[Senate Hearing 114-729]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-729
FIFTEEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: THREATS TO THE HOMELAND
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 27, 2016
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
RAND PAUL, Kentucky JON TESTER, Montana
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
JONI ERNST, Iowa GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
BEN SASSE, Nebraska
Christopher R. Hixon, Staff Director
Brooke N. Ericson, Deputy Chief Counsel for Homeland Security
David S. Luckey, Director of Homeland Security
Elizabeth E. McWhorter, Professional Staff Member
Gabrielle A. Batkin, Minority Staff Director
John P. Kilvington, Minority Deputy Staff Director
Stephen R. Vina, Minority Chief Counsel for Homeland Security
Harlan C. Geer Minority Senior Professional Staff Member
Marian P. Gibson, Minority U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Detailee
Eric K. Hanson, Minority U.S. Army Detailee
Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
------
Opening statements:
Page
Senator Johnson.............................................. 1
Senator Carper............................................... 2
Senator Paul................................................. 15
Senator McCaskill............................................ 18
Senator Ayotte............................................... 21
Senator Tester............................................... 23
Senator Booker............................................... 26
Senator Baldwin.............................................. 28
Senator Portman.............................................. 30
Senator Sasse................................................ 32
Senator Ernst................................................ 35
Senator Heitkamp............................................. 37
Senator Lankford............................................. 39
Senator Peters............................................... 48
Prepared statements:
Senator Johnson.............................................. 59
Senator Carper............................................... 61
WITNESS
Tuesday, September 27, 2016
Hon. Jeh C. Johnson, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security....................................................... 5
Hon. James B. Comey, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
U.S. Department of Justice..................................... 6
Hon. Nicholas J. Rasmussen, Director, National Counterterrorism
Center, Office of the Director of National Intelligence........ 8
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Comey, Hon. James B.:
Testimony.................................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 73
Johnson, Hon. Jeh C.:
Testimony.................................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 63
Rasmussen, Hon. Nicholas J.:
Testimony.................................................... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 79
APPENDIX
Information submitted by Senator Carper.......................... 85
Information submitted by Senator Booker.......................... 88
Statement from Church World Service (CWS)........................ 89
Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record
Mr. Johnson.................................................. 90
Mr. Comey.................................................... 119
Mr. Rasmussen................................................ 122
FIFTEEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: THREATS TO THE HOMELAND
----------
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 2016
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ron Johnson,
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Johnson, Portman, Paul, Lankford, Ayotte,
Ernst, Sasse, Carper, McCaskill, Tester, Baldwin, Heitkamp,
Booker, and Peters.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JOHNSON
Chairman Johnson. Good morning. This hearing of the Senate
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (HSGAC)
will come to order.
I want to, first, thank our witnesses, Secretary Jeh
Johnson, Director James Comey, and Director Nicholas Rasmussen,
first of all, for your service to this Nation. The task you
face is not easy. I do not envy your task, but I know you all
work tirelessly trying to keep this Nation safe. And, we truly
do appreciate your efforts.
I will ask unanimous consent (UC) to have my written
statement entered into the record\1\--without objection--and I
will keep my comments pretty short, because I think we, mainly,
want to hear from you.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Senator Johnson appears in the
Appendix on page 59.
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I was in New York, yesterday, as one of the U.S.
representatives to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly.
And, I had some pretty interesting meetings with Ambassadors,
foreign ministers, and other delegations from some of our
coalition partners. I think it is fair to say, unfortunately,
the general feeling is, America has not led enough to actually
accomplish the goal that President Obama laid out 2 years ago,
which is to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).
In June of this year, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Director, John Brennan, testified before the Senate
Intelligence Committee. And, he said that, unfortunately,
despite all of our progress against the Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant (ISIL) on the battlefield and in the financial
realm--and we have made progress--``our efforts have not
reduced the group's terrorism capability and global reach.'' He
went on to say, ``They remain a formidable, resilient, and
largely cohesive enemy.'' And, Director Rasmussen, I do not
want to steal your thunder, here, but I have to point out that,
in your testimony, you, basically, confirm what Director
Brennan stated. You say, ``It is fair to say that we face more
threats, originating in more places and involving more
individuals, than we have at any time in the past 15 years.''
But, despite this progress--again, acknowledging the fact
that we have made some progress on the battlefield--it is our
judgment that ISIL's ability to carry out terrorist attacks in
Syria, Iraq, and abroad has not, to date, been significantly
diminished. And, the tempo of ISIL-linked terrorist activity is
a reminder of the group's continued global reach.
Gentlemen, you have a very difficult task: trying to defend
our homeland--trying to keep Americans safe. But, in reading
this, I just want to make the point that it has been 2 years
since President Obama laid out our goal--America's goal--toward
ISIL, which was to defeat it. Two years. It took us about 4
years to defeat Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. Defeating ISIS
on the battlefield, denying them that territory, and destroying
that caliphate is the essential first step to reducing those
threats that, largely, have not been diminished.
So, again, I thank you for coming here. I appreciate your
thoughtful testimony and I am looking forward to your answers
to our questions.
With that, I will turn it over to Senator Carper.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER
Senator Carper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just
talk--I was not planning on getting into this, but, I have a
friend, who, if you ask him how he is doing, he always says,
``Compared to what? '' Well, compared to 2 years ago. Two years
ago, ISIS was rolling through Syria and Iraq like Sherman
through Georgia. And, 2,000 fighters, from around the world,
were going to that part of the world to join up with ISIS--
2,000 a month--from the United States, it was 10 a month. Last
month, from around the world, 50 showed up. And, from the
United States, not even one. We have taken back half, or more,
of the land that they had captured from all of the Sunni
Triangle. We are moving in on Mosul, which has 2 million
people, up to the north--we will take that out next. And, it is
not just the United States. This is a coalition. We do not want
to have boots on the ground. We made a decision not to have
boots on the ground. The American people do not want that.
And, what we do is, we bring intelligence, we bring
training, we bring support, and we bring air power. And,
together, this coalition is, as we say in Delaware,
``kicking''--well, kicking something. And, we are kicking these
guys all over Iraq, and we are kicking them around in Syria. We
kicked them out of Libya. And, these guys are not 12 feet tall.
They are not 12 feet tall. And, we are taking it to them.
What is going on right now? They are losing. They are
losing on the battlefield. They are looking for other soft
targets. They are looking for other countries to go to, like
Libya. And, when they go there, we will take care of them there
as well.
So, how are we doing? This coalition is actually doing
pretty well. It took awhile to get it together and get it
rolling, but we are rolling, now.
But, Mr. Chairman, having said that, I want to thank you
for pulling us together, today, on the heels of the terrorist
attacks in Minnesota, New Jersey, and New York. Thank you for
the hard work and the dedication of law enforcement officials,
represented by the folks that are before us today. Those
attackers were identified, and they were stopped, before they
could fully carry out their plans. And, the vigilance and quick
thinking of everyday citizens likely saved many lives as well.
That, alone, serves as an important reminder that, if we see
something, we need to say something.
While the investigations into these attacks and their
specific motives are still being determined, it is clear that
these attacks were carried out by two men--two Americans, in
fact--who spent most of their lives in our country. These
attacks underscore a key fact--the fact that the greatest
threat to our homeland does not come from overseas. It does not
come from Syrian refugees or from those who travel as tourists
on the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). The greatest threat to our
country now comes from within--from American citizens and legal
residents, who have spent most of their lives in this country--
in our country. My colleagues and members of our staffs may
recall the words of renowned counterterrorism expert, Peter
Bergen, who testified right here, before this Committee, within
the past year--last November, in fact--when he said these
words: ``Every person who has been killed by a jihadi terrorist
in this country, since [the attacks on September 11, 2001] (9/
11), has been killed by an American citizen or resident.''
Think about that. Many of the attacks are being carried out
by Americans--by people who have lived, in some cases, their
entire life or much of their life here. They may have come here
as children. They grew up knowing nothing else but life in
America. Yet, some have suggested that the way to stop these
attacks is for America to ban entire groups of people from
traveling to our country. Banning entire religious groups from
entering the country will not prevent attacks from people--like
those committed by Ahmad Rahami, in New York and New Jersey, or
Dahir Aden, in Minnesota. Rahami came here at the age of 7, and
Aden came here at the age of 2. They grew up as Americans. I
believe that those who would seal America's doors to immigrants
and refugees fundamentally misunderstand how to stop these
homegrown attacks.
The reality is that stopping homegrown terrorism starts
with reaching out to local communities, building stronger
partnerships, and making the American dream accessible to all.
Fortunately, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is doing
just that with its Office of Community Partnerships (OCP). I am
proud that this Committee passed a bill, with bipartisan
support, to enhance the ability of the Department to work with
the Muslim community, and others, in order to counter the
violent messages of ISIS and other terrorist organizations.
Another important way to battle homegrown terrorism is by
neutralizing the terrorists who create the hateful propaganda
that is radicalizing our fellow Americans. That is why it is
important that we keep taking the fight to ISIS. Simply put, we
must continue to defeat and destroy these guys. And, by doing
that, we prevent ISIS from portraying itself as a winner, and
we bring to light the horrible abuses it thrusts upon innocent
people of every age, race, religion, and nationality. The 60-
nation coalition that we lead has put ISIS on the verge of
defeat in Iraq and Syria--and in Libya.
For instance, ISIS once held, as I said earlier, a body of
land in Iraq and Syria that is about the size of Austria--the
size of South Carolina. Over the past 2 years, we have taken a
big chunk of it back. We have also taken 45,000 ISIS fighters
off of the battlefield, taken out a bunch of their leadership,
and cut their funding by more than a third. And, thanks in part
to the diligent efforts of our witnesses, we have reduced,
dramatically, the number of fighters that are coming to that
part of the world.
The other thing that has not gotten much attention is that
ISIS is really good at social media. Really good. When they
were winning, they were really good at social media. When they
were not doing so well, they were doing really well on social
media. They are not doing so well on social media anymore--and
we have finally learned how to fight that battle and to win
that one as well.
I will close with this. This may be Jeh Johnson's last time
before this Committee. I just want to take a moment and thank
you for your leadership. You remember the old commercial on
Oldsmobiles: ``This is not your grandfather's Oldsmobile.''
This is not the Department of Homeland Security you took over--
you and Alejandro Mayorkas took over 3 or 4 years ago. You have
come a long way--provided great leadership and put together a
great leadership team. And, I thank my colleagues for helping
to make sure you have had that leadership team, and we have
tried to provide adequate funding. And, can you do better?
Sure, we can all do better. But, I just want to thank you and
Ali Mayorkas, especially, for your enlightened leadership.
I ask that the rest of my statement, Mr. Chairman, be made
a part of the record.\1\ Thank you.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Senator Carper appears in the
Appendix on page 61.
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Chairman Johnson. Without objection.
Earlier this month, this Nation marked a terrible day in
its history, 9/11, which was an unprecedented attack, on this
Nation, by Islamic terrorists. I would just like to have this
Committee take a moment of silence, in acknowledgment of that
terrible day.
[Moment of silence.]
Thank you.
It is the tradition of this Committee to swear in
witnesses, so if you will all rise and raise your right hand.
Do you swear the testimony you will give before this Committee
will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
so help you, God?
Secretary Johnson. I do.
Mr. Comey. I do.
Mr. Rasmussen. I do.
Chairman Johnson. Please be seated.
Our first witness is Secretary Jeh Johnson. Secretary
Johnson is the fourth Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security. Prior to leading DHS, Secretary Johnson served as
General Counsel (GC) for the Department of Defense (DOD),
General Counsel of the Department of the Air Force, and
Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York.
Secretary Johnson.
TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE JEH C. JOHNSON,\1\ SECRETARY, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Secretary Johnson. Thank you, Chairman, Senator Carper, and
Senators of this Committee. You have my prepared statement. I
will not read it. I will just say, briefly, a couple of things.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson appears in the Appendix
on page 63.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One, I have talked, repeatedly, about how we see the global
terrorist threat evolving and the threat to our homeland
evolving, from terrorist-directed attacks to a global threat
environment that now includes terrorist-inspired attacks of the
type we have seen most recently, in our homeland, where an
actor is self-radicalized, without receiving direct orders from
a terrorist organization, and has, as Senator Carper noted,
very often spent most of his life here. He can be a U.S.
citizen and he can have been born here, but he is inspired by
things that he sees on the Internet, social media, and the
like.
This makes for a more complicated and challenging homeland
security and public safety environment. I think I speak for all
three of us when I say that the prospect of the next terrorist-
inspired attack, on our homeland, is the thing that keeps us up
at night the most often.
Within the Department of Homeland Security, as you have
noted, one of the things that I have been very active in
promoting is our efforts at building community partnerships,
particularly with American Muslim communities. I think, in this
environment, it is critical that we do that to encourage them--
if you see something, say something. It can make a difference--
to build bridges, in terms of grantmaking activity, resources,
and the like.
So, this threat is challenging, and it includes not just
terrorist-inspired attacks. We now have a new category, which
we refer to as ``terrorist-enabled attacks,'' which is
something in between terrorist-directed and terrorist-inspired.
And, every once in a while, there is something we refer to as
``terrorist-validated,'' where a terrorist organization may
take credit for something after the attack. And, I am sure we
will discuss much of this, today.
As I think you know, I have been very active, lately, in
promoting the assistance that my Department can provide to
State and local election officials, when it comes to their
cybersecurity. In the run-up to the November 8th election, we
have been working with State election officials and local
election officials, to help them with their cybersecurity, when
they ask. I am pleased that 18 States have now come forward and
requested our assistance in their cybersecurity efforts.
The last thing I will say is that I am very appreciative of
the efforts of this Committee to codify much of what we have
done to move forward on my ``Unity-of-Effort'' initiatives to
build, frankly, a better Department of Homeland Security--with
fewer stovepipes as well as more efficient, effective hiring
and acquisition processes. All of you, I think, are aware of
our Joint Task Forces (JTFs) for border security, which is not
only a border security mission, but a counternarcotics mission
as well. And, I am pleased that the Committees of Congress are
seeking to codify that into law. I think that is vital for our
homeland security mission, and I appreciate the support for
much of our initiatives at management reform. I think you know
that the levels of employee satisfaction and morale improved,
significantly, this year, thanks to the efforts of our
leadership team to get out there and engage the workforce and
to show them what we can do to help them with their jobs.
And so, we are building a better, more effective, and more
efficient Department of Homeland Security. And, I appreciate
the support that we have received from this Committee.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Secretary Johnson. And, we
certainly appreciate your efforts.
Our next witness is Director James Comey. Director Comey is
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
Director Comey has also served as U.S. Attorney for the
Southern District of New York, Deputy Attorney General (AG) for
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and General Counsel for
organizations in the private sector. Director Comey.
TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE JAMES B. COMEY,\1\ DIRECTOR, FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Comey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Carper, and
Members of the Committee. It is good to be back before you,
again. I should note that this may be the last time I sit next
to my old friend Jeh, with whom I served as an Assistant U.S.
Attorney in New York many years ago. And, I will miss his
presence. I will still be here for another 7 years, Jeh. You
are welcome back.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Comey appears in the Appendix on
page 73.
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Mr. Chairman, as the Committee knows, counterterrorism
remains the FBI's top priority for good reason. What I thought
I would do this morning is just, very briefly--in addition to
the written statement, which I have submitted in advance--give
you a status report on how we think about the most prominent of
the threats we face, which comes at us through the group of
savages that calls itself ``the Islamic State.'' I thought I
would give you a status report, since we were last together, on
the three prongs of that threat.
The first prong is their effort, over the last 2 years, to
lure people--troubled souls seeking meaning--to travel to their
so-called caliphate. As Senator Carper said, the traveler
phenomenon has changed, dramatically, since last summer. It
started to go down late last summer, and it has stayed down.
Where we used to see 8 or 10 people from the United States,
trying to go to the so-called caliphate, we are now down to
one--or none--a month. That brand of the caliphate appears to
have lost some of its power to attract troubled souls to travel
there.
The second dimension of the threat--the second prong--Jeh
Johnson mentioned. And, that is, the effort--or the ability--of
the so-called ``Islamic State'' to inspire, enable, and
sometimes direct those in the United States to engage in acts
of violence. That remains at the center of the FBI's challenge
in confronting this threat. Finding those needles in the
haystack--in fact, finding those pieces of hay that might
become a needle, and figuring out how to disrupt them before
they do harm, is at the center of the FBI's life. It is very
hard work, but it is work we aspire to and believe we can do
perfectly. And, that is our goal: to do it perfectly day after
day after day.
It is a challenge, not just because of the disparate nature
of the threat, but because we increasingly are unable to see
the communications of those who have become the most
dangerous--the phenomenon that we refer to as ``going dark.''
It is a challenge we continue to try and work around, to
mitigate, and to drive a conversation about, in the United
States.
The third element of the threat is one we cannot take our
eye off of--and I assure you that people at this table and the
people we work with have not taken their eyes off of it. The
so-called caliphate will be crushed. The challenge will be
that, through the fingers of that crush, are going to come
hundreds of very dangerous people. They will not all die on the
battlefield in Syria and Iraq. There will be a terrorist
diaspora, sometime, in the next 2 to 5 years, like we have
never seen before. We must prepare ourselves and our allies,
especially in Western Europe, to confront that threat, because,
when ISIL is reduced to an insurgency and those killers flow
out, they will try to come to Western Europe and try to come
here to kill innocent people. We have to keep our eye on it and
be ready for it. And, I assure you, even though it is not
covered a lot, that work is under way every day.
The last thing I will say is that I believe very much that
we have changed, as a Nation, and the FBI has changed, as an
organization, in the last 15 years. One of the most profound
changes in our counterterrorism efforts is our jointness--the
way in which we work together--not just at the Federal level,
but at the State and local level as well. I think you saw no
better example of that than in New York and New Jersey in
recent days, where we had everybody surging to a threat and
working together in ways that, frankly, would have been
unimaginable in 2000, when there was often friction between
State and local law enforcement or between Federal authorities
across the Hudson River. No more. That is a very important way
in which we are transformed. And, it is a testament to the
quality of people doing this work. I am proud to be able to
represent them.
