[Senate Hearing 114-540]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-540
INCREASING EFFECTIVENESS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 10, 2015
__________
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JACK REED, Rhode Island
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama BILL NELSON, Florida
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
TOM COTTON, Arkansas KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JONI ERNST, Iowa JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska TIM KAINE, Virginia
MIKE LEE, Utah ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
TED CRUZ, Texas
Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
december 10, 2015
Page
Increasing Effectiveness of Military Operations.................. 1
Schwartz, General Norton A., USAF, Retired, President and CEO,
Business Executives for National Security, and Former Chief of
Staff of the Air Force......................................... 4
Stavridis, Admiral James G., USN, Retired, Dean of the Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, and Former
Commander of U.S. European Command and U.S. Southern Command... 8
Lamb, Dr. Christopher J., Deputy Director of the Institute for
National Strategic Studies, National Defense University........ 12
(iii)
INCREASING EFFECTIVENESS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS
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THURSDAY, DECEMBER 10, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in Room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Wicker, Ayotte,
Fischer, Cotton, Ernst, Sullivan, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill,
Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Donnelly, Kaine, and King.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman McCain. Well, good morning.
The committee meets today to continue our series of
hearings on defense reform. We have reviewed the effects of the
Goldwater-Nichols reforms on our defense acquisition,
management, and personnel system, and our past few hearings
have considered what most view as the essence of Goldwater-
Nichols, the roles and responsibilities of the Secretary of
Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
service secretaries, and service chiefs, and the combatant
commanders.
This morning, we seek to understand how Goldwater-Nichols
has impacted the effectiveness of U.S. military operations and
what reforms may be necessary.
We are pleased to welcome our distinguished panel of
witnesses who will offer insights from their many years of
experience and distinguished service. General Norton Schwartz,
former Chief of Staff of the Air Force and President and CEO
[Chief Executive Officer] of Business Executives for National
Security; Admiral James Stavridis, former Commander, U.S.
European Command and U.S. Southern Command, and currently the
Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts
University and frequent appearance on various liberal media
outlets; Dr. Christopher Lamb, Deputy Director of the Institute
for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense
University.
More than anything else, the Goldwater-Nichols Act was a
result of escalating concern in the Congress and in the country
about the effectiveness of U.S. military operations. The
Vietnam War, the failure of the hostage rescue mission in Iran,
and the flawed invasion of Grenada all pointed to deep systemic
problems in our defense enterprise that needed to be addressed
for the sake of both our warfighters and our national security.
In particular, Goldwater-Nichols focused on ensuring the
unity of command and improving the ability of our forces to
operate jointly. As we have explored in previous hearings, many
questions remain about the balance our military is striking
between core military competitiveness, competencies, and joint
experience. But as it relates to combat effectiveness, there is
no doubt, as one former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
put it, no other nation can match our ability to combine forces
on the battlefield and fight jointly.
The subject of today's hearing relates directly to the many
steps Goldwater-Nichols took to improve the unity of command.
The law made unified commanders explicitly responsible to the
President and the Secretary of Defense for the performance of
missions and preparedness of their commands. It also removed
the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the operational chain of command
and prevented the services from moving forces in and out of
regional commands without approval. Geographic combatant
commanders were given the ability to issue authoritative
direction on all aspects of operations, joint training and
logistics, internal chains of command, and personnel within
their assigned areas of responsibility. These steps were
effective in establishing clear lines of command authority and
responsibilities that translated to a more effective fighting
force than we had in the 1980s.
However, 30 years later, we have to take a hard look at
this command structure in light of current threats and how our
model of warfighting has evolved. The United States confronts
the most diverse and complex array of crises since the end of
World War II, from rising competitors like China, revanchist
powers like Russia, the growing asymmetric capabilities of
nations ranging from Iran to North Korea, the persistence of
radical Islamic extremism, and the emergence of new domains of
warfare such as space and cyberspace. These threats cut across
our regional operational structures embodied by geographic
combatant commands.
So we must ask whether the current combatant command
structure best enables us to succeed in the strategic
environment of the 21st century. Should we consider alternative
structures that are organized less around geography and
transregional and functional missions.
At the same time, as numerous witnesses have observed,
while combatant commands were originally envisioned as the
warfighting arm of the military, the Department of Defense,
that function has largely migrated to joint task forces,
especially on an ad hoc basis in response to emerging
contingencies. This suggests that people have identified a
shortcoming in the current design and have adopted measures to
work around the system as we see quite often. This should
inform our efforts to reevaluate and re-imagine the combatant
commands.
At the same time, combatant commands have come to play very
important peacetime diplomatic functions. Do these developments
argue for changes in the structure of combatant commands? At a
minimum, it would call into question the top-heavy and bloated
staff structures that we see in the combatant commands. Time
and again during these hearings, we have heard how dramatic
increases in civilian and military staffs have persisted even
as resources available for warfighting functions are
increasingly strained.
As former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele
Flournoy pointed out earlier this week, combatant command
staffs have grown to 38,000 people. That is nearly three
divisions? worth of staff in just the combatant commands alone.
We have to ask if this is truly necessary and whether it is
improving our warfighting capabilities.
At the same time, we have to examine whether there are
duplicative functions in the Joint Staff, combatant commands,
and subordinate commands that can be streamlined. That includes
the question of whether we really need all of the current
combatant commands. For example, do we really need a NORTHCOM
[Northern Command] and a SOUTHCOM [Southern Command]? Do we
really need a separate AFRICOM [Africa Command] headquartered
in Germany when the vast majority of its forces reside within
EUCOM [European Command]?
As we have to revisit the role of the Chairman and the
members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Goldwater-Nichols
strengthened the Joint Staff and operational commanders at the
expense of the services. Has that gone too far or not far
enough? Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates raised this
issue when he testified before this committee because of his
frustration with the military services? lack of responsiveness
to current operational requirements.
Many of our witnesses have discussed whether the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has sufficient statutory authority
to perform the strategic integration that the Department of
Defense all too often seems to do poorly, integrating
priorities, efforts, and resources across regions, across
domains of military activity, and across time, balancing short-
term and long-term requirements. The question has been raised
whether the Chairman should be placed in the chain of command
with the service chiefs and combatant commanders reporting to
him. We have heard testimony in favor and against. I look
forward to exploring this further today.
These are critical questions about our defense organization
that have direct bearing on the effectiveness of U.S. military
operations and, as a consequence, on the wellbeing of our
warfighters. We owe it to them to look at this seriously, ask
the tough questions, challenge old assumptions, and embrace new
solutions if and when it is needed.
I thank our witnesses again and look forward to their
testimony.
Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let
me join you in welcoming the witnesses. I have had the
privilege really of working with General Schwartz as Chief of
Staff of the Air Force, Admiral Stavridis as EUCOM Commander,
and Dr. Lamb, your service in the Defense Department, now as an
analyst and academic. I deeply appreciate it. Thank you very
much, gentlemen, for joining us today.
As the chairman has said, we have undertaken a very
rigorous, under his direction, review of Goldwater-Nichols. And
we heard just a few days ago from former Under Secretary of
Defense Michele Flournoy about one of the issues, and that was
in her words,``over the years, the QDR [Quadrennial Defense
Review] has become a routinized, bottom-up staff exercise that
includes hundreds of participants and consumes many thousands
of man-hours rather than a top-down leadership exercise that
sets clear priorities, makes hard choices and allocates risk.''
So one of the things I would hope that the witnesses would
talk about with this whole planning process, the formal
process, the informal process, and how we can improve that--
that is just one of the items. There is a long and I think
important list of topics that we could discuss: the role and
authorities assigned to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, including whether the Chairman should be placed in the
chain of for military operations; improving the employment and
synchronization of military capabilities through possible
structural reforms to our combatant commands, defense agencies,
and field activities; and the potential benefits of adopting
organizational changes, including consolidation of staff
elements and creation of cross-functional teams, to achieve
efficiencies and provide senior civilian and military leaders
with more impactful and timely recommendations.
And finally, in previous hearings, several of our witnesses
have rightly observed that enhancing the effectiveness of our
military operations and better capitalizing upon the gains
achieved through those improvements may require significant
changes to our interagency national security structure and
processes as well. And this point was made by Jim Locher, who
was the godfather, if you will, of the Goldwater-Nichols. In
his words, ``No matter how well you transform the Department of
Defense, it is still going to be troubled by an interagency
system that is quite broken and the problems that confront this
Nation and national security require an interagency response.
The days of the Department of Defense being able to execute a
national security mission by itself are long gone, and we do
not have the ability to integrate the expertise and capacity of
all of the government agencies that are necessary.'' I think it
is important to keep that in mind.
And chairman--again, let me commend him for beginning this
process with this committee and the Department of Defense, and
I hope it is a catalyst under his leadership for serious review
by other committees and other agencies about how together we
can improve the security of the United States.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Welcome, General Schwartz.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, USAF, RETIRED,
PRESIDENT AND CEO, BUSINESS EXECUTIVES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY,
AND FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE AIR FORCE
General Schwartz. Thanks, Chairman McCain and Ranking
Member Reed for your and the committee's commitment to
improving DOD's internal governance and defense organization
shaped by the Goldwater-Nichols reforms. It is an unexpected
privilege to return to this hearing room and to offer a few
related ideas on how to improve performance in the Department
of Defense, and it is a special pleasure to sit beside the
finest flag officer of my generation, Jim Stavridis.
While there are many issues that warrant attention, command
arrangements, resource allocation, acquisition processes,
overhead reduction, joint credentialing of military personnel,
and the potential for consolidation, among others, I wish to
focus this morning on the three that I am persuaded hold the
greatest promise for particularly positive outcomes. They are
the role and authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, right-sizing the combatant commands, and establishing
standing joint task forces for execution of COCOM [combatant
commands] operational missions. I am certainly prepared to
address the other matters you mentioned at your discretion.
In my experience as a former member of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the Joint Staff, a functional combatant commander,
and a chief of service, I have come to the conclusion that the
Chairman's informal role in supervising the combatant
commanders and the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] is insufficient
for the demands of our times. While it is true that delegated
authority from the Secretary of Defense is an alternative,
there should be no doubt in the armed forces about the
directive authority of the Chairman, subject to the close and
continuing scrutiny and oversight of the Secretary of Defense.
Strategic guidance for force employment, force allocation
tradeoffs between combatant commands and establishing strategic
priorities for the armed forces should not be the result of
bureaucratic negotiation or the exquisite application of
personal persuasion, but rather the product of strategic
leadership. This capacity is constrained by the Chairman's
inability to exercise executive authority on behalf of the
Secretary of Defense, and the remedy I suggest is to place the
Chairman in the line of supervision between the Secretary and
his or her combatant commanders.
The nine combatant commands are complex entities, none of
which are alike, some with regional responsibilities and some
with functional roles. The commands strive to serve both
peacetime, crisis response, and warfighting obligations. The
composition of the combatant command staffs clearly reflect the
inherent tension in this excessively broad mission array:
peacetime administration, deterrence, training, and partner
engagement versus maintaining the capacity to conduct complex
contingency operations in peace and war.
The proliferation of resource directorates, J-8's; joint
intelligence centers, J-2's; security assistance program
offices, typically J-4's; partner engagement entities,
typically J-9's; and operations and training staff, J-3's, is
the result of this expansive assigned mission set. And over
time, the warfighting role of the combatant commands has
evolved to the almost exclusive use, some would suggest
excessive use, of joint task forces up to and including four-
star-led joint task forces to execute assigned missions. The
simple question in my mind is, can the combatant command, no
matter how well tailored, perform each and every associated
task with equal competence? I do not think so and the attempt
to infuse greater interagency heft into the combatant commands
has, in my experience, detracted from the core operational
focus in either peacetime or in conflict.
How have we squared the tension between combatant commands?
peacetime and wartime roles? I would argue by again extensive
use of joint task force organizations to execute operational
missions. It is my conviction that the efficacy of the task
force employment model is beyond dispute. The National
Counterterrorism Joint Task Force demonstrates conclusively in
my mind the enduring value of standing, mature, well-trained,
and equipped joint task forces. It may well be that high
performance parallels exist for national joint task forces in
the surface, maritime, and air domains as well. What we should
continue, however--or what, I should say, we should discontinue
is the proliferation of joint task forces in each combatant
command with the attendant service components and headquarters
staffs. Task Force 510 in the Pacific Command might qualify,
however, as an exception to the rule.
In short, Mr. Chairman, we need to have within the armed
forces a strategic leader who can exercise executive authority.
We need to aggressively tailor combatant command headquarters
composition to its core mission or missions and refrain from
creating subordinate joint task forces out of service
headquarters. And finally, we need to drive toward employment
of long-term, highly proficient national joint task forces for
combatant command employment.
Thank you, Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and
members of the committee for your attention this morning. I
trust my presentation will assist in advancing the noble cause
of Goldwater-Nichols reform. Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Schwartz follows:]
Statement by General Norton A. Schwartz, USAF (Ret.)
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, Members of the Committee,
thank you for your commitment to improving internal governance and
defense organization shaped by the Goldwater-Nichols reforms. My
remarks are based on my experience in uniform as the 19th Chief of
Staff of the United States Air Force and a former Commander of the US
Transportation Command. It is an unexpected privilege to return to this
hearing room and to offer a few related ideas on how best to improve
performance in the Department of Defense.
I now serve as the President and CEO of Business Executives for
National Security, a non-partisan organization of business executives
with genuine concern for national security. As part of your defense
reform review I would be pleased to offer to you, at some future date,
my organization's views on the pressing need to make more efficient use
of defense resources and improve Defense Department management--also
objectives of the original Goldwater-Nichols legislation.
As requested, my remarks today are confined to the topic of
increasing the effectiveness of military operations. The views are my
own.
the rationale for reform
First, let me commend the Senate and this Congress for restoring
acquisition responsibilities to the Service Chiefs in this year's
National Defense Authorization Act legislation. Not only does it put
accountability where it belongs in the Service acquisition structure,
it identifies the acquisition career field as central to respective
service identities, which is important for promoting viable military
career paths.
The need to reconsider the roles of other senior military leaders
in the structure of the Department stems, I believe, from two
transformational factors that have evolved since implementation of
Goldwater-Nichols. The first is the concept of jointness, which has
been inculcated over a period of nearly thirty years into the daily
cadence of military operations. I cannot foresee us ever going to war
in the future with a concept of operations that is not joint. Because
of this irreversible development, we should perhaps look at adapting
the current joint duty requirements for officer promotion by
emphasizing joint experience at the operational level of command
instead.
The second factor is related to the first and involves changing the
way we identify and resolve conflict today as opposed to more
traditional warfare designs of the past. The evolving threat is
political, economic and demographic. In the Middle East the adversary
is ideological, made up of proto-state, non-state, and sub-state
entities. Think ISIS/ISIL, Hezbollah, Hamas. Internationally, China and
Russia seek ascendancy. Across the developing world, nearly 40 percent
of the population is under the age of 15 creating a huge demand on
future resources and governing institutions. Climate change suggests
complex consequences with security implications. Clearly, maintaining
national security in this environment requires DoD to plan for a wide
range of contingencies. The model we have adopted more often than not
as the preferred military response is to task organize for the specific
contingency.
Goldwater-Nichols arose in an era of more sharply defined politico-
military circumstances. Those boundaries no longer exist. It is
therefore appropriate and necessary to evaluate the need to adapt our
military operational structure for the new threat environment.
three suggestions for improving military operational performance
While there are many issues that warrant attention: command
arrangements, resource allocation, acquisition processes, overhead
reduction, joint credentialing for military personnel and the potential
for consolidation among others, I wish to focus on the three I am
persuaded hold the greatest promise for particularly positive outcomes.
They are: the role and authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, right-sizing the Combatant Commands (COCOMs), and establishing
standing Joint Task Forces for execution of COCOM operational missions.
1. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the operational
chain of supervision
In my experience as a former member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the Joint Staff, I have come to the conclusion that the Chairman's
informal role in supervising the Combatant Commanders and the JCS is
insufficient for the demands of our times. While it is true that
delegated authority from the Secretary of Defense is an alternative and
is routinely implied, there should be no doubt in the Armed Forces of
the United States about the directive authority of the Chairman,
subject to close and continuing scrutiny and oversight by the Secretary
of Defense.
Developing strategic guidance for force employment, deciding force
allocation tradeoffs between Combatant Commands and establishing
strategic priorities for the Armed Forces should not be the result of
bureaucratic negotiation or the exquisite application of personal
suasion but, rather, the product of strategic leadership. That capacity
is constrained by the Chairman's inability to exercise executive
authority on behalf of the Secretary of Defense. The remedy, I suggest,
is to place the Chairman in the line of supervision between the
Secretary and the Combatant Commanders.
2. Right-sizing the Combatant Commanders for peacetime deterrence and
engagement roles
The nine Combatant Commands are complex entities, none alike, some
with regional responsibilities and others with functional roles. The
commands strive to serve both peacetime, crisis response and
warfighting obligations. The composition of the Combatant Command
staffs clearly reflects the inherent tension in this excessively broad
mission array: peacetime administration, deterrence and partner
engagement versus maintaining the capacity to conduct complex
contingency operations in peace and war.
The proliferation of organizational elements such as resource
directorates (J-8s), Joint Intelligence Centers (J-2s), security
assistance program offices (typically J-4s), partner engagement
entities (typically J-9s) and operations and training staffs (J-3s) is
the result of the expansive assigned mission set. What we see over time
is that the warfighting role of the Combatant Commands has evolved to
the almost exclusive use of subordinate Joint Task Forces (JTFs).up to
and including four-star led JTFs.to execute assigned operational
missions. Further, the infusion of greater Federal interagency heft
into the Combatant Commands has, in my experience, detracted from core
operational focus, in both crisis and conflict. This evolution in
organizational complexity raises a simple question: can a Combatant
Command, however well-tailored, perform each and every associated task
with equal competence? I don't think so, and I believe it is necessary
to refocus the Combatant Commanders on their core mission: strategic
engagement, relationship building, joint training, combat support, and
contingency planning; and, adjust their headquarters staffs
accordingly.
3. Standing Joint Task Force for land, maritime and air
The proliferation of COCOM organizational elements that I have just
described brings up a fundamental question of task and purpose. The
COCOMs are supported by separate component commands in land, sea and
air. Yet, their components role is largely administrative not
operational. Instead, we have we squared the tension between Combatant
Command peacetime and wartime roles by extensive (some would argue
excessive) use of Joint Task Force organizations to execute operational
missions. By and large this has been successful.
