[Senate Hearing 114-585]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-585
THE FUTURE NUCLEAR POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
of the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JANUARY 27, 2016
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
24-800 PDF WASHINGTON : 2017
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JACK REED, Rhode Island
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama BILL NELSON, Florida
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
TOM COTTON, Arkansas KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JONI ERNST, Iowa JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska TIM KAINE, Virginia
MIKE LEE, Utah ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
TED CRUZ, Texas
Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama, Chairman
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska BILL NELSON, Florida
MIKE LEE, Utah JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
TED CRUZ, Texas MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
january 27, 2016
Page
The Future Nuclear Posture of the United States.................. 1
Harvey, John R., Former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs. 3
Payne, Keith B., President and Co-Founder, National Institute for
Public Policy.................................................. 10
Roberts, Brad H., Director, Center for Global Security Research,
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory......................... 13
Miller, Franklin C., Principal, The Scowcroft Group.............. 18
(iii)
THE FUTURE NUCLEAR POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES
----------
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 27, 2016
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:31 p.m. in
Room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jeff
Sessions (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Sessions, Fischer,
Donnelly, and King.
Other Senators present: Cotton and Sullivan.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS
Senator Sessions. The meeting will come to order.
Senator Donnelly is on the way, and I think we'll just
proceed with some preliminaries.
I thank our colleagues for coming. And it's an opportunity
today to examine the future of America's nuclear force posture
with a rock-star panel, I've got to say. These are four
individuals who have served different administrations, who have
been deeply involved in this issue, have thought about them,
written about it, and, I think, will be a real asset to our
committee as we go forward.
So, we've asked the witnesses to provide an assessment of
the continuities and changes in the U.S. nuclear posture, with
an eye toward what we've gotten right and what policies or
assumptions have not been borne out by recent events.
As I believe Mr. Miller just noted as we talked about the
grimness of this subject, it's--for 60 years, there's a lot
that can be said as to how this policy of nuclear deterrence
has helped protect the peace.
More important, we've asked for the panel's thoughts on how
the current nuclear posture should be changed to address the
strategic environment as it may evolve over the next 25 years.
In other words, what should be the major considerations and
content of any nuclear review to be conducted by the next
President?
From my perspective, there have been at least three
constants in U.S. nuclear policy across Republican and
Democratic administrations over the past quarter century. The
first constant has been the enduring necessity for a triad of
land, air, and sea-based nuclear forces to deter threats to
vital U.S. interests and to assure allies of U.S. security
commitments.
Second--and this is often forgotten by anti-nuclear
groups--there has been a shared objective to reduce the U.S.
nuclear stockpile from Cold War highs to the lowest number of
nuclear weapons consistent with maintaining U.S. nuclear
deterrence and assurance objectives.
Third constant. Unfortunately, there has been a consistent
decline in leadership focus and funding for America's nuclear
forces and the nuclear laboratory and production complex,
perhaps in the misguided belief that, with the end of the Cold
War, nuclear deterrence was no longer a national priority. And
I think we've observed that our unilateral reductions have not
resulted in world reductions of nuclear weapons, but, in fact,
more proliferation.
Congress has demonstrated over the last few years a strong
commitment to fund the nuclear modernization plans of the Obama
administration. Now, that's a commitment that the President has
made, and we need to make sure it goes forward. It's probably a
minimum action, but it's--essentially does, I think, where--
what we have to do.
Each leg of the nuclear triad is being replaced, hopefully
before this Cold War-era force reaches the end of its service
life. And a very large sum of money is programmed to refurbish
nuclear warheads and bombs that have far outlasted their
intended lifetimes and to replace nuclear handling facilities,
some of which date back to the dawn of the Nuclear Age. And
indeed, however, the sums of money spent on our nuclear
warheads and our triad is relatively small in light of the
entire defense budget.
So, I thank our committee members from being here.
Senator Cotton, we're glad to have you. You're going to
find that you've got four of the truly--true experts on this
subject before us today.
Senator Cotton. I do thank you.
Senator Sessions. So, we'll proceed with a 5- to 7-minute
opening statement by each of our witnesses, in this order:
Dr. John Harvey is a former Deputy Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy in the Clinton
administration, and former Principal Deputy to the Assistant to
the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological
Weapons in the Obama administration, and former Director of
Policy Planning Staff of the NNSA [National Nuclear Security
Administration]. He also had contributed valuably to our
discussions about improving our laboratories and our
modernization.
Dr. Keith Payne, the CEO and President of the National
Institute for Public Policy, formerly Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense in the Bush administration, helped write
the 2001 Department of Defense Nuclear Posture Review in the
Bush administration, and was a key member of the Perry-
Schlesinger Report in, what, 2009, that was--really helped us
reach a bipartisan consensus on nuclear posture.
Dr. Brad Roberts is the Director, Center for Global
Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and
Missile Defense Policy in the Obama administration. I believe
you've got your book out now. Is it--"Care for"--"The Case for
Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century.'' It's an important
subject. Thank you for that.
Mr. Frank Miller, the Principal of the Scowcroft Group,
former Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control for
the National Security Council, 2001 through 2005, and senior
civilian defense official responsible for nuclear matters in
the Bush and Clinton administrations.
So, we do have a good panel, indeed.
Senator Donnelly, I just did a brief opening statement, and
I would yield to you for your opening comments at this time,
before we hear from the panel.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOE DONNELLY
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank our witnesses for agreeing to appear today
before the committee. Over many years, we've sought your
counsel on our Nation's nuclear deterrent. Today is no
different.
I also understand a number of you have worked side by side
with a prestigious Hoosier who is also my good friend, Jonathan
George. So, he sends his best wishes.
At the beginning of every administration, there are a host
of pressing national security issues that must be addressed,
but, as Secretary Harold Brown once observed, then there is
also the question of nuclear weapons. No other issue garners as
much debate and thought on their force structure and possible
use. And rightly so.
Today, you have the opportunity to once again give this
committee advice on a topic that forms the foundation of our
national security and that of our allies. This is a time for us
to learn and reflect on a topic that is at the very core of our
national security debate.
Again, I'd like to thank Senator Sessions for arranging
this hearing. I look forward to another productive year of work
in this subcommittee, where we have built such a strong
bipartisan consensus on our nuclear posture, nonproliferation
efforts, and missile defense.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
All right. Dr. Harvey?
STATEMENT OF JOHN R. HARVEY, FORMER PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL
DEFENSE PROGRAMS
Dr. Harvey. Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly,
members of the committee, thanks for the opportunity to testify
before you today about the future nuclear posture of the United
States.
My statement today reflects almost an entire career working
on nuclear deterrence. Most recently, from 2009 to 2013, I was
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary under Ash Carter, then the
Under Secretary. I was his go-to person for the 2010 Nuclear
Posture Review, and, more generally, for oversight of the
Nuclear Stockpile and for programs to modernize delivery
platforms and nuclear command and control.
I request that my written statement be entered in the
record. It----
Senator Sessions. We will make it part of the record.
Dr. Harvey. Its basic points are as follows:
In recent years, our government has made great progress in
advancing a comprehensive strategy to sustain and modernize
U.S. nuclear forces. The President has sought significant
increases in modernization programs. In very large part,
Congress has funded these programs and, as it should, has held
the administration accountable for sustained progress. A
bipartisan consensus on modernization, although fragile and
very narrowly focused, has emerged, and my written statement
speaks about how this has come to be.
Job number one now, however, is to preserve this consensus
and, if possible, bolster it in the face of two daunting
challenges. First, in a decades-long modernization effort, we
begin the climb up the bow wave of needed investment that peaks
in the late 2020s. Second, and most importantly, is the
challenge of sustaining momentum and consensus in the
transition over the coming year to the next President. The
nature and scope of the 2017 Nuclear Posture Review will be a
factor in meeting these challenges. Continued close attention
and bipartisan support from Congress will be essential.
In light of the evolving global security environment, the
next President will likely direct a review of nuclear posture.
Congress has three options to consider in seeking to shape that
review. First, it could take no action. That is, leave it up to
the direction of the--discretion of the next President. Second,
it could direct the next administration to conduct a nuclear
review, with specified terms of reference, and deliver a report
by a date certain on the way ahead. Third, it could establish a
new bipartisan commission to inform the nuclear review--
independent commission--to inform the nuclear review of the
next President.
In considering options, the three previous NPRs [Nuclear
Posture Reviews], those concluded by Clinton in 1994, Bush in
2001, and Obama in 2010, reflect much more continuity than
change. All concluded that a triad of strategic forces, of
nuclear forces, and Europe-basing of U.S. nuclear bombs carried
by NATO dual-capable aircraft, were essential to both strategic
and extended deterrence. All concluded that a hedge capability
was needed to respond to unanticipated technical problems or to
adverse geopolitical changes requiring force augmentation. All
agreed that deterrence could not be based solely on the
existence of nuclear forces. Rather, it depends on the ability
of forces to hold at risk assets most valued by an adversary.
And finally, this meant that force capabilities mattered, and
all understood that these capabilities might need to be
adjusted as adversary target sets and employment strategies
evolved.
Given this continuity in policy, given the current, if
fragile, consensus on modernization, and given the successful
bipartisan review carried out by the Perry-Schlesinger Panel in
2009, a new bipartisan commission is not needed, nor would its
work be timely. Rather, the next President should update the
conclusions and recommendations of the 2010 Nuclear Posture
Review, based on the global security environment as it has
evolved since that review.
The committee asked for views of major considerations for
the next Nuclear Posture Review. Very importantly, that review
should open the aperture on issues that the Obama team has put
to bed, based on its assessment of the future security
environment. It must also manage the downside risk that certain
recommendations could rupture existing consensus on today's
modernization program.
Regarding Russia, my colleague, Keith Payne, is going to go
into more detail about Russia, but let me make just one brief
point. Russia has an active strategic modernization program
underway. More of a concern than Russia's modernization
program, however, is its evolving nuclear strategy. If Russia
really believes that it could escalate its way to victory, say
in restoring the Baltics to Russian rule, then it must be set
straight. No conceivable advantage and incalculable downside
risks would accrue from any nuclear use against NATO. The next
NPR should determine whether existing U.S. declaratory policy
in this regard needs to be refined or clarified.
I highlight other major issues for review and resolution.
How many ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] should we
deploy at how many bases to meet the security needs while
maintaining a robust cadre and career path for ICBM operations?
Can ballistic missile modernization be leveraged to reduce
costs via a smart approach to common ICBM and SLBM [Submarine-
launched ballistic missiles] components? Is additional
modernization needed to convey a critical message? That is,
U.S. nuclear forces cannot be neutralized by attacks, whether
kinetic or cyber, on the nuclear command-and-control system. In
light Asian security developments and the continuing challenge
of assuring allies, should we seek allied support and
concurrence on a plan to demonstrate the ability to deploy U.S.
nuclear weapons and dual-capable aircraft to bases in the
Republic of Korea and Japan?
There are two looming questions regarding stockpile
modernization. First, do we need nuclear warheads with new or
different military capabilities? Second, do we need to retain
capabilities to develop and produce such warheads, if required?
My short answer to the first question is, ``Maybe.'' To the
second, it is, ``Most assuredly,'' and we must do more to
achieve this objective.
My written statement elaborates on these issues and raises
a few others.
Mr. Chairman, some NPR issues will be controversial and,
thus, pose a risk to a continuing consensus on modernization.
That does not mean the next NPR should not study them. Rather,
all of the security implications of alternative courses of
action must be vetted before proceeding carefully and with
transparency to any recommended changes in posture. This can
best be achieved with a Nuclear Posture Review that integrates
all elements of nuclear security, not just force posture;
embraces all agencies with national security equities, as well
as allies; and communicates clearly with Congress and the
American public.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Harvey follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. John R. Harvey
Introduction
Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, and members of the
Subcommittee: I am pleased to testify before you today along with
colleagues and friends--all of whom reflect the highest standards of
public service--about the future nuclear posture of the United States.
My statement today reflects 38 years of experience working nuclear
weapons and national security issues, first at Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory, then at Stanford University's Center for
International Security and Arms Control and in senior positions in the
Departments of Defense (twice) and Energy. From 2009-2013, I served as
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical,
and Biological Defense Programs, initially under Ash Carter then
serving as Undersecretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. I
was his ``go to'' person for the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review as well as
for interactions with the Department of Energy on all aspects of the
nuclear stockpile. I provided oversight to DOD acquisition programs to
sustain and modernize nuclear delivery systems and systems for their
command and control. Today, I consult with several organizations on
many of these same issues. My statement today, however, reflects my
views and not necessarily those of any organization to which I consult.
priority one--bolstering the fragile consensus on modernization
It is worthwhile to take a step back and recall the state of the
U.S. nuclear posture in 2009 when President Obama took office. The
prospects were grim:
Funding was insufficient to sustain the R&D base needed
for long-term certification of stockpile safety and reliability and, at
the same time, recapitalize an aging infrastructure.
Basic nuclear weapons design, engineering, and production
skills and capabilities were increasingly at risk because they were not
being exercised.
Ongoing warhead life extension activities were under
funded and constrained in their ability to improve warhead safety,
security, and reliability.
Operations at warhead component production facilities
were at increased risk of safety shutdown.
DOD had yet to step up to its own nuclear modernization
needs.
There was little consensus within Congress, or between
the administration and Congress, on the role of nuclear weapons in our
national security strategy.
Many in Congress were concerned that a comprehensive
approach to nuclear security had not been clearly articulated, and they
were right!
Today, the tide has shifted. Specifically:
The 2010 NPR was built on a foundation of bipartisan
support; in large part, it adopted the recommendations of the
Bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the
United States (aka ``the Perry-Schlesinger commission'').
It was achieved with unprecedented interagency
cooperation and White House involvement, and defined an integrated/
balanced strategy for reducing nuclear dangers.
Very importantly, the strategy strongly linked our
nuclear deterrent to other elements of nuclear security including arms
control, nonproliferation, threat reduction, and nuclear
counterterrorism.
High level support across his administration for
increased investments in DOE's nuclear weapons programs and DOD's
nuclear delivery systems enabled the President to conclude, and
convinced the Senate to ratify, the New START Treaty.
Recent President's budget requests have further increased
investment for modernization. To a very large degree, Congress is
funding these programs and, as it should, is holding the administration
accountable for sustained progress.
