[Senate Hearing 114-576]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-576
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLICY AND
PROGRAMS TO COUNTER THREATS TO THE
UNITED STATES FROM TERRORISM AND
IRREGULAR WARFARE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 21, 2015
__________
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman JACK REED, Rhode Island
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma BILL NELSON, Florida
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
TOM COTTON, Arkansas RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
JONI ERNST, Iowa MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina TIM KAINE, Virginia
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
MIKE LEE, Utah MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
TED CRUZ, Texas
Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff
Director
_________________________________________________________________
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska, Chairman
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
TOM COTTON, Arkansas
JONI ERNST, Iowa
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
TED CRUZ, Texas BILL NELSON, Florida
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
TIM KAINE, Virginia
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
april 21, 2015
Page
Department of Defense Policy and Programs to Counter Threats to 1
the United States from Terrorism and Irregular Warfare.
Lumpkin, Honorable Michael D., Assistant Secretary of Defense for 2
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.
Howell, Brig. Gen. Scott A., Howell, USAF, Deputy Director for 6
Special Operations and Counterterrorism (J37), Joint Staff.
(iii)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLICY AND
PROGRAMS TO COUNTER THREATS TO THE
UNITED STATES FROM TERRORISM AND
IRREGULAR WARFARE
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 21, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:39 p.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Deb
Fischer (chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Fischer, Cotton, Ernst,
Tillis, Nelson, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Donnelly, and Kaine.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER, CHAIRWOMAN
Senator Fischer. The hearing will come to order.
I'd like to welcome everyone to the hearing today. Senator
Nelson is on his way, but we're going to start the hearing.
This subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on the
Department of Defense's counterterrorism activities and policy.
And I'd like to welcome our witnesses. Before us today, we
have Michael Lumpkin, the Assistant Secretary for Special
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, and Brigadier General
Scott Howell, the Deputy Director for Special Operations and
Counterterrorism on the Joint Staff.
Welcome, gentlemen, and I thank you both for your service.
Following their brief opening statements, we will have a 5-
minute round of questions for each member, and then we will
proceed to a closed session.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about
how the Department is keeping pace with an increasingly
unstable global threat picture. In the last year, ISIL has
taken Mosul and expanded its control in Syria; Libya has
descended further in the chaos; Yemen's government has
collapsed; and al-Shabaab continues to conduct high-profile
attacks in Somalia and Kenya. Those who seek to attack our
Nation are taking advantage of this rising tide of instability,
and the lack of credible local partners casts doubt on whether
the President's strategy of taking out terrorists who threaten
us while supporting partners on the front lines can even be
applied today. I hope the witnesses will help this committee
understand how the U.S. policy has adapted to this new
landscape and what new approaches are being utilized to protect
U.S. interests.
I also hope to hear more from our witnesses on the amount
of risk our current strategy is accepting. General Votel has
characterized it as moderate, but I hope our witnesses can add
further detail and explain how this risk is distributed. My
concern is that, if we are only responding to the highest-
priority verified threats against our country, we will be
unable to proactively deal with smaller problems before they
become serious threats. Accepting such risk seems, at best, to
be a temporary strategy, since small problems will inevitably
accumulate and grow.
I would ask unanimous consent that we enter Senator
Nelson's, the Ranking Member, comments--opening statement into
the record.
Senator Fischer. And, with that, I would ask our panel to
please give us their opening statements.
Secretary.
STATEMENT OF HONORABLE MICHAEL D. LUMPKIN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT
Mr. Lumpkin. Thank you, Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member
Nelson, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank
you for this opportunity to appear before you today.
I am joined at the table by Brigadier General Scott Howell,
the Deputy Director for Special Operations on the Joint Staff.
And Mr. Steve Vanech, the acting Director for National
Counterterrorism Center's Director of Intelligence, will join
us for the closed session.
As I speak, U.S. Special Operations Force, also known as
USSOF, are deployed globally to support our mission to defend
America, our allies, our partners, and from the threats posed
by terrorist organizations. In today's environment, USSOF
successfully take direct action against multiple terrorist
organizations, in addition to building the capacity of our
partners. USSOF provide a vital but small component of our
comprehensive approach to counterterrorism. These efforts take
time to mature, but our operations are having positive effects.
As you are keenly aware, our Special Operations Forces are
unique assets. These assets are only effective when the
Department has the authority to employ them properly. While the
2001 Authorized Use of Military Force, also known as AUMF, and
the 2002 Iraq AUMF provide statutory authority for our current
operations, I fully support the President's proposed AUMF to
counter the Islamic State of Iraq in Levant, or ISIL. This
proposed legislation provides the adequate flexibility to
counter ISIL today while signaling to our friends and our
enemies that we are serious about addressing future
permutations of this expanding threat. I urge you to favorably
consider it.
I will now provide general comments on our counterterrorism
efforts. My colleagues and I will present additional details
during the closed session.
Since August 2004, USSOF has aggressively pursued ISIL in
Iraq and Syria. USSOF have deployed more than 3,000 personnel
to the region and conducted more than 10,000 hours of
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations.