And so, I appreciate your support of the FBI and our work.
I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Director Comey.
Our final witness is Nicholas Rasmussen. Mr. Rasmussen is
Director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).
Director Rasmussen previously served as the Deputy Director of
NCTC, in various functions on the National Security Council
(NSC) staff, and in several key positions with the Department
of State (DOS). Director Rasmussen.
TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE NICHOLAS J. RASMUSSEN,\1\ DIRECTOR,
NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Mr. Rasmussen. Chairman Johnson, thank you very much for
including me in this conversation, this morning, on our
homeland security challenges. And, I appreciate the opportunity
also--along with Senator Carper--to discuss the terrorism
threats that concern us the most.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Rasmussen appears in the Appendix
on page 79.
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As Secretary Johnson and Director Comey have noted, we have
had great success. We have made great progress in strengthening
our homeland security capacity. And, we have made progress in
reducing that external threat from terrorist groups,
particularly that threat of a large-scale, catastrophic attack
that we faced so acutely on 9/11.
That said, recent attacks in Minnesota, New York, and New
Jersey underscore the ongoing threat we face from individuals.
This is from individuals who choose relatively simple attack
methods and are propagated by terrorist organizations. And,
having passed the 15-year mark since 9/11, it is fair to say
that the array of terrorist actors, around the globe, that we
deal with, today, is broader, wider, and deeper than at any
point since 9/11. And, that threat landscape that we face is
less predictable than at any point in our post-9/11 history.
ISIL's access to resources, in terms of both manpower and
funds, as well as the territorial control that they have
enjoyed in areas of Syria and Iraq, those are the ingredients
that we have, traditionally, looked to as being critical to a
terrorist organization's capacity to mount external attacks.
And, for that reason--and this echoes something that Senator
Carper said. For that reason, shrinking the size of territory
controlled by ISIL and denying the group access to additional
manpower--that remains a top priority. And, success in these
areas will, ultimately, be essential to our efforts to
constrain ISIL's capacity to act as a terrorist group with
global reach. And, clearly, significant progress has been made,
in these areas--in both of these dimensions.
But, despite this progress, it is our judgment that ISIL's
capacity and ability, today, to carry out attacks, in Syria,
Iraq, and abroad, has not, thus far, been significantly
diminished. And, the tempo of ISIL-linked terrorist attacks and
terrorist activity, in Europe and other places around the
globe, is a reminder of that global reach.
This external operations capability has been building and
entrenching over the past 2 years. And, we do not think that
battlefield or territorial losses, alone, will be sufficient to
completely degrade the group's terrorism capabilities--
necessary, but not sufficient.
Now, the tremendous efforts we are undertaking to counter
the ISIL threat are absolutely warranted, but I also want to
stress that we still view al-Qaeda, and the various al-Qaeda
affiliates, as a primary counterterrorism concern and a top
priority. What remains of al-Qaeda's leadership, in the
Afghanistan-Pakistan region (AfPak), still aspires to strike
the United States and to strike Western interests--although we
do not assess that al-Qaeda is capable, right now, of an attack
on the scale of 9/11. But, that al-Qaeda global network remains
dangerous and resilient. And, its affiliates in Africa, the
Middle East, and South Asia are focused on developing more
connectivity and more unity, despite the pressure they are
facing from ISIL.
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), in Yemen, and the
Nusra Front, in Syria, remain al-Qaeda's largest and highest
capacity affiliates. And, they maintain their intent to conduct
attacks in the West.
We are, particularly, concerned about al-Qaeda's safe haven
in Syria, because we know al-Qaeda is trying to strengthen its
global network by relocating some of the remaining leadership
from South Asia to Syria--taking advantage of the safe haven.
And, as you know, the Nusra Front took steps, in July of this
year, to hide its ties to al-Qaeda by changing the group's name
and publicly claiming to separate from al-Qaeda. We believe
firmly that Nusra Front's disassociation is in name only and
that the group remains part of al-Qaeda--supporting the al-
Qaeda ideology and focus on attacking the West.
Now, stepping back, there are two concerning trends in the
contemporary threat environment that I want to flag. The first,
as Director Comey mentioned, is the increasing ability of
terrorist actors to communicate with each other outside of our
reach with the use of encrypted communications. As a result,
collecting precise intelligence on terrorist intentions and the
status of specific plots is increasingly difficult.
Second, while we have seen a decrease in the frequency of
large-scale, complex plotting efforts that, sometimes, span
months or years, we are instead seeing much more rapidly
evolving threats, or plot vectors, that emerge quickly or
suddenly. And, this so-called ``flash-to-bang'' ratio--the time
between when an individual decides to attack and when an attack
actually occurs--the ``flash-to-bang'' ratio of this kind of
plotting is extremely compressed and allows very little time
for law enforcement and intelligence officials to get their
arms around a plot.
Of course, any hope of enduring security against homegrown
violent extremists (HVE) rests in our ability to counter the
appeal of terrorism and to dissuade individuals, in the first
place. To this end, NCTC continues to refine and expand our
work on the prevention side, working closely with Secretary
Johnson, his team at DHS, with Director Comey, and with our
colleagues at the Department of Justice. This is an area of
emphasis for NCTC. It is an area where we can continue to do
more countering violent extremism (CVE) and it is an area where
we have enjoyed great support from the Committee. And, I look
forward to working with the Committee on this issue in the
times ahead.
I will stop there, Mr. Chairman. And, I look forward to
your questions.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Director Rasmussen.
This is such an important hearing, that I have decided I
will let the questions go for 7 minutes. But, I am going to
warn Committee Members that I am not going to let them go a
second over that time limit. So, I will be gaveling it. If you
ask a question at the tail end, I will just ask for the answers
to be submitted as questions for the record.
Gentlemen, I think it is relatively safe to say that most
of your activities involve playing defense. Obviously, some of
the intelligence gathering can be used for offensive
capabilities, but, by and large, what you are trying to do--and
what the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and NCTC are
doing--we are playing defense.
Now, it is possible you can win a football game by playing
defense, if you get really lucky. But, if you are really going
to win the game, you have to go on offense.
Director Rasmussen, one of the things I want to talk about
is the fact that we have had 2 years where the caliphate
continues to exist. And, yes, we have reduced their territory,
but, according to your testimony and Director Brennan, we have
not reduced their capability. The diaspora has already begun.
We are poking a hive and we are doing some damage to it. But,
the killer bees are leaving the hive, and they are setting up
new hives.
Director Rasmussen, can you talk about what you know of, in
terms of the training? We have talked about inspired lone
wolves. Now, we are talking about, potentially, ISIL-directed
wolf packs--whether it is in airports in Brussels or Istanbul.
I have, certainly, heard stories of children, in the caliphate,
being trained to do savagery.
By the way, I like your description, Director Comey:
``savages'' and ``barbarians.''
So, Director Rasmussen, can you just talk about what you
know, in terms of the effectiveness of their training, both in
the caliphate and--as long as they continue to exist--using
social media? I think we just witnessed that in New York and
New Jersey as well--the pressure cooker bombs--these things
that are online. Just talk a little bit about that for me.
Mr. Rasmussen. To your question, Mr. Chairman, there was a
period, I would certainly argue, at the peak of the caliphate's
geographical expanse, when there was--certainly, a greater
share of territory was available for ISIL to conduct this kind
of recruitment and training activity. The flow of foreign
fighters, which Director Comey referred to, was at its peak
approximately a year or 18 months ago. And, at that time, we
were, certainly, concerned about the physical space that ISIL
owned and the ability of the group to use that physical space
to collect these foreign fighters to train, to deploy, to
equip, and to create this cadre of potential terrorists, who
could be deployed back out to locations around Western Europe
and, indeed, around the globe.
That is why the shrinkage of that physical caliphate has
been such a high first-order priority of our strategy to defeat
ISIL. But, we have acknowledged all along, I think--or, at
least, as an intelligence matter, felt all along that there was
going to be a lag between the time where we achieved
territorial success on the battlefield and the time at which we
could actually succeed in constraining ISIL's ability to carry
out attacks overseas. That is because much of that
infrastructure that was set into motion or put into place is
going to have to be hunted down and destroyed, systematically.
It is not simply a matter of taking territory or winning a
battle in a place like Mosul or Raqqah.
So, from an intelligence perspective, it is not that we are
at all aiming to minimize the importance of the territorial
success that the coalition has had and the shrinkage of the
caliphate--not by any means, whatsoever. In fact, destroying
the physical manifestation of the caliphate is also a pre-
condition for undermining the ISIL narrative--for getting at
and exposing the lie behind ISIL's social media outreach to try
to motivate people in the ways that Secretary Johnson and
Director Comey talked about.
So, I think of it as a timeline, where the effects we are
looking to see are, simply, going to be delayed or lag behind
the physical progress on the battlefield. It is not surprising.
It puts us in a period of sustained vulnerability that I do not
think any of us are comfortable with. But, I think it is a
reality.
Chairman Johnson. Do you not agree that a year or 2 years
from now--and if they still control territory--they still have
Raqqah--we will, probably, be making the same statement that we
have not reduced their global reach and their terrorist
capability, because they have spread--they have set up--whether
it is in Libya or some of these other affiliates? I mean, they
have to be destroyed. We cannot just nibble around the edges,
here.
Mr. Rasmussen. If we are sitting here a year from today, I
hope we are in a position to say that we have put,
considerably, more pressure on that component of ISIL that
focuses on external operations--on deploying these operatives
overseas--and that we will have done a great deal more work by
that time, a year from now, to rip apart that network and to
render it less capable.
Will we be at the end of that effort? I do not know that I
can predict that.
Chairman Johnson. To talk a little bit about the diaspora
that, I think, is already occurring--certainly, I am concerned
about the potential of ISIL operatives coming into the United
States. But, when I take a look at the level of risk--whether
it is through refugees, through the Visa Waiver Program, or
through an incredibly porous Southern border, I would say that
I am most concerned about our porous border. And, Secretary
Johnson, I just want to talk a little bit about the latest
statistics on unaccompanied alien children (UACs) and family
units.
In 2014, we held hearings--and, in the news media, we were
talking about this surge--this humanitarian crisis. In 2014,
there were 68,000 unaccompanied children that crossed the
border. So far, in 2016, we are up to 54,000. In terms of
family units, back in 2014, there were about 68,000 family
units. We are already at 68,000, with a month to go.
So, we have, certainly, gotten more efficient at
apprehending, processing, and dispersing. Let us face it. A lot
of them just turn themselves in. My concern is--because we have
not stopped the flow or reduced the flow--because we still have
enormous incentives for people to come into this country--we
have not succeeded in doing that. I am concerned about the
diversion of resources on the border--having to take care of
what remains, I think, a humanitarian crisis. Again, hats off
to your Agencies. The Agencies have gotten better at handling
it, but we have not stopped the flow. Can you just kind of talk
about the concern you have, in terms of the Southern border
being diverted--still working on these problems?
Secretary Johnson. Yes, sir. The underlying ``push
conditions'' in Central America still exist. The poverty and
the violence in Central America still exist. In fiscal year
(FY) 2015, the numbers of those apprehended on the Southern
border went down, considerably. In fiscal year 2014, the total
number was about 479,000. And, in fiscal year 2015, it was
about 331,000. My projection, for fiscal year 2016, is that we
will come in at around 407,000 to 408,000 people apprehended on
the Southern border. That is a fraction of what it used to be,
but it is still too high.
And, you are correct, Chairman, in that we have gotten
better at processing the UACs, in particular, on the front end.
We have added resources. But, the ``push factors'' still exist.
I am concerned about what we refer to as the ``special
interest alien'' that comes from the other hemisphere and who
turns up on our Southern border. We do not see this very often.
It is a very small percentage of those who are apprehended on
our Southern border--people who are coming from the Middle East
region. We, now, have in place systems to almost immediately
investigate that person, when we apprehend them. I have put in
place a working group within my Department, over the last
several months, to work with the law enforcement components of
other governments, in Central and South America, to interdict
these people--before they get to our border--and to share
intelligence about what we are seeing. The smuggling
organizations that focus on migrants from the Middle East are a
relatively limited number. And so, what we are doing--and what
I want to do more of--is focus our law enforcement efforts on
cooperating with the law enforcement agencies of Central and
South American governments, to break these organizations up.
You began your question by referring to migrants from the
other hemisphere. And, I think that that is a very legitimate
concern--and we are focused on it.
Chairman Johnson. Senator Carper.
Senator Carper. How much time do I have, Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Johnson. Seven minutes.
Senator Carper. Thank you.
I have a couple of ``yes'' or ``no'' questions, Secretary
Johnson, which I would like to ask you, if I could. Last week,
at a hearing in the House of Representatives, there was some
confusion about whether the Department's Office of Community
Partnerships is being guided by a strategy. I just want to ask:
Does the Office of Community Partnerships have a strategic
plan?
Secretary Johnson. We have a plan, though----
Senator Carper. And, my second question is: Can you present
that plan to us, say, sometime in the next week?
Secretary Johnson. I have given the Office a deadline for
giving Congress a plan. I believe that the deadline I gave them
was sometime in the month of October. So, you will have that
plan in the month of October.
Senator Carper. All right. Thank you.
Sort of following up on that, one challenge that we face,
with stopping homegrown terrorism, is that, as we hear, it is
no longer, solely, a law enforcement matter. We simply cannot
arrest our way out of this problem. Stopping homegrown attacks
means that we must focus on stopping Americans from becoming
violent extremists in the first place--and the Department of
Homeland Security's Office of Community Partnerships has taken
up the difficult task of building relationships with
communities, in order to prevent the recruitment of Americans
by terrorists. It is a new Office. It is a new Office with a
very tough job. And, with that said, we cannot put all of our
eggs in one basket.
This is a question for each of you. We will start with you,
Mr. Rasmussen. What are each of your Agencies doing to prevent
the recruitment of Americans by terrorist groups, like ISIS?
What else can and should we be doing? Everybody realizes--and I
love your analogy, Director Comey, about squeezing ISIS--and
some of these guys are slipping out through our fingers and
going to other places. But, how do we better ensure that they
are not successful, as they slip out to other places, including
the United States. And, maybe, more importantly, that they are
not successfully radicalizing--even from afar--the folks that
are here, in the United States? Please.
Mr. Rasmussen. Thank you for the question, Senator Carper.
NCTC plays two primary roles in our efforts to counter violent
extremism--and, particularly, our efforts to prevent terrorist
recruitment, particularly of American--U.S. persons. First of
all, we provide the analysis that underpins much of the
community's effort, trying to understand the process of
radicalization, the way in which individuals succumb or find
themselves vulnerable to this particular poisonous version of
extremist ideology. And so, that analytical understanding helps
inform the strategy and policy efforts that Secretary Johnson's
task force is leading, at the Department of Homeland Security.
So, there is that baseline analytical work that we are doing to
support the strategy and policy work.
Beyond that, though, I have officers from NCTC, who are
practitioners in this area and are serving on the task force at
DHS. We were happy to make our contribution--of our share of
the interagency kind of quota or tax--of officers to contribute
to this effort. I only wish we had more experts that I could
send over to Jeh's team to do more. I think this is a
capability area that we are trying to grow, inside the Federal
Government. We have some really strong expertise. But, I think
we need to build more of it--and that starts with my
Department, in the first instance.
Senator Carper. All right. Thank you so much.
Director Comey, the same question.
Mr. Comey. We have two main responsibilities, in that area.
The first, is, obviously, it is our job to try and find those
who may be headed in that direction--from consuming poison to
acting on it. So, that involves building a complex and very
productive set of relationships with communities, teachers, and
religious leaders. And then, also, in the online space, making
sure we have the sources and the undercovers in place, to see
those who might be going from consuming to violence.
Senator Carper. My sense is, we are doing a lot better in
the online space--a lot better.
Mr. Comey. We are, in one sense. We are not, in another
sense. We are making good progress, with the help of companies,
like Twitter, at chasing the ``Islamic State,'' so-called, off
of that space. The challenge is, we have chased them to a place
where they are less able to proselytize, broadly, but more able
to communicate in a secure way--chased them to applications
like Telegram. And so, our mission is to try to get into those
spaces, to see what those thugs--those savages--are talking
about, in that space. That is our primary responsibility.
But, we are also working with NCTC and DHS. We have a lot
of indicators of mobilization to violence, because we have
worked, literally, thousands of cases. And so, part of our job
is to supply our partners, in the government, the State, and
local law enforcement, as well as teachers and religious
leaders, with the indicators of someone headed in that
direction, so there can be appropriate disruption.
Those are our two responsibilities.
Senator Carper. Thank you.
Secretary Johnson, the same question. Could you talk
further about what the Department of Homeland Security is doing
to prevent the recruitment of Americans by terrorist groups,
like ISIS? And, what else can and should you be doing--maybe,
with our support?
Secretary Johnson. We have done a lot, in my judgment, to
build bridges, to certain communities in this country, through
our engagements, which include the FBI and which include local
law enforcement. In my view, where we need to do a lot more is,
not only to chase these groups off of the mainline Internet,
but also to help Muslim leaders--community leaders--build the
countermessage. And so, I would like to see a greater
partnership between community leaders and those in the
technology sector, who are willing to do this--partner to
develop that positive countermessage. It exists at some level,
but it needs much greater amplification. I think we are off to
a good start.
The other thing I will say is that I am very pleased that
Congress, for this fiscal year, gave us some grant money for
CVE. It is only $10 million, which does not go very far. We
need to do a lot more of that, in the future. We are going to
be making some grant awards, before the end of the calendar
year, with that money, but we need more of that. I think that
is a critical part of the future.
