[Senate Hearing 114-658, Part 1]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-658, Pt. 1
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2017 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 2943
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
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PART 1
THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. ARMY
U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES KOREA
AIR FORCE POSTURE
U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND, AND
U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND PROGRAMS AND BUDGET
NAVY POSTURE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE
U.S. CYBER COMMAND
ARMY POSTURE
F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER PROGRAM
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FEBRUARY 11, 23; MARCH 3, 10, 15, 17; APRIL 5, 7, 26, 2016
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman JACK REED, Rhode Island
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma BILL NELSON, Florida
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
TOM COTTON, Arkansas RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
JONI ERNST, Iowa MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina TIM KAINE, Virginia
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
MIKE LEE, Utah MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
TED CRUZ, Texas
Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff
Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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February 11, 2016
Page
The Future of the U.S. Army...................................... 1
Ham, General Carter F., USA (RET.), Chairman, National Commission
on the Future of the Army; Honorable Thomas R. Lamont, Vice
Chairman, National Commission on the Future of the Army;
General James D. Thurman, USA (Ret.), Commissioner, National
Commission on the Future of the Army; and Sergeant Major of the
Army Raymond F. Chandler III, USA (Ret.), Commissioner,
National Commission on the Future of the Army.................. 4
February 23, 2016
U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Forces Korea....................... 39
Harris, Admiral Harry B., Jr., USN, Commander, United States
Pacific Command................................................ 44
Scaparrotti, General Curtis M., USA, Commander, United Nations
Command, Combined Forces Command, United States Forces Korea... 61
Questions for the Record......................................... 106
March 3, 2016
Posture of the Department of the Air Force....................... 115
James, Honorable Deborah Lee, Secretary of the Air Force......... 119
Welsh, General Mark A., III, USAF, Chief of Staff of the Air
Force.......................................................... 138
March 10, 2016
U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Northern Command, and U.S. Southern
Command Programs and Budget.................................... 169
Haney, Admiral Cecil E. D., USN, Commander, U.S. Strategic
Command........................................................ 173
Gortney, Admiral William E., USN, Commander, U.S. Northern
Command and Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command 184
Tidd, Admiral Kurt W., USN, Commander, U.S. Southern Command..... 196
Questions for the Record......................................... 247
March 15, 2016
Posture of the Department of the Navy............................ 259
Mabus, Honorable Raymond E., Jr., Secretary of the Navy.......... 263
Neller, General Robert B. USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps... 281
Richardson, Admiral John M., USN, Chief of Naval Operations...... 290
Questions for the Record......................................... 327
(iii)
March 17, 2016
Department of Defense Budget Posture............................. 343
Carter, Honorable Ashton B., Secretary of Defense; Accompanied by
Honorable Michael J. McCord, Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) and Chief Financial Officer...................... 348
Dunford, General Joseph F., Jr., USMC, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff................................................ 377
Questions for the Record......................................... 425
April 5, 2016
U.S. Cyber Command............................................... 455
Rogers, Admiral Michael S., USN, Commander, U.S. Cyber Command;
Director, National Security Agency; Chief, Central Security
Services....................................................... 458
Questions for the Record......................................... 503
April 7, 2016
Posture of the Department of the Army............................ 507
Murphy, Honorable Patrick J., Acting Secretary of the Army....... 510
Milley, General Mark A., USA, Chief of Staff of the Army......... 519
April 26, 2016
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program................................ 561
Kendall, Honorable Frank, III, Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics......................... 565
Bogdan, Lieutenant General Christopher C., USAF, Program
Executive Officer for the F-35 Lightning II Joint Program...... 567
Gilmore, Honorable J. Michael, Ph.D., Director of Operational
Test and Evaluation, Department of Defense..................... 577
Sullivan, Michael J., Director of Acquisition and Sourcing
Management, Government Accountability Office................... 592
Questions for the Record......................................... 623
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2017 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 2016
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. ARMY
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:53 a.m. in Room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe,
Sessions, Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Ernst, Tillis, Lee,
Reed, McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, and Heinrich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman McCain. The Senate Armed Services Committee meets
this morning to receive testimony on the findings and
recommendations of the National Commission on the Future of the
United States Army.
I am pleased to welcome General Carter Ham, General James
D. Thurman, the Honorable Thomas Lamont and Sergeant Major of
the Army Raymond Chandler.
Gentlemen, this committee is grateful to you for your many
years of distinguished service and your leadership during the
conduct of the National Commission's work. We are thankful for
the comprehensive and timely report. Today, we hope to benefit
from your recommendations.
The focus of this hearing is our Army and our soldiers.
Their mission is unequivocal. It is to fight and win our
Nation's wars. As Army Chief of Staff General Mark Milley said
eloquently, the Army's ``reason for being, our very reason for
being, at the very core of what it means to have an Army is to
win, and to win decisively, in ground combat against the
enemies of our country so that American citizens can enjoy
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.''
Through 15 years of war, our Army has been tested. Time and
time again, our soldiers proved their commitment, courage, and
determination. It is our duty to do our utmost to provide them
with the support they need and deserve. That starts by
recognizing that our Army is still at war.
At this moment, 187,000 soldiers are deployed in 140
locations around the globe. They're fighting terrorists and
training our partners in Afghanistan and supporting the fight
against ISIL, all the while defending South Korea and
reassuring our allies in eastern Europe. Yet, as the demands on
our Army continue to increase, our support for our soldiers has
not kept pace. In short, our Army is confronting growing
threats and increasing operational demands with shrinking and
less-ready forces and aging equipment. By the end of the next
fiscal year, the Army will be cut down to 450,000 Active Duty
personnel soldiers, down from a wartime peak of 570,000. These
budget-driven force reductions were decided before the rise of
ISIL or Russia's invasion of Ukraine. As the Commission notes,
a regular Army of 450,000 is the minimum sufficient force
necessary. We must be clear that when we minimize our Army, we
maximize the risk to our soldiers. Those risks will only grow
worse if mindless sequestration cuts are allowed to return and
the Army shrinks to 420,000 soldiers. On the present course,
we're running the risk that, in a crisis, we'll have too few
soldiers who will enter a fight without proper training or
equipment.
Given current operational demands, readiness must be the
first priority of the Army. Yet, as our Army shrinks, readiness
suffers. Just over one-third of the Army's Brigade Combat Teams
are ready for deployment and decisive operations. I repeat,
only just over one-third. The Army has no plan to return to
full-spectrum readiness until 2021, at the very earliest. As
the Commission's report makes clear, both the mission and the
force are at risk.
Meanwhile, the Army is woefully behind on modernization.
The Army must modernize for the harsh realities of 21st century
warfare. Our soldiers must be trained and equipped for an
increasingly diverse and complex range of threats. They must be
able to win against peers in highly lethal combined-arms
maneuver, near-peer in hybrid warfare conditions, and
determined unconventional insurgents. Yet, our Army is
essentially organized and equipped as it was in the 1980s. The
main difference is that it's smaller. In fact, many key
enabling forces, like artillery, armored calvary, engineers,
air defense, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
response, and theater transport have been reduced to levels
that compromise the Army's ability to field campaign-quality
forces. Put simply, our ground force is not in balance. We're
not sized with the adequate capacity or with key capabilities
to give our soldiers what they need to win decisively. Part of
that is the legacy of the Army's acquisition record, which
former Army Secretary McHugh said, quote, ``too often, a tale
of failure, too many underperforming or canceled programs, too
few successful fieldings of developmental designs, and far too
many taxpayer dollars wasted.'' While we have struggled,
adversaries such as Russia have been investing billions in
modernizing their armies. The result is that America's
capability advantage in ground combat weapons is not nearly as
great as it once was.
Another challenge to the Army's balance has been its
failure to operate as a total force composed of the regular
Army, the Guard, and the Reserve. Yet, while the Army is
intended to operate as one force, the Commission identified
major gaps, including a lack of focus on multi-component units,
the absence of an integrated recruiting force, and the
inability to manage pay and personnel across the entire Army
with a single system. The Commission's recommendations for
developing a total Army as well as those related to the
critical issue of Army aviation are worthy of the committee's
consideration.
Our total Army needs a major change of direction. This will
not be easy, but it's been done before. Army leaders like
General Abrams transformed the Army before. They restored the
discipline and morale of the force in the aftermath of the
Vietnam War. They transitioned the Army to an All-Volunteer
Force while revolutionizing training doctrine, and they built
an Army that won the Cold War and removed Saddam Hussein from
Kuwait. We need this kind of transformation again today,
because, as the Commission has made clear, our Army is in
trouble. The increasing velocity of instability, combined with
continued reductions in defense spending, will inevitably lead
to depleted readiness, chronic modernization problems, and
deteriorating morale. We can and must do better.
I'm grateful to the Commission for its important
contribution to helping us find a better way forward.
Senator Reed.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well thank you very much Mr. Chairman. Thank
you for holding this hearing. It's--very important, as you
pointed out.
After nearly 15 years of continuous operations, it's
critical we take a step back and assess the current state of
the regular Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army
Reserve. As such, our witnesses this morning each bring a
unique and valuable perspective on these issues. I look forward
to their testimony and exploring in greater detail the
recommendations that the National Commission on the Future of
the Army has put forth for consideration.
First, let me begin by thanking the commissioners as well
as your staff. You've done an extraordinary job. Your hard
work, your willingness to take on this challenge is deeply
appreciated. The comprehensive study that you have produced is
thorough and thoughtful. In particular, I applaud your efforts
to reach out to all stakeholders, including senior leadership
in the Department of Defense, leadership within the regular
Army, the Army National Guard, the Army Reserve, numerous
elected officials both in Washington and in the states, and,
most importantly, soldiers currently serving in uniform. I
think you were guided in those efforts very effectively by the
Sergeant Major.
Thank you, Sergeant Major.
Thank you for the process, and thank you for the great
effort.
As the final Commission report illustrates, the Army is
faced with a number of challenges and tough choices for the
foreseeable future. The threats facing our Nation are not
diminishing, and it underscores our need for a well-trained and
well-resourced, properly equipped military force that can
deploy at a moment's notice. The Army has made increasing
readiness levels a top priority; however, in a constrained
budget environment, augmenting funding for readiness often
comes at the expense of other Army priorities, including
investment in modernization and recapitalization. Furthermore,
the problem is compounded by the fact the Army has had a poor
track record with the modernization efforts, resulting in
programs that have been truncated or canceled. I look forward
to hearing from our witnesses on their thoughts on how the Army
can continue to improve readiness, as well as your views on how
the Army can improve its acquisition process.
Another issue the Commission considered was the Aviation
Restructure Initiative, or the ARI, and the transfer of all
Apache helicopters in the Army National Guard to regular Army.
The Commission's recommended allowing the Active component to
retain 20 battalions of Apaches, each equipped with 24
aircraft, while providing the Army National Guard with four
battalions of Apaches, each equipped with 18 aircraft. In light
of the vigorous debate the ARI proposal has generated in
Congress and the importance to the Army, I look forward to
hearing our witnesses particularly with respect to this issue.
Finally, the Army continues to draw down its end strength,
as the Chairman has pointed out. The final goal is 450,000 in
the Active Army, 335,000 in the Army National Guard, and
195,000 in the Army Reserve. The Commission noted this level of
uniformed military personnel, again, as the Chairman pointed
out, provides the Army a minimally sufficient capability and
capacity across the range of near-term challenges. In light of
the evolving security environment and unanticipated global
challenges, I welcome your comments on whether you believe the
U.S. Army can continue to meet its commitment with this Army--
this size Army.
Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, commissioners.
Chairman McCain. I thank the witnesses. Whatever order you
would like to begin, I think would be appropriate.
General Ham, is that----
JOINT STATEMENT OF GENERAL CARTER F. HAM, USA (RET.), CHAIRMAN,
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF THE ARMY; HONORABLE THOMAS
R. LAMONT, VICE CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF
THE ARMY; GENERAL JAMES D. THURMAN, USA (RET.), COMMISSIONER,
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF THE ARMY; AND SERGEANT
MAJOR OF THE ARMY RAYMOND F. CHANDLER III, USA (RET.),
COMMISSIONER, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF THE ARMY
General Ham. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and Senator
Reed, with your indulgence, I think, with the agreement of my
partners here, we'll just have one opening statement, and then
go to questions.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
General Ham. Sir, on behalf of all of the fellow
commissioners and the great staff that support us, thank you
all for inviting us to testify before the committee on a report
on the future of the Army. I'd especially thank you, Mr.
Chairman, for having appointed General J.D. Thurman to the
Commission, and, Senator Reed, for having appointed Sergeant
Major of the Army Ray Chandler. It will be no surprise to those
on this committee that both General Thurman and Sergeant Major
of the Army Chandler offered characteristically direct and
forceful insights to the Commission.
Chairman McCain. Not surprising.
General Ham. No, sir.
The committee and staff have already received the
Commission's report, so I won't spend a lot of time addressing
specific issues, but I would like to give you a sense of how we
approached the task that you gave to us in the Fiscal Year 2015
National Defense Authorization Act. The Commission made every
effort to be inclusive, accessible, and transparent. We visited
17 states, interacted with over 320 different Army units of all
three components. We interacted with all 54 adjutants general
and 33 governors. About 80 Members of Congress engaged with the
Commission. We've met with all six geographic combatant
commanders, many of their service component commands, and many
of our most important allies and foreign partners. That's
certainly only a very partial list. We tried to pay strict
attention to the law that you passed creating the Commission.
Importantly, our recommendations were required to be consistent
with acceptable levels of national risk and, importantly,
anticipated future resources. In other words, this was not an
unbounded effort.
The result is a set of 63 specific recommendations that we
believe are well researched based on realistic assumptions and
backed by solid data. We found that America's Army is the best
in the world, and those who have chosen to serve make it so and
deserve our full and continued support and appreciation. Yet,
as indicated, our Army faces some significant challenges, many
of them budget driven.
From fiscal years 2010 to 2015, for example, overall
defense spending declined seven percent, but Army funding
declined 14 percent. On the two main issues before the
Commission--force size and mix and the Apache transfer--the
Commission found the following:
An Army of 980,000 is the minimally sufficient force to
meet current and anticipated missions at an acceptable level of
national risk. Within that 980,000, as indicated, the
Commission finds the regular Army of 450,000, the Army National
Guard of 335,000, and the Army Reserve of 195,000 present the
right mix of forces; but, again, the absolute minimum levels to
meet America's national security objectives. The numbers do not
tell the full story. The Army of 980,000 must be resourced so
that it is trained, ready, postured, and modernized to meet the
Nation's demands.
It's important to remember the mandate that you gave us.
You told us to size the force in light of the two previously
mentioned considerations: risk and resources. Adjust either, or
both, particularly the level of anticipated resourcing, and you
would reasonably arrive at very different conclusions. In our
assessment, an Army of 980,000 is the absolute minimum--a
floor, not a ceiling.
On the Apache question, the Commission recommends the Army
maintain 24 fully manned Apache battalions, 20 in the regular
Army and four in the Army National Guard. The Commission
recommendation has advantages over the Aviation Restructure
Initiative in both wartime capacity and surge capacity, and has
the added benefit of reducing peacetime deployment stress, and
we believe it will better promote integration of the regular
Army and the Army National Guard. It comes at added cost. To
offset the added costs of having four Apache battalions in the
Guard, we make some suggestions with regard to potential cost
offsets, including adding only two Black Hawk battalions to the
National Guard instead of the four that are currently planned,
and suggest considering slowing Black Hawk modernization.
The report also contains several prominent themes based on
the Commission's factfinding and analysis. We consider
sustaining the All-Volunteer Force, vital to the future of the
Nation. A return to a draft or other model of compulsory
Military Service will not yield the quality Army the Nation
requires. An All-Volunteer Force is expensive to recruit and
retain. We believe doing so is the right choice.
The Commission believes it is critically important to
develop a true total-force culture. While the regular Army,
Army National Guard, and Army Reserve are distinct, essential,
and interdependent, they are meant to operate as one force,
with their efforts fully integrated. The Commission found gaps
in seams in the implementation of the total-force policy, and
our report highlights some of those and offers some remedies.
The Commission recommends funding at least at the fiscal
year 2016 President's Budget level, which would provide, in our
opinion, the Army the minimum resources necessary to meet its
requirement at acceptable risk. Given the evolving strategic
environment and the potential for growing instability, even
this level of funding may prove inadequate in the future.
Additionally, Army funding must be predictable. Successive
years of budget uncertainty and continuing resolutions have had
significant negative consequences for the Army. In the
Commission's view, even with budgets at the President's Budget
2016 level, the Army would still have some significant
shortfalls in aviation, short-range air defense, and other
capabilities that we address in the report.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, that's a brief rundown of what
we found. We recognize that certainly not everyone will agree
with our recommendations. Indeed, many have already voiced
their disagreement. What I do hope, though--and I think I speak
for the Commission--is that our report will contribute to the
important debate that the Congress and the administration--I
would argue, indeed, the Nation--must have to determine how
America's Army should be sized, trained, modernized, and
postured.
With that, my fellow commissioners and I are prepared to
answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Ham follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Carter Ham
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed; on behalf of all my fellow
commissioners thank you for inviting us to testify before the committee
on our report on the future of the Army. We appreciate the opportunity
discuss our findings and recommendations with the committee.
The Committee and staff have already received the Commission's
report, so I won't spend a lot of time addressing specific points. I
would like to give you a sense of how comprehensive we were.
The Commission made every effort to be inclusive, accessible, and
transparent.
We visited 17 states and interacted with:
over 320 different Army units;
all 54 adjutants general and 33 governors
about 80 Members of Congress; and
all six geographic combatant commands and many of our
most important allies and foreign partners
That is just a very partial list.
I should also point out that we paid strict attention to the law
you passed creating the Commission; you'll notice every chapter begins
with a direct quote from the law as a way to frame the subsequent
material.
The result is a set of 63 specific recommendations that are
unbiased, well researched, based on realistic assumptions, and backed
by solid data. Importantly, our recommendations had to be consistent
with ``acceptable levels of national risk'' and ``anticipated future
resources.'' In other words, we were not unbounded in our work.
What we found is that our Army is the best in the world. Those who
wear the uniform deserve our gratitude every day.
The Army faces severe challenges, most of them budget-driven. From
fiscal years 2010-2015, overall defense funding declined 7 percent.
Army funding declined 14 percent.
On the two main issues before the Commission--force size and mix,
and the Apache transfer--the Commission found the following.
An Army of 980,000 is the minimally sufficient force to meet
current and anticipated missions at an acceptable level of national
risk. Within that 980,000, the Commission finds a Regular Army of
450,000, an Army National Guard of 335,000, and an Army Reserve of
195,000 represent the right mix of forces and, again, the absolute
minimum levels to meet America's national security objectives.
To fully understand this recommendation it is important to remember
the mandate you gave us. We weren't asked to come up with an optimal
force size based on the world situation and our best judgment. That
would have been nice, but it would not have been realistic.
Instead, we were asked to size the force in light of the two
previously mentioned considerations--acceptable risk and anticipated
resources. Adjust either or both and you can arrive at very different
conclusions, and I'm sure you and the administration will have your own
ideas on how to balance those considerations.
However, in our assessment, an Army of 980,000 is the absolute
minimum--a floor, not a ceiling.
On the Apache question, the Commission recommends the Army maintain
24 manned Apache battalions--20 in the Regular Army and four in the
Army National Guard. The Commission recommendation has advantages over
the Aviation Restructure Initiative in both wartime capacity and surge
capacity, and will reduce peacetime deployment stress. It will also
promote better integration of the Regular Army and National Guard.
To offset the added cost of having four Apache battalions in the
Guard, the Commission suggests the Army could add only two Black Hawk
battalions to the Guard instead of the four currently planned, and slow
Black Hawk modernization.
The report also contains several prominent themes based on the
Commission's fact-finding and analysis.
First, the All-Volunteer Force is a national treasure. Since its
inception, the quality and professionalism of the force has improved
dramatically--but it is expensive. However, the Commission considers
sustaining the All-Volunteer Force vital to the future of the nation.
All budget and force management decisions must be made with this goal
in mind.
Second, the Commission believes it is critically important to
develop a true ``one Army'' Total Force culture. While the Regular
Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve are distinct, essential,
and interdependent, they are meant to operate as one force--with their
efforts fully integrated.
The Commission found that gaps and seams exist in the
implementation of the Total Force Policy. The report highlights some of
those and offers remedies.
For example, we recommend putting all Army marketing under one
roof, fielding a consolidated pay and personnel system, and making
changes to the existing 12304b authority that will make it easier for
the Army to employ the Reserve components.
Third, the Commission recommends funding at the president's fiscal
year 2016 level, which would provide the Army with the minimum
resources necessary to meet its requirements at acceptable risk. Given
the strategic environment and potential for growing instability, even
this funding level may prove inadequate.
Furthermore, it should be understood that even with budgets at the
PB16 level, the Army would still suffer from significant shortfalls, in
aviation and short-range air defense as well as other capabilities we
address in the report.
That is a very brief rundown on what we found. Certainly, not
everyone will agree with our recommendations. Indeed, many have already
voiced their disagreement.
What I do hope, though, is that our report will contribute to the
important debate that the Congress and the Administration, indeed the
Nation, must have to determine how America's Army should be sized,
trained, modernized and postured.
With that, we are prepared to answer your questions.
Chairman McCain. Well, thank you very much. Thank--to the
commissioners. We're very appreciative. This comes at a
excellent time for us as we begin the markup for the 2017
defense authorization bill.
I guess I would like to start by saying: Obviously, end
strength is only part of the answer, but, if you want to
improve the missions and capabilities, end strength is a place
to begin. Would--I think you would agree. We're now looking at
a reduction for 2017 down to 420,000 Active component, as
opposed to 450,000. What--I guess my first question is, how
serious is that impact?
General Ham. Mr. Chairman, in the Commission's work and in
the analysis that we did, some of it in a classified realm--and
I would certainly commend the classified annex to the members
of the committee and to your staffs--it was our assessment that
the regular Army force of 420,000 would be inadequate to meet
the Nations' requirements at acceptable levels of risk.
Chairman McCain. You were looking at the 2016 level of
funding as a level that you think is barely acceptable, I guess
is my interpretation. What if it's $17 billion less?
General Ham. Sir, again, with any--any change to that--and
we all--as you know, right now the Army is looking at budgets
below the President's Budget for fiscal year 2016. We think
that delta in funding just adds to the level of risk, makes it
more difficult for the Army to sustain the levels of readiness
that are required to meet the Nation's objectives, and further
delay any effort to improve modernization.
Chairman McCain. As you pointed out in your opening
statement, as we lurch from one year to the next with total
unpredictability as to the level of funding, no company or
corporation could survive under that kind of uncertainty from--
as they lurch from year to year. How harmful is that, not only
for planning, but--help me out on morale and retention and
readiness, this OCO idea, which none of us like, but seems to
be the only way that we're able to fund--but the impact of the
year-to-year uncertainty of the ability they're going to be
able to carry out their missions.
General Ham. Mr. Chairman, let me start, and, if you'll
allow me, maybe turn to Sergeant Major of the Army Chandler.
I think, in my view, the biggest impact of the budget
uncertainty manifests itself particularly in the area of
modernization, but we also--in our site visits around the Army,
also heard numerous reports from soldiers, noncommissioned
officers, and officers of their training and leader development
plans that were disrupted because of the uncertainty in the
budget. For example, some leader development courses that were
canceled or postponed early in the fiscal year because of
funding challenges. Particularly in the Reserve components, if
a young noncommissioned officer who is either employed or
perhaps a college student had made plans to attend a leader
development course, and then that was suddenly canceled because
of budget challenges, it may be a couple of years before that
Reserve-component noncommissioned officer may find another
opportunity to attend important leader development.
Sergeant Major?
Mr. Chandler. Thanks, sir.
Mr. Chairman, you know, one of my great privileges is to be
able to talk with soldiers. It's what I did as the Sergeant
Major of the Army, it's what I was able to do in great part as
part--a member of the Commission. I will tell you, I think that
the risk to soldiers in the long-term impact on areas like
leader development and retention are huge if we're not able to
sustain a budget over a period of time. I'll give you a quick
example.
We had the opportunity to go to the National Training
Center and speak with the 116th Brigade from a number of
states, primarily Idaho. One of the commanders that we had an
opportunity to speak with, he was very concerned about being
able to retain his mid-grade noncommissioned officers and
officers. The challenge was, if I'm--got to make a choice
between going on an annual training event or, as they did, 60
or 70 days of annual training in order to prepare for a NTC
[National Training Center] rotation, if they weren't going to
be utilized after that and deployed someplace, then the issue
became, ``Why am I doing this? I've deployed several times over
the past 14 or 15 years, and now being in a place where I'm
spending 2 or 3 years ramping up for a keystone event, go to
the National Training Center, and then not be deployed to go do
something. Why do I need to continue to do this?''
I think you'll see that, if we're not able to sustain
adequate funding, leader development programs, and the
opportunity to go and train and deploy, this will have a huge
impact on the Army's ability to generate readiness and fight
and defend our Nation's wars.
Chairman McCain. General Thurman.
General Thurman. Mr. Chairman, one of the things that I've
observed with the lack of predictable funding has been not
being able to sustain Combat Training Center rotations. The
crown jewel of the Army to be able to conduct decisive land
combat is at our training centers. There were cases over the
past few years where rotations were canceled. That is not a
good ideal, particularly when we've got formations that have to
be trained for land combat. I just used my past experience in
Korea. That situation is very volatile over there, and it
requires ground forces that are properly trained for decisive
land combat. This has got to be sustained.
That was one of the things that I saw a I looked in--over
the course of funding is--if we don't have predictable funding
and cannot sustain readiness, particularly on the high end,
then we've got an Army that's not properly trained.
What I've learned over my experience, a soldier must have
confidence in themselves, they must have confidence in their
leadership, and they must have confidence in their equipment.
That--and if they don't have that, and have the opportunity to
train on that, then we're headed for something that is not good
for the country.
Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Sir, did you want to answer?
Mr. Lamont. Just very quickly. I want to point out, when we
made reference to and benchmarked FYPB16 [Fiscal Year
Presidential Budget], that was really informed by the QDR
[Quarterly Defense Review] of 2014. The strategic environment,
as we all know, has changed fairly dramatically since then.
We're quite concerned with those levels, particularly as we go
into 2017.
Chairman McCain. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Once again, gentlemen, thank you and your colleagues for
your extraordinary service.
Let me go back to the issue of the Army Restructuring
Initiative, the helicopters. I think, General Ham, your
comments and also the report suggested that one of the reasons
that you think it--there should be Apaches in the National
Guard is to help integrate Army aviation across the whole
spectrum--Active forces, National Guard forces, Reserve forces.
I--you might comment on that. Also, in terms of the location of
these residual National Guard units, was there any
consideration to ensuring they are closely colocated with
Active forces so they have access to training ranges, to--you
know, to the things you need to do to stay proficient and
current? Would that be part of your recommendations, or would
you consider making further recommendations?
General Ham and----
General Ham. Yeah, Senator Reed, thanks. If you'll allow me
to begin, then I'll turn to General Thurman----
Senator Reed. Yes, sir.
General Ham.--who served on the Aviation Subcommittee.
We looked at four criteria in evaluating a number of
alternatives for--with regard to the Apache issue. We looked,
first and foremost, at wartime sufficiency. What was the proper
structure to meet the stated wartime demands? That's
articulated in the classified annex. We also looked for what
alternative offered the best surge capability for unforeseen
circumstances. Thirdly, we did look at, How do we best support
the total force policy or the integration of the components?
Lastly, importantly, looked at cost. In all of those, we came
to the conclusion that we have stated. Cost, by the way, is
one--is the reason why we recommend--while the battalions in
the National Guard----
Senator Reed. Right.
General Ham.--be fully manned, they be equipped with only
18, vice 24, aircraft, purely as a matter of cost. The National
Guard Bureau and the Director of the Army National Guard told
us that they are quite familiar and comfortable with cross-
leveling units when there is a need for operational employment.
Before I turn to General Thurman, Senator Reed, just--we
did not look specifically at where those battalions might be
located. Certainly in the recommendation that addresses multi-
component units, which we think is important, it does work
best, in our opinion, when those units are colocated--regular
Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve.
General Thurman?
Senator Reed. General Thurman?
General Thurman. Sir, Senator Reed, just to add to that.
One of the things that I just would recommend is, we went into
extensive analysis on wartime capacity that's in that
classified annex that General Ham referred to. Bottom line,
there's--if you put all of the AH-64 aircraft in the regular
Army, you have no strategic depth to reach back to. That was a
big driver.
Here's the other fact, is--our aviation units today--Combat
Aviation Brigades, Apache units--are inside the 1:2--1 year
deployed to two years back home, the BOG Dwell that's referred
to. That really drove us to come up with a alternative to the
Aviation Restructure Initiative. Frankly, that initiative was
budget-driven, when you really get inside that and look at it.
The National Guard option, we looked at that, although a
little more expensive. We used several of the analysis agencies
to help us with this, with--inside of the Training and Doctrine
Command. We settled that we--as a minimum, you need 20
battalions in the regular Army so you can get them out the
door. We learned a lot of lessons at the start of this war,
with aircraft and aviation. Twenty-four is the right number in
a Apache battalion to maintain the amount of combat power that
you must have when these formations are deployed.
For the Army National Guard, we see some opportunities also
for them to work with combined-arms maneuver, particularly with
the units that are closely located, whether it be Fort Bragg,
Fort Hood, you name it. That's very important, because an
aircraft not working with maneuver formations, sir, you know
that's not very effective.
In terms of cost, what we didn't want to do as a Commission
is bring forth an option and not look in detail at this cost,
and look at how we would offset those costs. Therefore, we
looked, as an option, at the Black Hawk fleet. Not to say the
Black Hawk fleet is not an important capability, because it is
one of the capabilities that's requested all the time, whether
it be inside the regular Army or for states and governors for
what they do in the Homeland. The National Guard option said
they could get by with only two battalions of Black Hawks, so
we looked at a 3 percent reduction--modest reduction inside the
Black Hawk multiyear to be able to offset that. The onetime
cost to go from the AH-64 Delta aircraft to the Echo model,
which we would recommend, is about $420 million. We thought we
could offset that inside the aviation portfolio. The annual
operating costs are about 165 million. Therefore, we brought
forth a option that is really paid for out of that aviation
portfolio, and that's what we tried to do.
The other thing I think that's important inside of Army
aviation and what the current environment shows is, we are
rotating--or are going to begin to rotate the Combat Aviation
Brigade out of Korea. Our professional judgment was to leave
that permanently stationed in Korea. One, they've got to be
ready to fight tonight. There's environment issues over there.
You're in a combined environment over--with the Republic of
Korea. That is very important, I think.
The last point I would bring up--or two points--is, we also
recommended retaining an 11th Combat Aviation Brigade. Now, we
don't have--we would have to come, obviously, to the Congress
to get additional funding for that. That's about $1.9 billion,
because you'd have to buy additional aircraft to maintain 11
Combat Aviation Brigades. The current environment says we need
11 Combat Aviation Brigades in the regular Army.
Then the other thing that I could talk about would be the
increase in flying hours funding.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your service.
Chairman McCain. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Thurman, on the aviation question, it seems to me--
and you're recommending a stronger commitment to that, it seems
like to me--what we learned in Iraq and Afghanistan was just
how critical that aviation component is. Would you share your
thoughts about the lessons learned and the shortages we found
when we were trying to maintain operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq?
General Thurman. Yes, sir, Senator.
As a division commander in Baghdad in 2006, the first call
I always heard was, ``Troops in contact, requesting attack
helicopters.'' The reason I bring that up, because this entity
is one of the capabilities that changes dynamics on the
battlefield. I would say aviation is going to continue to be a
high-demand item in Afghanistan and also what--in Iraq or any
other theater that we are going to get involved in. You see it
when you review the war plans, and you see it when you review
the requirements that are coming into the Joint Staff for Army
aviation.
Senator Sessions. Well, I think that's true. I was talking
to a young former helicopter pilot, and flew over a group of
Sunnis that we were supporting. They were all standing up and
cheering. They were facing combat, and they'd call for air--
aviation support, and, when it came, he could see them cheer
when they flew into the battle. I think it's a big deal.
With regard--I understand that the President's Budget zeros
out the Lakota aircraft that's going to be used to replace the
old TH-67 trainers. Any of you aware of that and have any
comment on it? Do we--we're well in the process of replacing
those. I think you--it's odd and concerning to me that it would
just be stopped.
General Thurman. Senator, first thing in regard to the
Aviation Restructure Initiative, we did not look in detail at
the entire ARI proposal. We looked at--the question the law
directed us to look at was primarily on AH-64s. I have heard
that the--there has been an adjustment of funding levels inside
of Lakota aircraft. I can confirm what you've just said.
Senator Sessions. Well, we'll need to examine that, I
think, and make sure.
With regard to the Aviation Restructure Initiative, it's--
there was a claim of 12 billion in savings. You believe your
plan--that sort of strikes a compromise--maybe General Ham--I--
whoever would like to answer this--your plan tries to offset
any cost of this area. You think that you've minimized the cost
by leaving, what, four in the Guard?
General Ham. Yes, Senator. Certainly the recommendation
that the Commission made is more costly than the Aviation
Restructure Initiative. Again, as General Thurman mentioned,
Senator, we didn't look at the entirety of ARI, we looked
specifically at Apache. We felt it was important for us, if we
were going to recommend to you something different than the
Aviation Restructure Initiative, that we at least offer some
off--some alternative sources of funding offsets for you and
for the Army to consider.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
One of the things that's concerning me about this is that,
as a--in reality, General Ham, maybe Sergeant Major Chandler,
it's easier to fire, eliminate a Active Duty military uniformed
soldier than a civilian. As a result, it seems to me we've
drawn down dramatically our uniformed personnel since the peak
of the war. A lot of that was natural. I mean, we expected some
of that to happen. Have we done enough to focus on reduction of
civilian personnel? It seems to me it would take fewer
civilians to support 450,000 Active Duty than it does to
support 570,000 Active Duty. Have you given any thought to
that?
General Ham. Senator, we didn't delve into that issue
particularly, but I would say--and this is, in hindsight,
probably an area that perhaps we could have dealt with more
fully--Army civilians are also part of the total force. It's
regular Army, Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and the Army
civilians that are so essential to sustaining soldiers in all
the components. Having said that, I think certainly a
comprehensive review is warranted. I would say the other
component of that is certainly the contract force that provides
many services to the Army, as well. We simply, because of time
and scope, did not spend a lot of effort in that area.
Mr. Lamont. I might add something to that, having been the
former Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower, which had
the civilian component within that organization. We reached a
peak also in civilians about the same time as we reached in the
uniformed side, with roughly 570-, the number being anywhere
from 275,000 civilian upwards almost to 300,000. I'm advised--
and I can't say this as being totally informed, but I'm advised
we're roughly at 235,000 Army civilians now, or at least headed
in that direction. Perhaps some of the staff can confirm that.
We have to be a little bit careful as we refer to the
generating force. There's the operational force and the
generating force within the Army, and the generating force
takes up roughly one-third. Within that generating force is
over 60 percent civilian. We have to be a little bit careful.
It's not always proportional when we cut those down. You--I
think your point, though, was well taken, that there may be
some need to see some reductions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I particularly noticed in the report those areas that were
cited as an unacceptable risk, because it seems to me that we
need to really pay attention to where you have determined we
have an unacceptable risk. Contained in those things were--that
you characterized as an unacceptable risk was chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear response, and also
military police. Now, I obviously am aware that Fort Leonard
Wood is incredibly important to all of the above, so I would
like--General Ham, if you could, briefly talk about what are
the potential consequences to our strength and our capabilities
if we are not really drilling down on this unacceptable risk
that you all reported on.
General Ham. Thanks, Senator. I would, first, recommend the
classified annex, which gets into some of the particulars,
particularly with regard to the chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear units of the Army. In general, I
would say that both of those capabilities that the Army
possesses in its various components reflect a structure that
was based on a different operating environment than exists
today, with the necessity that the Army and the likelihood that
the Army will operate in a chemical, biological, radiological,
or nuclear environment at home or overseas, I think, drives
some added emphasis in that area. There is--I would note, we
believe that there is a particular role for the Army National
Guard for domestic response in that area.
With regard to military police, as many parts of the world
are increasingly urbanized and soldiers will be operating in
and amongst populations, the military police provide a very
special capability that facilitates the ability of other Army
units to operate in that environment. Again, it was our general
assessment, in both of those capabilities--CBRN [Chemical
Biological Radiological Nuclear] and military police--that the
capacity within the Army across the three components has not
kept pace with the demand.
Senator McCaskill. I assume, since engineers were not
cited, that you all are comfortable with our capabilities in
the--with the Army Corps and the engineering force?
General Ham. Yeah, Senator. Two different things. We didn't
spend a lot of time with the Army Corps of Engineers. An
absolutely vital part of the Army and its contributions to many
facets of American life and foundational for the economy are
well known to you and the members of this committee.
With regard to the operating force of the engineer corps,
we didn't find significant shortfalls in engineers, themselves.
We found significant shortfalls in tactical mobility, meaning
that engineer units across the Army, all components, many of
them have much of the equipment that they require, but they
can't move it. In simple terms, I may have my bulldozer, but--
--
Senator McCaskill. Don't know how to get it there.
General Ham.--I have no way to move my bulldozer from where
it gets off at a port to where it's needed to be. That's a
needed area to be addressed.
Senator McCaskill. I also looked at the report as it
relates for the generating force. I know, Mr. Lamont, you just
referenced the generating force. Does the Commission believe
the Army has cut too much from the generating force? How much
risk has been taken in the Army's ability to expand the
generating force, if necessary? I mean, obviously, you know, if
we don't have the folks in place to train up what we need, then
we are really in trouble. If one of you would address the
issues around the--what is the appropriate size of the
generating force? Do we really even know?
Mr. Lamont. Well, let me take a stab at that.
One, we are quite concerned with the generating force, as I
just mentioned, and the--although the Commission did not delve
deeply into that, I think you hit a key point when you said,
``What's our ability if we have to expand?'' Those--the
generating force are our trainers, our schoolhouses, our
medical, and things of that nature. As the war progressed in, I
want to say, 2008, 2009, 2010, the demand for troops grew, and
we moved any number of troops out of the generating force and
sent them off to war. They were replaced, often, by civilians.
I think that that ratio remains much the same.
We are quite concerned with the size of the generating
force. I don't know that there is an ideal number, an optimal
number. We'd better have them when we need them.
Senator McCaskill. Do you think the ratio of 60 civilian,
40 military is appropriate for the generating force? That seems
awfully high civilian, which I understand how it happened and
why it happened, but shouldn't we try to reverse that?
Mr. Lamont. Well, speaking as--personally and not as a
member of the Commission, I agree that that's quite bad. In
fact, when I left, it was over 62 percent were civilian. That
seems dramatically small--or large.
General Ham. Senator, would it be okay if Sergeant Major--
--
Mr. Chandler. Senator, just--another item of information.
The Army uses modeling to develop force structure----
Senator McCaskill. Right.
Mr. Chandler.--for operational forces, but we don't
currently have a model for the generating force.
Senator McCaskill. For generating?
Mr. Chandler. There is a great deal of work that's going
into developing a generating force model. When the Army
achieves that, I think you'll be able to have better
granularity on the questions that you're asking.
One thing I would tell you, is that there is no
proportional ratio, from my perspective, having been in the
training and doctrine business for quite a bit of time, that
says, ``Okay, if you cut this from the operational force, then
you can see a reduction in--a similar reduction in the
generating force.'' If you've got to train soldiers at basic
combat training, it takes a certain amount of people. That
ratio never changes.
I applaud the Army's effort for the generating force model.
I'd ask them to move on that as quickly as possible. Then I
think you can get to the real--instead of throwing darts at a
dartboard--to a real level of granularity on where the
generating force should be. I think most of us are uneasy about
the fact that we've cut it to--maybe into the bone.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Sergeant Major.
Thank all of you for your work on this.
Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. I want to thank all of you for your
distinguished service and work on this Commission.
I know that the Chairman had asked you about the total
force size and thinking about, What's the optimal size of the
Army? That's what I would like to hear from you. Let's--given
the threats we're facing around the world, given the challenges
that we face--as I understand, General Ham, you also noted that
the President's fiscal year 2016 plan does not take into
account recent changes in strategic environment. Can you tell
us what is the optimal size for our Army? Because I think it's
important for us to understand what the optimal size is if we
really want to protect the American people and not in a budget-
constrained environment. I understand we're in that, but we
should understand--With the threats we're facing, what is the
number, if you could decide that number today?
General Ham. Yeah, Senator, it is--it's a great question,
and a tough question--it is important to note that, of course,
that was not the task that we had in the law. The task that we
had in the law was constrained by resourcing. That's how we
approached our work.
I think I'm on a firm ground that I would speak for the
Commission that said if you--if the law had not contained that
constraint, if it didn't say you have to provide
recommendations----
Senator Ayotte. See, this is the great thing about
hearings. We can sort of ask anything, even if we----
General Ham. Right.
Senator Ayotte.--said ``in the law.''
General Ham. Right.
Senator Ayotte.--I'm asking for your opinions today.
General Ham. Yeah. The Commission--I think the Commission
did not address that. I would offer you my personal opinion
that would say--again, let me backtrack and speak one moment
for the Commission.
We were careful in the words that we chose. We chose
``minimally sufficient'' at--of an Army of 980,000. Minimally
sufficient. I think it's a real question to say, Is that the
Army the Nation wants? Do--does America want a minimally
sufficient Army? I think that's a discussion for many to have.
I think if the--if additional funding were available, then
certainly a larger force--again, let me speak personally--I
would say, halt any further drawdown now, and make a more--much
more comprehensive assessment of the operating environment, and
then see what that cost may be, and then come back to this
committee and others to say, ``Here's what we think the bill
is.''
Senator Ayotte. ``Minimally sufficient,'' to me, doesn't
sound like protecting our national security interests. That's
really--I'm not going to ask you to give me an opinion as a
Commission, but you, given the breadth of experience on this
panel, based on your experience, General Thurman, where do you
think we need to be, versus putting aside the budget issue for
a moment? Because this is an important, I think, understanding
that we have to have of where we are versus where we should be.
General Thurman. Yes, ma'am.
Senator, I will tell you, I'm very concerned, because I
think we've got major warning signs in front of us right now.
Not speaking as a commissioner; I'm telling you what I see as I
watch the resurgence of Russia--they're basically in Syria,
they're conducting their own NTC rotation. They have gone to
school on us, and, as I watch that unfold; and then I turn to
Korea and I watch what's occurring over there in Korea today,
it's probably more dangerous today than it's been in a long
time, given we're dealing with a maniac over there, frankly.
Those forces over there have got to be trained, ready to fight
tonight, because it's a miscalculation on either side that
could get us in a war.
I think, if you look back what happened over the course of
the last few years when we had the Budget Control Act go into
effect, the assumptions have changed. One, we're not out of
Afghanistan, probably putting more back in. We've got ISIS
[Islamic State of Syria], ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant], Iraq, Syria. We've got Africa, the--North Africa, that
whole issue that's going on in there. One of the
recommendations that we got in the report is to go back and
review the national security strategy that we currently have in
the budget, because I believe it's seriously out of balance
and--as I look at this.
The number--there needs to be another analysis, in my
opinion, to go back and look at, What is the right size Army
that this Nation needs? Frankly, it's going to be expensive,
and we've got to, I believe, come to grips with that. The--
frankly, the assumptions that--when we reduce the force,
they're not true anymore. We have a set of failed assumptions.
That's my opinion.
Mr. Chandler. Senator, if you don't mind, I'll add my two
cents. I think I can be blunt. I don't think it's wise for us
to consider growing the Army until we totally use the entire
force and then determine from there what additional
capabilities we may need. We've used the Active component, the
regular Army, significantly, and the Guard and Reserve less. We
need to use and execute the total-force policy to get the Guard
and Reserve engaged on a predictable rotational basis----
Senator Ayotte. Well----
Mr. Chandler.--which will allow us----
Senator Ayotte. I don't want to interrupt, here, because I
know we have a vote, but I'm not sure, if I asked my Guard and
Reserve members if they've been used less, given the nature of
many of them holding down civilian jobs at the same time, they
would necessarily agree with that calculation, especially with
what we've had to do in Iraq and Afghanistan. We couldn't have
done it without them.
Mr. Chandler. I would tell you that the vast majority of
guardsmen and reservists that we talked to want to be utilized
more frequently, in a predictable manner.
Mr. Lamont. I would concur with that, by the way, as a
traditional guardsman for 26 years. We found this every visit
we went, ``If you're going to train us up and then not use us,
why are we here?'' It's much different than my years, back in
the '80s and early 1990s.
Senator Ayotte. Well, I have great confidence in our Guard
and Reserve, but I don't think that gets to the fundamental
question. Because they're asking--we're asking to downsize
them, too, in terms--I mean, the decisions you're making at
today are how much training, how much aviation assets they're
going to get, what are they going to get for their readiness?
To me, I think it's a total-force question for the Army, and
it's one that we need to face, of: Where are we, versus the
threats that we're facing? It seems to me that--as I hear some
of these threats, that it's time for us to really think about
not drawing down, but looking at, How do we make sure we can
protect this Nation? Also that we don't drain our people. You
know, the dwell-to-deploy ratio and really making sure our most
precious resource, that they have what they need, and the
support that they need.
Senator Reed [presiding]. Well, thank you very much,
Senator.
I--the Chairman is voting. Most of my colleagues are
voting. They shall return. I think someone famous once said
something like that. I'm going to take the opportunity, and, as
soon as one of my colleagues arrives, I'll recognize the
person.
Sergeant Major, what's the most interesting, insightful
thing that some of the soldiers told you when you were out with
your colleagues in the field that we should know?
Mr. Chandler. Well, I think the one thing that I would ask
the committee to take away is, the soldiers are extremely proud
of what they do, regardless of what component they're in, and
that they want to serve, they're proud to serve, their families
are proud of what they do. They want to be ready to do what it
is that the Nation asks us to do, asks them to do. You know,
whether you're--you're dusty and sweaty and haven't taken a
shower in 3 days at the National Training Center, you know,
these kids were motivated. They were going to finish their
final live-fire objective. They were excited about what they
were doing. If you went to a drill and saw what some of these
kids are doing, yeah, they don't want to do a lot of mandatory
training, they don't want to look at PowerPoint slides, they
want to get after it, they want to be what they came in the
Army to be, which is a United States Army soldier of the proud
tradition that wants to do the Nation's bidding.
You can't--having been away from the Army for a year and
coming back and trying to be objective, you can't but be filled
with pride in the service that these kids--we--I spoke to a
specialist in--at--and actually came to a hearing in
Washington. This kid had tried to do many things before he
entered the Army, but the Army gave him a sense of purpose and
a desire to do and be a part of something bigger than himself.
He was almost in tears, moved me to tears, about his sense of
who he was and what he was about. That's the thing I'd ask you
to take away. These kids are proud of what they do. They need
the Nation's support.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Sergeant Major.
Again, thank you, gentlemen.
On behalf of the Chairman, I would like to recognize
Senator Ernst.
Senator Ernst. Thank you.
Thank you, gentlemen, so much for being here today and for
your testimony. I certainly appreciate all the years of service
that all of you have given.
I'd like to start with some discussion about the State
Partnership Program, which has been really important to Iowa
and many of our other states. Throughout your report, you
stress the need for the Army to enhance its total-force
approach to ensure the Army can meet its mission requirements,
and the importance of the National Guard in achieving that
goal. I do appreciate the thoughtful analysis of the importance
of the Guard, especially, since 9/11. In particular, I would
like to talk about the State Partnership Program. I do think
that this program is key in allowing our Army and our country
to better partner with foreign countries and develop these
nations and enhance our security and the security of our
allies, and doing so at a low cost to American taxpayers.
Last week, this committee had a hearing on the Asia
Pacific, and the witnesses stressed the importance of SPP
[State Partnership Program] and their belief that it should be
expanded more into the Asia Pacific, in particular. Is this a
program that was looked at during this study? If any of you
could address that, or, General Ham, if you would like to take
that. National--the impact to our Army with use of the Guard as
well the State Partnership Program, was that looked at, at all?
General Ham. Thanks, Senator. We heard, loud and clear,
from all six geographic combatant commanders, their praise and
reliance upon the State Partnership Program, and every one of
them wants that program, not only to be sustained, but to be
increased. They're looking for more and more opportunities to
expand State Partnership into other nations, particularly new
and nontraditional partners in some parts of the world. I would
agree with you, and it's certainly what we found in our work,
was the State Partnership is a very low-cost, high-payoff
program for the Army and for the Nation.
Senator Ernst. Thank you.
Any other thoughts, gentlemen, on that? Yes, sir.
Mr. Lamont. Yes, ma'am. Being from your neighboring State
of Illinois and a guardsman, and our partner was Poland. In my
previous life, as the Assistant Secretary of the Army, I
happened be in Poland at the same time as the Illinois Adjutant
General. I was absolutely irrelevant to the Polish army,
because their connection was with the Illinois Guard. That
partnership is so vital to our country partnerships; it is
extremely important. They didn't care about me or anybody else,
but they cared about the people they worked and served with,
visited with, went to war with. Poland, as you probably know,
have provided us, and maybe still provide us, with a brigade at
least once a year when we were in Afghanistan and Iraq. What
that saved United States taxpayers, for instance, and our
soldiers, was enormous. It is vitally important, as you know.
Senator Ernst. Very good. Well, I appreciate that. Iowa has
a very strong partnership with Kosovo, and, through that, we've
developed--even outside of our State Partnership Program,
between our soldiers and Kosovo Security Forces, have developed
now an economic relationship through our State with the nation
of Kosovo. Just the last couple of weeks, we opened a brand new
consulate in Des Moines. That's our State's first consulate. We
were really excited about that. That started and grew out of
the State Partnership Program. I appreciate your thoughts on
that.
I'd like to turn to a different topic just very briefly.
One of the recommendations is to reduce mandatory training, as
prescribed by the Army Training and Leader Development
Regulation. While I agree with this recommendation, I can't
tell you how many times I have spoken to Active-component
commanders as well as Reserve-component commanders, and they
have said that they are assuming risk rather than mitigating
the risk due to the mandatory training requirements. The over-
burdensome requirements mean that commanders aren't able to use
that time to train on their unit's mettle or their mission-
essential task list, which ultimately harms the readiness of
their units and the Army as a whole. You know, we're in a
politically correct environment. We seem to be very risk-
averse. Can you talk to that, maybe, a little bit more about--
and maybe, Sergeant Major, if you would address this--on how we
get back to being soldiers, but also giving back some of that
risk?
Mr. Chandler. Well, thanks for the question, Senator.
The--I would start off by saying that the Army is making
inroads to reduce mandatory training, in line with the doctrine
of mission command. The mitigation of risk is by the higher
commander. It's--if I was in command of a unit, it would be my
responsibility to tell my higher commander, ``These are the
areas of risk that I am assuming, based off of what you told me
to do.'' The challenge really is even exacerbated for Army
National Guard and Army Reserve units because of the limited
amount of time, as you well know, for IDT [Inactive Duty
Training] weekends or battle assembly weekends. Where do you
find that balance? I applaud the Army's effort. The Commission
does, highly recommends that the Army move out a little bit
quicker on reducing the overhead burden, so to speak, of the
mandatory training requirements. Look, we ask these commanders
to make life-and-death decisions on the battlefield. We should
entrust and empower them to make those same decisions at some
home station or IDT battle assembly weekend event. Same with
Active component. We're not going to get to the level of
readiness that we need to if we continue to add necessary, but
mandated, requirements with a certain frequency. The commander
knows the unit. They should be able to make the decisions on
when and where they need to make the mandatory training occur
and still maintain an acceptable level of readiness.
Senator Ernst. Very good. I also agree with that, Sergeant
Major. Our company commanders and first sergeants, our
battalion commanders and sergeant majors know their soldiers
best, and they know what they need to work on. I'm glad to see
that we have a recommendation that moves us in that direction.
Thank you much, Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. On behalf of the Chairman, Senator Donnelly,
please.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will pass to
Mr. King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, an observation. The budget control caps were set in
2011. I was just making some notes. That's pre-ISIL, pre-Syria,
pre-Ukraine, pre-South China Sea, pre-North Korea launch. Here
we are, trying to fit the defense posture of this country,
subsequent to all those events, within caps that were
established five years ago. Now, they were adjusted somewhat
last year, but not all that much. It just--it--I mean, I'm all
for planning and thinking ahead and having constraints, but
when the constraints keep you from responding to the threats
that the country is facing, it's just not a rational or prudent
policy, it seems to me.
I wanted to start with a question. General Ham, when you
made your recommendations, were you consciously or
unconsciously operating under those caps? In other words, are
your recommendations based upon those budget realities or were
they based upon what your best judgment of what the Army needs
to look like in order to meet the threats that this country
faces?
General Ham. Senator, a little bit of both. Certainly, the
judgment of the eight commissioners--lots of experience in a
lot of different fields represented there. Again, we were
instructed in the law that we had to conduct our assessments
and make our recommendations consistent with an anticipated
level of future resource. It wasn't further defined. You could
kind of pick and choose, What do you think the anticipated
level of future resourcing would be? It was our general
assessment that it's unlikely, at the time that we were doing
our work, that there would be a significant increase in
funding. We--that's why we--we've centered on this notion of
the level of funding in the President's Budget for fiscal year
2016 in the--and was kind of the--again, the floor of ceiling.
Of course, as you know, Senator, we're not at that level yet. I
think that's at least a start point. It was--I guess to
summarize, it was a--looking at the anticipated security
environment, but certainly informed by the level of funding we
thought might be attained.
Senator King. You understand the thrust of my concern.
General Ham. I do, sir. One of our most important
recommendations, already been referred to, is that, because the
global security environment has changed so significantly from
those days of budget and strategic plans, it is time for, we
believe, new strategic guidance.
Senator King. I certainly agree with that wholeheartedly.
To put a point on this, you recommend going down to 30 Active
BCTs [Brigade Combat Teams], which is actually less than we had
before September 11th, and then perhaps a reduction to 28.
Here's my question. How long does it take to recruit, train,
and equip a BCT if we wanted to increase that number, from a
standing start?
General Ham. Senator, let me take a stab at it and maybe
ask the Sergeant Major of the Army to comment.
I actually had to do this when I was a division commander.
A brand new infantry Brigade Combat Team was formed, stood up,
equipped and deployed. With all of the very, very high
priority--this was in the mid-2000s--it took about 18 months to
be able to do that. I would say in a--on a more normal basis,
it would probably take--and again, that was in a period of
almost unconstrained resources--typically, I would say two to
three years would be a more likely timeframe to start from
scratch and build a Brigade Combat Team.
Senator King. That reminds me of the old thing I learned in
Driver's Ed, that your headlights only illuminate a certain
distance down the road, and, if there's a wall 1 foot beyond
that distance, you can't stop. We're not going to have the
ability to respond to a threat if we're talking a minimum of 18
months to two and a half to three years. I mean, that's the
risk that we're undertaking as we make--as we're making these
decisions.
I--General, your reaction to that kind of----
Mr. Chandler. Senator, I would say--and I agree with what
General Ham said--the greatest challenge is the leader
development in order to fill that brigade.
Senator King. That's not something you can just turn off
and on.
Mr. Chandler. No, those--you know, it takes 20 years to
make a battalion commander or a brigade commander. I mean, it
takes 20 years to grow a sergeant major, 15 years to grow a
first sergeant. Expansion will get the people into the Army,
will get the equipment to where it needs to be, but to find the
leadership in order to fill out that organization and make it
effective takes time. There's just not a lot of them to spare.
Senator King. Okay. I have the same concern about the end-
strength numbers, that those were numbers derived from a
different strategic world, and that we really do need, as you
say, a strategic reset to take account of the current
challenges.
Yes, sir.
General Thurman. Senator, I was a G3 of the Army for three
years, and I was there for the grow-the-Army piece, where we
grew Brigade Combat Teams up to 43 Brigade Combat Teams. I was
there for Iraq surge, Afghan surge, and watched what goes on
inside the Army. The biggest issue is manpower because of what
it takes to get the right people in these jobs. It varied on
the length of time. Also, as division commander, my experience,
just--much like General Ham, we deployed a brigade for a
specific set of missions, and we were able to man, train, and
equip that in 18 months. That's a stretch. That's a big
stretch. Again, that's having all the resourcing you need, with
the right levels of modernization.
Senator King. Two----
Mr. Chandler. That's something that's a concern. Yes, sir.
Senator King. Two days ago in this committee--and I'll end
my comments; I know I'm over time--two days ago, we had General
Clapper here, who said that, in his 50 years of service to this
country, he has never seen a more diverse or serious set of
threats. At the same we're getting that testimony, we're
talking about reducing end strength and developing a situation
where it's going to be very difficult to respond to a crisis.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Senator Donnelly.
Mr. Lamont. Senator, I just want to point out one thing. In
that recommendation for perhaps removing two ICBTs--IBCTs, that
was conditional. If there were no other alternatives inside the
Army, the resourcing, or anyplace else, that's what we might
have to look for. That was a big ``if.''
Senator Reed. On behalf of the Chairman, Senator Tillis,
please.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Thank you all for being here, and thank you for your
service.
I have a question. How do--what are your opinions about the
current balance between the number of general officers in the
Army and the current force structure, overall end strength?
General Ham. Senator, we did not assess that. I would offer
a personal opinion, and--just from my own personal experience.
That is a thing that's continually looked at to see if it's
quite right, not only in terms of number, but in terms of grade
structure--one, two, three, or four stars. The Army has made
some adjustments over the past couple of years. It is a
constant evaluative process.
Senator Tillis. Any other comments?
[No response.]
Senator Tillis. Talk a little bit about acquisition and
reform. To what extent have you all looked into some of the
reforms that are detailed in the fiscal year 2016 NDA. Do you
agree with them? Do you think that they make sense? Are there
any concerns with them?
General Ham. Senator, again, it got outside the mandate
given to the Commission, so we didn't spend a lot of time on
acquisition reform or, for that matter, for modernization.
Clearly that's a--an issue--in order for the Army to keep apace
with the technological advances, for our soldiers to be
equipped so that they can go into battle, as we say, never into
a fair fight, I think modernization and the acquisition reform
that will lead to cost-effective modernization are clearly
critical items for the Army and for the Nation to address.
Senator Tillis. Yeah, it seems to me that we really need to
have that considered in any kind of overall assessments of the
Army or any branch, because we're--the money and the
inefficiency that we have there is at the direct expense of
other things that we need to spend our money. This is one area
I would like for you all to touch on. In my time--I'm from
North Carolina, and spend a lot of time down at Camp LeJeune
and Fort Bragg. One consistent theme that I'm hearing down
there is a concern that our readiness levels are at a very low
point. If you take a look at Fort Bragg and you're talking
about the number of jumps that they want to do now, at--we've
had this discussion about Pope Air Field and little bit of a
disagreement with the Air Force on what we should do with those
assets down there. That stimulated a discussion about just how
many jumps we should have. It's substantially higher than what
they've been doing over the past 10, 15 years. My concern is,
that points to, I think, a readiness deficiency. To what extent
do you all agree with that?
Sergeant Major, I see your shaking your head. We'll start
with you.
Mr. Chandler. Well, Senator, I think, you know, the Army
developed a capability called a Rapid Equipping Force, which
was able to generate and fill requirements much more quickly
than I think the normal acquisition process takes. My only
recommendation was, maybe there should be some look at how that
process worked, and does it apply to the overall acquisition
program. You know, I think there were some decisions made about
how many jumps folks would make in airborne units, because of
the necessity to get them prepared to do the directed mission
they had in Iraq or Afghanistan. Getting those guys back,
jumping of planes--guys and gals jumping out of planes is a
great thing. Personally, I'm all for it. How that fits into the
overall picture, I'm not aware of right now.
General Thurman. I would add two points to your question.
That has to do with acquisition. I think it is right to do
acquisition reform. It takes too long to field equipment. Why
does that happen? It happens because we never seem to get the
requirements right. You have to lock down the requirements in a
more timely manner. I mean, if you look at the Army, the Army's
track record is not good. Ground combat vehicle, armed aerial
Scout, all those were killed because, over time, it takes too
long to field that equipment. Requirements change, threats
change. That is right, in my opinion, to really take a good
look at that.
I think, in terms of readiness, there's always the question
about proficiency verses currency. We need to be proficient.
That comes to light in aviation. Because, right now, I believe
aviation is on the ragged edge. That's our recommendation on
increase in flying hours. That's flying hours to support
combined arms maneuver with maneuver formations. It's one thing
to go fly a helicopter, it's another thing to integrate it in a
combined arms formation. That's what's missing.
The recommendation we had, which is going to cost some
money, was to increase flying hours, not only for the regular
Army, but also for the Reserve components--Army National Guard,
Army Reserve--to get their proficiency levels up. Because
that's not happening out there, even today. That's what we
found when we went around and visited units.
Senator Tillis. Thank you.
Well, in closing--and I know this is a theme that the Chair
has struck many times in the year that I've been here--I'm
trying to figure out how we have an--in any discussion about
things that we can do to better prepare men and women, and
better equip men and women, we have to talk about acquisition
reform, we have to talk about why I've got in my office a 600
page RFP for the new-generation handgun. It's got 39 pages
that--and when I go back to the Department, they said, ``But,
it's only 39 pages of specifications.'' I said, ``Great. Then
that means we can delete everything else that doesn't speak to
the complexity of the process and the selection process?'' Of
course not. The reason that I try to bring these things up,
even in things where we're talking about capability and
readiness, that sort of behavior has a direct deleterious
effect on our ability to provide men and women with training
and the equipment they need to bring the fight to the enemy. We
have to make sure that it's integrated and stay on the front
stage. I know that--I know the Chair agrees.
Thank you. I've gone over my time.
Chairman McCain [presiding]. Well, I thank Senator Tillis.
I know our panelists agree that it harms our credibility
when we ask for more funding and we have a $2 billion cost
overrun on an aircraft carrier and we have, starting with the
FCS [Future Combat Systems], a long line of programs where
billions of dollars were wasted, with no result. I appreciate
the emphasis that you have given on this issue. We have to fix
it.
Senator Donnelly.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank all the witnesses.
Indiana doesn't have a large Active Duty presence for many
of the services, but it's home to our Nation's fourth-largest
National Guard unit. Many of the 14,000 Hoosiers who serve in
the Guard also have spent time on Active Duty. In your report,
you write of how disheartening it was to hear the discord
within the Army ranks, pitting the Army National Guard against
the regular Army. I heard that same disheartened sentiment
among our Hoosier Guard members. From the top down, their focus
has been on serving our country, our State, and our local
communities. I appreciate your call for leaders in the DOD and
in Congress to do our part to keep these conversations
professional and respectful while keeping in mind that there
can be different viewpoints on how to best accomplish these
objectives. As all of you know so well, one of our hopes in
convening the Commission was to get objective input as to how
to resolve this difference and others.
General Ham, how do you believe the findings of the
Commission will help support the reset in that relationship
between the regular Army and the Guard?
General Ham. Senator, I believe many of the recommendations
that we make with regard to the total force, whether it be a
legislative change that would allow for the assignment of
regular Army soldiers into Army National Guard units, multi-
component units that bring soldiers from all three components
together in common mission, in my view, also increased
readiness within the Reserve components on the cyclical basis,
called the Sustained Readiness Model, that the Army has
developed, and in the operational employment of the Reserve
components along with the regular Army. I think all of those
tend to build this sense of one Army. The same would be true
for leader development courses for noncommissioned officers and
officers.
General Milley, the Chief of Staff, who you all know very
well, begins many of his addresses to soldiers of all
components, he said, ``Look at your uniform. Over your breast
pocket, it says U.S. Army. It doesn't say regular Army, doesn't
say Army National Guard, doesn't say Army Reserve. It says U.S.
Army.'' That common start point is--I think is a place to
begin.
Senator Donnelly. Just to follow up on that, in the
recommendations, what do you see as the most vital in helping
to create that one Army and to resolve that tension?
General Ham. Senator, I'll offer two that I think are
vitally important, and others may have some other views.
The first and foremost, I think, is the overarching
recommendation to sustain the All-Volunteer Force. I think, if
we don't do that, the rest of it might not matter. Secondly, I
think is this element of adequate funding, reliably and
predictably developed and delivered to the Army in all of its
components, I think will go a long way to removing some of the
doubt and uncertainty that exists.
Senator Donnelly. Well, I'd like to ask the panel a
different question, which is--we have 63 different
recommendations for the future of the Army, and we're in a
resource-constrained environment. Of those 63, what would each
of you prioritize as your most important recommendation, going
forward.
Mr. Lamont?
Mr. Lamont. Manning and resourcing the total force. We're
very concerned, as we've mentioned, about keeping our levels of
manning such that we can respond to acceptable levels of risk.
It's not just enough to have a larger Army. You'd better have
them trained, equipped, and ready, or you don't gain a whole
lot. It's going to be a resourcing--frankly, a resourcing
picture for that manning and readiness level, as you mentioned.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
General Ham?
General Ham. Senator, I think I would fall back to
recommendation 6, the Congress and the administration should
return to predictable and responsible budgeting processes that
meet minimum funding requirements.
Senator Donnelly. General Thurman?
General Thurman. Thanks, Senator.
I would agree with General Ham on that. However, I would
add that I believe readiness in maintaining the All-Volunteer
Force is fundamental to this country. Why do I say that? I'm
very worried about the declining population that is actually
eligible in this country to serve in the United States
military. Less than one-third is what can meet standards, in
terms of the medical fitness, the aptitude, and--and that's
declining. I think that's something that we've really got to
pay attention to as we go down the road.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
Sergeant Major?
Mr. Chandler. Senator, I think--it's hard for me to
prioritize, because each one of these are interwoven in some
aspect of preserving and sustaining the All-Volunteer Force in
a total-force policy. If you're going to pin me down, budgetary
stability, budgetary predictability is important.
I want to give you one area that I think is a resounding
theme throughout this. This is the Army culture, the culture
that all three components are interwoven, that rely on one
another, that we have to do some work in order to break that
culture down. That are--where many of the recommendations come
from, especially in multi-component units and leader
development training. I mean, if people don't want to get
along, one of the best ways you can solve that is, make them
stay in the same room until they work it out. I'm sure you
probably have had some experience with that here.
Senator Donnelly. Indeed, I have.
Mr. Chandler. I had the opportunity to serve with the Army
National Guard unit in Mississippi for three years as a regular
Army soldier, and that was probably the most important
assignment for me in my military career culminating as the
Sergeant Major of the Army, because I was forced to be in an
environment, post-Desert Shield/Desert Storm, right after the
brigade that I was assigned to had been declared unfit for
deployment, to be a regular Army unit stationed in the same
armory with the same persons. I was forced to change my view of
what the Army National Guard does for the Nation. I've never
forgotten it. I still stay in contact with some of those
individuals that were in that brigade.
That's the type of thing that, when we talk about the
total-force policy and the questions that you asked us, that we
really have to get after. It's not just a policy, but that the
policy is executed at the grassroots lever. The questions that
you had about, you know, some--what I think--very
unprofessional and uncalled for comments in open media and so
forth--will get resolved over time, but it's not going to get
changed in one administration. It's going to take, you know, a
commitment to a long-term vision to make this work for what's
best for the Army and the Nation.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you so much.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Lee.
Senator Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks, to all of you, for your testimonies today and for
devoting a year to this Commission and to the future of the
Army.
One of the key issues that Congress asked your Commission
to report on was the Aviation Restructuring Initiative, or ARI,
and the future of combat aviation in the Army. In
recommendation number 57, the Commission recommended retaining
four Apache battalions in the National Guard, each with 18
aircraft, and committing to using the National Guard Apache
battalions regularly. The report states that this would provide
more wartime capacity than ARI, and would be more cost-
effective. Can you please discuss for us and explain to the
committee, if you would, why you determined that the--that
surge capacity and strategic depth were important factors in
your recommendation--in developing and making your
recommendation, and what problems would the Army face if it
lost strategic depth, you know, provided by the National Guard,
of Apache battalions.
General Thurman. Senator, thank you.
First off, we looked at four areas, after extensive
analysis. We visited over 31 aviation units across all three
components. The first thing we looked at was wartime capacity,
the ability to respond and meet the war plan requirements, and
then wartime surge capacity, and then to ease the burden on
peacetime deployments, and then we factored in the cost,
because we didn't want to come forward with a recommendation
without some cost offsets. You mentioned strategic depth. There
is no strategic depth if you move all of the AH-64 aircraft
inside the regular Army. I would refer you to the classified
annex. It has a lot of our work--analytical work in there that
talks about the requirements for AH-64 attack aircraft, which,
in a lot of cases, was very short as we looked at that.
One--to get to your point--it takes time to train an Apache
aviator. That's a very complex system. I am a rated AH-64 Alpha
pilot, not a Echo or a Delta model. That is a very
sophisticated aircraft. Not only do you have to master that
skill of flying the platform, but, one, can you integrate it
with combined arms maneuver? We felt there needed to be depth
in the force with--and what the recommendation calls for, it
would give you about 280 pilots inside the National Guard--Army
National Guard.
Now, the other point was, these formations need to be put
on a rotational cycle, inside the force generation and actually
utilized so it could offset the stress that's on the current
peacetime deployments. That's what we tried to do. We offered
up some cost, modest cost, in terms of reduction of Black Hawk,
to offset what it would cost to put four battalions inside the
Army National Guard. That is in the report. Again, a onetime
cost for the Delta-model-to-Echo conversion, which would be
required, is roughly a $420 million, and then another 165
million, in terms of operating and sustainment cost, is what we
did.
Senator Lee. Right. Right. No, I'm pleased to hear the
careful manner in which you've gone about it. I would--my staff
and I have visited with members of the Utah National Guard's
1st Battalion, 211th Aviation Regiment, and there's definitely
a degree and quality of Apache experience in those Guard units
that I don't think can be replaced or replicated or matched
anywhere else.
Last fall, Chief Warrant Officer Kent Jones, one our
National Guard instructors, reached the milestone of 10,000
flying hours in the Apache, which is a record. The past two
years, I've been greatly concerned about using this type of
experience. How and to what extent did the Commission view
these issues of pilot and crew experience as you factored in--
those into this analysis?
General Thurman. Senator, we looked at that as a--an
investment, in terms of personnel. Absolutely you would want to
retain some of that experience, because if you got into a major
conflict, that's going to be required. If you go back to the
Iraq War, we called a lot of our aviators to Active Duty that
were retired, because we needed that experience back. Again,
you don't build that overnight, and it takes time to do that.
Senator Lee. Great. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lamont. You might want to know that, in fact, one of
the key members of our staff, on the aviation side, came from
the Utah National Guard as an aviator instructor pilot.
Senator Lee. Sounds like you know how to pick them. That's
great.
Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you----
General Ham. Senator, may I--Mr. Chairman, if I may, just
for a moment, correct the record. General Thurman said that
he's a rated pilot. I would, for the record, note General
Thurman ``was'' a rated pilot. I love him dearly, but I would
not get in an aircraft with him today.
[Laughter.]
Chairman McCain. The airways are safe.
[Laughter.]
Chairman McCain. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all very much for your past service and for your
willingness to be part of this Commission and work on this
report.
A recent RAND report found that current NATO [North
Atlantic Treaty Organization] force structure in Europe, and I
quote, ``cannot successfully defend the territory of its most
exposed members. In the worst-case scenarios for NATO, Russia
would be able to conquer the capital of Estonia in 36 hours.''
The Commission recommends that the Army should forward-deploy
an Armored Brigade Combat Team in Europe and convert the U.S.
Army-Europe Administrative Aviation Headquarters to a
warfighting mission. I wonder if you could elaborate. I don't
know, General Ham, if you would like to do that or if there's
someone else on the panel who would like to elaborate on these
recommendations and our need to bolster United States Forces in
Europe to deter Russian aggression.
General Ham. Thanks, Senator.
Let me begin, and I suspect a couple of others may want to
weigh in.
With regard to the Armored Brigade Combat Team, there are
two issues at play here. The regular Army has nine Armored
Brigade Combat Teams. They're presently all consumed in
rotational assignments. There's an Armored Brigade Combat Team
that rotates to Korea. Under the model that basically is
``three to make one,'' there are three. Same for the Mideast,
and the same for Europe. There's no excess capacity in the
regular Army to meet an unforeseen contingency with Armored
Brigade Combat Teams. We felt there was needed capacity.
One way to get additional capacity would be to forward-
station an Armored Brigade Combat Team in Europe, thereby
freeing up two other regular Army Armored Brigade Combat Teams
for unforeseen contingencies, but it also has the significant
effect--we believe, has a significant effect on both deterrence
against Russian aggression and assurance of the NATO allies.
They are sorely lacking in armored brigade--or armored
capability, and we think a United States brigade would be
helpful.
Senator Shaheen. Does the National Guard have any role to
play as we're looking at how we can cycle forces in and out?
General Ham. Yes, ma'am, absolutely they do. The--in our
discussions with the Chief of Staff-Army, Chief National Guard
Bureau, they're already looking at, How can you, on a
predictable basis, employ those Armored Brigade Combat Teams--
six, I believe, in the Army National Guard--how can you employ
them on that rotational basis? I think, in the not-too-distant
future, it might not at all be unusual to see an Army National
Guard Armored Brigade Combat Team rotate for a year to Korea or
to the Mideast.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
I think, given the challenges we're--that Europe is facing
right now, that looking at how we can provide that kind of
additional support is really important.
I want to get parochial for a bit, because the New
Hampshire National Guard has experienced a 32 percent decline
in force structure since 2007. This percentage is ten times the
decrease in the National Guard, as a whole, during the same
period. There are seven states that are smaller than New
Hampshire but have a larger Guard force structure. Does the
Commission have any recommendations for how to address the
right Guard force structure in a State?
General Ham. We do, Senator. In fact, there's a chapter in
the report dedicated to that. The law required us to conduct an
assessment of the process by which Army National Guard forces
are allocated amongst the States and territories. We made three
recommendations. They are largely administrative. We found, in
general, that the process that is used to determine the
stationing of Army National Guard forces is largely sound, and
there is an opportunity for all of the stakeholders, both
Federal and State, to participate in the process. The one
recommendation that we think was--that--or one part that was a
shortcoming was that, with the establishment of the Chief of
the National Guard Bureau as a four-star officer and a full
member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that role had not been
codified in that process, and particularly with relation to the
Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of Army, who have
significant responsibilities.
We thought that the process was pretty sound for all--
again, for all stakeholders to weigh in when decisions were
being made with regard to the allocation of Army National Guard
forces.
Senator Shaheen. I guess I'm not quite clear. How would
that affect what's happening in New Hampshire, where you've had
that decline? How would that helpful--be helpful in reversing
that?
General Ham. So--well, I'm not sure that--I'm not sure
that--reversing might not be in the cards, but when there are--
when there are force-structure changes that are recommended.
For example, as we see the Army National Guard go down from a--
I think, from 353,000, eventually stepping down, perhaps, to
the 335,000, with the changes in aviation, there is a process
by which all of the stakeholders--the adjutants general, the
governors, the State legislators, the Army staff, the National
Guard Bureau, indeed the--you know, there is a role for the
Congress, here, in terms of funding--for all of those voices to
be heard in that allocation process. There are a number of
factors that are considered: ability to recruit and retain,
access to training areas, the demographics of the particular
State or territory that's being addressed. Again, we--while we
didn't look at individual cases, we looked at the process, and
it was our assessment that the process was largely found--and I
think the--with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, the
Chief of Staff-Army, Secretary of the Army, and to include
leadership at the Joint Staff and OSD [Office of the Secretary
of Defense], I think there is a willingness to have those
discussions, but albeit at some point there are some very, very
difficult decisions that have to be made with regard to
allocation of forces to the States and territories.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to come back to helicopters, specifically Black
Hawks and the recommendations that have been made. The Army's
proposed Aviation Restructuring Initiative would move all
Apaches from the Army National Guard to the regular Army,
leaving the regular Army with 20 battalions. The National Guard
Bureau's alternative proposal asks for 24 battalions, six with
the National Guard, and 18 with the regular Army. Your report
seems to find a middle ground, recommending that the Army
maintain 24 AH-64 Apache battalions, 20 battalions in the
regular Army and four in the National Guard. My feeling is, we
need a strong Army National Guard, which does not equate for it
to have Apaches, helicopters that are designed solely for
combat. The Army National Guard should have combat components,
and Black Hawks have, again and again over our history, proved
to be, in combat situations, a critical asset and should be--
should continue to be used by the National Guard, for all the
reasons that you have set forth in your report, not the least
of which is that an Army that trains together will fight
together more effectively.
Let me ask you, General Lamont, do you agree that Black
Hawks are a vital component of the Army National Guard?
Mr. Lamont. Absolutely. Not only for their ability to--as a
lift force in a combat asset, but in your domestic responses.
Particularly, as you know, the Guard makes very great use of
Black Hawks throughout all the domestic response issues, be it
floods, be it tornados, be it whatever is the situation.
They're very, very important to the Guard.
Senator Blumenthal. As a Senator from a State that has seen
those Black Hawks used in those domestic situations, and a
State that has experienced hurricanes, floods, tornados, I
strongly agree with you.
Let me ask, General Thurman. Do you see a specific need for
the Army National Guard to have Apaches, rather than keeping
them in the Active component under the total-force strategy?
General Thurman. Yes, sir, Senator, for the purpose of
having strategic depth for the Nation to meet emerging
requirements and the--what we found was that we don't have that
once you eliminate them out of the Army National Guard. Our
analysis, inside the classified annex, will lead you to that
conclusion, I believe.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
General Thurman, you mentioned one of the elephants in the
room, in my view, just a few moments ago, the rejection rate of
Army volunteers for reasons relating to physical fitness and
perhaps other reasons. That number that I've seen is two-thirds
to three-quarters are rejected because they can't pass the
physical test. I wonder how important you feel that issue is
for our Army and our Marine Corps and other services that have
to rely on a ready recruit force in an All-Volunteer Army.
General Thurman. Senator, I feel very strong about that. I
think fundamental to this country is maintaining the All-
Volunteer Force. That is something that is easily broken, in my
view. Having available manpower to--that you can recruit from,
I think, is very important, and it's something that we ought to
take notice of in the country as we see this population
decline.
Senator Blumenthal. It really is an issue of national
security. If we can't field the force, we can't send them into
combat, and we can't protect our Nation. I would suggest, since
my time is about to expire, that there be a very intense and
aggressive focus on this issue of the readiness of our young
men and women seeking to come into our Volunteer Force, and
what can be done in our schools, our communities, and elsewhere
to send that message.
Thank you very much for your service and your excellent
work on this report.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for your service, all of you, and for your work
on this Commission.
I'd like to follow up on concern regarding recruiting
people into our military branches. General Thurman, you
mentioned once again how important it is. This is not the first
time that this committee has heard those concerns. Do any of
you have any specific suggestions on what we can do to change
these outcomes, where so few people qualify to even join our
military? I mean, for example, should we be looking to expand
Junior ROTC [Recruit Office Training Course] or ROTC? I'm
looking for specific suggestions that you may have.
General Ham. Senator, I'll start, and perhaps Secretary
Lamont, who lived in this world for a long time, may have some
thoughts.
My thought was the same that you just expressed. That is a
continued emphasis, or perhaps renewed emphasis, on the Junior
ROTC program. While that doesn't necessarily lead directly to
enlistments or to service, I think it does, in terms of
building character, physical fitness, and leadership amongst
America's youth, I think is a very wise investment.
Mr. Lamont. Specifically about JROTC, they are very, very
important, although I will caution you that I think we are
legislatively prohibited from actually recruiting from that
base. The mayors of the cities in which those schools exist
love them. I have had the opportunity to visit JROTC units in
Chicago, under Mayor Daley. He said, ``Give me more. Give me
more.'' We went to Philadelphia, we went to New Orleans. What
they do to get these kids away from the gangs, away from
inappropriate family situations--we have found that their
graduate rates, their grade rates, their ability to go into
higher education--far greater----
Senator Hirono. Yes.
Mr. Lamont.--than in our other schools. We'd love to have
the ability to recruit from those people, but we're--we really
can't do that. It--they're vitally important to us, let's put
it that way.
Senator Hirono. You would find that, generally, when young
people are exposed to these programs, then they have an
understanding--better understanding of the military and what it
means, and that one would hope that there is a higher of
enlistment as a result.
If the other two gentlemen would like to add, but if you
pretty much agree with ROTC--but, if you have any other
suggestions.
Mr. Chandler. Well, I think, first of all, we're limiting
the conversation to what the military can do. This is not a
military issue. This is a national issue, which is going to
take a great deal of courage and commitment and a long-term
vision to solve. By the time a person is in the JROTC program,
fundamentally they're cooked. Okay? Their diet, their
nutrition, the way that they exercise--although it can be
adapted, their lifestyle, the way that they are brought up by
their family, is going to determine whether or not they are
going to be able to meet standards.
You really have quite--the military has, really, two
options. They can either extend--reduce the standard and bring
a person in, accepting more risk and spending more time in the
training base to get them to an acceptable level, or you're
going to have to increase recruitment efforts--and that's
primarily other options and dollars--to get people who are
qualified at the current standard to come in. I mean, all of
the services compete against one another. They also compete
against colleges, universities, and businesses that are looking
for the same type of person. The challenge will be, Where is
it, once they come into the Military Service, and specifically
the Army--what are we willing to accept that risk? You have to
get ahead of the bang, so to speak. That----
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Mr. Chandler.--starts at the pre-K----
Senator Hirono. I----
Mr. Chandler.--you know, and the----
Senator Hirono.--completely agree.
Mr. Chandler.--elementary school level of how you help
adapt lifestyle choices.
Senator Hirono. Thank you for recognizing that it's a
continuity. This is one of the reasons that there are generals
who have come forward to express how important it is for us to
support quality early education as laying a foundation, the
very kind of foundation you're talking about.
Mr. Lamont, I understand that you had the opportunity to
meet with Governor Ige and General Brooks and General Logan,
our TAG [The Adjutant General]. You know that we have a huge
military presence in Hawaii, of course. The rebalance to the
Asia Pacific is a commitment that I have paid particular
attention to, representing Hawaii as I do. It includes many
seapower-related actions, but there is also a strong Army
presence. Would an Army of 980,000 be able to support our
rebalance to the Pacific, especially recognizing the
provocative behavior of China and North Korea and other global
requirements?
Mr. Lamont. As General Ham mentioned, that was--wasn't
within our task, but if you want a personal opinion, I'll be
happy to address it.
Senator Hirono. Yes.
Mr. Lamont. By the way, my visit to Hawaii was--although
quite short, it was very well informed, having dealt with all
three components there, and it also helped us inform on how we
push forward multi-component units, because the Reserves and
the Army National Guard and PACOM--Pacific Command----
Senator Hirono. Yeah, all the----
Mr. Lamont.--work so well----
Senator Hirono. Yes.
Mr. Lamont.--together. Now, maybe that's----
Senator Hirono. I think----
Mr. Lamont.--brought together----
Senator Hirono.--that's the perfect model.
Mr. Lamont.--by geographic requirements, but they truly are
a model in how they work together.
To get to your question, if I can't avoid it--answering
that----
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lamont.--the situation, we're quite concerned with that
level of force, quite frankly, to meet the challenge that we
have in the Pacific.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is----
Chairman McCain. Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thanks, to all of you, for your service on the Commission
and your testimony today.
I want to follow up in a way related to the question of
Senator Hirono and other colleagues about, kind of, the young
people's ability to meet standards, but sort of coming at it
from a different direction, which is--Sergeant Major, your--you
talked about the recruitment challenge. You know, as we're
dealing with this workforce of tomorrow, the Millennials and
those younger, they're a very different breed. I learn that all
the time with my own kids, in terms of what they want to do.
You're right that, you know, the best and the brightest at that
period of life--say, high school--colleges are competing for
them, and the private sector wants to get these folks. We had a
military commission--Military Compensation Review Commission
that reported back to us last year, and they looked at all the
compensation and benefits. A lot of that analysis was about,
sort of, the fiscal realities of the personnel side of the
military budget, but it was also looking at it in terms of the
recruiting and the retention side. Your all's first, kind of,
pillar of your recommendations is, got to maintain the All-
Volunteer Force, and that assumes recruitment and retention. I
would just like each of you, from your own experiences, talk
about, you know, what is your sense, right now in the Army? Do
we have the right recruiting and retention strategies with
respect to the workforce of tomorrow, the talent pool that's
out there that we want? Either as Commission members or from
your own personal experiences, what things would you recommend
to us that we think about to enhance the recruitment and
retention ability into the Army?
General Ham. Thanks, Senator. I'll start and then--and turn
to the others.
I think two elements I would highlight. In our engagements
across the force, there's a lot of uncertainty. In the
retention aspect, whether you're regular Army, Army National
Guard, or Army Reserve, is my--they watch their numbers, they
see what's happening--is my unit going to still be here in a
year or two? Am I still going to be relevant? That uncertainty,
I think, has certainly an effect on retention.
From the recruiting and bleeding-into-retention aspect, we
heard loudly and clearly from soldiers of all components. They
would like the ability to move between components more
seamlessly and more easily, depending how their life situation
changes. You're 18, the regular Army might make all the sense
in the world. You get married, want to go to college, the Army
National Guard might make all the sense in the world to do
that. Then perhaps you find attracted to civil affairs, and so
the Army Reserve might be a good place for you. Right now, the
policies are constraining with that kind of movement.
Senator Kaine. Tom?
Mr. Lamont. A couple of things, sir.
Our recruiting cohort's primarily 18 to 25 years of age. As
you've heard today, we're roughly at the ability to look at
about 25 percent of the eligible population within that cohort.
That's--it's narrowing down, particularly as our economy may
continue to grow and they may have other opportunities outside
of the military. Our--what we call the DEP [Delayed Entry
Program], that's Delayed Entry Program--two years ago, we were
roughly at 32,000 waiting to come in when the opportunity and
the spaces became available. We're roughly around 10,000 now,
which is considered very much a floor of where we need to be to
be able to reach out.
We've also mentioned today so much about the physical
concerns of some of that cohort, but the behavioral aspect, as
well. As we look at States, for instance, in the drug programs,
where marijuana, for instance, is becoming quite common, the--
available in other States--well, we still have prohibitions
against folks coming in, in that regard. We're narrowing, in
many respects, the eligible cohort that we have to recruit
from.
We have 11,000 recruiters throughout the Army. Our
marketing budget's 280 million a year. We're also making a
recommendation that we look at how we can integrate the
recruiting. They're all competitive--all three components are
competitive here. The Army recruits for itself. The National
Guard recruits for itself. The Army Reserve recruits for
itself. How can we--that competition for that same eligible
person is there, but we've got to bring them together so we can
all recruit. I--it's not going to be easy, and there is
cultural issues, and the universal recruiter isn't--this isn't
a new concept. We have to make an effort and try.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Secretary.
Other comments? If I may, Mr. Chair, just--if I could hear
from the other two witnesses if they have additional comments?
Mr. Chandler. Yeah, Senator. I agree with General Ham and
Secretary Lamont's statements. I think that the Military
Compensation and Reform Commission that made some
recommendations--I was a signator of that while I was on Active
Duty as part of the Department of Defense's recommendation. I
think it's a very forward-looking approach. A lot of the folks
that have questions are those that are currently in the current
retirement system and are not going to be affected by these
changes. I think it does look at a more future approach to what
Millennials and others are interested in.
I would also applaud the Army's efforts with trying to
think about how we can maybe change some policies that prevent
us from reaching our--the higher objective. I'll use Cyber
Command as a--Army Cyber as an example. You know, a big
struggle with, How do you get this very specialized and unique
individual--and ``unique'' can mean many different things--how
do you get them to want to be a part of the Army, which, in
general terms--and I am generalizing--is a little bit different
from their experiences either in college or in--working for
some corporation--and to look at things? Like, maybe the tattoo
policy needs to be loosened more for them, or that we provide
an opportunity to move in and out of, not only the Army, but
back into the--you know, the Microsofts and the Dells of the
world, and bring them back. I think those are things that we
should be patient with, we should allow some experimentation
with, and that we should try and focus on the strategic
objective. How do we find the best people that want to come in
and serve the Nation, serve their state, and be productive
members of the military? I think we're on a path. We've just
got to be patient with it.
Senator Kaine. General?
General Thurman. Senator, I would add two things here to
what's already been said, but I think there has to be a renewed
emphasis on service to Nation in this country. That starts in
the family and in the schoolhouse. We really need to get back
to some of the basic values of what our principles are in the
country. That's my personal opinion after watching my whole
family serve throughout World War I, II, and so forth, into
Vietnam.
The second thing that we looked at was having--was
implementing the one personnel and pay system for the Army.
Right now, you have separate personnel databases between the
Army National Guard and the regular Army. You've got to see
your people enterprise. Right now, you can't. There's a program
called the Integrated Pay and Personnel System that is out
there being developed, and I'd highly recommend that that
funding continue for that, because I think that will help what
General Ham talked about, of how you can transition between
components so you don't lose the talent. That would be one of
my recommendations, sir.
Senator Kaine. Thank you so much, to the witnesses.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman McCain. Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen, for your important
work on this matter. I apologize that I have been detained at
the Banking Committee, where we had Federal Reserve Chair
Yellen in her semiannual testimony.
I have reviewed the report carefully. I wanted just to get
on the record a discussion about one particularly interesting
idea, recommendation 22 from Appendix B on page 112, which I'll
just read in full rather than asking you all to turn to it.
``The Congress should require the Secretary of Defense and
Joint Staff to oversee the modeling of alternative Army design
and operational concepts, including: (1) the Reconnaissance
Strike Group, (2) Hybrid Battalion Task Force, (3) Striker
Global Response Force, and (4) the Reconnaissance and Security
Brigade Combat Team--and report on their findings within 1
year. The report to Congress should explicitly address the
value of follow-on pilot programs to test further any promising
any alternate force design-and-concept approaches.''
This seems to me like a far-reaching, maybe even radical,
proposal, and I would like to hear more on the record about it
and what might be necessary to undertake that kind of
transformation. Maybe if we could start with General Ham and
then go to General Thurman for your comments.
General Ham. Good. Thanks, Senator.
You asked us in the law to be comprehensive in our work,
and so we did. We reached out to a lot of different agencies,
to include some who have thought seriously about the size,
structure, and capabilities that ought be resident in the Army.
Some of those viewpoints have been controversial within the
Army and from those outside. We felt, nonetheless, it was
important to hear from them. We did hear from a number of those
who have offered these kinds of recommendations.
I guess I would say that, Senator, we didn't find any of
those notions were sufficiently mature for us to make a
recommendation to say we think the Army ought to adopt this
model or that model, but we found elements of the four
particular proposals that were mentioned, but several others,
that we think certainly merit further evaluation by the Army,
and indeed by the Joint Force, because recognizing that the
Army is always a part of a Joint Force. Some of these
implications would have--or some of these recommendations would
have implications for the other services, so it's important to
view this in a joint perspective.
That's--that was the genesis of that recommendation. We
think there's merit in looking at these things. There are
systems within Army Training and Doctrine Command and other
agencies, and we think they should take a serious evaluation of
these proposals.
Senator Cotton. General Thurman.
General Thurman. Yes, sir, Senator.
What I would say, in addition to that, I think it's
important to look at these concepts and see what benefits that
you can gain, in terms of overall capabilities, given the
threats that we have today. There are emerging threats, as
you're well aware of, out there that we may have a different
look at how we may want to provide the capability to the joint
force commander or the global combatant commander. I think
these all warrant serious review and a look what can be used
to--maybe to advance capabilities inside the Army for the
future, really, is what you're looking at.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Mr. Lamont, Sergeant Major, anything to add to General Ham
and General Thurman's comments?
Mr. Chandler. I'd just concur with what they said. I mean,
you know, you--the Army that I've been a part of is an evolving
and learning organization; and another set of eyes on how to
get after the challenges, I think, is important, and I highly
recommend that they move forward.
Senator Cotton. Yes. Well, sometimes evolutions can be
slow, and lessons learned can be hard. I do think it's a very
intriguing idea that we should take seriously as a committee
and explore, going forward in the future.
Again, thank you all for your service to the country, not
just now, but in many iterations previously.
Chairman McCain. I'd like to thank the panel again for
their great work. I think it's given us some very valuable
input. I know that Senator Reed and I will look seriously at
some of your proposals and discuss them with the other members
of the committee, who obviously, as you can see by the
participation, are very interested. We appreciate your
significant contribution.
Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. I'd just thank the commissioners, your
colleagues that are not here, all of you, for--extraordinarily
well done.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:56 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2017 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 2016
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES KOREA
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m., in
Room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John
McCain (chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Ayotte,
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Graham, Reed,
Nelson, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly,
Hirono, Kaine, King, and Heinrich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman McCain. Good morning. Since a quorum is now
present, I ask the committee to consider a list of 255 pending
military nominations. All of these nominations have been before
the committee the required length of time.
Is there a motion to favorably report these 255 military
nominations to the Senate?
Senator Inhofe. So moved.
Chairman McCain. Is there a second?
Senator Reed. Second.
Chairman McCain. All in favor, say aye.
The motion carries.
Good morning. The Senate Armed Services Committee meets
this morning to receive testimony on U.S. Pacific Command and
U.S. Forces Korea in review of the defense authorization
request for fiscal year 2017 and the Future Years Defense
Program.
I am pleased to welcome Admiral Harris and General
Scaparrotti back to this committee. I thank you both for your
decades of distinguished service and for your leadership in an
increasingly uncertain time.
Over the past several years, China has acted less like a
``responsible stakeholder'' of the rules-based order of the
Asia-Pacific region and more like a bully. I note this
morning's Wall Street Journal headline, ``China Appears to Have
Built Radar Facilities on Disputed South China Sea Islands.''
China's increasingly assertive pattern of behavior calls
into serious question whether China's rise will, in fact, be
peaceful. Despite United States efforts to rebalance to the
Asia-Pacific, U.S. policy has failed to adapt to the scale of
velocity and challenge we face.
For example, the administration has insisted that China
must cease its reclamation, construction, and militarization in
the South China Sea, and that it will fly, sail, and operate
wherever international law allows. But after more than a year
of this rhetoric, China's reclamation infrastructure,
construction, and militarization have all continued.
The information referred to follows:
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Last week, we saw press reports that China had deployed the
HQ-9 surface-to-air missile system to Woody Island in the
Paracel Islands. As I mentioned yesterday, they show a high-
frequency, possibly over-the-horizon, radar on reclaimed land
on Cuarteron Reef in the Spratly Islands.
If true, this deployment would represent a blatant
violation of Xi Jinping's September 2015 commitment to
President Obama in the Rose Garden that China ``did not intend
to pursue militarization.''
Admiral Harris, I would like to ask today if you can
confirm the reported militarization of Woody Island, the radar
at Cuarteron Reef, and if you can reveal to this committee any
further examples of militarization now occurring in the South
China Sea that you are aware of.
As China continues to use force and coercion to
unilaterally change the status quo and challenge the rules-
based international order, the credibility of the
administration's commitments to regional security is
diminished. Indeed, China's reclamation and militarization in
the South China Sea, together with China's rapid military
modernization and expansion, are making it more difficult for
the United States to defend our allies and our interests from
military aggression.
Simply put, the administration's policy has failed.
Beijing has been willing to accept a high level of risk to
achieve its strategic goals. Meanwhile, the White House's risk
aversion has resulted in an indecisive and inadequate policy
that has confused and alarmed our regional allies and partners.
The United States must now consider fresh options to raise the
cost on Beijing's behavior.
Shaping rather than reacting to Beijing's actions will mean
adopting policies with a level of risk that we have been
unwilling to consider up to this point. The administration must
initiate a robust freedom of the seas campaign, flying and
sailing wherever international law allows. This should include
freedom of navigation operations designed to challenge China's
excessive maritime claims, as well as joint patrols and
exercises with our allies and partners span the First Island
Chain.
We must also maintain our commitment to continued sensitive
reconnaissance operations, which are critical for gathering
military intelligence in the Western Pacific. Despite China's
protests and growing ability to threaten our aircraft, the pace
and scope of these operations must continue uninterrupted.
Given the shifting military balance, we also need to take a
hard look at what the future U.S. military posture in the
region should look like. While the department has initiated a
European Reassurance Initiative in Europe, it is clear to me
that a similar Asian reassurance initiative should be
considered.
Building off the recent CSIS [the Center for Strategic and
International Studies] report, we should consider further steps
for enhancing posture, improving infrastructure, funding
additional exercises, pre-positioning additional equipment and
munitions, and building partner capacity throughout the Asia-
Pacific region.
Beyond my concerns about sustaining freedom of the seas, I
am concerned China may also attempt to expel another country
from disputed territories, such as Second Thomas Shoal, or
build new infrastructure at a location like Scarborough Shoal.
Given this, we should consider clarifying how the United States
will respond to an attack on the territory or Armed Forces of
the Philippines under the United States-Philippines mutual
defense.
Finally, I believe it is time for the United States
Government to explore the appropriateness of sanctions against
Chinese companies involved in the reclamation that has
destabilized the South China Sea and caused massive
environmental destruction across this maritime domain.
While China's assertiveness poses a major long-term
challenge, North Korea's destabilizing behavior continues to
present a real and rising risk of conflict.
Over the past 2 months, it has defied the international
community by testing a nuclear device and launching a long-
range missile. These calculated cycles of provocation continue
to pose a risk of violent escalation on the Korean Peninsula.
That is why I am thankful for the close cooperation with our
partners in Seoul between United States Forces Korea [USFK] and
the ROK [Republic of Korea] Armed Forces.
I applaud the leadership of President Park for choosing to
finally close the Kaesong Industrial Region, which has enriched
the North with hundreds of millions of dollars in the last
decade. I am also proud to have supported new congressional
sanctions on North Korea.
Despite the deficit of leadership from Beijing on this
issue, these two steps will bring increased pressure on the
North Korean regime and its supporters.
