    [Senate Hearing 114-690]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 114-690

                          PROTECTING AMERICA FROM THE
                                 THREAT OF ISIS

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                   HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                  MAY 26, 2016

                                   __________

            Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/

                           Printed for the use of the
            Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

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            COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                        RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin Chairman
    JOHN McCAIN, Arizona                 THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
    ROB PORTMAN, Ohio                    CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
    RAND PAUL, Kentucky                  JON TESTER, Montana
    JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma             TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
    MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming             HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota
    KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire          CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
    JONI ERNST, Iowa                     GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
    BEN SASSE, Nebraska

                      Christopher R. Hixon, Staff Director
                        Daniel P. Lips, Policy Director
                 David S. Luckey, Director of Homeland Security
               Elizabeth E. McWhorter, Professional Staff Member
                  Gabrielle A. Batkin, Minority Staff Director
               John P. Kilvington, Minority Deputy Staff Director
           Harlan C. Geer, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member
                         Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
                       Benjamin C. Grazda, Hearing Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                     ------
    Opening statements:
                                                                       Page
        Senator Johnson..............................................     1
        Senator Carper...............................................     2
        Senator Portman..............................................    14
        Senator Peters...............................................    17
        Senator Ayotte...............................................    19
        Senator Booker...............................................    24
        Senator Ernst................................................    27
    Prepared statements:
        Senator Johnson..............................................    37
        Senator Carper...............................................    38

                                    WITNESS
                             Thursday, May 26, 2016

    Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of
      Homeland Security..............................................     5
    Justin Siberell, Acting Coordinator of Counterterrorism, Bureau
      of Counterrorism, U.S. Department of State.....................     6

                         Alphabetical List of Witnesses

    Mayorkas, Hon. Alejandro N.:
        Testimony....................................................     5
        Prepared statement...........................................    40
    Siberell, Justin:
        Testimony....................................................     6
        Prepared statement...........................................    47

                                    APPENDIX

    Department of State and USAID Joint Strategy Report on Countering
      Violent Extremism..............................................    53
    Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record
        Mr. Mayorkas.................................................    65
        Mr. Siberell.................................................    87

                          PROTECTING AMERICA FROM THE

                                 THREAT OF ISIS

                                  ----------

                             THURSDAY, MAY 26, 2016

                                         U.S. Senate,
                               Committee on Homeland Security
                                      and Governmental Affairs,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in
    room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ron Johnson,
    Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
        Present: Senators Johnson, Portman, Ayotte, Ernst, Sasse,
    Carper, McCaskill, Tester, Baldwin, Booker, and Peters.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JOHNSON

        Chairman Johnson. This hearing will come to order.
        I want to welcome our witnesses. Thank you for taking the
    time to appear here today and for submitting your thoughtful
    testimonies. We are looking forward to the answers to our
    questions.
        When I took over as Chairman of this Committee, working
    with Senator Carper, who, by the way----
        Senator Carper. A bloodless coup. It was a bloodless coup.
        Chairman Johnson. But, he is looking pretty good, having
    just spent 4 days traveling with the President to Vietnam and
    just getting back yesterday. So, he got a good night's sleep. I
    appreciate that.
        But, one of the first things we did is we developed a
    mission statement for the Committee--pretty simple: to enhance
    the economic and national security of America. Then, on the
    Homeland Security side of the Committee, we established four
    basic priorities:
        Border security: we have held, I think, 18 hearings on some
    aspect of our unsecured border.
        Cybersecurity: we passed the Federal Cybersecurity
    Enhancement Act of 2016--a good measure.
        Protecting our critical infrastructure, particularly, our
    electrical grid, from a kinetic terrorist attack, a cyber
    attack, electromagnetic pulses (EMP), and geomagnetic
    disturbances (GMD).
        And then, finally, what can we do, as a Nation, to protect
    our homeland against Islamic terrorists and other violent
    extremists?
        So, this hearing is really about that last priority--
    addressing Islamic terror and trying to secure our homeland and
    keep it safe. Not an easy task.
        For every last one of these hearings, the goal is,
    primarily, to lay out a reality, as best we can, so that we can
    identify--define the problem--admit we have it, so we can
    actually work toward some common-sense solutions, recognizing,
    in this realm, the solutions are very difficult and it is going
    to take quite some time to, finally, in the end, defeat Islamic
    terror.
        I just want to lay out a couple of facts that have been
    developed by staff--recognizing again these are estimates.
    There is nothing hard and fast, but it just gives us some
    indication of what we are dealing with here, when we are
    talking about the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).
        Apparently, the monthly revenues of ISIS have dropped from
    $80 million per month, which would be a little less than $1
    billion per year, to about $56 million per month, about $672
    million a year. Still, some pretty significant revenue in the
    hands of barbarians.
        There have been 12 confirmed cases of the use of a mustard
    agent. Three other cases are suspected, both in Syria and Iraq.
    That ought to concern everybody.
        More than 42,900 foreign fighters have entered the conflict
    zone--about 7,400 Westerners. ISIS has trained at least 400
    fighters to target Europe with its external operation.
        At least eight of the Paris plotters were foreign fighters
    returning from Syria. The same network behind the Paris attacks
    and the Brussels attacks--it is the same network that was
    behind the Paris attacks and the Brussels suicide bombings. In
    total, there were 162 victims.
        There were 1.8 million illegal border crossings into the
    European Union (EU) in 2015. The previous year, in 2014, there
    were 280,000. So, you can just see that, as things degrade in
    Syria and Iraq, it is putting enormous pressure on European
    Union States.
        ISIS has 43 affiliates--according to some reports--
    supporting groups, globally. So, the fact that ISIS has a
    territory--has established this caliphate--other Islamic terror
    groups are beginning to pledge their loyalty. So, ISIS
    continues to metastasize. Until we finally do defeat them, they
    are going to continue to inspire. They are going to continue to
    metastasize and continue to be a real and growing threat.
        So, again, I think we have to take this seriously. We will
    continue to explore this. I am really looking forward to the
    testimonies from representatives from the Department of
    Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of State (DOS).
        With that, I will turn it over to Senator Carper, after I
    ask consent to enter my written statement in the record.\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Senator Johnson appears in the
    Appendix on page 37.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Senator Carper. I think that is a great idea.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER

        Senator Carper. Mr. Chairman, thank you for pulling this
    together. I want to say to the Secretary and to Justin, thank
    you very much for joining us today. It is an important hearing
    and a timely one as well.
        Our thoughts and prayers continue to be with the people of
    Belgium and the people of France, who have not only endured
    losses from terror attacks in their capital cities, but also
    have endured the recent tragedy involving the crash of the
    EgyptAir flight that departed from Paris' Charles De Gaulle
    Airport earlier this month. While we are still learning the
    facts surrounding the loss of the EgyptAir flight, this tragedy
    reminds us that securing our homeland is likely to remain an
    ongoing challenge for some time to come--and our efforts must
    adapt as groups, like ISIS, evolve their tactics.
        The Chairman has alluded to some of the progress that is
    being made, on the battlefield and in other ways, with respect
    to ISIS--and it is a big coalition: 60 nations. It is beginning
    to work and we are providing, I think, good leadership. It is
    going slower than we would like, but real progress is being
    made--not only in terms of regaining land, but in reducing
    their capacity to be successful in that part of the world, in
    taking away their money, and in limiting their ability to
    finance their operations.
        But, securing our borders and our immigration system is,
    obviously, a key element of keeping us safe--and we have
    focused quite a bit on those topics as of late, as you know.
    Hearings on the Syrian refugee program, the security of the
    Visa Waiver Program (VWP), and the thoroughness of all visa
    screening efforts bear witness to our focus. We found that the
    Syrian refugee screening process takes upwards of 2 years and
    that DHS has enhanced the security of the Visa Waiver Program--
    not once, not twice, but three times in the last 18 months--and
    this Committee has focused a lot of time and energy on that as
    well. And, our government also deploys special visa teams
    abroad to help consular officers detect fraud.
        Securing our borders, however, is only half of the battle.
    We could shut down all travel and immigration to this country
    and still not be safe from terrorist threats. That is because,
    as Peter Bergen testified, in November--I believe right here in
    this room--and this is a quote from him, ``Every person who has
    been killed by a jihadi terrorist in this country since the
    attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11) has been killed by an
    American citizen or resident.''
        Let me say that again: ``Every person who has been killed
    by a jihadi terrorist in this country since 9/11 has been
    killed by an American citizen or resident.''
        The people who carried out those attacks were not foreign
    students, they were not tourists, and they were not even
    refugees. They were Americans. And, in many cases, they had
    spent much of their lives in this country--in the United
    States.
        For instance, the Tsarnaev brothers spent nearly a decade
    in the United States before carrying out the Boston Marathon
    bombing. Major Nidal Hassan was born and raised in America and
    was serving in the U.S. Army when he committed the Fort Hood
    attack. Syed Farooq spent most of his life in California before
    he and his wife committed the San Bernardino massacre.
    Unfortunately, ISIS knows all too well that the best way to
    attack America is to have Americans do it for you. That is why
    ISIS has put an emphasis on using social media and the Internet
    to radicalize Americans at home.
        In order to counter homegrown terrorist attacks, we have to
    do our best to make sure that, when ISIS makes its recruitment
    pitch to Americans, their twisted message falls on deaf ears.
    But, if ISIS is successful at radicalizing Americans, we must
    also be vigilant in ensuring, to the best of our ability, that
    we can stop almost every terrorist attack well before an attack
    can be carried out.
        Let me be clear. The Department of Homeland Security--and
    other agencies--are not alone in tackling the threat of
    homegrown terrorism. Congress must help. Indeed, all Americans
    must help. We can start by taking action to keep weapons--
    whether they are explosives, dirty bomb materials, or guns--out
    of the hands of terrorists here. We also need to improve the
    ability of our law enforcement and intelligence agencies to
    detect homegrown terrorism plots by helping them work through
    their challenges on encryption. And, finally, we need to give
    our Federal agencies the tools they need to help prevent our
    young people from falling prey to ISIS' online propaganda.
        Late last year, I authored, with some of our colleagues
    here, legislation to empower the Department of Homeland
    Security to tackle this challenge. This legislation would
    create an office at the Department of Homeland Security tasked
    with working with community groups, families--especially young
    people--and religious leaders to develop community-based
    solutions for stopping the recruitment of young Americans into
    ISIS. Our legislation was reported out of Committee earlier
    this year. It was also included in the Department of Homeland
    Security Accountability Act of 2016, which we approved just
    yesterday. We need to get this bill enacted into law as soon as
    possible, so that we can further help our communities resist
    ISIS' recruitment efforts.
        Secretary Mayorkas and Mr. Siberell, I want to commend you
    and your Departments for the work that you do to protect our
    people, in this country, from terrorist attacks, both at home
    and abroad. We stand ready to work with you both--and your
    colleagues both--to make sure that your Departments have the
    resources that you need to combat these threats.
        We welcome your testimonies. We appreciate your hard work,
    the leadership that you are providing, and your selfless
    devotion to our country. God bless you. Thank you.
        Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Carper.
        It is the tradition of this Committee to swear in
    witnesses, so if you will both rise and raise your right hand.
    Do you swear the testimony you will give before this Committee
    will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
    so help you, God?
        Mr. Mayorkas. I do.
        Mr. Siberell. I do.
        Chairman Johnson. Please be seated.
        Our first witness is Ali Mayorkas. Mr. Mayorkas is the
    Deputy Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security.
    Previously, he served as the Director of the United States
    Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), at DHS. A lot of
    acronyms in this business. He was a partner in a law firm and
    the youngest United States Attorney to serve the Nation when he
    was confirmed by the Senate, in 1998, as the U.S. Attorney for
    the Central District of California. In that capacity, he also
    served as the Vice Chair of the Attorney General's (AG)
    Advisory Subcommittee (AGAC) on Civil Rights and was a member
    of the Subcommittee on Ethics in Government. Mr. Mayorkas.

      TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE ALEJANDRO N. MAYORKAS,\1\ DEPUTY
            SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

        Mr. Mayorkas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Mayorkas appears in the Appendix
    on page 40.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and distinguished
    Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to
    appear before you to discuss the priorities and the key actions
    of our Department of Homeland Security to address the terrorist
    threats to our Nation, particularly, following the Islamic
    State of Iraq and the Levant's (ISIL) November 2015 and March
    2016 terrorist attacks in Brussels and Paris. I will be brief
    in my remarks and defer to my written testimony, submitted this
    past Tuesday, so that I can focus on the questions you may
    pose.
        As I articulated in my earlier submission, the threats we
    face today are more complex and decentralized than they were a
    decade ago. We are in a new phase in the global terrorist
    threat. We have moved from a world of terrorist-directed
    attacks to a world that increasingly includes the threat of
    terrorist-inspired attacks--one in which the attacker may never
    have come face-to-face with a member of a terrorist
    organization but is, instead, inspired by the messages and
    propaganda of ISIL. By their nature, such inspired attacks are
    harder for intelligence and law enforcement to detect and could
    occur with little or no notice--presenting a more complex
    security challenge.
        Confronting the world of both terrorist-directed and
    terrorist-inspired attacks, our Department of Homeland Security
    has focused our resources and efforts in four areas, in order
    to counter the diverse and evolving threats we face: aviation
    security, border security, countering violent extremism (CVE),
    and information sharing and support. In each of these areas, we
    have strengthened--and continue to strengthen--our programs and
    processes. And, we are executing critical initiatives to better
    respond to the dynamic threat landscape across the world.
        We have strengthened our screening protocols at domestic
    airports and established security enhancements at foreign
    airports that are the last points of departure to the United
    States. We are continually refining our risk-based strategy and
    our layered approach to border security, extending our zone of
    security to interdict threats as far outward from our homeland
    as possible. We are leveraging all available advance passenger
    and manifest data, intelligence, law enforcement information,
    and open source information.
        We have strengthened the Visa Waiver Program in
    coordination with the Department of State and Congress. All
    individuals traveling as part of the Visa Waiver Program are
    subject to rigorous screening before departure to the United
    States--and throughout the travel continuum. The Visa Waiver
    Program significantly enhances our Nation's security and law
    enforcement partnerships with participating countries and we
    continue to work with our international partners to strengthen
    our information sharing and to increase our joint presence at
    Europol.
        We have strengthened our information-sharing efforts and
    close partnerships with State, local, and tribal law
    enforcement--our key first responders throughout our Nation.
        Finally, we have strengthened our relationships with
    communities across the country and with agencies across the
    government through our Office for Community Partnerships (OCP)
    and the Countering Violent Extremism Task Force. We are working
    in close collaboration to develop guidance, resources, best
    practices, and training to protect communities from violent
    extremism.
        I would like to thank this Committee for endorsing the
    Secretary's key ``Unity-of-Effort'' priority. Strengthening and
    maturing the Department is an ongoing process. We rely on this
    Committee to work with us--legislating the joint task forces--
    and having the Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy, and
    Plans--the office that leads our countering violent extremism
    efforts--is critical to ensuring the Department of Homeland
    Security is able to pursue key mission priorities.
        On behalf of our Department, I want to thank you, Mr.
    Chairman--and the Committee--for your support of our
    Department. I am very proud to work alongside 240,000 men and
    women who work each day to protect our homeland.
        Thank you very much.
        Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Mayorkas.
        Our next witness is Justin Siberell. Mr. Siberell is Acting
    Coordinator of Counterterrorism (CT) in the Bureau of
    Counterterrorism at the U.S. Department of State. He joined the
    State Department Foreign Service in March 1993 and joined the
    CT Bureau in July 2012. He is a career member of the Senior
    Foreign Service (SFS) with the rank of Minister Counselor.
    Before joining the Counterterrorism Bureau, Mr. Siberell was
    Principal Officer in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. In
    Washington, he completed tours in the State Department
    Operations Center and the Executive Secretariat. Mr. Siberell.

        TESTIMONY OF JUSTIN SIBERELL,\1\ ACTING COORDINATOR OF
     COUNTERTERRORISM, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT
                                OF STATE

        Mr. Siberell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Siberell appears in the Appendix
    on page 47.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and Members of the
    Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
    today. The Department of State is working closely with the
    Department of Homeland Security and other U.S. Government
    Agencies to counter ISIL and to keep America safe.
        Mr. Chairman, we face an evolving terrorist threat
    environment that is increasingly dispersed and adaptive. This
    new reality requires that we strengthen partnerships globally,
    including with our European partners. I would like to describe
    some of the steps we are taking to do just that. I have
    submitted a longer statement for the record.
        In partnership with a broad coalition of countries across
    the globe, we have made progress in degrading the capabilities
    of transnational terrorist groups. In particular, the U.S.-led
    Global Coalition to Counter ISIL has made important progress in
    reducing ISIL's control of territory in Iraq and Syria as well
    as constricting the funds and foreign terrorist fighters (FTF)
    available to it. At the same time, terrorist groups continue to
    exploit instability along with weak or non-existent governance,
    sectarian conflict, and porous borders, in key regions of the
    world, to extend their reach, terrorize civilians, and attract
    and mobilize new recruits.
        In the face of increased military pressure, ISIL, al-Qaeda,
    and both groups' branches and adherents have pursued mass
    casualty attacks against symbolic targets and public spaces.
    Terrorist attacks in Bamako, Beirut, Brussels, Jakarta, Paris,
    San Bernardino, and elsewhere demonstrate that these groups
    remain resilient and determined to continue targeting innocent
    civilians.
        Mr. Chairman, the Department of State is working to address
    and to mitigate the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters
    and other radicalized individuals around the world,
    particularly in Europe. We are working with partners to
    increase information sharing, augment border security, and
    strengthen legal regimes in order to enable more effective
    counterterrorism efforts.
        This engagement has yielded positive results: 45 countries
    with whom we have engaged have either passed new laws or
    updated existing laws to address the threat caused by foreign
    terrorist fighters. The United States now has in place
    agreements with 55 international partners to strengthen efforts
    to identify, track, and deter the travel of suspected
    terrorists. We have provided support to the International
    Police Organization (INTERPOL) to enhance its role in serving
    as a focal point for sharing critical FTF identity data with
    countries around the world. Fifty-eight countries and the
    United Nations (U.N.) now contribute foreign terrorist
    fighters' profiles to INTERPOL.
        Many of these actions were guided by the requirements upon
    member States that were identified in U.N. Security Council
    Resolution 2178, a landmark document developed by the United
    States and agreed to, unanimously, by Security Council members
    in September 2014.
        We continue to work with DHS and our 38 Visa Waiver Program
    partners to strengthen our vital security and counterterrorism
    partnership, including by implementing changes contained in the
    Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention
    Act of 2015. The Visa Waiver Program gives us unprecedented
    leverage to hold our partners to the highest standards of
    security in issuing passports and screening travelers--and it
    is vital to the security of the homeland as well as to the
    security of our closest allies.
        We have increased our engagement with our European partners
    in the aftermath of the horrific terrorist attacks in Paris and
    Brussels. Earlier this year, we deployed Foreign Fighter Surge
    Teams, composed of experts from across the U.S. interagency
    counterterrorism community, to several European countries,
    including Belgium and Greece. These interagency teams are
    working with partners to identify concrete areas for tightening
    cooperation in order to identify, disrupt, arrest, and
    prosecute suspected foreign terrorist fighters.
        The Department of State is strengthening our international
    partners' border security through the development and the
    deployment of the Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) as well
    as by working with the Department of Homeland Security to
    deploy key technologies to assist governments with more
    effectively identifying and targeting suspect travelers. These
    programs provide a highly valuable capability to countries for
    strengthening border controls through enhanced technology and
    training.
        Effective border security is one of the most essential
    tools governments possess to deny terrorists the space and the
    freedom to plot and carry out attacks. And, our efforts, in
    this regard, are aimed at ensuring our international partners
    will adopt and implement the effective procedures and
    technology to enhance our collective security.
        We are also increasing our focus on identifying and
    preventing the spread of violent extremism--to stop the
    radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization of individuals to
    engage in terrorist attacks. Yesterday, the Department of State
    and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
    released the first ever joint strategy on countering violent
    extremism, which articulates an expanded effort to better
    understand and address the drivers of radicalization and to
    disrupt the recruitment into terrorist groups.
        Mr. Chairman, there is no greater priority than keeping
    America safe from the threat of terrorism. The Department of
    State works in close partnership every day with our colleagues
    at DHS and in other government Agencies to counter the threat
    posed to the United States by terrorist groups, like ISIL. We
    greatly appreciate Congress' interest and support of our
    efforts.
        I look forward to your questions and our discussion today.
    Thank you.
        Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Siberell.
        Mr. Mayorkas, obviously, the headlines nowadays are about
    the long lines at the Transportation Security Administration
    (TSA), so I do want to talk a little bit about that. We did
    have a briefing by Admiral Peter Neffenger in the Senate
    Commerce Committee. I just want your assessment of what is
    causing that. What is the root cause of lines as long as 3
    hours when getting through, for example, Chicago O'Hare
    International Airport?
        Mr. Mayorkas. If I can, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much
    for the opportunity. Let me separate Chicago O'Hare and the 3-
    hour lines that were experienced about a week ago, because,
    quite frankly, that was error on our part. That was a failure
    to address, with appropriate staffing, a very predictable surge
    at a peak time of travel. So, that was an aberration, if you
    will, with respect to the Agency's failure to address what it
    was ready for.
        Chairman Johnson. So, we can separate Chicago O'Hare, but
    there are problems at other airports. So, let us talk about the
    problem in its totality.
        Mr. Mayorkas. So, we would identify, I think, three general
    factors, if I may--and they have arisen over the course of
    quite some time.
        First, and very importantly, we have enhanced security
    measures at our airports in response to an Inspector General's
    (IGs) report that was published last year. That Inspector
    General's report identified certain deficiencies in the
    Agency's protocols. And, we have since executed a 10-point
    plan, directed by the Secretary, to address those deficiencies.
        Chairman Johnson. OK. Let me stop you right there. Do you
    have a metric, in terms of what those enhanced security
    measures mean--in terms of throughput? Do we have the average
    number of passenger throughput, versus what it was, and versus
    what it is today?
        Mr. Mayorkas. So, I would have to report back to you on
    that, Mr. Chairman. I do not have that at my----
        Chairman Johnson. OK. I would ask for that be submitted
    afterwards.
        Mr. Mayorkas. Most certainly.
        Second, over a number of years, the staffing at TSA dropped

