    [Senate Hearing 114-652]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 114-652

                 CURRENT TERRORIST THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                        SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

                                     OF THE

                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                          THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2015

                                   __________

          Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence

                    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

             Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov

                                       ________

                           U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    24-733 PDF                      WASHINGTON: 2017
      _____________________________________________________________________________
      For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office,
    Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov. Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800
                Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001

                        SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

               [Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]

                     RICHARD BURR, North Carolina, Chairman
                  DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Vice Chairman

    JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho                RON WYDEN, Oregon
    DANIEL COATS, Indiana                BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
    MARCO RUBIO, Florida                 MARK R. WARNER, Virginia
    SUSAN COLLINS, Maine                 MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
    ROY BLUNT, Missouri                  ANGUS KING, Maine
    JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma             MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas
                     MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
                         HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio
                        JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio
                      JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio
                                  ----------
                          Chris Joyner, Staff Director
                     David Grannis, Minority Staff Director
                      Desiree Thompson Sayle, Chief Clerk

                                    CONTENTS

                                   ----------

                               FEBRUARY 12, 2015

                               OPENING STATEMENTS

    Burr, Hon. Richard, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from North Carolina.     1
    Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from
      California.....................................................     2

                                    WITNESS

    Hon. Nicholas Rasmussen, Director, National Counterterrorism
      Center.........................................................     4
        Prepared statement...........................................     9

                             SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL

    Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at
      Guantanamo Bay, Cuba...........................................    37

                 CURRENT TERRORIST THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES

                                  ----------

                          THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2015

                                           U.S. Senate,
                              Select Committee on Intelligence,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:32 p.m. in Room
    SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Burr
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members Present: Senators Burr, Feinstein, Risch,
    Coats, Rubio, Collins, Blunt, Lankford, Cotton, Wyden, Warner,
    and King.

       OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BURR, CHAIRMAN, A U.S.
                      SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA

        Chairman Burr. Good afternoon. We're going to get the
    hearing started. I want to welcome Director Nick Rasmussen from
    the National Counterterrorism Center. Nick, we've invited you
    here today in an open session. I think there were some of the
    news outlets, Vice Chair, that said this would never happen
    with me being Chairman, that everything would be closed, and I
    just want to point out we are having an open session.
        This is to provide the Senate and the American people with
    an update on the current threat from terrorism. The Committee
    remains concerned about the expanding, evolving nature of this
    threat and the challenges facing the intelligence community and
    the evolving nature of the threat.
        This is the first of what I hope will be a number of open
    hearings that should give the intelligence community an
    opportunity to better inform the public of its current efforts
    and challenges. As Mr. Rasmussen and I have talked about:
    Here's what we do; here's sort of how we do it; as much as we
    can tell; but more importantly, here's why the American people
    should understand why this is important to them. It's about
    their defense.
        Given the nature of the material we're here discussing and
    the fact that this is an open hearing, I want to remind
    everyone to use extreme caution to protect intelligence sources
    and methods. While this is an excellent venue to engage Nick
    Rasmussen, I reserve the right to immediately suspend any
    questions or comments that may be sensitive in nature or whose
    response could disclose classified information.
        The Congress is currently debating several matters that
    impact our counterterrorism efforts, including an AUMF on the
    conflict in Iraq and Syria. As we take up these issues, I want
    to make sure that our members and the public understand the
    serious and credible threat that many of these groups present
    to the security of the United States and to our allies.
        In addition to addressing the threat itself, I hope you'll
    discuss the impact that media leaks, encryption, and other
    collection challenges are having on your ability to detect and
    to thwart terrorist attacks.
        Nick, I'm afraid that your job is getting harder at a time
    when we can least afford it. I've spent more than ten years as
    a member of the House and Senate Intelligence Committee, as has
    the Vice Chairman, and have watched closely the threat
    environment as it's evolved since the attacks of 9-11.
        The threats we face today are much greater than those we
    faced since 2001. Al-Qaeda in 2001 was estimated to have less
    than a thousand members. The group was relatively
    geographically contained, and plots against our interests were
    infrequent by today's standards. Today we face groups like the
    Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, which is often described
    as a terrorist army, with memberships estimated to be in the
    tens of thousands.
        We face terrorist safe havens spanning North Africa, the
    Middle East, and South Asia and are confronted by a host of
    different plots almost daily. We have evacuated our embassies
    in Libya and Yemen due to threats against our personnel, and
    terrorist groups are becoming more creative, threatening our
    citizens and allies with non-metallic IED's and massive truck
    bombs; in addition, their mastery in the use of the Internet
    and social media to disseminate propaganda, to recruit fighters
    that often already have access to western countries, like we
    have seen in Europe, Canada, and even in New York.
        One of the biggest lessons we've learned from the September
    11th attacks was that we cannot give terrorists a sanctuary
    from which to plan attacks against us. Arguably, ISIL now has
    control of the largest territory ever held by a terrorist
    group. This safe haven provides ISIL and other extremists with
    the time and space they need to train fighters and to plan
    operations. It also has provided them with the access to
    weapons and a network that can be used to support external
    operations.
        We knew about the threat we faced from al-Qaeda prior to 9-
    11, but we failed to act. I just hope we don't make the same
    mistake again.
        Nick, I once again thank you. I welcome you here, and I now
    turn it over to the distinguished Vice Chairman.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, VICE CHAIRMAN, A
                      U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA

        Vice Chairman Feinstein. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Director Rasmussen, welcome. Let me say that I've been
    reading a number of your intelligence products, and
    particularly on threats yesterday. I think your agency is doing
    a very good job. I think you're outwardly bound and just the
    way we think it ought to be. So I want to thank you for that
    good work.
        Today provides us an opportunity for the Committee, as the
    Chairman has said, to discuss in unclassified terms the
    terrorist threats to the United States and to the rest of the
    world. This is really particularly important, that the American
    public understand these threats, because they provide the
    necessary context for a number of policy decisions that the
    United States Government is facing and that we have to help
    make. These threats affect whether we authorize the use of
    force against ISIL, the need for our continued military
    deployments to counter terrorism efforts, and the need to
    reauthorize intelligence tools necessary to keep our country
    safe.
        I believe that the terrorist threat facing the United
    States is as diverse and serious as at any time in our history.
    I have never seen more serious threats. These come from both
    inside our country and outside. More so than any other
    terrorist organizations we've seen in the past, ISIL is seeking
    to radicalize followers around the world and inspire attacks in
    our homeland.
        They are extraordinarily visible. If you look at AQAP, just
    as much a danger to us, but much more invisible. The uniforms
    of ISIL, their equipment, their taking over the city, the
    children that have been beheaded, the Christians who have been
    sacrificed, the Iraqi Army that's been--700 frog-walked and
    then shot down in cold blood, all of this has been on
    television. So Americans have come to know the threat that ISIL
    is.
        The guidance from ISIL to potential terrorists is clear. It
    wants westerners to come to Syria and to Iraq to fight. ISIL
    instructs them how to carry out attacks at home, and that's
    what we're up against. There are more than 100 Americans who
    have either traveled to Syria or attempted to travel there.
    There are 20,000 foreign fighters who have traveled to Syria
    and who will return home. At least 3,400 of them are from
    Western Europe, and that includes visa waiver countries, where
    they are a plane ticket away from the United States.
        What we don't know is how many people are inside the United
    States following ISIL on the news and on social media and who
    are becoming inspired to carry out their own attacks.
        Separately, al-Qaeda remains focused on conducting attacks
    against our homeland. While AQ in the ungoverned areas of
    Pakistan may be as weak as it has been in many years, al-Qaeda
    in the Arabia Peninsula, or AQAP, still poses a clear threat.
    The group is enjoying a safe haven in Yemen with the Houthi
    overrun of the government there.
        Remember, AQAP was behind the attacks against Charlie
    Hebdo. The group has already attempted to send non-metallic and
    essentially undetectable bombs into our country on four
    occasions, beginning with the Christmas Day 2009 Abdulmutallab
    ``Underwear Bomber.'' They do have a bomb that can go through a
    magnetometer. And AQ has published step by step directions for
    building that bomb in the latest ``Inspire'' magazine.
        Our efforts to confront AQAP are significantly diminished
    with the removal of President Hadi of Yemen. The Houthis may
    have no love for AQAP, but over time the Yemeni government had
    become a strong counterterrorism partner that we no longer
    have. Closing our embassy in Sanaa was the right choice, but
    the instability in Yemen presents AQAP with new freedom to roam
    and kill.
        Elsewhere, there is a power vacuum in Libya, maybe even
    civil war. In much of northwest Africa groups are using that
    territory for a safe haven. I could go on and on.
        But let me just conclude with one remark that I hope
    Director Rasmussen will address. On June 1, three provisions of
    the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which we call
    ``FISA,'' will expire. They are the business records authority,
    the roving wiretap, and the lone wolf. If these authorities
    expire, the intelligence community will lose key tools to
    identify terrorist groups and to protect the homeland. This
    includes NSA's phone metadata program as well as the authority
    for domestic FBI investigations, but also other important
    authorities.
        So I look forward to your testimony, Director Rasmussen,
    and again I thank you for the excellent work that you are
    doing.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Burr. Thank you, Vice Chairman.
        Let me say for the purposes of members, it's my intent once
    the testimony has been received that we will go to five-minute
    questions based upon the order of attendance. Hopefully, that
    has been shared with everybody.
        We will at this time turn to the Director for as much time
    as your testimony might take, Nick.