Senator Carper. When ISIS was rolling through Iraq, like
Sherman through Georgia, they were robbing banks, taking over
oil fields, and really building quite a financial presence--
quite a treasury. My understanding is that their ability to
attract money from those oil operations is greatly diminished.
We have, actually, attacked places where they were hoarding
actual cash and destroyed it.
It is one thing to defeat ISIS on the battlefield--and we
are doing that. It is another thing to engage them on social
media. It sounds like we are doing that, I think, fairly
effectively.
The other thing that is out there that we have not talked
about is: how do we undercut and take away their financial
ability--their financial resources to help fund operations
around the world--and what are doing in that regard?
Mr. Rasmussen. Senator, I think the very way you framed the
question highlighted some of the ongoing work we have
undertaken to put pressure on ISIL's ability to raise finances.
The coalition military campaign has prioritized, all along, the
effort to go after ISIL's capacity to exploit Iraq and Syria's
oil resources. That becomes a recurring business, because, in
many ways, they can reconstitute. Sites are struck. ISIL-
affiliated individuals end up with work-arounds, and then they
end up being back on the target list, because it is, literally,
an ongoing effort.
At the same time, we have also worked with the Iraqi
Government to constrain the ability--or the flow of Iraqi
Government funds into ISIL-held territories, through payment of
salaries and what-not, which the Iraqi Government was engaged
in, during some periods of the occupation of major cities.
That, again, has shrunken the amount of money available to
ISIL.
As you rightly noted, some of the sources of income that
ISIL has are now non-recurring. And so, it is a pie that will
continue to shrink, over time. But, again, one of the things we
have also learned about terrorist organizations is, it does not
always take a massive amount of money to fund the terrorist arm
of the organization. The resource-intensive bit of ISIL's
program was running the caliphate--delivering goods and
services to Iraqis and Syrians on the ground, inside of the
caliphate. The bit of business that involves deploying
operatives overseas or recruiting operatives to send overseas
is not, necessarily, the most resource-intensive part of what
they do.
Senator Carper. Thank you very much.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Carper.
Again, I want to be very respectful. I truly appreciate the
fact that we have so many Members here. I want them all to get
a chance--giving 7 minutes--so I just ask the Members and the
witnesses to watch the clock. If there is a question like
that--and both of us ran over. If there is a question at the
very end, we will just ask for the answer to be written--just
like we do written questions, after the hearing.
With that, it is Senator Paul.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAUL
Senator Paul. Thank you. One common attribute shared by
many of the recent attacks has been that they were previously
investigated by the FBI, and they were found not to be credible
threats. This would be true of the Boston bombers, the
underwear bomber, the Garland, Texas shooter, the Orlando
killer, and the most recent New York bomber.
We are all fallible, and I am not here to say, ``Gosh, the
FBI is terrible, because it missed these things.'' But, I am
also troubled that the FBI is unwilling to even admit that they
may have made some mistakes. Every time these come up, what I
hear from the FBI is, ``Oh, no, we made no mistakes. We did
exactly what we should have. And, our conclusion was right,
given the information.'' Well, these are judgment calls, and
the judgment calls were incorrect. And so, I think we should at
least admit that, and then look at some of the facts.
I am also troubled that the FBI continues to ask for more
power, instead of saying, ``Well, maybe, we could use our
current powers more efficiently and effectively.'' And, I will
give you, I guess, an example.
Omar Mateen, the Orlando killer, was investigated for a
couple years--say we cannot find enough information. Internal
policies caused you to end the investigation. There was no law
saying that you had to stop it. Maybe, we should talk about
whether or not the FBI's policy should change--about how long
you keep an investigation open.
Mateen goes into a gun store. The gun store owner calls
you. The FBI shows up. FBI does not get the security footage.
Well, I mean, local policemen, in my hometown, know to get the
security footage. Everybody does it. That is the first thing
you do in any kind of potential crime scene.
Could we not have taken the security footage, matched it
with, let us say, how many terrorists live within--terrorist
suspects live within 50 miles of that gun store? I do not think
we are talking about thousands of people. We might be talking
about 20 people. Could we not then present a list and pictures
of the 20 people that we have, as suspects, to the gun store
owner? Could we not try to match them with the security
footage?
We went back for the security footage weeks later, and it
had already been erased. Let us admit these were mistakes. I am
not even saying that we should hang somebody out to dry. Let us
just admit that we are not perfect and we made mistakes, here,
because, if we do not admit to mistakes, we are not going to
get better.
So, one concern is the length of the investigation. Should
we have longer investigations? Are you changing any policy? Or,
are you going to tell us, ``We made no mistakes, and it is just
one of those things? ''
And, with regard to opening investigations, I have asked,
repeatedly: Why did you not get a warrant? Why did you not do
this? Why are you closing the investigation? And, I hear and
read that the FBI's own internal rules say that you have to
have probable cause to open an investigation. Well, that sounds
to me above and beyond the Constitution. And, I am a stickler
for privacy and probable cause. But, to investigate something
does not--I would not think it requires probable cause to open
an investigation.
So, I think you have all kinds of tools that, maybe, we are
not using, adequately. And yet, there seems to be a great deal
of lobbying, by the FBI, for new powers: for getting new third-
party data, for getting new meta data, for new rules on
encryption, for banning technology, and for trying to get
involved with technology, when, in reality, I think we need to
admit, maybe, there are some problems in our current
investigation practices--also acknowledging that we are
fallible and that we all make mistakes--and that you cannot be
perfect and things will slip through. But, I think to say,
``Well, we said these people were not credible threats, but we
did not make a mistake. They just were not''--well, they were
credible threats, repeatedly. And, when a parent says, ``My son
is a terrorist''--as a parent, I can tell you that is a pretty
hard thing to do--that, maybe, we should try a little harder.
The most recent guy was in jail, and they said, ``Well, we did
not investigate him. He was in jail.'' Well, we never even
prosecuted him, which is a whole other criminal justice issue.
You do not get prosecuted for stabbing your brother. But, the
thing is, if he had a lawyer at the time, you should have at
least requested--maybe the lawyer says, ``You cannot talk to my
client,'' but someone should have asked. He gets out of jail
after 3 months. He is never prosecuted. Nobody ever follows up.
I think there is a lot of public information you could have
looked at. I think there is no reason why you could not open an
investigation. And, the standards get much lower when the
investigations are opened. The standard for the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA) warrant is not probable
cause. It is: ``relevant to an investigation.'' We can argue
about that standard, but that is the current standard. I just
do not think we are, necessarily, using our tools adequately.
And, I think it is important to admit when we make mistakes, so
we can improve our technique. And, I guess, my question to
Director Comey is: Is it your position that no mistakes were
made, in each of these instances, in judging them not to be
credible threats? Would you not have done more to address the
situation in the gun store that Mateen went into 6 weeks before
the shooting? Would you not have done more--when Rahami was
arrested--to question him, because his dad said that he was a
terrorist?
Mr. Comey. Thank you, Senator. Sitting before you is a
deeply flawed and fallible human being, who believes very
strongly in admitting mistakes when they are made. I hope you
saw the very painful moment, when I admitted, publicly, we made
a mistake in allowing Charleston, South Carolina shooter,
Dylann Roof, to get a gun. So, as long as I am Director of the
FBI, we will stare back, very carefully, at what we do. And,
where we make mistakes, we will admit them. We will be
transparent, and we will get better.
As you know, I hope, I commissioned a lookback at our
investigation of the Orlando killer, which is just being
completed, now. And, the Inspector General (IG) is going to do
another one, which is great, because, if there is learning
there, we are going to squeeze it for all of the learning we
can get--and get better.
Senator Paul. But, what is your opinion on the gun store?
Should we have done more on the gun store?
Mr. Comey. Your facts are wrong there.
Senator Paul. Excuse me?
Mr. Comey. Your facts are wrong there. The gun owner did
not call us contemporaneously. When we were contacted and went
back to the store, it was in the weeks afterward, and so the
video was not available.
Your facts are also wrong, with respect to what the bomber
in New York--who is still alive, and is going to have a trial,
I hope, and be sentenced to jail for the rest of his life--so I
want to be careful what I say. Your facts are wrong about what
his father told the FBI. But, there, as well, we will go back
and scrub our prior contact with that matter very carefully--
and maybe the Inspector General will as well--which would be
great as well. And, if there is the potential for learning, we
will learn from it. We are not perfect people. We aspire to be
perfect, because we think that is what the American people have
a right to expect. But, you will find us being very candid
about our shortcomings and our strengths.
Senator Paul. With regard to length of investigations and
your internal policy on having probable cause to open
investigations?
Mr. Comey. That is just wrong as well. We do not need a
probable cause to get a search warrant or to get a wiretap.
And, I want to correct something else that you said. You need
probable cause to get a FISA warrant from a FISA judge. To open
our investigations, the threshold is much lower. We open
assessments based on just tips. Then, we open preliminary
investigations and full investigations on much lower
thresholds, because you investigate to see if there is probable
cause.
Senator Paul. So, should we keep our investigations open
longer?
Mr. Comey. We should keep them open as long as the facts
warrant keeping them open--and there is no restriction. As you
saw, in Orlando, that preliminary is, normally, set for 6
months. It can be extended another 6 months, and another 6
months, and another 6 months. We have the policies and the
tools, by and large, that we need to do this well, which is why
we need to look back at each case and say, ``So what did we do?
Who did we interview? What documents did we get? And, how could
we do this better?''
Senator Paul. But, that would be the judgment call. Should
we keep them open longer?
Mr. Comey. Sure, and that judgment has to be made, every
day, by professional agents, with the review of their
supervisors.
Chairman Johnson. Senator McCaskill.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCASKILL
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all
for being here.
I will have a number of questions for the record about
bioterrorism funding and BioWatch as well as retaliation in the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA). I am very
concerned about those issues, especially, since Admiral
Neffenger said that there had been no actions taken, in regards
to the TSA whistleblower retaliations--and that does not match
what has been reported publicly--and I am trying to figure out
what the facts are.
I want to spend a few minutes talking about prevention,
Director Rasmussen. Prevention is really hard. As somebody who
has spent a lot of time in law enforcement, I know it is hard
to quantify when you are successful and it is incredibly hard
to do it on a performance basis, knowing what is working and
what is not. But, I think all of the experts agree that one of
the key foundations to the prevention of the radicalization of
lone wolves in this country is, in fact, having cooperation and
working relationships with the American Muslim community. Would
you agree with that assessment, Director Rasmussen?
Mr. Rasmussen. Absolutely. And, that is why, what I alluded
to, in my response to Senator Carper's question, is that the
officers I have that are working alongside Jeh Johnson's
professionals, in this area, are doing exactly that. They are
practitioners, out engaging with Muslim communities around the
country, to exactly the ends that you described.
Senator McCaskill. So, the vilification of the Muslim
community, in this country, is very counterproductive to the
most essential piece of our prevention efforts to combat the
biggest threat we face, which is the radicalization of lone
wolves--which is akin to looking for the veritable needle in a
haystack. Correct?
Mr. Rasmussen. Again, to reiterate, there is no question
that we need a cooperative, engaged, and productive partnership
with Muslim communities--not just with Muslim communities, but
with communities at large, as we deal with the challenge of
lone wolves.
Senator McCaskill. In that light, Director Comey, we have
had a number of arsons at mosques across the country. Is there
an effort that is beyond--I was an arson prosecutor a long
time, so I know about the great work of the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). I know about the
capabilities we have now, in terms of the technical ability to
determine arson. Are you comfortable that all of the resources
of the law enforcement community and the Federal Government are
being used in a display to the good, patriotic American
Muslims, whose places of worship are being burned out of the
misplaced prejudice and vilification of a certain religion?
Mr. Comey. I am.
Senator McCaskill. And, is there a cooperative effort
between both the FBI and the ATF as well as local law
enforcement, in that regard?
Mr. Comey. Yes.
Senator McCaskill. Is there a team approach?
Mr. Comey. Yes, we work very well together on those cases
and many others.
Senator McCaskill. Secretary Johnson, when someone, who is
on the ``terror watchlist'' and who believes that they are on
the ``terror watchlist'' erroneously, tries to buy an airline
ticket, do they have to, sometimes, miss their flight?
Secretary Johnson. I can imagine that happening. Yes, very
definitely, ma'am.
Senator McCaskill. So, it might be that they have to go
someplace very important, and they are not allowed to get on an
airplane. Correct?
Secretary Johnson. Correct.
Senator McCaskill. But, there is a process that they can
then use to get a review of their being on the list. Correct?
Secretary Johnson. There is an adjudication process to get
off of the list, yes.
Senator McCaskill. And, approximately how long does that
adjudication process take, on average?
Secretary Johnson. For the overwhelming majority of cases,
where it is a matter of mistaken identity, it is pretty quick.
I think it is just a matter of days or weeks.
Senator McCaskill. But, in the meantime, they have been
inconvenienced.
Secretary Johnson. Very definitely, yes.
Senator McCaskill. And, if we had the same process for
someone buying a gun, they would be inconvenienced, but, rather
than missing a flight to an important meeting or to the funeral
of a loved one, they would be missing out on owning a gun for 2
weeks?
Secretary Johnson. Correct.
Senator McCaskill. And, is there any reason that we cannot
put into the process a way to add those people to a database
that would flag, at the point of purchase, anybody who is on
that list--in terms of them being inconvenienced--by delaying
their purchase for a few weeks? Is there any reason, either
Secretary Johnson or Director Comey----
Secretary Johnson. Senator, in my judgment--consistent with
the Second Amendment and consistent with a responsible gun
owner's right to own a gun, we should give the Attorney General
added discretion to deny a gun purchase to somebody who meets
certain parameters, similar to the parameters for the ``no-fly
list'' or the ``terrorist watchlist.'' So, the answer to your
question is yes, in my judgment. As a matter of homeland
security, I think this is something we need to do.
Senator McCaskill. Do you think that would be more
effective? I mean, I think, after the fact, it is very easy to
say that we should start grabbing surveillance tapes in gun
shops. Can you imagine the hue and cry if we started grabbing
surveillance tapes in gun shops without having probable cause
of a crime being committed? I mean, you think the National
Rifle Association (NRA) is up in arms about wanting to make
sure that we do not inconvenience anyone that is on the
``terrorist no-fly list'' for a couple of weeks. Can you
imagine what the reaction would be, if we started,
unilaterally, seizing purchase videos in gun shops? I mean, do
you think, Director Comey, that is something that the FBI would
even be comfortable doing without probable cause or without
some reason to believe a crime has been committed?
Mr. Comey. We do not seize anything, except pursuant to
law. So, we would not be comfortable in doing anything outside
of that construct.
Senator McCaskill. So, I guess the purpose of this line of
questioning is, I do not get why we are having a long hearing
on the danger of terrorists, in this country, when we cannot
even take the baby step of saying that someone, who is going to
be inconvenienced by missing a flight, cannot have the same
inconvenience for buying an AR-15, which can kill a number of
people in a short period of time--even when that person is on
the same list. It is, I think, frankly astounding to me. And, I
was really pleased to see, last night, that both Presidential
candidates agree. So, I am hopeful that the people, who have
refused to vote for this, in this body and on this Committee,
will take another look at it. Because, I think, we can pound
our chests about how long you are investigating people or
second-guessing the factual determination that goes into
probable cause as well as argue for seizing the videos of gun
shops. But, I just do not know how we can, with a straight
face, say that we are serious about this, without taking that
important step.
I will say that I was in Jordan, looking at the screening
procedures. I know that both of you were involved in your
Agencies, Director Rasmussen and Director Comey, and I was
astounded at how detailed the screening interviews and
processes were, on the ground, in Syria. And, I was much more
comfortable about that than the Visa Waiver Program. And, I
made it. Look. I made it.
Chairman Johnson. I certainly appreciate that.
Senator McCaskill. You did not even have to yell at me.
Chairman Johnson. I appreciate it. I will say that the
answer to your question is, because terrorists kill people with
knives, homemade bombs, and trucks. That is why. Senator
Ayotte.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AYOTTE
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Chairman. I want to thank all of
you for your service to the country.
Director Comey, I wanted to follow up on one of Senator
Paul's questions, and start with this, in terms of the Mateen
situation, in Orlando. I understand that he was interviewed
twice by the FBI, and then the inquiry was closed. Is that
true?
Mr. Comey. Yes. He was interviewed twice during a 10-month
or 11-month investigation. Then, the preliminary was closed.
Senator Ayotte. So, in that investigation, was there any
work done to see what he was doing online? In other words, you
interviewed him in person. Was there anything looked at, to see
what he was doing online?
Mr. Comey. As I understand it today, there were no search
warrants for the content of any of his devices or for the
content of his held by a service provider.
Senator Ayotte. I guess my question is, there is even work
you can do without a search warrant--just publicly. Was
anything done to see whether he was saying anything online--or
doing anything--without going and getting a search warrant, at
that point?
Mr. Comey. In public? Like public postings on social media?
Senator Ayotte. Public space. Did the FBI do anything?
Mr. Comey. I do not know the answer. I do not think so, at
this point.
Senator Ayotte. OK. So, one of the things that--as I
understand, too, from what I have heard, in prior briefings--
that was not done. And, as I look at the situation, one thing
that I would assume that we would do, in every investigation--
even before we got to the level of looking for content--is to
see if there is anything, in the publicly available space, that
individuals you are following up on may be saying about
terrorism--about any extreme figures. Would you agree that that
would be a natural step, in an investigation?
Mr. Comey. Maybe. And, maybe, that is one of the things we
learned from our lookback. It would depend upon the
investigation. This one had two sources, who were speaking to
him, including taping conversations with him. So, I think the
case agent thought they had a pretty good vector into his state
of mind.
Senator Ayotte. Well, I guess my question goes to whether
there are lessons learned and whether everything was done well,
in Orlando. This one seems obvious to me--that, when you have
an individual, who has made some extreme statements--you are
interviewing them--we know also that you tried to verify,
through secondary means. But, it just seems surprising to me
that there was not some kind of online work done, for something
so significant. So, that, to me, is of deep concern. I hope you
will give us a report of exactly what was done--or not done--in
that instance.