It is my conviction that the efficacy of the Task Force employment
model is beyond dispute. The National Counterterrorism Joint Task Force
demonstrates conclusively, in my mind, the enduring value of standing,
mature, well-trained and well-equipped Joint Task Forces. It may well
be that high performance parallels exist for National Joint Task Forces
in the surface, maritime and air domains as well. We need to consider
creating highly efficient National Joint Task Forces for global
employment when and where needed. What we should discontinue, however,
is the proliferation of Joint Task Forces in each Combatant Command,
with attendant service components and headquarters staffs (Task Force
510 in the US Pacific Command, PACOM, might qualify as an exception to
the rule).
conclusion
A major purpose of Goldwater-Nichols was to strengthen the Joint
Staff and the Combatant Commanders. Your comprehensive review needs to
balance that objective with the Service's authorities to organize,
train and equip. The roles are complementary: operations and support.
However, we need to reinforce the chain of supervision and, in turn,
accountability. You have done this with the reconstitution of the
Service Chiefs' acquisition role. On the Joint Chiefs' side, we need to
have within the armed forces a strategic leader who can exercise
executive authority. We need to aggressively align Combatant Command
headquarters composition to its core mission(s) and refrain from
creating subordinate Joint Task Forces from Service headquarters. And,
finally, we need to drive toward employment of long-term, highly
proficient National Joint Task Forces for Combatant Command employment.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Committee today.
Chairman McCain. Admiral Stavridis?
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, USN, RETIRED, DEAN OF
THE FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY, TUFTS UNIVERSITY, AND
FORMER COMMANDER OF U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN
COMMAND
Admiral Stavridis. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed,
other distinguished members, a pleasure to be back with you and
to be here with General Schwartz, who was not only a service
chief but a combatant commander, as well as being Director of
the Joint Staff. There is no one who can talk more coherently
to these issues than him. And as well, my good friend, Dr.
Chris Lamb, who I think an best address the questions of
planning and strategy that Senator Reed raised a moment ago.
I spent 37 years in uniform. I spent probably a decade of
that in the Pentagon. I wish I had been at sea during those
years, but in that time, I managed to serve on the staff of the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of
Naval Operations, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. So I have sort of seen inside the building. And as
Senator McCain mentioned, I was twice a combatant commander,
once in Europe and once in Southern Command, Latin America and
the Caribbean.
So I am going to simply walk into four or five ideas that I
think might be interesting for this committee to discuss and
debate. None of these are fully firmed ideas, but I think they
relate to the objective of what the committee I think very
correctly seeks to do as we sit here kind of 3 decades after
Goldwater-Nichols. And they all relate in one way or another to
how the Department is organized.
So I am going to start with one that I think is
controversial but ought to be considered, and that is do we
need a cyber force for the United States. I would invite you to
think about where we were 100 years ago. We had an Army, a
Navy, and a Marine Corps. Did we have an Air Force? Of course,
not. We barely flew airplanes 100 years ago. I would argue
today it feels like that moment a few years after the beach at
Kitty Hawk, and my thought is clearly we need a Cyber Command,
and I think we are moving in that direction. But I think it is
time to think about whether we want to accelerate that process
because our vulnerabilities in the cyber domain, in my view,
are extraordinary, and we are ill-prepared for them. And
therefore, some part of our response will have to be done by
the Department of Defense, and the sooner we have not only a
Cyber Command, but in my view a cyber force, small, capable, I
think we would be well served. I think we should have that
discussion.
Secondly, to the question of the interagency and the power
of how to bring those parts of the government together, I think
an interesting organizational change to consider would be at
each of the regional combatant commands to have a deputy who is
a U.S. ambassador or perhaps some other senior diplomat. I
think you would need to continue to have a military deputy in
order to conduct military operations, but a great deal of what
combatant commands do is diplomatic in nature. And I think
having a senior representative from the interagency present
would be salutary. This has been tried at SOUTHCOM, EUCOM, and
AFRICOM at one time or another, and I think it would be an
effective and interesting idea to consider as you look at the
combatant commands.
Thirdly--and the chairman mentioned this--in my view
geographically we have too many combatant commands. We have six
today. I think we should seriously consider merging NORTHCOM
and SOUTHCOM and merging EUCOM and AFRICOM. I think there are
obvious efficiencies in doing so. I think there are operational
additional benefits that derive. And I think finally it is a
way to begin reducing what has correctly been identified as the
bloat in the operational combatant command staffs.
Fourth, I would associate myself with General Schwartz and
a number of others who have testified with the idea that we
should consider an independent general staff and strengthening
the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Frankly,
in practice, as a combatant commander I would very typically
call the Chairman, check signals with the Chairman. I would not
undertake a radical departure without talking to the Chairman.
I think putting the Chairman in the chain of command, as
General Schwartz has outlined and a number of other witnesses
have mentioned, is efficient, sensible, and frankly codifies
what is in effect today in many ways.
In addition, I think that Chairman would be well served
with what some have termed a general staff. This is the idea of
taking mid-grade military officers of extraordinary promise and
pulling them from their services and more or less permanently
assigning them to this general staff. This model has been used
in other points by other nations in history. I think it is a
powerful way to create efficiencies and avoid duplication
because by doing so, you can reduce a great deal of what
happens in the combatant commands today. So in addition to
strengthening the position of the Chairman, I think it would be
worth considering whether a general staff model would make
sense.
Fifth and finally, I think that we talk a great deal,
appropriately, about joint operations. It is important to
remember that joint education is extraordinarily important in
both ultimately the conduct of operations, the creation of
strategy, the intellectual content of our services. So I would
advocate considering whether we should integrate our joint
educational institutions, probably by taking the National
Defense University, putting it back to three-star rank, and
giving that officer directive authority over the Nation's war
colleges. This would also create a reservoir of intellectual
capability, which I think could match up well with the idea of
a general staff.
All five of those ideas are controversial, but I think they
should be part of the conversation that this committee is
unpackaging, which is one that is deeply important for the
Nation's security. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Stavridis follows:]
Prepared Statement by Admiral James Stavridis, USN (Ret)
Chairman McCain, Rank Member Reed, other distinguished Members of
the Committee, thank you for asking me to come and discuss ideas for
reform of the Department of Defense.
In the course of my 37 years of active service after passing out of
Annapolis in 1976, I served about half of my career in staff
assignments in the Pentagon--on the staffs of the Secretary of Defense
as his Senior Military Assistant; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs focused
on the Unified Command Plan; Secretary of the Navy as his Executive
Assistant and Special Assistant; and Chief of Naval Operations with
focus on long range and strategic planning.
I also served twice in command as a Combatant Commander at US
Southern Command for three years; and as US European Commander for four
years, concurrently with serving as Supreme Allied Commander at NATO.
While I did not enjoy staff duty as much as being at sea (true I
suspect for most military officers), I learned a great deal and formed
some opinions that I am happy to share today based on my years of
active duty.
Additionally, since leaving active duty two years, I have served as
the 12th Dean of The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts
University and as a Senior Fellow at Johns Hopkins Applied Physics
Laboratory. In both capacities, I continue to study and comment on
these issues.
All of these remarks, however, are my personal opinions and do not
represent the views of any other individual or organization.
I would like to begin by pointing out that I believe that overall
that the US Department of Defense is the best functioning entity in the
US government, and that it does an enormous amount of good in the world
today. And that the vast majority of civilians and military assigned to
the Department on staff duty are dedicated, hard-working, and very
focused on their jobs in professional and commendable ways.
Having said that, I also believe it is time to take a look at
several aspects of the way the Department does business, and the work
of this committee is therefore timely and sensible. It is over three
decades since Goldwater-Nichols reshaped much of the day-to-day conduct
of DoD business, and its effects have been overwhelmingly good. But
three decades is a long time, and it makes a great deal of sense to
look at new ways to think about how this enormous, $600 billion per
year enterprise is run.
All the thoughts that I offer today should quite obviously be
regarded merely as starting points for further discussion, as the
issues are so significant and complex that they demand much study,
collaboration, consideration of second order effects, and caution as we
go forward.
As 2016 rolls around, it will be thirty years since the Goldwater-
Nichols Act fundamentally reshaped the broad organization and
specifically the chain of command of the military. It solidified the
Joint requirements for education and promotion, created the position of
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and vested the power to
conduct military operations solely in the Combatant Commanders,
reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense and the President. After
thirty largely successful years under Goldwater-Nichols, now is a good
time to take a fundamental look at what we are doing in the massive
Department of Defense and consider some new potential ideas.
Here are five admittedly controversial ideas to think about:
Create a Cyber Force. It is a foregone conclusion that we need a
military Cyber Command, i.e. an independent, 4-star commander focused
on cyber operations. The real question is: do we need a cyber force as
well? If we look back a hundred years ago, we didn't have an Air
Force--quite obviously because we didn't fly planes in any number. It
took us over 50 years to figure out that we needed a separate branch of
the military to focus on aviation.
Today we cannot conceive of a world in which we would not have
trained, capable Airmen ready to defend their nation in the skies.
Seems high time we considered a separate service to do the same in the
cyber world, a place where we are increasingly under attack and in
which many other nations have already militarized. And while we are at
it, we should likewise think about whether this model works for Special
Operations as well--i.e. creating a fully formed separate Service to
perform all elements of Special Operations.
Give Each Regional Combatant Command a Civilian Deputy. As we look
at a 21st century in which we need to exercise national security
through not only the military instrument but also via diplomacy and
development, having a senior civilian as a Deputy at each COCOM makes
sense. The best choice would be a senior State Department official,
preferably someone who had served as an Ambassador in the region for
the Geographical Commanders. He or she should be detailed at the level
of Minister-Counselor (1/2 star) with authority through the command.
This has already been successfully implemented at SOUTHCOM, EUCOM,
and AFRICOM; and standardizing it makes sense to increase the
interagency reach of the COCOMS. We should also give each of the
Combatant Command staff a capable J-9 staff element to do interagency
coordination and a very small group J-10 to do private public
cooperation.
In terms of the Functional Combatant Commands, there may likewise
be arguments for including a civilian deputy above the level of the
current ``Politcal Advisors POLAD'' provided by State Department,
although it is a less clear cut case. These commands should be examined
on a case-by-case basis to see if this model is equally effective as it
is for the Geographic Combatant Commanders.
Reduce the number of Geographic Combatant Commands, rationalizing
them to four in number. This should be done in parallel with reducing
the overall size of the staffs, which are too large given that much of
the operational activity of the Department is conducted by Joint Task
Forces anyway.
--Merge SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM into a single Americas Command. The
artificial division of Mexico from SOUTHCOM hurts our unified purpose
throughout Latin America and the Caribbean; and our Canadian allies are
very involved in the world to the south as well. Making this one
command--probably headquartered in Miami, with a sub-unified command in
Colorado Springs retaining NORAD and air defense--would be efficient,
save resources, and improve focus on the Americas.
--Merge EUCOM and AFRICOM, reconstructing the earlier model, now
terming it Euro-Africa Command. The staffs remain collocated in Germany
anyway, and there are savings to be had in terms of size much as is the
case between the two commands focused on the Americas.
Stand up a truly independent General Staff with Operational
Authority, atop the military chain of command. In today's world, the
officers assigned to the Joint Staff in the Pentagon essentially
function in this role. The problem is that they know they will return
to their parent services for promotion and advancement to the next rung
on the career ladder.
An independent General Staff would be manned by the brilliant few,
selected from their service at the level of 0-4/0-5, and permanently
assigned to the General Staff. Additionally, some number of 0-6 and
Flag / General officers could likewise be laterally assigned after
their Captain / Colonel and Flag command assignments. But the key would
be that they would no longer return to their parent services once they
were assigned to the General Staff--only to Joint commands and / or
back to the Pentagon General Staff.
It is also time to consider simply making the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff the senior operational commander, reporting directly to
the Secretary of Defense. The Combatant Commanders should report to the
Chairman, not to the Secretary of Defense. Frankly, this is how the
system largely works in practice anyway; and it would merely codify the
existing custom into a sensible, linear chain of command. The Service
Chiefs should continue to focus on train, equip, and organize
functions, with additional responsibility for acquisition, reporting to
the Service Secretaries.
Finally in this regard, it is worth looking at the entire system of
``Joint Credit'' for promotion, and potentially shifting the
requirement for ``Joint Credit'' up to the 0-8 or even the 0-9 level.
This would also permit dropping a significant number of ``joint
billets'' which are needed to keep access to joint credit available to
everyone. All of this would potentially permit reducing the total size
of the officer corps.
Unify Joint Professional Military Education (i.e. all of the War
Colleges) Under one 3-star officer, who would also be the President of
the National Defense University.
Given the need for a coherent, unified curriculum under Joint
aegis, having a single chain of command (as opposed to each of the
Services) controlling Joint Education at the highest levels might make
sense. This officer could then report to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, functioning somewhat like a Combatant Commander for
intellectual, research, and joint educational matters.
The cultural, educational, and organizational power of unifying the
various War Colleges may make sense and, by the way, serve as a central
point of effort to organize the study required to consider the other
changes discussed herein. This command would then be essentially the
intellectual arm of the General Staff described above.
All of these ideas are highly controversial, bordering on
heretical. And I freely admit they may not be the exact right next
moves. But I offer them as an examples of the kind of thinking we need
to undertake on the upcoming 30-year anniversary of Goldwater-Nichols,
which shook us up but may not have taken us far enough down the road to
truly Joint, Interagency, and International / Coalition operations--
which collectively represent the future of security in this turbulent
21st century.
Chairman McCain. Thank you, Admiral.
Dr. Lamb?
STATEMENT OF DR. CHRISTOPHER J. LAMB, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE
INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES, NATIONAL DEFENSE
UNIVERSITY
Dr. Lamb. Senator McCain, Senator Reed, and members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to share my views on
improving the effectiveness of military operations this
morning. Your invitation to testify is a great honor and
especially so considering the distinguished service of your
other witnesses today, General Schwartz and Admiral Stavridis.
It is the high point of my career to be sitting with them today
and in front of you, and I am really, truly humbled by the
opportunity.
I also want to acknowledge the presence of my wife who, in
light of the unconventional things I am about to say, decided I
needed moral support, and I agree with her.
Chairman McCain. We will hold her in no way responsible.
[Laughter.]
Dr. Lamb. She will appreciate that I know.
In my written statement, I argued for three sets of
organizational changes to increase the effectiveness of U.S.
military operations.
First, to correct a persistent lack of preparedness for
irregular threats, I argue that we should give USSOCOM [U.S.
Southern Command] the lead for small unit irregular conflict
and the Marine Corps the lead for larger irregular conflicts.
Second, to make the best possible investments in military
capabilities and maintain our advantages in major combat
operations, I believe we should encourage the use of horizontal
teams in the Department of Defense and support their work with
collaborative management or joint scenarios, operating
concepts, data, methods of analysis, risk metrics, and
institutional knowledge. And I completely agree with General
Schwartz that we need to reinvigorate our approach to joint
headquarters so that we have standing task forces ready to
experiment with and test new joint concepts.
And then, finally, to better integrate military operations
with other instruments of national power, I believe we need
legislation that allows the President to empower leaders to run
interagency teams.
None of these recommendations are unique to me, and they
have all been made before by various groups and individuals.
But I hope now is an opportune time for the Senate and the
leadership in the Department of Defense to reconsider their
merits.
In the brief time remaining, I would like to address some
likely questions about these recommendations, particularly with
respect to horizontal or sometimes referred to as cross-
functional teams because I know that members of the committee
have expressed some interest in that. And so I want to raise a
number of questions that are likely to come up in this area.
First of all, it is often asked whether all national
security problems are not inherently complex and therefore
require cross-functional teams. My response to that would be
no. Clausewitz famously argued the most important judgment a
statesman and commander have to make is determining, quote, the
kind of war in which they are embarking, neither mistaking it
for nor trying to turn it into something that is alien to its
nature.
I think the same thing holds true for national security
problems more generally. We need to determine the kind of
problem being addressed. Not all military tasks are
intrinsically joint. Not all national security missions are
intrinsically interagency. If we say otherwise, we greatly
increase the risks of failing to bring the right type of
expertise to bear on the problem at hand.
Another question that frequently arises is whether all
groups with representatives from functional organizations are,
in effect, cross-functional teams. No. There is a huge
difference between a committee and a team in the executive
branch. The members of the committee, to use some shorthand,
typically give priority to protecting their parent
organization's equities, and the members of a cross-functional
team give priority to the team mission.
So why do some groups work like teams and some groups work
like committees? For example, why do all executive branch
cross-functional groups not work as well as, say, an Army
battalion headquarters, which also has to integrate functional
expertise from the artillery, the infantry, armor, et cetera?
Well, I think the answer is that the difference is the degree
of autonomy exercised by the functional organizations and the
degree of oversight exercised by their common authority. In a
battalion headquarters, all the participants share a cross-
cutting culture, have the obligation to follow legal orders,
and receive direct and ongoing supervision from the battalion
commander. Most interagency groups consist of members from
organizations with quite different cultures, different legal
authorities and obligations, and no supervision from the only
person in the system with the authority to direct their
behavior, the President.
Another question often raised is whether we do not already
have in effect good interagency teams with empowered leaders,
for example, the State Department's country teams. Ambassadors,
after all, have been given chief of mission authority by the
President.
Well, first of all, there are notable exceptions to that
authority to the ambassador, particularly with respect to
military and covert operations. But in any case, the
ambassador's authority is not sufficient. Many ambassadors are
perceived as representing State's interests rather than
national interests. Hence, the country team members often feel
justified in working around the ambassador, and the direct
supervision of the President is so far removed that many of the
people on the country teams feel that they can do that and
actually be rewarded by their parent organizations for doing
so.
I will stop there, but I want to close by anticipating one
final reaction to the proposals for horizontal teams. Some will
invariably complain that this is all rather complicated and
that at the end of the day, we are better off just finding and
appointing good leaders. This is an understandable but
dangerous simplification.
First, as Jim Locher likes to say, there is no need to
choose between good leaders and good organizations. We need
both. Horizontal teams cannot be employed to good effect
without supportive and attentive senior leaders, but neither
can senior leaders of functional organizations solve complex
problems without organizations that are engineered to support
cross-cutting teams.
Second, in the current environment, titular leaders simply
lack the time to supervise every or even the most important
cross-cutting problems. Neither is it sufficient to simply
insist that their subordinates, quote, get along. The heads of
functional organizations have an obligation to represent their
organization's perspectives and expertise. This obligation,
reinforced by bureaucratic norms and human nature, ensures that
group members with diverse expertise will clash. Conflicting
views are healthy, but they must be productively resolved in a
way that gives priority to mission success and not less noble
factors.
Finally, I would dare to say that the intense focus on
leadership, particularly in this town, has always struck me as
rather un-American. Our Founding Fathers realized the American
people needed more than good leadership. They paid great
attention to organizing the government so that it would work
well or work well enough, even if it is not always led by
saints and savants. We should do the same with respect to the
Department of Defense and the national security system. Right
now, I do not believe the men and women who go in harm's way
for our collective security are backed up by the best possible
policy, strategy, planning, and decision-making system. That
can and should change, and I am glad the committee is looking
into this matter.