       STATEMENT OF HON. NICHOLAS RASMUSSEN, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
                        COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER

        Director Rasmussen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Madam Vice
    Chairman, and members of the Committee. I have submitted for
    the record a much longer statement that has gone around the
    world and discussed in some depth the threat picture as we see
    it.
        Thank you first for inviting me today to discuss the
    terrorist threat the United States is facing worldwide and also
    to discuss NCTC's particular efforts to counter that threat. As
    both the Chairman and Vice Chairman have noted, today's threat
    environment is increasingly diverse and dynamic, as is the wide
    array of terrorist actors that is driving this environment.
    Those actors are located across Africa, Asia, the Middle East,
    and they can increasingly reach into the West, even into the
    United States.
        The emergence of Iraq and Syria as extremist battlefields
    and ISIL's related expansion in reach has brought about changes
    in that terrorism landscape. The emergence of new groups in the
    wake of the Arab uprisings since 2011 has also altered the
    threat picture, as most of those groups are focused more on
    achieving local gains in their regions.
        We're also experiencing a new level of specialization and
    fragmentation within that larger terrorism landscape. We
    believe we might be entering into an era in which the
    centralized leadership of terrorist groups matters less than it
    did previously. We may be entering a time in which group
    affiliation and identity is more fluid and extremist narratives
    are more focused on a wider range of alleged grievances and
    enemies. As Paris showed us, this may also be a time in which
    personal connections among individual terrorists may be more
    relevant to their plotting than their individual group
    affiliation or identity.
        Now, even in this dynamic and increasingly complex threat
    environment, I still believe it is possible to differentiate to
    some degree the threat we are facing in the U.S. and in the
    West from the threat we are seeing in the regions where many of
    our terrorist adversaries are located. As we look at that
    global terrorism picture, we are trying to be careful not to
    paint that picture with a single broad brush, and I'll try to
    explain.
        In the United States and in the West--and by ``the West'' I
    traditionally mean Western Europe--the threat of catastrophic
    attack has been significantly reduced as we and our partners
    have been able to apply consistent counterterrorism pressure to
    some of the most dangerous groups that we face. Now, clearly
    sustaining that counterterrorism pressure and the key elements
    of that counterterrorism pressure in those key places around
    the world is an essential condition to preventing the
    reemergence of some of the more complex threats that would aim
    to have catastrophic impacts on our homeland.
        But in this current environment, our assessment is that we
    face a much greater, more frequent recurring threat from lone
    offenders and probably loose networks of individuals. Measured
    in terms of frequency and numbers, it is attacks from those
    sources that are increasingly the most noteworthy feature of
    the terrorism landscape.
        Since May of last year, 10 of the 11 attacks we've seen in
    the West were in fact conducted by these individual extremists,
    two here in the United States and the nine others occurring in
    Europe, Canada, and Australia. Now, the majority of these
    attacks, these 11 attacks, look more like what we would expect
    from random acts of violence rather than the effort at large-
    scale destruction that we saw in terrorist plotting immediately
    after 9-11.
        In going forward, we believe that both individuals and
    smaller networks will try to mount similar attacks, to try to
    capitalize on and build momentum from the media coverage that
    these kinds of attacks generate.
        Now, it's also important to note that what I would call
    these smaller-scale or lower-level attacks still can cause
    amazingly tragic human suffering. They can clearly generate
    fear among local populations, and they clearly have profound
    political effects on the societies in which these attacks come.
    And I'm in no way seeking to minimize the impact that such
    attacks can occur.
        Furthermore, our increasing focus on these smaller-scale,
    more-frequent, lower-level attacks in the West should not in
    any way suggest that we're no longer concerned with the ability
    of established terrorist groups and even some individuals to
    target western aviation, which would certainly constitute a
    large-scale and potentially catastrophic attack. Mitigating
    that threat to aviation remains at the very top of our priority
    list in terms of disruption efforts.
        It also remains true that we still face moderate and small-
    scale threats from groups that are more structured and
    cohesive, like traditionally al-Qaeda was and some of the
    traditional al-Qaeda affiliates and allies. And although the
    number of groups posing that truly transnational threat is
    somewhat smaller and our efforts to place pressure on them have
    met with some success, it's important to remember that these
    groups are persistent and they're patient with their desires
    and their plans to strike the homeland.
        Now, in contrast to the threat we face here at home and in
    western capitals, our allies and partners in Africa, Asia, and
    the Middle East are facing in some ways a much different
    threat. As you know, some of the most ambitious and active
    terrorist groups are located in countries that are continuing
    to work through the effects of the Arab uprisings in recent
    years, places like Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Other
    terrorist groups are very active in countries undergoing
    insurgencies, places like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria,
    Somalia, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and again Yemen. In all of these
    countries, terrorist groups are trying to displace weak
    governments or to make significant territorial gains.
        In other countries, terrorists are contributing to
    population displacements that are affecting millions of people
    on a huge scale. This is happening in places like Iraq, Syria,
    Nigeria, and Afghanistan. Some of these terrorist groups are
    also responsible for stoking sectarian tension and contributing
    to the proliferation of Sunni on Shia violence.
        Now, amidst all of this insecurity, violence, and political
    instability around the world, terrorists are carrying out ever
    more violent attacks much more frequently in these countries
    and often on a much greater scale than what we've seen recently
    conducted here in the West. In the last year alone, we've
    assessed that there have been hundreds of attacks in these
    countries that have, unfortunately, caused thousands of deaths.
    Just last month, as the world focused its attention on Paris
    and the attacks there, at the same time, as this Committee well
    knows, attacks on local populations by Boko Haram in Nigeria,
    AQAP in Yemen, were taking place on a significantly larger
    scale.
        Now, despite the fact that I've tried in some small way to
    differentiate between the threat environment in the West and
    the threat environment we see in Africa, the Middle East, and
    South Asia, there is one phenomenon which draws those two
    separate threat pictures tightly together. That phenomenon is
    the continued flow of foreign fighters to Syria, and
    particularly those fighters who come from western countries.
    While the majority of the roughly 20,000 foreign fighters have
    in fact come from the Middle East and from North Africa, more
    than 3,400 have, we assess, come from western countries.
        Now, at NCTC we're working to advance a broad effort across
    our Center to track foreign fighters, working very closely with
    the rest of the intelligence community and with our partners
    around the world. NCTC compiles information on known and
    suspected terrorists who travel to Syria, and we house that
    data in our Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment, known as
    ``TIDE.'' That effort has created a valuable forum for
    identifying, tracking, and sharing information on known or
    suspected terrorists with key stakeholders, and that includes
    the law enforcement community, the counterterrorism community,
    the screening, and the watch-listing communities.
        Also, this TIDE effort has also directly helped to resolve
    inconclusive identity information, enhance TIDE records with
    more information, and, most importantly, upgrade watch list
    status for several hundred known or suspected terrorists.
        NCTC officers are also working to fully identify foreign
    fighters who potentially have access or connections to
    individuals in the homeland so that they, too, can be watch
    listed.
        Now, to do all this my officers are using NCTC's unique
    access to a wide range of IC and law enforcement information,
    wider than anywhere else in the IC. This access includes our
    own data holdings as well as our embedded officers from ten
    other intelligence organizations.
        Now, to prevent individuals from traveling to Syria in the
    first place, my officers are also working to diminish the
    appeal of terrorism. In partnership with the Department of
    Justice, with Department of Homeland Security, and with the
    FBI, we have helped develop tools to counter violent terrorism
    and raise awareness among our law enforcement and community
    leaders across the country. We have tried to tailor these tools
    to address foreign fighter recruitment, particularly in this
    updated ISIL context, and we have received a significant amount
    of positive feedback from the communities with whom we have
    worked. There's definitely a demand signal for more of this
    across the country.
        Now, despite these concerted efforts, the nature of today's
    threat is, as we discussed at the beginning and was evident in
    both the Chairman and the Vice Chairman's statements, the
    nature of today's threat is challenging significantly our
    ability to identify and disrupt terrorist plots. This is coming
    at a time when we are, unfortunately, losing capability.
        Today the terrorist-related communications of our terrorist
    adversaries are increasingly intermingled with communications
    that are not relevant to our terrorism work, but they are not
    separate and easily identified streams of information. Signals
    intelligence is increasingly important in denied areas around
    the world where we face challenges with getting information
    from human sources. It's difficult for us to operate in places
    like Syria and Libya and increasingly now in Yemen, and
    terrorist groups are watchful for the possibility that they
    could be infiltrated by human sources.
        Due to the Snowden leaks and other disclosures, terrorists
    also have a greater understanding of how we seek to conduct
    surveillance, including our methods, our tactics, and the scope
