- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

[Senate Hearing 114-204, Part 1]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

S. Hrg. 114-204, Pt. 1

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2016 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

=======================================================================

HEARINGS

before the

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

S. 1376

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES

----------

PART 1

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE
NAVY POSTURE
U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND
ARMY AND AIR FORCE POSTURES
U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND, AND U.S. CYBER
COMMAND
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND AND U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS
COMMAND PROGRAMS AND BUDGET
U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES KOREA
U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND PROGRAMS AND BUDGET

----------

MARCH 3, 10, 12, 18, 19, 26; APRIL 16, 30, 2015

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

S. Hrg. 114-204, Pt. 1

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2016 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

=======================================================================

HEARINGS

before the

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

S. 1376

__________

PART 1

__________

MARCH 3, 10, 12, 18, 19, 26; APRIL 16, 30, 2015

__________

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/

______

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

23-397 PDF WASHINGTON : 2017
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
Washington, DC 20402-0001

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JACK REED, Rhode Island
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama BILL NELSON, Florida
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
TOM COTTON, Arkansas KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JONI ERNST, Iowa JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska TIM KAINE, Virginia
MIKE LEE, Utah ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
TED CRUZ, Texas

Christian D. Brose, Staff Director

Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director

(ii)

C O N T E N T S

----------

march 3, 2015

Page

Department of Defense Budget Posture............................. 1

Carter, Hon. Ashton B., Secretary of Defense; Accompanied by Hon.
Mike McCord, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Chief
Financial Officer.............................................. 5
Dempsey, GEN Martin E., USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff..... 22

Questions for the Record......................................... 72

march 10, 2015

Navy Posture..................................................... 109

Mabus, Hon. Raymond E., Jr., Secretary of the Navy............... 113
Dunford, Gen. Joseph F., Jr., USMC, Commandant of the Marine
Corps.......................................................... 132
Greenert, ADM Jonathan W., USN, Chief of Naval Operations........ 145

Questions for the Record......................................... 200

march 12, 2015

U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern Command.................. 239

Gortney, ADM William E., USN, Commander, U.S. Northern Command,
and Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command........ 242
Kelly, Gen. John F., USMC, Commander, U.S. Southern Command...... 244

march 18, 2014

Postures of the Department of The Army and the Department of The
Air Force...................................................... 279

McHugh, Hon. John M., Secretary of the Army...................... 283
James, Hon. Deborah Lee, Secretary of the Air Force.............. 300
Odierno, Gen. Raymond T., USA, Chief of Staff of the Army........ 308
Welsh, Gen. Mark A., III, USAF, Chief of Staff of the Air Force.. 310

Questions for the Record......................................... 349

march 19, 2015

U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Transportation Command, and U.S.
Cyber Command.................................................. 387

Haney, ADM Cecil D., USN, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command...... 390
Selva, Gen. Paul J., USAF, Commander, U.S. Transportation Command 401
Rogers, ADM Michael S., USN, Commander, U.S. Cyber Command/
Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security
Services....................................................... 412

Questions for the Record......................................... 437

march 26, 2015

U.S. Central Command, U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Special
Operations Command Programs and Budget......................... 543

Votel, GEN Joseph L., USA, Commander, U.S. Special Operations
Command........................................................ 547
Rodriguez, GEN David M., USA, Commander, U.S. Africa Command..... 556
Austin, GEN Lloyd J., III, USA, Commander, U.S. Central Command.. 566

Questions for the Record......................................... 614

april 16, 2015

U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Forces Korea....................... 621

Locklear, ADM Samuel J., III, USN, Commander, U.S. Pacific
Command........................................................ 624
Scaparrotti, GEN Curtis M., USA, Commander, United Nations
Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea.............. 639

Questions for the Record......................................... 679

april 30, 2015

U.S. European Command Programs and Budget........................ 687

Breedlove, Gen. Philip M., USAF, Commander, U.S. European
Command/Supreme Allied Commander, Europe....................... 691

Questions for the Record......................................... 737

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2016 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

----------

TUESDAY, MARCH 3, 2015

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:43 p.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Wicker,
Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Lee,
Graham, Reed, Nelson, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, and Heinrich.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman McCain. Good afternoon. I want to apologize for
keeping you waiting, Secretary Carter and General Dempsey and
Secretary McCord. We had a vote, and members will be arriving.
The committee meets today to receive testimony on the
Department of Defense's fiscal year 2016 budget request, the
associated Future Years Defense Programs (FYDP), and the
posture of U.S. Armed Forces.
Let me start by thanking each of you for your service to
our Nation and to the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines
here at home and in harm's way around the globe, and to their
families.
Over just the past 6 weeks, this committee has undertaken a
serious and rigorous review of the present global challenges we
face, as well a review of the U.S. National Security Strategy.
We have received testimony from some of America's most
experienced statesmen and leading strategic thinkers. A unified
and alarming assessment has emerged from these national
leaders.
As former Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger testified
on January 29, ``The United States has not faced a more diverse
and complex array of crises since the end of the Second World
War.''
Given the accumulating dangers we face, it is notable that
the President supported the Department of Defense in requesting
a level of defense spending that is roughly $38 billion above
the caps imposed by the Budget Control Act [BCA] and
sequestration, which mandates nearly $1 trillion in defense
cuts over 10 years. In light of recent events, I think this
approach was more than justified.
With each passing year since the BCA was enacted in 2011,
and with the United States slashing its defense spending as a
result, the world has become more dangerous and threats to our
Nation have grown. I don't think that is purely a coincidence.
The President's budget request responds to many critical
priorities, particularly addressing cyber and space
vulnerabilities, military readiness shortfalls, and essential
long-term modernization initiatives.
At the same time, the President's request reflects budget-
driven policy decisions that would reduce some critical
military capabilities, either through the early retirement or
cancellation of existing systems, deferred development or
procurement of new systems, or withheld funding for proven
requirements.
This committee will closely scrutinize these decisions and
seek to meet urgent and legitimate military needs, where
possible.
As for meeting our growing national security requirements,
General Martin Dempsey's prepared testimony this afternoon
states that the President's request is ``at the lower ragged
edge of manageable risk'' and leaves ``no slack, no margin left
for error or strategic surprise.''
I would go further. I question whether the Defense
Department's current strategy, which was released in January
2012, has not been overtaken by world events, which would
suggest the need for new strategic guidance and even more
defense spending than the President's request.
Just consider the events of the past year alone. Russia has
challenged core principles of the postwar order in Europe by
invading and annexing the territory of another sovereign
Nation. A terrorist army that has proclaimed its desire to
attack America and its allies now controls a vast swath of
territory in the heart of the Middle East. Iran continues its
pursuit of nuclear weapons while expanding its malign influence
across the region. North Korea mounted the most brazen
cyberattack ever on our territory. China has stepped up its
coercive behavior in Asia, backed by its rapid military
modernization.
The findings of last year's National Defense Panel cast
serious doubt on whether our military can fulfill even the
current strategy at acceptable risk. This bipartisan group of
military commanders and policymakers stated that the defense
spending cuts imposed by the BCA and sequestration ``constitute
a serious strategic misstep.'' More ominously, the Panel
concluded that, ``In the extreme, the United States could find
itself in a position where it must either abandon an important
national interest or enter a conflict for which it is not fully
prepared.''
Based on its findings, the National Defense Panel
recommended unanimously that Congress and the President
immediately repeal the BCA and return, at a minimum, to the
last strategy-driven budget proposed by former Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates in 2011. That would mean $611 billion for
the discretionary base budget for the Defense Department in
fiscal year 2016.
But here, too, I would note that the world has changed
significantly since 2011, and this recommendation is more
likely a floor, not a ceiling, of what we as a Nation should be
considering for our own defense.
While Senator Reed and I support the National Defense
Panel's recommendations, we recognize that $611 billion for
defense is neither realistic in the current political
environment, nor is it likely that the department could
responsibly execute this funding in fiscal year 2016. That is
why Senator Reed and I came together in the Views and Estimates
letter that we sent last week to the Budget Committee to
propose an objective that, I hope, could be a new basis for
bipartisan unity: ending sequestration for defense by
allocating $577 billion in discretionary base budget authority
for fiscal year 2016.
I recognize there are differences of opinion over broader
fiscal questions, especially how to approach nondefense
discretionary spending, but continuing to live with the
unacceptable effects of sequestration is a choice.
Sequestration is the law, but Congress makes the laws. We
can choose to end the debilitating effects of sequestration,
and we must, because at sequestration levels, it is impossible
to meet our constitutional responsibility to provide for our
National defense.
We look forward to the witnesses' testimony today and hope
that they will cover a broad spectrum of the policy and
resource issues the department confronts. I would also ask our
witnesses to share their views on the current situations in
Ukraine, Syria, and Iraq.
I want to thank Senator Reed for his continued bipartisan
cooperation that has characterized our relationship for many
years, especially on this joint letter to the Budget Committee.
I thank you.
Senator Reed?

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me join you in
welcoming Secretary Carter, Chairman Dempsey, and Mr. McCord.
Gentlemen, I appreciate your willingness to be here today
to talk about the President's fiscal year 2016 budget request,
which the Chairman has noted is $38 billion above the Budget
Control Act discretionary funding caps. But also as the
Chairman noted, these BCA caps, coupled with the imminent
threat of sequestration level cuts and the lack of budget
stability necessary for military planning, create an urgent and
growing strategic problem that we simply must address.
Indeed, in my view, it creates a problem for every Federal
agency and department. I think sequestration, across-the-board,
must be ended.
On January 28, this committee heard stark testimony from
each of the service chiefs about the impact of reduced funding
levels. All of the Services are working hard to maintain near-
term readiness to meet the ``fight tonight'' requirement, but
only by assuming increased risk in the form of cuts and delays
to training, maintenance, modernization, and infrastructure
sustainment, and by curtailing quality-of-life programs.
As Air Force Chief of Staff General Welsh eloquently
stated, ``When the bugle calls, we will win. But the
vulnerabilities sequestration introduces into our forces will
encourage our adversaries, worry our allies, limit the number
of concurrent operations we can conduct, and increase risk to
the men and women who fight America's next war.''
The Services, the men and women in uniform, are the
backbone of our Nation's defense, and they are under great
strain. I am, certainly, interested in the witnesses' testimony
on how the Department of Defense will continue to manage this
problem while a solution is not yet on the horizon.
If you do not get the $38 billion over the BCA, that is the
President's request--again, Senator McCain and I are urging
even more--what must be cut? If sequestration is not avoided,
what else must be cut? What is your timetable for beginning to
implement these cuts?
As I stated earlier, the services are focused on near-term
readiness, and they need to be, because they are actively
engaged around the world, fighting significant challenges to
U.S. national security interests.
In Afghanistan, the commanding general of United States
Forces, General Campbell, believes he has the resources and
authorities he needs for the 2015 fighting season, but the
Taliban remain resilient despite coming under pressure on both
sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
Operations against ISIS in Iraq and Syria continue at a
pace that appears to be rolling back their territorial gains of
last year and providing the time and space needed for advise-
and-assist programs. But this critical campaign must continue
unabated if it is going to be successful against such a
dangerous enemy. The fight will be harder, each and every day,
especially as Iraqi forces try to enter urban centers like
Mosul.
In Europe, the post-Cold War international order is under
threat from a Russia that seeks to dominate Ukraine and
intimidate its other neighbors, including by conducting
increasingly aggressive military activities both within and
outside its borders. Turmoil in Yemen and Libya provide safe
havens for terrorists and must be closely watched. China's
actions continue to make its neighbors uneasy.
Meeting all of these threats requires ready troops and
adequate funding, and I am interested in the witnesses' views
on how you are prioritizing this funding.
In addition to ongoing operations, there are emerging
threats, which will require immediate and significant
investments.
The recent cyberattack on Sony by North Korea illustrates
that even a relatively small and weak rogue nation can cause
extensive damage to United States-based economic targets
through cyberspace. The United States must work to counter this
threat.
In addition, I also understand that efforts are now
underway to protect our space assets from hostile acts, an
equally serious asymmetric threat and one that will require
substantial funding.
In focusing on emerging threats, we cannot disregard the
significant funding necessary for the maintenance and
modernization of our nuclear enterprise, including the Ohio-
class replacement submarine.
I am interested in hearing how the Department will balance
new threats with legacy programs. Clearly, the department has
many bills to pay, and they cannot do it without the help of
Congress.
Military personnel costs consume approximately a third of
the Department's budget. The department has once again
submitted several proposals aimed at slowing the growth of
military personnel costs. This committee must carefully
consider these proposals, as well as the recommendations of the
Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission,
in order to provide the Defense Department with flexibility in
these areas.
With regard to BRAC, I understand the department is again
requesting an additional base realignment and closure, or BRAC,
round in 2017. While BRAC has been controversial in the past, I
do believe that we need to consider efforts to allow the
Defense Department to shed what may be as much as 25 percent in
excess infrastructure it does not necessarily need, and use
these resources to invest in higher priorities.
Again, I would appreciate your views on this matter.
While the focus today is on the defense budget, the
Pentagon simply cannot meet all these national security
challenges without the help of other government departments and
agencies, including State, Justice, Homeland Security, and the
Intelligence Community.
So, again, I would ask, as you speak, to comment on the
interagency necessities that are facing the department.
Let me commend all our witnesses for working hard. Let me
commend the Chairman for his efforts, particularly in leading
our mutual letter to the Budget Committee.
I look forward to your testimony.
Chairman McCain. Secretary Carter?

STATEMENT OF HON. ASHTON B. CARTER, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE;
ACCOMPANIED BY HON. MIKE McCORD, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(COMPTROLLER) AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

Secretary Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Reed, all the members of the committee. Thank you for inviting
me to be here today with you, and thank you for confirming me
as Secretary of Defense. I am honored by the trust and
confidence of President Obama in appointing me, and the Senate
in confirming me.
My care and respect for the men and women of the finest
fighting force the world has ever known is as boundless as
their skill and devotion. I know this committee shares the same
devotion to them and shares responsibility for them and for the
defense of our great country. I hope that my tenure as
Secretary of Defense will be marked by partnership with you on
their behalf.
I am here to present the President's budget for the
Department of Defense for fiscal year 2016. Since I have been
on the job for exactly two weeks, it is plain that I did not
have a role in shaping this budget. But I have studied it
carefully, and I am fully prepared to answer your questions
about it and to work with you to find common ground where you
have concerns.
Most importantly, I strongly support the President in
requesting a defense budget above the artificial caps of the
Budget Control Act, above the so-called sequester levels, next
year and in the years thereafter. I share the President's
desire to find a way forward that upholds the fundamental
principles behind the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, and I
support the President's commitment to vetoing any bill that
locks in sequestration, because to do otherwise would be both
unsafe and wasteful.
Before I turn to the budget to explain what I mean by that,
allow me to share some observations from my short time on the
job, observations that help reinforce my testimony here.
Shortly after I was sworn in, I spoke to the people of the
Department of Defense--military, civilian, and contractor--and
told them I had three commitments as Secretary of Defense.
The first is to them and their families, to their safety,
their welfare, and their effectiveness, and equally to those
who came before them and to those who will come after them.
The second commitment is to assist the President as he
makes difficult decisions about how to defend the country in a
turbulent world, and then to carry out those decisions where
they involve the use of military force.
The third commitment is to the future, to make sure our
military remains the very best in an ever-changing world amidst
fast-moving technological and commercial change, and as we seek
to attract new generations to the mission of national security.
Because of those commitments, I traveled at the end of my
first week on the job to Afghanistan to visit our troops and
commanders, and also the leaders of Afghanistan and some of
their military leaders. I wanted to assess the conditions on
the ground there as we enter a new phase of our long campaign
and as we carry out the transition to an enduring presence that
will ensure, as the President says, our progress in Afghanistan
sticks.
Next, I traveled to Kuwait, where I met with the emir
before convening senior American diplomats and military leaders
from throughout the region; Ambassadors from several countries;
our commanders from CENTCOM [United States Central Command],
EUCOM [United States European Command], AFRICOM [United States
Africa Command], and SOCOM [United States Special Operations
Command]; and the commanders of the campaign in Iraq and Syria
against ISIL [the Islamic State of Syria and the Levant]. I
wanted to hear directly from them about the complex political
and military situation in the region and about the best
approaches to leveraging U.S. leadership of the broad coalition
combating this ugly scourge. This afternoon, I would be pleased
to discuss these challenges or any others--the Chairman
mentioned Ukraine--in addition to the budget.
The point is that in these regions of the world, just as in
the Asia-Pacific, in Europe and elsewhere, it is America's
leadership and America's men and women in uniform who
frequently stand between order and disorder, who stand up to
malicious and destabilizing actors while standing with those
who believe with us in a more secure, just, and prosperous
future for all of our children.
But this Congress will determine whether our troops can
continue to do so. The administration is proposing to increase
the defense budget in line with the projection submitted to
Congress last year. By halting the decline in defense spending
imposed by the Budget Control Act, the President's budget would
give us the resources we need to execute our Nation's defense
strategy.
But, and I want to be clear about this, under
sequestration, which is set to return in 212 days, our Nation
would be less secure.
Mr. Chairman, as you yourself have reminded Congress,
sequestration threatens our military readiness, the size of our
warfighting forces, the capabilities of our air and naval
fleets, and, ultimately, the lives of our men and women in
uniform.
The Joint Chiefs have said the same before this committee,
and they could not have been more clear in their assessment of
the damage sequestration would do to our National security.
I want to commend you and thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member Reed, for your very thoughtful letter to the leadership
of the Senate Budget Committee about the dangers the
sequestration, and I completely agree with you that the threat
of sequestration is, as you said, ``a national security crisis
of the first order.''
The great tragedy is that this corrosive damage to our
National security is not the result of objective factors,
logic, or reason. It is not that we have some new breakthrough
in military technology or some novel strategic insight that
somehow provides the same security for a smaller budget. It is
not that sequester is forced upon us by economic emergency or
dire recession that makes taking grave security risks
absolutely necessary. It is surely not the case that the world
has suddenly become more stable or that America has less to do
to keep it safe, allowing us to take a peace dividend. It is
not even that these cuts solve the Nation's overall fiscal
challenges, because the sad math is that they are large and
sudden enough to damage defense but fail to resolve our long-
term fiscal issues and the real drivers of the deficit and
debt.
Sequester was not the result of objective factors.
Sequester is purely the fallout of political gridlock. Its
purpose was to compel prudent compromise on our long-term
fiscal challenges, compromise that never came. This has been
compounded in recent years because the Defense Department has
suffered a double whammy, the worst of both worlds, that has
coupled mindless sequestration with constraints on our ability
to reform.
We need your help with both. I know that Chairman McCain,
Senator Reed, and others on this committee are as committed to
reform as I am, and I look forward to working with you on new
reforms.
We at the Pentagon can and must do better at getting value
for the defense dollar. Taxpayers have trouble comprehending,
let alone supporting, the defense budget when they hear about
cost overruns, insufficient accounting and accountability,
needless overhead, excess infrastructure, and the like.
There are significant savings to be found through new
reforms across DOD [the Department of Defense], reforms that we
are committed to pursuing. But sequester cuts don't help us
achieve any of them. In fact, the nature of sequester
frequently leads to waste as, for example, when it forces a
reduction in contract production rates driving up unit costs.
But at the same time that I am committed to new and further
reforms, I must note that, in the past several years, painful
but necessary reforms proposed by DOD, reforms involving
elimination of overhead and unneeded infrastructure, retirement
of older force structure, and reasonable adjustments and
compensation, have been denied by Congress.
I need your help with these reforms, which have been
frustrated at the same time sequester looms and at the same
time as we make new reforms. I will work with Congress to
resolve concerns and find common ground, but we must have your
help.
If confronted with sequester-level budgets and continued
obstacles to reform, I do not believe that we can simply keep
making incremental cuts while maintaining the same general set
of objectives that have anchored our defense strategy. We would
have to change the shape and not just the size of our military,
significantly impacting parts of our defense strategy. We
cannot meet sequester with further half measures.
As Secretary of Defense, I will not send our troops into a
fight with outdated equipment, inadequate readiness, or
ineffective doctrine. But everything else is on the table,
including parts of our budget that have long been considered
inviolate.
This may lead to decisions that no Americans, including
Members of Congress, want us to make.
I'm not afraid to ask the difficult questions, but if we
are stuck with sequestration's budget cuts over the long term,
our entire Nation will have to live with the answers.
So instead of sequestration, I urge you to urge your
colleagues to embrace the alternative: building the force of
the future powerful enough to underwrite our strategy, equipped
with boldly new technology; leading in domains like cyber and
space, as the Chairman and Senator Reed said; attracting and
retaining the best Americans to our mission; being lean and
efficient throughout our enterprise; and showing resolve to
friends and potential foes alike.
I think we can all agree that the world in 2014 was more
complicated than anyone could've predicted. Given today's
security environment, the President's proposed increase in
defense spending over last year's budget is responsible, and
it's prudent.
I earnestly hope we can come together behind a long-term
budget approach that dispels sequester and provides stability,
rather than doing this one year at a time.
I hope we can again unite behind what our great Nation
should and must do to protect our people and make a better
world. I hope we can provide our magnificent men and women of
the Department of Defense, who make up the greatest fighting
force the world has ever known, what they need and what they
fully deserve.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Carter follows:]

Prepared Statement by Hon. Ash Carter
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, members of the committee:
thank you for confirming me as Secretary of Defense, and for inviting
me here today to discuss the President's fiscal year 2016 budget
request for the Department of Defense (DOD). Oversight is key to our
system of government. I not only welcome your wisdom and experience; I
also want your partnership, and need your help.
I also want to thank Chairman Dempsey for his leadership, as well
as Deputy Secretary Work and Vice Chairman Winnefeld, in particular for
all their hard work over the past year in helping develop the budget
request we will be discussing today.
i. introduction and strategy
Since I last appeared before this committee, I had the opportunity
to see our troops in Afghanistan and Kuwait. Hearing from them was one
of my highest priorities upon taking office.
In Afghanistan, our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are
helping cement progress made toward a more secure, stable, and
prosperous future, by training, advising, and assisting Afghan forces
and continuing their counterterrorism mission. They are working to
ensure that Afghanistan never again becomes a safe haven for attacks on
our homeland, or on our partners and allies.
In Kuwait, our men and women in uniform are contributing to our
counter-ISIL coalition in Iraq and Syria. They are working closely with
Iraq and our global coalition partners to ensure that local forces can
deliver lasting defeat to a vile enemy that has barbarically murdered
American citizens, Iraqis, Syrians, and so many others, and that seeks
to export its hateful and twisted ideology across the Middle East and
North Africa, and beyond.
No doubt the challenges and opportunities we face extend well
beyond the Middle East.
In Europe, our troops are helping reinforce and reassure our allies
in Eastern Europe as we confront a reversion to archaic security
thinking.
In the Asia-Pacific--home to half the world's population and
economy--they are working to modernize our alliances, build new
partnerships, and helping the United States continue to underwrite
stability, peace, and prosperity in the region--as we have for decades.
As we still meet longtime challenges, such as the continuing
imperative to counter the spread of weapons of mass destruction, our
Armed Forces are also addressing new dangers, such as in cyberspace.
Across the world, it is America's leadership, and America's men and
women in uniform, who often stand between disorder and order--who stand
up to malicious and destabilizing actors, while standing behind those
who believe in a more secure, just, and prosperous future.
Mr. Chairman, this committee and this Congress will determine
whether our troops can continue to do so--whether they can continue to
defend our Nation's interests around the world with the readiness,
capability, and excellence our Nation has grown accustomed to, and
sometimes taken for granted.
Halting and reversing the decline in defense spending imposed by
the Budget Control Act, the President's budget would give us the
resources we need to execute our Nation's defense strategy.
It would ensure we field a modern, ready force in a balanced way,
while also embracing change and reform, because asking for more
taxpayer dollars requires we hold up our end of the bargain--by
ensuring that every dollar is well-spent.
The President is proposing to increase the defense budget in fiscal
year 2016, but in line with the projection he submitted to Congress
last year in the fiscal year 2015 budget's Future Years Defense Program
(FYDP). The department is executing the plan it presented last year.
Accordingly, for fiscal year 2016, the President is proposing $534
billion for DOD's base budget and $51 billion in Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO), totaling $585 billion to sustain America's national
security and defense strategies.
The Defense Department needs your support for this budget, which is
driven by strategy, not the other way around. More specifically, it is
driven by the defense strategy identified in the 2014 Quadrennial
Defense Review, which reflects the longtime, bipartisan consensus that
our military must protect the Homeland, build security globally, and
project power and win decisively. We do so in line with our
longstanding tradition of maintaining a superior force with an
unmatched technological edge, working in close partnership with friends
and allies, upholding the rules-based international order, and keeping
our commitments to the people who make up the All-Volunteer Force.
Our defense budget's priorities line up with our strategic
priorities: sustaining America's global leadership by:

rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region;
maintaining a strong commitment to security and
stability in Europe and the Middle East;
sustaining a global counterterrorism campaign;
strengthening key alliances and partnerships; and,
prioritizing key modernization efforts. This budget
ensures we can execute our defense strategy with manageable
risk, even as it does require us to accept elevated risk in
some areas.

But--and I want to be clear about this--parts of our Nation's
defense strategy cannot be executed under sequestration, which remains
the law of the land and is set to return 212 days from today.
As I have said before, the prospect of sequestration's serious
damage to our national security and economy is tragically not a result
of an economic emergency or recession.
It is not because these budget cuts are a mathematical solution to
the Nation's overall fiscal challenge--they are not.
It is not because paths of curbing nondiscretionary spending and
reforming our tax system have been explored and exhausted--they have
not.
It is not due to a breakthrough in military technology or a new
strategic insight that somehow makes continued defense spending
unnecessary--there has been no such silver bullet.
It is not because the world has suddenly become more peaceful--for
it is abundantly clear that it has not.
Instead, sequestration is purely the collateral damage of political
gridlock. Friends and potential enemies around the world are watching.
We in DOD are prepared to make difficult strategic and budgetary
choices. We are also committed--more than ever before--to finding new
ways to improve the way we do business and be more efficient and
accountable in our defense spending.
But in order to ensure our military remains the world's finest
fighting force, we need to banish the clouds of fiscal uncertainty that
have obscured our plans and forced inefficient choices. We need a long-
term restoration of normal budgeting and a deal that the President can
sign, and that lives up to our responsibility of defending this country
and the global order. That means, among other things, avoiding
sequestration.
To be sure, even under sequestration, America will remain the
world's strongest military power. But under sequestration, our
military--and our national security--would have to take on
irresponsible and unnecessary risk--risk that previous administrations
and congressional leaders have wisely chosen to avoid.
Sequestration would lead over time to a military that looks
fundamentally different and performs much differently than what we are
used to. Not only as Secretary of Defense, but simply as an American, I
deeply, earnestly hope we can avert that future. I am committed to
working with the members of this committee, and your colleagues
throughout the Congress to prevent it.
I know how proud you and all Americans are that we field the finest
fighting force in the world. But our military superiority was not
built, and will not be sustained, by resting on our laurels. So instead
of resigning ourselves to having the diminished military that
sequestration would give us, I propose that we build the force of the
future, together.
ii. building the force of the future
Assuming the Congress funds the President's fiscal year 2016 budget
and averts sequestration, we have the opportunity to build the force of
the future. We have inherited a long tradition of military excellence
from those who came before us, and we must preserve it for those who
will come after.
But to do so, DOD must embrace the future--and embrace change--
throughout our institution. We must be open to new ideas and new ways
of doing business that can help us operate more efficiently and perform
more effectively in an increasingly dynamic and competitive
environment.
What DOD Needs To Do
As DOD counters the very real dangers we face in the world, we will
also grab hold of the bright opportunities before us--opportunities to
be more competitive and reforge our Nation's military and defense
establishment into a future force that harnesses and develops the
latest, cutting-edge technology, and that remains superior to any
potential adversary; one that is efficient and accountable to the
taxpayers who support it; and one that competes and succeeds in
attracting the next generation of talented Americans to fill its ranks.
These are the three main pillars on which DOD will build the force
of the future.
Competitiveness through Technological and Operational Superiority
As other nations pursue comprehensive military modernization
programs and develop technologies designed to blunt our military's
traditional advantages, the first pillar of our future force must be
ensuring that we maintain--and extend--our technological edge over any
potential adversary.
The President's fiscal year 2016 budget includes targeted
investments in modernized space, cyber, and missile defense
capabilities geared toward countering emerging threats that could upend
our technological superiority and our ability to project power. DOD
would look forward to providing a full account of our proposed
modernization investments, and the threats that compel them, in a
classified setting.
The budget also supports the Defense Innovation Initiative, which
will help ensure the military continues to ride the leading edge of
innovation, and makes deferred modernization investments that will
ensure America's nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective.
Across all these efforts, we must be open to global, commercial
technology as well, and learn from advances in the private sector.
Because we know that technology alone--however advanced--cannot
sustain our military's superiority, just as important is a ruthless
focus on operational excellence. This means using our existing forces
and capabilities in new, creative, and fiscally prudent ways to achieve
our objectives. This also means working to develop more innovative and
effective strategic and military options for the President, introducing
a new and more rapidly responsive global force management model,
developing new operational concepts, and reforming and updating all our
operational plans.
Competitiveness through Accountability and Efficiency
The second pillar of building the force of the future requires
redoubling our efforts to make DOD more accountable and efficient. We
live in a competitive world and need to be a competitive organization.
If we don't lean ourselves out and maintain our fighting weight, we
have no business asking our fellow citizens for more resources.
As I made clear in my confirmation hearing, I cannot suggest
greater support and stability for the defense budget without at the
same time frankly noting that not every defense dollar is always spent
as well as it should be.
American taxpayers rightly have trouble comprehending--let alone
supporting--the defense budget when they read of cost overruns, lack of
accounting and accountability, needless overhead, and the like.
If we're asking taxpayers to not only give us half a trillion of
their hard-earned dollars, but also give us more than we got last year,
we have to demonstrate that we can be responsible with it.
We must do all we can to spend their money more wisely and more
responsibly. We must reduce overhead, and we must curb wasteful
spending practices wherever they are.
DOD has sought to continuously improve our acquisition processes
over the past 5 years, and I am proud myself to have been a part of
that effort. Today, I am recommitting the Defense Department to working
both with Congress, and on our own, to find new and more creative ways
of stretching our defense dollars to give our troops the weapons and
equipment they need.
The department's Better Buying Power initiative is now on its third
iteration since I established it in 2010, with Better Buying Power 3.0
focused on achieving dominant capabilities through technical
excellence. I know well and very much appreciate the strong support for
acquisition reform demonstrated by the Senate and House Armed Services
Committees, and their chairmen, and I share their deep desire to
achieve real, lasting results that benefit both America's security and
taxpayers.
DOD is working closely with committee members and staff on ways to
eliminate some of the burdensome and duplicative administrative
requirements levied on our program managers. To that end, the
President's fiscal year 2016 budget submission includes a number of
legislative proposals designed to help streamline the program oversight
process. We look forward to continuing our close partnership with
Congress to see these measures implemented.
As we sustain our focus on acquisition reform, I believe that DOD
must concurrently undertake a wholesale review of our business
practices and management systems.
Our goal is to identify where we can further reduce the cost of
doing business to free up funding for readiness and modernization--
ensuring that our energy, focus, and resources are devoted to
supporting our frontline operations as much as possible.
We intend to work closely with industry partners--who execute or
enable many of our programs, logistics, training, administrative, and
other functions--throughout this process, both to explore how they
could help us accomplish our missions at reduced cost, and because they
may have new and innovative ideas worth considering.
Additionally, the Defense Department is pursuing creative force
structure changes to be more agile and efficient--such as how we're
modernizing our cruisers and restructuring Army aviation. We've
established a new Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency. Four previous
rounds of efficiency and budget reduction initiatives have yielded
approximately $78 billion in projected and actual savings in fiscal
year 2016, helping to cushion our defense programs from successive
years of budget cuts.
We're also working hard to cut unnecessary overhead: from reducing
management headquarters budgets by 20 percent across the department, to
divesting excess bases and infrastructure.
When DOD recently requested a round of domestic Base Realignment
and Closure, Congress asked that we first pursue efficiencies in
Europe. We did. DOD has approved and is pursuing a broad European
Infrastructure Consolidation--which will result in some $500 million in
annual recurring savings. We now need a round of domestic BRAC
beginning in fiscal year 2017 to address excess infrastructure here at
home.
Simply put, we have more bases in more places than we need. We
estimate DOD has about 25 percent more infrastructure capacity than
necessary. We must be permitted to divest surplus infrastructure as we
reduce and renew force structure. With projected recurring savings from
a new BRAC round totaling some $2 billion a year, it would be
irresponsible to cut tooth without also cutting tail.
For base communities in question, it's important to remember that
BRAC is often an opportunity to be seized. Communities have shown that
BRAC is ultimately what you make of it, and there are plenty of places
that have emerged from it stronger than they were before.
Consider Lawrence, Indiana, which took advantage of Fort Harrison's
closure in 1996 to create an enterprise zone, community college,
recreational facilities, and commercial sites that in just 7 years not
only replaced 100 percent of the jobs lost when the base closed, but
created even more.
Charleston, SC, stepped up when the Charleston Naval Complex closed
in 1993, and now is home to more than 80 new industrial and Federal
agency tenants. The former naval base is now producing millions of
dollars' worth of goods that are exported to Europe, Africa, and the
Middle East.
At former Mather Air Force Base in Sacramento County, CA, the local
redevelopment effort has invested $400 million and created more than
6,500 jobs--over six times the number of jobs lost when the base closed
in 1993. It's now home to scores of businesses, a mixture of private
companies, government agencies, and non-profit organizations.
These are just a few examples of what can happen when local
leaders, communities, and businesses work together and take advantage
of the opportunities for new jobs and new growth after BRAC.
One more point on accountability: Whether we're improving
acquisition or closing bases, it is not enough to simply tell taxpayers
that we're spending their dollars responsibly. We have to also show
them, which is why good cost accounting and financial auditability is
so important to me.
DOD has made significant progress over the past 5 years in adding
more discipline to our business environment, but there is much work
left to be done, and we remain fully committed to our current audit
goals.
Today, over 90 percent of DOD's current year, general fund
budgetary resources are under some form of financial audit, with the
Military Services all involved and following the model employed by the
Marine Corps.
We plan to submit every corner of DOD to this kind of audit regimen
beginning in fiscal year 2016. With this foundation, the department
will progressively expand the scope of these audits until all our
organizations, funds, and financial statements will be under audit in
fiscal year 2018, complying with Congress's statutory direction to be
audit ready by the end of fiscal year 2017.
There's a reason why auditing is a basic practice as ancient as the
Domesday Book, and it is time that DOD finally lives up to its moral
and legal obligation to be accountable to those who pay its bills. I
intend to do everything we can--including holding people to account--to
get this done.
Competitiveness through Attracting Future Talent
Third, but no less important, DOD must be competitive when it comes
to attracting new generations of talented and dedicated Americans to
our calling of defending the Nation.
We know how the attacks of September 11th, 2001 motivated so many
Americans to want to be part of this noble endeavor. Going forward, we
must ensure our future force can continue to recruit the finest young
men and women our country has to offer--military and civilian--like
those who serve today.
As we do this, we must be mindful that the next generation expects
jobs that give them purpose, meaning, and dignity. They want to be able
to make real contributions, have their voices heard, and gain valuable
and transferable experience. We must shape the kind of force they want
to be in. The battle for talent will demand enlightened and agile
leaders, new training schemes, new educational opportunities, and new
compensation approaches.
DOD is already pursuing several initiatives that will help ensure
the military is a compelling career option. In recent years, we've been
expanding pilot programs that facilitate breaks in service that let our
people gain diverse work experience. We've tailored our transition
assistance program, Transition GPS, to better prepare servicemembers to
enter the civilian workforce--providing different tracks for those who
want to go to college, those who want skills training, and those who
want to be entrepreneurs. We've put a renewed focus on military ethics
and professionalism, as well as making sure our military health system
is held to the same high-quality standards we expect from the
servicemembers and military family members under its care.
Because we know how important it is--both for today's
servicemembers and the generation that will follow them--we're also
deeply committed to creating an environment and culture where we live
the values we defend and every servicemember is treated with the
dignity and respect they deserve.
That's why we're continuing to expand combat positions available to
women--because everyone who's able and willing to serve their country
should have full and equal opportunity to do so.
It's why we're striving to eliminate sexual assault from the
military.
It's why we've been making sure gay and lesbian servicemembers can
serve openly, and that their families receive the benefits their loved
ones have earned.
But for everything we're doing, DOD cannot build the force of the
future by ourselves. We need Congress' help.
What We Need Congress To Do
Since our current defense budget drawdown began several years ago,
I've observed something of a phenomenon here in Washington.
Along with our troops, their families, and our defense civilians, I
thank our supporters on Capitol Hill, including most members of this
committee, who have joined with us in trying to do everything possible
to get Congress to prevent more mindless cuts to our defense budget.
Unfortunately, these combined efforts have been unsuccessful in
actually restoring adequate and predictable resources for DOD. We have
had to endure deep cuts to readiness, weather pay freezes and civilian
furloughs, and cut badly needed investments in modernization and
critical technologies. At the same time, Congress has sometimes sought
to protect programs that DOD has argued are no longer needed, or
require significant reform.
We have had the worst of both worlds--a double whammy of mindless
sequestration coupled with inability to reform.
As many of you know, it wasn't always this way.
During the defense drawdown after the Cold War, DOD had much more
flexibility thanks to the help of Congress. For example, we were able
to resize the Army, retire the A-6 Intruder and many other weapons
systems, and implement multiple BRAC rounds, which freed up dollars we
re-allocated to keep our force structure ready, capable, and deployable
around the world.
I know some of the changes and reforms we're proposing may feel
like a significant change from how we currently do business. But if
anyone can understand how the dots connect and how we need Congress'
help to be able to defend our country, our allies, and our interests in
an increasingly dangerous world, it's you--the members of this
committee.
The fact is, if we're not able to implement the changes and reforms
we need, we will be forced to make painful tradeoffs, even at the
higher topline the President is requesting. We will lose further ground
on modernization and readiness--leaving tomorrow's force less capable
and leaving our Nation less secure. We will face significant hurdles to
executing our Nation's defense strategy. That's why we need your help.
iii. the president's fiscal year 2016 budget
As we do every year when formulating our budget, this budget seeks
to balance readiness, capability, and size--because we must ensure
that, whatever the size of our force, we have the resources to provide
every servicemember with the right training, the right equipment, the
right compensation, and the right quality of fellow troops. That is the
only way we can ensure our military is fully prepared to accomplish its
missions.
Almost two-thirds of DOD's fiscal year 2016 base budget--$348.4
billion--funds our day-to-day expenses, similar to what a business
would call its operating budget. This covers, among other expenses, the
cost of fuel, spare parts, logistics support, maintenance, service
contracts, and administration. It also includes pay and benefits for
military and civilian personnel, which by themselves comprise nearly
half of our total budget.
The remaining third of our base budget--$185.9 billion--comprises
investments in future defense needs, much like a business' capital
improvement budget. It pays for the research, development, testing,
evaluation, and ultimately acquisition of the weapons, equipment, and
facilities that our servicemembers need.
Broken down differently, our base budget includes the following
categories:

Military pay and benefits (including health care and
retirement benefits)--$169 billion, or about 32 percent of the
base budget.
Civilian pay and benefits--$79 billion, or about 15
percent of the base budget.
Other operating costs--$105 billion, or about 20
percent of the base
budget.
Acquisition and other investments (Procurement;
research, development, testing, and evaluation; and new
facilities construction)--$181 billion, or about 34 percent of
the base budget.

Modernization
What makes this budget different is the focus it puts, more so than
any other over the last decade, on new funding for modernization. After
years of war, which required the deferral of longer-term modernization
investments, this budget puts renewed emphasis on preparing for future
threats--especially threats that challenge our military's power
projection capabilities.
Threats to Power Projection and our Technological Edge
Being able to project power anywhere across the globe by rapidly
surging aircraft, ships, troops, and supplies lies at the core of our
defense strategy and what the American people have come to expect of
their military. It guarantees that when an acute crisis erupts anywhere
in the world, America can provide aid when disaster strikes, reinforce
our allies when they are threatened, and protect our citizens and
interests globally. It also assures freedom of navigation and
overflight, and allows global commerce to flow freely.
For decades, U.S. global power projection has relied on the ships,
planes, submarines, bases, aircraft carriers, satellites, networks, and
other advanced capabilities that comprise our military's unrivaled
technological edge. But today that superiority is being challenged in
unprecedented ways.
Advanced military technologies, from rockets and drones to chemical
and biological capabilities, have found their way into the arsenals of
both non-state actors as well as previously less capable militaries.
Other nations--among them Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea--have
been pursuing long-term, comprehensive military modernization programs
to close the technology gap that has long existed between them and the
United States.
These modernization programs are developing and fielding advanced
aircraft, submarines, and both longer-range and more accurate ballistic
and cruise missiles. They're developing new and advanced anti-ship and
anti-air missiles, as well as new counter-space, cyber, electronic
warfare, undersea, and air attack capabilities. In some areas, we see
levels of new weapons development that we haven't seen since the mid-
1980s, near the peak of the Soviet Union's surge in Cold War defense
spending.
Targeted Investments in the President's Budget
One of the reasons we are asking for more money this year than last
year is to reverse recent under-investment in new weapons systems by
making targeted investments to help us stay ahead of emerging threats--
adding substantial funding for space control and launch capabilities,
missile defense, cyber, and advanced sensors, communications, and
munitions--all of which are critical for power projection in contested
environments.
The budget also makes significant investments in the resilience and
survivability of our infrastructure and forces, particularly in the
western Pacific, with improved active defenses such as our Patriot and
AEGIS systems, as well as selective hardening of key installations and
facilities.
DOD is also addressing the erosion of U.S. technological
superiority with the Defense Innovation Initiative (DII). The DII is an
ambitious department-wide effort to identify and invest in innovative
ways to sustain and advance America's military dominance for the 21st
century.
The DII will identify, develop, and field breakthrough technologies
and systems through a new Long-Range Research & Development Planning
Program, and the President's budget supports this effort through
specific investments in promising new technologies and capabilities
such as high-speed strike weapons, advanced aeronautics, rail guns, and
high energy lasers. The DII also involves the development of innovative
operational concepts that would help us use our current capabilities in
new and creative ways. The ultimate aim is to help craft `offset
strategies' that maximize our strengths and exploit the weaknesses of
potential adversaries.
Our budget is also making focused and sustained investments in
modernization and manning across the nuclear enterprise, even as we
reduce the roles and numbers of nuclear weapons in the U.S. nuclear
posture. These investments are critical for ensuring the continued
safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent, as well
as the long-term health of the force that supports our nuclear triad,
particularly after recent troubling lapses in parts of DOD's nuclear
enterprise. To help fund improvements across the nuclear enterprise, we
are requesting an increase of approximately $1 billion in fiscal year
2016, and about $8 billion over the FYDP.
Readiness
DOD must rebuild and recover after more than 13 years of
uninterrupted war. But our effort to do so has been frustrated by two
variables, both of which are out of our hands--one, the continued high
operational tempo and high demand for our forces, and two, the
uncertainty surrounding annual appropriations.
Only over the last couple of years has readiness begun to recover
from the strains of over a decade of war, exacerbated by sequestration
in 2013. Nevertheless, readiness remains at troubling levels across the
force.
While our forward-deployed forces remain ready, our surge forces at
home are not as ready as they need to be. The President's budget
therefore invests in near-term unit readiness by adjusting service end-
strength ramps to reduce personnel turbulence and stress on the force,
while increasing funding to improve home station training and training-
related infrastructure.
This past year has demonstrated that our military must be ready to
fight more than just the last war. We have to be prepared across all
domains--air, land, sea, space, and in cyberspace--to engage in both
low- and high-end missions and conflicts, as well as in the shadowy,
so-called `hybrid warfare' space in between.
While this budget submission's requested and projected funding
levels will enable the military to continue making steady progress
toward full-spectrum combat readiness, the gains we've recently made
are fragile. Sustaining them to provide for ready and capable forces
will require both time and a stable flow of resources, which is why,
even under the budget we're requesting, the Army, Navy, and Marine
Corps won't all reach their readiness goals until 2020, and the Air
Force won't do so until 2023.
Army:
For fiscal year 2016, the Army's base budget of $126.5 billion
supports an end strength of 1,015,000 soldiers--475,000 soldiers on
active duty, 342,000 soldiers in the Army National Guard, and 198,000
soldiers in the Army Reserve--comprising 57 total force brigade combat
teams and associated enablers. The budget also supports 19 brigade-
level training rotations at the Army's Combat Training Centers, which
are critical to the Army's efforts to reach full-spectrum combat
readiness.
While the Army's postwar end-strength target remains a force of
approximately 450,000 Active-Duty soldiers, 335,000 Army National Guard
soldiers, and 195,000 Army Reserve soldiers, this year's budget slows
the drawdown rate. Rather than planning to reduce the Active-Duty Force
by 20,000 soldiers and the National Guard by 14,000 soldiers in fiscal
year 2016, the Army will instead plan to reduce by 15,000 active-duty
soldiers and 8,000 guardsmen, while still maintaining its schedule for
reducing unit structure. This will help mitigate personnel turbulence
and stress, while also improving unit manning as the Army approaches
its target size.
The Army's budget for fiscal year 2016 also includes $4.5 billion
for Army helicopter modernization. Specifically:

UH-60M Black Hawk: We are requesting $1.6 billion to
support buying 94 multi-mission helicopters in fiscal year
2016, and $6.1 billion for 301 helicopters over the FYDP.
AH-64E Apache: We are requesting $1.4 billion to
support development and purchase of 64 attack helicopters in
fiscal year 2016, and $6.2 billion for 303 helicopters over the
FYDP.
CH-47F Chinook: We are requesting $1.1 billion to
support development and purchase of 39 cargo helicopters in
fiscal year 2016, and $3.2 billion for 95 helicopters over the
FYDP.
UH-72 Lakota: We are requesting $187 million in
fiscal year 2016 to support the final buy of 28 light utility
helicopters.

These investments require difficult trade-offs given today's
constrained fiscal environment. That is why the Army is resubmitting
the Army's Aviation Restructure Initiative, which makes the most
efficient use of taxpayer dollars by retiring outdated airframes and
streamlining the Army's helicopter fleet so that platforms can be
modernized and allocated where they are needed most.
As you know, I am committed to reviewing the Army's Aviation
Restructure Initiative. However, the Army believes that fully
implementing the Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI), which includes
shifting National Guard Apaches to Active-Duty units while providing
Guard units with Black Hawks, is prudent for several reasons.
For one, Apaches are in high demand at high levels of readiness
that would require Guard units manning them to mobilize at
unprecedentedly high rates; or alternatively, for the Army to spend a
total of approximately $4.4 billion to fully equip the Guard's Apache
battalions, and then $350 million per year to maintain them at those
high levels of readiness. Meanwhile, Black Hawks are more suitable for
Guard missions here at home. Whether homeland defense, disaster relief,
support to civil authorities, or complementing our active-duty
military, these missions tend to demand transport and medical
capabilities more than the attack capabilities of Apaches. In sum, the
initiative avoids approximately $12 billion in costs through fiscal
year 2035 and saves over $1 billion annually starting in fiscal year
2020. Considering these figures, implementing the Aviation Restructure
Initiative is not only in the best warfighting interest of the Army,
but also in the interest of the taxpayers who fund it.
I know this is a contentious issue. However, we believe the ARI is
the least cost, best solution for the Army's aviation enterprise. DOD
looks forward to making its case to the National Commission on the
Future of the Army established by the 2015 National Defense
Authorization Act.
Navy and Marine Corps:
The Navy and Marine Corps are allocated $161 billion for fiscal
year 2016, supporting a 282-ship fleet in 2016 and a 304-ship fleet by
fiscal year 2020 with a return to 11 aircraft carriers, 386,600 Active-
Duty and Reserve sailors, and 222,900 Active-Duty and Reserve marines.
The President's budget invests $16.6 billion in shipbuilding for
fiscal year 2016, and $95.9 billion over the FYDP. The budget protects
critical Navy and Marine Corps investments in undersea, surface,
amphibious, and airborne capabilities--all of which are critical for
addressing emerging threats. Specifically:

Submarines: We are requesting $5.7 billion for fiscal
year 2016, and $30.9 billion over the FYDP, to support buying
two Virginia-class attack submarines a year through fiscal year
2020. We are also requesting $1.4 billion in fiscal year 2016,
and $10.5 billion over the FYDP, to support the replacement for
the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine.
DDG-51 Guided Missile Destroyers: We are requesting
$3.4 billion for fiscal year 2016, and $18.5 billion over the
FYDP, to support the continued development and procurement of
two DDG-51 destroyers a year through fiscal year 2020.
Aircraft Carriers: The President's budget plan
enables us to support 11 carrier strike groups. We are
requesting $678 million in fiscal year 2016, and $3.9 billion
over the FYDP, to support the refueling and overhaul of the USS
George Washington. We are also requesting $2.8 billion in
fiscal year 2016, and $12.5 billion over the FYDP, to support
completion of the Gerald Ford, 4-year construction of the John
F. Kennedy, and long-lead items for CVN-80, Enterprise.
Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) and Small Surface
Combatants: We are requesting $1.8 billion in fiscal year 2016,
and $9.4 billion over the FYDP, to support development and
procurement of 14 littoral combat ships over the FYDP--
including 3 LCS in fiscal year 2016. We are also requesting $55
million in fiscal year 2016, and $762.8 million over the FYDP,
to support capability improvements to the survivability and
lethality of the LCS required for the Navy to modify it into a
small surface combatant.
Fleet Replenishment Oiler: We are requesting $674
million to support buying one new fleet replenishment oiler,
the TAO(X), in fiscal year 2016--part of a $2.4 billion request
to buy four of them over the FYDP.
Amphibious Transport Docks: We are requesting $668
million in fiscal year 2016 to finish buying one San Antonio-
class amphibious transport dock.
F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter: The
Department of the Navy is procuring two F-35 variants, the Navy
carrier-based F-35C and the Marine Corps short take-off and
vertical landing F-35B. The Navy and Marine Corps are
requesting $3.1 billion in fiscal year 2016 to support
procurement of 13 aircraft--9 F-35Bs and 4 F-35Cs--and aircraft
modifications and initial spares, and $20.9 billion over the
FYDP to support procurement of 121 aircraft and aircraft
modifications and initial spares.
Patrol and Airborne Early Warning Aircraft: We are
requesting $3.4 billion in fiscal year 2016, and $10.1 billion
over the FYDP, to support continued development and procurement
of 47 P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft through fiscal
year 2020. We are also requesting $1.3 billion in fiscal year
2016, and $6.1 billion over the FYDP, to support buying 24 E-2D
Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft through fiscal year
2020.

Making these investments while also abiding by fiscal prudence, we
had to make more difficult trade-offs. For that reason, we are
resubmitting our request to place some of the Navy's cruisers and an
amphibious landing ship--12 ships in total, including 11 cruisers--into
a phased modernization program that will provide them with enhanced
capability and a longer lifespan. Given that our cruisers are the most
capable ships for controlling the air defenses of a carrier strike
group, and in light of anti-ship missile capabilities being pursued by
other nations, this modernization program will, over the next decade
and a half, be a baseline requirement for sustaining both our cruiser
fleet and 11 carrier strike groups through 2045.
I acknowledge and appreciate the plan put forward in the 2015
National Defense Authorization Act, which helps us get to our goal, and
which we have begun to implement. However, this plan is more expensive,
and results in shorter ship life. Considering that our plan is critical
for our power projection capabilities, we believe it should be
implemented in full, and look forward to working with the Congress as
we move forward.
Air Force:
The Air Force is allocated a base budget of $152.9 billion for
fiscal year 2016, supporting a force of 491,700 Active Duty, Guard, and
Reserve airmen, 49 tactical fighter squadrons, 96 operational bombers
out of a total 154-aircraft bomber fleet, and a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear deterrent that includes 450 intercontinental
ballistic missiles.
The Air Force's budget reflects DOD's decision to protect
modernization funding for advanced capabilities and platforms most
relevant to both present and emerging threats--in this case, fifth-
generation fighters, long-range bombers, and mid-air refueling aircraft
to assure our air superiority and global reach; both manned and
remotely-piloted aircraft to help meet combatant commanders' needs for
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and research and
development to ensure continued and competitive space launch
capabilities. Specifically:

F-35A Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter: We are
requesting $6 billion to support buying 44 aircraft, aircraft
modifications, and initial spares in fiscal year 2016, and
$33.5 billion to support buying 275 aircraft, modifications,
and spares over the FYDP.
KC-46A Pegasus Refueling Tanker: We are requesting
$2.4 billion to buy 12 aircraft in fiscal year 2016, and $14.6
billion to buy 72 aircraft over the FYDP.
Long-Range Strike Bomber: We are requesting $1.2
billion for research and development in fiscal year 2016, and
$13.9 billion over the FYDP.
Remotely-Piloted Aircraft: We are requesting $904
million to support buying 29 MQ-9A Reapers in fiscal year 2016,
and $4.8 billion to support buying 77 of them over the FYDP.
This investment is critical to ensuring the Air Force has
enough around-the-clock permissive ISR combat air patrols--in
this case, allowing us to increase from 55 to 60--to meet
increased battlefield demands.
Competitive Space Launch: This budget supports year-
over-year increases in competitive space launches--going up
from two in fiscal year 2015 to three in fiscal year 2016, and
further increasing to four competitive launches in fiscal year
2017. The budget also supports investments to mitigate DOD
reliance on the RD-180 space engine that powers the Atlas V
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle rockets.
Combat Rescue Helicopter: We are requesting $156
million in fiscal year 2016 for the Air Force's next-generation
combat rescue helicopter--part of a total $1.6 billion request
over the FYDP for research, development, testing, and
evaluation--and requesting $717 million over the FYDP for
procurement.

In light of high demand coupled with congressional consultations,
the Air Force budget reflects DOD's decision to slow the retirement
timelines for three key ISR and battle management platforms.
We chose to defer the retirement of the U-2 Dragon Lady
reconnaissance aircraft until fiscal year 2019, when planned sensor
upgrades to the RQ-4 Global Hawk will combine with other capabilities
to mitigate the loss of the U-2. We chose to delay the previously
planned retirement of seven E-3 Sentry AWACS until fiscal year 2019, so
they can support air operations over Iraq and Syria. We chose to delay
retirement of any E-8 JSTARS through fiscal year 2020, pending final
approval of the Air Force's acquisition strategy for its replacement.
The Air Force budget also supports a timeline that would phase out
and retire the A-10 in fiscal year 2019. With the gradual retirement of
the A-10 that we're proposing, the Air Force will better support legacy
fleet readiness and the planned schedule for standing up the F-35A by
filling in some of the overall fighter maintenance personnel shortfalls
with trained and qualified personnel from the retiring A-10 squadrons.
As you know, F-35 maintainer demand has already required the Air
Force to use the authority Congress provided last year to move some A-
10s into back-up aircraft inventory status. I should note that the Air
Force is doing so only to the extent that it absolutely must, and so
far intends to move far fewer A-10s into this status than what Congress
has authorized. I know this is an important issue, and DOD looks
forward to working with you on it.
Defense-Wide:
The remaining share of our base budget--about $94 billion--is
allocated across DOD. This includes funding for cyber, United States
Special Operations Command, the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency, the Defense Health Agency, the Joint Staff, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, and missile defense.
For fiscal year 2016, a $9.6 billion total investment in missile
defense helps protect the U.S. Homeland, deployed forces, and our
allies and partners. This includes $8.1 billion for the Missile Defense
Agency, $1.6 billion of which will help ensure the reliability of U.S.
ground-based interceptors, which are currently sited at Fort Greely,
AK, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA. The budget also continues to
support the President's timeline for implementing the European Phased
Adaptive Approach.
Overseas Contingency Operations:
Separate from DOD's base budget, we are also requesting $50.9
billion in Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding for fiscal
year 2016. This represents a 21 percent decrease from last year's $64.2
billion in OCO funding, continuing OCO's decline since 2010, while also
reflecting continued operational demands on U.S. forces around the
world. OCO comprises funding for:

Afghanistan and Other Operations: We are requesting
$42.5 billion to support Operation Freedom's Sentinel and other
missions. This includes $7.8 billion for reset and retrograde
of U.S. equipment from Afghanistan, as well as $3.8 billion for
training and equipping the Afghan National Security Forces
through our ongoing train, advise, and assist mission.
Counter-ISIL Operations: We are requesting $5.3
billion to support Operation Inherent Resolve. This includes
$1.3 billion for training and equipping Iraqi forces, including
Kurdish forces, and the vetted moderate Syrian opposition.
Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund: Reflecting the
vital role that our allies and partners play in countering
terrorism that could threaten U.S. citizens, we are requesting
$2.1 billion for the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund that
President Obama established last year.
NATO Reassurance: We are requesting $789 million for
the European Reassurance Initiative, which the President
created last year to help reassure our NATO allies and
reinforce our Article V commitment in light of Russia's
violations of Ukrainian sovereignty.

The conclusion of major combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq
has resulted in a 73 percent drop in DOD's OCO costs from their $187
billion peak in fiscal year 2008.
We are continuing to use OCO as appropriate to finance our
military's response to unforeseen crises, but we must also account for
those enduring priorities that we do not envision going away--such as
supporting our Afghan partners, countering terrorism, maintaining a
strong forward presence in the Middle East, and ensuring our military
is ready to respond to a wide range of potential crises.
The administration intends to transition OCO's enduring costs to
the base budget between fiscal years 2017 and 2020. We will do this
over time, and in a way that protects our defense strategy--including
DOD's abilities to deter aggression, maintain crisis-ready forces, and
project power across the globe. This transition, however, will not be
possible unless the threat of sequestration has been removed.
Having financed the costs of key military activities--such as
counterterrorism operations and our Middle East posture--outside the
base budget for 14 years, and knowing that the security situation in
the Middle East remains volatile, it will take time to determine which
OCO costs are most likely to be enduring, and which are not. But we
will release a plan later this year, which will also address how we
will budget for uncertainty surrounding unforeseen future crises, and
implications for DOD's budget.
iv. compensation
The choices we face about military compensation are vexing,
critically important, and closely followed, so I want to be direct and
upfront with you.
When our troops go into battle--risking their lives--we owe to
them, and their families, not only adequate pay and compensation, but
also the right investments--in the right people, the right training,
and the right weapons and equipment--so that they can accomplish their
missions and come home safely.
To meet all of these obligations at once, we have to balance how we
allocate our dollars. It would be irresponsible to prioritize
compensation, force size, equipment, or training in isolation, only to
put our servicemembers' lives at unacceptable risk in battle.
For the President's fiscal year 2016 budget, the Defense Department
considered its compensation proposals very carefully, as well as those
approved by Congress in the 2015 National Defense Authorization Act.
Accordingly, this budget again proposes modest adjustments to shift
funds from compensation into readiness, capability, and force
structure, so that our people can continue executing their missions
with continued excellence.
As you know, the congressionally-commissioned Military Compensation
and Retirement Modernization Commission has recently released its own
compensation proposals. Their work, which DOD is continuing to analyze,
shows thoughtfulness and good intent, which we deeply appreciate.
Given that this hearing is being held before the department has
submitted its recommendations on the commission's report to President
Obama, it would not be appropriate for me to discuss them at this time.
Many of these proposals would significantly affect our servicemembers
and their families, and DOD owes them, the President, and the country
our utmost diligence and most rigorous analysis.
However, I can say that the department agrees with the overarching
goals of the commission, especially providing servicemembers and
beneficiaries more options--whether in preparing for retirement or in
making health care choices.
I can also say that the commission's proposals are complicated, and
do not lend themselves to binary answers. Therefore, when we provide
the President with our recommendations on each proposal, DOD will
clarify not simply whether we support each proposal, but also where we
recommend specific modifications to improve or enable us to fully
support a given proposal.
We believe there is something positive in almost every one of the
commission's recommendations, and that they present a great opportunity
to ensure we honor our servicemembers past, present, and future. I look
forward to Congress' support and partnership as we work hard to take
advantage of it.
v. impact of sequestration
At the end of 2013, policymakers came together on a bipartisan
basis to partially reverse sequestration and pay for higher
discretionary funding levels with long-term reforms. We've seen how
that bipartisan agreement has allowed us to invest in areas ranging
from research and manufacturing to strengthening our military. We've
also seen the positive impact on our economy, with a more responsible
and orderly budget process helping contribute to the fastest job growth
since the late 1990s.
The President's budget builds on this progress by reversing
sequestration, paid for with a balanced mix of commonsense spending
cuts and tax loophole closures, while also proposing additional deficit
reduction that would put debt on a downward path as a share of the
economy. The President has also made clear that he will not accept a
budget that locks in sequestration going forward.
As the Joint Chiefs and others have outlined, and as I will detail
in this testimony, sequestration would damage our national security,
ultimately resulting in a military that is too small and insufficiently
equipped to fully implement our defense strategy. This would reflect
poorly on America's global leadership, which has been the one critical
but defining constant in a turbulent and dangerous world. In fact, even
the threat of sequestration has had real effects.
You don't need me to tell you that the President has said he will
not accept a budget that severs the vital link between our national and
economic security. Why? Because the strength of our Nation depends on
the strength of our economy, and a strong military depends on a strong
educational system, thriving private-sector businesses, and innovative
research. Because that principle--matching defense increases with non-
defense increases dollar-for-dollar--was a basic condition of the
bipartisan agreement we got in 2013. The President sees no reason why
we shouldn't uphold those same principles in any agreement now.
The only way we're going to get out of the wilderness of
sequestration is if we work together. I therefore appeal to members of
Congress, from both parties, to start looking for ways to find a truly
bipartisan compromise. I hope they can make clear to their colleagues
that sequestration would also damage America's long-term strength,
preventing our country from making pro-growth investments in areas
ranging from basic research to early childhood education--investments
that, in the past, have helped make our military the finest fighting
force the world has ever known.
Sequestration is set to return in just over 200 days. Letting that
happen would be unwise and unsafe for our national defense, over both
the short and long term.
Short-Term Impact
DOD has had to live with uncertain budgets for the last three
years, continuous and sudden downward revisions of our budget plans,
and even a government closure. To continue meeting all of our mission
requirements, we've done our best to manage through these
circumstances, underfunding significant parts of our force and its
support systems. Put bluntly, we have survived, but not thrived. Our
military has made painful choices and tradeoffs among the size,
capabilities, and readiness of our joint force, and we've amassed a
number of bills that are now coming due.
That's why the department has been counting on and planning for a
budget increase of roughly $35 billion above sequestration-level caps
in fiscal year 2016. If it looks like DOD will be operating at
sequestration levels in 2016, on October 1 we will have to swiftly
begin making cuts so that we don't end up $35 billion short as we
approach year's end.
A return to sequestration in fiscal year 2016 would affect all
aspects of the department, but not all equally.
More than one-third of the fiscal year 2016 cuts would come have to
come from Operations and Maintenance accounts, with unavoidable
reductions in readiness and our ability to shape world events in
America's interest. Let me put this more plainly: allowing
sequestration to return would deprive our troops of what they need to
accomplish their missions.
Approximately half of the cuts would have to come from the
department's modernization accounts, undermining our efforts to secure
technological superiority for U.S. forces in future conflicts. Because
there are bills that DOD absolutely must pay--such as the salaries of
our troops--many capabilities being developed to counter known threats
from highly capable adversaries would be delayed or cancelled,
deepening our Nation's vulnerabilities at a time when the world is
growing more dangerous, not less. Sequestration would put a hold on
critical programs like our Aerospace Innovation Initiative, the Next
Generation Adaptive Engine, the Ground-Based Interceptor missile
defense kill vehicle redesign, and several space control efforts.
Deferring these investments is bad policy and makes the Defense
Department less competitive for the future. What's more, it breaks
faith with the troops of today and the troops of tomorrow. It
undermines the defense industrial base that is a critical foundation
for our national security.
Long-Term Impact
If sequestration were to persist over time, the long-term
consequences would be harder hitting. We would ultimately have a
military that looks fundamentally different, and that performs much
differently, from what our Nation is accustomed to.
If we are forced to sequestration-level budgets, I do not believe
that we can continue to make incremental cuts and maintain the same
general set of objectives as we've had in our defense strategy. I will
insist that new cuts be accompanied by a frank reassessment of our
strategic approach to addressing the threats we face around the world--
what we are asking the Armed Forces to do and to be prepared to do.
I cannot tell you right now exactly what that means--DOD is not
resigned to the return of sequestration--but I can tell you that I will
direct the department to look at all aspects of the defense budget to
determine how best to absorb these cuts. No portion of our budget can
remain inviolate.
What I will not do is let DOD continue mortgaging our future
readiness and capability. I will not send our troops into a fight with
outdated equipment, inadequate readiness, and ineffective doctrine.
Everything else is on the table.
What does that mean? We could be forced to consider pay cuts, not
just cuts in the growth of compensation. We could be forced to consider
all means of shedding excess infrastructure, not just working within
the congressional BRAC process. We could be forced to look at
significant force structure cuts, not just trimming around the edges.
We could be forced to ask our military to do--and be prepared to do--
significantly less than what we have traditionally expected, and
required of it.
I am not afraid to ask these difficult questions, but if we are
stuck with sequestration's budget cuts over the long term, our entire
nation will have to live with the answers.
A prolonged period of depressed defense budgets will almost
certainly mean a smaller, less capable, and less ready military. No one
can fully predict the impact on the future. But it could translate into
future conflicts that last longer, and are more costly in both lives
and dollars.
That may sound severe to some, but it is a fact, and history should
be our guide when we think about the true cost of sequestration.
The Case for Repealing Sequestration
I know I'm preaching to the choir here. If sequestration could have
been reversed by just this committee and its counterpart in the House,
it probably would have happened years ago. So I offer the following to
members of the committee about what you can remind your colleagues when
you ask for their vote to repeal sequestration:
Remind them that even after the increase we're asking for, DOD's
budget as a share of total Federal spending will still be at a near-
historic low--a quarter of what it was during the Korean War, a third
of what it was during the Vietnam war, and half of what it was during
the Reagan buildup.
Remind them that the increased funding is for modernization that's
critical to keeping our military's technological edge and staying ahead
of potential adversaries.
Remind them that DOD has hands-on leadership from the very top--
me--devoted to using taxpayer dollars better than they've been used in
the past. You have my personal commitment to greater accountability,
greater efficiency, and running this department better and leaner than
before.
Remind them that sequestration's cuts to long-term investments will
likely make those investments more costly down the line. All who bemoan
unnecessary Pentagon program delays and the associated cost overruns
should know that sequestration will only make these problems worse. I
can easily sympathize with my non-defense counterparts in this regard;
knowing how wasteful and inefficient sequestration would be at DOD, I
have no doubt the same is true at other departments and agencies as
well.
Remind them that sequestration's impact on our domestic budget will
cause further longterm damage to our defense--because the strength of
our Nation depends on the strength of our economy, and a strong
military needs strong schools to provide the best people, strong
businesses to provide the best weapons and equipment, and strong
science and research sectors to provide the best new innovations and
technologies.
Remind them that we can't keep kicking this can down the road. The
more we prolong tough decisions, the more difficult and more costly
they will be later on.
vi. conclusion
The men and women of DOD are counting on Congress to help assure
the strength of our military and American global leadership at a time
of great change in the world.
We must reverse the decline in defense budgets to execute our
strategy and fund a modern, ready, leaner force in a balanced way. We
must seize the opportunity to enact necessary reforms in how we do
business. We must bring an end to the threat sequestration poses to the
future of our force and American credibility around the world.
As you evaluate the President's budget submission, I encourage you
and your colleagues to keep it in perspective.
In the years since the President's fiscal year 2012 budget
request--the benchmark for cuts prescribed under the 2011 Budget
Control Act--DOD's 10-year budget projections have absorbed more than
$750 billion in cuts, or more than three-quarters of the trillion-
dollar cuts that would be required should sequestration be allowed to
run its course. While some claim this is our biggest budget ever, the
fact is, as a share of total Federal spending, DOD's fiscal year 2016
budget is at a near-historic low--representing about 14 percent of
total Federal discretionary and non-discretionary outlays. DOD's total
budget remains more than $100 billion below what it was at the height
of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
I think we can all agree that the world in 2014 was even more
complicated than we could have foreseen. Given today's security
environment--which has over 200,000 American servicemembers stationed
in over 130 countries conducting nearly 60 named operations--our
proposed increase in defense spending over last year's budget is a
responsible, prudent approach.
Some of you may recall how, in 1991, after America's Cold War
victory and amid doubts about America's engagement with the world and
calls for a bigger domestic peace dividend, a bipartisan group in
Congress stepped forward to help shape America' global leadership and
make long-term decisions from which we continue to benefit.
Senators Sam Nunn and Dick Lugar helped craft, pass, and pay for
the small Cooperative Threat Reduction Program that allowed the United
States and DOD to provide the funding and expertise to help former
Soviet states decommission their nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapon stockpiles.
The Nunn-Lugar program was initially opposed abroad, and there were
also doubts at the Pentagon about whether we could implement it without
losing track of funding. I know. I helped lead the program in its early
years. But with slow and diligent effort by American defense officials,
the Congress, and our foreign partners, it worked.
It helped prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into the
wrong hands. It helped establish a pattern of international cooperation
and global norms in the post-Cold War international order. In the light
of the current instability in Ukraine, it might have staved off several
variants of nuclear disaster.
But it also set an important precedent for our work on this budget
and in the years ahead. It shows what congressional conviction--
especially when it is bipartisan--can accomplish in foreign policy. It
shows the value of foresight and planning for an uncertain future. It
shows how spending a relatively few dollars today can generate huge
value down the line.
As the new Secretary of Defense, I hope it will be possible to
again unite behind what our great nation should do to protect our
people and make a better world, and provide our magnificent men and
women of DOD--who make up the greatest fighting force the world has
ever known--what they deserve.
Thank you.

Chairman McCain. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I hope that
every Member of Congress is able to hear that message that you
have just conveyed. Thank you.
General Dempsey?

STATEMENT OF GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF

General Dempsey. Thank you, Chairman, Ranking Member Reed,
other distinguished members of this committee. I appreciate the
opportunity to provide you an update on our Armed Forces and to
discuss our defense budget for 2016.
I would ask that my written statement be submitted for the
record. I will touch on just a few points of emphasis.
Our military remains strong today. However, with threats
proliferating, resources declining, and sequestration just
months away, our ability to assure our allies is in question
and our advantages over our adversaries are shrinking.
This is a major strategic challenge, affecting not only our
military, but ultimately America's leadership in the global
world order. We face the reemergence of nation states with the
capability, and potentially the intent, to constrain us. In
space and cyberspace, our adversaries are rapidly leveling the
playing field. We face an increasingly capable network of non
state actors, including the Islamic State in Iraq and the
Levant [ISIL], who threaten our national security interests
both overseas and at home.
Our strategy against ISIL integrates and balances nine
lines of effort, only two of which are military. ISIL's threat
is transregional and will require a sustainable level of effort
over an extended period of time to create an environment in
which they will be expelled and ultimately defeated.
In Europe, Russia seeks to reduce NATO [the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization] and European Union influence in Eastern
Europe and generate disagreement among our NATO allies on the
very future of Europe. Russian leaders have chosen a very
dangerous path to achieve their strategic objectives, lighting
a fire of ethnicity and nationalism not seen in Europe in 65
years, and it may burn out of control. Our strategy is to
reassure and reinforce our NATO allies while considering other
instruments of national power to counter Russian aggression.
Altogether, the global security environment is as uncertain
as I have seen it in my 40 years of service. We are at a point
where our national aspirations are at risk of exceeding our
available resources.
That brings me to the budget. We have heard Congress loud
and clear as over the years it has challenged us to become more
efficient and to determine the minimum essential requirements
we need to do what the Nation asks us to do. PB16 [The
President's Budget for fiscal year 2016] is that answer.
In my judgment, this budget represents a responsible
combination of capability, capacity, and readiness investment.
It is what we need to remain, however, at the bottom edge of
manageable risk to our national defense. As the Chairman said,
there is no slack, there is no margin left for error, nor for
response to strategic surprise.
Funding lower than PB16, and a lack of flexibility in
making the internal reforms necessary, could and will, in fact,
put us in a situation where our National Defense Strategy will
simply no longer be viable.
For the past 25 years, the United States military has
secured the global commons. We have deterred adversaries,
reassured allies, and responded to crises and to conflict by
maintaining our presence abroad. It has been our strategy to
shape the international security environment by our forward
presence and by building relationships among regional partners.
In general terms, one-third of the force is forward-
deployed, one-third has just returned, and one-third is
preparing to deploy. Of necessity, certain capabilities
actually operate with half of our forces deployed and the other
half recovering. This puts a significant strain on our men and
women in uniform and on their families.
Sequestration will fundamentally and significantly change
the way we deploy the force and shape the security environment.
We will be almost 20 percent smaller but our forward presence
will be reduced by more than a third. We will have less
influence, and we will be less responsive. Conflict will take
longer to resolve and will be more costly, both in terms of
dollars and in casualties.
In an age when we are less certain about what will happen
next, but quite certain that it will happen more quickly, we
will be further away and less ready than we need to be.
Simply stated, sequestration will result in a dramatic
change in how we protect our Nation and how we promote our
National interests.
Mr. Chairman, members of this committee, our men and women
in uniform are performing around the globe with extraordinary
courage, character, and professionalism. We owe them and their
families clarity and, importantly, predictability on everything
from policy to compensation, health care, equipment, training,
and readiness.
Settling down this uncertainty in our decision-making
processes will help keep the right people, our decisive edge,
in our all-volunteer force and maintain the military that the
American people deserve and expect.
I am grateful for the continued support to our men and
women in uniform from this committee and this Congress, and I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Dempsey follows:]

Prepared Statement by General Martin E. Dempsey, USA
Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, members of this Committee, it is my
privilege to report to you on the state of America's Armed Forces, the
changes in the global security environment, and the opportunities and
challenges ahead.
I am exceptionally honored to represent the men and women of our
Armed Forces. Those who defend this Nation and the families who support
them remain our most valuable national treasure and our competitive
advantage. Deeply experienced from fourteen years of continuous
deployments in harm's way, our All-Volunteer Force has been adaptable
and resilient beyond expectation. Our men and women in uniform have
performed around the globe with extraordinary courage, character, and
professionalism. I am grateful for the continued support they receive
from this distinguished body and from the American people.
What makes America's Armed Forces who we are is our ability to
provide options to the national command authority and our elected
leaders to keep our Nation safe from coercion. The American people and
our Allies expect that of us.
Our military remains strong today. However, with threats
proliferating, resources declining, and sequestration just months away,
our ability to assure our allies is in question and our advantages over
our adversaries are shrinking. This is a major strategic challenge
affecting not only our military, but ultimately, America's leadership
in the global world order.
With your support, we can--and we must--sustain our military's
decisive edge by prioritizing investments in readiness, training,
modernization, and leader development. We must make the tough, but
necessary choices in our strategy, our structure, and our resources for
our Nation's future. Our men and women in uniform and the American
people are trusting us to get it right.
joint force operations
It has been an extraordinarily busy time for America's military.
During the past twelve months, the men and women of our Joint Force
have been on point around the world. They have maintained our enduring
global commitments, bolstered long-term partnerships, and responded to
new threats.
Over the past year, the Joint Force continued to support the Afghan
National Security Forces through the first democratic transfer of power
in Afghanistan's history. My regular visits to Afghanistan reinforce
just how much our coalition and Afghan partners have accomplished
together over thirteen years of significant investment. The end of 2014
marked the completion of the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) mission. While Afghanistan is headed in the right direction
towards a fully-functioning inclusive government, the path is neither a
straight line, nor is it short. Moving forward with NATO's Resolute
Support mission, our remaining force of about 10,000 troops will assist
our Afghan partners in strengthening the Afghan institutions, systems,
and processes that will support long-term security and stability--
ultimately giving the Afghan people the opportunity to succeed on their
own.
At the same time, the force has maintained pressure on Al Qaeda,
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and other violent
extremist groups both directly and through our partners where United
States and allied interests are threatened. We have reinforced our
commitment to our NATO allies in Europe in the face of Russian
aggression. We have helped to address urgent humanitarian crises such
as the Yazidi refugees trapped on Mount Sinjar and the Ebola outbreak
in West Africa. We have maintained an active presence in the South and
East China Seas, while remaining prepared to respond to provocations on
the Korean Peninsula. We have campaigned against sources of instability
in Africa and in Latin America.
We have also postured with our interagency partners to reinforce
security to our homeland--to include providing ballistic missile
defense, countering persistent threats of terrorism, and improving our
defenses against cyber-attack on government networks and critical
infrastructure.
In the near term, we will sustain--in some cases adjust--these
commitments around the globe to protect our national security
interests. While our global mission requirements have decidedly gone
up, we will manage all of these demands with constrained resources.
Consequently, we will have to assume higher risk in some areas to
create opportunity in others.
the changing security environment
Our understanding of the security environment carries important
consequences for our Nation and for our military. It drives our
strategy and budget, shapes the size, structure, and capability of the
force, and affects where and when we send America's sons and daughters
into harm's way.
Last year, I stated that the global security environment is as
fluid and complex as we have ever seen. That has certainly played out
over the past twelve months. We have seen significant shifts in an
already complex strategic landscape--increasingly capable non-state
actors who are taking advantage of the internal conflict within Islam
and the reemergence of states with the capability and potentially the
intent to constrain. This is increasing the strain on the international
order.
In what I often term the ``heavyweight'' category, Russia's
coercive and destabilizing actions have threatened NATO's eastern
flank. Russia is investing deeply in advancing their capabilities
across the board, especially in Anti-Access Area-Denial (A2AD) and
cyberspace. Meanwhile, China is also fielding new defense platforms at
a startling pace. In almost everything we do globally, we must consider
the second- and third-order effects on our relationships with Russia
and China.
In the ``middleweight'' category, Iran seeks to be a hegemon in the
Middle East. Beyond Iran's nuclear aspirations, as one of the world's
leading exporter of arms, Iran employs surrogates and proxies in many
places across the globe. Iran is also becoming increasingly more active
in cyberspace. We have significant interests in the region that would
not be well-served should Iran achieve their purposes.
North Korea is the other ``middleweight.'' Cyclical provocations by
North Korea have increased the risk of potential miscalculation. We
must use all instruments of national power to ensure North Korea does
not achieve its intentions. We have a large stake in maintaining
stability on the Korean Peninsula and supporting our Republic of Korea
ally.
We are also seeing power in the international system shifting below
and beyond the nation-state, particularly across the network of radical
movements that use terrorism as a tactic. This network extends across
an already unstable Middle East and North Africa, vis-`-vis the complex
situations we have seen unfold over the last year in Libya, Gaza, Iraq,
Syria, Nigeria, and Yemen. Within the trans-regional terror network, we
have seen ISIL gain prominence in Iraq and Syria, while inspiring
existing radical franchises like Al Qaeda affiliates and Boko Haram to
rebrand themselves into an even more aggressive ideology. That is what
makes this movement so dangerous.
With our partners, we must keep relentless pressure across the
entire network with our full suite of capabilities to include
intelligence, building partners, and in some cases, direct action. At
the same time, we must be careful not to fixate on a single group, nor
paint these violent extremist groups all with one brush. We have to
apply the right mix of tools of national power at the right time, over
the right length of time, in order to make a difference. Even more
challenging is keeping pressure on a network that adapts and
metastasizes. Overmatch in size and technology matters, but the rate in
which we can innovate and adapt relative to these non-state actors
matters more. This is a generational challenge.
Running north and south in our own hemisphere, the well-financed
transnational organized criminal network is growing extraordinarily
capable. Beyond a drug trafficking network, it is capable of moving
anything from arms and unaccompanied children to terrorists and weapons
of mass destruction. This network deserves more attention not just
because of its effect on the social fabric of our country, but because
of the effect it could have--and is having--on the security of our
Nation.
In cyberspace, our adversaries have become increasingly more
capable, attempting to level the playing field in this critical domain.
While we have expanded authorities and capabilities to defend our
military networks, critical civilian infrastructure and private sector
companies are an Achilles' heel in our Nation's security. Together, we
must reconcile these issues. To this end, cybersecurity legislation
that facilitates information sharing and encourages public-private
partnerships is required to ensure our continued security and
prosperity. Staying ahead of our adversaries in the cyber domain will
require a concerted effort of the whole nation.
Across the board, as the international order trends towards
instability, strategic risk trends higher. While our potential
adversaries grow substantially stronger, most of our allies are growing
more dependent on sustained U.S. assistance. I believe these trends
will continue.
We must bring to bear every tool of national power in America's
arsenal in coordination to address these emerging trends. Likewise,
deepening relationships of trust with our allies and building the
capacity of our partners to be more self-sustaining will be even more
vital in the years ahead.
preparing the joint force
Within the context of the rapidly evolving security landscape, the
Joint Force of the future will require exceptional agility in how we
shape, prepare, and posture. Here are my five guideposts to sustain and
improve the force:
the all-volunteer force (avf)
Our competitive advantage is our people and their adaptability. I
firmly believe that our Nation needs a professional All-Volunteer Force
(AVF). The AVF is the right force for this Nation and the Nation should
never take it for granted. Conversely, the force has earned the trust
and confidence of the American people and must renew that contract
daily.
As part of strengthening the AVF, the Joint Chiefs and I are
committed to offer everyone in uniform equal professional opportunities
to contribute their talent. We are removing the legacy gender-based
barriers to service that no longer make sense. The Services are
progressing through validation of occupational standards and are on
target to recommend final decisions to integrate remaining closed
positions or any exceptions to policy by the end of the year.
To keep the AVF on a viable path, getting our personnel costs in
balance is a strategic imperative. Ultimately, we need to make sure
that we can continue to recruit, retain, equip, and train the best
fighting force on the planet and fairly compensate America's best for
their service.
We owe our men and women some clarity--and importantly,
predictability--on everything from policy to compensation, health care,
equipment, training, and readiness. Frankly, right now we are not
delivering. Settling down uncertainty in our decision making processes
will help keep the right people in the Service. To this end, I want to
continue working with Congress to address the growing imbalances in our
accounts in a sensible, holistic way that preserves the All-Volunteer
Force well into the future.
As such, we are looking closely at the recommendations of the
Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission. We are
pleased that the commission supported our request to grandfather any
changes to retirement pay for those currently serving and retirees. We
will continue to place a premium on efforts that support wounded
warriors and mental health.
We will also keep working with the Department of Veterans Affairs,
other agencies, veteran service organizations, and communities across
the country to make sure those who are transitioning home and
reintegrating into civilian life have access to health care, quality
education opportunities, and meaningful employment. This especially
includes those with enduring mental and physical challenges. I
appreciate Congress for recently passing legislation to improve the
access of veterans to mental health and suicide prevention services.
This remarkable generation is not done serving. As such, the Joint
Chiefs and I recently signed a Call to Continued Service letter that
will go to all transitioning service members, encouraging them to keep
serving the Nation in their communities. Our collective effort to
enable our veterans and their families to continue contributing their
strengths is a direct investment in the future of America.
preserving jointness
Our military has become more integrated operationally and
organizationally across the Services and across the Active, Guard, and
Reserve components, especially over the past decade. However, the
institution tends to work like a rubber band--if you stretch it and
then release it, it will return to its normal form and shape. This is
especially true in a resource-constrained environment. This tension
comes at a time when our ability to win together through jointness is
at its peak. The Joint Chiefs and I are committed to preserving the
strength we have gained as a more seamless force. We are likewise
committed to preserving the vital relationships with our interagency
partners.
Additionally, across the Services, we are resetting how we train
and develop our forces for conflict across the spectrum. For the past
decade, the Joint Force primarily focused on counterinsurgency centered
in the Middle East. As we work to institutionalize the lessons of our
recent wars--for example, by establishing building partnership capacity
as a competency of the entire force, not just Special Forces--we are
also working to restore balance and strategic depth in our
capabilities. This includes those critical conventional areas that were
deemphasized over the past decade by necessity.
Concurrently, we are adapting how we engage and posture around the
world in ways that are more dynamic, more strategic, and more
sustainable. We are reevaluating how we employ our assets around the
globe to better identify opportunities that generate the greatest
advantages. We are developing new approaches across and within commands
in how we assign, allocate, and apportion forces inside a broader
interagency construct.
We are also adapting our learning institutions to maximize the
diverse talent of our men and women and to better cultivate agile
thinkers for a global Joint Force. Within our Joint Professional
Military Education (JPME) programs, we are mapping desired strategic
leader attributes to the curriculum to ensure we are delivering them.
We are undergoing an integrated, Department-wide effort to identify
and invest in innovative ways to reverse the erosion of U.S.
technological superiority--ensuring that our military remains dominant
now and in the future. We are seeking innovation not only in
technology, but also in leader development, wargaming, operational
concepts, and business processes.
the defense industrial base
Our Nation cannot sustain the world's finest military without also
sustaining the world's strongest and most innovative defense industrial
base (DIB).
An enduring source of strategic advantage, we count on the defense
industry to be able to research, develop, produce, deliver, and
maintain the world-class weapons systems on which our military has long
relied.
I remain concerned that an unstable budget environment will promise
long-term damage to critical segments of the DIB, most significantly in
the small businesses that support our Nation's defense. Furthermore,
sequester-level cuts will lead to a hollow DIB that no longer holds all
of the critical design and manufacturing capabilities our military
needs.
A strong, efficient, and technologically vibrant defense industry
is fundamental to securing our Nation's defense.
our allies
Our alliances remain paramount to our own security. We are far more
effective when we have a global network of capable partners with shared
values. Our Allies and partners provide vital basing and access, offer
complementary military capabilities, and help shape outcomes towards a
common purpose. Improving partner capability and capacity in targeted
ways is an important component of our military strategy.
We are continuing the rebalance to the Asia Pacific as part of our
government's larger priority effort to foster stability and growth in
that region. We have old and new partners in the Asia Pacific and we
will continue to develop our relationships, engage more at every level,
and shift assets to the region, over time.
Europe remains a central pillar to our national security and
prosperity. NATO has the capability and must sustain the will to
address the threats to its eastern and southern flanks. In the near
term, we will continue to reassure allies and improve NATO's readiness.
Over the long term, we will adapt our strategies and structures to meet
new realities. NATO is and will remain the most important and most
capable alliance in history.
In every theater, we must guard against a slow erosion of our
alliances and be careful not to shunt the steady work required to
sustain these ties. Remaining the security partner of choice increases
our Nation's collective ability to safeguard common interests and
support greater stability in weaker areas of the world.
the profession
Rekindling our understanding and our resolve as a profession
continues to be one of my foremost priorities as Chairman. On and off
the battlefield, we must always be good stewards of the special trust
and confidence gifted to us by our fellow citizens. We owe it to the
American people and to ourselves to look introspectively at whether we
are holding true to the bedrock values and standards of our profession.
The vast majority of our force serves honorably with moral courage
and distinction every day. But failures of leadership and ethics, and
lapses of judgment by a fraction of the force show that we still have
work to do.
We are seeing substantial progress in sexual assault prevention and
response, however, we will remain laser-focused on reinforcing a
climate where sexual assault is unacceptable, not just because it is a
crime, but because it is completely counter to our core values.
All of these issues have my ongoing and full attention. We know we
own the profession and must reinforce the enduring norms and values
that define us to continue to be a source of trust and pride for our
Nation.
resourcing our defense strategy
I stated last year that the balance between our security demands
and available resources has rarely been more delicate. The National
Security Strategy (NSS) released last month addresses some of our top
concerns--the decline in military readiness, the strategic risk that
will result should sequester-level cuts return, and the need to pursue
greater integration with our Allies and partners. We need the full
proposed President's Budget (PB) for fiscal year 2016 to support this
strategy and to maintain the military the American people deserve and
expect.
PB16 reverses the decline in national defense spending of the past
five years and helps ensure we can manage risk, meeting near-term
defense needs while preparing for the future. It represents a
responsible combination of capability, capacity, and readiness
investment--leading to a Joint Force that is global, networked, and can
provide options for the Nation. As the risks to our national security
are increasing, this budget resources the force to remain capable,
ready, and appropriately sized--able to meet today's global commitments
and prepare for tomorrow's challenges.
The Joint Chiefs and I fully support the PB16 budget. It is what we
need to remain at the lower ragged edge of manageable risk in our
ability to execute the defense strategy.
However, we have no slack, no margin left for error or strategic
surprise. We remain concerned that we still lack support for the
reforms necessary to ensure that the Joint Force is combat ready and
that we can preserve military options for our Nation into the future.
We need budget certainty and we need flexibility to reset the force for
the challenges we see ahead.
Congress--and the American people--challenged us to become more
efficient and to determine the minimum floor we need to be able to do
what the Nation asks us to do. PB16 is that answer. Funding lower than
PB16, especially if sequestration-level cuts return next year, combined
with a lack of flexibility to make the reforms we need, will render the
overall risk to our defense strategy unmanageable. In other words, our
Nation's current defense strategy will no longer be viable.
I ask Congress to support the entirety of this budget and end the
deep, indiscriminate cuts that sequestration will impose.
Thank you for your enduring support.

