[Senate Hearing 114-691]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-691
FRUSTRATED TRAVELERS: RETHINKING TSA
OPERATIONS TO IMPROVE PASSENGER SCREENING AND ADDRESS THREATS TO
AVIATION
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 7, 2016
__________
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/
Printed for the use of the
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
RAND PAUL, Kentucky JON TESTER, Montana
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
JONI ERNST, Iowa GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
BEN SASSE, Nebraska
Christopher R. Hixon, Staff Director
Jose J. Bautista, Professional Staff Member
Servando H. Gonzales, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Detailee
Brooke N. Ericson, Chief Counsel for Homeland Security
Gabrielle A. Batkin, Minority Staff Director
John P. Kilvington, Minority Deputy Staff Director
Stephen R. Vina, Minority Chief Counsel for Homeland Security
Abigail A. Shenkle, Minority Professional Staff Member
Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
Benjamin C. Grazda, Hearing Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statements:
Page
Senator Johnson.............................................. 1
Senator Carper............................................... 2
Senator Tester............................................... 15
Senator Enzi................................................. 17
Senator Ernst................................................ 18
Senator Ayotte............................................... 20
Senator Peters............................................... 22
Senator Lankford............................................. 24
Senator Portman.............................................. 26
Senator Heitkamp............................................. 28
Senator McCaskill............................................ 32
Prepared statements:
Senator Johnson.............................................. 39
Senator Carper............................................... 41
WITNESS
Tuesday, June 7, 2016
Hon. Peter V. Neffenger, Administrator, Transportation Security
Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security........... 4
Hon. John Roth, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security....................................................... 7
Jennifer Grover, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S.
Government Accountability Office............................... 9
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Grover, Jennifer:
Testimony.................................................... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 68
Neffenger, Hon. Peter V.:
Testimony.................................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 43
Roth, Hon. John:
Testimony.................................................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 56
APPENDIX
Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record
Mr. Neffenger................................................ 89
Mr. Roth..................................................... 118
Ms. Grover................................................... 120
FRUSTRATED TRAVELERS:
RETHINKING TSA OPERATIONS TO IMPROVE PASSENGER SCREENING AND ADDRESS
THREATS TO AVIATION
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TUESDAY, JUNE 7, 2016
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:14 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ron Johnson,
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Johnson, Portman, Lankford, Enzi, Ayotte,
Ernst, Sasse, Carper, McCaskill, Tester, Baldwin, Heitkamp,
Booker, and Peters.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JOHNSON
Chairman Johnson. Good morning. This hearing will come to
order. I apologize for my tardiness. What should have taken 10
minutes took an hour. But, I want to welcome the witnesses and
try and catch my breath. I appreciate your testimonies.
Obviously, there is a fair amount of interest in this hearing.
I think, at the heart of what is currently ailing the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), is the fact that
we really have two completely contradictory goals. On the one
hand, we want efficient throughput, so we can get passengers to
their flights on time. And, at the same time, we need to be 100
percent secure.
All of this is being driven--we have to understand that the
root cause of the problem here is Islamic terrorism. Since the
inception of the TSA, we have spent about $95 billion just on
TSA alone. The cost of Islamic terror to the world--to the
civilized world--is enormous. So, if you really want to talk
about addressing the root cause of the problem, we have to
defeat Islamic terrorists where they reside.
But, again, I appreciate all of the witnesses' testimonies.
The fact that we consciously made the decision to decrease the
number of TSA workers--obviously, it did not work out very
well. I appreciate the fact that we are beefing up training--a
``Unity of Effort initiative.'' All of these things are
positive signs. I appreciate the fact that, Admiral Neffenger,
you are working very cooperatively with both the Department of
Homeland Security's (DHS's) Office of the Inspector General
(OIG) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO). It comes
through very clear in testimony.
So, again, I just apologize for being late. I do ask
unanimous consent that my written statement be included in the
record.\1\
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\1\ The prepared statement of Senator Johnson appears in the
Appendix on page 39.
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With that, I will turn it over to Senator Carper and I will
catch my breath.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER
Senator Carper. Mr. Chairman, we are glad you are here.
There were a couple of trains that were shot out from under me
coming down from Delaware, so I know the feeling.
Thank you all for joining us this morning. We are delighted
that you are here. This is going to be a good hearing. This is
going to be a really good hearing. It is a very timely hearing.
As we all know, the Transportation Security Administration
was created in the wake of the attacks on September 11, 2001
(9/11). And, we understand well the terrorist threat to our
aviation system, which the Agency was created to combat. Having
said that, though, we oftentimes fail to acknowledge an
undeniable tension that exists--as alluded to by the Chairman--
an undeniable tension that exists at the core of TSA's mission.
On the one hand, we ask TSA to screen millions of
passengers and their luggage carefully every day to prevent
explosives, weapons, and other dangerous items from finding
their way on board our aircrafts.
On the other hand, millions of passengers--we have been
among them--we have all been there--want to get on board our
airplanes on time and without the aggravation that security
screening oftentimes can bring.
Given the long wait times we have recently witnessed--at
security checkpoints at a number of airports across America--we
know that it can be difficult to strike the right balance
between security and convenience. Some might even be tempted to
say that we cannot have both--that effective security measures
invariably bring with them inconvenience, lines, and even
missed flights. I disagree. In fact, I believe that many of the
problems we have witnessed at some of our airports are
eminently solvable. But, first, we need to better understand
the scope of the challenge and its genesis.
After the DHS OIG produced a very troubling report last
year, revealing vulnerabilities at TSA checkpoints, Admiral
Neffenger took several steps to tighten security. And, while
the steps that he and his team have taken have contributed to
longer waits for some, there are other reasons why TSA has
struggled lately. And, I want to talk about a couple of them.
Resource constraints and increased air travel have played a
significant role. TSA is being asked, literally, to do more
with less. While inept management and ineffective leadership at
some airports has been a major factor, the truth is that
staffing at TSA has dropped by more than 10 percent since 2011.
At the same time that staffing has gone down, passenger volume
at our airports has increased by more than 10 percent. TSA must
be nimble enough to handle this growth in air travelers,
especially the surges that occur during the busy summer travel
season--like we are seeing now--and at other times during the
year.
The good news is that Admiral Neffenger and Homeland
Security Secretary Jeh Johnson have moved quickly to reduce
wait times and to do so without compromising security. Is there
more that we can do? Sure there is--and I am going to talk
about a couple of those things.
But, based on the reports that we have seen, these efforts
are already beginning to bear fruit. They helped to keep
passengers moving during the busy Memorial Day weekend. But,
let me just say this: Security on our airplanes and security in
our airports--these are shared responsibilities. It cannot all
be on TSA. It cannot all be on Admiral Neffenger and his
leadership team. This is a shared responsibility.
Congress must work with the Administration to ensure that
the Agency has the resources it needs to effectively carry out
their mission. Funding levels in appropriations bills awaiting
action--we have some appropriators here. I just want to say
that you folks are doing a good job, with respect to funding
levels for TSA. And, the bills that are awaiting action in the
Senate move us--and I think they move TSA--in the right
direction. We need to enact those bills.
But, airports and air carriers have an important
responsibility to help reduce wait times as well. I have been
very encouraged by the willingness of private sector
stakeholders to step up and contribute their own resources and
ideas to solving this problem. A longer-term solution is being
demonstrated--we just talked about it back in the anteroom with
Admiral Neffenger. It is being demonstrated, in real time,
today, at London's Heathrow Airport. In the spirit of my
saying, ``Find out what works and do more of that,'' TSA
launched a similar initiative last month. It is called an
``Innovation Lane''--there are a couple of them down in
Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport--and I am sure
we will hear more about them, today--and the partnership,
between TSA and Delta Air Lines, to improve passenger
throughput by, I am told, as much as 30 percent.
While that concept shows great promise over the long haul,
airlines have already taken a number of other steps that can
make a difference, now, such as reassigning their own employees
to help TSA in some places. Perhaps, the most important step we
can take, though, is to continue to dramatically grow
participation in trusted traveler programs, like TSA PreCheck,
that speed screening for vetted passengers and shorten wait
times for those not in TSA PreCheck lines, too. And, I am
encouraged by the steps that TSA has taken so far to increase
TSA PreCheck enrollments. We are told that enrollments have
soared, from 3,500 people, per day, getting into TSA PreCheck a
year ago, to, roughly, 16,000 a day at the end of last month.
We look forward to learning more today about the additional
ways that we can encourage enrollment in this program.
In closing, it is important to keep in mind that there are
still very real security threats to our aviation system. They
are not going away. These guys are not stupid. They are trying
to come up with new formularies in order to create bombs that
are even harder for dogs to detect.
Today's solution may not work tomorrow. Those seeking to
wreak havoc are always changing their tactics and these
evolving threats require that we constantly adjust what we do
at our airport security checkpoints and on our airplanes.
Finally, we need to stay on top of the growth in air travel
and the changing travel patterns, so that TSA and its partners
are not caught, like they were, recently, dealing with
logistical challenges that they are not prepared for. This is
why strong leadership is so critical in order to see us through
these very challenging times.
Leadership is a lot like integrity. Senator Alan Simpson
used to say, ``Integrity--if you have it, nothing else matters.
Integrity--if you do not have it, nothing else matters.'' The
same is true of leadership. And, I think we are blessed with
enlightened leadership and we are grateful to you, Admiral
Neffenger, for your willingness to serve. This burden is not
just for you and your team to bear. This is a shared
responsibility. Each of us needs to do our part and, if we do,
we will be much safer as a Nation. Let us roll.
Thank you.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Carper.
It is the tradition of this Committee to swear in
witnesses, so if you will all rise and raise your right hand.
Do you swear that the testimony you will give before this
Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth, so help you, God?
Admiral Neffenger. I do.
Mr. Roth. I do.
Ms. Grover. I do.
Chairman Johnson. Please be seated.
Our first witness is Admiral Peter Neffenger. Admiral
Neffenger is the Administrator of the Transportation Security
Administration. Administrator Neffenger manages a workforce of
nearly 60,000 employees and is responsible for security
operations at, approximately, 440 airports throughout the
United States. Prior to joining TSA, he served as the 29th Vice
Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). Admiral Neffenger.
TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE PETER V. NEFFENGER,\1\
ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Admiral Neffenger. Thank you, Chairman. Good morning,
Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and distinguished
Members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today. I sincerely appreciate the Committee's
oversight of and support for TSA and of our important
counterterrorism mission.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Neffenger appears in the Appendix
on page 43.
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Since taking office on July 4 last year, I have traveled,
extensively, to observe our operations and to meet with our
employees--and they are truly impressive. Their patriotism,
their sense of duty, and their commitment to our national
security mission is exemplary. And, when I appeared before the
Committee nearly one year ago, I committed to addressing the
immediate challenges we faced in our security mission, while
positioning TSA for the future. And, to that end, over the past
11 months, we have undertaken a systematic and deliberate
transformation of TSA. Our strategy has included three
complementary elements:
First, focusing on security effectiveness. In the wake of
the Inspector General's finding, that was our fundamental
mission--and that is our most important mission.
Second, resourcing to meet demand.
And, third, transforming the system.
We are holding ourselves accountable to high standards of
effectiveness and we are supporting our front-line officers in
their critical counterterrorism mission.
We have renewed our focus on security. We have revised
alarm resolution procedures. We have ceased engaging in risky
practices. We have retrained the entire workforce. And, we have
retooled our performance measures to ensure we stay focused on
our critical security mission.