Not everything is ``fixed,'' but there is a fragile consensus in
place regarding the future nuclear posture and a plan (that changes a
bit every year) to achieve it.
To what do I attribute this remarkable demonstration of
bipartisanship in a political environment that is as corrosive as many
of us can remember? I think the answer is two-fold. First, the actions
of Vladimir Putin, in essence to reestablish the Soviet Union, have
made it clear to most Americans that optimistic assumptions about the
future global security environment are not coming to pass. Recent
Russian behavior has also muted the voices of those who sought to
hijack, and misrepresent, the President's Prague agenda in calling for
unilateral reductions to small numbers now.
Perhaps more importantly, is the commitment of this Committee and
its staff (both minority and majority) working together, and together
with their House counterparts and with colleagues both inside and
outside the Obama administration to do what's right for our nation's
security. I must add that vocal support for the President's
modernization program from my colleague at the table, Keith Payne,
taken at some personal risk, has helped to solidify support of other
conservatives not inclined in general to agree with the President.
This decades-long modernization program for all elements of the
nation's deterrent--the nuclear stockpile and supporting
infrastructure, nuclear delivery platforms, and command and control
systems that link nuclear forces with Presidential authority--faces
several challenges. The next few years are critical as we climb the so-
called modernization ``bow wave'' of needed investment that peaks in
the mid-2020's. The greatest challenge, however, is to bolster
consensus, and sustain momentum, in the transition over the next year
to a new administration. Continued close attention and bipartisan
support from Congress will be essential.
the 2017 nuclear posture review
Given changes in the security environment since the 2010 NPR, it is
almost certain that the next President will direct a review of the
current posture, policies, and programs for U.S. nuclear forces and,
very likely, will do this whether or not Congress passes legislation
requiring it. What should Congress do? There are three primary options
to consider:
Take no action--leave to the discretion of the next
President.
Direct the next administration to conduct a review of
U.S. nuclear posture and deliver, by a date certain, an unclassified
report (with classified annex, if needed) on the way ahead.
Establish a new bipartisan commission to inform the
nuclear review of the next President.
In considering options, it is noteworthy that previous NPRs--those
concluded by Clinton in 1994, by Bush in 2001, and by Obama in 2010
(informed by Perry-Schlesinger)--reflect much more continuity than
change. After evaluating alternatives, all concluded that a strategic
triad of nuclear forces--consisting of land- and sea-based ballistic
missiles, and heavy bombers--and forward basing of B61 nuclear bombs
carried by NATO dual capable aircraft were essential to both strategic
and extended deterrence. All concluded that a hedge capability, held in
reserve, was needed to respond to unanticipated technical problems with
a warhead or delivery system, or to adverse geopolitical changes that
required augmentation of deployed forces. All agreed that it is
insufficient to base deterrence solely on the existence of some level
of nuclear forces; rather, it depends on the ability of forces to hold
at risk assets and installations most highly valued by an adversary.
Thus, force capabilities mattered and all understood that capabilities
might need to be adjusted as adversary target sets and employment
strategies evolved.
Given the trend of continuity, given the current, if fragile,
consensus on modernization and given the intense bipartisan review that
was carried out by Perry-Schlesinger in 2008-09, a new bipartisan
commission is not needed at this time. Even if the FY17 NDAA were to
establish one, and assuming it became law in late Fall 2016, it would
take at least another 18-24 months to get the members appointed, the
commission up and running, and recommendations developed. The
commission would likely be carrying out its work in parallel with the
next administration's nuclear review and would thus not be timely.
Rather, the next administration should review and update the
conclusions and recommendations of the 2010 NPR based on the global
security environment as it has evolved since that review was completed.
This review would benefit from the analyses, assessments, and
contributions of experts in the think tank community. Examples include
work of the National Institute of Public Policy in informing the 2001
NPR, and recent work (i.e. Project Atom) at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies addressing options for the future U.S.
nuclear posture.
major considerations of the next npr
The Committee has requested that we provide views of ``what should
be the major considerations and content of the next NPR.'' Most
importantly, the next NPR should ``open the aperture'' on issues and
activities that the Obama administration had ``put to bed'' based on
its assessment of the future global security environment. In doing so,
we must manage the downside risk that certain recommendations could
rupture existing consensus on today's modernization program.
Russia
Deterring a potentially hostile Russia remains the primary focus of
U.S. nuclear forces. Mr. Putin believes he has a ``responsibility to
protect'' ethnic Russians wherever they reside. He has used this
argument to intervene in the internal affairs of Moldova, Georgia and
now Ukraine including the illegal annexation of Crimea. Putin's modus
operandi in Ukraine has not been an all-out armored assault as the
Soviets did in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Rather, he
seeks to achieve his political ends by introducing covert forces
employing ``gray ops'' (aka hybrid warfare) to incite, or amplify,
instabilities and insurgencies among fringe elements in Eastern
Ukraine. He has also given increased prominence to nuclear forces, and
to brandishing these forces in seeking to intimidate his perceived
adversaries.
What do the events in Ukraine mean for NATO members such as Latvia
and Estonia with sizable ethnic Russian populations? Would NATO even
recognize that a member state was under such covert assault? How would
other members respond under the Article V commitment to defend that
member? How should these events be reflected in U.S. and NATO security
posture and planning? What does all this mean for the U.S. nuclear
posture. These questions are at the top of the list for the next NPR.
Ten years ago, few would have imagined the events of the past two years
in Ukraine. Today, it must inform our thinking about future conflict.
Russia has an active strategic modernization program underway. Some
of it, like ours, involves upgrading older systems at the end of their
service lives. Other modernization involves potential qualitative
advancements that we must monitor closely so that we are not surprised
and, if required, can make a timely (and possibly asymmetric) response.
That said, we must be careful not to convey that U.S. modernization is
being driven by Russia's. We must modernize whether or not Russia
modernizes if we are to retain basic components of an effective Triad.
More so than its modernization program, I am concerned about
Russia's evolving nuclear strategy. In short, Russia seems to embrace
the threat of limited nuclear use to deescalate a conflict, for
example, to solidify near-term gains against a conventionally superior
adversary. Does Russia really believe that it could escalate its way to
victory say in restoring the Baltics to Russian rule? If it does, then
we must set Russia straight that no conceivable advantage at all could
ever accrue from nuclear use against NATO. The next NPR should
determine, among other things, whether existing U.S. declaratory policy
needs to be refined or clarified.
Nuclear Delivery Systems and Command and Control
Several issues involving nuclear delivery systems and nuclear
command and control (NC2) are timely for consideration in a new NPR:
How many ICBMs should we deploy (at how many bases) to
meet security needs while maintaining a robust cadre and career path
for ICBM operations?
How best can ICBM and SLBM life extension program be
leveraged to reduce costs through a smart approach to commonality
(e.g., in solid rocket motors, firing systems, guidance and control,
and ground components), recognizing that these two systems experience
different operating environments?
What additional modernization is needed to convey
credibly an important message for deterrence; that is, U.S. nuclear
forces cannot be neutralized by attacks, whether kinetic or cyber, on
the NC2 system?
In light of security developments in East Asia, and the
continuing challenge of assuring allies of U.S. security commitments,
is it time to revisit options to:
Establish and exercise, with allied concurrence and
support, a capability to deploy U.S. dual capable aircraft, and nuclear
weapons, to bases in Japan and the ROK?
Restore nuclear capability to carrier air via the F-35?
Develop and deploy on attack submarines a modern,
nuclear, land-attack SLCM?
Are New Military Capabilities Needed?
Two looming questions involving stockpile modernization are worthy
of debate and discussion:
Do we need nuclear warheads with new or different
military capabilities?
Do we need to retain capabilities to develop and produce
such warheads?
My short answers to these question are, respectively, ``maybe'' and
``most assuredly.'' It is timely to review needed military capabilities
in light of the evolution of the global security environment including
Russia's actions upsetting the emerging post Cold War international
order and increased focus on the challenge of deterring escalation in a
conventional conflict between nuclear-armed states. At least three
options may be seen as pertinent:
Lower yield options for ICBM and SLBM warheads, at least
until a viable prompt global conventional strike capability is
achieved.
Capabilities to hold at risk hardened, underground
installations.
Warheads that provide extended service life, greater
margin for enhanced reliability, modern safety and security features,
and ease and rapidity of manufacture.
These ideas are not new and I do not think it urgent to develop and
field such warheads. That said, consideration of these and other such
options should be on the agenda of the next NPR.
The second question addresses the challenge of maintaining
capabilities of weapons scientists and engineers to develop and field
modern warheads if required by a future President. To maintain such
readiness, designers and engineers must be provided opportunities to
exercise critical capabilities with challenging design problems.
Over the past decade and more, however, challenging warhead design
and development opportunities have been few and far between. Most work
today involves warhead life extension programs (LEPs) that do not
present sufficiently complex design and development challenges to fully
exercise skills. The B61-12 LEP offers challenges to the Sandia teams
developing nonnuclear warhead components--e.g., a modern warhead
electrical system--but not to the design and engineering teams at Los
Alamos. Indeed, the bomb's ``physics package'' (the warhead primary,
secondary, inter-stage and radiation case) is essentially the same as
the original bomb.
Today, there are no requirements for new military capabilities. How
then can critical skills be exercised? The LEP for an interoperable
ICBM/SLBM warhead, called IW1, when compared to today's refurbishment
LEPs, presents a formidable challenge for training young designers. The
follow-on interoperable warhead (IW2) presents an even greater
challenge. Both programs, however, were delayed by five years in recent
budgets and are late to need for retaining critical capabilities. The
next NPR should review whether to accelerate the IW1 and IW2 LEPs.
Prototyping is another option to exercise the entire design,
development and manufacturing enterprise. Here, a modern warhead design
would be taken from initial concept through prototype development and
flight testing, up to a point where a few are built but not fielded.
The FY15 and FY16 NDAAs have advanced legislation to facilitate
retention of capabilities through expanded use of prototype development
at the national laboratories, and by establishing a nuclear weapons
design responsiveness program as a key component of stockpile
stewardship. Absent these initiatives, and possibly within a decade,
there is serious risk that the nuclear weapons enterprise will be
unable to provide a timely response to unanticipated contingencies.
Establishing affordable programs to exploit these opportunities is a
challenge for the next NPR.
Nuclear Stockpile and Supporting Infrastructure
Several other issues involving the nuclear stockpile and supporting
infrastructure should be addressed with high priority in the next NPR:
Early retirement of the B83 bomb: U.S. hedge strategy seeks to
provide two separate, genetically diverse warheads for each leg of the
Triad. Sufficient numbers of one warhead are held in reserve to provide
backup in the event of an unanticipated technical failure of the other.
There are two U.S. gravity bombs--the B61, undergoing life extension,
and the B83. Current plans are to retire the B83 well before the end of
its service life, and possibly before sufficient experience is gained
with the B61-12 LEP to fully assess any ``birth defects'', in part to
avoid a relatively small investment in B83 warhead surveillance. In
light of the increased importance of extended deterrence in our
security posture, it makes sense to revisit that decision.
W76 backup: A major goal of the ``3+2 strategy'' for stockpile
modernization is to provide a ``backup'' for the W76 SLBM warhead--the
most prevalent warhead in the future force--in the event of
unanticipated technical failure. This was to be achieved by fielding
interoperable ICBM/SLBM warheads. That specific approach has been
called into question, in part by the more urgent need to extend the
life of our other SLBM warhead--the W88. In any case, there are
insufficient W88s to back up the W76. A new approach is needed to hedge
W76 failure.
Recapitalizing uranium and plutonium manufacturing infrastructure:
A responsive nuclear infrastructure to repair or rebuild warheads would
relieve the need to maintain a large stockpile of reserve warheads to
back up the deployed force. We have not had one since the early 1990s.
Progress has been made recently on what seems to be affordable
approaches to recapitalization. But the capability being provided,
particularly regarding plutonium pit manufacture, may not be in time to
meet the needs of future LEPs. It is time to resolve this problem.
conclusion
Certain issues will be highly controversial and thus pose a risk to
maintaining a continued consensus on modernization. That does not mean
that the next NPR should not study them. Rather, all of the security
implications of alternative courses of action must be understood before
moving forward carefully, and with transparency, to any recommended
changes in U.S. nuclear posture. This can best be achieved with an NPR
that integrates all elements of nuclear security, not just force
posture, embraces all agencies with national security equities as well
as allies, and communicates clearly with Congress and the American
public.
Tool completed successfully
Senator Sessions. Thank you very much.
Dr. Payne.
STATEMENT OF KEITH B. PAYNE, PRESIDENT AND CO-FOUNDER, NATIONAL
INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY
Dr. Payne. Thank you. I greatly appreciate the honor of
participating in today's hearings. I thank Chairman Sessions
and Ranking Member Donnelly for the opportunity.
I'd like to start by noting that there has been an
overwhelming bipartisan consensus on U.S. nuclear policies for
the last five decades. The debates that we have had typically
have not been over fundamental issues. For example, there is a
longstanding agreement that two primary roles for U.S. nuclear
weapons are to deter enemies and to assure allies. And from a
broad agreement on those two goals follow many points of
consensus about what we say and what we do with regard to
nuclear capabilities.
For example, because there are a variety of nuclear attacks
that must be deterred, and no one knows the minimum U.S.
capabilities necessary to deter, it is a longstanding
bipartisan consensus in support of hedging, flexibility,
diversity, and overlapping U.S. deterrence capabilities. Every
Republican and Democratic administration for five decades,
including the Obama administration, ultimately has understood
the value of hedging flexibility, diversity, and overlapping
U.S. deterrence capabilities, and ultimately rejected calls for
a minimalist approach to deterrence and deterrence
requirements. From that consensus then follows our longstanding
support and broad agreement in favor of sustaining a nuclear
triad of bombers, land-based, and sea-based missiles.
Similarly, from the agreed fundamental nuclear policy goal
of assuring allies follows the continuing consensus behind
sustaining some U.S. nuclear forces that are forward-deployed,
such as our DCA [Dual-Capable Aircraft] in Europe, or forward-
deployable, depending on local conditions and history.
These points of fundamental consensus remain with us today.