USSOF have enabled thousands of strikes against ISIL's
leadership and forces, weakened its ability to exert external
territorial control, and challenged the foundation of its
expansionalist propaganda.
As part of our broader effort to assist the Iraqi Security
Forces, USSOF are coordinating with the central government in
Baghdad to provide training, equipment, and assistance to the
Kurdish Peshmerga. USSOF will also provide training and
assistance to select members of the moderate Syrian opposition.
While we work to destroy ISIL in Syria and Iraq, the group
is taking steps to expand its reach into Africa and Southeast
Asia. Recent killings of civilians in Afghanistan, Libya,
Yemen, Tunisia, and groups loyal to ISIL highlight the
expanding nature of the threat.
In West Africa, USSOF are partnering with local and
European allies to degrade Boko Haram, which recently pledged
allegiance to ISIL. With a relatively modest investment of
personnel and resources, USSOF and our allies are exerting
significant pressure on Boko Haram and its facilitation
network.
I am deeply concerned that the lack of unity of government
and deteriorating situation in Libya has created a safe haven
for militias and terrorist organization. ISIL's increased
popularity and presence in Libya highlight the need to quickly
achieve a lasting political solution. As I mentioned earlier,
the President's draft AUMF would provide appropriate
flexibility to confront ISIL's affiliates, where conditions
merit.
SOF are also working in multiple countries to eliminate the
threat posed by al-Qaeda. In Afghanistan, USSOF, in partnership
with the Afghans, continue to pressure al-Qaeda, the Haqqani
Network and others that pose threat to U.S. and coalition
interests. USSOF provide critical support to train, advise,
assist the Afghans, in addition to conducting targeted
counterterrorism operations.
Across Africa, USSOF are partnering with local and regional
forces and our European allies to degrade terrorist groups,
such as the Somali-based al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda in the Lands
of the Islamic Maghreb. These efforts have had significant
disruptive effects on these organizations. In addition, USSOF
are supporting other U.S. Government efforts to improve
governance and promote security across the continent.
In Yemen, I am troubled by the ongoing military aggression
perpetuated by the Houthis and the resulting widespread
unstable security conditions. Before the Houthis' destabilizing
military actions against the legitimate Government of Yemen,
USSOF provided critical support to the Yemeni security forces
to develop their ability to counter the threat of al-Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula. USSOF will continue to contribute to the
broader U.S. Government efforts to restore stability in Yemen
and degrade AQAP.
And in Syria, USSOF are conducting strikes against key
members of al-Qaeda's Syria-based affiliate.
SOF are taking steps to understand and address multiple
global threats, including terrorist networks, the flow of
foreign fighters, the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, and malign activities undertaken or sponsored by
other states. USSOF are deployed around the world, and are
working closely with our allies and partners to leverage our
respective strengths and capabilities against these common
threats. USSOF represent relatively small slice of the U.S.
Government's efforts against these threats; however, they are
achieving meaningful and positive effects.
I look forward to providing details in answering any
questions you may have.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lumpkin follows:]
Prepared Statement by Honorable Michael Lumpkin
introduction
Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Nelson, and distinguished members
of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to appear before
you today. As I speak, U.S. Special Operations Forces--known as USSOF--
are deployed across the globe in support of our broader
Counterterrorism Mission to defend America, our friends, and our
partners, from the threat posed by extremist terrorist organizations.
The current security environment is rapidly evolving with new threats
and challenging dynamics. In this complex environment, U.S. SOF
continue to successfully undertake operations against terrorist
organizations. Many of those forces are also doing critical work
associated with building the capacity of our partners to conduct their
own operations. Of critical importance, but often less visible, the
relationships that U.S. SOF develop with partners through persistent
engagement over many years are among the most valuable counter-
terrorism tools available to the United States.
Additionally, some SOF are poised to take direct action, including
strikes against high-value targets, when required. I will provide an
overview here and provide you with details on that specific element of
SOF efforts, and answer any questions you may have in our closed
session. I look forward to describing for you some of the actions
conducted recently and answering your questions, both here and in the
closed session. But before I do, I want to stress that direct action
counterterrorism operations are only a small part of a larger U.S.
counterterrorism effort. As I mentioned earlier, beyond direct action,
we put great effort into building partner capacity. These efforts are a
vital component of the whole-of-government approach to
counterterrorism, complementing the work of the State Department, the
Justice Department, Treasury, Homeland Security, and our Intelligence
Community, just to name a few. These efforts take time to mature, but
our strategy is having positive impacts.
One example of our successful whole-of-government approach is
Colombia. In just over a decade, and thanks in large part to U.S.
Government assistance and engagement, Colombia has been transformed
from a near-failed state into a major regional player with significant
political influence, the continent's most professional security forces,
and a dynamic economy. Colombia has set the standard for law
enforcement and counter-narcotics cooperation. Colombia now exports
their security expertise to other countries. The number and
effectiveness of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and National
Liberation Army guerrillas have been dramatically reduced. These
developments are making possible President Santos' deliberate steps to
achieve a negotiated peace. Efforts to reach a peace agreement are
ongoing, and continued robust U.S. Government engagement is necessary
to ensure that lasting success is achieved. Colombia's case highlights
what targeted SOF employment, intelligence, and sustained U.S.
