    [Senate Hearing 114-626]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 114-626

        EMERGING UNITED STATES DEFENSE CHALLENGES AND WORLDWIDE THREATS

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                        FEBRUARY 9 AND DECEMBER 6, 2016

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

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                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

      JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman        JACK REED, Rhode Island
    JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma               BILL NELSON, Florida
    JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama                  CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
    ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi            JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
    KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire             JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
    DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                   KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas                    RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
    MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota               JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
    JONI ERNST, Iowa                        MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
    THOM TILLIS, North Carolina             TIM KAINE, Virginia
    DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska                    ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
    MIKE LEE, Utah                          MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
    LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
    TED CRUZ, Texas

                       Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
                       Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff
                                         Director

                                      (ii)

                             C O N T E N T S

    ________________________________________________________________________

                                February 9, 2016

                                                                       Page

    Worldwide Threats................................................     1

    Clapper, Honorable James R., Jr., Director of National                5
      Intelligence.
    Stewart, Lieutenant General Vincent R., USMC, Director of the        43
      Defense Intelligence Agency.

                                December 6, 2016

                                                                       Page

    Emerging United States Defense Challenges and Worldwide Threats..    95

    Keane, General John M., USA (Ret.), Chairman, Institute for the      99
      Study of War, and Former Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.
    Brimley, Shawn, Executive Vice President and Director of Studies,   110
      The Center for a New American Security.
    Kagan, Robert, Senior Fellow, Project on International Order and    121
      Strategy, The Brookings Institution.

                                     (iii)

                               WORLDWIDE THREATS

                                  ----------

                           TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 2016

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in Room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe,
    Sessions, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan,
    Lee, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Manchin, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
    Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, and Heinrich.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman McCain. Well, good morning. The Senate Armed
    Services Committee meets this morning to receiving testimony on
    the global threats faced by the United States and our allies as
    part of our oversight of the President's Defense Budget Request
    for Fiscal Year 2017.
        I'd like to welcome back Director of National Intelligence
    James Clapper and the Director of the Defense Intelligence
    Agency, General Vincent Stewart.
        As this is likely his final appearance before this
    committee at our annual Worldwide Threats hearing, I'd like to
    thank Director Clapper for over five decades of service to
    protecting our country. Director Clapper, and particularly we
    thank you for leading the men and women who strive every day to
    collect and analyze the information that helps keep America
    strong. I thank you for being with us today. I've had the honor
    of knowing you for a long time, and I know of no individual who
    has served this Nation with more distinction and honor. We're
    grateful for your service. We know that that service will
    continue in the years to come.
        The list of the threats confronting our Nation is drearily
    familiar, yet it is impossible to say we have seen much
    improvement. In Afghanistan, 9,800 American troops are still in
    harm's way, the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and the Haqqani Network
    continue to threaten our interests in Afghanistan and beyond.
    Now ISIL [the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] has arrived
    on the battlefield, raising the specter of yet another ISIL
    safe--to plan and execute attacks; regional order in the Middle
    East is breaking down, and this power vacuum is being filled by
    the most extreme and anti-American of forces; Sunni terrorist
    groups such as ISIL and al-Qaeda; Shiite extremists, such as
    the Islamic Republic of Iran and its proxies; and the imperial
    ambitions of Vladimir Putin. ISIL has consolidated control over
    key territories in Syria and Iraq. It is metastasizing around
    the region and expanding globally from Afghanistan, as I said,
    as well as to Lebanon, Yemen, Egypt, and, most worryingly, to
    Libya. It has also conducted or inspired attacks from Beirut to
    Istanbul, Paris to San Bernardino. More than a year into our
    military campaign against ISIL, it's impossible to say ISIL is
    losing and we are winning.
        At the same time, Iran continues to challenge regional
    order in the Middle East by developing a ballistic missile
    capability, supporting terrorism, training and arming pro-
    Iranian militant groups, and engaging in other malign
    activities in places such--Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, Bahrain,
    and Yemen. As the Islamic Republic receives tens of billions of
    dollars in sanctions relief from the nuclear deal, it's obvious
    that these activities will only increase.
        Russia annexed Crimea and continues to destabilize Ukraine
    with troubling implications for security in Europe. Putin's
    intervention in Syria has undermined negotiations to end the
    conflict by convincing Assad and his allies they can win.
        In Asia, North Korea continues to develop its nuclear
    arsenal and ever more capable ballistic missiles, one of which
    it tested this weekend, in violation of multiple U.N. Security
    Council resolutions.
        China continues its rapid military modernization while
    taking coercive actions to assert expansive territorial claims.
    At the time of this hearing last year, China had reclaimed a
    total of 400 acres in the Spratly Islands. Today, that figure
    is a staggering 3,200 acres, with extensive infrastructure
    construction underway or already complete.
        I look forward to our witnesses' assessment of the nature
    and scope of these challenges and how the intelligence
    community prioritizes and approaches the diverse and complex
    threats we face. As policymakers, we look to the intelligence
    community to provide timely and accurate information about the
    nature of the threats we face and the intentions of our
    adversaries. We have high expectations of our intelligence
    community, as we should, and as they do of themselves. However,
    we cannot afford to believe that our intelligence agencies are
    omniscient and omnipresent, especially after years of
    sequestration and arbitrary budget caps that have damaged our
    Nation's intelligence every bit as much as they have the rest
    of our national defense.
        Unfortunately, this misperception is only fed by the
    prideful assertions of politicians seeking to justify their
    policies. For example, during the Iran deal, we were told that
    the United States has, quote, ``absolute knowledge about Iran's
    nuclear military activities.'' We were told that the deal,
    quote, ``absolutely guarantees that we will know if Iran cheats
    and pursues a nuclear option.'' This hubris is dangerously
    misleading and compromises the integrity of our debate over
    important questions of U.S. national security policy.
        Americans must know that intelligence is not like in the
    movies. Although our intelligence professionals are the best in
    the world, there will not always be a satellite in position or
    a drone overhead, and not every terrorist phone call will be
    intercepted. Whether it is Russian military activities on the
    border of NATO [the North Atlantic Treaty Organization] or the
    movement of terrorist groups across the world or of any of the
    other number of hard targets that we expect our intelligence
    community to penetrate and understand, we will not always know
    how our adversaries make decisions, let alone understand their
    implications.
        This is doubly true if we further constrain our Nation's
    intelligence professionals through policy decisions that limit
    their effectiveness. Our intelligence capacity and capability
    are just like anything else, constrained by the limitations of
    time, space, technology, resources, and policy. As one senior
    U.S. official acknowledged about limited understanding of ISIL
    2 years ago, quote, ``A lot of the intelligence collection that
    we were receiving diminished significantly following the United
    States withdrawal in Iraq in 2011, when we lost some of the
    boots-on-the-ground view of what was going on.'' Put simply, if
    our national leaders decide not to be present in places, we
    should not be surprised later when we lack sufficient
    intelligence about the threats and dangers that are emerging
    there.
        As we receive this important intelligence update today, we
    must remember that it is the responsibility of policymakers,
    from the White House to the Pentagon to here on Capitol Hill,
    to invest in cutting-edge capabilities that can provide early
    indication and warning as well as to provide our intelligence
    professionals with sound policy decisions and support,
    including, at times, military support that enable them to
    perform their often dangerous and always important work on
    behalf of our Nation. If we fail to make these commitments, we
    will continue to be surprised by events at an ever increasing
    cost to our national security.
        Senator Reed.

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me join you in welcoming the Director of National
    Intelligence, General Clapper, and Director of Defense
    Intelligence Agency, General Stewart. Your long service, both
    of you gentlemen, to the Nation is deserving of praise.
        I particularly want to echo the Chairman's comments,
    General Clapper, about your distinguished service and your
    continued service, I'm sure.
        Thank you, gentlemen.
        We live at a time when there is a complex array of threats
    facing the United States, some immediate, some in the future.
    It is a challenge to both the administration and Congress to
    decide how to allocate our Nation's finite resources to address
    those threats. Your testimony today will provide needed insight
    for our committee on that challenge.
        In Afghanistan, for example, the security and political
    environments both remain challenging. The Taliban have sought
    to take advantage of the still maturing Afghan Security Forces
    by increasing their operational tempo, especially in rural
    areas. Also, an ISIL affiliate has entered the battlefield in
    the form of the so-called Islamic State in the Khorasan
    Province, or ISKP. All the while, remnants of al-Qaeda continue
    to seek a resurgence. Pakistani army operations across the
    border have added to the dynamic by pushing other bad actors,
    including the Pakistan Taliban and Haqqani Network into
    Afghanistan. I look forward to the assessment of our witnesses
    of these security challenges for the coming year and the
    prospects of reconciliation between the Afghan government and
    the Taliban.
        While ISIL controls less territory in Iraq and Syria than
    it did a year ago, it remains a significant threat to regional
    stability, the United States, and our allies. As our efforts to
    support the Iraqi Security Forces and local forces in Syria
    continue, there are a number of questions we may not--must ask.
    What local forces will serve as the whole force once ISIL is
    removed from Mosul, Raqqa, and the surrounding areas? How will
    Iran seek to advance its interests in Iraq? How will Turkey
    respond to the threat posed by ISIL within its borders? Will
    our partners across the Gulf unify their efforts in Syria? How
    will ISIL react within Iraq and Syria and transregionally as it
    is put under increasing amounts of pressure? These are
    questions our military forces must factor into their planning
    efforts in order to ensure the success of our campaign. Again,
    I look forward to your assessments on these important issues.
        The past year has seen substantial changes in the nature of
    the international community's relationship with Iran. The Joint
    Comprehensive Plan of Action [JCPOA] between the so-called P5+1
    and Iran has halted and rolled back dangerous elements of
    Iran's nuclear program and, critically, has placed it under the
    most comprehensive and rigorous verification regime ever
    assembled. I hope our witnesses will provide their assessment
    of the likelihood of Iran complying with this agreement over
    its term.
        While the JCPOA made substantial progress with respect to
    Iran's nuclear program, it also enabled Iran to return to the
    international economic community. This presents the United
    States and our partners in the Middle East with an adversary
    with additional resources they may use to support its proxies
    in places like Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and other locations in
    the Gulf. Iran may also choose to use these additional
    resources to advance its missile program. Iran's decisions in
    these respects will be a key metric as we evaluate how to array
    our forces across the Gulf and what assistance our partners
    across the region will require to confront Iran. I would
    welcome our witnesses' assessment of the Gulf nations' current
    capacity to counter Iran's proxies and unconventional forces,
    and where this committee should consider additional investments
    to better support our partners' requirements.
        Russia's posturing and increasingly aggressive acts in
    eastern Europe and in the Middle East are something we must
    continue to monitor, contain, and, when necessary, counter. The
    President's decision to increase funding for the European
    Reassurance Initiative is a critical step. We must keep a
    watchful eye on the Putin regime, particularly his use of
    conventional and unconventional tactics to bully its neighbors
    and others.
        Russia's Syrian campaign has, for the moment, eclipsed its
    aggression into Crimea and Ukraine as the most serious
    flashpoint in United States-Russian relations. In Syria, Russia
    continues to bolster the military of the Bashar al-Assad regime
    while simultaneously running an information operations campaign
    to suggest that its military operations are instead focused
    against the Islamic State. Unlike Russia's obscured hand in
    Ukraine, its actions in Syria are being played out in daily
    headlines that report on Russia's indiscriminate bombing and
    its support of the Syrian regime in areas where moderate forces
    are aiming to get out from under the rule of the Assad regime.
    This is a complex problem for the United States, the coalition
    fighting ISIL, and our friends and allies in the region. I look
    forward to hearing how the intelligence community sees this
    situation and how the United States can best protect and
    advance our interests.
        North Korea presents an immediate and present danger to
    global security. The regime conducted a rocket launch just a
    few days ago, in violation of multiple U.N. [United Nations]
    Security Council resolutions following its January nuclear
    test. While China could exert pressure on North Korea through
    economic sanctions to encourage the regime to desist, the Xi
    administration prefers to remain on good terms with the North
    Korean regime, putting the entire region at risk. Without
    China's cooperation, it is clear that North Korea will continue
    to develop its nuclear and ballistic missile capability.
        China continues to invest aggressively, itself, in its
    military, particularly in capabilities that allow China to
    project power and deny access to others. While China's economy
    has experienced the most significant challenges in recent
    memory, China is continuing its aggressive efforts to solidify
    its claims in the South China Sea, despite the protests of its
    sovereign neighbors. It is critical that we enhance our
    partnerships with others across the region to bring China into
    the rule of law based on a global regime that will guarantee
    peace and prosperity across the region.
        It's also critical that we use all of the Nation's tools to
    ensure that China's continued theft of our intellectual
    property is put to a halt. I will look forward to your views
    regarding China's adherence to President Xi's pledge to
    President Obama to cease such economic espionage.
        An area of equal concern is the threats and opportunities
    presented by cyberspace. From a military standpoint, our forces
    remain dependent on our ability to collect intelligence,
    conduct defensive cyberoperations to protect our networks and
    also our intellectual property, and, as appropriate, to counter
    with offensive cyberoperations, including actions against
    certain adversaries who utilize the Internet for recruitment,
    propaganda, and command and control. We look forward to our
    witnesses' assessment of these approaches.
        Again, let me thank you, gentlemen, for your service. I
    look forward to your testimony.
        Chairman McCain. Director Clapper.

       STATEMENT OF HONORABLE JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR., DIRECTOR OF
                         NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

        Mr. Clapper. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and
    distinguished members of the committee, first, thank you both
    for your acknowledgment of my service. It was--last week marked
    55 years since I enlisted in the Marine Corps Reserve. I'm very
    proud of that.
        Chairman McCain. In an auspicious----
        Mr. Clapper. I'm proud to be sitting next to one.
        Chairman McCain. In an auspicious beginning.
        Mr. Clapper. I also, Chairman McCain, would want to thank
    you for your acknowledgment of the great men and women who work
    in the intelligence community for both of us. I also appreciate
    your, I thought, very accurate statement about the capabilities
    of the intelligence community, what we can and can't do, and
    what it is reasonable to expect and not to expect us to do. I
    appreciate that.
        General Stewart and I are here today to update you on some,
    but certainly not all, of the pressing intelligence and
    national security issues facing our Nation. After listening to
    both of your statements, I think you're going to hear some
    echos here. So, in the interest of time and to get to your
    questions, we'll just cover some of the wave tops.
        As I said last year, unpredictable instability has become
    the new normal. This trend will continue for the foreseeable
    future. Violent extremists are operationally active in about 40
    countries. Seven countries are experiencing a collapse of
    central government authority. Fourteen others face regime-
    threatening or violent instability, or both. Another 59
    countries face a significant risk of instability through 2016.
        The record of level of migrants, more than 1 million,
    arriving in Europe is like to grow further this year. Migration
    and displacement will strain countries in Europe, Asia, Africa,
    and the Americas. There are now some 60 million people who are
    considered displaced globally. Extreme weather, climate change,
    environmental degradation, rising demand for food and water,
    poor policy decisions, and inadequate infrastructure will
    magnify this instability.
        Infectious diseases and vulnerabilities in the global
    supply chain for medical countermeasures will continue to pose
    threats. For example, the Zika virus, first detected in the
    western hemisphere in 2014, has reached the U.S. and is
    projected to cause up to 4 million cases in this hemisphere.
        With that preface, I want to briefly comment on both
    technology and cyber:
        Technological innovation during the next few years will
    have an even more significant impact on our way of life. This
    innovation is central to our economic prosperity, but it will
    bring new security vulnerabilities. The Internet of Things will
    connect tens of billions of new physical devices that could be
    exploited. Artificial intelligence will enable computers to
    make autonomous decisions about data and physical systems, and
    potentially disrupt labor markets.
        Russia and China continue to have the most sophisticated
    cyberprograms. China continues cyber espionage against the
    United States. Whether China's commitment of last September
    moderates its economic espionage remains to be seen. Iran and
    North Korea continue to conduct cyber espionage as they enhance
    their attack capabilities.
        Nonstate actors also pose cyberthreats. ISIL has used cyber
    to its great advantage, not only for recruitment and
    propaganda, but also to hack and release sensitive information
    about U.S. military personnel. As a nonstate actor, ISIL
    displays unprecedented online proficiency. Cyber criminals
    remain the most pervasive cyberthreat to the U.S. financial
    sector. They use cyber to conduct theft, extortion, and other
    criminal activities.
        Turning to terrorism, there are now more Sunni violent
    extremist groups, members, and safe havens than at any time in
    history. The rate of foreign fighters traveling to the conflict
    zones in Syria and Iraq in the past few years is without
    precedent. At least 38,200 foreign fighters, including at least
    6900 from Western countries, have traveled to Syria from at
    least 120 countries since the beginning of the conflict in
    2012. As we saw in the November Paris attacks, returning
    foreign fighters with firsthand battlefield experience pose a
    dangerous operational threat. ISIL has demonstrated
    sophisticated attack tactics and tradecraft.
        ISIL, including its eight established and several more
    emerging branches, has become the preeminent global terrorist
    threat. They have attempted or conducted scores of attacks
    outside of Syria and Iraq in the past 15 months. ISIL's
    estimated strength worldwide exceeds that of al-Qaeda. ISIL's
    leaders are determined to strike the United States homeland,
    beyond inspiring homegrown violent extremist attacks. Although
    the United States is a much harder target than Europe, ISIL
    external operations remain a critical factor in our threat
    assessments for 2016.
        Al-Qaeda's affiliates also have proven resilient. Despite
    counterterrorism pressure that's largely decimated the core
    leadership in Afghanistan and Pakistan, al-Qaeda affiliates are
    positioned to make gains in 2016. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian
    Peninsula, or AQAP, and the al-Nusra Front, the al-Qaeda
    chapter in Syria, are the two most capable al-Qaeda branches.
    The increased use by violent extremists of encrypted and secure
    Internet and mobile-based technologies enables terrorist actors
    to, quote, ``go dark'' and serves to undercut intelligence and
    law enforcement efforts.
        Iran continues to be the foremost state sponsor of
    terrorism and exert its influence in regional crises in the
    Mideast through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Quds
    Force, its terrorist partner, Lebanese Hezbollah, and proxy
    groups. Iran and Hezbollah remain a continuing terrorist threat
    to United States interests and partners worldwide.
        We saw firsthand the threat posed in the United States by
    homegrown violent extremists in the July attack in Chattanooga
    and the attack in San Bernardino. In 2014, the FBI arrested
    nine ISIL supporters. In 2015, that number increased over
    fivefold.
        Turning to weapons of mass destruction, North Korea
    continues to conduct test activities of concern to the United
    States. On Saturday evening, Pyongyang conducted a satellite
    launch and subsequently claimed that the satellite was
    successfully placed in orbit. Additionally, last month North
    Korea carried out its fourth nuclear test, claiming it was a
    hydrogen bomb, but the yield was too low for it to have been
    successful test of a staged thermonuclear device.
        Pyongyang continues to produce fissile material and develop
    a submarine-launch ballistic missile. It is also committed to
    developing a long-range nuclear-armed missile that's capable of
    posing a direct threat to the United States, although a system
    has not been flight tested.
        Despite its economic challenges, Russia continues its
    aggressive military modernization program. It continues to have
    the largest and most capable foreign nuclear-armed ballistic
    missile force. It has developed a cruise missile that violates
    the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force, or INF, Treaty.
        China, for its part, continues to modernize its nuclear
    missile force and is striving for secure second-strike
    capability, although it continues to profess a no-first-use
    doctrine.
        The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, provides
    us much greater transparency into Iran's fissile material
    production. It increases the time the Iranians would need to
    produce enough highly enriched uranium weapon for a nuclear
    weapon from a few months to about a year. Iran probably views
    the JCPOA as a means to remove sanctions while preserving
    nuclear capabilities. Iran's perception of how the JCPOA helps
    it achieve its overall strategic goals will dictate the level
    of its adherence to the agreement over time.
        Chemical weapons continue to pose a threat in Syria and
    Iraq. Damascus has used chemicals against the opposition on
    multiple occasions since Syria joined the Chemical Weapons
    Convention. ISIL has also used toxic chemicals in Iraq and
    Syria, including the blister agent, sulfur mustard; first time
    an extremist group has produced and used a chemical warfare
    agent in an attack since Aum Shinrikyo used sarin in Japan in
    1995.
        In space and counterspace, about 80 countries are now
    engaged in the space domain. Russia and China understand how
    our military fights and how heavily we rely on space. They are
    each pursuing destructive and disruptive anti-satellite
    systems. China continues to make progress on its anti-satellite
    missile program.
        Moving to counterintelligence, the threat from foreign
    intelligence entities, both state and nonstate, is persistent,
    complex, and evolving. Targeting and collection of U.S.
    political, military, economic, and technical information by
    foreign intelligence services continues unabated. Russia and
    China pose the greatest threat, followed by Iran and Cuba, on a
    lesser scale. As well, the threat from insiders taking
    advantage of their access to collect and remove sensitive
    national security information will remain a persistent
    challenge for us.
        I do want to touch on one transnational crime issue;
    specifically, drug trafficking. Southwest border seizures of
    heroin in the United States have doubled since 2010. Over
    10,000 people died of heroin overdoses in 2014, much of it
    laced with Fentanyl, which is 30 to 50 times more potent than
    heroin. In that same year, more than 28,000 died from opioid
    overdoses. Cocaine production in Colombia, from which most
    United States supplies originate, has increased significantly.
        Now let me quickly move through a few regional issues. In
    East Asia, China's leaders are pursuing an active foreign
    policy while dealing with much slower economic growth. Chinese
    leaders have also embarked on the most ambitious military
    reforms in China's history. Regional tension will continue as
    China pursues construction at its outposts in the South China
    Sea.
        Russia has demonstrated its military capabilities to
    project itself as a global power, command respect from the
    West, maintain domestic support for the regime, and advance
    Western--Russian interests globally. Moscow's objectives in
    Ukraine will probably remain unchanged, including maintaining
    long-term influence over Kiev and frustrating its attempt to
    integrate into Western institutions. Putin is the first leader
    since Stalin to expand Russia's territory. Moscow's military
    venture into Syria marks its first use since its foray into
    Afghanistan of significant expeditionary combat power outside
    the post-Soviet space. Its interventions demonstrate the
    improvements in Russian military capabilities and the Kremlin's
    confidence in using them. Moscow faces the reality, however, of
    economic reception--recession driven, in large part, by falling
    oil prices as well as sanctions. Russia's nearly 4 percent GDP
    [gross domestic product] contraction last year will probably
    extend into 2016.
        In the Middle East and South Asia, there are more cross-
    border military operations underway in the Mideast than at any
    time since the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Anti-ISIL forces in Iraq
    will probably make incremental gains through this spring, some
    of those made in Beiji and Ramadi in the past few months. ISIL
    is now somewhat on the defensive, and its territory and
    manpower are shrinking, but it remains a formidable threat.
        In Syria, pro-regime forces have the initiative of having
    made some strategic gains near Aleppo and Latakia in the north,
    as well as in southern Syria. Manpower shortages will continue
    to undermine the Syrian regime's ability to accomplish
    strategic battlefield objectives. The opposition has less
    equipment and firepower, and its groups lack unity. They
    sometimes have competing battlefield interests and fight among
    themselves. In the meantime, some 250,000 people have been
    killed as this war has dragged on. The humanitarian situation
    in Syria continues to deteriorate. As of last month, there were
    approximately 4.4 million Syrian refugees and another 6 and a
    half million internally displaced persons, which together
    represent about half of Syria's pre-conflict population.
        In Libya, despite the December agreement to form a new
    Government of National Accord, establishing authority and
    security across the country will be difficult, to put it
    mildly, with hundreds of militia groups operating throughout
    the country. ISIL has established its most developed branch
    outside of Syria, in Iraq and Libya, and maintains a presence
    in Sirte, Benghazi, Tripoli, and other areas of the country.
        The Yemeni conflict will probably remain stalemated through
    at least mid-2016. Meanwhile, AQAP and ISIL's affiliates in
    Yemen have exploited the conflict and the collapse of
    government authority to recruit and expand territorial control.
    The country's economic and humanitarian situation also
    continues to worsen.
        Iran deepened its involvement in the Syrian, Iraq, and
    Yemeni conflicts in 2015. It also increased military
    cooperation with Russia, highlighted by its battlefield
    alliance in Syria in support of the regime. Iran's Supreme
    Leader continues to view the United States as a major threat.
    We assess that his views will not change, despite the
    implementation of the JCPOA deal, the exchange of detainees,
    and the release of the ten sailors.
        In South Asia, Afghanistan is at serious risk of a
    political breakdown during 2016, occasioned by mounting
    political, economic, and security challenges. Waning political
    cohesion, increasingly assertive local powerbrokers, financial
    shortfalls, and sustained countrywide Taliban attacks are
    eroding stability.
        Needless to say, there are many more threats to U.S.
    interests worldwide than we can address, most of which are
    covered in our statement for the record, but I will stop my
    litany of doom here and pass to General Stewart.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Clapper follows:]

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         Chairman McCain. General Stewart.

       STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL VINCENT R. STEWART, USMC,
              DIRECTOR OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

        General Stewart. Chairman McCain, Ranking Members--Ranking
    Member Reed, members of the committee, thank you for this
    opportunity to provide the Defense Intelligence Agency's [DIA]
    assessment of global security environment and the threats
    facing the Nation.
        Mr. Chairman, my statement for the record details a range
    of multifaceted challenges, adversaries, threats, foreign
    military capabilities, and transnational terrorist networks.
    Taken together, these issues reflect the diversity, scope, and
    complexity of today's challenges to our national security. In
    my opening remarks, I would like to highlight just a few of
    these threats.
        The Islamic State in the Levant: With coalition forces
    engaged against the Islamic State of Iraq in the Levant, DIA is
    helping the warfighter and our policymakers better understand
    both the ideology and the capabilities of ISIL. ISIS--ISIL, as
    well as like-minded extremists are born out of the same extreme
    and violent Sunni Salafist ideology. These Salafi jihadists are
    determined to restore the caliphate and, as they have shown,
    are willing to justify extreme violence in their efforts to
    impose their social order on others. As the Paris attacks
    demonstrated, ISIL has become the most significant terrorist
    threats to the United States and our allies. In 2015, the group
    remained entrenched in Iraq and Syria, and expanded globally.
    Spectacular external attacks demonstrate ISIL's relevance and
    reach, and are a key part of their narrative. ISIL will
    probably attempt to conduct additional attacks in Europe and
    attempt to direct attacks on the United States homeland in
    2016. ISIL's foreign fighter cadre is core to its external
    attack capability, and the large number of Western jihadists in
    Iraq and Syria will pose a challenge for Western security
    services.
        On the ground in Syria and Iraq, ISIL continues to control
    large swaths of territory. In 2015, coalition airstrikes
    impeded ISIL's ability to operate openly in Iraq and Syria,
    curtailed its use of conventional military equipment, and
    forced it to lower its profile. In 2016, the growing number of
    anti-ISIL forces and emerging resource shortfalls will probably
    challenge ISIL's ability to govern in Iraq and Syria. However,
    the group will probably retain Sunni Arab urban centers.
        In Afghanistan: In their first full year in the lead,
    Afghan Security Forces increasingly conducted independent
    operations. However, these forces struggled to adapt to a lack
    of coalition enablers and the high operational tempo, which led
    to uneven execution of operations. As a result, insurgents
    expanded their influence in rural areas, limiting the extension
    of government control. The deployment of Afghan specialized
    units and their enablers will be necessary to continue securing
    key population centers.
        In Russia: Russian military activity has continued at
    historical high. Moscow continues to pursue aggressive foreign
    and defense policies, including conducting operations in Syria,
    sustaining involvement in the Ukraine, and expanding military
    capabilities in the Arctic. Last year, the Russian military
    continued its robust exercise schedule and aggressively and
    occasionally provocative out-of-area deployments. We anticipate
    similar high levels of military activity in 2016.
        China is pursuing a long-term comprehensive military
    modernization program to advance its core interests, which
    include maintaining its sovereignty, protecting its territorial
    integrity, and projecting its regional influence, particularly
    in the South China Sea. In addition to modernizing equipment
    and operations, the PLA has undergone massive structural
    reforms, including increasing the number of navy, air force,
    and rocket force personnel, establishing a theater joint
    command system, and reducing their current military regions
    down to five joint theater of operations. China has the world's
    largest and most comprehensive missile force and has
    prioritized the development and deployment of regional
    ballistic and cruise missiles to expand its conventional strike
    capabilities against U.S. forces in the region. They field an
    anti-ship ballistic missile, which provides the capability to
    attack U.S. aircraft carriers in the western Pacific ocean.
    China also displayed a new intermediate-range ballistic missile
    capable of striking Guam during its September 2015 military
    parade in Beijing.
        North Korea's nuclear weapons program and evolving
    ballistic missile programs are a continuing threat. In early
    January, North Korea issued a statement claiming that it had
    successfully carried out a nuclear test. A couple days ago,
    they conducted their sixth space launch. This launch was the
    second launch to place a satellite into orbit. The DPRK display
    of a new or modified mobile ICBM during their recent parade,
    and its 2015 test of a new submarine-launch ballistic missile
    capability, further highlight Pyongyang's commitment to
    diversifying its missile force and nuclear delivery options.
    North Korea is--also continues to its effort to expand its
    stockpile of weapons-grade fissile material.
        In space, China and Russia increasingly recognize the
    strategic value of space and are focused on diminishing our
    advantage, with the intent of denying the U.S. the use of space
    in the event of conflict. Both countries are conducting anti-
    satellite research and developing anti-satellite weapons,
    making the space domain increasingly competitive, contested,
    and congested.
        In cyberspace, DIA remains concerned about the growing
    capabilities of advanced state actors, such as Russia and
    China. These actors target DOD personnel, networks, supply
    chain, research and development, and critical infrastructure
    information in cyber domain. Iran and North Korea also remain a
    significant threat to conduct disruptive cyberspace attacks.
    Nonstate actors' use of cyberspace to recruit, propagandize,
    and conduct open-source research remains a significant
    challenge.
        Mr. Chairman, the men and women of your DIA are providing
    unique defense intelligence around the world and around the
    clock to warfighters, defense planners, the defense acquisition
    community, and policymakers to provide warning and defeat these
    and other threats. I look forward to the committee's questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Stewart follows:]