Chairman McCain. Thank you very much.
Chairman Dempsey, in front of the House Armed Services
Committee on February 25, General Breedlove testified, ``I
think, first and foremost, Mr. Putin has not accomplished his
objectives in Ukraine, so next is probably more action in
Ukraine.''
In your professional military opinion, do you think General
Breedlove is correct, that Putin will continue kinetic military
operations in Ukraine and places like Mariupol because he has
not yet accomplished his objectives?
General Dempsey. Mr. Chairman, in an April 2014 speech,
President Putin actually referred to a concept he described as
Novorossiya, which is New Russia, that stretches across eight
oblasts in Ukraine, essentially the eastern, southern oblasts
of Ukraine, and up into Transnistria.
He said that was what his intention was to do. To this
point, their actions seem to suggest to me that they may
actually be intent on accomplishing it.
Chairman McCain. Does that convince you or give you the
view that we should be providing defensive weaponry to Ukraine?
General Dempsey. Chairman, as you know, we have provided
about $100 million in other kinds of aid. We have a program to
provide training.
Chairman McCain. My question is, do you believe that we
should provide defensive weaponry to Ukraine?
General Dempsey. If I could, Senator, the----
Chairman McCain. I know what you have done.
General Dempsey. Right.
Chairman McCain. Not enough. Go ahead.
General Dempsey. I think we should absolutely consider
providing lethal aid, and it ought to be in the context of our
NATO allies, because Putin's ultimate objective is to fracture
NATO.
Chairman McCain. I thank you, General.
Today in Tikrit, Secretary Carter, the Shiite militia with
the Iranian Revolutionary Guard leader, among others, and
Iranian air, is now attacking Tikrit, the hometown of Saddam
Hussein, as we recall. The majority of that effort, with a
couple thousand Iraqis, is being undertaken by the Shiite
militia, the same militia that we fought against in the surge,
the same militia that, according to estimates, manufactured the
IEDs [improvised explosive devices], which directly resulted in
the deaths of some 1,000 or 2,000 young Americans.
Are you concerned that Iran is basically taking over the
fight? According to the Wall Street Journal this morning, we
are observing that operation. Does that ring an alarm bell with
you, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Carter. It does. It does. Our approach to
combating ISIL in Iraq is to work with the Iraqi security
forces and a multisectarian government that takes a
multisectarian approach to defeating ISIL and regaining control
of its own territory.
Sectarianism is what brought us to the point where we are,
and so I do look at it with concern. We are watching it very
closely. The Shiite militia is involved. Also, the Iraqi
security force is involved. Some Sunni forces are involved.
I would note that some Sunni tribal leaders in Tikrit, and
this is important, have signaled their support for this
offensive. If that is true, it is good news, because it
suggests that this is not purely a Shiite on Sunni thing.
But this is the problem that brought Iraq low, so I am
looking at it with great concern.
Chairman McCain. Of course, there are well-documented human
rights violations, significant, by Shiite militia on Sunni, as
we all know.
Secretary Carter, you just returned from Afghanistan, an
excellent visit, from all reports. My understanding from media
reports is that you will be reevaluating the calendar-driven
plan for withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Is that true? Can you tell us what recommendations you have
in mind?
By the way, we have been hearing about these
recommendations for a year or two now. Do you have any timeline
as to when a decision may be made, because according to the
calendar-driven plan that is now a place, we are going to have
to be withdrawing troops very soon.
Can you update us on that?
Secretary Carter. I certainly can. That was the reason that
I went to Afghanistan, second only to the primary reason, which
is to see our fantastic people who are there and let them know
that we are all with them and think about them every day.
But I had an opportunity to assess conditions on the ground
there, to discuss them with President Ghani, and I will share
my observations.
But just to get to the answer to your question, I think the
phrase I used when I came before you last was, we have a plan,
but a plan is a plan, and a plan is something you adjust over
time. So I think we can adjust our plan over the next year or
two.
I did discuss that with President Ghani. I have discussed
that here in Washington. I don't know what decisions the
President will make in that regard or the timetable on which he
will make them, but I, certainly, have had the opportunity to
acquaint myself with them.
One other thing I would like to say is that President Ghani
gave me a very articulate depiction of conditions and how they
changed, and what the good things have been and what the bad
things have been. I don't want to take too much time, but I
just wanted to tell everybody on this committee that the first
thing he said to me when he saw me was, would you please go
home and tell everyone there, and especially the troops, that I
know that almost 1 million Americans have come through here in
the last decade to help my country, and that thousands of them
have been killed and wounded, and I want you to know, thank
you.
I just wanted to tell you that, because I haven't heard
that for a long time.
Chairman McCain. But it is your opinion that the present
plan needs to be revised?
Secretary Carter. I think that there are going to be
respects in which the President is going to want to consider
the conditions that have changed. I will give you some examples
of that.
Chairman McCain. I understand the examples. But do you want
to stick with the calendar-driven plan as it is now, or do you
want it to be revised?
Secretary Carter. No, I think we need to do conditions. In
any military plan, we have to be conditions-based, absolutely,
firmly.
Chairman McCain. I thank you. I thank both of you for your
testimony.
Secretary McCord, do you want to add anything?
Mr. McCord: Not on the subject of Afghanistan. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
gentlemen, for your testimony, for your service.
Just quickly following up, Mr. Secretary, you have been to
Afghanistan, Iraq, and the region, and also been in
communication with foreign leaders, your counterparts across
the globe. Are they aware of the impending sort of budgetary
train wreck in the United States? Does this create anxiety and
the conclusion that we won't have the resources, even if we
have the resolve?
Secretary Carter. Well, in general, they are polite enough
not to raise this question, but when I have had conversations
with foreign leaders, I think it is distressing to me because
they hear everything we say, and they see everything we do, and
they get a very clear picture of the dangers of sequester. They
probably get an outsized picture of our lack of will.
But this is not good for our friends. Of course, I am only
talking to our friends, so I can only imagine what our foes are
thinking. But they are probably thinking the same thing, ``What
are these guys doing to themselves?''
This is why it's not only a substantive matter, but it is a
matter of appearances and deterrence that we get our act
together with respect to sequester.
Senator Reed. So, essentially, this goes beyond just the
numbers in the budget and what programs we are going to fund.
This goes to the perception of the world of the United States
being both capable and resourced to carry out a strategy to
support their allies and oppose their adversaries. Is that
accurate?
Secretary Carter. That is exactly right.
Senator Reed. The other side of this coin, too, is, we are
not in a situation where our allies seem to be stepping up to
the plate to fill in the gaps, either the NATO countries or
even our Gulf allies.
Secretary Carter. Amen to that. You mentioned the
Europeans. Europeans, our NATO partners, made a pledge to take
steps that would, for most of them, involve an increase in
defense spending. They really need to take that step, because
we can't be the only one on our team with military potential in
that theater, which, as you and the Chairman have mentioned
with respect to Ukraine, is a very dangerous one.
Senator Reed. I don't want to beat a dead horse, but their
enthusiasm to raise their defense budget is probably affected
by our lack of will to raise ours, not just the defense budget,
but other budgets. Is that correct?
Secretary Carter. That well could be, and it is yet another
reason for us to get it together here.
Senator Reed. General Dempsey, you mentioned there are nine
lines of operation against ISIL, and the Department of Defense
has, I think you said, two. So there are seven lines being
funded outside the DOD budget. Is that accurate?
General Dempsey. Yes. Some of the lines, for example,
counter messaging, reside partially within our budget, but
generally, the answer to that is yes.
Senator Reed. So that even if we were to restore some
significant funding to the Department of Defense on the ground,
you would still be without the resources you need to defeat
ISIL and degrade ISIL?
General Dempsey. Yes, sir. If what you mean is that we need
the whole-of-government here, absolutely.
Senator Reed. State, Homeland Security.
General Dempsey. Right.
Senator Reed. When you talk about the situation with Ebola
recently.
General Dempsey. Counter-foreign-financing, which works
through Treasury.
Senator Reed. The Treasury Department, et cetera, et
cetera.
So there is not a nice, neat separation between our
National security and DOD and the rest of government.
General Dempsey. Not on the ISIL campaign, no, sir.
Senator Reed. Secretary Carter, just doubling back here for
a moment, let's assume the worst and we don't move above the
BCA and sequestration, how does this affect our overseas OCO
[contingency operations] accounts? Is there an effect you see
on our ability to fund them? Do you have to borrow from Peter
to pay Paul?
Secretary Carter. You mean if we are denied what we are
asking for in the base budget? Well, we also have an OCO
budget, as you say. There isn't slack in the OCO budget. That
is money being spent for real things.
It is being spent for the campaign against ISIL. It is
being spent in Afghanistan. It is being spent in the Horn of
Africa.
So OCO is committed to the here-and-now ways that we are
protecting our security, and we can't rob Peter to pay Paul.
Senator Reed. Just in that same vein, General Dempsey,
another way to approach the problem, how are you going to
manage the strategic risk if we have the situation of
sequestration in place, and the Budget Control Act?
General Dempsey. As you know, sir, I have submitted the
Chairman's risk assessment, which establishes the fact that we
are at significant risk against the strategy as it was
conceived in 2012 already. What we have been doing is we have
been increasing risk over the past 3 or 4 years.
What I would tell you now is that if we don't get funded at
the PB16 level, and if we don't get the reforms inside of the
budget, because it is $4.2 billion for this year, but it
accrues to, I think, $40 billion over the FYDP [Future Year
Defense Program], if we don't get that, the strategy is going
to have to change.
So if you are asking me how I am going to manage the
current strategy, it is unmanageable.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Secretary Carter, you heard the answer
General Dempsey just gave. Do you agree with his statement?
Secretary Carter. I do.
Senator Inhofe. You know, I wasn't here. I am sorry I
missed your opening statement, and I didn't have the benefit of
reading it. But I think it is worthwhile getting on the record
again--you have heard many times the statements of James
Clapper and others.
The Clapper statement: ``Looking back over my now half
century of intelligence, I have not experienced a time when we
have been beset by more crises.'' He repeated that in a
different way later.
Of course, just last week, we had General Stewart saying
essentially the same thing.
Now I assume that you agree with those statements?
Secretary Carter. I do. When I started in this business,
there was one problem, which was the Soviet Union.
Senator Inhofe. Those were the good old days, weren't they?
I can say that.
Secretary Carter. I remember enough not to be too
nostalgic. It was pretty serious. But the world is so much more
complicated, so much more is happening, exactly as you say.
Senator Inhofe. Hearing Prime Minister Netanyahu this
morning, that just drove that home. I was thinking how easy
that was. Yes, the threat was terrible. We had two superpowers.
We knew what they had, and they knew what we had. They were
predictable. We were predictable. Mutual assured destruction
meant something. It doesn't mean anything anymore.
I was just thinking about that, how different that is
today.
The other thing I wanted to mention is that, General
Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Welsh, and General Dunford
all testified, and they talked about if sequester is coming in.
Now you said something that I think is even more significant.
You said even with the fiscal year 2016 budget, the Army, Navy,
and Marine Corps won't reach their readiness goals until 2020
and the Air Force until 2023. Is that accurate?
So what you are saying there is even our budget, without
the sequestration, you are saying that threat is there.
Secretary Carter. What is going on there is digging
ourselves out of a hole of sequester in the past, particularly
the 2013 budget, the year in which the shutdown occurred, and
so forth.
The thing about readiness is that it is easy to have it
fall off, but then it takes time to build it back. I think what
the chiefs are saying absolutely accurately is we lost a lot of
readiness through the turmoil of the last few years. Even if we
are given the opportunity, as we hope with this budget, to
start building back, it is just in the nature, it is in the
nature of training, that it takes a while to get that readiness
back. So I do agree with them.
Senator Inhofe. Secretary Carter, you were over there. Of
course, this is the first time you have appeared before this
committee in this capacity. When you were over there and you
apparently had some time, good quality time with President
Ghani, when you were there, and it was observed, I think by
General Dempsey, that we don't operate in a vacuum here. What
we are saying the whole world knows. Is there anything you want
to add with our relationship with President Ghani that would be
beneficial to have the whole world know, or those who are
participating in that theater?
Secretary Carter. Yes. One thing, which is that he is a
partner in a way that we have been looking for and without whom
the sacrifice that we have made over these last 10 years can't
be successful.
He understands what we have tried to do for him. He knows
that it has been a great benefit to his country and not just to
protect our country, which, of course, it has, and was why we
went there in the first place, to protect ourselves from the
breeding ground of the 9/11 attacks on our own country.
I think everybody who participated in this campaign ought
to know that around the world and in our coalition, that we
have now in President Ghani somebody who really gets the
sacrifice that we have all made on behalf of Afghanistan, and
is committed to making the progress that we made there stick.
That is what I would say.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. That's good. I appreciate that.
Senator Reed talked about our limited resources now, and I
wasn't sure I understood your answer there. Do you think people
are out there--it doesn't matter where they are. It can be the
Ukraine. It can be Georgia. It can be anyplace. Do they
recognize that we don't have the resources we have historically
had, and we are not able to do what we historically have done?
Secretary Carter. Well, they hear us saying that, and they
hear us debating that. You know, I hope, and this is something
I try to say, and I am sure you all try to say, which is yes,
we are having internal debates and so forth, and we don't like
what is going on here, and I have, certainly, said that today.
But don't underestimate the will and the power of the United
States. I hope people understand that as well, because we still
have the greatest fighting force the world has ever seen.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, I understand that. We are aiming that
toward others. People look at us, and yes, we do. But looking
here at home, when even you admit that with the current budget,
even without sequestration, our risk level is going to
increase, right?
Secretary Carter. That risk as measured in the readiness
that needs to be restored, as you mentioned, yes.
Senator Inhofe. Risk means lives, doesn't it?
General Dempsey, should Congress pass AUMF [the
Authorization to Use Military Force] without restrictions?
General Dempsey. I am the military guy in the room, and I
would always seek to preserve all of our options. I was
consulted on the document passed in the Congress, and it will
allow us to meet the campaign as we've designed it. You say
without restriction. That really now becomes a decision between
you and your colleagues.
Senator Inhofe. All right. Secretary Carter?
Secretary Carter. Exactly the same answer. Key to us is,
can we do our campaign?
Senator Inhofe. Okay, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. [presiding] Senator Hirono, please.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and your testimony.
Secretary Carter, as the department continues to rebalance
our military forces in the Asia Pacific and the Middle East,
there are, clearly, challenges, in terms of available
resources. I know from our January meeting that you agree that
stability in the Asia-Pacific region is critical to our
National security, even as there is instability in so many
other parts of the world.
So you mentioned today once again in your testimony that
one of the priorities is to continue our commitment to the
rebalance to the Asia Pacific. So I did want to highlight one
related issue that I would like to continue to discuss with
you, and that is, there are plans in place to shift a number of
military personnel and assets from Hawaii to include naval
vessels, aircraft, Air Force tankers, back to the continental
United States by 2020.
I am concerned about how moving these kinds of significant
capabilities away from the region, while we are supposed to be
committed to the rebalance to the Asia Pacific, will look to
our allies and to our adversaries. So I would like to continue
this discussion with you, as we go forward.
This is a question relating to energy security. In April
2014, there was a DOD directive to all of our service entities.
It was signed by the acting Deputy Secretary of Defense. This
was a new energy directive to enhance capabilities while
improving energy security and mitigating costs, because we all
acknowledge that the DOD is the largest user of energy in our
country.
Can you tell us where DOD stands in regards to implementing
this directive, which, by the way, goes to 2024? How is it
supported in the President's budget?
Secretary Carter. Thank you, Senator.
On the first point, I agree with you entirely. The Asia-
Pacific rebalance is a critical part of our strategy going
forward. We can't forget, as we are embroiled in the conflict
against ISIL, which we must win, that it is a big world out
there. We have interests and friends and challenges throughout
the world, and the Asia-Pacific is where half the world's
population and half the world's economy resides.
So I agree with you, and I would be happy to discuss that.
We have done that before, and that is a continuing commitment
not only of mine and yours, but of our country. So I would be
happy to talk to you about that.
With respect to energy, a very important point. The energy
landscape is changing a lot, and the Defense Department is, as
you say, the largest user of energy in the Federal Government,
by far, and, therefore, has a real stake in where we go with
respect to energy and a role to play in getting us there.
I signify, if I may, two ways in which we do that. One is
R&D [research and development] in areas that are particularly
important to defense, where because of our particular needs, we
may be an early adopter of technology. That is a longstanding
role of the Department of Defense in many things, like the
Internet and everything else. We are doing it for defense, but
it has spinoffs.
The other way we play a role is in the country's overall
energy strategy. Obviously, that is Secretary Moniz's
responsibility, and the President's, but we try to make sure
that what we are doing is aligned with them.
Of course, finally--I don't want to go on too long--
overall, our energy situation has improved tremendously in the
last couple years, and our opportunities have widened. That has
been good for defense, because we are, for example, a huge user
of fuel. When oil prices come down, we benefit from it. Thank
you.
Senator Hirono. Thank you for your continuing commitment.
General Dempsey, there was a recent RAND workplace survey
report that indicated that 62 percent of women who reported an
unwanted sexual contact to military authorities indicated that
they experienced at least one form of retaliation. A
significant number of these retaliations came from coworkers,
not from the command structure.
So this is a difficult situation, and I would like to know
what your thoughts are on this type of retaliation and how it
can be curtailed within the service.
General Dempsey. Well, it is absolutely unacceptable. There
were 12 metrics that we have established to track progress
toward ridding the professional force from this stain. Ten of
them trended positively, two of them negatively. One was the
retribution issue.
Thankfully, a companion piece was that the vast majority of
respondents--and by the way, we had an unusual number of
respondents for a survey--expressed faith in the chain of
command. So we actually have been able to isolate the issue to
peer-on-peer retribution.
Senator Hirono. Yes.
General Dempsey. So you ask what we are doing about it.
Well, based on that survey, actually, we have had several
meetings. The Secretary convenes a meeting every 2 weeks, I
think it is. We had one yesterday. That is the topic. We are
looking to get after that, but we actually are encouraged that
we have been able to turn the trendline on 10 out of 12. We
have to go to work on the other 2, and keep our eye on the
first 10.
Senator Hirono. Yes, there will be continuing, I think,
interest on the part of most members, many members of this
committee----
General Dempsey. As there should be.
Senator Hirono.--on how you are doing on the peer-to-peer.
General Dempsey. We don't mind that a bit. We have to work
on this.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Senator Wicker, please.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
Secretary Carter and General Dempsey, I want to ask first
about the big picture. In the 6 minutes that we have, I would
like to drill down a little on Afghanistan.
Last week, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper
spoke to us, and he said, among other things, unpredictable
instability is the new normal. Secretary Carter, I think this
is what you and Senator Inhofe were talking about when you said
we used to know the exact threats, and it was one big threat,
and now it is unstable and unpredictable.
General Clapper also said this. He noted that, last year,
there were more deaths from state-sponsored mass killings, more
people displaced from their homes, and a higher rate of
political instability than we have seen in decades. It was the
most lethal year for global terrorism in 45 years. That is
Director Clapper.
Now, only a few days before, Secretary of State Kerry told
the House Foreign Affairs Committee that we are actually living
in a period of less daily threat to Americans and to people in
the world than normally, less deaths, less violent deaths today
than through the last century.
Now, Secretary Carter, are we living in a period of less
daily threats to Americans?
Secretary Carter. Senator, I haven't seen that particular
comment of Secretary Kerry----
Senator Wicker. That is the exact quote.
Secretary Carter.--with what the context of that was.
But I would say two things. One is, to get back to what
Director Clapper said about an uncertain world and one in which
new and different threats are constantly emerging, I would
agree with that completely. I just simply don't know what
Secretary Kerry said in that particular instance, Senator, what
the context for it was.
But we, certainly, have serious threats to the United
States around the world. I guess it is a good thing that we
have combated terrorism as vigorously as we have since 2001,
and we have made a lot of changes, a new Department of Homeland
Security, a lot of changes in intelligence in the Department of
Defense. So I think we have upped our game considerably.
At the same time, our opponents, both state opponents and
terrorists, continue to be pretty ingenious.
Senator Wicker. Mr. Secretary, I would just observe, in
terms of the level of threat, it is hard to square the two
statements coming from two members of the same administration.
Either we are living in a time of higher instability and more
deaths from state-sponsored mass killings, or we are in a
period of less daily threats to Americans, this second
statement coming from our chief negotiator with the Iranian
regime.
I will have to say to you, it causes me concern that
Secretary Kerry would feel this way while at the same time
trying to negotiate a nuclear deal with this terrorist nation.
General Dempsey, if the Secretary of State is correct,
perhaps we don't have to avoid sequestration, if we are living
a period of less daily threats to American, less threats to the
people of the world, than normally. Perhaps we could stick with
sequestration, if that is the case. Wouldn't you agree?
General Dempsey. Well, you know, I would say this, Senator,
one of the ways the military actually contributes to this
argument is by being forward-deployed, so that we can shape and
influence the future.
You may have heard me say in the past the last thing we
want to do is play a home game. If you sequester us, we will be
playing a home game.
Senator Wicker. Well, you know where I stand on
sequestration.
General Dempsey. I do, sir.
Senator Wicker. I am doing everything I can, working with
the bipartisan leadership of this committee.
I appreciate your testimony on page three, General Dempsey,
that threats are proliferating. It seems to me that that is
what is obvious out there.
It does concern me, though, when the Secretary of State
completely misses the point, as demonstrated by the
juxtaposition of Director Clapper's statement and the Secretary
of State's statement.
Now, Secretary Carter, on the first page of your testimony,
thank you for commending our troops. You say, in Afghanistan,
our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are helping cement
progress made toward a more secure, stable, and prosperous
future.
I want to salute you for saying that we have made progress.
It seems to me that there are some people out there listening,
maybe to the network news or some of the talking heads, who
would conclude that things have gone to hell in Afghanistan.
As a matter of fact, as you pointed out, in response to
Senator Inhofe's question, President Ghani and his chief
opposition leader are in a partnership. They appreciate our
presence there, and we have made progress. Things are headed in
the right direction. 10 years? worth of blood and sacrifice has
gotten us to where we are.
You say they are working to ensure that Afghanistan never
again becomes a safe haven for attacks on our homeland or our
partners and allies.
I think 6 years ago, you might have been able to say that
about Iraq. I just wonder what lessons we have learned from
Iraq and what assurances you can give with the plan the
administration has, with the President's plan for a drawdown of
troops in Afghanistan, that we won't lose the progress that we
have made that you have talked about, to cement the progress
toward a more secure, stable, and prosperous future in
Afghanistan, and toss that all away, as we have elsewhere.
Secretary Carter. Thank you, Senator. We do have the
opportunity to cement it. You said, what is the difference
between Iraq and Afghanistan? They are very different
situations in the following two ways.
The first is that we, as President Ghani clearly indicated
to me, but he has said this publicly, he wants us there. We
have a willing partner. We have a bilateral security agreement,
which we didn't get with Iraq, welcoming us to stay in
Afghanistan. That is the first thing.
The second thing is that we have a partner in President
Ghani. You mentioned Dr. Abdullah, the Chief Executive Officer,
and that is an important point, as you note.
They are working together. I saw both of them. I saw both
of them together. I kind of watched their relationship. They
have agreed to work together in a multisectarian, if I can use
that phrase, way, which is exactly what didn't happen in Iraq,
the devolution to sectarianism. That is what led to the
opportunity the cruel force of ISIL exploited and to the
situation we are now in.
So we have an opportunity in Afghanistan, for those two
critical reasons that are so different from Iraq, to get an
outcome that really is cemented.
Senator Wicker. General, would you like to comment on that?
General Dempsey. There is a terrorist network that
stretches from Afghanistan to Nigeria, and we have to keep
pressure on it along its entire length. I think Afghanistan is
and will remain an anchor point for that pressure.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Senator Blumenthal, please.
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I want to shift to an area where both of you have
demonstrated a lot of attentiveness and caring, which is the
well-being of the extraordinary men and women whom you command
while they serve under you and afterward when they become
veterans. I know that both of you have shown that, indeed, Mr.
Secretary, in your prior life, when you worked as
Undersecretary. General Dempsey, I was privileged to watch you
perform at a recent event sponsored by the Woodruff Foundation,
so I know how active you are in support of our troops and our
wounded warriors.
I want to focus on the connections between the DOD and the
V.A., having now seen it from the perspective of the V.A., the
Veterans Administration, in my capacity as ranking member. I am
struck by the need for better information. The health
electronics records have been a point of contention, but so
have the formulary issue, the drug formulary issue. There are a
variety of areas where there needs to be simply better
coordination. That is a Washington word, ``coordination,''
``collaboration.''
But can you see ways that we can improve the flow of
information and the help that veterans get, particularly our
veterans who suffer from posttraumatic stress and traumatic
brain injury, which, as you know, both Chairman McCain and I
have addressed in the Clay Hunt Veterans Suicide Prevention
Bill that we cosponsored and that recently passed. But that is
just a beginning, a down payment.
I wonder what more we can do in that area. I know we have
talked about it a little bit, and I wonder if you could address
that in the context of the budget.
Secretary Carter. I can, and thank you for that. We did
discuss it. Accordingly, I have tried to see where things stand
and assess it.
I have a great partner in the Secretary of Veterans
Affairs, and I have talked to him. To the soldier, sailor,
airman, and marine, they shouldn't have to worry that there are
two Cabinet departments that are responsible for taking care of
them. They shouldn't have to worry about that. We should have
to make it knit together.
You mentioned IEHR, the Integrated Electronic Health Record
program, formulary issues, which have to do with pharmacies and
what they call drugs and so forth. So, yes, we do need to stay
closely knitted, and we will.
I wanted to particularly note your work on PTS [post-
traumatic stress], simply because that is one of these things
that we have learned through sad experience in the last decade
or so is a serious thing that can also be treated. I think you
have been the one championing, and I thank you for that. We
will do it, making sure that veterans who came along before
there was this awareness and before there were these treatments
are given the benefits of this awareness and given the benefits
of this treatment.
I have looked into that since you and I have talked. I can
say more about that and we can talk about it privately, but I
understand exactly the need that you were pointing me to, and I
think I see a way that we can address that. That is really
important for our older veterans.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, I appreciate those comments. You
are absolutely right. The diagnosis for PTS began in the 1980s,
but troops were suffering from it way before then. Part of the
challenge is to not only care for them, and you mentioned there
are treatments, but in many ways, PTS is still a mystery. There
are centers of excellence that the V.A. has established. One of
them happens to be at the V.A. facility in West Haven, in
Connecticut, under the aegis of Yale New Haven and the
psychiatrists and so forth there, and they are doing some great
work.
But with proper support, and I hope it will come from the
Department of Defense as well as the V.A., so much more can be
done and more effective treatment, which we are just beginning
to discover, as you observed.
Let me just conclude by going through some of the
procurement issues that I think are important.
The Joint Strike Fighter, I am pleased to see the increase
there from 38 to 57, which, going back again to your prior
service in the Department of Defense, might not have been
predicted at that time, the, in effect, vote of confidence. I
don't want to speak too strongly, but it looks to me like that
procurement program is proceeding well. Am I correct?
Secretary Carter. I think we have stability in the Joint
Strike Fighter program, compared to 5 years ago. That is the
basis on which the ramp-up of production is a prudent thing to
do. That is a good opportunity for us, that the program is
running that way.
Senator Blumenthal. I am very pleased to see that both the
Virginia-class and the Ohio replacement are moving ahead on a
very good pace.
Secretary Carter. True. Both necessary.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Thank you, General.
Secretary Carter. Thank you.
Senator Reed. Senator Ayotte?
Senator Ayotte. I want to thank the Chairman.
I want to thank all of you for what you do for the country.
Secretary Carter, I want to thank you very much for so
quickly after your confirmation following through and meeting
with the JTACs [joint terminal attack controllers] to hear
their perspective on close air support on Friday, and for
including me in that meeting.
I appreciate your commitment to review the Air Force's
decisions on the A-10 and appreciate your willingness to do
that. So thank you very much.
Secretary Carter. Thank you.
Senator Ayotte. I wanted to follow up on the issue of
Ukraine, on a different topic, and that is the issue of U.S.
intelligence sharing, because there were reports recently in
the Wall Street Journal that really troubled me about what we
are doing to help the Ukrainians in terms of their defense, the
information we can share with them to be able to minimize their
casualties and defend their territory.
In that article, basically what it said is that images are
being significantly degraded to avoid provoking Russia and that
what it was doing, in terms of Ukrainian officials, they said
it has really hampered their ability of their forces to counter
separatists because it is a 24-hour delay, in terms of
intelligence sharing, and that they are actually approaching
other countries like Canada because of these intelligence gaps.
So can you help me understand, if we are not going to give
them arms to defend themselves, because we haven't done that
yet--and I appreciate that I hear from General Dempsey and you
as well that this is something that you are very open to--at
least we can share information with them because they are
obviously dying by the thousands defending their own territory.
So can you help me understand this issue; can we share
intelligence with them so they can defend themselves?
Secretary Carter. I can help you in a limited way, because
that is not a decision that either the Chairman or I are
involved in. This is an intelligence community thing, and it
has to do with the sharing arrangement that we have with
Ukraine. I think there are other considerations that they take
into account when making that determination.
But I think your larger point, which is that there are
things that we can do to help the Ukrainians help themselves--
and, of course, the main effort there is the political and
economic ones, sanctions and so forth. But on the military
side, there are ways that we can help the Ukrainians to help
themselves. We are, as you say, working through them now.
But I am afraid I can't speak to the intelligence. The
intelligence community will have to answer that.
General Dempsey. It is sources and methods, Senator. It has
nothing to do with the fact that we are worried about angering
Russia.
I can assure you that both the Secretary and I are
committed to finding ways to help Ukraine defend its sovereign
territory and reduce the casualties. There is a
disproportionate number of casualties on the Ukraine side. You
are right, both the Europeans and us should be active in trying
to help them.
Senator Ayotte. So think about if you, General Dempsey,
with all of your military experience, if you are fighting an
enemy and you weren't getting intelligence in real-time. A 24-
hour delay is like a lifetime in a wartime setting.
So I guess the real-time intelligence, to me, there has to
be a way to protect our sources and methods. But 24 hours later
in an intelligence context is like a lifetime.
So I really hope we will get them real-time intelligence,
so that they can defend themselves. They have suffered too many
casualties, and anything we can do to prevent those casualties,
I think we have some responsibility here, given we were
signatories to the Budapest Memorandum, too, and this is just
outright aggression of one nation upon another. So I appreciate
that.
I wanted to ask as well about ISIL's activities beyond Iraq
and Syria. We are hearing a lot about ISIL's activities in
Libya.
Can you help me understand what we see ISIL doing even
beyond the grave challenges that we face of their establishing
a caliphate along Iraq and Syria, in places like Libya? Where
else are we seeing their presence? What are we going to do
about it?
Secretary Carter. Thank you, Senator. I will say something,
and then the Chairman might want to add in.
We are seeing it. We are seeing it throughout North Africa.
We are seeing it in the Gulf area. I had a lengthy
conversation, to get back to the previous conversation we were
having on Afghanistan, with President Ghani, about it showing
up in Afghanistan. Then we see people in Europe, individuals
who are joining up, and so forth.
I will give you the perspective I learned by talking to our
folks over in the meeting I held in Kuwait last week, what I
learned about it, which is, one, ISIL is attractive to younger
members of older movements, where the leadership has gotten a
little older. Maybe they have gotten a little staid. The
younger guys who have more steam or are more deluded are
attracted to this newer, more radical thing.
The second thing I learned is that this is a social media-
fueled terrorism group in a way that we haven't seen yet. So
people who are very distant from any battlefield, very distant
from any experience of radicalism, suddenly becoming enticed
through social media.
In terms of what we do about it, I think this is why I
wanted people to come from all over the region and, indeed, in
the case of Special Operations Command, all over the world. We
need to be prepared for this, in terms of protecting our own
people.
I think it is also true the diplomatic and nondefense
people who were in this conference have this knowledge and
responsibility. But it is something that we need to combat in
the information domain as well. That is going to be
challenging, because this is a social media--if bin Laden was
the Internet terrorist, these guys are the social media
terrorists. I think that we will see people running up that
flag or saying that they are attracted to that movement all
over the world.
By the way, and this is the last thing I will say, that is
why it is important to inflict defeat upon ISIL. We have to
take the steam out of this thing. These guys aren't invincible,
and we have to make that clear.
General Dempsey. The only thing I would add, Senator, in
addition to what the Secretary said about it, the radical
nature of its ideology makes it attractive to a population
where governance has collapsed broadly across the region. They
are extraordinarily in the social media. So we really are
taking and continue to refine a transregional, sustainable,
persistent approach to this.
As I said, it stretches from al Qaeda in Iraq and Pakistan
all the way over to Boko Haram. At different times and in
different places, they syndicate with each other. We have to
see it that way, in order to deal with it.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
Chairman McCain [presiding]. Senator Manchin, and following
Senator Manchin, at the request of Secretary Carter, he would
like to take about a 15-minute break after Senator Manchin, and
the committee will stand in recess for 15 minutes following
Senator Manchin's questioning.
Senator Manchin?
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank all of you for your great service to the country. I
appreciate very much what you do every day.
There is not a person that I know of in my state of West
Virginia who doesn't support everything you do, doesn't support
the military, how they fight. They will do anything you ask
them to do.
But they still ask questions about why we spend so much
money on military, why we spend more than 8 of the next
countries put together. So we have to be always gaining their
trust, if you will.
I know in procurement, we are not the best in procurement.
We are not the best in developing weapons, as far as the
costliness. Eisenhower said beware of the military-industrial
complex. I think we all are in tune with all of this.
So I know how detrimental sequestration is. We talked about
flexibility at one time. Flexibility by itself won't do it. I
understand that.
Secretary Carter, you and I had a nice conversation. I
think Secretary Hagel was trying to look at the budgets,
reducing them by 20 percent and everything. But basically, it
really comes down to the auditing, knowing where we are. I have
talked about contracting. I have talked about the effectiveness
of our National Guard. I have even asked the question, tell me
the difference between the Reserve and the Guard, why do we
have duplication? There is so much going on here.
Are we allowing you to do everything that you need to do to
run a very effective and efficient and cost-effective military
for our country? The people in West Virginia are willing to
spend their taxes and invest their taxes into the defense of
this country. But with that, they would like to make sure they
are getting pretty good bang for their buck, too, and not just
throwing a lot of it away.
So how do we do this? How do we help you? We ought to have
an audit. We have been talking about that, and I know that the
Chairman here has been very much concerned about that, and
developing our arsenal, if you will, making sure we are able to
get that to market, do what we are supposed to do, and get it
there as quick as possible.
So anybody on the panel, Secretary, if you wanted to start
with that, and, General, chime in.
Secretary Carter. Well, I think your constituents are very
logical. They are saying, hey, look, I am willing to pay for
defense, but I want to make sure that every dollar is spent
well. So we need to pair our request for the funds that we need
to defend our country with the assurances that we are using it
well.
We know we are not always using every dollar of the defense
budget well. That is why I think Senator McCain, Chairman Reed,
and this entire committee has been urging a movement toward
reform, one I very much support and would like to partner with
you on, because I think the taxpayer will find it easier to
support what we are trying to do to defend ourselves if they
also see us vigorously getting the best value for every tax
dollar.
You mentioned audit. Audit is, as you indicate, key. We
have a plan for audit readiness for the Department. You and I
have discussed that. Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
and Chief Financial Officer Michael McCord is in charge of that
effort. But I am completely committed to its success.
Senator Manchin. Sorry to interrupt, sir. Just one thing,
every time we hear about reduction in force, it is always on
our frontline. It is always the people we are depending on to
be on the frontline, fighting and defending us.
But when you look at, basically, the size of the staffs, it
is just overwhelming the size of the staff keeps growing, but
we always continue to talk about the reduction in force of the
people we need out front.
What can we do to help you there, to get control of that,
reduce that staff proportionately?
Secretary Carter. Well, you are absolutely right. I hope
you will support and continue to support us as we get rid of
excess infrastructure and shed excess staff.
This is the kind of thing we have to do, if we are going to
go forward here with resources that are still going to be under
pressure. They are going to be under pressure, so we have to
make sure every dollar counts.
Senator, while I am speaking, before I ask the Chairman to
comment on the same thing, let me just say, Mr. Chairman, I
appreciate your consideration. This is about my healing up my
back, and I thank you. However, I am doing fine, so since
everybody is here, unless others want to take it, I am okay
going on. I very much appreciate your consideration.
Chairman McCain. Well, I was trying to prevent you from
having to be interrogated by Senator Fischer. She's next.
[Laughter.]
If you are ready for that.
Secretary Carter. I just got another pang.
General Dempsey. Yes, thanks, Senator.
First, it is probably worth remembering that when I became
the Chief of Staff of the Army, we were tasked to find $487
billion in the budget. We did. When I became the Chairman, I
think I am actually jinx, but we were then asked to achieve
that level, an additional $520 billion--roughly speaking, a
little over $1 trillion. We have actually found $750 billion of
it. What we are debating now is the last $250 billion over the
next 6 years.
I think we have done pretty darn well, to be honest with
you, Senator.
In terms of what you can tell the people in West Virginia,
they are going to see those Mountaineers, the 20th-ranked
Mountaineers, playing basketball, and they don't have to worry
about getting blown up while they are watching a basketball
game. We are doing okay at the away game.
Last but not least, I would venture to tell you all that
this group at JCS [the Joint Chiefs of Staff], the Chiefs, have
proposed some of the most controversial and emotional changes
in terms of paid compensation, health care, basing, weapons
systems, than any group in my memory in 40 years.
If we get some help with that, and we get some topline, as
the Chairman mentioned, for things that were unforecasted--for
example, space, nuclear weapons, the emerging threats--we can
actually manage it and look the American people in the eye, as
I do my own family, and tell them that we are spending your
money wisely.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed [presiding]. Senator Fischer?
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. I do appreciate
your service.
Secretary Carter, I appreciate your fortitude to stay, so
you can have my questions.
A lot of my colleagues have drilled down on some issues,
and I have about three different areas I would like to touch
on, if I may.
As we look at the situation in Ukraine, and we see that the
separatist forces are having success on the battlefield, do you
believe that that may incentivize Putin to become more
ambitious in Ukraine, so that he maybe would look at more
ambitious goals with regard to that country?
Secretary Carter. I am concerned about that. I think he has
made his goals pretty clear. He speaks about them openly, which
is to have all around him states that are in his orbit, rather
than pursuing their own futures, their own independent futures.
Ukraine is an example of that.
I think that if we don't remain united on the political and
economic pressure, which is having a real effect in Russia, and
if we don't remain united in standing up for NATO in Europe,
and if we don't remain united in sticking up for the ability of
the Ukrainian Government and Ukraine to plot an independent
path for itself, Putin will just keep pushing and keep pushing.
My read of him is that that is the kind of guy he is.
Senator Fischer. I would say, right now, that we are
united. But I have fears for the future and how we move forward
in this area. You mentioned NATO and our commitment there and
the commitment that we have.
What effect is it on the world when they see that we are
not helping a country, Ukraine, with more lethal force to
defend themselves when we signed an agreement that we would?
What message does that send to our NATO allies and to the
institution of NATO itself?
Secretary Carter. As it happens, I was in Budapest in 1994
when that agreement was signed, the very one that Vladimir
Putin's Russia is violating, so I know it well.
It was not a NATO-type agreement. But in it, Russia pledged
to respect the territorial integrity of Ukraine, which it
clearly has not done.
Insofar as NATO is concerned, as you say, I think the point
of our so-called reassurance initiative, but it basically means
rotating more forces into Europe and taking steps to strengthen
our presence in Europe, that is a way of saying, which I think
we have to do, to NATO that we are with you in a very serious
kind of obligation that we have under the NATO treaty.
We have an obligation to Ukraine also. To get to your other
point, I think that assisting them politically, economically,
and we talked before about the military being something also
under consideration, that is very important.
Senator Fischer. As we look at Russia, they are not
honoring the assurances that they gave to Ukraine. As you
mentioned, that was an agreement. They have been in violation
of the INF
[Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] Treaty, which they don't
admit to. But as has been discussed, they have been in
violation of that treaty.
How long does the United States wait before we start
exploring options, not just with regard to Ukraine but with
regard to Russia's blatant violations of a treaty agreement
with our country?
Secretary Carter. We haven't waited. We shouldn't wait. We
haven't waited to explore alternatives. The INF Treaty is a
two-sided treaty. They said they wouldn't do something. We said
we wouldn't do something. They have done what they weren't
supposed to do. So that means that we can react, in various
ways.
So if they don't get back into compliance, we can take
steps that are defensive, in terms of defending ourselves, that
are deterrent steps, and that are aimed at countering the
effects of this weapons system that violates the INF Treaty
that they are working on.
I think they need to understand that the United States can
react to this kind of thing. It was a two-way street. So it is
not something that we asked them to do and they give us for
free. It is something that we have. It is a two-way street, and
we have begun to think about things we can do now.
I mean, we signed the treaty because we thought it was, on
the whole, best for both of us not to do that. That was the
logic behind the treaty. I think that logic is still fine. But
you can't be one-sided about it.
Senator Fischer. I totally agree. I appreciate that you are
looking for options. I hope you can be more public about that
and also be very firm publicly in that the United States will
react to treaty violations, especially when they are violations
on treaties with our country. Thank you.
Senator Reed. Senator Donnelly?
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for your service.
General Dempsey, Secretary Carter, are you looking into how
our plan for Mosul got out and what is going on with that?
Secretary Carter. I have spoken to General Austin. The
Chairman has as well. Clearly, that was an instance of
speculation that, certainly, doesn't reflect what we need to be
thinking, with respect to an offensive against Mosul, which is,
we will conduct an offensive against Mosul when the Iraqi
security forces can lead such an offensive helped by us,
because it is important that that offensive succeed. So it will
happen when it can succeed.
Senator Donnelly. This would be for either you or General
Dempsey. How do we make sure this doesn't happen again? What is
being done to prevent it?
General Dempsey. As the Secretary mentioned, General Austin
and I have been in contact. He is conducting an internal
inquiry into it. I know he will take the appropriate action.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
Let me ask you this, and these are obviously not classified
sources or whatever. These are newspapers you read, this and
that. They said this morning, in the effort that is going on in
Tikrit, that we are really kind of peripheral players in this
and that General Soleimani from Iran is on the frontlines with
the Shiite militia.
What is going on there?
Secretary Carter. This gets back to the point made earlier.
Senator Donnelly. I apologize, if it was already mentioned.
Secretary Carter. No, it is fine. I am sorry. Your question
is right on.
We operate in Iraq in support of the Iraqi Government. The
Iraqi Government, in this case, did not ask for our support, in
this particular operation. I think that we need to be watchful,
together with the Iraqi Government, as we take back territory
from ISIL, that we continue to conduct this campaign in a
multisectarian way, because we have been down the road of
sectarianism in Iraq, and it is important that the Government
of Iraq today not go down that road again.
So we need to have success against ISIL. But we need to
have it in a way that doesn't inflame sectarianism again. That
is why we are watching this so closely.
General Dempsey. If I could add, Senator, the Soleimani
report, by the way, is a pull off of social media. I have seen
pictures myself. Our intel community will now go to work to
decide whether he was personally there or not.
But it is worth reminding ourselves that Iran and its
proxies have been inside Iraq since 2004. This is the most
overt conduct of Iranian support in the form of artillery and
other things. Frankly, it will only be a problem if it results
in sectarianism, as the Secretary said.
So of the size of the force going to Tikrit, about a third
of it is Iraqi security forces, the Fifth Division normally
based just north of Taji, and then the other two-thirds are
Shiite militia from the Popular Mobilization Committee.
If they perform in a credible way, rid the city of Tikrit,
turn it back over to its inhabitants, then it will, in the
main, have been a positive thing in terms of the counter-ISIL
campaign.
At this point, as the Secretary has mentioned, it is
supported by the Sunni members of parliament and the local
leaders. But that is dependent on the behavior of the militia
as they conduct this campaign.
By the way, we are watching.
Senator Donnelly. I was going to say, I am sure, like you,
my concern is that these Sunni tribal leaders look up and go,
these are the same people who have been working us over for
years. At what point do they say, where's the good option here
of these sides?
Secretary Carter. That is exactly the concern. They did, as
we understand it, make a statement today, the tribal leaders in
the area, that they supported the offensive. I hope that is
true, because what is very important is that we all be behind
defeating ISIL and that sectarianism not raise its ugly head
again, because that is what brought us to this place in the
first place.
Senator Donnelly. Let me ask one last question, because I
have about a minute, and I know it will take up that much time.
It has been mentioned in Syria that we plan to reduce ISIS,
get rid of them. How do you bring Assad to the table?
Secretary Carter. In Syria, it is a very good question. I
will offer the following: He needs to come to the table in
order to discuss his own receding from the scene in Syria.
Senator Donnelly. Right.
Secretary Carter. For that to occur, he needs to see the
right combination of the doom of the strategy that he has set
his country's course on, set the course of his country on, and
also I believe the pressure from Russia and Iran, both of whom
are supporting him. They need to withdraw their support of him,
because of what he has done to his country. When he sees that
combination, it seems to me that may cause him to recede.
But no doubt on our point of view, which is he has done
things to his people by this time that put him outside the
pale, and he has to go.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Senator Sullivan, please.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Carter, it is good to see you again.
Congratulations.
General Dempsey, others, thank you for your service.
I want to go back to a theme that we discussed during your
confirmation hearing, and that is this broader theme of
leveling with the American people on our threats. I think that
you are seeing--I would call it a pretty general bipartisan
concern that there is a disconnect sometimes between what we
are hearing from the uniformed military and what we are hearing
from the intelligence services and agencies, and, importantly,
what we are hearing from the leadership of the country, the
President. Senator Wicker was talking about the Secretary of
State.
You know, I think there is growing agreement, certainly
here, about the importance of defense spending, and how we,
certainly, think, I think most Americans think, we face a lot
of threats in the world. Defense spending is a function of
these threats.
But when we hear kind of the disconnect between different
members of the administration on what the threat levels are,
and how the President in many ways paints a very benign picture
of what is going on in the world and how we are making progress
in a lot of areas, it undermines credibility in what we all are
trying to do with regard to bolstering our National defense.
So again, I am not going to go into the specific quotes
from Secretary Kerry, the President's State of the Union, all
of which seemed to tell Americans, hey, don't worry, everything
is looking great. Things aren't looking great, and I think that
you and the members of the military recognize that.
What would you see right now as the top three biggest
threats that the United States is facing, both of you,
Secretary Carter and General Dempsey?
Secretary Carter. Before I get to the top three, to your
first point, I think that the President is requesting in this
budget an end to sequester and more money than would be called
for by sequester.
Senator Sullivan. I recognize that. But it is harder to get
through the Congress, if the President in his next breath or
the Secretary, in his next breath, of State, says that, don't
worry, everything is fine in the international world. The
threat level is decreasing. The moment of crisis has passed. We
are making progress with ISIS. I mean, I don't think any of
those statements are accurate.
Secretary Carter. Well, the only thing I would say is that
I think the reason why we need the resources that we are
requesting, both in the base budget and in the OCO budget, is
because we are being asked to respond to and defend the country
against a great variety of threats.
I will do a stab at three of them, but it is very hard to
rank things, because they are all important, otherwise we
wouldn't be doing them. But just to pick the things that we are
requesting additional funds for, that is OCO funds this year,
which are new things. I think you have to count ISIL as one. We
are requesting funds specifically in addition to the base
budget for combating ISIL. I think the same is true of the
European Reassurance Initiative, which is connected with the
behavior of Russia in Europe and our NATO and other obligations
in Europe. We are requesting extra money for that in the OCO
budget. We are requesting, of course, funds for Afghanistan, to
make sure that our success there can stick.
So I don't know that those are the most important things,
but they are very important things. There are other reasons why
we are requesting the amount of money that we think the country
needs, which is above the sequester level.
Senator Sullivan. So, General Dempsey, do you generally
agree with those top three?
I am going to get to a couple other questions.
General Dempsey. I might package them a little differently.
I am actually concerned about European security for reasons we
talked about earlier and, in particular, because--and it is not
just about Russia. It is what Russia has done, as I mentioned.
It has started a fire of ethnicity and nationalism. It may,
actually, burn out of their control.
So European security, for the first time in 20 years,
concerns me.
Second, the threat network that, as I mentioned, runs from
Afghanistan, Pakistan, all the way to Boko Haram. We can't just
deal with one of those groups. We have to deal with them in the
aggregate. We have all kinds of tools, direct action, building
partners, enabling others like we are doing with the French in
Mali. But we have to keep the pressure on that entire network.
The last one is one I would have to discuss in a closed
session, and that would be on narrowing technological gaps in
certain key areas.
Senator Sullivan. Okay, thank you.
I want to switch, gentlemen, to the Arctic and the
strategic posture that we have up there.
Mr. Secretary, in your last hearing here, you did mention
that you agreed with me that Alaska occupied the most strategic
place in the world, according to Billy Mitchell. I just want to
straighten the record with the Chairman and the ranking member.
Billy Mitchell was court-martialed, but he was court-martialed
for insubordination after accusing Army and Navy leaders of
``almost treasonable administration of national defense'' for
investing in battleships as opposed to aircraft carriers. He
was later given a Congressional Medal of Honor by the Congress.
So I think he has been vindicated, but I am going to ask a
question that follows up on that.
You put out a strategy on the Arctic, and yet the Russians
are making huge moves in the Arctic with regard to new bases,
with regard to new airfields, new Arctic command, claiming
territory over huge swaths of the Arctic. We had big support in
Alaska the last week, the Army task force that was up looking
at potential force reductions, looking at two brigade combat
teams potentially being moved out of Alaska.
If the Army eliminated even one brigade combat team in
Alaska, how do you think Kim Jong-Il or Vladimir Putin or our
allies in Japan, Korea, Singapore, would react to that, given
how important the Arctic is, given how important this new part
of the country is? To be honest, we have a 13-page paper. The
Russians are putting major, major troops and infrastructure in
the Arctic.
Does that concern you? Should we be looking at removing
brigade combat teams, our only airborne brigade in the Pacific?
Sorry, Mr. Chairman. I went on a little longer.
Secretary Carter. I think both of your points are very
important. The Arctic is going to be a place of growing
strategic importance. The Russians are active there. We are, as
your state is right on the point of, an Arctic power. That
needs to be part of our strategy. It needs to be more than, and
I think it is, more than a pamphlet, as you say.
The other thing you raised with Kim Jong-Il's thinking, and
so forth, this is why, whether we continue to invest in the
defense that we need, whether it be BCTs [brigade combat
teams], as you say, or any other part of our force, is
something that others are watching. It is important, if we ever
have to use it. But it is also important in ensuring that it is
less likely that we will have to use it.
I do worry about our foes being encouraged or heartened
when they see us debate whether we should spend enough money on
our defense. That is just yet another reason why I really hope
we get the support for the defense spending we need.
General Dempsey. I won't speak to the number of Army BCTs,
brigade combat teams. But I will say the Russians have just
taken a decision to activate six new brigades, and four of them
will be in the Arctic.
Chairman McCain. [presiding] Thank you.
Some of us still believe in battleships, and we are not
sure that Alaska should have ever been made a State.
[Laughter.]
Senator King?
Senator King. With some trepidation, Mr. Chairman, I want
to associate myself actually with the Senator from Alaska's
questions, because the Arctic is emerging as an enormously
important and strategic area. Just one of the simplest
measurements is, we have one heavy icebreaker and one medium
icebreaker. The estimates are that the Russians have 7 to 10
icebreakers. That is just basic infrastructure. The resources
up there, and the strategic implications, are enormous. So I
appreciate the Senator raising that question.
I think one of the things we have to do is put this
discussion into context, in terms of your budget. This chart,
which I am sure you are familiar with, is the last 50 years of
defense spending as a percentage of GDP. Starting in 1962 at
about 9 percent, today it is at 3.3 percent and headed down at
a time of increasing threat and peril for our country.
Often, we get confused about the absolute dollar amounts,
but a percent of GDP is a way of comparing apples to apples
throughout recent history. We are reducing the defense function
dramatically--dramatically--at a time, as I said, of increasing
threat.
General Dempsey, I want to put a fine point on your
testimony. You talked about numbers of deployments and
readiness. If we aren't able to avoid the sequester, are
American lives being put at risk?
General Dempsey. Yes.
Senator King. That is an eloquent answer, General. I
appreciate it.
Secretary Carter, I do want to talk about an area of your
budget in a little more detail. $5.5 billion is scheduled for
increased activities in cyber. I am extremely concerned about
cyber. I think it is the next frontier of warfare. We have had
plenty of warning shots across our bow in the last couple
years. Yet Congress hasn't acted. I commend you for taking this
initiative.
Here's my concern, however. News reports are that the CIA
[Central Intelligence Agency] is expanding their cyber
capability. Of course, NSA [the National Security Agency] has a
substantial cyber capability. You are building a substantial
cyber capability. I don't want to return to the post-September
11 days when we had a lot of intelligence capability, but they
weren't talking to each other.
Please assure me that you will be coordinating with CIA and
NSA, so that we are not duplicating, overlapping, spending more
of the taxpayers' money than we have to, and, worst of all, not
sharing whatever information is being derived in this field.
Secretary Carter. Well, thank you. You are absolutely
right. This is a terribly important DOD mission, and that is
why both I and, I think, the Chairman has been a great leader
in this as well, and we are so determined to do more.
But this is one of these things that, just like you
analogized it to the war on terrorism before 9/11, it requires
us to stitch together the efforts of different parts of the
government. To the list you named, I would add also the FBI,
which has some capabilities and some authorities in this area;
DHS [Department of Homeland Security], which has capabilities
and authorities in this area. We have to make the whole greater
than the sum of the parts.
So even as we in DOD move out and make the investments we
need to, we need to coordinate with the others.
Our investments are in two categories. One is to make sure
that our networks are secure, because our forces depend for
their effectiveness upon information networks. So the buying of
planes, ships, and tanks doesn't get us anywhere unless we have
the networks to go with them. They don't do any good in
warfare, unless the networks are survivable and able to avoid
penetration.
Also, another thing we need to do is build cyber-weapons as
weapons of war, because war comes out of being a dimension of
future warfare, as many have noted.
We also play a role----
Senator King. Let me interrupt you there, if I might. I am
concerned that our cyber-defense system is just that, it is
defense, and that we don't have an offensive capability. Or if
we do, it is not broadly known. Therefore, particularly nation
states who act against our cyber, we are very vulnerable,
because we are such a wired country. There is no price to be
paid.
I wonder if we shouldn't be developing a theory of
deterrence similar to nuclear deterrence in the 1950s, 1960s,
and 1970s, which served us well, actually, until today, so that
people understand that if they come against our cyber-
infrastructure, they are going to pay a price. Is that
something that I hope you can consider?
Secretary Carter. I think that is very wise, so I
appreciate that thought.
I think that is something that we need to think through
better than we have. What does doctrine mean, what does
deterrence mean, in this new domain?
So at the same time we build capabilities, we have to build
doctrine as well. So I think that is a very, very wise point.
Senator King. Thank you.
Final question, and I am running out of time, so I will
really ask you to respond to this perhaps on the record.
That is, you have identified as a priority acquisition
reform. I know that you once held that job, and I hope you will
hold to that. I would like to see a little more detail about
how you are going to tackle that.
I know the Chairman has expressed this concern. How do we
get at procurement not only in terms of cost, but in terms of
timeliness, that we are not taking literally decades to develop
a new aircraft, but that we have a more timely procurement
process?
So you don't have to respond now, but I would appreciate
seeing something on that, because I think that is a very
important part of your mission, going into this job.
By the way, I am delighted that you are here with us today.
Thank you.
Secretary Carter. Thank you. Will do. I will respond.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ernst?
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Secretary Carter, General Dempsey, for being
here with us. We appreciate your service and your testimony
today.
Secretary Carter, in the beginning of your testimony, you
had given quite an extensive list of the trips that you have
taken, the people that you have met, the places you have been,
and the impact with equipping and training our soldiers. So I
can tell that is very important to you.
Do I understand correctly that you also took a trip to
Arlington?
Secretary Carter. I did the morning I was sworn in, with my
wife.
Senator Ernst. I appreciate that so much, Secretary. That
tells a lot about a person, that not only are you recognizing
the sacrifice that the blue star families give to their loved
ones who are serving overseas right now, but also to those gold
star families that have left someone behind.
Secretary Carter. Thank you.
Senator Ernst. So thank you for doing that.
Secretary Carter. Thank you.
Senator Ernst. I learned of that, and I was significantly
impressed that you would take the time to do that. So thank
you.
I do want to talk a little bit about, we have talked about
this all day, with the Shiite militia. I know Senator McCain
had spoken about this earlier. In the fiscal year 2015 budget,
we had $1.6 billion that we used for the Iraq train and equip
fund, and that was to train and equip the Iraqi security
forces, the Kurdish Peshmerga, and Sunni tribes and, of course,
other local forces. Now in this fiscal year 2016 budget, you
are requesting $700 million for this fund.
I do support this effort. I think we should be training and
equipping the Kurdish Peshmerga. I think they have been
important allies in the pushback against ISIS and others. But
what I am concerned about, though, is the relationship between
the Iraqi security forces, Iran, which has been the sidebar
topic of many conversations today, and the Shiite militia
forces.
During the Iraq war, IEDs were a huge concern to American
troops. I think as Senator McCain alluded to earlier, there
were some types of IEDs, the EFPs, explosively formed
projectiles, that were used. They were devastating to our men
and women, left many gold star families out there.
We know that those EFPs, a lot of those came from Iran. So
right now, what I would like to hear from you is, are American
taxpayer dollars going to the Shiite militia that once were
fighting against American soldiers? How can we assure the
American taxpayer that these dollars going to this fund to
train and equip Iraqi forces will not be used against us, as we
move forward?
Secretary Carter, if you can address that?
Secretary Carter. Thank you. Then Chairman Dempsey.
First of all, I share your concern about the Shiite
militias and the face of sectarianism looming again in Iraq,
which, as you know extremely well from your own service, is the
principal challenge that the Government of Iraq faces going
forward.
Our training and equipping is to Iraqi security forces
through the Government of Iraq. Our assistance, by the way,
also to Peshmerga is through the Government of Iraq. That
reflects the view that a multisectarian Iraqi Government is the
best way to keep Iraq together and to defeat ISIL in Iraq, and
ultimately drive them out of the country.
But I say I share your concern because what we have seen in
the last few years has been sectarianism eroding the
capabilities of the Iraqi security forces. That is why they
collapsed in the face of ISIL.
So I absolutely share your concern about EFPs. You know
that extremely well from your own service. We have had that
experience before.
General Dempsey, who was there also in Iraq, does as well,
so let me ask him to join in.
General Dempsey. I will just express my own concern as
well. I think if General Austin were here--I guess he will be
here, actually--he would tell you that the reason his campaign
plan is deliberate is that one of the lines of effort--I
mentioned there were nine--is Iraqi governance. If the central
government of Iraq does not achieve, let's call it
reconciliation, because that is probably the right word, with
the Shiite and the Kurds, then it does put our campaign at
risk. So I am concerned about that.
As far as the weapons that we have been issuing to the ISF
[Iraqi Security Forces], as well as to the Peshmerga through
the Government of Iraq, we have confidence that those are going
into the right hands.
Some of the weapons you have seen in the hands of the
Shiite militia, because you can see it on YouTube and on
Twitter and places, are things that were procured by the Iraqis
through our foreign military sales process that they bought a
couple years ago, two or three years ago. But we are monitoring
it as well as we can.
Senator Ernst. I thank you very much.
Senator McCain, thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to the witnesses for this excellent testimony. I
want to ask about two items, sequester and the ISIL AUMF.
On sequester, I received a letter last week as a member of
the Budget Committee from Chairman McCain and Ranking Member
Reed that I would ask unanimous consent that it be entered into
the record.
Chairman McCain. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Senator Kaine. Highly important letter for Budget Committee
members and all of us, and I just want to read one sentence to
you and ask if you agree with it.
``If we continue on our current path, i.e., sequester, we
risk undermining the central pillars of our all-volunteer force
and with it the foundations of international peace and
security, of which the United States military has been the most
reliable guarantor since the end of World War II.''
Do you agree with that statement?
Secretary Carter. I do.
Senator Kaine. General Dempsey?
General Dempsey. I do, Senator.
Senator Kaine. It strikes me, could we send up any sort of
clearer white flag at the beginning of a partial disarmament
than to place a vote on the BCA from August 2011 as a higher
priority for the Nation than our security in a world that has
changed and put new threats on the board since then? Could we
do anything that would send a worse message to our allies about
our weakening resolve?
Secretary Carter. I am very concerned about what our
internal budget debates look like to friends and foes alike
internationally. It is yet another reason why we really need to
knock it off and get ourselves on a stable budget path that
gives us enough to defend ourselves properly.
Senator Kaine. Let me just say that we have had an
interesting set of discussions about Afghanistan. I think the
committee has come to the position we should be conditions-
based, not calendar-based. Let me apply that same analogy to
our sequester issues.
Shouldn't we be conditions-based? I mean, are we really
going to elevate a BCA cap that we voted on in August 2011
before North Korea's cyberattack, before Putin went into the
Ukraine, before ISIL was grabbing acres? Are we really going to
elevate that above a conditions-based national defense? For the
same reasons that we shouldn't elevate a calendar over the
conditions in Afghanistan, we shouldn't elevate an August 2011
vote over the conditions of security that faces the country.
I took that as the point of the letter, and I recommend it
to all of my colleagues.
With respect to the ISIL AUMF, an area where I sort of have
disagreed sometimes with the Chairman, but where the back-and-
forth has made me think about my position, is the question
about the issue of ground troops as part of the ISIL AUMF. In
listening to the Chairman about this, what I have realized is
that my concern is not really about language, and it is not
really about sort of the constitutional allocation of power. It
is really about the definition of the mission. I would like to
ask you a question on this.
We have heard in last three weeks, in meetings with the
Foreign Relations Committee by, first, King Abdullah of Jordan,
and then the emir of Qatar last week, about the battle against
ISIL in the region. Both of them said to us, essentially, U.S.
ground troops aren't a good idea because this has to be our
fight against our terrorist threat. We want your help. We want
you to be deeply involved. But if it gets pitched as the U.S.
against ISIL, or even as the West against ISIL, then it takes
on a fundamentally different tenor and could even become kind
of a recruiting bonanza for ISIL.
King Abdullah, in a very courageous way, and sadly, we met
with him on the very day that it was revealed that the
Jordanian pilot was so horribly murdered, burned, he said, this
is our fight and we have to show the world that this is our
fight. If we are willing to do it, then we need all kinds of
help from you. But we have to be up front that this is our
fight. The United States didn't create ISIL. It didn't create
this extremist ideology. It was birthed in our region by people
claiming the mantle of the religious tradition that we honor,
and perverting it for a bad end.
So both of them have sort of guardedly advised us against
ground troops, but toward the big picture goal that this battle
against ISIL has to be the region policing itself, not the U.S.
trying to counter them.
As we think through this military mission, what is your
response to that sentiment? Again, it is not about
draftsmanship or about the allocation of power, but it is about
isn't there a compelling need for the region to show that it
will battle its own threat? If so, we will help them, rather
than have it be the U.S. burden?
General Dempsey. Senator, that is exactly how the campaign
is designed. It is designed to leverage a coalition of regional
partners, assisted by those outside the region, but very much
relying upon those in the region to lead the effort, requiring
the Government of Iraq to lead the effort, especially in terms
of reaching out to form a coalition within Iraq of Sunni tribal
leaders and Kurdistan Peshmerga.
So I would simply say that is exactly how the campaign is
designed.
Secretary Carter. I second that. That is how the campaign
is designed, and it is how it needs to be designed for the two
reasons you say. The first is that we don't only seek the
defeat of ISIL. We seek the lasting defeat of ISIL. That means
after they are defeated, they need to stay defeated. That means
somebody who is there ensuring that defeat. The second reason,
that you also say, which is that if it becomes our war, it
becomes a harder war.
So for both of those reasons, we need to have others
involved. That is, as the Chairman says, what the campaign
calls for now.
Senator Kaine. Thank you so much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Cotton?
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Secretary Carter, welcome back in your capacity as
Secretary. I have to go back to something that we were
discussing a few series ago about the leak of our plans to
Mosul. I believe Secretary Carter said you are looking into it.
General Dempsey, I know you said you are looking into it.
I don't understand what would take so long to get to the
bottom of it. This was not a leak. It was a planned conference
call with members of the media, if I understand the reporting
correctly.
Do I misunderstand something here?
Secretary Carter. No, that is my understanding as well. I
just would say two things about this whole incident.
The first is, Senator, that when an operation is mounted
against Mosul or anywhere else, it needs to be a success, and
it needs to be Iraqi led, supported by us, and it has to be
successful. That is a little bit like the conditions-based
points that Senator Kaine--
Senator Cotton. Mr. Secretary, I agree fully. I agree
fully. I don't understand why announcing any timeline would
have contributed to any idea it would have been a success, nor
do I understand why it would take so long to understand why an
organized conference call with the media was held.
Secretary Carter. I will say something about that, and let
the Chairman, who has also spoken to General Austin about that.
That clearly was neither accurate information nor, had it
been accurate, would it have been information that should have
been blurted out to the press. So it is wrong on both scores.
The only thing I will say is that we try, as the Department
of Defense of a democracy, to be as open as we can. So there
are lots of people out there talking all the time about what we
are doing. Every once in a while, somebody gets out in front of
their skis.
But I also, even as we make sure that this particular
incident doesn't happen again, I think that it is important
that we be open as a Department, not with military secrets and
not with war plans, which is the mistake made in this case. But
we do try to keep the country informed of what we are doing. It
is about protecting them. It is a democracy.
So openness is important, but it has to have limits when it
comes to security matters. Those limits, obviously, weren't
respected in this case.
Chairman?
General Dempsey. Senators McCain and Graham have sent a
letter through the President to the Secretary to me to General
Austin, actually, to ask that very question. I must suggest
that I will wait until we respond to the letter.
Senator Cotton. Secretary Carter, during your confirmation
hearings, you had mentioned that U.S. options to respond to the
breach of INF Treaty by Russia and, this is a quote, and I
think you alluded to this earlier when you were speaking with
Senator Fischer, active defenses to counter intermediate-range
ground-launch cruise missiles, counterforce capabilities to
prevent intermediate-range ground-launch cruise missile
attacks, and countervailing strike capabilities to enhance U.S.
or allied forces.
Could you elaborate on the size and scope of those
capabilities, and what you think the Russian Government's
reaction might be if we were to fund such capabilities?
Secretary Carter. I think in this setting, I would like to
limit the amount of detail that I go into. But I will affirm
what you just said, which is that we have three kinds of
options for responding to a violation of the INF Treaty. I
think the Russians need to know that this is a two-way street.
They signed, we signed, and we can and will react. Those are
the three categories in which we could react militarily: active
defenses, which are to protect ourselves and our allies and
their territory against this new threat; counterforce, which is
a way of making sure that if, God forbid, there is an actual
military confrontation, they can't be used; and the third is
this opens up the option for us to have systems which we
decided to forgo in the interest of this INF Treaty years ago.
We don't have to forgo them anymore because a treaty is a two-
way street.
With that, Chairman, do you want to add anything?
General Dempsey. The only thing I will add, Senator, is
that the development of capabilities to fit into the categories
that the Secretary mentions would be INF-compliant. That is the
difference between the two of us.
Senator Cotton. Okay.
This may be a question about military terms of art, so I
will start with the Chairman, if that is okay, and let
Secretary Carter bat cleanup.
Mr. Chairman, what are ``enduring offensive ground combat
operations''?
General Dempsey. I will tell you that as the one who would
have to assist in the implementation of that, I would consider
``enduring'' to be mission-by-mission. So if we were, for
example, to decide that our advice to the President would be
that we would have to introduce ground forces to accompany
Iraqis into combat in Mosul because of the complexity of the
terrain, then we can do that, but it would be mission-specific,
as opposed to a temporal issue, mission-specific rather than a
temporal dimension, meaning two weeks or two years.
Senator Cotton. Secretary Carter, do you have anything to
add?
Secretary Carter. No, I think that is accurate.
I think the important thing about the language of the AUMF,
and however that discussion, debate, turns out from my point of
view is, first, that we have the flexibility to run the
campaign we need to defend the country. The second is that our
troops see our government as a whole supporting them.
Those are the two things that are important to me in this
whole debate.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. General, you keep saying that if you
decide to recommend to the President. We would like to know
when you are going to decide to make that recommendation to the
President.
General Dempsey. Well, Senator, when the task at hand, when
I get the advice from CENTCOM, of course, General Austin, and
when the mission would require it. We have not reached that
point.
Chairman McCain. No, things are going fine.
Senator Nelson?
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, it is good to see you.
Mr. Chairman, in your professional military opinion, if
additional arms are not provided to Ukraine, you have a little
David fighting the Russian bear. Is it reasonable to assume
that Russia, through their subterfuge of the rebels, would
continue to advance right across the country?
General Dempsey. I am concerned about two things, Senator.
One is that it would be a Russian aspiration to do so, and
then, second, the separatists may on their own decide to do so.
There are capability gaps we have identified.
Look, here's the other thing, Senator. If Russia wants to
take Ukraine, it is going to take it, because of its geographic
proximity and the size.
On the other hand, there are some capability gaps that put
the Ukraine forces at a real disadvantage. I think we ought to
look for opportunities to provide those capabilities, so that
on the chance that the Russians are actually telling the truth,
which, frankly, I doubt very much, that the separatists and the
sovereign state of Ukraine can compete on a level think field.
Senator Nelson. Why do you think that the Russian policy is
such that--as you say, if they decide to take Ukraine, they
could. Why are they not moving more aggressively across
Ukraine?
General Dempsey. This is probably now speculative because
the intelligence doesn't yet support it. I suspect it will. I
think that their pace is designed to create uncertainty on the
part of our European allies, because if they can maintain that
level of uncertainty, then they have the potential to put
friction inside of NATO, which is actually their larger
strategic goal.
Senator Nelson. If successful in Ukraine, and Russia wanted
to continue to be aggressive, they could suddenly amass on the
borders of the three Baltic states. There would be no match
there, but now we have NATO members.
What do you think is the resolve of the European NATO
membership to stand and fight for the Baltics, if the Russian
bear comes across the line?
General Dempsey. That is the commitment they have made as a
member of NATO. They all agreed to live up to their Article 5
responsibilities.
I will say that, based on the European Reassurance
Initiative, that NATO has taken rotational force, Baltic air
policing, establishment of a very high readiness joint task
force. NATO and Wales made some commitments that indicate to me
that they, all of them, take that responsibility seriously.
The problem we could potentially have is the asymmetric
nature of it, where there might be a dispute about whether it
is actually happening. So we are working with our NATO allies
to work through that.
Senator Nelson. Of course, the situation there is, with
those large Russian-speaking populations in the Baltics,
especially in Estonia, it could give him the same excuse that
he has tried to use with regard to Crimea.
Let me ask you about mental health. I have been enormously
impressed with some of our Special Operations Forces, that they
are now realizing that the stigma against mental health
counseling, they are really trying to turn it around, because
it is performance enhancement, not only the body but the mind
as well. To what degree are you all trying to implement that
same thing across-the-board of the Department of Defense?
General Dempsey. To a great degree, because it actually,
when it started under Bill McRaven when he was the SOCOM
[Special Operations Command] commander, now under Joe Votel,
what they realized is exactly what you said, that it is not
enough just to say it is not a stigma. So they found a way to
turn it into a positive. We would call it a combat multiplier.
So not only is it something you do after the fact but you
build in the kind of resiliency you need right from the start.
All the services are learning lessons with each other.
Senator Nelson. Final question for either of you, training
500 a month or every two months for the Free Syrian Army, is
that really going to be productive?
Secretary Carter. I will take that first, if I may,
Chairman.
That is a small number but grows over time. It is paced by
the throughput of the training centers. I think that the U.S.
effort needs to be just one effort. There need to be others in
the region who participate in this. It gets back to something
we were discussing earlier about the need for the defeat of
ISIL to be a lasting defeat and for regional partners to be
involved.
So the only thing I would say is that there need to be
other efforts beside the U.S. effort here, in accordance with
the discussion we were having earlier.
Chairman McCain. Senator Graham?
Oh, I am sorry. General, did you want to--
General Dempsey. Just to say that we need a partner on the
ground, and we need something we can have this coalition
coalesce around.
Chairman McCain. Senator Graham?
Senator Graham. Thank you. I think Senator Lee is allowing
me to go ahead, and I appreciate it very, very much.
Let's continue that thought.
Have you been told, General, by the Arab forces in the
region, the Arab leaders, that we are not going into Syria
unless we can get rid of Assad?
General Dempsey. There are some of them who say that, and
others who don't. But, yes, I have heard that.
Senator Graham. Well, the reason they are saying that is
they don't want to defeat ISIL and turn Syria over to Iran,
that Assad is a puppet of Iran. Do you agree with that?
General Dempsey. I do.
Senator Graham. So a lot of Arabs are saying, I want to
destroy both enemies of the region, Assad as well as ISIL. So I
don't see any chance of a regional force until you put Assad on
the table.
The Authorization to Use Military Force, I have a very
specific question. The people we are training throughout the
region to go in and fight ISIL, the Free Syrian Army, the young
men who are going to join this cause, what would happen if the
Assad air force, the airpower through MiGs and helicopters with
barrel bombs, if they began to attack the people we trained
because Assad knows one day they will turn on him.
Under the Authorization to Use Military Force, can we
protect the people we train against an attack by Assad?
Secretary Carter. Well, first of all, I think we have an
obligation to those we have trained to protect them. The manner
in which that would be done is something that is being
discussed. But in my view, we have an obligation to do that. It
goes with the training part.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with that, General?
General Dempsey. I do, Senator.
Senator Graham. Well, I agree with you both, and I have
asked the White House General Counsel this very question and he
told me very quickly, no, the Authorization to Use Military
Force would not allow us, the United States, to engage the air
forces of Assad. That is not included within the authorization.
So that, to me, is a very important point. Could you check
with the White House and see where they come out on this, at a
later time?
If the sanctions were relieved tomorrow, if the Iranians
got sanction relief, General, what do you think they would do
with the money, given their behavior on the ground today?
General Dempsey. I can't speak to that, Senator. But here's
what I will say, I am under no illusions that ending their
nuclear program ends the problems we have with Iran in the
region, whether it is surrogates and proxies, arms trafficking,
cyber.
So this is an adversary who, as someone pointed out
earlier, has actually led to the deaths of American servicemen
on the battlefield. So I think we have to keep an eye on them
in that regard as well.
Senator Graham. Would you agree with me that the most
likely outcome, given their behavior today, is that they are
not going to build hospitals and schools. They are probably
going to put the money into their military?
General Dempsey. You know, Senator, I think they will
probably distribute their money like we do. I just hope they
don't sequester it.
Senator Graham. Well, I will tell you what, I just hope we
don't give them more cash, because I think they are wreaking
havoc as it is.
Secretary Carter, do you agree with me that the Iranians as
I speak are wreaking havoc throughout the region without a
nuclear weapon?
Secretary Carter. I do agree with that, Senator. You look
at Yemen, from Yemen to Syria and Iraq and Lebanon and
elsewhere, and that is why I think that it is important that we
remain vigilant and prepared, and I think we, in the Department
of Defense, need to and will be prepared for Iran across a very
wide front.
Senator Graham. Would you agree with the following
statement? The Iranians with a nuclear weapon would be the most
significant national security threat that Israel faces and the
United States would face.
Secretary Carter. Certainly, I would let the Israelis speak
for themselves.
Senator Graham. I think they have.
Secretary Carter. I think so, too.
The two things I would say is that we need to be concerned
about Iranian behavior beyond their nuclear program.
Senator Graham. Well, let's look at it the other way. Can
you think of anything, off the top of your head, that would
beat out an Iran with nuclear weapons?
Secretary Carter. Well, there may be a close tie with North
Korea with nuclear weapons.
Senator Graham. Well, they already have nuclear weapons.
Secretary Carter. I understand, but in terms of the danger
posed by a difficult state in the possession of nuclear
weapons.
Senator Graham. Well, let's look at that. Do you think it
is more destabilizing for Iran to get a nuclear weapon than
North Korea, in terms of the Mideast?
Secretary Carter. In terms of the Mideast, surely.
Senator Graham. Have you been told by Arab allies that
anything you give the Iranians on the nuclear front, we are
going to want the same thing or more? If the Iranians get a
nuclear capability, do you think the Arabs in the region will
want nuclear capability to match the Iranians?
Secretary Carter. There are those who have said that, and
that is one of the reasons why we oppose Iran getting a nuclear
weapon, because it could be the beginning of a powder train
that would encourage others in the region to pursue a nuclear
program as well. So that would just unleash proliferation in
the Middle East.
Senator Graham. So, the Prime Minister's warning in that
regard today is probably well-heeded?
Secretary Carter. I did not hear the Prime Minister today,
but I, certainly, think that the danger of a runaway Iranian
program stimulating runaway nuclear programs elsewhere in the
Middle East is a very serious one.
Senator Graham. Thank you, both, for your service.
Chairman McCain. Senator Lee?
Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to each of you for being here, and thanks for all
you do to keep our country safe.
Secretary Carter, the Department of Defense is calling for
a BRAC round in 2017, citing that it has nearly 20 percent more
infrastructure than it finds necessary. Can you give a more
detailed explanation as to what the department finds within its
infrastructure that is unnecessary or in excess, and why? Also,
can you describe to us what improvements you think need to be
made to the BRAC process to avoid the kind of cost overruns
that we experienced in the 2005 round?
Secretary Carter. Thank you. We are requesting another
round of BRAC. The basis for that is a measurement of our
infrastructure against our current holdings of equipment and
our needs.
So, for example, it is aircraft fleets versus apron space.
It is that kind of analysis that measures the amount of excess
infrastructure that we are carrying.
With respect to BRAC rounds, the 2005 BRAC round was not
what we are seeking, that kind of BRAC round. We are looking
for the kind of BRAC that occurred in the 1990s, where true
savings occurred.
You might say, why didn't savings occur in the 2005 BRAC
round? It is because when it came time to reconfigure bases--
that was, by the way, at a time when the defense budget was
growing very rapidly--the department decided at the same time
to modernize a lot of installations at the same time it was
consolidating others. That created far fewer savings than a
pure BRAC round would.
So we are seeking BRAC authority. I know that that is not
an easy thing to get, but we simply have to reduce tail, or we
have to take it out of tooth, and I don't think anybody wants
that.
Senator Lee. Okay.
A lot of Americans became frustrated last summer when we
saw the Iraqi security forces, on whom we had just spent $25
billion training and equipping over the course of the last
decade, quickly free from a much smaller and less well-trained,
less well-equipped ISIS force in northern Iraq, giving up
ground and leaving behind a lot of weapons and leaving behind a
lot of equipment that had been provided for them, a lot of it
by us.
So, Mr. Secretary, you just returned from a visit to the
Middle East to look into our strategy there and how things are
going there. Can you discuss with us a little bit the oversight
we exercise over the train and equip missions in Iraq and in
Syria, and tell us a little bit about what is being done to
make those forces accountable for the training and equipment
that we are giving them, just to make sure that something
similar doesn't happen, make sure that our investment is not in
vain?
Secretary Carter. Thank you, Senator. Let me give that a
start and then ask Chairman Dempsey to chime in, also.
You exactly put your finger on it. What happened last year
was an unwillingness of the Iraqi security forces to fight
using the equipment and training that the United States had
given them. The reason for that was a political failure on the
part of their government to keep the promise that had been made
to the country to keep it a multisectarian state. That is not
what was happening under Maliki. That is the reason why the
forces folded.
So the most important thing we can do going forward is to
make sure that Iraq doesn't decline again into sectarianism. So
that is the most important thing we can do, and it is a
political thing rather than a technical thing involving the
training. But it is job one.
Insofar as their training is concerned, I will let the
Chairman speak to that. But we are giving them training and we
are going to give them support when they go into battle. We are
now, and we have been now for quite some time, conducting a
bombing campaign against ISIL in order to blunt their offense
and prepare the way for the counteroffensive.
Let me ask the Chairman if he wants to add anything there.
General Dempsey. Just in terms of the oversight, Senator,
four locations: Irbil in the north, al Asad in the west, Taji
just north of Baghdad, and Besmaya to the east of Baghdad. So
the training is centralized.
The oversight, once they deploy, is actually built around
the supply chain, so the things that we are giving them, there
is a tether that goes out to where they are operating.
To this point, our program is to take and pull some units
offline who exist, regroup them, put them back out, as well as
to help the Iraqis manage their own training base.
Does that answer the question?
Senator Lee. Yes, I think that is helpful.
As my clock is ticking down, if I can just ask one other
quick question that either one of you can answer.
How are U.S. defense and intelligence agencies adapting to
the collapse of the Yemeni Government, and the loss of our
primary counterterrorism partner against one of the most
capable al Qaeda offshoots? What are we doing in that realm?
Secretary Carter. Well, I will start, and the Chairman can,
please, add.
The first thing is that al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
[AQAP], which is in Yemen, is a very serious offshoot of al
Qaeda, very serious for us because they are determined to
attack us. They make that absolutely clear. Therefore, our
counterterrorism operations in Yemen are critically important.
Therefore, the restoration of a government there that will
cooperate with us is very important to us.
Now, we are trying to do everything we can to continue to
combat AQAP in the face of what is going on with the Houthis
and the government in Sana'a. But it will be much better for us
if we are able to reconstitute or assist in the reconstitution
of a government there in Sana'a.
I know our diplomatic colleagues are working on that, but
it is important to our counterterrorism effort.
Let me ask the Chairman.
General Dempsey. Yes, what I would add, Senator, is our
diplomatic effort is to try to keep the country together, but
our counterterror effort is based mostly out of Aden in the
south.
We still have a partner there who has an interest in
keeping al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula under pressure. Our
fear is that if the country does devolve into civil war, we
lose that platform.
Senator Lee. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. I want to thank the witnesses for a long
afternoon of testimony. I believe that it is important that all
of our colleagues, as well as the American people, understand
your message, and that is that sequestration cannot continue
without, as you responded to Senator King, without putting the
lives of the men and women who are serving in uniform today in
danger.
I thank you for that frank and candid testimony. I thank
you for being here this afternoon.
Secretary Carter. Thank you.
General Dempsey. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:19 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
personnel and readiness
1. Senator McCain. Secretary Carter and Chairman Dempsey: The
Department's legislative proposals accompanying the fiscal year 2016
budget request assume savings in the personnel and readiness accounts
primarily: 1) by implementing new TRICARE fees or increasing existing
fees; 2) by slowing the growth of military compensation (annual pay
raises and BAH); and 3) by reducing commissary subsidies. If Congress
does not authorize additional changes in compensation and benefits,
where will the Department find the money in the budget to offset the
savings assumed in the budget request? How would that impact force
readiness?
Secretary Carter. If Congress does not authorize the additional
changes requested in compensation and benefits, the Department will be
forced to take additional reductions within the readiness and
modernization accounts and possibly make further force structure
adjustments in the longer-term to offset the higher personnel costs.
The proposed compensation adjustments are an important part of the
Department's efforts to balance compensation with the required levels
of readiness, capacity, and capability needed to ensure that our people
can continue executing the Nation's Defense Strategy with continued
excellence. Providing a robust pay and benefits package is a vital
component of military quality-of-life and readiness, but we also owe
our warriors the best possible training and equipment to ensure their
superiority on the battlefield and bring them home safely to their
families. A prolonged period of reduced investment in readiness and
modernization will almost certainly mean a smaller, less capable, and
less ready military, which could translate into future conflicts that
last longer, and are more costly in both lives and dollars.
General Dempsey. The President's Budget represents a strategic
combination of capability, capacity, and readiness investments. The
level of funding associated with each investment area creates a balance
that allows the Department, albeit with manageable risk, to execute the
Nation's defense strategy. Without support for the Department's reform
initiatives to include those associated with military compensation we
may need to adopt a defense strategy that is much less ambitious. Any
significant changes to our PB proposals will challenge our already
limited flexibility to operate. Compensation reforms were undertaken to
slow the rate of growth of the military compensation and benefits
package as part of a larger approach to preparing a future force that
is balanced and ready to meet challenges known and unforeseen. Those
savings are programmed against critical needs. Should those resources
not become available the Department will have to revisit the strategic
combination of investments in a holistic way to rebalance capability,
capacity, and readiness within a new strategy.

2. Senator John McCain. Secretary Carter and Chairman Dempsey: If
sequestration continues in fiscal year 2016, how will it harm personnel
and readiness programs?
Secretary Carter. Sequestration would make it impossible to
maintain a force trained and equipped to meet all the requirements that
the Combatant Commanders and other military leadership have determined
are necessary to ensure the Nation's defense against all the varied
threats that exist today, and that might reasonably arise in the years
ahead. Budget Control Act (BCA)-level funding in fiscal year (FY) 2016
and beyond would require the Department to draw-down force structure,
to fall short on our program to reset our equipment strained by more
than a decade of war, and to forego some modernization programs
necessary to keep out technological superiority. These are not just
hard choices, these are bad choices.
Over time, BCA level funding will erode our greatest strength--our
people. Reductions in training and professional development programs
will lead to a loss of proficiency and experience within the ranks,
further degrading readiness, and substantially increasing the risk to
the men and women in uniform. Reversing the harms of BCA-level funding
will take longer than those harms to adversely affect the Department's
ability to meet ever-changing threats. The money required to reverse
these harms might well surpass the money saved.
With regard to military personnel, the President exempted these
accounts from the severe effects of the fiscal year 2013 sequester.
Controlling the cost of pay and benefits to avoid further reducing the
size of the force or sacrificing readiness would have to be considered
if BCA-level funding returns.
Lastly, sequestration will impact funding across the board for
family programs and services. The Department remains committed to
providing military families with support programs and resources that
empower them to face the unique challenges of military life; these
programs are crucial to the readiness and quality of life of military
members and their families. Under sequestration, however, everything in
the Department budget is subject to reduction or elimination. We will
strive to protect the investment in these valuable programs, but cuts
could directly impact support for families.
General Dempsey. Sequestration would make it impossible to maintain
a force trained and equipped to meet all the current requirements that
our Combatant Commanders and other military leadership have determined
are necessary to ensure the Nation's defense against all the varied
threats that exist today, and that might reasonably arise in the years
ahead. Budget Control Act (BCA)-level funding in fiscal year 2016 and
beyond would require the Department to draw-down force structure, to
fall short on our program to reset our equipment strained by more than
a decade of war, and to forego some modernization programs necessary to
keep our technological superiority. These are not just hard choices,
these are bad choices.
Over time, BCA-level funding will erode our greatest strength--our
people. Reductions in our training and professional development
programs will lead to a loss of proficiency and experience within our
ranks, further degrading readiness, and substantially increasing the
risk to our men and women in uniform. Reversing the harms that BCA-
level funding would have, will take longer than it will take for the
harms to adversely affect our ability to meet the ever-changing threats
we face, and the money that will take to reverse these harms might well
surpass the money we would save.
With regard to military personnel, the President exempted these
accounts from the severe effects of the fiscal year 2013 sequester. If
we return to BCA-level funding, controlling the cost of pay and
benefits to avoid further reducing the size of the force or sacrificing
readiness would have to be considered.
Lastly, sequestration will impact funding across the board for
family programs and services. The Department remains committed to
providing military families with support programs and resources that
empower them to face the unique challenges of military life; these
programs are crucial to the readiness and quality of life of military
members and their families. Under sequestration, however, everything in
the Department budget is subject to reduction or elimination. We will
strive to protect the investment in these valuable programs, but cuts
will be unavoidable, and will directly impact support for families.

3. Senator John McCain. Secretary Carter and Chairman Dempsey: Do
you believe that the current military compensation and benefit
structure has a negative impact on military readiness?
Secretary Carter. The structure of the military's compensation and
benefits package is sound and has allowed the Department to recruit and
retain the ready force that has successfully met the intense challenges
of these past 14 years of conflict. Maintaining a sound compensation
and benefits package requires periodic adjustments to ensure it remains
competitive and relevant. The support of the Congress in adjusting the
rates of pay and the flexibilities the Congress has provided the
Department through broad special and incentive pay authorities have
helped the Department respond timely to changes in labor market
conditions. The Department also remains open to considering other
changes to the military compensation and benefits package and is
currently evaluating the recommendations of the Military Compensation
and Retirement Modernization Commission.
Maintaining a robust pay and benefits package is essential and must
be sustained to execute the National Defense Strategy, yet it must
remain in balance with readiness, capacity and capabilities needed. If
there is reform, slowing the rate of growth of the military
compensation and benefits package is one element in a larger approach
to preparing a future force that is balanced, and ready to meet
challenges known and unforeseen. Even with slowing the growth, the
Department will maintain a compensation package that sustains the all-
volunteer force. The Department is facing significant readiness
challenges, and the prospect of returning to sequestration-level
funding means these readiness challenges will not by fully met.
General Dempsey. The structure of the military's compensation and
benefits package is sound and has allowed the Department to recruit and
retain the ready force that has successfully met the intense challenges
of these past 14 years of conflict. Maintaining a sound compensation
and benefits package requires periodic adjustments to ensure it remains
competitive and relevant. The support of the Congress in adjusting the
rates of pay and the flexibilities the Congress has provided the
Department through broad special and incentive pay authorities have
helped the Department respond timely to changes in labor market
conditions. The Department also remains open to considering other
changes to the military compensation and benefits package and is
currently evaluating the recommendations of the Military Compensation
and Retirement Modernization Commission.
Maintaining a robust pay and benefits package is essential and must
be sustained to execute the National Defense Strategy, yet it must
remain in balance with readiness, capacity and capabilities needed. If
there is reform, slowing the rate of growth of the military
compensation and benefits package is one element in a larger approach
to preparing a future force that is balanced, and ready to meet
challenges known and unforeseen. The Department is facing significant
readiness challenges, and the prospect of returning to sequestration-
level funding means these readiness challenges will not by fully met.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
iran
4. Senator Ayotte. In his written statement to this committee
several weeks ago, Dr. Henry Kissinger noted that international talks
with Iran started as an effort ``to deny Iran the capability to develop
a military nuclear option'' but have devolved into to a ``negotiation
over the scope of that capability.'' Kissinger wrote that ``the impact
of this approach will be to move from preventing proliferation to
managing it.'' Why has Iran been able to successfully shift the U.S.-
led negotiations from seeking full denial of an Iranian nuclear program
to now negotiating over the scope of this program?
Secretary Carter. From the beginning, the U.S. objective has been
to negotiate a deal that seriously curbs Iran's nuclear activities and
effectively cuts off Iran's pathways to a nuclear weapon. The U. S.
policy is to deny Iran the capability to develop a nuclear weapon.
Preventing the proliferation of nuclear technology, and especially
nuclear weapons, is a cornerstone of U.S. national security. I believe
these objectives will be advanced by reaching an agreement that
peacefully prevents Iran from attaining a nuclear weapon.

5. Senator Ayotte. If Iran is permitted to retain an enrichment
capability, how will Saudi Arabia and others in the region respond?
Secretary Carter. [Deleted.]
General Dempsey. Saudi Arabia and others in the region have
publically noted concerns over the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,
emphasizing that they will obtain capabilities similar to what is
approved for Iran, but it is unknown whether they will drastically
alter pre-existing plans to develop domestic peaceful nuclear programs.
We continue to work with our partners in the region regarding the
development of peaceful nuclear power and to encourage a nuclear
weapons-free middle east.
guantanamo
6. Senator Ayotte. The administration has been transferring and
releasing detainees from Guantanamo who previously were assessed to
pose a high or medium threat to the United States, its interests, or
its allies. Secretary Carter, when the administration transfers a
Guantanamo detainee, do you agree that the American people have a right
to know what type of terrorist activities they have engaged in and
which terrorist groups they have been associated with?
Secretary Carter. The Department of Defense has publicly released
information about detainees' terrorist activities and associated
terrorist groups in response to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
requests. This information is publicly available in the FOIA Reading
Room on the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff's FOIA
website: http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation--and--plans/Detainee/
Upon the committee's request, the Department, in coordination with
the Intelligence Community, would be prepared to provide the committee
a classified briefing with additional information about detainees'
terrorist activities and associated terrorist groups.
dod audit
7. Senator Ayotte. The Department of Defense is the last federal
agency to fail to be auditable. Secretary Carter, in your answers to my
earlier questions for the record you also indicated that you commit to
achieve current DOD timelines for auditability and will be stressing
your obligation to keep that effort on track. As this is a priority of
yours, what actions have you taken thus far to accomplish those
deadlines?
Secretary Carter. I continue to firmly believe auditable financial
statements are an imperative for the Department of Defense to be fully
accountable to the Congress and to taxpayers. I have made this a part
of a broader and evolving management reform agenda so that it is clear
to all that this has my attention and full support. As mentioned in my
earlier statements, over 90 percent of the Department's current year
fiscal year 2015 general funds are currently under audit. I have asked
my deputy, my chief financial officer, my deputy chief management
officer, and the Service secretaries to keep me fully apprised on
progress. I am convinced the Department is on the right track but I
also know that much remains to be done. My plan is to monitor progress
so that my team will position the Department to achieve the 2017 goal.
To do this, I am prepared to make changes if we are not making
sufficient progress and to hold our leaders--both civilian and
military--accountable for progress.

8. Senator Ayotte. The Department of Defense has repeatedly pushed
back its timelines for producing a clean audit opinion. What actions
are you prepared to take in order to ensure that DOD finally meets its
timelines?
Secretary Carter. As I have stated before, I'm convinced the
Department is on the right track to meet statutory timelines. Over 90
percent of the current year budget execution is now under audit and the
feedback received from these audits will highlight areas needing
attention. My goal is to position the Department to achieve current
statutory goals for audit readiness and that is to have all financial
statements ready for audit by the end of fiscal year (FY) 2017, then
proceed to actually audit them in fiscal year 2018. This extends beyond
my tenure, but I intend to make sure the Department and its future
leaders will make those dates. I rely on my deputy, my chief financial
officer, my deputy chief management officer, and the Service
secretaries to make this happen. They know that Department auditability
has my full support. I am prepared to make adjustments, including
holding senior leaders at all levels and in all business lines
accountable for successful results.
General Dempsey. I fully support the intent of full auditability of
the Joint Force to attain and sustain clean audit opinions of all
financial statements on a continuing, annual basis. I am reasonably
confident the Department will be audit ready by fiscal 2017.
The Military Departments and Services, Combatant Commands, Combat
Support Agencies, and other agencies are closely following DOD's
Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Guidance and the
schedule prescribed by the Department. There is clearly an all-out team
effort to posture the Department for success--all are communicating,
cross talking, and diligently working with independent public
accounting firms to help identify areas needing improvement and to
address corrective actions applicable to assessable units. In addition,
to ensure personnel are dedicated, we are making accountability for
results part of individual performance plans. Lastly, a number of
ongoing interim audit assertions, attestation engagements,
examinations, and mock audits are underway--consistent with a planned
phased approach in meeting the Department's established FIAR timelines
and objectives. By closely following existing published notices of
audit findings and recommendations, harvesting from and applying
lessons learned to each organization's domain, and taking steps to
sustain consistent, repeatable, accurate, and timely business
processes, I am reasonably confident these foundational measures will
foster a culture of stewardship that will allow the Department to be
audit ready by fiscal 2017.
afghanistan
9. Senator Ayotte. Setting aside our current force posture and the
debates regarding that posture up to this point, what kind of military
and intelligence posture does the United States require in Afghanistan
to ensure it can never again be used as a training ground and launching
pad for terrorist attacks against our country?
Secretary Carter. The Department of Defense is working with its
interagency partners to determine a post-2016 posture that will enable
us to support the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF)
in combating terrorists within Afghanistan and to conduct, if required,
a national counterterrorism mission that supports U.S. interests. Under
the terms of the Security and Defense Cooperation Agreement that the
United States and Afghanistan signed last year, the United States and
Afghanistan agreed to cooperate closely in the common fight against
terrorism and acknowledged that continued U.S. military operations to
defeat al Qaeda and its affiliates may be appropriate. The post-2016
counterterrorism strategy will continue to require a well-synchronized
interagency approach drawing on all the instruments of national power.
General Dempsey. Under the terms of the Security and Defense
Cooperation Agreement with Afghanistan, the United States maintains the
authority to continue to target al Qaeda and other terrorists in
Afghanistan who threaten the United States and its interests. The
Department of Defense is working with the interagency to determine a
post-2016 posture that will enable us to support the Afghan National
Defense and Security Forces in combating terrorists within Afghanistan
and to conduct, if required, a national counterterrorist mission that
support U.S. interests.

10. Senator Ayotte. The 2015 NDAA included language that supports
that the U.S. government continue efforts with the Afghan Government to
promote the rights of women and ensure their inclusion in political,
economic, and security matters. Additionally, the language supports
funding for recruiting and training female searchers and security
officer to staff voting stations during elections. Can you describe the
gains that women and girls have enjoyed in Afghanistan since the fall
of the Taliban?
Secretary Carter. Afghanistan has made significant progress during
the past 13 years to promote the rights of women and ensure their
inclusion in political, economic, and security matters. The Afghan
Constitution states that all citizens of Afghanistan, men and women,
have equal rights and duties before the law, including volunteering for
public service. Women now constitute 20 percent of the civil service
and 27 percent of Parliament. While girls were not permitted to go to
school during the time of Taliban rule, girls currently constitute 40
percent of students in Afghanistan.
The high participation of women in the two rounds of presidential
elections last year is a promising indicator of increased women's
empowerment. A number of domestic and internationally funded campaigns
encouraged women to vote. In addition, the Ministry of Interior's
Female Searcher Program recruited enough female searchers to staff
approximately 5,800 polling centers. Reports indicated that more than
9,800 female searchers participated in the first round in April, and
more than 10,800 were deployed for the presidential run-off in June. As
a result of these efforts, female participation in the April election
was estimated at 36 percent, and female participation in the June run-
off election increased to approximately 38 percent.
In addition, women now serve in the Afghan National Defense and
Security Forces (ANDSF). Currently, approximately 2,300 women are in
the Afghan National Police, and approximately 870 women are in the
Afghan National Army. This includes Captain Niloofar Rhmani,
Afghanistan's first female fixed-wing pilot since Taliban rule, who
will be honored by the State Department during a visit to the United
States in March. During her visit, she will also meet with female
Marine aviators at Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, California, and
fly with the Navy's Blue Angels.
General Dempsey. Afghanistan has made significant progress since
the fall of the Taliban in 2001.This progress includes nearly 8 million
children in school, a third of which are girls, a rising life-
expectancy, and improving economic growth. Afghan women have come out
of the total seclusion they experienced during Taliban rule to take
their rightful place in the society. Women now comprise 20 percent of
the civil service, 27 percent of the parliament, and 40 percent of
students. Female life expectancy rose from 44 years in 2001 to 64 years
today.
Since 2002, maternal mortality fell from 1600 to 327 deaths per
100,000 births. Female literacy has increased to nearly 15 percent
nationwide, 30 percent among girls aged 15-24, and almost 40 percent
among young urban women. In the last five years, nearly 120,000 girls
have graduated from secondary school, and an estimated 40,000 are
enrolled in public and private universities. Of the 8.4 million
students now in school, 37 percent (over 3 million) are girls.
In 2014, the Afghan Ministry of Defense approved the annual
Accession Plan for Capacity of Afghan National Army (ANA) Female
Training Establishments, stating that 485 women can/will be trained in
the coming year. The ANA officers' Academy graduated its first female
class of 21 cadets in June 2014 and close to 200 police women recently
graduated in training in Sivas, Turkey on February 27, 2015. There are
currently 869 women in the Afghan National Army (includes Afghan Air
Force), while the current female strength in the Afghan National Police
is 2334.

11. Senator Ayotte. Can you describe the pivotal role that women
are now playing in Afghanistan and what role they will play in the
future?
Secretary Carter. Afghan women are exercising their rights to work,
vote, receive an education, and serve in political office and in the
national security forces. A powerful indicator of the dramatic
improvement in conditions for Afghan women is in access to education.
While girls were not permitted to go to school during the time of
Taliban rule, currently more than three million girls in primary
schools across the country are learning to participate openly and
actively in the future of a democratic Afghanistan.
President Ghani has indicated that he will promote continued
improvements in conditions for women in Afghanistan, who continue to
face discrimination, harassment, and abuse in many sectors of society,
including in the security sector. The Department of Defense will assist
the Afghan government by continuing to support efforts to integrate
women into the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF).
Changing societal norms in Afghanistan will be a slow and difficult
process, but the future seems increasingly positive for women to play
an increased role in the ANDSF. For example, the Afghan National Army
Officers' Academy graduated its first class of 21 female cadets in June
2014, and approximately 200 women graduated from Afghan National Police
training in Sivas, Turkey, on February 27, 2015. The Department will
continue to work with the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of
Defense to implement strategies seeking to improve the treatment of
women and to increase their recruitment.
General Dempsey. The Afghan Constitution states that all citizens
of Afghanistan, men and women, have equal rights and duties before the
law. Women in Afghanistan have a major role to play in Afghanistan's
future and are currently exercising their rights to work, vote, be
educated, serve in political office and serve in the Afghan National
Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF).
Notably, of the 6.8 million votes cast in the April election, 36
percent were cast by women. Three vice presidential running mates were
women. 21 percent of the current members of provincial councils and
11.5 percent of the candidates for provincial councils in April were
also women.
There are more than 3,000 woman-owned businesses and associations
in Afghanistan today. Democracy International polling showed that 92
percent of Afghan respondents agree that women have the right to
participate in elections. The vast majority of respondents (83 percent)
in a 2013 Asia Foundation survey agreed with the statement ``Women
should have the same opportunities as men in education.'' The U.S.
Government has more than $200 million per year programmed directly for
gender-related issues.
ukraine
12. Senator Ayotte. On February 25, General Breedlove said, ``More
than 1,000 pieces of Russian military equipment have been transferred
into Ukraine, including tanks, armored personnel carriers, heavy
artillery pieces and other military vehicles and equipment . . . These
are not the actions of a good faith negotiating partner.'' Over the
last few weeks, has Russia continued to send advanced weapons into
Ukraine? What type? How many?
General Dempsey. Russian military forces continue to operate in
eastern Ukraine, where they provide command and control support,
operate air defense systems, and have fought alongside pro-Russia
separatist forces.
Russia continues to transfer military equipment to pro-Russia
separatists in eastern Ukraine. We can confirm that Russia has
transferred additional tanks, armored vehicles, heavy artillery, rocket
systems, and other military equipment to pro-Russia separatists.
Pro-Russia separatists currently have a fighting force numbering in
the hundreds of tanks, armored vehicles, heavy artillery pieces, and
other military vehicles.

13. Senator Ayotte. How many Russian troops are currently in
Ukraine?
General Dempsey. The intelligence community reports there are
hundreds of troops currently in Ukraine.
russia
14. Senator Ayotte. According to news reports in January, Russia
signed a military cooperation deal with Iran that includes joint
exercises and military training. As you know, Russia has consistently
served as Iran's primary foreign arms supplier, and Russia has
reportedly deepened its economic ties with Iran in the last year. How
would you characterize Russia's relationship with Iran? Should we be
concerned?
Secretary Carter. [Deleted.]
General Dempsey. I believe it is a significant relationship from
the perspective of the United States, Russia, and Iran. The Iran-Russia
relationship has elements of promise but also risk. Given ongoing
dialogue with Iran on its nuclear program, the Russia relationship can
be pivotal to successful resolution of the issue. We need to retain an
appropriate amount of caution given the dissonance of policy objectives
between us, the Russians and the Iranians.
china
15. Senator Ayotte. China has stolen massive amounts of technology,
intellectual property, and military secrets from the United States. How
would you characterize the scale and severity of the cyber theft that
China is committing against U.S. defense companies?
Secretary Carter. [Deleted.]
General Dempsey. We believe the intellectual property China
collects from U.S. defense companies is provided to their indigenous
companies for commercial benefit, to enhance China's international
competitiveness and develop military capabilities without the added
costs and time of research and development. This theft not only
undermines the innovation of U.S. industry but more importantly our
military superiority relative to China. Additionally, this potentially
undermines U.S. military superiority relative to other states and non-
state actors, since China is working to expand its own international
arms sales.

16. Senator Ayotte. How do you assess this theft impacts U.S.
military superiority relative to China?
Secretary Carter. China is likely using its cyber-espionage
capabilities, along with other efforts, to support intelligence
collection against certain U.S. national defense programs and
acquisition of advanced technology. China could potentially use this
information to benefit its defense industry and other civilian high
technology industries. Differentiating between China's civil and
military end-use remains a challenge due to opaque corporate
structures, hidden asset ownership, and the connections between
commercial personnel and the central government. This theft undermines
U.S. military superiority relative to China. Additionally, this
potentially undermines U.S. military superiority relative to other
States and non-State actors as China expands its own international arms
sales.
General Dempsey. We assess that China is using its cyber-espionage
capabilities, along with other efforts, to support intelligence
collection against certain U.S. national defense programs in order to
support their acquisition of advanced technology. The information
targeted could potentially be used to benefit China's defense industry,
as well as other civilian high technology industries. Differentiating
between China's civil and military end-use remains a challenge due to
opaque corporate structures, hidden asset ownership, and the
connections of commercial personnel with the central government. This
theft undermines U.S. military superiority relative to China.
Additionally, this potentially undermines U.S. military superiority
relative to other states and non-state actors, since China is working
to expand its own international arms sales.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
russian involvement in the arctic
17. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Carter, recent news report shows a
rapidly increasing Russian military involvement in the Arctic.
Recently, the Russians have begun constructing as many as thirteen new
airfields and ten air-defense radar stations, conducting Long-Range Air
Patrols with their Bear-Bombers, including off the coast of Alaska, and
creating a new ``Arctic Command'' and even activating and an Arctic
Brigade. Additionally, Russia has made several large territorial claims
into the Arctic, including the expressed desire to expand its Arctic
borders by more than 460,000 square miles. Meanwhile, the U.S. has a
thirteen-page Arctic Strategy. Rear Admiral J.C. Wylie, once said,
``The ultimate determinant in war is a man on scene with a gun . . . He
is control, he determines who wins.'' How does our 13-page Arctic
Strategy stack up against all the ``guns'' that Russia is putting in
the Arctic?
Secretary Carter. Our Arctic strategy ensures we continue to take
tangible efforts to safeguard U.S. national security interests in the
Arctic using all elements of national power, including military,
diplomatic, and informational. The Department maintains a robust force
structure in Alaska and has strong military-military ties with Arctic
North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies. The Department also works
closely with Canada to protect the northern approach to North America.
These relationships play a critical role in deterring Russian behavior
in the Arctic and will ensure coordinated response to any aggressive
behavior.

18. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Carter, it appears that woefully behind
in our Arctic presence with just a 13-page strategy. How can we
properly plan for and resource needed force structure in the Arctic
when 13-pages seems to be all that we have?
Secretary Carter. The Department's Arctic Strategy provides
guidance on the ways and means to achieve the desired end-state in the
Arctic, in support of the National Strategy for the Arctic region and
the National Security Strategy: The Department seeks an Arctic that
remains stable and free of conflict, where nations continue to act
responsibly in a spirit of trust and cooperation, and where economic
and energy resources are developed in a sustainable manner that
respects both the fragile environment and the interests and cultures of
indigenous peoples.
The capabilities and activities to implement the Department's
Arctic Strategy are subject to the same, established Departmental
processes that prioritize and source other operational needs in the
near- and long-term. The processes include the Global Force Management
process and the annual Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
cycle.
Developing capabilities specific to the Arctic is a long-term
process and is expensive. It is important to balance the changing
region in the long-term with the opportunity cost of making premature
and unnecessary investments. The Department will continue to review and
assess appropriate communications; Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance and domain awareness; infrastructure; and presence to
outpace the potential challenges that accompany increased human
activity in the Arctic.

19. Senator Sullivan. Gen. Dempsey, you mentioned that Russia was
building six new brigades--with four of being built in the Arctic. What
type of brigades will these be and where specifically will each of
these new brigades be located?
General Dempsey. [Deleted.]

20. Senator Sullivan. Gen. Dempsey, what are the operational and
tactical implications of these locations?
General Dempsey. [Deleted.]

21. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Carter, what are the strategic
implications of these four new brigades and each of their respective
locations?
Secretary Carter. [Deleted.]

22. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Carter, in your opinion, how specifically
does this force build-up affect Russia's Arctic Power projection?
Secretary Carter. Russia's conventional force build-up in the
Arctic will improve its power projection capability. The new Russian
Joint Strategic Command North establishes a unified command and control
structure that includes search and rescue operations along the Northern
Sea Route, and the Russians have enhanced their maritime and air
capabilities. The Department will continue to monitor the evolution and
intent of Russia's force build-up. Additional, specific details on
Russia's Arctic power projection capabilities can be provided in a
classified setting.

23. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Carter, what should be the appropriate
U.S. response to these new land forces in an Arctic-forward posture?
Secretary Carter. The Department is constantly reviewing military
posture to provide the right mix of forces to assure partners and
allies and meet national security objectives. If a threat to vital
national interests is detected or anticipated, the Department of
Defense will respond appropriately and ensure the safety of U.S.
citizens and uphold any Article 5 security responsibilities.

24. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Carter, should the U.S. respond and re-
posture against these Russian forces, how should we re-posture, and if
we should not, why not?
Secretary Carter. It is likely the Russian force build-up in the
Arctic is primarily defensive. It is also likely the build-up is
intended to protect Russia's economic interests and conduct operations
such as search and rescue. The United States will continue to remain
vigilant in the Arctic in order to ensure that Russia and other nations
abide by international norms and resolve any disputes peacefully.
Should a credible maritime or air threat to vital United States
national interests in the Arctic region materialize, the Department of
Defense will review its options and respond appropriately.
arctic force structure
25. Senator Sullivan. Gen. Dempsey, does the U.S.--and specifically
USARAK--have sufficient capabilities, resources, and training to
posture against these new Russian brigades?
General Dempsey. Yes. The U.S. Army maintains capability to respond
against these new brigades, but the effects of current operational
demand for Army forces requires the Joint Staff and Headquarters
Department of the Army to balance global requirements against the
Army's inventory of forces. At times this response capability will
reside solely within Army elements from USARAK, while at other times
this requirement may be fulfilled with a Joint Force composed of ground
elements sourced from all the Services' global inventory.

26. Senator Sullivan. Gen. Dempsey, if no (to the above question),
what capabilities, resources, and training are needed?
General Dempsey. Answer not required (see #25)

27. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Carter and General Dempsey, are there any
units tasked within our Arctic Strategy or our Arctic OPLAN?
Secretary Carter. Specific units are not tasked through strategies
or contingency plans; however, some units, such as those stationed in
Alaska, conduct training and engagements with partners in the Arctic
region. These steady-state activities support the strategy and ability
to respond to future contingencies.
General Dempsey. The DOD Arctic Strategy, as well as other DOD
strategies, are not the means for apportioning or assigning units to
specific regions or to perform specific tasks. DOD apportions and tasks
assets through its Global Force Management process. Units in Alaska may
be apportioned to multiple OPLANS, to include operating in the Arctic.

28. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Carter and General Dempsey, how do
Alaska's units fit into our Arctic Strategy and OPLAN?
Secretary Carter. Units in Alaska, like the missile defense units
at Fort Greely, play a critical role in the ability to defend the
homeland, as well as in the ability to project power. Alaska-based
units also stand ready to provide defense support of civil authorities
when directed by the Department. Alaska-based units work with a host of
partners to ensure situational awareness of the Arctic environment, and
these partnerships reinforce international cooperation in support of
the Arctic Strategy.
General Dempsey. Units assigned to Alaska provide a wide-range of
military capabilities and a persistent presence on the outskirts of the
Arctic to protect national interests. These units are capable of
supporting air and space command and control (C2), weather forecasting,
missile defense operations, mid-air refueling operations, and
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations.
Despite the long distances and the harsh Arctic climate, military units
in Alaska possess capabilities to respond to a wide range of
contingencies.

29. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Carter, do you believe that Alaska's BCTs
are uniquely suited to help address strategic needs in our Pacific
Pivot and new Arctic Strategy?
Secretary Carter. There is an undeniable strategic requirement that
defines the Department's presence in Alaska. This capacity cannot
easily be replaced in alternate locations. Units based in Alaska afford
the Army the ability to retain focus to the Pacific region. The
strategic importance of having access to the seaways and routes that
are becoming accessible in the Arctic is quickly being realized.
European partners as well as the Russians have quickly assessed the
same. Protecting access to the global commons and the Arctic is a key
role of the Army. Likewise, the Russians have organized four brigades
for Arctic operations. Furthermore, these stationing requirements
endure not only because of location, but Alaska also offers unique and
joint opportunities for training units in extreme weather environments.
This is a capability that cannot be replicated elsewhere.
Unfortunately, reductions in defense spending are forcing the Army to
make difficult choices to reduce end-strength and unit structure. Prior
to any inactivation decision, the Department will carefully weigh the
strategic and local community impacts.

30. Senator Sullivan. Gen. Dempsey, what other Army units in the
U.S. could currently provide the Army with the force structure and
equipment it would need for a conflict in an Arctic AOR?
General Dempsey. Without identifying specific units, the Army's
readiness capacity continues to improve for both active and reserve
Brigade Combat Teams. Nevertheless, the Army still requires more time
and consistent funding to sufficiently recover readiness across all
formations. The Joint Staff regularly conducts assessments to determine
our ability to meet the requirements of specified operational plans
conducted in simultaneous execution. In this context, we will continue
to review mitigation options and residual risk resulting from current
operational and Combatant Commands' requirements.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Lee
sequestration
31. Senator Lee. Secretary Carter, can you give us more detail
about why the Department decided not to develop an alternative budget
that would be applicable in the case of sequestration, and what the
Department is doing now to prepare for that scenario?
Secretary Carter. The President's fiscal year 2016 budget proposes
equal dollar add-backs for both defense and non-defense discretionary
spending. These increases were more than paid for with smart spending
cuts, program integrity measures, and commonsense loophole closers.
Since the defense base budget at the sequester-level would undermine
the Department's ability to meet the current defense strategy, the
Administration has declined to submit an alternative, sequester-level
plan to avoid serious consequences to economic growth and national
security at a time when our military is stretched on a whole range of
issues. Therefore, the Department urges Congress to support the budget
the President has put forward that will avoid the harmful budget cuts
of sequestration and reduce the deficit in a balanced way.
force mixture
32. Senator Lee. Do you believe that, especially in a difficult
fiscal climate, missions should as much as possible be entrusted to
Reserve Component forces in order to reduce the need for cuts to
readiness, modernization, and recapitalization, as suggested by the
National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force?
Secretary Carter. After the past 14 years of combat operations, the
Reserve Component (RC) is clearly capable of performing a wide variety
of missions. Changes and updates to mobilization law (in regards to
access authority) have made the RC a valid alternative for many
operational missions. The Department needs to analyze what capabilities
are being asked for, when that capability is needed, and how long it
would take the RC to be ready to perform that specific mission. With
the reduction in resources forecasted under the Budget Control Act,
coupled with the current security environment, the Department will need
to include the RC as part of the operational force.
General Dempsey. Not necessarily. Our Reserve Components have and
will continue to provide critical capability as part of our overall
Total Force. But, there is an irreducible minimum below which the Joint
Force cannot prudently cut Active Component end strength without
jeopardizing war-fighting capability, institutional health, and the
ability to generate future forces. The National Commission correctly
identifies in their report that conducting operations with Reserve
Component forces is not always less expensive than doing so with Active
Component forces. While the Department is open to ideas for cost
savings, we must carefully examine whether or not moving a particular
mission to the Reserve Component will indeed generate savings over the
long run, and whether or not that action will have any unintended
consequences on our future war-fighting capability. Although the
National Commission identified possible cost savings of roughly $2
billion associated with moving about 36,000 additional active airmen
into the Reserve Component, our mission analysis does not support that
due to reduced rotational capacity and the corresponding increase in
risk.

33. Senator Lee. How do you intend to utilize the National Guard
and Reserve forces in the upcoming fiscal year to take advantage of
their cost- and combat-benefits to the military reported in the 2013
CAPE report and 2014 Reserve Forces Policy Board report?
Secretary Carter. Sufficient funding of readiness and modernization
of the Reserve Component (RC) is vital to maintaining operational
experience and capacity to meet National security requirements. The RC
provides operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S.
defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. Missions
that are planned and predictable are best suited for the RC. However,
some RC units and capabilities can respond on short notice for
contingency operations, e.g. Air Force fighter units, National domestic
support units, and some intelligence and cyber capabilities. In
domestic roles, the RC will continue to be the most appropriate
capability to support civil authorities due to its communal relations,
proficiency in disaster response, and experiences in nation building in
Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans, and other peace keeping and stability
operations.
department reform
34. Senator Lee. Secretary Carter, On January 22, the DOD's Defense
Business Board issued recommendations that they believe could save up
to $125 billion over the next five years for the Department through
better business practices and reforms to contracting services. Have you
had an opportunity to look over these recommendations and do you
believe that if implemented they could make the desired budgetary
impact without compromising mission effectiveness?
Secretary Carter. I have had the opportunity to review the Defense
Business Board recommendations and found them insightful on
substantiating areas in which the Department can seek efficiencies. I
have directed further analysis of each of the six core business
processes. Furthermore, I have directed my staff to develop and
implement a management structure to pursue potential opportunities that
will be included in my management reform agenda. Any reduction to these
costs will allow the Department to continue to sustain investments in
readiness and modernization activities. While seeking cost reductions
in these back office functions, the Department will remain focused on
mission effectiveness to avoid any degradation to, or optimally
improve, support to the warfighters.

35. Senator Lee. Deputy Secretary Work stated in September `` . . .
there's a lot of money in the OCO that should probably be in base. It's
not because we didn't want it to be in the base; it's just happened
over 12 years''. Do you agree with Deputy Secretary Work's comments,
and how has the Department of Defense attempted to address these issues
in this year's budget request?
Secretary Carter. I agree with Secretary Work's comments. Over the
last several years, both the Department and the Congress have leveraged
the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget to provide funding for
base requirements.
The Administration is looking at all requirements funded under the
OCO title. This includes requirements that may end in the near future
and enduring requirements, which should transition to the base budget.
In looking at these requirements, the Department must consider the
appropriate financing mechanism for all costs that are above and beyond
the Department's organize, train, and equip mission, including costs
associated with providing support to Afghan partners, enduring overseas
operations, responding to counter terrorism abroad, and maintaining a
strong forward presence in the Middle East region. This transition will
not be possible, however, if the sequester level discretionary spending
caps remain in place.
General Dempsey. Yes, I agree with Secretary Work's comments. For
several years, both the Congress and the Department have leveraged the
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget to provide funding for
things that may be more appropriately aligned with base requirements.
The Department is engaged with the Administration to look at all
requirements currently funded under the OCO title. This includes
requirements that may end in the near future and enduring requirements,
which we want to transition to the base budget. In looking at these
requirements, we must consider the appropriate financing mechanism for
all costs that are above and beyond the Department's organize, train,
and equip mission, including costs associated with providing support to
our Afghan partners, enduring overseas operations, conducting
counterterrorism worldwide, reassuring our NATO allies, and maintaining
a strong forward presence in the Middle East region. The transition of
enduring OCO-funded requirements to the base budget will not be
possible, however, if the sequester level discretionary spending caps
remain in place.

36. Senator Lee. Secretary Carter, the DOD budget overview states
that ``the need to reduce unneeded facilities is so critical that, in
the absence of authorization of a new round of BRAC, the Administration
will pursue alternative options to reduce this wasteful spending''. Can
you be more specific with what further options the Administration might
pursue?
Secretary Carter. As far as using other authorities, the Department
only has authority to undertake a BRAC round if Congress authorizes it
to do so. However, budget cuts require exploring any and all
authorities Congress has provided to eliminate wasteful infrastructure.
I have not yet decided which options to pursue if Congress does not
provide BRAC authority.

37. Senator Lee. Secretary Carter, one of the key initiatives for
reducing costs and overhead in the Department of Defense is through
decreasing the Department's major headquarters' operating budgets by 20
percent. However, a GAO report from January found that ``without a
systematic determination of personnel requirements and periodic
reassessments of them, DOD will not be well positioned to proactively
identify efficiencies and limit personnel growth within these
headquarter organizations''. Has the Department been actively working
with GAO to address this issue and what recommendations will you be
adopting to satisfy these concerns?
Secretary Carter. The Department remains committed to working with
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to implement the
recommendations of previous reviews and to collaborate as part of
ongoing reviews. The Department continues to undertake numerous
initiatives to improve efficiency and reduce duplicative, low-priority,
and non-value workload across the headquarters staffs. The Department,
in its response to the GAO, only partially concurred with the GAO's
recommendation in their January report.
The Department will continue to use the Planning, Programming,
Budgeting, and Execution process and leadership prioritization of
missions, functions, and tasks to ensure appropriate workload
determinations that limit personnel growth. Additionally, the
Department is currently conducting Business Process and System Reviews
of the Office of Secretary of Defense, Defense Agencies, and DOD Field
Activities, to aid in aligning resources to mission responsibilities.
Other ongoing efforts include an examination of the resources
associated with, and the effectiveness of, the Department's performance
of six core business processes (Human Resource Management, Health Care
Management, Financial Flow Management, Acquisition and Procurement
Management, Real Property Management, Logistics & Supply Chain
Management). This work, directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and
informed by a recent Defense Business Board report, will help identify
efficiencies, cost savings, and personnel reductions, including those
at headquarters.
national security
38. Senator Lee. Secretary Carter, you stated in your testimony and
when we met prior to your confirmation that one of the first acts you
would undertake as Secretary would be to review the President's current
strategy to defend the nation from an ISIS threat. What is your
understanding of the threat that ISIS currently poses to the security
of the United States, and how do you assess thus far the progress of
President Obama's strategy to ``destroy and defeat'' ISIS? What
specifically in your opinion needs to be accomplished regarding ISIS
and other extremist groups operating in that area in order to protect
the security of the United States, and how does this budget request
reflect that?
Secretary Carter. The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) poses
an immediate threat to United States' interests in the Middle East as
it seeks to control territory, destabilize and overthrow governments,
and perpetuate acts of terror on the local population. If not
addressed, ISIS will pose a growing threat to United States interests
as demonstrated by its recruiting of foreign fighters and desire to
lead the global jihad.
The President's strategy to defeat ISIS has made progress in a
short amount of time. ISIS' command and control, supply lines, and
military and economic infrastructure are all degraded. ISIS also
controls less territory in Iraq than they did before the air campaign
and training and equipping of Iraq's security forces to re-take their
country.
The Department needs to continue to use air power in conjunction
with advise and assist efforts on the ground to deny ISIS safe haven
and to protect the security of the United States. The Department must
work with the Iraqis to generate the forces required to go on the
offensive against ISIS. Additionally, the training and equipping
program for Syria will initiate this spring and is essential to the
success of the strategy. Military efforts must be complemented by the
contributions of other key actors in the U.S. government in order to
disrupt ISIS's finances, support effective governance and multi-
sectarian inclusiveness in Iraq, and counter ISIS's narrative and its
appeal.
The fiscal year 2016 Overseas Contingency Operations ``Operation:
Inherent Resolve'' request of $5.3 billion, including for the Iraq
Train and Equip and the training and equipping of vetted Syrian
opposition, provides the resources needed for the Department to deny
ISIS safe haven and build the capacity of partners to ultimately defeat
ISIS. The Department must avoid a return to sequestration in fiscal
year 2016.

39. Senator Lee. A policy goal highlighted in the fiscal year 2016
budget request is to work closely with European partners to strengthen
their military capabilities. I believe it is especially important for
our NATO allies to increase their defense budgets and collective
capabilities as a deterrent to Russian aggression. These are
longstanding goals of NATO that have not been met, how specifically do
you intend to address this issue?
Secretary Carter. One of the key 2014 North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) Wales Summit outcomes was allied leaders' agreement
to a Defense Investment Pledge to halt the negative defense spending
trend now, and to move towards spending 2.0 percent of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) on defense within a decade with a view toward filling
NATO's capability shortfalls. Progress toward this goal will require
defense expenditures to increase in real terms as GDP grows. Allied
defense ministers will review each ally's progress at least annually,
and the United States intends to raise examples of inadequate progress
at every defense ministerial and bilateral meeting, as appropriate. The
United States also intends to engage intensively with allies, such as
the United Kingdom and Germany, that are about to undergo strategic
reviews that will affect their future defense investment decisions.
NATO allies must not only increase defense spending, but must make
investments in the types of capabilities that NATO needs to deter
Russian aggression.
General Dempsey. At the September Wales Summit, the Allies pledged
to reverse the trend of declining defense budgets, to make the most
effective use of that spending towards infrastructure and equipment,
and to further a more balanced sharing of costs and responsibilities.
In order to keep Allies on course in achieving the goals of that
pledge, I will continue to stress the shared threats NATO members face
and the critical need to continue to invest in defense capabilities to
strengthen the Alliance. For Allies with larger economies, this means
investment in military capabilities that that can be used to impose
costs on any opponent with minimal cost and risk to Alliance forces.
For those Allies with smaller economies, investment in capabilities
that are needed by the Alliance, in which they may have a comparative
advantage, is most needed.

40. Senator Lee. Secretary Carter, the budget request for fiscal
year 2016 highlights the need to continue the defense rebalance to the
Asia-Pacific region while maintaining a focus on the Middle East. What
steps have we taken thus far in the pivot to the Asia-Pacific region,
and what are the next steps to be taken? Will continuing the pivot to
this region necessitate a reduction in force from other areas of the
world?
Secretary Carter. The rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region remains
a top whole-of-government priority effort rooted in an analysis of
long-term U.S. security and economic interests. The Department of
Defense's implementation is focused on modernizing alliances and
partnerships, enhancing force posture, updating capabilities and
concepts of operation, and strengthening multilateral defense
cooperation in the region. To date, the Department has made significant
progress toward enhancing both the capacity and capability of United
States forces in the region. Sixty percent of our naval and overseas
air assets are on track to be forward-based in the Pacific region by
2020. The Department is also enhancing the rotational access and
training opportunities for ground forces. This includes developing a
more operationally resilient and politically sustainable laydown for
the U.S. Marine Corps, as well as designating the U.S. Army's I Corps
as regionally aligned to the Pacific.
Looking ahead, the Department is developing new military
capabilities and operational concepts to ensure that U.S. forces will
continue to project power effectively in an environment of increasingly
capable anti-access/area-denial threats. This year's budget includes
investments in capabilities best suited to this region's challenges.
The investments include continued upgrades to integrated air and
missile defense systems; modernized maritime domain awareness
platforms; swapping out the forward-based aircraft carrier, USS George
Washington, for the more capable USS Ronald Reagan; resilient
infrastructure on Guam; and development of future capabilities like the
long range strike bomber, the Virginia Payload Module, and the F-35
Joint Strike Fighter. These robust investments reflect the Department's
conscious decision to send its most advanced capabilities to the Asia-
Pacific first.
The Department will continue to balance presence and posture
requirements globally to protect U.S. national security interests.
However, the continued strain of sequestration would affect the degree
to which the Department could continue to support the modernization
investments necessary to maintain our long-term technological edge in
the Asia-Pacific region. Reduced funding would also lead to a reduced
pace and scope of near-term presence activities, which would have a
negative impact on successes to date.

41. Senator Lee. How is this budget prioritizing our defense
against cyber-threats to our military infrastructure? What objectives
do you believe cyber-attackers will try to achieve against our military
in the next decade?
Secretary Carter. Defending against cyber threats is one of my top
priorities. The Department must be well-postured to respond to the
growing cyber threats confronting the U.S. Accordingly, the President's
fiscal year 2016 budget requests $5.5B for cyberspace operations,
invests in cyber-related Science and Technology, and supports
organizing, training, and equipping the Cyber Mission Force.
More than $2 billion of the Department's cyberspace operations
budget request pertains to defensive cybersecurity measures. These
measures include funding for public key infrastructure implementation,
network intrusion detection systems, defense industrial base
protections, and cryptography, as well as for the deployment of the
Joint Regional Security Stacks (JRSS). The JRSS replace current
individualized, localized security systems with an enterprise-wide
capability that allows U.S. Cyber Command and local commanders to
protect more effectively against the growing cyber threat. The JRSS
will provide a more secure environment with improved command and
control that operates at lower cost.
Additionally, the Department has undertaken a rigorous process to
identify, assess, and prioritize mitigation of cyber vulnerabilities of
weapons systems. The Department is pursuing new approaches to ensuring
platforms and weapons systems are hardened during the system's
lifecycle and able to operate in a cyber-contested environment.
Over the next decade, state and non-state actors will rapidly
expand their malicious cyberspace capabilities and will target the
public and private networks of the United States and its allies and
partners. These hostile actors will continue to use cyberspace as an
asymmetric capability to harm the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests,
both directly and indirectly. Adversaries will continue to seek to hold
our critical infrastructure, military missions, and defense-related
intellectual property and trade secrets at risk. Protecting against
these threats will require increased investment to defend military
infrastructure.
General Dempsey. Defending against cyber threats is one of my top
priorities. Accordingly, the President's fiscal year 2016 budget
requests $5.5B for cyberspace operations, both offensive and defensive,
investing in cyber-related Science and Technology, as well as
organizing, training, and equipping the Cyber Mission Force. We must be
well-postured to respond to the growing cyber threats confronting our
Nation.
Specific to your question, more than $2 billion of the Department's
cyberspace operations budget request pertains to defensive
cybersecurity measures. These measures include funding for public key
infrastructure implementation, network intrusion detection systems,
Defense Industrial Base protections, and cryptography, as well as for
the deployment of the Joint Regional Security Stacks (JRSS). The JRSS
replace current localized security systems with an enterprise-wide
capability that provides U.S. Cyber Command and local commanders with
more effective defenses to counter the growing cyber threat. The JRSS
will provide a more secure environment with improved command and
control, and will operate at lower cost.
Additionally, the Department has undertaken a rigorous process to
identify, assess, and systematically prioritize mitigation of cyber
vulnerabilities of DOD weapons systems. We are pursuing new approaches
to ensuring platforms and weapons systems are hardened across the
entire system's lifecycle and can operate in a cyber-contested
environment.
Over the next decade, state and non-state actors are expected to
rapidly expand their malicious cyberspace capabilities and target the
public and private networks of the United States and its allies and
partners. These hostile actors continue to see cyberspace as an
asymmetric capability to harm the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests,
directly and indirectly. The Department assesses that adversaries will
continue to seek to hold our critical infrastructure, military
missions, and defense-related intellectual property and trade secrets
at risk. This will require increased investment to defend military
infrastructure.

42. Senator Lee. We have seen the continued development of
ballistic missile technology and capabilities in Iran and North Korea,
as well as the modernization of nuclear weapons and delivery platforms
from Russia and China. What is your assessment of the development and
deployment of our missile defense technology, and do you believe that
the proposed budget keeps us on the trajectory to keep up with the
ballistic missile threats that we will face in the future?
Secretary Carter. Yes. The Department is developing fiscally
sustainable, off-setting technologies to address gaps in the Ballistic
Missile Defense System (BMDS) and extend dominance in missile defense.
The goal for these investments is to deploy a future BMDS architecture
more capable of discriminating and destroying a reentry vehicle with a
high degree of confidence.
The Department's budget balances investment between homeland and
regional missile defense capabilities while pursuing advanced
technology to pace the emerging threat. We will do this by improving
current system capabilities and investing in the most promising
technology to reverse the adversary's numerical advantage.
The President's fiscal year 2016 budget request invests in off-
setting technology, including advanced sensor and kill vehicle
technology that will enable us to deploy multiple kill vehicles from a
single interceptor to counter advanced threats. The Department is also
investing in directed energy technology that will revolutionize missile
defense, dramatically reducing the cost per kill in our future BMDS.
General Dempsey. The current missile defense programs and fiscal
year 2016 budget request ensure that we can sustain and modernize our
missile defense capability to keep up with the evolving BMD threat.
This entails continued investment in improvements to the ground-based
midcourse defense (GMD) system, including enhanced performance of the
Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) kill vehicle and the deployment of new
sensors. The U.S. remains on track to deploy 14 additional GBIs in
Alaska by the end of 2017 to augment the 30 interceptors already
deployed. The addition of the second forward-based missile defense
radar in Japan strengthens our homeland and regional defenses in
support of the GMD. In addition, the budget supports forward stationing
and rotational deployment of BMD forces in a way that is phased to
provide the best operational capability available in order to protect
U.S. and allied forces while balancing dwell time and providing time
for system modernization programs.

43. Senator Lee. General Dempsey, last year Congress authorized the
federal government to send defensive weapons to the government of
Ukraine. What is DOD's assessment of the Ukrainian military's capacity
and readiness level to receive such weapons and use them in an
accountable and effective manner?
General Dempsey. Any U.S. decision to provide defensive weapons to
Ukraine would include consideration of requirements to provide
equipment training. The defensive weapons under consideration are
designed to require only a very basic level of training. Additionally,
before weapons with technology are provided, DOD conducts a Technology
Security/Foreign Disclosure process to ensure that if such weapons were
lost on the battlefield, there would be no loss of either sensitive
U.S. technology or military capabilities.

44. Senator Lee. There have been several open-sourced reports today
regarding the presence of Iranian fighters and military advisors in the
Iraqi Security Force's current push against ISIS in Tikrit. How
extensive is Iran's influence over the ISF and the Iraqi government,
what specific assistance are they providing in this offensive, and are
Iranian officials working with the ISF able to access intelligence
information that we are sharing with the Iraqis?
General Dempsey. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Cruz
nuclear capabilities
45. Senator Cruz. Secretary Carter, since 2000, the Russians have
discussed strategy and designed training exercises around a theory of
``escalating to de-escalate'' by using a nuclear weapon to make the
costs of military involvement too great for the U.S. or NATO. In such a
scenario, the Russians believe they could use a nuclear weapon to
accomplish their objections while the U.S. would be unwilling or unable
to retaliate. Russia's recent aggression in Ukraine and Georgia raise
concerns that Putin might eventually use nuclear weapons to achieve his
strategic objective: incorporating elements of the former Soviet Union
into the Russian Federation, or even reconstituting most of the former
Soviet Union. Does a failure to modernize our nuclear forces act as an
enabler for Russia to pursue this course of action in the future?
Secretary Carter. Russia's recent behavior poses a serious
strategic challenge. The U.S. response must be equally serious and
integrated across all instruments of national power, including
diplomatic, economic, as well as military.
The nuclear modernization plan was specifically designed to hedge
against geopolitical risk, including increasing strategic competition
with Russia. It does so by sustaining a Triad that offers a range of
capabilities that underwrite strategic stability. The President's
budget request fully supports this plan through focused and sustained
investments in nuclear modernization and manning across the nuclear
enterprise. Congressional support for the modernization program is
imperative. A prolonged period of reduced defense budgets would almost
certainly mean a smaller, less capable, and less ready U.S. military--
and that, in turn, could invite others to challenge us or create more
risk.

46. Senator Cruz. Secretary Carter, a few weeks ago at your
confirmation hearing, we discussed the dangers posed by a nuclear Iran.
You succinctly described it as ``exceptionally grave'' because it could
launch a new regional nuclear arms race, greatly unbalance the Middle
East, and also because of Iran's stated intent to annihilate Israel and
the United States makes it unacceptably likely they might use them.
Since that time, details of a pending agreement between the President
and Iran have emerged in press reports that suggest such a deal would,
at best, slow Iranian nuclear progress but would not in any meaningful
way prevent it. President Netanyahu told a joint meeting of Congress
that he believed we were at a ``fateful crossroads'' and that this deal
would ultimately lead to a ``nuclear armed Iran.'' Do you agree with
that assessment?
Secretary Carter. Prime Minister Netanyahu certainly has the right
to express his opinion on the nuclear negotiations. As has been
repeatedly stated, however, the only deal that the U.S. is prepared to
accept is one that prevents Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.
I believe that a nuclear deal will have the effect of putting in
place the conditions to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon,
rather than inevitably lead to Iran acquiring one. The intention is not
to prevent Iran from having a civilian nuclear program if it lives up
to all of its obligations under any potential deal. Transparency and
intense monitoring and verification measures will be in place to ensure
that Iran's nuclear activities are exclusively peaceful, and that there
is advance notice of any Iranian treachery in contravention of a deal.
In any deal, the Department will remain poised as the hedge against
Iranian non-compliance.

47. Senator Cruz. Secretary Carter, since your confirmation, has
the President consulted you on his negotiation efforts with Iran, and
asked for your professional opinion as Secretary of Defense on the
consequences of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons?
Secretary Carter. Yes. The Department works closely with the
Administration on all matters of national security.
missile defense
48. Senator Cruz. Secretary Carter, during your confirmation
hearing you said that, ``With respect to ballistic missiles that could
threaten the United States, I think that's one of the reasons why we
need to keep our missile defenses and especially our ICBM defenses
current, capable and large enough in size to deal with both the
prospective Iranian threat and the also very real North Korean ICBM
threat.'' I agree with your assessment, and I was also pleased to see
the Department of Defense give priority to midcourse and homeland
defense programs in the fiscal year 2016 budget. Even so, the missile
defense community has long voiced that interception of a ballistic
missile in the boost or ascent phases is preferable due to a higher
probability of successful intercept. We haven't had any active programs
to develop intercept capabilities in the boost and ascent phases since
2010. Can you share your vision of boost phase missile defense with the
Committee and pledge your commitment to support development of
technology to intercept ballistic missiles in this phase of flight?
Secretary Carter. Destroying missiles during the boost phase puts
pressure on adversary payload deployment timelines, thins out attacks,
and denies unimpeded access into midcourse with complex
countermeasures, which is the greatest challenge from the emerging
threat. Technology advances in highly efficient, compact electric
lasers that could be small and light enough to fit on high altitude
unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) offer new opportunities for effective and
affordable boost phase intercept.
The Missile Defense Agency's fiscal year 2016 budget request
includes funding to advance technology supporting boost phase
intercept. Two short wavelength electric lasers are being scaled up in
the laboratory from kilowatts to tens of kilowatts. Measurements of
vibrations and high altitude turbulence and optical propagation are
planned, using existing high altitude UAVs. We are also bringing on
industry this year to assess the feasibility and develop concepts for a
new missile defense laser demonstrator scheduled to fly before the end
of this decade.

49. Senator Cruz. Secretary Carter, with an emerging Iranian ICBM
program and active North Korean ICBM Program, are you comfortable with
the level of funding toward General Missile Defense for protecting
against a threat to the U.S. Homeland? Do you believe that this program
has the appropriate priorities for procurement, research, and
development?
Secretary Carter. The Department remains committed to operating,
sustaining, and expanding the Nation's homeland missile defenses and
requests $1.76 billion for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense program.
This amount is $613 million over our President's Budget (PB) 2015
request. I support the priorities laid out by the Missile Defense
Agency in this budget request.
The PB 2016 request supports expanding the number of currently
deployed Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs) to 44 by the end of 2017. The
request supports continued flight and system ground testing, Redesigned
Kill Vehicle development, and enhancement of Stockpile Reliability
Program to improve GBI performance, reliability, and reliability
testing. The request also supports improvements to our sensor networks
to increase battle space and discrimination.

50. Senator Cruz. Secretary Carter, our closest ally in the Middle
East, Israel, recently used the Iron Dome with great success against
small rockets. However, as radical Islamic extremists and the Iranian
regime develop new capabilities, do you believe that they have adequate
defenses against nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons attacks by
the Iranian regime or other radical Islamic terrorists?
Secretary Carter. The U.S. commitment to Israel is ironclad. Israel
faces very real missile threats from a number of actors in the region,
and Israel's security remains a top priority. In addition to Foreign
Military Financing assistance, the United States has provided more than
$3 billion in missile defense assistance to Israel since 2001. The
Department has worked with Israel to develop a multi-layered missile
defense architecture that includes Iron Dome, David's Sling, and Arrow.
However, the Government of Israel is in the best position to determine
the overall adequacy of its national defense.
cyber threats
51. Senator Cruz. General Dempsey, how do you describe the
Department of Defense's role in deterring and responding to
cyberattacks from state actors and state sponsored actors against U.S.
defense capabilities, research programs, and operational networks? Do
you believe that this budget provides enough resources for us to stay
ahead of state backed threats?
General Dempsey. Deterrence in cyberspace, as with other domains,
relies on two principal mechanisms: denying an adversary's objectives
and, if necessary, imposing costs on an adversary for aggression. The
Department of Defense plays a key role in our deterrence strategy,
particularly regarding our defense capabilities and research programs,
by providing military options to respond to attacks in cyberspace as
with attacks in any other domain.
To that end, the Department has spent several years building
capabilities to provide a credible threat of response to deter
malicious nation state activities against us in cyberspace. We view
cyberspace as a global warfighting domain rather than simply an
information technology resource, and have established U.S. Cyber
Command and its associated forces dedicated to defending against and
responding to adversary cyberspace attacks. We are also working with
like-minded nations to establish an environment of expectations, or
norms of behavior, that increase understanding of cyber doctrine, and
guide Allied policies and international partnerships.
This budget continues our investments in deterring and responding
to state-sponsored aggression in cyberspace, consistent with the
Department's other priorities. We continue to strengthen our defenses,
resiliency, and monitoring capabilities in order to deny or minimize
the benefit of malicious activity in cyberspace and ensure our ability
to attribute malicious activity to its source and sponsor. We are also
continuing to invest in U.S. Cyber Command's Cyber Mission Forces to
provide a credible threat of response in cyberspace in addition to our
response options in other domains. Along with the efforts of our
nation's law enforcement, intelligence, and diplomatic communities, the
Department of Defense will ensure the cost of a state-sponsored attack
in cyberspace far outweighs any potential benefit an adversary may hope
to gain.

52. Senator Cruz. General Dempsey, do you have concerns about the
capability of non-state actors to degrade or disrupt defense
information systems as cyber weapons proliferate and are reengineered?
What is our answer to this threat?
General Dempsey. The cyberspace threat from non-state actors has
been a consistent concern for as long as we have been leveraging
information technology. The low cost and rapid proliferation of
malicious cyberspace tools enables anyone with hostile intent, from
amateur hackers to criminal and terrorist organizations, the capability
to threaten our national interests.
To counter this threat, we are building robust defensive
capabilities and building better resiliency and monitoring
capabilities. We have also built an operational force aligned to U. S.
Cyber Command, consisting of active duty military, civilian, national
guard, and reserve components, to actively defend against and respond
to malicious cyberspace activity. We continue to leverage the Nation's
ingenuity by recruiting and retaining an exceptional cyber workforce
and enabling rapid technological innovation.
In addition, the Department of Defense continues to work closely
with its interagency partners, including the Departments of Justice and
Homeland Security, to address threats to the United States from
wherever they originate, through a whole-of-government approach. The
Department is dedicated to the defense of the Nation, and to the
privacy and the civil liberties of its citizens.
We also continue to build robust relationships with private
industry partners, U.S. Allies and international partners to enable
information sharing and strengthen collective cybersecurity.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
electronic health records
53. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Carter, one of my major
priorities is to ensure that VA can exchange relevant health data with
DOD and the private sector in a usable, computable, format to support
clinical decisions. This initiative has faced changes in scope and
project management issues in the past that have led to delays and have
impacted cost estimates for this program. While VA and DOD are sharing
more health data than ever, existing data-sharing mechanisms have
limited utility in clinical encounters due to access limitations and
usability issues. To that end, please provide a status update on the
Defense Healthcare Management System Modernization (DHMSM) program,
including a schedule that includes the estimated contract award date,
and key dates for program rollout and retirement of legacy EHR systems.
Secretary Carter. Each product under consideration for the Defense
Healthcare Management System Modernization (DHMSM) Electronic Health
Records (EHR) solution is being extensively tested by subject matter
experts and users. To address access limitations, the DHMSM program is
working closely with the Defense Military Information Exchange program
(within the same Program Executive Office), which is providing
technical solutions to allow the Department to increase the level of
data shared with VA and the private sector. These enhancements will
continue to improve existing data-sharing capabilities and address
congressional directives.
The DHMSM program has been open and transparent with industry and
has consistently met acquisition goals on schedule over the last 18
months. The program held four Industry Days, released three draft
Requests for Proposals (RFPs), and released a final RFP in August 2014
that resulted in extremely robust interest and corresponding industry
competition. The program is currently in Source Selection with an
anticipated contract award this fiscal year. The details of the source
selection process are deemed extremely sensitive; however, competition
remains robust. The program is on-track to begin deployment of the
modernized EHR System prior to December 31, 2016, as required by the
fiscal year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act requirement.
Retirement of legacy EHR systems will depend on the selected solution
and the proposed deployment schedule.

54. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Carter, a recent report from the
Center for a New American Security on modernizing military healthcare
highlighted potential disadvantages to DOD's current commercial
approach to replacing its health record, including the potential that
health data may not be as interoperable as the Department hopes, and
the limitations that can come with having only one company that can
upgrade or improve the system. What is DOD doing to reduce the risk of
vendor lock, data isolation, and potential bid protest inherent in the
multibillion dollar DHMSM procurement?
Secretary Carter. To address vendor lock, the Request for Proposal
(RFP) uses a multi-pronged approach by including well-defined
requirements consistent with the tenets of open systems architecture
(OSA), standard and custom clauses that protect the Government's
intellectual property and data rights, and evaluation criteria that
assess proposed approaches to achieving OSA and interoperability and
proposed intellectual property/data rights postures. The RFP requires a
data architecture that supports open standards based data portability.
Vendors will be evaluated on whether their product provides well-
documented open Application Programing Interfaces and services to
facilitate integration. System improvements will be through upgrades
with newer modular components without redesign of entire system or
large portions. The vendor must adopt emerging standards and maintain
compliance and currency with the Office of the National Coordinator and
other applicable national standards.
To reduce the risk of data isolation, the DHMSM program is working
closely with the Defense Medical Information Exchange program (within
the same Program Executive Office), which is providing technical
solutions to allow the Department to increase the level of data shared
with the Department of Veterans Affairs and the private sector. These
enhancements will stabilize existing data-sharing capabilities and
address congressional directives. The second phase of work will enable
the modernized Electronic Health Records to access legacy data,
supporting better access to safer, higher-quality care for
beneficiaries and providers.
Regarding potential bid protest, the DHMSM program office includes
acquisition, contracting, and legal professionals, whose collective
knowledge and experience are informing the RFP and Source Selection
process. The program informed industry of the requirements through
multiple Industry Days and draft RFPs over a 10 month period. The
program office remained open and transparent throughout this entire
period, affording industry an opportunity to comment formally and
directly throughout the requirements development and overall
acquisition process. I cannot predict if there will be a protest, I am
confident the source selection process is executing with a high level
of integrity and process discipline and evaluating proposals within the
parameters/criteria as described in the RFP.

55. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Carter, the most recent health
data interoperability management plan indicates that progress is being
made on terminology standardization in a number of health data domains.
What progress has been made on developing standards to govern health
data transport and security between the two Departments?
Secretary Carter. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Trusted
Internet Connection Gateways provide secure communication between VA-
based networks and Department of Defense networks via the medical
community of interest (MED-COI) Enterprise Gateways. The MED-COI
Gateway components provide a secure means to monitor, screen, and
restrict traffic flows into and out of the Department's Medical Health
System networks. The gateways provide a secure means of communication
and access to both Personal Identifiable Information and Protected
Health Information between the Departments.
The Department leverages standard commercial off the shelf
equipment on the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Approved
Product List configured to adhere to DISA Security Technical
Implementation Guide compliance. Data in transit is secured by
leveraging commercial standard encryption (e.g., AES-256 encryption)
per DODI 8500.2 over MED-COI dedicated transport, improving performance
and availability. At the MED-COI Gateways, the data is decrypted for
inspection prior to being re-encrypted for transport to systems at
various sites. The VA is responsible for securing the traffic in
transport across the VA network. The Department secures data at rest by
leveraging multiple industry best practices (e.g., FIPS 140-2), which
the Department is currently rationalizing into a single solution. From
a network perimeter prospective, the Departement is proactively working
to rationalize to a single Computer Network Defense Service Provider.
With these various data transport security layers, the Department
is providing infrastructure and services to enable comprehensive health
data transport security. The Departments are continuing to work
together to ensure stable, secure methods for health data transport
between the Departments as technology and standards evolve.

56. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Carter, what plans does DOD have
to manage the conversion of legacy data for use in the proprietary
system that will replace AHLTA?
Secretary Carter. The Department will migrate the required
operational AHLTA data to the new Defense Healthcare Management Systems
Modernization (DHMSM) Electronic Health Records (EHR) system. This
information will be accessible via interfaces based on industry/
national-standards. The vendor must provide a Data Management Plan
(CDRL A0027), in accordance with the DHMSM Engineering Master Plan,
DHMSM Interface Strategy, and the Program Executive Office DHMS Data
Strategy. This plan must align data management activities to enable
Government compliance with the Department of Defense Instruction
``Sharing Data, Information, and Information Technology (IT) Services
in the Department of Defense'' (DODI 8320.02), which conveys the data
management activities that must take place to enable net-centric
concepts. Additionally, this plan must support coordination between the
DHMSM program, DHA, and the Defense Medical Information Exchange (DMIX)
and Theater Medical Information Program-Joint (TMIP-J) programs
regarding data management strategies, activities for access to clinical
and patient health information, and data migration to support
transition.
In support of Initial Operational Capability Deployment, the DHMSM
program has evaluation criteria (Section L) to support data migration.
The vendor's proposal must include:
(1) Approach and schedule to achieve product integration and
installation of the proposed solution in Government test facilities.
(2) Approach for legacy data migration.
The remainder of the legacy AHLTA data will align with an
enterprise data management strategy to shift most Medical Health System
systems from receiving data directly from the DHMSM EHR system to
receiving data from an enterprise data warehouse accessible via
Industry/national-standards based interfaces.
During the transition to the new DHMSM EHR system, DOD clinicians
will be able to retrieve records through the tools created by the DMIX
program from the AHLTA Clinical Data Repository and other legacy data
stores through a web-based viewer called the Joint Legacy Viewer.
mental health of veterans
57. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Carter and General Dempsey, last
month, GAO published a report on the need for better tracking and
oversight for service member separations for non-disability mental
conditions. Three of the four military services: Army, Navy, and Marine
Corps, are unable to track whether a separating service member has a
mental condition. DOD and other stakeholders, must be able to assess
separation frequency and trends in order to identify potential
inappropriate separations. Will you implement the recommendations from
GAO and conduct appropriate oversight into this matter to ensure that
DOD has sound policies and processes to track whether a separating
service member has a mental condition and ensure that service members
are administratively separated for non-disability mental conditions?
Secretary Carter. Yes, I agree with the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) that there is a need to develop a method to uniformly
track non-disability information. This is one of the reasons the
Department is conducting a review of separation program designator
codes beginning June 2015 and the information portrayed on the various
copies of the DD Form 214, ``Certificate of Release or Discharge From
Active Duty'' with a goal to bring greater clarity and standardization
across the Department.
General Dempsey. Yes, we agree with GAO that there is a need to
develop a method to uniformly track non-disability information. This is
one of the reasons we are planning to conduct a comprehensive review of
separation program designator codes and the information portrayed on
the various copies of the DD Form 214, ``Certificate of Release or
Discharge From Active Duty,'' with a goal to bring greater clarity and
standardization across the Department.

58. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Carter, DOD and VA are not
adequately coordinating continuity of access to mental health care for
service members transitioning off of active duty. In many cases, DOD
doctors have much more freedom to prescribe treatments for mental
health conditions than VA doctors because of DOD's more expansive
formulary. VA clinicians can get exceptions to provide specific
treatments to veterans on an individual basis, but approving the
exception takes time. Too frequently, after leaving active duty with a
supply of effective prescription medication, veterans wait until their
medication is about to run out before making an appointment with a VA
clinician. If an exception to the formulary requirements is not already
in the works, that veteran will leave VA frustrated and without access
to a prescription medication/treatment that has proven successful while
that veteran was on active duty. I find it unacceptable that a veteran
loses access to a treatment that is working because of a lack of
coordination between DOD and VA. When prescribing drugs/therapy not
included in VA's formulary, do DOD clinicians notify service members of
the time requirement associated with getting a waiver in the VA system?
Secretary Carter. The Department of Defense is expanding the
inTransition program to ensure that all Service members leaving
military service or transferring duty stations while receiving care for
mental health conditions are automatically enrolled in the program. The
inTransition program provides coordination between the Department of
Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) (for those who plan
to access VA services) through personal assistance with arranging their
transition to new care providers in the Department, VA or the
community.
Mental health providers caring for a Service member while on active
status will dispense medication sufficient to cover the Service
member's needs until the VA intake. This change in Department policy is
accompanied by a 3-tiered education plan within the Department:
providers will educate their patients, anticipatory guidance sheets
will reflect the change (which takes tracking of impending discharges
out of the equation), and our website will detail the change in VA
policy. Regarding prescribing differences between the Department and VA
providers, a waiver is no longer necessary and drugs prescribed while
on active status will now be continued at the VA, if not already
available from the VA formulary. In January, the VA policy was changed
and the Department published an announcement that Service members who
are currently prescribed medications for mental health conditions, who
will be transitioning their care to the VA medical system, will be able
to continue taking psychiatric medications that were previously
unavailable owing to differences in the Department of Defense and VA
medication formularies. This change is effective for Service members
who are processing their separations on or after February 2015.
transitional assistance management program
59. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Carter, the Transitional
Assistance Management Program (TAMP) provides 180 days of premium-free
transitional health care benefits after regular TRICARE benefits end.
The benefits provided by TAMP are available to service members
involuntarily separated from active duty under honorable conditions,
but not to service members administratively separated under other-than-
honorable conditions. I am concerned that a growing number of service
members who are separated under other-than-honorable conditions also
suffer from service-related medical or mental health concerns. Will you
commit to work with me to provide transitional health care benefits to
all deserving service members?
Secretary Carter. The Department believes that separating Service
members are sufficiently supported by current programs under existing
law without any further expansion of Transitional Assistance Management
Program (TAMP) eligibility. The Department of Defense has a robust
Integrated Disability Evaluation System to evaluate Service members for
any medical and mental health conditions that could potentially render
them unfit for service. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has a
very mature program to evaluate any medical and mental health
conditions that do not manifest prior to separation that are service
connected. VA eligibility for health care services for service
connected disabilities is not precluded by a discharge from service
characterized as under other-than-honorable conditions.

60. Senator Blumenthal. Do you support extending TAMP to all
service members involuntarily separated through administrative
procedures?
Secretary Carter. The Department believes that separating Service
members are sufficiently supported by current programs under existing
law without any further expansion of Transitional Assistance Management
Program eligibility. VA eligibility for health care services for
service connected disabilities is not precluded by a discharge from
service characterized as under other-than-honorable conditions.

61. Senator Blumenthal. Please identify whether you have the
authority to implement such a change without new legislation?
Secretary Carter. The Department does not have authority to
implement such a change without new legislation. 10 U.S.C. 1141,
paragraphs (1) through (4) specify `` . . . involuntarily discharged
under other than adverse conditions . . . .'' as the eligibility
requirement for Transitional Assistance Management Program.
record of service identification cards
62. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Carter, I am deeply concerned by
the growing threat of identity theft targeting military personnel and
veterans when they share their personal information with third parties
to provide proof of military service to obtain access to exclusive
military discounts or other benefits. Currently, active duty, reserve,
National Guard, or retired members possess a government-issued common
access card (CAC) that satisfies merchants' requirements for on-site
proof of service. Non-retired veterans have no such card. They are left
to pursue a variety of unsecure methods to obtain promised discounts,
including emailing or sending through the mail copies of DD-214 forms,
photocopying identification cards, completing varied and complex
application processes, or paying significant membership fees to for-
profit entities--all in order to simply document their service to our
country. Requiring our nation's heroes to provide this valuable private
personal and financial information puts them at severe risk of identity
theft, and other kinds of fraud and abuse. Secretary Carter and General
Dempsey, would you agree that protecting these citizens who voluntarily
served their country--yet are increasingly targeted for identity
theft--should be a priority?
Secretary Carter. Protecting the personal information of all
military personnel and veterans is a priority. To help alleviate some
of the unsecure methods veterans use to obtain private discounts, since
January 2014, honorably separated members of the uniformed services
have been able to obtain an identification (ID) card, similar to a
proof of insurance card, through the joint Department of Defense/
Department of Veterans Affairs eBenefits web portal. To date, over
700,000 of these cards have been generated by eBenefits users. These ID
cards provide veterans the ability to provide basic proof of service,
while alleviating many of the risks you have mentioned.
An alternative option for these veterans is also to utilize State-
issued ID cards that designate veteran status. Veterans in 44 States
and the District of Columbia may apply for a driver's license or State-
issued ID card that designates veteran status. The remaining states
either have statutes that provide for such State-issued cards but the
statutes have not yet gone into effect, or have legislation providing
for such cards pending in the legislatures.
Lastly, retired veterans are issued an ID card, DD Form 2 that does
not contain private personal and financial information.
General Dempsey. Protecting the personal information of all
military personnel and veterans is a priority. Since January 2014,
honorably separated members of the uniformed services have been able to
obtain an identification (ID) card, similar to a proof of insurance
card, through the joint Department of Defense/Department of Veterans
Affairs eBenefits web portal. To date, over 700,000 of these cards have
been generated by eBenefits users. These ID cards provide veterans the
ability to provide basic proof of service, while alleviating many of
the risks you have mentioned, and has helped alleviate some of the
unsecure methods veterans use to obtain private discounts.
An alternative option for these veterans is also to utilize State-
issued ID cards that designate veteran status. Veterans in 44 States
and the District of Columbia may apply for a driver's license or State-
issued ID card that designates veteran status. The remaining states
either have statues that provide for such State-issued cards but the
statues have into yet gone into effect, or have legislation providing
for such cards pending in the legislatures.
Lastly, retired veterans are issued an ID card, DD Form 2 that does
not contain private personal and financial information.

63. Senator Blumenthal. Will you agree to work with me to establish
recognition of service cards to protect personal information while
providing immediate and on-site verification to merchants nationwide,
thus ensuring that more than 17 million non-retired veterans receive
service-based discounts and other benefits?
Secretary Carter. I understand the need for recognition of service
identification (ID) cards for non-retired veterans. In order to address
this need, since January 2014, honorably separated members of the
uniformed services have been able to obtain an ID card, similar to a
proof of insurance card, through the joint Department of Defense/
Department of Veterans Affairs eBenefits web portal. To date, over
700,000 of these cards have been generated by eBenefits users. These ID
cards provide veterans the ability to provide basic proof of service,
while alleviating many of the risks you have mentioned.
An alternative option for these veterans is also to utilize State-
issued ID cards that designate veteran status. Veterans in 44 States
and the District of Columbia may apply for a driver's license or State-
issued ID card that designates veteran status. The remaining states
either have statutes that provide for such State-issued cards but the
statutes have not yet gone into effect, or have legislation providing
for such cards pending in the legislatures.
high altitude isr plan
64. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Carter, I understand the Air
Force is developing a High Altitude ISR plan that will transition the
State Department and Long Range EO/IR/MSI missions from the U-2 to the
Global Hawk and enable U-2 retirement by fiscal year 2019. Funding to
begin this transition of mission, as required by previous NDAA
language, was appropriated in fiscal year 2015 but is held up until the
Department provides a High Altitude ISR plan. When will DOD submit the
new plan to facilitate actions enabling the mission transitions from
the U-2 to the Global Hawk by fiscal year 2019?
Secretary Carter. The Air Force is developing the High Altitude
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance Plan, including the
transition of missions from the U-2 to the Global Hawk. This transition
plan is being coordinated with the key stakeholders within the
Department of Defense. Staffing of the transition plan is expected to
be complete by the end of fiscal year (FY) 2015, upon which the
Department will provide the plan to Congress. In the President's Budget
submission for fiscal year 2016, the transition of these missions from
U-2 to Global Hawk is programmed to align with the retirement of U-2 in
fiscal year 2019.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand
special victims' counsel/retaliation/sexual assault
65. Senator Gillibrand. In both 2012 and 2014, 62 percent of
victims who reported unwanted sexual contact indicated they had been
retaliated against, socially and professionally. I am very concerned
that nearly two-thirds of survivors perceive retaliation. To me that
says that, whether it is professional or social retaliation, there is a
problem with the command climate and that needs to be addressed. How do
you plan to address this issue?
Secretary Carter. The Department has an obligation to ensure that
victims of sexual assault can report the crime without concern of
retaliation, from their peers or anyone else. It is unacceptable that
any military member who files a report perceives any kind of
retaliation, to include social retaliation from co-workers or peers.
A) Commanders set the tone in their units and they should be at the
core of any effort to address retaliation. Recent Department survey
data shows that most Service members highly rate their unit leadership
efforts to advance sexual assault prevention and response. However,
everyone in the chain of command must be just as supportive. To achieve
this, several Secretary of Defense initiatives informed by these
results were implemented directing the Chiefs of the Military Services
and the National Guard Bureau to: (1) augment the training of junior
officers, junior enlisted supervisors, and civilian employees that
supervise military members on awareness and prevention of retaliation
associated with reporting; (2) develop new procedures to engage command
to prevent retaliation; and (3) conduct a comprehensive review of the
means available to address both social and professional retaliation, to
include appropriate conduct on social media.
B) Since 2012, the Department has allowed members making an
unrestricted report of sexual assault to request an expedited transfer
from their assigned units. Members have broad latitude in deciding
whether requesting this transfer would be right for their
circumstances, whether they perceive retaliation or ostracism or simply
want closer proximity to a certain support network. 216 members moved
pursuant to expedited transfer rules in fiscal year 2012, in fiscal
year 2013, there were 565 expedited transfers and there were
approximately 549 in fiscal year 2014, the final figure for which will
be reflected in the Department's Annual Report to Congress in April.
General Dempsey. We have an obligation to ensure that victims of
sexual assault can report the crime without concern of retaliation,
from their peers or anyone else. It is unacceptable that any military
member who files a report perceives any kind of retaliation, to include
social retaliation from co-workers or peers.
As commanders set the tone in their units, they should be at the
core of any effort to address retaliation. Recent DOD survey data shows
that most Service members highly rate their unit leadership efforts to
advance sexual assault prevention and response. However, everyone in
the chain of command must be just as supportive. To achieve this, the
Department implemented several initiatives informed by these results
directing the Department to: (1) augment the training of junior
officers, junior enlisted supervisors, and civilian employees that
supervise military members on awareness and prevention of retaliation
associated with reporting (2) develop new procedures to engage command
to prevent retaliation and; (3) conduct a comprehensive review of the
means available to address both social and professional retaliation, to
include appropriate conduct on social media.
Additionally, since 2012 the Department has allowed members making
an unrestricted report of sexual assault to request an expedited
transfer from their assigned units. Members have broad latitude in
deciding why this transfer would be right for their circumstances,
whether they perceive retaliation or ostracism or simply want closer
proximity to a certain support network.

66. Senator Gillibrand. Do you have sufficient resources and
authorities to address the problem?
Secretary Carter. Yes. The President's Budget request has provided
sufficient resources to continue the development and enhancement of the
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program to enable the Department
better to address issues of retaliation proactively. That said, if
sequestration takes effect, it will be difficult to maintain the
momentum on all fronts. I have the authorities I need to address all of
the sexual assault related issues.
General Dempsey. The President's Budget request has provided
sufficient resources to proactively continue the development and
enhancement of the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program.

67. Senator Gillibrand. The Special Victims' Counsel Program--which
details a judge advocate to assist and represent sexual assault victims
and help them navigate the military justice system--is an important
step to increasing everyone's confidence in the system. Despite the
downsizing that is taking place across the Services, I understand that
the Air Force was able to increase its number of Air Force judge
advocate slots by 58, the majority of which will be devoted to the
Special Victims' Counsel Program. It is my understanding that the other
Services have not seen that authorized slots increased. Do you have
sufficient resources to dedicate to the Special Victims' Counsel
Program?
Secretary Carter. Yes. The Services have all relayed that they have
sufficient resources to dedicate to the Special Victims' Counsel
Program. The Services are constantly reassessing the demand for SVC
services to ensure that victims of sexual assault are afforded this
service.
The Air Force recently authorized 58 officer billets and 15
enlisted paralegal billets to increase the personnel strength of key
trial practitioners in the military justice system. This action
addresses rising caseloads in the provision of legal services to
victims of sexual assault and the expansion of the Special Victims'
Counsel program (SVC) as required by law (FY 2014 NDAA, Sec. 1716).
These new authorizations will allow the SVC program to grow. With the
addition of these manpower authorizations, the Air Force has dedicated
the necessary resources to provide legal services to victims of sexual
assault under the current construct of the program.
The Army currently has 75 Special Victims' Counsel assigned in
legal assistance offices at locations worldwide. When the program was
implemented in 2013, the Army used its active duty attorneys to serve
as SVCs and backfilled some positions with reserve component judge
advocates, as necessary, to ensure continued support. Based on current
workload, the Army believes that the end strength of 75 SVC in the
Active Army will allow victims of sexual assault who request SVC
services to have an SVC assigned at or near the victim's location.
The Navy refers to its special victims counsel program as the
Victim Legal Counsel Organization. The Navy has sufficient resources
dedicated to the program at this time with 29 counsel supporting the
program.
The Marine Corps currently has sufficient resources to dedicate to
the Special Victims' Counsel Program. The Marine Corps refers to the
SVC program as the Victims' Legal Counsel Organization (VLCO), and to
the judge advocates that provide these services as Victims' Legal
Counsel (VLC). The VLCO presently has sixteen (16) VLC supporting
victims. The VLC are assisted by 9 paralegals.
General Dempsey. Yes. The Services have all relayed that they have
sufficient resources to dedicate to the Special Victims' Counsel (SVC)
Program.
The Air Force recently authorized 58 officer billets and 15
enlisted paralegal billets to increase the personnel strength of key
trial practitioners in the military justice system. With the addition
of these manpower authorizations, the Air Force has dedicated the
necessary resources to provide legal services to victims of sexual
assault under the current construct of the program.
The Army currently has 75 SVC assigned in legal assistance offices
at locations worldwide. Based on current workload, the Army believes
that end strength of 75 SVC in the Active Army will allow victims of
sexual assault who request SVC services to have an SVC assigned at or
near the victim's location.
The Navy refers to its SVC program as the Victim Legal Counsel
Organization. The Navy has sufficient resources dedicated to the
program at this time with 29 counsels supporting the program.
The Marine Corps currently has sufficient resources to dedicate to
the SVC Program. The Marine Corps also refers to the SVC program as the
Victims' Legal Counsel Organization (VLCO), and refers to the judge
advocates that provide these services as Victims' Legal Counsel (VLC).
The VLCO presently has sixteen 16 VLCs supporting victims which are
assisted by 9 paralegals.
The Services are constantly reassessing the demand for SVC services
to ensure that victims of sexual assault are afforded this service.

68. Senator Gillibrand. The Special Victims' Counsel have testified
at the Judicial Proceedings Panel on Sexual Assault, and told ME, that
the program needs to be improved. Common criticisms are the current
appellate process is nonresponsive and insufficient to protect victims'
rights; victim access to information--including discovery, pleadings
and motions--remains inconsistent; and that there is widespread
confusion about procedures for representing victims in judicial
proceedings and for enforcing other victim rights. Do you think you
have sufficient authority to review and implement reforms that may be
needed?
Secretary Carter. Yes. I believe the Department has sufficient
authorities to implement reforms. In the event that there are
appropriate reforms that could be carried out only with the enactment
of legislation, I will pursue such legislation
The Department is working hard to make necessary improvements to
the Special Victims' Counsel (SVC) program and implementing those
changes through policy initiatives. As an example, the Department has
directed implementation of numerous recommendations from the Response
Systems to Adult Sexual Assault Crimes and Related Offenses Panel
(RSP), including ensuring compliance by trial counsel with victim
rights set forth in Article 6b of the Uniformed Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ) and Department policy. The Department has also directed
an assessment of the effectiveness of the processes used to receive and
investigate complaints relating to violations or failures by military
and civilian employees of all the Services to provide the rights
guaranteed by Article 6b, UCMJ, and to determine whether a more uniform
process is needed. With respect to the appellate process, the
Department referred an RSP recommendation regarding SVC representation
throughout the military justice process (including appellate review) to
the Military Justice Review Group (MJRG) for consideration. The MJRG
was tasked to conduct a comprehensive review of the military justice
system and make recommendations for changes to the Uniform Code of
Military Justice and the Manual for Courts-Martial. This review will
inform the Department on military justice improvements, including SVC
programs.
General Dempsey. Yes. We believe the Department has sufficient
authorities to implement reforms. The Department continues to make
necessary improvements to the Special Victims' Counsel (SVC) Program
and implementing those changes through policy initiatives. The
Department has directed implementation of numerous recommendations from
the Response Systems to Adult Sexual Assault Crimes and Related
Offenses Panel (RSP) to include ensuring compliance by trial counsel
with victim rights set forth in Article 6b of the UCMJ and DOD policy.
It also directed an assessment of the effectiveness of the processes
used to receive and investigate complaints relating to violations or
failures by military and civilian employees of all the Services to
provide the rights guaranteed by Article 6b, UCMJ, and to determine
whether a more uniform process is needed.
With respect to the appellate process, the Department referred an
RSP recommendation regarding SVC representation throughout the military
justice process (to include appellate review) to the Military Justice
Review Group (MJRG) for consideration. The MJRG was tasked to conduct a
comprehensive review of the military justice system and make
recommendations for change to the Uniform Code of Military Justice and
the Manual for Courts-Martial. We expect this review to inform the
Department on military justice improvements, to include SVC.
combat integration
69. Senator Gillibrand. January 2016 is the deadline for the
implementation of combat integration in the military. Not only is this
a readiness issue, since you want to have the best qualified people in
position, regardless of gender, it is also a way to give women a fair
shot to reach positions of leadership in the military. Secretary
Carter, it will be up to you to make the final determination of whether
to allow exceptions. What criteria do you intend to use to make this
determination?
Secretary Carter. In accordance with the 2013 Direct Ground Combat
Definition and Assignment Rule rescission memo, all requests for
exceptions to policy must be narrowly tailored and based on a rigorous
analysis of factual data regarding the skills and abilities needed for
the position. If I receive requests for exception to policy, I will
carefully consider them in this light.

70. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Carter, will you be looking
across the services to see if one asks for an exception in a position
whose equivalent another service does not request an exception for?
Secretary Carter. Yes, this is a Department-wide effort and all
final recommendations will be discussed collaboratively. Any requests
for exception to policy must be personally approved, first by the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and then by me.

71. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Carter, what kind of oversight
are you currently doing to ensure that the services are developing
gender neutral standards?
Secretary Carter. In recognition of the lessons learned from
ongoing overseas contingency operations, and in order to fully
implement rescission of the Direct Ground Combat Definition and
Assignment Rule, the Department directed the Services to review and
validate all occupational standards to ensure they are current,
operationally-relevant, and gender neutral by September 2015. Since the
rescission of the rule, the Services have provided recurring progress
updates on their efforts. Representatives from the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness have also spent
considerable time visiting each Service and reviewing all Services'
work in this area, as well as facilitating cross-service working groups
to ensure all are informed of complementary efforts.
Beyond this, the Department recently issued implementing guidance
to the Military Department Secretaries requiring them to certify that
their validated standards accurately predict the performance of actual,
regular, and recurring duties of a military occupation as set forth in
the fiscal year 2015 National Defense Authorization Act. To
institutionalize these changes and to ensure continued compliance, the
Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness further directed
that Service Inspectors General establish procedures for conducting
gender-neutral standards compliance inspections at least every three
years, starting no later than fiscal year 2016.

72. Senator Gillibrand. What else are the services doing to help
with recruitment and retention of women?
Secretary Carter. In addition to efforts associated with rescission
of the Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule, over the
last few years, the Services have considered and implemented additional
initiatives to help improve the recruitment and retention of women in
the military. Marketing and advertising campaigns across web, media and
social platforms have been updated to integrate gender-diverse imagery.
Gender-diverse imagery that resonates with women may increase the
number of women seeking to enter military service. News articles about
female service members with successful careers or unique service
stories have been publicized. Senior military leaders have engaged in
concerted efforts to build advocacy among women in positions of
influence throughout our recruiting communities. Some Services have
increased their target for the number of female recruits and
established metrics that are frequently reported to heighten awareness
and increase emphasis in this area. Additionally, some Services have
increased the number of female recruiters. The Services are also
reviewing enlistment bonuses in difficult to recruit occupations where
females are under-represented, reviewing long-standing policies.
Although not specifically related to the retention of women, all of the
Services have begun to use the Career Intermission Pilot Program
authority. This program allows an active duty Service member to
temporarily transition to the Individual Ready Reserve while pursuing
personal or professional growth outside the Service and then allows for
a seamless return to active duty. While this is still a pilot program,
there is some evidence that Service members, male and female, welcome
the opportunity to take time away to focus on family and other personal
needs without adversely impacting their career opportunities or their
ability to continue to serve their country.
General Dempsey. The Services have considered and implemented
additional initiatives to help improve the recruitment and retention of
women in the military. In an effort to increase female propensity for
military service, marketing and advertising campaigns have been updated
integrating gender-diverse imagery that resonates with women across
web, media and social platforms, including news articles which
highlight female service members who have successful careers or unique
service stories. Our senior military leaders continue to build advocacy
among women in positions of influence throughout our recruiting
communities. Some Services have increased their target for the number
of female recruits and established metrics that are frequently reported
to heighten awareness and increase emphasis in that area. Additionally,
some Services have increased the number of female recruiters. The
Services are also reviewing long standing enlistment bonus policies in
difficult to recruit occupations where females are under-represented,
and where appropriate, they are revising them to be more favorable to
potential female recruits.
cyber-security
73. Senator Gillibrand. Cybersecurity continues to grow in its
importance as we face threats from state and non-state actors. I have
long pushed for the importance of using the reserve component to
address cyber both because of the recruitment and retention
opportunities that the Guard and Reserve present and because of the
surge capacity they can offer to both our federal and state
governments. What do you see as the role of the reserve component in
cyber?
Secretary Carter. Over the past 18 months USCYBERCOM and the
Services conducted an initial analysis of the Reserve Component's (RC)
role in the Cyber Mission Force (CMF). The analysis is ongoing and
additional assessments will occur in fiscal year 2016 and beyond. The
objective is to develop an integrated military and civilian total force
to achieve USCYBERCOM's three missions (defending the Department of
Defense Information Network; providing support to combatant commanders
for execution of their missions around the world; and, strengthening
our nation's ability to withstand and respond to cyber-attacks), and
support the Department's Federal partners, in conjunction with the
National Guard Bureau and State cyber mission needs.
The Department assesses there can be advantages to using RC
resources for CMF missions, such as providing load sharing with active
duty forces, providing available surge capacity if authorized to
activate, and maintain Department-trained forces to defend national
critical infrastructure, if authorized. Several factors should be
considered when determining the CMF force structure and the mix within
the total force. These factors include whether the position is military
essential, peacetime and wartime demands, deployment frequency and
duration, speed of response, unit readiness for specific missions, and
costs.
General Dempsey. Cybersecurity is a team effort and by including
the Reserve Component (RC) in the Cyber Mission Force build, the
Department creates opportunities for defense in depth and flexibility.
Furthermore, the RC has the ability to allow Cyber trained military
personnel to continue to serve as they transition to the civilian
sector. As part of the whole of government efforts, RC personnel are a
critical asset available to augment our response to a Cyber incident
against our country's critical infrastructure in support of Federal,
State and Local governments.

74. Senator Gillibrand. The Army and Air Force have taken different
approaches to integrating the reserve component into their cyber
forces. How do you see the services moving forward on this?
Secretary Carter. The Department recognizes the need to incorporate
the strengths, skills, and authorities afforded to the Reserve
Components (RC) into the overall cyber force structure. When the Cyber
Mission Force (CMF) construct was approved, the Department initially
determined its military personnel would be Active Duty. The analysis
conducted for the section 933 report from the Fiscal Year 2014 National
Defense Authorization Act concluded there are advantages to using RC
resources for CMF missions, such as providing load sharing with active
duty forces, providing available surge capacity, and maintaining
Department-trained forces to defend national critical infrastructure if
authorized.
The Services' developed individual plans that incorporate the RC
into the total cyber force structure. The Army's proposed plan will
create an additional 21 RC Cyber Protection Teams (CPTs), above and
beyond their CMF requirement. The Air Force's proposed plan will
leverage 15 RC Squadrons to fill two of their CMF-required CPTs and the
cyberspace operations component of one CMF-required National Mission
Team. Meanwhile, the Navy and Marine Corps will continue to contribute
Individual Mobilization Augmentees to fill specific holes on their CMF-
required teams.
Although the Services are employing their RC teams somewhat
differently at present, all RC Forces will be trained and equipped to
the same Joint standard, providing a sustainable approach to
incorporating the RC into the CMF. This is consistent with the section
933 report. The Services' proposed plans, in total, would integrate
nearly 2,000 RC personnel into the cyber force structure, adequately
addressing the opportunity for surge support and additional Service CPT
support in the near-term.
General Dempsey. The Air Force is integrating the Reserve Component
(RC) into their requirement for the USCYBERCOM Cyber Mission Force. The
Army has chosen to build RC capacity to support the ARCYBER missions. I
believe both approaches are viable, and we will evaluate the pros and
cons of each as we gain experience in this area. Providing trained,
equipped and mission ready cyber warriors utilizes the strengths of the
RC in recruiting and retention, as well as their civilian acquired
skills and relationships. We as a department will continue to evaluate
the opportunities for integration of the RC in the future.

75. Senator Gillibrand. We just received a report from the services
articulating their plans to either create separate specialties or
designators for cyber. How do you envision the development not only of
separate specialties for cyber but also career tracks?
Secretary Carter. Success in cyberspace will rely on our people--
just as it does in other domains. In order to outpace the threat, we
need to ensure the Services present their best and brightest to the
Cyber Mission Force. While serving as Deputy Secretary of Defense I
directed the Services to develop plans to recruit and retain the most
highly skilled personnel, while ensuring they remained competitive, in
both rank and position, with personnel in other career specialties. As
a result, the Services recognized that separate management constructs
may be required for their military cyberspace workforce. Each Service
has made progress on developing special designators for their cyber
personnel, as well as creating special career tracks for the most
highly skilled cyber operators. Though each Service's approach is
different, they all address the need to provide incentives such as
unique training opportunities, retention bonuses, and opportunities to
work on challenging and highly rewarding missions. The Services are now
working toward expanding their plans to include their civilian
cyberspace workforce as well.
The Services have a long history of excellence in recruitment, and
I am confident they will continue to attract the best and brightest
enlisted, officer, and civilian personnel to this growing career field.
As referenced in the report, the Department will continue to monitor
Services' progress at recruiting, training, retaining, and managing top
cyber talent, and will assist the Services in implementing new
personnel functional communities, series, and incentives as required. I
am committed to ensuring the workforce for the cyberspace domain is as
world class as the personnel in other warfighting domains, and
specifically, to ensuring the Cyber Mission Force is fully manned,
trained, equipped, and ready to fulfill USCYBERCOM's missions by the
end of fiscal year 2018.
General Dempsey. The Department has embraced the importance of
Cyber, and the Services are leaning forward in human capital management
for Cyber. Efforts are currently underway to carefully and properly
create Cyber constructs that can then be used as the primer for
developing the human resources life-cycle that ranges from recruiting
to retirement. However, it is too early to speculate how the
development of separate specialties and career tracks will unfold. We
are committed to working with the Secretary and Service Chiefs to
ensure the workforce for the cyberspace domain is able to meet today's
national security challenges and we understand the importance for
getting this right.

76. Senator Gillibrand. How do we integrate cyber into the training
of all of our service members so that we can better integrate it into
all forms of combat?
Secretary Carter. Cyber is a top area of focus for me. In fact, I
selected Fort Meade, home of U.S. Cyber Command, as my first domestic
troop talk as the Secretary of Defense. I did this because I wanted to
hear directly from the troops on the cyber front lines.
Integration of cyber into all echelons of training is underway. At
an enterprise level, all Service members must complete annual Cyber
Security Awareness training. This training covers basic education and
competency of Information Assurance practices. Individual awareness and
sensitivity are critical as they are the first line of cyber defense.
Additionally, cyber training is prominent at CYBER FLAG, CYBER
GUARD, and CYBER SHIELD exercises. These U.S. Cyber Command led
exercises focus on cyber scenarios with participation by both the
Combatant Commands and Services. The other Combatant Commands
incorporate cyber scenarios into their annual exercises, such as United
States Pacific Command's TERMINAL FURY, United States Strategic
Command's GLOBAL LIGHTNING, United States Transportation Command's
TURBO CHALLENGE, United States European Command's AUSTERE CHALLENGE,
and United States Africa Command's JUDICIOUS RESPONSE.
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness is drafting policy governing the acceleration of integrated
cyber training, and the Combatant Commanders Exercise Engagement and
Training Transformation program is placing a resourcing priority on
Combatant Commands conducting exercises in degraded cyber environments.
As a result, I expect the frequency of cyber exercises to increase
during my service as Secretary of Defense.
The Department's success in future combat operations depends on our
ability to dominate in the cyber domain. As the Secretary of Defense, I
have made integrating cyber training into the Department's training
fabric priority number one.
General Dempsey. The Department of Defense (DOD) uses a multi-
tiered approach for cyberspace training that addresses individual
training requirements for all service members, specialized training
requirements for cyberspace operations professionals, and collective
training requirements for units and higher level staffs.
Individual training ranges from basic awareness on a variety of
cyberspace topics (i.e., classes on defensive cyberspace operations,
establishing cyberspace situational awareness, and knowledge
management) to advanced coursework that obtains industry level
certifications. All service members must complete annual information
assurance training to use DOD computer systems. Web-enabled joint and
service portals such as Joint Knowledge Online (JKO), Navy Knowledge
Online (NKO), and the U.S. Army Information Assurance Virtual Training
Portal, provide all service members access to an array of cyberspace
training products and courses to meet Service specific training
requirements.
Cyberspace operations professionals, such as Joint Cyberspace
Center personnel assigned to the combatant commands and the Cyber
Mission Forces, are required to obtain and maintain additional
qualifications. The Joint Staff, United States Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM), United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), and the
Services are maturing this operational level capability through a
rigorous training program that includes web-enabled training (DOD and/
or industry run schools), and practical application. These
professionals frequently leverage the Joint Information Operations
Range (JIOR), a persistent closed-loop cyberspace training environment,
to refine their skills.
The Chairman's Annual Joint Training Guidance emphasizes cyberspace
related training which has been incorporated into joint training plans
and programs. Many exercises incorporate cyberspace operations against
active opposing forces. These exercises include substantial Service
participation and incorporate a diverse training audience in a joint
environment.

77. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Carter, last week, DOD acting
Chief Information Officer Terry Halvorsen testified that DOD might need
additional authorities to partner with the private sector on data
storage and security. What does DOD envision in terms of data sharing?
Secretary Carter. The Department is researching the ability of
public-private partnerships to drive additional innovation and
efficiency into the Department's information technology environment. In
such an environment, the Department and our private partners would need
to seamlessly share cybersecurity threat data in order to effectively
detect, mitigate, and respond to emerging cyber threats. This ability
would be critical to maintaining the Department's cyber defenses and
ensuring dependable mission execution in the face of capable
adversaries.

78. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Carter, can you tell me what kind
of authorities you might need?
Secretary Carter. At this time, I cannot specifically identify the
kinds of additional authorities that may be needed. The Department is
researching the ability of public-private partnerships to drive
additional innovation and efficiency into the Department's information
technology (IT) environment. Additional authorities may be required to
enable the Department to more effectively leverage public-private
partnerships to support the modernization of our IT environment.
military compensation and benefits
79. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Carter, last week we heard from
representatives of military and veteran service organizations, as well
as from the Commissioners from the Military Compensation and Retirement
Modernization Commission, that there are significant problems with
TRICARE but that there are mixed sentiments from service members,
retirees and their families about whether they would rather see TRICARE
reformed or replaced. For the past two years, you have come to us with
the same recommendations about consolidating TRICARE plans. In
developing these recommendations, what were your considerations?
Secretary Carter. For the past two years the Department has
submitted similar plans to modernize the TRICARE benefit. In doing so,
the Department considered patient access and choice of care, along with
a contemporary utilization management framework. Costs for our
beneficiaries and costs to the Department were also considered.

80. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Carter, we have heard that
TRICARE's problems have diminished its quality, access and value, did
you assess whether the changes you recommend would improve these?
Secretary Carter. I believe that TRICARE offers our beneficiaries
tremendous value. The 2016 budget proposal provides beneficiary choice
by consolidating the current TRICARE plans into one Preferred Provider
Organization (PPO)-like plan that includes utilization management
tools. Active duty will continue to receive priority access to care.
Active duty family members can choose to have their care managed by the
Military Treatment Facility (a no cost option) or for maximum
flexibility they can self-manage their care with complete freedom of
choice with low co-pays depending on the venue of care. Utilization
management tools guide patients to the appropriate location to receive
care (e.g., lowest cost is their primary care provider) thereby
improving continuity which is an important component for quality care.
Together, these changes provide greater value than the existing health
benefit package.

81. Senator Gillibrand. Have you surveyed service members and their
families about their satisfaction with TRICARE? If so, what did you
find out?
Secretary Carter. The Department manages an extensive, longstanding
and continuous core survey program to monitor the experience of
Military Health System (MHS) beneficiaries using any aspect of the
direct or purchased care system. The Defense Health Agency (DHA) relies
on three core surveys: the Health Care Survey of DOD Beneficiaries
(HCSDB), the TRICARE Inpatient Satisfaction Survey (TRISS) and the
TRICARE Outpatient Satisfaction Survey (TROSS). These surveys are based
on nationally recognized surveys used by most major health plans in the
U.S.--the Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems
(CAHPS) family of surveys, sponsored by the Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality (AHRQ) and Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, (CMS).
DHA surveys in general are designed to provide a standardized means
of evaluating beneficiary experience of care whether in a military or
civilian facility, and to benchmark that care to national civilian
results represented by the CAHPS surveys for health plans, outpatient
and inpatient care. The Army, Navy, and Air Force also measure various
aspects of the patient experience, and focus specifically on care
received in their military facilities in an outpatient (non-
hospitalized) setting. The Services design their surveys with
sufficient power to be able to drill down to examine each military
treatment facility (MTF), as well as individual providers within each
MTF. The Service surveys differ from each other in methodology,
sampling, mode, and instrument to reflect Service preference for how
and what types of information to collect on their MTF users. DHA
surveys, on the other hand, use a standardized instrument, survey
methodology, and mode to effectively examine beneficiary experience of
care across the Services and between the direct and purchased care
venues. As noted above, The DHA also capitalizes on national
standardized survey instruments in order to compare to, or benchmark
against, civilian health plan results (CAHPS surveys). As such, the DHA
surveys are specifically designed to examine across Services and
direct-purchased venues of care, but are not powered to examine the
performance of clinics or providers within MTFs. DHA survey results are
reported quarterly to support improvement efforts in the direct and
purchased care venues.
General findings across the DHA surveys:
HCSDB survey findings: Adult beneficiary ratings of their ``Health
Plan'' (based on ratings of an 8-10 on 0-10 scale) increased for all
users from 1999 to 2014, and remained higher than the civilian CAHPS-
Plan-based 50th percentile benchmark adjusted for age and health
status. This increase and higher ratings applied to all beneficiary
groups: enrolled in MTFs, enrolled with the Civilian plan, and non-
enrollees (i.e. Standard/Extra). Ratings of ``health care'' also
increased over this time period, for all users in general, and
especially for enrollees with civilian PCM and non-enrollees. Direct
care enrollee ratings for ``health care'' generally lagged beneficiary
ratings of care in civilian facilities and the national benchmark
average. Similar patterns were found in beneficiary ratings of access
to care. Ratings by non-enrolled MHS beneficiaries are similar to or
even higher than civilian benchmarks.
TRISS survey findings: MHS beneficiaries rate their inpatient
medical and surgical care in military treatment facilities and their
care in civilian facilities equal to or higher than the national 50th
percentile CAHPS inpatient benchmark survey results; but rate their
obstetrical experience in military facilities, on average, lower than
the civilian benchmarks; and, as such, the MHS is actively engaged in
improving the obstetrical experience and process of care and support.
TROSS survey findings: Focused on their experience with outpatient
care. Beneficiary ratings of their access to care and provider
communications in military facilities, while high, are slightly lower
than the civilian benchmark top ratings (outpatient CAHPS). Conversely,
MHS purchased care users report significantly higher scores than the
civilian benchmark with courteous, respectful and helpful office staff
members.
The Service outpatient surveys generally report higher ratings of
the care experience than the TROSS (outpatient) results, likely due to
differences in the time frame users are asked to report on, that is,
Service surveys focus on the specific outpatient visit with a specific
provider on a specific data, while the DHA surveys, including the
TROSS, focus on beneficiary experience over the previous twelve months
similar to the CAHPS surveys. The Service survey results help identify
positive and negative patterns at the military treatment facility and
provider level for more immediate corrective action at the local level,
but cannot be compared across Services or with national benchmarks.
The Department is currently developing a Tri-Service Joint
Outpatient Experience Survey (JOES) to be operational in fiscal year
2015. The survey will consolidate the four separate outpatient surveys
currently being conducted within the Military Health System (Army,
Navy, Air Force and DHA). The combined, standardized survey will be
used to compare and assess providers, clinics/sites and facilities
using a uniform fielding methodology, sampling design and instrument.
JOES will assess beneficiaries using outpatient services in a
standardized way, while reducing survey burden on the beneficiary.
Survey results will provide actionable feedback at the tactical level
to improve the beneficiaries' experience, and the overall quality of
care. Survey results will be monitored by senior leadership, and, a
component of the survey will allow comparison to civilian health care
practices across the U.S.
General Dempsey. Yes. The Department's satisfaction surveys,
including Individual Service and the TRICARE Outpatient Satisfaction
Survey (TROSS) demonstrate that the majority of patients reported being
satisfied with access to care. There is variance between satisfaction
scores in the direct care and purchased care components.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
rd-180 engine replacement
82. Senator Nelson. Secretary Carter, we rely heavily on the Atlas
V rocket, and its Russian-made RD-180 engine, for getting our national
security assets into space. Given the deteriorating situation with Mr.
Putin, Congress authorized and appropriated $220 million to end our
reliance on the RD-180. We gave a deadline of four years--2019--from
now to do it. What are you doing to meet that deadline?
Secretary Carter. The Department is committed to transitioning from
its use of Russian rocket propulsion systems in the most efficient and
affordable manner possible. As an initial step, the Department
reprogrammed $40 million to initiate engine risk reduction activities.
This funding, when combined with the $220 million included in the
fiscal year 2015 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act
(P.L. 113-235), will fund critical rocket propulsion work as directed
in Section 1604 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon
National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2015 (P.L. 113-291).
The Department currently procures launch services, rather than
launch vehicle hardware, and is working with industry to determine how
to procure future, cost effective launch services utilizing
domestically-produced propulsions systems. It should be noted that
transitioning from reliance on the Russian RD-180 engine requires more
than just development of a domestic propulsion system. The propulsion
system must be integrated into a launch system in order to provide
access to space. This integration process, while initiated in parallel,
is likely to require as much as two additional years after completion
of propulsion system development. Transitioning off the RD-180 onto a
U.S designed and manufactured rocket propulsion system or a new launch
system by 2019 represents significant cost, schedule, and technical
challenges.

83. Senator Nelson. Mr. Secretary, do you feel that the 2019 goal
is attainable?
Secretary Carter. Ending reliance on the Russian RD-180 engine
requires more than just development of a domestic rocket propulsion
system. The propulsion system must be integrated into a launch system
in order to provide access to space. This integration process, while
initiated in parallel, is likely to require as much as two additional
years after completion of propulsion system development. Further, the
system must complete certification before being allowed to service
National Security Space missions. This combination of required events
represents significant cost, schedule and technical challenges to
attaining the 2019 goal. Nonetheless, we remain committed to
transitioning from our use of the RD-180 engine in the most efficient,
expeditious, and affordable manner possible that is consistent with the
direction in Section 1604 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. ``Buck''
McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2015 (P.L.
113-291).
cyber
84. Senator Nelson. Secretary Carter, what do you see as the
Department's role in cyber security?
Secretary Carter. The Department of Defense has three missions in
cyberspace: (1) defend Department of Defense information networks to
assure Department of Defense missions; (2) provide integrated cyber
capabilities to support combatant commands' contingency plans and
military operations; and (3) defend the Nation against cyberattacks of
significant consequence. For the defend the Nation mission, the
Department works closely with other government agencies to synchronize
capabilities and develop options to disrupt cyberattacks of significant
consequence before they can impact the homeland. More broadly, the
Department partners with other U.S. Departments and Agencies to
investigate cyberattacks, develop indications and early warning of
threats, and protect U.S. critical infrastructure. If required, the
Department may provide cybersecurity support to other agencies of the
Federal Government, state and local governments, and the private
sector.

85. Senator Nelson. Mr. Secretary, how will you work with other
departments and agencies to secure our nation's cyber infrastructure?
Secretary Carter. Cybersecurity requires a whole-of-government
approach built on the unique authorities, missions, and capabilities of
all departments and agencies. In general, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) leads the national effort to protect against, prevent,
mitigate, and recover from cyber incidents, and investigates
cybercrimes within DHS's jurisdiction. The Department of Justice (DOJ)
investigates, attributes, disrupts, and prosecutes malicious cyber
actors and leads domestic intelligence activities. Finally, the
Department of Defense securely operates and defends the Department's
information networks and assures the ability of the Department to
perform its national security mission. The Department's cyber force
supports military operations in all domains by integrating cyber
capabilities alongside traditional land, maritime, air and space
capabilities. The Department also defends the Nation from attack, to
include countering cyberattacks of significant consequence. In
addition, both DOJ and the Department support the national effort to
protect against, prevent, mitigate, and recover from cyber incidents.
isil
86. Senator Nelson. Mr. Secretary, now that you've had a chance to
review the situation in the Middle East, what steps do you believe we
need to take now against ISIL?
Secretary Carter. The steps that are needed now against the Islamic
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) include keeping the military pressure on
the ISIS network through the advise and assist presence in Iraq, and
the continued use of airstrikes in both Iraq and Syria. Also, the
training and equipping of a moderate Syrian opposition force to counter
ISIS inside Syria will begin soon. While these lines of effort are
underway, it is imperative that any military gains are complemented and
enhanced by the contributions of other lines of effort from U.S.
government partners. Other lines of effort include empowering Iraqi
Prime Minister Abadi as he seeks to create a more inclusive, multi-
sectarian government; maintaining pressure on ISIS' finances; and
augmenting efforts to counter ISIS' narrative and its appeal,
especially as the group seeks to expand its global network outside of
Iraq and Syria to other parts of the Middle East, Africa, and beyond.
Each of these efforts must also enable and empower the robust coalition
of nations opposed to ISIS.
nato allies
87. Senator Nelson. In light of Russia's aggressive behavior
towards Ukraine, what are we doing to reassure our NATO allies about
our commitment to the region?
Secretary Carter. The United States is undertaking several
initiatives to reassure North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
allies of our commitment to collective security.
The President's European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) includes
conducting additional military exercises and training on land, in the
air, and at sea, while sustaining a rotational presence across Europe
in support of Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE. ERI increases the
responsiveness of U.S. forces to reinforce NATO allies' capabilities by
prepositioning equipment and enhancing reception facilities in Europe,
and increasing the participation of the U.S. Navy in NATO naval force
deployments, including more persistent deployments to the Black and
Baltic Seas. ERI also builds the capacity of close partners such as
Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine to enhance interoperability with the
United States and NATO forces and to provide for their own defense.
In addition to ERI, the United States is fully committed to NATO's
Readiness Action Plan (RAP). RAP is NATO's response to new security
challenges along its eastern and southern borders. RAP will allow NATO
to respond more quickly to security threats along its borders by
creating a new Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) and
establishing new headquarters elements in several eastern allied
nations.
All of these initiatives are in place to reassure our NATO Allies
and partners of the United States' commitment to our central and
eastern European partners, and to the transatlantic relationship.
General Dempsey. Since early March 2014, the United States has
taken action, both bilaterally and through NATO, to reassure Allies of
our solemn commitment to their security and territorial integrity as
members of the NATO Alliance.
The European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) provides over $1 billion
in new monies that will enable the United States to further support the
defense and security of NATO Allies and bolster the security and
capacity of U.S. partners. With ERI funding, DOD seeks to continue
providing a visible U.S. presence for NATO Allies, as well as other
partners in the region, who feel most threatened by Russia's actions
against Ukraine.
The ERI funding enables the United States to undertake the
following measures:
Increase exercises, training and rotational presence
across Europe but especially on the territory of our newer Allies. Many
of the U.S. air and ground forces participating in these activities
would rotate in from the United States.
As we have done in Poland, deploy detachments of U.S.
planners to augment the capability of our Allies to design and host a
broad range of training opportunities.
Increase responsiveness of U.S. forces to reinforce NATO
by exploring initiatives such as prepositioning of equipment and
improving reception facilities in Europe.
Increase participation by the U.S. Navy in NATO naval
force deployments, including more persistent, rotational deployments to
the Black and Baltic seas.
Build the partner capacity of close partners such as
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine so they can better work alongside the
United States and NATO, as well as provide for their own defense.
This initiative will build on existing tools and
authorities, and was included in the Department of Defense's Fiscal
Year 2015 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) request to Congress and
the Department of State's Fiscal Year 2015 Foreign Military Financing
OCO Budget.
climate change
88. Senator Nelson. Mr. Secretary, our coasts and all of our people
and assets, including our naval infrastructure, are at risk from sea
level rise. Is the department making any plans to address this?
Secretary Carter. Yes. In 2014, the Department of Defense issued
the third update to the Department's Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap,
which presents the Department's strategy for addressing immediate and
long-term climate change challenges. Beginning in 2009, the Department
recognized that climate change in general, and sea level rise in
particular, could affect our ability to conduct our assigned missions.
The Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program began a
series of projects to develop and evaluate the information, models, and
tools needed to examine climate change related effects on coastal
installations. The results of these initial projects pointed out the
need for further refinement of regional climate change scenario
development beyond those available in the National Climate Assessment.
The Department is leading a federal working group that includes the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency, U.S. Geological Survey, U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers Civil Works, Oceanographer of the Navy, and the
South Florida Water Management District to develop more specific
regional scenarios that account for both sea level rise and extreme
water levels associated with storm surge.
The Department is currently conducting a screening-level
vulnerability assessment to identify where the Department is vulnerable
to extreme weather events today and to what degree. The survey includes
current vulnerabilities to inundation/flooding, temperature extremes,
drought, wildfire, and wind, as well as identifying current sea level
effects, potential vulnerabilities if levels rise, and the reference
datum used for the analysis worldwide. This data will enable the
Department to identify where more comprehensive and region- or
installation-specific assessments are needed to determine what adaptive
responses are the most appropriate. The survey will be complete in late
2015.
The Department has been actively reviewing policy, guidance, and
directives to identify and integrate consideration of potential climate
change effects into our infrastructure and operations. Long-range
planning documents, like installation master plans and integrated
natural resource management plans, now require planners to consider
climate-related impacts in their design and management decisions. The
Department has identified areas where new policies were needed, such as
flood plain, water resource management, and sustainable building
design, and issued them.

89. Senator Nelson. Mr. Secretary, are there steps you can take now
that will protect our investments from this happening? Would this
include moving assets, such as naval vessels, to other locations?
Secretary Carter. Sea level rise is a gradual occurrence and will
manifest itself differently in different locations. In some locations
the Department is already experiencing sea level rise, especially those
areas where the shoreline is also subsiding (sinking). The two effects
together produce higher than expected tidal and storm surge conditions
and can lead to damage to infrastructure and equipment. Shore
installations are prepared for dealing with these conditions in the
near-term with sand bag plans, evacuation of ships and aircraft, and
protective mooring practices.
For the long-term, consideration of the effects of climate change,
including sea level rise, are being made during master planning and
design processes. Moreover, some areas are experiencing increased
shoreline erosion. Infrastructure located along these shorelines is
being monitored for adverse effects and reinforced or moved back as
necessary.
At this time, there are no plans to permanently relocate any
assets, such as naval vessels, as a result of the effects of climate
change.
support to special operations
90. Senator Nelson. Mr. Secretary, last year, Admiral McRaven
expressed concern about the impacts that budget cuts, including
sequestration, could have on special operations. There are reports that
the Services are considering cuts to capabilities that provide direct
support to special operations forces, such as rotary wing aircraft.
What are the responsibilities of the Services for providing that
support to special operations forces? Are you comfortable that the
fiscal year 2016 budget request provides an appropriate level of
investment in such capabilities?
Secretary Carter. The Services currently provide Special Operations
Forces (SOF) with intelligence, communications, logistics, military
construction, and medical support.
Yes, I am comfortable with the level of investment funding that the
fiscal year 2016 budget requests for Service capabilities, which
support SOF. However, additional budget cuts or sequestrations could
limit conventional force support to SOF and affect SOF's ability to
perform their assigned missions. Potential budget cuts would impact
SOF's access to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets,
tactical fixed and rotary-wing lift, as well as disrupt modernization
schedules, infrastructure construction projects, sustainment levels,
and sea-based support to SOF.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
integration of women
91. Senator Shaheen. General Dempsey, can you provide an update on
the progress of the integration of women in the armed forces and share
with us any circumstances that may lead to the services submitting
exceptions to policy?
General Dempsey. Since the Department rescinded the Direct Ground
Combat and Assignment Rule in 2013, we have opened more than 91,000
positions that were previously closed to women. Going forward, the
major decisions for the Department concern the traditional, ground
combat arms occupations, infantry, armor, artillery, and of course our
Special Operations occupations. The Services continue to take a
deliberate approach to validate occupational standards to ensure they
are operationally specific, operationally relevant, and gender-neutral.
The Joint Chiefs are committed to expanding opportunities for women in
our military and ensuring every member of our Armed forces has an
opportunity to succeed.
While it would be premature to discuss exceptions to policy as laid
out in the January 24, 2013 rescission memo, exceptions must be
narrowly tailored and based on a rigorous analysis of factual data
regarding the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed for the position.
biofuels
92. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Carter, can you discuss the
military's efforts to diversify its energy resources to reduce its
reliance on a volatile global oil market. Related to these efforts, can
you provide an update on the current public-private joint agency
initiative to develop a domestically produced, cost-competitive
commercial supply of advanced biofuels? Additionally, can you discuss
the development of biofuels and its importance to the Department's long
term budget and operational planning?
Secretary Carter. The Alternative Fuels Policy for Operational
Platforms, states that the Department of Defense's ``primary
alternative fuels goal is to ensure operational military readiness,
improve battlespace effectiveness, and further flexibility of military
operations through the ability to use multiple, reliable fuel
sources.'' There is a clear long-term interest in being able to use
globally sourced fuels, produced from a variety of feedstocks, to power
the mission.
Consistent with these policies, the Department has been supporting
alternative fuel initiatives that generally fall into three categories:
testing, fuel production support, and procurement.
The majority of the Services' alternative fuels efforts
focus on testing to see if alternative fuels can work properly with our
equipment. This will enable us to buy and safely use alternative fuels
that may become available in the commercial marketplace.
The Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III Advanced Drop-
in Biofuels Production Project is a Department of Defense partnership
with the private sector and the Department of Energy. In September,
three companies were selected for $70 million DPA Phase 2 awards to
construct commercial-scale biofuel production facilities; these
projects will also have private sector funding totaling approximately
$700 million. Each project will be capable of producing more than ten
million gallons per year of fuels meeting military specifications while
the combined maximum capacity of the three projects will exceed 110
million gallons per year of such fuels. Each project will use a
different feedstock: municipal solid waste, woody biomass, and fats,
oils, or greases.
The ``Farm-to-Fleet'' initiative was announced in 2013
with the goal of enabling biofuel blends to become a regular,
operational fuel purchased for military use. These fuels will be
purchased by the Defense Logistics Agency Energy through its regular
competitive bulk fuel procurement program; the Department of
Agriculture is making Commodity Credit Corporation funds available to
this procurement program to support use of agricultural commodities in
producing drop-in biofuels.
Overall, these initiatives will contribute to ensuring that the
Department is able to buy and use the fuel we need, where we need it,
from a variety of feedstocks, at a competitive price.
europe
93. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Carter, the OCO request includes
$789 million for the European Reassurance Initiative to demonstrate our
support for our NATO allies and European partners. Do you believe this
level of funding is adequate to counter the threat posed by Russia?
Secretary Carter. The Department is confident that the funding
levels for fiscal year 2016 European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) are
adequate to counter the threat posed by Russia as it stands today and
to continue the reassurance initiatives. The fiscal year 2016 ERI seeks
to maintain a persistent presence of U.S. air, land, and sea forces in
Eastern Europe; build allied and partner capacity; and increase
readiness and responsiveness through additional exercises,
prepositioning, and infrastructure improvements.
Along with our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and
partners, the United States is also helping to adapt the Alliance to
the new security situation in Europe and counter the threat posed by
Russia. The Readiness Action Plan, adopted by allied leaders at the
2014 Wales Summit, seeks to go beyond assurance measures by enhancing
NATO's command-and-control infrastructure and rapid response
capability. Specific enhancements include: reforming the NATO Response
Force, in particular by launching the Very High Readiness Joint Task
Force; establishing small command-and-control elements on the territory
of eastern allies, which will coordinate NATO activities in these
nations and be prepared to receive reinforcing units, if necessary;
reviewing and updating existing defense plans; and expanding the size
and mission of the Multinational Corps Northeast in Poland, which will
increase its focus on Article 5 planning and preparedness. Reassurance
and these enhancements will make the United States and NATO better able
to respond to threats emanating from Europe's east and south.

94. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Carter, with continued aggression
from Russia in Europe, unwavering support for our NATO allies is
crucial. As you are aware, Poland is in the process of seeking to
upgrade its air and missile defense program in light of threats
associated with the Russian incursion in Ukraine. I understand that
Poland seeks a transitional presence of American PATRIOT systems to
protect itself until its modernization program is complete. Do you
support the deployment of a transitional PATRIOT presence in Poland?
Secretary Carter. The goal is to maintain close cooperation on
missile defense with Poland. Given current global requirements for
Patriot, the U.S. Army does not have the assets available to make a
long-term deployment to Poland. However, the Army will look for
opportunities to conduct Patriot training and exercises with Poland.
The Department will also continue to identify additional opportunities
to conduct joint training in Poland.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2016 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

----------

TUESDAY, MARCH 10, 2015

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

THE POSTURE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m., in
room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John
McCain (chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe,
Sessions, Wicker, Ayotte, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis,
Sullivan, Graham, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, and King.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman McCain. Good morning. I want to welcome the
witnesses, and I thank you all for being here this morning. The
committee meets to receive testimony on the plans and programs
of the Department of the Navy for fiscal year 2016. I want to
thank each of our witnesses for their distinguished service to
the Nation as well as to the sailors, marines, and civilians
they lead who are serving around the world today.
This is Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert's last posture hearing
before the committee, and I am sure he is relieved to know
that, his last appearance as Chief of Naval Operations [CNO]. I
would like to thank you, Admiral Greenert, for your 40 years of
distinguished service to our Navy, and I wish you and Darlene
all the best in the future.
In the last 3 months, some of America's most experienced
statesmen and strategic thinkers have offered this committee a
clear, unified, and alarming assessment of current worldwide
threats in U.S. national security strategy. As Dr. Henry
Kissinger, former Secretary of State, testified on January
29th, ``The United States has not faced a more diverse and
complex array of crises since the end of the second World
War.''
The actual global challenges we face are compounded by the
limitations of the Budget Control Act [BCA] of 2011 and
sequestration, which are a self-inflicted national security
crisis. Indeed, all four of the military Service Chiefs have
testified that defense spending at sequestration levels would
put American lives at risk. Now more than ever, a strong Navy
and Marine Corps are central to our Nation's ability to deter
adversaries, assure allies, and defend our national interests.
From our strategy of rebalancing, to the Asia-Pacific
region, to conducting ongoing operations against ISIL [the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant], to deterring rogue
actors like Iran or North Korea, to many other requirements,
the United States Navy and Marine Corps are key pillars of our
national security strategy. Yet by any measure, today's fleet
of 275 ships is too small to address these critical security
challenges. The Navy's force structure assessment requires is
306 ships. The bipartisan National Defense Panel calls for a
fleet of 323 to 346 ships, and our combatant commanders say
they require 450 ships. But under sequestration, the Navy has
said the fleet could shrink to 260 ships. Equally troubling,
the Marine Corps continues personnel reductions down from
202,000 Active Duty marines in 2012 to 184,000 today, to
182,000 in 2017.
With the demands on our sailors and marines rising, these
force reductions, coupled with major readiness shortfalls due
to sequestration, are lengthening deployments, cutting training
and time at home with families, and putting our All-Volunteer
Force under considerable strain. The President's Budget request
attempts to buy as much readiness as the Department can execute
for fiscal year 2016, and this is yet another reason why we
cannot afford a defense budget at sequestration levels.
The President's Budget also includes significant funding
requests for major Navy and Marine Corps acquisition programs.
In the current fiscal environment, it is all the more important
for this committee to conduct rigorous oversight of these
programs to ensure that the Department of the Navy is making
the best use of limited taxpayer dollars. That is exactly what
we will.
With the Littoral Combat Ship [LCS], despite initial cost
overruns that more doubled the cost per ship, the Navy appears
to have stabilized the cost of the LCS frames. Yet the program
still faces challenges to deliver the promised warfighting
capability. All three of the LCS mission packages still need
significant further testing and must overcome major technology
integration challenges.
Regarding of the Secretary of Defense's decision to upgrade
the LCS, this committee will continue seeking further
information to justify this decision. Without a clear
capabilities-based assessment, it is unclear what operational
requirements the upgraded LCS is designed to meet, and, thus,
how much more lethal and survivable the ship needs to be. In
short, the Navy must demonstrate what problem the upgraded LCS
is trying to solve. We cannot afford to make this mistake
again.
With the first three Ford-class carriers, despite cost
overruns of more than $2 billion each, this program has not
exceeded the cost cap in the last 3 years. However, the second
Ford-class carrier, the USS John F. Kennedy, will deliver in
fiscal year 2022 less capable and less complete due to the
Navy's proposed two-phase delivery approach. This plan would
leave us with an incomplete ship should world events demand an
additional aircraft carrier, or if the USS Nimitz encounters
unforeseen problems in the final years of its 50-year service
life. I am also concerned about the Navy's plan to delay full
ship shock trials from the first to the second Ford-class
carriers. That delay is hard to justify for a new ship that is
this complex.
This committee also has a duty to shape the future of our
Navy and Marine Corps. With three Service combatant classes set
to retire soon, now is the time to lay the analytical
groundwork to replace those ships. As the Navy develops
requirements for the next class of amphibious vessel, we must
ensure that our warships are capable of supporting the Marines
in the manner they plan to fight in the future. We must also
carefully examine the future aircraft fleet and the carrier air
wing. Twelve billion dollars or more for one ship is simply too
expensive. We must do even more to reduce costs and increase
competition within the aircraft carrier program, and as
challenges to American air power projection grow, we must chart
a path to achieve the unmanned strike capability from our
aircraft carriers.
We look forward to the witnesses' testimony today and hope
that they will cover the broad spectrum of policy, procurement,
readiness, personnel, and resource issues that the Department
confronts. Senator Reed?

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let
me join you in welcoming Secretary of the Navy Raymond E.
Mabus, Jr., Admiral Greenert, and Commandant of Marine Corps
General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., to this committee this morning
to testify on the plans and programs of the Department of the
Navy and the review of the annual budget request. Let me also
thank Secretary Mabus for joining us last Saturday at Quonset
Point for the keel laying ceremony for the USS Colorado. Thank
you, Mr. Secretary.
I want to welcome General Dunford to his first posture
hearing, and I also want to join the chairman in commending the
outstanding work of Admiral Greenert as he departs at least
this venue. Thank you very much, sir, for your extraordinary
service to the Navy and to the Nation.
Our witnesses this morning face huge challenges as they
strive to balance the need to support ongoing operations and
sustained readiness with the need to modernize and keep the
technological edge so critical to military success. These
challenges have been made particularly difficult by the fiscal
constraints of the BCA and sequestration. All the military
departments have been forced to make painful tradeoffs, and now
the threat of sequestration continues to loom. If Congress does
not act to end sequestration, I believe our long-term national
security interests will be threatened.
Last year, the Department of the Navy was facing serious
readiness problems caused by deferred maintenance, reduced
steaming and flying hours, and cancelled training and
deployments. The increased emphasis on readiness in this year's
budget will address some of the Navy's most serious readiness
problems, but results in a serious shortfall in modernization
funds to meet future threats. I am interested in hearing the
witnesses' views on the increase in this risk because of the
shortfalls.
All areas of our naval forces are overtaxed. The Navy is
facing shortfalls on attack submarines, air and missile defense
cruisers, destroyers, and strike fighter inventories. They have
already been operating for 2 years now with fewer than their
required 11 aircraft carriers. During the next decade, as a
first priority the Navy will buy a new class of strategic
missile submarines to replace the Ohio-class submarines, a very
costly venture. I am interested in hearing how the Navy is
managing its operational tempo with these shortfalls. I am also
interested in the witnesses' views on how they will manage
competing demands in the budget once the costs of the Ohio
replacements begin.
The President's Budget request calls for Marine Corps end
strength of 184,000 marines, down from the war time high of
over 20,000 marines. I am interested to learn how the Marine
Corps will manage mission risk with a force this size,
particularly with additional missions such as increased embassy
security. For Marine Corps modernization, the fiscal year 2016
request supports the decisions made last year that made the
strategy for ground systems more sound.
The Marine Corps clearly remains committed to
revitalization of its armored amphibious assault capabilities
with a budget request that includes funds for mobility and
survivability upgrades for its current family of armored
amphibious assault vehicles, and continues the competitive
search for a new-wheeled amphibious combat vehicle. We
understand that the Amphibious Combat Vehicle Program would
integrate a number of existing technologies into a new vehicle.
The Marine Corps has described this program as ``non-
developmental,'' which raises a question about what ``non-
developmental'' means when you are developing a new system. I
am interested in your insights, Commandant, on what this whole
program involves.
It also is clear the Marine Corps' real amphibious
challenge on what General Dunford has called the amphibious gap
has more to do with ships and connectives than air and seaborne
assault systems. Navy witnesses have testified about the number
of ships required to meet amphibious shipping goals. Sometimes
lost in that discussion is the fact that changes to the Marine
Corps ground or air components ripple through the amphibious
ship force requirement. I know that the Navy's planned purchase
of the LPD-28 amphibious transport is one effort to address the
amphibious shipping shortfall. I am interested to know what
else the Department of the Navy is doing to close or mitigate
the gap between requirements and capabilities to ensure our
amphibious force meets our needs and is capable and ready.
The Department of Defense [DOD] Defense Strategic Guidance
issued in January 2012, followed by the 2014 QDR [Quadrennial
Defense Review], and this January our national security
strategy, all echo a renewed United States military orientation
on the Asia-Pacific. Consistent with that strategy, the Defense
Department has been working to realign United States military
forces in South Korea and Okinawa, and plan to position Navy
and Marine Corps forces in Australia, Singapore, and possibly
elsewhere in the region. The problem has also been implementing
a plan to forward deploy more ships, as shown by the Navy's
second rotational deployment of a Littoral Combat Ship (LCS),
the USS Fort Worth, in Singapore. I am interested in hearing
more about these and other aspects of the deployment.
Again, there are many questions, but I want to conclude by
once again thanking all of you for your extraordinary service
to the Nation, to the Navy, and to the Marine Corps. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Mr. Secretary?

STATEMENT OF HON. RAYMOND E. MABUS, JR., SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Secretary Mabus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman McCain,
Ranking Member Reed, members of this committee, thank you for
this opportunity to discuss the Department of the Navy with CNO
Jon Greenert and Commandant of the Marine Corps, Joe Dunford. I
have the great privilege of representing the sailors and
marines who serve our Nation around the world, the civilians
who support them, and all of their families.
As the chairman and Senator Reed pointed out, this is
Admiral Greenert's last posture testimony before this
committee. He has been a steady hand at the helm of the Navy
through the past 4 years of international instability and
budget turbulence, and every day his judgment, his advice, his
good counsel have been critical. It is an honor to serve with
him, and he will leave a lasting legacy.
Today our security interests face an increasing array of
threats and demands, while our budget situation, as you so
clearly pointed out, Mr. Chairman, grows more challenging. But
it is clear that the Navy and Marine Corps team offer the best
value to advance both our global security and economic
interests. Uniquely, the Navy and Marine Corps provide presence
around the globe around the clock. We are the Nation's first
line of defense, ready for anything that may come over the
horizon. Presence means that we respond faster, we remain on
station longer, we carry everything we need with us, and do
whatever missions are assigned by our Nation's leaders without
needing anyone else's permission.
We have always said America's success depends on an
exceptional Navy and Marine Corps. Article 1 of our
Constitution authorizes Constitution to raise an Army when
needed, but directs you to provide and maintain a Navy. From
the first six frigates to our growing fleet of today, from
Tripoli to Afghanistan, sailors and marines have proven the
founders' wisdom. American leaders across the political
spectrum have understood the vital significance of sea power.
We are truly America's away team. We deploy in peace just
as much as in war, and our role the last 7 years in securing
sea lanes and freedom of commerce has boosted our own and the
world's economy. Nearly half the world's population lives
within 100 miles of the sea, 90 percent of all global trade
goes by sea, and 95 percent of all voice and data goes under
the ocean. The shelves of our stores are stocked with just-in-
time delivery, with products from all over the globe, and some
38 million American jobs are directly linked to seaborne
international trade. For 7 decades, the Navy and Marine Corps
have been the primary protector of this international system,
and that is why our national defense strategy is so clearly
focused on the maritime domain and requires investment in
maritime assets.
For the past few years, the Department of the Navy has
attempted to minimize the impact of an uncertain budgetary
environment marked by numerous continuing resolutions, the
imposition of sequester-level funding, and the threat of the
return of sequestration. This environment had made it much more
difficult, but even more critical, to set priorities and to
make some hard choices.
The presence of our Navy and Marine Corps uniquely delivers
is built on four foundations: people, platforms, power, and
partnerships. These are key to the capability, capacity, and
success of our naval services, and they remain my top
priorities.
People. Our sailors and marines are well known for their
ability to exercise independent judgment and the flexibility to
adapt to changing circumstances. We remain committed to
providing our sailors, marines, and our civilians with the
training and the support they need to maintain our naval
presence, and we include in this their dedicated families, our
injured, and our wounded.
We have launched a comprehensive approach to assuring we
have the world's healthiest, fittest, most resilient, and best
educated force, one which truly America represents America's
diversity. We continue to aggressively combat sexual assault,
abuse, ethical failings, similar challenges, and we are
exploring innovative means to improve the way we manage the
force.
In platforms, our people, as good as they are, cannot do
their job without ships. Providing presence, being where we are
needed when we are needed, requires those ships. Quantity has a
quality all its own. That means we have to have a properly-
sized and a properly-balanced fleet. On September 11, 2001, the
Navy battle force stood at 316 ships. By 2008, our fleet had
declined to 278 ships. Our focus on two ground wars only partly
explains that decline.
In the 5 years before I came to this office, the Navy
contracted for only 27 ships, not enough to stop the slide and
the size of the fleet. In my first 5 years, we have contracted
for 70 ships, halting and reversing the decline. By the end of
the decade, our fleet will once again top 300 ships. We have
accomplished this with a direct and fundamental business
approach based in large part on the legislation which
originated in this committee, authored by Chairman McCain and
then Chairman Levin, things like increasing competition,
relying more on fixed price contracts. Thanks to this
committee, Congress has helped multiyear and block buys.
But budget instability, budget uncertainty seriously erode
our ability to grow our fleet, manage our resources, and
maintain the industrial base. Without a correctly sized and
shaped fleet, the Navy and Marine Corps will not be able to
meet the demands for the kinds of missions for which we are the
best and often the only option. In the face of budgetary
uncertainty, cutting ships is the most damaging and lease
reversible course of action, which is why I am committed to
preserving ship building to the maximum extent possible.
Fueling the ships' aircrafts and vehicle of our Navy and
Marine Corps is a vital operational concern and enables a
global presence. That is why the Navy has a history of
innovation, particularly in energy, moving from sail to steam
to oil and pioneering nuclear power. We believe our national
security interests and the ability of the Navy and Marine Corps
to meets its missions must be enhanced by increasing our energy
diversity and efficiency. Our ability to maintain presence and
advance global security will also be augmented through
partnerships. Cooperation makes us more effective and defuses
tensions, reduces misunderstandings.
Again and again, our naval forces have proven themselves
the most immediate, the most capable, and the most adaptable
option when a crisis develops. Overall, the President's fiscal
year 2016 budget balances current readiness needed to execute
assigned missions while sustaining a highly capable fleet, all
within a tough fiscal climate. That climate demands, as you
pointed out, Mr. Chairman, our most rigorous examination of
every dollar we spent in continuing our aggressive efforts to
cut unnecessary costs in every program and shift resources from
tail to tooth.
When America is called, the Navy and Marine Corps have
always been there. In order to ensure that we continue to
provide the naval force our Nation's leaders and the America
expect, the Commandant, the Chief of Naval Operations, and I
look forward to answering your questions, and to working
together with this committee and with Congress to maintain our
great Navy and Marine Corps. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Mabus follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Ray Mabus
Chairman McCain and Ranking Member Reed, members of the committee,
thank you for affording this opportunity to discuss readiness and
posture of the Department of the Navy. With Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO) Jonathan Greenert and Commandant of the Marine Corps Joseph
Dunford, I have the great privilege of representing the sailors and
marines who serve our Nation around the world, the civilians who
support them and all of their families.
I cannot let it pass without noting that this will be Admiral
Greenert's last posture testimony before this committee. He has been a
steady hand on the helm for the U.S. Navy through the past 4 years of
international instability and budget turbulence. Every day his
judgment, his advice and his counsel have been critical. He has been a
great CNO, and it has been an honor to serve with him. He will leave an
enduring legacy of having advanced the interests and capabilities of
our Navy and our Department, and I know this committee and our country
want to share in offering our heartfelt thanks.
This statement, together with those provided by General Dunford and
Admiral Greenert, presents to you and to the American people, an
overview of the Department of the Navy, and highlights our priorities
as we move forward with the fiscal year 2016 budget process. As the
Secretary of the Navy, I am responsible for recruiting, training, and
equipping the almost 900,000 sailors, marines, and civilians who spend
every day working to defend the American people and our national
interests.
This opportunity to review our current posture comes at a
particularly critical juncture in our Nation's history. Our national
security interests face an increasing array of threats and demands
around the globe, even as our fiscal and budgetary situation grows more
challenging. However, this is an opportune moment as well, as I firmly
believe the threats and demands are best met with a strong and
comprehensive maritime response. Similarly, I believe naval assets
offer not only the best value to preserve our national security by
advancing our global interests, but also the best value in supporting
our own and the world's economy to help meet our fiscal challenges. The
rationale for that belief is as simple as it is enduring.
the value of presence
Uniquely, the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps provide presence
around the globe, around the clock. We are the Nation's first line of
defense, ready for any challenge that might come over the horizon.
Presence means we respond faster, we remain on station longer, we carry
everything we need with us, and we carry out the missions assigned by
our national leaders without needing anyone else's permission.
America's leadership role in the world is due in large part to our
Nation's sea services capability and capacity to ensure stability,
build on our relationships with allies and partners, deter adversaries,
prevent wars, and provide our Nation's leaders with options in times of
crisis. Should those measures fail, the combat power necessary to fight
and win in any sort of conflict. As America's away team, performing
most often far from home, the operational tempo of the Navy and Marine
Corps are--unlike our sister Services--little different in times of
peace or in times of conflict. There are no permanent homecomings for
sailors and marines because we are never a garrison force.
Born a maritime nation, we have known throughout our 239 years that
for America to succeed, we must have an exceptional Navy and Marine
Corps. Thomas Paine famously declared in Common Sense in 1776 that
``the cause of America is in a great measure the cause of all
mankind.'' He was equally adamant that the defense of liberty required
a capable naval force. More than just physical security and defense
from European powers, Paine drew direct connections between the Navy
and the economic success of the American experiment.
Our Nation's founders, whether northern merchants and lawyers like
John Adams or southern planters like Thomas Jefferson, also considered
a Navy critical to our Nation's success. Article One of our
Constitution grants Congress the power to ``raise'' an Army when
needed, but directs Congress to ``provide and maintain a Navy.'' Over
the past 2 centuries, American leaders from across the political
spectrum have hewed to that Constitutional direction and have, in a
nonpartisan fashion, promoted the vital significance of sea power. Over
the past 2 centuries, from Tripoli to Iwo Jima to Tripoli, from the
first six frigates to the Great White Fleet to the great fleets of
World War II, our Navy and Marine Corps have protected and advanced
American interests, stability and freedom around the world.
Today, the value and importance of our naval assets to security and
stability here at home and around the world has never been greater.
Nearly half the world's population lives less than 60 miles from the
sea. With 90 percent of global trade carried by sea, even those who
live in landlocked states are dependent on the world's oceans. In these
days of an internet-connected world, 95 percent of all the voice and
data goes under the ocean through cables, including the data keeping
the world's financial system running.
We live in an age of globalization and worldwide trade. The shelves
of stores of every variety are stocked through ``just in time''
delivery with products from all over the globe. Estimates show that a
single major port facility in the United States impacts more than 1
million American jobs and contributes about $1 billion a day to our
Nation's economic productivity. Overall, some 38 million American jobs
are directly linked to seaborne international trade.
The security and stability of the international system of trade and
finance is tied irrevocably to the free movement of goods and data
across and under the sea, and is more than just a military concern. It
impacts potentially every American in the prices we pay for goods and
services and in the very availability of those goods and services.
While it is far away and out of sight to most Americans, our naval
presence around the world isn't a theoretical construct.
For 7 decades, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps have been the primary
protector of this international system. There is a sound basis in the
proposition that rising international prosperity is directly linked to
the U.S. Navy. We have kept the sea-lanes open. We have kept freedom of
navigation open for anybody engaged in peaceful and legitimate trade.
As the President has said, we have ``been the anchor of global
security.''
We benefit from this enormously economically, but we also benefit
from the way that shared economic success helps to limit conflict and
war. Around the world, high unemployment, stagnant economies, financial
struggles often lead to social disorder, political unrest, upheaval,
and outright conflict. Maritime instability contributes to these
problems, stoking the fires--as can increasing competition for scarce
resources. By helping to secure the world's maritime commons, by
providing a calming presence, and by responding to crises early to
limit their escalation and enhance diplomatic opportunities, the
ability of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps to be where it matters when
it matters is vital to international stability. That is why our
national defense strategy is so clearly focused on the maritime domain
and requires investment in maritime assets.
around the globe, around the clock
The best illustration of the extent and impact of the presence
provided by our Nation's sea services can be seen in just a single day
of operations. I've chosen July 26th not because it was especially
important, but because it was reasonably typical. On that day, I was on
a trip around the world, visiting sailors and marines and meeting with
some of our international partners. In my nearly 6 years as Secretary,
I've traveled to 131 countries and territories and traveled nearly 1
million air miles. I believe I can do my job better by actually seeing
and talking with the men and women who serve our Nation where they are
serving, and by meeting face-to-face with representatives of other
countries, and not just sitting behind a desk in Washington.
My trip last July began in Hawaii, observing activities and
operations in the world's largest maritime exercise, Rim of the Pacific
(RIMPAC), which included the navies of 22 nations, including allies
from the region, like Japan and Australia and South Korea, but also
valued NATO allies like Norway, which sent a warship all the way from
the Baltic Sea to join the exercises. For the first time it also
involved ships from the People's Republic of China's Navy. During the
exercise, these diverse forces worked together on everything from
search and rescue and humanitarian missions to practicing counter-
piracy tactics and maritime security missions.
As I flew onward to Tokyo to meet with Japanese leaders, an annual
exercise, Malabar, was just beginning in the Indian Ocean. This
bilateral U.S.-Indian naval exercise, which has grown in scope and
complexity since its first iteration, has fostered mutual understanding
with our Indian counterparts and enhanced our ability to operate with
one another in a wide range of missions. This year, the Maritime Self-
Defense Force from Japan joined the exercise in an important
demonstration of multilateral cooperation between Pacific and Indian
Ocean nations. The relationship between the Nations of the Pacific and
the Indian Oceans will continue to be critical in these important
maritime regions.
On the same day, in Afghanistan, our marines were increasing
training of Afghan security forces, working toward turning over
operational responsibilities to them, as the marines reduced their
direct combat mission. On that day, we had more than 5,000 marines and
sailors in the country, patrolling, training, and working with our
Afghan partners and NATO allies.
At the same time, our Marine Corps Black Sea Rotational Force was
involved in Platinum Lion, a series of exercises with our Romanian,
Bulgarian, and Serbian partners, taking place in Bulgaria. Working with
these NATO allies and friends from Eastern Europe, this exercise is an
important annual event in the Black Sea region to build the capacity
and capability of our partners and to promote peace and stability in an
area that has been in turmoil for the past several years. Our Marine
Corps Black Sea Rotational Force regularly deploys throughout Europe,
training with other forces, monitoring security developments, and
enhancing our ability to operate with our partners and allies in future
contingencies.
On July 26, the United States Embassy in Tripoli was evacuated as
the fighting in Libya intensified and the State Department decided
United States personnel were no longer safe at the Mission. The Marines
of the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force-Crisis Response, in
support of United States Africa Command, helped coordinate the
evacuation and escorted the vehicles that carried our diplomatic and
military personnel to safety in Tunisia. This kind of operation,
reacting to threats and problems as they develop, is the very reason
our Navy and Marine Corps are forward deployed, and must be forward
deployed to effectively give our leaders options.
On that day about half of our Navy's ships and submarines were at
sea, with 99 of our ships forward deployed and another 41 training near
our shores. Tens of thousands of sailors and 36,000 marines were away
from their homes, far from friends and family, forward deployed around
the world, serving in both combat and cooperation missions.
That was just one day last July. Each of these exercises on the
world's oceans, training events, security cooperation engagements with
friends and allies, combat operations in Afghanistan and contingency
operations in North Africa, continued to build and strengthen our
partnerships and alliances to help protect Americans and secure the
global system.
For 365 days per year, the Navy and Marine Corps operate across the
planet. When strikes against Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
targets in Iraq and Syria were ordered, Navy ships and aircraft were
quickly in range and launched operations. In fact, for the first 54
days, FA-18s off USS George H.W. Bush were the lone strike component.
When the President decided to employ military assets to support the
fight against Ebola in West Africa, V-22s and marines from our Special
Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force-Crisis Response were on the ground
within hours to provide logistical support to the medical responders.
Our Nation's Defense Strategic Guidance is clearly a maritime-
centric strategy focused on the Asia Pacific, on the Arabian Gulf, on
building partnerships, all while maintaining our presence around the
globe. To fulfill our role in this strategy the Navy and Marine Corps
face daily demands ranging from humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief, to protecting our embassies, to working with scores of partners
and allies, to dealing with multiple asymmetric threats and potential
conflicts. The Navy and Marine Corps meet these demands, and many more,
using the same people and the same platforms and equipment
demonstrating the versatility and flexibility that is the hallmark of
this force.
For the past few years, we at the Department of the Navy have
attempted to minimize the impact of an uncertain budgetary environment,
marked by numerous continuing resolutions, the imposition of sequester-
level funding and the threat of the return of sequestration. That
environment has made it more difficult, but even more critical, to set
priorities to make hard choices and to find opportunities to improve
our stewardship of taxpayer dollars.
Almost 6 years ago, when I was preparing for my confirmation
hearing to be Secretary and began closely examining the challenges our
Navy and Marine Corps faced, it became clear to me there are four areas
that demand our attention in order to provide and maintain the presence
our Navy and Marine Corps uniquely deliver. Those four areas are
People, Platforms, Power, and Partnerships. Those have been, and
continue to be, the key factors in assuring the capability, capacity,
and success of our naval services, and that is why they have been, and
will remain, my top priorities.
People--Our True Advantage
It is one of the great maxims of naval history that sailors and
marines are the sea services' greatest advantage and most important
asset. In the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, we have the best people in
the world. Our sailors and marines are well known for the ability to
exercise independent judgment, to flexibly adapt to changing
circumstances or environments that were unanticipated at the start of a
deployment, but for which their training has fully prepared them.
Perhaps less well known is how far down the chain of command we devolve
critical responsibility. Aboard USS Ronald Reagan in the weeks after
the earthquake and tsunami that ravaged Japan, I was surrounded by flag
officers, but the briefing on relief operations I received came from a
third class petty officer and a lieutenant junior grade because they
had been instrumental not just in executing, but also in designing, the
effort.
Providing our sailors, marines, and civilian workforce the training
to deal with the uncertainties they will certainly face and providing
the support that they need to do their jobs is one of our most
important responsibilities. This also extends to helping their
dedicated families and ensuring we support our wounded or injured
veterans.
Three years ago, we introduced the 21st Century Sailor and Marine
Initiative, to provide a more coordinated and comprehensive approach to
assuring we have the healthiest, fittest, most resilient, and best
educated force in the world. The goal is to help our sailors and
marines maximize their personal and professional readiness, and to
assist them and their families with the mental, physical and emotional
challenges of military service. It eliminated the stovepipes that
existed between many of the programs designed to support our people and
helps us address issues like suicide, sexual assault, and alcohol
related incidents in a comprehensive way that protects our sailors and
marines and makes them stronger. A fleet full of successful sailors
will ensure a successful Navy, and a force full of successful marines
will ensure a successful Marine Corps.
We are looking to expand the initiative by exploring new ways to
improve the fitness of our force. We are reassessing our physical
fitness requirements to make them more relevant to warfighting and to
instill a ``culture of fitness'' instead of just training for a
physical fitness test. This means reviewing nutritional standards,
making efforts to reduce stress, and improving health care and support
networks to deal with issues like suicide and abuse. We are also
working hard across these areas to curb the all-too-common factor of
alcohol-related incidents, which can end careers and, tragically,
sometimes lives. Available data shows that the number of these damaging
incidents has trended downward. To ensure we maintain that trend, we
are using media and education campaigns, directed actions against the
irresponsible use of alcohol like continuing to place reasonable limits
on where and when alcohol is sold on base, and the continued use of the
alcohol detection program implemented in 2013.
Sexual assault and harassment remains a challenge that we are
responding to aggressively. In the past several years we have taken
numerous steps to address it. These include widespread training like
our bystander intervention program, increased use of interactive means,
victim support programs like the Victim's Legal Counsel, and new
investigative resources. Combined with much more direct leadership
engagement, evidence suggests that these efforts are improving the
confidence of sailors and marines in the system and their belief that
reports will be taken seriously. Because of this increased trust in
their chain of command, we have seen survivors coming forward in larger
numbers and also, increasingly, reporting incidents that took place
earlier than the year it is being reported. This large increase in
reports, especially since 2012 when many programs began to mature, is
what we anticipated seeing if our efforts were successful, since they
would represent increased confidence in the system. We are turning more
attention to the risk of retaliation, especially by peers, as this
issue has increased in prominence in our surveys. Our interactive
education programs are having a measurable impact, and we will continue
to develop and deploy those. Sexual assault is an ``insider threat''
with devastating impacts on the Navy and Marine Corps. We've done
myriad things to attack this insidious threat, but, no matter how much
we've done, there is more to do until we've eliminated the scourge of
sexual assault.
Vice Admiral James Calvert, who earned two Silver Stars as a
submariner in World War II, once wrote that ``as important as ships
are, naval history is made by men.'' I would make one change to that
statement: today naval history is made by men and women. From the
appointment of Admiral Michelle Howard as the Vice Chief of Naval
Operations, to our work expanding roles and missions open to women to
the maximum extent possible, we are leading the military in our quest
to ensure we're using our best and most talented servicemembers across
the force. We will continue our efforts to recruit and retain a diverse
force, including a more representative number of women. A more diverse
force is a stronger force.
For several years now, female officers have had the opportunity to
serve on our ballistic and guided-missile submarines, and they have
performed exceptionally well, as anticipated, earning their
qualifications and opening a new path. We are expanding opportunities
for them. USS Minnesota and USS Virginia, both fast attack submarines,
are leading the integration of women into the rest of the submarine
force at this moment. In January, the Navy also announced a plan and a
set of milestones for fully including enlisted women on submarines that
will begin next year.
Women have also been integrated into the Coastal and Riverine
Squadrons and have deployed. We have also opened 348 billets for Navy
positions that support Marine Corps units. The Marine Corps continues
on pace with their study of the positions that are currently closed to
women and will have results later this year. In accordance with the
Secretary of Defense's guidance, the default position will be that all
currently closed positions will be opened to the assignment of women
unless an exception is formally requested.
Talent is best cultivated by promoting and advancing our sailors
and marines on merit and competition. It also requires us to maximize
their opportunities to broaden their experience and exposure to new
ways of doing things. We have to look at things like moving away from
year group management for our officers and expansion of the Career
Intermission Program, as well as other reforms and adjustments within
our current system. While a number of our initiatives can be undertaken
within our current authorities, there are some that will require
adjustments to the law, including changes to the Defense Officer
Personnel Management Act, which is almost 4 decades old. We have made
legislative proposals in this area, and we ask for your help in
bringing our personnel system into the 21st century.
Maintaining our presence around the world is hard on our force.
That is one of the reasons why in 2014 we began the implementation of
the Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP). This is a program that Navy
is using to schedule and plan our deployments and the maintenance of
our platforms. Over the course of the past 13 years of war, one of the
biggest challenges for our sailors and marines has been predictability
in their deployments. The goal of OFRP is to return some amount of
scheduling to their lives. Missing holidays, birthdays, and other
significant family events is hard enough, but not knowing when it will
happen makes things even more difficult. There is no way to completely
eliminate the unexpected. Events around the world can, and do, take on
a life of their own, and our men and women know this. Increasing the
predictability of deployments will help with the stress on our sailors
and marines and their families and also has the added benefit of
helping us properly support our maintenance requirements and readiness
posture.
There will be times when a crisis erupts somewhere in the world and
our sailors and marines remain deployed in order to deal with it. The
world gets a vote. For the past several years we have had a number of
ships and units remain at sea far beyond the normal deployment length.
In order to help our sailors and marines and their families during
these extended deployments, we've implemented the Hardship Duty Pay-
Tempo program. When operational tempo is high and a deployment extends
beyond more than 220 consecutive days, this pro-rated additional
payment kicks in. This is an effort to show our sailors and marines we
understand the difficulty these extended deployments create for them
and their families and to show them, in a tangible way, the gratitude
of the Department of the Navy and the American people.
Those sailors and marines on sea duty, deployed away from home
around the world, are the backbone of the Navy and Marine Corps, and
they enable us to provide and maintain our global presence. Despite the
challenges involved, we need to ensure our men and women are
incentivized to take on sea-going assignments. This past year, we
increased Career Sea Pay for those who have spent a total of 3 years at
sea in order to both improve critical sea-duty manning and reward those
who take these challenging sea-going assignments. We also increased
Career Sea Pay-Premium, which recognizes sailors and marines who spend
more than 36 consecutive months in sea-going positions or who have
spent a cumulative 8 years at sea during their career. These increases
are long overdue since they were last adjusted in 2001.
The Reserve component continues to be a vital part of the Navy and
Marine Corps Team. In fiscal year 2014 we mobilized 2,700 individual
Reserve sailors and marines to support operations around the world. As
the force level shifts in Afghanistan, our Reserve component will be
taking on the vast majority of the individual augment requirements
requested by the joint force. This allows us to focus our Active
component on filling critical sea billets to help ensure fleet
wholeness and readiness. Reserve sailors and marines are deployed
globally, and we will continue to maintain a Reserve that is ready,
relevant, and responsive to the Nation's needs.
Attracting and retaining our talent is critical to maintaining our
innovative and adaptive force. An important part of that involves the
challenge of military compensation. Cooperation between Congress and
the Department of Defense on this issue will be vital as we look at
slowing the growth rate of our personnel costs. We must keep the faith
with the men and women who are in uniform. We must look for the right
ways to build incentives and retain our most talented people. But we
also must recognize that growth in pay and benefits must be contained
or we will not be able to provide our sailors and marines with the
training and equipment that they need.
Our civilian workforce is also vital to the success of the
Department of the Navy. They help design our ships, aircraft, and
equipment and are critical enablers of our forces. Without them, we
literally would not have a fleet to put to sea. We could not operate
ashore at our bases across the globe. Over the past few years our
civilian workforce has persevered through some very trying times. From
pay freezes, to hiring freezes, and the huge, negative impact of
furloughs, they have shown an immense amount of dedication to our Navy,
Marine Corps, and our Nation. In 2013, 12 of our civilians were killed,
and others injured in visible and invisible ways, in the attack on the
Washington Navy Yard. There is no more tragic example of how our
civilians share the burden with those in uniform. We continue to
support the victims and the families who endured this tragic attack and
have implemented numerous security measures to improve the safety of
our workforce.
This committed and patriotic workforce is the foundation of how the
Department of the Navy operates. In order to ensure we have the most
capable people, in the right positions, we run a number of leadership
development programs. Annually we select participants for senior
leader, executive leader, and developing leader programs to provide
education and training that will help our people tackle the issues we
face.
platforms--america's fleet
The hard truth of providing the presence the American people and
our Nation's leaders expect is that it requires platforms. To be where
we are needed, when we are needed, we must have the ships, submarines,
aircraft, vehicles, and equipment for our sailors and marines to
operate. That means we must have a properly-sized fleet. Quantity has a
quality all its own.
Recently much has been said in many venues about the size of our
fleet. The completely wrong assertion is made over and over that our
fleet is shrinking. Let me state this very clearly: our fleet is
growing and will number greater than 300 ships before the end of this
decade.
It is absolutely true that our fleet shrank dramatically between
2001 and 2008. On September 11, 2001, the Navy's battle force stood at
316 ships. But, by 2008, after one of the great military buildups in
American history, our fleet had declined to 278 ships.
Part of the reason for that was understandable: our focus was on
two ground wars. But, frankly, it cannot all be attributed to that. In
the 5 years before I took office as Secretary, the Navy only contracted
for 27 ships, far too few to maintain the size of the fleet, much less
grow it. In my first 5 years as Secretary, we contracted for 70 ships.
We have halted and reversed the decline.
We haven't done this at the cost of naval aviation. During my time
in office we have bought 1,300 aircraft. That is 40 percent more than
the Navy and Marine Corps bought in the 5 years before this
administration took office.
We have done this both in ships and aircraft by taking some direct
and basic actions including: block buys and multi-year procurements;
increased competition; stable designs and mature technologies; targeted
reviews; pursuing cross-program common-equipment buys; and
affordability through hard but fair bargaining. In addition, we have:
supported shipyard facility improvements and optimal-build plans;
conducted rigorous ``should cost'' studies; designed equipment for
affordability and modularity; instituted strict controls to fight
``requirements creep;'' used open-architecture systems to the maximum
extent possible; and signed shipbuilding capability preservation
agreements resulting in more competitive shipyards and lower costs for
the Navy.
The amphibious and auxiliary ships industrial base is of concern to
us and is at risk should future funding levels be reduced. We have
recently introduced an integrated acquisition strategy for LHA 8, T-
AO(X), and LX(R) to support stability and competition within this
sector of the industrial base. The strategy will help ensure the ships
are built affordably, while providing the greatest degree of stability
for the industrial base.
There are a number of references previously to the industrial base.
A healthy design and production industrial base is critical to
achieving what is needed for our fleet in ships, aircraft, weapons and
all procurements. Stability and predictability are critical to the
health and sustainment of this industrial base.
This is especially true in shipbuilding. Changes in ship-build
plans are significant because of the long lead time, specialized
skills, and extent of integration needed to build military ships. Each
ship is a significant fraction of not only the Navy's shipbuilding
budget but also industry's workload and regional employment.
Consequently, the timing of ship procurements is a critical matter to
the health of American shipbuilding industries, and has economic
impacts at the local, regional and national levels.
It is important, therefore, to provide stability and predictability
to the industrial base to maintain our ability to continue to build the
future fleet. In the overall picture, we should not pay for one Navy
ship by cutting another Navy ship; each ship is crucial in many, many
ways.
The Department's shipbuilding plan continues to build the balanced
force we require. This year we have requested funding for nine new
ships as well as for the refueling of the carrier USS George
Washington. We also plan to modernize 11 cruisers, which are our most
capable ships for controlling the air defense of a carrier strike
group. The Navy's cruiser modernization plan, in accordance with fiscal
year 2015 congressional direction, will allow the Navy to reduce
overall funding requirements while most efficiently increasing the
capability and extending the service life of these large surface
combatants.
Our efforts to maintain and affordably procure our fleet's ships
and submarines have continued through this past year. The Department
has established a steady state Ford-class procurement plan designed to
deliver each new ship in close alignment with the Nimitz-class ship it
replaces. CVN 78 (future USS Ford) cost performance has remained stable
since 2011 and under the congressional cost cap. We are also committed
to driving down and stabilizing aircraft carrier construction costs for
the future John F. Kennedy (CVN 79) and the future Enterprise (CVN 80)
and have made significant progress in doing so. As a result of the
lessons learned on CVN 78, we have made significant changes to reduce
the cost to build CVN 79, including improvements in material
availability and pricing; major changes in build strategy and processes
determined to execute construction activities where they can most
efficiently be performed; incorporation of design changes only for
safety, those mandated or lower costs; and aggressive measures for cost
control in government-furnished equipment. The costs of CVN 79 also
remain stable and under the congressional cost cap.
In our attack submarine program we are continuing procurement of
two Virginia-class submarines per year while reducing construction time
and also developing the Virginia Payload Module (VPM). Thanks to the
support of Congress in authorizing the use of a multi-year procurement
(MYP), in April 2014, the Navy awarded the Block IV contract for 10
submarines. The savings realized with this MYP contract was more than
$2 billion, effectively giving the Navy 10 ships for the price of 9.
SSBNs, coupled with the Trident II D-5 Strategic Weapons System,
represent the most survivable leg of the Nation's strategic arsenal and
provide the Nation's only assured nuclear response capability.
Originally designed for a 30-year service life, the Ohio-class has been
extended to 42 years of operation. They cannot be extended further. For
this reason, we are intensively continuing development of the follow-on
12-submarine Ohio Replacement Program (ORP). This effort is driven by
meeting the program's performance requirements while reducing costs
across design, production, operations and sustainment. However, in
order to afford the ORP procurement costs beyond this Future Years
Defense Program (FYDP) it is clear that this program must be funded by
a significant increase in the Navy's shipbuilding budget, or from other
sources. Otherwise, funding this necessary program will effectively
keep the Navy from performing its other critical missions.
The Arleigh Burke-class (DDG 51) program remains one of the Navy's
most successful shipbuilding programs--62 of these ships are currently
operating in the fleet. We are in the third year of an MYP. The second
of our fiscal year 2016 ships will provide significant upgrades to
integrated air and missile defense and additional ballistic missile
defense capability by introducing the next flight (Flight III), which
incorporates the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) designed to
address a number of growing threats.
With four Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) in service, operational
experience continues to increase through at-sea testing and rotational
deployments, and the value of this class continues to be demonstrated.
USS Fort Worth began her maiden deployment to the western Pacific, and
upon arrival in Singapore was sent to assist in the search and recovery
efforts for the downed Air Asia airliner in the Java Sea. USS Fort
Worth's deployment marks the beginning of continuous LCS forward
presence in Southeast Asia and will validate the 3:2:1 (three crews,
two ships, one ship always forward-deployed) rotational manning and
crewing concept for the LCS class. This will also be the first
deployment of the Navy's MH-60R Seahawk helicopter along with the MQ-8B
Fire Scout on an LCS.
After an exhaustive analysis by the Navy's Small Surface Combatant
Task Force, in December 2014 the Secretary of Defense approved the
Navy's proposal to procure a new small surface combatant based on an
upgraded LCS. This followed his February guidance to review the program
and consider development of a more lethal and survivable small surface
combatant. The upgraded LCS will provide multi-mission anti-surface
warfare and anti-submarine capabilities, as well as continuous and
effective air, surface and underwater self-defense. They are both more
lethal and more survivable, as well as continuing to be affordable and
providing the fleet with the requirements it needs. As these
capabilities are consistent with those of a frigate, I directed
designation of these new small surface combatants as Frigates (FF).
Our amphibious ships are incredibly versatile. Across the spectrum
of maritime operations, from the humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief efforts in the Philippines following super-typhoon Haiyan to the
combat operations in Libya during Operation Odyssey Dawn, the Navy and
Marine Corps team do a wide array of things with these ships. At this
moment, the USS Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group and 24th Marine
Expeditionary Unit are in the Fifth Fleet area of operations, ready for
anything that might happen from Iraq and Syria to Yemen.
Congress provided $1 billion of funding in the fiscal year 2015
Appropriations Act toward a 12th LPD, and we have requested the balance
of funding this year for this ship, LPD 28. Procurement of LPD 28 will
assist in mitigating impacts to shipbuilding and combat systems
industrial bases, and the ship's design and construction features will
fully exploit some of the ongoing design innovations and cost reduction
initiatives that are necessary for the LX(R) to achieve its
affordability goals.
Support vessels such as the Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) and the
Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) provide many additional options and
flexibility to Combatant Commanders. The future USNS Lewis B. Puller
(MLP 3), the first Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) variant of the
MLP, which includes a flight deck, was christened in early February in
San Diego and will deliver in summer 2015. The Navy awarded MLP 4 AFSB
in December 2014, and plans to request MLP 5 AFSB in fiscal year 2017.
JHSV production continues with delivery of the fifth JHSV anticipated
in April 2015. JHSVs 6 through 10 are also under contract. In fiscal
year 2015, Congress provided funding for an eleventh JHSV, which we
expect to be put under contract this coming summer.
Combat Logistics Support ships fulfill the vital role of providing
underway replenishment of fuel, food, repair parts, ammunition and
equipment to forward deployed ships and embarked aircraft to enable
them to operate at sea for extended periods of time. We will begin to
replace the Fleet Replenishment Oilers beginning in fiscal year 2016
with the TAO (X). These will be double-hulled and meet Oil Pollution
Act of 1990 and International Marine Pollution Regulations.
With the strong support of Congress, we continue to strengthen
naval aviation as well. Adding new aircraft to our growing fleet will
increase U.S. naval strength, in terms of both force capacity and
capability. In the vertical lift community, multi-year production
contracts for the MV-22 and MH-60R continue, as does the Marine Corps
procurements of the AH-1Z and UH-1Y.
The E-2D, our new and upgraded electronic early-warning aircraft,
reached initial operating capability in October and is continuing
production under a multi-year contract. We continue to buy P-8As to
replace the venerable P-3. Last year, in 2014, we saw the first
deployment of this aircraft and continuous rotational deployments to
Seventh Fleet are now underway. This past year also continued the
integration of the EA-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft into the
fleet. With Congress' addition of 15 Growlers in 2015, we will have 153
of these aircraft in 16 squadrons. With the final Navy deployment of
the legacy EA-6B Prowler, and the looming retirement of the Marine
Corps' last Prowlers, these incredibly capable new aircraft take over
the Nation's airborne electronic attack mission.
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter remains a central part of the future
of both Navy and Marine Corps aviation. This past year we saw the
Marine Corps begin F-35B operations at two additional bases. The
Marines are on track to have initial operating capability (IOC) for the
first squadron this year. The Navy completed the F-35C's first flight
operations at sea aboard USS Nimitz (CVN 68). According to plan, the
Navy is the last Service to acquire the F-35 and is continuing an
acquisition strategy to achieve IOC in the 2018-2019 timeframe.
Incentive agreements with the builders have been achieved that will
improve aircraft unit costs while also improving the learning curve on
production.
Unmanned systems are critical to our ability to be present; they
lessen the risk to our sailors and marines and allow us to conduct
missions that are longer, go farther, and take us beyond the physical
limits of pilots and crews. Launching and recovering unmanned aircraft
as large and capable as our manned fighters from the rolling decks of
aircraft carriers, launching unmanned rotary-wing patrols from our
small surface combatants, and deployment of unmanned underwater
vehicles globally are elements of both the present and future of
maritime presence and naval warfare.
We are moving ahead with a number of unmanned programs in the
effort to rapidly integrate them into the fleet. The MQ-8B Fire Scout
has already begun regular deployments. When USS Fort Worth deployed to
Singapore recently the ship took a mixed aviation detachment of a
manned MH-60R helicopter and MQ-8B UAV's. This kind of hybrid
employment, pairing our manned and unmanned systems to take advantage
of the strengths of each, will be a hallmark of our future approach to
unmanned systems. The first operational variant of the larger and more
capable next generation Fire Scout, the MQ-8C, was delivered in 2014.
This aircraft will bring double the endurance and double the payload of
the older versions.
We continue to work toward a full start of the Unmanned Carrier
Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike system (UCLASS) program. This
unmanned addition to the air wings aboard our aircraft carriers is a
vital part of the future of naval aviation. Full start of this program
has been delayed pending a defense-wide review. Having the proper
balance of long-endurance surveillance capabilities and the ability to
grow into long range, penetrating strike missions in the future is
critical. Development also continues of the unmanned underwater systems
that are part of our future mine warfare capabilities. These systems
will see formal operational testing in the Littoral Combat Ship program
in 2016.
Maintaining the required pace of Navy shipbuilding while continuing
the recapitalization of our aviation assets and other platforms made
necessary by our deployment cycles and operational tempo is a very real
issue. It will necessitate continued leadership, oversight and
management to make sure we develop innovative solutions and maximize
the efficiency in our acquisition system. Building our platforms is a
unique public-private partnership and a key economic engine in nearly
every state in the union. It provides more than 100,000 high-skill,
high-paying jobs and helps ensure the foundation of global prosperity
and security that our naval presence has assured since World War II.
Because cuts to our shipbuilding programs are the least reversible
in their impact on our fundamental mission of providing presence and in
their consequences to the industrial base and to our economy, I am
committed, to the maximum extent possible, to preserve ship
construction and to seek reductions in every other area first, should
further budget reductions such as sequestration become reality.
Power--Energy and Efficiency
For 2 centuries the U.S. Navy has had a history of leadership in
energy innovation, transitioning from wind to coal, coal to oil and
finally pioneering nuclear power. Fueling the ships, aircraft, and
vehicles of our Navy and Marine Corps is a vital operational concern
and enables the global presence necessary to keep the Nation secure.
But power and energy are also issues of national and international
security.
My responsibility as Secretary of the Navy is to ensure that the
Navy and Marine Corps have the right people, with the right training
and the right tools to defend our country. Power and energy are an
important part of ensuring our people have what they need and can get
where they are needed. It is a critical element of our presence and why
Navy has always been an energy innovator.
Throughout human history, access to resources has been a major
source of conflict. Energy and fuel can and are being used as weapons.
Threats against the shipping lanes in the Middle East, European
dependence on Russian gas supplies and the impact of Russian energy
dependence by the Ukraine are the subject of daily headlines. This is
true regardless of the price of a barrel of oil, although the price
decline of the last year has certainly impacted strategic calculations
around the globe.
Here in the United States, with domestic production up and new oil
and gas reserves being discovered even as prices have fallen, energy
still remains a security concern. Even if we were able to produce every
single drop of oil or gas that America needs domestically, we cannot
control the price. Oil is the ultimate global commodity, often traded
on world markets based on speculation and rumor. Oil price instability
is often the result of global instability, and prices fluctuate with
little warning. The volatility of oil prices, both up and down, has
been repeatedly demonstrated in recent years. Energy supply will remain
an issue for many of our allies and for others around the globe,
creating the potential for instability and even conflict.
Operationally, energy matters now more than ever. The ships and
aircraft that we deploy include advanced capabilities that make us the
most effective expeditionary fighting force in the world. But our
weapons platforms also use far more energy than their predecessors. Our
ability to maximize our capabilities depends on having the energy
available to power them.
In 2009, I established formal energy goals for the Department of
the Navy to help drive the Navy and Marine Corps to strengthen our
combat effectiveness by using energy more efficiently and by
diversifying our sources of power. From the deployment of hybrid
electric drives, to the introduction of alternative fuels into the
fleet, to the Marines' use of expeditionary power systems in
Afghanistan, we have made real progress over the last few years.
This past year, we christened USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000), which has an
electric propulsion system. This system is state-of-the-art and will
significantly reduce fuel demand, which is a critical part of ensuring
we have the fuel to power next generation weapons, like the Laser
Weapon System (LaWS) and the electro-magnetic rail gun. This past fall
we commissioned USS America (LHA 6) which is driven by hybrid electric
power plants. This is the same engineering design used in USS Makin
Island (LHD 8) that, for her maiden deployment, cut her fuel
consumption nearly in half when compared to other big deck amphibious
ships. We also took delivery of two more Virginia-class submarines,
with their advanced nuclear power systems that lead the world in
efficiency and safety.
Our shore installations, like our shipyards, are critical to our
operations. We continuously strive to be smarter and improve energy
efficiency at our installations. We are leveraging private sector
funding to accomplish that goal. In fact, the Department of the Navy is
on track to have awarded nearly $1 billion in energy savings
performance contracts by December 2016. That's $1 billion to improve
our infrastructure and lower our energy bills in the process. The
Renewable Energy Program Office (REPO) coordinates and manages our goal
of producing or procuring one gigawatt of cost-effective renewable
energy for our bases. We will reach this goal by December of this year.
The power we are buying through our REPO projects will be cheaper, over
the life of the contract, than our current rates.
Last September, we announced contracts with three companies that
have committed to produce drop-in, military-compatible biofuels at
operational quantities. Let me be clear: we are not obligated to buy
fuel from any producer and do not intend to buy any fuels unless they
are cost competitive. That said, it is critical we continue to use
alternative fuels in our ships and aircraft to ensure operational
flexibility. The private sector, including major airlines, is expanding
the use of alternative fuels just as we are.
Diversifying our energy supply for our ships, our aircraft, and our
bases helps guarantee our presence and ability to respond to any
crisis. Increasing our energy efficiency assures that we can remain on
station longer or extend our range, without the delays and
vulnerability of refueling. The benefits of competition, as we have
demonstrated in shipbuilding, are always welcome. In these ways, our
focus on power and energy is helping to ensure the U.S. Navy and Marine
Corps remain the most powerful expeditionary fighting force in the
world and their ability to protect and advance American interests
around the globe.
Partnerships--Naval Diplomacy and International Cooperation
In the 21st century, to be effective, all nations and people that
seek freedom and security have to carry their own share of the
responsibility of defending the global system. A collective effort will
assure our navies can provide the necessary presence to maintain
freedom of navigation and maritime security around the world. Whether
blue water or brown, America's Navy and our other allies and partners
help assure stability and security, creating and strengthening global
relationships, providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief,
deterring adversaries when possible, and defeating aggression when
necessary.
Cooperation on the world's oceans helps us diffuse tensions, reduce
misunderstandings, and limit conflict. The world's maritime tradition
is nearly as old as human history. From harbors near the Arctic Circle
and around the Mediterranean, from the littorals of Asia to the shores
of Africa, the Americas and Australia, human civilizations have
launched one great fleet after another toward the horizon. Again and
again naval forces have proven themselves the most immediate, the most
capable, and the most adaptable option when a crisis develops.
This is even more true when like-minded navies, with similar
national policy objectives, can find ways to work together. Whether
exercising together in the Baltic or in Southeast Asia, operating
against pirates in the Gulf of Aden, or cooperating to provide relief
in the aftermath of natural disasters, the strong cooperation between
the United States and our partners and allies makes a difference all
over the globe. Partnerships are a key contributor to presence.
Building partnerships and establishing trust between our Nation and
our Navy and countries around the world is why I travel to visit with
foreign military and governmental leaders. Those meetings are critical
to building the relationships that can help us deter conflict or
respond in a more coordinated and effective manner to manmade or
natural crises. It is critical in my job as Secretary of the Navy to
understand the global landscape and the security challenges--and
opportunities. Briefings and PowerPoint slides can never match the
value of firsthand observation and interactions, as anyone who has
served aboard a ship, at a forward outpost, or in a warzone can tell
you. As the old Navy saying goes, ``You can surge people and you can
surge platforms, but you cannot surge trust.''
Our rebalance to the Pacific continues to be an important part of
our partnership efforts. We must have the right platforms in the right
places to ensure our friends and allies understand our commitment.
We're moving more ships to the central and western Pacific, including
forward basing an additional fast attack submarine in Guam and as I
mentioned earlier we are forward stationing four Littoral Combat Ships
out of Singapore. We are ensuring that our most advanced platforms are
in the Pacific, so we're increasing the number of DDG's with the
Ballistic Missile Defense systems based in Japan and the P-8A maritime
patrol aircraft are making their first rotational deployments in the
region. In the longer term, by 2018 we will deploy an additional
Amphibious Ready Group to the Indo-Pacific region and we will
deploy a growing number of Joint High Speed Vessels and Mobile Landing
Platforms there. With these changes, and others, by the end of the
decade 60 percent of our fleet will be based in the Pacific, a fleet
which will be larger than the one we have today.
The Marine Corps is also building its capacity to work with our
Indo-Pacific partners. We continue to increase the rotational
deployment of marines to Australia, which will culminate in the regular
rotational deployment of a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) of
approximately 2,500 marines. The Marines have increased the size of
this deployment from just over 200 marines to more than 1,000 and over
the past year these marines out of Darwin have conducted exercises and
theater security operations throughout the region. We are also
continuing forward on the plan to base another MAGTF (part rotational,
part permanent) of about 5,000 marines in Guam, which will become a
central hub for many of our Pacific operations.
This past year saw dramatic developments in Eastern Europe and the
Black Sea region. The Navy and Marine Corps have been central to
demonstrating support for our allies and friends and American interests
in the region. Alongside the Marine Corps' Black Sea Rotational Force's
operations in Eastern Europe, a series of Navy ships have deployed into
the Black Sea to ensure freedom of navigation and work with our
partners there. The bonds between America and Europe and our shared
values remain as strong today as ever.
That is demonstrated in one of the world's strongest and most
enduring defense partnerships: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
It is true that America's defense strategy calls for an increased focus
on the Western Pacific, Arabian Gulf, and Indian Oceans. But that same
strategy also ensures that we aren't turning away from our longstanding
allies in Europe and also calls for renewing our commitment to NATO. A
very concrete example of this is the move of four ballistic missile
defense capable DDGs to Rota, Spain. All of these efforts are a
continuation of NATO's 65-year mission to keep all nations free, and
not to claim territory or tribute.
This past summer,USS America sailed from the Gulf Coast, where it
was built in Mississippi, around South America to its new homeport in
San Diego. As America sailed through the Americas, the sailors and
marines aboard conducted theater security cooperation activities with
countries in the region, training together and helping to develop the
skills needed to counter illicit trafficking and conduct combined
operations. Our new Joint High Speed Vessels are also deploying to the
Americas with the ability to operate for longer periods and carry
adaptive payloads. Our security is undeniably tied to our neighbors and
we are working with innovative and small-footprint approaches to
enhance this.
This past September, I invited the leaders of our partner navies in
West Africa to join me for a series of discussions in Newport, RI,
called the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Dialogue. Naval leaders
from 16 nations bordering the Gulf of Guinea came to discuss how we
could increase collaboration in a region where piracy, extremism,
trafficking and insecurity of all types are on the rise. We discussed a
unified code of conduct for maritime law enforcement and encouraged
more direct cooperation in the region. As the economy in the Gulf of
Guinea continues to grow, so does the increasing relevance of guarding
against transnational crime like maritime terrorism and the illegal
movement of drugs and weapons. The United States Navy and Marine Corps
will continue to work with our partners in West Africa and help them
improve their capabilities and promote collaboration.
Sailors and marines of every nation have much in common with other
sailors and marines. Working together, we become more inter-operable,
we can provide key training and develop the operational capabilities of
like-minded countries and navies. This in itself increases stability
for the global system. It distributes the burdens and costs of maritime
security and makes us all safer by reducing the likelihood of conflict.
Direct engagement with foreign leaders by our Department's senior
leadership is a central component of building the human connections
that are critical to successful partnership and combined operations.
They are a large part of what builds the international relationships,
trust, and inter-operability that is central to our globalized world.
In this interconnected world, threats know no boundary, no
international lines, so the burden of security has to be shared. Across
239 years of history our Navy and Marine Corps have worked with allies
and friends. From suppressing the slave trade on the coast of Africa in
the mid-19th century to the combined operations of World War II, the
examples are endless. From the exercises I mentioned earlier like
RIMPAC, Malabar, and Platinum Lion, to our multi-lateral and bilateral
meetings with both uniformed and government leaders, to our combined
operations like the search for Air Asia Flight 8501 and counter-piracy
patrols off the Horn of Africa; these examples illustrate that the
partnerships we build and maintain today remain critical to our global
presence.
fiscal year 2016 budget submission
The Department of the Navy's proposed budget for fiscal year 2016
is designed with a focus on the three objectives laid out 2014
Quadrennial Defense Review: protect the homeland, build security
globally, and project power and win decisively when called upon. In
doing so we have looked across the FYDP to maintain our ability to
conduct the 10 primary missions listed in the Defense Strategic
Guidance to 2020 and beyond. Overall the fiscal year 2016 President's
Budget balances current readiness needed to execute assigned missions
while sustaining a highly capable fleet, all within a tough fiscal
climate.
Our approach to this budget has focused on six objectives. First,
maintain a credible and modern sea-based strategic deterrent. Second,
sustain our forward global presence to ensure our ability to impact
world events. Third, preserve both the capability and capacity to
defeat an aggressor in one multi-phase contingency operation while
simultaneously denying another aggressor the ability to achieve their
objectives. Fourth, ensure that the force is adequately ready for these
operations through critical afloat and shore readiness and personnel
issues. Fifth, continue and affordably enhance our asymmetric
capabilities. Finally, sustain our industrial base to ensure our future
capabilities, particularly in shipbuilding.
Even as we deal with today's fiscal limitations, we cannot let slip
away the progress we've made in shipbuilding. It takes a long time,
measured in years, to produce a deployable ship. As I noted earlier, it
is the least reversible thing we might do to deal with budget
constraints. If we miss a year, if we cancel a ship, it is almost
impossible to recover those ships because of the time involved and the
fragile industrial base. To do the job America and our leaders expect
and demand of us, we have to have those gray hulls on the horizon.
This budget results in a 2020 fleet of 304 ships. We will purchase
Virginia-class attack submarines at a rate of 2 per year for a total of
10 across the FYDP, with the inclusion of the Virginia Payload Module
by fiscal year 2019 for at least 1 boat per year. We also will continue
to procure Arleigh Burke-class destroyers at a rate of 2 per year, with
the first Flight III DDG funded in fiscal year 2016 and delivered in
fiscal year 2021. Fourteen ships of the Littoral Combat Ship-class, of
which at least the last five will be the frigate variant, will also be
procured in this FYDP. We will also continue the construction of
amphibious ships, mobile landing platforms, high speed vessels, and
combat logistics ships.
This budget carries on the development of the future carrier air
wing. Procurement of both the F-35C and F-35B continues, with initial
operating capability (IOC) of the F-35C coming sometime in late fiscal
year 2018 or early fiscal year 2019. Our multi-year procurement of the
E-2D will now include the introduction of inflight refueling capability
for the new aircraft. We are continuing the integration and procurement
of the Small Diameter Bomb II for the F/A-18 and fund advancements to
the Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile to reach IOC for Block I in
fiscal year 2017. The budget also funds the EA-18G into its Full
Operating Capability and full air wing integration in fiscal year 2017,
and we continue the development of the Next Generation Jammer.
We are accelerating the purchase of P-8A maritime patrol aircraft
to reverse the reductions that were made due to sequester cuts. Our
plan is to complete the buy in fiscal year 2019 and have the entire
inventory of 109 aircraft by the end of the FYDP. We are also
addressing the future of our logistics support and carrier onboard-
delivery aircraft. This budget funds the purchase of 24 Navy V-22
Tiltrotor aircraft across the FYDP, with an IOC for Navy squadrons of
fiscal year 2021.
In order to face potential adversaries who are building
technologically advanced platforms and weapons of their own, we must
move forward on our development of new and innovative systems. This
budget funds the accelerated acquisition of the Long Range Anti-Ship
Missile (LRASM), which will reach early operating capability on the B-1
in fiscal year 2018 and with F/A-18s in fiscal year 2019. We are also
continuing procurement of SM-6 missiles. Funding for the next leap
forward in weapons technologies, such as the LaWS and railgun programs,
are included as well as the precision-guided Hyper-Velocity Projectile
(HVP) for both our 5-inch guns (by fiscal year 2019) and for the
railgun once development is complete.
The fiscal year 2016 budget also places priority on emerging
capabilities in the cyber and electronic warfare efforts. We will
continue to recruit and train top talent to form 40 cyber mission teams
by the end of 2016. We also include funding for Operation Rolling Tide
and the results of Task Force Cyber Awakening, which invests in
enhancements to our networks for cyber defense-in-depth, including
defense solutions for ships, security improvements for our command and
control networks, and the expansion of some of our defense initiatives
to tactical IT systems. The Navy is developing capabilities to deliver
cyber effects from land and sea-based platforms. We are continuing the
build of the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) satellites with an IOC
expected in fiscal year 2016 and the launch of the fifth satellite in
late 2016.
The Marine Corps end strength will hold at 184,000 marines for 2016
while leadership assesses the impact of the drawdown that has been
conducted over the past 4 years. This pause is for 1 year only. The
marines will draw down to 182,100 under this budget in 2017. After
coming down by 18,000 marines, we need to ensure we have the right
number of small unit leaders and their ability to prepare their marines
for deployment. We must also make sure that units preparing for
overseas operations have adequate time and ability to train and to
maintain unit cohesion.
The Marine Corps will begin procurement and testing of the next
generation ground combat maneuver capability, starting with the Joint
Light Tactical Vehicle. We will also award engineering manufacturing
and development contracts to two vendors to produce Amphibious Combat
Vehicle 1.1 prototypes for testing and evaluations. The F-35B program
also remains a high priority for the Marine Corps, and this budget
ramps up production of airframes with the plan to stand up a third F-
35B squadron by fiscal year 2018. These programs are important to our
ability to maintain the Marine Corps as the Nation's expeditionary
force-in-readiness. Our ability to remain forward engaged and ready to
respond to crisis is dependent on the readiness of our forward deployed
and home station units. The Marine Corps must remain the most ready
when the Nation is least ready.
Our support for our sailors and marines and their families is
evident in the personnel initiatives in this budget, many of which were
described earlier. We are continuing the Compensation Reform and
Quality of Service initiatives that we first proposed in the budget for
fiscal year 2015. This includes increasing our requested pay raise from
1.0 percent to 1.3 percent in fiscal year 2016. To ensure fairness
across the force, this budget also makes certain that every active duty
family members has the option to receive health care with no co-pays/
cost share regardless of their assigned duty station, including remote
locations. The re-investment in our talented and innovative workforce
also continues from the fiscal year 2015 budget to this one, including
the new sea duty incentive pays and bonuses, barracks improvements for
our junior personnel, and improved fleet training and spares
availability to ensure our men and women have the tools they need to
get their jobs done.
The American people have every right to expect that after coming
out of two wars there would be savings in the defense budget. Our
Department is continuing its reform of acquisition practices, including
fundamental changes to how we contract for services. We are
establishing additional discipline in the contractual services
process--from requirements to tracking to execution to surveillance--
that ensures the integrity of the system remains high and to guard
against fraud. Also, as a result of reformed contracting processes, we
fully expect in this budget to achieve the reductions in contractual
services that we began in last year, realigning those resources to
buying more material equipment and readiness for the force.
We continue to aggressively implement acquisition practices that
improve the return for each taxpayer dollar we spend. Improved
management of requirements, multiyear procurements, appropriate
incentive contracts, additional competitions, and small business
initiatives are but a few of the tools we are using to maximize the
return on each dollar we invest on behalf of the taxpayer. However, the
way some of the budget reductions have been executed in the law,
through continuing resolutions and the sequester, have made planning
virtually impossible and have not allowed us to approach reductions in
a strategic way. After the initial return of a moderate amount of
stability following last year's Bipartisan Budget Act and the recent
Omnibus Spending Bill, the President's Budget for fiscal year 2016
continues this stability to the Department's planning for the future.
In order to maintain our constitutional responsibility to ``provide for
and maintain a Navy,'' we must work together to ensure that our Navy
and Marine Corps remain the most powerful expeditionary fighting force
in the world.
Over the past 3 years, the Navy and Marine Corps have had to make
tough choices across a wide range of competing priorities in order to
deal with funding instability. This proposed budget submission for
fiscal year 2016 maintains the minimums necessary to accomplish the
missions required by the DSG. We continue to accept some risk to our
capacity to complete all ten of the missions, and we have continued
reductions to the maintenance funds for our shore infrastructure,
elements of our weapons capacity, and selected aviation accounts. While
these reductions were seen as the most reversible, over a longer period
of time the expenses have continued to add up. Because we have already
taken these savings, a return to the funding level required by the 2011
Budget Control Act certainly will have more dramatic impacts.
conclusion
In 2015 we commemorate the bicentennial of the end of the War of
1812. At the Battle of New Orleans a joint force of sailors, marines,
soldiers, and volunteers repelled a veteran British Army, battle
hardened by their war against Napoleon. From the Navy's small
combatants and gunboats that attacked the landing force in Lake Borgne,
to the gunnery crews who joined the Army's artillery on the field of
battle at Chalmette Plantation, sailors and marines ensured the defense
of our homeland against invasion. Only weeks later off the coast of
Africa, Captain Charles Stewart and USS Constitution fought the war's
final battle at sea, bringing an end to the conflict that established
the U.S. Navy as a player on the world's stage.
When America has called, the Navy and Marine Corps have always been
there. Two hundred years ago our squadrons sailed for the shores of
Africa and the Second Barbary War, having just concluded that decisive
role in the War of 1812. One hundred and fifty years ago, Admiral
Farragut sailed up through Mobile Bay during the Civil War. One hundred
years ago, as the first World War began, we prepared for convoy
operations and anti-submarine missions in the battle for control of the
Atlantic. Seventy years ago, sailors and marines fought their way
across the Pacific toward Japan. For all of those 200 plus years, and
continuing today, the Navy and Marine Corps have been ready to fight
and to win our Nation's wars, whether coming from the sea or on, above
or beneath the sea.
Today, from the coast of Africa to the wide expanse of the Pacific,
from the Arctic to the Antarctic, our sailors and marines continue to
deploy to protect and defend the American people and our national
interests. They, and our Navy and Marine Corps civilians, continue to
ensure that America's Away Team is ready and present around the world,
prepared for action in times of crisis or working with our partners in
in times of peace.
The United States of America faces an international security
environment full of uncertainty. To face that world, the funding levels
in the Department of the Navy's proposed budget for fiscal year 2016
reflect the resources required to rapidly respond to a diverse scope of
contingencies spanning extremist organizations, pandemic diseases and
natural disasters, while continuing to deter assertive actors across
the globe through our expeditionary presence and dominant warfighting
capability. These investments will continue to provide the best value
in dealing with that dynamic security environment, as well as securing
and strengthening our own and the global economy.
In order to ensure that we continue to provide the Navy and Marine
Corps our Nation's leaders the American people have come to expect, the
Commandant and Chief of Naval Operations and I look forward to working
with this committee and Congress. From maintaining our momentum on our
plan to build to a fleet of 304 by the end of the decade, to our
continued efforts to purchase the aircraft, vehicles and weapons
detailed in our budget submission, to the priority of ensuring we
maintain and retain the talented sailors, marines, and civilians who
make it all possible, we will need to work together. We look forward to
answering your questions, at this hearing and in the future. We will
continue to work to provide for, and maintain, our Navy and Marine
Corps because, as President Theodore Roosevelt once said, ``A good Navy
is not a provocation to war. It is the surest guaranty of peace.''