Thank you again for this opportunity to share some results
of our research at National Defense University. I look forward
to answering any questions you might have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Lamb follows:]
prepared statement by dr. christopher j. lamb*
Senator McCain, Senator Reed, and members of the Committee, I
greatly appreciate the opportunity to share some of my research and
views on defense reform. The invitation to testify to the Senate Armed
Service Committee is a great honor, especially considering the stature
of your other witnesses today and their records of service to our
country. It is humbling to be sitting next to them and in front of you
today. I understand the Committee is interested in organizational
changes that could increase the effectiveness of U.S. military
operations and whether current combatant command and Service structures
provide the necessary strategic planning and military readiness to
ensure operational excellence. I hope to provide some useful insights
for your consideration on those topics.
My testimony identifies three major impediments to high performance
in military operations that can be corrected. Most of my
recommendations involve the Department of Defense, but I also argue
that interagency teams could be structured and incentivized to improve
performance for some types of military operations. Fielding interagency
team would require some changes in the way we structure and run the
larger national security system.
My views on these topics are shaped by my experience as a Foreign
Service officer and mid-grade executive serving in both the Pentagon
and Department of State over the past 20 years, and by research this
past decade at National Defense University, including organizational
performance studies in support of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
and for the Project on National Security Reform. I am on record as a
strong proponent of defense and national security organizational
reform, and this testimony draws heavily upon previous research. Where
appropriate I cite such research in support of my recommendations.
why reform?
Not everyone will agree there is a defense performance problem
worthy of the Senate's attention. However, I believe that reforms in
several areas could improve the effectiveness of military operations. A
brief overview of major trends helps explain why. At the outset of
World War II we were not as well prepared for war as our enemies, but
we prevailed by learning, adapting and out-producing our foes. At war's
end the United States accounted for just under forty percent of global
gross domestic product. The resource preeminence of the United States
put us in a good position to ensure permanent readiness against the
global Soviet threat. During the Cold War we built new institutions to
safeguard our freedoms, and we out-lasted the enemy. After Vietnam we
instituted an all-volunteer military, executed a revolution in military
training techniques, leveraged technology successfully with
increasingly realistic testing (compared to our World War II
performance), and finally fixed our most egregious operational command
and control problems with the Goldwater-Nichols legislative reforms.
The result was stable nuclear deterrence and unparalleled world-leading
conventional military forces. Our one glaring weakness throughout this
period was poor performance against irregular threats.
The terror attacks on September 11, 2001 highlighted this weak spot
and also its strategic import. 9/11 drove home the reality that
terrorists are willing to and capable of launching mass-casualty
attacks against us and our allies. In responding to 9/11 the national
security system performed well in some areas. Success was usually a
function of departments and agencies conducting their core missions
extremely well, or leaders pioneering ways to generate new levels of
interdepartmental cooperation on nontraditional missions. However, the
system performed poorly on the whole, demonstrating our historic
inability to counter irregular threats well. The United States spent
prodigious sums, organized world-wide coalitions, swept large enemy
formations from the field, and targeted terrorists and insurgent
leaders on an industrial scale, but exercised little influence over
eventual outcomes in Afghanistan and Iraq. We squandered resources,
lost public support, and arguably generated as many terrorists as were
eliminated.
Despite fifteen years of war, the threat of catastrophic terrorist
attacks remains. Distracted, if not exhausted by fifteen years of
conflict, we have seen our notable advantages in major combat
capabilities diminish relative to some nations that are exploiting the
global explosion in information technologies. Areas that used to
constitute an unhindered, unilateral advantage for U.S. forces are now
subject to challenge. The credibility of our aging deterrent forces
against weapons of mass destruction is also growing suspect. With our
share of global gross domestic product roughly half of what it was
following World War II and projected to decline in relative
----------
* The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect
the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the
Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
terms, peer competitors are likely to emerge much earlier than we
anticipated following the collapse of the Soviet Union and prior to 9/
11.
This broad overview of defense performance prompts several
observations about the need for defense reform. First, we are long past
due for correcting our persistent difficulties in dealing with
irregular threats. Second, if resource overmatch was ever a good
strategy, it has lost its luster and is no longer affordable. To
maintain our current advantages in major combat operations we need to
improve our ability to make good decisions on investments in military
capabilities going forward. Third, effective military operations alone
are insufficient. They must be integrated effectively with other
instruments of power, something we currently do quite poorly. It is
imperative that we improve our ability to collaborate across
departments and agencies. In particular, the time has come to give the
President the authority to delegate his authority for integrating
department and agency efforts to manage or resolve complex, high-
priority national security problems. In sum, we need a Pentagon that
can manage the full range of security challenges; rationally allocate
resources to priority missions; and collaborate well with other
departments, agencies and allies. Consequently it is important to
identify major impediments to these performance aspirations and
understand how they might be overcome.
reforming irregular conflict capabilities
Although irregular conflict is the subject of endless debate and
terminological controversies, we understand its distinguishing features
and why they require different military capabilities. In large-scale,
force-on-force combat operations the primary operational objective is
destruction of enemy capabilities, which sets the conditions for
subsequent political relationships. In major combat operations military
necessity take precedence over all other concerns except the purpose
for which the war is being fought. All other objectives remain in doubt
until the adversary's ability to resist is overcome. In contrast,
military objectives are subordinate to, and constantly informed by,
numerous political considerations in irregular conflict. In irregular
conflict the immediate objective is not to take terrain and destroy
forces, but to alter political relationships and, by extension,
adversary behavior. Military operations are constantly tailored to and
constrained by political considerations even down to the tactical
level, which these kinds of military operations different and
demanding.
Irregular conflicts take much longer, so patience and perseverance
are necessary, and taxing. Protracted engagements make it imperative
that costs--human, material, and political--be kept low. Popular
political support (host country, U.S. domestic and international)
determines which side will be able to best inform and sustain their
operations, and our partners know and understand local populations far
better than we do. When one of the protagonists can no longer count on
the passive or active support of key population groups, they must
reduce their presence, withdraw, or otherwise abandon their efforts.
Thus, both to reduce costs and be effective, it is often advisable for
the United States to work well with third parties, which is not easy to
do.
For all these reasons, prevailing in irregular conflict requires
military forces with some new or modified capabilities, or increased
quantities of existing capabilities in the following areas:
Force protection to keep casualties proportionate to the
perceived US interests at stake; without it U.S. public support
dwindles over time. In irregular conflict force protection is more
demanding because it is difficult to identify the enemy, which means
ambushes, surprise attacks, and acts of terror are the norm.
Discriminate and proportionate force to keep the enemy on
the defensive without provoking popular discontent, and over time to
make the population feel secure enough to resist enemy coercion or
better, to assist U.S. and allied forces. In major combat operations
the U.S. military wants to avoid harm to non-combatants or exerting
more force than necessary to achieve military objectives. However,
these objectives are subordinate to the success of their military
missions. In irregular conflicts the opposite is true; proportionate
and highly discriminate use of force is a prerequisite for success.
Special intelligence in irregular conflict is complex and
more critical. In large-scale combat operations the intelligence
community can focus on a standard set of primary indicators and
warnings for enemy disposition, composition, and movement. Our most
likely combat opponents and their order of battle are usually known
well in advance of hostilities. In irregular conflict intelligence is
required on short notice and for a broad set of social, political and
military subjects, often cannot be collected by traditional technical
means, and is more difficult to interpret once collected.
Persuasive communications to influence foreign audiences
with messages supportive of U.S. policy are more important in irregular
conflict for the simple reason that it is difficult for terrorists to
survive without popular support and impossible for insurgents. Hence,
every effort must be made to convince the population that even passive
support of the enemy is not in its interests. Persuasive communications
are always difficult because they require a deep understanding of
target audiences, but in irregular conflicts they also need to be
immediately responsive to tactical developments to be effective.
Modified command and control to ensure unified effort
across diverse government departments and agencies and with allies. The
requirement to apply all instruments of national power instead of
relying primarily on military force means that irregular conflict is an
intensely interagency effort. Moreover, policy and strategy in
irregular conflicts are more fluid and must repeatedly be translated
into realistic operational requirements. In turn operational plans must
be carefully tailored to support policy objectives and repeatedly
updated.
This list could be expanded, and the nomenclature, relative
importance, situational impact, role of technology and many other
aspects of irregular conflict could be debated, but these broad
requirements are well-known and well-represented in all the classic
literature on the topic, including our own U.S. Marine Corps Small Wars
Manual. So it is significant that the Department of Defense did a poor
job of fielding capabilities for irregular conflict in Afghanistan and
Iraq.
This past year researchers at National Defense University completed
a comprehensive review of lessons from the past decade and a half of
war. \1\ After reviewing 23 senior leader accounts from both the Bush
and Obama administration, as well as more than one hundred insider
accounts, influential articles, blue-ribbon commissions, think tank and
inspector general reports, it is clear there is a broad consensus that
we performed poorly on strategic communications, specialized
intelligence and equipment, and in providing civil-military
administrative capacity for better governance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Christopher Lamb with Megan Franco, ``National-Level
Coordination and Implementation: How System Attributes Trumped
Leadership,'' in Richard D. Hooker, Jr., and Joseph J. Collins, Hooker
and Joseph Collins, eds., Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long
War, National Defense University Press, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There were bright spots to be sure. We achieved unprecedented
integration of all-source intelligence in support of high-value
targeting, and ground forces received equipment previously available
only to Special Operations Forces (SOF): body armor, latest generation
night vision goggles, intra-squad communications gear, tactical
satellite radios, tactical unmanned aerial vehicles, etc. We went from
having 8 unmanned aerial vehicles in Iraq in 2003 to 1,700 by 2008, and
within 18 months we deployed thousands of mine-resistant, ambush-
protected (MRAP) vehicles to theater--an accomplishment some have
described as an industrial feat not seen since World War II. To get
these kinds of capabilities to the troops the Pentagon created new
organizations and streamlined procedures and Congress supported these
efforts by making copious amounts of funding available. Even so, and
despite urgent requests from commanders in the field, much of this type
of capability was late to need, and arrived only after senior leaders
mounted extraordinary efforts to squeeze them out of a reluctant
bureaucracy. Worse, much of this new-found capacity is now being
abandoned.
For example, it took the Department a long time to realize that
defeating insurgents, partnering with host-nation officials, and
winning popular support are hardly possible without a profound
understanding of local social and political relationships at all
levels. The need for socio-cultural understanding has been cited as one
of the ``top 5'' lessons learned from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq,
a view echoed by many senior leaders in the Department of Defense. Yet
the U.S. military's traditional pattern of behavior on sociocultural
knowledge is reemerging. After we develop sociocultural expertise at
greater-than-necessary expense and too late to ensure success, we then
abandon the hard-won capability as part of post-conflict budget
reductions or out of deference to prevailing American strategic
culture, which favors technology, small-unit combat skills, and large-
scale military maneuver training rather than a deep understanding of
our adversaries and their societies. Much of the organizational
architecture developed to provide sociocultural knowledge to U.S.
forces is being dismantled. The Army's Irregular Warfare Center and
Human Terrain Team programs have been shut down, and officers
participating in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands Program are not being
promoted at rates comparable to the rest of the Army.
We also were slow to recognize irregular threats that arose in the
aftermath of our regime-change operations. It took years to produce
leadership, concepts, and viable plans for countering insurgents. When
some of our more capable and innovative field commanders combined
traditionally effective counterinsurgency techniques with an astute
appreciation of local political realities, they were uncommonly
successful. In a healthy, high performing organization these
extraordinary successes would have been rapidly recognized, rewarded,
and replicated. Our record in this regard is spotty. Anecdotally, it
appears extremely successful field commanders were passed over for
promotion or promoted only after intervention by senior civilian
leaders.
The replication of these successful examples was even more limited.
The U.S. military adopted proven counterinsurgency techniques slowly
and unevenly. In part this was because the methods used to achieve
tactical successes challenged prevailing policy and strategy. Tactical
partnering with local forces could fuel sectarian sentiments and
undermine formal Iraqi governmental structures the United States was
committed to supporting; it also often involved working with local
leaders with checkered pasts or who were judged to be marginal players;
and it ran counter to our policy of transferring responsibility for
security to Iraqi military forces as quickly as possible, which was
based on the assumption that the mere presence of U.S. forces was an
irritant to be minimized as a matter of priority. For all these and
other reasons the tactical successes of Marine and Army field
commanders in late 2004 and 2005 failed to prompt a rapid reassessment
of these policy and strategy assumptions.
Our desire to pass responsibility for security to host-nation
forces also was handicapped by lack of preparedness for irregular
conflict. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States had no plans
for establishing local security forces and proceeded on an ad hoc
basis. Once the efforts were under way we developed security forces
modeled on U.S. institutions even though the local political, economic,
and social conditions ``made U.S. approaches problematic and
unsustainable without a significant U.S. presence.'' \2\ We also
encouraged short tours and optimistic reporting, which made it
difficult to evaluate actual progress. In turn, the longer it took
commanders to recognize gaps between desired and actual performance,
the longer it takes to adapt more effective methods.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ T.X. Hammes, ``Raising and Mentoring Security Forces in
Afghanistan and Iraq,'' in Lessons Encountered.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In short, our performance in Afghanistan and Iraq reinforced
awareness that we are poorly prepared for irregular conflict. This was
true before 9/11 and, with the exception of hunting high-value targets,
largely remains the case today. Innumerable studies and Pentagon
directives over the past decades have identified this problem and
attempted to fix it by encouraging the Services to take the mission
more seriously. On at least three occasions since World War II national
leaders spent major political capital trying to force a solution. The
Soviet Union's support for ``wars of national liberation'' led
President John F. Kennedy to embrace Special Forces and unconventional
warfare, even replacing an Army Chief of Staff who he believed was
unsympathetic to his plans. In 1986, after years of poor responses to
terrorism and other political-military problems, Congress mandated new
special operations and low-intensity conflict organizations over the
objections of the Pentagon. More recently, Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates launched his own personal effort to get the Pentagon to better
balance conventional and irregular capabilities. These efforts failed,
and it is not hard to see why.
We keep asking organizations that are raised, trained and equipped
to conduct large-scale force-on-force combat operations to also conduct
irregular conflict as a lesser-included mission. They invariably give
priority to what they consider their more important core missions, and
are slow to comprehend, much less invest in irregular conflict concepts
and capabilities. They argue irregular conflict is not sufficiently
different from conventional war to justify separate capabilities. They
insist SOF have the mission covered, and that allies and other U.S.
departments and agencies should do more. If forced to invest in
irregular capabilities, the Services pursue less costly non-material
initiatives like education and training that can be more easily
reversed. They argue their future capabilities will be equally
effective in all types of conflicts, so there is no need to buy
equipment for irregular conflict now. If they must buy such equipment
they typically abandon it as quickly as possible to avoid maintenance
costs. \3\ If assigned an irregular conflict campaign, our field
commanders learn on the fly.
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\3\ Christopher J. Lamb, Matthew Schmidt and Berit Fitzsimmons
``MRAPs, Irregular Warfare, and Pentagon Reform,'' Occasional Paper,
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University,
June 2009.
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Besides Service cultures focused on major combat operations, there
are other factors handicapping readiness for irregular conflicts.
Asking all the Services to be equally responsible for the mission just
makes it easier for everyone to ignore the responsibility and harder
for anyone to be held accountable for results. Also, irregular
conflicts require a flexible approach to requirements and acquisition
but the Pentagon usually does not do business this way. General
requirements for irregular conflict are well-known but the amount and
specific types of equipment needed are highly situation-dependent,
transitory and difficult to establish in advance. What we need is a
solid research and development base and some programs of record that
can be rapidly expanded depending on emergent needs. This is precisely
what Secretary Gates wanted to do when he called for the
institutionalize procurement of [irregular] warfare capabilities.'' But
with the exception of USSCOM, which was granted unusual acquisition
authorities by Congress, this sort of approach to irregular conflict
programs is difficult in today's Pentagon. Finally, without a clear
mission-lead the largest rather than the best-suited military
organizations dominate command and control of deployed forces in
irregular conflict (again SOF sometimes being an exception). As a
result we often operate with less effectiveness early on, make the
situation worse and inadvertently raise costs.
In my opinion we now have overwhelming evidence that the United
States will not have a standing and ready irregular conflict capability
until it clearly assigns that mission to specific organizations that
are culturally capable of executing it and rewarded for doing so.
USSOCOM promulgates four SOF ``truths:'' that in special operations
humans are more important than hardware; SOF cannot be massed produced;
quality is better than quantity; and competent SOF cannot be created
after emergencies occur. These same truths largely apply to irregular
conflict. We did not get world-class SOF without a powerful
organization assigned to organize, train, equip and employ these
forces, and the same has proven true for irregular conflict more
broadly. Conventional forces can ``learn'' and prepare for irregular
conflict after the fact, but the costs of doing so are high and the
results are poor.
Different ways of ensuring irregular conflict capabilities have
been proposed, including the creation of large new organizations, but
the most sensible and politically feasible option would be to leverage
the parts of the Department of Defense that are historically most
proficient in irregular conflict: Special Operations Forces and the
U.S. Marine Corps. In effect, we need to adjust military roles and
missions to assign a clear division of labor for irregular conflict in
a tiered approach. USSOCOM should be, and to some extent already is,
the preferred option for small unit direct and indirect irregular
conflict, but it needs to be upgraded to conduct indirect missions
better. \4\ The U.S. Marine Corps has comparative advantages at the
lower-end of the conflict spectrum compared to the Army, and with some
increases in authorities, force structure and equipment could take the
lead role successfully for larger-scale irregular conflicts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ The case for improving USSOCOM's indirect capabilities is made
in ``The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces,'' a prepared
statement of Christopher J. Lamb before the Emerging Threats and
Capabilities Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, U.S. House
of Representatives, July 11, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
USSOCOM already is assigned the lead for many irregular conflict
missions that can be conducted by small units, but its indirect
capabilities need to be upgraded. By indirect, I do not mean ``non-
lethal,'' as is often supposed. I mean working by, with and through
foreign forces and populations with both lethal and non-lethal
capabilities. Our preferred approach to irregular conflict should be
working with host-nation forces, both to be more effective and to
reduce the resource and political commitments of the United States.
Indirect missions require greater specialization in what some call
SOF's ``warrior-diplomat'' or ``cross-cultural'' skill sets, including
a deeper understanding of indigenous forces and populations. Direct SOF
missions require more emphasis on technical skills, particularly those
highly specialized capabilities involved in direct action behind enemy
lines. For SOF to be equally well prepared for indirect and direct
missions some units must weight their training and equipment toward
warrior-diplomat skills while others concentrate on what some refer to
as the SOF ``commando'' skills.
If USSOCOM is going to excel not only at special operations but
also at irregular conflict more generally, it must put much greater
emphasis on its ability to conduct missions indirectly. SOF indirect
approaches and capabilities are as valuable and challenging to build,
maintain and employ as SOF direct action capabilities. Somewhat
counter-intuitively, SOF indirect capabilities have actually atrophied
this past decade; arguably when they could have been most useful.