    and scale of our efforts. They have altered the ways in which
    they communicate, and this has led to a decrease in collection.
    We have specific examples, which I believe we have shared with
    the Committee and the Committee staff in classified session,
    specific examples of terrorists who have adopted greater
    security measures, such as using various new types of
    encryption, terrorists who have dropped or changed email
    addresses, and terrorists who have simply stopped communicating
    in ways they had before, in part because they understand how we
    collect.
        Leaks have also driven a wedge between the government and
    providers and technology companies. Some companies that were
    formerly recognizing that protecting the Nation was a valuable
    and important public service now feel compelled to question or
    oppose our efforts.
        Now, these challenges that I just described in the
    collection environment--and they go to the question you raised,
    Mr. Chairman--all of this places a huge, huge premium on
    information-sharing among governments who all face this
    challenge. This information-sharing gives us the best chance to
    identify potential lone actors and loose networks of the sort
    that are carrying out the most frequent attacks.
        Now, while the sheer number of foreign fighters that I
    talked about earlier threatens to overwhelm the law enforcement
    and intelligence capabilities of some of our key partners
    around the world, the problem has actually spurred information-
    sharing to a level that we have rarely seen, if ever, and
    that's a positive development. So I would argue that this is
    one tiny bit of good news embedded within a threat picture and
    a foreign fighter problem that is of increasing concern, as I
    hope I have made clear.
        I'll stop there now for now, Mr. Chairman, Madam Vice
    Chairman, and I look forward to your questions and the rest of
    the Committee. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Director Rasmussen follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman Burr. Director, thank you very much.
        I'll restate: We'll go to five-minute questions based upon
    the order of attendance, and that's Burr, Feinstein, Wyden,
    Warner, Cotton, Coats, Collins, Blunt, Lankford, and Risch.
        Mr. Director, I'm going to go right to the issue that the
    Vice Chair raised with you, and that's the three FISA
    provisions that are set to expire the 1st of June, and
    specifically: If they were to--if we allowed those to expire,
    what would be the impact on the NCTC's ability to discover and
    thwart terrorist attacks here at home?
        Director Rasmussen. As I know the President and the DNI
    have stated, Director of National Intelligence have stated, it
    is essential that we retain these important capabilities. The
    ability to have insight into what our adversaries are doing,
    the connections they may have both internationally and
    potentially into the homeland, is an essential part of the
    business of identifying individual terrorists and then building
    out the picture of the networks in which terrorists operate.
        So fundamentally, reauthorization is something that we are
    counting on in the intelligence community as an important part
    of our work.
        Chairman Burr. Director, earlier this week the
    Administration announced the creation of a Cyber Threat
    Intelligence Integration Center, or they referred to it as
    CTIIC, within the ODNI. The national center will reportedly be
    modeled after NCTC and the National Counterproliferation
    Center, which have struggled under the ODNI management. I'm
    hesitant to authorize the creation of a new center until some
    of these lingering management challenges can be resolved, not
    least of which is NCTC's inability to fully hire.
        Can you assure the Committee that NCTC will be able to fill
    the majority of your open vacancies by the end of the year?
        Director Rasmussen. I believe I can, Mr. Chairman. I'm
    happy to report that since, I would say, over the last five,
    six months we have taken significant strides forward in
    addressing just that concern and problem, not only improving
    our ability to hire analysts and officers from outside of
    government, outside the intelligence community, to bring new
    blood into our center, but also increasing the level and the
    inflow of detailees, officers detailed from other intelligence
    community entities, into NCTC, which, as you well know, Mr.
    Chairman, that's part of the lifeblood of NCTC, having that
    contribution of officers from FBI and from CIA, from NSA, from
    the Defense Department, DIA, every member of the community.
        We're making I think tremendous progress. If we had had
    this discussion a year ago, I would have given you a much more
    cautious and hedged response because I wasn't necessarily
    confident that we could get to where we needed to be. But just
    in the last few months, I've had tremendously productive
    engagements with FBI, with CIA, to get our numbers with FBI and
    CIA to the levels we need them to be. So I'm pretty confident I
    can give you the assurance that you're looking for, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Burr. Nick, in many ways the threat from terrorism
    is growing, it's not declining. The number of threat streams
    you are facing is shocking, and your ability to collect
    intelligence on those threats is waning. As the principal
    adviser to the President on counterterrorism, are you concerned
    about the trend and the impact it's having on our security?
        Director Rasmussen. In my statement I certainly talked
    about the wider array, the more diverse array of threats and
    terrorist actors that we're seeing around the globe. Clearly,
    that puts increasing pressure on our capacity to respond and to
    react in all of those different places, to develop effective
    strategies in all of those places.
        As we've talked about in closed session as well, it's not
    always possible for the United States to transform the
    environment in some of these areas where the terrorism threat
    is growing. So we have to develop an approach that allows us to
    mitigate and disrupt the terrorist threat networks that are
    most particularly aiming at U.S. interests, while also looking
    to see if there are ways in which we can over time develop
    stronger partnerships with countries in particular regions, so
    that we don't own the burden ourselves of doing that mitigating
    and disrupting.
        But unfortunately, while you are doing that long-term work
    to establish a more sustainable counterterrorism framework with
    our partners, you have to deal with, as you said, Mr. Chairman,
    every day a constant inflow of new terrorism-related threats.
    So you're trying to keep up with every one of those most recent
    threats at the same time you're trying to build a more
    sustainable CT partnership, network of CT partnerships around
    the world.
        So doing that long-term work while we're also managing the
    day to day is increasingly a challenge, I will admit.
        Chairman Burr. Thank you, Mr. Director.
        Vice Chairman.
        Vice Chairman Feinstein. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Rasmussen, I think last year when we had our worldwide
    threat hearing--this is a little different than that--the
    Khorasan Group was sort of put out there as a group that could
    really be effective in launching an attack against the United
    States. As I'm reading your written remarks, particularly on
    page 8, you talk about two highly capable AQIM offshoots,
    Belmokhtar's al-Mulathamun Battalion and Tawhid wal-Jihad in
    West Africa, merging to form the violent extremist group al-
    Murabitun, which is one that we really haven't heard of before.
        How big is this? That's the first part of the question.
    Secondly, how do you rank the groups and their threats toward
    the homeland? Which one should we be the most wary of?
        Director Rasmussen. Let me try to bite that off in a couple
    different chunks, Madam Vice Chair. We did point in our
    statement this year to the emergence of this group in North
    Africa, which is an offshoot of a group we've long known and
    which you've long known about, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.
    But one of the offshoots of that group that grew out of a
    leadership dispute and internal fights about direction is a
    group that we know as the al-Murabitun Battalion, which
    includes known individuals with links to al-Qaeda, but again,
    as I've said, they have engaged in a little bit of internal
    feuding that has put them into separate organizations, at least
    from the way we look at it.
        We look at that grouping as a pretty significant threat to
    our interests in and across North Africa. As far as an ability
    to project a threat potentially to the homeland, I would
    describe that as more potential than actual at this point. But
    they certainly have taken note of what has happened in Western
    Europe, and I would over time be concerned about the ability of
    groups like this in North Africa having the ability to project
    into Europe.
        Of course, I consider attacks that could happen in Europe
    potentially as attacks that could involve significant U.S.
    interests. We have significant diplomatic, business, and other
    presences in most Western European capitals. So I don't take
    for granted that Americans would not be a part of any attack
    that took place in Europe.
        To your question on the Khorasan Group, as we've talked
    about before, that is a group, a loose network of individuals
    affiliated, long a sense of affiliation with core al-Qaeda in
    the tribal areas of Pakistan, and we've long worried about
    their ability to potentially not only engage and impact the
    fighting in Syria, which they're engaged in doing, but also,
    while they're engaged in that activity, also looking for
    opportunities to engage in external operations against U.S.
    interests, western interests, into Europe and ultimately even
    the homeland.
        There's not much more I can say about that in this session,
    as you well know. But this is among the very, very highest
    counterterrorism priorities for the intelligence community, is
    to try to understand this network with more granularity, with
    more specificity, and to develop disruption options to go after
    it.
        Vice Chairman Feinstein. Is AQAP still number one in terms
    of--I'm talking about the homeland now.
        Director Rasmussen. I guess I try to avoid number one,
    number two, number three, because as soon as you say that
    someone who isn't watching the picture as closely as you are
    and as we are says: Well, your number three must not be getting
    the right attention. And they'd be right to think that, but I
    think they'd also be missing something.
        As I said in my statement, even though what we're seeing
    more frequently in the West are these low-level attacks
    conducted by individuals who aren't networked necessarily, we
    still are absolutely fixated and focused on AQAP's efforts to
    develop an aviation attack against the United States, for all
    of the reasons that were mentioned in both the Chairman and the