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Chairman McCain. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and the complete
statements that have been submitted by all three of you will be
included in the record.
General Dunford?

STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., COMMANDANT OF THE
MARINE CORPS

General Dunford. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and
distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to be here
today with Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert to represent
your marines. I will begin by thanking the committee for your
steadfast support. Due to your leadership, we have fielded the
best trained and equipped Marine Corps our Nation has ever sent
to war.
I know this committee and the American people have high
expectations for Marines as our expeditionary ready force. You
expect your Marines to operate forward, engage with our
partners, deter potential adversaries, and respond to crises,
and when we fight, you expect us to win. You expect a lot from
your marines, and you should. This morning as you hold this
hearing, over 31,000 marines are forward deployed and engaged
in doing exactly what you would expect of them.
Our role as the Nation's expeditionary ready force informs
how we man, train, and equip the force. It also prioritizes the
allocation of resources that we receive from Congress. Over the
last few years, we have prioritized the readiness of our
forward deployed forces. These are the forces you can count on
for immediate crisis response. These are the forces that
supported the recent evacuation of United States citizens in
South Sudan, Libya, and Yemen. These forces are currently
conducting strikes in Syria and Iraq, training the Iraqi army,
and protecting our embassy in Baghdad. These are 22,500 marines
in the Pacific west of the international dateline.
I can assure you that your forward deployed marines are
well-trained, well-led, and well-equipped, but we have had to
make tough choices to deal with the effects of two wars,
sequestration in 2013, and reduced budgets in 2014 into 2015.
In order to maintain the readiness of our forward deployed
forces, we have not sufficiently invested in our home station
readiness, modernization, infrastructure sustainment, and
quality of life programs. As a result, approximately one-half
of our non-deployed units--those are the units you depend on
for unforeseen contingencies--are suffering personnel,
equipment, and training shortfalls. In a major conflict, these
shortfalls will result in a delayed response and/or the
unnecessary loss of American lives.
Over time, under investing in modernization will result in
maintaining older and obsolete equipment at higher cost and
degraded capabilities. In many areas, funding levels are
forcing us to maintain legacy capabilities instead of
innovating and adapting for tomorrow's threats. It will
eventually erode our competitive advantage, and we do not ever
want our marines and sailors in an unfair fight.
The readiness challenges we have today provide context for
my message this morning. We can meet the requirements of the
defense strategic guidance with the President's Budget, but
there is no margin. BCA funding levels will exacerbate the
challenges that we have today. It will also result in a Marine
Corps with fewer available active duty battalions and squadrons
than would be required for a single major contingency. Perhaps
more concerning, it will result in fewer marines and sailors
being forward deployed and in a position to immediately respond
to crises involving our diplomatic posts, American citizens, or
U.S. interests. As we saw in the wake of Benghazi, the American
people expect us to respond to today's crisis today, and we can
only do that if we are properly postured forward.
In closing, my assessment is that funding below the
President's Budget level will require that we develop a new
strategy. Thank you once again for the opportunity to appear
before you this morning and for your leadership in addressing
today's fiscal challenges. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Dunford follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Joseph Dunford, USMC
introduction
The Marine Corps is the Nation's expeditionary force-in-readiness.
Congress, specifically and uniquely, structured and prescribed the role
of the Marine Corps as a ``. . . balanced force-in-readiness, air and
ground . . . to suppress or contain international disturbances short of
large scale war.'' Under this mandate, marines are forward-deployed,
forward-engaged, and postured to shape events, manage instability,
project influence, and immediately respond to crises. As an inherently
joint combined arms team, marines assure access and enable heavier
contingency forces to deploy from the United States in response to a
major contingency.
Also, to meet the intent of Congress, the Marine Corps must
maintain a high state of combat readiness. We look at readiness through
the lens of our five pillars of readiness--high quality people, unit
readiness, capacity to meet the combatant commanders' requirements,
infrastructure sustainment, and equipment modernization. These pillars
represent the operational and foundational components of readiness
across the Marine Corps. Our role as America's 9-1-1 force informs how
we man, train, and equip our force, and how we prioritize and allocate
resources across the pillars of readiness. While we will always ensure
that our forward-deployed marines and sailors are properly manned,
trained, and equipped, we seek to maintain balanced investment across
the pillars to ensure current and future readiness. We emphasize that
all marines and all Marine units are physically and mentally ready to
deploy to any clime and place, at anytime.
The Marine Corps is a force of economy. For 6.0 percent of the
defense budget, the Marine Corps provides 21 percent of the Nation's
infantry battalions and 15 percent of the fighter/attack aircraft.
These capabilities, organized as Marine Air Ground Task Forces with an
organic logistical element, unprecedented complexity.
strategic landscape
The challenges of the future operating environment will demand that
our Nation maintains a force-in-readiness that is capable of global
response. The strategic landscape will be characterized by competition
for natural resources, violent extremism, natural disasters, social
unrest, cyber-attacks, regional conflict, and proliferation of advanced
weaponry and weapons of mass destruction. The expansion of modern
conventional and cyber weapons to a broader range of state and non-
state entities, along with the erosion of U.S. technological advantages
in areas where we have long enjoyed relative superiority, is likely to
continue. Further, the actions of transnational criminal organizations
and violent extremist groups will continue to contribute to regional
unrest and instability that directly threaten U.S. interests through
piracy, trafficking and terrorism. The United States must expect a
security landscape characterized by volatility, instability and
complexity, and a growing potential among adversaries to employ weapons
of mass destruction.
As marines, we view global security challenges from a maritime
perspective. The majority of these challenges reside in the congested
and diverse areas where the sea and land merge--the littorals. Today,
more than 80 percent of the world's population currently resides within
100 miles of a coastline and this proportion is continuing to rise.
Most maritime activities such as commercial shipping, fishing, and oil
and gas extraction take place within 200 miles of the shore. It is no
accident that the so-called ``Arc of Instability'' encompasses the
littoral areas of South Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa. These
geographic and demographic trends indicate a future security
environment with a significant maritime element.
We expect that the next 10 years will be largely characterized by
small-scale crises and limited contingencies in and around coastal
environments. Should major operations and campaigns occur, they are
likely to involve a significant maritime and littoral dimension. Ready,
responsive, flexible, and strategically mobile naval forces are
essential to ensuring continued access and security in the global
commons. The increased likelihood of operations in the littorals
demands the Marine Corps focus on its Title 10 responsibilities to be
organized, trained, and equipped to come from the sea across the range
of military operations.
America's responsibility as a world leader requires an approach to
the current and future strategic landscape that leverages the forward
presence of our military forces in support of our diplomatic and
economic approaches. As stated in the 2012 President's Defense
Strategic Guidance, ``The United States will continue to lead global
efforts with capable allies and partners to assure access to and use of
the global commons, both by strengthening international norms of
responsible behavior and by maintaining relevant and interoperable
military capabilities.'' The Marine Corps' unique capabilities support
this strategic approach.
your marines
In 2014, marines responded to crises around the world and remained
forward-deployed and forward-engaged managing instability, building
partner capacity, strengthening alliances, and projecting influence.
Your marines demonstrated the relevance of expeditionary naval forces
by executing more than 30 amphibious operations, 150 Theater Security
Cooperation (TSC) events, and 130 exercises around the globe. While we
have drawn down our forces in Afghanistan, our operational tempo
remains extraordinarily high. Most marines in the operating forces are
is a strong demand signal for marines and tailored Marine Air Ground
Task Forces.
Operation Enduring Freedom--Afghanistan
In 2014, the Marine Corps contributed to the mission in Afghanistan
by training, advising and assisting the Afghanistan National Security
Forces (ANSF) and supporting the fight against terrorism in Southwest
Asia. Our operations focused on ensuring the success of the Afghanistan
elections in the summer of 2014 and transitioning security
responsibilities to the ANSF. With marines serving in an advisory
capacity, the ANSF retained control of all district centers in Helmand
Province. Regional Command (SW) also turned over operational
responsibilities to the International Security Assistance Force Joint
Command facilitating redeployment of Marine Expeditionary Brigade-
Afghanistan (MEB-A) to home station. Today, a residual Marine presence
continues to support the Resolute Support Mission (NATO)/Operation
Freedom's Sentinel (United States) in Afghanistan.
In more than 13 years of combat operations, 377 marines were killed
and 4,946 injured in Afghanistan. We remember their selfless service
and many sacrifices. Our success in RC-SW is directly related to the
high quality men and women in our ranks, the training that prepared
them to face the rigors of combat, and the equipment that provided
protection and a tactical edge over the enemy. Due to the enduring
support ofCongress and the American people, the marines who fought in
Afghanistan had the training and equipment necessary to accomplish the
mission. The full support of Congress for a variety of initiatives such
as Mine Resistant Armor Protected Vehicles and upgraded individual
protective equipment saved lives and enhanced combat effectiveness.
Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG/MEU) Operations
Our preferred method of deploying our marines is aboard Navy
amphibious ships to form ARG/MEU Teams. These are the Nation's most-
ready, forward-postured forces. This capability provides strategic
speed, agility, and options to our National Command Authority. They
operate in international waters retaining flexibility for the
geographic combatant commander (GCC) while respecting the sovereign
territory of individual nation states. The ARG/MEU team can respond
faster from longer ranges with greater capabilities across the ROMO
than any other conventional forces in the Department of Defense (DOD)
and are also capable of enabling joint, interagency, and coalition
forces. In 2014, the 11th, 13th, 22d, 24th, and 31st Marine
Expeditionary Units (MEU) deployed and contributed to combatant
commander requirements by participating in numerous exercises and
operations throughout the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), U.S. Pacific
Command (PACOM), U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), and U.S. European
Command (EUCOM) areas of responsibility (AOR). When required, the ARG/
MEU has the scalability and versatility to respond to simultaneous
emergencies. Last summer, the 22d MEU/Bataan ARG was operating in the
CENTCOM AOR conducting operations in Yemen. When needed, elements of
the ARG/MEU rapidly transited into the Mediterranean Sea to support the
suspension of embassy operations in Libya and relocation of its staff.
During their return, they launched a force over 1,200 miles to
contribute to the initial response to counter the Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria. Concurrently, elements of the ARG/MEU continued to support
United States operations in Yemen. Over the last year, we have also
increased collaboration with SOF, significantly improving our
complementary capabilities.
Due to their forward presence, flexibility, ability to respond
quickly and the decision space they afford our leaders, ARG/MEUs
continue to be in high demand. Unfortunately, the Navy and Marine Corps
can meet less than half of the GCC ARG/MEU crisis response force demand
Corps forces stand ready aboard ships to assure allies, deter potential
adversaries, and provide persistent U.S. presence. Our marines are
forward deployed, with little to no footprint ashore, to respond and
protect U.S. national security interests around the globe.
Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force--Crisis Response
Operations
With the high demand for Marine crisis response capabilities and
the shortage of amphibious platforms from which to forward deploy
forces, Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force-Crisis Response
(SPMAGTF-CR) were developed. While they don't provide the flexibility
and responsiveness of an ARG/MEU, they mitigate a capability gap for
the combatant commanders. Our SPMAGTF-CRs are tailored to respond to
crisis and also conduct security cooperation activities with partner
nations in order to develop interoperability, facilitate access, build
partner capacity and security relationships, and gain regional
understanding. This past year, SPMAGTF-CR units assigned to AFRICOM
positioned forward in Moron, Spain, and Signonella, Italy safeguarded
the lives of our diplomatic personnel and conducted military-assisted
departures from the United States Embassy in South Sudan in January and
our embassy in Libya in July. The Marine Corps SPMAGTF-CR unit assigned
to CENTCOM (SPMAGTF-CR-CC) became fully operational on 1 November 2014
and deployed to the CENTCOM AOR. Since November, SPMAGTF-CR-CC
conducted embassy reinforcement, TSC exercises, and provided critical
aviation and ground capabilities in the fight against ISIL. Most
recently, marines from SPMAGTF-CR-CC supported the evacuation of our
Embassy in Sana'a, Yemen. A third SPMAGTF deployed in support of U.S.
Southern Command from June to September aboard USS America on her
transit around the South American continent and The placement of these
Marine Corps tailored task force capabilities forward, where GCCs need
them, provides enhanced diplomatic protection and additional crisis
response options.
Marine Corps in the Pacific
The Marine Corps' activities in the Pacific are led by III Marine
Expeditionary Force (III MEF) headquartered on Okinawa, Japan. This
past year, III MEF conducted 52 operations and exercises. In 2014, III
MEF conducted Exercise SSong Yong--the largest amphibious exercise of
the year with our Korean allies further demonstrating the United States
commitment to South Korea. III MEF plays an important role in
maintaining stability in East Asia and significantly contributes to
peace and prosperity throughout the region. A number of TSC exercises
were conducted using Maritime Prepositioning Ships. While these
platforms were designed to deliver heavy equipment for a major
contingency, adapting them for day-to-day engagement enabled us to
better support the combatant commander's theater campaign plan and
mitigated the number of amphibious lift in the Pacific.
The Marine Corps continues to rebalance its force lay-down in the
Pacific to support the Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG). The
Distributed Laydown's planned end state of four geographically
distributed, politically sustainable and operationally resilient MAGTFs
in the Pacific (Australia, Guam, Japan, and Hawaii) is a long-term
effort that will span the next 15 years. In 2014, we met the Secretary
of Defense's guidance to have 22,500 marines west of the International
Date Line, forward based and operating within the Asia-Pacific Theater.
Marine rotational force-Darwin (MRF-D), based at Robertson Barracks, is
in its third year of execution, and has rotated 1,263 marines through
Darwin conducting bilateral training and exercises. This capable of
Humanitarian Response/Disaster Relief (HA/DR), TSC, and crisis response
operations. MRF-D has strengthened our alliance with our Australian
allies and provided the GCC an immediate response option in the wake of
an unforeseen crisis.
Black Sea Rotational Force, Embassy Security Forces, and Theater
Security Cooperation
Marine Corps operational commitments span across all GCCs
contributing to stronger alliances, stable international order, and
security for our diplomatic stations. In the Republic of Georgia, the
Marine Corps prepared three Georgian infantry battalions for their
deployment to Afghanistan. There, the Georgian forces provided force
protection and executed Quick Reaction Force (QRF) missions as the ISAF
mission transitioned to the Resolute Support Mission. Enabling the
deployment of Georgian battalions reduced the requirement for United
States forces in Afghanistan while providing the commander with the
requisite capabilities.
In support of our strong commitment to the security and stability
in Europe, Marines of the Black Sea Rotational Force (BSRF) mission
conducted hundreds of TSC activities in EUCOM and provided a
significant crisis response option for the EUCOM commander.
Additionally, Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Teams provided forward-
deployed platoons to four geographic combatant commanders in support of
dynamic mission tasking such as embassy reinforcement in Baghdad, Iraq
and Sana'a, Yemen.
The 2015 President's National Security Strategy emphasizes the
security of American citizens. This past year the Marine Corps worked
closely with the State Department to increase baseline security at high
risk embassies and consulates. Today marines are routinely serving at
173 embassies and consulates in 141 countries around the globe. In
2014, the Marine Corps Embassy Security Group added 237 Marine Security
Guards (MSG) to new and current posts including Iraq, Lebanon, and
Turkey. These marines represent our initial installment towards the
additional 1,000 MSG requirement from Congress. The Marine Security
Augmentation Unit (MSAU) also deployed 29 times at the request of the
State Department executing 16 Embassy/Consulate security missions and
13 VIP (POTUS/VPOTUS/SECSTATE) security missions. MSAU marines deployed
to Iraq, Israel, South Korea, Chad, China, Poland, Philippines, France,
Bahrain, Romania, Australia, Brazil, United Kingdom, Kenya, Ukraine,
South Sudan, Turkey, Mexico, and Thailand.
fiscal year 2016 budget priorities
The President's Budget for fiscal year 2016 (PB16) allocates $24
billion to the Marine Corps' baseline budget. To meet our
responsibilities as the Nation's 9-1-1 force, we prioritized near-term
readiness while assuming risk in our home station readiness,
modernization, infrastructure, and quality-of-life programs. We will
attempt to reestablish an acceptable balance across the five Pillars of
Readiness across the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). The following is
a detailed description of the Marine Corps' budget priorities supported
by PB16 of Force Structure, ACV, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV),
JSF, CH-53K, C4, and naval programs of interest.
Force Structure
In 2010, the Marine Corps' internal force structure review
concluded that the Marine Corp's optimal size to meet the requirements
of the President's National Security Strategy was 186,800. This optimal
size gives the Marine Corps the capacity we need to meet current steady
state demand with a deployment-to-dwell (D2D) ratio greater than 1:2.
We continue to support this review and conclusion. Today, the Marine
Corps continues to execute its end strength reductions that began
during fiscal year 2012, reducing the Corps from a high of 202,000. The
Marine Corps is adjusting its active duty end strength to 182,000
marines by 2017, emphasizing the enduring requirement to provide crisis
response forces that meet today's demand. We can meet the DSG at this
level, but with less than optimal time between deployments to train and
allow marines to be with their families.
Our most significant readiness challenge is the gap in the numbers
of unit leaders with the right grade, experience, technical and
leadership qualifications associated with their billets. Specifically,
our current inventory of noncommissioned officers (NCO) and staff
noncommissioned officers (SNCOs) is not meeting our force structure
requirements. This dynamic directly affects our training, maintenance,
and discipline resulting in degraded readiness and combat
effectiveness. The Marine Corps' PB16 military personnel budget funds a
fiscal year 2016 end strength of 184,000 in our base and supports
right-sizing our NCO corps to provide our marines the small unit
leadership they deserve.
Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV)
The Marine Corps appreciates the support of Congress in
restructuring the ACV program in the fiscal year 2015 appropriations
bill. That action has set us on a path to publishing a Request for
Proposals (RFP) to industry in March of this year and enables a truly
'streamlined acquisition process. Leveraging the stability of the
Services' requirements and the mature technologies of nondevelopmental,
modern, wheeled, armored combat vehicles, the combat developers and
acquisition professionals have developed a way forward to field a
capability for the marines in as little as 6 (vice 13 or more) years.
Consistent with Marine Corps Ground Combat and Tactical Vehicle
Strategy (GCTVS) and Expeditionary Force 21, the Amphibious Combat
Vehicle (ACV) will be developed and procured in phases to incrementally
field modern replacements for the aging Amphibious Assault Vehicle
(AAV).
The program is based on the most current threat projections and
anticipated operational requirements, and is fully informed by the real
world challenges that our marines have faced during 14 years of
sustained combat. The ACV will provide our ground maneuver forces the
ability to negotiate the challenging urban and cross-country terrain of
the littorals while protecting them from ballistic and explosive
threats and supporting them with precision heavy machine gun fire.
The President's Budget fully funds ACV 1.1 within the FYDP. PB16
will buy 86 vehicles over the FYDP or approximately 42 percent of the
204 ACV 1.1 vehicles in the Approved Acquisition Objective (AAO). When
Full Operational Capability (FOC) is achieved in fiscal year 2023, we
will have modernized two Assault Amphibian (AA) Companies currently
equipped with 4 decades old AAVs with 204 new vehicles. ACV 1.1 plus
the 1.2 increment are currently planned to modernize 6 of 10 AA
Companies. With PB16 funding, the Marine Corps will achieve Initial
Operational Capability (IOC) which consists of an ACV platoon of 21
armored vehicles, providing protected amphibious lift to an infantry
company. IOC is achieved when the platoon is fully equipped, the unit
is fully trained and judged combat ready for deployment, and the
required maintenance and support personnel are in place to sustain the
unit.
The need for self-deploying, high-water speed vehicles remains our
ultimate objective. The capability to come from the sea and operate in
the littorals will be significantly dependent on the speed at which we
can maneuver. ACV 1.1 provides a responsible and effective approach to
mitigating the age of our AAV fleet while investing in needed
capabilities for tomorrow. We will continue to prioritize our science
and technology efforts to field an amphibious combat vehicle that will
fully support our operating concepts in the future.
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle
Over the past 14 years of combat, we found that the HMMWV utility
vehicle was not adequate for the modern battlefield due to its
vulnerability to improvised explosive devices (IED). In 2006, we began
development of a light tactical vehicle that could combine the land
mobility performance, transportability profile and payload of the HMMWV
with the protection of a combat vehicle within the weight constraints
of the expeditionary force. Today, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle
Program has three exceptionally strong designs in competition that will
realize the initiating concept in production and deployment while
increasing the protected mobility of the highest risk portion of the
light combat and tactical vehicle fleet.
The JLTV program is in the engineering and manufacturing
development (EMD) phase with Milestone C and the low rate initial
production contract award scheduled for fiscal year 2015. The PB16
supports the Marine Corps' strategy to reach IOC for JLTV in the fourth
quarter of fiscal year 2018 and FOC in the fourth quarter of fiscal
year 2021. IOC consists of one infantry battalion fully fielded with
the JLTV plus a training element.
Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF), MARSOC, and critical
supporting establishment training units will also be allocated a
portion of PB16 funded vehicles. Vehicles will be allocated by unit
based on the JLTV Fielding Plan, currently in development in support of
Milestone C decision in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2015. PB16
will buy 4,476 vehicles over the FYDP, or approximately 80 percent of
the increment 1--5,500 vehicles--Approved Acquisition Objective (AAO).
Joint Strike Fighter
Our tried and true F/A-18s, AV-8Bs, and EA-68 Prowlers have
performed magnificently in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, providing
our Marine riflemen the fires they needed, in every clime and place
from sea bases large and small, and expeditionary bases ashore. With
the help of Congress, we have kept these aircraft as modern as possible
and extracted every ounce of readiness we can from them; however, the
high operational tempo has pushed these aircraft to more rapidly
approach the end of their service lives. Due to the uncertainty
prevalent in today's global security environment, the Nation requires
we maintain a capability to respond quickly in contested regions
regardless of weather conditions. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF),
as part of the MAGTF, meets the Nation's needs.
The Marine Corps remains committed to the recapitalization of our
aging TACAIR fleet through the procurement of the F-35. The JSF brings
a new capability to the battalion sized forces that sail with our
Marine Expeditionary Units. Today, there are a multitude of high risk
regions where a crisis response operation would require large joint
strike packages to soften or blind the threat. These packages would
have to include cruise missiles, fighter aircraft, electronic warfare
platforms, aircraft which specialize in suppression and destruction of
enemy air defenses, and strike aircraft--just for U.S. forces to gain
access. Such strike packages require coordination across Services and
combatant commands and take weeks and months to assemble. This same
kind of access can be attained with a single detachment of four to
eight F-35s--the same sized detachment which will reside with a Marine
Expeditionary Unit. For major contingencies, a surge of F-35s to our
amphibious carrier decks and forward austere bases enables even greater
options and striking power. The F-35 provides a transformational
capability to the Marine Corps and the Joint Force. It gives our Nation
a day one, full spectrum capability against the most critical and
prohibitive threats.
The Marine Corps prioritizes putting our TACAIR as close to our
infantry as we can by basing them from amphibious carriers or austere
Forward Operating Bases and Forward Arming and Refueling Points ashore.
This places the F-35's transformational capabilities in the hands of
the infantry marine. The Marine rifleman is now supported immediately
with close air support, electronic warfare capabilities, and
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support in threat and
weather conditions which previously would have denied aviation support.
The F-35's ability to develop, process, and display information to the
pilot and disseminate it at tactical, operational, and strategic levels
is what makes the platform truly unique, ``a server in the sky'' for
the MAGTF. The sensors and communications equipment of our F-35s allow
pilots and forward air controllers to see through the clouds to
exchange high fidelity pictures in environments we would consider a no
go today. Enhancing the C2, strike and intel capabilities of the MAGTF
commander, the F-35 transforms the MAGTF into an element capable of
penetrating any AOR in the world to set the conditions necessary to
enable follow-on forces.
The Marine Corps has maintained the lead in this transformational
platform. The F-358 and C models will replace the over 23-year-old F/
A-18 Hornet, 18-year-old AV-88 Harrier, and the 27-year-old EA-68
Prowler; the same aircraft that have been passed from fathers to sons
and daughters now serving. We have stood up our first two squadrons
ofF-35Bs and will stand up a third in 2016. PB16 supports the Marine
Corps' timeline to achieve IOC of its first F-358 squadron later this
year and complete full transition by 2031. With the OPTEMPO expected to
remain high, we will transition to F-35s as rapidly as possible.
Continued congressional support for this transition is key to
increasing our degraded aviation readiness and minimizing our exposure
to ever increasing operations and support costs for aged aircraft.
CH-53K
The CH-53E, the Marine Corps' heavy lift helicopter, is the only
vertical heavy lift helicopter in DOD. Like its predecessors, the CH-
53A/D, the CH-53E has continued a proud lineage of worldwide support of
the Marine rifleman and Joint Force in various tactical and logistical
capacities. Though a workhorse for the Marine Air Ground Task Force
since its acquisition, the CH-53E does not have the capacity to support
the Marine Expeditionary Brigade of2024 with the payloads and ranges
required to support the ship-to-objective maneuver concepts outlined in
Expeditionary Force 21. Our CH-53 recapitalization effort is
instrumental in maintaining a true heavy lift capability for the Marine
Corps and the Nation for the future. Developmental testing is currently
underway and the first flight of the CH-53K is scheduled for 2015 with
an Initial Operational Capability in 2019. PB16 is instrumental in
providing critical funding for the last test articles in support of a
Milestone C decision in 2016.
The CH-53K will meet all of the requirements of the modern Marine
Expeditionary Unit and Marine Expeditionary Brigade and remain the only
heavy lift rotary wing asset in the DOD inventory. The CH-53K is a
state-of-the-art heavy lift vertical connector providing increased
reliability, range and lift for the Marine Air Ground Task Force and
Joint Force. The mainstay for the CH-53K will remain heavy lift
external operations. To this end, its key performance parameter is the
ability to externally transport a load weighing 27,000 pounds 110
nautical miles, nearly three times the capability of the CH-53E.
Additionally the CH-53K will incorporate a triple hook system,
facilitating the delivery of three independent loads, to three
different locations, in support of three separate units dispersed
across the battlefield. The new cabin will support the transportation
of the DOD standard 463L pallet enabling more efficient ``tail-to-
tail'' logistical transitions with C-Ss, C-17s, and C-130s. The
implementation of civil sector logistical advancements will facilitate
near real time situational awareness of all cargo and passengers
embarked and delivered by the CH-53K. The CH-53K will provide precision
and tempo for the Marine rifleman, enabling mission success.
PB16 provides Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E)
funding for the continued CH-53K System Development Demonstration
contract which includes continued design, part qualification,
developmental and operational test. Additionally, PB16 provides ROT&E
funding for the incremental procurement of System Demonstration Test
Articles 5 and 6, which will be used to ensure production readiness,
quality system verification, and production planning and validation. We
remain committed to our Program of Record of 200 CH-53Ks in order to
keep Marine Corps' heavy lift assets relevant and effective for the
marine on the ground in the future MAGTF.
Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4)
Deployed warfighters require access to the right data at the right
place at the right time. The demand for information will not tolerate a
break in access. With the speed in which technology evolves today, we
must continue to grow C4 capabilities down to the operational level.
Information must be available through multiple mediums, from flag pole
to fighting hole. Our end state is to enable command and control in an
information enterprise that supports the way the Marine Corps operates,
which includes a range of missions from crisis response to supporting
our Expeditionary Force 21 concept--all characterized by mission-
tailored forces. A single Marine Corps network will support the Marine
Corps' component of the Joint Information Environment.
Our main focus today is unifying our networks to seamlessly connect
the deployed and engaged forces to joint information and data. This
provides our marines, sailors, and supporting personnel the persistent
information needed to conduct operations. We continue to increase our
cyber capacity with trained personnel and emergent technology to
protect this critical data.
The Marine Corps must retain the ability to rapidly support the
extension of the Marine Corps' information and data services to enhance
our rapid response to crisis, provide contiguous command and control to
a disaggregated force, and scale to support theater security and major
combat operations. We will continue to invest in C\4\ down to the
corporals and sergeants. This will allow our front line Marine rifleman
to be more agile, lethal and responsive by directly leveraging the
capabilities of the F-35 and communicating better with Special
Operations Forces.
Naval Integration and Programs of Interest
As the Service with primary DOD Directive and Title 10
responsibility for the development of amphibious doctrine, tactics,
techniques, and equipment, our capabilities are reliant on the Nation's
investment in our partnered Navy programs. Naval integration will
increasingly form an important component of our exercise and
experimentation programs. The Marine Corps fully supports the Secretary
of the Navy and CNO's efforts to balance amphibious platforms and
surface connectors that facilitate operational maneuver from the sea
and ship-to-objective maneuver with the other service requirements of
the Navy.
The President's Budget investments in LPD-28, LX(R), and ship-to-
shore connectors demonstrate our commitment to global maritime presence
and the Nation's mandate to sustain an amphibious capability that can
respond to deter, deny, and defeat threats on a global scale. We
appreciate Congress providing a substantial portion of funding to
procure a l2th LPD. The enhanced mission profiles of these new and
additional platforms create operational flexibility, extended
geographical reach, and surge capabilities to the geographical
combatant commands.
Naval investments in alternative seabasing platforms expand access
and reduce dependence on land bases, supporting national global
strategic objectives and providing operational flexibility in an
uncertain world. The naval seabasing investments in the Mobile Landing
Platform, the Large Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off Ship (LMSR) strategic
sealift ship, and the T-AKE Dry Cargo and Ammunition Ship as part of
the Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadrons, coupled with the Joint High
Speed Vessel (JHSV) and connectors, provide the additional lift, speed,
and maneuver necessary to augment Navy and Marine Corps future security
capabilities. Although not a substitute for amphibious warships, these
alternative lift platforms will complement amphibious ships.
While the President's Budget moves us in the right direction, it
will take many years and a sustained effort to address the risk in the
current number of amphibious ships and to address the material
readiness of our current inventory. The Marine Corps will continue to
work closely with the Navy to implement the 30-year ship building plan
and to address the current readiness challenges.
readiness
Proper balance across the five Pillars of Institutional Readiness
is the most effective means of achieving a force capable of rapidly
responding to challenges across the range of military operations while
remaining good stewards of the Nation's resources. The five Pillars of
Institutional Readiness involves operational readiness (i.e. Unit
Readiness, and Capacity and Capabilities to Meet Requirements pillars)
and foundational readiness (i.e. our investments in High Quality
People, Infrastructure Sustainment, and Equipment Modernization
pillars). The Marine Corps' ability to remain ready is enabled by the
five pillars of readiness.
Our current funding level protects near-term readiness; however, it
does so at the expense of long-term modernization and infrastructure,
threatening future readiness. We are funding critical readiness
accounts to include: operating forces; depot, intermediate and
organizational maintenance; repair and sustainment of training ranges,
training and education, exercises, and fuel and repair parts. The
Marine Corps is not adequately resourcing our non-deployed units; it
will take time and sustained funding to address the deficiencies in
personnel, equipment and training. This is a rational choice given the
current fiscal situation, but it is not sustainable over time.
Imbalance amongst the pillars for long periods will hollow the force
and create unacceptable risk for our national defense. During these
fiscally constrained times, we must remain ever vigilant in the
allocation of resources to ensure the holistic readiness of the
institution and ensure every dollar is going where it is needed most.
Since 2012 our accounts are auditable. This gives confidence to the
American people and commanders that we ask only for the amount of
funding required to provide a lean, highly capable, mobile and ready
force.
High Quality People
Our marines and civilians are the foundation of all that we do. We
succeed because of our focus on people. They are the primary means by
which the Marine Corps meets its defense responsibilities. The
resources we dedicate to recruiting, retaining, and developing high
quality people directly contribute to the success of our institution.
Our commitment to quality must never waver.
Our success in maintaining an elite force begins with recruiting
young men and women who possess the character, mental aptitude,
physical and psychological fitness, and desire required to earn the
title ``Marine.'' The Marine Corps is committed to recruiting and
retaining high-quality people who meet prescribed physical and mental
standards, and are ready in mind, body, and spirit to execute their
duties in the defense of our Nation.
Today, the Marine Corps does not have the proper level of personnel
stability or cohesion in our nondeployed units. The practice of moving
marines between units to meet manning goals for deployments creates
personnel turbulence, inhibits cohesion, and is not visible in our
current readiness assessment tools. This personnel turbulence affects
our combat readiness and our ability to take care of marines. Moving
forward, we will improve cohesion by increasing our preparedness across
the force and emphasizing consistency of leadership, personnel
stability, and sustained readiness across the force. The overhaul of
our manpower management and readiness reporting models, systems,
policies, and processes will allow us to minimize personnel turbulence,
increase unit stability, and develop cohesion. We ask Congress to
support these measures through appropriations of the funds we have
requested in PB16.
Our civilian workforce continues to be a significant force and
readiness enabler to our institution. They reflect the same high
quality standard that propels a ready force with many having previously
worn the uniform of our Nation--68 percent are veterans. They also
remain a lean portion of our organization at a ratio of only 1
appropriated funded civilian to every 10 Active Duty marines. Our
civilians are contributing where we need them most. With 95 percent
working outside the National Capitol Region, our civilians are directly
supporting marines and the mission at our bases, stations, depots, and
installations. Without these civilians, we would be forced to assign
uniformed marines to these tasks taking away leadership and capacity in
operational units.
Our civilian workforce grew post-September 11, in large part due to
military-to-civilian conversions, which allowed marines to move from
support billets to the operating force. A Department-wide focus on
insourcing, new requirements (e.g. cyber), and necessary support for
our military surge to 202,000 also played a role in the growth. In
2009, the Marine Corps proactively began reducing civilian structure
and personnel, and we are continuing to reduce our workforce by another
10 percent, including 20 percent at headquarters.
A key element in our overall readiness is family readiness. The
family members of our Marines are very much a part of the Marine Corps
family. Their sacrifices and support are not taken for granted. As we
return from 14 years of major combat operations, the Marine Corps is
repositioning our capabilities to deliver core programs and services
that best meet the needs of today's marines and families. We are
renewing our programs and services consistent with our reduced end
strength, changing demographics, mission, and budget environment. We
are emphasizing the importance of maintaining a high level of
readiness. Our Marine and Family Programs exist to support unit mission
readiness, and individual health and wellness goals. In order to
maintain the high standard of family support, we will develop a plan
with a bias toward decentralizing decisionmaking and resource
allocation. These programs and their impact on our marines will
continue to be an area we focus on to judge our readiness. We thank
Congress for your continued support of Marine and Family Readiness
programs at the PB16 level.
Unit Readiness
Our operational tempo since September 11, 2001, has been high and
remains high today. We expect this trend to continue. Your marines
serving today in the operating forces are either deployed, getting
ready to deploy, or have recently returned from deployment. Congress
directed the Marine Corps to be the Nation's force-in-readiness. The
current fiscal environment challenges the Marine Corps' ability to meet
this mandate. In these circumstances, the Marine Corps has assumed some
risks to fund unit readiness in the near term. The Corps provides units
ready to meet core and assigned missions in support of steady state and
crisis/contingency requirements. Our ability to sustain assigned
mission requirements with units ready to deploy must be carefully
managed while we continue end strength reductions.
Over half of home-station/nondeployed units report unacceptable
levels of readiness; nevertheless, the Marine Corps excels at
generating ready units to meet operational requirements. Deployed units
report high levels of readiness for core and assigned missions.
Alternately, the ability of nondeployed units to conduct full spectrum
operations continues to degrade as home-station personnel and equipment
are sourced to protect the readiness of deployed and next-to-deploy
units. We must remain cognizant that our home-stationed units
constitute the ``ready forces'' that would surge to conduct full
spectrum operations required in major contingencies. As the Nation's
first responders, the Marine Corps' home stationed units are expected
to be in the same high state of readiness as its deployed units.
Our home station units' ability to train is challenged. Time is an
essential component required to fix worn equipment and train units to
standard. Lower end strength and unit deployment to dwell (D2D) ratios,
shortages in personnel and equipment at the unit level, and the paucity
of amphibious and maritime prepositioning ships contribute to degraded
full spectrum capability across the Service. For example, a D2D ratio
of 1:2 means your marines are deploying for 7 months and home for 14
months before deploying again. During that 14 month ``dwell,'' units
are affected by personnel changes and gaps, ship availability
shortfalls, equipment reset requirements, degraded supply storages,
training scheduling challenges and more. These challenges factor into
every unit's mission to remain consistently ready.
Marine Aviation contains some of our most stressed units. The
Marine Corps has 55 Active component squadrons, 3 of which (2 VMM and 1
VMFA) are in transition. Of the remaining 52 squadrons, 33 percent are
deployed and 17 percent are in workups to deploy. Our minimum readiness
goal to deploy is T-2.0. Deployed squadrons/detachments remain well-
trained and properly resourced, averaging T-2.17. Next-to-deploy units
are often achieving the minimum goal of T-2.0 just prior to deployment.
Nondeployed squadrons experience significant resource challenges which
manifest in training and readiness degradation, averaging T-2.96.
The Marine Corps is applying resources to maintain the readiness of
deployed and next-to-deploy units. Our focus is to continue to meet
current requirements, while addressing the personnel, equipment, and
training challenges across the remainder of the force. We are in the
midst of a comprehensive review of our manning and readiness reporting
systems. We will develop a detailed plan to enhance our overall
readiness during 2015.
Capacity to Meet Combatant Commanders' Requirements
We are committed to meet the expeditionary requirements of our
combatant commanders. The Marine Corps' PB16 military personnel budget
funds a fiscal year 2016 end strength of 184,000 on the way to 182,000
in fiscal year 2017. The Marine Corps of 182,000 includes the 1,000
additional MSG marines directed by Congress to protect more of our
embassies abroad, the Marine contribution to the special operations
component, Marine Cyber forces, and SPMAGTF's assigned to support
multiple COCOMs. Marines assigned to Marine Special Operations Command
and Marine Forces Cyber Command continue to significantly contribute to
the needs of the COCOMs through specialized capability sets and as
enablers for the joint force.
In order to meet COCOM requirements, the Marine Corps will sustain
a D2D ratio in the Active component force of 1:2 vice a more
sustainable D2D ratio of 1:3. That is the fundamental difference
between an optimal force structure of 186,800 marines and 182,000. The
Marine Corps has some high demand/low density units that maintain a
current D2D ratio of less than 1:2. The Marine Corps will continue to
provide ready forces to meet COCOM demands, but we are carefully
assessing the impact of reduced D2D ratios on our training and quality
of life.
Facility Investments
The President's Budget for fiscal year 2016 funds 81 percent of the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) facilities sustainment model
requirement for the Marine Corps (an increase over the fiscal year 2015
level). The OSD guideline is to fund 90 percent of the requirement. We
remain aware that underfunding facilities sustainment increases the
rate of degradation of Marine Corps infrastructure, which leads to more
costly repairs, restoration, and new construction in the future.
Our installations are critical to our ability to train forces and
be ready. They provide our training ranges and care for marines and
their families. However, we are forced to take risk in sustaining
current infrastructure in support of operational readiness. With the
help of Congress, the Corps has made significant progress over the last
8 years in replacing old, unsatisfactory buildings. Our MILCON is now
focused primarily on new platforms and PACOM force relocation efforts.
The most important mission of our installations is to enable
operating force readiness. We do this by being responsible stewards of
land, air, and water resources, and by being good neighbors in our
local communities. These conservation efforts maintain our valuable
training ranges and much needed air and sea maneuver corridors. A
consistent emphasis on community partnering and engagement creates
good-will, enhances family quality of life, and reduces encroachment
risks to our bases and stations. Congressional support and community
partnering have resulted in the addition of training areas at the
Townsend Bombing Range in Georgia, the Chocolate Mountains Aerial
Gunnery Range in both Arizona and California, and the Marine Corps Air
Ground Combat Center in California. We are also making great strides in
reducing energy consumption on our bases and stations. By lowering
utility use we are reducing costs, protecting the environment,
improving the resiliency of energy-dependent infrastructure and
ultimately enabling operational readiness.
Equipment Modernization and Innovation
For the last 14 years, the Marine Corps has focused our resources
on providing the marines what they need for the current fight.
Readiness remains our #1 priority to meet our national security
responsibilities; however, our focus on the current fight coupled with
our declining budget, has forced the Marine Corps to make difficult
choices and reduce investment in modernization to maintain current and
near-term readiness. In today's fiscal environment, the Marine Corps is
investing only in essential modernization, focusing on those areas that
underpin our core competencies.
Though emphasis is placed on new or replacement programs such as
the ACV, JLTV, CH-53K, and JSF, much of our modernization resources are
focused on improving the capabilities and extending the life of current
systems in order to fill the capabilities gaps that can be exploited by
today's threats. These modernization efforts span from our AAVs to our
current legacy aviation platforms.
In order to balance modernization across the capabilities of the
MAGTF, our top priorities for recapitalization and upgrades are the ACV
and the F-358. Programs like ACV 1.1 with science and technology
efforts for high-water speed, AAV survivability upgrades, Network On-
The-Move (NOTM), Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR), JLTV, and
aviation platforms such as the MV-22, CH-53K, and F-358 are required to
modernize capabilities and provide the technology required to dominate
our adversaries.
Modernization consists of three elements: development of new
technologies, the procurement of new capabilities, and investment in
legacy systems. An over commitment in one element creates missed
opportunities in another. The Marine Corps is investing heavily in
legacy systems partially due to the time required to recapitalize
needed capabilities. This necessary allocation with limited resources
in turn results in less investment in areas needed for a rapidly
changing world (i.e. live virtual training, digital interoperability,
and connectivity across Service components). For example, the
subcomponent shortfalls and age of the AAV fleet has led to lower
reliability and increased risk in operational mission profiles. The
need for recapitalization of the 42-year-old AAV is critical and the
Nation cannot afford to gap this capability. The application of fiscal
resources that would otherwise be focused on recapitalization and
modernization is necessarily directed toward sustainment. Current
maintenance for AAVs averages approximately $575,000 per AAV, per year
with future depot maintenance costs growing to $700,000 per AAV in
fiscal year 2016. This required allocation of precious resources works
against our other modernization and recapitalization efforts.
For our legacy aircraft platforms, the focus is on modernization to
keep them relevant in today's fight while providing a bridge to our
aviation recapitalization efforts. Rapid procurement of these new
systems is critical to solving both our serious current and future
readiness problems. Reduced modernization investment has also stretched
our program timelines to the limit of their acquisition baseline. Any
further extension of our program baselines could result in a Nunn-
McCurdy breach and reduce industry interest in producing limited
production items. We have also delayed the procurement of other major
programs like CAC2S so that we now will not reach full operational
capability until fiscal year 2022 vice fiscal year 2018.
Limited to essential modernization efforts, the Marine Corps
forecasts critical issues due to underfunding in several areas
including:

Recapitalization of our 30-year-old TRC-170 system
needed to provide alternate communications networks in degraded
spectrum contested environments.
The Marine Corps' Composite Tracking Network resulting
in the MAGTF's eventual inability to communicate with the
Navy's network and participate in their Cooperative Engagement
Capability.
Our ability to maintain Joint Interoperability with
other Services through the Tactical Communications
Modernization (TCM) program.
Continued underfunding of the NOTM program leaving two
thirds of our operating forces without the ability to conduct
mobile networking in distributed environments. Failure to
procure military satellite communications kits for, all fielded
NOTM systems, will result in continued reliance on expensive
(leased) commercial satellite communications (SATCOM) services.

Modernization and innovation are more than just procurement
programs. We must invest in MAGTF experimentation and test new tactics,
techniques, procedures, gear and concepts that will allow us to meet
future challenges. Inadequate resources toward modernization will
further close the technological gap between our capabilities and our
adversaries. Our adversaries continue to develop new capabilities
seeking any technology overmatch in specific domains and functions.
Increasingly capable threats, the proliferation of A2/AD weapons, and
the aging of key material capabilities create challenges where we will
pursue science and technology (S&T) to maintain our decisive
technological advantage. We are maintaining our commitment to S&T, and
we continue to look for opportunities to expand our efforts in this
critical area.
special interest topics
Marine Corps Force Integration Program
Since January 2013, the Marine Corps has opened 5,998 previously
closed positions to women. We now have 94 percent of our Military
Occupational Specialties (MOS) available to women. Some positions
remain closed--mostly within infantry, artillery, tanks, and assault
amphibian vehicle specialties. These specialties are the focus of
ongoing Marine Corps research to establish occupationally specific,
operationally relevant, gender-neutral physical standards.
The Marine Corps continues its deliberate, measured, and
responsible approach toward integrating female marines into previously
closed occupational fields to the maximum extent possible. As the
Marine Corps has studied gender integration, we have remained committed
to high standards and combat effectiveness--from recruiting and entry-
level training (ELT) to performance in the operating forces.
During this effort, the Marine Corps has evaluated gender
integration from ELT to full mission profiles as a complete ground
combat arms integrated unit. Since this time last year, the Marine
Corps has established the Ground Combat Element Integrated Task Force
(GCEITF). The GCEITF is a gender-integrated, ground combat arms unit
designed specifically to support the most in-depth, detailed study of
the physical demands associated with ground combat and the associated
physical performance standards as well as the physiological predictors
of success. The results from the GCEITF research will inform the
establishment of occupationally specific, operationally relevant,
gender-neutral standards based on the required individual physical
contributions to mission-oriented collective tasks.
The GCEITF along with our other research and assessment efforts
will inform a recommendation on further integration to the Secretary of
the Navy and the Secretary of Defense. That recommendation will be
provided in late 2015.
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
The Marine Corps' Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR)
mission is to develop and manage an evidence-based program that
eliminates sexual assault within our ranks and provides world-class
care to victims. Since fiscal year 2012, the Marine Corps has expended
more than $16 million toward SAPR and special victim legal training
initiatives.
The Marine Corps continues to see an overall positive trend in
closing the gap between the actual number of sexual assaults and those
that are reported. While the prevalence of marines experiencing
Unwanted Sexual Contact (USC) dropped from approximately 3,300 in
fiscal year 2012 to approximately 2,300 in fiscal year 2014, the Marine
Corps has seen an 89 percent increase in reports during that same time
period. Closing the reporting gap is essential to both tackling the
problem and providing supportive services to victims.
The addendum to the SAPR Campaign Plan launched in 2012 was
approved in April 2014 to build upon the positive momentum of the
campaign thus far by extending the sustainment phase and incorporating
additional tasks that strengthen SAPR capabilities. In July 2014, the
Marine Corps released new training called ``Step Up'' that is designed
specifically for junior marines, our highest at-risk population for
sexual assault.
The Marine Corps continues to improve victim services such as the
credentialing and up staffing of SAPR victim advocates and the
development of the Victims' Legal Counsel Organization, which has
provided dedicated victim legal services to more than 680 clients
including 388 victims of sexual assault. On the heels of positive
indicators of SAPR progress, Headquarters Marine Corps' SAPR division
is expanding its reach with an increased focus on prevention. Our goal
is to eliminate sexual assault from our ranks. We believe that
preserving the commanders' ability to lead in this area is a vital
element of our continued improvement in this current issue.
Suicide Prevention
Each tragic loss to suicide has far-reaching impact on families,
friends, and our entire Marine Corps community. The Marine Corps
embraces prevention efforts through a series of actions to foster hope
and connection to those at risk for suicide. Community Counseling
Services located on Marine installations worldwide increase access to
care and assist marines, attached sailors, and their families with
navigating available support resources. The Marine Corps' Marine
Intercept Program uses licensed clinical providers in care coordination
and outreach services for marines who are identified as having suicidal
ideations or have attempted suicide. The DSTRESS resource also provides
phone, chat, and Skype support 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days
a year. The Marine Corps continues to support DSTRESS as a critical
resource in suicide prevention.
Suicide prevention remains a priority for the Marine Corps, and we
will continue to apply the resources necessary to combat this difficult
issue.
Wounded Warriors
The Marine Corps' commitment to our wounded marines and their
families is unwavering. Since 2007, the Wounded Warrior Regiment has
provided meaningful recovery and transition assistance to wounded, ill,
and injured marines, sailors in direct support of Marine units, and
their families. Additionally, the WWR administers the Marine Corps'
federally mandated Recovery Coordination Program, which seeks to
integrate marines' medical and non-medical care.
While the Marine Corps' reduced presence in Afghanistan will result
in fewer combat casualties, non-combat injuries and illnesses will
likely remain stable. In addition, instances of PTS and TBI will
continue to increase due to delayed onset and as marines often delay
seeking help.
Our comprehensive capabilities create the optimal care to meet
individual marine's needs. These capabilities include: Recovery Care
Coordinators, District Injured Support Coordinators, WWR Transition
Specialists, WWR Liaison Officers, and Wounded Warrior Hope and Care
Centers. Our costs in personnel are more than just numbers. Ultimately,
the cost of 14 years of war is calculated in lives. From March 2003
through 7 January 2015, l,483 marines have given their lives and 13,992
have been wounded in the service of our Nation. We remember their
service and sacrifice and thank Congress for their continued support of
our wounded warriors and their families. The Marine Corps will not
forget the sacrifices our marines and sailors have made for the Nation.
Transition Readiness
The Marine Corps makes marines, wins battles, and returns
responsible citizens following active service. Every year, the Marine
Corps returns approximately 35,000 marines to the civilian sector. The
transition from uniformed service to contributing members of America's
prosperity as civilians is significant to the economic health of the
Nation. The technical expertise that marines have learned during their
service has significant application value to the country in the
civilian sector.
Our transition readiness program is designed to prepare marines for
transition to civilian life by preparing and connecting them with
resources to successfully meet educational, employment, or
entrepreneurship goals. Implementation of transition readiness seminars
(TRS) and separate ``track options'' classes that align marines future
personal and professional goals with hands-on application have created
an enhanced transition experience for marines. In fiscal year 2014 and
the first quarter of fiscal year 2015, TRS attendance exceeded 42,500.
In fiscal year 2015, Marine Corps Credentialing Opportunities On-
Line (COOL) was launched. COOL is a credentialing awareness,
information and resources capability for all marines, translating their
Military Occupational Specialties into career development credentialing
opportunities during and beyond their service. A leading example of the
21st Sailor and Marine initiative, the establishment of Marine Corps
COOL with the Navy also established the Department of the Navy (DON)
COOL as a platform for the Navy/Marine Corps Team. DON COOL has, in
turn, inspired an OSD initiative for a similar department-wide landing
page for all the Services.
The Marine Corps also launched the Spouse Transition and Readiness
Seminar (STARS) at all Marine Corps installations in September 2014.
This seminar addresses the transitional challenges and opportunities
specifically for spouses as they prepare to transition with their
marines into the civilian world. STARS has been embraced by OSD as a
model for other Services to consider emulating.
We have fully funded transition assistance in PB16. Effective 1
October 2014, a new Personal Readiness Seminar (PRS) is being delivered
to all incoming Active Duty marines upon check-in at their first
permanent duty station. PRS provides an overview of the Marine For Life
cycle, including personal and professional development programs and
services, and introductory personal finance topics.
conclusion
The unpredictability of the future security environment facing our
Nation today reaffirms the wisdom of the 82nd Congress--the United
States must maintain a force-in-readiness. The Marine Corps remains
that expeditionary force-in-readiness. We maintain a high state of
readiness and remain postured for immediate crisis response across the
globe. With the continued support of Congress, we will maintain balance
across our pillars of readiness and deliver ready, relevant, and
capable marines and Marine Air Ground Task Forces to our Nation today
and tomorrow. During this period of budget austerity, we will set the
standard for stewardship--every dollar will count. In the end, we will
do what marines have always done--innovate for the future, adapt to
overcome, and always win.

Chairman McCain. Admiral Greenert?

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JONATHAN W. GREENERT, CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS, U.S. NAVY

Admiral Greenert. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today. It is my honor to serve and
represent more than 600,000 Active and Reserve sailors, our
civilians, and their families, especially the 41,000 sailors
who are underway and deployed around the world today. It is my
pleasure to testify to this morning beside Secretary Mabus and
General Dunford.
Mr. Chairman, Navy-Marine Corps team is united in
fulfilling their longstanding mandate: to be where it matters
when it matters, ready to respond to crises. Now, to that
point, recent events exemplify the value of forward presence.
Last August, the Bush Carrier Strike Group relocated from the
Arabian Sea to the Arabian Gulf--it is about 750 miles--in less
than 30 hours, and immediately began flying 20 to 30 combat
sorties per day. for 54 days, that was the coalition strike
option to project power against [the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria] ISIS.
The destroyer Truxtun arrived in the Black Sea within a
week after Russia invaded Crimea, and the LCS Fort Worth and
the destroyer Sampson were among the first vessels to support
the search effort for the Air Asia Flight 8501 in the Java Sea.
So we have been where it matters when it matters.
But, Mr. Chairman, as I have testified before, the
continuing resolution and the sequestration of 2013 degraded
our readiness and our capabilities, and we have not yet
recovered. Budget reductions have forced reduction of afloat
and ashore operations, generated maintenance backlogs, and have
compelled us to extend unit deployments. Since 2013, many of
our ships have been on deployment for 8 to 10 months or longer,
and that exacts a cost on the resiliency of our people and the
service lives of our ships.
Now, this degraded readiness has reduced our ability to
respond to contingencies. For example, our combatant commanders
require that three carrier strike groups and three amphibious
ready groups be ready to respond within 30 days to a crisis.
That is our covenant to them. However, today on average we have
been able to keep one carrier strike group and one amphibious
ready group in this readiness posture, so we are at one-third
of the requirement.
Now, assuming the best case of an on-time adequate and
stable budget and no major contingencies, we might be able to
recover from the accumulated backlogs by 2018 for our carrier
strike groups, and by 2020 for our amphibious ready groups. So
that is at least 5 years after this first round of
sequestration, and that is just a glimpse of the damage
sequestration would cause if we go back there.
We have been forced to slow Navy modernization. The overall
impact of the budget shortfalls in the past 3 years has
declined our relative warfighting advantages in several areas,
notably anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, air-to-
air warfare, and what we call integrated air and missile
defense. So we have been compelled to accept significant risk
in the execution of two key missions that are specified in the
defense strategy. I provided each of you a handout that
summarizes where the Navy stands with our missions and where we
stand in relation to those missions under the two budgets, the
President's Budget and sequestration.
The first mission at risk is to deter and defeat
aggression, which really means to win a war at sea while
deterring another at sea in a different theater. The second
mission at risk is to project power despite anti-access and
area denial [A2/AD] challenges. Mr. Chairman, when I say
``risk,'' I mean that some of our platforms, our people, and
our systems will arrive late to the fight. They will arrive
with insufficient ordnance, and they will be without modern
combat system sensors and networks that are required, and they
will be inadequately prepared to fight. Now, ultimately this
means more ships and aircraft out of action in battle, more
sailors, marines, and merchant mariners killed, and less
credibility, frankly, to deter adversaries and to ensure allies
in the future.
Given the circumstances, the President's Budget 2016
submission represents the absolute minimum funding levels
needed to execute our strategic guidance. To bring the Navy
program into balance within that fiscal guidance, we focus to
build the appropriate capability, and then deliver that
capability at whatever capacity we could afford. We were once
again compelled to defer upgrades in aircraft, upgrades in
ships and submarines, and to take significant reductions in
aircraft procurement, munitions, and shore infrastructure.
So, Mr. Chairman, today's world is more complex, more
uncertain, and more turbulent. Our adversaries are modernizing
and expanding their capabilities. It is vital that we have and
adequate, predictable, and a timely budget to remain an
effective Navy. I thank you, and I thank this committee for
what they have done for us, and I look forward to working with
the Congress to find solutions that will ensure our Navy
retains the ability to organize, train, and equip our great
sailors and their families in the defense of this Nation. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Greenert follows:]
Prepared Statement by Admiral Jonathan Greenert, USN
introduction
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of
the committee, I am honored to represent more than 600,000 Active and
Reserve sailors, Navy civilians, and their families, especially the
41,000 sailors who are underway on ships and submarines and deployed in
expeditionary roles, around the globe today.
As the chartlet below shows, about 95 ships (one-third of the Navy)
are deployed around the globe protecting the Nation's interests. This
is our mandate: to be where it matters, when it matters.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Figure 1: The Navy's forward presence today

I would like to begin this statement describing for you the
guidance that shaped our decisions within the President's Budget for
fiscal year 2016 (PB-16) submission. I will address the Navy's
situation following sequestration in fiscal year 2013, the Bipartisan
Budget Act of 2013 (BBA), and the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) and Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2015. Then, I will
provide details of our PB-16 submission.

strategic guidance
The governing document for PB-16 is the Secretary of Defense's 2014
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR uses the President's 2012
Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) as a foundation and builds on it to
describe the Department of Defense's role in protecting and advancing
U.S. interests and sustaining global American leadership. The DSG and
its 10 Primary Missions of the U.S. Armed Forces have guided Navy's
planning for the past 3 years. Validated by the QDR, those missions
remain the baseline against which I measure our posture in various
fiscal scenarios. Also, 2020 is the ``benchmark'' year identified by
the DSG, and that remains the timeframe on which my assessments are
focused.
The QDR's updated strategy is built on three pillars: Protect the
Homeland, Build Security Globally, and Project Power and Win
Decisively. In support of these, it requires the Navy to ``continue to
build a future Fleet that is able to deliver the required presence and
capabilities and address the most important warfighting scenarios.''
In order to improve its ability to meet the Nation's security needs
in a time of increased fiscal constraint, the QDR also calls for the
Joint Force to ``rebalance'' in four key areas: (1) rebalancing for a
broad spectrum of conflict; (2) rebalancing and sustaining our presence
and posture abroad; (3) rebalancing capability, capacity, and readiness
within the Joint Force; and, (4) rebalancing tooth and tail. To satisfy
these mandates of the QDR strategy, the Navy has been compelled to make
tough choices between capability, capacity, and readiness across a wide
range of competing priorities. Our fundamental approach to these
choices has not changed since I assumed this position. We continue to
view each decision through the lens of the tenets I established when I
took office: Warfighting First, Operate Forward, Be Ready.

overview
Sequestration deeply affected the Navy budget in fiscal year 2013
and we have not yet recovered. Stabilized funding in fiscal year 2014
and 2015 provided by the BBA, along with an additional $2.2 billion
above Navy's requested budget in fiscal year 2015, provided limited
relief from sequestered Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA) funding levels
and helped Navy's overall posture. However, the cumulative effect of
budget shortfalls over these years has forced the Navy to accept
significant risk in key mission areas, notably if the military is
confronted with a technologically advanced adversary or forced to deny
the objective of an opportunistic aggressor in a second region while
engaged in a major contingency. By ``risk,'' we mean that some of our
platforms will arrive late to the combat zone, and engage in conflict
without the benefit of markedly superior combat systems, sensors and
networks, or desired levels of munitions inventories. In real terms,
this means longer timelines to achieve victory, more military and
civilian lives lost, and potentially less credibility to deter
adversaries and assure allies in the future.
The PB-14 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) submission was the
baseline required by Navy to carry out all 10 DSG missions. Over the
last 3 years, however, the Navy funding under sequestration and the BBA
was $25 billion less than the PB-13/14 submissions, shortfalls that
manifest in the continued erosion of our warfighting advantages in many
areas relative to potential adversaries. PB-16 represents the bare
minimum to execute the DSG in the world we face, but still results in
high risk in two of the most challenging DSG missions that depend on
adequate numbers of modern, responsive forces. Should resources be
further reduced below PB-16 levels, and certainly if sequestered, the
DSG will need to be revised.
If budgeted at PB-16 levels, we assess that the Navy of 2020 will:
\1\
Include 304 ships in the Battle Force, of which about
115 will be deployed. This global deployed presence will
include more than two Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) and two
Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG) deployed, on average.
In the best case, provide ``surge'' capacity of about
three CSGs (by approximately 2018) and three ARGs (by
approximately 2020), not deployed, but ready to respond to a
contingency.
Deliver forces to conduct the DSG primary mission
Deter and Defeat Aggression, but with higher risk compared to
PB-14 due to capacity and readiness challenges.
Conduct, but with greater risk, the DSG primary
mission Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD)
Challenges against a technologically advanced adversary
compared to PB-14. This is principally due to the slower
delivery of new critical capabilities, particularly in air and
missile defense, and overall ordnance capacity.

To ensure the Navy remains a balanced and ready force while
complying with the reduction in funding below our PB-14 plan, we were
compelled to make difficult choices in PB-16, including: slowing cost
growth in compensation and benefits; deferring some ship modernization;
deferring procurement of 18 of Navy's most advanced aircraft; delaying
over 1,000 planned weapons procurements; and continuing to reduce
funding for base facilities sustainment, restoration, and
modernization. Deferments in PB-16 compound modernization delays we
were compelled to accept in PB-15 due to budget constraints.
Additional challenges are on the horizon. In the long term beyond
2020, I am increasingly concerned about our ability to fund the Ohio
replacement ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) program--our highest
priority program--within our current and projected resources. The Navy
cannot procure the Ohio replacement in the 2020s within historical
shipbuilding funding levels without severely impacting other Navy
programs.
continuing impact of sequestration in fiscal year 2013
Sequestration in fiscal year 2013 resulted in a $9 billion
shortfall in Navy's budget, as compared to the PB-13 submission. This
instance of sequestration was not just a disruption, it created
readiness consequences from which we are still recovering, particularly
in ship and aircraft maintenance, Fleet response capacity, and
excessive CSG and ARG deployment lengths. As I testified in November
2013, March 2014, and January 2015, the continuing resolution and
sequestration reductions in fiscal year 2013 compelled us to reduce
both afloat and ashore operations, which created ship and aircraft
maintenance and training backlogs. To budget for the procurement of
ships and aircraft appropriated in fiscal year 2013, Navy was compelled
to defer some purchases to future years and use prior-year investment
balances to mitigate impacts to programs in fiscal year 2013 execution.
The most visible impacts occurred in Operations and Maintenance funded
activities. Specific impacts to Navy programs include:

Cancelled five ship deployments
Delayed deployment of USS Harry S. Truman strike
group by 6 months
Inactivated, instead of repaired, USS Miami
Reduced facilities restoration and modernization by
about 30 percent (to about 57 percent of the requirement)
Reduced base operations, including port and airfield
operations, by about 8 percent (to about 90 percent of the
requirement)

--------
\1\ Navy revised the accounting guidelines for its Battle Force
according to requirements set forth in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015. Numbers in this statement are
not directly comparable to those used in prior testimony, see chart
below. The NDAA prohibits inclusion of `` . . . patrol coastal ships,
noncommissioned combatant craft specifically designed for combat roles,
or ships that are designated for potential mobilization.'' Ships that
were counted last year, but are no longer counted, are Patrol Craft
(PC) and Hospital Ships (T-AH).

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current as of 1 Jan 2015 FY 2016 FY 2020
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PB-16: New guidelines...................................... 279 282 304
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PB-16: Old guidelines...................................... 288 291 308
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Furloughed civilian employees for 6 days, which,
combined with a hiring freeze and no overtime for 6 months,
reduced our maintenance and sustainment output through lost
production and support from logisticians, comptrollers,
engineers, contracting officers, and planners
Cancelled Fleet engagements and most port visits,
except for deployed ships

While the Navy was able to reprioritize within available resources
to continue to operate in fiscal year 2013, this is not a sustainable
course for future budgets. The actions we took in 2013 to mitigate
sequestration only served to transfer bills amounting to over $4
billion to future years for many procurement programs--those carryover
bills were addressed in Navy's fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015
budgets. If we were sequestered again, we would be forced to degrade
current and future Fleet readiness.
Shortfalls caused by the fiscal year 2013 sequestration remain in a
number of areas and the Navy is still working to recover from them. For
example, we have not yet caught up from shipyard maintenance backlogs.
We are working through shipyard personnel capacity issues to determine
when ships can be fit back into the maintenance cycle and are balancing
that against operational demands on the ships to ensure we meet the
global force management requirement for combatant commands. The result
of maintenance and training backlogs has meant delayed preparation for
deployments, forcing us, in turn, to extend the deployments of those
units already on deployment. Since 2013, many CSGs, ARGs, and
destroyers have been on deployment for 8-10 months or longer. This
comes at a cost to the resiliency of our people, sustainability of our
equipment, and service lives of our ships.
Maintenance and training backlogs have also reduced Navy's ability
to maintain required forces for contingency response to meet combatant
command operational plan requirements. Although the requirement calls,
on average, for three additional CSGs and three additional ARGs to
deploy within 30 days for a major crisis, Navy has only been able to
maintain an average of one group each in this readiness posture. Root
causes can be traced to the high operational tempo of the Fleet, longer
than expected shipyard availabilities, and retirements of experienced
shipyard workers, but the fiscal year 2013 sequestration exacerbated
the depth of this problem and interfered with our efforts to recover.
Assuming a stable budget and no major contingencies for the
foreseeable future, I estimate it is possible to recover from the
maintenance backlogs that have accumulated from the high operational
tempo over the last decade of war and the additional effects of
sequestration by approximately 2018 for CSGs and approximately 2020 for
ARGs, 5 plus years after the first round of sequestration. This is a
small glimpse of the readiness ``price'' of sequestration.
where we are today
Before describing our fiscal year 2016 submission, I will discuss
the Navy's current posture, which established the baseline for our PB-
16 budget.
Congress' passage of the BBA averted about $9 billion of an
estimated $14 billion reduction we would have faced under sequestration
in fiscal year 2014. It enabled us to fund all planned ship and
aircraft procurement in fiscal year 2014, but cumulatively the
shortfalls increased risk in Navy's ability to execute DSG missions.
The BBA still left a $5 billion shortfall below PB-14 in our
investment, operations, and maintenance accounts.\2\ The shortage in
funding compelled us to reduce procurement of weapons (many missile
types) and aircraft spare parts, defer asymmetric research and
development projects, cancel repair and maintenance projects for
facilities ashore, and defer procurement of maintenance/material
support equipment for the Fleet.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Congress subsequently added $3.4 billion in fiscal year 2014,
which added an SSN and increased Navy's Ship Modernization, Operations,
and Sustainment Fund (SMOSF).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The recent passage of the NDAA for fiscal year 2015 and
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act averted about $2
billion of the estimated $13 billion reduction that Navy would have
faced under sequestration; an $11 billion shortfall remains (as
compared to PB-14). Although the funding enabled us to continue the
refueling and complex overhaul of the USS George Washington (CVN 73),
Navy was forced to balance its portfolio to mitigate the shortfall by
making choices between capability, capacity, and readiness. We were
compelled to further reduce the capacity of weapons and aircraft, slow
modernization, and delay upgrades to all but the most critical shore
infrastructure. As I described in testimony in March 2014, PB-15
represented another iterative reduction from the resources we indicated
were necessary to fully resource the DSG missions, making Navy less
ready to successfully Deter and Defeat Aggression and Project Power
Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) Challenges. Continuing along
this budget trajectory means that by 2020, Navy will not have recovered
sufficient contingency response capacity to execute large-scale
operations in one region, while simultaneously deterring another
adversary's aggression elsewhere. Also, we will lose our advantage over
adversaries in key warfighting areas such as Anti-Surface Warfare,
Anti-Submarine Warfare, Air-to-Air Warfare, and Integrated Air and
Missile Defense.
our strategic approach to pb-16
In developing our PB-16 submission, we evaluated the warfighting
requirements to execute the primary missions of the DSG. These were
informed by: (1) current and projected threat, (2) global presence
requirements defined by the Global Force Management Allocation Plan
(GFMAP), and (3) warfighting scenarios as described in combatant
commanders' Operation Plans (OPLANs) and Secretary of Defense-approved
Defense Planning Scenarios (DPS). We used these warfighting scenarios
to assess our ability to execute more than 50 end-to-end capabilities,
also known as ``kill chains'' or ``effects chains.'' These chains
identify all the elements needed to provide a whole capability,
including sensors, communications (networks), operators, platforms, and
weapons. To arrive at a balanced program within fiscal guidance, we
focused first on building appropriate capability, then delivering it at
a capacity we could afford. Six budget priorities guided us:
First, maintain a credible, modern, and survivable sea-based
strategic deterrent. Under the New START treaty, the Navy SSBN force
will carry about 70 percent of the U.S. strategic nuclear warheads by
2020. Our PB-16 request sustains today's 14-ship SSBN force, the
Trident D5 ballistic missile and support systems, and the Nuclear
Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) suite. The Ohio-class SSBN
will begin retiring, one per year, beginning in 2027. To continue to
meet U.S. Strategic Command presence and surge requirements, PB-16
continues to support construction of the first Ohio replacement SSBN in
2021 for delivery in 2028 and first deterrent patrol in 2031. As part
of the Navy's Nuclear Enterprise Review, our PB-16 submission also adds
approximately $2.2 billion across the FYDP to: (1) increase shipyard
and Nuclear Strategic Weapons Facilities (SWF) capacity by funding
required civilian end-strength; (2) accelerate investments in shipyard
infrastructure; (3) fund additional manpower associated with nuclear
weapons surety; and (4) fund key nuclear weapons training systems.
Second, sustain forward presence of ready forces distributed
globally to be where it matters, when it matters. We continue to
utilize cost-effective approaches such as forward basing, forward
operating, and forward stationing ships in the Asia-Pacific, Europe,
and the Middle East. Rotational deployments will be stabilized and more
predictable through continued implementation of an improved deployment
framework called the Optimized Fleet Response Plan (O-FRP). We will
distribute our ships to align mission and capabilities to global
regions, ensuring high-end combatants are allocated where their unique
capabilities are needed most. We will meet the adjudicated fiscal year
2016 GFMAP; this represents about 45 percent of the global geographic
combatant commander (GCC) requests. Sourcing all GCC requests would
require about 450 combatant ships with requisite supporting structure
and readiness.
Third, strengthen the means (capability and capacity) to win in one
multi-phase contingency operation and deny the objectives of--or impose
unacceptable costs on--another aggressor in another region. PB-16
prioritizes investments to close gaps in critical kill chains, but
accepts risk in capacity or in the rate at which some capabilities are
integrated into the Fleet.
Fourth, focus on critical afloat and ashore readiness. PB-16 helps
improve the overall readiness of our non-deployed forces, but not to
our satisfaction. With a stable budget and no major contingencies for
the foreseeable future, I estimate it is possible to recover from the
maintenance backlogs by approximately 2018 for CSGs and approximately
2020 for ARGs. Facilities Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization
(FSRM) funds are increased for fiscal year 2016 to arrest the decline
of facilities conditions, but then FSRM funds are inadequate for the
remainder of the FYDP, in order to fund afloat readiness. Our budget
constraints prevent us from funding all but the most critical shore
facility upgrades in fiscal year 2017 and beyond.
Fifth, sustain or enhance Navy's asymmetric capabilities in the
physical domains, as well as in cyberspace and the electromagnetic
spectrum. PB-16 prioritizes capabilities to deal with adversary
threats, including electromagnetic spectrum and cyber capabilities and
those capabilities that provide joint access developed in concert with
other Services under the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the
Global Commons (formerly known as Air-Sea Battle). In line with
CYBERCOM priorities, we are investing in cyber defense-in-depth and
expansion of cyber defense initiatives to tactical platform Information
Technology systems, boundary defense solutions for ships, and security
improvements for our C\4\I systems.
Sixth, sustain a relevant industrial base, particularly in
shipbuilding. We will continue to evaluate the impact of our investment
plans on our industrial base, including ship and aircraft builders,
depot maintenance facilities, equipment and weapons manufacturers, and
science and technology researchers. The government is the only customer
for some of our suppliers, especially in specialized areas such as
nuclear power. PB-16 addresses the health of the industrial base by
sustaining adequate capacity, including competition, where needed and
viable. While prioritizing required capabilities, we also sought to
sustain a viable industrial base.
what we can do
As described earlier, due to the impact of prior year shortfalls
and modernization deferrals in the PB-16 FYDP, we still face
significant risk in executing at least 2 of 10 primary missions of the
DSG in 2020. The 2014 update to the ``2012 Force Structure Assessment''
(FSA) and other Navy analysis describe the baseline of ships needed to
support meeting each mission. Against that baseline and using a
rigorous assessment of over 50 capabilities (with appropriate capacity)
necessary to be tactically successful (called ``end-to-end kill chain''
analysis), we conclude that with PB-16, the Navy of 2020 will support
each of the 10 DSG missions as follows:
Provide a Stabilizing Presence
PB-16 will meet the adjudicated presence requirements of this
mission. By increasing the number of ships forward stationed and
forward based, and by improving our deployment preparation process
called the O-FRP, presence improves in some global regions as compared
to previous budget submissions. The Navy of 2020:

Provides a global presence of about 115 ships (same
as PB-15); an increase over an average of 95 ships deployed
today.
Increases presence in the Asia-Pacific region. This
includes forward deploying an additional SSN to Guam, the most
capable DDG to Japan, Mobile Landing Platform (MLP), Joint High
Speed Vessel (JHSV), both Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) variants,
MQ-8C, P-8A, EA-18G, upgraded F/A-18E/F, and E-2D. MQ-4C Triton
high endurance unmanned aerial vehicles will operate from Guam
in 2017. This presence will assure allies, shape, and deter.
However, a major maritime operation will require substantial
naval forces to swing from other theaters or surge forward from
CONUS bases.
``Places a premium on U.S. military presence in--and
in support of--partner nations'' in the Middle East, by
increasing presence by 40 percent to about 36 ships in 2020.
Though not counted in Navy's Battle Force, 10 of our Patrol
Craft (PC) serve as Forward Deployed Naval Forces (FDNF)
operating out of Bahrain, and 7 LCS will join them by the end
of 2020. In 2016, Navy's first Mobile Landing Platform/Afloat
Forward Staging Base (MLP/AFSB) will augment the on-station
AFSB-Interim (a modified dock landing ship) to support Special
Operations Forces and augment mine countermeasure capability.
Continues to ``evolve our posture'' in Europe by
meeting ballistic missile defense (BMD) European Phased
Adaptive Approach (EPAA) requirements with four BMD-capable
guided missiles destroyers (DDG) in Rota, Spain, and two land-
based sites in Poland and Romania. The first two DDGs arrived
in 2014 and all four will be in place by the end of 2015.
Additional presence in Europe will be provided by forward
operating JHSVs and rotationally deployed combatants.
Will provide ``innovative, low-cost and small-
footprint approaches'' to security in Africa and South America
by deploying one JHSV, on average, to each region. Beginning in
fiscal year 2015, we will deploy one hospital ship (T-AH), on
average, and, beginning in fiscal year 2016, add one PC ship,
on average, to South America. AFSBs forward operating in the
Middle East could also provide additional presence in Africa as
required. As available, we are deploying ships for shorter
periods (= 2 months) in theaters other than those which they
would be primarily assigned (e.g., AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM).

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Figure 2: The Navy's forward presence in fiscal year 2020

Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare (CT/IW)
We will have the capacity to conduct widely distributed CT/IW
missions. This mission requires Special Operations Forces, Navy
Expeditionary Combat capabilities such as Explosive Ordnance Disposal
(EOD), Combined Explosive Exploitation Cells (CEXC), Intelligence
Exploitation Teams (IET), and a variety of platforms that can
accommodate adaptive force packages. PB-16 procures a third MLP/AFSB in
fiscal year 2017 for delivery in fiscal year 2020, and funds an
enhanced SOF capability on all three AFSBs, which provides more robust
medical facilities, improved C\4\I, and increased accommodation for
aircraft, and other SOF-specific equipment. PB-16 also procures 10 MQ-
8C Fire Scout systems for deployments aboard LCS, which are
fundamentally multi-mission.
Deter and Defeat Aggression
Navy inherits and continues to experience high risk in this
warfighting mission. Our FSA described the ship force structure
necessary to meet this mission's requirement: to be able to conduct one
large-scale operation and ``simultaneously be capable of denying the
objectives of--or imposing unacceptable costs on--an opportunistic
aggressor in a second region.'' According to the FSA, the Navy has a
requirement for a force of 11 CVN, 88 large surface combatants (DDG and
CG), 48 attack submarines (SSN), 12 SSBN, 11 large amphibious assault
ships (LHA/D), 12 amphibious transport docks (LPD), 11 dock landing
ships (LSD), 52 small surface combatants, 10 JHSV, 29 combat logistics
force (CLF) ships, and 24 command and support ships. Provided
sufficient readiness is restored and maintained across the Fleet, this
globally distributed force will yield a steady state deployed presence
of more than two CSG and two ARG, with three CSG and three ARG ready to
deploy within 30 days in response to a contingency (``surge''). PB-16
puts Navy on a path to procure the right mix of ships as defined by the
FSA; however, the 2020 Battle Force will have a shortfall of small
surface combatants due to a gap in FFG and MCM retirements and LCS
deliveries. Other sources of risk in this primary mission are less
aircraft, modern sensors, networks, and weapon procurements across the
FYDP. Slowed modernization across the Fleet is a serious concern.
Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations
The Navy of 2020 will be able to meet the requirements of this DSG
mission.
Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) Challenges
Our power projection capability, reconstitution of weapons systems,
and modernization programs to enable Joint Assured Access have been
deferred due to budget constraints over the last 3 years. This reduces
options and decreases our ability to assure access in all domains
(space, air, surface, subsurface, and cyber). Over the last 3 years,
funding shortfalls required us to reduce procurement in weapons by over
4,000 planned quantities. We continue to take risk in capacity in order
to preserve investments in developing future capabilities. This reduced
procurement of weapons and deferring of air and missile defense
capabilities, coupled with joint force deficiencies in wartime
information transport, C2 resiliency, and airborne ISR, will result in
high risk in conducting this DSG mission if we are faced with a
technologically advanced adversary.
Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction
This mission has two parts: (1) interdicting weapons of mass
destruction as they proliferate from suppliers, and (2) defeating the
means of delivery during an attack. PB-16 will continue to meet the
requirements for this mission by providing sufficient deployed CSG,
ARG, and surface combatants, as well as Navy special warfare personnel
(SEAL) and EOD platoons, to address the first part. For the second
part, BMD-capable DDG exist in sufficient numbers to meet the majority
of GCC presence requirements under the GFMAP, and can be postured to
counter weapons delivered by ballistic missiles in regions where
threats are more likely to originate. That said, missile defense
capacity in some scenarios remains a challenge.
Operate Effectively in Space and Cyberspace
Our PB-16 submission continues to place priority on cyber efforts
to build the Navy's portion of the DOD's Cyber Mission Forces and
strengthen our cyber defense capabilities afloat and ashore. We have
accessed about 80 percent of the 1,750 cyber operators that will form
40 cyber mission teams by the end of 2016; we will continue to recruit,
hire, and train this force. Additionally, we will align Navy networks
with a more defensible DOD Joint Information Environment (JIE) through
the implementation of the Next Generation Enterprise Network (NGEN)
ashore and Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES)
at sea. We will continue funding for the launch and sustainment of the
Mobile User Objective System (MUOS), DOD's newest and most robust
solution for extending narrowband Ultra High Frequency Satellite
Communications (SATCOM) connectivity ashore, in flight, and at sea.
Also critical to assured command and control, PB-16 continues funding
the installation and sustainment of the Navy Multiband Terminal (NMT),
our newest and most robust solution for giving surface and submarine
forces access to wideband Super High Frequency and Extremely High
Frequency SATCOM connectivity.
Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent
This mission is the Navy's top priority in any fiscal scenario, and
our PB-16 submission meets its requirements. Our sea-based strategic
deterrent remains safe, secure, credible, and effective today, but Navy
is also implementing 27 specific actions based on the DOD Nuclear
Enterprise Review recommendations, including oversight, training,
policy, and process improvements, funded with an additional PB-16
investment of over $400 million in fiscal year 2016 and over $2 billion
across the FYDP. Our PB-16 submission satisfies STRATCOM demand for at-
sea SSBN availability through the end of the current Ohio-class'
service life. Navy's PB-16 submission also funds Nuclear Command,
Control, and Communications (NC3) modernization, Trident D5 ballistic
missile Life Extension Program (LEP) to maintain a 2017 Initial
Operational Capability (IOC), and Common Missile Compartment
development on a 2019 delivery timeline. Continued congressional
support for Naval Reactors' Department of Energy (DOE) funding is
essential to maintain life-of-the-ship core reactor design and
development synchronization with our Ohio replacement shipbuilding
schedule, which ensures lead ship procurement in 2021, and refueling of
the land-based prototype. Naval Reactors' DOE budget also includes the
second year of funding for the Spent Fuel Handling Project,
recapitalization of which is critical to the Navy's refueling and
defueling schedule of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and submarines.
Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities
PB-16 will maintain an appropriate capacity of aircraft carriers,
surface combatants, amphibious ships, and aircraft that are not
deployed and are ready for all homeland defense missions.
Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations
Navy's global presence and training is sufficient to conduct these
operations.
modernization
The following paragraphs describe specific PB-16 programs that
influence our ability to conduct the missions required by the DSG, and
the impact of programmatic action:
Shipbuilding
Navy shipbuilding priorities remain largely consistent with PB-15.
Navy will procure 48 ships across the fiscal year 2016-2020 period.
Fourteen Battle Force ships will be delivered in fiscal year 2016
alone. PB-16:

Maintains funding to support RDT&E and advanced
procurement of the first Ohio replacement SSBN, our highest
priority program. Without increased shipbuilding funding in
fiscal year 2021 and beyond, Ohio replacement SSBN funding will
consume the majority of Navy's annual shipbuilding budget, and
degrade other shipbuilding programs. Appropriations for SSBN
recapitalization are historically consistent with the last
period of SSBN procurement between 1974 and 1990.
Fully funds USS George Washington (CVN 73) refueling
and complex overhaul.
Procures 10 Arleigh Burke-class DDG (1 Flight IIA and
9 Flight III) in the FYDP, 2 per year, resulting in an
inventory of 72 by 2020. The first Flight III DDG, which will
incorporate the advanced AN/SPY-6 radar (formerly called the
Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR)), will be procured in
fiscal year 2016 and delivered in fiscal year 2021.
Procures 10 Virginia-class SSNs in the FYDP, 2 per
year, resulting in an inventory of 22 Virginia-class submarines
(51 total SSNs of all types) by 2020.
Funds the final nine LCS (Flt 0+) across the FYDP
(three per year fiscal year 2016-2018). Then beginning in
fiscal year 2019, Navy will procure new Small Surface
Combatants (two in fiscal year 2019, three in fiscal year 2020)
based on upgraded variants of the LCS that Navy will designate
as ``Frigates'' (FF). There will be no construction gap between
procurement of the last LCS (Flt 0+) and the first ``frigate.''
The new ``frigate'' will offer improvements in capability,
lethality, and survivability.
Funds replacement of LSD amphibious ships with the
LX(R) starting with advanced procurement in fiscal year 2019
and procurement of the first LX(R) in fiscal year 2020. LX(R)
serial production will begin in fiscal year 2022.
Procures a 12th LPD, which will be developed in
parallel with the LX(R) program and incorporate targeted design
and construction initiatives to increase affordability. Adding
LPD 28 to the inventory will help mitigate expeditionary
capability and amphibious lift shortfalls.
Funds four Fleet oilers (T-AO(X)) across the FYDP
beginning in fiscal year 2016. T-AO(X) replaces the aging
single hull fleet oiler. This new procurement ensures continued
combat logistics support to our ships.
Funds five Fleet salvage ships (T-ATS(X)) across the
FYDP beginning in fiscal year 2017. These new ships replace the
two aging salvage class ships with a single class while
improving capability and performance.
Combatant Ship Modernization
In parallel with shipbuilding, PB-16 continues modernization of in-
service platforms to allow our combatants to remain relevant and reach
their expected service lives. The ship modernization program does not
keep pace to deal with high-end adversary weapons systems by 2020.
Flight I and II of the Arleigh Burke-class DDG began mid-life
modernization in fiscal year 2010; 13 will have completed Hull
Mechanical and Electrical (HM&E) modernization by the end of 2016, and
6 of these ships will have also completed combat systems modernization.
In fiscal year 2017, we will begin to modernize the Flight IIA DDGs.
However, due to fiscal constraints we were compelled to reduce the
combat systems procurements of one DDG Flight IIA per year, starting in
fiscal year 2016. This will result in some destroyers not receiving
combat systems upgrades when originally planned to allow them to pace
the threat, particularly in Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) and Ballistic
Missile Defense (BMD).
In order to maintain force structure that provides Air Defense
Commander support to the CSGs, Navy will induct two Guided Missile
Cruisers (CGs) into phased modernization in fiscal year 2015 and an
additional two in fiscal year 2016. This will place a total of four
ships in modernization with the intent that each ship period will be
limited to 4 years. We are committed to modernizing a total of 11 CGs
in the current modernization program. Without any phased modernization
program, the CG class will retire, without replacement, at the end of
their service lives between 2020 and 2030. Using the congressionally-
directed 2/4/6 plan, the final retirements will occur between 2036 and
2039. Under the Navy's original PB-15 plan, the final CG retirement
would have occurred in 2045, at a significantly reduced cost to the
Navy, and would have relieved pressure on a shipbuilding account
largely consumed in the 2030s with building Ohio replacement SSBNs and
aircraft carriers. We request congressional support for Navy's original
plan.
Nine of 12 Whidbey Island-class LSDs have undergone a mid-life
update and preservation program, 2 are currently being modernized, and
1 more will be inducted into phased modernization in fiscal year 2016.
Modernization of seven Wasp-class large deck amphibious assault ships
(LHD) was delayed by 2 years, and they will now complete mid-life
modernization by fiscal year 2024. Modernization of the eighth LHD, USS
Makin Island, will be addressed in subsequent budget submissions.
warfighting capability
Aviation
PB-16 continues our transition, albeit more slowly than desired, to
the ``Future Air Wing.'' This transition will dramatically improve our
capabilities and warfighting capacity across critical ``kill chains.''
But, funding shortfalls have stretched (deferred) modernization plans
in this area. This delay will call into question our ability to deal
with near peer competitors, especially if directed to carry out our DOD
campaign plan in the 2020 timeframe. Specifically, we will continue to
field more advanced land-based maritime patrol aircraft (manned and
unmanned) to evolve our ISR, ASW, and sea control capabilities and
capacity. To further these objectives, PB-16 provides the following
capabilities:

Navy Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA)
Increment I capability will field with the E-2D Advanced
Hawkeye aircraft in 2015, with four air wings transitioned to
the E-2D by 2020. This integrates aircraft sensor and ship
weapons capabilities, improving lethality against advanced air
and missile threats. However, we deferred 2 E-2D outside the
FYDP (procure 24 vice 26).
The F-35C Lightning II, the carrier-based variant of
the Joint Strike Fighter, is scheduled to achieve IOC in 2018.
However, F-35C procurement will be reduced by 16 airframes
(from 54 to 38) across the PB-16 FYDP when compared to PB-15.
The F-35C, with its advanced sensors, data sharing capability,
and ability to operate closer to threats, is designed to
enhance the air wing's ability to find targets and coordinate
attacks.
Continued support for a Service Life Extension Program
(SLEP) for the legacy F/A-18A-D Hornet to meet our strike
fighter inventory needs while integrating the F-35C. With SLEP
modifications, some of these aircraft will achieve as much as
10,000 lifetime flight hours, or 4,000 hours and (16 years)
beyond their originally-designed life.
To address Navy electronic attack requirements, EA-18G
will reach full operational capability in fiscal year 2017.
Replacement of the aging ALQ-99 jamming pods begins in fiscal
year 2021, when the Next Generation Jammer (NGJ) Increment I,
featuring upgraded capabilities against mid-band frequencies,
reaches IOC. NGJ Increment II research and development on low
band frequencies remains funded for fiscal year 2016.
All components of an improved air-to-air ``kill
chain'' that employs infrared (IR) sensors to circumvent
adversary radar jamming will be delayed another year. PB-16
increased funding to procure an additional 28 Infrared Search
and Track (IRST) Block I sensor pods for F/A-18E/F Super
Hornet, for a total of 60, across the FYDP; however, the IRST
Block I sensor system will field in 2018 (versus 2017 under PB-
15) and the improved longer-range IRST Block II will not
deliver until 2022 (versus 2019 under PB-15).
Improvements continue to the air-to-air radio
frequency ``kill chain'' that defeats enemy jamming at longer
ranges. By 2020, 380 jamming protection upgrade kits for F/A-
18E/F Super Hornets and EA-18G Growler will be delivered. But,
we were compelled to defer 180 kits beyond the FYDP.
Integrates the Small Diameter Bomb II (SDB II) on the
F/A-18 by fiscal year 2020, and procures 1,590 units across the
FYDP to enhance carrier air wing precision strike capabilities.
V-22 (Navy variant) aircraft have been selected as the
solution to the aging C-2 Carrier Onboard Delivery (COD)
aircraft. PB-16 procures 24 aircraft over the FYDP with an IOC
of fiscal year 2021. The V-22 (Navy variant) extends the range
and in increases the flexibility of Strike Group resupply.
Navy's commitment to the Unmanned Carrier-Launched
Airborne Surveillance and Strike System (UCLASS) program
continues. However, a DOD-wide Strategic Portfolio Review will
delay UCLASS Air Vehicle segment contract award by at least 1
year. The remaining UCLASS Carrier Integration and Connectivity
and Control System segments will continue and are funded
through the FYDP.
Long Range Strike
Our precision strike capabilities and capacity will be critical to
success in any foreseeable future conflict. Potential adversaries have
already fielded and continue to develop advanced, long range weapons
that will require effective counters. We remain challenged in this
area. Accordingly, PB-16:

Funds Virginia Payload Module (VPM) RDT&E and SCN to
accelerate inclusion of VPM on at least one Virginia Class
Block V SSN per year in fiscal year 2019 and 2020. VPM will
enable Virginia-class SSNs to mitigate the loss of SSGN strike
capacity as they begin to retire in 2026. VPM will more than
triple the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) Block IV strike
capacity of a Virginia-class SSN from 12 to 40 missiles.
Supports the existing Tactical Tomahawk cruise missile
inventory by extending service life through investments in
critical capability enhancements and vital parts to achieve
maximum longevity. PB-16 adds 100 Tomahawks in fiscal year
2016. Production deliveries will now continue through fiscal
year 2018, which minimizes factory impact until the start of
Tomahawk Block IV inventory recertification and modernization
beginning in fiscal year 2019.
Invests in future capability by commencing an analysis
of alternatives for the Next Generation Land Attack Weapon
(NGLAW), with a planned Fleet introduction in the 2024-2028
timeframe, at least a decade prior to the sundown of TLAM Block
IV in the 2040s.
Anti-Surface Warfare
Navy remains challenged in this mission area due to both capability
and capacity shortfalls. To deal with potential adversaries' long-range
anti-ship cruise missiles and maritime air defenses, PB-16 implements a
plan to deliver a family of anti-surface warfare (ASuW) capabilities.
The program maintains current ASuW capability inherent in the Harpoon
missile, Standoff Land Attack Missile-Expanded Response (SLAM-ER),
Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) C-1, and Mk48 Advanced Capability (ADCAP)
torpedoes. In the near term, we are pursuing options to develop an
improved, longer-range ASuW capability by leveraging existing weapons
to minimize technical risk, costs, and development time. Five of 10
Patrol Craft in the Arabian Gulf have been upgraded with short-range
Griffin missiles, and the other 5 will receive them by the end of 2015.
Additionally, PB-16 funds enhanced ASuW lethality for LCS by
integrating surface-to-surface missiles (Hellfire Longbow) onto those
platforms starting in 2017. Navy is evaluating which missile to select
to provide upgraded LCS (``frigates'') an additional and even longer
range over-the-horizon missile capability. Also, PB-16 continues to
accelerate acquisition of the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) air-
launched variant, which will achieve early operational capability on F/
A-18E/F aircraft in fiscal year 2019.
Anti-Submarine Warfare
PB-16 sustains our advantage in the undersea domain by delivering
the following capabilities, although capacity challenges persist:

Procures 47 P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft,
replacing the legacy P-3C Orion's capability, and completing
the transition by fiscal year 2019. We continue investments in
the development of a high-altitude anti-submarine warfare
capability (HAAWC), which is composed of a MK 54 torpedo kit
and software support system.
Continues installation of ASW combat systems upgrades
for DDGs and improved Multi-Function Towed Arrays (MFTA) for
DDGs and CGs. Both installations will be complete on all DDGs
forward based in the Western Pacific by 2018.
Continues upgrades to all our P-8A and ASW helicopters
in the Western Pacific with sonobuoys and advanced torpedoes by
2018; however, in PB-16 we were compelled to reduce weapons
capacity, which equated to cancelling 240 MK 54 lightweight
torpedoes.
Procures 145 MK 48 ADCAP torpedoes over the FYDP to
reduce a wartime requirement shortfall from 30 percent to 20
percent, and invests in modularity and endurance improvements
to enable more efficient production, better performance, and
future upgradability.
Improves surface ASW capability in the LCS ASW Mission
Package by employing an MFTA in concert with variable depth
sonar (VDS) in 2016.
Defers recapitalization of our ocean surveillance
ship, T-AGOS(X), from fiscal year 2020 to outside the FYDP, a
reflection of our intent to extend the service life of our
current T-AGOS vessels.
Develops and builds the Large Displacement Unmanned
Undersea Vehicle (LDUUV) in the FYDP to augment submarine
capabilities. We will use Office of Naval Research Innovative
Naval Prototype large UUVs to train our Fleet operators,
preparing them for LDUUV Fleet introduction in the early 2020s.
Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare
PB-16 puts Navy on a path to maneuver more freely in the
electromagnetic spectrum, while strengthening our capability to degrade
adversaries' ability to do so. It maintains our investment in the
Ships' Signals Exploitation Equipment (SSEE) Increment F, which equips
ships with a capability to interdict the communications and address and
offset elements of adversary kill chains by 2020. PB-16 adds an
advanced geo-location capability to SSEE Increment F, which contributes
to defeating the ``left side'' of the adversary's ballistic missile
kill chain and C4ISR systems. It also increases our investment in
upgraded electromagnetic sensing capabilities for surface ships via the
Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP) Block 2 that
will deliver in 2016, procuring an additional 14 systems. PB-16 begins
low rate initial production of SEWIP Block 3 in 2017 to add jamming and
deception capabilities to counter advanced anti-ship cruise missiles.
PB-16 also stands up Real-Time Spectrum Operations (RTSO) as a Program
of Record. RTSO will provide ships and strike groups the ability to
sense, control, and plan the use of spectrum, detect interference,
notify the operators of spectrum issues, and provide recommended
actions allowing for command and control of the electromagnetic
spectrum.
Our cyber capability continues to afford the Navy a competitive
advantage, but we are growing increasingly concerned about potential
vulnerabilities that could affect combat readiness. Recognizing these
risks, in fiscal year 2015 the Navy stood up a dedicated task force to
evaluate our cyber security posture and manage our investment portfolio
to ensure we are spending money where it matters most. In addition to
evaluating our cyber risk and informing our budget process, the task
force will also recommend changes to the Navy's acquisition and
management of our networks and cyber-connected systems.
Mine Warfare
To enhance our ability to counter mines in the Middle East and
other theaters, our PB-16 program sustains investments in the LCS mine
countermeasures mission package (MCM MP), completing initial testing of
its first increment in 2015 and achieving full operational capability
in 2019. The MCM MP provides significantly faster rates of waterspace
mine clearance over legacy counterparts. PB-16 also sustains our
interim AFSB, USS Ponce, in service through at least fiscal year 2017.
USS Ponce provides forward logistics support and command and control to
MCM ships and helicopters, allowing them to remain on station longer
and sustain a more rapid mine clearance rate. In the near-term, PB-16
continues funding for Mk 18 Kingfish unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV)
and Sea Fox mine neutralization systems deployed to the Arabian Gulf
today, as well as increased maintenance and manning support for
forward-deployed MH-53 airborne mine countermeasures platforms and
Avenger-class MCM ships forward based in Bahrain.
readiness
Afloat Readiness
PB-16 funds ship operations to 45/20 (deployed/nondeployed)
steaming days per quarter. Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds
an additional 13/4 days (deployed/non-deployed), providing the training
and operations required to meet our fiscal year 2016 GFMAP commitment.
PB-16 baseline funds ship maintenance to 80 percent of the requirement,
with OCO funding the remaining 20 percent, to continue life cycle
maintenance reset of CVNs and surface force ships. To address the
workload to be completed in our public shipyards, Navy funds additional
workforce (up to 33,500 full-time equivalent workers by fiscal year
2017) and will send selective submarines to private shipyards in fiscal
year 2016 and fiscal year 2017.
With respect to the Flying Hour Program, PB-16 achieves deployed
readiness levels of T2.5/T2.0 (USN/USMC) in accordance with guidance
for all carrier air wing (CVW) aircraft.\3\ Navy funds Aviation Depot
Maintenance to 83 percent of the requirement, which puts the depots at
capacity. As Aviation Depot Maintenance throughput improves, the
associated F/A-18 flying hours and depot maintenance budgets will
increase to the more notional level of 77 percent. PB-16 increases Navy
Expeditionary Combat Command fiscal year 2016 base funding from 42
percent to 80 percent. OCO funds the remaining 20 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Due to extended depot repair time, F/A-18A-D availability is
reduced and shortfalls in aircraft will be borne by non-deployed
forces. As more legacy F/A-18s approach their 6,000 hour design life
and are inducted for assessment and life extension to 8,000 or 10,000
hours, aviation depots are experiencing production challenges resulting
in longer-than-expected repair cycle times for these aircraft. Navy has
taken steps to better maintain and repair these legacy aircraft and
expects to improve depot productivity by 2017, with the backlog fully
recovered by 2019. In PB-16, Flying Hours for these aircraft will
reflect the maximum executable profile and achieve T2.0 for deployment,
with tailored T-ratings through the training cycle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year after year, the Navy has consistently provided more global
presence than authorized and adjudicated by the GFMAP. In 2013 and
2014, for example, Naval forces provided 6 percent and 5 percent more
forward presence, respectively, than planned due to emergent operations
and unanticipated contingencies. This unbudgeted usage amounted to
greater than 2,200 days in theater over that planned in 2013 and
greater than 1,800 days in theater over that planned in 2014. We should
operate the Fleet at sustainable presence levels, in order for the Navy
to meet requirements while still maintaining material readiness, giving
ships time to modernize, and allowing them to reach their expected
service lives.
Ashore Readiness
To comply with fiscal constraints, we are compelled to continue
accepting risk in shore infrastructure investment and operations. PB-16
prioritizes nuclear weapons support, base security, and airport/seaport
operations while maintaining our commitment to quality of life programs
for our sailors and families. We are funding the sustainment,
restoration, and modernization of our facilities at a level to arrest
the immediate decline in the overall condition of our most critical
infrastructure. Although fiscal year 2016 marks an improvement in the
facilities funding when compared to PB-15, Navy is still below the DOD
goal for facilities sustainment. Facilities sustainment also declines
in the PB-16 FYDP in order to preserve the operational readiness of our
Fleet. When restoring and modernizing our infrastructure, we intend to
prioritize life/safety issues and efficiency improvements to existing
infrastructure and focus on repairing only the most critical components
of our mission critical facilities. By deferring less critical repairs,
especially for non-mission-critical facilities, we are allowing certain
facilities to degrade and causing our overall facilities maintenance
backlog to increase. We acknowledge this backlog must eventually be
addressed.
Navy will exceed the minimum 6 percent in capital investment in
Naval Shipyards and Depots described in 10 U.S.C. 2476, with a
projected 7.4 percent in fiscal year 2016. Additionally, we are on
track to exceed the target in fiscal year 2015 with a projected 6.3
percent investment. Our Naval Shipyards and depots are critical to
maintaining the warfighting readiness of our force, and Navy will
continue to prioritize investments to address the most critical safety
and productivity deficiencies.
Audit Readiness
Navy is on course to achieve full auditability on all four
financial statements by the end of fiscal year 2017, a legislative
mandate. An audit of the Schedule of Budgetary Activity (SBA), began in
December 2014. This initial audit is a critical step to identify any
weaknesses in business systems and business processes. The Navy's Audit
Plan has been greatly improved by lessons learned from our sister
Service, the U.S. Marine Corps, which achieved a clean audit on their
SBA in 2013. The remaining challenge to meeting the fiscal year 2017
mandate is to achieve auditability on the other major financial
statement, Navy's Balance Sheet. Audit readiness on the Balance Sheet
depends primarily on the accuracy of the multi-billion-dollar Asset
line; the Navy has been executing a plan to bring Service-wide
accountability for major assets (by amounts and value) into compliance
with financial audit standards. The Navy is confident that it will be
able to undergo an audit of all of its financial statements by fiscal
year 2017 to meet the congressional requirement.
Family Readiness
Family readiness is fully integrated into our Navy's call to be
ready. PB-16 continues to provide support for critical programs that
support our sailors and their families so that they can adapt to, and
cope with, the challenges of balancing military commitment with family
life. Navy Fleet and Family Support Centers ensure military families
are informed, healthy, and resilient through robust programs that
include: relocation assistance; non-medical and family counseling;
personal and family life education; personal financial management
services, information and referral services; deployment assistance,
domestic violence prevention and response services, exceptional family
member liaison; emergency family assistance and transition assistance.
Increased stress and longer family separations have amplified program
demand and underlined the importance of these support programs and
services to ensure the psychological, emotional, and financial well-
being of our sailors and their families.
Navy Child and Youth Programs continue to provide accessible,
affordable, and high-quality child and youth development programs
through child development centers, youth centers, child development
homes, and contract child care spaces. All Navy child development
centers are DOD certified and nationally accredited, and provide
consistent, high-quality care at affordable rates based on total family
income.
military construction
The PB-16 Military Construction program includes 38 projects valued
at almost $1 billion to invest in our construction worldwide. We have
prioritized funding to enable IOC of new platforms such as LCS, P-8A,
F-35C, MH-60, and MQ-4C through the construction of hangars, mission
control centers, and various support and training facilities. We are
also supporting combatant commander requirements by constructing a
land-based Aegis site in Poland and upgrading port facilities in
Bahrain. A portion of MILCON funds will recapitalize infrastructure in
three naval shipyards and improve the resiliency of utilities systems
at seven bases. Three projects will improve the quality of life for our
sailors and their families by addressing unaccompanied housing issues
in Florida and Maryland and constructing a new child development center
in Japan.
health of the force
We measure and track the health of our force using Navy-wide
metrics on recruiting, retention, manning levels; unit operational
tempo; individual tempo (how often individual sailors are away from
home); morale; stress; sexual assault rates; suicide rates; alcohol-
related incidents, and other factors. Based on a comprehensive study of
these metrics and trends, today we rate the overall health of our Navy
force as good. Our sailors are our most important asset, they are our
``asymmetric advantage,'' and we have invested appropriately to keep a
high caliber all-volunteer force. At work, the Navy is committed to
providing our sailors a challenging, rewarding professional experience,
underpinned by the tools and resources to do their jobs right. Our
obligations don't stop at the bottom of the brow. I remain focused on
dealing with enduring challenges that relate to the safety, health, and
well-being of our people, no matter where they are located. We also
support our Navy Families with the proper quality of life in terms of
compensation, professional and personal development, and stability
(i.e., deployment predictability). Navy's 21st Century Sailor Office
(OPNAV N17), led by a flag officer, continues to integrate and
synchronize our efforts to improve the readiness and resilience of
sailors and their families. Specific initiatives that we continue to
support in PB-16:
21st Century Sailor Programs
Suicide Prevention
Preventing suicide is a command-led effort that leverages a
comprehensive array of outreach and education. We continue to raise
awareness regarding the combination of indicators most common to
suicide-prone individuals such as post-traumatic stress, relationship
problems, legal and financial problems, periods of transition and
mental health issues. We have launched several key initiatives
including: (1) mandatory Operational Stress Control (OSC) skills
training for units within 6 months of deployment; (2) new guidance for
Navy unit commanders and health professionals to reduce access to
lethal instruments under certain conditions; (3) an interactive,
scenario-based suicide prevention training tool; (4) an OSC curriculum
specific to our Reserve sailors; and (5) specialized Chaplain Corps
professional development training on suicide prevention. Our sailors
continue to learn about the bystander intervention tool known as
``A.C.T.'' (Ask-Care-Treat). We also invest in the resilience of our
people to help them deal with any challenge.
Resilience
Our research shows that a sailor's ability to steadily build
resilience is a key factor in navigating stressful situations.
Education and prevention initiatives train sailors to recognize
operational stress early and to use tools to manage and reduce its
effects. Our Operational Stress Control (OSC) program is the foundation
of our efforts to teach sailors to recognize stressors in their lives
and mitigate them before they become crises. We expanded our OSC mobile
training teams, developed Bystander Intervention to the Fleet training,
and deployed resiliency counselors on our aircraft carriers and large
deck amphibious ships. The 21st Century Sailor Office is also
conducting a Total Sailor Fitness curriculum review and developing a
Resilience Management System to automate the collection and reporting
of all destructive behaviors and better coordinate and integrate our
resilience efforts. We also launched a new campaign across the Fleet in
2015 called ``Every Sailor, Every Day,'' which emphasizes personal
responsibility and peer support, so that sailors are even more
empowered to look out for and help other sailors.
Sexual Assault
The Navy continues to pursue a deliberate strategy in combatting
sexual assault. We continue to focus on preventing sexual assaults,
ensuring victims are fully supported, improving investigation programs
and processes, and ensuring appropriate accountability. These efforts
include making sexual assault forensic exams available on all ships and
24/7 ashore, having a cadre of professional and credentialed sexual
assault response coordinators and victim advocates, special victim
trained investigators and JAGs, and ensuring commands take all reports
of sexual assault seriously and support the victim. We will enhance our
response efforts by full implementation of deployed resiliency
counselors on large deck ships, enhanced NCIS investigative capability
using specially training Master-at-Arms, and continued legal assistance
to victims through our Victims Legal Counsel program.
Sustaining a professionalized response and victim advocacy system
remains the top priority, but preventing sexual assaults in the first
place is an imperative. Our strategy focuses on improving command
climate, strengthening deterrence measures, and encouraging bystander
intervention. To facilitate the latter, we trained facilitators to lead
small, peer-group interactive discussions using various scenarios.
Likewise, we have focused on raising awareness and accountability
regarding retaliation to reduce the potential for re-victimization. A
RAND survey of DOD found that 53 percent of retaliation is ``social''
or ``peer,'' so we are focusing in on that area. Navy efforts are
aligned with SECDEF direction to enhance first line supervisor skills
and knowledge in recognizing signs of possible acts of retaliation.
Recent Navy survey results show that prevalence of sexual assaults is
decreasing, but we remain fully committed to creating and sustaining a
culture where sailors understand the importance of treating shipmates
with dignity and respect at all times, in all places.
Manpower
End Strength
PB-16 supports an fiscal year 2016 Navy Active end strength of
329,200 and Reserve end strength of 57,400. It appropriately balances
risk, preserves capabilities to meet current Navy and Joint
requirements, fosters growth in required mission areas, and provides
support to sailors, Navy civilians, and families. Programmatic changes
tied to force structure and fact-of-life additions resulted in modest
PB-16 active component end strength growth. Examples of force
structure-related changes include retaining personnel for CVN 73 and
its air wing, restoring manpower to nine cruisers that will remain in
operation, and building crews for new construction destroyers (DDG 51,
DDG 1000) and submarines (Virginia-class). PB-16 end strength remains
fairly stable across the FYDP, reaching approximately 330, 000 Active
and 58,900 Reserves in fiscal year 2020.
Sea Duty
Navy continues to emphasize and reward sea duty. Aggregate Fleet
manning (what we call ``fill'') increased from 93 percent in fiscal
year 2013 to 96 percent in fiscal year 2014, the equivalent of roughly
3,500 more sailors aboard surface ships. Also, we are very close to
achieving our goal of ensuring that more than 90 percent of our sailors
are serving in jobs at the required grade with requisite experience and
training (what we call ``fit''). Navy is committed to reducing
deployment lengths to 7 months, but in recognition of those who have
been experiencing longer deployments (over 220 days), in 2014 we began
providing additional pay called Hardship Duty Pay-Tempo (HDPT). We have
also incentivized and rewarded sea duty, in general, by increasing Sea
Pay.
Personnel Management
Recruiting and Retention
Navy recruiting and retention remain strong, although retaining
personnel in certain critical skills continues to present a challenge,
particularly as the demands we place on sailors and their families
remain high. The threat of looming sequestration, along with a
recovering economy, is a troubling combination. We are beginning to see
downward trends in retention, particularly among pilots, nuclear-
trained officers, SEALs, and highly-skilled sailors in information
technology, Aegis radar and nuclear specialties. We are using all tools
at our disposal, including special and incentive pays, to motivate
continued service in these critical fields.
Gender Integration
Integrating women across the force remain top priorities, because
they allow the Navy to tap into the Nation's rich talent pool. Over 96
percent of all Navy jobs are currently available to women and we expect
to open all occupations by early next year. We are also focused on
retaining women warfighters by increasing career flexibility through
initiatives like the Career Intermission Program, which allows
servicemembers to take a hiatus from their careers for up to 3 years to
pursue personal priorities before re-entering the force. One of our
major thrusts in fiscal year 2016 is to increase female accessions of
both officer and enlisted in order to provide greater female
representation in all operational units by 2025. We are setting a goal
of increasing female enlisted accessions to 25 percent and changing the
mix of ratings available to provide greater operational opportunity for
women to serve. Integration of women into the submarine force is
tracking well.
Diversity
Demonstrating our continued commitment to diversity, Navy recently
established a Diversity Policy Review Board, chaired by the Vice Chief
of Naval Operations. Individual community self-assessments focused on
diversity trend analysis are also vetted at my level to ensure each
warfighting enterprise remains free of barriers to advancement and
committed to equal opportunity to our entire talent pool without regard
to race, gender, country of origin, or religion. Additionally, Navy
offers a range of Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics
(STEM) education and outreach programs to generate interest by the
Nation's youth in these fields and open up opportunities for them to
consider potential Navy careers where STEM expertise could be applied.
Quality of Service
Navy continues to invest in projects designed to improve sailor's
quality of service, which has two components: (1) quality of work, and
(2) quality of life. Further, all funds saved through ``compensation
reform'' are directly invested in quality of work and quality of life
programs. PB-16 invests in quality of service initiatives such as
barracks and training building improvements, greater travel and
schools, expanded use of tactical trainers and simulators, and
increased funding for spare parts and tools. It also leverages smart
technology devices and applications through an ``eSailor'' initiative
to enhance training, communication and sailor career management ashore
and afloat.
Talent Management
As our economy improves and the labor marketplace becomes even more
competitive, the battle for America's talented youth in service
continues to heighten. Today's generation, while remarkably similar in
their desire to serve as the rest of us, have different expectations
for a career of service. Meanwhile, our personnel policies and
information systems are rooted in the assumptions of a previous era.
Much like any legacy weapons system, that personnel and learning
structure is in need of modernization. Thus, we are examining
initiatives to modernize how we manage our future force, for example:
(1) phase out strict Year-Group management practices in favor of a
milestone-based promotion system; (2) improve lateral flows between
Reserve and Active components to offer more agile pathways of service;
and (3) upgrade our information technology, software, and tools to
enable a more mobile, flexible, and accurate personnel delivery system.
Further, we plan to build upon our cultural strengths through a number
of family-centered initiatives, such as expanded child development and
fitness resources, along with greater career flexibility for dual-
military and dual-professional families to grow together while serving
our Nation.
Transition Assistance
A new Transition Goals, Plans, Success (GPS) curriculum replaced
the 20-year old Transition Assistance Program (TAP) to improve career
readiness standards and assist separating sailors. The mandatory 5-day
core curriculum provides Veterans Affairs benefits briefings, the
Department of Labor employment workshop, financial management and
budgeting, and military to civilian skills crosswalk. Moreover, the DOD
Military Life Cycle (MLC) Transition Model, implemented in 2014 in the
Navy, is working to begin a sailor's transition preparation early in
their career, by providing opportunities to align with civilian
standards long before their intended separation, to achieve their post-
military goals for employment, education, technical training, or
starting a business.
Character Development
At all levels in the Navy, we emphasize a culture of integrity,
accountability, and ethical behavior. All of these make up the
character of our leaders. Good character enables unconditional trust
throughout our ranks. This is essential to succeed as a unified,
confident, and interdependent team. It must be inherent in all our
operations.
Navy continues to emphasize character development as a priority in
our overall leader development efforts, which are outlined in Navy's
2013 Navy Leader Development Strategy. In 2014, we established the
Naval Leadership and Ethics Center (formerly known as the Command
Leadership School), which serves as the means by which we guide our
efforts. This new command, alongside our Senior Enlisted Academy, and
Leadership and Ethics programs at the Naval War College, expands and
improves character development initiatives at every level. We are
developing an ethics curriculum (courses and modules) that will be
embedded in schoolhouses across the Fleet. We are also strengthening
our Navy Leader Development Continuum, which is the way in which we
facilitate development of both officers and enlisted throughout all
phases of their careers. We are not learning alone; we draw insights
and share best practices with our sister Services. The Navy is
committed to inculcating into every member of our profession the key
attribute of good character. It reflects our Navy heritage and the
citizens of our Nation expect that we uphold the highest standards of
behavior and performance in the execution of duties.
navy reserve force
Our Navy responded to extraordinary challenges over 13 years of war
with the help of Reserve sailors. The men and women of our Navy Reserve
have increasingly put their civilian careers on hold in order to
operate forward, provide critical support to Fleet and Combatant
Commanders, and enhance the performance of the Joint Force. The Navy
Reserve is a valuable hedge against an uncertain and challenging
security environment; they augment the Fleet with unique skills to see
us through any challenge. Since September 11, Reserve contributions to
the Active Duty Navy component have been significant--over 73,000 Navy
Reserve sailors were mobilized in support of global contingency
operations, providing tens of thousands of ``boots on the ground'' in
Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa, as well as
supporting key missions like those at Joint Task Force-Guantanamo Bay.
On any given day, nearly 25 percent of the Navy Reserve Force directly
supports the Navy worldwide--about 15,000 dailors.
Based on our annual assessment of the Active/Reserve mix, PB-16
continues investments in expanding critical capabilities within the
Reserve component including: (1) surge maintenance, by selectively
targeting reservists who bring specific, valuable civilian skill sets
to the Navy Total Force; (2) intelligence support, by realigning end
strength to support this vital mission; (3) cyber warfare, by ensuring
the appropriate mix of Reserve manning to augment the Active Navy
capability; and, (4) high value unit escort, by leveraging the Navy
Reserve's ability to fill short notice requirements using Reserve
Coastal Riverine Force units to assume CONUS high value unit escort
missions from the Coast Guard. PB-16 maintains several vital Reserve
capabilities, including all of the Navy-unique Fleet essential airlift
assets (C-40A and C-130). These enable the Navy to meet short-notice,
mission-critical airlift requirements more responsively than any other
logistics option. It also supports Airborne Electronic Attack by fully
funding a Reserve airborne electronic attack squadron, which is an
integral component of Navy's cyclic operational expeditionary airborne
electronic attack deployment capability.
conclusion
For the last 3 years, the Navy has been operating under reduced
top-lines generating capability shortfalls amounting to $25 billion
less than the President's Budget requests. With each year that the Navy
receives less than requested, the loss of force structure, readiness,
and future investments cause our options to become increasingly
constrained. Navy has already divested 23 ships and 67,000 personnel
between 2002 and 2012. We have been assuming significant risk by
delaying critical modernizations of our force to keep pace and maintain
technological advantage.
Unless naval forces are properly sized, modernized at the right
pace, ready to deploy with adequate training and equipment, and able to
respond with the capacity and speed required by combatant commanders,
they will not be able to carry out the defense strategy, as written.
Most importantly, when facing major contingencies, our ability to fight
and win will not be quick nor as decisive as required. To preclude a
significantly diminished global security role for the Nation's
military, we must address the growing mismatch in ends, ways, and
means.
The world is more complex, uncertain, and turbulent; this trend
will likely continue. Our adversaries' capabilities are modernizing and
expanding. It is, therefore, vital to have an adequate, predictable,
and timely budget to remain an effective Navy. PB-16 proposes the best
balance of Navy capabilities for the authorized amount of funding, and
enables the Navy to conduct the 10 primary missions outlined in the
President's DSG and the QDR. But, there is considerable risk. PB-16 is
the absolute minimum funding needed to execute our DSG. Should
resources be further reduced below PB-16 levels, the DSG will need to
be revised. If sequestration is implemented in fiscal year 2016, it
will damage our national security.
I thank this committee for their abiding support and look forward
to working together to develop viable options for our Nation's future.