Government engagement can accomplish.
As you are keenly aware, our Special Operations Forces are unique
assets. They benefit from a very rigorous selection process, realistic
training, as well as specialized education and equipment. These assets
are only effective when the Department of Defense has the authority to
employ them properly. While the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military
Force (AUMF) and the 2002 Iraq AUMF provide statutory authority for the
current operations I am going to discuss with you in our closed
session, I fully support the President's proposed AUMF to counter the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). This proposed legislation
provides adequate agility to conduct operations necessary to counter
ISIL today, while signaling to our friends and enemies that we are
serious about addressing future permutations of this very real threat.
I urge you to favorably consider it.
I will now take a brief moment to address the counterterrorism
situation in several regions around the world.
counterterrorism in iraq and syria
Since August 2014, U.S. SOF have aggressively pursued ISIL and al-
Qaeda-associated forces operating in Iraq and Syria. U.S. SOF have
deployed more than 3,000 personnel to the region and conducted more
than 10,000 hours of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
missions, which have enabled thousands of strikes against ISIL and al-
Qaeda forces in Iraq and Syria.
In Syria, U.S. SOF have taken a simultaneously top-down and bottom-
up approach. That is, they are focused on concurrently destroying
ISIL's leadership and forces, in order to weaken ISIL's ability to
exert territorial control, and to challenge the foundation of its
expansionist narrative. Operations against ISIL in Northern Syria are
focused on ISIL's network along the border with Turkey. These
operations are now expanding beyond the towns immediately around
Kobani. In addition, U.S. SOF continue to conduct operations against
key members of al-Qaeda's Syria-based affiliate.
In Iraq, U.S. SOF are engaged in multiple operations to degrade
ISIL, while increasing our partner's capabilities. U.S. SOF in Northern
Iraq, in coordination with the central government in Baghdad, have
worked with Kurdish Peshmerga forces to great effect. With U.S. SOF-
provided training, equipment, and assistance, Peshmerga forces have
conducted multiple, complex operations against ISIL in Iraq. These U.S.
SOF-led efforts are only a small component of the U.S. Government's
broader strategy to train, equip, and advise Iraqi Security Forces.
counterterrorism in yemen
In Yemen, I remain deeply troubled by the ongoing military
aggression perpetuated by the Houthis and the resulting wide-spread,
unstable security conditions. Before the Houthis' destabilizing
military actions against the legitimate government of Yemen, U.S. SOF
provided critical support to Yemen's security forces to develop their
ability to counter the threat of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP). AQAP remains al-Qaeda's most dangerous regional affiliate, and
I am concerned by its ability to exploit the current security vacuum in
Yemen. U.S. SOF will continue to contribute to the broader U.S.
Government's efforts to develop opportunities to restore stability in
Yemen and degrade AQAP's operational capabilities.
counterterrorism in afghanistan
In Afghanistan, U.S. SOF efforts are critical to U.S. Government
efforts of solidifying the security gains made over the last decade,
and contributing to robust, enduring counterterrorism partnerships.
Preventing al-Qaeda from regenerating in Afghanistan, monitoring
potential emerging threats, and preventing attacks on our forces remain
our top priorities.
U.S. SOF, in partnership with the Afghans, continue to pressure al-
Qaeda and other groups, such as the Haqqani network, that pose a threat
to U.S. and Coalition personnel serving in Afghanistan. U.S. SOF
provide critical support to train, advise, and assist the Afghans, in
addition to conducting counterterrorism operations against the remnants
of al-Qaeda. U.S. SOF are building the capacity of the Afghan National
Security and Defense Forces, particularly Afghan SOF, so they can serve
as the legitimate and capable first line of defense against terrorists
seeking to destabilize Afghanistan.
counterterrorism in africa
In Africa, the threat environment is varied and evolving with
terrorist organizations, such as al-Shabaab and Boko Haram, able to
exploit corruption, instability, and popular grievances in order to
mobilize support, establish sanctuaries, and carry out attacks. In
coordination with broader U.S. Government efforts in Africa, U.S. SOF
are deployed across the continent and are working closely with partners
to disrupt these threats and support efforts to improve security and
stability. U.S. SOF have been cultivating relationships with our local
partners in this region for years. We are now starting to see the
returns on those early investments, but it is critical that we continue
to sufficiently resource these operations.
The recent, high-profile attacks by al-Shabaab in Garissa, Kenya
and against the Higher Education Ministry in Somalia serve as reminders
of the serious threat posed by this group. U.S. SOF are partnering with
African Union forces operating in Somalia, in addition to undertaking
unilateral operations against al-Shabaab high-value targets who are
part of al-Qaeda. These efforts have had a significant impact on al-
Shabaab's leadership and have forced it to shift personnel and
resources out of traditional safe havens along the Somali coast. The
coast had been the main source of revenue for the organization, and
finances are the lifeblood of terrorist organizations. U.S. SOF
continue to work with our regional partners on the ground to maintain
military pressure on al-Shabaab and support other U.S. Government
efforts to improve governance and sustain security gains in Somalia.