    considerably. And, it dropped at a time--and this is the third
    factor--when there was an increase in travel volume. And so, I
    would say that those three factors, together: enhanced
    security,--which we will, of course, not compromise--an
    increase in travel volume, and a reduction in the staffing of
    our personnel. And, we are addressing all three of those very
    vigorously.
        Chairman Johnson. So, talk about the staffing, because we
    have also had representatives from U.S. Customs and Border
    Protection (CBP) that are having a hard time with staffing. I
    will tell you that, in Wisconsin, there is not one manufacturer
    that can hire enough people, so just talk about the staffing.
    Is it a budget-related issue? Is it the fact that we are simply
    not able to attract and recruit enough people? Is it an
    attrition problem? Are people leaving for certain reasons?
        Mr. Mayorkas. There are multiple factors. And I appreciate
    the opportunity to explain--and I should, first, thank you and
    your colleagues for a $34 million reprogramming that allowed us
    to hire additional personnel on a very short term basis, to
    convert part-time personnel to full-time, and also to pay
    overtime, so that we can be ready for the summer surge in
    volume.
        There was a purposeful effort to reduce staffing over a
    number of years and to move to a risk-based methodology that
    relied on TSA PreCheck and other throughput accelerators, to
    include ``Managed Inclusion''--a program that we have since
    eliminated, both following the Inspector General's report and
    also under Administrator Neffenger's leadership and assessment
    of the security imperative. We have suffered attrition because
    of the pay that TSA employees receive and because many of them
    are part-time looking for full-time opportunities. And, there
    are better opportunities, in what can be a transitional
    workforce, by virtue of that part-time status.
        So, there are multiple reasons--and we are talking each and
    every one of those. We are converting quite a number of part-
    time positions to full-time positions. We are taking a look at
    the pay structure, which, of course, we would need to partner
    with Congress to alter. The TSA employees are not on a general
    schedule (GS) pay schedule.
        We are also taking a look at the staffing models that we
    employ. For example, we have skilled screeners--airport
    screeners--performing functions that do not necessarily require
    those talents. And, we want to move those talents to where they
    are needed and to employ people--divestiture officers--those
    that communicate to passengers in line that they need not take
    off their shoes if they are in a TSA PreCheck line--but, if
    they are not, they need to take off their shoes, their coats,
    etc.
        Chairman Johnson. San Francisco is contracting with a
    private firm to do the TSA security, correct?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Yes, it is.
        Chairman Johnson. How many other airports are using that
    same model?
        Mr. Mayorkas. I know there are others. I do not have the
    exact number. Our ability to staff the security at airports is
    a voluntary--it is a partnership with the local airport. It is
    a voluntary relationship. But, what I think is critical, from a
    security perspective, is that, even if it is a private company,
    they must, of course, maintain security protocols according to
    our standards.
        Chairman Johnson. So, the question I had is this: with
    those private sector contracted companies, are there the same
    long lines at those airports?
        Mr. Mayorkas. San Francisco International Airport is a
    major hub that does have some wait time issues. They are not as
    acute as some of our top airports. And, I should say, it is the
    top airports, at peak times, that create the wait time
    phenomenon. And, we are focused, therefore, on the top 20
    airports, at the peak times, and surging staffing accordingly.
        Chairman Johnson. We are going to have Admiral Neffenger
    here, I think on June 6th or 7th, so I will get into greater
    detail with him. I know he has been doing a top-to-bottom
    assessment of this. You talked about a layered approach toward
    border security. I want to talk a little bit about a layered
    approach to airport security as well. We had a very interesting
    hearing, ``Dogs of DHS.'' I am a big proponent of K-9 units.
    There is no technology that even comes close to the ability of
    the nose of a dog. Can you just talk a little bit about it? It
    has been a year under Admiral Neffenger. He has been doing this
    basic assessment. How close are we to a reengineering of
    airport security?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Admiral
    Neffenger is a phenomenal leader--and I use that adjective
    advisedly. The assessment is underway, but the changes are
    underway as well. Admiral Neffenger has not waited to complete
    the assessment before implementing the reforms that are already
    identified as needed.
        You mentioned canines. We have deployed additional canines
    and are looking to deploy more. They are, in fact, an
    extraordinarily effective tool, both from a security
    perspective and, critically, from a throughput perspective,
    because individuals who pass the canine review, if you will,
    can go through expedited screening just as though they had
    enrolled in and had succeeded in being approved for TSA
    PreCheck. So, the canine deployments--from a risk-based
    approach--reengineering the TSA PreCheck process--maximizing
    the marketing of the TSA PreCheck. It is a security imperative.
    It is also a throughput advantage.
        We went, last year, from a daily average of 3,000 enrollees
    into TSA PreCheck to now, where we are close to an average
    daily enrollment of 15,000. I think 2 days ago we reached the
    16,000 mark. So, those are two examples of the reforms that he
    has instituted while the assessment is underway--not waiting
    until it is completed.
        Chairman Johnson. OK. Well, thank you. Just so you know, I
    will be highly supportive of beefing up and increasing the use
    of K-9 units. I think that is one of the best things we can do,
    in terms of a layered approach. Senator Carper.
        Senator Carper. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I had not planned
    to address TSA, but it is something that I think we are all
    interested in. I flew back in from Hanoi, Vietnam, came back in
    through San Francisco, California, connected yesterday morning,
    and landed at Dulles, in Virginia. What I witnessed in travel
    there--and earlier in the month of May and in April--most folks
    on this Committee have TSA PreCheck and that is how we get
    through airports. And, time and again, I went quickly through
    TSA PreChecks and saw long lines of people waiting who were not
    TSA PreCheck folks. I know, in talking with Admiral Neffenger
    several times in the last 2 weeks, one of the things that we
    have to do--it is a collective responsibility, but we have to
    get more people in these trusted traveler programs. And, the
    numbers that you just cited--we are up to 16,000 per week,
    where, previously, TSA was at 5,000 a week in sign-ups--we have
    tripled that. That is very good. We want to continue to do
    that.
        TSA used to have a marketing program. They used a paid
    media program. They have not used that for a while and I think
    they are ramping that up to get the message out again. A pretty
    good television (TV) commercial--or put it online--people
    waiting for it could be like 10, 20, 30, or 40 minutes to get
    through regular checks, while people are zipping by going
    through TSA PreCheck. That is just a great commercial--very
    easy to understand.
        But, the problem we have at TSA--they have a tough job.
    They have all kinds of people wanting to get through the
    security, get on their planes, and go someplace. And, by the
    same token, we have to make sure that nobody gets through that
    is going to create mischief or mayhem on an airplane. There is
    a tension that we have to deal with.
        You have a terrific leader. I do not know who figured out
    we should ask Admiral Neffenger to be the head of TSA, but you
    have a great leader--and some of the problems they had in
    Chicago, that you have mentioned, were management problems.
    They knew the folks were coming. They should have known. They
    should have staffed for it. And, it was a failure of leadership
    in that instance--and the leadership, I understand, has been
    changed--and that is good.
        At London's Heathrow Airport, they are doing some very
    interesting things, as you know, in terms of modernizing the
    procedures you go through for the security checks. And, I
    understand that Delta Air Lines is funding a couple of lanes--
    21st Century lanes down at Hartsfield Jackson Atlanta
    International Airport--and that is good. We want to encourage
    other airlines to do the same kind of thing. But, I am told the
    processing time for people going through TSA--rather, through
    regular checks, is about 25 percent.
        Jeh Johnson, our Homeland Security Secretary, sent a
    letter, I think, to Fortune 100 companies asking them to
    consider paying for TSA participation for their employees--
    particularly, the ones that are more senior. And, that is
    something I would urge us to do on our own. We all have Fortune
    100--we have Fortune 500 companies in our States. Why do we
    not, as Members of our Committee, send them a copy of Jeh
    Johnson's letter with a cover letter of our own saying, ``This
    is what Secretary Johnson has asked 100 companies to do. Why do
    you not consider doing the same thing as well? '' And, the
    private sector pilots--the Chairman has mentioned this. There
    were a number of pilots that we had the private sector in--I do
    not know, a half dozen or more airports around the country--
    where the private sector is actually doing this. I think there
    is an authorization for, maybe, three more of those.
        The last thing I would say is just regarding leadership.
    Leadership is the most implement element in any organization I
    have ever been a part of--whether it is this organization or
    the ones that you all are a part of. And, at the State
    Department and at DHS, we need strong leadership. And, you have
    a great leader in Admiral Neffenger--and we look forward to
    having him here before the Committee.
        That is not what I wanted to talk about, but it is timely--
    and it is important.
        I just want to say that the people at TSA--when I go
    through TSA, I thank the people who work there. If they are
    doing a good job, I thank them. I cannot tell you how many
    times people have said to me, ``Nobody has ever thanked me.
    Nobody has ever thanked me before.'' I tell them who I am and
    what I do--and people appreciate that. Two of the most
    important words you can say, when people are doing a good job,
    are just, ``Thank you.''
        As you know, Secretary Mayorkas, we have had a number of
    hearings here on VWP. People are concerned that VWP is the soft
    underbelly. They do not understand how it has morphed from a
    travel facilitation program, years ago, to one that enables us
    to get more information out of the 38 countries that we partner
    with. Would you just take a minute to briefly mention some of
    the ways we have tightened up VWP to make sure that we have all
    of the information--more and more information that has value to
    protect us--and, at the same time, we protect our security.
    Thank you.
        Mr. Mayorkas. Thank you very much, Ranking Member Carper.
    With respect to the Visa Waiver Program, I would answer the
    question in two parts.
        One is with respect to the individual traveler. An
    individual traveler who seeks to avail himself or herself of
    the Visa Waiver Program must, of course, submit an application
    beforehand--and we have strengthened that application to
    capture more data, so we know more about the individual
    traveler before they arrive in the United States. We added, in
    fact, 22 additional fields to the application. And, those
    additional fields have, in fact, elicited data that has been
    very material to our security determinations--whether to allow
    a Visa Waiver Program applicant to arrive here in the United
    States under that program. So, from the analysis and the
    assessment of the individual traveler, we have strengthened the
    application form in very significant ways.
        And, then, for a country to qualify as a Visa Waiver
    Program country, there are, of course, statutory requirements
    that are very critical to our homeland security mission--and
    there are additional requirements that we, ourselves, have
    imposed--and Secretary Johnson has strengthened those
    requirements. The participating country must have a visa
    refusal rate that is under a particular percentage in order to
    ensure that they are not a source of visa fraud. We have
    critical homeland security and law enforcement partnership
    agreements that a country must sign and must implement in order
    to qualify as a Visa Waiver Program country. And, we use the
    Visa Waiver Program as a mechanism to drive better cooperation
    and better information sharing with key international partners.
        And so, from both a micro and a macro perspective, the Visa
    Waiver Program actually enhances our homeland security.
        Senator Carper. Great. Thank you. I have one last quick
    question. In the 2016 omnibus appropriations bill, we provided
    the Department of Homeland Security with, I think, about $10
    million for grants to counter violent extremism--and $10
    million is not a lot of money. It sounds like it is, but it is
    not. How is DHS going to ensure that it has ample resources to
    effectively deal with this threat? How can we help further?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Thank you very much, Senator. The challenge
    of violent extremism is one of our top priorities. The
    Secretary has made it one of his top five priorities. We
    created the Office for Community Partnerships to strengthen our
    efforts in this critical mission area. And, the name is
    actually very significant because, what we used to do, frankly,
    is we used to have discrete lines of effort throughout the
    Department--separate Agencies and separate offices had very
    important and very effective work underway, but we were not
    united in our effort. And, we were not necessarily aligned in
    our allocation of resources. And, under the Secretary's
    umbrella initiative of ``Unity of Effort,'' we brought all of
    those resources and all of those efforts together in the Office
    for Community Partnerships.
        And, the name is important because, ultimately, the
    community, itself, is the most effective means of countering
    violent extremism. And, what we do is we equip, we assist, we
    train, and we empower local communities in the struggle. And,
    under George Selim's leadership, we are going to allocate the
    $10 million--for which we are very thankful--in a grant program
    that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) will
    administer. We are tapping into FEMA's grantmaking expertise to
    administer--to ensure that we employ those funds as effectively
    and as usefully as possible. In fact, we are engaging with
    stakeholders now to ensure that the plans that we develop are,
    in fact, the plans that the communities, themselves, believe
    are most prudent and most effective.
        It is a very difficult challenge. ISIL is extraordinarily
    sophisticated and extraordinarily focused on its propaganda
    internationally, including its very able use of social media in
    its effort to radicalize individuals here in our homeland. And
    so, we have to counter that message--as you have alluded to
    earlier--and we cannot do it, of course, as a government,
    alone. We need to partner, not only with communities, but also
    with the private sector--and we are working with technology
    companies, students, universities, and colleges to really
    engage in countering violent extremism messages in a peer-to-
    peer (P2P) format, which we think is the most effective way to
    proceed.
        Senator Carper. Thank you for all of that.
        Chairman Johnson. Senator Portman.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PORTMAN

        Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
    holding another hearing on a critical topic.
        I will say, we have not made much progress. And, with all
    due respect to what we just heard about some of the new
    approaches that are being taken, I think it is hard for us to
    sit here this morning and say that ISIS is, in fact, being
    contained, which is what the Administration has said on
    occasion. Of course, ISIS is also called the ``Junior Varsity
    (JV) team'' and ISIS was called ``a bunch of guys in a truck.''
    I think that was all misleading rhetoric. And, sadly, if you
    look at what has happened, you have to say that ISIS continues
    to grow. It continues to grow in a lot of respects. One, is a
    destabilizing effect on the Middle East--well beyond Syria now.
    Obviously, we are once again trying to retake Fallujah, Iraq.
    We have more and more military assets going into Iraq after
    precipitously pulling out of Iraq.
        I think you have to also say they have further destabilized
    Europe. The Chairman talked about the number of refugees that
    have moved to Europe--many illegally--and we see what has
    happened, obviously, with the attacks in Paris and Belgium.
    But, it goes well beyond that.
        ISIS also poses a greater threat to the United States,
    based on everything that we are hearing in public testimony. I
    assume you two would not disagree with that--that it is a
    greater threat, today, than it was the last time we held a
    hearing. Their ability to reach out to people continues to
    grow. When you look at what is happening on the Internet and
    the real social media communication that is going on--we are
    losing the battle.
        And so, my only concern about the back and forth this
    morning--and I have a lot of respect for Mr. Mayorkas, as he
    knows, and, Mr. Siberell, I do not know you, but it looks like
    you have a good background and that you are doing your best.
    But, I think there is not a sense of urgency here. And, I
    think, it is right that we have passed some legislation here,
    out of this Committee, that can be helpful. It is correct that
    we did provide some more funds for some of these important
    uses, but I would say on all three levels--as I see them, one
    is the military level--really going after ISIS, particularly,
    in Syria and Iraq. I do not believe we are doing what we should
    be doing to be more aggressive and to be able to eliminate
    their ability to attack us, attack Europe, and attack other
    places.
        Second, on the border security front, we continue to have
    gaps. As the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director
    told us, in this Committee, we have serious gaps in
    intelligence, in terms of being able to know who the Syrian
    refugees are who are coming to this country--and yet, they are
    coming.
        And then, finally, I think, perhaps, the most important
    area--the one we have not yet been able to figure out--is
    this--what I would call, ``counterterrorism communication,'' to
    put it broadly--and, specifically, online. I looked at some
    recent data. We are facing a very effective online opponent.
    They have a very slick narrative.
        When we are asked to look at some of the ISIS propaganda
    online, we tend to see the stuff that has to do with violence
    and extremism. Here is a report that we received recently. A
    single month this summer, 52 percent of the nearly 900
    propaganda messages that ISIS sent out were focused on quality-
    of-life issues; 37 percent hit military themes; and only 2
    percent touched on brutality or violence.
        So, they are sophisticated. They are reaching out to
    alienated youth in the West and elsewhere. We see this. I mean,
    I do not think we can say that there are fewer jihadists going
    to the Middle East, can we? I think it is increasing. The
    number of foreign fighters is increasing.
        So, I guess what I would ask this morning is, what are we
    doing to respond to this increased capability they have--to the
    urgency of this problem? What would you say is the most
    important thing we should be doing?
        I noticed, Mr. Siberell, you talked about the Global
    Engagement Center (GEC) at the State Department. We have talked
    about the CVE effort at the Department of Homeland Security. We
    have talked about the Office for Community Partnerships. You
    talked about Director George Selim this morning. I know these
    are nascent groups. They are all about a year old--or less, I
    think, at the State Department. I assume the State Department
    started this new group because the Center for Strategic
    Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC) was not working well and
    had not provided the kind of counter-messaging that you had
    hoped.
        Are you all working together? I think it is great that
    there is a ``Unity of Effort'' initiative now at the Department
    of Homeland Security. Is there unity of effort, in terms of our
    government? And, would you say--maybe, I will ask you, Mr.
    Siberell, first. Would you say that we are effectively
    countering the messaging we have talked about this morning?
        Mr. Siberell. Thank you, Senator. The coordination within
    our government, on this issue, is definitely strengthening. It
    is a major challenge. I would agree with you that ISIL's use of
    propaganda--the use of social media and the Internet--to
    propagate their message and to use the Internet as a very
    effective tool to recruit new members really has been
    unprecedented. And, it is not something that we have seen used
    as effectively by any other group, previously.
        I think their message has been blunted. That narrative of
    victory that they relied upon so successfully in their early
    period of recruitment--if you think of the 2014 and early 2015
    era--there have been significant losses that ISIL has suffered.
    That narrative of victory has been blunted somewhat. They are
    not delivering effectively on governance. And, you noted the
    statistics on--they are focused--52 percent of their messaging
    is on quality of life. Well, they have suffered in their
    ability to provide that quality of life. And, the Global
    Engagement Center is a new effort. It is intended to build
    broad networks, globally, to coordinate messaging against----
        Senator Portman. How long has it been up and running?
        Mr. Siberell. Just since earlier this year. There was a new
    Executive Order (EO) that authorized the establishment of the
    Global Engagement Center.
        Senator Portman. Do we still have the Center for Strategic
    Counterterrorism Communications?
        Mr. Siberell. No.
        Senator Portman. And, why not?
        Mr. Siberell. It has been folded into the Global Engagement
    Center.
        Senator Portman. So, you are suggesting that their
    narrative is less compelling now because they have had fewer
    victories and because they cannot focus as much on quality-of-
    life issues? Does this mean there are fewer foreign fighters
    that are being drawn to the Middle East?
        Mr. Siberell. Well, the cumulative number of foreign
    fighters is something we have--is unprecedented. That is
    something we have never seen in any previous----
        Senator Portman. Let me restate the question. Are you
    saying that it is effective, in terms of what we are actually
    all looking for, which is fewer foreign fighters--fewer of
    these, let us say, alienated youth from Western countries,
    particularly, being drawn to the Middle East? Is that
    happening?
        Mr. Siberell. We believe there has been a decrease in the
    number of foreign fighters traveling to the conflict, yes.
        Senator Portman. So, you think there is a decrease in the
    number of foreign fighters?
        Mr. Siberell. Yes.
        Senator Portman. Can you give me any information on that,
    in a follow-up communication, as to why you think that and what
    your numbers are based on?
        Mr. Siberell. I would be happy to do that. These are
    numbers and conclusions that also come out of our intelligence
    community (IC)--their observations of less force strength of
    ISIL----
        Senator Portman. But, you would disagree with me this
    morning? You think that we are turning the tide? You think that
    there are fewer foreign fighters coming into the Middle East
    and, therefore, posing less of a risk to the United States?
        Mr. Siberell. I think that there has been a decrease in
    foreign-fighter entry into the Syria-Iraq conflict, but there
    has been an increase in other places--Libya, as an example.
    There are other places where ISIL does continue to attract new
    adherents--new followers. They continue, as you pointed out, to
    associate themselves with existing insurgencies--and that is a
    problem. It is not something that is localized in Iraq and
    Syria. As you have noted, it is a global phenomenon that we
    have to confront around the world--not simply in one single
    place--as difficult as that is.
        Senator Portman. I think it would be misleading, based on
    other Administration officials, who have testified in public--I
    am not talking about our classified briefings--to say that we
    are making progress--to say that it is decreasing, but I would
    love to see your statistics on that and where you got them.\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The information provided by Mr. Siberell appears in the
    Appendix on page 87.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Mr. Siberell. OK.
        Senator Portman. So, Secretary Mayorkas, would you say that
    DHS is communicating directly and coordinating with this new
    Global Engagement Center?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Senator, I am not particularly familiar with
    that aspect of our communication--on the international front.
    My focus has been domestically, countering the violent
    extremist messaging of ISIL as it is targeted to the homeland.
    I would have to defer to my experts in the international arena
    to----
        Senator Portman. Well, my time has expired. I have to--
    thank you, Mr. Chairman, for indulging me. I guess, what I
    would say is that this Committee would be very interested in
    knowing what the level of coordination is between the State
    Department and DHS. Let us face it, social media is not subject
    to boundaries. And so, the people you are trying to address in
    those communities are the same people who are hearing this
    message overseas. And, I would hope that we could have better
    communication, within our government, with the ``Unity of
    Effort'' initiative.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Johnson. Senator Peters.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PETERS