With Congress' help, we overhauled our approach to training
at all levels of the Agency, including leadership training.
And, we established the first ever TSA Academy on January 1 of
this year, with initial course offerings focused on training
front-line Transportation Security Officers (TSOs). This
intensive training enables TSA to achieve consistency, develop
a common culture, instill core values, and raise performance
across the entire workforce.
Second, we are resourcing to meet demand. With help from
Congress, we halted the reduction of our screening workforce
this past year. We are making investments in new technology,
converting part-time officers to full-time, and shifting
screeners and K-9 resources to high-volume airports. We have
begun hiring into the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS)
remaining consistent with our new concept of operations. And,
we are conducting our operations more effectively.
We completed a review of personnel policies and practices,
which led to a number of significant changes. And, we are
designing a Human Capital Management (HCM) system to address
recruitment, development, promotion, assignment, and retention.
Third, we are transforming TSA in fundamental ways to
ensure a mature, enterprise-wide approach needed to have an
Agency prepared to address the very real and sustained
terrorist threat. We have reinvigorated partnerships with the
airlines, airport operators, and the trade and travel
industries. We are working closely with Congress to address the
ongoing demands of our security mission.
We are overhauling management practices across the Agency.
We conducted an independent review of our acquisition program.
We are building a new planning, programming, budgeting, and
execution process. We are modernizing. Among other initiatives,
our innovation team is taking advantage of existing technology
to establish automated lanes at selected checkpoints. And, as
noted, through a public-private partnership with Delta Air
Lines, we have, recently, installed two new automated lanes.
These were done in just 9 weeks and they became operational
last month, in Atlanta. Initial results show dramatic
improvements. We have similar projects planned with other major
airlines and airports in the coming months.
This year, TSA is projected to screen some 742 million
people. By comparison, in 2013, TSA screened 643 million
people. So, our approach to screening requires a similar
transformation and we are meeting that challenge head on. With
the support of Congress, for our recent reprogramming request,
we have brought on board 768 new TSA officers. Our Federal
Security Directors (FSDs) have redeployed Behavior Detection
Officers (BDOs), as needed, to screening functions. We placed
additional K-9 teams at our highest-volume airports and
activated our volunteer National Deployment Force to surge to
airports of greatest need--and we are beginning to see positive
results.
For example, nationwide, over Memorial Day, 99 percent of
passengers waited less than 30 minutes in standard security
lines; 93 percent of passengers waited less than 15 minutes;
and, in TSA PreCheck lines, 93 percent of passengers waited
less than 5 minutes.
Over that 6-day period, over this last Memorial Day, we
screened 10.3 million passengers. That is a 3-percent increase
over the same period last year--and we did so effectively--and
we did so in a way that protected the system.
Four factors, in my opinion, have contributed to our
ability to move people more efficiently and effectively through
checkpoints.
First, the new resources that we received from Congress,
through the reprogramming and other proactive efforts, have
allowed us to effectively open more checkpoint lanes at peak
periods to manage the volume.
Second, we placed a strategic focus on the seven largest
airports in the system, because, if you can prevent problems
from happening there, then you do not have problems that
cascade throughout the system.
Third, we established a National Incident Command Center
(NICC). This allows us to focus, daily, on screening
operations, hour by hour, at the seven largest airports, to
look to see what the challenges are, as they develop--and to
move resources, in nearly real time, to address those
challenges. We have now expanded that to the top 20 largest
airports--and this is a full-time command center, which will
stay in operation.
And, finally, we are conducting daily operational calls
from that command center, airport-by-airport, with the
airports, the airlines, and the Federal Security Directors, in
order to ensure collaboration, information sharing, and the
real-time movement of necessary resources.
None of this would have been possible without the
tremendous efforts of our front-line officers. They have
performed admirably and they always deserve our thanks. But, we
are not celebrating and we are not letting up. Passenger volume
will remain high throughout the summer and we will need to
continue to manage resources aggressively.
In the short term, TSA, airlines, airports, Congress, and
travelers, working together, can improve the passenger
experience while maintaining security. I would like to thank
the airlines and the airports, in particular, for hiring staff
to support non-security duties in the airports. But, longer
term, we know we have to continue to right-size TSA to ensure
we meet the demands being placed upon us. We look forward to
working with Congress to get it right, both in terms of
staffing and in developing new approaches to aviation security.
Our front-line officers are focused on their security
mission. It is up to us to ensure that they have what they
need.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear today, thanks for
the Committee's support, and I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Admiral Neffenger.
Our next witness is John Roth. Mr. Roth is the Inspector
General of the Department of Homeland Security. Before joining
the Office of the Inspector General, he served as the Director
of the Office of Criminal Investigations (OCI) at the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) . Mr. Roth.
TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE JOHN ROTH,\1\ INSPECTOR GENERAL,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Roth. Thank you. Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member
Carper, and Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me
here to testify this morning.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Roth appears in the Appendix on
page 56.
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About a year ago, I testified before this Committee at a
hearing about TSA. During that hearing, I testified that we
remain deeply concerned about TSA's ability to execute its
important mission. At the time, I testified that TSA's reaction
to the vulnerabilities that our audits uncovered reflected
TSA's failure to understand the gravity of the situation.
Since that time, we have conducted more audits and released
more reports that challenge TSA's management of its programs
and operations.
However, I believe that we are in a different place than we
were last June. As a result of our audit reports and a vigorous
response by DHS, TSA is now, for the first time in memory,
critically assessing its deficiencies in an honest and
objective light. TSA's leadership has embraced the OIG's
oversight role and appears to be addressing vulnerabilities.
However, we should not minimize the significance of the
challenges that TSA faces and the risk that failure brings. The
stakes are enormous. Nowhere is the asymmetric threat of
terrorism more evident than in the area of aviation security.
TSA cannot afford to miss a single, genuine threat without
catastrophic consequences--and yet, a terrorist only needs to
get it right once.
Fortunately, TSA's response to our most recent testing has
been significant. DHS and TSA instituted a series of changes
well before our audit was even final. As part of that effort,
TSA initiated a ``tiger team'' program that resulted in a list
of 22 major corrective actions that TSA either has taken or is
planning to take. We are, generally, satisfied with the
response we have seen at TSA. These efforts have resulted in
significant changes to TSA leadership, operations, training,
and policy.
We will continue to monitor TSA's efforts to increase the
effectiveness of checkpoint operations and we will continue to
conduct covert testing. In fact, we have a round of covert
testing scheduled for this summer and are presently developing
the testing protocols. Consistent with our obligations under
the Inspector General Act of 1978, we will report our results
to this Committee as well as to other Committees of
jurisdiction.
We applaud TSA's efforts to use risk-based passenger
screening, such as TSA PreCheck, because it allows TSA to focus
on high-risk or unknown passengers, instead of known, vetted
passengers, who pose less risk to aviation security.
However, while reliance on intelligence is necessary, we
believe that TSA, in the past, has overstated the effect of a
reliance on intelligence and a risk-based approach.
The hard truth is that, the vast majority of the time, the
identities of those who commit terrorist acts are, simply,
unknown to or misjudged by the intelligence community (IC).
What this means is that there is no easy substitute for the
checkpoint. The checkpoint must, necessarily, be intelligence
driven, but the nature of terrorism, today, means that each and
every passenger must be screened in some way.
Unfortunately, TSA made incorrect budget assumptions in
2014 and 2015 about the impact that risk-based security would
have on its operations. For the Administration's 2016 budget,
for example, TSA believed that it could reduce the screener
workforce by more than 1,600 screeners--full-time employees--
stating that risk-based security requires fewer resources and
would allow TSA to transition to a smaller workforce.
Likewise, in the Administration's Fiscal Year (FY) 2015
request, TSA asked for a reduction of over 1,400 full-time
screeners, based on claimed deficiencies and risk-based
security.
However, our testing and audits found that TSA had been
incurring unacceptable risks in its approach. And, TSA has now
eliminated some of the more dangerous practices that we
identified. Moreover, we believe that, even if TSA had not
changed its approach to screening, the planned decline in the
screener workforce was far too optimistic. As a result, the
long lines that we are seeing this summer are not mysterious:
TSA, because of the decisions it made in 2014, has fewer
screeners, but is facing more passenger volume than ever
before.
We will continue to examine TSA's programs and operations
and to report our results. In addition to the new round of
penetration testing, we are in the process of conducting a
number of audits and inspections, including a look at the
Federal Air Marshal Service, their use of Behavior Detection
Officers, and TSA's oversight of the badges that are used to
get access to secure parts of the airport.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. I welcome any
questions that you or other Members of the Committee may have.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Inspector General Roth.
Our next witness is Jennifer Grover. Ms. Grover is the
Director of the Homeland Security and Justice (HSJ) team at the
Government Accountability Office. In this position, she
oversees GAO's reviews of TSA programs and operations. Ms.
Grover.
TESTIMONY OF JENNIFER GROVER,\1\ DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY
AND JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Grover. Good morning, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member
Carper, other Senators, and staff. In recent weeks, travelers,
Members of Congress, and others have raised concerns about long
airport security lines. As you have both noted this morning,
one of the challenges inherent in TSA's mission is the tension
between taking the time to do the job right and moving
passengers through as efficiently as possible. But, first and
foremost, TSA is responsible for ensuring transportation
security.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Grover appears in the Appendix on
page 68.
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My statement today will focus on two points. First, changes
that TSA made to improve the security effectiveness of its
expedited screening programs, which likely contribute to
today's long lines. And, second, new information showing that
TSA should improve its oversight of screener performance to
ensure that screeners are carrying out their tasks accurately.
First, regarding expedited screening, as we have heard
already this morning, TSA has made recent changes to tighten
security, which likely contribute to the long screening lines.
In November 2015, TSA modified its risk assessment rules, which
reduced the number of passengers that were automatically
designated as low risk. At the same time, TSA cut back,
significantly, on its use of ``Managed Inclusion,'' which is
used to divert non-TSA PreCheck passengers into the TSA
PreCheck lanes when they would otherwise be underused. TSA
still uses this program at airports where passenger screening
canines are available, but has discontinued its use otherwise.
According to TSA, these changes were necessary to improve
the security of their expedited screening programs and resulted
in a 20-percent decrease in the number of passengers receiving
expedited screening. Despite the changes that TSA has made, GAO
continues to be concerned about the effectiveness of the
remaining ``Managed Inclusion'' program. We await the results
of tests, which TSA is planning, to evaluate the security
effectiveness of the program, as we recommended in December
2014.
My second point is about TSA's oversight of its screener
performance. Our recent review of screener training and testing
showed that TSA could improve its oversight of the screeners'
ability to identify prohibited items. TSA conducts tests to
monitor screener performance. However, we found that much of
the testing data was missing over multiple years. For example,
screeners are regularly tested on their ability to identify
images of threat items hidden in carry-on baggage and TSA
policy requires FSDs, who are the local TSA officials, to
submit the data to headquarters.
In every year from 2009 through 2014, TSA headquarters did
not receive any of this data from a substantial percentage of
airports. We recommend that TSA ensures that FSDs submit
complete image testing results to headquarters, as required,
for airports across the country. This is needed to confirm that
the screener image testing is being carried out as intended and
to allow for a future national analysis of the data for trends
that could inform screener training.