One of the things that I know is important to the FBI--
because you have testified before other Committees--is wanting
the authority--what is called the electronic communications
transactional records (ECTR) fix. Can you explain the
significance of that, to this Committee--and why it is
important? Because, having been a prosecutor before this, I can
assure you that, in your basic child pornography case--Internet
predator case, I was able to get these types of records. And,
tell us how you are being limited, right now--and why you need
us to fix it.
Mr. Comey. Sure. For many years, we were able to issue
national security letters (NSL), which were issued in our
national security, counterintelligence, or counterterrorism
cases for telephonic transaction records and Internet
transactions records--not the content of people's calls or
their emails, but the Internet Protocol (IP) addresses involved
and who they communicated with on the Internet and by
telephone.
Several years ago, lawyers for some Internet service
providers started to interpret the statute to say that, if you
read the language, it actually--through what I think was a
mistake--should not allow you to use a NSL to get transaction
records on the Internet, where you can get them on telephone,
and interpreted that way. The fix that we think--because we
think Congress intended to allow us to use NSLs in both
circumstances--is needed is to allow us to get non-content for
telephone transaction records and Internet transaction records.
Senator Ayotte. And, you would agree that this is a very
common tool in criminal cases--just average criminal cases--
where you are not getting content, but you are, actually, in
many instances, issuing a subpoena to get the basic electronic
records. And, it seems absurd to me that we cannot make that
basic fix that only failed the Senate by one vote. So, I hope
we can get you that authority.
I wanted to also follow up on the most recent case, where
Mr. Rahami has been arrested. And, in that instance--I know
Senator Paul had asked you about that, but one thing is--what
the public reports of what is out there. It is my understanding
that he was actually flagged by the Department of Homeland
Security after he arrived back from Pakistan--and notified by
the National Targeting Center (NTC), based on when he was
stopped at the airport. And, the National Targeting Center, as
I understand it, is under the Department of Homeland Security,
specifically, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). And, as
a result of that, that information was passed on to the FBI.
Later, in August 2014, Mr. Rahami's father makes some type
of report of some connection to terrorism. And, at that point,
that was also provided to the FBI. So, the reports are that he
was never interviewed there.
So, what I think we are trying to understand is, these are
basic steps that, when you have someone traveling to Quetta,
Pakistan--even if they have family members there--we know that
is a hub of terrorism and a very dangerous place. And, that
flag--and that travel history, combined, later, with a report,
where a family member may have reported a potential tie with
terrorism--and yet, there was not an in-person interview.
So, can you help us understand? Do you have enough people?
Is there some reason why he would not be interviewed? And, what
are the things we need to learn from this? Because, obviously,
we want to prevent it, in the first place. But, when something
like this comes through your doors, we want to make sure it is
followed up on, so that we can do all we can, with local law
enforcement, to stop these things before they start.
Mr. Comey. Thank you, Senator. I will, at some point, want
to have that conversation. I do not want to have it, now, for
two reasons.
First, this is an active investigation. This guy is alive
and entitled to a fair trial. And, I do not want to do anything
that gives him an opportunity to claim we deprived him of that
right.
And, second, I do not know yet. We are going to go back and
look, very carefully, at the way we encountered him. And, we
will find the appropriate forum to be transparent about what we
did well, what we could have done better, and what we have
learned from it. We have not done that work yet, because we are
doing an active investigation. So, I do not want to comment in
this forum, beyond that, right now.
Senator Ayotte. Well, I appreciate that. But, I think this
is a really important question for all of us. First, do you
need different legal authorities? Second, do you need more
agents? Third, was it a case of something being missed, that
this individual was not interviewed, despite these flags? If we
look at the Orlando situation and if we go back to the Boston
Marathon bombers, Tsarnaev brothers--each one of them--putting
them together--what more do we need to do? What are the lessons
learned? And, if you need additional support, we need to know
about it very quickly.
Thank you.
Chairman Johnson. Senator Tester.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TESTER
Senator Tester. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
each one of you for being here, today. And, thank you for the
work you do. And, a special thank you to you, Jeh, since this
is your last time in front of this Committee.
Jeh, you brought up support for State governments on
election tampering. Could you give me an idea on how prevalent
this is by foreign governments?
Secretary Johnson. We are seeing a limited number of
instances, where there have been efforts, through cyber
intrusions, to get into the online presence of various State
election agencies. And, one or two of them have been
successful--others have not. But, more broadly, just in the
general environment, Senator, that we are in, where we have an
increasing level of sophistication with nation-state actors,
``hactivists,'' and so forth, we have been out there saying to
State election officials, ``If you need help, just ask us for
it.''
Senator Tester. So, they are getting into the databases and
changing the votes? That is what they are doing?
Secretary Johnson. No. No, that is not it. The matters are
under active investigation. I think there is a limited amount
we can say.
Senator Tester. OK.
Secretary Johnson. But, what we are seeing are efforts to
get into voter registration rolls and get the identity of
registered voters--things of that nature--not to change a
ballot count.
Senator Tester. OK. And, change votes----
Secretary Johnson. Not to change votes, no.
Senator Tester. No, but to change it, so a person, who
would normally be registered, would not be registered, then? Is
that what we are talking about? Or, to register people who are
not registered?
Secretary Johnson. I cannot say that.
Senator Tester. OK.
Secretary Johnson. No, I cannot say that.
Senator Tester. Alright. And, is this coming from one
particular country?
Secretary Johnson. I do not believe that we have reached a
determination of that nature, to that extent.
Senator Tester. OK. We talk about the Southern border a
lot. I always talk about the Northern border.
Secretary Johnson. Yes, you do.
Senator Tester. And, I want to talk about that, for a
second, in the arena of communications. We have been told, by
folks who work under you, on the ground, on the Northern
border, that there are gaps in communication on the Northern
border. Are you aware of those gaps? First, are you aware of
those gaps in communication? Do they exist?
Secretary Johnson. It is something that I have heard about,
and I know you have an interest in this. Frankly, I would not
be surprised if there were some level of gaps in communication
that should not exist.
Senator Tester. Right. And, I guess the next question is,
then: If you do have gaps--which is not unreasonable, but it is
something we need to work on, though, to get it fixed--do you
have work-arounds on those gaps, through local law enforcement,
highway patrol, or municipal sheriff departments--whatever it
might be?
Secretary Johnson. I would have to get back to you on that,
Senator.
Senator Tester. Could you check on that? Because I think
that that is--if we have dead zones on the Northern border,
that is a particular problem and a concern that, quite frankly,
is pretty basic. And, if you could find out and just let me
know, that would be great.
Secretary Johnson. Sure.
Senator Tester. I want to talk a little bit--since this is
your last meeting, Jeh--about DHS. DHS is a behemoth of an
Agency. It is massive, and you have done a masterful job, in
your job, there. I think you report to a number of Committees.
I think, maybe, 119 Congressional Committees and
Subcommittees--119.
Secretary Johnson. Depending on how you count, yes, sir.
[Laughter.]
Senator Tester. Yes. Well, I count in base 7, so there may
be less than that. Or, there may be more.
Secretary Johnson. I love Congress.
Senator Tester. Do you have any ideas--I mean, I cannot
imagine--first, from an accountability standpoint, it does not
make much sense to me, because, how can this work? And, second,
do you have any actions that you think Congress could do, on
your way out, that would make you all more accountable and,
quite frankly, more functional?
Secretary Johnson. Well, first, we have, actually--
notwithstanding the number of Committees and Subcommittees--we
have actually reduced the amount of time it takes to respond to
a Congressional inquiry, pretty significantly, since I have
been Secretary. And, we do spend a lot of time responding to
requests. I will say that I read every letter from a Member of
Congress that comes in. About half of them are from the same
two people. No names mentioned, here.
Senator Sasse. You are welcome.
Chairman Johnson. It is called oversight.
Secretary Johnson. You are not one of the two. No, sir.
[Laughter.]
The real problem with having so many Committees--being
divvied up among so many Committees, it is very tough to get
any kind of comprehensive authorization of our activities
through Congress. That is the real substantive problem with
having so many Committees of oversight.
Senator Tester. Is there a solution to that? Should we just
give it to this one and be done with it?
Secretary Johnson. I would say--look, in a perfect world, I
would say that there should be one oversight Committee for
authorization and one Committee for appropriations--just like
in my Department of Defense days. We had the Senate Armed
Services Committee (SASC) and we had the Senate Appropriations
Committee--and that was it. And, if I appeared before any other
Committee, I got in big trouble.
Senator Tester. OK. And, this is for both you and for Jim
Comey. Canada has changed its policy for Mexicans traveling up
to Canada. And, there is not much we can do about that. It is
between those two countries. But, this policy--and I think I
sent you a letter on it. In fact, I know I sent you a letter on
it. And, I think you responded to it, and I appreciate that you
read it. Has this changed our posture at all toward the
Northern border, because of the potential appearance of
loosening travel restrictions?
Secretary Johnson. It depends on how they arrive into
Canada. If it is by air, that is one thing. If it is on land,
that is another.
I will say that we are building information-sharing
agreements with the Government of Canada, so that we have a
better sense for who is coming and going across our border into
Canada. And, I think we need to keep moving in that direction.
Senator Tester. OK. The last thing, because it has been
claimed here a couple times--do you see yourselves as only
playing defense?
Secretary Johnson. That is an interesting question. When I
was at DOD, signing off on a lot of targeted lethal force, as
consistent with law, I suppose I was on offense. I think it is
inherent, in the DHS mission, that we are on defense. But, I
think it is also incumbent upon us to have an affirmative
agenda for improving our mission and for how we do business.
So, I have tried to do both.
Senator Tester. Thank you all.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Johnson. Senator Booker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BOOKER
Senator Booker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First and foremost, I just want to thank you all for your
work. It is incredible, the dedication you all have. You are
truly patriots to our country. And, obviously, what we all
witnessed happening, in New Jersey and New York this past week,
is a further affirmation of the quality of your commitment to
the security of our homeland. And, I appreciate you saying
earlier, Director Comey and Secretary Johnson, that this is a
multiple-level commitment from local authorities as well as
from State and Federal authorities, because, what we saw, the
commitment amongst the Linden, New Jersey police officers, for
example, who, literally, took fire from a terrorist--saved
lives--I reached out to the two gentlemen last week. And, there
is truly heroic work being done at every level of our
government.
Secretary Johnson, I have been very concerned and focused
on issues of rail security. It is something that I feel we are
not doing enough about, especially given the Northeast
corridor. More people travel along the Northeast corridor, by
rail, than they do on air travel. We have seen that the pipe
bombs found in the Elizabeth, New Jersey train station were
near Amtrak--New Jersey Transit, where millions of people ride,
in the State of New Jersey.
In 2007, Congress actually passed legislation requiring
that TSA and other Agencies implement a number of
recommendations that came out of the (9/11 Commission). Among
them were several requirements for TSA to issue regulations
that would provide direction to public transportation agencies,
railroads, and bus companies on security training for frontline
transportation workers.
Since the passage of the legislation, there have been
several critical events, from the Brussels metro bombing to,
more recently--again, what we saw in New York and New Jersey--
near train stations. And, if you look at it from a larger
perspective, since 2001, there have been more than 1,900
attacks that have been carried out against transit systems,
globally--resulting in thousands of deaths--about 4,000--and
14,000 injuries.
However, TSA, currently, has less than 800 full-time
employees dedicated to protecting surface transportation
assets, which is less than 2 percent of the Agency's workforce.
If you just look at the proportion of what we are applying to
air travel compared to surface travel, you see it is almost as
if we are still fighting the 9/11 efforts and not really
looking forward to what the attacks are that we are seeing,
consistently, around the globe, today.
I have been discussing this, with TSA status--have been
writing letters about it. I hope I am not in your top two, but
I definitely have been pushing this for some time. And,
frankly, it is just becoming very frustrating to me.
And so, I just want to ask very specifically: Can you
please provide me with a very specific timeline on when TSA is
going to finish its work on the 9/11 Commission's
recommendations, Secretary Johnson?
Secretary Johnson. Yes, we can get you that timeline.
Beyond that, I will say that I am also a regular user of
the Northeast corridor and of New Jersey Transit. And so, I am
very familiar with rail security. Frankly, I believe that TSA's
principal focus should continue to be aviation security, given
the threat streams that we all see. That needs to be their
number one priority. They do have the rail security mission as
well, but, as you know, Senator, we have Amtrak police and New
Jersey Transit police to support that mission as well. But, I
would like to see us continue to develop that aspect of TSA's
mission, so that we are in a better place.
Senator Booker. I appreciate that, and I appreciate your
commitment to get me a timeline. This is an issue of
proportionality--2 percent going to surface transparency and
90-plus percent going to aviation. At least in terms of
proportionality, does it seem a little out of whack?
Secretary Johnson. I would want to think about that a
little bit more. Again, when it comes to rail security, we have
other security forces out there supporting the mission. So, I
would want to think about whether that is the right ratio or
not. I continue to be concerned about aviation and airport
security--and I believe that needs to be TSA's principal focus.
Senator Booker. And, I am not arguing with that. Again, I
look forward to getting the timeline.
And, just really quickly, Director Rasmussen and Director
Comey, do you believe that Rahami was part of a cell of other
terrorists that were planning attacks?
Mr. Comey. That investigation, as I said earlier, is open.
We see, so far, no indication of a larger cell or the threat of
related attacks.
Senator Booker. And, it is interesting that you are seeing
a spiking of violent extremism happening. Secretary Johnson--I
appreciated his talk about the terrorist diaspora, like has
never been seen before, as we win on the ground--continue to
win on the ground in Syria and Iraq. Can you give me sort of
more of an idea of why you think there is a spike going on?
And, what are some of the root causes of this?
Mr. Comey. For me, Senator?
Senator Booker. Yes--either one.
Mr. Comey. Well, at least what I was talking about, in
terms of the terrorist diaspora, is, we know thousands--tens of
thousands, by some measures--of fighters have flocked to the
so-called caliphate. Many have died in battle there--and many
more will die, as the caliphate is crushed. What I am talking
about is the future that we have to focus on----
Senator Booker. So, can you just hone in on 2015. There has
been a spike, right? And so, this is not, necessarily, a result
of the gains that we are making in Syria and Iraq. Do you have
another understanding of why we are seeing a spike in 2015,
and, seemingly, in 2016 as well?
Mr. Comey. Well, we saw a spike, in the United States, of
people moving toward violence, because ISIL started investing
in their social media campaign, in 2014. It paid dividends,
starting in the spring of 2015, where troubled souls started to
flock to it, electronically--and be motivated to move to
violence. We have made progress against that--against locking
those people up--and disrupting some of that narrative. And so,
the numbers have come down, slightly.
Senator Booker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Johnson. Senator Baldwin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BALDWIN
Senator Baldwin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I also want to explore the--well, first of all, thank you
for being here--appearing today--and for your work. I want to
continue to explore what you talked about, Director Comey, with
regard to sort of the impending terrorist diaspora, when the
caliphate is crushed. In your testimony before us this morning,
you talked about the fact that this is not an often-looked-at
area, but that work is under way--and you assured us of that.
I guess I would ask you and Director Rasmussen about, sort
of what your early estimates are, of what that is going to look
like, globally, and sort of the ``where, when, and who.'' I
understand the things that are dependent--that we have to know,
first, when we consider action on the ground to be concluded.
But, I would like to hear what your early estimates are.
And then, what sort of strategic changes we should look toward,
domestically. What is going to be the impact of that diaspora,
domestically? What sort of policy and resource implications
does that have?
So, realizing that we are not in a classified setting, tell
us what you can about that work under way.
Mr. Comey. Certainly, Senator. And then, Nick will both
check me, and probably make the answer more thoughtful. But, I
will take the first shot.
Certainly, at least hundreds of fighters are not going to
die in the coming crushing of the caliphate. The caliphate, as
Nick Rasmussen has said and as Secretary Johnson has said, has
been steadily losing territory. There is going to come a point,
where it is going to be, essentially, crushed. I do not know
exactly how to estimate that, over the next couple of years.
Through the fingers of that crush are going to come some very
bad people--a much larger diaspora than we saw, for example,
out of Afghanistan after the mujahideen--the conflict with the
Soviets that ended in the late 1980s.
And so, the most important way to prepare for that is to
knit ourselves together, especially with our European
colleagues, because most of that flow is going to go up into
Europe, from which it came. And so, there is a tremendous
amount of work under way, including by the FBI, in making sure
people are taking advantage of the data we have gathered, both
in our Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) and in our
investigations--and connecting themselves to us and, maybe,
most importantly, getting our European colleagues to learn the
lessons we learned, after 3,000 people were murdered in our
country, 15 years ago--where we broke down the barriers and
knitted ourselves together.
Our European Union (EU) colleagues must do that--and
connect themselves to us and our information better, so that we
can spot and disrupt that flow when it comes.
Senator Baldwin. I know my time is going to be very
limited. What I will want to get to, fairly quickly, is the
domestic implications and the planning under way for how we
pivot, from looking for that needle in the haystack--the lone
wolf--the radicalized person, to those who may gain access to
the United States in this diaspora--maybe, well identified in
advance. So, if you could----
Mr. Comey. I will do 30 more seconds. Then, I will let
Director Rasmussen follow up.
In a sense, that is the threat we have been preparing for
since 9/11: the external flow of terrorists looking to come
into our country. That is where we have made such tremendous
progress. So, to my mind, it is simply about continuing to do
what we have done well, and finding ways to improve that. But,
really, the central part of that mission is getting our
partners, outside of the United States, to learn the lessons
and to travel the journey we have traveled, in 15 years--and do
it much more quickly. Nick.
Mr. Rasmussen. I just have a couple of points to amplify
the Director's comments, because I think what he is pointing to
is exactly right. What we have succeeded in doing, across both
Administrations, over the last 15 years, is creating an end-to-
end watchlisting system that allows us to have confidence that,
if we have an identity, we are very likely able to prevent an
individual from getting into the United States.