        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate our
    witnesses testifying today on this very important topic.
        Certainly, I think it is always important to remember that
    ISIS is responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of
    Muslims. And, we have to actively engage the Muslim community,
    both abroad as well as the Muslim community in our own States--
    and in this country.
        As a Senator from Michigan, I am blessed to represent a
    very vibrant Arab-American, Muslim community in Michigan. Some
    of the most patriotic individuals that I have ever met are part
    of that community. And, certainly, they need to be a part of
    any solution to counter the radical extremism that we see
    coming from ISIS and the recruitment efforts that are occurring
    in our communities.
        Mr. Siberell, I understand--or, in fact, I have a copy of a
    new report\1\ that just came out, I believe just yesterday, on
    the Department of State and USAID's joint strategy on
    countering violent extremism. For the panel, could you
    summarize what you think are the key parts of this new
    strategy? And, how does it differ from the past? And, why do we
    believe that this will be more successful than anything we have
    done in the past?
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The Department of State and USAID Joint Strategy Report on
    Countering Violent Extremism appears in the Appendix on page 53.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Mr. Siberell. Thank you, Senator, for the question.
    Yesterday, we did release the joint Department of State-USAID
    CVE strategy. It is the first time the State Department and
    USAID have released such a strategy. What it gets at, is the
    essential determination and conclusion that our effort in
    confronting violent extremism--terrorism, globally--needs to be
    more comprehensive. We need to scale up our efforts to better
    understand the drivers and the roots of the radicalization that
    is leading to recruitment into these terrorist groups--that is
    enabling these groups to continue to recruit, identify, and
    attract new members, despite the fact that they offer only
    misery, death, and destruction in the communities that they
    control.
        We understand that we have had significant success in
    blunting the capabilities of groups over time and, certainly,
    great success through intelligence, military, and law
    enforcement efforts in removing terrorist leadership. Yet,
    these groups continue to attract new followers.
        So, this strategy is an acknowledgment of the fact that our
    approach--and when I say ``our,'' it is the United States
    working in partnership with countries around the globe--needs
    to be expanded to better understand what is driving people to
    be attracted to the ideology that these groups propagate as
    well as what can be done to address those factors in a more
    effective fashion. So, it lays out a series of strategic
    objectives, the first of which is to invest more seriously in
    research itself--better understanding these drivers and the
    factors leading to radicalization.
        It then discusses the importance of building international
    understanding of the effective measures that can be adopted by
    governments at the national and subnational levels. It
    addresses the importance of orienting some of our capacity
    building and development efforts toward those drivers,
    beginning to blunt the radicalization process, and also helping
    countries to deal with those who may have been radicalized--to
    deradicalize and to be provided off-ramps, effectively, for
    joining up with these organizations.
        It also addresses the importance of effective counter-
    narratives. That is an area where we are investing--and the
    Global Engagement Center will be leading in that effort. And,
    the Global Engagement Center--just to address the Senator's
    earlier question--it is an interagency organization housed at
    the State Department, but with representation from across the
    Federal Government.
        And then, finally, the strategy addresses the importance of
    rehabilitation and reintegration efforts--and these are for
    efforts related to those who have, for instance, entered into
    the detention system--the prison system--and what governments
    can do to better reintegrate those--or rehabilitate those--who
    have renounced violence.
        So, the strategy, we believe, provides us a strong
    framework to more coherently implement policies and programs
    around the world to develop this more comprehensive approach,
    which we believe is merited.
        Senator Peters. Thank you. And, that is an overview of what
    is happening overseas. Mr. Mayorkas, if you could, please talk
    a little bit about what is happening in our local communities,
    as I mentioned at the outset of my time, in the vibrant Arab-
    American, Muslim communities that we have here in the United
    States and, in particular, in Michigan. I know your Department
    has engaged with the community on a regular basis. Secretary
    Johnson has been in the community as well. Could you give us an
    assessment of where we are, how important those efforts are,
    and what we should expect in the future?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Thank you very much, Senator. Secretary
    Johnson has actually visited and engaged with quite a number of
    communities across the country. I visited Detroit a number of
    years ago, in my prior capacity at USCIS, for the very same
    purpose, from a different perspective, at that time. And, I
    have also, of course, visited Minneapolis, Boston, and New
    York.
        Our efforts in the community are absolutely vital and one
    of the things that we are very focused on, as a Department--
    and, quite frankly, across the government--is actually being in
    the community, finding, identifying, empowering, and equipping
    local, trusted voices to be the critical messengers in the
    battle to counter violent extremism--whether they be faith
    leaders, educators, parents, civic leaders, or the like.
        Our Office for Community Partnerships equips local
    communities with tools--with toolkits and messages--and also
    helps them identify the symptoms of an individual on the path
    to radicalization. Across the Administration, we created the
    interagency CVE Task Force to make sure that the ``Unity of
    Effort'' initiative is not only accomplished within the
    Department of Homeland Security, but across the government. And
    so, we have harnessed the resources of the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and
    other Agencies that are focused on the security and safety of
    the American people. We work in the communities--with the
    communities--partnering with them to really amplify the voices
    and really employ the tools to reach the people who are on the
    path to radicalization.
        Senator Peters. In the number of communities that you
    mentioned--and others that I know you have been involved in--
    what have you found the reaction from those communities to be?
    Have they been active and willing partners? And, do you
    consider them strong allies in your efforts?
        Mr. Mayorkas. We very much consider them very strong
    allies. They, themselves, share the concern, not only for the
    safety of the Nation, but for the safety of their respective
    communities. No one--no parent wants to lose a child to violent
    extremism. No parent wants to see a child travel to a conflict
    zone and join a terrorist organization. No responsible parent,
    of course. And so, they are close allies. We have brought
    leaders from communities across the country into the Department
    of Homeland Security--into our offices to understand their
    perspectives, to better understand the sensitivities, and to,
    frankly, learn from them how we can best partner together.
        We do not, of course, have a monopoly on the best ideas and
    how to both work with and impact the communities that we are
    trying to reach. And so, it is very much a collaborative
    effort. It is very much a partnership with those communities.
        Senator Peters. Thank you. My time has expired. I
    appreciate the efforts of both of you. Thank you.
        Mr. Mayorkas. Thank you.
        Chairman Johnson. Senator Ayotte.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AYOTTE

        Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Chairman.
        Secretary Mayorkas, when we have a VWP application, is that
    application cross-checked with both our ``terrorist watchlist''
    and our ``no-fly list? ''
        Mr. Mayorkas. Senator, yes, that application--the data in
    that application is run through multiple databases. And, I
    should say, the Visa Waiver Program traveler is vetted at a
    number of different points----
        Senator Ayotte. OK. So, you have the ``terrorist
    watchlist,'' and the ``no-fly list.'' I assume there is our FBI
    criminal database--the recordskeeping process for our criminal
    records. What other databases?
        Mr. Mayorkas. It is the ``terrorist watchlist,'' and the
    ``no-fly list,'' our law enforcement databases, which you have
    identified, and also other intelligence databases. And, I can
    certainly provide--subsequent to this hearing--greater
    specificity on which of those databases are checked.
        Senator Ayotte. OK.
        Mr. Mayorkas. But, it is a full complement of databases.
        Senator Ayotte. So, here is my question. When we look at
    the attacks that happened in Paris, first, and then,
    subsequently, in Brussels, my question is this: We know that
    many of the European countries, and, in particular, four
    countries--the United Kingdom (U.K.), Germany, France, and
    Belgium--have actually received some of the greatest numbers of
    foreign fighters that have gone back and forth between either
    Iraq or Syria. And, my question is pretty straightforward:
    Those that we know were involved in the Paris attacks--or the
    Brussels attacks--were any of those individuals not on our
    ``terrorist watchlist'' or our ``no-fly list''--which is a
    smaller subset of the ``terrorist watchlist''--or our other
    databases? Do you know the answer to that?
        Mr. Mayorkas. I do not. I would defer to our experts and I
    will, certainly, follow up with you, Senator.
        Senator Ayotte. So, this is a really important question.
    And, the reason I think it is a really important question is
    that we are only as good as the information that we have. And,
    we can add additional questions on the VWP checklist, but we do
    not do an in-person interview with those that apply for the
    Visa Waiver Program, correct?
        Mr. Mayorkas. We do not do a consular interview. That is
    correct.
        Senator Ayotte. Right. I mean, it is a pretty large
    program, with 38 countries involved. So, we are not doing an
    in-person interview. We have added some additional questions,
    but it is really what comes in and what goes out that is the
    most important, in terms of how well we are doing. So, I think
    it is really important for this Committee to understand whether
    any of the individuals that we know were involved in Paris--
    that have been identified in Brussels--were they on the
    ``terrorist watchlist? '' Were they in any of our other
    databases? If not, then we better understand why not. And, we
    better understand, as we look at the countries of origin--that
    we see if there are gaps in our information sharing. And, the
    reason I ask this is because it has been pretty widely
    publicized, for example, that Belgium had very serious issues
    with their law enforcement capability, as we know that
    information was shared from countries, like Turkey, about at
    least one of the individuals involved in the attacks--and that
    information was not acted upon. And so, would you agree with me
    that this is pretty important for us to understand? Because,
    the program is only as good as the information we have, in
    terms of how this vetting happens.
        Mr. Mayorkas. If I may, Senator, this is absolutely an
    important issue. Whether or not an individual is on a ``no-fly
    list'' is not necessarily dispositive of whether or not our
    security vetting would prevent an individual that would pose a
    threat or danger to the United States from traveling here.
        Senator Ayotte. Well, I would agree, but if they are not on
    the ``terrorist watchlist,'' which is a broader list than the
    ``no-fly list--the ``no-fly list'' is a subset of the
    ``terrorist watchlist''--and if they are not at least on the
    ``terrorist watchlist,'' if they are not in our FBI database,
    or if they are not in some of these other databases that we,
    obviously, cannot discuss here--if they are nowhere, it is a
    lot less likely that we are going to discover them. Would you
    agree with me on that?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Senator, not necessarily. I would----
        Senator Ayotte. OK. Tell me why you think we are going to
    discover them.
        Mr. Mayorkas. If I may--and I will keep it specific to the
    Visa Waiver Program. The application that a traveler must
    complete is a very comprehensive application. In fact, in our
    effort to strengthen the Visa Waiver Program, that application
    has become even more comprehensive. And so, we have picked up
    data for an individual traveler, who is not, necessarily, in
    our databases, but we have picked up data about that traveler
    and that has revealed information that has enabled us to deny
    that individual the ability to travel based on----
        Senator Ayotte. So, let me ask you this: How many VWP
    applications are there? How many are in the program? How many
    people?
        Mr. Mayorkas. I would have to get you that data.
        Senator Ayotte. So, I think it is important to understand
    how much individual investigating is done on each of those
    applications. So, in other words, when I get an application, if
    I am an investigator, how much follow-up work is done on each
    application?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Senator, what I would appreciate is the
    opportunity to have our experts brief you in a classified
    setting as to how we address the extraordinary amount of
    information we receive on those applications.
        Senator Ayotte. OK. So, this is just what I am trying to
    get at here. We know that there were deficiencies in Belgium. I
    know that the Secretary is looking at countries of concern, but
    information sharing is the critical piece here in order for us
    to protect our citizens--whether they are in the Visa Waiver
    Program or not. But, in particular, with this category of
    individuals, because they do not have to take the extra step to
    get a visa. And, I think it is important, whether it is in a
    classified setting or not, that we understand whether, of the
    individuals that were involved in Brussels and in Paris, were
    any of them in any of our intelligence databases, first?
        Second, how many folks do we actually have in this Visa
    Waiver Program?
        Third, for on a hard-copy application, on how many of those
    do we have the opportunity to, actually, individually
    investigate aspects of that application?
        So, that is why the lists become important and that is why
    the intelligence databases become important, because,
    presumably, with the numbers, we cannot individually
    investigate each application. So, what worries me is that you
    have a significant, obviously, number of foreign fighters that
    have returned to these European countries--and the sharing of
    information with our allies is critical. It is also the
    critical piece that determines how effective our Visa Waiver
    Program is.
        So, I know my time is up, but I hope that we will have an
    opportunity to really break this down, so we can fully
    understand how thorough the vetting is for this program. Thank
    you.
        Mr. Mayorkas. Mr. Chairman, may I seek your indulgence to--
    --
        Chairman Johnson. Sure, because I am going to seek your
    indulgence next.
        Mr. Mayorkas. This is a very important point. Allow me to
    make a number of points.
        First, we vet every single Visa Waiver Program traveler's
    application. Every single one. One----
        Senator Ayotte. And, what does that vetting involve?
        Mr. Mayorkas. That involves checking against our
    databases--not only the name of the individual, but also
    pinging against our databases and our extensive holdings--all
    of the information that we collect through that application.
    And so, sometimes the information that is of secondary
    importance, if you will--not necessarily pertinent to the
    individual, but pertinent to other individuals' identities,
    whom we identify on the application, has proven to be quite
    material in our security vetting. And, I could explore this
    further with you in a different, classified setting. That is
    the first point.
        Two, the ease with which an individual might travel from
    one European country to another, by way of example, is very
    different than the ease with which--or the difficulty with
    which someone might travel from a European country to the
    United States. Our security protocols at last-point-of-
    departure airports are extraordinarily robust--and we have
    multiple layers of security. And so, the travel from one
    foreign country to another is not to be viewed as synonymous
    with the ability of an individual to travel from one foreign
    country to the United States, specifically.
        Third, there is a difference between a refugee, to give a
    particular example, being processed across a border, from one
    European country to another, and what we consider and what we
    employ in our security vetting. The difference between the
    processing of an individual--the capturing of the biographic
    information--and allowing that individual to travel through
    within the European zone, ultimately, to resettle there, is a
    very different process than our multi-tiered, rigorous
    screening process for refugees here in the United States.
        Senator Ayotte. Right. Well, Mr. Secretary, I appreciate
    your description, but that is why I want to know how many folks
    are in the database--or not. And, second, the refugee issue is,
    obviously, a separate issue than the situation of ``I am a
    citizen of Belgium, I am in the Visa Waiver Program.'' I am not
    necessarily--unless we know someone has been back and forth and
    how good our information is--it is really important. So, I
    would also like to know how much we are able to get--given the
    volume--I would like to know what the volume is and how much
    follow-up work we are actually able to do, if we do not have
    someone on a database.
        Thank you.
        Senator Carper. Mr. Chairman, I do not normally interject
    myself into the conversation like this, but I would like to ask
    for just 30 seconds to say something that I think is pertinent.
    We have not talked a lot about the preclearance program. I
    hope, at some point, we will have an opportunity to do that. We
    are trying to grow that. The idea behind preclearance is that
    it pushes out our borders further and further into other
    places, so that folks that are coming through preclearance in
    other countries have interviews and have their biometrics taken
    there.
        And, the other thing is that everybody that comes through
    via the VWP, when you get to this country, we collect--if I am
    not mistaken--their biometrics. They are all fingerprinted. The
    program has gotten better and better and better as time has
    gone by. Is it perfect? No. Can we do better? Yes. We have to
    continue to improve it. But, a lot of work is being done and I
    think we need to acknowledge that.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Johnson. OK. I want to quickly chime in. From what
    I know--and without giving you my rationale--I believe the
    greatest threat we have, in terms of risk factors, stems from
    foreign fighters--or ISIS operatives--coming to America and
    threatening the homeland. And, the least risky is the United
    States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) because, with proper
    vetting, we can really reduce risks there, with the number we
    are bringing in. So, that is the lowest risk.
        Then, I would say the Visa Waiver Program is the next
    highest risk.
        But, I think our greatest risk is from foreign fighters or
    ISIS operatives going through Africa, into Central America, and
    coming up through our completely porous border.
        So, that is my ranking in terms of risk assessment: the
    lowest risk: USRAP; the next highest risk: the Visa Waiver
    Program; the highest risk: coming through our porous border. I
    just want your rankings, Mr. Mayorkas and Mr. Siberell. Just
    the ranking. No rationale. We will talk about it later in my
    questioning. What do you think is the ranking, from the lowest
    risk to the highest risk?
        Mr. Mayorkas. I have not ranked them. I would want to think
    about that. I think all of the avenues----
        Chairman Johnson. OK. That is fine. Think about it, because
    I will come back to it in my questioning.
        Mr. Siberell, do you have a quick answer to that?
        Mr. Siberell. I do not have a relative ranking of that
    either. I would say that, with the Visa Waiver Program, as I
    think we have discussed previously, this is a program that
    enables us to have--and provides us leverage--huge leverage
    over the Visa Waiver Program partners to require improvements
    and the strengthening of their own processes. And so,
    therefore, it is effectively a border security program. It is
    very strong.
        Chairman Johnson. OK. Again, I am a supporter of that. I
    think, honestly, the ranking is kind of obvious, but think
    about it and I will come back to you in my questioning. I do
    not want to take any more of Senator Booker's questioning time.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BOOKER