    Vice Chairman's statements: the attempt to propagate the recipe
    for putting explosives on an airplane; the continued effort,
    even amidst all the fighting in Yemen for AQAP, to mount an
    external operation. That is all still very much at the top of
    our counterterrorism priority list from an analytical
    perspective, from a collection perspective, and from a
    disruption perspective.
        So when something like ISIL seizes--or rises to the
    forefront of concern, we don't have the luxury of downgrading
    our effort, our level of effort against some other threat
    stream or set of terrorism actors that we already had at the
    top of our list.
        I hope that responds.
        Vice Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Burr. Senator Wyden.
        Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Director, it's great to see you again. I think you've done
    a good job of laying out counterterror challenges. In my years
    on the Committee, we've seen the threats move from al-Qaeda in
    Afghanistan to insurgents in Iraq to al-Qaeda in the Arabian
    Peninsula. So these are very real threats, very real threats.
        The question then becomes, how do we focus on ways to deal
    with these threats, rather than in effect use approaches that
    waste time and resources? We've got to focus on approaches that
    work.
        The bulk collection, the bulk phone records collection that
    has been widely debated, has been described by the President's
    review group--and I'll just quote here--as ``information that
    could readily have been obtained in a timely manner using
    conventional Section 215 orders.'' So these are all public
    documents, public reports. Mike Morell, for example, a veteran
    of the CIA, supported this document.
        My question to you is, first: If Congress passes the
    legislation ending bulk collection, would intelligence agencies
    still be able to collect the information you and they need to
    protect our country against terrorist operations?
        Director Rasmussen. I look at this in terms of, as the
    President said last year, making sure that we're in a position
    to preserve the capability that that bulk collection gave us.
    That's why I support, as did the Director of National
    Intelligence, the legislation that would transition the program
    to one that would preserve that capability without requiring
    the Federal Government to hold the records in the way that it
    had previously.
        Senator Wyden. So you're proposing that we end the bulk
    collection program, but in effect the phone companies can still
    keep their recordkeeping practices, right?
        Director Rasmussen. I'm comfortable that that capability
    would--that step would preserve our capability if that became--
    --
        Senator Wyden. Very good. One other question. Mr. Director,
    my understanding is--and it would be very helpful here--that
    there are some questions about whether the Office of the
    Director of National Intelligence has provided you at the
    National Counterterrorism Center with a copy of the full
    classified version of the Committee's report on the use of
    torture. Have they provided you that report?
        Director Rasmussen. A select number of my officers had
    access, I'm certain, to the executive summary. I'd have to get
    back to you----
        Senator Wyden. Have you seen it?
        Director Rasmussen. I've seen portions of it, Senator.
        Senator Wyden. Have you asked for a copy of the report?
        Director Rasmussen. I have not personally asked for a copy
    of it, no. I asked that I be allowed access to it in order that
    we perform the role that we did perform at the tail end of last
    year when we were asked to participate in the effort to develop
    threat assessments.
        Senator Wyden. Well, there are some additional details in
    the classified version that I think are relevant. So I hope
    that you will ask for a copy and review it. But I look forward
    to working with you. I think it is helpful to have on record
    that if the Congress passes the legislation ending bulk
    collection you and the other intelligence agencies can go
    forward doing the important work to deal with the threats to
    this country. They are very real. I'm interested in working
    with you on the matter of the report as well. I hope that you
    will ask for a copy of the report and review it.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Director Rasmussen. Thank you, Senator.
        Chairman Burr. Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Rasmussen, nice to see you again. Thank you for your
    great service.
        I do think I want to make a brief comment on Senator
    Wyden's comment. We'll have a spirited debate, I think, on that
    FISA issue. I do think there are challenges, as we've discussed
    before, both privacy and security-related, around holding data
    at the telcos, and that'll be the subject of, I know, ongoing
    conversations.
        I want to raise--ISIL-AQAP has been the focus of most of
    your testimony, but I'd like to raise one other area I think in
    your testimony you've touched on, but I'd love to hear before
    the group. When we think back to last year in April, when we
    were all at that moment astonished by the actions of Boko Haram
    in Nigeria, seizing 300 girls from a school, 200 of which I
    believe are still missing, and subsequent actions of the United
    States in sending troops and advisers to that region.
        We've seen since that time about a million and a half
    people displaced, north of 3,000 killed in 2014, and a
    coalition arise. I think just recently Niger joined with
    Nigeria, Benin, Chad, and Cameroon for an 8,700-person force.
        Could you give us an assessment whether these countries
    have the capability, whether the tide is swaying? Obviously,
    Nigeria has postponed their elections. The first question would
    be: Can they take on this threat of Boko Haram? It's remarkable
    that, with the atrocities they commit, they're still pushed off
    the front page because of the extraordinary atrocities of ISIL
    and others. And what type of potential threat that poses beyond
    that immediate region?
        Director Rasmussen. Thank you, Senator. I think you're on
    to something with the question, by raising the question of
    regional partners. There's no question but that Nigeria faces
    significant, serious challenges to mounting on its own a
    response against Boko Haram. Even in the most stable political
    environment, they would face those challenges. As the Committee
    well knows, right now Nigeria is in the midst of a potential
    political transition that will test even further their ability
    to mount a coherent response among their political,
    intelligence, and military communities.
        So one solution to that is to try to get regional partners,
    as you described, more involved: Niger, Cameroon, other
    partners. They are increasingly stepping up to that challenge
    with their admittedly limited resources, but their shared sense
    of threat.
        I think we will be in a position to try to enable these
    partners, to try to develop a regional approach against Boko
    Haram, and doing what we can, principally through advising and
    assisting and in providing intelligence where it's appropriate.
    I think that can increase their effectiveness.
        I think it remains to be seen--it certainly isn't the case
    yet that the tide has been turned against Boko Haram, and it
    remains to be seen if the regional partners can in concert turn
    that tide. I would not want to get out ahead of that in terms
    of predicting anything. This is a part of the world where we do
    not have the largest resource footprint, so we do what we can.
    But we may have to reevaluate Boko Haram's trajectory over time
    if we see that the regional partners are overmatched.
        Senator Warner. Do you see any evidence of--there has been
    some reported evidence of Boko Haram's reaching out to other
    groups in terms of network. Could you comment on that?
        Director Rasmussen. Exactly. The increased
    intercommunication between Boko Haram and other terrorist
    groups in the northern part, northwestern part of Africa, and
    even with ISIL, all of that just adds to the picture of an
    interconnected terrorist network with the ability to share
    resources, personnel, expertise, and tradecraft in a way that
    serves as a multiplier for their own capabilities, and that's a
    disturbing trend.
        Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, I think this is an area that
    we need to keep our eye on as well. Obviously, there's huge
    challenges. Thank you.
        Chairman Burr. Thank you, Senator Warner.
        Senator Coats.
        Senator Coats. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
        In response to the questions that Senator Wyden raised, you
    indicated that you and the Director of National Intelligence
    have assessed that ending the bulk collection program and
    transferring it to communication companies would not impede in
    any way doing the necessary tracking and usage of that to reach
    the information that you want. But since that hasn't been done
    and since we haven't really laid out a procedure, the
    procedures how we're going to do that, and we don't know
    exactly how it's going to be collected, and so forth and so on
    with a much shorter period of time of holding that information,
    how can you be so certain that this is not going to degrade in
    any way your ability to access that information?
        Director Rasmussen. I guess I would say I can't say
    anything with complete certainty, Senator. But looking at the
    provisions as we understood them, we believe the legislation
    would have maintained the essential capability that we were
    requiring that we maintain.
        Senator Coats. Well, the legislation calls for a shortened
    period of time for holding that information. We've seen in
    Paris and some other instances where we need to go deeper than
    that in order to determine the connections and the network that
    we need to assess.
        Director Rasmussen. I certainly agree. But----
        Senator Coats. Well then, how can you say with assurance
    that ending that bulk collection is going to not leave you
    short-handed in terms of what you need to assess?
        Director Rasmussen. I can't predict in the future exactly
    how, what information requirements we would have.
        Senator Coats. Well then, how can you come to a conclusion?
    Don't you leave a little, well, we're not sure, Senator,
    exactly how this is going to work, so we can't guarantee that
    it'll give us the same access as we have under the bulk
    collection program?
        Director Rasmussen. Again, I look at this in terms of
    capability, and my understanding of the legislation is it would
    have provided us with that essential capability. I'm a little
    bit burdened here because as NCTC Director, I follow in the
    footsteps of two previous NCTC Directors, Mike Leiter and Matt
    Olsen, who were distinguished national security lawyers, who
    lived this architecture in ways that I haven't. So I'm less in
    a direct position to speak on exactly how these programs work
    in the same way that my predecessors were.
        Senator Coats. That's why I raised the question in my mind