We also found that TSA's covert test results are not
reliable. FSDs conduct covert testing at airports on a regular
basis. But, when TSA headquarters brought in a contractor last
year to independently perform the same tests, the contractor
obtained noticeably different results. Specifically, screeners
performed more poorly on the tests conducted by the contractor.
TSA is in the process of determining the root cause of the
differences, but initial results suggest that FSDs may have
trouble obtaining anonymous role players to keep the tests
covert. TSA has briefed its FSDs on the results and continues
to work with the contractor to examine this issue.
In conclusion, TSA has taken positive steps to improve the
security effectiveness of its expedited screening programs,
though these changes likely contribute to today's long
screening lines. Yet, more work remains for TSA to ensure that
screeners are carrying out their tasks accurately. TSA should
improve its oversight of screener performance by more
effectively collecting and monitoring screener testing data and
by ensuring the reliability of its covert testing data.
Chairman Johnson and Ranking Member Carper, this concludes
my statement. I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Ms. Grover.
By the way, I appreciate the attendance. But, because we
have pretty strong attendance, we will limit questioning rounds
to 5 minutes. And, I will start.
Admiral Neffenger, we are putting an awful lot of weight on
the expedited screening procedures--TSA PreCheck--that type of
thing. What metric do you use or what do we know about how--how
much faster is the throughput of that program?
Admiral Neffenger. So, the difference between an expedited
lane and a standard lane, roughly--at peak, if you have an
efficient team working it, you can move about 250 people, per
hour, through a TSA PreCheck lane. It is about 150, per hour,
through a standard screening lane.
Chairman Johnson. So, it is about 75 percent faster--and
that is just off of the top of my head.
Admiral Neffenger. It is a significant improvement. That is
right.
Chairman Johnson. What percent--because we know the number
of people that signed up for TSA PreCheck, but I do not know
how often they travel. What percent of passengers, currently,
are in TSA PreCheck?
Admiral Neffenger. Well, on a daily basis, we move about 30
percent of the traveling population through TSA PreCheck lanes.
So, that is the combination of people who have signed up for
TSA PreCheck, people who are in cleared populations, like
Department of Defense (DOD) individuals, who hold security
clearances and the like, and then, a very small piece, based
upon rules.
Chairman Johnson. And, we are all concerned a little bit
about that algorithm, correct?
Admiral Neffenger. Yes, sir.
Chairman Johnson. This is what the Inspector General and
GAO were a little concerned about that, I guess, they call that
``Managed Inclusion.''
Admiral Neffenger. Well, I would not call that ``Managed
Inclusion.'' ``Managed Inclusion'' was the practice of taking
truly unknown people and randomly assigning----
Chairman Johnson. OK.
Admiral Neffenger. We do not do that anymore. So, these are
people who are looked at--they are looked at through a rules-
based calculation and assigned a risk value. Again, it is a
very small population.
Chairman Johnson. But, you are looking at that because we
are a little concerned about that, correct?
Admiral Neffenger. Yes, sir.
Chairman Johnson. I do know that there are about 200
adjudicators that are waiting to be approved by TSA. I know, in
Milwaukee, people cannot sign up and get their application--
they cannot apply. There is, I think, about a 45-day waiting
period. Where are you, in terms of approving those
adjudicators, so more people can sign up for TSA PreCheck?
Admiral Neffenger. Well, we have been working very closely
with the vendor. We, actually, have all of the capacity we need
to approve it. As long as we get a completed application--they
have to fill out the standard form that we all fill out for
security clearances. If we get a completed application, then we
can process that application inside of 7 days--and that is the
turnaround that we have right now.
Chairman Johnson. I do know they are waiting at the
Milwaukee airport. That application office is clogged. So, if
you would check on that----
Admiral Neffenger. I will check on that.
Chairman Johnson. I would appreciate that.
Admiral Neffenger. Yes, sir.
Chairman Johnson. Where are we, in terms of new technology?
You talked about two new automated lanes in Atlanta. Can you
describe those in greater detail?
Admiral Neffenger. I will. So, these are two lanes--this is
existing equipment. This is equipment that I first saw when I
visited London's Heathrow Airport last year. Essentially, if
you just think of the current system--it is a fully manual
system. You have to push your bag along a table. You have to
engage the conveyor belt at the X-radiation (X-ray) machine.
Then, you have to pull your bag out on the other side. And, it
is a single-file system. You are in line behind whoever is in
front of you and until their stuff moves through.
So, first, it is an automated conveyor belt--so it is an
automated roller system--an automatic bin return. There are
five stations where individuals can stand, so you can move five
people at a time up to the checkpoint.
As you put things in your bin and push it onto the conveyor
belt, you can cycle right in. So, there is no waiting for the
person in front of you.
And then, on the other end, it has an automatic divert. The
bins have radio frequency identification (RFID) technology on
them, so they are tracked to the individual. It makes it much
easier to divert a bag if there is an image of concern. And, it
pulls the person whose bag has been diverted out of the line.
The bottom line is we are seeing, just in the initial phase
of operating these two lanes, about a 30-percent increase in
throughput--at the same level of effectiveness. It also allows
us to be much more effective on our end. To GAO's point, one of
the problems that we have is giving real-time, right-now
feedback to an officer on their performance. This does that. It
allows us to do real-time performance monitoring.
Chairman Johnson. Are you looking at just better detection
technology--better than the Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT)
machines?
Admiral Neffenger. Yes, sir.
Chairman Johnson. Are you really exploring that?
Admiral Neffenger. Yes, sir. In fact, what we are looking
at--the next phase would be to incorporate computer tomography
(CT) technology at the checkpoint. So, we now have a couple of
approved systems that we can put in. We are looking to pilot
one of those this summer. That gives us a much more defined
ability to see what we are looking--it is a system we use in
checked baggage and it is a substantial improvement over the X-
ray.
Chairman Johnson. We held a hearing on the ``Dogs of DHS.''
From what I have learned, I am incredibly impressed by, again,
the ability--the nose of a dog. There is no technology that can
beat it.
Where are you, in terms of trying to beef up the number of
K-9 units we have?
Admiral Neffenger. Well, as you know, TSA, itself, operates
a little over 300 K-9 teams--of which 148 have been trained to
do passenger screening. My goal is to get the rest of those
trained for passenger screening. That will take about another 8
or 9 months or so. But, I would like to see a total of about
500 dog teams. That would allow me to really address the
highest-volume airports in a very efficient way.
Chairman Johnson. OK. I want to be very supportive of those
efforts. Senator Carper.
Senator Carper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Neffenger, I want to go back to a conversation you
and I had several weeks ago. There had been long waits and a
lot of frustration at Chicago O'Hare International Airport. I
urged you to go there and to see for yourself what had
happened--what had gone wrong. And, I want to thank you for
going. Tell us what you found. Tell us what has been done and
what lessons you learned that you have been able to take away
and to spread to other airports--to other security stations
across America.
Admiral Neffenger. Well, thank you for that--and thank you
for the opportunity to talk about that, earlier. There are a
couple of pieces to that answer.
The first is: What happened in Chicago? That was truly--in
my opinion--and in my investigation--just a failure to get
enough lanes opened in advance of what was anticipated to be a
significant increase in volume for that day. It was sort of the
first day of the volume season. We saw about a 13-percent
increase in volume from the previous week and we did not have
enough lanes open. And, once you are behind, it is very
challenging to catch up.
So, the first thing we did was to look at what caused that
and to make some immediate operational changes--opening a
checkpoint earlier and making sure that the lanes are fully
staffed when you do. We put a new, temporary management team in
place, which, I am pleased to say, within 24 hours had really
turned that situation around--and we have not seen a repeat of
that.
What we learned from that, though, is that you really do
need to pay attention to these large hub airports. And, out of
that really came the development of a daily National Command
Center focused, specifically, on screening operations. We have
always focused on our daily operations, but you need to really
look at screening, checkpoint by checkpoint, at the major
airports across the country. And, in this case, we decided to
focus, for the Memorial Day weekend, on the seven largest
airports. These are the big, multi-hub airports where all of
the traffic originates, essentially. And, if you start to have
problems in one, you are going to cascade it across the system.
And so, by doing that--by taking the resources that we were
able to put into place as a result of the reprogramming--
overtime hours, new hires, as well as converting people from
part-time to full-time--we dramatically increased the staffing
available. And then, we watch it very carefully, on a daily
basis, to make sure it is applied to the right locations.
So, the lesson we learned out of that was that you have to
be laser-focused on the actual operations, airport by airport,
at the largest airports. And, you cannot let yourself get
behind, because, once you are behind, it is like a traffic jam.
It is very challenging to clear it out.
Senator Carper. Alright. Thank you so much. I talked
earlier about leadership--the importance of leadership. I think
we are blessed with the leadership that you provide. Talk to us
about your ability to put in place around you the kind of
leadership team that you need in order to lead TSA. And, also
talk about the flexibility you have to put in place, whether it
is at Chicago O'Hare or at other airports--the kind of
leadership teams that will better ensure that we do not see the
kind of jam-ups and confusion that we witnessed at Chicago
O'Hare.
Admiral Neffenger. Well, I have made a number of leadership
changes over the course of the past year--some just in the past
few months. It is critical that you get the right leaders in
the right places. For the first time ever, we now have a Chief
of Operations for TSA. Before that, we had a series of
operational programs that, in my opinion, were not fully
integrated. And, as a result, you can have a problem that
arises without a vision for how to deal with that. So, we have
a Chief of Operations, now. I have a new Deputy Administrator,
I have a new Chief of Staff, and I have a new head of my
Screening Operations section. Those have made a substantial
difference. And, we have made some field changes, where
necessary, to ensure that you have the right people in the
right place.
Senator Carper. Good. Thank you.
The Chairman asked about the issue of TSA PreCheck
contractor and staffing backlogs. I have heard some reports
that there was a backlog. And, the folks that, actually, vet
the TSA PreCheck applicants, there were not enough of them.
And, there was a delay--as much as 40 days--in doing that
vetting process. And, I think I just heard you say earlier, in
response to the Chairman's question, that that is really a 7-
day wait--and that is not extraordinary. Is that correct?
Admiral Neffenger. Yes, I think we have fixed the problem,
with respect to clearing the contractor's employees, who do the
vetting work. So, we have a process in place. We can handle
anybody they give us--and we can turn it around very quickly.
What we are now working with the contractor on, is
expanding the number of mobile enrollment centers ensuring that
we balance their staffing workload, so that they provide
staffing to the highest-volume locations.
Senator Carper. Good. Very briefly, tell us, what do we
need to do? We are all about doing our jobs. We want you to do
your job. We want your folks to do their jobs. What do we need
to do, in our jobs, to enable all of you to be more effective?
Admiral Neffenger. That is a great open-ended question.
Well, Congress has been extremely supportive this past year.
You have helped us to grow back some of the staff that we
needed. I do believe that TSA is smaller than it needs to be in
order to meet the demands of the system. It was extremely
helpful to get those 1,600 people, who we were slated to lose,
back on the books. The TSA Academy has been a cultural game
changer for us. And, more importantly, this recent
reprogramming--we have another reprogramming that is pending.
It has been approved by the Senate. It is pending before the
House right now, which would allow us to bring on additional
staff and, more importantly, allow us to continue to convert
more part-time workers to full-time. Those are very important,
because that helps us to address the challenge of just getting
lanes manned at peak periods.