The problem is, as the Director said--and, actually, there
is a good-news story there in that, I think, terrorist
organizations look at us as a harder target, as a result. They
know it is harder for individuals to get into the United States
than it is to get into Western Europe or, certainly, into other
parts of the world.
But, the problem is, we are not our own ecosystem, as the
Director said. We are dependent, in part, on what our partners
share with us, in terms of the information they have. We are,
probably, the most aggressive collectors of identity
information about terrorists--or potential terrorists--of any
country in the world, but we cannot capture it all. And so,
what we can get from our partners will give us the tools to
identify someone at the border, to put them on a watchlist, and
to make sure they cannot enter the country.
I would point to one last challenge on this, and that is
that, even as good as we are at this and as much progress as we
have made in creating this end-to-end system, it is still a
name-based system. And, over time, it needs to transition to a
biometrics-based system, because terrorists, over time, have
shown that they have the capacity to innovate, and they can
develop the kinds of documents that, over time, might be able
to fool us. And so, I think we would all be more comfortable
if, a decade from now, we had a biometrics-based capacity to
identify travelers at the border--or potential terrorists--
rather than a name-based system.
Senator Baldwin. Thank you for those answers. I have a
minute left. And so, I am not sure I am going to get the whole
answer on the record, but let me present the question. I am
trying to bring this, from this impending diaspora, to sort of
the domestic implications.
Secretary Johnson, I wanted to just highlight something
that is concerning me, in my home State. And, that is the
availability of grant resources for local partners. So, in the
largest population center of our State, the surrounding
Milwaukee area--their fusion center, the Southeastern Wisconsin
Threat Analysis Center, recently, actually, worked with the FBI
to thwart a terrorist attack in that city.
Unfortunately, they have had to reduce their full-time
personnel by two-thirds when Milwaukee no longer qualified for
the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) funding--under the
risk formula. And, I know that they could use additional funds.
So, given the increase in attacks on soft targets, across
the country, would you agree that there is a need for increased
grant funding? And, can you report back--again, we are not
going to have time for your answer on the record--on the threat
portion of the formula evolving, in light of the uptick in soft
targets?
Chairman Johnson. And, the Secretary can respond in writing
on that.
Secretary Johnson. Yes.
Chairman Johnson. Senator Portman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PORTMAN
Senator Portman. Thank you to all three of you. You guys
are helping, every day, to keep our country safe--and no one is
infallible, nor is our system--as we have seen, because there
have been gaps and there have been problems. But, we want to
thank you for your service, today.
I am, particularly, concerned about two things. One is the
homegrown terrorist threat. We have talked about that before,
on this Committee and in our Subcommittee--and I continue to
believe that our online presence is not what it ought to be,
particularly, the counternarrative. I understand these groups
are moving away from some of the services, like Twitter, which
is good, but they are going to encrypted sites, as Director
Comey said. And, we still are not figuring out who has
responsibility for that. And, I want to get into another topic,
so I will not ask you to respond to that. But, I may ask you
some questions--more detailed questions--in writing, regarding
who is in charge and how we are going to get the best minds
working on the counternarrative to counter what we are seeing
online, which, even today, continues to attract some of our
young people. Before this Committee, you told us, a few months
ago, you were concerned about this issue. When you are talking
about foreign fighters and other jihadists scattering, in 2 to
5 years, as you have said this morning--that being one of your
major concerns--you have also told us that we have gaps in
intelligence there, particularly, in what you call the
``crucial zones of conflict.'' So, to me, this is a critical
issue. And, it was just raised by one of my colleagues. But,
how do you get that intelligence, so that, when people are
scattering--and, Director Rasmussen, you talked about the need
for biometrics, because of people being able to change their
identity, as we have seen in the European situation. Those are
the two concerns that I think are the most pressing for me.
But, if I could raise another issue, since it is a 9/11
hearing, there is legislation that we have worked on--thank you
to Secretary Johnson for bringing it to us. The Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) wants us, very much, to
codify and help protect some of our urban search and rescue
volunteers. FEMA task forces, around the country, rely on
firefighters and other experts to come together and form these
task forces. We are really proud of our task forces in Ohio.
And so, we wrote legislation, which was reported out of
this Committee, unanimously, on May 25th, with the support of
FEMA and the Administration. Ranking Member Carper is a
cosponsor and Senator Booker is a cosponsor. They have both
agreed to try to help to get this thing done.
We have now had it on the floor for a while, with no
success getting what is called a ``hotline'' done--meaning just
getting everyone to approve it, since it is non-controversial.
So, I am just announcing, today, that I plan to go on the
floor and offer it under unanimous consent, because we cannot
figure out who is blocking it. We cannot imagine someone would
want to block this.
On 9/11, I was here. My wife was visiting--a rare visit to
Washington, actually--and 9/11 hit. She got what I think was
the last rental car out of Enterprise, out of Washington, and
drove straight home to be with our kids. And, as she was
driving, on some lonely highway, in Pennsylvania, Ohio Task
Force One was coming the other way. And, lights were flashing,
and she recognized them. And, they were driving into danger.
And, I have known a lot of the men and women involved with that
task force, including men who went that day, on that trip, who
did go into harm's way. They deserve this protection. This
protects their job when they get back. It protects them from
liability. It protects them, in terms of their insurance. It is
just commonsense stuff.
So, one, I want to thank the International Association of
Fire Fighters (IAFF). I want to thank FEMA, and others, who
have endorsed this, supported this, and helped us to move it.
But, let us get this done. We cannot wait until another
Congress. FEMA actually came, originally, to this Congress,
about 10 years ago, on this issue, and said that they wanted to
codify it. So, Secretary Johnson, thank you for your support of
it. And, I hope that we can move it forward.
Do you have any comments on that, Secretary Johnson, this
morning?
Secretary Johnson. Senator, I am familiar with the
legislation. I know FEMA is very supportive of it, and I hope
it passes.
Senator Portman. Thank you.
With regard to the other two topics, on homegrown terrorism
and the online challenge, can we dig a little deeper, as to who
is responsible, in our government, to provide that
counternarrative? It is not, necessarily, something that
government does well, but we, on this Committee, have been able
to look at some of the videos that these jihadists and
murderers are putting out there, showing terrorists providing
candy to children--being in playgrounds--and that it is,
somehow, a euphoric life. And then, we have seen some of the
counternarrative--and some of it has not been very effective,
to be frank. I do not know who is best to respond to that. I
know you have been involved with this, Secretary Johnson, but
who is responsible, within our government? And, how can we
ensure that we can get the best minds, including those from the
private sector, involved in this in order to have a more
effective counternarrative out there, to stop some of this
homegrown terrorism? Which--if you look at these cases, whether
it is Orlando, San Bernardino, or Cincinnati, Ohio, where we
had a young man arrested, so much of it is being encouraged by
online messaging by ISIS and other groups.
Secretary Johnson. Well, first, the countermessage--just
given the nature of it--would not be very credible if it were a
government message. This is something that has to be developed
within the community.
To the extent that we, in government, have a role in
promoting that, facilitating the partnerships, and getting the
right people together in the room to develop this
countermeasure, we have, in my Department, the Office of
Community Partnerships, which, at the moment, is leading an
interagency task force that consists of FBI, NCTC, and others,
where we draw, from all of our Agencies, the best talent and
the best minds. This task force was put together, probably,
about a year ago. I think it is a good thing. No one Department
has a corner on this, but, there is, in fact, a task force, led
by my Department, devoted to countering violent extremism and
building community partnerships, which includes this effort to
amplify the countermessage.
Senator Portman. Have you seen their work?
Secretary Johnson. I have. I have seen the work that is out
there online. I think it needs to have a broader message.
We are also, by the way, encouraging this, through grants--
through State Department grants. In the future, I want to see
more of my Department do the same thing. We are encouraging
young people to develop these kinds of materials, and we are
encouraging innovation in this area. But, inherently, it is not
a government message.
Senator Portman. I understand what you are saying, about a
government message not being as effective. I also, though,
believe that we cannot just allow there to not be a
countermessage out there, because the government does not
organize it. In other words, if the private sector is not doing
it, if you cannot get, as you say, young people to go online,
voluntarily, with their own countermessage that is effective, I
think it is incredibly important. And so, we will follow up
again, with more specific questions. But, I think the task
force--as I understand it, some of the task force efforts have
not been very compelling, from a sort of production point of
view--to make it so that it is something that can help to
change minds and persuade young people. So, we will continue to
follow up on that.
Senator Portman. Thank you.
Chairman Johnson. Senator Sasse.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SASSE
Senator Sasse. Thank you, Chairman.
Director Comey, why was Cheryl Mills granted immunity in
the classified data investigation for Secretary of State
Clinton?
Mr. Comey. The Department of Justice wrote a letter to
Cheryl Mills' lawyer that gave her what is called ``active
production immunity'', for the production of her laptop. So, it
is not personal immunity, for her. The immunity ensures that
we, the Department of Justice, will not directly use against
you anything we recover on this laptop. It is a fairly common
tool in criminal investigations, but that is what it was. And,
the FBI judgment was: We need to get to that laptop. We need to
see what it is. This investigation has been going on for a
year, and this was, in the negotiation, a tool that her lawyer
asked for, which the Department of Justice granted, so we could
get the laptop.
Senator Sasse. Thank you. Was she then Secretary Clinton's
lawyer, in Secretary Clinton's interview with you? And, is that
irregular?
Mr. Comey. Our understanding was, she was acting as a
member of her legal team--not irregular. It is not the FBI's
job to decide who can be in a voluntary interview. There are
ethical canons that govern lawyers, but we do not police that.
If it was a judicial proceeding, the judge might police who
could be there representing an individual. But, that is not
something that we could do anything about, in a voluntary
interview.
Senator Sasse. Secretary Clinton has summarized, to the
public, that you have said that her statements in her interview
and her statements to the public were truthful. Do you think
that is accurate?
Mr. Comey. As an investigator, I kind of look at the world
in an odd way. I never say that I believe anybody or that
anything is truthful. I always ask: Do I have evidence to
establish that it is untruthful or that I do not believe
somebody? And so, as I said, when I testified about this, for 5
hours, in July, we did not develop evidence that led us to
believe that any of the statements to us were untruthful.
Senator Sasse. Do you think that Cheryl Mills would have
destroyed her laptop? And, if so, why was there this
negotiation, as opposed to just asking for it by a grand jury
subpoena?
Mr. Comey. Well, it is a lawyer's laptop. So, having done
this for many years, a grand jury subpoena, for a lawyer's
laptop, would likely entangle us in litigation over privilege
for a very long time. And so, by June of this year, I wanted
that laptop. Our investigators wanted that laptop. And, the
best way to get it was through negotiation.
Senator Sasse. Do you think any laws were broken by Cheryl
Mills?
Mr. Comey. We have no evidence to establish that she
committed a crime.
Senator Sasse. Do you think that Secretary Clinton broke
any laws, related to classified data?
Mr. Comey. We have no evidence sufficient to justify a
conclusion that she violated any of the statutes, with respect
to classified information.
Senator Sasse. Is there any distinction between that
statement and saying that no prosecutor would bring charges,
which is, I think, what you said in your public statements the
day that you made your announcement?
Mr. Comey. Well, I think it is another way of looking at
it. I think, given the evidence in this case, I still think
that no reasonable prosecutor would try to bring this case.
Senator Sasse. OK. Thank you.
Secretary Johnson, last week, the Inspector General said
that somewhere between 800 and 1,800 individuals were
accidentally granted citizenship. Can you tell us the exact
number?
Secretary Johnson. The exact number is 750. The Inspector
General settled on this number of 858. As we looked closer, not
all 858 were actually granted citizenship.
Senator Sasse. Can you distinguish some of those categories
inside of the 750? And, were any of them from special interest
countries?
Secretary Johnson. Not offhand. I cannot give you that
breakdown offhand. I suspect it is a knowable fact, which we
can provide you. I will say, Senator, that we have been
reviewing all of these cases, as we have been going through the
process of converting the physical fingerprints to digital, and
there is a process under way, right now, and an investigation
to denaturalize a number of those, who should not have been
naturalized, as a result of what occurred. And, that is under
way--and we are going to continue to do that.
Senator Sasse. Were any of them from Iran, Syria, or Libya?
Secretary Johnson. I would have to check. I do not know,
sitting here right now, sir.
Senator Sasse. This is an honest question, not a ``gotcha''
question. How would you not know that? Why would that not be
something that is urgent to you--to understand the categories
under the 750----
Secretary Johnson. It is a knowable fact. I can get you the
information. Just sitting here right now, I do not have the
list in front of me. And, I do not want to be wrong.
Senator Sasse. Do you think any of them were terrorists?
Secretary Johnson. I have no basis to believe that any of
them were terrorists or suspected terrorists.
Senator Sasse. Director Comey----
Secretary Johnson. We are going through the process now, of
investigating the cases. This is a legacy matter that goes back
to the 1990s. And, we have been denaturalizing people as we go
through this process.
Senator Sasse. But, these were 750 people that were under
deportation orders. So, it would seem that as to the offensive
versus defensive form of the question earlier--is there any
more important defense than knowing if any of those 750 people
were terrorists or likely terrorists?
Secretary Johnson. I agree with you----
Senator Sasse. What is the priority that would take
precedence over that?
Secretary Johnson. I agree with your question, sir, and
that is why we are going through this process, right now, to
investigate each one of these cases, using the resources we
have.
Senator Sasse. But, in the 11 days--or whatever it has
been--since the IG made your Department aware of the problem,
you did not think to ask if any were from Libya or Syria?
Secretary Johnson. Senator, just sitting here, right now, I
cannot give you the answer to that question. It is an important
question. Just sitting here right now, I cannot give you the
answer to the question. And, I do not want to be wrong.
Senator Sasse. Thank you.
Director Comey, I think the IG said that at least 2 of the
then 858--I will take Secretary Johnson's point, it may be 750.
At least two of them had previously been referred to the FBI
for possible terrorist linkages. Do you know anything about
that?
Mr. Comey. I do not.
Senator Sasse. So, when the IG reveals that to us--help
us--help Nebraskans understand how the Executive Branch works
together. The IG says these people have been referred to the
FBI. Your Agencies are or are not talking to each other? How
can we explain that to our citizens?
Mr. Comey. Your question was to me, personally. I will find
out, after this hearing. I am highly confident people in our
Counterterrorism Division have been talking to DHS to find out
what is there, and to look at it. It just has not been briefed
to the Director, yet.
Senator Sasse. Thank you.
Secretary Johnson. Correct.
Senator Sasse. The distinction between historic fingerprint
records--and I know I am at time, so this one may turn into one
of yours, by mail, for later. But, historic fingerprints versus
digitized fingerprints-- how long has that process been going
on? And, when will it be completed?
Secretary Johnson. I expect it to be completed in the next
9 months. It has been going on for quite some time--possibly
years, sir.
Senator Sasse. Before we had digitized fingerprints,
though, we still had a process to decide who to let into the
country--and not. So, that is not a sufficient excuse for what
went wrong here, right? What happened to grant these 750
people, who were supposed to be deported--how were they granted
citizenship? What was the mistake?
Secretary Johnson. They were granted citizenship at a time
when the conversion was not complete. Therefore, the persons
examining the records did not have the old fingerprints from
the paper record. And, that is what happened.
Senator Sasse. Thank you. Thank you to all three of you.
Chairman Johnson. Senator Ernst.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ERNST
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank
you for being here, today.
Secretary Johnson, if I could start with you, please. On
June 29, Senator Grassley, Senator Sasse, Senator Fisher, and I
introduced a bill called ``Sarah's Law'' to amend the mandatory
detention provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) to require the Federal Government to take custody of
anyone in the country illegally, who is charged with a crime
that results in death or serious bodily injury. ``Sarah's
Law''--and we have talked a lot about this as of late--was
named in honor of a young woman from Iowa, who was killed in a
drunk-driving accident, in Omaha, Nebraska. And, behind the
wheel of the other vehicle was Edwin Mejia, who was in the
country illegally and was driving drunk at three times over the
legal limit. When local law enforcement reached out to the U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), to see if they
wanted to detain the driver, before he could post bond, ICE
declined to do so. And, Mejia subsequently posted bond and
remains at large.
In a letter I received back in May, ICE acknowledged that,
simply put, Edwin Mejia should be in custody and that his
detention should have qualified as an important Federal
interest, pursuant to the detention policies outlined in a memo
you circulated in November 2014.
Since then, we have been told, by ICE, that they have
instructed their field offices to consider anyone in the
country illegally, who kills an American, to be an ``important
Federal interest'' and a priority for detention and
deportation. And, first I have to say, for the record, that I
cannot believe that this was not a top Obama Administration
priority to begin with. And, regardless of what has been said
in the field offices--we have not received any confirmation
that it truly was said in the field offices. So, we do not know
if this is actually the policy of ICE now--or not. There is no
written confirmation.
So, can you confirm that ICE field offices have been
instructed to detain illegal immigrants who are charged--not
convicted, but charged--with a crime that results in the death
of an American citizen?
Secretary Johnson. I believe I can. I am very familiar with
the case of Sarah Root. I have exchanged correspondence with
Senator Sasse on this tragic topic. We have reiterated to the
field, at my direction, that there is this important Federal
interest provision in our priorities memo, which I issued in
November 2014. That has been sent to the field. And, just
yesterday, I was looking at our numbers of those in detention,
and it is reflected in the implementation of the policy. So, we
are detaining more people, when somebody in the field judges it
to be an important Federal interest to do so.
Senator Ernst. Do you know how many times that important
Federal interest has been used to detain someone?
Secretary Johnson. Not offhand, but it is reflected in the
statistics that we are seeing now.
Senator Ernst. OK. So, we are seeing an increase, perhaps,
in the number of people being detained by ICE?