Chairman McCain. I want to thank the witnesses, and those
are very compelling remarks, Admiral Greenert. General Dunford,
do you share Admiral Greenert's level of concern concerning the
effects of sequestration, and the, as Admiral Greenert pointed
out, a significant period of time before we can even recover
from the present effects of sequestration?
General Dunford. Mr. Chairman, I absolutely do. The
sequestration of 2013 has certainly impacted our current level
of readiness. Frankly, if we go to sequestration, we will be
unable to meet the current strategy, and we will certainly have
to reduce the capacity of marines that have forward deployed.
Chairman McCain. I believe you were asked by another--I
believe it was Senator King, does this sequestration put the
lives of the men and women who are serving in uniform at
greater risk.
General Dunford. Mr. Chairman, I will take that. It
absolutely does, Chairman, and in this way. We have readiness
challenges at home station. My expectation is that when Marines
are called, we will go, and they will either go late or they
will go with shortfalls in equipment and training that would
absolutely put young Americans' lives at risk.
Chairman McCain. Admiral Greenert?
Admiral Greenert. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. A lot of people
write recently about today in Today's Navy, a nice article
recently. This is about the future Navy. Our benchmark is 2020.
If we do not modernize, we will be late. We will not be ready.
We will not have what we need to defeat and deny.
Chairman McCain. Is it affecting morale and retention of
outstanding men and women?
Admiral Greenert. It is. The families are angry with
sequestration in general and the threat of it again. We have
pilots, a very key part of our ability to project, who are--our
retention is low on pilots. It is low on nuclear-trained
operators, Aegis technicians, and cyber.
Chairman McCain. General Dunford, the deployments are
longer. Is that correct?
General Dunford. Mr. Chairman, the biggest significance is
the time between deployments. Most of our units, our infantry
battalions, our fighting squadrons, are deploying for less than
a one-to-two deployment to dwell ratio. What that means is they
are deploying for 7 months, and they are actually home for less
than 14 months before they deploy. That continues almost at
infinitum.
Chairman McCain. So that is another factor on reenlistment.
General Dunford. Mr. Chairman, it will be over time. We
have not seen the impact on the ability to recruit and retain
high quality forces right now, but it does have an impact on
two things. It has an impact on training across the range of
military operations, and it also has an impact on the amount of
time our marines are able to spend with their families between
deployments.
Chairman McCain. Mr. Secretary, you and I have had
conversations about the situation of the cost overruns of the
aircraft carriers, of the Gerald R. Ford. I understand that the
follow-on 78 and 79, I guess, they are or will be around $12
billion each. Is that correct?
Secretary Mabus. The 79 has a congressional cost cap of
$11,500, and we are under that.
Chairman McCain. I hope, Mr. Secretary, given new
technologies, and drones, and a lot of other aspects of
warfare, including the F-35 capabilities, that we will be
looking at alternatives as well to the Nimitz-class or the
latest class of aircraft carriers. Is that correct?
Secretary Mabus. It is, Senator. I think that as you and I
discussed, everything is getting smaller and faster with the
possible exception of the military.
Chairman McCain. I guess I am not quite clear on why--is it
not true that the major cost overruns were due to advances or
new technology in launching and electromagnetic aircraft
launching system, advanced arresting gear, dual band radar, and
advanced weapons elevators. Are those still the greater risks
on the cost problem with the Gerald R. Ford and the Kennedy?
Secretary Mabus. Mr. Chairman, you are absolutely correct
that those were some of the reasons for the cost overruns. You
and I are in pretty violent agreement that the way the Ford was
built is not the way to build a ship. It was being designed
while it was being built. Too much new technology was trying to
be forced in, and that technology was not mature.
Today, though, the Ford is 87 percent complete. The testing
on the electromagnetic launch and the advanced arresting gear
is where it should be, and it is moving along. The risk of
anymore cost overruns, as you pointed out in your opening
statement, we have stable costs for the last 3 years or more
now, and it goes down every day. There is still some risk in
the testing of those brand new systems that we have never used
before.
Chairman McCain. General Dunford and Admiral Greenert,
could you give a brief update on the progress of the F-35?
General Dunford. Mr. Chairman, in our case, the 1st
Squadron will be at initial operating capability [IOC] this
summer. That is the VMFA 121 out in Yuma, Arizona. I visited
the squadron a couple of weeks ago. I am confident that we are
on path to bring that squadron up to IOC, and we also have a
good number of aircraft laid in across the next--across the 5-
year defense plan to bring the F-35B into service.
Chairman McCain. Admiral?
Admiral Greenert. We had our carrier test this past summer.
It went great. Tailhook was certified. We had no bolters, so
the avionics of the aircraft itself for the C model--that is
ours--is good. We still have a way to go for the software. That
is the 3F software. Right now we are on track for an IOC of
late fiscal year 2018 or early 2019.
My concern is that this software is able to integrate all
of the weapons systems that we have on the current aircraft on
our air wing, so this aircraft has to fit into our air wing. We
cannot fit the air wing around the aircraft. But so far so
good. We have to keep really close watch on it.
Chairman McCain. Thank you. Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me
first say that the chairman's questions regarding sequestration
and your responses about the real and dramatic effects on the
lives of the men and women that we serve are, I think, another
strong indication of the need for collective and bipartisan
action to end sequestration. So thank you, gentlemen, and thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary and Admiral Greenert, last year in the
defense authorization bill, we in section 1022 created the
National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund, which was designed to help
you from a DOD [Department of Defense] level to build or
replacement the Ohio-class submarine. Can I just ask both of
you how you intend to use this fund, and in general your plans
for the replacement of the Ohio. Mr. Secretary, if you want to
begin?
Secretary Mabus. Well, we very much appreciate the
establishment of this fund. CNO and I have been talking for
some time now about when we begin to build the Ohio-class
replacement in 2021, if it is a pure Navy build, it will
devastate some part of the Navy, either our shipbuilding, or
readiness, or something, because of the high cost of these, and
because we do not recapitalize them very often.
If you look back in history, there is precedent for either
making this a national program because it is the most
survivable leg of our deterrence triad, or adding funds to Navy
shipbuilding to accommodate it. The 41 for Freedom in late
1950s, early 1960s, and the Ohio-class in the late 1970s
through 1992, both times Navy shipbuilding was increased pretty
dramatically to accommodate these submarines. But to show you
the effects from 1976 to 1980, the Navy shipbuilding budget
doubled to accommodate the Ohio-class. Our fleet still declined
by 40 percent because it simply was not enough to do both.
Senator Reed. Admiral Greenert?
Admiral Greenert. Senator, first of all, I think it is a
great start. I think we need to pursue clarity of the intent of
the Congress, and what I mean by that is the legal
ramifications for sources of the fundings we could put in
there. Is it just other Navy shipbuilding accounts? Is it just
other Navy appropriations, or do we mean the whole DOD could
contribute to this fund, which, in my view, would be great.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much. In my view it would be
great, too, and that was the intent, I believe. The
clarification we will try to produce for you, sir.
General Dunford, again, in my opening remarks I talked
about the Fighting Vehicle Program, and this has been an
interesting and tortured path. The expeditionary fighting
vehicle was cancelled. We have several different concepts, and
this has spanned the careers of several commandants. Now, we
are into this new amphibious combat vehicle, which is described
as non-developmental. Seriously, your comments upon what you
see is the challenge. What are you trying to accomplish by
this, and how do you avoid the fate of the preceding vehicles,
which we spent money on, but could never deliver?
General Dunford. Senator, thanks. We have been working for
some time, as you alluded to, to replace the 40-year-old
amphibious assault vehicle. Until 2 years ago, we were trying
to reconcile the protection required against today's threat,
the costs that we could afford, and then the ship-to-shore
capability, that high speed self-deploying capability.
It turned out that we could not reconcile those three, and
so a decision was made to break the program into thirds. So the
third is to address the need for ground tactical vehicles with
adequate protection from range-to-shore right now, and so that
vehicle would be moved from ship-to-shore in a connector. The
second phase would be to get our vehicles to at least have the
same capabilities as today's assault amphibious vehicle. That
is, it could self-deploy from an amphibious ship.
From that point down the road, we have a decision point to
then pursue again a self-deploying high speed vehicle. If at
that time we can reconcile those three variables I talked
about, or to continue to make improvements to the second phase,
which is a vehicle with at or greater than capability to our
current assault amphibious vehicle. But, Senator, the reason
why we are where we are is we simply could not reconcile those
three things--the cost, the capability, and the protection
required against a current threat.
Senator Reed. So you are focusing first on a vehicle that
will be basically have some limited forwarding capability to
get a short distance in a low surf, and then fight on land with
all the protections we have seen against IEDs [improvised
explosive devices] and those things, and all the lessons we
have learned. That is the first phase.
General Dunford. That is exactly right, Senator. We expect
our vehicles will operate 90 percent of the time ashore, and so
this first phase vehicle is optimized for ground protection and
mobility ashore.
Senator Reed. The second phase, is it going to be a
completely different vehicle, or you are trying----
General Dunford. No, Senator. I was out to the Nevada Auto
Test Center about 3 weeks ago to look at the current state of
the vehicles. Quite frankly, I think in most cases, we have
asked for a vehicle that just provides adequate ground mobility
and not necessarily a self-deploying vehicle. All of the
individuals right now that are competitive in the process have
a vehicle that actually I think may get pretty close to the
second phase that we require.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, and just finally, Mr.
Secretary, the director of operations, who will test the
evaluation, has raised some concerns about the survivability of
the LCS--and if Admiral Greenert wants to take the question
also--and also the ones that have been modified to operate as
frigates. Have you specifically established survivability
requirements for the modified LCS, and have you--are those
requirements much different than the initial requirements of
LCS?
Secretary Mabus. The small surface combatant task force
looked at that and did upgrade the survivability by things like
hardening the area around the magazine, around various combat
systems. CNO has pointed out very accurately in the past, the
best way to survive is not to get hit. So we have upped the
defensive capabilities of that ship, and it is also a very
ship, too.
It is important to keep in mind that this is a small
surface combatant, that the new upgraded ones have been
designated a frigate. But they are not destroyers, they are not
cruisers, and they have a very different role to play. But the
survivability for a small surface combatant, particularly with
the upgrades, meets our fleet requirements and meets the
requirements that we have set.
Senator Reed. Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe?
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would say to our
panel we have good attendance up here, so we are going to be
talking about a lot of systems, and I will kind of start off on
one, Admiral Greenert, that I think has changed quite a bit,
and that is the JSOW program [Joint Standoff Weapon]. I think a
year ago they were talking about adding 4,400 or so of the
JSOWs, and that was in the 2015 budget. I do not remember. What
is the current inventory? If we were going to get--how many
more would that represent when you said 4,400?
Admiral Greenert. I will have to get you those numbers. I
do not have them handy here.
Senator Inhofe. I mean, is it like 2,000 now?
Admiral Greenert. We benchmark against the combat
requirement, and, again, I have to get you the number.
Senator Inhofe. Okay, that is fine. But I guess my point
is, if we were talking about projecting in last year's budget
4,432 more of the JSOWs over the life of the program, which
would have included at that time, because we have in this
budget, or we had in this budget, 200 to be bought, then all of
a sudden, at least it was to me, the program was terminated. I
am just wondering what has happened that caused that not to be
a necessary component as it was considered to be before now?
Admiral Greenert. Well, we had to take some chances, and I
am not happy at all. We do not have enough munitions. I am very
concerned about it, and I think I expressed it. But the point
was we felt we had the combat expenditure. We watched very
closely how many we used during the year. When I say
``combat,'' I mean we have enough for what we believe would be
the model number, and can we reconstitute the line, and we felt
we could. So we are taking risks. It is not good.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. That is a good point. You are adding
risk by having to do this. You would prefer not to.
Admiral Greenert. I would prefer not to. I have risk in
other munitions that are just bad. It is not a good picture,
Senator.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. Yes. No, that is right. Senator Reed
talked about, General Dunford, about the F-35. Just to
elaborate a little bit more, that would actually be there in
replacing the F-18s, is that correct, and the EA6Bs?
General Dunford. The AV-8s, Senator. It will replace three
aircraft----
Senator Inhofe. All three.
General Dunford.--all of which are over 20 years old.
Senator Inhofe. All right. Yes, that is right, 23 years
old, the F-18s and the E6B-27. So and you have looked at the
missions of all these, and you are satisfied that these
missions are going to be met with this change and getting rid
of the older, and the F-35s are going to be capable of doing
it?
General Dunford. Well, Senator, it will do that, but it is
probably also important to point out that this actually does
not just replace the F-18, the AV-8, or the VA-6. It is a
fundamentally different capability. It is a transformational
capability. It will do everything that those three aircraft
will do, but also in terms of the information environment, it
will do a significant amount more for the Marine Air-Ground
Task Force.
Senator Inhofe. You talked about the--no, Admiral Greenert,
you talked about the pilots, and we have a pilot shortage. You
have talked to your--the Air Force and the problems that they
are having right now. Are your problems similar to that?
Admiral Greenert. They are. What happens is people get
deployed. They are flying all the time. In fact, they are
flying so much, working up quickly to go on deployment, some of
them say I cannot even get a wheel done. Then when we come
back, we shut down, and they sit around here, and they look out
on the tarmac, and there is a Super Hornet they would love to
be flying, but we do not have the funding to provide that. They
say what is with this? This is not what I signed up for.
Senator Inhofe. That is the same thing that General Walsh
talked about.
Admiral Greenert. It is, yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. It is the same situation. Now, tell me if
this is true because I remember bringing this up kind of
comparing the cost of replacing some training versus retention.
As I understand, the 10 years of the retention bonus was around
$250,000. That is in the Air Force. Is that comparable to the
Navy?
Admiral Greenert. It is comparable. We have the same thing.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. Yes. Then also, that training, if you
take to them F-22 capability, is going to be something like $17
million. I mean, up here we look at the economics of this
thing, and obviously it is far better if we can retain these
people rather than go through training. Have you thought of
anything specifically that would help you in that respect?
Admiral Greenert. We have, yes, sir. So, we use the term--
we want to optimize what we call our training plan, our fleet
response training plan, and you hit the nail on the head. It is
getting the flying done more consistently throughout, keep
them, if you will, busy, proficient, that they feel a part,
they have a predictable future out there instead of a cycling
process as they get ready to deploy.
Senator Inhofe. That is the message I get when I talk to
those--we know there is a lot of competition with the airlines.
We know that in the training, it is a supply and demand thing.
Admiral Greenert. Senator, excuse me. A consistent budget
will really help us be able to do that. Consistency is key.
Senator Inhofe. Absolutely. I understand that. You said,
General Dunford, when Senator McCain asked you some specific
questions about it, you said, and I wrote it down, ``Funding
below the President's Budget would require a new strategy.''
You answered a couple of questions about some of the specifics,
but what would an overall new strategy look like? What are we
talking about?
General Dunford. Well, Senator, what I really meant was
that on a day-to-day basis, we would not have the marines that
are forward deployed to meet the sure allies, part of the
strategy, and to respond to crisis, part of the strategy. Then
we would have fewer forces than were required to meet a single
major contingency, and so, in my mind that does, from a
marine's perspective, drive the need for a new strategy.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, I understand.
General Dunford. So it is a capacity issue as well as a
readiness issue.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. My time has expired, but if you want
to expand on that for the record, please do because that would
be something that we need to be equipped with her.
General Dunford. We will do that, Senator. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]

Inherently, the Marine Corps organizes, trains, equips, and
provides forces to support the Nation's strategy which is where I will
focus my remarks. Given the numerous and complex security challenges we
face today, I believe DOD funding at the Budget Control Act level, with
sequestration, will result in a need to review our strategy. Marine
Corps Forces would not be able to execute the strategy given the
implications of the potential resource constraints.
As a forward deployed force in readiness, the Marine Corps is
currently meeting the needs of the Nation, though at a cost to
modernization and infrastructure. Over the coming years, maintaining a
deployment to dwell ratio of 1 to 2 has the potential to consume
readiness at a rate that exceeds the Corps' institutional ability to
properly balance and sustain it. We are currently unable to maintain
ready forces at acceptable levels of readiness for a major OPLAN though
we are putting measures in place to improve future readiness. The
potential for simultaneous OPLAN execution in multiple theaters exposes
even greater risk. The aforementioned are exacerbated by sequestration
and our initiatives to improve will never gain the irreversible
momentum that I am seeking.
The challenges we have under the current budget may result in a
Marine Corps with fewer active duty battalions and squadrons than would
be required for a single major contingency. Further budget reductions
will result in fewer Marines and sailors being forward deployed in a
position to immediately respond to crises involving our diplomatic
posts, American citizens or our interests overseas. The Marine Corps
will still be able to support OPLAN requirements and forward presence
is okay in the short term; however, over time we will have to fix
capacity and/or adapt strategy.
The Marine Corps can currently meet the requirements of a major
OPLAN in a single theater with challenges in lift and TACAIR capacity
in the near term. A majority of the ground units are capable of meeting
availability to load dates--some exceptions exist in key enablers,
combat support such as tanks and AAVs, ground fire support,
maintenance, logistics, and medical. Maintaining readiness levels for
deployed and next-to-deploy forces impacts the ability for non-deployed
forces to be ready to respond to other demands. An example of adjusting
our service strategy would be to fulfill a requirement for a battalion
with a two company battalion rather than a full three company
battalion. Make no mistake, this battalion would be as ready and
capable as the full battalion; it would just be more streamlined and
tailored for the specific mission. Inherent in our Marine Corps ethos
is the ability to be scalable and tailored for specific missions. We
can use this strategy to mitigate capacity shortfalls while at the same
time continue to fulfill the demand for Marine Corps capabilities and
maintain readiness.
Another strategy would be to provide in lieu of capabilities. For
example, a potential increase in rotary wing attack aviation could
partially mitigate shortfalls in artillery fires, though limitations
such as weather and maintenance provide other considerations for risk.
Shortfalls in capacity could be partially mitigated by the Joint Force,
though capacity and readiness are also challenged for the Navy, Army,
and Air Force. In total, mitigation strategies only increase our risk
to supporting the defense strategy and serve to provide a false sense
that the Marine Corps and Joint Force are appropriately sized and
balanced.

Chairman McCain. Senator Manchin?
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of
you for your service, and appreciate it very much. I will take
a little different twist than this. There is not a person I
know of in West Virginia that is not extremely proud of the
military that we have and have served with distinction, and
truly is proud to have the greatest military that history has
ever recorded.
With that being said, I sat in my first meetings in this
Armed Services, and at that time we had the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and Admiral Mullen was here. The question was asked to
Admiral Mullen, what is the greatest threat that the United
States of America faces? I thought I was going to hear his
depiction of an evaluation of the around the world terror that
we were facing. He did not even hesitate, and he said that the
finances of our country is the greatest threat we face.
We are at $18 trillion and growing. We will grow another
half a trillion this year. With that being said, people back
home in West Virginia want us to be responsible. They ask the
question, and they said, ``you know, we hear that our military,
our DOD, will spend more than the next seven or eight countries
combined. How come we cannot do it more efficiently or more
effectively? If money is the problem, we have to make sure that
we have the money to do it. But are we using the money
wisely?''
So through procurement we are trying to get OTTIS
[Operational Test/Training Instrumentation System]. We are
trying to find out why procurements--why we have--everyone has
a different platform. Everything seems to be siloed, if you
will, rather than integrated. I do not know if you all have a
comment or an answer to that, but it is hard to go back home
and explain, you know, we are going to be--I think the request
is a little under $600 billion this year for fiscal year 2016.
Is the request $585 [billion]? I think just from the Navy,
yours has gone from $149 [billion] to $161 [billion], your
request.
So they are not going this way, and I know you are saying
if sequestering kicks in. Sequestering has a real onerous, I
think, connotation to it because of the way it is administered.
If we allowed you all to do maybe things differently than us
intervening in it and trying to tell you how to do your job, it
might be a little bit better.
I appreciate that, too, and I know it is hard for you all
to make those comments, Secretary. But are there ways that we
can do it more effective and efficiently, and what can we do to
untie your hands to let you do more with maybe a little more
challenging financial, but be able to have the ability to do
more with what you have?
Secretary Mabus. Senator, first, you are absolutely correct
that we as a military have to be efficient, have to be
effective, have to use the taxpayers' money very efficiently.
My father was the cheapest human that God ever saw fit to put
on this Earth I think, and I am his son. So, we have been using
the tools that this committee and this Congress has given,
things that I talked about--firm fixed price contracts, driving
them down, things like that.
But I will show you a chart. Here is what we have to do to
buy anything. You cannot read it. I cannot either from here. It
is spaghetti. It is a labyrinth that you have to go through.
You could help us by taking out some of those things. Make us
focus on what is important, and that is the outcome.
[The chart referred to follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Secretary Mabus. We are also looking at things like
contracts. The Navy spends about $40 billion a year on
contracts, and until a couple of years ago we could not track
that money from the time you appropriated--authorized and
appropriated it until it got to the contract. We can today. We
are saving today 10 percent a year, so $4 billion a year on
contracts. We are going to do better than that. Those are hard
things. Those are not easy things.
The last thing is that there are really four parts to DOD
or five parts. There are the four Services, the three
departments--the Army, Navy, Air Force. But there is also DOD,
the defense agencies, that are all overhead, and they have
grown far, far faster than the Services.
Senator Manchin. Let me just say one thing, and one final
thing because my time will be running out real quick, and I am
so sorry. But every time we talk about a lack of resources or
money, General and Admiral both, it is always reduction-in-
force, how it is going to affect the people on the front line.
But when we look at you all's staff, your staff keeps growing
and growing and growing, even though you talk about reduction-
in-force. It does not make sense why we go to the front line
immediately and have a reduction-in-force when the staff has
made no sacrifices.
Secretary Mabus. Can I take a shot at that, sir?
Senator Manchin. Whoever. Whoever.
Secretary Mabus. I am going to defend my two Service Chiefs
here. Their staffs have not grown. The uniforms and the
civilians in the Department of the Navy have not grown. In
fact, from 2014 to 2016, we have a difference of 10 civilians.
We are not growing. In fact, the Marines are shrinking, the
Navy is staying steady, and the staffs are staying steady or
going down. We are doing a 20 percent reduction in headquarters
staff.
But, again, it is what we call the fourth estate, DOD
agencies, things like the Defense Finance and Accounting
Service, things like the Defense Logistics Agency. Their
contractors have just grown exponentially, and so that is where
the growth is coming. It is not--I will speak just for the
Department of the Navy, it is in not in the Department.
Senator Manchin. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Wicker?
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Secretary Mabus, and maybe we
will have time to get to that point, but let me go ahead with
my planned questions. Admiral Greenert, we sort of decided on
this rebalance to Asia before the latest provocations from
Russia, before ISIS [the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] took
over so much territory. If sequestration returns in October,
what sort of gap will these cuts create between Asia's
rebalance strategy and the already important tasks of deterring
Russia and defeating ISIS? Can you highlight to this committee
the role amphibious ships will have in executing these
missions? Admiral Greenert?
Admiral Greenert. Thanks, Senator. Yes, Senator, one of the
top priorities we have is presence. So other than funding the
sea-based strategic deterrent, I need to make sure that we are
present around the world. So my point would be we will pursue
forward presence. You will not see much reduction under a BCA
scenario in our forward presence. Most of the rebalance to the
Asia-Pacific is what we call forward stationed or forward-
deployed naval force in Japan, in Singapore, and in Guam. Those
will continue to, in fact, increase.
Our distribution around the world is--we are increasing the
forces in the [U.S.] European Command [EUCOM] as we look at how
we are going to deploy in the future, strictly for the reason
you stated with the instability in the AFRICOM [U.S. Africa
Command] and in the EUCOM region. It is not dramatic, but it is
there. Amphibious forces play a very important role, which we
call the ``new normal,'' the ability to respond quickly to
counter terrorism, to piracy, and to support our forces and
defend Americans abroad, especially in our embassies.
Senator Wicker. So the Asia-Pacific rebalance will not take
a hit from sequestration, and our European presence will not
take a hit from sequestration. Those hits will take place
elsewhere. Is that----
Admiral Greenert. Those hits, if you will, will take place
in our ability to respond to supplement those forces forward,
and those forces forward will not be as modern as they need to
be. We will have dramatic decreases in modernization.
Senator Wicker. Okay. General Dunford, I have been worrying
aloud about Afghanistan. General Dempsey told our committee
last week there is a terrorist network that stretches from
Afghanistan to Nigeria, and we have to keep pressure on it
throughout its entire length. He went on to say ``I think
Afghanistan is and will remain an anchor point for that
pressure.'' Do you agree with that, General Dunford?
General Dunford. Senator, I do agree with that. I think of
Afghanistan as a counterterrorism partner and as a platform
from which the United States can protect its interest in
Southwest Asia is absolutely critical.
Senator Wicker. Am I right then to worry about the current
plans for drawing down our forces in Afghanistan, to worry that
those are based on more of a political calculation rather than
the facts on the ground?
General Dunford. Senator, my understanding from listening
to Secretary Carter's testimony, and General Dempsey's
testimony, and General Campbell's testimony is that they are
all reviewing the current plan in light of the points you just
made.
Senator Wicker. I hope we do. Last week before the
committee, I pointed out to Secretary Carter and General
Dempsey that things are headed in the right direction in
Afghanistan. I do not know if the American people appreciate
that, but we have made great gains there. President Ghani and
his chief opposition leader, Dr. Abdullah, and a partnership,
they want us there as a stabilizing force, and I just hope that
we are not about to throw away what progress we have made.
Secretary Mabus, you and I have been friends a long time.
Remarkable testimony actually. Very profound statement that you
had, which you, of course, had to abridge during your oral
remarks. You mentioned what Thomas Paine said about the cause
of America is in a great measure the cause of all mankind. I
almost want to substitute the word ``cost'' there, and it seems
that it falls on the United States of America. You also
correctly say for 7 decades the United States and Marine Corps
have been the primary protector of this international system.
We are doing it for everybody else.
There is a sound basis in this proposition that rising
international prosperity is directly linked to the U.S. Navy.
Thank you to our military and to our Navy. We have kept the sea
lanes open you say. We have kept freedom of navigation open for
anybody engaged in peaceful and legitimate trade. As the
President said, we've been the anchor of global security.
This is for you, but also for our friends internationally
listening to this. We are going to have to insist on more of a
contribution from our international partners. We keep the lanes
open for them. Our friends in Europe, our [North Atlantic
Treaty Organization] NATO friends, our other friends in Europe
are depending on what exactly you are talking about. I would
just say we are going to have to collectively come up with a
plan to convince our partners in international security that it
is in their interests, too, to make the financial sacrifice to
help us afford all of this protection that we are giving to the
world. Would you like to comment on that, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Mabus. Well, first to say we have been friends
for a long time, and second to say that it is one of the
reasons that we are pursuing these partnerships, and that is a
message that you just gave that I take to countries around the
world that we cannot do it by ourselves, and that they have to
bear their fair share of any burden.
As part of that, to be interoperable with us, to exercise
with us, to make sure that we go to--we go into things
together. One of the things that--one of the tangible things
that is happening right now is the French aircraft carrier
Charles de Gaulle is in the Arabian Gulf conducting strikes
against ISIS. That is a sort of partnership that not only we
need, but that the world needs.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, and I have gone way over. I hope
that I speak for Senator Hirono, my ranking member on the
Subcommittee on Seapower, that you will perhaps give us some
language to address the problems you pointed out in that very
confusing chart. If there are suggestions you have for ways
that we can cut through that red tape and make procurement of
important weapon systems a little easier and a little more
favorable to our fighting men and women, I hope you will get
that to Senator Hirono and me. Thank you.
Secretary Mabus. I would be very happy to. Thank you,
Senator.
Chairman McCain. The Senator is correct. He has gone way
over. [Laughter.]
Senator Donnelly?
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have taken
warning of that comment that you just made. Mr. Secretary,
thank you for your service, and I want to tell you, and you
already know, you have a great team sitting there with you,
General Dunford, Admiral Greenert. Admiral, thank you for
everything you have done for our country. We were
extraordinarily blessed to have you on command, and we
appreciate it.
I also want to mention, Mr. Secretary and to Admiral
Greenert, I want to take a moment to recognize the superior
performance of the Navy's nuclear forces. It has been
exceptional. You have created a culture of outstanding
performance, and it has not gone unnoticed. So, as a Nation, we
really feel in your debt for having done all of that.
Now I want to ask you about suicide prevention. It has been
such a challenge for our Services. It has been something we
have worked on together. What I want to talk about is physician
assistance. They have a great reputation in the mission, a
great reputation for medical care. The first is to Admiral
Greenert and to Secretary Mabus, and then I will get to General
Dunford second. But to Admiral and Mr. Secretary, what are your
thoughts about expanding the Services' use of physician
assistants specializing in psychiatric care to fill some of the
provider gaps that we see?
Admiral Greenert. It is an excellent idea. We have looked
at things like this. I have to go back and take another round
through that, but clearly we can use more folks to help us with
the resiliency in the psychological arena.
Secretary Mabus. Senator, I am a big fan of physician
assistance, of nurse practitioners, of people that we can get
out in bigger numbers to help with some of this resiliency,
because as you pointed out, suicide is one of the big
challenges we face, and not just in the military. It is the
second leading cause of death of Americans 18 to 32 years old.
Senator Donnelly. It is a staggering and scary statistic.
General, you have done a great job in embedding mental health
providers with the expeditionary units. What are your thoughts
on the utility of physician assistance also helping in the
Marine Corps with psychiatric care?
General Dunford. No, Senator, thanks, and I think my answer
would be similar to Admiral Greenert. It is in the sense that I
would be supportive of anything that would increase the
capacity of us to deal with the resilience of our marines and
sailors, and also their mental health.
Senator Donnelly. Okay, thank you. Mr. Secretary, at Crane
in Indiana, we work on counterfeit part detection. How big a
threat do you see that being in the years ahead?
Secretary Mabus. Well, it is something that we have seen in
the past, and it could be critical in the future. It is
important for us to stay on top of that because some of the
counterfeit parts that we have detected that Crane found
earlier were critical parts in our submarines, for example, and
you cannot take chances on things like that. It is one of those
capabilities that we have absolutely got to keep up, and it is
part of the acquisition strategy that we have to have adequate
oversight.
I will go a little bit further here in that our acquisition
workforce, people at Crane, people around the country, that
oversaw things like this, went down pretty considerably. Since
2010, we have been rebuilding that workforce to do exactly some
of those very specialized skills like that.
Senator Donnelly. General Dunford, the Marines have played
such a strong role in Anbar Province in Iraq over the years. A
lot of extraordinary relations were created between the Marines
and the Sunni tribes. As we take the battle to ISIL, can you
give me an update as to what role the Marines are playing in
terms of trying to cultivate those long-term relationships
because they are so critical to our success?
General Dunford. Thank you, Senator, and we do, in fact,
have forces in Anbar Province today. We have two 25-man
training teams that are with the Iraqi 7th Division. We also
have a Marine Corps colonel who is the commander of our Special
Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force, and that force now is
focused on supporting General Austin's counter-ISIL efforts.
In addition to developing those relationships in Anbar
Province, we have marines protecting the embassy in Baghdad,
and then also we provide the tactical recovery of aircraft and
personnel missions. So we support the strikes that can win both
with carriers and with joint force aircraft. We support the
strikes that go into Iraq and Syria with the V-22 so that if
something did happen, we would be in a position to recover
aircraft and personnel.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Rounds?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank
you for your service. I would like to follow up a little bit on
what Senator Inhofe was discussing, and, in particular, Admiral
Greenert, you were responding to the munitions questions, but
this would be for both you and General Dunford. In your
judgment, are your munitions inventories sufficient to support
current operations and the defense strategic guidance plan? Are
there individual munitions whose inventories are either present
or projected, which are insufficient to meet the requirements?
If so, what are they, and what is being done to address the
shortfalls?
Admiral Greenert. For operations today, we have sufficient
munitions. For operations in the future, my benchmark year, our
benchmark year, is 2020. There is a series of missions we have
to do. They are outlined on the card that I gave you. They are
effectively based upon the war plans. We have insufficient
munitions in 2020, even some munitions in the President's
Budget. They are air-to-air. They are surface-to-surface, if
you will, cruise missiles. Some of our air-to-ground, and as
Senator Inhofe mentioned, the joint standoff weapon, the JSOW.
Now, the air-to-air has two elements. There is a longer
range and a medium range. Both of those have shortfalls. In our
lightweight torpedo we have a shortfall, and our heavyweight
torpedo we have a shortfall. A ``shortfall'' is defined as the
combatant commander believes they need all of this to win in
the model, you know, campaign, and you have to have enough to
reload so that you are not just standing around here saying,
well, we won, but we are empty, if you see what I mean. So that
is kind of the baseline, sir.
Senator Rounds. General Dunford?
General Dunford. Senator, thank you. We have adequate
ammunition for today. We have taken risk and ammunition that
would be needed for a major contingency as we have dealt with
the budget challenges. The three major areas that we have
shortfalls are in our javelin systems and tow systems. Those
are anti-tank weapon systems. The other areas in HIMARS [High
Mobility Artillery Rocket System] rockets, that is an artillery
system, a rocket for artillery. There are a large number of
other smaller areas of ammunition that we are short. Those are
the main areas. Again, it has been a decision that we have made
as we try to balance risk.
For the Marine Corps, as I mentioned in my opening
statement, we always ensure that our units that are forward
deployed or next to deployed have the wherewithal to accomplish
the mission. So, what we end up doing is taking risks at home
station and against a major contingency, and that is exactly
what we have done in the case of ammunition.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Secretary Mabus, you pointed out
in the procurement process the complications and the added
costs that come with that. Are there programs that would
benefit from cost reduction initiatives, such as multiyear
procurement or block buys that do not currently have those
authorities? If there are, would you care to elaborate on them?
Secretary Mabus. Well, Senator, thanks to this committee,
in particular, thanks to Congress, we have multiyear authority
on things like the Virginia-class submarines we bought 10
submarines for the price of 9 because of that multiyear. Now we
have a multiyear on the Marine Osprey V-22s, and it has
dramatically driven down the costs. We have a multiyear on our
VDG-51s, our destroyers, which has also pretty dramatically
driven down the costs, block buys on the Littoral Combat Ship.
Any time we can do that, we very much want to and
appreciate this committee. Expanding those authorities to do
that for weapon systems for things like that would certainly be
helpful. But it is some of the things, as I said in my opening
statement, it is just basic business concepts, getting more
competition in, doing some of these longer-term things, so that
industry knows what we are going to buy so that they can make
the investments up front in infrastructure and job training so
that they can buy things in economic order quantities so that
we can drive the costs down. The chart I held up shows just
some of the steps that we have to go through. Even if we get a
multiyear, even if we get a block buy, we have to go through
this very convoluted process that really adds no value at the
end, and it does not give us a better weapons system.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back my 9
seconds.
Voice. You are a hero.
Chairman McCain. Very thoughtful. Senator Blumenthal, you
have an extra 9 seconds.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to
begin by thanking all three of you for your extraordinary
service to our Nation. Admiral Greenert, particularly, my
personal thanks to you for your numerous visits to Connecticut
and your strong advocacy of our Navy's strength, particularly
when it comes to submarines. I know that all of us on this
committee and the American people join me in gratitude to you.
I want to ask a question about submarines, the Virginia
Payload Module [VPM], which I think is critically important to
the Virginia-class submarines that we are going to be
procuring. The VPM adds significantly to the number of
Tomahawks that can be prepared--I think it is 76 percent--which
will be especially important at a time when the number of boats
in our fleet diminishes to minimum or below minimum strength. I
am wondering whether there is the possibility that that
acquisition program--I know that the VPM, Virginia-class
submarines are going to be procured beginning in 2019 with one,
and then in subsequent year one. Whether that program can be
accelerated so that more of the Virginia-class boats have the
VPM and are able to increase their capacity to deliver that
kind of attack.
Admiral Greenert. We are going to look at that, Senator,
and by I think in April/May we will be done studying that. We
would like to do that. We have to look at the technical risks
associated with that, so if it is feasible, we will give it a
good try to get that one. If we go to that year, 2018, we are
into--the Secretary just mentioned a block buy, that we have a
block buy in there. So we are going to have to transition that
bridge, if you will, into trying to manipulate such a major
part into a block buy. So I do not know what it will do, but we
will have to study that.
Senator Blumenthal. What do you think is the timetable for
making that determination?
Admiral Greenert. By May we should have an answer. We will
be working very closely with your committee and make sure they
know--I am sorry, with your staff and make sure they know how
it is coming along.
Senator Blumenthal. If you could keep us informed, I would
appreciate it.
Admiral Greenert. Will do, yes, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. Let me move to an issue that I know
concerns all of you, the impact of post-traumatic stress, the
care for our men and women in uniform. General Dunford, I know
you have been very, very cognizant and attentive to this issue.
Are you satisfied that this budget has enough in the way of
resources to deal with post-traumatic stress and traumatic
brain injury, which, as you also know, is the cause of not only
a threat to readiness, but also suicide and other facts?
General Dunford. Senator, we consciously protected those
programs as we built the President's Budget in 2016. But I
would tell you, again, it goes back to what happens with BCA
levels or sequestration. It will become increasingly difficult
to protect those kinds of programs as well as a number of other
programs as we draw down the budget even further.
Senator Blumenthal. On that topic, Secretary Mabus, the
connectivity to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) on
health issues, on a number of personnel-related issues has been
questioned and challenged in this very room by the VA's
officials and by other members of DOD. I wonder whether there
is more that you can see being done to better relate and
transfer information that is important to disability claims, to
healthcare in the VA, and so forth.
Secretary Mabus. Absolutely, Senator. That is one of the
critical things we do, particularly for our wounded or injured
as we move them from active duty to the VA. We have a goal in
days of how long it takes to move someone. Both Navy and Marine
Corps are under that goal. We are doing it faster.
But the goal is not a quick goal. It is too long, and we
need to get better at that. We need to get better at having
systems that talk to each other between DOD and the VA. But it
is something that we are very, very conscious of, and trying to
eliminate some of disability determination that both DOD and
the VA run, and sometimes they do the same things, just at
different times.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ernst?
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank
you so much for being here today. I appreciate your service and
your willingness to testify in front of this committee.
General Dunford, I would like to start with you, sir. The
budget that we have right now in front of us reflects a switch
from land-based to operations, large-scale battles, back to
being a quick reactionary force for the Marines, and I know
that the Marines are going to adapt accordingly. They always do
that very well. But I do worry that our forces are going
through a lot of uncertainty with financial constraints, and we
seem to be caught off guard by our adversaries.
Our enemies are capturing stockpiles of weapons, some of
which are the M-16s and the M-4s. We have been using this
individual weapon system for 50 years now. It was developed in
1964. This still remains our soldier and our airmen's basic
rifle, and that puts us at an equal playing level with our
adversaries on the ground. Is it possible that while we are
taking a look at advancing our ships, modernizing our ships,
modernizing our aviation platforms, within the budget, is there
room to move on advancing individual weapon systems that put us
at a technological advantage over our adversaries?
General Dunford. Senator, thanks for that question, and
that actually is one of my greatest concerns. We know
historically the Marine Corps needs to invest a minimum of
about 11 or 12 percent, and that is fairly small, of our
overall obligation authority into modernization and capability
development.
This year we are at about 9 percent, so it is lower than it
has been historically, and I am concerned. But today I think we
are doing a pretty good job of resetting our capabilities to
the fight that we had yesterday. I am not satisfied we are
investing enough in the capabilities that we need to fight
tomorrow. What you are suggesting is modernization of things
like weapon systems.
I would say this. I agree with your point that we need to
be able to do that, but I also would just make a point that it
is not just a weapon, it is who is behind that weapon. So, it
is still not a fair fight even if the enemy has the same weapon
as we do. It is the marine behind the weapon that makes the M-
16 most effective.
But your point about increased investment in these areas,
that is one of the sacrifices we have made as we have continue
to fight today's fight and make sure our marines that are
forward deployed have what they need. We have taken risk in our
capability development.
Senator Ernst. Exceptional. Thank you, General, for
pointing out it is that marine that is behind that weapon
system, and making sure that we are training them appropriately
and have the means to do that is extremely important. One thing
that I would love to address to both Admiral and to you as
well, General, and Secretary, in the statements we have talked
a little bit about the total force that we have out there,
which would include not only our active duty personnel, but
those Reserve members that are being used as operational
forces. I would love to hear you elaborate a little bit about
the role that our Reserve members have played in backfilling
for your components.
Admiral Greenert. Well, I would be remiss if I did not
acknowledge this is the 100th anniversary of the Navy Reserve
this year, in fact, just a few days ago. So happy anniversary
to the Navy Reserve.
Senator Ernst. Yes, happy anniversary.
Admiral Greenert. We are absolutely unable to function
without our Navy Reserve today. They have gone from sort of
folks that were there for a strategic force in case of the big
war to now they are part of our total force. They do our
logistics, all of our logistics, a lot of our medical. They are
in cyber in a huge way. As we go to the unmanned in the remote
areas, they are our operators in waiting, and a lot of them are
integrating fully in that regard. They do our Riverine Squadron
[RIVRON] force. That means our high value units, our
submarines, our ships out and around the world, and they are
building partnership capacity. So there are other areas that
they are working their way into, so a very effective force
woven into the fiber of who we are today.
Senator Ernst. Thank you.
General Dunford. Senator, thanks. Our ability to meet the
combatant commanders' requirements on a day-to-day basis and in
response to a major contingency is inextricably linked to the
readiness of our Marine Corps Reserve. They are integrated into
everything that we do to the point where when we look at our
requirements over the next couple of years, we actually have a
force generation plan that fully integrates our Reserves into
our ability to meet those forward presence requirements every
day.
So that to us is what we mean by when you use the term
``operational reserve.'' What it means is that we are using
them on a day-to-day basis to meet not only the routine
requirements of the combatant commanders, but, again, the
historic need for a strategic reserve that could respond to an
unexpected major contingency.
Senator Ernst. Thank you very much, gentlemen. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Hirono?
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank
you for your service, and a particular aloha mahalo to Admiral
Greenert, this being your last force posture testimony.
Secretary Mabus, I am very committed to the rebalance of
the Asia-Pacific, and we had a discussion about that yesterday
between you and me. So, it is really important that our efforts
to maintain stability in the Asia-Pacific area is important to
our national security even as there are conflicts arising in
other parts of the world. As you stated in your testimony, ``We
must have the right platforms in the right places to ensure our
friends and allied understand our commitment.'' So the
rebalance has to be more than rhetoric, and as we discussed
yesterday, I trust that the Navy, as it updates its strategic
lay down and dispersal plans will, ensure that future plans
will reflect the rebalance in terms of equipment, personnel,
and partnership opportunities. I certainly look forward to
further discussions with you.
Secretary Mabus, do you think that this budget reflects our
continued commitment to the rebalance with sufficient
specificity?
Secretary Mabus. Senator, I do. The commitment to the
rebalance is real. It is absolute. You can begin to see the
things that are already happening. You are seeing the second
deployment of an LCS to Singapore, and by 2017 we will have
four LCSs in Singapore. The crews will fall in on the ships
instead of the ships coming back home.
Today you are seeing more than 1,000 marines rotationally
deployed to Darwin, Australia, and within the next year or 2
that will go up to a full--nearly 2,500 marines, Special
Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force. You are seeing the plans
that we have to put our newest equipment, both ships and
aircraft, in the region. We are going from about 55 percent of
our fleet in the Pacific to 60 percent.
But I think the important number is that the fleet is
getting bigger so that 60 percent of this fleet is going to be
bigger than the fleet of the past. We in this budget
specifically have the resources to carry out that, but I will
echo Admiral Greenert and General Dunford. This is the minimum
that we have to have in order to do not only the rebalance, but
all the other missions that we are called upon to do.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. I think I heard your response to
Senator Donnelly's question about your concern about
counterfeit parts, and I believe you said that you do have a
concern about that. I just wanted to ask you one question,
though. You do have a concern about counterfeit parts.
Secretary Mabus. Yes.
Senator Hirono. So I was just wondering whether you were
aware of any technological product that can be embedded in
parts to ensure that it is not a counterfeit part.
Secretary Mabus. Senator, I am not aware of any specific
chip or whatever that you can imbed in it. What I am aware of
is that our quality control folks, places like Crane, Indiana,
that the Senator was talking about, are exceptionally good at
spotting those counterfeits.
Senator Hirono. I am aware of a particular product that I
would love to talk with you further in a different context.
Regarding your energy efforts, we do need a sustained long-
term commitment to research and development in this area, and
meeting our energy security needs and preserving the
superiority of our forces in the face of energy supply
challenges in the 21st century are important goals. In your
testimony, you highlighted the 2009 formal energy goals for the
Department of the Navy, which includes using energy more
efficiently and diversifying our sources of power, and
certainly, I will agree with your efforts. Could you give us an
update briefly on the 2009 formal energy goals, and how does
the President's Budget proposal support these energy goals?
Secretary Mabus. I would be happy to. The biggest goal was
by no later than 2020, at least half of all energy, both afloat
and ashore, will come from non-fossil fuel sources. The goal is
to make us better warfighters. In terms of our basis, we will
be there at the end of 2015, and we are saving money by doing
it. We will have a gigawatt of power into our bases from non-
fossil fuel sources by the end of 2015.
In terms of afloat, we will buy no alternative fuels unless
it is absolutely cost competitive with traditional fuels, but
that seems to be the case even with today's low oil prices, and
we are moving pretty aggressively to do that. We have
demonstrated--we have certified all of our ships. We have
certified all our ships. We have certified all our aircraft on
this. In terms of efficiencies, we are making great strides in
efficiencies, and the President's Budget supports both the
diversifying--the kinds of energy and also the efficiencies.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, and I appreciate the indulgence
of the chair. I have gone over. Mahalo.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ayotte?
Senator Ayotte. I want to thank the chairman, and I want to
thank all of you for your leadership to the country and our
military at such an important time. I just wanted to associate
myself with some of the comments that Senator Blumenthal made
about the Virginia Payload Module. I am very interested if that
is feasible as well, Admiral, in going forward, and I look
forward to seeing what you come forward with in May. I think it
is important if we can expedite that and it is possible to do
that.
I also wanted to follow up, Admiral. In your prepared
statement, you noted that our naval shipyards and depots are
critical to maintaining warfighter readiness for the force, and
I certainly agree with that. In order to have a strong attack
submarine fleet, we need to ensure that those submarines are
maintained properly and quickly, and that they are combat
ready.
One thing that I wanted to ask about is making sure that
the facilities we have are prepared to do that, and doing that
in the most efficient way so that we can save dollars and get
things done sooner. I know that Senator King shares my pride
with the work done at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, and, in
fact, they have--the workers at the shipyard have actually been
producing ahead of schedule the maintenance--just recently in
April of last year they undocked the USS Topeka days ahead of
schedule--20 days ahead of schedule. In June following a
maintenance availability, the workers at the Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard returned the USS California to the fleet 14 days ahead
of schedule. In September they delivered the USS Springfield
back to the fleet ahead of schedule and under budget.
One of the things that they have brought to attention of my
office is that they are doing this with facilities that are
frankly outdated in some instances. They are working in
structural shops that are on average over 100 years old, and
have deteriorated to the point of partial failure. For example,
the heat treat forge area was recently condemned, and the
buildings have exceeded their useful life. The fact that they
are delivering faster and under budget even with these
facilities, can you imagine what they could do with more modern
facilities?
There is a military construction project that has been
submitted for reprogramming. It is called P-266 Structural
Shops Consolidation. It will address many of the problems that
I just talked about, and it will achieve efficiencies, improve
working conditions, most importantly, save money and time,
which I know we are all looking to do, and result in submarines
being sent back to the fleet even more quickly. I am confident
if we are able to do this, it will allow them to do an even
better job, and they are doing an incredible job now.
So, Admiral, I am not expecting you to be familiar with all
of these projects offhand, but this is a very important one to
our shipyard, and I think that will, most importantly, drive
cost efficiencies and results for the Navy. So I would like an
update on where this reprogramming request sits. Obviously I do
not need you--if you have it now, great. If you do not, if that
is something you could submit to your office as quickly as
possible, I would appreciate it.
Admiral Greenert. I will take it for the record and get you
a complete answer, Senator.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you very much.
[The information referred to follows:]

Naval Shipyards are critical to our warfighting readiness. Despite
current fiscal constraints, we are working hard to address the most
critical deficiencies at the shipyards. For example, between 2012 and
2015, the Navy invested more than $240 million to repair and modernize
the infrastructure at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard.
One of Navy's investments at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is a fiscal
year 2014 military construction project, also known as P-266, which
will considerably update and consolidate the structural shops at the
shipyard. Unfortunately, the project requires an additional $20 million
to execute, so we are preparing a reprogramming package for Department
of Defense and Congressional approval. Pending Congressional approval,
we expect to award the project before the end of this fiscal year.

Senator Ayotte. I also wanted to follow up just to ask in
general about the importance of the Navy civilian workforce,
and what we see, Secretary Mabus, in terms of the importance of
the civilian workforce. Many of them--I think as the economy
improves, the competition for the types of skills that they
have, that they are able to work obviously on such important
equipment like our attack submarines or other equipment, then
we are going to see more competition for their skills. We want
to make sure that they stay in the Navy and able to serve the
Navy.
So can you talk to me about what is the strength of the
civilian workforce? How do we see recruitment going forward?
What are the challenges we face there, and any concerns you may
have?
Secretary Mabus. Thank you, Senator. In terms of the public
shipyards like Portsmouth, if you want to see the effects of
sequestration, you do not have to look any further than that.
There was a hiring freeze put in place because of
sequestration, so as people left they could not be replaced.
There was a furlough that some of them were exempt from, but
not all. There was the government shutdown when they could not
work.
Because of all those things, we have a backlog in those
public shipyards. They do great work, but they have to have
enough of those artisans, enough of those people with the
specific skills to do it. Again, that is a great tangible
example of not only effects immediately of sequestration, but
how it stretches out because it will take until about 2018, as
the CNO said, to recover from that.
The civilian workforce writ large, we would not have a
fleet to put to sea without those civilians, and we lost 12
civilians killed in the line of duty at the Washington Navy
Yard. So they are in every way an integral, vital part of our
Navy and Marine Corps.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Admiral?
Admiral Greenert. Ma'am, this morning there is a great
article on what the director for Office of Personnel Management
is trying to do for quick hiring. We are trying desperately to
hire people into our shipyards because we need to build it up.
It is hard. The sequestration has hurt us, and the Gordian Knot
is getting through the paperwork to hire someone. It is
difficult to compete for this young talent.
Senator Ayotte. These are incredibly talented people. I
mean, I have had the chance to meet many of them, exactly.
Admiral Greenert. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator King?
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Greenert, I
want to associate my comments. It must be--I am sure you are
very sad that this is your last hearing before this committee,
but you have had a long and very distinguished career, and I
want to thank you. Secretary Mabus, your dad should have met my
dad. I can remember my dad standing in front of me on the long
distance telephone looking at his watch watching the time go
by. I think they would have had some spiritual kinship.
Admiral Greenert, the Arctic is an important area of
policy, and I know you have been looking at it. The Navy has
developed a strategy. Just briefly, do you see the Arctic as an
emerging area of important--of strategic importance, national
security importance to this country?
Admiral Greenert. Senator, I do. I think we need to look at
it deliberately and understand it. Therefore, things like ICEX
[Ice Exercise], where we were together almost a year ago, we
need to do it more frequently, get industry up there and study
the place, find out when is it going to melt, what are the sea
lines of communication that will open, are there territorial
disputes? Who has them? Are there threats? Russia is increasing
their military presence. It sorts of makes sense, and if that
is where a sea line of communication is. But also, how do we
survive up there, our ships, our aircraft, and our people?
Senator King. I think just a simple example about
infrastructure, icebreakers, we have one heavy duty, one medium
duty Coast Guard. The Russians have 17 icebreakers in the
Arctic. If we are taking about innocent passage, trade,
icebreakers are the highway builders, if you will, and that is
an area. I know it is not a naval question, but, I mean, that
is an example of how we are really not adequately, I believe,
focusing on our strategic interests in that region.
Again, for Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, it strikes
me that one of the issues that really is not talked about--we
talked a lot about sequestration, and I do not have to pile on
on that subject. We all agree that it is a serious risk to the
national security of this country. But the industrial base, you
cannot turn off and on a shipyard. One of the things that
worries me as I look at charts from Bath Iron Works, for
example, in Maine that if we do not have the workload, the
employment drops down. If a skilled shipbuilder leaves to go to
some other area of the country or some other profession, they
are gone and you cannot just turn that back on. Secretary
Mabus, is that something that concerns you?
Secretary Mabus. It concerns me every day, Senator, and it
is one of the reasons that I said in my opening statement--the
larger statement of the committee, that I will protect
shipbuilding to the maximum extent possible because it not
reversible. If you do not build a navy ship one year, you never
build it. It is not something that money the next year can make
up, and it is primarily because of that industrial base. If you
lose those highly skilled workers and their unique skills, they
are not easily learned. In fact, I was--as Senator Reed said, I
was at Quonset Point with keel laying for the USS Colorado.
They recognized more than 10 people who were celebrating their
40th anniversary at that shipyard that had worked there for
more than 40 years.
So the industrial base if you lose it, if you lose these
high quality, high-skilled shipbuilders, you do not get them
back. You see the effects today in terms of Bath or some of our
shipyards. What you see is the effects on our fleet 10 years
from now, 15 years from now, 20 years from now. It is something
that I have said--evidently I used a term that nobody else had
used much, but I am going to protect shipbuilding until the
last dog dies. We are going to try to stay there partly for the
industrial base, but also for our Navy.
Senator King. One of the problems is the long lead time
means that the shortchanging we are doing now is going to have
the effect 5, 10 years from now--I remember learning in
driver's ed that if you are going above a certain speed, your
headlights will not illuminate the wall in time for you to
stop. In effect, there is a wall out there we are very close to
hitting. We just will not know it for about 10 years because of
the decisions we are making now in terms of the
shortsightedness of this sequester policy.
Secretary Mabus. We are living today with decisions that
were made 10, 15 years ago in terms of the size of our fleet.
The people sitting in all these chairs 15, 20 years from now
will be living with the decisions we make today. As I said, in
shipbuilding, they are not reversible.
Senator King. Well, you ended your prepared testimony with
a quote from Theodore Roosevelt about the Navy as an instrument
of peace. From that same speech, Roosevelt said something that
is extraordinarily applicable to the discussion we have been
having today about readiness. He said, ``The veteran seamen of
our warships are as of high a type as can be found in any Navy
which rides the waters of the world. They are unsurpassed in
daring and resolution, in readiness and thorough knowledge of
their profession.'' This is Teddy Roosevelt 100 years ago. ``To
build the finest ship with the deadliest battery and to send it
afloat with a raw crew, no matter how brave they are
individually would be ensure disaster if a foe of average
capacity were encountered.'' This is the payoff line. ``Neither
ships nor men can be improvised when the war has begun.''
General Dunford, I would assume you--this is all about
readiness and training and the irresponsibility of our not
solving this funding problems so that you can have your men and
women ready.
General Dunford. Absolutely, Senator. I mean, that is what
you expect from the Nation's ready force is that when you call
us we are there. As I mentioned earlier, when you call us for
today's crisis, we respond actually today, and that is what it
is all about.
Senator King. Thank you, gentlemen, for your service. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to all
the witnesses. Admiral Greenert, I add my comments to those of
my colleagues about your service, and we will miss you at these
hearings. I am sure Angus was joking a bit when he said you are
so sad to be here for the last time, but you have been very,
very helpful, and we all appreciate that.
On sequester, I cannot resist, Secretary Mabus, since you
started talking about how cheap your dad was. I have done a lot
of budgets. I have done them as the managing director of a law
firm with lawyers in three countries. I have done them as a
mayor. I have done them as a governor. I am the only governor
in the history of my State--this is a sad accolade, not a good
one. I am the only one in the history of my State that left
office with a smaller budget than the one I started with
because of being governor in the worst recession in 75 years.
Sequester violates every principle of good budgeting that
any competent manager in the public or private sector would
follow. Period, full stop. Sequester violates every principle
of budgeting that any competent private or public sector
manager would follow. I am proud that one of my first votes as
a Senator in February 2013 was to eliminate the sequester. I
know how to find budgetary savings. I have done it my whole
life. But non-strategic across-the-board cuts can be done with
the slide rule. It is not about the application of human
judgment, and any budgetary philosophy that says we do not care
about human judgment, we are just going to do this kind of
across-the-board cutting is foolish.
I have watched us have very significant discussions on this
committee where I think we have all come to bipartisan
consensus about Afghanistan, and let me make an analogy, that a
calendar-based strategy is a bad idea, a conditions-based
strategy is a good idea. I just want to analogize that to our
budgetary reality. We are either going to be sequester-based
and say, ``well, we are obligated to follow caps that Congress
put in place in August 2011 before we saw the degree of cyber
attacks from Northern Korea, before we saw the President of
Russia, Vladimir Putin, go into the Ukraine, before ISIL was
gobbling up territory in Iraq and Syria, before Boko Haram was
slaughtering thousands upon thousands of people in Africa.''
We are either going to be sequester-based and ignore every
bit of reality that has occurred since August 2011, or we are
going to be conditions based in our budgeting. I would just
like to ask all my colleagues, we have decided on Afghanistan I
think as a body, that we ought to be conditions-based, not
calendar-based. I would say for purposes of funding our
military and other priorities, let us be just as conditions-
based, and let us not grab onto some bizarre, incompetent
budgetary theory and elevate that over the security of the
Nation. So that is just my editorial comment, and what I intend
to do as a member of the Budget Committee, as a member of the
Armed Services Committee, and certainly in any floor activity
about budget or appropriations.
I want to offer some praise to General Dunford and Admiral
Greenert. In your written testimony, and you had to truncate it
here today, you both talked about something that I think is
really important, which is helping your marines and sailors
transition from active life to civilian life. The transition of
people into a civilian workforce where only 1 percent of adults
have served in the military, so there is not a natural
understanding for what a gunnery sergeant does or what an E-5
is. They care about that transition, which is something that I
think the DOD generally has kind of woken up to more recently
as we have Iraq and Afghanistan war vets, especially enlisteds,
with unemployment rates that are unacceptably high.
I think you have all come a long way in the last couple of
years in being really intentional about this. In both of your
written testimonies, you talk about efforts that have been
underway to help folks get credentials that match civilian work
skills, and to help people think in a more significant way
about that transition. General Dunford knows I have a son who
is an officer in the Marine Corps, and about 2 weeks into
taking his first platoon, he called me up and he said, ``hey,
Dad, my NCO [noncommissioned officer], who is, you know, the
guy I am really relying on, has just told me he is leaving in 2
weeks, and he does not know how to find a job.''
If you wait until somebody is at the end of their time and
then try to cram it all into their head, and help them figure
out how to transition in the last couple of weeks, it is not
going to work very well. But if you start on day one and make
that a priority, it will work a lot better, and our marines
will be marines for life, and our sailors will be sailors for
life. I give you all a lot of credit for making that a
priority, and your written testimony today attributes to it.
One question that I want to ask may be a question for the
record because it may involve classified information. I am
concerned about the civility of the Government of Bahrain. The
5th Fleet is headquartered in Bahrain, and that 5th Fleet is
not only important for our defense, but it keeps open sea lanes
in an important part of the world that allow shipments of oil
and other shipments that affect the global economy.
The instability of Bahrain, in my view, causes me
significant concern about the long-term viability of the 5th
Fleet there as its headquarters. Certainly the security of the
lives of those Americans who are serving, but also whether that
is--can we have a 5th Fleet strategically positioned there
given that instability? Maybe for the record, I would like to
ask if you could just offer some thoughts, appropriately
classified if need be, about what the instability issues, what
threats that poses and what the Navy is doing to consider how
to mitigate those threats, if you could, Admiral Greenert.
Admiral Greenert. I will take that for the record and give
you a complete answer, Senator.
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Thank you, Senator Kaine. I thank you also
for your eloquent dissertation on sequestration, and I totally
agree with it. I thank you for that. Senator Cotton?
Senator Cotton. Mr. Secretary, Admiral, General, thank you
very much for your years of distinguished service to our
country and for all of the men and women you represent, the
sailors, the marines, and the civilians. I was an Army guy
myself. General Dunford, I have had many of your marines tell
me that the Army stands for ``ain't ready for Marines yet.''
That is not true, is it?
General Dunford. It just may be, Senator.
[Laughter.]
Senator Cotton. That is a shocking revelation. Well, there
is no substitute for an Army, but there is also certainly no
substitute for a Navy and Marine Corps that is constantly on
watch all around the globe, that is never in peacetime phase
because it always deployed somewhere. We are very grateful for
what you all do.
Admiral Greenert, you have written and spoken at greater
length in other forums about the concepts of payloads, not
platforms. Could you give us maybe a truncated simple version
here of what you mean by that and how it informs the
procurement plan for the Navy in the future?
Admiral Greenert. Yes, Senator. We are a capital intensive
service, and so when we build a ship it is there for 30 years
at least, and been longer. To put an integrated complicated
system there in there inside--a weapon system in such a vessel,
when you want to change it out, you have to take the ship out
of service 18 months to 2 years. We cannot do that anymore. We
cannot afford to take it out of service. That is one. Two, the
industry and technology is moving so fast, they can put
together a weapon system that can come in a modular fashion.
So the deal today is to put together a platform, what I
call a platform that has enough cooling volume, persistence and
time at sea, and the ability to support the upgrades--quick and
fast upgrades. The Enterprise was our first aircraft carrier
built in 1961. Its first mission was the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Its last mission was off Afghanistan in 2012, and it had the
most modern systems we had, a platform with several changes of
payloads. So, that is what I am getting at. It applies to
aircraft, and it applies to ships for sure.
Senator Cotton. General Dunford, would you care to comment
on how that concept may or may not apply to a ground force like
the Marine Corps or, for that matter, the Army?
General Dunford. Senator, I would like to take that for the
record. I am not sure I can answer that.
[The information referred to follows:]

This concept of payloads, not platforms, is an important one for
us, as a scalable and rapidly deployable force. One of the hallmarks of
Marine Corps organization is that the Marine Air Ground Task Force
(MAGTF) can be of variable size and possess a myriad of capabilities to
meet the needs of Combatant Commanders. So this idea is deeply
ingrained in our institutional culture. As far as how this impacts our
development and procurement of equipment, I must first echo the Chief
of Naval Operations comments related to shipbuilding. This is
particularly applicable to the Navy's amphibious fleet which provides
the ability to provide a number of various payloads to meet a number of
different missions. Amphibious ships are inherently adaptive to the
force package embarked and perform the widest range of missions of any
ship in our battle force inventory. The ships, along with a MAGTF are
the Swiss army knife in a commander's tool kit. The demand for this
capability is rising as it proves to offer legitimate crisis response
for our friends and deterrence to our foes.
Additionally, when developing future systems, the USMC always
anticipates both missions and technologies which do not currently
exist. We seek to provide room for development in our equipment
portfolios by procuring materiel with growth capacity that will allow
for the expansion of capabilities to meet requirements that have not
yet been levied.

Senator Cotton. Admiral Greenert, would you like to
comment, because obviously the Navy and the Air Force are much
bigger platforms, more capital intensive investments than
General Dunford tends to use in the Marine Corps than the Army
uses in its ground operations.
Admiral Greenert. Well, again, payloads and platforms. My
support for General--I am a supporting entity for the Marine
Corps, so when I build an amphibious ship, it has to be able to
expand to bring in the Marines' systems as they evolve and
expand. So it is very much a part of what I support for General
Dunford, and, in fact, we fell behind in that regard. As the
marines went ashore, if you will, in Afghanistan and Iraq, we
did not evolve in our ships, and now we are making that
adjustment working together.
Senator Cotton. Thank you. I also would like to associate
myself with the comments of Senator Kaine and Senator McCain
about the impact of sequestration, in particular the impacts on
readiness. I would be curious to hear from both Admiral
Greenert and General Dunford about the timeline that you think
may be required to get back to full readiness in your two
Services.
Admiral Greenert. If we have a predictable, stable budget
at the right level, which we believe the President's Budget is
minimally there, we will be back where we need to be in 2018
for our carrier strike groups and 2020 for my amphibious
readiness groups that are supporting General Dunford.
General Dunford. Senator, our timeline is roughly the same,
sometime between 2018 and 2020. But, of course, that very much
is dependent on future budgets as well.
Senator Cotton. Could you care to comment on the status of
morale for your sailors and your marines, especially over the
last 2 years, in a sequestration environment?
Admiral Greenert. Well, when sequestration hit morale, it
was hard on them. It was a hit to morale. They were angry. They
did not understand. What is this? What did I do? So now the
families are angry. They have gotten over that. Today they are
anxious, but morale is good overall. It is not very good, and
it is not poor. It is good. They understand that we are looking
out for their basic needs, and we are providing them ready
forces when they deploy. But there is a great anxiety out
there, and if we go back to that, I am not sure exactly what is
going to happen. I lived through this in the late 1970s and the
early 1980s.
General Dunford. On balance, Senator, we have a very young
force. I would probably describe the reaction as angst at this
point. They are concerned about it. Where I am mostly
concerned, though, are the mid-grade staff NCOs and the mid-
grade officers who are looking to the future of uncertainty,
and would make decisions to leave the Marine Corps when we want
them to stay.
Senator Cotton. Thank you. Thank you all again for your
service, and thank you again for all the hard work that marines
and sailors you represent do as well as their families since
there is no peacetime Navy or Marine Corps, and you are always
on watch.
Chairman McCain. Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all
very much for being here, Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert,
and General Dunford, and thank you for your service to the
country. Admiral Greenert, we are going to miss you, but we
hope you will be back in another capacity at some point.
As we were discussing, Admiral, before the hearing started,
I had, as you all know, the great opportunity yesterday to
embark with the USS New Hampshire submarine to go out for the
day, to dive with the submarine. It was really an experience of
a lifetime, and I very much appreciated that. I was especially
impressed by the dedication and the professionalism of our men
serving on that submarine as on all of our submarines,
impressed by the teamwork that they experienced that, as they
pointed out to me, that a submarine only runs if everybody
works together. The cook knew as much about the ship and how it
was laid out and the operations as the people in the operations
room. So it was very impressive.
One of the things that became clear as we were discussing
with folks about their experience on the New Hampshire was that
while--General Dunford can appreciate this. A lot of the
discussion during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq has been
about the toll that that has taken on our fighting men and
women. One of the things that was clear yesterday, and not
because anyone on the New Hampshire complained about it, but
the toll that the reduction in our ships and their capacity has
on the men and women who serve on those ships, because the
deployments increase just as our deployments during Iraq and
Afghanistan in a way that I think is less clear to the American
public, and the toll that that takes.
I wonder, Admiral or Secretary Mabus, if either of you
would like to speak to what that shortfall in our ship
capacity, the impact that that has on the men and women who are
serving on those ships.
Admiral Greenert. You explained it very well, Senator.
There is a commitment, a covenant that we have for providing
ready forces forward around the world to be able, as we like to
say, where it matters when it matters. If you have less ships
distribute, those which are there will stay on the watch
longer. We have a phenomenon that we are trying to get out of,
as we were just describing how long it would take to get our
readiness right, and that is when we have sequestration, all of
our maintenance slowed down in Portsmouth Naval Shipyard,
Puget. All of our shipyards slowed down to kind of parade rest,
as we like to say. So now, we are trying to get that back up,
get the workforce back because many left as a result of
sequestration.
Somebody is out there standing the watch, and that is that
longer deployment waiting for the other folks to get their
maintenance and training done to come out to relieve them. That
hurts and takes a while.
Secretary Mabus. Senator, in the early 90s we had about a
400-ship Navy, and we had on average 100 ships forward
deployed. Today we have a little bit less than a 300-ship Navy,
and we still have 100 ships forward deployed. So you explained
it very well. Sailors are going out for longer. They are
staying for longer.
One of the things that we have been working on is trying to
make those deployments more predictable, and not just the
deployments, but the things the CNO was talking about--the
training, the maintenance, and the surge capability when they
come back--and it is called the optimized fleet response plan.
We are doing it for our carriers first then our strike groups.
We are going to do it for our amphibious ready groups next. But
it is trying to do that.
The last thing I would like to say is that it is one of the
reasons that I remain so committed to shipbuilding, to getting
the right number of those gray hulls so that it will ease some
of the stress on the sailors who--the men and women who sail in
them.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Well, one of the things I
neglected to say that you all know is that the USS New
Hampshire is a Virginia-class submarine, and one of the things
that was very exciting to hear from folks on the ship was that
they always feel very good when it is the Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard who has done the work because they do such a great job
at the shipyard. So I had to put that plug in for the
Portsmouth Shipyard because they do such great work.
I am really out of time, but, Mr. Chairman, if I could ask
one more question?
Chairman McCain. Other than a commercial? Yes.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Secretary Mabus, last September
the Departments of Energy, Navy, and Agriculture awarded
contracts to three companies to construct and commission bio
refineries to produce drop-in fuels to help meet our
transportation needs, drop-in bio fuels. Can you speak to why
you think this is so important for the Navy?
Secretary Mabus. It is important because it makes us better
warfighters. It is important because it takes fuel away as a
weapon to be used against us. All you have to do is look at the
headlines about Crimea, the Ukraine, Europe today, and Russia
using fuel as a weapon, and we are trying to avoid that. It
will also help us smooth out some of these price swings in the
oil and gas market.
Finally, I am a big believer in the free market. I think
you need competition in things like fuels. Now, we are--we will
not buy any alternative fuel unless it is absolutely priced
competitive with traditional fuels. The other two requirements
that we have, one is that it be drop-in as you said. We are not
changing engines or settings. Third, that it take no land out
of food production. So we are looking at second generation,
third generation biofuel production.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Graham?
Senator Graham. Thank you all for your service. What is the
morale in the Marine Corps like, General?
General Dunford. Senator, it is high.
Senator Graham. Yes, well, it should be high because you
are the finest fighting force on Earth. I want to tell the
Marine Corps and the Navy better days are coming to the
families. We are going to get our act together in Congress. I
do not know exactly how yet, but we will. We are not going to
leave you hanging. We are not going to take modernization off
the table so you cannot fight the next war effectively, and we
are going to somehow solve the problem we have created, so just
hang in there. Keep your chin up and focused on the mission.
General, do you agree it would be smart to leave a residual
force behind in Afghanistan if conditions require it?
General Dunford. I do, Senator.
Senator Graham. From a Navy perspective, Admiral, do you
believe that the threats we face are growing as I speak?
Admiral Greenert. I do, absolutely.
Senator Graham. Do both of you agree that there are more
terrorist organizations with more capability, with more safe
havens, with more weapons, with more desire to attack the
homeland than any time since 9/11?
Admiral Greenert. I do.
General Dunford. I do, Senator.
Senator Graham. When it comes to Iraq and Syria, do you
agree with me that if we take ISIL on, and when I say ``we, the
United States and the region, that we must win?
General Dunford. Yes, Senator.
Senator Graham. How many marines were involved in the first
battle and second battle of Fallujah?
General Dunford. The first battle, Senator, was about two
regimental combat teams of--in the order of 6,000. The second
battle, and, of course, there were soldiers as well. The second
battle was about 14,000 U.S. forces. That is marines and
soldiers.
Senator Graham. So do you agree with me without that
capacity, it would have been very difficult for the Sunni
tribes to prevail over al-Qaeda in Iraq at the time?
General Dunford. Without, absolutely, Senator.
Senator Graham. Okay. So we are about to fight a bigger
force, and how many members of our military do we have in Iraq
today?
General Dunford. Senator, I do not know the exact numbers,
but I think on the order of 3,000.
Senator Graham. How many of those are marines?
General Dunford. We have about 500 marines, Senator. They
are actually on the ground in Iraq.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with me, both of you, that
ISIL represents a threat to us, not just the region?
General Dunford. I do, Senator.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with that, Admiral?
Admiral Greenert. Yes, I do, Senator.
Senator Graham. So anybody who thinks that defeating or
destroying ISIL is their problem, not ours, is making a huge
mistake?
General Dunford. I agree with that, Senator.
Admiral Greenert. We have to prevail, yes, Senator.
Senator Graham. Do you agree that it is in our national
security interests to make sure that not only are they degraded
and destroyed, but they do not come back?
General Dunford. I agree with that, Senator.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with me that the best way to
ensure that you degrade and destroy ISIL is having some
American ground forces to help the regional forces?
General Dunford. Senator, right now I think it is critical
that we provide U.S. support, and I think we are waiting for
General Austin to make a recommendation as to exactly what that
support would be.
Senator Graham. Does that not guarantee the highest chance
of success is to have some American capability on the ground
enhancing our regional partners?
General Dunford. Certainly my perspective would be as a
link to our supporting capability.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with me that any marine, or
soldier, or sailor, or airman who participate in these
operations would be protecting the Homeland?
General Dunford. I believe that, Senator.
Senator Graham. If somebody died trying to deal with ISIL
in Iraq or Syria, they would have died on behalf of protecting
their Nation?
General Dunford. They would have died in protecting our
national interests is clear, Senator.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with me that if we do not stop
ISIL sooner rather than later, the likelihood of another attack
against this country grows?
General Dunford. I think it grows, but also I think if we
do not stop them, there will be destabilization in the region
as well. It is inimical to our national interests.
Senator Graham. Do you worry about the king of Jordan if
they do not at least get slowed down or degraded pretty
quickly?
General Dunford. I do, Senator.
Senator Graham. Do you, Admiral?
Admiral Greenert. I do, Senator, yes, I do.
Senator Graham. So to both of you and to those who serve
under you, I am sorry that some of you may have to go back. I
regret it more than you will ever know. But I think you know
better than anyone else why you may have to go back. The only
commitment I will make as a Senator from South Carolina is that
if you go back, you go back to win, and that we get this right
this time. Thank you all for your service.
Senator Reed [presiding]. Senator McCaskill?
Senator McCaskill. Thank you. Thank you all for being here.
I sometimes neglect to say how much respect I have for all of
you. I am so busy getting after something that I forget to tell
you, so let me do that before I get after something.
Admiral Greenert, I am dismayed about the Fat Leonard
scandal. I am dismayed because it rips at the fabric of honor
and integrity that defines our military. One of the things that
I have tried to do since I was allowed to join this important
committee is make sure when we have those moments that
consequences go to the very top instead of hanging out at the
middle or the bottom, which has sometimes occurred when there
is a scandal like this. So I would like you or Secretary Mabus
to speak to the accountability of those at the top of the chain
of command for this conduct that occurred on their watch.
Secretary Mabus. The Leonard Francis scandal----
Senator McCaskill. Correct.
Secretary Mabus. Well, Senator, we are going to hold people
accountable that violated either the law or Navy ethics, and I
have already issued letters of censure to three admirals, one
three-star, two two-star admirals. The two two-stars elected to
retire. The three-star had already decided to retire.
One thing, though, that I think is important about this
situation is that the reason this was uncovered is that we set
up financial trip wires that Glenn Defense Marine Asia [GDMA]
went across, and so, red flags were raised. The [Naval Criminal
Investigative Service] NCIS investigated this for 3 years with
no leaks. We during that investigation found that an NCIS agent
was furnishing Mr. Francis with information, that set up some
false information to him, and it led to Mr. Francis believing
that the investigation had been shut up down, and allowed us to
arrest him on American soil. He has implicated a number of
naval personnel.
We are at the--on the timetable of the U.S. Attorney's
Office in San Diego in terms of how quickly we get to these
things, and that has been a frustration because we have--it has
taken a long, long time. But I have set up a consolidated
disposition authority, so if somebody was found not to be
criminally liable, we are taking a look at them to see if they
violated Navy ethics. We are stepping up ethics training for
COs [commanding officers], XOs [executive officers], people in
areas of responsibility. We have completely overhauled our
procurement requirements and regulations in terms of husbanding
these services that GDMA provided. We are auditing that on a
routine basis.
One thing I do want to say, though, is that you could have
all the ethics training in the world. If somebody does not know
it is wrong to steal, if somebody does not know it is wrong to
take a bribe, they miss something at home.
Senator McCaskill. Right.
Secretary Mabus. What we have to do is set up a system that
will catch them and will hold them accountable. You are right,
it is up and down the chain. I think that by the first
actions--I not only took the actions to censure three admirals.
I have taken two more from access to classified information
based on allegations. I do not know if those allegations are
correct yet, but in order to protect the integrity of the
Service.
Finally, Senator, unique among the Services, when we make a
change in command, when we do something to a senior officer, a
CO or a flag officer, we announce it. We try to be completely
transparent about this. Partly it is because of what we can--
the learning effect that it will have on other people, but
partly because people need to know what is happening in the
Service. We have not seen the numbers go up, but because we
announce it we tend to get more scrutiny.
Senator McCaskill. Well, I appreciate that, and I
appreciate that you all have done this. I wanted you to know I
am very interested in how all of this shakes out, and if there
is anything I can do to prod the U.S. attorney into doing
justice in the most efficient, and effective, and time
sensitive way let me know.
I do not have much time left. I do want to ask a couple of
questions that you all can respond on the record for me at a
later date because I do not want to hold up the Senator from
Alaska. But one is obviously the electronic capability platform
as it relates to the growlers. I know you testified last week,
Admiral, about a shortage of two to three squadrons. I am very
concerned about that. I would be concerned about that if these
amazing aircraft were not built in St. Louis because the
capability of the electronic battlefield that we face now, and
I would like you to respond to what--I am worried that this
joint study that is going on now will not be completed in time
for us to really evaluate whether the needs jointly even exceed
what you have said, which is two to three squadrons in terms of
a shortfall. So that I need on the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

In previous testimony, the 2-3 squadron shortfall that I mentioned
was in reference to strike fighter aircraft. The Navy has the inventory
of Growlers we need to support current Navy requirements. There is a
study in progress to identify Joint warfighting requirements, Concept
of Employment (CONEMPS) and future mission sets. The results of this
study are expected to be released this summer and will provide insight
that will allow the Department to determine the necessary force
structure to meet Joint Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) requirements
rather than just those requirements unique to the Navy.

Senator McCaskill. For you, General Dunford, I would like
an updating on the how the realigning of Guam is going. This is
something that we have worked on in this committee, and when I
used to chair the Readiness and Management Support
Subcommittee, this was something we talked about a lot. If you
would get to the committee, and specifically to my office,
where we are with the realignment with Guam and what the
situation is on that, I would be very appreciative.
General Dunford. We will get that information to you,
Senator, thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]

General Dunford. The nature of the program for the USMC is
characterized by its duration and scope. The scope of the program is
significant, and entails myriad actions prior to Marines moving off of
Okinawa, and the duration is on the order of decades.
The program has experienced some start and stops, but has continued
to move forward. The most noticeable progress has been at MCAS Iwakuni.
Last year we completed the move of VMGR-152 from Okinawa to MCAS
Iwakuni and the base has been and continues to enlarge. CVW-5 is on
track to commence their relocation from Atsugi to Iwakuni in fiscal
year 2017. By the time Iwakuni is finished the base will have nearly
doubled in size and capacity.
Guam and the CJMT have both moved forward. The Supplemental
Environmental Impact Study for Guam, and in the Environmental Impact
Study for the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) Joint
Military Training Complex have progressed. These NEPA actions are
necessary to commence construction. Our first project, a range complex
in Guam, is in the fiscal year 2016 budget request. We have also
published a Guam master plan, as required by the NDAA, and are
preparing to deliver a Hawaii master plan that will outline the early
stages of preparation for moving Marines to Hawaii as a part of the
realignment. While compliance with the Endangered Species Act and the
associated consultation with the UFWS remains challenging for the Guam
relocation, the DON anticipates issuing a Record of Decision (ROD) this
summer. We anticipate that the consultations for CJMT will be similarly
challenging, but still anticipate issuing the ROD for the CJMT in the
summer of 2016.
We continue to conduct rotational deployments to Darwin, Australia
and the fourth rotation of approximately 1,170 Marines and an aviation
detachment has just commenced. The size of the rotation increases apace
of adequate facilities available with the force eventually being 2500
Marines strong.
While there is significant activity off of Okinawa to prepare for
the realignment there is also significant activity on Okinawa. The
Futenma replacement facility and Camp Schwab realignment are underway.
This is a long term project with FOC for the airfield anticipated to be
fiscal year 2025. Political challenges remain but we are pleased to see
construction progressing and resolute commitment for the government of
Japan. The sun will not set on this realignment program until planned
land returns in Okinawa are complete. This is scheduled for fiscal year
2032. Of note, the Marine Corps has already returned land in Okinawa
and the most recent return took effect on 31 March of this year, when
we transferred West Futenma housing back to the Japanese.

Senator McCaskill. I know everybody has covered
sequestration before I got here, but for whatever every other
Senator said about sequestration, me, too. Thank you.
Senator Reed. Senator Sullivan?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator
McCaskill, I might get a highlight of your final question is
actually one of my first questions. So, gentlemen, I appreciate
your service and your frank testimony. General Dunford, I also
appreciate your highlighting the bang for the buck component of
the Marine Corps' spending and warfighting capability, 6
percent of the budget, 21 percent of the infantry battalions. I
think that is important for the American people to understand
and recognize.
I do want to follow on a number of the general questions
from Senators Wicker, Hirono, McCaskill on the redeployment,
the pivot to Asia in particular with regard to some of our
ground forces. As part of this committee's oversight
responsibility, I will be heading to the region relatively soon
to look at some of the issues in terms of what cost, training,
readiness, deployment capabilities, as it relates to the Guam
redeployment, but also some other issues.
I would just like, General Dunford, from your perspective,
what are the issues we should be thinking of when we are
looking at that, and are you satisfied with how that
redeployment is going? As you probably know, there are some
concerns about that, and I think they have been consistent
concerns over the years.
General Dunford. Senator, thanks, and that clearly is one
of the more important issues we are grappling with now is the
Pacific. I think maybe break it down into three pieces. The
first would be capacity, and for the U.S. Marine Corps what the
rebalance means is 22,500 marines west of the Date Line, and we
are there now. So as we have drawn down the force in Iraq and
Afghanistan, we have reconstituted our unit deployment program
and got those numbers back for our 3rd Marine Expeditionary
Force, back to what they ought to be.
The second piece is the reposture of forces, relieving some
of the pressure in Okinawa, building up forces in Guam, and
then as the Secretary talked about, forces in Australia as
well. So there are several pieces. It is the Guam piece, it is
the Australia piece, and then forces will go to Japan, and then
some forces will eventually go to Hawaii as well. We are just
getting started with that this year. In the President's Budget
2016, there is a training range in Guam. That is one of the
pre-conditions for us to bring forces down to Guam. We will
bring a total of 5,000 forces to Guam eventually. We are
rotating this spring another force of 1,000 marines into
Australia with an eventual plan to bring that number up to
2,500.
But I think in terms of the issues that you should be
concerned about, one clearly is the progress for the Futenma
Replacement Facility and how that progress in Japan because
that is going to be critical. We have to have the Futenma
Replacement Facility in order for us to leave our current
Futenma Air Station, and then make the deployment--make the re-
deployment to Guam as well and properly support the marines
that are in the area.
The other piece is lift in the area. We are going to better
support the combatant commanders' day-to-day requirements by
disaggregating out there. So in other words, by moving to Guam
and moving to Australia, we get better coverage in the Pacific
on a day-to-day basis. But then in a contingency, we have to
aggregate those forces, for example, in a conflict on the
Korean peninsula. So, one of the real critical things we are
working on within the Department of the Navy with the Secretary
and the CNO's help is the additional lift that would be
required to move marines around.
So there is enabling capability, and the first is lift,
amphibious lift and other forms of lift, to move marines around
both for training and for contingency purposes. Then as well
the training facilities and the quality of life support that
will be on Guam over time. But all this is--we are a lot
further--I have touched on this probably off and on for the
last 10 years, Senator, and we are finally now starting to pour
concrete. We are starting to actually move forward with the
plan. So I feel much better about it than I have in recent
years.
Senator Sullivan. Great, thank you. I want to switch and
follow on to the question that Senator King had talked about in
terms of the Arctic, and I will be a little more blunt. We have
a DOD 13-page Arctic strategy, and yet when you look at what
the Russians are doing in the Arctic, it is actually quite
impressive. Impressive, but disturbing. So I am sure you
gentlemen are somewhat familiar, but General Dempsey mentioned
in testimony with the Secretary of Defense last week that the
Russians are looking at four new Arctic combat brigades as our
U.S. Army is thinking about pulling them out of the Arctic. I
think that would give Vladimir Putin a lot of joy.
They are building new airfields, 13 new airfields. They are
conducting long-range air patrols with their barrel bombers off
the coast of Alaska again. They have incredibly 6 new
icebreakers coming, 5 more planned to add to their fleet of 40.
Meanwhile, the United States is thinking about an additional
one to our fleet of five.
Does it concern you, particularly when we talk about
keeping sea lanes open, there is going to be a very, very
important sea lane that is developing in the Northwest Arctic
Passage there? Has the Navy given any thought to this in terms
of particularly adding icebreakers to the Navy's shipping fleet
if we are going to be remotely competitive with the Russians in
the Arctic that they have stood up a new Arctic command? They
are all in in the Arctic, and it is not 13 pages of paper. It
is concrete. It is ships. It is airfields. We are thinking
about removing forces from Alaska, and we do not have--I think
we are number five or six in the world in terms of icebreakers.
It seems to me a ludicrous situation that the Navy should be
concerned about.
Admiral Greenert. Well, the purview of the icebreakers is
the Department of Homeland Security, the Coast Guard. So if we
split that, then we will be clobbering our strategy. Although
it sounds like a petty answer, somebody has to be in charge
right here, and right now it resides with the Department of
Homeland Security.
Am I concerned? Yes, Senator, I am concerned because for us
to take our combat ships up there, we have to work in
conjunction with that and make sure that we can get up there as
well. So we have to look at the hardening of our hulls, and we
look toward that, and also it is not just surface ships which
we tend to focus on. It is the aircraft in the undersea domain.
So as I mentioned earlier, we have increased--I have
directed the increase in our exercise capacity up there and our
activity up there. We are spending a little bit more--it is
modest right now, exercising with the Norwegians, with the
Scandinavian countries, and with Canada in that arena to get
used to operating up there.
Senator Sullivan. Mr. Secretary, any thoughts?
Secretary Mabus. As the ice melts in the Arctic, our
responsibilities clearly are going up. We just--the CNO and I
just issued the new Navy road map for the Arctic. We updated
it. I stopped through the university at Fairbanks, the
University of Alaska at Fairbanks. In terms of it is not just
platforms, and it is not just capability. It is what we are
facing up there. We not only have less ice, but it is freezing
in different ways. So, as we send our submarines up there, they
do not have a whole lot of clearance both above or below, and
the ice is forming in different ways that are beginning to be a
hazard to navigation.
But as CNO said, we are upping our exercises. We are upping
our research into the area. We are moving in terms of hardening
hulls, in terms of warfighting capabilities. We have a SEAL
[Sea, Air, Land] training unit on Kodiak specifically focused
on cold weather combat. In fact, every SEAL goes through it
right after they come out of BUD/S [Basic Underwater
Demolition/SEAL] training. So we are concerned about it. We are
trying to move on it. But it, again, is one of these things
that in this budget situation you have to make some very, very
hard choices, and we do not have the capability that we would
like to have in the Arctic.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. On behalf of Chairman McCain, let me thank
the witnesses for their excellent testimony and for their
service to the Nation, and the Navy, and the Marine Corps, and
adjourn the hearing. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:54 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
littoral combat ship mine countermeasures mission package
1. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, the mine
countermeasures (MCM) mission package, which is more than 4 years
behind schedule, will not achieve full capability until 2019. The
fiscal year 2014 Director of Operational Testing and Evaluation annual
report again stated, ``The MCM package has not yet demonstrated
sufficient performance to achieve the Navy's minimal Increment 1
requirements.'' Navy plans indicate two of the four Avenger-class mine
countermeasures ships in Bahrain will be replaced with Littoral Combat
Ships (LCS) in 2019 and the other two will be replaced in 2020. Please
comment on the:

Testing progress of the LCS mission packages
Risk in delivering the full mine countermeasures
capability, increment four, in fiscal year 2019
Contingency plans to extend the Avenger-class in
Bahrain, should the mine countermeasures mission package
experience further delays
Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. LCS Mine Countermeasures (MCM)
Mission Package testing continues to make progress. While not all of
the performance measures for the LCS MCM Mission Package (Phase 1) were
fully demonstrated by the end of fiscal year 2014, systems testing and
tactical proficiency events are currently ongoing in the Gulf of
Mexico. Continued system refinements and improved operator performance
are keeping the MCM Mission Package on track to demonstrate Phase 1
effectiveness during Initial Operational Test and Evaluation later this
year. The MCM Mission Package remains on schedule to support
deployments beginning in fiscal year 2018, and will enable the
scheduled decommissioning of the Avenger-class ships as they reach
their end of service life.
The Navy continues to assess the risks associated with meeting the
full Phase 4 capability in 2019, and will be able to more clearly
identify and mitigate any risk following the experience gained from
this year's testing events. However, a significant overlap currently
exists between the scheduled LCS MCM Mission Package deployments to
Bahrain and the departure of the Avenger-class that would accommodate
any unexpected delay in the arrival of MCM Mission Packages.
Furthermore, Minehunting Units and Expeditionary MCM companies already
deployed to Bahrain will provide additional MCM capacity during the
transition to the LCS MCM Mission Package.
ford-class testing issues
2. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, the Director of Operational
Test and Evaluation's fiscal year 2014 Annual Report states the
reliability of four systems--the electromagnetic aircraft launching
system, advanced arresting gear, dual band radar, and advanced weapons
elevators--are the most significant risks to the USS Gerald R. Ford
(CVN-78) initial operational test and evaluation.
Can you update us on the testing and reliability of these key
systems on CVN-78, which is scheduled to deliver in March 2016?
Mr. Mabus. The Electromagnetic Aircraft Launching System (EMALS)
testing, to date, has shown an increased reliability growth trend as
reported to the Director of Operational Testing and Evaluation (DOT&E)
in December 2014. EMALS is currently preparing the land-based test site
for the Repeated Deadload Phase of testing later this fiscal year. The
purpose of this test is to perform additional deadload events to
continue to grow the proven system reliability. EMALS motor/generator
shipboard testing started on schedule in August 2014, as did catapult
testing in December 2014. Testing will continue through the 1st
quarter, fiscal year 2016, with data from the shipboard test program to
be incorporated into the Reliability Growth Program.
Performance testing for the Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) is
scheduled to start later this fiscal year. Reliability growth tracking
will re-commence with this phase. An update to AAG Reliability Growth
metrics is expected to be available for the annual December Reliability
brief to DOT&E. AAG shipboard testing will begin in August 2015.
Dual Band Radar (DBR) began testing in March 2014, and will
continue at Wallops Island through the 3rd quarter, fiscal year 2015. A
Reliability Working Group, responsible for gathering and reporting
reliability data, recently began tracking reliability data during Land-
Based Engineering Testing at Wallops Island; no reliability reports
have been generated to date. DBR shipboard testing begins in May 2015.
Advanced Weapons Elevators shipboard testing began in March 2015,
with testing of the first of 11 elevators now 70 percent complete.
Reliability growth tracking begins following the completion of
shipbuilder installation and testing, and data collection will begin in
early fiscal year 2016.

3. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, what is being done to ensure
these key systems are ready for the next carrier, USS John F. Kennedy
(CVN-79), which is scheduled to go under contract this spring of 2015?
Mr. Mabus. All design changes made to key systems as the result of
lessons learned from CVN 78 have been captured in the configurations to
be installed on CVN 79. There is one exception; the Dual Band Radar
will be replaced on CVN 79 by the Enterprise Surveillance Suite. The
risk of further modifications discovered during shipboard testing that
would impact ship integration is considered low, and the opportunity to
incorporate system changes is maintained until installation on CVN 79.
movement of forces in the pacific
4. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus and General Dunford, the
movement of forces from Okinawa to Guam and other parts of the Pacific
carries with it a significant cost and impact on our ability to respond
in theater. I am very concerned that these costs are not yet fully
accounted for, and that if we see over-runs which hinder our ability to
build the replacement infrastructure, we will not be able to meet our
operational plans in the Pacific theater. I am also concerned with the
continued proposal to fund civilian infrastructure ``outside the
fence'' on Guam, and the cost of family housing driven by those forces
that will be on ``accompanied'' tours.
Who is responsible for the analysis to determine the number of
accompanied personnel?
Secretary Mabus. The Marine Corps relocation provides for a
holistic and operationally-responsive Marine Corps Air Ground Task
Force capability on Guam based on a mix of assigned and rotational
forces organized to meet regional needs. This force structure, as
agreed by the United States and Japan in 2012, provides for
approximately 5000 Marines on Guam. It will consist of 2,979
rotationally assigned unaccompanied Marines through the Unit Deployment
Program (UDP) and 1,796 permanently assigned personnel. To estimate the
number of accompanied family members, the Marine Corps relies on
standard planning factors for permanently assigned Marines to inform
housing and other support requirements. This estimate is incorporated
in the July 2014 Guam Master Plan, and we will continue to evaluate
these requirements as the relocation moves forward to ensure housing
and support facilities are appropriately sized and resourced.
General Dunford. The Marine Corps relocation provides for a
holistic and operationally-responsive Marine Corps Air Ground Task
Force capability on Guam based on a mix of assigned and rotational
forces organized to meet regional needs. This force structure, as
agreed by the United States and Japan in 2012, provides for
approximately 5000 Marines on Guam. It will consist of 2,979
rotationally assigned unaccompanied Marines through the Unit Deployment
Program (UDP) and 1,796 permanently assigned personnel. To estimate the
number of accompanied family members, the Marine Corps relies on
standard planning factors for permanently assigned Marines to inform
housing and other support requirements. This estimate is incorporated
in the July 2014 Guam Master Plan, and we will continue to evaluate
these requirements as the relocation moves forward to ensure housing
and support facilities are appropriately sized and resourced.

5. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus and General Dunford, how certain
are you that the costs and schedule now proposed will be met?
Mr. Mabus. The Marine Corps is currently executing the Guam Master
Plan that was submitted to Congress last summer (July 2014) and is on
track to meet the scheduled milestones and is continuing to refine
costs within the profile defined by the master plan. The Marine Corps
is confident in the reliability of the cost estimate for the relocation
of Marines off Okinawa as a planning figure and has employed the
appropriate approach and methodology for determining the estimate.
Since the 2012 initial estimates for Guam, a steadfast approach has
further refined the estimates to better account for Area Cost Factor
changes, environmental mitigation, and more fidelity on one-time costs.
We are committed to the most cost effective laydown for the Marines on
Guam. We will pursue all avenues for making the relocation as
affordable as possible while controlling costs.
General Dunford. The Marine Corps is currently executing the Guam
Master Plan that was submitted to Congress last summer (July 2014) and
is on track to meet the scheduled milestones and is continuing to
refine costs within the profile defined by the master plan.

6. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus and General Dunford, why is the
Department requesting an additional $20 million for the civilian water
and wastewater infrastructure on Guam?
Mr. Mabus. The cost of public infrastructure improvements necessary
to support the relocation--specifically for water and wastewater--
exceed the current level of appropriated funding. If the $20 million
request for fiscal year 2016 is not funded it will need to be requested
again to support the Navy's requirement to support Initial Operating
Capability of the future Marine Corps Base Guam.
While appropriated, no funding was executed in fiscal year 2014 due
to the Congressional restrictions on obligations and/or expenditures
until an implementation plan is provided to Defense Committees. The
plan is being prepared by the President's Economic Adjustment Committee
(EAC) pursuant to the fiscal year 2014 NDAA and will capture the
complete requirements for water/wastewater and other areas of
investment. The plan will be released not later than the issuance of
the Record of Decision pursuant to the requirements in the NDAA. fiscal
year 2014 - $119.4; fiscal year 2015 - $0; fiscal year 2016 - $20.
General Dunford. The cost of public infrastructure improvements
necessary to support the relocation--specifically for water and
wastewater--exceed the current level of appropriated funding. If the
$20 million request for fiscal year 2016 is not funded it will need to
be requested again to support the Navy's requirement to support Initial
Operating Capability of the future Marine Corps Base Guam.
While appropriated, no funding was executed in fiscal year 2014 due
to the Congressional restrictions on obligations and/or expenditures
until an implementation plan is provided to Defense Committees. The
plan is being prepared by the President's Economic Adjustment Committee
(EAC) pursuant to the fiscal year 2014 NDAA and will capture the
complete requirements for water/wastewater and other areas of
investment. The plan will be released not later than the issuance of
the Record of Decision pursuant to the requirements in the NDAA. fiscal
year 2014 - $119.4; fiscal year 2015 - $0; fiscal year 2016 - $20.
cruiser and dock landing ship phased modernization
7. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert, in your written statement you
``request congressional support for Navy's original plan'' for cruiser
phased modernization, which would induct 9 additional cruisers into
phased modernization in fiscal year 2016 for a total of 11 cruisers in
this status. Could you explain your position, including the benefits
and cost savings of supporting Navy's original plan?
Admiral Greenert. The Navy continues to face challenging funding
reductions instituted by the Budget Control Act of 2011, as amended by
the Bipartisan Budget Agreement of 2013. The Navy's original Cruiser
modernization plan provided a viable strategy to mitigate the cost of
modernization while delaying recapitalization of the class. Navy's
original plan would save $4.4 billion more than the ``2-4-6'' plan
mandated by law in fiscal year 2015. Just based on the duration of the
modernization period, the cost savings of our original plan would be
roughly $75 million per year per ship compared to the traditional class
average operations and sustainment (O&S) costs, primarily due to
reduced crew and steaming days.
Additionally, Navy's original plan maintained a minimum of 11
active CG 47 class Air Defense Commander (ADC) platforms in the Fleet
into the mid-2030s and final CG retirement would have occurred in 2045.
The current ``2-4-6'' plan will see the last CG retire in 2038 due to
the reduction in time the ships are in the modernization period. This
seven year delay in fully recapitalizing the ship class would have
relieved pressure on our shipbuilding account largely consumed in the
2030s with building Ohio Replacement SSBNs and aircraft carriers.
The reduced cost is a result of the pace and rate of modernization
in our original PB 2015 plan. That plan would have inducted all 11 CGs
into the program by early fiscal year 2016 and would have modernized
the Cruisers starting at a rate of one per year in fiscal year 2017.
Additional savings would have been achieved based on the duration each
ship was in the modernization period (anywhere from 4 to 10 years). The
cost savings during the modernization period, as compared to
traditional class average O&S costs, are roughly $75M per year per
ship, primarily based on reduced crew and steaming days. We estimate
the PB 2015 plan would have cost the Navy about $4.4B less through the
fiscal year 2015 FYDP than the Congressionally directed ``2-4-6'' plan.
We anticipate similar cost avoidance though the fiscal year 2016 FYDP
if allowed to return to the original plan.
upgraded littoral combat ship decision
8. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, regarding
the decision to upgrade the last 20 LCS, in his February 2014 memo,
Secretary of Defense Charles T. Hagel asked the Navy to provide
``alternative proposals to procure a capable and lethal small surface
combatant, generally consistent with the capabilities of a frigate.''
Then, Navy conducted extensive analysis and produced their
recommendation to upgrade the last 20 LCS, which will cost an
additional $60 to $75 million per LCS.
As the Congressional Research Service has noted, the missing piece
of analysis is explaining why 20 upgraded LCS are operationally
necessary--what specific gaps they will fill for our combatant
commanders. This work should have been done to validate there is an
actual problem that needs to be solved, before Secretary Hagel signed
the memo, and the search for a solution began.
Additionally, the continuous sensor and weapon upgrades of our
destroyers and fast attack submarines are based on staying ahead of
specific threats in order to achieve specific warfighting objectives.
In other words, these ships are ``benchmarked'' in terms of capability
and quantity against specific threat missiles, sensors, and so on. If
LCS is to be upgraded to take on the role of a Frigate, we must
understand its new warfighting role and benchmarks.
Just as with our destroyers and submarines, benchmarking to a
specific threat helps everyone understand when and if future upgrades
are necessary. I presume these upgrades to LCS are just the beginning
of what will be necessary to keep these ships relevant against future
threats as they continue to operate out to 2050.
Can you explain the extent to which analysis has been or will be
done to explain the specific combatant commander gaps the upgraded LCS
will fill and threat benchmarks the LCS upgrades should be measured
against?
Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. Navy's 2012 Force Structure
Assessment (FSA) determined the need for 52 small surface combatants to
meet Combatant Commander requirements. This requirement remains valid
and Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) and Frigates (FF) will fill it. LCS is
meeting its Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) validated
requirements but in response to SECDEF direction, Navy will procure 20
FFs with increased lethality and survivability to complete the 52 ship
requirement.
LCS and FFs are part of the same Program of Record and will address
three primary anti-access threats documented as joint capability gaps:
swarming fast attack craft/fast inshore attack craft (FAC/FIAC); diesel
submarines; and maritime mines. LCS, with its ability to embark the
mine countermeasure (MCM) mission package will execute the MCM mission
exclusively, whereas the surface warfare (SUW) and anti-submarine
warfare (ASW) missions can be executed by either LCS (with the
appropriate mission package embarked) or the multi-mission Frigates.
The FF, with additional lethality and survivability features, will
address the same SUW and ASW missions as LCS while accepting less risk.
The Office of Naval Intelligence provided the estimated threat
environment that framed the Small Surface Combatant Task Force's
(SSCTF) requirements analysis. Additionally, analytical input from Navy
Component Commanders and Fleet Commanders prioritized SUW and ASW
missions. This input ensured the proposed design was relevant and
adaptable to meet warfighting needs.
In addition, through extensive war gaming and campaign analysis,
LCS was tested against various threats in typical areas of fleet
operation around the world. The threat weapons employed in these areas
were used to build the benchmarks against which the Frigate will be
measured. The FF Increment to the LCS Flight 0+ Capability Development
Document (CDD) is in Navy staffing but the draft includes specific
threat weapon benchmarks that the ships will be measured against.
The Frigate's increased organic capability will enable these ships
to operate in multiple threat environments and their design will
counter current and emerging threats.

9. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, how did
you arrive at 32 LCS and 20 upgraded LCS Frigates as the right mix of
52 Small Surface Combatants?
Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. In February 2014, Secretary of
Defense Hagel directed Navy to provide alternative proposals to
increase LCS lethality and survivability, prior to placing additional
ships beyond 32 under contract. In December 2014, Secretary Hagel
approved Navy's proposal to procure a small surface combatant based on
the LCS Flight 0+ designs, designated as a Frigate (FF) by Secretary
Mabus in January 2015.
The FFs and LCS will address three documented joint capability
gaps: swarming fast attack craft/fast inshore attack craft (FAC/FIAC);
diesel submarines; and maritime mines. LCS will exclusively address the
mine countermeasure mission due to its ability to embark the mine
countermeasure mission package, whereas the surface warfare (SUW) and
anti-submarine warfare (ASW) missions can be executed by either LCS
(with the appropriate mission package embarked) or the multi-mission
FFs. The FFs will have greater lethality, system redundancy, and
survivability.
Both the modular capability of LCS and multi-mission capabilities
of the FF are vital to the future surface fleet in addressing SUW, ASW,
and mine-countermeasure (MCM) missions. The break at 32 LCS/ 20
Frigates represents a natural point in which the lethality and
survivability improvements could be implemented, while best supporting
cost and schedule concerns. In addition, 32 modular LCS supports
maintaining the MCM mission aboard a sufficient number of ships to meet
warfighting needs. As Frigate designs mature, Navy will evaluate the
technical feasibility and cost to back-fit and forward-fit lethality,
survivability, and capability improvements to LCS Flight 0+.
industrial base
10. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and General
Dunford, how would you describe the state of the industrial base that
supports your programs?
Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. Eleven different ship classes (DDG
1000, CVN 78, SSN 774, DDG 51, LPD, LCS, LHA(R), JHSV, MLP, T-AGS, and
AGOR) are currently under construction. In fiscal year 2014, six ships
were delivered (USS Somerset (LPD 25), USNS John Glenn (MLP 2), USNS
Millinocket (JHSV 3), USS America (LHA 6), USS North Dakota (SSN 784),
and USNS Fall River (JHSV 4)). As of April 1, 2015, 66 ships are under
contract.
The U.S. naval shipbuilding industrial base is a complex, multi-
tiered network of shipbuilders, equipment, system and component
suppliers. The state of the shipbuilding industrial base today is
stable, however, some shipyards will face challenges as their current
workload completes. Our submarine shipbuilding yards are healthy;
building two VA Class submarines per year, as opposed to the previous
decades when they built one or fewer submarines per year. Given the
priority and necessity for replacing the Ohio Class Ballistic Missile
submarines, the two nuclear shipbuilders and their suppliers have a
firm basis for production and non-production workload through the early
2030s. In contrast, the non-nuclear (surface combatants, amphibious and
auxiliary) shipbuilders and suppliers' risk may be greater during this
same timeframe, depending upon the funding levels enacted. Since the
non-nuclear ships do not have the same priority as the Ohio Replacement
Program (ORP), if the DON is required to fund the entire ORP, these
non-nuclear ships are more likely to be impacted by decreases in their
funding levels. Less funding would lead to lower capacity and under-
utilization, further impacting shipbuilding affordability for the
Department, as well as the industrial base's ability to compete for
additional work and make necessary investments in facilities, people,
and processes. Discussions with shipyards are being pursued to evaluate
possible investments to improve prime equipment supplier production, in
order to further reduce costs and improve efficiencies. DON has and
will continue to emphasize stability; competition; maximizing our
buying power through economic order quantity procurements, block buys
and multiyear procurement (MYP); and driving affordability earlier and
throughout the life cycle of each ship. DON will continue to work with
Congress and industry to evaluate opportunities for continued
acquisition efficiency and cost-savings opportunities. This includes
flexibility with the use of advanced procurement funding for long-lead
time and materials as well as continued use of block buys and MYP in
order to enable more efficient and effective shipbuilding and
construction schedules.
General Dunford. The defense industrial base is doing the maximum
they can to cope with the turbulent budget of the last few years.
However, with an unpredictable budget, they have had to make difficult
decisions regarding investment in emerging technologies and their
ability to engage in long term, low cost, contracts.
The Marine Corps continues to work closely with the industrial base
that supports our programs to create innovative solutions to identified
requirements while keeping cost-effectiveness and sustainability in
mind during this prolonged period of fiscal constraint. The primary
concern, with regard to the industrial base, remains keeping
procurement schedules predictable and on timeline which enables us to
maximize productivity and cost savings. Stable and predictable budgets
will enable this to the maximum extent possible by allowing both the
Marine Corps and our industrial partners to plan procurement and
construction in a rational manner which provides the taxpayers with the
highest quality product at the best price. This can only be ensured
when the industrial base is able to make capital investment and hiring
decisions with a measure of certainty due to the high skill workers
they require the complicated techniques which must be performed.
Uncertain budgets make it very difficult for industry to have a
stable or expanding business base, allowing them to invest in internal
research and development and capital equipment to make them viable,
innovative, and competitive, and making the industrial base reliable
for the long term. Budget uncertainty also makes it difficult for
industry and the Department to sustain legacy systems while investing
in developing next generation systems necessary for U.S. technical
superiority. The past few decades have seen a trend where most `new'
weapons systems have really just ben upgrades of existing systems, and
therefore do not exercise the industrial base and government skill sets
necessary to design, develop and integrate a truly new weapon system.
We have seen these skills atrophy severely, and are getting close to
the point where they may be lost, just when the U.S. needs them to face
ever increasing threats.

11. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and General
Dunford, in the event of further budget reductions, what must this
committee be particularly mindful of related to the industrial base?
Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The Navy has a direct relationship
and a vested interest in the shipyards, their subcontractors, and the
supply chain's performance and continued viability. Shipbuilding and
industrial base stability is required in order to balance capability,
affordability, and a robust industrial base. A shortage of funding
would reverse the Navy's progress towards recapitalizing a 300 ship
battleforce and would increase the pressure on the shipbuilding
industry. Each shipyard faces challenges as their current workload
completes. Lower capacity and under-utilization further impacts
shipbuilding affordability for the Department, as well as impacts the
industrial base's ability to compete for additional work and make
necessary investments in facilities, people, and processes. Further
budget reductions will have a negative impact on the U.S. economy as
workers directly employed in the U.S. shipbuilding and repair industry
in 2014 totaled 147,000. This total includes 31,000 workers at Naval
Shipyards, 61,000 at yards with Navy new construction work, and 55,000
at the remaining shipbuilding and repair yards.
Funding stability is key to stability in shipbuilding programs.
Because cuts to DON shipbuilding programs are the least reversible in
their impact on the DON's fundamental mission of providing presence and
in their consequences to the industrial base and to our economy, the
Department is committed to the maximum extent possible, to preserve
ship construction and to seek reductions in every other area first,
should budget reductions such as sequestration become reality
General Dunford. The Marine Corps continues to work closely with
the industrial base that supports our programs to create innovative
solutions to identified requirements while keeping cost-effectiveness
and sustainability in mind during this prolonged period of fiscal
constraint. The primary concern, with regard to the industrial base,
remains keeping procurement schedules predictable and on timeline which
enables us to maximize productivity and cost savings. Stable and
predictable budgets will enable this to the maximum extent possible by
allowing both the Marine Corps and our industrial partners to plan
procurement and construction in a rational manner which provides the
taxpayers with the highest quality product at the best price. This can
only be ensured when the industrial base is able to make capital
investment and hiring decisions with a measure of certainty due to the
high skill workers they require the complicated techniques which must
be performed.
two-phase aircraft carrier delivery
12. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, the Navy is proposing to
deliver CVN-79 in two phases, which extends the delivery of the full
ship by what appears to be at least 16 months into 2025. While I
understand there is a business case that suggests this will increase
competition and lower costs, can you discuss the risk this plan assumes
if the USS Nimitz (CVN-68) has operational availability issues as she
approaches her 50-year service life? What would be the pros and cons of
having 12 operational carriers for a period of time in the mid-2020s?
Mr. Mabus. The Department has implemented a number of processes to
improve performance on CVN 79 construction that minimizes risk to the
two-phased delivery approach. The second phase of construction has been
designed to include those items that are cheaper to complete outside of
the shipyard, taking advantage of competition in installation and
integration to reduce the overall cost of construction. CVN 79 will be
introduced to the Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP) as the
operational replacement for CVN 68 in fiscal year (FY) 2025, which is
when CVN 68 is scheduled to begin inactivation. The opportunity to
utilize a two-phased approach for CVN 79 delivery enables the Navy to
maintain an 11 aircraft carrier force structure required by law and the
Navy's latest Force Structure Assessment while reducing construction
costs. This force structure supports a forward deployed naval posture
which meets warfighting and peacetime requirements across the entire
spectrum of current and potential future conflicts. Increasing the
carrier force structure from 11 to 12 CVNs is in excess of what is
foreseen to meet Carrier Strike Group presence and surge requirements
projected at the time of NIMITZ inactivation. By completing CVN 79 in
two phases, the timeframe with 12 operational CVNs is minimized, thus
reducing operational costs associated with maintaining the CVN force.
future surface combatants
13. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert, retirements of three surface
combatant classes are on the horizon. The first cruiser will retire in
2020, the first Flight I destroyer will retire in 2026, and the first
LCS will retire in 2033. Can you describe your vision and current
planning for the future surface combatant force? Is there a
Capabilities Based Assessment in progress? If so, please describe the
key elements and estimated completion date.
Admiral Greenert. The Navy's vision and current planning for the
future surface combatant force includes procuring up to 27 Flight III
DDG 51s, 52 small surface combatants (the last 20 of which will be a
modified LCS designated as a Frigate), and executing Cruiser phased
modernization which extends their service lives into the late 2030s.
A future surface combatant Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) will
begin this year and is estimated to complete by early 2016. Key
elements will include the identification of capability gaps as a result
of retiring ship classes and projected future threats, prioritization
of operational risks, and recommendations to address identified gaps.
ohio replacement program funding
14. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, several
Defense and Navy leaders have identified the challenge associated with
procuring Ohio Replacement Program (ORP) submarines in the 2020s within
historical shipbuilding funding levels and the severe impact doing so
would have on other Navy programs. This committee recognizes the
importance of the ORP and wants to work with you on the funding
challenge. Given the first procurement in fiscal year 2021 will show up
in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) beginning with the next
budget, is there a proposal or discussion that this committee can help
with?
Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. Given the need to recapitalize this
strategic asset, coupled with the ongoing need to support Navy force
structure, the Navy continues to pursue the means to resource
construction of the OHIO Replacement (OR) SSBN in accordance with the
schedule to fulfill U.S. Strategic Command requirements in fiscal year
2031.
The Navy continues to need significant increases in our topline
beyond the FYDP, not unlike that during the periods of 41 for Freedom
(1958-1964) and Ohio (1974-1991) construction, in order to afford the
OR SSBN procurement costs. Absent a significant increase to the SCN
appropriation, OR SSBN construction will seriously impair construction
of virtually all other ships in the battle force: attack submarines,
destroyers, and amphibious warfare ships. The shipbuilding industrial
base will be commensurately impacted and shipbuilding costs would
spiral unfavorably. The resulting battle force would fall markedly
short of the Force Structure Assessment, unable to meet fleet inventory
requirements.
The National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund (NSBDF) is a good first step
in that it acknowledges the significant challenge of resourcing the OR
SSBN, but the fund is unresourced and the Navy does not have other
funds for the NSBDF to support OR.
The Navy will work with the Congressional Defense Committees to
determine reasonable options and funding alternatives to help solve the
impact of OR on the shipbuilding budget.

15. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, can you discuss the steps that
are being taken to reduce the cost of ORP nuclear ballistic missile
submarines?
Mr. Mabus. The Ohio Replacement Program is the Department of the
Navy's highest priority, and as such, numerous efforts are being
conducted to reduce the program cost throughout design, production, and
operations and sustainment. Some of these efforts include pursuing
innovative acquisition strategies; new ideas and implementation through
design for affordability; independent deep dive analysis; common
material procurements and portfolio savings with Virginia-class
submarines; use of prototyping, component development and reuse; and
potential savings from continuous production of key materials.
In December 2012, the Navy awarded a Research and Development
contract for Ohio Replacement SSBN which focuses on meeting the
program's performance requirements while reducing costs across design,
production, and operations and sustainment. The average follow-on ship
recurring cost estimate was reduced to $5.2 billion CY 2010 ($9.8B TY)
dollars from $5.4 billion CY 2010 ($10.5B TY) dollars. Cost reduction
efforts continue and bring the Navy closer to its cost goal of $4.9
billion CY 2010 average follow-on ship recurring cost. The cost
reduction efforts will continue throughout the design and construction
phases.

16. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, are you on track to meet the
$4.9 billion target for hulls 2 through 12?
Mr. Mabus. The Ohio Replacement Program is the Department of the
Navy's highest priority, and as such, numerous efforts are being
conducted to reduce the program cost throughout design, production, and
operations and sustainment. Some of these efforts include pursuing
innovative acquisition strategies; new ideas and implementation through
design for affordability; independent deep dive analysis; common
material procurements and portfolio savings with Virginia-class
submarines; use of prototyping, component development and reuse; and
potential savings from continuous production of key materials.
In December 2012, the Navy awarded a research and development (R&D)
contract for OR SSBN which focuses on meeting the program's performance
requirements while reducing costs across design, production, and
operations and sustainment. The average follow-on ship recurring cost
estimate was reduced to $5.2 billion CY 2010 ($9.8B TY) dollars from
$5.4 billion CY 2010 ($10.5B TY) dollars. Cost reduction efforts
continue and bring the Navy closer to its cost goal of $4.9 billion CY
2010 average follow-on ship recurring cost. The cost reduction efforts
will continue throughout the design and construction phases.

carrier onboard delivery replacement
17. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert, this budget proposes
replacing the C-2 Greyhound with the V-22 Osprey. The transition from a
fixed wing to tilt-rotor aircraft will mark a significant departure for
this mission and carrier aviation. In your statement, you say, ``The V-
22 (Navy variant) extends the range and in increases the flexibility of
Strike Group resupply.'' Can you elaborate on this statement?
Admiral Greenert. The Navy V-22 variant extends the range of the
MV-22 by utilizing an extended range fuel system. This expands the
range of the Carrier Onboard Delivery (COD) capability to 1,150
nautical miles while carrying up to 6,000 pounds of cargo/passengers.
The Navy V-22 will increase flexibility of Strike Group resupply
operations by evolving the Aerial Logistics Concept of Operations from
a CVN centric ``hub and spoke'' model to a flexible Sea Base support
concept. Under this model, any V-22 capable ship or seabase, can serve
as a logistics hub alleviating current COD mission limitations
associated with solely traditional aircraft carrier cyclic launch and
recovery operations.

18. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, can you
discuss the analysis and selection process behind this decision and why
you're convinced this is the right platform for this mission in the
future?
Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The 35 remaining C-2A aircraft are
nearing the end of their service life and becoming increasingly more
expensive to operate. Accordingly, the Navy identified the need for a
solution for the Carrier Onboard Delivery (COD) mission capability.
Between 2004 and 2013 the Navy performed a series of analyses,
which identified the COD capability as a critical force enabler that
must have a material solution, and that a manned carrier based
logistics aircraft was the preferred material concept. Other key
analytic findings were that a force structure of 44 C-2 or V-22 class
aircraft are required to conduct the COD mission into the future and
that ``off-the-shelf'' solutions were available. Additionally, the
latest analysis proved that a COD mission solution is required no later
than 2026.
In 2012, an update to the 2005 Analysis of Alternatives (AoA)
focused on updating the cost estimates for the six most likely
alternatives. The analysis concluded, in part, that transferring the
COD mission to the V-22, already a part of the existing V-22 Program of
Record, was a viable and cost-effective option; in fact, an option that
provided the Navy ``the best value'' solution. This update was
validated by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment
and Program Evaluation (OSD CAPE) in December 2012. Following
validation, an underway Military Utility Assessment (MUA) was performed
in June 2013 onboard the USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75). This assessment
demonstrated that the V-22 is an effective, flexible and safe platform
to conduct the COD mission from an aircraft carrier.
Based on in-depth analysis and demonstrated capability the
Department of the Navy selected a Navy variant of V-22 as the solution
to recapitalize the COD mission aircraft. This decision pursues an
acquisition strategy which funds the existing Program of Record to
procure 44 V-22 COD mission aircraft. This approach takes advantage of
an existing full-rate production line, captures potential multiyear
procurement savings and capitalizes on the benefits of operating a
common Joint service aircraft. Overall, this decision is the most
affordable, long-term solution with the least risk in meeting Navy
requirements.
ballistic missile defense ship requirement
19. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert, can you tell us what the
ballistic missile defense requirement is for our surface ships (i.e.,
how many ships must have this capability)?
Admiral Greenert. The 2014 update to the 2012 Force Structure
Assessment sets the requirement at 40 advanced capable BMD (AEGIS
Baseline 9+) ships, as part of the 88 large surface combatant
requirement, to meet Navy unique requirements to support defense of the
sea base and limited expeditionary land base sites.
The basic and intermediate capable BMD ships remaining in inventory
will continue to contribute to the sourcing of Combatant Commander
(CCDR) requests independent of the Navy unique requirement. This CCDR
demand has increased from 44 in fiscal year 2012-2014 to 77 in fiscal
year 2016. Navy continues to be challenged to meet all CCDR demand for
BMD ships, but will meet 100 percent of Secretary of Defense
adjudicated requirements in fiscal year 2016. To better meet CCDR
demand and the Navy unique requirement, Navy is building advanced BMD
capability in new construction ships and modernizing existing
destroyers with advanced BMD capability.
Basic BMD capability includes early baseline ships capable of
tracking and engaging short and medium range ballistic missiles.
Intermediate capable BMD ships provide improved capability against more
complex ballistic missiles. Advanced capable BMD ships are those with
the ability to conduct Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) (BMD
and Air Defense simultaneously). Each improvement also provides a
greater area of coverage (footprint) by the ship.
The minimum requirement for 40 advanced capable BMD ships is based
on the Navy unique requirement as follows. It accepts risk in the
sourcing of CCDR requests for defense of land.
- 27 to meet CVN escort demand for rotational deployment of the
carrier strike groups
- 9 in FDNF Japan to meet operational timelines in PACOM
- 4 in FDNF Europe for rotational deployment in EUCOM

20. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert, what time period is this
requirement valid for?
Admiral Greenert. The updated ballistic missile defense (BMD)
requirement is set out in the 2014 Force Structure Assessment (FSA).
The focus of the 2014 FSA update is 2030 in order to provide the
subsequent shipbuilding plan time to appreciably impact/change the 2030
force.
lx(r) amphibious ship program
21. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, the Navy
is developing the requirements now for the next class of amphibious
ship, the LX(R). Those requirements should reflect an assessment of how
the naval force, sailors and marines, will be expected to operate and
fight in the future. I know the Marine Corps is experimenting with
operations off a wider range of noncombatant ships, but we must ensure
that our warships are capable of supporting them in the manner they
plan to fight in the future. Can you update us on the progress of the
LX(R) development effort?
Admiral Greenert. LX(R) is the replacement program for the landing
ship dock, LSD 41 and LSD 49 classes, which will begin reaching their
estimated service life in the mid-2020s. The Analysis of Alternatives
Report was completed in April 2014. After thorough analysis, the
Department has determined that using a derivative of the LPD 17 hull
form is the preferred alternative to meet LX(R) operational
requirements. This determination sustains the program's focus on
requirements, affordability and total ownership cost. Program focus
during fiscal year 2016 will be to finalize the requirements in the
Capability Development Document and execute contract design efforts to
meet acquisition milestones for procurement of the lead ship in fiscal
year 2020. Competition will play a key role in the LX(R) acquisition
strategy.
LX(R) is envisioned to be a flexible, multi-mission warship with
capabilities that support execution of the full range of military
operations. The need to support disaggregated or split operations away
from the Amphibious Readiness Group or to deploy independently is a key
driver for the design of the ship class. The inherent flexibility of
amphibious ships is demonstrated by their support to 7 of the 10
missions in the Defense Strategic Guidance. LX(R) will be a versatile,
cost-effective amphibious ship--a success story in leveraging mature
design while balancing cost and requirements to deliver key
capabilities. The lead LX(R) will deliver in time for LSD 43's
retirement in fiscal year 2027.
General Dunford. First it must be noted both that you are correct
that the wider range of noncombatant ships will help the force expand
our operational capability and that those vessels are not a replacement
for amphibious warships. Those noncombatant vessels can only operate
effectively in permissive environments whereas amphibious warships are
capable of operating across the range of military operations,
particularly in ``most dangerous case scenarios.''
LX(R) the next generation of amphibious warship is currently being
developed and is templated to have 11 ships in its class to replace the
LSD 41/49 class. In the most recent 30 year shipbuilding plan, advanced
procurement is programmed for FY19 to procure the lead LX(R) class ship
in FY20. It should be noted that development of the LX(R) on the LPD-17
hull form has allowed us to achieve cost savings. Additionally, LPD-28,
which the Congress had the wisdom to provide to the Navy and Marine
Corps last session, allows us to bridge the gap from an industrial base
perspective, also achieving cost savings. That decision also allows the
shipyards to begin using naval architecture on LPD-28 that will be
required on LX(R), again achieving cost savings and lowering the time
required for construction on LX(R).
LX(R) will possess the capacity to operate independently and will
bridge existing LSD 41/49 operational capability shortfalls including
embarkation capacity, command and control, medical, and aviation.

future carrier and carrier air wing
22. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert, can you provide your vision
for the future of aircraft carriers and the carrier air wing?
Admiral Greenert. The fiscal year 2016 President's Budget request
sustains the transitions for aircraft carriers and carrier air wings to
ensure the Navy improves the proven capabilities required of these
platforms to win in projected threat environments. The 2014 Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) validated the requirements for these platforms as
set forth in the approved Defense Planning Scenarios, Combatant
Commanders' Operation Plans (OPLANs), and Fleet priorities outlined in
the Naval Aviation Master Aviation Plan (MAP).
The aircraft carrier is central to Navy core capabilities of
forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime
security, and humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR). The
Department remains committed to maintaining a carrier force, and
associated carrier air wings, that provide unparalleled responsiveness
and flexibility to operational commanders across the full range of
military options. Maintaining the aircraft carrier force structure at
the level required by law requires a combination of a steady-state
Ford-class procurement plan, recapitalization of the Nimitz-class via
the Refueling and Complex Overhaul (RCOH) program, maintaining an in-
service aircraft carrier life cycle support program, and inactivating
current CVNs at their notional 50-year service life as Ford-class CVNs
are delivered.
The carrier air wing is currently evolving to improve its lethality
as an integrated maritime power projection force. The future force
structure features enhanced capabilities to achieve superiority in
electromagnetic maneuver warfare, advanced strike, sea control,
surveillance, command and control, and logistics. The Airborne
Electronic Attack mission formerly fulfilled by the EA-6B is being
recapitalized with the EA-18G. The carrier based squadron transition
will be complete in 2015. The strike fighter contribution to the future
carrier air wing requires the complementary capabilities of both the F/
A-18E/F and F-35C, which will improve access in contested environments
and kill chain effectiveness in all assigned mission areas. The F-35C
will replace aging F/A-18C aircraft as they reach the end of their
service life and will provide a 5th generation strike fighter aircraft
that combines low observable technology, greatly improved sensors and
data fusion to outpace future threats. The F/A-18E/F continues to
receive advanced capability upgrades required to sustain its relevance
until eventual replacement with the Next Generation Air Dominance
family of systems, which is currently in the requirements definition
phase. Improvements in surveillance and detection are integrated with
the E-2D as it replaces the E-2C. An expanded helicopter footprint
employs the MH-60R for Strike Group submarine defense and surface
surveillance reconnaissance and strike, a role previously filled by the
S-3B and SH-60F; while the MH-60S replaces the aging HH-60H for combat
support and small boat defense within the Strike Group. Finally, a Navy
variant of the V-22 will recapitalize the Carrier Onboard Delivery
(COD) logistics mission and enable a flexible Sea Based logistics
support concept.
The Navy is also exploring unmanned options for carrier air wing
integration. UCLASS is currently in the requirements definition phase
of development and will capitalize on the proven capabilities of the
UCAS-D.

23. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert, how important is the
attribute of strike in a contested environment to our first unmanned
carrier launched aircraft system?
Admiral Greenert. The Navy has a validated requirement for strike
in a contested environment for the Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne
Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) system.

24. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert, you have mentioned a RAND
study of less expensive aircraft carrier options. What are the major
elements of this study and what is the estimated completion date?
Admiral Greenert. This study will examine potential requirements,
capabilities, and alternatives for future development of aircraft
carrier alternatives that would replace or supplement the highly
capable Ford-class CVN. The study will examine a range of mixes and
alternatives for platforms with lower costs and potentially smaller air
wings.
The study will compare the current CVN 78 platform, a two-reactor
nuclear propulsion system, and a conventionally-powered variant, in
both existing and smaller, new design variants, with consideration of
incorporating unmanned aircraft into the future carrier air wing. This
study is expected to complete in early Summer of 2016.
flight iii guided missile destroyer
25. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, what is your assessment of the
readiness of the air and missile defense radar to begin procurement as
part of the Flight III Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG) in fiscal year
2016?
Mr. Mabus. The Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR), officially
designated SPY-6, is on track to begin procurement in fiscal year 2016
as part of the Flight III DDG 51. Introducing SPY-6 through the proven
Aegis combat system in the well-established DDG 51 hull remains the
lowest risk and fastest way to get this capability to the Fleet.
The AMDR program has met all major program milestones per plan,
including successful completion of Hardware Critical Design Review
(CDR) in December 2014 and is on track to complete System CDR in April
2015. The tactical software that runs the radar is well into
development, and is already integrated with, and running, radar
hardware. The DDG 51 shipbuilders are designing the ship changes
required to host the radar, based on detailed radar design information
already delivered. Build-up of a full scale Engineering Development
Model (EDM) array is in progress to support near field range testing
later this summer.
Test planning efforts are currently underway to support a six month
campaign of increasingly complex tests using satellites, manned and
unmanned aircraft, and dedicated targets.
In summary, the radar hardware design is complete, and is already
integrated with initial tactical software. The program is on track,
with schedule margin, to support a production decision for procurement
of the fiscal year 2016 Flight III DDG 51. Introducing the AMDR/SPY-6
on the Flight III DDG 51 remains the lowest risk, fastest, and least
expensive way to deliver this vitally needed capability to the Fleet.
amphibious assault
26. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, what is
the closest range from shore the Navy and Marine Corps can conduct an
amphibious assault in a contested Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD)
environment today and projected into the future?
Admiral Greenert. The extent and effectiveness of shaping actions
to neutralize threats to naval forces in advance of amphibious
operations are highly dependent on the mission. Acceptable operational
risk is determined by considering the mission, the nature of the
threats that can potentially oppose that mission, and the capabilities
of friendly forces to counter those threats. The final decision to
conduct amphibious operations is based on mission requirements and risk
regardless of range.
The Joint Force Commander and Joint Force Maritime Component
Commander will conduct shaping operations to mitigate the threat and
establish the requisite conditions for an amphibious operation (e.g.,
establishment of air and maritime superiority). The overall objective
of setting these conditions is to permit the amphibious force to close
the distance which will allow a faster buildup of combat power ashore
of the landing force.
General Dunford. There is no optimal or minimum distance for
launching an amphibious assault--the answer is that it depends on the
circumstances, the mission, and the risk we must accept. In our recent
wargaming efforts, based on a scenario in the 2020's, we planned
operations beyond 50 nautical miles (NMi), and amphibious assaults at
30 NMi, 12 NMi, and 4 NMi against an A2AD enabled adversary.
There is no fixed distance that will define how or when Marine
forces come ashore during and amphibious assault in a contested area.
Where Navy vessels are positioned and when amphibious forces are
ordered ashore will be a decision made by the Joint Force Commander,
Combatant Commander, or higher.
The distance from the shore depends on the geography, the enemy's
capabilities, the extent that we have been able to shape the
environment in the landing areas, and the level of risk we are willing
to accept. Tides, sand bars, reefs, currents, mangroves, and geography
in the landing area will all impact the distance from which we can
approach a landing area. These characteristics will vary depending on
the objective area.
Every adversary is going to have a different set of capabilities;
the following are primary ones that need to be considered: off shore
anti-access capabilities presented by submarines, ships, and long range
aircraft; near shore capabilities like coastal defense missiles, mines,
patrol boats and small boats that could be used for swarm attacks;
maneuver forces ashore that are available to react to landing forces.
Depending on the scope of A2AD capabilities and the adversary's ability
to shift their defenses to different areas--our 'assault distance' will
vary.
The final factor is risk to the mission and the force. As the
nation's expeditionary force in readiness, the Marine Corps will
sometimes be asked to conduct crisis response and contingency missions
in an uncertain or contested environment which are critical to our
national security. If the strategic situation allows for a long build-
up of forces we may be able to get closer. In every operation we will
work to create an advantage for our forces--or shape the environment.
Preparing for an amphibious assault requires us to address the enemy's
capabilities and local geography but we will always be constrained by
what forces we have available, how much time we have, and the risk we
are willing to accept.
tomahawk cruise missiles
27. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, the
President's Budget for fiscal year 2016 includes procuring 100 Tomahawk
missiles in fiscal year 2016 and proposes ending production thereafter,
citing sufficient inventory to meet requirements. The Tomahawk's
replacement, the Next Generation Land Attack Weapon (NGLAW) is not due
to enter service until the mid-2020s at the earliest. Please comment on
the:

Effect of ending production on the size of the
shortfall in Tomahawks in 2020
Projected level and timing of low point of Tomahawk/
NGLAW inventory
Risk in ending production of the Tomahawk prior to
introduction of its replacement
Effect of a delay in the NGLAW program on the Navy's
ability to meet its long-range precision strike requirements
Effect of ending production on the ability of the
supplier base to recertify the existing Block IV missiles

Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The Navy has a sufficient inventory
of Tomahawk cruise missiles through 2020. Beginning in 2019, the Navy
plans a recertification and modernization of Tomahawk missiles which
will extend service life from 15 to 30 years and is crucial to
maintaining Tomahawk inventory beyond 2020. Based on operational
planning scenarios and projected annual expenditures, the Tomahawk
inventory in 2020 will be at 134 percent of the combat requirement.
The Navy's Next Generation Strike Capability (NGSC) strategy will
develop a family of more lethal, survivable and affordable multi-
mission weapons. The NGSC strategy plans for NGLAW production to begin
in 2026. The projected low point of combined Tomahawk/NGLAW inventory
occurs in 2024 when the inventory decreases slightly to 132 percent of
the combat requirement.
The Navy takes an acceptable level of inventory risk in order to
make capability investments to keep Tomahawk Block IV weapons relevant
in all theaters through their 30 year service life while concurrently
pursuing an overarching Next Generation Strike Capability strategy
which supports introduction of the NGLAW capability in the mid to late
2020 timeframe. Additionally, a recent Defense Contract Management
Agency study concluded that the risk to restart TACTOM production was
low to moderate.
The Navy plans to mitigate the risk of any delay in the NGLAW
program through its Tomahawk recertification and modernization plan.
Beginning in 2019, the recertification and modernization will extend
Tomahawk missile service life from 15 to 30 years. The first
recertified and modernized Tomahawk missiles will be retired in 2035,
with the last Tomahawks being removed from the active inventory in the
mid to late 2040's time frame. Under this plan and even without any
NGLAW contribution, Tomahawk inventory in 2035 is projected to be 130
percent of the combat requirement.
The Navy plans to procure up to 165 Tomahawk missiles in fiscal
year 2016 (includes 18 procured through Replacement in Kind sale of
Torpedo Tube Launched Missiles to the United Kingdom), with final
delivery planned for the end of fiscal year 2018. The Tomahawk missile
recertification and modernization program begins in the 1st Quarter of
fiscal year 2019, and the majority of the supplier base will continue
to be engaged during the transition from production to recertification
and modernization. This significant continuation of effort across the
supplier base, coupled with the fact that many of the Tomahawk missile
vendors also support other weapons programs with similar parts, ensures
the ability of the supplier base to support Tomahawk recertification
and modernization.
joint standoff weapon
28. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, the
President's Budget for fiscal year 2015 included procuring an
additional 4,432 Joint Standoff Weapons (JSOW) beyond fiscal year 2015,
including 200 in fiscal year 2016. The Justification Book stated
``Production in fiscal year 2015 is focused on the AGM-154-C1 because
of the low inventory''. The fiscal year 2016 President's Budget
terminated JSOW production because, as the Justification Book states,
``the Department has determined that there are sufficient JSOW C (fixed
target) and JSOW C-1 (maritime moving target) weapons in inventory, and
that other weapons will provide a much more formidable capability in
future near-peer surface warfare engagements''. Please comment on:

What has changed since the submission of the
President's Budget for fiscal year 2015 that has made those
4,432 JSOWs no longer necessary to meet Navy requirements
What constitutes ``sufficient weapons in inventory''
What other weapons are being referred to in the fiscal
year 2016 Justification Book
What constitutes a ``much more formidable capability''
The impact of termination on potential JSOW foreign
military sales
The impact of termination on the JSOW industrial base

Mr. Mabus. [Deleted.]
Admiral Greenert. [Deleted.]

other munitions
29. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert, in your testimony before the
Committee, you stated ``we have insufficient munitions in 2020, and
even in some munitions in the [2016] budget''. What munitions
specifically you are referring to, and their specific shortfalls?
Admiral Greenert. [Deleted.]

30. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert, what risks are being assumed
with the insufficiencies?
Admiral Greenert. [Deleted.]

31. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert, what steps you would
recommend to alleviate these insufficient inventories?
Admiral Greenert. [Deleted.]

multiyear procurement
32. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, a
contract was recently signed for multiyear procurement (MYP) of the
Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) which saved approximately 18.38
percent over annual contracts. Are there other munitions programs that
you believe would benefit from MYP, and if so, what are they and what
steps are being taken to implement MYP?
Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The Department of the Navy is
always looking for opportunities to increase savings in the munitions
portfolio.
In the ship defense portfolio, both Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM)
Block 2 and Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) have good potential for future
multi-year procurements. fiscal year (FY) 2018 is the earliest RAM
Block 2 would be considered for a MYP after it achieves Full Rate
Production. fiscal year 2018 is the earliest for SM-6 after the Block
1A Engineering Change Proposal completes testing and is approved for
Full Production cut-in.
While MYPs are a good method to generate savings they also come at
the cost of decreased financial flexibility for future years. Given the
unstable funding environment the department has faced with
Sequestration and annual continuing resolution bills, the department
must be judicious in pursuit of MYPs. Increased stability in current
and future budgets would increase the department's ability to pursue
more MYPs.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
readiness of the force
33. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, General
Dempsey testified that the fiscal year 2016 President's Budget is
``what we need to remain at the lower ragged edge of manageable risk in
our ability to execute the defense strategy'' and that ``we have no
slack, no margin left for error or strategic surprise.'' Do you agree
with General Dempsey's statement?
Admiral Greenert. Yes, PB-16 is the absolute minimum funding needed
to execute our DSG. Should resources be further reduced below PB-16
levels, the DSG will need to be revised.
General Dunford. Anything less than the President's Budget
restricts the ability to put ready Marines forward to protect our
interests and provide decision-space for our nation's leaders. It also
forces the Marine Corps to accept risk in responding to a major
contingency operation.
If your military, and specifically the Marine Corps, is tasked to
do more but with decreased funding, it renders the current defense
strategy unexecutable. The Marine Corps, as the nation's-force-in-
readiness, defends the homeland by being forward postured, as we are in
Europe/Africa with the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force for
Crisis Response (SPMAGTF-CR-AF), in the Middle East with the Amphibious
Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG/MEU--or Marines on
amphibious ships) and the SPMAGTF-CR-CC, and with forward-based and
forward deployed III MEF units in the Pacific. We forward position our
Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Teams (FAST), which are under the
operational control (OPCON) of the Navy, supporting each Geographic
Combatant Commander. We have Marines stationed at State Department
Posts throughout the world, safeguarding American lives and interests.
However, this comes at a cost.

34. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, can you
give us some context in terms of readiness of personnel, equipment,
training, and etcetera?
Admiral Greenert. Sequestration in fiscal year 2013 resulted in a
$9 billion shortfall in Navy's budget, as compared to the PB-13
submission. This instance of sequestration was not just a disruption,
it created readiness consequences from which we are still recovering,
particularly in ship and aircraft maintenance, Fleet response capacity,
and excessive CSG and ARG deployment lengths. The continuing resolution
and sequestration reductions in fiscal year 2013 compelled us to reduce
both afloat and ashore operations, which created ship and aircraft
maintenance and training backlogs. To budget for the procurement of
ships and aircraft appropriated in fiscal year 2013, Navy was compelled
to defer some purchases to future years and use prior-year investment
balances to mitigate impacts to programs in fiscal year 2013 execution.
The most visible impacts occurred in Operations and Maintenance funded
activities.
While the Navy was able to reprioritize within available resources
to continue to operate in fiscal year 2013, this is not a sustainable
course for future budgets. The actions we took in 2013 to mitigate
sequestration only served to transfer bills amounting to over $4
billion to future years for many procurement programs--those carryover
bills were addressed in Navy's fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015
budgets.
Shortfalls caused by the fiscal year 2013 sequestration remain in a
number of areas and the Navy is still working to recover from them. For
example, we have not yet caught up from shipyard maintenance backlogs.
We are working through shipyard personnel capacity issues to determine
when ships can be fit back into the maintenance cycle and are balancing
that against operational demands on the ships to ensure we meet the
global force management requirement for Combatant Commands. The result
of maintenance and training backlogs has meant delayed preparation for
deployments, forcing us, in turn, to extend the deployments of those
units already on deployment. Since 2013, many CSGs, ARGs, and
destroyers have been on deployment for 8-10 months or longer. This
comes at a cost to the resiliency of our people, sustainability of our
equipment, and service lives of our ships.
Maintenance and training backlogs have also reduced Navy's ability
to maintain required forces for contingency response to meet Combatant
Command operational plan requirements. Although the requirement calls,
on average, for three additional CSGs and three additional ARGs to
deploy within 30 days for a major crisis, Navy has only been able to
maintain an average of one group each in this readiness posture. Root
causes can be traced to the high operational tempo of the Fleet, longer
than expected shipyard availabilities, and retirements of experienced
shipyard workers, but the fiscal year 2013 sequestration exacerbated
the depth of this problem and interfered with our efforts to recover.
Assuming a stable budget and no major contingencies for the
foreseeable future, it is possible to recover from the maintenance
backlogs that have accumulated from the high operational tempo over the
last decade of war and the additional effects of sequestration by
approximately 2018 for CSGs and approximately 2020 for ARGs.
General Dunford. The Marine Corps, as the Nation's ready force,
deploys ready Marines and Marine units to meet operational
requirements. The Marine Corps is meeting its current operational
requirements but at the cost of surge capacity, modernization, and
infrastructure sustainment.
Deployed and non-deployed units alike require personnel, equipment,
and training resources to generate ready forces capable of responding
to any crisis around the globe at a moment's notice. Non-deployed units
are the bill payer for protecting deployed unit readiness. Operational
necessity compels the re-allocation of non-deployed essential personnel
and equipment to deployed and next-to-deploy units. But even when not
deployed, Marine units are on a short tether and are required to
maintain high levels of readiness to respond to emergent major
contingencies and unforeseen crises.
The paucity of operationally available amphibious shipping
negatively impacts home station unit training. Aircraft maintenance
backlogs in the depots contribute to higher over-utilization rates of
available aircraft for needed training and certifications, which in
turn hasten the induction of these aircraft into maintenance cycles.
Training and certification opportunities are diminished as aircraft
maintenance induction rates exceed depot outputs.
Although all major equipment has returned from Afghanistan, the
Marine Corps continues its reconstitution of the whole-of-force after
over a decade of sustained conflict. The Marine Corps will not take an
operational pause to reconstitute; rather, as war-torn equipment is
repaired, returned back to units, and subsequently employed
operationally, the Marine Corps will continue to develop and field
equipment. The evolution of operational maneuver from the sea and ship-
to-objective maneuver requires developing a complimentary portfolio of
ground combat and tactical vehicle capabilities, such as sustaining a
portion of the decades old amphibious assault vehicle and fielding its
intended replacement--the Amphibious Combat Vehicle.

35. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, what is
your assessment of the global security environment, and how much risk
is this nation accepting based on cuts to our military and reduced
readiness levels?
Admiral Greenert. Today's world is more complex, uncertain and
turbulent, and this trend will likely continue. We face an environment
in which our adversaries' capabilities are modernizing and expanding,
and the ongoing development and fielding of anti-access/area denial
(A2/AD) capabilities challenge our global maritime access. The
environment is also marked by continued threats from expanding and
evolving terrorist and criminal networks, the increasing frequency and
intensity of maritime territorial disputes, and threats to maritime
commerce, particularly the flow of energy.
The cumulative effect of budget shortfalls over these past three
years has forced the Navy to accept significant risk in key mission
areas, notably if the military is confronted with a technologically
advanced adversary or forced to deny the objective of an opportunistic
aggressor in a second region while engaged in a major contingency. By
``risk,'' we mean that some of our platforms will arrive late to the
combat zone, and engage in conflict without the benefit of markedly
superior combat systems, sensors and networks, or desired levels of
munitions inventories. In real terms, this means longer timelines to
achieve victory, more military and civilian lives lost, and potentially
less credibility to deter adversaries and assure allies in the future.
The fiscal year 2016 Navy budget submission, including OCO, sets us
on a course to restore our readiness over time, particularly to rebuild
our capacity to surge forces for contingency operations. However, we
continue to accept risk in two mission areas specified by the Defense
Strategic Guidance: (1) Deter and Defeat Aggression and (2) Project
Power despite Anti-Access/Area (A2/AD) Challenges, primarily as the
result of reduced procurement of aircraft, slowed ship and aircraft
modernization and decreased ordnance deliveries.
General Dunford. The Global Security Environment. The current
operating environment is volatile and complex. It is marked by a
growing demand for Marine capabilities ranging from Amphibious Ready
Groups/Marine Expeditionary Units (ARG/MEUs) and Special Purpose MAGTFs
to Marines at embassies. There are no indications that the future will
be any less challenging or that the demand for Marines will decrease.
Threats will continue to include the proliferation of modern
conventional, asymmetric, and cyber weapons, violent extremism,
transnational crime, and piracy. Sources of conflict will include
water, energy and food scarcity, weak governments resulting in
ungoverned spaces, territorial and tribal disputes, and regional
competition. Due to geography and demographics, the most likely
locations for conflict will be in and around the littorals where our
naval forces are uniquely capable of responding. The realities of
reduced defense spending and an increasingly volatile and unpredictable
global security environment presents tough choices for the services and
what the nation wants its military to do.
Risk. The Marine Corps is operating at an elevated risk level in
meeting the tenants of the defense strategy. At funding below the
President's Budget request, we would not have adequate forward presence
to assure allies or respond to crisis in the manner needed. The defense
strategy requires a sustained ability to deter aggression, operate
effectively across all domains, and respond decisively to emerging
crises and contingencies. The Marine Corps, as the nation's
expeditionary-force-in-readiness, does this by defending the homeland
with forward presence. Under sequestration, there will be less forward
deployed forces resulting in increased risk to our national security
interests.

36. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, how has
sequestration impacted your ability to sustain readiness and at the
same time invest in modernization?
Admiral Greenert. Sequestration in fiscal year 2013 resulted in a
$9B shortfall in Navy's budget as compared to the PB 2013 submission.
This instance of sequestration was not just a disruption; it created
readiness consequences from which we are still recovering, particularly
in ship and aircraft maintenance, fleet response capacity, and
excessive deployment lengths. In combination with the impacts of the
fiscal year 2013 Continuing Resolution, this compelled us to reduce
both afloat and ashore operations, and create ship and aircraft
maintenance backlogs.
Shortfalls caused by the fiscal year 2013 sequestration remain in a
number of areas and the Navy is still working to recover from them.
Assuming a stable budget and no major contingencies for the foreseeable
future, it is possible to recover from the maintenance backlogs that
have accumulated from the high operational tempo over the last decade
of war and the additional effects of sequestration by approximately
2018 for CSGs and approximately 2020 for ARGs.
Deferments in PB-16 compound modernization delays we were compelled
to accept in PB-15 due to budget constraints. To budget for procurement
and modernization for ships and aircraft, Navy was compelled to defer
some purchases to future years, further reducing the capacity of
weapons and aircraft, slow, shorten and delay modernization plans; and
reduce quantities of ordnance procurement; and delay upgrades to all
but the most critical shore infrastructure.
PB-15 represented another iterative reduction from the resources
necessary to fully resource the Defense Strategic Guidance missions,
making Navy less ready to successfully Deter and Defeat Aggression and
Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) Challenges.
Continuing along this budget trajectory means that by 2020, Navy will
not have recovered sufficient contingency response capacity to execute
large-scale operations in one region, while simultaneously deterring
another adversary's aggression elsewhere. Also, we will lose our
advantage over adversaries in key warfighting areas such as Anti-
Surface Warfare, Anti-Submarine Warfare, Air-to-Air Warfare, and
Integrated Air and Missile Defense.
General Dunford. Today, approximately half of the Marine Corps'
home station units are at an unacceptable level of readiness.
Investment in the future is less than what is required, and
infrastructure sustainment is budgeted below the Department of Defense
standard. Additionally, the deployment-to-dwell time ratio is being
maintained at a very challenging level. The operating forces are
deploying for up to 7 months and returning home for 14 or less months
before redeploying. Additionally, the Marine Corps has significantly
reduced many of the programs that have helped to maintain morale and
family readiness through over a decade of war. These are some of the
damages to date caused by sequestration and lower funding levels.
The fiscal year 2016 President's Budget is the bare bones budget
for the Marine Corps that can meet the current Defense Strategic
Guidance. The budget prioritizes near-term readiness at the expense of
modernization and facilities, and only achieves a 1 to 2 deployment to
dwell ratio, which is unsustainable over the long term. Another round
of sequestration would force the Marine Corps to significantly degrade
the readiness of our home station units, which is the Marine Corps'
Ready Force to respond to crises or major combat operations. The fiscal
challenges we face today will be further exacerbated by assuming even
more risk in long-term modernization and infrastructure in order to
maintain ready forces forward. This is not sustainable and degrades our
capacity as the Nation's force-in-readiness.

37. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, how do
lower readiness levels and a smaller force impact our ability to deter
aggression?
Admiral Greenert. The cumulative effect of budget shortfalls has
forced Navy to accept significant risk in key mission areas, notably if
the military is confronted with a technologically advanced adversary or
forced to deny the objective of an opportunistic aggressor in a second
region while engaged in a major contingency. This means that some of
our platforms will arrive late to the combat zone and engage in
conflict without the benefit of markedly superior combat systems,
sensors and networks, or munitions inventories that are below desired
levels. This means longer timelines to arrive and prevail, more ships
and aircraft out of action in battle, more sailors, marines, and
merchant mariners killed, and less credibility to deter adversaries and
assure allies in the future.
Lower readiness levels and a smaller force would degrade both our
capability and capacity to deter aggression. Limiting our ability to
provide sustained global presence with combat ready forces, where it
matters, when it matters, will challenge our ability to deliver
overpowering warfighting capabilities that can deter aggression. Navy
presence is critical, not only for the immediate response that ready,
maritime forces can deliver, but also through their ongoing
contributions to the Combatant Commanders' theater campaign plans.
Additional warfighting capacity, particularly to meet contingency
response requirements, requires sustaining the readiness of non-
deployed forces.
General Dunford. The Marine Corps is operating with elevated risk
in meeting the tenants of the defense strategy. At funding below the
President's Budget request, we would have less readiness and inadequate
forward presence to assure allies or respond to crisis in the manner
needed. The defense strategy requires a sustained ability to deter
aggression, operate effectively across all domains, and respond
decisively to emerging crises and contingencies. The Marine Corps, as
the nation's expeditionary-force-in-readiness, does this by defending
the homeland with forward presence. Smaller, less ready forces will
produce fewer forward deployed forces, resulting in increased risk to
our national security interests.

38. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, if those
forces are not ready, what is the impact on executing combatant
commander operational plans?
Admiral Greenert. If sufficient numbers of our contingency response
forces are not ready, there will be a delay in Navy's ability to fully
support the Combatant Commanders' Operational Plans (OPLANs) in some
cases.
The cumulative effect of budget shortfalls has forced Navy to
accept significant risk in key mission areas, notably if the military
is confronted with a technologically advanced adversary or forced to
deny the objective of an opportunistic aggressor in a second region
while engaged in a major contingency. This means that some of our
platforms will arrive late to the combat zone and engage in conflict
without the benefit of markedly superior combat systems, sensors and
networks, or munitions inventories that are below desired levels. This
means longer timelines to arrive and prevail, more ships and aircraft
out of action in battle, more sailors, marines, and merchant mariners
killed, and less credibility to deter adversaries and assure allies in
the future.
General Dunford. Maintaining the readiness of our forward deployed
forces during a period of high operational tempo while amidst fiscal
uncertainty; as well as fiscal decline, comes with ever increasing
operational and programmatic risk. Today, approximately half of the
Marine Corps' home-station units are at an unacceptable level of
readiness in their ability to execute wartime missions, respond to
unexpected crises, and surge for major contingencies. Furthermore, the
ability of non-deployed units to conduct full spectrum operations
continues to degrade as home-station personnel and equipment are
sourced to protect and project the readiness of deployed and next-to-
deploy units. As the Nation's first responders, the Marine Corps' home-
stationed units are expected to be at or near the same high state of
readiness as our deployed units, since these non-deployed units will
provide the capacity to respond with the capability required
(leadership and training) in the event of unexpected crises and or
major contingencies.
Despite this challenge and imbalance, the Marine Corps continues to
provide units ready and responsive to meet core and assigned missions
in support of all directed current operational, crisis, and contingency
requirements. However, we continue to assume long-term risk
particularly in supporting major contingencies in order to fund unit
readiness in the near term. Consequently, the Marine Corps' future
capacity for crisis response and major contingency response is likely
to be significantly reduced. Quite simply, if those units are not ready
due to lack of training, equipment or manning, it could mean a delayed
response to resolve a contingency or to execute an operational plan,
both of which create unacceptable risk for our national defense
strategy as well as risk to mission accomplishment and to the force as
a whole. It means more lives lost because America's fighting men and
women were not as ready as they should have been.

39. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, if a
major or even minor contingency operation were executed today given
your current state of readiness and current global commitments, is it
possible the Navy or the Marine Corps would have to send forces into
combat that are not fully trained and ready?
Admiral Greenert. Navy will not send forces forward into combat
until they have completed essential training, maintenance, and other
readiness requirements. The cumulative effect of budget shortfalls,
however, has forced Navy to accept significant risk in key mission
areas, notably if the military is confronted with a technologically
advanced adversary or forced to deny the objective of an opportunistic
aggressor in a second region while engaged in a major contingency. This
means that some of our platforms will arrive late to the combat zone
and engage in conflict without the benefit of markedly superior combat
systems, sensors and networks, or munitions inventories that are below
desired levels. In real terms, this means longer timelines to achieve
victory, more military and civilian lives lost, and potentially less
credibility to deter adversaries and assure allies in the future.
For minor contingencies, the Navy will respond within required
timelines by reallocating currently deployed units and/or employing our
limited, but ready, contingency response capacity today.
General Dunford. Although we are committed to generating ready
forces, a strategic surprise or another situation of vital national
interest may erupt where national leaders order the deployment of
forces that are not sufficiently manned, trained, and equipped--
essentially not fully ready for the mission.
- The Marine Corps continues to provide ready and responsive
units to meet core and assigned missions in support of all
directed current operational, crisis, and contingency
requirements.
- Maintaining the readiness of our forward deployed forces
during a period of high operational tempo amidst fiscal
uncertainty, as well as fiscal decline, comes with ever
increasing operational and programmatic risk.
- Today, approximately half of the Marine Corps' home-station
units are at an unacceptable level of readiness in their
ability to execute wartime missions, respond to unexpected
crises, and surge for major contingencies
- As the Nation's first responders, the Marine Corps' home-
stationed units are expected to be at or near the same high
state of readiness as our deployed units. These non-deployed
units will provide the capacity to respond with the capability
required (leadership and training) in the event of unexpected
crises and or major contingencies.

40. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, would you
please provide complete inventory of aircraft and ship munitions and
shortages?
Admiral Greenert. [Deleted.]
General Dunford. [Deleted.]
joint standoff weapons
41. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert, what has changed to make
JSOWs no longer necessary to the Navy's requirements?
Admiral Greenert. [Deleted.]

42. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert, what will be the total
inventory of JSOWs if the program is terminated in fiscal year 2016?
Admiral Greenert. The total DON JSOW inventory, including 200
weapons projected to be procured in fiscal year 2015, will be 4,600
weapons. The variants are broken out as follows:
JSOW A - 1,455
JSOW C - 1,453
JSOW C-1 - 1,692

43. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert, is the inventory enough to
meet all combatant commander wartime requirements?
Admiral Greenert. The DON JSOW inventory is sufficient to meet
wartime requirements. The Department's assessment is informed by the
fiscal year 2015 Naval Munitions Requirement Planning (NMRP) modeling
process.

44. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert, is there an existing weapon
that can replace the JSOWs' capability, and if not, what is the plan to
replace that lost capability?
Admiral Greenert. [Deleted.]
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
virginia-class submarines
45. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Greenert, what percentage of combatant
commander requests for attack submarines is currently being met by the
Navy?
Admiral Greenert. Navy is currently sourcing approximately 55
percent of Combatant Commander requests for attack submarines in fiscal
year 2015.
Navy projects we will source approximately 57 percent of Combatant
Commander requests for attack submarines in fiscal year 2016.

46. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Greenert, in light of the activities
and advances of our potential adversaries, as well as the threats we
will confront, do you see the need for attack submarines increasing or
decreasing?
Admiral Greenert. Combatant Commander (CCDR) requests for attack
submarines will continue to increase as other countries expand their
capacity and capabilities in the undersea domain. The Navy will only
meet about 60 percent of CCDR demand in fiscal year 2016, and sourcing
will become more challenging as the number of attack submarines decline
below the 48 SSN requirement in the 2020s.
PB-16 continues our ongoing effort to addresses this SSN shortfall
through multiple parallel efforts:
Continuing procurement of two Virginia-class
submarines per year, resulting in an inventory of 22 Virginia-
class submarines (51 total SSNs of all types) by 2020;
Reducing the construction span of Virginia-class
submarines;
Extending the service lives of select attack
submarines (SSN 688s) with the potential to eliminate 10-15
attack submarine (SSN) years from the SSN shortfall of 51
years; and
Funding Virginia Payload Module (VPM) RDT&E and SCN to
accelerate inclusion of VPM on at least one Virginia-Class
Block V SSN per year in fiscal years 2019 and 2020. VPM will
enable Virginia-class SSNs to mitigate the loss of SSGN strike
capacity as they begin to retire in 2026. VPM will more than
triple the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) Block IV strike
capacity of a Virginia-class SSN from 12 to 40 missiles.

47. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, how
important is it that Congress provide reliable and sufficient funding
so that the Navy can fully implement the Block Four MYP contract for 10
Virginia-class submarines (2 per year)?
Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The Virginia-class Submarine (VCS)
program is successfully proceeding at the two-per-year pace that began
in fiscal year 2011. PB16 includes funding for two VCS from fiscal year
2016 to fiscal year 2020, which is required to mitigate the attack
submarine shortfall below the minimum 48 SSNs in the late 2020's. The
Navy awarded the VCS Block IV contract in April 2014 for ten ships from
fiscal year 2014 to fiscal year 2018. The savings realized with a
multi-year procurement (MYP) construction contract was over $2 billion,
effectively getting ten ships for the price of nine as opposed to
building the same ships under a more traditional annual procurement
arrangement. Reliable and sufficient funding is critical to mitigate
the attack submarine shortfall and achieve the savings realized with a
MYP construction contract.

ship and submarine building
48. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, I
understand that the Navy proposes building 19 ships and submarines in
fiscal year 2016. How would that number decline if defense
sequestration returns fully, and what specific ships would be cut?
Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The proposed 19 ships and
submarines include the following: Large Surface Combatants (2); Small
Surface Combatants (3); Attack Submarines (2); Amphibious Warfare Ships
(1); Combat Logistics Force (1); Aircraft Carrier Refueling (1);
Amphibious Warfare Ship Service Live Extension Program (SLEP) (4);
Surface Support (5). A return to sequestration in fiscal year 2016
would necessitate a revisit and revision of the Defense Strategic
Guidance. Required cuts will force us to further delay critical
warfighting capabilities, reduce readiness of forces needed for
contingency response, further downsize weapons capacity, and forego or
stretch procurement of ships and submarines, only if necessary. We will
be unable to mitigate the shortfalls like we did in fiscal year 2013
because prior-year investment balances were depleted under fiscal year
2013 sequestration.
Because of their irreversibility, force structure cuts represent
options of last resort for the Navy. Disruptions in naval ship design
and construction plans are significant because of the long-lead time,
specialized skills, and extent of integration needed to build military
ships. Because ship construction can span up to nine years, program
procurement cancelled in fiscal year 2016 will not be felt by the
Combatant Commanders until several years later when the size of the
battle force begins to shrink as those ships are not delivered to the
fleet at the planned time. Likewise, cancelled procurement in fiscal
year 2016 will likely cause some suppliers and vendors of our
shipbuilding industrial base to close their businesses. Further budget
reductions will have a negative impact on the U.S. economy as workers
directly employed in the U.S. shipbuilding and repair industry in 2014
totaled 147,000. This total includes 31,000 workers at Naval Shipyards,
61,000 at yards with Navy new construction work, and 55,000 at the
remaining shipbuilding and repair yards. This skilled, experienced, and
innovative workforce cannot be easily replaced and it could take years
to recover from layoffs and shutdowns; and even longer if critical
infrastructure is lost. As a result, the Navy is committed to
protecting the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) appropriation
that funds force structure and SCN will only be reduced as a last
resort option for the Navy. Stability and predictability are critical
to the health and sustainment of this vital sector of our Nation's
industrial capacity.

49. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, what
would be the long-term impact of those reductions?
Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. A return to sequestration in fiscal
year 2016 would necessitate a revisit and revision of the Defense
Strategic Guidance. Required cuts will force us to further delay
critical warfighting capabilities, reduce readiness of forces needed
for contingency response, further downsize weapons capacity, and forego
or stretch procurement of ships and submarines only if necessary. We
will be unable to mitigate the shortfalls like we did in fiscal year
2013 because prior-year investment balances were depleted under fiscal
year 2013 sequestration.
Because of their irreversibility, force structure cuts represent
options of last resort for the Navy. Disruptions in naval ship design
and construction plans are significant because of the long-lead time,
specialized skills, and extent of integration needed to build military
ships. Because ship construction can span up to nine years, program
procurement cancelled in fiscal year 2016 will not be felt by the
Combatant Commanders until several years later when the size of the
battle force begins to shrink as those ships are not delivered to the
fleet at the planned time. Likewise, cancelled procurement in fiscal
year 2016 will likely cause some suppliers and vendors of our
shipbuilding industrial base to close their businesses. Further budget
reductions will have a negative impact on the U.S. economy as workers
directly employed in the U.S. shipbuilding and repair industry in 2014
totaled 147,000. This total includes 31,000 workers at Naval Shipyards,
61,000 at yards with Navy new construction work, and 55,000 at the
remaining shipbuilding and repair yards. This skilled, experienced and
innovative workforce cannot be easily replaced and it could take years
to recover from layoffs and shutdowns; and even longer if critical
infrastructure is lost. As a result, the Navy is committed to
protecting the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) appropriation
that funds force structure and SCN will only be reduced as a last
resort option for the Navy. Stability and predictability are critical
to the health and sustainment of this vital sector of our Nation's
industrial capacity.

50. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, it would
be very difficult to make-up for those lost ships and submarines?
Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. A return to sequestration in fiscal
year (FY) 2016 would necessitate a revisit and revision of the Defense
Strategic Guidance. Required cuts will force us to further delay
critical warfighting capabilities, reduce readiness of forces needed
for contingency response, further downsize weapons capacity, and forego
or stretch procurement of ships and submarines only if necessary. We
will be unable to mitigate the shortfalls like we did in fiscal year
2013 because prior-year investment balances were depleted under fiscal
year 2013 sequestration.
Because of their irreversibility, force structure cuts represent
options of last resort for the Navy. Disruptions in naval ship design
and construction plans are significant because of the long-lead time,
specialized skills, and extent of integration needed to build military
ships. Because ship construction can span up to nine years, program
procurement cancelled in fiscal year 2016 will not be felt by the
Combatant Commanders until several years later when the size of the
battle force begins to shrink as those ships are not delivered to the
fleet at the planned time. Likewise, cancelled procurement in fiscal
year 2016 will likely cause some suppliers and vendors of our
shipbuilding industrial base to close their businesses. Further budget
reductions will have a negative impact on the U.S. economy as workers
directly employed in the U.S. shipbuilding and repair industry in 2014
totaled 147,000. This total includes 31,000 workers at Naval Shipyards,
61,000 at yards with Navy new construction work, and 55,000 at the
remaining shipbuilding and repair yards. This skilled, experienced and
innovative workforce cannot be easily replaced and it could take years
to recover from layoffs and shutdowns; and even longer if critical
infrastructure is lost. As a result, the Navy is committed to
protecting the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) appropriation
that funds force structure and SCN will only be reduced as a last
resort option for the Navy. Stability and predictability are critical
to the health and sustainment of this vital sector of our Nation's
industrial capacity.
ohio-class submarines
51. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Greenert, in your prepared statement,
you discuss your concerns regarding the ability of the Navy to ``fund
the Ohio replacement ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) program'' with
current and projected resources. You say that the ``Navy cannot procure
the Ohio replacement in the 2020s within historical shipbuilding
funding levels without severely impacting other Navy programs.'' If
additional funding is not provided for the procurement of the Ohio
replacement, what specific impact will it potentially have on other
important Navy programs?
Admiral Greenert. The Ohio Replacement (OR) SSBN is our highest
priority program and we are committed to executing the program to its
current schedule. Without increased shipbuilding funding in fiscal year
2021 and beyond, OR SSBN funding will consume the majority of Navy's
annual shipbuilding budget, and degrade other shipbuilding programs.
Appropriations for SSBN recapitalization are historically consistent
with the last period of SSBN procurement between 1974 and 1990.
Within the Navy's current and projected resources, the OR SSBN
would consume about half of the shipbuilding funding available in a
given year--and would do so for a period of over a decade. The
significant drain on available shipbuilding resources would manifest in
reduced procurement quantities in the remaining capital ship programs.
Therefore, additional resources for shipbuilding will likely be
required during this period.
Since the CVN funding requirements are driven by the statutory
requirement to maintain eleven CVNs, and accounting for one OR SSBN per
year (starting in fiscal year 2026), there would only be about half of
the resources normally available to procure the Navy's remaining
capital ships. At these projected funding levels, Navy would be limited
to on average, as few as two other capital ships (SSN, DDG, CG, LPD,
LHA, etc.) per year throughout this decade.
Such low shipbuilding rates for an extended period of time would
result in a battle force inadequately sized to meet our naval
requirements in support of the DSG. Further, there is significant risk
to the industrial base in this case since low production rates outside
of the SSBN and CVN production lines may not provide adequate work to
keep shipyards operating at minimum sustaining levels and could result
in shipyard closures. Navy's ability to recover Fast Attack Submarine,
Large Surface Combatant, Small Surface Combatant and Amphibious Force
inventories lost during the decade and a half in which the SSBNs were
being procured would be challenged, particularly in those parts of the
industrial base permitted to atrophy during this period.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
pivot to the asia-pacific region
52. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Mabus and General Dunford, in our
Strategic Pivot to the Pacific, Navy and Marine Corps assets play a
vital role in providing constant presence in the region that is often
described by the phrase ``tyranny of distance.'' However, with just
over 300 ships in the fleet by 2012 and a smaller than desired Marine
Corps, it strikes me that budget challenges might be driving strategy.
In a budget constrained environment, like the one we are in, what are
your top priories in the pivot to the Asia-Pacific region?
Mr. Mabus. Our rebalance to the Pacific continues to be an
important part of our partnership efforts. We must have the right
platforms in the right places to ensure our friends and allies
understand our commitment. The Marine Corps continues to execute the
Guam Master Plan submitted to Congress in July 2014 which will provide
a holisitic and operationally-responsive Marine Corps Air Ground Task
Force capability on Guam. The Navy is moving more ships to the central
and western Pacific, including forward basing an additional fast attack
submarine in Guam and forward stationing four Littoral Combat Ships out
of Singapore. We are ensuring that our most advanced platforms are in
the Pacific, so we're increasing the number of DDG's with the Ballistic
Missile Defense systems based in Japan and the P-8A maritime patrol
aircraft are making their first rotational deployments in the region.
In the longer term, by 2018, we will deploy an additional Amphibious
Ready Group to the Asia-Pacific region and we will deploy a growing
number of Joint High Speed Vessels and Mobile Landing Platforms there.
With these changes, and others, our presence will assure allies, shape
behavior, and deter conflict.
General Dunford. The nature of the pivot itself, duration,
complexity, and a combination of reciprocal and sequential tasks makes
it difficult to pinpoint one, or even a couple, top priorities. The
Marine Corps' top priority has always been, and will always be,
maintaining a forward deployed force that is most ready when the nation
is least ready. To meet that commitment to the American people, the
Marine Corps must, on a day to day basis be forward deployed, forward
engaged, and prepared for crisis response, while maintaining readiness
to respond in the event of a major contingency. Our operational
imperatives remain our top priorities throughout the process of
realigning our force structure in the Asia-Pacific.

53. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Mabus and General Dunford, can you
fully execute this Asia-Pacific region under sequestration?
Mr. Mabus. A return to sequestration in fiscal year 2016 would
necessitate a revisit and revision of the Defense Strategic Guide
(DSG). We would be unable to sufficiently meet two of the ten missions
in the DSG: Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges
and Deter and Defeat Aggression. In addition, we would be forced to
accept higher risk in five other DSG missions: Counter Terrorism and
Irregular Warfare; Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil
Authorities; Provide a Stabilizing Presence; Conduct Stability and
Counterinsurgency Operations; and Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster
Relief, and Other Operations. Additionally, at sequestration levels the
risk to our readiness will be exacerbated and the condition of our
infrastructure, including piers, runways, and mission-critical
facilities, will further erode. This situation may lead to greater risk
of mishaps, serious injury, or health hazards to personnel.
General Dunford. A return to sequestration in fiscal year 2016
would impact the Marine Corps' ability to execute the pivot through its
effect on MILCON, as the pivot relies on rebasing Marines in Guam and
Hawaii, and MILCON is an important part of those moves. Impacts to
MILCON due to sequestration, including MILCON in the Pacific, would
need to be part of a larger conversation about the priorities of the
Department and the defense strategy under a sequestered budget.
Specifically in fiscal year 2016 the construction of the Live Fire
Training Range Complex (LFTRC), $126M, would not commence.
arctic challenges and icebreaking
54. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Mabus, last week, Secretary of
Defense Ashton B. Carter and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Martin E. Dempsey, USA, testified before this committee. I
asked them about Russian activities in the Arctic and I referenced a
recent news report which shows a rapidly increasing Russian military
involvement in the Arctic. In fact, the Russians have begun
constructing as many as 13 new airfields and conducting Long-Range Air
Patrols with their Bear-Bombers, some off the coast of Alaska, creating
a new ``Arctic Command'' and even activating an Arctic Brigade, and
building 6 new icebreakers, with 5 more planned, to add to their 40 at
this point. Importantly, Newsweek also recently reported that ``Nuclear
units in the Russian Navy have engaged in exercises in the
international waters underneath the North Pole.'' Meanwhile, we have a
13-page Arctic Strategy, a handful of icebreakers and not a lot of
action in the Arctic. From the Navy's perspective, how are we not
falling behind in the Arctic and failing to live up to our 13-page
Arctic Strategy?
Mr. Mabus. As part of the near-term strategy, the DON is partnering
closely with OSD and the Combatant Commanders to identify warfighting
requirements to determine the appropriate timing for future capability
investments.
The Navy recognizes that the opening of the Arctic Ocean has
important national security implications and fully supports the U.S.
Coast Guard's (USCG) efforts to modernize its icebreaking fleet and
increase Arctic capabilities.
We have sufficient capability to meet near-term operational needs.
The U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014-2030 outlines the Navy's strategic
approach for the Arctic Region and the ways and means to achieve the
desired national end state. In support of Department of Defense Arctic
Strategy, the U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014-2030 outlines deliberate
and measured steps to achieve four strategic objectives over the near-
term (2014-2020), mid-term (2020-2030), and far-term (beyond 2030)
timeframes:
1) Ensure United States Arctic sovereignty and provide homeland
defense
2) Provide ready naval forces
3) Preserve freedom of the seas
4) Promote partnerships
Through annual and biennial exercises like ARCTIC ZEPHYR, COLD
RESPONSE, and BALTOPS, we engage with our Artic partners, including
Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.

55. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Mabus, what are the obstacles to
adding icebreakers to the Navy's fleet, especially given the Navy's
Arctic responsibility to keep Arctic sea lanes open?
Mr. Mabus. Congress assigned responsibility for icebreaking to the
USCG per 14 U.S. Code Sec. 2-Primary duties, which states, ``the Coast
Guard shall develop, establish, maintain, and operate with due regard
to the requirements of national defense, aids to maritime navigation,
icebreaking facilities, and rescue facilities for the promotion of
safety on, under, and over the high seas and waters subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States.''
The Navy recognizes that the opening of the Arctic Ocean has
important national security implications and fully supports the U.S.
Coast Guard's (USCG) efforts to modernize its icebreaking fleet and
increase Arctic capabilities.

56. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Mabus, with a non-bureaucratic
answer that shifts the responsibility to the Department of Homeland
Security, how is the Navy going to acquire additional icebreaking
capacity in the future and what will they do if they do not get it?
Mr. Mabus. Current Navy capabilities are sufficient to meet near-
term operational needs. The Navy recognizes, however, that the opening
of the Arctic Ocean has important national security implications and
fully supports the U.S. Coast Guard's (USCG) efforts to modernize its
icebreaking fleet and increase Arctic capabilities. The USCG Cutter
POLAR STAR's recent reactivation will provide the U.S. with heavy
icebreaker capability for about another seven to ten years. POLAR STAR,
along with the medium icebreaker USCG Cutter HEALY, provide the minimum
capability necessary to address the Nation's near term icebreaking
needs and will provide the USCG time to assess longer term national
needs and requirements.
In accordance with the U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap, in the near-term
the Navy will refine or develop the necessary strategy, policy, plans
and requirements for the Arctic Region. Additionally, the Navy will
continue to study and make informed decisions on pursuing investments
to better facilitate Arctic operations.

marine training the joint pacific alaska range complex
57. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, in your testimony, you talk
about the Marine Corps' effort to be good stewards and maintain
training ranges and air and sea maneuver corridors. I've trained in the
Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC) and we have plenty of space.
Our ground space is the size of Delaware, our air space is the size of
Florida, and our sea space is the size of Virginia. What are the
obstacles, if any, for the Marine Corps to do more training in the
JPARC, especially cold weather and mountainous training?
General Dunford. The Marine Corps already has a robust cold weather
and mountain training area with installation and logistic
infrastructure supporting operations and training requirements. The
Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center (MCMWTC), Pickel Meadows,
CA, is easily accessible, cost effective, and fully capable of meeting
Marine Corps mountain and cold weather training requirements. We
currently execute 6 service level training exercises, Mountain Exercise
(MTX), annually onboard MCMWTC.
Comparatively, training at MCMWTC is significantly more cost
effective than it would be at JPARC. For example, any element of the
1stMarine Division, one third of the USMC's Ground Combat Element
(GCE), can travel, via ground, to MWTC in one day. Travel to JPARC is
nearly cost prohibitive, so much so that Army Rangers have been sending
companies to MTX at MCMWTC for the last year and intend to continue
doing so for the coming years. MTX has a mature intelligence driven
scenario run by Exercise Control (EXCON) staff. MWTC also incorporates
Special Operation Forces (SOF), company sized opposing force,
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), and Simulated
Close Air Support (SIMCAS) into every MTX at no additional cost to the
battalion.

58. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, what should I or Alaskan
Command do to make JPARC more attractive and accessible to Marine Corps
training?
General Dunford. The primary obstacles to conducting training at
JPARC are the costs, in both time and dollars, associated with
transiting to the training areas. The Marine Corps Mountain Warfare
Training Center (MCMWTC), Pickel Meadows, CA, is easily accessible,
cost effective, and fully capable of meeting Marine Corps mountain and
cold weather training requirements. We currently execute 6 service
level training exercises, Mountain Exercise (MTX), annually onboard
MCMWTC. It is designed and staffed to facilitate Marine Corps training.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
decommissioning of helicopter sea combat squadrons
59. Senator Nelson. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, in
regards to the Navy's plan to decommission Helicopter Sea Combat (HSC)
squadrons, if the mitigation strategy is to use existing Active Duty
squadrons not already dedicated to special operations support, how will
the Navy fully support the rotary wing needs of expeditionary and
carrier strike groups to which these squadrons are already assigned?
Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. We conducted a comprehensive
program review of expeditionary and carrier strike group rotary wing
requirements and determined that it was necessary to divest from all
activities that did not directly support those missions. This includes
dedicated rotary wing support to Special Operations Forces (SOF). As a
result, requests for helicopter support to special operations will be
addressed through the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP)
process to match available Joint and Navy resources with the highest
priority requirements. If dedicated Navy helicopter support to SOF is
required and prioritized through the GFMAP, then we may have to assume
risk in other missions.

60. Senator Nelson. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, what is
the Navy's assessment of the increase in risk associated with using
less experienced aviators than those aviators in the units scheduled
for decommissioning in supporting special operations--some of the most
dangerous flight regimes flown by rotary wing aviators today?
Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. Special Operations Forces (SOF)
support capability currently resides as a mission subset of the
Helicopter Sea Combat (HSC) community. As a risk mitigation strategy,
the Navy will leverage the experience and expertise of HSC 84 and 85
personnel by transitioning a cadre of the most seasoned aircrew to
Tactical Support Units (TSU) resident with the HSC type wings. These
seasoned aviators will in turn instruct aircrews on SOF support mission
specifics thereby reducing risk to future SOF support missions. The
Navy will maintain the ability to provide limited support with active
duty HSC squadrons in accordance with existing Navy general purpose
force requirements.

61. Senator Nelson. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, what is
the Navy's plan to recruit and maintain a Reserve of rotary wing
aviators and maintainers now that the Navy Reserve will have just one
rotary wing squadron if HSC-84 and HSC-85 are decommissioned on
schedule?
Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. A personnel transition plan will
coincide with the disestablishment of these squadrons. Navy Reserve
Full Time Support and Selective Reserve personnel may continue to serve
in one of two newly established Helicopter Sea Combat (HSC) Tactical
Support Units (TSU). They may also serve in one of two Fleet
Replacement Squadron (FRS) Squadron Augment Units (SAU) or select
reassignment to other Navy Reserve billets. These TSUs and SAUs will
provide both a mission and viable career path for the current and next
generation of HSC reservists.
littoral combat ship surface fires
62. Senator Nelson. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, given the
debate over the lethality of the LCS, what is the feasibility of using
Mark 75 OTO Malara 76mm guns from the decommissioning Oliver Hazard
Perry-class frigates on LCS instead of the currently used Mark 110 57mm
guns?
Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. As part of the Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) programs, some of the retiring Oliver Hazard Perry-class
Frigates (FFG 7) are being bought by other countries and the 76mm guns
will remain with the ships. The other FFG 7 class ships not part of the
FMS program were either disposed of, or scheduled to be disposed of due
to the poor material condition of the ship.
The Navy analyzed the feasibility of both the 57mm and the 76mm
guns by comparing lethality, procurement cost, training infrastructure,
manning, shipboard maintenance, operations/sustainment costs,
commonality and design change impacts to the ships and their combat
systems.
The Navy's conclusion is reuse of the existing guns on new
construction LCS ships is not advisable based the analysis and the
service life left in these guns.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
navy strike-fighter inventory
63. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Greenert, what impact has the Navy's
strike-fighter shortfall had on training and operations?
Admiral Greenert. The Navy prioritizes and continues to meet
deployed readiness requirements set forth in the Fleet Response
Training Plan (FRTP). Accordingly, the Department carefully monitors
strike-fighter inventory requirements and projected aircraft
availability to meet the requirements for operational deployment.
However, achieving these standards has come at the expense of force
training for operational squadrons in the early stages of the FRTP and
the Fleet Replacement Squadrons responsible for aircrew initial and
refresher training.
The FRTP is based on a structure of tiered readiness that prepares
units for operational deployment. To support more intensive aircraft
maintenance efforts and reduced aircrew training requirements during
the initial FRTP phases, operational squadrons are assigned and operate
fewer aircraft than required for deployment. With an increased number
of strike-fighter aircraft in an out-of-reporting status for planned or
unplanned depot level maintenance, aircraft available for these
squadrons are below their prescribed entitlements. Consequently, their
readiness levels are degraded for lack of training opportunities due to
insufficient aircraft. However, as each strike-fighter squadron
approaches the intermediate and advanced phases of the FRTP, they
receive the full complement of entitled aircraft and complete current
and missed training events required to achieve deployed readiness
standards.
The compound effect of achieving deployed readiness standards in
this manner is an overall reduced readiness posture of the non-deployed
strike fighter-force. This results in a steeper training curve to
maintain deployment readiness and also results in less surge (backup
airwing/squadron) capacity to meet Combatant Command warfighting
requirements. Additionally, this process strains the operational fleet
of aircraft through overutilization in the advanced phases of the FRTP,
which leads to greater service life consumption across the strike-
fighter inventory. Improved depot throughput and careful management of
aircraft utilization will return strike-fighter squadrons to the
optimum readiness profiles across the FRTP, which in turn will improve
non-deployed force readiness.

airborne electronic attack analysis
64. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Greenert, last year the Navy
conducted an analysis of the Navy's electronic attack requirement. This
analysis justified the inclusion of 22 E/A18-G Growlers in the Navy's
fiscal year 2015 unfunded requirements list. A follow-on study is now
determining the electronic attack requirement of the joint force. When
do you expect to have the results of this analysis?
Admiral Greenert. The Navy's on-going study will identify Joint
warfighting requirements, Concept of Employment (CONEMPS) and future
mission sets. The results of this study are expected to be released
this summer and will provide insight that will allow the Department to
determine the necessary force structure to meet Joint Airborne
Electronic Attack (AEA) requirements rather than just those
requirements unique to the Navy.

65. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Greenert, while the analysis is not
yet complete, based on the work that has been done to date, do you have
reason to believe that the final analysis will determine that the joint
requirement would not be greater than the Navy-only requirement?
Admiral Greenert. We have no reason to believe the requirement will
decrease, but until the study is complete I cannot speculate on the
findings. While last year's study focused only on Navy demand, the
current study identifies Joint warfighting requirements, Concept of
Employment (CONEMPS), and future mission sets. The results will provide
insight that will allow the Navy to optimize our EA-18G procurement
plan and force structure to meet all DoD requirements for Airborne
Electronic Attack.
guam
66. Senator McCaskill. General Dunford, the Senate Armed Services
Committee has been particularly concerned about the plans for the
relocation of marines from Okinawa to other locations in the Pacific,
and specifically, the affordability, sustainability and operational
viability of those plans. Can you provide the current status of the
efforts to implement the eventual move of marines from Okinawa to Guam
and other locations?
General Dunford. The nature of the program for the USMC is
characterized by its duration and scope. The scope of the program is
significant, and entails myriad actions prior to Marines moving off of
Okinawa, and the duration is on the order of decades.
The program has experienced some start and stops, but has continued
to move forward. The most noticeable progress has been at MCAS Iwakuni.
Last year we completed the move of VMGR-152 from Okinawa to MCAS
Iwakuni and the base has been and continues to enlarge. CVW-5 is on
track to commence their relocation from Atsugi to Iwakuni in fiscal
year 2017. By the time Iwakuni is finished the base will have nearly
doubled in size and capacity.
Guam and the CJMT have both moved forward. The Supplemental
Environmental Impact Study for Guam, and in the Environmental Impact
Study for the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) Joint
Military Training Complex have progressed. We anticipate a Record of
Decision in the coming months for Guam and summer of 2016 for the CJMT.
These NEPA actions are necessary to commence construction. Our first
project, a range complex in Guam, is in the fiscal year 2016 budget
request. We have also published a Guam master plan, as required by the
NDAA, and are preparing to deliver a Hawaii master plan that will
outline the early stages of preparation for moving Marines to Hawaii as
a part of the realignment.
We continue to conduct rotational deployments to Darwin, Australia
and the fourth rotation of approximately 1,170 Marines and an aviation
detachment has just commenced. The size of the rotation increases apace
of adequate facilities available with the force eventually being 2500
Marines strong.
While there is significant activity off of Okinawa to prepare for
the realignment there is also significant activity on Okinawa. The
Futenma replacement facility and Camp Schwab realignment are underway.
This is a long term project with FOC for the airfield anticipated to be
fiscal year 2025. Political challenges remain but we are pleased to see
construction progressing and resolute commitment for the government of
Japan. The sun will not set on this realignment program until planned
land returns in Okinawa are complete. This is scheduled for FY32. Of
note, the Marine Corps has already returned land in Okinawa and the
most recent return took effect on 31 March of this year, when we
transferred West Futenma housing back to the Japanese.

67. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Mabus, how is the Navy accounting
for the costs of such a realignment that are not captured in the Guam
Master plan, including the costs of additional strategic lift necessary
to move marines around the theater?
Mr. Mabus. The Guam Master Plan includes costs for the construction
of facilities and infrastructure to execute the Marine Corps
Distributed Laydown in Guam. The Guam Master Plan is central to our
broader efforts to rebalance our forces to, and realign them within,
the Asia-Pacific theater.
The Marine Corps is currently executing the Guam Master Plan and is
on track to meet the scheduled milestones and is continuing to refine
costs within the profile defined by the master plan.
The schedule that moves Marines and their gear from Okinawa to Guam
will not be realized until there is a full operational capability for
the USMC forces, which is expected to occur after 2021. The costs for
relocation of the Force to Guam (one way movement of the units) will be
included in the budget submission for the year of execution. The
Department recognizes the critical importance of having sufficient lift
to move Marines around the theater. Funding for this requirement is
part of the DON budget submission and therefore any scheduled lifts
would be included in future year budgets. If there is an event that
requires movement other than scheduled, such that a Strategic Lift is
ordered by a Combatant Commander, the costs would be identified by the
requirements ordered.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
audit readiness
68. Senator Manchin. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and General
Dunford, how do you plan on holding leaders accountable to make sure
your Service is ready for a full financial statement audit by the end
of fiscal year 2017?
General Dunford. Accountability is inherent in command throughout
the Marine Corps. This includes the responsibility for financial
management and is reflected in the Department of the Navy, Marine Corps
Manual and the Marine Corps' Financial Guidebook for Commanders (NAVMC
2664 Rev 1.0). As the first service under financial statement audit
starting in fiscal year 2010, commanders and leaders throughout the
Marine Corps are expected to play a leadership role in achieving a full
financial statement audit. We will hold Marine Corps leaders
accountable for achieving audit objectives, to include all aspects of
financial management, similarly to how we hold leaders accountable for
all other responsibilities inherent to command.
Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. We have given commanders of major
commands the responsibility of making the changes necessary to the
business processes and systems within their purview so that our
Departmental business environment will be audit ready. Coincident with
this increased responsibility, commanders are accountable for results
in financial auditability.
As part of our auditability strategy, we have designated some
commanders as leaders of the auditability efforts in selected
functional areas. For example, one commander was responsible for
preparing Military Payroll for audit, and another has spearheaded audit
readiness in Real Property business operations; another was the lead in
travel expenses. In addition, each command has tested samples of its
own business transactions, determining if they were properly executed
and documented. Below-threshold results require corrective actions and
re-testing.
Responsibility and accountability for reaching the mandated goals
in financial auditability have been placed at the command and
organizational level. Engaging the Department's leaders in this way not
only ensures that audit readiness receives the appropriate priority;
this approach also emphasizes that changes in Departmental business
processes need to occur at the command level, where financial
transactions are generated.

69. Senator Manchin. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and General
Dunford, what do you believe should happen if the Department of Defense
misses that deadline?
Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The Department of the Navy is
executing its plan to achieve financial auditability by the end of
fiscal year 2017, as the Congressional mandate requires. The other
Military Departments, as well as other Defense Department
organizations, also have roadmaps to reach this objective. Should any
organization fail to reach financial audit readiness by the mandated
date, causes for missing the deadline should be identified, shared, and
corrected as soon as possible.
General Dunford. The Marine Corps remains on track to meet the
fiscal year 2017 timeline for full financial statement auditability for
all areas under our control. The Marine Corps would expect that DoD
would share the same philosophy as the Marine Corps of holding leaders
and commanders accountable if we do not achieve our audit objectives by
fiscal year 2017.
______

Question Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
integration of women
70. Senator Shaheen. General Dunford, last fall the Marine Corps
established the Ground Combat Element Integrated Task Force to evaluate
the performance of women in collective tasks in combat units. I
understand that this task force is preparing for evaluation and the
results will be available later this year. Can you discuss the metrics
in which you will evaluate women in order to determine whether or not
they may serve in infantry units?
General Dunford. Throughout this process, the Marine Corps has
maintained a focus on combat effectiveness and combat readiness; the
Marine Corps must ensure that we assign Marines to occupational
specialties and units for which they are best qualified in order to
maintain combat effectiveness and our ability to fulfill the unique
role as the nation's expeditionary force in readiness. Therefore, the
research effort underway is designed to provide the fullest
understanding of all aspects of integration of females into all ground
combat arms units of the Marine Corps, not just infantry units. While
there is an emphasis on the development of gender neutral physical
performance standards for service in these occupational specialties,
the Marine Corps is also developing metrics that encompass
physiological, anthropometric, and non-physical parameters to evaluate
what contributes to successful ground combat arms units and mission
accomplishment.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand
special victims' counsel, retaliation, sexual assault
71. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, in
both 2012 and 2014, 62 percent of victims who reported unwanted sexual
contact indicated they had been retaliated against, socially and
professionally. I am very concerned that nearly two-thirds of survivors
perceive retaliation. To me that says that, whether it is professional
or social retaliation, there is a problem with the command climate and
that needs to be addressed. How do you plan to address this issue?
Admiral Greenert. Sustaining a professionalized response and victim
advocacy system remains the top priority, but preventing sexual
assaults in the first place is an imperative. Our strategy focuses on
improving command climate, strengthening deterrence measures, and
encouraging bystander intervention. To facilitate the latter, we
trained facilitators to lead small, peer-group interactive discussions
using various scenarios. Likewise, we have focused on raising awareness
and accountability regarding retaliation to reduce the potential for
re-victimization. A RAND survey of DoD found that 53 percent of
retaliation is ``social'' or ``peer,'' so we are focusing in on that
area. Navy efforts are aligned with SECDEF direction to enhance first
line supervisor skills and knowledge in recognizing signs of possible
acts of retaliation. Recent Navy survey results show that prevalence of
sexual assaults is decreasing, but we remain fully committed to
creating and sustaining a culture where Sailors understand the
importance of treating Shipmates with dignity and respect at all times,
in all places.
We are collecting and will assess data on reports and
investigations of retaliation. We also use the Survivor Experience
Survey to assess retaliation, and will use the forthcoming Military
Justice Experience Survey similarly. Future survey questions will be
better designed to understand more accurately what the victims
perceived and experienced.
We are providing training and awareness to the Fleet to include
survey results and definitions of retaliation, and reporting options
available to report retaliation. Retaliation has been the focus of
senior leader Fleet engagements and media outreach efforts to ensure
our Sailors understand the issue of retaliation and reprisal. Sexual
Assault Prevention and Response annual training, and modules for First
Line Supervisor training and Pre-Command courses will include
retaliation in the curriculum.
General Dunford. Our current approach to sexual assault prevention,
which includes the prevention of victim retaliation, is built around
the central role of the commander. The commanding officer of every unit
is the centerpiece of an effective and professional warfighting
organization. They are entrusted with our greatest asset--the
individual Marine--and are charged with building and leading their team
to withstand the rigors of combat by establishing the highest level of
trust throughout their unit.
Retaliation was incorporated into the Marine Corps Order (MCO)
1752.5B in 2013, which specifically requires commanders to ``protect
victims of sexual assault from coercion, retaliation, and reprisal.''
Decisive and engaged leadership continues to be our greatest weapon in
the battle against sexual assault. As outlined in MCO 1752.5B,
commanding officers are responsible for creating a command climate that
is non-permissive to sexual assault and protecting victims from
retaliation.
To better address this problem, we recently identified six areas of
focus: strategic communications, training, prevention and response,
research, legal and social media retaliation. Through these six areas
of focus, our goal is to provide a clear framework--within the context
of evidence-based best practices and based on Department of Defense,
Department of the Navy, and Marine Corps policy--that enables us to
effectively raise awareness of this issue; provide the tools for
commanders and all Marines to identify and correct any instances of
retaliation, no matter where it occurs; and prevent retaliation from
occurring in the first place.

72. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, do
you have sufficient resources and authorities to address the problem?
Admiral Greenert. Yes, Navy has sufficient resources and
authorities to address the problem. Programmatic needs are regularly
assessed to ensure that sufficient resources and authorities remain in
place.
General Dunford. Presently we have sufficient resources and
authorities to address the problem. Our efforts are a subset of a
broader effort across the Department of Defense (DOD) and the
Department of the Navy (DON) to address retaliation, and we are working
to implement related provisions of the National Defense Authorization
Act and recommendations of the Response Systems Panel.

73. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, the
Special Victims' Counsel (SVC)/ Victims Legal Counsel Program, which
details a judge advocate to assist and represent sexual assault victims
and help them navigate the military justice system, is an important
step to increasing everyone's confidence in the system. Despite the
downsizing that is taking place across the Services, I understand that
the Air Force was able to increase its number of Air Force judge
advocate slots by 58, the majority of which will be devoted to the
Special Victims' Counsel Program. It is my understanding that the Navy
and Marine Corps have not seen their authorized slots increased. Do you
have enough SVCs to meet your needs?
Admiral Greenert. Based on the current demand level for the Navy
Victims' Legal Counsel Program (VLCP), VLC staffing is appropriate.
There are 31 judge advocates and 10 enlisted Yeoman assigned to VLCP.
The JAG Corps continually assesses demand and locations for VLC
services to ensure Navy is properly manned to respond to victims' legal
needs.
General Dunford. Yes, the Marine Corps currently has enough
victims' counsel to meet our needs. (The Marine Corps refers to this
program as the Victims' Legal Counsel Organization (VLCO), and to the
judge advocates that provide these services as Victims' Legal Counsel
(VLC).) Every major Marine Corps installation has a VLCO office, and to
date, no eligible victim of sexual assault has been turned away from
VLC services. Further, we have Reserve officers to help augment active
duty VLC in supporting victims.
The Marine Corps regularly reviews its personnel structure to
ensure we have the right Marines in the right locations to most
effectively accomplish the Marine Corps mission. I have recently
directed a review of the personnel requirements for Marine judge
advocates. As part of that review, the Staff Judge Advocate to the
Commandant of the Marine Corps will examine the number of personnel
assigned to the VLCO, and make recommendations on whether additional
resources are required.
I am committed to ensuring that the VLCO has the personnel needed
to provide effective assistance to every eligible victim of sexual
assault that seeks assistance from a VLC.

74. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, the
SVC has testified at the Judicial Proceedings Panel on Sexual Assault
and told me that the program needs to be improved. Common criticisms
are that the current appellate process is nonresponsive and
insufficient to protect victims' rights; victim access to information--
including discovery, pleadings and motions--remains inconsistent; and
that there is widespread confusion about procedures for representing
victims in judicial proceedings and for enforcing other victims'
rights. Are you looking at these issues?
Admiral Greenert. Yes. Navy addressed these issues. Specifically,
in January 2015, the Deputy Judge Advocate General of the Navy in his
role as Commander, Naval Legal Service Command, issued a Notice on
Disclosure of Information to Crime Victims, establishing a standardized
policy for disclosure of information to all victims who suffer harm as
a result of an offense under the Uniform Code of Military Justice--
including victims of a sexual assault. Also, in order to standardize
procedures for representing victims in judicial proceedings, Uniform
Rules of Practice for the Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary, including
specific guidance on Victims' Legal Counsel, were promulgated on March
1, 2015. Navy will continue to monitor procedures for representing
victims in judicial proceedings at all stages.
General Dunford. Yes, the Marine Corps has looked at these issues.
The Marine Corps, along with the other Services, recently reviewed how
to improve the integration of Victims' Legal Counsel /Special Victims'
Counsel into the military justice system in light of the experiences of
the first year of operations and additional legislation. Please see the
following attachments that detail current policies and procedures
victims' counsel and the military justice process: Staff Judge Advocate
to the Commandant of the Marine Corps Practice Advisories 4-14, 3-15
and 5-15 and excerpts from the Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary,
Uniform Rules of Practice.
In addition to this formal guidance, the Officer in Charge of the
Victims' Legal Counsel Organization continually updates the Victims'
Legal Counsel staff on best practices for enforcing victims' rights.
Such guidance includes using Article 138 Complaint of Wrong procedures
and other non-judicial enforcement mechanisms.

75. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, what
recommendations do you have to address them?
Admiral Greenert. The Navy continues to pursue a deliberate
strategy in combatting sexual assault. We continue to focus on
preventing sexual assaults, ensuring victims are fully supported,
improving investigation programs and processes, and ensuring
appropriate accountability. These efforts include making sexual assault
forensic exams available on all ships and 24/7 ashore, having a cadre
of professional and credentialed sexual assault response coordinators
and victim advocates, special victim trained investigators and JAGs,
and ensuring commands take all reports of sexual assault seriously and
support the victim. We will enhance our response efforts by full
implementation of deployed resiliency counselors on large deck ships,
enhanced NCIS investigative capability using specially training Master-
at-Arms, and continued legal assistance to victims through our Victims
Legal Counsel program.
Sustaining a professionalized response and victim advocacy system
remains the top priority, but preventing sexual assaults in the first
place is an imperative. Our strategy focuses on improving command
climate, strengthening deterrence measures, and encouraging bystander
intervention. To facilitate the latter, we trained facilitators to lead
small, peer-group interactive discussions using various scenarios.
Likewise, we have focused on raising awareness and accountability
regarding retaliation to reduce the potential for re-victimization. A
RAND survey of DoD found that 53 percent of retaliation is ``social''
or ``peer,'' so we are focusing in on that area. Navy efforts are
aligned with SECDEF direction to enhance first line supervisor skills
and knowledge in recognizing signs of possible acts of retaliation.
Recent Navy survey results show that prevalence of sexual assaults is
decreasing, but we remain fully committed to creating and sustaining a
culture where Sailors understand the importance of treating Shipmates
with dignity and respect at all times, in all places.
General Dunford. These recent developments have significantly
enhanced VLC ability to zealously advocate for victims' rights. The
Marine Corps will continue to evaluate these enhancements and the need
for others so that VLCs have the tools they need to properly represent
victims.

76. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, in
both 2012 and 2014, 62 percent of victims who reported unwanted sexual
contact indicated they had been retaliated against, socially and
professionally. Nearly two-thirds of survivors perceiving retaliation
and zero progress in addressing this problem indicates that there may
be larger issues with the command climate. Since 2012, what policies or
programs have the Navy and Marine Corps implemented to stop
retaliation, and why do you think these programs have failed to reduce
the amount of retaliation perceived by survivors?
Admiral Greenert. One year ago, Secretary Mabus issued a written
order making retaliation against an individual who reported a criminal
offense, a violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).
This past December, the Secretary signed a comprehensive revision of
Military Whistleblower Protections, which: a) prohibits retaliation by
superiors who threaten unfavorable or adverse action, or withhold, or
threaten to withhold, a favorable action; b) defines and prohibits
ostracism, and c) expands the definition of maltreatment.
The Navy continues to pursue a deliberate strategy in combatting
sexual assault. We continue to focus on preventing sexual assaults,
ensuring victims are fully supported, improving investigation programs
and processes, and ensuring appropriate accountability. These efforts
include making sexual assault forensic exams available on all ships and
24/7 ashore, having a cadre of professional and credentialed sexual
assault response coordinators and victim advocates, special victim
trained investigators and JAGs, and ensuring commands take all reports
of sexual assault seriously and support the victim. We will enhance our
response efforts by full implementation of deployed resiliency
counselors on large deck ships, enhanced NCIS investigative capability
using specially training Master-at-Arms, and continued legal assistance
to victims through our Victims Legal Counsel program.
Sustaining a professionalized response and victim advocacy system
remains the top priority, but preventing sexual assaults in the first
place is an imperative. Our strategy focuses on improving command
climate, strengthening deterrence measures, and encouraging bystander
intervention. To facilitate the latter, we trained facilitators to lead
small, peer-group interactive discussions using various scenarios.
Likewise, we have focused on raising awareness and accountability
regarding retaliation to reduce the potential for re-victimization. A
RAND survey of DoD found that 53 percent of retaliation is ``social''
or ``peer,'' so we are focusing in on that area. Navy efforts are
aligned with SECDEF direction to enhance first line supervisor skills
and knowledge in recognizing signs of possible acts of retaliation.
Recent Navy survey results show that prevalence of sexual assaults is
decreasing, but we remain fully committed to creating and sustaining a
culture where Sailors understand the importance of treating Shipmates
with dignity and respect at all times, in all places.
General Dunford. The Marine Corps takes the issues of sexual
assault and retaliation very seriously and has implemented large-scale
initiatives to eliminate these and other damaging behaviors from our
ranks. Specific to retaliation, in 2013, language was inserted into
Marine Corps Order 1752.5B that required commanders to ``protect
victims of sexual assault from coercion, retaliation, and reprisal.''
In addition, ALNAV 030/14 published in April 2014 defined retaliation
as a prohibited criminal offense. On 4 December 2014, Secretary of the
Navy (SECNAV) signed SECNAV Instruction 5370.7D, Military Whistleblower
Protection, which prohibits retaliation against members of the DON who
report a criminal offense.
Since 2012, the Marine Corps has made significant improvements to
our policies, processes, and the overall quality of victim services.
This was part of a holistic approach to sexual assault designed to
reinforce our core values and, by doing so, eliminate the underlying
conditions that lead to sexual assault and other crimes and misconduct,
including retaliation. Future Marine Corps efforts will address
retaliation specifically, with initiatives centering on the following
six areas of focus: strategic communications, training, prevention and
response, research, legal and social media retaliation. However, we
will continue our holistic approach to sexual assault, which has worked
thus far to reduce sexual assault prevalence and increase reporting
rates.

77. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford,
Congress legislated that retaliation is a crime under the Uniform Code
of Military Justice. Are Marine Corps and Navy commanders using the
full military justice toolkit provided by the Uniform Code of Military
Conduct to reduce retaliation and maintain good order and discipline?
In your response, please provide military justice statistics related to
retaliation in fiscal year 2014 that includes: (a) the number of
sailors and marines that were counselled or received letters of
reprimand for retaliation, and whether any servicemember receiving
counselling or letters of reprimand were senior noncommissioned
officers or officers; (b) the number of servicemembers receiving non-
judicial punishment for retaliation, and whether any were officers or
senior noncommissioned officers; (c) the number of sailors and marines
administratively separated for retaliation and the characterization of
their discharges; and (d) the number of sailors and marines that were
court-martialed for retaliation, the rank of the accused, and the
results of trial.
Admiral Greenert. Yes, commanders are using the UCMJ, as well as
other administrative measures, to reduce retaliation and maintain good
order and discipline. On April, 25, 2014, the Secretary of the Navy
issued ALNAV 030/14, a lawful general order, which made retaliation
against an individual who reported a criminal offense a violation of
Article 92 of the UCMJ. On December, 4, 2014, the Secretary signed
SECNAV Instruction 5370.7D, a comprehensive revision of Military
Whistleblower Protections, including preventing retaliation or
ostracism by superiors. To combat peer-to-peer retaliation, SECNAVINST
5370.7D defines and prohibits ostracism as a form of retaliation. This
expansion beyond the UCMJ offense of maltreatment requiring a senior-
subordinate relationship directly addresses peer-to-peer retaliation or
reprisal.
(a) In fiscal year 2014, two Sailors were counseled or received
letters of reprimand for retaliation. One of these alleged retaliators
was reported to be the victim's peer or co-worker and one was within
the victim's chains-of-command.
(b) In fiscal year 2014, two Sailors received non-judicial
punishment for retaliation. Both of these alleged retaliators were
reported to be peers or co-workers of the victims.
(c) In fiscal year 2014, no Sailors were administratively separated
for retaliation offenses.
(d) In fiscal year 2014, no Sailors were court-martialed for
retaliation offenses.
General Dunford. Marine Corps commanders have numerous methods in
their toolkits to confront retaliation. They take appropriate action
after review of investigations conducted by the Inspector General (IG),
criminal investigators or command inquiries. Commanders can address
retaliation reports through the informal resolution process by
resolving a complaint directly with the complainant, through
administrative counseling or separation of offenders, non-judicial
punishment or court-martial action. Depending on the facts of the case,
service members who retaliate against those who report crimes may be
administratively sanctioned or court-martialed for an orders violation,
obstruction of justice, or maltreatment.
Victims of retaliation may report retaliation using numerous
methods to include making a hotline complaint to the IG, making a
complaint against a senior officer through a complaint under Article
138, Uniform Code of Military Justice or a complaint under Article
1150, of the U.S. Navy Regulations, a report to criminal investigators
or through the chain of command.
The Marine Corps has not formally tracked command investigations
concerning retaliation, administrative actions, non-judicial punishment
or court-martial actions against those who committed retaliation;
however the Marine Corps is developing a formal tracking system to
capture this information. This formal tracking mechanism will track
cases falling under the expanded definition of retaliation found in the
National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2014 and as
implemented by the Secretary of the Navy in Instruction 5370.7D,
Military Whistle Blower Protection, for retaliating against a victim
through an unfavorable personnel action, ostracism or maltreatment.
combat integration
78. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Mabus, January 2016 is the
deadline for the implementation of combat integration in the military.
Not only is this a readiness issue, since you want to have the best
qualified people in position, regardless of gender, it is also a way to
give women a fair shot to reach positions of leadership in the
military. You said in your written testimony that ``In accordance with
the Secretary of Defense's guidance, the default position will be that
all currently closed positions will be opened to the assignment of
women unless an exception is formally requested.'' Do you expect there
to be requests for exceptions coming from the Navy or the Marine Corps?
Mr. Mabus. The default position that all currently closed positions
will be opened to the assignment of women unless an exception is
formally requested is currently being reviewed at the JCS and OUSD(P&R)
levels to synchronize decision impacts that will affect more than one
Service and/or USSOCOM. Formally and informally, this synchronized
approach is being applied to the Services and SOCOM in order to make
recommendations for position/occupational openings and/or submission of
an Exception to Policy, if needed. The decision timeline has shifted to
September 2015 in order to align with all Service decisions. The bi-
annual DON report to SECDEF on the progress of WISR implementation due
in April 2015 will include this timeline shift.
I approved the Navy's surface ship ETP requesting to keep FFGs,
MCMs, and PCs closed to the assignment of enlisted women given the
pending decommissioning schedules of these ship classes, habitability
modifications would not be a judicious use of fiscal resources.
Additionally, there is equal professional opportunity for women at sea
on platforms other than FFGs, MCMs, and PCs. Opening these aging ship
classes would not improve career opportunities for women; in fact, such
assignments would be in lieu of assigning women to Navy's newest and
most sophisticated platforms.

79. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, are
the Navy and Marine Corps working toward opening all positions to
women?
Admiral Greenert. Integrating women across the force remains a
priority. Over 96 percent of all Navy jobs are currently available to
women, and we expect to have all occupations open by early next year.
General Dunford. We were directed by the Secretary of Defense to
open all positions for women and to recommend exceptions to policy if
required. We are on the path to accomplish that task.

80. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, what
might make you ask for exceptions to the policy?
Admiral Greenert. Navy is on track to comply with the Secretary of
Defense-directed rescission of the 1994 Direct Ground Combat Definition
and Assignment Rule (DGCAR), and expects to have no closed occupations,
few closed positions, and equal professional opportunity for females in
every officer designator and enlisted rating by January 1, 2016.
However, Navy may seek exceptions to policy when the cost of berthing
modifications would make it imprudent to expend taxpayer dollars to
open platforms expected to decommission in the near future.
General Dunford. The Navy and Marine Corps will not compromise
readiness and combat effectiveness or reduce our high standards because
that is what America demands. A recommendation for an exception to
policy may be based on any number of factors that could include a
detrimental impact on combat effectiveness, unit readiness, or the
health and welfare of Marines.

81. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Mabus, what kind of oversight are
you currently doing to ensure that the Navy and Marine Corps are
developing gender neutral standards and working to meet the intent of
the directive from former Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta and
General Dempsey?
Mr. Mabus. On January 23, 2013, then Secretary of Defense Leon
Panetta, with the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and in
collaboration with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS),
rescinded the 1994 Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule
which excluded women from assignment to units and positions whose
primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground. As a
result of that recession, Secretary Panetta directed the Services to
integrate women into all positions and units by January 1, 2016, unless
he or his successor approved narrowly tailored exceptions, based upon
rigorous analysis, to keep an occupational specialty or unit closed.
The recommendation to the Secretary of Defense to seek and
exception to policy is to be made by a Secretary of a Military
Department with the concurrence of the CJCS. On September 30, 2015, I
provided the Department of the Navy recommendation, along with research
from the Navy and Marine Corps, to the Secretary of Defense. This
submission included certifications from the Chief of Naval Operations
and the Commandant of the Marine Corps that the occupational standards
used in their respective services are gender-neutral and operationally
relevant, in accordance with the law. It has been my clear position
that if you meet those standards, you should be allowed the opportunity
to serve. By definition, if the standards are strictly met, combat
effectiveness will not be diminished.
Under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 652(a)(1), the Secretary of Defense must
submit to Congress a report providing notice of a change to integrate
women into closed positions and units. The Secretary may implement the
change 30 days after congress receives this report. Should the
Secretary of Defense, after having considered the recommendations of
the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the CJCS, decide to
continue to integrate women into closed positions and units, he will
provide the requisite report to Congress. Such report will include all
the information that is necessary to ensure that congress is fully
informed of the reasons and justifications for this departmental
change.

82. Senator Gillibrand. General Dunford, how is the Marine Corps
developing its gender neutral standards?
General Dunford. MOS subject matter experts have been tasked to
review what tasks Marines within an MOS are required to perform and to
ensure the standards are gender-neutral. Using the expertise gained by
cumulative knowledge of generations of Marines who have served in
combat, these experts have reviewed what tasks are actually being done,
the order and frequency in which tasks are performed, and the standards
of performance necessary to adequately perform each task to accomplish
the mission. This process will validate Marine Corps tasks, conditions
and standards and will be the basis for Training & Readiness manuals
for each MOS. Training and Readiness manuals provide the basis for all
individual MOS instruction, sustainment training, and proficiency
assessments as well as unit training and unit training readiness
assessments.
Additionally, the Marine Corps is using a number of studies to
validate gender neutral standards. We established the Ground Combat
Element Integrated Task Force primarily to better understand and refine
gender-neutral skills in the context of more complex unit tasks. The
GCEITF is a gender integrated ground combat arms unit built to conduct
a research study and designed to determine the individual contribution
to physically demanding ground combat arms MOS collective tasks. The
goal is to validate what gender-neutral standards are required of
individual Marines for the unit to be successful. The Marine Corps is
using the data obtained from the task force and entry level training
research studies to validate, refine, and implement gender-neutral
occupational standards that can be applied to all Marines.

83. Senator Gillibrand. General Dunford, what do you expect to
learn from the Ground Combat Element Integrated Task-Force experiment?
General Dunford. The Ground Combat Element Integrated Task Force
(GCEITF) is a gender integrated ground combat arms unit built to
conduct a research study and designed to determine how an individual
contributes to physically demanding ground combat arms MOS collective
tasks. The purpose of the research study is two-fold. The first is to
build a data set that supports establishing MOS specific physical
standards and assessments. The second is to determine the effects (if
any) of gender integration on ground combat arms small unit mission
effectiveness.
(Source: USMC Response to Status Report in Hegar, et al v. Carter,
No. 12-6005)

84. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Greenert, the closed positions to
women in the Navy are in large part special operations positions. What
can you tell us about how the Navy is working with Special Operations
Command to make the determination about how to open these positions?
Admiral Greenert. Navy is closely coordinating with U.S. Special
Operations Command in conducting a methodical and orderly evaluation to
inform recommendations regarding integration of women into Naval
Special Warfare/Special Operations occupations. This includes frequent
exchanges of information and bi-weekly video tele-conferences to
synchronize the decision process. This partnership and transparency
will lead to a fully-informed recommendation that will be provided in
parallel to Navy and U.S. Special Operations Command leadership.

85. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, what
else are the Services doing to help with recruitment and retention of
women?
Admiral Greenert. Navy efforts to help with recruiting women
include generating female-centric marketing materials for use in direct
mail and email campaigns, creating video products for use on Navy.com
and the Navy's YouTube channel to highlight stories of successful
female Sailors and Officers, and leveraging female influencers through
the use of Carrier Embarks, Education Visits, and other outreach
initiatives. Navy is focused on retaining women warfighters by
increasing career flexibility through initiatives like the Career
Intermission Program, which allows service-members to take a hiatus
from their careers for up to three years to pursue personal and/or
professional priorities before re-entering the force. Additionally,
Navy has increased its female accession goal to 25 percent of all
recruits for fiscal year 2015 and fiscal year 2016, in order to
increase female representation in all operational platforms, and in
particular in the most under-represented ratings.
General Dunford. The Marine Corps does not have gender-specific
recruiting or retention requirements. We strive to access and retain
the best and most-fully qualified Marines, regardless of gender.
However, the Marine Corps has taken deliberate actions to increase
female accessions and will continue to actively monitor propensity and
other market indicators to reach the female audience. Examples of
advertising marketing channels include collateral material, direct
mail, Marines.com websites, online display advertising, print media,
and social media showing female Marines alongside their male
counterparts. Overall, since 2008, the Marine Corps has increased
female accessions, both enlisted and officer, by nearly five percent.
It is noteworthy that, over the last two fiscal years, the NROTC
scholarship acceptance rate for females has been higher than the male
acceptance rate.
Retention rates for females in the Marine Corps are essentially the
same as that of their male counterparts after the first term. During
the first term, female retention is lower. Female officer retention is
actually higher than male between 20 and 30 years of service. The
Marine Corps is always assessing its retention mission and has met all
goals in recent history. The quality of our force has never been
higher. Nevertheless, per the direction of the Secretary of the Navy,
the Marine Corps is considering several policies intended to enhance
retention of females across the ranks. We have also implemented a
career intermission program that allows Marines to pause service for
family or educational reasons as a retention measure.
cyber security
86. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford,
Admiral Rogers testified last week that Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) was
having trouble filling its target of 6,200 cyber troops by the close of
2016. Are you able to fill your cyber positions as well as meet Cyber
Command's needs?
Admiral Greenert. Navy is contributing to the building of Cyber
Mission Force teams for U.S. Cyber Command, with Navy teams organized
into existing U.S. Fleet Cyber Command operational commands. Our
contribution includes the sourcing of four National Mission Teams,
eight Combat Mission Teams, 20 Cyber Protection Teams, three National
Support Teams and five Combat Support Teams. We are on track to man
these teams at the initial operational capability manning requirement
of 50 percent in 2016, and at the full operational capability manning
requirement of 80 percent in 2017.
General Dunford. We project our manpower models to be sufficient to
present forces to USCYBERCOM on track with the Cyber Mission Force
build, and at the same time, build capacity to fill cyber positions in
the Marine Corps. In fiscal year 2017, we will reach the ``assess''
phase of the build-assess-build plan laid out by the Commander of
USCYBERCOM, and will reevaluate manpower requirements for the Cyber
Mission Force.

87. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, do
you have the training capacity you require?
Admiral Greenert. The Navy training plan ensures that Cyber Mission
Force (CMF) personnel gain the technical skills required through a
combination of joint training pipelines, including accession level and
advanced courses, educational opportunities, and operational Cyber
exercises. The Navy also has sufficient joint training capacity (in
conjunction with NSA, USCYBERCOM, and the other Services) to meet the
training requirements of the CMF.
However, the Navy needs a training environment--a ``cyber range''--
to conduct the unit-level training of its Cyber Mission Teams. This
Persistent Training Environment (PTE) will ensure we build proficiency
leading up to certification events, maintain overall Cyber Mission Team
proficiency, and allow teams to exercise in a realistic environment
without the risk of harming operational computer systems or networks.
General Dunford. Currently, we have the training capacity to man
our service's portion of the National Mission Force and are making
strong progress for that build. Additionally, we have already adjusted
service level training to ensure we are expanding cyber training
capacity in the Marine Corps. For example, by extending the length of
the Marine Corps Cyber Security Technician course. Looking to the
future, we are planning for additional training requirements as we
continue to build the Cyber Mission Force and integrate cyberspace
operations in the Marine Air-Ground Task Force. To account for this, we
are working with mission partners and industry to build a persistent
training environment where cyber warriors can continue to build their
skills. Additionally, the Marine Corps is forming a Cyber Task Force to
address issues like training and readiness in cyberspace to adjust to
the needs of this increasingly critical mission.

88. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, we
just received a report from all of the Services articulating their
plans to either create separate specialties or designators for cyber.
It is my understanding training for building a cyber warrior can be up
to 2 years. How do you envision the development not only of separate
specialties for cyber but also career tracks and a way to retain these
dedicated warriors?
Admiral Greenert. The Navy denotes military personnel in the Cyber
Mission Forces (CMF) through officer designators (1810/Information
Warfare-IW; 1820/Information Professional - IP; 1840/Cyber Warfare
Engineer-CWE) and enlisted ratings (Cryptologic Technician Networks -
CTN; Cryptologic Technician Collection - CTR; Cryptologic Technician
Linguist - CTI; Information Systems Technician - IT; and, Intelligence
Specialist-IS).
Today, Navy CMF officer designators and enlisted ratings are
meeting retention goals. For officers, the Navy is making efforts to
retain CWE technical expertise by encouraging them to cross designate
to the IW or IP communities. Career paths include increasing
opportunities for graduate-level Cyber education, currently offered
through a combination of service and private sector institutions such
as the Naval Post Graduate School, Naval War College, and Rensselaer
Polytechnic Institute.
For enlisted Sailors, five ratings in the CMF will increase by more
than 900 billets by the end of fiscal year 2016, with the CTN rating
experiencing the most growth. The Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB)
contributes significantly to our retention of enlisted Sailors in
ratings with crucial skill sets.
General Dunford. In order to attract and retain the best people,
the Marine Corps has followed multiple lines of effort. To improve
continuity and reap greater return-on-investment in the lowest density
highest demand military occupational specialties (MOS), we have
coordinated with our Service to extend standard assignments to four
years. Additionally, the number of feeder MOS's available to lateral
move into critical cyber related specialties has been increased in
order to obtain a larger talent pool of qualified and experienced
Marines. We are currently accessing sixteen feeder occupational
specialties from the communications, signals intelligence, electronic
warfare, data, and aviation specialty fields to meet the personnel
demands of cyber occupational field. The largest reenlistment or
lateral move bonus offered in the past year of $60,750 was offered to
Sergeants who move into the Cyber Security Technician specialty. To
drive home the point of how seriously the Marine Corps takes its cyber
talent management, this bonus consumed 16 percent of the retention
bonus budget for the last fiscal year. In the future, our focus will
broaden to include generating a sustainable force generation model that
retains a unique, skilled expertise within the larger contexts of cyber
ready MAGTFs. Additionally, we commissioned a personnel occupational
specialty life cycle management study by the Center for Naval Analysis
to further develop the way ahead for our cyber work force development.

89. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, how
do we integrate cyber into the training of all of our servicemembers so
that we can better integrate it into all forms of combat?
Admiral Greenert. We are addressing Cybersecurity and Cyberspace
Operations holistically. From Cybersecurity, as a component of the
Navy's Mission Assurance Program to protect critical infrastructure, to
Cyberspace Operations in the Information Environment (led by Fleet
Cyber Command/Commander TENTH Fleet) and everything in between, the
Navy is preparing to fight and win in cyberspace. Additionally,
Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare will be fully integrated across the
Navy training continuum from accession training to advanced education
and leadership development programs. Training and education initiatives
are already in place to incorporate Cybersecurity and Cyberspace
Operations into our enlisted and officer accession programs and career
development pipelines. Further, expanded coordination between the Naval
Academy, Naval Postgraduate School, and Naval War College is leveraging
the capabilities of these uniquely Navy educational institutions.
Efforts are underway today to integrate rigorous Cybersecurity
standards, metrics, and certifications that will enhance combat
readiness and effectiveness Afloat and Ashore. We are making strides to
prepare the Fleet for Cyberspace operations. The Navy Cyberspace
Operations Manual is currently under revision, and in 2013, we
published the ``Information Operations at the Operational Level of War
Concept.'' This launched the Navy's Warfighter doctrine development
process for the integration of operations in the Information
Environment, including the Cyberspace Operations Concept of Operations
and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures development to inform Fleet
Readiness and Training. We are also developing an ``All Hands'' cyber
training with Navy context that builds upon the DoD-mandated
Information Assurance/Cyber Challenge for our total force, this
training will use case studies based on cyber issues we have seen from
internal and external sources.
General Dunford. Since 2014, the Marine Corps has dramatically
increased cyber integration into the training cycle by leading,
supporting, or participating in over 31 combined, joint, and service
exercises. Additionally, Headquarters, Marine Corps recently
established a Cyber Task Force that will develop a comprehensive plan
to integrate cyber-MOS qualified Marines to support our MAGTF
warfighting capabilities; defend our key cyber terrain; provide an
operational, secure, effective and efficient Marine Corps Enterprise
Network to the MAGTF; and enhance command and control (C2) and digital
interoperability across all elements. Our end state will be to increase
the capacity and capability of the MAGTF to operate in and exploit the
cyber domain. However, the Marine Corps MAGTF is designed to be part of
a broader Joint Force. We expect our Joint, interagency and coalition
partners to complement our cyberspace operations through information
sharing, development of capabilities, and operational coordination.
Likewise, as we integrate cyber capabilities into the MAGTF and the
Marine Corps as a service, we expect to expand our role of providing
cyber capabilities to the joint force through our commitment to
USCYBERCOM.

90. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Greenert, you've spoken about the
importance of the Reserve component for the Navy's cyber efforts. Can
you please explain how the Navy uses its Reserve component in terms of
staffing its own cyber needs as well as its support of CYBERCOM?
Admiral Greenert. Through ongoing mission analysis of the Navy
Total Force Integration Strategy, we developed a Reserve Cyber Mission
Force (CMF) Integration Strategy that leverages our Reserve Sailors'
skill sets and expertise to maximize the Reserve Component's support to
the full spectrum of Cyber mission areas. Within this strategy, the 298
Reserve billets, which are phasing into service from fiscal year 2015
through fiscal year 2018, will be individually aligned to Active Duty
CMF teams and the Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber (JFHQ-C). Accordingly,
each Navy Reservist assigned to a CMF billet provides operational
support to the team's respective operational commander, including Fleet
Commanders, US Pacific Command, US Southern Command, US Cyber Command,
and DoD/Defense Information Security Agency. As the Navy builds its
Reserve CMF support structure, Fleet Cyber Command and TENTH Fleet
conduct ongoing assessments to maximize the Reserve Force's support to
CMF operational objectives.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
joint strike fighter
91. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Mabus, the stealthy F-35 is a
supersonic, multi-role, fifth Generation fighter designed to replace
aging AV-8B Harriers, F/A-18 Hornets, F-16 Fighting Falcons, and A-10
Thunderbolt IIs. Analysis indicates that F-35 will be six times more
effective than legacy fighters in air-to-air combat, five times more
effective in air-to-ground combat, and six times more effective in
reconnaissance and suppression of air defenses--all while having better
range and requiring less logistics support. Replacing multiple classes
of aircraft with the F-35 reduces operating costs by streamlining spare
pools, supply chain management, infrastructure, etc. The F-35 program
will be able to keep costs down by capturing economies of scale by
ramping up production as quickly as possible. It is my understanding
that the Navy's fiscal year 2016 budget request includes 16 fewer F-35
aircraft in the last 3 years of the FYDP instead of efforts to keep
open the production line of legacy F-18 aircraft or defer their
retirement. What is your view of bringing forward production of F-35
aircraft to meet any gap in capabilities that has arisen due to delays
in the program?
Mr. Mabus. The fiscal year 2016 budget request delivers a balanced
approach that adheres to fiscal guidance. Due to fiscal constraints,
the Navy was compelled to defer procurement of 16 F-35C aircraft as a
budgetary decision. While the Department remains fully committed to
integrating the F-35C into the future carrier air wing, this decision
has increased risk in strike fighter inventory management as new
aircraft procurement is the solution to far-term inventory challenges.
In an effort to advance our current capability and reduce risk in
managing our strike fighter inventory, the Department's goal is to
increase F-35C development and procurement funding over the next five
years to achieve full rate production.

92. Senator Blumenthal. General Dunford, the Marine Corps is
scheduled to declare initial operational capability for the F-35 later
this year. To me that demonstrates that the program is maturing and
reaching a point where there would be benefits to increasing
production. What can be done to bring forward the estimated 2022 date
for close air support capability and how can we close this capability
gap with regards to the fiscal year 2016 budget request by the Marine
Corps?
General Dunford. The Marine Corps will achieve initial operational
capability (IOC) in a Block 2B software configuration of the F-35B this
summer. At IOC, the F-35B will be capable of conducting effective close
air support (CAS). The funds requested in this year's fiscal year 2016
budget go towards the planned schedule of development and production.
The F-35 program already has a continuous series of upgrades in
capabilities scheduled in the coming years to increase its abilities.
The best way to help in the continued improvement of the F-35 is to
support the fiscal year 2016 budget request along with the Marine
Corps' Unfunded Priority List, including six F-35Bs.

taiwan indigenous submarine program
93. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Mabus, I understand Taiwan is
open to the participation of private contractors from the U.S.
submarine industrial base to develop the contract design and provide
program management, post-delivery testing, and evaluation for their $5
billion effort to establish an indigenous submarine program. What is
the Navy's position and guidance regarding enabling the U.S. submarine
industrial base to provide the requested services and equipment and
what should the process be for companies that want to participate with
regards to ensuring we protect our technology and maintain our undersea
warfare advantage?
Mr. Mabus. Each individual request for an export license receives
careful scrutiny and is evaluated by the Navy department that manages a
like or similar system. Several other agencies and organizations within
DOD will conduct additional reviews before the Department of State
makes the final decision on release of that technology to a foreign
customer. With this export license review, each decision is evaluated
on a ``case by case'' basis with specific attention to issues of
protection of key technologies and maintenance of our undersea warfare
superiority. When such a decision is made, the specifics of that
decision will be released in accordance with classification and policy
guidance.

[Whereupon, at 11:54 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2016 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

----------

THURSDAY, MARCH 12, 2015

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Wicker,
Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Lee,
Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand,
Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, and King.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman McCain. Good morning. The committee meets today to
receive testimony on the posture of U.S. Northern Command and
U.S. Southern Command to inform its review of the Defense
Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2016.
I would like to extend our appreciation to the witnesses
for their many years of distinguished service, and to the
soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and their families, who
serve our Nation with distinction.
General Kelly, this is likely your final appearance before
the committee in your current position. And I know how upset
you are about that. But, it must be said that the Nation owes
you the highest debt of gratitude for your more than 40 years
of dedicated service, at which time you have given the most to
our Nation that can ever be asked of a military officer and a
citizen. I know that I speak for my colleagues when I say that
your candor has been as refreshing as it has been valuable to
the work we do on the committee. And I implore my colleagues to
pay close attention to your testimony today and to heed your
warnings to us. It is my sincere hope that your service to the
Nation will continue for many years to come.
Over the last month, the committee has heard from some of
the Nation's most respected leaders on the current global
security environment, and their testimony has been crystal
clear: Our Nation faces the most complex and challenging array
of threats it has in over a half a century. This situation in
our own hemisphere is no exception.
Compounding the enormous security challenges facing our
Nation is the looming threat of sequestration, which is having
a devastating impact on the readiness and capabilities of our
men and women in uniform. Retired General Jim Mattis rightly
told this committee last month, ``No foe in the field can wreak
such havoc on our security that mindless sequestration is
achieving today.''
I expect our witnesses to candidly update the committee on
what sequestration will mean for their ability to accomplish
their missions and protect the force. More starkly, we'd like
to know, at what point does sequestration push us beyond
accepting risk and towards mission failure?
Admiral Gortney, this is your first time testifying before
the committee as the Commander of U.S. Northern Command and
North American Aerospace Defense Command. After nearly 4 months
in command, I look to your assessment of the challenges within
your area of responsibility, as well as your strategy to
confront them. I am particularly interested in your views on
the current state of U.S.-Mexican security cooperation and ways
in which our two nations can strengthen this vital partnership.
Though the President of Mexico's efforts against transnational
organized crime have resulted in some notable successes,
including the removal of several senior cartel leaders from the
battlefield, the security situation remains highly volatile and
continues to directly impact the security of our southern
border as well as more than 1,200 American cities where these
ruthless criminal networks now operate.
Additionally, with North Korea moving closer to an
operational road-mobile ICBM [Intercontinental Ballistic
Missile] and Iran publicly stating it intends to launch, as
early as this year, a space-launched vehicle capable of ICBM
ranges, it's all the more important that the United States
expand and modernize its homeland ballistic missile defense
system. I support the increase of ground-based interceptors
from 30 to 44 by 2017, but we need to be assured that the
planned improvements to the ground-based midcourse defense
system will stay ahead of the ballistic missile threats to our
homeland that are anticipated by the intelligence community.
General Kelly, the situation within your area of
responsibility represents as complex and challenging a set of
problems as I have ever seen in the hemisphere. While there are
important success stories like Colombia, the situation in many
other parts of the region remain highly unstable. We are all
particularly concerned about Central America, which is mired by
feeble governance and weak security institutions, high rates of
corruption, and is home to several of the most violent
countries in the world. Increasingly capable transnational
criminal organizations exploit these shortcomings and command
multibillion-dollar global networks that traffic in weapons,
drugs, bulk cash, human beings, and anything that will earn a
profit. Increasingly, their activities directly threaten our
National security. Working with our regional partners to arrest
the troubling rise in instability must be a priority.
I agree with you, General Kelly, that our approach to
Central America requires a sustained multiyear commitment
similar to what we pursued under Plan Colombia. I hope you will
describe in greater detail what a Plan Central America should
look like and what role Southern Command would play in such an
effort.
Additionally, I remain troubled by the lack of appropriate
and persistent U.S. support and engagement in the Western
Hemisphere, and how sequestration would further erode our
already limited presence and programs in the region. We cannot
afford to go on treating our own neighborhood as our lowest
geographic priority which only receives the level of resources
and focus that it deserves when it erupts into crisis. This is
a recipe for failure. And I know you feel the same way.
In closing, I want to ask you, General Kelly, to pass on
the deepest thanks and gratitude of the members of this
committee to the military men and women conducting detention
operations at Guantanamo Bay. Putting aside politics and the
broader debate about the future of this detention facility, the
Americans serving there today deserve our utmost appreciation.
Theirs is an extraordinarily trying and difficult mission. And,
through it all, they continue to serve honorably and with the
utmost professionalism. So, General, please extend our thanks
to them.
Thank the--you, again, for--our witnesses for appearing
before us today.
Senator Reed.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And let me join you in welcoming our witnesses and thank
General Kelly for his extraordinary service and his advice and
counsel over many years.
And welcome, Admiral Gortney. This is your first appearance
in your role as the NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command] Commander.
And let me also ask you to thank the men and women under
your command, and their families, because the--families
service, not just individual servicemen and -women. And no one
has served more, as the Senator has pointed out, than the Kelly
family. So, thank you, General Kelly.
Admiral Gortney, as you know, one of the three pillars of
our defense strategy, as laid out in last year's Quadrennial
Defense Review, is to protect the homeland, to deter and defeat
attacks on the United States, and to support civil authorities
in mitigating the effects of potential attacks and natural
disasters. Similarly, President Obama's National Security
Strategy, released last month, emphasizes the defense of our
homeland as a primary responsibility. This, simply stated, is
your very important mission.
To that end, while Admiral Haney, the Commander of STRATCOM
[U.S. Strategic Command], is responsible for synchronizing
global missile defense planning and operational support, you
are responsible for the operation of our homeland ballistic
missile defense system. And we look forward to hearing about
the improvements that are planned for the ground-based missile
defense system, the progress being made to test, correct, and
field additional interceptors, the enhancement of sensors and
discrimination capabilities, and the status of the redesigned
kill vehicle.
In addition, NORTHCOM works closely with other Federal
agencies, the Governors, and the National Guard to collaborate
on responding to national and manmade disasters, and partners
with Canada and Mexico to promote security across our borders.
I look forward to hearing, also, about your current efforts on
how these would be impacted by the return of sequestration.
In Southern Command, one of the primary threats is posed by
illegal narcotics trafficking and organized criminal networks.
These organizations create devastating instability in nations
throughout our hemisphere, including the corruption of civilian
and security institutions and brutal violence inflicted upon
the people of the region. Whether it is illegal drugs for sale
or individuals escaping violence in their hometowns, the
consequences of crime do not stop at the border. And what often
starts as SOUTHCOM's [U.S. Southern Command] problem soon
becomes NORTHCOM's problem. An obvious answer, then, is to
address the problem at its root. But, complicating SOUTHCOM's
ability to respond is the fact that sequestration has reduced
the military services' support of your requirements and reduced
the funding in a defensewide counterdrug account. In your
submitted opening statement, General Kelly, you characterized
the impact of these reductions as, quote, ``managing to keep
the pilot light of U.S. military engagement on in the region,
but just barely.'' This is a stark warning, and one that is
certainly amplified when considering the cuts on the civilian
side of our government, as well.
General Kelly, given the physical constraints that are
likely to face you, I am interested in your insights into how
SOUTHCOM can successfully engage in the region. For example,
SOUTHCOM is also training and equipping security forces of
friendly nations, training and equipping peacekeepers for
deployment to peacekeeping operations across the globe, and
enabling, advising, and supporting Colombian military and law
enforcement operations. These activities often provide benefits
far beyond the investment. How can we leverage these low-cost,
high-yield activities? Are there other innovative ideas we
should be implementing?
General Kelly, Admiral Gortney, you are both exceptional
officers whom I am glad are leading these commands, and I look
forward to your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Welcome.
Who--Admiral Gortney, do you want to be first? Or General
Kelly?
Admiral Gortney. We are long-time shipmates.