Successful indirect efforts in places like the Philippines were
overshadowed by SOF direct action missions in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Even SOF units that traditionally demonstrate greater appreciation for
indirect approaches often paid more attention to direct action against
terrorists and insurgent leaders in those countries. \5\ Army Special
Forces in particular have sacrificed area orientation, language
proficiency, and cultural appreciation within their assigned regions
since 9/11. The operational demands of the Iraq and Afghan theaters led
to a substantial degradation of SOF indirect skills.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ ``The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces,'' Prepared
Statement of Christopher J. Lamb before the Emerging Threats and
Capabilities Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, U.S. House
of Representatives, July 11, 2012. 25 pages.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reconstituting these critical capabilities requires significant
investment and leadership. USSOCOM leaders are aware of the problem and
have been trying to upgrade SOF indirect capabilities. How well they
are doing is a matter of great import. USSOCOM needs better socio-
cultural knowledge; better persuasive information capabilities; more
robust and quicker access to civil affairs skills; adjustments to the
SOF selection process; a Washington presence for its indirect
leadership and some indirect programs; new approaches to interagency
collaboration on indirect approaches to irregular conflict; new
authorities to oversee security assistance programs on a multi-year
basis; and perhaps separate budget lines for direct and indirect
capabilities. If the Committee looks into it and concludes USSOCOM is
failing to provide these kinds of improvements, it may want to
investigate new sub-unified commands for USSOCOM that cooperate but
concentrate on the direct and indirect approaches, respectively. \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ A case for this is made in David Tucker and Christopher Lamb,
U.S. Special Operations Forces, Columbia University Press, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For irregular conflict problems that cannot be contained and well-
managed by small SOF teams, we would call upon the U.S. Marine Corps.
The Marines would be assigned the lead role for large-scale, direct
interventions against irregular opponents. The Marines would partner
with USSOCOM, concentrate on the least secure areas that demand the
most direct attention, and in more secure areas use their
infrastructure to assist USSOCOM's small-unit, indirect operations with
host-nation forces. Of course the Army, Navy and Air Force would lend
support for joint operations as necessary, but in terms of training and
equipping their forces, they would be free to concentrate on major
combat operations. Any irregular conflict mission requiring more than
the combined forces of USSOCOM and the U.S. Marine Corps should
probably be reconsidered, but in extremis other forces could be
assigned to operate under their direction as necessary.
The U.S. Marine Corps would require additional resources to be well
prepared for its new, priority irregular conflict responsibilities. It
would need new authorities for command of irregular conflict missions
and fielding of irregular conflict equipment similar to the authorities
Congress granted USSOCOM. Similarly, and again like USSOCOM, the
Marines should be granted special irregular conflict acquisition
authorities so that they could rapidly integrate and field relevant
technology and equipment tailored for irregular conflicts. In addition,
it would be necessary to increase Marine force structure and transfer
some existing capabilities for irregular conflict from the Services;
the types of irregular conflict capabilities the other Services have
long refused to purchase and maintain. This would include slower fixed-
wing aircraft for reconnaissance and close fire support; brown- and
green-water vessels for inland waterways and coastal patrol boats; up-
armored vehicles; etc. The Marines would maintain a prudent technology
base for irregular conflict capabilities that could be modified and
expanded as circumstances warrant, much as they have tried to do with
non-lethal weapons. It should be relatively easy for the Marines to
integrate these kinds of irregular conflict capabilities since they
already have air, naval, amphibious, ground and support capabilities
that are integrated down to the tactical level.
With USSOCOM taking the lead on small unit irregular conflict
missions like the raid on Bin Laden's hideaway and the advisory mission
to the Philippines, and the Marines taking responsibility for larger
direct interventions against irregular opponents such as we faced in
Afghanistan and Iraq, the nation would be much better prepared for
irregular conflicts. And the Services would not be distracted from
their focus on major combat operations. Instead of spending valuable
senior leader time and scarce training resources on difficult programs
like regionally-aligned brigades, the Army, Navy and Air Force could
concentrate on reestablishing our diminishing lead in major combat
operations.
This division of labor would be more efficient in the short and
long-term. Short-term savings would come from abandoning universal
requirements like language training, irregular forces at major combat
training centers, efforts to improve training of foreign forces
throughout our force structure, etc. Critical irregular conflict
requirements such as force protection (e.g. up-armored vehicles),
discriminate force (e.g. non-lethal weapons, Military Police);
intelligence (e.g. persistent counter-insurgent ISR, Human Terrain
Teams, Foreign Area Officers and programs), persuasion (e.g.
psychological operations), and command and control (e.g. multi-level
shared communications architectures) and other niche capabilities (e.g.
countering-IEDs) could be transferred and consolidated under USSOCOM
and the Marine Corps.
The Department of Defense already expends considerable resources to
maintain a high state of readiness for SOF and the Marines,
particularly in training, air and sea-lift, and amphibious
capabilities. These organizations are already postured for global,
expeditionary operations with minimum overseas infrastructure. It is
inherently more efficient to ask them to serve as the first, second and
preferred proponents for irregular conflict than to ask all the
Services to maintain readiness for the same. For example, the Marines
already have the expeditionary infrastructure to manage brown- and
green-water operations more efficiently than the Navy, and provide
responsive close air support in irregular conflict operations more
readily than the Air Force.
Over the long-term the Department of Defense could expect better
performance and additional savings from operational efficiencies.
Assigning the irregular conflict mission to USSOCOM and the U.S. Marine
Corps would increase the chances that such operations could be
conducted with a small footprint and expert command and control.
Irregular conflict requires inherently ``joint,'' interagency and
multinational operations. Both USSOCOM and the Marines are
intrinsically joint and capable of working with interagency partners as
demonstrated historically and in recent operations. SOF are
particularly well adapted to work through third parties with small
numbers of advisors. If an irregular conflict problem exceeded SOCOM's
capacity the Marines could draw upon those historical, cultural and
structural attributes that make them a more efficient irregular
conflict mission partner than the larger Services, including a higher
tooth-to-tail ratio. \7\ If, in extreme circumstances, the other
Services were needed they would support the Marines and SOF. Inverting
the general rule that the largest forces have the top command slots
would help ensure tactical irregular operations are controlled by
appropriate expertise from the beginning.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ It has been argued that the ``every marine is a rifleman''
ethos ``allows a high degree of adaptability'' for irregular warfare
missions. Michael R Melillo, ``Outfitting a Big-War Military with
Small-War Capabilities,'' Parameters. Carlisle Barracks: Autumn
2006.Vol.36, Issue 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This new division of labor makes particular sense in a time of
declining resources when organizations naturally focus on what they
consider to be their ``core competencies.'' A better division of labor
takes advantage of this natural tendency to focus on core missions by
reducing duplication and increasing specialization (i.e. competence).
Currently Army efficiency is undermined by the view that it should be a
``full-spectrum'' rather than a decisive land force. For example, a
proper active-reserve balance would be easier to achieve if the Army
focused just on decisive land battle. Similarly, Marine Corps
efficiency would improve if the Marines' strategic concept
unequivocally included irregular conflict. The Department of Defense
already absorbs the cost of amphibious expeditionary units that have
air, sea and land elements in an organization that has historically
conducted irregular conflict well. It is more efficient to ask that
organization to expand its existing elements to include capabilities
for irregular conflict. In an emergency, the Marines--supported by Air
Force and other naval forces--would still pack enough punch to stop
most conventional aggressors until the Army arrived on the scene.
reforming pentagon decision making
Limited Pentagon decision-making capacity also constrains the
effectiveness of military operations. A decade ago the 2006 Quadrennial
Defense Review report put major emphasis on improving decision-making
capacity. It said ``the complex strategic environment demands that our
structure and processes be streamlined and integrated to better support
the President and joint warfighter;'' and ``recent operational
experiences demonstrated the need to bring further agility, flexibility
and horizontal integration to the defense support infrastructure.'' The
report asserted the Department had ``moved steadily toward a more
integrated and transparent senior decision-making culture and process
for both operational and investment matters;'' that it had ``made
substantial strides in . . . the creation of new organizations and
processes that cut across traditional stovepipes;'' and ``most
importantly, the Department has made notable progress toward an
outcome-oriented, capabilities-based planning approach that provides
the joint warfighter with the capabilities needed to address a wider
range of asymmetric challenges.'' \8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, D.C.: Dept. of
Defense, 2006: pp. 65ff.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The report was correct about the need to improve Pentagon decision-
making capacity, but overly optimistic about the amount of progress in
that direction. Like many organizations the Pentagon is divided into
hierarchical structures that represent different bodies of expertise:
e.g. policy, intelligence, personnel, program analysis, acquisition,
and budgeting. Within these bodies are subdivisions that further
specialize in more narrowly defined subjects. These stove piped
divisions each build and nurture expertise in a relatively narrow body
of knowledge. There are advantages to such organizations but typically
they are incapable of rapid, integrated decision making, which the 2006
report acknowledged the Pentagon needed to keep pace with the evolving
security environment. That conclusion is even more valid today.
The Pentagon has elaborate processes and laborious coordination
procedures to integrate diverse expertise across its functional
organizations. Generally speaking, however, these attempts at
integration produce compromises that paper over critical assumptions,
distinctions, and differences of opinion that need to be resolved.
Separate organizations in in the Office of the Secretary of Defense
lead various stages of these decision-making processes. Each office
leading a component part of the strategy process depends on other
parties in the process to do their work well and protect the integrity
of the decision process. Each organizational boundary crossed opens up
an opportunity for the dilution of strategic logic.
The overall process values compromise more than clear choices among
competing alternatives. All organizations' equities are protected to
the extent possible, which results in long lists of desired objectives.
Offices managing the process further down the logic chain use those
wide-ranging priorities as justification for picking and choosing their
own areas to emphasize, which loosens the strategy logic, sometimes
beyond recognition. The same types of compromises affect the Joint
Staff's efforts to create meaningful joint operational concepts.
Because the Department cannot make trades at these broader levels in
the analytic chain of reasoning--strategy, planning and operational
concepts--the rest of the downstream processes--requirements, programs
and budgets--is managed without the benefit of broader context. \9\
Each link in the chain of reasoning tends to operate semi-autonomously.
Thus the process is not truly ``strategy driven,'' which is a major
reason the Department is unable to rationally allocate resources to
produce the most valuable capabilities for the most important missions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ The bureaucratic factors shaping these processes are further
described in Christopher Lamb, ``Pentagon Strategies,'' in David
Ochmanek and Michael Sulmeyer, eds., Challenges in U.S. National
Security Policy: A Festschrift Volume Honoring Edward L. (Ted) Warner,
(Arlington, VA: RAND, 2014); and in ``Acquisition Reform: The Case of
MRAPs.'' Prepared Statement of Christopher J. Lamb before the House
Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, June 24, 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When diverse groups do meet to cooperate there are disincentives
for information sharing and collaboration. Involving other parties
slows and waters down the resultant products. One Joint Staff
assessment in support of the 2006 QDR effort identified over 860 cross-
cutting groups that Joint Staff personnel attended. All but a handful
of these groups were information-sharing and not decision-making
bodies. Even so, they shared information incompletely because extant
organizational incentives militate against transparency. When measured
by what they produce, these groups absorb large amounts of staff time
and energy without producing what the Chairman and Secretary need most,
which is truly integrated assessments of problems, their causes and
preferred solutions.
The bureaucracy's penchant for producing consensus products
encourages talented and highly motivated officials to get their
positions directly to senior decision-makers by circumventing the
formal coordination process. If the issue is simply a narrow functional
concern, then a quick decision this way can be made without much risk.
But the most important issues are increasingly multidisciplinary or
cross-functional, and proposals presented by one functional entity
invariably reflect a limited perspective that does not benefit from all
relevant information. The narrow, functional proposals presented to the
Secretary and Deputy Secretary often contradict one another, and with
the limited information provided, it is difficult for these senior
officials to determine which position is the more compelling and why.
Thus it is difficult for senior leaders to make well-reasoned tradeoffs
among competing alternatives.
In essence, Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries have to serve as
their own integrators of functional expertise, diving deeply into the
issues that matter most to them to investigate the ``stove piped'' or
``least common denominator'' products they receive and root out
critical issues. This is what Secretary Gates did to ensure the
delivery of needed armor and theater intelligence and surveillance
assets to Iraq. Yet this is a difficult task for Secretaries of Defense
and an inefficient use of their limited time. Pentagon organizations
husband their information carefully. Data is safeguarded; analysis is
not collaborative, methods, metrics and lexicon are not common or
agreed upon; and institutional knowledge is not easily retained or
retrieved for the benefit of all components. So it takes a great deal
of time for the Secretary and Deputy Secretary to assess the competing
positions presented to them. Moreover, they are constrained by the
political liabilities of overriding powerful personalities and
institutional interests. Hence, decisions tend to be made slowly if at
all, or if in response to a crisis, made without the benefit of
requisite information and supporting analysis.
Not surprisingly, these circumstances frustrate Secretaries and
Deputy Secretaries, who feel poorly supported by their staff. They
often conclude, incorrectly, that it is the sheer size of the staff
that prevents better decision support. In reality, it is the inability
of their functional leaders to collaborate and produce integrated
problem assessments and solution proposals. Staffs could be cut in half
and the Secretary would receive 50 percent less paperwork, but he would
not receive one smidgen more of the better integrated products he
needs. In reality, Pentagon middle managers and action officers are
working extremely hard; just not to good effect. The Pentagon's large
staff ends up working marginal resource allocation issues, and consumes
too much time and energy for too little effect. In essence, large
amounts of the Secretary's most important and expensive commodity--
human talent--is wasted.
Improving decision-making capacity in the Department of Defense
requires holistic organizational reform. However, several fundamental
changes are especially important. The Secretary cannot be the first
point of integration for the Department's most important cross-
functional endeavors. He needs horizontal organizations empowered to
generate cross-cutting problem assessments and solution alternatives.
Such teams could manage cross-cutting functions for the Secretary but
also oversee real-world missions that require the rapid integration of
diverse functional specialties. They would examine problems ``end-to-
end'' and be the designated strategic integration point across all
bodies of expertise, freeing up senior leaders to focus on key
strategic decisions. The teams would intervene selectively to eliminate
friction and sub-optimal efforts where component parts of the
Department are not collaborating to maximum effect. The presumption is
that the Secretary will back up their authority to intervene and obtain
the results he wants. Leaders of functional organizations would be free
to focus on problems resident within their domains.
For the horizontal organizations to succeed, they must be
constituted correctly and their leaders empowered appropriately. They
must be given proper resources, to include office space, administrative
support, and members committed for specific periods of duration and
levels of effort. The groups also must be given clear objectives;
preferably a clear, written mandate that identifies what is to be
accomplished and why. The groups must be allowed to decide how to
accomplish their objectives, identify their metrics for evaluation and
feedback, and what expertise they need. Group members that represent
bodies of functional expertise must be given incentives to collaborate
with the other members of the group and not simply represent their
parent organization's interests. This means the group leader must be
able to return the expert in question to his parent organization and
must have a say on their evaluations. If these horizontal organizations
are not empowered, the reorganization efforts will fail. They will
simply become another layer of advisory groups that further confuse the
rest of the Pentagon entities about their respective roles and
responsibilities.
These cross-cutting teams would encounter less resistance from
functional organizations if the Department could do a better job of
determining which problems are actually cross-functional rather than
primarily the responsibility of a single functional domain. In this
regard the Department's tendency to label all operating concepts
``joint'' complicates a proper division of labor between the Services
and joint entities. Our broadest operating concepts are invariably
joint but many subordinate operating concepts like anti-submarine
warfare should be considered ``Service-centric'' and left to the
Services to formulate and update. There may be an element of joint
command and control or information sharing involved in Service-centric
military concepts of operation but the vast bulk of the requisite
expertise is resident in a single Service. Distinguishing between
operating concepts that are intrinsically joint, like theater air and
missile defense, and concepts that are largely the preserve of one
Service, would make a meaningful division of labor between the Services
and joint entities much easier.
To better support decision making by senior officials and their
cross-cutting teams, the Pentagon also needs a reformed decision
support culture. In the training revolutions of the 1970s the Services
transformed their combat capabilities by introducing objective,
empirical feedback into training exercises with the aid of new
simulation technologies and after-action reports to improve learning
and future battlespace decision making. The new training approaches
instilled respect for collaboration, information sharing, and empirical
objectivity. A similar transformation of Pentagon decision support
capabilities is needed, and it would require sustained attention from
the Secretary.
To begin with, the Secretary would have to make a point of
insisting on collaboration from senior leaders. He can do this through
his personal example and key hiring decisions. The Secretary also would
need a small technical support staff that I have referred to elsewhere
as a Decision Support Cell, \10\ to oversee the new approach to
information sharing in support of analysis. The cell would ensure that
decision support is transparent, based upon clear assumptions about
security challenges and options to meet those challenges. In
particular, it would be responsible for ensuring all organizations have
equal access to the same joint scenarios (to bound the assumptions
about priority problem sets); authoritative joint operating concepts
(testable preferred ways to solve operational problems); joint data
(common assumptions about forces, performance, terrain, etc.); joint
methods of analysis (transparent means of assessing risk); joint
operational risk metrics (standards for measuring value and risk); and
repositories of institutional knowledge (the means to retrieve and
build upon knowledge). Currently no single entity has the authority to
produce these necessary precursors for good analysis of alternatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Christopher Lamb and Irving Lachow, ``Reforming Pentagon
Decisionmaking with a Decision Support Cell,'' Strategic Forum No. 221,
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University,
July 2006.
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Finally, the Department needs some selective investments in greater
jointness that would allow it to empirically test and exercise
innovative improvements in operational military capabilities. Even
though Joint Forces Command was disbanded and widely assessed as
inefficient, we still need the ability to generate standing joint task
force headquarters that can conduct realistic experimentation in and
testing of innovative joint operating concepts. The Services have the
technical capacity and resources to fully explore Service-centric
operating concepts, but we lack commensurate capability to test new
joint concepts with joint headquarters.
In fact, the ability to optimize joint headquarters and operations
has largely eluded us. It is stunning to realize that we were not even
able to achieve unified command of all military forces in Afghanistan
until 10 years of war had passed. Secretary Gates is forthright in
acknowledging command relationships in Afghanistan were a ``jerry-
rigged arrangement [that] violated every principle of the unity of
command.'' \11\ SOF and conventional forces had trouble coordinating
their operations, and even within the SOF community, which ostensibly
shares a common chain of command and considers unified effort a core
organizational value, we could not achieve unified effort. Despite
broad agreement among national security leaders, USSOCOM leaders and
many individual SOF commanders that the indirect approach to
counterinsurgency should take precedence over kill/capture operations,
the opposite occurred. SOF units pursuing counterterrorism took
precedence and often failed to sufficiently coordinate their efforts
with other SOF units conducting counterinsurgency. It is apparent we
need a much more aggressive effort to field truly joint task force
headquarters and experiment with the same during peacetime.