    about your answer to Senator Wyden, who I think took that as a
    definitive yes, the DNI thinks this is fine and NCTC Director
    thinks it's fine, and therefore why in the world would we ever
    question it? As you know, there's a difference of opinion in
    the intelligence community among the different agencies as to
    whether or not this is the right thing to do.
        Director Rasmussen. I understand that, and that's why I'm
    relying on my experts, who have assured me that preservation of
    this capability gives us what we need. As with anything, it
    certainly involved giving and taking, give and take on
    particular provisions. I'd be happy to talk about it further
    with you in closed session or I can come to you with----
        Senator Coats. I understand, and I think we should do that,
    Mr. Chairman, because I think there's still some major
    questions that need to be resolved here.
        In the remaining time that I have, do you--through your
    agency or somewhere in the IC community, what is the appeal to
    the thousands of westerners that fall prey to the appeal of
    engaging in this depravity, which they obviously are all aware
    of and are so attracted to this? I'm trying to get to the
    source, get my head around the fact that, how could someone who
    has perfect capability, seeing exactly what they're walking
    into, think that's the thing to do?
        Now, if you're of the same ideology perhaps from certain
    countries in the Middle East, but coming from Western Europe
    and coming from America, more civilized and cultured
    societies--``civilized'' might not be the right words, but I
    think you know what I mean--are you looking at that? Is there a
    way for us to counter with social media saying, this is what
    you're getting into, which is a pretty tough situation?
        Director Rasmussen. That's a terrific question, Senator.
    ISIL's propaganda runs the gamut. You're absolutely right to
    point to some of these horrific videos involving executions of
    hostages or opposing fighters on the battlefield. That clearly
    sends a signal and that attracts its own element.
        But ISIL's propaganda also includes a fair number of
    messaging examples in which they paint a very bucolic,
    fulfilling life in the caliphate, that they project to
    individuals who may be disenfranchised, disadvantaged,
    dissatisfied in their home environments. So that--so the range
    of factors that grab people who end up going to a place like
    Syria right now ranges from the ideological, which you pointed
    to, but also to the psychological, catering to some sense of
    wanting to belong to something, no matter how depraved that
    thing that they would be belonging to is. Then for others there
    is just the sheer sense of adventure and a chance to throw your
    hat in with the winning side, is a part of the calculation.
        We've tried to disaggregate all of these different factors
    in the messaging that we're seeing, so that we can try to
    develop some counter-messaging strategies to go at it. The
    President is convening this CVE summit next week, drawing in
    all of our European partners, many of our Middle Eastern
    partners, to try to get a better handle on this, to try to--
    unfortunately, as we all know, the government is probably not
    the best platform to try to communicate with the set of actors
    who are potentially vulnerable to this kind of propaganda and
    this kind of recruitment. That's something we deal with all the
    time.
        We try to find ways to stimulate this kind of counter-
    narrative, this kind of counter-messaging, without having a USG
    hand, a U.S. Government hand, in it. People who are attracted
    to this don't go to the government for their guidance on what
    to do, not the U.S. Government and certainly not their
    governments in the Middle East. So statements from senior
    religious figures in Middle East capitals are useful, but it's
    pop culture that is going to get--in many cases the voices of
    pop culture or voices more relevant to these experiences of
    these young people is going to have a far more profound impact
    on them than anything we say.
        Senator Coats. Yes, I think so, too. We need to take the
    same advantage of social media that they've taken. And I agree,
    it shouldn't be government-directed. It ought to be coming from
    other areas of the culture reaching out to these people and
    letting them know exactly what they're getting into, which is
    not the promise that's being made during the recruitment.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Burr. Thank you, Senator Coats.
        Senator Collins.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Director, I want to follow up on the issue of the
    telecommunications companies holding the data in two different
    ways. First of all, there are hundreds of telcoms in this
    country and, by contrast, very few people--the number of people
    who had access to the database in this country, as has come out
    in recent months, was strictly limited, and they were well
    trained.
        If more people have access to the database, isn't that
    likely to raise additional privacy problems and questions?
        Director Rasmussen. I'd have to understand exactly how that
    architecture is going to look. I'd ask if I could take that for
    the record, Senator.
        Senator Collins. A related question: Would you be troubled
    if there is no requirement for the telecommunications companies
    to retain the data for a certain length of time?
        Director Rasmussen. It's obviously in the interest of the
    intelligence community to try to maintain the capability to
    access that data for as long a period of time as we can. In
    terms of specific provisions to compel, I can't speak to that.
    I can only speak to the interest we have in maintaining that
    capability, which of course is to have that access.
        Senator Collins. Let me turn to the issue of home-grown
    terrorism and countering violent extremists. You said in your
    testimony today, and I completely agree, that we face a much
    greater recurring threat from lone wolves and loose networks of
    individuals, and you talked about the number of attacks since
    last May, but ten of them were from violent Islamic extremists.
        As you may have seen, former Defense Intelligence Agency
    Director Michael Flynn recently commented that he could not
    identify which agency or individual in the U.S. Government is
    in charge of the fight against radical Islamic extremists.
    Obviously, DHS, the FBI, DOD to some extent, the Department of
    State, NCTC are all important players. Who's in charge?
        Director Rasmussen. I would argue, Senator, that, as with
    most elements of our counterterrorism effort, we're approaching
    it on a whole of government effort, without a single agency
    with lead or overall responsibility. In the effort against
    home-grown violent extremists here in the United States, we
    have a very tight-knit community focused particularly among
    Homeland Security, the Justice Department, FBI, and NCTC. Along
    with the deputy directors of those organizations, I meet, Matt
    Olsen before we met, every other month at that director or
    deputy director level to synchronize and coordinate all of our
    activities aimed at dealing with the home-grown violent
    extremist phenomenon, working to make sure that we coordinate
    and partner with each other, so that when we go to a
    community--and I used Denver in my testimony as an example of a
    community we had gone to in the wake of the arrests there last
    year of the three young Somali-American women who were
    disrupted on their way to Syria--we go arm in arm, lockstep
    with each other, all four of us together, working hand in hand
    with the special agent in charge of the local FBI office, the
    U.S. attorney in that capital, and all of the Homeland Security
    elements in that city, so that we are speaking with one voice
    as a Federal Government.
        Now, when we get there we're dealing with the widest
    possible array of community leaders and community
    organizations, because most of this home-grown violent
    extremism, effort to counter home-grown violent extremism
    effort, is going to be carried out by those communities. Our
    role in many cases is to empower and provide information.
        One of the things we did in that experience in Denver was
    provide a community awareness briefing that explains exactly
    what Senator Coats was talking about: the appeal of this
    narrative, the kinds of things that their kids might be seeing
    on the Internet if they weren't supervised or if their parents
    were not involved with or engaged with what their children were
    doing.
        So I'm very comfortable that we are working well and
    harmoniously together. Could I make the case for one single
    agency being given a lead role? I don't think I could right
    now. If we had somebody--if we had a bunch of discord and
    disharmony, I might make that case, Senator. Could we do
    better? I'm not going to sign up to the idea that we couldn't
    do more and do better, and we're trying, and we're looking to
    resource this more robustly. But I don't think the problem we
    face is a result of not having a lead Federal agency.
        Senator Collins. I guess from my perspective the problem is
    if no one's in charge it's very difficult for us to assess the
    effectiveness of a program, to budget appropriately, to hold
    people accountable, to assess whether what we're doing is
    making a difference. When we did the Fort Hood investigation in
    2010, one of our major recommendations from the Homeland
    Security Committee was that there needed to be a strategy, but
    there needed to be a lead agency or person in charge.
        It's not that these efforts aren't worthwhile, but we can't
    budget for them, we can't assess them, if there isn't a person
    who can come and report to us. My concern is that the National
    Security Council appears intent on trying to exercise the role
    of policy implementer rather than just policymaker.
        Director Rasmussen. Thank you, Senator. We are all trying
    to operate the four agencies I mentioned under the rubric of
    the President's home-grown CVE strategy for here in the
    homeland. We are, though, looking at ways, in keeping with your
    suggestion, to try to come up with funding mechanisms that
    cross departmental lines so that we can do exactly what you
    describe, give some sense of the jointness, the joint work that
    is going on, without relying solely on department budgets and
    Department stovepipes.
        I'll certainly make sure we get more information to you on
    that.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Chairman Burr. Senator Blunt.
        Senator Blunt. Thank you, Chairman.
        Mr. Rasmussen, let's talk about Yemen a little bit. I
    understand our embassy there is closed, most of the people we
    had there, certainly from the State Department, at the embassy
    are all out of the country; cars left with keys in them at the
    airport or whatever it took to get out of there.
        It's just been a few months ago that Yemen was supposedly a
    great example of how our efforts were working, how the plan was
    working. How do you think that changed so quickly and what,