In West Africa, U.S. SOF are partnering with local and European
allies to degrade Boko Haram. With a relatively modest investment of
personnel and resources, U.S. SOF have been able to support our allies
who are exerting significant pressure on extremists and the
facilitation networks that support them. Although Boko Haram continues
to pose a significant threat to the Lake Chad Basin region, our local
partners are now in a better position to conduct offensive operations
against Boko Haram, while safeguarding their respective populations.
Across the Trans-Sahel region, U.S. SOF are partnering with local
and European allies to degrade al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic
Maghreb. Taking advantage of multiple programs and authorities, U.S.
SOF are supporting our allies to significantly degrade the ability of
these groups to operate in the Mali-Niger-Algeria tri-border region.
The relationship and cooperation between U.S. SOF and French forces has
been particularly important as we work collaboratively to meet shared
counterterrorism objectives.
counterterrorism in libya
As with Yemen, I am deeply concerned about the political and
security situation in Libya. The lack of a unity government that is
representative of all of Libya's people has created an environment
where militias and terrorist organizations can take hold. ISIL's
increased popularity and presence in Libya highlight the need to
quickly achieve a lasting political solution. As I mentioned earlier,
the President's draft AUMF would provide the appropriate flexibility to
confront ISIL elements and threats where conditions merit.
global threats
We are also taking steps to understand and address multiple global
threats, including: the challenges associated with the flow of foreign
terrorist fighters, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
and malign activities undertaken or sponsored by other states. Although
these threats cross multiple geographic combatant command boundaries,
U.S. SOF are well-postured to mitigate them. U.S. SOF are deployed
around the world and are working closely with our allies and partners
to leverage our respective strengths and capabilities against these
common threats. These long-term partnerships are critical, given that
these transnational challenges will take years to effectively address.
conclusion
Forward deployed U.S. SOF personnel are leveraging unique
capabilities and working with partners to address some of the most
significant and complex threats that face our country, our allies, and
our partners. U.S. SOF represents a relatively small slice of the U.S.
Government's efforts against these threats, however, they are achieving
significant and meaningful positive effects. I look forward to
detailing for you some of our recent activities and answering your
questions. Thank you.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
General.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. SCOTT A. HOWELL, USAF, DEPUTY DIRECTOR
FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND COUNTERTERRORISM (J37), JOINT STAFF
General Howell. Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Nelson,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, appreciate the
opportunity to come appear before you today to discuss these
important topics.
I do not have a prepared opening statement, but look
forward to the discussion and your questions.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
With that, I will begin the questioning. We will have our
5-minute rounds.
And, Mr. Secretary, as I mentioned in my opening statement,
General Votel has stated that he's able to meet the current
threats with moderate risk. Can you elaborate on what a
moderate risk is and if we're only going to be dealing with, I
guess, verifiable threats to the homeland?
Mr. Lumpkin. I think the--what General Votel was speaking
of when he was reflecting the moderateness of the risk is that,
because of the size of the force and the scope of the problem,
we have to work with our limited means to do what we possibly
can. And those things that are imminently threat to U.S.
interests are--and U.S. lives--are what we at the Department
are focused on.
Again, we are just a part of the larger U.S.
counterterrorism effort that involves State, it's involved--
Department of State, USAID--in these efforts to restore
governance, because these terrorist organizations take root and
take hold in areas where there's a--not a strong central
government and they have maneuver room to grow and to
metastasize.
So, again, I think what he was speaking of specifically is
that section of what we're able to do within our--within the
toolbag of the Department of Defense.
Senator Fischer. Would you say our focus now, then, is on
Syria and Iraq? And at what point do we, I guess, not play
defense and we start looking more at offense? Do we wait until
something gets out of control? Does it have to boil over? When
do we commit resources in places like Yemen and Libya?
Mr. Lumpkin. That's a great question. Thank you very much.
I think the key is--and I think that's one of the reasons
why the President submitted the Authorized Use of Military
Force against ISIL that was not geographically bounded. It
allowed--it was against the organization of ISIL, as we see it
metastasizing in these areas that lack governance, these places
like Libya. We have seen, you know, ISIL expanding across
northern Africa into other places into the Middle East. So, I
think this was a--an initiative to have the flexibility, should
they metastasize to prove a threat against the United States,
that we could effectively respond.
Senator Fischer. You don't feel that you have the authority
or the flexibility now to counter threats in places like Libya
or Yemen?
Mr. Lumpkin. I believe that if we--I mean, I would have to
defer to the lawyers and the--how they see the current
authorities and how they're interpreted. But, I know that there
are limitations to what we can do, going back, the AUMF of 2001
has very--has been--has strict adherence guidelines, and we
have to make sure we're fully compliant. And again, I think
that the President's intent of submitting the AUMF for--against
ISIL was to--as we look at the current problem in Iraq and
Syria, but also to see, as they are metastasizing, make sure we
have the agility to do what's necessary before they get out of
hand.
Senator Fischer. Do you try to look at policy, and what the
policy should be, what the strategy should be, where we need to
commit our forces, before you look at what the resources are? I
mean, this committee--this subcommittee and the full committee
hear constantly about sequestration and the challenges that
that has put on our military. But, shouldn't it be policy
that's driving decisions that are made, and not looking at the
limits that we may or may not be facing with resources?