I am very encouraged by the joint United States-Republic of
Korea statement that our two countries will begin the process
of consultation for deploying the Terminal High-Altitude Area
Defense, THAAD, system to the Korean Peninsula. The deployment
of this system by the alliance is a critical step to providing
a further layer of defenses against North Korea provocations.
I look forward to hearing General Scaparrotti's perspective
on the utility of the THAAD system and other ideas to enhance
the United States-ROK relationship and deterrence on the
peninsula.
I would call my colleagues' reminiscence to an occasion
here the last time Secretary Ash Carter was here, after it had
been in all of the newspapers and television and radio that the
United States had finally decided to sail a ship into the areas
around the disputed islands. The Secretary of Defense, in front
of this committee, refused to confirm that--refused to confirm
what was in the media and well-known to everyone, according to
the New York Times the next day, for fear of upsetting climate
talks with China. That cannot be made up. Of the 30 years that
I have been on this committee, I have never seen a performance
like that.
Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
join you in welcoming the witnesses.
Gentlemen, we appreciate your long and distinguished
service to the Nation, and also the service of your families
throughout many, many years.
General Scaparrotti, this might be your last United States
Forces Korea posture hearing. We are hearing rumors that you
are being moved to a different command. But thank you for your
friendship and your service over many, many years.
It is clear from the events of the last few months that we
are facing a challenge of increasing complexity and instability
in the region. Given North Korea's recent nuclear test and
China's militarization of land features in the South China Sea,
the security situation in the region seems more precarious than
in many recent years. The United States has historically
underwritten the peaceful development of the Asia-Pacific
region with strategic alliances and a forward presence that has
allowed all the countries in the region, including China, to
make extraordinary economic developments in relative peace.
One of the pillars of our strategy is to provide stability
and security in the region by maintaining close partnerships
and alliances. From the new defense cooperation agreement with
the Philippines and our rotational Marine presence in
Australia, to our growing defense relationship with Vietnam,
there has been great progress on implementing the
administration's rebalance to Asia, despite competing resource
demands from other regions. We must continue to build on these
strategic partnerships and demonstrate our commitment to the
region by investing sufficiently in our presence and partner
capacity-building programs.
Admiral Harris, I am deeply concerned, as we all are, about
China's violation of its commitment to President Obama in
November not to militarize the South China Sea.
Just yesterday, CSIS released an image that appears to show
that China has placed an advanced radar system on Cuarteron
Reef, a land feature that China has reclaimed in the Spratly
Islands. This is in addition to the HQ-9 surface-to-air
missiles that it added to Woody Island in the Paracels
recently.
It seems clear that China does not intend to be a
responsible stakeholder in the region. I would appreciate your
views on how China's recent actions affect the stability of the
region.
General Scaparrotti, it seems that as Kim Jong-un has
consolidated his power in North Korea, he is more and more
willing to tolerate risk, as evidenced by his recent nuclear
test and rocket launch. I would like to hear about how you
believe the security situation on the peninsula will evolve
over the next year.
Again, we appreciate you joining us this morning, look
forward to your testimony, and salute your service. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. General Scaparrotti, this is perhaps your
last appearance before this committee. I want to thank you for
your outstanding service and your great work, particularly in
these times of heightened tension. We thank you for your
service to the country.
Admiral Harris, do you want to begin?
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL HARRY B. HARRIS, JR., USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
PACIFIC COMMAND
Admiral Harris. Thank you, sir. I would.
Thank you, Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, and distinguished
members. It is my honor to once again appear before this
committee.
Before I begin, on behalf of all the men and women of
United States Pacific Command [PACOM], I would like to wish
Senator McCaskill a speedy and full recovery.
I am pleased to be here with General Scaparrotti to discuss
how PACOM is advancing America's interests across the vast
Indo-Asia-Pacific.
I request, sir, that my written posture statement be
submitted for the record.
Chairman McCain. Without objection.
Admiral Harris. Since taking command of PACOM last May, I
have had the extraordinary privilege of leading the 400,000
soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, guardsmen, and civilians
serving our Nation. These dedicated men and women and their
families are doing an amazing job, and I am proud to serve
alongside them.
I would like to briefly highlight a few regional issues
since I last testified before this committee 5 months ago.
As China continues its pattern of destabilizing
militarization of the South China Sea, we resumed our freedom
of navigation operations there, a waterway vital to America's
prosperity, where $5.3 trillion in trade traverses each year.
General Scaparrotti and I remain fully aligned in dealing
with North Korea's recent underground nuclear test followed by
a ballistic missile launch.
A revanchist Russia is revitalizing its ability to execute
long-range strategic patrols in the Pacific, to include the
basing of its newest strategic ballistic missile submarine and
last month's bomber flights around Japan.
Recent terrorist attacks in Bangladesh and Indonesia
underscore the fact that violent Islamic extremism is a global
concern that must be crushed.
We continue to strengthen our alliances and partnerships.
Japan's peace and security legislation authorizing limited
collective self-defense will take effect this year. This
legislation, and the revised guidelines for United States-Japan
defense cooperation, will significantly increase Japan's
ability to work with us.
Thanks to the great leadership of General Scaparrotti,
South Korea and the United States have taken a strong and
unified stance to maintain peace and stability on the Korean
Peninsula. In the face of recent North Korean aggression, PACOM
hosted a trilateral meeting between the United States Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs General Dunford, Japanese Chairman Admiral
Kawano, and South Korean Chairman General Lee. Trilateral
cooperation between Japan, Korea, and the United States is a
priority, and I am doing everything I can to enhance it.
Our alliance with the Philippines took an important step
forward when the Philippines Supreme Court recently upheld the
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, or EDCA, which will
provide significant partnership and access benefits.
I am also excited about our burgeoning relationship with
India, where I will visit next week. As the world's two largest
democracies, we are uniquely poised to help bring greater
security and prosperity to the entire region.
Two visionary policies are now coinciding as the United
States rebalances west of the Indo-Asia-Pacific and India
implements its Act East policy.
Last October's Malabar exercise between India, Japan, and
the United States shows the security interconnectedness of the
Indian Ocean, Asia, and the Pacific Ocean. I rely heavily on
Australia, not only for its advanced military capabilities
across all domains, but importantly for Australia's warfighting
experience and leadership in operations around the world.
These examples clearly demonstrate to me that the United
States is a security partner of choice in the Indo-Asia-
Pacific. It is also why I believe that our strategic rebalance
has taken hold. Given that four of the five strategic problem
sets identified by Secretary Carter--China, North Korea,
Russia, and ISIL [the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant]--
are in our region, I would say that we cannot rebalance fast
enough.
But there is more work to do, and we must not lose the
momentum, so I ask this committee to support continued
investment in the future capabilities. I need weapon systems of
increased lethality that go faster, go further, and are more
survivable.
If funding uncertainties continue, the U.S. will experience
reduced warfighting capabilities, so I urge Congress to repeal
sequestration.
Finally, I would like to thank this committee and Congress
for your enduring support to PACOM, and the men and women in
uniform, our civilian teammates, and our families. Thank you,
and I look forward to your questions, sir.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Harris follows:]
Prepared Statement by Admiral Harry B. Harris Jr.
Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, and distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
This is my first posture assessment since taking command of U.S.
Pacific Command (USPACOM) in May 2015. Over the past 9 months, I've had
the extraordinary privilege to lead 378,000 Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen,
Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and civilians selflessly serving our nation.
These dedicated men and women and their families are doing an amazing
job, and I'm proud to serve alongside them.
USPACOM protects and defends, in concert with other U.S. Government
agencies, the territory of the U.S., its people, and its interests.
With allies and partners, USPACOM enhances stability in the Indo-Asia-
Pacific region by promoting security cooperation, encouraging peaceful
development, responding to contingencies, deterring aggression, and,
when necessary, fighting to win. This approach is based on military
preparedness, partnership, and presence.
The strategic importance of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region cannot be
overstated. Recognition of clear military, economic, and demographic
trends inspired President Obama to undertake a ``Rebalance'' strategy
in 2011. The Rebalance, a strategic whole of government effort, guides
and reinforces our military efforts, integrating with diplomatic,
political, and economic initiatives.
In August of 2015, Secretary of Defense Carter described four
elements of the military component of the Asia-Pacific Rebalance:
1) investing in future capabilities relevant to the challenges in
the Asia-Pacific;
2) fielding the right numbers of existing capabilities to the
Asia-Pacific;
3) adapting our regional force posture; and
4) reinforcing alliances and partnerships.
Despite other pressing challenges around the world, and because of
the legislative and budgetary support of Congress, we achieved momentum
in each element above. I believe we must continue, and even increase,
this momentum, as the strategic imperative behind the Rebalance remains
valid.
What follows is my assessment of the Indo-Asia-Pacific and
USPACOM's part of the Rebalance. I will describe the security
challenges and highlight regional opportunities with strategic value. I
will discuss the value of U.S. strategic force posture and forward
presence to the Rebalance--how it improves our readiness to fight
tonight, enhances our ability to reassure allies and partners, and
maintain stability. I will then explain how USPACOM strengthens our
alliances and builds critical regional partnerships that deliver
strategic benefit while enhancing U.S. readiness to protect and defend
U.S. interests. Finally, I will highlight critical needs and seek your
support for budgetary and legislative actions in the coming weeks and
months.
security environment
The Indo-Asia-Pacific has been a largely peaceful region for over
70 years, in large part, because of the system of rules and norms
established and underpinned by robust U.S. presence and anchored by a
series of treaty alliances and bilateral relationships with countries
in the region. Regional nations, including and perhaps especially
China, have benefited because of the security architecture provided by
the United States and our allies. The Indo-Asia-Pacific is critically
important to United States commerce, diplomacy, and security. Estimates
predict up to 70 percent of the world's population will reside in the
region by the middle of this century. Within the region are the world's
two largest economies after the United States (China and Japan), and
five of the smallest economies. The region contains the world's most
populous nation (China), largest democracy (India), largest Muslim-
majority state (Indonesia), and smallest republic (Nauru). It contains
seven of the ten largest standing militaries in the world, five nuclear
nations, and five of the U.S.' seven mutual defense treaty alliances.
The region's environment, history, cultural and political
diversity, and robust military capabilities present dynamic strategic
challenges. Self-interested actors challenge the existing international
rules-based order that helped underwrite peace and prosperity in the
region for over 70 years. North Korea continues its provocative,
coercive behavior and weapons development. Chinese coercion, artificial
island construction, and militarization in the South China Sea threaten
the most fundamental aspect of global prosperity--freedom of
navigation. Other challenges include the movement and facilitation of
violent extremists to and from the Middle East, transnational criminal
activity (including human trafficking and illicit drugs), and an
increasingly revanchist and assertive Russia. USPACOM enhances U.S.
Force posture, presence, and resiliency in the region, modernizing U.S.
Force capability to ensure forces are ready to fight and win any
contingency. USPACOM is working with allies and partners on a
bilateral--and increasingly multilateral--basis to address these
challenges. Together, we enhance capability and capacity to respond to
the range of threats endemic to the region. We are stronger together.
overview
A number of challenges has emerged over the past year that place
stability and security at risk. In July 2015, China largely completed
land reclamation at seven sites in the South China Sea and is finishing
runways, infrastructure, and systems to militarize what are, in effect,
man-made bases, significantly raising regional tensions. China views
the South China Sea as a strategic frontline in their quest to dominate
East Asia out to the Second Island Chain. I view their thinking as
approaching a new ``Great Game.'' Last month, North Korea conducted its
fourth nuclear test in ten years and last August, raised tensions with
a land-mine attack in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Russia continues
modernizing its military forces, homeporting its newest Dolgurukiy-
class ballistic missile submarine in Petropavlovsk, and revitalizing
its ability to execute long range strategic patrols, highlighted by
last July's deployment of Tu-95 Bear bombers near Alaska and
California, and last month's bomber flights around Japan. Terrorist
attacks in Bangladesh and Indonesia underscore the fact that violent
Islamic extremism is a global problem.
While these events threaten the region's peace and prosperity,
there was positive progress as well. Last September, Japan passed its
Peace and Security Legislation which authorizes collective self-defense
in limited circumstances. The Philippines remained committed to solving
its maritime dispute with China peacefully through arbitration under
the Law of the Sea Convention. The Philippine Supreme Court upheld the
Philippine's domestic approval of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation
Agreement (EDCA), which will provide significant partnership and access
benefits. India underscored its ``Act East'' policy by crafting a Joint
Strategic Vision of the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region with the
United States and is progressing toward signing essential foundational
agreements that will enable deeper ties, improve interoperability, and
increase cooperation. Singapore has increased routine access to United
States military assets such as Littoral Combat Ships and P-3/P-8
aircraft. Trilateral cooperation among allies is increasing and
multilateral forums such as the Association of South East Nations
(ASEAN) are focusing on shared security challenges in the region. These
events demonstrate that Indo-Asia-Pacific countries are increasingly
viewing the United States as their security partner of choice. That
said, significant challenges remain.
key challenges
North Korea: Though North Korea is not yet an existential threat
to the United States, it remains the most dangerous and unpredictable
actor in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Kim Jung Un regularly conducts
provocative and escalatory actions. Just last month, North Korea
conducted an underground nuclear test, the fourth since 2006, which
violated its obligations and commitments under international law,
including several UN Security Council Resolutions. Additionally, this
month, North Korea conducted a ballistic missile test under the guise
of launching a satellite. These tests, coupled with the unprovoked mine
attack on Republic of Korea (ROK) soldiers in the DMZ last August, are
the latest in a series of actions intended to destabilize the
Peninsula, challenge ROK President Park's leadership, and raise
tensions.
While the international community urges North Korea to live up to
its international obligations and return to credible negotiations under
the Six-Party Talks framework, Pyongyang has shown no willingness to
seriously discuss denuclearization. Kim Jung Un is on a quest for
nuclear weapons, and the technology to miniaturize them and deliver
them intercontinentally. Additional nuclear tests are likely to occur.
North Korea will also likely test and field improved mobile
intercontinental ballistic missiles and intermediate range ballistic
missiles (MUSUDAN) capable of reaching Japan, and actively pursue its
submarine launched ballistic missile development program. On 6
February, North Korea launched its second space vehicle in direct
violation of several United Nations Security Council Resolutions,
firing a complex, multi-stage rocket that also forms the basis of an
intercontinental ballistic missile. North Korea announced its intent to
conduct ``annual and regular'' drills to advance this prohibited
capability. I have no doubt they will do so.
North Korea refuses to abide by the rules and norms of the
international community and represents a clear danger to regional
peace, prosperity, and stability. In the cyber domain, North Korea has
lesser cyber technical capabilities than other states, but has already
demonstrated them as a way to impose costly damage to commercial
entities. This was demonstrated in the high-profile attack on Sony
Pictures Entertainment. North Korea sells weapons and weapons-related
technologies in conflict with United Nation Security Council Resolution
restrictions.
Chinese Military Modernization and Strategic Intent: China's
military modernization program is transforming its forces into a high-
tech military to achieve its dream of regional dominance, with growing
aspirations of global reach and influence. Given China's economic rise,
the goal may be natural; however, the lack of transparency on China's
overall strategic intent behind its military investments and activities
creates instability and regional anxiety.
China's navy and air forces are rapidly fielding advanced warships
and planes. Over the past decade, the Chinese navy has significantly
increased in size and is much more capable in every way. Chinese forces
are operating at a higher tempo, in more places, and with greater
sophistication than ever before. Chinese shipyards are constructing
China's first cruiser-sized warship, their first indigenous aircraft
carrier, and many classes of patrol boats, frigates, and destroyers.
Newer, more capable submarines continue replacing older ones. New
fighters (including the ``Gen-5'' J-31), bombers, special mission
aircraft, and unmanned systems give China greater air capabilities,
lethality, and flexibility. These advances have been aided and
accelerated by systemic technology theft, enabling China to skip
decades of research and development and go straight into production.
Finally, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is undergoing dramatic
reorganization to improve its command and control of joint forces.
China's strategic capabilities are significant. The Jin-class
ballistic missile submarine (Type 094) carries the JL-2 submarine
launched ballistic missile capable of reaching parts of the continental
United States and represents China's first credible sea-based nuclear
deterrent. New road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles provide
more strike options and greater survivability.
In the maritime domain, China's Navy (PLA(N)) is increasing its
routine operations in the Indian Ocean, expanding the area and duration
of operations and exercises in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean,
and is beginning to act as a global navy--venturing into other areas,
including Europe, North America, South America, Africa, and the Middle
East.
While China's actions are causing concern among neighbors in the
region, there are potential opportunities. Its small but growing number
of bilateral and multinational exercises suggests Beijing's greater
willingness to interact with partners. Support for UN Peace Keeping
missions is an encouraging sign of Chinese willingness to play a more
active and constructive role in international affairs. My goal is to
convince China that the best way ahead is through peaceful cooperation,
participation and conformance in a rules-based order, and by honoring
agreements made in good faith.
Territorial Disputes: The political and military dynamic in the
East and South China Seas is changing, and tactical miscalculations
between claimants present threats to stability and security.
In the East China Sea, tensions between Japan and China over the
Senkaku Islands continue. China seeks to challenge Japan's
administrative control over the islands by deploying warships into the
area, sailing coast guard ships inside the territorial waters
surrounding the Senkakus, and intercepting Japanese reconnaissance
flights. In April of 2014, President Obama affirmed that Article V of
the United States-Japan Security Treaty includes the Senkaku Islands. I
am bound to protect that promise.
In the South China Sea, the situation is more complex. There are
six claimants to disputed features: Brunei, China, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam, and there are three notable disputes
over territorial sovereignty. The first dispute is between China,
Taiwan, and Vietnam over the sovereignty of the Paracel Islands, which
China took by force from Vietnam and has occupied since 1974. The
second dispute is between China, Taiwan, and the Philippines over
Scarborough Reef, of which China seized control in 2012. The third
dispute involves multiple claimants within the Spratly Islands where
China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines each
claim sovereignty over various features.
The United States takes no position on competing sovereignty claims
in the South China Sea, but we encourage all countries to uphold
international law, as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention, which
ensures unimpeded lawful commerce, freedom of navigation and
overflight, and peaceful dispute resolution.
While China has not clearly defined the scope of its maritime
claims in the South China Sea, China has unilaterally changed the
status quo. Chinese leaders seem to believe that, through coercion,
intimidation, and force, they can bypass accepted methods of dispute
resolution. They have demonstrated this through aggressive artificial
island building, and by growing a fleet of ``white hull'' ships and
fishing vessels whose purpose is to dominate the area without the
appearance of overt military force. China is now turning its artificial
island projects into operating bases for forward-staging military
capabilities--under the rubric of being civilian facilities. For
example in January 2016, China landed civilian aircraft on its man-made
airbase at Fiery Cross Reef. The PLA is installing new or improved
radars, communications systems, and other military capabilities at
seven separate reclaimed bases. The scale and scope of these projects
are inconsistent with the China's stated purpose of supporting
fishermen, commercial shipping, and search and rescue. Although
Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Taiwan have also conducted land
reclamation in the South China Sea, their total--approximately 115
acres over 45 years--is dwarfed by the size, scope, speed, and scale of
China's massive buildup. In a little over two years, China has
constructed more than 3,000 acres of artificial land--heightening
environmental concerns by destroying the fragile ecosystem of the South
China Sea. Professor John McManus of the University of Miami has called
this the most rapid rate of permanent loss of coral reef area in human
history. Equally concerning is Beijing's repeated pronouncements that
it will not accept any decision issued by the arbitral tribunal in the
case filed by the Philippines under the Law of the Sea Convention..
China's actions undermine the international rules-based order.
Furthermore, these actions have driven China's South China Sea
neighbors to expand their own military capabilities and seek stronger
relationships with the United States and one another. The result is a
situation that is ripe for miscalculation that could escalate to
conflicts that no one wants, in an area vital to global prosperity.
While preventing conflict in South China Sea requires patience and
transparency among all parties, time favors the Chinese. For the United
States to continue to play a constructive role in preventing conflict
and supporting peaceful dispute resolution requires national resolve
and a willingness to apply all elements of national power in the right
measure to influence all claimants to use international dispute
resolution mechanisms. For example, USPACOM recently conducted freedom
of navigation operations in the South China Sea--the continuation of a
longstanding United States practice. These operations are an important
military tool to demonstrate America's commitment to the rule of law,
including the fundamental concept of freedom of navigation. The U.S.
will sail, fly, and operate wherever international law allows.
Russian Assertiveness: Though focused on Europe and the Middle
East, Russia is engaged politically and militarily in the Indo-Asia-
Pacific. Russian activity is assertive, but not confrontational. Ships
and submarines of the Russian Pacific Fleet and long range aircraft
routinely demonstrate Russia's message that it is a Pacific power.
Russian ballistic missile and attack submarines remain especially
active in the region. The arrival in late 2015 of Russia's newest class
of nuclear ballistic missile submarine (DOLGORUKIY SSBN) in the Far
East is part of a modernization program for the Russian Pacific Fleet
and signals the seriousness with which Moscow views this region.
Violent Extremism / Foreign Fighters: The Indo-Asia-Pacific has
the largest Muslim population on the planet and extremism is a rising
challenge. Of the many extremist groups in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, those
connected to Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or al Qaeda
(AQ) are of greatest concern. Foreign fighters from the Indo-Asia-
Pacific have contributed to violence in Syria and Iraq and pose a
growing threat to security in their home countries upon their return.
Attacks in Australia and Bangladesh underscore regional concerns about
self-radicalized actors. Small but growing numbers of Bangladeshi,
Indonesian, and Philippine extremists have pledged fealty to ISIL, and
threats to host nation and Western interests are rising. USPACOM--in
coordination with USSOCOM--and partner nations are focused on
disrupting these extremist networks.
Transnational Crime: Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs),
many operating sophisticated global enterprises that traffic in human
beings, weapons, drugs, and other illicit substances, exist throughout
the Indo-Asia-Pacific. The revenue from criminal endeavors threatens
stability and undermines human rights. Corruption follows wherever
these organizations flourish, weakening governments and contributing to
regional instability.
Methamphetamine and amphetamine-type stimulants continue to be the
primary drug threat in the region. Joint Interagency Task Force-West
(JIATF-W) reports that at least 90 percent of the precursor chemical
seizures potentially destined for illicit methamphetamine production
originates in China. Maritime container shipments of China-sourced
chemicals are diverted for methamphetamine and heroin/opioid production
in Mexico--a direct threat to the United States Homeland. The Asia-
Pacific is also a growing, lucrative market for illicit narcotics
produced in the Western Hemisphere. Just last week, JIATF-W coordinated
with French authorities in French Polynesia to apprehend a sailing
vessel located with almost 750 kilograms of cocaine.
Nearly 36 million victims of human trafficking are estimated
worldwide and nearly two-thirds are from Asia. Women and children--
especially those from the lowest socioeconomic sectors--are the most
vulnerable. Roughly half of those 36 million victims end up in the
commercial sex trade, while others are forced into difficult and
dangerous positions in factories, farms, as child soldiers, or as
domestic servants. While much remains to be done, USPACOM forces,
including JIATF-W, are building partner capacity and sharing
intelligence in order to combat these transnational threats.
Proliferation Issues: The Indo-Asia-Pacific region has the busiest
maritime and air ports in the world. Developing technology has outpaced
many nations' ability to effectively manage export controls. Trade
includes dual-use technology--commercial items controlled by the
nuclear, ballistic missile, and chemical/biological weapons control
regimes, including manufactured or re-exported materials from other
nations with limited export control enforcement.
USPACOM's Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) community
supports counter-proliferation operations throughout the Indo-Asia-
Pacific region. USPACOM addresses concerns through key leader
engagements, combined and joint exercises, and international security
exchanges focused on counter proliferation activities. Recent success
stories include Vietnam joining 104 nations as an endorsee of the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The PSI rotational exercise
series provides a framework for partner nations to improve legal
authorities and operational capabilities to interdict WMD, delivery
systems, and other related materials. Proactive dialogue under PSI is
vital to reducing WMD proliferation.
USPACOM works with the Armed Forces of the Philippines to enhance
military to military interoperability and provide assistance to
military first responders' capability to respond to a WMD. Under
section 1204 of the fiscal year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA), the primary objective of USPACOM's WMD assistance is to train
and equip first responders. In Aug 2015, USPACOM, Service Components,
and combat support agencies such as the Defense Threat Reduction Agency
provided the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) a ``first class''
Chemical, Biological, Radiation, Nuclear (CBRN) Defense capability.
Under these section 1204 authorities, USPACOM will begin to work with
Thailand, Vietnam, and Malaysia to enhance their capacity to respond to
a WMD event.
Natural Disasters: The Indo-Asia-Pacific remains the world's most
disaster-prone region, experiencing over 2,700 disasters that affected
nearly 1.6 billion people in the past decade alone. In addition to
seismic and weather disasters, areas of large populations, dense living
conditions, and poor sanitation in the region create optimal conditions
for the rapid spread of diseases. U.S. Forces regularly train with
allies and partners in disaster relief operations and are called upon
often to respond to tragic events.
USPACOM's Center for Excellence for Disaster Management (CFE-DM)
increases regional governments' readiness to respond to natural
disasters by developing lessons learned and providing best practices.
Many of the lessons learned and preparedness measures implemented after
Typhoon Haiyan (Operation Damayan, November 2013) reduced damage and
loss of life when Typhoon Hagupit struck the Philippines in 2014. To
help USPACOM rapidly respond to future natural disasters, Vietnam is
allowing sets of vehicles, equipment, and supplies to be prepositioned
within its borders for disaster preparedness purposes. USPACOM will
continue improving pre-crisis preparedness and working with allies and
partners to improve responses whenever disasters strike, but it is
important to note that disaster preparedness cannot overtake
traditional military readiness as our focus.
strategic force posture in the indo-asia-pacific
The tyranny of distance and short indications and warnings
timelines place a premium on robust, modern, and agile forward-
stationed forces at high levels of readiness. USPACOM requires a force
posture that credibly communicates U.S. resolve, strengthens alliances
and partnerships, prevents conflict, and in the event of crisis,
responds rapidly across the full range of military operations.
USPACOM's strategic force posture is also supported by the deployment
of rotational forces and the fielding of new capabilities and concepts
that address operational shortfalls and critical gaps.
Global Force Management (GFM): In support of the Rebalance, the
Department has undertaken GFM initiatives that include the deployment
of Littoral Combat Ships to Singapore, replacing the aircraft carrier
USS George Washington in Japan with the more capable USS Ronald Reagan,
the deployment of two additional ballistic missile defense-capable
surface ships to Japan, and the stationing of additional submarines and
a submarine tender in Guam. The Air Force deploys a broad range of
aircraft as part of its Theater Force Package model including B-52s, F-
22s, F-16s, E-8s, and RC-135s. The Army forward deployed a second
ballistic missile defense radar in Japan, maintained a THAAD battery in
Guam, and delivered training and presence across the region through
Pacific Pathways, enhancing partnership opportunities without permanent
basing. The Army also continues updating Prepositioned Stocks (APS) and
advocating for the placement of Disaster Response activity sets across
Southeast Asia. The Marine Corps continues to execute the Defense
Policy Review Initiatives (DPRI), which will reduce the Marine Corps
footprint in Japan and distribute Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF)
capability across the region. The Marine Corps is also expanding
rotational presence in Australia through its Marine Rotational Force-
Darwin initiative. USPACOM plans to improve rotational force presence
in the Philippines via the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement
(EDCA) and establishing USAF dispersal capabilities in the Commonwealth
of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) and in the Northern Territory of
Australia. Rotational forces west of the International Date Line are
positioned to deter and defeat potential aggressors in the region.
Finally, we are beginning consultations with the government of South
Korea for the placement of a Terminal High Altitude Air Defense
capability on the Korean Peninsula.
Posture Initiatives: The size and scope of forward stationed
forces and the challenges within the security environment require
recapitalization and improvement to infrastructure in theater. To that
end, fiscal year 2016 military construction projects largely reflect
requirements that support fielding new capabilities in the region, to
include the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, CV-22 Osprey, C-130J Hercules,
and F-22 Raptor. Additional investments support resiliency initiatives
and infrastructure recapitalization in Australia, Guam, CNMI, Hawaii,
and Japan; critical munitions throughput recapitalization in California
(Military Ocean Terminal Concord); and quality of life investments for
our forces in South Korea and Japan.
Additionally, USPACOM's force posture strategy seeks to provide the
correct level of capital investment to support established posture
initiatives and commitments, including efforts in Korea (Yongsan
Relocation Plan and Land Partnership Plan) and Japan (Okinawa
Consolidation and the Defense Policy Review Initiative). In support of
these initiatives, the Government of Japan committed up to $3.1 billion
to help realign United States Marines from Okinawa to Guam and other
locations, and $4.5 billion to expand the airfield and associated
facilities at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni. Korea and Japan
maintain robust host nation funded construction programs, which play
vital roles in supporting United States presence and enduring
capabilities in the region. These vital partner contributions require
the Services to program Planning and Design funds to ensure our allies
deliver facilities that meet our requirements.
Furthermore, USPACOM is expanding its presence in various parts of
the region to include completing the permanent stationing of THAAD on
Guam, the addition of a submarine and sub tender in Guam, additional
Aegis BMD capable ships to Japan, and seeking the assignment of
additional Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets
in the region. In support of the Rebalance, USPACOM is in the midst of
executing four major Force Posture initiatives: (1) United States-Japan
Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) / USMC Distributed Laydown, (2)
United States Forces Korea Realignment, (3) Resiliency Efforts, and (4)
Agile Logistics.
DPRI: USPACOM is making progress on DPRI/USMC
Distributed Laydown initiatives; however, significant Japanese
political challenges remain. Consolidation of United States Marines in
Japan is dependent upon completion of Okinawa construction efforts to
include the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF). In spite of the
Government of Japan (GOJ) political resolve and dedication of
resources, progress on relocating Marines from Futenma to Camp Schwab
is slow going. GOJ budgeted $258M in fiscal year 2015 for 200 projects,
but only 9 facilities have been completed with an additional 8 under
construction. GOJ faces challenges in several areas, including
overcoming Nago City obstruction impacting construction and controlling
protester interference. The central government has dispatched police
officers from the mainland to Okinawa to assist the Okinawa Prefectural
Police in managing protest activity in and around United States bases
in Okinawa. However, as of this writing, very little progress has been
made in improving the situation and protests continue to escalate.
While the issues in Okinawa continue, USPACOM made progress in laying
the groundwork for relocating 5,000 Marines to Guam. Tied to the Guam
effort, DOD is aggressively pursuing the establishment of the CNMI
Joint Military Training (JMT) Area to mitigate joint training
deficiencies in the region.
USFK Realignment: The consolidation of United States
forces in Korea via the Land Partnership Program (LPP) and Yongsan
Relocation Program (YRP) is moving ahead at full-speed. Construction
will triple the size of Camp Humphreys and increase the base's
population to 36,000 troops and family members. The ROK is bearing the
majority of the relocation's cost, committing over $7.5 billion to the
project. USPACOM appreciates Congress' continued support of DOD's
largest peace-time relocation project.
Resiliency Efforts: USPACOM resiliency efforts include
investment in a more robust transportation infrastructure in ally and
partner countries, mitigation of single points of failure via the
dispersal and optimization of critical enablers, such as communication
nodes, fuel, medical, and logistic support equipment, and hardening
facilities. For example, USPACOM is hardening facilities in Guam and
CNMI as well as enhancing airfields at dispersed sites throughout the
theater.
Agile Logistics: Due to time and distance required to
move assets within the USPACOM region, it is imperative to invest in
infrastructure to ensure logistics commodities--munitions, fuel, and
other war materiel--are properly prepositioned, secured, and available
to meet requirements. USPACOM continues to build capacity for pre-
positioned war reserve fuel stocks and invest in munitions, fuel, and
other war materiel facilities and infrastructure throughout the
theater. For example, critical munitions throughput recapitalization in
California (Military Ocean Terminal Concord) is necessary to support
USPACOM plans and operations.
Readiness: USPACOM is a ``fight tonight'' theater with short
timelines across vast spaces. Threats such as North Korea--which has
over a hundred thousand rockets aimed at Seoul--require United States
military forces in the region maintain a high level of readiness to
respond rapidly to a crisis. USPACOM's readiness is evaluated against
its ability to execute operational and contingency plans, which place a
premium on forward-stationed, ready forces that can exercise, train,
and operate with our partner nations' militaries and follow-on forces
able to respond to operational contingencies.
Forward-stationed forces west of the International Date Line
increase decision space and decrease response time, bolster the
confidence of allies and partners, and reduce the chance of
miscalculation by potential adversaries.
The ability of the U.S. to surge and globally maneuver ready forces
is an asymmetric advantage that must be maintained. Over the past two
decades of war, the U.S. has of necessity prioritized the readiness of
deploying forces at the expense of follow-on-forces and critical
investments needed to outpace emerging threats. A shortage of ready
surge forces resulting from high operational demands, delayed
maintenance periods due to sequestration, and training pipeline
shortfalls limit responsiveness to emergent contingencies and greatly
increase risk. These challenges grow each year as our forces downsize
while continuing to deploy at unprecedented rates.
Fiscal uncertainty requires the Department to accept risk in long-
term engagement opportunities with strategic consequences to U.S.
relations and prestige. Continued budget uncertainty and changes in
fiscal assumptions in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) degrade
USPACOM's ability to plan and program, leading to sub-optimal
utilization of resources. Services must be able to develop and execute
long-term programs for modernization while meeting current readiness
needs. Much of the supporting infrastructure in the Pacific and on the
West Coast of the U.S. mainland was established during World War II and
during the early years of the Cold War. The infrastructure requires
investment to extend its service life but the Services struggle to
maintain infrastructure sustainment, restoration, and modernization
accounts at appropriate levels. If funding uncertainties continue, the
U.S. will experience reduced warfighting capabilities and increased
challenges in pacing maturing adversary threats.
allies and partners
USPACOM's forward presence, posture, and readiness reassure allies
and partners of United States commitment to security in the Indo-Asia-
Pacific. Strengthening these relationships is critical to meeting the
challenges and seizing opportunities. Through bi-lateral and multi-
lateral relationships and activities, USPACOM is building a community
of like-minded nations that are committed to maintaining of the
international rules-based order. The United States's five Indo-Asia-
Pacific treaty allies are Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea,
Philippines, and Thailand. In addition, the United States continues to
strengthen partnerships with New Zealand, India, and Singapore, and
build new relationships that advance common interests with Vietnam,
Mongolia, Malaysia and Indonesia. This year, USPACOM plans to leverage
Fiscal Year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act, Public Law 114-92,
section 1263, ``South China Sea Initiative'' (section 1263) authority,
to begin implementing the Secretary's Southeast Asia Maritime Security
Initiative (MSI)--an initiative Secretary Carter announced at the
Shangri-La Dialogue that will increase the maritime security and
maritime domain awareness capacity of the Philippines, Vietnam,
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand. The Secretary has made available $50
million in fiscal year 2016 funding and announced an additional $375
million from fiscal year 2017-2020 to conduct MSI activities pursuant
to this authority. MSI takes a regional approach to help our partners
better sense activity within their sovereign territorial domain, share
information with domestic joint and international combined forces, and
contribute to regional peace and stability operations. I'm also looking
forward to improving military-to-military relationships with Burma and
Sri Lanka, once political conditions permit. Strengthening and
modernizing alliances and partnerships is a top USPACOM priority.
allies
Japan: The US-Japan alliance remains strong and operational
cooperation between USPACOM and the Japan Joint Staff continues to
increase. Our relationship is a cornerstone of regional stability. On
September 19th, 2015 Japan's Peace and Security Legislation authorizing
limited collective self-defense passed into law and will take effect
this year. Japan's Peace and Security Legislation and the revised
Guidelines for United States-Japan Defense Cooperation will
significantly increase Japan's ability to contribute to peace and
security. Japan's leadership has worked toward lessoning historical
tensions and improving cooperation and collaboration with the Republic
of Korea (ROK) in areas such as information sharing and disaster
response The Government of Japan supports USPACOM activities to
maintain freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. In another
growing relationship, a Japanese destroyer participated in the United
States-India-Japan trilateral exercise MALABAR in October and then
transited the South China Sea in company with the USS Theodore
Roosevelt in early November. Japanese P-3s exercised with the
Philippines and operated in the South China Sea while returning to
Japan from Southwest Asia.
Republic of Korea: The ROK alliance remains strong, and I am
optimistic that the Japan-ROK relationship will continue to improve,
which I hold as a top priority. The United States and ROK agreed to
delay wartime operational control (OPCON) transfer and adopt a
conditions-based approach, rather than following a calendar-based
deadline. Secretary of Defense Carter and his counter-part, Minister
Han, signed the Conditions Based OPCON Transition Plan (COTP) in
November 2015 at the annual Security Consultative Meeting in Seoul.
This is part of American and ROK efforts to modernize the alliance to
better address continued threats and provocations from North Korea such
as January's nuclear test and February's space launch. Trilateral
cooperation with Japan is the next logical step to ensure both
countries' mutual security.
Australia: The United States-Australia alliance anchors peace and
stability in the region. Australia plays a leading role in regional
security and capacity-building efforts and addressing disaster
response. Australia is a key contributor to global security,
contributing to counter-ISIL efforts in Iraq and the Resolute Support
mission in Afghanistan. With the implementation of force posture
initiatives, the Marine Rotational Force-Darwin successfully completed
its third rotation while increasing its presence from 250 to 1,177 U.S.
Marines. The fourth rotation begins in April 2016. The United States
and Australia are increasing collaboration in counter-terrorism, space,
cyber, integrated air missile defense, and regional capacity building.
Australia is procuring high-tech U.S. platforms that will increase
interoperability. These include the F-35A Lightning II, P-8 Poseidon,
C-17 Globemaster III, EA-18G Growler, Global Hawk UAVs, and MH-60R
helicopters. To enhance synchronization and integration, the Australian
Government provides a Flag Officer and a Senior Executive (civilian) to
USPACOM and a General Officer to U.S. Army Pacific staffs on a full-
time basis.
Philippines: The alliance between the Philippines and the United
States has been important for more than 65 years. The Philippines
Supreme Court recently upheld the Philippine's domestic approval of the
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) which will improve United
States access and build Philippine military capacity by addressing
capability gaps, long-term modernization, Maritime Security (MARSEC),
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), and disaster response capabilities.
USPACOM is exploring way to use MSI to realize Philippines MARSEC and
MDA capability development. The Philippine Navy has made good use of
two previously awarded Excess Defense Article (EDA) U.S. Coast Guard
Cutters. During the 2015 Cooperation Readiness Afloat and Training
(CARAT) exercise, one of the EDA cutters (BRP RAMON A. ALCARAZ PF-16)
operated with the USS Fort Worth, enhancing our shared security
concerns. During the 2015 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit,
President Obama announced the award of a third former United States
Coast Guard cutter through the EDA program, which will significantly
enhance the Philippine Navy's maritime security capabilities, and,
through MSI, we are exploring ways to ensure that this vessel is
delivered fully mission capable. U.S. P-3s and P-8s already operate
from Clark Air Base on a rotational basis, and the EDCA will increase
United States access in crisis to Philippine facilities that are
important strategic locations. USPACOM provides information sharing and
training for the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the areas of MARSEC
and MDA, Additionally, USPACOM provided $3.5 million in Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) equipment and two years of
sustainment training to the Armed Forces Philippines Defense Initiative
through the CBRN Defense programs. USPACOM appreciates the continued
support of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Joint Program Executive
Office, and Joint Requirements Office in providing CBRN equipment and
training to partners in the region.
Thailand: The United States and Thailand's long relationship began
with a Treaty of Amity and Commerce in 1833, now 183 years old; that
relationship expanded into a defense treaty in 1954, and the U.S.
continues to value our alliance and friendship. Unfortunately, the Thai
military's ongoing control of the civilian government since May 2014
undermines this important relationship. The U.S. encourages a return to
democracy that will fully restore our bond; until then, military
engagements and exercises will continue in reduced form. USPACOM will
continue demonstrating commitment to our oldest ally while also
reinforcing democratic values and ideals. Moving forward, it would be
my hope that we use MSI to more fully support Thailand's maritime
security and maritime domain awareness capability as an important
member of the region. Moving forward, it would be my hope that we use
MSI to more fully support Thailand's maritime security and maritime
domain awareness capability as an important member of the region.
partners
Singapore: Singapore is our most important partner in Southeast
Asia. It has been a major security cooperation partner for over a
decade and provides invaluable access for U.S. Forces. The rotational
deployment of Littoral Combat Ships to Changi Naval Base has been
productive, and P-8s now operate out of Paya Lebar Air Base on a
regular basis. USPACOM conducts dozens of military exercises each year
with Singapore's Armed Forces, Singaporean military officers regularly
attend United States professional military education, and Singaporean
military personnel participate in advanced military training that is
conducted throughout the United States. Singapore hosts the annual
Shangri-La Dialogue, a Secretary of Defense-level event that deepens
regional ties and tables important issues for discussion. The
combination of forward deployed forces and deep training relationships
contribute to readiness, build deeper ties, and allow the U.S. to
promote maritime security and stability with regional partners.
India: The new found momentum in our bilateral relationship with
India represents USPACOM's most promising strategic opportunity. In
January 2015, President Obama and Prime Minister Modi signed a Joint
Strategic Vision of the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region. This
landmark document presents shared views and interests for the region.
The United States / India military-to-military relationship deepens as
forces increasingly train and operate together. USPACOM intends to add
momentum to an important relationship. Through this end, I have made
improving the military-to-military with India a formal Line of Effort
at USPACOM. In June 2015, during Secretary of Defense Carter's visit to
India, the United States and India renewed the ten-year Defense
Framework Agreement. In 2015, United States and India militaries
participated together in three major exercises and 62 other military
exchanges covering scenarios ranging from high-end warfare to
humanitarian assistance and disaster response. The US-India Defense
Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) further expands opportunities.
Defense sales are at an all-time high and U.S.-sourced airframes, such
as P-8s, C-130Js, C-17s, AH-64s and CH-47s, increase interoperability.
USPACOM will advance the partnership with India by expanding the scope
of military-to-military interactions.
New Zealand: Despite differences over nuclear policy, our
military-to-military relationship with New Zealand, underpinned by the
Wellington and Washington Declarations, is on solid footing. The New
Zealand military has fought, flown, and sailed with United States
forces since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom. New Zealand
continues to be a respected voice in international politics and a
recognized leader in the South Pacific that shares common security
concerns with the U.S., including terrorism, transnational crime, and
maritime security. Military-to-military relations and defense
engagements with New Zealand remain strong.
Vietnam: Vietnam's growing economy and their concerns over Chinese
coercion presents a strategic opportunity for the United States to add
another regional partner. USPACOM is moving forward with Vietnam to
improve Vietnam's capacity and capability in maritime security,
disaster response. We are also exploring ways to use MSI to support
Vietnam's maritime security modernization efforts, including in the
area of search and rescue. In addition, Vietnam has agreed to allow
U.S. prepositioning humanitarian stocks and supplies for disaster
preparedness purposes.
Indonesia: Indonesia is an important security partner in Southeast
Asia. President Joko Widodo's initiative to transform Indonesia into a
global maritime ``Fulcrum'' demonstrates Indonesia's desire to play a
larger role in international diplomatic, economic, and security issues.
Again, USPACOM is developing ways to partner with Indonesian security
forces through MSI and other U.S. security cooperation programs to
improve Indonesia's maritime security capacity and encouraging a
collaborative regional maritime security architecture. Indonesia is not
a claimant to territory in South China Sea maritime dispute, but it is
reinforcing security on and around its Natuna Islands. Indonesia will
maintain relationships with other influential nations such as Russia
and China, but security cooperation with the United States is a top
priority for Jakarta. As a tangible sign of this, the United States and
Indonesia signed a ministerial-level Joint Statement on Comprehensive
Defense Cooperation in October.
Malaysia: Malaysia is another important contributor to regional
peace and security. Through the Comprehensive Partnership with
Malaysia, the United States and Malaysia promote regional stability.
Malaysia's regional leadership role, technologically advanced industry,
stable economy, and capable military make it an important partner in
securing peace and prosperity in Southeast Asia. USPACOM continues to
assist Malaysia in building an amphibious force to address non-
traditional threats in and around Malaysia's territorial waters.
Malaysia seeks United States support in developing a more capable Coast
Guard through the Malaysia Maritime Enforcement Agency. These
capabilities and engagements demonstrate Malaysia's capacity and
resolve to ensure regional and domestic security, and Malaysia develops
opportunities for multilateral security cooperation through Cooperation
Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercises. Like other section
1263-designated countries, we are exploring ways that MSI can support
Malaysia's maritime security requirements in each of these areas.
Sri Lanka: President Sirisena, elected in January, is serious
about addressing Sri Lanka's human rights issues. We have an
opportunity to expand United States interests with Sri Lanka--Asia's
oldest democracy--and will proceed deliberately as progress is made.
Given Sri Lanka's strategic location, it is in America's interest to
increase military collaboration and cooperation. As conditions permit,
USPACOM will expand military leadership discussions, increase naval
engagement, and focus on defense institution building in areas such as
demobilizing and military professionalism.
others
In addition to Indo-Asia-Pacific allies and partners, USPACOM has
many other unique relationships throughout the region with countries,
jurisdictions, and international governmental organizations. These
relationships are important parts of our overall strategy.
Taiwan: Free and fair democratic elections in January on the
island of Taiwan reflect shared values with the United States The
United States maintains its unofficial relations with Taiwan through
the American Institute in Taiwan and we continue supporting Taiwan's
security. USPACOM will continue to fulfill United States commitments
under the Taiwan Relations Act; continued arms sales to Taiwan are an
important part of that policy and help ensure the preservation of
democratic government institutions.
The United Kingdom (UK), Canada, and France: Staunch NATO allies,
the UK, Canada, and France are also Indo-Asia-Pacific nations, each
with significant interests in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, including
territories, allies, partners, and trade. Each participates in PACFLT's
RIMPAC and other major exercises, and deploy ships, submarines, and
other forces to the region for operational, partner capacity, law
enforcement and disaster response missions. Canada has a General
Officer serving as a Deputy Director for Operations at USPACOM; the UK
will assign a similar grade officer to serve as Director of USPACOM's
Theater Security Cooperation effort. Each nations' leadership expressed
renewed commitment to the region, and USPACOM welcomes and supports
their efforts.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): While not a
military alliance, ASEAN is among the most important multilateral
forums in the region. The ten ASEAN member states, under the
chairmanship of Malaysia last year and Laos this year, seek to improve
multilateral security engagements and advance stability in the Indo-
Asia-Pacific. ASEAN-centered political-security fora such as the ASEAN
Defense Minister's Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) and ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF) have encouraged ASEAN members and China to conclude a meaningful,
substantive Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. USPACOM investment
in the ADMM-Plus, ARF and other U.S. ASEAN defense engagements improve
multilateral defense cooperation and promote regional norms.
Facilitating capacity building through incrementally increasing the
complexity of ASEAN's recurring multilateral exercises is a priority.
In 2016, USPACOM will participate in the second series of ADMM-Plus'
three major exercises.
China: The United States-China relationship remains complex. While
Chinese actions and provocations create tension in the region, there
are also opportunities for cooperation. The United States approach to
China encourages a dialogue between the armed forces of both countries
to expand practical cooperation where national interests converge and
to constructively manage differences through sustained and substantive
consultations. USPACOM's engagements with China, governed by section
1201 of the fiscal year 2000 NDAA, improve transparency and reduce risk
of unintended incidents, enhancing regional stability.
USPACOM executed over 50 bilateral and numerous multilateral
engagements last year with China. USPACOM supports our national effort
to encourage China to support the existing security architecture;
however, China's base-building and militarization in the South China
Sea, its lack of transparency regarding military modernization efforts,
and continued malicious cyber activity raise regional tension and
greatly hinder United States-China cooperation. Instead of jointly
working toward reinforcing international rules and law to promote
regional peace and stability, United States-China engagements are often
focused on reducing friction and avoiding miscalculation.
USPACOM hosted a United States-China Military Maritime Consultative
Agreement plenary and working group focused on operational safety in
November 2015. USPACOM also provided significant support to the
development of the Rules of Behavior memorandum of understanding on
safety in the air and maritime domain. Ongoing dialogues led to
improved communications and safer encounters at sea and in the air.
There are areas where United States and Chinese militaries
cooperate in areas of common interest, such as counter piracy, military
medicine, and disaster response. The most successful engagements
focused on military medical cooperation and shared health concerns. For
example, in January 2015, the PLA hosted the USPACOM Surgeon and
component surgeons in Beijing, Xi'an and Shanghai focused on Disaster
Response, Pandemic and Emerging Infectious Diseases, and Soldier Care.
In September, the USPACOM Surgeon sponsored the third acupuncture
subject matter expert exchange between United States and PLA
acupuncturists in Beijing, leading to collaborative research on
acupuncture treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder. USPACOM
encourages China's participation in international efforts to address
shared challenges in a manner consistent with international law and
standards.
Bilateral and Multilateral Approaches: USPACOM is directly
connected to regional leaders. I am in frequent communication with my
regional counterparts and appreciate the ability to reach out at any
time to share perspectives. USPACOM maintains a close link with allies
and partners through staff exchange and liaison officers, in addition
to a series of formal bilateral mechanisms. In Australia, key
engagements stem from the ANZUS treaty obligations, guided by USPACOM's
principle bilateral event with Australia, the Military Representatives
Meeting. Similarly, USPACOM's military to military relationship with
Japan is guided by the annual Japan Senior Leader Seminar. Military
Committee and Security Consultative Meetings are the preeminent
bilateral mechanisms that guide the ROK and U.S. alliance. Each year,
USPACOM co-hosts the Mutual Defense Board and Security Engagement Board
with the Armed Forces of the Philippines to deal with 21st-century
challenges. USPACOM conducts annual Senior Staff Talks with Thailand to
address security concerns and reinforce U.S. commitment to democratic
principles. Bilateral mechanisms also exist with non-alliance partners
throughout the region, including India, Indonesia, and Vietnam.
The future lies in multilateral security mechanisms. USPACOM is
evolving key bilateral relationships into multilateral ones that will
more effectively address shared security concerns. For example, US-
Japan-ROK trilateral coordination in response to North Korean
provocative behavior is improving. The ROK and Japan each recognize
that provocative actions by North Korea will not be isolated to the
peninsula and greater coordination and cooperation are required. The
December 2014 signing of the US-Japan-ROK Trilateral Information
Sharing Arrangement is an important step toward greater information
sharing. This arrangement was first exercised in early January
following the nuclear test in North Korea.
To encourage multilateral cooperation, USPACOM hosts the Chief of
Defense Conference (CHODs) annually. The CHODs conference location
rotates between Hawaii and a regional partner. In 2015, 31 countries
attended the CHODs conference in Hawaii. USPACOM also participates in
Australia-Japan-United States trilateral defense dialogues, including
the Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF). The trilateral
relationship between the United States, Japan, and India is growing, as
evidenced by the first trilateral ministerial meeting held last year.
The United States, Japan, and India share democratic values, interests
in protecting sea lanes of commerce, and promoting adherence to
international laws and norms. Next, USPACOM aims to build a powerful
quadrilateral partnership framework of the most powerful democracies in
the Indo-Asia-Pacific. India, Japan, Australia, and the United States
working together will be a force for the maintenance of the regional
rules-based order, counterbalancing and deterring coercion or
unrestrained national ambitions.
activities
Security Cooperation and Capacity Building: USPACOM's Security
Cooperation approach focuses on building partner readiness, reducing
partner capability gaps, and building partner capacity. One of the more
powerful engagement resource tools is Foreign Military Financing (FMF).
Favorable consideration for continued funding of FMF enables USPACOM to
meet regional challenges to include border security issues, disaster
response, counterterrorism, and in particular, maritime security.
As I mentioned, USPACOM will leverage the fiscal year 2016 NDAA
section 1263 ``South China Sea Initiative'' authority to execute the
Secretary's Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative to build
maritime security and maritime domain awareness of partners in the
South China Sea region, through assistance to, and training of, partner
nation maritime security forces. USPACOM will continue to rely on FMF
as a source of providing major end items to eligible countries. MSI
support notified pursuant to the new section 1263 authority should be
viewed as complementary and additive in nature to these FMF plans.
Under MSI, PACOM plans to provide niche capabilities, more multi-
mission type of equipment, and connective tissue that will help
partners better deploy and employ these maritime security capabilities,
both domestically to protect their sovereign territory, but also as a
means of fostering greater regional interoperability.
Maritime Domain Awareness: Southeast Asian partners have expressed
strong enthusiasm and support for United States security cooperation
efforts in the area of maritime domain awareness (MDA). USPACOM will
leverage MSI and the new section 1263 authority to develop multilateral
approaches to information sharing toward a regional common operating
picture. This year, the Philippines, Australia and the United States
are co-hosting a workshop to discuss regional best practices. This
civilian-military workshop will facilitate whole-of-government
discussions on maritime challenges that support creation of a regional
maritime domain awareness network to share information across Southeast
Asian partners--another multilateral approach to addressing security
challenges in the region.
Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI): Indo-Asia-Pacific
countries provide over 40% of the world's uniformed peacekeepers to
United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations worldwide; half of those
countries that provide UN peacekeepers are GPOI program partners. GPOI
builds and maintains the capability, capacity, and effectiveness of
partners to deploy professional forces to meet the UN's needs in peace
and security operations. Partners are meeting program goals achieving,
or making progress towards achieving, self-sustaining, indigenous
training capability. In 2016, USPACOM and Mongolia will cohost a
multinational peacekeeping exercise called KHAAN QUEST, training
personnel from 37 nations for deployment to UN peacekeeping missions.
USPACOM expects 28 regional GPOI partners in KHAAN QUEST. USPACOM will
continue improving partner military peacekeeping skills and operational
readiness and provide limited training facility refurbishment.
Indonesia's plan to provide 4,000 deployable Peacekeeping Forces by
2020 is another opportunity for USPACOM to engage with Indonesian
military forces.
Pacific Pathways: As an innovative way to overcome the Indo-Asia-
Pacific's vast time-distance challenges, United States Army Pacific
(USARPAC) created Pacific Pathways which sequentially deploys small
units to multiple countries for training. Their forward presence also
enables rapid response to humanitarian emergencies or regional crises.
This cost-effective program ensures that our regionally aligned Army
elements know how to deploy and fight in the Indo-Asia-Pacific
alongside our allies and partners. I support and encourage this kind of
innovative thinking, and it pays major dividends in both relationships
and readiness.
Joint Exercise Program: USPACOM's Joint Exercise Program
intentionally synchronizes frequent, relevant, and meaningful
engagements across the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. This important
program, funded through the Combatant Commander Exercise Engagement
Training Transformation (CE2T2), improves readiness of forward deployed
assigned forces. Exercises and training strengthen USPACOM's military
preeminence and enhance relationships. USPACOM appreciates Congress'
support for continued progress.
Pacific Partnership: United States Pacific Fleet's (PACFLT)
Pacific Partnership is an annual disaster response preparedness mission
to Southeast Asia and Oceania regions. Pacific Partnership includes
participation from U.S. allies and partners to improve cooperation and
understanding between partner and host nations ahead of major natural
disasters that require a multinational response. Last year, USNS Mercy
conducted a four-month deployment to Fiji, Papua New Guinea, the
Philippines, and Vietnam and provided healthcare and surgical
procedures, community health engagements, and engineering projects
including nearly 700 surgeries, 3,800 dental exams, and 10 renovation
and new construction projects.
Joint Enabling Capabilities Command: One organization that
supports USPACOM's ability to respond rapidly and effectively to events
in theater is TRANSCOM's Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC).
The JECC is critical to USPACOM's ability to facilitate rapid
establishment of joint force headquarters, fulfill Global Response
Force (GRF) execution, and bridge joint operational requirements by
providing mission-tailored, ready joint capability packages.
Counter-Narcotics: The drug trade continues to grow and threaten
stability across the region. It has become a massive business, with
sophisticated global networks. USPACOM combats drug trafficking in the
region through Joint Interagency Task Force-West (JIATF-W). Building
partner capacity to counter illicit trafficking of narcotics continues
in areas such as the tri-border area of the Philippines, Malaysia and
Indonesia, the coastal areas of Vietnam and Cambodia, and the border
regions of Bangladesh. USPACOM is also fighting illicit trafficking
across the Northern Thai border in the historic ``Golden Triangle''
area and beginning new partnerships with France to combat trafficking
in and through French Polynesia and the Southern Pacific. Counter-
narcotics programs support law enforcement and security forces, enhance
relationships with partner nation law enforcement agencies, and impede
the flow of narcotics and other illicit commodities.
JIATF-W engagements with China are an essential part of the counter
narcotics effort. Maritime container shipments of China-sourced
chemicals are often diverted for methamphetamine and heroin/opioid
production in Mexico--a direct threat to the United States Homeland. As
much as 90 percent of the precursor chemicals used in methamphetamine
production originates in China. Further, the annual volume of
methamphetamine seizures going into the U.S. exceeded cocaine seizures
on the southwest border of the U.S. in recent years. Through a
partnership with the Internal Revenue Service, JIATF-W leveraged
Department of Defense counternarcotic authorities to open an additional
avenue of cooperation with Chinese officials by providing anti-money
laundering training to counterdrug efforts. These efforts show promise
in improving communication, cooperation, and information sharing on
significant criminal enterprises operating in the United States and
China.
The Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (DKI
APCSS): DKI APCSS serves as a truly unique venue to empower regional
security practitioners to more effectively and collaboratively
contribute to regional security and stability. This center is one of
our asymmetric capabilities. No other country has anything quite like
it. Through its academic exchanges, workshops, and sustained alumni
engagement activities, DKI APCSS helps build partner nation capacities
and affirm U.S. interests in the region. DKI APCSS provides added
support to the USPACOM mission in several uniquely focused areas: as
one of the few organizations authorized to conduct carefully measured
engagement with Burma defense officials; as the primary tool of
security cooperation engagement with the Pacific Island region; and as
USPACOM's lead in implementing the U.S. National Action Plan mandate to
increase inclusion of women in the security sector under the Women,
Peace, and Security program. Recent successes include development and
implementation of a successful country-wide security plan for 2015
elections in Burma; building the capacity of government officials in
preparation for the Lao 2016 chairmanship of ASEAN; enhancing the
cybercrime investigation capability of the Bangladesh Police;
developing rules of engagement for the Timor Leste police during
peacetime; building a data system for collection of counterterrorism
information in Vietnam; and improving coordination among Philippine
national agencies, local government units, NGOs, and other stakeholders
in disaster response.
Center for Excellence-Disaster Management (CFE-DM): The CFE-DM is
USPACOM's executive agent for collecting lessons learned and developing
and sharing best practices to prepare U.S. and partner governments for
disaster response. CFE-DM recently completed a Joint After-Action
Review of USPACOM's disaster response to the April 2015 Nepal
Earthquake (Operation SAHAYOGI HAAT). The success of the response is a
testament to Nepali preparation and disaster risk reduction efforts
that were enhanced by our ongoing training assistance. The civilian
national disaster management structures functioned, and the initial
international response coalesced around the Nepal Army's Multinational
Military Coordination Center (MNMCC). Five years of USPACOM Theater
Security Cooperation initiatives with regional partners, organizations,
and international agencies facilitated this collaborative foreign
disaster response. CFE-DM supports USPACOM's efforts to increase
resilience and more effective disaster response capabilities.
critical capabilities
The most technical, high-end military challenges in the region are
growing. While many improvements to posture, forward deployed forces,
and our relationships help address these challenges, USPACOM requires
the best, high-end warfighting capabilities available now and in the
future. As Secretary Carter recently said about deterring our most
advanced competitors, ``We must have, and be seen to have, the ability
to impose unacceptable costs on an advanced aggressor that will either
dissuade them from taking provocative action or make them deeply regret
it if they do.'' There are a number of mission sets and enablers that
requires continuous focus and attention. These include undersea
warfare, munitions, ISR, cyber, space, and Integrated Air and Missile
Defense (IAMD) systems. We must preserve our asymmetric advantages in
undersea- and anti-submarine warfare, and we must regain and retain
fading abilities to counter anti-access / area-denial (A2/AD)
strategies.
Today, China is ``out-sticking'' United States air and maritime
forces in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region in terms of ranges of anti-ship
weapons. I need increased lethality, specifically ships and aircraft
equipped with faster, more lethal, and more survivable weapons systems.
We must have longer range offensive weapons on every platform. Finally,
we must have a networked force that provides greater options for action
or response.
We face a significant A2/AD challenge in this region. Pacing the
threat is not an option in my playbook. We must outpace the competition
which requires continued investment in development and deployment of
the latest technology to USPACOM. Examples include Navy Integrated
Fires and the AEGIS Flight III destroyer and its Air and Missile
Defense Radar (AMDR)--essential tools in the complex A2/AD battlespace
in which our young men and women operate today. The arrival of the USS
Barry, USS Benfold and USS Chancellorsville in the Western Pacific
represent forward deploying cutting edge technology where it is needed.
Undersea Warfare: Of the world's 300 foreign submarines, roughly
200 are in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region; of which 150 belong to China,
North Korea, and Russia. China is improving the lethality and
survivability of its attack submarines and building quieter high-end,
diesel- and nuclear-powered submarines. China has four operational Jin-
class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and at least one more may
enter service by the end of this decade. When armed, a Jin-class SSBN
will give China an important strategic capability that must be
countered. Russia is a Pacific threat, modernizing its existing fleet
of Oscar-class multi-purpose attack nuclear submarines (SSGNs) and
producing their next generation Yasen-class SSGNs. Russia has also
homeported their newest Dolgorukiy-class SSBN in the Pacific,
significantly enhancing their strategic deterrence posture. USPACOM
must maintain its asymmetric advantage in undersea warfare capability
including our attack submarines, their munitions, and other anti-
submarine warfare systems like the P-8 Poseidon and ship-borne systems.
Critical Munitions: Critical munitions shortfalls are a top
priority and concern. USPACOM advocates for continued investment,
additional procurement, and improved munitions technologies to better
deter and defeat aggression. Munitions are a major component of combat
readiness. USPACOM forces need improvements in munitions technologies,
production, and pre-positioning, but fiscal pressure places this at
risk.
USPACOM weapon improvement priorities include long-range and stand-
off strike weapons, longer-range anti-ship weapons (ship and aircraft-
based), advanced air-to-air munitions, theater ballistic/cruise missile
defense, torpedoes, naval mines, and a cluster munitions replacement.
Our subsonic ship-to-ship munition, the Harpoon, is essentially the
same missile we had in 1978, when I was a newly-commissioned Ensign.
Nearly forty years later, competitors have developed supersonic ship-
to-ship and land-based weapons that reach much farther, punch harder,
and fly faster. USPACOM welcomes efforts to turn the tables back in our
favor--quickly. In the air-to air realm, USPACOM welcomes advancements
in munitions that will provide an advantage in a complex air-to-air
environment. Additionally, modernization and improvement to U.S.
torpedo and naval mine capabilities and inventories are required to
maintain U.S. undersea advantage. Continued improvements in the
capability and capacity of ballistic/cruise missile defense
interceptors will further enhance Homeland defense capabilities and
protect key regional nodes from aggressive action. In support of Korea,
USPACOM supports efforts to acquire a replacement for aging cluster
munitions.
Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance: The challenge of
gathering credible ISR cannot be overstated, and it is a constantly
evolving problem. The Indo-Asia-Pacific presents a dynamic security
environment requiring flexible, reliable, survivable deep-look and
persistent ISR to provide indications and warning and situational
awareness across a vast geographic area. As previously noted, USPACOM
faces a variety of challenges and potential flashpoints to include
threats from North Korea, a resurgent Russia, an expanding China,
terrorism, and territorial disputes. Several hundred thousand Americans
live under a constant threat of attack by North Korea, with over a
hundred thousand rockets able to range Seoul on little to no notice.
These challenges require ISR to prevent strategic surprise and
accurately assess the security environment and, if necessary, defeat
potential adversaries. The Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific has increased
USPACOM allocation of ISR resources. USPACOM will continue to require
additional advanced ISR to avoid long-term risk.
Cyber and Space: The cyber domain, coupled with space, is the most
likely ``first salvo'' in a future conflict. Increased cyber capacity
and nefarious activity, especially by China, North Korea, and Russia
underscore the growing requirement to evolve command, control, and
operational authorities. I support a separate CYBERCOM functional
combatant command that retains its ``double-hatting'' with the National
Security Agency. I also believe that in order to fully leverage the
cyber domain, USPACOM requires an enduring theater cyber capability
able to provide cyber planning, integration, synchronization, and
direction of cyber forces.
USPACOM relies on space based assets for satellite communications
(SATCOM) and ISR across the range of military operations. The USPACOM
region spans over half the globe and space based assets are high-
demand, low-density resources. As the shared domain of space grows
increasingly congested and contested, our adversaries are developing
means to attack our space-enabled capabilities. USPACOM requires
resilient SATCOM capability to support operations. China is pursuing a
broad and robust array of counterspace capabilities, which includes
direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles, co-orbital anti-satellite
systems, computer network operations, ground-based satellite jammers
and directed energy weapons.
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD): TPY-2 radars in Japan,
the THAAD system on Guam, and the Sea-Based X-band Radar (SBX) based in
Hawaii defend the U.S. Homeland and our allies. USPACOM's IAMD priority
is maintaining a credible, sustainable ballistic missile defense by
forward deploying the latest in ballistic missile defense technologies
to the Pacific. For example, the U.S. Seventh Fleet is increasing its
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capability with the addition of the USS
Benfold, which arrived in Japan last year, and USS Barry scheduled to
arrive in early 2016. These ships received a midlife modernization,
making them the most capable BMD ships in the world. The addition of
these modernized ships enables the U.S. Seventh Fleet to better support
the United States-Japan alliance with a credible ballistic missile
defense capability. USPACOM continues to work with Japan, the Republic
of Korea, and Australia to improve coordination and information sharing
with the goal of creating a fully-integrated BMD architecture.
Innovation: Innovation is critical to addressing USPACOM's
capability gaps and maintaining our military advantage. USPACOM
partners with DOD-wide organizations, national laboratories, and
industry to provide innovative solutions to fill capability
requirements. In particular, USPACOM maintains a strong relationship
with the OSD Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO), which is developing
game-changing technologies for the Indo-Asia-Pacific. USPACOM strongly
supports Deputy Secretary Work's Third Offset Strategy and the
associated effort to strategically advance areas where the U.S. can
maintain dominance. The ability to quickly and adaptively change joint
operational concepts and innovatively employ current capabilities in a
high-end fight is critical.
conclusion
It has been over four years since the President announced the
United States Rebalance to the Indo-Asia-Pacific. There is much more to
the Rebalance than military activity and the success of this strategic
concept depends as much on our economic and diplomatic efforts as it
does on our military efforts. From the military perspective, I believe
the Rebalance is working. This success is due in no small part to the
support of this committee and the Congress. But we are not done, and we
must not lose momentum. USPACOM appreciates your continued support. I
ask this committee to support continued investment in future
capabilities that meet the challenges in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. I
appreciate your help in continuing to field the right numbers of
existing capabilities. I ask for your support to our plans to adapt our
regional force posture. Finally, I ask your continued support for our
efforts to reinforce and enhance alliances and partnerships. Thank you
for your enduring support to USPACOM and our men and women in uniform,
and their families, who live and work in the vast Indo-Asia-Pacific.
Chairman McCain. General Scaparrotti?
STATEMENT OF GENERAL CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI, USA, COMMANDER,
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND, COMBINED FORCES COMMAND, U.S. FORCES
KOREA
General Scaparrotti. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed,
and distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to
testify today as the commander of the United Nations Command
[UNC], Combined Forces Command [CFC], and the United States
Forces Korea [USFK].
Sir, I would like to add to Admiral Harris's comment that
we wish Senator McCaskill a speedy recovery as well.
On behalf of the American soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines, and our civilians, serving in the Republic of Korea,
thank you for your support.
Admiral Harris, thank you for your vision and professional
support of the entire PACOM team for USFK.
I have prepared brief opening remarks, and I ask that my
written posture statement be entered into the record.
Chairman McCain. Without objection.
General Scaparrotti. Since my last testimony, our United
States-ROK alliance has continued to focus on advancing our
combined capabilities. Some of these advanced capabilities
include the establishment of the first United States-ROK
combined division, the rotation of additional U.S. Forces to
the peninsula, the execution of our annual combined training
exercises, and steady progress on our $10.7 billion plan to
relocate United States forces in Korea.
Furthermore, the Republic of Korea has improved its
capabilities with the recent establishment of the Korean Air
and Missile Defense System and center, and the Allied Korea
Joint Command and Control System. The Republic of Korea has
also invested in modern equipment with the purchase of the F-35
Joint Strike Fighter, Global Hawk, Patriot Advanced Capability
3 missile upgrades, as well as AH-64 Apache helicopters.
These alliance advances help counter the real and proximate
North Korean threat. North Korea continues to conduct
provocations and to resource its large conventional force. Of
greater significance, North Korea continues to aggressively
develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in direct
violation of the U.N. Security Council resolutions, as
demonstrated with its fourth nuclear test and its fifth TD-2
launch in January and February.
In regards to this threat, my top concern remains the
potential for a North Korean provocation to start a cycle of
action and counteraction, which could quickly escalate, similar
to what we experienced this past August.
While I am proud to report that our alliance stood
shoulder-to-shoulder and de-escalated the situation, it could
have spiraled out of control and demonstrates why we must be
ready to fight tonight on the peninsula.
To maintain this level of readiness, we will continue to
focus on sustaining, strengthening, and transforming the
alliance with an emphasis on our combined readiness in four
critical areas.
First, ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance]
remains my top readiness challenge. CFC/USFK requires
additional persistent, all-weather ISR capabilities, as well as
dependable moving target indicator support, to maintain
situational awareness and provide adequate decision space.
Second, it is critical for the alliance to establish a
layered and interoperable ballistic missile defense. To advance
this goal, we will soon begin bilateral consultations regarding
the feasibility of deploying the THAAD system to the Republic
of Korea, which would complement the Patriot system
capabilities.
Third, we must maintain an adequate quantity of critical
munitions to ensure alliance supremacy in the early days of any
conflict on the peninsula. This requirement is further
amplified by the approaching loss of cluster munitions due to
the shelf-life expiration and the impending ban.
Fourth, we must focus on command and control,
communications, computers, and intelligence, or what we call
C4I. Both the United States and the Republic of Korea are
investing in new tactical equipment that will comprise a
reliable C4I architecture, but much more is required.
In closing, I would like to express how proud I am of the
servicemembers, civilians, and their families serving in the
Republic of Korea who never lose sight of the fact that we are
on freedom's frontier. I also would like to recognize
Ambassador Mark Lippert and Admiral Harry Harris and the United
States and ROK senior leaders for their enduring commitment to
our mission on the peninsula. Thank you, and I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Scaparrotti follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Curtis M. Scaparrotti
1. introduction
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee, I am
honored to testify as the Commander of the United Nations Command
(UNC), the United States-Republic of Korea (United States-ROK) Combined
Forces Command (CFC), and United States Forces Korea (USFK). Thank you
for your continued support to our servicemembers, civilians,
contractors, and their families, whose service each day on ``Freedom's
Frontier'' advances vital U.S. interests, strengthens the Alliance
between the United States and the Republic of Korea, and makes a
critical contribution to the stability of Northeast Asia. In my third
year as the Commander, I have witnessed the U.S.-ROK Alliance grow
stronger, as the Alliance has improved its capabilities, planning, and
cooperation to counter evolving threats from North Korea and to advance
our four priorities:
Sustain and Strengthen the Alliance.
Maintain the Armistice. Be Ready to ``Fight Tonight'' to
Deter and Defeat Aggression.
Transform the Alliance.
Sustain the Force and Enhance the UNC/CFC/USFK Team.
Through this past August's land mine attack, North Korea's fourth
nuclear test in January, and the TD-2 missile launch earlier this
month, the United States and Republic of Korea stood united and
resolute against North Korea's provocative actions. Our strength and
combined actions are the product of established ROK-U.S. bilateral
processes, the Alliance's shared commitment to remain ready to ``Fight
Tonight,'' and the alignment of American and Korean values and goals.
While the Command focuses on these core priorities, we are also
looking to the future. The Alliance took concrete steps over this past
year to enhance our ability to respond to North Korea's evolving
asymmetric capabilities, strengthen ROK forces to lead the combined
defense of the Republic of South Korea, and relocate United States
forces to two enduring hubs south of Seoul.
2. america's future in korea--securing vital interests and advancing
regional stability
The UNC/CFC/USFK mission is vital to the broader effort to expand
security and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. As a sub-unified
Command of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), USFK's core responsibility is
to deter and defeat external aggression against the Republic of Korea,
which enhances stability in the Asia-Pacific region and affirms our
commitment to the United States-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. We cooperate
closely with PACOM in its mission to promote security cooperation,
encourage peaceful development, respond to contingencies, deter
aggression, and, when necessary, fight to win.
From my perspective, the level of U.S. engagement demonstrated by
USFK in Korea and PACOM in the broader region is critical in this time
of opportunity and challenge in Asia. Expanding ties among Asian
countries and across the Pacific have helped facilitate an era of
robust economic growth and military advances. While these advances
promote global expansion and interdependent stability, international
tensions have risen from the actions of several regional nations'
military modernization and the use of national power. In this context
of significant and rapid change, the Republic of Korea's neighbors are
adjusting their strategies to shape the region's future.
China's continued pursuit of its military modernization program and
land reclamation activities have prompted concerns among many nations
in the region. Even as China's relations with North Korea remain
strained, Beijing continues to support the North Korean regime, remains
its largest trading partner, and seeks to prevent spillover of North
Korean issues.
Japan's decisions to take a more active role in its defense and to
advance global security are viewed by many nations around the world as
a positive development. Yet, some in China, the Republic of Korea, and
North Korea have been critical, as historical issues continue to
influence views on Japan's international role. In this complex setting,
USFK continues to look for opportunities to advance trilateral military
cooperation among the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.
Over the past year, Russia has continued to expand its military
presence, economic investment, and diplomatic engagement to reassert
its strategic interests in the region. Russia conducted combined
military drills with China in August, conducted multiple air patrols by
its bombers throughout the region and into the Korean Air Defense
Identification Zone, and named 2015 as a ``Year of Friendship'' between
Russia and North Korea.
Unfortunately, North Korea has chosen not to embrace this era of
change and prosperity, and has been omitted from many of the
opportunities in 21st century Asia. Kim Jong Un, North Korea's singular
leader and the third generation of the Kim Family, exercises complete
control over the state and military decision-making process focused on
preserving the survival of his regime. He maintains an extensive
internal security apparatus that addresses any challenges to his rule
and he has openly replaced several top military leaders to solidify his
authority. Kim also perceives that the regime's survival relies on the
domestic and international recognition of North Korea as a global and
nuclear power. This January's fourth nuclear test and February's launch
of a TD-2 missile configured as a satellite launch vehicle--its fifth
long-range missile launch since 2006--further demonstrate that North
Korea will continue to defy UN Security Council resolutions and
international norms in its attempts to seek the regime's desired
recognition.
Similar to his father and grandfather, Kim has likewise
demonstrated that violent provocations remain central to North Korea's
strategy. For example, this past August, North Korea carried out a
heinous landmine attack in the DMZ that grievously wounded two Korean
Soldiers. Later in the month, tensions rapidly intensified with the
deployment of additional forces to the DMZ, psychological operations,
and hostile rhetoric which required a strong, yet measured Alliance
response. Even though our combined actions enabled national leaders
from the two Koreas to resolve the situation diplomatically, it
demonstrated North Korea remains a credible and dangerous threat on the
Peninsula.
We continue to assess that North Korea recognizes it cannot reunify
the Korean Peninsula by force with its large, but aging, conventional
military. While it continues to train and man its conventional force,
North Korea remains focused on improving its asymmetric capabilities:
nuclear weapons, long-range ballistic missiles, and cyber programs. In
addition to its fourth nuclear test, the regime conducted a multitude
of multiple rocket launch system tests, as well as no-notice Scud and
No Dong missile tests from a variety of locations throughout North
Korea. Upgrades continued on the Taepodong Inter-Continental Ballistic
Missile (ICBM) launch facility and development of a submarine-launched
ballistic missile and vessel. Lastly, North Korea continued to improve
its capabilities in the cyber domain which build on the regime's
success of past cyberattacks.
Even as North Korea is investing heavily in asymmetric
capabilities, its conventional military threats are still formidable.
The KPA is the fourth-largest military in the world with several
hundred ballistic missiles, the largest artillery force in the world
with over 13,000 long-range and other artillery pieces, one of the
largest chemical weapons stockpiles in the world, a biological weapons
research program, and the world's largest special operations force.
About three-quarters of its ground forces and half of its air and naval
assets are within 60 miles of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). In the
contested waters around the Northwest Islands and beyond the western
end of the DMZ, North Korea has taken deliberate steps to strengthen
its awareness and posture with additional navigation buoys, coastal
observation posts, and naval patrols. These steps even include
beginning construction of troop and weapon emplacements on Kal Do, an
island less than three miles from Yeonpyeong Do, site of the 2010 North
Korean shelling of the Republic of Korean military and civilian
targets.
Due to these enduring and proximate threats, our Command must
continue to deter North Korea's aggression as the risks and costs of a
Korean conflict would be immense to the Republic of Korea, Northeast
Asia, and the world. The region accounts for one-fifth of the world's
economic output, 19% of global trade, four of the 13 largest economies,
and four of the six largest militaries in the world. If deterrence
fails, full-scale conflict in Korea would more closely parallel the
high intensity combat of the Korean War than the recent wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan. Furthermore, any conflict with North Korea would
significantly increase the threat of the use of weapons of mass
destruction.
3. the command's four priorities--progress and prospects
In the context of this unique strategic environment, the Command
advances vital U.S. interests, strengthens the ROK-U.S. Alliance, and
makes a critical contribution to security in the Asia-Pacific. This
year, we have made progress on each of our four priorities--first, to
sustain and strengthen the Alliance; second, to maintain the Armistice,
while remaining ready to ``Fight Tonight'' to deter and defeat
aggression; third, to transform the Alliance; and, finally, to sustain
the force and enhance the UNC/CFC/USFK Team.
A. Sustain and Strengthen the Alliance. Three key innovations this
year have led to substantive improvements in the ability of United
States and ROK forces to operate together as integrated and capable
allies.
1. A new ROK-United States Combined Division improves
interoperability. For more than 60 years, the Soldiers of the U.S. 2nd
Infantry Division (2ID) have stood shoulder-to-shoulder with our ROK
allies. This year, that enduring commitment was taken one step further
through the transformation of 2ID into a Combined ROK-United States
Division. This new organization integrates over 40 ROK Army officers
into the 2ID headquarters, fostering mutual trust, combined decision-
making, and open communications. In addition, a ROK Army mechanized
brigade will habitually train with the Combined Division's units to
develop shared capabilities. If conflict comes to the Peninsula, this
brigade will be under the operational control of the Combined Division
to create a seamless capability.
2. Rotational forces improve readiness. In order to increase the
effectiveness and readiness of U.S. Forces on the Peninsula, USFK
rotates specifically selected unit capabilities instead of maintaining
permanently stationed units with servicemembers on individual one-year
tours. Fully manned, trained, and mission-ready rotational forces also
provide the Alliance elevated capabilities over time by introducing a
greater number of the United States servicemembers to the unique
aspects of contingency operations in Korea.
In the summer of 2015, the United States Army began rotating
Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) into the Republic of Korea for the first
time, on nine-month tours as the 2nd Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT)
of the 1st Cavalry Division arrived from Fort Hood, Texas. Just two
months after the unit arrived, the BCT was able to integrate with the
ROK Army to conduct a combined and joint exercise. 2ID's Combat
Aviation Brigade has also increased its capabilities through the
rotation of Aerial Reconnaissance Squadrons and the Counter Fire Task
Force expanded it combat power by adding a rotational Multiple Launch
Rocket System (MLRS) battalion.
Rotation of fully-trained and resourced forces to the Korean
Peninsula is not just an Army commitment. The United States Navy's
Pacific Fleet ships and aircraft routinely exercise in the waters
surrounding the Korean Peninsula as part of their regular rotation
throughout the Pacific. Furthermore, the United States Air Force
rotates both Active and Reserve Component fighter squadrons to Korea,
while the United States Marines deploy air-ground teams to exercise and
practice interoperability with the ROK Marine Corps.
3. New capabilities improve the Alliance's defense and deterrence.
The ROK government has continued to invest approximately 2.5% of its
Gross Domestic Product in its national defense--one of the highest
rates among U.S. allies. During this past year, the Republic of Korea
made progress in enhancing future interoperable-warfighting
capabilities by procuring upgrades such as PAC-3 missiles for the
Patriot Weapon System, multi-role tanker-transport aircraft, and the
AEGIS command and control and weapons system. These follow previous
investments in F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, Global Hawk high-altitude
unmanned aerial vehicles, and other important assets. Once integrated
into our Alliance force structure, these systems will further enhance
our readiness and capability. Additionally, we announced this month
that we will begin bilateral consultations regarding the viability of
deploying the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to the
Republic of Korea to upgrade our combined missile defense posture.
B. Maintain the Armistice. Be Ready to ``Fight Tonight'' to Deter
and Defeat Aggression. The Command's focus on readiness proved critical
to answering North Korean provocations this past year. Our cooperation
affirmed both countries' pledge to develop Alliance solutions to
Alliance challenges.
1. The Command deters and defends against aggression to foster
stability on the Peninsula. President Obama noted at his October
meeting with President Park that, from the events of this August,
``North Korea was reminded that any provocation or aggression will be
met by a strong, united response by the Republic of Korea and the
United States.'' When crisis came, we were prepared. A constant focus
on readiness and open communication enabled the Alliance to act
deliberately and prudently. The Alliance's actions deterred broader
North Korean provocations and set the stage for a peaceful resolution
of the crisis.
2. Three successful exercises enhance the Command's readiness. UNC/
CFC/USFK enhanced its readiness through its three annual multinational,
combined, and joint exercises--Key Resolve, Foal Eagle, and Ulchi
Freedom Guardian. Key Resolve and Ulchi Freedom Guardian are annual,
computer-simulated command post exercises that focus on crisis
management and the defense of the Republic of Korea. Foal Eagle is an
annual field training exercise to ensure operational and tactical
readiness. All three exercises provide realistic scenarios that prepare
our forces, to include additional participants from the UNC, to deter
and defeat North Korean aggression and potential instability in the
region. They are essential in improving ROK-U.S. crisis management,
combat readiness, and interoperability.
We also aligned USFK's readiness program on the Korean Peninsula
with PACOM's regional efforts. In August 2015, USFK and PACOM
integrated for the first time the Korea-based Ulchi Freedom Guardian
exercise and PACOM's Pacific Sentry command and control exercise. This
coordination allowed the Alliance to test effective decision-making and
mutual support with PACOM.
3. A revitalizing UNC strengthens the international contribution to
Korea's defense. Last year, we increased our efforts to further
strengthen the engagement of the United Nations Command's 17 Sending
States in our day-to-day operations. When North Korean aggression
raises tensions, the Sending States provide credible and multinational
support for the defense of the Republic of Korea.
To revitalize the UNC, we will continue to engage all of the
Sending States to leverage their many capabilities for Korea's defense.
A senior Australian officer on our staff leads a sustained effort to
enhance Sending State engagement in UNC's work. The representatives of
the UNC Sending States participate in our exercises, train with us,
meet monthly with the Command's senior leadership, and assign top-
quality officers to work in the Command. During the Ulchi Freedom
Guardian 2015 exercise, the Command greatly appreciated the 89
participants from seven UNC Sending States (Australia, Great Britain,
Canada, New Zealand, Colombia, Denmark, and France).
C. Transform the Alliance. In 2015, the Command and the Alliance
continued to adapt to face both emerging and evolving challenges.
1. The MCM and SCM reaffirms ROK and U.S. commitment to defense
cooperation. Following the October meeting between President Obama and
President Park, in which our two countries recommitted to a
comprehensive and global Alliance, our senior defense officials met in
November at the 40th ROK-U.S. Military Committee Meeting (MCM) and the
47th ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM). They approved and
agreed to implement a new concept to detect, disrupt, destroy, and
defend (the ``4Ds'') against North Korean missile threats; pledged to
address global security challenges of mutual interest; strengthened
cooperation in the space and cyberspace domains; reaffirmed a timely
completion of the Yongsan Relocation Plan and Land Partnership Plan;
identified critical military capabilities that the Republic of Korean
military must develop to meet the conditions of OPCON transition; and
endorsed the Conditions-based Operational Control (OPCON) Transition
Plan, or COT-P.
2. The plan for conditions-based OPCON transition (COT-P) defines
an effective way forward. COT-P creates a well-designed pathway to
implement a stable transfer of wartime OPCON of combined forces from
the United States to the ROK. This Plan provides a road map for the
Republic of Korea to develop the capabilities that will allow it to
assume wartime Operational Control (OPCON) when the security
environment on the Korean Peninsula and in the region is conducive to a
stable transition.
3. Effective military planning positions the Alliance to respond to
a changing threat environment. USFK regularly reviews and updates
operations plans to ensure our readiness to respond to regional threats
and crises. The combined ROK-United States operations plan has and will
continue to evolve to enhance readiness and strengthen the ROK-United
States Alliance's ability to defend the Republic of Korea and maintain
stability on the Korean Peninsula.
D. Sustain the Force & Enhance the UNC/CFC/USFK Team. Our
Multinational-Combined-Joint Force continues to foster a positive
Command Climate and focus on the welfare of our team.
1. The Command fosters a positive Command Climate through trust and
team-building. The foundations of our organization and a positive
Command Climate consist of effective communication, trust, and
teamwork. Regular training on prevention of sexual harassment, sexual
assault, and suicides continues to be a priority. The result is a
strong record of servicemember discipline in the Republic of Korea.
Over 99.4 percent of our servicemembers demonstrate their discipline
and desire to be law-abiding, good neighbors in Korea.
2. Cohesive communities and new facilities promote Korea as an
``Assignment of Choice.'' This attention to the welfare of our entire
team has been an important driver in making Korea an ``Assignment of
Choice.'' Our realistic training against a real North Korean threat,
cohesive community, the safety of our host country, and the brand-new
facilities at Camp Humphreys welcome members of our military to serve
on ``Freedom's Frontier.''
4. critical near-term alliance transitions
Northeast Asia is one of the world's most dynamic regions. As a
result, the Command's success is not only contingent on our ability to
meet our immediate requirements, but also on our flexibility to adapt
in the strategic environment to new opportunities and challenges. While
we focus our efforts on our four Command priorities, we are also making
decisions and taking actions now that shape the future of our Command
and Alliance. Longer-term success requires both steadfast advancement
of the Command's priority to maintain readiness to ``Fight Tonight''
and the agility to transform in the future.
A. Enhance the Alliance's capabilities. As the North Korean threat
evolves, its extensive asymmetric arsenal could be used at a time and
location of its choosing. This creates indications and warning
challenges for the Alliance which require the United States and the
Republic of Korea to develop new capabilities to detect and defend
against this threat.
1. Advance ISR, BMD, and critical munitions to sharpen our tools of
deterrence. Together, both countries must constantly improve their
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capacity; develop a
robust, tiered ballistic missile defense; field appropriate command and
control assets; acquire necessary inventories of critical munitions;
and enhance the tools to prevent, deter, and respond to cyber-attacks.
2. The Tailored deterrence strategy underscores the U.S. commitment
to the Peninsula. We have developed and refined a Tailored Deterrence
Strategy, which serves as a strategic framework for tailoring
deterrence against North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile threat
scenarios. By providing a full range of ready military capabilities,
including the U.S. nuclear umbrella, conventional strike, and missile
defense capabilities, this strategy supports deterrence and represents
the U.S. commitment to provide and strengthen extended deterrence.
3. The Combined Counter-Provocation Plan manages the risks of
miscalculation. We also have confidence in our Combined Counter-
Provocation Plan. This plan improves our ability to respond to North
Korean provocations as an Alliance, while managing the risks of
miscalculation and escalation. The events of this August underscore how
strong, yet measured responses set the conditions for diplomatic
efforts to work.
B. Relocate the United States force in Korea. The Command made
progress towards relocating the majority of United States forces in
Korea to two enduring hubs south of Seoul--a Central Hub around the
cities of Osan and Pyeongtaek, and a Southern Hub around the city of
Daegu. The $10.7 billion program is the largest single construction
program in the Department of Defense and is well on its way to
realizing its goal of modernizing the warfighting Command in Korea,
improving the Command's effectiveness in deterring North Korea, and
defending the Republic of Korea.
1. Construction peaks as workers build facilities to triple the
size of Camp Humphreys. At the end of 2015, approximately 65% of the
program was completed. Currently, at the peak of production, workers
are constructing 655 new buildings, and remodeling or demolishing 340
existing buildings to accommodate the increase in population from
approximately 12,000 to more than 36,000 servicemembers, families,
civilians, and other members of our community. The majority of new
facility construction at Humphreys will be completed in 2016, and the
majority of unit relocations will occur through 2018. During these
transitions, we are committed to making relocation decisions with the
effective defense of the Republic of Korea as our most important
priority.
2. United States Naval Forces Korea moves its headquarters to
Busan, collocated with the ROK Navy. The project at Camp Humphreys is
not the Command's only move. This year, United States Naval Forces in
Korea relocated the majority of headquarters staff from Yongsan
Garrison in Seoul to the ROK Navy base in Busan, to enable the two navy
staffs to work closer on a daily basis. This is the first United States
headquarters located on a ROK base.
5. usfk's critical needs
My top concern remains that we could have very little warning of a
North Korean asymmetric provocation, which could start a cycle of
action and counter-action, leading to unintended escalation. To remain
effective as the threat evolves, we seek four critical capabilities:
First, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, or ISR. ISR
remains my top readiness challenge and resourcing priority as CFC/USFK
requires increased, multi-discipline, persistent ISR capabilities to
maintain situational awareness and provide adequate decision space for
USFK, PACOM, and National senior leaders. Therefore, among various
spectrum, deep look, and full-motion video (FMV) capabilities, I also
request dependable Moving Target Indicator (MTI) support combined with
an airborne command and control and battle management capability. The
ability to correlate MTI with other airborne sensor data in near-real-
time, with a robust on-board communications ability, contributes to a
deeper understanding of the North Korean threat and intent.
Second, Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and
Intelligence, or C4I. Both the United States and the Republic of Korea
are investing in new tactical equipment that will comprise a reliable
C4I architecture. We must maintain this momentum in improving C4I
capabilities and interoperability, so we can communicate from tactical
to strategic levels and between units in the field.
Third, Ballistic Missile Defense, or BMD. North Korea's missile
program continues to develop, so it is critical for the Alliance to
continue to build a layered and interoperable BMD capability. The U.S.
PATRIOT system provides important defensive capabilities, and I have
previously recommended to both governments that they consider a high-
altitude missile defense capability. Meanwhile, the Republic of Korea
is moving forward in the development of its Korea Air and Missile
Defense (KAMD) and ``Kill Chain.'' We have also made progress in
advancing the interoperability of Alliance BMD capabilities, but there
remains work to do in this area, particularly to further refine
interoperability between systems.
Fourth, Critical Munitions. The Command has identified specific
munitions that it must have on hand in the early days of any conflict
on the Peninsula. In this phase, the Alliance relies on the United
States and ROK Air Forces air superiority to provide time for ready
forces to flow into the Republic of Korea. In order to ensure this
supremacy through immediate Alliance capability and interoperability,
we must have sufficient critical munitions on hand. Therefore, we will
continue to work closely with the Republic of Korea to ensure it
procures the appropriate types and numbers of critical munitions for
the early phases of hostilities. Of note, the potential ban on cluster
munitions could have a significant impact on our ability to defend the
Republic of Korea.
With these capabilities, our Alliance will greatly improve its
posture in Korea. If we continue to act together, with the consistent
support we have experienced in both Washington and Seoul, I believe the
Command and the Alliance will strengthen and ensure our capability to
deter North Korea and defend the Republic of Korea and United States
interests.
6. conclusion
Over the past two-and-a-half years, I have seen steady progress in
the United States-ROK Alliance. Last year, we were tested, and we found
ourselves ready. Through annual exercises that rehearse United States-
ROK cooperation, the commitment to readiness of United States and ROK
armed forces, and our peoples' shared values and goals, UNC/CFC/USFK
and the ROK-United States Alliance have successfully advanced our
priorities and realization of our combined vision.
We are deeply thankful for the support of our Korean partners and
the UNC Sending States. We appreciate and value the continued support
of Congress and the American people, as it is your support that allows
us to undertake this critical mission.
It is my honor to serve with the American Soldiers, Sailors,
Airmen, and Marines and our government civilians who serve in the
Republic of Korea. Their presence and actions ensure freedom and the
success of our objectives. Finally, we would like to recognize the
leadership and support of senior United States and ROK civilian and
military leaders, Ambassador Mark Lippert, and Admiral Harry Harris, as
we support vital United States interests, strengthen the Alliance
between the United States and the Republic of Korea, and make a
critical contribution to security and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific.
Thank you, and I look forward to our discussion.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
I thank the witnesses for the kind words about Senator
McCaskill. You reflect the views of all of us in wishing her
well and a speedy recovery.
General Scaparrotti, you have the benefit of now 4 years of
service as commander of forces in Korea. Have you ever seen
tensions this high?
General Scaparrotti. No, sir, I have not, particularly in
August. I think the tensions then with North Korea to ``semi-
war'' status was the highest tension that we have seen,
probably since 1994.
Chairman McCain. In your testimony, you said the situation
``could spiral out of control.''
General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. My concern is that, in a
provocation, much like we had in August, both sides at a very
high alert status, there could be a miscalculation. Then with
the response, it would be hard to control that situation.
Chairman McCain. You do support THAAD deployment?
General Scaparrotti. I do, sir.
Chairman McCain. Admiral Harris, do you think it should be
seriously considered, an option of a second carrier based in
Japan?
Admiral Harris. Senator, I believe that, as a COCOM
[Combatant Command], I want as much capability as close to the
fight as I can. I think with regard to the second carrier
strike group in Japan, there are some problems with that, with
the political piece with Japan, the costs, and all that. I will
defer to the Navy to sort that out.
But, again, as a COCOM, I would welcome as much forces
forward as possible.
Chairman McCain. You have been in your job for how long
now?
Admiral Harris. Just a little over 7 months. I took over
last May.
Chairman McCain. You have had extensive experience with the
Chinese issue, with the issue of China?
Admiral Harris. Yes, sir, I have. Before this job, I was
the Pacific Fleet Commander.
Chairman McCain. Has any of this escalation, the latest,
this HQ-9 surface-to-air missile system, surprised you?
Admiral Harris. No, sir. It does not surprise me. In my
opinion, China is clearly militarizing the South China Sea, and
you have to believe in the flat earth to think otherwise.
Chairman McCain. One of the responses is to regularly sail
into and fly over international waters?
Admiral Harris. Yes, sir. As I testified last September----
Chairman McCain. Not as a one-off, but as just a regular,
routine use of international airspace and waters?
Admiral Harris. Yes, sir. I agree with you.
Chairman McCain. The situation vis-a-vis China continues to
escalate, in your view?
Admiral Harris. Yes, sir. It does. I think China's SSM,
surface-to-surface missiles, surface-to-air missiles, on Woody
Island; its new radars on Cuarteron Reef over here; the 10,000-
foot runway on Subi Reef over here and on Fire Cross Reef and
other places; these are actions that are changing, in my
opinion, the operational landscape in the South China Sea.
Chairman McCain. The weapons they have developed could pose
a direct threat to our carrier capabilities?
Admiral Harris. Yes, Senator. They could. The DF-21, which
they have developed, and the DF-26, which they are developing,
could pose a threat to our carriers. I think, though, that our
carriers are resilient, and we have the capability to do what
has to be done, if it comes to that.
Chairman McCain. I note you mentioned in your remarks that
the United States-Philippines alliance is important. Do you
think it is important for us to lift restrictions on the sale
of weapons to Vietnam?
Admiral Harris. Yes, Senator. I believe that we should
improve our relationship with Vietnam. I think it is a great
strategic opportunity for us, and I think the Vietnamese people
would welcome an opportunity to work closer with us, as their
security partner of choice.
Chairman McCain. That also means port visits?
Admiral Harris. Yes, sir. We do port visits in Vietnam. I
advocate for more, and I believe that we will be able to do
more this year.
Chairman McCain. If you were asked for your top two or
three priorities of what we should do, in light of this
compelling information concerning the militarization by China,
what would you recommend?
Admiral Harris. Sir, I believe that we should maintain our
credible combat power. We should maintain a network of like-
minded allies and partners. We should continue to exercise our
rights on the high seas and in the airspace above it. We should
encourage our friends, partners, and allies to do the same.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony.
Admiral Harris, you pointed out that there is a growing
alliance in the Pacific, including India, the Philippines,
Vietnam, potentially. Some of this, ironically, might be a
result of some of these contested actions of the Chinese. Is
that accurate?
Admiral Harris. Yes, Senator. It is accurate. I believe
that China's actions are provocative, increases tensions, and
it causes the nations in the region to look to the United
States as their security partner of choice and away from China.
Senator Reed. Do you feel that we are fulfilling that role
adequately, that we are engaging, and that we are cooperating
and leading as we should in the Pacific?
Admiral Harris. I believe we are. Across the Indo-Asia-
Pacific, from India through Southeast Asia and East Asia and
Japan and Korea, we are improving our treaty alliances, our
bilateral partnerships.
In turn, we are getting increased access throughout the
region. Singapore comes to mind. The EDCA that I spoke about in
the Philippines comes to mind.
This is an exciting time, in terms of access and agreements
and relationships with countries throughout the Indo-Asia-
Pacific region.
Senator Reed. One of the consequences of their buildout
into the islands is that they have very accurate surface-to-
surface missiles, they have accurate radars, which would seem
to put an even higher premium on underwater operations by U.S.
submarines or autonomous vehicles. Is that your view? Are they
becoming more important, submarines?