    looking back, do you think that you and others might have seen
    to give more warning than we got of that?
        Director Rasmussen. The situation in Yemen for some period
    has been stable--unstable politically, and for a long period of
    time the Yemeni government faced this problem of a Houthi
    conflict emanating out of the northwestern part of Yemen. But
    that was not a new phenomenon and for many years the influence
    of the Houthi community there was largely contained to that
    northwestern part, corner of Yemen, along-stride the Saudi
    border.
        That changed rather dramatically when the Houthis moved out
    of that historical location they held and moved towards Sanaa.
    Much as we saw in dealing with the ISIL phenomenon, the one
    thing that's very difficult to assess from an intelligence
    perspective is the ability of a military organization to
    actively confront another insurgency. Director Clapper I know
    has talked about the challenge the intelligence community faced
    in predicting whether the Iraqi security forces would have
    melted away the way they did in the face of ISIL's advances
    last summer.
        I would say on somewhat of a smaller scale something like
    that happened in Yemen, with President Hadi, who already faced
    a complicated political environment in managing his military
    and managing his security organizations, as the Houthi advances
    toward Sanaa took place, it simply became the case that they
    were unopposed in many cases. That's something that we've got
    to try to find a better way as an intelligence community to
    understand, the willingness of fighters to fight, because when
    you match up orders of battle and read about the resources
    available to the various sides, you would look at that and say
    there's no way that might happen, but obviously it did.
        And it's left us in a position now where, on relatively
    short notice, just over the past few months the security
    situation deteriorated far more rapidly than we expected and,
    particularly because we could not assure the safety and
    security of our officers there, the decision was made to leave.
        Senator Blunt. I don't want to get into any kind of ongoing
    discussion with you about the specifics of how I'd see these
    things now. But we've got an example in ISIL or ISIS where
    they're the JV one day and they're virtually a nation-state 90
    days later, or Yemen, which is a great example of our
    successful foreign policy and six months later it appears to be
    a total disaster.
        But I think you're now--is it fair to say that the
    intelligence community has to begin to reevaluate how we--what
    you answered, reevaluate how those insurgencies may match up
    against the ability to face them?
        Director Rasmussen. I think that's fair, Senator.
        Senator Blunt. Another question I have. I noticed in the
    information the President sent up yesterday for the Congress to
    look at the focus was against ISIL or associated persons or
    forces. How would you define the second part of that? Is that
    another terrorist group who actually is somehow fighting? What
    does that mean? Is that al-Nusrah? Is that some of these al-
    Qaeda groups that don't appear to be that much in line with
    ISIL? How would you define ``associated persons or forces'' if
    you were me?
        Director Rasmussen. I guess I look at it and take it pretty
    much at face value, Senator, in concluding that that language
    likely allowed for the possibility that other networks, maybe
    not even formal groupings but other networks, might align
    themselves with ISIL. As we know, right now ISIL-ISIS is in
    conflict with core al-Qaeda and with al-Nusrah Front, the
    designated al-Qaeda affiliate operating in Syria.
        Senator Blunt. So core al-Qaeda or al-Nusrah would not be
    included in that definition, because they're actually not
    associated with ISIL? I mean, that's my belief, and I think
    that's what you just said.
        Director Rasmussen. I'd have to check, but I guess what I'm
    saying is when I looked at the words ``associated forces'' I
    was thinking ahead to maybe the development of new alliances,
    new alignments, that we can't necessarily foresee today. I
    wasn't trying to suggest that anybody was today in or out of
    that particular definition, inside or outside that particular
    definition.
        Senator Blunt. I don't want to take more time than I should
    here, but today--we have to base this looking at this on what
    we do foresee today, and I think what you've said are there are
    significant terror groups that are clearly not associated with
    ISIL. Would that be right?
        Director Rasmussen. There are certainly terrorist groups
    that have not affiliated or associated at this point with ISIL.
    ISIL has reached out and developed affiliated relationships or
    endorsement-like relationships with groups outside of Iraq and
    Syria, including in North Africa, including in Algeria, and
    including in I believe Yemen as well.
        Senator Blunt. I'm out of time. Thank you, Chairman.
        Chairman Burr. Senator Lankford.
        Senator Lankford. Thank you.
        I need to ask you, on page 10 of your written report you
    use the statement here ``Iran remains the foremost state
    sponsor of terrorism,'' and then a couple of notes on that. I'd
    like to get some additional details on that. When you talk
    about Iran being the foremost state sponsor of terrorism, how
    far does that extend? How many countries are they engaged in or
    terrorist groups are they engaged in sponsoring?
        Director Rasmussen. Iranian sponsorship and association
    with particularly Lebanese Hezbollah gives--provides a global
    reach to that organization. So I could not give you a direct
    answer as to how many countries, but I would certainly argue it
    is global. It extends to pretty much every single region of the
    world.
        Senator Lankford. Can you give me some examples of places
    that we know there are clear lines, where Iran is engaged in
    terrorism and advancing that ideology or being a state sponsor?
        Director Rasmussen. Certainly in portions of West Africa,
    portions of Southeast Asia, portions of Latin America. I could
    go into more detail in a classified setting.
        Senator Lankford. It begs the question here as well, the
    foremost non-state sponsor. Are we able to identify individuals
    and groups of individuals as well that are--you identify Iran
    as the foremost state sponsor. A lot of these groups obviously
    have to get funding, support, coordination from somewhere. Are
    we able to identify some of those non-state sponsors?
        Director Rasmussen. We certainly have a robust effort
    across the intelligence community to try to understand
    particularly where individuals play a role in the financing of
    terrorist organizations, and where we can identify through
    intelligence those individuals developing an approach, using
    every tool we have, whether it's designation by the Treasury
    Department, other law enforcement or intelligence action, any
    tool we have, to try to shut down that financing pipeline.
        That is an area where it is a constant, constant struggle
    because these organizations are ubiquitous in their efforts to
    fundraise. I'd be happy to talk in closed session about the
    work the community is doing in that area.
        Senator Lankford. Thank you. Is there a sense for Iran as a
    state sponsor of terrorism? Is that on the decline? Is it
    consistent? Has it continued to increase? Have we noticed a
    significant change in Iran and their behavior in the last
    several years?
        Director Rasmussen. I guess I would describe it as
    consistent and steady. The degree of concern we face has been
    consistent and steady over time. We're particularly mindful of
    their support for militant groups in places like Iraq, where
    that front line activity, where Shia militant groups that have
    connections to Iran could be potentially threatening to our
    personnel on the ground in Iraq.
        Senator Lankford. Let me ask about one other country and
    location. Libya has fallen into total chaos, with no
    functioning government any more, and every time they form a
    government it collapses within months, and borderline, as the
    Vice Chairman mentioned earlier, near-civil war at this point.
    Terrorist groups seem to enjoy a vacuum. What do we see as on
    the rise in Libya, and what's our status there as far as
    terrorist organizations and the spread of terrorism there?
        Director Rasmussen. You're absolutely right, Senator. If I
    had to identify one of the greatest areas of emerging concern
    with respect to counterterrorism, it would be Libya. We were
    already facing the chaotic political environment there, in
    which the resident North African-based terrorist groups that
    we've talked about before--AQIM, al-Qaeda in the Islamic
    Maghreb, Ansar Al-Sharia--were already active and potentially
    threatening in Libya and with the potential ability to threaten
    U.S. interests across North Africa.
        What's changed more recently and what's made the
    environment there even more different is that ISIS-ISIL has
    looked to also take advantage of the chaos in Libya and
    establish a foothold there as well. We are still looking to try
    to assess whether that capability will manifest itself in
    external operations outside the region of North Africa or if
    the intent is simply to give themselves the capability to
    attack western interests in places like Cairo or Algiers or
    Tunis or Morocco.
        That by itself would be significant, a sufficient concern
    to warrant our attention. But we're obviously mindful of what
    they might try to do to expand into Europe as well and
    potentially threaten our interests there.
        Senator Lankford. One final question. If Iran stopped
    supporting terrorism, what effect would that have on the region
    and on our terrorist operations?
        Director Rasmussen. Well, if Iran got out of the business
    of providing state sponsorship to terrorist organizations, it
    would obviously lower our potential level of concern about the
    capabilities of some of the groups that we worry about. I don't
    necessarily know that it would look like an on-off switch,
    though. These are in some cases relationships and capabilities
    that have developed over decades and decades. So I don't know
    that that would all be unraveled and unspooled by just flipping
    a switch.
        Senator Lankford. Obviously that's not a switch that we
    have access to, but there are lots of connections there.
        Director Rasmussen. I understand. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Lankford. Thank you. I yield back.
        Chairman Burr. Senator Rubio.
        Senator Rubio. Thank you.
        Mr. Rasmussen, just to take on what Senator Lankford said,
    I want to go a little bit deeper into Libya. Isn't it a fact
    there has now been multiple open source reports in the media
    that Darnah in Libya has emerged as a central and important and
    growing hub for ISIS; is that not right?
        Director Rasmussen. I think that's right, yes, sir.
        Senator Rubio. And in addition, they've now been linked to
    many of the groups now in Benghazi. In essence, there are now