There are, nevertheless, some recent and unprecedented
developments that justify, I believe, a new DOD [Department of
Defense] review of U.S. deterrence policy and requirements
since the earlier Nuclear Posture Reviews. For example, we need
to recognize that the optimistic post-Cold-War expectations
about Russia that dominated earlier thinking do not reflect
contemporary realities. And we should review U.S. policies
accordingly. To be specific, Russian President Putin's
strategic vision for Russia is highly destabilizing. It
includes the reestablishment of Russian dominance of former
Soviet territories via Russification and the use of force, if
needed, if not by preference. Most disturbing in this regard is
that Moscow seeks to prevent any significant collective Western
military opposition by threatening local nuclear first-use.
This is not the Cold War notion of a mutual balance of terror.
It is a fundamentally new coercive use of nuclear weapons and
threats not really accounted for in earlier NPRs. Russian
military officials speak openly of preemptive use of nuclear
weapons in a conventional war. And, according to some open
Russian sources, Russia has pursued specialized low-yield
nuclear weapons to make its first-use threats credible and its
nuclear weapons locally employable. If Russia is planning--if
Russia's planning now follows this apparent policy--and I have
no reason to believe that it doesn't--it tells me that U.S. and
NATO deterrence policy is now failing in a fundamental way, and
the consequences of that failure could be catastrophic.
Consequently, the unprecedented questions to be considered in a
new DOD review is how the alliance can effectively deter this
combined arms threat to our allies and friends. What deterrence
concepts may be applicable in this case, in this new world?
What are the corresponding metrics for Western conventional and
nuclear force adequacy? And what now should be NATO and U.S.
declaratory policies with regard to deterrence?
We also need to consider the prioritization of our nuclear
policy goals. The 2010 NPR explicitly placed nonproliferation
as the top goal and said that reducing the number and reliance
on U.S. nuclear weapons was a key to realizing that top goal.
Yet, at this point, the goal of nonproliferation should no
longer be used as a policy rationale to further reduce U.S.
nuclear deterrence capabilities. After two decades of deep U.S.
nuclear reductions and focusing elsewhere, and the emergence of
new nuclear--unprecedented nuclear threats, I believe we need
to again elevate the priority of the U.S. deterrence mission
and related capabilities. Its subordination has had some
negative consequences.
Finally, since the end of the Cold War, the study of Russia
and the Russian language has declined dramatically in our
educational system, in general. And the U.S. intelligence
community reportedly has largely divested itself of the
capacity to understand Russian nuclear weapons policy,
programs, and war planning. That is a dangerous inadequacy.
Deterrence strategies depend, fundamentally, on our
understanding of the adversary's thinking and planning and
capabilities. We need both to better understand and to be able
to explain the realities of Russia's goal to change the
international order under the cover of nuclear first-use
threats. If we hope to deter effectively, we must consider
again the intellectual resources necessary to perform that
vital task.
There are many other additional points that could be made
on this subject, but, in deference to the time limit, I'll stop
there and thank you for giving me the opportunity to express my
views.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Payne follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Keith B. Payne
I greatly appreciate the honor of participating in today's hearing.
I would like to start by noting that there has been a near-
overwhelming bipartisan consensus on U.S. nuclear policies over the
past five decades. Despite the occasional flare ups, our nuclear
debates typically have not been over fundamentals.
For example, there is a long-standing agreement that two primary
roles for U.S. nuclear weapons are to deter enemies and to help assure
our allies of their security.
From the broad agreement on these two goals follow many points of
consensus regarding what we should do and say about our nuclear
capabilities. For example, because a variety of plausible nuclear
attacks must be deterred, and no one knows the minimum U.S.
capabilities necessary and credible to deter them, there is a long-
standing bipartisan consensus in support of hedging, flexibility,
diversity and overlapping U.S. deterrence capabilities.
Every Republican and Democratic administration for five decades,
including the Obama administration, ultimately has understood the value
of these attributes and ultimately rejected a minimalist deterrence as
inadequate and incredible. From this consensus has followed our
longstanding consensus in favor of sustaining a diverse nuclear triad
of bombers, land-based and sea-based missiles.
Similarly, from the fundamental nuclear policy goal of assuring
allies follows the continuing consensus behind sustaining some U.S.
nuclear forces that are forward deployed, such as our DCA in Europe, or
forward-deployable--depending on local conditions and history.
These points of fundamental consensus remain with us today.
There are, nevertheless, some recent and unprecedented developments
that justify a contemporary DOD review of U.S. deterrence policy and
requirements.
For example, we need to recognize that the optimistic post-Cold War
expectations about Russia that dominated earlier thinking do not
reflect contemporary reality, and review United States policies
accordingly: to be specific, the Putin regime's strategic vision for
Russia is highly revisionist and destabilizing. It includes the
reestablishment of Russian dominance of the near abroad via
``Russification'' and the use of force if needed. Most disturbing in
this regard is that Moscow seeks to prevent any significant collective
Western military opposition to its offensive military operations by
threatening local nuclear first use. The underlying Russian presumption
appears to be the expectation that the United States and NATO will
concede territory rather than face the possibility of Russian nuclear
first use. This Russian strategy is not the Cold War notion of a mutual
balance of terror: it is a fundamentally new, coercive use of nuclear
weapons and threats.
Russian military officials speak openly of the preemptive
employment of nuclear weapons in a conventional war. And according to
open Russian sources, Russia has pursued specialized, low-yield nuclear
weapons to make its first-use threats credible and its weapons locally
employable.
If Russian planning now follows this apparent policy (and I have no
reason to believe it does not), it tells me that United States and NATO
deterrence policy is now failing in a fundamental way, and the
consequences of that failure could be catastrophic.
Consequently, the unprecedented question to be considered in a new
review is how the alliance can effectively deter this combined arms
threat to our allies and partners: What deterrence concepts may be
applicable? And, what are the corresponding metrics for Western
conventional and nuclear force adequacy? What are the gaps perceived by
Moscow in United States will and capabilities, and how might those gaps
be filled? Does the United States need ``new'' nuclear capabilities for
deterrence and assurance, or are the existing options in the stockpile
adequate? In addition, according to numerous reports, the U.S. nuclear
infrastructure no longer is able to respond in a timely way to the
possibility of new requirements for deterrence and assurance. That
capability has been lost. If true, what level of readiness should be
deemed adequate and what needs to be done to achieve that goal?
We also need to reconsider the prioritization of our nuclear policy
goals. The 2010 NPR explicitly placed nonproliferation as the top
policy goal, and stated that reducing the number of and reliance on
U.S. nuclear weapons was a key to realizing that top goal. The ``take
away'' from that position is that the U.S. must further reduce its
nuclear arsenal to serve its highest nuclear policy goal. This point is
repeated often by critics of the administration's nuclear modernization
programs.
Yet, at this point, the goal of nonproliferation should no longer
be used as the policy rationale to further hammer U.S. nuclear
deterrence capabilities. After two decades of reducing our nuclear
deterrent and focusing elsewhere, and the emergence of unprecedented
nuclear threats to us and our allies, the deterrence rationale for
reviewing our nuclear policy priorities and the adequacy of our nuclear
deterrence forces is overwhelming.
Finally, since the end of the Cold War, the study of Russia and the
Russian language has declined dramatically in our educational system in
general, and the U.S. intelligence community reportedly has largely
divested itself of the capacity to understand Russian nuclear-weapons
policy, programs, and war planning. This is a dangerous inadequacy:
deterrence strategies depend fundamentally on our understanding of an
adversary's thinking and planning. If we hope to deter effectively, we
must review the intellectual resources necessary to perform this vital
task, and begin it again.
There are many additional points that could be made on this
subject, but in deference to the time, I will stop here.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Dr. Payne.
Dr. Roberts.
STATEMENT OF BRAD H. ROBERTS, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR GLOBAL
SECURITY RESEARCH, LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY
Dr. Roberts. And let me add my thanks to you for the
opportunity to be here, and to you, Senator Sessions, for the
kind plug for my new book.
[Laughter.]
Dr. Roberts. You've asked us to highlight elements of
continuity and change. And I'd like to look at the--this in two
basic phases: the period from the end of the Cold War up to and
including the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review, and the period
since.
And in the period across the three reviews and the review
conducted by the George H.W. Bush administration, but called--
not called a Nuclear Posture Review, but, over that period, the
two prior panelists have already hit the main point: there's a
great deal more continuity than change in U.S. nuclear policy.
Every President has wanted to move away from Cold War
approaches in nuclear strategy. Every President has wanted to
reduce nuclear arsenals. Every President has wanted to reduce
the role and salience of nuclear weapons in U.S. deterrence
strategies. Every President has also wanted to ensure that
deterrence, nuclear and otherwise, would be effective for the
problems for which it is relevant in a changed and changing
security environment. Each administration has decided to
maintain the triad, after, in fact, each administration
considering whether or not that was the right outcome. Each has
worked to ensure stable strategic relationships with Russia,
China, and U.S. allies. Each has rejected mutual vulnerability
as the basis of the strategic relationship with new nuclear
armed or arming regional challengers, such as North Korea. This
is--that last point is a huge driver, of course, of
developments in our strategic posture.
Let me also highlight two conspicuous changes over the
first three Nuclear Posture Reviews. One is the steadily rising
salience of extended deterrence and the assurance of our
allies. By the end of the Cold War, we had almost stopped
thinking about this problem. And in the 1990s, it was rare to
hear a senior defense official, or otherwise, speak about
extended deterrence and the assurance of our allies. This
problem has come center stage again in our nuclear strategy.
The other important change over those three NPRs relates to
the scope of the reviews. The 1999--I'm sorry--the 1994 Review
was very much a DOD-only look at force structuring, answering a
simple question, Now that the Cold War is over, what do we do
with this large force structure? The 2001 Review was more
effective at taking a broader look at the fit of nuclear
strategy in defense strategy more generally, and looked at how
to utilize our nuclear capabilities and strategy to underwrite
the objectives of assure, dissuade, deter, and defeat. And the
2009 Review was the broadest by far. It was the first that was
interagency in character. This, by the way, was mandated by the
Congress. It was the first that tried to integrate all of the
different elements of nuclear policy and strategy into a
comprehensive hole. So, deterrence, extended deterrence,
strategic stability, arms control, nonproliferation, and
disarmament. That was, in part, what the Congress wanted the
new administration to do, and it's, in part, what the new
administration wanted to do. My view is that this was helpful,
that a broad interagency process was effective in, one,
ensuring the needed leadership focus and ensuring the
leadership buy-in in the results of the review.
Now, second phase, looking back now at the period since the
2009 NPR. Let me highlight four key changes bearing on the
scope and content of our nuclear strategy. The first is, of
course, the abrupt turn in Russian security policy in spring
2014. With this, it's no longer possible to say, as we did in
2009, that the relationship with Russia was improving and
presenting minimum risk of armed conflict. That's manifestly
not the case today. But, as the new threat is principally to
our NATO allies, our national response needed to focus on
adapting, modernizing, and strengthening deterrence in Europe.
This process began with the 2013 Wales Summit, a few months
following the annexation of Crimea, and will be accelerated at
the upcoming July Warsaw Summit. Now, does this require a
change in U.S. nuclear policy or posture, this change in
Russian orientation? Does this require a change in U.S. nuclear
policy or posture, separate and apart from NATO's posture? I
don't think so. No administration moved away from parity as the
guiding principle in our overall strategic nuclear relationship
with Russia. We, the Obama administration, maintain an express
commitment to strategic equivalence with Russia and to the
second-to-none force-sizing criterion.
Now, the argument has been made, not by anyone on this
panel, that Russia's nuclear assertiveness requires a
comparable nuclear assertiveness by the United States and by
NATO, and that Russia's buildup of its nuclear force and
development of new nuclear weapons with new military
capabilities for new military purposes requires a like response
from the United States and NATO. Keith has already discussed
some of the deficiencies in NATO's nuclear posture, and he
almost didn't mention hardware. The deficiencies in NATO's
nuclear posture are largely in the software side. And by that I
mean how the alliance has talked about, displayed, and
exercised its commitment to nuclear deterrence. I don't think
the commitment ever went away, but it's been difficult to find
amidst all the other noise.
I said I'd highlight four key changes since 2009. The first
is about Russia, of course. The second is that we have now
learned, the Obama administration and its supporters, that the
conditions do not now exist, and are not proximate, that would
allow us to take substantial additional steps to reduce the
role and number of U.S. nuclear weapons. Remember that the
implementation of the Prague Agenda was--has been pragmatic in
character. The administration set out a plan of action to try
to create the conditions that would allow others, other nuclear
weapon states, to join with us in further steps to reduce the
role and number of nuclear weapons. After 7 years, what do we
have to show for that? Russia's not willing to take the
additional one-third reduction that we would be willing to take
if they were willing to do so on a reciprocal basis. China
hasn't even agreed to talk about nuclear weapons or to join in
strategic stability talks. It certainly hasn't accepted any new
nuclear transparency measures at a time of a buildup of its
capabilities. North Korea has continued its steady progress
towards a small nuclear force that will be capable of reaching
out and putting the United States at risk. And our allies have
shown themselves, in both Europe and Northeast Asia, unwilling
to shed the last part of the capabilities that we uniquely
associate with extended deterrence, which is our ability to
forward-deploy B61 bombs in combination with dual-capable
aircraft.
So, I don't think this means we should abandon our
disarmament nonproliferation and arms control objectives. I
think we should recognize that they are unlikely to pay any
significant dividends anytime soon, dividends measured in terms
of what we need in the way of our nuclear forces. We should not
abandon the balanced approach set out by the Perry-Schlesinger
Commission, but we should temper our expectations.
I think, lastly, the debate will occur about whether--if
Russia is unwilling to join us in further arms control, should
we simply not proceed on our own, unilaterally? We see signs of
that debate already. Of historical note is the fact that two
Republican administrations since the end of the Cold War were
willing to take unilateral steps to reduce U.S. nuclear forces.
And, of note, neither Democratic administration has been
willing to do so. So, I think we'll have this debate, whichever
stripe is in the White House.
Third change. In the period since 2009, the more
multidimensional nature of strategic conflict has come more
clearly into focus. Nuclear weapons, missile defense,
cyberspace, outer space, may all be separate domains, but
they're all part of other same strategic landscape, and they're
all a part of what we would face if ever there were to be a
significant military confrontation with Russia or China.