Admiral Harris. It is, though I would not say it is
becoming more important, because submarine and undersea warfare
has always been important to the joint force. I view the
submarine as the original stealth platform, and the
capabilities that we have is a true asymmetric advantage over
any other adversary or potential adversary on the planet. That
is our capability in the undersea realm.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Let me pose a question to both of you. China and North
Korea is a very complicated relationship. The Chinese I think
are nervous, not perhaps as much as the South Koreans and the
United States, but, certainly, a little bit nervous. Yet they
are the major funder in terms of the banking system, all of the
infiltrating and exfiltrating monies in and out of North Korea,
equipment, et cetera.
Why, in your view, have we not been able to convince the
Chinese of the danger that they face, and that their efforts
and our efforts together could be effective in preventing
potential catastrophes? Admiral Harris?
Admiral Harris. Sir, I wish I knew the answer to that
question. But I will say, adding on to what General Scaparrotti
mentioned about THAAD, I find it preposterous that China would
try to wedge itself between South Korea and the United States
for a missile defense system designed to defend Americans and
Koreans on the peninsula. If they were truly concerned, if they
were truly interested, I believe China would and should
intervene with North Korea and convince them to quit their
cycle the provocations.
Senator Reed. General Scaparrotti?
General Scaparrotti. Sir, first, I agree with Admiral
Harris. I think that they state that they are concerned about
stability on the border, and I believe that they place that
value above the risk that they believe they are taking with Kim
Jong-un. We, certainly, hope that they will reconsider that
calculus, because they, certainly, could have a greater
influence in North Korea, given that 80 percent of their trade
and a good deal of North Korea's banking is with China.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Admiral Harris, you urged us all to repeal sequestration,
which is, I think, the logical and obvious thing that must be
done. Looking at your budget for this year, do you think you
have adequate resources for the challenges, and they are
significant, that you face?
Admiral Harris. Senator, thanks to the Congress, I am in
good shape in Pacific Command in fiscal year 2016, and the
budget for 2017 looks good for me. I am grateful for that.
There is always more, of course, and I will just mention a
couple areas: munitions; submarines--my submarine requirement,
as a combatant commander in the Pacific, is not being met, and
that is solely because of numbers--ISR, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance, that General Scaparrotti
mentioned; and long-range antisurface missiles, weapons, which,
I am pleased to note, is in the fiscal year 2017 budget.
Senator Reed. I presume you would agree, General
Scaparrotti?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, Senator. I agree. I enjoy a
priority within PACOM and DOD [the Department of Defense] as
well to ensure that my forces can fight tonight. The four needs
that I noted are the primary ones.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe?
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, last week, we appreciate very much, Admiral
Harris, your giving us the time that you gave us. I led a
delegation of House and Senate members, and you were very nice
to spend time with us when we visited you there.
Since that time, we had a personal visit with the
Australian Minister of Defense; with our Marines in Darwin, in
the northern part of Australia; the Singapore Minister of
Defense; and the commander of COMLOG WESTPAC [Commander
Logistics Group, Western Pacific]; as well as Diego Garcia. We
went a long ways around.
But going back to our visit with you, we thank you very
much for that.
Just a minute ago, when we were also there visiting with
you--and this would have been the 13th, last Saturday--we asked
you a question about the budget. You were not forecasting any
shortfalls at that time in the fiscal year 2017 projected PACOM
budget, in the current threats in the Pacific. Is that what you
just restated a minute ago?
Admiral Harris. Yes, sir. It is.
Senator Inhofe. Generally speaking, the forward forces are
in pretty good shape when you get a hostile environment like we
have right now. We talked about that when we were in your shop
there. But it is usually at the expense of somebody else, in
this case, the follow-on forces. Do you feel confident that
they are being treated in a way that, should they be called
upon, they have had adequate training that they would need to
make this happen?
Admiral Harris. Yes, Senator. I am confident that the
follow-on forces are in good position today.
Senator Inhofe. We do not hear that very often. I am glad
to hear that.
General Scaparrotti, there are currently nine ongoing
operations and exercises within PACOM, all vital to our
international interests. I will not list those. You know what
those nine are.
According to the Army budget overview, PACOM's combined
operations consist of over 75,000 U.S. soldiers. How many of
these strategic enablers are sustainable under the proposed
Army budget now? Have you looked at that?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, Senator. I think that we can
actually sustain the pace and operations that we have today for
2016 and 2017, in PACOM. Pacific Pathways has been very helpful
throughout the Pacific. I think that is probably the one where
we would adjust tempo, or perhaps pace, if there was budget
pressure on that. But I am pretty confident we can maintain the
exercises, and, in particular, those that we do on the
peninsula.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, Pacific Pathways is the number two
here. If something happened there, does that have an effect on
any of the others?
General Scaparrotti. Well, sir, I think it would affect
others in the sense that Pacific Pathways is very important to
partner development. It brings a lot of capability within the
Pacific, not only to the peninsula itself.
Senator Inhofe. All right. The international standoff
deepened earlier this month when North Korea, of course,
ignored repeated warnings by the regional powers.
Do they pay any attention to the regional powers? We have
been talking about this for a long time.
Admiral Harris, do you think, when they have all these
warnings by us and by others that are out there, does that mean
anything to them, North Korea?
Admiral Harris. I am not sure what means anything to North
Korea, Senator. But I have to think that the pressure brought
on by our alliance with South Korea and other nations in the
region, they do take note of that. If they did not take note of
it, I am not sure where we would be.
I believe that they also listen to China, though I think
the Chinese influence on the North is waning compared to what
it has been in the past.
Senator Inhofe. On the 9th of February, we had a hearing
with James Clapper, and he expressed very much of a concern
with the acceleration that is taking place.
A minute ago, you said that we are probably in pretty good
shape in PACOM. That is what you said when we were there last
Saturday. Since that time, you have all these--and I will
submit these three for the record, Mr. Chairman. You actually
talked about the Wall Street Journal but also the Washington
Post; and, just yesterday, Japan's Foreign Minister canceling a
visit to China; and then the tensions that came out in an AP
[Associated Press] story just a few hours ago.
I would like to submit those for the record.
Chairman McCain. Without objection, they will be included.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Inhofe. Then I would like to have you, for the
record, maybe, Admiral Harris, kind of explain that if it
seemed at the time of our visit on Saturday that things were
under a level of control in terms of the budget concern and the
resources that would be allocated to you, why there would not
be an insufficiency now since these things happened since our
last Saturday visit. Just looking at it very honestly with
acceleration as to what those resources are, are they really
adequate, for the record?
Admiral Harris. Thanks, Senator. I believe, for the record,
that PACOM is adequately resourced in fiscal year 2016 and in
the 2017 budget.
Senator Inhofe. Okay, that is fine. I just wanted you to
elaborate on that for the record, after this meeting is over.
The information referred to follows:
I support the President's fiscal year 2017 budget and feel it
addresses many of the Indo-Asia-Pacific Theater priority programs and
requirements. I believe the budget allows me to meet the strategy in
the USPACOM area of responsibility. USPACOM worked closely with the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Services to ensure the
final President's Budget was adjusted to fund key weapon systems and
modernization efforts which address adversary high-end capabilities and
provides adequate force structure needed in the Pacific Theater.
Critical investments include: Upgrading fourth generation fighters and
procuring sufficient fifth generation aircraft; investing in precision
munitions (i.e. AIM-9X, AIM-120D, SM-6, MK-48); sustaining Long Range
Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) procurement; procuring Virginia-class
submarines, enhancing other undersea capabilities, and resourcing
advanced Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and
Command and Control (C2) systems (i.e. E-2D Advanced Hawkeye and P-8
Poseidon).
If additional resources were to become available, I would
prioritize additional investments in the following areas: accelerate
Virginia-class submarine procurement, procure additional F-35 Joint
Strike Fighters, and procure additional critical munitions (AIM-9X,
AIM-120D, SM-6, MK-48).
However, as I testified during my confirmation hearing and have
discussed publically elsewhere, I believe that sequestration, if it
continues in force after 2017, will significantly harm USPACOM forces
and my ability to meet my strategic objectives.
Admiral Harris. Yes, sir. I am happy to do that.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Gillibrand?
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both
for your service and this hearing.
I am concerned about cyber threats from this region, in
particular. How do you assess these threats? How are forward-
deployed forces vulnerable to them? What can we do to address
them better?
Admiral Harris. Thank you, Senator. I will start.
Cyber is the new frontier. It is the new threat vector. We
are expending enormous resources across the department in
getting after cyber. In the Pacific, we have stood up an
organization called CYBERPAC, Cyber Forces Pacific, within
Pacific Command. They look at DOD information systems defense
or defensive cyber operations and offensive cyber operations.
I have assigned to me at PACOM cyber mission teams and we
are learning how to use those teams. Again, this is new, but it
is a very real threat not only to U.S. military forces, but to
America in general, in my opinion.
General Scaparrotti. Senator, I thank you for the question.
As Admiral Harris said, this is a domain that we are
learning that is very challenging and in particular in the
peninsula, because North Korea also has a very deliberate goal
of increasing their cyber capability. As you know, they have
demonstrated that both here with the Sony attack in the United
States and also in Korea against their banking and media
industry in 2013.
It is a great concern to me. We have increased our joint
cyber center capabilities over the past year. We continuously
work at that. I also now have been deployed a cyber mission
team, and I work also with the teams and am supported by the
teams in PACOM.
I would just make one other comment. It is important within
the alliance that I and the Republic of Korea's cyber teams
develop a much closer relationship, because we do have a unique
vulnerability in that we have systems that are ROK-United
States that support the alliance specifically centric.
We are working hard as an alliance as well to ensure that
we have a proper defense and a capability that we require
within the domain.
Senator Gillibrand. I also have concerns specifically about
China. I think China is making significant progress in its
military modernization initiatives. In fact, it is currently
testing the J-20, its fifth-generation competitor to the F-35.
How effective is our current defense posture and network of
regional partners in deterring Chinese expansion? In which
areas are we lacking depth of strategic operations or tactical
levels? What do you think are the most effective ways to ensure
China's rise is peaceful? Last, are there any particular United
States military capabilities with which you see China closing
the gap?
Admiral Harris. I will start, Senator.
I think that, in the capability realm, I asked for
increased surface-to-surface weapons. When I started flying P-
3s back in the late 1970s, we had the Harpoon missile. That is
the same missile we have today.
We need to have an increased lethality and reach and speed
that I talked about before. I am grateful that the Services
responded to that request, and in fiscal year 2017 budget,
there is increased funding for programs to increase that
lethality of surface-to-surface missiles.
I think Deputy Secretary of Defense Work just recently
spoke of the SM-6 missile and its capability in the surface-to-
surface mode or against surface targets.
The LRASM, the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile, which is air-
launched now, is another great capability that we need to bring
online fast, and I am grateful for that.
I wrote also about the need for increasing the buy, and
rate of buy, of F-35s, the Joint Strike Fighters. I am pleased
that in the fiscal year 2017 budget, that is in there. I am
glad about all of that.
As I mentioned before, we have a shortage in submarines. My
submarine requirement is not met in PACOM, and I am just one of
many COCOMs that will tell you that. That is our principal
asymmetric advantage over China and any other adversary, and I
think we have to keep after it. I think it is important in the
long run to modernize our force for the future.
To get at your last question about what we can do, I think
diplomacy is probably the key. We have to have a strong defense
backed up by active diplomacy. I think we need to use diplomacy
to influence China toward an acceptable behavior in the
international space.
General Scaparrotti. Senator, I would just add, and
emphasize the last point.
On the peninsula, one of my concerns is that, if there is
conflict, what are China's actions? We plan for those
possibilities. I am sure they do as well. I think diplomacy and
engagement, which PACOM engages with them regularly to have
these conversations, is very important, so that they understand
our intent, and we have those communications, if we should have
a conflict on the peninsula.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ayotte?
Senator Ayotte. I want to thank both of you for your
service to the country.
Admiral Harris, I want to thank you for also visiting the
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. We are really appreciative of that
visit.
To follow up on what I have heard you say today, in terms
of the gap of our attack submarine fleet and the needs that you
have in PACOM, what role, first of all, does the Virginia-class
submarine play in the importance of our supremacy undersea? How
big is this gap? We actually asked the Navy this morning about
all of the combatant commands, and the Navy told us that only
62 percent of the requests for attack submarine support are
being met right now. What is the gap like in PACOM as well?
Admiral Harris. The gap is about 62 percent. The exact
numbers are classified. I would be happy to have that
discussion with you. But we experience an attack submarine
shortfall in the Pacific, and I would maintain that the Pacific
is the principal space where submarines are the most important
warfighting capability we have.
As far as Virginia-class submarines, it is the best thing
we have. It is the best thing we have. I cannot get enough of
them, and I cannot get enough of them fast enough.
Senator Ayotte. Great. Thank you. I think this is the issue
that you raised as we think about sequestration, the long-term
impact on our investment in our attack submarine fleet, which
is so critical to the defense of the Nation and, obviously, an
area where we have very important supremacy undersea with the
challenges that we are facing in the region.
But if we do not have presence, then we obviously cannot
address our security needs. Our presence in the region is
probably as important as anything else. Would you agree with
that?
Admiral Harris. I do. If you do not have presence, then you
better have reach. That reach comes from submarines and
aircraft and the like. We need the new SSBN [ballistic missile
submarine], SSBN-X [Ohio-class replacement submarine], in the
2020s, and we need the new long-range bomber as well.
Senator Ayotte. I also wanted to ask you about unmanned
underwater vehicle R&D [research and development] and what you
think we should be doing in terms of conducting research,
development, and fielding advanced unmanned underwater
vehicles. Is that something we need to invest in and focus on
going forward?
Admiral Harris. I think we must invest, Senator, in
advanced underwater vehicles and go forward with it, not only
in antisubmarine warfare and all of the things that UAVs can
provide us in that regard, but also in mine warfare to get
after the mine threat that we will face.
Senator Ayotte. How are we doing on that, compared to, for
example, China or other countries?
Admiral Harris. I think we are doing okay in it, but we
need to do a lot more.
Senator Ayotte. Okay, thank you.
I wanted to also ask, General Scaparrotti, as we look at
the actions of North Korea that have been discussed today--
recently, obviously, the underground nuclear tests, the
ballistic missile launching--how do you assess what they are
doing right now? I know there is always a pattern of escalation
and looking for an international response, but it strikes me
that Kim Jong-un is even less reliable, obviously, than his
father.
Where do you assess this situation, and what more should we
be doing to respond?
Secondly, what is your prediction in terms of what we might
see next from the North Koreans? Or is it just so unpredictable
from your perspective?
General Scaparrotti. Thank you, Senator.
First of all, I think Kim Jong-un has been clear that he
intends to establish himself and wants to be accepted as a
nuclear nation with a valid missile capability to deliver those
assets. Of course, he claims he can do that today. He wants to
be recognized as such.
He said, despite international sanctions, that he will
continue to develop his nuclear and his missile capabilities.
Despite our deterrence, as you have seen, he has continued to
do so.
I think his calculus is, at this point, that those tests
that he just conducted in January and February, that they were
within his risk tolerance; that he could conduct those; and at
some point in the future, in the next 3 or 4 months, move
beyond it, just as he has done in cycle of provocation and
relaxation over time, which has been their norm.
I do worry about his calculation being wrong, at some
point. I state that is what I worry most about.
His view of the world is a very isolated one. Given the way
that he leads, in terms of the brutal nature of his leadership,
I am not sure that he gets a lot of good advice or at least
critical advice from those around him.
Senator Ayotte. I think you are pretty hesitant when you
are around him to give any contrary advice also. That is the
problem.
General Scaparrotti. I think we will see increasing tension
as we go into this training period coming up here in February
and March. I think what we should do, to ensure that our
alliance is strong, is that we maintain our deterrence
activities that we have there, particularly our large exercises
here. There is no doubt in my mind that he knows of our
capability and believes that he cannot defeat it.
I think stronger sanctions are very important for the
international community.
Senator Ayotte. Excellent. We recently passed very strong
legislation.
General Scaparrotti. I appreciate that.
Senator Ayotte. I think that sets the stage for the
sanctions piece. Thank you.
General Scaparrotti. Yes, ma'am.
Chairman McCain. Senator King?
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Scaparrotti, I think your analysis is exactly
right. Almost all wars in history are started from a
miscalculation. I think, for that reason, it seems to me that
part of our strategy should be very clear about what our
capabilities are, what our red lines are, and when we will act,
so that there is not a miscalculation or misunderstanding or an
underestimation of our capacity. Would you agree?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir, I would agree.
Senator King. Admiral Harris, what are the strategic
implications for the United States strategy in the Pacific of
the Chinese Anti-Access/Area Denial, so-called A2/AD, strategy?
It seems to me that forces us to question the strategy of
the carrier as the primary instrument, the development of the
standoff cruise missiles by the Chinese. This, it seems to me,
is a moment of inflection, in terms of what our strategy is in
that region.
Admiral Harris. Thanks, Senator.
We have predicted the demise of the carrier since I have
been in the Navy. We had the Soviets with their submarines,
carriers, and all their capability, and we questioned the
survivability of the carrier then, and then the Soviets went
out and tried to build their own. Then they sold it to China,
and China is using it, and they are building their own now.
If the carrier were really irrelevant, then I question why
these competitors and peer competitors are trying to build
their own at the rate they are building them.
I think the A2/AD strategies that China imposes are
serious, and we have to seriously consider them and work around
them.
Senator King. It seems to me that we need to think about
the range of our weapons.
Admiral Harris. We do. Yes, sir. That is one of the issues
that I spoke about earlier.
In our regular ship surface-to-surface weapons, we are out-
stuck by the Chinese today. But because of this committee and
Congress, we are going to be in good shape in 2017, as we put
money into those systems.
I think, again, the original stealth platform is the
submarine, and we will be able to win in any conflict at sea
when we apply the joint force to that.
I am comfortable with the carrier operating in those
waters, but we have to consider it. We have to consider the
threat.
But the Chinese A2/AD threat is not 10-feet tall. It is not
even 6-feet tall, in my opinion.
Senator King. You mentioned the importance of diplomacy as
part of the overall strategy. Would part of that be the
advisability of the U.S. acceding to the U.N. Law of the Sea
Treaty?
Admiral Harris. In my opinion, Senator, yes.
Senator King. That would help us in dealing with some of
these fuzzy claims in the South China Sea?
Admiral Harris. I believe that U.S. accession to UNCLOS is
a positive.
Senator King. I have looked at the map. We ought to call
the South Atlantic the South American Sea or something, because
just the name, it is nowhere near China.
Admiral Harris. Yes, sir. We do call the Gulf of Mexico the
Gulf of Mexico.
Senator King. Not the Gulf of Florida, interestingly.
Admiral Harris. That is right.
Senator King. Just yesterday, there was a report of the
fastest sea level rise in 28 centuries, and a projection that,
by the end of this century, sea level could rise 3 to 4 feet.
Are you looking at the strategic implications of that, both in
terms of our infrastructure that is on the coast, but also the
stability of areas within your command, Bangladesh, low-lying
coastal cities throughout the region?
Admiral Harris. I look at it in a capability way, because
it will be PACOM forces or U.S. military forces that respond to
disasters caused by flooding or tornadoes or typhoons or
whatever, so I look at it in that way. But, frankly, I am not
looking at rise in sea levels and its effect globally toward
the end of century. That is just too far out for me.
I worry about what is happening in the near term and what I
can do about it, and how I can be helpful.
Senator King. Would it not be prudent though to analyze our
infrastructure, just to do a tabletop on what would happen if
sea level went up a couple feet in San Diego or Guam or Hawaii?
Admiral Harris. Certainly. Yes, sir. It clearly would.
Senator King. Finally, what is China's goal? What are their
strategic goals? Is it purely defensive? Is it offensive? Do
they want to take territory? What is behind this buildup that
they are engaged in?
Admiral Harris. Senator, this is my opinion. I believe
China seeks hegemony in East Asia.
Senator King. Simple as that?
Admiral Harris. Simple as that.
Senator King. Regional control?
Admiral Harris. Yes, sir.
Senator King. Thank you, Admiral.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ernst?
Senator Ernst. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today.
We, certainly, appreciate your service.
Admiral Harris, in 2014, the Marine Corps announced its
Expeditionary Force 21 doctrine, which stated that, after over
a decade of land-based combat operations, the Marines were
going to start returning to their amphibious roots. I believe
the success of this effort is vital in order to respond to a
rising China and to assist our allies in that region.
Are you comfortable with the Navy and Marine Corps forces
that are postured to provide expeditionary capabilities to meet
your PACOM requirements?
Admiral Harris. Senator, I am, but I will be the first to
say that 14 years of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan land
wars, there are majors in the Marine Corps, O-4s, that have
never served at sea in the Fleet Marine Force.
Senator Ernst. Correct.
Admiral Harris. I welcome their return to amphibiosity. But
it is not just the Marines. The Marines are involved in
training our allies and partners, as they see the benefits of
having an amphibious capability for their areas, for example,
Indonesia and all of the archaeological islands that comprise
that country, Japan and their interest in amphibious warfare,
and on and on.
I am pleased with the work that we are doing and especially
pleased with the work that the Marines and the Army are doing
to increase the amphibious capability of our friends, allies,
and partners in the region.
Senator Ernst. Very good. You have a strategy for closing
that gap, like you said, the O4s mostly have land-based combat
operations?
Admiral Harris. Right. I had a strategy when I was the
Pacific Fleet commander, and now I get to task the Pacific
Fleet and the Marine Forces specific to come up with that
strategy and work it.
Senator Ernst. Very good. I am very excited about that. We
are getting back to the basics, I think, for all of our forces
out there.
Do you agree with the Navy-Marine Corps Joint Forcible
Entry capability with a validated ship requirement of 38?
Admiral Harris. I do. The forcible entry requirement is
critical not just for the Marines but for the Army as well.
Senator Ernst. Do you think that that will be able to be
maintained, then, moving into the future?
Admiral Harris. I do not know. I hope so. I hope that we
will be able to get our amphibious ship levels to that
standard.
Senator Ernst. Okay, thank you, Admiral.
Over the past several weeks, just a slightly different
topic, but over the past couple weeks, we have had a number of
very distinguished witnesses, such as Lieutenant General Thomas
Conant, a former PACOM deputy commander, and General Carter
Ham, the former commander of AFRICOM [United States Africa
Command] and United States Army Europe. They have spoken very
highly of our National Guard State Partnership Program.
I do believe that this program is key in working with our
allies, and developing our allies and their capabilities. But I
am concerned because in the PACOM or in the Asia-Pacific area,
there are very few State Partnership Programs out of 70
different unique programs that we have worldwide. I think it is
important that we exercise these types of programs and develop
those relationships with those countries.
Could you speak to that a little bit, sir?
Admiral Harris. I can. I am a huge fan of the State
Partnership Program. I have seen it work in the Pacific.
General Grass and I have talked about it, and I have asked for
an increase in state partner relationships out there.
But for the countries in the region, their state partners,
our Guard forces, are often their principal training
relationship. It is critical for all the reasons you mentioned.
General Grass and I are in lockstep on the way forward in the
Pacific.
Senator Ernst. Are there certain countries that we should
be working more with, with a state partnership relationship?
Admiral Harris. Sure. Mongolia comes to mind in, and we
have asked for that.
Mongolia is a perfect case in point of a country that would
benefit greatly from our State Partnership Program.
Senator Ernst. That is very good. We have many States that
already have developed relationships, and sometimes look for
second partnerships as well, so thank you.
General Scaparrotti, do you have any thoughts on the State
Partnership Program?
General Scaparrotti. I, too, am a big fan of that. The
relationships that are built over time, the trust that is
built, are very important. That is really the glue that helps
us improve not only that relationship, but, importantly, to
develop capacity within our partners.
Senator Ernst. Fantastic. Thank you.
Thank you very much.
Chairman McCain. Some of that depends on the attractiveness
of the State. Don't you think that has a lot to do with it?
Senator Nelson?
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, when does China yank North Korea's chain? What is
the point at which they really get serious that North Korea is
getting out of control with the nuclear weapons capability?
General Scaparrotti. Sir, I wish I knew the answer, because
we have been trying to find that spot, frankly. I think they
have underestimated the danger of KJU [Kim Jong-un], at this
point. He is clearly confident in his ability to provocate and
control a situation, so I would encourage them to reconsider
that at this time.
But, obviously, they still, despite these recent events,
appear to be reluctant to take some serious steps, which they
certainly could.
Senator Nelson. Do they seem to be, certainly, the one
applying economic pressure, and so forth. I mean, do they fear
a united Korean Peninsula so much, and/or do they fear too many
refugees coming in, that this nuclear threat is not enough for
them to pull that chain?
General Scaparrotti. Well, I think first they fear
instability on their border, if that were to occur, the refugee
problem it would create for them along the border, and then
also the security of the WMD [weapons of mass destruction].
North Korea not only has nuclear but they have probably one of
largest chemical and bio stockpiles--chemical, in particular,
but bio capability--around the world.
That is their first concern, getting control of that, if it
were to be an unstable country.
Secondly, I believe, too, that it provides them a buffer,
and they would fear a unified Korea, particularly with a United
States ally. They would be concerned where our forces would be
stationed.
Senator Nelson. As you all wargame this, what is China's
position, if the young gentleman goes off his rocker and
launches an attack against us, an attempted attack, because
presumably we would have the capability of knocking it down? In
a wargame like that, what do you expect for China's reaction?
General Scaparrotti. Sir, we actually have that as a part
of our wargaming and planning. I think our first thing, as I
mentioned earlier, is that we count on engagement with them. We
work on engagement, particularly with PACOM, on a regular basis
in order to give us that relationship. If and when there is
any, even a provocation on the peninsula today, we make contact
to make sure they understand our intent.
This is my personal opinion. I think that China is also
looking at those possibilities in their calculation, and
probably are more inclined lately to intervene potentially, at
least in the border areas and to the extent that they would be
concerned about control of those WMDs as well.
I think intervention is more of a likelihood, in my mind,
in the few years that I have been in command now, than it was,
say, 2 years or 3 years ago.
Senator Nelson. It may be one of the areas that China would
suddenly see that it has its interests aligned with the
interests of the United States.
Admiral, it is great to see you.
Mr. Chairman, he is a great product of Pensacola, Florida.
As a native Floridian, you can hear it in the lilting tone of
his voice.
Admiral, share with us your thought of the importance, from
a national military perspective, of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership [TPP].
Admiral Harris. Sir, I am just going to bask a little bit
in that lilting-ness just for second here.
The Trans-Pacific Partnership, I believe, is an important
component of the economic part of the rebalance. I have spoken
of the rebalance being comprised of the military, diplomatic,
political, and economic parts. In the economic sphere, which I
have said is the most important component of the rebalance--the
most visible piece is the military piece, because you can see
an aircraft carrier or Joint Strike Fighter or Stryker vehicle
and all that.
But the most important part of the rebalance, to America,
is really the economic component. In that economic component,
you have energy and you have TPP. I think that TPP binds us to
the 11 other nations that are part of TPP.
The standards that it takes for a country to enter TPP is
helpful. It is helpful to the global trade piece, and it is
helpful to those things that we view as important as conditions
of entry.
I think the fact that there are countries waiting in line
to figure out how to get in, I think that is important as well,
and indicative of how TPP is viewed now in the Pacific.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Sullivan?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony. I appreciate the
opportunity to get caught up yesterday.
Admiral, I appreciate you talking about the TPP, not only
in terms of economics, but energy. As we discussed yesterday,
the United States has an enormous opportunity now, in terms of
our competitive advantages in energy, LNG, oil exports to our
allies and even other countries in the region. I think it is
something we need to be taking advantage of.
I want to follow up on the chairman's questions on the
South China Sea. Secretary Carter was testifying here a few
months back when we had done the first FONOPs [Freedom of
Navigation Operations]. I am a big supporter of Secretary
Carter, but I think there was some concern here on the
committee that an opportunity to actually announce in a robust,
articulate way what we were doing was missed, because we
literally had to press it out of him just to get any details on
what the heck was going on.
From your perspective, what exactly is our policy with
regard to the South China Sea, our freedom of navigation
operations? What is the purpose? What is the goal? Should we be
doing this on a regular basis, as the chairman said, also with
our allies?
Admiral Harris. Thanks, Senator.
I believe the purpose of freedom of navigation operations,
and the other operations we do in the South China Sea, is to
exercise our rights on the high seas and in the airspace above
it on a regular basis.
Senator Sullivan. To what end? What is the goal?
Admiral Harris. The goal is international rules and norms.
This is international water and international airspace. If we
do not exercise our rights, or if those rights are not
routinely exercised by someone, then we stand a chance of
abdicating those rights to someone else.
The regular exercise of freedom of navigation, in my
opinion, is critical. It is important, and it is something that
we must continue to do.
Senator Sullivan. Do we have allies who are interested in
doing that with us for the same reasons? Are we looking to
coordinate with them in terms of future FONOP operations?
Admiral Harris. We have allies, friends, and partners,
Senator, that are very supportive of our freedom of navigation
operations. There are some of those who are willing to consider
doing them with us, but there are others that are unable to,
either because of their own military capability or lack
thereof, or of their internal politics, I guess, and of their
relationship with China.
Senator Sullivan. Do you think that it would be helpful to
have additional allies, whether they are from the region or
maybe some of our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]
partners?
Admiral Harris. It would be helpful. I have encouraged
other countries to conduct operations in the South China Sea,
because, at the end of the day, South China Sea is
international waters, in my view.
Senator Sullivan. We talked about Okinawa yesterday. Can
you just give us an update on what more we should be looking at
doing? We are helping our allies, particularly with regard to
Japan, in terms of the Marine redeployment there.
Admiral Harris. We have this relationship with Japan in
Okinawa. We have an obligation to defend Japan, and they have
an obligation to provide us a place from which to defend them.
Okinawa is one of those critical places where we must be in
order to meet our treaty obligations to defend Japan.
A few years ago, through a lot of increasing tensions over
the years, Japan asked us to move our forces out of Futenma to
someplace else. Our response to that is, sure, you build a new
place and we will move our forces there. That is a simplistic
view, but that is how we agreed to move from Futenma to the
Futenma Replacement Facility, Camp Schwab, Henoko.
In that process, we agreed also to relocate 8,000 to 10,000
Marines out of Okinawa. For that, you have the Guam piece, the
Hawaii piece, and part of the Marine rotation forces in Darwin.
You have all of that, which is a follow-on to once we start
moving Marines from Futenma to the Futenma Replacement
Facility.
The challenge we have is to get the build done on the
Futenma Replacement Facility, which is Japan's responsibility.
That is their obligation to us.
Right now, it is slowed. It is a little over 2 years late.
It was going to be done by 2023, and now we are looking at 2025
before that is done. That is when the big movement of Marines
from Okinawa to Guam and Hawaii would take place, in the 2020s.
I believe we have to continue to fly and operate out of
Futenma and continue to work with the Japanese, as they start
to build the replacement facility at Henoko, Camp Schwab.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Hirono?
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank both Admiral Harris and General
Scaparrotti for the time you spent with me yesterday. I
appreciate that very much, and for your service.
General Scaparrotti, our very best wishes to you, as you go
forward.
Admiral Harris, I am happy to see in your written testimony
that you raise the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for
Strategic Studies, DKI APCSS, and the Center for Excellence in
Disaster Management.
Can you talk briefly about the importance and the benefits
that these two organizations provide to you as the commander of
PACOM?
Admiral Harris. Yes, Senator. I believe the Daniel K.
Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Strategic Studies, DKI APCSS, is
a true force multiplier for my operations in the Pacific. DKI
APCSS is able to bring countries to Hawaii that I cannot go to.
They enjoy special ability to link together students from all
over the region in very positive ways.
In building those relationships, it helps me in the region,
and it also helps those countries to realize the benefits of a
relationship with the United States.
I cannot say enough about DKI APCSS and retired Lieutenant
General Dan Leaf, who directs that. I am pleased to be able to
work closely with him and the center. I am pleased that the
center is a direct report to PACOM.
So, too, CFEDM, the Center for Excellence in Disaster
Management, I think that that center has the capability and the
potential to be a true storehouse of knowledge and lessons
learned on how we do disaster management, not only in the
region, but that can be shared globally for people who would
seek that information.
Senator Hirono. I think particularly as we natural
disasters occurring more and more, that the center is very
important. I have been visited the center a number of times. I
totally agree with you that that is a really important
resource. It is a resource for you as well as our country.
I want to turn to the relationship, the trilateral
relationship, among Japan, United States, South Korean. This is
for General Scaparrotti.
The tensions, as you say, are higher than ever, and there
are some historical issues between Japan and South Korea that
make the relationship between these two countries particularly
challenging. From your perspective, how do you see this
relationship currently and moving forward? Perhaps with the
tensions between South and North Korea now, perhaps South Korea
will be moving more closely to Japan. How do you see this
developing?
General Scaparrotti. Senator, thank you. It is an important
question and an important relationship for us.
I see it positive, and I see it moving in a positive
direction. A year ago, we were having difficulty with
trilateral relationships, encouraging mil-to-mil relationships,
et cetera. Over this past year, there has been, I think, a
concerted effort with both parties, with the U.S. as a partner
to both, to improve that relationship.
As you know, Japan and Korea recently had high-level
discussions, as well as a meeting between the Prime Minister
and the President Park that resolved the comfort women issue. I
think that was significant, as well as the pressures from North
Korea. I think both have encouraged them to increase the
trilateral relationship.
Admiral Harris just hosted a conference with the two
chairmen from each of those countries, as well as General
Dunford. I think we have the foundation now to move forward in
the future with greater mil-to-mil exercises, as well as
probably an encouraging environment for increasing information
flow between the three countries.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
This is for Admiral Harris. The actions of North Korea have
been particularly troubling, especially with their so-called
hydrogen bomb test and their rocket launch into space. Do you
see North Korea as a nuclear state? If so, what does this mean
for the United States and the U.N. [United Nations]?
Admiral Harris. They clearly have some nuclear
capabilities. I am not convinced that the bomb that went off
was a hydrogen bomb, but they clearly have some degree of
nuclear capability.
I think they pose a very distinct and real threat, not only
to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, but globally.
As they develop their nuclear capability--and as I said before,
they are on a quest for nuclear weapons, the means to
miniaturize them, and the means to deliver them
intercontinentally. They pose a real threat to Hawaii and to
the West Coast, to the mainland of the United States, and soon
to the entire U.S.
They pose a threat today, with their hundreds of thousands
of rockets within rocket range of Seoul, to the 28,500 American
troops that are posted there, their families, the hundreds of
thousands of Americans who work in Korea, and our Korean ally
and Japan.
They are a real threat today, and I encourage China, for
example, to be helpful and to try to bring North Korea to the
negotiating table and to do the right thing.
Senator Hirono. Well, our best wishes on your continuing
efforts on that score, because I know it is quite the challenge
to have China step up and deal with North Korea in a way that
would be helpful to stabilizing that region. Thank you very
much.
Chairman McCain. Senator Rounds?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, first of all, let me say how much I appreciated
the opportunity to visit with you at PACOM headquarters this
last week on the Inhofe codel. Your message was striking. At
the same time, I came away a little bit puzzled with one part.
We have been working on the issues surrounding rebalance or
a rebalance strategy since 2011. The rebalance, a strategic
whole-of-government effort, guides and reinforces our military
efforts, integrating with diplomatic, political, and economic
initiatives. In August 2015, Secretary of Defense Carter
described four elements of the military component of the Asia-
Pacific rebalance.
Have you seen a doctrine that you put your strategy around,
which is the rebalance? Or is it a series of concepts that are
still being developed?
Admiral Harris. I believe that we have a strategy now, and
it is the East Asia military strategy that was put out by OSD
[the Office of the Secretary of Defense] last December,
November or December. I think it captures it well. There are
probably other things that will come out on that, but I am
satisfied, in reading the East Asia military strategy piece--
the Asia-Pacific strategy piece, rather, that it is captured in
there.
But I think all the elements that I spoke about earlier on
the rebalance are in play in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Just
in the diplomatic and political spheres, for example, we now
have the EDCA, the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, with
the Philippines, which gives us access to their bases. We have
the new defense guidelines with Japan, which is the follow-on
to their peace and security legislation, which allows them some
limited collective self-defense, which moves that relationship
forward. We have access agreements with Singapore, which allows
us to put our LCS, littoral combat ships, there, and P-8, P-3
aircraft there on a routine basis.
Of course, all the agreements we have with Australia, which
is the cornerstone of our MRF-D deployment, the Marine
Rotational Force Darwin deployment.
I am very pleased with those initiatives, which are in that
diplomatic, political sphere part of the rebalance.
The military piece is, as I said, the most visible piece.
You can see that. Then we have the economic piece, which is the
most important part to the United States, in my opinion.
Senator Rounds. With regard to A2/AD, there seems to be
considerable movement, a very quick movement, on the part of
China in this area. Do you have the appropriate intelligence-
gathering information? Do you need more tools than what you
have right now?
Admiral Harris. I can always use more tools, Senator. I
would like to know more about China's intent. But in that
regard, what I need more than anything else is persistent ISR
to keep that never-blinking eye on Korea.
Senator Rounds. Specific platforms that are not available
to you now that you need?
Admiral Harris. There are platforms that are not available
now that I have asked for.
Senator Rounds. Okay. They are coming?
Admiral Harris. It is being considered. It is part of the
global allocation of forces. I compete with platforms along
with Central Command, EUCOM, European Command, and the like.
Senator Rounds. In the current posture, the Chinese have
clearly put us in a position where they are moving us, in terms
of our safety zones, farther out, farther away. The LRS-B
[Long-Range Strike Bombers] is being proposed right now.
Is the LRS-B an asset that you would consider critical,
with regard to our future capabilities in the South China area?
Seeing how they could be deployed out of North America, they
basically would be in a position to make the strikes necessary
at that time that perhaps some of our other carrier-based units
might not be able to maintain, just based upon size and
capabilities.
Admiral Harris. Senator, I am sorry. I do not know the
acronym.
Senator Rounds. Long-range strike bomber.
Admiral Harris. Yes. It would be helpful. As I mentioned
before, in talking about the next-generation bomber, all of
that capability is important, not only the next-generation
bomber, but the next-generation SSBN.
We need those to maintain a position of strength into the
2020s.
Senator Rounds. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Senator Reed. [Presiding.] On behalf of Chairman McCain,
Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Harris, I am so glad to hear someone in your
position who does not know one of the acronyms that is being
used. It makes me feel so much better.
[Laughter.]
Admiral Harris. Acronyms kill, ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. Yes, they do. That was a very good pun.
I want to thank you both for your service. I want to start,
I assume it should be with you, Admiral Harris.
There was a report that was just given to Congress this
week that suggests that Chinese investments in the national
security sector in the United States are growing. Is there any
reason why we should be concerned about that?
Admiral Harris. Sure. I think that, depending on the area
that they invest in, there is every reason to be concerned. We
need to look at each one of these investments carefully. We
have a process called CFIUS [Committee on Foreign Investment in
the United States], another acronym. I could not begin to tell
you what it stands for.
Senator Shaheen. That one I know.
Admiral Harris. All right. But that allows us a mechanism,
a legal mechanism, to perhaps prevent China from buying or
investing in certain areas. I have used it before, when I was
at Pacific Fleet, to prevent the purchase of some facilities,
which were near our key military facilities.
Senator Shaheen. Does the economic reliance on China by
some of our American allies create complications for our
security strategy, as we are thinking about Chinese investments
in our national security sector and what is happening with some
of our allies with respect to their reliance on what is
happening in the Chinese economy?
Admiral Harris. Clearly, Senator, it does.
China is the principal trading partner of many of our
friends, allies, and partners, not only in the Indo-Asia-
Pacific, but globally. That is a factor that each country has
to make, and it is a factor in how we regard their reliability
in certain cases.
I am often asked, well, we have this size of the Chinese
military and we have this size of the United States military
west of the dateline, but surely, if you added to that all of
our capability resident in our friends, allies, and partners,
they would match the Chinese, in terms of numbers. You cannot
always count on that in every case, because each country will
make their independent, sovereign decision on whether to
participate in a given operation or whatever.
China's investment in those countries, in those countries'
trade relationships with China, is important. It matters, just
as it matters to us.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
General Scaparrotti, in your testimony, you mentioned North
Korea's recent actions that suggest that it will do whatever it
wants to defy U.N. Security Council resolutions and other
norms.
A couple weeks ago, we passed additional sanctions on North
Korea here. To what extent do those help or hurt, as we are
trying to influence North Korea's actions?
General Scaparrotti. Senator, thank you. I appreciate the
action that Congress took here in terms of sanctions, because I
do believe they have an impact. We know that we have slowed his
capability to develop his munitions, missiles, et cetera. He is
somewhat cash-strapped. I think additional sanctions, which
there are steps we have not taken yet, I think the more that we
do, the more pressure we then put on Kim Jong-un.
He has a fairly shaky economy, not a good hand. These
sanctions, I think, could create a big problem for him,
certainly to someone who puts 30 percent of his economy into
his military.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I am, certainly, a big
proponent of our having passed those sanctions.
I would like to say for the record, Mr. Chairman, that one
of the things that I am very concerned about, with respect to
the sanctions and their enforcement, is the fact that we have
still have sitting in the Banking Committee the nomination of
Adam Szubin to be the person at the Department of the Treasury
who is charged with enforcing those sanctions. He has not yet
been officially approved.
I would hope that we could enter that into the record, and
I would urge that we see some action on his nomination.
I am out of time, Mr. Chairman, but can I ask one more
question?
Senator Reed. Yes.
Senator Shaheen. Given the recent action by North Korea,
have we seen that affect that Chinese thinking or support for
North Korea and their willingness to try and encourage them to
pull back on their nuclear efforts? For either of you, both of
you.
General Scaparrotti. As you know, they denounced the
actions as well. They stated their concern with them. I think
they are in active conversations with us now.
But to this point, we have not seen the steps we would like
them to take, in my opinion, and that they could take.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you both very much. Thank
you for your service.
Senator Reed. On behalf of Chairman McCain, Senator Graham?
Senator Graham. Thank you, Senator Reed.
General, let's pick up with what you just said.
Are we overly relying on China to discipline and regulate
North Korea? Every time somebody mentions North Korea, the
first thing out of their mouth is, ``Well, we have to have the
Chinese help us.''
General Scaparrotti. Sir, in my opinion, I do not know that
we are overly reliant. But, certainly, there are actions--for
instance, unilateral actions that this body just took--that we
could, certainly, apply as well.
Senator Graham. Could you give me a list of things that we
could do that we have not done regarding North Korea? Not right
now, but later.
General Scaparrotti. Yes, I could.
Senator Graham. Okay. Have you ever found a situation in
military history, modern military history, where sanctions
stopped a dictator from acquiring weapons?
General Scaparrotti. I am not aware. I would have to look
at that, Senator, to be honest with you.
Senator Graham. Do you think he cares how his people live?
General Scaparrotti. No, he does not.
Senator Graham. Do you think if he had a missile that could
reach the United States, he would actually use it against us?
General Scaparrotti. I think that his stated purpose is to
protect his regime. If he thought his regime was challenged, he
states that he would use WMD.
Senator Graham. Is it in our national security interests to
allow the North Koreans to develop missile technology that
could hit the Homeland?
General Scaparrotti. No, sir.
Senator Graham. Would you suggest we use military force, if
necessary, to stop that?
General Scaparrotti. If military force was necessary, yes,
sir. But I think there should be----
Senator Graham. But that should be on the table? But that
should be one of the options?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with that, Admiral?
Admiral Harris. I do.
Senator Graham. I just want the committee to understand
that we are about to have to cross a road here eventually.
Don't you think that, in the coming few years, we are going
to have to make a decision about this?
Does that make sense to you, admiral?
Admiral Harris. It does, Senator, in my opinion.
Senator Graham. Say in the next 5 years--I am just picking
a date out of thin air here--the United States is going to have
to make a tough decision regarding North Korea, whether or not
to let them know that if you continue down the missile
development road, we will attack that program?
Admiral Harris. At some point, it may come to that.
Senator Graham. Do you think it would be good for North
Korea to understand that is the consequence of what they are
doing?
Admiral Harris. I think they do understand it, Senator.
Senator Graham. Do you think they really believe we would
use military force to stop their missile program?
Admiral Harris. I do not know what they believe.
Senator Graham. Okay.
What about you, General?
General Scaparrotti. Sir, I would say the same. Our
difficulty is really understanding their----
Senator Graham. Could we make it more clear to them? Is it
possible to make it more clear to them?
General Scaparrotti. I think it is possible to make it more
clear to them.
The second thing I would add, Senator, is that, as you look
to the future, I am concerned as well not only about his
nuclear missile capabilities, developing cyber capability. He
is developing a strategic-launch ballistic missile, and he is
developing his air defense capabilities.
All of those things, in about 5 or 6 years, are going to be
a more formidable problem.
Senator Graham. In light of the threat that could emerge
over the next 5 years from North Korea, if sequestration goes
back into effect, does that affect the Army's ability to
participate in South Korea effectively?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir, it does.
Senator Graham. If sequestration goes into full effect,
Admiral, what does that do to your ability in your theater?
Admiral Harris. I think it hurts me greatly, not only for
forces that are forward-deployed, but also follow-on forces. I
worry most about those follow-on forces.
Senator Graham. We have a 5 year window here of where North
Korea is advancing missile technology and cyber capability.
They are becoming more of a threat in the next 5 years, unless
something changes. Is that correct? Is that what you are
telling the committee? In the next 5 years?
Admiral Harris. You said 5 years. I did not.
Senator Graham. Okay. I am just picking 5 years.
Admiral Harris. Right.
Senator Graham. Let's just say in the next 5 years, if
nothing changes, they are going to be a bigger threat to the
United States?
Admiral Harris. Clearly. Clearly.
Senator Graham. Is that true of you, General?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, I agree.
Senator Graham. We have that dynamic. The Congress'
response is to reduce your capabilities in the next 5 years.
Is that what Congress is doing to you?
Admiral Harris. If sequestration remains the law of the
land, as I testified during my confirmation hearing, I think it
will hurt us significantly in the 2021, 2022 time frame.
Senator Graham. From a policymaker point of view, your
military advice to us would be to change that construct?
Admiral Harris. My military request of you, Senator, would
be to end sequestration.
Senator Graham. Yes, because what we are doing is we are
having the enemy increasing capability, and we are decreasing
your ability to confront the enemy. That is a bad combination.
Admiral Harris. It is not just North Korea.
Senator Graham. In your theater.
Admiral Harris. In my theater. It is globally.
Senator Graham. What does North Korea want, General? Just
survivability?
General Scaparrotti. Sir, he wants to protect his regime,
the Kim family regime. He wants to establish himself as a
recognized nuclear state.
Senator Graham. Okay.
Admiral, would the TPP be helpful, if passed, in your
region?
Admiral Harris. It would be helpful to pass.
Senator Graham. What if we failed to pass it?
Admiral Harris. Then the countries in the region will
question the seriousness of our commitment to the rebalance,
one. Two, they will turn somewhere else.
Senator Graham. Will that likely be China?
Admiral Harris. It will be China.
Senator Graham. Thank you, both, for your extraordinary
careers. Thank you, both.
Chairman McCain. [Presiding.] Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thanks to the witnesses. I appreciate this testimony much.
Some of us are running back and forth to a Foreign Relations
Committee hearing with Secretary Kerry, where many of the same
issues are being discussed. We apologize for that.
Admiral Harris, I enjoyed our visit in Halifax at the
security conference there in November. One of the issues we
talked about I know was raised by Senator King in a question
when I was gone, but I think it was raised pretty briefly. He
asked you whether you thought the United States should ratify
the U.N. Convention on Law of the Sea [UNCLOS], and you said
yes. I want to dig into that a little bit more.
A lot of the testimony and discussion this morning has been
about the Chinese island-building and other activities in the
South China Sea. A lot of the testimony that is going on
upstairs with Secretary Kerry is about the same thing.
Admiral, you said a few minutes ago, and I quote, you were
asked about China and what our posture is vis-a-vis China's
activities. ``The goal is international rules and norms.'' I
think that ought to be the goal.
We should be an enforcer of international rules and norms,
but I just find it fascinating that as much as we talk about
the Chinese activities in the South China Sea that we are
against, because they violate international rules and norms, we
are the only major power in the world that has not ratified the
U.N. Convention on Law of the Sea.
Now, as a practical matter, in terms of our own activities,
we act as if that is law. We act in accord with it. But our
refusal--and it is a refusal, and it is a refusal by this body,
the Senate, to ratify--means that we really lack standing to
hold it up against the actions of anybody else and complain
about their failure to follow the requirements of that
convention.
This is not only a matter with respect to China in the
South China Sea. It is also increasingly becoming an issue with
Russia in the Arctic.
If you could, Admiral Harris, instead of just saying, ``I
support it,'' talk to me a little bit about, from the security
standpoint, the safety of the United States and the mission
that we have in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, what would ratification
of that U.N. convention do for the United States?
Admiral Harris. Thanks, Senator, for the opportunity.
Let me begin in response by saying that I have talked to
quite a few folks who are opposed to UNCLOS, the United Nations
Commission on Law of the Sea, and I have been informed by them,
and I appreciate their position, and I understand the position.
I do not agree with it, but I want to acknowledge that there
are good reasons--there are reasons to oppose UNCLOS.
My personal opinion is, first and foremost, UNCLOS gives us
credibility. It gives us credibility in the international space
that we lack today simply because we are not a signatory to
UNCLOS.
In a purely military sense, in a projection of power,
whether we sign on to UNCLOS or not is not going to affect
that. But I think, by not signing onto it, we lose the
credibility for the very same thing that we are arguing for,
which is following accepted rules and norms in the
international arena.
The United States is a beacon, and we are a beacon on a
hill. But I think that light is brighter if we sign onto
UNCLOS.
We are going to find ourselves in this odd situation here
in a few months if--if--the International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea agrees with the Philippines' position with regard to
their claim against China's nine-dash line.
We are going to find ourselves supporting that outcome and
yet not be a signatory to it. That puts us in an awkward
position vis-a-vis the other countries in the region.
You raise Russia. Russia is going to reap the benefits of
almost half of the Arctic Circle, because of this theory of
extended continental shelf, which is afforded by UNCLOS. On the
other hand, we are not going to reap those great benefits,
because we are not a signatory to UNCLOS.
I think it affects us in our commerce, in our trade, which
is part of that rebalance. It is part of those four big spheres
in the rebalance.
Senator Kaine. The absence of ratification does not only
deprive us of an argument against activities of others that we
would argue are not lawful, but it also deprives us of some
positive, upside benefits, for example, with respect to the
extended continental shelf argument.
Admiral Harris. Right. In my opinion, that is true.
Senator Kaine. I have no further questions. Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
Senator Reed. [Presiding.] Thank you.
On behalf of Chairman McCain, Senator Cotton, please?
Senator Cotton. Thank you. I apologize for my absence. I
have had presiding officer duty on the Senate floor.
General Scaparrotti, that is the equivalent of staff duty
for a junior officer at the regiment, if you are not aware.
I want to address something specifically that you stated in
your testimony on page 12. ``We will continue to work closely
with the Republic of Korea to ensure it procures the
appropriate types and numbers of critical munitions for the
early phases of hostilities. Of note, the potential ban on
cluster munitions could have a significant impact on our
ability to defend the Republic of Korea.''
Could you say a little bit more about that significant
impact, General Scaparrotti?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. Thank you.
There is presently a policy that in 2019 will go into
effect that states, basically, the use of cluster munitions
that have a dud rate of greater than 1 percent can no longer be
a part of our inventory or be employed. I rely on cluster
munitions in a very large way to affect operations, if we go to
crisis on the peninsula.
My concern is that we will not be able to replace those
cluster munitions with proper munitions, or we will use unitary
rounds, which, to have the same effect, I have to fire three to
five rounds for each one of those cluster munitions.
My point is that we need to work now to both develop
munitions that are acceptable with less than 1 percent dud
rate, so that we can replace them in due time. Until we do, I
need to be able to use those cluster munitions that I have in
storage now in the peninsula in the interim.
Senator Cotton. Is the rationale for this policy a
humanitarian concern, based on the nature of cluster munitions?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir.
Senator Cotton. Do you think it is more humanitarian to
preserve these munitions in our arsenal and, hopefully, deter
them or any other munitions from ever having to be used, or to
remove them from the arsenal and perhaps increase the
likelihood of a conflict in which thousands could die?
General Scaparrotti. No, I think, particularly in this
case, if we were not to use cluster munitions in a crisis on
the peninsula, it will result in greater both military and
civilian casualties in the long run, because extension of the
campaign and also the effect it would have tactically on our
forces.
We have done some modeling on this. We have done some
testing on it. I am quite confident of that opinion.
Senator Cotton. Have your predecessors relied on these
types of munitions going back to the 1950s?
General Scaparrotti. We have used cluster munitions in the
past. They are being used today. For instance, the Russians
have used them in a devastating way in Ukraine.
Senator Cotton. I have noticed.
Admiral Harris, I would like to turn to your testimony on a
related topic. Page 20, under the heading ``Critical
Munitions,'' you state, ``Critical munitions shortfalls are a
top priority and concern.''
Do you mean to say there that you actually are facing
actual shortfalls now in critical munitions?
Admiral Harris. That is true, Senator. I have called for
increased munitions. There is a shortfall in General
Scaparrotti's arena. Part of that shortfall should be paid for
by the Korean ally. That is a subject of discussions that we
have with Korea.
Senator Cotton. Not just in Korea, though, but theater-
wide, do you face this kind of shortfall?
Admiral Harris. I do, but the focus of that part of my
written testimony centered on Korea.
Senator Cotton. Okay. In this kind of unclassified setting,
is it something that you get into in more detail, about the
kind of shortfalls you are facing?
Admiral Harris. I prefer not to in this setting, but I
would be happy to come back to you in a closed session to talk
about it, or come to your office.
Senator Cotton. I understand. We might submit questions for
the record. I think it would be the height of irresponsibility
for civilian and military leaders in this country not to, at a
minimum, have sufficient munitions to fight and, hopefully,
deter the wars that we might face. Whatever we might disagree
about on longer term, large-ticket budget items, I think we
need to have the rounds for our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines.
Admiral Harris, I would like to turn to the United States-
Philippines alliance, something to which Senator McCain alluded
about our Mutual Defense Treaty.
CSIS has recommended that we should consider offering an
explicit guarantee to the Philippines that the U.S. will
respond under the Mutual Defense Treaty to an attack on the
Philippines military in disputed water or territory. Do think
this option should be considered?
Admiral Harris. I think we should consider it, and we
should have a discussion of it in the policy arena. Our
obligations under the treaty with the Philippines is pretty
clear. Whether we extend that to Second Thomas Shoal, which we
do not hold as Philippines' sovereign territory, because we do
not take a position on sovereignty, we should have that
discussion, I believe.
Senator Cotton. Thank you. I think we should have that
discussion as well. I think deterrence works best when
deterrence is clear, as with relationships that we have with
NATO, Taiwan, and so forth.
My time has expired.
Senator Reed. Senator, if you would like to take additional
time, because we have until Senator Blumenthal and Senator
Sullivan return.
Your timing is exquisite. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
On behalf of Chairman McCain, let me recognize Senator
Blumenthal, as he is seated. Thank you.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
your great work on behalf of our country and the work that you
have done, particularly in the theaters that you have covered.
General Scaparrotti, I want to come back to one of the
points that was raised by my colleague, Senator Gillibrand,
about soft targets, in terms of cyber. How vulnerable do you
think those targets are in the area under your command?
General Scaparrotti. I think, first of all, I am confident
in our military systems, my command and control systems. We red
team that. We exercise it. I think we have a good defense. But
with promise cyber is, it is very dynamic. It changes every
day, so it is something we have to stay focused on.
I am concerned about, obviously, the civilian cyber network
that we are all connected to and has an influence on us
militarily as well in the peninsula. That requires ROK-United
States work, and it requires ROK work with their civilian
counterparts, as well.
Senator Blumenthal. Is there, in your view, any action we
could take with respect to North Korea that would deter their
invasive action, such as we saw with Sony, such as we have seen
and you see in your theater?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, I believe there are some actions
we could take. I would prefer to provide that to you in either
a closed session or a classified document.
Senator Blumenthal. I understand that point. Without
speaking to them specifically, have you made recommendations
about them? Do you think there is the prospect of imminent
action that will widen and increase the effectiveness of what
we are doing?
General Scaparrotti. Well, in terms of the recommendations,
we are actively discussing some operations, in terms of their
effectiveness, et cetera. But that is presently just a part of
planning.
Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Harris, in terms of the
submarine capability of this country, we face no shortage of
challenges in the Asia-Pacific. Also, I think many of us have
no doubt about the importance of submarines.
I know that my colleague, Senator Ayotte, asked you about
the sufficiency of the funding that we have in prospect.
If you were to talk to the American public, how would you
put it so that they could understand the importance of our
submarine capability in the Asia-Pacific?
General Scaparrotti. Senator, I would say that the
submarine force has been our principal asymmetric advantage
over all the adversaries we faced in the 100 years of the
submarine service. It is such an asymmetric advantage that
every country who can builds their own submarine force.
Those countries that are building those submarine forces
are building some very capable vessels. The Russians, the
Chinese lead that effort. The Japanese make a great submarine.
But I am concerned about the Russian and Chinese
submarines, as they increase in their capability. The Russian
submarine force, in my opinion, did not take a hiatus when the
Cold War ended. Now we have the Dolgorukiy-class SSBN. Their
newest ballistic missile submarine is now in their Far East
fleet in the Pacific.
The Chinese are building Jin-class SSBNs, which has the
capability, if mated with the right missile, to threaten the
entire United States.
These are submarines that we have to, we must keep them at
risk whenever they are underway and on patrol.
I face a submarine shortage in the Pacific. My requirements
are not being met, and that is a function of numbers and global
demand. I get all that. But I am also worried about that delta,
that shortfall between requirement and presence.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Thank you both. My time has expired.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
On behalf of Chairman McCain, Senator Tillis, please?
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Gentlemen, I am sorry I was not here for a lot of the
committee meeting. I have Judiciary and Veterans' Affairs going
on at the same time. But thank you for coming before the
committee, and thank you and your family for your service, and
all the folks that back you up.
I have a question that I hope it has not been asked, but it
has to do with the buildup that we see in China.
Admiral, when you and I had a briefing, you made the
comment that we have a qualitative advantage, but quantity has
a quality of its own. As China continues to expand either its
geographic footprint or it continues to build ships and other
assets, has there been any modeling or any focus on what it is
going to take to continue to operate these things, in terms of
fiscal sustainability? Is there anything in your analysis to
say, at some point, you have to maintain them, you have to
operate them, and with their financial woes? Is there is any
thought on that or analysis being done?
Admiral Harris. It is a great point, Senator. I have not
done that analysis, nor have I seen analysis of China's fiscal
sustainability of their military out beyond--pick a date, 2020,
2025 or whatever.
But what I have seen is an increased number of frontline-
capable ships, submarines, and aircraft well into the 2020s. I
am worried about that.
But I have not looked at their ability to fiscally sustain
that force.
Senator Tillis. Another point that you made that really
struck me was the difference when you talk about our
qualitative advantage. It is not only our technological and our
power projection capability, but it also has to do with
important things like survivability.
We are clearly going to have to spend more and sometimes
take longer to increase the assets that we have in the area,
because of the premium that we place on force protection and
survivability.
I just think that is important for people to understand. We
would never feel like, given China's priorities today, that we
need to match them ship for ship. But we need to figure out
when those ratios--I think your concern is that, even with our
advantage, the ratios are getting to a point where you
expressed some concern. Is that correct?
Admiral Harris. It is correct. But I am less concerned
about managing the Chinese ship for ship than I am matching
them missile for missile. Their missile ranges far exceed ours
ship to ship.
Senator Tillis. That is a very good point.
Admiral Harris. But I am pleased that in the 2017 budget,
we are going to put some funding against improving our surface-
to-surface missile capability.
Senator Tillis. Now, if I can flip it for a minute, we are
viewing China as a kind of emerging threat or growing that in
that area of the world. What sort of work can we do to identify
instances, particularly as it relates to North Korea, to find
partnerships and common interests? What kinds of things, either
General Scaparrotti or Admiral Harris, are we working on that
you think could potentially bear fruit?
Admiral Harris. I have talked in public before about--there
are more things that bind and link China with the United States
than separate us. The things that separate us are not
insignificant. But let me talk now about those things that we
can do together in shared security spaces.
We have a military consultative working group with China
where we meet with them on a regular basis to discuss incidents
at sea and in the air. We have our rules of behavior working
group. We have all of these positive fora where we can engage
in discussions with our Chinese counterparts.
They are active globally in positive areas, and we should
talk about those and commend them for it. They were involved in
the removal of chemical weapons from Syria. They were involved
in an evacuation of noncombatants from Yemen. They have been
involved in counterpiracy operations off the Horn of Africa now
for years. They are on the 22nd iteration of that. They had the
largest number of ships off the west coast of Australia in the
search for the missing Malaysian airliner.
These are all positive things, and they are doing good
things in that international space.
It is just those provocative things that they are doing in
Southeast Asia and the South China Sea, which raises tensions
and provocations, which causes problems in that area that we
have to work with them on.
Senator Tillis. Thank you.
In closing, two things. I suspect that my colleague here is
going to bring up the 425. I would associate myself with any
concerns that he may have with that. I will be sticking around
for his questions. But I think it is also to continue to
communicate back to us how the current budget request helps
you, what the priorities should be, communicating those back to
our office, and continue, I think, to pound the table to say,
at all costs, avoid sequestration.
I look forward to working with you, and thank you for your
service.
Senator Reed. On behalf of the chairman, Senator Sullivan,
please?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My colleague,
Senator Tillis, is wise in terms of his ability to anticipate
questions. I did want talk a little bit about some of the force
posture.
Admiral Harris, in your testimony, you talked about the
tyranny of distance and the importance of forward station
forces at high levels of readiness that can rapidly respond to
a crisis in terms of a full range of military options. The
President, when he announced the rebalance, which I think has
broad support here on this committee, bipartisan support, he
talked about no force reduction in the Asia-Pacific theater.
Despite that, as you may be aware, and we talked about a
little bit yesterday, the Army has decided to essentially get
rid of the only airborne brigade combat team in the Asia-
Pacific, the 425, also the only Arctic trained and mountain
trained. They are, certainly, a brigade combat team that brings
a lot of onlies to the fight. Although it is an Army decision,
it certainly impacts the two of you.
I know, General Scaparrotti, you view the 425 as an
important strategic reserve that can get to Korea within 7
hours. We have a huge strategic lift capability coupled with
the 425.
Admiral Harris, you actually own those forces, in terms of
operational command.
General Milley, to his credit, has said he is going to take
a look at this decision. He has actually put the decision on
hold. I was up in Alaska with him. He was on a fact-finding
mission just a couple days ago.
If he were to reverse that decision, would you support his
decision to do that, if he were? Both of you?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. I would. It brings a very
specific set of capabilities to the theater, as you just
stated. I would just say that General Milley, as you know, with
the downsizing of our force, has to make a decision to take
that someplace.
With that comment, I would just say my personal opinion is
that we need to reconsider the downsizing of the Army at this
point, given the challenges that we have around the globe. We
have a mismatch between the requirements and our strategy and
the force that we have today.
Senator Sullivan. I could not agree more with you on that,
General.
General Milley, again, to his credit, is looking hard at
the tooth-to-tail ratio. If he has to cut anybody, the
infantry, armor, tooth element of our forces--but I think your
broader point on not drawing down the 425 is a really good one.
Admiral Harris, do you have any thoughts on the?
Admiral Harris. Sure, Senator. I will be the first to say
it is much more fun to be an insatiable COCOM than it is to be
a Service Chief, so I do not envy the position that General
Milley or Admiral Richardson or any other Service Chiefs are
in, as they have to make these difficult decisions.
But I would say that our Nation has an insatiable desire
for security, and rightfully so. I welcome General Milley's
decision to reconsider the reduction of the 425 and that great
capacity that is resident in Alaska. Now, these are follow-on
surge forces that, without them, I do not know where we would
be, if we had a major fight on the Korean Peninsula.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you for that. I was just out at
Fort Polk at the JRTC [Joint Readiness Training Center]. The
425 is actually doing their month-long training out there. To
watch close to 1,000 airborne soldiers drop out of the sky in
the middle of the night on a forcible entry military exercise
shows you what an awesome instrument of American power this
unit is. I certainly think it is a strategic mistake for the
country to be getting rid of them.
Let me ask one final question, just switching gears here.
CSIS, in their report--I know both of you have reviewed it--
recommended that we should consider offering an explicit
guarantee to the Philippines that the United States will
respond under the United States-Philippines Mutual Defense
Treaty to an attack on the Philippines military in the disputed
waters or territory.
I think, to the President's credit, he did this with regard
to one of the islands, with regard to our treaty obligations to
Japan recently.
Should this option be considered? What do you think the
effect of such a declaration would be? What do you think the
effect of the President's previous statement vis-a-vis Japan
and our treaty obligations to Japan on one of the islands, what
do you think the impact of that was?
Admiral Harris. I am trying to decide which question to
answer first. I will start backwards.
I think the Secretary of Defense and the President's
unequivocal declaration that the Senkaku Islands fall under the
protections afforded by the mutual security treaty with Japan
had a positive effect on the situation in the East China Sea.
I responded to a question earlier about CSIS's
recommendation about the Philippines.
Senator Sullivan. I am sorry. I was----
Admiral Harris. No, no.
I believe that our obligations to the Philippines under
that treaty, which every treaty is different, is clear, and I
understand my obligations. I think we should consider it, for
sure.
We should consider clarifying our position on the
Philippines marines that are on the Second Thomas Shoal. We
have maintained as a Nation that Second Thomas Shoal, that
territorial maritime dispute there, we do not take a position
on that. We are going to have to study this and get into it.
But I think it clearly should be considered.
Senator Sullivan. Your first statement about the
President's statement, you said you thought it was positive.
Why? Why do you think so? What did it do?
Admiral Harris. It sent a clear signal to China that we
would defend the Senkakus just as we would defend Tokyo.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
Admiral Harris, General Scaparrotti, on behalf of Chairman
McCain, thank you for your testimony and your continued
service.
Again, on behalf of the chairman, let me adjourn the
hearing. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
nuclear proliferation
Admiral Harris and General Scaparrotti: According to a recent
report in the New York Times, some politicians in South Korea are
calling for an indigenous nuclear weapons program due to the recent
North Korean nuclear test.
1. Senator Ayotte. What are your assessments of these reports?
Admiral Harris. The United States is completely committed to the
defense of South Korea and the ROK government is committed to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty. While some politicians may have personal views on
the matter, these views do not represent the official position of the
ROK government, and I have not received any indications during my
engagements with ROK leadership that nuclearization is a consideration.
General Scaparrotti. I do not believe these reports represent the
senior leaders of the Republic of Korea (ROK) Government. I have not
received any indications that nuclearization is under consideration by
any of the ROK officials I am in contact with. The United States is
completely committed to the defense of South Korea, and the ROK remains
committed to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
President Park has rejected the need for nuclear weapons as recently as
13 January 2016. Additionally, Minister of Defense Han Min-koo rejected
the call for developing nuclear weapons, instead calling for a THAAD
deployment. This was in response to the remarks by the ROK's Ruling
Party Floor Leader regarding nuclear weapons.
2. Senator Ayotte. Do you believe South Korea or any other ally in
the region may decide to pursue a nuclear weapons capability in the
near future?
Admiral Harris. Our allies benefit from the conventional and
nuclear deterrence provided by our significant military capabilities,
and I have received no indications that our regional allies are
dissatisfied with the U.S. commitment to extended deterrence.
General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]
3. Senator Ayotte. Why do you believe the United States nuclear
umbrella is not deemed sufficient by those calling for an indigenous
nuclear weapons program in South Korea?
Admiral Harris. The United States and our alliance with the ROK
have effectively deterred major hostilities on the Korean peninsula for
over 60 years. Although the U.S. nuclear umbrella is designed to help
deter and prevent major hostilities it cannot, nor was it meant to,
deter all possible provocations. The calls for an indigenous ROK
nuclear weapons program are not unique to recent events. It is
understandable that some South Koreans would become increasingly
concerned as the DPRK continues to advance its nuclear weapons program,
and as a result want to bolster their own sense of national security as
a result of the ongoing posture of the DPRK.
General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]
pacom
4. Senator Ayotte. Do you have the right number of U.S. Army troops
stationed in or rotating through the PACOM area of responsibility?
Admiral Harris. USPACOM has adequacy in some areas but faces
shortfalls in others, specifically in those capabilities considered
``High Demand/Low Density (HD/LD)'' throughout the Army. The physical
number of U.S. Army troops stationed in, or rotating through, the
USPACOM AOR is sufficient for steady state (Phase 0) operations;
however, if a contingency occurs we will need to rely on the
availability of trained and ready CONUS-based Army forces that can
respond quickly to a short- to no-notice crisis and supplement what we
have postured in theater. This remains the area of operational risk
that is most significant when considered against OPLAN requirements.
For certain specific capabilities (see question #5 for examples), our
planning has determined that additional presence on the Korean
peninsula is required, either via permanent stationing or rotational
(deployed) forces. Increased forward presence (permanent basing) in the
PACOM AOR would reduce the Army's deployment to dwell ratios and
significantly alleviate stress on the force. Additional prepositioning
of Army-specific equipment and supplies will also serve as a combat
multiplier in both contingency and crisis.
5. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Harris: If not, what more do you need?
Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
patriot missiles
6. Senator Ayotte. General Scaparrotti: Do all the Patriot
batteries in South Korea feature the ``Configuration 3+'' upgrade?
General Scaparrotti. No. There are eight (8) United States Patriot
batteries stationed in South Korea and all eight are scheduled to
receive the Configuration 3+ upgrades in fiscal year 2017. U.S. Patriot
batteries in the PACOM region are the priority for fielding
Configuration 3+ upgrades.
7. Senator Ayotte. General Scaparrotti: What are the implications
of not having this upgrade?
General Scaparrotti. The operational implications of not fielding
configuration 3+ upgrades to the U.S. PATRIOT force would be additional
risk in our ability to defend the ROK. The 3+ upgrades would improve
the lethality of the PATRIOT in defending against the NK BMD threats.
Not upgrading current U.S. PATRIOT with configuration 3+ leaves our
systems less capable against the advancing capabilities of the NK
missile force.
Significant improvements that Configuration 3+ provides the force
include:
1) Missile Segment Enhanced (MSE) interceptors. These provide
extended range and increased lethality.
2) Radar Digital Processor (RDP) upgrades. This upgrade to the
Patriot system radar will replace obsolete components, increase radar
reliability, increase long range TBM detection, optimizes the MSE
interceptors.
3) PDB 8 software and Modem Man-stations in the command control
van. The software updates improve system reliability and maximize the
MSE interceptor capability and RDP improvements.
8. Senator Ayotte. General Scaparrotti: Do you recommend that
Patriots in South Korea receive the ``Configuration 3+'' upgrade?
General Scaparrotti. Yes. I recommend that United States Patriots
in Korea remain the priority for 2017 fielding of the Configuration 3+
upgrades due to the imminent threat we face.
Patriot is currently the only capability on peninsula that defends
against the North Korean ballistic missile threat. In order to maximize
the viability of this BMD capability, I recommend that the U.S. Patriot
systems assigned to the KTO remain a priority for upgrades with
Configuration 3+.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Rounds
pacom platform allocation
9. Senator Rounds. Admiral Harris and General Scaparrotti, you
stated during testimony that there were specific Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms that would aid PACOM's
mission that have not been provided to you during the Department of
Defense global force allocation process. Please provide detail on the
types and numbers of these platforms. We are prepared to receive a
classified response if necessary.
Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Cruz
port visits
10. Senator Cruz. I am concerned about the apparent unwillingness
of the Administration to open United States ports to Taiwanese ships
during the ROC Navy's transit across the Pacific for their Fleet of
Friendship goodwill visit to destinations in Central America. Given
that Taiwan and the United States have built a close partnership in
maritime security cooperation, is there an alternative procedure DOD
can suggest for solving the problem of resupplying their fleet during
the transit? Looking beyond this issue, what do you see as next steps
that the United States and Taiwan can take to strengthen maritime
cooperation?
Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
thaad in south korea
11. Senator Cruz. I am pleased to see progress on discussions with
South Korea regarding THAAD. This is a crucial step to securing our
ally and protecting U.S. troops deployed in the region. As you aware,
China wasted no time in waging a propaganda war against this action,
going so far as to blackmail South Korea with economic retaliation if
THAAD were deployed. I am concerned that this Administration and the
Department of Defense have not been vocal enough in countering China's
deceptive claims on THAAD's capabilities, nor condemning their harsh
treatment of South Korea. Moving forward, what concrete steps will DOD
take to address China's behavior regarding THAAD?
Admiral Harris. I will continue to engage the American public on
this issue, and I will continue to clearly represent United States
policy to the international community. While no decisions have yet been
made on a deployment of THAAD to the Korean Peninsula, the United
States will take the steps necessary to protect our Homeland and our
treaty ally. In recent bilateral engagements with China's military, the
United States has made clear that American defensive capabilities on
the Peninsula are intended solely to defend the Republic of Korea and
United States troops and citizens there, against the evolving North
Korean threat. This capability includes defense against North Korean
ballistic missiles. We have also made clear that THAAD in South Korea
is not directed at China and is not intended to affect strategic
stability with China.
General Scaparrotti. USFK remains focused on bilateral engagement
with the ROK regarding the deployment of THAAD to the Korean Peninsula
to enhance our theater ballistic missile defense. Interactions with
China are beyond USFK's authorities, and I respectfully defer your
question to PACOM.
south china sea
12. Senator Cruz. China began aggressively expanding their
territorial claims and building illegitimate islands almost two and a
half years ago. You indicated during the Armed Services hearing that
you believe the United States should carry out freedom of navigation
operations in the South China Sea. When did you first provide this
professional military advice to the Administration?
Admiral Harris. Prior to assuming command of USPACOM, I served as
the Commander of U.S. Pacific Fleet from November 2013 to May 2015.
During that time, I provided multiple maritime options for the USPACOM
Commander including proposed freedom of navigation operations. The
USPACOM Commander considered those options in conjunction with other
options leveraging all elements of national power. I assumed command of
USPACOM in May 2015. Since assuming command, I have provided my
professional military advice to the Secretary of Defense concerning all
matters relevant to U.S. strategic objectives in the Pacific Command
area of operations. This advice included proposed freedom of navigation
operations in the South China Sea as well as other operations,
activities, and actions designed to convey our strategic message and
influence the behavior of Chinese leaders.
13. Senator Cruz. Why did PACOM fail to exert its right to
navigational maneuver in the waters surrounding these man-made islands
from 2012 until October 2015? In your professional military opinion,
has the delayed response made it more difficult to roll back and
counter China's narrative that the South China Sea ``belongs to
China,'' as a Chinese Vice Admiral declared last September?
Admiral Harris. Although USPACOM did not conduct Freedom of
Navigation Operations (FONOPS) inside 12NM of disputed South China Sea
features in 2013 or 2014, USPACOM continued to conduct a broad range of
military operations in the South China Sea, which China claims in its
entirety. These operations include numerous monthly FONOPS since 2011
in the South China Sea outside 12NM of disputed features challenging
excessive restrictions in Exclusive Economic Zones and airspace, a
significant number of reconnaissance flights each month, frequent
single and multiple ship patrols as part of our Pacific Presence
Operations, and eight FONOPS inside 12NM of disputed South China Sea
features in 2011, 2012, 2015, and 2016.
I have always been a proponent of the United States flying,
sailing, and operating wherever international law allows and have
always supported a robust FONOPS program. The United States has not
relinquished the South China Sea to China. We have maintained a
consistent, open, and prominent presence that has successfully
demonstrated our commitment to our allies and partners, as well as a
commitment to security and stability in the region.
submarines
14. Senator Cruz. Admiral Harris, you expressed concern during the
Armed Services hearing that our capacity to deploy submarines is
falling well below the requirements of our combatant commanders,
specifically noting that submarines provide you with your ``principal
asymmetric advantage.'' Please explain the impact of that deficit on
future operations in an environment where China continues to increase
their A2/AD capabilities and Russia continues their investment in
undersea warfare. Given the current size of our submarine fleet and
existing shipbuilding projections, are you concerned that the United
States could be denied access anywhere in your PACOM area of
responsibility in the next decade? If you were not resource or asset
constrained, how many attack submarines would you desire in PACOM?
Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
us strategy and regional order
15. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Harris, recently, we have been
working with the Chinese to increase dialogue and confidence building
measures, particularly as they relate to operations on the high seas
and in the air. In 2014, the US, China and 25 other maritime nations
implemented the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea which would
monitor maritime behavior. However, despite some progress, China
continues its coercive behavior in maritime disputes through island
building in the South China Sea and provocations around the Senkaku
Islands in the East China Sea. Are the Chinese deliberately ignoring
these confidence building efforts or are they interpreting differently
than the US?
Admiral Harris. China does not want a war or military conflict with
the United States, and they likely view confidence building measures as
moderately useful in preventing the inadvertent escalation of maritime
encounters. As do we. That said, China's national policy holds that the
rocks, shoals, and reefs in the South China Sea are China's. This
drives their behavior which includes ignoring international law as it
applies to maritime law. Regarding confidence building measures
themselves, China does not view confidence building measures as
directly relevant to disputes in the East and South China Seas. In
these disputes, China's interest is in portraying other countries'
operations in Chinese-claimed waters as an infringement on China's
rights, which justify a stern response, rather than an encounter
between ships exercising equal rights. As a result, I believe China
will employ confidence building measures only selectively in the East
and South China Seas, and not in situations in which it believes these
confidence building measures constrain it from pursuing its sovereignty
objectives.
All this said, the Chinese are actively implementing standards and
rules of behavior agreed to in the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea
and the Rules of Behavior for the Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters
that were recently signed as bilateral confidence building measures.
The United States and China meet three times a year; twice during
Military Maritime Consultative Agreement working groups, and once at a
plenary session that addresses operational safety concerns,
effectiveness of confidence building measures, as well as identifying
additional areas for improvement. I believe these confidence building
agreements and meetings have been helpful in improving safe maritime
encounters.
chemical biological stockpile in north korea
16. Senator McCaskill. General Scaparrotti, in your testimony you
commented that North Korea has one of the largest chemical weapons
stockpiles and biological weapons research programs in the world. The
recent National Commission on the Future of the Army found that the
Army is incurring ``unacceptable risk'' in our response capabilities as
they relate to, among other areas, chemical, biological, radiological
and nuclear (CBRN) response. Do you agree with the Commission's
findings?
General Scaparrotti. Yes. I concur with the Commission's findings.
The Army's force structure and response capabilities for CBRN response
have been in steady decline over the past decade or longer. The vast
majority of our force flow to support our OPLAN, in the area of CBRN
response, is heavily dependent on the Reserve component and is
projected to arrive in theater much later in the fight than we have
requested or require. In dealing with the massive WMD programs within
North Korea, we simply lack the capacity to adequately address the
scale of this problem set.
17. Senator McCaskill. General Scaparrotti, do you have sufficient
CBRN response capability to meet the requirements on the Korean
Peninsula?
General Scaparrotti. No. We do not have sufficient CBRN response
capability to meet potential contingencies in the Korean Theater of
Operations, due to a lack of sufficient passive and active CBRN Defense
capabilities and personnel. We have shortages in the area of collective
protection and insufficient capabilities in both aerial and ground
based persistent biological sensors/surveillance; The Chemical and
Biological Defense Program (CBDP) and the Joint Program Executive
Officer--Chemical and Biological Defense (JPEO-CBD) are currently
working with us to address these issues. Additionally, we lack CBRN
Specialists to manage/respond to a CBRN incident and execute the
required post-incident decontamination.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Donnelly
hypersonics
18. Senator Donnelly. Admiral Harris, do you see investment in
hypersonic systems, including conventional prompt strike, as a priority
for the future of our ability to deter aggression and defend our
interests in the Pacific?
Admiral Harris, Yes--investments in hypersonic weapons must be a
priority to ensure our ability to deter aggression and defend our
interests in the Pacific remain unchallenged. Hypersonic systems are a
significant deterrent because they provide a non-nuclear option to
provocation and the ability to rapidly project power to decisively
defeat aggressors. Furthermore, hypersonic systems increase platform
survivability and decrease operational employment risk in Anti-Access/
Area Denial environments.
anti-access/area denial (a2/ad)
19. Senator Donnelly. Admiral Harris, General Scaparrotti, what
advantages would flying 5th generation aircraft provide in the
contested airspace over the Korean Peninsula?
Admiral Harris. Fifth generation aircraft provide significant
advantages in the contested airspace over the Korean Peninsula. Our
fifth generation aircraft provide increased survivability and lethality
in the A2/AD environment through enhanced systems and increased
situational awareness. This said, due to the relative small number of
fifth generation fighters that will be brought online by the Air Force,
Navy, and Marine Corps in the next five years, I believe it is prudent
to migrate some fifth generation capability and weapons to our existing
large fourth generation fighter force.
General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]
20. Senator Donnelly. Admiral Harris, General Scaparrotti, can you
speak to the expected survivability of older and less protected
airframes, such as Korean F-5s and US A-10s in the initial phases of a
war in Korea?
Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]
21. Senator Donnelly. Admiral Harris, General Scaparrotti, what is
your choice to go against threats such as MiG-29s and the plethora of
short/long, stationery, transportable, radar and IR threats?
Admiral Harris. Fifth generation fighters and hypersonics. The
Pacific theater requires fifth generation fighters equipped with the
payload and range that provides the air superiority necessary to win
decisively against threats such as the MiG-29s. Fifth generation
fighters are multi-role tactical aircraft with electronic warfare
capabilities that can operate, and endure, in an Anti-Access / Area-
Denial (A2/AD) environment. Furthermore, it is essential that Pacific
theater fighters are able to communicate with our regional allies such
as: Australia, Japan, and South Korea who are procuring F-35 aircraft.
Additionally, hypersonics are game changing technologies that enhance
our ability to overcome the tyranny of distance, while providing the
element of surprise. Hypersonics provide range at sea, and the air
launch necessary for the freedom of maneuver of fleet operations.
Hypersonics also give us the speed, survivability and time critical
strike capability that allows our forces to strike at will.
General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]
22. Senator Donnelly. Admiral Harris, General Scaparrotti, would we
be able to gain air superiority over Korea faster or slower with F-35/
22s versus A-10s and even F-16s?
Admiral Harris. We enjoy air superiority today against the North
Korean Air Force with our F-22s, F-16s, F-15s and F/A-18s. We would
gain air superiority faster with F-35/22s versus A-10s and F-16s. The
superior technology of our fifth generation aircraft to provide
situational awareness and counter-air capability, combined with our
high level of pilot proficiency provide significant advantages against
even the most advanced aircraft in North Korea, the MiG-29.
General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]
23. Senator Donnelly. Admiral Harris, what do you see as the top
A2/AD challenges we face in the Asia-Pacific region?
Admiral Harris. The top three challenges are: (1) gaining and
maintaining air and sea superiority, which requires ample submarines,
fifth generation aircraft, and critical munitions; (2) defending space
assets, to include communications, position, navigation and timing
assets, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets;
and, (3) defending our assets through integrated ballistic and cruise
missile defense and dispersal operations.
24. Senator Donnelly. Admiral Harris, what particular programs do
you see as vital to maintaining our ability to project power in the
Asia-Pacific?
Admiral Harris. In order to project power in the Asia-Pacific
Theater, PACOM forces require capabilities that can operate and survive
in an Anti-Access / Area-Denial (A2/AD) environment against China and
Russia. Some specific programs required in the PACOM theater are:
regional submarines, Fourth Generation Fighters with upgraded Fifth
Generation capabilities and Fifth Generation aircraft; precision
munitions (i.e. AIM-9X, AIM-120D, SM-6); Long Range Anti-ship Missile
(LRASM); advanced Intelligence, Surveillance, and Recognizance (ISR)
communications systems (i.e. Advanced Hawkeye E2D and P-8 Poseidon).
Our forces require systems that diminish gaps in surface, air and
subsurface areas.
25. Senator Donnelly. Admiral Harris, General Scaparrotti, a key
component of Chinese military strategy would be attacks on regional
United States land bases, of which five are currently within range of
China's land-attack cruise missiles. Given limited resources, what
priority should be given to investments in base dispersion, base
hardening, enhancing the ability to operate from further away, and
enhancing CONUS-based global strike capabilities?
Admiral Harris. Regional missile forces continue to evolve in both
capability and capacity, resulting in growing levels of risk to forward
U.S. Forces. High priority must be given to reducing risk via
investments in both active (ballistic and cruise missile defense) and
passive defense (distributed operations, hardening and seaport/airport
repair) at our existing, planned, and possible expeditionary operating
locations. Additionally, high priority must be assigned to the
development of the robust distributed logistics support capability that
is essential to enabling sustained combat operations from numerous ``at
risk'' U.S. operating locations in the Western Pacific.
General Scaparrotti. As USFK does not focus on Chinese deterrence
and defense per the scope of your question, I respectfully defer this
request to the key leaders of both Pacific Command and U.S. Strategic
Commands. However, USFK is focused on maintaining a level of security
for our installations based on current threat assessments. Every
installation conducts regular training and vulnerability exercises
designed to harden our force protection. Additionally, USFK planners
have developed and regularly refine contingency plans to disperse key
systems when threatened.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
asia-pacific rebalance 2025
26. Senator Hirono. Admiral Harris and General Scaparrotti, Last
month, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
released the Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025 Report. The SASC heard
testimony on its findings earlier this month. An excerpt from the
abridged report is as follows: ``Although the Obama administration
issued a series of speeches and documents on the rebalance, the authors
found that there remains no central U.S. Government document that
describes the rebalance strategy and its associated elements. In
interviews with leaders throughout the Department of Defense, in
various U.S. agencies, on Capitol Hill, and across the Asia-Pacific,
the study team heard consistent confusion about the rebalance strategy
and concern about its implementation.'' Can you both please provide
your thoughts on this? Do you agree that the United States does not
have a clear strategy in the Pacific? What can you do in your capacity
to support a clear and consistent strategy?
Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
General Scaparrotti. I have a clear understanding behind the intent
and objectives of the U.S. Rebalance, and am in regular dialogue with
leaders throughout the Department of Defense and elsewhere in the U.S.
Government to remain synchronized. Throughout my time in Command, I
have regularly offered my best military advice to support the
development and implementation of a clear and consistent strategy. The
rebalance has played a role in the high priority allocation of
resources to United States Forces Korea, as well as increased senior
leader attention and time spent in Korea. This has been a key component
to our success in Korea.
pacom
27. Senator Hirono. Admiral Harris, this past week it was announced
that the contract award for the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack
Radar System (JSTARS) program has been delayed by at least six months.
How important is having the JSTARS capability in the Asia-Pacific
region and are you concerned about the delays associated with the
JSTARS recapitalization program? How does this impact your capabilities
in Asia-Pacific?
Admiral Harris. It is very important to maintain JSTARS capability
in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, and potential delays in the JSTARS
recapitalization concern me. The primary impact is a potential gap in
the Battle Management Command and Control (BMC2)-Intelligence
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability to meet key strategic
objectives. The current Air Force E-8C retirement plan would further
reduce deployable capacity, impacting USPACOM access to forces.
Advocacy is essential in retaining sufficient JSTARS capability to meet
command requirements in the 2017-2028 timeframe, as there is no other
alternative joint capability that provides an integrated BMC2-ISR
capability of the E-8C.
eagle vision
28. Senator Hirono. Admiral Harris, in your testimony you make
mention of the fact that The Indo-Asia-Pacific is the world's most
disaster-prone region. The United States plays a significant role in
providing humanitarian assistance to countries that experience these
hardships, and PACOM is a critical component of that aid. As the
Commander of PACOM, can you please comment on the capabilities that the
Eagle Vision system in providing assistance to those countries in need?
As you know, the Hawaii Air National Guard is one of the few Air Guard
units which hosts the system.
Admiral Harris. Eagle Vision provides me with rapid access to broad
area and multispectral imagery. It supports aircraft mission planning,
mission target area visualization, intelligent assessment, map
preparation, and other topographic applications in support of both
warfighting or disaster response. Eagle Vision's most notable aspect is
its ability to provide near real time imagery aiding command and
control.
These capabilities can enhance the ability of responders to focus
limited assets on critical areas of need. Eagle Vision can be deployed
to any location within the USPACOM AOR by C-130 or C-17. In the USPACOM
AOR, Eagle Vision is currently used by the 293rd Combat Communications
Squadron, Hawaii Air National Guard, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii.
pacom aor
29. Senator Hirono. Admiral Harris, given the downward pressures on
budgets and other resource restrictions, we obviously can't have
everything we need in terms of providing national security
capabilities. As far as PACOM is concerned, if additional resources
were made available what items would you recommend having in the PACOM
AOR?
Admiral Harris. I recommend additional investment in the
advancement of critical munitions, additional submarines, fourth
generation fighters with upgraded fifth generation capabilities and
fifth generation fighters, and persistent Intelligence Surveillance
Reconnaissance (ISR). Critical munition (i.e. AIM-9X, AIM-120, SM-6)
shortages impact USPACOM's ability to conduct high end warfare in an
Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) environment. The restricted ranges of
our aging surface-to-surface and air-to-surface munitions now serve as
the limiting factor in the effectiveness of advanced U.S. assets. Until
munition ranges and effectiveness catch up to the capability of our
advanced fighters, ships, and submarines the benefit of having such
capable assets will be stymied. Additional submarines would assist in
maintaining an asymmetric advantage against the current adversary
submarine threats in the region and fifth generation aircraft have the
capability that can operate and survive in an A2/AD. Persistent ISR is
necessary to bolster Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). Persistent ISR is
necessary to find, fix, and target concealed and mobile missiles in the
AOR.
thaad
30. Senator Hirono. General Scaparrotti, I understand that a
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system is being considered
for use against potential North Korean missile threats. Can you talk
more about this weapon system and the capabilities that it would bring?
General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]
japan - korea relations
31. Senator Hirono. General Scaparrotti, how would you currently
assess the state of Japan-Korea defense cooperation including in the
missile defense arena?
General Scaparrotti. Although there are still lingering historical
issues, the prospects for improved defense cooperation between Japan
and Korea have increased. The North Korean threat has galvanized our
partners on both sides and they have recognized that cooperation in the
missile defense arena is paramount to national and regional security.
Recent achievements like the 2014 Trilateral Information Sharing
Arrangement and the U.S. ROK Japan Defense Trilateral Talks will
continue to underpin trilateral relationships into the future. As
evidence of these improving relations, there have been several Defense
Trilateral Talks that have occurred in the wake of this year's DPRK
nuclear and missile tests. I am cautiously optimistic both nations will
continue to work together and strengthen our unified position against
North Korea.
regional energy security
32. Senator Hirono. Admiral Harris and General Scaparrotti, as you
know, the Asia-Pacific region is home to some of the fastest growing--
and industrializing--economies in the world. As these economies grow
and industrialize, they need to generate the energy needed to power
their more modern economies. However, the Asia-Pacific region does not
have substantial fossil fuel resources, and is already facing the
challenges presented by air and water pollution, as well as the myriad
other consequences of a rapidly changing climate. Furthermore, the
distances within the PACOM AOR make energy transport and cost a
vulnerability for our forces. The United States military's experiences
in Iraq and Afghanistan are well documented examples of these
difficulties. In your view, despite the currently record low price of
oil, how much of a long-term vulnerability does competition for energy
resources present in the region both for the relations between nations
there as well as U.S. Forces in the AOR? What sort of pressures does
this place on U.S. national security in the region, and what types of
initiatives are you undertaking to help alleviate some of these
concerns? What have been some of the outcomes of those efforts to date?
Admiral Harris. Experts state that growth in trade of energy
sources will be particularly large in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region and
almost all these energy sources will require movement through
international waters. To ensure global growth and to meet our nation's
security priorities, international sea lines of communication must
remain secure. Security of international sea lanes is a cornerstone of
Pacific Command's mission. We employ two broad efforts: enduring
presence and working with allies and partners. Enduring presence of
Pacific Command's forces enhances international maritime domain
awareness and supports the free flow of international trade, to include
energy supplies. Pacific Command works with allies and partners to
improve and/or develop their domestic maritime security capabilities.
In its first year of execution, the Department of Defense Maritime
Security Initiative addresses improving partner nation capability and
capacity to conduct maritime security and enforce their resource rights
within their Exclusive Economic Zone. Additionally, Pacific Command
works closely with partners across the Indo-Asia-Pacific region in our
strategic approach to ensure energy requirements will never be an
operational constraint. Part of Pacific Command's energy security
program includes building resiliency in energy systems; increase allied
and partner interoperability; and integrating energy security
principles into operations, activities, and actions. Outcomes of these
efforts include energy security dialogues with allies and partners;
inclusion in steady state campaign plan, contingency plans, and
exercise scenarios; and informing innovation requirements for basing
and operational energy security innovation in order to improve mission
assurance and extend operational reach.
General Scaparrotti. The Republic of Korea (ROK) is a small nation
without a significant endowment of natural resources. Thus, significant
shifts in energy prices or supplies have a potentially significant
impact on the ROK economy. However, energy competition does not play a
large role in ROK national security decision-making, nor does the ROK
appear to feel significant pressure. A robust nuclear energy
capability, combined with the security provided by the United States-
ROK Alliance, helps to alleviate energy concerns. The United States can
further contribute to ROK energy security as a source of oil,
particularly with the recent lifting of the United States crude oil
export ban.
The ROK does not have international oil or gas pipelines; they rely
exclusively on tanker shipments. The ROK is one of the world's top
importers of liquefied natural gas (LNG), coal, and crude oil. They are
the second largest importer of LNG mostly from the Middle East and
Southeast Asia. They are the fourth largest importer of coal which
comes from Australia and Southeast Asia. The ROK is the fifth largest
importer of crude oil, mostly from the Middle East. The ROK imports
about 97% of its total primary energy consumption, and much of it from
the Middle East and through Southeast Asia. The security of key sea
shipping lanes, especially in the South China Sea (SCS), is paramount.
The ROK has a vested interest in maintaining freedom of navigation
operations (FONOPS) in the SCS to ensure its energy security.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2017 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 3, 2016
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
POSTURE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in Room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe,
Sessions, Wicker, Ayotte, Cotton, Rounds, Tillis, Sullivan,
Lee, Reed, Nelson, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, and Heinrich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman McCain. Good morning.
The committee meets today to consider the posture of the
Air Force in the context of our review and oversight of the
fiscal year 2017 budget request. I welcome our witnesses,
Secretary of the Air Force Deborah James and Chief of Staff of
the Air Force General Mark Welsh.
General Welsh, I understand this may be your last time you
will appear before this committee. Thank you for not cheering.
I just want to take this opportunity to express our gratitude
to you and your family for 40 years of service and sacrifice in
defense of our Nation and wish you every success in your future
endeavors.
Twenty-five years of continuous deployments, troubled
acquisition programs, and frequent aircraft divestments have
left us with the oldest and smallest Air Force in history. The
combination of relentless operational tempo and misguided
reductions in defense spending in recent years has depleted
readiness. Today less than half of the Air Force fighter
squadrons are fully combat mission ready, and the Air Force
does not anticipate a return to full spectrum readiness for
another decade.
Meanwhile, potential adversaries are developing and
fielding fifth generation fighters, advanced air defense
systems, and sophisticated space, cyber, and electronic warfare
capabilities that are rapidly shrinking America's military
technological advantage and holding our aircraft at greater
risk over greater distances.
Despite temporary relief from the arbitrary spending caps
imposed by the Budget Control Act, including through last
year's Bipartisan Budget Act, we are still placing an
unnecessary and dangerous burden on the backs of our airmen.
Given the obvious needs of our Air Force to restore
readiness, recapitalize our combat aircraft fleet, and invest
in modernization, the President should have requested a defense
budget that reflects the scale and scope of the national
security threats we face and the growing demands they impose on
our airmen.
Instead, he chose to request the lowest level of defense
spending authorized by last year's budget agreement and submit
a defense budget that is actually less in real dollars than
last year, despite the fact that operational requirements have
grown.
That leaves the Air Force $3.4 billion short of what the
Air Force said last year it would need for fiscal year 2017.
Given this budgetary shortfall, I am concerned the Air Force
will not be able to meet the requirements outlined in the 2014
QDR [Quadriennial Defense Review]: to simultaneously defeat an
adversary while denying the objectives of another.
The shortfall in this year's budget has forced the Air
Force to make a number of painful and undesirable decisions.
The most significant was to slow procurement of the F-35A by 45
aircraft over the next five years. This budget-driven decision
will likely increase the cost of this already costly aircraft,
while exacerbating what defense experts call the modernization
bow wave for other critical Air Force programs over the next 10
years, which the Air Force admits it cannot afford at current
funding levels. It also means it will take even longer for the
Air Force to address the tactical fighter shortfall looming in
the next decade.
While we recognize the need for additional resources, this
committee will continue to exercise rigorous oversight on Air
Force acquisition programs, including the KC-46A tanker
program, the presidential aircraft replacement, and the GPS
Operational Control System, recently labeled the Air Force's
``number one troubled program.'' If the Air Force, and the
Department of Defense more broadly, wish to convince the
American people that they need more taxpayer dollars, they must
show they are efficiently and wisely using the resources they
already have.
In particular, questions persist about the validity of the
F-35 program of record quantity. Just consider that 815 F-35A's
have been deferred from delivery to the Air Force since 2002,
and the Service's latest procurement profile now projects the
last F-35A to be delivered in the year 2040. At a certain
point, a 38-year acquisition program runs the risk of producing
obsolescence, especially when our adversaries are accelerating
technological developments to counter the F-35. I look forward
to reviewing the Secretary of Defense's decisions on
revalidation of the total F-35 program of record quantity,
which is due to this committee by May 25th, 2016.
