. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Senator Cotton. Your testimony and all other written
    testimony will be written into the record.
        [The prepared statement of General Carlisle follows:]

               Prepared Statement by General Herbert J. Carlisle
                                  introduction
        Chairman Cotton, Ranking Member Manchin, and distinguished Members
    of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
    today to discuss how we deliver Persistent Attack and Reconnaissance
    with our Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) Enterprise today and in the
    future. As lead command for the Combat Air Force and the RPA community,
    Air Combat Command is responsible for the organizing, training,
    equipping, and in-garrison employing of the RPA mission. This mission
    is instrumental to achieving decision advantage against our enemies, is
    an indispensable asset to our National Security, and is the backbone to
    the success of our fights in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and other areas
    combating extremism and terrorism. The Air Force is fully invested in
    continuing to achieve sustainability of this enterprise.
        Combatant commanders rely upon our RPA enterprise, and specifically
    our MQ-1 and MQ-9. As we speak, we are flying combat missions around
    the globe. They are arming decision makers with intelligence, our
    warfighters with targets, and our enemies with fear, anxiety, and
    ultimately their timely end.
        But this enterprise is a victim of its own success. An insatiable
    demand for RPA forces has stretched the community thin, especially our
    airmen performing the mission. As much as we value our technology and
    weapons systems, our airmen are truly the most important aspect of this
    enterprise. We rely on their drive, commitment, performance, and
    innovation to find success. Due to mission demands, we have also been
    relying upon their sacrifice. We are taking steps to remedy this
    problem, stabilize the RPA enterprise, retain our valuable airmen, and
    sustain and eventually increase the capability our RPA community
    delivers to the warfighter. Our national defense requires it and we
    will deliver.
                            value of the rpa mission
        Air Force MQ-1s and MQ-9s currently fly 60 Combat Lines (CL) every
    day. Combat Line replaced the term Combat Air Patrol (CAP) and is
    defined as one aircraft's sortie. Each Combat Line can last up to 22
    hours. They aid ground forces by providing close air support during
    troops in contact situations, and employ their Hellfire missiles and
    guided bombs to neutralize their targets. Our intelligence airmen from
    our Distributed Common Ground System watch and analyze every second of
    their streaming video, monitor pattern of life to find potential
    targets, and arm our commanders with decision advantage.
        Their video is also live streamed to devices in the field held by
    Air Force Joint Terminal Air Controllers accompanying Army units on the
    ground or observing the battle from nearby. US and allied forces can
    watch the enemy hide from or advance on their positions. They base
    their movements on the situational awareness provided by our MQ-1s and
    MQ-9s. There is not a ground unit to be found that does not request the
    support of an RPA.
        When we find ourselves conducting combat operations against ISIL,
    al Qaeda, or its affiliates, our RPA enterprise quickly becomes one of
    the most valuable battlefield assets. Combatant Commanders may not have
    ground forces pushing through a city, able to identify enemy combatants
    or high value targets first hand, to radio the target information to
    overhead aircraft. Some of our combatant commander's only true on-the-
    battlefield eyes are viewing video streamed from our RPAs and manned
    ISR platforms. In our current conflicts, before an enemy target is
    destroyed by a precision guided munition, it is likely discovered and
    first viewed by an RPA.
        RPAs are not the only aircraft in our inventory equipped with
    visual or infrared sensors commonly referred to as targeting pods. Our
    fighter aircraft such as our F-16s, F-15Es, and even our B-1 and B-52
    bombers carry similar advanced sensors. But they cannot orbit unseen
    and unheard over a civilian population interspersed with enemy
    combatants. They are limited by their loiter time and aerial refueling
    requirements. Our MQ-1 and MQ-9 aircraft have no such limitations. They
    can loiter for longer periods of time and provide enduring battlefield
    effects, without which our combatant commanders would struggle to find
    and eliminate targets.
        Our MQ-1 and MQ-9 enterprise has grown tremendously since its
    inception 20 years ago. In 2006 the Air Force flew 12 Combat Lines.
    Today we fly 60. That is a 5 fold increase and exemplifies the furious
    pace at which we have expanded our operations and enterprise. Today we
    have almost 8000 airmen solely dedicated to the MQ-1 and MQ-9 mission.
    Over 1400 of this 8000 are Guard and Reserve personnel dedicated to the
    MQ-1 and MQ-9 mission. 77 percent of our cockpits are dedicated to
    flying combat lines every single day. The other 23 percent are
    dedicated to sustaining combat capacity though formal training and
    test. Of the 15 bases with RPA units, 13 of them have a combat mission.
    This mission is of such value, that we plan on consistent increases in
    aircraft, personnel, and results.
        Our RPA enterprise operates differently from others in our flying
    enterprise. Some of our RPA bases have aircraft for local training and
    cockpits where our crews fly combat missions. Some bases just have
    cockpits. Overseas we operate numerous Launch and Recovery Elements
    where our deployed crews take off and land our RPAs. Crews from one
    unit will likely be flying aircraft from another unit, and possibly
    multiple aircraft in different areas all in the same day. This stands
    in stark contrast to how a traditional squadron operates, where their
    aircrew, maintainers and aircraft deploy together, fly combat sorties
    together, and redeploy together.
        Another unique aspect of our RPA enterprise is that our crews
    deploy in-garrison. They arrive at work, fly combat sorties, and then
    go home to their families. This occurs every single day. However, their
    services are in such high demand that a regular work week, a 5-ON 2-OFF
    work schedule, is prohibitive to adequately providing for combatant
    commander requirements. Our crews work a different and more demanding
    schedule. Their regular work days are 10 hours long. They fly for six
    days straight, conduct non flying duties for one day, and then receive
    two days off. Instead of a 7 day week they work a 9 day week and their
    two days off are not guaranteed to coincide with a weekend. This
    grueling schedule is necessary to meet mission requirements; however it
    is also a significant aspect of the enterprise we are committed to
    fixing.
        The first step to fixing that is to increase the number of RPA
    crews by increasing the output of our training pipeline. Air Combat
    Command is responsible for the training of our Air Force's RPA pilots
    and sensor operators. We will graduate 384 next year which is 200 more
    than we have graduated annually in past years. This tremendous output
    is currently achieved with very limited resources as we strive to
    balance ACC's two main priorities: Provide for Today and Prepare for
    the Future. More pilots and sensor operators flying combat lines means
    less instructors available to train our pipeline students. Increasing
    the instructors available to train our pipeline students will decrease
    the number available to fly combat lines. This delicate balance is
    challenging, but achievable thanks to The Secretary of Defense's
    authorization to decrease our daily Combat Lines from 65 to 60. This
    slight reduction has allowed the Air Force to begin the process of
    righting our training pipeline and continuation training requirements
    by reinvesting those pilots into the school house.
        Our process for training our RPA airmen has changed significantly
    from its inception years ago. Originally we pulled pilots and
    navigators from manned flying communities like fighters, bombers,
    transport, and special operations. Usually these were not voluntary
    assignments. This drained valuable experience and manpower from these
    other flying communities and was a stop gap measure. Additionally it
    was not a good use of resources as our Air Force expended tremendous
    time, money, and effort to train these airmen for flying manned
    aircraft only to retrain them in RPAs. As our RPA enterprise increased
    exponentially, we transitioned towards a sustainable training pipeline
    and initiated a new career field--18X RPA Pilot. We created a new
    focused training pipeline for RPA pilots that not only shortens the
    time required to complete, but also eases the strain on other flying
    communities. While only one third of our current RPA pilots are 18X RPA
    Pilots, our steady state goal is to reach 90 percent and we are well on
    our way to achieving that desired end state.
        Our 18X training pipeline and RPA pilot career field is not the
    only recent measure to help improve our enterprise. Our total force has
    been integrated into our RPA enterprise and it is not just our active
    duty that fulfills our RPA requirements. Our Air Force has 17 total
    Guard and Reserve locations operating MQ-1s and MQ-9s. Our Guard and
    Reserve components currently fly 19 of our 60 daily combat lines from
    10 different locations with a planned reduction to 16 steady state
    combat lines. Our near term plans include converting all Guard units to
    MQ-9s, standing up units in Arkansas, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and
    initiating two active associate squadrons to be used for formal
    training in the New York Air National Guard at Syracuse and March Air
    Reserve Base in California.
        As we have increased our RPA footprint with our Combatant
    Commanders over the past decade, our enterprise must now grow. Plans
    are in place to continue purchasing aircraft and cockpits to achieve
    the required force structure. This will strike through the top item on
    Combatant Commander's priority lists.
        We in the Air Force and Air Combat Command fully understand the
    value of our RPA enterprise to our national defense, and that is why
    over the past 10 years we have added over 35,000 airmen to our ISR
    community, of which almost 8000 are dedicated to the RPA enterprise.
    This addition occurred while we shrunk the total force by over 50,000
    airmen. That means 85,000 airmen were removed from other essential
    missions. This is the trade-off decision we made because we fully
    understand the value of their mission. It is not just value-added, but
    required.
                   challenges facing the usaf rpa enterprise
        A robust RPA enterprise is essential for the successful conduct of
    armed conflict. The biggest challenge that we as an Air Force face with
    our RPA enterprise is that our airmen are leaving the service faster
    than we can replace them, taking with them years of training and combat
    experience. When an RPA airman separates, we do not just lose a body in
    the cockpit. We lose their expertise and experience too. While on
    paper, personnel may be a one for one swap that populates spreadsheets,
    their experience is incalculable and irreplaceable.
        The surge that our RPA enterprise has experienced in recent history
    is now no longer a surge, but the new normal. We have surged RPA
    operations nine times over the past eight years. It has become routine,
    and is taxing our airmen and our RPA enterprise beyond their limits.
    Sustained high operations tempo and the corresponding high levels of
    stress is negatively impacting the RPA enterprise. It is robbing our
    airmen of the quality of life necessary to withstand grueling schedules
    and maintain a healthy force. This leaves many of our airmen with just
    one option: to separate; a decision they have chosen at an extremely
    high rate, which threatens the sustainment of our nation's essential
    RPA mission.
        Our regular Air Force RPA pilot manning currently accounts for
    around 80 percent of our requirement. Of these pilots, only one third
    are career RPA pilots (18X) while two thirds come from manned flying
    communities. The Air Force has borrowed pilots from these other flying
    career fields to augment this steady state force, but it remains over
    200 pilots short. This shortfall is based on our cap of 60 Combat Lines
    and would only increase should the requirement for CLs increase.
        Due to the insatiable demand for their RPA combat services and the
    corresponding increase in MQ-1/9 Combat Lines, the Air Force has
    executed rapid growth of the RPA community. This generated a
    requirement for more operators. In order to produce this higher number
    of operators, the Air Force has made the difficult decision to augment
    our Formal Training Units with Instructor Pilots from operational
    squadrons, further reducing the availability of pilots to fly combat
    lines, and swelling the burden on the rest of the force. Second order
    effects of this decision include less Instructor Pilots available to
    train less experienced pilots in operational squadrons.
        Additionally our combat surge has reduced the availability of
    training sorties for our operational units. These RPA units must now
    borrow time during combat sorties to conduct training, such as
    upgrades, and improving skills, tactics, and weapon delivery
    procedures. This places severe limitations of their effectiveness. This
    is opposite the rest of our flying communities where home station
    training, conducted during dwell time with dedicated training sorties,
    allows our operators to focus on a diverse skill set across the full
    range of military operations
                           rpa enterprise way forward
        Air Combat Command recognizes the stressors applied to the RPA
    community and we have taken the initial steps required to fix it. We
    are invested in this venture and we know that we must stabilize the
    enterprise in order to sustain the combat capability and capacity for
    America.
        Recognizing the need for change in 2015 the Secretary and Chief of
    Staff of the Air Force initiated an RPA Get Well Plan. Also in late
    2015 ACC initiated a Culture and Process Improvement Plan (CPIP) for
    the MQ-1 and MQ-9 enterprise, with the goals of providing relief to our
    taxed crews and constructing a sustainable plan for the future. Our
    overriding goal was to determine why our MQ-1 and MQ-9 airmen are
    stressed and leaving the force and what we can do to improve their
    quality of life so they make the preferred decision to remain in the
    Air Force and continue to provide their in-demand services to the
    combatant commanders.
        ACC's CPIP is an aggressive, action-oriented, field-influenced
    program with the goal of making lasting change for the MQ-1/9
    enterprise. We want to move the RPA community toward the sustainment
    model we have established for other Air Force weapon systems. To tackle
    this challenge our team conducted 1,195 face to face interviews and
    1,164 electronic surveys with our RPA airmen and families. This was a
    grass-roots initiative to listen to our airmen and ensure their voice
    was heard and incorporated into stabilizing the RPA enterprise.
        CPIP responses cast light on the individual issues our RPA airmen
    have experienced, detrimental to the culture of their enterprise. Our
    RPA airmen are overtasked, their communities undermanned, and are
    lacking adequate support on their bases. This materializes as increased
    stress, reduced motivation, and a general reduction in job
    satisfaction, even though the airmen fully understand the incredible
    impact they have on our combat mission.
        Our solutions generated from our CPIP process are extensive but
    achievable. We are examining the possible expansion of the RPA
    community to several new bases and overseas locations. This will this
    help by giving airmen and their families more diverse options where
    they can be based. We are evaluating base services to meet the personal
    and family requirements of our RPA airmen, and we are also taking a
    further look at other quality of life initiatives, compensation, and
    developmental opportunities.
        There are also additional changes, resulting from our CPIP
    findings, the Air Force is enacting to continue to build our RPA
    capacity and capability for the future. We are committed to investing
    resources to meet our sustained requirement of 361 MQ-9s and 271
    cockpits. We are growing our Formal Training Unit (FTU) capacity in
    order to increase RPA pilot production to over 400 per year by 2019.
    The most we have trained up through this year is 250. Our FTUs must
    continue to expand to fully realize the benefits of a stabilized and
    in-demand service.
        The funding required to support out initiatives is essential to our
    national defense. Air Combat Command would like to express our sincere
    appreciation to Congress for their support regarding our MQ-9
    initiatives. The 12 MQ-9 aircraft added in fiscal year 2015 and the
    addition of 4 more aircraft in fiscal year 2016 will greatly aid our
    combat and reconnaissance operations we provide to the Combatant
    Commanders. We also thank you for your continued support in our fiscal
    year 2017 budget request. This will allow us to purchase additional MQ-
    9s and help replace combat losses. All of these programs will not only
    help stabilize our RPA enterprise, but will also amplify our combat
    capability.
        To further incentivize our airmen to remain in service, we have
    requested and received authorization for an annual $25,000 aviator
    retention pay for RPA pilots to bring their total compensation to the
    levels of our most in-demand operators and pilots. Congress's support
    for this initiative has been indispensable and we thank you for your
    backing. Furthermore, we plan to add regular monthly flight pay with
    gate months which ensures flight pay during non-flying assignments.
    These additional compensation measures will align our RPA pilot force
    with the rest of our flying enterprise.
                                   conclusion
        The Air Force has provided continuous combat airpower for our
    Nation. It has been continuous as there has been no break in combat
    sorties and units deployed to combat theatres in the last 25 years. But
    it has also been continuous in that it has continuously evolved.
        In Desert Storm, only 8 percent of our weapons were precision
    guided. 92 percent were unguided. Today that number is 100 percent
    precision. As we have transitioned to the precision era, our
    Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance has also become precise.
    To support our 100 percent precision operations, to find our enemies,
    to relay targets to aircraft, and to monitor and execute the strikes,
    we have grown our RPA enterprise exponentially, creating a bow wave of
    challenges.
        There is no break in sight for this mission, and we must mitigate
    these challenges all while continuing to supply our combatant
    commanders with forces required to support the defense of our nation.
    We have plans in place to address our current challenges, and we have
    enacted further plans to grow our RPA enterprise to reach its full
    potential.
        None of this can happen without our airmen. They are indispensable
    and our most valuable asset and this will never change. Recruiting,
    retaining, and promoting our airmen is as vital to our service as our
    aircraft and weapon acquisitions. Our RPA airman and families have
    sacrificed greatly in the defense of our nation. I am proud to have the
    opportunity to make the necessary changes to give our airmen the
    resources and tools necessary to maximize their impact on our national
    defense.
        Our Get Well Plan and CPIP initiatives have started the ball
    rolling, and the future only gets brighter for our RPA enterprise. I
    thank the committee for their dedication to our Armed Forces and
    attentiveness to our RPA enterprise. I have no doubt that this
    partnership will continue to do much to improve our forces, the lives
    of the airmen involved, and the combat output so desperately desired by
    our combatant commanders. I look forward to continued collaboration and
    the success it will bear for the Joint Force and our Nation.

        Senator Cotton. We will now pause on witness statements and
    turn to the ranking member, Senator Manchin.

                  STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOE MANCHIN III

        Senator Manchin. First of all, thank you all for your
    service and thanks for being here today.
        Mr. Chairman, I want to also extend a welcome to all of our
    witnesses and thank you for holding this hearing today.
        Our witnesses this afternoon will help us understand the
    issues surrounding a growing capability that many only dreamed
    about, unmanned aircraft systems. We only have to read the
    headlines about so-called drone strikes to understand that
    these systems have become an important element of modern
    warfare.
        We have all been concerned about supporting the combatant
    commander requirements that result in a need for 65 combat air
    patrols, and this has led to placing significant strain on the
    Air Force's RPA operator community.
        Last fall, Secretary Carter approved an Air Force MQ-1/9
    RPA combat air patrol reduction from 65 to 60 CAPs. He said
    that this reset would allow the Air Force to redirect
    operational MQ-1/9 pilot manning to ameliorate schoolhouse
    manning challenges. Secretary Carter also announced a number of
    other changes that I hope we will be able to discuss today.
        The Army operates, among other unmanned systems, the MQ-1C,
    which is the Gray Eagle UAV. I know from the prepared testimony
    that General Perkins also has problems, including having the
    expand the capabilities of the UAV school to meet increased
    manning requirements. This has caused a Gray Eagle operators
    and maintainers.
        In the interest of time--I will turn my phone off.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Donnelly. You can blame it on me, Joe.
        Senator Manchin. I am so sorry.
        In the interest, I am going to stop there, and I look
    forward to hearing all you all's testimony and our questions to
    follow up.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
        General Perkins?

    STATEMENT OF GENERAL DAVID G. PERKINS, USA, COMMANDING GENERAL,
                U.S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND

        General Perkins. Chairman Cotton, Ranking Member Manchin,
    and members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity
    to be here today to discuss the Army unmanned aerial systems,
    or UAS, as we refer to them.
        The United States Army organizes, trains, and employs our
    unmanned aerial systems primarily as an organic support asset
    to the ground commander to provide assured forward-based
    organic support to the maneuver commander from the platoon to
    division level.
        On September 11, 2001, the U.S. Army UAS force consisted of
    a little less than 3 companies and less than 200 soldiers.
    Since then, the United States Army UAS force has grown to over
    700 medium and large UAS and over 6,500 small UAS operated by
    more than 7,000 soldiers.
        To address this rapid expansion and continued growing
    demand, the Army is executing a comprehensive strategy to
    ensure that UAS formations are capable of meeting the
    challenges now and in the future.
        We have made great strides over the past year implementing
    changes that will result in higher levels of UAS readiness
    across the total Army. I will share a few examples of those
    here.
        UAS are now fully integrated into Army doctrine and
    regulations. Our aviation brigades now have training oversight
    of the Shadow UAS platoons and then brigade combat teams to
    improve standardization, safety, and operational capability. We
    now also have lieutenant platoon leaders assigned to each
    brigade combat team Shadow platoon. We have assessed more than
    100 former OH-58 Delta pilots as UAS tech warrant officers. We
    have improved the UAS and aviation warrant officer basic course
    to reflect these best practices.
        All of our Army training standards are in compliance with
    the basic UAS qualification training requirements directed in
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructions 3255.01.
        To improve the training of our leaders, we have established
    an air cavalry leaders course, a UAS platoon leaders course,
    and UAS leaders course.
        The Forces Command Commander has integrated UAS training
    into his training guidance and readiness reporting, and the
    Army places high priority now on UAS readiness and readiness
    reporting.
        Our division commanders and aviation center are closely
    collaborating to assure integrated UAS home station training
    that encompasses the maneuver units they support, ranges,
    airspace, frequency management facilities and airstrips.
        In short, we have done much to improve our state of UAS
    training and readiness since 2014, and I am optimistic that the
    improved readiness results will rapidly become apparent.
        I look forward to working with this committee to address
    your concerns about Army UAS readiness and appreciate the
    opportunity to speak with you today. All of us in the Army
    appreciate the support that we get from each one of you in a
    collective body. Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of General Perkins follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by General David G. Perkins
        Chairman Cotton, Ranking Member Manchin, and Members of the
    Subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to
    discuss the doctrine, manning, and training of Army Unmanned Aircraft
    Systems (UAS) units.
                                  introduction
        Army UAS provide assured, forward based organic support to the
    maneuver commander from the platoon to division level. On September 11,
    2001, the U.S. Army UAS force consisted of only three companies and
    less than 200 soldiers. Since then, the Army UAS force has grown to
    over 600 medium and large UAS, and over 6,500 small UAS operated by
    more than 7,000 soldiers. To address this rapid expansion and continued
    growing demand, the Army is executing a comprehensive strategy to
    ensure that UAS formations are capable of meeting the challenges now
    and in the future. Today, I will highlight current Army UAS doctrine,
    manning, and training, as well as how the Army intends to continue to
    improve the warfighting capability of its UAS formations.
                      army unmanned aircraft systems (uas)
        The majority of today's Army UAS formations are designed and
    trained to operate at the brigade, division, and corps level. They
    primarily support Brigade Combat Teams at the operational and tactical
    level, and are fully integrated as a member of the combined arms team,
    executing joint combined arms maneuver and wide area security in
    support of the ground force commander. The remaining UAS formations
    provide strategic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR),
    and precision strike in support of Global Force Management Allocation
    Plan (GFMAP) requirements for Army, Special Operations, and joint
    forces. Army UAS formations deploy to the theater and execute all
    aspects of their mission from within the area of operations of the
    supported units.
        The Army divides UAS into two basic categories. The first category
    consists of the smaller, less complex systems operated by soldiers,
    independent of military occupational specialty (MOS), who are selected
    and trained at the small unit level. The second category encompasses
    the larger, more capable systems operated by professional UAS soldiers
    who are institutionally trained, formally qualified, and assigned to
    maintain and operate Army UAS in UAS specific units.
        The Army's smaller UAS are rucksack portable, hand-launched air
    vehicles that provide reconnaissance capabilities to battalion and
    below. These UAS are categorized as Group 1 UAS, meaning they weigh
    less than 20 pounds, fly at lower altitudes, are highly automated, and
    operate within line-of-sight of the operator. They provide a tactical
    reconnaissance capability to small units on the ground, allowing units
    to see beyond terrain features and inter-visibility lines to provide
    information collection and security. Group 1 UAS include the RQ-11B
    Raven and the RQ-20A Puma, which stay aloft for 1-2 hours while
    delivering basic full-motion imagery to a soldier on the ground. Puma
    and Raven UAS operators can be any MOS and are trained by master
    trainers at the unit level. Group 1 master trainers are qualified
    instructors who are certified through a 140-hour Qualification Course
    at Fort Benning, Georgia. The Army possesses no Group 2 UAS systems.
        The second category of UAS are the Army's larger, more capable
    systems (Group 3 and Group 4) that operate at higher altitudes and at
    distances typically beyond the line-of-sight of their launch and
    recovery locations. Because of the complexity of these systems and
    their associated missions, Group 3 and 4 are organized into specific
    UAS units. The Army's current Group 3 Tactical UAS is the RQ-7B Shadow,
    which supports brigade and below tactical requirements. The Army's
    Group 4 UAS, MQ-1C Gray Eagle, supports tactical, operational, and
    strategic requirements at the division and above level.
        Group 3 and 4 UAS are fully integrated into Army intelligence,
    maneuver, aviation, mission command, and fires doctrine. Their purpose
    is to enable combined arms maneuver by increasing the maneuver force's
    mobility, lethality, survivability, and mission command. Today, over
    4,500 Group 3 and 4 trained UAS soldiers and Warrant Officers are
    assigned to 75 Shadow platoons and 10 Gray Eagle companies across the
    Army. These numbers will grow as the Army increases to 94 Shadow
    platoons and 15 Gray Eagle companies by the end of fiscal year 2018.
                     army uas force structure and missions
        There is currently two UAS-specific formations in the Army for the
    Group 3 UAS (Shadow) and two UAS-specific formations for the Group 4
    UAS (Gray Eagle). Shadow UAS are organized into platoons and assigned
    to either a Brigade Combat Team, a Heavy Attack Reconnaissance Squadron
    within the Combat Aviation Brigade, or Special Operations Units. The
    Gray Eagle UAS are organized into two different company constructs and
    either assigned to the Combat Aviation Brigade in a Division or at
    Echelons Above Division (EAD).
        The Shadow platoon is assigned to every Brigade Combat Team in both
    the Active Component and National Guard. These platoons are fully
    integrated into combined arms maneuver, and provide the commander with
    reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities to meet tactical maneuver
    and intelligence requirements. The Shadow platoon has 27 UAS soldiers
    and four air vehicles, providing 18-24 hours of continuous UAS coverage
    to the supported commander. Combat Aviation Brigades also have three
    Shadow platoons assigned to each Heavy Attack Reconnaissance Squadron.
    These platoons also have 27 UAS soldiers and four air vehicles that can
    provide 18-24 hours of coverage. These platoons are employed with the
    AH-64 Apaches to execute manned/unmanned teaming (MUM-T) for enhanced
    reconnaissance, security, and attack operations.
        A divisional Gray Eagle Company is assigned to each of the active
    component Combat Aviation Brigades and provides tactical and
    operational commanders organic reconnaissance, surveillance, security,
    and attack capabilities. Gray Eagle Companies provide support to both
    the Aviation Brigade and divisional ground maneuver forces as a
    division-level capability. Organized to deploy as a unit and conduct
    operations from one or more locations within their division area of
    operations, the 127-Soldier Divisional Gray Eagle Company has 12 air
    vehicles and can provide up to four simultaneous 24-hour missions per
    day as a consolidated company, and three simultaneous 24-hour missions
    per day in a split-based configuration. Although designed to support
    Army division requirements, these formations have been recently
    deployed in support of combatant commanders separate from their
    divisions on a Request for Forces basis to fill GFMAP requirements for
    ISR.
        The Army also possesses EAD Gray Eagle Companies, which are
    assigned to both the Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) and the
    Army Special Operations Aviation Command (ARSOAC). These companies are
    trained, equipped, and organized to conduct long-endurance, extended
    range, multidiscipline intelligence and precision strike operations to
    provide timely intelligence and destruction of high payoff targets in
    support to both Army and joint organizations. These Gray Eagle
    Companies also have 12 air vehicles, are larger than divisional
    companies, and are manned with a total of 165 soldiers. This additional
    manning enables the EAD Gray Eagle Companies to conduct more split-
    based operations and are more tailorable to meet GFMAP requirements.
    Currently, only one EAD Gray Eagle Company is fielded with three
    additional companies scheduled to be complete by fiscal year 2018.
                               army uas training
        The centerpiece of the Army's UAS strategy is the soldier. Army
    enlisted soldiers and Noncommissioned Officers (NCOs), led by UAS
    Warrant Officers, operate and maintain our Group 3 and 4 UAS. UAS MOSs
    consist of 15W (UAS Operator) and 15E (UAS Maintainer) for enlisted
    personnel and NCOs, and 150U (UAS Operations Technician) for warrant
    officers. Soldiers who enter the UAS MOS must meet the highest
    standards, and achieve a surveillance and communications (SC) score of
    at least 105 on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery military
    entry exam. This score is the highest SC score for entry into any Army
    MOS. The U.S. Army Aviation Branch has been very successful with
    recruiting and enlisting highly qualified soldiers for these positions.
        Upon entry into the service, UAS operator and maintenance MOSs have
    a 6-year active duty service obligation contract that ensures service
    longevity of these quality enlistees after completion of their highly
    technical and tactical training. Upon completion of their initial
    enlistment, UAS Operators are currently offered a reenlistment bonus of
    approximately $11,000 for an additional 5-year reenlistment to enable
    the Army to build senior NCOs as the force continues to grow.
        Acquiring our UAS Warrant Officer leaders from the senior NCOs
    within the 15W UAS Operator enlisted feeder population ensures that our
    most experienced and capable UAS operators progress into senior
    leadership positions. Additionally, due to the inactivation of the OH-
    58D Kiowa scout helicopter fleet, we have also been able to transition
    over 100 of our Warrant Officer OH-58D pilots to transition into the
    150U UAS Operations Technician field, infusing high quality aviators
    and aero scouts into this growing field.
        UAS soldiers and warrant officers attend a variety of Professional
    Military Education and functional training courses for qualification
    and further education. Aviation Branch Professional Military Education
    (PME) is continuously reviewed, and MOS qualification-critical tasks
    are continuously updated using lessons learned from both combat and
    training. Programs of Instruction in the UAS field, like the Warrant
    Officer Basic Course, the Warrant Officer Advanced Course, the UAS
    Maintainer Course, and the UAS Operator Course continue to evolve and
    improve as we expand our knowledge, along with the missions and roles
    of our UAS formations.
        To address recent lessons learned, the Aviation Branch also added a
    UAS Platoon Leader Course for newly appointed UAS Shadow Platoon
    Leaders, and the Air Cavalry Leaders Course to provide hands on
    training for UAS and AH-64 Apache helicopter operators and leaders to
    gain greater proficiency in the employment of UAS while teamed with
    Apaches.
        To ensure that we continue to develop the most capable personnel
    for this growing force, our UAS Institutional Training Center at Fort
    Huachuca, Arizona is staffed with the most qualified soldiers, marines,
    Department of the Army civilians, and contractors. The Army UAS School
    at Fort Huachuca qualifies both UAS operators and maintainers, as well
    as U.S. Marine Corps and Australian Army Shadow operators, and serves
    as the center of institutional training efforts for initial
    qualification, advanced individual training courses.
        The first phase of qualification training at Fort Huachuca consists
    of an 8-week common core course for all UAS operators. During this
    phase, UAS operators receive in-depth instruction on the fundamentals
    of aerodynamics, doctrine, risk management, mission planning, flight
    safety, and navigation. During the second phase of training, UAS
    operators conduct live and simulated flight training in either the
    Shadow or Gray Eagle UAS. Shadow operator training is a 10-week program
    of instruction, and the Gray Eagle operator training course is a 25-
    week program of instruction. Both courses are performance oriented and
    require operators to achieve mastery of their launch, pilotage, payload
    operation, mission, gunnery, and recovery skills prior to graduation.
    Army training standards are in compliance with the Basic UAS
    Qualification (BUQ) training requirements directed in Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3255.01. Because of the
    diversity of UAS designs and missions across DOD, CJCSI 3255.01
    contains a broad range of applicable training certification
    requirements. Upon completion of the initial training courses at Fort
    Huachuca, soldiers are then assigned to Army units. Once integrated
    with their new unit, soldiers are incorporated into the unit
    commander's aircrew training program (ATP), which is designed to
    produce fully mission trained, combat-ready crewmembers. This training
    focuses on task proficiency at the individual, crew, and unit level to
    enable the execution of the collective mission essential tasks
    necessary to accomplish successful joint combined arms operations.
        The ATP process in units consists of progressing through three
    readiness levels (RL). RL3 is refresher training, and focuses on
    training and demonstrating proficiency in basic UAS launch, recovery,
    and flight tasks. RL2 is mission training, and focuses on training and
    demonstrating proficiency in those tasks required to execute missions
    (reporting, air-ground operations, acquiring and engaging targets,
    conducting reconnaissance, MUM-T, etc.). The third progression level is
    RL1. RL1 is continuation training. Once designated RL1, the UAS
    crewmember is responsible for maintaining proficiency in base, mission,
    and special tasks assigned by the commander, and must complete
    semiannual and annual task iterations in all modes of flight, as well
    as meet semiannual flying hour minimums. RL1 crewmembers must also
    complete and pass an annual standardization flight evaluation, medical
    evaluation, and operator's written examination.
        As UAS soldiers gain experience in their unit during home station
    training, combat training center rotations, and deployments, UAS
    operators are further evaluated and certified as aircraft commanders.
    UAS Aircraft Commanders serve as the unit's first level trainer, and
    are responsible for all operational and training aspects of a specific
    mission, as well as the safe operation of the UAS by the other crew
    members. The Aircraft Commander (AC) program is designed to ensure that
    the designated aircraft commander possesses the maturity, experience,
    and skill proficiency required to execute their duties.
        After designation as an AC, the next step for a UAS operator is
    designation as a UAS Instructor Operator (IO). Prerequisites for a
    soldier to attend the IO course are 200 or more actual flight hours, as
    well as demonstrated maturity, judgment, and operator proficiency. As
    we continue to grow the UAS force, the IO course prerequisites serve as
    initial screening criteria for course attendance. To ensure the quality
    of the prospective IOs, candidates must also pass a proficiency flight
    exam and written test and receive a commander's recommendation for
    attendance. The soldier must then satisfactorily complete all course
    requirements for designation as an IO.
        No waivers have ever been given for schoolhouse instructor pilots
    and the waivers for instructor operators in UAS units are limited.
    There are no waivers for RL progression or currency. The only two
    waivers still granted are for hours (200) and rank, and are directly
    coordinated with the battalion command sergeant major. The Army is
    trending down on waivers and grant them for fewer reasons, with
    accident rates also decreasing. There were 56 waivers in fiscal year
    2014, 40 in fiscal year 2015, and 16 so far in fiscal year 2016.
    Waivers are not given lightly.
        Due to a recent OSD directed Resource Management Decision to grow
    additional UAS formations to meet global ISR requirements, the Army is
    expanding the capabilities of the UAS school to meet increased manning
    requirements. This has caused a temporary shortage in Gray Eagle UAS
    operators and maintainers. We are currently on track to close the gap
    in fiscal year 2017. Until then, some of our non-deployed Gray Eagle
    formations will be manned at lower levels to ensure deployed units are
    fully manned and trained to meet mission requirements.
                                   readiness
        To measure readiness of the UAS force, the Army implemented
    multiple initiatives to improve readiness reporting. A recent FORSCOM
    message directed subordinates to establish UAS flight hour programs and
    to report monthly UAS flying hour execution to the FORSCOM Commander.
    The fiscal year 2016 FORSCOM Training Guidance directed Combat Aviation
    Brigade Commanders to provide aviation standardization, maintenance,
    and safety oversight to Shadow Platoons assigned to ground maneuver
    units. This is to ensure all UAS formations regardless of parent HQs
    are executing flying hours to sustain readiness and build proficiency.
    It also directed full execution of the UAS flying hour program to
    improve Shadow UAS platoon readiness, and to build the experience
    levels required for IO certification.
        HQDA also updated the Defense Readiness Reporting System to better
    facilitate Army UAS crew readiness reporting to ensure standardization
    across the Army. These changes will be implemented in the next update
    to DA PAM 220-1 (Defense Readiness Reporting System--Army Procedures).
        As we continue to gather lessons learned, and tactics, techniques,
    and procedures (TTPs), we are continually assessing manning and home
    station training through an Army-level holistic UAS review process.
    This will enable the Army to more rapidly refine TTPs and training as
    we employ new sensors, weapons, and formations. This review process,
    coupled with the increased rigor in our readiness and training
    processes, will maintain our positive trend of reduced accidents and
    mishaps in recent years.
                                   conclusion
        Over the last 15 years, the US Army has rapidly grown our Unmanned
    Aircraft System fleet. Army UAS formations are embedded at the
    tactical-level within Brigade Combat Teams and Combat Aviation
    Brigades, at the operational level in Divisions, and at the strategic
    level in INSCOM and Special Operations units. Army UAS formations have
    played, and will continue to play, a critical role in our ability to
    maintain overmatch of our adversaries as we face an increasingly
    complex world. Although this technology has influenced the character of
    warfare, integration of this technology must always be underpinned by
    our most important weapons--highly trained professional soldiers and
    leaders able to fully exploit the capabilities that UAS bring to the
    battlefield.
        Thank you for the opportunity to represent our soldiers and our
    Army. On behalf of the Army, thank you for your support to our
    soldiers, civilians, veterans, and their families.