This puts a focus on the challenge of ensuring the needed
degree of integration across these capabilities in our policy.
This invites an important question about the scope of a
possible 2017 Review. We, the Obama administration, conducted a
QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review], an NPR, a Ballistic Missile
Defense Review, a Cyber Review, and a Space Review. Should
another administration do the same thing? Good question. I
think integration would be important and valuable, but I don't
see us not doing a repeat of other Nuclear Posture Review as a
self-standing activity.
The fourth and final difference is in the political
context. And you've already heard remarks on this from both
panelists. We should recall the stark divisions and paralysis
that marked the executive-legislative process 8 to 9 years ago.
The word has been used around this table a number of times now
about a consensus. I'm skeptical about this consensus. I think
it's neither broad nor deep. I'm not sure it extends beyond
many people at this table. And I think preserving it and
deepening it will be, and must be, a key objective of the next
administration. And, in my view, this requires being mindful of
those initiatives that might seem rewarding in the development
of new capabilities, but would be damaging to the political
will to proceed with life extension activities.
Lastly and briefly, let me highlight three key elements of
continuity since 2009 that I think we haven't so far discussed:
The first is about Asia. The 2009 Nuclear Posture Review
was really the first to give a very prominent place to thinking
about Asia in our nuclear strategy. Our focus is always,
traditionally, on Russia. How do we put a focus on China? Our
focus on extended deterrence has almost always been about
Europe. How do we think about the extended deterrence
requirements of Northeast Asia and the particular assurance
requirements of allies there? These remain important tasks, and
we can't let our focus on Russia and our concern about Russia
distract us from the Asian environment.
Secondly, let me put a finer point on a point John Harvey
made. We've said, all three administrations, we want a hedge,
we need a hedge, the need for the hedge is rising because the
geopolitical environment is becoming more uncertain. We will--
we've committed to reducing our reliance on a large stockpile
of uploadable weapons that are aging and expensive to maintain
by increasing our reliance on a flexible, adaptive nuclear
infrastructure to produce new capabilities in the future if we
need them, we don't have it. We're not getting closer to having
it. We're not even sure what that would cost. This is a problem
that the Strategic Posture Commission in 2009 very much
emphasized, and where the problem still sits in front of us
today.
Lastly, each administration has debated whether new nuclear
weapons for new military purposes with new military
capabilities are needed. We are certain to have this debate
again. We should have this debate. It's an important debate to
have. There is no unmet military requirement today. I don't
believe you've heard from the STRATCOM commander, or a former
commander, indicating that there is some significant
deficiency, in terms of STRATCOM's ability to deliver on the
guidance it's been given. There is a gap in technical
capability. These weapons are old. Where they're deficient is
in their age.
Is there a case for new nuclear weapons? Yes. One argument
we've heard is that this will reinforce deterrence because it
will give us a lower-yield option that the President might find
more credible to threaten. Another argument is that we need new
weapons in order to enhance the ability of our laboratories to
produce in the future. These are both valid arguments. I find,
on balance, neither of them persuasive. I think we can move to
the prototyping of new weapons without producing new ones, and
gain the benefits that we need in our infrastructure. And I
think there are other ways, other than hardware fixes, to deal
with the deficiencies in our deterrence posture.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Roberts follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Brad Roberts
Thank you for the opportunity to participate in this preliminary
discussion of a possible 2017 Nuclear Posture Review. I would like to
underscore that the views I am presenting here are my personal views,
following on my service as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy from 2009 to 2014 (in which capacity
I was co-director of the 2009-10 NPR) and on my authorship of a
recently published book on U.S. nuclear policy (The Case for U.S.
Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century, Stanford University Press,
December 2015). Please do not attribute my views to my new employer as
of last spring, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
You have asked us to highlight elements of continuity and change in
U.S. nuclear policy. Surveying the nuclear policies of all four post-
cold war administrations, the continuities are striking. Every
president has wanted to move away from Cold War approaches, to reduce
nuclear arsenals, and to reduce the role and salience of nuclear
weapons in U.S. deterrence strategies. Every president has also wanted
to ensure that nuclear deterrence would be effective for the problems
for which it is relevant in a changed and changing security
environment. Each administration has decided to maintain the Triad.
Each has worked to ensure stable strategic relationships with Russia,
China, and United States allies. Each has rejected mutual vulnerability
as the basis of the strategic relationship with new nuclear-armed or
arming regional challengers.
Let me also highlight two conspicuous changes over the three
nuclear posture reviews. One is the rising salience of extended
deterrence and the assurance of our allies--which has returned to as
central a place in our nuclear strategy as it had at the height of the
Cold War. The other change relates to the scope of the reviews. The
1994 review was the narrowest of the set, focused largely on force
structure decisions. The 2001 review was broader, linking strategies
for modernizing deterrence to a changing defense strategy. The 2009
review was the broadest. As mandated by Congress, it was DOD-led but
interagency in character and fully elaborated the ``balanced approach''
recommended by the Perry-Schlesinger Strategic Posture Commission
(balancing political means to reduce threats with military means to
deter them so long as they exist). Such a broad review helped to ensure
leadership focus, leadership ``ownership'' of main messages, and
effective interagency implementation. These are important benefits of
continuing value.
From the vantage point of January 2016, what are the key elements
of change and continuity bearing on the U.S. nuclear posture? I will
briefly highlight here four key changes.
1. With the abrupt turn in Russian security policy in spring 2014,
it is no longer possible, as it was in 2009, to characterize the
relationship with Russia as improving and presenting minimum risks of
armed conflict. But as the new threat is principally to our NATO
allies, our national response needs to focus on adapting and
strengthening deterrence in Europe. This process began with the 2013
Wales summit and will be accelerated at the upcoming Warsaw summit.
Does this require a change in U.S. nuclear policy or posture, separate
and apart from NATO's posture? The current posture is sized and
structured to maintain strategic stability with Russia. The Obama
administration, like its predecessors, has maintained ``second to
none'' as a guiding principle and has maintained the resilience of the
force so that it is not vulnerable to a preemptive strike. The argument
has been made that Russia's nuclear assertiveness requires a parallel
nuclear assertiveness by the United States and that its large and
diverse theater nuclear force requires a symmetric NATO nuclear force,
along with a new generation of ultra low-yield weapons. The
deficiencies in NATO's nuclear posture are not in its hardware,
however, which is robust for the deterrence of Russian de-escalation
strikes. The deficiencies are in its software--in the ways in which the
Alliance expresses its convictions about the role of nuclear deterrence
(and which will be addressed in Warsaw).
2. In the period since 2009, we have learned that the conditions
do not now exist--and are not proximate--that would allow us to take
additional substantial steps to reduce the role and number of U.S.
nuclear weapons. The Obama administration set out a practical agenda
for seeking cooperation with other nuclear-armed states to move in this
direction. What are the results? Russia has proven unwilling to take an
additional one-third reduction. China has proven unwilling to embrace
new transparency measures--or even to discuss strategic stability.
North Korea has continued its nuclear build up. Our allies are
unwilling to abandon the U.S. nuclear capabilities uniquely associated
with extended deterrence (i.e., non-strategic nuclear weapons forward-
deployed or deployable). This does not mean that the United States
should abandon the arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament
projects. Doing so would only further aggravate the problem. We should
not abandon the ``balanced approach.'' But the United States should
temper its expectations. And it should refrain from unilateral steps
that supposedly put pressure on others to join us. If it made no sense
in 2009 to take unilateral action to eliminate a leg of the triad, it
makes even less sense today.
3. In the period since 2009, the more multidimensional nature of
strategic conflict has come more clearly into focus. Nuclear weapons,
missile defense, cyber, and space may be separate domains, but they are
all part of the same strategic landscape. This puts a focus on the
challenge of ensuring the needed degree of integration in policy,
strategy, and execution. This invites an important question about the
scope of a possible 2017 review. The Obama administration conducted a
set of separate but linked reviews of these different posture elements.
Might an alternative approach enable more effective integration?
Possibly. But a single, comprehensive strategic review would be
difficult to do on an interagency basis, whereas the 2009 NPR benefited
significantly from that interagency aspect.
4. A final key difference is in the political context. In the lead
up to the Obama administration, executive-legislative gridlock had
prevented any modernization decisions. The Strategic Posture Commission
(SPC) helped to remedy that problem, with its bipartisan advice to the
Obama administration to pursue modernization by life extension, which
the administration accepted. In the interim, we have not recovered a
broad and deep bipartisan consensus on nuclear modernization. But we
have achieved sufficient agreement within and across the parties to
enable a series of positive decisions to support modernization with
steadily increasing investments. This needs to be preserved and
nurtured. Repeating the SPC would not be useful or necessary toward
that end. A private bi-partisan initiative could, however, help set the
right context and provide the right markers for the journey ahead.
Let me round out my introductory remarks by highlighting three key
elements of continuity since 2009.
1. Asia is as relevant to the United States nuclear posture as is
Europe. China's nuclear future has nearly as many large question marks
as does Russia's. Our pursuit of strategic stability with both needs to
continue to adapt. Our Northeast Asian allies are as anxious about
extended deterrence in a changing security environment as are our
Central and Northern European allies. Don't let the Russia problem
distract us from this strategic truth
2. We still don't have the hedge we say we want. Each
administration since the Cold War has wanted to ensure that we have a
strong national capacity to respond to both geopolitical and technical
surprises. Each has wanted to reduce reliance on a large and expensive-
to-maintain stockpile of aging nuclear weapons as a hedge against
uncertainty by increasing reliance on a responsive and adaptive nuclear
weapons complex. The Strategic Posture Commission put special emphasis
on this point. Fixing this problem with the proper investment and
governance strategies should be a key priority. I know of no one who
thinks that the risks of geopolitical and technical surprise are
declining.
3. Each administration has debated whether new nuclear weapons are
needed -and we are certain to have this debate again. The George W.
Bush administration's pursuit of new weapons came to a political dead
end. The Obama administration's pursuit of a modern arsenal through the
life extension of existing capabilities has been more successful. There
are two arguments for new weapons--that we need them for deterrence and
that we need them to sustain our national design competence. Both
arguments have some merit. But there is no good reason to think that a
new effort to build new weapons for new military purposes would not too
come to a political dead end. Moreover, there are other means to
strengthen deterrence and sustain design competence.
Thank you for the opportunity to join in this discussion. I look
forward to your questions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Mr. Miller.
STATEMENT OF FRANKLIN C. MILLER, PRINCIPAL, THE SCOWCROFT GROUP
Mr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Donnelly, members
of the committee, it's an honor to be in front of you. It's an
honor to be here with my colleagues, with whom I have spent
decades working together. It's an honor to see Senator
Sullivan, with whom I spent time on the NSC [National Security
Council] staff, back in the old days.
You asked me, sir, to comment on our nuclear----
Senator Sessions. Was he as brilliant then as he is today?
Mr. Miller. Yes, sir, he was.
You asked me to comment on our nuclear posture, which I
understand personally to mean our understanding of the threats
we face, our declaratory policy, and the state of our forces.
And sadly, I must report to you that I'm deeply concerned on
all counts. I believe we have declined in all three areas since
the beginning of this century.
It should be evident by now, although, astonishingly, it
isn't in all quarters of this town, that the world President
Obama called for in his April 2009 Prague speech is not the one
he's bequeathing to his successor. Rather than reducing
reliance on nuclear weapons, North Korea, Russia, and China
have significantly increased the role those weapons play in
their national security strategies. North Korea is now a
nuclear weapon state. China is modernizing its long-range
nuclear forces across the board. President Putin, over the last
10 years, has engaged in an across-the-board modernization of
his strategic nuclear forces and his theater nuclear forces--in
the process, violating the 1991-1992 Presidential Nuclear
Initiatives and the INF Treaty. Russian Defense Minister Shoygu
remarked last month that 56 percent of Russian nuclear forces
are new. You know about the dangerous military activities that
the Russians are engaged in using their strategic bombers,
their nuclear exercises which explicitly target NATO members,
and you've heard the stream of saber-rattling statements coming
from Putin and his cadre, the likes of which have not been
heard since the days of Nikita Khrushchev.
Regrettably, our declaratory policy, apart from stating,
quote, ``As long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States
will maintain a safe, secure, and reliable deterrent,'' close
quote, our policy has not recognized the threats posed by the
developments I've just described. Deterrence rests on getting
inside the head of the potential aggressor. If we think of
history, to the extent our unwillingness to respond is
perceived by the Russian leadership as weakness, much as Hitler
perceived the failure of Britain and France to respond to his
reoccupation of the Rhineland and his annexation of Austria and
Czechoslovakia, to the extent that he, Hitler, saw that as
proof Britain and France would not defend Poland, then we,
ourselves, have to be concerned whether we've left the door
open to potential Russian miscalculations, miscalculations
which could prove fatal in a crisis. We need to make clear to
Mr. Putin that, despite what he says in his exercises, that any
use of a nuclear weapon--any use--could lead to unpredictable
outcomes which could result in the destruction of his country
as well as the rest of the world.
Moreover, in sharp contrast to both Russia and China, the
United States has not deployed a new strategic system in this
century. The bomber and ICBM legs of our triad have significant
deficiencies. And yet, the modernization programs for all three
legs of the triad remain in the planning stages, with new
systems not due in the field until the mid- to late-2020s. Even
given that, we hear the arms control community calling for the
end of the long-range standoff weapon, which would take the B-
52 out of the triad and essentially eviscerate the air leg of
the triad, killing the B61 bomb, which would end our nuclear
forward presence in NATO and end our nuclear sharing there,
calls to cancel the Minuteman ICBM Modernization Program, and
even calls to cut back the number of new replacement
submarines.
As a result of all of this, I do believe a major review of
our nuclear posture is required to better align us to deter
foreign leaders whose polices, pronouncements, and investments
in nuclear forces suggest they might actually believe in
military use of such weapons in a crisis.
I may have a slightly different take from my colleagues--
some of my colleagues, however, on how that review should be
carried out. I believe it is incumbent on any new
administration to review its predecessor's policies. Certainly,
this is true with respect to defense policies and nuclear
policies. But, I believe such a review should be conducted
promptly and quietly in a highly classified manner within a
select group of policymakers and senior military officials in
the Pentagon. The results of that review should be shared with
the President and the Vice President. Changes which the review
might suggest, if approved by the Secretary of Defense or by
the President, as appropriate, should then be implemented and
announced when--at a time, and in a manner it achieves maximum
security benefits for ourselves and our allies. The relevant
congressional committees should be consulted and kept abreast
of decisions which may have been required, and all of this well
before any public rollout.