The second piece is this very real need to transform the
system. I mentioned those two automated lanes. That is an
example of the ways in which we need to modernize and bring TSA
into the 21st Century. And, this is not technology that does
not exist. This is just using existing technology. I have
technology--information technology (IT) backbone systems that
have to be upgraded. I need to connect my systems in a way that
they are not currently connected. I cannot, currently, see the
health of the system, because I have independently operating
entities out there that cannot be networked together for
cybersecurity reasons. And, I need to do a better job of
getting real-time performance data on my workforce, which I
currently cannot get. It is a very manual system right now.
So, those are the kinds of things that I intend to bring
forward to Congress, over the coming weeks, in order to show we
have a good--I think we have a good plan moving forward and a
good strategy for addressing that. It will help us to address a
lot of the concerns that the Inspector General and GAO have
raised, with respect to performance. Their work has been
critical, in terms of informing how we go forward with this.
Senator Carper. In closing, continue to let us know how we
can help.
Admiral Neffenger. Yes, sir.
Senator Carper. Thank you.
Chairman Johnson. We are going to do questioning in order
of arrival. Senator Tester.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TESTER
Senator Tester. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, thank you for
your service, Administrator Neffenger. And, I want to thank you
for your employees, too. As I have told you before, I do a lot
of flying and, maybe, with one exception, these folks have been
very professional--and that is over the last 10 years. So,
thank you very much--not only for what you do, but for what the
people who serve under you do.
I want to talk about advanced imaging technology for a
second. We have talked about it before--and the need to get it
deployed throughout the country. Could you talk about--and I
know you are under budget constraints--and that might be
something we can do, as it applies to full-body scanners. But,
could you talk about your progress on getting full-body
scanners to the airports that do not have them, currently? How
is that progressing?
Admiral Neffenger. Yes, sir. Well, we have now identified
the number that we need in order to do that--and let me preface
it by saying that I agree with you. I think that it is
important that we get that capability everywhere that we need
it, because we know that the terrorist groups are focused on
their ability to get into the system.
Senator Tester. The weakest link.
Admiral Neffenger. So, we are working through the
Administration, right now--the Department of Homeland Security
and the Administration--to put forward what we hope will be a
request that will allow us to purchase the additional equipment
that we need. Not every place can actually accept one, but,
wherever we can put one, that is the goal.
Senator Tester. OK. Good. Thank you.
For GAO and the IG, have you guys done any research into
the effectiveness of magnetometers as opposed to full-body
scanners and whether we should be concerned, on this side of
the dais, with airports that only have magnetometers?
Mr. Roth. During our covert testing, we sort of saw both
types of machinery. Without getting into the details, there is
cause for concern, in terms of not having an AIT in a specific
facility.
Senator Tester. Did you find the same, Jennifer?
Ms. Grover. Yes, they do different jobs. They are also
looking for different things and have different purposes. So,
there is a cost when you do not have an AIT.
Senator Tester. OK. And, Administrator Neffenger, you
talked about new scanners that you are working on now, which
will be more effective--which is good for you. I always worry
about scanners--to know if I am getting radiated or not. Do you
guys have protections? Are there parameters that you work under
for health situations?
Admiral Neffenger. Yes, sir. So, the scanners that I was
referring to are really the ones that are checking the carry-on
baggage.
Senator Tester. Yes, but you said there would be similar
technology applied to us.
Admiral Neffenger. Oh, no. If I did, then I misspoke. No,
the technology that we are currently using is non-penetrating.
It is just radio waves bouncing off----
Senator Tester. Super.
Admiral Neffenger. We have no intention of using anything
else.
Senator Tester. OK. When I get on an airplane, I look out
and the passengers have gone through the magnetometer or the
full-body scanner, whichever it may be--but there are people
that work for the airlines--there are people who work for the
airport. Can you tell me--do they go through the same procedure
as the passengers?
Admiral Neffenger. Very few go through the same procedures
as passengers. So, this is a population that has already been
vetted against criminal databases and terrorist databases--and
they are recurrently vetted. Some airports do screening--in the
form of magnetometers and what might be called a ``stadium
check'' of the bags--and then, they are subject to random
screening throughout the day. But, the passenger screening
environment is unique to the passengers.
Senator Tester. It is more intense than the screening
environment for the people who work there, would you say?
Admiral Neffenger. I think, for passengers--remember, we
know something about these individuals that are badged--that
have badged access--so, you are doing continuous vetting of
those individuals against terrorist databases and recurrent
vetting against criminal databases.
Senator Tester. So, Administrator, tell me what recurring
vetting means. What does that mean? Are you vetting them
monthly? Weekly?
Admiral Neffenger. Daily.
Senator Tester. Daily.
Admiral Neffenger. Every single day, if you hold a badge,
you are continuously vetted against the terrorist screening
database and the extended categories that feed that database.
Senator Tester. So, you are comfortable with it? I mean, as
the Administrator of the TSA, you are comfortable with the
state of our screening procedures for those employees and the
folks who work for the airlines and the airports. That is all I
want to know. If you are not comfortable, then----
Admiral Neffenger. Well, I think there is more work to be
done. I think we need to keep our eye on the insider
population. If you have a trusted population, you need to
continuously verify that trust--and you need to do it in a way
that is designed to deter, detect, and, ideally, disrupt----
Senator Tester. So, when you find contraband items with
those employees, do you keep a record of that?
Admiral Neffenger. We do. If we find it, we keep a record.
And, for contraband items, we work with local law enforcement
to deal with whatever consequences might result from that.
Senator Tester. OK. And so, do you have the ability--if you
find somebody that has contraband items--to get them
terminated?
Admiral Neffenger. Yes, sir, we do.
Senator Tester. Thank you.
Chairman Johnson. Senator Enzi.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ENZI
Senator Enzi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, I thank you all
for the testimonies that you have provided.
I go home pretty much every weekend--to Wyoming, which
means flying--and I tried to get into some businesses there,
but I found out that any business that I am not familiar with
looks pretty simple until I take a look at it. So, that is
probably what we are seeing as we go through airports, too.
But, I am worried about the management at the security points,
themselves--not about whether they are stopping the bad stuff
or not--but about whether they are getting people through the
lines. Several times, I have found a manager at one of these
checkpoints and asked him some questions--like why they had
three people training one person on how to look at a driver's
license, instead of having two of those people helping
somewhere else.
I also find two podiums for one line to be able to get
through the screening. So, they are continually holding up the
line, because, if they let more people through, they get
stacked up and cannot get through the X-ray machine to begin
with. And yet, there will be another line over there that is
not being used with X-rays. So, I am always wondering why the
management does not say, ``Just open one podium if we can only
open one line through there or, otherwise, take that second
person from the podium and help to staff a second line over
there.'' I am just not seeing any--and I am seeing the lines
growing and growing behind me--and my result, when I have
called in about some of these things, has been a call later
saying, ``When you are coming through the airport, if you will
just let us know in advance, we will make sure you get through
security.'' I want you to know that is not the point. The point
is I want my constituents to be able to get through the line
just as easily--and I want to be able to do that.
I have also seen one screener who took three times as long
to look at the screen for the item coming through and called
for somebody to do a bag check on almost everything that came
through. And, nobody checked to see if that person was just
extra careful or if they were actually finding those kinds of
things.
Also, at Dulles, I really like the little sign that they
have that says how many minutes you have to wait in the
different lines. One of the things that fascinates me here, in
D.C., is that almost everybody is TSA PreCheck. So, the regular
line is usually one minute. The TSA PreCheck line is 20
minutes.
Now, in Casper, Wyoming, when you go through, they do not
have a TSA PreCheck line and a regular line. But, if you have
TSA PreCheck on your ticket, they hand you this orange card
that you can take through with you. And then, you have the same
thing--except for having to remove your computer--you have the
same thing as if you were in a regular TSA PreCheck line. And,
it kind of expedites things. So, instead of taking regular
people and putting them in TSA PreCheck lines, sometimes,
maybe, we ought to be taking TSA PreCheck people and putting
them in a regular line--giving them an orange card, so that
they can be expedited.
Another thing that I hear frequently is, ``Why are there so
many people that do not appear to have anything to do at the
checkpoint?'' And, my suggestion on that is the same as--it is
that, if they do not have anything to do, is there some kind of
a collection point where they can be out of sight at the
moment, so that people are not counting how many people are
just standing around? And then, there is a pool to draw from
when there is another use for them.
So, I guess, my question is--besides the observations that
I have made--is there some kind of an incentive system for
people to suggest improvements--for people that work for TSA to
suggest improvements? And, how does that incentive system work?
Admiral Neffenger. There is. And, as to your observations,
one of the things that I have found--that we have found--is
that, by focusing, as I said, daily, on screening operations,
you start to identify some of those challenges that, maybe, you
have seen.
I suspect that those are problems here and there, because
we are not seeing that widely across the system, but, what we
can do, is rapidly identify those kinds of problems and then
get the best practices out there.
So, it is about front-line leadership. It is about
supervisory leadership. And, it is the--measuring performance
and then moving those measures of good performance to other
places. So, that has been very helpful.
I happen to believe that front-line people are, probably,
some of your best sources of information for how to improve a
process, because they see it. They live with it every day. And,
in fact, when the people who are now operating those new
automated lanes, down in Atlanta, first took a look at it, our
TSOs, immediately, found even more efficient ways to operate
it, because they, instantly, saw how much they could do
differently as a result of that. So, we do have a program. I am
happy to give you, for the record, kind of the details on how
it works, how we collect information, the kinds of information
that have come in, and then, how we put it to use back through
the system.
Senator Enzi. I appreciate that. My time has expired, but I
will be submitting some questions about rural airports, where
they have very few passengers, and some things that could be
done there.
Thank you.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Enzi. Senator Ernst.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ERNST
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, thank you to
Senator Ayotte for allowing me to jump ahead here in the
questioning. And, thank you to all of our witnesses. You all
have very important jobs. We want to make sure that our
constituents are not only traveling comfortably, but we also
want to make sure that they are traveling safely. So, thank you
for taking on the roles that you have.
Administrator Neffenger, it seems as though a lot of the
issues that we are seeing--a lot of the underlying problems at
TSA--come from a simple mismanagement of resources. We have
heard a number of them, today. And so, I do think that is
something that we need to really hone in on. In Inspector
General Roth's written testimony, he noted that recent audits
reflect issues with TSA's stewardship of taxpayer dollars. And,
as a straightforward example--and this is pretty blatant--but
recent media reports revealed that TSA spent tens of thousands
of dollars on a mobile application--and, maybe, you know where
I am going with the ``Randomizer.'' It is a mobile application
called the ``Randomizer.'' And, it is an arrow on the screen of
an iPad that, randomly, tells passengers to go to the left line
or to the right line. And, this is government spending here.
This is the epitome of wasteful Washington spending.
What we would like to hear is how you will assure us--and
the American people--that TSA will take those taxpayer dollars
and be responsible stewards of those dollars.
Admiral Neffenger. Well, Senator, thank you for that
question. I found that pretty outrageous, too. As you know,
that application was purchased, I think, in the 2013
timeframe--and we do not use it anymore, because we have
stopped that process of randomly including people.
I am very concerned about that. One of the things I did,
when I was in the Coast Guard, was work on reforming our entire
acquisition process--really setting clear requirements for why
we do what we do and ensuring that those requirements lead to
capability as well as ensuring that you do not buy capability
that you do not need at a higher price than you should be
paying for it.