        Senator Cotton. Ms. Farrell?

    STATEMENT OF BRENDA S. FARRELL, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES
            AND MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

        Ms. Farrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Cotton, Ranking Member Manchin, and members of the
    subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today to
    discuss some of the unmanned aerial systems, or UAS, pilot
    challenges that DOD [Department of Defense] faces. Let me
    briefly summarize my statement.
        The size, sophistication, and cost of DOD's UAS portfolio
    has grown considerably, as has the demand for trained pilots.
    In our prior work, we found that the Air Force has not provided
    a sufficient number of UAS pilots to meet requirements due to
    several factors, including most notably the increase in demand
    for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. As a
    result, the UAS workload has been performed by fewer pilots
    working more hours to accomplish the Air Force mission.
        My statement today is based primarily on reports we issued
    in April 2014 and May 2015. We made 10 recommendations to DOD
    to improve the Air Force management of UAS pilots, address Army
    pilot training challenges, and enhance DOD coordination of UAS
    training. For this statement, we followed up with DOD officials
    to determine what actions they had taken in response to our
    recommendations.
        My statement is divided into three parts.
        The first part addresses the actions that the Air Force has
    taken to strengthen management of its UAS pilots. We found the
    Air Force has undertaken a number of actions but has not fully
    addressed the issues related to identifying pilot requirements,
    recruiting and retention difficulties, evaluating the potential
    use of civilians as pilots, ensuring pilots complete the
    required training, moving pilots through the training pipeline
    and analyzing UAS pilot promotion rates.
        For example, in our April 2014 report, we found that the
    Air Force had not accurately identified the number of UAS
    pilots required to accomplish its mission, nor had it
    established a minimum number of pilots needed. Indications are
    that it needs more pilots.
        As of March 2016, the Air Force had not updated pilot
    requirements, and until it does, the Air Force will not know if
    it is assuming unacceptable levels of risk to accomplishing the
    mission and ensuring safety.
        The second part of my statement addresses training
    challenges that the Army faces. In 2015, we found that the Army
    had challenges related to pilots completing their training,
    tracking training, and its use of less experienced instructors,
    which could affect training quality.
        For example, we found that a 2015 Army review showed that
    pilots in most Army Shadow units did not complete training in
    fiscal year 2014. The study found that Army UAS pilots in 61 of
    65 Shadow units that were not deployed in fiscal year 2014 have
    flown an annual unit average of 150 hours of training, which is
    about 200 hours less than the minimum amount required. We
    corroborated the Army's findings in focus groups, discussions
    with Army UAS pilots, and in responses to a questionnaire that
    UAS unit commanders also provided.
        Finally, the third part of my statement addresses
    coordinating the training of UAS pilots within DOD. In 2015, we
    found that some coordination was occurring among the services
    with respect to UAS training, but potential benefits exist.
        For example, we reported that coordinated training between
    services could help shorten the amount of time the services
    spend acclimating to each other once deployed and would allow
    an easier transition to working together during missions.
        Also, a senior OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense]
    official stated that the services may have valuable lessons to
    share with one another because the services fly similar UAS. He
    cited similarities between the Air Force's Predator and the
    Army's Gray Eagle. However, we found that no DOD-wide training
    strategy existed, and we recommended that DOD issue a
    Department-wide UAS training strategy that addresses if and how
    the services should coordinate with one another to share
    information on training UAS pilots. Without such a strategy,
    the services will not be positioned to capitalize on training
    opportunities and may waste scarce resources.
        In summary, Mr. Chairman, the Army and the Air Force have
    taken action to implement the recommendations that we made to
    address some of the workforce challenges. However, none of the
    recommendations have been fully implemented.
        We look forward to working with the Air Force and the Army
    to continue to monitor the actions that they have taken in
    response to our recommendations.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That concludes my statement. I
    will be pleased to take questions when the subcommittee so
    desires.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Farrell follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Cotton. Thank you all.
        General Carlisle, as I mentioned in the opening statement--
    and you touched on some of the same points in your written
    statement--the Air Force has faced some challenges normalizing
    the integration of unmanned aircraft into institutional
    processes. Now, perhaps platforms like the MQ-1 and MQ-9 were
    viewed as emergency urgent fixes during the early phases of the
    war on terror or something that might decline as combat
    operations declined in their OPTEMPO [Operation Tempo].
    Certainly the Air Force, like all services, have been
    underfunded in recent years, which puts you on the horns of a
    dilemma trying to meet all of your increasing requirements
    while also meeting the warfighting demands.
        That said, unmanned aerial vehicles are an increasingly
    potent resource on the battlefield and much of the next chapter
    of the Endeavor war is going to be written by them.
        The Air Force has a history and a culture that is deeply
    rooted in fighter operations over the skies of Europe. Do you
    think there is some kind of cultural aversion within the Air
    Force that has hindered it from fully integrating unmanned
    systems into its doctrine and its operations?
        General Carlisle. Chairman, thanks for the question.
        I do not. I will tell you that what our RPA crews do--and
    it is across the spectrum, obviously, MQ-1/9, RQ-170, the RQ-4
    and what is going to be MQX and RQX in the follow-ons. The use
    of those systems, the employment of those, the weapons school
    and how they stand up and integrate in all of our exercises
    into the training between the Army and the Air Force at both
    Green Flags and Army warfighter assessments--we spend a lot of
    time making sure that we get this right and we do that
    integration.
        I will tell you I do not think, if you talk to anybody in
    the United States Air Force, they would tell you that RPAs are
    not part of our future. They are a huge part of our future.
    Today it is the largest mission design series in the United
    States Air Force on the MQ-1/MQ-9 side, and they will continue
    to grow.
        The challenge that we faced--and again, I truly believe,
    Mr. Chairman, that it was not cultural. It was the demand
    signal accelerated so rapidly and we were trying to meet the
    demands of the warfighter, which we had to do to win the
    Nation's wars today that we are fighting. We just started this
    ramp of increasing those combat lines, or combat air patrols,
    per day, and we did not have time to build what is a normal
    process to develop and take care of that enterprise.
        An example of it. Between the MQ-1 and 9, we have flown 3
    million hours--over 3 million hours--in those two weapon
    systems. Over 2.8 million hours of that time has been combat,
    which means the formal training unit, the test and the
    continuation training are a mere fraction of the amount of time
    we have flown, and it is because of the demand signal.
        The purpose of the ``get well'' plan and the culture and
    process improvement program is to step back--and we have done
    that. The GAO report was fantastic in helping us do this--look
    at what we need to do to get this right, determine those
    numbers, fix the training pipeline, and then put the right
    amount of force and the right amount of work into the RPA
    enterprise because it is going to be with us, we see it,
    indefinitely. It is a huge part of our future. We are working
    hard to normalize that. It is not the cultural part. It is the
    training and to try to meet the demand of the combatant
    commanders and the warfighters.
        Senator Cotton. Why do you think there is such an unmet
    demand signal? When I meet with combatant commands, theater
    commands, whether here in Washington or downrange, one
    consistent theme I hear--I suspect the members of this
    committee will hear the same thing--is we cannot get enough
    unmanned aerial coverage in our theater.
        General Carlisle. Sir, I think the demand signal is
    incredible. Clearly what the RPAs provide with respect to all
    the way from situational awareness and intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance--another part of that that is
    behind the scenes that they do not necessarily see but is a big
    part of that is the processing, exploitation, and dissemination
    of that information that is done via both Air Force and Army
    DCGS, or distributed common ground system.
        It is a demand for ISR. It is the desire for that
    unblinking eye in their entire theater so they know what is
    going on 100 percent of the time everywhere. That is the demand
    signal.
        We have to get better at how we do this. We have to be more
    predictive in our intelligence. We have to machine to machine.
    We have to get learning systems that can think ahead of the
    adversary and try to address that in more modern and
    technologically advanced ways, which goes to Secretary Carter's
    third offset, is how do you get inside of that information. The
    demand signal is totally understandable because they are the
    ones--the combatant commanders are the ones that are given the
    job to execute the war plans, if required to, and they need
    that information. We are trying to meet it.
        But there is also across all the services--and again,
    Chairman, you know this. There is still demand in bombers.
    There is still demand in airlift. There is still demand in
    fighters. There is strike capability. There is still a demand
    in space and cyber and nuclear deterrent capability. It is the
    balance act that you referenced in your opening statement.
        Senator Cotton. Let us assume that the demand signal from
    downrange is accurate and needed. Let us just assume that. What
    is the biggest bottleneck in meeting that demand? Can you not
    turn out the pilots quickly enough? Can you not retain them?
    Can industry not make the aircraft enough? Are we not providing
    enough money to do any of that? Do you not have enough analysts
    on the backend? What is the main bottleneck in this process?
        General Carlisle. Everything. Seriously, sir, I think the
    first thing that we had to address was training pipeline and
    the FTU [formal training unit] at Holloman and the money and
    resources we are putting into that to expand that is a big part
    of it. Then the manpower and the resources to do it. We have to
    grow the enterprise to continue to try to meet the demands.
        I do believe there is technology that can help us to meet
    some of that demand across the entire ISR enterprise so we can
    get better at that.
        But we started with the training enterprise and the fact
    that the pipeline was not big enough or doing enough to produce
    the capability we needed. Then the resourcing challenge of
    balancing that demand signal with all the other demand
    signals--clearly, BCA [Budget Controll Act of 2011] did hurt us
    significantly with respect to manpower and resources to do
    things. But we are addressing those. We are trying to work on
    those.
        I think the idea that we could--you know, I mean, there are
    other ways to do this--not other ways. There are ways to take
    advantage of the RPAs, other forms of intelligence, predictive
    capability, on-orbit capability, other systems that are coming
    on. Even within the MQ-9, there are new systems on the sensor
    side that give us ultimately more capability like Gorgon Stare,
    which is a great capability. We are deploying in that.
    Downrange it is doing fantastic, but the back end of that is
    the processing, exploitation, and dissemination to take all
    that information and get it out. Is there machine-to-machine
    ways that we can do that better? Is there learning algorithms
    that we can do to take advantage of that? Chairman, we are
    working on all of that right now.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, General.
        Senator Manchin?
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I thank all three of you for your service and for being
    here today.
        General Perkins, if I may ask you. You rely almost
    exclusively on enlisted UAV operators. Correct?
        General Perkins. That is correct, sir.
        Senator Manchin. Are you having a problem or the same
    problem that the Air Force is having? I am just trying to find
    out if there is a way we can help each other.
        General Perkins. Sir, I understand.
        We man our unmanned aerial systems very similarly to the
    way we man all our other systems in the Army, whether it is a
    tank or an artillery piece or mechanized infantry carrier. That
    is part of a formation. Most of our weapon systems are operated
    and manned by non-commissioned officers and soldiers, and then
    they are commanded by officers. The way we operate our unmanned
    aerial systems is a similar way. They are organic to a brigade.
    They are organic to a division. They are part of that
    formation. Therefore, the majority of them are operated and
    manned by our sergeants and soldiers, and they are overseen by
    our warrant officers and officers.
        Right now, our biggest challenge, based on our force
    structure, is not the manning of those. It is, as the GAO
    report stated, what I would call our home station training as
    we are building up that capability.
        Senator Manchin. General Carlisle, it seems like you all
    are only looking at the enlisted operators for the Global Hawk
    fleet, when the severe shortage of operators are with the
    Predator and the Reaper.
        General Carlisle. Sir, the shortage of operators in
    Predator and Reaper was not because we did not have the people
    coming into it. We did not have the training pipeline to put
    them through as that demand signal grew. When we went from
    seven CAPs to 65 CAPs, we did not, at the time, expand the
    training capacity, open the undergraduate RPA training and the
    MQ-1/9 training fast enough to generate the amount of people
    that the demand signal----
        Senator Manchin. The platforms, General Carlisle, that you
    are working versus maybe General Perkins--do you all have the
    same type of equipment? Are you using different equipment? Is
    it more sophisticated what the Air Force might be needing for
    the training that they have to have?
        General Carlisle. Sir, there are two parts to the training.
    There is undergraduate RPA training, which is the basic, how do
    you fly RPAs. We have marines going through our URT right now
    and that is similar.
        The MQ-1C, the Gray Eagle, and the MQ-9 Predator are
    totally different systems. The tactics, techniques, and
    procedures doctrine would be similar, but the actual training
    on the system between the MQ-9 and the MQ-1C are significantly
    different. The MQ-1C is much closer to a Predator, an MQ-1,
    which the Air Force----
        Senator Manchin. I think Senator Cotton had asked--
    basically I think you are having more of a licensed pilot,
    basically a trained pilot, on some of these platforms. Do you
    all use trained pilots, General Perkins?
        General Perkins. Sir, what we do with our unmanned aerial
    system operators is--as General Carlisle said, there is a
    significant difference in the technology and how they are
    operated. It is point and click from the ground station. There
    is not a stick and rudder. They are not flying them. They are
    automatic takeoff and landings. Those are very difficult skill
    sets to train somebody with. Ours is automated from that point
    of view.
        As we train our operators, what we do is they all go
    through a basic initial 8-week course, and they take the FAA
    [Federal Aviation Administration] written exam kind of the
    ground week, but then they do not actually have to take what
    would necessarily be considered flying pilot training because
    they are not actually flying it. The basic part--it is the same
    as what you might call ground week and they are FAA-certified
    for their ground week portion. They just do not have the air
    time because they are not pilots.
        Senator Manchin. General Carlisle, despite the fact that
    Congress provided the Air Force authority to provide higher
    bonuses to the RPA pilots up to $35,000, you have chosen to
    provide only the bonus level that is authorized for all Air
    Force pilots of $25,000. Knowing that you have this shortage,
    why did you all make that decision?
        General Carlisle. Yes, sir. We appreciate--and again, we
    appreciate certainly the Senate and this committee's support
    for that.
        The sister services in the Department of Defense, the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense have to have an implementing
    guidance as part of the fiscal year 2016 NDAA. We are still
    waiting on that.
        Senator Manchin. What I am saying is it was not by accident
    that happened. We knew you were having some challenges there
    and we thought we would give you the tools to close that gap.
    But then you all have not decided to use it.
        General Carlisle. Again, we truly appreciate the support on
    that.
        A couple of factors that I would throw in that. We truly
    appreciated it and as we get that implementing guidance--as a
    matter of fact as we come back in fiscal year 2017, we are
    going to ask--we brought back some economic data and some
    information to the Senate for support. We would like that
    authority across all of our rated career fields.
        Senator Manchin. I am sure you would. I am sure of that,
    sir.
        [Laughter.]
        General Carlisle. But, sir, I am 511 fighter pilots short
    today. Our whole entire rated career field is being challenged.
        Senator Manchin. I am running out of time here, but on your
    fighter pilot, their pay scale is much different than the
    person that you might be training for this and a bonus to get
    into the system.
        General Carlisle. No, sir. There is no hiring bonus to come
    in and fly airplanes. We have done some changes.
        Senator Manchin. Well, you have the $25,000 ones.
        General Carlisle. Once they reach the end of their training
    commitment.
        Senator Manchin. Right, to keep them.
        General Carlisle. Now we are going to give that to our RPA
    pilots as well. We would like all of those to be raised, and we
    are asking for that in the fiscal year 2017.
        Senator Manchin. You are saying $25,000 will not do the
    job.
        General Carlisle. Sir, it is not competitive. We have some
    studies. RAND did a study about what it takes. The bonus and
    the flight pay has not changed since 1999. It is 17 years old.
    The draw from the airline hiring has reignited at a phenomenal
    level. Our ability to keep our entire rated force in is one
    that we believe that we need a higher bonus capability to keep
    those folks in the Air Force, across all of them, RPAs as well
    as the rest of the rated career fields.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, General.
        Senator Cotton. Senator Rounds?
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Carlisle, how many pilots are you short right now
    with regard to the unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs?
        General Carlisle. Sir, we are currently about 83 percent
    manned in the RPAs.
        Senator Rounds. Eighty-three percent manned?
        General Carlisle. At the 10-to-1 for the current system.
    Let me expand a little bit on that in accordance with the GAO.
    Ms. Farrell pointed out these points, and we have taken them to
    heart and we are working on them.
        The first thing we did was the 10-to-1 crew-to-CAP ratio.
    We are not there yet because of the continual surge, nine
    surges in 8 years, and the rapid increase in the number of
    combat air patrols. We got down as low as 7-to-1, and that was
    way too low. The first thing we have to do is get back to the
    10-to-1 crew per combat line, or CAP.
        But the next thing we have to do is--and I kind of alluded
    to in the statement about the 3 million hours versus 2.8
    million hours during combat. We have no dwell in the RPA
    enterprise. Every mission they fly from the day they come out
    of training and they show up at their unit is combat. That is
    unsustainable. We have to build more capacity into the RPA
    enterprise so that a portion of the force can do continuation
    training, can do other things, can improve the system, can take
    some non-combat time during a tour. The 83 percent is reference
    100 percent combat and no dwell.
        Senator Rounds. I am just going to go back to what the GAO
    finding was, and that was that at the time, if I understand it
    correctly, you could not tell them how many pilots you needed.
    What is the total pilot count that you need to do the mission
    today?
        General Carlisle. Sir, if you said stay at 60 CAPs----
        Senator Rounds. What you would need today.
        General Carlisle. That part of the discussion on that,
    Senator, is the demand signal. I think the reason we were
    unable to tell them is we really did not know what the end
    result of the demand signal was.
        The total number of pilots we need across the whole
    enterprise is about 1,000, and we are about 83 percent manned.
    But that is only to do 100 percent combat. What we are trying
    to build to is about a third to a fourth of the force in dwell.
    If there is a 1,000 requirement today--and I think that may be
    under by a little bit. Sir, I will get back to you with the
    exact numbers. Maybe 1,084 or something to that effect. Then I
    would probably need another 300 so that I could have a third--
    --
        Senator Rounds. You need 1,400, in that neighborhood.
        General Carlisle. Yes, sir.
        Senator Rounds. Really you are probably closer to about
    maybe 70 percent of what you really need right now?
        General Carlisle. Yes, sir.
        Senator Rounds. Can you share with me--and General Perkins,
    I would like your thought on this as well--the difference
    between the mission that a pilot operating one of these
    aircraft--tell me if there is a difference in the mission
    between that, which is a mission flown by a United States Air
    Force officer, and a warrant officer flying a mission for an
    Army mission. Could you tell me the differences between them?
        General Carlisle. Yes, sir. Sir, from the Air Force
    perspective, it is a theater asset doing theater-level air
    power. When he takes off, he probably takes off with a pre-
    designated mission. It is launched. He is probably doing it
    remote split op. He is doing it from either Ellsworth or
    Whiteman or Creech or Holloman where some of the many Air
    National Guard units are doing fantastic work for us. He will
    probably fly that mission. He could well do an entire different
    set of mission sets across that time. He could do close air
    support. He could do solely ISR. He could do strike. He could
    do personnel recovery. He could do interdiction. He could do
    interdiction and targets in the deep fight.
        The missions that our RPAs fly--it is a theater-level asset
    given to the joint force commander for his allocation to meet
    the theater-level missions that he is trying to do. It is in
    coordination with either the land component or the maritime
    component, if it happens to be a maritime mission like in the
    Arabian Gulf. It is in coordination with them, but it is under
    the control of the joint force commander and the Air Force----
        Senator Rounds. General Perkins, you have heard that
    explanation. How would a mission flown by one of your pilots
    differ?
        General Perkins. Sir, I will compare it to our helicopter
    pilots in the Army, both our warrant officers and commissioned
    officers. Really two parts to it. One is the actual process of
    flying the aircraft and the flight dynamics. Obviously, with
    our Apaches, Black Hawks, and Chinooks, the pilots, the warrant
    officers, the commissioned officers are actually flying them
    dealing with the dynamics, as they say, stick and rudder and
    all of that, and so there is great skill involved with that,
    from that portion of it.
        With our unmanned aerial systems, they are completely
    automated. It is automatic takeoff, automatic landing, and then
    they just point and click in the ground station. That is why we
    referred to our unmanned aerial systems are really being
    operated by our sergeants, soldiers, and warrant officers doing
    a great job. But the actual physical activity is significantly
    different.
        With regard to the mission profile itself and how it reacts
    to the formation, our unmanned aerial systems--the great
    majority of them are organic to our maneuver brigade combat
    teams. They are working, generally speaking, for a battalion
    commander or brigade commander, of which they are organic to
    that organization.
        With our aviation assets, our Apaches or even Black Hawks,
    they are not organic to a maneuver brigade. They are generally
    out of a combat aviation brigade, are supporting the entire
    division. The level of supervision is not the same as well
    because they are not organic to the maneuver force.
        I think both the way that they are organized within the
    maneuver force, as well as the requirements to actually operate
    it, there are some significant differences.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cotton. Senator Heinrich?
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman. I want to thank you
    for holding this hearing.
        General Carlisle, as you know, Holloman Air Force Base in
    New Mexico serves as our Nation's premier formal training unit
    for the RPA enterprise. I am very proud, and I know you are
    proud of the work that they do to help give our airmen the
    skills and training to go on and carry out what we have heard
    repeatedly is a critical and growing mission set.
        I have long called for actions to alleviate the stress on
    this force, to rectify personnel shortfalls, and to improve the
    quality of life for our airmen. I specifically want to thank
    you for the outreach that you conducted last year and the
    important announcements that you made in December as a result
    of that.
        In your testimony, you said that the sustained high tempo
    and high levels of stress is, quote, robbing, unquote, our
    airmen of quality of life. You have mentioned the RPA pilots
    simply want time, time to spend with their family or go to
    school, to train, to take a vacation, et cetera. These are
    important to anyone's quality of life in their career. Airmen
    throughout the Air Force are obviously busy, of course, but the
    service seems to have done a better job of balancing and, for
    that matter, creating sustainable schedules in other career
    fields.
        Can you talk a little bit about--describe for the committee
    why an RPA pilot's daily duties and schedule are so different
    from other Air Force career fields.
        General Carlisle. Yes, sir. I think it probably stems from
    born in combat and then the pace at which the demand increased.
    The RPA pilots, central operators--and actually it is a crew
    because it is the pilots, central operators. It is a
    communication specialist that has to make sure the remote split
    ops is working properly and the ground control station is
    adequately connected to the forward capability of the airplane
    flying forward. It is in-garrison combat ops.
        What our RPAs are doing is 24/7/365. When we say 60 CAPs,
    that means 24/7/365 days a year that all of those CAPs are
    flying. Today that is 100 percent of our force. There is no
    other part of the Air Force that does that. There is no other
    part of the Air Force that has 100 percent of their capability
    engaged 100 percent of the time without any continuation
    training.
        Senator Heinrich. Obviously, we have got to grow the
    pipeline in terms of training. But what are we going to do to
    adjust those schedules so that that is sustainable in the long
    term and we can keep these folks within that career field?
        General Carlisle. Yes, sir. That is exactly what Senator
    Rounds asked, and that is we need to build capacity within the
    RPA enterprise so that we have some that are what we would call
    dwell, just like we have deploy-to-dwell for our soldiers,
    sailors, airmen, and marines that go downrange. Something we
    have to come to grips with is in-garrison combat operations.
    Folks that are doing the combat mission, in the case at Creech
    and Ellsworth and Whiteman and many of our Guard units, where
    every day they go to work, they brief up the mission, they fly
    a combat mission and nonstop, and then they come home. Their
    schedules change from they are doing the days, the mids, the
    swings. They are doing different schedules usually they are
    there 10 to 12 hours. They are there most of the day, middle of
    the day to the middle of the night, or all night in that
    schedule.
        That is something that I think as a military and certainly
    as an Air Force, in-garrison combat operations--we need to
    build that dwell time in, which we have not done. That is the
    25 to 30 percent increase in the size of our RPA capability.
    Some portion of that force is working a day schedule, is doing
    continuation training, is going to weapons school, is taking
    vacation, going to school and relief from the continuous combat
    operations.
        Senator Heinrich. You mentioned that ACC is examining the
    possible expansion of the RPA community to a number of
    potential new bases or even overseas locations.
        I wanted to bring up the fact that given--you know, I know
    at Holloman, for example, we have what used to be the Force
    Space Control Squadron that is 64,000 feet of prime real estate
    that is secure and currently not being used for anything.
    Before we create new capacity, I think it is going to be
    important to look around the Air Force and make sure that we
    inventory those places where this could be just a natural
    growth with facilities that are sort of ready and waiting.
        General Carlisle. Sir, most definitely. When we look at
    those new bases, we will follow the strategic basing process
    that the Air Force utilizes. I will tell you I truly believe
    that Holloman will be very competitive in that. We will see
    what the basing process comes up with.
        Senator Heinrich. Mr. Chair, thanks again for holding this
    hearing.
        Senator Cotton. Senator Ernst?
        Senator Ernst. Does anybody have any questions while I am
    getting my stuff together?
        Senator Cotton. Senator Sullivan?
        Senator Ernst. Thank you.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        General Carlisle and General Perkins, I want to ask a
    little bit about the issue of--you know, one of the things that
    we have seen with regard to the combatant commanders and
    different executive agencies is almost an insatiable appetite
    for the ISR capability. To me, that kind of poses two questions
    at that theater level, which is where the Air Force is very
    focused on that, what support or other capabilities, General
    Carlisle, do you see that you need to meet that demand, which
    is very, very large, as you know.
        Then, General Perkins, has the Army looked at expanding the
    role of its platforms beyond the organic maneuver sphere to
    help in some ways meet the broader theater-wide demand that I
    think all of us see as so highly needed and requested?
        General Carlisle. Sir, from the Air Force standpoint, I
    believe that if you look at the American way of war and what we
    are doing today, that information, situational awareness,
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, I totally agree
    with, understand. When I was an air component in the Pacific, I
    wanted all the information all the time. We do.
        In trying to meet that, I do believe that it is a question
    of how do you do that and what can you do with respect to the
    whole ISR enterprise, whether it is on-orbit capability,
    whether it is other platforms that we are modernizing, it is
    RQX, whatever that is, MQX, whatever that is. I think the RPA
    enterprise has come so far. I think we need to elevate it to
    that capability in predictive intelligence and some of those
    things that we can do in a cooperative environment between all
    the services and all their ISR capability.
        I will tell you that we have great interaction with our
    Army counterparts, for example, in the distributed common
    ground system. The Army and the Air Force--we do a lot of time
    cross-talk on how we process that information. I think the
    demand signal is appropriate, given what we are asking the
    combatant commanders to do. We as the organize, train, and
    equip folks in support of those joint warfights and being a
    force provider--I have to figure out better ways to do that
    using technology as well as the innovative spirit of our
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines.
        Senator Sullivan. General Perkins, are you looking outside
    that organic maneuver mission in terms of supporting the
    broader theater demand?
        General Perkins. Senator, exactly. As I had said, most our
    assets are organically organized within the brigade or the
    division. But we have--based on this requirement, on this very
    large demand kind of at the enterprise level, the Army is now
    being funded for and fielding four additional echelon-above-
    division Gray Eagle units. Those are our most capable ones.
        Our most recent one just stood up last month at Fort
    Wainwright and is going in and will have its first flight next
    month.
        We are in the process of bringing on four additional Gray
    Eagle companies to help with this enterprise demand from the
    combatant commanders. They will actually be a little bit larger
    than the ones that are organic to the division so that organic
    platoons can operate in a split-base manner so that we can
    provide, again, a better product because our demand tends to
    not be in one place but dispersed around the world. What we are
    doing now is, as we are growing those additional Gray Eagle
    companies, putting them in between divisions so we kind of
    balance, providing an organic--the one going in at Wainwright
    is a division asset, but we have one echelon-above-division,
    one already in that has already deployed because it is kind of
    like General Carlisle says, as soon as we build it, we want it.
    We have three more others that we are building right now.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me ask kind of a follow-up. You
    mentioned the Gray Eagles coming to Fort Wainwright. General
    Carlisle, you have a lot experience serving up in Alaska. The
    joint training opportunities at JPARC, particularly given our
    kind of hub of air combat power that is happening--every
    platform in the Air Force is up there but also the Gray Eagles
    and the two brigade combat teams that we have at Wainwright and
    JBER. Do you view JPARC as a premier place in the Nation to
    help with some of not only the training that the Air Force does
    but also the joint training that could be very, very useful,
    particularly as the Army is looking to move these more kind of
    strategic-focused Gray Eagle units?
        General Carlisle. Sir, I would defer a little bit to
    General Robinson and General Brooks, who are the component
    commanders for the Pacific, as they operate out of there.
        But I will tell you that JPARC to me is a national asset.
    We had the Chief of Staff of the Republic of Korea Air Force
    with us up in Alaska, and we showed him the JPARC. We overlaid
    the Korean peninsula, and JPARC is twice as large as the entire
    Korean peninsula.
        Senator Ernst. Mr. Chairman, we are used to those kind of
    large comparisons in Alaska.
        General Carlisle. But the airspace, the lack of
    encroachment problems, the ability to operate with our Army
    brethren, and the strategic assets we have up there with the F-
    35's coming before too long, combined with the F-22's, command
    and control with the AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control
    System], bringing our partners over--I will tell you the one
    thing that I am pushing for--and General Robinson and I have
    spent a lot of time talking about this.
        In the past, we have kind of used Red Flag Alaska
    predominantly to train our Pacific partners. I think that is
    shortsighted. I would like the Europeans to train with us I
    think in the future. I think for partners they need to train at
    both Red Flag Nellis and Red Flag Alaska. I think they need to
    do both because both of them offer incredible experiences,
    incredible capability and different. For the joint warfight and
    the coalition warfight, it is important. JPARC is--two
    assignments in Alaska, and I will tell you it is some of the
    greatest airspace you can imagine. It is very valuable, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cotton. Senator Ernst?
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thank you very much for being here today, Ms. Farrell and
    General Perkins. Thank you.
        General Carlisle, I have lots of questions for you, sir.
        As you are probably aware, as RPA units were moved into the
    Air National Guard, there is an issue surrounding whether or
    not the RPA mission is an aeronautical mission in nature, as
    defined by the Federal Aviation Administration. This lack of
    defining RPAs as an aeronautical mission is causing risk to
    airports' grant assurances across the country, not just in
    Iowa. I know that the chairman has a similar situation existing
    in Arkansas as well.
        Late last year, our Governor wrote to the two Departments
    to intervene on behalf of the 132nd Fighter Wing to help
    resolve the long-simmering issue of the FAA's threat to
    withhold the Des Moines International Airport's grant
    assurances.
        What specific steps has the Air Force taken to resolve this
    issue or when will it be resolved?
        General Carlisle. Ma'am, we are working very closely with
    the FAA. I think the `see and avoid' capability of the RPAs and
    the technology that we are putting into the RPAs for that 'see
    and avoid?--obviously, being a pilot, having spent a lot of
    hours flying an airplane, you cannot always see it in an
    airplane either. There are instrument meteorological
    conditions.
        We are working closely with FAA for them to fully
    understand how the RPAs are utilized, what the safety factors
    are, how they operate in airspace. I think we have the Air
    Force moving out. I think we also have the academia world spend
    a lot of time on the things that we are doing with respect to
    technology and how we operate these airplanes within airspace.
        Currently, what we are doing in stateside and flying within
    CONUS [Contiguous United States] is we generate memorandums of
    agreement corridors for how we can use our RPAs in the safest
    manner possible and not send any jeopardy to the manned flights
    or any other flight or aviation that is going on. I believe
    that we will continue to advance both the technology and the
    platforms and our ability to ensure safe flight between both
    manned and unmanned.
        I will tell you, ma'am, my biggest concern is the rampant
    commercial market and what is going on and how we control
    things that have happened with RPAs that are not regulated by
    either the Army or the Air Force that are causing what I think
    is the biggest hazards. I believe that is where the FAA's
    concern is predominantly resting with is that commercial
    enterprise and sportsmen enterprise with respect to RPAs.
        Senator Ernst. Well, certainly there is a lot of division
    in this issue.
        Because we have a new mission, we do not have F-16's based
    out of our Des Moines International Airport any longer. This
    has created quite a rift in determining what is an aeronautical
    mission and what is not--what is, what is not. The Air Guard is
    in a difficult position right now. The Des Moines Airport is in
    a very difficult position, and it has created a rift between
    the two different groups and within our community because we do
    not have an answer from the FAA or the Air Force on this issue.
    It grows daily.
        General Carlisle. Ma'am, we are working it. We fully
    understand that. We have examples in other States where we have
    worked with the FAA and resolved the issues. I truly believe we
    will do the same thing in Des Moines in the fact that we--we
    have done it yet. You are right. We should have been ahead of
    this by a bit, I would say, that we have not done. But we are
    working hard to have those dialogues and come to those
    agreements so we can resolve this issue. Ma'am, I believe we
    will get there. I truly do.
        Senator Ernst. I do hope so, General. If you can
    communicate that as well, I would certainly appreciate it. It
    is an issue that we will continue to work on, and if we do not
    see resolution coming from the Air Force or the FAA, this is
    something that we will act on legislatively, which is not what
    I would like to do.
        General Carlisle. Ma'am, we will attack it.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you.
        General Carlisle. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Ernst. General Carlisle, from 1941 to 2013, the
    132nd air wing of the Iowa Air National Guard flew manned
    aircraft, as I stated. We had F-16's. In 2013, after 72 years
    of manned flight, this unit transitioned to an RPA unit, and
    the pilots learned how to fly aircraft remotely.
        I understand you have discussed already the fighter pilot
    shortage. It is around 500. I think you might have stated 511
    fighter pilots you are short.
        General Carlisle. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Ernst. Are some of these shortages brought by
    transitioning those fighter pilots into those RPA units?
        General Carlisle. Ma'am, I think you bring up a great
    point, and that is we got to utilize the assets we have and the
    capabilities and the trained folks we have.
        The reason the transition occurred was because of the
    drawdown in the force. We lost the airplanes. It was the
    mission which we could take advantage of those aviators. The
    challenge with the fighter pilot shortage is we do not have
    enough airplanes to absorb young pilots and train them. The
    reason that Des Moines transitioned is because we retired at
    one point 250 airplanes in 1 year, 250 fighters in 1 year. That
    reduction in the size of the force is what has led to this
    problem with respect to the 11F shortage.
        I do believe there is capability as we move into the future
    in the size of the force that taking advantage of those folks
    that had previously flown fighters is one that we are looking
    to keep the 11F experience within the Air Force and take