The decision to further delay the F-35 procurement also
underscores the folly of the Air Force's plan to retire the A-
10 fleet before a proven close air support replacement is
fielded. Much fanfare has been made about the Air Force's
decision not to divest A-10 aircraft in fiscal year 2018, but
beginning in fiscal year 2018, the Air Force again plans to
retire the entire A-10 fleet by 2021 with no replacement.
As the Air Force proceeds with needed modernization, I
recognize the need for a new bomber to replace our aging fleet
of B-52, B-1, and B-2 aircraft. A long-range, penetrating
strike capability is vital to deterring our enemies and
reassuring our allies in increasingly contested environments in
Europe and the Asia-Pacific.
However, I remain seriously concerned about the acquisition
strategy for the B-21 Long Range Strike Bomber, especially the
use of a cost-plus contract for the development of this
aircraft. I am still not convinced that this program will not
repeat the failures of past acquisition programs such as the F-
35. I will carefully examine every legislative option to ensure
that our Congress can fulfill our dual obligations to the
American people, providing our warfighters with the necessary
capability to defend this country and to do so at the lowest
possible cost and shortest period of time.
Similarly, ending the use of Russian rocket engines remains
a top priority for this committee. Department leaders have
correctly drawn attention to Russia's growing development of
military capabilities to threaten U.S. national security in
space. The greatest risk in this regard is that Vladimir Putin
continues to hold our national security space launch capability
in the palm of his hand through the Department's continued
dependence on Russian rocket engines. This is a national
security threat in addition to a moral outrage at a time when
Russian forces continued to destabilize Ukraine, including
nearly 500 attacks in the past week, as General Breedlove, the
Commander of European Command, testified on Tuesday.
The Treasury Department remains unwilling to sanction
Roscosmos, the Russian parent company of the manufacturer of
the RD-180, which is controlled by two sanctioned cronies of
Vladimir Putin. This suggests a level of hypocrisy in U.S.
sanctions policy that will only make it harder to convince our
European allies to renew their own sanctions on Russia this
summer.
This committee wants to find a constructive solution to
eliminate our dependence on Russian rocket engines immediately
without compromising future competition, a goal that Secretary
James said was possible in testimony in January.
Finally, I want to express my continuing concern with the
Air Force's mismanagement of its remotely piloted aircraft, or
RPA [Remotely Piloted Aircraft], enterprise. The Air Force's
MQ-1 and MQ-9 community remains undermanned and overworked.
Yet, despite the Air Force's stated need for an additional
3,000 RPA manpower authorizations, the Air Force's end strength
remains the same as last year.
While the Congress authorized greater retention bonuses for
RPA pilots, the Air Force did not provide them out of a sense
of ``fairness.'' After years of warnings that RPA pilots and
maintainers are leaving in droves, this was a missed
opportunity and a damaging mistake. I look forward to your
explanation for this action.
Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let
me join you in welcoming Secretary James and General Welsh to
the committee this morning to testify on the plans and programs
of the Department of the Air Force for the fiscal year 2017
annual authorization.
We are grateful to both of you for your service to the
Nation. Particularly, General Welsh, let me join the chairman
in commending you for your outstanding service to the Nation
and to the Air Force. You have led with vision and integrity.
Thank you very much, sir.
Over the past 15 years, the Air Force personnel and
equipment have played a key role in support of our national
security goals in Iraq, Afghanistan, and across the globe. Over
this time, we have relied heavily on Air Force strike aircraft
to take on important ground targets, Air Force manned aircraft
and unmanned aerial vehicles to provide intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance support, and Air Force tankers
and cargo aircraft to support coalition air operations.
Our witnesses this morning face huge challenges as they
strive to balance the need to support ongoing operations and
sustain readiness with the need to modernize and keep the
technological edge in the three domains of air, space, and
cyberspace that are so critical to military success. The Air
Force has produced a budget that, like all the Services, made
tough decisions in a time of constrained resources.
The Air Force is proposing significant force structure
changes to ensure that it will have the right size and mix of
assets and capabilities to meet strategic needs in a manner
consistent with a constrained budget environment. The Air Force
proposal includes major shifts in both strategic and tactical
aircraft programs, with reductions shared among the Active Duty
force, the Air National Guard, and the Air Force Reserve. Here
are some examples.
The Air Force is planning to retire the entire A-10 fighter
force over the future years defense program as new F-35A Joint
Strike Fighter aircraft replace them on a one-for-one basis.
While there is a one-for-one replacement for aircraft and
squadrons under the Air Force plan, it is not clear that the
close air support capability of the modernized force will equal
or exceed the close air support capability of the current
force, and we would appreciate your thoughts, as the chairman
has indicated. The disjunction between the deployment of F-35's
and the proposed retirement of the A-10 raises that question,
and it is a critical question.
The Air Force continues its plan to eventually retire the
entire U-2 fleet and keep the Global Hawk Block 30 remotely
piloted aircraft fleet. In the meantime, the Air Force plans to
develop and field capabilities for the Global Hawk that are
intended to equal or exceed the capability of the U-2, as
required by law. Again, I would appreciate an update on this
particular issue.
DOD [Department of Defense] has directed the Air Force to
reduce the number of Predator and Reaper RPA, remotely piloted
aircraft, Combat Air Patrols, CAPs. The previous goal was 65
CAPs. The new goal will be 60 CAPs. This is to allow time for
the Air Force personnel and logistics systems to catch up to
the demand for RPA forces. Again, your views on how this is
going to be accomplished would be actually critical.
Finally, the Air Force wants to make significant reductions
in certain high-demand/low-density forces, such as the AWACS
[Airborn Warning and Control System], JSTARS [Joint
Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System], and Compass Call
fleets before they would be replaced by new systems and
capabilities. We need to understand the risks involved and the
gaps that would be produced in phasing one system out as other
systems come aboard.
Four years ago, Congress created a National Commission on
the Structure of the Air Force to make recommendations on
policy issues that are directly relevant to these force
structure decisions. We look forward to receiving testimony
from the Air Force on the progress being made to implement
those recommendations.
As the Air Force contemplates major force structure
changes, we need to understand what if any effects these
changes may have on the Air Force's ability to play a key role
in implementing defense strategic guidance calling for a shift
to refocus emphasis to the Asia-Pacific region, for one
example. Again, I hope our witnesses today can give us this
advice.
You have, as the chairman has indicated, significant
challenges in maintaining the acquisition programs with the new
strike fighter. It is an expensive program, and again, I think
it will be a focus not only of our questions but of your
efforts over the next several months.
I look forward to your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Welcome, Secretary James.
STATEMENT OF HONORABLE DEBORAH LEE JAMES, SECRETARY OF THE AIR
FORCE
Ms. James. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Reed,
and good morning to all the members of the committee.
We have got a lot to talk about this morning, and General
Welsh and I are very proud to be here to represent the Air
Force.
When we testified before you last year at our posture
hearing, we outlined three priorities. Those are taking care of
people, balancing readiness of today with the needs of
modernization for tomorrow, and making every dollar count. I am
here to tell you that those are the same priorities. They have
not changed.
But what has changed--and both the chairman and the ranking
member have already touched upon this, that what has changed
over the last few years are the threats and the challenges that
are faced by our Nation around the world. Your Air Force is
fully engaged in every region of the world, every mission area
across the full spectrum of military operations. Put simply, we
have never been busier on such a sustained global basis, at
least not in the 35 years that I have been an observer on the
scene.
Now, General Welsh, is going to talk to you more about
these areas, as well as many others under our priorities
representing our budget in just a few minutes. But what I would
like to do is use my precious time here before the committee to
update on two key areas of interest, and both the ranking and
the chairman touched upon these. Those two areas are the B-21
bomber and space launch.
Our nuclear enterprise is our number one mission priority,
and the B-21 will be an essential piece of our Nation's nuclear
backbone and, indeed, ditto for the conventional area as well.
The B-21 will be a vital global precision attack platform that
will give our country a deep, penetrating capability, enabling
us to hold targets at risk anywhere on the globe and provide
the President with flexible options in addressing future
threats. Now that we are beyond the GAO [Government
Accountability Office] protest period, we are moving forward
with execution.
Now, in terms of the B-21 acquisition, cost control is
paramount. We have taken a careful look at lessons learned from
previous acquisition programs. We have looked at those that
have worked well, and we have looked at those that have not
worked well. Experience tells us that there is no one-size-
fits-all when it comes to acquisition contracts and strategies
because you see we have certainly examples of cost-plus
failures, but there also have been cost-plus successes.
Likewise, we have had some successes in fixed-price work, but
there have also been some noteworthy failures in the fixed-
price development world to include the A-12, the Tri-Service
standoff attack missile, the C-5, the future combat system, and
the C-17.
Now, some of these programs were canceled without delivery
of any warfighting capabilities. Some had to sacrifice
capability to stay within funding constraints. Some were
restructured and significant additional funding was added to
complete. Many of them, in addition, resulted in years of
litigation.
To help ensure that we now deliver the best value to the
American taxpayer with the right quantities, the B-21 approach
uses a mix of contract types to support the overall acquisition
strategy, and this mix was specifically chosen to capitalize on
the advantages of the different contract types while limiting
the potential risks for cost growth and/or performance issues.
Although the B-21 design incorporates mature and existing
technology, we will be integrating those technologies on a
never-before-built low-observable bomber. It is these two
factors, the never-before-built bomber and the integration
aspect that introduces risk into this development program,
particularly when we get to integration and test phases.
While some can draw comparisons between the B-21 and the
KC-46, there are actually some very important differences.
Unlike the KC-46, the B-21 is neither a commercial derivative
aircraft, nor is it a commercial derivative design. Unlike the
KC-46, the B-21 has no anticipated commercial or foreign sales
market to offset any unexpected development costs.
Now, after carefully considering these and other factors,
the milestone decision authority determined a cost-plus
incentive contract type was best for the development phase of
the program.
Now, of course, there have also been cost-plus failures.
There is no question about that. F-22, B-2, F-35. They went way
over cost and did not produce the performance on time. We are
mindful about all of these examples, and we are also very
mindful of the potential for cost growth. We believe that we
have taken steps to address this.
First, we had two independent cost estimates completed and
we have funded to the higher estimate.
Second, we have and will continue to ensure the
requirements remain stable. By the way, the chief requirements
control officer is sitting right next to me right now this
morning.
Third, we crafted an incentive structure that will reward
cost and schedule performance during this cost-plus phase of
the contract. We structured the majority of these incentives
toward the back end of the cost-plus phase of the program,
which means that the contractor will be incentivized to get to
production as quickly as possible and as feasible and not drag
it out in the cost-plus phase.
Fourth, we are using those mature technologies I referenced
to meet requirements and avoid developing key subsystems while
also developing the aircraft. By the way, that combination was
one of the things--one thing that went wrong in the B-2
program.
Now, all of these factors make us believe that we have a
good approach and that we will control costs on this program.
Technology maturation and risk reduction was fixed-price. The
first five low-rate initial production options are fixed-price,
and the remainder of the production will be fixed-price. The
majority of this program will be fixed-price, but a portion, of
course, is in the cost plus incentive arena.
Let me now take a few moments just to update the committee
on some elements with respect to space launch since we were
last together in January.
Now, during the January hearing on space launch, I
testified that I too was disappointed that ULA [United Launch
Alliance] had not been on the GPS-3 [Global Positioning System]
competitive launch. I asked my team to go look at options for
what could be done about this because, after all, the ELC is
taxpayer dollars involved. My general counsel performed that
review and coordinated the results with the OSD [Office of the
Secretary of Defense] general counsel.
The general counsel found that while certainly it is
possible to terminate the contract, it is not probably the most
cost-effective approach for the taxpayer. Given that ELC
provides infrastructure, which is essential to the launches
that are specific to the block buy, we would still have to pay
for that service somehow, and we would end up probably paying a
lot more than we are paying today. Breaking that contract and
allocating those costs to each individual launch in the block
buy would likely cost the taxpayer between $700 million and
$800 million more.
Now, that was the finding of my general counsel, together
with the OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] general
counsel. But I want to take one more step. I would like to get
an independent legal review to see if there is some angle there
that we are missing.
Additionally, since the space hearing, the DOD engaged the
Department of the Treasury regarding the status of sanctions as
they pertain to the recent reorganization of Roscosmos and as
the chairman noted the findings there.
Meanwhile, we have continued our plan to transition away
from the RD-180 rocket engine reliance, and in addition to the
first 2 OTA [Other Transaction Authority] contracts that went
to SpaceX and Orbital ATK, on February 29th we awarded two
more. These two were to Aerojet Rocketdyne and to ULA. With
these actions, we will have obligated all of the fiscal year
2015 funding for rocket propulsion system work in a full and
open competitive way per the law.
Finally, we are still concluding and conducting an analysis
on various allocation strategies, should allocation become
necessary in the future. Preliminary analysis suggests that a
transition to a combination of an allocation between the Delta
and the Falcon launch service, on the other hand, would add
anywhere from $1.5 billion to $5 billion in additional cost,
depending on your assumptions and depending on when you would
begin such a transition. The basic rule of thumb here is that
the sooner a full RD-180 ban might start, the more disruptive
it would be to the launch manifest and to the production
timeline and the higher the cost would be.
Now, none of this additional cost, whatever that cost ends
up being, is currently contained within the Air Force program.
As I just said, everything I just said is preliminary in
nature. We are still trying to refine the details.
As I wrap up, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and this
committee for your leadership and support of the Bipartisan
Budget Act. As you noted, it does not provide all of the
resources that we felt we needed, but it is extremely important
because it is much needed stability and predictability.
While we are appreciative of this, we worry about the
return of sequestration in fiscal year 2018 and beyond. You all
remember in 2013, sequestration compelled us to park jets and
delay upgrades and halt training, and that further exacerbated
our readiness situation. If we return to it in fiscal year
2018, we will be even worse off. It will touch our people, our
modernization efforts, and our readiness. All of the programs
that both the ranking and the chairman talked about in the
beginning--all of these relate to money. We agree with these
points. All of these points relate to money, and getting
sequestration lifted permanently would be a fantastic start to
helping the entirety of DOD in this arena.
Thank you very much for your support of our Air Force and
for our airmen, and we look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. James and General Welsh
follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman McCain. General Welsh?
STATEMENT OF GENERAL MARK A. WELSH III, USAF, CHIEF OF STAFF OF
THE AIR FORCE
General Welsh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Reed, and distinguished members of the committee. It is always
a privilege to testify before you and to join Secretary James
in representing America's airmen.
As you heard from the Secretary, our top priorities remain
taking care of people, balancing readiness and modernization,
and making every dollar count. While we keep one eye on those
priorities, we keep the other on our very interesting world.
Along with you, we have been watching China flex its muscles in
the South China Sea. We have watched as they dramatically
increased the level of technical capability in their air force
and expanded the scope and complexity of their operations in
both space and cyberspace.
After wreaking havoc in Georgia, Crimea, and the Ukraine,
we see a resurgent Russia now aggressively supporting the Assad
regime in the skies over Syria and promise to modernize its
legacy nuclear forces.
We noticed Iran's broad overt and covert influence on
unrest in the Middle East and its general malign influence
inside and outside the region.
We watched with interest as North Korea conducted an
illegal nuclear test and subsequent rocket launch, perhaps
signal events for a ballistic missile program yet to come.
We continue to watch ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]
walk a trail of terror that now stretches well beyond Iraq and
Syria.
To confront these challenges and to ensure a fighting force
that is able to overcome them all, our fiscal year 2017 budget
request attempts to balance the size of our force with the
required readiness and necessary modernization of that force.
In terms of people, our fiscal year 2017 budget request
modestly grows the total force and adds airmen in a number of
critical career fields like ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance], cyber, maintenance, and battlefield airmen. We
are asking to increase Active Duty end strength from roughly
311,000 to 317,000 by the end of fiscal year 2017. Given our
current operational tempo, it is imperative that we at least
get to this number this year.
If mission demands require additional growth in 2017,
Secretary James is prepared to use her existing authorities to
grow modestly beyond 317,000 provided we are able to attract
the right talent for the positions we need. That would, of
course, require congressional support of a reprogramming action
to fund the additional manpower.
In the Air Force, total force integration is alive and
well. We continue to shift mission sets from the Active to
Reserve components where appropriate and to integrate
organizations when and where it makes sense. We have three
Active Duty officers today commanding Reserve component wings,
and this summer an Air Force Reserve officer will take over--
will take command--excuse me--of an Active Duty fighter wing
and an Air National Guard officer will take command of an
Active Duty mobility wing. We will also test a fully integrated
air refueling wing beginning in fiscal year 2017.
For fiscal year 2017, we have requested a 1.6 percent pay
raise for both military and civilian airmen and targeted pay
and retention bonuses for a variety of career fields, including
RPA crews. Chairman, thanks to your help and the help of this
committee, RPA and manned pilot incentives are finally at the
same level, but we cannot stop there. This year, we chose to
give our RPA pilots a $25,000 per year retention bonus and not
the full $35,000 you authorized. We did that to make sure that
the bonus for RPA pilots was commensurate with that of other
critically manned pilot categories. We have some that are even
in more crisis than RPAs at this point in time. We will intend
to seek legislation this year to increase all of our aviator
retention pay for manned and unmanned platforms to $35,000 per
year. We will ensure you have all the details you need to
assess that proposal.
Finally, this year's budget expands the Sexual Assault
Prevention and Response program, fully funds child care
facilities, boosts educational benefits, and supports important
infrastructure programs that benefit both airmen and their
families.
Readiness remains both an imperative and a struggle for us.
Less than half of our combat units are fully prepared, as you
heard, for a high-tech fight against a capable and well-
equipped force. This budget funds flying hours to the maximum
executable level, invests fully in the corresponding
sustainment accounts, and ensures our top end combat exercises
like Red Flag and Green Flag remain vibrant.
In consultation with our combatant commanders, we made some
adjustments to address the global threats that I mentioned
previously. We did rephase the A-10 and EC-130 divestitures.
Both fleets are fully funded in fiscal year 2017. Keeping them
beyond that is simply a manpower issue. We do not have enough
people in the Air Force to continue to operate all the
equipment we have today and to stand up a new fleet of F-35's.
With additional manpower and funding to cover the activity, we
could certainly do that, and I would be a very happy Air Chief
if we got that increase. But today we do not have the manpower
to do both.
Our budget request also adds 24 MQ-9 Reapers and increases
our munitions buy to meet operational demands.
Our aircraft inventory is the oldest it has ever been, as
the chairman started off mentioning, and our adversaries are
closing the technology gap. We simply must modernize. This
budget request includes ongoing investments in nuclear
deterrence, space, and cyberspace. We are pressing ahead with
legacy platform replacements, the F-35, KC-46, B-21, Combat
Rescue Helicopter, and the JSTARS. Due to limited trade space,
we had to defer five F-35's from our fiscal year 2017 program,
delayed some upgrades to legacy weapon systems, and will
continue to live with a dramatically reduced infrastructure
improvement program.
To maximize our buying power, we will streamline energy
usage, we will employ airmen's cost-saving ideas by the
hundreds, and we will march toward audit readiness by the end
of this fiscal year.
In closing, I would like to offer my thanks to each one of
you for dedicating your time and your attention to our Military
Services, not just our Air Force, and the remarkable men and
women who give them all life.
We look forward to your questions.
Chairman McCain. Well, thank you very much.
You know, the only problem, General, with your statement
about the A-10 is you have no replacement for it, and it is in
combat and in operation in Iraq and Syria as we speak. You want
to retire it, but you have no plans, according to what has been
submitted to this committee, as to the F-35's that will replace
it. In fact, you have reduced the number of F-35's that we are
requesting. It does not match up, General.
General James. Chairman, the mission capability of the A-10
will not be replaced by the F-35.
Chairman McCain. We have a conflict going on in Iraq and
Syria now, which the A-10 is in combat, most notable when they
destroyed the fuel trucks, and you have nothing to replace it
with.
General James. Sir, we would do the work that the A-10 is
doing today with the F-16 and the F-15E predominantly.
Chairman McCain. Then why are you not doing it now?
General James. We are, sir. They are flying many air
sorties.
Chairman McCain. You know, that again flies in the face of
reality. The A-10's are flying the most effective and least
costly missions in Iraq and Syria.
General James. Chairman, we would love to keep it all. The
fact is that the Budget Control Act----
Chairman McCain. But you have nothing to replace it with,
General. You have nothing to replace it with. Otherwise, you
would be using the F-15's and the F-16's, which you have plenty
of. But you are using the A-10 because it is the most effective
weapon system. This is really unfortunately disingenuous. I
mean, you have the options of using the F-15 and the F-16 right
now. You are not. You are using the A-10.
General James. Sir, we are using them both heavily. We are
using the B-1 heavily.
Chairman McCain. Every Air Force pilot that I know will
tell you the most effective close air support system is the A-
10.
General James. Senator, we have X amount of people and X
amount of dollars.
Chairman McCain. You have X amount of missions, and the A-
10 is carrying out those missions, General.
General James. No, sir.
Chairman McCain. That is amazing.
General James. Senator, those are not the facts.
Chairman McCain. Yes, they are the facts, General.
General James. We can give you the numbers.
Chairman McCain. They are the facts. The facts are on the
ground in the destruction of the enemy by the A-10 aircraft. If
you were not using the A-10, as you said, if you think the F-15
and the F-16 can do the job, then you would be using them
instead of the A-10.
You know, General, I have had a little military experience
myself, including in close air support. For you to sit there
and tell me that we could be using the F-16 and the F-15 when
we are not and your plans are to use the F-35 at 10 times the
cost eventually, it flies in the face of not just my experience
but the experienced pilots that I know, the U.S. Air Force
pilots that I am in constant communication with.
General James. Senator, my last comment. I do not want to
argue this with you.
Chairman McCain. You are arguing. You are arguing facts.
General James. Senator, I will give you the facts of how
many targets have been struck by which kind of platforms in
Iraq and Syria over the last year.
Chairman McCain. Yes, and a significant number of them have
been done by the A-10. Is that true or false?
General James. No. It is true.
Chairman McCain. It is true? Then why would you want to
retire the least expensive, most accurate close air support
system?
General James. I do not want to retire it, Senator. But the
Air Force has to get bigger to do all this.
Chairman McCain. But you have not got a replacement for it,
General. For you to sit here and say that you do absolutely
flies in the face of the facts. Enough said, General. Okay?
General James. Okay, Chairman.
Chairman McCain. You know, it is really embarrassing to
hear you say something like that. When I talk to the people who
are doing the flying, who are doing the combat, who say that
the A-10 is by far the best close air support system we have--
it is embarrassing.
General James. We all talk to them, Chairman. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Secretary James, on the rocket engine,
which you chose to highlight, are you aware that there are
members of--two members at least of Roscosmos who are on our
sanctions list? You are aware of that.
Ms. James. Yes.
Chairman McCain. We have now two sanctioned cronies of
Vladimir Putin who are getting X millions of dollars of
taxpayers' money. Right?
Ms. James. I do not know that to be true or false.
Chairman McCain. Well, they are being paid. Are they being
paid?
Ms. James. I do not know.
Chairman McCain. Is Roscosmos being paid? Do you know that?
Ms. James. I got the decision from the Treasury Department
vis-a-vis the sanctions----
Chairman McCain. Do you know that Roscosmos is the Russian
parent company of the manufacturer of the RD-180? Do you know
that?
Ms. James. I do not have access to who makes that money.
Chairman McCain. It is public knowledge, Secretary James.
It is public knowledge that the company is Roscosmos that is
the company that is selling the--is a parent company of the
manufacturer of the RD-180. You did not know that?
Ms. James. Chairman, I would be happy to get the Treasury
Department to come brief you.
Chairman McCain. I am not asking for the Treasury
Department. I am asking you if you know what is public
knowledge. Do you know that it is public knowledge that
Roscosmos is the parent company of the manufacturer of the RD-
180? Do you know that or not?
Ms. James. I have not studied it in detail, but if you say
so, I believe you.
Chairman McCain. I am asking you if you know it not. This
is really--you know, I have been to a lot of hearings in my
time, but I have not quite seen one like this. I am asking you
a question. Do you know that the Russian parent company of the
manufacturer of the RD-180 is Roscosmos, of which two
sanctioned cronies of Vladimir Putin control it? Do you or do
you not know that?
Ms. James. I accept your word. I know it.
Chairman McCain. Thank you. I am astonished that you did
not know it. I mean, after all, this is a pretty big deal that
we have been talking about, and you chose to bring that up in
this hearing, and you do not know that Roscosmos is the Russian
parent company of the manufacturer of this rocket engine, which
is controlled by two sanctioned cronies of Vladimir Putin. You
did not know that?
Ms. James. I brought up that the Treasury Department did
not put the Roscosmos on the sanctions list, and you brought
that up too, Chairman.
Chairman McCain. That was not my question. My question was
whether you knew that or not.
Ms. James. Prior to you telling me this today, that
individual aspect, no. But I accept your word and I know it
now.
Chairman McCain. I am not asking you to take my word. I am
astonished that you did not know it.
Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
One of the points that you both made and I made in my
statement was the decision by Secretary Carter to lower the
number of combat air patrols for the remotely piloted aircraft
from 60 to 65. My sense is that is a reflection of the stress
on the whole enterprise, the number of pilots, et cetera. This
is an asset that every commander needs more not less, as we
hear every time we go overseas. Two questions follow from that.
One is that in order to aid the enterprise, the training of
the pilots, selection of pilots, who will fly these aircraft so
we can get back up to the CAP levels of 65 or beyond, is there
any legislative initiative that you need going forward, General
Welsh and Secretary James? Do you want to start, General?
General James. Senator, I do not believe there are. We are
in the process now of doubling our production and our training
pipeline between now and the end of fiscal year 2017. That is
biggest and most significant first step. We have never trained
more than 180 a year. We will train 334 this year and 384
beginning next year. That is the beginning of the recovery in
that enterprise and normalizing a battle written for the entire
community. But I think we are on track to get that done.
Senator Reed. Secretary James?
Ms. James. I would concur. Not this year, but as we go
forward, as you heard, we do want to modestly build up our end
strength. There may be things coming down the pike next year.
Senator Reed. General Welsh, we had a lively discussion in
my office about--first, let me commend you on opening up the
senior enlisted ranks to access to operators for Global Hawk,
which you have done, which I think makes sense, and you can tap
into some great expertise. The question, what about the
Predator and Reaper communities? Those are still restricted to
trained pilots and non-commissioned officers. Is there any plan
to go look at the enlisted ranks to fill those slots?
General James. Initially we want to get that community well
first, complete our ``get well'' plan, get it healthy. It was
not a problem moving--availability of officers who are enlisted
to move through the pipeline. The problem was the training
pipeline itself. We need to get that healthy first. We chose
the Global Hawk community to initiate the enlisted RPA operator
program because it is a smaller community. It can be more
controlled initially. We can learn the lessons we need to learn
as we do that, and then we will decide where we go from there.
Senator Reed. Let me switch to another issue that I
mentioned in my opening statement, and that is that we have
some high-demand/low-density aircraft you are well aware of,
JSTARS, AWACS, Compass Call. The plan again, because of
pressure, is to retire these aircraft, and we are sort of in a
similar dilemma as the A-10. We do not have an obvious
replacement. Can you comment on that, General?
General James. The strategy for those aircraft, JSTARS, EC-
130H, Compass Call, et cetera, is to try and modernize within
our top line because we do not think there is more money
coming. To do that, we have to take money out of our top line
some way, and the way we have approached this is to look at
downsizing to certain numbers of aircraft in those fleets to
pay for the recapitalization program and just replace it on the
fly. It means that short-term you have less capability in that
mission area to support the combatant commanders with, but if
we do not do this, long term we will have no capability in that
mission area to support the combatant commanders.
Senator Reed. You are going to use the internal budget
issues to generate more improvements on existing aircraft or
even build new aircraft.
General James. That is our intent, sir. We can do that with
any capability. It is not the ideal way to do it because you
have to give up capability to get future capability. But we
just do not think there is more money coming to support a
development program.
Senator Reed. Secretary James, one of the issues that is
always attendant upon development of a new aircraft is not just
the acquisition costs but the life cycle costs. Have you been
looking at the B-21 in terms of life cycle costs? If you have,
can you give an indication of how you are prepared to minimize
those costs, since we are starting on this process right now
with design and initial sort of production?
Ms. James. I would like to, if I may, come back for the
record or come back in a briefing format to give you some
information on that, Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe?
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, let me just say to the two of you I have been
on this committee for 20 years, and I was on the House Armed
Services Committee before that. I have found that the two of
you are the most accessible of any Secretary and Chief that we
have had in the past. I really do appreciate it. You have come
out when we have called. I remember on very short notice,
General Welsh calling you and asking if you would meet me in
Fort Smith, Arkansas to look at a problem with the 188th wing
there, and you were there. It was a little intimidating for me
because I had to park my little Harmon Rocket next to your C-
20. But, nonetheless, we enjoyed that visit, all on short
notice. I really do appreciate it.
I want to use my time differently than the rest of them
because it is very disturbing to me, when I watch the
presidential debates and I hear people talking, nobody knows
the level of threat that we are facing in this Nation right
now. You know. Both of you know. But the people do not know
that. That is what we should be talking about in terms of the
resources that we have.
When I read the statement that was made by our former
Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel, when he said, quote,
American dominance on the seas, in the skies, and in space can
no longer be taken for granted, you know people back in
Oklahoma, when we say that, maybe it is not believable. But it
is true. I think in your statement that you submitted, you said
in different words the same thing. The era in which the United
States could project military power without challenge has
ended. I agree with that.
The thing that that translates into is the other statement
that you made the deteriorating military strength is an
invitation for conflict. We all remember when we were looking
at the big bomb and the threats that we were facing. Our
feeling was at that time you have to have it, but you never
want to use it. The best way not to use it is to have it. You
have got to have that force.
One of the things that was stated in your message when you
said, quote, your Air Force will support the most urgent
combatant commander request. When I read that, that means to me
that we cannot meet all of the combatant commander requests,
but just the most urgent ones. Do you want to define what an
urgent one is, either one of you?
General James. Senator, the decision on which combatant
commander's request we actually prioritize is actually made
through a joint process. The ultimate decision belongs to the
Secretary of Defense. There is a debate that goes on or a
requirement that is presented from a combatant commander to the
Joint Staff. The services engage in the discussion. The Joint
Chiefs engage, and the Secretary of Defense makes a decision
based on what he sees to be the greatest priority.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, but if we had the resources, would you
not say that you would be meeting--attempting to meet most all
of the requests that they have, not just the urgent ones.
General James. Senator, all the services would like to meet
all----
Senator Inhofe. You were at Hill, I think, were you not,
when you were flying during Desert Storm I think it was,
probably F-16's I would guess.
At that time, was the threat to the United States as great
as it is today?
General James. Sir, I think the greatest existential
threat, the nuclear threat that Russia holds, was the same, but
other than that, no.
Senator Inhofe. Well, James Clapper and every witness we
have had before this committee has said that we are facing the
greatest threats today that we have ever faced. Some of them
say not just in the last 40 years but in the history of this
country. I believe that is true. That is what we need to be
talking about.
You mentioned a minute ago that we are trying to go up from
310,000 to 317,000 Active Air Force. Is that correct?
Ms. James. Yes. The Chief did mention that, Senator, and it
is--actually I think it is 311,000 to 317,000 for the Active.
You will recall about a year or so ago, we also increased our
Guard and Reserve to about 3,000 additional. We are modestly
now upsizing Active, Guard, and Reserve. As the Chief was
saying, we think, given world demands and our reading of the
situation, that there may be cause for even more provided that
we can get the right talent.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. That is really, Madam Secretary, the
point I am trying to make here. At that time, if we had 300,000
or so Guard--or currently Guard, we would be talking about a
total force, including the Reserve component, of around
600,000. I mean, round figures. At the time that you were
flying those F-16's, at that time we actually had 134 combat-
coded fighter squadrons. Today we have 55.
This is the point I am trying to get across because we know
it in this room, but the Americans do not know it, that we have
a greater threat and we have less than half of the capability
in terms of numbers that we had at that time.
Ms. James. We are approximately 200,000 people smaller than
we were at the time of Desert Storm.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, and that is the point I want to make,
and I do not have time for that.
But for the record, I would like to ask you if we had three
top priorities, what would they be if we had the funding levels
to support where we are deficient today. For the record. All
right? Thank you.
Ms. James. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Oh, I meant to mention also I really
appreciate your greatest asset being here too, Betty.
Chairman McCain. Senator King?
Senator King. First, I want to associate myself with the
comments of Senator Inhofe. I think we are facing--all the
testimony that has been in all the hearings, whether for me in
Armed Services or in Intelligence, that we are facing a more
diverse and serious threat environment than we have faced in
any of our adult lives.
I think the important point--and people often talk about
defense budgets and do we need to modernize the nuclear fleet--
is that the most successful foreign policy initiative in terms
of peacekeeping has been our deterrent. The fact that nuclear
weapons have not been used since 1945 is a function of the
reality of the fact that have a deterrent force. It is a
paradox that in order to prevent war, you have to prepare for
war. There is a danger, particularly I am concerned, as is
Senator Kaine, that we have ceded our congressional power over
war-making to the executive. I think that is something that we
really need to discuss and focus upon. But the larger question
is how do we maintain the peace, and the best way to do that
paradoxically is to prepare for war. That is what we are
talking about today.
Let me ask some specific questions about the B-21. Is the
fixed-price part of the contract fixed today? In other words,
is there a price or is that to be set after the design phase?
Madam Secretary?
Ms. James. The price is related to what is called the APUC
[Average Per Unit Cost]. If you think back, Secretary Gates in
the year 2010 set a price point for what we now call the B-21.
The fixed-price is fixed. It is fixed today.
Senator King. It is a dollar amount?
Ms. James. Yes.
Senator King. It is so many millions of dollars per
airplane.
Ms. James. Yes.
Senator King. As I understand it, 70 percent of the
contract, roughly, is in this fixed-price component.
Ms. James. Correct.
Senator King. 30 percent is in the cost-plus component,
which is engineering and design. The fixed-price part is fixed.
Ms. James. We will make that price point--beat it actually,
we hope, vis-a-vis what Secretary Gates set.
Senator King. Could you explain as briefly as possible the
incentive structure in the cost-plus part of the contract that
is designed to mitigate the very real and I think legitimate
concerns the chairman has articulated about cost-plus contracts
generally?
Ms. James. The basic approach involves having very specific
performance milestones, having gates along the way during that
cost-plus phase of the contract. Then there are incentives,
meaning a fee that the contractor will earn, provided that they
hit those milestones and do it correctly.
Senator King. If they do not hit the milestones, if they do
not hit the price milestones, if the cost-plus is too much on
the plus side, they lose incentive fees.
Ms. James. They lose the fee. They lose partly the fee or
they can lose all of the fee under certain circumstances.
Senator King. What we are really talking about here in
contractual terms is risk. They are not willing to bear all the
risk of new R&D, but we are not bearing all of it either
because of the way the fee is structured.
Ms. James. That is right. It is a shared risk situation,
and the bulk of the incentives are geared toward the tail end
of the EMD [Engineering Manufacturing and Development], which
gives the contractor the incentive to go as quickly as possible
and not drag out the cost-plus EMD portion, to get to
production as quickly as is feasible.
Senator King. Well, that gets to my next question. Senator
Inhofe has a very powerful chart that talks about the length of
time it takes to bring a new airplane to flight, and it was
something like 23 years as opposed to a new automobile or a new
commercial plane. Those three things, automobile, commercial
plane, and military plane, used to be the same, roughly, time
frame 30 years ago, and today there is this dramatic
difference.
Are we focused on time as well as price?
Ms. James. We are focused on both, and we project the mid-
2020's would be the IOC [Initial Operating Capability] of this
aircraft.
Senator King. Well, I hope that there are structures in the
contract too that strictly relate to this issue because, you
know, the F-35 time was a real problem. I think Senator
Inhofe's chart was 23 years now is the time to bring a new----
Ms. James. There are, Senator.
Senator King. One final quick point in terms of design.
Because we are designing a structure, a platform, if you will,
that will have a significant life, 20-30 years, I hope that the
design concept includes--``easy'' is not the right word, but
facilitates modularization and modernization without having to
redesign the whole structure. I think that is very important.
Otherwise, it is obsolete the day it takes to the air.
Ms. James. You are right and it does.
Senator King. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Sessions?
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Welsh, with regard to nuclear issues, as Senator
King and Senator Donnelly, our ranking member on the Strategic
Subcommittee, we have been dealing with these issues for many
years. I think we have good bipartisan understanding of these
issues. Deterrence is the key fundamentally to peace. It is
important.
Is it not true, however, that the Russians are aggressively
pursuing nuclear advancement in making a number of--taking a
number of steps to achieve that?
General James. They are, Senator.
Senator Sessions. Tell me about how you feel about it.
Particularly within NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization],
we have a dual aircraft that is capable of nuclear and
conventional weapons. I understand that it is at least a week
before that aircraft could be loaded and deployed to deliver a
nuclear weapon. It seems to me that is the kind of signal that
Russia might misread as not being alert and determined to use
our nuclear capability if we have to. Do you think that is
acceptable, and should we improve that delay time?
General James. Senator, there are various levels of
response time required by the NATO system. It depends on the
qualification level of the crew, the current alert status of
the crew, the NATO threat level that has been set at the time.
Actually I think you can do it faster than a week. But this is
something you have to pay attention to all the time.
Senator Sessions. Well, I just think it is important for
us, do you not, that we start our modernization program, get it
moving to send a message to the entire world that we are not so
shaken by the concept of nuclear weapons that we are not going
to be prepared to defend ourselves if it happened. Do you think
we need to be sure we are moving forward at a steady pace to
maintain the nuclear arsenal, modernize it, make it more safe,
but yet more effective if delivered?
General James. Senator, I think one of the reasons we are
facing this bow wave and recapitalizing the nuclear
infrastructure is because we have not stayed on a steady pace
with our investment in it over time. Now we are going to have
to pay the price and prioritize our investment over the next 10
to 15 years.
Senator Sessions. Well, I think that is the conclusion of
our subcommittee, absolutely. Over the last 20-30 years, we are
the slowest nuclear power in the world to modernize and
recapitalize our nuclear weapons system.
With regard to this RD-180, Russian launch system, that
goes into space, you have said this before, but I would like
you to repeat it. Are you committed to transitioning off the
Russian engine and to an American-made replacement as soon as
feasible? Both of you can answer.
Ms. James. Yes, absolutely.
Senator Sessions. Well, Secretary James, how we do that
could impact significantly cost. Is that right?
Ms. James. Yes.
Senator Sessions. Well, one figure you gave us, Madam
Secretary, was $1.5 billion to $5 billion in cost. What was
that?
Ms. James. We agreed to do an analysis--and that analysis
is still ongoing--of different possibilities of allocation
strategies, one of which involves Delta on the one hand--so
some of the launches going under Delta----
Senator Sessions. That would be the Delta medium that is
more expensive right now?
Ms. James. That would be the Delta--I am looking around. I
think is that the heavy? That would be the Delta heavy. Then
there would be--the other side of the allocation would be the
SpaceX variant. SpaceX would do the launches that it is
certified to do, and the others would be done by the Delta.
That approach would cost additional dollars to the Air
Force budget, to the taxpayer, anywhere on the order of $1.5
billion more to maybe as high as $5 billion more depending on
when you would cut of the RD-180 and start this approach. There
are various assumptions at play here, and we are still doing
the analysis. Those figures are preliminary.
Senator Sessions. Well, it is a bitter pill it is taking as
long as it apparently is taking to replace the engine.
However, I am concerned about cost, and I think that you
have to be concerned. A billion dollars or $5 billion would
impact your ability to do the things you have already been
asked about, would they not, General Welsh? It would have to
come out of your hide.
General James. Senator, that is the problem right now. It
is balancing this.
Senator Sessions. Senator McCain and this committee is
going to give vigorous oversight to that. But I think you
cannot make foolish decisions and incur more cost than is
reasonably necessary in this project. I really care about that.
With regard to the long-range strike bomber, now named the
B-21, we are talking about $550 million a copy I understand.
That is half a billion dollars per plane. Just for a layperson,
that seems like a lot. Are we missing something here in our
entire process of procurement both in terms of how many years
it takes to accomplish this and ending up with a cost this
high? Or is there anyway to achieve the same quality and
capability in a shorter time at less cost?
Ms. James. Well, that figure that you quoted, the $550
million, in fiscal year 2010 dollars is actually the price
point that former Secretary Gates wrote into the acquisition
strategy. Frequently in Defense, we do not pick a price point
and then try to do the development and the procurement around
that price point. The private sector does that all the time.
Defense usually does not. This was a rather unusual program,
and it was all about cost control. I know it is a lot of money,
but it is a lot of capability for a lot of money.
Senator Sessions. Well, thank you. My time has expired.
Thank you very much for your service, both of you, and we will
continue to work on these tough issues.
Ms. James. Thank you.
Senator Reed [presiding]. On behalf of Chairman McCain,
Senator Heinrich.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you very much.
Secretary James, you mentioned at the beginning the focus
on taking care of people. I still have very serious concerns
that we are not adequately taking care of our RPA community,
particularly our RPA pilots. I would certainly ask that the
issue that Chairman McCain mentioned at the very beginning
regarding bonuses be looked at again. You know, General Welsh,
I know when we talked about this last year, the community was
practically at the breaking point. As somebody who represents
the Nation's premier RPA training mission in New Mexico, I am
very pleased at the focus that has been put on this. I think
that you, General Welsh and Secretary James, General Carlisle
as well--we all very much appreciate the focus, but we have to
do more because this is a very, very serious stressor and we
are not seeing the relief that we need yet.
You have heard from some of my colleagues concerns about
this as well. I want to put a little different focus on it in
regards to my question and focus specifically on the training
element of the RPA [Remotely Piloted Aircraft] mission versus
the operational challenges that we face right now.
I want to ask what plans the Air Force has to invest in
additional training facilities and infrastructure specifically
at Holloman Air Force Base or at other locations to handle the
increased workload that we see coming down the pipeline as a
result of trying to fix some of these stresses.
General James. Senator, this year in fiscal year 2017, the
budget request asks for a little over $3 million to finish a
GCS facility at Holloman so we can put the new Block 50
cockpits in there when they arrive, also to house the current
GCS so we get people out of trailers into a little more livable
day-to-day environment.
Next year we asked for more money because one of the things
that has changed in our plan as a result of the ``get well''
plan is that the 6th reconnaissance squadron, which has been
doing the training for the Predator crews, was scheduled to be
divested. We are now going to keep that, transition it to MQ-
9's, build new facilities, equipment, and the infrastructure
required to be able to train students in that squadron now.
That will also be done at Holloman. I believe that is $43
million here in the next couple years.
Senator Heinrich. Fantastic. I think this focus is going to
pay a lot of dividends down the road. I appreciate everything
you are doing on this front.
Secretary James, last year one of the things that I
expressed concern about is the lack of modernization for our
Air Force research laboratories. As you know, these labs play a
critical role in developing and deploying next generation
systems, improving acquisition program outcomes--we have spent
a lot of time talking about that today--and in making sure that
operational technical problems are solved in a reasonable time
period.
I am still highly concerned about this. I look at this
budget and it invests heavily in modernization programs like
the F-35, the B-21, but it seems to be continuing to
shortchange the underlying infrastructure that develops the
technologies that really set us apart from our adversaries in
the world.
What is the Air Force's plan to modernize its research
laboratory infrastructure, specifically focused on things like
MILCON [Military Construction] and increased flexibility for
minor construction projects so that we have that infrastructure
in place to support the kind of capabilities that we all know
we need?
Ms. James. Just a few points, if I may make, Senator. There
are two Air Force-owned lab projects that are in the fiscal
year 2017 budget, $13 million for a facility at Kirtland, which
would be focusing on space vehicle research, and then there is
a $75 million project for Eglin, and that would be focusing on
advanced munitions and technology. Those are the two that are
Air Force-owned labs that are in the budget.
We also have dollars in the budget that will do the MIT-
Lincoln Lab approach. That is a different form of a lab. We are
advancing the ball on that.
But let me come back to your overall point, and that is the
infrastructure spending across the Air Force. This was one of
the reductions that we had to make, one of the tough choices,
along with some of the modernization choices and the other
things that we talked about earlier. Neither one of us--I think
I speak for the Chief too. We are not satisfied with the level
of funding there. We are essentially shortchanging a lot of
different areas and a lot of different facilities, but that is,
again, a budget situation. A BRAC [Base Realignment and
Closure] would certainly help for us to be able to shed excess
infrastructure and that way we could spend the dollars on those
facilities that we really need for the future.
Senator Heinrich. I wanted to raise this for my colleagues
because I think we need to understand that there are some very
difficult tradeoffs being made here. We are certainly not
meeting the needs of basic infrastructure, and it is one of the
things we need to focus on with regard to research and
development and also with regard to things like our ranges,
which just simply do not also get the MILCON investment that
they need to support all of our services, not just the Air
Force.
Thank you all.
Senator Reed. On behalf of Chairman McCain, Senator Cotton,
please.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Earlier this week, I chaired a classified hearing of the
Airland Subcommittee about the B-21. It was a very worthwhile
hearing. One thing I noted in that hearing is no member asked
about the need for the next generation bomber. They understood
the strategic threats we face and the capability it delivers.
Obviously, there are many issues that we cannot entertain here
in this hearing.
But one thing I would like to hear from both of our
witnesses on the question we asked in that classified setting
is why will the B-21 be different. We have ongoing issues with
the F-35. We were supposed to have 620 F-22's. We got 187. We
were supposed to have 80-something B-2's. We got 20. Many of
those decisions go back decades. There is not much we can do
about that now. But what is it about the way the contract for
the B-21 has been structured and about this aircraft that gives
us the confidence, given the vital need for the aircraft, that
we will, at the end of the program, in fact, have 100 aircraft?
General Welsh, if you would like to start.
General James. Senator, for it to be different, we have to
make it different, which is going to require attention from
this minute forward under this program at every level of our
Air Force and the right kind of oversight provided by everyone
from the Congress to the Department of Defense to our folks in
Air Force Materiel Command and our acquisition chain.
The difference to date has been the collaborative effort
with industry before we even sent a request for proposal out to
industry was, at least in our experience, incredibly good. We
identified needs and the cost curve before we wrote the
requirements for the RFP [Request for Proposals]. We set a
requirements baseline for this airplane 4-plus years ago and it
has not changed at all. We have held very firm to that. As a
result, the industry teams who were competing were able to get
way ahead of the game in terms of looking at integration of
sensors onto the platform, final design work, et cetera because
they were not worried about us changing a requirement that
would cause them to reshuffle all that work again at some point
in their development process. I think that is why we saw the
fact that the actual price that they came in within their bids
was lower than what we had put on as a requirement of the
system.
We have to keep that same kind of communication, that same
kind of dialogue going from now forward. We cannot take our eye
off this ball or it will drift like everything else has. We
just cannot let it.
Senator Cotton. Secretary James, do you have anything to
add?
Ms. James. First of all, I certainly concur with everything
that the Chief said.
Back to the actual strategy, we tried to learn from both
successes and failures of the past acquisition strategies. We
are approaching this differently. He mentioned the importance
of having stable requirements, and in order to change a
requirement, it requires the Chief of Staff of the Air Force
himself to sign off on such a thing. There have not been
changes.
We went and we got two independent cost estimates because
the other thing that we learned from the past is having proper
estimates that are realistic is really important. We budgeted
to a higher independent cost estimate to provide enough margin
in the program. Then we structured the contract in a hybrid
fashion, some of which is cost plus incentive for a portion of
the contract, and a lot of it is in the firm fixed-price world.
The period of development, which is cost plus incentive, the
incentives are specifically structured so that the contractor
will be incentivized to meet milestones on time. If they do,
they make their maximum fee. It is also backloaded such that
the contractor is incentivized to get through the cost-plus
portion into production and into the firm fixed-price as soon
as feasible and not drag it out in the cost-plus arena.
Then if I could ask the Chief to just say a few words
because the other part of the question had to do with the need,
the Nation's need for the bomber, and how it will be different,
given the threats that we----
Senator Cotton. My time is running short. As I said, there
was uncommon consensus in the subcommittee hearing about the
need for this next generation bomber.
General Welsh, I want to turn my attention to a more
immediate practical matter. I hear from Arkansans who are
flying missions in the Middle East right now over Iraq and
Syria that our aircraft are in some ways facing a maintenance
crisis, that we have F-15E's that are either not able to take
off or having to return early because of their age and because
of maintenance issues. Could you say a little bit more about
this situation?
General James. Sir, our fleets of airplanes are getting
old. All of them are, except the ones just coming off the line
now. We have now six fleets of airplanes that are older than 50
years old, and we have 23 I believe that are older than 25
years. Supplies are getting tougher to find. Manufacturers are
diminishing. Cost of maintenance is increasing. Our aircraft
availability is going down in virtually every system we have.
It is just a fact of life right now in the Air Force. It is why
we have to modernize. The cost of day-to-day operations in our
Air Force is going up because the fleets are old.
Senator Cotton. Well, you can imagine what it is like to
hear from Arkansans who are either flying these aircraft or
whose children are flying these aircraft. On the one hand, they
see cost overruns on the F-35. They see brand new F-15A's
destined for Saudi Arabia sitting on the flight line at St.
Louis, and then they see what happens to pilots when their
aircraft goes down over territory controlled by the Islamic
State. Are we putting the kind of resources we need to into
this immediate problem of the maintenance and flight readiness
of these aircraft that are being flown every day by America's
sons and daughters over a brutal terrorist army?
General James. Senator, we pay an awful lot of attention to
maintenance of our airplanes before we put people in them to go
fly. I think that is reflected in the actual maintenance rates
and the lack of emergencies over enemy territory for the last
25 years. Our maintenance teams are remarkable. They are
stressed because they are undermanned. We have built up a
35,000 person ISR enterprise over the last 10 years or so while
we cut the Air Force 50,000 people overall, which is an 85,000
person cut to the rest of the 330,000 mission area in the Air
Force. We are thinned out everywhere. That is the manpower
problem. There is no place we can go to grab people because we
are undermanned everywhere. Our people are working their tails
off. They are doing great work. I feel comfortable about the
safety of our crews who are flying these airplanes, but keeping
them safe is getting harder and harder and more and more
expensive.
Senator Cotton. Well, thank you. My time has expired. But I
think it is incumbent upon us as a committee to do everything
we can to make sure that we are getting you the resources and
tools that you need on the front lines, even as we are looking
to the next generation of capabilities as well. Thank you.
Chairman McCain [presiding]. Senator Nelson?
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, welcome.
General Welsh, thank you so much for your long and very
distinguished record.
I just want to raise two questions that, while I am doing a
markup, I am sure the chairman raised. One is the Russian
engine, the RD-180. Madam Secretary and General, is it your
opinion that we would buy the RD-180 as little as possible in
order to protect us against a gap that we would not have
sufficient engines to have access to space?
Ms. James. I certainly want to buy it as little as
possible. You said the magic word, sir, and that is assured
access to space, which is the top job that we all have.
The other element was we were trying to get to a
competitive environment so that two companies could actually
have a reasonable competition and that would be a good thing
for the taxpayer, the industrial base, and so on. We did feel
that a little bit more flexibility in the number of engines
would help get us through that competitive environment to the
transition and to such point that we have a fully capable
rocket, plus an engine manufactured in America that is
integrated and certified. We think that is a little bit more
time and a little bit more flexibility would be helpful.
Senator Nelson. I will just conclude this by saying that we
are concerned about a gap of potentially three or four years
where the only way to get to space is we could not go on the
Falcon 9 because it does not have the lift capability of
getting some of those payloads to orbit and would have to go on
the Delta IV. But there you are talking about a much more
expensive launch than the Atlas V, which could put those
payloads to orbit. Is that correct?
Ms. James. That is correct. Essentially it boils down to
money. If you were to cut off the use of the RD-180's,
depending on assumptions, the manifest would have to be changed
and things would perhaps get delayed to a degree. But this is
where I referenced that our analysis is still ongoing.
Senator Nelson. Okay. I think we all want to get to the
same place, and the bottom line is assured access to space.
Ms. James. Right.
Senator Nelson. Let me go over to the B-21. In this
contract, we have got production at the end, and we have got
development now. Because of the good work by the chairman on
previous contracts, namely the tanker, and his concerns about
the overruns, the chairman is quite concerned about is this a
cost-plus on the development side. But you all, obviously,
having been very sensitized to the fact of overruns in the
past, indeed, as the chairman has pointed out, on the F-35, you
wanted to make this as tight as you could going out on an RFP.
In that development stage, you actually have about five units
that are going to be basically at fixed-price. Is that correct?
Ms. James. The contract that was let some months ago is for
engineering, manufacturing, and development, and then it is
also for the production phase, the LRIP [Low Rate Initial
Production], what is called LRIP, the low rate initial
production phase, and that will deliver to us a certain number
of aircraft, 21, if memory serves me correctly.
Senator Nelson. General, do you want to add anything to
that?
General James. No, Senator. Those aircraft are at a fixed
cost after that, the first five production lines.
Senator Nelson. I must admit in the classified briefings
that we have had and that this Senator has had personally, I,
knowing the sensitivity of the chairman, have hammered on this
over and over with regard to watching the cost. I have been
impressed with the Air Force doing everything that you can
possibly do on a contract of this magnitude to make sure that
you rein in those costs. It is our job to have the oversight
and to make sure that you are doing the job. I want to commend
you for what you have done thus far.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ayotte?
Senator Ayotte. I want to thank the chairman.
I want to thank both of you for your service to the country
and your families as well. Appreciate it.
I would like to ask you, Secretary James, about the Haven
Well situation in Portsmouth that you and I have talked about,
the PFC [Perfluorinated compound] contamination of the
groundwater in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. This is something
that I just have a couple of questions on.
The Air Force submitted a report last September and found
that as of September 15th, there were thousands of
servicemembers, both Active Duty and Guard, as well as
civilians, that may have been exposed to the PFCs there. I just
wanted to get the update on what the plan is to contact those
individuals.
Then as a follow-up on this, the City of Portsmouth also
just submitted recently a proposal to the Air Force on how to
clean up the contamination at Pease. I understand that was
submitted three weeks ago. I would like just to get a sense of
when you expect the Air Force to respond to the City of
Portsmouth. Obviously, I hope you will be transparent and
responsive.
Ms. James. On the second point, Senator, I am going to have
to go back and check with our Assistant Secretary for I&E just
to see where that proposal stands. I have not seen that
proposal myself.
Senator Ayotte. If you can submit just when you expect to
respond for the record, that would be helpful. Thank you.
Ms. James. I will do that.
You are right. You and I have talked about this. Sometimes
as we as a country and as a military, in our efforts to protect
people, sometimes communities get contaminated to a certain
degree. We regret it and we stand by it, and we are prepared to
take the right action and clean it up.
We have notified airmen, including former airmen, of what
has happened so that they are aware of it, and that occurred,
if I recall correctly, by mid-December. That happened some time
ago. We are going to clean the water.
We are also working with the CDC [Centers for Disease
Control] on the matter of developing a plan for health
monitoring. They have the lead, but we are working with them.
Senator Ayotte. Excellent. I would just urge you with
Portsmouth submitting the proposal, that you work very closely
with the city and in a transparent manner so that we can really
get this cleaned up and also get treatment or support for
anyone who has been affected. I appreciate that. Thank you.
General Welsh, I would like to ask you when do you expect
the SDB-2 to achieve a demonstrated full mission capability for
the F-35A.
General James. Senator, I will have to get the date. I do
not know that off the top of my head.
Senator Ayotte. I think we have, in some documents, heard
from your staff that it is not going to be before 2022, but if
you can get me the exact date, I would appreciate it. Thank
you.
Senator Ayotte. I would also like to ask you--I know that
Senator McCain had asked you some questions about the A-10. How
many A-10's will be grounded in fiscal year 2018 due to
unserviceable wings and also how many in 2019?
General James. Senator, our intent would be for none of
them to be grounded for unserviceable wings. A-10's that are in
the fleet we need to keep flying.
Senator Ayotte. Excellent. I am glad to hear that.
As I understand it, there needs to be some work done on the
A-10 wings. Does the Air Force plan to submit a reprogramming
request to ensure that that support is there? Because I
understand there is going to need to be some work done or some
enhanced wing assemblies.
General James. Senator, my understanding of this is that we
have the funding and the wings necessary for fiscal year 2017,
and we have a decision point during this year that we will
reach where we have to make a decision on acquiring them in
2018 and beyond. If that is not accurate, I will get you the
right answer shortly after this hearing.
Senator Ayotte. Well, one thing I understand is that there
are 110 more wings that are needed. Am I hearing you say today
that you are committed to ensuring that these wings are
repaired and that they remain, obviously, operational so that
we can continue to use the A-10 as it is doing, as I understand
Ash Carter, the Secretary, has recently said, a great job in
the fight against ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]?
General James. Senator, they are doing a great job in the
fight against ISIS and everywhere else we use them. Anything
that we have in our inventory that needs modifications to stay
safe and effective, our intent is to continue to do that.
Senator Ayotte. Okay. I appreciate that.
I also want to ask about what is happening in the boneyard
right now with the A-10. As I understand it from information my
office has gotten, in 2014 the Air Force scrapped or destroyed
about 44 A-10's, and even beyond that, as I understand it, in
2015 as well, there were a number of A-10's scrapped, to a
total of 82 A-10's scrapped in the boneyard. The cost to
destroy one of these A-10's is, as I understand it, $15,500 per
A-10. One thing I am concerned about, as we have the A-10's out
fighting the battle against ISIS, we have the Air Force
spending about $1.3 million in the last 2 and a half years
destroying A-10's. Are there no parts on those aircraft that
were destroyed that could have been used to support the A-10's
that are being deployed now? Is that not why we keep--one of
the reasons we keep them in the boneyard?
General James. Senator, the word ``destroy''--I have to
define that. I do not know what that means. I do not know if
that means they disassembled them and took parts of the
airplane to use as spare parts, which would be normal. I do not
know the facts on this case, Senator. I will find out for you.
Senator Ayotte. Well, I hope you would because, as I
understand it, we have been told that there are plans to
destroy a total of 79 A-10's this and next fiscal year. What I
would like to understand is if we are destroying these A-10's,
is this being done prematurely, number one, given obviously the
concerns we have about the close air support capacity and also
the concerns that we ensure that we are getting the right parts
to keep our flying A-10 fleet in really full maintenance
operational capacity? Can we make sure that we get an answer to
that?
General James. Yes, ma'am. We will get you an answer for
that. There is certainly no intent to not have flying airplanes
fully serviced with spare parts. I doubt very seriously if
anything is going on that is causing that to happen. But I will
get you the facts. I just do not know.
Senator Ayotte. Well, I appreciate it. I appreciate the
follow-up on both the wing issue, which is critical to make
sure that our A-10's keep flying and also on the boneyard
issue. Thank you, General.
Chairman McCain [presiding]. Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thanks to both of you, Secretary James, General Welsh. It
is always good to have you here.
I want to ask about two things: budget and Air Force sort
of strategic thinking about unmanned platforms. On the budget
first.
In your testimony, you talked a bit and offered I think
appropriate thanks to our chair and ranking member on the two
year budget deal that we struck in October and the
appropriations bill that we followed up with in December.
We have now done two two year budgets in a row. Painful
getting to both of them. But to me the two year budget deals
sort of have three strong pluses.
One, two years gives you more certainty than one year. I
think certainty is good.
Second, in the two year budget deals, we have treated the
BCA caps as a discipline but not as straitjacket. It is sort of
a starting point, but in each of the two year budget deals,
Murray-Ryan in December 2013 and then the deal in October, we
used the caps as a starting point, but we adjusted off them to
take account of current realities.
The third positive about this deal in my view was that it
expressed a preference for base funding over OCO [Overseas
Contingency Operations] funding, and it was something I think
everybody on this committee wanted to get to. There is a role
for OCO, but we should not use OCO generally just as a way to
end run the caps. We should try to, again, provide more
predictability by putting funds in the base when we can.
There is a little bit of discussion going on up here now. I
am on the Budget Committee too. More of it is on the House side
than the Senate side about whether we should undo the second
year of the two year budget deal and just revisit it and maybe
do something different. I strongly opposed that on the theory
that two year budget deals are providing certainty and why
would we want to now kind of throw that up in the air and
inject more uncertainty in the situation.
Would you agree that a two year deal provides a certainty
that is helpful to you and, if at all possible, we should kind
of try to stick with it?
Ms. James. I certainly agree that having certainty is an
excellent thing and the two year budget deal does give us that
certainty. Not so much from my military work but from my
professional staff member work when I was on the House Armed
Services Committee, I would tend to agree. If you do that to
the deal, if you open the deal, it might open up a hornets'
nest. But again, I say that from my past experience.
As you heard both General Welsh and I note, and many of the
members have noted, there are all these programs that people
are concerned about. We are concerned about them too. We
certainly could use more money. But I as an American citizen
would not want to see the deal reopened and then everything go
poorly as a result and lurch toward a government shutdown and
things of that nature. Stability is pretty key.
Senator Kaine. General Welsh, additional comments?
General James. Senator, all the concerns about the makeup
of the budget plan we share, but stability is a wonderful thing
actually, especially in the environment within the last few
years.
Senator Kaine. It seems to me maybe we have kind of
blundered into--I am not sure we have gotten there completely
intentionally, but we have blundered into a positive where you
do a two year budget deal, then a 1-year appropriations deal.
The two year budget provides some general certainty, and when
you get the first year appropriations bill done, that gives you
some predictability, but it also gives you the ability in year
two to alter the appropriations line items to take account of
some reality. You get some in-the-ballpark certainty with the
ability to kind of true things up in the second year. It is my
hope that we stick with the two year deal and do not do another
one.
I want to ask you about unmanned platforms and really
bigger picture kind of strategically how you approach it. I was
reading last month a series of articles about the CBARS of the
Navy. It is carrier-based aerial refueling system tanker that
they are working on that I think the committee has supported.
It kind of made me wonder within the Air Force how doctrinally
do you approach the analysis of platforms to determine this
could be profitable to go, an unmanned direction. These would
be platforms we would never want to go unmanned. All my
military LAs [Legislative Liasons] have always been people who
have flown things, and so I am all into pilots. But I am just
kind of curious about how you approach this question for your
future investment about what can be done unmanned and what
necessarily needs an onboard crew.
General James. Senator, I think we start with where does
having an unmanned platform in some way, shape, or form make
the mission either more cost-effective or more successful. An
example initially was ISR [Intelligence Surveillance
Reconnaissance]. You can actually orbit over a point in space--
you can monitor a target for hours and hours and hours beyond
what the human body can tolerate. But we have less than 10
percent of our aircraft fleet is unmanned at this point in
time. That will likely grow over time. When it becomes safe
enough to fly unmanned systems that move freight over time and
distance in a predictable way with the autonomy to manage
routes, et cetera, I think you will see it grow there.
We have to be careful about cost curves that look a lot
like airplane cost curves that we have discussed earlier for
unmanned systems. That will not work. We cannot keep going
bigger and more cosmic. We have to go smaller in some cases and
look at augmenting manned platforms. You know, swarms is a
great concept. If it can be managed from an airborne platform
or remotely by a human in the loop, they would become
incredibly effective very, very quickly.
We are looking for those ideas where it is practical, it is
affordable, and we can build a program we can execute in the
near to mid-term before we start to change a mission area to
remotely piloted with vehicles.
Senator Kaine. You mentioned the swarm concept. We have not
spent too much time talking about that here, but I gather that
that is a very important component of this thinking about sort
of the third offset. If that is going to be a big strategic
direction going forward, that would necessarily involve the
innovation around the creation of new unmanned platforms.
General James. Yes, sir. Man-machine interface coupled with
autonomy, coupled with thinking systems is exactly what the
third-rail strategy is all about. We have been working on this
for the last couple years.
Senator Kaine. How much of that work--oh, I am already
over. I am sorry, Mr. Chair. I will stop there and follow up
later.
Chairman McCain. Senator Rounds?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to go back just a little bit. I also attended
the classified briefing on the B-21. I was curious about when
we talk about this hybrid contracting strategy of the cost plus
incentive and then the fixed-price, have you ever used it
before. Clearly there was a logic and you understood the need
to look at keeping our costs under control and working it
through. You have touched about it here with Senator King a
little bit and so forth. But is there anything else with regard
to the approach that was determined that we really have not
delved into today that you think should be said?
Ms. James. I think we have covered it fairly well today,
Senator. The key components are thinking how we look to the
programs of the past, both those that had done poorly and those
that had done well. Given the specifics of this program, some
of which involves mature technologies, that suggests less risk,
but when you are talking about a never-before-developed
platform and then the very important integration, that suggests
that there is risk. As I mentioned for that development phase,
we did think cost plus incentive was the way to go but
carefully constructing those incentives to get the types of
behaviors from the contractor that we seek.
The Chief is in charge of requirements. The stable
requirements is very important. We think we have budgeted well
for this. We took the independent cost estimate and we budgeted
to that level, which is higher. That gives us a margin of
protection, and we are looking to move into the production
phase, which is firm fixed-price, as quickly as is feasible.
The incentives are structured to make that happen.
Echoing what the Chief said, it ultimately will come down
to persistent focus and the human beings who will be overseeing
this to keep it on track. Certainly we--and there is another
team of people as well. We are very committed to doing that.
Senator Rounds. With regard to your readiness goals, the
priorities and the responses that you have to demands that are
there right now, how would you assess the high-end combat
skills such as those that would be employed against a near peer
competitor? I know we are talking a little bit about the A-10
and so forth, and I know that in its current environment there,
it has a high survivability rate. If you are talking about near
peer competition, there may be some real challenges with the A-
10, but that would not just be the A-10. It would be other
areas as well.
What would you believe to be the biggest obstacles in the
Air Force's readiness recovery?
General James. To answer your first question, sir, how do I
see us against a very tech savvy, well-equipped foe, we are
rusty. That is not what we have been doing for the last 25
years. We have been operating in a different environment.
I think the key being ready for the full spectrum of
operations that we could potentially face is consistent and
persistent investment over time in the mission critical
infrastructure that allows you to train to that level. We have
heard discussion from Senator Heinrich, for example, about
training ranges, black and white world test infrastructure,
simulation infrastructure so that you can actually simulate a
threat that our fifth generation capabilities will be operate
against. Building that in the real world in a training range is
cost-prohibitive. We have to get into the simulation business
and go to virtual constructive and then add live training into
it.
All those things have to happen to develop a force over
time, and that is the long-range readiness issue that we have
to invest in now to recover. That will take us 8 to 10 years
once we have a chance to reset the force from what we are doing
today, which is not going to happen soon.
Senator Rounds. I have got just about a minute left, but I
am really curious. You talk long-term. What about the near-term
and mid-term readiness rebuilding efforts? Can you rank
basically how this is fitting in with the need to modernize
specifically the purchases of the F-35, the KC-46, the B-21,
the cybersecurity needs that we need to address, the
capabilities, the ISR priorities? How does that fit in terms of
the rebuilding efforts right now for modernization that we are
challenged with as you talk about? How does it fit in?
General James. Senator, for us it has to fit in at the top
of the priority list. The prioritization right now in our
budget, as we make decisions, wherever we can, we prioritize at
this point manpower, size of the force. We cannot get any
smaller. We just cannot do what we are trying to do right now
plus anything new if we get any smaller.
The second thing is readiness because when the Nation
calls, we have to be able to answer.
Then the third thing is modernization. This year, what you
are seeing in our budget is we have cut the force for 25 years
straight, and now we cannot cut it anymore and still do our
job. We cut readiness for about 10 years to pay for
modernization, and about five years ago, we decided we cannot
do that anymore. We are not going to be ready enough as a force
to do the job if we are called.
Now the only place we have left to go for money to balance
things out is modernization. That is what the budget reflects.
That is why you are seeing the F-35 slid to the right, even
though we have been trying to protect it. You are seeing other
programs that make F-16's and F-15's viable in 10 years against
the threat we expect then are being delayed because we just do
not have the money to do it. It is a balancing act, Senator.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Donnelly?
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary James, I want to start by thanking you for the
time you spent with me at Grissom Air Base in Indiana last
year. It sent an important message to the men and women of
434th and the communities that support them about the
importance of their mission.
Madam Secretary, when do you anticipate we will see another
KC-46 basing opportunity for a Reserve-led unit? Either one can
answer.
Ms. James. Yes. Chief, if you have that date or do you have
it written down?
The next time a basing decision for a Reserve unit. Is that
what you said, sir, for the KC-46?
Senator Donnelly. That is correct.
General James. I think the next update will be actually
late winter this year, late this year, early next year, and
then that will be the decision that has already been announced
for MOBE-4. The primary base has already been identified and
the alternates have been identified. That environmental study
has now started and it will be done the end of this year.
The next one, I believe, starts--the next study--we are
going to start looking at it in late fiscal year 2017--or
excuse me--calendar year 2017 for the next selection of the
next KC-46 base.
Ms. James. Would that be for the Reserve----
General James. I do not remember which is the next----
Ms. James. We are going to get back to you on this so that
we get you a good time frame.
Senator Donnelly. In the last basing decision, the Air
Force emphasized the importance of Reserve-led associate units,
which aligns with the recommendation of the Air Force
Commission report that recommended expanding the number of
associate units. Do you anticipate that the Air Force will be
creating more Reserve-led associate wings in the future?
Ms. James. I am very interested in associate wing
structures, and so we cannot say for sure, but we are pushing,
pushing, pushing for additional integration at all times. I
think it certainly is a possibility and we will just have to
continue to review as we go forward.
General James. Senator, we mentioned the integrated wing
that we will start testing this year. That integrated wing is
actually a Reserve wing, and it will be led by a Reserve
commander with Active Duty fully embedded inside the wing.
Senator Donnelly. Secretary James, when we talk about the
growing threats to U.S. air superiority, many people assume we
are talking about a distant prospect of direct conflict with
countries like Russia and China. But while that is a reality,
we also need to be prepared for a more immediate concern, which
is the spread of advanced Russian and Chinese weapon systems
into the wars we are already fighting. We are seeing advanced
air defenses spread to countries throughout the Middle East and
Africa, including Syria where our pilots are already flying.
General Welsh, understanding we are in an unclassified
setting, how concerned are you for our airmen and women if they
have to face systems like Russia's S-400 in the near future?
General James. Senator, I am very concerned about it. That
is why I keep insisting that we have to modernize. An air force
that does not stay ahead of the technology curve will fail. 53
countries today are flying Russian fighters around the world.
They will export their new capabilities as they field them, and
their new capabilities will be better than our old stuff.
Senator Donnelly. General, are you willing to provide us,
you know, as time provides, a classified briefing regarding the
threats our airmen are facing even not so much with Russia and
China but where their equipment is being utilized?
General James. Sir, I would be honored to do that.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you very much.
Secretary James, is the Air Force committed to commonality
as a means to modernize and maintain the triad in a way to work
together to not only be more efficient but also help on the
budget end as well?
Ms. James. We are definitely actively exploring different
elements of commonality with the Navy as we together are
looking to modernize the three legs of the triad. Yes, we are
looking at that very closely.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Sullivan?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, General Welsh, thank you for your
testimony.
I want to begin by just thanking you and the airmen you
lead for what you do. You know, your testimony highlights a lot
of things that I do not think most Americans are aware of like
constant combat operations for a quarter century. It is
remarkable. The broader number of areas in which you
specialize, fighters, close air support, ISR, strategic
airlift, two-thirds of the nuclear triad, GPS [Global
Positioning Systems] systems.
You know, my State sees a lot of this on a daily basis. As
you know, the F-22 fighter squadron just recently deployed to
Korea and Japan as a show of force for our allies there. We are
intercepting Russian bombers again almost on a weekly basis.
You know, in Alaska, we have become the combat air power in the
Asia-Pacific, if not for the country, in terms of F-16's, F-
22's, C-17's, KC-135's, AWACS, HH-60's, the C-130's, F-35's
come in JPARC [Joint Pacific Alaskan Range Complex] . I just
appreciate and see a lot in terms of the airmen that you are
leading.
Let me ask a basic question. Actually two. How is morale?
When you are here testifying talking about cutting forces,
cutting readiness, that has got to impact morale.
Then a broader, more strategic question, you are here
talking about a budget that is cutting our ability to do what
the Air Force does best, the smallest Air Force in our history.
Why do you believe the President or Secretary of Defense is
putting forward such a small budget? Why do we not begin with
morale?
General James. Morale actually, if you visit as many airmen
as I am privileged to visit and Chief Cody is privileged to
visit and Secretary James is privileged to visit, you walk away
with the perception that morale is pretty darned good. They are
a little tired.
Senator Sullivan. Great.
General James. They have questions. They are concerned
about the future because they actually are very connected to
what goes on in this city and all these issues we have been
talking about.
Senator Sullivan. Right.
General James. They pay attention. Even our very young
airmen do. All the services are this way now. They are worried
about their future, the future of their mission set, what is
happening to their airplane, their squadron, their family
services. All those things are of interest to them. They sense
this pressure on resources, which is going to affect those over
time. But when it comes to how proud they are of who they are,
of what they represent, of the people they stand beside, and of
how well they do their job, morale is not an issue.
Senator Sullivan. That is good to hear.
How about on the budget?
General James. I think the budget is--well, you will have
to talk to the President and the Secretary of Defense to get
why they are submitting the budgets they are, sir.
But I will tell you this, the folks in the Air Force just
see what we are asked to do and they want to do it better than
anybody else on the planet can do it. When they do not feel
they have the right tools to get that done or there are too
many things to do for the number of people they have standing
around, they get frustrated by that.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask on the F-35's. You know,
Lieutenant General Bogdan has highlighted that you are
beginning to reduce the unit price of the F-35A to well below
$100 million, but your budget proposes to decrease procurement
to 43 from 48. Does this risk undermining or reversing the
reduction of unit costs in terms of what you have been able to
do to drive down costs?
Ms. James. I was going to say we do not believe so, not for
the short run. The reason for that, because when you decrease
the buy, ordinarily the unit cost does go up, but what the
dynamic is over the next several years is that because of the
FMS [Foreign Military Sales] buys being higher, we believe that
the unit cost will be stable, reasonably stable, and not go up
dramatically because of this. As you said, General Bogdan is
very focused on cost control and continuing to do better and
better.
Senator Sullivan. Do you believe that the reduction in
procurement--is that going to impact the arrival of F-35's that
are scheduled in places like Eielson or other bases around the
country?
General James. Senator, over the next 15 years--if we
stayed at the lower production rate, over the next 15 years, it
would mean two fewer squadrons to field between now and 2030.
It is going to affect someplace.
In the near term, it will not have a dramatic effect
because we will be standing units up. But by 10 to 15 years
from now, you will start to see a delay in beddown of units.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask one final question. I want to
follow up on what Senator King had talked about on the
procurement timeline and how the procurement timeline for major
weapon systems has increased dramatically over the years. In
the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] last year, the
chairman and others on this committee were very focused on
giving you more authority over procurement.
What do you believe is the most important thing we can do,
either the services or the Congress or both, to help bring down
the procurement timeline of major weapon systems that we have
seen grow over the years that I do not think anyone is
satisfied with?
Ms. James. Well, first of all, the changes of last year I
think are very positive. To the extent now that the Air Force
and the Navy and the Army will be able to be the MDA [Milestone
Decision Authority], the decision authority for milestones,
going forward on some of the newer programs, I think that will
help as we go forward.
My advice to you would be to continue--and we do the same
thing with our regulations--continue to look to streamline,
wherever possible. Sometimes we have the approach of lots and
lots of oversight. We do this. You do this. Although that is I
think a good idea on troubled programs--we have to do that when
things have gone amiss--sometimes you need to ease up a little
bit on the vast majority of programs that are actually going
quite well. Because we have a set of rules that tends to apply
to most programs at a certain dollar level, even the programs
that are executing well, nonetheless, have the weight of what I
will call a lot of oversight. I would say continue to look
streamline, and we should do the same thing on our end.
Senator Sullivan. General, any thoughts?
General James. Senator, I believe that really reform
acquisition--you should start will smaller programs and look at
them in a very concentrated way. Ninety-five percent of the
acquisition programs in the Air Force are cost and schedule.
They do not get the same attention the big programs do, but
they are going tremendously well, and they normally do.
If you identified some category of those smaller programs
and went to the program managers and their industry partners
and said, what can you do to take 50 percent of time and 25
percent of cost out of your small program and then gave them
leeway to do that and looked at the results, we may be able to
learn which things are not adding value to the process and then
bring those up into the bigger programs.
When we start with the big programs, nobody really wants to
give up oversight control, and it is harder to make change that
way. But we have got a lot of programs that work really well.
Let us make them work much, much better and then learn the
lessons from that to change the enterprise.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Blumenthal?
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to continue the line of questioning that
Senator Sullivan began on the F-35. The delay in procurement of
five F-35's was accompanied also by the pushback, the delay in
60 aircraft per year as a procurement plan. You are saying
today that will not increase the per-unit cost because there
will be FMS, foreign military sales? By what countries? What
increase in per-country sales by what countries and when?
Ms. James. I will have to get you that detail.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, how can you testify, with all due
respect, that you are confident that the per-unit will not rise
when you cannot tell us what countries will be buying more of
the aircraft?
Ms. James. General Bogdan, the program manager, has
informed us that because of FMS buys, he does not project that
the unit cost will go up in a substantial or material way. That
is his assessment.
I will get you the list of FMS customers.
Senator Blumenthal. Do you have information as to any
countries that will be buying more?
General James. Senator, I know countries' air chiefs who
have talked to me about their countries' desire to buy into the
program. They have not fully committed to the program yet, and
I do know there are air chiefs who would like to buy more in
the near to mid-term. With your permission, rather than talking
about them publicly, I would be glad to give you--tell which
ones those are after the hearing.
Senator Blumenthal. I think this is an important point
because we know what happens when sales decline. Ordinarily, as
Secretary James has observed quite rightly, the per-unit cost
rises, and the viability of this program really depends on it
being affordable and the credibility of the companies and the
entire Air Force budget depends on this kind of information. I
certainly would appreciate that information, and I know--I
agree with you--that there are countries that would like to buy
more, but we also have seen that other countries are as hard-
strapped as we are, in fact, even more so because their
economies may be less robust than ours. That kind of
information is really important.
How important do you think that the F-35 program is to the
Air Force modernization plans, General?
General James. Sir, the F-35 program at this point in time
is essential to our modernization program. Capabilities are
going to be fielded by both China and Russia in the next five
to six years, if not a couple years sooner, that will make
airplanes that we have in the fleet today, except for the F-22,
not competitive. We have to have some level of ability to
compete with those threats in the future.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, I agree with you completely,
which is why I am so concerned about the affordability of the
program and the trust and confidence of the American people
that it can be done within the limits of what our spending can
be.
Let me turn to the----
Chairman McCain. Before you leave that issue, it is well
known that the new Canadian Government is reconsidering their
commitment to buy the F-35. That is amazing. I do not know
where the witnesses have been residing, missing out on these
international decisions that are clearly under review by many
nations because of the cost of the F-35.
Please proceed.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me turn to the National Guard and Reserve units. I
know, Madam Secretary, you had responsibility as an Assistant
Secretary for our Reserve program. I am concerned that the
Active Air Force is receiving C-130J aircraft. Our National
Guard and Air Force Reserve will still be flying the C-130H.
Perhaps, General Welsh, you could tell us a little bit about
your strategy for outfitting the Air National Guard and Air
Force Reserve with the most suitable modern aircraft.
General James. Thanks, Senator. I think it is important to
remember how we ended up where we are. When we built the C-
130H's, the newest C-130, we put it into the Guard and Reserve,
and the Active kept the C-130E model. The newest fleets were in
the Guard and Reserve. Then the C-130J came along and it was
time to recapitalize the oldest C-130's which were in the
Active force. That is why the C-103J went there first.
The C-130J buy ends at the end of this FYDP [Future Years
Defense Program] essentially as we finish populating our Air
Force Special Operations Command C-130J fleet. We believe that
we need more C-130J's in the total force. We right now are
building and have almost finalized the modernization plan for
the entire fleet. We are doing this in conjunction with the
Guard, the Reserve, and the Active Duty. It is led by Air
Mobility Command. Every State TAG [The Adjutant General] is
going to be part of this review process and final affirmation
of the plan. We will do the AMP [Avionics Modernization
Program] increment 1 and 2 to do the near-term and the far-term
navigation update, and then modernization of those C-130H
models. As part of that plan, we will identify units at the
back end of that modernization for increment 2 as ones that
would probably be the best choice if we can generate funding
for C-130J between now and that point in time in 2028 to start
populating those squadrons with C-130J's wherever we can get
the money to do it.
We need to modernize our 130 fleet. All these units are
fantastic units and contributing routinely to the joint fight
around the world.
Senator Blumenthal. I agree totally. They are fantastic
units. They are contributing greatly, and they need a
modernized fleet. Thank you for making that point.
My time has expired, but if you have additional details, I
would welcome them in written form. Thank you very much,
General. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Chairman McCain. Senator Graham?
Senator Graham. Thank you, General. Thank you very much for
your service. Secretary James, thank you for coming.
Your favorite topic, the A-10. If you had all the money
within reason in the world, would you keep the A-10 or would
you want to retire it?
General James. I would keep the A-10 and build a new low-
threat CAS platform. I would replace the A-10 with it when it
was fielding, and I would use the other money to build manpower
to stand up the F-35 in the Air Force. We need the capability.
We are stressed. We have been for 25 years. We are downsizing.
That is what I would do, and I think it is a logical plan. We
just do not have the money to do it.
Senator Graham. I think that is the point. We are having
all these fights about the A-10. But it is a budget-driven
problem.
General James. Sir, this is not about the A-10 at all. It
is about having to make decisions. I find myself in an almost
surreal position arguing to divest things I do not want to
divest, to pay a bill we were handed in law, and we are not
being allowed to pay it by the institution that passed the law.
Senator Graham. What do you think is the biggest
consequence of sequestration to the Air Force thus far?
General James. My opinion. I will let the boss jump on
here, sir.
But, Senator, my opinion is it is not really the mechanism
of sequestration. That was a shock in 2013. It is more the
Budget Control Act caps and how they have reset the sense of
what is good in a budget. We are still $12 billion below what
we had planned even four years ago for our budgets. All the
force structure that we had in place in the Air Force at that
time that we have had trouble divesting was based on a top line
that was $12 billion to $20 billion per year more than what we
are going to have going forward. We have to make some very
difficult decisions to live within that top line.
Senator Graham. If we go back to sequestration, what awaits
us from an Air Force point of view?
General James. Exactly what we saw in 2013, sir, decreased
training, decreasing readiness, much more frustration on the
part of our people. When they looked out windows at airplanes
they could not fly, we had a problem with moral then. If we do
that again, we will have a much bigger one than we did last
time.
Senator Graham. Is it affecting families?
General James. I think it affects families' concern more
than it directly affects families, to be fair. We have done a
pretty good job of protecting family programs. But the tension
associated with it, the concern about the future of their
platform, their unit, their tasking affects everybody.
Senator Graham. In your time in the military, have you ever
seen more threats to the Homeland than you do today?
General James. No, sir, not threats to the Homeland.
Senator Graham. Secretary James, anything you want to add
right quick?
Ms. James. I would just add that every program that has
been discussed here today is a good program, and it all comes
down to money. Somehow if you have got to balance your books,
as we have to submit a budget each year, you have to make
choices about what you are going to invest in and what you are
going to cut. None of the cuts are easy cuts. They all hurt
some element of the force. Every single program pretty much
that has been discussed here today falls into that category.
As the Chief said, we always ask at every juncture Congress
to work with us. I know this committee has been leaders in this
regard, but to convince everybody else that we have to lift
sequestration permanently because, of course, it will come back
to us in fiscal year 2018 if action does not occur.
Senator Graham. The Russian rocket problem is not a
sequestration problem. Is it?
Ms. James. That is one and the contract strategy for the B-
21 is one that we discussed here today. But most of the other
issues I think have related to money.
Senator Graham. Why do you think we have such fights with
the Air Force in this committee? They seem to happen a lot.
Ms. James. Well, these are lively discussions from our
oversight committee and the people who are executing on the
programs.
Senator Graham. Does it make sense to you what we are
trying to say about the Russian rockets--the committee?
Ms. James. It certainly makes sense and I agree and I too
want to get off the reliance of the RD-180 as quickly as
possible.
General James. Senator, can I make one comment?
Senator Graham. Sure, absolutely. But tell me how does this
movie end with the Russian rocket debate. But go ahead. I am
sorry.
General James. Well, let me slip back to the fight comment
you made. I think the discussions we have, whether it is my
discussion earlier with the chairman or it is any other
discussions we have with members of the committee, come from
the same passion for providing national security for this
country.
Senator Graham. It just seems that we fight more with the
Air Force than anybody, and I am in the Air Force--or used to
be, anyway. Still am in my own mind. Just take that back. I
mean, we got four branches of the service. We seem to tangle
with you all more than anybody, and it is not that we do not
respect the Air Force. I certainly do. It was one of the
highlights of my life to have been a part of it.
But you promise us, Secretary James, that this rocket
engine thing is going to end well, that Senator McCain will be
pleased one day soon?
[Laughter.]
Ms. James. I promise you we are working very hard on the
problem. We are getting all of the analysis done, and I am sure
at the end of the day, you know, we will get your guidance,
your law that will pass. The new NDAA will settle it going
forward.
Senator Graham. Well, that will be a good day.
Thank you both. Thank you, General Welsh. You have provided
really good leadership at a tough time for the Air Force. I
sincerely mean that.
To all those who fly, flight, our job is to let you win.
Thanks much.
Chairman McCain. Well, to illustrate the point, I received
a letter today after several months from Secretary James saying
that concerning the Russian rocket, quote, assuming a Delta-
Falcon phase two split buy, the pre-decisional Air Force
estimate projects a cost in excess of $1.5 billion. This
morning you said not $1.5 billion. You said $5 billion.
Ms. James. I said somewhere between $1.5 billion and $5
billion, depending on the assumptions and when RD-180 access
would stop.
Chairman McCain. Actually I quote. Assuming a Delta-Falcon
phase 2 split buy, the pre-decisional Air Force estimate
projects a cost increase in excess of $1.5 billion. It does not
mention $5 billion in this letter, Secretary James. I can read
English.
Ms. James. That figure of $1.5 billion assumes the block
buy continues, that we still have RD-180's for the block buy.
If there were a decision by Congress to break the block buy, to
stop access to those RD-180's, that could create even larger
costs. The $5 billion comes from the Mitchell study of about a
year and a half ago.
Chairman McCain. But you do not mention any of that in this
letter.
Ms. James. I am mentioning it today. It depends on
assumptions.
Chairman McCain. I am to disregard really the letter you
sent to me that I have been waiting several months for. Maybe
that helps explain some of the difficulties that we have.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:34 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2017 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 10, 2016
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND, AND U.S. SOUTHERN
COMMAND PROGRAMS AND BUDGET
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m. in
Room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John
McCain (chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Wicker,
Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Graham, Reed,
Nelson, Manchin, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono,
King, and Heinrich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman McCain. Good morning. The committee meets today to
receive testimony on the posture of U.S. Northern Command,
Southern Command, and Strategic Command to inform its review of
the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2017.
I'd like to extend our appreciation to the witnesses for
their many years of distinguished service, and to the men and
women of our military who defend our Nation every day.
Admiral Tidd, this is your first time testifying before the
committee as the Commander of U.S. Southern Command [SOUTHCOM].
After nearly 2 months in command, I look forward to your
assessment of the challenges within your area of
responsibility, as well as your strategy to confront them. It's
clear you face a daunting array of security and governance
challenges in the region, yet SOUTHCOM continues to suffer from
persistent resource shortfalls that undermine efforts to
confront these challenges. I hope you will outline for the
committee where you are being forced to accept the greatest
risk as a result of these shortfalls. Of particular concern is
the deteriorating situation in Central America, where feeble
governance, endemic corruption, and weak security institutions
are allowing transnational criminal organizations to operate
with impunity. We, of course, must improve and adequately
resource our drug interdiction strategy to combat these groups,
but we must also renew our efforts to combat the real driver of
drug trafficking: the demand here at home. The demand for the
drugs that these groups traffic--heroin, methamphetamine, and
cocaine--is too high, and the profits too great, to dissuade
these criminals from their illicit actions.
To be clear, the threat posed by these groups extends
beyond the drugs they smuggle into our communities. The
smuggling routes they control are also used to traffic weapons,
bulk cash, and human beings. As your predecessor, General
Kelly, testified before this committee, terrorist organizations
could seek to leverage these same smuggling routes to move
operatives with intent to cause grave harm to our citizens or
even bring weapons of mass destruction into the United States.
On a more positive note, I'm interested in your assessment
of the ongoing talks in Colombia and how you believe the United
States can best support our partners as they enter a new and
likely more challenging era. Colombia, once on the cusp of
becoming a failed state, has emerged from decades of conflict
as a stark example of what sustained U.S. support and
engagement can achieve. It's vitally important that we continue
to invest in our relationship during this critical period so as
not to squander the extraordinary progress that has been
achieved.
I'd like to take a moment to recognize the military
servicemembers conducting detention operations at Guantanamo
Bay. Too often in the course of debating the future of the
detention facility, we lose sight of the remarkable men and
women who serve honorably under extraordinarily difficult
conditions. Admiral, please convey our deepest appreciation for
their service and the professionalism they display each and
every day on behalf of our Nation.
Admiral Gortney, I look to you for an update on the current
state of United States-Mexican security cooperation and
opportunities for our two nations to strengthen this vital
partnership. While Mexico's efforts to combat transnational
criminal organizations have resulted in notable successes by
capturing or killing senior cartel leaders, such as El Chapo,
the security situation remain highly volatile and continues to
directly impact the security of our southern border. Heroin,
largely produced in Mexico, continues to ravage communities all
across the Nation and demands a renewed effort to combat this
scourge, both in our seats and also at its source.
I also look forward to your assessment of the increasing
threat posed to the Homeland by the development of advanced
missile capability--of advanced missiles capable of carrying
nuclear payloads by Russia, Iran, and North Korea.
Admiral Haney, the strategic threats to the United States
and its allies have increased exponentially in just the few
short years since you've taken the helm of Strategic Command.
While nuclear, cyber, and counterspace threats generally have
been on the rise, Secretary Carter's warning that, quote,
``We're entering a new strategic era,'' has great implications
for STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command]. Return to great power
competition noted by the Secretary means that deterring Russia
and China once again assumes primacy in your planning and
operations. Whatever President Obama may have hoped for, the
United States can no longer seek to reduce the role of nuclear
weapons in our national security strategy or narrow the range
of contingencies under which we would have to consider their
use. U.S. Strategic Command faces significant near- and longer-
term challenges.
In about 15 to 20 years, U.S. nuclear submarines, ICBMs
[intercontential ballistic missiles], air-launch cruise
missiles, heavy bombers, and nuclear-capable tactical fighters
will have to be withdrawn from operational service, having been
extended well beyond their original service lives.
Modernization programs are in place to replace these systems,
but there is no slack left in the schedule. Today's Congress
supports fully the modernization of the U.S. nuclear deterrent.
Any reduction in funding over the next decade, however, could
delay the development of these replacement systems, increasing
strategic risk at a time when Russia and other countries
continue to modernize their nuclear capabilities.
Russia, then, is your near-term challenge. Russia's
aggression in Ukraine and destabilizing actions in Syria take
place under a nuclear shadow. Russia has threatened our NATO
allies with nuclear strikes, is developing a new nuclear
ground-launch cruise missile capable of ranging most of Europe,
and has fired air- and sea-launch cruise missiles against
targets in Syria, missiles that could be armed with nuclear
warheads and flown against European and United States targets.
Your task, Admiral Haney, is to ensure that strategic
Command is prepared to deter Russian nuclear provocations. This
requires better intelligence about Russian nuclear capabilities
and plans, a nuclear planning process tied to EUCOM [European
Command] and NATO operations, and a survivable, well-exercised,
and ready nuclear force.
Finally, as this committee continues its review of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act, we're interested to hear your views as
to whether our defense enterprise is organized properly to
perform the missions that cut across the functional and
geographic boundaries we have drawn. We also welcome any ideas
on reform we might consider to make our defense enterprise more
effective without minimizing the vital tasks that must be done.
I noted, to the members of the committee, that yesterday we
had an all-Army panel, and today it's an all-Navy panel, a
definite upgrade.
[Laughter.]
Chairman McCain. Senator Reed.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
May I point out that the meeting of the United States Naval
Academy Alumni Association will take place immediately
following the hearing in the ante room.
[Laughter.]
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to welcome our witnesses, particularly Admiral Tidd,
who's appearing before this committee for the first time. Thank
you, sir, for your service.
Admiral Gortney, this could be your last hearing before the
committee. Thank you for your extraordinary service in so many
different capacities. Not only you, but your families, have
served with great distinction and great sacrifice. Obviously,
the men and women in your commands have done so much.
Admiral Haney, likewise to your family and to the men and
women of your command.
I'm pleased to see some senior noncommissioned officers
here. Thank you for what you do to lead our forces.
Admiral Haney, your command has responsibilities for the
functions that are global in nature--space and nuclear, to name
a few. But, your first and foremost responsibility is to ensure
that the nuclear triad can deter threats that are existential
to our Nation. This administration has committed to the
modernization of all three legs of our triad. Our current
nuclear forces cost about 4 percent of our DOD [Department of
Defense] budget, which is a relatively good bargain,
considering the threats they deter on a daily basis. But, in
the late 2020s, as the Chairman has mentioned, when this
modernization is at its peak, that figure will rise to about 7
percent of the DOD budget. While this is about half of what we
spent at the height of the Cold War, it is still a considerable
amount of money, and I will want to hear your views on the
importance of this modernization and how it can be done in the
most cost-effective manner possible.
Admiral Gortney, your mission is to protect the Homeland,
to deter and defeat attacks on the United States, and to
support civil authorities in mitigating the effects of
potential attacks and natural disasters. While Admiral Haney is
responsible for synchronizing global missile defense, planning,
and operation support, you are responsible for the operation of
our Homeland ballistic missile defense system. We look forward
to hearing about the ongoing improvements to the ground-based
missile defense system, particularly the enhancement of sensors
and discrimination capabilities.
In addition, NORTHCOM [Northern Command] works closely with
other Federal agencies, the Governors, and the National Guard
to collaborate on responding to natural and manmade disasters,
and partners with Canada and Mexico to promote security across
our borders. I look forward to hearing about your current
efforts in these areas and how these would be impacted by the
return of sequestration next year.
A number of the problems in NORTHCOM originate from the
SOUTHCOM AOR. Drug traffickers and transnational criminal
organizations are not bound by geographic borders, and the
violence and instability they engender have pushed individuals
to flee, often seeking sanctuary on our shores. An obvious
answer then is to address the problem at the root. Of course,
such efforts require a whole-of-government approach,
incorporating the capabilities of interagency partners, such as
the State Department, FBI, and the Drug Enforcement Agency.
Consequently, any cuts made to their budgets have direct
implications on the ability, particularly, of SOUTHCOM
[Southern Command] to carry out its mission.
SOUTHCOM is responsible for maintaining our security
relationship in the region. The closest military-to-military
relationship in the AOR [Area of responsibility] is with
Colombia, who, with our sustained assistance, has undergone a
remarkable transformation. It is now equally important to
ensure that the peace implementation phase of this
transformation is as robustly supported as the kinetic
operations.
Admiral Tidd, as you stated in your testimony, nowhere is
our own security more inextricably intertwined to that of our
neighbors, partners, and friends than in Latin America, and the
Caribbean. I look forward to hearing your views on how we can
best maintain our engagement in this important area of the
world.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Welcome the witnesses. Your complete
statements will be made part of the record.
Admiral Haney.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL CECIL E. D. HANEY, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
STRATEGIC COMMAND
Admiral Haney. Good morning, Chairman McCain, Ranking
Member Reed, and members of the committee.
I'm honored to be here with you today and pleased to
testify with Admiral Bill Gortney, Commander, U.S. Northern
Command, Admiral Kurt Tidd, Commander, U.S. Southern Command.
I'm also honored to represent my team of sailors, soldiers,
airmens, and marines, and civilians who carry out the various
missions assigned to U.S. Strategic Command. They are dedicated
professionals who represent our most precious resource and
deserve our unwavering support. As a result of their efforts,
our Nation's strategic nuclear deterrent force remains safe,
secure, effective, and ready, and we are working hard to
improve the resiliency and flexibility in space and cyberspace.
It is critical, as you've stated, that we modernize our
strategic nuclear deterrent capabilities that underpin our
Nation's security. As you know, the current global security
environment is more complex, dynamic, and uncertain than
possibly anytime in our history as adversaries and potential
adversaries challenge our democratic values and our security in
so many ways. They are modernizing and expanding their nuclear
capabilities, developing and testing counterspace and
cyberspace technologies, and are advancing conventional and
asymmetric weapons.
Future deterrent scenarios will likely include multiple
adversaries operating across multiple domains and using anti-
access aerial denial asymmetric warfare in ``escalate to de-
escalate'' tactics. These trends affect strategic stability.
Given all of this, the missions of U.S. Strategic Command
remain important to our joint military forces, to our Nation
and our allies and partners. Comprehensive strategic deterrence
and assurance and escalation control is far more than just
nuclear weapons and platforms. It includes a robust
intelligence apparatus, space, cyberspace, conventional and
missile defense capabilities, and comprehensive plans that link
together organizations in a coherent manner.
Additionally, we engage daily on a broad range of
activities across our other mission areas, including
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, combating
weapons of mass destruction, joint electronic warfare, and
analysis and targeting.