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        Chairman McCain. Thank you very much, General.
        Director Clapper, in all these many decades you have served
    this country, have you ever seen more diverse or serious
    challenges to this country's security?
        Mr. Clapper. No, sir, I have not. I have said that--
    something like that virtually every year I've been up here.
    This is my fifth or sixth time. I decided to leave it out this
    year because it's kind of a cliche, but it's actually true
    that, in my 50-plus years in the intelligence business, I
    don't--I cannot recall a more diverse array of challenges and
    crises that we confront as we do today.
        Chairman McCain. Your job has been made considerably more
    difficult because of sequestration.
        Mr. Clapper. Yes, sir, it has. I think the biggest problem
    with it, frankly, over time, is the uncertainty that it injects
    in a context of planning, and particularly--and it plays havoc
    with systems acquisition. So, it's--the uncertainty factor that
    we now have is--that has also become a normal fact of planning
    and programming.
        Chairman McCain. Thank you.
        Just in the last few days, the issue of torture has arisen
    again. General David Petraeus made a statement that I'd like to
    quote to you. He says, ``Our Nation has paid a high price in
    recent decades for the information gained by the use of
    techniques beyond those in the Field Manual. In my view, that
    price far outweighed the value of the information gained
    through the use of techniques''--i.e., waterboarding--``beyond
    those in the manual.'' The manual obviously prohibits
    waterboarding and other forms of torture. Do you agree with
    General Petraeus's assessment?
        Mr. Clapper. I do. I believe the--the Army Field Manual is
    the standard, and that is what we should abide by. It serves
    the purposes of both providing a framework for the elicitation
    of valuable intelligence information, and it comports with
    American values.
        Chairman McCain. That's the point, I think. Isn't it the
    fact that this is--American values are the--are such that
    just--no matter what the enemy does, that we maintain a higher
    standard of behavior, and, when we violate that, as we did with
    Abu Ghraib, that the consequences are severe?
        Mr. Clapper. Yes, sir.
        Chairman McCain. An erosion of our moral authority.
        Mr. Clapper. I would agree with that.
        Chairman McCain. Isn't it already proven that Mr. Baghdadi
    is sending people with this flow of refugees that are
    terrorists, that--in order to inflict further attacks on Europe
    and the United States?
        Mr. Clapper. That's correct. That's--one technique they've
    used is taking advantage of the torrent of migrants to insert
    operatives into that flow. As well, they also have available to
    them, and are pretty skilled at, phony passports so they can
    travel ostensibly as legitimate travelers, as well.
        Chairman McCain. They're pretty good at establishing secure
    sites for them to continue to communicate.
        Mr. Clapper. That's true. That--I alluded to that in my
    opening statement, about the impacts of encryption and the
    growth of encrypted applications, which has--having a negative
    impact on intelligence-gathering. I recently traveled to Texas,
    and this is affecting not only us in the national security
    realm, but State and local officials, as well.
        Chairman McCain. As you know, in addition to the Atlas
    rocket, which uses the Russian RD-180 rocket engine, the United
    Launch Alliance also maintains an American rocket with an
    American engine. As we continue to have this important debate
    about how to break our Nation's dependency on Russia for
    national security space launch, do you believe we need to look
    seriously at that American rocket, the Delta, as an alternative
    way to get off the RD-180 and encourage competition from other
    organizations capable of providing us with this ability?
        Mr. Clapper. I'm a customer, Chairman McCain, of the launch
    industry in the United States. My interest is in seeing to it
    that our overhead reconnaissance constellation is replenished,
    and replenished on time. There is a capability with the Delta
    that--as you allude--which is, we think, from our standpoint,
    since we pay the freight when we use these systems--which is
    both effective and cost-efficient. I certainly do agree on--you
    know, a fundamental American tenet of the competition. That's
    why I'm quite encouraged by the aggressive approach that SpaceX
    has taken. Our plan is to certify SpaceX for carrying national
    security payloads into space.
        Chairman McCain. It's not in our interest in any way to
    continue our dependency on Russian rocket engines.
        Mr. Clapper. Well, I--from--just speaking as a citizen, I'd
    rather we didn't--we're more dependent on the RD-180s. We have
    been, and they've worked for us. Again, my interest, though, is
    getting those payloads up on time.
        Chairman McCain. Thank you very much.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        General Clapper, to date what's your assessment of the
    compliance by the Iranians with the JCPOA, your--the community?
        Mr. Clapper. Right now--and I think the key milestone here
    was implementation day on the 16th of January. The Iranians did
    comply with the requirements that were--that they were required
    to live up to. I think we, in the intelligence community, are
    very much in the distrust-and-verify mode. There are a half a
    dozen or so ambiguities--maybe others, but certainly a half a
    dozen or so ambiguities in the agreement that we have
    identified, and we're going to be very vigilant about Iranian
    compliance.
        Senator Reed. Well, that's exactly what you should be
    doing. I commend you for that.
        Just going forward, are you confident that you could detect
    a serious deviation from the agreements in sufficient time to
    give the executive options?
        Mr. Clapper. Yes, sir, I am confident. I will--my
    fingerprints are on the infamous Weapons of Mass Destruction
    National Intelligence Estimate of October 2002. I was serving
    in another capacity then. So, I think we approached this with
    confidence, but also with institutional humility.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, sir.
        There are many challenges that are being posed by the
    Russians, but the Russians are facing a challenge of
    unexpectedly low oil prices that seem to be continuing. Has the
    intelligence community made an assessment of the impact, medium
    to long term on this, on the ability of the Russians to
    maintain their military posture and their provocative actions?
        Mr. Clapper. Well, the price of oil has had--the falling
    price of oil has had huge impacts on the Russian economy.
    It's--the price of Ural crude is running around $28 a barrel.
    The Russians' planning factor for their--planning and
    programming for their budget is around $50 a barrel. So, this
    is causing all kinds of strain, if you look at all the
    classical measurements--economic measures--inflation, the value
    of the ruble, which has sunk to an alltime low, unemployment,
    stresses on their welfare system, et cetera, et cetera.
        That said, the Russians appear to be sustaining their
    commitment to their aggressive modernization program,
    particularly in the--with their strategic missiles.
        Senator Reed. Looking ahead, though, is there any
    indication or--this is an area that you're picking up
    information through many sources that are reflecting great
    concern by the Russians on their ability to keep this up, or
    looking at----
        Mr. Clapper. Well, that determination will be made by one
    man. I think, for lots of reasons, he will sustain the
    expeditionary activity in Syria, although I think perhaps even
    the Russians are seeing that this is headed for stalemate, in
    the absence of a substantial ground-force insertion, which I
    don't believe the Russians are disposed to do.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Quickly changing topics in the remaining minute and a half.
    In Afghanistan, multiple challenges. President Ghani is trying
    to pursue a reconciliation with the Taliban. In that regard,
    there is at least a four-nation process: China, Pakistan, the
    United States, and Afghanistan. Any insights about the
    possibility of reconciliation or the motivation of any of the
    parties to the--to this action?
        Mr. Clapper. Well, I think that--you know, the Taliban
    position has consistently been not to do that, not to
    negotiate. They're the first--the precondition they always
    ascribe is the removal of foreign forces. I don't see them
    changing that position.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        General Stewart, thank you for your distinguished service.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        This is a very accurate litany of doom. You covered a lot
    of stuff in a short period of time. We'll have to go back and
    reread that.
        When you look at what--right now, we're kind of in a
    situation where, ``Russia is pursuing new concepts and
    capabilities and expanding the role of nuclear weapons, that
    security strategy.'' That's a quote out of the U.S. National
    Intelligence--so, you covered that also in your--briefly in
    your opening remarks.
        When we talk to people on the outside and they say, you
    know, ``You have Russia saying--stating they're going to make
    these advances, they're going to modernize, and yet we have a
    policy where we're not doing it.'' What's a justification? What
    kind of answer can we give people who ask that question,
    including me?
        Mr. Clapper. Well, sir, that's a policy issue. I worry
    about the adversaries. I've used this metaphor before this
    committee. General Stewart and I and the rest of the
    intelligence community are just down in the engine room
    shoveling intelligence coal----
        Senator Inhofe. Yeah.
        Mr. Clapper.--and people on the bridge get to decide where
    the ship goes, and how fast, and arrange the furniture on the
    deck. So, I--that's a policy issue that others decide.
        Senator Inhofe. Well, I personally don't think it's a good
    policy, but we all have opinions on that.
        I was fortunate enough to be over in the Ukraine, back when
    Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk were successful in their parliamentary
    elections, and the first time in 96 years there's not one
    Communist in the Parliament. That's really kind of exciting,
    although I was upset with our lack of--when Putin came in and
    started killing people--with our lack of support, at that time,
    as a policy for Ukraine. As we're looking at it now, and in--
    there's been statements made from Russia saying that, ``As the
    NATO becomes more aggressive and we become more aggressive,
    they're going to become more aggressive''--does it look to you
    like it's--that's going on right now? What's--what'll be the
    end game of that?
        Mr. Clapper. I think--answer your last question on what the
    end game is, I don't know, but I will say that the Russians--I
    might ask General Stewart to comment on this--but, I think the
    Russians fundamentally are paranoid about NATO. They're greatly
    concerned about being contained and, of course, very concerned
    about missile defense, which would serve to neuter what is
    their--the essence of their claim to great-power status, which
    is their nuclear arsenal.
        So, a lot of these aggressive things that the Russians are
    doing, for a number of reasons--great-power status to create
    the image of being coequal with the United States, et cetera--I
    think could probably--could possibly go on, and we could be
    into another Cold War-like spiral, here.
        Senator Inhofe. Well, that--the Cold War, that--I was
    thinking of that at the time. Isn't that what we went through
    for such a long period of time, where you had Russia--or USSR--
    making the statements and preparing themselves and wanting to
    outdo us--I mean, just for the image? I see this as something
    kind of similar to that.
        Director Clapper, in your prepared statement, you said
    the--and this is a quote--``United States air campaigns have
    made significant gains in ISIL.'' Then we have reports that the
    United States fights against ISIL is actually benefiting al-
    Qaeda. Is there a relationship--or, what is that relationship
    between al-Qaeda and ISIL?
        Mr. Clapper. Well, I've seen that. I don't know that I
    could say that the airstrikes against ISIL are somehow
    benefiting al-Qaeda, because we're still keeping the pressure
    on----
        Senator Inhofe. Yeah.
        Mr. Clapper.--al-Qaeda.
        Senator Inhofe. You're familiar with those reports, though.
        Mr. Clapper. I've read them.
        Senator Inhofe. Yeah.
        Mr. Clapper. I'm not sure I would subscribe to them. There
    have been--you know, I think we have--there has been progress
    made against ISIL in its Iraq-Syria incarnation, because that
    assumes some of the accouterments or characteristics of a
    nation-state, and that, in turn, presents vulnerabilities that
    we can exploit. I think the important thing is to keep the
    pressure on, on multiple fronts, and keep attacking those
    things which are near and dear to ISIL, which is the oil
    infrastructure that it owns----
        Senator Inhofe. Yeah.
        Mr. Clapper.--and its access to money.
        Senator Inhofe. Yeah.
        One last question. My time's expired. The RD-180 issue,
    it's one we're looking at. I think there is a recognition that
    we need to keep using for a period of time as we make any
    transition that might be in the future. Now, we have--in the
    defense authorization bill of 2016, I guess it was, we talked
    about nine additional ones. I think the Air Force has
    requested, at one point, in some form, 18 additional ones. What
    is your thinking about that?
        Mr. Clapper. Well----
        Senator Inhofe. The transition.
        Mr. Clapper. I'll tell you, Senator. I--my position here
    is, I'm a user or a customer. I have to have certain payloads
    delivered on time to sustain the health and viability of our
    overhead reconnaissance system, which is extremely important to
    the Nation's security. I don't get into too much, other than I
    have to pay the bills, because I pay the Air Force whenever we
    avail ourselves of their launch services.
        How they design their systems, that's kind of up to them.
    I'm interested in delivery. The Delta is--worked great for us.
    It's--appears to me to be cost-efficient, and it is effective,
    in terms of--when we've used it, it delivers.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to join my colleagues in thanking both of you for
    your extraordinary service to our Nation.
        Director Clapper, you made the point, in response to
    Senator Reed and also in your testimony, that the international
    community is, in your words, ``well postured'' to detect any
    violation by Iran of the nuclear agreement. Has there been any
    indication so far that it is moving toward a violation?
        Mr. Clapper. No, not yet. The--no, we have no evidence,
    thus far, that they have--they're in a--moving towards
    violation.
        Senator Blumenthal. I'm sure you would agree that this
    Nation and the international community need to be vigilant and
    vigorous in enforcing this agreement.
        Mr. Clapper. Absolutely, sir. As I said earlier, I think
    we, in the U.S. intelligence community, are in the distrust-
    and-verify mode.
        Senator Blumenthal. The distrust-and-verify mode includes
    not only the IAEA, but also other investigative tools that you
    have at your disposal.
        Mr. Clapper. Absolutely.
        Senator Blumenthal. Going to the ballistic missile issue,
    which I believe is profoundly important--and General Stewart
    makes this point in his testimony, as well--I urged the
    President to impose sanctions and enforce them as a result of
    Iran's continued development of ballistic missiles, which are a
    threat, not only to the region, but also to our allies in
    Europe. Fortunately, he has heeded those calls from myself and
    letters that were joined by my colleagues.
        How important do you think it is that we continue to
    enforce sanctions in response to Iran's development of
    ballistic missiles?
        Mr. Clapper. Well, I think it's quite important that
    sanctions be enforced, not only for missiles, but for terrorism
    or any other things that are covered under the sanctions. The
    Iranians have a very formidable missile capability, which they
    continue to work on. They've fired some 140-or-so missiles
    since the original UNSCR [United Nations Security Council
    Resolution] 1929 of 2010. About half of those firings were
    going on during the negotiations, which were--of course, were--
    as you know, were separate from the actual negotiations.
        So, for our part, this is a challenge that we must attend
    to by being as vigilant as possible on gleaning intelligence
    about these capabilities and reporting that to our
    policymakers.
        Senator Blumenthal. Speaking for myself--and I believe my
    view is joined by other colleagues--I will continue to insist
    on vigorous enforcement of those sanctions because of the
    threat that you have very powerfully outlined.
        General Stewart, in your testimony, you make the point that
    the economic relief that Iran will see as a result of the JCPOA
    is unlikely, in the short term, to increase its military
    capability. Is that correct?
        General Stewart. I think it is--it is unlikely immediately,
    because I believe that the focus will be on internal economic
    gains. However, after 35 years of sanction, Iran has developed,
    as we've just discussed, the most capable missile force in the
    region. It's extended its lethality, its accuracy. It's got all
    the ranges covered. It can reach all of its regional targets.
    In the long term, I fully expect that they'll invest some of
    the money into improving the rest of their military
    capabilities.
        Senator Blumenthal. What is the ``long term''? In other
    words, how many years is ``long term''?
        General Stewart. Yeah.
        Senator Blumenthal. Are we talking 5 years, 10 years?
    Secondly, what should be our response--and I believe it has to
    be a robust and strong response--to that increase in longer-
    term military capabilities that threatens our allies and
    friends in the region, most particularly Israel, with terrorism
    and other conventional military capabilities, as well as the
    kinds of counterincentives we can provide?
        General Stewart. So, the long term might not be as far as 5
    years. We've already seen an agreement between Iran and the
    Russians for the S-300 Air Defense System. We're seeing Russia
    demonstrate tremendous capabilities as they've done their out-
    of-area deployment into Syria. So, there's lots of weapons
    technology being displayed. I suspect, within the next 2 to 5
    years, we can expect Iran to invest in some of those weapons
    technology that's being displayed in the Syrian battlefield by
    the Russians today.
        Senator Blumenthal. What should be our response?
        General Stewart. I think I'm going to punt that to the
    policymakers on the response to how Iran arms and how they
    might use this weapons capability.
        Senator Blumenthal. You would agree that we should respond
    robustly and strongly.
        General Stewart. I would agree that we should have a policy
    to be prepared to respond----
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
        General Stewart.--appropriately.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, General.
        Thank you, Director Clapper.
        Senator Reed [presiding]. On behalf of the Chairman,
    Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Well, we thank both of you for your service.
        Director Clapper, thank you for your decades of service to
    the country. That's something we all respect and value.
        General Stewart, I appreciate seeing you again. You've been
    in the battlefield, and you've seen it from both sides and know
    the importance of intelligence.
        Director Clapper, it seems to me that we are about to see a
    tremendous expansion of proliferation in the numbers actually
    of weapons and the countries that possess nuclear weapons on
    something that the world is united behind, trying to stop--the
    U.N. and the whole world. NATO has fought to maintain a limited
    number of nations with nuclear weapons, and we've been
    particularly concerned about nuclear weapons in the Middle
    East. Where do we stand on that from a strategic position? Your
    best judgment of the risk we're now facing.
        Mr. Clapper. Well, the--of course, we worry about North
    Korea in this respect. I think--in the Mideast, I think the
    agreement, the JCPOA, which does prevent, if it's complied
    with, a nuclear capability in Iran, at least in the foreseeable
    future, that should serve as a tempering factor for the likes
    of--for other countries that may feel threatened if, in fact,
    Iran proceeded on with its nuclear weapons program.
        Senator Sessions. Well, we've got India and Pakistan.
    Secretary Kissinger testified here a year ago, I suppose, in
    which he said that we could see multiple nations in the Middle
    East move toward nuclear weapons. We do know that North Korea
    will sell weapon technology, do we not? Have done so in the
    past?
        Mr. Clapper. That's true, that particularly North Korea is
    a proliferator. That's one of the principal ways they attempt
    to generate revenue, is through proliferation. I worry,
    frankly, about more mundane things, like MANPADs, which the
    North Koreans produce and proliferate throughout the world,
    which poses a great threat to aviation.
        So, I think our role in the intelligence community is to be
    as vigilant as we can about this, and report when proliferants
    spread. That--it is a great concern, and certainly--
    particularly in the Mideast.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you. That is a serious subject.
        General Stewart, tell us where we stand in Iraq. You served
    there, and you were involved with the Sunnis in al-Anbar
    Province. You saw them flip and become turned against al-Qaeda.
    Can we replicate that now? What are the prospects for the
    Sunnis once again turning against the terrorists?
        General Stewart. I think if the Sunnis believe that they
    have a real prospect, either for an involvement with the Iraqi
    government or some other confederation construct where their
    views and interests are represented--I think they will likely
    turn against ISIL. I don't think that that message is--been
    effectively communicated yet. I think Abadi would like a more
    inclusive government, but I'm not sure that he has all of the
    members of his ruling body behind such inclusivity. Until that
    occurs, then the Sunni tribes are very likely to remain either
    on the fence or choose the least worst option, which is to not
    antagonize, and maybe even support, ISIL in the western part of
    Iraq.
        Senator Sessions. That would be the decisive action that
    needs to occur, that, once again, the decisive action would be
    if the Sunnis would turn against ISIL as they turned against
    al-Qaeda.
        General Stewart. I think that would absolutely be decisive,
    but I think they'll be very cautious to ensure that we will not
    leave them hanging out there after they've turned against ISIL.
    This is pure pragmatism. If they're not--if we're not
    successful, we're not supportive of the Sunni tribes, they will
    die. Al-Qaeda--or ISIL will be brutal, they'll be ruthless. If
    we're going to support them, we're going to try to convince
    them to turn and fight against ISIL, then we have to have the
    true commitment of the Government of Iraq and all of the
    parties to encourage them to fight against ISIL, because this
    is purely about survival for those tribes.
        Senator Sessions. Our effort to push back against ISIL
    would be a extremely important action--development.
        General Stewart. Yes, sir, I believe it would be.
        Senator Sessions. What about Mosul, city of a million, that
    would not have the heritage of ISIL and that kind of extremism?
    What are the prospects for turning the situation around in
    Mosul and freeing Mosul from ISIL's----
        General Stewart. I'm less optimistic in the near term about
    Mosul. I think there's lots of work to be done yet out in the
    western part. I don't believe that Ramadi is completely secure,
    so they have to secure Ramadi, they have to secure the Hit-
    Haditha Corridor in order to have some opportunity to fully
    encircle and bring all the forces against Mosul. Mosul will be
    complex operations. I'm not as optimistic--as you say, it's a
    large city. I'm not as optimistic that we'll be able to turn
    that, in the near term; in my view, certainly not this year. We
    may be able to begin the campaign, do some isolation operations
    around Mosul, but securing or taking Mosul is an extensive
    operation, and not something I see in the next year or so.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you very much, General Stewart.
        Chairman McCain [presiding]. Senator Heinrich.
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Welcome back, Director Clapper, General Stewart. Thank you
    for that predictably cheery briefing.
        Director Clapper, I've always believed that the ground war
    against ISIS [the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] must be won
    by our Arab partners rather than by American ground forces. It
    was, therefore, pretty encouraging to finally hear Saudi Arabia
    and the UAE [United Arab Emirates], over the weekend, voice
    some openness to putting ground forces in Syria. What's the
    intelligence community's assessment of the capability of Saudi
    and, UAE ground forces? How realistic do you think this
    proposal is? In other words, do you assess that they actually
    have the political will to potentially do that?
        Mr. Clapper. Well, let me start with UAE, which is a very,
    very capable military, although small. Their--the performance
    of their counterterrorist forces in Yemen have been quite
    impressive.
        I think--certainly appreciate and value the Saudi
    willingness to engage on the ground. I think that will be a
    challenge--would be a challenge for them if they were to try to
    take that on.
        General Stewart. If I could add----
        Senator Heinrich. General, absolutely.
        General Stewart. I fully concur with the UAE forces.
    Whether they have the capacity to do both Yemen and something
    in Iraq-Syria is questionable for me.
        Senator Heinrich. Yeah.
        General Stewart. I think they're having a tough--they're
    doing extremely well in Yemen, but the capacity to do more is
    pretty limited.
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you both.
        Director Clapper, one of the things we've been struggling
    with, obviously, is trying to crack down on ISIS's financing.
    They have multiple sources of revenue that include illicit oil
    sales, taxation, extortion of the local population, looting of
    banks, personal property, smuggling of antiquities, and, to a
    lesser extent, even kidnapping for ransom, and foreign
    donations. I'm certainly pleased to see some progress has been
    made, where the U.S.-coalition forces have escalated tactics by
    targeting wellheads, targeting road tankers, even cash storage
    sites. These efforts have certainly helped force ISIS to cut
    its fighters' pay; in some reports, by up to 50 percent. What,
    additionally, do you believe that we can be doing to further
    restrict their financial resources?
        Mr. Clapper. I think the main--sir, you've outlined pretty
    much the sources of revenue for ISIS. They have a very
    elaborate bureaucracy for managing their money. I think the
    important thing is to sustain that pressure on multiple
    dimensions, to include going after the oil infrastructure. I
    know they--ISIL has displayed great ingenuity by setting up
    thousands of these mom-and-pop refineries.
        Senator Heinrich. Yeah.
        Mr. Clapper. We just have to stay at it. I--and, as well,
    the recent bombing of the financial institution in Mosul had
    big impact on them. I think we're starting to see some success
    with the Iraqi government in reducing payments to Iraqi
    citizens who were--live in ISIL-controlled areas. There's a
    downside to that. When they do that, that alienates--
    potentially alienates them further about the central government
    in Baghdad.
        To me, the important aspect, here, and the important theme
    would to sustain the pressure.
        Senator Heinrich. You know, one of the sources that has
    been, I guess, surprisingly consequential is black-market
    antiquity sales from the looting that's occurred. One of--it's
    my understanding that the United States has sanctions that it
    can impose on anyone who imports antiquities stolen by ISIS,
    but it doesn't have separate abilities to sanction individuals
    who actually purchase looted Syrian antiquities. Would it be
    helpful to authorize sanctions that are not just against the
    buyer or the seller of those, but against other middlemen who
    are involved?
        Mr. Clapper. I would want to take that under advisement and
    consult with my colleagues in the Department of Treasury. I
    will tell you that, in the relative scheme of things, the sale
    of antiquities is not a big revenue-generator, and it's really
    kind of tapered off some. I'd be for exploring whatever--
    whatever ways we can pressure the--ISIL financially, we should.
        Senator Heinrich. Great. Thank you both.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Ayotte.
        Senator Ayotte. I want to thank you both for your service.
        I want to thank you, Director Clapper, for your many
    decades of service to our country. We appreciate it.
        I wanted to follow up on a--your written statement, where--
    in it--and I think you reiterated it today--that Iran probably
    views the JCPOA as a means to remove sanctions while preserving
    some of its nuclear capabilities. In a second part, you said,
    ``as well as the option to eventually expand its nuclear
    infrastructure.'' Can you expound on that?
        Mr. Clapper. As the period of the agreement plays out, I
    think it's--we should expect that the Iraqis will want to push
    the margins on R&D [research and development] to--they've
    already done work on--on research and development on centrifuge
    design. Now, they've sustained the position they've taken, and
    the--you know, there's one man that makes the decision, here,
    as the Supreme Leader, that they're not going to pursue nuclear
    weapons. There are many other things they could do, in a
    nuclear context, that serves to enhance their technology and
    their expertise.
        Senator Ayotte. Let me ask you. We saw Iran actually have
    ballistic missile tests on October 10th and November 21st,
    post-JCPOA, and even pre-receiving the sanctions cash relief,
    that they recently received, of billions of dollars. We also
    know that, recently, North Korea had a space launch
    developing--continuing to develop their ICBM [intercontinental
    ballistic missile] program. I wanted to ask you, first of all,
    do you--we know that, in your statement, you've mentioned, and
    historically, that there has been cooperation between North
    Korea and Iran on their ballistic missile program. Can you tell
    us what that cooperation has been? Can we expect that North
    Korea will sell or share technology with Tehran that could
    expedite Iran's development of ICBM missiles?
        Mr. Clapper. Of late--I have to be mindful of the setting
    here--there has not been a great deal of interchange between
    Iraq and Iran--or between North Korea and Iran on the subject
    of nuclear or missile capabilities, but there's been--there has
    been in the past. We have been reasonably successful in
    detecting this. So, hopefully we'll--with appropriate----
        Senator Ayotte. Let me ask----
        Mr. Clapper.--vigilance, we'll be able to sustain that. The
    North----
        Senator Ayotte. Let me ask you--sorry.
        Mr. Clapper.--Koreans, though, will--they're interested in
    cash. This is one of their----
        Senator Ayotte. We now know Iran has more cash, correct?
        Mr. Clapper. Well, they do now. As General Stewart
    indicated, a lot of the cash, at least in the initial tranche,
    is encumbered. The Iranians have a lot of obligations to
    fulfill, economically with----
        Senator Ayotte. Let me follow up on----
        Mr. Clapper. It's a debtor nation.
        Senator Ayotte.--on the two. What do you--when you--what do
    you make of other fact that the Iranians did, in fact, post-
    JCPOA, in violation of existing U.N. resolutions, make two
    launches of ballistic missiles? I think you were asked about
    the sanctions that were put in place. Let's just be clear;
    those sanctions weren't very tough. Do you think that those are
    going to deter Iran from continuing to develop its ICBM
    program?
        Mr. Clapper. Well, the Iranians have conducted some 140
    launches since the original U.N. Security Council Resolution
    1929 that was imposed in 2010. Seventy of those, about half of
    them, were done during the negotiations, given the fact that
    missiles weren't a part of the negotiation. So, as far as these
    two launches are concerned, I think this was a deliberate
    message of defiance, and that the Iranians are going to
    continue with an aggressive program to develop their missile
    force.
        Senator Ayotte. As you and I have talked about in the past,
    just to be clear, we judge that Tehran would choose ballistic
    missiles as its preferred method of delivering nuclear weapons,
    if it builds them. That's--that is obviously why you would
    build a ballistic missile, if you choose to build a nuclear
    weapon.
        Mr. Clapper. Well, and they have hundreds of them----
        Senator Ayotte. Right.
        Mr. Clapper.--that threaten the Mideast. Of course, the two
    under development could potentially, given the technology,
    although the immediate one that's most--I guess the most
    proximate that would be launched, the GAM, is built by
    civilians and is ostensibly for space launch----
        Senator Ayotte. I only have 5 seconds left, but I want to
    follow up on the heroin question. I believe you said that
    heroin and Fentanyl, which is, of course, 30 to 50 times more
    powerful, is coming over our southern border. That has doubled
    by the Mexican drug cartels, going back to 2010. Do you believe
    that that's something that we--General Kelly has raised this
    when he was commander of SOUTHCOM as--that delivery system and
    those cartels could actually deliver almost anything with the
    sophisticated networks they have established, but do you
    believe we should be focused also on more interdiction,
    particularly on the heroin problem at the southern border?
        Mr. Clapper. I do. The experience, at least what I've
    observed--and I think General Kelly has said this consistently
    when he testified--is that it wasn't for lack of intelligence;
    it was lack of operational capacity to actually react and
    interdict. I'm a big fan of the Coast Guard, and the Coast
    Guard's done some great things. These new national security
    cutters are fantastic capability against drug--to--for drug
    interdiction purposes.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Kaine.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thanks, to the witnesses. I have many questions to ask, but
    I think what I'll do is focus on one.
        I just--I'm struggling with this, and I would love to hear
    your thoughts about low oil prices and how they affect our
    security posture. This is not in a litany of gloom; this is a
    good thing. It's got some elements to it that are--I think are
    challenging.
        I was in Israel once, in April of 2010, and meeting with
    President Shimon Peres, and I asked him what would be the most
    important thing the U.S. could do to enhance security in the
    region. He said, ``Wean yourself off dependence on oil from the
    Middle East.'' As I talked to him, his basic logic was, to the
    extent that we developed noncarbon alternatives or our own
    native energy sources, our demand for Middle Eastern oil would
    drop. We're a market leader. That would have a effect of
    reducing prices. A lot of the nations in the Middle East--Iran
    and other nations--Russia or Venezuela--they've used high oil
    prices to finance bellicose adventurism. If they get more
    strapped on the cash side, they have a harder time doing it.
        So, we've seen a dramatic development in American native
    energy. We've seen development of noncarbon energy. We've seen
    oil prices go to dramatic lows. They're not going to stay there
    forever, but many are predicting that they're going to stay
    significantly lower than historic lows. It's good for American
    consumers. It's good for American businesses. It poses
    challenges for some of our principal adversaries; Russia, for
    example. It puts a cap on, to some degree, what Iran would get
    from being back in a global economy and selling their oil. It
    also poses some risks, as well. I've heard European
    counterparts say that they're really worried about an
    aggressive Russia, but they're even more worried about a
    economic basket-case Russia.
        So, from the intel side, as you look at intel and threats,
    talk a little bit about the prospect of low oil prices and any
    negatives associated with that, please.
        Mr. Clapper. Well, I think you've painted the picture
    pretty well, Senator Kaine. The--it's working, I guess you
    would say--one could say, to our advantage. Russia--I spoke
    about that earlier--and the price--current price of Ural crude,
    for example, is $28 a barrel, when Russia's planning factor for
    their national budget is $50 a barrel. This has affected--for
    example, they have been unable to invest in the Arctic, so it's
    had profound impact, and will, I think, for some time, just
    structurally in Russia.
        Venezuela is another case, a country that was--that's been
    completely dependent, almost, for its revenue for a long time,
    on oil revenue. Of course, with the precipitate drop in oil,
    it's had a huge impact on their economy, which is status
    managed anyway and is laced with all kinds of subsidies for its
    people. Now they're having--they're facing insolvency.
        So, that--it has that effect. Of course, to the extent that
    we become independent and not dependent on anyone's oil, that's
    a good thing. Countries caught in the middle, I think, it's
    going to be a mixed bag as to how well they manage themselves,
    where they are dependent on others for oil. If the price stays
    low, that's great. If it--if it's hiked, either by virtue of
    the natural forces or artificially, that could have a very
    deleterious impact on the economy, say in Europe. So, it's a
    very mixed picture.
        Senator Kaine. Just a followup about Russia, in particular.
    It seems that sometimes they're more likely to engage in some,
    you know, adventurism outside their country when their internal
    politics and economy is in trouble. I mean, Putin seems like a
    guy who, when things are going bad at home, he wants to divert
    attention. Whether it's throwing an Olympics or a World Cup or
    invading another country, that seems to be kind of a move that
    he'll make when he's got dissatisfaction at home driven by
    economic challenges. So, is there some degree to which these
    lower oil prices, they negatively affect an adversary, but they
    may make them a little more unpredictable and, hence,
    dangerous?
        Mr. Clapper. That's true. Of course, all decisionmaking in
    Russia is essentially made by--is done by one person. The
    Russians have a great capacity for enduring pain and suffering.
    The polls that are taken in Russia still indicate very high
    levels of popularity, 80-percent range, for Putin. It is
    interesting, though, his speeches of late in--domestically,
    have taken a different turn or a different tone, in that they
    are much more exhorting patriotic spirit and the great history
    of Russia as, I think, probably a way of diverting attention
    from the poor economic performance of the Russian economy. By
    any measure--you look at unemployment, inflation, the worth of
    the ruble--its alltime low--and investment, et cetera, whatever
    measure you want to use, the--it's all not good for--from a
    Russian perspective.
        Now, the issue would be, How does that affect the street,
    and what point does the people start turning out and
    demonstrating, which--that's what makes them--they're very
    nervous. If people get organized and restive on a large scale
    throughout the--throughout Russia, they--Russians are very
    concerned about that.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Fischer.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Director Clapper, in your statement, you assess that
    foreign support will allow Damascus to make gains in some key
    areas this year. General Stewart, you state that the Assad
    regime is unlikely to be militarily defeated or collapse in the
    near term, and it's poised to enter 2016 in a stronger military
    position against the opposition because of their increased
    support that they're receiving from Iran and Hezbollah and
    Russia. Given Assad's apparently improving fortunes that we're
    seeing, do you assess that he will negotiate any kind of
    transition from power?
        General Stewart. He's certainly in a much stronger
    negotiating position than he was just 6 months ago. His forces,
    supported by Russian air forces, supported by Iranian and
    Hezbollah forces, are having some effect, but not decisive
    effect across the battlefield. They've isolated Aleppo, for
    instance. They're now sieging Aleppo. So, he's in a much
    stronger negotiating position, and I'm more inclined to believe
    that he is a player on the stage longer term than he was 6
    months to a year ago. He's in much better position.
        Senator Fischer. General, what--how would you define
    ``longer term''?
        General Stewart. Yeah, that's--I think this--this one's
    interesting, because I think the Russians are very comfortable
    with the idea that, if they have a regime that supports their
    interests in Syria, Bashar al-Assad might not be as important
    to them as--Bashar al-Assad is far more important to the
    Iranians to maintain their relationship with Syria and status
    around Lebanon. So, I think getting all the parties to agree on
    whether he should go, the timeline with which he should go, who
    might be an--a better alternative, because that's important to
    all the parties--this is such a dynamic space--and then you sow
    the Turks in with their interest that Assad should go, also.
    So, I think, long term, I'm not seeing any change in the status
    here for the next year or so. Beyond that, we'll see how the
    fight on the battlefield unfolds.
        Senator Fischer. Before I turn to you, Director Clapper--
    General, when you mention about Iran and Moscow being able to
    work together on this, and maybe they're--what I heard was,
    maybe they're diverging in their support for Assad in keeping
    him in power or giving him more leverage in a transition. Do
    you believe that is going to come to a head--again, in the
    short term, long term--and what are the consequences of that?
        General Stewart. In----
        Senator Fischer. I mean, I can remember--and it wasn't that
    long ago--when we would all sit up here and say, ``it's not a
    question on if Assad is leaving, it's when he's leaving.'' That
    obviously has changed.
        General Stewart. The Russian reinforcement has changed the
    calculus completely. The tactical relationship that Iran and
    Russia has today, I suspect, at some point--and it's pretty
    hard to predict that some point--will diverge, because they
    won't share the stage. Iran wants to be the regional hegemon.
    If it has to compete with Russia in the longer term--and again,
    I can't put months or years--I suspect that their interests
    will diverge because of competition as a regional power.
        In the near term, though, their interest is simply to prop
    up the regime. The regime, in my mind, is not necessarily
    Assad; it's the regime, first of all, that allows Russia to
    maintain its interests and allows Iran to control Syria--
    greater Syria and parts of Lebanon. When those two things
    become tension points, where their interests--where Russia
    jettisons Assad or Russia pushes for his removal--I suspect
    that they will have at least a tactical breakdown. However,
    it's still in Iran's interest to maintain a relationship with
    Russia, because of what we talked about earlier, the ability to
    procure weapons from Russia without any preconditions. They
    would like to modernize all of their military forces, and
    Russia seems to be an option for doing that.
        So, the relationship might be tense, it might break down at
    some point because of regional desires for control, but they'll
    still have the enduring relationship from a weapons procurement
    standpoint.
        Senator Fischer. Director Clapper, I'm out of time, but if
    you had just a couple of comments you'd like to add there--I
    apologize for giving you less time.
        Mr. Clapper. That's fine.
        The thing that I find interesting is that both the Russians
    and the Iranians are growing increasingly interested in using
    proxies, rather than their own forces, to fight in Syria. The
    Russians are incurring casualties. The Iranians are. To the
    extent that they can bring in others--and, of course, in Iran's
    case, Hezbollah.
        I think Russians are not wedded to Assad personally, but
    they have the same challenge as everyone else, ``If not Assad,
    who?'' I don't know that they've come up with an alternative to
    him, either.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator King.
        Senator King. Gentlemen, thank you for being with us this
    morning.
        I was discussing, yesterday with one of our ``Five Eyes''
    partners, overall long-term intelligence and worldwide threats.
    I'm afraid--and you touched on this, Director Clapper, in your
    report--I'm afraid that the Syrian refugee crisis is a
    precursor of a larger refugee crisis that we could be facing
    over the next 10 to 20 years, based upon predictions of climate
    change, the band of the world that is going to be subject to
    droughts, famine, crop loss, flooding in some areas, over--
    incredible heat in the band around North Africa, Central
    Africa, into Southeast Asia. We could see mass migrations that
    could really strain the Western countries. Would you concur in
    that, Secretary----
        Mr. Clapper. Well, I think you're quite right. I alluded to
    that, at least briefly, in my oral statement, about the fact
    that we have some 60 million people around the globe displaced
    in one way or another. I think the----
        Senator King. If that increases, it's going to create--
    because all of those people are going to want to go where
    things are better----
        Mr. Clapper. Exactly.
        Senator King.--which happens to be the northern hemisphere.
        Mr. Clapper. So, that's why that is going to--that will
    place ever greater stresses on the remainder of the countries,
    whether here in the Americas, Europe, Africa, Asia, wherever.
    The effects of climate change, of weather aberrations, however
    you want to describe them, just exacerbate this. You know,
    the--what we have in the world is sort--in the--by way of
    resource to feed and support the growing world population is
    somewhat of a finite resource. There's only so much water, only
    so much arable land. The conditions that you mention, I
    believe, are going to foment more pressure for migrants. That
    on top of the instability that--of governance that I spoke
    briefly about in my oral statement, as well--I think are going
    to make for a challenging situation in the future.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Again, turning to something that you touched on. The lack
    of capacity to deal with drug imports, it seems to me, is
    something that is a real strategic and tactical challenge.
    We're suffering terribly, in my home State of Maine, with
    heroin. New Hampshire has one death overdose a day. In Maine,
    it's 200 a year, one death every weekday, if you will. We're
    trying to deal with the demand side and with the treatment and
    prevention. Keeping this stuff out to begin with--and heroin's
    cheaper than it's ever been, which tells me that the supply is
    up. What do we--where should we be putting our efforts on the
    interdiction side?
        Mr. Clapper. Well, on--to the extent--I think the--working
    with the Mexican government, particularly since that's where a
    great deal of this comes from, is Mexico, and I think the
    partnership that we can engender with them is crucial to this.
        Senator King. Are they----
        Mr. Clapper. Obviously----
        Senator King.--a serious partner? Do they want to stop
    this, or does--or are they conflicted? Do they see this as a
    cash crop?
        Mr. Clapper. Well, I think it's who--it depends on who
    ``they'' is in Mexico. I think the national leadership would
    obviously like to stop the flow. There are very--as you know,
    very, very powerful economic forces in Mexico that auger
    against that, and we've got a lot of money. They also have a
    corruption problem, frankly, to deal with. So, I think we need
    to be as aggressive as we can be in interdicting what we can. I
    mentioned earlier, for example, the tremendous impact of the
    Coast Guard capabilities, when they're brought to bear. As we
    discussed earlier, General Kelly, one of--the former commander
    of SOUTHCOM--has spoken to this many times, about not so much a
    lack of intelligence, but rather the lack of an operational
    capability to respond to the intelligence to interdict. We have
    the intelligence capability and the intelligence capacity, but
    that needs to be matched by a concomitant resource commitment.
        Senator King. We need a greater commitment, in terms of
    interdiction capacity.
        Mr. Clapper. Exactly.
        Senator King. With just a few seconds left, and perhaps you
    could take this for the record. We always, at these hearings,
    talk about the cyberthreat. We've done some actions here. We
    finally got though a cyber bill last year about information-
    sharing. I'm still concerned about critical infrastructure.
    Perhaps, for the record, you could give us some thoughts about
    what further we should be doing here in Congress or in the
    country, in terms of critical infrastructure. Because that's, I
    think, our--one of our areas of greatest vulnerability.
        Mr. Clapper. I share your concern and we'll provide some
    for the record.
        Senator King. Thank you.