    advantage of it.
        Senator Ernst. We had a panel the other day. General Holmes
    was here, a number of others. They stated that they are short
    pilots, they need more pilots, and they were thinking of moving
    some of these assets to the Air Guard and Air Force Reserve. My
    thought was, well, why did we transition these folks into RPA
    units then.
        But I do not know whether that was shortsightedness on the
    part of the Air Force to underestimate what they needed as far
    as fighter capabilities.
        General Carlisle. Ma'am, it was a balance. You know, it is
    what we talked about earlier. The RPA enterprise was growing at
    a phenomenal rate, so we needed the RPA capability. The
    drawdown in the fighters was driven by a variety of factors,
    including balancing with other portfolios, whether it was the
    space portfolio or the bombers or ISR and other realms in the
    big wing ISR. I believe that it is that balance that we have
    talked about. How do we balance the force and provide all the
    capabilities that the combatant commanders want? The RPA
    enterprise is one that is in high demand. We are in high demand
    for fighters as well. The tradeoff between those two--we do not
    have enough of either.
        Senator Ernst. No doubt. I do appreciate the fact that we
    have that ISR capability and that we do have the RPA unit now
    in Des Moines replacing the F-16's. But it seems to be such a
    waste of taxpayer dollars maybe to have transitioned fighters
    out, replace it with an RPA unit. Now we are saying we do not
    have enough of those fighter capabilities.
        We had a lot of pilots that left Iowa because they were
    seeking opportunities to fly and not fly an RPA. I do think it
    was a bit shortsighted, but I do not know who is at fault
    there.
        But I do appreciate your answers today and want to thank
    you for being here. General Perkins, Ms. Farrell, thank you
    very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Senator Cotton. We have at least one more Senator en route.
    Fortunately, I have several questions to fill the time until
    that Senator arrives or more Senators.
        In particular, Ms. Farrell, we have not yet heard from you.
    You have been involved in many studies and assignments. You
    have extensive experience in this field. Can you please just
    give a high-level summary for the committee of the most
    important challenges you see in the UAS/RPA enterprise, the
    recommendations GAO has made to the Department, and the
    progress the Department is making in implementing these
    solutions?
        Ms. Farrell. Certainly.
        Our report had 10 recommendations that I mentioned. Seven
    were to the Air Force. Two were to the Army, and one to OSD.
        Of the ones to the Air Force, there were four that focus on
    improved management of the UAS pilot community. Those dealt
    with requirements, setting the optimum crew ratios, setting the
    minimum crew ratio, exploring alternatives for pilots such as
    enlisted or civilians, and then developing a tailored
    recruiting and retention strategy for the UAS pilots.
        The key recommendation is truly about the crew ratio. It
    keeps coming up. These shortages that are related to
    instructors or the training pipeline, quality of life, people
    overworking--it always goes back to do you have enough pilots.
        The 10-to-1 crew ratio was developed very quickly in 2008
    by the Air Force Manpower Agency. When we looked at that ratio,
    the Manpower Agency agreed with us that it was missing some key
    elements that we touched upon earlier, that being launch and
    recovery, as well as some other key administrative tasks such
    as evaluating flight safety.
        When we looked at Air Force documentation of, well, what
    are they actually flying, we found it was even less than the
    10-to-1 ratio. We found ranges in documentation from 7-to-1 to
    8.5-to-1, meaning seven pilots flying for a near continuous 24-
    hour presence in a particular geographic area. When we talked
    with Air Force officials about, well, what happens when you do
    go below the 10-to-1, since you already know that 10-to-1 is
    probably low, there were times that they denied requests for
    the UAS support, but sometimes those denials were overturned by
    Joint Staff because they needed them to perform the mission. We
    were told that at times the ratio was as low as 6-to-1.
        Determining what that ratio truly is under optimum
    conditions, as well as a minimum acceptable level, is key to
    the Air Force determining how they go about recruiting the
    right numbers and thus retaining the right numbers. Then it
    spills over to the training pipeline.
        We would encourage them to be very aggressive with that
    crew ratio. We know they are working on it, but we think that
    they should be very aggressive in that area.
        For the Army, the Army has taken actions also on our
    recommendations. A key one was the waivers for prerequisites
    for training instructors. We have heard that the Army is
    working on mitigating those risks to waiving certain
    prerequisites such as the number of flying hours, and we think
    that that is a good step to look at how they can best mitigate
    those circumstances. The key is also going back and providing
    training for those instructors that did not meet all the
    requirements to become instructors and making sure that in some
    way they are prepared to continue.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        General Carlisle, any thoughts on Ms. Farrell's
    observations?
        General Carlisle. No. Mr. Chairman, the GAO report was
    really well done. Ms. Farrell's points are exactly right.
        In cases where the demand signal went up and our crew ratio
    was dropping, the term was `surge.' We needed to surge. We
    ended up doing nine surges in 8 years, which forced us into
    some of those crew ratios that were down in that seven. I do
    remember going below seven. I am not sure we ever got to six,
    but it was bad.
        The point that we are making--I think the first study came
    out with reference to the crew ratio and it was 9-to-1. We
    relooked at it and said 10-to-1.
        There are two things additionally that we have done that I
    think would go to what the GAO is talking about. One is we
    believe that the LR squadrons, launch and recovery, need to be
    separate squadrons and not embedded in the crew ratio for the
    mission control elements. We have already done one of those
    squadrons that we have broken out that have unit tasking codes
    to go downrange. When you break out LRU [Launch Recovery
    Units], that frees up in the current status about 32 crews,
    which gives you a crew ratio--the 10-to-1 is a more truly 10-
    to-1 because you do not have to break out the launch and
    recovery. That is one thing that we are doing, again, to speak
    to the comments that GAO made.
        Then the second thing is the dwell time. So 10-to-1 is
    based on combat, 60 combat lines per day, or CAPs. If we
    continue to grow this force, which we are trying to do, and we
    have some in dwell, then the combat crew ratio is 10-to-1, but
    the actual crew ratio for the overall enterprise will give us
    that much more, which allows us to do all those things that she
    talks about, the administrative tasks, the time off, the
    schools, the continuation training, and all those things that
    every unit has to do as part of their unit organization and
    what they do to accomplish the mission.
        Again, I truly agree with what Ms. Farrell said. Then we
    have taken it to heart. We have looked hard at it, and we are
    sharing that as we build that manpower so that we reach a crew
    ratio that is executable, sustainable, and supportable.
        Senator Cotton. Senator Manchin?
        Senator Manchin. I just have one question and it could be
    for both of you.
        The Federal Aviation Administration has been very
    conservative in deciding how to manage routine operations of
    government-owned UAVs in the national airspace system. Until
    roughly 5 years ago, each flight of a DOD-owned UAV in the
    national airspace system had to go through an extraordinary
    approval process that could take several months for DOD to
    receive clearance.
        Periodically we have received reports on the rate of
    progress in integrating unmanned aircraft systems into the
    national airspace. While there has been progress, I am told it
    has been very slow.
        For the flights with the DOD-managed airspace over DOD-
    controlled real estate, we understand there is not a big issue
    at all. We understand that. However, with the Global Hawk and
    the Predator/Reaper aircraft having intercontinental range and
    with Army or Marine Corps' ground forces not collocated with
    the Air Force RPA aircraft, I basically suspect the Air Force
    will have to routinely fly RPAs in the national airspace
    system.
        I guess I would ask both of you, maybe General Carlisle,
    General Perkins, are you all experiencing difficulty in
    operating, General Carlisle, the Predator/Reaper or Global
    Hawks in the national airspace system?
        General Carlisle. Yes, sir, we do. It is a challenge for
    our training for crews that are stateside. For both our launch
    and recovery crews, we in most cases were able to either--we
    were fortunate enough in the case of places like Holloman where
    we do a predominant amount of our formal training--is it sits
    inside of government-controlled airspace. It becomes less of a
    challenge for training.
        But in places where that does not occur, then we work with
    the FAA. In many cases we will spiral an airplane up inside of
    the airspace that we control, usually the TFR [Temporary Flight
    Restriction] that exists over the airfield, and then we will
    build a corridor we can come in agreement with the FAA to fly
    the aircraft to the training airspace.
        I think total use of the national airspace system by RPAs
    is some period of time off. I think the FAA has issues with it.
    I think they are probably more confident in government and
    certainly the military's procedures on how we do things. I
    think what concerns the FAA most is the commercial enterprise
    or sportsmen or uncontrolled RPAs that are less governed by the
    regulations and rules that we use in the United States Air
    Force and the United States Army.
        It is a challenge. We are working very closely with them.
    We spend a lot of time. We have FAA representatives in many of
    our bases. We have one at Holloman that works with them all the
    time. We have one in Arizona that works----
        Senator Ernst. General Perkins, how is it with you?
        General Perkins. Sir, you are correct. This has been a
    difficult challenge that we have faced I think mainly because
    as it came on, new technology was not something that our system
    was necessarily set up to deal with.
        We have had to deal with it very similar to as General
    Carlisle has highlighted. First of all, we had to work very
    closely with FAA. You have to gain, I think, a level of
    understanding on both sides what their safety parameter is and
    what our capabilities are.
        What we started doing is exactly as he said. We would
    establish a corridor, have a memorandum of agreement. These are
    the corridors we use, say, between training areas, et cetera.
    We would set times that we would use it to de-conflict from the
    civilian air. Then because these are by definition unmanned,
    just as we spoke earlier in the hearing, we would have to use--
    we started using a chase aircraft. You would have to follow the
    unmanned aerial system with a Black Hawk or an Apache to
    provide that visual if something were to go on. Of course, that
    is doubling or tripling your overhead to operate.
        We are now, as the Air Force is, going down and procuring
    and working with sense and avoid radar. If we have areas that
    we want to operate in the national airspace, we can set up a
    sense and avoid radar, which precludes us from now having to
    put twice as many aircraft in the air to trace it down.
        I think we are making progress, but this will not be solved
    easily because, as we have said also, the proliferation of the
    privately owned ones there, I think concern is going up rather
    than going down. But we have made dramatic progress from when I
    was first involved in this, but we have a long ways to go.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you.
        Senator Cotton. Senator Lee?
        Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        In early December, I sent a letter to Secretary Carter
    regarding the process that drone operators, commanders, and
    ultimately the White House use to initiate drone strikes.
    Specifically, I was interested and remain interested still in
    certain aspects of the process.
        According to the U.S. policy standards and procedures for
    the use of force put out by the White House, the United States
    will use lethal force only against a target that poses a
    continuing imminent threat to U.S. persons.
        Yet, media reports, based off of leaked documents, seem to
    suggest that the amount of time between when a target is
    identified, the President authorizes the use of lethal force on
    a target, and the execution of that strike can take a lot of
    time, a lot of time that we do not commonly associate with the
    word ``imminent.'' In fact, it can take several months.
        General Perkins and General Carlisle, can you confirm the
    accuracy of these reports about the length of time between the
    identification of the target and the execution of the order?
        General Perkins. Sir, I will discuss it from my experience
    and how we operate.
        Again, Army unmanned aerial systems are generally organic
    assets to a tactical formation, and having commanded an
    infantry division in Iraq where I had these assets, as long as
    I was operating underneath my rules of engagement, it was
    somewhat instantaneous.
        Now, you may be referring to some strategic targets that
    have different planning parameters, which I am not involved in
    that process. I would not comment.
        But I will tell you at the tactical level, it was not an
    issue once the rules of engagement were established that I had
    to struggle with.
        Senator Lee. General Carlisle?
        General Carlisle. Yes, sir. Thank you very much for the
    question.
        I would offer that if you would like at some point in the
    future in a classified environment, we could take this
    discussion probably to a different level. To get more probably
    to the question you are really asking but in an open forum,
    there are some things that we probably should not discuss here.
        But having said that, I think there are a couple of things.
    One is custody of a potential target, and how you do that in
    time, again that would go under the classified piece. Then both
    the ID and continuous ID is part of that custody, as well as
    collateral damage estimates and how you deal with those. Again,
    those are things that when you talk about strategic targets and
    the things you are talking about, at a higher classification
    level, we could go into a deeper discussion about what we
    provide and what the Air Force does in accordance with how we
    do that.
        I do believe truly that with respect to rules of engagement
    and rules and laws, that we in the United States Air Force
    follow all of the rules of engagement and follow all of the
    laws in accordance with the law of armed conflict and the
    appropriate laws that pertain to that, sir.
        Senator Lee. Thank you.
        A number of members of this committee are concerned about
    cybersecurity issues across the Department of Defense, as state
    and non-state actors alike seem to be increasing their threat
    capability in this area.
        Drones rely completely on wireless technology, of course.
    That is what makes them valuable. It is what enables them to do
    what they do, the use of wireless technology to be connected
    with their operators in other parts of the world. This creates
    an obvious area of security concern.
        I would like to know how is the Department of Defense
    working to protect the operational security of unmanned
    vehicles from crippling cyber attacks and potentially a cyber
    hacking incident that could compromise their security here.
        General Perkins. Sir, that is a major concern across that
    whole domain. I will address it initially with our unmanned
    aerial systems. Right now, without getting into too many
    details in this forum, our number one modernization issue,
    specifically with our Shadow and the Gray Eagles as they come
    out, is encrypting and protecting that communications link I
    guess is the best way to say it and the data protection. That
    is our number one modernization issue right now with our
    Shadows is to protect it from the type of threat that you
    talked about.
        General Carlisle. Yes, sir, Senator. Again, same thing. We
    are looking hard at all the different ways, and there is cyber
    protection and there is the way that you make it more difficult
    for them to get into those nodes via encryption, via
    directional, via the type of waveform, and the capability you
    are using with respect to directional data links and things
    like that. But there is, again, a level, if you would like in a
    future environment, we can come and spend time at a classified
    level talking about the things we are doing for cyber
    protection.
        But I think in general for the United States Air Force in
    particular is we all know that everything, almost to an item,
    that we employ has cyber challenges and vulnerabilities that we
    have to protect. We are looking hard at what cyber operations
    in the future and cyber protection of all systems in the future
    look like and how we are doing that. That is one of the big
    areas that we are moving forward on in the Air Force as part of
    our cyber defense.
        Senator Lee. Mr. Chairman, I have got one more follow-up
    with General Carlisle if that is all right.
        On January 20th, the ``Washington Post'' reported that the
    Air Force RPA force has been experiencing an increase in
    electrical and in mechanical failures, causing the destruction
    or sustained damage to 20 large drones last year. This includes
    10 MQ-9 Reapers which, when fully equipped, cost $14 million to
    replace.
        General, can you tell us what the Air Force is doing to
    investigate the common causes of these types of accidents and
    how you are working to make the RPA fleet more sustainable?
        General Carlisle. Yes, sir. It has generally been
    centralized on the starter generator, which is the problem in
    the MQ-9 community. The new MQ-9's and the block 5 MQ-9's that
    we are producing now have a different electrical system. It
    does not have the same starter generator. It does not have the
    same problem.
        With the older block 1 MQ-9's, the starter generator is a
    problem. We have worked with the manufacturer. We found some
    quality control issues. We really have not found the root cause
    in that, though. But we have put in and we are modifying the
    current block 1 MQ-9's with a thing called ESIP, electrical
    safety improvement program. Basically we put a direct-drive,
    brushless alternator that allows 10 hours of flight capability
    if you lose a starter generator, which has caused those
    accidents that you referenced, Senator. Just since last April,
    we have recovered 17 MQ-9's using this direct-drive, brushless
    alternator. That gives us the capability with the older MQ-9's,
    the block 1's. The block 5's--it is not a factor, sir.
        Senator Lee. Thank you very much.
        Senator Cotton. Senator Gillibrand?
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Carlisle, the Air Force is offering retention
    bonuses for the RPA pilots for the first time in fiscal year
    2016. How significant is your shortage of pilots? Since the
    bonuses have been implemented, have you seen significant
    interest? To what degree is the Air Force encouraging RPA
    pilots who want to leave active duty to stay in Reserves or
    National Guard, and how is this shortage impacting your ability
    to meet strategic needs?
        General Carlisle. Yes, ma'am. We did a career incentive
    retention pay of $25,000. In fiscal year 2016 and 2017, that
    only applies to 29 folks in the RPA enterprise. To date, we
    have seen that we do not have the final number on take rate
    based on this year yet because, obviously, we are still in the
    middle of the year. But we have a fairly positive response from
    the RPA community with respect to the retention bonus.
        We are short. We are very much encouraging folks to stay
    with the Air Force in another component, either the Air
    National Guard or the Air Force Reserve.
        We actually have a rated problem across our Air Force. We
    are working with Congress in fiscal year 2017 to raise that to
    $35,000, if at all possible, across the entire rated force to
    try to maintain the level of folks we need within the Air Force
    and increase the take rate so we can keep that experience
    capability and those incredible airmen doing the job we are
    asking them to do, ma'am.
        Senator Gillibrand. Do you think pay is fundamentally the
    reason why you do not have the force you need?
        General Carlisle. Ma'am, I think it is a combination. There
    is kind of three components. I think it is quality of life and
    the family. I think it is job satisfaction with the job they
    are doing. Then I think it is compensation. I think every
    airman takes all three of those into account. We know that we
    cannot compete with General Atomics if they want to hire and
    pay somebody to be a contractor RPA pilot. We cannot compete
    with the airlines that want to hire our pilots. But if we can
    increase the compensation somewhat and we can improve their
    quality of life, we know that the job satisfaction of both the
    RPAs and the manned pilots--they find great job satisfaction.
    Frankly, it is higher than it is in the civilian community.
        It is a combination of all three of those. We have to
    improve their quality of life. If we could increase their
    compensation, combined with their job satisfaction, I believe
    we can keep the right folks in our Air Force.
        Senator Gillibrand. Have you thought about utilizing Guard
    and Reserve as a backup?
        General Carlisle. Ma'am, our Guard and Reserve is hugely
    engaged in the RPA enterprise. As a matter of fact, they are
    mobilizing and volunteering to pick up three additional lines
    to allow us to get healthier. The Guard and Reserve are
    phenomenal in what they do in supporting the joint fight. It is
    one Air Force. Doing the mission, you cannot tell the
    difference between a guardsman or a reservist or an active duty
    member, ma'am.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
        Ms. Farrell, I went to Africa recently on a CODEL
    [Congressional Delegation], an anti-terrorism CODEL. One of the
    concerns that was raised was the limited amount of ISR
    capabilities that AFRICOM [United States African Command]
    shares with EUCOM [United States European Command]. What is
    your assessment our ISR capabilities versus our needs?
        Ms. Farrell. Senator, that really would be better addressed
    by one of the generals. Our focus was really on the human
    capital management aspect and the shortages, but not a
    particular geographic area.
        Senator Gillibrand. General Perkins?
        General Perkins. Senator, the demand on unmanned aerial
    systems, like almost every other asset that we have, is
    somewhat insatiable. I can understand that. Having commanded in
    combat a number of times, I created insatiable demands. You can
    always use more infantrymen. You can always use more
    intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance systems. I am sure
    they have a very high demand.
        As we are growing demand from 200 systems to over 7,000, we
    have to grow it as a system. It is growing the operators,
    growing the training base, growing the actual systems
    themselves, and then the force structure. I think we have got
    about the right balance, and then it is just deciding where to
    use that for the biggest return on investment.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cotton. Ms. Farrell, I want to discuss something
    related to what Senator Gillibrand was raising. She was talking
    primarily about compensation and the bonus pay. I want to talk
    about quality of life and job satisfaction.
        I know you and your team have spent quite a bit of time
    around the units and the operators and pilots in both the RPA
    and the UAS community, as have members of this committee and
    some of our very capable professional staff. Could you provide
    your perspective on those quality of life and job satisfaction
    issues, things like the amount of hours worked, availability of
    child care, availability of housing, the pride in the work
    done, and the morale of those personnel?
        Ms. Farrell. Yes, sir. We did visit 10 sites in total
    between the two reports issued in 2014 and 2015 for the Army
    and the Air Force and one Marine Corps location. We did conduct
    focus groups. The focus groups are nongeneralizable. We do
    analyze the information we get from those groups to see if we
    are looking at themes and we did. For the Army, we administered
    also a questionnaire to six units, RPA units, to gather
    information.
        As for the morale for the Air Force--and again, this was in
    2014--in all 10 of the focus groups that we met with, the
    morale was reported to be low. Another factor that I think
    enters is about in 4 of 10 of those focus groups, members
    reported that they believed the stigma was attached to being an
    RPA pilot in a negative way, and that some, including some
    commanders, even thought that perhaps the Air Force had missed
    their recruiting goals in 2011 and 2012 because of the stigma
    associated. You know, those are perceptions. GAO likes data.
        We did look at promotion rates, and we found that in 20 of
    24 promotion boards over a certain period of time, RPA pilots
    were promoted at a much lower rate than the line of the Air
    Force. We also found that for 9 of those 24 boards, that RPA
    career field fell at the bottom as well.
        As far as other comments about training or sense of worth,
    we would hear in the focus groups that this was a valuable
    mission. We heard repeatedly, though, with Army focus groups--
    there were eight--that they wished they could get the training.
    It seems like with the Air Force, the problem was they wanted
    more training, and they wanted improved training. For the Army,
    they were wanting the training. We heard repeatedly in all the
    focus groups and in five out of six of unit questionnaires that
    were provided back to us that they had difficulty doing the
    training.
        For example, one person noted that over a 3-year period,
    they had only done about half of the required training. He and
    others reported to us that they were pulled for non-training
    activities. Units reported that this happened often because of
    resource constraints, broken equipment. It was a variety of
    reasons that that was reported.
        For the quality of life, as you have heard, the Air Force
    and the Army are structured very differently. There could be a
    huge advantage for the Air Force RPA community being structured
    the way they are, being deployed at station once they can get
    their shortages fixed because currently, as you know, that
    quality of life is impacting. We hear over and over in all the
    focus groups that they would almost rather be deployed for 6
    months overseas than at their home station for 3 years because
    they do not know when the end is going to happen. It is so
    difficult for them to do the mission, and then after the
    mission is over, all those other things that happened when they
    are stationed in the States. Then some of them have families.
    There is a number of issues that need to be addressed.
        But, again, I go back to setting the pilot requirement is
    imperative because it spills over to all these other issues of
    making sure that you have got a enough so that somebody is not
    working 23 hours a day.
        Senator Cotton. You mentioned stigma they felt. You said
    that was a perception. Could you elaborate a little bit on the
    perception as you heard it from members of the community?
        Ms. Farrell. Yes. We heard from about 4 out of 10 focus
    groups that there was a negative perception because with an
    RPA--again, this was the Air Force focus groups--they are not
    actually in the cockpit. That then would be interpreted as of
    less value.
        We heard from both Air Force and Army that there is just
    not enough known about that RPA or UAS community, that there
    needs to be more education going up the chain. We have seen the
    Chief of Staff for the Army, for example, directing reviews to
    understand more about what is going on with UAS training. It
    appears that perhaps you have got some of the senior leadership
    paying attention and the RPA pilots are trying to decide if
    they want to stay. But in between, there needs to be an awful
    lot of education about what this community brings.
        Senator Cotton. That is stigma inside the service primarily
    or in society, or both?
        Ms. Farrell. Both. The stigma specifically inside the Air
    Force in terms of perhaps impacting on their promotions--that
    is the reason we did look at the promotion rates--but also in
    recruiting, that they do not have enough pilots with the
    experience to go be recruiters to also help overcome any stigma
    that might be associated with bringing them into the Air Force.
        Senator Cotton. General Perkins, how many times did you
    serve in Iraq?
        General Perkins. Sir, I have had----
        [Audio disruption.]
        General Perkins. The best offense is generally a good way
    to go about this.
        Senator Cotton. General Carlisle, do you think there are
    many people who are contributing more to the mission of killing
    ISIS [the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] terrorists than your
    RPA pilots?
        General Carlisle. No, sir. I think the RPAs are at the head
    of that mission. They are doing phenomenal work.
        Senator Cotton. Maybe our society should pay them the
    respect they deserve then and honor their service and not
    attach any stigma to what they do since they are keeping us
    safe in our beds at night.
        Senator Gillibrand, a second round of questions?
        Senator Gillibrand. I have no further questions.
        Senator Cotton. I still have a few more. You are all
    excited to hear that.
        Senator Manchin, any second-round questions?
        Senator Manchin. No.
        Senator Cotton. General Carlisle, a lot of the questions
    here today, obviously, are focused on the use of officers
    versus enlisted personnel to fly remotely piloted aircraft. In
    2014, a GAO report recommended the Air Force consider the use
    of enlisted pilots on MQ-1's/MQ-9's. The Air Force declined
    that recommendation, and it said, quote, it considered
    assigning enlisted personnel as RPA pilots, but it decided that
    the responsibilities of piloting an RPA were commensurate with
    the rank of officer instead. End quote. Yet, just in January,
    the Air Force has seemed to reverse its position by announcing
    that enlisted personnel will begin flying the RQ-4 Global Hawk.
        One, was there new information or a policy change that led
    to this position in January, and two, could we just get your
    bottom line answer on whether you think it will ever be the
    right course of action for the Air Force to use enlisted
    personnel to fly its RPAs?
        General Carlisle. Yes, sir. We did announce that we are
    going to have enlisted pilots fly the RQ-4. It is closer to the
    Army system, reference, point, and click. It is a singular ISR
    mission that they do. We have all the confidence in the world
    that they are going to do a phenomenal job.
        With respect to the MQ-1/9, our challenge, as I mentioned
    earlier, was we did not grow enough training. Whether we put
    officers through that training or enlisted members through that
    training, we did not have a large enough training enterprise.
        The second challenge that we faced as we moved forward in
    the MQ-1/9 world was the rate at which the demand increased. If
    you took a person that was already pilot-qualified, that
    training was shorter and quicker so you could get them into an
    actual RPA mission sooner, which given again the demand, that
    was of value. That is why we did not start back with enlisted
    members in the RPA community.
        We are going to very deliberately implement the RQ-4
    enlisted operators. I will brief the Secretary probably in May.
    I imagine that sometime in late 2016/early 2017, we will have
    enlisted members flying the RQ-4.
        As we learn from that, we will look at the MQ-1/9
    enterprise, and there may be--we may, in fact, do that. We do
    not know the answer to that right now, Mr. Chairman. I do
    believe that the difference between Dave and I that we have
    talked about between the employment, the way the Air Force
    employs the MQ-1/9 in particular in theater-level air power
    across multiple mission sets in a very dynamic environment is a
    different CONOPs [Concept of Operations] or an employment
    concept than an organic RPA to a ground commander in a ground
    unit. But that does not indicate in any way that we are not
    going to continue to look at it, and that may, in fact, be the
    right answer. It will take us a bit of time as we look at that,
    sir.
        Senator Cotton. The answer to the question right now, will
    the Air Force use enlisted personnel to fly the MQ-1/MQ-9, is
    maybe.
        General Carlisle. Yes, sir. We do not know. We are going to
    start with the RQ-4.
        Senator Cotton. You are going to start with the RQ-4 and
    evaluate both the results of that initiative and how you might
    transfer those lessons to the MQ-1, MQ-9.
        General Carlisle. Exactly, sir.
        Senator Cotton. What is a timeline for a yes or no answer
    to the question as opposed to a maybe?
        General Carlisle. Sir, I think as we start the
    implementation and getting the enlisted and operators trained
    on the RQ-4 and then flying the RQ-4, we probably will probably
    not even be able to implement that prior to late 2016/early
    2017. I would guess it would probably be in 18 months from now
    when we would have a significant amount of information and data
    and understanding of how that went before we would relook at
    the MQ-1/9 discussion.
        Senator Cotton. I want to return to an exchange you had
    with Senator Rounds as well, and I apologize if I did not catch
    this. Could I get the bottom line answer for how many pilots
    you need today to meet demand?
        General Carlisle. Sir, we are about 83 percent manned right
    now, and that is of about 1,100 required to do the entire
    enterprise at a 10-to-1 crew-to-combat lines ratio. We need an
    additional probably 300 to get some dwell capability so that we
    have part of the force that is not doing combat and is doing
    continuation training. I think the total number--and I will
    come back with the exact number, but I think the number that we
    are looking at is around 1,400, sir.
        Senator Cotton. You need 1,100 to do the mission. You need
    300 to build up enough dwell time, for a total of 1,400.
        General Carlisle. Yes, sir.
        Senator Cotton. At 1,100 needed for the mission--are you
    saying 83 percent of 1,100?
        General Carlisle. Yes, sir, something in that vicinity as
    we grow.
        Senator Cotton. I am not great at math, but that sounds
    like you have about 900?
        General Carlisle. Yes, sir. That is about right, 900 and
    something.
        Senator Cotton. You have 900 today. You need 1,100 to meet
    mission requirements. You need 1,400 to meet mission
    requirements and provide appropriate dwell time.
        General Carlisle. Yes, sir. Right now, we have 981 for a
    requirement of 1,180.
        Senator Manchin. My only thing just for clarification was
    along those same lines here. Did I understand you earlier
    saying, General Carlisle, that you were 500 fighter pilots
    short?
        General Carlisle. Yes, sir. Five hundred eleven to be
    exact.
        Senator Manchin. Five hundred short.
        General Carlisle. Yes, sir.
        Senator Manchin. The shortness you have right now is 300
    for drones. You have more shortage in fighter pilots than
    drones?
        General Carlisle. We are about 200 short. Nine hundred
    eighty one is what we are assigned, and we are 1,180 is
    authorized. We are about 200 short in the MQ-1/MQ-9 world. We
    are about 500 short across all fighter pilots. That is all
    platforms, F-16's, F-15's, A-10's, F-22's.
        Senator Manchin. I thought it was like a 3-to-1 difference.
    For every one fighter pilot, you were three UAV pilots short.
        General Carlisle. No, sir. If you include the entire
    fighter force, that is a larger----
        Senator Manchin. I understand.
        General Carlisle. It is a pretty large number. You know,
    the fighter community reference the line cockpits, the
    training, the test, and then all the other demands on that
    fighter community for COCOM [combatant command] positions and
    staff positions and things.
        Senator Manchin. General Perkins, are you all short?
        General Perkins. Sir, right now, based on--again, when we
    build a capacity--and we are still building some of our Gray
    Eagle companies--we try to bring both the force structure, as
    we procure the equipment, and the pilots up. With regard to our
    Shadow operators that are with our organic maneuver brigades,
    we are at 100 percent. With our Gray Eagle manning, we are at
    98 percent.
        Senator Manchin. What kind of bonuses are you giving?
        General Perkins. Well, sir, when you sign up to be a 15
    Whiskey, which is our unmanned aerial system operator, that is
    a 6-year enlistment, which is longer than most. You can become
    an infantryman for 3 years. You do have to commit for a longer
    period of time. Then once you complete your 6-year enlistment,
    right now you can reenlist, but again it has got to be for 5
    years after that. Currently that is a $11,000 bonus after you
    have completed 6 years, to reenlist for another 5.
        Senator Manchin. Can you help the Air Force with some of
    your excess 100 percent and get them up?
        General Perkins. Well, we work very closely with the Air
    Force. They help us out in the field all the time.
        Senator Cotton. I want to actually touch on something
    related here about training times. General Perkins, you are
    going to graduate a bunch of new privates from basic training
    on Friday. Correct? All around America.
        General Perkins. Correct.
        Senator Cotton. Then they will go on to what is called
    advanced individual training.
        General Perkins. Yes, sir.
        Senator Cotton. Some of them will complete in their same
    station what they call one-station unit training.
        General Perkins. Right.
        Senator Cotton. Those proud new privates, when they get out
    of basic training on Friday, if they are going on to 15 Whiskey
    training to be one of your operators, how long is their
    advanced individual training?
        General Perkins. Sir, they will leave, say, Fort Jackson or
    Fort Sill where they do their basic training. They will go out
    to Fort Huachuca where we do all of our 15 Whiskey training.
    They all get--now, this is post basic training, which is 10
    weeks. They get 8 weeks of what I refer to as ground week. They
    got to take the FAA written exam, et cetera. If they are then
    going to be our Shadow operator, which is sort of our mid-level
    with our organic brigades, that is 10 additional weeks. Then if
    they are going to be a Gray Eagle operator, which includes an
    instrumentation requirement, that is 25 weeks. If they are
    going to be the Shadow operator, that is going to be 18 weeks
    of AIT [Advanced Individual Training]. If they are going to be
    a Gray Eagle operator, that will be 33 weeks of AIT.
        Senator Cotton. I have a few comparative numbers here in
    front of me. Your repairmen take 17 weeks of AIT?
        General Perkins. Correct. Generally our longest--and there
    are different kinds of repairmen, but if you look across the
    Army, it averages about 12 weeks between the lowest and the
    highest. Generally our military operational specialties that
    have the highest or the longest AIT are our repair people
    because they have got to go through the troubleshooting. They
    have to learn the electronics, mechanics, et cetera. Our
    Patriot repair people, our radar repair people--those tend to
    be our longer AITs because of the requirement to understand the
    technicality of what is going on and being able to
    troubleshoot, et cetera. That is probably a medium number you
    said for our repair people in general.
        Senator Cotton. That is just for the people who are
    repairing the very aircraft that these operators are flying.
        General Perkins. Correct.
        Senator Cotton. Just 1 week less to learn to be a repairman
    for one of those aircraft as opposed to being an operator.
        You are right about the repair AIT times. A basic
    television equipment maintainer takes 24 weeks of AIT. A
    Patriot repairman takes 45 weeks. Not even the Gray Eagle
    operators take that long.
        General Carlisle, when you have new officers, they pin on
    their 2nd lieutenant bars. How long do they undergo training
    before they are prepared to operate the MQ-1 or MQ-9?
        General Carlisle. Sir, first they go through undergraduate
    RPA training, which is held at Randolph, and that usually lasts
    about 6 months. Then from there, if they are going to RQ-4,
    they will go to Beale and get RQ-4 training. If they are
    getting MQ-1/9, they will go to Holloman for that training, and
    that lasts between 4 and 6 months. It is about a year.
        The challenge we have right now is--and one of the things
    we are trying to do is our training pipeline is very
    inefficient. We have to get better at moving those folks
    through. Part of it is class start time dates, the other
    required training they have to do. But we are working hard to
    get efficiency within that.
        The actual full-up training to when we send them to a unit
    and then once they get to the unit, they go through their
    mission qualification training, but usually that is a top-off
    while they are doing combat missions.
        Senator Cotton. I make the comparison and ask the question
    to highlight the challenges the Air Force has, whether you use
    officers or whether you ultimately use enlisted personnel and
    moving people from the schoolhouse to the front lines because I
    think that is going to be a continued bottleneck no matter what
    course you take on who is piloting the aircraft or whatever
    kind of additional bonuses that you are going to provide or
    whatever kind of additional quality of life measures on which
    you can improve.
        Senator Manchin, anything further?
        Senator Manchin. No.
        Senator Cotton. Well, we will conclude. Thank you very much
    for participating in what is a very important hearing. As you
    can see, there is a lot of interest in this topic on the
    committee. I want all of our pilots and our operators to know
    that the members of this committee and the Americans that we
    represent appreciate their service and thank them for keeping
    our country safe.
        This hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:14 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2017 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, APRIL 5, 2016