Secretary Johnson. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Ernst. OK. And, do you have any updates, from the
Department, on Edwin Mejia's--where he is located or where we
are on finding him?
Secretary Johnson. I know, from my communications with
Senator Sasse--as I told him, we, along with local law
enforcement, are looking for him.
Senator Ernst. Do you believe him to be in the country or
elsewhere?
Secretary Johnson. I could not say.
Senator Ernst. OK. And, for Director Rasmussen, we will
move on to a different topic. In your testimony, you noted,
``Having passed the 15-year mark since 9/11, the array of
terrorist actors around the globe is broader, wider, and deeper
than it has been at any time since that day.'' An issue that I
have been focused on is the rise of ISIS in Southeast Asia. Is
NCTC concerned with this? And, what do you believe to be the
potential impact on U.S. national security?
Mr. Rasmussen. That is a terrific question, Senator. I just
returned from four nations in Southeast Asia, just within the
last 2 weeks, myself, because I was concerned about how, as the
caliphate has looked to expand around the world, there are
certainly vulnerable populations in Southeast Asia, in a number
of countries where the ISIL ideology could find fertile ground.
As you well know, in the period after 9/11, Southeast Asia
was a very active theater for al-Qaeda, and the al-Qaeda-
affiliated organization Jemaah Islamiyah posed a major threat
in Southeast Asia to U.S. interests and to the interests of our
partners. So, we have known, looking back, that this was always
a potential hot zone, where ISIL might find the possibility to
take root.
My trip out there was designed to kind of engage with our
intelligence partners to make sure that we were doing exactly
what Director Comey was talking about--a much more aggressive
exchange of intelligence information that we need to--to be
able to get ahead of this. There are foreign fighters, from
that region, who have made their way into Iraq and Syria. Those
individuals seek to identify individuals to send back to--or to
connect with--back in their home countries. And so, the same
phenomenon that the Europeans are dealing with--that our other
partners are dealing with--is being seen in Southeast Asia. So,
we are applying many of the same tools to try to get ahead of
it there.
Senator Ernst. And, for Secretary Johnson and Director
Comey, with those terrorist elements existing in Southeast
Asia, do we see any implications of those potential members
from Southeast Asia of ISIS or other terrorist-affiliated
groups--do we see them traveling into the United States?
Secretary Johnson. Senator, the way I would answer the
question is this: We continually reevaluate and evaluate our
targeting rules--the rules that we apply for how we assess
someone entering the country--or who wants to enter the
country. And, based on threat streams, we adjust those so that,
when people seek to come here--or come here--and they show up
at the port of entry (POE), they will either be sent to
secondary, or they may be denied entry, altogether, at the
outset.
Senator Ernst. OK. Very good.
Director Comey, do you have anything to add?
Mr. Comey. No, just that that threat underscores the
importance of connecting ourselves to those partners in
Southeast Asia, so that we know who they are worried about, so
we can put them in our databases and so we can stop them from
getting in here.
Senator Ernst. Very good. Gentlemen, thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Johnson. Senator Heitkamp.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HEITKAMP
Senator Heitkamp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First off, Director Comey, thank you so much for coming to
North Dakota to address what I think is a critical problem in
our State, across Indian country. And, that is the lack of
criminal justice support for native populations. I think you
saw there the dramatic increase in the amount of drug crime, in
particular, but also sexual assaults. Many of the communities
that I visit with tell me that they feel under siege. When I
challenge them to say, ``What are you doing?'', they tell us
that the communities are terrified. And so, I know you and I
may have a disagreement about the need for additional
resources, but we certainly want to find out what it takes to
staff up--to protect these communities, especially given the
unique role the FBI plays in Indian country, in terms of your
primary jurisdiction.
I want to just make a point. I am just going to make some
quick points and just get things on the record--probably I will
not have as many questions.
One of the trends that I have seen, Director, with very
many of the very high profile incidences of terror and mass
shootings is a background history in domestic violence. I think
that taking a look at the National Instant Criminal Background
Check System (NICS)--taking a look at how domestic violence
plays into this and what we need to do to, maybe, pay more
attention to those early warnings of someone with a violent
background, it seems--I am not saying every person who commits
an act of domestic violence could become a terrorist, but, I
think, if we looked at those circumstances, we are seeing more
and more of that. So, I would just maybe follow up with a
question on NICS, domestic violence, and what we are doing to
close those loopholes.
Secretary Johnson--the Northern border--you were not going
to come here without getting a question on the Northern border.
Obviously, I am very concerned about staffing. I appreciate
your response to Senator Tester's question about the need to
continue our collaboration with Canada. We are blessed, on the
Northern border, with a law enforcement relationship that has
been historically very collaborative. And, I think we can
double our impact on the border if we continue to advance the
work that this Administration has started with the Canadian
Government.
I want to talk about drugs on the Southern border. I have
spent a fair amount of time on the Southern border. I think
most of the ranchers down there would tell you now that they
are not as concerned about trafficking in persons coming across
the border, but they believe a great deal of drugs are coming
across the border. In fact, I recently received a picture of a
cannon that shot marijuana across the border. And, I know you
have seen those as well.
Going back to the questioning--or the discussion with--I
guess not much discussion--the diatribe with Director Comey--
one of the challenges that we have is that methamphetamines in
my State have gone from $600 an ounce to $300 an ounce. I
honestly believe that is supply driven, and that we are seeing
more and more coming into the country. If we are going to have
a logical discussion about issues regarding immigration, we
need to take a new look at border security and make sure that
we are doing everything that we can to respond to what people
on the ground are actually seeing. I really appreciate all of
the men and women--blue and green--who work for your Agency and
who are doing a terrific job.
The final point is, the great work that you are doing, in
terms of outreach to communities that could, potentially,
become radicalized. I think that is work that almost every
community in our State could benefit from--Minneapolis is,
obviously, an area where you have done a great deal of work on
anti-radicalization. We have populations that move from Fargo,
North Dakota and from Grand Forks, North Dakota to Minneapolis.
How do we take that program more broadly? And, as you said--I
think, very correctly--you are not as concerned about
radicalization--the message coming from the government may not
be the most helpful message. How do we get this message into
the community? And, how do we build those relationships long
term?
Secretary Johnson. Well, first, if I, personally, do not
make it to Fargo, others will, from my Department, for----
Senator Heitkamp. Well, you are welcome in Fargo. You can
visit the chipper. [Laughter.]
It is at the Visitor Center.
Secretary Johnson. Thank you. Senator. Listening to your
questioning, I think the immediate answer I have is, it would
be most important if community leaders could be encouraged to
apply for some of our grants, in the future, for locally-based
countering violent extremism initiatives. It seems to me that a
community, like Fargo, could probably benefit from something
like that.
Senator Heitkamp. I am absolutely convinced that this
community policing model that came out of the 1990s, where we
actually have dialogues with community members, eyes and ears
on the ground, and build the trust, is how we are going to do a
much better job defending the homeland. But, also, the best
defense is a good offense. I think that this is a great
proactive measure that needs to be taken. And, please, I hope
that, in the exit of this Administration, this is a project
that continues to receive very high priority at the Department
of Homeland Security.
So, thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. And, I will yield back
the rest of my time.
Chairman Johnson. Senator Lankford.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LANKFORD
Senator Lankford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you. Thank you for being here, and thank
you for all you do for the country. You all stay at it all day,
every day, and there is a lot that goes on, which most people
do not know that you all do. So, we appreciate the work. You
also can appreciate our second-guessing and looking over your
shoulder all of the time, as we all have accountability. But, I
want you to know we very much appreciate your work.
Secretary Johnson, could you also pass on my appreciation
to Administrator Neffenger as well? He has had a very tough job
and has made some serious transitions within the TSA, both in
personnel and in process. I know a lot of that is still in
process, but can you pass, on from our Committee and from me,
that appreciation for the hard work that he has taken on there
as well?
I know with my State as well--just on a purely parochial
level, we have had conversations before about REAL ID and some
uniqueness in Oklahoma, because we have a private system for
issuing driver's licenses. So, it has been an ongoing process
to be able to help try to figure out a way to be able to
fulfill that, because of our unique system. Oklahoma is a
little bit different from some States, in that people,
typically, do not mind going to get a driver's license, because
it is a private entity that does it. And, it usually takes
about 5 minutes. That is not true in a lot of other States, and
we are trying to not lose that part, while we are still working
through the REAL ID process. So, I appreciate the flexibility
that has been there.
I want to talk briefly on several issues here as well. One
is the growth of homegrown violent extremism. This is one of
those threats that is incredibly difficult to be able to track,
but it is trending the wrong direction. And, trying to figure
out both the inspiration side and tracking how people are
inspiring those, in the United States, and how we move, as, Mr.
Comey, you have mentioned often, the ``flash-to-bang'' ratio--
that time period getting very close together. So, what do you
see currently, nationally, on homegrown violent extremism, and
the trends?
Mr. Comey. We continue to work cases, trying to assess
where someone is on the consuming to acting spectrum, which, as
you said, is often very short and unpredictable.
Senator Lankford. Right, and it is not illegal to be able
to look at Anwar al-Awlaki's sermons, for instance. But,
suddenly, those that are looking at it then turn violent,
fairly quickly--but not all of the people do.
Mr. Comey. Right. It is even protected speech to say, ``I
am a fan of the Islamic State,'' so-called. And so, our
challenge is to figure out where people are with that. We still
have about 1,000 open investigations on that. If there is any
good news--and I do not want to squeeze it too hard for good
news--it is that the rate of increase has slowed a little in
recent months.
Now, my hope is that it is going to follow the same
trajectory as the traveler numbers, and head downward. But, it
has not headed downward, yet. We are still opening and closing,
and it is ticking up slightly.
Senator Lankford. So, we have thousands of foreign
fighters, who have traveled to Syria and Iraq to fight with the
Islamic State, that have returned back to Europe. We have a
limited number--what is our number that we think have tried to
travel to fight with the Islamic State--or at least traveled to
that region, from the United States?
Mr. Comey. With us--with the Islamic State--it is a number
in the dozens.
Senator Lankford. OK. So, we are in the thousands, though,
of people that have traveled to that region and who have
returned to Europe. How are we doing now, with tracking those
individuals that have been traveling from Europe to the United
States?
Secretary Johnson. Senator, first of all, we have added a
lot of security around the Visa Waiver Program. We get more
information through the Electronic System for Travel
Authorization (ESTA), which has actually been a productive
exercise. We have denied ESTA travel--visa-free travel to a lot
of people, as a result of the added security.
Senator Lankford. Help me understand the phrase ``a lot of
people.'' Give me an example of what that might be.
Secretary Johnson. I have seen the statistics. In the first
year that we added questions to the Electronic System for
Travel Authorization, I think, we denied--as a result of those
additional questions--people, I believe, in the thousands. I
can get you the exact number. It is an available number.
Senator Lankford. OK. That would be helpful.
Secretary Johnson. The Congress, last year, passed
additional security, which has also limited the ability to
travel here visa-free. Congress gave me the authority to add
countries to the list for which, if you visited them, you
cannot come here visa-free. And, I took advantage of that. So,
we have added security there.
More broadly, however, I think it is incumbent on us to
continue to work with the EU--with European nations on the
sharing of Advance Passenger Information (API) and Passenger
Name Records (PNR) data, more Federal air marshal agreements,
and more preclearance--forward deployed. We used the football
analogy, earlier, where we are defending on the 1-yard line. I
want to defend on the 50-yard line. So, preclearance is an
opportunity to screen people on the front end of their travel
to the United States. We have had a number of foreign airports
that have indicated an interest in building that with us. And,
it is a priority of mine, and we are going to keep at it.
Senator Lankford. OK. Let me bring in several topics here,
as we try to blitz through this. Secretary Johnson, this is an
internal issue, but it is one of the things that I am also
concerned about and that we have clear oversight on. And, one
is dealing with human resources (HR). When DHS was formed, you
had all of these different HR systems. As I recall, the number,
in 2011, was still reaching about 442--or somewhere through
there--total different, independent systems--still within DHS,
dealing with HR. 2011 came, and DHS set its standards. So,
there are 15 main areas and 77 projects that we want to be able
to accomplish. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) came
out and said, at the end of 2015, that, of those 15 projects
named in 2011, only one of them has been accomplished--of the
areas--and of the 77 projects within that, I believe it is two
or three that have been completed. And so, what I am trying to
figure out is, give me--that was at the end of 2015. At the end
of 2016, where do you think we are going to be, in trying to
compile all of these different HR systems, so we can have a
more efficient inner structure?
Secretary Johnson. It is a good question. As part of my
``Unity-of-Effort'' initiative, we have been looking to
streamline the HR process and reduce the number of these
systems. I would have to get you the exact number. I do know
that GAO has been very complimentary of us for addressing all
of the high-risk items on their ``High-Risk List,'' and we hope
to get off of that list at some point in the not too distant
future. But, I can get you the precise numbers.
Senator Lankford. OK. That would be helpful to know. Just
trying to be able to track the process, internally, there.
Of the 148,000 older fingerprint cards that Senator Sasse
mentioned before, where are we, as far as getting those
digitized?
Secretary Johnson. Nine months.
Senator Lankford. Nine months--to be complete, from now, of
all 148,000?
Secretary Johnson. Nine months from now to be complete.
Senator Lankford. OK. Mr. Comey, let me ask you about drug
enforcement. And, this is one of the areas I am concerned about
with the FBI. You have so much on your plate, but, obviously,
dealing with drug enforcement, specifically, dealing with
Central America--you have a very unique connection, where there
is both gang involvement and what is destabilizing Central
America--much of it is coming from the United States and the
movement of drugs. Again, it is destabilizing, so it is causing
immigration issues and a lot of crime and grief on our streets,
for families. Give me an update on where you see the trends
right now, in the movement of drugs in the United States, and
the gang activity in the United States.
Chairman Johnson. I will let him get away with it, because
we are down to a couple of Members, but answer briefly.
Mr. Comey. The two major trends to highlight--nearly all of
the heroin coming into the United States and nearly all of the
methamphetamine is being produced in Mexico, now--and a wave of
highly pure heroin has been washing from the east coast toward
the west, and a wave of highly pure methamphetamine has been
washing from west to east. Those waves are now overlapping.
Those are Mexican trafficking organizations that are using
gangs in the United States as their distributors, but the
importers are the Mexican trafficking organizations. Those are
the two most important macro trends, at this point.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Lankford.
This is a pretty interesting Committee. I do not think
people realize that we really have two Committees in one. We
have the homeland security side, and then we have the
governmental affairs side, which is really the Senate's
oversight Committee. We have, as a result, oversight pretty
much over the entire Federal Government. We also have
legislative jurisdiction, which we have tried to use, with
Secretary Johnson, in trying to codify some of the good work he
is doing to improve the Department of Homeland Security.
But, we also have legislative jurisdiction over national
security procedures and Federal records. And, I would be
remiss, in my duty as Chairman of the Committee, if I did not
delve a little bit, in terms of the mishandling of classified
information by the former Secretary of State.
Classified information and the protection of it is
extremely important. If you mishandle classified material, you
can put people's lives at risk. Certainly, if our adversaries
have access to it, it can change their calculation. Their
behavior may change. I cannot think--and, having been in
business, the best possible thing I could get would be the
email communication of my negotiating partners, to figure out
where they are coming from. And, let us face it, if adversaries
have emails, they could, potentially, blackmail government
officials. So, the handling of classified information is an
incredibly important issue. It is something incredibly
important to protect.
Director Comey, when all is said and done, there were seven
emails that are so top secret that not one member, I believe,
on this Committee--maybe somebody on the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence (SSCI)--can have access and actually
look at those things. In your investigation, were you able to
look at those--or was any member of the FBI?
Mr. Comey. Yes, Senator, because I have the appropriate
clearances, that was a particular special access program to be
able to view that material--as did all of the investigators and
analysts working on the case.
Chairman Johnson. OK. But, it does say something when
Members of this Committee do not have access to that, correct?
These emails, in your investigation, were, obviously, outside
of a classified system, correct?
Mr. Comey. They were on an unclassified system, in fact.
Chairman Johnson. So, they were clearly outside of a
classified system. And, anybody emailing the Secretary
understood that, correct? I mean, it is pretty obvious, when
you are sending an email, whether it is to
statedepartment.gov.class or to Clinton.inc--or whatever the
email handle was. Correct?
Mr. Comey. I am not sure that individual emailers
understood what the Secretary's email address was, because it
was not visible in a lot of people's fields. It would just have
an initial----
Chairman Johnson. How many----
Mr. Comey. But, they knew--everybody emailing knew they
were not on a classified system.
Chairman Johnson. And, that is the only system that should
be used for classified material, right? It is not like you have
three, four, or five different email systems you should be
communicating our Nation's top secrets on, correct?
Mr. Comey. Correct. The FBI has three systems:
unclassified, secret, and top secret. And so, you are supposed
to use, for obvious reasons, the system appropriate to the
information.
Chairman Johnson. So, if you are not using that classified
system, you are mishandling classified material?
Mr. Comey. Yes.
Chairman Johnson. In your press conference, you said that
no reasonable prosecutor would bring this case. But, in fact,
there are a couple of cases I just want to see if you are aware
of: the case of Naval Reservist Bryan Nishimura, in
Afghanistan, in 2007 and 2008. Now, he was not prosecuted,
because, in order to avoid prosecution, he pled guilty to the
unauthorized removal and retention of classified materials. A
judge fined him $7,500, and he was ordered to surrender his
security clearance.
Another case was of James Hitselberger. He was a contractor
translator at the naval base in Bahrain. He pled guilty to a
misdemeanor for his handling of documents in 2014. He was
sentenced to time served after 2 months in a D.C. jail and 8
months of home confinement.
How are those cases different than what happened with the
former Secretary of State?
Mr. Comey. All of the cases that were prosecuted,
including--I definitely know the Nishimura case, for sure. I
went through 40 years of cases. So, in June and July, I had
them all in my head. I do not remember exactly the second one.