And so, when I first got here--within the first month--I
brought in the Defense Acquisition University (DAU), which, as
you know, is a semi-independent arm of DOD that looks at how we
execute government procurement. And, they conducted a pretty
in-depth review, over about a 3-month period, of our
acquisition program. They have made a number of substantive
recommendations, which we are beginning to put into place now.
And, we are working with the Department and our other overseers
to do that.
I do not want to see us spend that kind of money. The money
that we have is so critically important to the mission of
security that I do not want to see any of it wasted as we go
forward. And, I have committed to being as open and transparent
as I need to be with, not only our current expenditures, but
also the things that we have carried forward from the past, to
ensure that we do not do that--and have invited oversight
entities in to take a hard look at that.
So, I am fully in your camp on that score. I cannot justify
some of the actions that were taken in the past, but I can
assure you that, at least under my watch, I will keep them from
happening, again.
Senator Ernst. Yes, we certainly cannot blame you for
previous years' Administration, but the thoughtful approach
that you are taking is very much appreciated by many of us--and
we hope that we can see that at all levels of TSA--and we hope
to see continuous improvement. So, thank you very much. I
appreciate it.
Admiral Neffenger. Thank you.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Ernst. Senator Ayotte.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AYOTTE
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Chairman. I want to thank all of
you for being here, today.
I wanted to ask Admiral Neffenger--there were some pieces
of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) reauthorization
bill that recently passed the Senate, including an amendment
that I was a part of, addressing insider security threats, as
well as an amendment focusing on the TSA PreCheck Enhancement
Act--to ensure that you are able to expand that program.
Are both of those pieces important to get passed?
Admiral Neffenger. We are supportive of both of those
pieces of legislation. They codify some things that we are
already doing. I think that is important, because you want to
ensure that you put good institutional practices in place for
the future. So, both of those are positive for TSA.
Senator Ayotte. Good. Well, I hope that the House will take
up the FAA reauthorization.
I wanted to ask about--Admiral, as you state, they are
concentrating on improving TSA protocols, retraining and
refocusing the workforce, and driving technological
improvements. One thing that you have not really mentioned, as
an existing tool that could do that, is the Screening
Partnership Program (SPP), where TSA acts as the oversight
entity, but not the security operator--contracting with
security companies. And so, what I have heard is that there are
long waiting lines to get applications approved and that TSA
does not seem to be that supportive of this program.
Particularly, as we look at this program--just to use an
example, in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, at Portsmouth
International Airport at Pease--that is a SPP airport--and one
of 22 airports, nationally, in the SPP. Unfortunately, what I
have heard, from my local airport, is that TSA has imposed
contracting limitations on Pease and the security contractor,
which limit the flexibility of the staff at the airport to
respond to dynamic needs. So, I guess I would like to know--it
seems to me, when we have seen, for example, the implementation
of the SPP partnership at San Francisco International Airport--
are you interested in also looking at a vibrant Screening
Partnership Program? And, does the Agency see SPP as a way to
consider reducing lines? So, what is your view of this program?
And, I do have a follow-up comment, because, having looked
at what the Inspector General and also GAO has looked at, in
this program, I know there is an outstanding issue, where TSA
has not shared with the Congress--or with those who are
conducting oversight--the cost estimates, so that we can, as
policymakers, really compare the SPP programs to the fully TSA-
run programs and decide what is the most efficient, effective
way to operate security at the airports.
Admiral Neffenger. Thank you, Senator. When I came into
this job, I was very interested in understanding the SPP
program better. As you know, that is a program where an airport
can request to bring in a private, contract screening
workforce. That workforce is contracted to the Federal
Government through TSA.
Senator Ayotte. Right.
Admiral Neffenger. But, they can choose to do so if they
like. And, I have been committed to making that as
straightforward a process as possible. In fact, we have
streamlined, significantly, the application process over the
course of this past year, so that they do not have long waits.
It is governed, certainly, by the Federal Acquisition Rules
(FAR), so there is a certain amount of waiting that is required
just for the announcement, the bid process, and so forth. But,
we have streamlined that significantly.
I do not know the problem in Portsmouth and I will look
into that for you, because I am not aware of the specifics of
that case.
Senator Ayotte. OK. Well, I appreciate it.
Admiral Neffenger. So, I will check into that. I would hope
that it is not the case that there is anybody making it more
difficult. We are officially neutral. If an airport wants to
use a private screening contractor, we will work with them to
ensure that they----
Senator Ayotte. So, one thing I wanted to follow up with
Ms. Grover on--as I understand, even though Congress has made
this request, TSA has not yet reported cost comparisons,
between the Federal and the private screening at SPP airports,
to us, as policymakers. Is that true?
Ms. Grover. At the time of our report, which was in
November 2015, that is what we found. I do not know if TSA has
taken actions over this past winter, but we did recommend that
they should provide regular information to you about the
relative costs.
Senator Ayotte. To my knowledge, it has not been produced.
Has it been, Admiral?
Admiral Neffenger. Well, we have a deadline at the end of
this month to provide to GAO those costs, so we have done that.
It, now, includes the so-called ``imputed costs.'' The issue
was that we were using just the costs to TSA, but it did not
include retirement costs and so forth, which the rest of the
Federal Government would pick up. So, now, the ``imputed
costs'' are those things that are outside of the TSA budget,
but that are still costs to the taxpayer for an employee at
TSA. That is the piece that needed to be added in to give the
full burden cost of----
Senator Ayotte. Are we doing any comparisons on wait lines
between the different programs and on this issue of management,
in terms of efficiency, between the two programs? Are we going
to get that information?
Admiral Neffenger. We have, actually, done that. And, what
we are seeing is comparable across the system, whether you are
a private screening workforce or a Federal workforce. It has to
do with making sure that the staffing is in place and that the
staffing allocations are correct. But, right now, we are
seeing, roughly, comparable wait times across the whole
system--and, as I said, by really focusing on the biggest-
volume airports, there has been a dramatic improvement in our
ability to manage the lines effectively.
Senator Ayotte. Well, I hope that, with the information
being transmitted to GAO, we will have an opportunity to see
that analysis as well. Thank you.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
I tell you, the one thing I love about this Committee is
that the Members ask great questions. And, I want to quickly
follow up on the SPP program. We talked about costs. We talked
about the metrics. Is it the exact same process? Are those
partners able to do it a different way or do they do it the
exact same way that TSA does it?
Admiral Neffenger. They train with TSA. They train at the
TSA Academy. They are trained to the same standards. And, you
have a Federal Security Director, a TSA employee, who manages
the contract of that workforce or works with the contractor to
manage the workforce. So, they should be performing to the same
standards across the system. And, that is how----
Chairman Johnson. So, there would not be innovation on the
part of those partners, in terms of screening. It is really
done the exact same way.
Admiral Neffenger. Well, it currently is.
Chairman Johnson. That process--I do not want to say
``impose,'' but, basically, they are required to do it the same
way.
Admiral Neffenger. There is, currently, a set of standards
provided. You are right, yes, sir.
Chairman Johnson. Let us see here. Senator Peters?
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PETERS
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
thank our panelists for being here today and for your work.
This is, obviously, tough work--the fact that you have to find
a needle in a haystack, based on the numbers that are going
through--but if that needle gets through, obviously, the impact
could be catastrophic. So, we appreciate your efforts to keep
us safe, but also to move us through very efficiently, as
people are getting on those airplanes--and it is going to take
the concerted effort of everybody to make that happen.
We have, certainly, heard the horror story of what happened
in Chicago--the delays that occurred there--and that have
happened on, I think, a few occasions. But, I want to get a
sense of what is happening around the country. Admiral, you
talked about your focus on some of the major airports, but,
obviously, we have many airports people are going through.
Where are we, in terms of the overall system of airports? Are
there a number of airports that you are concerned about? How
would you break that down--the places where we have problems--
as a percentage of the whole system?
Admiral Neffenger. Well, I think that the positive side of
this is that we are not seeing problems--if you take the top 20
airports, which represent about 58 percent of the daily travel
volume--these are the big hub airports and then the lesser hub
airports associated with them. The remaining 430 or so are
really doing pretty well. It is a pretty healthy system. And, I
look at this across--I see the results of every airport every
day. And, we are, generally, moving people very effectively
through the smaller airports. Every now and then you get a spot
problem, because you will have an unexpected surge of people
coming through, but, for the most part, they are moving very
well.
Where we have seen the problems, consistently, have been in
those top 20 airports. When you get stories of long wait times,
it is there, which is why I really wanted to retool our
approach to this, focusing, specifically, on those airports and
making sure that you get the resources in there to get ahead of
the expected surge of people coming. We get good data from
reservation systems and the airlines on who to expect--make
sure that you get your lanes manned at the time. So, I think
that the positive side is, if you can work on those 20
airports, you can really, for the most part, solve the problems
in the whole system.
Senator Peters. Well, speaking of one of those airports,
the Detroit Metropolitan Airport, which is one that I hear
about regularly--I travel through there as well. I will say,
from my personal experience, when I have traveled--at least at
the times that I have traveled--the volumes have been similar
to what I have experienced over the last few years--although we
still get complaints from my constituents, particularly, in the
morning hours. Could you address a little bit of what is
happening in Detroit--the good, the bad, and the lessons
learned that would be helpful in Detroit as well as at other
airports?
Admiral Neffenger. Actually, Detroit is a very good
example. One, you have an exceptionally strong workforce
there--a good workforce and a very stable workforce. We have
been able to convert more of those employees to full-time
positions. That is very helpful, because that immediately
reduces attrition. A lot of people want full-time jobs. When
they cannot get them, then they leave for a full-time job. You
have a good management staff in place there and they have
strong relations with the airport and the airlines that service
it. I was, recently, in Detroit and had a chance to meet with
the various partners in the airport environment. And, they all
had--I believe, honestly so--good things to say about our folks
there.
What we have seen there is that it really is a matter of,
first, ensuring that you get a checkpoint opened well in
advance of the time that you expect the surge of passengers to
come in. Second, that you work closely with the airlines and
the airports to manage that surge, as it is moving from curb to
ticket counter, to checkpoint. And then, more importantly, that
you have fully staffed lanes. So, that is the absolute key to
doing that. If you can do that, then you can, very efficiently,
move those people through a line while doing the job the way we
should--and moving them through.
So, the lesson we learned from Detroit is, when they really
got ahead of that--and, if you noticed, over Memorial Day
weekend, they had exceptionally good numbers going through
there. People moved through very efficiently. We did not have
any extended wait times at all there.
Senator Peters. Great. And, in the remaining time here,
Admiral, I appreciate your efforts on acquisition and
procurement reform--and changing those systems. Certainly, it
was very disturbing to Members of this Committee--and others--
to see some of the media reports that occurred last year about
equipment that was not performing the way it was advertised--
and that people were able to get through items, in some of the
tests, that were done for the IG and others. To what extent,
going forward, are we going to hold the contractors that design
and build these machines to much higher standards than they
have been held to in the past? And, they must be held
accountable, because we simply cannot accept the types of
failures that we have seen in the past.
Admiral Neffenger. Well, I spent a lot of time with our
major equipment contractors when I first came on board. And, we
have had a lot of lengthy discussions about performance
standards--performance of the equipment, maintenance of the
equipment, and so forth--going forward.
I am also very interested in seeing more participation by
the private sector in the types of things that we are looking--
the types of capabilities that we need. I think that we need
more open architecture--we need the ability for some of the
really talented, innovative minds out there to participate by
increasing our ability to do the job more effectively.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Admiral.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Peters.