        Senator Booker. Gentlemen, thank you very much for the
    incredibly difficult work you have done--and do--every day--the
    service you render to our country. I am grateful to you both.
        There were really colossal and consequential intelligence
    failures on the part of our European allies that allowed some
    of these horrific attacks to take place. For instance, we
    understand now that there were a lot of gaps in the ability of
    EU member countries to collect information about people who
    traveled to fight with ISIS in Syria, Iraq, and, now, even
    Libya--even some of the countries, themselves--and we now know
    that Belgium has a lot of problems, internally, as a Federal
    system divided by language, geography, and culture. There are
    eight different security agencies, three languages, and seven
    parliaments. In Brussels, a city of 1.2 million people, there
    are 19 communes, each with its own mayor and administration.
    Their Muslim communities are very different than ours, in
    Europe, in that our Muslim Americans define themselves as
    Americans and feel very integrated into society. European
    Muslims do not have that. There are a lot of challenges for our
    European allies.
        Within the EU, General Michael Hayden has said that EU
    member States share more with the United States, which is a
    good thing, than with each other. But, this allows challenges
    and problems in Europe, I imagine, to fester and to explode--as
    we have seen. Information sharing among EU member States,
    today, is often compared with where we were pre-9/11, which
    involves a lot of overlapping, stovepiped security entities.
        And so, I would just like to, for a second, look at what
    has happened, since the Belgium attack, with our European
    allies--and to see if they are starting to really change their
    procedures and their policies. And, do you believe that there
    is really political buy-in for sharing across borders in
    European countries around counterterrorism? Is there adequate
    coordination going on--information sharing and the like? Either
    of you may respond.
        Mr. Mayorkas. I am happy to jump in first, Senator. Thank
    you very much. So, the issue of information sharing is
    critical--as I identified in my opening remarks--of course,
    critical to homeland security, in terms of the sharing of
    information with us. And, it very well may be true that they
    share more information with us than they do with each other,
    because we demand that information in order for travelers to
    arrive here in the United States, either through the Visa
    Waiver Program or otherwise. They have, in fact, advanced
    considerably in the sharing of information, understanding the
    imperative post-Paris and post-Brussels--and I can cite some
    specific examples.
        We are very encouraged that the European Union passed a
    passenger name record (PNR) agreement for the collection and
    sharing of passenger name record data--information that is a
    critical snapshot of who the individual is--well in advance of
    the travel within the European territory. That is one example.
        Two, they have really empowered and equipped Europol as a
    central repository of information and cooperation--really a
    coordination hub--of which we participate, considerably, in the
    collection, the dissemination, and the sharing of information.
    They now have the European Counterterrorism Centre (ECTC) in
    Europol. They have the European Migrant Smuggling Centre in
    Europol--and that is serving as a great hub. I think they are
    making tremendous advances in the collection and the sharing of
    information. They have a ways to go. They do not necessarily
    collect and share passenger name record information with each
    other. They are marshaling through privacy and other interests
    that have served as a challenge in the past. I think the EU PNR
    agreement is, frankly, a milestone in that effort and I would
    defer to my colleague for any other comments.
        Mr. Siberell. Well, I would agree with all of that. I think
    that there is political will now, within Europe, for improving
    their own systems, integrating watchlists, beginning to collect
    PNR data, and to use that effectively, as Secretary Mayorkas
    noted. I think that this political will is there today. It is
    somewhat late in coming, but it is a result of the fact that
    they have large numbers, as we all know, of foreign terrorist
    fighters that have gone off to Syria. This has been a crisis
    for some time. The Paris and Brussels attacks really brought
    this home. We have seen, certainly, a change in the way that
    they are approaching these issues--a greater willingness and
    understanding that they need to improve their systems and a
    greater openness to work more closely with us--even more
    closely than they had been, which was already close.
        Senator Booker. So, after the 9/11 attacks, we created the
    fusion centers, which I think have been really effective,
    having seen them as a local official and, now, as a U.S.
    Senator. You are mentioning things like Europol, but are they
    really replicating what has been successful here, in terms of
    the fusion centers that we are using? Are we seeing them move
    rapidly, as we did, in that direction?
        Mr. Siberell. What we have seen them do--and I will also
    defer to Secretary Mayorkas--is to lay out the series of steps
    that they need to take to better integrate their systems. I
    think the aspiration is for, ultimately, a unified list, like
    we have developed since 9/11. But, in the meantime, what they
    need to do is to build better integration between their lists
    and to ensure that you can have a single point of search
    against all of their holdings. And, that is an area where we
    can help them--and we are prepared to provide them technical
    assistance as they work through that project.
        Senator Booker. And so, on that point, the House just
    recently passed H.R. 4314, the Counterterrorism Screening and
    Assistance Act of 2016, to accelerate our role in supporting
    them. And, I guess my question is: there is a lot that we have
    learned, a lot of resources that we have, and a lot of
    technology that we have developed. How can our systems better
    help them improve their capabilities? Are there things that we
    should be doing to help share those best practices and to
    provide that kind of technology--that this body here should be
    acting on with great, deliberate urgency?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Senator, I would say, absolutely, yes--and we
    are. And, let me, if I can, give you a bottom line to your
    question, which is that I think they are improving in the
    sharing of information. They are on the right path. They are
    not where we need them to be. But, we are working to make sure
    that they are.
        I am actually joining the Attorney General and others, such
    as General Francis Taylor, the leader of our Intelligence and
    Analysis Office, who is here today. We are going to Europe, on
    Tuesday, to address the very issue that you raise.
        We have offered our technological advances in this area,
    the Secure Real Time Platform, the Automated Targeting System
    (ATS), and the Global Enrollment System (GES). We have offered
    those critical instruments that we, ourselves, have developed
    and, of course, avail ourselves of in order to assist them in
    this imperative--this security imperative.
        Senator Booker. Great. And, I do not have time to go into
    this line of questioning, but I just want to reiterate, in
    terms of CVE efforts, there is a problem with government-run
    CVE efforts, because they are delegitimized--really the ``kiss
    of death'', when it comes to our involvement in countering a
    lot of the messaging that was brought up in earlier
    questioning. And, I just want to encourage the efforts that I
    am seeing, which are going on and that are allowing a thousand
    flowers to bloom--that are more authentic voices. And, one of
    the most authentic voices--and I will just say this in
    conclusion--is former foreign fighters, who, themselves, have
    been disillusioned with the toxicity, the hatred, and what they
    have seen and experienced. Often, they are very persuasive as a
    buffer--or an antidote--to the toxins that are being spewed by
    ISIS. I just would like to say that and to encourage you. I was
    very happy about the State Department and USAID unveiling the
    joint strategy, but I am just hoping that we are investing
    substantively in CVE--and I said this to Secretary Johnson. CVE
    should not mean law enforcement. It should really mean these
    other efforts that are going on, which are empowering local
    communities, helping to elevate authentic voices, and really
    doing the things that actually work to counter violent
    extremism.
        Mr. Mayorkas. Senator, we could not agree more. And, that
    is the ethic that we are, frankly, executing. It is not our
    voice that is going to move the mountain of this challenge but,
    rather, the voices in the community.
        I attended an extraordinary, quite frankly, peer-to-peer
    challenge, where students from all over the world competed in
    developing countermessaging programs. It came from students and
    it was focused on reaching students. Facebook was a critical
    partner in that endeavor. We are working with technology
    companies, so that they serve as platforms for these flowers to
    bloom. We are working with philanthropic organizations (CBOs),
    the community-based organizations, faith leaders, teachers,
    schools, parents, and peers--most critically. And, you have
    identified an extraordinarily powerful voice: those who once
    were on the wrong path and have realized the grave problems of
    their prior ways.
        Senator Booker. Thank you, sir, that is music to my ears.
    And, as a Jersey boy, it is almost like Bruce Springsteen music
    to my ears. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Johnson. Senator Ernst.