But, I am highly confident that all of the cases that were
prosecuted, including the misdemeanors, involved obstruction of
justice and vast amounts of material handled in such a way that
it was clear they were intentionally mishandled. Nishimura is a
great example--a huge amount of stuff that he tried to destroy,
once the investigation began. So, there were aggravating
factors that led the Department of Justice to bring those
cases.
Chairman Johnson. Did you look at any aspects of
obstruction of justice in your investigation, with any of the
players, in this episode?
Mr. Comey. Sure, yes.
Chairman Johnson. And, you found none? I mean, on March 2,
the ``New York Times'' reported, for the first time, that
Secretary Clinton had a personal email account. On March 3,
Chairman Trey Gowdy sent a letter to Secretary Clinton's
attorney, requesting they preserve the records. The following
day, Chairman Gowdy issued a subpoena. And, somewhere between
March 2 and March 31, Platte River Networks' employees,
basically, destroyed evidence. Is that not obstruction of
justice?
Mr. Comey. We looked at it very hard, to see if there was
criminal obstruction of justice. In fact, one of the people the
Department granted immunity to was the fellow involved in
deleting that stuff, after the public notification and the hold
letters. And so, we looked at it very hard. We could not make
an obstruction case against any of the subjects we looked at.
The Department granted immunity to the one fellow, who had
erased the stuff, so that we could figure out, ``Did anybody
tell you to do this? Did anybody ask you to do this?'' to see
if we could make an obstruction case. We could not.
Chairman Johnson. My concern, when all is said and done,
with what Secretary Clinton did, is that, by not prosecuting
anybody in this case, we really do signal that we have a two-
tiered justice system here. And, what is that going to do, in
terms of other people that are charged with the responsibility
of properly handling classified information? Are you also
concerned about that, in terms of what actions you have taken?
Mr. Comey. I very much disagree with your characterization.
I think, had we recommended prosecution, it would have been a
two-tiered justice system, because we would have been
recommending it in a circumstance where, for the ordinary Joe
and Jane, we would never have considered it. My goal in this
case was to treat people--as it has been in my entire career--
fairly, without regard to their rank in life. This case was
done in that way, and the decision was made in that way. So, I
think to do otherwise would have been ``two-tiered.'' I am very
proud of the work we did. I know it generated a lot of
controversy, but I am very proud of the work we did.
Chairman Johnson. I have just a couple of seconds, so I
will not go down my next line of questioning. I might go to a
second round or a third round. Senator Carper.
Senator Carper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Is there anything else you would like to say, with respect
to the last question or the last line of questioning from the
Chairman, Mr. Comey?
Mr. Comey. No, I do not think so, Senator.
Senator Carper. OK. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask that
something be submitted for the record.\1\ It is actually a
series of email exchanges between Secretary Clinton and former
Secretary of State Colin Powell, who is one of the people I
most admire.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Information submitted by Senator Carper appears in the Appendix
on page 85.
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Chairman Johnson. Without objection.
Senator Carper. I am going to pivot here and change the
subject a little bit. And, this would be one for Secretary
Johnson. I would like to talk about the National Protection and
Programs Directorate (NPPD). As the Secretary knows, I am not a
big fan of a lot of acronyms, and it always was not clear to me
why we would sort of--instead of actually calling an Agency
what it--by a name that would actually tell you what it does,
we call this one NPPD. And, I understand and very much support
your efforts--the Department's efforts to streamline that
particular entity and actually to call it by something that
explains or conveys what they actually are responsible for
doing. And, instead of calling it ``NPPD,'' to call it the
``Cyber and Infrastructure Protection Agency,'' which makes a
lot of sense. As my father would say, ``Well, that is common
sense, Tom.''
So, talk to us about why the streamlining and the name
change are appropriate, please.
Secretary Johnson. First, it is so that the name is
simpler. Right? I always have to think about what NPPD stands
for.
Senator Carper. Me, too.
Secretary Johnson. And, it is a very generic name. We need
an Agency of our government devoted to cybersecurity. And, the
substance behind our proposal to restructure this thing is so
that NPPD sheds some of its less critical and more
administrative missions and focuses on just two things--
cybersecurity and infrastructure protection--and focuses on
both in a way so that the two missions are merged. We ought to
have a focus on the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure
and the cybersecurity of infrastructure. And so, we want to
take those two missions, put them together, and have a lot of
the same people focused on both of those missions in a more
effective and efficient Agency, called the ``Cyber and
Infrastructure Protection Agency.'' We need an Agency of our
government devoted to those two very important things.
Senator Carper. Good. I approve that message.
Secretary Johnson. And, it will require an act of Congress
to make all of that happen, which is why we are seeking the
help of this Committee.
Senator Carper. Good. Let us talk a little bit about
EINSTEIN. I understand the Department has made a lot of
progress on the implementation of the new cybersecurity
information-sharing portal and on EINSTEIN. And, these are, as
you know, really important programs that can, we think, help us
on the cybersecurity front across our Federal Government--as
well as in the private sector. And, I would like for you to
drill down just a little bit more on these two programs, if you
would, as well as the status of EINSTEIN implementation across
Federal civilian Agencies. And, are there any Agencies you are
concerned about not meeting the statutory deadline? I think it
is December of this year. What is the status of the cyber
information-sharing portal that we established, in law, at the
Department of Homeland Security? Are companies starting to
share their information?
Secretary Johnson. We are, as you know, Senator, deploying
EINSTEIN 3A, right now, which has the ability to block unwanted
intrusions in the Federal civilian .gov system. About a year
and a half ago, we had only covered about 20 percent of the
Federal civilian workforce. Today, as we sit here, we are up to
about 65 percent, and we have memorandums of understanding
(MOUs) with all but three Cabinet-level departments. I
scheduled a meeting with the Secretary of one of those Cabinet-
level departments, and lo and behold, the MOU fell into place
before we had the meeting.
Senator Carper. Maybe you have to schedule a couple more
meetings.
Secretary Johnson. And, the other two, I am confident we
are going to have very soon as well--and those will be the last
three large remaining ones. I am not referring to anybody at
this table here. And, I believe we are going to meet the
statutory deadline.
Senator Carper. That would be great.
Secretary Johnson. I think it is critical that we do that.
Senator Carper. Please share a little bit of the status, if
you will, of the cyber information-sharing portal that is being
established at DHS, please?
Secretary Johnson. We now have automated information
sharing at the National Crime Information Center (NCIC). We put
it in place in March 2016. And so, it is now a matter of
getting Agencies and companies online with this new capability.
We have the intelligence community (IC), and we have the law
enforcement community--the Federal Government--online with
this--a few other Departments--and we have a number of large
companies in the private sector and in information-sharing
organizations. But, there is a lot more to do there.
And so, I am continually promoting this new capability, in
the private sector, in particular--and so that is a work in
progress.
Senator Carper. Alright. Good. I think I mentioned to you,
I went down to the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
(FLETC), in what used to be Naval Air Station (NAS) Glynco,
Georgia. And, I was really impressed by what I saw. I spent a
great day there--a wonderful day there, with a lot of very
dedicated people, doing good work for our country. And, I want
to talk just a little bit--some of them were TSA. They are now
running a TSA training academy there to try to eventually train
everybody who works at TSA. And, I have been especially
impressed with the steps that Admiral Neffenger has taken at
TSA. I remember the day you called me to say, ``We have
somebody we want you to consider for confirmation as head of
TSA, this guy named Neffenger''--I think a three-star admiral.
You said, ``He is a good one.'' And, boy, you were right. You
were right.
Just do us a little bit of a favor and update us on how TSA
has been doing after some very tough sledding earlier this
year. How are they doing?
Secretary Johnson. Well, first, the day Pete was sworn in,
I handed him a 10-point plan for improving aviation security,
in reaction to the Inspector General's covert testing last
year. TSA has done an excellent job at implementing that 10-
point plan, including investments in new technology and less
managed inclusion at airports--the longer line, where you take
people from the longer line and put them in the shorter line.
That contributed to the additional wait times that we saw this
spring, along with the increased travel volume. We addressed
that by, with the permission of Congress, expediting the hiring
of new Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) and converting a
lot of them from part-time to full-time. We have addressed the
wait times. We are continuing to invest in new technology, and
I think we have to build back that workforce. And so, we have a
long-term plan, with Congress, to do that.
Senator Carper. Mr. Chairman, just maybe another minute--
and this is the last time we will, probably, have Jeh before
us. As much as I admire, respect, and feel gratitude toward Mr.
Comey and Nick, I just want to say what a joy it has been to
work with you. Thank you for your leadership. Our job was to
try to make sure you were surrounded by a first-rate team, and
the folks that you and the President gave to us to consider
really are a first-rate team. We are really pleased with that.
Ever since this Department was created, they have suffered
from bad morale. With all of these disparate Agencies all over
the place, it made it hard to communicate and to work together.
For a long time, we did not have confirmed leadership at the
top, and we have tried to address all of that and provide
reasonable amounts of support financially. And, the morale of
the Agency has finally turned around for the better. Would you
just take a minute and talk about that--just a minute--and tell
us what advice you would give to your successor on the
importance of continuing some of the management reforms at the
Department.
Secretary Johnson. I would say that it is important to
continue what we have begun. Particularly, when it comes to
employee satisfaction, we turned the corner--and I hope that
continues.
The Deputy Secretary and I did, this year, 55 employee
engagements in 22 different cities, to hear concerns and to
meet employees. We have a more transparent hiring system and a
more transparent promotion system. We have, as you know, a
Department-wide mission statement. And, we have been stressing,
to our workforce, the importance of their mission. And, I think
people are responding.
I think it is significant to note that the levels of
employee satisfaction went up the most significantly in the
immigration components. ICE went up seven full percentage
points. U.S. Customs and Border Protection went up four
percentage points. And, these are two very large government
Agencies, in and of themselves. I am very proud of their
progress, and I think we need to continue that--along with
making our Department more centralized, less stovepiped, and
more streamlined.
So, I hope that happens. And, I will note that it was
Members of this Committee, including you, in particular, Tom,
that told me that management reform needed to be one of my
priorities, if I was confirmed. And, it has been.
Senator Carper. Thank you.
Chairman Johnson. Senator Peters.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PETERS
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, thank you to
our witnesses here, today. I thank you for your service, every
day, in defense of our Nation. You have a very tough task, and
you perform it with professionalism and passion. Thank you for
that.
I also wanted to say thank you to Secretary Johnson. I know
this may be your last appearance. You have heard many of my
colleagues praise your efforts. I want to join in that chorus.
I appreciate your efforts, particularly, in Michigan--
especially the many trips that you have made to our State,
particularly, to engage the community. As I am sure most folks
are aware, we have a very large Middle Eastern population in
Michigan--one of the largest concentrations anywhere. You have
been actively engaged in that community, and I know that has
been a part of your efforts to make sure that there is a
community approach to dealing with the threats that are there.
You were recently there in August. We spoke briefly before
the beginning of the hearing. You were meeting with some police
officers of Middle Eastern descent. If you would, just
briefly--I think folks need to know what is happening in a
vibrant Middle Eastern community, in Michigan, and how that can
be a template for how we handle this issue around the country.
Secretary Johnson. Senator, you have, in Michigan, some
really dedicated, terrific DHS personnel, who took the
initiative to form this Middle Eastern Law Enforcement Officers
Association (MELOA), which consists of largely--but not
exclusively--DHS people: CBP, ICE, and TSA--centered around the
Detroit-Dearborn area.
I went out there for a visit, to meet with them, several
months ago. I think it was January. I was really impressed, and
I encouraged them to grow nationally for a couple of reasons:
one, community outreach; two, recruiting; and, three, cultural
sensitivity, when it comes to others in law enforcement.
And, when I went back in August, I was pleased to see that
they were having a national-level meeting. Their organization
has grown. And, I would like to see this concept grow across
the entire Federal Government. And so, I have encouraged them
to do that. And, Senator, I encourage you to get to know these
people and support them as well. They are a terrific group,
centered right there in your State.
Senator Peters. Well, I look forward to it. And, I
appreciate your efforts in shepherding that forward and in
giving them the support that they need to continue to grow.
And, hopefully, we will be able to involve all sorts of
agencies, both local and Federal, in that kind of community.
I also want to change course a little bit and just talk
about some potential future threats. Certainly, we have had a
discussion today about a variety of immediate threats that we
have to be very concerned about--and you are actively engaged.
But, also, I stay up at night thinking about some of the future
threats that may be there and whether we are adequately
prepared.
One area that I have thought about--and we had some
testimony here, before our Committee, not long ago--dealt with
biodefense and bioterrorism, and the potential for that. We
heard from former Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge and
Senator Joe Lieberman, regarding some findings from the Blue
Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense--and, basically, they declared
that the United States is unprepared for biological threats.
The Government Accountability Office also has found that
the biodefense enterprise is fragmented and is lacking the
strategic oversight necessary for efficiency and
accountability. And, certainly, I am concerned that a bioterror
attack could be the next threat that we have to deal with--and
we need to be prepared.
Secretary Johnson, I am particularly interested in DHS's
use of the BioWatch program, which was developed to provide
early detection of a bioterrorism event. As you know, last year
GAO identified flaws with BioWatch, including that it is not
really possible to test it in an operational environment. So,
could you give us an update on BioWatch and some of your
efforts related to bioterrorism, please?
Secretary Johnson. Senator, it has been a focus of mine. We
have an office and a mission dedicated to the chem-bio threat
to the homeland. I would be happy to give you a fuller written
report on exactly where we are with BioWatch. But, this has
been a focus of mine. And, obviously, it has been a focus of
others, including Secretary Ridge.
The way I look at it is this: There are threats--and all
three of us deal with this every day. There are threats that
are high probability, and then there are threats that are
perhaps less--lower probability, but high impact and high cost.
And, we have to be responsible and keep our eyes on all of it.
And, that includes the chem-bio threat to the homeland. But, I
can get you a fuller report, in response to your question, sir.
Senator Peters. Well, I would appreciate that.
I realize that you have multiple threats, and you do have
to make those kinds of assessments on a regular basis. But,
certainly, something of this nature, as you mentioned--even if
the probability is maybe lower at this time, the impact is
significant. And, when you look at some of the new technologies
that are coming on board in the biotechnology sphere--Clustered
Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats (CRISPR)
technology, for example, which could be used in some very
nefarious ways--it certainly has incredible potential. But,
also you can buy these kits fairly inexpensively, and this
could present some significant issues.
In my remaining time, I just want to touch on
cybersecurity--another area that is critical for us and perhaps
one of the biggest threats that we have as a country. I had the
opportunity to be out yesterday and visit with folks at the
National Security Agency (NSA) and with the Cyber Command. And,
I am encouraged by the cooperation that I saw. I know a couple
of you have mentioned how we are now working together on
cyber--all of the Agencies coming together. I saw that,
firsthand. It was refreshing to see.
But, I would just like a brief comment on an area that I
see as a vulnerability that we have to be thinking about--that,
when it comes to cyber risk, it is usually the weakest link
where the bad guys are going to go. And, although the Agencies
have hardened systems and our Departments have done it, I think
of small local governments and I think of small businesses--and
others. We know some of the attacks that we have seen--cyber
attacks--have gone through contractors that are small
contractors tied to a larger organization. So, I see some
significant threats, potentially, through local governments,
municipalities, as well as small businesses.
Are there things that we should be doing, here in Congress,
to aid those efforts? Because, I know all three of you are very
aware of that.
Secretary Johnson. I will just start really quickly. First
of all, I am very appreciative of the law Congress passed last
year on cybersecurity, which has greatly aided what we do in
DHS. When you talk about the weakest link--the weakest link is
always the employee vulnerable to an act of spear phishing. And
so, the very basic thing that all of us need to do is raise
employee awareness among our respective workforces to the
hazards of spear phishing. The most sophisticated attacks very
often occur just simply through an act of spear phishing.
Chairman Johnson. Senator Booker.
Senator Booker. Director Comey, I would like to change the
direction of my questioning, specifically, to issues of race in
America. There has been a lot of talk recently about law and
order. And, you and I both--you, in your position, and me, when
I was mayor and had a city with high levels of violence and
crime--really did focus on law and order. And, it is critically
important. But, we make a distinction in America, between law
and order, which is a baseline--but we seek a higher level of
standard--and that is justice. We pledge allegiance to this
idea of liberty and justice for all. Our highest ideal is on
the Supreme Court building: ``Equal justice under the law.''
Now, in Birmingham, in 1960, there was law and order, but
there was a clear lack of justice. And, many people complained
when some rabble rousers--outside agitators, came in,
literally, breaking some laws, actually, but exposing the fact
that there was law and order, but without justice.
Now, Martin Luther King wrote eloquently in the letters
from the Birmingham jail about that distinction--really
focusing on the difference between law and order--which he used
Germany, and other areas, as examples of places that had law
and order, but did not have justice. We are Americans, and we
strive for that ideal.
Now, what frustrates me is, 50 years from that time, we
still seem to be dealing with a lot of the same issues. The
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, also called
the Kerner Commission, which was put forth by President Lyndon
Johnson 50 years ago, was seeking to diagnose why there was so
much violence and rioting in cities--as well as nonviolent
protests--going on. And, the report identified police incidents
as the most common cause of riots and criticized the
overpolicing of black neighborhoods.
Now, what frustrates me is that you read the Kerner Report,
you read the letters from the Birmingham jail, and you read
your words, sir--your courageous words--and, you see, we are
still struggling from those issues.