But, the hype and publicity created by holding
congressionally mandated Nuclear Posture Reviews tends, on the
other hand, to create significant and early expectations that
there will be opportunities for all interested parties to
comment on the draft changes and to affect their trajectory. In
particular, the inclusion of the State Department and the White
House staff have led to an overemphasis on arms control
initiatives and nonproliferation policies. While those are
important, the basic nuclear posture which the United States
requires to deter an attack on ourselves and on our allies
should be decided on firm national security principles. Having
decided these, an administration can expand its focus, where
arms control may be able to help support nuclear stability on a
regional or global basis. And it is here that the State
Department will, of course, have a role. Again, however, this
should be after basic deterrent requirements have been
established.
There are other good arguments against recreating prior
NPRs. Full-blown interagency involvement in Nuclear Posture
Reviews tends to increase significantly the amount of time
necessary to reach and, therefore, to implement conclusions.
Endless meetings of interagency working groups serve to slow
the review process and don't improve its results.
Furthermore, holding NPRs on a quadrennial basis has
created the expectation that nuclear policy needs to change
with every new administration. Contrary to changing policy
simply because a new administration has taken office are the
facts that the basic tenets--as has been described, the basic
tenets of our deterrence policy, as contrasted with their
implementation, have been remarkably consistent over the
decades, and this has served our country well, as well as our
allies. And the basic tenets include deterrent threats on the
ability to convince an enemy leadership that our retaliation
will impose costs which will outweigh any gains he hopes to
make. To be credible, we must have a retaliatory force which
can clearly impose the costs our policy requires, even under
the worst-case conditions of a surprise attack. And our
retaliation must focus on assets the enemy leadership values,
not on what we value. This means, as Keith Payne suggested, we
must always continue to study potential enemy leaderships to
understand their value structures.
I say all of this based on my own experiences in the
Department of Defense. Beginning in October 1981, I became the
senior-most official in OSD [Office of the Secretary of
Defense] policy tasked on a day-to-day basis with managing U.S.
nuclear deterrence policy. And I maintained that position
through January 2001, when I was detailed to the NSC. During
the period 1981 to 2001, we in OSD, working with the Joint
Staff and the Nuclear Staff in Omaha, and with the strong
support of several Secretaries of Defense, one, corrected the
perception that the Reagan administration believed in nuclear
warfighting; two, completely reconfigured U.S. declaratory
policy; three, weathered the nuclear freeze and nuclear winter
movements while maintaining support for our deterrent; fourth,
maintained the vast majority of our strategic triad
modernization efforts on track; fifth, completely overhauled
the Nation's nuclear war plans twice, once during the period
1989 to 1991, and then again as Russia began to--as the USSR
began to disintegrate, we did it again in 1991; and based,
lastly, on a firm understanding of our deterrent needs,
developed proposals which formed the basis of the 1991-1992
presidential initiatives and the START II Treaty.
Most of this was done within the defense establishment and
public mention by the then-Secretary of Defense when final
decisions were made or approved by himself or the President.
Some of the major changes, specifically those involving war
plans, were never announced. We didn't raise public
expectations that change was necessary, nor, in both Democratic
and Republican administrations, did we ask for public comment
on what we proposed to do. Neither did we involve the other
executive branch departments and agencies, with the exception
of coordinating with the Department of Energy on developing and
fielding the new nuclear warheads. The one NPR in which I was
involved, that of 1993-94, proved a disappointment, in that it
raised many expectations about radical changes in our posture
which were not fulfilled because the international situation
made such changes imprudent at best, and dangerous at worst.
Accordingly, I would urge Congress not to mandate the incoming
administration to conduct another Nuclear Posture Review, even
though I would recommend that that review take place quietly
and internally.
Mr. Chairman, I thank the committee for asking me to
testify, and I look forward to answering your questions on my
somewhat different views.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Miller follows:]
Prepared Statement by Franklin C. Miller
Committee Tasking: ``We would like you to provide an assessment of
the continuities and changes in the U.S. nuclear posture since the end
of the Cold War, with an eye toward what we've gotten right and what
policies and/or assumptions have not been borne out by recent events.
Most importantly, please provide the committee your thoughts about how
the current nuclear posture should be changed to address the strategic
environment as you see it evolving over the next 25 years. In other
words, what should be the major considerations and content of the next
nuclear posture review.''
I am honored to be here and would like to thank the Committee for
asking me to join my distinguished colleagues and friends on this
panel. I have worked with each of these gentlemen for many many years
and I deeply respect them and their contributions to the United States.
the nuclear posture of the united states
You asked me to comment on our nuclear posture--which I understand
to mean our understanding of the threats we face, our declaratory
policy and the state of our forces. Sadly, I must report to you that I
am deeply concerned on all counts, and that I believe we have declined
in all three areas since the beginning of this century. It should be
evident to all, although astonishingly it is not so--particularly in
the Washington-based arms control village--that the world President
Obama called for in his April 2009 Prague speech is not the one he is
bequeathing to his successor. Rather than reducing reliance on nuclear
weapons, Russia, China, and North Korea have all significantly
increased the role those weapons play in their respective national
security strategies. North Korea is now a full-fledged nuclear weapons
state. China is engaging in a major modernization of its
intercontinental land-based and sea-based nuclear missile forces.
And President Putin has increasingly over the last decade, presided
over an administration which is:
Engaged in an across-the-board modernization of both its
strategic nuclear triad and its shorter range nuclear forces, in the
process violating both the landmark 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty and the 1991-1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs).
In sharp contrast to our programs, which are with the exception of
updating the antiquated B-61 bomb all in the planning phase, the
Russians are deploying their new systems on land and at sea. Last month
Russian Defense Minister Shoigu stated that over 50% of Russian nuclear
forces are ``new'';
Using strategic bombers to engage in highly dangerous
military activities and maneuvers adjacent to the our own airspace and
that of our NATO and Pacific allies (in some cases actually endangering
civil aviation);
Carrying out a series of nuclear exercises which
explicitly simulate attacks on our NATO allies; and
Issuing a stream of nuclear saber rattling policy
statements and specific threats, including many by Putin himself, the
likes of which have not been heard since the days of Nikita Khrushchev.
Regrettably, our declaratory policy, apart from stating that ``as
long as nuclear weapons exist the United States will maintain a safe,
secure and reliable deterrent'' has not recognized the threats posed by
the developments I have just described. To the extent that our
unwillingness to respond is perceived by the Russian leadership as
weakness--much as Hitler perceived the failure of Britain and France to
respond to his reoccupation of the Rhineland and his annexations of
Austria and Czechoslovakia as proof that London and Paris would not
defend Poland--then we have left open the door to potential
miscalculations by Mr Putin and his gang, miscalculations which could
prove deadly in a crisis.
Moreover, in sharp contrast to both Russia and China, the United
States has not deployed a new strategic system in this century. The
bomber and ICBM legs of our Triad have significant deficiencies. And
yet, the modernization programs for all three legs of the Triad remain
in the planning stages, with new systems not expected in the field
until the mid-to-late 2020's. Worse yet, the arms control community
continues--despite the deal it struck to support Triad modernization in
exchange for ratification of New Start--to call for slashing the
modernization programs: eliminating the replacement for the air
launched cruise missile (thereby taking the B52 out of the Triad and
eliminating our ability to use the so-called ``bomber discount rule''
which then-Strategic Command head General Bob Kehler said was crucial
to maintaining sufficient strategic weapons numbers under New Start);
eliminating the replacement for the Minuteman ICBM; cancelling the B61
modernization program, thereby ending NATO's forward based nuclear
deterrent and its concurrent nuclear risk- and burden-sharing; and
cutting back the number of SSBNs (which, in the aggregate, will carry
upwards of 70% of our deterrent under New Start).
As a result of all this, I believe a major review of our nuclear
posture is required in order to better align us to deter foreign
leaders whose policies, pronouncements, and investments in nuclear
forces suggest that they might actually believe in military use of such
weapons in a crisis.
reviewing our nuclear posture or a holding new nuclear posture review
I believe I have a slightly different take from my colleagues,
however, on how that nuclear review should be carried out. Let me say
at the outset that I believe it is incumbent on every incoming
Administration to review its predecessor's policies. This is certainly
true with respect to defense policies and particularly the case with
respect to nuclear deterrence policy and the programs and plans which
support that policy. Where I believe I may part company with my
colleagues, however, is that I believe such a review should be
conducted promptly and quietly and in a highly classified manner,
within a select group of policy makers and senior military officials in
the Pentagon; the results of such a review should be shared with the
President and the Vice President. Changes which the review might
suggest, if approved by the Secretary of Defense or the President, as
appropriate, should then be implemented and announced when appropriate
and at a time and in a manner which achieves maximum national security
benefit for the United States and our allies. The relevant
Congressional Committees should be consulted where appropriate and kept
abreast of decisions which may have been required--and all this well
before a public roll-out.
The hype and publicity created by holding ``Congressionally-
mandated Nuclear Posture Reviews'' tends, on the other hand, to create
significant and early expectations on the Hill and elsewhere that there
will be opportunities for all of the interested parties--Congressional,
other Executive branch agencies, and public interest groups--to comment
on the draft changes and to affect their trajectory. In particular, the
inclusion in the past of the State Department and the White House staff
have led to an over-emphasis on arms control initiatives and non-
proliferation policies. While those are important, the basic nuclear
posture which the United States requires to deter attack on ourselves
and on our allies should be decided on firm national security
principles; having decided these, an Administration can expand its
focus to where arms control might be able to help support nuclear
stability on a regional or global basis--and it is here that the State
Department will have a role. Again, however, this would be after the
basic deterrent requirements had been established.
There are other good arguments against recreating prior NPRs. Full-
blown interagency involvement in Nuclear Posture Reviews also tends to
increase significantly the amount of time necessary to reach--and
therefore to implement--conclusions; endless meetings of interagency
working groups serve to slow the review process and do not improve its
results. Furthermore, holding NPRs on a quadrennial basis also has
created the expectation that nuclear policy needs to change with every
new Administration. Contrary to changing policy simply because a new
Administration has taken office are the facts (1) that the basic tenets
of U.S. nuclear deterrence policy (as contrasted to the implementation
of those policies) have been remarkably consistent over the decades,
and (2) that such consistency has served the nation, and our allies,
well.
Those basic tenets include:
Deterrence rests on the ability to convince an enemy
leadership that our retaliation will impose costs which will outweigh
any gains he hopes to make through his aggression;
To be credible, we must have a modern retaliatory force
which can clearly ipose the costs our policy requires--even under the
worst-case conditions of a surprise attack;
Our retaliation must focus on assets the enemy leadership
values--not on what we value; this means we must always study potential
enemy leaderships tho understand their value structures;
My views are based on my own experiences in the Department of
Defense. Beginning in October 1981, I became the senior most official
in OSD/Policy, tasked on a day-to-day basis with managing U.S. nuclear
deterrence policy (with the exception of actual nuclear target
planning). In 1985, I also assumed responsibility for nuclear target
planning. As I advanced in my career, rising to be a Deputy Assistant
Secretary, a Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, and an Assistant
Secretary, I maintained control of the nuclear portfolio. This
continued through January 2001, at which point I was seconded to the
White House as Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control.
During the period 1981-2001, we in OSD, working with the Joint Staff
and the nuclear staff in Omaha, and with the strong support of several
Secretaries of Defense:
corrected the perception that the Reagan Administration
believed in nuclear war-fighting,
reconfigured U.S. declaratory policy,
weathered the nuclear freeze and nuclear winter movements
while maintaining support for our deterrent,
maintained the vast majority of the strategic Triad
modernization efforts on track,
completely overhauled the nation's nuclear war plans
twice (once during the period 1989-1991, and then again as the USSR was
beginning to disintegrate in 1991)
and, based on a firm understanding of our deterrent
needs, developed proposals which formed the basis of the 1991-1992
Presidential Nuclear Initiatives with Russia and of the START 2 Treaty.
Most of this was done within the Defense establishment, and public
mention was made by the then-Secretary of Defense when the final
decisions had been approved either by himself or by the President. Some
of the major changes, particularly those relating to the war plans,
were never announced. We did not raise public expectations that change
was necessary nor, in both Democrat and Republican Administrations, did
we ask for public comment on what we proposed to do. Neither did we
involve the other Executive Branch departments and agencies (with the
exception of coordinating with the Department of Energy on developing
and fielding new nuclear warheads.) The one NPR in which I was
involved, that of 1993-1994, proved a disappointment in that it raised
many expectations about radical changes in our posture which were not
fulfilled because the international situation made such changes
imprudent at best and dangerous at worst. Accordingly, I would urge
Congress not to mandate that the incoming Administration conduct yet
another Nuclear Posture Review.
Mr. Chairman, I again thank the Committee for asking me to testify
and I look forward to answering any questions the Committee might have
for me.
Senator Sessions. Thank you. Well, it's an important
situation we're dealing with.
I hope, as we go forward, maybe we'll take turns. If
somebody would like to follow up a little bit on what the
previous questioners' questions were out of turn, just raise
your hand, and--if you want to clarify something. Let's don't
be afraid to ask simple questions, because sometimes those are
the best questions that get asked.
We had Secretary James of the Air Force testify this
morning. She repeated what others have said, that Russia
represents the greatest threat, or the potential greatest
threat, to the United States. It's sort of painful to hear that
said, when we were so hopeful other things might--things might
be different.
So, we've had some assumptions for a long time that have
driven our nuclear strategy. And let me ask you about this. So,
one of the assumptions I think were--is that great power
conflicts--Russia/United States, in particular--are a thing of
the past. Another one was, it--the United States should lead
and that others would follow to reduce the importance of
nuclear weapons to their national security. I would say--this
is one quote the President delivered in South Korea, under the
umbrella, ``As President, I've changed our nuclear posture to
reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons in our national
security strategy. I made it clear the United States will not
develop a new nuclear warhead, will not pursue new nuclear
missions for nuclear weapons. We've narrowed the range of
contingencies under which we would ever use, or threaten to
use, nuclear weapons.'' It was a pretty historic statement, I
thought, particularly in light of where it was delivered.