By the way, when I am connecting in Detroit, it is really
great for my FitBit challenges with my wife. A lot of long
walks.
Let us see here. Senator Lankford.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LANKFORD
Senator Lankford. Not as much as Charlotte Douglas
International Airport is a help for that, but that is a whole
different issue.
Thank you all. I have been here for your testimony, today.
I think everyone has reiterated the same thing and we want to
make sure that you hear, loud and clear, from all of us: Safety
is the primary consideration. We never want there to be a
situation where you just say, ``Let us speed everything up.''
In fact, that was part of our conversation even, a year ago,
when you were going through the confirmation process. And, the
concern with the TSA PreCheck line is that TSA PreCheck had
become a TSA PreCheck line plus another randomized--and we had
so many people going through it--it was all about speed and
there was a sense, from us, to say, ``We are losing a sense on
safety.'' And, obviously, from the IG's report as well, to come
back and say, ``OK, we are also overly optimistic on staffing.
So, we have a drop in staff and we have an increase in
passengers and it is not rocket science to try to figure out
why we have long lines to go through.'' So, I just want to make
sure everyone hears, loud and clear, we are still focused on
safety. It is not just about speed, but there are also plenty
of people, myself included, that, as we travel through
airports, see TSA workers standing around or not in a hurry,
when people are waiting in very long lines. And so, I think
people understand the safety, but they also want to see some
efficiency in the process.
With that, let me just highlight a couple of things that I
want to be able to bring up--one we have already briefly
discussed. That is the innovation that happened in Atlanta. I
would like to be able to talk more about how that could be
multiplied.
My understanding is that Delta Air Lines spent about $1
million researching a better way to do the TSA screening in
their home airport, in Atlanta. They developed a system,
partnered with TSA, and implemented the system. It has proven
to be much faster. And, for $1 million, at that airport, their
check-in is now much faster.
The concern I have is: Where can we have more opportunities
for the private sector to be able to engage with TSA to help
innovate in other areas and to be able to--not only put private
sector folks in places that are non-security, but to allow for
better innovation in the process as well?
Admiral Neffenger. Well, thank you for that question. This
is where I see the greatest promise going forward. Originally,
the whole idea came about as a result of seeing some of the
work that had been done, in Europe, to create more efficient,
more automated systems, as you move through. In discussions
with a number of airports and airlines, shortly after I came
in, I said that I was looking for opportunities to partner on
some innovation pilots. Originally, it was just, ``Hey, can we
do a couple of pilot projects?'' Delta Air Lines offered to
jump in and purchase a couple of these automated systems. This
happens to be one that is currently in use at Heathrow
Airport--and they move very quickly. And, you are absolutely
right. Just these first two lanes, alone, have shown tremendous
promise, in terms of improving efficiency--about a 30-percent
improvement, by their own count, in what we go through. So, I
think that that is, certainly, a critical element of
transforming the system.
Other airlines and airports have come forward and said that
they want to do the same thing. So, I put together an
innovation project team, which is focused, specifically, on
these public-private partnerships--managing it so you do not
create a hodgepodge of systems out there. You really want to do
something that makes sense and that takes advantage of existing
technology--not just to automate the lane, but to look at the
technology that can be added to that automation and that could,
eventually, lead to electronic gates to let you into a
checkpoint or that could move the identification (ID) check out
to a kiosk--and then, you keep the person sterile as they come
through--really building that true curb-to-gate security
environment, as opposed to just focusing it all around the
checkpoint.
I am very excited we have a pretty good plan going forward.
It is mapped out. We are building the architecture for that now
with various airlines and airports that have expressed
interest. We have about a dozen airports that have come
forward--along with the airlines that service them--to talk
about doing some of this transformation. And, this is happening
over the course of the next 6 months.
So, I am happy to provide you with a more detailed brief on
that, but I think you would find it promising.
Senator Lankford. I think you would find plenty of people
that are willing to help you innovate in the areas that are the
pinch points--like the bags, which have been noted--to try to
find ways to be able to evaluate how we, actually, move people
faster through this spot and still get the innovation we have.
With the innovation and the technology piece of it, that
would still be the expectation, I think, of everyone on this
dais as well. Early on in TSA's history, there were a lot of
overpromises made by some manufacturers. We overpurchased in
some areas and ended up having, in warehouses, lots of
equipment sitting there, unused. We, obviously, do not want to
see that, nor do we want to have equipment put in place that
says one thing and actually cannot fulfill what it is stated
to, actually, do.
So, we want to make sure that that process stays in place
and that all of our equipment--so, not only purchasing the
right amount, but also having the equipment that, actually, can
fulfill what it is being asked to do. So, thank you for that.
And, I would ask for your continued attention on things like
the TSA PreCheck. In Oklahoma, we had a computer glitch for a
while, where, suddenly, you could not sign up for TSA PreCheck
for a period of time. There are lots of other ways to be able
to, not only show innovation in getting people through the
line, but also in getting people registered for TSA PreCheck.
And so, we can get that background, so TSA PreCheck is really
TSA PreCheck and more people are able to actually go through
that process and be able to be checked off.
So, I would appreciate continued attention to that as well
from all of those contractors, around the country, that are
doing that.
Admiral Neffenger. Yes, sir.
Senator Lankford. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Johnson. Senator Portman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PORTMAN
Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Admiral, it
is great to have you here before us. You are talking to a
pretty tough audience here, because we are all frequent flyers.
And, I go back and forth from Ohio, every week, a couple of
times, I guess. We are also, though, all TSA PreCheck, I would
think, and so, when I am in the TSA PreCheck line in airports
in Cincinnati, Columbus, or Cleveland, it is a lot shorter. It
is not like Dulles International Airport or Ronald Reagan
Washington National Airport, where a lot of people are in the
TSA PreCheck program. And so, a lot of the questions we are
asking you are not about TSA PreCheck, but about, how we can be
sure and expedite everybody.
And, by the way, the TSA folks who I deal with every week
are courteous--they are professional--the vast majority of
them. I remember being here at a hearing, recently, where
Senator Carper said that he thanks them as he goes through--as
I try to do. And, I say, ``Thank you for keeping us safe.''
They look at you kind of funny, like, ``No one has ever said
that to me before.'' And, I think that was your experience,
too.
On the other hand, as taxpayers, they do all work for us.
And, that customer service side of----
Senator Carper. When I say that, people say to me, ``Are
you Rob Portman?'' [Laughter.]
Senator Portman. I go incognito through there.
But, you talked a little about the training and performance
measurement--and, again, I appreciate your leadership and I am
glad you are there. We talked a second ago about what you have
done, with regard to Mr. Roth's report that came out just
before you were confirmed, in June of last year. But, in terms
of the training, just quickly, on the customer service side,
what are you doing, in terms of measuring performance and
training?
Admiral Neffenger. Well, that was one of my big concerns
when I came in. In fact, I extend it beyond customer service.
This is what true public service is all about: providing an
important service to the public in a way that treats them with
respect and dignity and that recognizes the inherent
inconvenience of what you are doing. So, that is an important
thing to do.
So, we built that into our new TSA Academy training. So,
for all of our new hires now, there is an entire component on
what it means to be a public servant and who that public is
that you serve. These are people who are your fellow citizens.
And, there is a part of it where they say, ``Think of these as
your family members''--assuming you like your family members.
But, they say, ``Think of these people as your family members,
as they are coming through.''
So, I hope people are seeing--and, anecdotally, we are
getting reports that people are seeing a difference among the
workforce, as they come through--and we have done that back
through the entire workforce. It takes front-line leadership to
make it work, so we are also working on that first-line
supervisory leadership training. That is critical. We need to
do more of that in TSA. It just had not been done consistently.
Senator Portman. I appreciate that attitude and that
approach--and I know that is your personal approach. And, I do
think, actually, it expedites the process as well. There is a
safety aspect to this also--in addition to the fact that it is
a matter of customer service for the taxpayers that are
inconvenienced.
This report from last June was incredibly troubling. Mr.
Roth has not gotten to answer many questions--and I may not
give you a chance here, either, but I am going to tell you
about your report. Ninety-five percent of the time, TSA was not
finding dangerous items. Security screeners failed to detect
weapons, mock explosives, and other prohibited items 95 percent
of the time. Shocking. This is before your time.
We also found that there were 73 individuals employed by
the aviation industry who were on terrorist ``watchlists.''
And, at the time, I asked some questions to you as a part of
your confirmation. You indicated you were going to,
immediately, put in place some things that Homeland Security
Secretary Jeh Johnson was talking about, to address both of
those issues--and that you were going to look at the more
systemic problems.
Can you give us a quick report--where are we on that 95
percent? Mr. Roth said that you are continuing to do testing
and audits, but you did not tell us what the percentage was.
So, either of you, if you could answer that.
Admiral Neffenger. I cannot talk about the percentage of
what we are finding in open session, but, what I will tell you
is that, we are better. As you know, one of the biggest
concerns I had was to, first of all, find out why we had a
failure rate of that magnitude. And, as it turns out, it was
really that we were asking the front-line workforce to do
something directly in opposition to what their job was. If
their job is to ensure something does not get past a
checkpoint, well, then you cannot ride them about moving people
faster through a checkpoint. And so, if I put myself in the
shoes of the front-line officers, they are torn, thinking, ``I
am told I cannot hold things up, but I have something to look
at.''
So, we have gotten better at that. We retrained the whole
workforce--and I think that we are significantly better. I am
hoping that the Inspector General's testing bears that out, as
we go forward.
Senator Portman. Mr. Roth, do you have anything to say on
that?
Mr. Roth. As I indicated in my testimony, we are going to
do some covert testing this summer. I will be candid in saying
that we have taken a look at some of the red team testing that
TSA has done. We think that our testing will be more objective
and I think those results will be more accurate. So, we will
wait and see what happens.
Senator Portman. This Committee will be very interested in
the results of that test. And, in terms of the employees on
terrorist ``watchlists,'' I assume you are comfortable that
that has been addressed?
Mr. Roth. Yes. Just so we understand, there are two lists.
One is the ``Terrorist Watchlist,'' itself. And, the other is
the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) database,
which is the larger list that supports the smaller list. They
did not have access to the larger list. It was, largely,
bureaucratic inertia--not on TSA's part, but on DHS's part--as
well as on the intelligence community's part. That has been
fixed and we think that TSA now has all of the information it
needs to be able to adjudicate those things.
Senator Portman. My time has expired, but I am going to ask
a question for the record, with regards to Cuba. I am very
concerned about the agreement the Administration has made with
Cuba. I am concerned about reports I hear of TSA opening--not
eight, but another additional two airports without any of the
kind of screening that we would consider acceptable. And, these
are all going to be, as I understand it, points of departure to
the United States. I know there has been travel, for instance,
from Afghanistan to Cuba, and so on. So, I will ask questions
for the record (QFRs) on that issue. But, I want to express my
concern, right now. We need to be sure that those airports are
fully vetted and have the proper security screenings in place.
Chairman Johnson. Senator Heitkamp.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HEITKAMP
Senator Heitkamp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, thank you
for stepping up and serving your country once again, Admiral.
We really appreciate this and we were very glad to confirm you.
And, I can tell you, from this testimony and our dialogue, our
trust has been well served.
But, we have some business that needs to get taken care of.