Now, you gave a speech that I found amazing. I actually,
used your speech in my book that I wrote. The ``New York
Times'' called it ``an unusually candid speech,'' and, for the
record, this is what you wrote: ``With the death of Michael
Brown in Ferguson, the death of Eric Garner in Staten Island,
the ongoing protests throughout the country, and the
assassinations of New York City police officers, we are at a
crossroads.'' You stated, ``As a society, we can choose to live
our everyday lives, raising our families and going to work,
hoping that someone, somewhere, will do something to ease the
tension--to smooth over the conflict. We can roll up our car
windows, turn up the radio and drive around these problems, or
we can choose to have an open and honest discussion about what
our relationship is today--what it should be, what it could be,
and what it needs to be--if we took more time to better
understand one another.''
Those are your words, sir.
``Much research points to the widespread existence of
unconscious racial bias. Many people in our white majority
culture have unconscious racial biases and react differently to
a white face than to a black face. In fact, we all, white and
black, carry these biases around with us.''
``But if we cannot help our latent biases, we can help our
behavior in response to these instinctive reactions, which is
why we need to work to design systems and processes that
overcome the very human part of us all. Although the research
may be unsettling, it is what we do next that matters most.''
You were incredibly courageous in this speech talking about
racial bias in policing. You and I both have an adherence to
the idea of data. We have wild conversations in America, and
sometimes I listen to them--and it seems like we are not even
talking to each other--we are not leading with courageous
empathy.
But, what I am frustrated about is, while I think we need
that empathetic--courageous empathy to begin to create the
understanding to heal, as a country, we still, consistently--50
years since the Kerner Report--based on data--have different
standards of justice being applied to different communities, in
our country, which is creating understandable tension. And,
frankly, if we saw the overpolicing that the Kerner Report
talked about being done in other areas--of affluence--we would
have a very different reality in American politics, because it
would not be tolerated.
Now, you go on in this great speech to talk about specific
needs that we have, if we are going to correct this problem.
You state: ``Not long after riots broke out in Ferguson late
last summer, I asked my staff to tell me how many people shot
by police were African-American in this country. I wanted to
see trends.'' You wanted the data.
I continue, in your words: ``I wanted to see the
information. They could not give it to me, and it was not their
fault. Demographic data, regarding officer-involved shootings,
is not consistently reported to us through our Uniform Crime
Reporting (UCR) Program. Because reporting is voluntary, our
data is incomplete and, therefore, in the aggregate, is not
available.''
``I recently listened to a thoughtful big city Police
Chief''--I stop here, and say that you and I both know there
are lots of police departments that are trying to do very good
things about confronting implicit racial bias. There are a lot
of good, thoughtful leaders in this country, who recognize,
like you do, that this is a problem.
I continue, in your words: ``. . . thoughtful big city
Police Chief express his frustration with that lack of reliable
data. He said people did not know whether the Ferguson police
shot one person a week, one a year, or one a century, and that
in the absence of good data, all we get are ideological
thunderbolts, when what we need are ideological agnostics, who
use information to try to solve a problem.' '' And, you say,
``He is right.''
And so, I do not want to be here 50 years from now--or
listening to my kids and grandkids struggle with what should
have been done in the 1960s, when thoughtful police leadership,
like you, called for understanding this data of what does exist
in our country, which is racial bias. And so, I have put forth
legislation, saying, ``Hey, let us get away from the
ideological thunderbolts and get the data.'' We cannot solve a
problem unless we measure it. You are a manager of an Agency. I
was a manager of a city. If you cannot measure it, you cannot
manage it.
And so, I want your opinion on, basically, what you stated
clearly--on the need for a national collection of data on
implicit racial bias and on police interactions with
communities.
Chairman Johnson. You can provide that as a written answer
to that question.
Senator Booker. Sir, that is--you allowed so many other
people to go over. My time has just ended. Why----
Chairman Johnson. Not really. I am going to ask for another
round, and you can have another round. OK. I am going to keep
this to 7 minutes.
There are three questions I want to ask, based on your
testimony, as well as other questions asked during the hearing.
First, Secretary Johnson, it appears now that this
Administration has let in about 10,000 refugees from Syria. I
have, certainly, been on the record saying that one of the ways
we could minimize any kind of risk would be to establish
criteria. I have suggested for it to cover women, children, and
the relatives of Syrian-American citizens that have the
financial wherewithal to support them.
Is the Department, in any way, shape, or form, establishing
criteria--or are we just vetting whoever the agency from the
U.N. is providing us, in terms of asking us to take in
refugees?
Secretary Johnson. We established criteria in the following
sense: Between us, the Department of State, and the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), we focus on
people who we think would be good candidates for resettlement
in the United States. That is number one.
We have criteria, in the sense that we have added security
checks to the process. And, if you meet certain criteria, there
is going to be extra vetting. That was particularly true around
Syrians. And so, we made the 10,000, frankly, by surging a lot
of resources and adding a lot of people to it. But, we do have
criteria. The criteria are not all public, and they should not
be. But, we added security to the process--to the vetting
process.
Chairman Johnson. So, you are fairly confident that the
vetting has been robust--we have not taken any risks? I am the
lead sponsor of the American Security Against Foreign Enemies
Act of 2015 (SAFE Act) that would have asked you three
gentlemen to certify that. But, are you very satisfied that the
10,000 Syrians we have let into this country represent no risk
to America?
Secretary Johnson. I am satisfied and comfortable that we
put a lot into this process, with a lot of additional security
and a lot of additional person power. And, I know for a fact
that an awful lot of the 10,000 are families, women, and
children, who are fleeing violence and fleeing terrorism--and
who will be honest, hardworking people in this country.
Chairman Johnson. OK. In testimony, we talked about more
robust uses of social media.
Secretary Johnson. Yes.
Chairman Johnson. Looking at that, when we are evaluating
and vetting refugees--can you describe that in a little greater
detail? One of the things I have suggested--I have certainly
asked people--why do we not have it so anybody seeking refugee
status comes in, with their devices--and, basically, have a
plug-in program that can very rapidly scan these things. How
are you doing it? And, are we trying to utilize technology to
the maximum effect to do what I am suggesting?
Secretary Johnson. Senator, I want to expand the use of
social media, not just for refugee vetting, but for visa-free
travel, for example. We have a notice and comment period we
just completed on adding social media questions in the ESTA
system, right now.
Chairman Johnson. But, again, those are questions. Is there
any automated system where, literally, you ask people to come
in with their devices, whether they are seeking a visa or
whatever----
Secretary Johnson. We have a system----
Chairman Johnson [continuing]. You just plug it in and,
bam.
Secretary Johnson. The answer to your question is, we have
a system for vetting social media. We need better technology,
so that it is not manual.
Chairman Johnson. So, right now, it is manual?
Secretary Johnson. It is manual and it is time-consuming,
which is why we need investment in the technology, so that we
can look at social media, not just for refugee vetting, but for
a whole host of things that this Department--and I suspect
other Departments--use it for.
Chairman Johnson. My guess is that that is technology that
ought to be rapidly developed. Am I incorrect there? Either
Director Comey or Director Rasmussen, can you weigh in on that,
one way or the other?
Mr. Rasmussen. I do not have any specialized knowledge on
that particular question.
Mr. Comey. I do know it is something that we work hard to
develop the technology for--for our investigations--to go
through huge amounts of seized media and publicly available
social media. So, there are tools out there. Whether it is fit
for this purpose or not, I do not know.
Chairman Johnson. I would suggest your Department and your
Agency work together on that.
Finally, Director Comey, I do want to talk a little bit
about these terror ``watchlists'', because I think we are
throwing a lot of terms around, and people do not really
understand them. So, I just want to make sure people understand
what we are talking about here.
From my understanding, the overall massive database is
really the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE).
Again, I am not sure what is law enforcement sensitive, so I do
not want to talk about numbers--foreigners compared to
Americans. A subsidiary list of that is called the Terrorist
Screening Database (TSDB). And then, much smaller subsets of
that are the No-Fly List and the Selectee list, correct?
Mr. Comey. That is correct.
Chairman Johnson. None of these lists were ever developed--
they were developed for law enforcement use, to give you an
indication of whether or not you should investigate somebody--
or somebody should be pinged for further investigation,
correct?
Mr. Comey. They are intelligence and law enforcement
databases. There are standards to get identities in there, but
their primary purpose is currently for that.
Chairman Johnson. They are far from perfect, correct?
Mr. Comey. Correct.
Chairman Johnson. The standards for getting on to those
databases are not exactly what you call completely tight. But,
let me put it this way: They were never intended to deny an
American constitutional rights, correct? That would be a misuse
of those lists?
Mr. Comey. I think that is fair to say. I hope that is true
of all of our work.
Chairman Johnson. How do you get off of the lists?
Mr. Comey. You get off of the list, either--and Nick will
help me with this--but you get off of the list, either when an
investigation has been closed, and then the agent sends the
appropriate notification to have the name removed, or you make
use of the redress procedures that DHS runs, to challenge and
have it looked at--and then have your name removed if it is a
mistake.
Chairman Johnson. Of course, you have to know that you are
on the list in order to seek redress. And then, even there,
that is not a judicial process, correct? That is just through
the Agency. And, let us face it, a bureaucrat in the Agency
will make the final determination. You do not have the ability
to get redress through the courts.
Mr. Comey. It is an administrative process, but people do
and have gone to court to challenge it beyond that, as I
recall.
Chairman Johnson. But, again, you have to know you are on
the list.
Mr. Comey. That is correct.
Chairman Johnson. That does represent a problem. And,
again, I will understand if you do not want to speak to this in
open session, but I think you have had some reservations about
utilizing those, in terms of those lists tipping off someone
that you may be investigating. Are you willing to speak to that
at all?
Mr. Comey. I think what I can say in open session is, I
just want to be thoughtful about any operational impacts to
anything that we set up.
Chairman Johnson. OK. My time is up. I am happy to let you
respond to Senator Booker or--Senator Carper, do you have
further questions?
Senator Carper. I just want to yield my time to Senator
Booker. Go ahead, please.
Senator Booker. Mr. Chairman, just for the record, it is
ironic that I was asking a question about equal application of
the law, and you did not equally apply the rules--if I can
finish, sir. You, literally, even said to somebody, ``Since
there are only a few people here, I will let you go a little
longer.'' And right before--you seemed to be incredibly strict
with your application of the rules to me----
Chairman Johnson. I cut other people off as well. Now, you
can ask the question and get the answer.
Senator Booker. I would like, for the record\1\, the
details of how long people went over, so I can point out to the
Chairperson how many minutes he allowed other people to go
over--and then, when I am bringing up issues of race and equal
application of the law, you suddenly cut me right off.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The information submitted by Senator Booker appears in the
Appendix on page 88.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chairman Johnson. That is an absurd characterization, but
now you can get your answer.
Senator Booker. Sir, I am not a characterization. I would
like that, for the record, at least, so you could see how you
apply--how you are conducting the hearing, sir.
Director Comey, I am going to finish the last paragraph of
your speech that I did not read, going back, so I can heighten
that issue of data.
``The first step to understanding what is really going on
in our communities and in our country is to gather more and
better data related to those we arrest, those we confront for
breaking the law and jeopardizing public safety, and those who
confront us. `Data' seems a dry and boring word . . . without
it, we cannot understand our world and make it better.''
Could you please comment on the lack of data, in regards to
policing in the United States, and how hard it makes this to
address the issue of implicit racial bias in policing?
Mr. Comey. Yes, thank you, Senator Booker. This is one of
the most important issues we confront in the FBI--I think we
confront as Americans. There are all kinds of people of
tremendously good hearts in law enforcement, not in law
enforcement, and in communities of color, protesting. Every
single one of them is unguided by actual data and information.
Every conversation, in my view, about the use of force and race
in policing, in this country, is uninformed--people of
tremendous good will, trying to resolve these things.
What we could contribute, as a country, is information to
that conversation, for the reasons you say, so that great
people, who care deeply about these things, can come to
solutions that are practical and just. We simply must collect
data that is reliable, nationwide, about police use of deadly
force in altercations--encounters with civilians. We simply
must.
If there is anything more inherently governmental than
that, I cannot imagine what it is. But, we are now in a
situation, where we have newspapers that are the only source of
that kind of data--and their data is not comprehensive.
We are going to do this. I have spoken to--one of the
beauties of a 10-year term is, I am not going to shut up about
this. I have 7 years to go. We will build a nationwide
database, which the FBI will collect, that can show us what
happened when, who was involved, what were they like, and what
were the circumstances--so we can have informed conversations.
No one in this country knows whether the use of deadly
force against any particular group--African-Americans, most
particularly--is up, down, or sideways, over the last 10 years.
Nobody knows. Do we have an epidemic of violence? No one knows
that. We could. We might not. We simply must gather the
information, so we can care deeply, and solve these problems.
Senator Booker. Director Comey, I really celebrate your
leadership around this issue--as was said--the courageous
speech you gave, and your remarks, right now. But, the one
thing I will ask you, sir, is: Where we do have data, it shows
an alarming fact pattern in our country--not only the studies
that you cite in your speech about implicit racial bias--but
the Department of Justice has dozens and dozens of police
departments, including the one that I ran--where I was even
surprised at the data they collected--to begin to create
transparency. So, police department after police department
that has--where we do now have the data, it is showing very
dramatic--from New York City, to New Orleans, to Ferguson--
showing dramatic biases in policing.
So, does that not lead you to believe--or that you see this
consistent fact pattern, where we have collected the data, that
we do not just have a problem in the United States--to a Nation
that aspires to high levels of justice and equality under the
law--we do not have a policing crisis in this country, given
the data that we do have?
Mr. Comey. I believe we have a chasm in this country, in
many places, where a divide is open--and opening between law
enforcement and communities, especially the African-American
community. The causes for it are complicated and longstanding,
but not elusive. We can stare at it. We have problems--things
we can do better in law enforcement that are obvious--and we
are working very hard to change.
Where I think we can close the chasm is: Everybody wants
the same kind of policing. Everybody does. Moms and dads as
well as law enforcement want the same kind of policing-- up
close, responsible, lawful, and firm--but fair--policing--
transparent. We are safer when we have it. And, the good news
for America is, there are a ton of police leaders who feel
exactly as I do. And, we are going to drive that chasm closer
together, because it is the way to save lives in this country.
Senator Booker. And, I want to appreciate and highlight
what you just said. As a guy who ran a police department, we
have incredible police leaders out there--the overwhelming
majority of whom seek the exact same thing as the black
community--as other communities--and, frankly, who are
undercelebrated on the level of daily heroism that they show in
conducting their jobs, as I just mentioned, earlier in my
testimony--in my questioning about the two Linden police
officers. But, what people do not realize is that goes on every
single day--there are people out there, putting themselves in
harm's way, who do share our same values. But, what you so
astutely pointed out--a lot of this is not conscious.
Sometimes, people are not even aware of how they are not
applying the law equally. And, when I see Justice Department
investigation after Justice Department investigation, police
departments large and small, and police departments run by
African-Americans as well as white folks, all coming up with
the same set of data--that is presenting the same fact: that we
do not have the equal application of the law. When we have
police--prisons that are now full of folks that--whether it is
Vermont, where African-Americans are 1 percent of the
population, but 11 percent of their prison population is
African-American--or States like mine--this dramatic unequal
application of the law, throughout the entire justice system--
we have to get to the core of this understanding of what can we
do to begin to correct for this implicit racial bias.
And, I will conclude with just saying that your
prescription of having a better national collection of this
data--we cannot get there unless we, first, engage in an
objective, dispassionate analysis of the facts and the data.
And, the fact that we do not collect them, 50 to 60 years after
the Kerner Report, is outrageous and unacceptable.
Thank you.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Booker. Senator
Carper.
Senator Carper. Mr. Chairman, just before we break up, we
came here with a hearing in mind, concerning how we can better
protect our homeland from threats, both foreign and domestic.
And, I want to thank Senator Booker for adding something that I
did not expect. And, I really want to say to Director Comey,
thank you for the way you have engaged on what I think we all
know is a really important subject.
We spent many months, in this room, years ago, on the heels
of 9/11, with the 9/11 Commission, led by Lee Hamilton and
Governor Kean. And, they had a vision that we would address and
fix some of the problems that led to 9/11 and allowed it to
happen. And, part of the problem was the stovepiping of
information and our inability to work together and talk
together. And, Mr. Comey, you said several times that we are
not perfect--and the goal is to always be more perfect. I like
to always cite the Preamble to the Constitution: ``We the
people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect
union . . .'' It does not say ``in order to form a perfect
union,'' but ``a more perfect union.'' None of us are perfect.
I always look at problems, and I say, ``Find out what works, do
more of that.'' And, everything I do, I know I can do better.
And, the same is true of all of us. But, I must say I am
encouraged by the way you work together and the way your
Agencies work together. And, I think we are all better for it.
And, as Jeh Johnson prepares to leave, in a couple months,
for more fertile fields, maybe--I do not know--but I want to
close, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman and I are baseball fans, and
you may be as well. One of my favorite Detroit Tigers players
was an outfielder named Kirk Gibson. And, when he had a
memorable home run, playing for another team, for the Los
Angeles Dodgers in a World Series, it sparked them to a World
Series victory. But, years later, he was back with the Tigers.
In the middle of the season, he announces that he is going to
retire--and he does it in a very different way. Usually, when
people are going to retire from baseball, or whatever, they do
it at the beginning of the season, or they do it in the middle
of the winter, or they do it in spring training, and say, ``I
just do not have anything left anymore.'' He did it in the
middle of the season. And, he called the press corps to the
Tiger dugout in July. And, he said, ``I have an announcement to
make. I have been traded.'' And, people gasped. Then, he said,
``Back to my family.''
So, Jeh, we are going to trade you back to your family, but
you come with our best wishes and affection and our thanks to
your wife, Susan, and to your family. God bless.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Carper.
Again, I also would like to express my appreciation. I
have, certainly, enjoyed working with Secretary Johnson. I
think you have done a lot of good work, and you have hired some
great people--and you have improved the Department. Thank you.
Gentlemen, thank you all for, again, your service to this
Nation and for attending this hearing.
The hearing record will remain open for 15 days until
October 12, at 5 p.m. for the submission of statements and
questions for the record. This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:52 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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