                   OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ERNST

        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank
    you for joining us today.
        First, I want to start with a comment, because we have had
    a lot of great discussion this morning, I think, in regards to
    ISIS propaganda and, actually, combating that. I know Senator
    Portman mentioned earlier in his comments that we really need
    that governmentwide coordination in our efforts to combat
    propaganda as well as, I think, to work in the communities.
    And, I share those concerns. I think all of us do. And, I have
    joined with Chairman Johnson and Senator Booker to introduce a
    bill that would require the President to combat terrorists' use
    of social media. That is where we see so much of this coming
    out of, so I do hope that we are able to move that bill forward
    in the Senate--and I just want to thank both of you for
    partnering on that. And, we do have a lot of folks that are
    concerned. We hope to work very well with you as we move
    through a number of these processes.
        Then, Deputy Secretary, if I could start with you, please.
    I understand the benefits of the Visa Waiver Program. I know
    that we have it, but, still, there are some security concerns--
    as Senator Ayotte was echoing some of those--but we have 38
    countries that participate in that, from what I understand. Is
    that correct?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Yes.
        Senator Ernst. And, are all of them meeting the necessary
    requirements as they go through the vetting?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Senator, thank you very much. The
    requirements are a prerequisite to joining the Visa Waiver
    Program and to remaining in the Visa Waiver Program. We have
    strengthened that under Secretary Johnson's leadership.
        If, in fact, a country--if we determine or assess that a
    country is falling short of its obligations under the Visa
    Waiver Program, then we develop a remediation plan with a
    timeline and strict requirements in order to ensure that no
    traveler that is arriving in the United States poses a threat
    to the United States. We have, in fact, employed that mechanism
    when a country has fallen short. And so, we are quite rigorous
    in the requirements of the Visa Waiver Program.
        Senator Ernst. Are there any countries not meeting the
    requirements right now?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Senator, there are. We have them on programs
    and any further details I would be happy to share with you in a
    different setting.
        Senator Ernst. Certainly. I appreciate that, because that
    is something that I think the public is concerned about, as we
    have a number of countries involved in this. And, the public
    really does not know what is being followed up on, so, I think,
    as long as we stay on top of that--if it is regular that they
    are meeting their security requirements--how do we check that?
    How do we know that?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Yes. I should say this underscores one of the
    critical benefits of the Visa Waiver Program, which is that we
    do have this leverage with another country--a country that
    wishes to remain in the program. We use it as a tool to ensure
    compliance with extraordinarily stringent obligations that
    serve the security of our homeland. It is a perfect example how
    the Visa Waiver Program serves as a tool of security, rather
    than otherwise.
        I do wish the name was changed because the term ``waiver''
    suggests some sort of relaxation of a security requirement
    when, in fact, the opposite is true. Not only do we capture an
    enormous amount of information about the individual traveler
    wishing to avail himself or herself of the program, but we also
    use the program--and other nations' desires to participate in
    it--as a driver of information sharing, information collection,
    and greater security partnership with the United States. It
    really dovetails with the question that Senator Booker posed,
    with respect to how a European country does with its security
    mechanisms. Perhaps, they do better with us than they do with
    each other by virtue of their participation in the Visa Waiver
    Program and their desire to avail themselves of that program.
        Senator Ernst. OK. Thank you. I appreciate that
    explanation.
        Mr. Siberell, media reports indicate that we sent a Foreign
    Fighter Surge Team to Brussels a month before the attacks
    there. And, what challenges prevented us and the Belgian
    authorities from preventing the attacks? And, additionally, is
    our Foreign Fighter Surge Team still on the ground there? If
    you could answer that first, please.
        Mr. Siberell. Thank you, Senator. The Foreign Fighter Surge
    Team that was deployed to Brussels--I should first say that
    that followed on cooperation that we have had undergoing, with
    the European countries, since 2013, when the problem of
    individuals traveling to Syria first manifested itself. This is
    before ISIL was a factor--when it was Al-Nusra and the other
    al-Qaeda-affiliated groups. So, we have had a long-standing
    dialogue with our European partners on these issues.
        After the Paris attacks, we had discussions within the
    government to determine what other things we can do now to push
    our European partners to a heightened level of cooperation. Are
    there gaps that we can identify? So, we put together
    interagency teams that went out to Brussels and had a dialogue
    that was quite mature and open. The Belgian Government is open
    to these consultations--and across issues like document
    integrity, passport issuance integrity, and targeted
    screening--techniques that we have developed--that DHS, in
    particular, has developed--helping to instruct the Belgians on
    those new techniques--better integration of watchlists and
    improved information sharing--all of these areas were
    identified in the work plan of that Foreign Fighter Surge Team.
        So, the Foreign Fighter Surge Team made an initial visit,
    as a group, to identify where we would have expanded
    cooperation--and they are ongoing, actually. So, there is a
    work plan that has been developed and we are continuing to send
    individuals back and forth. In fact, we have Belgians also
    coming to the United States. It is an elevated partnership,
    effectively.
        Senator Ernst. OK. Was there anything that could have been
    done by our Foreign Fighter Surge Team to assist before that
    attack happened? Is there any way we could have helped to close
    up that gap?
        Mr. Siberell. I am not aware of any specific piece of
    information that would have been provided or revealed by our
    Foreign Fighter Surge Team members prior to the attack.
        Senator Ernst. OK. And, I am going to jump to the Iraqi
    Kurds, for just a moment, as well. As you know, the Iraqi
    Kurdish forces are one of our critical partners--if not the
    most critical partner we have in the fight against ISIS. And, I
    understand that the Administration just allocated--or
    designated $415 million in financial assistance to the Iraqi
    Kurdish forces. Can you provide the Committee with additional
    details on where the assistance will come from, who it will be
    going to, and what purpose it will be for?
        Mr. Siberell. Senator, I think I will have to take that
    question back and get you an answer. From the counterterrorism
    perspective, I would agree with you that the Iraqi Kurdish
    forces have been among our closest partners and, in
    coordination with the Government of Iraq, have provided a
    critical counter to ISIL, pushing ISIL out of considerable
    areas that they encroached upon, including in northern Iraq.
    And, the Kurds continue to play a critical role with us in the
    coalition to confront ISIL. But, I will have to get you an
    answer on that.
        Senator Ernst. I would certainly appreciate that.
        Gentlemen, thank you for being here, today. I, certainly,
    appreciate your time and efforts.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
        Mr. Siberell, in Mr. Mayorkas' opening statement, he talked
    about how ISIS has gone from directing activity to inspiring
    it. I would agree that al-Qaeda directed and that brand of
    Islamic terror was a centralized operation that directed
    activity. But, my take on ISIS is that their method of using
    social media has been to inspire. Outside of their caliphate--
    their territory--they are inspiring. But, what concerns me is
    their progression. They are now beginning to direct. Is it not
    true that there are reports that they had a hand in directing
    the Brussels attack--that they have heard different names for
    this--but we will call it an ``external operations unit''
    beginning to direct. So, they have gone beyond just inspiring,
    to having this ``external operations unit'' and starting to
    direct attacks.
        Mr. Siberell. Senator, I think you have pointed out the
    essential difference and why ISIL poses a new kind of challenge
    than al-Qaeda had previously. Al-Qaeda was made up,
    effectively, of clandestine cells--individuals who had to
    become a member, had to be vetted, effectively, by the
    organization, and then were operating in a clandestine manner--
    secretly, in a number of locations around the world, in which
    they devised plots and challenged the security of our partners,
    globally.
        ISIL works using a completely different model. They do
    have, obviously, this core of individuals concentrated in Iraq
    and Syria. They have a very disciplined military structure to
    pursue their efforts there. But, at the same time, they make
    use of the Internet--social media--to inspire others--
    individuals who may not actually have become members of the
    group, but who can act on their behalf. And, that also reflects
    the difference in time we have, from when al-Qaeda was at its
    height, to where ISIL is, today, with the Internet and social
    media--having access to those platforms in a way that al-Qaeda
    was never successful in using.
        But, if I could just answer your question. It is true, yes,
    that ISIL has identified--we know they have identified, among
    the foreign fighter cadre, those with skills that could be
    useful in infiltrating back into their home countries to carry
    out plots. So, the ``external operations network'' that ISIL
    has developed is a very real danger. And, we have been working
    against it and have had some success in doing so. But, it is
    absolutely the case that they have also not only trained
    operatives, but that they have trained individuals to inspire
    attacks using social media--deliberately--including using
    individuals in the United States.
        Chairman Johnson. So, we may be nibbling around the edges.
    We may have started to take back some of that territory in
    Iraq. But, they are growing, they are evolving, they are
    metastasizing, and they are starting to send out their
    operatives--let us face it, through the refugee flow, the
    enormous--the 1.8 million refugees flowing into Europe. And, I
    am going to go back to, again, my question, because I think the
    answer is quite obvious. The refugee program, literally, we can
    assure that whatever the number is--10,000--those refugees that
    might be let into this country should pose no risk. You set up
    criteria--women and children or relatives of Syrian-American
    citizens that have the financial capability to support them.
    Again, taking 10,000 out of 4 million displaced refugees--we
    can make sure that we take no risks with those refugees.
        The same is true with the Visa Waiver Program. I agree, I
    think it is--combined with preclearance, we can really reduce
    the risks. So, in the order of what concerns me regarding,
    potentially, ISIS operatives coming to this country--the least
    concern I have is the refugee program and then, next, is VWP.
    By far, my greatest concern is our porous Southern border.
    Correct? I mean, when we were down in Central America, I heard
    a new term--a new acronym: special-interest aliens (SIA). So,
    is that not true? And, does that not also point to the fact
    that we have to secure our border?
        Mr. Siberell, you first.
        Mr. Siberell. Well, I would defer to Secretary Mayorkas on
    the Southern border issues. I think those are three categories
    of concern and we have to ensure that our border security
    measures are effective in preventing any of those categories of
    individuals from threatening the American people.
        Chairman Johnson. I will also point out that, certainly,
    from what I have witnessed, ISIS is very strategic. You do not
    take your foreign force and take over vast territory in Iraq
    without really having been very strategic. And, as we watch
    them dangerously evolve, I am highly concerned. Mr. Mayorkas.
        Mr. Mayorkas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First of
    all, we are very focused on special-interest aliens--
    individuals from designated countries that seek to enter the
    United States illegally. We are extraordinarily focused on
    that. We may not agree, today, Mr. Chairman, on the level of
    security on the Southwest border. That border, in our
    estimation, is more secure than it has been in a long time.
        One of the primary areas of concern----
        Chairman Johnson. Let me just stop you right there, in
    terms of the actual numbers. OK? Unaccompanied alien children
    (UACs) from Central America--let me get it here--in 2014--the
    enormous surge--year-to-date (YTD), through April, which is the
    last number we have, we had 25,500 unaccompanied children. As
    of April 2016, we are at 25,359. We are at the exact same
    level, year-to-date, of unaccompanied children.
        In terms of family units, we are ahead. And, in terms of
    the total number of apprehensions on the border, in 2014, year-
    to-date, we were at 261,000. Last year, at the same point in
    time, we were down to 182. Right now, we are at 223. So, again,
    I do not see improvement, in terms of the security of our
    border. It just has not improved. And, it represents an
    enormous risk.
        I will let you finish.
        Mr. Mayorkas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First of
    all, the unaccompanied children and the family units pose a
    unique challenge because, by and large, those individuals,
    fleeing the three Central American countries of Guatemala,