I tell people, occasionally, that, if you have ever been to a
penitentiary and have the warden bring out a box, they have a
box of handmade weapons--from toothbrushes that have been
shaved off to just simply plastic knives that have been used to
kill other people. And so, we have to be really careful that we
do not overstate the risk that there is because, even though we
are looking for traditional weapons, we let people on with
knitting needles. So, we sometimes frustrate the public because
they look at this through a lens of common sense.
One of the things I want to ask is whether, when you look
at the metrics--and it is for anybody here--and we look at this
transition now to bag fees that has resulted in more people
taking carry-ons, I believe. Has that been a problem? And, is
there a way to pre-screen carry-on baggage that would help the
line move quicker--and also would provide greater security, in
terms of determining what is in the bags?
Admiral Neffenger. I will start the answers on that. The
first thing is, we have been working really closely with the
airlines--to the extent possible--to enforce the ``one-plus-
one'' rule. It is the case that there is more stuff coming
through a checkpoint--more carry-on baggage, by definition, is
going to slow things down.
The other thing is to encourage people to really double-
check their bag--pack wisely. A prohibited item in a bag of any
type causes something to stop for a moment while it is being
checked. So, we encourage people to double-check their bags and
make sure that they have not put anything in there that should
not go. There is very clear information on the website now,
explaining what should not go in there. If they have any
question at all, they can always ask somebody as they come into
the airport.
So, I think, trying to keep the number of bags coming
through to a minimum--so the ``one-plus-one'' rule is very
important--and many of the airlines are working very hard to
enforce that. And then, ensuring that passengers just double-
check before they come through, because it will--one, it is an
inconvenience to the individual that forgot that they left
something in there.
It is true that we find a lot of contraband items coming
through. We had a phenomenal number of loaded weapons at
checkpoints last year. It always astonishes me that people
forget that they have a weapon in their bag when they come
through. So, that, from my perspective, is one of the most
important things we can do.
We are looking at whether there are ways to do something
different with carry-on baggage before you get to a checkpoint.
But, again, that is a part of the technology improvements that
we are considering.
Senator Heitkamp. I would really encourage you to think
outside of the box on what could happen with carry-on luggage,
because--more time to screen that--we are all standing in line
with our carry-ons, right? Those carry-ons could, with a couple
of extra lines, be screened ahead of time, as we are moving
through the line. And, I think that would give you more time to
actually check the carry-on luggage.
I can tell you, it is incredibly frustrating when you see
someone bring something through that they should not have. Just
a couple of weeks ago, I had a bottle of water in my backpack.
How often do I fly? And, I have made that mistake. And so, you
do not always know.
I want to ask, finally, about the 2013 GAO report that
noted that TSA could not provide evidence to justify its
Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT)
Program. GAO recommended that Congress should consider the
absence of scientifically validated evidence for using
behavioral indicators to identify threats to aviation security,
while assessing the potential benefits and costs to making
future funding decisions for aviation security. Obviously, DHS
did not concur with GAO's recommendation.
My question is: Have you reviewed that report? And, since
you have been there, have you come to the same conclusion as
DHS did, when they did the review initially?
Admiral Neffenger. Well, I have reviewed that report and
there are a couple of elements to this that I think are
important.
The first thing I did was figure out whether anybody else
is doing behavioral detection of some sort. And so, quite a few
law enforcement agencies around the world use it. There are
other security agencies that do it. So, I think that there is
some value in continuing to look at whether behavioral
detection is a valid element to add in. It is never going to be
a perfect system.
That said, we are looking at how we can more effectively
use the people that we have assigned as behavioral detection
officers. As I said in my opening statement, we are pushing a
lot of those people back into security screening duties this
summer. We are having them work with K-9 teams, because I do
think that there is some work to be done on the validation of
the indicators--on the way in which we do behavioral detection.
There may be some modifications that we will have to make in
order to make it more scientifically valid.
Senator Heitkamp. I do not want to belabor the point, but
it is--and can be--a very effective tool at checkpoints--at
border crossings. There is a science to this. The question is:
Are you applying the right science?
Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for the time.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Heitkamp.
Just to pick up, that is really what Israel does, correct?
Admiral Neffenger. They do. In fact, a lot of what the
Israelis are doing has informed what we are doing--and we have
trained with the Israelis on behavioral detection.
Chairman Johnson. But, that is a far more intensive
process, correct?
Admiral Neffenger. It has more elements to it than we are
currently using. That is correct.
Chairman Johnson. There are a number of people proposing to
force airlines to drop the baggage fees to allow more people to
check bags. Do we really gain anything from that? We still have
to run those bags through the detection system, correct?
Admiral Neffenger. It is hard to know whether it would
dramatically change the way things are. I think there is more
to be gained by reminding people to minimize their carry-on
baggage to the ``one-plus-one'' rule that the airlines require.
That makes things a lot smoother at the checkpoint. I have
concerns about the baggage system's ability to handle checked
bags without some modifications to the way we are currently
doing it, in some airports. So, what I have committed to doing,
with the airlines and airports, is to work on minimizing the
amount of carry-ons, because a lot of that stuff gets gate-
checked anyhow. I would just as soon prefer it does not come
through the checkpoint if it going to be gate-checked on the
plane--and then ensuring that we have the appropriate staff
there to handle it.
Chairman Johnson. So, again, you are kind of confirming my
suspicion that we do not gain a whole lot from that--and I,
basically, agree with that. I think there is an awful lot to be
said for having the passenger stay with their bag, just in
terms of security as well.
Without getting into the details of the failure of the AIT
machines, has there been any thought given to having an AIT
machine followed by a metal detector?
Admiral Neffenger. We have looked at that. And, in fact, as
we look at what I call ``transformation''--but really changing
the thinking behind screening--I want to get away from what is,
essentially, a static system. We are looking at systems that
integrate that technology. The challenge is that you have to be
careful, because then metal detectors go off on people with
artificial hips. So, there may be a way to do it. But, we are
looking at ways to integrate more of the technology--and that
is why I really want to activate the private sector more
effectively than we have, because I think that there are ways
to do this that are smarter.
Chairman Johnson. Generally, the people who know they are
going to set off a metal detector can talk about something, but
that would really----
Admiral Neffenger. Yes, sir.
Chairman Johnson [continuing]. Improve security,
dramatically, would it not--if people went through both?
Admiral Neffenger. Go ahead.
Chairman Johnson. General Roth.
Mr. Roth. Again, the two different machines look for two
different kinds of things.
Chairman Johnson. Correct.
Mr. Roth. And, my understanding, as far as the TSA's
protocols now, when there is an alarm on the AIT that is, for
example, suspicious, they have the ability then to run people
through----
Chairman Johnson. But, again, the failure--and I do not
want to go into detail, but I have seen videos. There is a real
problem, in terms of what one machine detects and what the
other one does not.
Mr. Roth. Correct.
Chairman Johnson. So, if you would go through both, I would
think that you would dramatically increase the level of
security.
Mr. Roth. I will defer to TSA on that. Our testing has not
shown that.
Chairman Johnson. Admiral.
Admiral Neffenger. What I would say is, it gets challenging
to talk about this in open session. And, I would be happy to
sit down with you, in closed session, to do so. But, we are
looking at those kinds of capabilities. I am concerned about
what one can do and what the other cannot do. I think the
canines play a role, here and if I could sit down with you----
Chairman Johnson. So do I. OK. Well, we will talk about
that in a closed session.
Admiral Neffenger. OK.
Chairman Johnson. And, again, listen, I truly appreciate
reading the testimony. It came across very clear. As General
Roth talked about, you are doing a great job at really looking
at this honestly, admitting you have a problem and critically
assessing what has happened in the Agency. So, I just want to
ask the Inspector General, on a scale of 1 to 10, in terms of
critical assessment, we have gone from what to what, in terms
of improvement?
Mr. Roth. I mean, we have gone from night to day. I cannot
put a number on it, but we went from a cultural situation,
where we were fought at every turn, to one in which they now
embrace oversight in a way that, I think, is a very sort of
positive method.
Chairman Johnson. So, Admiral, that is to your credit and
thank you for your service in doing that.
Now, let me ask you the harder question. So, that is the
first step in solving the problem. How about the actual
implementation of the solutions? Where are we? Let us say we
were at one. Where are we now, on a scale of 1 to 10?
Mr. Roth. I mean, we have a number of challenges--I will
not underestimate it. With regard to the checkpoint and the
covert testing, there is a 23-point plan that TSA has put into
place. We are, generally, satisfied with the progress they are
making. It is by no means complete. But, there are issues, not
just at the checkpoint. There are issues with regard to TSA as
a contract administrator, for example. There are issues as far
as TSA as a regulator with local airports--how well they are
regulating the local airports. We have considerable concerns
about insider threat and the fact that there is a--while the
Administrator talked about the recurrent vetting that occurs--
the criminal vetting, it is a very static process. You are
either convicted of certain offenses--enumerated offenses--or
you are not. But, there is not a holistic look at an airport
worker, who has unrestricted access to aircraft--unescorted and
unrestricted access to aircraft. They are either sort of
convicted or not convicted. And, if they are not convicted,
there is no holistic vetting that would occur, for example,
that I am familiar with--with Federal employees--where we look
at a whole range of things before we determine whether they are
trustworthy.
Chairman Johnson. So, I hate putting words in people's
mouths, but, from the standpoint of taking the first step in
solving a problem--it is admitting we have one. We have really
taken that step.
But, in terms of, actually, solving the problem, you would
say that we have a long way to go?
Mr. Roth. That is correct. We did not get into this
overnight and we are not going to----
Chairman Johnson. Admiral, you would probably agree with
that, correct?
Admiral Neffenger. I would agree with that. I think that we
have made some substantial progress in really enumerating what
some of these issues are. But, these are issues that will take
some time to correct.
Chairman Johnson. Trust me. I do not envy your task. Again,
God bless you for your service. Senator McCaskill.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCASKILL
Senator McCaskill. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to talk a little bit about the Senior
Executive Service (SES). I understand, Mr. Neffenger, that the
bonuses that were paid to the former Assistant Administrator
happened before your time, but there was $90,000 in bonuses
paid to the Assistant Administrator of the Office of Security
Operations at the same time that all of those tests were
failing--where the IG was conducting the tests and showing that
67 out of 70 weapons got through. And, those bonuses were paid
in a way to hide them. They were paid over time, obviously--
clearly exceeding a 20-percent cap.
I know that you have made changes to make sure that does
not happen again, but this is really a symptom of this Senior
Executive Service, I think, and the lack of reform that has
occurred with the SES.
I like to point out every time I get a chance, on the
record, how the Senior Executive Service began. And, it began,
frankly, as an idea that I think the Chairman would agree
with--that you need to get talent in management and government.
So, the idea is that you would hire competitively with the
private sector and these managers would go from Agency to
Aagency and gain expertise.
Well, that has long since been abandoned. These are people
who burrowed in one agency, that hang out long enough to figure
out how to get an SES position, and then they get paid a lot
more--and this is where we have seen a lot of abuse, in terms
of bonuses.
So, let me ask you this: With your reforms, is there any
connection between bonuses paid and whether the Agency is
succeeding? In the private sector, the bonus pool changes based
on how the company did. And, it has not been that way in
government. I do not think anybody, looking objectively at TSA
over the last couple of years, would say that the bonus pool
should be really big.
So, are you now tying bonuses to the performance of the
Agency and not just the performance of the individual?
Admiral Neffenger. It is a combination of both, now--and I
want to just also preface it--or add--that I have severely
limited both the type and the number of bonuses that can be
handed out in the Agency. And, I have put controls on it above
me. My concern was that the Agency had the ability to
independently assign bonuses. I now require Department
oversight for that--and I have asked the Department to do that.