        [The information referred to follows:]

        [Deleted.]

        Chairman McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Cotton.
        Senator Cotton. Gentlemen, thank you both for your many
    years of service to our country.
        First, I'd like to say that it's reassuring to hear so many
    members of this committee, who voted to give the world's worst
    state sponsor of terrorism tens of billions of dollars, express
    their grave concerns about what Iran might do with that money.
    I wish we had heard more of those concerns during the debate
    and before the vote on it.
        Director Clapper, you testified last year that, in your 45
    years of public service, this was the worst global threat
    environment you had ever seen. Is that correct?
        Mr. Clapper. Yes, sir. I had occasion to say it again in
    a--response to a question earlier.
        Senator Cotton. That's a--and that's--was your point with
    Senator McCain earlier, is that it's the worst global threat
    environment now in 46 years?
        Mr. Clapper. Well, it's certainly the most diverse array of
    challenges and threats that I can recall.
        Senator Cotton. Why is that?
        Mr. Clapper. Well, I think it's--frankly, it's somewhat a
    function of the change in the bipolar system that did provide a
    certain stability in the world, the Soviet Union and its
    community, its alliance, and the West, led by the United
    States. Virtually all other threats were sort of subsumed in
    that basic bipolar contest that went on for decades and was
    characterized by stability. When that ended, that set off a
    whole range of a whole group of forces, I guess, or dynamics,
    around the world that have changed.
        Senator Cotton. You both have long and deep experience in
    the Middle East. In your experience, is the Middle East a place
    that prizes concessions in negotiations or strength in
    toughness?
        General Stewart. I would argue that, in almost all these
    cases, strength is preferred over signs of weakness.
        Senator Cotton. Do you believe that the appearance and
    reputation for power is an important part of the reality of
    power in national security affairs?
        General Stewart. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Cotton. What would you believe is our current
    reputation for power in the Middle East after, say, 12--10
    American sailors were videotaped kneeling at gunpoint by
    Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps forces?
        General Stewart. I don't know that that incident alone
    reflects the perception of our strength and power. I think,
    over the last several years, there have been some concerns
    among our partners about our commitment to the region, our
    willingness to employ the force, where our interests--both
    national and strategic interest lies. I think that's caused
    just a little bit of concern among our partners about our
    commitment to the region.
        Senator Cotton. I would like to return to a question that
    Senator Heinrich raised. He raised the news that the Saudi
    Defense Ministry and now the Emirati Foreign Ministry have both
    suggested that they would be willing to deploy their troops to
    the ground in Syria. He asked you to assess the capability of
    those militaries. Threats, for good or for ill, are part of--
    are both capability and intention. In both of the statements
    from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, they both insisted that they
    would need to see United States leadership in that effort.
        Director Clapper, do you have any idea what kind of
    leadership they're talking about, what more they would expect
    to see from the United States that they apparently are not
    seeing at the moment?
        Mr. Clapper. Well, I don't know what--I--and I took it to
    mean specifically with respect to if they deployed a
    significant military force into Syria. I took it to mean the
    command-and-control capability that, you know, the U.S. is
    pretty good at. I--that's what I took it to mean.
        Senator Cotton. General Stewart?
        General Stewart. I think the Arab countries, led by Saudi
    Arabia and the Emiratis, would like to see more ground forces
    to match their commitment. Having said that, I do not assess
    that the Saudi ground forces would have either the capacity to
    take this fight on--as I've said earlier, the Emiratis, very
    capable, acquitted themself well in Yemen, but lack the
    capacity to take on additional fight elsewhere. I think the
    idea is, How do we get more U.S. skin in the game?
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        Director Clapper, in early October, shortly after Russia
    began its incursion into Syria, President Obama called it,
    quote, ``a big mistake,'' and, quote, ``doomed to fail.'' Do
    you believe, 4 and a half months later, that Russia's incursion
    into Syria is ``a big mistake'' from their standpoint, and
    ``doomed to fail''?
        Mr. Clapper. It could be a big mistake. One of the concerns
    the Russians have, of course, those with long memories, is a
    repeat of Afghanistan. Of course, that's why the Russians, to
    this point, have avoided a significant ground force presence.
    They have about 5,000 personnel tied up in supporting the air
    operations--advisors, intelligence, et cetera. So, long term,
    it could be a mistake for them. They haven't enjoyed the
    success, I think, that Putin anticipated. I think he believed
    that he would go in quickly and be able to leave early. That is
    not turning out to be the case. They are getting into a long-
    term stalemate, themselves.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        My time is expired.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Nelson.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Good morning, gentlemen. I repeat what so many have said
    here. Thank you for your public service.
        Given what you just said, General Clapper, about Russia
    being concerned about being bogged down, and going back to the
    comments of Senator Kaine about the cash reserves of Russia
    diminishing because of the price of oil, and you mentioned
    that, at some point, the street in Russia going--these are my
    words--to erupt. Can you give us any sense of when that might
    occur, given these factors that has been discussed in the whole
    committee meeting?
        Mr. Clapper. Senator Nelson, I cannot. I don't know when
    that tipping point might occur. As I said, the Russian people
    have a great capacity for enduring discomfort and inconvenience
    and pain. I think, at some point, they will reach a breaking
    point. I think the Russian leadership is mindful of that and
    are very concerned about it. The sustained economic recession,
    which will go well into 2016, I think it's somewhat of an
    imponderable to try predict when--if this is sustained, when
    that will cause a breaking point and when the street will say
    something.
        Senator Nelson. From an intel standpoint, Putin can
    continue his diversions--Crimea, Syria, whatnot--to get the
    nationalistic fervor of the Russian people continually stoked
    up. When they can't get butter and they get to the point that
    they realize that that's going more to guns, do we have any
    sense, from the history of Russia, of all--or from an intel
    standpoint--do we hear anything of the rumblings going on in
    Russia that would give us a better idea of how to predict that
    timing?
        Mr. Clapper. Well, no. I don't think--predicting, you know,
    sociological dynamics is very difficult, when people will
    collectively reach a breaking point. That's, you know, kind of
    what happened with the demise of the Soviet Union, when the--
    you know, ``the big lie,'' I think, became evident to more and
    more people. That's another thing that the Russians worry
    about, is information and--information from the outside world.
    The Russians expend a lot of energy, time, and resource on
    controlling information and controlling the message in Russia.
    So, the combination of these factors--their ability to endure
    the gradual erosion of the economy of Russia, their tight
    control of information, not unlike the heyday of the Soviet
    Union, makes it, to me at least, very difficult to predict when
    all those forces will collide.
        Senator Nelson. Let me ask about assured access to space,
    which is essential to our national security. We have a great
    deal of optimism as a result of what we're seeing, a number of
    companies now producing rockets that seem to be quite
    successful. We have the likelihood of new engines being
    produced. This Senator is concerned, not in the long term, but
    more in the short term, of--Is there a gap there that, if we do
    not have that Russian-supplied engine, the RD-180, that we will
    not have the assured access to space because of the alternative
    being, number one, that the Delta 4 cannot be produced quickly
    enough, and number two, that it would be prohibitively
    expensive compared to the alternative of the Atlas 5?
        Mr. Clapper. Well, as I said earlier, Senator Nelson, I--
    I'm in the customer mode. I have certain imperatives, in terms
    of our assured access to space for overhead reconnaissance
    purposes. This is extremely crucial capability for the Nation's
    safety and security. I look to the providers of those who get
    those things into space, which, for me, is the Air Force----
        Senator Nelson. I understand that.
        Mr. Clapper.--to decide that. So, I--you know, the Delta
    has worked great for us. We felt it was responsive, it was
    cost-effective----
        Senator Nelson. Right.
        Mr. Clapper.--and it worked for us.
        Senator Nelson. Are you concerned that there could be a
    gap?
        Mr. Clapper. Well, I certainly would be. I mean, when we've
    had to manage gaps, not so much from a--because of launch, but
    simply because of the capabilities in space, that is a great
    concern to us in the intelligence community. So, yes, I would
    be very concerned about gaps.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Rounds.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Director Clapper and General Stewart, thank you both for
    your service to our country. We most certainly appreciate the
    participation that you have in this meeting today.
        In October of last year, the United States Naval Institute
    published a rather chilling article detailing the long list of
    advanced weaponry that the Chinese military has cloned by
    stealing from other nations either through cyber espionage or
    reverse engineering. What roles do you see the intelligence
    agencies taking to prevent this hemorrhaging of American
    technological advantage?
        Mr. Clapper. Well, I think it's our responsibility to
    ensure that our policymakers, and particularly the Department
    of Defense, are aware of the--this hemorrhage, if you will, of
    technological information that the Chinese have purloined. So,
    I think our duty, our obligation is--from an intelligence
    community standpoint, is to make sure people know about this,
    and, where we can, suggest ways to try to stop it.
        Senator Rounds. General Stewart?
        General Stewart. I don't know if I could add anything more
    to that. We detect, we get an appreciation, understanding of
    the threat vectors, we inform, and, if we can, we provide some
    potential solutions. It then becomes up to those who have the
    technology, who have been threatened--their intellectual
    property threatened, to take those countermeasures. So, I think
    we identify, we warn, we report, and it's over to the users.
        Senator Rounds. Would you both--with regard to the tools
    that you have available today, do you have the appropriate
    equipment, tools, and technology to be able to detect and
    report these attacks?
        Mr. Clapper. Yes, we do. I do think--and this gives me an
    opportunity for maybe a small commercial that we do sustain our
    R&D. This is particularly the--important for, well, all the IC,
    but particularly NSA [the National Security Agency], that we
    stay ahead of cyber technological developments in the world
    domain for foreign intelligence purposes to stay abreast of
    these.
        Senator Rounds. What do you believe constitutes an act of
    war in cyberspace? What do you assess it would look like? When
    does it become an act of war?
        Mr. Clapper. That's a great question, Senator, that--one
    that we've wrestled with. A certain extent, it's--I guess it's
    in the eye of the beholder. This gets to the whole issue of
    cyberdeterrence and all those kind of complex questions. I
    think that's a determination that would almost have to be made
    on a case-by-case basis, depending on the impact.
        Senator Rounds. So, if we were to suggest that it was time
    to define what an act of war in cyberspace would be, it would
    not be appropriate? Or should we be looking at clearly defining
    what an act of war constitutes with regard to cyber activity?
    Would that be helpful, or not?
        General Stewart. I think it would be extremely helpful to
    have clear definitions of what constitutes cyber events versus
    acts of war. We generally look at all cyber events, and we
    define it as an ``attack.'' In many cases, you can do
    reconnaissance, you can do espionage, you can do theft in this
    domain we call cyberspace. The reaction always is--whether it's
    an adversary doing reconnaissance, an adversary trying to
    conduct HUMINT [human intelligence] operations in this domain,
    we define it as an ``attack.'' I don't think that's terribly
    helpful. So, if we can get a much fuller definition of the
    range of things that occur in cyberspace, and then start
    thinking about the threshold where an attack is catastrophic
    enough or destructive enough that we define that as an act of
    war, I think that would be extremely useful.
        Senator Rounds. Have we done enough, or a sufficient job,
    in deterring cyber aggression?
        General Stewart. I think we have a pretty robust capability
    to understand the adversaries. I think most potential
    adversaries understand that we have a capability. Whether or
    not we are ready to use that, because that's the essence of
    deterrence that an adversary actually feels, that we will use
    the capability that we have, I'm not sure we're there yet. That
    goes beyond our ability to understand and to counter with
    military capabilities. So, I think there's another dimension of
    convincing, from a policy standpoint, that we're willing to use
    that capability.
        Chairman McCain. Wouldn't it be a good idea to have a
    policy, General? As I understand it, we have no policy as to
    whether we should deter, whether we should respond, whether--if
    so, how. Is it--wouldn't it be good if we had a policy?
        General Stewart. Mr. Chairman, I always find it good to
    have a policy that guides the things that I can do as a
    military officer.
        Chairman McCain. I think that's not a earth-shaking
    comment, to tell you the truth. I don't think we'll stop the
    presses. The fact is, we don't have a policy. I don't know how
    you act when there's no policy as to how we respond to threats
    or actual acts of penetration into some of our most sensitive
    information.
        Senator Sullivan.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Welcome, gentlemen. Great to see two marines at the table.
    As the Chairman knows, the terms ``marine'' and
    ``intelligence'' are considered synonymous by most, so glad to
    see you're----
        Chairman McCain. Really?
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Sullivan.--glad to see you're bolstering that fine
    tradition.
        I wanted to focus a little bit on the--what's going on in
    the South China Sea. Director Clapper, last time you were here,
    you expressed concerns over the possible militarization of some
    of the formations that are being built up in that part of the
    world by the Chinese. As you know, here we are, a year later,
    and that's exactly happened, in terms of 3,200 acres of new
    land, seven large land features, an airfield, one of which is
    10,000 feet long. What do you believe the Chinese--what do you
    believe their goals are in the region?
        Mr. Clapper. Well, I think the Chinese are very, very
    determined to sustain their exorbitant claims in the South
    China Sea. They've had this ``nine-dash line'' playing for some
    time. They have sustained that. I think they will continue with
    building up their capabilities on these outcroppings and
    islands.
        Senator Sullivan. Do you think they're clearly looking to
    militarize those outcroppings?
        Mr. Clapper. Well, I think--not sure what--you know, what
    the definition of ``militarize'' is. Apparently, President Xi
    may have a different view than--definition than we do. I think
    when you put in runways and hangars and start installing
    radars, doing port calls with Chinese navy and Chinese coast
    guard ships--they have not yet, I don't believe, actually
    landed any military fighter aircraft yet, but they have tested
    the airworthiness, so to speak, of their air drones there with
    civilian aircraft. So----
        Senator Sullivan. So, I want to follow----
        Mr. Clapper.--I think it's very clear that they will try to
    exert as much possessiveness, if you will, over this area and
    the South China Sea in general.
        Senator Sullivan. I want to follow up on a point the
    Chairman just made. As far as our policy to counter that, you
    know, this committee, in a bipartisan way, has certainly been
    encouraging the White House, the military, to conduct regular
    FONOPs [freedom of navigation operation] in the region,
    preferably with our allies. I think our allies are all very
    motivated to see American leadership here. Do you think that we
    have clearly articulated what our policy is? Do you think that
    regular FONOPs by U.S. military vehicles--ships, aircraft--with
    our allies, is an important way to counteract the strategy that
    seems to have very little pushback on it right now?
        Mr. Clapper. Well, again, this is a policy, and we're just
    down in the engine room, shoveling intelligence coal. I do
    think that we have made clear the policy on freedom of
    navigation, and have done at least two FONOP missions.
        Senator Sullivan. Do you think our allies understand what
    our articulated policy in the region is?
        Mr. Clapper. I think they do, and I think they welcome our
    freedom-of-navigation operations. I think they are a bit
    reticent to speak publicly as supportively as they do in
    private.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me turn to the Arctic. I appreciated
    your--both of your focus on the Arctic in your testimony. As
    you know, there's been a dramatic increase in the Russia's
    military buildup in the Arctic. There's been statements by the
    Deputy Prime Minister about how we should colonize the Arctic.
    You even mentioned, Director, in your testimony, that the
    Russians would be prepared to--unilaterally, to protect their
    interests in the Arctic. Let me just ask a couple of questions,
    and you--both of you can answer them to the--however you want,
    in terms of prioritization.
        What do you believe the Russians are up to with their
    dramatic buildup in the Arctic? President Putin certainly is
    somebody who probes for weakness. How do you think he's
    reacting to our actual plans for dramatically withdrawing the
    only Arctic-trained forces in the Active Duty U.S. military? Do
    we need to be looking at, kind of, FONOP kind of operations in
    the Arctic, particularly given that the Russians have such a
    significant interest in the Arctic? They've built up their
    northern fleet, they have 40 icebreakers, and the strategic
    northwest passage is only going to become more important. Is
    that something we should be looking at doing on a regular
    basis----
        Mr. Clapper. Well, I can----
        Senator Sullivan.--in terms of our FONOPs?
        Mr. Clapper.--I can----
        Senator Sullivan. You can answer any of those--all three of
    those questions, if you'd like.
        Mr. Clapper. I can comment on--from an intelligence
    perspective, that we are turning attention to the Arctic.
    There's about a 6,000-kilometer-long coastline that the
    Russians have on the Arctic. They've established a--built
    around their northern fleet a joint command to oversee their
    military activities. They are refurbishing bases there.
    They're--quantitatively, they appear to have what--where
    they're going would be actually less than what they had in the
    Arctic regions during the heyday of the Cold War, but,
    qualitatively, it'll probably be better.
        What has stymied the Russians, as I alluded to earlier,
    though, was--their grand plans for investing there,
    particularly with energy extraction, have been stymied because
    of the economic recession. So--and they need foreign
    investment, from a technological standpoint, and they are not
    getting it, because of the economic extremis they're in.
        So, yes, Arctic is important. We engage with the countries
    that are a part of the Arctic Council, notably Canada and
    Norway. We are stepping up our intelligence-sharing with those
    countries. In terms of what the Russians are doing there. As
    far as what we do about it and troop deployments, that's kind
    of not our department.
        Senator Sullivan. You can give us assessment on what you
    believe Putin would think as he builds up the Arctic, we're
    withdrawing forces from the Arctic. In your assessment of how
    he operates and thinks, what does he think about that? How will
    he view a reduction in Arctic forces by the United States when
    he is dramatically building up forces? You can certainly answer
    that question.
        Mr. Clapper. Well, I don't know what he thinks. I don't
    read his mind. I guess anytime he sees an opportunity where he
    believes we're reducing or not being prevalent, then if he--if
    that serves his purpose, he'll take advantage of it.
        Senator Sullivan. General, any views?
        General Stewart. The Russians intend to increase their
    ability to control the Arctic regions. They've built air bases,
    they're building missile defense capability, both coastal and
    naval missile defense capability. They're doing that for
    economic and military reasons. In the absence of something that
    counters that, they will continue to expand. So, there is, I
    think, an imperative that we have both the willingness and the
    capacity to push back on their control or dominance of the
    Arctic region.
        I think they're probably in a place where they are--they'd
    be willing to negotiate and discuss how you conduct operations
    in the Arctic, but they need to have something to push against.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator King feels compelled to ask an
    additional question.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I think.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator King. Quick question about money. Two questions,
    actually.
        Where does North Korea get its money? It doesn't seem to
    have much of an economy, and yet it's building missiles,
    nuclear capability, military buildup. Where's their funding?
        Mr. Clapper. Well, the--their primary trading partner, of
    course, is China, by far, probably 90 percent of their trade.
    They--and the biggest single export from North Korea to China
    is coal. Runs around a--they get about a billion-point-two a
    year from coal sales. Then, of course, it's illicit finance--
    illicit finances. They have a--an organized approach to
    laundering money and this sort of thing. So--but, most of their
    trade in the--in North Korea is natural-resource-heavy. The
    Chinese exploit that. So, that's where they get the lion's
    share of the----
        Senator King. Is it safe to say that if China decided they
    didn't like the direction of North Korean policy, they could
    have a significant influence over it?
        Mr. Clapper. I don't think there's any question that, to
    the extent that anyone has leverage over North Korea, it's
    China.
        Senator King. A second followup question, this time about
    Russia. What percentage of the Russian budget is funded by oil
    revenues?
        Mr. Clapper. Oh, I'll have to take that for the record, but
    a large part is--a significant proportion of their budget is--I
    think is from oil revenue. I don't know exactly what it is. I
    could----

        [The information referred to follows:]

        [Deleted.]