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\11\ Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New
York: Knopf, 2014): 206.
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enabling unified effort in the national security system
The national security system's inability to routinely integrate the
efforts of diverse departments and agencies has long been recognized,
but the impact of this limitation on successful military operations is
less appreciated. For example, it is widely assumed that senior leaders
are uniquely responsible for the unsatisfactory outcomes in Afghanistan
and Iraq. When things go wrong it is natural to blame leaders,
reasoning that things would have gone better if they had made better
decisions. It also is understandable that poor outcomes are often
linked to common decision- making errors such as flawed assumptions,
improper analogies, tunnel vision, and cognitive dissonance. Almost by
definition when things go badly, these types of limitations are in play
to some extent. However, it is also important to acknowledge that
leaders are not in complete control of outcomes and that they are
constrained to make their decisions within an organizational and
political system with behaviors they do not fully control. For these
reasons, good outcomes are not always the result of great decision
making, and bad outcomes are not always the result of flawed decision
making. The war in Iraq is a case in point.
A close examination of the historical record demonstrates that
disunity of effort provides a better explanation for what went wrong in
Iraq than the belief that senior leaders based their decisions on
optimistic assumptions, made them without examining a sufficient range
of options, or failed to adjust their decisions as circumstances
changed. For example, many believe U.S. leaders made the ``heroic''
assumption that Iraqis would welcome U.S. forces with open arms and
there would be no civil unrest in response to the overthrow of Saddam
Hussein's regime. U.S. leaders were not so naive. They thought the
majority Shiite population would welcome Saddam's ouster but the Sunnis
much less so, and that in any case whatever welcome U.S. forces
received would not last. Intelligence on Iraq predicted a ``short
honeymoon period'' after deposing Saddam, and almost all decision-
makers in Defense, State, and the White House worried that an extended
American occupation would be costly and irritate the local population.
Most senior leaders preferred a ``light footprint'' approach in both
Afghanistan and Iraq. As many commentators have noted, there were
multiple planning efforts prior to the war by State, Defense, and other
national security institutions that underscored how difficult the
occupation might be. These insights found a ready audience in the Bush
administration, which came to office disdaining extended nation-
building missions and warning that the U.S. military was ``most
certainly not designed to build a civilian society.'' \12\
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\12\ Condoleezza Rice, ``Campaign 2000: Promoting the National
Interest,'' Foreign Affairs, January/February 2000.
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Yet there were deep disagreements among senior leaders about how
best and how fast to pass authority to the Iraqis while reducing U.S.
presence. The Department of Defense preference was a short transition
period for military forces with a quick turnover of authority to Iraqi
expatriates. The Department of State, including Secretary Colin Powell
(and later Ambassador Bremer), did not want an extended occupation of
Iraq either. However, State believed it would be difficult to find
others willing to take responsibility for the future of Iraq and that
the United States would have to do so since it had engineered the war.
State wanted the speed and scale of U.S. postwar activities
commensurate with the U.S. interests at stake. It thought the quickest
way out of Iraq was to make the maximum effort to stabilize it
following the termination of large-scale fighting, which meant a large
ground force for security, plenty of development assistance, and as
much international support as could be mustered.
The White House explicitly considered the U.S. obligation to Iraq
after deposing Saddam Hussein. The President decided to give Iraqis a
chance at democracy because he thought it was the right thing to do,
albeit not a vital security interest for the United States. This
decision meant State and DOD could not ignore the postwar mission but
left plenty of wiggle room for disagreements about how the mission
should be conducted. The two departments obliged. They disagreed over
the importance of ensuring good governance in Afghanistan and Iraq,
over the appropriate level of U.S. commitment to this mission, over how
it should be carried out, and over which department would do what to
execute postwar tasks. These disagreements should not have been a
surprise; they had been a longstanding bone of contention between the
two departments.
Consistent with previous experience, President Bush did not resolve
the differences. The President gave the lead for postwar planning to
DOD to preserve ``unified effort.'' But he also promised Ambassador
Bremer that he would have the authority and time he needed to stabilize
Iraq (that is, to take the Department of State approach). As the
situation deteriorated, State was increasingly adamant about security
and DOD was increasingly adamant about early departure for U.S. forces.
State increased its appeals for more troops, while Rumsfeld's generals
told him counterinsurgency was an intelligence-dependent mission and
that more troops would be counterproductive. When Ambassador Bremer
worried the Department of Defense was setting him up to take
responsibility for failure by pushing an accelerated schedule for
turning over authority to the Iraqis, President Bush reiterated his
promise to support more time and resources for Iraq. The NSC staff
refereed the debates between State and DOD, looking for ways to effect
compromises. The views of the two departments were not reconciled and
the success of the postwar mission was compromised--not because of
optimistic assumptions about Iraqi sentiments, but because differences
between strong departments were not managed well.
I believe our greatest, most persistent, most deleterious
implementation problem in Afghanistan and Iraq was our inability to
integrate the vast capabilities resident in the national system for
best effect. Many blue-ribbon commissions and senior Department of
Defense leaders agree. General Wayne Downing, a former four-star
commander of the nation's special operations forces, argued after 9/11
that, ``the interagency system has become so lethargic and
dysfunctional that it materially inhibits the ability to apply the vast
power of the U.S. government on problems,'' a fact made evident by
``our operations in Iraq and in Afghanistan'' and elsewhere. \13\
Several Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also are on record
lamenting insufficient interagency cooperation, including General
Richard Meyers \14\ and General Peter Pace. General Pace, after years
of managing the military portion of the effort against Al-Qaeda, argued
the enemy could not be defeated without better interagency cooperation.
He bluntly concluded, ``We do not have a mechanism right now to make
that happen.'' \15\ Pace and other senior military officers argued for
legislation to force interagency cooperation much as the Goldwater
Nichols legislation at the end of the 1980s forced joint cooperation
among the military services. \16\
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\13\ Shanker, Thom, ``Study Is Said to Find Overlap in U.S.
Counterterror Effort,'' New York Times, March 18, 2006.
\14\ 2nd Annual C4ISR Summit, August 20, 2003, Danvers,
Massachusetts, Selected Speeches, Testimony, Articles, October 2001-
September 2005, page 225.
\15\ ``Pace Calls for Better Interagency Work,'' UPI, August 9,
2007.
\16\ Naler, Christopher L. Unity of Effort: An Interagency
Combatant Command. Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Center,
2005, 4. .
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Recent Secretaries of Defense are also on record complaining that
interagency mechanisms do not work well. Secretary Cohen called the
interagency policymaking process in the late 1990s ``dysfunctional,''
and Secretary Rumsfeld made the same point, saying the endless and
fruitless interagency meetings he participated in ``sucked the life''
out of senior officials. He told the 9/11 Commission that a legislative
fix was needed. When Secretary Robert Gates replaced Secretary Rumsfeld
he told Congress that:
Nearly nine years under four Presidents on the National
Security Council staff taught me well about the importance of
interagency collaboration and cooperation. The U.S. clearly
needs a government-wide approach to the challenges we face
today and will face in the future. If confirmed, this type of
interagency collaboration and cooperation will be one of my
priorities. \17\
\17\ United States. ``Advance Policy Questions for Dr. Robert M.
Gates.'' Posed by the Senate Armed Services Committee. 5 December 2006.
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Not long into his tenure as Secretary of Defense, however,
Secretary Gates concluded wholesale reform of the national security
system was needed to improve cross-organizational collaboration. \18\
He noted: ``The U.S. government has tried, incrementally, to modernize
our posture and processes in order to improve interagency planning and
cooperation mostly through a series of new directives, offices,
coordinators, tsars, and various initiatives,'' and he concluded these
half-measures were insufficient. \19\ Two years later he was even more
emphatic, arguing that: ``America's interagency toolkit is a hodgepodge
of jerry-rigged arrangements constrained by a dated and complex
patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in resources, and
unwieldy processes.'' \20\ Michelle Flournoy, Secretary Gates' Under
Secretary of Defense for policy matters later added an exclamation
point to his concerns:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Robert M. Gates. ``Landon Lecture'' (speech, Kansas State
University, November 26, 2007), Department of Defense, http://
www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199.
\19\ Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates,
Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, DC),
Saturday, January 26, 2008.
\20\ Robert M. Gates. Remarks at The Nixon Center, February 24,
2010, available at www.nixoncenter.org/
index.cfm?action=showpage&page=2009-Robert-Gates-Transcript.
To put it bluntly, we're trying to face 21st century threats
with national security processes and tools that were designed
for the Cold War--and with a bureaucracy that sometimes seems
to have been designed for the Byzantine Empire, which, you will
recall, didn't end well . . . .We're still too often rigid when
we need to be flexible, clumsy when we need to be agile, slow
when we need to be fast, focused on individual agency equities
when we need to be focused on the broader whole of government
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
mission. \21\
\21\ Garamone, Jim. ``Flournoy Calls for Better Interagency
Cooperation.'' American Forces Press Service. 11 June 2010. .
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In other words, we have long recognized that insufficient unity of
effort in the national security system is a major handicap for
successful military operations, but we have been at a loss for how to
correct this liability. My hope is that recent research from National
Defense University can help point the way forward.
Various senior leaders and studies increasingly argue for
interagency groups that operate as teams (sometimes labeled as fusion
cells, task forces, etc.). \22\ One problem with such recommendations
is that they are short on details that explain how these constructs
would differ from current interagency groups. For example, when the
Project on National Security Reform recommended ``empowered''
interagency teams, it was able to cite only a few positive examples of
such phenomena that were revealed by mass media or personal accounts
from practitioners. To rectify this shortcoming, researchers at
National Defense University made a point several years ago of producing
in-depth studies of four rare but highly successful interagency teams:
\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ The author is on record as a proponent of interagency teams.
See ``Overcoming Interagency Problems.'' Prepared Statement of
Christopher J. Lamb before the Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and
Capabilities Subcommittee on Implementing the Global War on Terror,
U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of
Representatives, March 15, 2006. Others have made the same
recommendation. For example, see Project Horizon Progress Report,
Washington D.C., Summer 2006.
\23\ The cases studies are: ``Deception, Disinformation, and
Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major
Difference''; http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/
stratperspective/inss/Strategic-Perspectives-11.pdf; ``Joint
Interagency Task Force-South: The Best Known, Least Understood
Interagency Success''; http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/
stratperspective/inss/Strategic-Perspectives-5.pdf; ``The Bosnian Train
and Equip Program: A Lesson in Interagency Integration of Hard and Soft
Power''; http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/
inss/Strategic-Perspectives-15.pdf; Post 2001: ``9/11,
Counterterrorism, and the Senior Interagency Strategy Team: Interagency
Small Group Performance in Strategy Formulation and Implementation'';
http://thesimonscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/IAS-003-
APRIL14.pdf; and ``Secret Weapon: High-value Target Teams as an
Organizational Innovation''; http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/
Documents/stratperspective/inss/Strategic-Perspectives-4.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the Active Measures Working Group, which countered Soviet
disinformation successfully for most of the 1980s and sent shock waves
to the top of the Soviet political apparatus at virtually no cost to
the United States;
the Bosnia Train and Equip task force, which stabilized
the military balance in Bosnia and helped secure the peace in the
aftermath of vicious inter-ethnic fighting;
the leadership group at Joint Interagency Task Force
South, which runs an organization that accounts for more than 80
percent of all federal, state and local government disruption of
cocaine shipments;
and the interagency High Value Targeting teams used by
Special Operations Forces to put terrorists and insurgents on the
defensive and set the stage in 2007 for the dramatic reversal of the
security situation in Iraq.
A careful comparison of the case studies reveals several
prerequisites for success. Many interagency groups fail to perform well
because representatives attending initial meetings begin to doubt that
senior leaders care whether the effort succeeds or not. Evidence that
senior leaders strongly support the group's mission is therefore a
critical first prerequisite. The nature of the support senior leaders
provide varied in the cases studied, but was sufficient to strongly
suggest that both Congress and the Executive Branch leaders considered
the missions assigned to the groups national priorities and wanted them
pursued on an interagency basis. These preferences were communicated
formally through directives and mandates, and informally through
attention paid to the groups and their issues. Otherwise, the senior
leaders generally allowed the groups great latitude, and did not
provide a lot of overt intervention to smooth the way to success.
After senior leader support, agreement on purpose seems to be the
next most important precondition for success. The case studies suggest
it is possible to start with a broad idea of the group's mission and
then forge a more specific concept for execution as the group better
understands the problems it is tackling. All four groups also benefited
from access to required resources, although they were managed
differently by each group. When senior leaders make a point of
providing special resources for a group it reinforces and communicates
their support. Not all missions require the same types or amounts of
resources, however. For example, in the case of the group charged with
countering Soviet disinformation, the primary resource required was
information resident in multiple departments and agencies about Soviet
activities and techniques. In the case of the U.S. program to arm and
train Bosnian Federation forces, substantial amounts of cash and
equipment were required.
The next most important prerequisite for success was team
leadership. Successful team leaders exhibited a propensity for taking
charge, taking risk, and assuming responsibility for outcomes. They put
mission success ahead of parent organization's preferences, which was
risky bureaucratic behavior. Successful interagency team leaders all
delegated substantial authority, trusted their subordinates and
encouraged initiative. Interestingly, teams were able to produce great
results with a mix of high performing and mainstream personnel from
diverse departments and agencies and without an extraordinary reward
system in place. Some enduring teams shifted from more mainstream
membership to higher performers as time went by and recruiting new team
members became easier. However, the ability of these teams to perform
at a high level with the members initially assigned to them is
noteworthy.
It also is interesting that team members proved highly productive
without tangible incentives. The vast majority of members on all the
teams had no expectations of personal recognition or monetary rewards,
either before or during their service. On the contrary, many assumed
their careers would be put on hold or retarded by assignment to the
teams. It was actually more important for team leaders to provide
positive feedback to the departments and agencies providing the
personnel than to the personnel themselves. This was true for all four
teams, although some team leaders made of point of making their team
members feel appreciated. What team members in all four cases did
receive, however, were huge psychological dividends when it became
clear they were making a difference on important missions. As a result,
most members were devoted to their teams and motivated to work long
hours--around the clock and seven days a week when circumstances
demanded it.
In addition, successful teams also required some unique structure.
In particular, they greatly benefited from colocation and full-time
focus on their missions. Small size was another common structural
attribute. All the groups were between seven and fifteen persons (in
the case of Joint Interagency Task Force South, the organization's
leadership team was this size). However, all four teams aggressively
pursued support from outside the team by engaging senior leaders,
negotiating partnerships with other organizations, and monitoring
entities conducting work on behalf of the teams. Even more important
for high productivity, all four groups were structured for end-to-end
mission management. This meant that within the scope of their mission
they took responsibility for the entire sequence of functions required
to achieve desired outcomes. If the group operated at the national
level, as was true for the Reagan-era Active Measures Working Group and
the Clinton-era Bosnia Train and Equip task force, end-to-end mission
management meant taking responsibility for policy, strategy, plans,
operations, assessments and adjustments to all components of the
mission effort to ensure desired outcomes.
The willingness to take responsibility for all activities necessary
to produce results was critically dependent upon each group's
leadership. Typically an interagency group conceives its mission in
limited terms. At the national level, the strong inclination is to
limit an interagency group to just a policy or planning exercise. At
lower levels there is a tendency to limit a group's mission to whatever
the lead or most powerful participant prefers to do. However, in the
four success cases we studied, the team leaders accepted a broader
``end-to-end'' mission concept that increased responsibility for actual
results but also increased the risks of failure. In some cases, like
the Bosnia Train and Equip task force, the need to produce results in
the field was essentially part of the original mission statement. Even
so, the task force embraced the intensely operational responsibility
for results when they could have avoided doing so. In other cases, like
the Active Measures Working Group and Joint Interagency Task Force
South, the leaders dared to take responsibility for ``end-to-end''
mission performance when it was much less necessary.
The ``end-to-end'' conceptualization of all four missions was
critical for productivity. It encouraged responsibility and
accountability. Once the groups established their lead role for all
components of the mission, there were no acceptable excuses for poor
performance. There were no other actors working a portion of the
process that could be held responsible for failures. In such
circumstances, only the inherent difficulty of the mission or
inadequate group performance were likely explanations for poor results.
In all four cases, the interagency groups rose to the challenge and
held themselves accountable for demonstrable progress toward group
objectives.
The ``end-to-end'' approach adopted by the four groups did not mean
they operated independently or that they did everything themselves. The
groups received guidance. The groups had to work within the parameters
established by higher authorities. Sometimes the scope of the group's
activities was clear; other times it had to be discerned or explored.
For example, the Active Measures Working Group determined that it had
to concentrate on countering Soviet disinformation rather than taking
on more aggressive active measures against the Soviet Union. This was a
point of dispute in the group, but the leaders knew the more aggressive
measures would collapse support for the group and decided to leave
those efforts to a classified group working out of the National
Security Council staff.
The research identified other group attributes correlated with
success, including the need to preserve good to great levels of trust
and the ability to learn from experience, which includes leader support
for innovation and a willingness to delegate responsibilities. However,
the main point to be made here is that stellar interagency performance
is possible even in our current system; it's just exceedingly uncommon.
The reason for this is that the groups require special empowerment and
must work around strong system impediments and disincentives. We would
be much better served by a national security system that supports
rather than thwarts such interagency collaboration.
At first the prerequisites for success identified by our research
might seem mundane. Most people would assume that a team requires
adequate authority and resources to perform its mission well, \24\ and
that having senior leaders assign a small group a clear mission, a
capable leader and necessary resources meet those requirements.
However, it is important to note that the groups did not have the
directive authority that some observers believe is essential for high-
performing interagency groups. \25\ They were able to use the senior
leader support they received to encourage collaboration across
departments and agencies, and once they had a collaborative effort
under way, the legal authorities resident in multiple departments and
agencies were sufficient to accomplish their missions. Having directive
authority would make it easier to field and sustain high performing
interagency teams, but the case studies suggest it is not a necessary
precondition for success when other support is in place.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Bradley L. Kirkman and Benson Rosen, ``Antecedents and
Consequences of Team Empowerment,'' The Academy of Management Journal
42 no. 1 (Feb., 1999), 58-74.
\25\ Seidman notes ``many believe that [interagency committees] are
fatally flawed because there is no provision for a central directive
authority'' that could compel involuntary cooperation. Seidman, Harold.
Politics, Position, and Power: The Dynamics of Federal Organization.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1980: 219, 224.