STATEMENT OF ADM WILLIAM E. GORTNEY, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
NORTHERN COMMAND AND COMMANDER, NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE
DEFENSE COMMAND

Admiral Gortney. Well, Chairman McCain, Ranking Member
Reed, members of the committee, thank you so much for having my
shipmate and myself here to talk to you today. It means a great
deal.
In preparing for today, I thought I would open--I first
thought I would open with my--a summation of my prepared
remarks that I had forwarded for the record. But, after
spending, over the past 2 weeks, time with you--thank you for
giving me your valuable time--I think the time would be better
spent if we talk about the threats that--as I see them, in the
defense of the homeland, and how it affects us. So, I am going
to set my prepared remarks aside, and I want to talk to those
threats.
And when we look at threats, we look at threats from the
most likely to the most dangerous. And so, I want to talk about
from the most likely to the most dangerous threats to the
homeland. And I think the most likely threat is that
transnational criminal network that is using the seams between
General Kelly's and my COCOMs [Combatant Commanders] and PACOMs
[U.S. Pacific Command], our interagency partners and us, seams
between us and our partner nations, and the seams within those
countries themselves. In those seams, people are moving drugs,
money. As the Chairman said, they are just moving product for
profit. And, through those seams--we need to close those seams,
because in those seams, if someone wants to move something that
is going to do great damage to our Nation, that is where they
will come.
The second is homegrown violent extremists. And it's not--
it's a very effective, I'm sorry to say, but sophisticated
social media campaign to stir up distrust from American
citizens to do harm to American citizens.
The third is cyber. The cyber, I am responsible for
defending my known networks and to help the lead Federal agency
in the aftermath of a cyberattack. But, it's far more
significant in that--is that it would effect--directly effect a
cyberattack against a critical infrastructure that I rely on to
defend the Nation and we rely on for our Nation to operate. I
see that as a significant threat.
The next is the North Korean threat, who has the intent
and, we assess, the capability to shoot a ballistic missile at
our homeland, and, of course, whether Iran will continue on its
path.
And finally, and the most dangerous, China to Russia.
However, as significant as those threats are, as I look at
mostly likely and most dangerous, I see the mostly likely and
most dangerous threat to my ability to protect the homeland,
and that is sequestration. And it's because of how
sequestration affects the forces that John and myself and our
shipmates that are the other geographic combatant commanders,
how it affects the services as they implement the sequestration
effect, how it hollows out the force. The services can only
go--have to--to generate the revenue to meet the sequestration,
they must go into the readiness accounts, and as--which leads
to a hollow force. And, as Admiral Greenert said to you a
couple of days ago, it delays capability that prevents us from
outpacing the threats that is our technological and our
advantage in the future battlefield.
As NORTHCOM and General Kelly, in SOUTHCOM, we rely on the
services in order for us to do our mission. Our forward-
deployed commanders, we--they rely on that capability. And the
specific impacts to each one of the missions, I'd like to
answer in the questions.
And I look forward to your questions.
Chairman McCain. General Kelly.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN F. KELLY, USMC, COMMANDER, U.S. SOUTHERN
COMMAND

General Kelly. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed,
distinguished members of the committee, thanks for the
opportunity to speak here today about SOUTHCOM's soldiers,
sailors, airmen, marines, coastguardsmen, and, just as
importantly, the civilian workforce.
It's great to be here with my good friend Admiral Gortney.
And I can assure you, as he just did, that there is really no
gap, no seam, no space between our two organizations. We work
very closely together, and we collaborate very, very closely
together.
I believe SOUTHCOM is the only government organization that
is 100-percent dedicated to looking at the issues of Latin
America and the Caribbean. My folks don't just pay attention to
what's going on in this region of the world. They understand it
intimately. They care about it, and they support it. They have
helped countries in Latin America improve human rights, worked
hand-in-hand with the region to professionalize security and
defense forces and rebuild institutions, and they've supported
our partners as they win back their streets and countries from
drug trafficking and criminal networks, much of which is
directly attributable to the drug demand in the United States.
I'm proud to lead this outstanding group of people, and I'm
proud of the work we're doing in Latin America.
As the committee knows, I think, SOUTHCOM's most important
mission is to protect the southern approaches to the United
States. We do not and cannot do this mission alone. We work
side by side with law enforcement professionals in the
Department of Homeland Security, the Coast Guard, DEA [Drug
Enforcement Agency], FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], and
the Department of Treasury. Together, we all defend the U.S.
homeland against transnational criminal networks, illicit
trafficking, and the potential movement of terrorists or WMD
[weapon of mass destruction] into the homeland.
Mr. Chairman, I'd like to take a moment to commend one of
our most valued partners in the U.S. Government, and that is
the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]. I've had the honor of
serving with the CIA all over the world for my entire career,
and this includes Iraq and Latin America. Like our men and
women in uniform, I believe the men and women of the CIA are
the best of their generation. When our country needs them most,
the CIA always answers the call. They do what the President
asks them to do, as we all do, and they do it with a
selflessness and a bravery that is very, very seldom
recognized. They step forward without question, without
hesitation, with the knowledge they will receive zero
recognition for the important work that they do. They willingly
put their lives on the line every day. They serve in some of
the world's darkest and most dangerous places, executing the
most complex, high-risk missions imaginable. And, most often,
they do it armed only with their wits.
Along with our Armed Forces, law enforcement, intelligence
agencies, the CIA is part of an extraordinary team doing
essential work to keep our Nation safe. And I believe most of
our citizens sleep safe at night because of what the entire
team does, and that team starts overseas with what the CIA
does.
I'd also like to say a few words about our partners in
Latin America, one relationship in particular. Mr. Chairman,
members, as you know, the United States has a very special
relationship with a handful of countries around the world.
These relationships are with countries that we rely on as
regional stabilizers. These countries are our strongest friends
and most steadfast allies. They look at--in the same--they look
at life and live their lives in the same way that we do.
Colombia clearly plays that role in Latin America. But,
they are more than just our--among our most trusted partners,
they are the model for winning the fight against violent
insurgencies in criminal networks. Colombia has shown us that
the key to defeating terrorists in criminal groups is by
upholding and defending the very values that these groups
threaten: freedom, democracy, and the protection of human
rights. Colombia has shown us that security and economic
prosperity really do go hand in hand. And at a--and at great
expense in Colombia blood--Colombian blood and Colombian
national treasure, they've shown us what the term ``national
will'' really means.
In my 30 years in uniform--over 30 years in uniform, I have
never seen a better success story than what I see every day in
Colombia. It's one place I believe we got it right, where our
support, coupled with a committed partner, brought a country
back from the brink, where our engagement in Latin America made
a real and lasting difference that's plain to see. Colombia is
now stable, thriving, and taking on greater responsibilities to
improve international security, not just in Latin America and
the Caribbean, but they are looking overseas, as well. In an
uncertain and turbulent world, we're lucky to have partners
like Colombia.
I'd like to thank the committee for its continued support
to the Colombian people as they work to achieve a just and
lasting peace, which is just about in sight.
Members of the committee, I look forward to your questions.
Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Thank you, General.
[The prepared statement of General Kelly follows:]
Chairman McCain. We're now looking at a proposal for a
budget that leaves the sequestration numbers in the numbers as
they have been following since we passed the Budget Control
Act. If that remains the case, General Kelly, what is your view
of what sequestration will do to your ability to carry out your
mission and the impact in increased risk to the lives of
American men and women serving in uniform?
General Kelly. Thanks for that question, Senator.
I would tell you, in Latin American Southern Command, it
is--it will be a--just simply put, a catastrophe. It will
essentially put me out of business. I have very, very little
work with now. We do most of our work partnering small--small
groups of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, even law
enforcement that go down, spend short periods of time advising,
assisting many of these groups, whether it's maintenance, human
rights, these kind of things.
I've queried my components--the Army, Navy, Air Force,
Marines. Their cuts would range from anywhere between 75
percent of--in the case of the Marines, maybe about 25 percent.
But, the point is, I will no longer able to partner at--almost
at all with the Nations that we work with every day. From a
drug-flow point of view, I got--we got, collectively--the DOD
[Department of Defense] and all of the agencies that do this--
we got 158 metric tons of cocaine last year, without violence,
before it ever even made it to Central America. I do that with
very, very few ships. I know that if sequestrations happen, I
will be down to maybe one Coast Guard, maybe two Coast Guard
cutters. That means, of the 158 tons I would expect to get this
year, I probably, if I'm lucky, will get 20 tons; and all the
rest of it just comes into the United States along this
incredibly efficient network. So----
Chairman McCain. And the risk----
General Kelly.--a catastrophe, Senator.
Chairman McCain. And the risk to the lives of the men and
women serving?
General Kelly. In my part of the world, it'll be, to say
the least, a heightened risk in--again, I'm in a part of the
world, as you know, sir, that is relatively peaceful, that
there is no real state-on-state problems. But, in other parts
of the world, like CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] and EUCOM
[U.S. European Command], potentially, these are--you know, we
could be talking--in my opinion, as just one guy talking, we
could be talking not high risk anymore, or severe risk, to our
plans, but really we could be talking defeat if sequestration
happens.
Chairman McCain. Admiral Gortney----
Admiral Gortney. Well, I'll----
Chairman McCain.--same question.
Admiral Gortney.--I'll pile onto what General Kelly was
saying. In a similar role in countering the transnational
criminal networks and our ability to do mil-to-mil training
with our partners, particularly in Mexico and in the Bahamas,
it's going to have a huge impact. We execute those missions
through service-retained forces. As soldiers, sailors, airmen,
and marines and coastguardsmen are training for their own
future deployment, they come down and do that mil-to-mil
activity for us, work for us, but it's training they receive.
And we've received, from our components, that that training is
going to have to be curtailed significantly. So, that will have
a huge impact on us on that.
The other impact would be in missile defense. Because the
services can only generate the revenue by going into readiness
or delaying delivery of a capability, the Missile Defense
Agency will--does not have a readiness account that they can go
to, so they're going to have to go to their new starts, they
will have to put the long-range discrimination radar, the
improvements to the advanced kill vehicle and a multi-object
kill vehicle--they'll have to put those on hold and will delay
the ability for them to field those capability which allows us
to outpace the growing proliferation of ballistic missiles.
And so, those are the two primary impacts to me, sir.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
General Kelly, in your written statement, you said, quote,
``In addition to thousands of Central Americans fleeing poverty
and violence, foreign nationals from countries like Somalia,
Bangladesh, Lebanon, and Pakistan are using the region's human
smuggling networks to enter the United States. While many are
merely seeking economic opportunity or fleeing war, a small
subset could potentially be seeking to do us harm. Last year,
ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] adherents posted
discussions on social media, calling for the infiltration of
the U.S. southern border.'' Can you tell us how serious you
think that threat is?
General Kelly. I think, Senator, that the kind of people
that you're referring to will--of course, their intent is to do
us the greatest amount of harm possible. This network that Bill
and I deal with every day, not to mention the law enforcement
folks, is so efficient that if a terrorist, or almost anyone,
wants to get into our country, they just pay the fare. No one
checks their passports, no one--you know, they don't go through
metal detectors. No one cares why they're coming. They just
ride this network. And if someone wanted to come in here with
nuclear material--I was just down at Emory University, at the
ebola facility there, talking about how ebola spreads and
potentially could be used as a weapon. It's an--it's a scary
proposition when----
Chairman McCain. Well----
General Kelly.--I think of this network.
Chairman McCain. So, how serious, in your view, is it that,
over time, there may be an effort by terrorists to cross our
southern border?
General Kelly. Extremely serious.
Chairman McCain. I thank you, General Kelly. And I thank
you for your honorable service.
And thank you, Admiral.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I think the chairman's questions and your answers has
really illustrated the critical and corrosive effect of
sequestration on everything you do--literally everything you
do. But, I think there's a point that also has to be
emphasized, because you don't do things alone, you do it with
other agencies, some of them civilian agencies.
General Kelly, you just said you were down at Emory, at
CDC, talking about the potential of a ebola-type epidemic being
transported into the United States. The border is the
jurisdiction, primarily, of Department of Homeland Security. I
could go on and on and on. So, the question is--because there's
been some discussion of, ``Well, we need relief for Department
of Defense.'' And both Senator McCain and I have urged that.
But, without relief across the board, without funding for DHS
[Department of Homeland Security], Department of Justice, FBI,
CDC [Center for Disease Control], can you do your mission,
Admiral Gortney?
Admiral Gortney. Sir, thank you for asking that question.
As we look at how we perform the range of missions that
we've been assigned, our homeland partnerships, our interagency
partnerships with the interagency--Homeland Security, with the
law enforcement efforts--that's actually our center of
gravity--the National Guard, our Governors, et cetera. But, to
your point on--those interagency relationships are absolutely
critical. Those interdependencies, many of which I am
supporting to them, but I am still tasked to do that--should
they be affected, it's going to have a significant effect
against how I'm able to do my missions to support them and
then, again, to defend the Homeland.
Senator Reed. General Kelly, your response?
General Kelly. I'd associate myself with that. If--this is
a team effort. And if anyone--if any of us get hit with a
sequestration-type impact, you know, again, the defense of the
homeland is, to me, absolute, and it would be seriously
degraded.
Senator Reed. You know, there are other aspects that--not
just reactive, but proactive. I'm told that, for example, the
Millennium Challenge, which is a quasi-Federal agency, gets
some funding from us, has been significant, in terms of road-
building and economic development in your area of operations.
And I would assume that's just--sometimes just as important as
the reactive, defensive measure. Is that accurate?
General Kelly. It is. Yes, sir. I mean, we could get into a
long discussion about what we're trying to do in the Central
American region to stabilize the region so that we don't have
another occurrence of, you know, 100,000 migrants coming up all
at once. And the Millennium Challenge Corporation is--things
like that or the Inter-American Developmental Bank--those are
organizations that we should invest in, because they do it
right, in terms of economic development, in working with
countries in identifying projects that will--everything from
stabilize their national institutions to economic development
to social development, protects human rights, things like that.
I really believe that investment in those kind of organizations
is the way to go, as opposed to, you know, we try to do our own
standalone-type investment, because they don't seem to work
very well.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Admiral Gortney, you are the operational, effectively,
commander for missile defense. Missile Defense Agency does all
the sophisticated development. You have pointed out how they
would be harmed. But, from your sense as to--as you described,
the trigger-pull or--what should be the priorities, in terms of
invest in national missile defense?
Admiral Gortney. Well, my priorities are completely aligned
with Admiral Syring's from the Missile Defense Agency. And the
priorities actually are concurrent priorities. All three have
to be taken into account.
The first is, we need to continue to improve our sensors.
The sensors are the ability for us to discriminate and track as
early as possible to be able to defeat the threat.
The second is, we need to enhance the lethality of our kill
vehicles. The--it's a very expensive proposition to shoot a
rocket with a rocket. And so, we want every one of our kill
vehicles to be as effective and as lethal as possible, and as
well as the means to develop other ways that we can get more
kill vehicles into space.
And the last is, as in any weapon system, you need to
invest in the sustainment piece of it so that all of--it's a
system of systems, and all of the system of systems are at
their peak physical condition, and that includes the ability
for us to test and exercise them. And they all have to be done
concurrently.
Senator Reed. And so, these priorities are higher, I can
assume, than expanding the basing of missiles around the
country?
Admiral Gortney. Yes. Admiral Syring and I are in agreement
that, before we put additional money, we want to make sure we
assure the three that we just talked about. That's the most
important piece.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Admiral.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You're recognized, I think.
Senator Inhofe. May I proceed?
Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think both of you were watching, a couple of weeks ago,
when we had Secretary Carter here. And you're familiar with his
testimony, wherein he--one of his statements was, ``Readiness
remains at troubling levels across the force,'' that, even with
the fiscal year budget, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps won't
reach their readiness goals until 2020; and the Air Force,
2023. And then General Dempsey stated that we--what we need to
remain at the lower ragged edge of manageable risk in our
ability to execute the defense strategy. Now, do both of you
agree with these statements?
General Kelly. Yes.
Admiral Gortney. Yes.
Senator Inhofe. The defense planning requirements are that
you guys are the one that--are in charge homeland security. And
that's supposed to be our number-one requirement, number-one
guidance. Is that correct?
Admiral Gortney. Homeland defense, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Homeland defense, yeah.
Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Well, the requirements are found in the
homeland defense, that's correct.
What concerns me is that, for the past 14 years, I think
that everyone's aware, and you're certainly aware, that both of
your areas of responsibility have been prioritized behind the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Is that correct?
General Kelly. Yes, sir.
Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Well, that's a big deal. I don't think many
people out there in the real world, or in America, understand
that--sure, we understand that our top priority should be
homeland defense. Everyone understands that. But, what the
budget--forgetting about sequestration, bringing us up to where
we are today as taking away your ability, or that priority for
homeland defense--you know, I think it's something that we have
to be talking about up here. Are--do you think--I'd ask both of
you, in your opinions, are we accepting too much risk as it
relates to our number-one priority, homeland defense?
Admiral Gortney. I'll take that, sir.
You know, our--the way we execute, the way and the means
that we execute homeland defense is an away game. It's better
to fight the fight at the further reaches through the forward-
deployed geographic commanders, such as General Kelly, here.
And the challenge that we're having, even though we've been in
14 years of war, as we come out of these wars, you're usually
entering a better security situation than when you went into
war. That's why we went to war. But, as Dr. Kissinger testified
to you a few weeks ago, clearly that's not what we had, and
it's--we just didn't predict it, even 3 short years ago. And
the forward-deployed combatant commanders, each and every
single one of them, are dealing with a crisis in their AOR
[Area of Responsibility] on their doorsteps today. And they're
seeking, and they need--in order for them to defend the Nation
in the far game, they need the forward-deployed forces and the
forward-based forces to deal with those crises, get them into
an off-ramp, and not let them escalate any more than they
already are. And that's where the risk is. They own that risk,
and that's the--their ability to execute that mission is very
tattered because of our--how thin we are, because we have to
distribute them globally. And as the service chief said, our
ability to surge them release--surge them greater capability
from the homeland so the game's--the fight is still overseas,
is reduced. And how that also impacts is those servicemembers
that are executing that mission----
Senator Inhofe. All right. Admiral----
Admiral Gortney.--their risk and the acceptable losses have
gone up significantly.
Senator Inhofe. Admiral--and I appreciate the answer. It's
a very good answer. It's a long way of saying ``yes.'' And so,
we----
Do you agree with that, General Kelly?
General Kelly. I do, yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Okay.
General Kelly, the area that I'm really familiar with--I
spent 20 years of my life in the--building and developing down
in south Texas. I'm familiar, not with the rest of the border,
but the Texas border, I am. And you talk about--you said--and I
wrote it down, here--your people understand it intimately.
Included in what they understand intimately, does that include
the border--the Texas-Mexico border?
General Kelly. No, sir, not in my case. My boundary ends
with the south Mexican----
Senator Inhofe. I see.
General Kelly.--border.
Senator Inhofe. Okay.
Admiral Gortney. So, Bill's your guy.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah. Oh, well--yeah, all right.
Are they very familiar with that? The reason I say that--
there's danger on the border down there. In fact, it's
misunderstood, because it's mostly between two cartels or two
drug groups firing. One of the few places in that border where
people can go over from the United States was a little
community called Progreso. And, even the other day, that ended
up a battleground. Is everyone on top of that and familiar with
that and aware of the risk that that gives some of our people?
Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir. Everybody's aware of the risk.
Do we have 100-percent visibility into everything of that? No,
sir, we don't. We work that very, very hard with our
interagency partners--Homeland Security and our interagency
partners inside----
Senator Inhofe. Yeah.
Admiral Gortney.--inside Mexico. And our responsibility is
to expand the capacity through training with the army, the
navy, and their marine corps, Sedena and Semar. And we're----
Senator Inhofe. Okay. I've got a problem with my timing,
here, and I did want to get into some statements that have been
made.
General Kelly, you talked about, in--on GTMO [Guantanamo
Bay], ever--the history of that, when we got it, the good deal
it is even today, and what all is there other than the
incarceration of terrorists that are down there. So, I'm going
to ask you this question for the record and--because I am very
interested in some of the other things that are going on down
there.
[The information referred to follows:]

Naval Station Guantanamo (GTMO) is irreplaceable as a forward
staging base for the U.S. assets critical to the layered defense
against threats to the U.S. homeland--both existential and potential.
GTMO's strategic importance dates back to its establishment in 1903 as
a coaling station for the Navy. That tradition continues today by
providing a secure location for the Department of Defense (DOD) and
Interagency to conduct their missions and operations. The U.S. Navy and
Coast Guard regularly use GTMO to refuel and conduct maintenance on
their vessels and aircraft patrolling the Caribbean. This maximizes
operating cost efficiency and time on station by preventing or reducing
unnecessary returns to the Continental United States. GTMO also
provides the only option for the DOD to meet its obligations under
National Presidential Security Directive 52 to safely house migrants
outside of the United States in the event of a mass migration.
Additionally, both Guantanamo's port and airfield were critical in
ensuring rapid and sustained response by the U.S. Military in the wake
of the devastating 2010 Haiti earthquake.
The State Department, Navy, Coast Guard, and other DHS components
rely on this Naval Station for mass migration events, humanitarian
assistance and disaster-relief operations in the Caribbean. A joint
white paper signed by the USCG Deputy Commandant for Operations and the
USN Acting Deputy CNO for Operations Plans and Strategy (N3/5) states
``For the near and far terms, the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard
confirm Naval Station GTMO's role as a strategic USG enabler for
security and stability in Latin America and the Caribbean region.'' I
concur with this assessment.

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Donnelly.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to thank both of you for being here.
General Kelly, I know this is your last time that you will
be here as SOUTHCOM Commander. And my father-in-law was a
Guadalcanal marine. And I think if he was still around, he
would say, ``If you want to know what a marine is, look at
General Kelly.'' So, we're very grateful for your service.
And, Admiral Gortney, my dad was in the Navy. He chipped a
lot of paint. He didn't see a lot of admirals, but we--he'd be
very grateful for your service.
To General Kelly, when you look--one of the things we're
dealing with in my home State of Indiana is, there's been a
huge influx of heroin into our State. And I was wondering if
you could tell us a little bit about the challenges you face in
trying to interdict that, in trying to stop it. And what is,
maybe, the best thing we could do to help you in that effort?
General Kelly. Senator, the first thing everyone should--
needs to understand is, really 100 percent of the heroin that's
consumed in the United States--and we, in fact, are right in
the middle of a heroin epidemic, a drug epidemic. A lot of
people in this town will say no to that, but we are in the
middle of a serious epidemic in--particularly in--when it comes
to the heroin. So, 100 percent of it is produced here in the
United--or, here in the--in Latin America. About half of it is
produced in Mexico, and the rest of it is produced further
south, in various parts of the isthmus--Central American
isthmus in South America. It's a relatively small amount--40-50
tons, we think--of heroin that feeds the heroin epidemic in the
United States.
What's the first step in stopping it? Stopping the drug
demand in the United States. That's the first step. And I don't
think we take that very seriously, as we do, say, tobacco use
and seatbelt use and things like that. So, we don't do much to
reduce the demand in the United States. If we did that, there
would be less of a market for it, obviously. But, because of
this network--and I say it a lot--this network has got to be
broken. And the way the network stays in place is drug demand
in--primarily drug demand in the United States, and then the
unbelievable profits that come out of that drug demand. Cocaine
alone, $85 billion a year in profits from cocaine sales alone
in the United States. And, of course, that's an unlimited
amount of money to either bribe officials, in our own country
as well as in Latin America, or to kill people or have people
killed. And until we really get around the drug demand issue,
there's not an awful lot we're going to be able to do to that
network.
Senator Donnelly. Is there anything you can do on the
ground, in terms of interdiction? Any other things that we can
help you with? Obviously, resources, but--what is the key to
their success in getting that into our country?
General Kelly. It's just years and years and years of a
very, very elaborate--development of this very elaborate, very
efficient network.
Some of the things we do do--and I'll go back to Colombia
for a second. I mean, Colombia is absolutely heroic in their
attempts to eradicate coca and poppy before it's ever
harvested. They knocked down about 1400 jungle laboratories
last year that make cocaine and make heroin. And they,
themselves--cocaine, alone--150 tons before it ever left--of
cocaine--before it ever left Colombia on its way north. So,
Colombia is deep into the fight. In fact, they, frankly, do
more to fight drugs in our country than I think the United
States does, sometimes.
Further north, in these countries that we're trying to help
in Central America, where an awful lot of the poppies are, in
fact, grown, we're just starting to see these countries--their
security forces able to stand up on their own. And then,
Mexico, about 40--about 50 percent of the heroin consumed in
the United States is--the poppies are grown and the heroin is
produced in Mexico. And that's really Bill's bailiwick.
Senator Donnelly. In terms of interdiction, you had
mentioned about the Coast Guard cutters and other resources
that you have--I may be mistaken with the exact number, but I
thought last year you told us you were able to--or had the
physical capability to stop about 25 percent of the traffic
that came through. Is that--is----
General Kelly. We're stopping----
Senator Donnelly.--is that----
General Kelly.--we think, about 20 percent.
Senator Donnelly. Okay.
General Kelly. With very few cutters. More cutters, more
ships mean we get more. Less means less.
Senator Donnelly. So, it's simply a direct--your ability to
stop is simply a direct correlation to the resources that you
have in that area.
General Kelly. That's correct, sir.
Senator Donnelly. Okay.
What--could you give us a little bit of a primer for a few
seconds on Venezuela and what's going on there right now?
General Kelly. It's a sad thing to watch. Two years ago,
when I took this job, the discussion was, How long would it be
before it collapses or implodes? I mean, I think we're kind of
there. Inflation rates of over 80 percent, there's almost
nothing on the shelves that common people can buy. Their--the
government there is, to say the least, restricting the free
press more and more every day. They're arresting opposition
leaders. Of course, they're blaming us for everything from coup
planning to this recent move by our President to put
sanctions--or, not sanctions, but to put restrictions in place.
They see that as an attempt to topple the government. They
don't need any help toppling their government. I mean, it's
just a really, really sad state of affairs to watch.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
Thank you both very, very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Sullivan.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I also want to thank both of the members of the panel
for their distinguished service to our country.
Admiral Gortney, I was--it was great seeing you in Alaska
recently. I wanted to dig into a little bit more on the Arctic
strategy that's highlighted in your testimony. And I actually
really appreciate how much emphasis you've been giving that in
your new position and in your testimony.
You know, one of the things that I think has come up in a
lot of the hearings here, whether it was General Dempsey or
the--Secretary Carter's growing importance, but also kind of
the fluidity of what's going on in the Arctic, particularly
with regard to the Russian moves that I know you've been
keeping an eye on. As a matter of fact, your testimony mentions
the aggressiveness that we haven't seen since the cold war, in
terms of the bomber runs. As you know, they--they're building
new airfields in the Arctic, they're--have a new Arctic
Command. General Dempsey testified last week, three--four new
Arctic combat brigades being deployed by the Russians in the
Arctic, a huge icebreaker fleet with as many as 11 more new
icebreakers. So, they're clearly seeing it as a strategic area.
For the world, resource development, new sea lanes that are
developing there.
And my concern is that we're well behind the Russians, in
terms of this, not only as an opportunity, but also as a
growing area of military competition that they're clearly
making it out to be. I'll give you a few examples on that. You
know, the Army is looking--our Army is looking at reducing, in
the light of what the Russians are doing--reducing two combat
brigades based in Alaska. That's a big concern.
I just have a couple of questions. And they're all kind of
related, so I'll just pose them to you. Do we have an Arctic O-
plan right now? And how would the Army troops in the Arctic, in
Alaska, fit into that? And does it make sense to significantly
reduce our military presence in the Arctic before we even put
out an O-plan and in the face of what clearly is a Russian
dramatic increase in the militarization of the Arctic? You
know, General Odierno mentioned, yesterday in testimony before
the Appropriations Committee, that he was waiting on NORTHCOM's
Arctic strategy to kind of get a sense of what they're going to
do with troop levels. So, you talk about seams. I--as you and I
have discussed, Alaska is really at the seams of NORTHCOM,
PACOM, EUCOM. And sometimes that's helpful. Other times I think
we can have our strategy fall through the seams. Can you just
comment on that, please?
Admiral Gortney. Yes. I'm assigned to be the ``advocate of
the Arctic,'' which is not a doctrinal term, it's not--I can't
direct anybody to do anything, but we are working on answering
that question: What are the requirements that we're going to
need to be able to inform our own operational plans, as you
mentioned, on the future of the Arctic, and then what we feel
are recommendations for all of DOD, not just the services, for
what necessary investments that get up there?
Senator Sullivan. Great. Because, you know, another thing
that kind of looks like it's falling through the seams, at
least within DOD and outside of the DOD, is icebreakers. When
the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] was here last week, talked
about the importance of those. Everybody agrees they're
important, and yet the Navy's not in charge of those; it's the
Coast Guard. So, there doesn't seem to be a coordinated focus
on that, as well.
Admiral Gortney. Which goes to the impact of our
interagency relationships and the impacts of sequestration. The
Coast Guard is responsible for the icebreakers. We don't--as
CNO said, we don't have any ships up there, but we--but--that
are--that float on top of the ocean, but we have submarines up
there quite frequently. So--but, we need to figure out, What
are the capabilities that we need? Because it's a very harsh
place. I mean, I graded--I loved visiting your State, but it's
a hard place to live and operate. And we have a difficulty--we
have the inability right now to reliably navigate, communicate,
and then sustain ourselves as we're up there. So, that's what
we're trying to answer, what we will endeavor to answer as the
advocate. And that report will be due out this spring, sir.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you.
And I do think the hardness actually makes for great
training, whether it's the Marines or the Army or the Navy, Air
Force, out there.
I'd like to turn to missile defense. You know, I think your
testimony highlights the growing threat, the ICBM threat,
whether it's from North Korea, whether it's from Iran--you
know, even potentially with, you know, weapons of mass
destruction in the future. Can you just comment on the role
that Fort Greely plays in that, and how important it is to
continue the focus, I think, which is a bipartisan focus here,
on increased missile defense?
Admiral Gortney. Absolutely.
You know, the strategic location of Alaska cannot be
overstated. Location, location, location. It's easier to deploy
forces from, say, our F-22s that are based there around the
world. They get wherever we need to put them quicker than, say,
we launched them out of Langley. So, the strategic importance
of Alaska can't be overstated. And, as a result of that, that's
where the Missile Defense Agency decided to put the vast
majority of our interceptors, up at Fort Greely, which we were
just up there visiting about a month ago.
We're on track. The first, which--the first missile field--
there's three missile fields, as you're aware--the first was a
test and evaluation. They're refurbishing that. And by the end
of '17, we'll have all 40 missiles up there, which brings our
numbers to 44. There's nothing preventing us from getting there
to maximize the investment that we've made for the
effectiveness of our missile defense program.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I want to join our Chairman in thanking both of you for
your distinguished service, but particularly, General Kelly,
thank you for your candid and thoughtful and insightful
remarks, but also for your and your family's service to our
Nation, which, as the Chairman said so eloquently, should
elicit our gratitude. And certainly members of the committee
feel it.
You mentioned the porousness of our borders and the
efficiency of the network that can transport drugs and people
into this country. As you may know, the Senate is now debating,
with uncertain prospects, a bill that would provide greater
assistance to the victims of human trafficking. And as a strong
supporter and leading cosponsor of that measure, I'm very
interested in what can be done by both of your commands in
stopping the flow of women and children who are exploited for
sex and slave labor. This kind of trafficking is modern
slavery, in effect. And you've spoken very powerfully on the
importance of human rights and the rule of law as it's been
vindicated in Colombia. I wonder what can be done, in your
view, in Central America, where the flow of both drugs and
human trafficking has gone. In the wake of success in Colombia,
perhaps you can give us your general comment on the trafficking
issue.
General Kelly. Thanks for the question, Senator. It's a
really important one. And my answer is not a military one for
sure; it's to give the people from that part of the world a
reason to stay home. All of the polling and all the indicators
are, they prefer to stay where their families are, where their
culture is, where they're comfortable. But, without better
human rights--and that is getting better in these countries--
without some access to economic well-being--and I think that is
the key--without lowering of the violence, basically due to--to
a large degree, to our drug consumption--and the countries are,
in fact, getting their arms around that. It's controversial, in
some respects, how they're doing it. But, the violence is going
down. And the human rights--accusations of violations are not
going up. And that's hugely important in the way they're doing
business there. Again, we've sometimes, in our interagency,
criticized the way people get at problems locally. The fact is,
they're getting at the problems.
But, really, the answer is, they won't leave if they can
get a job and live a decent life. We know that.
Senator Blumenthal. And, as you said, the solution isn't
going to be exclusively military, although law enforcement is a
part of it. And I think Senator Reed, in his remarks, made the
point that sequestration in affecting the non-Department of
Defense aid and functions in those areas is important in
fighting the flow of human trafficking, as well. Is that
correct?
General Kelly. Yes, sir, it is.
Senator Blumenthal. Admiral, I wonder if you, in your
command, have any insights into stopping the flow of
trafficking.
Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir. We work very closely in the mil-
to-mil relationship with both Sedena and Semar, because they've
been asked by their government to go after the--some of the
internal challenges that they have. And so, we have been very,
very effective. And in the last 24 to 36 months, a significant
change and an increase in receptiveness and desire to partner
with us and work with us and help them train to be more
effective. And I just received and we've just started on a path
to really assist their efforts on their southern border,
because, as they said, ``If we fix our southern border, it'll
help with so many challenges inside of our country.'' And
that's why the impact of sequestration will cut back that
ability--our ability, the amount of mil-to-mil training
capacity that we'll be able to give them so that they can
assist and make their country better.
Senator Blumenthal. In effect, the result of sequestration
is a kind of ripple effect that affects not only our military
readiness, but also the impacts we can have on cultural and
governance change for the better in these countries, that
eventually effects us, because trafficking of drugs and slave
labor across our borders affects our quality of life, as well.
Admiral Gortney. Absolutely. It's a--as General Kelly said,
this is a team sport. It requires unity of effort, whole of
government, things we speak to infrequently but are just such a
huge part of our--of how we deal with our partners to our
southern border.
Senator Blumenthal. My time is expired. I want to thank you
both for your testimony here today. Thank you. And thank you
for your service.
Chairman McCain. Senator Lee.
Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you very much, Admiral Gortney and General Kelly.
We really appreciate your service to our country.
I'm mindful of the ongoing search and rescue efforts in
connection with the soldiers and marines who were involved in
the helicopter crash off the coast of Florida in the last 2
days. Our prayers go out to them and to their family members.
General Kelly, you stated, last year, that the threats
associated with the drug trade and with the flow of
undocumented immigrants across our southern border presented an
existential threat to the National security of the United
States. I was wondering if I could just get--both of you--get
each of you to tell the committee, in your opinion, what the
greatest threats are to our National security in connection
with this--that is, the greatest threats that exist as a result
of an unsecure southern border, and how significant these
threats are if we're not able to achieve a greater degree of
control over who and what might be crossing our southern
border.
General Kelly. Well, sir, I would start with--I mean,
there's many different threats against our country. And
oftentimes we focus, certainly I'm--lectured repeatedly on--the
threats that I concern myself most with are not, kind of,
military threats, they're maybe law enforcement threats,
they're immigration threats. But, you know, I am a problem-
solver, and I am tasked to try to protect the southern
approaches to the United States. I don't just focus on military
threats, because, frankly, from my part of the world, there's
very few military threats. But, you know, on a--there's 40,000
Americans that die every year from the drugs that move up
through my part of the world into Bill's and then into our
Homeland. 40,000 people a year. You know, since September 11,
there's--half a million people have died from narcoterrorism,
as we call it in--down where I live. Narcoterrorism. 500,000
Americans have died. Very few have died from, you know,
traditional terrorism, if you will, since September 11. It
costs our country $200 billion a year to deal with the people
that are into drugs but are not, you know, dying. So, I see
that as a huge, huge, huge threat.
And I'm--I won't just limit myself to worrying about
traditional military threats, because, as Bill says, it's a
team sport, and most of the--all of the law enforcement--the
CIA, the DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency]--everyone's doing
their part, but, at the end of the day, I'm not going to
concern myself with, ``Look, General Kelly, it's not a military
threat, so don't worry about it.'' That's why--I mean, 95
percent of my activities in the course of the--of my time--all
of my time--95 percent, I focus on nonmilitary things--
economics, human rights, developing relationships with
presidents and ministers of defense to--and police chiefs in
all of these countries, particularly the Central American
countries, so I can move them in the direction of solving their
problems, which will ultimately solve our problems.
Senator Lee. Great.
Admiral?
Admiral Gortney. To add on exactly what John said, you
know, these businesses that are moving product have outstripped
the capacity of the Nations to our southern--from our southern
border--their capacity to be able to handle these challenges.
And that's why it requires the team effort from all of our
elements of government to assist them to build their
capacities, whether it's in a mil-to-mil capacity, which is
what my responsibility is, whether it's a law enforcement,
whether it's capacity-building in governance, in the judicial
system. That's what has to occur. It just can't be focused
exclusively on the military. It takes everything to deal with
the challenges that these countries are being faced with.
Senator Lee. Thank you.
General Kelly, can you discuss the level in the recent
trends and activity of Islamic terrorist organizations within
the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility?
General Kelly. I'm comfortable to say, Senator, that the
Islamic extremist, you know, organizations are not very well
entrenched in my part of the world. I don't see any direct
terrorist threat right now. And I'm--you know, the people
that'll look the hardest at this are CIA and FBI. So, I'm
comfortable. But, there is a fair amount of activity by both
Iran and recruiting, or at least attempts to recruit, by other
Islamic extremist organizations. They're--we expect--or we
calculate right now somewhere less than 100, but close to 100,
young people that have left the Caribbean region, in
particular, who now have gone to Syria to fight for the Islamic
extremist organizations. And, of course, these small countries
that don't have anything approaching our FBI or any of the law
enforcement, they're extremely concerned about them coming
back, as we are to our own country. And western Europe has the
same concerns. The difference is, these small countries that
I--that I'm describing have no real ability to deal with them.
And, of course, if they come back, or when they come back, they
can--they conduct operations in their own country or they can
simply get on the network, ride up into our country, and do
whatever someone tells them to do.
Senator Lee. Because they're right at our backdoor.
Thank you.
Thank you both.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Just to be clear about your answers to
Senator Lee, is the southern border secure, or not secure?
Admiral Gortney. The southern border can be more secure, as
can the Mexican border be more secure.
Chairman McCain. That's the only question I had.
General?
General Kelly. Sir, I think, with the amount of drugs and
people that move across our southwest border, it doesn't seem
all that secure to me.
Chairman McCain. Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Gortney, I want to thank you. In fact, I want to
thank you both for your emphasis on the importance of the
effect of sequestration on your commands and on your ability to
carry out your responsibilities.
As I talk to people at home, often I run into people to
say, ``Well, sequestration is not such a big deal. It's only 2
percent of the Federal budget.'' What people don't realize is,
two-thirds of the Federal budget isn't subject to
sequestration. So, what it really amounts to, in your case, is
about a 10-percent cut, which is very significant. Two percent
of one-third, you end up with about a 10-percent cut. And
that's what you're facing.
The other thing that I think we have to realize around
here--everybody's worried about sequestration. In talking to my
colleagues, the solutions are not easy, and we have to keep in
front of us the danger of sequestration. When we're talking
about the solutions, finding other alternatives to replace it
are--there's no low-hanging fruit, here. It's going to be
difficult. But, I'm very happy to have your testimony, this
morning, which underlines for this committee and for the
country how serious a threat this is to our National security.
Admiral Gortney, if--with regard to your responsibilities
in the Arctic, is--would it be in the National interest for
this country to accede to the Law of the Sea Treaty?
Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir. The Department of Defense, the
Chief of Naval Operations, and myself are all in agreement that
we should accede. It would--especially as we take on the role
as a lead for the Arctic Council, it would give us a better
strength, a better position of strength as we negotiate through
there.
Senator King. And, as I understand it, it's actually
compromised--our failure to be a member of that treaty is
actually compromising our ability, for example, to stake claims
to where the Continental Shelf is and those kinds of things.
Admiral Gortney. That's one of the reasons why we feel it's
a--it would be a good idea to accede.
Senator King. General Kelly, you agree with that?
General Kelly. I don't have a lot of experience, in my part
of the world, with the treaty and the issues related to the
treaty, but certainly, in my broader opinion, I agree with Bill
exactly, yes, sir.
Senator King. Thank you.
General Kelly, you talked--it was kind of amazing----
Well, first, let me say, I really appreciate your comments
about the CIA, because I've--I--as I travel, and as a member of
the Intelligence Committee, I generally meet with CIA personnel
around the world, and I have found them to be uniformly
patriotic, intelligent, passionate about their work on behalf
of this country. And, as you mentioned, they live in a
dangerous world. There are places in the world where, if they--
they can--you know, it's a danger to go outside and have lunch
downtown. And I think it's very important to recognize these
people that don't get recognition generally, and I really
appreciate the statement that you've made.
You talked about Colombia as a model partner. And I had to
think, you know, 15-20 years ago, we wouldn't have been saying
that. And in--we're dealing with so many unstable regimes
around the world. How do we replicate what happened in
Colombia? What are the steps that they took in order to take
their country back, if you will, from the chaos that they were
in 20 years ago?
General Kelly. Well, sir, they--when you're looking over
the abyss--and it's a long way down--you have kind of a--you
know, a come-to-God point, I think, and you make--you have to
make some decisions. And they made those decisions. And really
Plan Colombia, such as it was--very, very successful--really
started on this side of the hill, I think, and--but, certainly
it started in the Congress.
And there's a real misconception about what--in some
places, about what Plan Colombia was. We gave--our money was 4
cents on the dollar, as to what the Colombians contributed. So,
we didn't bankroll it. A lot of think--I have people tell me
that, ``We shouldn't put boots on the ground like we did in
Colombia.'' We didn't put boots on the ground. They did all
their own fighting, they did their own dying. And, while they
were committed--or, making these commitments, they made social
changes. Their elites were taxed and had to make a commitment
to Plan Colombia. It is a remarkable reorientation of their
society that they had to conduct.
And, frankly, the good-news story there is that what we're
doing in Central America now--because they face similar
problems; they're in the abyss, they're about to be failed
states--so, the Colombians--I just was down in Colombia, I met
with the President and the Minister of Defense, and we talked
about this at length--but, I've brought the Colombians up to
have seminars, to Miami, and invited all of the senior-most
officials of the three countries that I'm particularly
concerned with--Guatemala, el Salvador, and Honduras. And a
daylong seminar is to--``This is where my country, Colombia,
was, 20 years ago. This is how close we were to being a failed
narco state. These are the decisions we had to make. And, oh,
by the way, they're exactly the decisions you have to make. You
have to redo your tax codes. You have to get your own wealthy
people investing--instead of investing in Miami, in high-end
South Beach real estate, to invest in your own country,'' these
kind of things. We've done that twice now, focusing, the second
time, on economics. And I'm going to do another one in--with
all three presidents and their teams coming up in Miami to do a
higher-level economic development conference. As I say, 95
percent of my efforts are not military. It's economic
development.
Senator King. And, as you testified earlier, that's the key
to stopping the flow of illegal immigrants into this country,
is to make their countries more attractive places to live. And,
in fact, that's happened with Mexico, hasn't it? Don't we--
isn't it a net-zero immigration from Mexico at this point?
General Kelly. As I understand, it is net-zero, and it is
because of the economy in Mexico.
Senator King. Thank you, General.
Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ernst.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, Admiral, General.
It was a pleasure to meet with you the other day, General.
I thank you for your time and attention, and thank both of you
for your testimony today.
Of course, I've shared with many folks that I am a very
proud member of the Iowa Army National Guard. And our members
have been very involved in a number of SOUTHCOM's missions,
whether it's counterdrug, security missions--I had an MP
detachment that served in Honduras as part of their security
mission--but, we also have National Guard members from all over
the United States that serve in Guantanamo Bay at the Detainee
Center. And unfortunately, a lot of folks will want to
politicize Guantanamo Bay, or, as we all it, ``Gitmo.'' But,
I'm very proud of the service that is given there, and I
believe it is a very important mission. I believe that this is
vital to our National interests, to keep these terrorists at
Guantanamo Bay.
So, General Kelly, if you would, if you could describe the
treatment that our citizen soldiers, or those that work at the
Detainment Center, receive from the inmates. And if you could
also describe, just in your own words or your personal thoughts
based on your experiences, whether you think that these
terrorists that are housed there--do you think that they would
return to the fight if they were released?
General Kelly. Well, maybe--thanks for the question,
Senator. I think the--I'll take the first part--the second part
first and just simply say there's--and again, I don't track
these kind of things. I'm not responsible to track these kind
of things. But, I think the--the best estimate on about how
many of them return to the fight is about 30--30 percent. So,
it's a fair number. We know for sure something in the
neighborhood of about 18 percent have. With the kind of
intelligence people, CIA and others, their estimate is about 30
percent. So, they do return to the fight. Less so recently,
but, of course, the more recent detainees that have been
released, they've got plenty--you know, they've got plenty of
time to get back in the fight if they want to. But, for right
now, in the most recent detainee transfers or releases, we
don't see any of them going back. But, again, they've just been
released.
As far as the treatment goes--first, as the Chairman said
at the beginning, the troops down there that guard--that do the
detention, that carry out the mission--I mean, we do exactly
what the President of the United States tasked us to do, and it
goes from the President to SECDEF [Secretary of Defense] to me
to GTMO. And you'll see it when you go down there on Friday.
The detainees are treated very, very, very well. Their medical
care is excellent. Their--they're treated humanely, with
dignity, all of that.
Now, if they cross the line, they're disciplined--they're
treated firmly, with minimum use of force. And there's a
percentage of them down there that we have to--that are pretty
abusive to my guys and gals down there. I won't go into what
``splashing'' is, but it's pretty vile stuff. They'll tell you
all about it. Physical assaults.
But, at the end of the day, you know, we're the good guys,
they're not. We carry out the mission that the President gives
us. And all of the human rights groups that go down there give
us very, very high marks on how that's done. And again, we can
decide--talk to policy, which I'm not into; but, at the end of
the day, it's a very, very important mission to this country,
and it's done superbly well by the men and women that are down
there.
Senator Ernst. Thank you very much, General.
We also did discuss the State Partnership Program the other
day during our discussion. And I do feel that this is a very
important program for many of our National Guards. Currently,
we are involved in a State Partnership Program with Kosovo. I
know other States are involved with a number of countries. If
you would please, in your own words, just describe how
important you believe this program to be.
General Kelly. Yeah. The Partnership Program is very, very
high impact and very, very low cost. And what I have seen over
my years in working with other countries, whether in the part
of the world I'm in now or in the Central Command area, you
know, in--among the Arab countries, it's our example that
they--that catches their attention. The fact that men and women
are--come down from Iowa or wherever and work together.
You know, the role--or the status of women in many of these
countries is very low. Yet, they see American units come by,
come down, and men and women working together; in many, many
cases, women actually in command of the unit, the small unit
that comes down. That's startling to them.
And I think, over time, that is what changes these
countries for the better, how--just working alongside American
servicemen and -women, and really, just as importantly,
Homeland Security men and women that are sprinkled around the
world--FBI, DEA, at--our good example is what changes these
countries over time. Where we touch, they notice, they take
notice, and then they change. We have very, very positive
effect on these societies.
Senator Ernst. I appreciate that so much.
And I do want to take the time to thank all of the staff
members that join us here today for the testimony. Lots of
great servicemembers come out of the IOS. So, thank you,
Sergeant Major, very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman McCain. Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thanks, to you both.
I want to offer a thank you and then two questions. So, on
the thank you side, you each helped prepared Senator Cornyn and
I for our recent visit to Mexico, Honduras, and Colombia. And
it was a very successful visit. We saw evidence of what you had
said, Admiral Gortney, the increasing mil-to-mil cooperation
between the United States and Mexico that's very laudable. We
went to Honduras, General Kelly, at your request, to meet with
President Hernandez. Our Ambassador, when we landed, first took
us to a neighborhood that he said, ``I'm now going to take you
to the most dangerous neighborhood in the most dangerous city
in the most dangerous country in the world,'' the Chermelecon
neighborhood in San Pedro Sula. But, we saw USAID [United
States Agency for International Development] projects in that
very dangerous neighborhood that are helping folks, visited
your--some of your folks at JTF-Bravo at Soto Cano, and then
had a chance to talk to the President about the proposed
budgetary investment in the region. And then, finally, in
Colombia, we went out to Tolemaida and saw the U.S. and
Colombian military, together, talk about the progress that
they've made in helping turn the failed state into a reliable
ally of the United States. And it was remarkable.
I saw all the challenges that you've testified to and that
my colleagues have asked you about, and I think you've done a
good job at responding to those. But--and I came back mindful
of challenges, but I also came back thinking of some upside
opportunities if we get it right. If we get it right. And I
want to ask you about that.
Senator McCain, in his opening comments, kind of talked
about, ``We don't necessarily pay that much attention to the
region, as we do other places, and more sustained effort could
be helpful.'' What I came away from our trip thinking is, of
the deep cultural connections that we have in this 36 nations
in the Americas, from Canada to Patagonia, where all this
mixture of an indigenous culture that has welcomed European,
African, and Asian immigration--in that mix is a common
feature, north to south. We all call ourselves Americans--
North, Central, or South. We are all Americans. There is a
growing middle class in these nations, and growing economic
prospects, and growing trade. The most significant number of
free trade agreements that the United States has is with
nations in the Americas.
There is the prospect for no war in the Americas, maybe for
the first time in history, and certainly in a very different
way than any other continent. The peace negotiation between the
Colombian government and the FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia], if it reaches a successful point in the sort of
final chapter, could make us two continents, with millions of
challenges, but two continents without a war, when you can't
say the same thing about Europe, you can't say the same thing
about Africa, you can't say the same thing about Asia.
And so, I really see some opportunities for an Americas, a
billion people strong, with cultural ties, with trade ties,
with better and better military ties, even in the midst of all
these challenges, which are real. And I just wanted to ask you,
Do you have that same sense of--there are really upside
opportunities in both of your areas of responsibility if we pay
persistent attention, rather than episodic attention, sort of
across all of government?
General Kelly. Couldn't agree more, Senator. The one
thing--my takeaway in the part of the world I work in, with the
exception--with very few exceptions--you know, the people that
didn't get the memo about, you know, human rights and things
like that--Venezuela is an example--the vast majority of the
continent, all the way down to Patagonia, as you say, they want
to be best friends with the United States, they want to partner
with us economically, socially. I mean, it's--they very, very--
and they're disappointed that we pay so little attention to
them.
Now, there are some competitors. You know, the Chinese are
very heavily involved, in terms of economics and things like
that. The Russians in--much less. But, they're, you know,
competitors, in a way. But, the frustration that the countries
have is, they would rather deal with us on a--on the very
issues they deal with China and Russia on, but we sometimes
just show a lack of interest. But, they want to partner with
us, and they love the fact that the United States no longer
comes down carrying a big stick, but, rather, equal partners.
And an awful lot of that good feeling comes as a direct result,
I think, of the men and women out of the command that I
command, and how much time and effort they put in, in
partnering across the region.
Senator Kaine. Admiral Gortney?
Admiral Gortney. I'll echo what John said. You know, our
partners know that we are a really great nation, and we're with
them for the long haul. We may have some ups and downs, like
most relationships, but we'll be there, we're stable, and we'll
be there with them for the long haul. So, a little bit of
investment of a--a little bit more investment of our time and
energy from all the elements of our government will go a long
way, because they need our help. Some--they have some immense
challenges out there.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen, for your service and for being
here today.
Admiral, in your prepared testimony, you discuss the
growing threat that's posed by cruise missiles, to the United
States; and you say that Russia is progressing towards its goal
of deploying long-range conventionally-armed cruise missiles,
and, if that trend continues, that, over time, NORAD [North
American Aerospace Defense Command] is going to face increased
risks in its ability to defend North America. Does the budget
support your plans for the cruise-missile defense that we need
for this country?
Admiral Gortney. Provided we're given the account that the
Department has asked for, I think we'll be on a good path. When
it comes to the particular cruise-missile threat, you know,
we're experimenting with JLENS [Joint Land Attack Cruise
Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System], up at Aberdeen.
That shows great promise. It's not without challenges any test
program is going to have, but--there's a lot of air traffic up
there. And to be able to integrate that into the rest of our
architecture, to include our Aegis ships that will be off of
our coast, so that we can deal with the leakers--you know, I've
been in the cruise-missile threat since I was a lieutenant JG,
and I've shot over 1300 of them, so I know how effective they
are, and I know how hard they are to defeat. And it really
requires us to have a layered approach that we--it's more
effective--it's only effective if we get the archer and not
just deal with the arrows, and have the ability to reach deep
to get the cruise-missile shooter so that we're only dealing
with a few of the leakers out here.
The long-range aviation--Russian long-range aviation, it's
a pretty significant increase in numbers. And what concerns me
more are two things. It's the--where they're flying, even
through the English--down the English Channel--it's where
they're flying that has not been what they have done in the
past, even back with the Soviet Union. And the development of
the cruise missiles that they have, that have a very long
range, that--from the Russian--from eastern Russia, they can
range critical infrastructure in Alaska and in Canada that we
rely on for our homeland defense mission. So, we have to look
at this in a more expansive manner. But, if we have the
investments that we've asked for, we'll be able to outpace that
technology.
Senator Fischer. And so, also in this year's budget, when
we look at those investments in the next-generation defense
technology, which I support--I think it's needed, and I support
it strongly--I am concerned, though, that those capabilities
are not going to be deployed anytime soon. I believe it will be
in the next decade, at the earliest. Do you have concerns with
that, as well? Are you satisfied with that timeline, or are you
just, I guess, accepting of that timeline?
Admiral Gortney. Well, there's--as a military officer,
we'll take capability earlier than later any day. And--but, for
the necessary investments, as the technology is advancing, I'm
satisfied with where we are.
Senator Fischer. Okay, good to hear.
With your cyberspace mission, you state that it would be
rather simplistic to assume that a large-scale cyberattack on
the Nation's infrastructure would somehow not impact both us
and our partners' ability to successfully perform the DSCA
[Defense Security Cooperation Agency] mission, the support that
we give to our civil authorities. And it makes strategic sense
to consider the steps that could be taken to mitigate or
prevent those types of attacks. Can you elaborate a little bit
on that statement that you made?
Admiral Gortney. Yes, ma'am. My assigned responsibility is
to defend my own networks and to help the lead Federal agency
in the defense support for civil authorities. But, effectively,
it can be a mission kill. We are very reliant on critical
infrastructure--held by the private and public--but critical
infrastructure in order for us to defend the Nation. A
cyberattack in Ottawa would take out the northeast quadrant of
our air-defense sector. It would be, effectively, a mission
kill. So, not only would it affect me to be able to do my
mission, more--quite frankly, more importantly, we, as a
Nation, rely on this same infrastructure for us to operate,
whether it's banking, rail, aviation, power, movement of water.
All of these things have critical infrastructure that we must
have, and they need to be hardened against an adversary.
Senator Fischer. Can you give us, specifically, some of the
steps that you would recommend we take so that we can look
towards that prevention when it comes to our cyber?
Admiral Gortney. Well, ma'am, this is out of my league, as
the technical aspects, I'm going to defer to my good friend,
Mike Rogers, at DSCA. He's--he really understands it. I don't
know a switch from a router.
But, the real issue comes down--is from you all. It
requires law and policy that are very difficult for us to come
across as a nation. Some--it's privacy--some privacy concerns,
some things that you might even say cross the Bill of Rights,
many of the same issues that we had before 9/11. And, as a
result of 9/11, we passed new laws and got new policy that gave
us the ability to better protect our Nation. And I would hope
that it wouldn't take a cyber 9/11 or a cyber Pearl Harbor for
us to finally realize we need to do that sort of thing. And you
all have done--you have taken great strides, and we're grateful
for that. And we need to continue that momentum.
Senator Fischer. And do you think that it is imperative
that the government be able to share some information with
private businesses, and private businesses also share that
information with each other, so that we can look more towards
defense, deterrence, and, if necessary, offensive use of our
capabilities?
Admiral Gortney. Yes, ma'am. And I'm really focused on the
defense. You don't transmit until you're ready to receive. And
we need to shore up that defense.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for your testimony here today, and your
service.
I want to continue Senator Fischer's questions about
cybersecurity. Cyberattacks against the homeland are growing as
a threat to U.S. infrastructure, business, and defense. A
critical mission of NORTHCOM is to coordinate the response to
attacks on the homeland with the Department of Homeland
Security. Admiral Rogers told our colleagues on the House side
that the Obama administration isn't where it needs to be yet in
planning the coordination between the military and civilian
agencies' response to a major cyberattack. How would you assess
the coordination between NORTHCOM and DHS?
Admiral Gortney. We're supporting the DHS in that regard,
predominantly in the aftermath of the event, in my defense
support for civil authorities. The difficulty that they have
are exactly what we were just discussing. It goes to the laws
that we need as a Nation so that then DHS has the authorities
they need to be able to better defend our Nation in that
regard.
Senator Gillibrand. From your perspective, how is the
overall coordination between Federal, State, and local
governments, and how, beyond what you've suggested, do you
think we could improve?
Admiral Gortney. Federal, local, and--we just--just a
couple of weeks ago, we met with the Council of Governors
within DOD. And I'm a member of that particular board in my
capacity as Northern Command. And we have a long way to go to
sharing information. We're doing a pretty good job sharing gov-
to-gov, from local/State to Homeland Security. The challenges,
we're working our way through. Homeland Security is working
their way through, sharing private-to-Homeland Security. But,
there are even some reasons why private can't talk to State and
local. And so, it's expanding those authorities that are
required to better communicate, to better defend.
Senator Gillibrand. I'd now like to turn to your Arctic
mission. Obviously, NORTHCOM plays an integral role in the
Arctic. How important are international cooperative agreements
and partnerships such as Tri-Command Framework for Arctic
Cooperation for U.S. NORTHCOM's success in the Arctic?
Admiral Gortney. Absolutely critical. You know, it's a
very, very difficult place to navigate, communicate, and
sustain ourselves. And so, those partnerships that we can share
capability and capacity, as we do with Canada through the NORAD
role, cannot be overstated.
Senator Gillibrand. New York's 109th Airlift Wing is home
to the only LC-130 Skibirds in the U.S. Air Force. Their unique
ability to provide airlift on snow and ice has made them
valuable resource to the National Science Foundation,
supporting science missions in Greenland and Antarctica. Last
year, the unit showed the full range of their capabilities by
successfully supporting exercises with the Canadian military in
the Arctic. Based on the current types of threats you see in
the Arctic, how important is this type of airlift capability to
the future success of the NORTHCOM?
Admiral Gortney. Absolutely critical. Once again, it goes
to, How are we going to navigate, communicate, sustain
ourselves, and the C-130s with skids, our helicopters with
skids from our other Guard outfits to help us out there,
absolutely critical.
Senator Gillibrand. I've read a lot of recent articles
about sort of--some sort of rush to use the Arctic for natural
resources, for other leverage. Do you think we need more of
this particular capability or other capabilities in the future
as our Arctic presence increases?
Admiral Gortney. I do. And that's why, as I'm working on
our--``Arctic Way Ahead'' is the atticad for the Arctic that
will be addressing those issues, and I'll have that out in the
spring.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
My last question, for General Kelly, is: Specifically, what
is your assessment with regard to Iran's role in the SOUTHCOM
area of operation?
General Kelly. Senator, the Iranians have, over the last
decade or so, been increasing the number of embassies, as an
example, in the region. I think they've tripled the number of
embassies. They've opened what they call ``cultural centers''
to--you know, trying to--try to garner support, in terms of
their country, and certainly to try to circumvent the
sanctions, I think. But, the point is, they've opened up these
cultural centers. And, you know, frankly, I don't see a lot of
similarity between the Latin culture and the Iranian culture,
for sure. I'm a little bit suspicious of these--of this
activity, just because there is such a vast different--
difference between the two countries--or the two regions, two
cultures. So, we keep an--we keep a watchful eye on them.
You know, there's a fair amount of concern about, you know,
local Jewish communities in Latin America, of which there are
many, actually. You know, I'm sure the Senator knows about the
issue in the '90s, the 85 deaths that were--that took place in
the Jewish Community Center there in Buenos Aires. So, we keep
a close eye on that. They're generally a country that, whatever
they're up to, it's--generally, they're up to no good, and we
have to watch them closely.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and
for your time here today.
I have two say, General Kelly, I agree with your statement
that there doesn't seem to be all that many similarities
between Latin American culture and Persian culture. I would
also like to point out that Iran has been implicated in the
murders of many Jews in South Africa and Argentina. The
investigator, which mysteriously turned up dead a few weeks
ago.
And, Admiral Gortney, I'd just like to highlight in your
testimony on page 6, that you say Iran recently launched
another satellite into orbit and, quote, ``Despite
international condemnation and sanctions, Iran has failed to
cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency to
resolve all outstanding concerns regarding its nuclear program,
particularly those concerning its possible military
dimensions,'' end quote. So, before we even reach any further
deal with Iran, Iran is already not living up to its
obligations under multiple U.N. Security Council Resolutions.
But, now I'd like to turn to Russia. General Kelly, on page
8 of your written testimony, you say, quote, ``Under President
Putin, we have seen a clear return to cold war tactics,'' end
quote. Could you please elaborate on what you mean,
specifically in your AOR?
General Kelly. Well, yes, Senator.
For a number of years, we saw almost no real activity of
any kind from the Russians. And just in the last couple of
years, there's been some long-range bomber missions, they
deployed a small task force of warships to the Caribbean, made
various stops in, you know, countries like Cuba, Venezuela, and
Nicaragua.
They're, you know, from my perspective, really a nuisance,
but they seem to be ratcheting up their kind of in-your-face
``We can go anywhere we want, and we have friends around the
globe.'' We know that they're in discussions, not to open
bases, but to have, you know, agreements to where they can
either bring ships to refuel and--or aircraft to land and
refuel. So----
But, as I say, they're more of a nuisance, but they're
really up to, I think, just kind of making their point that
they can go anywhere they want and challenge us in various
ways.
There's also a pretty steady stream of electronic warfare
collection vessels that, you know, ply the waters of the
Caribbean in the Atlantic--our Atlantic coast. And
periodically, you know, they'll stop and get fuel, as I say, or
pull liberty in some of the countries that they're friendliest
with.
Senator Cotton. Admiral Gortney, could--would you share
your perspective on growing Russian influence and activity in
your AOR?
Admiral Gortney. Absolutely, sir.
You know, qualitatively, the Russians are--have developed a
better military than the quantitative military of the Soviet
Union. And they're--and they've also developed a new doctrine,
and we're seeing that military and that doctrine playing out in
the Ukraine.
In the homelands, we're seeing them use that better
military with long-range aviation and the deployment of their
submarines and of the collection vessels that John was taken
about.
So, what bothers me is the intent. What is their intent?
They're clearly messaging us. That's--we do that, as well. But,
what is the intent as they employ that doctrine through the
spectrum of conflict? That's what concerns me.
Senator Cotton. And now this is a question for both of you.
If the United States proceeds with the sequestration cuts to
our defense budget, would you expect to see Russian influence
and activity in the western hemisphere continue to grow or
decrease?
Admiral Gortney. I think any opponent will seize an
opportunity when they see it. And I think that that's exactly
what would happen.
General Kelly. I agree, sir. And the sequestration thing,
again, is--the--what our partners around the world are looking
at is this kind of almost withdrawal of our leadership role,
depending on what part of the world and who you're talking to.
But, to take away the ability to partner with nations, to do
deployments, to--would really, really, I think, send a shock
wave through many of the countries that we're--that are--that
most--that we're most aligned with and allied with. I know, in
my part of the world, they're already very, very concerned at
the limited amount of engagement that already takes place.
Senator Cotton. So, let me get this straight. Twenty-five
years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 50 years after
the Cuban missile crisis, 200 years after the Monroe Doctrine,
your opinion is that, if this Congress proceeds with the
sequestration cuts to our defense, we will see continued and
growing Russian adventurism in the western hemisphere. Admiral
Gortney, yes or no?
Admiral Gortney. I would agree with that.
Senator Cotton. General Kelly?
General Kelly. Yes, sir.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for you being here and for your service
to the country. I apologize for missing the--your remarks.
Unfortunately, there are too many things going on at one time,
which I know you appreciate.
General Kelly, last year during the crisis on the southern
border with unaccompanied minors, you gave a briefing to a
number of Senators. And one of the things you talked about is
the impact of cutbacks on your ability to address drug
interdiction and interdiction of illegals coming across the
border. Can you talk a little bit about that here and what the
impact of these budget cuts have had on your ability to address
those issues?
General Kelly. Yes, Senator.
As far as the interdiction of drugs go--and we've talked
about it a little bit here in the hearing, previously--it's
all--in my world, it's all about having an ability to see them,
detection and monitoring. That's really my mission. And then I
work closely with law enforcement, particularly Coast Guard, to
do the final interdiction phase.
The interdiction phase really takes ships or cutters that
you can fly a--or some vessel that you can fly a helicopter
from. Last year, we interdicted 158--collectively, we
interdicted 158 metric tons of cocaine, with no violence. Once
it gets ashore--and that's the key--once it gets ashore in
Central America and moves up through Mexico, we're taking
almost nothing off the market, and the violence is
unbelievable. More ships, more cutters means more cocaine.
You're never going to get to the point of going--you know,
stopping it all. That includes heroin and methamphetamine.
Again, all that comes up through the network that runs through
my zone and into Bill's. You're never going to stop it all.
But, the key--what you're trying to do is drive down
availability and drive up price, and then people--less people
won't start toying around with drugs and get--you know, get
hooked on drugs and all that kind of thing.
And you weren't here, but, you know, 40,000 Americans a
year die from drugs. It costs our country $200 billion a year,
and then all the human misery that goes with that. So, that's
kind of the--more vessels that I can fly helicopters from.
Another option, and something I'm doing more and more of,
is--that is working with the department of militaries,
particularly in Central America--moving their militaries away
from the internal parts of their country to the--recommending
that they move to the borders, and then work together with
border--with their neighbors, north/south, to include Mexico,
in--to try to--you know, this year, in fact, the Hondurans, for
the first time, I think, in history, interdicted multiple tons
of cocaine, a lot of it because of how we recommended they go
about their business.
So, the partners have ponied up to this in a big way,
because they see it as--much of it is because their countries
are in the conditions they're in because of the drug
trafficking.
Senator Shaheen. And how is--how important is it to those
countries in Central America to have--to be able to see us as a
strong partner in those efforts? And what will be the impact of
further cuts on our ability to do that?
General Kelly. Well, the--they see us, as I mentioned just
a few minutes ago--they want to be partnering with us, they
want to trade with us, they want to interact with us, they want
our help, our investment--a better way to put it. And if we
walk away--frankly, if we walk away--if we reduce any more of
what I'm doing in Latin America, it'll be--it'll go to zero. I
mean, we're doing so little now, and we could do so much more
with just a little bit more.
Senator Shaheen. Well, we certainly appreciate that in New
Hampshire and northern New England, where we've seen a real
epidemic of heroin and drug abuse and deaths from heroin
overdoses. So, we very much appreciate that.
Can I also ask--and again, you may have covered this--but,
are you seeing terrorists from other parts of the world
exploiting the smuggling routes that are used by organized
crime?
General Kelly. That's actually a great question, Senator.
We are beginning to see a real convergence of the two. We know,
as an--the biggest problem these traffickers have is not
getting drugs and things into the United States. The biggest
problem they have is laundering the $85 billion of illicitly-
gained funds. And we know, to one degree or another, that there
are Lebanese Hezbollah associates that are helping launder some
of that money. And we don't know exactly how much they're
taking as a fee, but we know it's an awful lot--tens of
millions of dollars, for sure.
Senator Shaheen. And do we know what banks they're using to
launder? Is it Lebanese banks?
General Kelly. There are connections with the Lebanese
banks back in Lebanon. And beyond that, I'm over my head.
We'd--you'd have to get Treasury in here to talk about it. But,
they're very aggressive. Our Treasury Department, very
aggressive, and increasingly so, going after this issue. Yes,
ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. My time is up, but thank you both.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. I want to thank the Chairman.
I want to thank both of you for your leadership and what
you do for our country.
I wanted to ask you, General Kelly--I note, in your
prepared statement, the superb work done by our guards and
medical force at Guantanamo. And I wanted to follow up and ask
you about an article I had read in the New York Times about a
court order that was not allowing female--certain female guards
to do all the same functions as men at Guantanamo, which
obviously--to me, strikes me as somewhat unusual, because I
don't think we would find that in other prison-type settings.
So, could you tell me a little bit about that and what's
happening? And if there's a specific group of detainees that
has generated this court order, who are they and why are they
there?
General Kelly. Yes, Senator. This issue on the women--and
you're exactly right, I have court orders against using women,
because they are women, with certain detainees--the high-value
detainees. But, this is really just a series of--they
manipulate us. They're experts at manipulating us, them and
their proponents. This is just a series. You know, 2 years ago,
it was Koran desecration, which we don't do, and they had
motions in the courts, and we got past that. Then it was how we
search them, that we were searching their genitals, which we
don't search that way. And right--you know, the temperature in
the cells, the noise in the cells. And this is just one of a
series.
I mean, frankly, we're dealing with women now. We have two
orders from two different judges, in the Commission side, to
not use women, because they were women, because the high-value
detainees felt it was against their religion, which anyone that
knows anything about the Muslim religion knows that it's not
against their religion. But, the point is, they're--you know,
we had women restricted from doing the jobs they're trained to
do----
Senator Ayotte. And who--you know, give us a sense of who
some of these high-level detainees who have brought this action
to prevent women guards, who, by the way, we're very proud of--
--
General Kelly. Yeah.
Senator Ayotte.--are doing great work at----
General Kelly. Well, certainly the----
Senator Ayotte.--Guantanamo?
General Kelly.--the September 11 five.
Senator Ayotte. So, the September 11 five----
General Kelly. Right.
Senator Ayotte.--want to tell us that our women--that women
who serve our country can't guard them?
General Kelly. That's exactly right. And then the Cole
bomber.
Senator Ayotte. And the Cole bomber.
General Kelly. The Cole bomber. And the expectation is,
once we get through this--we have two judges, two court orders.
One has been lifted, the other one is still under
consideration. And, as soon as this is over, it'll be, ``We
don't want to be touched by Jews,'' or ``We don't want to be
touched by, you know, black soldiers,'' or ``We don't want to
be touched by Roman Catholics.'' It's just a series. It's
beyond me why we even consider some of these requests, but I'm
not a lawyer, I'm not smart enough to figure this out.
Senator Ayotte. Well, it's beyond me, too, because I think
they'll find that, in the United States of America, we believe
very firmly in equality for women. And so, to me this is just
absurd that we're even entertaining these challenges.
But, I want to commend the women guards at Guantanamo. And
I know that you're every bit as good. And, you know, when the
9/11 attackers don't want women guarding them, it's absurd, and
I don't think we should be accommodating that.
So, please say thank you, for me, and that we support them
fully.
General Kelly. Sure will.
Senator Ayotte. I also wanted to follow up on the recent
transfers from Guantanamo to Uruguay and just ask you--I
understand there were a number of transfers made there in
December. And can you tell me whether you have any concerns
about the resettlement of these detainees in Uruguay? And I did
see public reports that one of them actually left Uruguay
already and went to Argentina. And can you help me understand
how we're keeping tabs on these folks?
General Kelly. I can tell you that--first, I'm not in any
way involved with the decision to transfer them. That's all
done by an interagency group. And I'm not privy at all to the
agreements that may or may not be made with countries that
receive these guys. Sometimes--the Algerians, as an example,
the Saudis, very specifically, when they take control of these
guys, they put them in a setting that is very, very
restrictive. It's my understanding, probably from reading the
same open press reports, that the--in particular, the Uruguayan
President, who said, once they arrived, that they are free men,
and that there are very few restrictions on them.
At a--there's another concern I have, that I cannot talk in
an open setting like this, about some of their activities; the
Uruguayans, in particular. But, you know, generally speaking,
if you believe the newspaper reports, some of them want to come
back to Guantanamo, because they're not living the lifestyle
they thought they would lead in Uruguay. It was kind of an
interesting twist.
But, again, I'm concerned somewhat about their activities,
but it's really not part of my responsibility to track them at
all.
Senator Ayotte. Well, I would like to follow up, certainly
offline, about some of the concerns that you may have about
Uruguay so that we can understand that.
And I just want to thank both of you for your tremendous
service to the country.
Chairman McCain. Senator King has a additional comment.
Senator King. Just--no, just a quick question for General
Kelly.
You've talked several times about the sophistication of
this network that's moving, principally, drugs in and out of
the country. Do you have any specificity on where they
penetrate the border? Is it in a particular area? Is it by
land, sea? What's the--how do they make it through? I guess,
Admiral, your jurisdiction, but either of you. I'm interested
in more specificity about where they come through.
General Kelly. I'll push it to the Admiral, but the answer
is ``everywhere you can imagine.''
Chairman McCain. Isn't--could I interrupt? Isn't the answer
also, it's like squeezing a balloon? And right now the Arizona-
Mexico border is one of the major transshipment points. One
reason is because we have mountains that--they come right up
and actually station guides on the mountains to lead them
forward.
I didn't mean to interrupt, but right now the Tucson sector
of the Arizona-Mexico border is one of the most heavily
trafficked, I'm sorry to say. But, it--but, please respond,
both of you.
Admiral Gortney. Chairman, that's exactly right. Part of
the challenge of--John and his predecessor's success in the
maritime pushed it up through the peninsula. And so, as we--
wherever we squeeze, we've got to squeeze equally on the
balloon. The efforts in the maritime right now is pushing it up
outside through the Bahamas into the east of the Bahamas. So,
wherever we apply pressure, we will be effective for a period
of time, and they're going to find the weakness. It's like
water. And so, it's understanding and have the intelligence as
to where to apply the pressure and where will they go next,
which is the real challenge. It sounds----
Chairman McCain. But, isn't it true that right now the
Arizona-----
Admiral Gortney. You have a----
Chairman McCain:--Mexico border is----
Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir.
Chairman McCain:--one of the major trafficking points? Is
that correct?
Admiral Gortney. That is correct, sir.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Senator King. But, again, I'm just trying to understand
this. As you seal up one place, you're going to find other--
some of the routes seem to be by water?
Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir.
General Kelly. The example I would give you--one of--2\1/2\
years ago, when I first took this job, we had the vast majority
of cocaine moving up Central America, Mexico, into the United
States, 2 or 3 percent moving up the islands into, say,
Dominican Republic and over to Puerto Rico. Now we see about--
we've had a lot of success on the isthmus. We've put a kind of
a shield in place, so we've deflected a lot of the cocaine. Now
it's moving--maybe 14-15 percent is moving up in a way that had
not been used since the 1980s.
In my JIATF-South--Joint Interagency Task Force-South, down
in Key West--we've just stood up a container cell, because we
know they're starting to move things now increasingly by
container. And we just got, I think--just the other day, 156
kilos in a container. As we've done things with----
Senator King. The container, which came over--came by sea.
General Kelly. By sea, yes, sir.
Heroin, we know, because it's very, very high value,
travels primarily by air. That is, a passenger with a couple or
3 kilos in--you know, in his bag. We see the aviation flights
that used to come out of Venezuela--exclusively out of
Venezuela, in--going into Honduras, because of things we've
done with the Hondurans, in the Honduran--recommendations we
made to the Hondurans and the Guatemalans--we're now seeing the
jets--or the aircraft, they've transitioned from, say,
propeller aircraft to jets. And now they're going deeper, to
Mexico. So, it----
Senator King. It would be----
General Kelly. They change very quickly.
Senator King. It would be helpful to us, in terms of
allocating resources to protect against this, to have some
analysis--and perhaps you could get together with the DEA, the
FBI, CIA, other--Homeland Security--about where the--not
necessarily where, but the types of routes--sea, air, land--
just so we know where we should be putting our resources.
General Kelly. We certainly have that, Senator. I mean, I
could sit here for 3 hours and tell you.
But, the bottom line is, my organization can see,
electronically as well as through intel, working with DEA and
FBI and all--we can detect and monitor this stuff to a very,
very high rate of accuracy. What I can't do--what the
interagency can't do very effectively, because we don't have
ships and cutters, is interdict it.
Senator King. And that's a question of resources, getting
back to the sequester.
I--for the record, if you would supply a one-pager on where
you see the paths, that would----
General Kelly. Yes, sir.
Senator King.--be helpful.
General Kelly. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]

The United States and Europe remain the two major markets for South
American cocaine, with the bulk of Colombian cocaine destined for the
U.S. Most U.S. bound cocaine moved through Central America in 2014.
Colombia and Ecuador will very likely remain the primary maritime
departure countries, delivering cocaine to Panama, Costa Rica, and
Guatemala for follow-on ground movement through Mexico and into the
U.S. Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, and parts of the
Eastern Caribbean will likely continue to pale in comparison to
trafficking through Central America; however, trend analysis suggests
use of the Caribbean maritime vector is likely increasing. With regard
to air transport, Venezuela to Honduras or Belize will likely remain
the primary vector for non-commercial air trafficking; however, Mexican
cartels are seeking more direct air and maritime routes to Mexico and
the northern Tier, with flights originating primarily out of Ecuador
and Peru.

Chairman McCain. Could I also mention, while we're in this
conversation, that, because of the legalization of marijuana in
Colorado and other places, that we are seeing a reduction in
marijuana shipments and an increase in methamphetamines,
heroin, and other so-called ``hard'' drugs. Do you want to
comment on that phenomenon?
Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir. It's one of the common questions
that come up in my partnership with the Bahamas and Mexico,
is--is the legalization of marijuana. It concerns them, it
concerns us, it especially----
Chairman McCain. Yeah, but hasn't it affected the kinds of
drugs that are being sent up? Less marijuana.
Admiral Gortney. The drug traffic has evolved. Is--I'm not
aware if it's a direct result, yet, of a--less of a demand for
marijuana that is legally grown and sold here in the States. I
can't help but think that, in the future, that is exactly
what's going to happen.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
General?
General Kelly. Yes, sir. The heroin issue is remarkable,
and the methamphetamine, as you point out. You know,
methamphetamine used to be produced in the United States, but,
because of different laws that the Congress changed, it's
harder and harder for the local labs to get the precursors to
make the methamphetamine. So, now I think it's something in the
neighborhood of 87--90 percent of all the methamphetamine now
consumed in the United States is produced in Mexico and then
smuggled in.
As far as the heroin goes, illegal pharmaceuticals--you
know, oxycontin, that kind of thing--have--is very, very
expensive. I'm told that if you went out here and bought a
single oxycontin pill on--illegally on Capitol Hill, it would
cost you about $60 and get you a certain place. That same
amount of heroin is about $6. So, we see--as the Federal
Government has really gotten its arms around illegal
pharmaceuticals and the availability of illegal pharmaceuticals
would come down, now the heroin has just exploded. And it's not
just in--as I've--I think I testified last year, it's not--it's
just not in inner-city communities now, it's everywhere. I
mean, it's in New Hampshire, it's in, you know, Capitol Hill,
it's in Beacon Hill, it's on the Harvard campus, you know, and
it's really very, very, very disturbing.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ayotte had an additional question.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Chairman.
Let me just say that, you know, this issue of heroin, it's
devastating in a State like mine. We've seen almost a 60-
percent increase in drug deaths because of, you know, the
inexpensive nature of heroin, and the addictive nature of it.
So, thank you for everything you're doing on that. And I think
that's an area where we should work together in this committee
to get more resources for you to--the more we can drive up the
price of heroin, obviously, and interdict more of it, the more
we can try to combat this along other ways, too. So, thank you.
I had a followup question, though, about Guantanamo. And,
you know, there's been a lot of talk about Guantanamo being
used as a--by our enemies as a recruitment tool. And has anyone
ever looked at the issue of--if we move these terrorists, we
move some of these high-level detainees, to a facility in the
United States, does anyone know whether--have we looked at the
idea of whether that facility would also be used as an example
of a recruitment tool? Seems to me that our enemies--almost
anything that becomes symbolic of the United States of America
and our fight against them can be used as a radicalization and
recruitment tool. Have you looked at this issue or have any
thoughts on that?
General Kelly. I have a lot of thoughts on it, Senator.
Senator Ayotte. Well, what are your thoughts?
General Kelly. I don't believe--well, my belief is, the
people that--these Islamic terrorists are focused on doing us
so much harm, not because of GTMO or wherever we house these
guys; it's really about us, as a people, as a country.
Senator Ayotte. And what we stand for.
General Kelly. And what we stand for, the way we live our
lives, the way we worship any god we want to worship, the way
we educate in--our little girls. That's why they hate us. I
don't--they don't need GTMO to hate us. And if you--and if we
move them to Charleston, then they'd--then it would be--
Charleston would be--they--it's because of who we are and who
they are as to why they hate us so much.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, General.
Chairman McCain. Senator Tillis.
Senator Tillis. Thank you.
Thank you both for your extraordinary leadership and
service.
I want to go back to expand on something that Senator
Donnelly asked. And this has to do--General Kelly, you and I
met earlier this week, and we were talking about the level of
situational awareness you have. You know where a lot of these
bad people are, you may even know their phone number. You know
where they're moving and when they're moving. So, there's got
to be a high degree of frustration that you could do so much
more if you had the resources available. Can you kind of replay
what we talked about, in terms of just how much you know about
what's going on down there that you can't really stop because
you have priorities that you have to leverage your assets?
General Kelly. Yes, Senator.
The fusion of intelligence, most of it coming from DEA,
FBI--and they have agents in many of these countries, living
full-time, and they work with the law enforcement--the local
law enforcement. So, the human intelligence is collected by
them, and it is just remarkable, the clarity that--and then,
the technical intelligence that the military provides, whether
it's NSA, satellites--we've got radars that triangulate and
watch the entire Caribbean. So, we fuse all of that together in
a place called JIATF-South, in Key West. And the picture we
have is really remarkable. I mean, as I was mentioning in your
office, oftentimes we'll know within a couple of hours when one
of the go-fasts, the speedboats, is going to leave Cartagena
Harbor, the fact that they have a ton and a half of cocaine
onboard, that there's two guys, one of whom is--you know, first
name is Jose, maybe have his phone number. The frustrating
thing is, we have insufficient airborne ISR [Intelligence,
Survelliance, Reconnaissance] to then really get the detail on
him as he's moving. And then, the end game is a law enforcement
helicopter, usually Coast Guard.
So, we see it. It's amazing picture, a very, very clear
picture. It's that we don't have the assets.
Now, what we've been doing more and more, since we don't
have the assets and we're getting less and less assets--
although I will say the Coast Guard Commandant has made a real
commitment to double the number of Coast Guard cutters. But,
that'll go from three to six. And he also--the Coast Guard also
has an awful lot of other missions to accomplish--migration up
in the Florida straits and all--you know, a lot of other
things. But, the point is, we're working more and more with the
partners. The Panamanians are very good partners in this, and
they take X-number of tons. The Nicaraguans, believe it or not,
are cooperative in this. And then, certainly the Hondurans or
Guatemalans.
The one thing we don't get when--if we--``we,'' the United
States--apprehend these guys, we bring them into the Federal
court system, and they very quickly plea bargain, and we get an
awful lot of intelligence that then goes back into the cycle.
When our partners get these guys, we kind of lose that ability
to interrogate them and then offer them a deal they can't
refuse.
But, the point is, since I don't have the assets--I've got
two Navy ships right now. That'll go to zero, forever, in--by
the summer. And that's not even with sequestration. As I say,
the Coast Guard Commandant's doubled his commitment, but
that's, you know, five or six ships.
So, the answer now is the partners, and try to get them to
play. And I have to give credit, as well--we, about 6 months a
year, will have a--at least one Canadian frigate, and they turn
themselves over to us. And so, we use them in the same way that
we would use a Coast Guard cutter or Navy ship. The British
occasionally have a ship down. The Dutch are very cooperative.
But, they don't have many ships in the region very often. The
French, out of Martinique. When they're working together with
us, they plug into our system, and we work them hard.
Senator Tillis. Thank you.
Another question for the both of you. Secretary Schultz was
here a few weeks ago, and he was talking about the border
security. And he said, when you're talking about the southern
border, you need to ask the question, ``Which southern
border?'' That would be the--relating to the Mexican southern
border. We know it's unsafe, and we know that 80 percent of the
people coming across our border are not from Mexico. So, there
seems to be something to be said for looking at both borders
and trying to figure out how to prioritize.
And I want y'all to speak on the subject. But, in a general
way, if we were giving you a dollar and you were setting the
border security strategy, you had a dollar to spend, how much
would that be spent on our southern border versus the Mexican
southern border?
I know it's an unfair question. You can get back with me if
you need to. But----
Admiral Gortney. Well, I'm----
Senator Tillis.--I think it's important to talk about----
Admiral Gortney. If----
Senator Tillis.--how the two are----
Admiral Gortney. If it's----
Senator Tillis.--intrinsically liked.
Admiral Gortney. If it's my dollar, I'm going to put it on
the Mexican southern border, partnering with Sedena and Semar,
helping strengthen their southern border, because Homeland
Security is in charge of our border between Mexico and the
United States. So, I think my dollar would be better spent
partnering with Mexico so we can shore up--help assist them
shore up their southern border so it's less of a challenge up
on our border.
General Kelly. And if I had--if had the same dollar, I'd
work my northern boundary, which is Guatemala, Honduras, and El
Salvador.
Senator Tillis. And, Mr. Chair, just--if I may just--as a
closing comment, I think that the comment, Admiral, in your
opening comments on page 6 with respect to Iran and their
trustworthiness--should be emphasized by anybody who hasn't
read the statements.
And the last question I have is, in your discussions with
leaders in Latin America, how do they feel about the current
administration's policy towards Cuba?
General Kelly. Actually, in general, they think it's a good
idea. They know, as they point out to me, that Cuba's problems
are not due to American embargo or whatever. I mean, it's--
everyone else on the planet trades with Cuba except us. But,
their advice is, you know, ``This is a good thing to do,
because now it gets everyone--all the naysayers off your back,
you know, all of the people that would criticize United
States.'' But, at the end of the day, they understand that--you
know, that the Cubans are--have the worst human rights record
in the western hemisphere, it's a completely repressive regime,
and their economic problems are due to their incompetence, not
due to the embargo. And so, they--but, they think it's a good
idea, because it gets--friend to friend, it gets people off our
back, in terms of their--they no longer can criticize us about
``the terrible things we've done to Cuba.''
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Well, I thank you both. And it's been very
helpful.
And again, General Kelly, we wish you every success in the
future, and thank you for your service.
Admiral Gortney, it's great to have you here, and I am sure
you're looking forward to next year.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:32 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2016 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

----------

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 18, 2015

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

THE POSTURES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY AND THE DEPARTMENT OF THE
AIR FORCE

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
(chairman) of the committee, presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Wicker,
Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Lee, Cruz, Reed,
Nelson, McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
Donnelly, Hirono, King, and Heinrich.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman McCain. Good afternoon.
This committee meets today to consider the posture of the
Army and the Air Force in the context of our review and
oversight of the fiscal year 2016 defense budget request. Both
of these Services, tested by years of war, are confronting
growing threats and increasing demands with shrinking forces
and aging equipment.
By the end of this fiscal year, the Army will decline from
a peak of about 570,000 to 490,000 Active Duty personnel. In
the next few years, the Army will continue cutting its end
strength down to 450,000 soldiers, a budget-driven force level
reduction that predated the rise of ISIL, Russia's invasion of
Ukraine and the Ebola crisis. If mindless sequestration cuts
are allowed to return, the Army will shrink to 420,000 troops,
increasing the risk that in a crisis we will have too few
soldiers who could enter a fight without proper training and
equipment. With global instability is only increasing and with
just 33 percent of the Army's Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) ready
for deployment and decisive operations, I simply do not see any
strategic basis for the Army Active Force structure to be
reduced below the pre-September 11 level of 490,000.
The Air Force posture statement makes clear that there is,
``a fundamental disconnect between America's airpower
expectations and its airpower capability. A quarter century of
near continuous deployments, frequent aircraft divestments, and
a decade's long procurement holiday left us with the oldest and
smallest Air Force in history. The Service's current 54 fighter
squadrons represent just one-third of the combat power mustered
for Operation Desert Storm. Less than half of today's already
insufficient number of fighter squadrons are completely combat
ready, and they are not expected to return to full readiness
until 2023 due to the damaging effects of sequestration
suffered in 2013. Meanwhile, the Service is increasingly
challenged by potential adversaries who are fielding fifth
generation fighters and advanced air defense systems.''
The Air Force posture statement also indicates that,
``there was a time when the Air Force could trade some capacity
in order to retain capability, but we have reached the point
where the two are inextricable. Lose any more capacity and the
capability will cease to exist.''
This statement makes the proposal in the Air Force budget
request to retire 164 A-10 aircraft in fiscal year 2016 before
the F-35 is fully operational is all the more confusing. If the
Air Force cannot afford to lose capacity, why is it
volunteering to retire its most proven aircraft for close air
support missions?
Meanwhile, both Services have critical modernization needs
that must be met if they are to meet future threats and
challenges. The Army remains reliant on shrinking wartime
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding to replace,
repair, and recondition equipment that has been lost, damaged,
or used extensively in more than a decade of war in Iraq and
Afghanistan. We must ensure this reset is placed on a firm
fiscal footing which requires the Army to learn the lessons of
its failed acquisition programs of recent years. These lessons,
together with the experience of more than a decade of war, must
guide the procurement of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle
(JLTV) and the Armored Multipurpose Vehicle (AMPV) by enhancing
tactical mobility, command and control, medical evacuation, and
other critical combat functions while significantly improving
the protection and safety of our soldiers.
The future of American airpower rests on a number of
current Air Force modernization programs. With program costs
approaching $400 billion, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
is the department's most costly and ambitious acquisition
program in history. After suffering years of unacceptable cost
growth and schedule delays, the program appears to have started
to stabilize. Still, cost, affordability, and technological
challenges remain. The plan to increase production at the same
time that development and testing continue will likely add risk
to this program and could result in further cost growth and
schedule delays in the future.
This committee will continue closely scrutinize the overall
management and performance of the F-35 program and we will hold
individuals accountable. This committee will provide the same
close oversight to other critical programs such as the long-
range strike bomber, the KC-46A tanker, and the presidential
airlift replacement programs. These very expensive programs
must be kept on cost and on schedule and deliver the
capabilities the American taxpayer deserves at the best
possible value.
In particular, the committee will closely monitor the Air
Force's ambitious $550 million unit cost target for the long-
range strike bomber. This program is essential to overcoming
growing operational risk to our ability to project power in
anti-access and denying environments, and it must be delivered
on time and on budget.
I must also note my concern with the Air Force's troubling
lack of urgency in ending our reliance on the Russian RD-180
rocket engine. Russia annexed Crimea over a year ago. Yet, the
Air Force does not even have an acquisition strategy yet for a
new rocket engine. Congress gave the Air Force $220 million in
fiscal year 2015 and set a deadline of 2019. Instead of giving
this effort the level of attention needed, the Air Force has
wasted a year doing very little to end our reliance on Russian
rocket engines. If the Air Force is unwilling to do what is
necessary to meet the 2019 deadline, they are going to have to
figure out how to meet our space launch needs without the RD-
180. Continued reliance on Russian rocket engines is
unacceptable, and it is time the Air Force conduct itself
accordingly.
I am gravely concerned about the dangerous choice we are
forcing upon our military, especially the Army and Air Force.
With the present operational tempo and drastic reductions to
defense spending, we will inevitably confront depleted
readiness, chronic modernization plans, and deteriorating
morale. We must chart a different course or else continue the
downward spiral of Army and Air Force capacity and readiness
that will compromise each Service's ability to execute the
administration's stated defense strategy at a time of
accumulating danger to America's national security. Such a
course is within our power. The President's budget request is a
start, but I believe this Congress can and must do better.
Senator Reed?

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let
me welcome the witnesses and thank them for their service and
also ask them, on behalf of all of us, to thank the soldiers,
the airmen, and their families who selflessly serve every day.
If you would do that, I would appreciate it.
This committee has heard testimony from numerous witnesses
expressing concern about the effect of the Budget Control Act
of 2011 (BCA) caps, the threat of sequestration, and the lack
of budget predictability. Chief of Staff of the Army, General
Raymond T. Odierno, and Chief of Staff of the Air Force,
General Mark A. Welsh III, you made a compelling case to the
committee a month ago about the risks of continued fiscal
constraints. Recently Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
General Martin E. Dempsey, testified that funding at the
President's budget request, which is already $38 billion above
the BCA caps, will keep the Department of Defense (DOD) at
the--his words--``lower ragged edge of manageable risk'' and
will leave ``no slack, no margin for error or strategic
surprise.'' I do not believe--I share the chairman's view--that
this is the way to remain the finest fighting force in the
world.
The fiscal year 2016 budget request continues
implementation of the Army size and force structure changes
directed in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) and the
2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. At the end of fiscal year
2016, Active Army end strength will be down to approximately
475,000 soldiers and combat brigades to 30. The funding request
for personnel next year is essentially flat compared to this
year. I would appreciate in your testimony an update about how
the Army is managing the pace and scope of end strength
reductions and force structure changes.
The Army's readiness request in operation and maintenance
continues to slowly build depth in non-deployed units,
including 19 combat training center rotations, of which 15 are
for active and 2 for National Guard combat brigades. I am
interested in learning how the Army plans to sustain momentum
in building the readiness of more units over the next several
years. What are the most important capabilities, capacities,
and readiness levels in the Army and how does this request fund
them to meet the missions of today and tomorrow? How would the
BCA caps impact the Army's management of these changes and the
associated strategic risk in readiness to meet urgent
contingencies?
The challenges of declining resources and the high cost of
new technologies have driven the Army to make tough choices in
its major modernization programs. The fiscal year 2016 request
includes a modest increase over last year for research,
development, and acquisition emphasizing aviation and science
and technology programs while deferring investment for a next
generation combat vehicle or a replacement on the Aerial Scout.
Again, I am interested in how the Army's budget request and the
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), the FYDP supports a
stable, affordable, and achievable modernization strategy.
For the Air Force, this budget request reverses a recent
downward trend in end strength and increases military personnel
by more than 6,000 airmen, mostly in active duty personnel. I
am interested in learning how these personnel will be utilized
because it is my understanding that they will not be allocated
for remotely piloted aircraft, which is an area recently facing
a manpower crisis.
The Air Force wanted to reduce the number of Predator and
Reaper remotely piloted aircraft combat air patrols it will
support, but demand from combatant commanders prevented it.
High tempo Predator and Reaper combat air patrols strain their
supporting ground crews so much that the Commander of the Air
Combat Command recently sounded an alarm that we are near the
point of breaking this critical force. Unfortunately, we have
been facing the prospect of breaking the Reaper and the
Predator force for at least the past 6 years, while demand
continues to exceed supply. The Air Force appears to have made
little progress in solving this operational problem, and I
would like to hear, General Welsh, what your thoughts are on
this issue.
Once again, the Air Force is proposing significant force
structure reductions in fiscal year 2016 and the FYDP. For
example, the Air Force will retire the entire A-10 fighter
force, will retire roughly 26 older C-130 aircraft leaving
roughly 275 aircraft to support tactical operations, and would
make significant reductions in certain high-demand/low-density
forces such as the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS),
Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), and
Compass Call fleets. I am interested to hear how you are
balancing these savings with mission requirements.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, we just received the Air Force's
report on how it intends to implement the recommendations in
the report of the National Commission on the Structure of the
Air Force. One of the principle efficiency recommendations of
the commission would move approximately, in their view, 36,000
additional active airmen into the Reserve components and
achieve related savings of roughly $2 billion. The Air Force
report, however, states that their mission area analysis does
not support this concept due to the reduction in rotational
capacity and the resulting increase in risk. So we will need to
understand why your views are accurate and you would reject
these recommendations.
Let me again thank you all for your service and I look
forward to the testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. I think we begin with Secretary of the
Army, John M. McHugh. Welcome.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. McHUGH, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

Mr. McHugh. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, distinguished Ranking
Member Reed, other equally distinguished members of the
committee, I deeply appreciate the opportunity to be here with
you today to discuss further the danger, truly, that lies ahead
should this budget not be enacted and, most importantly, if
sequestration is allowed to return.
In short, it is truly amazing how much can change in just 1
year. Over the last 12 months, we have been the geopolitical
landscape morph at really an astonishing pace. As the chairman
so accurately noted in his opening remarks, from renewed
aggression by Russia and increased threats from North Korea to
gains by radical terrorists in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, not to
mention the fight against Ebola, the demand for your Army to
take contingencies around the world has grown at an alarming
rate. Far from being foreseeable, our requirements have been
more unexpected, our enemies more unpredictable, and our
ability to handle multiple, simultaneous operations more
uncertain.
Yet, with such volatility and instability around the world,
America's Army is faced yet again with an enemy here at home,
the return of sequestration, unprepared units, un-maintained
equipment, untrained soldiers. Ladies and gentlemen, our Army,
your Army faces a dark and dangerous future unless this
Congress acts now to end these ill-conceived and inflexible
budget cuts.
Moreover, I want to be very clear here. Every installation,
every component, and nearly every program will feel the brunt
of these cuts. Under sequestration, by 2019 we will be forced
to reduce our end strength to unconscionable levels, likely
losing another six Brigate Combat Teams (BCT) and potentially a
division headquarters, not to mention the impacts to associated
enablers, contracts, facilities, and civilian personnel.
Let me share with you some accomplishments of America's
Army this past year. As Russian-backed forces rolled into
Ukraine, annexed Crimea, and threatened regional stability, our
soldiers rapidly deployed to Eastern Europe in a demonstration
of U.S. commitment and resolve. From Latvia and Lithuania to
Poland and Estonia, soldiers from the 173rd Airborne and the
1st Cavalry showed the world that America would stand with our
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and respond to
unbridled aggression.
In West Africa, as thousands suffered from the scourge of
Ebola, your Army acted. Elements of several units led by the
101st Airborne provided command and control, equipment, and
expertise to support efforts to stop this deadly and
destabilizing disease.
In response to rapid gains by the Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levant (ISIL), your soldiers quickly returned to Iraq to
advise and assist security forces in turning the tide on this
barbaric group of radical terrorists.
In the Pacific, thousands of soldiers and civilians
supported operations to strengthen our partnerships and
increase our substantial presence.
Today, the headquarters of nine Active Army and two Guard
divisions are committed to combatant commanders. Some 143,000
soldiers are deployed, forward-stationed, or committed,
including over 19,000 Reserve component soldiers.
Moreover, we have done all of this while continuing to
transform to make our units leaner, more agile, and far more
lethal. As all of you know so well, such extraordinary success
comes at a price, for in the end, the young lieutenant meeting
his or her platoon, the sergeants training and mentoring their
soldiers, the invaluable civilian workforce labor in countless
orders to support them, and the young family waiting patiently
at home are all human. The stress of war, multiple deployments,
and unpredictable requirements does not change in the face of
indiscriminate funding cuts.
Through it all, we have and we will remain committed to
supporting the needs of our warriors and their families. From
programs to increase resilience and improve behavioral health
to the prevention of sexual assault and the protection of
victims from retaliation, we will keep faith with our soldiers.
Rest assured, the return to sequestration will directly impact
critical installation and family programs Army-wide.
Let me put it simply. We need the President's budget. Our
$126.5 billion request, as the chairman noted, is some $6
billion over the potential sequester level and is specifically
designed to preserve our modest gains in readiness over the
last year and take care of your soldiers.
Moreover, this request seeks vital reforms to compensation
and force structure that will ensure funding needed to support
near-term readiness and help place the Army on a predictable
path to balance. The modest changes to pay and allowances
through our aviation restructuring initiatives, our reforms are
both necessary and prudent to sustain the readiness of our
forces and move the Army toward eventual balance. I cannot
emphasize enough how critical these funds and reforms are to
ensuring that your Army has sufficiently trained and ready
soldiers to protect our Nation.
I also recognize that we have the duty to prudently use the
scarce resources that the American people provide through all
of you. From my first day in office, I sought and supported
numerous reforms and efficiencies from improving our
procurement process to drastically cutting our headquarters. We
take stewardship very seriously. Frankly, historically the
Army's track record on acquisition programs is too often a tale
of failure, too many under-performing or canceled programs, too
few successful fieldings of developmental designs, and far too
many taxpayer dollars wasted. We know this and we will do
better.
In this critical area, while many significant strides have
been made over the last 5 years in reducing bureaucracy and
improving our oversight, we have a long way to go. Mr.
Chairman, I would note that we are especially heartened by your
and Chairman Thornberry's commitment to making measured,
deliberate, and comprehensive reforms to the defense
acquisition system, and we look forward to working with you on
these vital efforts.
Ladies and gentlemen, this is a historic moment. We need to
stop talking and we need together to start acting. We need
wisdom not words. We need results not rhetoric. As I said
before this distinguished panel last year, we need
predictability not politics. As we face extreme instability
around the world, we must have certainty here at home. Your
soldiers--and I know you agree--deserve no less. We must have
an end to sequestration this year, and we must have this
budget.
On behalf of the nearly 1.3 million men and women of
America's Army--Active, Guard, Reserve, and civilian--thank you
for your continued oversight, partnership, your leadership and
support. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the
committee's questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. McHugh and General
Odierno follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by Hon. John M. McHugh and GEN Raymond T.
Odierno, USA
executive summary
Now more than ever, in today's uncertain and dynamic security
environment, we must be prepared to meet multiple, wide-ranging
requirements across the globe simultaneously while retaining the
ability to react to the unknown. The velocity of instability around the
world has increased, and the Army is now operating on multiple
continents simultaneously in ways unforeseen a year ago. In short, our
Army is busy. We are fully engaged and our operational tempo will not
subside for the foreseeable future. In the wake of Russia's
intervention in Ukraine, the Army deployed forces to Eastern Europe in
a demonstration of U.S. commitment and resolve. In West Africa, the
Army provided support for the U.S. Agency for International
Development's humanitarian mission to stem the tide of the Ebola virus.
In response to regional instability in the Middle East, Army forces
have recommitted to advise and assist Iraqi Government forces and the
Kurdish Peshmerga. Across the Pacific, thousands of Army forces are
supporting operations to strengthen our partnerships and alliances as
part of Pacific Pathways in places like Thailand, the Philippines,
Malaysia, Australia, Indonesia, and the Republic of Korea. We remain
committed to protecting the enduring Armistice on the Korean Peninsula.
Our soldiers remain on point in Afghanistan, even as we draw down our
forces there. Currently, 9 of 10 Regular Army and 2 Army National Guard
division headquarters are committed in support of combatant commands,
with more than 143,000 soldiers deployed, forward stationed, or
committed and 19,000 Reserve soldiers mobilized.
Last year, we testified that the minimum force necessary to execute
the defense strategy was a force floor of 450,000 in the Regular Army,
335,000 in the Army National Guard and 195,000 in the Army Reserve--a
total of 980,000 soldiers. That assessment has not changed and is based
on certain planning assumptions regarding the duration, number and size
of future missions. When determining these assessed force levels, we
also made clear that risks at this level would grow if our underlying
assumptions proved inaccurate. Although we still believe we can meet
the primary missions of the Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) today, our
ability to do so has become tenuous. There is a growing divide between
the Budget Control Act's (BCA) arbitrary funding mechanism--that has
seen the Army budget drop in nominal terms every year since enacted in
2011--and the emerging geopolitical realities confronting us now across
Europe, the Middle East, Africa and the Pacific, along with the growing
threats to our Homeland. Risk thereby increases to our force, our
national security and our Nation. As the Army approaches a Total Army
end strength of 980,000 soldiers by fiscal year 2018, we must
constantly assess the operational tempo and its impacts on the health
and viability of the force. We must ensure we have both the capability
to respond to unforeseen demands and the capacity to sustain high
levels of readiness.
So, as the Army looks to the future and continues to downsize, we
have developed a new Army Operating Concept, ``Win in a Complex
World.'' The foundation of the Army Operating Concept is our ability to
conduct joint combined arms maneuver. The Army Operating Concept
endeavors to build a force operating alongside multiple partners able
to create multiple dilemmas for our adversaries, while giving
commanders multiple options and synchronizing and integrating effects
from multiple domains onto and from land. Recognizing the changing
world around us, the Army Operating Concept envisions an Army that is
expeditionary, tailorable, scalable, and prepared to meet the
challenges of the global environment. The Army Operating Concept sets
the foundation upon which our leaders can focus our efforts and
resources to maintain strategic and operational flexibility to deter
and operate in multiple regions simultaneously--in all phases of
military operations--to prevent conflict, shape the security
environment, and win wars now and in the future.
Nevertheless, fiscal challenges brought on by the BCA strain our
ability to bring into balance readiness, modernization and end
strength. The BCA puts at significant risk the Army's ability to meet
the Army's obligations within the DSG and fulfill its national security
requirements. Even as demand for Army forces is growing, budget cuts
are forcing us to reduce end strength to dangerously low levels. We
face an ``ends'' and ``means'' mismatch between requirements and
resources available.
The BCA and sequestration have already had a detrimental impact on
readiness and modernization. Budget constraints have significantly
impacted every Army modernization program, forcing the delay of
critical investments in next generation capabilities, to include
training support and power projection capabilities across Army
installations. Although the Bipartisan Budget Agreement (BBA) provided
fiscal relief to the Army in fiscal year 2014, in fiscal year 2015 the
Army budget decreased by $6B. We now face a fiscal year 2016 defense
spending cap insufficient for operating in an unstable global security
environment that presents the Army with a number of urgent, complex and
challenging missions. The fiscal year 2016 spending cap--set almost 4
years ago--has not kept pace with the geopolitical reality unfolding
around the world.
We know we must strike a balance between resources and capacity.
The Army fully supports fiscal responsibility and has worked diligently
and consistently to be a good steward of taxpayer dollars. In that
regard, we have made many tough choices. There are critical cost-saving
measures that allow the Army to further reallocate scarce resources to
ensure Army forces remain as trained and ready as possible. These
include compensation reform, sustainable energy and resource
initiatives, a new round of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) and the
Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI). We ask Congress to support these
initiatives because without the flexibility to manage our budgets to
achieve the greatest capability possible, we will be forced to make
reductions to manpower, modernization and training that are larger,
less efficient and longer-standing in the damage they inflict on the
Army.
We also need consistent and predictable funding. The use of
Continuing Resolutions wreaks havoc with Army readiness, modernization
and end strength. It makes long term planning difficult, especially
with the uncertainties that exist if we return to sequestration in
fiscal year 2016. As a result, we are forced to train intermittently
and the materiel and equipment we buy costs more and takes longer to
acquire. This ongoing budgetary unpredictability is neither militarily
nor fiscally responsible. To maintain an appropriate level of
readiness, the Army must receive consistent funding for training each
year. Unless Congress eases the BCA defense caps, the Army will
experience degraded readiness coupled with increased risk, making it
more difficult for us to provide for the common defense. Each passing
year, the BCA increases risk for sending insufficiently trained and
equipped soldiers into harm's way, and that is not a risk our Nation
should accept.
Lastly, our profession is built on trust. In holding true to that
trust, our Nation expects our competence, commitment and character to
reflect our Army values. To that end, we are working to reduce and, in
the future, eliminate sexual assault and sexual harassment, which
destroys good order and discipline and is contrary to our core values.
We are also increasing opportunities for women and opening positions
based on standards free on any gender bias. Finally, our programs like
Soldier for Life and the Ready and Resilient Campaign are demonstrating
our sacred commitment to care for our soldiers, our civilians and their
families who selflessly sacrifice so much. These are actions we have
taken because it is the right thing to do.
introduction
Last year, we testified before Congress that the minimum end
strength the Army requires to execute the 2012 Defense Strategic
Guidance is 980,000 soldiers--450,000 in the Regular Army, 335,000 in
the Army National Guard and 195,000 in the Army Reserve. We described
how the Army moved to implement the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) guidance by shaping the force while supporting the fight in
Afghanistan and deploying forces to address several unexpected
challenges around the world. In contrast to the projections outlined in
the defense strategy, the regional security and stability in Europe,
Africa, the Middle East and the Pacific have deteriorated over the past
12-24 months in ways we did not anticipate. These growing and emerging
threats to the global security environment compel us to rethink our
assessment of the drawdown. For the next 3 years, as we restructure to
operate as a smaller force, the Army faces readiness challenges and
extensive modernization delays. Under the President's budget, we will
begin to regain balance between end strength, modernization, and
readiness beyond fiscal year 2017. Although we still believe we can
meet the fundamental requirements of the DSG at 980,000 regular, Guard,
and Reserve soldiers, it is a tenuous balance. The risk to our national
security and our force itself continues to increase with rising
instability and uncertainty across Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and
the Pacific, along with a growing threat to the Homeland. Any force
reductions below 980,000 soldiers will render our Army unable to meet
all elements of the DSG, and we will not be able to meet the multiple
challenges to U.S. national interests without incurring an imprudent
level of risk to our Nation's security.
increasing velocity of global instability
The accelerating insecurity and instability across Europe, the
Middle East, Africa, and the Pacific, coupled with the continued threat
to the homeland and our ongoing operations in Afghanistan, remain a
significant concern to the Army. The Islamic State in Iraq and the
Levant's (ISIL) unforeseen expansion and the rapid disintegration of
order in Iraq and Syria have dramatically escalated conflict in the
region. Order within Yemen is splintering; the al Qaeda insurgency and
Houthi expansion continues there; and the country is quickly
approaching a civil war. In North and West Africa, anarchy, extremism
and terrorism continue to threaten the interests of the United States,
as well as our allies and partners. In Europe, Russia's intervention in
Ukraine challenges the resolve of the European Union. Across the Asia-
Pacific, China's lack of transparency regarding its military
modernization efforts raise concerns with the United States and our
allies, and the continuing development of North Korea's nuclear and
missile programs contributes to instability. The rate of humanitarian
and disaster relief missions, such as the recent threat of Ebola,
heightens the level of uncertainty we face around the world, along with
constantly evolving threats to the homeland. With the velocity of
instability increasing around the world, continuing unrest in the
Middle East, and the threat of terrorism growing rather than receding--
witness the recent tragedies in Paris and Nigeria--now is not the time
to drastically reduce capability and capacity.
The Army, as part of the Joint Force, operates globally in
environments characterized by growing urbanization, the potential for
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, malicious cyber and
information operations, humanitarian crises and the deleterious effects
of climate change. Sectarian violence exploited by state and non-state
actors, irredentism and terrorist activities are driving conflict
around the world. The corrosive effects of drug and human trafficking
by transnational criminal organizations undermine State authority and
trigger a destabilizing level of violence in places such as Central and
South America. These combined factors lead to vulnerable populations
and threats that appear across multiple domains, the sum of which will
continue to challenge global security and cooperation in ways that are
difficult to anticipate.
No single strategic challenger is likely to gain overall
superiority over U.S. military capabilities in the near future. Even
so, competitors of the United States seek to negate our strengths,
exploit our vulnerabilities, and gain temporary or local superiority in
one or more capability areas. It is unlikely any of these challengers
will choose traditional force-on-force confrontation with American
forces. Instead, potential adversaries are likely to pursue and
emphasize indirect and asymmetric techniques. Their strategies may
include employing anti-access/area denial capabilities, using
surrogates, subverting our allies, using cyber and information
operations, staying under our threshold for combat or simply prolonging
conflict to test our resolve.
One of the most important global security bulwarks is the U.S.
network of security alliances and partners. This valuable asset to U.S.
national security and global stability is entering a period of
transition. Traditional allies in Europe face significant economic and
demographic burdens that exert downward pressure on defense budgets. As
a consequence, allies and partners who have joined us in past coalition
operations may be less apt to do so in the future. Building the
security capacity necessary for regional stability requires sustained
and focused engagement. Active engagement with allies, friends and
partners is resource-intensive, but will be essential to sustaining
global multilateral security. This combination of threats and
conditions creates an increasingly dangerous and unpredictable
operational environment and underscores the need for a U.S. Army that
is agile, responsive and regionally engaged.
demand for a globally responsive and regionally engaged army
It is imperative we maintain strategic and operational flexibility
to deter and operate in multiple regions simultaneously--in all phases
of military operations--to prevent conflicts, shape the security
environment and, when necessary, win in support of U.S. policy
objectives. The Army is and will continue to be the backbone of the
Joint Force, providing fundamental capabilities to each of the
combatant commanders such as command and control, logistics,
intelligence and communications support to set the theater, as well as
providing ground combat forces, Special Operations Forces, and Joint
Task Force (JTF) headquarters. Demand for Army capabilities and
presence continues to increase across combatant commands in response to
emerging contingencies. The Army has sent rotational forces to Europe,
Kuwait, and the Republic of Korea, and established JTF Headquarters in
Iraq, Afghanistan, Honduras, the Horn of Africa and Jordan. In multiple
areas of responsibility, the Army is meeting simultaneous requirements
based on our 10 primary DSG missions. As part of the Joint Force, we
support combatant commanders and work with interagency partners and our
allies to enhance security cooperation, provide foreign humanitarian
assistance, build partner capacity and participate in multi-lateral
exercises.
We are making the Army more agile, adaptable and expeditionary than
ever before. For example, there is an infantry battalion forward-
deployed in Djibouti, and units in Kuwait positioned to quickly respond
anywhere in the Middle East. Even as we reduce our presence in
Afghanistan, the global demand for Brigade Combat Teams (BCT), the
Army's basic warfighting units, is projected to decrease by only one
before 2016. Combatant commanders' demand for Patriot missile
battalions and Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) batteries
exceeds our capacity, significantly limiting options in emerging
crises, and exceeding the Army's ability to meet Department of Defense
(DOD) deployment-to-dwell rotation goals for these units. In fiscal
year 2016, we expect combatant command and interagency demand for Army
forces will increase further in areas such as logistics, intelligence,
cyber, space, air and missile defense, signal, aviation, Special
Operations Forces and mission command.
Demand for Army division headquarters is already high and we expect
this trend to continue. Combatant commanders rely upon the proven
mission-command capabilities of our division headquarters and the
essential shaping effects of Army enabler units including Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms. In the last year, we
deployed the 1st Infantry Division headquarters to U.S. Central Command
in support of the multinational effort to defeat ISIL, and we delivered
the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) headquarters to synchronize
national and international efforts to counter the Ebola virus in West
Africa. Additionally, 1st Armored Division Headquarters conducts
operations in Jordan; 2nd Infantry Division protects the Republic of
Korea; 3rd Infantry Division advises and assists in Afghanistan; and
4th Infantry Division assures our allies in Europe. All told, elements
of 9 out of 10 Regular Army division headquarters and 2 Army National
Guard division headquarters, including the Global Response Force, are
currently deployed or prepared to deploy around the globe supporting
commitments to the Pacific Theater and the Republic of Korea;
Afghanistan, Jordan, Iraq and Kuwait; Africa; Eastern Europe; and the
Homeland.
Consequently, we must size and shape the Army for the world in
which we live. First, through the Army, and the presence it provides,
we will fulfill our collective security obligations, defend our
citizens and protect our national interests when the Nation calls upon
us. Second, a robust Army provides combatant commanders with essential
capacity to more fully engage allies and shape the security environment
across their areas of responsibility. Finally, appropriate Army force
levels reduce the risk of being ``too wrong'' in our assumptions about
the future.
Unlike previous eras and conflicts, today's fast-paced world simply
does not allow us the time to regenerate capabilities after a crisis
erupts. Faced with a national crisis, we will fight with the Army we
have, but there will be consequences. Generating the Army is a complex
endeavor that requires policy decisions, dollars, soldiers,
infrastructure and, most importantly, time. It takes approximately 30
months to generate a fully manned and trained Regular Army BCT once the
Army decides to expand the force. Senior command and control
headquarters, such as divisions and corps, take even longer to generate
and train to be effective given the skill sets and training required of
soldiers manning these formations. Overall, we must acknowledge that
today's highly-technological, All-Volunteer Force is much different
than the industrial age armies of the past.
Finally, with flexibility to balance structure, modernization and
readiness within budgetary authority, we can best mitigate the risk
imposed by budget reductions and end strength reductions to adapt to a
rapidly-changing operating environment. Achieving this balance will
enhance our ability to redesign the force for the future, experiment
with new, innovative operational concepts and rebuild critical
collective skills, all while taking care of our soldiers and their
families in a manner consistent with their service and sacrifice.
Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World
Even as the Army confronts the many challenges wrought by
sequestration, we continue to seek efficiencies while adapting to the
complexities of an evolving and unstable security environment. It is
imperative that our Army adapts to the future joint operating
environment, one that consists of diverse enemies that employ
traditional, irregular and hybrid strategies which threaten U.S.
security and vital interests. In October of last year, we introduced
the new Army Operating Concept, ``Win in a Complex World.'' The
foundation of this concept is our ability to conduct joint combined
arms maneuver. It endeavors to build a force operating alongside
multiple partners able to create multiple dilemmas for our adversaries,
while giving commanders multiple options and synchronizing and
integrating effects from multiple domains onto and from land.
Recognizing the changing world around us, the Army Operating Concept
envisions an Army that is expeditionary, tailorable, scalable and
prepared to meet the challenges of the global environment. The Army
Operating Concept reinforces our five strategic priorities:

1. Develop adaptive Army leaders for a complex world;
2. Build a globally responsive and regionally engaged Army;
3. Provide a ready and modern Army;
4. Strengthen our commitment to our Army profession; and
5. Sustain the premier All-Volunteer Army.