        Senator King. You've talked about a 4-percent contraction,
    I believe, in their economy over----
        Mr. Clapper. Yes.
        Senator King.--the past year, which is projected to
    continue into this year.
        Mr. Clapper. Correct.
        Senator King. At some point, it seems to me, they're going
    to reach a point where they just run out of money. I wouldn't
    imagine they would be too good a credit on the world----
        Mr. Clapper. Right.
        Senator King.--credit market.
        Mr. Clapper. They do have very significant reserves--
    financial reserves that they've built up over the years, which
    they're starting to eat into. You're quite right, I mean, over
    an extended period, it can't sustain them.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Very quickly, Director. General Kelly
    testified before this committee about this issue of this
    manufactured heroin, which has now become a major issue all
    over America, particularly the northeast and the midwest, this
    dramatic increase in heroin drug overdoses. Some of it comes
    across the land border. General Kelly testified before this
    committee that he--because of his lack of assets, he watches,
    sometime, seaborne transportation of drugs that land in various
    places in the Caribbean and come up into the United States.
    Isn't that an issue that you can trace, to some degree, to
    sequestration, but also the old squeezing-the-balloon theory?
        Mr. Clapper. Well, I can't say specifically whether this is
    attributable to sequestration, or not. I just do know that
    there is a great deal of intelligence that the intelligence
    community produces on drug flow into the United States. And----
        Chairman McCain. And some of that is----
        Mr. Clapper. I've heard--I've----
        Chairman McCain.--shifted to seaborne----
        Mr. Clapper. Yes----
        Chairman McCain. Yeah.
        Mr. Clapper.--exactly. Seaborne interdiction with these
    semi-submersible vehicles that are sailed to the American
    coast. The difficulty has been: not enough operational
    resources, and particularly Coast Guard or Navy resources, that
    could be used to take advantage of the intelligence that is
    produced. I saw General Kelly speak to that, just about every
    year he testified.
        Chairman McCain. The interesting thing about this is that
    if you talk to literally any Governor in the northeast or
    midwest of this country today, they would say that this is
    practically an epidemic of--a dramatic increase in heroin drug
    overdose deaths. Now we're going to have this agreement with
    the FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia], which all of
    us want, in Colombia. Does that mean that a lot of these FARC
    people will go into the drug business?
        Mr. Clapper. It certainly could, sir. The other thing I--
    and I alluded briefly to this in my statement--was, of course,
    the--we're seeing an increase in cocaine, which is occasioned
    by--comes from Colombia and, as part of this agreement and
    also, I think, President Santos, the--took heed of what were
    presented to him as environmental impacts of the eradication
    program that have been existent in Colombia for some years.
    They're stopping the drug eradication and trying to appeal to
    the farmers to grow other crops, which probably will be a
    challenge. So----
        Chairman McCain. We saw that experiment in Afghanistan,
    trying to get the farmers to go to other crops rather than
    poppies. It was a failure.
        Mr. Clapper. Well, it didn't seem to work, no. I mean,
    that--there is so much money to be made, and it is such a huge
    moneymaker that it's very hard, I think, to find other--
    alternate crops that are equal--that are legitimate, that are
    equally profitable.
        Chairman McCain. Finally--I apologize for imposing on your
    time, but one thing we know is the Energomash, the company that
    sells the Russian rocket engines to the United States, is rife
    with people who are cronies of Vladimir Putin, people who have
    been sanctioned, part of criminal activities. Wouldn't it
    better for us to--rather than giving tens of millions of
    dollars to Russia--Putin and his cronies, to buy more Deltas as
    part of the solution? I know your answer is going to be: you're
    the purchaser. I also think that this almost borders on a
    national security issue, because, if we're going to give tens
    of millions of dollars to people who are known thugs and Putin,
    himself, who was just recently implicated by the British for
    the murder of a former KGB agent in London, the assassination
    of Boris Nemtsov in the shadow of the Kremlin, that--for us to
    unnecessarily provide the Russians with tens or hundreds of
    millions of dollars, it doesn't seem to me to be a logical way
    to do business, particularly if the we have the opportunity to
    buy more Deltas and have the development of Russian rocket
    engines here in the United States, which people like SpaceX and
    others are working on. Do you have any comment?
        Mr. Clapper. I would agree with you. I--I'm interested in
    the service, in lift, in getting--in launch, in getting our
    reconnaissance satellites deployed on time. I would much prefer
    that the totality of the system that gets those satellites into
    orbit were American.
        Chairman McCain. I thank you.
        Senator Reed, do you have----
        Senator Reed. I simply want to thank both General Stewart
    and General Clapper for their testimony and their service.
        Particularly, again, General Clapper, thank you for your
    extraordinary service to the Nation.
        Mr. Clapper. Thank you very much.
        Chairman McCain. Can I say, sometimes we have hearings that
    are, maybe, not too productive. I view this as one of the more
    helpful hearings that we have had before this committee. I
    thank the witnesses for their candor and their wisdom.
        This hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:37 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

        EMERGING UNITED STATES DEFENSE CHALLENGES AND WORLDWIDE THREATS

                                  ----------

                           TUESDAY, DECEMBER 6, 2016

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in Room
    SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Wicker,
    Ayotte, Fischer, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Lee, Graham,
    Cruz, Reed, McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand,
    Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, and Heinrich.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman McCain. Good morning. The Senate Armed Services
    Committee meets this morning to receive testimony on emerging
    U.S. defense challenges and worldwide threats.
        We're fortunate to have with us three distinguished
    witnesses: General Jack Keane, Chairman of the Institute for
    the Study of War and former Vice Chief of Staff of the Army;
    Mr. Shawn Brimley, the Executive Vice President and Director of
    Studies at The Center for a New American Security; and Dr.
    Robert Kagan, Senior Fellow at The Brookings Institute, Project
    on International Order and Strategy.
        Our next President will take office as the United States
    confronts the most diverse and complex array of global security
    challenges since the end of the second World War. Great power
    competition, once thought a casualty of the End of History, has
    returned as Russia and China have each challenged the rules-
    based order that is the foundation of our security and
    prosperity. Rogue states like North Korea and Iran are
    undermining regional stability while developing advanced
    military capabilities that threaten the United States and our
    allies. Radical Islamist terrorism continues to pose a
    challenging threat to our security at home and our interests
    abroad. The chaos that has spread across the Middle East and on
    which our terrorist enemies thrive has torn apart nations,
    destroyed families, killed hundreds of thousands of men, women,
    and children, and sent millions more running for their lives.
        Today--today--President Obama will deliver a speech in
    Florida touting his counterterrorism successes. I'm not making
    that up. Yet, even a glimpse at the chaos enveloping the Middle
    East and spreading throughout the world reveals the delusion
    and sophistry of this President and his failed policies. In
    short, when our next President is inaugurated, just 6 weeks
    from now, he will look out on a world on fire and have several
    consequential strategic choices to make: how to address Russian
    or Chinese aggression; how to confront threats from North
    Korea; whether to alter our relationship with Iran; how to
    improve and quicken our campaign against ISIL [the Islamic
    State of Iraq and the Levant]; how to counter the instability
    radiating from Syria; how to ensure victory in the war in
    Afghanistan--and I could go on--not to mention the overwhelming
    challenge of cybersecurity. Our next President will not have
    the benefit of time and cautious deliberation to set a new
    strategic course for the Nation. That work begins with a series
    of decisions that will present themselves immediately on day
    one. That's why it's so important to get these things right
    from the outset.
        As we ponder these strategic questions, we must also
    consider our military posture around the world. We must decide
    the appropriate military presence in Europe and reverse
    reductions made by the Obama administration under the
    assumption that Russia was a partner. We also need a fresh look
    at further steps to enhance U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific
    region. We need to uphold our commitments to allies and
    partners, including by finally providing lethal assistance to
    Ukraine and standing by the opposition in Syria. We need to
    push back against the spread of Iranian malign influence in the
    Middle East. This starts in Iraq, where the eventual liberation
    of Mosul will intensify the sectarian struggle for power and
    identity. We need to finally give our troops in Afghanistan
    what they need to succeed: permanent and flexible authorities
    to engage the enemy and troop levels based on security
    conditions on the ground.
        Here at home, we need to return to a strategy-based defense
    budget. Our next President would need more than $100 billion
    over and above the Budget Control Act caps just to execute our
    current defense strategy, which is insufficient, since it
    predates Russian invasion of Ukraine and ISIL's rampage across
    Syria and Iraq. This will require our next President to
    negotiate a broad bipartisan agreement on the budget that
    brings an end to the dangerous and misguided Budget Control
    Act. Such an agreement has eluded President Obama and the
    Congress, not because of disagreements on defense policy, but
    because we've lacked the political will to prioritize defense.
        Since the election, many have discussed domestic
    priorities, including reviewing Obamacare, increasing
    information spending, and implementing tax cuts. These can be
    no--there can be no greater priority than preserving and
    increasing America's position of strength and military
    advantage in the face of increasing global dangers, that
    rebuilding our military must be a political priority, not just
    a talking point. We must not only provide stable and increased
    defense budgets, but the next President's administration must
    also implement reforms to the Nation's defense. This will
    include changes to the defense enterprise passed by the
    Congress over the last 2 years.
        I'm proud of the work we've done on modernization--on
    modernizing military retirement, improving military healthcare,
    reforming defense acquisition, trimming Pentagon bureaucracy,
    and more. The ultimate success of these reforms will depend on
    years of faithful implementation and dedicated follow through
    by the Department of Defense.
        The President-elect's selection of General James Mattis to
    serve as Secretary is an encouraging sign in this regard, but
    there are dozens of senior civilian and military nominations
    still to come, and it will be the job of this committee and the
    full Senate to provide advice and consent on these nominations.
    We will be watching closely to see what choices the next
    President makes.
        I encourage the next President to be bold. We need
    innovators for the future, not imitators of the past. We need
    thinkers open to new ideas, not functionaries wedded to old
    ways. We need people who understand the bureaucracy but will
    not be captured by it. Put simply, to ensure the success of
    defense reform, we need reformers throughout the leadership of
    the Department of Defense.
        Finally, our next President needs to repair the
    relationship between the executive and legislative branches.
    The constitutional mandate to provide for the common defense is
    one the President and the Congress share together. This is not
    a defect, but the design of our founders. To deter adversaries
    and defeat our enemies, fix our defense budget, and implement
    critical reforms on--to our defense enterprise, the executive
    and legislative branches must work together as coequals. We
    need our next President, our next Secretary of Defense, and
    those elected to the next Congress to uphold this essential
    constitutional principle. The American people and the men and
    women who serve in our Armed Forces deserve and expect nothing
    less.
        Senator Reed.

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you for holding this very important hearing.
        I also want to thank the witnesses for their participation,
    not only their participation, but their service in so many
    different capacities to the Nation over many, many years. Thank
    you all very much.
        The most immediate threat to the safety of Americans at
    home and abroad still remains the Islamic State in Iraq and the
    Levant, or ISIL, and the remnants of al Qaeda. I recently
    returned from the region, where I met with our military
    commanders, diplomats, and senior political leaders.
    Militarily, ISIL is on the path to defeat in Iraq. The Iraqi
    Security Force, enabled by U.S. and coalition train, advise,
    and assist efforts, coupled with airstrikes, intelligence, and
    other support, are in the process of displacing ISIL from Mosul
    and are expected, in the coming months, to significantly
    disrupt the ability of ISIL to hold any key terrain within
    Iraq. Nevertheless, ISIL will likely continue to act as the
    subversive force in Iraq for the foreseeable future; and also,
    as the Chairman indicated, with the final capture of Mosul,
    that will start a political process in which the sectarian
    groups will vie for power, and that could be a decisive and
    critical theater arena of action in Iraq.
        In Syria, isolation operations around Raqqa have commenced,
    but the task of supporting forces on the ground who will
    ultimately enter, clear, and hold Raqqa is months away. Unlike
    Iraq, we have no partner in Syria for humanitarian,
    stabilization, and reconstruction efforts. Even after Raqqa is
    retaken, the security situation will remain extremely difficult
    as the remnants of ISIL seek refuge in the largely ungoverned
    areas of eastern Syria along the Euphrates River as the broader
    Syrian civil war is likely to rage on.
        I also recently visited Afghanistan, where political
    tensions between President Ghani and Chief Executive Officer
    Abdullah appear to be receding as the 2016 traditional fighting
    season comes to a close. Our commander in Afghanistan, General
    Nicholson, recently described the conflict between the Afghan
    government and the Taliban as, in his words, ``an equilibrium
    in favor of the government because they are controlling the
    majority of the population.''
        Decisions earlier this year by the President to maintain
    approximately 8400 U.S. troops in Afghanistan into 2017 and to
    provide robust support to the Afghan national defense and
    security forces has laid the foundation for a sustainable U.S.
    and international security presence in Afghanistan. The
    decision also sent an important message to Afghans, the
    Taliban, and others in the region, including Pakistan,
    regarding the commitment of the United States to continue
    progress in Afghanistan. Assuming the continued support of the
    Afghan government and the support of its people, I hope the
    next administration will follow a conditions-based approach to
    U.S. presence in Afghanistan that provides flexibility on the
    number of military personnel deployed in support of our longer-
    term strategy there.
        Over the past few months, the implementation of the Joint
    Comprehensive Plan of Action, the JCPOA, has largely proceeded
    as planned. While the JCPOA is having its intended impact in
    the nuclear arena, Iran's behavior with respect to its proxy
    forces across the region has not improved, and, as I discussed
    during my recent visit with the commander of our naval forces
    in the Middle East, Iran's unsafe and unprofessional actions in
    the maritime arena continue. How the new administration chooses
    to proceed with respect to Iran will be an important decision.
    It is critical that we need cede space or territory to Iranian
    influence, but it's similarly critical that we not take actions
    that escalate tensions unnecessarily and can be blamed on the
    United States. For example, as many experts have pointed out,
    the likely result of the U.S. unilaterally withdrawing from the
    JCPOA would be a resumption of the Iranian nuclear program
    without the ability to reimpose effective sanctions, which rely
    on enforcement by our partners around the world.
        In Europe, we continue to be a witness to a number of
    destabilizing factors, including adversarial actions by Russia,
    acts of terrorism, and sustained refugee and migrant flows.
    Such instability is acutely on display in Ukraine, where
    Russian-based separatists commit daily cease-fire violations
    with seemingly endless resupply from Russia, and disinformation
    campaigns continue to undermine public confidence in Ukrainian
    government institutions. This confluence of destabilizing
    factors makes the multinational effort underway to strengthen
    Ukraine's capability to defend itself and to decrease
    corruption, increase accountability, and reform institutional
    structures all the more important.
        In the Pacific, China has alarmed its neighbors in the
    South China Sea by militarizing land features in a body of
    water that is critical for trade and regional peace, and
    refusing to acknowledge the international norms and laws that
    govern those waters.
        In Korea--North Korea--Kim Jung-un continues to destabilize
    the Korean Peninsula with nuclear ballistic missile
    developments, and sanctions are not working as effectively as
    they should to bring the North Koreans to the negotiating
    table. Regimes as authoritarian and insulated as North Korea's
    are brittle and prone to collapse. How we would deal with such
    a collapse and the security and humanitarian problems that
    would ensue is an ongoing debate and challenge to U.S. Forces
    Korea and the PACOM [United States Pacific Command] Commander.
        Finally, defense budgets should be based on a long-term
    military strategy, which requires the Department to focus at
    least 5 years into the future. Last year, Congress passed the
    2015 Bipartisan Budget Act, or BBA, which established the
    discretionary funding levels for defense spending for fiscal
    years 2016 and 2017. While the BBA provided the Department with
    budget stability in the near term, there is no budget agreement
    for fiscal year 2018 and beyond. Therefore, without another
    bipartisan agreement that provides relief from sequestration,
    the military services will be forced to adhere to the
    sequestration-level budget caps and could undermine the
    investments made to rebuild readiness and modernize platforms
    and equipment.
        Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for this important hearing.
        Chairman McCain. I thank you.
        I thank the witnesses.
        General Keane, given your advanced age, we will begin with
    you.

       STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOHN M. KEANE, USA (RET.), CHAIRMAN,
    INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR, AND FORMER VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
                              OF THE ARMY

        General Keane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Love that
    introduction.
        [Laughter.]
        General Keane. Good morning, everyone. Listen, I'm
    delighted to be here with Dr. Kagan and--my good friend. Let me
    just say something about Dr. Kagan, here, and his family. His
    father, himself, his wife, his brother, and his sister-in-law
    all----
        Chairman McCain. All have exceeded----
        General Keane.--make a great contribution----
        Chairman McCain.--exceeded his----
        General Keane.--to this country, believe me.
        Mr. Brimley, as well, thank you to be here.
        Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished
    members of the committee, thank you for inviting me once again.
        Listen, I so appreciate what this committee has done
    through the years in taking care of our men and women in the
    Armed Forces. Just let me say straight out, my congratulations
    to the committee and to your leadership, Senators McCain and
    Reed, for your seminal achievement with the FY17 NDAA [National
    Defense Auhtorization Act]. We've not had such a critical
    transformational piece of defense legislation in 30 years, not
    since Goldwater-Nichols in 1986. You've stopped the drawdown of
    our ground forces, particularly the Army, who's borne the brunt
    of 15 years of war. They're still doing heavy lifting around
    the world. You know, it was the Army who was asked to reduce
    its force structure to pay for the needs of the other
    Departments. Makes no sense whatsoever.
        I applaud your bold reforms on defense acquisition,
    military healthcare, security cooperation, and the reduction of
    flag officer and SES billets--I know you will eventually get
    around to compensation, which is in dire need-- and, of course,
    the much needed increase of funding to depleted readiness
    accounts.
        Let me summarize what you have in front of you with my
    written statement, which has an unusual amount of verbosity in
    it, but, given the subject matter was so important, I decided
    to write a little bit more than I usually do. Let's start with
    the defense challenges.
        You know as well as I do, there's a lot more that we have
    to--done here. You have made an incredible first start with the
    FY17 NDAA, but we have major capability gaps, and we've got
    serious funding issues. The BCA has to end. We can't do
    anything if that continues. We can't get out our hole, and it's
    going to put us in a worse hole.
        It's--you know, it's not sufficient, you know, to be the
    best military in the world. Certainly, we take pride in that,
    as we rightfully should. We've--we spend more money than many
    other nations do if you add them all up, by comparison, in
    defense. What is really needed is, we have to be so superior in
    our capability that our adversaries are not willing to
    challenge us. The reason is because we're a credible deterrent.
    We had that for many years in the Cold War. We were, indeed, a
    credible deterrent. I believe that deterrence, with other
    issues, helped to force the collapse of the Soviet Union.
        So, since that time, we've had two and a half decades since
    the end of the Cold War, and--which has been reasonably
    successful, in terms of foreign policy and national security. I
    don't dispute that. With some exceptions. We have been
    continuously decrementing the United States military during
    that whole period of time. Our adversaries are closing the
    technology gap. They are catching up.
        We are ill-prepared, as we sit here today, to meet all the
    threats that we're facing. I don't make that statement lightly.
    You've had a Chief of Service come in here--[General Mark A.]
    Milley, straight talker--tell you, in no uncertain words, that
    he's at high military risk to win a conventional war. Now, that
    didn't get a headline in any newspaper, it didn't even cause a
    stir with the administration. We haven't had a service chief
    make a statement like that in 40 years. Other service chiefs
    could make the same statement. The Air Force, they've got a
    1947 air force, in size. They've got 60-percent-plus combat
    aircraft than what we used to have when we began the decline.
    Sixty-plus percent. The Navy--you know, you're aware of it--
    they've got 270 hulls, and they're going to 308. The 270, as
    part of that, they're going to retire more ships than they can
    replace during the timeframe to get to the 308. They've gone
    through a 50-percent-plus reduction during this two-and-a-half-
    decade decline. If you look at it in spending dollars, constant
    dollars, we're spending about the same amount of money that we
    did three decades ago, but we're considerably smaller. We've
    got so--less to show for it. So, we've got to fix the
    shortfall. The reality is, we need more combat brigades. The
    reality is, we need more ships. The reality is, we need more
    aircraft. It's indisputable.
        The technology gap, it's closing, and closed. Precision-
    guided munitions, space-based technology, stealth, offensive
    and defense missiles, long-range artillery, they're all there.
    That capability exists in our adversaries.
        Russia and China, they have a brilliant strategy. They're
    not stupid. They've got an asymmetric strategy to minimize the
    great-power advantage that we have in our air and maritime
    capability. So, what have they done? They've made long-range
    anti-ship missiles, and they've made long-range anti-aircraft
    missiles. Those things matter. They've deployed them in eastern
    China. That's a major challenge for us. They've deployed them
    in western Russia, and it's also a major challenge for us.
        Russia's got a new tank. It's a T-14 Armata. The crew is no
    longer in a turret. The first time that's ever happened. It's
    in the main body. They're in a special protected capsule. It
    has advanced reactive armor, second generation, on it that we
    believe--we don't know for sure--but our main tank sabot round,
    long penetrator, it'll stop it. It also has active protective
    system on it, their second generation. The United States has
    not fielded a single Active Protective System on a tank yet, or
    any other combat vehicle. Your committee has mandated they do
    it. You put some money in there for them to do it.
        Now, listen, if you don't know what Active Protective
    System is, let me take you through it for a second. You put
    sensors on a vehicle that track an incoming round to the
    vehicle, and, as the vehicle--as the round is about to hit the
    vehicle, you actually have a kill system on the vehicle that
    kills the round before it hits. Brilliant technology. Where do
    we get all of that from? Private sector. It has to do with
    microchip technology and incredible software programs. Out
    there on the private sector, smart guys, small business guys
    got it. DARPA [Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency] had a
    program, over 10 years ago, to look at this. Technology's
    proven, and the United States military ground forces still
    haven't put it on anything. What's wrong with that? It has
    nothing to do with money. It doesn't have anything to do with
    the White House. It doesn't have anything to do with Congress.
    Doesn't, I mean, have anything to do with OSD [Office of the
    Secretary of Defense]. You know what it is? It's the damn
    bureaucracy inside the Army. They push back on new technology,
    because they want to design it themselves because you give them
    money to do it. These are the laboratories and the tech bases.
    It's the acquisition bureaucracy that stalls this.
        When I was Vice Chief of Staff for the Army, I had no idea
    about all of that, and it took me a year or two to figure out
    what I was really dealing with, bureaucrats and technocrats
    that were stalling the advance of a great army. That's out
    there. You've got to bore into that with this committee. The
    military and Defense Department needs help to break down that
    bureaucracy.
        Listen, some--all the service chiefs know what they want to
    do with their service, but allow me a little bit of allowance
    here, as an observer, to throw out a couple of tidbits. You
    know, for my Army, the Army that you're looking at is a 1980s
    Army. That's the equipment it's got. It hasn't had a new major
    end item since the 1980s. The Stryker vehicle was bought off-
    the-shelf. That's a legacy system out there. The problem is,
    they're 200,000 shorter--smaller than what the 1980 Army was.
    200,000 smaller. If you have Active Protective System like I
    just said, and you can kill anything that comes at a tank,
    should we design a tank that looks different than what it is?
    Does it really have to be 70 tons? I don't think so.
        So, the Army's got to do some thinking about where it's
    going. I--also, I believe it has to rethink its organization,
    how it fights, and go after the technology that is available,
    and press the R&D [research and development] community to get
    you the new technology that you can conceptually even think
    through yourself.
        The Navy--lookit--what the Chinese have is serious, in
    terms of long-range anti-shipping. Long-range anti-ship
    missiles are here to stay. Nineteen ship surface carrier battle
    groups, does that still make sense in the face of that threat?
    They can put--they can swarm those missiles. They can bring
    them en masse against that carrier battle group that will
    really test our air defense systems. Doesn't it make sense to
    look at undersea warfare and take a look at all the functions
    that are taking place on the surface, and whatever functions on
    the surface we can do undersea, put it there. Why? You've got
    protection and you've got stealth. Seems to make sense. Some of
    this is cultural, to be sure, inside services. You know, these
    things are not easy. There are good people there. You can push
    it a little bit. Goldwater-Nichols changed the United States
    military. FY17 NDAA is going to do some of that, as well.
        The Air Force--lookit, we know--we know it intuitively.
    It's obvious. It's right in front of us. Unmanned flight is
    here. It's here. We've got to get serious about it. If you put,
    in a remote station, a pilot and a multifunctional crew versus
    a single pilot or a dual pilot in the air, that is an enhanced
    airpower capability. That's here. We can do that. We've got to
    think about doing it.
        I also think--and comes through our flag officers, it got
    at something that Senator McCain was saying--we've got to look
    for our flag officers who are not risk-averse, who themselves
    are not bureaucrats, and who have--they're willing to take risk
    and are innovative. The reason why they got that rank on their
    shoulder has nothing to do with cars, airplanes, and all them
    other stuff that goes with it. It all has to do about taking
    the rocks out of the rucksack of our soldiers and moving that
    system forward. We've got to get the best that we can to do
    that kind of work.
        Let me just say that modernizing a military is challenging.
    We can do it, even though we're facing all these threats, as
    Senator McCain and Senator Reed took out. General Marshall,
    Admiral King, General LeMay, Admiral Rickover, General Abrams,
    they all met those challenges, and they transformed our land,
    air, and sea forces. They are the ones that are responsible for
    winning on the battlefield from Normandy to the Philippines and
    from Kuwait to Iraq.
        Let me just say something about the DOD [Department of
    Defense] business side of the house. Certainly, we are the best
    fighting force in the world. We're first-rate at that. We're
    absolutely third-rate at running the businesslike functions of
    DOD, because we're not good at it. We don't know enough to be
    good at it. We're managing huge real estate portfolios, we're
    managing huge lodging capabilities. We're one of the great--
    biggest motel owners in the United States. We're managing the
    largest healthcare enterprise in the world. The amount of
    maintenance that we're doing, from a pistol to an aircraft
    carrier, is staggering. Those are all business functions.
    Business functions. They're all non-core functions. We're also
    managing new product design and new product development, using
    business terms. We don't do well at this. There's a ton of
    money involved in it. We've got to get after that money, and
    we've got to do better at it. I think we should bring in, as
    the number-two guy in the Department of Defense, a CEO [Chief
    Executive Officer] from a Fortune 500 company in the last 5
    years that's done a major turnaround of a large organization.
    We need businesspeople to help us do this. We need a CFO [Chief
    Financial Officer], not a comptroller, in DOD. That CFO has the
    background that's necessary to look at business practices in
    the DOD, where cost is a--cost-based analysis and performance,
    internal control, auditing, rigorous financial reviews, cost
    efficiency, and dealing with waste. Those are the kind of
    things we need. Desperately need them, because the money is
    there. We want to--you want to do so much more. Some of that
    money is sitting right there in the budget.
        You know as well as I do that these global security
    challenges we're--facing us are enormous. Senator McCain laid
    them all out. I won't go through them all. I'll just touch on a
    couple of things.
        One is American leadership. That is where we have to start.
    American leadership is crucial and indispensable in this world
    to global security and stability. The world economy absolutely
    depends on that global stability and security. We need to
    reassure our allies that we're going to stand behind them. They
    don't trust us. They don't believe we're the reliable ally we
    used to be. If you travel the world, you're getting the same
    thing that I'm getting. This is real. They--as a result of it,
    they're making decisions based on that fear. Some of those
    decisions are not very good.
        Radical Islam. We know it's a multigenerational problem of
    the 21st century. We know we have to name it, we have to define
    it, and we have to explain it to the American people. My God,
    if they're going to deal with this for the 21st century, we're
    going to have people killing them on some kind of episodic
    basis, they certainly need to understand a little bit about it,
    you would think, that we can explain what this is, what this
    ideology is, what are the signs, symbols, dress, and behavior
    and speech of those who radicalize themselves to it, so their
    eyes and ears can identify it and report it to somebody. Just
    makes sense, but we're not doing it.
        The other thing is, we need to develop a comprehensive
    strategy, but we can't do that until we form a global alliance
    to push back against what is a global threat. We haven't done
    it.
        ISIS [the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria]. ISIS is the
    most successful terrorist organization that's ever been put
    together. We're making progress against them in Iraq, to be
    sure. We do not have an effective strategy to defeat them in
    Syria, because we don't have an effective ground force. We have
    no strategy to deal with the spread of ISIS to 35 other
    countries. I'm not suggesting for a minute that we're involved
    in all of that, but I think we can tangibly help the people who
    are. This administration's going to have to deal with, How do
    we defeat ISIS? Not just how we succeed in Iraq. I think
    they're going to ask for a comprehensive campaign plan to do
    it. I don't think there has been one, to be frank about it.
        In Iraq, we will retake Mosul. How long will depend on how
    much ISIS wants to defeat--to resist. They didn't resist in
    Fallujah and Ramadi that much. After we take Mosul, if we have
    sectarian strife in Mosul, where we do not have unity of
    governance and unity of security, then that is going to
    contaminate the political unity in the country as a whole which
    is so desperately neeed. That is a major issue for us.
        The major geopolitical issue for the United States in Iraq
    is political unity with that government and diminishing Iran's
    strategic influence on Iraq. That is what we should be working
    on. Frankly, we have not. We have not worked on that anywhere
    near as hard as we could be. We can't get the Secretary of
    State to make regular visits there to work on that very
    project. The Iranians are there all the time. That is a major
    issue for us. This administration's going to have decide, as
    the previous one did, Are we going to leave troops in Iraq?
    Yes? No? How much? What are they going to do? How long? Those
    are decisions in front of them. I would hope that we would
    avoid the disastrous pullout we did in 2011, which had
    incredible consequences, as we all know. The Syrian civil war,
    a major human catastrophe, to be sure, and as intractable a
    problem, I think, as any of us have had to deal with.
        The reality is, we squandered the opportunities to change
    the momentum against the regime. I won't list them all. You're
    aware of it. Right in front of us, I still believe we could put
    safe zones in there to safeguard some of those humans up near
    the Jordanian and Turkish border. That, de facto, would be a
    no-fly zone. I think it would also aid the Syrian moderates,
    and likely attract some others to that movement. Many of the
    people that were helping the Syrian moderates, the Islamists,
    moved way when we did not execute the 2013 chemical redline.
        Chairman McCain. General, we're going to have to----
        General Keane. Okay, I'll wrap it up.
        Afghanistan. Let me just say, the war is not winnable under
    the current policy. We cannot win. That's the reality of it.
    We've got sanctuaries in Pakistan. No insurgency's ever been
    defeated with sanctuaries outside the conflict area. Pakistani
    and Afghan National Security Forces do not have the enablers
    they need to be able to overcome the Taliban, who have
    resurged. There's ways we can deal with that, to be sure. I'll
    take it on in questions-and-answers.
        With Russia and China, I'll just tell you that my view is
    strength and resolve in dealing with both of them. They would
    recognize that. I truly believe that Russia's aggression needs
    to be stopped. Credible deterrence is the way to do it. The
    resolve in that deterrence. Russia certainly wants to be an
    equal partner with the United States to be on the world stage.
    Grant them that. We should make no concessions to them until
    they change their behavior.
        I'll just stop right there, Mr. Chairman, and I'll take
    your questions later.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of General Keane follows:]