Mr. Lumpkin. With regard to DOD's counterterrorism policy,
yes. And that's why we have a strategy that dovetails section
1208 strategies that the Congress has been very supportive of,
as well as section 2282, global train-and-equip strategies, to
make sure we can build our partner capacity to make sure that
we have those--our--those partners that we can with--by, with,
and through to achieve the outcomes that we're looking for. So,
yes, we have a--what I would say, a coherent strategy. But,
again, a small slice of the larger U.S. Government strategy.
Senator Fischer. And how do you judge when a moderate risk
becomes a high risk?
Mr. Lumpkin. We continually evaluate, every day, to see, as
things change and they shift, the speed with which the enemy
can move, based on the lack of governance and security vacuums
in numerous countries, can--forces us to monitor all the time.
Senator Fischer. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Lumpkin. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Fischer. Next, I would call on my Ranking Member,
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
And I will hold most of my questions for the classified
session.
But, let me just ask you. Last year, Congress provided DOD
with a CT-focused transfer fund of 1.3 billion. But, that
hasn't been spent. So, why not? And which one of your deputies
is charged with executing this program?
Mr. Lumpkin. Thank you for that question, Senator.
I received oversight responsibility of the Global
Counterterrorism Partnership Fund within the Department about
30 days ago. Since that time, we--of the $1.3 billion, about
220 million of it has been obligated, to date. We're--I fully
expect to obligate about another $270 million, here, shortly.
One of the things we have to make sure as we're building
this program, which the Congress was so supportive on, is to
make sure we have the right governance in place to provide--
that we're putting--effectively managing the monies and
managing the resources so that we have measures of
effectiveness with the program as we build it.
So, what we want to make sure we're not doing is, we're not
just throwing money against the problem, and make sure that
we--it's part of a larger strategy, and that we put it in
places where the respective nations can absorb the material
that we're putting into their respective countries.
Senator Nelson. Which deputy?
Mr. Lumpkin. That--it's me that's doing it. I'm----
Senator Nelson. Okay.
Mr. Lumpkin.--principally responsible.
Senator Nelson. All right. Good.
Now, this committee has also received a lot of complaints
from the combatant commanders--as a matter of fact, every one
of them--about the patchwork of security assistance authorities
that is available to them to build partner capacity. So, why is
this? Especially since the Office of the Secretary of Defense
has made the situation additionally complicated by sprinkling
these programs across a bunch of offices. What's going on?
Mr. Lumpkin. Senator, I can speak to those programs that I
manage, specifically, which are the section 2282, section 1208,
as well as the Global Security Contingency Fund. And the--
those--that's--those fall largely outside of the traditional
foreign military sales programs, but they are focused on
equipping and training our foreign partners to make sure that
they have the capacity to execute missions in support of our
interests and their interests.
I--those particular ones that I'm responsible for, I
believe are well synchronized, and I'd look forward to briefing
you on how those are synchronized, where we would have more
time to spend on it.
But, I'll take--I mean, I can take that question back, from
the whole of Department of Defense. I'll that one for the
record, sir.
Senator Nelson. General Votel told us that a campaign plan
for global special operations--when he was here last month.
What is the purpose of this new campaign plan?
Mr. Lumpkin. The campaign plan, which is still in staffing,
so it is not an approved campaign plan, is to ensure that SOCOM
has the ability to fully synchronize its efforts across the
geographic combatant commands, to ensure that there are no gaps
in seams where our enemies can hide. So, SOCOM is focused
largely on the counterterrorism issue, is--wants to make sure
that we have all the bases covered, so it's just kind of just
to level the bubbles across the entire defense enterprise, to
make sure that everybody's singing off the same sheet of music.
Senator Nelson. For the record, do you want to comment on
the effects of sequestration and your concerns about the cuts
to the service-provided enablers?
Mr. Lumpkin. Yes, sir, I would.
Sequestration in the Budget Control Act has--will have
negative impacts, as structured, for U.S. Special Operations
Command. I think the largest challenges that we'll see is those
service-supported enablers from combat support, combat service
support. ISR, the intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance capabilities that support special operations
every day, are going to--as well as the force modernization
for, particularly, special operations aircraft. As you're
aware, the services provide the aircraft. We make those
special-operations-peculiar modifications. As they have a
reduction in funds, those aircraft will come to us at a slower
rate, which will hurt our modernization ability within the
force.
So, I think that we--it will have not only short-term
impacts, but I think you're looking at long-term impacts on
modernizing and maintaining a healthy special-operations
capability in the out years.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen, both, for your
service to our country.
Secretary Lumpkin, a little over a year ago, Vladimir
Putin, in Russia, invaded and took Crimea from the Ukraine.
That started out with what I think most would characterize as a
successful unconventional or irregular warfare campaign
involving the so-called ``little green men.'' Would that be
your assessment of the way the invasion of Crimea began?
Mr. Lumpkin. I believe that his incursion into Ukraine
definitely used unconventional tactics.