These guide my command priorities. Achieving comprehensive
strategic deterrence, assurance, and escalation control
requires a long-term approach to investing in capabilities in a
multi-generational commitment to intellectual capital. The
President's Budget for fiscal year 2017 strikes a responsible
balance between national priorities, fiscal realities, and
begins to reduce some of the risks we have accumulated because
of deferred maintenance and sustainment. This budget supports
my mission requirements, but there is no margin to absorb new
risk. Any cuts to that budget will hamper our ability to
sustain and modernize our forces.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Haney follows:]
Prepared Statement by Admiral Cecil E. D. Haney
introduction
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, I am
honored to be here today. Thank you for the opportunity to provide
testimony on the posture of United States strategic forces, my
assessment of the President's Fiscal Year 2017 Budget, and how United
States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) is confronting today's complex
global security environment. I am also pleased to be here with Admiral
Bill Gortney, Commander of United States Northern Command; and Admiral
Kurt Tidd, Commander of United States Southern Command. I thank you all
for your continued support to our Nation's defense.
I have the privilege of leading a motivated team of strategic
warriors focused on mission excellence. While today, the Nation's
strategic nuclear deterrent force remains safe, secure, effective and
ready, we are working diligently to improve the resilience,
responsiveness, credibility and flexibility of our operational plans
and capabilities. USSTRATCOM is focused on deterring strategic attack,
providing assurance to our allies and partners, and providing
warfighting solutions to other Combatant Commands and partners across
the spectrum of operations. While executing our global
responsibilities, we continue to forge enduring partnerships with
agencies and organizations across the U.S. Government, academia,
commercial industry, and Allied nations.
The momentum we have established is largely due to those who
dedicate themselves to national security in spite of uncertainty and
resource challenges: the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and
civilians who carry out and support our strategic missions. Thank you
for the opportunity to publicly acknowledge their service, devotion and
professional skill.
Over the last two years, I have gained considerable insight
regarding the progress and work remaining to deliver comprehensive
strategic deterrence, assurance and escalation control. My focus here
is to provide clarity, make recommendations on required steps for
continued success, and demonstrate how USSTRATCOM supports strategic
stability and national security.
Much remains to be done to sustain and modernize the foundational
nuclear deterrent force that we need to protect the Nation from
existential threats in an increasingly uncertain and unpredictable
environment. We must continue to meet critical investment timelines to
ensure that aging platforms and weapons systems do not reach the point
at which their viability becomes questionable.
The President's Budget offers a balanced approach to national
priorities and fiscal realities, and reduces some accumulated risk as
we pursue modernization across USSTRATCOM mission areas. The Bipartisan
Budget Act of 2015 provided near-term fiscal stability for these
critical missions, and we appreciate Congressional and White House
support in this effort. I support continued bipartisan efforts to
achieve long-term relief from the constraints imposed by the Budget
Control Act of 2011, especially given the multi-year acquisition
timelines required to modernize our strategic systems.
Maintaining and improving comprehensive strategic deterrence,
assurance and escalation control requires a multi-faceted, long-term
approach to investing in strategic capabilities and a renewed, multi-
generational commitment of intellectual capital. As I look at trends in
the security environment, continued long term investment is needed to
ensure that current progress transitions into long-term success. Our
allies and adversaries are observing and assessing the fiscal emphasis
placed on our Nation's strategic deterrence and assurance capabilities.
We cannot afford to send mixed messages on their importance by
underfunding them.
global security environment
Today's global security environment is complex, dynamic and
volatile; perhaps more so now than at any other time. The dangers
presented by this unpredictable security environment are compounded by
the continued propagation of asymmetric methods, the unprecedented
proliferation of advancing technologies, and the increasingly
provocative and destabilizing behavior by current and potential
adversaries. Some nations are investing in long-term military
modernization programs, including capabilities that could pose an
existential threat to the United States. A number of others are
developing, sustaining, or modernizing their nuclear forces, including
weapons and platforms that are mobile, hardened and underground.
Russia. Russia warrants our attention. Its new security strategy
makes clear that Russia seeks to re-assert its great power status.
Russia is modernizing its conventional and strategic military programs,
emphasizing new strategic approaches, declaring and demonstrating its
ability to escalate if required, and maintaining a significant quantity
of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Russia has engaged in destabilizing
actions in Syria and Ukraine (Eastern and Crimea), while also violating
the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and other
international accords and norms. Russia is also developing counter-
space and cyber capabilities
Despite these activities, and assertions by some that the United
States and Russia are in a nuclear arms race, there is continued
adherence to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) by
both nations. In compliance with a series of treaties, the United
States has reduced its stockpile by 85 percent relative to its Cold War
peak. Instead of dozens of delivery systems, we now have four strategic
delivery platforms. We seek no new military capabilities in our nuclear
forces. Rather, we seek to retain and modernize only those capabilities
needed to sustain a stable and effective deterrent capability. We are
on track to achieve New START limits of 1550 deployed warheads and 700
deployed delivery systems by February 2018.
The benefit of New START is that it promotes stability by
maintaining equivalency in nuclear weapon numbers and strategic
capability. It also promotes transparency via inspections and helps
assure our non-nuclear allies they do not need their own nuclear
deterrent capabilities. However, to maintain strategic stability as we
draw down to New START central limits, the remaining systems must be
safe, secure, effective and ready.
China. In addition to pursuing regional dominance in the East and
South China Seas, China continues making significant military
investments in nuclear and conventional capabilities. China is re-
engineering its long-range ballistic missiles to carry multiple nuclear
warheads and continues to develop and test hyper-glide vehicle
capability. China's pursuit of conventional prompt global strike
capabilities, offensive counter space technologies, and exploitation of
computer networks raises questions about its global aspirations. While
China periodically reminds us of its ``No First-Use'' nuclear policy,
these developments--coupled with a lack of transparency on nuclear
issues such as force disposition and size--impact regional and
strategic stability.
North Korea. North Korea's behavior over the past 60 years has been
very problematic. Today, North Korea continues heightening tensions by
coupling provocative statements and actions with advancements in
strategic capabilities, including claims of miniaturized warheads;
developments in road mobile and submarine launched ballistic missile
technologies. Most recently, North Korea has conducted its fourth
nuclear weapons test and another missile launch of a satellite into
space, furthering its ICBM research. These actions show disdain for
United Nations Security Council resolutions and a dangerous lack of
regard for regional stability.
Iran. As Iran follows the mandates of the Joint Comprehensive Plan
of Action, we must be vigilant to detect if Iran ever shifts its
intentions to pursue a nuclear weapon. Iran continues to develop
ballistic missiles and cyberspace capabilities--and we remain focused
on countering its destabilizing activities in the region.
Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs). Ungoverned or ineffectively
governed regions remain incubators for those who seek to attack the
world's peaceful societies. VEOs recruit and operate freely across
political, social, and cyberspace boundaries. The effect of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) in the hands of VEOs could be catastrophic, and
highlights the importance of our non-proliferation and counter WMD
efforts.
In summary, the global strategic environment is increasingly
complex. Unlike the bipolarity of the Cold War, today's multi-polar
world with state, non-state, and mixed-status actors is more akin to
multiplayer, concurrent and intersecting games of chess that severely
challenge regional and global security dynamics. Future conflicts will
not be contained within prescribed borders, stove-piped domains, or
segregated areas of responsibility. We must view threats as
transregional, multi-domain and multi-functional, requiring a
comprehensive approach to strategic deterrence, assurance and
escalation control.
usstratcom in the 21st century
USSTRATCOM counters diverse and complex threats through the
execution of its fundamental mission: to detect and deter strategic
attacks against the U.S. and our allies, and to defeat those who attack
if deterrence fails. USSTRATCOM is assigned nine distinct
responsibilities: Strategic Deterrence; Space Operations; Cyberspace
Operations; Global Strike; Joint Electronic Warfare; Missile Defense;
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance; Countering Weapons of
Mass Destruction; and Analysis and Targeting. These diverse assignments
are strategic in nature, global in scope, and intertwined with Joint
Force capabilities, the interagency process and the Whole-of-Government
approach. Each mission supports or is interconnected with the others,
and their combined capabilities enable a comprehensive approach to
strategic deterrence, assurance and escalation control in the 21st
century.
Deterrence is a fundamentally human endeavor, firmly rooted in
psychology and social behavior. At the most basic level, deterrence is
achieved through one of two mechanisms. The first is an aggressor's
recognition that unacceptable costs may be imposed for taking an action
and recognition that forgoing this action may result in lesser costs.
The second is an aggressor's belief that the contemplated action will
not produce its perceived benefit, or that not acting will produce a
greater perceived benefit. These elements combine to convince potential
adversaries that they will not succeed in an attack, and even if they
try, the costs will far outweigh the benefits. USSTRATCOM's
capabilities underpin these fundamental elements of deterrence.
Achieving comprehensive deterrence, assurance and escalation
control requires nuclear weapons systems along with a robust
intelligence apparatus; space, cyberspace, conventional, and missile
defense capabilities; global command, control, and communications; and
comprehensive plans that link organizations and knit their capabilities
together in a coherent way.
Priorities. USSTRATCOM is guided by my six overarching priorities:
1. Deterring strategic attack against the United States and
providing assurance to our allies. Strategic attacks can occur through
a variety of means in any domain. They may impact many people or
systems, affect large physical areas, act across great distances,
persist over long periods of time, disrupt economic or social
structures, or change the status quo in a fundamental way.
2. Providing the Nation with a safe, secure, effective and ready
nuclear deterrent force. Foundational documents such as the 2010
Nuclear Posture Review, the 2013 Report on Nuclear Weapons Employment
Strategy, the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and the 2015
National Military Strategy have consistently repeated this mandate. I
am committed to providing our Nation with a viable and credible nuclear
deterrent force.
3. Delivering comprehensive warfighting solutions. To effectively
deter, assure, and control escalation in today's security environment,
threats must be surveyed across the ``spectrum of conflict.''
Escalation may occur at any point, in varying degrees of intensity,
with more than one adversary, in multiple domains, to include ``below
threshold activities'' that would not ordinarily propel international
action. Our actions and capabilities must convince any adversary that
they cannot escalate their way out of a failed conflict, and that
restraint is always the better option. Doing so requires a deeper,
broader understanding of our potential adversaries, so that we can deny
action; hold critical nodes at risk; and prevent activities,
perceptions and misperceptions from escalating. We must also look at
our military capabilities in a holistic manner, and fully integrate
them within our other elements of national power. We must pursue a
Whole-of-Government approach to deterrence, including allies and
partners in our efforts, with ready forces in all domains.
4. Addressing challenges in space and cyberspace with capability,
capacity and resilience. Space capabilities remain foundational to our
way of life not only for the United States but for the international
community at large. Yet some nation states are investing in counter-
space capabilities. We must assure our continued access to space
through improved space situational awareness, operating procedures,
resiliency and other operational concepts central to our ability to
maintain an advantage in space. Cyberspace underpins all of my mission
areas and has become a critical facet of national power. We must
continue to develop a robust Cyber Mission Force with the authorities,
skills and resources to protect our DOD networks against a maturing set
of cyberspace threats. Additionally, cyber defense of future networked
systems must be a design priority.
5. Building, sustaining and supporting partnerships. We aim to work
seamlessly with the other Combatant Commands, across the Federal
Government, commercial sector, academia and with partners and allies to
apply the scope of the USSTRATCOM portfolio toward a synchronized
pursuit of national objectives. This robust interaction must occur at
all levels at USSTRATCOM and includes operations, planning, exercising
and wargaming.
6. Anticipating change and confronting uncertainty with agility and
innovation. Sound decision-making requires thorough analysis to
prioritize our activities with flexible, agile and adaptable thinking.
This effort includes a variety of wargames, demonstrations and
exercises to evaluate deterrence and escalation control options. We
will support the DOD Defense Innovation Initiative and the associated
Advanced Capability and Deterrence Panel's efforts. This will help us
identify new operational concepts, develop cutting edge technology, and
enable a continuing evolution of ideas on how to deter current and
potential adversaries.
mission area capabilities & requirements
We must maintain a military capability that provides our leadership
with the decision space to respond in the best interest of the United
States. This includes the ability to mitigate current and future risk
as it pertains to nuclear, space and cyberspace threats. Therefore,
prioritizing resources to meet our requirements necessitates a
thoughtful assessment of national priorities in the context of fiscal
realities. The President's Budget supports my mission requirements, but
there is no margin to absorb risk. Any cuts to the budget will hamper
our ability to sustain and modernize our military forces, and will add
significant risk to our strategic capabilities.
Nuclear Deterrent Forces
Today, America's nuclear forces remain safe, secure, effective and
ready. For more than 70 years, thanks in part to our credible nuclear
forces, the United States has deterred great power war against nuclear-
capable adversaries.
Nuclear Triad. Our nuclear Triad is a requirement. The policy of
maintaining a nuclear Triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems was
most recently re-iterated in the 2014 QDR. Our Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles, Ballistic Missile Submarines, Air-Launched Cruise
Missiles, and nuclear capable heavy bombers and associated tankers each
provide unique and complementary attributes that together underpin
strategic deterrence and stability--and each element is in need of
continued investment. The Triad provides a hedge against technical
problems or changes in the security environment and must consist of
independently viable weapons systems and platforms which present
adversaries with a complex, multi-pronged problem. The fiscal year 2017
budget request funds the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent program to
replace our aging Minuteman ICBM fleet, which for decades have served
to complicate an adversary's decision to launch a comprehensive
counterforce strike on the United States. The fiscal year 2017 budget
request funds the Ohio-Replacement Program to ensure the uninterrupted
deployment of the Triad's most survivable leg. The Long Range Strike-
Bomber, Long Range Stand-Off Cruise Missile, and B61-12 gravity bomb
are needed to provide the flexibility, visibility and ability to
forward-deploy and to support our extended deterrence commitments to
our allies.
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). Our ICBM force
provides a responsive, highly reliable and cost effective deterrent
capability. To maintain an effective Minuteman III force through 2030,
USSTRATCOM supports several near-term sustainment efforts, including
ICBM Fuze Modernization, Launch Control Center Block Upgrade, and
Airborne Launch Control System Replacement. Vital ICBM security
improvements include a UH-1N Helicopter Replacement, Payload
Transporter Replacement and ICBM Cryptographic Upgrade. Beyond 2030,
the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent program is essential to
recapitalize the ICBM force prior to Minuteman age out I fully support
an integrated Ground Based Strategic Deterrent weapon system that
recapitalizes flight systems, ground launch systems, command and
control, and support equipment. I am encouraged by the ongoing Air
Force and Navy effort to study the feasibility of sharing common
technology between their respective programs in order to reduce costs
and preserve the unique skills required to field capable ballistic
missile weapon systems.
Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs). Recapitalizing our sea-based
strategic deterrent force remains my top modernization priority. The
Navy's SSBNs and Trident II D5 ballistic missiles constitute the
Triad's most survivable leg. The Ohio-class SSBN fleet is undergoing
significant sustainment efforts to maintain our nation's required high
operational availability and extend the life of the D5 ballistic
missile. USSTRATCOM continues to strongly support and work with the
Navy as it modernizes the SSBN fleet. The Ohio Replacement SSBN,
currently in development and expected to be fielded in 2031, will
continue to serve as the Nation's survivable strategic deterrent into
the 2080s. Despite a hull life extension from 30 to 42 years, the
current Ohio-class will quickly approach the end of its effective
service life. No further extension is possible. Any further delay will
put the reliability of our sea-based nuclear deterrent at unacceptable
risk. In addition, we must continue our commitment to the United
Kingdom to develop and field the Common Missile Compartment to ensure
both nations' SSBNs achieve operational capability to replace the
existing platforms.
Heavy Bombers. Our dual-capable B-52 and B-2 bombers are the most
flexible and adaptable leg of the nuclear Triad and provide significant
conventional capabilities. Bombers play a key role in stabilizing and
managing crises by providing a visible signaling option and rapid hedge
against operational and technical challenges in other legs of the
nuclear Triad. Ongoing and planned sustainment and modernization
activities, to include associated Nuclear Command, Control and
Communications upgrades, will ensure our bombers provide credible
deterrent capabilities until their planned end-of-service-life. I fully
support the Air Force program for fielding a new, highly survivable
penetrating conventional and nuclear Long Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B).
When coupled with a new Long Range Stand-Off (LRSO) cruise missile and
the B61-12 gravity bomb, the LRS-B will provide the President with
flexible options to address a range of contingencies in non-permissive
environments. Maintaining an air-delivered standoff and direct attack
capability is vital to meeting our strategic and extended deterrence
commitments and denying geographic sanctuaries to potential
adversaries. The new LRSO is needed to replace the aging Air Launched
Cruise Missile (ALCM), which has far exceeded its originally planned
service life, is being sustained through a series of service life
extension programs, and is required to support our B-52 bomber fleet.
Likewise, the B61-12 is needed to extend the life of aging gravity
nuclear weapons and provide continued viability for both the B-2
strategic bomber and dual capable fighter aircraft supporting our NATO
and extended deterrence commitments.
Foundational to the nuclear triad is a synthesis of dedicated
sensors, assured command and control, nuclear weapons and their
enabling infrastructure, treaties and non-proliferation activities.
Sensors. Indications and warning are necessary for maximum decision
space, and strategic missile warning remains one of our most important
capabilities. Along with persistent and tailored intelligence, our
Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment network provides
timely, accurate, unambiguous and continuous tactical early warning,
allowing us to select the most suitable course of action in rapidly
developing situations. While the Defense Support Program is nearing the
end of its operational life, the Space-Based Infrared System program is
on track to provide continuous on-orbit warning. The survivable and
endurable segments of these systems, along with Early Warning Radars
and nuclear detonation detection elements, are in urgent need of
sustainment and modernization. We must continue to maintain legacy
systems and address the ever-increasing risk to mission success. Prompt
and sufficient recapitalization of these critical facilities and
networks--to include electromagnetic pulse protection and survivable
endurable communications with other nodes in the system--will be
pivotal in maintaining a credible deterrent.
Nuclear Command, Control and Communications (NC3). All USSTRATCOM
missions require robust global Command, Control, Communications, and
Computer (C4) capabilities and infrastructure supporting the
President's national-decision making process across a spectrum of
scenarios. These communications capabilities are crucial to providing
the President and his key advisors the right information to expand
decision space. USSTRATCOM is teaming with the White House, national
laboratories, and the private sector to develop a Global C4 system,
setting the conditions for timely, informed National decision making
anywhere on the globe. The Council on Oversight of the National
Leadership Command, Control and Communications System has proven
effective in synchronizing and prioritizing modernization efforts, and
articulating those priorities to Congress.
Maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent for the long term requires
recapitalization of key systems and capabilities throughout the NC3
architecture. The unpredictable challenges posed by today's complex
multi-domain, multi-threat security environment make it increasingly
important to optimize our aging NC3 systems architecture while
leveraging new technologies. Maintaining nuclear deterrence and
strategic stability requires a command and control architecture
comprised of interdependent fixed and mobile systems and nodes that
deliver capability throughout the space, air and land domains. Through
continued funding for NC3 modernization programs, we can ensure
effective command and control of the Nation's forces well into the
future.
In space, we are transitioning from Military Strategic and Tactical
Relay (MILSTAR) to Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite
communications systems. The AEHF satellite constellation system,
coupled with requisite ground node and airborne platform Family of
Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight terminals (FAB-T) and the Presidential
and National Voice Conferencing (PNVC) system, will extend enhanced
capabilities to enable collaboration between the President and senior
advisors under any circumstance and also assure connectivity with the
nuclear forces.
Our efforts to field an air layer network supported by AEHF and a
modernized Very Low Frequency/Low Frequency (VLF/LF) capability will
increase resiliency and reliability across the NC3 architecture and
begins to address the emerging threats to our space-based
communications. I support the investment plan to replace our aging very
low frequency receivers on the E-6B Airborne Command Post (ABNCP) and
the E-4B National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC), providing assured,
world-wide survivable communications into the future. Additionally, the
Air Force continues to fund the very low frequency receiver on the B-2
bomber fleet, and began a program to install next generation protected,
assured, and survivable communications on the B-2.
Within the land component, there are efforts underway to upgrade
fixed and mobile warning systems to enable them to leverage the
evolving Space Based Infra-Red System (SBIRS) capability. Progress has
also been made on the construction of the new USSTRATCOM Command and
Control (C2) Facility, which will support all our missions and will be
a key component of our future nuclear and national C2 architecture. The
C2 Facility, which is on track for occupancy in 2018, serves as a
visible reminder to adversaries of the importance and national
commitment to modernize our aging NC3 facilities.
Weapons and Infrastructure. Today's stockpile remains safe, secure,
effective, and meets operational requirements. However, our nuclear
weapons (now averaging 27 years of service) and supporting
infrastructure (some of which date back to the Manhattan Project) are
in dire need of modernization and life extension. Surveillance
activities, Life Extension Programs (LEPs), and Stockpile Stewardship
efforts are essential to mitigating age-related effects and
incorporating improved safety and security features without a return to
underground nuclear explosive testing. Continued talent pool investment
with our nuclear scientists and engineers is also paramount to
providing viability to our stockpile requirements.
As a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC), I work closely
with my DOD and Department of Energy National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) counterparts to ensure we maintain a safe,
secure, and effective nuclear stockpile. Active and sustained execution
of the NWC's long-term ``3+2'' strategy to deliver three ballistic
missile and two air-delivered warheads is crucial to addressing near-
term technical needs and future capability requirements. W76-1 and B61-
12 LEPs are on track and are necessary to maintain confidence in the
reliability, safety and intrinsic security of our nuclear weapons.
Additionally, early activities are underway to synchronize the LRSO
cruise missile program with the W80-4 warhead LEP to ensure these
programs are fielded in time to maintain a viable stand-off nuclear
capability. The President's Budget ensures schedule alignment of the
cruise missile and its associated warhead.
Treaties. International agreements such as New Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (New START), the Open Skies Treaty (OST), and the
Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty contribute to strategic
stability through transparency, confidence building, and verification.
The State Department has primary responsibility for treaty
administration, and USSTRATCOM remains closely involved in their
execution. While these agreements have served valuable roles in
promoting strategic stability, treaty violations are a significant
cause for concern.
In meeting treaty obligations, the United States Air Force has
eliminated all non-operational intercontinental ballistic missile
silos, and is placing 50 intercontinental ballistic missiles into a
non-deployed status. All intercontinental ballistic missiles now carry
only a single warhead. The Air Force has also eliminated non-
operational B-52G series heavy bombers, and is converting 42 B-52H's to
conventional-only bomber missions. Additionally, the United States Navy
is sealing four launch tubes on each Ohio-class SSBN, removing 56
launch tubes from accountability under New START.
Budget. Sustaining and modernizing the nuclear enterprise
infrastructure is crucial to maintaining a viable nuclear deterrent
force. It is impressive to see today's systems working well beyond
their expected service life, but we cannot rely on that indefinitely.
Aging weapon systems and supporting infrastructure are stressing our
ability to maintain a viable and credible force.
I share concerns about the cost of modernization, but the greater
worry is the cost if we do not make needed investments. To reverse the
long trend of flat or even declining resources, there must be a
sustained, multi-decade investment program to our weapons, delivery
systems and supporting infrastructure. As stated by the Congressional
Budget Office, the expected cost of nuclear forces represents roughly 5
percent to 6 percent of the total costs of the planned defense budgets
for the next ten years. The importance of the foundational nuclear
deterrent force to national security, assurance to our allies, our non-
proliferation objectives and strategic stability far outweigh the
expense of recapitalization. Failing to provide the resources requested
in the fiscal year 2017 budget request would delay the development of
these programs and unacceptably degrade our credibility and ability to
deter and assure. Our Nation must make this investment.
Space Operations
The U.S. must maintain assured access to space. Our national space
capabilities allow us to globally navigate, communicate, and observe
events in areas where non-space sensors are not feasible. Space
capabilities are also a vital component of comprehensive deterrence and
assurance and are critical to supporting our deployed forces and our
national decision-making processes. Investment in these capabilities is
vital to our national security. We greatly appreciate the continued
support of Congress in helping to increase the resiliency and vitality
of our space assets.
The space domain has increasingly become contested, degraded, and
operationally limited. These are not new challenges. Some countries
have clearly signaled their intent and ability to conduct hostile
operations in space as an extension of the terrestrial battlefield.
These operations would deny U.S. Forces the advantages of space, which
have enabled us to favorably shape events in all corners of the globe.
In response to growing space threats, the DOD and Intelligence
Community (IC) established the Joint Space Doctrine and Tactics Forum
(JSDTF), which I co-chair with Ms. Betty Sapp, Director, National
Reconnaissance Office. The JSDTF's goals are to ensure U.S. space
policy, doctrine, operational concepts, strategies and planning
scenarios reflect that space is a contested domain, populated by
dynamic actors. We have already made significant improvements in the
integration of exercises and wargames, and are revising associated
joint doctrine, as well as new tactics, techniques and procedures for
our space operators. The JSDTF will foster the transformation of how
the U.S. operates in space by promoting seamless functionality between
the DOD and IC--a tight bond we must continue to strengthen.
Another key initiative is the establishment of the Joint
Interagency Combined Space Operations Center (JICSpOC) located at
Schriever Air Force Base in Colorado. This center combines the efforts
of USSTRATCOM, Air Force Space Command, and the intelligence community
with a goal to create unity of effort and facilitate information
sharing across the national security space enterprise. At its current
phase, the JICSpOC is providing a robust location to conduct
comprehensive operational experimentation. The JICSpOC will ensure the
space enterprise meets and outpaces emerging and advanced space threats
and will provide vital information for national leadership, allies,
partners and the Joint Force. It will also serve to enhance the
Nation's deterrent posture by demonstrating the United States is
prepared when our space capabilities are threatened.
A component to all of these efforts is Space Situational Awareness
(SSA)--the information that allows us to understand what is on orbit,
where it is, where it is going, and how it is being used. Consistent
with long-standing obligations and principles of the Outer Space Treaty
and other international legal standards, our goal is to ensure space
remains a safe domain for all legitimate users. Sharing SSA information
and collaborating with other nations and commercial firms promotes safe
and responsible space operations, reduces the potential for debris-
producing collisions and other harmful interference, builds
international confidence in U.S. space systems, fosters U.S. space
leadership, and improves our own SSA through knowledge of owner/
operator satellite positional data.
USSTRATCOM has negotiated SSA Sharing Agreements and Arrangements
with 51 commercial entities, two intergovernmental organizations
(EUMETSAT and European Space Agency), and ten nations (Spain, France,
Italy, Japan, Australia, Canada, South Korea, United Kingdom, Germany,
and Israel) and is in the process of negotiating additional agreements.
Through these sharing agreements, USSTRATCOM assists partners with
activities such as launch support; maneuver planning; support for
satellite anomaly resolution, electromagnetic interference reporting
and investigation; support for de-commissioning activities; and space
object conjunction assessments.
The Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program (GSSAP)
achieved initial operational capability in October of 2015, and
USSTRATCOM is now operating GSSAP satellites to enable our cutting-edge
SSA capabilities. GSSAP facilitates space-monitoring activities that
contribute to global safety of spaceflight, as well as the peaceful
access to space.
At the nucleus of USSTRATCOM's approach to space security is
mission assurance--ensuring combatant commanders have required access
to space-based capabilities. USSTRATCOM's Joint Functional Component
Command for Space (JFCC-SPACE), located at Vandenberg Air Force Base in
California, leads the effort, and through the Joint Space Operations
Center (JSpOC), executes continuous and integrated military space
operations and routinely tracks thousands of space objects in orbit
around the Earth. This includes more than 1,300 active satellites
operated by approximately 60 nations and a wide variety of government,
commercial, and academic organizations. The JSpOC also maintains the
catalog of all artificial Earth-orbiting objects, charts preset
positions for orbital flight safety, and predicts objects reentering
the Earth's atmosphere.
We must sustain judicious and stable investments to preserve the
advantages we hold in this complex environment. Examples include the
Space Fence program which will greatly expand the capacity of the Space
Surveillance Network; investments in modeling and simulation that will
increase our understanding of the space environment and adversary
capabilities; and funding for satellite communications that are
resistant to interference. We must also continue to seek innovative and
solutions with Allies and our commercial partners to ensure access to
space operations remains available. These include active and passive
protection measures for individual systems and constellations, and a
critical examination of the architectural path we must follow to ensure
resilience and affordability in our space capabilities.
Cyberspace Operations
This year will mark the sixth anniversary of United States Cyber
Command (USCYBERCOM). USCYBERCOM imparts an operational outlook and
attitude to the management of the DOD's approximately seven million
networked devices and 15,000 network enclaves.
Our primary focus for cyberspace operations within DOD is building
the capability and capacity to protect DOD networks, systems, and
information; defend the nation against cyberattacks; and support
operational and contingency plans. The Cyber Mission Force (CMF)
construct addresses the significant challenges of recruiting, training
and retaining people, in addition to acquiring the facilities and
equipment necessary for successful cyberspace operations. We are
creating 133 cyber mission teams manned by more than 6,000 highly
trained people by the end of fiscal year 2018. To date, 84 of those
teams are fielded and assigned to a variety of missions, including our
ongoing efforts to degrade, dismantle, and ultimately destroy ISIL.
These teams support combatant commands and national missions. Budget
stability is crucial to achieving this vision.
On 30 September 2015, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff signed the DOD Cybersecurity Culture and
Compliance Initiative (DC3I), tasking USSTRATCOM and USCYBERCOM to lead
implementation. DC3I fosters long-term improvement through training,
inspections, reporting and accountability. Improving our cybersecurity
culture requires a holistic approach that addresses people, processes,
and technology. Such efforts will continue to be critical to defending
our DOD networks.
Global Strike
USSTRATCOM's Joint Functional Component Command for Global Strike
(JFCC-GS) operates from Offutt AFB, Nebraska. JFCC-GS provides a unique
ability to command and control our global strike capabilities and build
plans that rapidly integrate into theater operations. This includes
integration of combat capability associated with kinetic and non-
kinetic effects.
Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) capability offers the
opportunity to rapidly engage high-value targets without resorting to
nuclear options. CPGS can provide precision and responsiveness in Anti-
Access/Area Denial environments while simultaneously minimizing
unintended military, political, environmental or economic consequences.
I support continuing research and development of CPGS capabilities.
Missile Defense
Ballistic missile proliferation and lethality continues to increase
as countries acquire greater numbers of ballistic missiles, increase
their ranges, and incorporate countermeasures. North Korea possesses
the Taepo Dong 2 space launch vehicle/ICBM, and has displayed the KN08
road-mobile ICBM that is likely capable of reaching much of the
continental United States. North Korea also possesses hundreds of
Short- and Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles capable of threatening South
Korea, Japan, and forward-deployed United States forces in Eastern Asia
and the Western Pacific. Iran's ballistic missile capability also
presents a significant challenge to United States interests in the
Middle East. Iran's overall defense strategy relies on a substantial
inventory of ballistic missiles capable of striking targets throughout
Southwest Asia and parts of Europe.
Accordingly, effective missile defense is an essential element of
the U.S. commitment to strengthen strategic and regional deterrence
against states of concern. The Ground Based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
system protects the United States Homeland against a limited ICBM
attack from North Korea and potential future threats from Iran.
However, continued investment in three broad categories is required to
lower costs and improve our capabilities against growing threats: 1)
persistent and survivable sensors, 2) increased inventories of Ground
Based Interceptors (GBI) with improved performance and reliability and
3) increased regional capability and capacity. These needs can be
addressed by the continued funding of priority programs such as: Long-
Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR), Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV), Aegis
Ballistic Missile Defense, Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense follow-
on, Overhead Persistent Infra-Red sensors, Upgraded Early Warning
Radar, and Joint Tactical Ground Stations. Collectively, these
improvements increase interceptor effectiveness and lower costs to
defeat threats.
We have made significant progress in reaching our missile defense
goals. To enhance Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) sensors and
discrimination, we are using available technology to improve sensors,
battle management, fire control and kill vehicles, while fielding LRDR
to improve tracking and discrimination for Homeland defense against
Pacific theater threats. We are also increasing the number of GBIs from
30 to 44 by the end of 2017. Upgrades continue to improve GBI fleet
reliability, and the development of the RKV began last year with
deployment expected in approximately 2020. The RKVs will be more
reliable, cost-effective, and easier to produce.
The European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) contributes to the
defense of our deployed forces in Europe and our European NATO Allies.
EPAA Phase 1 was achieved in December 2011. Phase 2 is going through
testing and integration and we expect it to achieve operational
capability in Spring 2016. Phase 3 remains on schedule to be
operational in the 2018 timeframe and will provide defensive coverage
against medium- and intermediate-range threats with the deployment of a
second Aegis Ashore site in Poland and an upgraded SM-3 Block IIA
interceptor. The EPAA continues to be interoperable with NATO's
Ballistic Missile Defence system.
While significant investments in intercept technology have
increased our missile defense capability, much work remains. Increases
in the quantity and quality of threats increase the risk that adversary
missiles will penetrate our defenses and reach their intended targets.
We are working with the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense
Organization, the Missile Defense Agency and industry partners to
explore improvements to the current BMDS. We must also examine the
potential to prevent attacks by countering threats prior to launch.
Efforts to defeat missile threats across the launch spectrum rely on
awareness and warning and must be based on actions that are
synchronized within a fully integrated missile defense architecture to
maximize our limited defensive capacity.
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD)
The U.S National Security Strategy states ``there is no greater
threat to the American people than weapons of mass destruction,
particularly the danger posed by the pursuit of nuclear weapons by
violent extremists.'' The DOD Strategy for CWMD also affirms that the
pursuit of WMD and potential use by actors of concern pose a threat to
U.S. national security and stability around the world. As DOD's global
synchronizer for CWMD planning efforts, USSTRATCOM supports this
strategy by leveraging the expertise resident in our Center for
Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (SCC-WMD), the Standing Joint
Force Headquarters for Elimination (SJFHQ-E), and our partners at the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)--all located at Ft. Belvoir,
Virginia. Together our organizations conduct real-world and exercise
CWMD activities with the other combatant commands to identify,
prioritize, and mitigate WMD risks posed by the proliferation of WMD
technology and expertise to nation-states and non-state actors.
To execute the DOD Strategy for CWMD, we have identified a need for
comprehensive situational awareness that incorporates collaborative
tools, continuously assesses the WMD threat, and provides a holistic
awareness of the WMD environment. This capability would provide an
enhanced awareness of emergent catastrophic-scale WMD threats that
require collaboration across the interagency and partner nations. There
is also an urgent need to update agent defeat weapon systems and
develop modeling and simulation to assess collateral damage during WMD
weapon attacks. USSTRATCOM is working closely with DTRA to resolve
modeling and simulation shortfalls and ensure that cutting-edge
technology is applied to WMD consequence.
The National Strategic Research Institute (NSRI) at the University
of Nebraska, a University Affiliated Research Center in partnership
with USSTRATCOM and the DOD, is providing our nation with cutting-edge
mission-essential research and development capabilities in Combating
Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD). The NSRI experienced another
successful year conducting scientific research to help ensure
preparedness for WMD threats.
Joint Electronic Warfare / Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations
The electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) reaches across geopolitical
boundaries and domains, and is tightly integrated into the conduct of
commerce, governance and national security. Commercial demand for
spectrum access results in increased pressure on bandwidth
traditionally used for military operations. Additionally, our potential
adversaries are actively pursuing capabilities to contest our use of
the EMS.
Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (JEMSO) strengthens U.S.
national objectives and enables the combat capability of the Joint
Force by ensuring access to the EMS while denying adversaries the same.
USSTRATCOM is developing JEMSO policy and doctrine, addressing
capability gaps across the DOD, and working closely with the Combatant
Commands, Services and other U.S. Government agencies through advocacy,
planning and training.
Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconnaissance (ISR)
The demand for ISR has outpaced our ability to meet all needs. At
the same time, we are focused on increasing the effectiveness and
persistence of ISR capabilities while reducing business costs. Located
at Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, Washington, DC, USSTRATCOM's Joint
Functional Component Command for ISR (JFCC-ISR) is working with the
Joint Staff, Services, Combatant Commands and the Intelligence
Community to improve the management of DOD's existing ISR capabilities.
I fully support maximizing the agile use of the capabilities we have,
while also enhancing allied and partner contribution and cooperation.
These efforts are designed to increase the persistence of our ISR
capabilities, reduce the risk of strategic surprise, and increase our
ability to respond to crises.
Targeting and Analysis
Targeting requires dedicated analysis. USSTRATCOM's Joint Warfare
and Analysis Center (JWAC) in Dahlgren, VA enhances our Strategic
Deterrence and Global Strike missions by providing unique comprehensive
analysis. JWAC's ability to solve complex challenges for warfighters--
using a combination of social and physical science techniques and
engineering expertise--is invaluable to protecting the Nation and
helping the Joint Force accomplish its missions.
our people
People remain our most precious resource and deserve our
unequivocal commitment to their well-being. Just as we sustain and
modernize our platforms and weapons, we must sustain and modernize our
workforce. Maintaining a talent pool of nuclear scientists and
engineers is also paramount to providing viability to meet our
stockpile requirements. Likewise, investing in the future of the
professionals who operate, maintain, secure, and support our nuclear
enterprise is critical. Tomorrow's leaders must have the ability to
stretch their intellect well beyond one-dimensional problems. They must
be able to operate in a multi-dimensional environment with multiple
activities taking place simultaneously.
My visits throughout the past year confirmed my belief that we have
an outstanding team in all of our mission areas. I am honored to lead
such a focused, innovative and professional group dedicated to
delivering critical warfighting capabilities to the Nation. Whether
they are underwater on an SSBN, underground in a Launch Control Center,
in the air on a bomber, or supporting missions from cyberspace to outer
space, these great Americans do all they can for our Nation.
conclusion
Achieving strategic deterrence, assurance and escalation control
will require a multi-faceted, long-term approach to investing in
strategic capabilities and a renewed commitment to sustaining
intellectual capital. The sustainment and recapitalization of our
Nation's strategic capabilities is sorely needed and must not be
delayed.
In today's uncertain times, your support, combined with the hard
work of the exceptional men and women of United States Strategic
Command, will ensure that we remain ready, agile and effective in
deterring strategic attack, assuring our Allies and partners, and
addressing current and future threats.
Chairman McCain. Admiral Gortney.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM E. GORTNEY, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
NORTHERN COMMAND AND COMMANDER, NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE
DEFENSE COMMAND
Admiral Gortney. Chairman McCain, Senator Reed,
distinguished members of the committee, it's an honor to be in
front of you here today with my longtime shipmates, Admiral
Cecil Haney and Admiral Kurt Tidd.
First off, I'd like to thank you for the 2-year budget
relief to sequestration. Last year, I talked about
sequestration being the biggest threat to national security.
The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 is a much appreciated step in
the right direction, and we all look forward to a more
permanent solution in the future.
I also appreciate the time many of you have spent with me
over the past two weeks. From our discussions, I believe our
time is spent--best spent if I quickly summarize the range of
significant threats to the Homeland, because I agree with DNI
[Director of National Intelligence] Clapper when he told your
committee last month, ``Unpredictable instability has become
the new normal.''
I look at threats to the Homeland from those most dangerous
to most likely. On the most dangerous, the nation-states:
Russia, China, North Korea, where the peninsula is more
unstable than it's ever been since the Armistice, and, of
course, Iran. Non-state actors: Daesh, and, in the future,
whatever adaptation Daesh will morph into. Then transnational
organized crime who move product--drugs, humans, weapons, or
anything that will make them a profit, exploiting the many
seams between the nations in North, Central, and South America,
the seams between the many agencies of the Governments of those
nations, the seams created by the inadequate authorities,
resources, and training of many of those agencies in those
nations, and, yes, the seams created by the geographic
boundaries of our combatant command structure, seams for which
Kurt Tidd and I are accountable to close while we work the
military-to-military effort of our Nation's whole-of-government
approach to the many shared challenges within North, Central,
and South America.
The number-one priority of the Department and NORAD
[Northern American Aerospace Defense Command] and NORTHCOM is
Homeland defense. It's a no-fail mission, and it's just as
important today as when NORAD and NORTHCOM were established,
with one single commander responsible for the defense of our
Homeland through the many domains of air, space, maritime,
land, and cyber, although, within cyber, our responsibility
extends only as far as defending our own networks.
Today's evolving and resurgent threats are a function of
the return-to-great-power competition and the continuing global
terrorist threat. These threats create vulnerabilities best
mitigated through an integrated and binational approach across
the multiple domains, which requires a fully integrated defense
in the air, space, sea, and land domains. As a result, together
NORAD and NORTHCOM have evolved well past our Cold War and 9/11
origins, and are today inseparable. We defend the Homelands in
the air through the NORAD, and the remaining domains through
NORTHCOM, facing the traditional and nontraditional threats in
our assigned battlespace. NORAD and NORTHCOM work seamlessly
together in defense of our Homeland. We're focused on complete
unity of command and unity of effort. We are two commands, but
a single, fully-integrated headquarters organized and trained
to face the diverse array of evolving threats to our Nation's
security.
Outside the traditional military threat and again created
by the return-of-great-power competition is the nontraditional
threat to the Homeland. To counter this threat, I'm a
supporting commander to the Department of Homeland Security,
the Department of Justice, and the many law enforcement
agencies engaged in this crucial fight. Here, my primary
concern are homegrown violent extremists who are self-
radicalized and are in the receive-only mode and not actively
communicating back to Daesh. These extremists are targeting SOF
[Special Operations Forces], Department of Defense personnel
and facilities, and our own fellow citizens. This is what
occurred in Chattanooga on a DOD facility and in San Bernardino
against our Nation's civilian population. As the commander
accountable for setting the force-protection condition of DOD
facilities in the continental United States, we at NORTHCOM
work closely with the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps
in order to balance the enduring nature of this threat with the
services' ability to complete the many missions they have here
in the Homeland.
In closing, I want to mention our Homeland partnerships
that enable our success. We partner continuously with the
numerous interagency components of the government. These
include the National Guard, both airmen and soldiers, the
intelligence community, law enforcement agencies, and our
closest mission partner, the Department of Homeland Security.
Our mission partners maintain nearly 60 liaison officers in our
headquarters, and these patriots are fully embedded into our
ops and our intel organization.
Building partnership capacity within the Homeland is
absolutely vital to our mission. At NORTHCOM, 70 percent of our
major exercise--and this is nearly 200 each year--are focused
on our mission partners as the primary target audience of the
exercise programs. We call this Theater Security Cooperation
within the Homeland. This is NORTHCOM supporting our mission
partners, and our mission partners supporting us, which is why
we view these Homeland partnerships as our center of gravity,
as they are critical to the success across all of our assigned
mission areas.
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak, and I
welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Gortney follows:]
Prepared Statement by Admiral William E. Gortney
introduction
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of
the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today
to discuss the posture of United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM)
and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). I am here
representing the Commands' soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast
guardsmen, national guardsmen, reservists, and civilians safeguarding
our nation amidst the most diverse and challenging security atmosphere
in our history. Brave men and women are confronting this rapidly
changing defense environment head-on. It is an honor and a privilege to
serve alongside them and I am grateful to the Committee for the support
you provide.
North America is increasingly vulnerable to a vast array of
evolving threats--from highly capable, national powers to disaffected
individuals who act in response to extremist propaganda. These threats
are growing and becoming much more diffuse and less attributable.
Moreover, I believe that many of the crises originating as regional
conflicts elsewhere in the world are rapidly manifesting themselves
here at home and they continue to challenge our ability to warn and
defend.
The complexity and volatility of our strategic environment demands
that we advance and sustain the capabilities to protect our Homelands.
I believe the President's fiscal year 2017 budget represents a balanced
approach to maintaining our strategic advantage within the realities of
a fiscally-constrained environment. We are still feeling the impacts of
sequestration, primarily because the majority of the Services' cuts
were from the operations and maintenance accounts, which directly
impedes their ability to provide trained and equipped servicemembers to
Combatant Commands. I thank the Committee for your support in passing
the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, which represents another important
step toward permanent relief from the sequestration caps in the Budget
Control Act of 2011.
We are resolute in our commitment to deter, prevent, and defeat
attacks against the United States and Canada. We stand ready to provide
rapid and robust support to the primary lead agencies responding to
domestic disasters and the law enforcement agencies (LEAs) charged with
combating transnational organized crime. We continue to strengthen our
regional and Homeland partnerships; they are our center of gravity.
strategic environment
The expansive complexity of the contemporary security environment
makes defending the Homeland a continual challenge. The spectrum of
threats to our national security ranges from traditional nation-state
military capabilities to individuals with access to increasingly
destructive technologies. The diffusion of capability, the inexact art
of predicting intent, and the complications of attribution all
contribute to a blurring of lines between traditional military threats
and asymmetric threats that trigger military support or response.
Technological advances and proliferation coupled with pockets of
instability will generate a growing array of potential threats against
which we must posture ourselves. Many of our potential adversaries are
pursuing advanced weapons development not seen in decades.
Individually, they pose serious concerns to our national security and
the international community. Collectively, they represent a vast
spectrum of complex and volatile threats that I believe will only
continue to grow and threaten the Homeland if we hesitate to act
decisively.
russia
A resurgent Russia continues to assert itself on the world stage.
No longer content merely to pursue primacy within its near abroad,
Russia's forays into Syria highlight Vladimir Putin's willingness to
employ military power to advance his agenda outside Russia's near
abroad. Last year I stated that Russia is progressing toward its goal
of deploying long-range, conventionally armed cruise missiles
comparable to Western systems. In 2015 these efforts came to fruition,
as Russia employed heavy bombers, surface vessels, and a submarine to
launch advanced conventional cruise missiles at targets in Syria. These
operations served as a proof-of-concept for weapons systems and tactics
ultimately intended to provide flexible deterrent options in a future
crisis.
Russia's strategic nuclear forces remain the only foreign military
threat that could imperil our nation's existence, and Moscow continues
to spend significant resources to modernize its nuclear arsenal and
delivery systems. While Russia seeks to avoid a strategic conflict with
the United States, Moscow perceives itself to be threatened by a
coordinated Western effort to erode its sovereignty, weaken its
economy, and undermine its regime. I am concerned these threat
perceptions could prompt Russia's leaders to misinterpret our
intentions in a crisis, leading to inadvertent escalation.
china
As part of its long-term, comprehensive military modernization
program, China continues to modernize and expand its strategic forces
with a focus on improving its ability to survive a first strike and
penetrate United States' missile defenses. Concerned that that United
States precision strike and missile defense capabilities undermine its
strategic deterrent, Beijing is working to improve the survivability of
its nuclear force to ensure a credible second-strike capability.
China continues to supplement its modest silo-based
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force with a growing number
of road-mobile ICBMs and is now in the process of operationalizing its
first viable class of ballistic missile submarines, which, if
successful, would be China's first sea-based strategic nuclear
deterrent. China is also developing a range of anti-access and area-
denial weapons which, along with its cyber, counter-space, and
strategic nuclear capabilities, are designed to discourage United
States intervention in a regional crisis. Meanwhile, Beijing's
diplomatic strategy appears to be focused on limiting United States
options by denying physical and political access in key regions around
the globe.
north korea
North Korea's recent hostile cyberspace activity, nuclear testing,
and continued ballistic missile development represent a dangerous
threat to our national security. North Korea's recent nuclear test and
satellite launch demonstrate Kim Jong Un's commitment to developing
strategic capabilities, as well as his disregard for United Nations
Security Council resolutions. The regime's efforts to develop and
deploy the road-mobile KN08 ICBM have profound implications for
Homeland missile defense, primarily because the missile obviates most
of the pre-launch indicators on which we have traditionally relied to
posture our defenses. While the KN08 remains untested, modeling
suggests it could deliver a nuclear payload to much of the Continental
United States. We assess Kim Jong Un is unlikely to attack our Homeland
unless he perceives an imminent threat to his regime's survival.
However, we are concerned the possession of a nuclear ICBM could
embolden the regime's intransigence below the nuclear threshold and
complicate our response to a crisis on the peninsula. While I do not
believe that North Korea's efforts to develop a submarine-launched
ballistic missile represent a near-term threat to the United States
Homeland, the program underscores the level of effort and resources the
regime is willing to devote to developing advanced weapon systems. As
the combatant commander charged with defending the Homeland, I take
this threat very seriously, particularly in light of North Korea's
unpredictable leadership.
iran
Iran poses multiple significant security concerns to the United
States, and I remain wary of its strategic trajectory. Last year's
conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was a welcome
development, but, Iran's continuing pursuit of long-range missile
capabilities and ballistic missile and space launch programs, in
violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions, remains a
serious concern. Iran has successfully orbited satellites using a
first-generation space launch vehicle and announced plans to orbit a
larger satellite using its ICBM-class booster as early as this year. In
light of these advances, we assess Iran may be able to deploy an
operational ICBM by 2020 if the regime choses to do so. Additionally,
Iran has invested in developing advanced offensive cyberspace
capability and has demonstrated cyberspace operations that could
threaten our critical civil infrastructure.
violent extremists
In addition to the challenges posed by global and regional powers,
a more insidious threat comes from extremists who undermine our
national security through radicalization and violence. Here in the
Homeland, we face a pernicious terrorist threat from the self-
proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which I choose
to refer to as Daesh. Their sophisticated and robust social media
campaign is motivating citizens to do harm to fellow citizens. Daesh
has a strong recruiting narrative amplified by abundant attention in
traditional and social media, which can resonate amongst disaffected
Westerners. The tragic attacks in Chattanooga and San Bernardino
underscore the difficulty intelligence and law enforcement face in
detecting Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVEs) who do not show outward,
reported signs of radicalization prior to an attack.
Meanwhile, we remain attuned to the potential for foreign terrorist
organizations to conduct more complex, directed attacks in North
America. al Qaeda and Daesh have communicated their intent to attack
North America, and Daesh demonstrated its capability to conduct
horrific, large scale attacks with the November 13th attacks in Paris.
In addition, we have observed a continued focus on aviation targets,
most notably by the probable bombing of a Russian airliner over the
Sinai Peninsula in November. While much work needs to be done, since 9/
11, our law enforcement partners and the wider Intelligence Community
have vastly improved procedures to deter or prevent similar coordinated
attacks, but terrorists are constantly adapting. We are prepared to
support civil authorities when asked if a complex or large-scale attack
were to take place.
transnational organized crime
Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) presents a dangerous and highly
sophisticated threat to the United States and a challenge to global
stability. Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) exploit
infrastructure, corrupt officials, challenge societal norms, and are
responsible for attacks on law enforcement and innocent civilians. TCOs
represent the principal suppliers of illicit drugs into the Homeland
and the trafficking of precursor chemicals for use in illicit drug
production. TOC erodes the rule of law through extortion, violence and
other illicit activity, which creates a security vulnerability that
could be exploited by state and non-state actors.
lines of operation
In my statement to this Committee last year, I described the unique
aspects of USNORTHCOM as the nation's Homeland geographic combatant
command (GCC) and NORAD as the nation's oldest bi-national command. I
explained the importance of prioritizing our complementary and
individual functions with a focus on our shared end states. Our key
Lines of Operation are more critical than ever to our mission success.
We map all of our activities to these Lines of Operation, which shape
our activities and effort.
USNORTHCOM and NORAD Lines of Operation
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defense of our Homelands
Defense Support of Civil Authorities
Homeland Partnerships
Regional Partnerships
The Arctic
Professionalism and Excellence
Warfighters and Families
defense of our homelands
As the Commander of USNORTHCOM and NORAD, my primary task is to
defend the Homelands. Defense of our Homelands is our dominant line of
operation, and it is the core focus of USNORTHCOM and NORAD primary
missions. We are ever mindful of the supreme responsibility we have of
defending the security of the United States, our citizens, and our
allies and partners. In 2015, we celebrated NORAD's 57th year defending
North America against attack through our no-fail aerospace warning and
aerospace control missions. NORAD was born in the Cold War and expanded
to an internal threat focus after 9/11. By contrast, USNORTHCOM was
born in the aftermath of 9/11 and shaped by the seminal nature of those
attacks. Both Commands are ever-adapting within the strategic
environment, and we work hard to develop our capabilities to outpace
threats.
missile defense
USNORTHCOM's most prominent Homeland defense mission is Ballistic
Missile Defense (BMD). Currently, our BMD architecture is designed
primarily to defend against limited long range ballistic missile
attacks from North Korean and Iran. In light of an evolving threat and
the increasingly enigmatic and unpredictable nature of North Korea's
dictator, Kim Jong Un, I believe it is imperative that the United
States continue to develop more capable forces and broader options for
effective ballistic missile defense. Our BMD architecture is comprised
of a group of independent, yet interrelated components that form a
complex and unified defensive network. This system of systems cannot be
modernized and maintained sequentially; each component must be improved
concurrently to outpace the evolving threat. I agree with and support
the modernization priorities set by Vice Admiral Jim Syring and his
team at the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), including improvement in our
discrimination sensors, lethality of our kill vehicles, sustainment of
the BMD architecture, and development of our kinetic and non-kinetic
options. I am grateful to this committee for your support and
commitment to modernizing our Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).
We are on the right path to improving our sensors through the
development and deployment of the new Long Range Discrimination Radar
(LRDR). This critical midcourse sensor is expected to provide
persistent sensor coverage and vastly improve our target tracking and
discrimination capability. The LRDR will help us evaluate our
countermeasure options and increase the capability of our Ground Based
Midcourse Defense (GMD) interceptors.
We remain on track to deploy the final 14 interceptors in Alaska,
which will give us 44 missiles in the ground by the end of 2017.
Finishing the inventory is a big step toward the robust BMDS of the
future, but it is critical that we not stop there. We need to continue
working on enhancements to the current Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle
(EKV), and investments in the future Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV). We
need to invest in the lethality of our kill vehicles, and in ways to
get us to the right side of the cost curve. Our adversaries are
developing relatively inexpensive technologies, which we assess can
reach the Homeland. By contrast, our interceptors are vastly more
expensive. Today, our BMDS is in an unsustainable cost model, which has
us postured to shoot down inexpensive rockets with very expensive ones.
I believe that Homeland defense is fundamentally an ``away game'',
and missile defense is no exception. Today's GMD system is designed to
intercept incoming threats after the launch is initiated. While that
approach offers us sufficient decision space, we need to augment our
defensive posture with one that is designed to defeat ballistic missile
threats in the boost phase as well as before they are launched, known
as ``left of launch.'' In concert with our public and private
stakeholders, MDA is working on an emerging technology that will enable
us to employ non-kinetic methods to defeat ballistic missile threats
when we receive indications that a launch is imminent. I believe this
technology will reduce the overall cost of engagement-based missile
defense and provide us options to defeat ballistic missiles that
continue to proliferate around the world.
We work closely with other GCCs, functional combatant commands, and
partner nations to leverage capabilities that enable us to protect the
Homeland. Thanks to agreements with the Government of Japan, United
States Pacific Command (USPACOM) was able to deploy a second Army Navy/
Transportable Radar Surveillance and Control Model 2, or AN/TPY-2 to
Japan, which dramatically improved our ability to ``defend forward.''
In addition to the proliferation of ballistic missile threats, I am
deeply troubled by the development of advanced long-range cruise
missiles and the growing threat they represent to North America. Russia
possesses both conventional and nuclear cruise missiles with the range
to reach North America and it has proliferated some advanced cruise
missile technologies to other actors. This threat is real and it is
imperative that we develop effective response options to outpace the
threat and enhance our deterrence. We are working with the Joint
Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization (JIAMDO), MDA, and
other stakeholders to improve our Cruise Missile Defense (CMD)
capabilities.
Effectively countering and defeating cruise missiles requires a
layered and integrated architecture that can defend across the full
spectrum of the engagement sequence. Cruise missiles represent a real
operational challenge because of their increased standoff capability,
low altitude and small radar signatures. Although no single system can
counter all cruise missiles, we have confidence in our layered
architecture to defend the Homeland. To defeat this more capable
threat, we are working on enhancements to each of the individual
systems, including our Indications and Warnings capabilities, wide-
area-surveillance, and advanced fire control infrastructure.
We are in the first segment of our three-phase Homeland Defense
Design (HDD) effort, which will improve our capability to find, fix,
track, target, and engage growing air threats, such as those posed by
cruise missiles, low-slow aircraft, and long-range aviation. In this
first phase, we are testing and evaluating advanced sensors as well as
integrated command and control capabilities. In addition to the new
STateside Affordable Radar System (STARS), we had begun a three-year
operational exercise of the Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense
Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS). This exercise has been an
opportunity for us to see how well JLENS can fit into the existing
Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) of the National Capital Region
(NCR), including deployment of a JLENS Fire Control System aerostat,
which is designed to work in tandem with the surveillance aerostat.
Unfortunately, on October 28, 2015, the JLENS Fire Control System
aerostat detached from its mooring station on Aberdeen Proving Ground,
Maryland, and eventually grounded in a wooded area in northeast
Pennsylvania. The Army is conducting a thorough investigation to
determine the cause of the incident. Although this was a setback to our
operational exercise, we still believe the JLENS system shows great
promise in defense of the NCR. If the outcome of the investigation
leads to the resumption of the operational exercise, we will work with
the Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, as well as
Congressional Defense Committees, on the way forward to continue our
assessment of JLENS' performance in support of cruise missile defense.
aerospace warning, aerospace control and maritime warning
In 1958, the United States and Canada formalized the bi-national
agreement, which created NORAD to provide centralized operational
control of continental air defenses against the threat of Soviet
bombers. Every subsequent renewal of that agreement helped reshape the
partnership to meet evolving threats to North America. After the fall
of the Soviet Union, and in light of non-traditional aerospace threats,
NORAD expanded its mission to include air sovereignty, warning, and
assessment. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, NORAD's paradigm
changed, and we began to focus on aviation security issues originating
within Canada and the United States. For the last 14 years, Operation
NOBLE EAGLE has defended our nation against 9/11-style terrorist
attacks and other non-traditional aviation threats.
Aerospace warning and aerospace control of North America remains
NORAD's primary missions. The command retains robust air defense
capabilities to execute the air sovereignty mission over Canada, Alaska
and the continental United States. Today, we are confronted with an
unprecedented spectrum of aerospace and maritime challenges, ranging
from resurgence in Russian naval and aerospace activity to the
proliferation of private Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS).
In addition to expanded military activity in Europe and the Middle
East, we are observing a significant rise in Russian military
assertiveness in the approaches to North America. Russian Long Range
Aviation activity has surged, beginning with regular out-of-area
patrols in 2007, culminating with a record number of out-of-area
patrols in 2014 and the first-ever combat use of Russian heavy bombers
in the Syrian conflict in November 2015.
NORAD is responsible for monitoring and identifying all aircraft of
interest approaching North America that may enter the sovereign
airspace of either Canada or the United States. On July 4th, 2015,
NORAD fighter aircraft intercepted and visually identified two sets of
Russian Tu-95 ``Bear'' long-range bombers flying in the United States
Air Defense Identification Zone, one in the airspace west of Alaska's
coast and another off the coast of central California. Although none of
the four bombers entered United States or Canadian sovereign airspace
and were not a direct threat to our national security, they do
represent a strategic demonstration of Russian military capability. I
believe these flights are one way the Kremlin delivers the message that
Russia remains a power with global reach.
In addition to increasing activity from state-actors and the
potential for 9/11-style attacks, the growing availability and
expanding capability of small manned and unmanned aerial systems will
challenge the DOD, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and our
law enforcement partners defending our airspace. UAS constitute a
rapidly-developing industry, with increasingly sophisticated and yet
simple-to-operate systems available for purchase by the general public,
increasing the likelihood that more of these aircraft will be used in
the National Airspace System. Although the vast majority of these
devices are operated in a lawful manner, their growing availability
increases the likelihood of illicit use. Countering increased
proliferation of non-traditional aviation technology (NTAT) will take a
whole-of-community approach, with law enforcement at every level
playing a critical role.
NORAD is postured to defend against threats to North America by
aircraft, cruise missiles, and medium or large UASs. However, the
layered detection infrastructure used to detect, identify, and track
these threats is not designed for smaller non-traditional aircraft or
UAS. On April 15, 2015, a small manned gyrocopter departed from
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania and flew to the NCR, landing on the grounds of
the Capitol in Washington, DC. The gyrocopter unknowingly exploited an
operational challenge in detecting and tracking low-altitude and slow-
speed aerial vehicles.
The airspace surrounding the NCR, known as the Washington DC.
Special Flight Rules Area (SFRA) is monitored by the Integrated Air
Defense System (IADS), which is a vast network of radars, cameras, and
other detection and warning devices. The IADS is extremely capable of
identifying and tracking potential threats to the NCR--anything from
large commercial aircraft down to small, single-propeller recreational
aircraft. Our post-event analysis revealed that the gyrocopter was
detected by several of our integrated sensors as it approached and
transited the SFRA. However, some of the aircraft's operational
parameters, including speed, altitude, and radar cross-section fell
below the thresholds necessary to differentiate it from surrounding
objects , including weather, terrain, and birds. This event reinforced
the fact that detecting and tracking low-altitude and slow-speed aerial
vehicles is a significant technical challenge. The post-event analysis
was a turning point for the interagency community's efforts addressing
the technical and procedural changes necessary to detect, track, and
mitigate threats posed by these non-traditional aviation technologies.
As the spectrum of aerospace and maritime threats expands, we test
and evaluate our ability to warn and defend against a range of
scenarios. We challenge ourselves to outpace the known threats and
anticipate the unknown ones. In order to test responses, systems and
equipment, NORAD conducts numerous exercises with a variety of
scenarios, including airspace restriction violations, hijackings and
responses to unknown aircraft. This year, we conducted fourteen robust
interagency live-fly aerospace defense exercises. These training events
are scenario-based and are intended to exercise all aspects of our
airspace defense plans. Defending the airspace in the NCR requires
close collaboration with all the interagency stakeholders; therefore,
we coordinate and exercise with our key partners, including the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), the National Capital Region Coordination
Center (NCRCC), the Joint Air Defense Operations Center (JADOC), the
Civil Air Patrol, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Continental NORAD
Region (CONR) Eastern and Western Air Defense Sectors.
In addition to NORAD's traditional air defense role, our mission
set also encompasses maritime warning, which includes the unique
responsibility of providing maritime domain awareness and maritime
warning of activities conducted in the maritime approaches and internal
waterways of North America. Although NORAD does not have a maritime
control mission, we are uniquely postured to process, assess and
disseminate intelligence and operational information to our Canadian
and United States interagency partners. The maritime approaches to
North America are extremely congested, which makes executing a
unilateral, bilateral or bi-national response to a threat challenging.
We issued eight maritime warning advisories in 2015, providing a
critical bi-national Homeland defense support capability.
homeland defense
Global violent extremism is on the rise and it is neither
restricted to a single ideology nor constrained by borders. The 2015
attacks in Paris, Mali, Chattanooga, San Bernadino, and others
represent a growing radical movement of groups and individuals inspired
by a range of beliefs that promote or use violence to undermine our
universal values. Here in the Homeland, we are seeing a growing use of
violence by domestic terrorists and HVEs, many of whom are radicalized
by violent extremist groups like Daesh, and al Qaeda.
We collaborate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), DHS,
and many other federal agencies to provide unity of effort to deter,
prevent, and defend against threats to our Homeland. Our federal
partners and allies have successfully deterred or prevented some
violent plots, but blind spots and intelligence gaps are common when
trying to counter terrorism, so we must prepare for those times when we
have no specific warning. In making assessments of possible threats, we
gather and share snippets of information and try to determine how
individual threat reports may morph into threat streams. We assess
these threats against four specific attributes: plausibility,
credibility, specificity, and imminency. In a number of cases, we are
able to establish that the threats are plausible and credible, but
often times we lack specific and imminent pre-operational indicators,
which makes preventing these attacks especially challenging.
As the Commander of USNORTHCOM, I am responsible for protecting DOD
installations and personnel from domestic threats. One of my assigned
tasks is setting the baseline Force Protection Condition (FPCON) for
DOD installations in the Homeland. Earlier this year, we began to
observe a growing focus on targeting members of the United States
military, in addition to virtual targeting of DOD personnel after Daesh
released the names and addresses of U.S. servicemembers.
On May 7, 2015, I raised the FPCON level in the United States to
FPCON Bravo, which is only the second time that has been done since 9/
11. My decision was a prudent measure to ensure increased vigilance and
safeguarding of DOD personnel, installations, and facilities within my
USNORTHCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). I believe terrorists will
continue to emphasize targeting DOD personnel for the foreseeable
future, so establishing a preemptive, unpredictable frequency of
actions will mitigate threats to our installations, personnel, assets,
resources, and infrastructure.
After the tragic July 16th shootings in Chattanooga, I released an
additional force protection advisory that mandated several additional
randomly-applied security measures within FPCON Bravo, with an emphasis
on off-installation activities, including recruiting stations, Reserve
centers, and Reserve Officer Training Corps units. With this threat not
diminishing, these increased security measures will likely become our
new normal, so we implemented measures that were practicable and
sustainable for the facilities affected.
For the Homeland, I believe Daesh's center of gravity is in their
narrative and a perception of success in bringing about a 21st century
``caliphate.'' Our objective must move beyond defending against violent
extremism to preventing it entirely by breaking their cycle of
radicalization, which will require countering their narrative at the
grassroots level. Countering the narrative of terrorists like al Qaeda
and Daesh requires a globally unified response, including positive and
proactive contributions from national and local governments, local
communities, and the private sector.
counternarcotics and transnational organized crime
The trafficking and the endemic abuse of illicit drugs represent a
national security threat to the United States. The primary criminal
drug threat is posed by Mexican TCOs, the main suppliers of cocaine,
heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana throughout the United States.
TOC distribution networks and drug trafficking enterprises are
expanding, most notably among the heroin and methamphetamine markets.
Here in the Homeland, TCOs maintain relatively low profiles to avoid
confrontations with law enforcement, but their domestically-affiliated
gangs commit violent crimes to maintain power in their territories and
control their local drug markets. In addition to illicit drug
trafficking, these intricate TOC networks move legal goods, weapons,
natural resources, and people, with revenues comparable to the gross
domestic product of small countries.
Combating TOC requires unity of effort among federal, state, local,
and foreign governments. We will continue to work together with our
interagency partners in assisting Mexico and other countries around the
world to respond to the evolving threats posed by transnational
criminal organizations. Central to this effort is strengthening our
partner nations' ability to enhance the rule of law so that judicial,
law enforcement, security, and community organizations can effectively
combat the TCOs.
USNORTHCOM works very hard to develop the trusted partnership
opportunities with our domestic law enforcement agencies and Mexican
military partners to align and synchronize our efforts. We provide
title 10 counterdrug support to federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies, and we coordinate with the National Guard to
synchronize DOD support to domestic law enforcement. When requested by
Mexico, and in a manner consistent with the human rights provisions of
the Leahy Law, USNORTHCOM cooperates with the U.S. Country Team and the
Mexican military to support efforts building C-TOC capacities to
disrupt and degrade TCO activities.
We provide operational counterdrug support through our subordinate
command, Joint Task Force North (JTF-N), which recruits and employs
title 10 units on a strictly voluntary basis filling domestic law
enforcement gaps with mostly military-unique capabilities. In 2015,
JTF-N provided support to 51 specific multi-domain and multi-LEA
operations, including detection and monitoring, ground surveillance,
and mobility support.
In addition to providing critical military-unique support to LEA,
the operational support provided by the title 10 units significantly
benefits DOD, because in many cases, it simultaneously achieves many of
the supporting unit's critical training requirements. The planning,
interagency collaboration, and dynamic execution of these missions
closely approximates the missions these units will perform during
future deployments, and the setting of southwest border operations
mirrors the austere environment common to many forward-deployed
locations.
USNORTHCOM is just one supporting organization in the much larger
interagency and international law enforcement effort to counter TOC in
the global environment. We contribute, as the other combatant commands
do, by addressing threats in our AOR, providing support to our
interagency and host nation partners, and collaborating with each other
to close gaps and seams. We will continue our efforts to enhance mutual
trust, increase collaboration, improve C-TOC capacity, and to
contribute to a cooperative defense of North America.
cyber
Cyber threats are increasingly among the most serious national
security dangers faced by the United States today, and I remain adamant
in considering activity in cyberspace as integral to an overall
domestic attack assessment. More and more we are confronted by a range
of actors, from nation states like Russia, North Korea, China, and
Iran, to profit-motivated criminals and ideologically-driven hackers.
Both state and non-state actors attempt to target critical
infrastructure, information and telecommunication systems, and
financial institutions. What makes cyber attacks so difficult to defend
against is the speed at which the technology advances, coupled with the
diffuse nature of the attacks and the difficulty to attribute the
source.
Cyber attacks pose a serious risk to the networks and systems
controlling our critical infrastructure. The U.S. military is dependent
on privately owned critical infrastructure, an attack on which could
yield potentially severe consequences in a time of crisis. We are
working with our Government and industry partners to isolate our
vulnerabilities and identify ways to prevent malicious cyber activity
while defending our networks.
In addition to the millions of daily vulnerability probes of our
networks and other cyber sabotage activity, we have seen a rise in
Chinese cyber espionage, resulting in a significant loss of
intellectual property and sensitive information that resides on some of
our unclassified systems. This loss of vital intellectual property has
the potential to damage our national security and impede our economic
growth.
defense support of civil authorities
As the USNORTHCOM Commander and a GCC with responsibility for 49 of
50 states, I have the responsibility to provide DOD assistance to
federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal authorities within the
Homeland. Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), our second Line
of Operation, is a unique authority by which we facilitate DOD support
in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for
domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic
activities. DSCA covers the spectrum of civil activities, from
localized weather incidents to the response to weapons of mass
destruction events. The DOD has a long history of supporting civil
authorities with specialized skills, capabilities, and capacities
maintained for the battlefield that provide stability in the wake of
catastrophic events at home. Our support has been significantly shaped
by lessons learned in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy,
and we conduct vigorous exercises to forge our enduring partnerships
with agencies and organizations across the country. We stand ready to
support the lead federal agencies (LFA) in responding quickly to
natural and manmade disasters and to the effects of terrorist attacks.
The most prominent and frequent support we provide is disaster
response assistance to DHS's Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA). Last year's FEMA major disaster declarations were mostly in
response to severe storms, flooding, and wildfires. We directly
supported disaster relief operations to several states that suffered
widespread flooding, including South Carolina. One of the worst fire
seasons in recent United States history occurred this past year, with
wildfires spreading throughout much of the Western United States and
straining federal, state, and local firefighting capacity. Of note,
2015 was the worst year on record for wildfires in Washington State,
culminating in a rash of fires that resulted in a federal emergency
declaration. As a result of widespread fires, the National Interagency
Fire Center (NIFC) set the national Preparedness Level (PL) at PL5, the
highest level, which indicated that wide geographic areas were
experiencing major incidents which had the potential to exhaust all
agency fire resources. For the first time since 2006, the NIFC
submitted a Request For Assistance (RFA) through USNORTHCOM, with final
approval by the Secretary of Defense for DOD firefighting support. In
August 2015, NIFC's request was approved, and with the help of the
United States Army, we deployed 200 soldiers from 17th Field Artillery
Brigade located at Joint Base Lewis-McChord in Washington to provide
ground support to the fire-fighting effort. The crews assisted the fire
prevention efforts, and constructed firebreaks to slow or stop the
progress of the fire.
As incidents in the Homeland develop, we work closely with our
interagency partners to provide options for DOD support, should they
require our assistance. In November, the DHS and U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) observed an increase in the number of
unaccompanied children (UC) and family units apprehended along the
Southwest Border, with a trend that was projected to exceed its organic
housing capacity. The Office of Refugee Resettlement at HHS initiated a
plan to expand its temporary capacity to house unaccompanied children,
which included a request to the DOD to identify facilities capable of
temporarily housing UCs. In support of HHS and with the help of the
Services, we coordinated the use of several DOD installations that
could be used for this purpose, under a reimbursable agreement between
the agencies. In January 2016, 129 UCs arrived at Holloman Air Force
Base, New Mexico under the care of HHS' Administration for Children and
Families and USNORTHCOM remains ready to facilitate the use of other
DOD installations if needed.
homeland partnerships
The focal point of USNORTHCOM and NORAD's power and strength are in
the partnerships that we create and sustain with joint, interagency,
and multinational organizations. Our trusted partnerships are our
center of gravity and are critical to our success across the spectrum
of our missions. Homeland Partnerships, our third line of operation,
underscore every one of our mission areas, and are best represented by
the integration in our headquarters of nearly 60 DOD and non-DOD
federal agencies, department representatives, and liaison officers. I
view Homeland defense as a team effort, and I rely on partnerships with
my fellow combatant commands, the Services, and our interagency
partners to accomplish this mission.
We have built on our partnership with the Joint Improvised-threat
Defeat Agency (JIDA) and the resulting collaboration with the lead
federal agencies to protect the Homeland from next-generation
Improvised Explosive Devices (IED).
We continue to develop our key partnership with the DHS and provide
support through frequent strategic, operational and tactical dialogue.
I collaborate regularly with DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson through visits
and monthly video teleconferences. I believe that his Southern Border
and Approaches Campaign will further unify Homeland defense and
security along our southern border. We are underway with the first of
three deliberate phases of support toward an end state of fully
integrated and synchronized operational activities with DHS's new Joint
Task Forces (JTFs).
regional partnerships
USNORTHCOM and NORAD do not face today's complex strategic
environment alone. Our allies and partner nations actively contribute
to the cooperative defense of North America. Strong and reliable
Regional Partnerships, our fourth line of operation, are critical for
us to protect our shared values and ways of life and defend our nations
in depth. We are inextricably linked with our partners through
geography, economies, and demographics, and conduct deliberate security
cooperation with them to strengthen our defense in depth and advance
our mutual security interests.
canada
For over 57 years, NORAD has been a model for international
cooperation and a symbol of trust and confidence between the United
States and Canada. Our partnership is reinforced by our common values,
and today, the men and women who wear the cloth of these two great
nations work side-by-side throughout USNORTHCOM and NORAD. We are
fortunate to have dedicated Canadian military members fully integrated
throughout the NORAD Command and staff, including the three-star
Canadian officer who serves as my NORAD Deputy Commander. This year, we
hosted our 8th annual Tri-Command Staff Talks among USNORTHCOM, NORAD,
and Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC), during which we were able
to advance several key initiatives, including combined training and
exercises, and synchronization of our requirements and capabilities
advocacy processes. Going forward, I will promote our alliance with
Canada to enhance our interoperability and contribute to combined
operations.
With our Canadian partners, we are focusing on a deliberate
collaborative investment strategy to outpace current and potential
adversaries and counter emerging threats through a seamless and layered
defense. As a result of our recent NORAD Strategic Review directed by
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Canadian Chief of the
Defence Staff, we commenced an effort to modernize NORAD. One of the
first parts of our modernization is the North Warning System, which is
the linchpin of our ability to detect, assess, and track airborne
activity along the northern border of North America. Over the next
decade, a priority will be research and development in next-generation
indications and warning systems for the northern approaches to improve
detection, surveillance, and engagement of current and emerging
threats, ensuring our ability to monitor, control, and respond if
necessary.
mexico
This year, the military-to-military relationship between the United
States and Mexico reached unprecedented levels of coordination. Today
we are strategic partners, respecting the laws and sovereignty of our
individual nations, while confronting shared security challenges. We
have developed an enduring cooperative relationship with the
Secretariat of National Defense (SEDENA) and the Secretariat of the
Navy (SEMAR). We work closely with the Mexican military to enhance
planning, tactical skills, communication capabilities to include
cybersecurity, and incorporation of human rights principles. In 2015
alone, I personally met with top military leaders of Mexico on eight
separate occasions to strengthen our relationships and enhance our
coordination.
I expect the safety and security of North America will be a long-
term fight, and we continue to help the Mexican military build
partnership capacity at their pace. We continued our training and
equipping efforts focusing on ensuring the timely delivery of a record
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) investment of over a billion dollars by
the Government of Mexico in UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters and High
Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV). We also began the
process this year of partnering with United States and Mexican civil
organizations to enhance the Government of Mexico's ability to control
and regulate their southern border with Guatemala and Belize. The focus
of our efforts in this region is to collaborate on improving the
communications network and investing in a biometrics system to promote
interagency coordination and reduce insecurity.
This past summer, in conjunction with our Customs and Border
Protection Air and Marine Operations partners, we conducted our second
annual bilateral security cooperation exercise with Mexico, which
demonstrated the significant progress we have made in training,
information sharing and interoperability with the Mexican military. The
exercise employs a cooperative response scenario designed to exercise
and refine procedures to monitor, track and coordinate a response to an
illegal flight transiting the border between the United States and
Mexico. We expanded the scope of this year's exercise by including a
two-phase live-fly portion, with the first phase simulating a hijacked
aircraft originating from the United States and transiting into Mexico.
The second phase was a simulated stolen aircraft suspected of carrying
narcotics which originated in Mexico and transited into the United
States. Not only did these two scenarios improve our information
sharing and mutual warning processes, the enhanced air control
procedures we developed provided the foundation necessary to streamline
a coordinated response to suspicious aircraft transiting our shared
border.
Our combined efforts to promote democratic values, respect human
rights, and counter TCOs continue to be a key focus of the training
provided by the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation
(WHINSEC). This program provides a critical foundation for mutual
security and democracy, and the relationships formed by the students at
WHINSEC reinforce the trust and cooperation among the participating
nations.
the bahamas
Increased tourism, maritime, and commercial activity complicated by
a resurgence in illicit trafficking and foreign influence, makes the
Caribbean region a significant challenge in maintaining our national
security. We are working with our regional partners to build domain
awareness and develop capabilities to counter illicit trafficking and
smuggling. Our ``third border'' with The Bahamas is the basis for a
partnership critical to the security of the United States. The Bahamian
Government is a willing partner, though they are limited in their
security capacity, so we are forging a strong partnership through our
support of the Royal Bahamas Defence Force (RBDF) and are helping them
build capabilities that enhance detection, monitoring and interdiction
of the migrant and drug flows that transit their country.
the arctic
Climate change and receding polar sea ice in the Arctic combined
with global interest in emerging economic opportunities and an increase
in human activity pose unique security challenges for the United
States. Although the Arctic remains a vast, harsh and challenging
operating environment, many Arctic nations are demonstrating increased
interest and presence in the region. I believe that The Arctic, our
fifth line of operation, represents the intersection between geography
and interests. I view the Arctic as an emerging region where we will be
called upon to support other federal agencies and work with our
regional partners to safeguard the stability and security of the
region.
We believe that while the likelihood of military conflict in the
Arctic in the short term is low, international interest and presence
are growing and it is necessary that the United States, and
specifically the DOD, plan for a wide range of challenges and
contingencies. Today, the often harsh operating environment yields
significant variability in the pace and scope of change in commercial
activity, which complicates our ability to plan and invest in our
required capabilities. Constrained budgets and competing priorities
dictate that we take a proactive, yet prudent approach to our
investments in Arctic capabilities.
As the Commander of USNORTHCOM, one of my assigned tasks is to be
the DOD advocate for Arctic capabilities. In this role, I am
responsible for collaborating with DOD Arctic stakeholders to help
identify capability requirements and shortfalls across the spectrum of
DOD operations and champion their resolution with our trusted partners.
Our Arctic Capabilities Advocacy Working Group (ACAWG) is a
collaborative forum among DOD, interagency, and trusted international
Arctic stakeholders, including geographic and functional combatant
commands, the Joint Staff, the Military Departments and Services, and
DOD agencies that supports these actions.
Our ACAWG is taking a prudent, fact-based approach to Arctic
advocacy and investment so that we do not over invest, under invest, or
be late to need. We are looking at short, middle, and long-term
material and non-material capabilities across the spectrum of DOD
operations, including Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel,
Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy. Our forces
must be able to navigate, communicate, and sustain themselves to be
effective in the region. To facilitate this, we are looking at
capabilities that support domain awareness, communications,
infrastructure, and sustainable presence.
Establishing a presence in the Arctic is an extremely costly
proposition, with estimates running three to ten times the cost of
building comparable facilities elsewhere. I believe that large
fundamental infrastructure investments are not required to establish a
large physical presence in the Arctic. Instead, we are concentrating on
scalable infrastructure sufficient for us to support contingency and
emerging Arctic missions, with a focus on qualified and equipped forces
that have essential Arctic-capable platforms that can deploy and
operate freely in the region, when required.
The United States has assumed the Chairmanship of the Arctic
Council at a crucial time amidst growing international presence and
interest in the Arctic. I believe that it is in the best interest of
the United States that we accede to the Law of the Sea Treaty to give
us a stronger position as we negotiate the complexities of territorial
concerns and maritime security interests.
conclusion
Our final two Lines of Operation, Professionalism and Excellence
and Warfighters and Families, are perhaps the most pivotal because they
underpin our endeavors across the spectrum of our assigned missions. We
hold ourselves to the highest standards of personal and professional
conduct. We reinforce our warfighters by ensuring that they are
properly trained for their missions, while also providing the family
advocacy programs, community outreach and service support functions
that are critical to the families who, in turn, support our warriors.
Despite what is likely to be an onerous fight against increasingly
diffuse threats, we are very fortunate to be able to depend on the
brave men and women who choose to wear the cloth of their nation and
defend their fellow citizens. We embrace our no-fail mission at a time
when our unique capabilities are needed most, and with your support,
together with the exceptional men and women of USNORTHCOM and NORAD and
our trusted partners, we will remain the greatest force for freedom,
safety, and security for North America. I look forward to your
questions.
Chairman McCain. Admiral Tidd.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL KURT W. TIDD, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
SOUTHERN COMMAND
Admiral Tidd. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed,
distinguished members of this committee, thank you for the
opportunity to speak with you today.
I'm honored to represent the men and women of United States
Southern Command, and I'm very pleased to be here today with my
very good friends and shipmates, Cecil Haney and Bill Gortney.
I'd like to thank the Congress, and this committee
specially, for its longstanding support to our mission and to
our partners in Central America, South America, and the
Caribbean.
I'd like to focus my opening remarks very quickly on three
Cs and three Gs. The Cs are connections, Colombia, and Central
America.
The first C, of connections. Security in this hemisphere
connects directly to other parts of the world. Smuggling
networks run through South America directly into our Homeland.
Foreign terrorist fighters flow from the Caribbean to Syria and
to Iraq. As part of their global strategy, Russia attempts to
discredit our reliability as a trustworthy partner here in our
own region. These issues transcend artificial boundaries, and
they demand a transregional, united response.
The second C is Colombia. As has already been recognized,
this committee knows well Colombia's transformation has been
remarkable. Once on the brink of failure, Colombia is now on
the brink of peace. But, the hardest work lies ahead, extending
government influence into dangerous criminal-controlled
territory, confronting the persistent threat of cocaine
production and trafficking, and, above all, securing a just
peace that will end more than 50 years of conflict. With the
blood and treasure that they have already sacrificed, with all
that they continue to do to export security across the region,
the Colombian people have more than earned our sustained
support.
The third C is Central America. As we recognized during the
2014 migrant crisis, what happens on the streets of San
Salvador and Tegucigalpa have a--has a direct impact on the
streets of Tucson and Providence. Our Central American partners
are doing all they can to win their countries back from vicious
gangs and narcotraffickers, but they cannot do it alone.
Because we remain the number-one world's consumer of illicit
drugs, we owe it to them to do our part.
Now to the three Gs: global networks, global competitors,
and Guantanamo Bay.
Global networks are the biggest threat that we face in our
region. No two networks are alike. Some are international
criminal enterprises focused on transporting any illicit cargo
for the right price. Others are small operations that smuggle
desperate migrants. Still others support terrorist
organizations through financing and through the spread of their
violent extremist ideology. No matter the motivation of these
groups, though, all of them have a corrosive effect on the
stability and the security of every country that they infect,
including our own.
Global competitors. They also operate deliberately in the
western hemisphere as part of their broader global strategies.
The most concerning of them is Russia, which portrays the
United States in our theater as unreliable and as withdrawing
from this pivotal region.
Finally, Guantanamo Bay, where we conduct the most
principled, humane detention operations anywhere in the world.
We will continue to do so until the very last detainee steps on
an airplane and departs the island. I know this committee
shares my enormous pride in the men and women who serve in this
demanding, sensitive, and often thankless mission with honor
and with the utmost discipline, professionalism, and integrity.
They are every bit as engaged in the war and every bit as
deserving of our thanks and praise when they return home, just
as their brothers and sisters who have returned home from Iraq
and Afghanistan. I thank very much your recognition of the hard
work that they do.
Mr. Chairman, members, thank you again for the opportunity
to appear before you today. I look forward to our continued
discussions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Tidd follows:]
Prepared Statement by Admiral Kurt W. Tidd
introduction
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished Members of the
Committee: thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss U.S. Southern Command's activities in Central America, South
America, and the Caribbean. Before I begin, I would like to thank the
Congress--and this Committee in particular--for its longstanding
support to our mission and to our partners in the region. Our efforts
are made possible through your help and by the hard work of our service
components, Joint Task Forces, and our soldiers, sailors, marines,
airmen, coast guardsmen, civilians, and contractors.
In my short time in command, I have dedicated myself to expanding
my knowledge of U.S. Southern Command's area of responsibility (AOR).
The Latin America and Caribbean of today is far different than it was a
quarter of a century ago. \1\ The region is home to a substantial
middle class that actively seeks more responsive and transparent
governments able to deliver promised services. There is little risk of
armed conflict between neighboring states; border disputes are settled
in diplomatic channels, not on battlefields. Governments are more
democratic and respectful of human rights than at any point in the
region's history. Militaries are more capable, professional, and among
their countries' most trusted institutions. \2\ These militaries are
also some of our most reliable partners, committed to working with us
and with one another to confront threats to hemispheric security.
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\1\ Secretary of State John Kerry, Remarks at the 45th Annual
Washington Conference of the Council of the Americas. April 21, 2015.
\2\ Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP): 2014
AmericasBarometer, Vanderbilt University.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite these improvements, the region still faces persistent,
unresolved challenges. The slowing Chinese economy and falling global
commodity prices are causing economic downturns across Latin America.
Violent crime, widespread poverty, and fragile institutions continue to
plague many nations. Pervasive corruption, inequality, chronic
unemployment, deteriorating citizen safety, and limited economic
opportunity drive migration, propel young men and women to join violent
gangs, or set the conditions for instability and potential violent
radicalization. Lack of state presence, ineffective governance, and
weak rule of law provide fertile ground for the drug trade and the
spread of powerful criminal networks. Public frustration with slow
economic growth, social exclusion, and endemic government corruption
fuels social protests and unrest. In certain countries there is a
troubling trend toward authoritarianism: elected leaders that shun
democratic standards, abuse human rights, muzzle the press, and
suppress the opposition. Natural disasters such as ?hurricanes,
earthquakes, volcanoes, fires, floods, and drought--as well as
potential regional epidemics like the Zika virus--loom as ever-present
?dangers.
The good news is none of these challenges is insurmountable, but
all warrant continued engagement. Because no nation in the region poses
a direct, conventional military threat to the United States, Latin
America tends to rank fairly low on force allocation priorities. This
is understandable--but often requires what is, in my view, an
unfortunate trade-off. Our attention to other parts of the world should
not come at the expense of the significant gains made in our own
hemisphere. Over the last twenty years, prudent engagement by the U.S.
military has supported democratic governance and economic development,
nurtured and developed professional defense forces, and encouraged
greater security collaboration. Along with the State Department and
other interagency partners, we have worked hard to realize a vision of
the Americas where countries share responsibilities, cooperate as
equals, and advance common interests and values.
Now, as criminal networks threaten the integrity of institutions
and jeopardize citizen security, we must help countries build on the
considerable progress achieved to date and continue working towards our
shared priorities. As competitors seek to challenge our aim of being
the region's security partner of choice, we must redouble our
commitments and reinvigorate our partnerships. As the world works to
contain the spread of violent extremism and confront challenges to a
rules-based international order, we must seek new ways to strengthen
our network of allies and partners. As we face an increasingly complex,
interconnected security environment, we must look beyond borders and
boundaries and seek not just whole-of-government, but whole-of-
hemisphere solutions to our shared challenges. Mr. Chairman, positive
and persistent U.S. engagement remains essential to advancing a Western
Hemisphere that is prosperous, stable, and secure. \3\ With the
continued support of the Congress and in full collaboration with our
interagency and regional partners, U.S. Southern Command will continue
working towards that goal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The White House, National Security Strategy. February 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, Mr. Chairman, Members: I am humbled and honored to be part
of the great team at U.S. Southern Command, and I look forward to
working with you and your staffs in the coming years. I intend to focus
my efforts in four key areas: ensuring we remain the premier security
partner of choice in this hemisphere; deepening our interagency
collaboration to generate heightened trust; becoming the innovation
platform for the Department of Defense, interagency, and international
partners; and enabling the critical transregional operations and
initiatives of our sister Combatant Commands and interagency partners.
We will continue to pursue an era of inclusive engagement with this
vital part of the world and advance our ``Partnership for the
Americas.''
security environment
The security environment in Latin America and the Caribbean is
characterized by complex, diverse, and non-traditional challenges to
U.S. interests. The principal challenge remains transnational criminal
networks, which are well-organized, well-financed, well-armed, and
technologically advanced. These networks are efficient, adaptive,
innovative, and exceptionally ruthless. They will transport anything or
anyone--cocaine, heroin, weapons, people, even wildlife--if they
believe the potential profit is greater than the potential risk.
Enormous profits allow criminal networks to acquire capabilities that
rival or even exceed those of the states that battle them, including
high-powered rifles and machine guns, transport planes, and long-range
submersibles. In response to these extraordinary circumstances,
democratic governments have deployed their militaries to support
overwhelmed police forces.
The overarching threat to our national security, however, is not
just the range of illicit commodities that are trafficked, but instead
the destabilizing operations, corruptive influence, and global reach of
many of these networks, some of which smuggle `special interest aliens'
(SIAs). Although the vast majority of SIAs are seeking economic
opportunity, such as some from Iran, or are refugees fleeing war, like
some from Syria, there is a risk that violent extremist organizations
could exploit established networks, established smuggling routes, or
other regional vulnerabilities--including lax immigration and border
security, corrupt government officials, or the enabling capabilities of
criminal organizations--to enter and move through the region
undetected.
Spotlight: Syrian SIAs in the AOR
--------------------------------------------------------
In 2015, partner nation officials detained
six groups of Syrians in Honduras, St. Maarten, Costa
Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Paraguay.
In each case, access to fraudulent or stolen
documents and corrupt law enforcement officials
facilitated SIA movement through numerous countries
in the AOR.
Let me talk for a moment on that last vulnerability. Whether Sunni
or Shiite extremists would wittingly collaborate with criminal groups
to accomplish their goals is up for debate. Many people are quick to
dismiss the possibility of these groups working together in this part
of the world. They believe the absence of evidence of a relationship is
evidence of its absence. Mr. Chairman, we at U.S. Southern Command
can't be that certain. We know that extremist groups are ideologically-
driven and want to harm the United States. We know that criminal
organizations are profit-driven and will engage in illicit activities
that increase their bottom line. We also know that both operate in the
same dark underworld of illicit finance, fraudulent documents, and
weapons trafficking and that violent extremist organizations have
availed themselves of some of these criminally-provided services. What
U.S. Southern Command lacks is the intelligence necessary to identify,
monitor, and fully illuminate and understand these networks and the
resources necessary to significantly disrupt, degrade and ideally
dismantle them.
Like our counterparts in the U.S. Government and the Congress, we
are also deeply concerned by the `triple threat' posed by foreign
terrorist fighters: they strengthen transnational terrorist groups,
incite others back home to conduct attacks, and can ultimately return
to launch acts of terror. \4\ ISIL's strategic communication efforts
have resonated around the world, including in parts of Latin America
and the Caribbean. Since 2013, we have seen a small number of
individuals and their families leaving the region to join ISIL in Syria
or Iraq. The appeal of violent extremist ideology to some Caribbean
citizens and their subsequent travel to Iraq and Syria remains a
concern; not just for us, but for our friends and partners across the
region.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ House Committee on Homeland Security, Final Report of the Task
Force on Combating Terrorism and the Foreign Fighter Threat. September
2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As in other parts of the world, the potential return of violent
extremists is a threat. These individuals could be well positioned to
spread ISIL's poisonous ideology and potentially inspire or execute
acts of terror against U.S. or partner nation interests. Many partner
nations are unable to monitor the potential return of foreign fighters
and often lack robust counterterrorism legislation and capabilities to
confront this threat. There is a significant and growing consensus--
which I have personally observed during conversations with security
chiefs across the region--about the threat of radicalization to
violence in this hemisphere; San Bernardino and Paris are clear
examples and dramatic wake-up calls that radicalization can happen
anywhere. We will work with our partners to enhance support to the
global coalition to counter ISIL, other transregional terrorist
threats, and violent extremist organizations.
As a state sponsor of terrorism, Iran's nefarious involvement in
the Western Hemisphere also remains a matter for concern. While Iranian
engagement has waned in recent years, President Rouhani recently
indicated that Tehran intends to increase economic, scientific, and
cultural ties with Latin America though he has made this same pledge
several times since his election in 2013. Additionally, Lebanese
Hezbollah maintains an extensive regional network of supporters and
sympathizers, some of whom are involved in trade-based money laundering
and other illicit activities to generate revenue, a portion of which
goes to support the parent organization in the Middle East. Lebanese
Hezbollah also maintains an infrastructure with the capability to
conduct or support terrorist attacks. As with every aspect of our
counterterrorism efforts, the U.S. Government remains vigilant against
these threats, working closely with our partners to protect the
southern approaches to the United States.
Apart from what I have already discussed, several other trends
impact regional stability. In El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras,
many of the conditions that caused the 2014 migration crisis of
unaccompanied children--high homicide rates, chronic poverty, and lack
of economic opportunity--remain the same or are worsening, leading the
UN High Commissioner for Refugees to call for action to respond to the
`looming refugee crisis' in the region. \5\ While apprehensions on our
border are down, Mexico's apprehensions at its southern border have
increased dramatically over the past three years. \6\ Sustainable
development and security gains must continue apace if the sub-region is
to address its long-standing challenges. To this end, I would like to
thank the Congress for providing funding to our State Department and
USAID partners as part of the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central
America, a five-year initiative that will help State Department and
USAID address the root causes of migration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Comments made by UN High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio
Guterres on the release of The UN Refugee Agency's report Children on
the Run: Unaccompanied Children Leaving Central America and Mexico and
the Need for International Protection. October 28, 2015.
\6\ Customs and Border Patrol apprehended 145,316 Central American
migrants (including 39,970 UACs) at the US SW Border in fiscal year
2015. From October 2014 to April 2015, Mexican officials stopped nearly
93,000 Central American migrants, far exceeding the 49,800 detained in
the same period 12 months earlier.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Central America is still awash in weapons and street gangs such as
MS-13 and M-18, both of which originated in the United States and have
close, direct, and growing ties with their U.S. counterparts. As an
indication of how dire the situation is in El Salvador, its Supreme
Court designated these groups as terrorists by ruling they violate the
fundamental rights of the population and seek to usurp state power.
Gangs are targeting the police and military with homemade grenades and
car bombs and terrorizing Salvadoran citizens. According to the FBI,
MS-13 is now present in 42 U.S. states, with a significant presence in
Houston, Long Island, Charlotte, and Washington, DC. \7\ Mr. Chairman,
the simple fact is that economic and security crises in Central America
reverberate almost immediately through communities across our country.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ National Gang Intelligence Center Assessment, November 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further south, rising crime, violence, and deteriorating economic
conditions continue to plague Venezuela. Due to speculation about the
potential end of United States immigration policies favorable to
Cubans, an increasing number of Cuban migrants are traveling overland
through Central America and Mexico to cross at the United States
Southwest border, with over 30,000 arriving via this route in fiscal
year 2015--in addition to more than 4,000 that arrived via traditional
maritime routes through the Florida Straits. Haiti--one of the most
unstable and least developed nations in the Western Hemisphere--will be
especially vulnerable as the electoral crisis drags on and the United
Nations stabilization mission draws to a close.
Our Colombian partners have made heroic strides battling the FARC,
but a peace accord will not spell the end of their security challenges.
Even if a peace accord is signed this spring, Colombia will confront
other threats, including criminal networks that will gladly recruit
experienced ex-FARC members and exploit the potential power vacuum
generated by the FARC's demobilization. As an example, the
transnational criminal network Clan Usuga is quickly becoming a
significant threat to Colombian national security. The 3,000-strong
group is comprised of former paramilitaries; has agents throughout
Central and South America and Spain; and is expanding into Venezuela to
increase its share of the drug trade. All of these issues warrant
continued active United States engagement to ensure our partners in
Central America and the Caribbean can address sources of instability
and Colombia can deliver on the promise of a hard-won peace.
Spotlight: Colombia's Counter IED Capacity
------------------------------------------------------------
The Colombian military, with our support and that of our
interagency partners like JIDA, has reduced IED incidents
by 21 percent in 2015. Casualties from IEDs are down 38
percent and the ``found and cleared'' rate for IEDs is
nearly 80 percent.
We must also contend with global competitors from outside our
hemisphere that are strategically and purposefully operating in the
Western Hemisphere. In this part of the world, Russia's actions are
directly connected to its broader global efforts to demonstrate that
Russia is a global power capable of challenging United States
leadership and the established rules-based international system.
Russian officials' rhetoric, high-level political visits, and military-
security engagements are designed to displace the United States as the
partner of choice in the region. Over the past year, Russia continued
to maintain a presence in Latin America, collecting information about
the region and the United States. Since mid-December 2014, Moscow has
deployed an oceanographic and a hydrographic research ship to
Nicaragua; an intelligence collection ship to the United States east
coast and Caribbean; and an additional oceanographic research ship to
the Caribbean. This is four naval deployments to Latin America in less
than twelve months, all of which involved data or intelligence
collection. Russia also reached an agreement with Nicaragua for
simplified port access and logistical support, and regularly broadcasts
anti-American propaganda in Ecuador, Argentina, and Venezuela via
Russian state-owned RT-TV, which also broadcasts to the United States,
and via online news and Sputnik Mundo, which is targeted to Latin
American audiences. Russia uses this media to create doubts about
United States intentions and criticize United States policies.