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In addition, we need to recognize how rare it is for interagency
groups to have a clear purpose and adequate resources to accomplish
their missions in the current national security system. Most
interagency small groups are assigned broad missions without a clear
focus. It has long been argued that it is much more difficult for
standing interagency committees with general responsibilities for
coordination to perform effectively, in contrast to interagency groups
that are organized to pursue a more limited objective and that ``go out
of business once their assigned task if accomplished.'' \26\ Joint
Interagency Task Force South, which manages the counternarcotics
mission on a continuing basis, belies the notion that standing
interagency groups cannot perform well. However, it does seem from the
four cases researched that a well-defined mission and group consensus
on what is being accomplished are critically important to team
performance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Seidman argues ``standing interagency committees with
responsibility to coordinate in general (emphasis in original)''
perform much less well than ``ad hoc interagency groups organized to
study and report on specific problems.'' Harold Seidman,
``Coordination: The Search for the Philosopher's Stone,'' in Harold
Seidman and Robert S. Gilmour. Politics, Position, and Power: The
Dynamics of Federal Organization, 5th ed., (Oxford University Press:
New York, 1980): 217.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Normally interagency groups also lack the resources necessary to
accomplish their missions. Because of the way government is structured
and resourced, it is common to approve interagency strategies without
providing the resources essential for success. The participating
departments and agencies are expected to provide the resources
voluntarily. In the national security system, other departments and
agencies frequently look to the large Department of Defense to pick up
the tab for new initiatives, and it typically resists. The tendency to
assign missions without identifying commensurate resources for the
group means many interagency small group efforts are doomed to
fruitless bickering over which organization will pay, or to a loose
coordination effort since every organization naturally demands control
over any resources it contributes.
It is even rarer for interagency small groups in the national
security system to own an entire mission area as opposed to being
assigned just one segment of the enterprise; for example, establishing
policy; making plans; and executing some portion of the required
operations. Rarely does an interagency group manage its mission ``end-
to-end'' as was true for the four cases studied. Members of the four
successful groups believed mission focus and comprehensive
responsibility for the mission were keys to success. Groups with a more
diverse set of responsibilities that dilute the group's focus, and
groups that are responsible for only one segment of a mission chain
find it much more difficult to achieve success.
In the current system most small groups operate without directive
authority. Instead, they are based on the voluntary cooperation of the
departments and agencies that staff them. In cases where simple
information sharing is all that is necessary or desired, interagency
small groups can succeed. If active cooperation or a high performing
team is necessary, then interagency groups needs assistance to escape
the centrifugal forces that pull them apart and incline their members
to protect their parent organizations' equities rather than give
priority to the group's mission. Assuming our case studies are a good
representation of system tendencies, senior leaders who want an
interagency small group to succeed need to set it up for success by:
1) Communicating the group's mission clearly, the priority they
attach to it and the fact that it can only be undertaken on an
interagency basis;
2) Providing the group resources as required by the mission;
3) Finding a leader committed to the mission who is willing to
buck his own parent organization's predilections;
4) Permitting the group to collocate and work the problem full-
time if the mission's level of difficulty demands it; and
5) Allowing the leader and his or her team the latitude to manage
their problem ``end-to-end,'' or from strategy to its execution and
assessment, so that the group effectively controls all aspects of the
solution chain.
It helps if Congress supports the Executive Branch on the first two
points. In taking these steps it also helps if senior leaders provide
tangible evidence of the importance they attach to the interagency
group's mission. Implicit in these conditions is the recognition by all
parties (senior leadership, parent organizations and the team leader
and members) that mission success takes priority over protecting
department and agency preferences. If the group is established with the
opposite expectation it will not be able to solve a complex problem
\27\ and the wisdom of allocating scarce resources (human and materiel)
to the effort probably needs to be reevaluated.
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\27\ This is a lesson from a case study of the Senior Interagency
Strategy Team at the National Counterterrorism Center, which turned out
to have some major performance problems. Christopher Lamb and Lt Col
Erin Staine-Pyne, ``9/11, Counterterrorism, and the Senior Interagency
Strategy Team: Interagency Small Group Performance in Strategy
Formulation and Implementation,'' Col. Arthur D. Simons Center for the
Study of Interagency Cooperation, Ft. Leavenworth, March 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
High-level political support cleared the way for the four groups we
investigated to function, but did not guarantee their success. The
team's leader and members must exploit the opportunity they have been
given by forging a consensus on how to accomplish their assigned
purpose. They need to:
1) Define the group's purpose with an ``end-to-end''
conceptualization of the problem and solution, taking responsibility
for all activities necessary to achieve results;
2) Pursue an open if not collaborative decision making process;
3) Partner aggressively with other entities to manage each segment
of the end-to-end solution chain;
4) Establish and maintain trust among group members; and
5) Learn from experience and adjust accordingly to manage the
assigned problem well.
Although our case studies demonstrate that interagency
collaboration is possible in the current system, they also suggest why
it is an uncommon and fragile commodity. Successful interagency groups
require national leaders, group leaders and teams that are willing to
challenge the structure, decision-making norms, culture and incentives
of the current national security system. This is seldom the case, which
is why high performing interagency small groups are rare, and even when
they do occur, are prone to breakdown and atrophy.
Ironically, the President will need more help from Congress to
generate these kinds of interagency teams than the Secretary of Defense
would need for producing cross-functional teams in the Department of
Defense. One reason for this is that the authorities of the President's
cabinet members are well-established in law and not easily overridden
except by direct personal intervention by the President. This point was
illustrated by the Department of Defense shortly after 9/11. The
Department cited current law on the chain of command for our armed
forces to argue Defense had to be put in charge of everything involving
Iraq. ``No one else could take charge of security, because no one else
had the legal authority to command our armed forces.'' Thus, Defense
argued, if the President wanted ``unity of leadership'' and ``unity of
effort'' he would have to put the Secretary of Defense in charge of
everything involving Iraq. \28\ Defense thought this argument was
conclusive and it apparently convinced the President. However, the
actual result of making Defense the lead agency for Iraq was less
unified effort.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the
Dawn of the War on Terrorism (New York: Harper, 2008): p. 316.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Legislation allowing the president to appoint leaders, or what some
call ``mission managers,'' to run interagency teams is also probably a
legal requirement. Gordon Lederman, the former leader of the Project on
National Security Reform's Legal Working Group, argues that, ``Any
individual in the interagency space who exercises meaningful authority
to compel departments to act'' would have to be an ``officer of the
United States,'' and officers of the United States must have their
positions established by statute as required by the Appointments Clause
of the Constitution. Codifying mission manager authorities in statute
would also help secure resources for the President's priority
interagency missions: ``The President may create structures and
processes and fund them temporarily by transferring resources, but
ultimately it is Congress that provides resources on a sustained basis.
Without Congress's input and resources, a presidentially-imposed
solution to interagency integration may wither for lack of funding.''
\29\ Thus, the legislation allowing the president to delegate his
integration authorities should also include a mechanism for funding
interagency team activities and provide for associated congressional
oversight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Gordon Lederman, ``National Security Reform for the Twenty-
first Century: A New National Security Act and Reflections on
Legislation's Role in Organizational Change,'' Journal of National
Security Law and Policy, vol. 3 (2009), 363ff. See also Christopher
Lamb and Edward Marks, ``Chief of Mission Authority as a Model for
National Security Integration,'' Strategic Perspectives, Institute for
National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, December 2010,
p. 10.
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In addition to legislation, it would be important to structure and
lead the teams well. The Project on National Security Reform has
proposed some baseline standards for such groups that would be a good
place to begin. If such teams were empowered and structured to emulate
the attributes of teams that have performed well in the past, the
President would find them useful. Empowered teams would produce better
strategy because they would be less susceptible to the bureaucratic and
political pressures that militate against strategy formulation. \30\
They also would execute strategy with much greater unity of effort.
Hence they would be more effective, and the President would be inclined
to use them more frequently. Their use would then proliferate, which
would create the need for some complementary reforms in the National
Security Council staff.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ The bureaucratic and political pressures that militate against
strategy are discussed at length in ``Pentagon Strategies,'' and
``National-Level Coordination and Implementation,'' op. cit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the use of interagency teams increases, the need to de-conflict
their efforts will grow. Such teams tend to pursue their objectives
with great determination and without regard for work in adjacent or
overlapping strategic challenges. The good news is that the National
Security Council staff, freed from intense issue management, could then
pay more attention to system management and better de-conflict the work
of the interagency teams. It also would be important to ensure such
teams were not assigned inappropriate problems to solve; i.e. ones that
are not inherently cross-functional. If the teams encroached on issue
areas that are predominantly the responsibility of one department or
agency, there would be much greater substantive and political
resistance to their use.
Ultimately, these developments would move us in the direction of a
new model for the National Security Advisor and staff. Contrary to
conventional wisdom, the choice is not merely between an ``honest
broker,'' and ``a commanding intellect,'' or some combination thereof.
What the President needs is a ``system manager'' with responsibility
for making the national security system better serve presidential
intent. The Project on National Security Reform has made a detailed
case for how such a revised national security staff should work. \31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Forging a New Shield. Arlington, VA: Center for the Study of
the Presidency, Project on National Security Reform, 2008; available
at: http://0183896.netsolhost.com/site/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/
pnsr--forging--a--new--shield--report.pdf.
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conclusion
In my estimation our historic unpreparedness for irregular
conflict, our inability to rationally allocate defense resources to
priority military capabilities and missions, and the lack of unified
effort among our departments and agencies are major impediments to
improving military effectiveness. Fixing these problems will be as
difficult as it is necessary. Not fixing them means we will continue to
be vulnerable to irregular threat in an age where small groups have the
intent and increasingly the capability to execute catastrophic
terrorist attacks; that potential adversaries will be much more likely
to close the gap on our advantages in major combat operations; and that
future national security missions will experience the same frustrating
lack of unified purpose and effort that has handicapped and in some
cases crippled us in the past.
For all these reasons I am encouraged and appreciative of the
Senate Armed Services Committee's decision to thoroughly investigate
Pentagon performance issues. Congress has intervened to improve
military capabilities in the past, and done so to very good effect when
it has developed a deep understanding of the underlying causes of
performance problems. The Committee's thorough, bipartisan approach to
identifying the root causes of behaviors that limit military
performance is altogether laudatory and a great encouragement to those
of us who work on defense matters. I wish you every success and would
like to again express my appreciation for the opportunity to share my
thoughts on this vital subject.Christopher Lamb with Megan Franco,
``National-Level Coordination and Implementation: How System Attributes
Trumped Leadership,'' in Richard D. Hooker, Jr., and Joseph J. Collins,
Hooker and Joseph Collins, eds., Lessons Encountered: Learning from the
Long War, National Defense University Press, 2015.
Chairman McCain. Thank you very much, Doctor.
Let us start out with a fairly easy one. Is there a reason
why we should have a NORTHCOM and a SOUTHCOM? And is there a
reason for us to have an AFRICOM that is based in Germany right
next to your old command, Admiral Stavridis? And let me add
onto that question. Is there not now a need, as much as we are
trying to reduce and streamline--is there not now a need for a
Cyber Command, given the nature of that threat? I will begin
with you, General.
General Schwartz. Sir, the original thinking on NORTHCOM
was concern about having assigned forces to a senior officer
with responsibility for the U.S., the domestic circumstances.
That notion foreclosed at the time the possibility of having a
joint command for both North and South America. It is time now
with the passage of time to consolidate both of those
organizations, as Admiral Stavridis suggested.
The rationale for AFRICOM was somewhat different. As you
will recall, there was actually an effort to place AFRICOM on
the African continent.
Chairman McCain. That did not turn out too well.
General Schwartz. It did not. But you can appreciate how
that thought process sort of preempted other considerations at
the time. But again, with the passage of time, that is an act
of consolidation that certainly makes sense to me.
And with respect to CYBERCOM [U.S. Cyber Command], yes.
Once they have assigned forces, it is time to establish
CYBERCOM as an independent COCOM.
Chairman McCain. Admiral?
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I think we absolutely should merge
NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM, not only for the efficiencies, but I
think there are cultural connections that are important to get
Canada and Mexico, two of the largest economies in the
Americas, into the flow with our work and our world to the
south. Predictably, there will be some objections based on
NORAD [North American Aerospace Defense Command]. I think that
can be easily handled with a subunified command in some way.
AFRICOM was a good experiment, but I think it is time to
admit merging it back together. The forces, as you said, are
all in Europe. And I think those connections between Europe and
Africa actually would be very positive and in some sense well
received in the African world.
And then Cyber Command I have already addressed. I think it
is absolutely time to do it. The real question we should be
considering, do we want to go one step further to a cyber
force?
Chairman McCain. That is really important. Thank you.
Doctor?
Dr. Lamb. I would not have strong feelings on the span of
control we assign to the combatant commands, but I would make
the following observation. I think that decision is probably
best linked to other recommendations that have been made here
today, including whether we increase and beef up our ability to
field joint task forces, standing joint task forces, whether we
have a general staff, or we have the Chairman in the chain of
command. I think that would impact a lot the effective span of
control the combatant commanders could exercise.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
And this whole issue of the joint task forces I think is
one of the most important aspects of it, obviously, since there
is now a gap between the organizations in being and the
appointment in every crisis of a joint task force, whether it
comes from that command or from others. It is obvious that is
where the operations are.
Finally, in a more philosophical plane here, one of the
much criticized but yet pretty successful staff structure has
been the German general staff, names like Schlieffen and
Ludendorff and others, as well as Keitel and others. And every
time we start talking about centralizing authority in the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that issue is raised.
The German general staff system is not something that we want
to emulate, and yet, there are others who say that it was not
because of the staff system that they lost, it was for other
reasons.
So give me more of a fundamental view. Do you want to
centralize this much power in the hands of one individual or
authority in the hands of this one individual? General?
General Schwartz. Mr. Chairman, I would not create a
general staff. I actually believe that there is risk of having
the brilliant few become self-serving. However, it is not
necessary that a Chairman in the chain of command connect to a
general staff. By retaining a similar arrangement as we have
now, where the Joint Staff is a creature of the Joint Chiefs,
you minimize concern about a rogue individual.
Admiral Stavridis. I would at least have a robust
discussion about the pros and cons of a general staff, in
addition to placing the Chairman atop it operationally.
In terms of the concerns raised about the German general
staff, you know, that rattles old ghosts in our memories, but
at the end of the day, it was political leadership and economic
collapse in Germany that led to the rise of fascism. The German
general staff was perhaps a tool of that.
I think here in the United States, the culture in the
military is so strongly one of subservience to civilian
leadership that I would not believe that to be a significant
concern when weighed against the efficiencies that could be
derived from such a structure.
Dr. Lamb. I would just second what Admiral Stavridis said
about there not being a threat to civilian control of the
military from a general staff. But I do think it is worthwhile
for the committee to ask or take up an issue that Michele
Flournoy raised earlier in the week about the tyranny of
consensus. Even compared to OSD, the Joint Staff is well known
for its extensive coordination to ensure consensus on positions
that are forwarded to the Chairman. And I think it would be
very interesting to hear from former Chairmen or the current
Chairman what they think of their staff's performance in that
regard and for the committee to get to the heart of why
consensus tends to rule in the way the Joint Staff operates and
runs. I think it has not served us particularly well or the
Chairman particularly well to date.
Chairman McCain. Well, I just would finally make a comment,
and that is that being a student of World War II, they did not
have any of all this stuff. There were just some very brilliant
guys named Marshall and Leahy and King and others that won the
most seminal war probably of modern times. So I do not know how
we look at that aspect of it, but it certainly was the major
factor in winning World War II.
Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen, for your very, very thoughtful
testimony.
Two issues are emerging, among many. One is putting the
Chairman in the chain of command, and two, creating a general
staff. And there are pros and cons, as Admiral Stavridis
pointed out. And since you gentlemen are some of the most
intellectually honest people I know, it helps us--we get the
pros a lot. What is the con? What do you worry about, General
Schwartz? If we had a Chairman in the chain of command--if we
did it, we would have to create sort of a buffer against those
downsides. So both you and Admiral Stavridis, please, and Dr.
Lamb.
General Schwartz. The traditional thinking of having the
Chairman in the chain of command is potentials for abuse, for
excessive exercise of one's authority, and undermining, as
Chris Lamb mentioned, the fundamental principle of civilian
authority. That is the downside.
But I believe that--and given my experience--the Chairman
and the Secretary operate so closely in today's environment
that there is a level of supervision which mitigates that
possibility. But that is a legitimate consideration.
Senator Reed. Let me follow up with a question. Even in
your concept of putting the Chairman in the chain, he would be
still subordinate to the Secretary of the Defense.
General Schwartz. Of course, exactly. Correct.
Senator Reed. The practical effect would be injecting him
between the service chiefs and service secretaries? What is the
practical effect?
General Schwartz. The practical effect is that there is an
authoritative referee in uniform. At the moment, that
authoritative referee is either the Deputy Secretary or the
Secretary. And it seems to me that having someone in uniform
with executive authority, properly supervised contributes to
effective activity.
Senator Reed. Admiral Stavridis, your points on both these
issues, the general staff, standalone general staff, and the
Chairman in the chain.
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, let me take the Chairman position
first. We have identified and already correctly identified one
of the cons. I will give you another one. It is having put that
much power and authority into one person, what if you get an
extremely mediocre Chairman, someone who is not smart, not
effective? We have a very good up and out system. We are
probably going to get a very good Chairman. But that level of
power and authority--you need to worry not only about abuse of
power but lack of capability in it as well.
In terms of the general staff, I think a con would be that
a general staff, because the officers would have been plucked
out of their services at the 04/05 level in their late 30's,
they would not have the robust level of operational experience
that we see on the Joint Staff today. That would be a con.
Again, my intuition is that in both cases the pros would
outweigh the cons, but that would be part of the conversation,
looking at both sides.
Senator Reed. Dr. Lamb, your comments.
Dr. Lamb. First, with respect to the Chairman in the chain
of command, I think I would agree with General Schwartz that in
the past the relationship between the Chairman and the
Secretary has been extremely tight. And so I am not sure what
the value added in inserting someone formally into the chain of
command is. There are issues there. Some Chairman and Secretary
teams have worked very closely, and the Secretary's interests
and decisions have been passed through the Chairman. And in
other cases, you can think of Secretaries who have dealt
directly with the combatant commanders at length. So I think I
would be kind of agnostic on that, but I am generally inclined
to believe there is not a lot of value added to that.
The more important decisions that I think the Chairman
needs to work on are future force development. This is where we
really have to work hard to preserve the qualitative advantages
that we currently enjoy and which I think most people agree are
diminishing. And there, to get to the issue of the general
staff, I think he needs really dedicated, deep expertise on his
staff, and currently we tend not to have that. We bring people
directly in from operational commands who have never worked
those broad issues before. We throw them at a problem for a
couple years, then rotate them out. My view would be that more
stability like a general staff would bring to the Chairman
would probably be a good thing on the whole.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much. Gentlemen, thank you for
your service and for your testimony.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ernst?