Rose Gottemoeller, in Prague in 2015--2014, December--at
a--altered that position a bit. She says, quote, ``We are
seeing new and enduring pressures on the nonproliferation
regime, pressures that threaten global stability. We are seeing
nations turn away from cooperation, turn away from the common
good of nonproliferation efforts and cling ever more tightly to
their nuclear arsenals.''
Another early assumption was that conventional substitutes
for nuclear weapons--conventional weapons--would diminish the
need for nuclear weapons. It--so, here we'd like to--I'll start
with Dr. Harvey. You started this off. And maybe we'll take a
minute or two here and discuss. Have assumptions--do our
assumptions need to be changed?
Dr. Harvey. I would say, first of all, that I think the
greatest nonproliferation mechanism since the end of World War
II has been the North Atlantic Alliance and the extension of
nuclear forces from the United Kingdom, France, and the United
States to that alliance so that countries--many countries in
that alliance who had the capability, both technical and
political, to produce their own nuclear weapons have not. In
this--and by the same course, our extension of our deterrent to
Japan and South Korea have provided the disincentive for those
two countries to develop their own nuclear weapons. Another
success for nonproliferation. So, I think you need to look at
this from that perspective.
The second point I want to make was one you made earlier,
which is that I would say part of the continuity is--from all--
since the end of the Cold War, all presidential administrations
have sought to reduce the role of nuclear weapons. President
George W. Bush, a fundamental part of his Nuclear Posture
Review was the inclusion of defenses--conventional defenses and
the inclusion of precision conventional strike to try to free
up some of the needs for nuclear weapons to fill some of those
roles.
Senator Sessions. I guess that time is going to----
And, Dr. Payne, you--if you would respond. And--but, it
does appear that the goal--the presidential policy, as the
President Stated in South Korea, not to develop new weapons,
and et cetera, et cetera, we have--it hasn't had the desired
result, it would seem to me.
But, anyway, what's your comment, in general?
Dr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me comment on the first point that you made, the notion
that conflict is a thing of the past. This was one of the great
hopes of the post-Cold War order. We were going to be in a new
world order that was going to be more benign. And,
particularly, we and the Russian Federation would be able to
cooperate and possibly even get to near-allied status. Go back
and look at--that was----
Senator Sessions. That was absolutely the dream.
Dr. Payne. That was the hope and, in some cases, the
expectation, even. Even as recently as 2012, a former Vice
Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said the idea of conflict
between the United States and Russia is a thing of the past,
not the future.
Let me just suggest, as an extension of what I said
earlier, is that, given what we now know the Russians are
saying, both externally and to themselves in their open
documents, their views are based on a very different
understanding of how the world now works. They are talking
about an expansion of Russian dominance into areas that we
thought were settled in the post-Cold War order, including the
change of territorial borders by force, if necessary. And what
they talk about is the use of nuclear threats, and, indeed,
even nuclear employment, if necessary, as cover for that
Russification and expansion of Russian domination.
Unfortunately, we've seen conflicts come out of that. We know,
at least it's reported, that in 2008 Russia went to a nuclear
alert in its operations against Georgia, and in 2014, President
Putin said that he had thought about going to a nuclear alert.
This is a very different world than we expected, post-cold-war.
And so, that's where--that's the line of thinking that leads me
to concur that there needs to be a review--a defense review of
some sort, the details to be worked out, because the world has
changed in a major way. And so, how we've looked at these
things over the last two decades also needs to change.
Senator Sessions. Well, thank you. I know others would like
to comment, but I'll turn to Senator Donnelly. I would note
your comments in your opening remarks about the very technical
nature of their tactical weapons evidences a serious
contemplation that they might be used. Would you agree with
that?
Dr. Payne. Yes, sir. The open Russian press from senior
Russian officials and scientists suggest exactly that. In fact,
in an important case, Victor Mikhailov has said--it was a--he
was head of the Sarov--was--at the time, was the head of the
Sarov Institute--said that the Russians were working--making
great progress on a nuclear scalpel that could be used in a
conventional conflict. As we understand, the idea is that a
nuclear scalpel could be used that would be at such a level
that the West would not respond, because it would be
essentially deterred from responding at a nuclear level, and
therefore, the West would essentially back down. I mean, that
appears to be at least part of the Russian thinking, and it's--
it goes by the name of ``to escalate to de-escalate a
conflict.'' In other words, escalate to nuclear use, and that
de-escalates the conflict. It de-escalates a conflict because
the West backs down. That's the notion of what's being
discussed, openly.
Senator Sessions. That's a grim reality.
Senator Donnelly?
Senator Donnelly. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
You can't always determine what another person thinks. You
can influence it one way or another, but you can't think for
them. I'm curious, just as a starter, Do any of you believe
that NATO would not fulfill--NATO countries would not fulfill
their treaty obligations to another NATO country if they were
attacked? Do any of you believe we would not?
Dr. Roberts. No.
Senator Donnelly. Do any of you believe that the Russians
think we would not respond?
Mr. Miller. I believe that there are reasons that they
could convince themselves, however wrongly, that we would not
respond. And that is my concern, sir.
Senator Donnelly. And you can send signals, but you can't,
on your own, determine what another person thinks or how
they're going to behave as they move forward. Let me ask you
this, to all of you. The ruble is worth 82, 83, somewhere
between 80 and 85--the last week, 85 rubles to a dollar, based
primarily on oil, their economy. As their economy grows into
deeper trouble, do you think that makes Russia more dangerous
or less dangerous on this front?
Dr. Payne. I think it has both effects, or it has
potentially both effects. In other words, what the Russians
have been--President Putin, in particular, has been saying
about the reduced economic resources is that Russia would
continue to make the military the first priority, and, in that
context, nuclear weapons the highest priority within the
defense establishment.
That said, if the resources dwindle as much as it looks
like they might, the question is, To what extent can they
actually maintain that? The Russians seem to suggest that
they're going to maintain it. Whether they will or not, I
think, is an open question. And that may make them more
dangerous, not less dangerous.
Senator Donnelly. And then I guess the followup question to
that is, As you look at this, how much of what you're hearing
from them is being driven by their economic conditions, the
things they're struggling through, that they have to have
something to talk about, something to lead forward with?
Mr. Miller. Sir, I'd say that what we saw, starting about 6
to 8 years ago, was President Putin changing the nature of the
Russian political system, even when they were riding high,
economically. And so, the emphasis on nationalism, the emphasis
on being surrounded by foreign forces, the elimination of
political opposition at home is part of the picture, whether
they're making money or not.
I think, to your prior question, it's always a concern
that--Russian history shows that, when regimes are having some
problems at home, they start to focus people's attention abroad
and to stir up nationalism.
All that said, I don't believe we're in any serious
circumstance of having Russia reach out and grab one of our
NATO allies. Now, I'm not sure what would happen in a crisis,
when he thought that was his least worst option.
Senator Donnelly. When you look at this on a continuing
basis--one of the things we've heard in the past is that, some
years ago, when it was clear that Russia--if there was a ground
action in that area, Russia had--would have--had a stronger
presence than NATO would. Now you look, and we've heard that
NATO on the ground would have a much stronger presence. You
don't think so.
Mr. Miller. No, sir. Again, if you look, geographically, at
the combination of ground forces in the Baltic region, the
Russian forces are much stronger. The Secretary of Defense has
taken great steps to improve our own capabilities, deploying
smaller numbers of U.S. forces, but the conventional balance on
the Russo-Baltic border is clearly----
Senator Donnelly. Well, how far do they go before it
matches up?
Mr. Miller. NATO?
Senator Donnelly. Yeah, before NATO forces and Russian
forces----
Mr. Miller. Tens of thousands of forces, sir, that we're
not----
Senator Donnelly. No, no, I'm sorry. What I mean is, on the
ground, how far would they have to go before it becomes an even
fight? Like heading over--in toward Europe?
Dr. Harvey. We have to reinforce, and then we can win the
war, but it takes us time to reinforce.
Senator Donnelly. But, with the reinforcements on the
ground, we have the advantage, at that point.
Dr. Roberts. We do not. We do not--we have--the current
NATO conventional force structure cannot be deployed in any
kind of timely fashion to redress a Russian invasion. The
reinforcements would have to come from across the Atlantic.
Senator Donnelly. So, you don't think that any of their
talks in regards to nuclear weapons is related to shifting
forces on the ground and shifting advantage on the ground.
Mr. Miller. Well, the concern would be if--if they achieved
a quick, limited tactical victory and we began to reinforce,
that the threat would then come--if we didn't stop our
reinforcements and simply leave the situation in the status
quo, then they would escalate to de-escalate and use nuclear
weapons. That's where the Russian strategy leads you.
Dr. Payne. Can I mention that President Putin has said that
he can have Russian troops in five NATO capitals in two days? I
don't know whether Russia plans to do that, but if President
Putin believes that, that can be the type of mistake that--that
Frank mentioned--that could lead to, you know, a disaster, even
though we, on our side, believe that it would be disastrous for
them to move in that direction.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you very much.
Senator Sessions. On the China border, is the opposite the
case, where the Russians are less able to resist the--a Chinese
advance, and therefore, they would even be more committed to a
scalpel or a nuclear weapon?
Mr. Miller?
Mr. Miller. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. Let's see. Senator Fischer?
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sessions. Thank you. I heard your--I heard Omaha
being mentioned on the football game the other day a lot.
Senator Fischer. I know. We always make the news.
Nebraska's always the leader.
[Laughter.]
Senator Sessions. Your Mr. Manning----
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Senator Sessions.--quarterback Manning----
Senator Fischer. I know. Peyton Manning----
Senator Sessions.--keeps calling your name.
Senator Fischer. He was----
Senator Sessions. I've thought about you.
Senator Fischer. He was just the best. That helped him--and
that helped him to win, when he yells out ``Omaha.''
Dr. Harvey, in your earlier statement, you referenced then-
President Bush, in 1991, in some actions that he had taken. At
that time, he unilaterally eliminated, I think, almost all the
deployed tactical weapons--tactical nuclear weapons that we
had. Did he expect the Russians to follow suit on that? Because
they did not. Did he expect that to happen?
Dr. Harvey. There was, I believe, the expectation--while
the--President Bush's--President Bush 1's tactical nuclear
reductions were unilateral--that there were be some
reciprocity. There was some reciprocity, but some of the
Russian promises on reciprocity have not been fulfilled.
Mr. Miller. Senator----
Senator Fischer. And as we look at our--as----
Mr. Miller. Senator, I was one of the architects of that.
Yes, the--President Bush made a speech, in late September 1991,
where he announced what we were going to do, and it
specifically challenged the Russian leadership to do the same
thing. President Gorbachev, in 1991, and President Yeltsin, in
1992, committed themselves to do virtually everything that
President Bush announced for our forces. But, as Dr. Harvey
indicated, they--and you've said--they failed to carry out
their pledge.
Senator Fischer. And today, we're faced with the tactical
nuclear weapons that the Russians have. And I think that line
is blurring between the tactical nuclear weapons and the
strategic nuclear weapons. How do you feel that we're going to
be impacted by that, especially with the Russians making a
number of advancements with their tactical nuclear weapons? How
does--how's that going to affect our nuclear posture in the
future? If you would all like to address, specifically, the
Russians, but also dealing with other nuclear powers that we
are looking at in his world, whether it's the Chinese or North
Korea, or looking down the road in the future to even Iran.
How's that going to affect our deterrence?
Dr. Roberts. So, let me start, if I may, with the Russia
piece. So, NATO's nuclear posture consists of two main
elements: the independent nuclear forces of the three nuclear
allies within the alliance; and the nuclear sharing
arrangements, which have steadily come down, and we can say at
the unclassified level, to 97 percent from their Cold War
height, the number of deployed weapons by the United States in
support of the nuclear assuring arrangements. So, the question
for NATO is how to adopt that posture to the new situation
presented by Russia and to its new capabilities.
The key development in Russian military doctrine is this
elaboration of the escalate-to-de-escalate strategy and the
footnote to that, which is, they recognize that that may not be
effective in achieving the result they would like, so they've
introduced a vocabulary now about pre-nuclear deterrence, the
use of long-range non-nuclear strike systems, whether cruise
missiles or ballistic missiles, that would be used to escalate
a conflict in order to de-escalate it, but below the nuclear
threshold. We need to strip away their confidence that those
threats are going to be effective in inducing NATO's restraint.
We can do that with a little bit of missile defense, a little
bit of non-nuclear strike of our own, and an ability to
retaliate if they conduct limited nuclear strikes, which we
have with our DCA arrangements, and an ability to escalate if
they continue with nuclear strikes, which we have with our
strategic national assets of the three countries.
So, this is--I don't see the Russians solving a significant
military problem for themselves by producing low-yield nuclear
weapons. If they use nuclear weapons, they will have crossed a
dramatic threshold. And the fact that they have certain yields
and certain downrange hazards will not be terribly impressing
upon the alliance of the need to do something decisive in
response to impress upon Russia the degree of its
miscalculation.
Now, the key wildcard here is where they go with INF
[Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty]. If they--if their
violation of the treaty proceeds now to the deployment of some
significant force of intermediate-range nuclear weapons, then I
think the problem for the NATO alliance becomes more complex.
And in that circumstance, I am not sure that the existing DCA
arrangements would be adequate to signal the resolve of the
alliance, when threatened.
So, with that, I'll set us--turn to others for the
additional comments.
Dr. Payne. I'll be happy to comment.
Senator Fischer. Dr. Payne.
Dr. Payne. And that is--it--the question isn't just how the
Russian nuclear weapons impact what we may or may not do; it's
how the Russian combined arms, conventional and nuclear
weapons, impact what we may or may not do. And let me just give
you an example. Defense Minister Shoygu just announced that
Russia was going to establish three new divisions in the
western district opposite NATO with permanent basing and that
Russia was going to move the S-400 to Kaliningrad. What this
suggests is a very serious buildup of conventional capability
in the western districts. We shouldn't be surprised by that, I
guess, given what they're saying, but it's actually happening.