So, I am a strong believer in controls. I believe that
there is a need to have the ability to get bonuses when people
have done good work. You want to keep good people in
government. So, the notion and the practice of bonuses is not,
necessarily, a bad one, but it has to be managed carefully--it
has to be controlled and it has to be appropriate.
Senator McCaskill. Because, if you look at the data, no one
could, objectively, look at the data and say that TSA has high
marks, in terms of the things you look at for management, in
terms of morale and turnover--on all of the measurements out
there. So, I think you are trying to do better, in that regard.
I think we need to look at SES reform in a larger capacity--not
just at TSA. But, I think there are just a lot of issues with
the Senior Executive Service.
I also have some serious concerns, related to this, about
whistleblower retaliation. I read, with interest, the article
that was published, in April, about the high level of
whistleblower retaliation at TSA. The case that really struck
me was the man who took his case all of the way to the Supreme
Court and won on whistleblower retaliation--that had been
wrongfully fired and he lost 10 years--it took him 10 years to
win. He lost 10 years of promotions and TSA said, ``Well, we
cannot speculate how much he would have been promoted in 10
years.'' They put him back in his other job, and, frankly, he
is still getting passed over to this day.
I would ask you, Mr. Roth, how does TSA compare to other
DHS components, as far as the number of whistleblower
complaints and the number of whistleblower retaliation
complaints?
Mr. Roth. We have not done a study on that. That is
something, certainly, that would be interesting to know, so I
can take that back.
Senator McCaskill. Yes. And, what can we do about the lost
years of salary, compensation, and promotion for the time
period that someone litigates them for being treated unfairly?
Admiral Neffenger. Well, the individual you are speaking of
did get full back pay for that full 10-year period--along with
all of the associated cost-of-living (COL) increases that would
have occurred during that time--in addition to other things.
So, he got a sizable payment for back pay--and it included the
cost-of-living increases.
I understand that he has ongoing litigation, so it would be
inappropriate for me to comment any more on that, because I
want to make sure that he gets the appropriate due process. I
am committed to supporting people who bring forward complaints.
I am committed to them being treated fairly and I absolutely
will not stand for retaliation inside the Agency.
I understand that there have been allegations of that and,
in one case, proof of that, in the past. My position is, I do
not want to inadvertently bias any action going forward, so if
you have pending litigation, we will support that going
forward. We will work with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC),
as necessary and, more importantly, I will take swift action
against people if they do something, on my watch, that
indicates that they have retaliated.
Senator McCaskill. I would love to get a response to the
people whose stories are laid out in the New York Times
article, as to the Agency's position on these people, what
occurred, and how this has been made whole. The woman who was
forced to leave her assignment after she complained--there are
a number of them in here, as you know. It is pretty damning.
And, it says it is much higher than, for example, the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS), which has many more employees, in terms
of the rate of complaints. It went up significantly--the number
of complaints. So, I want to take a look at that.
My time is up. I would say, on the record, that I hope you
are thinking about every airport--you have a group of frequent
flyers up here. Everyone flies home every weekend. No one uses
TSA more than all of us, because we are flying twice a week
coming back and forth to work. And so, we see an awful lot in
airports. I am bombarded with kiosks wanting to sell me
everything from sunglasses and pillows to cases for my iPhone.
I would love to see a kiosk for TSA PreCheck. I mean, how
simple would it be to put up a kiosk, in the airport, for
someone to sign up for TSA PreCheck. It would not be that
expensive and, frankly, you could probably staff it, especially
in the non-peak hours, with people who are waiting for surges
of people coming for flights. I bet you could do it pretty
cost-effectively at $85 a pop. That is a hell of a lot more
than a lot of cell phone covers.
Admiral Neffenger. Well, I think the vendor is looking at
dramatically increasing the number of mobile sites just for
that reason.
Senator McCaskill. Kiosks. Not an office somewhere that you
have to go----
Admiral Neffenger. No, no. These are----
Senator McCaskill [continuing]. Down into the bowels of the
airport, back by the lost luggage, to find it. I am talking
about right there, neon letters, with a big smiley face. Maybe
we could even sell cell phone covers at the same place. Thank
you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Johnson. Senator Carper.
Senator Carper. Just to follow up on that, E-ZPass is not
the same. We have a much different vetting process with E-
ZPass, as opposed to TSA PreCheck. But, when you come into
Delaware, we collect tolls on I-95. There is a fairly easy
place--very visible, right on the road--to stop off and, if you
want to get an E-ZPass, you can. The same thing with our
``north-south'' highway that goes down to our beaches. It is
easy to just pull off and get yourself an E-ZPass. So, I think
that is a good idea.
I am going to ask a series of questions and I will ask for
very brief responses, if you will, Admiral. I apologize to
General Roth and I apologize to Jennifer for not asking more
questions, but my colleagues have asked several that I wanted
to, so thank you very much for the good work that you and your
teams are doing to make TSA better. Make them better.
Admiral, I was struck by the apparent success of TSA's
efforts to reduce wait times ahead of the Memorial Day holiday.
According to the news reports that we talked about here today,
security checkpoint wait times were mostly average--I think 99
percent of passengers waited fewer than 30 minutes to pass
through screening--with 93 percent waiting under 15 minutes.
Just take a minute and tell us how you and your team were able
to cut wait times in such short order.
Admiral Neffenger. Really, four things.
First, we got new resources through the reprogramming:
thousands of overtime hours, we were able to convert people
from part-time to full-time, and we moved additional K-9 units
into the largest airports. So, that was number one.
Second, the standing up of a national--focusing on the top
7 airports, primarily--looking across at the top 20 in addition
to that. That allows us to address problems at the places where
they begin.
Third, having the National Incident Command Center to
manage that on a daily basis--to look specifically at the
checkpoint screening operations. And then, the daily phone call
with each airport, Federal security director, and the airline
partners in that airport, airport by airport, across the top
airports.
Senator Carper. Alright. I mentioned in my opening
statement that we have included, in the appropriations
legislation reported out of Committee, by the Senate
Appropriations Committee, some additional monies for human
resources, for personnel resources, for dogs--canines--and,
maybe, for some infrastructure improvements and technology
improvements. Do you still believe that is going to be needed?
Admiral Neffenger. Absolutely, yes, sir.
Senator Carper. That is all I need. Thank you very much.
Talk to us about the role that your employees have played,
in terms of--they are on the front lines. They see this stuff
every day and talk to people every day. How do you ask them for
their ideas and make sure that their input is gathered and
actually acted on?
Admiral Neffenger. Well, I think we still need to become
better at that, but what I have tried to do is to--both
anecdotally and more formally--solicit information on how best
to do the job that we are doing. So, we bring them in on short-
term details to our technology office. They work in our test
facility. They give us ideas as to how to improve what we are
doing. When we were looking at these automated lanes, for
example, we brought some front-line TSOs up and said, ``How
would you run this thing? ''
So, there is a lot of just great tactical knowledge that
they have in their head on how to do this job better, from day
to day. And, we are trying to capture that in a much more
systematic way.
Senator Carper. One of the ways I have always found to
improve employee morale--whether it is in the Federal
Government, the State, or some other regard--is training. Folks
on my staff, particularly, folks in Delaware, love to come to
D.C., where we have specialized training for them, regardless
of what their jobs might be. Not only does it allow for folks
to do a better job, but their sense of self-worth is enhanced
as well. So, I want to encourage you to continue to do the
training that is going on down in Glynco, Georgia at the
Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC).
The other thing I want to ask is, you talked a little bit
about the range of weapons that we find--that your folks find
on passengers trying to get onto a plane. And, I think you
actually have an Instagram feed to display some of those. Can
you just take a minute and tell us, if you will--speak about
some of the dangerous items that TSA screeners discover in
carry-on baggage and at the checkpoint--and the importance of
careful and effective security screening in order to identify
some of the overt threats.
Admiral Neffenger. Well, we have seen a lot of loaded
handguns come through checkpoints. Last year, I believe it was
somewhere around 2,700 handguns were confiscated at
checkpoints. Many of these are not just loaded, but they have
rounds in the chambers--so these are weapons that are
dangerous.
Two weeks ago, we had two smoke grenades--live smoke
grenades--found in carry-on luggage coming through.
You get a lot of inert items coming through--things that
look like grenades, but those are of concern, too, because, you
cannot tell from a distance. Quite a few knives, concealed
weapons, and canes with knives--with swords embedded in them.
You name it. And, somebody is trying to bring it through a
checkpoint. Throwing stars, brass knuckles, and all sorts of
stuff that you just do not want on an aircraft--in an aircraft
environment--given what we know to be the way some people have
been acting lately.
Senator Carper. Good. The last thing I will say is that I
was elected Governor in November 1992. Along with other newly
elected Governors, in November 1992, we went to ``New Governors
School'' 2 weeks after the election. It was hosted by Roy
Romer, who was then the Chairman of the National Governors
Association (NGA), the Governor of Colorado. I learned a lot.
It was like 3 days and the faculty was existing governors and
their spouses--the ``grizzled veterans,'' I called them. And
then, there were the newbies--those who had just been elected--
Governors-elect and their spouses. And, one of the best lessons
I learned during those 3 days was from one of the Governors,
who said, ``When you have a problem--when you face a problem in
your State as Governor--do not make a 1-day problem a 1-week
problem or a 1-month problem or a 1-year problem. Own the
problem. Take responsibility for the problem.'' Say, ``This is
what we are going to do. We are going to fix this problem.
Apologize and then do it.''
And, the way I watch you perform in your role as the head
of TSA, I am reminded of that advice. And, I do not know that
you will ever be a Governor, but you are, certainly, prepared
with the training you have gone through as well.
I am going to close with the Preamble to the Constitution.
We are very proud of the Constitution. Delaware was the first
State that ratified the Constitution. For 1 whole week, we were
the entire United States of America--a pretty good week. And,
the Preamble to the Constitution begins with these words: ``We
the people of the United States, in order to form a more
perfect union . . .'' It does not say to form a perfect union.
We did not. We continued to amend the Constitution over time.
And, the idea is to always get better. How do we get better?
And, clearly, TSA is doing a better job. We are grateful for
that. We are anxious to know how we can help to make that
happen even more expeditiously.
We want to thank our friends at GAO and the IG's office for
the good work that they are doing to help, if you will, the
wind beneath your wings--and to say, ``Let us keep up the good
work.''
The last thing is, we were in Africa about a year ago with
our family on a family vacation. I heard this old African
saying: ``If you want to go fast, travel alone. If you want to
go far, travel together.'' And, in this instance, this is a
team sport. We are going to travel together. And, I think, to
the extent we do, we are going to go a long ways toward where
we need to go. Thank you--so that other people can get where
they need to go.
Thank you.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Carper.
Again, I want to thank our witnesses. Admiral Neffenger,
really, we do appreciate the enormity of your task--the
significant challenge--but I think you have really shown that
you have taken some pretty great strides. And, that first step
is admitting we have the problem. And then, starting to work in
a very methodical and very military fashion, quite honestly,
which I think we all appreciate.
Inspector General Roth and Ms. Grover, thank you for your
contribution to this effort as well. Again, thank you for your
time, your testimonies, and your answers to our questions.
With that, the hearing record will remain open for 15 days
until June 22 at 5 p.m. for the submission of statements and
questions for the record. This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:57 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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