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, gentlemen, for joining us today. It is nice to
have you here. Some interesting comments.
Admiral and Dr. Lamb, if you would please. In 2009, in
relation to the DOD, former DOD Secretary Bob Gates said this
is a Department that principally plans for war. It is not
organized to wage war, and that is what I am trying to fix.
Again, that was from Bob Gates.
And from both of you, please, do you believe that it can be
fixed within the Department? And if so, if you could share your
thoughts on that. Yes, please. General, go ahead.
General Schwartz. I agree that the model for employment--
once again, I would try to reemphasize my earlier point, that
we have migrated perhaps more by chance than by design, but the
joint task forces are the way we operate today. And it seems to
me that professionalizing those entities in the same way that
we have grown the special operations national joint task force
is the model for the future in the other operating domains.
Senator Ernst. Thank you.
Admiral Stavridis. I agree with General Schwartz as a
general position. I think we should make the point that the
Department of Defense today operates very effectively in a
number of venues, but we could be better and more efficient if
we had a model like General Schwartz is suggesting in my view.
Dr. Lamb. I really appreciate the question. I am personally
fascinated by Secretary Gates and his tenure as Secretary of
Defense. I think he is a remarkable man, and he has been very
candid in his memoirs about the experience he had leading the
Department of Defense at a time of war. And I have looked at
what he had to say very carefully, and I think it is
interesting.
And what really seemed to frustrate him was that even
though we had troops on the battlefield in contact with the
enemy, the service chiefs were called to their statutory
obligation to raise, train, and equip the force of the future,
and he could not get enough capability in the field for the
problem we were currently trying to master. And this was a
source of great frustration to the Secretary, and I think it
underlies the comment that you just quoted him on.
But for me, the problem there was in part our lack of
preparedness for irregular warfare. The services, whether we
are talking about preparing for future irregular conflicts or
we are engaged in them currently, have always given priority to
what they consider their core responsibility of fighting and
winning the Nation's large-scale force-on-force conflicts. We
have never been very good at being prepared for irregular war,
and I think that is true over the last 60 years.
So I think we do need some changes there. But for me, the
solution there is to put someone definitively in charge of
being prepared for irregular conflict. That is something we
have not done. We always turn to all the services and say you
are all equally responsible for being prepared for irregular
conflict, and they invariably consider a lesser included case.
So we do not go to those conflicts thinking about them,
planning for them, prepared for them with the niche
capabilities, et cetera. I think that is what frustrated the
Secretary, and I think it can and should be fixed.
Senator Ernst. Yes, and there were a lot of very
provocative comments that the Secretary has made, and that is
good because now we are spending the time talking about some of
those reforms and thoughts that he had in regards to irregular
warfare, asymmetrical warfare. We really did not start
talking--at least I was not so much aware of it until about 15
years ago or so when we really started taking a look at our
force.
But how can we empower those combatant commanders to take
that prudent risk and make those decisions on their own? Do we
empower them to do that, or how can we empower them to do that?
Any thoughts? Or does it need to be a top-down approach? Why
can it not be a more bottom-up approach in taking some of those
risks? General?
General Schwartz. I think thoughtful combatant commanders
like Jim Stavridis did exactly that. However, it is important
to assign missions and to distinguished what the priorities
are. That is a function of the Pentagon in this town. And we
have not been terribly good at that.
Senator Ernst. We have not. Thank you, General.
Chairman McCain. Senator Manchin?
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank all of you for your service.
And I am going to direct these to General Schwartz and
Admiral Stavridis.
I am so appreciative of you all coming and so candid with
us and tell us exactly what you have seen and what your
experience. The hard thing I am having a hard time with, why
either you cannot make these changes when you are in that
command, when you are on the front line, when you are in
charge. Is the system bogged down to where we are throwing so
much stuff at you from here to the intermediators that is
coming to us? But also, how do we keep the separation of the
civilian oversight, as we do, which is unbelievable, and I am
glad we do. And that is the concern we might have, the balance.
But you know, when you have--the 2010 report by McKinsey
and Company found that less than 25 percent, or one-quarter, of
active duty troops were in combat roles, with the majority
instead performing overhead activities. And if you look at it
from the standpoint of all the pay increases, we are giving the
same pay increases to 75 percent of the people who do not see
any action. I think we need to know from you now in your role,
not being constrained in your remarks, how do we get to where
you are able to make the decision when you are in charge and in
power. They are saying they cannot be made. The military cannot
change. Under the Goldwater Act that we had way back when, that
only we can force it from here. But yet, we have thrown so many
regulations and so many oversights, that it makes it impossible
to govern. Where is the intermediate? Who makes that decision?
Is there a commission that should be in place?
And for those who are concerned about giving total power to
the Joint Chiefs and the Chairman, still having the civilians
in the control in an advisory capacity--I do not know how to
circumnavigate this.
And the final question you all two can answer. I know that
we are talking about NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM. I would ask the
same question about National Guard and Reserves. I as a
Governor, former Governor. I was over my Guard. And I would
have gladly shared with the President, and if the only reason
we have the Reserves doing what they are doing and the Guard
doing what they are doing is because of separation of
oversight, it does not make any sense to me. We could save a
tremendous amount and use our Guard and Reserves in a much
more, I think, effective role and much more cost-effective. But
I do not see that happening either.
So whoever wants to chime in, please do.
General Schwartz. Thank you.
I actually believe that giving the Chairman, hopefully a
very capable individual, directive authority, executive
authority would change the dynamic in what you are saying.
Senator Manchin. And right now, you are saying that that
person does not have that.
General Schwartz. At the moment, he does not have that. He
can encourage. He can persuade, but he cannot compel. And that
is not a business-like approach to the problem.
Secondly, with regard to the Guard and Reserve, it is at
least in part a function of the statutory authority, as you are
aware being a former Governor and others here on the dais. The
Reserve is a Title 10 entity which is responsive to the service
leadership, and the Guard, of course, is Title 32 and a little
more complex arrangement. And I think it is safe to say that at
least the Army and the Air Force have a preference for
maintaining both of those entities because access to the
Reserve is cleaner and more expeditious in most cases than it
is in some cases with the Guard.
Senator Manchin. Admiral?
Admiral Stavridis. A couple of thoughts, sir. You do touch
on, I think, an important aspect of all this, which is
reforming pay, benefits. I think those authorities derive from
all of you here on Capitol Hill based on proposals that can
come, and I think you are spot-on to look at why do we pay an
03 essentially exactly the same amount of money.
Senator Manchin. Right.
Admiral Stavridis. It really is in my view ripe for a new
look. You could drive it from here, but I think in the
building, they have the authority to build that into proposals
and move it forward. And I hope you spur them to do it.
In terms of authorities to really make changes, I think
providing the SecDef more authority to go into government and
move civilians that have been there, simple authorities over
the GS system I think would be helpful in creating
efficiencies.
In terms of the Guard and Reserve, to the degree the
committee wants to really lick your finger, reach up, and touch
the third rail, you could look at an alternative model in the
maritime world. We have an Air Guard and a land Guard, if you
will, but we have a Coast Guard. The Coast Guard resides, as
you all well know, in the Department of Homeland Security. It
is a very different model. If you want to look at efficiencies
and structures, that might be an interesting model to look at
as to whether it pertains in the air and on the land, as it
seems to work quite effectively in my view at sea.
So these are huge questions. In terms of do you need a
commission, I would say what this committee is doing right now
is the basis of driving these thoughts forward, and I hope you
continue at this.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, sir.
Chairman McCain. Senator Fischer?
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, recently a friend and I have been having
discussions on a 1984 speech by Caspar Weinberger, which of
course became known as the Weinberger Doctrine. And the third
rule that he laid out would be that military forces should only
be committed after the military and political objectives have
been clearly defined.
There has been criticism lately because of recent campaigns
that we have seen in Afghanistan and Syria, criticisms that
perhaps we have not seen that end result, that end state really
clearly defined. I think in future conflicts, especially when
we look at the cyber area, it is going to be difficult. It is
going to be a challenge there to be able to define what is
ahead.
I guess I would like to hear from all of you, if you
believe these evolving trends are going to change, how we look
at laying out those objectives in the future, and are we going
to be able to look at a comprehensive strategy and
comprehensive plan for the future? Or are we going to have to
look at it more incrementally as we move forward, and what are
the risks that would be involved with that? If I could start
with you, General.
General Schwartz. As I see it, ma?am, the role of civilian
leadership is to decide the why and the where, and the role of
the uniforms is to offer advice on the how. Both are essential
ingredients of success. And the desire for clarity in the why
and the where is important to those who serve in uniform,
without a doubt.
I think the clear thing here is that there is a need for
understanding that these are complex circumstances, but it is
important for there to be support for the mission.
And if I may offer an unsolicited piece of advice, the
absence of an authorization for use of military force in the
current setting is less than ideal.
Admiral Stavridis. I agree with General Schwartz. Clearly,
ideally the ideal structure, Senator, would be crisp, clear
direction from the political level, a coherent strategy that
has been explained to the American people and has a reasonable
level of support in our democracy. Then the military conducts
the detailed planning, which really is the precision piece of
this going forward. How to make that link more effective--I
think a lot of what we are discussing today would be helpful in
that regard. And the degree to which that our military can be
given that kind of strategic clarity will be the degree to
which we are successful in our engagements overseas.
Senator Fischer. So would you both say that that is a rule
that we as Members of the Senate should continue to require to
limit risk even into a future where the nature of warfare may
change?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes.
Senator Fischer. And, Dr. Lamb, if you had comments,
please.
Dr. Lamb. Yes. One of the jobs I had in the Pentagon was
helping prepare the contingency planning guidance and the
defense planning guidance and overseeing the Nation's war plans
for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. And one of my
observations was that the operational plans were crystal clear
compared to the strategic guidance that we often are able to
promulgate. And I know that some of your previous witnesses
have talked about strategy from the point of view of the need
for more gray matter, greater strategists, better strategists,
et cetera.
My view is a little bit different. I think there are
political and bureaucratic forces at work that tend to militate
against strategy. You ask why do we not have a clear end state.
Why do we not have a clear center of gravity? Why do we not
marshal our resources against that center of gravity, et
cetera? I think the answer is twofold.
First of all, in formulating a strategy with that kind of
clarity, right now there are great political and even
bureaucratic disincentives for that kind of clarity. So if you
say there are three ways to attack this problem and we are
going to choose door B, so to speak, someone will always
criticize you for not having taken option A or option C. So the
safer thing to do is to say we are going to do all those
things. So in the war on terrorism, we are going to emphasize
strategic communications and we are going to go after the
terrorists themselves and we are going to dissuade state
sponsors, and on and on and on. So if you look at all of our
public strategy documents, they are just long laundry lists of
objectives, and you do not have that clarity.
And then when it comes to implementing the strategy, you
similarly have bureaucratic forces at play. I am firmly
convinced, after a year of study, that a lot of popular opinion
about what went wrong in Iraq is in fact wrong. Because of the
point we just made about formulating strategy, if you have real
strategy, it really exists not on paper but in the minds of the
key decision-makers because they cannot promulgate the strategy
for the reasons I just mentioned. So it is in their minds. So
if you are going to get a clear, cohesive implementation of the
strategy, everybody has to be working together and have a mind-
meld, if you will.
That did not happen in Iraq, and we could go into detail on
why that did not happen. But the point is we had people in one
part of our national security system working very hard to go in
one direction and people on the ground in Baghdad supported by
other people trying to go in a different direction. And the
results were not good.
So when it comes to strategy, I think we have political and
bureaucratic problems. And it is one reason I favor these
cross-functional teams. I think they can put the strategy
together and have a better chance of implementing it in a
cohesive and a unified way.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And I appreciate Senator Fischer bringing up the Weinberger
Doctrine and, General Schwartz, your comment about the
authorization. I think there are many reasons why an
authorization is really important. One is just the legal
requirements of Article I and Article II. The second is the
sign of resolve that you show to adversaries, allies, and
especially your troops. But the third is sort of the one that
the Weinberger Doctrine gets at, which is it helps you clash
out at the beginning what is the mission and goal. So
traditionally the President would present an authorization, but
then Congress usually does not just accept it verbatim.
President Bush presented an authorization right after the
attack on 9/11. Congress rejected the originally presented
version and batted it around and came up with something
different.
The war against ISIL is one that we started on August 8th,
2014--the President to protect Yazidis on Mount Sinjar and to
protect the American consulate in Irbil. But within a couple of
weeks, it was, okay, now we have to go on offense, but we did
not have the discussion. We did not have the administration's
presentation of the rationale and then the withering cross
examination that that deserves. I fault the President for not
sending an authorization to Congress for, I mean, essentially 6
months after the beginning of the war, and now it has been 10
months since the President sent an authorization. We still
really have not had the discussion that you ought to have at
the front end if you are going to ask people to risk their
lives. So I think the Weinberger Doctrine is a good way to look
at it.
A couple questions just to clarify. You have all offered
some interesting ideas. So, Admiral Stavridis, the cyber force.
Just walk through, if you are looking 15 years ahead, how does
that look. There is a force. There is a command. Is there a
cyber academy? Most of us have just done our service academy
nominations. Is there a cyber academy? Talk to us about what
that would look like.
Admiral Stavridis. I can. I think it is small. It is
probably numbered in thousands of members, so quite small, less
than 10,000 probably.
I think what you have today is each of the service
academies is building inside itself a small cyber academy, and
this is kind of the inefficiency of it that I think we need to
overcome.
So, yes, I think there would be an educational pipeline. I
think there would be a career path. I think you would have to
get away from some of the, if you will, traditional go to boot
camp, shave your head, crawl your way up a hierarchical
organization. I am not sure that is going to attract the kind
of people we need in a cyber force. So it probably has somewhat
different paid benefits back to Senator Manchin's question a
moment ago about are we paying the right people the right
amount. So this may be a highly paid cadre. I think probably
the closest analog to what we have, quite obviously, is special
forces, and that is roughly what it would look like.
I do believe it is time we get after this because I think
our vulnerabilities are significant in this area.
Senator Kaine. A second question to another idea you had. I
thought it was intriguing, the idea of an ambassadorial level
sort of civilian deputy within the COCOMs. And I gather there
is sort of an unstated assumption that is kind of about the
nature of the American military mission now that so much of it
is diplomacy, you know, the nations that want us to send the
special purpose MAGTFs throughout Africa to train their
militaries. I mean, so much of it is kind of on the border
between diplomacy and military or working out with the Japanese
the Okinawan situation. That is diplomatic as much as it is
military. Is that sort of your thinking behind the
recommendation?
Admiral Stavridis. It is. The structure, as it was in
effect when I was at Southern Command and while I was at U.S.
European Command, I had a military deputy, and I think you need
to continue to have a military deputy for the conduct----
Senator Kaine. Operations.
Admiral Stavridis.--of operations.
But we also had, instead of a POLAD, a political advisor
from the State Department--we had a senior ambassador who was
our civilian deputy, and he or she was capable of doing that
kind of engagement, diplomatic work, working with host nations,
helped resolve innumerable individual challenges in, if you
will, the smart power side of the equation. It is low cost, and
it also is a strong signal to the interagency about how we want
to work together to address problems that I think is salutary.
Senator Kaine. It sounds like a Fletcher School dean idea.
And then, Dr. Lamb, one last question for you. The idea
that you advocate in your opening testimony about having some
primary responsibility for irregular war, if it is small or if
it is large, rather than everybody feeling like the irregular
wars are sort of a lesser responsibility, which means we are
not really preparing for regular wars. Talk a little bit about
that. Elaborate on that if you would.
Dr. Lamb. Yes. I mean, I think that we have a parallel with
regard to special operations forces in general. All the
services, before we combined them under SOCOM [Southern
Command], had special operations forces. They knew what they
wanted to use them for, et cetera. But they were not a priority
for the services. So Congress in its wisdom--and I think
rightly so--created USSOCOM, and we now have world-class
special operations forces particularly for the high value
target mission. So the direct action, go there, go to a site,
get what you need done, and come back. We have unparalleled
capabilities. And those have only improved over the last 10 or
15 years.
But when it comes to working by, with, or through host
nation forces, we are not quite as sharp. And there is a number
of complex reasons for that which have been discussed by many
individuals. But I think the committee needs to take that issue
up with SOCOM. SOCOM leadership has repeatedly told Congress
that they think the indirect mission is in fact more important
and they intend to improve their indirect capabilities. But
whether or not that is happening I think is a matter of great
import.
With regard to the Marine Corps, not every problem,
unfortunately, not every low end of the conflict spectrum
problem could be handled with a small special operations team.
So the question is who in the Department of Defense, amongst
all our forces, is really responsible for being prepared for
that mission. Time and time again, we go on these missions,
whether it is Panama, Somalia, Bosnia. We go on these missions
not really prepared for them, kind of learning on the job,
seeing what the situation demands, not having the equipment, as
Secretary Gates found, not only not having the equipment, but
not being able to generate it quickly in response even to
urgent requests from forces in the field.
I think we can do better than that. The Marine Corps, from
my point of view, would work well in that regard for a number
of reasons. It has a history of greater involvement in these.
It is already kind of a joint force with amphibious, air, land
capabilities that are well integrated. So there is a lot of
advantages there.
I think we have come to a point where we cannot afford all
the duplication we have without some clarification of roles in
the Department. So this is something that made sense to me.
Senator Kaine. I thank all of you.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ayotte?
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Chairman.
I want to thank all of you for being here today.
Admiral Stavridis, I wanted to ask you about your prior
position as Commander of SOUTHCOM. And we had testimony this
spring from General John Kelly, the Commander of SOUTHCOM,
about how the networks are working over our southern border,
the sophisticated smuggling networks that I can assure you now,
unfortunately, are being used to devastate my State with how
heroin is coming into my State, but also the issue that he
raised as well was that he believed that adherents to ISIS have
called for infiltration of our southern border.
So I wanted to ask you about your thoughts on that in terms
of the use of those networks not only on things like drugs, but
also as we look at this terrorism challenge. Is this something
we should be worried about?
Admiral Stavridis. It absolutely is something we should be
worried about, Senator. And I have called this before
convergence, and it is the convergence of these drug routes,
which are extremely efficient, with the possibility of using
them to move terrorists or, at the really dark end of the
spectrum, weapons of mass destruction, along with the
narcotics. So when those drug routes and those higher-level
threats converge--convergence--I think we are at great risk.
What we should do about it is exactly what we are talking
about here is think holistically about how you create a network
to combat a network. This is a very sophisticated, private-
public, if you will, collaboration with international abilities
ranging from moving submarines with 10 tons of cocaine to
aircraft, et cetera, et cetera. So you need to bring the
interagency to bear. You need to bring special operations to
bear. And I think this also argues for merging NORTHCOM and
SOUTHCOM because it creates one sphere through which these
routes are coming at us. So there is a quick basket of ideas.