So, you know, what does that mean? It means that NATO needs
to be able to prevent conventional fait accompli by Russia,
because we can't allow President Putin or the Russian elite to
believe that they can have Russian troops in five NATO capitals
in two days. And that's----
Senator Fischer. They've--but, they've shown to us that
they can move their forces quickly.
Dr. Payne. That's true. And that's--and so, what I'm
suggesting is, this is something that NATO needs to respond to.
We need to make sure that Russian cannot----
Senator Fischer. But, do we----
Dr. Payne.--produce these fait accompli----
Senator Fischer.--do we respond with a--nuclear deterrents?
That's--you know, that's my question.
Dr. Payne. Right.
Senator Fischer. What is our posture going to be, going
forward, with regards to deterrence when you're--not just the
conventional weapons that they have, but also--and not just
Russia--but with their tactical?
Dr. Payne. Yes, Senator Fischer. I think it's a two-pronged
approach. We have to be able to deter the conventional
assault--the Russian troops in five NATO capitals in 2 days.
And helping to counter that vision of the Russians is
important. And conventional forces are necessary for that; not
just on a rotational basis, but having conventional forces that
can help prevent that will help deter that. We also need to be
able to deter the nuclear escalation threat. So, we need to be
able to do both. And that's where I believe there is a role for
NATO and U.S. nuclear weapons to deter that notion that nuclear
escalation will save the day for them.
Now, what does that mean for us when you look at the
basics? Where does the rubber meet the road? It means that we
can't remove the DCA from Europe. That would be ridiculous at
this point. But, there have been many, many suggestions that
the United States DCA should be removed from Europe. We should
go ahead. We must go ahead with the B61-12 for the DCA. We need
to maintain our deterrent that can help prevent the Russians
from thinking they can nuclear escalate their way out of a
problem that they create by trying to put Russia troops in five
NATO capitals in 2 days. So, it's a two-pronged deterrence
approach.
Mr. Miller. Could I just be--very brief, say--we have two
problems. One, Putin's rebuilt Russia's nuclear and
conventional forces. And two, he's shown a propensity to use
those conventional forces in Georgia and Ukraine when he
thought there was low risk. Our job, as the United States, and
our job, as to NATO, is to say to him, ``There is an extreme
risk in using those forces of any kind against the alliance.''
And that means building up some conventional capability in
Europe, and it means retaining a good, credible nuclear
deterrent, which means modernizing our forces. If he is
convinced there will be cost to potential aggression, he's not
going there. But, at no cost, he could.
Senator Fischer. Will it take the United States to be the
leader on that, to bring in all of the NATO partners that we
have so that they understand the importance of having a line of
defense with Russia? They have a big border now to protect----
Mr. Miller. We are the----
Senator Fischer.--whether it's in the south, and the issues
they face there, but--how do you convince, I think, especially
Western European countries of the importance of having that
firm border on the east?
Mr. Miller. We are the leaders of the alliance. Without us,
there is no NATO alliance. And it makes hard work. I chaired
NATO's Nuclear Policy Committee for 4 years. You can do that.
You can bring those countries along. But, it takes hard work.
Brad knows that. My other colleagues know that, as well. We
have to lead, and we have to be prepared to take that burden
on.
Senator Fischer. And, Mr. Chairman, I am way over my time,
but can I have Dr. Harvey respond?
Senator Sessions. Important.
Senator Fischer. Since I used your name at the beginning,
sir.
Dr. Harvey. I think it's important that we recall that,
back in the 1950s and the 1960s, when Russia had a massive
conventional strength on the western--on the--confronting the
western alliance, that we declared that we would use nuclear
weapons first to repel conventional aggression. We want to get
beyond that. We need to have our capabilities in place to deter
conventional attack with conventional forces. And that
involves, very likely, restoring some military capability from
the United States to the alliance, and figuring out ways to
exploit technology better, via offset strategies, et cetera, to
be able to achieve military objectives, not necessarily with
stationing massive armored divisions forward, but with
technology.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Senator King?
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It seems to me there's a real dilemma at the core of this
discussion, and that is, How do we increase our deterrence in
Europe with a NATO deterrent without at the same time feeding
Putin's paranoia about aggression from the West? There's a kind
of--it's not really chicken-and-egg; I think it's a downward
spiral, it seems to me.
Mr. Miller, would you comment on that? Because clearly part
of what motivates Putin is a 500-year-old Russian belief that
the West is out to get them.
Mr. Miller. I think he is motivated by that, Senator King,
but I also think that he and his military experts are quite
aware of what our capabilities are and are not. The movement of
a United States Brigade Combat Team to the Baltics, and
actually parceled out among those countries, is clearly not an
offensive threat. I don't--I think he and his military are
quite clear that NATO cannot, and does not, present an
offensive threat to Russia. But, as you say, it feeds the
paranoia, and it helps him in his general political approach to
dominance and eliminating opposition in Russia.
Senator King. How much of this new-found Russian
aggressiveness, if you will, is Putin himself, as an
individual, and how much is Russian doctrinal structural
thinking?
Dr. Harvey, you want to take a crack at that?
I realize--we spend a lot of time around here
psychoanalyzing Mr. Putin, so we may as well do it a bit more.
Dr. Harvey. If my wife were here, who--she is a Russia
specialist. She's a--an expert on the Putin stuff. But, I'm
going to turn this over to Keith. I think he can handle this
one better.
Dr. Payne. Thanks, John.
We make a mistake if we personalize this to President
Putin----
Senator King. Right.
Dr. Payne.--because most of what we hear and see, and the
kind of things that the--come out in the--particularly the open
press with regard to the topic that we've been discussing today
go back to 1999-2000. We see military leaders making statements
that are, as I said earlier in my prepared remarks, preemptive
use of nuclear weapons in conventional conflict. So, it's much
more of a culture and a regime position than it is narrowly
personalized President Putin. My strong belief is, if President
Putin for some reason were no longer on the scene----
Senator King. We'd still be dealing with this.
Dr. Payne.--we'd still be dealing with this, yes, sir.
Senator King. That's important. That was the thrust of my
question.
Let me change the subject entirely, because we've been
talking about Russia most of the time. Very specific question,
briefly. How vulnerable are we, in terms of command and
control, to cyberattack? We can have all the weapons in the
world, but if we can't communicate because of a--some--a
cyberattack of some nature--and, to the extent, in an
unclassified setting, you can share your thoughts.
Dr. Harvey. I spent quite a bit of time worrying about this
when I was working with Ash and others in the Department of
Defense. Before he became Secretary and Deputy Secretary, he
led a crusade within the Department to strengthen the command
and control of nuclear forces. One of the key elements of the
command and control of nuclear force is ensuring a cyber
integrity of the system. We have an old system.
Senator King. That may be good.
Dr. Harvey. That may be good, to some degree. We're
thinking of--we have to modernize it. Part of Ash's initiatives
was to introduce a complete comprehensive, ongoing cyber
assessment of the command-and-control system. And we're
starting off with the ICBM force, and we're moving through the
whole system. I am not currently current with that cyber
vulnerability assessment. But, it's something I worry quite a
bit about. And it's important that we devote the right
attention to ensuring that we can get a conference set up with
the President, we aren't fooled into believing that the attack
is underway, when it really isn't--when it isn't--or that it
isn't underway when it really is. We need to ensure that we can
communicate with our forces, and that no one can disrupt those
communications.
Senator King. Well, I'm glad to know that work is ongoing,
and I hope it has a sense of urgency.
Mr.--Dr. Roberts.
Dr. Roberts. I had a comment on that. We have a command-
and-control system tailored for the problem of the 1960s and--
--
Senator King. That's reassuring.
Dr. Roberts.--which is essentially--in plain speak, it
enables the President to take a 5-minute multiple-choice quiz
and then skedaddle, which fit a world in which we worried
seriously about the possibility of a major bolt-out-of-the-blue
Soviet strike.
If that's the path--if that's no longer the pathway to
nuclear war, what might be? Well, the case that concerns all of
us around the table, I think, is regional aggression, a
regional conflict, where the adversary tries to escalate its
way out of a failed act. And thus, the first decision the
United States encounters about employing a nuclear weapon isn't
in the bolt-out-of-the-blue context. And, if you will, if the
system is geared to enable the President to take a multiple-
choice quiz in 5 minutes, what he needs to be able to do is to
take--pass the essay test. Imagine a Korean contingency in
which North Korea has crossed a red line of ours. We face a
decision about whether and how to respond with a nuclear
weapon. Who's the President going to want to talk to? And--
many, many, many people.
Senator King. Right.
Dr. Roberts. And is the system geared to do that? Well,
that's not quite the nuclear command and control system, but
it's a part of the new landscape we're in. And moreover, if
we're entering the phase of nuclear decision after some period
of prolonged conventional regional war, we can expect that
cyber and space assets both would already have been under
attack. And thus, we might be entering the nuclear phase of a
conflict with a weaker command-and-control system than has been
our assumption when we think that the problem is the bolt-out-
of-the-blue.
So, there's an excellent question about the cyber
vulnerability of the command-and-control system, but there's a
related question about whether the system, as it was conceived
and constructed for the problem of the past, how it needs to
evolve to be effective for the problem that's emerging in front
of us.
Senator Sessions. Senator----
Senator King. Mr. Chairman, may I follow up with one
additional question?
Mr. Miller. And you've got--could I just say--command and
control, while vital, has always been an afterthought. We have
to modernize the triad and OES----
Senator King. Right.
Mr. Miller.--nuclear command and control, too. I would
recommend to the committee that it engage in looking at that
over the next year. This is a critical element of our--it is
the most critical element of our force structure.
Senator Sessions. The command and control----
Mr. Miller. Yes, sir. Nuclear command and control.
Senator King. I wanted to ask one additional question. It
may be that you could answer very briefly and give us some
thoughts on the record.
Again, to change the subject utterly. We've been talking
about Russia, then we've been talking about escalation, North
Korea. What about terrorists? How--deterrence doesn't work
against a suicidal nonstate actor. The whole theory just breaks
down. Do we need a--I mean, how do we deal with that? We've--
deterrence has been very effective, a tremendously effective
doctrine for 70 years, but now we're in an entirely different
situation, where if somebody doesn't care about dying and they
don't represent a country--how do--what's the strategic
doctrine that deals with that threat?
Dr. Harvey. I would make one point. First of all, we can
deter the sale or transfer of nuclear weapons from states to
terrorists by making it clear to states that we hold them
accountable for those transfers; and, two, that we have the
capabilities to know whose nuclear weapon just went off and
where it came from. And that's an important critical aspect of
deterrence in the concept of terrorism.
Senator King. Is that a well-known concept in the world
today? People--other countries know that that's our----
Dr. Harvey. We have fairly robust nuclear forensics
capabilities to be able to determine, if we acquire a nuclear
weapon from a--that--where it came from, and, number two, if
one goes off, also be able to understand, through debris
analysis, where it came from. And that's pretty well
understood. I think the point of--once the terrorists get the
bomb, yeah, you're right, they're going to want to use it, and
they're not going to care if they give up their lives to use
it. And our job has to be able to create barriers and delay
mechanisms to convince them they will not be able to achieve
their objective, which is to kill a lot of Americans or a lot
of allies.
Senator Sessions. Senator Cotton, thank you for joining us.
Senator Cotton. Well, thank you for the invitation. I don't
sit on the subcommittee, but I believe that, while there may be
more immediate threats to our national security, there's no
more fundamental issue for the safety and security of the
American people than our nuclear forces.
I'm occasionally asked by those on the left, as well as--
who pose nuclear weapons--and those on the right, who look for
places to trim spending, ``Why do we spend so much on weapons
we never use?'' My answer, first, ``On the contrary, we use our
nuclear weapons every single day.'' And, second, ``We actually
don't spend that much on our nuclear weapons.'' I think it's
less than 5 percent now of the total defense budget. That is a
very valuable investment.
To that end, when was the last time the United States
designed a nuclear bomb?
Dr. Harvey. The last full-up nuclear weapons--nuclear
warhead that we designed was the W88 SLBM warhead for the
Trident ballistic missiles carried on submarines. And that was
in the 1980s.
Senator Cotton. When was the last time we built a nuclear
warhead--a new nuclear warhead?
Dr. Harvey. It was the W88, probably--we were producing
them through the late 1980s into the early 1990s, when
President George Herbert Walker Bush stopped the production.
Senator Cotton. It is the current policy of the United
States Government not to develop new nuclear warheads or pursue
new military missions for nuclear weapons. Should that remain
the policy of the United States?
Dr. Harvey. That policy should be reviewed in every
administration. This administration, early on, made a decision,
in light of the difficult efforts underway to sustain the
existing stockpile, not to go off and develop new warheads or
new--new nuclear warheads and for nonproliferation objectives.
It was not a decision, for all time, not to consider the
possibility of having new or different military capabilities in
the force. And every Nuclear Posture Review should revisit that
decision. Indeed, all Presidents, including this one, has said
we need to maintain the capabilities to ensure that we can
develop new or different warheads for providing different
military capabilities, if required from an evolving security
environment.
Senator Cotton. Mr. Miller, I saw you nodding your head?
Mr. Miller. Senator, I--I was not in the administration,
was not a part of this administration, but the intent of that
policy, as I understand it, as the intent of the Prague speech,
was to set an example for others not to either rely more on
nuclear weapons or build new nuclear weapons. The French, the
Russians, the Chinese, the Indians, the Pakistanis, and the
North Koreans are building new nuclear weapons. If the intent
of our policy of self-restraint was to stop them from doing so,
that policy has failed. To the degree that our stockpile
requires new capabilities, then I think we ought to examine
that.
Senator Cotton. Let's move from warheads and general policy
to delivery systems and immediate policy. I have seen several
reports, both in the media and in conversations, that the long-
range standoff cruise missile may not be fully funded in the
President's upcoming budget request. Senior civilian and
military DOD officials insist that this is absolutely
necessary.
Mr. Miller, would you like to explain why they have reached
that conclusion?
Mr. Miller. Yes, sir. The bomber leg of our triad consists
of 19 B-2 bombers and about 50-odd B-52s. The only way the B-52
is an effective deterrent is by carrying a cruise missile. The
cruise missile that it carries now, the AGM-86 ALCM, first
entered the force in about 1980-1981. It's got reliability
problems. And whereas it was stealthy then, it is no longer
stealthy today. So, if you don't have the long-range standoff
weapon, you don't have the B-52, and, by extension, you really
don't have a triad anymore.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Dr. Payne, do you have anything to add on that question?