We need to engage proactively and deepen security cooperation with
our partners in the Americas. We strongly suspect that Russia's actions
in the Western Hemisphere are not driven by events in this AOR, but
rather are integrated into a larger, more holistic approach. This
requires an equally integrated, transregional response on our part.
When it comes to transregional competitors, we are closely coordinating
with fellow combatant commanders to ensure we are contributing not just
in our area of responsibility but across regional boundaries to ensure
competitors are unable to exploit seams between our areas of
responsibility.
In contrast to Russia, China's primary focus in the region is on
trade and investment. Still, China seeks to forge security
relationships as part of its strategy to increase its influence in the
region. Military engagements tend to focus on soft-power, with offers
of training in Beijing, high-level visits, donations of equipment, and
naval diplomacy efforts. During May-June 2015, a Chinese Naval
Hydrographic Survey Ship made port calls in Brazil and Ecuador during
its circumnavigation. The Chinese Navy's 20th Naval Escort Task Force
made a port call in Cuba in November as part of their goodwill cruise
around the world. Additionally, the Chinese hospital ship PEACE ARK
visited Peru, Grenada, and Barbados in 2015 to provide medical services
to local communities, marking the vessel's second visit to the region
since 2011. Chinese defense firms also continue to make inroads into
the Latin American arms markets through low-cost military hardware, no-
strings-attached sales and financing, and offers of co-production
facilities in the region. While China's competition for regional
influence does not pose a direct military threat to our interests in
this hemisphere, it does reinforce the importance of ensuring China's
activities abide by regional political, economic and security norms. It
also underscores the importance of the United States remaining engaged
in this important part of the world.
command priorities
To address these challenges, we work with our partners to defend
the southern approaches to the United States, respond to regional
contingencies, and promote security cooperation with the 31 nations and
16 areas of special sovereignty in our AOR. We focus on one no-fail
mission and four priorities, which I would like to discuss today.
We continue to conduct safe, humane, legal, and transparent care
and custody of the remaining detainees currently at Joint Task Force
Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO). Detention operations are a demanding, sensitive,
and often thankless mission. The medical and guard force deal with
enormous stress and are subject to near-constant verbal and physical
assaults by detainees. Some of our female troops must continue to deal
with the frustration of a temporary court order that prevents them from
performing their assigned duties, even though they are all fully
trained, immensely qualified, and embody the values of equality and
diversity that our nation espouses to the world and holds dear. Despite
these challenges, and as many of you have witnessed first-hand, the men
and women at JTF-GTMO conduct the most humane, principled detention
operations anywhere in the world, often exceeding the requirements of
U.S. laws and the Geneva Convention. I thank you for your continued
active support for these tremendous young men and women and invite you
to continue to visit them to see for yourselves the conditions under
which they labor, and the quiet professionalism with which they execute
their duties.
Unlike the conduct of our troops, the condition of many JTF-GTMO
facilities falls far short of acceptable standards. As the Congress
knows, most of the facilities constructed to temporary standards are
deteriorating rapidly due to the harsh environment, ongoing mission
demands, and a chronic lack of funds for maintenance and
recapitalization. Last year, rains associated with Hurricane Joaquin
resulted in widespread leaks in troop housing--an unsurprising
occurrence, given the dilapidated condition of these buildings. With no
long-term military construction, we expect to continue addressing life,
health, and safety issues in an incremental, piecemeal manner that
rapidly becomes more costly than investment in new construction.
In concert with our law enforcement, intelligence community,
diplomatic, and regional partners, we remain focused on countering
transnational organized crime (CTOC). Our Joint Interagency Task Force
South (JIATF-S) is at the forefront of our efforts to combat the
illicit drug trade and to illuminate the networks engaged in this
nefarious activity. Although receiving only 1.5 percent of the total
U.S. counterdrug budget, JIATF-S and its international partners disrupt
three times the amount of cocaine seized at or within U.S. borders.
While the U.S. Navy was only able to provide limited surface ships to
and U.S. Customs and Border Protection assets, as well as significant
contributions by partner nations and Allies, helped disrupt 192 metric
tons of cocaine in fiscal year 2015. Operations like MARTILLO not only
strike a blow to powerful criminal networks, they ultimately save U.S.
lives and resources by stopping hundreds of tons of cocaine, heroin,
and other drugs destined for our cities and towns.
Operation MARTILLO Fiscal Year 2015 Disruptions
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cocaine 192 MTs
% disrupted by partners 35%
Marijuana 62,995 lbs
Bulk cash $11.4 million
In response to the insecurity that drove last year's unaccompanied
children crisis, we are prioritizing our capacity-building efforts in
the Northern Tier of Central America. We thank the Congress for its
support to our CTOC activities and for recognizing the important role
security plays in addressing the sub-region's long-standing challenges.
Through equipment support, infrastructure projects, counterdrug
training, and aggressive information sharing, we are improving our
partners' maritime interdiction and border security capabilities and
enhancing regional domain awareness. To complement these efforts, last
year our Marine component deployed a Special-Purpose Marine, Air,
Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) to help partner nations extend state
presence and security in Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Belize.
Working alongside Honduran military and government officials, U.S.
Marines built roads and a C-130 capable airfield and provided essential
water services to vulnerable populations. Working in tandem with Joint
Task Force-Bravo, the SPMAGTF promises to be one of our most responsive
forces; sourced mainly by Marine Reservists, it provides us with an
agile, forward-deployed, rapid response capability that is without
equal.
Spotlight: Support to Interagency Operations
-------------------------------------------------------------
In 2015, we supported United States Immigration and
Customs Enforcement's (ICE) Operation CITADEL, which
targeted the smuggling of migrants from the Middle East,
Asia, Africa, and Latin America into the United States.
This operation led to the dismantlement of large-scale
criminal networks and the rescue of many unaccompanied
children.
We also dedicate significant effort to remaining vigilant against
the threat of violent extremism, and I thank the Congress for providing
the dedicated resources to support this important mission. Our
counterterrorism (CT) efforts center on building and supporting partner
nation capacity to detect and defeat terrorist threats within their
borders. We are working with partners from across the region to counter
extremism, recruitment, and radicalization to violence in vulnerable
communities. Over the past year our Special Operations Forces (SOF)
conducted multiple engagements such as subject matter expert exchanges,
counterterrorism-focused exercises, and civil affairs activities. These
efforts--coupled with support to U.S. Country Teams and interagency
operations--ensure our nation and those of our friends remain secure.
As discussed earlier, transnational organized crime and terrorist
networks are intersecting layers of a global illicit economy. We will
begin to explore if and how taking a counter network approach against
illicit networks can improve our insight and successes in both our CTOC
and CT efforts.
Spotlight: DOD Rewards Program
-------------------------------------------------------------
In 2015, the DOD Rewards Program enabled partner nation
authorities to bring 135 members of terrorist
organizations to justice.
Whether countering transnational organized crime and terrorism,
supporting disaster response operations, establishing cyber defense
capabilities, or emphasizing a solid human rights foundation, building
partner capacity is the cornerstone of everything we do. Our efforts
help build and nurture committed and capable partners who can control
their borders, address drivers of insecurity and instability, respond
to natural and man-made disasters, and contribute to regional
security--all of which help generate an extended layered defense of the
U.S. Homeland and protect our interests. Although it is impossible to
do justice to all the incredible work being done by our joint task
forces, service components, and the National Guard's State Partnership
Program, I would like to share a few highlights of our capacity-
building efforts in the region. \8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ For a full overview of component activities, please see the
Annex.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After 51 years of armed conflict, Colombia--a strategic ally,
friend, and preeminent partner--is on the verge of ending the
hemisphere's longest-running guerilla war. Thanks to its own efforts
and our sustained assistance, Colombia has been transformed from a near
failed state into a major regional player with significant political
influence, world-class security forces, and a growing economy. The
Colombian military has grown from an internal defense force to a
respected exporter of counterdrug and counter IED expertise \9\ and is
standing up a regional demining center of excellence. The Colombian
Navy is also a regular contributor to NATO counter-piracy operations
off the coast of Africa as well as counterdrug patrols in our own
hemisphere with JIATF-South.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ In 2015, USSOUTHCOM and the Department of State Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement supported military and
civilian law enforcement capacity-building activities by Colombian
military and law enforcement personnel. USSOUTHCOM provided assistance
to the COLMIL to execute 85 military BPC activities. These activities
were focused on maritime interdiction, support to law enforcement
entities, security and maintenance of vessels at port, riverine
training, command and control, border security, intelligence training,
and human rights training.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Colombia's transformation is remarkable, but it will still face an
uncertain period with many new challenges even when an accord is
reached. In many ways the hardest work lies ahead. For Colombia to
successfully consolidate the promise of its decades-long struggle, the
United States must remain as fully engaged a post-peace accord partner
as we ever were during Colombia's struggles. U.S. Southern Command will
continue to support Colombia's efforts to: take the FARC off the
battlefield and out of illicit activities; successfully implement a new
counternarcotics strategy and establish state presence; conduct
humanitarian demining; and transform the Colombian military to adapt to
an evolving security environment. On a broader level, it is also
essential that we continue providing Colombia a robust and agile
assistance package that will help it successfully address the new
security, developmental, and human rights challenges posed by a post-
accord environment.
To enhance the professional development of the region's military
officers and senior enlisted leaders, U.S. Southern Command conducts or
facilitates International Military Education and Training (IMET),
military and defense exchanges, and security seminars. Through the
Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI) and William J. Perry
Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, we are supporting the increased
professionalization of regional defense organizations. These programs
help build accountable, transparent armed forces that can ensure the
sustainability of U.S. security cooperation investments, increase
citizen safety, and uphold universal values such as good governance,
rule of law, and respect for human rights. We are also supporting the
development of a competent and professional Non-Commissioned Officer
(NCO) corps through close interaction during engagements, exercises,
and at defense institutes like the Western Hemisphere Institute for
Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) and Inter-American Air Force Academy
(IAAFA).
Spotlight: Building Cyber Defense Capacity
-------------------------------------------------------------
We are building cyber security and cyber defense
capabilities with seven regional partners and working with
Brazil, Peru, Colombia, and Chile as they establish
dedicated cyber defense commands or capabilities.
As the only Combatant Command with a dedicated human rights office,
we continue to make progress engaging our partners on this foundational
issue. Last year, Paraguay became the 11th partner nation to commit to
implementation of the U.S. Southern Command-sponsored Human Rights
Initiative (HRI) within its military forces. We also supported civil-
military dialogues in Honduras and Guatemala and held the first-ever
HRI event in Haiti. Partner nations acknowledge their responsibility to
respect and protect human rights, but generally lack the resources to
build strong programs. Requests for HRI assistance far exceed our
ability to support--which is why we encourage regional militaries to
share their expertise with one another. During last year's Tradewinds
exercise, Caribbean security officials led multiple training tracks on
human rights issues, advancing our goal of increased human rights
integration in multinational exercises.
Like HRI, our humanitarian assistance and humanitarian and civic
assistance programs also yield significant `return on engagement.'
These programs help improve our partners' abilities to provide
essential services to their citizens, reduce human suffering, and
support economic development. But they do more than that-- they remind
the world that our military's greatest strength is more than our proven
ability to project power around the globe, it is the generosity and
compassion of our people. There is perhaps no better symbol of that
generosity than deployments by our world class hospital ship USNS
Comfort. As part of Continuing Promise 2015, medical and support staff
from across the U.S. military and the region worked alongside nearly
400 volunteers to treat 122,268 patients and conduct 1,255 surgeries.
In an historic event during the Comfort port call in Haiti, U.S. and
Cuban medics worked side by side to treat Haiti's poor and exchange
best medical practices. Continuing Promise is without a doubt one of
the U.S. military's most impactful missions, but future Comfort
deployments are in jeopardy due to the U.S. Navy's budget constraints.
Spotlight: Partnership with NGOs Aboard the Comfort
-----------------------------------------------------------
More than 400 volunteers from NGOs and academic
institutions worked alongside U.S. military members,
serving as doctors, nurses, and surgeons. USNS Comfort
also hosted the NGO Operation SMILE, which provided 279
life-changing surgeries to patients in the region.
Additionally, our annual Beyond the Horizon and New Horizons
humanitarian exercises help advance security, prosperity, and good
governance in equal measure, while also building the capacity of
partner nations to respond to disasters without request for U.S.
assistance. As part of these exercises, United States Air Force and
Army medical teams conducted readiness training that treated over
30,000 patients in El Salvador, Panama, and Honduras. In partnership
with regional militaries and civilian agencies, we constructed disaster
relief warehouses, emergency operation centers, schools, clinics, and
hospitals in remote or under-serviced areas. These exercises were
supported by private sector and NGO partners, who provided nearly $4
million in donations of gifts-in-kind and services for the citizens of
Latin America. In these and other activities, we work closely with
other U.S. agencies--including the Department of State and USAID--to
support their efforts in promoting resilient democratic societies
through sustainable, long-term development.
I would also like to highlight one of our most successful capacity-
building efforts: the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). In
partnership with the State Department, GPOI allowed us to train and
equip more than 3,500 peacekeepers (male and female) from six partner
nations. These partners are currently deployed to four United Nations
(UN) peacekeeping missions in Africa and Haiti. The relatively small
investment--$7.6 million in fiscal year 2015--not only supported
training and equipping of peacekeepers, but also enabled El Salvador to
deploy an attack helicopter unit to the U.N. Mission in Mali; allowed
Peru to deploy a heavy engineer company to the U.N. mission in the
Central African Republic; assisted Chile's efforts to create a regional
gender integration training capability; and helped Uruguay sustain
critical enabling helicopter and riverine capabilities supporting the
U.N. mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. All of these efforts
help maintain stability in war-torn states and troubled regions,
protect civilians, and deliver critical humanitarian aid. Given the
multiple benefits of GPOI, I fully support continuing and expanding
this important program throughout the region.
The State Partnership Program and our multinational exercises
continue to build a strong Inter-American system of persistent defense
cooperation. A force multiplier to our efforts, National Guard units
from 19 states conducted 215 activities that developed core
competencies in regional military forces, promoted the concept of
citizen-soldiers as public servants, and reinforced our bilateral
relationships with 28 countries. In the Caribbean, we conducted a
highly successful iteration of our annual Tradewinds exercise, which
brought together more than 750 participants from 17 different nations
to work together on real-life training scenarios related to disaster
response and CTOC operations.
As part of Southern Seas 2015, UNITAS--the United States Navy's
longest-running annual maritime exercise--brought together North
American, South American, Pacific, and African maritime forces from
eight countries to improve interoperability and build working
relationships at sea. Last year we had the largest U.S. Force
participating in the exercise's history, courtesy of the creative
employment of the USS George Washington and associated air wing during
her transit through the region. While these types of maritime
engagements offer unparalleled opportunity to engage with our partners
in areas of maritime law and policy, discussion of issues like
excessive maritime claims can become derailed by the United States'
status as a non-party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea. Accession to the Convention gives the United States a seat at
the table and thus an immeasurably stronger position from which to
engage our partners on maritime security concerns.
Finally, contingency planning and preparation--which includes other
exercises like Panamax, Fused Response, Fuerzas Humanitarias and
Integrated Advance--prepares our team to respond to regional crises and
enhances interoperability with our interagency and regional partners.
These efforts not only improve our planning, training, and readiness,
they build invaluable relationships across agencies, departments, and
governments. For example, in the event of a natural disaster in Central
America, our Joint Task Force Bravo--located at Soto Cano Airbase in
Honduras--will be at the forefront of our response efforts. Essentially
a small aviation regiment with 18 helicopters, JTF-Bravo is our only
permanently deployed contingency force in the region. The outstanding
men and women of JTF-Bravo regularly conduct life-saving search and
rescue missions and provide humanitarian assistance and logistical
support to Honduran and regional counterdrug operations.
We train for a variety of contingencies, one of which is a mass
migration event. We work closely with our interagency partners in the
State Department, the Department of Homeland Security, and other
regional partners to monitor increased migrant flows. Last year, we
conducted a mission rehearsal exercise at United States Naval Station
Guantanamo Bay to test our ability to support a response to a
humanitarian crisis in the Caribbean. As the only permanent Department
of Defense base in Latin America, the United States Naval Station
provides persistent U.S. presence and immediate access to the entire
region. It serves as a forward operating base for DHS-led migrant
operations and a distribution and staging area for foreign humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief operations. If directed to execute
today, resource and capacity challenges at the Naval Station would
significantly impact our support to the Department of Homeland Security
and the Department of State operational and contingency plans. These
challenges call into question our ability to provide safe care,
custody, and transportation of interdicted migrants, which is
especially concerning given recent increases in migrant flows.
critical needs and concerns
U.S. Southern Command is committed to honoring the trust American
taxpayers place in us, and we strive to make every defense dollar
count. Through better business practices, we are working to mitigate
funding reductions and gain efficiencies throughout our headquarters.
Our most significant challenge is under-sourcing of assets, an issue
that will be compounded should sequestration return. For every
additional capacity-building activity we conduct, we can further
strengthen the security network that keeps our partners stable and our
Homeland secure. For every additional ship and air asset we are able to
dedicate to the detection and monitoring mission, we can disrupt
approximately 20 more metric tons of cocaine. For every additional ISR
resource we are provided, we can better illuminate threat networks in
the region. Yet even with the limited resources we have, we punch well
above our weight class. We are in fact, a world-class welterweight: we
are fast and agile; we are well trained; and we have the strength and
stamina for the long run--qualities that are essential for success
against the threats and challenges in our area of responsibility.
To help mitigate shortfalls in the detection and monitoring
mission, we employ creative and non-traditional approaches like
adapting anti-IED technology for use in counterdrug operations in dense
jungle and mountainous terrain. Looking ahead, we will continue to
explore alternatives to traditional sourcing solutions, including
driving innovation and experimentation into training and exercises.
With a multitude of willing and welcoming partners in Latin America and
the Caribbean, we have a unique experimentation training environment,
perfect for expanding war gaming; testing new operational concepts,
tactics, technologies and procedures; and exploring new ways to combine
capabilities and improve interoperability. Additionally, we will
continue to pursue opportunities to use innovative ISR platforms. I
especially want to thank the Congress for the additional funding, which
is helping increase our domain awareness and enhance ongoing CTOC
operations.
While JIATF-South--through excellent interagency and partner nation
coordination--has developed impressive air and maritime awareness of
drug movements, when the networks hit terra firma we go dark. To
address these blind spots, we are exploring how we might partner even
more closely with the interagency and partner nations to improve
synchronization and fully illuminate threat networks. We will work with
our Central American partners, the Department of State, the
intelligence and law enforcement communities, and U.S. Country Teams
every step of the way as we improve our collective effort to degrade
and disrupt the corrosive operations of criminal networks.
Finally, I thank the Congress for your continued support to U.S.
Southern Command's talented men and women and their families.
Unfortunately, our servicemembers, especially our junior enlisted
personnel, face a significant quality-of-life challenge: the lack of
affordable housing. In almost all respects, Miami is the perfect city
for our headquarters. I say `almost' because the cost of living is one
of the highest in the nation. Many of our assigned personnel cannot
afford to live near the command, and government housing acquired
through domestic leasing is expensive and extremely competitive. We are
currently working with the Department of Army to develop our formal
housing requirement, and we will work closely with the Congress as we
move forward to improve the quality of life of our men and women in
uniform.
conclusion
In closing, I am sure members of this Committee will agree: nowhere
is our own security more inextricably intertwined to that of our
neighbors, partners, and friends than in Latin America and the
Caribbean. In an increasingly chaotic and insecure world, this region
can and should serve as a beacon of hope, peace, prosperity, and
partnership. This is both the promise and the potential of our shared
home. It is a goal shared by our partners and one that we can achieve--
but only by remaining engaged and only by working together. Day in and
day out, the outstanding team at U.S. Southern Command is doing exactly
that: we are building partnerships that protect our interests, defend
our Homeland, uphold the global common good, and advance security, good
governance, and opportunity. Once again, thank you for your persistent,
sustained support for your U.S. Southern Command, and I look forward to
our discussion.
Annex: 2015 Joint Task Force and Component Accomplishments
joint interagency task force south (jiatf-s) key west, florida
Joint Interagency Task Force South contributed to the
disruption of 192 metric tons of cocaine in fiscal year 2015, worth
nearly $3.9 billion wholesale. This represents 76 percent of all
documented U.S. cocaine removals that were likely directed towards the
U.S. market. JIATF-S employs an integrated defense forward capability
for the ongoing efforts at the U.S. Southwest Border and for U.S.
operations in the Western Hemisphere using tactical control (TACON)
ship days, TACON flight hours, and by monitoring illicit air activity
using Forces Surveillance Support Center relocatable over-the-horizon
radar.
Operation MARTILLO: The vast majority of JIATF-South
successes came as a result of JIATF-South leadership and coordination
of Operation (OP) MARTILLO, the multi-lateral effects-based operation
designed to deny the Central American littoral routes to illicit
traffickers. Begun on January 15, 2012, OP MARTILLO results to date
include the disruption of 595 metric tons of cocaine, the seizure of
$25.8 million in bulk cash, and the seizure of 1486 detainees and 478
vessels and aircraft. OP MARTILLO has had the desired effect of
increasing partner nation participation in U.S. efforts to disrupt
illicit trafficking and counter transnational organized crime.
Operational Results and Impact: In the air domain, over
the past year, JIATF-South documented a 53 percent decrease in illicit
air tra20.cks destined for Central America (primarily Honduras).
Decisions made by some of our partner nations to establish lethal air
interdiction policies have impeded JIATF-South's efforts to share
illicit air track information with those partner nations. Ultimately,
air trafficking continues to be a declining percentage (3 percent) of
overall cocaine flows. In the maritime domain, during the same period,
JIATF-South documented a 20 percent increase in the overall volume of
cocaine departing the source zone in South America. Eastern Pacific
flow currently accounts for more than 68 percent of documented cocaine
movement. It is assessed the increase in Eastern Pacific cocaine
movement is at least partially caused by trafficker adaptation to
focused law enforcement pressure in the Western Caribbean. JIATF-South
is currently developing strategies to better apply requisite pressure
against each threat vector, so as to curtail transit options available
to traffickers. The increase in documented flow is partially due to
increased law enforcement reporting and contributions from partner
nations to augment collective situational awareness. JIATF-South
identified several transatlantic maritime cases in fiscal year 2015 and
established a liaison officer at the Maritime Analysis Operations
Center-Narcotics in Lisbon, Portugal to facilitate the targeting of
these cases by European law enforcement agencies. JIATF-South Counter
Threat Finance team targeted $30.5 million in bulk cash and closely
worked with DEA Lima, Peru on several investigations. JIATF-South
Container Cell supported investigations resulting in 7 MTs of cocaine
seized in commercial shipping containers and continues to develop
relationships to increase situational awareness of global movements of
cocaine via commercial shipping.
Supporting Defense of the Homeland. The establishment of
three Department of Homeland Security Joint Task Forces, JTF-East, JTF-
West, and JTF-Investigations in 2015 has the potential to greatly
enhance the interagency effort to defend the southern approaches.
JIATF-South has been integrally involved with and fully supports the
development of these organizations so that efforts to counter illicit
trafficking will be synchronized to produce the greatest combined
effect. Since its inception in September 2012, OP Unified Resolve, the
counter illicit trafficking operation supporting Puerto Rico, has
substantially improved and formalized interoperability between JIATF-
South, Coast Guard District 7, Coast Guard Sector San Juan, and the
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Office of Air and Marine Caribbean
Air and Marine Branch in our shared Counter Illicit Trafficking
operations. Under the new DHS JTF construct OP Unified Resolve will be
coordinated by Joint Task Force-East.
Role of Partner Nations: In fiscal year 2015, 50 percent
of JIATF-South disruptions were marked by partner nation participation.
The role of our Latin American partners should not be understated. Of
the 250 illicit trafficking events disrupted by JIATF-South in fiscal
year 2015, 88 of these (35 percent) would not have been successful
without the support of our international partners. Many Central
American partners have greatly increased their ability to respond to
illicit trafficking cases cued by JIATF-South including Guatemala,
Panama, and Costa Rica who collectively responded to twice the number
of events in fiscal year 2015 compared to fiscal year 2014. The success
of JIATF-South continues to draw support as several additional nations
have expressed interest in joining the international effort to counter
illicit trafficking. The contributions of ships and aircraft to the
Transit Zone effort by the U.K., France, the Netherlands, and Canada
continue to be significant and needed.
Innovation and Transition to Counter Network Operations:
Recognizing the holistic nature of the threats and challenges to the
U.S. from TCOs in the Western Hemisphere, JIATF-South's planning
process is orienting the command and its focus towards countering the
organizations responsible for undermining the stability and security of
the region. With their authorities firmly planted in the detection and
monitoring (D&M) of illicit trafficking, JIATF-South will employ
several initiatives to focus their core mission set on illuminating
illicit networks for disruption. Network focused D&M will rely on
Tactical Development Analysis, Threat Finance Information, and
Container Cell intelligence to develop awareness and increase
effectiveness in a fiscally austere environment. Additionally, JIATF-
South is leveraging interagency partnerships to develop the ability to
detect and monitor illicit trafficking activity, using the cyber
domain.
joint task force guantanamo (jtf-gtmo)
guantanamo bay, cuba
Safe and Humane Custody and Control: JTF-GTMO conducted
safe, humane, legal, and transparent custody and control of detainees,
including those convicted by military commission. High Value Detainees
(HVDs) and non-HVDs maintained family contact via mail, telephone calls
and, in areas which support this service, videophone conferences
coordinated by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
High quality care, to include routine and urgent medical care, was
provided to detainees on a 24-hour basis. General surgical care, dental
care, preventative medicine, optometry and mental health services were
provided, or arranged, as was targeted specialty care on a recurring
basis.
Legal and Transparent Operations: Assessments of
detention conditions by the ICRC continued with four visits in 2015.
All detainees were provided the opportunity to meet with ICRC delegates
and medical personnel during these visits. Additionally, detainees are
granted access to legal representation. For non-High Value Detainees,
during fiscal year 2015 JTF-GTMO scheduled 385 habeas meetings (259
were completed) and 222 commissions meetings (141 completed). With
respect to High Value Detainees, JTF-GTMO scheduled 43 habeas meetings
(29 completed) and 1,781 commissions meetings (894 completed).
Committed to transparency, JTF-GTMO hosted 75 media representatives
from 40 domestic and international news organizations and answered
hundreds of media queries during the past year. Similarly, JTF-GTMO
also hosted 166 Distinguished Visitor visits totaling more than 1100
personnel, including seven Congressional Delegations, Service Chiefs
and senior DOD, DHS, DOJ and DOS policy makers.
Military Commissions: Support for the Military
Commissions process is a priority of JTF-GTMO. These proceedings are
open to observation by the media, victim family members, non-
governmental organizations and other visitors. In fiscal year 2015,
JTF-GTMO supported 3 days of hearings which addressed pre-trial motions
in the case of United States v. Mohammad, et al., the five individuals
accused of coordinating the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United
States (referred to in the press as ``the 9/11 Five'') and 4 days of
hearings to address pre-trial motions in the case of United States v.
Al Nashiri, the alleged USS Cole bomber. Additionally, the Court
arraigned and conducted 7 days of hearings to address pre-trial motions
in the case of United States v. al Iraqi, an alleged al Qaeda commander
charged with law of war offenses.
In the ``9/11 Five'' military commission, the judge's 7
January 2015 interim order bars female guards from touching (absent
exigent circumstances) the 9/11 Five detainee-accused during movements
to and from attorney-client meetings and commission hearings. This
order remains in effect until the judge hears evidence and argument and
makes a final ruling. The cancellation of several commissions sessions
in 2015 prevented the resolution of this issue. The practical effect of
the judge's order is that it prohibits female guards from participating
in commissions-related movements of the 9/11 Five detainee-accused.
Male guards therefore complete extra duties that female guards may not
perform. The judge's order resulted in fifteen (15) Equal Opportunity
(EO) complaints because a portion of the guard force cannot perform
their assigned duties based on gender. The EO complaints are
unresolved.
Infrastructure: Sustainment costs continue to rise due to
the many facilities at JTF-GTMO that are past their designated
lifecycle. Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization (SRM) costs have
steadily increased the last four years ($19M, $20M, $21M, $24M). Eight
military construction (MILCON) projects, valued at $231M, were planned
for fiscal year 2015-18 to address infrastructure concerns. Six of
those projects, valued at $207M, or 90 percent of the total Military
Construction (MILCON) budget were cancelled in January 2015.
Detainee Movement Operations: JTF-GTMO conducted 12
Detainee Movement Operations during fiscal year 2015 which transferred
35 detainees to 10 different countries.
joint task force-bravo (jtf-b)
soto cano air base, honduras
Joint Task Force-Bravo is a forward-based expeditionary
joint task force operating as U.S. Southern Command's lead forward
element in the Central American (CENTAM) region. The Joint Task Force
integrates and synchronizes efforts, provides assets and capabilities
to enable others to operate, and executes operations in support of the
CCDR's priorities of Countering Transnational Organized Crime (CTOC),
Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief, Building Partner Nation
Security Capacity, and Contingency planning/support to promote regional
cooperation and enhance security throughout Central America. JTF-Bravo
performs the following missions:
Facilitates integration of Partner Nation and U.S.
Government agencies to develop a common understanding of Transnational
Criminal Organizations (TCO) and enables operations to counter
identified TCO networks.
Conducts combined operations with military and law
enforcement elements from the U.S. and Partner Nations to disrupt and
deter organized crime networks in Central America.
Consistently refines and evolves a common understanding
of the environment and its efforts to enable partners to counter
threats to both the CENTAM region and the American Homeland
Provides a running estimate of the environment to both
synchronize and integrate operations to achieve the right, overall
effects against Criminal Transnational Organizations / Illicit
Facilitation Networks.
Supports efforts dedicated to Building Partner Capacity
by providing subject matter expertise and capabilities throughout
CENTAM in areas ranging from medical support to the local population
and fire-fighting capabilities, to logistical support to partner nation
militaries.
Serves as U.S. Southern Command's first responder for
natural disasters and humanitarian events within CENTAM.
Is prepared to provide SOUTHCOM a no-notice command and
control node throughout CENTAM in a natural disaster scenario.
Manages the only all-weather day/night C-5 Galaxy-capable
airfield in CENTAM, supporting ongoing operations and maintaining
readiness to facilitate humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
throughout CENTAM.
JTF-B's operations enable DOD, DOS, IA, and PN efforts
throughout CENTAM. Over the past year, JTF-B provided air movement
support to the Honduran military for twelve iterations of Operation
CARAVANA during 2015 (moving 3,525 pax and 135,500 pounds of
equipment), allowing them to position forces into isolated regions of
eastern Honduras and posturing them to effectively deter Illicit
Facilitation Networks. JTF-B also conducted 25 medical missions during
2015. These missions provided vital care to underserviced communities
within Central America, increasing the local population's faith in
government, providing HN medical training, and fostering goodwill
across the region. In addition, JTF-B also assisted the Government of
Belize in drug eradication efforts and supported U.S. Law Enforcement
and military units in training the Belizean Defense Forces--providing
time and space as the Belize forces continue to develop capacity.
Finally, JTF-B conducted or directly supported a number
of vital Contingency Operations, such as a high visibility mission to
repatriate Central American citizens back to their home counties,
supported 15 MEDEVAC missions in 2015--including a Honduran soldier
seriously injured in a drug interdiction off the shore of Gracias a
Dios, Honduras, a Search and Rescue mission of a missing American off
the coast of Roatan, Honduras, as well as in the search effort for
survivors of a capsized ferry off the coast of Nicaragua. JTF-B's
continuing activities demonstrate U.S. commitment to CENTAM, posturing
our Nation as the partner of choice and a force that will serve the
people of Central America for years to come.
u.s. army south (arsouth)
headquarters: ft sam houston, texas
Security Cooperation: ARSOUTH conducted 164 security
cooperation events with 23 countries in U.S. Southern Command's area of
responsibility. These events represent both engagements and building
Partner Nation capabilities with other militaries in the region.
Countering Transnational Organized Crime (CTOC): ARSOUTH,
with the support of the Texas Army National Guard, 72nd IBCT, conducted
CTOC tactical training in Guatemala and Honduras. They also conducted
information training in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador. The four
Mission Essential tasks trained were: Border Control Operations,
Command Post Activities, Information Support to Operations, and
Sustainment Operations. These training efforts contributed to the
capacity-building efforts of our Partner Nations, enabling selected
elements of their security forces to better focus on basic border
control and security operations. U.S. Army South has supported 60
operations in the SOUTHCOM AOR, contributing to the arrest of 71
individuals including 14 HVT's, and seizure of 12.5 metrics tons of
cocaine and $12.3 million. These operations have contributed to the
disruption of TCO networks especially in Honduras and Guatemala.
Information Security Cooperation: In addition to the CTOC
training effort, ARSOUTH conducted Information engagements as a part of
the Distinguished Visitor Program, Bilateral Staff Talks, and all
regional Professional Development Exchanges, enabling military
information capacity building in support of Guatemala, Honduras, El
Salvador, Colombia, Chile and Peru.
Counter Terrorism: ARSOUTH conducted 10 Subject Matter
Expert Exchanges in six countries that included over 750 host nation
soldiers. The engagements included: Medical, Search and Rescue,
Logistics, Maintenance and Communications.
Civil-Military Relations: ARSOUTH conducted Civil-
Military Relations Professional Development Exchanges in Brazil,
Colombia, Chile, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru,
Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, improving the ability of these
countries to conduct inter-organizational coordination during
humanitarian assistance / disaster relief operations and in countering
transnational criminal organizations. These exchanges demonstrate the
synergy and value of interagency collaboration and provide an effective
forum for executive-level information-sharing, both bilaterally and
regionally.
Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP): HAP focuses on
activities which help build partner nation capacity to provide
essential services to their populace, with particular emphasis on
response to disasters and other crises, reinforcing citizen security,
and sustaining stability in a particular country or throughout the
region. ARSOUTH, as USSOUTHCOM's Executive Agent for the construction
facet of HAP, completed 21 projects in 2015, and also initiated the
planning for 22 future construction projects across the AOR.
Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI): GPOI is a
security assistance program to enhance international capacity to
conduct United Nations and regional peace support operations. ARSOUTH,
as USSOUTHCOM's GPOI construction executive agent, executed 14 projects
in Central and South America and initiated the planning for three
future projects (El Salvador and Uruguay).
Conference of the American Armies (CAA): The CAA (20
member Armies, 5 observer Armies and two International Military
Organizations) strengthens relationships and improves interoperability
in peacekeeping and disaster relief operations through the creation and
implementation of practical initiatives approved by the Army
commanders. Army South organized and led delegations representing the
U.S. Army Chief of Staff at conferences on IEDs, Disaster Response,
Interagency Operations and CAA Procedures in Colombia, Mexico, Brazil
and Chile.
Exercise Beyond the Horizon (BTH): Humanitarian and Civic
Assistance Field Training Exercises were conducted in El Salvador and
Panama. BTH El Salvador yielded six engineer projects and three general
Medical Readiness Training Exercises (MEDRETEs), treating a total of
24,627 patients. In the El Salvador effort, over 1,760 U.S troops
participated, and the host nation provided 163 security, engineering
and medical personnel. BTH Panama included an Ophthalmology specialty
MEDRETE which removed 250 cataracts from pre-screened patients, while a
general MEDRETE treated 4,760 local patients. Forty eight U.S. troops
participated in these efforts, while the Panamanian Ministry of Health
and the Panamanian National Police provided over 60 personnel for this
bilateral collaborative initiative.
Exercise Fuerzas Aliadas--Humanitarias (FA-HUM): This
year's Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Table Top Exercise (TTX)
was hosted by Honduras, to build Partner Nation capacity to respond to
a major disaster and strengthen military/security force collaboration
and cooperation in the region. The TTX exercised the coordination,
response and integration of Honduras' SINAGER (National Risk Management
System) members and other International Cooperation members. It greatly
improved their ability to respond to an adverse event, activating
SINAGER and national, regional, and international emergency protocols.
Exercise PANAMAX 2015: This year's Joint/Combined
operational exercise focused on the defense of the Panama Canal and
designated ARSOUTH as HQ, Multi-National Forces-South. The Crisis
Action Planning Phase had 127 participants--82 U.S. and 45 Partner
Nation personnel from 9 countries. ARSOUTH also hosted the CFLCC with
Colombia as the lead country which included 62 personnel from 15
Partner Nations and 29 U.S. personnel. In addition, ARSOUTH
participated in a bilateral exercise with the Government of Panama
(PANAMAX-Alpha) where 20 United States personnel worked with the
Panamanians coordinating United States forces assistance during
simulated security operations.
Exercise Integrated Advance 2015: For 2015 Integrated
Advance is a Command Post (CPX) and Field Training Exercise (FTX)
focused in the Caribbean and designed to conduct combined security,
peacekeeping and selected maritime operations. This Joint operational
exercise focused on the interagency planning required for a United
States response to a Caribbean Mass Migration. ARSOUTH formed the core
of the JTF-MIGOPS with 127 personnel (including 52 from other military
services and government agencies).
u.s. naval forces southern command (usnavso)
headquarters: mayport, florida
U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command/U.S. FOURTH Fleet
(USNAVSO/FOURTHFLT) employs maritime forces in cooperative maritime
security operations in order to maintain access, enhance
interoperability, and build enduring partnerships that foster regional
security in the USSOUTHCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR).
Continuing Promise 2015 (CP 15): U.S. Navy Hospital Ship
USNS Comfort completed her longest and most successful CP in history,
conducting mission stops in 11 partner nations (Belize, Guatemala,
Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, El Salvador, Colombia, Dominica, the
Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Haiti) from April through September
2015. The CP-15 medical team treated 122,268 patients, including 1,255
surgeries conducted aboard the Comfort, along with 279 surgeries
conducted by the non-government organization ``Operation Smile'' aboard
the Comfort. The CP-15 also featured 1,285 subject matter expert
exchanges, 94 engineering projects, and 85 community relations events.
Almost 400 members of non-government organizations deployed as part of
the CP team, which included approximately $5.24 million dollars in
donations to the 11 partner nations. CP-15 sent a strong message of
U.S. commitment and partnership with the people of the Caribbean,
Central and South America, and directly impacted more people in our
partner nations than any other U.S. Navy mission.
Southern Seas 2015 (SS 15): Task Force 49 (TF 49), led by
Commander Carrier Strike Group Nine, deployed to the USSOUTHCOM AOR,
sailing around South America from the end of September through mid-
December 2015. TF-49 participated in both UNITAS Pacific, hosted by
Chile, and UNITAS Atlantic, hosted by Brazil. This was the largest and
most capable U.S. Force to participate in UNITAS in the more than 50-
year history of the multi-national maritime exercise. UNITAS is the
longest-running naval exercise in the world. USS George Washington also
conducted multi-day bilateral exercises with the Japan Self-Defense
Force, the Peruvian Navy, the Chilean Air Force, and the Brazilian Navy
as well as receiving distinguished visitors from Panama, Colombia,
Uruguay, Argentina, and Paraguay.
Southern Partnership Station (SPS): SPS is a series of
Navy/Marine Corps engagements focused on Theater Security Cooperation
(TSC), specifically Building Partner Capacity (BPC), through Subject
Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEEs) with partner nation militaries and
civilian security forces. SPS engagements include Community Relations
projects that focus on our partnerships, shared interests, and shared
values. 2015 SPS Deployments:
SPS Joint High Speed Vessel 2015 (SPS JHSV 15): USNS
Spearhead built partner capacity while conducting TSC engagements
through the use of Adaptive Force Packages (AFPs) ashore in Belize,
Guatemala, Colombia, and Honduras. The sailors, marines, soldiers,
airmen, NCIS agents, and civilian mariners making up the Spearhead Team
built upon the firm foundation of the JHSV 14 deployment, and the
persistent annual presence of Spearhead and the AFPs in the USSOUTHCOM
AOR are reaping rewards of partnership and interoperability.
SPS Oceanographic 2015 (SPS OCEANO 15): With the
support of the Naval Oceanographic Office, survey ship USNS Pathfinder
conducted hydrographic surveys in the Western Caribbean, shore-based
Fleet Survey Teams conducted hydrographic surveys in coastal waters of
Peru, Honduras, and Jamaica, and a Light Detection and Ranging aircraft
and crew conducted hydrographic surveys in the coastal waters of
Honduras. All SPS OCEANO surveys are conducted with the assistance of
partner nation personnel and equipment, and support USSOUTHCOM's
Oceanographic, Hydrographic, and Bathymetric Program and the Chief of
Naval Operations Global Maritime Partnership Initiative. All
hydrographic survey and environmental assessment data is shared to
enable safe and effective maritime navigation and access to the
littoral for naval and joint forces.
Operation MARTILLO: Two frigates, one destroyer, one
coastal patrol ship, JHSV SPEARHEAD, four fixed-wing maritime patrol
aircraft squadrons, and one scientific development squadron detachment
deployed to support Operation MARTILLO, conducting D&M Operations under
the tactical control of Joint Interagency Task Force South, targeting
illicit trafficking routes in the waters off Central America.
USS Columbus: The Los Angeles-class fast attack submarine
deployed to the USSOUTHCOM AOR. Columbus visited United States Naval
Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and made two Panama Canal transits.
PANAMAX 2015: Chile served as Combined Forces Maritime
Component Commander (CFMCC) for the annual PANAMAX Exercise, which
exercises defense of the approaches to the Panama Canal. Chile led a
multinational staff of more than 50 military and civilian personnel
from 16 Partner Nations (including the U.S.), all based at USNAVSO/
FOURTHFLT Headquarters in Mayport. In this year's PANAMAX, the CFMCC
staff worked through the Navy Planning Process to produce a Concept of
Operations (CONOP) with notional forces, for presentation to the
Combined Joint Task Force led by U.S. Army South. Now in its 13th year,
PANAMAX focuses on ensuring the defense of the Panama Canal, increasing
multinational force interoperability while supporting the training
requirements of all participating nations' civil and military services.
12th air force (air forces southern)
headquarters: davis-monthan afb, tucson, arizona
Security Cooperation: Twelfth Air Force (Air Forces
Southern) (hereafter AFSOUTH) led 50 security cooperation events in 11
USSOUTHCOM partner nations. Engagements focused on countering
transnational organized crime, communications, aircraft operations and
maintenance, ISR, space, cyberspace security, safety, command and
control, space capabilities, aerospace medicine, air evacuation,
expeditionary medicine, information sharing, mobility, Future
Engagement Talks, logistics, aircrew search and rescue, and
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The 571st Mobility Support
Advisory Squadron completed 19 air advisor events in Belize, Brazil,
Colombia, Curacao, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Panama,
and Peru, training 417 partner nation military members.
Legal: The AFSOUTH Staff Judge Advocate promoted Law of
Armed Conflict adherence and Human Rights Law in 9 legal engagement
activities with Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, and
Trinidad & Tobago.
Airlift Missions: AFSOUTH executed 85 theater airlift
missions, moving more than 4,267 passengers and 406 tons of cargo
throughout USSOUTHCOM's area of responsibility.
System of Cooperation among the American Air Forces
(SICOFAA): SICOFAA strengthens relationships and improves
interoperability in peacekeeping and disaster relief operations through
the creation and implementation of practical initiatives approved by
the commanders of the 20 SICOFAA member Air Forces and the 5 observer
Air Forces. USAF Chief of Staff and the 12 AF (AFSOUTH) Commander
participated in the annual American Air Chiefs Summit (CONJEFAMER) in
Mexico City in June 2015. Delegates from USAF and AFSOUTH participated
in five SICOFAA committee meetings and the CONJEFAMER planning
conference.
Medical Support: AFSOUTH provided medical planning and
oversight of detainee movement operations and forward operating
location missions; delivered operational health expertise and steady-
state planning for contingency and real world operations across
USSOUTHCOM AOR; supplied counterdrug operations medical guidance and
planning support; and coordinated USAF medical engagements for New
Horizons and Beyond the Horizon exercises. Surgeon General provided
Crisis Action Team support for PANAMAX and Integrated Advance. AFSOUTH
International Health Specialists conducted 15 Theater Security
Cooperation global health engagements with partner nations addressing
flight medicine, air evacuation, force health protection, and
expeditionary medicine advancing regional collaboration across the
aerospace medicine enterprise.
New Horizons 2015 (Honduras): AFSOUTH trained 120 U.S.
Military personnel in this joint exercise. Engineering personnel
constructed one new 1400 square foot school and drilled two water wells
supporting 3,000 Honduran citizens. During the exercise, deployed
medical personnel not only provided care for U.S. members, but also
volunteered their medical capabilities to the local hospital emergency
room by treating 678 Honduran civilians and providing over 100 surgery
consults. Additionally, deployed communications support personnel wired
the local hospital offices for internet capability. International
Health Specialists conducted a 12 day infectious disease assessment for
the local Ministry of Health and provided a final report with
recommendations to improve local health conditions.
ISR: AFSOUTH provided command and control for ISR
missions in support of USSOUTHCOM priorities. AFSOUTH executed 939 ISR
missions and 5,423 flight hours, resulting in over 4,544 images and
nearly 9,235 minutes of video. This information assisted in numerous
drug trafficking seizures in the SOUTHCOM AOR by the United States and
its partner nations in fiscal year 2015. AFSOUTH continues to assist
critical partner nations in counter-drug/counter-narcotics trafficking
efforts and is currently working to enable Air Force operational and
ISR capability in both Guatemala and Honduras. AFSOUTH assists both
Colombia and Peru in maintaining the strategic initiative against
illegally-armed combatants who previously threatened the very existence
of those nations.
marine corps forces south (marforsouth)
headquarters: doral, florida
Theater Security Cooperation: In 2015, MARFORSOUTH
completed more than 120 Security Cooperation events in 21 countries.
This resulted in over 750 Partner Nation Marine Corps and Defense Force
personnel trained. While continuing to foster long-term relationships
based on mutual respect and common values, MARFORSOUTH conducted a
variety of key leader engagements throughout the USSOUTHCOM area of
responsibility that reinforced our commitment to partner nation
leadership. To meet shared security objectives in combatting
transnational organized crime, MARFORSOUTH delivered tailor-made
training to our partners by establishing persistent presence security
cooperation teams in Belize, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. This
was training often conducted hand-in-hand with our Colombian Marine
Corps partners through the United States/Colombia Action Plan.
SPMAGTF-SC-15: From June to November 2015, U.S. Marine
Corps Forces, South deployed Special-Purpose Marine, Air, Ground Task
Force-SOUTHCOM (SPMAGTF-SC) to Central America. Leveraging a force one-
tenth the size of those in CENTCOM and AFRICOM, SPMAGTF-SC temporarily
deployed to one of the most austere locations in Honduras to provide
support to partner nation militaries and populations living in extreme
poverty and at the highest risk for involvement in illicit activities.
Using SPMAGTF-organic aircraft and engineering support, marines and
sailors throughout Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Belize focused
on building and maintaining partnership capacity through shared values,
challenges, and responsibility. The Marines built three schools,
improved a partner nation military airfield, and provided essential
water services to those in need. This force was instrumental in
bringing together the national level government of Honduras with remote
populations mostly segregated by terrain, expanding governance and
visibility on key issues in the region.
SPS-JHSV 15--Marine Detachment (MARDET): MARFORSOUTH
deployed 35 Marines and Sailors to Guatemala and Honduras in support of
United States Naval Forces Southern Command/United States Fourth
Fleet's Southern Partnership Station (SPS) initiative. The MARDET
provided engineer support to the SPS mission and met emergent
requirements under OPERATION ESCUDO UNIDO. This is the first iteration
of SPS that included a USMC Deputy Mission Commander, who was an
integral part of the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command's C2 structure
for the mission. 32 of the engineers supported airfield construction at
Mocoron in Gracias a Dios, as well as humanitarian construction
assistance and water purification projects in the area.
Tradewinds Phase II (Ground): In June 2015, MARFORSOUTH,
in partnership with the Belize Defence Force, Canada, and 17 other
partner nations from the Caribbean Region, executed Exercise Tradewinds
2015 Phase II (Ground), a combined Field Training Exercise (FTX) in
Belize, in order to enhance combined Counter Transnational Organized
Crime (CTOC) operations capability and promote interoperability and
multinational relationships throughout the theater. There were over 400
participants in the Belize-hosted, MARFORSOUTH-led ground portion of
the exercise that accomplished the capacity building exercise through
five distinct exercise tracks in a Subject Matter Expert Exchange
(SMEE). The tracks included nine days of interoperability training in
command and control, jungle tactics, military support to law
enforcement, instinctive shooting, and riverine skills. Of note,
Tradewinds 2015 facilitated the positive increase of mil-to-mil
relationships between Mexico and Belize that resulted in training and
cooperation that was exclusive of the exercise and enhances the border
security of both nations.
MLAC-15: In August 2015 United States Marine Corps
Forces, South executed the Marine Leaders of the Americas Conference in
Cartagena, Colombia to increase professional exchanges and strengthen
relations among naval infantry forces within the Western Hemisphere.
This sixth iteration was co-hosted by commander, United States Marine
Corps Forces Command on behalf of the Commandant of the U.S. Marine
Corps, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, South and the Infanteria de Marina de
Colombia. This event provided the Commandant of the Marine Corps with
an opportunity to meet and engage senior Marine Corps and naval
infantry leaders from 15 partner nations.
UNITAS Amphibious 2015: From 14-25 November 2015,
approximately 1,000 representatives from Brazil, Canada, Chile,
Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and the United States participated in
UNITAS Amphibious 2015, a combined Field Training Exercise in the
vicinity of the Ilha do Governador and Ilha da Marambaia, Brazil, in
order to enhance interoperability in Amphibious Operations, and
Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) missions. The U.S.-
sponsored exercise, UA 2015, develops and sustains relationships--which
improve the capacity of our PN security forces to achieve common
desired regional goals. This annual exercise fosters friendly
cooperation and understanding among all participating forces.
Security Augmentation Force (SAF): The SAF is
MARFORSOUTH's designated company of marines that reinforces Diplomatic
Missions in the AOR, as required in support of `New Normal'
requirements. In close coordination with Department of State, the SAF
is postured in CONUS should an Ambassador decide that the local guard
force is unwilling, unable, or insufficient to provide security to his
mission. While there are currently no high threat posts in the AOR, the
potential for a natural disaster is possible for some Embassy
locations. MARFORSOUTH deploys its Marine Liaison Element to visit each
Embassy, solidifies plans of action with the Country Team, and captures
relevant information that will enable SAF in rapidly responding to
crisis.
special operations command south (socsouth)
headquarters: homestead, florida
Building Partner Capacity: SOCSOUTH elements worked with
Partner Nation units in Belize, Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican
Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Guyana, Panama, and Peru to
improve their capacity to conduct ground and maritime interdiction,
broaden and reinforce their civil affairs programs, engage in Military
Information Support Operations (MISO), and develop their intelligence
capacities. Through active engagement, SOCSOUTH helped Partner Nations
develop self-sustaining capabilities to better protect themselves,
contribute to regional security and stability, and collaborate with
U.S. and other forces.
SOCSOUTH used episodic engagements-including 26 Joint
Combined Exchange Training (JCET) events--with multiple Central
American, South American, and Caribbean partners to develop United
States forces' skills and enhance Partner Nation interoperability.
In Brazil, SOCSOUTH JCETs allowed United States and
Brazilian counter-terrorism forces to share best practices for
operating in a range of complex environments and assisted the
Brazilians' capacity building efforts in preparation for the upcoming
Olympic Games.
In Colombia and Peru, SOCSOUTH continued to partner
with these Andean Ridge nations as they confronted narco-terrorist
insurgencies and global illicit trafficking networks. Colombia's
enhanced capacity is a significant supporting element of that nation's
ongoing peace process.
In Honduras, SOCSOUTH teams and Colombian counterparts
continued to help train National Police officers of the TIGRES special
response unit as part of expanded United States support to Honduran
authorities as they confront sources of insecurity in urban and remote
rural areas.
In Belize, El Salvador, and Guatemala, SOCSOUTH teams
engaged the Partner Nation in cooperative activities to reinforce their
Naval Special Forces maritime interdiction capabilities. Guatemalan and
Salvadoran Naval Special Forces conducted seven major maritime
interdiction operations in support of Joint Interagency Task Force-
South's (JIATF-S) multinational collaborative efforts against regional
illicit traffickers.
Civil Affairs: In 2015, 14 civil affairs teams and civil-
military support elements engaged eight Partner Nations as they worked
to enhance civil-military relations, reduce the vulnerability of key
populations impacted by transnational organized crime or violent
extremism, and improve/extend governance in underserved regions.
Military Information Support Operations: SOCSOUTH
maintained military information support teams in six Partner Nations
supporting Colombia's Demobilization and Counter Recruitment Programs,
Guatemalan Interagency Task Forces, Panamanian security services'
outreach programs in the Darien border region, the global DOD Rewards
Program, and United States Government Anti-Trafficking in Persons
efforts. These activities supported a broad range of efforts against
transnational organized criminal and violent extremist organizations.
Intelligence Analytical Support to U.S. Country Teams:
SOCSOUTH provided support to U.S. Country Teams efforts focused on
terrorism, human smuggling network s, and transnational organized
crime.
SOCSOUTH helped develop host nation capabilities and
country team support through a number of subject matter exchanges.
SOCSOUTH supported multiple U.S. Country Team and
Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) collaborations with Partner
Nations, with emphasis on countering Special Interest Aliens involved
in cross-border criminal activities.
Building Intellectual Capital: SOCSOUTH, in conjunction
with the Colombian Joint Staff College, conducted six Counter-Terrorism
Fellowship Program (CTFP)-funded seminars in Bogota, Colombia during
2015. Subject-matter expert presenters from the United States,
Colombia, and other nations collaborated with hundreds of participants
from 18 Western Hemisphere and NATO countries. Late in the year,
SOCSOUTH worked with Partner Nation defense and security institutions
in El Salvador to build a complementary regional CTFP series in that
country.
Fuerzas Comando 2015: Fuerzas Comando is a USSOUTHCOM-
sponsored, SOCSOUTH-executed multinational exercise featuring a Special
Operations skills competition and a Senior Leader Seminar designed to
promote military-to-military relationships , increased
interoperability, and improved regional security. Approximately 700
military, law enforcement, and civilian personnel took part. The 2015
skills competition was held in Poptun, Guatemala and included
participation by 18 Partner Nations and the United States. In the city
of Antigua, distinguished representatives from each nation discussed
approaches to combating terrorism, organized crime, and illicit
trafficking at the Senior Leader Seminar.
Fused Response 2015: SOCSOUTH executes an annual CJCS-
directed exercise to validate time sensitive crisis action planning, as
well as training, readiness, interoperability and capability of Special
Operations Forces in support of regional crises and contingencies.
Fused Response 2015 was a Joint and Combined exercise held across
several locations in Honduras. United States military and civilian
personnel and aircraft operated with their Honduran counterparts to
refine rapid crisis response procedures and learn from each other's
best practices.
Panamax 2015: In this annual USSOUTHCOM-sponsored, 19-
nation exercise, regional forces support the Government of Panama as it
protects safe passage through the Panama Canal, ensures its neutrality,
and preserves its national sovereignty. SOCSOUTH took part as a member
of the multinational Special Operations team led by Brazil.
Gator Aide 2015: Exercise Gator Aide is a Personnel
Recovery exercise designed to validate USSOUTHCOM's non-conventional
assisted recovery capabilities. SOCSOUTH worked with U.S. interagency
partners to enhance each other's readiness to prepare for, plan, and
conduct specialized search and rescue operations throughout the region.
Chairman McCain. Thank you very much, Admiral Tidd.
Admiral Gortney, it's been described by many Governors and
law enforcement individuals in the Northeast and the Midwest
that the drug overdose deaths of manufactured heroin is now, in
the view of some Governors, a, quote, ``epidemic.'' That is now
being brought to my attention, and many, many others,
particularly those who represent these States. How's it getting
in?
Admiral Gortney. It's coming through the traditional legal
border crossings in very small quantities, some----
Chairman McCain. By individuals or vehicles, or both, or--
--
Admiral Gortney. Both. Both, sir. By very small quantities,
because of the profit margin. I was just down in--at the San
Diego-Tijuana border crossing, an immense challenge separating
the legal versus the illegal activity that comes across the
border and how the technology is--that our Custom and Border
Patrol and Immigration are using is being circumvented by a
very adaptable enemy.
Chairman McCain. What do we need to do?
Admiral Gortney. Well, two things, sir. We need to work on
the technologies that allow us to detect this. We need to work
at the root cause within Mexico, in the case of the poppy
production and the eradication of the poppies. We'd work with
SEDENA [Secretariat of National Defense] and SEMAR [Secretariat
of Navy] on that, in our mil-to-mil responsibilities, as well
as working with our partners north of the border. We do that
through JTF [Joint Task Force] North, helping them improve
their--our mission partners improve their capability and
capacity where----
Chairman McCain. Should we expect more of the Mexican
Government?
Admiral Gortney. I would think we--yes, sir, we do need to
expect more of the Mexican Government and all of the agencies
within the Mexican Government.
Chairman McCain. The manufactured heroin is much easier
than cultivated heroin.
Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir. Between heroin and
methamphetamines, the precursors in methamphetamines are coming
from China, factories in China, and we have to tackle all of
the illicit drugs that are coming across the border, sir.
Chairman McCain. Part of it, as you mentioned in your
remarks, it has got to do with the fundamentals of economics,
and that's supply and demand. If there's a demand, there's
going to be a supply.
Admiral Gortney. That's absolutely correct, sir.
Chairman McCain. Admiral Tidd, you, I think very correctly,
applauded the agreement in Colombia with the FARC. I think it
is a testimony to the Colombian people and government, first of
all, but it is a sign and a story that we should understand
better, and that is, it's been a long-term investment by the
United States of America of billions over time because the
heroin--excuse me--the cocaine was obviously a threat to the
United States of America. But, now we are hearing that poppy
cultivation--or cocaine--is way up. Is that correct?
Admiral Tidd. Yes, sir, that's correct. I think in the next
set of figures that will come out, we're going to see a very
significant increase in coca production.
Chairman McCain. With the cocoa production up, that means
there's going to be more cocoa coming into the--cocaine coming
in the United States.
Admiral Tidd. I'd--that's what I would expect, yes, sir.
Chairman McCain. That's where the market is. What do we
need to do there? Because obviously it will lower the cost of
cocaine, the--more people will find it affordable. What do we
do there?
Admiral Tidd. Sir, I think it's a multifaceted approach.
First and foremost, we need to continue to stand steadfast with
our Colombian friends. As you recognized, it's a--it is a
relationship that extends over decades. We will need to
continue to work very closely with them.
With regard to the actual movement of cocaine, those
transnational criminal networks that have moved the cocaine, we
need to do everything that we can to apply pressure on them to
detect, to illuminate, and then to disrupt them. That
disruptive work will require the efforts of both--all of our
interagency partners as well as allied partners.
Chairman McCain. Admiral Gortney, what--we know that Mr.
Baghdadi, the head of ISIS, has--is sending people out of ISIS
in the wave of refugees that have left Syria and Iraq. What is
the threat of someone--individual or individuals coming across
our southern border?
Admiral Gortney. I think if someone can find a seam to
enter into our country, legally or illegally, they're going to
exploit that particular seam. That's why we work very closely
with our mission and partners to the south while we look into
the drugs, we look to the left and right to see, within those
seams, if there's anything else that be moving--in this case,
terrorists.
Chairman McCain. What more do we need to do in order to
secure our southern border? Have we made progress in securing
our southern border, or is it basically the status quo?
Admiral Gortney. I think the efforts have been effective,
but not nearly as effective as we would like them to be. We're
working against a very adaptive enemy who will exploit the
seams. As we make an advance in one area, they're very quickly
able to overcome that. We're not able to stay out in front of
that, their OODA [observe, orient, decide and act] loop, so to
speak. That's where we need to--that's where we need----
Chairman McCain. Well--so, what do we need to do? Isn't it
true that more and more of those who are being apprehended are
what we call OTM [on the move], other than Mexican?
Admiral Gortney. That's correct. There's--as I look at it,
it's the mass migration that are escaping the conditions within
Central America, and the cartels are moving the people. The
other problem is the drugs. The one that is the most concerning
to us is the heroin that is being produced and shipped out of
Mexico, and the methamphetamines. Moved by the same cartels.
Chairman McCain. What do we need to do?
Admiral Gortney. We need to tackle both. They both have
different problem sets.
Chairman McCain. I mean, do we need more Border Patrol? Do
we need more towers? Do we need more--in other words, what more
do we need to do to increase our border security?
Admiral Gortney. The first thing, for the people, is
improving the conditions within Central America, a whole-of-
government approach, working with the countries down there to
improve the conditions so that people want to remain within----
Chairman McCain. That's a long-term project. What about
the----
Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir.
Chairman McCain. What about the short term?
Admiral Gortney. Sir, both of them demand long-term
problems. This is a 30-year fight that we have to confront.
When it comes to the drugs, it's working with our mission
partners in those countries, as well as Mexico. It's improving
the technology along----
Chairman McCain. What about security on the border itself?
Is it--we need more technology? We need more towers? We need
more Border Patrol? What do we need?
Admiral Gortney. I would say that the--having been on the
Mexican-Guatemalan border and then the Arizona and the Mexican
border, the threat is a function of the--what we need is a
combination of analyzing the threat, the terrain, the
technology, and the training of the people. Efforts along all
of those, both with our people and then working with Mexico and
with Guatemala and Belize is exactly in order against all of
those.
Chairman McCain. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me begin with Admiral Haney. Admiral Haney, we are in
the process of modernizing the triad, for very obvious and
compelling reasons. With respect to the air aspects, there is
proposals for a new penetrating bomber, but that bomber also
needs ordnance to carry. Two items which you could comment upon
are the replacement for our existing air-launched cruise
missile and also the B61-12 gravity bomb. But, a related issue
would be timing of--improvements on these delivery systems
might, in fact, be--come along before the new penetrating
bomber, but they would be very, very useful on whatever
platform it's applying. I presume that, but you might confirm
or refute.
Admiral Haney. Ranking Member Reed, the air leg associated
with our triad of platforms is very important, in terms of
complex deterrents that any adversary that would want to
escalate their way out of a failed conflict would have to also
deal with. That's important in strategic stability. As you've
indicated here, and I will articulate, it's very important that
we move forward with the replacement bomber, in that our B-52
fleet, the planes flying today were off the assembly line in
1962. We'll still be flying that plane into the 2040s. Even our
B-2 fleet is about 25 years old. It's important that we're able
to have that capability--stealth platform to deliver both
nuclear and conventional missions.
With regards to nuclear arsenals for that plane in order to
have both flexible deterrents as well as visible deterrents,
it's important that we replace the air-launch cruise missile.
It was built in the '70s for a 10-year lifespan, well beyond
that span today. That's why it's very important that we replace
it with the long-range standoff cruise missile program that's
just now getting underway in part of the President's budget for
2017. We already have a cruise missile, but it's well beyond
its lifespan, and we need to replace it.
We also have programs associated with the B61-12 nuclear
bomb that replaces four variants of, again, aging bombs. This
helps us reduce our stockpile and have a more effective
deterrent.
Senator Reed. Just a follow-up question. As you develop
this new air-launch cruise missile, it--I presume, and correct
me if wrong, it could be launched from numerous platforms, even
existing platforms. Is that correct?
Admiral Haney. Absolutely. B-52, for example, which
launches our air-launch cruise missile, doesn't have stealth
characteristics. We'll use this new long-range standoff.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Admiral Haney. You're welcome.
Senator Reed. Admiral Gortney, you have many
responsibilities in your--as you've indicated in your testimony
and your response to the Chairman. One issue, though, is
missile defense--national missile defense. Can you give us,
sort of, an update on the long-range discrimination radar? How
is it going? Also, generally, our posture when it comes to
missile defense.
Admiral Gortney. We're on track with long-range
discriminating radar and the necessary investments to keep our
ballistic missile defense architecture to make it the very best
we can and then to improve it. We want to thank the Members of
Congress for those investments. We're in good shape there, sir.
We're on path to have 44 interceptors in the ground by the end
of 2017; 40 in the great State of Alaska and four in
California.
Also, we thank you for the investments to help us get on
the correct side of the cost curve, because right now we're on
the wrong side of the cost curve, both in theater ballistic
missile defense and intercontinental ballistic missile defense
against rogue nations. Admiral Jim Syring, at MDA, and I asked
for those investments and the research and development to help
us get on the correct side of the cost curve. They're in the
budget, and we thank you for that. Those that pay out, we'll be
coming to you and asking you to put those into production once
we understand what they do. I'm confident in the capability
that we have today.
Senator Reed. Just a follow-up question. This is always a
subject of constant evaluation and reevaluation, but, at this
juncture, your view would--on the need for an East Coast array
of missiles, that need is not evident at this moment?
Admiral Gortney. I do not see it, sir. If the threat
manifested itself from Iran today, I have the ability to engage
it today. If I had one dollar to invest, I'd put it to where we
could engage in those capabilities that get us on the correct
side of the cost curve. Those capabilities will work both for
theater ballistic missile defense for our servicemembers and
their families overseas, as well as ballistic missile defense
for here in the Homeland.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. My time is run out. But, Admiral Tidd, I want
to commend your efforts and also the--your testimony today. One
of the chief issues that I think emerges from your testimony is
the need to build capacity in our allies in the region, that we
can't, by far, do it alone. That is a multi-agency effort, not
just SOUTHCOM, but SOUTHCOM plays a very critical role,
because, for many in Latin America and South America, you used
to represent not just Department of Defense, but the United
States in your command. A quick comment, because my time is
expired.
Admiral Tidd. Yes, sir. Thanks very much.
Where the Department is--of Defense--is able to play a
useful is, we have a regional and a subregional look. The
actual activities occur on a country-by-country basis, but
we're able to look across the entire region and, I think,
provide a very useful service to our interagency partners.
Senator Reed. Thank you, sir.
Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I--in this morning's Air Force Times, Admiral Haney, I
noticed the--it caught my eye because Senator Rounds and I were
just on Diego Garcia--that the Air Force is deploying three B-
2s there. You're quoted in the article, announcing--making this
announcement in this morning's Air Force Times. Any comments
you want to make about that deployment of those three B-2s in
Diego Garcia?
Admiral Haney. Senator Inhofe, I would not describe it as a
deployment. We take our global----
Senator Inhofe. That's how it was characterized in the
article, though.
Admiral Haney. Well, I didn't get interviewed by----
Senator Inhofe. All right.
Admiral Haney.--Air Force Times, so I would say they
probably mixed some of my earlier statements, et cetera.
We actually send out our bombers--B-52s, B-2s--number one,
were we invited to participate in exercises with our allies and
partners. We do that throughout the globe. We do Pacific
operations, as well.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah. Well, that's good.
I want to--there's an area where I have sensed that there
is a disagreement between our military intelligence, on one
side, and the State Department, on the other side, having to do
with the Open Skies Treaty. Russia has reportedly announced its
intent to submit plans for aerial surveillance flights, which I
understand are permitted under the Open Skies Treaty, over the
United States using advanced digital cameras. Several in the--I
think Clapper made some comments, and certainly Lieutenant
General Vincent Stewart, Director of Defense Intelligence
Agency, with--concerned about this because of the advanced
technology that's out there. To quote him, he says, ``The
things that you can see, the amount of data you can collect,
the things you can do with post-processing allows Russia, in my
opinion, to get incredible foundational intelligence on
critical infrastructure, bases, ports, all of our facilities.''
He was critical of this. What is your thinking about this?
Where do you fall down on this?
Admiral Haney. Senator Inhofe, I think, as with all things,
we have to take a balanced approach, but we have to look at
this very carefully. Clearly, we, back here recently, did an
Open Skies Treaty mission over Russia with one of the 32 other
signors of the treaty. It's a mechanism by which we are able to
have transparent mechanisms with our allies and other partners
in that group, while at the same time we have to be careful as
we look through the technology advances using digital media
versus film. Sustaining film is problematic today. This is--got
to be in balance. Clearly, I'm concerned of any Russian ability
to gain intelligence on our critical infrastructure.
Senator Inhofe. Now, when we were going over Russia, were
we using the advanced digital equipment?
Admiral Haney. We were not, because we haven't gotten that
far yet.
Senator Inhofe. They're ahead of us, then. All right.
The--when Senator Reed was talking about the--all three
legs, you were concentrating on the air legs of the triad.
The--Admiral Winnifeld recently made the statement--and I'll
quote him--he said, ``Any remaining margin we have for
investing in our nuclear deterrent has been steadily whittled
away as we've pushed investments further and further into the
future.'' Do you think, Admiral Haney, that Russia is actively
modernizing their nuclear weapons delivery system and we're
just--are they ahead of us?
Admiral Haney. Well, I would----
Senator Inhofe. If so, is this a concern?
Admiral Haney. Well, Russia's modernization program in
their nuclear deterrent forces is of concern. Period. Dot. End.
The piece when you look at what they've been modernizing, it
didn't just start. They've been doing this, quite frankly, for
some time, with a lot of crescendo of activity over the last
decade and a half.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, we've been talking about it for a long
period of time, that we have not been keeping up in our
program, as many people think we should. A lot of us, when
we're back in the--our own States, we hear things that are
going on, and some things really catch the attention of the
American people. I brought up these two issues, because these
are two that do make a difference and the people are aware of,
and there are concerns out there.
Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Tidd, welcome to Florida. Welcome to Miami.
Admiral Tidd. Sir, it's a delightful place to live.
Senator Nelson. In your three Cs and three Gs, you talked
about this efficient network that moves things from south to
north, not only drugs, human trafficking, all kinds of
contraband. Do you have enough resources to do that in the
President's Budget?
Admiral Tidd. Sir, the simple fact of the matter is, we do
not. I do not have the ships, I do not have the aircraft to be
able to execute the detection and monitoring mission to the
level that has been established for us to achieve.
Senator Nelson. This is a unique role, where the Navy in
the Caribbean and the Pacific coordinates with the law
enforcement arm of the Coast Guard. They need assistance, too,
don't they?
Admiral Tidd. Sir, I would agree completely. It is very
much a team sport. The activities that are orchestrated by our
Joint Interagency Task Force South in Key West Florida involve
the efforts of all of the State--excuse me--all of the Federal
law enforcement agencies as well as the Department of Defense.
Coast Guard plays a very significant role.
Senator Nelson. We have seen some lessening of the violence
and the drug lords in Honduras. That used to be the number-one
murder capital in the world. Just this past weekend, I met, on
several occasions, with the President of Costa Rica. They seem
to be fairly stabilized. But, we're getting more drugs coming
into stable places in the past, such as Panama. That being the
Panama Canal, an expanded canal, what do you think is the
threat there?
Admiral Tidd. Senator, the adversary that we are dealing
with is very flexible, very agile, and it's like squeezing a
balloon; when we squeeze in one place, if we are not able to
apply pressure across the entire breadth of the network, they
will adapt and move to the area that they think they can get
in. As we have been--had some success working with our Honduran
partners, as they have been able to get out and apply greater
pressure in areas that previously had been denied to them,
we're seeing the--that the drug traffickers are moving the
landing points for the--where the drugs are coming ashore in
Central America to different countries.
Senator Nelson. Couldn't we get a lot more support from
Mexico, where all these drugs, basically, other than the ones
that are going the water route to Puerto Rico, some to Haiti--
couldn't we get a lot more support from Mexico, since they come
there and then they go across the border?
Admiral Tidd. Senator, I would defer that specific question
to----
Senator Nelson. I know----
Admiral Tidd.--to Admiral Gortney.
Senator Nelson.--it's not in your AOR, but what do you
think?
Admiral Tidd. What I think is that we continue to work very
closely with the militaries of all of the countries of Central
America. I know that NORTHCOM works closely with the Mexican
military to improve their capability and capacity to get this
problem. Our ability to share information effectively plays a
significant role.
Senator Nelson. Well, at least we got El Chapo. That was a
step in the right direction.
Tell me about Haiti. They've got this interim government.
Is it working until they can finally declare a President?
Admiral Tidd. Sir, I think the situation in Haiti--every
morning that we wake up, we watch--and to make sure that they
have not had significant crises that have occurred there.
They're going to have their hands full for a long time to come.
The role played by the U.N. peacekeeping operation,
MINUSTAH [United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti], there
has been absolutely critical in sustaining that--the stability
that is there. We've got some key partners in the nation, most
notably Brazil that has been a real backbone of that MINUSTAH
operation. We would hope that countries like that would
continue to make those contributions.
Senator Nelson. Basically, bottom line, until they improve
in their economic depravity, it's going to be a nation whose
government is always subject to a lot of corruption.
Admiral Gortney, what do you think about Mexico in helping
us out?
Admiral Gortney. I think they're in a 30-year fight, going
after immense challenges. The number-one problem is corruption.
If you look at the root cause that you've got to solve first--
and this is Admiral Soberon's words, not mine--is to go after
the corruption within the country. We need to assist them
across our whole-of-government approach in this 30-year fight.
They're great mission partners. SEDENA and SEMAR are great
mission partners, but they have an immense challenge. We do
everything we can to assist them with that.
Senator Nelson. Isn't it interesting that you can rely on
that elite unit at the federal level, but you get anywhere
below that, it's just--you can't even say anything about intel;
otherwise, it gets to the drug lords.
Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir. You mentioned the--recapture of
El Chapo. Those Mexican marines were trained by United States
marines.
Senator Nelson. Well, that's very good.
With that, I'll say, Mr. Chairman, the marines are standing
tall.
Chairman McCain. Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Gortney, our adversaries are continuing to invest
in developing advanced long-range cruise missiles. That can
hold the United States at risk. I think we have really thin
defenses against those. Can you talk a little bit about the
JLENS program and what role this plays in defending the United
States against a cruise missile attack?
Admiral Gortney. Yes, ma'am. The three types of missiles we
worry about, the third one is the cruise missile attack. The
Russians have--are employing these cruise missiles in Syria
today, both from bombers, ships, and submarines. When there's
no operational or tactical requirement in the battlefield to do
it, they're messaging us that they have this capability, and
those missiles can--have made it either a conventional or a
nuclear-tipped warhead.
In order to defeat this threat--I've been defending against
them since I was a lieutenant JG, and I've shot over 1300 of
them. If you want to defeat this threat, you have to be able to
detect it. In order to do that, you need an array--a radar that
is above the horizon. That can come in many forms. It can be
the AWACs, it can be the E-2 Hawkeye for the Navy, or it can be
JLENS [Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted
Sensor System]. What it does for us here in the national
capital region as we're executing our test, is putting this
array up. It fills a gap--at the classified level I can't say
in this forum--it fills a cap--a capability gap that I do not
have today. We look forward to restarting the JLENS program
after the very unfortunate mishap that we have. We understand
what happened. We've put in place the mitigation efforts. We
look forward to completing it, because, should it bear out, it
fills a gap that I do not have today against this particular
threat.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
Admiral Haney, last week General Rand, who commands Global
Strike Command, he testified that the Huey helicopters
providing security for our ICBM fields, they cannot meet the
emergency response requirements. Can you talk about the current
capability gap that we have and the need that we see to replace
those helicopters?
Admiral Haney. Senator Fischer, the--General Rand's
comments were spot on the mark there. These current
helicopters, these UH-1Ns, don't have the lift capability, the
speed capability to meet the requirements that have been
improved--validated through a number of studies, as well as
Might Guardian exercises, and what have you. They don't have
the lift to get the amount of security forces to the scene.
When you look at these missile fields, they're vast, and they
cover large areas, as you well know. They--in order to meet
those kinds of requirements, we need a new helicopter.
Senator Fischer. Would you say that need is urgent?
Admiral Haney. I would definitely say the need is urgent.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Admiral.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have to run, to preside.
Chairman McCain. Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for your service and for being here today.
I think, Admiral Tidd, if I could, you know, you were
talking about the drugs, and this and that. If you were going
to rate--and I've just heard a couple of statistics--but how
the drugs are getting here, most predominantly--by air, sea,
over ground, or through tunnels?
Admiral Tidd. I would defer to Admiral Gortney to----
Senator Manchin. Okay.
Admiral Tidd.--talk how they actually get across the U.S.
border into the United States. But, as they go through the
SOUTHCOM region, they go by air and by sea.
Senator Manchin. Okay.
Admiral Tidd. Then over land of Central America.
Senator Manchin. How do they get into the United States
border? Across it----
Admiral Gortney. Through all mechanisms, sir. Everything
that we talked about, that Admiral Tidd talked about, through
the tunnels----
Senator Manchin. I've heard that--and, sir--and, Admiral,
that's the--I had not heard that tunnels were so prevalent. I
heard that tunnels are probably one of the most pervasive ways
that this stuff is getting in, and we're not doing a whole lot
about the tunnels.
Admiral Gortney. Well, sir, I've been in one of the
tunnels.
Senator Manchin. Okay.
Admiral Gortney. I've looked at the tunnel detection
capability that Custom and Border Patrol use, the technology
that they have applied to that, and then crawled through the
tunnels with them. It's a--once again, it's a very adaptive
enemy that goes out there. If they can find a mechanism in
order to----
Senator Manchin. Are we destroying the tunnels?
Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir, we are, those that we find. As
they detect them, they then work the law enforcement piece on
each side to find out where the entry and exit piece is, what
is the network that is controlling that entry and exit piece
after that, and working both sides of the borders on it. Then,
once the--once they understand that, they'll go ahead and
destroy and fill in the tunnel.
Senator Manchin. Do you think a wall is needed?
Admiral Gortney. Sir, we--a wall will not solve the immense
problems that go out there. You need all of the technology.
Senator Manchin. I know. Would it help? I'm just saying--
because people believe--of course, there's a lot of rhetoric
about a wall----
Admiral Gortney. Yeah.
Senator Manchin.--these days in the news, but I'm--
sincerely, do you believe that it could help, or would help,
more----
Admiral Gortney. Well----
Senator Manchin.--than not having a wall?
Admiral Gortney. The--I have flown the border between what
we call our middle border, on the Arizona side, and I've seen
the technology that is applied there, be it sensors, be it
fencing. Every type of fencing that happens to be out there,
because the terrain demands different types of fencing----
Senator Manchin. Sure.
Admiral Gortney.--for it, and we need to put in place all
of that technology across our border as we try and work with
our mission partners south of the border, as well as cut back
significantly the demand signal here in our country.
Senator Manchin. If I could follow up with you again,
Admiral, as--yesterday, Lieutenant General Thomas submitted in
written testimony that ISIS-inspired lone actors pose the most
direct and immediate threat to United States Homeland. As we
saw in San Bernardino and Dallas. There are many folks in my
State of West Virginia that have a lot of concerns with our
Government when our Government considers accepting refugees
from overseas. They're more concerned about, Are we doing the
proper vetting process? I would ask, Should we accept Syrian
refugees into this country at this time? Are we able to do the
proper vetting, since we have such little facts about those
people coming?
Admiral Gortney. Homeland Security has a very robust
vetting process for everybody that comes into this country,
particularly focused on the Syrian refugee challenge that's
coming this way. I have confidence in the program, but no
program is perfect, sir. When I look at people that are trying
to come to do nefarious activity in our country, the ones that
I am not--I am most concerned are those that enter the country
legally, under a legal means, because then they have freedom of
maneuver to operate within the United States. Those that try
and enter illegally have hooks that we may have opportunities
to pick up. Then, if they're maneuvering inside, they have--do
not have the freedom of maneuver inside the country. It is the
vetting process, a very robust vetting process that Homeland
Security has, that is absolutely critical----
Senator Manchin. But, you all recommend that we do not
reduce that vetting process whatsoever.
Admiral Gortney. No, I would not----
Senator Manchin. Thank you.
Admiral Gortney.--at all.
Senator Manchin. Admiral Haney, if I could ask you. In
recent days, we have once again seen North Korea threaten to
conduct a preemptive nuclear strike and reduce Seoul into a sea
of fire and ashes. Now, I know we always hear that rhetoric
anytime we partner with South Korea, as we're doing right now,
to conduct military exercises, but it seems to be a lot
stronger this time. It seems to be growing stronger every year.
Do you feel there is a linkage to North Korea's ratcheted
rhetoric and their more aggressive missile test?
Admiral Haney. Well, I won't, Senator, try to rationale----
Senator Manchin. Right.
Admiral Haney.--North Korean behavior and Kim Jung Un's
behavior. I will state that the nuclear test, the fourth test
they just did here, and the space launch that they just did,
further enhanced their understanding and knowledge associated
with this. North Korea has made many claims--miniaturization of
nuclear warheads. They've paraded around their KNO-8
intercontinental ballistic missile. I think we have to take
these problems seriously, because it's clear to me they are
working hard to----
Senator Manchin. Is it more aggressive than you've seen in
the past?
Admiral Haney. Absolutely.
Senator Manchin. So--thank you.
Thank all of you.
Chairman McCain. Admiral, if I could just follow up. Your
greater concern is people who come into this country legally,
as opposed to coming across our border. Is that a correct----
Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir, because it's their ability of
freedom of maneuver to operate within our country. Anytime that
someone is--comes through illegally, we have the--a better
opportunity to detect them and pick them up. As they're in the
country, just as the San Bernardino attack showed out, the
woman involved entered the country legally. We did not have the
sensors, the ability to detect what she wanted to do. You've
got to tackle both of them as we go forward.
If you look at the Paris attacks, they entered the EU
legally. They operated--they had freedom of maneuver to operate
within the EU on the continent, because of the policies that
they have in the EU--operated and planned the attack in a
country that did not have the authorities that Paris did, and
then freely move into France to conduct the attack. Disabling
their--this freedom of maneuver is--I think is absolutely
critical, which goes back to the vetting policy that was asked
before, sir.
Chairman McCain. Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Admiral Tidd, I want to talk about the potential for
migrant flows into the United States from Latin America, as we
saw during the migrant crisis in the summer of 2014. Obviously,
there are push factors involved, given the crime and the
violence in, say, Central America. But, there are always pull
factors involved, as well. This is one reason why President
Obama stated, in 2014, that parents in Central America
shouldn't send their children to the United States through
coyotes or human traffickers. Similarly, you see, in Europe,
after Chancellor Merkel said that Germany would take all
migrants and refugees, there was a significant increase in the
flows, not just from places like Syria and Iraq, but from many
other countries in Africa and Asia.
Therefore, I'm very troubled by what I heard last night in
the Democratic debate. It's easy to write off political debates
as theater, but we're the world's superpower. There's only six
people right now who are likely to be our next President of the
United States, our next Commander in Chief. Last night, the two
candidates in the Democratic side said, essentially, that they
would never send any children back to their country of origin
if they make it to the United States. What kind of message did
that send to families in Central America and South America
about the risk they're willing to undertake to send their
children to the United States through human traffickers and
through coyotes?
Admiral Tidd. Senator, I think one of the most effective
things that the Department of Homeland Security was able to do
to begin to curtail that movement of children coming into the
country back in 2014 was to try to change the messages that
were being communicated via social media back to family
members, that, ``It's safe, it's easy to come in. You won't be
incarcerated.'' They put a hard push to communicate that, if
you come across the border, you will be held until you can be
processed for return back home. I think all of the steps that
can be taken to deal with those pull factors would be critical.
Senator Cotton. I agree. I mean, I don't think it's an
especially moral policy what Chancellor Merkel has proposed in
Europe or what we heard last night. We're essentially saying,
to people who are poor and oftentimes in countries racked by
violence, that if you can survive, you can stay here.
Admiral Tidd. The critical work that you identified to try
to change the push factors out of those countries, the long-
term sustained work that's being done by Department of State,
by USAID [United States Agency for International Development]
to try to provide economic opportunities so that those--the
people will find that it is economically a much better decision
to remain home, and then the work that's being done to try to
improve security within those countries so that it is not a--
it's a life-or-death decision to remain home--that's the key to
the long-term----
Senator Cotton. I agree, on the long-term solution, the
work that you and all the men and women of SOUTHCOM do and have
done for many years are critical to build that kind of capacity
in the countries that send the most migrants here. But, I also
think that statements by American leaders, that essentially
create a full employment opportunity for human traffickers are
very damaging, not just for our country, but for the young
children that might be sent here.
I'd like to stay in your AO [area of operation] and turn to
Guantanamo Bay. I led a delegation of the freshmen on this
committee and the Intelligence Committee last year to see
Guantanamo Bay. We were very impressed by the operations. We
were even more impressed by the men and women you have serving
there. Could you explain to us a little bit about the stressful
and sometimes dangerous working conditions they face handling
these depraved terrorists?
Admiral Tidd. Senator, thanks for the opportunity. We--
I've--in the short two months that I've been in the--this
position, I've visited Guantanamo Bay twice to see for myself,
to be able to assess exactly the high degree of professionalism
and discipline that the men and women execute that mission. As
you observed, it is very difficult, very challenging,
oftentimes under enormous pressure from both the expectations
from outside, but then also just the actions of the detainees
there. There have been a--in the last 12 months, 100 assaults
committed by the detainees on our guard force, assaults in the
form of splashing, scratching, pushing, shoving, those sorts of
activities, and then threats of worse if they had the ability
to do that. The fact that our men and women never respond in a
negative way, that they continue to remain very professional, I
think is testimony to the fact that they are supremely well
trained, they are exceptionally well qualified for the mission
that we ask them to do. All of the American people can be very
proud of the job that they've done--that they have done and
continue to do.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
My time is expired.
Chairman McCain. Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Haney, you note in your testimony, and I'm quoting,
``Recapitalizing our sea-based strategic deterrent'' remains
your top priority, end quote. Considering the gap that we're
facing in submarine capabilities, do you think that we ought to
consider building three submarines a year--two Virginia-class
and one Ohio replacement?
Admiral Haney. Oh, Senator Blumenthal, I am supportive, and
as you correctly stated----
Senator Blumenthal. I am, too. I am, too, and I appreciate
your support.
Admiral Haney.--the building and the capability that we
need to have, in terms of the Ohio replacement, SSBN, is a top
priority. As I mentioned also, having conventional capability
across our joint military forces is also important. We've got
to get that balance right. I'm not--to give you an acquisition
strategy on the number per year and what have you, there, I
will say we need to have a--I depend upon the strong submarine
force and all their capabilities, but, in particular, to have
that strategic survivable capability underwater is very
important to our Nation as a whole.
Senator Blumenthal. I didn't ask you to commit to doing it,
but to consider doing it, which I think is really important.
Privately, I think that the Navy has been receptive to this
idea of two Virginia-class submarines a year, plus the ORP
[Office of Research Protections] at least for some period of
time. In order----
Admiral Haney. Well, I can I'd like to see five per year,
but, you know, we have to do things in reason. From the spirit
of what we need as a country as a whole, we've got to get that
balance right. We do know, as I'm thinking you're implying,
correctly so, that our submarine force does bring significant
value to our Nation.
Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Tidd, some of the reports that
we've had indicate that we can actually see illicit
substances--opioids, heroin--transported across waters, even
across borders, but we lack the equipment and manpower to
intercept and interdict and stop them. Is that true?
Admiral Tidd. Senator, it is. First, what I'd like to do is
thank the exceptional efforts of the Congress to provide
additional resources as they became available for us to be able
to increase the resources that we do have. The--we've been able
to apply those resources very quickly in some new ways and to
be able to take advantage of some nontraditional capabilities
to increase our ability to see the movement and things that are
going on.
It still only gives us glimpses. We're not able to maintain
a persistent view of activities going on within the theater. As
you rightly point out, our ability to interdict is extremely
limited. The number of surface ships largely provided by the
U.S. Coast Guard, but the U.S. Navy also provides some limited
capability, as well, but even that, it's not enough for us to
be able to deal with the--what we're able to see.
We try to mitigate that by increasing the capability of our
partner nations, and they've--and the development that we've
been able to do in their intercept capability and interdiction
capability has made a significant improvement. As it stands
right now, about half of the interdictions that occur, occur
with the help of partner nations.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, my time is limited, but let me
just emphasize how important I think the American people
believe it is to interdict and intercept the flow of these
illicit substances. Clearly, the demand side needs to be
addressed. In fact, we are seeking to do so through the
Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act, which is only a step
in the right direction, because it lacks the resources to
provide the kind of treatment and services and even law
enforcement support that we need to do. The demand side is
important, but equally so, the work that you're doing is
absolutely critical. I recognize that the dedicated men and
women under your command are working as hard and long as they
can with the limited resources they have.
I'm hopeful that we can get from you a more specific list
of resources, whether it's equipment, ships, aircraft, that you
think are necessary. I'm not asking you to provide it now, but
I would, for the record, ask that you provide it to the
committee.
Thank you, sir.
Admiral Tidd. Sure.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for your dedicated service to our Nation.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Chairman.
I want to thank all of you for your service and leadership
for our country.
Admiral Gortney, in the 2016 NDAA [National Defense
Authorization Act], I was able to include a very--a bipartisan
effort that was focused in asking the Secretary of Defense to
carry out research, development, testing, and evaluation
activities with Israel on anti-tunnel capabilities to detect,
map, and neutralize Hamas and Hezbollah terrorist tunnels that,
of course, are used for those tunnels to come up and commit
attacks in Israel. But, we also know that this is a very
important issue, not only in protection of our friend and ally,
Israel, but also on our southern border, because we know that
tunnels on our southern border can be used to smuggle drugs,
like heroin and Fentanyl, which are devastating my State, into
the United States, and they also presumably could be used by
other bad actors, including terrorists.
Admiral Gortney, has there been collaboration with Israel
on terror tunnels that has benefited NORTHCOM's and the Joint
Task Force North's efforts to develop technology to detect,
map, and neutralize drug-smuggling tunnels on our southern
border?
Admiral Gortney. Absolutely, ma'am. It's very, very helpful
for us. You know, we don't have a monopoly on good ideas in our
country. When we can partner with our partners overseas that
have a similar challenge, it's very, very--it's been very, very
beneficial, both for us and for our partners in the Custom and
Border Patrol.
Senator Ayotte. Excellent. I'm glad to hear it. I look
forward to continuing to focus on those efforts.
How much of this is an issue as we look at--in New
Hampshire, we had a record number of drug overdose deaths this
year from heroin and Fentanyl--420. It's been devastating. In
fact, right now, on the Senate floor, we have the Comprehensive
Addiction Recovery Act, which is focused, obviously, on the
prevention, the treatment, and support for our first responders
so that they can help bring people back from drug overdoses.
But, thinking about the interdiction piece, what's happening
over our southern border on this issue? This is something I've
raised also with Secretary Johnson. Can you give us an update
on your interdiction efforts?
Admiral Gortney. Yes, ma'am. Our interdiction efforts, we
work both sides of our middle border. North of our border, we
do the Department of Defense support with our mission partners
through JTF North. You know, just last year, it was a $10.7
million program that we were given for JTF North, and they
assisted in pulling--taking $436 million of drugs off the
street with our mission partners. We use the services in order
to do that. In a 30-day period, over one stretch of territory
that Custom and Border Patrol was asking us to take a look at,
they were able to interdict 1 pound of marijuana and only one
trafficker. We put United States Marine Corps ground sensor
platoon who were in their training in order to deploy, and, in
that same 30--in another 30-day period over that same terrain,
they were able to pull up 1200 pounds of marijuana and 75
traffickers. Being able to assist with them is absolutely
critical for that.
Senator Ayotte. What are you seeing on heroin and Fentanyl?
Admiral Gortney. Heroin and Fentanyl are coming through our
normal passages, the legal entry control points across our
border. Heroin, predominantly through the San Diego passage.
Very, very small shipments, which is very, very difficult for
our partners to be able to detect with the technology that they
have today.
Senator Ayotte. What more could we do to assist you to give
you some more technological tools or personnel to try to
address this? Because what's happening in New Hampshire and
across the country is, the price of heroin and Fentanyl, of
course, have gone down dramatically, and you've got people----
Admiral Gortney. Ten dollars a pop in any----
Senator Ayotte. Yeah. They're going from prescription
drugs, unfortunately, to heroin, and people are dying.
Admiral Gortney. That's correct. Everywhere, ma'am. We've
got to--we have to tackle this from both sides of the problem.
Where our mission partners--what do our mission partners need
in the capabilities to detect, improvements with all of our
whole-of-government approach with Mexico and Central and South
America. I'm responsible for the Mexican piece, of the mil-to-
mil piece. Then we have to work on the demand signal. Sir, I
want to--Senator Donnelly, with your anti-opiate bill that goes
to the floor today, absolutely critical. You know, we look at
this, the three of us look at this through not only military
officers that are tasked to defend the Nation and what we can
do in order to do that, but we look at it as fathers and
grandfathers, as well. We have to go after the demand signal
while we work the interdiction piece.
Senator Ayotte. Let me just thank Senator Donnelly, because
this is something that he's been a great leader on that we've
worked together, and appreciate his efforts on this and focus
on it, and others on this panel who have been working on it.
I also wanted to ask, Admiral Gortney, in your prepared
statement, you said that you assess that Iran may be able to
deploy an operational ICBM by 2020 if the regime chooses to.
Well, we know, in the last several days--first of all, we had a
ballistic missile test in October, one in November, and, in the
last 2 days, we've had several ballistic missile tests from
Iran. Can you give us the detail on that assessment? Obviously,
they're testing this capacity--where they stand on this
development.
Admiral Gortney. Yeah. None of their tests violate any of
the agreements that are out there, but I think it's indicative
of where their minds are. I don't see a change in their
behavior. If they had the capability today, I have the ability
to engage it today. We watch very closely. We thank the
committee and all of Congress for the investments that allow us
to be able to outpace that particular threat.
Reading their intentions, I don't see a change from the
Iranians' behavior.
Senator Ayotte. In other words, bad behavior.
Admiral Gortney. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Donnelly.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank Senator Ayotte. She's been a great
partner in this effort to try to stop the flow of heroin. I
know what a challenge it's been in New Hampshire and in my
State. We've both worked in a real bipartisan way to try to get
this done. She's been a great partner.
The Chairman mentioned, at the beginning, about the fact
that this is an epidemic. I just want to tell you, a little
town in my State, Connorsville, Indiana, and it's, you know, a
little southeast of Indy. We've lost young person after young
person after young person, older people, too, to heroin deaths.
Six dollars per is what it's taking, in terms of each time they
use heroin, it's 6 bucks. The extraordinary talent we're
losing, the extraordinary family damage it causes, it takes
your breath away, as all of you know. In some of the saddest
cases, they are vets. They're our family in the military who
this has happened to. We know we have a demand problem. We're
trying to get our hands around that and get it fixed. But, as
you look at this, how much is getting through that--you know,
that--whether it's the heroin or the Fentanyl or whatever--that
you look, and you go--of the percentage coming through, how
much are we stopping?
Admiral Gortney. I don't have the percentages in front of
me, and----
Senator Donnelly. I'm not looking for an exact number.
Admiral Gortney. Yeah. I'm hesitant of using the percentage
of our confiscation as a metric of success, because of the
increase--you know, if you're measuring from 2 years ago or----
Senator Donnelly. Right.
Admiral Gortney.--or that, it's--I just don't think it's a
very good metric that we can either hang on our hat on--that we
would not want to hang our hat on. We have to do more. We have
to do more throughout Central--Mexico and Central and South
America with those mission partners, our whole-of-government
approach with that, with the eradication effort, which, you
know, currently 570 hectometers--hecta-acres, the Mexican--
SEDENA, the navy, has eradicated of--just in poppies last year.
But, it's still not enough. Once again, as Admiral Tidd talked
about, the balloon--when we think about the balloon, the
pressure to stop the interdiction, we also have to work the
demand piece on top of it.
Senator Donnelly. Do we have intelligence services who are
working this to try to find out--you know, as we talked,
Admiral, about it's this group and that group and that group--
do we have intelligence agencies that are working to try to
find out when this is going out, where it's going out, to try
to help with that effort?
Admiral Gortney. Absolutely, sir. We're working and passing
that information with our mission partners, as well as
developing their capability to determine that on their own.
Senator Donnelly. Well, if you could both put together, in
effect, almost--I don't know if this is the right term--a wish
list saying, ``Look, if we had this, we could stop this much
more. If we had this, we could prevent this portion.'' If you
could provide that to us, I'd be very, very grateful.
Admiral Gortney. We'll take that for a task, sir.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
Senator Donnelly. Admiral Haney, when you look at
hypersonics, there's a wealth of open-source reporting on
efforts by Russia, and particularly China, to develop
hypersonic weapons that could pose a serious challenge to our
missile defenses. Within DOD, our most advanced hypersonic
effort is CPGS [conventional prompt global strike], and I was
wondering what your thoughts are on the value of CPGS to
STRATCOM and the Nation.
Admiral Haney. I feel that the Conventional Prompt Global
Strike is a very important----
Senator Donnelly. I apologize, I use----
Admiral Haney.--program----
Senator Donnelly.--I use military-speak.
Admiral Haney.--is also a very important approach that we
have to continue to pursue, one, to understand that technology,
but, as you've stated, since other nations are also pursuing
it, our ability to counter it is also very important.
Senator Donnelly. Admiral Gortney, I want to get your
perspective on our missile defense priorities this year. You
know I work with Senator Sessions and a number of our wonderful
colleagues here in regards to this area. We have a strong
commitment to the success of our GMD [Ground Based Midcourse
Defense] system. I was wondering if you could let me know if
our current GMD architecture with interceptors in Alaska and
California provide cover for the entire continental United
States, including the East Coast, against the threats.
Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir, I am able to deal with rogue
nations from any direction at this particular time with what we
have. We appreciate the investments in making that which we've
got, as best as we got, the improvement in sensor and, again,
like we talked, the necessary R&D investments to get us on the
correct side of the cost curve and continue to outpace the
threat.
Senator Donnelly. Well, I want to thank all of you for your
service. As I mentioned, we have a lot of threats overseas, but
every week, there are stories about young men and women who are
dying from heroin, from opioids. Our EMTs are overwhelmed and
using Narcan to try to bring people back in anti-overdose
situations. We not only want to protect our country from our
enemies overseas, but to keep our people safe. You're right on
the front line. We appreciate your hard work on this. Don't
ever think, for a minute, that we don't realize what a
challenge it is and that you don't have our full support.
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Sullivan.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I wanted to thank you, gentlemen, for your service.