                                   U.S. Senate,
                               Subcommittee on Airland,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                               ARMY MODERIZATION

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in
    Room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Tom
    Cotton (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Subcommittee members present: Senators Cotton, Inhofe,
    Wicker, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Manchin, Gillibrand,
    Blumenthal, Donnelly, and Heinrich.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TOM COTTON

        Senator Cotton. The Airland Subcommittee convenes today to
    hear testimony about Army modernization to review the defense
    authorization request for fiscal year 2017 and the Future Years
    Defense Program.
        I welcome our witnesses, Lieutenant General Mike
    Williamson, principal military assistant for acquisitions;
    Lieutenant General John Murray, deputy chief of staff for Army
    programs; Lieutenant General Joseph Anderson, deputy chief of
    staff for operations, plans, and training; Lieutenant General
    H.R. McMaster, director of the Army Capabilities Integration
    Center.
        Thank you each for your dedicated service to our Nation.
        In many hearings, the full committee has heard about some
    of the most diverse, complex, and dangerous threats to our
    national security since the end of World War II. Russia
    occupies land in three countries and routinely probes NATO
    [Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies, China is
    building and militarizing islands out of the sea, North Korea
    is testing nuclear weapons and missiles, and Iran is running
    wild across the Middle East. But instead of strengthening our
    forces against these threats, we have seen sustained cuts to
    our military's force structure, modernization, and readiness.
        Army Chief of Staff General Mark Milley often states that
    readiness is his number-one priority. It is hard for anyone who
    has led soldiers in combat to disagree, just as the moms and
    dads of more than 186,000 soldiers deployed in over 140
    countries could never disagree. But we cannot afford to
    shortchange modernization. Today's modernization is tomorrow's
    readiness.
        As we explore the Army's modernization strategy today, I am
    particularly interested to explore how the Army is using its
    new acquisition authorities in the creation of a Rapid
    Acquisition office. In its understandable focus on
    technological breakthrough, I wonder if the Army has moved
    quickly enough to adopt proven technology already possessed by
    our allies and adversaries alike. In many cases, the desired
    technology may already exist in the private sector and may be
    within the Army's grasp. I will offer three examples.
        First, active protection systems to protect vehicles from
    close-in threats like rocket-propelled grenades are near
    completion in Israel, fielded in Germany and Russia, but the
    United States is still in the science-and-technology phase.
        Second, the Distributed Common Ground System, or DCGS,
    remains beset by problems. Last year, Lieutenant General
    Williamson testified before this subcommittee that the
    completeness of the DCGS program is what makes it so valuable
    and predicted that as we go into the May time frame where we go
    through our next set of evaluations, I think you will see a
    completely different perception of how that tool is provided.
        Unfortunately, a year later a report by the Director,
    Operational Test and Evaluation indicates that DCGS is not a
    functional mission command or intelligence analysis tool, and
    that even under laboratory conditions, soldiers and commanders
    ``did not consider DCGS to be very helpful for the fight'' and
    sought PowerPoint and pencil-and-paper workarounds even when
    commercial, off-the-shelf solutions are potentially available.
        Third, the global response force typically housed in the
    82nd Airborne needs an enhanced tactical mobility program. In
    plain English, they need four-wheelers and other all-terrain
    vehicles to get from the drop zone to the front lines. This
    requirement was demonstrated in 2012 and approved in 2014. Here
    we are in 2016 when any farmer or deer hunter in Arkansas could
    have gone and bought one at a local dealer.
        In addition, some issues sit at the intersection of
    modernization and readiness. I am concerned, for example, about
    the maintenance and modernization of theater activity sets and
    the Army's pre-positioned stocks to be used by rotating units
    or to support contingencies.
        Likewise, the subcommittee is curious about the Army's
    plans to implement the Associated Unit pilot program in which
    active Guard and Reserve units will be paired up to train and
    potentially fight together. In both cases, modernization could
    be disjointed and readiness may suffer without a well-
    considered plan.
        Finally, I am sure committee members will want to examine
    the recommendations of the National Commission on the Future of
    the Army. The Army has suggested that about 50 of the 63
    Commission recommendations are very easy to implement at no
    cost or some of which the Army has already begun
    implementation. That is good news.
        But, according to Army, another 15 significant
    recommendations will require a detailed analysis and are
    expensive to implement. For instance, the Army's fiscal year
    2017 unfinanced requirements list includes nearly $1.2 billion
    in funding to implement recommendations on aviation
    modernization, retain an 11th Combat Aviation Brigade, and
    retain four National Guard AH [Apache Helicopter]-64 attack
    battalions. That is not such good news.
        Again, I thank our witnesses for their service and for
    their appearance today. I look forward to the discussion.
        Senator Manchin?

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOE MANCHIN

        Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of
    you for your service and for helping us navigate this
    difficult, challenging time.
        I want to thank the chairman for holding this important
    hearing on Army modernization. I would also like to welcome
    your witnesses to today's hearing and thank them for their
    testimony and their service to our country.
        The U.S. military remains the most ready and capable
    fighting force in the world. However, after nearly 15 years of
    constant military operations, it is important that we take a
    step back and assess the current state of our military force
    and the threats that we face at home and abroad.
        While the focus of today's hearing is on the Army's
    strategy for modernization, I think it is also imperative that
    we acknowledge the other challenges facing the Army, including
    the importance of rebuilding readiness in the regular Army, the
    Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve.
        The Army has made rebuilding readiness their number-one
    priority in fiscal year budget 2017 request. The high
    operational tempo for the past decade-and-a-half has consumed
    readiness levels as quickly as they could be reconstituted. The
    demands on our military force will not diminish any time in the
    near future.
        Coupled with the devastating impact sequestration has had
    on readiness accounts, I commend the Army for prioritizing
    readiness in this year's budget and ensuring that our military
    are trained and ready to respond to any contingency at a
    moment's notice. As the committee begins their consideration of
    fiscal year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, it is
    important that we protect these investments in the readiness
    accounts from any misguided cuts.
        While the readiness of the force is vitally important, we
    cannot shortchange our investments in modernization. However,
    in order to meet the top-line funding levels set by the 2015
    bipartisan budget agreement, the Army had to reduce funding for
    some procurement and modernization efforts. As General Daniel
    Allyn, vice chief of staff of the Army, testified last month
    before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness,
    this year's budget request is insufficient to simultaneously
    rebuild decisive action readiness and modernize. To ensure
    sufficient readiness for the demands of today's operating
    environment, the Army must assume risk by reducing end
    strength, delaying modernization, and deferring infrastructure
    recapitalization and investment.
        The Army's fiscal year 2017 budget request included $22.6
    billion for the Army's modernization efforts. Of this amount,
    $15.1 billion was requested for procurement and $7.5 billion
    for research, development, test, and evaluation activities.
    However, the total funding for procurement in fiscal year 2017
    request is $1.3 billion less than enacted the amount in fiscal
    year 2016.
        In particular, the Army's aviation portfolio was hard-hit
    by these reductions. The aviation portfolio accounts for
    approximately 25 percent of the Army's entire procurement
    budget, and the fiscal year 2017 budget request reduced
    procurement quantities for the AH-64 Apache, the UH-60 Black
    Hawk, and the CH-47 Chinooks. I would like to know if our
    witnesses feel confident that the reduction in these
    procurement accounts will not adversely impact these programs
    by adding substantial cost to the overall program or have an
    unintended consequence of reducing the readiness of our
    aviation units.
        At the same time, the Army has had a poor track record with
    their modernization efforts. Many programs have been truncated
    or canceled, usually after billions of dollars had already been
    invested. Last year, this committee gave new acquisition
    authority to the service chiefs with the intent that this would
    improve the acquisition process. I look forward to hearing from
    our witnesses on their thoughts on this new authority and what
    further actions the Army needs to take to improve its
    acquisition processes.
        Earlier this year, the National Commission on the Future of
    the Army released their comprehensive study on the roles and
    structure of the Army. I was pleased with the Commission's
    report and believe it was thorough and thoughtful.
        With regards to the Army's Aviation Restructure Initiative,
    the Commission recommended that the active component retain 20
    battalions of Apache helicopters, each equipped with 24
    aircraft, while providing the Army National Guard with four
    battalions of Apache helicopters, each equipped with 18
    aircraft.
        While the Commission struck a balanced compromise, the fact
    remains that in order to execute the Commission's
    recommendations for ARI [Aviation Restructuring Initiative], it
    will require substantial funding. According to the Army's
    unfunded requirements list, the Army would need approximately
    $1.2 billion in additional funding to implement the
    Commission's recommendation of fiscal year 2017, as well as
    additional funding above that amount over the next several
    years. While it is my understanding that General Milley is
    still reviewing the Commission's proposal, I would welcome any
    comments from our witnesses on this issue.
        Finally, we must ensure our men and women in uniform remain
    the best trained, the best-equipped fighting force in the
    world. In light of the Budget Control Act and the Army's
    constrained top-line funding levels, it becomes even more
    imperative that every dollar we spend on the military is spent
    efficiently and effectively so that our soldiers can complete
    their mission, win our nation's wars, and return home safely.
        Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing,
    and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
        We will turn to our witness now, General Williamson.

      STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MICHAEL E. WILLIAMSON, USA
    MILITARY DEPUTY AND DIRECTOR, ARMY ACQUISITION CORPS, OFFICE OF
    THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS,
                             AND TECHNOLOGY

        General Williamson. Chairman Cotton, Ranking Member
    Manchin, and distinguished members of the subcommittee on
    Airland. Thank you for the invitation to discuss the fiscal
    year 2017 budget request and Army equipment modernization. I
    respectfully request that our written statement be made part of
    today's record.
        Senator Cotton. Without objection.
        General Williamson. Mr. Chairman, today's Army prioritizes
    readiness while continuing to assume risk and modernization.
    Due to resource constraints, we simply cannot modernize the
    entire force with the most modern equipment. Therefore, we must
    do so selectively. Our resources are focused on protecting
    science and technology so the next generation of breakthrough
    technologies can be rapidly applied and exploited with our
    existing and our new systems.
        We are also investing in targeted new systems to fill
    critical operation requirements and capability shortfalls.
    These systems include the armored multi-purpose vehicle, the
    joint light tactical vehicle, and fixed-wing aviation. We are
    incrementally modifying and modernizing existing systems to
    increase capabilities and to extend service life. These systems
    include the Paladin, the Black Hawk, the Apache and Chinook
    helicopters, as well as our unmanned aviation.
        We also have a requirement to reset and sustain and return
    our existing Army equipment to the required level of combat
    capability so that we will be prepared to fight in any
    immediate contingencies.
        Then finally, we are divesting excess equipment across the
    entire Army to reduce and eliminate sustainment costs. Systems
    currently being divested include the M113 armored personnel
    carrier, the TH-67 training helicopters, as well as the Kiowa,
    the Kiowa Warrior, and the UH-60 Alpha Black Hawk fleets.
        Equipping is and will always remain a critical component of
    readiness. We cannot put our soldiers at risk by not providing
    them with the right equipment at the right time and at the
    right place to accomplish their assigned missions.
        Mr. Chairman, with your permission I would like to address
    just two other areas. First, reduction in the Army's
    modernization account continues to present significant
    challenges for the defense industrial base, including our own
    organic industrial base. In developing our equipment
    modernization strategy, we carefully assessed risk across all
    portfolios to protect ongoing production and to sustain the
    industrial base and to include the preservation of key
    workforce skills.
        Secondly, I want to take this opportunity to express my
    appreciation to the members of the subcommittee for your
    continued efforts to strengthen and enhance the acquisition
    workforce. Our acquisition professionals are experienced, well-
    educated, and well-trained. They are critical assets in the
    Army's ability to design, develop, and deliver needed
    capability to our soldiers.
        Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee,
    thank you for your steadfast and strong support of the
    outstanding men and women of the United States Army, our Army
    civilians, and their families. This concludes my opening
    remarks.
        [The joint prepared statement of General Williamson,
    General Anderson, Lieutenant General McMaster, and Lieutenant
    General Murry follows:]