             Prepared Statement by General John M. Keane, USA (Ret)
        Chairman McCain, ranking member Reed and distinguished members of
    the committee thank you for inviting me once again to provide testimony
    on our major defense issues and global security challenges.
        Let me say, straight out, my congratulations to the committee and
    to your leadership, Senators McCain and Reed for your seminal
    achievement with the FY 17 NDAA. We have not had such a critical
    transformational piece of defense legislation in 30 years since the
    passage of Goldwater-Nichols in 1986. You have stopped the drawdown of
    our ground forces, particularly, the Army who has borne the brunt of 15
    years of war, is still doing heavy lifting around the world, yet, it
    was the Army who was asked to reduce its force structure to pay for
    needs in the other departments. Makes no sense. I applaud your bold
    reforms on defense acquisition, military healthcare, security
    cooperation and the reduction of flag officer and SES billets. Of
    course the much needed increase of funding to depleted readiness
    accounts.
                              defense challenges:
        It will take the help of the new President and the new Congress to
    complete what you have begun because there are major capability gaps
    and serious funding issues remaining. The Budget Control Act
    (sequestration) must be ended. Frankly, it's not sufficient to be the
    best military in the world, or to spend more money on defense than the
    next five or so militaries combined, what is critical is that the US
    military is so superior in capability that our adversaries are
    unwilling to challenge us because we are such a credible deterrent. We
    achieved this during the Cold War and it was a factor in the Soviet
    Union collapse. Regrettably, this superiority is dangerously eroding.
    Over the course of the past 2 = decades since the end of the Cold War,
    the capacity of US armed forces has been continuously decremented and
    coupled with the rapid closing of the military superiority gap by
    potential adversaries, the US military is ill prepared to meet the many
    and various security challenges it faces around the world today and in
    the future. Readiness is down across the board in all the services with
    pilot training, safety and aircraft maintenance reaching critical
    levels. The Army Chief of Staff, General Milley, known for straight-
    talk, in testimony before this committee told you that because only one
    third of his combat units were ready for combat, that the Army is at
    ``high risk'' for winning a conventional war. We have not had a service
    chief make a statement like that in 40 years. Other service chiefs
    could make similar statements. As you know, we have the smallest Air
    Force since 1947, and a 270 hull Navy, while moving to 308 ships, the
    Navy will be retiring ships faster than they can be replaced. In
    constant dollars we are spending about the same on defense as we did
    almost 3 decades ago. Alarmingly, for today's defense budget we are
    fielding 35% fewer combat brigades, 53% fewer combat ships, 63% fewer
    combat aircraft squadrons along with a dramatic increase in overhead
    not directly related to war fighting combat power.
        The technology advantages that were enjoyed from the end of the
    Cold War are closing rapidly and in many cases have closed: precision
    guided munitions, space-based technology, stealth, offensive and
    defensive missiles, long range rocket artillery and ground warfare. Our
    revisionist adversaries Russia, China and to a lesser degree North
    Korea and Iran are developing asymmetric capabilities to minimize the
    air and sea power technology advantage we have enjoyed for years by
    fielding significant long range anti-shipping and anti-aircraft missile
    capability. These forces are forward deployed in Eastern China
    challenging western Pacific access and Western Russia at Kaliningrad
    challenging Baltic Sea access. The Russians who are fielding a
    revolutionary tank, the T14, Armata, the first ever, no crew in the
    turret (they are in a protective capsule in the forward main body), has
    an improved gun system, and has their 2nd generation active protection
    system (APS). The Israelis launched an Armor brigade, their very best,
    to conduct an approach march from West to East Gaza, during the last
    conflict in 2014, with APS on each combat vehicle in order to destroy
    the rockets/missile infrastructure that they could not accomplish with
    air power. They rode through a gauntlet of sophisticated, anti-tank
    systems and did not lose a single vehicle, due primarily to APS.
        The US Army has not fielded a single combat vehicle with APS,
    (although with your mandate and funding they will begin soon) despite
    that the US defense industry has had this proven technology for over 10
    years, which was a DARPA initiative. While funding is usually an issue
    with new technology this is not a funding issue nor is it the White
    House, the Congress, or OSD, this is the Army's acquisition system,
    their labs and tech base, who steadfastly pushed back on this
    technology preferring in-house design as part of a risk averse culture
    to new, outside technology. Thank you to this committee and the
    Congress at large in seeking acquisition and innocation reform which
    demands not only major organization and systemic changes but a
    fundamental cultural change in accepting risk and failure as part of
    the innovation process.
        Given the challenges our adversaries are presenting and the decades
    of military decline in capability, we now must fix it, but we cannot
    rely on the much maligned acquisition system to get us there. This must
    be an urgent, high priority effort and your directed changes help:
    service chiefs back in the acquisition process to help drive it,
    separating out the research and development function at OSD (they are
    the future), rapid prototyping to dramatically accelerate production of
    what works, trial and error experimentation and accepting that failure
    is an answer and not a necessarily bad answer.
        The service chiefs certainly know what future capability they
    desire but it's also appropriate for others to make observations that
    at times seem quite obvious. A few tidbits of my own:

        a.  The joint force is how we fight and while our success is
    technology dependent equally important are adaptable, flexible JT force
    organizations that can react to the unexpected and are grounded in up
    to date doctrine that truly advantages our technology.
        b.  The ground force today is essentially organized and equipped as
    it was in the 1980s, yet considerably smaller (Army 200K less).
    Furthermore enabling forces like artillery, armored reconnaissance,
    engineers, air defense, theater support, etc. have been reduced to
    levels that compromise our ground force ability to field campaign
    quality forces. Our ground force is not in balance and they must
    rethink their organization, doctrine and put together a modernization
    program that moves away from the 1980 legacy systems and embrace
    advance technology that is available and push the R&D hard for new
    technology.
        c.  The Navy battle formations are vulnerable to long range anti-
    shipping missiles which can be sent en masse, challenging the best of
    our air defenses. Doesn't it make sense to embrace the reality that the
    undersea affords our combat power significant protection and stealth
    and therefore charge our fleet design around the principle that
    whatever is on the surface as to capabilities that can be accomplished
    under the sea, we should get on with it, and therefore redesign our
    fleet? Don't we need to move from the large aircraft carrier to smaller
    platforms yet more of them to give us some redundancy and flexibility?
        d.  The time is here to recognize that the future of air power is
    unmanned. It's not a technology issue, it's largely about culture. A
    pilot with a multi-functional team at a remote station is an enhanced
    air power capability.

        Modernizing while supporting significant operational demands is not
    easy, but it has been done before. Leaders like General Marshall,
    Admiral King, General LeMay, Admiral Rickover and General Abrams
    transformed our land, sea and air forces before in periods of great
    challenge. Their efforts fielded trained, disciplined and modernized
    formations that won on battlefields from Normandy to the Philippines,
    from Kuwait to Iraq.
        The Defense Department capability to fight is second to none, as
    the record speaks for itself, but its ability to manage effectively the
    business like functions of the DoD are, at best, third rate. In as much
    as DoD is not a business, it does have vast business-like functions
    that it must manage; real estate (housing, barracks, maintenance
    facilities, warehouses, training areas, ship yards, airfields), lodging
    (transient and guest quarters), utilities ( power plants, electrical
    grids, water treatment facilities), new product development and
    production (research, development and acquisition) maintenance (from a
    pistol to an aircraft carrier) and the largest healthcare enterprise in
    the world. Much of these non-warfighting functions lend themselves to
    major reform as public-private partnerships (PPP) similar to the highly
    successful PPP, the Army residential initiative, or RCI, which led to
    the transformation of 88,000 Army units. Quality of life and family
    satisfaction rose exponentially while cost and maintenance were driven
    down.
        The new Secretary of Defense should consider appointing as his
    deputy a successful Fortune 500 CEO who has executed a turnaround of a
    large business in the last 5 years. The comptroller should no longer be
    someone that simply has knowledge of the DoD federal budget and
    programming process but rather is a major corporate CFO, who should be
    the DoD CFO, therefore understands rigorous financial review, cost
    basis analysis, auditing, internal reporting, cost controls and holding
    the organization accountable for financial efficiency as well as waste.
                          global security challenges:
        Our new President and his national security team will be
    confronting global security challenges on a scale not seen since the
    rise of the Soviet Union to super-power status following WWII. Radical
    Islam is morphing into a global jihad; ISIS is the most successful
    terrorist organization in history despite losing major territory in
    Iraq, it has expanded into 35 countries and is motivating followers to
    kill their fellow citizens around the world; Al Qaeda is a thriving
    revitalized organization; the Taliban control more territory in
    Afghanistan than at any time since the successful invasion of 2001;
    revisionist powers Russia, China and Iran are seeking some form of
    regional domination; North Korea is a rogue nation with an unsteady
    leader who is building a nuclear and ballistic missile arsenal and
    threatening to use it; and advanced adversarial states are conducting
    cyber attacks and espionage activities at exploding levels in stealing
    intellectual property, technology and critical information.
        What makes this such a dangerous situation is that unlike previous
    security challenges, the US today is failing miserably to adequately
    meet these threats, so much so that our adversaries are emboldened and
    our friends and allies no longer trust us.
                               what can be done:

        1.  American Leadership--Recognize that American leadership is
    crucial and indispensable to global stability and security which is so
    vital for a progressive and growing world economy. Without strong
    American leadership the world becomes a more dangerous place. As such,
    we should reassure our allies that the US will stand with them against
    regional aggression and help them organize to meet the challenges of
    radical Islam.

            Also, it is critical that our allies are not simply relying on
    the US defense umbrella but are tangibly contributing to their own
    local and regional defense while investing their fair share.

        2.  Radical Islam--must not simply be named as a political and
    religious ideology fighting a war within a great religion, which does
    not mean that the US is at war with Islam, but radical Islam must also
    be defined and explained so that the American people can be informed
    and educated. As such they can better understand why this is the multi-
    generational security challenge of the 21st century and equally
    important for the American people, who are our eyes and ears, in how to
    recognize the dress, behavior and speech of a radicalized Islamist
    terrorist who is living among us. Similar to the communist ideological
    threat where the US helped craft a strategy and organize a regional
    political and military alliance, we must now form a global alliance and
    develop a comprehensive strategy to defeat the movement and its
    ideology.

        3.  ISIS: Iraq/Syria and the World Beyond--

           -- Overall--First and foremost the POTUS as CINC needs an
    assessment of the current situation, future plans and if the desired
    end state is less than satisfactory then what will be needed is a
    comprehensive campaign plan to defeat ISIS, not simply in Iraq and
    Syria but a strategy as well for the 35 countries where ISIS has
    expanded , particularly with its external terrorist network.

           -- Iraq--The military campaign led by Iraq and supported by the
    US will eventually succeed in retaking Mosul. How long it will take
    depends on ISIS desire to resist. They eventually abandoned Fallujah
    and Ramadi after initially resisting. How Mosul ends is very important
    because if it winds up in sectarian strife and there is no unity in
    governance and security after, then it will contaminate any chance of
    political unity in Iraq, at large, which is as significant to success
    as the military campaign. US policy should be all-in on its focus for
    political unification in Iraq and diminishing Iranian influence which
    has grown exponentially at US expense since Iraq was abandoned
    politically in 2009 and militarily in 2011. Iraq is a country of
    consequence in the region with wealth, an educated class of people, and
    a huge potential for political and economic progress. US policy must
    counter the Iranian desire that Iraq remain a weak, but stable country,
    and allied with Iran as part of its strategic objective to dominate the
    Middle East region. Our diplomatic effort to date has been feeble with
    the Secretary of State rarely visiting the country and not surprising,
    as a result, a lack of focus in achieving our strategic political
    objectives. The new administration will face near term decisions of
    withdrawing or keeping U.S. forces in Iraq and, if so, how many will
    stay, how long and for what mission. Certainly if we have learned
    anything after the disastrous 2011 pull out, is that US forces are a
    stabilizing factor that not only impacts security but the vital issue
    of political growth and unity. Post WWII Europe and Japan, South Korea
    after the Korean War, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo are vivid examples.

           -- Syria--There is no effective plan to defeat ISIS in Syria as
    there is not a capable ground force. The Syrian Arabs and Kurds
    assisted by US SOF is simply not sufficient. The CINC must be presented
    with alternative ground force options which includes neighboring
    countries, NATO and the US along with the associated risk.

           -- ISIS beyond Iraq and Syria--With ISIS in 35 countries as part
    of its external terrorist network, the US and our allies should assist
    these countries where needed with intelligence, training and
    technology.

        4.  Syrian Civil War--A frustrating calamity and a growing human
    catastrophe where so many opportunities to at least try to change the
    momentum against the Assad regime were squandered. No one has seriously
    proposed a military solution to the Syrian civil war, although a
    military victory in a civil war is not without its historical
    precedence. What was proposed by national security team key leaders and
    by analysts outside the administration were limited military options
    that could change the momentum against the regime and force a political
    solution. Clearly some of these options are not as viable now with the
    Russian incursion and increased Iranian assistance. However to continue
    to simply negotiate when all the opposition parties are not at the
    table and the Russians and Iranians or not serious, is futile. The U.S
    has no leverage in the negotiations, particularly, as Russian and
    Syrian air power focuses on destroying US backed and other moderate
    opposition forces. It was a major policy failure to permit Russian
    airpower to bomb the Syrian opposition forces the CIA was directly
    assisting. We warned the Russians not to bomb but they did it anyway.

            They should have been told if they did bomb US backed Syrian
    forces, then the US would reply in kind and bomb the Russian backed
    Syrian forces, particularly their air power. I still believe that
    establishing safe zones inside Syria near the Turkish and Jordanian
    borders is a credible option. It would be a major morale boost for the
    Syrian opposition and enhance the role and support of the Syrian
    moderate opposition groups with other groups, to say nothing of the
    tens of thousands of Syrian civilians who will be protected.

        5.  Afghanistan--After 15 years the war is not winnable. The
    security situation is worsening and as such the government of
    Afghanistan is getting weaker. While there are many Afghan issues that
    contribute to the current situation, it is critical to understand how
    US policy contributed to the current outcome if we are to turn it
    around.

            a. When the Bush administration decided to go to war in Iraq in
    December `01, after the successful invasion of Afghanistan in November,
    Afghanistan became an economy of force effort, with the minimum
    military resources applied. As such, the Afghan security forces were
    not developed fully, the Taliban re-emerged in 2004/2005 and no
    increase in force levels occurred until 2008 when President Bush was
    able to deploy additional forces that year because of the availability
    of forces due to the military success in Iraq.

            b. In 2009, faced with a still worsening security situation,
    President Obama decided to employ a counter--insurgency strategy that
    was successful in Iraq and escalate the forces required. However, he
    did not provide the recommended forces that Generals McChrystal and
    Petraeus requested as the minimum force to defeat the Taliban. The
    POTUS cut the force request by 25% and decided to withdraw the same
    forces in 15 months regardless of the situation on the ground. At this
    decision point, Afghanistan was doomed to a protracted war. All US
    combat forces were withdrawn eventually by 2015.

            c. Two Taliban sanctuaries exist in Pakistan where the Pakistan
    military provides intelligence, training, and logistics assistance to
    enhance the Taliban operational performance while providing continuous
    safe haven. No insurgency has ever been defeated while it maintains
    sanctuary outside the conflict area.

            We are in this current situation largely because the war in
    Iraq itself became protracted and much needed forces could not be
    applied to Afghanistan, US ground forces, particularly the Army is too
    small to fight two counter insurgencies simultaneously, and the Obama
    policy was not to win the war but to end US involvement. The new
    administration must call for a political and security assessment and
    face the harsh realities of possibly squandering 15 years of US combat
    in Afghanistan in a war not winnable. What's required is a new strategy
    with a commitment to force the elimination of sanctuaries in Pakistan
    and a commitment to provide to the ANSFs the enablers they need to turn
    the momentum: intelligence, attack helicopters, strike fighter support,
    medevac, anti-IED capabilities, much needed logistics and increased CT
    Special Operations Forces. Without an on-the-ground assessment, I
    honestly cannot tell you if that is sufficient, how many additional
    troops are required to support those functions and for how long. I do
    know this, without the US and Afghan resolve to win, we never will.

        6.  Russia--The US once again faces the need to prepare for great
    power competition and confrontation. Russian aggression along the
    eastern and southern front of NATO presents military challenges to
    European security not seen in decades. Russia desires to be a global
    power operating with considerable influence on the world stage. As such
    Putin wants to be treated as an equal with the US. Our basic strategy
    in dealing with Russia should be through strength and resolve.
    Rebuilding the military, closing capability gaps, moving beyond a troop
    trip wire in Eastern Europe are major factors in a credible deterrence.
    Deterrence is not achievable simply with enhanced capabilities, your
    adversary must believe you intend to use it. Putin has known for
    several years now that the US is paralyzed by the fear of adverse
    consequences and therefore he is quite emboldened. That must change. Of
    course the US should continue to dialogue with Putin but US concessions
    should not be on the table as a condition for better relations as the
    Obama administration did with the ``reset'' strategy in giving up
    missile defense systems in Eastern Europe. The result, no reset, but
    increased Russian aggression in Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, Syria and
    provocations in the Baltics. For progress in US / Russia relations we
    can try to find common interests but Russia's aggressive behavior
    toward US allies must stop. That must be the US condition for an
    improved relationship.

        7.  Iran--The Islamic Republic of Iran is totally committed to
    their number one strategic objective: to dominate and control the
    Middle East by spreading the Islamic Revolution. They regard the US as
    their enemy and the major impediment to achieving this objective. US
    strategic policy toward Iran should be to counter their number one goal
    in concert with our allies. They will continue to use proxy fighters
    and terrorists and provocations against US capabilities to humiliate
    the US in order to weaken the relationship between the US and our
    regional allies. We should counter these activities to strengthen not
    weaken our commitment to our allies. Adverse aggressive Iranian
    behavior that violates UN sanctions, the nuclear deal or the
    international order should not be tolerated. Action should be taken
    beginning with sanctions and escalating as needed. It is likely as the
    US and allies express a resolve and intent to thwart Iran's strategic
    goals that they may indeed terminate the nuclear deal. If they do not
    the US should not terminate until such time as they begin to cheat as
    we know they will if they are not already. Tough, demanding inspections
    and priority targeting by US and allied intelligence services is
    crucial to effective monitoring of the nuclear deal. It was Iranian
    informants who gave up the secret underground nuclear sites in Fordow.
    It's just a matter of time.

        8.  China--The most important bi-lateral relationship of the 21st
    century. Two economic giants who have global interests in the world
    economy, expanding trade, stimulating the economic growth of developing
    countries while insuring the global commons continues to be a major
    pathway for enhancing stability, security and economic well being. The
    Chinese have become hard-core capitalists and their outreach to every
    region of the world is staggering. Their global investment portfolio is
    beyond anything the world has seen.

            All that said, what is clear is that China desires to dominate
    and influence the Pacific in a way that the U.S. has done for 70 years
    after WWII. The thought that China had only a defensive military
    strategy is no longer the situation. China is projecting military power
    into the South China Sea by establishing forward military bases and
    capabilities as part of a strategy to enhance their influence over the
    countries in the region as well as the global commons. The US also has
    valid interests in the region as an ally to every Pacific nation. Our
    allies doubt our resolve given the US selective disengagement policy
    and it is critical for the new administration to be clear with China
    about US Pacific interests and that we will go and come as we please
    and that we intend to back our allies' self interest. Avoiding
    confrontation is desirable, certainly, but at times, may not be
    avoidable. We cannot let our desire to avoid confrontation lead us to a
    point of concession and weakness. The US has many shared economic and
    environmental interests that can be pursued in enhancing the Pacific
    Asia economy and quality of life but these interests should always be
    pursued from a position of strength and resolve.

        In closing, the complexity of the global security challenges the US
    is facing cannot be over stated, they are diverse, formidable and
    dangerous. The FY 17 NDAA is attempting to begin to stop the
    precipitous multi-decade decline of the US military which drove by
    necessity the strategy change from the ability to wage two major
    regional conflicts to something far less. Sadly to demonstrate how far
    we have fallen, we could not fight two low tech ground insurgencies,
    void of air and naval power, in Iraq and Afghanistan simultaneously. We
    fought them sequentially, a reality from which we have not recovered.
        President-elect Trump must return American leadership to meet these
    global challenges and do so in cooperation with our allies. His
    national security team as priority one must develop a comprehensive
    national security strategy which is threat and national interest based.
    It should see the world as it truly is, based on honest, straight
    forward assessments. As such it should be the foundation for US foreign
    policy and US defense strategy. DoD defense strategy must drive force
    sizing and force capabilities. Not the budget or available funding. DoD
    also must responsibly make tough choices on priorities because there
    never are unlimited resources. A strong military force is essential to
    maintaining the credibility of President-elect Trump's foreign policy.
    The existence of sufficient, capable and ready military forces combined
    with a credible intent to use them, when our national security
    interests are at stake, serves to prevent war and confrontation. Much
    must be done to rebuild the US armed forces and this committee as well
    as the House Armed Services is critical for success.
        Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

        Chairman McCain. Mr. Brimley.

       STATEMENT OF SHAWN BRIMLEY, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND
      DIRECTOR OF STUDIES, THE CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY

        Mr. Brimley. Thank you, Chairman McCain, Senator Reed,
    members of the committee. I'm honored to testify before you
    again, and have the distinct feeling of being out of place
    again as I sit next to titans like Robert Kagan and General
    Keane, two men I greatly admire.
        President-elect Donald Trump will take office next January
    and shoulder the formidable burden of a complex national
    security inheritance, which I'll summarize briefly right now.
        The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as you know, remain
    incredibly complex. Although President Obama deserves credit,
    in my mind, for undertaking the significant surge of combat
    forces into Afghanistan 2009, the difficulty in supporting
    Afghan Security Forces was complicated by the public timelines
    for withdrawal. In Iraq, I believe the reduction of forces
    between 2009-2012 was far too steep, making it difficult for
    the U.S. to retain adequate leverage over the sectarianism of
    the government in Baghdad, which, in turn, enabled the rise of
    the Islamic State and the rapid advances in both Iraq and
    Syria. While I largely agree with the parameters of the
    operational approach in countering ISIL on the ground in Iraq
    and Syria--for instance, airpower, Special Operations forces,
    and combat advisors, of which I think we could do more--the
    ultimate question of how to deal with Bashar al-Assad remains
    unanswered, and Russia's involvement and support of the
    barbarism we're seeing every day in places like Aleppo is
    horrifying. We ought to do more to stop it.
        I am concerned, but not particularly surprised, by the
    behavior of Russia and China. Vladimir Putin is no friend of
    the United States, and he clearly sees the long arc of history
    bending against the maintenance of an extensive Russian sphere
    of influence that acts as a break on democracy, civil society,
    and full economic integration--or integration with a wider
    Europe, and a global liberal economic order. The unlawful
    incursion of Russia into Ukraine should not be legitimized by
    the United States, and ongoing steps to shore up our deterrence
    posture in the region ought to be sustained and increased, and
    increased soon.
        China's behavior, in my mind, is perhaps the most
    consequential, in terms of its lasting impact on the global
    order. China's aggressive behavior towards its neighbors, and,
    in particular, its rapid land reclamation efforts in the South
    China Sea, are destabilizing. The eventual placement--and I
    think it will happen--of military platforms on these so-called
    ``islands,'' things like antiship cruise missiles, advanced air
    defense systems, and the like, would further upset the military
    balance of power in the region, which I think would
    dramatically risk escalation and miscalculation and conflict.
    DOD has a significant role to play in enhancing our military
    posture in the region, and I hope the Trump administration will
    quickly do so. The predictable provocation from North Korea, I
    should add, will come soon, as well. I believe urgency is
    important in this regard.
        From the perspective of the Secretary of Defense tasked to
    oversee the development, sustainment, and employment of U.S.
    military forces, it is clear that our vaunted military
    technological edge that has allowed our men and women in
    uniform to deploy rapidly around the world and engage our
    adversaries with unrivaled speed, precision, and staying power,
    has begun to erode. We've seen this over the last few years,
    for sure. I worry that our edge is eroding to the point where
    the task of maintaining conventional deterrence in key theaters
    around the world is becoming difficult--more difficult, more
    expensive, and more risky to our men and women in uniform.
    Moreover, the era of tight defense budgets and the disaster of
    sequestration, as you know, has made it very difficult for the
    Pentagon to keep investing in game-changing defense
    technologies and to properly enable a culture of
    experimentation and exercising that can advance new concepts of
    operation and displace old and outdated ways of keeping our
    forces on the cutting edge. I sincerely hope that sequester
    caps can be eliminated and the Pentagon's defense budget can
    both increase and the uncertainty which has imperiled rational
    strategic and budgetary planning can finally be alleviated.
        Finally, like General Keane, I would like to commend this
    committee and its staff for the work done in assembling an
    impressive conference report for the NDAA. Beyond the budget
    levels, the NDAA advances a comprehensive and important defense
    reform agenda that includes reforms in OSD, the number of
    general and flag officers, DOD's acquisition and healthcare
    systems, and adds important rationality to our security
    assistance architecture, which is so vital for our defense
    strategy. These and other reforms must be implemented, and
    others initiated in the years to come, not only because they
    will save significant amounts of taxpayer money that will allow
    for investment in other important areas in the defense program,
    but they will make the Department more agile and more effective
    in supporting and advancing America's security interests around
    the world.
        Thank you again for inviting me.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Brimley follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman McCain. Dr. Kagan.

         STATEMENT OF ROBERT KAGAN, SENIOR FELLOW, PROJECT ON
      INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND STRATEGY, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

        Dr. Kagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you, all the
    committee members, for holding this hearing, for inviting me.
    It's an honor to be here. It's an honor to be on this panel. I
    just want to say that every one of the family members that
    General Keane mentioned is deeply in love with General Keane.
    So, it's a mutual admiration society.
        I want to talk about a subject that we don't like to talk
    about in polite company, and it's called ``world order.'' You
    know, we naturally focus on threats to the homeland and our
    borders, and we talk about terrorism, as we must, as something
    that's obviously of utmost importance, has to be a top priority
    to protect the homeland. As we look across the whole panoply of
    threats that we face in the world, I've--I worry that it's too
    easy to lose sight of what, to my mind, represent the greatest
    threats that we face over the medium- and long-term, and
    possibly even sooner than we may think, and that is the threat
    posed by the two great powers in the international system, the
    two great revisionist powers international system: Russia and
    China. Because what they threaten is something that is, in a
    way, more profound, which is this world order that the United
    States created after the end of World War II, a global security
    order, a global economic order, and a global political order.
    This is not something the United States did as a favor to the
    rest of the world. It's not something we did out of an act of
    generosity, although, by historical terms, it was a rather
    remarkable act of generosity. It was done based on what
    Americans learned in the first half of the 20th century, which
    was that, if there was not a power, whether it was Britain or,
    as it turned out it had to be, the United States, willing and
    able to maintain this kind of decent world order, you did not
    have some smooth ride into something else. What you had was
    catastrophe. What you had was the rise of aggressive powers,
    the rise of hostile powers that were hostile to liberal values.
    We saw--we all know what happened with two world wars in the
    first half of the 20th century. What those who were present at
    the creation, so to speak, after World War II wanted to create
    was an international system that would not permit those kinds
    of horrors to be repeated. Because the understanding was that,
    while Americans believed very deeply, in the 1920s and '30s,
    that they could be immune from whatever horrors happened out
    there in the world, that it didn't matter to them who ran
    Europe or who ran Asia or who did what to whom, as long as were
    safe, they discovered that that was not true and that,
    ultimately, the collapse of world order would come back and
    strike the United States in fundamental ways.
        Americans have decided to take on an unusual and burdensome
    role of maintaining world order because the United States was
    the only power in the world that could do it. The critical
    element of maintaining that world order was to maintain peace
    and stability in the two big cockpits of conflict that had
    destroyed the world and had produced repeated conflicts from
    the late 19th century onward. That was Europe and Asia. The
    United States accomplished something that no other power had
    able to accomplish before. It essentially put a cork in two
    areas that had been known for the constant warfare, put an end
    to an endless cycle of war between France and Germany, between
    Japan and China. That was the stable world order that was
    created after World War II that America gradually thrived in,
    that produced the greatest era of great-power peace that has
    been known in history, the greatest period of prosperity, the
    greatest period of the spread of democracy. I think it's very
    easy to take that for granted, to focus on some nearer-term
    threats that we may face, which are, as I say, understandable,
    but lose sight of how precious that world order is and the
    degree to which it may be threatened.
        My concern right now is that that world order is more at
    risk than we may want to realize. It is at risk because of two
    trend--intersecting trend lines that I think are things to be
    worried about. They are the trend line of increasingly activist
    revisionist great powers, Russia and China, together with the
    other trend line, which is a United States which is
    increasingly lacking both the will and the capacity to continue
    playing the role that it's played since the end of World War
    II. As those two lines intersect, we begin to enter a period of
    increasing danger, because, as the willingness and capacity of
    the United States to maintain the order meets the increasing
    desire of those revisionist powers to change the order, the
    risk of conflict grows proportionately. If you think about a
    historical analogy, I don't know whether it's 1920, 1925, or
    1931, but we are somewhere on that continuum, in my view.
        I think, with everything else that we have to do--and this
    puts enormous strain on our defense budget resources, because
    we cannot ignore what's going on in the Middle East, we cannot
    ignore Iran, we cannot ignore North Korea, we cannot ignore
    ISIS, but we especially cannot take our eye off what I believe
    is ultimately the main game, which is managing these two
    revisionist powers and understanding what they seek. We cannot
    be under any illusions about Russia and China. We will find
    areas of cooperation with them. They both partake and benefit
    from and, in some case, sort of feed off of, the liberal world
    order the United States has created. Let us never imagine that
    they are content with this order, that they do not seek,
    fundamentally, eventually to upend this order, especially on
    the security side, to create a situation which they think ought
    to be the natural situation, which was--which is they being
    hegemonic in their own region. China has a historical memory of
    being hegemonic, dominant in its region. Russia has a
    historical memory, which Putin has expressed on numerous
    occasions, of restoring its empire, which stretched right into
    the heart of central Europe. As far as they are concerned, the
    order that the United States has created is unfair,
    disadvantageous to them, temporary, and ought to be overturned.
    I can only say that, in the process of overturning that, the
    history teaches, that overturning does not occur peacefully. It
    should be our task both to prevent them from overturning it and
    to prevent them in a way that does not produce another
    catastrophic war. That is the great challenge we face.
        Now, are we up to this challenge? Unfortunately, that is, I
    think, very much in question. I do believe that the policies of
    the outgoing administration have indicated a general desire for
    a degree of retrenchment in the world, a sense that the United
    States was too involved, too engaged. It focused, to some
    extent, on the Middle East, but, I think, overall, the message
    that was sent, whether intentionally or unintentionally,
    although, in some cases, I think it was intentional, was that
    the United States is not really going to be in this business of
    world-order upholding as it used to be, and that we would
    really like others to step up and play that role while we pull
    back and tend to some of our business. Entirely understandable,
    entirely dangerous, because it has, as the other panelists have
    said, led both our allies to question whether the United States
    is really there for them, and it has emboldened those who seek
    revisions in the international system to take increasing steps
    to do so.
        It's unfortunate, that, after these 8 years which--in which
    this signal has been sent, that, during his political campaign,
    the President-elect's comments during the campaign, as well as
    those of his surrogates, have only reinforced the impression
    that the United States is out of the world-order business.
    Comments about whether the United States really should support
    NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies. Comments
    about Estonia being in the suburbs of St. Petersburg.
    Complaints about the need to defend Japan, and is that an
    equitable thing? The fact that both candidates came out against
    the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which is really, in my eyes, a
    strategic deal more than a trade deal designed to pull the
    United States and its Asian partners together. All the elements
    of this campaign have only sent even greater shockwaves
    throughout the world about what the United States stands for.
        So, in a certain sense, yes, the next administration has a
    big hole to dig out of. It is--also has to dig out of a hole,
    to some extent, of its own making. We need to see, in the early
    stages--in the very early stages, I would say, a clear
    repudiation of all that rhetoric, some clear signs that this
    new administration understands the importance, not only of
    reassuring allies, but a willingness to bolster our commitment
    to those allies. Because, after all, the challenge from the
    revisionist powers is increasing; therefore, it's not enough to
    say we're committed to the defense of allies. We have to show
    that our capacities are increasing along with those of the
    increasing threat, which, of course, gets to the defense
    budget, which I don't have to talk to this committee about the
    need to do that.
        Let me just end--I know I'm going on too long--let me just
    end on one point, and it has to do with Russia. Both China and
    Russia are revisionist powers. They have different tools in
    their kit. China has been the more cautious, so far, although I
    don't presume caution indefinitely, focusing more on their
    economic clout. Russia has, by far, been the most aggressive,
    willingness to use military force. It's invaded two countries,
    projected force into a third, but also has a whole panoply of
    geostrategic weapons that it has used, from energy resources to
    cyber. Now, especially in the past few years, to political
    information warfare, direct meddling in the political processes
    of the Western democracies. We've seen it in central and
    eastern Europe. We've seen it in Western Europe. We saw it in
    the Italian referendum. We're going to see it in the French
    elections. We're going to see it in Germany. This is a full-
    bore strategic tool being used by Russia for two basic
    purposes: one, to affect the outcome of these elections; but, I
    would say, more importantly, to discredit the democratic
    process entirely. Because, after all, Russia and China are both
    autocracies. They feel threatened by democracies. One of their
    objectives--and this is an objective that Putin is particularly
    pursuing--is to discredit democracy, in general. This is his
    major tool.
        Unfortunately, as we've seen in this last campaign, the
    United States has now become the target of this Russian
    strategy. What I'm about to say, I'm going to say because I
    have all you Senators in front of me. This'll probably be the
    last time I'll be invited to have all these Senators in front
    of me. This is not a partisan question. This is a strategic
    question. If Russia, every 4 years, is allowed to come in and
    weigh in in our elections in the way that it did right now--
    this--in this election, we are going to be at a serious
    strategic disadvantage, going forward.
        Now, I understand that we live in a partisan world. I used
    to be a Republican. I--the only administration I ever served in
    was Republican. I understand the reluctance of Republicans to
    raise questions about this last election. This has got to go
    beyond partisanship, because this tool is not going away, this
    Russian effort is not going away.
        So, I would just--I would hope that Congress takes this
    threat seriously enough to hold serious investigations on what
    happened, how it happened, and, most importantly, how are we
    going to prevent it happening in the future. Because this is a
    major strategic tool that the Russians are going to continue
    using here and throughout the democratic world.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Kagan follows:]