I also want to follow up on the line of questioning that
Senator Donnelly was just talking about, in terms of missile
defense. He and Senator Sessions--actually, everybody on this
committee has been a real strong supporter of that. Having both
the two COCOM [combatant command] commanders in front of us who
are tasked with that, I'd like to dig into some details.
Admiral Haney and Admiral Gortney, can North Korea range
any part of the United States right now, in terms of their
missile capability? That's either the mainland or Alaska or
Hawaii or any American territories in the Pacific.
Admiral Gortney. Sir, as the Commander accountable of
holding the trigger to defend the Nation against that
particular threat, I assess that they have the ability to put
an ICBM in space and range the continental United States and
Canada. The----
Senator Sullivan. Clearly, then, Hawaii and Alaska are in
range.
Admiral Gortney. Absolutely. Yes, sir.
Senator Sullivan. Would--do we anticipate that will have
a--you say ICBM, but nuclear capability ICBM now----
Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir.
Senator Sullivan.--or soon?
Admiral Gortney. I assess, as the commander there, that
it's the prudent decision on my part to assume that he has the
capability to nuclearize--miniaturize and nuclearize--
miniaturize a nuclear weapon and put it on an ICBM. I have the
ability----
Senator Sullivan. Today.
Admiral Gortney. Today.
Senator Sullivan. Range the continental United States.
Admiral Gortney. Range all of the States of the United
States and Canada. We have the ability to engage that threat.
Intel community gives it a very low probability of success, but
I don't--do not believe the American people want to base my
readiness assessment on a low probability.
Senator Sullivan. I think you're very correct on that.
How about Iran? Same question.
Admiral Gortney. Iran, we do not assess they have the
ability to do it today. Should they have the ability to do it
today, I have the ability to engage it today.
Senator Sullivan. When do you think they'll have the
ability?
Admiral Gortney. It's a decision on their part, sir, and
it's a decision if they want to nuclearize, whether they want
to develop--complete the development of an ICBM and then the
reentry vehicle. We track very carefully all three of those
pieces.
Senator Sullivan. Do you think they're cooperating with
North Korea on some of this right now to----
Admiral Gortney. Absolutely. Absolutely.
Senator Sullivan. You anticipate that that threat will
continue to grow and probably they'll be able to reach Hawaii,
Alaska, the East Coast, continental U.S. within----
Admiral Gortney. The----
Senator Sullivan.--five years?
Admiral Gortney. Well----
Senator Sullivan. If they continue on their current path.
Admiral Gortney. We look at it in a one, two, and three, a
decision to nuclearize, a decision to put it on a warhead, and
a decision to be able to actually put the reentry vehicle all
together. When they make that decision, it's a one-two-three
decision on their part. We track--and we look very closely--we
have the intel community looking very closely at each one of
those pieces.
Senator Sullivan. I've been supportive of the Department of
Defense, Obama administration's missile defense budget. You
probably saw, this committee's been very supportive of that.
I've lately heard concerns that maybe in this year's budget
there's not enough. Can you--either of--Admiral Haney or
Admiral Gortney, can you talk about what you think, in terms
of--given these threats, which are quite significant, the role
of Fort Greeley, the role of our GBIs [Ground Based
Interceptors]. Do we think we have enough right now?
Importantly, do we have enough--particularly on the radar and
ground-base interceptor element right now, but do we have
enough to deal with the threat that certainly seems to be
increasing? Does 41 do it, or should we anticipate having more?
Because it doesn't look like the Iranians or North Koreans are
going to be standing down their missile capability anytime
soon.
Admiral Gortney. It'll be 44 interceptors by the end of
2017.
Senator Sullivan. Fourty-four.
Admiral Gortney. Fourty-four in Fort Greeley in the great
State of Alaska, and the necessary sensors are going all in
place of Alaska because of the strategic importance of Alaska.
It's not going to be enough, because it's not going to be able
to outpace the threat in the number of rate counts, the number
that can be shot at us as----
Senator Sullivan. Right.
Admiral Gortney.--we project into the future, which is why
the investments that you all have supported in our research and
development are so important, to get us on the correct side of
the cost curve. Because, on our current path, using the current
technologies and a one interceptor versus one warhead in
midcourse is a failing proposition----
Senator Sullivan. Yeah.
Admiral Gortney.--because they can produce more than we can
ever possibly afford to put in the ground.
Senator Sullivan. Do we--do you anticipate, in 5 to 10
years, as the threat grows, as the rogue-nation missile
capability increases, as the number of missiles they have
increases, as their ability to nuclearize payloads--miniaturize
the nuclear payloads increases, are we going to need more
ground-base interceptors to keep up with that threat?
Admiral Gortney. We're going to need more capability to
engage the threat throughout its flight, keep them on the
ground, kill them on the rails, kill them in boost phase, and
then get more warheads in space in midcourse. We have to be
able to engage it right now throughout the flight of the
profile, not just in midcourse with a--one rocket against a
very--one very expensive rocket against another rocket.
Senator Sullivan. In your professional military opinion, do
we have enough--is the current budget on these issues, given
the threat, which you've just laid out is quite significant,
including North Korea being able to hit the continental United
States--does the current budget, in your professional military
opinion, have enough resources dedicated to missile defense to
keep us safe now and, importantly, to keep up with this growing
threat?
Admiral Gortney. Working very closely with Admiral Syring,
who's in charge of developing this at the Missile Defense
Agency. Last year's budget, we think, was adequate for us to
improve what we have and invest in those technologies and see
if those technologies will bear out to get us on the correct
side of other cost curve and engage throughout the flight of
these missiles.
Senator Sullivan. This year's budget?
Admiral Gortney. This year's budget, yes, sir.
But, should--should those technologies come forward, the
budget's not enough to put those capabilities into production
and to deliver those capabilities. Once we prove, say, the
laser technology that can hit their--multi-object kill vehicle
technology that's out there--should those technologies bear
out--and they are very, very promising--then we're going to be
needing an increase in the budget to put those capabilities in
place.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed [presiding]. On behalf of Chairman McCain,
Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Senator Reed.
We've been talking a lot--I think the fact that you've--
practically every Senator has asked questions about drugs is an
indication of how serious this problem is in all of our States.
We've talked about the border. We've talked about maritime
asset ships, intelligence. But, these drugs--you mentioned
Colombia, Mexico--are grown in great big fields. What effort is
being made with these other countries to put a stop to that? I
mean, if somebody in Iowa was growing 100 acres of poppies and
turning it into heroin, I think we'd do something about it. Is
there any effort made, in terms of our relationship with these
so-called partner countries, to control the production of this
stuff?
Admiral Tidd?
Admiral Tidd. I'll start on that one. Senator, yes,
Colombia has made some very significant efforts. I think you're
familiar with their aerial eradication program. That was----
Senator King. But, haven't they backed off----
Admiral Tidd.--making progress----
Senator King.--recently?
Admiral Tidd. That is correct. As they have negotiated a--
the peace accord, one of the conditions of that peace accord
included stopping the aerial eradication program and now going
in for manual eradication. One of the challenges with manual
eradication, they have to be able to put their military forces
into and control the territory that right now has been denied
territory to them. That's going to be one of the reasons
they're going to be facing some very stiff fights even as the
peace accord, if signed, comes into effect, because they will
be going up against narcotraffickers who control that land, as
well as the actual growers, the peasants themselves. This is
their source of livelihood, and they are going to be giving up
that source of livelihood. It'll be a----
Senator King. It may be a source of livelihood, but it's a
source of death up here.
Admiral Tidd. Absolutely.
Senator King. I don't understand calling somebody an ally
who's--and having them produce these death-dealing substances.
Same question about Mexico, Admiral Gortney.
Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir. The--in the crop eradication,
just SEDENA alone, their navy and marine corps, about 270,000
hecta-acres and 500---of marijuana--and 570,000 hecta-acres of
poppy. It's not nearly enough. As a result, they've just
purchased more helicopters, a little bit cheaper than----
Senator King. ``They'' being the Mexicans?
Admiral Gortney. Mexicans--SEDENA and SEMAR--to increase
that poppy eradication effort, as well as the other internal
security challenges that they're confronting as they're working
their way against the cartels.
Senator King. Changing the subject. Admiral Gortney, your--
have jurisdiction over the Arctic, or at least a significant
part of it. The administration proposed, this year--and I
support the proposal--for the beginning, a downpayment, if you
will, on a new icebreaker. That's good. The problem is, that
icebreaker will really replace what we have; it doesn't
increase our capacity. Isn't it true that we really need more
icebreaker capacity as the Arctic begins to open up for trade
and development and transport?
Admiral Gortney. Well, speaking for my closest mission
partner, other maritime partner, which is the United States
Coast Guard, I would agree with them that they do need more
icebreaker, more capacity and capability out there.
Senator King. Yeah. I don't want to look a gift horse in
the mouth. We've got to get this new one started. But, it's
really--that really is replacing the----
Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir.
Senator King.--the Polar Star, not giving us any new
capacity. Okay.
Admiral Haney, deterrence has been a strategic basis of our
nuclear strategy since 1945 or thereabouts, but deterrence
rests on a theory of a semblance of rationality on the other
side. Does deterrence work with North Korea? Are they concerned
about the possibility of being obliterated if they attack?
Admiral Haney. Senator King, I think--I can't tell you
exactly what Kim Jung Un, the leader of North Korea, thinks
today, this very minute, but he has to know that he faces a
very credible response across our joint military forces if he
decides to do the unthinkable.
Senator King. That--the deterrence, the fact that that
would--there would be a--assured destruction is a fact that's
known in North Korea.
Admiral Haney. Again, I have not had a opportunity to talk
to the leaders of North Korea, but I am convinced they look at
our whole joint military force. That's why we see reactions to
some of our exercises and what have you. I think they have a
keen appreciation to the fact of what we bring as a complete
force, not just the nuclear capability I lead.
Senator King. As they say, it would behoove us to let there
be no misunderstanding. Of course, the other side of this
question is deterrence against nonstate actors, which is even
more of a difficult--from a theoretical point of view,
particularly people who don't care about dying. Where do you
strike back? Where do you--where is the retaliation? I think
that's a--that's a second level of theoretical problem with the
theory of deterrence as applied to current threats that we
face.
Admiral Haney. Senator, as you have articulated, deterrence
is complex, and it requires a deep understanding of the
adversary, an understanding of what feeds the adversary and,
consequently, has to be tailored for each specific adversary.
That requires a lot of critical thinking and overall
comprehensive approaches in multiple domains as we see
adversaries even--including violent extremist organizations,
use cyberspace, for example, in order to recruit and in order
to finance their mechanisms. Those kind of things have to
become more costly for them to pursue, and it is still--I would
argue that deterrence is complex, but the fundamentals still
apply.
Senator King. Thank you.
I'm out of time. For the record, could Admiral Gortney and
Admiral Tidd give us something in writing on why we should not
join NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM and if there's a Goldwater-Nichols
II--not now, because I am out of time, but perhaps a written
statement? Because I know that's a question that's going to
come up before the committee.
Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir. Be happy to do that.
Admiral Tidd. Yes, sir.
Senator King. Thank you.
Senator Reed. On behalf of Chairman McCain, Senator Ernst.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Senator Reed.
I'm disappointed that our Chairman stepped out. We have
some wonderful naval officers here in front of us today. Thank
you so much.
But, Senator Reed, I would have you notice that the senior
enlisted advisor to Admiral Tidd is an Army command sergeant
major from Iowa.
Thank you so much for being with us today, Sergeant Major.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your great service to our Nation.
Admiral Tidd, we had a wonderful conversation the other
day, and we did talk, during our conversation, about SOUTHCOM's
limited Active Duty capabilities due to the prioritization from
DOD in other areas of operation. But, I am very proud of the
job that our citizen soldiers do in that area. Our National
Guard has done a lot of work in the SOUTHCOM AOR to support
United States security and to build our partner capabilities in
Central and South America. Whether, as we discussed, it's
serving with honor and integrity at Guantanamo Bay or working
to end the flow of narcotics into the country or partnering
through state partnership programs with many of our allies, our
Guard has been vital to SOUTHCOM and to our regional security.
Sir, if you could please describe some of the ongoing
efforts by the Guard in SOUTHCOM, please.
Admiral Tidd. Absolutely, Senator. I think it goes without
saying, we would not be able to execute the lion's share of our
missions in the absence of contributions by the National Guard,
whether in the form of units rotating through Guantanamo Bay,
as has been so effectively accomplished, to state partnership
programs that provide a sustained continuity of contact with
countries over the years, building their partner capacity,
enabling them to do the sorts of jobs, and also going to the
Army's recently established regionally aligned force prospect
that the lion's share of the regionally aligned force to the
SOUTHCOM region comes out of the National Guard. It is--it's
absolutely critical to our ability to execute our mission.
Senator Ernst. Okay, thank you. I appreciate it so much.
We also briefly discussed the activities of Russia, Iran,
and China, and Central and South America. Could you just tell
us, in this open forum, what activities you've seen in that
area? That came as a surprise to me.
Admiral Tidd. Thank you, Senator.
The--as we look at the transregional nature of our
activities, if you are interested in what Russia is engaged in,
you don't just look at eastern Europe. If you're interested in
what China is engaged in, you don't just look at the South
China Sea. Iran, the same story, you don't just look at the
Middle East. Russia, who--which, arguably, has virtually no
strategic interests of note in the southern region, is engaged
in a direct competition to displace the United States for
influence within the region. They are going back in and
redeveloping the historical contacts that they had with a
number of countries throughout the region, developing weapon
sales at extremely low rates--low costs. What gives us great
concern is, they are engaging in a concerted effort to convince
partners that the United States is not a reliable ally, that we
are withdrawing from the region.
Essentially, any steps that plays into that narrative that
makes it look like the United States does not provide the
forces or is shrinking down the presence of the United States
or consolidating to get at--slightly, at Senator King's point
that consolidating combatant commanders simply plays into that
false narrative that the United States is not interested in the
region.
In China, it's largely an economic competition. They're
looking for markets and resources. Iran is essentially
establishing cultural centers and other sorts of activities,
but, we think, at a higher level of classification, we can talk
to some of the other activities they're engaged in.
Senator Ernst. But, bottom line up front, you do believe
this is something we need to keep an eye on.
Admiral Tidd. They--if you are concerned about those
countries on a global scale, you cannot afford not to be
watching what they are engaged in, in the SOUTHCOM region.
Senator Ernst. Thank you very much.
Thank you, gentlemen.
I'll yield back my time.
Chairman McCain [presiding]. Senator Heinrich.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
Admiral Gortney, we've dramatically increased resources for
Border Patrol in recent years, and we need to continue that
push. I think the Chairman pressed you hard on that issue. But,
we've often neglected the equally critical role that our
Customs and Border Protection officers play in protecting the
overall integrity of that border. Your comments really got to
that when you mentioned the incredible problem of manufactured
heroin in small quantities that are actually moving through our
ports of entry. Should we be resourcing those ports of entry as
seriously as we resource the border overall?
For some of our colleagues who don't come from border
States, it's just important to remember that we have Border
Patrol agents, the guys in the green uniforms, who are out
there all along the border, from east to west, and then we have
these officers, whose job it is to sit at the ports of entry
and make sure that we stop any illegal activity, being it
moving narcotics, cash, other contraband, back and forth across
that border.
Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir. We need to invest for all of
them. When I was at the port of entry there in San Diego, I was
extremely impressed with the dedication of the patriots that
are doing that. A very, very difficult task. Their motivation,
their training, their professionalism, confronting an immense
challenge. Anything we can do to increase their capacity and
their capability, this Nation needs to invest in.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you for your comments on that.
I want to follow up with Admiral Tidd and go back to 2014,
when your predecessor, General Kelly, said that he was able to
see 75 percent of the cocaine trafficking heading towards the
United States, but that they had to, quote, ``simply sit and
watch it go by,'' unquote, because of the lack of resources.
Now, I know some of that has changed, but we should all find
this unacceptable, especially considering that the drug cartels
are making on order of $85 billion a year in annual profits,
which is literally what is fueling the violence, the corruption
in Central America, and driving the refugee crisis that we see.
Admiral Tidd, how many interdiction assets do you have at
your disposal? What are your requirements?
Admiral Tidd. On a given day, on average, we tend to have
between five and six surface ships--those are largely Coast
Guard cutters; one to two U.S. Navy platforms. The established
requirement in order to interdict at the established target
level of 40 percent is up to 21 surface platforms. It is--it's
a question of resources.
Senator Heinrich. Right.
Admiral Tidd. Allocation of resources and priorities across
all of the threats the country faces is--I don't question that.
I understand it. I was involved in it. But, it is simply a
matter of resources.
Senator Heinrich. I want to thank you for your work on this
front. I asked that question specifically to shine a light on
how wide a gap there is between how we have resourced your men
and women who do that work, and where we would like that to be,
which is why I asked you specifically what the requirement is.
We're nowhere close. We've gotten better. We need to keep a
focus on that and not let that slip.
Let me ask you, too, What percentage of your ISR
requirements are being met today?
Admiral Tidd. Overall, approximately 11 percent of the
requirement.
Senator Heinrich. I think that--that's a pretty sobering
number for all of us, as well, Mr. Chair.
My time is almost done. I want to switch to Admiral Haney
and just ask you a broad question about why you believe the
combination of LRSO and LRSB is so important. My hope is you
can also explain the strategic importance of nuclear
modernization efforts and the tools that they will provide the
combatant commanders like yourself.
Admiral Haney. Well, to your first question, it is very
important for our Nation to have the adequate strategic
deterrence and assurance mechanisms and methodologies and
capabilities. From the air leg of our triad, it's very
important that our platforms are appropriately armed in order
to be credible. That includes B-52 aircraft, B-2s, which we
will be flying both of those for some time to come, as well as
the long-range strike bomber, stealth aircraft. Even while we
have stealth aircraft, it's important that we have standoff
capability. As we watch our adversaries work to have better
anti-access aerial denial kinds of capabilities, we must have
standoff in order to manage strategic stability as we should.
As a result, I see the long-range strike--long-range standoff
option being critical to all of those platforms, all three of
them.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Chairman McCain. Senator Tillis.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Gentlemen, I apologize for not being in the hearing. I've
got a competing Judiciary hearing, and I've got to run for a
vote. Admiral Haney and Admiral Gortney, thank you for being
here.
Admiral Tidd, I want to focus a little bit more on your
command in--at a couple of things. One, I think the 11 percent
coverage for a very critical area of other region is important.
I'd like for you to talk--I know a lot of times we talk about
SOUTHCOM, we talk about the work we're doing in Colombia and
down in Latin America, drug interdiction, but you and I have
had discussions. One thing I'd like for you to expand on, and
it relates to a question that Senator Ernst asked, and maybe
even focus a little bit on Iran's activity in Hezbollah and a
number of other things that we're seeing there that are
potentially systematically over time going to change the
environment in your sphere of influence. Can you talk a little
bit about that?
Admiral Tidd. With--specifically with regard to Iran, there
has been a longstanding presence of Hezbollah, one of other
principal surrogates of Iran in the region. Their activities
have largely been involved in logistics support, providing
funds back to Lebanon, to Hezbollah itself, but it also is
available as a potential to conduct other activities. It's a
force in being, obviously, and they watch very closely what
the--we watch very closely what they are doing, where they are.
The--what makes it particularly noteworthy is, there are
not large implantations within Central and South America of
Muslim communities. They tend to be very small. This interest
on the part of Iran is in developing partnerships,
relationships, in order to escape the diplomatic isolation that
they found themselves in over the last decade--couple of
decades.
The greater concern that we're beginning to see now is on
the part of Islamist extremist groups. There is now a general
recognition throughout the region in meetings with senior
security chiefs from across the Caribbean, in particular, but
also Central American countries. They recognize the risk of
radicalization--self-radicalization occurring within their
countries. There have already been a number of fighters that
have gone over to Iraq and Syria to fight. We have seen
indications--there have been a number of them that have been
killed. I think we all saw the video of the 14-year-old from
Trinidad-Tobago that was videotaped engaged in an act of
terrorism, executing a Syrian combatant. That is there, and the
countries are worried about the return flow of those foreign
fighters coming back.
Senator Tillis. Thank you.
I don't want you to comment, because it relates to policy,
but, you know, you could make a logical argument that, as
Iran's economy improves, as money returns back to Iran as a
result of this--the Iran agreement that I opposed, that we
could even see more shifting of resources. It could accelerate
the pace of what they're doing in your area of responsibility.
I think we need to make sure that we're paying attention to it.
It's not one that you normally think about when you talk about
the--think about the Iran threat.
I want to, in my remaining time, have you talk about
Guantanamo Bay, and not with respect to the detainees. But,
there's also discussions out there about, you know, maybe we
don't need Guantanamo Bay or our presence there at all. Could
you give me some sense of what you think the strategic
significance of that land mass is with respect to your area of
responsibility and our ability to respond in that part of the
world?
Admiral Tidd. Senator, the first time I visited Guantanamo
Bay was in 1979. We have significant strategic interests at the
Naval Station Guantanamo Bay that will continue long past
whenever detention operations end. It is a critical point to
support Coast Guard operations and the detection and monitoring
mission across the Caribbean Basin. It is absolutely critical
to supporting any sort of a migrant crisis that might occur. In
fact, as I know you're aware, there is a very small MILCON
[military construction] request in to do some basic level
construction. If we were to have a migrant crisis, we would
need to be able to rapidly build up the facilities to deal with
up to 10,000 migrants in a 72-hour period, and as many as
45,000 beyond that. Without that MILCON, we--it--we--right now,
we are completely incapable of meeting that timeline, should we
have to do it, and we would need that, to be able to have a
fighting chance of being able to do it so that we would not
have--bring that large number of migrants into the United
States. It's a--it is a small downpayment that we think is
probably a prudent investment to be able to do that.
Guantanamo Bay will remain critical long past the detention
operations.
Senator Tillis. I think that we just need to underscore
that. If you talk about our ability to complete missions, the
humanitarian missions alone, in addition to other potential
uses, that it would be irresponsible for us to consider any
dialogue around not having that continue to be an important
asset for us in that part of the country.
Gentlemen, thank you all for your time. I will--because my
colleague here almost never misses a hearing to talk about the
four-two-five, I will say that I still share his opinion that
that's a very important capability that we have in Alaska. I'm
glad that General Milley seems to have taken that position, and
I look forward to us coming to the resolution that I think my
colleague from Alaska hopes we get to.
Thank you all.
Thank you, Senator.
Senator Reed [presiding]. Thank you.
On behalf of Chairman McCain, Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Last, but not least. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Thank all of you for your testimony and being here today.
You've been asked a lot of questions, particularly, Admiral
Gortney, on our missile defense system. I'm probably going to
want to chat with you further, or perhaps for the record, on
whether or not we are--in terms of our need to increase our
capability to stop the missiles throughout the flight of the
missile, whether we're putting our resources in the right
proportions with regard to stopping these missiles. That--I
just wanted to mention that to you as a follow-up later.
Senator Hirono. Admiral Haney, cyber has become a
significant part of the DOD establishment. The Army and the Air
Force have laid out requirements and started establishing
cyber-protection teams and units around the country, with many
of them in the National Guard units. I wanted to ask, How is
this process working? What is your forecast for when future
units will be established to meet these requirements? I'd note
that, in Hawaii, we have everything that is going on in the
Asia-Pacific region and where--the home of PACOM [Pacific
Command], NSA [National Security Agency] Hawaii, much of our
defense infrastructure in the Pacific. I would certainly like
to have you keep Hawaii in mind as you move forward with these
cyber-protection units. Can you talk a little bit about how
things are going?
Admiral Haney. Senator Hirono, the--this initiative of
using Guard units to also augment our Active Duty units, I
think is critical for our future. This was a start. Clearly,
National Guard gets a vote, in terms of how we continue to
progress in this regard. As you know, the threats to our Nation
and our international community of nations is pretty high
regarding how actors, both nonstate and state actors, are
applying malfeasance, in terms of working against us in the
cyber domain. Critical to our critical infrastructure, critical
to how we fight as a military, and what have you. Quite
frankly, we continue to grow. I'm proud of the cyber-protection
teams I, as the combatant commander, have gotten to work with.
I know, as I've talked to other combatant commands, including
the two to my left, we appreciate the work that they are able
to do. We're still growing these teams. We don't have them all
at the right level yet. More to follow.
Senator Hirono. Of course, once you develop the teams, we
must be ever-flexible, because they--what happens in the cyber
arena is constantly changing. In terms of the timeframe for
these future units to at least be put in place, what is your
timeframe? Are we talking about 2 more years? A year?
Admiral Haney. I'd have to take that question for the
record, Senator. I don't have that. I know there's work going.
We've just gotten started. In terms of how we will continue to
build for the future, more to follow.
Senator Hirono. Thank you very much.
Admiral Tidd, regional epidemics like the Zika virus are
concerning and threatening the well-being of our citizens. One
case of the Zika virus was reported this year, so far, in
Hawaii, and four were also reported in 2015 and 2014. Can you
describe the role that SOUTHCOM has in dealing with epidemics
such as these?
Admiral Tidd. Yes, Senator. The--as a result of the initial
Ebola outbreak, a large interagency network was put together,
and SOUTHCOM was a key participant in that. That was
reenergized with the outbreak of Zika that we're seeing.
We remain postured to be able to respond to requests for
assistance from our partner nations in SOUTHCOM, but we have
put out specific guidance to the men and women, part of our
command, who are operating down in that region Those--the
policies that affect them, the protective measures, are largely
the--exactly the same protective measures that have been in
place to protect them from exposure to dengue fever, to the
Chikungunya, and other mosquito-borne illnesses. We continue to
emphasize that.
To date, we've had only two of our military personnel--two
males--who have been diagnosed and confirmed to have had Zika.
They've recovered and returned to duty. We've had one family
member--a pregnant female family member who has taken advantage
of a policy to return to the United States. The family was--had
been scheduled to return already, and it was a slightly
accelerated return on her part.
But, we're working with the countries, primarily in
training in the mosquito eradication programs. Their militaries
obviously are very heavily engaged in those activities. That's
where we stand right now. We have a Navy medical unit down in
Peru that has been doing a lot of work in the experimental
development of vaccines and that type of work, and also in the
detection.
Senator Hirono. Thank you very much. Especially for places
such as Hawaii, with so much tourist traffic from areas that
have had these outbreaks, it is really important. Thank you
very much for your efforts.
Admiral Tidd. Senator.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. On behalf of Chairman McCain, Senator Graham,
please.
Senator Graham. Thank you all.
Admiral--I can say that to everybody. The Navy's doing well
with these commands. Have any of you served in Iraq or
Afghanistan?
[A show of two hands.]
Senator Graham. Admiral Gortney and Admiral Tidd. While
there, did you serve with American Muslims in uniform?
Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir, I did.
Admiral Tidd. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. What is your view of the service of those
who are Muslim in the United States military?
Admiral Gortney. They're patriots who serve their Nation.
Admiral Tidd. Concur.
Senator Graham. Do you agree that we're in a war between
radical Islam and the world at large?
Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir. It's a generational war.
Senator Graham. That the biggest victims of radical Islam
are people within the faith who will not bend to their will:
other Muslims.
Admiral Gortney. I'd have to say they're a threat to both
inside and outside the faith.
Senator Graham. But, when you add up the numbers of people
killed, there's more Muslims than anybody else.
Admiral Gortney. That's correct.
Senator Graham. Do you believe it's in our national
security interest to help those in the faith who would fight
back against radical Islam?
Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir, I would.
Admiral Tidd. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
I just want to be on the record, here, that, to those
3,500, plus or minus, American Muslims serving in uniform, I
appreciate your service, that of your family, and I respect
your faith.
Admiral Gortney, in the next decade, if nothing changes in
North Korea and potentially Iran, are we going to face more
threats from a missile launch against the United States by a
rogue nation, or less?
Admiral Gortney. A greater threat, sir.
Senator Graham. Okay. If we go back to sequestration, do we
compromise your ability to deal with that threat?
Admiral Gortney. I believe it would, sir.
Senator Graham. Admiral Tidd, over the next decade, do you
see more instability in the region in Southern Command, or
less?
Admiral Tidd. I see no less.
Senator Graham. Okay.
Admiral Tidd. I see no less.
Senator Graham. How many ships are you supposed to have?
Admiral Tidd. Senator, if I were to accomplish the goal of
40 percent interdiction, I would require 21 ships.
Senator Graham. How many do you have?
Admiral Tidd. On average, about six to seven.
Senator Graham. To get to where you need to go, you need
more ships.
Admiral Tidd. Correct.
Senator Graham. How many Navy ships do you have available
to you?
Admiral Tidd. On average, one to two.
Senator Graham. The rest are Coast Guard.
Admiral Tidd. They are, yes, sir.
Senator Graham. In Southern Command, the United States Navy
is able to generate two ships?
Admiral Tidd. In--because of the demand for surface
platforms in other theaters that are a higher priority, yes,
sir, that's correct.
Senator Graham. If we sent you more ships, it wouldn't be a
waste of money, would it?
Admiral Tidd. Senator, it would come at the expense of
other higher-priority theaters.
Senator Graham. But, if we had a larger budget, it would
make sense to build more Navy ships, at least from your
command's point of view?
Admiral Tidd. Sir, I would never turn down additional
ships.
Senator Graham. When you say you need 17--what number did
you say?
Admiral Tidd. Twenty-one.
Senator Graham. Twenty-one. I'm sure somebody just didn't
make that up. That was----
Admiral Tidd. No, sir, there is a fairly lengthy study that
went in to derive that requirement.
Senator Graham. That 40 percent interdiction is drugs and
other contraband coming to the country?
Admiral Tidd. That's correct.
Senator Graham. If we've got a drug problem here, we're not
doing much to stop it, because we're certainly under-resourcing
you. Would you agree with that?
Admiral Tidd. I would.
Senator Graham. It's one thing to build a wall, which makes
sense to me. It--but, it also seems like we should build up the
Navy to interdict the flow of drugs and other contraband into
our country.
If we go back to sequestration, the chance of you getting
more ships goes down, not up. Is that correct?
Admiral Tidd. Senator, we're still suffering from the
hangover from the last sequestration. Ships that had delayed
maintenance, aircraft that had delayed maintenance. Those ships
are not available now to be able to operate in our theater. Any
future sequestration would be catastrophic.
Senator Graham. Admiral Haney, in your lane, what's the
effect of going back to sequestration from your point of view?
Admiral Haney. My point of view, going back to
sequestration would be crippling, in that it would put
significant risk of these programs that we need for our joint
military force, as a whole, and particularly these long-term
programs that are associated with my mission space.
Senator Graham. Thank you all for your service.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Graham.
On behalf of Chairman McCain, thank you, gentlemen, for
your testimony and for your service.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator James Inhofe
northcom
1. Senator Inhofe. How do you assess North Korea's current
ballistic missile capabilities and how does the fiscal year 2017 budget
request support your ability to counter the threats?
Admiral Gortney. North Korea has been developing and producing
ballistic missiles for over three decades. Through its space launches,
North Korea has successfully demonstrated many of the technologies
required for an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Meanwhile,
North Korean military parades in recent years have showcased road-
mobile ICBMs, which we assess the regime is developing primarily as a
means to deter external attack. Though not yet flight-tested, we assess
they are capable of ranging the continental US, albeit with low
reliability.
We are well-postured against the current threat from a rogue
nation. The Ground Based Midcourse Defense system covers all of the
United States, including the East Coast, against missile threats from
North Korea. Looking ahead, we must continue investments designed to
improve our sensor architecture, enhance our kill vehicles, and
sustain/test the entire ballistic missile defense system. Programs
funded in the budget such as the Long Range Discrimination Radar, the
Re-designed Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle, discrimination improvements
for Homeland defense, and the Space-based Kill Assessment experiment
are key contributors.
2. Senator Inhofe. Do you believe that Russia is testing the
readiness of our forces along the western boundary? Will the fiscal
year 2017 DOD budget impact your ability to protect our shores from
these threats?
Admiral Gortney. With regard to Russian activities on their Western
boundary (e.g. the Baltics or Ukraine), this is really a USEUCOM
question, but yes, I believe they are testing our forces. As the
Commander of NORAD and USNORTHCOM, I am especially cognizant of the
potential of Russia's Northern Fleet and its Long Range Aviation based
in the West to reach North America. Over the past six years, I have
seen Russia resume some of its naval operations in the approaches to
North America, and I have seen an increase in the amount of strategic
heavy bomber activity globally.
With regard to Russian activities to our West (e.g. in the United
States Arctic, Alaska and the Aleutians or the West Coast of CONUS),
yes, I am absolutely convinced they are testing our forces, assessing
our capabilities, and sending strategic messages (like flying strategic
heavy bombers off the West Coast on the 4th of July).
I also believe that the fiscal year 2017 budget request strikes a
prudent balance among the modernization of the joint force, its size,
and its readiness, and continues to keep faith with servicemembers and
their families. We are countering Russia's aggressive policies through
investments in a broad range of capabilities. The fiscal year 2017
budget request will allow us to modify and expand air defense systems,
develop new unmanned systems, design a new long-range bomber and a new
long-range stand-off cruise missile, and modernize our nuclear arsenal.
3. Senator Inhofe. With across the board military personnel
reductions, what other contingencies will fall back on the states that
federal elements used to support?
Admiral Gortney. I am confident that the Department, with its total
force of Active, Reserve, and National Guard forces, is fully ready to
carry out its missions, including responding to contingencies.
Therefore, I do not foresee any contingencies falling back on the
states.
4. Senator Inhofe. You acknowledged in your opening statement that
sequestration cuts deeply impacted NORTHCOM's readiness, how much will
another year of sequestered funds impact the forces of NORTHCOM?
Admiral Gortney. The stability provided by the Bipartisan Budget
Act of 2015 is a much-needed step in the right direction. However, what
is needed most is a permanent fix to the Budget Control Act of 2011 to
restore predictability and stability into the budget process. Another
year of sequestration will impact the Services' plans and schedules to
regenerate force readiness and modernize capabilities in order to keep
pace with existing threats.
stratcom
5. Senator Inhofe. In order to ensure one of our nuclear triad legs
remains effective, are the DOD and Navy budgets going far enough?
Admiral Haney. Our current Triad systems are remaining in service
well beyond their expected service lives and we must properly resource
our recapitalization programs across all the Services to avoid
unacceptable gaps is our deterrence capabilities. The Triad enterprise
is receiving strong budget support from the Navy and Air Force.
However, our continued success depends on the Department of Defense and
Congress providing stable and adequate funding over the long-term.
Recapitalizing our sea-based strategic deterrent force remains a
top Defense Department and USSTRATCOM modernization priority. The
fiscal year 2017 President's Budget request for Ohio-class SSBN
sustainment, Trident II D5 missile modernization, and the Ohio
Replacement SSBN program is sufficient to support USSTRATCOM mission
requirements. When the Ohio-class submarines begin retiring in 2027,
they will be the longest served submarines in U.S. Navy history at 42
years. Given the previous decision to delay the Ohio Replacement
program, there is no additional engineering margin to extend our Ohio-
class submarines. I fully support the Navy's effort to leverage
lessons-learned from the Virginia-class attack submarine acquisition
program as well as manage overall force cost by transitioning the very
capable Trident II D5 missile into the Ohio Replacement SSBN.
Similar to our sea-based deterrent force, our land-based strategic
deterrent is in need of recapitalization to ensure it remains credible
in the future. The Minuteman III was initially deployed in the 1970s
and will remain in service through 2030, nearly sixty years of service.
While the missile has gone through multiple life extension programs,
much of the launch infrastructure has not been modernized since initial
deployment in the 1960s. The Ground Based Strategic Deterrent program
is the first substantial full weapon system recapitalization effort
since the Minuteman III entered service and must start deploying by the
mid-2020s to prevent a strategic capability gap.
The Air Force is upgrading and recapitalizing air-delivered
strategic capabilities to ensure the most flexible and visible Triad
leg will continue to fully support U.S. deterrence and assurances
commitments worldwide. USSTRATCOM fully supports Air Force ongoing
efforts to sustain legacy platforms (B-2/B-52) until their planned end-
of-life, and develop and field the new B-21 dual-capable bomber and
Long Range Stand-off cruise missile to maintain an effective and
credible air delivered nuclear deterrent.
6. Senator Inhofe. Are the systems currently in our arsenal
currently degrading our nuclear deterrent? If so, when were the last
modernizations completed?
Admiral Haney. Today, our nuclear forces are safe, secure,
effective, and ready to support our national security challenges.
However, our legacy Triad delivery and weapon systems are at or well
beyond their expected service lives, with little to no margin to absorb
additional risk. The Defense Department is faced with two formidable
but not insurmountable challenges: sustaining our current deterrent
systems until retirement and deploying future forces without degrading
our deterrent capabilities. USSTRATCOM fully supports ongoing efforts
to sustain legacy platforms and develop and field those capabilities
required to accomplish the Deterrence and Assurance mission.
Development of these follow-on capabilities must remain on track to
avoid strategic capability gaps.
The Ohio-class SSBN fleet is undergoing significant sustainment
efforts to maintain high operational availability and extend the
service life. Simultaneously, the Navy is conducting a Trident II D5
missile life extension in order to transition the missile to the Ohio
Replacement SSBN. The Ohio Replacement Program is the first sea-based
recapitalization effort in over 30 years and must proceed on schedule
to maintain an effective and credible sea-based deterrent. There is no
additional engineering margin to extend our Ohio-class submarines. When
the Ohio-class submarines begin retiring in 2027 at 42 years of service
life, they will be the longest serving submarines in U.S. Navy history.
The Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) was
initially deployed in the 1970s and will remain in service through
2030. Unfortunately, much of the launch infrastructure has not been
modernized since initial ICBM deployment in the 1960s. The Air Force
estimates Minuteman III is sustainable until flight system attrition
begins in the 2028. The Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program
is the first substantial full weapon system recapitalization effort
since the Minuteman III entered service and must start being fielded by
the mid-2020s. Successfully fielding the GBSD weapon system will ensure
our ICBM deterrent capability beyond 2030. Like the sea-based strategic
deterrent, ICBM enterprise success depends on stable and adequate
funding over the long-term.
Our dual-capable B-52 and B-2 bombers and their associated weapons
have performed their nuclear deterrent mission for over seven decades
through significant sustainment and modernization efforts. The Air
Force has ensured the effectiveness of these aging aircraft through
multiple payload capabilities, survivability and communications
upgrades. Our legacy capabilities are effective against current
threats, but will be increasingly challenged in the 2020s as
adversaries field more complex air defenses. The B-21 Long Range
Strike-Bomber, Long Range Stand-off cruise missile, and B61-12 gravity
bomb are all needed to provide the flexibility, visibility and
capability to meet strategic mission needs and support extended
deterrence commitments to our allies.
7. Senator Inhofe. If it took six years to create the first 84
teams, is it reasonable to assume that USCYBERCOM is still on track to
create the remaining 50 in the next 30 months? How crucial is current
funding levels to this goal?
Admiral Haney. In 2013, my sub-unified command, USCYBERCOM, began
to build the capability known as the Cyber Mission Force (CMF). Of the
target total of 133 CMF teams, 123 are in varying levels of
development. We have 33 teams that have achieved Full Operational
Capability (FOC), and 68 have achieved Initial Operating Capability.
USCYBERCOM, working with the Services, remains committed to
achieving FOC for the entire Cyber Mission Force by 30 Sep 2018. The
current funding levels and a consistent funding stream are crucial to
meet the timelines given to USCYBERCOM. If the Defense Department is
impacted by budget shortfalls or delays, this goal and associated
timelines will be severely impacted.
southcom
8. Senator Inhofe. Where is SOUTHCOM restricted in dealing with
this problem prior to it reaching the United States? If you had
additional allocations in the budget, how would you rectify this
shortfall?
Admiral Tidd. SOUTHCOM does not have any specific restrictions,
however, we are limited in our ability to execute our statutory
requirement to detect and monitor (in support of law enforcement
interdiction) illicit traffic in maritime and sea domain en route to
the United States due to a lack of resources. Our largest shortfall is
not in funding, but in surface assets with which to conduct this
mission.
In order to meet the U.S. Government national goal to remove 40
percent of documented cocaine movement through the transit zone,
USSOUTHCOM requires 21 vessels. Over the last year, our average number
of surface assets has been seven, the vast majority of which were U.S.
Coast Guard assets. Our current ideal breakdown of the 21 vessels
includes 14 medium range ships (similar to the Littoral Combat Ship or
future Offshore Patrol Cutter), 3 long range ships (like a Cruiser,
Destroyer, or National Security Cutter), and 4 coastal patrol boats.
The most useful vessels to USSOUTHCOM are medium and long range ships
equipped with a flight deck that provides persistent offshore presence,
capable of conducting Airborne Use of Force (AUF), with embarked law
enforcement teams.
As the Services face asset shortfalls and readiness challenges,
those shortfalls trickle down to the Combatant Commands. Frankly,
SOUTHCOM feels the cuts associated with those shortfalls in a
disproportionate manner. Because we cannot buy our way out of an asset
shortfall, we use any additional funds to build our partners' capacity
to complement our interdiction efforts and protect their own
territorial land and waters. We also look at innovative ways to employ
contract and experimental surface and air platforms.
9. Senator Inhofe. Despite the excellent job our troops at GITMO
under very difficult circumstances, a court order is denying our female
troops from performing the jobs they are trained to do--what is the
current status of this court order? What impact is it having on the
morale of our service-members there?
Admiral Tidd. Thank you for your recognition of our troops,
Senator. All of the personnel participating in the detention operations
mission at GTMO--to include military, civilian, male, and female--
perform their duties with the utmost professionalism, to the highest
standards.
This ``temporary'' court order was issued on January 7, 2015 and is
still in effect. The court's order limits ``the use of female guards to
physically touch the accused during movements to and from attorney-
client meetings and Commission hearings, absent exigent
circumstances.'' It has resulted in decreased unit readiness, decreased
unit cohesion and a negative impact on morale. Additionally, the troops
are concerned it could impact their career progression . . . .it is our
responsibility to ensure that does not happen.
10. Senator Inhofe. What specifically is SOUTHCOM conducting with
Columbia to ensure our support is evident? Is WHINSEC (Western
Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation) and IMET (International
Military Education and Training) assisting in ridding Columbia of the
FARC rebels?
Admiral Tidd. Colombia is a strong strategic ally, with which we
coordinate closely every day to further security throughout the entire
region. Colombia's transformation has been remarkable, but it will
still face an uncertain period with many new challenges even if a peace
accord is reached. For Colombia to successfully consolidate its hard-
earned gains, the United States must remain as fully engaged a post-
peace accord partner as we ever were during Colombia's struggles.
United States Southern Command will continue to support Colombia's
efforts to take the FARC off the battlefield, successfully implement a
new counternarcotic strategy, establish state presence in areas where
it had not previously existed, conduct humanitarian demining, and
transform the Colombian military to adapt to an evolving security
environment.
As a broader United States interagency, it is also essential that
we continue providing Colombia a robust and agile assistance package
that will help it successfully address the new security, developmental,
and human rights challenges posed by a post-accord environment. This
includes the training, education, and frankly, relationship-building
that takes place through programs such as IMET at institutions such as
the Inter-American Air Forces Academy (IAAFA), the United States Army
Sergeants Major Academy (USASMA), the National Defense University
(NDU), all U. S. Service War Colleges, and WHINSEC.
WHINSEC plays a critical security cooperation role in Colombia and
sets conditions for future access and long term relationships--in fact,
many WHINSEC alumni have attained key positions of prominence across
the Colombian military. The school's curriculum is an integral
component of the Colombian military officers and non-commissioned
officers' development and continued professionalization, ``Preparing
the leadership of the future.''
- WHINSEC plays an important academic and technical advisory role
assisting the Colombian Army to develop new courses to support
transformation and creation of new military occupational skills to
perform DDR related missions.
- WHINSEC's instructors have done a superb job integrating into
Colombia the same academic core values used in the WHINSEC schoolhouse.
Through collaboration with WHINSEC, Colombian military professional
development courses now include elements of military justice systems &
procedures, civil-military relations, and human rights modules, all of
which will be directly integrated into DDR initiatives.
- WHINSEC's U.N. Peacekeeping Operations Course is another example
where Colombian officers are trained to support DDR challenges using
contemporary lessons. In these courses, Officers are given instruction
and preparation to assume DDR management and advisory roles as
transition staff members. Additionally, the Colombians utilize this
course as part of their ``train the trainer'' program for the newly
established Peace Operations and Civil Affairs Training Center (ESMAI)
located in Bogota, which will support future Colombian Military U.N.
PKO missions as part of their transformation Regional Security Exporter
line of effort.
Over the years the IMET account has been one of the most effective
security cooperation programs in the SOUTHCOM arsenal. Not only has a
large number of the Colombian military senior and mid-level leadership
professionally benefited from IMET courses, but the application of the
knowledge learned during IMET funded courses has been instrumental in
improving the overall defense capabilities of the Colombians. The IMET
program will continue to support the DDR and Colombian Ministry of
Defense Transformation process through these specific types of courses:
- Strategy and Defense Policy--provide the Colombian military the
skills needed to formulate policy and strategy to address security,
developmental, and human rights challenges during the DDR process.
- Executive programs in Defense decision making--provide the
Colombian military the knowledge and lessons that could be applied
during the transformation planning.
- Joint Operations--educate the COLMIL officers in joint
operations, decision making, and planning processes and combined-
operations in a joint environment.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
drug tunnels
11. Senator Ayotte. You testified that the collaboration between
Israel and the United States with regard to tunnels has ``been very,
very beneficial, both for us and for our partners in Customs and Border
Patrol.'' Can you provide some details?
Admiral Gortney. Yes, collaboration with Israel has provided
significant gains in terms of our knowledge of tunnel issues. With
Israel, we share similar problem sets on the border. Four specific
areas where we have gained invaluable knowledge are: magnetic, mapping
and borehole technologies for sensing and detecting tunnel activities;
remediation techniques to temporarily or permanently close tunnels;
identification of key indicators of tunnel activity and tunnel
improvised explosive devices; and adoption of Israeli equipment (`foam
in a bag') currently in use in Arizona to block tunnel entry and exit
points.
12. Senator Ayotte. Will you keep my office updated on this and let
us know what more we can do to help you to fight drug smuggling
generally and also to fight drug tunnels under our southern border?
Admiral Gortney. Yes, I will keep your office updated on our
efforts. We support the Department of Homeland Security in carrying out
its mission to secure the Southwest Border, including through detection
and monitoring, as well as with tunnel detection capabilities and
analytical support. Joint Task Force North is my lead for coordinating
our Federal military support to law enforcement counternarcotics/
counter-transnational organized crime efforts along the Southwest
Border, providing a critical link with Federal military, National
Guard, and law enforcement partners through their long-standing
relationships.
united states naval station guantanamo
13. Senator Ayotte. Setting aside the detention center, what is the
strategic and operational value of United States Naval Station
Guantanamo?
Admiral Tidd. The Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay is an important
strategic base, and the only one of its kind in the Western Hemisphere.
This base supports the Department of Defense and the broader U.S.
Interagency, to include the Department of State (DOS) and Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) in various mission sets. From this strategic
base of operations, the U.S. conducts detection, monitoring, and
intercept of illicit traffic and other threats, as well as staging for
disaster and humanitarian relief efforts. There is also an active DOS
and DHS Migrant Operations Center at GTMO that maintains a steady-state
migrant processing mission.
As Secretary of Defense Carter recently stated before the House
Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Defense in response to a
question about the future of the Naval Station, ``GTMO is a strategic
location . . . The Naval Station is secure.''
14. Senator Ayotte. Would it be a mistake to give it back to Cuba?
If so, why?
Admiral Tidd. I agree with the Secretary of Defense that Guantanamo
Bay is a strategic operating base and that it would be a mistake to
lose it. Again, it is the only one of its kind in the Western
Hemisphere and the missions of various Departments would be compromised
if we could no longer operate out of that facility.
milcon, substandard facilities
15. Senator Ayotte. What are SOUTHCOM's MILCON requirements for JTF
Gitmo so that we can ensure our troops there have the safe and quality
living conditions they deserve?
Admiral Tidd. Senator, thank you for your steadfast support of the
personnel carrying out the important detention operations mission at
Guantanamo Bay. I would also like to thank the Congress for funding two
MILCON projects at GTMO that are already underway and will improve both
the safety and quality of life of our troops--the dining facility, and
the clinic that greatly reduces detainee movements which reduces risk
to the guard force.
As noted in our response to Chairman Thornberry of the House Armed
Services Committee, we do have an unfunded requirement for
unaccompanied personnel housing facilities at GTMO. The existing
facilities were constructed 10 to 60 years ago. The Department has
requested $13.7M in fiscal year 2017 Facilities, Sustainment,
Restoration, and Modernization (FSRM) funding, but this will only
provide a short-term fix. Full replacement of these facilities is the
safest option, at a cost of $115M.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
the arctic and the 4-25 ibct (abn)
16. Senator Sullivan. In your best military judgment, considering
the statements from senior military leaders below--both before and
after the recent announcement--do you support General Milley's desire
and best military judgment to keep the 4-25 IBCT (ABN)--in its
entirety--in Alaska for at least another year, if not longer?
Admiral Gortney. I support General Milley's decision to keep the 4-
25th IBCT (ABN) for another year. Alaska is a strategic location, and
having one of the Army's five airborne brigade combat teams in Alaska
gives the United States flexibility in a time of strategic instability.
While not assigned to USNORTHCOM, the 4-25th IBCT (ABN) is able to take
advantage of cold weather training facilities in an austere environment
that are matched by few places in the world.
17. Senator Sullivan. In your best military judgment, what kind of
unique capabilities does the 4-25 IBCT (ABN) bring to USNORTHCOM?
Admiral Gortney. The 4-25th IBCT (ABN) are worldwide deployable
forces assigned to USPACOM. The 4-25th IBCT (ABN) has the capability to
support USNORTHCOM's defense support of civil authorities and search
and rescue missions throughout the austere conditions in the Alaska
Joint Operations Area, when approved by the Secretary of Defense.
18. Senator Sullivan. What kind of message does keeping the unique
capabilities of 4-25 IBCT (ABN) in Alaska send to President Putin about
United States resolve in the Arctic?
Admiral Gortney. The 4-25th IBCT (ABN) is a worldwide deployable
force assigned to USPACOM with a flexible warfighting capability for
our nation similar to the other four airborne brigade combat teams in
the United States. Their forward-based location in Alaska underscores
the United States commitment to worldwide deployability and the
capability to operate in all environments.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Lee
19. Senator Lee. Between SOUTHCOM, NORTHCOM, the Drug Enforcement
Agency, Department of Homeland Security, Central intelligence Agency,
Department of Justice, and others agencies involved in the region, who
is the lead on addressing the regional violence in Mexico and Central
America as it pertains to U.S. security?
Admiral Gortney. In line with the President's National Security
Strategy of 2015, regional violence in Mexico and Central America is
addressed through a whole-of-government approach, with U.S. military,
intelligence, law enforcement, and other agencies working together in
close coordination under their respective agency authorities to engage
foreign partners and to defend the United States Homeland. I believe
the primary threat to the U.S. security in this region stems from
transnational criminal organizations and the violence and instability
that results from their illicit activity. The U.S. Department of State
and our Embassies in each country lead the coordination efforts of U.S.
federal agencies as we support our partners in Mexico and Central
America.
Admiral Tidd. First and foremost, each nation has primary
responsibility for securing its own sovereign territory, to include the
security of its citizens. However, it is clearly in the interest of the
U.S. to support those nations as they address internal as well as
regional security because their security is inextricably tied to our
own. As with all matters of foreign affairs, the State Department has
the overall lead for U.S.engagement abroad. I can speak specifically to
the Department of Defense's role, which is to support our partner
nations and other U.S. Federal Agencies' efforts in the region within
the authorities granted to the department.
20. Senator Lee. What, if any, role has SOUTHCOM had in the United
States' response to the Zika virus in Brazil and Latin America, and
what role will this Combatant Command play in implementing programs or
utilizing funding if granted by Congress?
Admiral Tidd. The President's supplemental request of $1.9B for
Zika response did not include any funds for the Department of Defense
(DOD). However, the supplemental did include transfer authority to
allow for flexibility across the Federal Government to respond to
emerging requirements. The support that SOUTHCOM is currently providing
to partner nations who request assistance is being funded out of our
baseline OHDACA funds.
To date, we have provided three minimal cost projects for Zika
mitigation and prevention in Colombia, and one minimal cost project in
Costa Rica. In Colombia, the projects provided for the purchase of
basic preventative materials (i.e. mosquito repellent, mosquito nets)
to be distributed to the local population in Zika endemic areas. In
Costa Rica, the project will support the Ministry of Health in the form
of laboratory reagents and supplies for Zika virus detection. In
addition, as part of our State Partnership Program, we have provided
Subject Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEEs) in vector control and disease
surveillance for both Suriname and Guyana.
Navy Medicine Research Unit-6 (NAMRU-6), located in Lima, Peru,
developed a laboratory improvement program for partner nation military
laboratories. PROMELA (Programa de Mejoramiento de Laboratorios de las
Fuerzas Militares de Latinoamerica) improves partner nation military
laboratories' capability to test for pathogens. In addition, NAMRU-6 is
actively engaged in infectious disease research projects in the region
through satellite sites in Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay,
Bolivia, Venezuela, and Peru and has the ability to test for the Zika
virus.
At the request of the Government of Paraguay, SOUTHCOM will partner
with USAID, the Pan American Health Organization, and the Ministry of
Health to identify gaps within their institutions to effectively
respond to the Zika virus. An entomologist and virologist from NAMRU-6
will conduct assessments to include an evaluation of the Paraguay's
capacity to detect and diagnose the virus as well as addressing
treatment, surveillance, pest management, waste disposal, and vector
control.
If requested, SOUTHCOM could provide additional regional support to
include vector control education, supplies and materials; laboratory
supplies; and SMEEs on field sanitation, disease surveillance,
epidemiology, and entomology.
21. Senator Lee. I have read in some slightly dated material that
SOUTHCOM, ``. . . is supporting the development of a regional maritime
interdiction strategy, as well as providing equipment and training to
improve maritime and air domain awareness.'' What is the status of
developing this multinational maritime strategy, and what plans does
SOUTHCOM have going forward with this strategy?
Admiral Tidd. The strategy to which you are referring is an annex
to the larger U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, an
effort being led by the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Bureau at the Department of State. The purpose of this annex is to
assist partner nation maritime forces in building comprehensive
maintenance and logistics systems that will improve maritime
operational readiness within their littoral waters, and build the
systems and a culture for effective preventative maintenance within the
respective maritime service(s). This is funded by various State
Department foreign assistance accounts, mainly International Narcotics
Control & Law Enforcement, Foreign Military Financing, and
International Military Education & Training.
SOUTHCOM contributes to this effort via a broad range of activities
which build partner nation capacity to counter illicit trafficking. Our
primary focus is on those partner nation units which have a clearly
established role in directly supporting law enforcement efforts. We
have conducted baseline assessments of these units' capabilities, and
provide a combination of training, equipment, and infrastructure
support as appropriate to mitigate their most critical capability gaps.
Examples include the provision of sensors for maritime patrol aircraft,
high-speed interceptor boats and tactical radio systems, construction
of coastal stations and command center facilities, and training on
maintenance/logistics support systems.
22. Senator Lee. In addition to the detention center at Guantanamo
Bay, there is also the critical Naval Base. Why is this base so useful
for our operations in the Caribbean? What strategic value do we gain by
maintaining this presence?
Admiral Tidd. The Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay is the only
strategic base of its kind in the Western Hemisphere. This base
supports the Department of Defense as well as the Department of State
(DOS) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in various mission
sets. From this strategic base of operations, the U.S. conducts
detection, monitoring, and intercept of illicit traffic and other
transnational threats, as well as staging for disaster and humanitarian
relief efforts. There is also an active DOS and DHS Migrant Operations
Center at GTMO that maintains a steady-state migrant processing
mission.
As Secretary of Defense Carter recently stated before the House
Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Defense in response to a
question about the future of the Naval Station, ``GTMO is a strategic
location . . . The Naval Station is secure.''
23. Senator Lee. Congress has previously taken an interest in the
security situation surrounding the Olympic games, as they are known for
being targets of terrorist attacks, havens for trafficking, and sources
of international political tension. What are the security concerns
surrounding the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro, and how is
SOUTHCOM involved in addressing them?
Admiral Tidd. We share your concern that a gathering of this size
with a high level of media exposure providing a world-wide audience is
a natural target. We also share Brazil and the international
community's commitment to ensuring a safe and secure 2016 Olympic
Games.
All U.S. security support for the Olympics is being coordinated by
the International Security Events Group (ISEG), which is led by the
Department of State. In response to specific Brazilian requests,
SOUTHCOM has provided training, subject matter expert exchanges, and
other support to assist Brazil in expanding its capacity to deal with
threats in preparation for the Games. Brazilian Federal Police and
Naval Special Forces are participating in a Joint Combined Exchange
Training (JCET) with U.S. Special Forces with a focus on security
operations at key Olympic venues. United States Special Forces units
have also received an invitation to observe the Brazil Federal Police
Special Operations Units at the Integrated Tactical Center in Rio de
Janeiro, which is a great opportunity to integrate our nations'
counterterrorism forces. We stand ready to support our Brazilian
partners in achieving the goal of a safe Olympic Games.
24. Senator Lee. As the Department of Defense has struggled with
how to fight ISIL in the Middle East and North Africa, much attention
ahs been given to this and other terrorist organizations in that
region. We know, however, that terror groups also seek havens in South
and Central America and have been successful in launching attacks in
such places as Argentina in the past. What efforts are being made to
prevent the growth of Sunni and Shia extremist groups in South
America--both in terms of recruitment and plotting of attacks in the
region? Has there been any noticeable increase in activity in the
region, or any sense of competition between Iranian sponsored groups
and ISIL?
Admiral Tidd and Admiral Gortney. Both Sunni and Shi'a Islamic
extremists are present in Latin America and primarily engage in support
activities, radicalization, and recruitment on behalf of terrorist
organizations abroad. We asses that extremists in the region do have
the capability to support an attack against Western interests.
Unlike other parts of the world, however, there is relative peace
and understanding between Sunni and Shi'a Muslims in the region. Of
concern is the possibility that those who are returning from conflict
zones in the Middle East could enflame religious hostilities, possibly
leading to widespread sectarian violence within the region's currently
moderate Muslim communities. In a worst case scenario, this could lead
to instability in some regional nations.
ISIL's strategic communication efforts have resonated in parts of
Latin America and the Caribbean. We believe at least 120 foreign
terrorist fighters have traveled from the region to join ISIL in Syria
or Iraq. The spread of violent extremist ideology in the Caribbean has
been a long-standing concern--not just for us, but for our friends and
partners across the region--especially given the Caribbean's close
geographical, cultural, and linguistic ties to the United States. This
is especially disconcerting given that many partner nations are unable
to monitor the potential return of foreign fighters and often lack
robust counterterrorism laws and capabilities to confront this threat.
It has become apparent to us that with each advancement in our
understanding comes a corresponding increase in our awareness of the
threat and the potential these organizations have to threaten the U.S.
and its interests within Latin America and the Caribbean.
Lebanese Hezbollah maintains an extensive regional network of
supporters and sympathizers, some of whom are involved in trade-based
money laundering and other illicit activities to generate revenue (in
the range of tens of millions of dollars annually), a portion of which
goes to support the parent organization in the Middle East. Lebanese
Hezbollah also maintains an infrastructure with the capability to
conduct or support terrorist attacks. As with every aspect of our
counterterrorism efforts, the United States Government remains vigilant
against these threats, working closely with our partners to protect the
southern approaches to the United States.
SOUTHCOM's counterterrorism (CT) efforts focus on building and
supporting partner nation capacity to detect and disrupt terrorist
threats within their borders. We are working with partners from across
the region to counter extremism, recruitment, and radicalization to
violence in vulnerable communities. Over the past year our Special
Operations Forces (SOF) conducted multiple engagements such as subject
matter expert exchanges, counterterrorism-focused exercises, and civil
affairs activities. These efforts--coupled with support to U.S. Country
Teams and interagency operations--ensure our nation and those of our
friends remain secure. We are also exploring how counter network
approaches might improve our counterterrorism efforts.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
commander, u.s. strategic command--b-2
25. Senator McCaskill. With the recent deployment of three B-2
Spirits from Whiteman Air Force Base to the U.S. Pacific Command area
of responsibility, I am pleased to know that there is a program in
place to upgrade their communications capabilities. I know there has
been a lot of discussion regarding the affordability of maintaining and
upgrading the nuclear triad and I also understand next generation
programs can be a timely matter with the length of time the acquisition
program can take. When will this upgrade be complete?
Admiral Haney. Bombers are the most flexible and visible leg of the
Triad. They provide key capabilities in support of U.S. deterrence and
assurance commitments worldwide, and play an important role in
conventional power projection. The B-2 Stealth Bomber plays a uniquely
important role in U.S. conventional power projection and nuclear
deterrence. Robust and survivable communications are essential to
execute world-wide conventional and nuclear deterrence and assurance
missions.
The Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) SATCOM program
provides robust anti-jam and highly survivable connectivity to ensure
that the nation's only penetrating stealth bomber will continue to be
able to strike any target worldwide. The B-2's AEHF and receive-only
very low frequency (VLF) modernization programs are instrumental in
supporting the bomber's conventional and nuclear missions, especially
in anti-access, area denial environments. The B-2 AEHF program is fully
funded and on track to field in 2021.
The B-2 is also receiving Increment 1 of the Common Very Low
Frequency Receiver (CVR Inc 1), which directly supports nuclear command
and control effectiveness. CVR Inc 1 will start fielding in late 2017.
The B-2's AEHF and CVR Inc 1 programs leverage communications
investments made in other programs to lower risk and cost and provide
leveraging options for other strategic platforms such as the B-52 and
RC-135. USSTRATCOM fully supports both programs, and urges that they
continue to be fully funded to avoid any mission gaps.
26. Senator McCaskill. What would be the consequences of a delay in
completing the communications upgrades on the B-2?
Admiral Haney. Bombers are the most flexible and visible leg of the
Triad. They provide key capabilities in support of U.S. deterrence and
assurance commitments worldwide, and play an important role in
conventional power projection. The B-2 Stealth Bomber plays a uniquely
important role in U.S. conventional power projection and nuclear
deterrence. Robust and survivable communications are essential to
execute world-wide conventional and nuclear deterrence and assurance
missions.
The B-2's communications modernization programs are mission-
critical enablers for both nuclear and conventional missions. Previous
efforts to modernize B-2 communications were delayed or cancelled due
to funding and technical issues. Current efforts are fully supported,
but further delays will create unacceptable mission limitations.
The B-2's Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite
communication (SATCOM) modernization will replace the bomber's legacy
Ultra High Frequency (UHF) SATCOM capability. The UHF capability is
vulnerable to jamming and does not effectively support the B-2's
stealth capabilities. Furthermore, the satellite constellation which
supports UHF SATCOM is approaching end-of-life. A previous 'just-in-
time' effort to add an AEHF capability to the B-2 was canceled in 2013
due to technical and cost issues. Those issues have been resolved and
the current AEHF effort is fully funded with program start in fiscal
year 2017. This program can also be leveraged to cost-effectively meet
Extremely High Frequency requirements for other strategic platforms
such as the B-52 and RC-135.
The B-2's Very Low Frequency (VLF) capability, known as Common VLF
Receiver Increment 1 (CVR Inc 1), provides required receive only
connectivity in support of nuclear command and control. It is fully
funded and on schedule.
commander, u.s. northern command
27. Senator McCaskill. As we look at ways to improve the efficiency
and effectiveness of the Department of Defense, it has been suggested
that we should relook at the Unified Command Plan which draws the
geographical boundaries for Combatant Commands. If U.S. Northern
Command and U.S. Southern Command were combined into one command, would
the Commander be able to execute the missions and requirements of both
commands?
Admiral Gortney. From a span of control perspective, it would be
extremely difficult for the Commander to execute the missions and
requirements of both U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern Command if
they were combined into one combatant command. Furthermore, I would be
very concerned that this merger would dilute the Commander's focus on
Homeland Defense, the Department's highest priority mission, as well as
undermining the key Homeland and regional partnerships developed by
U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern Command. In addition to the
partnerships with Canada, Mexico, The Bahamas, 49 States, 2
territories, and the District of Columbia, a merger would add an
additional 31 countries, 15 dependencies and areas of special
sovereignty to a merged Commander's portfolio. I believe this expanded
span of responsibility would seriously challenge a single Commander's
ability to sustain and develop our partnerships, with whom we share
responsibility for the defense of North America.
28. Senator McCaskill. What, if any, additional risks would the
U.S. incur?
Admiral Gortney. I believe that by combining U.S. Northern Command
and U.S. Southern Command, the U.S. would incur risk to our Homeland
defense mission as well as to our Homeland and regional partnerships.
One of the many lessons learned from the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001 was the need for a single combatant command to be assigned the
Homeland defense mission as its number one priority mission. U.S.
Northern Command is responsible for defending all of the approaches to
the US, including air, land and sea against threats, and we must
coordinate with both of our North American neighbors who are part of
our in-depth Homeland defense architecture. In addition, a merger would
significantly undermine our ability to support civil authorities in
responding to disasters and emergencies in the U.S. Homeland.
commander, u.s. southern command
29. Senator McCaskill. As we look at ways to improve the efficiency
and effectiveness of the Department of Defense, it has been suggested
that we should relook at the Unified Command Plan which draws the
geographical boundaries for Combatant Commands. If U.S. Southern
Command and U.S. Northern Command were combined into one command, would
the Commander be able to execute the missions and requirements of both
commands?
Admiral Tidd. If NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM were combined into one
command, I believe we would inevitably sub-optimize both critical
mission sets. NORTHCOM's Homeland Defense mission and SOUTHCOM's
external focus of Theater Security Cooperation in our shared
neighborhood of the Western Hemisphere are very distinct in nature.
Unless we decide as a nation that one of those missions is no longer
important, I believe we will continue to need two separate Commands to
focus on each unique mission.
30. Senator McCaskill. What, if any, additional risks would the
U.S. incur?
Admiral Tidd. If SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM were combined, again, we run
the risk of sub-optimizing both unique missions. I would defer to
Admiral Gortney to address the specific risks that would be involved in
a suboptimization of NORTHCOM. However, I can tell you that our
neighborhood, Latin America and the Caribbean, already perceives that
the U.S. is losing interest in the region due to low prioritization of
assets and resources. At the same time, extra-hemispheric actors such
as Russia, China, and Iran are steadily increasing their engagements
and investments in this region. Minimizing the strategic importance of
this region by diluting the SOUTHCOM mission would only play into the
current perception in the region and open the door to those external
actors to gain influence in our near-abroad.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
illicit substances
31. Senator Blumenthal. You noted during your testimony that
USSOUTHCOM's ability to interdict flows of illicit substances is
extremely limited. Can you please provide a list of resources--
equipment, ships, aircraft--that you believe are necessary to more
effectively intercept and interdict the flow of illicit substances?
Admiral Tidd. In order to meet the U.S. Government national goal to
remove 40 percent of documented cocaine movement through the transit
zone, USSOUTHCOM requires 21 vessels. Our current ideal breakdown of
the 21 vessels includes 14 medium range ships (similar to the Littoral
Combat Ship or future Offshore Patrol Cutter), 3 long range ships (like
a Cruiser, Destroyer, or National Security Cutter), and 4 coastal
patrol boats. The most useful vessels to USSOUTHCOM are medium and long
range ships equipped with a flight deck that provides persistent
offshore presence, capable of conducting Airborne Use of Force (AUF),
with embarked law enforcement teams.
As you know, we also face significant shortfalls in the area of
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). To have a better
understanding of the environment and threats in our region, we require
persistent airborne and maritime ISR assets with precise geo-location
and identification capabilities. Because of the geography in this part
of the world, we would also need ISR capabilities able to collect in
triple-canopy, adverse weather, across air, ground, and sea.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2017 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 15, 2016
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
POSTURE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:32 p.m. in Room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe,
Sessions, Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan,
Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, and King.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman McCain. Good afternoon.
The committee meets today to receive testimony on the plans
and programs of the Department of the Navy for fiscal year
2017.
I want to thank each of our witnesses for their
distinguished service to the Nation, as well as the sailors,
marines, and civilians they lead who are serving around the
world today.
Last month, the Director of National Intelligence provided
this committee a candid and unsettling picture of the worldwide
threats to our national security, which have steadily increased
since dangerous reductions in defense spending were enacted in
2011.
The unwillingness of the administration and too many in
Congress to chart a different course has forced our sailors and
marines to try to do more with less. By any measure, today's
fleet of 272 ships is too small to address critical security
challenges. Even with recent shipbuilding increases, the Navy
will not achieve its requirement of 308 ships until 2021, and
there is no plan to meet the bipartisan National Defense
Panel's recommendation for a fleet of 323 to 346 ships.
The last five carrier strike group deployments have
exceeded 8 months, taking their toll on our ships, aircraft,
and sailors. This has forced the Navy to accept carrier
presence gaps in order to complete deferred maintenance.
Similarly, by the end of this fiscal year, the Marine Corps
will be reduced to 182,000 marines, even as General Neller
testified last year that the optimal size for the force is
186,000. The Marines have a requirement for 38 amphibious
ships, but they only have 30 in the fleet. Marine Corps
aviation is in crisis. Many aircraft are down hard. Pilots are
not flying, and nondeployed Marine aviation squadrons are short
in the number of aircraft needed to train or respond in a
crisis.
Budget cuts and force reductions, together with high
operational tempo, have forced sacrifices of vital training and
time at home with families, putting our All-Volunteer Force
under considerable strain.
Given the obvious needs of our Navy and Marine Corps to
restore readiness and modernize their ships, aircraft, and
combat vehicles, the President should have requested a defense
budget that reflects the scale and scope of the national
security threats we face and the growing demands they impose on
our sailors and marines. Instead, the President chose to
request the lowest level of defense spending authorized by last
year's budget agreement and submitted a defense budget that is
actually less in real dollars than last year, despite the fact
that operational requirements have grown.
Even with the relief of the Bipartisan Budget Act,
insufficient funding has forced the Navy to propose
inactivating seven guided missile cruisers for up to 10 years.
I am particularly concerned about the Navy's proposal to cut a
carrier air wing, which appears to ignore the versatility of
our air wings to rely on overly optimistic projections for its
yet unproven optimized fleet response plan and could reduce
operational flexibility in a time of growing uncertainty.
The answer to our forces' readiness shortfalls is not the
reduction of squadrons but the proper funding of flight hours,
depot maintenance, and the procurement of new aircraft, many of
which such as additional F-18's were not requested purely for
budgetary reasons.
As we consider the future of the carrier air wing, I
continue to believe the Nation needs an unmanned carrier-based
penetrating strike aircraft. While I am frustrated with the
slow pace of development towards this goal, I am hopeful the
so-called MQ-25 Stingray will be an important step in this
direction by facilitating the rapid development of unmanned
carrier-based tanking and ISR [intelligence, reconnaissance,
surveillance] capabilities.
The President's Budget includes significant funding
requests for major Navy and Marine Corps acquisition programs,
which require continued oversight by this committee to ensure
these programs make the best use of limited taxpayer dollars.
Initial cost overruns more than doubled the cost of each
littoral combat ship [LCS] and development costs now exceed $3
billion and counting. Meanwhile, key warfighting capabilities
of the LCS, including mine countermeasures and anti-submarine
warfare, have fallen years behind schedule and remain unproven.
Because of the long-running cost, schedule, and performance
issues with this program, I support the Department's proposal
to down-select to one variant no later than 2019 and reduce the
inventory objective to 40 ships. I am encouraged to see the
Navy has begun the process of identifying the LCS replacement,
and I hope we can transition to a more capable, small surface
combatant expeditiously.
I am also pleased that after more than $2 billion in cost
overruns for each of the first three Ford-class carriers, this
budget request reflects cost reductions of nearly $700 million
for these ships. I expect this to be just the start of cost
reductions in this program. Given continued technological
challenges and schedule delays, the Navy must take all steps
necessary to control costs in this program.
I also look forward to reviewing the Navy's report on
alternative carrier designs, which is due to this committee on
April 1st, which I expect to provide alternatives to the sole
source status quo and options to increase competition.
The Ohio-class replacement submarine is an equally
important program which will carry about 70 percent of the
Nation's deployed nuclear warheads. The cost of this program
will be second only to the joint strike fighter. Make no
mistake. The Nation and the Navy cannot afford--literally
cannot afford--any margin for error or growth in cost of this
program. We must get it right the first time with lessons
learned from past acquisition experience, including accurate
cost estimating, technology maturity, avoiding concurrent
design, or development with production, off-ramps for high-risk
systems, and meeting reliability targets for critical systems.
Similarly, given the importance of replacing our aging
fleet of amphibious vehicles, the Marine Corps must learn the
lessons of past failures, such as the expeditionary fighting
vehicle, and deliver this needed capability on time and cost
and up to expectations.
As the Navy and Marine Corps move forward with these
significant acquisition programs, I would like to hear from our
witnesses how they intend to implement the new acquisition
authorities contained in last year's defense authorization bill
to improve acquisition outcomes and save taxpayer dollars.
Finally, Admiral Richardson, almost 2 months ago, the
government of Iran captured 10 Navy sailors and their vessels
in a blatant violation of international law. Senior
administration officials reacted as if nothing out of the
ordinary occurred. Indeed, some even praised and thanked the
Iranians. By failing to affirm and defend basic principles of
international law, the administration has placed our Navy and
Coast Guard vessels and the men and women who sail them at
greater risk in the future. While I understand the Navy is
continuing to investigate this matter, I request that you bring
the committee up to date on the findings of the investigation
and the welfare of the crew members who were detained.
I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses on these
and many other important issues confronting our Navy and Marine
Corps.
Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let
me join you in welcoming Secretary Mabus and Admiral Richardson
and General Neller. Thank you, gentlemen, for your service to
the Nation.
This afternoon, we will discuss the Department of the
Navy's fiscal year 2017 authorization request. We certainly are
grateful for your service, and I want to especially welcome
Admiral Richardson and General Neller. This is your first
posture hearing. welcome aboard I think they say in the Navy.
You face a huge range of challenges as you strive to
balance the need to support ongoing operations and sustain
readiness with the need to modernize and keep the technological
edge critical to our military's success.
Last year, the Department of the Navy was facing serious
readiness problems caused by deferred maintenance, reduced
steaming and flying hours, and canceled training and
deployments. The continued emphasis on readiness in this year's
budget will address some of the Navy's most serious readiness
problems. I am interested in hearing the witnesses' views on
this matter, which are absolutely critical.
All areas of our naval forces are maintaining an extremely
high operational tempo. Demand is overwhelming for attack
submarines, air and missile defense cruisers, destroyers and
strike fighters. In addition, the Navy is now in its fourth
year of operating with fewer than required 11 aircraft
carriers. During the next decade, as a first priority, the Navy
will need to buy a new class of strategic missile submarines to
replace the Ohio-class submarines. I am interested in hearing
how the Navy is managing current demands on its assets and how
it plans to manage future modernization demands, particularly
how it will use the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund as we
begin procurement funding of the Ohio replacement in fiscal
year 2017.
General Neller, you have stated in your words
recapitalization of our force is essential to our future
readiness with investments in ground combat vehicles, aviation,
command and control, and digitally interoperable protected
networks. The Marine Corps continues to make modernization of
ground vehicles a priority by developing the Amphibious Combat
Vehicle [ACV] to replace the aging inventory of Amphibious
Assault Vehicles [AAV], as well as the Joint Light Tactical
Vehicle [JLTV] in which the Marine Corps is partnering with the
Army.
Both programs awarded contracts last fall, but were
subjected to protests. While the JLTV protest has been
resolved, the Marine Corps is still awaiting a decision for the
ACV. I would welcome an update from our witnesses on the status
of these programs and if they believe there will be significant
delays in fielding due to delays in the acquisition program.
The Department of the Navy budget has its usual number of
significant programs, some of which have issues with their
execution. However, I want to note specifically one program,
and that is the procurement of the V-22 tilt rotor aircraft.
The Navy budget would break the current multiyear procurement
contract. When Congress authorizes a multiyear procurement
contract, we are agreeing to authorize the administration to
commit future Congresses to a specific procurement program. In
return, I believe that there is a commitment by the
administration that absent remarkable changes in the situation,
the administration will live up to the contract and future
budget requests. I am very interested in hearing more about why
the Navy proposes to break this contract.
The Defense Department's Defense Strategic Guidance, issued
in January 2012, followed by the 2014 QDR [Quadrennial Defense
Review], announced a renewed strategy for United States
military orientation on the Asia-Pacific. Consistent with that
strategy, the Defense Department has been working to realign
United States military forces of South Korea and Okinawa and
plans to position Navy and Marine Corps forces in Australia,
Singapore, and possibly elsewhere in the region.
The Department has also begun implementing a plan to
forward-deploy more ships, as shown by the Navy's rotational
deployment of littoral combat ships to Singapore. I am
interested in hearing how the Navy will ensure that the LCS
deployments will not further delay operational testing of the
LCS and the LCS mission modules which are both significantly
behind schedule already.
Again, let me thank you for your service and for your
dedication to the men and women of the Navy and the Marine
Corps. I look forward to your testimony.
Chairman McCain. Secretary Mabus, welcome.
STATEMENT OF HONORABLE RAYMOND E. MABUS, JR., SECRETARY OF THE
NAVY
Mr. Mabus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed,
members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to
discuss the Department of the Navy.
As you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, this is the first budget
testimony before this committee for the Chief of Naval
Operations [CNO], Admiral Richardson, and the Commandant of the
Marine Corps, General Neller. In the time since they took these
positions, I have had the privilege of their frank,
professional, and invaluable counsel. They are officers of the
highest caliber who expertly lead our Navy and Marine Corps
during ever-tightening fiscal constraints and an increasingly
dynamic threat environment.
This is my eighth time and my last to appear before you at
a budget hearing. For me, leading the Department of the Navy is
the greatest honor of my life. I could not be more proud of our
sailors, our marines, and our civilians.
I am also proud of the many steps we have taken and the
changes we have made to ensure that the Navy and Marine Corps
remain the greatest expeditionary fighting force the world has
ever known.
First and foremost, we continue to provide presence. That
unrivaled advantage on, above, beneath, and from the seas gives
our leaders options in times of crisis, reassures our allies,
deters our adversaries. There is no next best thing to being
there. Maintaining that presence requires gray hulls on the
horizon.
While there has been discussion about posture versus
presence, the simple fact is that for the Navy and Marine
Corps, our posture is presence. In every case, from high-end
combat to a regular warfare to disaster relief, our naval
assets get on station faster, we stay longer, we bring whatever
we need with us, and since we operate from our ships, which are
sovereign American territory, we can act without having to ask
any other nation's permission.
Resourcing that presence depends on four fundamentals:
people, our sailors and our marines; platforms, our ships and
aircraft and systems; power, how we use energy to make us
better warfighters; and partnerships, our relationship with
international allies and most importantly with the American
people.
When I took this post almost 7 years ago, we had an
incredibly committed and capable force, but each of these four
words staring with ``P'' was under pressure. Our people were
under stress from high operational tempo and extended
deployments. Our fleet was shrinking and too many of our
platforms were costing too much. Our use of power was a
vulnerability, and our partners were seeking reassurance of our
sustained engagement. Now our people, platforms, power, and
partnerships are stronger than they have been in many years,
enabling us to provide that invaluable presence.
People. We have instituted sweeping changes in personnel
policy. Promotions are based more on merit and less on tenure.
Commanding officers are empowered to meritoriously promote more
sailors and marines. We have made career paths more flexible.
One example, thanks to Congress, is the Career and Admission
Program, which has been greatly expanded.
We have also increased the professional development and
educational opportunities to bring America's best ideas to the
fleet by adding 30 graduate school slots through our Fleet
Scholars Education Program and sending high-performing sailors
on SECNAV [Secretary of the Navy] industry tours to great
American companies like FedEx and Amazon where they learn
private sector best practices that can be applied when they
return.
We are absolutely committed from leadership to the deck
plates on combating the crime of sexual assault and the tragedy
of suicide.
We have also revamped physical fitness assessments, making
them more realistically aligned with the jobs we do, and we
have promoted healthier lifestyles through better nutrition and
a culture of fitness.
All billets in both services are now open to women.
Standards will absolutely not be lowered, but anyone who can
meet the standards will be able to do the job. This will make
us a more effective combat force.
We are trying to mitigate stress on sailors and marines and
their families by making deployments more predictable,
extending hours for child care, and creating collocation
policies.
To tap into the innovative culture inherent in the Navy and
Marine Corps, we established task force innovation, which takes
good ideas from deck plate sailors and field marines,
recognizes funds, and rapidly moves these good ideas fleet-
wide.
On platforms, we have reversed the decline in ship count,
and thanks to Congress and, in particular, to this committee,
our Navy will reach, as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, 300
ships by 2019 and our assessed need of 308 ships by 2021.
In the 7 years before I took office, the Navy contracted
for 41 ships. In my 7 years, we have contracted for 84, and we
have done so while increasing aircraft purchases by 35 percent,
all with a smaller top line. Practices like firm fixed price
contracts, multiyear buys, stable requirements have driven down
costs on virtually every class of ship, and we are also in the
process of recapitalizing nearly every naval aviation program.
We have expanded unmanned systems on, under, and above the
sea and put increased focus on them by establishing a deputy
assistant secretary for unmanned and an office of unmanned
warfare systems on the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] staff,
known as N-99, designed specifically to coordinate all the
unmanned programs.
We are also implementing advanced energy technologies like
electromagnetic railguns and laser weapons.
Power. To increase our lethality and operational
flexibility, I set goals of having 50 percent of sea and shore-
based energy derived from alternative sources by 2020,
competitive with the price of conventional power. We met that
goal ashore by the end of last year.
Energy efficiency has also been greatly increased on our
bases and at sea. Since 2009, both the Navy and Marine Corps
have achieved large drops in oil consumption.
Partnerships. I have traveled nearly 1.2 million miles to
144 different countries and territories, visiting our sailors
and marines, our allies and our partners. 12 of my trips have
been to Afghanistan where I visited every Marine Corps forward-
operating base in Helmand to be with our forward-deployed men
and women and have actively engaged with our allies and friends
around the world to build and maintain a network of navies with
whom we train, operate, and trust.
We have worked in close partnership with Congress to
fulfill the constitutional mandate to provide for and maintain
a navy. As President George Washington said, it follows then as
night succeeds the day that without a decisive naval force, we
can do nothing definitive, and with it, everything honorable
and glorious.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mabus follows:]
Prepared Statement by the Honorable Ray Mabus
Chairman McCain and Ranking Member Reed, members of the Committee,
thank you for the opportunity to discuss the readiness and posture of
the Department of the Navy. With Chief of Naval Operations John
Richardson and Commandant of the Marine Corps Bob Neller, I have the
great privilege of representing the sailors and marines who serve our
nation around the world, the civilians who support them and all of
their families.
This is the first testimony before this committee for Admiral
Richardson and General Neller in these positions. In the time since
they took these critical posts, I have had the privilege of their
frank, professional and invaluable counsel. They are officers of the
highest caliber who expertly lead our Navy and Marine Corps during
ever-tightening fiscal constraints and an increasingly dynamic threat
environment.
This is my eighth time, and my last, to appear before you. For me,
leading the Department of the Navy is the greatest honor of my life. I
could not be more proud of our sailors, marines, and civilians. I'm
also proud of the many steps we've taken and changes we've made to
ensure that the Navy and Marine Corps remain as they have been for over
240 years as the greatest expeditionary fighting force the world has
ever known
This statement, together with those provided by Admiral Richardson
and General Neller, presents to you and to the American people an
overview of the Department of the Navy and highlights our priorities as
we move forward with the fiscal year 2017 (FY17) budget process. As the
Secretary of the Navy, I am responsible for recruiting, training, and
equipping the sailors, marines, and civilians who spend every day
working to defend the American people and our national interests.
Every year, as we review our current posture, we must ask
ourselves, as a Department, as a military, and as a nation, how to
balance our national security demands. We face an increasing array of
threats, conflicts and challenges around the globe, even as our fiscal
and budgetary situation continues to strain resources. Consistently,
when a crisis occurs, the leaders of this country want immediate
options, so they ask for the Navy and Marine Corps, for our carrier
strike groups and our amphibious ready groups, for our sailors and
marines, for our presence. With 90 percent of global trade traveling by
sea, 95 percent of all voice and data being transferred under the ocean
and more than 80 percent of the world's population living within 60
miles of the sea, there is no question that now, more than ever, we are
living in a maritime century.
the value of presence
What our Navy and Marine Corps uniquely provide is presence--around
the globe, around the clock--ensuring stability, deterring adversaries,
and providing the nation's leaders with options in times of crisis. We
are ``America's away team'' because sailors and marines, equally in
times of peace and war, are deployed around the world to be not just in
the right place at the right time but in the right place all the time.
In every case, from high-end combat to irregular warfare to disaster
relief, our naval assets get on station faster, we stay longer, we
bring whatever we need with us and, since we operate from our ships,
which are sovereign American territory, we can act without having to
ask any other nation's permission. While there has been discussion
about posture versus presence, the simple fact is that for the Navy and
Marine Corps, our posture is presence.
For more than seven decades, Navy and Marine Corps presence has
kept international sea lanes open around the world. For the first time
in history, one nation--America--is protecting trade and commerce not
just for ourselves and our allies but for everyone. Today, $9 trillion
in goods are traded by sea annually, supporting 40 million jobs in the
U.S. alone and benefiting nearly every consumer on earth. These
statistics make it clear that the health of the world's economy depends
in large part on the United States Navy and Marine Corps.
The security and stability of the international system of trade and
finance is tied irrevocably to the free movement of goods and data
across, above and under the sea, and is more than just a military
concern. It impacts every American in the prices we pay for goods and
services and the very availability of those goods and services. While
the Navy's activities often take place far away and out of sight of
most citizens, the impact of our global naval presence isn't a
theoretical construct; its effects are palpable throughout American
life.
The economic benefit is just one that comes from our sailors and
marines doing their job across the globe. That ubiquitous presence
reassures our allies and deters our adversaries. If conflict comes, we
will fight and win. Our presence is an unrivaled advantage that we
provide our nation. There is no ``next best thing'' to being there.
Maintaining that presence requires gray hulls on the horizon.
With each year's budget decisions, we determine what the future
Navy and Marine Corps will look like. Just as the Fleet and Corps we
have today are the result of decisions made a decade ago, so will
tomorrow's Fleet and Corps be a result of the decisions we make today.
For this reason, we have to balance the needs of our Navy and Marine
Corps today with those of our nation tomorrow.
Our combatant commanders understand the critical expeditionary
capability the Navy and Marine Corps team brings to the fight. Whether
we are conducting security cooperation around the world, deploying
Marines in response to a humanitarian crisis or launching strikes from
our carriers, it is clear Navy and Marine Corps presence provides great
value to our decision makers and our nation. The emergence of a diverse
set of challenges, including Russia, North Korea, China, Iran and ISIS
demands continued emphasis on our Naval and expeditionary forces. We
absolutely cannot afford to forfeit the capabilities of our future
maritime power and superiority.
around the globe, around the clock
You only need to look around the world to see our Navy and Marine
Corps are first on-station and demonstrate an instrumental and
prominent role in our national security strategy.
For the first 54 days of the air campaign against Islamic State
militants in Iraq and Syria, the only strikes came from Navy F/A-18
Hornets off USS George H.W. Bush in the Arabian Gulf because land-based
fighters could not participate until host nations approved.
During a 10-month deployment ending in June 2015, USS Carl Vinson
Strike Group conducted 12,300 sorties, including 2,383 combat missions
against Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).
The operational tempo of Naval Special Operations Forces (NAVSOF)
remains high, as they continue operations in the Middle East, Horn of
Africa, and Central Asia. NAVSOF is manning the Combined Joint Special
Operations Task Force-Iraq and deploying forces to Afghanistan.
In March 2015, USS Gary intercepted a suspected narcotics-
trafficking vessel off the coast of Central America and seized 5,200
kilograms of cocaine.
In July 2015, USS Porter entered the Black Sea to reassure NATO
allies of our commitment to regional stability by conducting naval
exercises with ships from 30 different nations including Spain,
Portugal, France, Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria.
Last fall, as a visible demonstration of our commitment to
maintaining freedom of navigation for everyone, USS Lassen patrolled
the Spratly Islands and nearby artificial reefs in the South China Sea.
USS Curtis Wilbur conducted similar freedom of navigation operations by
patrolling near the disputed Triton Island earlier this year.
When tensions rose in Yemen last summer, marines embarked with
sailors onboard Navy craft to shore up security and surveillance in
surrounding waters in preparation for a potential crisis.
The 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) deployed to Saipan to
provide Defense Support to Civil Authorities after Typhoon Soudelor
killed 30 people and displaced 150,000 others in the Commonwealth of
the Northern Marianas.
Within 40 hours of President Obama's order, a Special Purpose
Marine Air-Ground Task Force deployed marines, sailors, aircraft and
equipment to Liberia to respond to the Ebola crisis, providing critical
airlift and surgical capability as part of U.S disaster relief efforts.
Maritime presence has been a tenet of our democracy since its
inception; the founding fathers wrote in the Constitution that Congress
is authorized to ``raise'' an Army when needed, but mandated it
``maintain'' a Navy. Maintaining our great Navy and Marine Corps is
what assures Americans at home, our friends and allies, as well as our
adversaries that we are ready to respond when called upon to any
crisis, anywhere.
Early on in my tenure as Secretary, I outlined four principles that
enable our Navy and Marine Corps' to sustain their global presence.
They are People, Platforms, Power and Partnerships. Those have been,
and continue to be, the key factors in assuring the capability,
capacity and success of our naval services, which is why they have
been, and will remain, my top priorities.
people--sustaining the world's most formidable expeditionary fighting
force
The sailors, marines, and civilians serving today are the best
force we've ever had. But for more than a decade we asked a lot of
everyone, because unlike other services, we deploy equally in peacetime
and wartime. There are no permanent homecomings for sailors and
marines. Despite all we've asked, they have performed magnificently.
We've taken steps to maintain the health and resilience of our force
across every facet of the Department. We have addressed issues like
operational readiness levels, personal well-being for our people and
their families, creating more options for career flexibility, opening
new slots for graduate education, improving our advancement process,
and promoting equality of opportunity. We have made the Navy and Marine
Corps stronger, focused not only on retaining the incredible expertise
and professionalism that resides within these two services, but also
that draws from the broadest talent pool America has to offer.
Our sailors and marines make Navy and Marine Corps presence
possible by operating the platforms, harnessing the power, and building
the partnerships necessary to fulfill our national security strategy.
Seven years ago when I took office, we had a committed and capable
force, but our people, and our platforms, were under stress from high
operational tempo and extended deployments.
To return stability to our sailors, marines, their families, and to
our maintenance cycles, one of our first priorities was to develop and
institute the Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP). This is a program
that the Navy is using to schedule and plan our deployments and the
maintenance of our platforms. Entering its third year since
implementation, OFRP is beginning to fully demonstrate its advantages
to the Fleet. USS Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group and USS Makin Island
Expeditionary Strike Group will be first to deploy later this year
entirely under the OFRP. Our men and women know there is no way to
completely eliminate the unexpected, because events around the world
can and do take on a life of their own. However, increasing the
predictability of deployments will help improve resilience in our
sailors and marines and their families and also has the added benefit
of helping us properly support our maintenance requirements and
readiness posture.
Under the OFRP, we continue to meet all operational commitments,
and sailors, marines, and their families are giving us positive
feedback on this and other initiatives like increases to Hardship Duty
Pay--Tempo (HDP-T), a pro-rated additional pay that kicks in when a
deployment extends beyond more than 220 consecutive days, and Career
Sea Pay, paid to those who have spent a total of three years at sea and
Career Sea Pay-Premium for those E-6 and above who have spent a total
of eight years in sea-going assignments. These incentives reward those
who take the hard and challenging billets at sea, which form the
backbone of our operations.
Taking care of our people is about more than just operational
stability. Through our 21st Century Sailor and Marine Initiative,
implemented in 2012, we have provided a holistic approach to assuring
we have the healthiest, fittest, and most resilient force in the world.
We have focused on helping our sailors and marines maximize their
personal and professional readiness by assisting them and their
families with the mental, physical and emotional challenges of military
service. Eliminating the stovepipes that existed between many of the
programs designed to support our people allows us to better address
issues like suicide and sexual assault in a comprehensive way that
protects our sailors and marines and makes them stronger.
In suicide prevention, we are continuing to accelerate our efforts
in 2016 by becoming more assertive on early recognition, education and
open dialogue to promote climates supportive of psychological health.
We are expanding our Ask, Care, Treat (ACT) initiative that focuses on
training, counseling, and intervention. To date, over 40,000 sailors
have received training via Navy Operational Stress Control (OSC)
courses. Our partnerships with the Navy and Marine Corps Public Health
Center, the Defense Suicide Prevention Office, and the Bureau of Navy
Medicine and Surgery have maximized our public health approach to
suicide prevention. Furthermore, we are adding to the nearly 800
Suicide Prevention Coordinators (SPC) trained in 2015, enhancing local
suicide prevention efforts at the deckplate by having a qualified
program advocate at nearly every command.
Sexual assault is a crime with devastating impacts to the Navy and
Marine Corps. Every sailor and marine deserves a working environment
respectful of all, completely intolerant of sexual assault, and
supported by programs of prevention, advocacy, and accountability.
We've implemented many actions to attack this insidious threat. While
there is still work to be done, we have instituted an increasingly
effective Sexual Assault Prevention and Response program and Victim's
Legal Counsel, which together encourage increased reporting and provide
critical support to those who come forward, and I am the only Service
Secretary who has my Sexual Assault Prevention Response Officer report
directly to me. We are also taking steps to prevent and respond to
perceptions of retaliation or ostracism on the part of the courageous
people who report these crimes- whether by the chain of command or
peers.
Our Sexual Assault Prevention and Response programs are many and
varied. Through our InterACT Bystander intervention training we've
educated more than 52,000 sailors and marines at 220 training events on
how to stop a potentially dangerous scenario from leading to an
assault. Our Navy Chaplain Corps has teamed with clinicians to
establish CREDO, a 48-hour retreat event with workshops focused on
teamwork, community building, personal resiliency and reconciliation.
In-person education is augmented by numerous interactive training tools
available to all sailors and marines ashore and afloat. But no matter
how much we've done and continue to do, we will not consider our
mission a success until this crime is eliminated.
Protecting our Department from instability and destructive and
illegal behavior is important, but equally important is promoting
healthy lifestyles that result in a more capable and ready fighting
force. Our high operational tempo demands a year-round culture of
fitness. We have completely revamped the Physical Fitness Assessment to
focus on producing warfighters, capable of accomplishing any mission
any time, a measure that not only improves readiness but reduces
overall medical costs. To set sailors and marines up for success, we
opened a 24-hour a day, seven-day a week gym on every base worldwide
and we began issuing the Navy Fitness Suit, a uniform item the marines
already have. sailors earn Fitness Suit patches for outstanding
performance, and those who maintain that level of performance over
three cycles receive the ``Outstanding Fitness Award.''
To complement physical training with well-balanced diets, we've
increased efforts to provide nutritious food options to sailors and
marines at sea and ashore. In 2012, the Marines introduced the ``Fueled
to Fight'' nutrition program, designed to promote a healthy lifestyle
by providing more nutritious food choices. At base dining facilities, a
labeling system identifies healthier options and enhances the Marine's
ability to make a healthy choice. The Navy also created their version,
called, ``Fuel to Fight,'' launched by the SEALS at Naval Amphibious
Base Little Creek, which increases the availability of lean-proteins,
vegetables, and complex carbohydrates in our galleys. We are further
developing the concept at one sea-based and one shore-based unit this
year and will implement it Fleet-wide in 2017.
Part of overall health is emotional health. In order for sailors
and marines to remain focused on the mission, they should not be
distracted by concerns about their home life. The Department of the
Navy takes very seriously its commitment to support our Navy and Marine
Corps families, and we have taken actions to make service more family
friendly. We established 24/7 Child Care Development Centers at three
Fleet concentration areas and increased access to childcare by a total
of four hours, two hours on either side of the previously existing
timeframe, at all locations.
In July of last year, I tripled paid maternity leave from 6 to 18
weeks, a period subsequently reduced to 12 weeks by the Secretary of
Defense. Meaningful maternity leave when it matters most is one of the
best ways that we can support the women who serve our county. This
flexibility is an investment in our people and our Services, and a
safeguard against losing skilled servicemembers. In our line
communities, for example, we were losing about twice as many female
servicemembers as male, most leaving between 7-12 years of service. We
believe extending maternity leave will save money and increase
readiness in the Department of the Navy by keeping people in.
Under a Congressional authorization, we piloted the Career
Intermission Program (CIP) beginning in 2009. CIP allows a sailor or
marine to take up to three years off, with a two-year payback for each
year taken. When they return they compete against people who have been
on active duty the same amount of time, as opposed to those from their
previously assigned year-group. Career flexibility does not come at the
cost of advancement potential. Our early participants have successfully
rejoined the Fleet and, again due to Congressional action, we are
expanding this program to help retain talented sailors and marines.
While we have taken steps to provide additional services and career
flexibility so sailors and marines can address their needs personal
needs, we have also aggressively enhanced professional development
opportunities to strengthen our All-Volunteer Force. In a world
increasingly dependent on inter-service, inter-agency, and
international cooperation, that development takes place over the entire
span of one's career. To broaden background diversity in our officer
corps, we re-opened NROTC units at Harvard, Yale, Columbia and
Princeton after a 40-year hiatus.
We also established the Fleet Scholars Education Program, adding 30
new graduate school positions allocated by warfighting commanders to
eligible officers. Our first participants are now studying at Harvard,
Dartmouth, and Yale.