     Joint Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General Michael E. Williamson,
      Lieutenant General Herbert R. McMaster, Jr., and Lieutenant General
                                 John M. Murray
                                  introduction
        Chairman Cotton, Ranking Member Manchin, distinguished Members of
    the Subcommittee on Airland, thank you for the opportunity to appear
    before you today. On behalf of our Acting Secretary, the Honorable
    Patrick Murphy, and our Chief of Staff, General Mark Milley, we look
    forward to discussing the Army's fiscal year 2017 (FY17) budget request
    as it pertains to Army strategy, equipment modernization, and
    readiness.
        We present our testimony today with a sense of urgency. With
    today's fiscal constraints, we risk becoming not only a smaller, but
    also a less-capable force. Budget unpredictability and reductions over
    the last several years has hampered modernization and threatens our
    ability to overmatch future enemies in ground combat. Investments today
    are critical because it is more cost effective to maintain and improve
    existing capabilities than regenerate lost capabilities rapidly in
    times of crisis. As the National Commission on the Future of the Army
    observed, reductions in Army modernization are elevating risk to Joint
    Force capability and national security. Our testimony aims to provide
    Congress and the American public with a greater understanding of the
    global security environment, the growing capabilities of our enemies
    and adversaries, and the capabilities and capacity the Army requires to
    protect our citizens and secure our vital national interests.
                   the need for ready, modernized land forces
        Since World War II, the prosperity and security of the United
    States have depended, in large measure, on the synergistic effects of
    capable land, air, and maritime forces. U.S. defense strategy requires
    ready Army forces capable of operating as part of joint teams in
    sufficient scale and for ample duration to prevent conflict, shape
    security environments, and create multiple options for responding to
    and resolving crises. As the nation's principal land force, the Army
    organizes, trains, and equips forces for prompt and sustained combat.
    Army forces are necessary to defeat enemy organizations, control
    terrain, secure populations, consolidate gains, and preserve joint
    force freedom of movement and action. Forward positioned and regionally
    engaged Army forces build partner capability, assure allies, and deter
    adversaries. To protect the homeland, foster security abroad, and win
    wars Army forces must have the capability (ability to achieve a desired
    effect under specified standards and conditions) and capacity
    (capability with sufficient scale and endurance) to accomplish assigned
    missions as part of the Joint Force while confronting increasingly
    dangerous threats.
        We live in an ever-changing, increasingly dangerous world. Since
    decisions about the Army's size and reductions in Research,
    Development, and Acquisition (RDA) investments were made in 2014, the
    Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) captured large parts of
    Iraq and Syria and expanded into Libya and other locations; the Syrian
    Civil War escalated causing a refugee crisis in the Middle East and
    Europe; Russia occupied Crimea, invaded Ukraine, and intervened
    alongside the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps to maintain the Assad
    regime in Syria; North Korea became increasingly bellicose and tested
    nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles; China continues its
    unprecedented construction at reclaimed features in the South China
    Sea; and the Taliban continued to intensify offensive operations in
    Afghanistan. ISIL continued to conduct attacks from Tunisia, to Egypt,
    Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey, France and Belgium. To respond to these threats
    Army forces have maintained a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) in Kuwait,
    returned advisors and Special Operations Forces to Iraq, initiated BCT
    rotations in Europe, increased exercises with partners and Allies in
    the Pacific, and maintained force levels in Afghanistan. Once soldiers
    are committed to these critical missions, it is difficult to disengage
    them. Due to reductions in the size of the Army and increasing
    commitments overseas, the pool of ready Army forces prepared to deploy
    rapidly and transition quickly into Joint operations is significantly
    challenged even as threats to national and international security are
    increasing.
                              emerging challenges
        Threats, enemies, adversaries and geo-strategic competitors are
    becoming increasingly capable and elusive, which pose challenges to
    United States national security interests. Russia, North Korea, Iran
    and Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs), such as ISIL, pose
    potential threats to United States national security interests. At the
    same time, the modernization of China's military forces poses a
    different type of challenge. Combined, those challenges represent a
    broad range of operations for which the Army must be prepared, from
    state to non-state to hybrid conflict. Analysis of threat capabilities
    reveals that the Army must modernize the force to be prepared to fight
    and win against increasingly capable adversaries.
        In terms of state-based challenges, Russia's purported annexation
    of Crimea and invasion of Ukraine demonstrated a sophisticated
    combination of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic means
    to achieve objectives below a threshold that the Russian leadership
    believe would elicit a concerted NATO response. In addition, through an
    intensive modernization effort, Moscow is developing a significant
    capability in several specific military areas. In Ukraine for example,
    the combination of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) and Offensive Cyber
    and advanced Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities depict a high degree
    of technological sophistication that is a direct result of their
    modernization efforts. Robust anti-access and area denial capabilities,
    which include advanced air defenses and mobile gun-missile systems that
    range out to 400 kilometers, allow Russia to challenge air superiority
    from the ground. In addition, Russia possesses a variety of rocket,
    missile, and cannon artillery systems that outrange and are more lethal
    than United States Army artillery systems and munitions. Advanced close
    combat systems including new combat vehicles, active protective
    systems, and improved Anti-tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) highlight
    improvements in the mobility, protection, and lethality of Russian
    heavy forces. It is clear that while our Army was engaged in
    Afghanistan and Iraq Russia studied United States capabilities and
    vulnerabilities and embarked on an ambitious and largely successful
    modernization effort.
        China is modernizing its Army and is developing capabilities to
    project power within the air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains.
    China's actions in the South China Sea lead to questions about its
    intention and commitment to uphold a rules based international system.
    Its efforts in space reveal China's determination to achieve space
    parity and possible superiority. China maintains its own constellation
    of satellites and recently demonstrated anti-satellite capabilities by
    shooting down one of its low earth orbit systems. China is also
    developing offensive cyber capabilities and an ability to jam the
    electromagnetic spectrum through EW capabilities that impacts United
    States communications and Precision, Navigation, and Timing (PNT),
    which severely limits what was once a significant differential
    advantage for U.S. forces. Additionally, China is actively fielding a
    fully mechanized force and has instituted realistic training to
    increase the readiness of its combat brigade formations. Current trends
    in Chinese weapons production will enable the Chinese to conduct a
    range of military operations well beyond its borders.
        Despite increasingly constrained financial resources, the
    Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) continues to prioritize
    expansion of its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. The DPRK also
    maintains an aging but large and capable conventional force that has
    the ability to mass long-range fires on targets throughout the region,
    including Seoul. In addition, the DPRK military possesses cyber and
    chemical-biological warfare capabilities. As the DPRK continues to
    threaten attacks on the United States and our allies, and as the DPRK
    leadership faces mounting economic and political pressures, the United
    States must maintain its deterrent force on the peninsula and be
    prepared to deploy substantial ground, air, and maritime forces as part
    of a coalition alongside Republic of Korea (South Korea) forces in
    defense of South Korea and the region.
        Iran employs proxies, exploits disenfranchised populations, and
    deploys covert operators to exacerbate sectarian conflicts, counter
    U.S. influence, and undermine United States interests in the greater
    Middle East. Iran's involvement in the Syrian, Iraqi, and Yemeni
    conflicts deepened over the past year. With the signing of the Russian-
    Iranian Military Cooperation Agreement last year, and the lifting of
    economic sanctions, it is likely that Iran will accelerate military
    modernization. Iran's current modernization efforts include purchases
    of long-range surface to air missiles from Russia, an extensive fleet
    of unmanned aerial vehicles, cyber capabilities, ballistic missiles,
    and anti-tank guided missiles.
        Threats to national security are also increasing from non-state
    actors. The emergence of ISIL is one example of how non-state actors
    capitalize on opportunities created by communal conflict and weak
    governance. ISIL's military organization; ideological base; use of mass
    murder and other forms of brutality; and its ability to mobilize
    people, money, and weapons have enabled it to seize territory and
    establish control of populations and resources. ISIL has demonstrated
    particular skill in employing social media to prosecute a propaganda
    campaign that complements terrorist and conventional military
    operations. ISIL's success, combined with the political and economic
    weaknesses of many Middle Eastern states has caused violent Islamist
    extremism to metastasize across much of the Middle East and Africa
    which has led to the greatest mass migration since the end of World War
    II. ISIL inspired, planned, and resourced attacks from Iraq to Lebanon,
    Turkey, Paris, Brussels, and even the homeland indicate that terrorist
    organizations that control territory, populations, and resources cannot
    be contained.
        As demonstrated in these examples, future armed conflict will be
    complex, in part, because state, non-state, and hybrid threats are
    increasingly capable and are narrowing U.S. competitive advantages not
    only on land, but also in the air, maritime, space, and cyberspace
    domains. Because these threats may originate in urban areas or remote
    safe havens, long-range strikes will prove insufficient to defeat them.
    The complexity of future armed conflict requires an Army capable of
    conducting missions at home and in foreign lands. To maintain overmatch
    against elusive and increasingly capable enemies, our Army must
    maintain readiness for today and invest in modernization to ensure
    readiness for tomorrow.
                         resourcing army modernization
        Due to resource constraints, today's Army prioritizes readiness
    while continuing to assume risk to modernization. We simply cannot
    modernize the entire force with the most modern equipment. Since fiscal
    year 2012 the Research, Development and Acquisition (RDA) accounts have
    declined by over 30 percent. Given the restrictions on modernization
    funding, technological plateaus and the uncertainty of world events,
    the Army must be selective in resourcing its programs. In fiscal year
    2017, the President's Budget request totals $22.6 billion for the
    Army's RDA program, which includes $15.1 billion for Procurement and
    $7.5 billion for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E). We
    are `adapting today and investing tomorrow'. We are focused on suitable
    new uses or purposes for equipment in the near term; making modest
    investments and delaying new capabilities in the mid-term and
    protecting Science and Technology for the future. Specifically, our RDA
    resources are focused on:
        1.  Science and Technology (S&T). Protected S&T funding ensures the
    next generation of breakthrough technologies can be rapidly applied to
    existing or new equipment designs. We are implementing a strategic
    approach to modernization that includes an awareness of existing and
    potential gaps; an understanding of emerging threats; knowledge of
    state-of-the-art commercial, academic, and Government research; and an
    understanding of competing needs for limited resources.
        2.  New Systems. The Army is making modest developmental
    investments based on critical operational requirements and capability
    shortfalls. Fiscal realities have led to the delay or discontinuance of
    new systems. Key investments that remain in the next generation of
    ground vehicle capabilities include the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle
    and the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, a critical program for the Army
    and the U.S. Marine Corps. Also in this area, the Fixed-Wing Utility
    Aircraft (FUA), a replacement for the C-12 and C-26 platforms, is
    projected to be selected and begin fielding in fiscal year 2018.
        3.  Modification/Modernization. The Army must incrementally modify
    or modernize existing systems in order to increase capabilities and
    extend service life. In addition, the continuous improvement of
    existing systems helps to sustain the industrial base. In this area, we
    are focused on improving the Abrams, Bradley, and Stryker Families of
    Vehicles, as well as Paladin, Improved Turbine Engine Program, and the
    Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System Unitary. We are also improving the
    Apache, Black Hawk, and Chinook helicopter fleets, as well as our
    Unmanned Aircraft Systems.
        4.  Reset and Sustain. Returning Army equipment to the required
    level of combat capability remains central to both regenerating and
    maintaining equipment near-term readiness for contingencies.
        5.  Divest. The Army divestment process seeks to identify equipment
    and systems that are excess across the Total Army in order to reduce
    and eliminate associated sustainment costs. For example, we are
    divesting the aging M113 armored personnel carriers. Additionally, the
    Army's Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles divestiture will
    eliminate a large portion of the fleet through Foreign Military Sales,
    distribution to other agencies, and demilitarization of older, battle-
    worn, excess vehicles. The Army also continues to divest its aging TH-
    67 training helicopters, as well as the OH-58A/C Kiowa, OH-58D Kiowa
    Warrior, and UH-60A Black Hawk fleets.
                       fiscal year 2017 budget priorities
        Over the last 15 years of combat operations, the United States Army
    had to focus on winning against specific threats in Afghanistan and
    Iraq that limited the Army's ability to modernize for future fights.
    There are currently no ground combat vehicle developmental programs
    which means, at current funding levels, the Bradley and Abrams will be
    in the Army inventory for 50-70 years. Meanwhile, threats, enemies and
    adversaries have been modernizing rapidly. Due to increasing enemy
    capability and reduction in Army resources available for modernization,
    risk is increasing to soldiers and missions.
        The President's budget request for fiscal year 2017 prioritizes the
    following five capability areas:
        Aviation. The Army continues to invest, at a slower pace, in
    Aviation to sustain fleet modernization and close key capability gaps
    in survivability and lethality. Specific investments in this portfolio
    include the following:

          The Army will pursue a Multi-Year Contract (MYC) in
    fiscal year 2017 for the AH-64 Apache in order to achieve cost
    avoidance and efficiencies, while completing the AH-64E Apache
    Remanufacture Program. This program is designed to renew the current
    Apache fleet by incorporating current technologies and a new airframe
    to extend the aircraft's useful life and make it one of the most
    technologically advanced weapon systems on the battlefield. With regard
    to Manned/Unmanned Teaming (MUMT), the AH-64E Apache program has
    successfully developed the capability to view video from all U.S. Army
    Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) and link with and fully control the
    Gray Eagle UAS. In fiscal year 2017, development continues on the next
    step of control with MUMT-X, which will give the AH-64E Apache the
    capability to control all other UASs in the Army fleet.
          The UH-60 Black Hawk continues to be the Army's workhorse
    and, at 2,135 total airframes, is our largest fleet of rotary wing
    aircraft. Fleet modernization efforts focus on the continued
    procurement of the UH-60M aircraft, recapitalization of UH-60A into UH-
    60L aircraft, the development of the UH-60V aircraft with a digital
    cockpit, and divestment of legacy aircraft. In fiscal year 2017, the
    Army will enter into the ninth MYC to be awarded through fiscal year
    2021.
          The Improved Turbine Engine Program is designed to
    provide significant horsepower and fuel savings to enable current AH-64
    Apache and UH-60 Black Hawk fleets to meet worldwide operational
    requirements for high altitude and hot conditions. The program
    continues in fiscal year 2017 with two vendors undergoing Preliminary
    Design Review, which will lead to a down select in fiscal year 2018 to
    a single vendor for engine development.
          The CH-47 Chinook, the Army's only heavy lift helicopter,
    is projected to remain in service through 2060, making it the Army's
    first, and only, aircraft in service for more than a century. The
    planned H-47 Block II upgrade to the H-47F/G will restore operational
    payload capability, efficiently incorporate engineering changes, and
    increase commonality between SOCOM and the conventional Army.
          The Army has an Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) fleet
    comprised of small (Raven and Puma), medium (Shadow), and large (Gray
    Eagle) components. All systems are existing programs of record and are
    under active acquisition programs to meet fleet size objectives over
    the next five years. Gray Eagle is a dedicated, assured, multi-mission
    UAS being fielded to all 10 Army divisions to support combat
    operations, as well as the National Training Center. Additionally, the
    Improved Gray Eagle, which achieves significant increases in payload,
    range, and station time through fuselage and engine enhancements, is
    fielded to Special Operations Forces and Intelligence organizations in
    support of global Department of Defense Intelligence, Surveillance, and
    Reconnaissance (ISR) requirements. Shadow is a dedicated
    Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition UAS fielded to
    Army and Army National Guard BCTs, Special Forces Groups, the Ranger
    Regiment, and performs Manned-Unmanned Teaming with Apache in Combat
    Aviation Brigades to meet the Armed Aerial Scout requirements in lieu
    of the divested OH-58D Kiowa Warrior. Shadow Platoons are currently
    undergoing a major block upgrade that provides enhanced encryption,
    increased endurance, improved optics, and a high bandwidth, digital
    data link capable of support secure transmission of multiple payloads.
          Fiscal year 2017 funds for the Army's fixed wing fleet
    include procurement of the FUA, which will begin replacing the current
    C-12 platforms and later the C-26 platforms.
          The Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM) is an Army-led
    Acquisition Category 1D program with Joint interest from the U.S. Navy
    and U.S. Marine Corps. JAGM is the next generation of aviation launched
    missiles to replace the laser Hellfire II and the Longbow radar
    missiles. Fiscal year 2017 funds the first JAGM Low Rate Initial
    Production lot.
        Network. The Army must maintain a robust Network that is protected
    against cyber-attacks to execute uninterrupted mission command. Key
    investments supporting the Network include the following:
          Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) provides
    ``networking-on-the-move'' capability. WIN-T also provides soldiers and
    leaders a mobile infrastructure that employs military and commercial
    satellite connectivity, and high capacity line-of-sight (terrestrial)
    connectivity. It extends the tactical wide area network throughout
    division, brigade, battalion, and company levels in the maneuver force.
    The WIN-T Increment 2 program is in Full Rate Production and fielding
    following a successful operational test and performing well in
    operations in theater.
          Assured Position, Navigation and Timing (A-PNT) is a
    critical enabler for Army warfighting functions and virtually all Army
    weapon systems. Program Manager Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PM
    PNT) and Army S&T are developing technologies to provide dismounted and
    mounted soldiers the capability to attain trusted PNT information while
    operating in conditions that impede or deny access to the Global
    Positioning System (GPS). These technologies include non-GPS
    augmentation for distributed Mounted and Dismounted PNT capabilities,
    pseudolite transceivers (an alternative source of GPS-like signals),
    and anti-jam capabilities. Both the Mounted and Dismounted efforts are
    structured to provide a hub capability that distributes an A-PNT
    solution to vehicles and soldier systems. In fiscal year 2017, Army S&T
    will transition A-PNT technologies for Mounted and Dismounted
    application to PM PNT with the Program of Record Milestone B scheduled
    in mid-fiscal year 2018.
          Communications Security supports the implementation of
    the National Security Agency (NSA) developed Communications Security
    (COMSEC) technologies into the Army by providing COMSEC systems
    capabilities through development and integration of encryption, trusted
    software, and/or standard operating procedures into specified systems
    in support of securing Army and Department of Defense Networks and
    capabilities.
          Offensive Cyber Operations (OCO) and Defensive Cyber
    Operations (DCO) allow the Army to protect its networks and project
    force in cyberspace. The Army has positioned itself with U.S. Army
    Cyber Command (ARCYBER) and the Cyber Center of Excellence to provide
    capabilities in both mission areas and will continue to do so. In the
    area of DCO, the Army will continue to invest in infrastructure and
    tools to set conditions for increased defensive capabilities. We are in
    the initial stages for fielding capability and fiscal year 2017 will be
    critical in further development.
          Cyber Situational Awareness is integral to OCO, DCO, and
    Department of Defense Information Network operations that support
    commanders in the conduct of unified land operations. These
    capabilities range from system status to mission and threat awareness
    to targeting and engagement data to influence cyber and electromagnetic
    effects. We are currently working with the Cyber Center of Excellence
    and ARCYBER to address these requirements.

        Integrated Air Missile Defense (IAMD). The Army must be able to
    defeat a large portfolio of threats ranging from micro Unmanned
    Aircraft Vehicles and mortars, to cruise missiles and sophisticated
    short and medium range ballistic missiles. The Army will support this
    priority by investing in an Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle
    Command System, an Indirect Fire Protection Capability, and
    modernization of the Patriot system.
        Within this demanding mission area, the number one Air and Missile
    Defense (AMD) modernization priority remains the IAMD Battle Command
    System (IBCS). IBCS will replace elements of seven existing mission
    command programs, and allow transformation to a network-centric system-
    of-systems capability that integrates AMD sensors and weapons. A second
    critical priority is to significantly improve capabilities in
    Countering Unmanned Aircraft Systems (CUAS) and Cruise Missile Defense
    (CMD), while continuing to pace the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
    threat and maintaining capability to Counter Rockets, Artillery and
    Mortars (C-RAM). The portfolio will accomplish this by leveraging the
    Indirect Fire Protection Capability Increment II Program and a Multi-
    Mission Launcher (MML) to address select CUAS, CMD, and C-RAM threats
    and replace Avenger/Stinger across the force. The Army is continuing
    investments to improve Patriot radar capabilities and field the PAC-3
    Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE).
        Combat Vehicles. The Army is pursuing a Combat Vehicle
    Modernization Strategy to ensure Army BCTs possess the lethality,
    mobility, and protection to achieve overmatch during joint
    expeditionary maneuver and joint combined arms operations:

          Ground Mobility Vehicle (GMV) will be procured as a
    Commercial/Government Off-the-Shelf (C/GOTS) solution to address a
    significant mobility gap in the Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT).
    The Army's current analysis of alternatives for GMV is expected to be
    complete in mid-fiscal year 2016 and inform the acquisition of a
    commercial, non-developmental solution beginning in fiscal year 2017.
          Stryker Lethality Upgrades address capability gaps
    resulting from more than 12 years of combat through an incremental
    Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) strategy currently focused on
    increasing mobility, electrical power, and the need to accept future
    network upgrades. Efforts also include upgrades to increase the
    lethality of the Stryker Family of Vehicles and Double V-Hull upgrades
    to increase vehicle protection. The Army plans to increase lethality by
    having half of the Infantry Carrier Vehicles equipped with a 30 mm
    cannon and the other half equipped with a Javelin missile on the
    existing Remote Weapons Station in each brigade. The Army plans to
    increase protection by upgrading Stryker vehicles to a Double-V Hull
    (DVH) architecture for four of the nine BCTs. DVH production utilizes
    an exchange process, removing select components and mission equipment
    packages from flat bottom Strykers and installing them into a new DVH.
          Mobile Protected Firepower will provide protected, long-
    range, direct fire capabilities to the IBCT to defeat enemy prepared
    positions, destroy enemy armored vehicles, close with the enemy through
    fire and maneuver, and ensure freedom of maneuver and action in close
    contact with the enemy. The Army plans to conduct the Mobile Protected
    Firepower Analysis of Alternative in fiscal year 2017 to assess the
    operational effectiveness, suitability and life-cycle cost of both
    developmental and non-development materiel solutions that satisfy
    requirements contained within the Initial Capabilities Document.
          Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle will replace the legacy
    M113s at the brigade level and below to support the Armored BCT and
    will consist of five mission roles: General Purpose, Mortar Carrier,
    Mission Command, Medical Evacuation, and Medical Treatment variants.
    The Engineering and Manufacturing Development contract was awarded in
    December 2014, and we anticipate the first prototype delivery vehicle
    in December 2016.

        Emerging Threats. As mentioned earlier, the Army invests in S&T to
    focus on critical capability gaps and allow our soldiers to operate in
    contested environments and win decisively against any potential
    adversary in the mid to far timeframe. These S&T investments will
    deliver capabilities to address critical gaps in combat vehicles,
    Future Vertical Lift (FVL), expeditionary mission command, cross-domain
    fires, cyber electromagnetic activities, robotics and autonomous
    systems, advanced protection and soldier and team performance and
    overmatch. For example, the Modular Active Protection System and
    advanced protection systems program will increase vehicle and aircraft
    survivability and protection against current and emerging advanced
    threats; Electronic Warfare efforts will focus on designing
    countermeasures to address threats against Army rotorcraft, ground
    mounted platforms and dismounted soldiers; and the Combat Vehicle
    Prototyping program will demonstrate advanced capabilities for the
    combat vehicle fleet, reducing technical risk for future programs,
    including the Future Fighting Vehicle. Other areas to help ensure that
    our soldiers are protected against emerging threats include Degraded
    Visual Environment mitigation to inform leadership on improvements to
    platform survivability; Red Teaming and Vulnerability Analysis to know
    our weaknesses and fix them; a directed energy component for Counter
    Unmanned Aerial Systems (CUAS), Counter Rocket Artillery and Mortar
    (CRAM), and Cruise Missile Defense (CMD); cyber situational awareness
    and offensive and defensive cyber operations to collect, develop
    understanding and defeat threat advancement in cyber electromagnetic
    capabilities; and sensor protection to ensure more consistent
    situational awareness. Additionally, the JMR-TD will fly demonstration
    aircraft to prove out FVL technology and inform requirements
    development. FVL will conduct an Analysis of Alternatives and begin
    development of the initial variant. A Materiel Development Decision for
    the first FVL variant will occur in fiscal year 2017. Lastly, S&T
    investments in robotics and autonomous systems (RAS) improve Army
    formation capabilities in situational understanding, mobility,
    protection, lethality, and sustainment in ways that cannot be achieved
    elsewhere.
        Other Major Programs for Fiscal Year 2017. The Squad is the
    foundation of the Decisive Force. Closing gaps in capabilities will
    ensure the Army's foundational tactical unit can close with and destroy
    the enemy under all battle conditions and accomplish missions in
    complex environments. The integration of Squad-related initiatives
    across numerous capability portfolios is essential to success. The Army
    is constantly working to reduce the weight and improve the performance
    of the soldier's individual equipment. Currently, we are researching
    improved ways to help redistribute the weight carried by soldiers so
    they can carry their load with less stress on their backs or knees.
    Plans include the development of new rucksacks and other equipment so
    soldiers can more comfortably carry their supplies, ammunition, and
    equipment. Research is also taking place on a new load-bearing system.
    Every effort undergoes extensive user evaluations by soldiers
    throughout the development process. The Army is also working to reduce
    the weight of the clothing and equipment soldiers carry by developing
    lighter body armor, helmets, and other equipment while addressing a
    wide-range of threats to our soldiers, including ballistics, blast
    overpressure, concealment, fragmentation, and heat.
        In addition to the above efforts, the Army's Soldier Protection
    System (SPS) is an integrated personal protection system that
    integrates head, torso, and extremity protection. It maintains current
    standards of personal protection but with lighter weight than current
    systems. It is also scalable, allowing soldiers to increase the level
    of protection or reduce weight depending upon mission requirements. SPS
    consists of five major subcomponents: (1) the Integrated Head
    Protection System is a new helmet concept which allows the soldier to
    add additional protection, such as an additional layer of armor or
    facial protection, depending upon mission requirements; (2)
    Transitional Combat Eye Protection is eyewear that electronically
    either automatically or manually adjusts for darkness or light, which
    is critical when a soldier exits a sunlit street into a darkened
    structure; (3) Torso Protection features a new combat vest with pelvic
    protection that provides modular levels of protection that can be
    scaled up or down depending on mission requirements; (4) Vital Torso
    Protection provides lighter weight hard armor plates; and (5) the
    Integrated Soldier Sensor System will provide sensor technology to
    record forces that affect the soldier, as well as monitor the soldier's
    health status. Other important initiatives include the Lightweight
    Advanced Combat Helmet, which provides the same levels of protection as
    the Advanced Combat Helmet but with less weight and the Enhanced Combat
    Helmet, which provides significantly better head protection without
    additional weight.
        In the area of Aircraft Survivability Equipment, the fiscal year
    2017 budget request will accelerate the Common Infrared Countermeasure
    system and will begin fielding in the near-term. This will be coupled
    with the Advanced Threat Detection System (ATDS) to improve infrared
    threat detection. Essential to protection of aircraft against emerging
    threats, the Army will pursue S&T efforts to develop follow on systems
    that are able to defeat a threat system irrespective of its targeting
    and guidance systems, propulsion means, or warhead type. In addition,
    fiscal year 2017 funds the development of an ATDS (Detect) to replace
    the Common Missile Warning System.
        In the area of Cross Domain Fires the Army is ensuring that area
    and precision fires capabilities support maneuver BCT core mission
    competencies. The Army is continuing research into improving organic
    BCT Near-Precision and Precision fires, cluster munitions replacement,
    and long-range fire enhancements. In the near-term, the Army will
    continue radar modernization with fielding the Q-50 and Q-53 Radar
    Systems, replacement of Paladin M109A6 with Paladin Integrated
    Management (M109A7), and continued production of Guided Multiple Launch
    Rocket System-Alternate Warhead missiles.
        The Army is committed to providing soldiers with the best
    intelligence tools and technology available. The intelligence
    warfighting function's priority is the Army's Terrestrial Layer,
    followed by the Foundation Layer and the modernization of the Aerial
    Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms and
    sensors within the Aerial Layer. The first priority is the Prophet
    Ground Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) capability. Prophet must be
    constantly modernized to maintain pace with changing global military
    and commercial technologies available to the threat. Prophet will also
    bridge the operational gap until replaced by the future Next-Generation
    Multi-Intelligence Ground Collection System. The second priority within
    the Foundation Layer is a capability that enables processing,
    exploitation and dissemination of information to maintain highly
    accurate situation awareness, such as the Distributed Common Ground
    System-Army (DCGS-A). As we continue to refine and improve the current
    version of DCGS-A, we are committed to a full and open competition in
    fiscal year 2016 to develop, test, and produce the next version of this
    intelligence software system. fiscal year 2017 funding will provide for
    the fielding of enhanced Increment 1, Release 2 capabilities to the
    Force, which improves the tools currently used by soldiers to analyze,
    process, and visualize the information on the battlefield, and support
    Increment 2 development and testing. DCGS-A Increment 2 will provide a
    modernized data management architecture that complies with the Common
    Operating Environment, the Intelligence Community Information
    Technology Enterprise, and the Joint Information Environment; the
    integration of emerging sensor and automation technology; and enhanced
    ease of use and analytic capabilities. Funding also provides for the
    procurement of DCGS-A Tactical Intelligence Ground Stations to equip
    activating Expeditionary Military Intelligence battalions in all
    components.
        The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), a Joint program with the
    U.S. Marine Corps, is the centerpiece of the Army's Tactical Wheeled
    Vehicle modernization strategy and a key enabler of Joint Combined Arms
    operations. JLTV provides the necessary leap in protection,
    performance, and payload--the Iron Triangle--to fill the capability gap
    remaining between the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle and
    the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Family of Vehicles. The JLTV is in
    Low-Rate Initial Production. The JLTV program will inform requirements
    for the potential development of a Lightweight Reconnaissance Vehicle
    (LRV).
        The Army and the Department are working to implement the fiscal
    year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) acquisition reform
    provisions to improve the acquisition process by strengthening the Army
    Chief of Staff's voice in the acquisition process as its principal
    customer. There is still more to be done within the Army to streamline
    the process. The fundamental principle is that authority must accompany
    responsibility. To hold the Chief of Staff accountable, he must have
    the authority to fix the Army's process. We will continue to explore
    steps to improve the Army's process.
        The Army will ensure that system requirements are affordable and do
    not add excess technical risk to our acquisition programs. We have
    instituted processes known as Knowledge Points to identify necessary
    requirements trade-offs at key decision points. This process is
    mandatory across all major programs and is a critical factor in
    achieving a more effective, more affordable, and more responsive
    acquisition system. Knowledge Points enable the Army Chief of Staff to
    formally review system requirements throughout the development phase.
    In addition, the Army has instituted affordability caps on new programs
    to make sure that we can sustainably afford the development and
    production costs. For example, we made certain that we could afford
    AMPV at the same time we were producing the Paladin Improvement
    Management howitzer and JLTV.
                            defense industrial base
        Reductions in the Army's modernization account continue to present
    significant challenges for the Defense Industrial Base, especially for
    companies that do not have commercial sales to leverage and for small
    companies that must diversify quickly. In developing our equipment
    modernization strategy, we carefully assessed risks across all
    portfolios to ensure balanced development of new capabilities,
    incremental upgrades to existing systems, and protection of ongoing
    production to sustain the Defense Industrial Base.
        The Army remains concerned about the preservation of key skills and
    capabilities in the manufacturing base for both our original equipment
    manufacturers and their key suppliers. Teaming and collaboration with
    our industrial base partners early in the process helps to reduce risk.
    Where applicable, the Army supports the efforts to develop Foreign
    Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) that can also
    help to sustain the Defense Industrial Base.
        The Army's approach to risk mitigation focuses on continuous
    assessment of industrial base risks across all portfolios. Fragility
    and Criticality (FaC) assessments are a critical part of the risk
    mitigation process and identify the fragile and critical portions of
    sectors within the Defense Industrial Base to facilitate risk-
    mitigation investment decisions. The FaC information provides Army
    program offices with the ability to accurately gauge how potential
    reductions in funding could affect suppliers that provide the
    capabilities, products, skills, and services needed to maintain
    readiness.
        The Army recently completed studies that independently assess the
    health and risk of the Munition, Combat Vehicle, and Tactical Wheeled
    Vehicle industrial base sectors. In the Combat Vehicle portfolio,
    production of the M109A7 Self-Propelled Howitzer System, the Armored
    Multi-Purpose Vehicle, ongoing FMS, as well as incremental upgrades to
    Abrams, Bradley, and Stryker ensure continuing workload to sustain
    critical skills. In the Army's Aviation portfolio, multi-year contracts
    for the Black Hawk, Chinook, and potentially Apache provide stability
    and predictability to the industrial base while achieving significant
    cost savings for the Army and the American taxpayer.
        The Army continually assesses the health of the organic industrial
    base (OIB), including our depots, arsenals, ammunition plants,
    munitions centers, and Government Owned Contractor Operated (GOCO)
    manufacturing facilities. The Army maintains critical skills sets in
    our OIB by identifying workload to preserve capabilities, exploring FMS
    opportunities, and encouraging our OIB facilities to partner with
    commercial firms and other Department of Defense organizations, such as
    the Defense Logistics Agency, to meet future requirements.
        The fiscal year 2017 budget request fully funds the Army's critical
    equipment readiness requirements and supports 13 million Direct Labor
    Hours (DLH) of work within the depots. The arsenals also anticipate
    executing 1.4 million DLH in fiscal year 2017 to sustain their skill
    sets. This workload will adequately preserve the depot and arsenal
    critical skill sets, with some risk for those systems that have either
    been through reset or RECAP with Congressional support. The Army is
    reassessing the arsenal's critical manufacturing capabilities with the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense and the other Services to ensure
    proper utilization of the arsenals to meet joint readiness
    requirements. Minimum workload levels to sustain these critical
    manufacturing capabilities will inform staffing levels and plant
    capacity to effectively sustain equipment readiness requirements. We
    will continue to modernize Army OIB infrastructure to support
    readiness.
                             capacity also matters
        The modernization priorities described above are critical to
    maintain overmatch against increasingly capable enemies. However,
    modernization alone is not enough. The Army requires ready forces that
    not only possess modern capabilities, but also the capacity to
    translate military objectives into enduring political outcomes. Army
    capacity is critical to deter enemies; reassure allies; surge forces to
    contingencies; control territory; secure populations overseas and in
    the homeland; and regenerate combat power. There is mounting risk
    associated with an Army that could prove too small to execute the
    strategy outlined in the National Military Strategy.
        Current demand exceeds the Army's ability to supply units on a
    rotational basis. Today, the Army is globally engaged with
    approximately 190,000 soldiers supporting Combatant Commanders in 140
    countries. These soldiers conduct combat operations, deter aggression,
    and assure our Allies and partners. In Afghanistan, the Army continues
    to engage the enemy as we work with Allies and partners to train,
    advise, and assist Afghan National Security Forces. In Iraq, we build
    partner capacity to fight the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.
    Throughout Africa and the Americas, we partner to prevent conflict and
    shape the security environment. In the Pacific, more than 75,000
    soldiers remain committed, including 20,000 who stand ready in the
    Republic of Korea. In Europe and Asia, Army forces reassure Allies and
    deter aggression.
        An Active Army which currently stands at 482,000 is drawing down
    from a wartime high of 570,000 (1,133,000 Total Force) to 450,000
    personnel (980,000 Total Force) and reducing from 45 to 31 BCTs (59
    Total Force). If sequestration-level cuts are imposed in fiscal year
    2018 and beyond, all components of the Army would be reduced further,
    with active duty end strength decreasing to 420,000, the Army National
    Guard drawing down to 315,000, and the Army Reserves reducing to
    185,000. Those reductions would create unacceptable risk to the nation.
    Insufficient capacity in ready land forces limits options for the
    President, Secretary of Defense, and combatant commanders to respond to
    and resolve crises. Moreover, once cut it is difficult to regenerate
    Army forces rapidly. Growing the Army is difficult, costly, takes time
    due to a lack of manpower, the sophisticated nature of weapons and
    equipment, the importance of training teams on collective and
    individual tasks, and the need for those teams to have experienced
    leaders.
                                   conclusion
        U.S. defense strategy requires ready Army forces capable of
    operating as part of joint teams in sufficient scale and for ample
    duration to prevent conflict, shape security environments, and create
    multiple options for responding to and resolving crises. Our risk to
    national security is increasing due to our adversaries improving their
    capabilities, increased global commitments, reductions in Army
    manpower, and reductions in resources for readiness and modernization.
    To mitigate risk, Army leaders prioritize investments to sustain
    readiness and close the most critical capability gaps. We recognize
    that, in our democracy, we get the Army that the American people are
    willing to pay for. It is our job to do the best we can with the
    resources that Congress and the American people provide us.
        Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of this Subcommittee, thank
    you for your steadfast support for our soldiers, Department of the Army
    Civilians, and Army Families.