Senator Cotton. Okay. Given what we've started to see in
the Baltics in recent months, between aggressive behavior from
Russian bombers or submarines, the alleged kidnapping of an
Estonian security officer from eastern Estonia, which has a
large Russian ethnic minority, as does eastern Latvia, what is
the Department's plans and position for that kind of irregular
campaign if it were to begin to be conducted by Russia in
Estonia and Latvia?
Mr. Lumpkin. That's one we should discuss in a closed
session, if you don't mind, sir.
Senator Cotton. Okay, sure.
I want to ask about the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act. There are three provisions of that Act that are expiring
in about 6 weeks, the so-called ``lone wolf,'' roving wiretap,
and business record provisions. Do you have a perspective on
the impact that it would have on the men and women in your
charge if those provisions are not reauthorized and the
programs they support continue?
Mr. Lumpkin. Sir, I'll be honest that that's a little out
of my lane, as far as the intelligence-gathering piece of it.
So, I would be--wouldn't want to speculate.
Senator Cotton. Okay.
General Howell, do you have perspective on that?
General Howell. No, sir, I don't. I'd have to defer to our
Intelligence Community colleagues to provide assessment.
Senator Cotton. Okay.
I think I'll yield back the balance of my time, in the
interest of getting on to the closed session.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
And, to Secretary Lumpkin and General Howell, thank you
both for being here.
I want to go back to--and follow up a little bit on Senator
Nelson's question about the impact of sequestration on the
Special Forces, because--I was very impressed, Secretary
Lumpkin, with your comment in your statement that humans are
more important than hardware. And I do believe that to be true.
And I believe that that--if we look at conflict over our
history, that that's been a critical element of our success,
has been the importance of individual leaders and the
commitment that our men and women in uniform have made.
So, as we look at the impact of sequestration, you've
talked about a number of things that would be affected by
service-provided capabilities, but can you talk directly about
the impact on the men and women who are serving in our Special
Operations? There's an impact with respect to their
deployments. And what does that do to morale? What does it do
to the men and women on the ground? And can you talk in
language that the average person out there can understand so
that they really appreciate what's happening to the men and
women who are serving?
Mr. Lumpkin. Well, I think, first, from an operational
standpoint, is--if we reduce ISR--this is the intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance capability--to our deploying
forces, we inherently put our troops at greater risk. We have
less fidelity on what's happening. We have--we take greater
risk in every operation. So, you're--you increase the risk to
lives, at the very front end, when you have reduced capability.
I think you also have--from the human aspect, day to day,
is--we make decisions, especially--whether--some of our units
are very reliant on the overseas contingency operations funds.
And it's very difficult for them to plan and not anticipate
what the future can be, whether it's a program they're working
or it's that their very job may exist in the future, just for
the nature of--we don't--because that's 1-year money, as you're
aware, and it's not part of base budget. So, I think that
people are looking for certainty and what's in their future.
And I think that's key. Because spending years in a precarious
situation of uncertainty is stressful, in itself.
We also have a challenge of that we frequently cut, when
times get tough, are those out-year expenses. And those are
research and development, and those are education, which are
absolutely key. And we have to make sure that, whatever the
outcome of a Budget Control Act scenario in fiscal year 2016,
that we continue to invest in our people, educationwise, and as
well as the research and development to make sure we keep them
safe and have sound operational capabilities in the future, to
give to Congress and the President, options as we move forward.
And then it goes everything that trickles down to
preserving the force, as far as health, welfare, holistic
taking care of our troops, whether it's pay, allowances, things
of that nature, that gives us the military capability that we
have today.
So, I mean, this goes from the very, you know, operational
aspects in the field to what life--how you live life every day
when you go to your housing on base or anywhere else. So, this
is--the impacts are very crosscutting and very deep, maybe not
so much in itself at the front end, but as you--as it trickles
down. And when you add them all together, they are significant.
Senator Shaheen. And Chair Fischer was getting at the
question of, What's--what drives--to what extent is policy
driven by resources? And isn't it true that, despite
everybody's best intent, that if sequestration kicks in again,
that, in fact, resources are going to have an impact on our
policy and our planning?
Mr. Lumpkin. Absolutely. It does. I mean--though the
reality is, you can--I mean, whether it's your--how you manage
your household--you make decisions on how much money you've got
coming in as income, and it's no different from the Department
of Defense. We make decisions based on resources that are
available.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Senator Fischer. Senator Ernst.
Senator Ernst. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. I do appreciate
the testimony and your service, as well. Thank you very much.
Last month, I had sent a letter to President Obama
regarding my concern about Iranian-supported and -controlled
Iraqi Shiite militia, and the long-term threat that they have
posed to our country and to a free Iraq. And, as both of you
know, throughout the war, we have lost a lot of wonderful
Americans to those that are involved with Iraqi Shiite militia.
And I believe that we can't forget their sacrifices against
this type of enemy, and that Iran's long-term--Iran's long-term
objective is to defeat both the United States and Iraqi
interests in Iraq. My opinion.