Outside the classroom, we recognize the value that private sector
ingenuity adds to American innovation, so we have also sent officers to
work at places like FedEx and Amazon as part of SECNAV Industry Tours.
Those who participate in these programs are our very best, and, in
return for their experience, we expect them to bring their knowledge
back to the Fleet and to continue to serve under the requirement that
for every month spent away, a sailor or marine owes three months back.
We want people to take advantage of these and other opportunities,
and we want them to commit to a career beyond any prescribed service
obligation. That means creating an advancement system based primarily
on merit, not tenure. In the Navy, we removed arbitrary ``zone stamps''
from officer promotion boards this year which can unnecessarily create
bias. Additionally, for enlisted, we increased the number of
advancement opportunities available to Commanding Officers to spot
promote their best and brightest sailors via the Meritorious
Advancement Program. Next year, we expect those numbers to grow even
further.
In the Marine Corps we are revamping our manpower models to develop
the force and address gaps in our Non-commissioned Officer ranks. Sixty
percent of Marines are on their first tour and 40 percent are E-3 and
below. We've implemented the Squad Leader Development Program to mature
and further professionalize the force. This Program screens small unit
infantry Marines, selects candidates based on performance and provides
them with opportunities for education, qualification and assignment.
After returning predictability to the Navy and Marine Corps and
creating an environment that supports families and promotes
professional development, I took actions to make a career in the
Department attractive and viable to the broadest spectrum of American
talent. We now actively cultivate a force representative of the nation
it defends. Doing so maximizes our combat effectiveness, because a
diverse force is a stronger force.
This year, twenty-seven percent of the freshman class at the Naval
Academy Class is comprised of women, more than a one-third increase
from the summer of 2009 when I first took office. For the first time in
American history, all billets in the Navy and Marine Corps will be open
to every member of this year's graduating class, and to all others,
officers and enlisted, throughout the Fleet.
I started integrating women into previously closed jobs shortly
after taking office by opening up submarines and the coastal riverines
to women. Later, in 2013, Secretary Panetta and Chairman Dempsey
decided that the default position would be to open all military
positions to women or seek an exemption to the policy. When weighing
this decision, I took a methodical and comprehensive approach.
Ultimately, I decided that denying any individual who meets an
established standard the opportunity to serve because of their gender
not only goes against everything we value as Americans, but it will
most certainly diminish our combat effectiveness. We have already
proven that is the case with respect to things like the color of
someone's skin or who they love.
While we celebrate diversity in all of our people, we are uniform
in purpose as part of an organization that prioritizes service over
self. Rather than highlighting differences in our ranks, we have
incorporated everyone as full-participants by moving, with some few
exceptions, to common uniforms in both the Navy and the Marine Corps so
that our forces have a common appearance. Now and in the future, we
will present ourselves not as male and female sailors and marines, but
as United States sailors and marines.
In the Reserves, during fiscal year 2015 we mobilized 2,700
individual Reserve sailors and marines to support operations worldwide.
This allows us to focus our active component on filling critical sea
billets to help ensure Fleet wholeness and readiness. This year, we
were reminded of the sacrifices our Reserves make with the attack at
Navy Operational Support Center (NOSC) Chattanooga that took the lives
of five of our sailors and marines. At home, we have taken steps to
provide force protection against these kinds of terrorist acts at off-
installation NOSCs, and as of December 2015, 70 of 71 off-installation
NOSCs now have armed Selected Reservists. More than 150 NOSC staff
personnel have graduated the Navy's Security Reaction Force Basic (SRF-
B) course in support of the Navy Reserve Force Protection mission. For
Marine Corps reserve centers, 146 of 161 locations have armed duty
personnel, and the remaining 15 sites are in the process of training
personnel to be armed. Abroad, our Reserve sailors and marines are
deployed globally, and we will continue to maintain a Reserve that is
ready, relevant, and responsive to the nation's needs.
The Department's civilian workforce supports our uniformed force
and is critical to the success of our missions. Our civilian employees
have endured multi-year pay freezes, a hiring freeze, furloughs and
continued limits on performance awards that impacted morale. Results of
a Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey indicated that, while our civilians
appreciated the role they play in our mission, they felt recognition
and training were lacking. Where possible, through such efforts as
Operation Hiring Solutions, the Department has mitigated the impacts to
Fleet readiness and operations and to increase civilian employee job
satisfaction. Our efforts have produced tangible results, demonstrated
by increased civilian retention rates over the last two consecutive
years.
This patriotic workforce is the foundation of how the Department of
the Navy operates. In order to ensure we have the most capable people,
in the right positions, we run a number of leadership development
programs. Annually we select participants for senior leader, executive
leader, and developing leader programs to provide education and
training that will help our people tackle the issues we face now and in
the future.
platforms--growing our fleet despite shrinking budgets
To provide the presence the American people and our nation's
leaders expect and have come to rely on, our sailors and marines need
the right number and composition of ships, aircraft, weapons, vehicles,
and equipment to execute the missions mandated by our National Security
Strategy. That means we must have a properly sized Fleet. Quantity has
a quality all its own.
When I first took office, I committed to growing the Fleet to meet
our validated requirement and strengthen the acquisition process by
employing stricter management and increased competition. In the seven
fiscal years from 9/11/2001 to 2009, our Fleet declined from 316 to 278
ships, and during that period, the Navy contracted for only 41 ships,
not enough to keep our Fleet from declining nor keep our shipyards open
and healthy. In the seven fiscal years following 2009, we will have
contracted for 84 ships. We will have done so while increasing aircraft
purchases by 35 percent, despite decreasing defense budgets.
shipbuilding
Navy shipbuilding is an essential part of our country's larger
shipbuilding and repair industry, which provides more than 400,000 jobs
and contributes more than $37 billion to America's gross domestic
product. Shipbuilding enhances and strengthens economic security as
well as national security. The work we have done, and must continue to
do, will reinforce the importance of maintaining a partnership with the
industrial base, as well as keep our shipbuilding industry strong and
ready to support the national security needs of our Navy and our
country.
Across our shipbuilding portfolio, we have employed direct,
impactful actions including increased competition within and across
product lines, using block buys and multi-year procurements when
products are mature; ensuring designs are stable before entering into
production; pursuing cross-program common-equipment buys; and achieving
affordability through hard-but-fair bargaining. This would not have
been possible without Congressional approval on items like multi-year
procurements.
Stability and predictability are critical to the health and
sustainment of the industrial base that builds our Fleet. Changes in
ship procurement plans are significant because of the long lead time,
specialized skills, and extent of integration needed to build military
ships. The skills required to build ships are perishable, and, in the
past, we have lost talent in this critical industry when plans have
changed. Each ship is a significant fraction of not only the Navy's
shipbuilding budget but also industry's workload and regional
employment. Consequently, the timing of ship procurements is a critical
matter to the health of American shipbuilding industries, and has a
two-to-three times economic multiplier at the local, regional and
national levels.
The Navy will continue to consider and, when appropriate, use
innovative acquisition strategies that assure ship construction
workload and sustain the vendor base while imposing cost competition.
We will continue to invest in design for affordability, modularity and
open systems architectures while incentivizing optimal build plans and
shipyard facility improvements and supporting shipbuilding capability
preservation agreements. These initiatives support affordability,
minimize life-cycle costs, improve and ensure quality products,
facilitate effective and efficient processes, and promote competition--
which all support Department priorities.
Our efforts to maintain and affordably procure our Fleet's ships
and submarines have continued through this past year. The Department
has established a steady state Ford-class procurement plan designed to
deliver each new ship in close alignment with the Nimitz-class ship it
replaces. CVN 78 cost performance has remained stable since 2011 and
this lead ship will deliver under the Congressional cost cap. The
fiscal year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) reduced this
cost cap for follow-on ships in the CVN 78 class by $100 million.
Stability in requirements, design, schedule, and budget, is essential
to controlling and improving CVN 79 cost, and therefore is of highest
priority for the program. In transitioning from first-of-class to
follow-on ships, the Navy has imposed strict configuration and cost
controls to ensure CVN 79 is delivered below the cost cap. CVN 80
planning and construction will continue to use class lessons learned to
achieve cost and risk reduction. The CVN 80 strategy seeks to improve
on CVN 79 efforts to schedule as much work as possible in the earliest
phases of construction, where work is both predictable and more cost
efficient.
In our attack submarine program, we awarded the largest contract in
Navy history, $18 billion, to build 10 Virginia-class submarines.
Because Congress authorized a multi-year contract for these 10 boats,
giving our shipyards stability and allowing them to order materials in
economic quantities, we were able to save the taxpayer more than $2
billion and effectively procured 10 boats for the price of nine.
We are continuing procurement of two Virginia-class submarines per
year under the Block IV 10-ship contract which runs through fiscal year
2018. We will also continue to develop the Virginia Payload Module
(VPM), which is planned for introduction in fiscal year 2019, as part
of the next Virginia-class multiyear procurement (Block V).
The Arleigh Burke-class (DDG 51) program is one of the Navy's most
successful shipbuilding programs--62 of these ships are currently
operating in the Fleet. We are in the fourth year of a multi-year
procurement, and thanks to the work at shipyards in Mississippi and
Maine and our acquisition team, the DDG 51 competitive multiyear
contract is saving more than $2 billion. The two Arleigh Burke-class
destroyers requested in fiscal year 2017, which will complete the
current multiyear contracts, will provide significant upgrades to
integrated air and missile defense and additional ballistic missile
defense capability (Flight III) by incorporation of the Air and Missile
Defense Radar.
With our Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), the average ship construction
cost, under the current block buy contracts, has decreased by nearly 50
percent in comparison to LCS hulls contracted prior to 2009. We now
have six ships of this class delivered, 18 currently on contract, and
two additional ships to award this fiscal year. We are currently
upgrading the design, which will significantly increase LCS lethality
and survivability, to be introduced no later than fiscal year 2019, and
potentially as early as fiscal year 2018. Because of these ships'
enhanced counter-surface and counter-submarine capabilities,
contributing to their role in Battle Group operations, we are re-
designating these future ships as Frigates.
Our budget request also includes incremental funding for the next
big deck amphibious assault ship, LHA 8. We are in the midst of an
innovative solicitation which solicits bids for LHA 8, the replacement
Fleet oiler T-AO(X), and early design efforts for the replacement for
the LSD 41/49 class LX(R). These bids which uniquely support both
stability and competition within the amphibious and auxiliary sectors
of the industrial base, will be awarded this fiscal year
Ohio Replacement (OR) remains our top priority program. Prior
modernization programs, such as our first strategic deterrence
procurement, ``41 for Freedom,'' were accompanied by topline increases.
The Navy greatly appreciates Congressional support in overcoming the
challenges posed by funding the OR Program.
The fiscal realities facing the Navy make it imperative that we
modernize and extend the service lives of our in-service ships to meet
the Navy's Force Structure Assessment requirements. An important
element of mitigation is the extension and modernization of our Arleigh
Burke class destroyers and Ticonderoga class cruisers (CGs).
The fiscal year 2017 President's Budget includes funding for the
modernization of two destroyers to sustain combat effectiveness, ensure
mission relevancy and to achieve the full expected service lives of the
AEGIS Fleet. The destroyer modernization program includes Hull,
Mechanical, and Electrical (HM&E) upgrades as well as combat systems
improvements with upgraded AEGIS weapons systems. Advanced Capability
Build (ACB) 12 to include open architecture computing environment, BMD
capability, installation of the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM),
integration of the SM-6 missile, and improved air dominance with
processing upgrades and Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air
capability. This renovation reduces total ownership costs and expands
mission capability for current and future combat capabilities.
Cruiser modernization ensures long-term capability and capacity for
purpose-built Air Defense Commander (ADC) platforms. Of our 22 total
cruisers, 11 recently modernized CGs will perform the ADC function for
deploying Carrier Strike Groups while the Navy modernizes our other 11
ships. As these are completed, they will replace the first 11 on a one-
for-one basis as each older ship reaches the end of its service life
(35 years) starting in fiscal year 2020. Our modernization schedule
commenced in fiscal year 2015 on a 2-4-6 schedule in accordance with
Congressional direction: two cruisers per year for a long-term phase
modernization, for a period no longer than four years, and no greater
than six ships in modernization at any given time.
The Budget supports CG Modernization and proposes a plan that will
save $3 billion over the FYDP by inducting the remaining cruisers into
modernization following their current planned operational deployments.
This differs from the current plan in that we would put a total of four
CGs in phased modernization in fiscal year 2017. We understand that
this request does not align with previous Congressional direction, but
feel it is the best way to honor today's operational demands as we
prepare for future strategic requirements.
aviation
With the support of Congress, we continue to strengthen our Naval
Aviation force. We are in the process of re-capitalizing every major
aviation platform in the Navy and Marine Corps inventory. The MV-22B
has replaced the CH-46E/CH-53D, and we are in the process of replacing
all other Navy and Marine Corps aircraft. We also continue to focus on
unmanned aviation. We are investing in the MQ-4C Triton, MQ-8C Fire
Scout, RQ-21 Blackjack, and RQ-7B Shadow plus initiating efforts to
provide carrier-based unmanned aviation capability with the RAQ-25
Stingray.
Our investments focus on developing and integrating capabilities by
using a family of systems approach, when viable, to maintain
superiority against rapidly evolving threats. Using current and future
platforms, weapons, networks and technologies, we will ensure Naval
Aviation relevance and dominance in the future. For legacy weapons
systems, we are addressing aviation readiness by investing in
operations and support accounts to mitigate training and platform
readiness issues. Our procurement of new aircraft and synchronization
of readiness enablers will improve our ability to project power over
and from the sea.
The Strike Fighter inventory should be viewed in two separate and
distinct phases. The near term challenge is managing a Department of
Navy Tactical Aviation (TACAIR) force that has been reduced in capacity
through a combination of flying many more flight hours than planned,
pressurized sustainment and enabler accounts, legacy F/A-18A-D Hornet
depot throughput falling short of the required output due to
sequestration and other factors, and the impact of delays to completing
development of the Joint Strike Fighter program. As a result of
aggressive efforts instituted in 2014 across the Department to improve
depot throughput and return more aircraft back to service, fiscal year
2015 depot throughput improved by 44 percent as compared to fiscal year
2014, returning to pre-sequestration levels of throughput. TACAIR
aviation depots are expected to continue to improve productivity
through 2017, and fully recover the backlog of F/A-18A-D aircraft in
2019 at which time the focus will shift toward F/A-18E/F service life
extension. In the far term, the Strike Fighter inventory is
predominantly affected by the rate at which we can procure new TACAIR
aircraft. The fiscal year 2017 budget request increases both the F/A-
18E/F and F-35 strike fighter aircraft in order to mitigate near-term
and far-term risks to our strike fighter inventory in the most
affordable, effective manner possible.
Critical to power projection from the sea, the E-2D Advanced
Hawkeye, our new and upgraded airborne early-warning aircraft,
completed Fleet integration and deployed with USS Roosevelt (CVN 71)
Carrier Strike Group. We are continuing Full Rate Production under a
multi-year contract and Fleet transition is underway. We expect to
integrate the advanced capabilities with Forward Deployed Naval Forces
(FDNF) by 2017. We continue to recapitalize the P-3C Orion with P-8As,
and are on-schedule to complete the purchase within the FYDP to bring a
total of 109 P-8As to the Fleet. Our P-8s will continue to undergo
incremental improvements.
Finally, we expect to complete EA-18G Growler Fleet transition in
fiscal year 2016. As the DOD's premier tactical Airborne Electronic
Attack / Electronic Warfare aircraft, the Growler is crucial to power
projection ashore in a saturated electronic warfare environment. With
Congress' addition of seven EA-18Gs in fiscal year 2016, we will have
160 of these aircraft in 15 squadrons to support the Navy requirement.
With the retirement of the Marine Corps' last EA-6B Prowlers in 2019,
these highly capable aircraft take over the nation's airborne
electronic attack mission.
Our rotary wing and assault support communities are in the midst of
large-scale recapitalization. In the vertical lift community, multi-
year production contracts for the MV-22 continue. We have taken
advantage of joint service commonality in the V-22 to fill a crucial
enabler in the Carrier On-board Delivery mission. In the Marine Corps,
procurement of the AH-1Z continues to deliver combat proven-
capabilities. Finally, with its first flight last fall, the CH-53K King
Stallion is poised to bring significant improvements in our heavy lift
capabilities.
unmanned systems
Currently, our warfare communities--air, sea, undersea and ground--
are all doing superb work in unmanned systems which are critical to our
ability to be present. They increase the combat effectiveness of our
deployed force while reducing the risk to our sailors and marines,
allowing us to conduct missions that last longer, go farther, and take
us beyond the physical limits of pilots and crews. Launching and
recovering unmanned aircraft from the rolling decks of aircraft
carriers, launching unmanned rotary-wing patrols from our small surface
combatants, and deploying unmanned underwater vehicles globally are
vital elements both now and in the future for maritime presence and
naval warfare. We have enhanced our focus on unmanned systems and
prioritized efforts under purposeful leadership at the level of the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Unmanned Systems and the new
office of Unmanned Warfare Systems of the staff of the Chief of Naval
Operations, also known as N99.
We are moving ahead with a number of unmanned programs in the
effort to rapidly integrate new capability into the fleet. The MQ-8B
Fire Scout began regular deployments in 2014. When USS Fort Worth
deployed to Singapore recently, the ship took a mixed aviation
detachment of a manned MH-60R helicopter and MQ-8B Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle's (UAV). This kind of hybrid employment, pairing our manned and
unmanned systems to take advantage of the strengths of each, will be a
hallmark of our future approach to unmanned systems. The first
operational variant of the larger and more capable next generation Fire
Scout, the MQ-8C, recently completed developmental testing and a
successful operational assessment. This aircraft is scheduled to be
deployable by the end of 2017 and will bring double the endurance and
double the payload of the older versions.
The MQ-4C Triton is a key component of the Navy Maritime Patrol
Reconnaissance Force. Its persistent sensor dwell capability, combined
with networked sensors, will enable it to effectively meet ISR
requirements in support of the Navy Maritime Strategy. The MQ-4C Triton
will establish five globally-distributed, persistent maritime ISR
orbits beginning in fiscal year 2018 as part of the Navy's Maritime ISR
transition plan. Currently, MQ-4C Triton test vehicles have completed
53 total flights and will continue sensor flight testing this spring.
In 2015, the Office of the Secretary of Defense conducted a
comprehensive Strategic Portfolio Review (SPR) of DOD ISR programs. The
results of the SPR, and a subsequent ISR portfolio review, as reflected
in our PB17 budget is the restructure of the Unmanned Carrier-Launched
Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) program. The RAQ-25 Stingray
will deliver the Navy's first carrier-based unmanned aircraft, a high-
endurance platform that will replace today's F/A-18E/F aircraft in its
role as the aerial tanker for the Navy's Carrier Air Wing (CVW), thus
preserving the strike fighter's flight hours for its primary missions.
Stingray will also have the range and payload capacity associated with
high-endurance unmanned aircraft to provide critically-needed, around
the clock, sea-based ISR support to the Carrier Strike Group and the
Joint Forces Commander. The Navy envisions that the open standards to
be employed in the Stingray design will enable future capabilities to
be introduced to the aircraft after it has been fully integrated into
the CVW.
Autonomous Undersea Vehicles (AUV) are a key component of the
Navy's effort to expand undersea superiority AUVs are conducting sea
sensing and mine countermeasure tasks today with human-in-the-loop
supervision. While nominal force structure requirements for fiscal year
2025 have not been determined, the Navy is committed to growing both
the size and composition of the AUV force. In the near-term, AUVs
present an opportunity to increase undersea superiority and offset the
efforts of our adversaries.
The Large Displacement Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (LDUUV) is an
unmanned undersea vehicle to offload ``dull, dirty, dangerous''
missions from manned platforms beginning in 2022. LDUUV will be
launched from a variety of platforms, including both surface ships and
submarines. The craft's missions will include ISR, acoustic
surveillance, ASW, mine counter-measures, and offensive operations.
The Surface Mine Countermeasure Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (SMCM
UUV) commonly referred to as Knifefish employs low-frequency broadband
synthetic aperture sonar. Knifefish is planned for incorporation into
increment four of the LCS mine countermeasures mission package.
weapons
The fiscal year 2017 budget invests in a balanced portfolio of ship
self-defense and strike warfare weapons programs. The Navy has made
significant strides in extending the Fleet's layered defense battle-
space while also improving the capabilities of the individual ship
defense layers in order to pace the increasing anti-ship missile
threat.
Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) provides theater and high value target
area defense for the Fleet, and with Integrated Fire Control, has more
than doubled its range in the counter-air mission. As the Secretary of
Defense announced a few weeks ago, we are modifying the missile to
provide vital anti-surface capability. The Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile
(ESSM) program awarded the Block 2 Engineering Manufacturing and
Development contract in 2015, which will borrow from the SM-6 active
guidance section architecture to improve ship self-defense performance
against stressing threats and environments. Rolling Airframe Missile
(RAM) Block 2 achieved IOC in May 2015, providing improved terminal
ship defense through higher maneuverability and improved threat
detection.
For strike warfare, the Department's Cruise Missile Strategy has
been fully implemented with the PB17 budget submission. This strategy
sustains Tomahawk Blocks III and IV through their service lives;
integrates modernization and obsolescence upgrades to the Block IV
Tomahawk during a mid-life recertification program which adds 15-years
of additional missile service life; fields the Long Range Anti-Ship
Missile (LRASM) as the Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare (OASuW) Increment
1 solution to meet near to mid-term threats; and develops follow-on
Next Generation Strike Capability (NGSC) weapons to address future
threats and to replace or update legacy weapons. This plan brings next
generation technologies into the Navy's standoff conventional strike
capabilities. NGSC will address both the OASuW Increment 2 capabilities
to counter long-term anti-surface warfare threats, and the Next
Generation Land Attack Weapon (NGLAW) to initially complement, and then
replace, current land attack cruise missile weapon systems.
ground forces
The focus of our Marine Corps ground modernization efforts
continues to be our ground combat and tactical vehicle (GCTV)
portfolio, along with the Command and Control (C2) systems needed to
optimize this effectiveness of the entire MAGTF once ashore.
The key priority within the GCTV portfolio is the replacement of
the legacy Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) with modern armored
personnel carriers through a combination of complementary systems. The
Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) program is the Marine Corps' highest
ground modernization priority and will use an evolutionary, incremental
approach to replace the aging AAVs with a vehicle that is capable of
moving Marines ashore, initially with surface connectors and ultimately
as a self-deploying vehicle. ACV consists of two increments, ACV 1.1
and ACV 1.2. Increment 1.1 will field a personnel carrier with
technologies that are currently mature. Increment 1.2 will improve upon
the threshold mobility characteristics of ACV 1.1 and deliver C2 and
recovery and maintenance mission role variants.
In parallel with these modernization efforts, a science and
technology portfolio is being developed to explore a range of high
water speed technology approaches to provide for an affordable, phased
modernization of legacy capability to enable extended range littoral
maneuver. These efforts will develop the knowledge necessary to reach
an informed decision point in the mid-2020s on the feasibility,
affordability, and options for developing a high water speed capability
for maneuver from ship-to-shore.
We are also investing in the replacement of a portion of the high
mobility, multi-purpose, wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) fleet which are
typically exposed to enemy fires when in combat. In partnership with
the Army, the Marine Corps has sequenced the Joint Light Tactical
Vehicle (JLTV) program to ensure affordability of the entire GCTV
portfolio while replacing about one third (5,500 vehicles) of the
legacy HMMWV fleet with modern tactical trucks prior to the fielding of
ACV 1.1.
Critical to the success ashore of the MAGTF is our ability to
coordinate and synchronize our distributed C2 sensors and systems. Our
modernization priorities in this area are the Ground/Air task Oriented
radar (G/ATOR) and the Common Aviation Command and Control System
(CAC2S) Increment I. These systems will provide modern, interoperable
technologies to support real-time surveillance, detection and targeting
and the common C2 suite to enable the effective employment of that and
other sensors and C2 suites across the MAGTF.
innovation
As we continue to use better procurement strategies for ships,
aircraft, and other weapons systems, we are also using better ideas to
enhance the utility of current assets and to accelerate future
capabilities to the Fleet. The Navy and Marine Corps have always been
at the cutting edge of technology. To tap into the ingenuity inherent
in our force, I created Task Force Innovation: a group from across the
department comprised of thinkers, experts, and warfighters with diverse
backgrounds and from every level. The Task Force is anchored in the
Department as the Naval Innovation Advisory Council, with a location on
each coast. These councils rely on feedback from databases such as
``the Hatch,'' a crowdsourcing platform that cultivates solutions from
those who know best, our deckplate sailors and marines in the field.
To facilitate ways for new technologies to reach the Fleet
unhindered by the overly-bureaucratic acquisitions process, we are
implementing Rapid Prototyping strategies. This initiative provides a
single, streamlined approach to prototyping emerging technologies and
engineering innovations to rapidly response to Fleet needs and
priorities.
We are also continuing the research and development of promising
technologies such as 3D printing, directed energy weapons, robotics,
adaptive force packaging at sea and unmanned vehicles to counter
projected threats and using the entire force to prove these concepts.
We are continuing the development and testing of the Electromagnetic
Railgun and Hyper Velocity Projectile (HVP) as part of a broader Gun/
Projectile Based Defense strategy. We plan to demonstrate this
capability this fiscal year in preparation for follow-on at sea
testing. In 2014, we deployed the first operational Laser Weapons
System (LaWS) onboard PONCE in the Arabian Gulf. Lessons-learned from
the 30 kilowatt LaWS installation are directly feeding the Navy's
investment in Solid State Laser weapons. The Navy is developing a 100-
to-150 kilowatt laser prototype for at-sea testing by 2018.
To secure our superiority in cyberspace, we are building a new
cyber warfare center of excellence at the Naval Academy, and we have
more than doubled our cyber workforce since 2009. In addition to
growing the cyber domain, we are also re-designating appropriate
positions to count as part of the cyber workforce. The Department is
diligently working on ensuring cyber workforce billets are properly
coded in our manpower databases for tracking and community management
efforts.
There has been a concerted effort to protect cyber positions from
drawdowns and maximize direct and expedited civilian hiring authorities
to improve cyber readiness and response. Additionally, the DON is
supporting the DOD Cyber Strategy in the stand-up of the Cyber Mission
Force teams; 40 teams by Navy, 3 teams by Marine Corps and 1,044 cyber
security positions within Fleet Cyber and Marine Forces Cyber commands.
These positions require unique cyber security skills and qualifications
to perform a multitude of cyber security functions that will enhance
the Department of the Navy cyber security and defense capability.
power--alternative energy fueling the fight
Energy is a necessary commodity for modern life, and it plays a
critical geopolitical role around the world. Access to fuel is often
used as a weapon, as we have seen with Russian action against Ukraine,
and threats against the rest of Europe. Although the price of oil has
recently declined, the overall trend strongly suggests that over time,
the prices could return to the higher levels.
Aside from the obvious economic instability that comes with the
volatile price of oil, being overly reliant on outside energy sources
poses a severe security risk, and we cannot afford to limit our sailors
and marines with that vulnerability and lack of stability. When I
became Secretary, our use of power was a vulnerability; we were losing
too many Marines guarding fuel convoys in Afghanistan and volatile oil
prices were stressing many areas, particularly training.
In 2009, the Department of the Navy set out to change the way we
procure, as well as use, energy, with the goal of having at least half
of naval energy--both afloat and ashore--come from non-fossil fueled
sources by 2020. By using alternative energy sources, we improve our
warfighting capabilities; reduce our reliance on foreign sources of
fossil fuels; and reduce the ability of potential adversaries the
opportunity to use energy as a weapon against us and our partners.
Pioneering new advancements in how we power our platforms and
systems is nothing new for the Navy and Marine Corps. For two centuries
we have been a driver of innovation, switching from sail to steam,
steam to coal, coal to oil, and harnessed the power of nuclear
propulsion. Operationally, energy matters now more than ever; our
weapons platforms today use far more energy than their predecessors.
The new technology we develop and acquire will ensure we maintain a
strategic advantage for decades to come. Fueling the ships, aircraft,
and vehicles of our Navy and Marine Corps is a vital operational
concern and enables the global presence necessary to keep the nation
secure.
After successfully testing the Great Green Fleet at the Rim of the
Pacific Exercise in 2012, just last month USS John C. Stennis Strike
Group departed on a routine operational deployment, steaming on an
blend of conventional and alternative fuels, as well as conducting
underway replenishments at sea with these fuels. The three stipulations
we have for our alternative fuels are they must be drop-in, they cannot
take away from food production, and they must be cost competitive.
The alternative fuels powering the Great Green Fleet 2016 were
procured from a company that makes its fuel from waste beef fats. These
alternative fuels cost the Department of Defense $2.05 per gallon. It
is critical we continue to use cost-competitive blended alternative
fuels in our ships and aircraft to ensure operational flexibility. For
example, of the three crude oil refineries in Singapore one is 50
percent owned by China, while an alternative fuel plant is owned by a
Finnish company.
This past year, we surpassed the goal the President set in his 2012
State of the Union Address, when he directed the Department of the Navy
to have a gigawatt (one-half of our total ashore energy needs in the
U.S.) of renewable energy by 2020. The Renewable Energy Program Office
(REPO) coordinates and manages the goal of producing or procuring cost-
effective renewable energy for our bases, and the power we are buying
through our REPO projects will be cheaper than our current rates over
the life of the contract. Today, we have in procurement more than 1.1
gigawatts of renewable energy for our shore installations--five years
ahead of schedule.
In August, the Department of the Navy awarded the largest renewable
contract in federal government history with the Western Area Power
Administration. This solar project will meet a third of the energy
needs for 14 Navy and Marine Corps installations, bringing them 210 MW
of renewable power for 25 years, and saving the Navy $90 million.
In the Marine Corps, the Expeditionary Energy Office (E2O)
continues to focus on increasing their operational reach and empowering
Marines in the field. E2O is doing amazing work. The Marine Corps hosts
two expos--one on each coast--every year where they ask industry
leaders to bring their latest technology, and, if the Marines see an
operational use for it, they can buy it. They have invested in items
such as small, flexible and portable solar panels that can save a
company of Marines in the field 700 pounds in batteries. The Marines
are also working on kinetic systems for backpacks and knee braces that
harvest energy from a Marine's own movement. These technologies are
making our Marines lighter, faster and more self-sustainable on the
battlefield.
Across the Fleet and Marine Corps, we have taken numerous energy
conservation measures that are aimed at energy efficiency, and have had
dramatic impact on our energy use.
For example, two of our newest amphibious ships, USS Makin Island
and USS America use a hybrid propulsion system that has an electric
power plant for slower speeds and traditional engines for speeds over
12 knots. When Makin Island returned from her maiden deployment, she
came back with almost half her fuel budget, despite the fact she stayed
at sea an additional 44 days.
We had a Chief suggest we change all the lightbulbs on our ships to
LEDs. Now every time a ship comes in for overhaul, we are changing out
the bulbs. This simple change is saving us more than 20 thousand
gallons of fuel per year per destroyer. They also last far longer, give
off better light, and reduce our maintenance costs.
Our sailors are using a Shipboard Energy Dashboard that provides
them with real-time situational awareness of the energy demand on the
various systems that are running, allowing sailors to see the impact
the way they operate a ship can have on fuel consumption. Sailors
across the Fleet are taking it upon themselves to make their own
platforms as efficient as possible, and the results are tangible.
The Department of the Navy's efforts in energy efficiency have
strongly contributed to a decline in the Navy's demand for oil nearly
15 percent from fiscal 2008 to fiscal 2014, and the Marines slashed
their oil consumption 60 percent over that same period, according to a
recent report by the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for
Acquisitions, Technology and Logistics. While drawdowns in Iraq and
Afghanistan have certainly contributed to these numbers, improvements
in our use of energy have had an impact on our overall consumption.
Diversifying our energy supply for our ships, our aircraft, and our
bases helps guarantee our presence and ability to respond to any crisis
because we can remain on station longer or extend our range, reducing
the delays and vulnerabilities associated with refueling.
We are a better Navy and Marine Corps for innovation, and this is
our legacy. Employment of new energy sources has always been met with
resistance, but in every case, adoption of new technologies enhanced
the strategic position of our nation through improvements in the
tactical and operational capabilities of our force. Our focus on power
and energy is helping to ensure the United States Navy and Marine Corps
remain the most powerful expeditionary fighting force in the world and
enhance their ability to protect and advance American interests around
the globe.
partnerships--building partnerships to advance our shared values
In this maritime century, cooperation with our international allies
and partners is critical to defending the global system, as it broadens
responsibility for security and stability, while diffusing tensions,
reducing misunderstandings, and limiting conflict. It is through a
cooperative effort that we will assure our navies can provide the
necessary presence to maintain freedom of navigation and maritime
security around the world.
I have traveled almost 1.2 million miles and visited 144 countries
and territories and all 50 states to meet with sailors and marines and
to build partnerships both at home and abroad. International meetings
establish the trust that helps us deter conflict and respond in a
coordinated and effective manner to manmade or natural crises. We
strengthen these partnerships in times of calm because, in times of
crisis, you can surge people, you can surge equipment, but you cannot
surge trust.
We continue to focus our efforts on the rebalance of assets to the
Pacific as an important part of our partnership efforts. Having the
right platforms in the right places is a vital piece of ensuring our
friends and allies understand our commitment to this complex and
geopolitically critical region. We're moving more ships to the central
and western Pacific to ensure our most advanced platforms and
capabilities are in the region, including forward basing an additional
attack submarine in Guam and forward stationing four Littoral Combat
Ships in Singapore. Also, we're providing two additional multi-mission
Ballistic Missile Defense destroyers to Forward Deployed Naval Forces
(FDNF) in Japan and the P-8A maritime patrol aircraft are making their
first rotational deployments in the region. Additionally, USS Ronald
Reagan replaced USS George Washington as our carrier homeported in
Japan.
We are hubbing Expeditionary Transfer Docks (T-ESD) 1 and 2 in the
vicinity of Korea/Northeast Asia, and hubbing Expeditionary Fast
Transports (T-EPF) to Japan and Singapore. In the longer term, by 2018
we will deploy an additional Amphibious Ready Group to the Pacific
region and we will deploy a growing number of Expeditionary Fast
Transports and an additional Expeditionary Sea Base there.
The U.S. Seventh Fleet along with allies and partner nations
combined for over 110 exercises throughout 2015 to train, build partner
capability and relationships, and exchange information. The largest
exercise, Talisman Sabre in the Asia-Pacific region, in July 2015,
featured 21 ships, including U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS George
Washington and more than 200 aircraft and three submarines. USS Fort
Worth participated in Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT)
exercises with partner navies from Cambodia, Philippines, Malaysia,
Indonesia, Brunei, and Bangladesh to conduct maritime security
cooperation exercises.
In addition to participating in many of the exercises as part of
the Navy-Marine Corps team, the Marine Corps is also building its
capacity to work with our Asia-Pacific partners. Marines participated
in 46 exercises in the region in 2015. Examples include Cobra Gold, a
crisis-response exercise with partners from Thailand, Singapore, Japan,
Republic of Korea, Indonesia, and Malaysia, and exercise Talisman
Saber, a United States-Australia exercise focusing on high-end combat
operations and peacekeeping transitions. Additionally, Marine
Rotational Force Darwin sustains more than 1,000 Marines on a revolving
basis to conduct exercises, security cooperation and training with the
Australian Defense Force and other countries in the region. This will
increase over the next few years to a full Marine Air Ground Task
Force.
As we rebalance our expeditionary forces to the Pacific, we will
remain focused on maintaining maritime superiority across all domains
and geographies, ensuring we don't neglect obligations in places like
Europe.
As a continuation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's 65-
year mission to keep all nations free without claiming territory or
tribute, we moved the fourth ballistic missile defense capable DDG, USS
Carney, to Rota, Spain, to join USS Donald Cook, USS Ross and USS
Porter to enhance our regional ballistic missile defense capability,
provide maritime security, conduct bi-lateral and multilateral training
exercises, and participate in NATO operations. We've also established
an AEGIS ashore site in Romania to provide additional shore-based
ballistic missile defense capability in Europe, with a second
installation in Poland scheduled to come online in the 2018 timeframe.
The Navy and Marine Corps continue to demonstrate support for our
allies and friends and American interests in the European region.
Alongside the Marine Corps' Black Sea Rotational Force's operations in
Eastern Europe, a series of Navy ships have deployed into the Black Sea
to ensure freedom of navigation and work with our partners there.
This past fall USNS Spearhead completed the Southern Partnership
Station 2015 in South America. As Spearhead sailed through the
Americas, the sailors and marines aboard participated in subject matter
expert exchanges and building partner capacity throughout the region.
In October, USS George Washington and USS Chafee participated in the
annual multinational exercise UNITAS, which was hosted by the Chilean
Navy and included personnel from Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, New Zealand and Panama to conduct intense training
focused on coalition building, multinational security cooperation and
promoting tactical interoperability with the participating partner
nations. USS George Washington also deployed as part of Southern Seas
2015, which seeks to enhance interoperability, increase regional
stability, and build and maintain relationships with countries
throughout the region while circumnavigating South America. A unique
symbol of our desire to build a strong relationship is evident in
deployments by our world class hospital ship USNS Comfort. As part of
Continuing Promise 2015, medical and support staff from across the U.S.
military and the region worked alongside nearly 400 volunteers to treat
122,268 patients and conduct 1,255 surgeries. In an historic event
during the USNS Comfort port call in Haiti, United States and Cuban
medics worked side-by-side to treat Haiti's poor and exchange best
medical practices. Continuing Promise is without doubt one of the U.S.
military's most impactful missions, but future USNS Comfort deployments
will be affected by today's budget realities. Our security is
inextricably linked with that of our neighbors, and we continue to work
with innovative and small-footprint approaches to enhance our
interoperability with partners in the Americas.
For some people around the world, sailors and marines who sail
aboard our ships are the only Americans they will ever meet, and it is
they who represent our country around the world.
In December, I hosted the leaders of our partner navies from West
Africa and from Europe and the Americas for the Gulf of Guinea Maritime
Security Dialogue. Naval leaders from 16 nations bordering the Gulf of
Guinea as well as 37 heads of navy, delegates and representatives from
Europe and the Americas came to discuss collaborative solutions to
piracy, extremism, trafficking and insecurity in the region. We
discussed a unified code of conduct for maritime law enforcement and
more direct cooperation in the region. As the economies in the Gulf of
Guinea continue to grow, so does the increasing relevance of guarding
against maritime terrorism, illicit trafficking of drugs, people and
weapons, extremism moving from east to west, and other transnational
crime. The United States Navy and Marine Corps will continue to work
with our partners in West Africa and help them improve their
capabilities and promote collaboration.
Working alongside other navies enhances interoperability, provides
key training opportunities, and develops the operational capabilities
of the countries and navies with which we have shared values. As we
look toward future operations, multinational cooperation will continue
to be vital to suppressing global threats, and building these strong
partnerships now seeks to enhance and ensure our operational
superiority into the future.
Outside of our international partnerships, the Department of the
Navy's collaboration with industry, both in technology development and
ship and aircraft building and repair, bolsters economic security as
well as national security interests at home and abroad.
Finally, our Navy and Marine Corps require the support of the
American people to maintain presence. I continue to honor our most
important partnership--the one with the American people--by naming
ships after people, cities, and states, as a reflection of America's
values and naval heritage, and to foster that powerful bond between the
people of this country and the men and women of our Navy and Marine
Corps.
fiscal year 2017 budget summary
The Department of the Navy's proposed budget for fiscal year 2017
is designed to achieve the President's Defense Strategic Guidance
(DSG): protect the Homeland, build security globally, and project power
and win decisively when called upon. In doing so we have looked across
the FYDP to maintain our ability to conduct the primary missions listed
in the DSG to 2021 and beyond. Overall the fiscal year 2017 President's
Budget balances current readiness needed to execute assigned missions
while sustaining a highly capable Fleet, all within a continually
constrained and unpredictable fiscal climate.
Our approach to this budget has focused on six objectives. First,
maintain a credible and modern sea-based strategic deterrent. Second,
sustain our forward global presence to ensure our ability to impact
world events. Third, preserve the capability to defeat a regional
adversary in a larger-scale, multi-phased campaign, while denying the
objectives of--or imposing unacceptable costs on--a second aggressor in
another region. Fourth, ensure that the force is ready for these
operations through critical afloat and shore readiness and personnel
issues. Fifth, continue and affordably enhance our asymmetric
capabilities. Finally, sustain our industrial base to ensure our future
capabilities, particularly in shipbuilding.
Even as we deal with today's fiscal uncertainty, we cannot let slip
away the progress we've made in shipbuilding. It takes a long time,
measured in years, to produce a deployable ship. It is the least
reversible thing we might do to deal with budget constraints. If we
miss a year, if we cancel a ship, it is almost impossible to recover
those ships because of the time involved and the inability of the
industrial base to sustain a skilled set of people without the work to
support them. To do the job America and our leaders expect and demand
of us, we have to have those gray hulls on the horizon.
Because of the long lead time needed for shipbuilding, it is not
the responsibility of just one administration. This Administration and
Congress, in previous budgets, have guaranteed we will reach a Fleet of
300 ships by fiscal year 2019 and 308 by fiscal year 2021. This FYDP
establishes a proposed shipbuilding trajectory for our Battle Force and
its underpinning industrial base in the years following fiscal year
2021, while maintaining decision space for the next Administration and
Congress. As such, the fiscal year 2017 President's Budget requests
funding for seven ships: two Virginia class attack submarines, two DDG
51 Arleigh Burke class destroyers, two Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), and
the LHA 8 Amphibious Assault Ship. The budget request also includes
funding for refueling and complex overhauls (RCOH) for aircraft
carriers USS George Washington and USS John C. Stennis.
The plan for LCS/FF requests funding for two ships in fiscal year
2017, preserving the viability of the industrial base in the near term
and creating future decision space for Frigate procurement should
operational requirements or national security risk dictate the need.
The fiscal year 2017 President's Budget includes funding for the
modernization of destroyers ($3.2 billion total invested in fiscal year
2017-fiscal year 2021) to sustain combat effectiveness, to ensure
mission relevancy, and to achieve the full expected service lives of
the AEGIS Fleet. The budget also requests $521 million across the FYDP,
in addition to current Ships Modernization, Operations and Sustainment
Fund (SMOSF) funding, to support cruiser modernization. The Navy will
continue to work with Congress to develop and evaluate funding options
to continue this vital modernization.
Above the sea, our naval aviation enterprise grows. Specifically,
we continue our recapitalization efforts of all major platforms and
increase procurement of F/A-18E/F and F-35 aircraft, and make key
investments in current and future unmanned aviation systems and strike
warfare weapons capabilities.
While accelerating new platforms and capabilities to the Fleet is a
priority, it is equally important to reduce the maintenance backlog
created by sequestration. The fiscal year 2017 budget provides
additional investments in shipyard and aviation depots in both civilian
personnel and infrastructure to achieve that end. As we execute our
readiness strategy, our focus remains on properly maintaining ships and
aircraft to reach their expected service lives and supporting a
sustainable operational tempo.
The cyber domain and electromagnetic spectrum dominance remain
Department priorities. The budget includes an increase of $370 million
over the FYDP ($107 million in fiscal year 2017) across a spectrum of
cyber programs, leading to significant improvements in the Department's
cyber posture. Specific elements include funding for engineering of
boundary defense for ship and aviation platforms and for afloat cyber
situational awareness.
While hardware upgrades and additions are crucial, our investment
in people must be equally prioritized. The fiscal year 2017 budget
includes a 1.6 percent pay raise for sailors and marines and adds
billets for base security. Our personnel initiatives receive funding
aimed to recruit, train, and retain America's best.
Our priorities combine to achieve one objective--naval presence.
That presence is weighted to meet the national security strategy. The
fiscal year 2017 budget sustains a forward deployed presence and
continues the rebalance to the Pacific. The number of ships operating
in the Asia-Pacific will increase from 52 today to 65 by 2020.
Crafting the Department of the Navy's budget did not come without
hard choices. To achieve a balance between current and future
capabilities, we were compelled to make several risk-informed
decisions. We have proposed deactivating the 10th Carrier Air Wing.
This primarily administrative move improves the alignment of carrier
air wing and aircraft carrier deployment schedules and alleviates
excessive time between deployments for CVWs attached to CVNs in lengthy
maintenance phases, without losing any aircraft.
Finally, throughout my tenure, as part of my Department of the Navy
Transformation Plan, I have stressed the importance of accountability.
We are moving very quickly to an audit ready environment. Congressional
support has been critical in providing the resources we need to bring
our systems into compliance.
conclusion
As the longest-serving Secretary since World War I, I have truly
been able to get to know the men and women of this Department, and I
have led institutional change--from inception to reality.
In order to provide our nation with presence, to deter our
adversaries and assure our allies, and provide our nation's leaders
with options in times of crisis, we have enhanced our capabilities
across every area of this department. By focusing on our people,
platforms, power and partnerships, we assure we remain the greatest
expeditionary fighting force the world has ever known.
Today there is no operational billet in the Navy or Marine Corps
that is closed to anyone based on their gender. Men and women wear
uniforms common in appearance so they are uniformly United States
sailors and United States marines. Career paths are flexible and
provide unprecedented opportunities for professional growth. We promote
based more on merit and not just tenure. We are encouraging retention
in the Department by creating an environment that doesn't force our
sailors and marines to choose between serving their country and serving
their families.
We are seeking innovation from within the talent inherent in our
sailors and marines. We have established an innovation network, with
crowdsourcing platforms established to allow new ideas to get from the
deckplates to our leaders.
We are growing the fleet. By the end of this fiscal year, we will
have contracted for 84 ships, which will give America a 300-ship Navy
by 2019 and a 308-ship Navy by 2021. We stood up a new Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Navy and OPNAV staff for Unmanned Systems development,
making us leaders in this emerging capability.
The Navy has fundamentally changed the way we procure, use and
think about energy. In the past seven years, the Navy and Marine Corps
have significantly lowered fuel consumption. We have sailed the Great
Green Fleet on alternative fuel blends and met our goal of having 1
gigawatt of renewable energy powering our shore-based installations
five years early.
We are rebalancing our Fleet to meet the goal of having 60 percent
of our assets in the Pacific region by the end of the decade, and we
continue to contribute to security cooperation and international
exercises with our friends and allies around the world.
Since the inception of our nation, America's Navy and Marine Corps
have paved the way forward for this country.
As President George Washington once said, ``It follows then as
certain as that night succeeds the day, that without a decisive naval
force we can do nothing definitive, and with it, everything honorable
and glorious.''
Chairman McCain. General Neller?
STATEMENT OF GENERAL ROBERT B. NELLER, USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE
MARINE CORPS
General Neller. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear today to talk about the posture of the
United States Marine Corps and your marines.
Our marines remain forward-deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan
embarked with their shipmates aboard Navy ships serving in
every nation and every climb and place. Our goal and respective
maritime character and expeditionary capability have been ably
demonstrated during the past year.
However, as we continue in conflict around the world, there
really has not been what we would call an inter-war period to
reset and reconstitute our force. Today's marines are deploying
at a rate comparable to our commitment during Operation Iraqi
Freedom and Enduring Freedom.
As we focus our attention across the globe in a security
environment where the only certainty is uncertainty, we must
make decisions about strategy and structure that will determine
our Nation's and our Marine Corps' capability in the future.
History has not been kind to militaries that fail to evolve
and change, and we see in the 21st century the potential for
dramatic change. The character of the 21st century is rapid
evolution, and it is imperative we keep pace with that change.
The efforts of the 114th Congress provided sufficient
resources to support the Marine Corps' near-term readiness, and
we thank Congress and this committee for that stability.
Nevertheless, as overall financial resources have been
diminished, the Marine Corps has protected the near-term
operational readiness of its deployed and next-to-deploy units
in order to meet operational commitments. This means that our
units today deploying are ready, but we do not have the depth
on our bench for major contingencies. The Marine Corps is no
longer in a position to simultaneously generate current
readiness, reset our equipment, sustain our facilities, and
modernize to ensure future readiness.
Maintaining the quality of the men and women in today's
Corps is our friendly center of gravity, that which we must
protect. This is the foundation from which we make marines win
our Nation's battles and return quality citizens to American
society.
As the Marine Corps draws down to 182,000 marines at the
end of this fiscal year, we continue to assess the capabilities
and needs of our future force, whether it be the use of the F-
35 fifth generation fighter, cyber warfare, information ops,
special operations, embassy security guards, or our security
cooperation group.
Modernization is our future readiness and the
recapitalization of our force is essential to this future
readiness. Your continued investment in facilities sustainment,
equipment reset, modernization, ground combat vehicles,
aviation, command and control, and digitally interoperable
protected networks is critical.
The Congress' intent for your Marine Corps to serve as the
Nation's force in readiness guides who we are and what we do,
and being ready is central to our identity as marines. With the
continued support of Congress, the Marine Corps will remain
ready with ready forces today and modernize to generate
readiness in the future.
Again, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Neller follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Robert B. Neller
the commandant's posture of the united states marine corps president's
budget 2017
prologue
The United States Marine Corps is the Nation's expeditionary force
in readiness. The intent of the 82nd Congress defined and shaped our
culture, organization, training, equipment, and priorities. Marines
appreciate the leadership of the 114th Congress in reaffirming that
role, especially as the strategic landscape and pace of the 21st
Century demands a ready Marine Corps to buy time, decision space, and
options for our Nation's leaders. Congress and the American people
expect Marines to answer the call, to fight, and to win.
Our global orientation, maritime character, and expeditionary
capability have all been ably demonstrated during the past year. The
capabilities of our total force are the result of the planning and
execution of committed marines and sailors operating under the
leadership of my predecessors. These capabilities and the posture of
our force would not be possible without the support and actions of the
Congress. As our attention is spread across the globe in a security
environment where the only certainty is uncertainty, we must make
decisions about our strategy and structure that will determine our
Nation's military capability in the future. Today's force is capable
and our forward deployed forces are ready to fight, but we are fiscally
stretched to maintain readiness across the depth of the force, and to
modernize, in order to achieve future readiness.
situation
The current global security environment is characterized by
violence, conflict and instability. Multidimensional security threats
challenge all aspects of our national power and the international
system. The expansion of information, robotics, and weapons
technologies are causing threats to emerge with increased speed and
lethality.
Over the last 15 years, the United States fought wars in the Middle
East, and your Marines continue to respond to crises around the globe.
There has not been an ``inter-war period'' to reset and reconstitute
our force. Your marines and sailors have remained operationally
committed at the same tempo as the height of our operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. As we have remained engaged in the current fight, our
enemies and potential adversaries have not stood idle. They have
developed new capabilities which now equal or in some cases exceed our
own.
This unstable and increasingly dangerous world situation is further
complicated by a constrained resource environment from which we must
continue current operations, reset our equipment, maintain our
warfighting readiness, and at the same time, modernize the force.
Therefore, it has become necessary that we continually balance our
available resources between current commitments and future readiness
requirements. This requires pragmatic institutional choices and a
clear-eyed vision of where we need to be in 10-20 years.
what marines are doing today . . .
Today, Marines remain forward deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, and
ready to respond to crisis around the world. Marines and sailors are
presently managing instability, building partner capacity,
strengthening allies, projecting influence, and preparing for major
theater combat operations. In 2015, Marines executed approximately 100
operations, 20 amphibious operations, 140 theater security cooperation
events, and 160 major exercises.
Our Nation has Marines on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan today,
and we anticipate our commitment could grow in the future. Marines
continue to advise, train and enable the Iraqi Security Forces and
other designated Iraqi forces with peer-to-peer advising and infantry
training. In Afghanistan, Marines continue to serve as advisors with
the Republic of Georgia's Liaison Teams (GLTs) in support of Operation
Resolute Support. From forward-deployed locations afloat and ashore,
Marine tactical aviation squadrons continue to support operations in
Syria and Iraq. In 2015, aviation combat assets executed over 1,275
tactical sorties and 325 kinetic strikes that have killed over 600
enemy combatants and destroyed over 100 weapons systems and 100
technical vehicles.
Our Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG/MEU)
Teams continue to show their capability a flexible and agile maritime
force. In 2015, the Marine Corps deployed over 12,000 Marines with our
shipmates on Navy warships. This past year, five separate MEUs
supported every combatant commander, participating in exercises and
executing major operations. The 31st MEU, our Forward Deployed Naval
Force in the Pacific, performed disaster relief operations on Saipan
after Typhoon Soudelor passed through the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands (CNMI). Marines were ashore to support the relief
effort within 12 hours of notification and delivered a total of 11,000
gallons of fresh water and 48,000 meals.
As part of the New Normal your Corps deployed two Special Purpose
Marine Air Ground Task Forces--Crisis Response (SPMAGTF-CR) to US
Central Command and US Africa Command. These forces are tailored to
respond to crises and conduct security cooperation activities with
partner nations, but they do not provide the same flexibility and
responsiveness of an ARG/MEU. Our SPMAGTF assigned to CENTCOM today
provides dedicated Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP)
support to Operation Inherent Resolve, in Iraq and Syria, and
simultaneously provides a flexible force for crisis and contingency
response. In AFRICOM, our SPMAGTF supported Embassies through
reinforcement, evacuation, and operations to reopen a previously closed
Embassy in Central African Republic. Your Marines also supported
operations during the Ebola crisis and assisted with elections.
Finally, a SPMAGTF deployed to the US Southern Command in 2015.
SPMAGTF-SC's primary focus was the reconstruction of a runway in
Mocoron Airbase, Honduras and theater security cooperation and training
in Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala and Belize.
The Marine Corps' activities in the Pacific are led by Marine
Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) headquartered in Honolulu, Hawaii, with a
forward stationed Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), III MEF,
headquartered in Okinawa, Japan. III MEF contributes to regional
stability through persistent presence and Marines remain the Pacific
Command's (PACOM) forward deployed, forward stationed force of choice
for crisis response. The Marine Corps continues to rebalance its force
lay-down in the Pacific to support Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG),
with 22,500 Marines West of the International Date Line, forward-based,
and operating within the Asia-Pacific Theater. The planned end state
for geographically distributed, politically sustainable and
operationally resilient MAGTFs in the Pacific is a long-term effort
that will span the next 15 years. The Marine Rotational Force-Darwin
(MRF-D), based in Australia's Robertson Barracks, is in its fourth year
of operation. This year we will deploy approximately 1,200 Marines to
Darwin for a six-month deployment.
The Marine Corps continues to work closely with the State
Department to provide security at our Embassies and Consulates. Today,
Marines are routinely serving at 174 Embassies and Consulates in 146
countries around the globe. Approximately 117 Embassies have increased
support in accordance with the 2013 NDAA. We have added 603 Marines to
the previously authorized 1,000 Marine Security Guards; 199 in new
detachments, 274 towards increased manning at current detachments, and
130 towards the Marine Security Augmentation Unit (MSAU). Additionally,
the US Embassy in Havana, Cuba was reopened on July 2015, with Marines
serving at this Embassy as they do in any other.
Our partnering capabilities assure allies, deter adversaries, build
partner capacity, and set conditions for the readiness to surge and
aggregate with a Joint, Coalition or Special Operations force for major
theater combat operations. Partnering also trains our Marines for
environments in which we are likely to operate. In 2015, the Marine
Corps, in conjunction with combatant commanders and the Marine Forces
Component Commands, conducted more than 140 security cooperation
activities, including exercises, training events, subject matter expert
exchanges, formal education key leader engagements, and service staff
talks. Your continued support has allowed the Marine Corps to operate
throughout the world today; now we must ensure our readiness tomorrow.
five areas of focus
Today, in addition to supporting the combatant commander's
requirements, the Marine Corps is focused on near-term efforts in five
interrelated areas that are vital to achieving our future success:
People, Readiness, Training, Naval Integration, and Modernization.
Across these five areas, three major themes run throughout: maintaining
and improving the high quality people that make up today's Marine
Corps; decentralizing the training and preparation for war while
adhering to Maneuver Warfare principles in the conduct of training and
operations; and modernizing the force, especially through leveraging
new and emerging technologies. The future requires Marines to embrace
change to leverage the rapid advancements in technology at the pace of
the 21st Century in order to gain an operational advantage over any
potential adversary we may face in the future.
people
The success of the Marine Corps hinges on the quality of our
Marines. This is the foundation
from which we make Marines, win our Nation's battles, and return
quality citizens to American society. The Marine Corps will maintain a
force of the highest quality which is smart, resilient, fit,
disciplined and able to overcome adversity. Maintaining the quality of
the men and women in today's Corps is our friendly center of gravity.
Our goal is to ensure every Marine is set up for success on the
battlefield and in life, and understands their value to the Marine
Corps and the Nation.
The Marine Corps continues to benefit from a healthy recruiting
environment that attracts quality people who can accomplish the
mission. Our recruiting force continues to meet our recruiting goals in
quantity and quality and is postured to make this year's recruiting
mission. We are on track to meet our active duty end strength goal of
182,000 Marines in fiscal year 2016, and we will look to maximize the
capabilities of each and every Marine. Where it makes sense, we will
look to leverage the unique skills of our Reserve Marines to align what
they bring from the civilian sector and better enable the readiness of
our Total Force.
As the Marine Corps completes our current draw down, competition
for retention will continue. We will strive to retain the very best
Marines capable of fulfilling our leadership and operational needs.
This is accomplished through a competitive career designation process
for officers and a thorough evaluation process for enlisted Marines
designed to measure, analyze, and compare Marines' performance,
accomplishments, and future potential. The Marine Corps continues to
retain quality Marines in a majority of occupational fields while
others, like aviation and infantry, are more challenging. An additional
challenge for all Marines is remaining focused on training for war
balanced against the volume of mandatory ``top down'' training
requirements not directly associated with warfighting.
Marine Leaders have a moral obligation to ensure the health and
welfare of the Nation's Marines from the day they make the commitment
to serve. We take this responsibility very seriously and strive to
maintain the trust and confidence of Congress and the American People
by immediately addressing any challenge to Marine Corps readiness and
finding solutions through our people and readiness programs. We have
reinvigorated the Marine for Life Program and continue to progress with
our Marine Corps Force Integration Plan (MCFIP), Sexual Assault
Prevention and Response Program (SAPR), Protect What You've Earned
Campaign (PWYE), Suicide Prevention and Response Program, our Wounded
Warrior Regiment, Marine and Family Programs, and Transition Assistance
Programs. The Marine Corps remains focused on solutions to address the
destructive behavior of sexual assault, suicide and hazing. The abuse
of alcohol has proven to be a contributing factor across the spectrum
of force preservation issues that impact the readiness of our force.
Our goal continues to be the elimination of this destructive behavior
from our ranks, and we believe that preserving our commanders' ability
to lead in this area is a vital element to reaching this objective.
readiness
The Congressional intent to serve as the ``Nation's Force in
Readiness'' guides who we are and what we do--being ready is central to
our identity as Marines. As a force, we will remain ready to fight and
win across the range of military operations and in all five warfighting
domains--maritime, land, air, cyber and space. The fiscal reductions
and instability of the past few years have impacted our readiness. As
resources have diminished, the Marine Corps has protected the near-term
operational readiness of its deployed and next-to-deploy units in order
to meet operational commitments. This has come at a risk.
The Marine Corps will continue to prioritize the readiness of
deployed and next-to-deploy units over non-deployed units. The majority
of our units are deploying ready while our non-deployed commands lack
sufficient resources to meet the necessary personnel, training, and
equipment readiness levels in order to respond today. However, to meet
Congress' intent that we remain the nation's force in readiness, the
Marine Corps requires a ``ready bench'' that is able to deploy with
minimal notice and maximum capability.
Our aviation units are currently unable to meet our training and
mission requirements primarily due to Ready Basic Aircraft shortfalls.
We have developed an extensive plan to recover readiness across every
type/model/series in the current inventory, while continuing the
procurement of new aircraft to ensure future readiness. The recovery
and sustainment of our current fleet is necessary to support both
training and warfighting requirements. Each type/model/series requires
attention and action in specific areas; maintenance, supply, depot
backlog, and in-service repairs. For example, in our F/A-18 community
we are 52 aircraft short of our training requirement and 43 aircraft
short of our warfighting requirement due to back log and throughput at
the Fleet Readiness Depot and our inventory of spares. If these
squadrons were called to on to fight today they would be forced to
execute with 86 less jets than they need. With the continued support of
Congress, Marine Aviation can recover its readiness by re-capitalizing
our aging fleet first as we procure new aircraft to meet our future
needs and support our ground forces.
Simultaneous readiness initiatives are occurring with our ground
equipment. Our post-combat reset strategy and Equipment Optimization
Plan (EOP) are key components of the overall ground equipment
``Reconstitution'' effort. As of Jan 2016, the Marine Corps has reset
78 percent of its ground equipment with 50 percent returned to the
Operating Forces and our strategic equipment programs. This strategic
war reserve is our geographically prepositioned combat equipment both
afloat and ashore where it makes the most sense to respond to
contingencies. We remain focused on this recovery effort and project
its completion in May of 2019. This service-level strategy would not
have been possible without the continued support of Congress and the
hard work of your Marines.
The Facility Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization (FSRM)
initiative and current state of facilities is the single most important
investment to support training, operations, and quality of life. The
2017 budget proposes funding FSRM at 74 percent of the OSD Facilities
Sustainment Model. This reduced funding level is an area of concern.
FSRM is a top priority to fix.
The sustainment of military construction (MILCON) funding is
crucial to managing operational training and support projects. Marine
Corps readiness is generated aboard our bases and stations. As we
transition to new capabilities and realign our forces in the Pacific,
adequate MILCON will be a key enabler for the Marine Corps' future
success.
Readiness is not just in our equipment supply and maintenance, but
in the quality and challenging nature of our training through the
mental, spiritual and physical readiness of marines and sailors across
the force. Readiness is the result of a variety of factors: commitment
by leadership, standards-based inspections, evaluated drills and
training exercises, and an understanding by all marines and sailors
that the call can come at any time. We must be ready and able to
answer.
training, simulation and experimentation
The Marine Corps' training and education continuum requires
parallel and complementary efforts, from Squad Leader to MAGTF
Commander. Organizing and executing high quality training is a
difficult task. It takes time, deliberate thought, and effort. Our
approach to training must evolve. It will emphasize the basics:
combined arms, competency in the use of our weapons and systems, and
expeditionary operations; but it must reemphasize operations in a
degraded command, control, communications, computers and intelligence
(C41) environment, camouflage/deception, operations at night,
operations in a nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) environment, and
decision-making in rapidly unfolding and uncertain situations. We must
provide opportunities to experiment and work with the latest
technological advances.
Our war gaming supports the combat development process in order to
develop and refine emerging concepts, conceptualize force design, and
identify future capabilities and deficiencies within the future
operating environments. War gaming achieves this purpose by permitting
the dynamic, risk free consideration of disruptive ideas and
capabilities which enable innovation and inform Service priorities. War
gaming also supports the development of operating concepts and
facilitates analysis of alternatives across the ROMO. The Marine Corps
is committed to the future development of a war gaming facility at
Marine Corps Base Quantico to enhance the study of the evolving
characteristics of, and the requirements for, successful warfighting in
the future. The Marine Corps is working to leverage virtual and
constructive training environments with better tools to train higher
level staffs and a focus on our leaders, from the Battalion to the
Marine Expeditionary Force level. Enabled by technology, we will
increase the amount of training each unit can accomplish in mentally
and physically stressing environments for all elements of the MAGTF
before they execute on a live training range or in combat.
Our current training schedule of major events will all focus on
building on our maritime based operational capability and at the same
time providing venues for experimentation. We will emphasize and
increase opportunities for force-on-force training and operations in
degraded environments in order to challenge Marines against a
``thinking enemy'' and maximize realism.
Demanding and challenging Professional Military Education (PME) is
the best hedge against uncertainty and its purpose is to prepare for
the unknown. Marines and sailors of all ranks have the responsibility
to educate themselves. The Marine Corps University (MCU) educates over
75 percent of Marine Corps' Captains and Majors and provides PME
opportunities for 100 percent of our enlisted force. Our training and
education initiatives contribute to our readiness and enhance our
ability to integrate with the Naval and Joint Force.
integration with the naval and joint force
In order to be the Nation's expeditionary force in readiness the
Marine Corps must remain a naval combined arms expeditionary force. Our
naval heritage is based on more than tradition; it is mandated by law
as our primary service responsibility. Marines will reinforce our role
as a naval expeditionary force to create decision space for national
leaders and assure access for the Joint force as part of a naval
campaign. As the service with the primary Department of Defense
Directive and Title 10 responsibility for the development of amphibious
doctrine, tactics, techniques, and equipment, our capabilities are
reliant on the Nation's investment in our partnered Navy programs. This
requires the proper balance of amphibious platforms, surface
connectors, and naval operating concepts to shape our force explicitly
as part of the Joint Force, understanding where we will both leverage
and enable the capabilities of the Army, Air Force and Special
Operations Forces.
The Navy and Marine Corps Team require 38 amphibious warships, with
an operational availability of 90 percent, to support two Marine
Expeditionary Brigades, in order to provide the Nation a forcible entry
capability. The Marine Corps fully supports the Secretary of the Navy
and Chief of Naval Operations' efforts to balance amphibious platforms
and surface connectors that facilitate operational maneuver from the
sea and ship-to-objective maneuver. The Long Range Ship Strategy (LRSS)
increases the amphibious warship inventory to 34 by fiscal year 2022.
We appreciate Congress providing the funding to procure a 12th LPD and
the funding for a second ship with the same hull form.
The LPD and the LX(R) represent the Department of the Navy's
commitment to a modem expeditionary fleet. L-class ships with aircraft
hangars and the command and control capabilities for the distributed
and disaggregated operations that have become routine for our ARG/MEU
teams. The Marine Corps fully supports the Navy's decision to use the
LPD-17 hull for the LX(R) program. This decision is an acquisitions
success story that provides a more capable ship, at lower cost, with
increased capacity, on a shorter timeline to better support how Marines
are operating today and are likely to in the future.
Steady state demand and crisis response sea basing requirements
must be met through creative integration of all platforms and
formations. This requires an integrated approach that employs warships,
alternative shipping and landing basing in a complementary manner.
Corresponding to the amphibious ship effort is our investment in
tactical ship-to-shore mobility because at some point in the naval
campaign, the landing force is going to land. The Amphibious Combat
Vehicle (ACV) is critical in the conduct of protected littoral maneuver
and the projection of Marines from sea to land in permissive,
uncertain, and hostile environments. Our planned investments are framed
by our capstone service concept, Expeditionary Force 21 (EF-21).
Working with our naval partners, we are aggressively exploring the
feasibility of future and existing sea based platforms to enhance the
connector capabilities of our LCACs and LCUs. We have a need to modify
traditional employment methods and augment amphibious warships by
adapting other vessels for sea-based littoral operations. Maritime
Prepositioning Ship squadrons have one Maritime Landing Platform (MLP)
that is effectively a ``pier in the ocean.'' These ships can move pre-
positioned war reserves into theater and serve as afloat staging bases
to receive and transfer equipment and supplies as part of an integrated
MAGTF or regionally oriented MEB. The end-state is a ``family of
systems'' designed to enhance mobility, interoperability,
survivability, and independent operational capabilities to further
enhance sea basing and littoral maneuver capabilities well into the
21st Century. The Marine Corps will continue to work closely with the
Navy to implement the 30-year ship building plan and to address the
current readiness challenges of the amphibious fleet.
The continued development of Information Warfare and Command and
Control capabilities are also required for the Marine Corps to operate
against increasingly sophisticated adversaries. This requires
investments in interoperable combat operations centers. We are
identifying and developing command and control systems and information
technology architecture to support operations and ensure our ability to
maneuver. Framed by service-level concepts like the Navy's Cooperative
Strategy 21 (CS-21), we will collaborate with the Navy on a Naval
Operating Concept revision in order to shape future naval campaigning
and naval expeditionary operations. This concept will include a greater
Marine Corps contribution to Sea Control operations through
interoperability with the Navy Composite Warfare Commander (CWC)
structure in order to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Anti Access/Area
Denial (A2/AD) threats and optimize the single naval battle success on
and from the sea. Since Marines and Special Operations Forces (SOF)
remain forward deployed, we must create true integration models to
maximize the capabilities of the sea-based MAGTF, including command and
control (C2), alongside our SOF partners. The end state is a fully
integrated and ready Navy and Marine Corps team, trained and resourced
to support our joint operating concept.
modernization and technology
History has not been kind to militaries that fail to evolve, and
the change we see in the 21st Century is as rapid and dramatic as the
world has ever known. That said the Marine Corps' modernization and
technology initiatives must deliver future capabilities and sustainable
readiness. Marines will continue working to do what we do today better,
but equally important, must be willing to consider how these same tasks
might be done ``differently.'' The Marine Corps must continue to
develop and evolve the MAGTF, ensuring it is able to operate in all
warfighting domains. To do so Marines are invigorating experimentation
of new concepts in order to advance our capabilities.
We will continue to develop our concepts to take advantage of the
capabilities of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and all of our emerging
aviation platforms, particularly in regard to sensor fusion and
electronic warfare. Marines will continue to experiment with and
exercise new ways to get the most out of the MV-22 and challenge
previous paradigms in order to provide the most effective MAGTFs to our
combatant commanders.
We will establish and define, in doctrine, our distributed
operations capability in our MAGTFs by the end of fiscal year 2016.
With distributed capabilities, we must also ensure our forces are not
constrained at the littoral seams between combatant commanders. You can
also expect the Marine Corps to continue to pursue technologies that
enhance our warfighting capabilities such as unmanned aerial systems
(UAS) and robotics, artificial intelligence, 3-D printing, and
autonomous technologies that provide tactical and operational
advantage.
The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab leads our experimentation effort
to capitalize on existing and emerging technology and MAGTF level
exercises. In conjunction with our coalition partners, the Navy and
Marine Corps team has experimented with dispersed sea based SPMAGTFs,
integrated MAGTFs in Anti-Access/ Area Denial environments,
incorporated emerging digital technologies with aviation platforms and
our ground forces, and conducted naval integration with interoperable
Special Operations Forces during Joint Exercises. We will continue to
emphasize experimentation during our exercises as a way to inform the
development of distributed doctrine and future operating concepts.
Exercises serve as a test bed for experimentation as we search for
faster, cheaper and smarter acquisition processes and programs.
The following equipment platforms and acquisition initiatives
require special mention:
amphibious combat vehicle (acv)
The ACV is an advanced generation eight-wheeled, amphibious,
armored personnel carrier that will support expeditionary maneuver
warfare by enhancing tactical and operational mobility and
survivability. The Marine Corps plans to procure 694 vehicles: 204 in
the first increment and 490 in the second increment. Our plan is to
have our first battalion initially capable in the 4th quarter of fiscal
year 2020 and all battalions fully capable by the 4th quarter of fiscal
year 2023. Your investment in this program provides the Marine Corps
with an advanced ship to shore maneuver capability for the Joint Force.
joint strike fighter (f-35)
The F-35 is a fifth generation fighter that will replace the Marine
Corps' aging tactical aviation fleet of F/A-18 Hornets, AV-8B Harriers,
and EA-6B Prowlers. The F-35 will have a transformational impact on
Marine Corps doctrine as we work to both do what we're doing today
better and ``differently.'' The Marine Corps plans to procure 420
aircraft: 353 F-35Bs and 67 F-35Cs. The first F-35B squadron achieved
initial operating capability in July 2015, and our second squadron will
become operational in June 2016. The Marine Corps plans to complete its
F-35 transition by 2031. We believe the Congressional support
investment in this program will pay significant dividends for the
capabilities of the Marine Corps and the Joint Force.
ch-53k
The Marine Corps' CH-53K ``King Stallion'' helicopter will fulfill
the vertical lift requirement for amphibious and Joint Forcible Entry
Operations. This CH-53 transition is critical to increasing the
degraded readiness of the CH-53E community and decreasing the
platform's operations and maintenance costs. The Marine Corps plans to
procure 200 aircraft. The program achieved Milestone B in December
2005. The CH-53K's first flight occurred in October 2015 and our two
aircraft have flown 25.8 hours.
command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (c41)
The modernization and technology effort of the Marine Corps
requires an integrated network that is deployable, digitally
interoperable, and supportive of rapid advancements in technology and
the evolution of combat capabilities. The Marine Corps Enterprise
Network (MCEN) establishes a comprehensive framework requiring the
development of command and control architecture to simplify and enable
operating forces to use services in a deployed environment. The
priority is to provide worldwide access to MCEN services from any base,
post, camp, station network, tactical network and approved remote
access connection. Our goal is to provide an agile command and control
capability with the right data, at the right place, at the right time.
Digital Interoperability (DI) is the effective integration of
Marines, systems, and exchange of data, across all domains and networks
throughout the MAGTF, Naval, Joint, and Coalition Forces, to include
degraded or denied environments, in order to rapidly share information.
This is a vital step in linking the MAGTF and the Joint Force to get
the vast amount of information collected on all platforms into the
hands of the warfighters that need it; in the air, on the ground and at
sea.
The Marine Corps' goal is to retain our tactical advantage across
the range of military operations with today's and tomorrow's systems.
Our end state is to field and operationalize ongoing programs and
continue to develop solutions that will enhance institutional
capabilities and retain our tactical advantage across the ROMO.
our challenges
The character of the 21st Century is rapid evolution. Our potential
adversaries have not stood still, and it is imperative that we keep
pace with change. Two years ago, the 35th Commandant, came before
Congress and testified that:
``...the 36th Commandant will reach a point, probably two years
from now, where he's going to have to take a look at that readiness
level and say, I'm going to have to lower that so that I can get back
into thesefacilities that I can't ignore, my training ranges that I
can't ignore, and the modernization that I'm going to have to do
eventually. Otherwise we'll end up with an old Marine Corps that's out
of date. `` \1\
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\1\ Gen Amos. Posture of the United States Marine Corps. CMC, Mar
2014.
This is where we find ourselves today. The Marine Corps is no
longer in a position to generate current readiness and reset our
equipment, while sustaining our facilities, and modernizing to ensure
our future readiness. The efforts of the I 14th Congress have provided
sufficient resources to support the Marine Corps' near-term readiness
and we thank the Congress for this fiscal stability. However, PB17
increasingly stretches the Nation's Ready Force. We are deploying
combat ready-forces at a rate comparable to the height of our
commitment to Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom; we are
facing future facilities challenges as we try to sustain our current
installations; and we are struggling to keep pace as our potential
adversaries rapidly modernize. This is not healthy for your Marine
Corps or for the security of our Nation.
The Marine Corps is now on its way down to 182,000 Marines by the
end of fiscal year 2016. Although our recruiting force continues to
meet our recruiting goals we are challenged to retain certain
occupational fields like infantry and aviation. The 21st Century
demands capabilities in 5th Generation Fighter Aircraft (F-35), Cyber
Warfare, Information Operations, Special Operations, Embassy Security
Guards, and the Security Cooperation Group that advises and assists our
allies and partner nations. The Marine Corps must continue to develop
and retain these capabilities with quality Marines.
In last year's fiscal year 2015 budget we were compelled, due to
fiscal pressures, to limit and reduce training for our operating
forces. In this year's fiscal year 2016 budget our operation and
maintenance funding was further reduced by 5.6 percent. This reduction
has been carried forward into our fiscal year 2017 budget. Two years of
fiscally constrained operation and maintenance funds will force us to
employ a prioritized readiness model for our deploying forces and
prevents us from our desired readiness recovery, both in operational
training and facilities sustainment. This means the Marine Corps will
not have as deep and as ready a bench to draw from for a major
contingency.
Modernization is future readiness. The recapitalization of our
force is essential to our future readiness with investments in ground
combat vehicles, aviation, command and control, and digitally
interoperable protected networks. We have important combat programs
under development that need your continued support. The Amphibious
Combat Vehicle (ACV) will replace our Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV),
which is now over four decades old. The Joint Strike Fighter will not
only replace three aging platforms, but provides transformational
warfighting capabilities for the future. Our ground combat vehicles
like the Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) have an average age of 33 years
and our Ml Al tanks have an average age of 26 years. The Marine Corps
is grateful for Congress' support of our wartime acquisition and reset
efforts of the MRAP, HMMWV, and the contracting of the Joint Light
Tactical Vehicle (JLTV). In summary, the increasingly lean budgets of
fiscal year 2016 and fiscal year 2017 will provide increased readiness
challenges and cause shortfalls in key areas. This reality will force
tradeoffs.
conclusion
``Onefact is etched with clarity; the Marine Corps, because of its
readiness tofight, will have a vital role in anyfuture war.'' \2\
Senator Mike Mansfield
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\2\ Honorable Mansfield. Fixing the Personnel Strength of the
United States Marine Corps, Adding the Commandant of the Marine Corps
as a Member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 82nd Congress, 1st Session,
House of Representatives, HR 82-666, 30 Jun 1951.
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Marines will continue to meet the high standards the American
people have set for us. As responsible stewards of the Nation's
resources, the Marine Corps remains committed to its auditability in
order to provide the best Marine Corps the Nation can afford. We will
therefore continue to produce highly trained Marines, formed into
combat-ready forces, and provide the capabilities the Joint Force
requires. The wisdom of the 82nd Congress as reaffirmed by the 114th
Congress remains valid today--the vital need of a strong force-in-
readiness. Marines are honored to serve in this role.
Marines are innovators and the history of the Marine Corps is
replete with examples of innovation out of necessity. With the
continued support of Congress, the Marine Corps will maintain ready
forces today and modernize to generate readiness in the future because
when the Nation calls, Marines answer and advance to contact.
Chairman McCain. Admiral Richardson?
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JOHN M. RICHARDSON, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS
Admiral Richardson. Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Reed,
distinguished members of the committee, I am honored and
humbled to appear before you today as your CNO on behalf of our
more than 500,000 active and Reserve sailors, our civilians,
and families to discuss the Navy's budget request.
To start, I want to thank you for your leadership in
keeping our Nation secure and in keeping our Navy the strongest
that has ever sailed the seas. This year's budget continues
that important work.
It is always good to start by framing the problem. America
is a maritime nation, and our prosperity is tied to our ability
to operate freely in the maritime environment. Today's
strategic environment is increasingly globalized and
increasingly competitive. Global systems are used more,
stressed more, and contested more.
The maritime system has seen explosive growth. For the
first time in 25 years, there is competition for control of the
seas. From the sea floor to space, from deep water to the
shoreline, and in the information domain, things are
accelerating. The global information system has become
pervasive and has changed the way we all do business, including
at sea. Technology is being introduced at an unprecedented rate
and is being adopted by society just as fast.
Finally, a new set of competitors are moving quickly to use
these forces to their advantage, and for the first time in 25
years, the U.S. is facing a return to great power competition.
These new forces have changed what it means for the Navy and
Marine Corps to provide maritime security.
While the problems are much more numerous and complex, our
responsibility remains the same. Naval forces must provide our
leaders credible options to protect America from attack,
advance our prosperity, further our strategic interest, assure
our allies and partners, and deter our adversaries, which rests
on the ability of the Navy and our sister services to win
decisively if conflict breaks out. If we do not adapt, we will
perform below our potential and worse, we may fall behind our
competitors.
To do this, the Navy is focusing on four lines of effort.
We are going to strengthen our Navy team, strengthen our
operating and warfighting at and from the sea, expand and
strengthen our partnerships, and achieve high-velocity learning
at every level.
Unquestionably, the most part of our Navy is our team.
Everything we do starts and ends with our sailors, civilians,
and their families. As our platforms and missions become more
complex, our need for talented people continues to be a
challenge. We need to recruit, train, and retain the right
people, and our sailor 2025 initiatives are aimed squarely at
that challenge. These efforts are based on our core values of
honor, courage, and commitment and demonstrated through four
core attributes of integrity, accountability, initiative, and
toughness. That team is committed to our mission, which
requires us to strengthen naval power at and from the sea.
This budget reflects some very tough choices as we achieve
this aim. We have prioritized shipbuilding and the industrial
base. First in that effort is the Ohio replacement program,
which I believe is vital to our survival as a Nation. We are
taking steps to more deeply engrain information warfare. We are
also investing in our naval aviation enterprise, rapidly
integrating unmanned systems, and bolstering our investments in
advanced weapons.
In addition to these investments, we are adjusting our
behaviors to keep pace with a world that continues to
accelerate. We are doubling down on an approach that relies
more heavily on experimentation and prototyping. We are
pursuing multiple avenues to drive shorter learning cycles into
all that we do. We must learn faster.
To close, I want to mention that recently I had the honor
to spend time with Senior Chief Ed Byers, who was awarded the
Medal of Honor by the President on behalf of the Congress.
Senior Chief Byers represents the very best of our service men
and women. He is emblematic of this generation's continued
commitment to our core values and to their fellow Americans.
The SEAL [Sea, Air, Land] ethos reads in part, my loyalty to
country and team is beyond reproach. I humbly serve as a
guardian to my fellow Americans, always ready to defend those
who are unable to defend themselves. I do not advertise the
nature of my work nor seek recognition for my actions.
Mr. Chairman, all our people want to do is protect their
great Nation. It is my job to lead them well and prepare them
for that task. The 2017 Navy budget is this year's best
approach to solving the problems and seizing the opportunities
that face the Navy today.
I thank you and look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Richardson follows:]
Prepared Statement by Admiral John M. Richardson
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of
the Committee, it is an honor to appear before you today. This is my
first of hopefully many chances to discuss the future of the United
States Navy with you, and as your Chief of Naval Operations, I look
forward to continuing to work closely with you to ensure that your Navy
is best postured to defend America's interests around the globe.
Prior to my confirmation, I testified that my most serious concern
was the gap between challenges to America's security and prosperity and
the resources available to protect them. In January of this year, I
outlined this gap in more detail when I released A Design for
Maintaining Maritime Superiority (the ``Design''), which describes an
increasingly competitive environment and the lines of effort the Navy
will pursue to execute our mission in that environment. The thinking in
the Design reflects inputs from leaders inside and out of the Navy and
is guiding our way forward. It shaped our budget submission and shapes
my testimony below.
The 2017 budget is this year's best approach to solving the
problems and seizing the opportunities that face the Navy today. The
budget reflects some constants; America has been a maritime nation
since we began. Our prosperity continues to depend on our maritime
security--over 90 percent of our trade is shipped over the seas--and
this linkage will only tighten in the future. Against the backdrop of
this historical truth, current problems and opportunities are growing
rapidly. The maritime environment has remained remarkably constant
since man first put to sea thousands of years ago. The oceans, seas,
shipping lanes and chokepoints are physically unchanged in the modern
era, but the maritime system has seen explosive growth in the past 25
years. Traffic over the seas has increased by 400 percent since the
early 1990's, driving and outpacing the global economy, which has
almost doubled in the same period. Climate change has opened up trade
routes previously closed. Access to resources on the seafloor has also
increased, both as Arctic ice has receded and as technology has
improved. Just as it has in the past, our future as a nation remains
tied to our ability to operate freely on the seas.
That maritime freedom is coming under increasing pressure and
stress. For the first time in 25 years, there is competition for
control of the seas. Nations like China and Russia are using their
newfound maritime strength not only to advance their national goals,
but also to challenge the very rules and standards of behavior upon
which so many nations since the end of World War II have based their
growth. We should interpret this challenge to international rules and
order as a challenge to our own security and prosperity, and to the
security and prosperity of all who support an open, fair architecture.
It is against this background that I consider the gravity of the
Navy's mission statement, as reflected in the Design:
``The United States Navy will be ready to conduct prompt and
sustained combat incident to operations at sea. Our Navy will
protect America from attack and preserve America's strategic
influence in key regions of the world. U.S. naval forces and
operations--from the sea floor to space, from deep water to the
littorals, and in the information domain--will deter aggression
and enable peaceful resolution of crises on terms acceptable to
the United States and our allies and partners. If deterrence
fails, the Navy will conduct decisive combat operations to
defeat any enemy.''
To me these words are not an abstraction, and are easiest to
appreciate in the context of what naval forces do every day. As just
one example, there was a day last fall when:
The destroyer USS Donald Cook transited the
Mediterranean, following an 11-nation multinational exercise in the
Black Sea and a port visit to Odessa, Ukraine--demonstrating our
commitment to our NATO allies;
Sailors at the Navy Cyber Defense Operations Command in
Suffolk, VA monitored intrusion prevention sensors that actively
mitigated almost 300,000 instances of unauthorized or adversary
activity across the Navy network enterprise, including more than 60,000
threats to afloat networks;
The Kearsarge Amphibious Readiness Group, with the 26th
Marine Expeditionary Unit aboard, participated in a Turkish-led
amphibious exercise, demonstrating our combined capability and
physically displaying our commitment to U.S. allies and partners;
Five ballistic missile submarines patrolled the oceans
(the latest in over 4,000 patrols since 1960), providing 100 percent
readiness in providing strategic deterrence;
USS Fort Worth, a Littoral Combat Ship, swapped crews in
Singapore after participating in a Cooperation Afloat Readiness And
Training (CARAT) exercise with the Bangladesh Navy, developing
cooperative maritime security capabilities that support security and
stability in South and Southeast Asia.
Sailors from a Coastal Riverine Squadron and an Explosive
Ordnance Disposal unit participated in an exercise in Cambodia,
increasing maritime security cooperation and interoperability between
the two navies;
Navy SEALS trained and advised Iraqi forces in the fight
against ISIL extremists, facilitating, mentoring, and enhancing their
ability to secure their territory;
Members of the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command provided
tactical intelligence training to Ghanaian Maritime Law Enforcement and
Naval servicemembers at Sekondi Naval Base, increasing our partners'
capacity and capability to secure their territorial waters;
The aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan launched four F/A-
18 fighters to intercept and escort two approaching Russian TU-142 Bear
aircraft that approached as the carrier was operating in the Sea of
Japan, operating forward to preserve freedom of action; and
The fast-attack submarine USS City of Corpus Christi
operated in the Western Pacific, after participating with the Indian
and Japanese Navies in Exercise Malabar 2015, increasing our level of
engagement with our partners across the Indo-Asia Pacific.
All of these events occurred on a single day: October 27, 2015. But
none were in the headlines. That is because on that day the guided
missile destroyer USS Lassen conducted a freedom of navigation
operation in the South China Sea, one of the many visible
demonstrations of our international leadership and national commitment
to preserving a rules-based international order that the Navy conducts
routinely around the world.
Your Navy's ability to execute these responsibilities--our
mission--is becoming more difficult as three interrelated forces act on
the global economic and security environments, and as new actors rise
to challenge us. I have already described the first force--the force
exerted by the expanding use of the maritime domain, on, over, and
under the seas. This global system is becoming more used, stressed, and
contested than perhaps ever before, and these trends show no signs of
reversing.
The second force is the rise of the global information system.
Newer than the maritime system, the information system is more
pervasive, enabling an even greater multitude of connections between
people and at a much lower cost of entry. Information, now passed in
near-real time across links that continue to multiply, is in turn
driving an accelerating rate of change.
The third interrelated force is the rising tempo at which new
technologies are being introduced. This is not just information
technologies, but also those that incorporate advances in material
science, increasingly sophisticated robotics, energy storage, 3-D
printing, and networks of low-cost sensors, to name just a few
examples. The potential of genetic science and artificial intelligence
is just starting to be realized, and could fundamentally reshape every
aspect of our lives. As technology is developed at ever-increasing
speeds, it is being adopted by society more quickly as well--people are
using these new tools as quickly as they are produced, in new and novel
ways.
Our competitors and adversaries are moving quickly to use these
forces to their advantage, and they too are shifting. For the first
time in decades, the United States is facing a return to great power
competition. Russia and China demonstrate both the advanced
capabilities and the desire to act as global powers. This past fall,
the Russian Navy operated at a pace and in areas not seen since the
mid-1990's, and the Chinese PLA(N) continued to extend its reach around
the world. Their national aspirations are backed by a growing arsenal
of high-end warfighting capabilities, many of which are focused
specifically on our vulnerabilities. Both nations continue to develop
information-enabled weapons with increasing range, precision and
destructive capacity, and to sell those weapons to partners like Iran,
Syria, and North Korea.
From a strategic perspective, both China and Russia are also
becoming increasingly adept in coercion and competition below the
thresholds of outright conflict, finding ways to exploit weaknesses in
the system of broadly accepted global rules and standards. For example,
Russia has continued its occupation and attempted annexation of another
nation's territory. As perhaps the most startling example, China's land
reclamation and militarization of outposts amidst the busiest sea lanes
on the planet casts doubt on the future accessibility of our maritime
domain. China is literally redrawing the map in the South China Sea by
creating artificial islands, to which they then claim sovereign
territorial rights, now complete with surface to air missiles and high
performance radars. Their activity creates great uncertainty about the
intentions and credibility of their leadership.
Russia and China are not the only actors seeking to contest United
States and global interests in the emerging security environment.
Others are also pursuing advanced technology, including military
technologies that were once the exclusive province of great powers;
this trend will persist. Coupled with an ongoing dedication to
furthering its nuclear weapons and missile programs, North Korea's
provocative actions continue to threaten security in Northeast Asia and
beyond. Iran's advanced missiles, proxy forces and other conventional
capabilities pose threats to which the Navy must remain prepared to
respond. Finally, international terrorist groups such as ISIL and al
Qaeda have proven their resilience and adaptability and pose a long-
term threat to stability and security around the world.
In summary, these new forces have changed what it means for the
Navy and Marine Corps to provide maritime security; the problems are
more complex, demanding, and numerous than ever before. But our
responsibility remains the same. Naval forces must provide our leaders
credible options that allow them to advance the nation's prosperity,
defend its security, further its strategic interests, assure its allies
and partners, and deter its adversaries--which rests on the ability of
the Navy and our sister services to decisively win if conflict breaks
out. The breadth of challenges we face demands a range of options, and
they must be credible. Only then can the United States effectively
advocate as a maritime power for the system of global rules and
standards that underpin shared prosperity now and in the future.
It is becoming increasingly difficult for the Navy to present a
sufficient number of credible options for leadership. While the
predictability provided by the 2015 Bipartisan Budget Act is greatly
appreciated, the Navy's fiscal year 2017 budget submission comes on the
heels of four prior years' budgets that collectively provided $30
billion less than requested levels to the Department of the Navy. It
represents yet another reduction of almost $5 billion from 2016 funding
levels. We have started the last six years with a continuing
resolution, with an average duration of 120 days. In response, we have
had to modify our behaviors with a host of inefficient practices, the
use of short-term contracts offering less than best value to the
government, and the associated increased workload on our shrinking
headquarters staffs. Continuing Resolutions can also delay critical
programs, including those with little to no margin for delay, such as
the Ohio Replacement Program. It's worse than that: the fiscal
uncertainty sends ripples through the entire system--the industrial
base is hesitant to invest, and our people remain concerned about the
next furlough or hiring freeze or overtime cap. This unpredictability
adds to the burden on our Navy team and drives prices up.
The challenges are increasing and funding is decreasing. America
remains the primary leader of the free world, with the most capable
military force on the planet. We remain a maritime nation whose future
is inextricably tied to the seas. Our Navy has tremendous
responsibilities to ensure that future is secure and prosperous. Within
those constraints, our fiscal year 2017 budget proposal reflects the
best portfolio of credible options to achieve our mission. Budget
constraints are forcing choices that limit our naval capability in the
face of growing and rising threats. The Navy's budget addresses our
gaps on a prioritized basis, and starts to accelerate our capabilities
so that we can maintain overmatch relative to our adversaries.
strengthen our navy team for the future
Without question, the most important part of our budget is our
investment in our Navy Team--our Active and Reserve sailors, our Navy
civilians, and their families. I am pleased that we were able to
provide a 1.6 percent pay raise for our sailors this year, outpacing
inflation and 0.3 percent more than last year. Just as important are
the investments we are making to improve the environment for the Team.
As the Design makes clear, some of the biggest impacts that we can make
on our warfighting capability do not involve a lot of money, but
instead are changes to how we do business.
These changes can't come soon enough. As our platforms continue to
become more technologically advanced and missions become more complex,
our need for talented, qualified recruits will grow. Further, the
competition for that talent grows more intense every day. This budget
keeps us on a good path. Our sailor 2025 program is a dynamic set of
initiatives, process improvements and management tools designed to
increase career choice and flexibility, provide advanced, tailored
learning, and expand support to our Navy families. In fiscal year 2017,
we begin to fully invest in the Sailor 2025 Ready Relevant Learning
initiative, which will begin to create a new way of training our
sailors through mobile, modular learning, re-engineered content, and an
improved IT infrastructure.
In this budget, we fund a wide range of initiatives to strengthen
our sailors individually and as a team. The Design highlights the
importance of our core values of honor, courage and commitment, as
demonstrated through four core attributes--integrity, accountability,
initiative, and toughness. We are implementing a strategy, headed up by
our 21st Century Sailor Office, to inculcate these attributes
throughout the fleet and improve sailor readiness and resilience. We
continue to further develop a climate of dignity and respect throughout
the Fleet. We also look to eliminate the toxic behaviors that destroy
the fabric of the team--including sexual harassment and assault, hazing
and alcohol abuse. We have increased funding over the FYDP to address
sexual assault prevention and response, adding 24 new positions to the
Naval Criminal Investigative Service--on top of 127 additions in the
previous two years--to speed investigations while continuing our
support for programs aimed at prevention, investigation,
accountability, and support for survivors such as the Victim Legal
Counsel Program.
As we seek greater efficiencies, planned adjustments allow us to
take modest reductions (3,600 sailors in fiscal year 2017) in our
active duty end strength. These are consistent with advances in
training methods and with standing down the Carrier Air Wing 14. There
will be no reductions in force or any other force-shaping initiatives--
we will achieve this through natural attrition. Nobody will lose their
job.
One of my observations since taking office is that we can do more
to increase the synergy between our military and civilian workforces.
Your Navy civilians are integral to all that we do. They work in our
shipyards and aviation depots, provide scientific and technical
expertise in our labs, and guard our bases and other facilities. To
respond to increasing security concerns, we have invested this year in
increased force protection measures, including in those civilians who
keep our people and property safe. Some of the maintenance and
readiness shortfalls we are still digging out from were made worse by
civilian hiring and overtime freezes and a furlough in fiscal year
2013. Worse, these actions strained the trust within our team. This
budget adds a net of over 1,300 civilian positions in fiscal year 2017
to support additional maintenance, enhance security, and operate our
support ships, and continues the investments in our civilian shipmates
that help to forge one seamless team. Even as we implement these key
initiatives to address security and to recover readiness, we balance
that growth with reductions over the FYDP of 3,200 FTE (1.8 percent),
for a net reduction of 1,900.
strengthen naval power at and from the sea
That team, with our Marine Corps partners, is committed to our
mission, which must be conducted in the environment I described above.
The Design calls for us to strengthen naval power at and from the sea
to address the growing scale, congestion, and challenge in the maritime
domain. The Ohio Replacement Program (ORP) is paramount to that effort,
and remains our top priority. In my opinion, it is foundational to our
survival as a nation. This budget funds the ORP; construction is
planned to start in fiscal year 2021. This start date is vitally
important to prevent any impact to continuous at-sea deterrence at a
time when it could be even more relevant than today.
To the maximum extent possible, we have also prioritized
shipbuilding and the industrial base that supports it. Our current
fleet of 272 ships is too small to meet the array of mission
requirements our nation demands. In this budget, we remain on a path to
achieve 308 ships by 2021. This year, we are funding two advanced
guided missile destroyers with upgraded radars (DDG Flight IIIs with
SPY-6), two Virginia-class attack submarines, two Littoral Combat
Ships, and the procurement of an amphibious assault ship replacement
(LHA(R)). The Ford carrier remains under its cost cap and will deliver
in 2016; we are continuing to exercise strong oversight and discipline
to ensure the cost of her sister ships Kennedy and Enterprise also
remain under budget. We have exceeded our shipyard investment goal--
we're at 8.1 percent, well beyond the 6 percent legislative
requirement.
As the Design emphasizes, we are fully committed to further
ingraining information warfare into our routine operations. This is
essential to the Navy's future. For example, we are increasing
procurement of the Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program
(SEWIP) Block II and III by 45 units. We are also investing in network
modernization afloat and ashore through 10 installations of the
Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) system in
fiscal year 2017.
To help remediate one of our most stressed areas, we have enhanced
our investments in the naval aviation enterprise. We are investing in
bringing fifth generation aircraft to the fleet, adding ten F-35Cs over
the FYDP. We are also replacing F-18 airframes that are meeting the end
of their projected service lives faster than projected, adding 16F/A-18
E/Fs over the next two years. Further, we are adding upgrades to the
Super Hornet to make it more capable in a high-end fight. We are
updating our strategy to more rapidly integrate unmanned aerial
vehicles into our future air wing. Revisions to our unmanned carrier-
launched airborne surveillance and strike (UCLASS) program will help us
to meet current mission shortfalls in carrier-based surveillance and
aerial refueling capacity, and better inform us about the feasibility
of future additional capabilities we desire.
To meet an increasingly lethal threat, this budget bolsters our
investments in advanced weapons across the FYDP. We are buying 100
additional tactical Tomahawks, 79 more air-to-air AMRAAM missiles,
additional sea-skimming targets, and accelerating our investments in
SM-6 missile development in order to provide a full range of capability
enhancements to the fleet. However, budget pressures also caused us to
cut other weapons investments such as the Mk-48 torpedo and AIM-9X air-
to-air missile. Many of our production lines are at minimum sustaining
rates, and the low weapons inventory is a continuing concern.
achieve high velocity learning at every level
All of these investments will deliver important capabilities to
better posture us for the current and future environment. But, as or
more importantly, we must also adjust our behavior if we are to keep
pace with the accelerating world around us.
This budget reflects some of that increase in pace. We are changing
how we approach training and education to take advantage of new tools
and to push learning out to where our sailors spend the bulk of their
time--their units. The intent is not to burden those units more, but to
empower their leaders and give sailors the best tools to support what
science is increasingly revealing about how people learn most
effectively.
It also means that Navy leaders, up to and including me as the CNO,
must exercise full ownership of how we develop and acquire new
capabilities for the future. That ownership has four elements:
authority, re