Dr. Payne. I would just add, as a--at a general level, that
the more flexible our capabilities are, the more diverse they
are, the more likely it is that we'll have what's necessary for
deterrence when it becomes extremely important to have an
effective deterrent. And so, the continuing reduction and
narrowing of our capabilities, I believe, has a adverse effect
of narrowing the potential that we will have what's needed for
deterrence when that crisis comes. And so, I think that the
cruise missile is extremely important, for the reasons that
Frank mentioned, but also in general, because we need to retain
a flexible, diverse force structure for deterrence purposes.
Senator Cotton. And my time is expired, here, but if I
could just conclude, Senator Sessions, with----
Senator Sessions. Yeah.
Senator Cotton.--one comment, since you and Senator King
had a conversation about Vladimir Putin and his intentions, and
divining those intentions.
Operations by Russia began in earnest in Syria in late
September. They continued unabated to include several
violations of Turkish airspace, 'til Turkey shot down a Russian
aircraft in its airspace in late November. To my knowledge,
since then, Russia has not had any incursions into Turkish
airspace.
What do you think that tells us about Vladimir Putin's
response to countries or adversaries that draw a line on his
aggressive conduct?
Dr. Payne. I think it--what it shows is that Vladimir Putin
is a calculating person. He has a chance to be reckless, but,
when he sees that being reckless really will have very negative
consequences, he can also pull back. That's why, in our
discussion today, our goal is to make sure that he doesn't make
a mistake and act on some of the more reckless ideas that seem
to be part of what that regime is talking about.
Senator Cotton. Well, I would agree with that. And I would
add, for the record to that conversation about Russia, that 500
years of Russian history shows that it's actually the West that
has more to fear from Russian aggression than Russia from the
West. The two main times they've faced a threat from the West,
from Napoleon's France and Hitler's Germany, it was the West
that united against that invader and on the side of Russia. And
if you ask Sweden or Poland or the liberal uprisings of the
19th century where they had the most fear from, it was from
Russia; it was not from anyone in the West.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Well, Dr. Payne, just follow up a little bit on that and--
because we really need to get your opinion on the necessity, or
not, of a new nuclear weapon. What I hear you saying is, in
this world of calculation by powers, that if Russia or some
other nuclear state is calculating that they can take--use a
small-yield--some sort of small-yield nuclear weapon, and they
calculate we won't retaliate, they are more likely to use that
weapon. Is that--first--that's the first question. If they
think we won't retaliate, they're more likely to use it than if
they are certain we would retaliate.
Dr. Payne. If they think that they have license to do that,
then they're more likely to move in that direction.
Senator Sessions. And if, to follow up, the flexibility
you're talking about in--if you only have, you know, a
nonsurgical-type response capability, then they might increase
their belief that you're not going to--you don't have the right
kind of weapon to respond, and might, again, cause them to
more--be more willing to use a nuclear weapon. Is that--I guess
I'm--you can probably see where I'm going.
Dr. Payne. Sure.
Senator Sessions. So, the question is----
Senator Donnelly. And if I could just add to that. And this
is--I don't want to go into any classified areas--but, don't we
have the ability to work with our weapons to match what they
do?
Senator Sessions. And so, the question--we'll get there.
The deal, to me, is--and we don't talk about it much--but, we
must have a realistic ability to respond, and our adversaries
need to know it. And we don't--that--and we don't need to be
put in a position where we've got to pour troops in, and they
be vulnerable to a nuclear attack. There's a--so, how do you
evaluate that, in terms of the kind of flexibility we need----
Dr. Payne. Right.
Senator Sessions.--in our system?
Dr. Payne. Yes, sir. I think you have hit the key question.
And my basic answer is, we need to fill the gap that the
Russians seem to see in our capabilities. What that gap is
seems to be at the low end of the spectrum, low-yield nuclear
weapons, very accurate nuclear weapons. Now, whether that means
we need a new capability, or not--I hate to be an academic, but
it depends on how you define ``new.'' If I heard my colleague,
Dr. Harvey, talk about ``new'' as something that would be
outside or beyond designs--existing designs. And it may well be
that----
Dr. Harvey. Qualified in nuclear tests.
Dr. Payne. Exactly. So, if the designs that we have,
qualified via previous nuclear tests, are as broad as I
understand them to be, then we may not need new nuclear
capabilities. We may need something that's outside of the
current stockpile, but it's not a new nuclear capability. But,
the first thing we need to do--and this is where I get back to
the point that Frank made earlier--is that we need to
understand what the Russians are doing and saying, and what
their views are, before we deem what we need for deterrence. In
other words, we need to understand them first, because what we
have has to impress them. It doesn't just have to impress us;
it has to impress them. So, we need to fill a gap we see.
Senator Donnelly. And isn't one of the other things we need
to do to send a clear message, through one way or another, that
any use of any weapon is--will clearly be countered immediately
the same way?
Dr. Roberts. So, easier said than done.
Senator Donnelly. No, I get that, too. But, I mean----
Dr. Roberts. You're passing through the filter of all of
their perceptions about the credibility of that threat.
Senator Donnelly. And it really comes down to a Clint
Eastwood moment of, ``Do you feel lucky? Do you think we're not
going to act?"
Dr. Roberts. Right.
Senator Donnelly. And----
Dr. Roberts. And what we----
Senator Donnelly.--our job is to ensure that they look at
the weight of evidence, and the evidence is that we will, I
guess.
Dr. Roberts. Yes. And that we make it difficult for them to
calculate precisely what risk they're going to run. Putin's
shown himself to be an astute player of low-stakes poker. He's
gone up against us everywhere that our stake hasn't been
anywhere near what his stake is. That's low-stakes poker. Going
up against NATO would be high-stakes poker. And we need to do
everything within our realm to demonstrate our conviction, our,
just, belief, that that would be so. I'm not sure that new
declaratory policy statements, new threats to Russia, new red
lines in the sand would have any impact on a man who's, by and
large, made up his mind about our strategic behaviors and our
strategic personality. But, to the extent we can expose him to
risks that he can't calculate, costs that are higher than he
might have expected to pay, and--while at the same time
reducing his expected benefits out of threatening and attacking
NATO and trying to pull it apart, then we make it more and more
difficult for him to convince himself that he can run these
risks and win.
So, I think the nuclear tool in the toolkit is fundamental,
but it's a much broader toolkit, and it begins with how we
convey the role of deterrence in the alliance's overall
strategy, and how we convey our intent to defend the vital
interests of our allies.
And just to sort of close with a comment on the quotation
you had, Senator Sessions, from President Obama in Seoul. What
was missing from the quotation, which--was what he then went on
to say, which was, ``But, we want North Korea to make no
mistake that the United States would use nuclear weapons on
behalf of South Korea when its vital interests are at risk.''
That's the message that they need to hear. And they need to
hear it from everybody in our political system, not just the
Commander in Chief.
Mr. Miller. If I could, sir, since I'm the one who said we
ought to say something in our declaratory policy. Nothing in
isolation makes sense. It's a combination of what we say, how
we exercise, how we lead in NATO, and how we modernize our
forces. Way back in the bad old days, they used to--we used to
say, ``We know we can't win a nuclear war. Our job is to
convince the Soviet leadership that they can't win, either.''
It's words like that. It's leadership. It's modernization. And
it's working with our allies to make clear to everybody that an
attack on one is an attack on all, and that it's high stakes.
Senator Donnelly. It's the entire picture that you paint.
Mr. Miller. Yes, sir.
Dr. Roberts. May I come back to the, ``Do we need new?''
question?
Senator Sessions. Right.
Dr. Roberts. Since this is clearly----
Senator Sessions. You indicated previously you didn't think
so. And so, modernization, you favor. Is that correct, Dr.
Roberts?
Dr. Roberts. Absolutely.
Senator Sessions. All right. So, go ahead.
Dr. Roberts. This is a case where the best may be the enemy
of the good, which is to say if--if we were to set out today
and to define the optimal nuclear arsenal for the security
environment we sit in, in 2016, it would probably look somewhat
different from the arsenal we have. But, do we know that
anything is different politically from the circumstance of the
George W. Bush administration, when executive-legislative
agreement was not possible on even replacement warheads? I'm
worried about the circumstance in which we go off and say,
``We're not sure that a new capacity is really going to just
solve this problem us, but it seems like it's the right thing
to do,'' and watching the political support for life extension
programs evaporate. Then we end up in a worst-possible world.
So, there's a pragmatic political question, here, it seems
to me, about whether or not going for new is an attractive
option. But, you're not asking the political question, you're
asking the military strategic question, ``Does this enhance, in
a fundamental way, in a--or a significant way, the nuclear
toolkit we already have in place?'' And I go back to my
starting point. Is there a military commander who has said
there is some deficiency in our ability to do what's--guidance
calls for, which is to put at risk those things that we believe
enemy leadership values? It's not simply to destroy enemy
societies. It's to do something much more complex. We don't see
evidence--I mean, no military leader has come forward and said
there is an unmet requirement.
So, the question then is, well, from a deterrence
perspective, as opposed to a warfighting perspective, might
there be some benefit? And you set out the case, but, if I may
observe, with a series of ``mights.'' Putin ``might'' think we
might--he might interpret this, he might think that. It seems
logical to us that he ought to be more impressed by the threat
to employ a lower-yield weapon than a higher-yield weapon. But,
I don't think we should join Mr. Putin in trying to reduce the
nuclear threshold to the lowest possible level with the lowest-
yield nuclear scalpels. We want it to be clear. Nuclear weapons
are brutish. They're meant to be different, ``You--if you cross
this line, we're not going to mess around with trying to match
you, scalpel for scalpel. You've changed the conflict, and
you've changed our stake, with crossing the nuclear
threshold.''
So, I don't see a deterrence rationale that's strong and
credible for going for new. There you have it.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Dr. Harvey. Could I elaborate on that one point?
Senator Sessions. Caused us all to think.
Who else would like to comment on that?
Dr. Harvey. I'd like to comment on the point that----
Senator Sessions. Dr. Harvey.
Dr. Harvey.--Senator Donnelly made. And I--it reinforces, I
think, Frank's comment--is that--I personally am not optimistic
that a--that you can manage escalation once nuclear weapons are
used. That's my view. And I believe that's our--that's the view
of many in the United States. I'm not sure that's Mr. Putin's
view. And that's the question. How do I convince him that he--
he may think he can manage escalation. So, what do I need to do
to convince him that he--that should introduce doubt in his
mind about that? And what that means to me is, we've got to
think about that, and that's what--exactly what the next
Nuclear Posture Review--and we shouldn't necessarily foreclose
any option until we understand what we think we need.
Senator Sessions. Dr. Payne--and before we get into it, I
would just say: Carrying through on a thorough effective
modernization would be a modest step in that direction, would
it not, Dr. Roberts?
Dr. Roberts. More than modest, I think.
Senator Sessions. Dr. Payne?
Dr. Payne. I just want to add that I agree with Brad's
point--I think we all do--that we don't want to mimic what the
Russians are doing for the sake of mimicking the Russians. I
don't know that there's any value in that at all. The question
is, what do we need to do to shut down the Russian strategy?
Because that we do need to do, and we all agree that we need to
shut down this Russian strategy. And so, the question isn't
mimicking the Russians; it's, Is there a gap that we can fill
that will contribute to shutting down the Russian strategy? You
know, I don't know that something new is necessary to do that,
if we define ``new'' the way Dr. Harvey rightly, I think,
defined it. I don't know that something new is necessary for
that. At the same time, I don't think we should come in and, a
priori, say we're not going to do anything new. I mean, we
should be able to take a good look, and try and understand,
What is it that the Russians are doing? What's their strategy
based on? And what does it take to fill whatever gap they see,
when we understand what that gap is? And we're just at the
nursery slopes of doing that, frankly.
Senator Sessions. Senator King?
Senator King. I would argue, taking off from that point, is
that the development of the new standoff cruise missile isn't
new. It's simply a making the--that arm of the triad effective,
based upon current realities. You all would agree?
[All three witnesses nodded in agreement.]
Senator King. Okay.
Again, change the subject a bit. It appears that the
Russians violated the INF Treaty. Is the INF Treaty still in
our best interests? Should we move on beyond it? Should we take
their--should--how do we respond? And do we respond possibly by
simply saying we're no longer going to abide by it, either?
Mr. Miller. I think that this--we're right back into, ``We
don't want to mimic what the Russians are doing.'' The Treaty
is of value if the Russians--if the Russians abide by it.
They've broken the Treaty. We need to work to try to get them
back into compliance with it. But, on the assumption that they
don't, then we ought not maintain the fiction that the Treaty,
in fact, is governing both sides, that it's a--they've made it
a dead letter. That said, given that introducing new
groundbased weapons into NATO is always a neuralgic issue, has
been from the very beginning of the alliance, I would not try
to match what the Russians are doing with a similar kind of
weapon system. I'd try to use our intelligence and our brains
to figure out a new way of offsetting that capability, should
we decide that's necessary for deterrence. And my own
inclination would be to go back to some sort of a submarine-
launched cruise missile.
Senator King. Dr. Roberts?
Dr. Roberts. Recalling my case, in my opening statement,
about the importance of Asia to this discussion, if we had the
opportunity to produce intermediate-range, conventionally-armed
ballistic missiles, this would be a useful response to China's
anti-access area denial strategies, and a--an important tool in
the assurance of our allies, and also avoiding a potential
difficulty among our allies as South Korea pursues theater-
range ballistic conventionally-armed missiles of its own, thus
inciting some Japanese interest in the same.
So, if the INF Treaty were to no longer be binding on the
United States, there might be certain advantages to derive for
our interests in the Asian security environment.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This has been a very
valuable hearing. I appreciate you.
Senator Sessions. We're lucky to have such a wise panel.
Senator Donnelly, anything further?
Senator Donnelly. No. Their wisdom has exceeded my ability
to absorb it.
[Laughter.]
Senator Sessions. That is a ditto here.
Thank you all for your comments. And I think we've all
gotten a sense of--we need to get this right. We don't need to
blunder in short-term thinking and make some errors that might
have ripple effects that we don't foresee today.
Thank you all.
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:18 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
[all]