So, with respect to your near- and long-term assessment,
what are the most--both the most likely and the most
dangerous--not necessarily courses of actions, but the
implications for Iraq, particularly for the Iraqi Kurds and the
Sunnis, if Iranian-controlled Shiite militias and their groups
continue at the forefront of taking back territory in Iraq? So,
again, focusing on Iran and those Shiite militias that are
backed by Iran, and the implications to both our interests and
Iraq.
Mr. Lumpkin. Thank you.
I think that Mr. Steven Vanech will be in the closed
session, could give you a much more satisfying answer for
what----
Senator Ernst. Okay.
Mr. Lumpkin.--you're looking for.
Senator Ernst. Okay, thank you.
General, the same, also? Okay, thank you very much.
And then, just a yes-or-no question in regards to this type
of situation. U.S. equipment that has been provided to Iraqi
Shiite militias, that equipment that has been provided to the
Iraqi government, has it been obtained by Iranian-controlled
militias? Just simple yes or no.
Mr. Lumpkin. Again, that would be--I would go to Mr. Steven
Vanech in the closed session for that.
Senator Ernst. Okay. Okay. I think most of my questions
will need to be asked in a closed session.
So, gentlemen, thank you very much. And I look forward to
that opportunity.
Thank you.
Senator Fischer. Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. thank you
for hosting this hearing, to you and the ranking member.
I just got back from a CODEL to Tunisia, Chad, Kenya,
Senegal, and Djibouti to talk about antiterrorism, to talk
about growing terror threats from al-Shabaab, from ISIL, from
Boko Haram. And every single military leader we talked to very
specifically said counterterrorism can only be addressed partly
through military action, that, in fact, to be effective, you
had to combine that with work by the State Department, U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), a more holistic
strategy on the ground, economic development, a range of
issues. Do you share that view?
Mr. Lumpkin. Yes, I do. The key is, is that, as long as
there is a lack of strong governance in a region, extremists
will take advantage of that. They'll co-op the people, and they
will grow, and they will ultimately be a threat regionally to
the burgeoning governments, but the regional and largely--
ultimately, probably internationally. So, I absolutely agree
with that.
Senator Gillibrand. General?
General Howell. I share the view, as well.
Senator Gillibrand. So, in closed session, I'll ask you
more specific questions about what type of strategies might be
effective. But, top line, every leader we talked to, both U.S.
and the foreign leaders, they did--very grateful for the work
the United States was doing. They overwhelmingly were grateful
for all the training that was taking place on the ground. They
were very grateful for intelligence-sharing. Several
governments wanted helicopters sooner than later. But, they
were grateful. And they saw how things were working
effectively, in terms of training their personnel to respond,
particularly in Chad, for example. They were doing very
effective work against--in Nigeria, more so than the Nigerian
government was doing. We saw the same in Kenya, where they were
obviously doing far more effective measures than the Somalians
were able to do. So, do you think that we have sufficient
Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to
support the counterintelligence efforts in Africa? Do you feel
like we have enough components and investment to do what we
would like to do in those places?
Mr. Lumpkin. Before I turn it over to General Howell, I
will tell you that our shortage of the ISR is not limited to
Africa. We don't have enough ISR, period. We work the best we
can to do with what we got. And that's exactly what we do.
So, as we look at the future and we look at dwindling
budgets, we see the number of what we call ``orbits,'' the
number of airframes in the air, is decreasing, not increasing
as the global threats are increasing so that----
Senator Gillibrand. So--but, can I request, then, a more
formal request about what you actually need to meet the needs
and goals you have in counterterrorism, in terms of ISR?
Because I want to be able to prioritize that in budget debates
and also when we write the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA), that we need more resources in this particular area,
because some things are going to be cut, but some things are
plussed-up because of the need. So, I'd like more specific
requests on that.
Mr. Lumpkin. Will do.
Senator Gillibrand. By region.
Mr. Lumpkin. Thank you.
Senator Gillibrand. And by terror threat.
General?
General Howell. Nothing to add to Mr. Lumpkin's comments.
Senator Gillibrand. Okay.
The rest of my questions will be in--I will submit for the
record for a different setting.
Senator Gillibrand. Now I want to turn to the issue of
integration. I've read a lot about the Cultural Support Teams,
how Special Ops have very effectively used them in Afghanistan.
For example, they would use the Cultural Support Teams to be
able to go into a village to actually inspect the women to make
sure they weren't hiding weapons, to question the women and
children to find out if any terrorists were among them, and to
very, very positive effects on the missions that certainly were
being run by Army Rangers and Navy SEAL teams. Can you talk
about the benefits of this program? And is SOCOM taking into
full account the range of benefits that would come from female
participation in Special Ops in its analysis of combat
integration?
Mr. Lumpkin. I'll just--I share your comment from the
Cultural Support Teams that are in Afghanistan, having served
over there. I think those ladies were reaching part of the
population that the males were not reaching--in day-to-day
conversation in the villages, sharing some of their concerns,
developing relationships, which made our force more effective.
So, I think we're constantly looking for new ways to find out
how both males and females can make our force better.
Senator Gillibrand. And will you use the practical benefits
that you've seen on the ground as part of your commitment to
force integration? I mean, I just read that the Army Rangers, a
large number of the females who were just trained in the latest
group, passed through the training.