                     Prepared Statement by Dr. Robert Kagan
        Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, members of the Committee, thank
    you very much for inviting me to testify this morning.
        Since the end of the Second World War, American foreign policy has
    aimed at defending and extending a liberal world order that conforms to
    American interests and principles. It has done so not as a favor to
    others but based on the hard-won understanding that in the absence of
    such a world order, both American interests and our cherished
    principles will eventually be imperiled. This was the lesson that those
    who were ``present at the creation'' of the American-led world order
    learned 70 years ago, after two world wars and the rise of fascism and
    totalitarian communism. If we are not vigilant, we will have to learn
    that lesson all over again, and perhaps at even greater cost.
        It has become common to say that the last 25-30 years of American
    foreign policy have been a failure. This betrays both a lack of
    historical memory and a lack of imagination. Which 25-year period of
    the last century would we rather have: the first 25 years of the 20th
    century, which gave us World War One, the breakdown of British-
    dominated world order, the Bolshevik revolution, and the birth of
    fascism? The second 25 years, which gave us the rise of Hitler and
    Stalin and Imperial Japan, World War Two, the communist revolution in
    China, and the imprisonment of half of Europe behind the Iron Curtain?
    The thirty years between 1950 and 1980, which despite the extraordinary
    success of the United States in establishing the secure basis of what
    used to be called the free world and which eventually produced the
    liberal world order we today enjoy, nevertheless also gave us the
    Korean War, the Vietnam War, three major wars in the Middle East, the
    Arab oil embargo, the Iranian Revolution, and the Iran hostage crisis?
        The fact is that for all the difficulties of the past 25-30 years,
    for all the errors, of which there have been many--because this is the
    real world in which failure is more common than success--for all the
    costs in lives and treasure, this period has been by any reasonable
    historical measure one of remarkable success. From the 1980s onward, we
    saw the fall of Soviet communism and the Soviet empire, the liberation
    of central and eastern Europe, the spread of democracy in Asia and
    Latin America, a global prosperity unmatched in human history, and,
    very importantly, no conflict between the great powers. Throughout much
    of this period, in crises in the Balkans and in the Middle East, the
    United States and its allies have operated effectively to stem
    humanitarian disasters and put an end to brewing conflicts. Democratic
    government has spread throughout Asia and Latin America, regions which
    were dominated by dictatorships in previous decades. Despite the
    economic downturn following the 2008 financial crisis, this is has been
    a period of extraordinary prosperity by historical standards.
        These past 25-30 years have also provided us a clear formula for
    success, a formula inherited from those early years after World War
    Two. By building and maintaining strong alliances with democratic
    nations and by supporting an open global economy that allows those
    nations to prosper, and which lifts billions of others in developing
    nations out of poverty, the United States can best protect its own
    security and the well-being of its own people. One need only think of
    the strong democratic alliances maintained during the 1980s, the
    relationships between Ronald Reagan and close allies like Margaret
    Thatcher, Helmut Kohl, Francois Mitterrand, and Yasuhiro Nakasone.
    Those bonds, together with a strong U.S. military and strong U.S.
    economy, prevailed in the Cold War, convinced Soviet leaders to concede
    peacefully, and established this extraordinary period in the history of
    international relations. It has not been perfect, because perfection in
    human affairs is not possible. By any reasonable standard, this formula
    has been successful--and successful for the American people. It created
    a world order conducive to American interests and American values.
        Today that order faces severe challenges, both from without and
    from within. The external challenges are obvious enough. Since 9/11 we
    have faced the threat of radical Islamic terrorism, which has proved
    resilient and to which we have responded inadequately. Iran's efforts
    to acquire a nuclear weapon, and to spread its influence by military
    means throughout the Middle East and Persian Gulf, have helped
    destabilize a region that remains strategically relevant despite the
    declining American reliance on its oil. North Korea's nuclear
    capabilities as well its ballistic missile capacities are growing.
        Today, however, I would like to focus on what I believe to be the
    greatest threats that we are going to face in the years and decades,
    and those are threats posed by China and Russia. For while the other
    threats I have mentioned pose serious challenges, and in the case of
    terrorism obviously require the utmost vigilance, only these two great
    powers have the capacity to upend the world order which has long
    provided for Americans' security and well-being. The unmistakable
    hegemonic ambitions of China and Russia threaten the stability and
    security of the world's two most important regions, East Asia and
    Europe. These regions are vital to the United States both economically
    and strategically. They are the regions where two world wars originated
    in the first half of the 20th century and would be the locus of the
    next great war should the United States fail to play the role it has
    played over the past 70 years in undergirding their security and
    stability. The simple fact is, the era of great-power rivalries has
    returned. In the past these great-power competitions have led
    invariably to great-power wars. Managing these rivalries, avoiding war,
    and doing so without abandoning the liberal world order in the
    misguided belief that we will be spared when it collapses, is the
    greatest challenge we face today and in the years and decades to come.
        Both China and Russia have much in common. Both are classic
    revisionist powers. Although both China and Russia have never enjoyed
    greater security from foreign attack than they do today--Russia has
    never been more secure from attack by its traditional enemies to the
    west, and China has never been more secure from attack by its
    traditional enemy in the east--both are dissatisfied with the current
    configuration of power in the world. Both seek to restore a hegemonic
    dominance in their regions that they enjoyed in the past. For China
    that means dominance of East Asia, with nations like Japan, South
    Korea, and the nations of Southeast Asia both acknowledging Chinese
    hegemony and acting in conformity with China's strategic, economic, and
    political preferences. For Russia, it means hegemonic influence in the
    areas of Central and Eastern Europe which Russia has traditionally
    regarded as either part of its empire or part of its sphere of
    influence. Both seek to redress what they regard as an unfair
    distribution of power, influence, and honor in the American-led postwar
    global order. Being autocracies, both feel threatened by the dominant
    democratic powers in the international system and by the democracies on
    their borders. Both regard the United States as the principal obstacle
    to their ambitions, and therefore both seek to weaken the American-led
    international security order which stands in the way of their achieving
    what they regard as their rightful destinies.
        The two great powers differ, so far, chiefly in their methods.
    China has until now been the more careful and cautious, seeking
    influence primarily through its great economic clout in the region and
    globally, and using its growing military power chiefly as a source of
    deterrence and intimidation. It has not resorted to the outright use of
    force yet, although its actions in the South China Sea are military in
    nature and carry the risk of producing military conflict. China's
    willingness to use force cannot be ruled out in the future, and
    possibly in the near future. Revisionist great powers with growing
    military capabilities invariably make use of those capabilities when
    they believe the possible gains outweigh the risks and costs. If the
    Chinese perceive America's commitment to its allies and its position in
    the region to be weakening, or its capacity to make good on those
    commitments to be declining, then they will be more inclined to attempt
    to use the power they are acquiring in order to achieve their
    objectives.
        Russia, on the other hand, has already been far more aggressive. It
    has invaded two neighboring states--Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in
    2014--and in both cases has hived off significant portions of those two
    nations' sovereign territory. It has also projected military force into
    Syria, lending its military support to the Syrian regime's efforts to
    crush all opposition, including by the aerial bombing and massacre of
    civilian populations. Russia has also been aggressive in other ways. It
    has wielded its control of European energy resources as a weapon. It
    has used cyberwarfare against neighboring states. It has engaged in
    extensive information warfare on a global scale. It has interfered
    directly in Western electoral processes, both to try to influence their
    outcomes and more generally to discredit the democratic system. This
    past year, Russia for the first time employed this powerful weapon
    against the United States, heavily interfering in the American
    electoral process with as yet unknown consequences.
        Although Russia, by any measure, is the weaker of the two great
    powers, it has so far had more success than China in accomplishing its
    objective of dividing and disrupting the West. Its interference in
    Western democratic political systems, its information warfare, and
    perhaps most importantly, its role in creating increased refugee flows
    from Syria into Europe have all contributed to the sapping of
    Europeans' confidence in their political systems and their established
    political parties. Its military intervention in Syria, contrasted with
    American passivity, has exacerbated already existing doubts about
    American staying power in the region. China, until recently, has
    succeeded mostly in driving American allies closer to the United States
    out of concern for growing Chinese power. That could change quickly,
    however, and especially if the United States continues on its present
    trajectory. We could soon face a situation where both great revisionist
    powers are acting aggressively, including by military means, which
    would pose an extreme challenge to American and global security.
        The return of this great-power challenge has come just at the
    moment when American and Western will, confidence, and capacity to meet
    the challenge have been in decline. The present administration has
    emphasized global retrenchment at the expense of engagement and
    although its stated policy has aimed to ``rebalance'' American foreign
    policy, the overall effect of its statements and actions has been to
    raise doubts around the world about America's staying power as the
    critical supporter of the present global order. Its early attempt to
    ``reset'' relations with Russia was a first blow to America's
    reputation as a reliable ally, partly because it came just after the
    Russian invasion of Georgia and thus appeared to be almost a reward for
    Russian aggression; partly because the ``reset'' came at the expense of
    planned programs of military cooperation with Poland and the Czech
    Republic that were jettisoned to appease Moscow; and partly because
    this effort at appeasement came just as Russian policy toward the West,
    and Vladimir Putin's repressive policies toward the Russian people,
    were hardening. Then in 2014, the West's collective response to the
    Russian invasion of Ukraine and seizure of Crimea, though better than
    the Bush administration's response to the invasion of Georgia--Europe
    and the United States at least imposed sanctions after the invasion of
    Ukraine--still indicated reluctance on the part of the U.S.
    administration to challenge Russia in what the American President
    regarded as Russia's own sphere of interest. In Syria, the present
    administration practically invited Russian intervention, if only
    through American passivity, and certainly did nothing to discourage it,
    thus reinforcing the already prevalent impression of an America in
    retreat in that region (an impression initially created by the
    unnecessary and unwise withdrawal of all American troops from Iraq).
    Subsequent Russian actions which increased the refugee flow from Syria
    into Europe also brought no American response, despite the evident
    damage of those refugee flows to European democratic institutions. The
    overall impression given by the present administration has been that
    none of this is America's problem.
        In East Asia this administration's otherwise commendable efforts to
    assert America's continuing interest and influence have been undermined
    by a failure to follow through with policies to support the rhetoric.
    The military component of the so-called ``Pivot'' has been hollow due
    to inadequate defense spending which has made it impossible to enhance
    the American military presence in a meaningful way. The important
    economic component of the pivot, meanwhile, represented most
    prominently by the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, was undermined
    this year when both leading presidential candidates announced their
    opposition to the agreement. The general perception of American global
    retreat and retrenchment, encouraged both by presidential rhetoric and
    by administration policies, especially in the Middle East, has also
    been noticed in Asia, where allies are left wondering how reliable the
    U.S. commitment may be when facing the challenge posed by China, for
    instance, in the continuing conflict over the South and East China
    Seas.
        The perceived weakness and withdrawal of the United States as a
    result of the present administration's policies and rhetoric has
    unfortunately been greatly exacerbated by the comments of the
    president-elect and his proxies during this year's campaign.
    Suggestions that the United States might not come to the defense of
    NATO allies if attacked by Russia, that it is not worth going to war
    over a country that is ``in the suburbs of St. Petersburg,'' that it is
    a ``real problem'' that the United States has to come to Japan's
    defense if it is attacked, and in general that the United States should
    fulfill its security commitments to other nations only if it makes
    economic sense--all these have only increased doubts about America's
    reliability as an ally and partner. \1\ They have given the clear
    impression to both friends and potential adversaries that the United
    States is turning inward, abjuring responsibility for global security,
    and effectively ceding hegemonic dominance of Europe and East Asia to
    Russia and China.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ On CBS This Morning on July 21, 2016, Newt Gingrich
    characterized Estonia as ``in the suburbs of St. Petersburg.'' See:
    Flores, Reena (2016, July 21) Newt Gingrich: NATO countries ``ought to
    worry'' about U.S. commitment. CBS This Morning. Retrieved from http://
    www.cbsnews.com/news/newt-gingrich-trump-would-reconsider-his-
    obligation-to-nato/.
        President-elect Donald Trump described a ``real problem'' in the
    U.S.-Japan defense relationship in his March 2016 interview with David
    Sanger and Maggie Haberman of The New York Times, see Haberman, Maggie
    and David Sanger (2016, March 26) Transcript: Donald Trump Expounds on
    His Foreign Policy Views. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://
    www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/us/politics/donald-trump-transcript.html?--
    r=0.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The conjunction of these two trends--the growing ambition and
    aggressiveness of the two revisionist great powers and the increasing
    global perception (and perhaps reality) of a United States withdrawing
    from its international responsibilities to provide security--is at some
    point going to produce a dangerous crisis, or more likely, multiple
    simultaneous crises. Americans have tended to take the fundamental
    stability of the international order for granted, even while
    complaining about the burden the United States carries in maintaining
    that stability. As history has shown, however, a world order collapses
    with remarkable rapidity and with great violence. The apparent calm of
    the 1920s became within a decade the crisis-ridden 1930s, eventually
    culminating in world war. Continued American withdrawal from its global
    role could quickly tempt the rival great powers to seize the moment and
    try to reshape fundamentally the power structures in East Asia and
    Europe, both of which are of vital strategic and economic importance to
    the United States. At that point the United States would be faced with
    the choice of responding with the necessary force or acquiescing.
        The goal of American policy now should be to avoid those crises and
    confrontations by moving quickly to re-establish the U.S. position as
    the principal upholder of the international order. That means reaching
    out immediately both publicly and privately to reassure allies in both
    Europe and Asia that the United States will not only make good on its
    commitments but intends to bolster its capacity to do so. These
    reassurances must therefore be accompanied by an immediate end to the
    sequester and a substantial increase in defense spending in line with
    the recommendations of recent secretaries of defense. Nothing would
    send a stronger signal that the United States is not engaged in a
    withdrawal from the world but means to continue playing its role as the
    principal upholder of the international order.
        The incoming administration must also find a way to move forward
    with the Trans-Pacific Partnership in some form. That agreement, like
    most trade agreements, is not just about trade. It is a strategic
    investment in security and stability in East Asia, a low-cost and low-
    risk way of ensuring the United States and its friends and allies in
    the region remain close and united in the face of possible Chinese
    pressures.
        Finally, there is the question of Russian interference in the most
    recent American presidential election. Some may not view this as a
    strategic and national security matter, but it is. Russian interference
    in Western democratic political processes has become a major element of
    Moscow's strategy to disrupt, divide, and demoralize the West. The
    tactics it has recently employed in the United States it has already
    used in elections and referendums across Europe, including most
    recently in Italy, and will likely use again in France and Germany. For
    the United States to ignore this Russian tactic, and particularly now
    that it has been deployed against the United States, is to cede to
    Moscow a powerful tool of modern geopolitical warfare. It is
    extraordinary that the United States government has taken no act of
    retaliation. It is unconscionable, and an abdication of responsibility,
    that Congress has not launched an investigation to discover exactly
    what happened with a view to preventing its recurrence in the future.
    One hates to think that because the Republican Party was the
    beneficiary of Russian intervention in this election that as the
    majority party in both houses of Congress it has no interest in
    discovering the truth about the foreign government's assault on
    American democratic processes.