    open source reports that ISIS is the predominant group in
    Benghazi.
        Director Rasmussen. That's correct.
        Senator Rubio. And there has also been open source
    reporting that ISIS was behind a terrorist attack at a hotel in
    Tripoli that killed an American citizen.
        Director Rasmussen. Yes, the Corinthia Hotel.
        Senator Rubio. And in addition, there was open source
    reporting this week that ISIS--an ISIS commander was killed in
    Afghanistan.
        Director Rasmussen. Yes.
        Senator Rubio. So there is now an ISIS presence as well in
    Afghanistan, including open source reports of terrorist
    training camps being set up in portions of Afghanistan.
        Director Rasmussen. That's correct. We've seen in recent
    months ISIS-ISIL has looked to expand its reach into a number
    of different places around the world, and you've highlighted
    two of the most recent examples in Afghanistan and Libya. I
    would also highlight, though, Algeria and Egypt as other places
    where that has happened.
        Senator Rubio. Well, let me just point out on the Libya
    front, Darnah is a port city, is it not, a port region, where
    they now have--which is a perfect--and there's no--there's no
    Assad bombing them there. There's no air strikes. My concern is
    that that's becoming one of their most important hubs, because
    it's completely uncontested. They have access to shipments and
    foreign fighters to take in.
        I just think that's an area of growing emergence and I'm
    surprised there's not more discussion about it because of how
    serious a threat that poses, including to the Sinai. Would it
    not be a great spot from which to launch attacks into the Sinai
    or get ISIL groups involved in the Sinai Peninsula?
        Director Rasmussen. That's exactly right. Again, the Ansar
    Bayt al-Maqdis, which is the Egyptian-based terrorist group
    that recently affiliated with ISIS, we worry about the threat
    they would pose to western interests in Egypt and the Sinai--
    tourists, American businesses, but also our troop presence.
        Senator Rubio. It would be a mistake in your opinion to
    simply focus on our fight against ISIS as simply being Syria
    and Iraq? This group is increasing its footprint and presence
    in multiple stages now, including Afghanistan, throughout North
    Africa, and in particular Libya.
        Director Rasmussen. That's correct, they've certainly
    expanded their reach.
        Senator Rubio. I want to ask you about Guantanamo. Prior to
    President Obama's executive order to determine the disposition
    of Guantanamo detainees, 101 former detainees were confirmed to
    have reengaged in terror. Then in the latest report that we got
    in July 2014 it stated that from 2009 to July of 2014 88
    detainees transferred out of Gitmo. Out of the 88 detainees
    transferred out of Gitmo, 6 of them had been confirmed to
    return to terror activity, and one additional one was
    suspected.
        So by my calculation, that means 107 of the 620 total
    detainees transferred from Gitmo have reengaged in terror and
    another 77 are suspected of doing so, in addition to the 107.
        So can you tell us, since July of 2014 when that report
    came out, how many more have returned in our estimation to
    terror?
        Director Rasmussen. We are just on the cusp within the next
    couple of weeks of providing the next iterated version of that
    unclassified report, the one you received last July. So those
    numbers will be out very, very shortly.
        Senator Rubio. But as it stands now, one out of six of
    those that have been returned----
        Director Rasmussen. What I wanted to say is, while we don't
    have that report finalized yet, what I expect is that the trend
    line--the proportions will be roughly in line with what we
    reported last July as well.
        Senator Rubio. As it stands right now before the report
    comes out, it looks like it's approximately close to one out of
    six individuals released from Guantanamo have reengaged in
    terrorism, maybe more.
        Director Rasmussen. As a net figure, that's correct. But
    the population released since 2009, that number is a lower
    number.
        Senator Rubio. Okay. Lastly, on the question of Iran, I
    want to return back to kind of the threat that Senator Lankford
    was pursuing. We know that Iran uses its proxy relationship
    with Hezbollah, for example, and we also are aware now that the
    Shia militias that are in Iraq as we speak are heavily indebted
    and controlled by them as well. Do we have any evidence that
    you can discuss here of Iran trying to set up similar type
    groups in places like Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Jordan?
        Director Rasmussen. I'd have to address that in a closed
    session, Senator.
        Senator Rubio. Okay. Thank you.
        Director Rasmussen. We'd be happy to provide you that
    answer. I wouldn't wait for a closed session. We'll provide you
    that answer through the Committee staff.
        Senator Rubio. Thank you.
        Chairman Burr. Thank you, Senator Rubio.
        Nick, somebody stops you on the street. They know you're
    the Director of NCTC and they say: Mr. Director, what does NCTC
    do, and why should I care? What would your answer be?
        Director Rasmussen. I would tell that person that NCTC
    strives every day to be a center of gravity for our Nation's
    counterterrorism efforts, not the center of gravity because to
    say that would be a disservice to all of our partners that do
    counterterrorism work as well, but a center of gravity that
    provides information, analysis, strategic planning in support
    of our national counterterrorism efforts.
        So if they asked I'd say that they have a large number of
    officers who come to work every day to assess, analyze, and
    provide information aimed at defeating our terrorist
    adversaries. That's what I'd say.
        Chairman Burr. And why should I care?
        Director Rasmussen. You should care because, as we talked
    about in my opening statement and in your opening statement,
    Mr. Chairman, the threat environment we face, we face right
    now, is the most multifaceted, diverse, dynamic threat
    environment we've ever faced and could manifest itself in
    communities all around this country. It's not simply a threat
    that manifests itself in far-flung places around the world.
        The kinds of low-level, potentially small-scale attacks I
    talked about from ISIL-inspired or other terrorist group-
    inspired individuals are the kinds of attacks that could
    literally happen in any of our 50 states.
        Chairman Burr. In part this hearing was because you said to
    me when we first met: You know, I believe America needs to know
    something about what we do, and the intelligence community
    can't be this black hole forever. I just want to thank you for
    what your organization does, for all the employees, because
    when you hear the intelligence community described it's not
    NCTC first, but everybody who's in the intelligence community
    is a customer of yours. They look to the analytic product that
    your folks produce. We look to the analytical product that you
    produce from the standpoint of being policymakers. They look at
    it more from a standpoint of actionable information.
        I think you've got some of the most talented folks working
    for you that you possibly could, but I do want to reiterate
    something. If for some reason you feel that there are
    constraints that don't allow you to build out your workforce to
    the degree we have authorized and to the degree I think we both
    agree you need, I hope you will share that with the Vice
    Chairman and myself so that we can help to try to remediate
    that.
        Director Rasmussen. I will certainly do that. Again, I'm
    enormously grateful to both you, Mr. Chairman, and the Vice
    Chairman for your sustained support of our workforce over time.
    I think one of the biggest contributions the Congress could
    make to that end would be to not put us in a position where
    we're dealing with a sequestration environment going into the
    future, because obviously that impacts all Federal agencies and
    their budgets and their ability to operate. But our
    organization in particular, where we were so reliant on
    detailed personnel from other organizations, that kind of a
    budget approach has a ripple effect because it reduces the
    ability of other organizations to do the hiring and developing
    of personnel that we need to fill our ranks. So it ends up
    having a double whammy effect on an organization like NCTC when
    there's an uncertain budget environment that affects our
    partners the way that does.
        Chairman Burr. I thank you, Mr. Director.
        I would turn to the Vice Chairman if she had any follow-up
    questions that she might want to ask.
        Vice Chairman Feinstein. I would like to put a paper in the
    record if I might, since Senator Rubio mentioned the recidivism
    rates of former Gitmo detainees. And I'd like to put--the
    problem is really that, whether it's Bush or Obama, people
    learned more, the recidivism rates changed dramatically.
        Pre-January of 2009, the recidivism rate was 101 of 532.
    That's 19 percent. Now, since the Obama Administration it's 6
    out of 88. That's 6.2 percent. So you have to look at it in
    versions of time. I'd like to put this paper in the record if I
    may, Mr. Chairman----
        Chairman Burr. Without objection.
        Vice Chairman Feinstein [continuing]. So everybody could
    see it.
        [The material referred to follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Vice Chairman Feinstein. I have one other question to ask
    the Director. Director, days before the public release of our
    report on CIA detention and interrogation, we received an
    intelligence assessment predicting violence throughout the
    world and significant damage to sanctions relationships. NCTC
    participated in that assessment. Do you believe that assessment
    proved correct?
        Director Rasmussen. I can speak particularly to the threat
    portion of that rather than the partnership aspect of that,
    because I would say that's the part NCTC would have the most
    direct purchase on. I can't say that I can disaggregate the
    level of terrorism and violence we've seen in the period since
    the report was issued, disaggregate that level from what we
    might have seen otherwise, because, as you know, the turmoil
    roiling that part--those parts of the world, not that part of
    the world but those parts of the world, the Middle East,
    Africa, South Asia, there's a number of factors that are going
    into creating the difficult threat environment we face.
        So the assessment we made at the time as a community was
    that this would increase or add to the threat picture in those
    places. I don't know, looking backwards now, that we can say,
    aha, it did by X percent or it didn't by X percent.
        We were also, I think, clear in saying that there's parts
    of the impact that we would not know until we had the benefit
    of time to see how it would play out in different locations
    around the world.
        Vice Chairman Feinstein. Oh, boy, do I disagree with you.
    But that's what makes this arena, I guess. The fact in my mind