Mr. Lumpkin. I believe you're talking about the women in
service review and the integration of women in U.S. Special
Operations Command. As you're aware, U.S. Special Operations
Command, like the service, is doing a study, and they're
working through to give a recommendation, not later than--I
believe that the decision will be made by 1 January 2016. But,
they're working through all of those pieces to make sure--
everything from that we have standards that are gender neutral,
that we have--and we maximize the opportunity for full
integration within the Special Operations enterprise.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
Senator Fischer. Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
The news is reporting today that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has
been seriously injured, possibly in March, and is now maybe not
in operational command of ISIL. There has been earlier reports
of this. I think there was one in November. There was one in
March. The November one may have turned out to be incorrect.
What can you tell us about al Baghdadi's condition and the
effect that that would have on ISIL's effectiveness?
Mr. Lumpkin. Thank you, sir. I saw the report, as well,
earlier today. And again, not the first time we've had this.
But, I think that talking about the impacts is probably a
closed-session issue.
Senator Kaine. Okay. So, you would not have a--I mean, in
here, not have anything to add, beyond what the report might be
today, but we can go into the impacts at the later session.
Mr. Lumpkin. Yeah, I have nothing to add to that report.
Senator Kaine. Okay.
Just a couple of questions to understand how a piece of the
Special Forces mission works. As I've traveled as an Armed
Services member, one of the things I've really seen is how well
Special Forces do in training foreign militaries, and how much
in demand that kind of training assistance is.
And I also know that the Marines have the Special Purpose
MAGTAV that's doing training. They've got a unit in Africa. And
then, the State Partnership Program, which the National Guard
has, also works on training of foreign militaries. I mean, this
is great, because it--as far as a expenditure of dollars in the
grand Pentagon budget, it's not a massive item, but it builds
up goodwill. And when countries really need it, they need it.
Talk a little bit about how that--the training is tiered.
And is it the COCOM that decides this kind of assistance would
need Special Operations to do the--SOF to do the training, this
kind would--the State Partnership Program would do it, or this
time the Marines could do it? How does that get done? Is it
organized at the COCOM level or is it done differently?
Mr. Lumpkin. It's largely organized by the--within the
combatant commands, and they look at--across their theaters on
where the capacity needs to be built. And so, we work in--
within the Office of Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff,
work in conjunction with the COCOMs to look at the resources
that are available and put the right amount of resources in the
right place at the right time.
There are some natural things, where Special Operations
will generally train Special Operations. But, they can train
other units, as well, whether it's law enforcement or military.
We also have the more enduring partnerships that go on, are--
the State Partnership Program is where you have this habitual
relationship between a foreign nation and, you know, a
respective state in this country. So, you end up with a very
habitual relationship, more conventional in nature, that
exists. But, all of these are synchronized across in--which
authority are we using? Are we going to use a counternarcotics
authority? Are we going to do a joint combined exercise for
training authority, which--where we get 51 percent of the
training? Are we going to use some other mechanism? So, we try
to take all these different authorities that we have to
maximize the engagement with the respective nation to make sure
we bring up their capacity. And we'll overlay--on the
counterterrorism front, we'll overlay the 2282, which is the
global train-and-equip authority, and to make sure that they
have the resources necessary, material resources--to make sure
that they have the--whether it's guns, planes, trucks, or
whatever they need--to make sure that they can execute those
missions that we train them to in--with those other authorities
that are out there.
Senator Kaine. My intuition would tell me that the demand
for this kind of training from United States is probably
increasing pretty significantly.
Mr. Lumpkin. It is increasing. What we do with--anytime we
do any of these training-type events, though, we--you know, of
course, we've--we do vetting for human rights, and we do
things--and so, the--you end up with their--as we work through
this, is that--especially in areas where there is a lack of
governance, it gets very difficult to find forces to work with
that we can adequately and effectively vet to make sure that
they--we can put the resources of both training and material in
the country.
Senator Kaine. Am I right that, sort of as a part of the
big DOD budget, these training activities are not a--you know,
a massive percentage of the DOD budget?
Mr. Lumpkin. You are absolutely correct.
Senator Kaine. And, when you do them, you build
relationships, and some of the people you're training might be
the Defense Minister in 10 years, or maybe the President in 15
or 20 years. And that's all part of the thinking about why it's
good for us to be that partner for these foreign militaries?
Mr. Lumpkin. Absolutely. When--recently when--as the
Assistant Secretary, I was down in Peru, and I was meeting with
people that I had gone to SEAL training, you know, 25 years
ago, when I was an Active Duty Navy SEAL.
And the other piece that's so significant and important
about these military-to-military relationships is, when
political relationships become strained, which happens between
sovereign nations--it's just part of the international
community--is that the military-to-military relationship is
kind of the glue that holds things together, that I can pick up
the phone and call somebody, and we can have--build a rapport
at our level to make sure that things don't go sideways on us,
and we end up with a situation that's much more difficult.
Senator Kaine. Great.
I'm over time. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
My thanks to my colleagues. My thanks to you, gentlemen,
for this open session.
We will now adjourn for the closed session.
Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 3:18 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
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