        Chairman McCain. Thank you, Doctor.
        That leads to my first question for the panel. This
    morning, we had a briefing with the Commandant of the Marine
    Corps, and I asked him what was, he felt, the highest priority
    that the Marine Corps has to combat as--not to combat, but as
    far as challenges to our Nation's security. His first answer
    was cyber. He put it in the realm of the ability of our
    adversaries to cripple our ability to wage war. I understand
    very well the side of it--the aspect of it you just described,
    but I'd also, maybe, like to ask the witnesses to elaborate on
    the absolute military threat that--and national security threat
    that cybersecurity, or our lack of cybersecurity, capabilities
    to combat and pose to the future of the military and our
    national security.
        General Keane.
        General Keane. Sure, certainly. Well, cyber represents
    another major battlefield capability and function that is going
    to be part of us in any future conflict, particularly dealing
    with any country that has advanced technology. That's the
    reality of it. We are attempting to harden our cyberdefenses,
    you know, for our systems so that we can adequately protect
    them. We are totally reliant on space-based----
        Chairman McCain. I don't mean to interrupt, but isn't it
    true we don't have a policy----
        General Keane. That's true.
        Chairman McCain.--as to how to combat----
        General Keane. We----
        Chairman McCain.--cyberthreats?
        General Keane. That's correct. The reality is that we are
    completely dependent on space-based technology, which also,
    obviously, can be interfered with, with cyber.
        Now, the one--we have a decided advantage, and we don't
    want to minimize this. The United States cyberattack capability
    is second to none. I'm assuming some members of the committee
    have had compartmentalized briefings on what that capability
    is, but it would make your eyes water. So, I mean, it's quite
    extraordinary, our offensive capability. Every other nation
    that's dealing with us knows that, as well. So, there is a
    built-in mechanism there, much as we had with nuclear weapons.
    The reality--in terms of mutually assured destruction--but, the
    reality is, in a tactical and operational setting, which John
    McCain--Senator McCain is getting at here, yes, we've got a
    ways to go. There's--we've got deficiencies there, but owe have
    enormous offensive capability, as well.
        Chairman McCain. Mr. Brimley.
        Mr. Brimley. Thank you, Senator. Just maybe a quick
    anecdote, to your point about the lack of a policy. I was a
    policy advisor in OSD in 2009, in the first years of the Obama
    administration, and passed down through the chain of command
    from Secretary Gates, at the time, was a question, What
    constitutes an act of war in cyberspace? I was part of a small
    team that put together a memo that apparently was very
    unsatisfactory, because one of the first questions that
    Secretary Panetta asked, upon assuming office, was, What
    constitutes an act of war in cyberspace? I think, in my mind,
    that just reflects the notion that there's lots of memos being
    written, lots of folks inside the bureaucracies thinking about
    and pondering these questions, but we have yet to sort of
    establish the basic rules of war. Rules of war as it pertains
    to cyberspace. What constitutes a conflict?
        Chairman McCain. Including what constitute an attack?
        Mr. Brimley. Absolutely.
        Chairman McCain. Do you take action to prevent it if you
    know it's coming? What do you do to respond to an attack? Is
    that what you were discussing?
        Mr. Brimley. Absolutely. Another quick anecdote. Early in
    '09, and maybe it was 2010, we tried to come up with a DOD
    cyberstrategy. Eventually we did and it got released. As part
    of those discussions, there was this question of speed. So, for
    instance, I believe, at the time, inside the Pentagon, there
    was this debate about preauthorizing offensive use of cyber.
    The argument was, things happen in cyberspace so quickly,
    there's not going to be an opportunity for humans--i.e., the
    President or the interagency--to be involved in deliberating,
    discussions about whether to take out a cyberserver farm, say,
    in Singapore that happened to be harboring--hypothetically
    harboring a third state's cyberoperations. So, there's this
    complex question of, How do we authorize use of force and think
    about the use of force in cyber, when you're not going to have
    the ability, in a--on a case-by-case basis, to have, you know,
    long, deliberative discussions about policy. You're going to
    have to think about preauthorizing steps in advance, up to and
    including going beyond our own networks and attacking the
    networks of others. So, that could create second- and third-
    order effects.
        It's a long way of saying, it remains incredibly complex,
    it remains incredibly unclear, at least from a public
    perspective, what our policies are. I would think there's a
    role for the committee in this regard in, sort of, legislating
    DOD, for instance, to finally come up and answer that basic
    question, What constitutes an act of war in cyberspace?
        Chairman McCain. Thank you.
        Dr. Kagan, did you want to add anything to the----
        Dr. Kagan. It's well out of my range, but I would just say
    that, as with all weapons, unless you can demonstrate a
    retaliatory capacity, you're never going to deter the use of
    it. That goes for cyber and the use--in a war setting and also
    in a political setting. So, unless there was retaliatory action
    for Russian actions, they have no incentive to stop doing it.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Also, let me thank the witnesses for their comments on
    NDAA. Let me state the obvious, also. The--this reform
    initiative was a result of the constant and gentle urgings of
    the Chairman. I think----
        Chairman McCain. It could not have happened unless it was
    totally partnership.
        Senator Reed. That nudging constantly was noticed.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Reed. Dr. Kagan, you made a--I think a very
    insightful--no surprise--analysis of two lines that could
    intersect disastrously, the--a revanchist Russia and China and
    a disengaging United States. This tracks, I think, to a basic,
    fundamental issue we've all talked about. We have to get a
    military--not just the military, but our national security
    enterprise--the Department of State, Homeland Security--to a
    much higher level that requires more resources. We can find
    some of those resources within a context of savings--General
    Keane pointed out, and--that there's money there. I think, even
    exhausting all the feasible savings, we still have a critical
    issue before us. It's--goes to the points that you raised, in
    some respects, just--as a nation, are we ready to take on the
    challenge and pay for it? General Keane, how do we pay for the
    extra margin? If we can get out of sequestration, how do we pay
    for the extra margin we'll need to do all the things we have to
    do--enhance our security, in space, undersea, et cetera? I'll
    ask everyone else to comment. That probably exhausts my time.
        General Keane. Well, you know, some of that gets back to
    what Dr. Kagan was talking about, is a lack of will. I actually
    am absolutely convinced this is--this is fundamentally American
    presidential leadership, because, you know, security of the
    American people shouldn't have a pricetag. That means we have
    to educate the American people about what is really going on.
    We have to make honest assessments about this threat and what
    it portends for the future of America if we do not engage it.
    Frankly, we have not been doing that. I hope and trust that
    this new administration will face up to that. I think that's
    where it starts. It starts with American leadership, and it
    starts with the education of the American people so that they
    really do understand that there is danger here, that it is
    threatening our livelihood as we know it. We have to make sure
    that they understand that and they're informed. They obviously
    influence this body, the House of Representatives and the
    Senate, if they are educated, if they are informed. Because
    that's where the decision is going to be made about resources,
    largely. I would trust that the new American president would
    make the commitment to invest in the defense budget, which it
    desperately needs.
        All that said, this is not just a windfall for the
    Department of Defense, because, at the end of the day, they're
    going to support a national security strategy, foreign policy
    would emanate from that, and a defense strategy would emanate
    from that national security strategy. It's also up to them to
    make the hard choices about priorities. There's never enough
    money to go around. They've got to really make some tough
    choices here, to be sure. We have such gaps and such holes that
    some of those choices are not too hard to understand what needs
    to be done. So, yes, I understand what you're saying, Senator,
    and I'm sympathetic to it, but I'm absolutely convinced the
    Nation doesn't understand. They really don't understand. We've
    got to start with them.
        Senator Reed. Mr. Brimley, then Dr. Kagan.
        Mr. Brimley. Thank you for your question, Senator.
        I would just say, without disagreeing at all--I would never
    disagree with General Keane--but, I would say, to the committee
    at large, it's not just a question of money. I mean,
    hypothetically, if sequester caps were lifted in the next few
    months, and for FY18 [fiscal year 2018], if there's a radical
    increase in defense spending, what do you think would happen? I
    mean, you know, absent anything else, the Pentagon will simply
    just keep doing what it's doing, and will just do more of it.
    They'll buy more short-range tactical fighters, they'll buy
    more vulnerable surface ships that are particularly vulnerable
    to antiship cruise missiles, et cetera.
        Senator Reed. I think----
        Mr. Brimley. The military services, left to their own
    devices, I think, will basically just keep doing what they're
    doing. Moreover, absent the reforms--and, you know, again,
    appreciate the reforms the committee pushed during this last
    NDAA--but, if we don't make progress on personnel reform, if we
    don't bend the cost curve on military healthcare, if we don't
    bend the cost curve on personnel, no amount of money is going
    to fix these problems. When I was in government, I spent a lot
    of time thinking about posture--overseas military posture. We
    found ways, at least in the Asia-Pacific, to start what we
    dreamed of as a significant rebalance. I think there's a lot
    more to do, but things like getting marines in Darwin, opening
    the door, at the time, to the Philippines, getting the Littoral
    Combat Ship forward-deployed to Singapore, starting to
    negotiate with Japan to maybe forward-station more aircraft
    carriers. I think there--you know, frankly, a mistake that the
    administration did was taking the BCTs our of Europe. We ought
    to put those back in.
        I think there are ways where we could do a lot more without
    necessarily having to add dramatic amounts of more dollars to
    the defense budget. We need to be more engaged in the world. We
    need to forward-station our troops and capabilities around the
    world. The pushback you get in the Pentagon when you talk about
    overseas posture is this notion that if I'm going to put
    something, say, in Europe or put something permanently in Asia,
    that gives the--potentially, the services and DOD writ large--
    it starts to lock them down. It somewhat decreases your global
    flexibility. So, there's this argument inside the Pentagon
    that, if we bring the troops home, and we bring capabilities
    home, that gives us more flexibility to rapidly deploy anywhere
    in the world where we may be needed. That comes at the cost of
    being forward and present in key theaters. We ought to be
    making bets on Europe, as Dr. Kagan said. We ought to be making
    bets on Asia and forward-station capabilities, and be very
    creative, and hold the military services to account. There's a
    lot we can do to be more engaged in the world without
    necessarily having to increase the defense budget.
        Senator Reed. Dr. Kagan, again, you raised this issue of
    the will of the American people. To be blunt, that will is
    most--or sometimes most directly expressed in, What are you
    willing to pay for, and how are you willing to pay for it? Can
    you comment?
        Dr. Kagan. Yeah, I mean, I--I'm not an expert on Pentagon
    budget and what can be saved and what can't be saved. I'm very
    dubious that, unless you actually increase the top-line, that
    you're going to get what you need, because I just think, you
    know, you can only squeeze so far and be as brilliant as you
    can be. Brilliant is never going to be your answer. So, I think
    the answer is, there's going to have to be more spending. I'm
    not a budget expert, writ large, either, but I would say we
    have to do whatever we need to do. We have to--if we need to
    raise taxes and we need to have some package that does that, if
    we need to find other ways of, you know, dealing with problems
    like entitlement spending to do it, we have to do it. I mean, I
    lived through the Reagan years. There were increases in defense
    budget which were offset by political bargains of one kind or
    another that required increase in domestic spending, which led
    to increased defense budgets. We survived the--I mean, in
    overall deficits--we survived the deficits and won the Cold
    War. So, I would say we are going to have to, as a Nation, take
    this seriously enough to pay for it.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The--let's start off--there are some differences between
    the NDAA--and I appreciate the comments that you've all made
    about the--this NDAA; we're going to get it through, and it's
    going to improve things--but differences between the
    administration and the NDAA. I happened to be in the Ukraine
    when they had their elections. It's the first time, as all of
    you know, in 96 years, there's not one Communist on the
    Parliament at--in the Ukraine. Immediately afterwards, Putin
    came in and started killing people. We were wanting--a lot of
    people were wanting to get defensive weapons over to the
    Ukraine. They're in this bill. The administration was saying
    that the--they refused to provide defensive legal assistance to
    the Ukrainians, for fear of provoking Putin.
        First question I'd ask you, Do you think Putin really needs
    provocation? Or isn't he going to do it anyway?
        Mr. Brimley. He doesn't need provocation. I think--you
    know, I absolutely support being as--you know, as--as forward-
    leaning as possible in helping our Ukrainian friends, you know,
    counter----
        Senator Inhofe. Well----
        Mr. Brimley.--counter the aggression.
        Senator Inhofe. Yeah. In my--the reason I asked the
    question, my feeling was, at the time, that he was doing this
    because he--the outcome of the--of Parliament. He didn't like
    that. He's getting bolder and bolder, as you have said.
        Yes, General Keane.
        General Keane. Well, I--there's a larger issue here. I
    mean, I think there's been a thought on part of the
    administration that any act like that, even assisting someone
    so that they can fight aggression, could possibly create an
    escalating situation. I think we get paralyzed by the fear of
    adverse consequences.
        There's clearly a pattern here. You know, after--not only
    did we not provide largely defensive lethal aid to the
    Ukrainians, but, after the--Libya and Qaddafi was taken down,
    you could argue, Well, should we have done that, or not? We did
    it. The only thing the new elected Islamic moderate government
    asked for us was to help them create a defensive force to stop
    the radicals. We said no. As a result of that, we lost our
    Ambassador, the Consulate, and eventually the Embassy. The
    radicals are running around the entire country, the Syrian
    moderates. You've probably met some of them. They were so
    desperate, they talked to me. They wanted--"Look it, we don't
    want your troops, we don't even want your airplanes. Just give
    us some weapons to be able to fight this guy, Assad, because
    he's got a modern--he's got modern equipment. He doesn't have
    very good soldiers. They lack will. They've got tanks and
    artillery and airplanes, and that makes a difference on the
    battlefield. Let us fight them. Give us some antitank weapons,
    some antiaircraft weapons.'' We said no. Look at the problem we
    have. I mean, that lack of support and engagement is mystifying
    to me. To fear that because it may escalate into something
    else? We get paralyzed by the fear that it may be something
    else that--it's----
        Senator Inhofe. Yeah.
        General Keane. Some of it's shameful.
        Senator Inhofe. I appreciate that.
        Let me just, real quickly, on--my time is running out
    here--I was at the meeting also this morning with General
    Neller. I commented, and he agreed, that the problem--one of
    the problems that we're having is that we don't--we have the
    wrong priority on defending America. I think you just said it a
    minute ago, that defense of the American people shouldn't have
    a pricetag. Well, we had a policy from the administration that,
    when we're getting into sequestration, that we're not going to
    put additional funding into the military unless an equal
    amount's going to be given to the nondefense portion of the
    budget. What does that tell you? It tells you that there's not
    a priority in defending America. Do you in--feel the same way?
    Do you feel that the next administration should have that
    priority changed?
        General Keane. Well, yeah, absolutely. Given the threats
    that we're facing, and given the leaders of our military who
    are coming before this committee and telling us what major
    challenges and security deficiencies that they have, that we
    can't meet the threats that are out there. I'm--and I--what I
    tried to explain to you is that, yes, we have to make
    investments; yes, we have to grow the capability of this force;
    but, also, we have to look inside this Department as to how it
    does its business, and hold it accountable for that.
        Yeah, absolutely, these--this situation that's in the world
    today is going to get worse if we don't stand up to it. I think
    we've learned a couple of lessons from history. Our adversaries
    look at us in terms of real capability. They see that gap
    closing, just as we see it. Rebuilding the military and putting
    that capability on the table is real. In and of itself, it
    becomes a deterrent. That is the wonderful aspect of this. We
    learned that through the Cold War. The other thing that has to
    be present, even though you have the capabilities there, and
    they know those capabilities are real, and they don't want to
    deal with those capabilities, if we don't have the intent to
    use that capability, it is not a credible deterrent. They have
    to clearly understand where those lines are. Russia's
    aggression has to stop. China wants to dominate and control the
    Pacific, and they resent the United States having done it for
    70 years. They are forward-deploying forces to do that. That
    kind of aggression that's taking place that will lead to
    confrontation, they have to know that we're not going to stand
    for that. They have to understand that. So, the intent, as well
    as the credible military capability, is what is a credible
    deterrence. You have to have both.
        Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chairman, I've got to say, this is-- I
    think, may be the best panel that we've had in recent years.
        I appreciate your honesty, all of you.
        Thank you.
        Chairman McCain. Thank you.
        Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I joined Chairman McCain at the Marine Corps Caucus
    Breakfast this morning, where the Commandant of the Marine
    Corps, in some sense surprisingly to me, identified cyber as
    the major threat and, in fact, I think, clearly indicated that
    we need a more robust and clear policy and strategy regarding
    cyber. One of the aspects of cyber that is perhaps most
    troubling is that, first of all, it spreads across many
    different spheres. Chairman McCain identified the potential for
    crippling our warfighting ability by literally disabling our
    ships or planes that are dependent on cyber communication, but
    also the attacks on civilian targets--our utilities, our
    financial system, and our election.
        So, I take it, Mr. Kagan, you would agree that we need a
    more clear and strong policy regarding cyber.
        Dr. Kagan. Yes. As I say, I'm not a cyber expert, so I
    couldn't tell you what that policy actually would be, other
    than, as I say, I think, you know, we need to--first of all,
    we, as a Nation, need to be clear about what has happened. I
    think--I mean, I'm only talking about the political side here.
    I mean, there's still a lot of uncertainty about what exactly
    has happened. I think it's very important that the American
    public know what happened, who did it, and how. That then we
    can begin to fashion a response to it, which I think must
    include retaliatory action as a deterrent.
        Senator Blumenthal. That investigation of its most recent
    effort to interfere in our elections is one that really should
    be done soon, it should have bipartisan support, and it should
    be sufficiently resourced so that it can be effective. Would
    you agree?
        Dr. Kagan. Yes. Again, because it's as--it should be
    understood as a strategic--it's a strategic issue, because
    Russia deploys this political weapon as part of its overall
    strategy. So, the United States needs to respond as if this
    were a strategic issue, and forget about who won and didn't win
    the election. This really is a fundamental strategic question.
        Senator Blumenthal. Without going into any of the details
    that may be, preferably, discussed in a classified setting, no
    doubt there has been work done--investigative work done into
    the Russian actions that were designed to destabilize or
    interfere with our electoral process. Separately, you would
    recommend that the Congress undertake such a study.
        Dr. Kagan. Yes. Partly, again, for the reasons that
    Congress is uniquely suited to then explaining things to the
    American people in a way that the administration is not likely
    to do. I mean, it's just not enough to come up with a secret
    report on what happened. I think the American people need to
    understand.
        By the way, I also think this needs to put in--be put in a
    global context, because this activity has been conducted in
    elections throughout Europe and in a--as I say, is about to be
    conducted in elections that are coming up in Europe.
        Senator Blumenthal. You mentioned, Mr. Kagan--and I'd be
    interested in the opinions of other individuals on this
    observations--that the two trends that are troubling are not
    only the changes in policy on the part of the revisionist
    powers, but also the growing doubts about our Nation's
    commitment to our alliances, including recent statements by the
    President-elect that we ought to, in effect, withdraw from our
    commitments to NATO, that our commitments to Japan also perhaps
    are not worth fulfilling. I wonder whether you would expand on
    the effects of those kinds of statements on the world order.
        Dr. Kagan. Well, as I say--and I want to be, you know,
    clear about this--I think that, unfortunately, the policies of
    the outgoing administration had already shaken confidence in--
    from the very beginning. I mean, I think the way the initial
    Russian reset was carried out, which wound up canceling
    military cooperation programs with Poland, and the Czech
    Republic send a very early signal about whether the United
    States was going to be a reliable ally. I think premature
    withdrawal from Iraq, the whole redline episode with Syria--I
    mean, there's a background here. When I look at what happened
    during the campaign, I see it as part of a continuum.
        Yes, the statements made by the President-elect and his
    proxies during the campaign have definitely raised alarm bells
    around the world about what the United States role is going to
    be, and have suggested that it is going to be a different role
    than the world has been accustomed to.
        Now, you know, we can--are told that the--people don't mean
    anything they say in election campaigns. Maybe that'll turn out
    to be true. That's why I think that a very high priority, and a
    first priority of the administration, must be to go out and
    reassure, publicly and privately, the allies that we are fully
    committed to all of our defense commitments. As I say, more
    than that, to say that we are going to keep up with the rising
    challenges that those countries face by taking the necessary
    steps, in terms of our own capacities to do that.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much.
        My time is expired. At some point during the hearing, I'd
    be interested in what the two other witnesses have to say about
    both those areas.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Blumenthal, in order for
    continuity, we could have those comments now.
        General Keane. Well, let me just add, as much as there are
    issues in the cyber area with the United States military, it
    also is the most protected function that we have. You know as
    well as I do that our critical infrastructure is exposed. By
    that I mean our banking and financial system, our utility
    infrastructure, our transportation system. They're all
    relatively exposed. The Congress here tried to work public-
    private partnerships in some legislation a few years ago. I
    think Senator Lieberman led that effort with others, and we
    couldn't get it done, mainly because the private sector did not
    want to make the commitment that it would take, largely in
    terms of dollars, to provide that kind of security.
        There's a presidential commission reporting out this week
    that's got a number of recommendations, so I think we need to
    take a hard look at what they're looking at. This mostly deals
    with--because they're not--they don't have access to the--what
    the militaries do, in a classified sense--this largely has to
    do with the private sector. It will take public-private
    partnership to provide that kind of security. Let's face it, I
    mean, cyberattacks on the United States have been absolutely
    exploding, you know, in terms of stealing technology,
    intellectual property, and obviously also in just stealing
    critical information. Largely, we have not been responding. I
    don't know how you stop something like that if they're not
    paying a price for it. Largely, they're not paying a price for
    it, Senator. That clearly has to be a part of our strategy.
        So, yes, we--but, we have to find ways to defend that
    critical infrastructure, and hopefully the presidential
    commission will give us some ideas on what the Congress needs
    to do to help do that. There are some things on the military
    side that we need to shore up.
        Mr. Brimley. I would just say, sir, quickly, on the allies-
    and-partners question. I agree with Dr. Kagan. I'm somewhat
    worried about the comments I saw from the President-elect and
    his team. I'm inclined to give them the benefit of the doubt,
    certainly during the transition. I would think that, upon
    taking office--to execute any of the at least rhetorical
    policies I've heard, vis-a-vis China or Iran, or even the
    comments on Taiwan, all of those things require robust
    alliances and partnerships. Moreover, the selection, I would
    think, of General Mattis, who spent years fostering strong
    alliances and partnerships in places like Central Command, for
    instance, I'm hopeful that the next team will be--at the
    Cabinet level, will have folks that are deeply versed in the
    value to us of having a strong strategy buttressed by strong
    alliances and partnerships.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Rounds.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I appreciate the direction that this committee meeting is
    focused on. In particular, I'm curious as to whether or not
    perhaps the committee has gone far enough with the NDAA
    proposal this year. We've directed, for the first time ever,
    that the President of the United States must now define when an
    act in cyberspace would require a military response. It started
    out with a discussion that we had as to whether or not we
    should define a cyber act of war. It's been refined a little
    bit in the discussion. I think it's a very appropriate item to
    have.
        Would it be fair to say that--have we gone far enough, or
    do we have to go farther, in terms of what we're expecting from
    the administration?
        Mr. Brimley. I'm happy to go first with that, sir.
        It's hard to know from the outside. I think a lot of the
    most useful strategic guidance in this domain would be highly
    classified. Just from my own basic experience in this,
    wrestling with this act-of-war question, I think that's
    something that can and should be debated openly and publicly. I
    think we ought to do more. Like I said, the second- and third-
    order consequences of getting involved in offensive operations,
    for instance, are problematic.
        Just to the earlier point on cyber, writ large, I do worry
    a little bit about the military services and sort of running to
    the ball on cyber. You know, I want the Marine Corps focused on
    closing with and destroying the enemy, you know, from
    amphibious operations and the like. I want the Army focused on,
    you know, major combat operations. I want the Air Force focused
    on what it does best. I--sometimes I worry that, sort of, the
    lack of--the necessity to have each military services investing
    in cyber, along with the broader architecture of Cyber Command
    and the NSA [National Security Agency], it--I'm not sure the
    incentives are properly there. Each military service chief
    feels compelled to focus on cyber, because they have to. I--
    sometimes I worry that that focus sometimes can protract from
    what the military services, in my mind, their core missions
    ought to be. Thinking about seapower, thinking about airpower.
    Obviously, cyber is a component of this. You know, but
    sometimes I worry that they are--that the demands for each
    military service detract from their core mission. I think cyber
    ought to be, you know, a stronger voice, perhaps, from Cyber
    Command and maybe even OSD is appropriate.
        Senator Rounds. Dr. Kagan?
        Dr. Kagan. Senator, forgive me, I've already exceeded my
    knowledge of cyber in this hearing.
        Senator Rounds. General Keane.
        General Keane. Well, I think the committee focus with the
    military portion of cyber deals with Cyber Command, itself.
    They have responsibility for the function, both from a defense
    perspective and from an offense perspective. I don't believe
    that this is an area that's going to require major investment
    strategy that compares anything to the lack of combat brigades,
    the lack of proper type of combat aircraft, or the lack of
    proper types of submarines and ships. I would leave it to the
    commander there to understand exactly what he needs to properly
    defend the military. Also, I know he's got the offensive tools.
    It's the defensive tools that are the issue.
        Senator Rounds. Interesting to me. I--my time is--I've got
    a short amount of time left, but I'm just curious. Throughout
    this discussion, we've talked cyber, we've talked some
    readiness issues, we've talked some challenges with regard to
    our naval forces, air forces, army. We really have not said
    much at all about space. Yet, everything everybody's got is
    dependent upon our ability to protect our own assets within
    space. How vulnerable are we? Should we be placing additional
    emphasis on the protection of our own assets from kinetic
    attack in space?
        General Keane. Well, the short answer is yes. As our
    adversaries have acquired all the technology that we have,
    you--we know for a fact it's part of their asymmetric strategy
    to deny us as much of our space-baked technology as possible.
    They practice it routinely. You know as well as I do, the
    Chinese have been shooting satellites down for years, getting
    ready for that asymmetric strategy against us. So, most
    definitely, there's--we're not going to go back, in terms of
    that technology and our dependence. Protecting it is an
    investment strategy, to be sure, but it is not on the scale of
    what is needed for our offensive capability, which is lacking.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        My time is expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator King.
        Senator King. I also want to associate myself with the
    comments of Senator Inhofe, and thank the Chairman and the
    Ranking Member for arranging this hearing. This is--this has
    been a very insightful and important.
        To follow up on this--just a quick question on the cyber
    issue. I wonder your opinions of splitting the cyber from Cyber
    Command and NSA. It strikes me that those are two different,
    very important, very engaging functions, and I wonder if the
    time has come to acknowledge the importance of each and make
    those two different individuals.
        General Keane, your thoughts?
        General Keane. Yeah, I wouldn't split it. I mean----
        Senator King. You would not.
        General Keane. No, no, absolutely not. Because the main
    tool that you're actually going to use is NSA. That is-- that's
    where most of our capability truly is. If Keith Alexander was
    sitting here--he's a good friend of mine, and I've talked to
    him at length about this--he would argue against splitting it.
        Senator King. I----
        General Keane. You're going to wind up----
        Senator King. I've had that discussion with him----
        General Keane.--creating more bureaucracy than we actually
    need if we do that.
        Senator King. Mr. Brimley? Mr. Kagan?
        Mr. Brimley. I've been back and forth on this particular
    question, myself, over the years. You know, I think one of the
    major problems we have with cyber, as it pertains to the
    government and also the military, is, you know, we're competing
    for talent. We're competing for talent with the private sector,
    we're competing for talent from the international community, as
    well. Which leads me to believe that, you know, splitting, you
    know, one rather--you know, one bureaucratic entity into two
    bureaucratic entities, you know, I think that could--you know,
    and setting those bureaucratic entities in some sort of
    competition with one another for talent, whether it's civilian
    talent or military talent--it's probably not the real issue. I
    would be more interested in, you know, making sure that, from a
    military perspective, we have the ability to direct-commission
    folks from, say, Silicon Valley who want to serve as reservists
    or who can serve on Active Duty for 1 or 2 years; you know,
    flexible hiring authorities for the civilian side; you know,
    flexible spending incentive programs to be able to compensate
    our best and brightest. Maybe not, obviously, from a private-
    sector level, but making it more attractive for folks to serve,
    both on the civilian side and military side, I think that's
    where we ought to focus much of our energy. The wiring
    diagrams, I think, are less important in that regard.
        Senator King. Thank you. Thank you.
        General Keane, I was struck by your testimony about the
    bureaucracy in the Army which stalled the development of new
    weapon systems and the deployment. That's a structural issue
    and a cultural issue. It's hard--these aren't bad people
    saying, ``We don't want to do good things.'' How do we deal
    with the cultural structural issue? Because we're seeing this
    across the--all the services, and in procurement, generally, of
    new technology. It takes too long, and it's too expensive.
        General Keane. Yeah, the--it's a great question. The only
    way you get at that is with absolutely strong leadership that
    is not going to tolerate that. You've got to bore down on it.
    First, you've got to get educated, yourself, because--most
    people, like I do--I came to the Pentagon, because I ran
    effective organizations at different levels. I didn't know
    anything about the business side of the Army. The first time I
    got exposed to it was when I was a four-star general. I was
    handicapped, initially, because I didn't know what was going
    on. It took me, what, a year, year and a half, to understand
    this issue.
        So, having people there who are strong leaders, want to get
    these results, holding the system accountable for it, really
    driving innovation and technology, who you put in there as
    Secretary of the Army, the civilian Under Secretary of the
    Army--a lot of times--just be frank with you--we put people in
    there, you know, who enjoy the ceremonial aspect of it, they
    enjoy being Secretary of the Army, but they don't drive change
    in the culture because they're--it's a reward for something
    they've done.
        Senator King. So, selection of leaders is a crucial
    element, looking for innovative and willingness to move. Let
    me----
        General Keane. You've got to force the R&D effort, and
    you've got to talk to civilian--you've got to talk to the
    defense industry on a regular basis, because the defense
    industry is spending their time thinking about your function.
    They're all--they're also spending research dollars on it. You
    have to have regular communication with them, let them know
    where you're trying to go, bring them into it to help
    contribute to it, drive your own people to work with them, as
    well. We can accelerate this process rather dramatically.
        Senator King. I would suggest that we have to.
        Let me quickly move on to one other question. There's an
    extraordinary story in this morning's Washington Post about a
    report done by McKinsey and by the Business Board a the Defense
    Department, $125 billion of savings identified over 5 years.
    That would be enough to fund the nuclear modernization program.
    Do we need to take seriously--because we're talking about
    increasing the defense budget, but how about talking about
    using the dollars we have more effectively?
        Mr. Brimley, your thoughts?
        Mr. Brimley. Quickly, sir. Absolutely. I mean, that
    report--I think it was the Defense Business Board Report--I
    mean, I remember reading that a few years ago when it came out.
    I'm glad to see it's finally being reported on, you know, at
    significant levels now.
        Senator King. Well, it's pretty disappointing that----
        Mr. Brimley. Absolutely.
        Senator King.--it took digging to get it out.
        Mr. Brimley. Absolutely. I--and I would just say, as part
    of your hearings, your posture hearings in 2017, as part of the
    budget debates, I mean, you ought to hold the next Pentagon
    team to account in not only advocating for more defense
    dollars, but making sure those defense dollars are better
    spent. That's going to take advancing the reform agenda that
    this committee has laid out in the NDAA.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Ernst.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thank you, gentlemen.
        This has been a great discussion this morning. I hope that,
    Mr. Chairman, we can continue and not just discuss it, but
    actually see some actions behind the words. So, I'm really
    encouraged about what we're touching upon today.
        I would like to get your thoughts on ISIS in Southeast
    Asia, because I do think it's something that we haven't spent a
    lot of time focusing on. We're not talking about it nearly
    enough. Islamic extremist groups in Southeast Asia, like the
    Abu Sayyaf group, they are all coming together under the flag
    of ISIS. It's a bit concerning.
        Earlier this year, both General Dunford and Secretary
    Carter agreed on my assessment of ISIS in the region, and they
    shared those concerns, as well. Since that time, ISIS-linked
    groups have carried out a number of attacks. Just last week, we
    saw an attack against the Philippine President's security
    detail, and we saw a bombing near the U.S. Embassy. So,
    continuing escalation of violence in that area by those
    extremist groups.
        Mr. Brimley, I'd like to start with you, because you did
    mention the rebalance towards the Pacific, and--you've
    mentioned that rebalance. I think, when that first started, the
    focus was very much on China and maybe North Korea, some of
    those aspects, but now we have ISIS engaging heavily in the
    Philippines. You spoke about the Marines in Darwin and other
    activities. Can you talk a little bit what you think our
    administration, the incoming administration, should do to
    really address this rising threat of ISIS in Southeast Asia?
        Mr. Brimley. Sure. Thank you, Senator.
        I would just say, we saw this before, you know, in 2001-
    2002, you know, terrorist groups in the region that have their
    own, sort of, particular interests as it pertains to the
    countries in which they operate. I mean, I think there's a lot
    of branding going on. We saw, in--after 9/11, a lot of
    terrorist groups around the world, but somehow they're
    affiliated with al Qaeda, and that gave them some, sort of, I
    guess, marketing prowess. It's--it doesn't surprise me that
    we're seeing that again with ISIS. I would just say, from a DOD
    perspective, one of the ways--you know, I think our posture in
    the region ought be focused on maintaining the regional order.
    We need to be able to prepare to go toe-to-toe with countries
    and threats. I'm worried about China. I'm worried about North
    Korea and the like. One of the tangible second-order benefits
    that we get from forward-deploying our troops and capabilities
    overseas is, we have that daily connectivity, and we have that
    daily deterrent prowess in places around the region.
        One of the debates that you see and hear inside the
    Pentagon, or one of the debates that we had in the--inside the
    Pentagon as it pertains to, say, the Marines in Darwin, for
    instance, is, you know, you start to break apart these larger
    entities, like a Marine Air/Ground Task Force [MAGTF], for
    instance, and you start to put--you know, put a company here in
    southern Philippines, and put a--you know, a task force of some
    kind in Australia, and there's a tradeoff between doing that,
    which gives you that kind of daily interaction with local
    communities, the ability to do counterterrorism operations, for
    instance, but there is some risk that it becomes more difficult
    to quickly bring those capabilities back together for a larger
    threat, responding to a larger threat. That's the balance that
    DOD, particularly OSD, has to grapple with every day.
        I would just encourage the committee, as you think about
    the--what--the Defense Strategy Review, what used to be the QDR
    [Quadrennial Defense Reviews], that the next administration
    will do next year, that you--you're very aggressive with them
    in articulating, you know, what you want to see out of the
    strategy, classified briefings for all these factors, and
    making sure that all these different constituent elements are
    part of that strategy and it's not--it's not just a public-
    relations document, which is what QDRs, I think, unfortunately,
    have tended to evolve into, which is part of the reason the
    committee took its action it did to make the QDR a Defense
    Strategy Review with a classified component.
        Senator Ernst. Very good, thank you.
        General Keane, could you talk a little bit more about,
    militarily, what we could be doing in that region, and the uses
    of forces?
        General Keane. Yeah, absolutely.
        ISIS [the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] has expanded
    into 35 countries. We don't really have a strategy to deal with
    any of that. We're focused on the territory that they took,
    certainly, in Iraq and Syria. I'm not saying that's not
    appropriate. That should be a priority. Commensurate with that
    priority, we should be addressing these other areas, as well. A
    lot of the identification with ISIS is aspirational, but they
    also have affiliates in these countries. This is one of them.
    What they--with an affiliate, they actually sign a document
    together to abide by certain ISIS principles and rules. In some
    cases, they direct; some cases, they provide aid; but in most
    cases, there's no direction. That's largely the case here.
        I believe what the United States can do, with its allies,
    is that--you know, we've been at war with organizations like
    this now for 15 years, and our reservoir of knowledge and
    capability here is pretty significant. It far exceeds anybody
    else in the world. We have allies that are participating with
    us. There's much we can do with them, in sharing intelligence
    and helping them with training and also helping them with
    technology--not expensive technology, but things that can truly
    make a difference, you know, with those troops. I don't think
    we necessarily have to be directly involving in fighting these
    forces ourselves, but aiding and supporting these forces, and
    having a strategy to do that, and lining up some priorities for
    ourselves--because we have limited amount of resources--but,
    make some choices, you know, based on what that threat is and
    what it may be--its implications for the region could help
    guide us to what those priorities should be.
        Senator Ernst. I appreciate your input.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, both
    to the Chair and Ranking Member, and also to all of our
    panelists, for giving us a lot to think about this morning.
        Dr. Kagan, I want to begin with you and with your comments
    about Russia's interference in our elections, because this is
    something that I have found very troubling. In fact, before
    Congress went out, before the October recess, called on
    hearings to better look at what was going on. We know that
    we've had Secretary Johnson and other Homeland Security
    officials say that there is evidence of Russian hacking into
    our electoral system that goes to the highest levels of the
    Russian government. That was done, not to influence the outcome
    of the election, necessarily, but to sow confusion about
    whether our electoral process was working. Yet, to date, there
    has not been one hearing on this issue in this Congress. What I
    was told when I asked about a hearing--and I have, again,
    called on the Foreign Relations Committee, on which I sit, to
    do a hearing, and I know that they're considering it-- but I
    was told that there was concern that this might be viewed as a
    partisan issue.
        So, I am very heartened by your point that this is not a
    partisan issue. In fact, the first person I heard raise it in
    Congress was Senator McCain, the Chairman of this committee,
    who talked about the efforts to hack into the Arizona and
    Illinois voter files.
        So, I couldn't agree more, this is a hearing that we ought
    to undertake because it's important to our American democracy,
    it's important to European democracy, when we look at what
    Russia's doing in eastern Europe, as you point out, in Germany,
    in France, the potential for them to continue to sow mischief.
        What kinds of--you also talked about taking retaliatory