        Senator Cotton. General McMaster?

     STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL HERBERT R. McMASTER, JR., USA
        DIRECTOR, ARMY CAPABILITIES INTEGRATION CENTER; DEPUTY
     COMMANDING GENERAL, FUTURES, UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING AND
                            DOCTRINE COMMAND

        General McMaster. Thank you, sir. Chairman Cotton, Ranking
    Member Manchin, distinguished members of this subcommittee,
    thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today about the
    importance of ready land forces and the enduring need to
    maintain a ready Army with sufficient capacity and capabilities
    to secure our nation.
        As Senator Cotton mentioned already, threats and enemies
    are becoming increasingly capable, and our competitive
    advantages that we have banked on over recent years are
    narrowing. Due to reductions in the size of the Army and
    decreased investments in modernization, as well as the improved
    capabilities of potential enemies, the Army risks losing
    qualitative overmatch in future conflicts.
        With a 74 percent decrease in Army modernization total
    obligation authority since 2008, risk to mission and soldiers
    is increasing. All of today's conflicts are over the control of
    territory, people, and resources. Because the Army is
    foundational to the joint force, the increased risk applies as
    well to joint operations, as well as to soldiers and Army
    units. In particular, we must ensure that combined arms units
    in our Army possess the mobility, the firepower, and the
    protection to defeat the enemy and establish control of land,
    resources, and populations.
        Over the last 15 years of combat operations, our Army has
    focused on winning against enemies in Afghanistan and Iraq. We
    are behind, though, in modernization against current as well as
    future threats. We have no current major ground combat vehicle
    development program underway. With current funding levels, the
    Bradley Fighting Vehicle and the Abrams tank will soon be
    obsolete, but they will remain in the Army inventory for the
    next 50 to 70 years.
        Meanwhile, threats, enemies, and adversaries have been
    modernizing rapidly. To mitigate mounting risk, our Army is
    particularly concerned about developing future capabilities in
    the following areas: combat vehicles, future vertical lift,
    expeditionary mission command or command-and-control
    capability, cross-domain fires, cyber and electromagnetic
    activities, robotic and autonomous systems, advanced protection
    as was already mentioned, and soldier and team performance and
    overmatch in close combat.
        The stakes are high. The combination of increasingly
    dangerous security environment, reductions in the size of the
    Army, decreasing investment in Army modernization, and fiscal
    uncertainty have increased risk to the joint force and to
    national security.
        Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this
    subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to speak with you
    today. I look forward to your questions.
        Senator Cotton. General Anderson?

      STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOSEPH ANDERSON, USA DEPUTY
                  CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY (G-3/5/7)

        General Anderson. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Cotton,
    Ranking Member Manchin, and distinguished members of this
    committee, thanks for the opportunity to talk to you about the
    Army's fiscal year 2017 PBR [President Budget Request] as it
    pertains to Army modernization. Thanks to all of you for your
    continued support of our soldiers, our families, our civilians,
    and our veterans.
        As you know, the Army remains the world's decisive land
    force. We are currently globally engaged with 187,000 soldiers
    in over 140 countries, while participating in seven named
    operations and rotating forces through Europe, the Pacific, and
    the Middle East. The Army remains the foundation of the joint
    force, and we conduct diverse and enduring missions. We will
    continue to invest in training, equipping, and leader
    development while balancing resources between readiness and
    strength and modernization.
        We require long-term, sustained, and predictable funding to
    meet our demands in today's security environment. The 2015 BBA
    [Bipartisan Budget Act] did provide some short-term relief.
    While the budget provides some predictability, it is
    insufficient to build full-spectrum readiness and modernize our
    equipment at the same time. We assume risk by reducing end
    strength, delaying modernization, and deferring infrastructure
    enhancements to build readiness for today's operating
    environment. These tradeoffs mortgage our future readiness and
    increase the risk of sending undertrained and poorly equipped
    soldiers into harm's way.
        I look forward to working with you to ensure that our Army
    remains the premier land force in the world, and I look forward
    to taking your questions. Thank you.
        Senator Cotton. General Murray?

    STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN M. MURRAY, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
                         STAFF OF THE ARMY, G-8