Senator Ayotte. I appreciate it. I do not know if anyone
else wants to comment on that. Thank you.
I also wanted to, not to pick on you today, Admiral, but
given your prior position as certainly the Commander of NATO,
what we have seen recently with Iran--on October 10th, Iran
conducted a ballistic missile test, a medium-range missile, and
then also recently we have learned that they have tested a
missile on November 21st. And as I look at these, first of all,
a clear violation of U.N. resolutions. Also from what we
understand, the reports suggest that the missile tested last
month has a range of approximately 1,200 miles. So that would
give Iran a capability, of course, of hitting eastern Europe
and places that we are concerned about in the NATO context.
So I have been asking why are we not responding to this,
and what do you think our response should be? Should there be
some response? It strikes me as a very important issue because
it is already, in light of the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan
of Action]--they are violating existing U.N. resolutions. And
it seems to me if there is not some response from us, that they
are going to continue. Not only this does not bode well for the
JCPOA, but also to continue to develop ICBM [Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile] capability, as you know, that could go even
further to hit the United States.
Admiral Stavridis. As I have said often, Senator, we ought
to be concerned about Iran's nuclear program, but it is a much
bigger problem than that. Iran views itself as an imperial
power dating back two and a half millennia. They currently are
in control of five capitals in this region. The JCPOA I think
is going to shower resources upon them. And so they are a
highly dangerous opponent and will be going forward.
So what should we do?
First, we should hold Iran to the commitments they have
made in the JCPOA, and if that means that agreement is broken
and we, therefore, return to a sanctions regime, we need to
face that.
Secondly, we need to use all of our clandestine, our
intelligence capability to truly understand what is going on in
Iran.
Thirdly, we need to stand with our Sunni allies in the
region and, of course, with Israel, who are going to be the
bulwark against this kind of expansion.
Fourthly, in Europe, as you well know, Senator--I took you
around there--we looked at the missile defense system. We
should continue to move in that direction. That is kind of a
beginning, but I think Iran will continue to be a geopolitical
threat to the United States.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you all.
Senator Reed [presiding].Thank you, Senator.
On behalf of Senator McCain, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you all very much both for your service and for being
here today.
Dr. Lamb, you talk about flattening the structure of the
military to set up special teams that have a commitment to
mission as opposed to what often interagency groups bring to
task. It seems to me that I really like that idea. I think that
one of the things--if we look at the private sector, one of the
things they figured out is that the top-down approach, a
hierarchical approach, is not as good for decision-making for
what they are trying to accomplish as a team approach.
But what are the challenges--and I guess maybe I ought to
ask both General Schwartz and Admiral Stavridis what you think
the challenges are of trying to move from what has been such a
traditional hierarchical structure to one that allows that team
approach to really address the challenges that we are facing?
And, General Schwartz, do you want to start?
General Schwartz. Sure. You know, I do not know, ma?am, if
the committee has had Stan McChrystal before you, but here is
an example, maybe the best recent example, of how the team
approach produces extraordinary results with his organization.
And he has written two books and what have you. But the bottom
line is that Chris Lamb's model does work. There is evidence of
that. And there is a new generation of military leadership that
gets it I think, and we should support that, encourage it, and
through your oversight, mandate it.
Senator Shaheen. Admiral Stavridis?
Admiral Stavridis. A core question going forward. And what
mitigates against it, what makes it difficult, Senator--and you
know this--is the built-in structure of the military. This is
an organization where a million people get up in the morning
and put on the same outfit. I mean, this is why we call it
``uniforms.'' And you have got to start cracking that
mentality. We will--I think General Schwartz is spot-on--
because there is a generational shift.
The question here is this is not an on and off switch
between a highly chaotic, Silicon Valley-like entity or a
Prussian-style military. It is a rheostat. We need to dial that
rheostat more toward team approaches, interagency,
international cooperation, strategic communication, all of
those smart power things without losing our ability to deliver
lethal combat power. I think we can do that. We need to think
of it as a rheostat that is turning in the direction you
identified.
Senator Shaheen. And, Dr. Lamb, you talked about the Coast
Guard having a different model. One of the things I remember
after the BP oil spill, when they were talking about the
response to rescuing people--no. I am sorry. Not the oil spill.
Hurricane Katrina--was that the Coast Guard was very effective
in responding I think both there and on the BP oil spill
because they were able to make decisions on the spot without
having to check with anybody.
So what is different about the Coast Guard model, and how
do you transfer what is effective about that? Or should we be
looking at transferring what is effective about that to address
some of the other challenges of building that teamwork
capacity?
Dr. Lamb. Well, when I was involved in the project,
national security reform, we spent some time looking at the
Coast Guard model. And the Coast Guard I think would say--and
Admiral Stavridis could speak to this, I think, more directly.
But I think they would say their leadership model and their
training and education model is different than some of the
other services. Because of their very nature, they are used to
thinking about problems in a cross-functional way. They both
serve the Department of Defense in war and law enforcement in
peacetime. And so they have some natural advantages in that
respect.
Senator Shaheen. So can you explain? When you say their
leadership model is different, their training is different,
what is different that gives them that different ability to
focus? Admiral Stavridis?
Admiral Stavridis. They begin their lives at the Coast
Guard Academy with an appreciation of the fact that they are
but one entity within the Department of Homeland Security,
which has 19 different entities within it. They know they
straddle that border between Title 10 combat operations, in
which they participated heroically many, many times, as well as
law enforcement, as well as rescue at sea, as well as
environmental. So their mission, their ethos, their mentality
is simply one of cooperation, working together. It is hard to
find a better integrated organization than the Coast Guard. I
think we could learn a lot from that.
General Schwartz. And they have much greater experience
with State and local leadership than typically do the active
duty forces.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you all very much.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
On behalf of Chairman McCain, Senator Sullivan, please.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen, for being here today and your
years of service, decades of service to our country.
I wanted to focus a little bit, Admiral, on your
recommendation perhaps with regard to NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM
merging with a bit of a focus on the Arctic. General Schwartz,
I know that you have spent a lot of time in Alaska and so have
a sense of that. We have had a lot of discussions here. Senator
King and I and the chairman and a lot of others are interested
very much in what is going on in the Arctic. Actually in this
NDAA, there is a requirement for the Secretary of Defense to
put together an Arctic operations plan for the first time,
which we think is progress.
But just given your background--actually any of the
panelists. You know, one of the many challenges that we have up
there is that when you look at the Arctic, it is the classic
scenes of different combatant commands where its forces are
OPCOM [Coast Guard Operations Command] to PACOM [Pacific
Command]. Its advocate is NORTHCOM, and its threat is primarily
in EUCOM.
So you, I am sure, all noticed the very massive Russian
buildup. Actually just yesterday there was another article
about a new missile defense system that they are putting in the
Arctic, four new combat brigades, 11 new airfields, on and on
and on, huge exercises. And we are looking at actually getting
rid of the only airborne BCT in the entire Asia-Pacific and in
the Arctic. And as you know, General Schwartz, that takes a lot
of training to have your forces up there well trained to be
able to operate in 30 below zero.
So I would just really appreciate your views on the Arctic,
but also how that NORTHCOM/SOUTHCOM merger idea would either
enhance or merger idea would either enhance or diminish--we do
not think it should be much more diminished. We think there
should be more attention on the Arctic given all that is going
on up there right now. Any panelist, I would welcome your
thoughts on it.
General Schwartz. I think it is important that the Arctic
be assigned as a mission to one of the combatant commands. That
has yet to happen. It should transpire. That is point one.
Point two is a more pedestrian concern, but we only have
one operating icebreaker, Senator Sullivan. This is unthinkable
for the United States of America. And clearly, that Coast Guard
platform--we need more of that, and we need the other kinds of
wherewithal that allow us to assert our sovereignty in the
Arctic.
Senator Sullivan. We have one and the Russians have 40 I
believe.
General Schwartz. Understood, sir.
Admiral Stavridis. You are absolutely correct. Russia has
38 plus two icebreakers. The Chinese, who are not an Arctic
power, to say the least, have 16 icebreakers, et cetera. The
Danes, a nation of 5 million, have eight icebreakers. So this
is actually beyond a pedestrian point. It is a very good one.
I agree with assigning it to U.S. Northern Command in its
entirety. I think that it would not be diminished by the merger
between NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM. When you look at the level of
activity to the south and what NORTHCOM is doing, I think that
could easily be folded into a unified command responsibility,
and I think it would be valuable because it would further
solidify our integration with Canada, with whom we ought to be
partnering in a very significant way, as you know better than
anybody, in the north.
Lastly, we should be working with NATO [North Atlantic
Treaty Organization] to ensure that NATO perceives this is a
NATO frontier. This is a NATO border. Canada and the United
States are NATO nations. We need to think of that border as
importantly as we do as the borders of the Alliance in eastern
Europe and to the south on the Mediterranean.
Senator Sullivan. General Schwartz, could you talk to just
the strategic location of those forces up there? Because, you
know, Admiral, when you talk about having it completely with
regard to unified under NORTHCOM, do you think that the
operational forces should also be under NORTHCOM, given that
they are very oriented towards the Asia-Pacific? And as General
Schwartz--and I know you know, sir, the strategic location of
Alaska is such that those forces, those air forces, those Army
forces, can really be anywhere in the northern hemisphere
within 7-8 hours whether it is Korea or the Baltics. Would you
mind just talking on that for a bit, sir?
General Schwartz. Quickly, if the constraint of assigned
forces to the domestic four-star can be overcome, that makes
sense. To assign those assets in Alaska that have the
opportunity both to reinforce America's claims in the Arctic,
as well as be deployable for other missions that might be
assigned is certainly the right approach.
Admiral Stavridis. I would only add we talk a lot about the
unified command plan, which kind of divides the world among the
combatant commanders. The other important document, Senator, is
called the ``Forces For'' document, which actually apportions
and assigns those forces. It is renegotiated typically every
two years. I think as General Schwartz indicates, that would be
a very important new way to think about force assignment.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain [presiding]. Senator King?
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
A couple of quick points. Amen on the icebreakers. It is
preposterous that we do not have more significant icebreaker
capacity, particularly given what is happening in the Arctic in
terms of the opening up of the ice.
Secondly, would all of you agree that it would be
advantageous to the U.S. to accede to the Law of the Sea
Treaty?
Admiral Stavridis. Because I am an Admiral, I get to go
first.
Senator King. Yes, sir.
Admiral Stavridis. Yes.
Senator King. Thank you.
General, do you agree?
General Schwartz. And airmen agree with that.
Senator King. Thank you.
Dr. Lamb?
Dr. Lamb. Agnostic, sir.
Senator King. Agnostic on the treaty? All right. Two to
one. We will take those odds.
Chairman McCain. Could I ask why agnostic?
Dr. Lamb. I really have not studied it at length, but I am
concerned about our willingness to protect freedom of
navigation around the world and the way other nations are
interpreting their littoral areas and their control over them.
I am not quite sure of the impact of the Law of the Sea Treaty
on those kinds of issues.
Senator King. My concern is that other nations are going
through that process, making claims, and we are standing on the
sidelines. Your gestures will not show up in the record. Could
you----
Admiral Stavridis. I agree with your assessment. We are
much better inside that treaty than outside it in terms of
protecting our rights. We could have a long hearing on the Law
of the Sea, and I am sure such has been done. But call me back
up on that one anytime.
Senator King. Thank you.
I want to associate myself with the comments of Senator
Ayotte on this Iran ballistic missile test. It is hard to
interpret exactly what they are doing. There is some thinking
that maybe this is the struggle of the hardliners and they are
trying to torpedo the agreement. On the other hand, it seems to
me it would be very dangerous for us to establish the precedent
of blinking at violations. I am a great believer that
implementation is as important as vision. I voted for the JCPOA
but it was based upon an understanding and expectation that it
would be scrupulously enforced. And I think this could be
interpreted as an early test of our resolve. And, General, I
take it you agree.
General Schwartz. I certainly do. And if it is a violation
of U.N. resolutions, we should call that out without
hesitation.
Senator King. Thank you.
Admiral Stavridis. I agree with General Schwartz. I agree
with your comment as well.
I have been hopeful of this agreement, but I am
increasingly skeptical that it will be the right step for U.S.
national security. This certainly gives weight to the negative
side of that equation.
Senator King. Thank you.
Dr. Lamb, in your prepared remarks, you talked about how we
need to be thinking about unconventional warfare and suggested
several areas, one that I want to emphasize. You talk about
persuasive communication. In my view, there are two fronts to
the war with ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant]. One
is military. The other is ideas. And we are badly losing the
war of ideas. And it strikes me that that is a huge gap in our
national strategy. I know we are doing some things, but my
sense is it does not have the priority that it should. Would
you agree with that?
Dr. Lamb. Yes, I absolutely would. I think there are two
issues here, one substantive and one organizational.
Organizationally we are not well organized to treat the issues
of communications. We get public affairs, public diplomacy, and
then what used to be called psychological operations.
Senator King. And USIA was abolished 15 years ago.
Dr. Lamb. Yes, yes. We do not have a dedicated organization
to deal with this anymore, and we are confused about the
difference between these different--Americans are very
sensitive about government control or use of information. And
we are losing this game. I would actually concur.
On the substantive front, we are having some real political
problems with deciding the best way to deal with the issue, as
General Dempsey once said, with the fact that some terrorists
happen to also be Muslim and Islamic. And we want to emphasize
that the Islamic religion is peaceful and tolerant and so on
and so forth, but we do have this strain within that religion
that sees the world differently. And our ability to deal with
that in a forthright way has really been handicapped.
And actually I am surprised by the number of senior leaders
who have said in their memoirs from their tours of duty during
the past 15 years that this is an Achilles heel for us and that
we still have not effectively identified the enemy we are up
against and how best to deal with that, how to turn that issue
back into something that the Islamic world debates itself about
what it is going to do about this virulent strain within it.
So I think substantively and organizationally we are really
on our heels in this regard. I could not agree more.
Senator King. And ultimately that is where this battle will
be won or lost in my view because there are now--pick a
number--100,000, 200,000 jihadists. There are 1.6 billion
Muslims. That is the battlefield. And it can only be won within
the Muslim community, but we have to lead it, it seems to me,
or we at least need to work with the worldwide non-jihadist
Muslim community.
General?
General Schwartz. Senator, I just would close by saying we
need to give voice to those who have escaped ISIL-occupied
areas.
Senator King. It seems to me a natural.
General Schwartz. Yes.
Admiral Stavridis. Just one last thought, if I could. It is
a battlefield, but it is also a marketplace. And we have to
compete. We have to recognize that. That is a very important
aspect of how we communicate. We are pretty good at dominating
markets. We should bring some of those skills to bear.
Senator King. It is ironic in the extreme that we are the
people that invented Facebook and Twitter and all of those
things, and we are losing on that front.
Well, thank you very much, gentlemen. I have a lot of other
questions about the organization, but we will get to those
later. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. If you would like to ask an additional
question----
Senator King. One additional question on--and maybe this is
for the record. We are talking about combining several of the
combatant commands, NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM, AFRICOM and Europe.
Are there any savings to be had? And if so, we would like to
quantify them because in fiscal year 2017 we are going to face
about a $15 billion shortfall from where we would like to be.
And that is real money, and we are going to have to find some
places where it can be saved in staff, personnel, noncombatant
kind of areas. So perhaps you have an immediate response or for
the record.
General Schwartz. In the business world, we call those
synergies. And I cannot offer a number, but certainly there are
those in the Department who could answer that question for you
and I would recommend you press for that.
Admiral Stavridis. Yes. There are savings. And I would
recommend not only pressing the Department but getting somebody
on the outside to take a good look at that.
Senator King. Thank you very much. I appreciate your
testimony.
Chairman McCain. I appreciate the comments about the hearts
and minds, but first you have got to kill them. And as long as
the perception is out there that they are winning, then they
will also win in other areas as well. I believe that one of the
reasons why these young men are most attracted is that they
think they are joining a winning cause, and events such as at
San Bernardino and Paris are one of the greatest recruitment
tools they have. And until we beat them on the battlefield, I
think that our messaging efforts will be severely hindered, but
I also agree that it is just going to be a long fight on using
the most advanced technologies.
And I would also point out that we still have a big problem
with the ability now of ISIS to be contacted and direct a young
man or young woman to a secure site. That is just not right.
That is not right. And I see heads nodding. As Senator King
mentioned, that is not recorded.
Senator King. I agree with the chairman on both fronts.
Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Admiral?
Admiral Stavridis. I agree completely. And I think that
this also gets into the cyber piece of this. There are ways
that we can track, control, eradicate in the cyber world.
I also particularly agree the leading edge of this has to
be hard power. In the long game, it is a mix of hard power,
smart power. But at the moment, dealing with the forces that
are arrayed against us from the Islamic State, we have to go
hard now.
Chairman McCain. Doctor, did you have any comment?
Dr. Lamb. For myself, I think this is just a good example
of what I was referring to on the indirect approach in special
operations, the military information support forces in SOCOM.
If you look at how they are raised, trained, and equipped, it
is not to the same levels of proficiency that the other aspects
of SOCOM are. So I think there is room for improvement there.
Chairman McCain. Well, I thank you.
And the Doctor is a graduate of the institution in which
you are presently employed when it had the correct name. I want
to thank you for your continued good work.
And I thank the Admiral and General for your many years of
service.
This will probably be the conclusion of a series of
hearings that we are having as we try to address this whole
issue of reform, ability to get into the challenge, to meet the
challenges of the 21st century. I believe that Goldwater-
Nichols could never have come from within the Pentagon. I think
everybody agrees with that. And we intend, on a bipartisan
basis, to work with the Pentagon and Secretary Carter as
closely as we possibly can, but I think it is pretty well known
that we have to lead. And it is not to the exclusion of the
Pentagon, but it certainly is a responsibility that I think
that we have. And I am proud of the modest measures that we
have taken in this year, but I think next year is really where
we can really make a significant impact. And the series of
hearings that we are now concluding with I think gives us an
excellent basis for the kinds of reforms that need to be made.
It just is disappointing to our constituents when I go back
to Arizona and somebody asks me about a $2 billion cost overrun
of one weapon system. It is hard to defend, hard to justify.
And then when we see the combat capabilities going down in
organizations and yet the staffs and support going up and we
are still unable to conduct an audit successfully of the
Department of Defense and no one can tell this committee how
many contract personnel are employed, there is a pretty large
task ahead of us. But if we pursue the principles that you have
recommended to us today, some of those other aspects of this
challenge will follow.
So you have been very helpful.
And, Admiral, I asked the panel yesterday if you all would
prepare notes of condolences to be delivered to Senator Reed on
Saturday afternoon, it would be much appreciated.
[Laughter.]
Admiral Stavridis. Con gusto.
Senator Reed. Go Army.
[Laughter.]
Admiral Stavridis. Go Navy.
Chairman McCain. We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:12 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
[all]