    action against Russia for what they're doing--what kinds of
    efforts would you suggest we look at, in terms of trying to
    retaliate or respond to what Russia is doing in the United
    States?
        Dr. Kagan. Well, there are--I'm sure there are people
    better equipped to answer that question than I am, but I would,
    you know, publish the Swiss bank accounts of all the oligarchs
    around--I mean, just these--there are all kinds of things that
    you could do that would cause----
        Senator Shaheen. Yeah, keep----
        Dr. Kagan. Well, I mean----
        Senator Shaheen.--saying a few more of those, because I
    think those are helpful.
        Dr. Kagan. You know, you could talk about all the ways in
    which--you know, you could reveal stuff about the way Putin has
    manipulated his own elections. I mean, there's all kinds of
    stuff out there, which, if you were of a mind to do it, you
    could do that would be embarrassing, of one kind or another. I
    mean, these people have money stashed all over the world. They
    have dachas, they have villas, et cetera. They--this is a kind
    of a mafia organization, where, you know, part of the game is
    everybody holding together. There's ways to create divisions
    and difficulties. I mean, it--I'm sure, as I say, there are
    people who could--if you put them to the task--and I'm--for all
    I know, they have been put to the task--you could come up with
    a whole list of things.
        By the way, I wouldn't make an announcement of it.
    They'll--they would understand what had happened. Until we do
    something like that, it's just open season for them to do this.
    So, I think we've already--we need to treat this like any other
    weapon system that's being deployed, because they are treating
    it like a weapon system.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Well, Mr. Chairman and Senator Reed, I hope that this
    committee will also consider hearings on this topic.
        Let me follow up on Senator King's issue that he raised
    with respect to the Pentagon study that was reported in the
    Washington Post, because--I haven't read the study. I don't
    know whether the concerns that are raised by some of the
    Pentagon officials in this news story are accurate, or not, but
    the very fact that it was buried--or the attempt was to bury it
    by Pentagon officials, I think, is a very bad message to be
    sending, especially in an organization that can't even get
    ready for an audit until 2017. I don't know how long we've been
    asking for an audit. It's been since I got on this committee,
    in 2011, so that's at least 6 years. I suspect it's been longer
    than that. So, there are clearly, as all of you pointed out,
    bureaucratic changes that need to be made in the Department.
        One of the things, General Keane, that you pointed out is
    that there is a predilection to try and kill some of the
    innovative programs so that the Pentagon can actually do those
    themselves. We had this experience with the Small Business
    Innovation Research Program [SBIR] as we're going into this
    NDAA, because the initial effort was to try and increase the
    amount of money that DOD is making available to small
    businesses to do innovation. I think we've heard from a number
    of panelists previously that this is one of the best research
    programs that still exists within--for small businesses to
    produce innovation that's used by the Department of Defense.
        So, is this the kind of initiative that you're talking
    about that there may be, for whatever reason, efforts to try
    and keep it from putting more money into that small-business
    effort to produce innovation?
        General Keane. I certainly encourage that. The--you know,
    the Active Protective System that I was talking about and that,
    when DARPA, you know, made a call to the people to come
    forward, and they knew that this would be an advanced
    technology that could actually change warfare, the contractor
    that the United States Army has gone to is a small-business
    contractor. So, here's this small-business contractor,
    conceptualized this capability themselves, and it will
    revolutionize combat warfare as we go forward. They also have
    technology, interesting enough, and they brought military
    leaders out to see it. They can stop a bullet. In other words,
    a 50-caliber bullet, they can kill the bullet. It's all because
    of--everything--all of this is available on the private sector.
        Senator Shaheen. Right.
        General Keane. Microchip technology, as I mentioned, and
    unbelievable software applied to that technology. Well, that's
    revolutionary technology, what I just mentioned to you. It
    changes warfare. That is something we should be investing in.
    We should put money behind this. I have no affiliation with
    this organization, let's get that straight, so--but, yes, this
    is--absolutely right, this is America. We're the most
    innovative, creative people on the planet. It's out there, and
    we have to unleash it and bring it in. It doesn't have to
    necessarily be a giant organization that does it. There are
    Americans out there doing this stuff. They're creative. Lookit,
    they changed a--the whole dot-com aspect of our lives out there
    in California by the innovation and creativity that these
    engineers have. We've got to tap into it.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, my time is up. Thank you, General
    Keane.
        I would point out that the reauthorization of the SBIR
    program is in this NDAA for 5 years, which I think is very
    positive, and I applaud the Chairman and Ranking Member for
    that. Unfortunately, the increase in spending on that program
    did not make it into the bill.
        Thank you all.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Lee.
        Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thanks, to each of you, for being here. Thanks for all you
    do to keep Americans informed and to keep Americans aware of
    what we're discussing today; that is, the emerging threats to
    our security.
        There are a number of threats we face around the world, and
    it's important to keep those threats in mind as we approach
    this exciting new period in our history, in which we've got a
    new administration coming. One of the many threats that we face
    in any era, in any administration, relates to the threat posed
    by the excessive accumulation of power in the hands of a few.
    We see that happen around the world, and sometimes we see it
    within our own government. It's one of the reasons why our
    system is set up the way it is. The Constitution of the United
    States is designed specifically to protect us against that kind
    of threat here at home, and it does so by wisely dividing that
    authority between Congress and the presidency.
        The framers believed that forcing the two political
    branches of government--that is, the two political branches
    that are not the judiciary--to collaborative, to interact with
    each other; where necessary, to serve as a check and as a
    balance on each other--and that this would provide us the best
    means toward achieving a stable, successful, and, hopefully,
    relatively popular foreign policy; that is, one that, in one
    way or another, reflects the will of the people, or at least is
    likely to be geared toward their interests.
        For several decades, Congress, quite regrettably, in my
    opinion, has deliberately abdicated many of its constitutional
    responsibilities. It's just sort of handed it over to the
    executive branch, being willing to take a backseat role--a
    backseat role, at best, in determining America's role around
    the world on how we're going to combat threats that face us.
    The result ends up being a foreign policy that is made
    primarily within the executive branch bureaucracy and
    Washington insider circles, informed, as they tend to be, by
    the interests and the aspirations of the so-called
    international community. This is a circle that increasingly
    becomes untethered from any clear lines of accountability
    connecting policy, policymakers, and the American people.
        For instance, the U.S. military is currently operating in
    the Middle East under a very broad--I believe, irresponsibly
    broad interpretation of a 15-year-old Authorization for the Use
    of Military Force, using it as justification to engage in a
    pretty broad range of actions, from intervening in two separate
    civil wars to propping up a failing Afghan government.
    Meanwhile, the executive branch seems increasingly inclined to
    choose and identify and engage threats through covert actions.
    That further helps the executive branch to avoid the scrutiny
    that would be available if stronger congressional oversight
    existed. They avoid that kind of scrutiny and public
    accountability.
        Now, this may be convenient for Members of Congress who
    want nothing more than to just have someone else to blame for
    decisions that turn out to be unpopular or unsuccessful, but
    it's an affront to the Constitution. It's more than that. It's
    more than just an affront to a 229-year-old document. It's an
    affront to the system of representative government that we have
    dedicated ourselves to as Americans. I think it's an insult to
    the American people, who are losing patience with a foreign
    policy that they feel increasingly and very justifiably
    disconnected from. Notwithstanding the fact that they're still
    asked, from time to time, to send their sons and daughters into
    harm's way to defend.
        So, as we discuss these emerging threats to our national
    security, I'd encourage this committee and all of my colleagues
    to prioritize the threat that will inevitably come to us if we
    continue to preserve the status quo and to exclude the American
    people and their elected representatives--in many cases,
    ourselves--from the process.
        So, I have a question for our panelists. One of the focuses
    of this committee has been on the readiness crisis within the
    military brought about by the conflicts we're facing in the
    Middle East and by a reduction in the amount of money that the
    Pentagon has access to. Easy answer to this is often, ``Well,
    let's just increase spending.'' That's not to say that that's
    not necessary, now or in other circumstances, in particular,
    but setting aside that, that is one approach that people often
    come up with. Another option that I think has to be considered,
    and perhaps ought be considered first, is to reexamine the
    tasks and the priorities that we're giving to our military
    leaders and to ask whether these purposes that we're seeking
    readiness for are truly in the interests of the American
    people, those we're representing, those who are paying the bill
    for this, and those who are asked to send their sons and
    daughters----
        Chairman McCain. The Senator's time has expired.
        Senator Lee.--into harm's way. So----
        Chairman McCain. The Senator's time has expired.
        Senator Kaine.
        Senator Lee. Could I just ask a one-sentence question, Mr.
    Chairman, to----
        Chairman McCain. Yes, but I would appreciate courtesy to
    the other members that if--make one long opening statement, it
    does not leave time for questions.
        Senator is recognized for a question.
        Senator Lee. Do you believe that the Congress, the White
    House, and the executive branch agencies have done an adequate
    job in reaching consensus on what the American people's
    interests are and on calibrating the military and diplomatic
    means to appropriate ends?
        Dr. Kagan. Do we answer?
        I don't accept this dichotomy that you've posited between
    what the Congress and the President do and what the American
    people want. I mean, when I think of some of the--first of all,
    historically, the executive has always had tremendous influence
    on foreign policy, much--whatever the Constitution may say,
    although the Constitution did give the executive tremendous
    power to make foreign policy, if you go back to Jefferson, the
    willingness to deploy force without congressional approval; you
    can go all the way through 200 years of history. I'm not sure
    it's substantially different. In any case, that's been the
    general prejudice. The founders wanted energy in the executive,
    and particularly in the conduct of foreign policy. That was the
    lesson of the Revolutionary War. That's why they created a
    Constitution which particularly gave power to the executive.
        Also, I just don't believe that the American people are
    constantly having things foisted on them that they didn't
    approve of. So, one of the most controversial things that's
    happened, obviously, in recent decade, that people talk about
    all the time, is the Iraq War, which was voted on, debated at
    length, and Congress, 72-to-28 I think was the vote, something
    like that, the American people--public opinion was in favor of
    it, just as the American people was in favor of World War I,
    the Spanish-American War. Later, these wars turn out to be bad
    or badly handled, the American people decide that it was a
    terrible idea, and then people start saying, ``Well, who did
    this?'' The American people want to find somebody to blame for
    doing these things. They don't want to take responsibility for
    their own decisions.
        I don't believe we have a fundamentally undemocratic way of
    making foreign policy decisions. I think it's complicated. I
    think mistakes are made. Foreign policy is all about failure.
    People don't want to acknowledge that failure is the norm in
    foreign policy, and then they want to blame people for failure.
    I think the American people are participants in this process.
        Senator Lee. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Keane. The only thing I would add is, I do think
    Congress should be more involved with the use of force when
    we're deploying force overseas. I think Congress has walked
    away from that responsibility recently. You have a colleague
    here who's been banging on this for some time: Senator Kaine. I
    would hope that this new administration would welcome
    congressional involvement when the Nation is going to commit
    its forces.
        Mr. Brimley. Sir, very quickly, I would just say, you know,
    the Defense Strategy Review that the Pentagon is mandated to
    provide this committee and Congress and the American people,
    that's a great forum to engage in these questions. What--
    readiness for what? Force structure for what? Modernization
    priorities. These are all things that can be debated openly.
    These are things which the Pentagon is congressionally required
    to submit. I think that's a great forum for these discussions.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Kaine.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thanks, to the witnesses.
        An observation and two questions.
        Observation. I was chairman of the Democratic National
    Committee [DNC] from 2009 through early 2011, and we had a file
    cabinet in the office, with a plaque over it, and it was a file
    cabinet that was invaded in 1972 at the Watergate complex when
    materials were taken out of the DNC. The materials that were
    taken were modest, and it made no outcome on what was one of
    the biggest landslide elections in the history of the United
    States. Yet, it led to one of--a very searching congressional
    inquiry, not because of the outcome of the election, but it led
    to a searching inquiry because of a desire to uphold the
    integrity of our electoral processes.
        I associate myself with comments of Dr. Kagan and some of
    the witnesses here. There have been requests of the Foreign
    Relations Committee, Armed Services Committee. There was a
    letter to the President from Democrats on the Intel Committee,
    dated November 29, asking that the President declassify
    information with regard to the engagement of Russia in activity
    concerning the American presidential election. I think it's
    absolutely critical that the American public know what
    happened, that Congress know what happened, and that we then
    figure out what we can do to avoid such instances, by Russia or
    anybody else, in the future. My fear is, if we don't do what we
    did, back in the '70s, in such an instance--and that wasn't a
    foreign government undertaking to influence an American
    election--but, if we don't, as Congress, stand up to protect
    the integrity of the system, that we're going to regret it in a
    lot of ways in the future. That's observation.
        Question. I thought it was interesting, Dr. Kagan, you
    talked about two trends: the historical rejuvenation project
    ambitions of certain nations and a retreating American
    willingness to be engaged. A third trend that I'm kind of
    interested in--I certainly see the first two--a third one is
    the increase of the power of nonstate organizations that don't
    follow any of the rules, Geneva Conventions, et cetera, and
    whether that--it be ISIL or al Qaeda or al-Nusra or ah-Shabaab,
    or whether it be, you know, global organizations that can
    offshore everything or the Sinaloa Cartel, there's a lot of
    nonstate organizations that use violence to achieve their end
    or use a nonstate capacity to avoid accountability. I think
    that is a trend that is also a pretty important trend that is
    hard for us to completely get our minds around, because so many
    of our doctrines are doctrines that we have developed thinking
    about state versus state. So, I'm just curious, in my first
    question, if you would just say something briefly about that
    trend, the rise of a nonstate willing to use violence or other
    nefarious ends, and how we should factor that into our
    strategic thinking.
        Dr. Kagan. Well, obviously, it's a problem, and--although I
    always find it ironic that these nonstate actors, all they
    really want to do is become a state. I mean, that's ISIS's
    great goal, is to be a state. So, you know, when I hear about
    how the state is becoming less important, that's all that these
    nonstate actors want to be. It's obviously something that we
    are engaged in, must be engaged in dealing with.
        What I would just say is, it's not going to be the rise of
    nonstate actors that upends the world order. It is going to be
    a constant problem, a constant threat, and, in some paradoxical
    way, a greater threat to the homeland in particular instances.
    It is only the great powers, the great revisionist powers that
    are capable of undoing this world order that the United States
    created after World War II. While we have to do everything, I
    just don't want us to lose sight of what I consider to be the
    main game, because we can fight a kind of low-level battle
    against nonstate actors for a long time. We will be. Once the
    order has blown up--well, we've seen what happens when the
    order blows up. That's what--we've got to make sure that we are
    preventing that from happening.
        Senator Kaine. Let me ask one other question. Dr. Kagan,
    again, you said something interesting about how China wants to
    be a hegemon in Asia and the Pacific. Russia wants to be a
    hegemon in Europe. They resist and resent the fact that the
    U.S. has played this role, post World War II, in engagement in
    international institutions and our own unilateral activity
    around the globe. You know, as they think about the future,
    when they think about a future where they would be hegemons in
    their regions and the U.S. would be a hegemon in the Americas.
    Because I--one of the things I'm questioning is, by trying to
    do a little bit everywhere, we're actually not doing very much
    in the Americas; and the activity of China, for example, in the
    Americas is very significant. So, I'm not sure we're committing
    the resources to do the global mission, nor are we committing
    the resources even to play the kind of leadership role that I
    think we could play in the Americas. I'm curious as to any of
    your thoughts on that.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Brimley. Well, sir, I would just say quickly, again, I
    don't think it's simply a matter of dollars and money. I think
    there are things we can do in Asia, there are things we can do
    in Europe that won't break the bank. I remember when we put
    together what became this Asia rebalance, and we came up with a
    briefing for then-Secretary Gates, you know, and there were
    three maps that we gave him. One map was the status quo of our
    posture in the region. One map was a--sort of a 20-year--what
    things could like in 20 years, and it was pretty, you know,
    ambitious, in terms of what the posture would look like. The
    third slide was what we called, sort of--at least I called
    ``baby steps.'' Here are things that we can do inside the FYDP
    that are not going to break the bank, that are politically
    doable, that aren't going to be, you know, politically
    controversial, in the sense of taking things away from, say,
    our bases here at home. That's when we came up Darwin and
    Littoral Combat Ships in Singapore, and some other things in
    the Philippines at the time. The vision was that we could do
    these sorts of small episodic baby steps year after year,
    administration after administration. If we had that political
    will, over the course of 20 years, it would amount to something
    truly strategic. That's still my hope. I don't think it
    requires huge amounts of new defense dollars to reinvest in our
    posture in places like the Asia-Pacific in ways that would
    detract from doing more in, say, North and South America.
        General Keane. I'd just add one thing on your nonstate
    actors. You know, in--they certainly know that they cannot
    defeat the United States military or militaries that exist in
    Europe. That's not their objective. I mean, their objective is
    to break our will, to force us back into ourselves so that they
    can have their way, you know, with the caliphate that they want
    to establish. They think by routinely killing us, it would
    force us to disengage and withdraw. That's, in my judgment, not
    going to happen. They dramatically underestimate the character
    and will and strength of the American people. Bin Laden did the
    same thing. He thought he was going to break our will by doing
    9/11, and quite the opposite occurred as a result of it.
        There is something that we have to be very careful of. We
    don't want to be very dismissive of this kind of warfare,
    because we've known for years the al Qaeda's pursuit of WMD
    [Weapons of Mass Distruction]. Make no mistake about it,
    obviously if one of these organizations got their hands on it,
    they would certainly use it, as brutal and fanatic as they are
    about killing people. One of the things that troubles us--the
    Director of the National Security Agency would--could speak
    better on it than I--but, we've been concerned, for a number of
    years, that radical Islamic organization will likely buy a
    offensive capability from the Russians, who are--half of what
    they devote to cyber is criminal. Buy that capability, and do
    some real damage to the United States in a way that 9/11 could
    never have done. So, the--you--we cannot underestimate the
    intent of the nonstate actors while we attempt to control what
    they're doing.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Graham.
        Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
    holding an important hearing on a very difficult topic, and to
    all the committee members for showing up. We're talking about
    important things to an empty room. Just look. Just look.
        So, Iran with a nuke. Number one--I'm going to ask, like 45
    questions in 5 minutes. Give brief answers if you can. If you
    can't, don't say a word.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Graham. Do you believe that the Iranians, in the
    past, have been trying to develop a nuclear weapon, not a
    nuclear powerplant for peaceful purposes?
        Mr. Brimley. Yes.
        General Keane. Nuclear weapon, yes.
        Dr. Kagan. Yes.
        Senator Graham. All right, three for three.
        Do you believe that there's--that's their long-term goal,
    in spite of what they say, is to have a nuclear weapon?
        General Keane. Yes.
        Senator Graham. Do you believe that would be one of the
    most destabilizing things in the world?
        Mr. Brimley. Yes.
        Senator Graham. Do you believe the Arabs will get one of
    their own?
        Mr. Brimley. Yes.
        Senator Graham. Do you believe the Iranians might actually
    use the weapon if they got one? The Ayatollah?
        General Keane. Well, I think the--before I answer that, I
    think there's just as great a chance that the Arabs would use
    their weapon----
        Senator Graham. Okay. Well, so----
        General Keane.--as a first strike----
        Senator Graham.--we don't know--well, let's--Bob, you
    should your hand. Do you--if you're Israel, what bet would you
    make?
        Dr. Kagan. I would bet my 100-plus nuclear weapons would be
    a deterrent to their use of nuclear weapons.
        Senator Graham. Okay. What if he wants to die and doesn't
    mind taking you with him? What does he want? Does he want to
    destroy Israel, or is he just getting--when the Ayatollah says
    he wants to wipe Israel out, is that all talk?
        Dr. Kagan. I don't know if it's all talk, and I don't blame
    people for being nervous. We lived under--the United States, we
    all lived under the shadow of possible nuclear war for 50
    years.
        Senator Graham. Yeah, but, you know, on their worst day,
    the Russians didn't have a religious doctrine that wanted to
    destroy everybody. Do you believe he's a religious Nazi at his
    heart? Or you don't know? Answer maybe you don't know.
        Dr. Kagan. Well, look, I believe that they--he clearly is
    that--believes in a fanatical religion, but----
        Senator Graham. Well, here's what I believe.
        Dr. Kagan.--I'm not--okay, go ahead.
        Senator Graham. Okay. I believe that you ought to take him
    seriously, based on their behavior. Number one----
        General Keane. I think we should take him seriously. How--
    whether they're religious fanatics or not, I don't think is
    that relevant. Clearly, their geopolitical goals to dominate
    the Middle East strategically, to destroy the state of Israel,
    and to drive the United States out of the Middle East, they
    have talked about it every single year----
        Senator Graham. Well, do you think that's their goal?
        General Keane. Yes, that----
        Senator Graham. Okay.
        General Keane. Of course it's their goal.
        Senator Graham. So----
        General Keane. Not only is it their goal, but they're
    succeeding at it.
        Senator Graham. Do you think we should deny them that goal?
        Dr. Kagan. Yes.
        Senator Graham. Good.
        North Korea. Why are they trying to build an ICBM
    [intercontinental ballistic missile]? Are they trying to send a
    North Korean in space? What are they trying to do?
        Mr. Brimley. They're trying to threaten us and our allies--
    --
        Dr. Kagan. To put a nuclear weapon on it to----
        Senator Graham. Do you believe it should be the policy
        of the United States Congress and the next President to
    deny them that capability?
        Mr. Brimley. I believe so.
        Senator Graham. Would you support an Authorization to Use
    Military Force that would stop the ability of the North Koreans
    to develop a missile that could reach the United States? Do you
    think Congress would be wise to do that?
        Mr. Brimley. I think Congress should debate it. I remember
    distinctly the op-ed that Secretary William Perry and Ashton
    Carter----
        Senator Graham. Well, I'm going to introduce one. Would you
    vote for it if you were here?
        Dr. Kagan. Only if Congress was willing to do what was
    necessary to follow up----
        Senator Graham. Well, do you think Congress should be
    willing to authorize any President, regardless of party, to
    stop North Korea from developing a missile that can hit the
    homeland?
        Dr. Kagan. Only if Congress is willing to follow up with
    what might be required, depending on North Korea's response.
        Senator Graham. Well, what might be required is to stop
    their nuclear program through military force. That's why you
    would authorize it.
        Dr. Kagan. No, but I'm saying that if--I'm--the answer is
    yes, but then you also have to be willing, if North Korea
    launched----
        Senator Graham. Would you advise me----
        Dr. Kagan.--North Korea, that you'd have to be willing to--
    --
        Chairman McCain. You have to let the witness----
        Senator Graham. Yeah, but he's not giving an answer.
        Dr. Kagan. Well, I thought I was giving an answer.
        Senator Graham. So, here's the question. Do you support
    Congress--everybody's talking about Congress sitting on the
    sidelines. I think a North Korean missile program is designed
    to threaten the homeland. I don't think they're going to send
    somebody in space. So, if I'm willing, along with some other
    colleagues, to give the President the authority, he doesn't
    have to use it, but we're all onboard for using military force
    to stop this program from maturing. Does that make sense to
    you, given the threats we face?
        General Keane. I don't believe that North Korea is going to
    build an ICBM, weaponize it, and shoot it at the United States.
        Senator Graham. Okay. Then you wouldn't need the
    Authorization to Use Military Force.
        General Keane. Right. The reason for that is----
        Senator Graham. That's fine.
        General Keane. The reason for--Senator, the reason they
    have nuclear weapons is--one reason. To preserve the regime.
    They know, when you have nuclear weapons, we're not going to
    conduct an invasion of North Korea. South Korea is not going to
    do it, we're not going to do it.
        Senator Graham. Why are they trying to build ICBM?
        General Keane. They want to weaponize it.
        Senator Graham. Do what with it?
        General Keane. I don't----
        Dr. Kagan. Preserve their regime.
        Senator Graham. Okay. All right. So, you would be okay with
    letting them build a missile?
        Dr. Kagan. No.
        Senator Graham. Would you, General Keane?
        General Keane. They're already building a missile.
        Senator Graham. Well, would you be willing to stop them?
        General Keane. I would stop them from using it, yes.
        Senator Graham. Okay.
        General Keane. I'm not going to stop them from building it.
        Senator Graham. Assad. Final question. Do all of you agree
    that leaving Assad in power is a serious mistake?
        Dr. Kagan. Yes.
        General Keane. Yes, absolutely.
        Senator Graham. Finally, do you believe 4 percent of GDP
    [gross domestic product] should be the goal that Congress seeks
    because it's been the historical average of what we spend on
    defense since World War II.
        General Keane. Pretty close.
        Senator Graham. Thanks.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Sullivan.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to thank the witnesses for their testimony today and
    their years of service and helping the Members of Congress
    understand some of these very difficult issues.
        Dr. Kagan, your ``Of Paradise and Power'' was one of the
    most insightful books I've ever read. So--I'm not sure that's
    saying much, but--from me--but, it was a great book. So,
    thanks.
        I want to follow up on Senator Graham's questions. Also,
    Mr. Brimley, I actually really appreciated your point about
    cyber, how it, you know, can become the bright shiny object
    that every service is pursuing, and forgetting their
    comparative advantages. I think that's a really important
    point. A number of us had breakfast with the Commandant this
    morning, and that--the Marine Corps--and that came up.
        With regard to--I want to go back to North Korea. The issue
    of--you know, one of the concerns that we clearly have is that,
    within the next 2 to 3 to 4 or 5 years--and, you know, nobody's
    sure when, but it's certainly going to happen--is that they're
    going to have an intercontinental ballistic missile that's
    likely going to be able to range continental United States.
    They're already probably close to ranging my State of Alaska
    and Hawaii. The concern I have, along the lines of what Senator
    Graham was saying, is that the American people are going to
    wake up, whenever that happens, and all of a sudden it's going
    to be in the news and it's going to be wild reports and, you
    know, ``The President has to do something.'' If we know that's
    coming--and it is coming--my view is--and I'm wondering what
    your view is--that we should be doing a lot more on missile
    defense, because if--let's say he's able to get--you know,
    let's say he--he is an irrational actors, and let's say he has
    the ability to launch one or two, and we have a very robust
    missile defense. We'll be able to confidently shoot that down,
    retaliate massively, which should be really strong deterrence.
        So, can you just comment on that, but, more broadly, just
    on North Korea, all three of you? I'm really stuck by the--or
    struck by--you know, obviously, President Obama's strategic
    patience was a nice phrase, but didn't do anything. This is
    going to be a really, really big issue, maybe for this
    administration. You're already seeing the concerns we have
    here. If we know that, in 1 to 5 years, this guy, who's not
    very stable, is going to be able to range our country with an
    intercontinental ballistic nuclear missile, shouldn't we be
    doing something right now, missile defense or otherwise?
        General Keane. Well, we are doing missile defense, to a
    certain degree, as you well know.
        Senator Sullivan. Yeah, but it's not nearly as strong as
    it----
        General Keane. Some of it is in your State. I think what
    the new administration has to do is take a look at that threat
    that we're discussing, and also, you know, a rogue actor, not
    trying to destroy the United States, but firing a couple of
    missiles at the United States for some motivating reason. Is it
    appropriate that we have a capability to defend against that? A
    number of years ago, we identified Iran as a potential actor
    that could do something like that, and also North Korea. We
    began to put in place a missile defense strategy to deal with
    that. Now, we've pulled it out of Europe as a part of the
    ridiculous reset we did with the Russians, a major concession
    we made to them. I think this should be on the table with the
    new administration when they're looking at a national security
    strategy in dealing with both of those actors along this line,
    because I'm convinced the Iranians are going to get a nuclear
    weapon. Also, what North Korea has, to this day. I would--I
    agree with, I think, what you were feeding back to me, is that
    that missile defense infrastructure that we have is not
    adequate.
        Senator Sullivan. No.
        General Keane. So, let's take a look at what it would take
    to make it adequate, see what the investment strategy is, and
    see if that is a priority that we want to make. I would admit
    it is.
        Senator Sullivan. Wouldn't that buy time for the President,
    whoever that--if it's President Trump--you know, when this
    becomes the big news in 2 years, ``Oh, my goodness, he can
    range Chicago with a nuke.'' If we have a strong missile
    defense, the President's going to have some additional options
    that he might not have if we don't have anything or if we have
    a weak one, like we do now.
        Mr. Brimley. Senator, I agree. I worry deeply about the
    nature of the regime and if we see the mating of a nuclear
    capability with, say, a KN08 or one of the variants. I think
    that's deeply concerning. I think it's not just missile
    defense. It's comprehensive ISR [intelligence, surveillance,
    and reconnaissance] architecture. Frankly, it's both of those
    things forward-deployed in places like South Korea and Japan
    and other places. This gets back to the alliances-and-
    partnerships question. I mean, the--missile defense and
    forward-deployed missile defense and all the concepts and
    operations and communications that requires with allies and
    partners ought to be a focus of the next defense strategy, for
    sure.
        Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kagan?
        Dr. Kagan. Well, this is a way--my answer answers a lot of
    the things that have been raised, including this issue,
    including space, including cyber, which is that we have been
    living in a series of delusions for years that somehow all
    these countries are not going to develop every capability they
    can possibly develop. We have been holding off or slowing down
    or not moving sufficiently quickly to develop the capabilities
    to stay ahead of their capability. So, we slowed down, I think,
    dumbed down our missile defense----
        Senator Sullivan. Yeah.
        Dr. Kagan.--efforts, because we decided it was somehow a
    violation of one thing or another. That was just foolish. I
    don't know--you guys that--know better than I do--whether he
    can build an ICBM faster than we can build the missile defense
    capability necessary to deal with it. Yes, and we ought to be--
    and, by the way, that will be useful in dealing with China,
    too. I mean, I've always felt that one of the major ways to get
    the Chinese to put pressure on North Korea is for us to build
    up capabilities that have direct implications for Chinese
    strategic interests. So, a missile defense capability that we
    build up in response to Korea will also affect China's nuclear
    force. That gives them more incentive than any of these other
    efforts we've been making to try to push. So, I would say full
    speed ahead. What I don't know, as a technical matter, is, What
    does full speed ahead mean when we have been artificially
    capping what we even are trying to do?
        Senator Sullivan. Well, it means more than we're doing now.
        Dr. Kagan. Yeah.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Cruz.
        Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Good morning. Welcome. Thank you for testifying here today.
        As all of you know, our Nation faces mounting challenges.
    State actors have become increasingly belligerent in recent
    years. Radical Islamic terrorism has metastasized in the Middle
    East and spread globally. We have failed to fund and build a
    military that is designed to meet the entirety of our strategic
    commitments. I look forward to working with the incoming
    administration to ensure that the security of our country and
    the welfare of every serviceman and -woman is among the very
    highest priorities.
        General Keane, as the next administration begins the
    process of designing our national security strategy, what
    advice would you give them with respect to the prioritization
    of our resources and efforts?
        General Keane. Well, first of all, the national security
    strategy should be job one and--in putting that together. Just
    as a--it'll drive foreign policy, and it'll drive the defense
    strategy. I think the Congress should also be informed about it
    as they're going through this process, because you have much to
    contribute, particularly this committee and Foreign Relations.
        Clearly, from a priority standpoint dealing with national
    security strategy, we start with the Nation's interests, and we
    also start with the threats. We start with the threats that are
    the most significant to us. We've spent a lot of time talking
    about this already. Those threats are coming at us from the
    revisionist powers: Russia, China, and Iran. That's--certainly
    are our top priorities. We've got radical Islam, which has
    morphed into a global jihad. ISIS, most successful terrorist
    organization in history, affiliating now with 35 country--even
    though it's still losing its caliphate. The Taliban, frankly,
    have more territory in Afghanistan under their control than at
    any time since 2001. That war, under current policy, is not
    winnable. We have to deal with that issue. Particularly
    frustrating after 15 years of involvement. This is the United
    States of America. Fifteen years of involvement, and we're
    still involved in a war that we can't win. I'm not suggesting
    we pull out of it.
        Those are major issues that we have to deal with. Another
    one is cyber. We've spent a lot of time talking about cyber
    here today. Our critical infrastructure is exposed. Our
    military needs to be hardened. This capability is growing, and
    our adversaries are exploding in the use of it.
        So, those are strategies that'll eventually lead to a
    defense strategy, which this committee has to deal with. I
    would hope, when the Department comes over here to discuss
    their defense strategy, that there really is some discussion
    about it. Because, listen--look what's happened to us. Do you
    remember, a number of years ago, that we had a defense strategy
    that was built around the anchor of defeating two regional
    conflicts? Remember that thought? We moved from defeating two
    regional conflicts to something less, that I can't even define.
    I don't know what it is. To tell you how sadly this is, we are
    fighting two--we fought two insurgencies in Iraq and
    Afghanistan--low-tech insurgencies, no air force, no navy
    involved--and we could not fight those two low-tech
    insurgencies simultaneously, Senator. We could not do it. We
    fought them sequentially. That's one of the reasons why we've
    got this problem in Afghanistan, because the ground forces were
    not large enough to fight two low-tech insurgencies
    simultaneously. We used to have a strategy that we were
    resourcing at one time to fight two major conflict
    simultaneously. We have to have a discussion about what it is
    we really are trying to do, and then resource it. That has--and
    that's what we haven't been doing, and that's the point you are
    making.
        Senator Cruz. Thank you, General.
        Let me shift----
        Chairman McCain. That's----
        Senator Cruz.--to a different issue, which is the potential
    for Iranian and North Korean nuclear proliferation. This is a
    question for Dr. Kagan. What concrete policy steps would you
    recommend to prevent cooperative nuclear proliferation between
    Iran and North Korea, and to promote enforcement of sanctions
    by China?
        Dr. Kagan. I'm trying to get Chinese leverage against North
    Korea. I believe--and I was saying this to the Senator before--
    the best incentive to get Chinese to put more pressure on North
    Korea is to up our own strategic capabilities in East Asia, and
    making it clear that, for as long as North Korea continues to
    have--pose a growing threat, that means an increase in the
    American military presence along all different levels. So,
    particularly--we were just talking about missile defense. Any
    missile defense increase that we do in response to a North
    Korean potential ICBM with a nuclear weapon on it also impacts
    the Chinese nuclear force. That is an incentive for the Chinese
    to put more pressure than they're currently putting on North
    Korea right now.
        I think that, in terms of--I don't--diplomacy and
    sanctions, we can tighten sanctions, but, at this point, we
    need to put sufficient pressure on China, but it has to be
    pressure that's meaningful to them, and that's of a strategic
    nature if we're going to get any progress on dealing with North
    Korea.
        Second--other than that, we should be building up our
    missile defense capabilities much more in technologically
    advanced way and in--much faster to deal with that potential
    threat.
        As far as Iran is concerned, I don't believe we are
    ultimately going to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon.
    They are determined to get it. We can slow them down. Whether
    we are ultimately going to prevent that, I think, it's highly
    unlikely. We either have to be-- your--the options are then
    obvious, we're either going to have to contain them when they
    have a nuclear weapon or we're going to have to prevent them
    from getting it, by force. That is the--those are the--in my
    view, those are the only real alternatives that we face.
        Senator Cruz. Thank you.
        Chairman McCain. Any additional comment on that?
        General Keane. I have one. I will disagree with the Doctor,
    here. I think we--this administration, despite the nuclear deal
    that has been made--I'm not suggesting that we tube the nuclear
    deal. I do believe we have to hold them accountable and have a
    tough inspection protocol, turn all of our intelligence
    agencies on it, and the rest of it. We know they're going to
    cheat. They have, before. It was an informant that gave us the
    Fordow secret site. I believe we need a policy, an unequivocal
    policy that says we are not going to let Iran have a nuclear
    weapon, and we would use the means necessary to stop it, if
    necessary. Iran with a nuclear weapon, I think, should be
    unacceptable to us, as a matter of national security policy.
        Chairman McCain. Mr. Brimley?
        Mr. Brimley. I disagree with General Keane's comments.
        Chairman McCain. You want to elaborate on that?
        [Laughter.]
        Mr. Brimley. Well, I just think--similar to North Korea, I
    mean, I worry about--particularly with North Korea and the
    nature of the regime itself, I think--you know, at the end of
    the day, I think--as objectionable as the Iranian regime may
    be, I think that they have proven to be rational actors. They
    have a strategy that makes sense from their perspective, that--
    and we are countering it through various means. We can debate
    whether we need to do more.
        I worry more about North Korea. That's why--I mentioned the
    op-ed, I think before you got in, Senator, but that the
    Secretary of Defense Perry wrote with Dr. Carter--Dr. Ash
    Carter, who's now the Secretary of Defense, about 10 years ago,
    that argued in favor of preemptively taking out any long-range
    ballistic missile from North Korea that was mated with a
    nuclear capability. I think that debate ought to be had again,
    because that's the one scenario that I worry about probably
    more than most.
        Dr. Kagan. Could I----
        Chairman McCain. It was--go ahead, Dr. Kagan.
        Dr. Kagan. I just want to make sure I've slid myself in
    exactly where I want to be, here, because I don't like General
    Keane disagreeing with me. I'm not saying we should not be
    willing to use force to deal with Iran. I'm saying let's not
    kid ourselves that there is a middle option between containment
    and ultimately using force, because of their determination.
        The only thing that I would say, in both Iran and North
    Korea's case, is, let's also not assume that there is an easy,
    quick option, where we do a surgical strike and then it's all
    over and we can all go home. They have options, too, after that
    strike, and we--we can't walk into that unless we are willing,
    ourselves, to take next steps that may be necessary. That's the
    only--it's not what--if Senator Graham had been here, that's
    what I wanted to say to Senator Graham.
        Chairman McCain. I'll relay that to him.
        [Laughter.]
        Chairman McCain. Only a President of the United States can
    make decisions along the lines of what we are discussing, with
    or without, in some cases, the approval of Congress.
        I want to thank the witnesses. It's been extremely helpful,
    as every member who attended had commented. I thank you for
    your knowledge. I thank you for your service to the country.
    We'll be calling on you again.
        Thank you.
        This hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

                                     [all]