        General Murray. Chairman Cotton, Ranking Member Manchin,
    distinguished members of this committee, once again, thank you
    very much for allowing me to testify today on the Army's fiscal
    year 2017 budget request.
        I would simply amplify a couple things that my colleagues
    have already said and the chairman and ranking member have
    mentioned several times, and that is the fundamental issue the
    Army faces each and every time we build a budget, and we are
    facing it right now as we build a team budget, and that is how
    do you balance really the three legs of the stool that we deal
    with when we talk about how we apply our resources. That is
    near-term readiness, that is really manpower or structure, and
    it is modernization/capital investments. It is the balancing
    act between those three that we deal with every time we build a
    budget.
        This budget request in fiscal year 2017 clearly prioritizes
    readiness. It is about a five percent increase in what we have
    asked for in readiness over the 2016 request. At the same time
    we are maintaining end-strength ramp on our way down to 450, as
    directed, and so you pay for that with modernization, capital
    investments in our installation. That is where the bill-payers
    are.
        If you ask me if I am concerned about risk in this budget,
    I would tell you no. I am more concerned about the cumulative
    risk over the last 5 or 6 years because this is exactly the way
    we have built budgets for the last 5 or 6 years. I am more
    concerned about the cumulative effect of the impact on the
    modernization accounts in our installations than I am in
    particular one budget.
        Once again, thank you for your steadfast support for our
    soldiers, our families, our civilians, and our veterans, and I
    very much look forward to taking your questions.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you all.
        I want to return to a concept you all raised in various
    ways. General Williamson, you talked about assuming risk on
    modernization, selectively modernizing targeted investments.
    General McMaster, you talked about the future of the Army and
    the risk we face there. General Anderson, you said we are
    assuming risk in modernization. General Murray, you said that
    you are more worried about the cumulative risk not just of this
    budget but five years of budgets.
        When we prioritize readiness, we are prioritizing the
    training and the safety of the soldiers that we have in the
    Army today downrange, which means that we are putting at
    greater risk the soldiers that we are going to be sending
    downrange in 5, 10, 15 years just to put it in the most
    concrete terms. Is that fair?
        General Anderson. It might be fair, Senator, but I think
    the issue is as we watch the cycle, our job is to--how we make
    sure from home station training, that is some of the money you
    are seeing pulled for readiness out of some of these programs
    to make sure they get better opportunity at home. Before they
    go to one of the training centers, be it at Fort Irwin, be it
    Fort Polk for their validation exercises before they out from a
    training perspective we are okay. The issue is going to be--and
    so far, as we keep doing that for all things Korea, for all
    things Afghanistan, all things Iraq, elsewhere, we are okay on
    a three-to-one cycle rotation.
        The issue is going to be, though, as you allude to, is what
    kit do they bring, as we watch in Europe and elsewhere. That is
    where, as H.R. mentioned, the overmatch piece. That is the
    larger concern of the two.
        Senator Cotton. General McMaster used the term qualitative
    overmatch. Could you explain what you mean by that?
        General McMaster. Yes, sir. We are losing qualitative
    overmatch over our enemies, and that has a lot to do with
    increased enemy lethality and our inability to keep pace in
    protection. You mentioned active protective systems in that
    connection.
        Also, we are seeing some disruptive technologies as our
    enemies really are doing four things that we have to keep up
    with. The first is they are evading our long-range detection.
    Our ability to project power onto land from the aerospace and
    maritime domains obviously is limited based on enemy counter
    actions.
        They are also, though, disrupting what they see as our
    differential advantages, so evading us, disrupting our
    capabilities. We see that with cyber electromagnetic
    capabilities that go after our networks in such a way that we
    cannot rely on the precision strike capabilities that we have
    been able to rely on over the years.
        The other thing that we are seeing disrupted from an enemy
    perspective, disruptive threats are tiered enemy air defense
    capabilities. Russia has established air supremacy over Ukraine
    from the ground, and so how do we contend with that sort of
    environment but then also how do we develop Army capabilities
    that have similar capabilities to those?
        Other capabilities we see emerging are enemy unmanned
    aerial systems, and we do not have an easy fix, a quick fix for
    that now, and we need to develop countermeasures to enemy UAS
    and swarm unmanned or remotely piloted aircraft capabilities.
        What we see Russia put on display in eastern Ukraine is the
    ability to combine these capabilities, to skim social media
    with the cyber capability, to identify a general target area
    then with UAS, and then to use massed artillery fires. We are
    outranged and outgunned by many potential adversaries in the
    future in winning that sort of deep fight against an enemy who
    has long-range capabilities.
        Those are some of the things that we are concerned about,
    sir, and of course with the modernization budget going down and
    we are trying to manage, you know, the programs that are vital
    to Army modernization and we do not have the flexibility really
    to invest in some of these key areas where we see some new
    vulnerabilities or areas that we have to go after with some
    urgency.
        Senator Cotton. General Williamson, did you want to
    respond?
        General Williamson. I did, sir. I wanted to give an
    example. When General McMaster talks about competitive
    advantage--so I am a product of the 1980s. I came in the Army
    in the 1980s. But one of the things I distinctly remember was
    that we wanted to own the night. The investment that we made in
    night vision capability and laser capability gave us a
    competitive edge on the battlefield.
        But what has happened now, separate from a state directing
    investment in something, what has happened now is that access
    to technology, so your ability to go on the Web and order
    something that in the 1980s we spent lots of money developing,
    our adversaries now have more access to things like night
    vision, to communications equipment, and so the investment for
    us is to always be one step ahead of them.
        The agility that you alluded to, the ability to react
    quickly to new threats, to exploit new technologies, that is
    the type of thing that we are looking for because now the
    access to technology is so great.
        Senator Cotton. I just think it is important that we be
    very frank here and that we are not engaged in political spin
    or military jargon. We are prioritizing readiness. I do not
    disagree with that priority. We cannot send our sons and
    daughters into combat today without 100 percent confidence in
    their readiness. If you have a child in our Army who is 20
    years old, they are going to be prepared for the battle
    downrange.
        If you have a child who is 10 years old who is going to be
    in the Army in 10 years, right now, their lives are going to be
    a greater risk because we have systematically underfunded our
    military and specifically Army modernization programs, as
    General Murray said, for the last five years.
        Senator Manchin?
        Senator Manchin. The definition of insanity is pretty well
    defined, I think, and a lot of people back home in West
    Virginia ask and they wonder why we are cutting our military
    back when they see a lot of bad things happening around the
    world, more challenges than ever before. Matter of fact, I
    think it is more challenging now than it was when we had a
    full-fledged cold war going on. I have a hard time explaining
    why we do this, and it seems to me with a rapidly changing
    world that our military is not changing with it.
        I guess I would ask, can you tell the subcommittee what
    exactly are we sacrificing by now focusing more on readiness
    than Army modernization? Does the Army have the capability and
    force structure to confront our modern-day threats? Can you
    discuss some of the differences in force structure and
    capability between today's Army considering today's challenges,
    Russian aggression, Syria, et cetera, and the Army at the end
    of the Cold War? I guess hindsight being 20/20, what would we
    change? What should we be doing different? So----
        General McMaster. Sir, I thought I would maybe talk about
    our projections in the future and then turn it over to Joe and
    Mike who can talk more about----
        Senator Manchin. Okay.
        General McMaster.--today and the demands on the force
    today.
        What we see is--our organization is charged with thinking
    about future conflict, learning in a focused, sustained, and
    collaborative manner about the future under our Force 2025
    Maneuvers, analyzing what we are learning, and then
    implementing changes. To exactly your point, we cannot remain
    static----
        Senator Manchin. Right.
        General McMaster.--if the risks are increasing and the
    security environment is changing. What we have determined and
    what we believe is that the trend that has allowed smaller and
    smaller forces to have a greater and greater impact over larger
    areas on land is reversing. What allowed us to do that was air
    supremacy, the ability to project power onto land. That is
    increasingly challenged now.
        Our enemies are becoming more and more capable based on the
    technology transfer that General Williamson mentioned. They are
    moving into restrictive and urban terrain, and so it is very
    difficult to solve these complex land-based political human
    problems from standoff range or from offshore.
        We believe that the demand for capacity, scale of land
    forces is not only going up today, which Joe Anderson will talk
    to you about, but in the future is going to continue to go up.
    What we see, sir, are trends that indicate that our Army in the
    future risk being too small to secure the Nation.
        You asked for a couple historical examples. One example is
    after the end of the Cold War, 1994, we did the bottom-up
    review----
        Senator Manchin. Right.
        General McMaster.--to see what size the Army should be.
    Remember, the world at the time--I mean, the Soviet Union had
    broken apart, was not a military threat, the Chinese military
    was not modernized, North Korea was not a nuclear power, there
    was no terrorist proto-state in the greater Middle East, Iran
    was not the threat that it is today, and the bottom line number
    for the active Army at the time was 484,000. Now, the active
    force is going down to 450,000.
        Another example is during the height of the wars in
    Afghanistan and Iraq our Army had 170,000 soldiers deployed to
    both those conflicts. Of those, 53,000 were Reserve components,
    so 117,000 in an active Army of 570,000. You will recall that
    some of the statements made at the time were the Army is
    straining to the point of breaking. Now, to go down to an Army
    of 450 with increasing commitments that Joe is going to talk
    about, could we sustain 170,000 soldiers overseas for
    contingency, which is not really a historically high number for
    armed conflict? I think we could not do it, sir.
        I do believe that we are increasing risk for modernization
    as we are talking about here, but to your question, also, as we
    look to the future, increasing risk in terms of the size of the
    total Army going down to the 980 number.
        Joe can talk to you about how today we are having a harder
    and harder time for the smaller force to keep pace with
    increasing demand to deter conflict and to respond to and
    resolve crises overseas.
        General Anderson. The challenge, sir, as H.R. talks about,
    is how do you fill all the requirements? The COCOM [Combatant
    Command] demand is filled 64 percent by the Army, the emergent
    demand is 46 percent of the Army, and that is on the rise,
    while the COCOM demand is plateauing. But the problem with the
    emergent demand in Iraq, Europe, they become enduring. They do
    not become one-time-in like Liberia and out. They become
    enduring requirements.
        In an unclassified mode, though, here as we talk BCTs
    [Brigade Combat Teams] is the simplest formation to use for
    comparison. The bottom line----
        General McMaster. Brigade Combat Team.
        General Anderson.--Brigade Combat Team between North Korea,
    between Russia, between the homeland and the counterterrorism
    fight, that adds up to a 56 BCT requirement, and that is
    exactly what is in the inventory. I am talking that is both AC
    [Active Component] and Guard. Every single piece, every
    particular unit under the Defense Planning Guidance, deny,
    defeat, homeland, counterterrorism, there is the math.
        All that simultaneity, you have to assume that is the case,
    which is what the DPG [Defense Planning Guidance] tells you,
    the Defense Planning Guidance tells you. There is the
    inventory. That is the challenge we have just in sheer end
    strength, as H.R. gave you the 450 number, 335 in the Guard,
    195 in the Reserves. That is the math.
        Senator Manchin. General Murray, I know you wanted to----
        General Murray. No, sir, I was just going to try to answer
    the question you asked up front, and that is what do we
    sacrifice to pay for readiness in fiscal year 2017, and it is
    simple math. It is the aviation modernization that one of you
    talked about upfront, it is we will continue to delay repair of
    critical infrastructure on installations, which we have been
    doing for years, and our MILCON [Military Construction] budget
    is as low as it has been for a very, very long time. That is
    how we are paying for the upfront readiness. It is really in
    the aviation portfolio, it is the sustainment of facilities,
    and the MILCON account.
        Senator Manchin. I am sorry, my time is up.
        General Anderson. Senator, if I could just pile on real
    quick, the readiness of installation affects the training, one-
    station training, and that is also being underfunded.
        Senator Cotton. Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. You know, I just wish that the general
    public could hear what you have been saying. You know, one of
    the problems that we have is we have a lot of politicians out
    there talking about how we have the best-funded and the best-
    prepared talking about--the general public does not know the
    problem that we are having right now. We know. Everyone around
    this table knows, and it is disturbing.
        Again, I point the finger at a lot of people are just not--
    a lot of people do not realize--I often say I looked wistfully
    back at the days of the Cold War, you know. Things were
    predictable in those days. Now, we have people, crazy people,
    North Korea, with capabilities that I think are greater than
    our intelligence tells us they are. So, yes, we are in the
    greatest and most threatened position we have ever been in, in
    my view.
        General Williamson, you and I have talked before about this
    disastrous history of our ground fighting vehicles. Remember,
    going back--and I was actually in the House when this first--
    and speaking of how sometimes things are not projected
    properly, the last year I was in the House on the House Armed
    Services Committee, we had someone testifying before our
    committee saying that in 10 years we would no longer need
    ground troops.
        Now, you do not know what you are going to have to have in
    the future, but the chairman is right when he says we have got
    to prepare right now for those kids who are 10 years old
    because this is what--they are the ones who are going to be
    paying for what we are not doing right.
        But you remember very well, General Williamson, when we
    went into--they canceled the program after--I think it was an
    $11 billion program, the Crusader program, but they actually
    spent $2 billion on it. In 2002 they cut it. Normally, I like
    to blame Democrats but this was not the Democrats. This was--
    and in fact, it was so serious that J.C. Watts, a Congressman
    from Oklahoma, actually retired as a result of that he was so
    upset with that.
        Then, along came the Future Combat System, you know, the
    FCS. Yes, this is going to replace it and they started spending
    money on that, and we all know what happened. They stopped that
    program in 2009. Now, the closest thing we have is going along
    well now called the Paladin PIM [Palidan Integrated
    Management], the PIM program.
        Now, what I would like to extract from you, not that you
    could control uncontrollable things in the future, but that you
    would do everything in your power not to let that program have
    the same fate as the other two programs before that.
        As this happens, we are now dealing with things--sure, you
    have modernized some of these things. Some of these are World
    War II vehicles we are fighting with now. I would like to have
    you tell this committee, General Williamson, your evaluation of
    the PIM program, is it on track now, and your thoughts on that
    program.
        General Williamson. Senator, absolutely. My starting point
    would be some immediate history. I would tell you there are two
    programs on the combat vehicle side that I would tell you I
    think are outstanding programs. The first one would be Paladin
    PIM, and I would like to talk about that for a second. The
    other one would be JLTV [Joint Light Tacticle Vehicle].
        On Paladin PIM, as you alluded to, we made some decisions
    in terms of reprioritization, which left us with a critical
    gap, and what we were facing was really when you canceled the
    non-line-of-sight cannon, you ended up not having an ability to
    deliver fives. The investment that was made in the Paladin PIM
    program, I think, was significant because we were not only
    going to face that gap but we were really pushed up against
    obsolescence of existing systems.
        Today, that program, which went into production, low rate,
    we have produced 18 of those systems, both the support vehicle
    and the Paladin itself. We have delivered 12 of those, and we
    have six awaiting delivery. That program right now is in
    production qualification, and all that means is that they are
    being produced on the line and all we are doing is guaranteeing
    the performance, the reliability, the repeatable processes. To
    date, it has gone so well that we are now looking at awarding
    the full rate production contract so that that can take effect
    in 2017 where we will buy out the remainder, which is roughly
    500 plus systems.
        Sir, if you remember in the beginning of my opening
    statement we talked about some systems we buy new, some we have
    to modernized and modify, and this is an example where we have
    been successful in modernizing a system, bringing additional
    capability, and filling a gap for the Army.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay. That is a very optimistic answer. I
    appreciate that very much. I think you go on to say that you
    will continue to make sure that within your power nothing is
    going to come and deliver a fate to the PIM system.
        General Williamson. Yes, sir. In fact, what I would offer--
    and it goes back to Senator Manchin's comment. What I would
    argue today is that the Army is modernized. We are modern, and
    as you look at our 2017 budget request, it includes
    modernization. What really affects us is that we have to slow
    down modernization, so as priorities come up, whether it is
    readiness or something else, we end up stretching out or
    delaying modernization, which adds cost in the long run. Our
    goal is to never let that happen----
        Senator Inhofe. Good. Good.
        General Williamson.--deliver to a schedule and to reduce
    cost and find efficiencies where possible.
        Senator Inhofe. Well, good. I appreciate that. I know my
    time is expired, but let me just ask General Anderson if he
    would, for the record, respond. The reports show that some 250
    vehicles are going to be needed for this European program over
    there, and I would kind of like to see a breakdown as to what
    they are for the record.
        General Anderson. Sure. The breakdown----
        Senator Inhofe. Oh, I mean, you could answer in the record
    if you want to. I do not want to use up all the time.
        General Anderson. Okay. Okay.
        Senator Inhofe. Good.
        Senator Cotton. Senator Heinrich?
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman Cotton.
        General Anderson and General Murray, I want to sort of
    return to some of these tradeoffs that are being made between
    modernization and readiness and sort of tell the story of one
    particular facility and then talk more broadly and ask you
    about just how far we are taking those tradeoffs.
        Last year, our 47-year-old communications center and
    network hub that was built actually in 1962 at White Sands
    Missile Range caught fire, and the facility is still relied
    upon to provide critical support for modern missile testing.
    The near meltdown and fire on July 2 of 2015 nearly cascaded
    into a full of electrical fire. It is symptomatic of the stress
    that we are seeing on aging facilities and shortfalls in the
    Army's larger modernization efforts that go with these funding
    levels.
        Despite the urgency to replace that particular facility, a
    MILCON project--and you talked a little bit about how we have
    been underfunding MILCON--was not in this year's budget, nor is
    it planned to be requested by the Department until fiscal year
    2019.
        More broadly, I want to ask you, how are we making sure
    that Army test ranges are appropriately funded or at least not
    pushed, you know, beyond what we can bear and that modern
    infrastructure that is going to be necessary to meet the Army's
    acquisition requirements is being met? How are we working to
    make sure that the workforce behind that at our Army test
    ranges is being maintained as well?
        General Anderson. What I was specifically talking about,
    Senator, was the two parts of the installations, base
    operations sustainment and then sustainment restoration
    modernization, SRM and BOS. That is the stuff that has been
    critically underfunded across all installations. I cannot give
    the specifics of the test range typically running through
    installation. I just command about 50 percent for the last
    three years.
        The issue is how are you catching up and the test
    facilities would fall on the same category. MILCON, though, as
    you know, compete in a whole different----
        Senator Heinrich. Right.
        General Anderson.--pot----
        Senator Heinrich. Yes.
        General Anderson.--based on what the priorities are from
    the readiness projection platforms, two test facilities, two
    labs, et cetera. I would have to get back to you on how that
    was being broken out to compete----
        Senator Heinrich. Yes.
        General Anderson.--but this is the rolling reoccurring
    phenomenon we are dealing with now for the last three plus
    years underfunding in all these facilities and capabilities----
        Senator Heinrich. Right.
        General Anderson.--for a myriad of reasons.
        Senator Heinrich. I think that with MILCON in particular,
    even though we are definitely making tradeoffs, we tend to have
    a long-term plan that seems to be able to mitigate a lot of
    that risk. I would just bring up the issue of the question of,
    are we adequately sourcing and providing for infrastructure at
    our test ranges? Sometimes I think those particular issues do
    not get addressed the same way that some of our other bases and
    facilities do get addressed in the MILCON process.
        General Anderson. I would say the operating force, the guys
    that go and go do things, do get prioritized based on what
    installation you are talking about.
        Senator Heinrich. Great. That is great. I have got, General
    Williamson, a question that is a little different in that if
    you have been following some of the stories coming out of the
    IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], some of the stories
    in the open press regarding theft of nuclear materials, the
    IAEA recently warned the international community about this
    increased danger of potential nuclear incidents because we have
    seen theft and misuse of nuclear materials worldwide. We have
    seen some incidences in Mexico and Iraq.
        Such an incident at home or abroad would have real
    implications for servicemen and women who would have to respond
    who would be at risk for radiation exposure or something where
    they do have to respond to that. One of the things that I think
    is essential is that all of our soldiers have the most up-to-
    date dosimeter technology to be able to deal with something in
    the case that they had to detect and combat these sorts of
    threats.
        Is it true that the majority of the devices that we use to
    measure radiation exposure for our soldiers were developed back
    in the Cold War with 1960s technology and are lacking the
    ability to relay information the way that modern information is
    typically relayed quickly and precisely in a network sort of
    situation?
        General Williamson. Sir, you are correct. The technology
    that was employed in our existing systems--and specifically we
    have an ANPR 75 dosimeter, and that is what we use within the
    Guard, the Reserve, and the Active Duty forces. It is an
    effective system.
        But I would tell you that after the disaster in Japan, as
    we helped the Japanese Government, one of the things that we
    discovered was I will call it a gap. As you looked at the
    ability to read the response, what we found is that that was
    all kind of manual.
        Senator Heinrich. Right.
        General Williamson. The intent--what we learned there was
    we needed to automate that. We did a joint program. We are
    engaged with the Navy to build a new series of dosimeters. If
    you are familiar with within the Army we have something called
    the Nett Warrior, which takes advantage of commercial
    technologies----
        Senator Heinrich. Yes.
        General Williamson.--and it keeps you--it gives you
    situational awareness. The connection between this new
    dosimeter will be to automatically send those updates so that
    you can get some early warning and reduce the threat of
    exposure.
        Now, right now, that program, the path it is on right now
    will get you to the deployment of new systems in the 2020 time
    frame, and so there is still some development work that has to
    be done and testing, but we think we are on the right path for
    a better dosimeter.
        Senator Heinrich. I have exhausted my time so I will yield
    back, Mr. Chair.
        Senator Cotton. Senator Wicker?
        Senator Wicker. Thank you.
        Lieutenant General Williamson and Lieutenant General
    Murray, on page 11 of your joint statement it says under
    aviation ``The Army continues to invest at a slower pace in
    aviation.'' Let me ask you about the UH-72A Lakota. The Army's
    budget request did not include funding for the Army's only
    light utility class helicopter. However, the Army subsequently
    published an unfunded requirement for 17 Lakotas in fiscal year
    2017.
        When considering readiness as paramount, why did you not
    include any Lakotas in your base budget request? Should you
    lose your UH-72 production capability, what is the Army's long-
    term plan to replace and/or conduct major repair and overhaul
    of the Lakotas if there is attrition or loss due to unforeseen
    accidents down the road? Absent other budget considerations, do
    you support Congress funding at least 17 Lakotas in fiscal year
    2017?
        We will begin with Lieutenant General Williamson.
        General Williamson. Sir, from a broader perspective could I
    ask General Murray to start talking about the budget and the
    readiness implications and I can talk programmatic?
        Senator Wicker. That will be very helpful.
        General Murray. Thank you, Senator. There were none in 2017
    because we met our production requirement in 2016 of 427
    aircraft. As you are very familiar, we are using the Lakota in
    a variety of administrative roles and for pilot training. There
    was none in 2017. Basically because we bought what we needed.
        The 17 you are referring to in the UFR [Unfunded
    Requirements] list--it was mentioned earlier--is tied to the
    National Commission recommendations. If those recommendations
    were to be enacted, we require an additional 17 Lakotas at Fort
    Rucker for pilot training. That was to increase--that was to
    account for the increased pilot training load at Rucker based
    upon 72 aircraft, which equals four battalions retained in the
    National Guard in the 11th Cav that has been talked about. That
    is the additional 17 in the UFR request.
        General Williamson. The only thing I would add, sir, is
    that--so for all of our production, whether it is aviation or
    combat vehicles, we really have a test that takes a look at
    criticality and fragility. What is the impact if I slow down/
    increase our ability to produce those assets? Right now,
    because there are commercial variants, we are comfortable that
    we could support a smaller number of LUHs being procured this
    year.
        I would go back to something that General Murray said, and
    that is so you cannot do that year after year because what
    happens is, is that--if everyone focuses on the primes, but the
    reality is, is what I am concerned about is all of those small
    businesses that build parts, all of those other things that go
    into the final system, if I do not continue to buy certain
    critical platforms----
        Senator Wicker. Right.
        General Williamson.--we start to lose that portion of the
    industrial base. It has to be a consideration. I am seeing it
    on combat vehicles, I am seeing it in other areas that we have
    to make sure we understand all of the components and who
    manufactures those.
        Senator Wicker. Okay. Well, let me say I am glad that you
    made the last point about the industrial base. I know that it
    has been the position of the Army with regard to other
    important assets that maintaining the industrial base is a
    critical part of that. It gives me some encouragement to hear
    your last statement, and I appreciate that. I hope you will
    continue to work with us on this important issue.
        General Williamson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you.
        Senator Cotton. Senator Donnelly?
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
    all of the witnesses for being here with us today.
        General Williamson, it is good to see you again. With or
    without JLTV coming online, I have been told that the Army
    plans to rely on Humvees to comprise the majority of its
    tactical vehicle fleet for decades to come. Is that accurate?
        General Williamson. That is correct, sir. It is part of our
    light tactical vehicle strategy.
        Senator Donnelly. Knowing that we will continue to rely on
    Humvees for another 20 to 30 years, would you agree we need to
    make appropriate investments to sustain and modernize our
    Humvee fleet, placing priority on those areas that are most
    critical to the safety of our soldiers?
        General Williamson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Donnelly. Okay. It has come to my attention that
    the average age of the Humvee ambulance fleet is more than 24
    years, 10 years older than the average of all other Humvee
    variants and more than a decade beyond the point at which these
    vehicles are expected to go without major overhaul.
        While we are working to modernize the Humvee ambulances for
    the Army National Guard, there has not yet been any investment
    like that for the regular Army. Does that concern you or is
    there any plan for that?
        General Williamson. Sir, I am going to have to give you two
    answers.
        Senator Donnelly. Okay.
        General Williamson. One--I would defer to General Murray to
    talk broader in terms of the modernization strategy, but what I
    would offer is that--and I think, sir, in part with your
    leadership, the investment that we have been able to make on
    upgrading existing Humvees within the Guard and Reserve, it has
    been a significant investment for us. I could kind of show you
    the numbers of platforms that we have been able to address. We
    still have more in the future.
        I think what you will find, though, is that the mix between
    the Humvee fleet, the projected JLTV fleet, and then what you
    are going to see with the introduction of the AMPV [Armored
    Multi Purpose Vehicle] gives me a little less concern that we
    will not have that kind of capability gap as you look into the
    future. I ask General Murray if he has any comment.
        General Murray. The only thing I would add to what General
    Williamson said, sir, is add in the MRAP [Mine Resistant Ambush
    Protected] ambulance variant that we still have in the Army in
    quite a few numbers.
        As we look at, you know, at the Brigade Combat Team forward
    level, we are really looking at track solution in terms of
    medical capability, and then really what you are talking about
    is from the BCT back. You are absolutely right; we have not
    figured out exactly what that capability will look like. We
    have several options. MRAP ambulance is one, recapping in the
    AC, and we appreciate the support of Congress with the National
    Guard in terms of their recap for their ambulance or a track
    variant, and that is what we are working through right now.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you. Generally Williamson, you and
    I have spoken in the past about the Army's assessment that the
    tank transmission industrial base is particularly fragile and a
    critical area to maintain our track vehicle capabilities.
        On a related note, it is my understanding that if the Army
    fields a new armored Brigade Combat Team in Europe, this unit
    will require modernized Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting
    vehicles that are not currently funded. Can you tell us what
    those requirements are and what you require in fiscal year 2017
    to begin this effort?
        General Williamson. Sir, I cannot talk to the specific
    numbers as the G-3 works their way through. I would like to
    address specifically your comment about transmissions both for
    Abrams and Bradleys. I will admit that I am concerned because,
    as a nation, we have gotten to the point where we have really
    one manufacturer of transmissions for our heavy combat
    vehicles.
        Now, I acknowledge that there are people who build
    transmissions, but it is different when you are putting it in a
    combat vehicle that weighs 45 tons or 70 or 80 tons. We are
    engaged with that manufacturer to ensure that we have, one,
    enough workload to ensure that we keep not only the skill sets
    employed but that we also have transmissions to support whether
    it is this deployment in Europe or whether it is to sustain our
    existing platforms.
        Senator Donnelly. Well, I would like to stay in close
    contact with you on this subject because, particularly in this
    area we think in Indiana we have some extraordinary
    transmission capability and the ability to make this mission
    more successful.
        General Williamson. Sir, I will do that. Again, I really do
    appreciate your engagement. This challenge for us on
    transmissions is really reflective of how we have to look at
    the entire industrial base in terms of support to our critical
    assets. Transmissions is one that we will continue to stay
    engaged on.
        Senator Donnelly. Well, thank you all for making sure that
    our soldiers are safe, that they get to come home to their
    families. Your hard work helps to make that possible every day.
    Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cotton. Senator Ernst?
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Gentlemen, thank you
    for joining us here today.
        I am going to tag on just something from what Senator
    Donnelly said, and there has been a lot of discussion about the
    ground combat vehicle program so I will not belabor it, but we
    have a situation right now as well with the Marines where they
    are short amphibious vehicles. We certainly do not want to see
    that gap increase with our war fighters in the Army as well. I
    do want to encourage you to keep working on this issue, and we
    will certainly follow up at a later date with that as well.
        But I would like to go back to small arms modernization.
    This has been kind of a point of issue for me. In the NDAA
    [National Defense Authorization Act] fiscal year 2016 the Army
    and Marine Corps was required to jointly develop a 15-year
    small arms modernization plan. General McMaster, if you can
    address this and just maybe give us the status of the plan.
        The Army is really--we have gone ahead--we have really
    moved ahead with respect to modernization of our battle rifle.
    We have added objects to them, different types of scopes. We
    have added other attachments for the M4 components, floating
    barrels, you know, a longer rail, but these are things that
    have been in the DOD's inventory for quite a while. Our special
    ops folks have used those for many, many years. Is that really
    weapons modernization? You know, if you could just give us an
    update there.
        General McMaster. Yes, ma'am. I know you are familiar with
    all the upgrades that have happened to the various weapons
    systems. You already sort of summarized those. I mean, I think
    it is 90-some upgrades to the old--you know, the M4 today
    versus how it was, you know, 15 years ago or something like
    that.
        The weapons have improved tremendously, but as you know, it
    is a combination of--and you already alluded to this as well--
    the optics, the weapon, the ammunition, and the training. There
    have been tremendous improvements across all of those areas.
        But what we are doing now as we look for future force
    development and we are working very closely with the Marine
    Corps Combat Development Command on this as well. It is called
    the Caliber and Configuration study because what you do not
    want is just sub-optimized for an individual soldier. Soldiers
    fight together as teams obviously so you want the squad, upon
    contact with the enemy, to be able to overmatch the enemy in
    close combat. We are looking at what are the configurations of
    calibers and types of weapons systems for small arms, crew-
    served weapons, but then also long-range capability and
    shoulder-fire capability.
        That study will be done by the second quarter of fiscal
    year 2017, and that will help us layout the--finalize the
    requirements and then begin to procure or to pursue the
    capabilities associated with how we see the future of squad
    fighting.
        Senator Ernst. Okay.
        General McMaster. There are some new technologies that are
    very promising, light-weight technologies, closed-bolt
    technologies, for example, for automatic weapons systems. We
    have an opportunity, I think, now to integrate a lot of these
    new technologies into the future squad.
        Senator Ernst. Well, I think it is important that we
    remember we have a lot of modernized weapons that will go into
    the special ops community. That is great. They utilize those
    weapons, and they appreciate the advanced features of those
    weapons. Why are we not able to push those out then to our guys
    in the BCTs? You know, Specialist Joe Snuffy would probably
    love to have a rifle that is, you know, being utilized in
    special ops.
        I think they are great. They utilize the technology that
    they have, and why do we not follow through with that and make
    sure other infantry soldiers on the ground are provided with
    those same advantages. That is something to look at.
        As well if we look at, you know, the pistols that we use,
    when is the last time that we upgraded with the pistols? This
    has been a real big issue. It has been bungled, I think, with
    the request for proposals and so forth. General Milley recently
    said you give me $17 million on a credit card and I will call
    Cabela's tonight and I will outfit every soldier, sailor,
    airman, and marine with a pistol for $17 million and I will get
    a discount on a bulk buy, you know, great for General Milley. I
    appreciate him being forthright.
        Why is it so difficult--and this is for General Williamson
    and General Murray--why is it so difficult for the Army to buy
    a basic item like a pistol?
        General Anderson. I agree.
        General Murray. I will start. I would like to be part of
    the deal with General Milley if he can get that many pistols at
    $17 million.
        But, ma'am, to be honest with you, I agree. I mean, we had
    been down a torturous path on this. I think we all know the
    history of it, and General Milley has been very eloquent about
    talking about it.
        But I would just tell you and hope it is reassuring that,
    Senator Cotton, your letter and the authorities given to
    General Milley in NDAA 2016, I will guarantee you he is
    involved in the testing, the requirements, concurrent with the
    source selection when we get to that point, and every intimate
    detail. I mean, General Anderson and I have sat several very
    painful, long meetings with him in the last week or two as we
    dug into how we got to where we are, how we fix this. I think
    you are going to see a pretty good outcome coming out of it.
        Senator Ernst. Okay. Well, I appreciate it. My time is
    expired.
        Gentlemen, I do not mean to make light of this situation,
    and I know General Milley takes this very seriously, but I
    think it really gets to the basic root of the problem that we
    have made this so complicated when it should not be.
        General Murray. Ma'am, if I could add one thing. Special
    ops soldiers in Afghanistan--which I was there 9 months ago--
    are carrying the same rifle that our soldiers and infantry
    squads are carrying. They are carrying the M4A1.
        Senator Ernst. Okay. Fantastic. Thank you very much.
        Senator Cotton. I am astonished that a meeting with Mark
    Milley could be painful.
        Senator Gillibrand?
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Williamson, I understand the Army was required to
    make tough choices for the coming fiscal year, and one of the
    toughest was the decision to cut the funding for the UH-60
    Black Hawk program. Several of my colleagues and I have asked
    the relevant committees to consider the plan to significantly
    scale back on procurement and recapitalization for the
    aircraft.
        If the Army's aviation budget were to be implemented as
    requested in the President's budget, what in your view would be
    the operational impact on units that rely on capabilities
    provided by the Black Hawk? Given the decision to essentially
    swap out the Army National Guard's Apache fleet in exchange for
    more Black Hawks, do you think that impact will be felt
    particularly strongly in that component?
        General Williamson. Ma'am, as the technician sitting at the
    table, I can talk to the programmatic impacts in terms of we
    have negotiated a multiyear contract for the procurement. One
    thing I can tell you that the Army worked hard to make sure
    that even though we had to slow modernization down, we did not
    want to break that multiyear and lose the savings associated
    with it.
        I would ask General Anderson or General Murray to talk
    about the operational impacts.
        General Anderson. As you know, ma'am, the ARI program kind
    of locked in concrete and gave us a way ahead in terms of who
    had to transfer non-NFCA-related or just who had to transfer
    what to maintain the base to pure fleet, divest the Kiowa
    fleet, and make sure we had the appropriate mix between all
    versions from the 64s, to the Black Hawks, to the Chinooks and
    then how we do the unmanned team to make sure our shadows link
    in our Apaches and help us with aerial reconnaissance.
        The plans--everything laid out by that plan is being
    followed through. All transfers are occurring on--this is
    multi-compo issue referred to. All the pieces from the active
    transfers to the Guard, the 60s that are coming out of 1st AD
    Cav and everything going for Drum and Schofield are all on
    progress, are all on time, and so far operationally. But as you
    know, the other components at 11th Cav, we are trying to build
    from the National Commission for Korea to help reduce that
    rotational burn on that peninsula to maintain our three-to-one
    ratio for all of our requirements.
        General Murray. Ma'am, I would just add that out of--the
    Black Hawks were supposed to transfer to the Guard as part of
    the original ARI plan. We are four short right now. Those four
    will be done in June and so we will be complete on that. We are
    still on track to take the last UH-60 Alpha out of the National
    Guard in 2023, the last one out of the active component in
    2025.
        I have seen a lot of numbers about, you know, the
    differences in Black Hawk production, and that was really from
    2016 enacted to the budget request you saw for 2017. We had
    actually planned for less production in 2017 based upon
    requirements.
        The operational piece, I mean, the aircraft are there. They
    are older, but we do not see an operational impact based on
    that because we intend to account for some of that reduction in
    production 2018 and out as we build those budgets, assuming
    that we are not back to sequestration level in 2018.
        Senator Gillibrand. Okay. Another topic, in your joint
    statement recognize the threat posed to our forces in the
    electromagnetic domain, particularly from military rivals with
    near-peer capabilities, for deployed Army forces like those
    stationed on the Korean and Arabian peninsulas, and Eastern
    Europe may be particularly exposed to some of these
    capabilities. Examples of electronic warfare could range from
    spoofing the unit's geolocation to blocking tactical-level
    communications between command and maneuvering units.
        At the appropriate level of classification, can you discuss
    how the Army is orienting itself to the rapidly deployed
    electronic warfare capabilities of certain competitor states?
    In your view, do you believe the Army is identifying and
    fielding new electronic warfare technologies adequately enough
    to keep us up with the rate of change in the operational
    environment?
        General Anderson. Yes, ma'am. We have got a couple of
    things in the works. I think you are familiar with CREW
    [Counter Radio Electronic Warfare], which is the Counter
    Remote. That is the first evolution. That is the 32,000
    platforms that are out there. We do have this new
    multifunctional electronic warfare platform coming along, and
    that is a next-generation requirement. It has both an air and a
    ground component. But right now the CSARs, which is the C-12
    version, does the jamming in the air, and the GATR is a ground
    jammer.
        It is the million-dollar question, how do we make sure the
    technology we produce, the quantity we get out there in
    sufficient scale, you know, but the CREW has been very
    effective as the first whack, but now, again, as we watch what
    is happening--what Russia is doing, we will see what North
    Korea is doing, the question becomes getting the
    multifunctional one further along faster to keep up.
        Senator Gillibrand. Anyone else?
        General McMaster. Yes, I would say, as we look to the
    future, we are not keeping pace with the cyber electromagnetic
    threat. We need to catch up to it. I think it is been a real
    wake-up call, ma'am, in terms of what is going on in Ukraine
    and really not that sophisticated capabilities, and now they
    can challenge our systems.
        What we are doing in the next two months is we have
    convened a team of experts to figure out what can we do now.
    This is again, this relates to the modernization budget. Again,
    our research and development budget has been reduced about 54
    percent since 2008, so we do not have the flexibility we might
    like to have to be able to pile onto these sort of problem
    sets. But this is something obviously we can work with the
    joint community.
        The problem is we rely--we made the assumption several
    years ago that we would be able to achieve and maintain air
    supremacy, and what we have seen an Ukraine is that Russia,
    with its tiered-air defense capability, is not allowing--would
    not allow our systems maybe even--to fly in a scenario. We have
    to regain our competency and our capability of terrestrial-
    based electronic workfare, signal intelligence capabilities.
    That is one aspect of it.
        The other aspect, though, is mission assurance for us, as
    you already mentioned, the threat to precision navigation and
    timing. How do we assure our own systems can degrade gracefully
    and operate in a contested and congested cyber electromagnetic
    environment? We have a short-term effort that I mentioned. Joe
    Anderson mentioned some of the long-term capabilities we are
    trying to develop. But what we have seen broadly here is that
    we cannot rely on maintaining dominance in any domain, and we
    need synergistic capabilities across each of our services so we
    can fight together as a team and pose the enemy with multiple
    dilemmas and ensure we can protect our own ability to operate.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Thank you.
        Senator Cotton. Senator Manchin has another obligation, but
    one more question, so I will turn to him for that question.
        Senator Manchin. I am so sorry. Thank you for the
    consideration.
        By fiscal year 2018 the Army projects its end-strength
    levels to be at 980,000 uniformed personnel; 450,000 to be
    regular Army; 335, Army National Guard; and 195, Army Reserve.
    With all of the new challenges that we have around the world,
    emerging threats and this and that, I guess just cut to the
    quick, is the Army able to meet the security needs of the
    United States with those figures? What do we need to do to
    change that so that we can meet the needs?
        General Anderson. Thanks, sir. I think, as you heard our
    chief testify a while ago, we are at high risk to do that. As I
    rambled earlier about all the plans we have to be prepared to
    defend against, the issue becomes again how do you sustain and
    how do you build combat capabilities. We talked about it takes
    about three years to get a brigade built, but how would you be
    able to sustain the operations I described earlier?
        Again, the best categorization we use or the numbers we are
    going to now are minimally sufficient. But as the chief risk
    assessment to the chairman, it is a high risk for us to support
    things around the globe.
        Senator Manchin. General, the only thing I would say is if,
    you know, if we do not listen to the people that have the
    knowledge such as you on the expertise and we start setting
    caps and different things that basically sound politically
    correct and we can sell them back home, it makes no sense at
    all because when things go to hell in a hand basket, people
    want to make sure we are protecting them.
        I will use basically Afghanistan. You know, how do we get
    to caps of 10? Was that something was right--you know, I am
    sure that there was--and I am not going to put anybody on the
    spot there, but if I am correct, I think that figure was closer
    to be like 13, 13-5, 13-6, so we did not repeat the sins of the
    past as Iraq. But we did not adhere to that.
        I think we are to the point now we want to cut through the
    chafe and get the numbers and see if this committee and this
    subcommittee can work towards getting you the strength that is
    needed.
        General?
        General McMaster. As we look to the future, sir, we think
    that risk will become unacceptable to national security in
    terms of the size of the force, and it is because of what we
    have mentioned. We have been able to have smaller forces have
    bigger impact----
        Senator Manchin. Right.
        General McMaster.--because we were not as challenged in the
    cyber electromagnetic domain, in the aerospace domains. We see
    the demand for land forces going up to do the things you have
    always wanted land forces to do, to defeat enemy organizations,
    but to establish control of territory, which is what all these
    conflicts are about today.
        But then what is really critical is to regard the
    consolidation of military gains politically as an inherent part
    of conflict. When we try to solve complex land-based problems
    exclusively from standoff range, you get a situation like we
    have seen in places like Libya, for example, where you cannot
    consolidate those gains.
        I think the two big implications for land force as we look
    to the future is the consolidation of gains, as I mentioned, as
    an integral part of conflict, and the second of these is the
    importance of land forces to deter enemies and to deter enemies
    not by the threat of punitive action later but by having the
    demonstrated capability to deny the enemy their objectives,
    deterrence by denial.
        These are--as we look to the future and we see the ships
    that have happened quite recently in the geopolitical landscape
    where we see this probing by China, by Russia, I think you make
    the argument by Iran at the frontiers of American power, and as
    these revisionist powers are trying to advance their interests
    at the expense of U.S. interests, it is very important to have