    Honduras, and El Salvador, do not seek to evade law
    enforcement.
        Chairman Johnson. OK. Again, I really do not want you
    discussing that because it really has nothing to do with ISIS.
        Mr. Mayorkas. OK.
        Chairman Johnson. I was just pointing out that fact, in
    terms of lax security on our border. If you want to talk about
    the numbers I did--the total apprehensions, which are pretty
    much on par with where we were in 2014.
        Mr. Mayorkas. And, 2014 was far different--and far lower--
    than in prior years. But, if I may, getting to the point of how
    we ensure the security of the border--and, specifically, with
    respect to the terrorist threat--one of the challenges in the
    smuggling of individuals, is the transnational criminal
    organizations (TOCs) and their participation in the smuggling
    of individuals. We have no evidence that suggests that they are
    willing participants in the smuggling of individuals who are
    members of terrorist organizations. In fact, we have quite the
    opposite--that they wish no part in the overt smuggling--
    participation in the smuggling of terrorists. And, perhaps, it
    is--and it would make sense that it is--for fear that they
    would bring the even greater force of the United States to bear
    on their organizations.
        The question is: Are there low-level individuals in these
    organizations who, unwittingly, may be smuggling an individual
    in, from one of these countries, who is, in fact, a terrorist?
    And, we are very focused on that. Our law enforcement
    officers--our Border Patrol agents--are extraordinarily focused
    on that and we have not observed any increasing concern. But,
    that does not suggest that we have not increased our vigilance.
        Chairman Johnson. OK. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Senator
    Carper.
        Senator Carper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I just want to return to the last part of the conversation.
    I want to go back to what--I quoted Peter Bergen just a moment
    ago. I will ask my staff to find that quote for me.
        We have been down to the border--down in Central America--
    and, as we know, the reason why those people--kids and
    families--are coming up here is because they live hellacious
    lives. It is dangerous. There is a lack of hope and a lack of
    opportunity. And, the Chairman has put his finger on the root
    cause in earlier conversations we have had here. And, that is
    our insatiable demand for drugs. And, we send money and guns
    down to Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador and they send
    drugs. And, the gangs and the folks that get our money and guns
    use them to make life miserable for folks. If we lived down
    there and we had kids, we would probably want to come up here
    as well.
        So, anyway, it is a ``needle in a haystack'' problem. I
    think of the border as a ``needle in a haystack'' problem. We
    can find ways to make the needles bigger--and we do that with
    force multipliers--not just for Border Patrol, but force
    multipliers in the air, on the ground, and so forth. But, we
    also need to make the haystack a lot smaller. And, part of that
    is the work that we are doing in partnership with these three
    Central American countries. It is their version of Plan
    Colombia, the partnership that they have established and that
    we are helping to support.
        I told the Chairman a few minutes ago that I thought he
    asked a number of important questions, but one of them was to
    kind of rank the order of the threat. And, he said, I think,
    wisely, that these people--these guys would be stupid to bed
    down for 2 years in a refugee program--and a most toughly
    vetted program, I think, for people coming to this country--and
    for the outside chance they would ever get here after 2 years.
    They are not going to do that. VWP will make that more and more
    difficult. We need to continue to tighten that. Preclearance--
    we need to grow that--and some of the other things that we have
    talked about.
        But, I want to go back to what Peter Bergen said right
    here, in this room, when he was testifying--I think it was last
    November. In his words: ``Every person who has been killed by a
    jihadi terrorist in this country, since 9/11, has been killed
    by an American citizen or resident.'' Has been killed by an
    American citizen or resident. And, our focus, wisely, needs to
    be on how we reach out to folks in this country and make sure
    that they do not become radicalized. And, we cannot do it by
    ourselves. We need great partnerships. We need to grow those
    partnerships and to work with families and organizations--faith
    leaders and so forth--and continue to work there. We need to
    fund it and to make that program as effective as we can.
        I have talked to folks in other countries to see why they
    are so challenged in Europe by some of the folks in their
    Muslim community--and they have had incredible migration. We
    have had, relatively, little, but they have had incredibly
    large numbers--millions of people--going from Syria and other
    places into Europe. And, a lot of times, when they get to those
    countries, they are not very warmly welcomed and they end up
    leading isolated lives in communities by themselves--blocked
    off. And, they perceive that they are not welcome there and
    that there is not much hope or opportunity. And, they are very
    susceptible to radicalization.
        One of the keys to our tamping down on those threats,
    here--they are not gone, because people still get radicalized
    here--but we want people, when they come from Syria or when
    they come from these other countries, where they are fleeing
    horror--once we make sure they are not a threat--we want them
    to feel a part of this country and a part of the ``American
    Dream.'' And, to the extent that we can continue to keep that
    alive, we will provide, probably, a lot more safety and
    security for our people than by doing a lot of the other things
    that we are talking about here today.
        Senator Portman asked some questions about ISIS' campaign
    success and so forth. I just asked my staff to pull out really
    quickly, some metrics--we like metrics here. And, I just wanted
    to hit a couple of bullet points.
        ISIS' recent losses have been severe. They have lost about
    40 percent of the territory that they once held in Iraq.
    Coalition forces have killed more than 10,000 ISIS fighters and
    20 key ISIS leaders, in recent months, including ISIS' chief
    propagandist and executioner. Just over a week ago, American
    forces carried out a strike, you may recall, that led to the
    deaths of ISIS' finance chief and second in command,
    simultaneously, which enhanced the capabilities of the Iraqi
    counterterrorism forces. As we know, Iraqi forces recaptured
    Ramadi from ISIS in January of this year. Campaigns to seize
    the ISIS strongholds of Mosul and Fallujah are well underway.
        In May 2016--this month--the FBI Director James Comey said
    that the rate at which Americans are joining ISIS has dropped
    precipitously in the last 9 months. In 2014, 6 to 10 Americans
    were leaving to join ISIS. I believe that was every month.
    Today, it is down to about one per month.
        In May 2016, ISIS announced that ISIL control 14 percent of
    Iraqi territory. That is down from about 40 percent. The U.S.
    Treasury Department also estimates that, due to the combination
    of falling oil prices, smuggling interdiction, and coalition
    air strikes, ISIS' oil revenues, which feed their efforts, are
    down to as low as $250 million per year. That is about half of
    what they used to be.
        Are we done? Is it time to spike the football? No. Is what
    we are doing working? Yes. And, we need to continue to do more
    of that--find out what works and do more of that.
        I have a couple of questions and I would just ask for short
    answers. Mr. Siberell, can you describe for us the kinds of
    improvements that the Foreign Fighter Surge Team is helping the
    Belgians to implement? Additionally, is there the possibility
    for these teams to be deployed to other countries in Europe?
    Just very briefly.
        Mr. Siberell. Yes, the increased and enhanced information
    sharing, integration of watchlists, and risk-based traveler
    screening--techniques that we have developed, in the United
    States, that would be helpful to the Belgians and other
    governments--and we are looking to deploy those in other
    European countries.
        Senator Carper. Good. Thank you. Ali, in your testimony,
    you referenced a method by which homegrown extremists support
    ISIS missions through online hacking. I think you called it
    ``doxing.'' Can you just explain, in a little more detail, how
    this works and how the Department can help to counter this
    threat? Thank you.
        Mr. Mayorkas. Thank you very much, Senator Carper.
    ``Doxing'' is the practice of taking the name and whatever
    information is available about an individual and publishing the
    name and that information and identifying that individual as a
    potential target of terrorism. And so, ISIL and other terrorist
    organizations will, essentially, ``dox''--will take, for
    example, information about military personnel that they pick
    off of a website--and they will publish it. And, they will
    identify those individuals as potential targets.
        Senator Carper. Good. And, one last question for you, Ali.
    How would we, with respect to soft targets--protecting soft
    targets--how would we increase the security of traditionally
    unsecured areas, let us say, of an airport? And, how would we
    do so in a way that does not further encumber the wait times
    for air travelers? And, could you just share with us, maybe, a
    step or two that DHS has taken towards that goal, please?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Thank you, Senator. So, soft targets have
    been an area of our focus for quite some time--the airports,
    specifically--even before Brussels. As a matter of fact, I
    visited Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) a little over a
    month ago. I met with the leaders of airport security there to
    talk about how they secure the perimeter. This was post-
    Brussels, but they had started long before. They had visited
    Israel, which has a great deal of experience in airport
    security as a place of mass assembly--and they have instituted
    quite a number of safeguards. The equipment at the airport and
    the manner in which the airport was both designed and built
    very much had security in mind.
        We worked through our National Protection and Programs
    Directorate (NPPD).
        Senator Carper. I like ``DHS.''
        Mr. Mayorkas. As do I. [Laughter.]
        That organization, under the leadership of Caitlin
    Durkovich, in our critical infrastructure arena, has worked
    with mall operators, theater owners, restaurant owners, and
    throughout the private sector, to ensure that they are properly
    trained and properly equipped to respond as soft targets to a
    potential mass casualty event.
        Senator Carper. Thank you very much. Thank you both for
    being here today. Thank you for your work and for your
    commitment and devotion to our country as well as your
    leadership in your respective Departments. This has been a good
    hearing. This is a threat that is going to be around facing us,
    in this country and around the world, for, maybe, as long as we
    are going to be around--and, certainly, for as far as the eye
    can see. Have we figured out, entirely, how to deal with it?
    No. These guys change their tactics and, over time, we have to
    change what we are doing in response. I think we are doing a
    lot of smart stuff--some of the smart things that we need to
    do. And, when I went back, Mr. Chairman, over to Vietnam
    earlier this week--and I was talking to a number of folks in
    that country, where we have a much better partnership than I
    would have ever imagined when I was a naval flight officer
    (NFO) over there during the Vietnam War. But, the spirit of
    working together, almost as a team, in many respects, is pretty
    amazing, given our history there. But, I used this phrase and I
    think it, probably, is germane here as well. What I said to the
    Vietnamese was, ``If you want to go fast, travel alone. If you
    want to go far, travel together.'' ``If you want to go far,
    travel together.'' And, that is really what we are trying to do
    here--not just in our country--and the Congress, the Executive
    Branch, the military, and so forth--Homeland Security--but all
    across the world. Folks know this is a cancer on our planet.
    And, we have to deal with it. But, if we go together, work
    together, and pull together, we will go a long way--and we need
    to.
        Thank you so much.
        Mr. Mayorkas. Thank you.
        Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Carper. Unfortunately,
    what you are saying is true--that we are going to be living
    with this for quite some time. And, it is unfortunate. We are,
    certainly, old enough to remember what the world felt like
    before global Islamic terror raised its ugly head and started
    slaughtering people.
        It is a reality that I wish did not exist, but it is one
    that does exist. I think this hearing--as I mentioned to the
    witnesses beforehand, the purpose of every hearing--the goal of
    every hearing is to deepen our understanding and to lay out the
    realities--whether, we like them or not, we have to face them.
    And, that is kind of what I have been trying to point out. Here
    is the reality of the situation--not whether we like it, but we
    have to face it, so we can actually deal with it, effectively.
        Again, I certainly appreciate the witnesses' time, your
    thoughtful answers to our questions, and we will keep working
    forward. This is going to be a long struggle. But, we will
    shorten it if we actually admit we have the problem and face it
    the way we have to: as a committed coalition of the willing--of
    the civilized portions of the world, because this is an attack
    on civilization and it has to be defeated.
        So, with that, the hearing record will remain open for 15
    days until June 10 at 5 p.m. for the submission of statements
    and questions for the record. This hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:52 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

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