    was the threat assessment was not correct.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Burr. Thank you, Vice Chairman.
        Senator Blunt.
        Senator Blunt. Thank you, Chairman.
        Let me go back to where I was when I ran out of time
    earlier, Mr. Rasmussen, on just trying to in my mind figure out
    where the AUMF that's proposed and how it relates to these
    various terror groups. I think the further language on
    ``associated persons or forces'' it says means ``individuals
    and organizations fighting for, on behalf of, or alongside ISIL
    or any closely related successor entity in hostilities against
    the United States or its coalition partners.''
        List for me just a few of the terrorist groups that would
    not be associated in that way with ISIL? You mentioned two
    earlier. Are there others that immediately come to mind? I'm
    not asking you for an exhaustive list, by the way.
        Director Rasmussen. I don't think Lebanese Hezbollah, for
    example, would qualify as an associated force. Terrorist groups
    we see operating in Latin America I don't believe would qualify
    under that definition of ``associated force,'' or some of the
    al-Qaeda-affiliated groups operating in Southeast Asia, for
    example. Those are just some examples off the top of my head.
        Senator Blunt. So if we just take that definition, does
    that mean ISIL and its associated groups are the only people
    we've authorized the President to go and do whatever is
    necessary within the restrictions of that? Or does the 2001
    AUMF give the President authority to go after other terrorist
    groups?
        Director Rasmussen. I'd have to get you an answer on that,
    sir, because I'm just not confident that I know enough about
    the design of AUMF, of the new authorization of force----
        Senator Blunt. How about the old one? You surely, as the
    Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, you surely
    know about the 2001----
        Director Rasmussen. Right.
        Senator Blunt [continuing]. What authorization that gives
    us.
        Director Rasmussen. That allowed us to carry out operations
    against al-Qaeda and associated forces. So I'm sorry; could you
    refresh me?
        Senator Blunt. No, that's the one. I think that's right,
    though I think it also said ``or future terrorism against the
    United States.'' And that's the one that the President proposes
    we let stand and we eliminate the 2002 that's more Iraq-
    specific and then add this one to it, is I believe the
    proposal.
        But what I guess I'm thinking is, what do we really add by
    adding this complicated definition of terrorists that associate
    with ISIL when--is ISIL covered under the 2001 AUMF?
        Director Rasmussen. I would defer to my lawyer friends, but
    I believe not.
        Senator Blunt. You believe not. So how are we engaging with
    ISIL now in Syria?
        Director Rasmussen. Let me provide you with an answer for
    the record, sir, because I want to be precise and correct in
    what I provide you.
        As the Administration has stated, we believe that the 2001
    AUMF provides legal authority to use military force against
    ISIL in both Iraq and Syria.
        Senator Blunt. All right. Do you have any follow-up on--do
    you understand the question----
        Director Rasmussen. Yes.
        Senator Blunt [continuing]. I assume we might be able to
    pursue ISIL or ISIS in Iraq through the 2002. If the 2001 is--I
    guess my point, Mr. Chairman, if the 2001 is broad enough to
    cover ISIL now, I don't know what we add to it when we add
    another authorization and leave that one on the books. But I
    think we do lead to significant complication here of who's a
    closely related associate of ISIL when we begin to define this.
        These groups--like core al-Qaeda is generally not anywhere
    what it was at one time, but various renamed or affiliated
    groups have sprung up everywhere from the Philippines to all
    over the world. I'm going to be very interested in how we
    define and why we would specifically begin to define individual
    groups, as opposed to--and how broad the 2001 authorization
    was, which is I guess the beginning of that question, Mr.
    Rasmussen.
        So thank you. I look forward to your response on that.
        Thank you, Chairman.
        Chairman Burr. Thank you, Senator Blunt. I think it gets
    even more confusing when in the same geographical battle space
    it would be the 2001 AUMF that provides us the ability to go
    after Khorasan, but next door in the same geographical area it
    would take a new AUMF to actually go after ISIL.
        Senator King, we're glad you could join us.
        Senator King. Thank you. I appreciate that. We just
    completed a markup in the Armed Services Committee. Senator
    McCain acted with some dispatch.
        Hopefully, I won't confuse this discussion further, but I
    think it's important to talk about this 2001 AUMF. Actually,
    the term ``associated forces'' doesn't appear anywhere in it.
    That's a gloss upon a gloss. The 2001 AUMF is very clear the
    President can use necessary and appropriate force against
    ``those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
    planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks
    that occurred on September 11th or harbored such organizations
    or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of
    international terrorism.''
        That has been used very, very broadly, and I think that's
    one of the concerns. I think the President has realized that to
    stretch it into attacking an organization that didn't even
    exist in 2001, operating in a country that was at least
    partially stable in 2001, is quite a stretch. I think that's
    why we've got the new authorization that's been brought forward
    to cover the ISIL situation.
        So I think that's a matter for the Foreign Relations
    Committee. But the 2001 has been stretched very far, and I'm
    frankly one who's glad to see that the President has brought
    forward a new authorization.
        Mr. Rasmussen, a couple of questions. Counterterrorism we
    always think of in terms of killing people, striking,
    intercepting communications, drones, all of that kind of thing.
    And yet we're now learning that what we--part of what we have
    to do is intervene before people get radicalized. And yet when
    you raise that the FBI says, well, we're not social workers;
    the county sheriffs say, we're not social workers.
        If it isn't going to be law enforcement that does that kind
    of intervention, and through the social media, for example,
    who's going to do it? And do you see that as part of the
    counterterrorism mission?
        Director Rasmussen. Certainly the effort to counter violent
    extremism and, especially, most particularly here in the
    homeland, is part of the counterterrorism mission. And I would
    argue that our law enforcement partners like FBI do embrace
    that mission, even if some individuals may have said exactly
    what you said, Senator King.
        Earlier in the discussion we talked about some of the work
    that NCTC is doing along with FBI, Homeland Security, and the
    Justice Department to try to do exactly what you just
    described. From the Federal Government, the effort, though, is
    to enable and empower local communities to carry out this kind
    of intervention in their own communities, and to enable them to
    do that in a way that does not scream a law enforcement
    context, because, as you know, that can have a chilling effect
    on the kind of community engagement and community dialogue that
    would help you get at the underlying causes that lead to
    violent extremism.
        So the role we've taken from the Federal Government has
    been a little bit more circumscribed, aimed at providing
    communities with the tools to do this kind of work, information
    so they understand how terrorists, and now particularly these
    days ISIL, is using social media to go after their children in
    their communities, to let parents and teachers and schools and
    other authority figures understand what is coming at them and
    where intervention might be necessary to prevent a foreign
    fighter from developing.
        What we're doing in this area is useful and important, but
    it is thus far not scalable or scaled on a size that I would
    say has the impact we want all across the country. At the
    President's Countering Violent Extremism Summit during part of
    next week, three pilots cities--Los Angeles, Minneapolis, and
    Boston--will report to the group on their efforts in this area.
    Those are three tremendously important cities that the Federal
    Government has been working very closely with to try to do this
    kind of work.
        But those are only three cities, and so the purpose of a
    pilot is to demonstrate whether this can be done on a scale
    that will have impact far beyond just those three cities.
        Senator King. I take it that you're concurring that this
    kind of effort has got to be part of the overall counterterror
    strategy?
        Director Rasmussen. Absolutely. And in particular as part
    of the counter-ISIL strategy, we're trying to do this work both
    at home, but also abroad, because, as you well know, Senator,
    most of that foreign fighter population that we're potentially
    worried about emanates from countries other than the United
    States. So we need to help other countries be more effective at
    this.
        I don't want to sound condescending. We need to also learn.
    I shouldn't say they need to do it the way we do. We need to
    learn from them. In many cases some of our European partners
    are doing tremendous work on a community engagement level to
    try to counter the work--counter the spread of violent
    extremism in their communities. I think that's going to be one
    of the other sidebars at next week's CVE summit, is to get some
    of the lessons learned out of our partners on that.
        Senator King. I understand the United Kingdom has developed
    a program for dealing with this problem in prisons, which is
    where a lot of radicalization takes place.
        Director Rasmussen. That's certainly true. The Paris
    example kind of brought home just how dangerous a radicalizing
    environment prisons can be. I know our Department of Justice
    has engaged on that issue, along with the Bureau of Prisons, in
    an effort to make sure that we've got that identified and,
    where possible, under control here. But I'd have to get you
    more detail on that.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Burr. Senator King, thank you. Thank you for your
    willingness to spend an hour and a half with Senator McCain and
    still come to this hearing.
        Senator King. I'm a patriot, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Burr. You'll be rewarded in heaven, I can assure
    you.
        [Laughter.]
        Director, thank you so much for being here today, for
    sharing your insight with us, and please carry back to your
    employees how grateful we are for the great work that the
    employees at NCTC do.
        Director Rasmussen. I will certainly do that, Senator.
    Thank you for having me.
        Chairman Burr. The hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:02 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]