    land forces as a credible deterrent against a revisionist power
    waging the sort of limited wars for limited objectives.
        Senator Manchin. But 980, I am just saying, is there a
    number? Is it going to be 1-1, 1-2, 1-3? Where do we need to be
    as far as our personnel?
        General McMaster. Yes, sir. Sir, we----
        Senator Manchin. Three years out, you know, knowing we have
    emerging threats. I know that is a tough one.
        General McMaster. Sir, I think--I mean, as we look to the
    future that if you look at the--as I mentioned, 484,000 in 1994
    when the world was a much safer place, and I would say we are
    going to 34,000 less in the active force now, that the number
    is, I think, in the future is going to be much larger.
        The thing is, I think, from your perspective as well--not
    to be presumptuous about this--but it is much easier to retain
    a capability than to have to rebuild it. It is much easier to
    maintain a deterrent than to have to rebuild a deterrent
    capability and capacity once it is gone.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cotton. Senator Rounds?
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank
    you all for your service. It is appreciated and sometimes we do
    not say it enough, but we appreciate what you do.
        I am going to follow up a little bit on what Senator
    Manchin was working on. Just at the end of my time I would like
    to lay this out for you over the next few minutes. If you
    could, please, if there are just a few items that we as
    policymakers are either doing or that we should not do that
    would be helpful to you in you carrying out your mission, would
    you just--at the end of this would you give us the one or two
    things that you think would be helpful to you in your job,
    okay?
        But let me begin by this: It seems that an important
    consideration of the Army's modernization effort is its cyber
    capabilities. I understand that the Army is undertaking a
    number of significant initiatives in this regard. These include
    the creation of 11 Cyber Protection Brigades in the National
    Guard, a Cyber Center of Excellence at Fort Gordon, Georgia,
    and a separate cyber branch for offices in the same level in
    the Army as other branches.
        Could you share with me a little bit, what is the current
    state of play for these initiatives, and are you seeing any
    problems recruiting and retaining the cyber workforce, both
    military and civilian?
        General Anderson. Yes, sir, thanks. We are building a COMPO
    41--the cyber mission force, active component is 41 teams, 20
    of which are Cyber Protection Teams and the other 20 are Cyber
    Maneuver Teams. The Reserves are building 10 teams, CPTs, and
    the Guard is building 11 teams, sir, CPTs.
        The issue is the timeline, very extensive training. I think
    one of your concerns was the Guard piece. Selecting these folks
    and making sure they can pass all the prerequisites to get to
    the program remain a challenge for both COMPOs. The length of
    training it takes, we are not going to be all fully
    operational, capable until the end of 2018, fiscal year 2018,
    so it is a very long pipeline for the 2017 to build that force.
        The good news is, as you referenced Gordon, the Cyber
    Center of Excellence, great programs, and the synergy they get
    between being co-located with the NSA [National Security
    Agency] makes it very powerful from an operational perspective.
        But twice a year now, EW [Electronic Warfare] cyber,
    heavily focused NTC [National Training Center] rotation January
    and June. Every rotation has a red team and then the hardest
    challenge we are having now is how do you operationalize cyber
    down at the tactical level? How do you help commanders figure
    out how they can shoot things like unmanned aerial systems down
    with these cyber guns? I mean, the technologies are out there,
    the capabilities are out there, but how do we get those deeper
    in our formations than what we have currently now from the
    teams that operate here at Fort Meade and the teams down at the
    Cyber Protection Brigade down at Fort Gordon?
        But it has come a long way, and the Army is now the
    executive agent for the Department of Defense on cyber
    offensive ranges. We are very defensively focused. Now, we are
    working that capability at the Joint Readiness Training Center
    and how that enables skill sets in that function down at Fort
    Polk, so some pretty good things.
        Senator Rounds. I understand that some of the individuals
    and the competencies that you begin with and the built-ins that
    we have got in some cases you may find the competencies that
    you want in some unusual places.
        General Anderson. Right.
        Senator Rounds. In doing so, that it may not fit
    necessarily the traditional individual that you would expect to
    be the next young person you would recruit into the Army. I am
    just curious. What are the challenges in finding the talent
    that it takes with regard to cybersecurity, and how do you
    approach that differently, if you do, than what you what in
    terms of looking for the right people that you would normally
    find in the Army today?
        General Anderson. The problem is they are another one of
    these low-density enabler categories. You are typically robbing
    Peter to pay Paul. For example, the forensic CID [Criminal
    Investigative Division] agents that do all--that can dig into
    computers and find all the stuff in there to figure out what
    you did, we have taken guys like that and brought them into
    cyber, and then you have this criminal investigation command
    complaining because we have taken their high technical experts.
        The problem is, sir, it is competing resources between a
    very limited gene pool. How you recruit, so like the Army Cyber
    Institute that the military academy does and now that we
    actually have an officer commissioning source that actually
    screens those kind of students you are talking about and
    figures out which ones are the better ones to be vectored into
    this highly technical field, that is starting to be one of our
    feeders.
        But it is going to take us a generation to build a
    capability from, you know, the officers that lead the teams to
    the warrants. The warrants, as you can well imagine, are very
    experienced, and the NCOs [Non Commissioned Officers] are
    typically coming out of the intel pool. You are typically
    grabbing intel analyst-type people, and that is the guys and
    gals you see on these teams. It is a nut-and-shell game until
    we get more capacity.
        Senator Rounds. Well, my time is just about up, but with
    the chairman's indulgence, I would just really like to know is
    there something out there, gentlemen, that we can do as
    policymakers that we are not doing or things that you would
    like to share with us that you would like us to do?
        General Anderson. Long-term, predictable, sustainable
    funding.
        General Murray. I would just echo that, sir. I mean, the
    inability to plan budgets year-to-year based upon threat of
    sequestration, continuing resolutions, that really makes, from
    my perspective, the most difficult thing.
        General McMaster. I would say, sir, just recognizing the
    synergy of the joint force and recognizing that investments to
    ensure that we can overmatch the enemy in close combat is as
    important to the investments that we make in the maritime and
    aerospace domains.
        General Williamson. Sir, I would just echo the stability in
    funding, but what I would add is this notion of risk. If you
    want to operate in an environment where we are leading and
    causing our potential adversaries to react to us, it means you
    have to be able to take some risk. That is risk on the science
    and technology, and that is risk in terms of modernization. How
    do we find those things and have the agility and the ability to
    incorporate them very quickly that causes the enemy to have to
    react to us as opposed to us waiting to find out a new
    capability that the enemy has and forcing us to react?
        Senator Rounds. Thank you for your service, gentlemen.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cotton. Senator Sullivan?
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, good to see you all again. I want to go back to
    Senator Manchin's questions about end strength and, you know,
    General McMaster, you mentioned that we could be approaching a
    point at which this is unacceptable, the risk level. But it
    seems to me it is a pretty dramatic statement that the chief
    and the senior leadership in the Army is saying that we are at
    a high risk. I do not know how many other service chiefs or how
    often the Army chief of staff has previously said high risk.
        If you look at just the recent testimony of Secretary
    Carter and General Dunford in front of the SCAS [Senate
    Committee on Armed Services], they all talked about these
    emerging threat environments, all of which have increased. If
    there is one common theme that we have heard in the last year
    is how much the threat environment globally has increased. Yet,
    the glide path to 450 has been straight down.
        There is a number of us--I think it is a bipartisan sense
    that 450 Active Duty force is unacceptable risk. Again, General
    McMaster, you said high risk. You said it is getting to
    unacceptable. My view is high risk from the senior Army
    leadership when they are saying that that is unacceptable risk.
    Do you all agree that 450 then is high risk for the country?
        General Murray. If I could, sir, and just in terms of the--
    so it is high military risk is what General Milley said, and
    then he specified that that does not apply to enemies like ISIL
    or the Taliban, the enemies we are currently fighting right
    now. That is high military risk against the near-peer----
        Senator Sullivan. Correct.
        General Murray.--state-type actors. I absolutely agree with
    the high military risk categorization.
        Senator Sullivan. Do you think that--so I would assume
    since General Milley thinks it is high risk, that all four of
    you would agree. Do you think that is unacceptable risk?
        General McMaster. Well, sir, from my personal opinion it
    is. I think that it is unacceptable risk because of a
    combination of factors. This is not a criticism of policy to
    say that it is time to make a reassessment.
        I think you have already recognized, and I think we all
    recognize, that the threats to national and international
    security are increasing. Many of those threats are
    interconnected. It is impossible to remain insulated from a lot
    of these threats.
        As you mentioned, our Army is going to a historic low. In
    terms of active force strengths, the smallest it has been since
    before World War II. We have not been modernized. We did spend
    a lot of money for Iraq and Afghanistan against those enemies,
    but it is not the kind of modernization we will need to fight
    the threats that we see emerging.
        In the recent CSIS [Center for Strategic and International
    Studies] report, they called this, you know, the triple whammy,
    you know, of really, first of all, taking a huge cut that is
    bigger than previous cuts in a postwar period. By the way, it
    is--I am not sure--I do not think it is a postwar period. I
    mean, we are still obviously fighting in Afghanistan and in
    Iraq and across the greater Middle East.
        But the second point is that this previous draw-downs that
    happened after the Cold War, after Vietnam, happened after the
    Army had been modernized considerably. The old Big Five had
    been largely bought out before the end of the Cold War. We have
    not done that, so we are not recently modernized, plus we have
    a big cut.
        The third thing is that the RDT&E [Research Development
    Testing & Evaluation] money has also taken a cut that is at a
    historic high as well. I think the threat is--I think primarily
    the thing that I would personally be most concerned about is
    the size of the total force, but it is that in combination with
    the modernization of resources.
        Senator Sullivan. That is a great answer. Again, I think
    there is a lot of agreement on this committee that 450 is an
    unacceptable risk, and I think a number of us are going to
    start to work to try and reverse that.
        Let me ask just two quick questions. One is kind of
    operational, one is much more strategic. You know, General
    McMaster, you talked about how long it takes to actually stand
    up a unit once you have cut it. How long does it take to stand
    up an airborne unit once you have gotten rid of it?
        I was recently down at JRTC [Joint Readiness Training
    Center] and watched one of our finer airborne BCTs [Brigade
    Combat Team] do their initial forced entry operation, over 800
    soldiers, middle of the night jumping into an airfield, pretty
    awesome instrument of American military power. You cannot grow
    that overnight. How long, if you got rid of an airborne BCT,
    would it take to regenerate that kind of expertise in
    capability?
        General Murray. Sir, we do not have experience rebuilding,
    but, I mean, we do have experience in terms of an Armored
    Brigade Combat Team recently when we grew the Army. When we
    grew the Army to 45 BCTs. We only really grew from scratch one
    BCT, and it was an armored not an airborne, and that was a 31-
    month ordeal to grow a BCT, so somewhere in that order of
    magnitude.
        I would just like to clarify one thing that may have come
    off differently. When we collectively say high military risk
    and individually said high military risk, whether that is
    unacceptable or not it is not our position to----
        Senator Sullivan. No, I got that. I said it was
    unacceptable.
        General Murray. Okay.
        Senator Sullivan. I know you did not say that. At a certain
    point I would imagine you would all agree that it is
    unacceptable. I know you did not say that today. I said that
    today, though. Yes, sir?
        General Murray. I mean, all I am saying is basically we are
    happy to identify the risk and then, you know, it is up to our
    civilian leadership to determine whether that is acceptable or
    unacceptable.
        Senator Sullivan. Hearing that the uniformed military
    leadership of the U.S. Army says high risk at 450, in my view
    from this committee's perspective is unacceptable risk.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Anderson. Sir, can I make one comment, though? An
    Airborne Brigade Combat Team is much more lethal effective than
    an Armored Brigade Combat Team, so chances are it is probably
    about 6 years to build one.
        Senator Sullivan. That is what I was thinking as well, but
    I did not say that.
        General Anderson. I knew you would.
        Senator Cotton. Especially if it is based in Alaska
    according to the father protector of the 4th through the 25th.
        Senator Sullivan. Probably the most important Airborne BCT
    in the entire U.S. Army, but we can debate that another time.
        Senator Cotton. General McMaster, to build upon Senator
    Sullivan's comments about 450,000 being an unacceptable risk in
    terms of end strength, there are some ideas in this Congress to
    mandate a higher level than that, say 480, 490, what have you.
    What would be the implications if Congress took that step but
    did not increase funding any?
        General McMaster. Sir, from a historical perspective and
    then, you know, they could answer that from a--it would be
    disastrous in terms of Army readiness. It would be disastrous
    in terms of really--it could be--talking about unacceptable
    risk, it could result in very high risk to not only the mission
    but to soldiers who would not be prepared for combat because
    they have not had the proper training work or could be
    overmatched by an enemy because they had rudimentary equipment.
        As you know, there are a lot of big armies in the world.
    There are some big armies in the world, and many of those
    armies I would welcome--I mean, I would not be really fearful
    of engaging them in close combat because they are not
    sufficiently modernized. They do not have the kind of training
    and leaders necessary to be effective.
        Sir, I would say that really what is necessary for an army
    is to have the balance that Joe Murray talked about earlier.
        General Murray. Chairman Cotton, so the Army will never
    give up the readiness of its formation. If you increase the
    number of soldiers without an increase in top line, we will
    ensure the readiness of our soldiers. What you will do is
    modernization will take another hit.
        At this point, I mean, we cannot stretch out things much
    more than we have. We would have to go in and start canceling
    programs like we do not want to do and slowing down production
    across probably every portfolio to the minimum sustainment
    rate. I mean, so we would further decrement installations,
    MILCON, and modernization to make sure that higher force level
    was trained and ready.
        Senator Cotton. Mandating a higher end-strength without
    increasing funding would mean a hollow force unless you
    borrowed more money from modernization to pay for readiness,
    therefore, further undermining the modernization-readiness
    balance we discussed earlier?
        General Murray. It makes the problem we have right now even
    worse.
        Senator Cotton. General McMaster, roughly how much does it
    cost for, say, 10,000 troops?
        General McMaster. I want to ask Joe Murray about this, but
    the rough figure is typically $1 billion for every 10,000
    soldiers. I think sometimes that--I mean, that sounds like a
    lot. Obviously, it is a lot. But I think when you compare that
    to some of the higher-ticket weapons systems and so forth, you
    know, really what the Army is is soldiers, right, and so that
    is really what gives us the capacity that we need to help
    defend our nation.
        Senator Cotton. Before this Congress considers moving
    forward with mandates on end strength, we need to consider how
    we might pay for that to ensure both readiness and
    modernization.
        Senator Blumenthal?
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I am very concerned about the level of procurement of Black
    Hawks, which have been serving the United States Army for more
    than 35 years, as you observe in your testimonies, the
    workhorse of the Army's aviation force, and it is not only used
    by us, America, not only by you, by our services, but by our
    partner nations across the globe. There have been continuous
    modifications to modernize it, to make it more capable, and to
    implement technology and capacity and efficiency that make it
    increasingly valuable.
        I am very, very concerned that the level of request for the
    fiscal year 2017 budget is inadequate. In fact, I have written
    a letter joined by 13 of my colleagues and 21 Representatives
    expressing concern regarding the need for additional Black
    Hawks in the fiscal year 2017 budget.
        Right now, my understanding is that the requested level is
    36, which is substantially below the projection of last year,
    24 below last year, roughly half of what the Army itself seems
    to believe is necessary to continue with modernizing and
    keeping capable our aviation capability.
        I invite you to comment on the--I ask you to comment on the
    level of the procurement request in the fiscal year 2017 budget
    and focus particularly on how we are raising the cost per unit
    if we lowered the level of procurement and how we may lose the
    defense industrial base that produces these helicopters,
    specifically, the men and women who are highly skilled and
    efficient who may leave because they are in fact laid off,
    particularly in light of the drop-off in commercial production.
    As you know, the commercial side of this industry is very
    challenged at the moment.
        You know this subject better than I. I have suggested some
    questions, and I invite any or all of you to comment.
        General Murray. I will start off, and I am sure General
    Williamson can answer, sir. So--and I am sure General
    Williamson will say this. We did not violate the multiyear
    contract. When we took it down to--and your number is correct;
    36 is in the budget of Black Hawks. That is in accordance with
    the multiyear, and that applies to the Apache and the Chinook
    as well. We will maintain the multiyear contract, maintain the
    workforce.
        You are also correct, a difference of 24 between what was
    enacted in 2016 and what you saw in the best request. When we
    built the 2017 budget before the BBA [Bipartisan Budget
    Agreement] hit and we understood what our top line was going to
    be, we had actually planned to reduce it to 50, so it is
    actually 14 between what we planned and what we put into the
    budget request based upon the BBA.
        It is going to have an impact, but fundamentally, to pay
    for the increase in readiness that the chief's number one
    priority is the near-term readiness, we had to go someplace to
    find that money. It is about a five percent cut in procurement,
    about a five percent increase in readiness. It is almost a
    direct proportion in terms of what we cut.
        We have protected the aviation portfolio for the last three
    or four years based upon our plan originally, the ARI. I just
    remind you that this budget did not account for the National
    Commission's recommendations. This budget was built around ARI.
    The recommendations came in after we had turned in our budget,
    and that is why you see some of the things in our UFR request.
        This year, to find that kind of money for the Army, there
    was about a $2.6 billion bill. We had to go to aviation to find
    that type of money to pay our decrement based upon the BBA. We
    do have plans in the out years, and they are plans, until we
    see what the 2018 budget is going to look like, whether it is
    closer to PB levels or BCA levels. We do have plans in the out
    years to try to buy back some of that divot we would be taking
    in 2017.
        Senator Blumenthal. General Williamson?
        General Williamson. Sir, I just wanted to add a couple
    comments and start by acknowledging at least two of the things
    that you said, and the first is this notion of the Black Hawk
    being a workhorse for us. As you know, at any given time we
    have had over 220 helicopters deployed in support of operations
    in combat, millions of hours of flight in support of our
    troops, and so that helicopter is critically important to us.
        I would echo something that General Murray said in terms of
    we went into this with an awareness of what was that minimum,
    and in this case it was 36. But this is where I would have to
    acknowledge your other point is that when we negotiate those
    kinds of deals, any multiyear, it is with an awareness of what
    gives us some efficiencies in the plant, what affords us the
    opportunity to meet production numbers, all of those things in
    line with the needs of our service.
        But the point that you made about the commercial side is
    really important. On the other side of the table when they are
    negotiating those rates, when they are negotiating that price
    with us, it is in anticipation of understanding what they are
    going to get from commercial sales and also--and this is a
    factor that is not often considered is other sales to our
    allies as an example. As we have seen the stress, if you will,
    in military budget, along with these new pressures on the
    commercial side, that has to be a factor.
        We try to work very closely with our vendors, with our
    partners with an understanding of what happens to their vendors
    and the agreements that they reach with their subs in order to
    give us that price.
        To just finish with something else that General Murray said
    is that as we are continuing to engage with our vendors on the
    aviation side, as well as on the combat vehicle side, we are
    trying to give indications of what goes beyond 2017 so that
    they can think through not only their workforce but also things
    like capital investment or their plant and their facilities and
    also for their machinery. It is not something that we take
    lightly, sir, and we will continue to stay engaged.
        Senator Blumenthal. I appreciate the very articulate points
    that you have made, and I can well understand that you
    appreciate that production of helicopters, production of most
    anything that is so essential to our Army and our military
    cannot be turned on and off like a spigot. It takes planning,
    it takes training of a workforce, it takes capital investment,
    and I am grateful to your sensitivity, and I would like to
    pursue some of these questions.
        This is a very complex and developing situation, and I know
    that we have a common interest in making sure that procurement
    is at a level that we look beyond this fiscal year to what is
    available and at what cost in future fiscal years. I think
    these are all very, very important points.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cotton. Senator Sullivan?
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, I just wanted to end with kind of a broader
    question on how the Army is thinking about broader strategy and
    how we should be thinking about broader strategy. You know,
    General McMaster, you have written about this. You and I have
    both had the opportunity to serve under General Abizaid, who
    has thought a lot about these issues and, you know, when he was
    one of the first military leaders, started talking about the
    long war and thinking about how to address that, he has even
    talked recently about a raid force concept in the Middle East.
        But a lot of that came out during the time when we were not
    also having to think about conventional near-peer situations
    like we do today. How is the Army thinking about kind of
    broader strategy, you know, the long war or whatever else we
    are--that you are thinking about in terms of looking at 2, 3, 4
    years from now, and then how should we be thinking about that
    as well? I open that up to everybody.
        General McMaster. Sir, first of all, I think what we are
    seeing is really the value of forward position, joint forces
    and Army forces in particular, and deterring conflict against
    determined enemies and capable enemies. Obviously, we----
        Senator Sullivan. You mean in foreign countries?
        General McMaster. In foreign countries, sir, so----
        Senator Sullivan. The value of allies is pretty important
    in our----
        General McMaster. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sullivan.--broader strategy. You know, whether it
    is the President in his recent, you know, Atlantic interview or
    some of the candidates on the campaign trail, remarkably, there
    seems to be almost a dismissive attitude towards allies. I
    think it is incredibly shortsighted. The President's comments
    in his recent interview were very shortsighted. I think some of
    the comments coming out of the campaign trail are.
        Allies are critical to forward deployment, correct?
        General McMaster. Yes, sir, and our engagement with those
    allies is what can bolster their will and their capabilities.
    Obviously, we want to deter conflict, and we have succeeded in
    doing so for over 60 years on the Korean Peninsula, over 70
    years since the hit of World War II in preventing great power
    conflict.
        I think as we look at the way that threats to United States
    security are evolving, especially with, you know, the four-
    plus-one construct for state actors, these are the revisionist
    powers of Russia and China, along with North Korea and Iran who
    have been taking bellicose and hostile actions, and the plus
    one is transactional terrorist organizations, ISIL [Islamic
    State of Iraq and the Levant] but also al Qaeda and associated
    groups and so forth.
        When we look at what is required to deal with those
    threats, it is a joint force and in particular it places a very
    high demand on ready land forces. I mean, I do not mean to
    sound snide, but, I mean, ISIL does not have a navy or an air
    force, and they are doing okay. The need for ready land forces
    that have the will and the capability to close with capable and
    elusive enemies, enemies that operate in and amongst
    populations and restrictive terrain, who avoid being classified
    as a target from standoff range, and now you combine that with
    enemies that now are demonstrating sophisticated long-range
    capabilities, cured air defense capabilities, creating this so-
    called anti-access/area denial threat.
        What we need is we need to maintain ready land forces that
    can deploy rapidly, they can be forward positioned, but then
    also deploy rapidly and then transition quickly into
    operations. Those land forces, I mean, those land forces have
    to have mobility. They have to have protection. They have to
    have lethality.
        I mean, we cannot--a lot of times you will hear the terms,
    you know, light and nimble. Well, you know, Richard Simmons is
    light and nimble, but we do not send him to go do harm to
    somebody or to defend our nation. We need forces that can get
    there and fight once they get there. For us, that is a
    combination of Airborne and Infantry Brigade Combat Teams,
    Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, and Armored Brigade Combat Teams.
        But what we see, to your question about the future, what do
    we see in the future for Army forces? Army forces will have to
    do, as I mentioned, when they have always had to do: defeat
    enemy organizations on the ground, secure territory to deny its
    use to the enemy, protect populations, but now increasingly,
    project power outward from land into the maritime aerospace and
    cyberspace domains in part to help ensure freedom of movement
    and action for maritime and aerospace forces.
        Russia has established air supremacy over Ukraine from the
    ground, for example. China is building landmass in the South
    China Sea to project power outward from that landmass into the
    maritime and aerospace domains.
        What our Army has to do is develop some of these new
    capabilities that allow us to support the joint force better,
    but I think when we see how technology is evolving, threats to
    our security from the shifts in the geopolitical landscape, the
    kind of missions we are going to have to conduct, and the sort
    of--you know, what we have learned from history and what is
    happening today, we see the demand for ready land forces going
    up, not going down.
        Senator Sullivan. Anyone else? Gentlemen?
        General Anderson. I think, sir, the whole--back to your
    Allied peace, that is the whole thing behind the regionally
    aligned forces concept. You know based on the global demand we
    have for all things Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, and the whole
    GRF [Global Response Force] piece, but the bigger issue becomes
    how do we appease, and it is all about the assurance,
    deterrence. We watch this in Europe every single day, as we
    watch and let it resolve, as we work all those nations, and
    from where we are stationing equipment to where we are storing
    equipment to where all the exercises are. But when you run a
    55-exercise activity over the course of a fiscal year, a lot of
    effects in terms of our partners. We are having equal success
    in the Pacific with specific pathways.
        When you look at those two models and the differences it
    makes from Balikatan, Foal Eagle, all the different exercises,
    Cobra Gold, the different exercises that are just going on, it
    is a huge enabler, and we do build some good partner capacity.
        Senator Sullivan. Well, I appreciate the emphasis on allies
    because if you look at our potential adversaries, they all
    seem--whether it is North Korea or Iran or China or Russia,
    they seem to have a hard time collecting any allies, and yet we
    have most of them and yet we are at this interesting period
    where some of the leadership in our country seems to be--right
    at this moment when allies matter more than anything and they
    are part of Army strategy and doctrine, we are being
    dismissive, which I think is shortsighted for our leadership in
    this country. Thank you, gentlemen.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cotton. General McMaster, in light of the comments
    you just made, what is your opinion of the Reconnaissance
    Strike Group from recommendation 22 in the Commission report?
        General McMaster. Sir, I think this is a really important
    initiative, and so what we think is--you know, we have some
    opportunities now. If we would have the resources, you know, to
    be able to pursue some of these capabilities, we can integrate
    them into formation.
        The problem we have now that is on the topic of
    modernization is we see some technologies that are very, very
    mature, for example, some new combat vehicle technologies, new
    power train capabilities, demand reduction in terms of, you
    know, hybrid and power and energy capabilities, light weight
    band track, independent suspension, active protective systems,
    improved lethality, but we do not have a place to put those now
    in terms of a prototyping program that is well-funded or a
    combat vehicle program. We need to develop these technologies,
    apply them, combine them so we developed a real no-kidding
    capability but then put them in organizations.
        We think that the trend is combined arms at lower levels.
    The trend is toward longer-range weapon systems. The trend is
    toward integrated air and ground formations. We want to build
    formations that are capable of operating widely dispersed with
    combined arms-air-ground capabilities over wide areas but can
    maintain mutual support, right, because we do not want those to
    be, you know, a bunch of Little Bighorns that occur
    simultaneously across a large area.
        We have to be able to fight together as a team, as part of
    the joint team, and we think this kind of a force, a force that
    can project power at greater range, combine arms-air-ground at
    lower levels, can essentially elevate the tactics of
    infiltration to the operational level.
        This is the kind of ideas that are consistent with
    Reconnaissance Strike Group. We are undergoing a force design
    effort now looking at the Army of 2030 as part of our Unified
    Quest war game. By the end of this calendar year, we are going
    to have some proposals about what we would like future Army
    organizations to look like and how those organizations would
    fight together under realistic conditions and under
    contingencies that we think are plausible in the 2030 time
    frame.
        General Murray. Sir, H.R. was basically talking--I mean, so
    the concepts that General McMaster described apply really to
    all four recommendations in--you know, it was not just the
    Reconnaissance Strike Group. There is no arguing with the
    concepts. The chief is still--we are about a week or two out
    from offering up where the chief is on his thoughts on all 56
    recommendations after the Sec Def, and then we should have
    something over here very shortly after that.
        Senator Cotton. Okay. We have had a good discussion so far.
    I need to close out with just a few specific programs that have
    been touched on earlier but we have not gone into at length.
    First, DCGS: There was a January 2016 DOT&E [Department of Test
    & Evaluation] report about DCGS Increment 1, Release 2,
    concluding that it was operationally effective, operationally
    suitable, and not survivable.
        I have some doubts about the testing parameters that were
    used, also, the inability to get the data that would allow us
    to quantifiably test against critical needs like intelligence,
    fusion, targeting, data synchronization. I also have some
    doubts about the size of the data set, had 191 different
    entries, which are several orders of magnitude about what you
    would see on the combat terrain, and some reports that the
    system had to be rebooted every 20 hours, which is not suitable
    for an operational environment.
        General Williamson, as I mentioned in my opening statement,
    you had said last year that you thought the value of the system
    would be shown by May. Where do you stand on that now on the
    value of the DCGS-A program?
        General Williamson. Sir, I go back to some of the comments
    you just made. Both, first, ATEC, the Army Test and Evaluation
    Command, their assessment was also suitable, effective, and
    survivable and DOT&E's report in terms of operationally
    suitable.
        But I would like to set those aside for a second. Having
    gone out and seen the system and obviously working very closely
    with the PM, we understand that there are additional
    capabilities that are required in that system. On the ground
    what I saw was that the brigade level, that system with trained
    soldiers provides the capability to commander. I think what we
    have seen is that lower echelons we probably--not we probably--
    we have to do more to reduce the complexity of the system and
    the ease of use. I think that is what you are going to see in
    Increment 2 of DCGS.
        We have reached out to industry to include three requests
    for information so that we could understand what industry
    believe they could provide in a capability. We had 80 one-on-
    one sessions, and we included two industry days where we
    brought in over 240 vendors who said here is what we think you
    need to do. We think we have a path forward on improving the
    usability of that system. From an operational standpoint, I
    pass to General Anderson.
        General Anderson. Yes, sir, we had a mission command summit
    last week. The issue is what does the field want? The field is
    frustrated, as you very much know, and of course the bigger
    challenge is fixed site, static, DCGS, much less challenge,
    deployable, small unit, much more difficult, and battalions are
    having a hell of a time.
        The issue was to try and get a balance between the 129 app
    version that has been developed, down to something between the
    DCGS-Lite, which the SOF has, which is four apps, and we think
    we have come to about 20, so that is what we laid out last week
    at Leavenworth, and now it is back out to the field to say did
    we pick the right apps to give you the COP [Common Operating
    Picture] so your analysts have the tools they need. Then the
    question becomes how do we work the intel-sharing from a
    brigade platform that is less challenged by this, or a
    battalion platform is extremely challenged.
        When I was out at the interview in the fall, not one of the
    six battalion commanders out there underground said that they
    wanted DCGS in their TACs [Tacticle Command Post] but they knew
    they needed the common operating picture tools, and that is----
        Senator Cotton. That is why we hear reports of using
    workarounds like the old pencil and paper----
        General Anderson. Right.
        Senator Cotton.--and PowerPoint----
        General Anderson. Analog, right.
        Senator Cotton. It sounds to me like it is not working very
    well.
        General Anderson. I am going to----
        Senator Cotton. I mean, it works fine if you are an O4 NMI
    and you live it day in and day out. It works less fine if you
    are an E4 in a battalion TAC.
        General Anderson. That is the key, sir----
        Senator Cotton. Expeditious----
        General Anderson.--the training. The bottom line, the young
    E5 who was operating that system--now, 1st AD is a little bit
    separate from the brigade modernization command, but it is the
    big C2 [command and control] facility there right at Bliss, the
    sergeant E5 intel analyst had not touched that machine until
    the first day of the exercise. That is a huge piece of--part of
    the problem.
        General Murray. This time last year, Chairman Cotton, and
    this is differently than obviously a brigade, but I had E4s in
    my division headquarters to section using DCGS in Afghanistan.
    Now, it was not moving every day, but I do agree that we still
    have some issues to work through. But I think one of the
    biggest issues we have to work through is the training piece
    because we are not giving these kids time to train on this
    system before asking them to operate them.
        There are ways that we can get after that. There is a
    facility at Fort Stewart called the IROC [Intelligence
    Readiness Operations Capability] which has DCGS up and running
    every day. I just mandated my DCGS operator. That was their
    place of duty. They were not pulling guard, they were not
    going--they would go to the range and qualify, they would go
    right back to that facility. They knew DCGS in and out, and
    they were operating it each and every day in a garrison
    environment.
        That is the other effort besides the effort to make things
    simpler is to make sure we understand that DCGS is a weapons
    system, and it is just not something you are going to pick up
    like a smartphone and jump on it and get on it. It has got to
    be trained day in and day out whether you are in garrison or in
    a deployed environment.
        Senator Cotton. Okay. I want to move on to the next topic.
    I have to say that I still have my doubts about that. Active
    protection systems for vehicles, I will direct this towards
    General Williamson and maybe General McMaster as our armor
    expert.
        As I mentioned at the outset of my opening remarks, as part
    of the Army's fiscal year 2017 budget proposal, the Army
    reportedly plans to experiment in commercially available active
    protection systems as part of Abrams, Bradley, and Stryker
    survivability enhancements, to put it simply, systems that
    would be able to intercept something like a rocket-propelled
    grenade could you briefly describe the efforts that are planned
    for fiscal year 2017?
        General Williamson. Sir, I will start out by talking about
    the path to 2017, and then I will defer to General McMaster to
    talk about the capability itself.
        As indicated, sir, by yourself and by others on this panel,
    the need to take advantage of these technologies is critical,
    and we are seeing our adversaries start to take advantage. We
    are not unfamiliar with the capabilities of active protection
    systems. We have made choices that we wanted those systems to
    mature from a safety standpoint, from a reliability standpoint,
    and therefore had not employed them.
        What we have seen over the last, I would say, 24 months is
    some advances made both on the commercial side but also by our
    allies in the employment of those systems, and so we have
    reached out to them.
        We have taken two paths, sir. First of all, we started on a
    science-and-technology path with a modular active protection
    system. That system really has three pieces, the first one
    being how do we develop a modular system that gives me, first,
    the ability to sense. How do I detect that something is being
    fired at me? Then the first part will be can I provide an
    obscurant to make it more difficult for something to hit the
    system.
        The second point is the soft-kill capability. Today, if you
    look out at about 90 percent of the weapons that would be fired
    against a platform, those can be deterred by some sort of
    electronic means. Then the third is kinetic. It is directly
    intercepting a system that has been fired at you. That is force
    on force.
        What we know is that some of those technologies are more
    mature than others, and so what we want to do is reach out, and
    we have started out today. We have started that in fiscal year
    2016 to take advantage of existing systems. There are roughly
    four out there that we have considered, and we are now doing
    the integration work on a Bradley, a Stryker, and an Abrams.
        The fiscal year 2017 request allows us to complete that. We
    are coming an above-threshold reprogramming to help us get
    started sooner and to start that effort with our vendors.
        Senator Cotton. General McMaster, do you have anything to
    add?
        General McMaster. Sir, I think you are highlighting an
    immensely important capability. As General Williamson said, we
    have seen these technologies before and we have seen them
    employed.
        I think there are just a few quick points on this is, first
    of all, a lot of times we prose ourselves with a false dilemma
    of either waiting for the perfect capability later or doing
    something now. I think this is a case where we have to do both.
    We need the capability for hard kill, soft kill target
    location, and then we have to integrate that into the formation
    as well. You want to protect an individual vehicle, but you
    want the formation to be protected.
        It is a ground problem, but it is also an air problem now
    with rotary-wing aircraft. Advanced protection systems for
    aviation and for ground and then tied to counter UAS [Unmanned
    Aerial Systems] and C-RAM [Counter Rocket, Artillery, and
    Mortar], or counter-rocket artillery and mortar capabilities.
    We see these technologies having a lot of commonality, and it
    could be tied as well to directed energy, electronic warfare
    capabilities.
        We have to really work hard on a concept to integrate a lot
    of these emerging technologies longer term. But there is an
    immediate threat that we can see now from enemies who possess
    this capability and we do not. We see that with Russia, for
    example.
        Senator Cotton. Given the programs you described, if
    successful, when might we actually see vehicles commanded by
    the next generation of H.R. McMasters downrange in Eastern
    Europe and Middle East with these systems?
        General Williamson. Sir, on the expedited version, taking
    advantage of commercial existing systems, we will do that
    characterization this year, integrate those onto existing
    platforms. Early next year, we will be able to make a decision,
    essentially a go/no-go that says this adds more value and more
    protection than not having it. At that point in 2017 we make
    the decision to start outfitting, equipping systems, and I
    believe that in 2018 you have formations equipped with a
    measure of protection.
        Senator Cotton. Good. I think, as we have discussed, as
    Senator Ernst raised in her questions, this fits in with the
    theme of modernization and readiness. Some of these items,
    because of their availability off the shelf, sit at the
    intersection of readiness and modernization that can be done so
    quickly, that they can actually contribute to readiness today
    for the force as opposed to readiness for the force 10 years
    from now.
        I want to turn to a third topic, activity sets and pre-
    positioned stock. I am getting into great detail. These are
    obviously platforms that are designed to support rotational
    troops that are in contingencies in places like Eastern Europe,
    South Korea, so forth. I will throw it up there for whoever
    wants to take it. Activity sets and pre-positioned stocks are
    very equipment-intensive undertakings. We are expanding them
    worldwide. Where do the vehicles and other associated equipment
    in the sets and stocks come from?
        General Anderson. A variety of means, sir. The Europe piece
    first, the European activity set is going to be the first set
    to be converted to start building the first ABCT [Armored
    Brigade Combat Team] APS [Active Protection Systems] set for
    Europe. Starting first quarter 2017 we start deploying heel-to-
    toe brigades. The next brigade to do that is 3rd Brigade, 4th
    ID out of Carson.
        They will bring their equipment from home station with
    them, and when that gets delivered to Europe, that EAS stuff
    will get harvested to build the first set of that APS, and then
    the second APS set will get built from the conversion 225 when
    Hawaii converts from a Stryker to a Lite. The Strykers from
    Hawaii will go to the West Coast, the 81st between Washington,
    Oregon, California, that ABCT's kit will get modernized, and
    that will get sent over to be the second set.
        The stretch will be based on what we do with additional
    force structure now based on Korea and elsewhere, where would
    you harvest--how could we possibly harvest based on the Korean
    equipment set on the peninsula based on taking potentially
    somebody's home station set if we have to build more, or do you
    harvest within the APS sets? Like APS-5's kit right now is
    all--the next rotation to Kuwait is also going to be the entire
    brigade comes with all of their kit, and then the kit that is
    being used now in Kuwait for Spartan Shield, that will get
    harvested to get reset back into APS-5. It is kind of a--again,
    between APS and what you may have to pilfer now here at home
    station based on what we do structure-wise or other set-wise.
        General Murray. I would just add, sir, so we have plenty of
    tanks and we have plenty of Bradleys, and it is based upon
    force structure reductions we have had, and we have really
    lightened the force over the last 10 years, so we have many
    fewer armored brigade combats.
        The problem is they are not modernized, and so if you go
    down to Anniston down in Alabama, I mean, we have yards of
    tanks, but it takes money to bring them up to the most modern
    configuration. We have enough Bradleys. Where you get into
    issues is primarily with wheeled vehicles, recovery vehicles,
    engineered, low-density equipment. That is where we have
    equipment issues that you are talking about, new production.
    The way General Anderson kind of laid it out is exactly right.
        The fundamental thing we are kind of struggling with right
    now is how many unmanned sets of ABCT equipment do we really
    want to have? You talked about the value of pre-positioned
    stocks, and I do not disagree with that, but there is also the
    value of having a manned ABCT, and so we are getting to the
    point now where we are going to have to start making some
    decisions about how many unmanned equipment sets we can really
    afford.
        I would just add, General Williamson was pretty specific
    with APS and AT [Anti Tank], and I would say that it is going
    to depend upon funding levels. If, for instance, we were back
    at sequester levels, I would be less confident that we were
    going to be able to do APS and AT and start fielding.
        Senator Cotton. It seems like a challenging balance to get
    back to the pre-positioned activity set. On the one hand, if
    that equipment is needed, you need it to be the most capable
    equipment we have. On the other hand, you might have it sitting
    idle for years at a time.
        General Murray. Yes, sir, and an earlier question was about
    the next generation of Bradleys and tanks, and that is actually
    in the ERI [European Reassurance Initiative] OCO [Overseas
    Contingency Operations] request, and so the 81st equipment that
    General Anderson talked about, the intent is to turn that into
    the SEP A3 and the Bradley V4--other way around--the SEP V3 and
    the Bradley A4 for that second set of ASP stock in Europe.
        Senator Cotton. One final topic, General Murray, obviously,
    aviation has been a main recurring topic of conversation here.
    That is in part because it is pretty expensive, I think 20
    percent of RDT&E, 20 percent of our procurement, but also, as
    we look at some of the capabilities our adversaries have that
    General McMaster has cited, you know, are our rotary-wing
    aircraft able to support troops on the ground given the kind of
    tiered air defense you see from the S300 or S400 systems in
    places like Ukraine or Syria or wherever else Russia might
    position them or sell them?
        General Murray. I will let H.R. kind of tag onto this, too,
    Chairman Cotton, but, I mean, you know, if you have those type
    of active air defense systems, we would have a difficult time
    operating rotary--we would have a difficult time operating
    fixed-wing. I think H.R. will kind of say that is the
    requirement for ground forces because we have always operated--
    so, for instance, we have also taken a lot of artillery out of
    our force structure because for the last 15 years we have
    operated under the assumption that we would always have air
    supremacy from our Air Force. We have got a great Air Force,
    but here recently within the last year or two, we have got to
    challenge that assumption. In that type of threat environment,
    no, we could not operate our rotary-wing aircraft.
        You talked about protection, and we have talked about APS.
    APS, as H.R. said, also applies to air. We are probably further
    along with the APS for aviation, our rotary-wing aircraft than
    we are for ground, and we have continued to invest in that as
    well.
        General McMaster. I would just say it would put a premium
    on really operating low level for rotary-wing aircraft.
    Anything that is medium or high altitude is extremely
    vulnerable to the long-range systems. Then as you are operating
    at low level, you really have to ensure mutual support, as you
    know, between ground and air forces and aviation forces. This
    is where the 11th Aviation Brigade comes in as very important
    because we have to train as air-ground teams, develop that
    common understanding of how we provide that mutual support.
        Ground forces clearing, for example, shoulder-fired air
    defense systems so then attack aviation can operate above or
    maybe even slightly behind those ground forces and pose that
    enemy with multiple dilemmas. We want, obviously, our enemies
    to respond to multiple forms of contact simultaneously,
    indirect fire, aviation, ground so that they cannot respond to
    everything that we are doing to them in close combat.
        In those kinds of tiered air defense areas, it put a
    premium on air-ground operations at the lower tactical level
    and ensuring mutual support between our aviators and our
    infantry armored cavalry team.
        Senator Cotton. All right. Gentlemen, thank you very much
    for your time. Thank you very much for a productive
    conversation. Most importantly, thanks for your service to our
    country.
        This hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:34 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]