The Army Operating Concept also describes the Army's contribution
to globally integrated operations. Army forces provide foundational
capabilities required by the combat commanders to synchronize and
integrate effects across land and from land into the air, maritime,
space, and cyberspace domains. The Army Operating Concept ensures that
we are prepared to lead joint, interorganizational, and multinational
teams in complex security environments.
Through a dedicated ``Campaign of Learning'' under Force 2025
Maneuvers, we will assess new capabilities, design and doctrine. This
enables future innovation of our expeditionary capabilities and
enhanced agility. We are assessing key capabilities such as manned-
unmanned teaming, operational energy and expeditionary command posts.
We are focusing our innovation efforts in this Campaign of Learning to
ensure we address the 20 Army Warfighting Challenges. The Army
Warfighting Challenges are the enduring first-order problems, and
solving them will improve combat effectiveness. These challenges range
from shaping the Security Environment, to countering Weapons of Mass
Destruction, to conducting Space and Cyber Operations, to Integrating
and Delivering Fires to Exercising Mission Command. The Army Operating
Concept represents a long-term, cost-effective way to enhance
readiness, improve interoperability and modernize the force. It is also
a cost-effective way to assess and demonstrate Joint and multinational
interoperability and readiness. We must continue to learn and apply
what we learn as we rethink how the Army operates to ``Win in a Complex
World.''
President's Budget Request
This year, the President's budget requests $126.5 billion for the
Army base budget. This budget request is about $5.4 billion above what
Congress enacted in fiscal year 2015. The President's budget requests
$6 billion more than an expected sequester-level budget. This
additional $6 billion will be invested in readiness and procurement:

$3.4 billion for training, sustainment and
installation programs directly supporting combat readiness;
and,
$2.6 billion for Research and Development, and
Acquisition accounts in order to equip soldiers across the
regular, Guard, and Reserve Forces, sustain critical parts of
the industrial base and invest in innovation supporting the
Army Operating Concept.

These increases are critical to achieving sustainable readiness
needed to meet the demands of today's complex environment, while
preserving manpower needed to prevent hollowness in our formations.
As Congress reviews our budget for this year, we ask that you
compare our funding levels to what we asked for and executed in fiscal
year 2013 and fiscal year 2014, rather than to the near-sequestration
level funding enacted in fiscal year 2015. With the support of
Congress, the Army executed $125 billion in fiscal year 2014 to begin
rebuilding readiness lost in fiscal year 2013 due to sequestration. The
fiscal year 2015--enacted level of $121 billion is challenging
commanders across the Army to sustain readiness while reorganizing
formations to operate as smaller forces. In fiscal year 2015, we are
significantly reducing key installation and family services, individual
training events and modernization to such an extent as to jeopardize
future readiness and quality of life. The Army's budget request for
fiscal year 2016 continues to focus on building near-term readiness
through predictability and continuity in funding levels.
One critical assumption in the President's budget request is that
Congress will enact necessary compensation and force restructuring. We
fully support modest reforms to pay raises, health care and other
benefits that have been proposed. Without these reforms, savings
assumptions we have included in our planning will not be realized,
placing increasing pressure on further end strength reductions and
reducing funding needed to sustain readiness. The President is
proposing over $25 billion in compensation reforms including slowing
the growth of Basic Allowance for Housing, changing TRICARE, reducing
the commissary subsidy and slowing the growth in basic pay. Should
Congress fail to enact these reforms, the effects of budget shortfalls
in programs and services throughout the force will wreak havoc on our
formations. We will have to make decisions at every Army installation
that will impact the quality of life, morale and readiness of our
soldiers. Without appropriate compensation reform, the Army would need
an additional $10.4 billion across the program years to meet our basic
requirements. To the extent Congress does not approve the extra topline
or the reforms, we would have to find another $2-3 billion per year in
reductions, thereby further diminishing the size and capability of our
fighting force. None of these reforms are easy, but all are necessary.
One of our most important reforms is the Aviation Restructuring
Initiative (ARI), which we continued in fiscal year 2015. Our current
aviation structure is unaffordable, so the Army's plan avoids $12
billion in costs and saves an additional $1 billion annually if we
fully implement ARI. We simply cannot afford to maintain our current
aviation structure and sustain modernization while providing trained
and ready aviation units across all three components. Our comprehensive
approach through ARI will ultimately allow us to eliminate obsolete
airframes, sustain a modernized fleet, and reduce sustainment costs.
Through ARI, we will eliminate nearly 700 aircraft and 3 Combat
Aviation Brigades from the Active component, while only reducing 111
airframes from the Reserve component. ARI eliminates and reorganizes
structure, while increasing capabilities in order to minimize risk to
meeting operational requirements within the capacity of remaining
aviation units across all components. If the Army does not execute ARI,
we will incur additional costs associated with buying additional
aircraft and structure at the expense of modernizing current and future
aviation systems in the total force.
Although we disagree with the need for a Commission on the Future
of the Army, as directed in the National Defense Authorization Act, we
will fully support the Commission as it examines and assesses the force
structure and force mix decisions the Army has proposed for Active and
Reserve components.
Impacts of Sequestration
In support of the President's fiscal year 2015 budget request,
which reflected the outcomes of the Secretary of Defense's 2013
Strategic Choices and Management Review and the 2014 QDR, we emphasized
that the updated defense strategy, combined with reduced Army force
levels, had increased the risk level to ``significant,'' and would
become manageable only after the Army achieved balance between end
strength, readiness and modernization. At force levels driven by
affordability under full sequestration, the Army cannot fully implement
its role in the defense strategy. Sequestration would require the Army
to further reduce our Total Army end strength to at least 920,000, or
60,000 below the 980,000 currently reflected in the President's budget
request.
Global demands for the Army are increasing, but end strength,
readiness and modernization cuts greatly reduce our ability to respond
at a time when the instability is accelerating worldwide. As a result,
we are faced with an ends and means disparity between what is required
of us and what we are resourced to accomplish. This has real impacts
for our national security. Long-term fiscal predictability will allow
the Army to balance force structure, end strength, modernization and
readiness, while providing the Nation a trained and ready force
prepared to win in a complex world. Without this investment, we will
see immediate degradations in recruiting, manning, training, equipping
and sustaining Army readiness during a time of great uncertainty and
growing worldwide instability.
Although we are already expecting a decline in the overall
readiness of our forces in fiscal year 2015, it pales in comparison to
the decrease of readiness under expected sequester levels in fiscal
year 2016. Sequestration measures will not only dissipate the modest
gains we achieved, but will leave the Army in a hollow and precarious
state. The impact of sequestration on the Army's fiscal year 2016
funding levels would cause an abrupt and immediate degradation of
training, readiness and modernization. Relief from full sequester-
levels in fiscal year 2014 provided some predictability and allowed for
partial recovery from fiscal year 2013's low readiness levels. However,
the Army demonstrated a need for funding above the enacted $121 billion
topline in fiscal year 2015, as savings from drawing down end strength
are manifesting as rapidly as possible. Current funding levels afforded
just over a third of our BCTs the training necessary to conduct
decisive action. This year, we face significant challenges to sustain
even that level of readiness in our dynamic operating environment.
If sequestration remains unchanged, the consequences for our Army
will be dramatic. Another round of cuts will render our force unable to
meet all elements of the DSG without creating additional risk to our
soldiers. Reductions in end strength brought on by sequestration will
limit our ability to provide strategic options to the President and
pose unacceptable risk by placing into question our capacity to execute
even one prolonged, multi-phased major contingency operation. We will
experience significant degradations in readiness and modernization,
which will extend adverse impacts well into the next decade,
exacerbating the time the Army requires to regain full readiness. The
Nation cannot afford the impacts of sequestration. Our national
security is at stake.
Achieving End Strength Reductions
By the end of fiscal year 2015, we will have reduced the Regular
Army by over 80,000 soldiers, 8,000 in the Army National Guard, and
7,000 in the Army Reserve. Commensurate with these reductions, the Army
will achieve an end strength by the end of fiscal year 2015 of 490,000
Regular Army, 350,000 Army National Guard, and 202,000 Army Reserve.
Consistent with available budget resources, the 2014 Quadrennial
Defense Review and the DSG, the Army will continue to reduce its end
strength in fiscal year 2016 as follows: the Regular Army will shrink
by 15,000 (3.1 percent) to 475,000; the Army National Guard will shrink
by 8,000 (2.3 percent) to 342,000; and the Army Reserve will shrink by
4,000 (2 percent) to 198,000.
To achieve required end strength reductions, we will need to
separate soldiers who have served their nation honorably. Cumulatively,
we will have reduced our Regular Army end strength from a wartime high
of 570,000 to 475,000 by the end of 2016 (17 percent reduction), while
our Army National Guard will have reduced its end strength from a
wartime high of 358,000 to 342,000 (4.5 percent reduction) and the Army
Reserve will have reduced its end strength from a wartime high of
205,000 to 198,000 (3.4 percent reduction). These reductions put the
Army on a glide path to meet the targeted force of 980,000 in fiscal
year 2018. For all components of the Army, this end strength is smaller
than the pre-2001 force structure.
Although we are making reductions in the overall end strength of
the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve, we have continued to
invest in higher full-time support levels, including Active, Guard, and
Reserve, military technicians and civilians. This budget supports
82,720 full-time support positions in fiscal year 2016 as compared to
68,000 in fiscal year 2001. This level of full-time support constitutes
a 20 percent increase since 2001.
In the Army civilian workforce, we have reduced Department of the
Army civilians from the wartime high levels of 285,000 and will
continue to reduce appropriately over the coming years. While
necessary, these reductions in the civilian workforce have and will
continue to adversely impact capabilities such as medical treatment,
training, depot and range maintenance, installation emergency services,
physical security and select intelligence functions. In all of the
reductions across the Total Army, we are taking prudent measures to
ensure we balance requirements and capacity.
To achieve planned end strength reductions, the Army expects to use
various types of separation authorities across all elements of the
Total Force. The National Defense Authorization Acts for fiscal year
2012 and fiscal year 2013 provided several authorities to help the Army
shape the force over the drawdown period, along with the flexibility to
apply them to meet specific grade and skill requirements. Under normal
loss rates, we would not be able to reach our end strength goal during
the fiscal year 2015--fiscal year 2017 period. There is no single
force-shaping method among the choices of accession, retention and
separation that allows the Army to achieve its end strength goals;
inevitably, we will have to involuntarily separate quality soldiers.
Closely managing accession levels, selectively promoting and following
more stringent retention standards will help shape the force over time.
Although the Army expects to lose combat-seasoned soldiers and
leaders, throughout this process, our focus will be on retaining
individuals with the greatest potential for future service in the right
grades and skills. As soldiers depart the Regular Army, we are
committed to assisting them and their Families as they reintegrate into
civilian communities. Leaders across the Army are engaged in ``Soldier
for Life,'' a continuum of service concept that facilitates transition
to civilian employment, educational opportunities and service in the
Reserve components.
ensuring a ready army
During this period of drawdown, the Army is reorganizing,
realigning and restructuring forces. The Brigade Combat Team
reorganization enhances brigade combat power by adding a third maneuver
battalion to 38 BCTs by the end of fiscal year 2015 and reducing the
total number of BCTs to 60 (32 Regular Army and 28 Army National Guard)
in the Total Force.
Since May 2014, we have been developing a sustainable force
generation and readiness model to account for the new, volatile,
strategic operating environment; the need to remain regionally-engaged
and budgetary and force sizing realities. The Sustainable Readiness
Model will provide force generation policies and processes that
optimize the readiness of the force and balance the Army's steady state
missions, contingency response capability and available resources. We
cannot predict the specific events that will cause the next demand for
Army forces, but history suggests it will come sooner than we expect.
All components of the Army must remain sized and postured as essential
members of the Joint Force to protect the Nation and its interests.
Even with funding relief from sequestration in fiscal year 2014, in
fiscal year 2015 we returned to near-sequestration level funding,
resulting in just a third of our BCTs trained in their core mission
capabilities in decisive action. The President's budget request
increases readiness funding above fiscal year 2015 levels, which is
critical to sustaining and improving readiness of the force. In fiscal
year 2014, the Army completed 19 rotations at the Combat Training
Centers (CTCs), including 6 rotations for deploying BCTs and 13
decisive action training rotations (12 Regular Army and one Army
National Guard). Fiscal year 2015 funding levels challenge Army
commanders to sustain continuity in readiness across the force;
however, we remain committed to CTC rotations to build leader and unit
readiness. Fiscal year 2015 plans fund 19 CTC rotations, with 15
Regular Army and 2 Army National Guard decisive action rotations, with
fiscal year 2016 continuing this level of CTC exercises. We are
improving Training Support Systems to enable more realistic home
station training, increase collective training proficiency and enhance
operational readiness for contingencies across the globe; however,
funding constraints in fiscal year 2015 impede our ability to maximize
home station training goals. The President's budget request for fiscal
year 2016 allows the Army to increase training readiness to battalion-
level across the Active component force and to platoon-level in the
Reserves. Lower funding levels will not allow us to achieve this
balanced readiness.
Although the Army attempts to mitigate the impacts on training
readiness, we must continue to implement the Contingency Force model of
fiscal year 2015 in order to maintain readiness for the 24 of 60 BCTs
that will receive sufficient funding to conduct training at CTCs and
home station. Funding shortages will limit the remaining 36 BCTs to
minimum Individual/Crew/Squad resourcing levels through sufficient
Training Support Systems (TSS). In short, sequestration forces the Army
to ration readiness. Regardless of funding levels, we are committed to
keeping CTCs a priority.
Our aim is to provide tough, realistic multi-echelon home station
training using a mix of live, virtual and constructive methods that
efficiently and effectively build soldier, leader, and unit competency
over time, contributing to the effectiveness of the current and future
forces. Training will integrate the unique capabilities of the Light,
Medium and Heavy forces, as well as the capabilities of Conventional
and Special Operations Forces. Furthermore, we are optimizing the use
of existing training capacity and leveraging other opportunities such
as CTCs, exercises and operational deployments to maximize the training
benefits of fixed overhead and operational costs. Training centers such
as Joint Multinational Readiness Center will increase our
interoperability with Allies. Our goal is to increase readiness from 33
percent to 70 percent of our Regular Army BCTs, allowing the Army to
balance combatant command force requirements while maintaining surge
capability--but we need consistent resources to get there. We are also
increasing funding for our individual and institutional training.
Funding increases focus on leader development, entry-level training and
flight training. This allows the Army to develop its future leaders,
prepare its soldiers to operate in today's dynamic combat environment
and provide trained and ready soldiers to meet combatant commanders'
requirements.
The Army continues to make progress in integrating the unique
capabilities of each of its components to support the needs of the
combatant commanders. As part of the Army's Total Force Policy, the
U.S. Army Forces Command is leading the way by partnering every Guard
and Reserve division and brigade with a Regular Army peer unit. The
Army is also piloting a program to assign Guard and Reserve personnel
directly to each Regular Army corps and division headquarters. For
example, the Reserve component rapidly provided support capabilities in
support of Operation United Assistance in Liberia to augment and
replace elements of the initial Active component response.
As we transition from combat operations in Afghanistan, our Army is
focused on our ability to rapidly deploy forces around the world in
order to meet the needs of our combatant commanders. To do this, we
enhanced prepositioned equipment sets and created activity sets to
support operations in Europe, the Pacific and around the world.
Activity sets are prepositioned sets of equipment that enable U.S.
regionally-aligned forces and multinational partners in Europe to train
and operate. We have also reinvigorated our Emergency Deployment
Readiness Exercise program and enhanced the en route mission command
capability of our Global Response Force. The President's budget request
provides sufficient capability to respond in each geographical
combatant command's area of responsibility.
The Army continues to be a good steward of the resources
appropriated for replacement, recapitalization and repair of materiel
returning from operations conducted in Afghanistan. In 2014, the Army
efficiently synchronized equipment retrograde out of theater.
Redeployment and retrograde operations remain on schedule; however, the
Army continues to forecast a need for reset funding for 3 years after
redeployment of the last piece of equipment from theater. A steady,
responsible drawdown of personnel and equipment demonstrates good
stewardship of resources while facilitating transition to the post-2014
Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan. In addition, we identified
almost $2 billion of potential requirement reductions in Contractor
Logistics and Training Support, and took advantage of our wartime reset
program to reduce Depot Maintenance by over $1.3 billion over 5 years.
These changes allowed the Army to increase the capability of its
prepositioned stocks program without an increase in the associated
costs.
The proliferation of information and communications technologies
increases the momentum of human interaction, creating a constantly
shifting geopolitical landscape. An Army that is globally engaged and
regionally aligned requires access at the point of need, robust network
capacity and capability that is tailorable and scalable. The Army's
strategy is to effectively leverage joint networks, transition to
cloud-based solutions and services, reduce the culture of controlling
network resources and divest legacy systems to make way for resources
to build network modernization. Over time, this will significantly
boost information technology operational efficiency, improve mission
effectiveness and posture the Army to more quickly adapt and innovate.
The Army continually seeks incremental improvements to its
institutional organizations, processes and business systems in order to
provide ready forces in the most fiscally responsible way for the
Nation. The Army is expanding its efforts to control the cost of
business operations by reducing the size of headquarters units, which
we view as a fiscal imperative. Progressive fielding of Enterprise
Resource Planning systems is enhancing accountability, changing
business processes and enabling the retirement of legacy systems that
will ultimately reduce our overall costs. Our workforce is adapting to
new systems and processes inherent in increased internal controls and
enterprise connectivity across business domains. Army leaders are
actively engaged in change management and committed to meeting audit
readiness goals and the September 2017 audit assertion of our financial
statements. We continue to challenge the status quo, enabling the
institutional Army to perform its activities smarter, faster and at
reduced cost to provide more resources for readiness.
ensuring a modern army
Modernization
Decreases to the Army budget over the past several years have had
significant impacts on Army modernization and threaten our ability to
retain overmatch through the next decade. Since 2011, the Army has
ended 20 programs, delayed 125 and restructured 124. Between 2011 and
2015, Research and Development and Acquisition accounts plunged 35
percent from $31 billion to $20 billion. Procurement alone dropped from
$21.3 billion to $13.9 billion. We estimate sequestration will affect
over 80 Army programs. Major impacts include delays in equipping to
support expeditionary forces, delays in combat vehicle and aviation
modernization, increases in sustainment costs to fix older equipment
and increases in capability gaps.
Our intent is to modernize and equip soldiers with effective,
affordable and sustainable equipment that is ready and tailorable to
support the full range of combatant command requirements. The
President's budget request would provide over $2 billion to address the
growing gaps in our modernization accounts. Even with this additional
funding, modernization remains more than $3 billion short of the
historical average as a percentage of the Army's budget.
The Army will continue to protect Science and Technology (S&T)
investments critical to identifying, developing and demonstrating
technology options that inform and enable affordable capabilities for
the soldier. S&T efforts will foster innovation, maturation and
demonstration of technology-enabled capabilities, maximizing the
potential of emergent game-changing landpower technologies. Key
investments include Joint Multi-Role Helicopter, the foundation for the
Army's Future Vertical Lift capability; combat vehicle prototyping;
assured Position, Navigation and Timing and enhancing cyber operations
and network protections. We continue to explore the possibilities of
cyber, high-energy laser, materials, human performance and quantum
science technologies for a variety of applications.
The centerpiece of the Army's Modernization Strategy continues to
be the soldier and the squad. The Army's objective is to rapidly
integrate technologies and applications that empower, protect and
unburden the soldier and our formations, thus providing the soldier
with the right equipment, at the right time, to accomplish the assigned
mission. The Army will support this priority by investing in
technologies that provide the soldier and squad with advanced
warfighting capabilities such as enhanced weapon effects, next
generation optics and night vision devices, advanced body armor and
individual protective equipment, unmanned aerial systems, ground-based
robots and soldier power systems.
Improvements to mission command will facilitate the decisionmaking
of leaders and soldiers across all tactical echelons for Unified Land
Operations in support of the Joint Force and allies. The Army will
develop and field a robust, integrated tactical mission command network
linking command posts, and extending out to the tactical edge and
across platforms. We will build enhanced mission command capabilities
and platform integration by fielding software applications for the
Common Operating Environment, while working to converge operations and
intelligence networks. Based on the current and projected demands for
ISR, the Army adjusted the Gray Eagle unmanned aerial system program's
fielding schedule to make more assets available to strategic and
operational commanders this year. The Army also expanded the Aerial
Intelligence Brigade with an additional 18 Gray Eagles for a total of
36 aircraft, and an increase from 48 to 165 soldiers per company.
With respect to combat platforms, and those desired to enable
greater protected mobility, the Army's objective is to consider the
most stressing contingency operations and make its fleets more capable.
In addition to the Apache AH-64E and Blackhawk UH-60M investments,
which support the Army's Aviation Restructure Initiative, the Army will
continue development of the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle to replace
the obsolete M113 family of vehicles and begin to produce the Joint
Light Tactical family of vehicles. The Army will also continue to make
improvements to the survivability, lethality, mobility and protection
of the Abrams tank, Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle and Paladin self-
propelled howitzer fleets. While resource constraints will force the
Army to delay new system development and investment in the next
generation of capabilities, we will execute incremental upgrades to
increase capabilities and modernize existing systems.
Few choices remain if modernization accounts continue to bear the
brunt of sequestration. Most programs are already at minimum economic
sustaining levels, and further reductions will rapidly increase the
number of cancellations. Those programs remaining will have higher unit
costs and extended acquisition schedules. Sequestration will create
severe reductions in buying power and further delays filling capability
gaps, forcing the Army to tier modernization--creating a situation of
``haves and have nots'' in the force. Rapid regeneration to fill
modernization gaps and the ability to ensure interoperable, networked
formations will come at a premium in cost and time. Most complex
systems in production now take 24-36 months to deliver once Congress
appropriates funding, while new starts or restarts take even longer. To
address the steep reductions in modernization accounts, the Army
emphasizes early affordability reviews, establishing cost caps (funding
and procurement objectives), synchronizing multiple processes and
divesting older equipment quickly.
Organic and Commercial Industrial Base
The Army's Industrial Base consists of Government-owned (organic)
and commercial industrial capability and capacity that must be readily
available to manufacture and repair items during both peacetime and
national emergencies. We are concerned that we will not be able to
retain an Army Industrial Base that provides unique capabilities,
sustains the capacity for reversibility and meets the manufacturing and
repair materiel demands of the Joint Force. In the Commercial
Industrial Base, prime suppliers have increased their role as
integrators, and delegated key innovation and development roles to a
vast and complex network of sub-tier suppliers. Sub-tier suppliers have
responded with their own complex network of suppliers, some of which
are small, highly skilled and defense dependent firms--these small and
specialized firms serve as the warning indicator that gauges the health
of the overall industrial base. In fiscal year 2014, the Army
identified those commercial sector industrial capabilities vital to our
national defense and sustainment of a credible and capable smaller
force. We must continue to protect these capabilities.
Cyber
Network dominance and defense is an integral part of our national
security, and the Army is focused on proactively providing increased
capability to the Joint Force. With the evolving cyber environment, the
Army has been proactively adapting to cyber threats and vulnerabilities
by transforming processes, organizations and operating practices. As
the Army restructures LandWarNet to support operations worldwide, it is
imperative we rapidly innovate and fund network and cyber
infrastructure, services, security, and capabilities.
A number of institutional transformations are in place or ongoing
to build and sustain the Army's future cyberspace force requirements.
To be more agile and responsive, while improving unity of command and
synchronization of cyberspace operations, we have consolidated Army
Cyber Command (ARCYBER), 2nd Army and the Joint Force Headquarters-
Cyber under one commander. The Army has established the Cyber Center of
Excellence at Fort Gordon, GA, and will serve as our focal point to
drive change across the Army. The proponent lead for cyberspace
operations shifted from ARCYBER to the Cyber Center of Excellence under
the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Additionally,
we established an Army Cyber Institute at West Point to collaborate
with government partners, industry and other higher education
institutions to develop cyber solutions. The creation of a cyber
network defender enlisted specialty and the Cyber Branch within the
officer corps was an effort to help focus and manage the Army's cyber
talent.
In terms of new and emerging initiatives, ARCYBER and the
acquisition community are pursuing ways to bring capabilities,
including big data analytics, to Army operations in order to improve
our cyber defense capability. We play a vital role in cyber operations
across the DOD and the Joint Force by providing Cyber Protection Teams
and Cyber Support Teams. Recent DOD decisions have resulted in the
pursuit of a defense-wide global implementation of network
modernization, including the Joint Regional Security Stacks, to enhance
the security of our networks. We continually conduct assessments to
better understand cyber vulnerabilities in our combat platforms and
communications systems. We must make prudent investments in our cyber
infrastructure, including facilities, networks and equipment to ensure
a capable force. The Army is currently reviewing cyber training range
capabilities and capacities to better assess future requirements. All
these efforts will generate resourcing requirements, which will have to
compete against other equally urgent priorities within the Army.
Installations, Water and Energy
Since 2012, as the Army implemented several rounds of budget
reductions, our installation programs have seen dramatically reduced
services and sustainment. Although we have survived for 2 years at
these reduced funding levels by deferring critical facility maintenance
and cutting back on services, should the increases proposed by the
President not materialize, we will seriously impair our facilities and
have to permanently reduce important programs and services. Even with
these increased funds, facilities maintenance is funded at only 79
percent in fiscal year 2016, which translates to higher future repair
and renovation costs.
As stated in previous testimony, we need another round of BRAC. We
simply have too much surplus infrastructure and will have even more as
we downsize. We are already in the process of separating nearly 152,000
soldiers, and sequestration would force us to separate another 60,000--
for a total reduction of 212,000. In addition, we have reduced over
50,000 civilians from these same installations. Without a BRAC and the
realized cost savings, the only alternative is to make additional cuts
in training, manpower and modernization to make up for shortages in
installation funding. These are not cuts we can afford to make. To
date, we have been able to mitigate the adverse impact by focusing
reductions on Europe and eliminating facilities not associated with
U.S. installations. Through analysis and evaluation, we continue to
examine other ways to reduce infrastructure within our authorities
around the world. We are now reducing personnel at U.S. installations
and we expect excess facility capacity will be about 18 percent Army-
wide when we reach the end strength ramp of 490,000 for the Regular
Army in fiscal year 2015.
To improve the resilience and efficiency of our remaining
infrastructure today and in future years, the Army will continue its
efforts to increase energy efficiency, expand the use of onsite
renewable energy, reduce water consumption, and reduce waste
generation. This year, we will issue an Energy and Sustainability
Strategy that focuses on building resiliency. Implementation of this
strategy will facilitate continuity of operations and improve the
Army's energy, water and sustainability posture. These actions will
also enhance the Army's ability to mitigate and adapt to the
deleterious effects of climate change.
soldiers and civilians committed to our army and profession
We must never forget our soldiers will bear the burden of our
decisions with their lives and health. As Army professionals, we must
do everything possible to maintain the trust of our soldiers,
civilians, and families who selflessly sacrifice so much. Today, they
trust that we properly prepare them with the right tools and resources
necessary to accomplish the missions that take them into harm's way. To
ensure the Army maintains the trust of the American people we serve,
the Army is evaluating ways to further develop our military and
civilian professionals, and ensure an uncompromising culture of
accountability exists at every level of command. As the Army prepares
for the environment that lies ahead, we must anticipate the unique
ethical and moral challenges the future may present, and remain
committed to developing Army Professionals of Competence, Commitment,
and Character.
The Army Ethic defines the moral principles that guide us in the
conduct of our missions, performance of duty and all aspects of life.
Our ethic is reflected in law, Army Values, creeds, oaths, ethos and
shared beliefs embedded within Army culture. It inspires and motivates
all of us to make right decisions and to take right actions at all
times. The Army Ethic is the heart of our shared professional identity,
our sense of who we are, our purpose in life and why and how we serve
the American people. To violate the Army Ethic is to break our sacred
bond of trust with each other and with those whom we serve. Army
Professionals must fulfill distinctive roles as honorable servants,
military experts and stewards of our profession.
Adaptive Army Leaders for a Complex World
The Army Operating Concept will require evolutionary change as we
deal with the growing complexity of the operational environment, and
this change begins by changing mindsets. The Army's competitive
advantage, today and into the future, will always be our soldiers and
civilians. Our top priority is to develop agile and adaptive leaders at
the tactical, operational and strategic levels. Today and into the
future, the Army must provide well-led and highly trained soldiers
organized into tailorable and scalable organizations that provide our
Nation's leaders an array of options, both lethal and nonlethal, across
the entire range of missions. The Army Leader Development Strategy
calls for the development of leaders through a career-long synthesis of
training, education and experiences acquired through opportunities in
institutional, operational, broadening and self-development learning
formats, supported by peer and developmental relationships. Leader
development and optimized soldier performance are directly linked to
the Army's ability to operate in the future. We must develop
multidimensional, adaptive and innovative leaders who thrive in
decentralized, dynamic and interconnected environments.
Leader development is the deliberate, continuous and progressive
process--built on a foundation of trust and founded in Army values--
that grows soldiers and civilians into competent, committed
professional leaders of character. As an institution transitioning from
extended combat rotations, we must regain our expertise as trainers and
improve the support and delivery of realistic training. Home station
and centralized training must leverage both current and emergent
technologies and integrate the latest capabilities, such as cyber;
hybrid threats and joint, interorganizational and multinational
organizations.
Today's combat environment requires dynamic leaders and soldiers.
To ensure all soldiers are adequately prepared, entry-level soldier
training focuses on fostering individual resiliency, battlefield
skills, Army values and developing the credentials to succeed in the
Army and excel afterward. The NCO development model is a deliberate,
analytical and data-driven process that constantly evaluates and
adjusts to ensure all leaders have the right tools to lead and mentor
others in today's and tomorrow's dynamic worlds. This model is
collectively known as NCO 2020, which looks at training from the
operational, institutional and self-development domains to ensure a
career of lifelong learning and of harnessing experience and
proficiency at all levels. This includes a revamping of the NCO
education system and a renewed emphasis on individual and collective
task training to help mitigate the effects of a reduction in Combat
Training Center rotations.
Today, the Army is expanding broadening opportunities for its NCOs,
warrant officers, and officers with programs like Training with
Industry, Strategic Broadening Seminars and the Congressional
Fellowship Program. Broadening and educational experiences for senior
field grade through general officers is also an area that must not be
overlooked. Developing well-rounded senior leaders who are capable of
effectively communicating the needs and capabilities of the profession
to Civilian leaders within the larger context of national concerns is
critical to the Nation.
It is imperative that our leaders and organizations are capable of
thriving in joint interorganizational and multinational teams, and that
they seamlessly integrate multi-domain effects from air, sea, space,
cyber, or land. This places a premium on innovation--on leveraging
current and emerging concepts and technologies both today and going
forward. Encouraging innovation and empowering all leaders with the
skills required to win in a complex world, manage complex institutional
processes and influence strategic decisionmaking within a broader
operating environment is paramount to the Army's future.
More than 250,000 people working in nearly 500 unique job series--
about 20 percent of the Total Army Force--comprise the Army Civilian
corps. Given the size, complexity, impact and importance of the
civilian cohort to the Army, we established the Army Civilian Workforce
Transformation (CWT). CWT is the Army's strategic campaign to transform
the Army's civilian cohort for the future and develop a more adaptable,
capable and technically proficient Army civilian who is well grounded
as a leader.
Soldier 2020 and Increased Opportunities for Women
In 2012, the Army initiated a deliberate Service-wide effort--
Soldier 2020--to ensure our units are filled with the best-qualified
soldiers. This effort includes opening previously closed positions and
occupational specialties to women, while maintaining our combat
effectiveness. The Soldier 2020 initiative seeks to remove as many
barriers as possible and allow talented people--regardless of gender--
to serve in any position in which they are capable of performing to
standard.
Over the past 27 months, we have opened 6 previously closed
Military Occupational Specialties and over 55,000 positions across all
Army components to women. This includes opening 1,562 positions in U.S.
Army Special Operations Command, including the 160th Special Operations
Aviation Regiment. The Army is validating gender-neutral physical
standards and completing a gender integration study, work that will
inform decisions on opening the 14 remaining Military Occupational
Specialties currently closed to women. Once the study is completed, we
will make a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense on opening as
many as 166,000 positions across the Active and Reserve components to
our women in uniform. As part of the Soldier 2020 initiative, the Army
Ranger School assessment program will begin this spring to assess
female soldiers and officers into Army Ranger School. The Army
continues to proceed in an incremental and scientific-based approach to
integrating women into previously closed units, positions and
occupations while preserving unit readiness, cohesion, discipline and
morale. The Army will complete all actions to meet Office of the
Secretary of Defense requirements prior to January 1, 2016.
Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) Program
From the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army down to our
newest soldiers, we continue to attack the complex challenges of sexual
assault. While we have made progress, much work remains. Sexual assault
is a crime that violates the core values on which the Army functions,
and sexual harassment shatters good order and discipline. Sexual
harassment and sexual assault must be stamped out, and doing so remains
a top priority throughout the Army. Commanders, the Chain of Command,
and the Uniform Code of Military Justice provide the vital tools needed
to prosecute offenders and hold all soldiers and leaders appropriately
responsible.
Across the Army, we are committed to maintaining momentum in Army
SHARP and making further advances along our five lines of efforts:
Prevention, Investigation, Accountability, Advocacy and Assessment. In
the last year, our efforts along the Prevention Line of Effort resulted
in actions such as consolidating SHARP training under TRADOC and
Initial Entry Training and Professional Military Education to increase
the quality and accessibility of our prevention tools. Our
Investigation Line of Effort showed advances in Special Victim
capabilities and Trial Counsel Assistance Programs. The Accountability
Line of Effort had successes through our Special Victim Investigation
and Prosecution capability and through tools such as Command Climate
Surveys and Commander 360 degree assessments. Our Advocacy Line of
Effort resulted in initial indicators of progress in establishing SHARP
resource centers in over 12 installations. We continue to see interim
progress along our Assessment Line of Effort as noted in the
President's report and we continue to closely monitor the established
metrics to measure compliance.
In sum, we have seen some progress as evident in the recent
statistics outlined in the 2014 ``Department of Defense Report to the
President of the United States on Sexual Assault Prevention and
Response'' that indicate a decrease in unwanted sexual contact in
fiscal year 2014 compared to fiscal year 2012. Within the Army, survey-
estimated rates of unwanted sexual contact for the past year decreased
significantly for active duty women (4.6 percent), compared to fiscal
year 2012 (7.1 percent). In addition, reporting data demonstrates more
victims are coming forward to report sexual harassment and sexual
assault. In fiscal year 2014, sexual assault reporting in the Army
increased by 12 percent over the previous year. We view this as a vote
of confidence and a sign of increased trust in our leaders, in our
response services and in changing Army culture. The decline in
prevalence of unwanted sexual contact, combined with the increase in
reports received, suggests the Army's efforts to prevent sexual assault
and build victim confidence in our response system are making progress.
Nevertheless, we must continue to work on fostering a climate where
individuals are not afraid of retaliation or stigma for reporting a
crime by ensuring individuals, units, organizations and specifically
commanders and leaders understand their responsibilities. Retaliation
takes many forms and originates from many sources--leaders, family,
friends and, most pervasively, peer to peer. Retaliation in its
simplest form is bullying. It is intimidation that deters people from
acting. It enables offenders, threatens survivors, pushes bystanders to
shy from action, and breeds a culture of complacence. Retaliation has
no place in the Army and we must stamp it out.
Sexual Assault Response Coordinators and Sexual Assault Prevention
and Response Victim Advocates are now credentialed through the DOD
Sexual Assault Advocate Certification Program, and the Army's SHARP
Academy is expanding their knowledge, skills and abilities. Based on
national experts' guidance, the Army's Sexual Assault Medical Forensic
Examiner's course now surpasses Department of Justice requirements and
establishes a best practice for all DOD to follow.
The chain of command is at the center of any solution to combat
sexual assault and harassment, and we must ensure it remains fully
engaged, involved and vigilant. Toward this end, we enhanced the
Officer and Enlisted Evaluation Reporting Systems to assess how
officers and NCOs are meeting their commitments--holding them
accountable through mandatory comments on how those leaders are acting
to foster a climate of dignity and respect and their adherence to our
SHARP program. With commanders at the center of our efforts, we will
continue to decrease the prevalence of sexual assault through
prevention and encourage greater reporting of the crime. We expect to
see reporting numbers to continue to rise. As our efforts to enforce
discipline, prosecute offenders and eliminate criminal behavior mature,
we expect the number of sexual assaults occurring within the Army to
eventually decrease. There is no place for sexual harassment or sexual
assault in our Army or our society.
The problems of sexual assault and sexual harassment will only be
solved when every soldier, civilian, and family member stands up and
unequivocally acts to stamp it out. Together, we have an obligation to
do all we can to safeguard America's sons and daughters, as well as
maintain trust between soldiers, civilians, families, and the Nation.
Army leaders, at every level of the chain of command, are doing this
through prevention, investigation, accountability, advocacy and
assessments.
maintaining the premier all volunteer army
As we shape the force of the future, we must enhance force
readiness, while taking care of the men and women who serve. This
means, while providing combatant commanders with versatile and trained
forces, we also have an obligation to support our soldiers, families
and civilians while they serve in the Army, and as they transition back
to civilian life. Those who make up the Total Army--soldiers, families
and civilians; Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve--
represent its strength. ``Total Army Strong'' expresses our enduring
commitment to soldiers, families, and civilians, and to sustain a
system of programs and services to mitigate the unique demands of
military life, foster life skills, strengthen resilience and promote a
strong and ready Army. ``Total Army Strong'' provides commanders
flexibility to prioritize and adjust programs and services, regardless
of geographic location.
We recognize that attracting and retaining highly-qualified
individuals in all three components is critical to readiness. However,
the stronger economy, including lower unemployment, poses challenges to
recruiting and retention in fiscal year 2016. Due to obesity, medical
conditions and other reasons, less than one-third of otherwise-eligible
Americans would even qualify for military service. Though we face
recruiting challenges in fiscal year 2016, we will man our formations
with highly-qualified and diverse soldiers by continuing and
strengthening those recruitment and retention programs that best
enhance and sustain the All-Volunteer Army.
Ready and Resilient Campaign
We must support and appropriately resource the Army's Ready and
Resilient Campaign. This campaign provides holistic, evidence-based
tools, training and resources to our commands and leaders who care for
our soldiers, civilians, and family members so they can strengthen
their resilience and achieve and sustain personal readiness. The Army's
Ready and Resilient capabilities improve the physical, emotional, and
psychological resilience of the entire force, attack the foundation of
acts of indiscipline and prevent negative behaviors from escalating to
damaging events such as suicide or sexual assault. We must ensure the
overall readiness and resilience of the Total Army Family through
optimal sleep, activity and nutrition--the Performance Triad. The
Performance Triad strengthens individual and unit readiness through a
comprehensive approach that promotes leadership and behavior change
strategies to improve personal and unit readiness and resilience, as
well as physical, emotional, and cognitive dominance through optimized
sleep, physical activity, and nutrition. The Performance Triad empowers
leaders to coach and mentor health readiness using technology to
actuate behaviors that support lasting cultural change as a mandate of
the Army profession.
Soldier for Life
Soldier for Life is not just a program; it is a change in mindset.
One way we encourage this frame of mind is through senior leader and
installation engagements, as well as changes in training curriculum. We
want soldiers to understand and believe from the time they come into
the Army and for the rest of their lives, that they deserve our utmost
care and attention throughout the soldier lifecycle--``Once a Soldier,
always a Soldier . . . a Soldier for Life!'' As soldiers return to
civilian life, they will continue to influence young people to join the
Army and, along with retired soldiers, will connect communities across
the Nation with its Army.
As we reduce the Army's end strength, we owe it to our soldiers and
their families to facilitate their transition to civilian life. The
Army supports continuum of service initiatives to help in this effort
by communicating the benefits of continued service in the Reserve
Components. Additionally, the ``Soldier for Life'' Program connects
Army, governmental and community efforts to facilitate the successful
reintegration of our soldiers and families back into communities across
the Nation through networks in employment, education and health. Our
pre- and post-retirement services ensure those who served become and
remain leaders in their community. For example, we have developed
strong relationships with government, nongovernment, and private sector
entities to include direct collaboration with the Departments of
Veterans Affairs, Labor, and the Chamber of Commerce to bring
employment summits to installations worldwide.
closing
We face a period of critical decisions that will impact the Army's
capability and capacity for the next decade. It is important that we
make the right decisions now. The operational and fiscal environments
are straining the Army as we attempt to balance end strength, readiness
and modernization to meet current demands while building the
foundations of a force that can meet future challenges. The velocity of
instability continues to increase worldwide, whether of ISIL and
terrorism in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen; anarchy and extremism in North
Africa; Russian belligerence; provocation by North Korea; or complex
humanitarian assistance requirements and the unpredictable nature of
disaster relief missions. But despite all of this, we continue to
reduce our military capabilities, degrade readiness and erode trust
with the specter of sequestration. We ask the help of Congress to
eliminate sequestration and provide our soldiers with greater
predictability in these uncertain times. We must not reduce the Army
below 980,000 soldiers and leave the Army unprepared to meet Defense
Strategic Guidance or respond to some unforeseen event.
Our strategic partnership with Congress is absolutely critical to
the Army's success. Simply put, our soldiers and civilians could not do
what they do each day without your support. Our Army needs
congressional support now more than ever. The decisions we make this
year and next on our fiscal policy, and related end strength, readiness
and modernization will directly impact the security of the United
States and the world for decades to come. Today, we have the most
capable and professional Army in the world. Our soldiers have gained
invaluable experience and expertise; built relationships among
interagency partners, allies and each other and developed an intimate
understanding of the world we live in. As we reduce the size of our
Army, each soldier leaving the ranks takes with him or her invaluable
experiences and a deep understanding that has come at great cost and is
impossible to replace in short order.
We look forward to working with Congress to ensure the Army is
capable of fulfilling its many missions, while continuing to be good
stewards of the taxpayers' money. Despite ongoing fiscal uncertainties,
we are pleased to report professionalism and morale within the Army
remains strong. Whether advising and assisting in Afghanistan and Iraq,
supporting allies in Europe and the Republic of Korea, serving in the
homeland or engaging our partners around the world, the indomitable
spirit of our greatest assets, our soldiers--our Nation's Trusted
Professionals--stands ready: Ready to safeguard our Nation's liberty,
deter aggression and protect our national interests at home and abroad.
With your assistance, we will continue to resource the best-trained,
best-equipped, and best-led fighting force in the world: the U.S. Army.

Chairman McCain. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary James?

STATEMENT OF HON. DEBORAH LEE JAMES, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

Ms. James. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Reed
and the rest of the committee. We very much appreciate the
opportunity to come before you today. It certainly is an honor
for me to be here as always with my wingman, General Mark
Welsh, a phenomenal leader, and with my colleagues as well,
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno from the Army.
Mr. Chairman, this morning--or this afternoon rather, I
would like to share with you some of my key takeaways that I
have accumulated over the last 15 months that I have had the
privilege to serve as the Secretary of the Air Force. You have
already touched upon several of them. So this is really a foot
stomp on my part.
So, number one, is that today we indeed are the smallest
Air Force that we have ever been since our inception as an air
force in the year 1947. Moreover, our aircraft in the Air Force
are the oldest that they have ever been. 27 years of age is the
average age, and that means that a lot of our fleets are
actually substantially older than 27 years of age. Here is
perhaps the most shocking statistic of all. The chairman
already said it. But more than half of our combat Air Force is
not sufficiently ready today for a high-end fight. Moreover, we
certainly all know that the budgets are extremely tight, and
all of these factors are coming together at a time when world
conditions are as unpredictable and dangerous as certainly I
can ever remember them ever being, at least in the 34 years
that I have been working on defense issues.
Now, your Air Force is working very, very hard to meet the
combatant commanders' most urgent needs, but I have to join
with my colleague, Secretary McHugh, in saying that if we are
forced to live with the sequestration level budget, simply we
will not be able to sustain this pace. Put plainly,
sequestration I believe will place American lives at greater
risk and that will be the case both here at home and abroad.
Under sequestration, we will not be able to simultaneously
defeat one adversary in one part of the world, deny a second
adversary elsewhere, their objectives, as well as defend the
homeland. That, of course, is our strategy, and under
sequestration, I am telling you we cannot do it all
simultaneously.
Mr. Chairman, at a recent hearing on sequestration, you
said if we continue with these arbitrary defense cuts, we will
harm our military's ability to keep us safe. I just want to say
I think you are absolutely correct, and this is simply not
acceptable. Something has to give. We thank you, Mr. Chairman
and other members of the committee, because we know that you
are working hard to get sequestration lifted, and we just ask
you to please keep that up because we do need it lifted
permanently.
Now, rather than simply living with the forced
sequestration levels and submitting a budget under those
levels, instead we are looking for a budget figure in fiscal
year 2016 which is substantially closer to what we need. For
the Air Force, this means about a $10 billion differential in
fiscal year 2016, $10 billion more than what sequestration
level funding would ordinarily provide to the Air Force. This
$10 billion increase provides both the forces needed to meet
our most pressing combatant commander requirements, and it also
makes the most important investments in our top priorities.
Here are our top priorities.
Number one, taking care of people. There is a lot in this
budget as it relates to people, but the number one priority on
people that I want to call to your attention is that General
Welsh and I firmly believe that this downsizing that we have
been going through for the better part of 20-some years has to
stop. If anything, we think we may have gone too far, which is
precisely why we are calling for a modest upward adjustment in
our total force end strength of about 6,600. That will be some
to the active duty, some to the Guard, and some to the Reserve.
Indeed, Mr. Reed, one of the reasons why we know now we have
downsized perhaps too much is because our High Velocity
Analysis (HVA), which came from the Guard and Reserve follow-up
report, indicated that we are short in every single component.
So we think we need a modest upward adjustment. That will help
us to alleviate strains in our nuclear enterprise, in our cyber
arena, as well as in maintenance. There are a number of other
areas as well. We have a program for Remotely Piloted Aircraft
(RPA), which we can talk about in the questions and answers
(Q&A).
Our second priority is getting the balance right between
the readiness of today and modernizing for tomorrow. Now,
General Welsh and I both consulted very closely with our
combatant commanders as we built this budget, and we consulted
closely with our sister Services as well. I can tell you the
number one thing that the combatant commanders say they want
from our Air Force is more intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR), ISR, ISR. That is the number one
priority. So this budget, which is before you, ramps up support
to the most urgent needs of ISR, to include support for 60
steady state ISR patrols, as well as extending the life of the
U-2 and the AWACS programs. We will also support vital space
programs, strengthen the nuclear enterprise. We will fund our
flying hours to the maximum executable level. We will invest in
weapons system sustainment, and ensure that combat exercises
like the Red Flags and the Green Flags remain strong. All of
that is the readiness of today, but the readiness of tomorrow,
modernization is important as well.
When it comes to modernization, strengthening the nuclear
enterprise remains the Air Force's number one mission priority,
and we have quite a lot in this 5-year plan for the nuclear
enterprise. There are our top three modernization programs, the
KC-46, the F-35, the long-range strike bomber. All of those are
supported in this budget submission. In addition, we will make
important investments in space, science and technology, and
other areas.
Finally, priority number three and the last priority is
what we call ``make every dollar count,'' and that is because
we get it that the taxpayer dollar is precious and we cannot
afford to waste a single dollar. We are constantly looking for
efficiencies and ways to do things differently to free up
resources and to give back to our people some of their valuable
time.
So, for example, we took an aggressive 20 percent
headquarters reduction in funding in fiscal year 2015, which
includes civilians, contractors, and redirecting military
personnel. We did not have to do it in 1 year. The Secretary of
Defense's (SecDef) challenge was over 5, but we did do it in 1
year because we thought it was the right thing to do and it
would free up the dollars more quickly.
Not only that, we have reduced our service contractor
workforce, about $7 billion in obligations, and 30,000 contract
full-time equivalents in the last few years. We plan to
continue scrubbing and scrubbing and scrubbing both the
civilian and the contractor workforce over the years.
We also have a series of initiatives we call ``bend the
cost curve,'' and we think, Mr. Chairman, these are very much
in line and in the spirit of your acquisition reform pitch.
So all in all, there is a lot of good in this budget, but
as you said, Mr. Chairman, there are some hard choices as well.
Even though we are $10 billion up from sequestration, we are
still $10 billion down from where we were just a few years ago.
So we are proposing to reduce the A-10 and to slow the growth
in military compensation. For example, these are the hard
choices.
We realize these proposals are very controversial. They are
not popular and some simply do not agree, and that there are
risks associated with all of this. We understand that. But we
would just ask everyone to keep in mind that it gets uglier and
uglier and uglier in terms of choices if we have to go to
sequestration.
So our Air Force under a sequestered budget would mean
divesting the U-2 and the Global Hawk block 40 and the KC-10s
and reducing MQ-1s and MQ-9s by 10 combat air patrols and
deferring 14 F-35s, canceling the adaptive engine program. Then
there would be a series of reductions we would have to take in
space, in cyber, in nuclear. Really everything under
sequestration would be at risk. It threatens everything.
So we thank you and we ask you to please continue to push
to lift it permanently. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The joint prepared statement of Ms. James and General
Welsh follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by Hon. Deborah Lee James and Gen. Mark A.
Welsh III, USAF
i. introduction
The U.S. Air Force is the most globally engaged air force on the
planet. American airmen are in constant defense of our national
interests, whether dropping bombs, commanding satellites in space,
delivering humanitarian relief, or protecting the homeland with an
array of air, space, and cyberspace capabilities our forefathers could
never have imagined. Airmen collaborate and train with allies--
expanding and strengthening our collective capabilities--and guarantee
the global freedom of movement and access that Americans have come to
expect. Alongside its sister Services, America's Air Force delivers our
Nation the power, influence, agility, and global reach no other country
currently possesses . . . no matter the effort, no matter the odds. Our
airmen are warfighters and they bring airpower to bear on behalf of
America every day.
But 24 years of continual combat operations, coupled with
constrained and unstable budgets, has taken its toll. America needs a
force ready for a spectrum of operations more global and complex than
ever before. Instead, a relentless operations tempo, with fewer
resources to fund, coordinate, and execute training and exercises, has
left a force proficient in only those portions of the mission necessary
for current operations. This is not the Air Force America expects . . .
but today, it is the Air Force America owns.
Today's Air Force is the smallest and oldest it has ever been, even
while the demand for airpower continues to climb. There is no excess;
there is no ``bench'' . . . everything is committed. When called into
action, today's Air Force cannot respond in one corner of the Earth
without diluting its presence elsewhere. The blanket of American
airpower covering the globe has thinned; in places, it is nearly
threadbare. As we have cut our capacity, we have found our capability
equally diminished--the two qualities are inextricably linked.
The Nation deserves an Air Force that can outmatch its most
dangerous enemies at their peak of power--the most demanding
warfighting scenario, not just the ``low-end fight.'' The President's
budget (PB) takes a critical step toward recovering that Air Force, but
make no mistake: even at President's budget levels, the Air Force
remains stressed to do what the Nation asks of us. To truly reverse the
erosion of American airpower requires sustained commitment, stability,
and the decision-space to invest each taxpayer dollar where it can best
deliver the most combat power.
Without bold leadership today--difficult decisions and a commitment
to air, space, and cyberspace investment--America's airpower advantage
is increasingly at risk.
ii. a globally engaged force
At the Nation's call, American airmen leap to defend her interests.
They respond at all hours, on any day, anywhere in the world, and they
do it whether the requirement has been planned for or not. After all,
enemies (and disasters) rarely strike when expected.
On the eve of 2014, the Nation--and the Air Force--planned for a
relatively quiet year. We expected to draw down combat forces in
Afghanistan, and have an opportunity to reset and reconstitute our
forces.
Instead, the Ukraine and a resurgent Russia happened. Ebola
happened. The Islamic State happened. Airmen flew 19,959 offensive
sorties, releasing 8,249 weapons \1\ in support of U.S. Central Command
alone. Air Force tankers offloaded 172 million gallons of fuel to Joint
and coalition air forces, and airmen flew 79,445 airlift missions in
operations on every continent.\2\ We kept watch over our enemies,
collecting and analyzing over 18 million images and 1.6 million hours
of full motion video . . . and we evacuated 6,075 wounded soldiers,
sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians from the battle space. Instead
of slowing down, our force sped up.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ These include Close Air Support, Escort, and Interdiction
sorties. Data from AFCENT Airpower Summary
\2\ Tanker Airlift Control Center Office of Public Affairs
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Air Force was equally busy at home, providing capability most
Americans never have to think about. Airmen launched nine national
security space missions--bolstering GPS, weather, and Space Situational
Awareness capabilities to benefit military and civilian users alike.
They engaged with allies to build America's space partnerships; and
worked to qualify potential new launch providers to increase
competition, reduce costs, and assure American access to space in the
future. Airmen began the long, critical work of revitalizing two of the
three legs of our Nation's nuclear triad, gathering over 300
recommendations from the field on how to improve Air Force nuclear
culture . . . and then implemented those ideas, to the tune of $50
million in fiscal year 2014 and a planned $154 million in fiscal year
2015.
Airmen provide access, overwatch, protection, and staying power for
American and coalition forces the world over. They degrade adversary
capabilities, and re-affirm every day that America can project power
anywhere in the world, at the time and place of our choosing. That
power--that presence, at home and abroad--is among the strongest
deterrents confronting the Nation's would-be enemies . . . and
protecting our national interests.
iii. capacity and capability: a dual problem
Americans have invested in airpower for well over 60 years to
ensure the fight is never fair. But today--after many years of
continual operations and a few fiscal upheavals--the Nation is at a
crossroads, with a fundamental disconnect between its airpower
expectations and its airpower capability.
There was a time when the Air Force could trade some capacity in
order to retain capability. But we have reached the point where the two
are inextricable; lose any more capacity, and the capability will cease
to exist.
The Service's intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
force is a sobering example of this critical nexus. In today's
warfighting environment there is nearly infinite appetite for Air Force
ISR \3\--we simply do not have the capacity to fulfill it. To meet as
much of the demand as possible, airmen work 10- to 12-hour shifts on a
``7-on, 1-off'' pattern, flying over 900 hours a year--a rate that can
accumulate a career's worth of flying hours in a single assignment.
These are combat shifts, physically, mentally, and emotionally taxing .
. . and to get it done, they are sometimes diverted from training that
allows them to improve, advance, and build a professional military
career. When such airmen are faced with the decision to separate or
continue to serve, it is difficult to convince them that staying is in
their best interests. We are losing them at a rate faster than we can
replace them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ A return to sequestration would result in 50 percent of the
high-altitude ISR missions being flown today no longer being available.
Commanders would lose 30 percent of their ability to collect
intelligence and targeting data against moving vehicles on the
battlefield.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At some point, no level of effort will cover the capacity gap
created by continual worldwide operations and dwindling, uncertain
budgets. The capability itself will fail.
The fleet offers another case in point. Today's Air Force is both
the smallest and oldest it has ever been. Since Operation Desert Storm
in 1991, the Air Force cut its total aircraft inventory from 8,600 to
5,452. During that same time period, we cut Active, Guard, Reserve, and
civilian airmen from 946,000 to little more than 662,000 (just 313,000
on active duty). The average age of Air Force aircraft is 27 years,
with many fleets substantially older.
The newest B-52 bomber is 53 years old. In at least one Air Force
family, three generations of airmen have piloted the Stratofortress, in
combat engagements from Vietnam to Operation Enduring Freedom (see
boxed text below).

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

By automobile standards, 12 fleets of Air Force aircraft are
authorized antique license plates in the State of Virginia. The Air
Force can (and does) continue to patch these older platforms up and fly
them in combat. But after extending their service life time and time
again, each airframe reaches the point where it cannot be ``patched
up'' anymore. It must be replaced or it fails.
With aging aircraft and stressed fleets, today's capacity, as small
as it is, is something of an illusion. The numbers are there--barely--
but the capability to command global influence is tenuous. What was, in
earlier times, a blanket of airpower covering the globe, has been worn
to mere threads.
iv. policy and purse strings
The world continues to change at an unprecedented pace and
operational requirements continue unabated. The demands for global
engagement is challenging under any circumstance . . . but when
combined with an uncertain budget environment, it drives the Air
Force--indeed, all Services--to make incredibly difficult choices,
pitting vital requirement against vital requirement.
When budgets contract and budgetary policy is continually
postponed, or written in a way that limits Service solutions to budget
problems, decision-space shrinks, and already difficult budget choices
become nearly impossible.
In fiscal year 2012, when the Air Force originally forecast its
requirements to meet the Defense Strategic Guidance, the Service
planned an fiscal year 2016 topline of $134 billion. Today--as enacted
in fiscal year 2015, and so requested in the fiscal year 2016
President's budget--that topline has decreased to $122 billion. In
aggregate, the loss across those 5 years is $64 billion (see chart I
below).

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

To put this into perspective, if the Air Force shut off all
utilities--turned off the lights, the heating and air conditioning, the
water supply--at all our major installations for 12 years \4\. . . or
if it quit flying for 20 months--did not burn any jet fuel at all for
nearly 2 years . . . it would save only $12 billion. Enough to buy back
1 year of sequestered funds. Money matters; the lost capability is
real; and the impact is going to be significant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ This number reflects the cost of utilities only at U.S. Air
Force installations--it does not reflect installations investments writ
large (and thus does not portray in any way the savings which could be
associated with base realignment and closure)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, both budget uncertainty and legislative programming
restrictions have left the Air Force with very limited decision-space
over the past 3 years. Tightly constrained on aircraft divestiture and
denied Base Realignment and Closure, leaves the Service with only a few
accounts to yield savings from quickly and cleanly, without violating
``must pay'' requirements: readiness, people, and modernization. From
these, the Air Force worked hard to identify the least catastrophic
choices it could.
The Air Force took risk in infrastructure. Our investment in
maintenance and repair--including restoration, modernization,
sustainment, and new construction to recapitalize Air Force facilities
and infrastructure--is just 1.9 percent of the Service's plant
replacement value. Private industry standard is between 6 and 8 percent
investment.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ . . . and National Research Council studies indicate that an
investment between 2 and 4 percent of PRV is warranted to avoid risk of
accelerated deterioration and infrastructure failure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unable to cut airframes we believe we need to divest or to reduce
excess base capacity; the Service has cut personnel--taking risk in
human capital. Since 2001, even as the Nation fought in Afghanistan and
Iraq, Air Force uniformed end strength dropped by 44,000 airmen.\6\ We
simply cannot get any smaller or we risk being too small to succeed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Fiscal year 2011-fiscal year 2014 Active, Guard, and Reserve
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We have also been forced to cut into some of the programs that keep
airmen and airpower a step ahead of the enemy at all times. In 2013,
for example, an entire Weapons School class--which produces the world's
best tactical and operational airpower experts--was cancelled.
Risk and tough choices are part of every business. The problem, for
the Air Force, is that failure is never an option. Airmen will fix it,
patch it, make do, and work until they drop to cover shortfalls. But
asking it of them, year in and year out, risks unbearable strain on a
force heavily engaged around the globe.
v. doing what we can
Recognizing that budget uncertainty--and a need for fiscal
restraint--may be here to stay, the Air Force has extended its
institutional gaze out 30 years to synchronize budget and acquisition
decisions with strategy. To guide this effort, in 2014 the Service
published America's Air Force: A Call to the Future,\7\ a ground-
breaking new strategic framework. This framework calls for strategic
agility to confront the rapidly-changing global environment, and--in
conjunction with the upcoming Air Force Strategic Master Plan--will
provide guideposts and long-range resourcing vectors with which to make
the difficult tradeoffs required in years to come.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ http://airman.dodlive.mil/files/2014/07/
AF_30_Year_Strategy_2.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the more immediate-term, the Air Force has realized value
through its ``Every Dollar Counts'' (EDC) campaign. At the heart of EDC
is the Secretary of the Air Force's challenge to every airman to take
ownership of the processes they touch and to look for better ways to do
business. EDC initiatives run the gamut, from soliciting grassroots
savings ideas to overhauling Air Force acquisition practices. Efforts
within the campaign have reduced energy costs by approximately $1
billion, and identified another $1.3 billion in potential savings
through Better Buying Power practices and the Air Force's partner
initiative, Bending the Cost Curve. We project another $35.4 million in
savings proposed by airmen, and have found opportunities to save $190
million over the next 5 years by analyzing War Readiness Engine
requirements. The savings are already planned for reinvestment in
readiness, as well as to modernize equipment and infrastructure.
Budgetary constraints also spurred the Air Force to re-evaluate the
way it does business with its installations' host communities, and seek
alternatives to the status quo. The Air Force Community Partnerships
Initiative makes unprecedented use of public-public and public-private
(P4) partnerships, leveraging the existing resources and capabilities
of installations, state and local communities, and commercial entities
to achieve mutual value and benefit for all. There are now 47
installations in the Air Force Partnership Program who identified more
than 1,000 initiatives across the spectrum of installation services and
mission support . . . and many of these initiatives are developing
further with potential application Air Force-wide.
Additionally, the Air Force unequivocally relies on three strong
components--Active, Guard, and Reserve--to sustain the force required
to meet strategic uncertainty, fiscal constraint, and rapidly evolving
threats head-on. The Air Force is absolutely committed to leveraging
the distinct and complementary characteristics of its Total Force more
effectively . . . and to do that, airmen must be postured to operate
cohesively and seamlessly as one team. Over the last year, dialogue
with stakeholders provided valuable perspective--and mutual
understanding--about the necessary size and shape of the future Air
Force. The Service spent 2014 thoroughly analyzing 80 percent of its
mission areas and platforms, taking a close look at component balance.
Over the course of the next year, the Air Force will continue
evaluating the remaining 20 percent of the mission areas . . . and
continue ongoing work to break down organizational, policy, and
cultural barriers to seamless operations.
The Air Force is a committed steward of America's resources,
saving--or avoiding costs--to the tune of billions of dollars through
the ingenuity of airmen. Yet even those billions fall far short of
making up the losses of the past 3 years. We need a stable funding
profile, and support for the tough fiscal decisions required, if we are
to meet the complex global challenges of the coming years.
vi. an investment in global influence
America is an airpower nation; we have enjoyed unrivaled success in
the air for the past 70 years. But future success is not a birthright,
and air and space superiority is not an entitlement. It must be earned.
Without it, American influence diminishes and the U.S. military will be
forced to radically change how it goes to war. Americans will be put in
danger, and our leaders' options will be markedly limited. Our
adversaries know this and are taking steps to tip the balance in their
favor.
We cannot let this happen. We must invest in the force required
today and invest in the force we will need tomorrow.
The fiscal year 2016 President's budget request is the result of
difficult, purposeful, strategy-based resourcing decisions made to meet
obligations set in the Defense Strategic Guidance. It aligns with
Department of Defense and Air Force 30-year strategies; continues to
regain ground in our ability to wage full-spectrum operations;
maximizes the contributions of the Total Force; reinforces investments
in nuclear deterrence and space control operations; emphasizes global,
long-range and non-permissive capabilities; and focuses on unique
capabilities the Air Force provides to the joint fight. It funds our
greatest asset--airmen--by halting the active duty manpower drawdown
and reinvesting pay and compensation savings in airmen's quality-of-
life programs. It preserves the Air Force's top three acquisition
priorities: F-35; KC-46; and the long-range strike bomber.
The fiscal year 2016 President's budget request also reflects
changes in the global landscape, buying back combat capabilities in
areas where the Air Force accepted risk in the fiscal year 2015
President's budget--the E-8, Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar
System, and F-15C. U-2 and E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System
divestment is rephased to fiscal year 2019, so we can continue to
operate those platforms and meet combatant commanders' most urgent
needs. We've increased funding for the nuclear enterprise, space,
cyber, ISR, and command and control improvements, investing in the
Nation's strategic deterrence and high demand airpower assets.
This budget cannot stand alone--it must serve as a point of
departure for future years' stable, committed investment in global
airpower for America. A return to sequestration-level funding will
devastate readiness and modernization; it will force the Air Force to
depart from a long-term, strategic planning framework in favor of one
that triages only those things absolutely required in the short-term.
It will reverse incremental progress made over the past 2 years in the
recovery from fiscal year 2013's sequestration-level funding and will
make it impossible to meet current operational requirements or execute
the Defense Strategic Guidance. Under a sequestration-level budget, we
will be forced to recommend divesting critical airpower capabilities--
like the KC-10 and U-2 fleets. Overdue investments in the nuclear
enterprise will be reduced and technologies vital to future capability
and the American industrial base--like the promising Adaptive Engine
Program--will be halted.
vii. conclusion
The U.S. Air Force is the world's best. American airmen are
warfighters. The air, space, and cyberspace capabilities they bring to
bear strike fear in the hearts of our enemies. If you are a threat, the
Air Force can see you; it can reach you; and it can strike you. We must
keep it that way.
As airmen continue to support and defend America's interests around
the globe--engaging in active combat and operational missions
worldwide--the Nation must acknowledge the serious disconnect between
the Air Force it expects, the Air Force it has today, and the Air Force
it is funding for the future. Today's Air Force is the smallest and
oldest it has ever been . . . and a high operational tempo, paired with
a constrained and uncertain budget environment, only accelerates this
trend. The Nation must invest in new technologies, in training,
infrastructure, and personnel, if it intends to continue operating as a
global superpower.
The fiscal year 2016 President's budget request preserves the
minimum requirement to meet current strategy. But even at the
President's budget level, the Air Force remains stressed and shortfalls
exist. Reversion to sequestration-level funding will carry great risk
for American airmen, and for America itself.
The fiscal year 2016 President's budget request is an investment in
a force we hope the Nation will never have to use. But if the
turbulent--and largely unexpected--global developments of 2014 prove
anything, they prove this: America's Air Force must be ready to engage
anytime, anywhere, and across the full spectrum of warfare. America
expects it, combatant commanders require it, and our airmen deserve it.

Chairman McCain. General Odierno?

STATEMENT OF GEN. RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA, CHIEF OF STAFF OF
THE ARMY

General Odierno. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, the
rest of the members of the committee, thank you so much for
allowing us to be here.
I think it is still imperative that I repeat again that we
today are experiencing a diverse and complex array of threats
that are unprecedented through a combination of transnational
extremist organizations and nation states. We continue to
witness an increase in the velocity of instability around the
world that was just unforeseen just a few years ago. In Iraq
and Syria, we continue to see the ruthless behavior of ISIL and
the smoldering of a sectarian conflict which is threatening
regional stability and the potential to escalate international
terrorism. Order within Yemen has splintered. Anarchy,
extremism, and terrorism are running rampant in Libya and other
parts of North and Central Africa. In Europe, Russian
aggression and its intervention in Ukraine challenges the
resolve of both the European Union (EU) and NATO. Across the
Pacific, China's military modernization efforts alarm our
allies and concern our regional interests, while North Korean
belligerence continues. We continue to have ever-evolving
threats against the Homeland.
In my opinion, this should not be a time to divest of our
military capability and capacity, but that is what we are
doing.
We have already taken a significant decrease in Active
component end strength, which has been said by both the
chairman and the Secretary of the Army. We have deactivated 13
BCTs in the Active component. We are in the process of
eliminating three complete aviation brigades out of the Active
component. We are taking 700 aircraft out of the Active
component. We are taking another 100 aircraft out of the
National Guard. We have slashed our investments in
modernization by 25 percent. We have already purged the much-
needed entry fighting vehicle modernization program and Scout
helicopter developmental programs. We have considerably delayed
other upgrades for many of our systems and aging platforms.
The unrelenting budget impasse has also compelled us to
degrade our readiness to historically low levels. Today only 33
percent of our brigades are ready, when our sustained readiness
rate should be somewhere around 70 percent. Under our current
budget, Army readiness will, at best, flat-line over the next 3
to 4 years. The compromises we have made to modernization and
readiness, combined with reductions to our force size and
capabilities, translates directly into strategic risk. Today we
are generating just enough readiness to meet our day-to-day
needs of immediate consumption. We are unable to generate any
residual readiness to respond to an unknown contingency or to
even reinforce ongoing operations. This is a dangerous
balancing act. We have fewer soldiers. The majority of our
units are not ready. They are manning aging equipment at a time
when demand for Army forces is higher than we originally
anticipated.
Our soldiers and leaders continue to perform superbly,
though. Just look how busy we are and where the Army is around
the world today, whether it is their engagement in Iraq,
Afghanistan, Jordan, Kosovo, the Korean Peninsula, and across
the African continent. We have rotational forces in Europe,
Kuwait, and the Pacific. We are conducting a wide range of
missions from humanitarian assistance to training and advising
forces in contact to reassuring our allies with dedicated
presence. This is the reality we face as we discuss Army
posture.
The President's fiscal year 2016 budget submission
recognizes these challenges, but even the President's budget
represents the bare minimum needed for us to carry out our
missions and execute and meet the requirements of our defense
strategy. It is in fact a tenuous house of cards. In order for
it to work, all of our proposed reforms in pay and compensation
must be approved. All our force structure reforms must be
supported to include the aviation restructuring issue, and we
must be allowed to eliminate a half a billion per year of
excess infrastructure that we have in the Army.
We potentially face a $12 billion shortfall in our budget.
If BCA caps remain, that adds another $6 billion in potential
problems. We can no longer execute the Defense Strategic
Guidance (DSG). Sequestration would compel us to reduce end
strength even further. That has been noted by several different
people here today, which is of great concern to all of us.
Anything below the President's Budget compromises our
strategic flexibility and inadequately funds readiness. It
further degrades an already underfunded modernization program.
It impacts our ability to conduct simultaneous operations and
shape regional security environments. It puts into question our
capacity to deter and compel multiple adversaries. If the
unpredictable does happen, we will no longer have the depth to
react.
We continue to work on achieving efficiencies within our
own budget. We have taken advantage of a wartime reset program
to reduce depot maintenance by $3.2 billion. We are reducing
our reliance on contractor logistics, saving nearly $2 billion
this year. We have identified and are avoiding costs in excess
of $12 billion through the aviation restructure initiative
(ARI). We have reorganized our BCTs throughout the force
eliminating overhead and maximizing our combat capacity. We
have eliminated nearly 12,000 positions by reducing all two-
star and above headquarters by 25 percent. We continue today to
look to ways to achieve individual collective training
efficiency.
I would ask that we also look hard at our acquisition
reform, to readdress the role of the Service Chiefs and also
the role of lifecycle management and logistics. We must address
the expansion of the bureaucracy which has added so much time
and costs to all of our programs.
We also continue to work very hard at sexual harassment and
sexual assault. It remains our top priority. While recent
reports show some indications that we have made some initial
progress, we have much work to do. Our men and women deserve to
be treated with dignity and respect and should expect a work
environment that is free of harassment, assault, and
retribution. A culture of inclusion and of mutual and shared
trust is essential to the Army.
Mr. Chairman, I continue to be inspired by the unparalleled
experience and professionalism of our men and women in the U.S.
Army. They demonstrate an unwavering dedication and a
commitment to the mission, to the Army, and to the Nation. We
owe it to them to ensure they have the right equipment, the
best training, the appropriate family programs, health care and
compensation packages commensurate with their sacrifices.
The decisions we make today and in the near future will
impact our soldiers, our Army, and the Nation for the next 10
years. The burden of miscalculation and under-investment will
directly fall on the shoulders of our men and women who will be
asked to defend this Nation in many places around the world. I
want to lessen that burden on our soldiers and ensure that they
have all the equipment, the readiness in order to accomplish
their mission.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to any questions I will have
as you move forward.
Chairman McCain. General Welsh?

STATEMENT OF GEN. MARK A. WELSH III, USAF, CHIEF OF STAFF OF
THE AIR FORCE

General Welsh. Thank you, Chairman McCain and Ranking
Member Reed, and members of the committee. It is always a
privilege to be here, and it is a huge privilege to be here
with the boss representing the greatest men and women on earth.
It is also a special honor to be here with Secretary McHugh and
General Odierno because the members of this committee and the
body of this committee, along with Secretary McHugh, General
Odierno, and the men and women who have led the Army in the
past built the blueprint for the greatest army on earth. You
and your airmen also wrote the blueprint for the greatest air
force on earth. Other nations have watched that Air Force in
action for some time now, and now a few of them are following
the blueprint.
The capability gap that separates from other air forces is
narrowing and it is narrowing noticeably, and that gap will
close even faster under BCA levels of funding. The Budget
Control Act is essentially forcing us to choose between
readiness, force structure, and modernization.
If we choose to sacrifice readiness in order to modernize,
we risk failure in today's fight. As an example, when
sequestration first hit in 2013, we saw the domino effect it
had on pilots, maintainers, weapons loaders, air traffic
controllers, fighter squadrons, bomber squadrons. The readiness
levels plummeted across the Air Force and every organization
central to combat operations. We were not fully ready if the
Nation had needed us for a larger effort, and we simply cannot
accept that.
If, on the other hand, we choose to fund readiness and walk
away from modernization, we risk losing tomorrow's fight, which
could be much more significant than the one we are engaged in
today. We cannot accept that risk. So not modernizing is simply
not an option. That is why we are protecting programs like the
F-35, the long-range strike bomber, and the KC-46 so
vigorously.
If we choose to trade force structure, people, and
equipment in order to fund both readiness and modernization, as
we have for the past decade-plus, we are now at the point where
we will be too small to succeed in the missions we have already
been given to do today. We are way past easy choices.
What sequestration really means is that it is time for
tough decisions. If Congress makes the decision that this
committee has been fighting so hard for them not to make to
stay at BCA levels of funding and then delays making the hard
decisions that will allow us to reshape the Air Force to be
successful at that level of funding, then our Air Force could
very quickly become irrelevant. If our Air Force is irrelevant,
our joint force is irrelevant because in modern warfare,
without the full spectrum of airspace and cyber capabilities
that airpower brings to the table, you will lose.
We understand that the Department must be part of the debt
solution for our Nation, but the fiscal year 2016 President's
budget (PB) reflects the minimum funding required to be ready
for today's fight and still able to win in 2025 and beyond. I
believe our Nation still expects that of us.
Thank you for having us today, and I know we all look
forward to your questions.
Chairman McCain. Well, thank you very much. General
Odierno, I believe that this probably is your last appearance
before this committee as Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. Is
that correct?
General Odierno. I have about 6 months, Senator.
Chairman McCain. Well, I want to thank you for your
leadership, your service. I was just thinking. I think you and
I first met some 14 years ago in Iraq. One of the blessings of
my life is to have the opportunity to know great leaders and
warriors such as you are, and I want to thank you for all you--
and I am sure you will continue to--do.
Do you believe that we should be sending defensive weapons
to Ukraine?
General Odierno. I believe that there are some things that
we could to do to help them to defend themselves, specifically
radars. That could help them specifically in a down-fire.
Chairman McCain. Weapons?
General Odierno. I think it depends on the type of weapons.
I am more concerned initially in helping them to defend
themselves, and I think that is a tack we should at least take
a look at.
Chairman McCain. At a press briefing by Secretary of State,
John F. Kerry, in 2014, Secretary Kerry said I think it is
self-evident that if Iran is taking on ISIL in some particular
place and it is confined to taking on ISIL, it has an impact
that is going to be--quote--the net effect is positive.
Speaking of Iran's role in Iraq and its specific military
assistance for Shia militias in the battle for Tikrit, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dempsey said on March
4th, if they perform in a credible way, then it will in the
main have been a positive thing in terms of the counter-ISIL
campaign.
General Odierno, do you think Iranian influence in Iraq is
a positive?
General Odierno. It depends, Senator. I would say this. I
have some concern over the Shia militias, who they report to,
who controls them, who controls their activities.
Chairman McCain. Is it not pretty obvious who is since the
pictures of Iranian Army Major General Qasem Suleimani are
widespread?
General Odierno. So that has some concern and the fact that
how close are they working with the Iraqi Security Force (ISF),
are they actually working with them. All that portends to have
some concern. I will tell you we all understand that in order
to be successful in Iraq, you have to have a government that
supports all the different groups, to include the Sunni, the
Shia, and the Kurds.
Chairman McCain. Is this not the same guy that sent in
copper-tipped Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) that killed
your soldiers and wounded them?
General Odierno. Absolutely, Senator.
Chairman McCain. It must be a bit disturbing.
General Odierno. It is.
Chairman McCain. So are you comfortable with the Shia
militias who I believe in the Badr Brigades that I believe we
took on during the surge are playing such a key role?
General Odierno. I am not comfortable with it.
Chairman McCain. Do you believe we have a strategy as
regards to ISIL in Syria?
General Odierno. I do. I do believe that our ability to
train the moderate Syrian opposition is a good strategy.
Chairman McCain. You think it is a good strategy. How is it
going?
General Odierno. Well, we have just begun or are just in
the process of beginning training them. I think we are still
waiting on approval of----
Chairman McCain. Four years after the President of Syria,
Bashar al-Assad, began his slaughter of the Syrian people.
I guess what I would like to ask you--today the Budget
Committee here in the Senate begins their deliberation as to
the budget that we will be taking up on the floor of the
Senate. I understand your words in your written statement and
your verbal statement. But if you had a chance to address the
Budget Committee in their work today as they frame a budget,
what would your words of advice be concerning the budget and
sequestration?
General Odierno. If we continue to go down the road we are
going, we will not have a trained and ready force prepared to
meet the requirements of our national security strategy. We are
mortgaging our future for today, and I think there is great
danger in that as we potentially have to ask our forces to do
some very important missions in the coming years.
Chairman McCain. Does it put the lives of the men and women
who are serving under you at greater risk?
General Odierno. Whenever we have this problem, it directly
affects the soldiers, sailors, and marines, everyone who will
be asked to do their job. The possibility of them giving their
lives increases significantly.
Chairman McCain. I thank you, General. Again, thank you for
your service.
Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too want to
add my great respect and commendation to General Odierno. We
met about the same time, 14 years ago, in Iraq. What is
remarkable is we see eye to eye on everything. Of course, I am
looking at your sort of chest at the same time, but that is a
whole different story.
[Laughter.]
Senator Reed. Let me raise a question that came up with
Secretary McHugh's testimony and your testimony. That is
acquisition reform. Secretary McHugh, you were very candid in
saying there are some distinct failures in acquisition policy.
General Odierno, yesterday and again today you suggested that
the Chief of Staff, you and your successor, should be more
involved.
Now, my understanding is you set the requirements
basically, but then it has to meet the testing and evaluation
of DOD.
A question for both of you. In terms of reform--and I must
recognize Senator McCain's and retired Senator Carl M. Levin of
Michigan's role in this dramatically. But what do you want to
change? You set the requirements. You are not going to test
yourself. Let me put it that way.
General Odierno. No, but it is more than just testing. It
is the application of the entire program. What I would say is
at our level, there is not a problem. The Secretary and I--we
talk extensively about these issues.
However, there is a message that gets sent throughout the
acquisition force that they do not work for the uniformed
military. They work for the civilians. I think that is a
dangerous message because I think our experience and support in
the process is very important, and I think we should play a
bigger role in approving where we are going, milestones, how
the requirements meet with what is being done by the
acquisition. I think an oversight by the military would be more
important and could add some potential positive energy towards
building better acquisition programs.
Senator Reed. Secretary McHugh, your thoughts?
Mr. McHugh. Well, and it may be because of, as the Chief
just said, our close personal relationship and good working
partnership, but as I look across the history of our
acquisition programs, clearly many things have happened
negatively on some of those. I do not want to ascribe it all to
a service chief not having enough reach and visibility at the
latter points of the process, but to me, the Chief's proposal
makes some sense. You do have, at the end of the day, the need
to ensure the Title 10 authorities of the civilian command, but
I do not think the two are mutually exclusive. As I said, I
think there are some good and certainly at a minimum it ought
to be discussed and looked at.
Senator Reed. Well, I think at a minimum you are absolutely
right, and the chairman is going to do that with the committee
and our colleagues. But one, there is the civilian control and
ultimately, two, one hopes that the testing and evaluation--the
people giving the tests are not the people who are making up
the requirements and then there could be a problem there in
terms of everybody is average or at least everybody passes.
That is not good either.
Madam Secretary and General Welsh, I talked about the
Reaper and the Predator issue. I know you get huge pressures in
terms of personnel. You are asking for about 6,000-plus
additional personnel. You, Madam Secretary, laid out where you
have problems within missile command in terms of getting that
staffed up. You have other issues, cyber. That is always--more
can be added to in this moment.
How are you going to deal with this issue, which has been
around for several years, of the stress on these crews that are
flying the remote vehicles?
Ms. James. So, Senator Reed, maybe I could begin and the
Chief can then jump in and tell you about some of the immediate
actions that we have taken just in the last couple of months,
but then there is more to follow.
So fundamentally, as I mentioned, we have 60 Combat Air
Patrols (CAP) funded in the budget with the ability to surge to
65, and we are at 65 today. But we have 55 CAP's worth of
people. So there is the fundamental problem. We are doing 65
CAP's worth of work with 55 CAP's worth of people. As the years
have progressed, even as we have built our force, the
requirements or the desires of the combatant commanders, given
all that has been happening around the world, has been going
up, up, up, up to the point where we have not been able to
catch up with ourselves. In order to keep pace with what the
combatant commanders are asking of us, we in fact have had to
rob from the schoolhouse those individuals who we were teaching
to put them on to operational missions which, in effect, is
another way that puts us behind.
So some actions that we have taken recently. We are using
more of our Guard and Reserve in this area. We are bringing
more onto active duty. We are getting recently qualified RPA
specialists who have left that field and gone back to their
other flying specialty. We are bringing some of those back. We
are delaying the departure of some who would have gone back to
their airframes. We are asking them to stay a bit longer, and
they have agreed to do so. I have used my authority that I have
as Secretary of the Air Force to incentivize our career RPA-
only pilots whose service obligations were about to expire,
which meant they could have left the Air Force, but I used my
authority to increase their pay to try to keep them with us. We
are working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)--
and I am certain that we are going to get this--to be able to
offer additional monetary incentives to the full panoply of
those who are serving in the RPA.
Then I will yield to General Welsh to tell about some of
the things that we are looking at for the future.
Senator Reed. Just very quickly, sir, because my time is--
--
General Welsh. Sir, the fundamental problem is we cannot
train as many people as we lose in a given year because we have
had to build the crew force to do the operational mission
before we built the training infrastructure. We are losing
almost 50 more people a year than we are training. So slowing
down the operational demand for enough time to get our training
pipeline completely full will fix this problem. We have been
chasing this requirements rabbit so long that we just have not
been able to catch it. Once we get ahead of it--it is getting
ahead of the training curve that is the problem. If we can do
that, we are okay.
Senator Reed. Well, just a final comment. Whatever we do in
Afghanistan, for example, I have a feeling we will need more
remote vehicles for protection, for exploitation of
intelligence, for counterterrorism operations. So I do not see
this demand coming down. Let us know how we can be helpful.
General Welsh. Yes.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe?
Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh, about 100 years ago when
you and I sat next to each other on the House Armed Services
Committee, did you ever dream we would be in a situation like
this?
Mr. McHugh. I never dreamt I would be here either. But, no,
if we had those discussions, I think, Senator, we considered
them pure fantasy.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, because I can remember some of the
discussions at that time. At that time, we were wondering about
whether the B-1 bomber was going to be successful and carrying
on that program. It did not seem like there was anything really
traumatic. It is kind of a serious observation as I am going
from memory.
You mentioned sending some troops to some of these places
that might surprise people. You mentioned Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania. I was over there. When you have some troops going
over there, generally it is for a fairly restricted period of
time. Is it not? A shorter period of time.
I wonder about the wisdom of that program because all of
them, to the last one, said where are they. We need to have
them back. They all expect that to be a permanent transfer.
When that happens, you might think about that.
You talked about, General Odierno, all the different
contingencies and things that are taking place right now all
over the world. It is totally unprecedented. I wonder if you
were to be forced into another totally different major
contingency, what would you do?
General Odierno. We would end up sending troops over that
are not properly trained.
Senator Inhofe. That is exactly what I thought.
You addressed this a little bit, Secretary James, in your
one, two, three things you outlined. Your second one was you
got to keep the balance right between today and then
modernization. So you have two things that are being drained
right now: training and I suspect modernization. You talked
about what we are looking at in terms of the future. But I am
sure that you are not reaching the goals that you had a year
ago on where we should be. So that is suffering now. Is it not?
Ms. James. You are right, Senator. Moreover, of course, the
message here is sequestration would make all of this much, much
worse. Of course, the first goal is taking care of people. Even
though under sequestration in the past, people were protected,
the numbers of people and so forth, there are Morale, Welfare,
and Recreation (MWR) programs. There is a variety of other
things which might not survive in the forms that we would like
and the funding levels that we would like. We would have to
look at all of those things. So we think everything would be
hurt.
Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, you and I talked. We talked
over in Arkansas when we all went over to a meeting over there.
I see our Senator Tom Cotton from Arkansas, was in the same
meeting. But at that time we talked about flying hours because
we were both flying in there. I have changed the figures that I
used to use because a Lazer (Senator Inhofe's assistant,
Anthony ``Laser'' Lazarski) update had informed me, and it is
more to retain a pilot of the F-22 level would be a bonus over
9 years of $225,000. You addressed this, Madam Secretary, and
yet, to train a new one from the beginning, it would be $9
million. That is still huge.
Now, do I understand from your statement that this
retention is not as bad as it was, say, a year ago? Does it not
kind of go with the economy? If the economy improves from where
it is today, there will be more competition with the airlines.
Is this true?
General Welsh. Senator, it is absolutely true. Historically
all of the Services have lost pilots as the airlines hire. We
expect the airline industry to hire roughly 20,000 pilots over
the next 10 years. So 2,000 a year. Their change in
requirements for their hiring means that military aviators will
be a target for them.
Senator Inhofe. One of their motives to get out is a lot of
them do not feel they are getting adequate flying hours in. Is
that true today?
General Welsh. Senator, it is true, although the Bipartisan
Budget Act (BBA) over the last 2 years has allowed us to fly at
a much more regular pace than we had in the years before that.
BCA will bring back the frustrations.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. I think that is one of a lot of things
that can really help the situation. People on this committee
are doing all we can right now during this budget time. We are
running out of time.
I have just one last question that is something to be
thinking about. If Congress would pass a budget resolution that
funds at the sequestration levels with the intent to raise
defense funding levels later in the year, when is the Army and
the Air Force forced to take irreversible action with regard to
force structure, personnel programs if you were forced in that
situation? Do you have any idea about when that would happen?
General Welsh. Senator, just to make sure I understood you
right, if the initial----
Senator Inhofe. If we come out with a budget that brings it
down, so you are suffering from the sequestration, but with a
message and language that we are going to come back later in
the year, when do you reach that point where it is kind of
irreversible, you cannot recover? Have you thought about that?
General Welsh. Senator, if we were funded at the
President's budget level with a promise of more later, I do not
see the catastrophic action that will be required. The BCA
level would be different, and I would need to get back to you
with that, unless the boss has a better----
Senator Inhofe. Just some thoughts.
Ms. James. I believe the answer, Senator, is if we are
funded, come October 1st, at the BCA level, we have to
immediately start taking actions. Perhaps immediately it is not
catastrophic, but I think it very soon would become very
serious. So that is sort of my off-the-cuff answer, but I would
like to come back as well.
Senator Inhofe. Well, yes. It is not necessary to come back
on that. It is kind of the nature of the beast during this
process to say, well, we are going to have to hurt you now, but
we are going to figure out something later in the year. So just
keep that in mind.
General Odierno. Senator, if I could, I would like to--Mr.
Chairman, if I may?
Senator Inhofe. Yes, of course.
General Odierno. So the one issue here that we keep running
into is for us we stop training and so that cannot just be
fixed with money. It is time and money. So every bit of time we
lose pushes us back further. So if we go to sequestration
levels, for us we cannot take any more force structure out. We
are already on that road. So it comes directly out of
modernization and training dollars. So what will happen is we
will start canceling training, and if we get it 3 or 4 months
later, we have lost 3 or 4 months of training. In fact, to
reschedule it, you will have units that will then miss a whole
cycle of training because they will have missed their
opportunity and it might not come around again for a whole
other year. So you then get on this cycle of really downward
readiness capability, and that is why it is so important to us.
Senator Inhofe. You would have to be sending troops forward
perhaps not trained.
General Odierno. That is correct.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Manchin?
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of
you for your service. There is not a West Virginian I know who
does not support the military and DOD. We have some wonderful
people in our State that would pay more taxes, would do
whatever they had to do and sacrifice for the defense that you
have given and the comfort you give to them.
With that being said, we have to answer to them also, our
constituents, and all of us here who are elected and go back,
how we are spending their tax dollars and are we getting the
best bang for our buck. When you look at the whole scenario--
and we just read today where Yemen--the Pentagon cannot account
for $500 million of missing weapons. Then you look at Mosul
when we trained and armed Iraq, and they abandoned and left
millions and millions. So we start wondering. Then we start
talking about we are not training our people adequately because
of a lack of money, and then you think about Admiral Michael G.
Mullen when he was before us when he was Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. He said the greatest threat that we face as a
nation is our finances. He did not speak about another country,
not a terrorist group, nothing. Finances, and here we are
talking about finances as being our Achilles heel.
So the only thing I would say is when you start looking at
military expenditures, I think that if you look at China and
Russia, everything I am hearing in all the briefings that I
receive--they are still moving forward. They are doing positive
things with their military. Correct? China, Russia, even in
crippling challenges they have with their economy.
So if you look at figures from the World Bank--and this is
2013. China's economy--their GDP is $9.2 trillion as of 2013,
and they spend about 2.1 percent of that money for their
military. But yet, they are getting, it looks like, a pretty
good bang for their buck.
You look at Russia, a $2.09 trillion Gross Domestic Product
(GDP), and they are spending about 4.2 percent of their GDP on
their military.
The United States has a $17-plus trillion GDP, and we spend
about 3.8 percent. So we are not out of that realm.
We are going this way. So you would have to ask the
question, are we getting the best bang for our buck? Have we
crippled you all? Have we put so much layers of bureaucracy you
cannot do your job? Have we given you so much mandates? Are you
buying equipment you do not need? Are you having overlap and
redundancies? I mean, we are not that far out. When you look at
the amount of sheer dollars, we are way far and above everybody
and a bunch of them put together. That is what we have to come
to grips with.
So I have to say, how do we answer? How do we work with you
all to help you do a better job? Because in all honesty, it
gets back--Admiral Mullen said, finances is the greatest threat
we face. So whoever wants to take a crack----
General Odierno. Senator, if I could just start out. I
think there are two issues. First off, I think what our
military is asked to do is very different than what the Russian
military and the Chinese military is asked to do. I think our
worldwide presence and our reassurance of our allies and
partnerships is more expensive. So I think we have to start
there. So I would say there is a policy perspective to it as we
are an arm of executing our foreign policy.
The second piece I would just say is that, yes, we can be
more efficient. But I think it has to do with some of the
things we just talked about. Budgets on time. I could tell you
that we do not make the best use of our budget every year as
soon as we get continuing resolutions, and we have had a
continuing resolution every year since I have been the Chief.
Senator Manchin. We always said we want to get rid of
sequestering. Get a budget. That is up to us.
General Odierno. So I think that adds to this as well.
There are things we need to do as well.
Senator Manchin. When you look at the figures, if you take
the additional responsibilities we have--and people start
saying have we done that and are we a safer world of the things
we have done, whether it be in North Africa, whatever. When you
look at what we are doing now, now with Syria and all the
threats that we have there--there has to be a better, more
effective, efficient way. The procurement. The chairman and I
have been on this procurement thing, and it is just
unbelievable and then getting an audit to find out where you
all--and the cutbacks. I think, Secretary James, you said you
are going to meet the 20 percent reduction?
Ms. James. Yes.
Senator Manchin. All the other branches met theirs.
Mr. McHugh. Actually our target was upped by the Chief and
myself to 25 percent. We will reach 20 percent. The last 5
percent that we added voluntarily is a bit of a squeeze, but it
is vitally important. Your points about our doing better, as I
mentioned in my opening remarks, are absolutely essential. We
need to be a part of America's solution to the very challenge
that Admiral Mullen spoke about and that you have referenced as
well.
I think there is an interesting data point, however. Of our
total budget, the Army actually controls about $50 billion of
it once you take away civilian pay, military pay----
Senator Manchin. Contractors.
Mr. McHugh. Operations and Maintenance (O&M) and
contractors, we actually have some control over because we
decide which contracts we are going to enter into. But we do
have costs associated with utilities, all of these things. So
just intuitively I would think there would be some things we
could cooperatively look at together, not ceding Congress?
rightful authorities of oversight, but rather giving us some
flexibility to operate better administratively.
The acquisition process that I spoke about, you have spoken
about and Senator McCain referenced, is an absolutely important
place for us to work together so that we can do better. The
Army, as I mentioned, has a history of failures. Most of them
were a little while ago. But we need to get better and show you
and the American taxpayer we deserve every dollar we get.
Senator Manchin. I am just concerned about the global
military presence and the buildup of China and Russia, what
they are doing, and what we keep hearing all the time of what
we are not going to be able to do.
Mr. McHugh. We all are.
Senator Manchin. We are still in the same realm of
percentages of GDPs and all that. I want to make sure we are
getting the best bang for our buck.
Ms. James. Senator, I just wanted to add. First of all, I
certainly agree with my two colleagues about the need to
continue to press on the acquisition side, efficiency side, and
so forth, and we are all in when it comes to that.
The other piece, though, I wanted to point out is I believe
Russia and China have a very, very different philosophy in
terms of their people issues and how they treat pay and
compensation and health care and housing and training and all
the things related to support of people. They are very
different than we are.
Senator Manchin. You are saying support of the troops.
Ms. James. Support of the troops, and I am glad that we are
the way we are. Maybe our system is not perfect, but I would
not want to have their system of pay and compensation and so
forth.
Chairman McCain. Twice the 20 percent has been mentioned.
Were those 20 percent of the people removed from the payroll of
the Air Force?
Ms. James. In the case of the Air Force, it is 20 percent
of our headquarters funding was reduced.
Chairman McCain. Were 20 percent of the people removed from
the payroll of the Air Force?
Ms. James. No.
Chairman McCain. That is what I thought.
Senator Sullivan?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank all of you for your great service to our
country. I also want to thank your staffs. I know how much work
goes into what they do and I appreciate that and all the
members of the Army and the Air Force.
General Odierno, this is your last hearing. I want to echo
the chairman's statements about your decades of service to our
country. I very, very much appreciate that.
I wanted to focus a little bit on some recent headlines.
There is a lot of discussion about Russia, particularly with
regard to Ukraine. But there has been a lot of discussion
recently about Russia with regard to the Arctic. Here is a
headline just a couple of days ago. Russia launches a massive
Arctic military drill that included a 5-day drill, 38,000
service men, 50 surface ships and submarines, 110 aircraft in
the Arctic. This is in addition to the new Arctic Command.
General Dempsey was testifying here a couple weeks ago and
talked about the Russians four new Arctic combat brigades, huge
icebreaker fleet that they are dramatically increasing, 13 new
airfields they are building now in the Arctic, Cold War level
bombers, bomber patrols off the coast of Alaska.
Then you have other headlines. U.S. Army mulls cutting
troops in Alaska, possibly by two combat brigades.
So I just wanted to ask the question. Particularly in light
of the way we understand Vladimir Putin, I certainly think that
the idea that weakness is provocative applies to him. General
Odierno, as the Russians build up in the Arctic, what do you
think that Vladimir Putin would be thinking about us even
removing one Arctic soldier from Alaska, let alone two combat
brigades?
General Odierno. Senator, I think that as he looks to
increase Russia's influence, that he will look to see that as
maybe a place that is not as much challenge as what might have
been if we had more troops in that area.
Senator Sullivan. So when you are looking at your strategic
guidance that informs--I know the Army is looking at some tough
decisions, and we have discussed this, Secretary McHugh. I know
that these are hard decisions right now. But in terms of the
strategic guidance, Admiral Gortney testified that there is not
even an Arctic Operational Plan (OPLAN) right now, but there
will be one soon, given these new military buildups.
In your military opinion, at the very least, should we not
delay any drawdowns in the Arctic until we have a strategy and
a validated OPLAN that lays out the strategic guidance that we
need from a national security perspective? It seems a little
backwards in what we are doing, no OPLAN and reducing forces
when we should have an OPLAN that actually guides the strategy.
General Odierno. Senator, we base our force sizing
construct on contingency plans (CONPLANS) that are selected by
the Department of Defense. We have not sized towards an Arctic
threat. We have other CONPLANS that we simply cannot meet
either with our structure. We are reducing because of budget
restrictions. We are not reducing because of our inability to
respond to com plans because that is true today. We cannot
respond fully to many of the com plans that we have developed.
So in my mind it applies not only there but in other places as
well.
Senator Sullivan. This is actually a little bit of good
news. This is a recent joint exercise, Army-Air Force exercise
a Spartan Pegasus, first U.S. airborne mission north of the
Arctic Circle in more than a decade. It was the 425 and many
airmen from Alaska. Could Spartan Pegasus have been done with
any other Army airborne unit in the Pacific or Contiguous
United States (CONUS) right now given their training?
General Odierno. Well, I think in the Arctic environment,
no, because they are specifically trained to operate in Arctic
weather. It would take months of training for them to be
prepared to operate in such a harsh environment.
Senator Sullivan. I want to just end with a broader
question on training. Secretary James, you talked about the
importance of taking care of people. I agree with that
certainly. I think also the best way to take care of our troops
is to train them hard to make sure when and if they go to war,
they come back alive. That is the best way to do it.
With regard to sequestration, I know that the Army
certainly focuses a lot in their classes on the Korean War,
looking at Task Force Smith in 1950, the saying of ``no more
Task Force Smiths,'' given how horribly our troops were trained
back then in 1950 and what ended up happening during that
drawdown. Are we at risk of repeating this dark chapter of U.S.
history right now? That is for all of you.
General Odierno. I would say potentially we are. It is
interesting. Back then Task Force Smith was composed of about
30 percent of those who had significant World War II
experience. All the leaders had significant World War II
experience, but the troops that were underneath them were not
trained to do the job. So when they got there, they were
overrun and thousands lost their lives. It was just not Task
Force Smith but the units that followed on behind them. I think
there is a lesson that we need to take heed as we move forward.
Mr. McHugh. The Chief and I talk often about what keeps up
at night, and I think he and I are in accord. The greatest fear
we have is sending particularly young soldiers into harm's way
without the proper training that they need to succeed and come
home. By whatever name you put on it, Task Force Smith or
anyone else, if sequestration returns and we are forced to
continue to do all the mission sets we are doing right now and
we have that next unforeseen occasion, we are going to have to
make those kinds of choices.
General Welsh. Senator, our Task Force Smith was actually
Vietnam, and when we came out of Vietnam, the Air Force learned
the lesson that most of our losses occurred in the first 10
combat sorties. I think the other Services learned the same.
Our response to that was to build the training curriculum, an
exercise called Red Flag, which was designed to simulate the
highest threat environment we could simulate for a training
environment to do exactly what you described, train hard and be
ready for combat. The problem we have in continuing that is
that we have spent the last 15 years not investing in the
infrastructure required to do that right because we have been
trading that for readiness.
We have not, for example, improved the threat arrays to be
current and modern. We have to transition to a simulation-based
environment, a virtual constructive live environment as opposed
to a live virtual constructive because we simply cannot afford
to keep the threat arrays current with the rapid pace of
technology, change of enemy threats system in the future. That
investment has not been made routinely just as investment in
nuclear infrastructure, investment in black and white world
test infrastructure, investment in space launch infrastructure.
Those are the things that are hurting our long-term readiness
and that are driving our requirement to go 8 to 10 years to
recover it as opposed to a couple of years to gain individual
readiness.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Donnelly?
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary McHugh, it was an honor to serve with you in the
House and to travel with you. General Odierno, thank you for
everything. You performed extraordinary leadership every tour
you have had.
To our Air Force friends, thank you so very much.
To our Air Force friends, I have the privilege of serving
on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, and I want to show
something that I know you are familiar with. This is an 8-inch
floppy disk. This is used with our intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) systems that we have for a system built in the
1980s based on technology from the 1970s. I would love to get
your opinion on what you think about using 8-inch floppy disks
in our ICBM systems. I guess the alternative is that it helps
to protect us from cyber in a strange way, but what are we
going to be doing to modernize this as we look forward?
Ms. James. Senator, in our 5-year plan as part of our
fiscal year 2016 submission, we have $5.6 billion more for the
nuclear enterprise overall than we had in our last 5-year plan
that we brought before you last year. So we have redirected a
lot of money in general. That particular item that you just
indicated is part of the modernization program over the next 5
years. I will have to get back to you with exactly how much
money is devoted to that and whether or not that will get
completely fixed over the next 5 years. I have learned that
nothing in the nuclear world is as easy as it might sound or
seem in the beginning because everything is so interconnected.
But it is part of it. We do have money against it, and please
allow me to come back to you with the details.
[The information referred to follows:]

The 8-inch floppy disks are one element of the Strategic Automated
Command and Control System (SACCS), an essential communications
capability our nuclear forces rely on for dissemination and receipt of
Emergency Action Messages and Force Direction Messages. Like many other
critical systems the Air Force depends on to perform the nuclear
mission every day, SACCS utilizes multi-decade old technology that
presents significant obsolescence and sustainment challenges. We
anticipate replacing the last of the 8-inch floppy disk drives in the
SACCS network by the end of fiscal year 2016 with solid-state, secure
digital storage media as part of the Data Storage Service Life
Extension Program (SLEP). Initiated in 2012, this SLEP provides $17.7M
in funds for replacement equipment, support, and training.
The Air Force requested $5.5M in the fiscal year 2016 President's
Budget and $24.9M over the Future Years Defense Plan in order to begin
a broader SACCS replacement effort. We estimate the first phase of this
initiative will be completed in 2020, with the timing of subsequent
phases dependent on the findings of a SACCS Longevity Study scheduled
to be completed in late-2015. This detailed assessment will report on
the current health of SACCS and identify the requirements needed to
ensure this vital capability remains credible and effective in the
years ahead.

Senator Donnelly. That would be great.
General Welsh. Senator, could I add that one of the things
that we walked away from as an institution, when Air Force
Systems Command went away, was developmental planning, the
effort for us as a Service to identify future gaps, shortfalls,
and then institutionally develop game plans to make sure that
we do not end up with these infrastructure problems that are 20
years too late to a solution. We are restarting that, and one
of the two areas that we will focus on is the nuclear
enterprise, and this will be part of it. How do we recapitalize
this in a responsible way with predictable, consistent funding?
We will certainly need your support for that.
Senator Donnelly. Great.
I know how hard all of you have been working on reducing
suicide numbers in the military. What do you think about the
use of physician assistants to help provide additional people
who our military may be able to go talk to, spend time with?
Mr. McHugh. Senator, I will begin. As you are aware just
painting the larger picture, our requirement for these kinds of
providers has grown dramatically. When I first came to the
Army, our requirement for those individuals was about 2,300. We
are now over 5,500 and we are still chasing that. We are pretty
close to meeting the requirement. But these are highly skilled,
highly competitive between the military and the civilian
sector. So I know that you have been working on a series of
pieces of legislation that we are very anxious to work with
you. Given the right training, which I know you understand and
support, we think there is a high likelihood of them being a
very valuable addition to our clinical staff.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
General Odierno, switching tracks a little bit. In Syria we
are working on training the moderates. If they go back into
Syria without a buffer zone, are you concerned that President
of Syria Bashar al-Assad could go after them as soon as they
come in with barrel bombs or other things?
General Odierno. I think that as we look at employing those
forces, once they are trained, I think we will have to be very
careful about how we do that. I think we would work with maybe
some of our allies that might be able to put some people in
there with them, and I think we would be very careful in where
we place them and what their initial missions would be as they
continue to develop capability. I also believe there would be
some enabler support that would be necessary in order to help
them as we reinsert them in to conduct fights. I think what we
should try to do initially is try to put them in a place where
they are not at risk from the regime because our focus really
is on ISIL, and I think we would have to work very carefully to
try to find places that would protect them from such an attack.
Senator Donnelly. Do you think Assad would go after them?
Even though our first goal is to go after ISIL at that point,
do you think Assad tries to get them before they can even get
started?
General Odierno. Senator, I think if we put them in the
right place, it would be very difficult for them to do that.
However, I would be inaccurate if I tried to predict what Assad
would do, but I think we would try to do it in such a way that
it would be difficult for him to do that, at least initially.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ernst?
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
General Odierno, thank you for being here. Secretary
McHugh, Secretary James, and General Welsh, thank you and your
staffs for being here today and providing testimony.
Sequestration has been very detrimental to all of our
forces. We know that. There are stress and strains that go
along with that.
What I would like to focus my attention on today is the
stress and the strain that exists not only between our Active
Forces but also the Reserve Forces and the Guard.
Many of you have mentioned the important role that our
Reserve Forces bring to the table. They are important to back
up our Active-Duty Forces. At the beginning of this week, I did
hear some interesting quotes coming from one of our State's
adjutant generals of the National Guard. His quote was that his
relationship between his State's Guard and Army leaders was not
good, and it was really disheartening to hear that. He also
said it has gotten very difficult for either one to talk to
each other. Again, this is extremely disheartening to me, and
maybe, Secretary McHugh, you can help me with this.
But I have been here for now about 2\1/2\ months, and I do
see some level of strain between our Reserve Forces and our
Active Forces, at least in this manner. I know that this has
existed. It ebbs and flows through all of the years. I
understand that. Sequestration has put a lot of pressure on us,
as well as time in rotations, men and women being away from
home, frequency of mobilizations and deployments. But again, it
is disheartening. We are one team, one fight. My husband spent
28 wonderful years on Active Duty Army, and I spent over 20 in
the Reserve and National Guard. We understand the need to work
together to resolve differences.
So if you could, could you address this issue? Again, we
are in difficult times right now, and our soldiers look to
their leadership to set a good example.
Mr. McHugh. I can certainly begin. As I am sure you would
appreciate, I am unable to speak to the general's comments, but
I can tell you it was disheartening to hear them. If you have
had the chance to visit our forward troops--and I know your
experience would teach you as well--there is not a lot of
dissension when you are forward. Guard and Reserve and Active
components work seamlessly, and frankly, that is our view of
the future, and we want to preserve the operational
capabilities that we have spent a lot of money to gain over the
last decade-plus within the Reserve component.
I think it is fair to say that in most respects that that
particular attitude or feeling derives out of our aircraft
reconstruction initiative, ARI. As to the Guard and the Active
component disagreeing, that is true, but we included the Guard
in virtually every phase, every meeting of that development and
that plan. Obviously, we are at a point where we are not in
agreement, but we have worked hard to try to include them in
our future forecasting whether it is ARI or any other measure.
The other thing I would tell you, I as Secretary, when we
first began our initiatives to, frankly, cut the budget, gave a
directive that we would start with the Active component. In
fact, for the first 2 years of our reforming and reconstructing
our fiscal posture, we did not take any cuts out of the Guard.
As well, whether it is in ARI or whether it is in end strength
reduction, we have taken the vast majority of our cuts out of
the Active component. For the aircraft, it is about three to
one, more out of the active than the Guard, and when you get to
end strength, it is about that same percentage, about three to
one, just over 20 percent to just over 7 percent. So we have
tried to be equitable and fair not just to be good partners
because we do not want to go to war without the Guard and
Reserve. We cannot go to war without the Guard and Reserve.
It has been my experience in some 23 years in this town
that we will have differences, but as we have forward,
particularly in the last decade and a half, I am optimistic we
will get back together and go forward and do America's hard
work of freedom.
Senator Ernst. Well, thank you. I do appreciate your
service. I appreciate the discussion. I do hope that as we move
forward, we continue to include Guard and Reserve members in
the discussions. Anytime there are cutbacks, it does hurt. It
does not matter who it is on the receiving end of that, but we
need to keep an open dialogue and set a great example for the
rest of our young men and women that serve.
So thank you all very much for your service. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to each
of our panelists today.
You have all been very eloquent in your testimony to the
impact of sequestration. Chairman McCain and Ranking Member
Reed have done an excellent job in this committee from the
start of this congressional session of holding a series of
hearings pointing out the folly of continuing sequestration and
what the consequences would be of going back to those caps.
As we all know, sequestration was never designed to work.
It was designed not to work, and that is why it is having such
devastating consequences. I think that is our responsibility as
Members of Congress to do what we can to address the results of
sequestration, and I think the reason that did not happen
before it went into effect the first time is because we could
not get a compromise around how to do that. There was no
agreement that in order to address this, we were going to have
to look at both the defense and the domestic side of the budget
and to look at both revenues and expenditures.
So I certainly am committed to doing that. I hope all of us
will be committed to doing that because we all understand what
the devastating consequences would be of having it kick back in
for the next budget cycle.
So thank you very much for your testimony with respect to
those impacts.
Secretary James, we had the great honor of hosting you at
Pease, the first base chosen to receive the new KC-46A tankers,
the 157th Air Refueling Wing. I think we were all very excited
to have you come and see what the capacity is at Pease.
I was disappointed to see a story yesterday about the first
flight facing delay for the KC-46A, and I wonder if you could
share some light on what the cause of that delay is and whether
there is any reason to be concerned about the long-term
production of the KC-46A.
Ms. James. You are right, Senator Shaheen. The slack is
gone from the schedule for meeting that first flight. So I will
say there is good news and there is not so good news. So the
good news on the KC-46 is that they did have a successful first
flight of what is called that green aircraft. So if you recall,
that happened several months ago. So that was good. However,
there have been these testing and integration challenges, and
as a result, some of the internal targets that the company has
set for itself along the path to doing what it must do for the
milestones and for the contractual obligations--some of those
internal targets have slipped.
So back to the good news. They have met the milestone
requirements so far and they have met the contractual
requirements, but everything internal that they indicated--not
everything but several of them have slipped.
So what I am trying to say is in any program, there is a
certain amount of slack that is built in. There is margin
because in any developmental program, you know certain things
are going to go wrong. But a lot of that slack now has been
used up.
So the key thing is the key date, which is contractual, of
course, is that they have to reach what is called required
assets available (RAA). The target is August 17th and that is
to have 18 aircraft. That is the next contractual deadline. So
the company feels that they can still make it, that yes, they
have used up margin but it is not to the point where they are
going to miss that deadline. They have recently introduced to
us a new integrated master schedule, which we are reviewing so
that we can kind of review with ourselves whether we believe
that or not.
Again, back to a piece of good news. The costs, of course,
are capped on this contract. So any cost overruns that may have
occurred or may occur in the future are on the company, not on
the Government. So we are tracking it very closely but it does
appear that that April timeframe is likely to slip for that
first flight.
Senator Shaheen. So do we have any idea what the timeframe
might be in the future and how much that will affect the end
production?
Ms. James. The timeframe that we are looking at as more
likely is probably later on in the summer vice April for that.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Staying at Pease--and I am almost out of time. So I will
submit this for the record. But as I am sure you are aware,
Pease was the first base closed in the first Base Realignment
and Closure (BRAC) round, and there were a number of
environmental issues there. There were agreements made between
the State and the Air Force to address those environmental
issues. One of them has recently appeared in the drinking water
for the City of Portsmouth, and it is contaminated. There are
children that go to school, daycare on the site, and there is
some concern about whether the State will be able to fund the
testing for everyone who might need to be tested. So we will
submit this for the record. But I hope the Air Force will be
willing to look at this situation, recognizing the agreement to
address the environmental results of having the Air Force there
and will be willing to take a look at helping with those costs.
Thank you all very much.
Chairman McCain. Senator Tillis?
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Welsh, Secretary McHugh, and General Odierno, thank
you for the time that you spent with me in the office and
speaking on this. Secretary James, I look forward to the
opportunity to meet with you. Our schedules have been hard to
coordinate, but hopefully we can do that soon.
General Odierno, I would like for you to go back to a
comment that you made in your opening, and it was about the
stresses on the budget even with the President's budget and
increased spending. You mentioned two different sources, I
think a $12 billion number and a $6 billion number that related
to efficiencies or things that you have to achieve that you are
saying are potentially at risk.
So the first question I would have was, could you give me a
little bit more information on these areas and what they are
funding? Second, what the threats are in terms of achieving
that, and if you do not achieve it, then what are the
consequences in other areas of the budget?
General Odierno. So in the President's budget that was
submitted, about $6 billion of the Army budget is tied up in
the pay and compensation requests that we made, specifically
pay raises, TRICARE, and other potential savings to reduce the
rate of growth. If those are not accepted, those will come back
as bills to the Army.
The second is the ARI which we have put in there--if that
is not approved, that will also have a significant bill in
2016. So the combination of those two things totals about $6
billion.
In addition to that, the Army has excess infrastructure
that is costing us about a half a billion dollars a year, and
we are unable to deal with that problem because of BRAC. So
that is an additional bill that is not included inside of the
budget.
Then we have about $6 billion that are currently in
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) that is supposed to be in
the base. At some time, we will move that back to the base.
Now, it might happen in 2016 or it might happen in 2017, but
that is another $6 billion that we have to account for that is
really base money, but right now we are paying for it in OCO.
Depending on how OCO is interpreted, we could be required to
pay that out of the base, and so that is the $12 billion.
The other $6 billion was the difference between the $126
billion the Army is getting and the $120 billion, which is the
sequester level. So that would be another $6 billion we have to
find.
So potentially it is somewhere between $12 billion and $18
billion we would have to find. That comes directly out of
readiness and it comes directly out of modernization because we
cannot take Active component end strength down any faster than
we already are and still meet all our commitments. So for us,
it would have a devastating effect on our readiness, and it
would really also cause us to reduce more of our modernization
programs. Frankly, we would probably have several breaches of
the Nunn-McCurdy Amendment if we were required to do that.
Senator Tillis. Thank you.
Senator Manchin brought up a good point about comparisons
between our budget and the others. I think, Secretary James,
you did a great job of explaining it is really an apple and an
orange. Not really responding now, but I would like to get more
information so that people can better understand the
disparities in terms of priorities we have for our people and
the amount of money being spent on modernization and
technologies that ultimately over time I think could provide
other nations with a technological advantage in spite of the
fact that we may be better off on the people side. But I think
it would be very helpful to hear from the staff and others to
get everybody thinking about the real apples-to-apples
comparison.
General Welsh, I had a question that relates. We spoke a
lot about aircraft and things on the ground. But can you talk a
little bit about the budget as it relates to space-based assets
and the investment that we are making there and any risks you
see going forward?
General Welsh. Senator, I can. Let me give you a quick
overview and then turn it over to the boss here who is the DOD
executive agent for space and spends a lot of her time talking
about this issue.
The real key for us, as General John Hyten, our Commander
of Space Command, has said recently, is that we have to look at
space now as a warfighting domain because whether we ever
decide we want to compete in that way in space, others clearly
are going there. So we have to be able to survive to operate in
that environment, and so General Hyten is leading the effort to
look at different ways of building, maintaining, and improving
the assets we currently have in space and the capabilities they
provide in new and different ways than the very--basically
functionally developed, large programs, large investment over
long periods of time that have dominated the space architecture
up till this point. So that is what he is trying to do.
The Secretary has put a great emphasis on prioritizing
operational capability in space when it comes to priority
funding decisions inside the Air Force. I will turn it over to
her from there.
Ms. James. As General Welsh was saying, some years ago,
Senator Tillis--I will say this might be a bit of an
exaggeration, but the United States and maybe a handful of
others really owned space in the sense that we were up there
and there were not a whole lot of others up there. But in more
recent years, space has become contested, congested, and very
competitive. So there are just dozens of countries now that
have assets in space. So what we want to make sure is that we
remain on top of our situation, that we are able to see what is
going on in space, and that we are able to have the use of
space for our needs, both military and civilian, because space
is very important to civilian needs as well.
So in this budget, there are additional investments
particularly in the area of space situational awareness. So
this is knowing what is going on, being able to track not only
satellites but also thousands and thousands of pieces of debris
and to know what some of these satellites are. So that is space
situational awareness. We have more investments there.
We also have investments in space control. So these are a
variety of things to be able to defend and deter any kind of
attacks against our assets. So we have a counter-communications
system as an example, which is designed to jam those who would
try to interfere with us in space, additional monies for
command and control.
So we do have additional investments there and we are
working it hard because it is very, very important to us both
from a military and a civilian use perspective.
Senator Tillis. It seems to me that in that area, there may
not be that much of a disparity between what we are spending
and what others may be spending to have a greater command in
space. That is the reason for my question. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Heinrich?
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman McCain.
I want to return to that issue. I like that phrase.
``Congested, contested, and competitive'' was it?
Ms. James. Yes.
Senator Heinrich. I think that is a very accurate picture
that you are painting.
I want to, in particular, Secretary James, thank you and
General Hyten for your leadership on the operationally
responsive space program. It is one of many solutions to what
we are seeing where we need to build and launch smaller
satellites quicker and at lower cost. As you well know, these
threats are only increasing and seemingly ever more quickly.
Shifting gears for a minute, Secretary McHugh, it is good
to see you. It was an honor to serve with you on the House
Armed Services Committee all too briefly. But I want to thank
you for your blunt words on sequestration. This weekend I will
be heading down to White Sands Missile Range. I know we have
talked about that a little bit. I am going to be participating
in their annual Bataan death march memorial marathon.
But what really pains me is to see the sequestration-driven
decisions and the associated impacts to both Wismer and the 2nd
Engineering Battalion and in particular the some 130,000 square
feet of brand new facilities that today sit empty at White
Sands without any sort of active duty presence.
So it is my hope that this committee and, frankly, the full
Senate recognize the seriousness of sequestration budget levels
and at a minimum, I think we need to support the President's
budget, and frankly, I think we need to do a little better than
that. When we return to responsible budget levels, I look
forward to working with you on putting those facilities to work
again, especially considering their brand new condition with
some sort of active duty mission.
General Welsh, I want to switch to you real quick. I thank
Senator Reed for bringing this up earlier, but I wanted to talk
a little bit more about the RPA issue and wanted to ask you,
other than sequestration relief, which is somewhat obvious, are
there other things that Congress can do to help with the strain
that we are seeing because of increased tempo and demand
overseas and the fact that we are losing more RPA pilots than
we are able to train?
General Welsh. Senator, the immediate problem is the
training one. If the requirement continued to grow and we were
tasked to continue to find hundreds or thousands of people to
now go into this mission area, they have to come out of some
other mission area with our current budget so that we do not
have extra people waiting to do some other job. So the tradeoff
there would be catastrophic really for support to the combatant
commanders in other mission areas, or we would have to grow the
Air Force, or we would have to significantly grow the Guard and
Reserve. This is a difficult mission for the Guard and Reserve
to support in huge numbers because of the 24/7 nature of it.
They do a great job of supporting it at the level where we are
now, and they have been spectacularly helpful in doing that.
But it is not one you can plant quickly into the Reserve
component and grow it over night. It takes a lot of
development.
The biggest thing I think we need to look at is the
efficiency of the ISR enterprise itself and the way we use it.
The interaction between DOD ISR and national ISR, the ability
to use both networks to collect against your collection
requirements whether you are a national leader or whether you
are a military leader in a combatant command. The way we use
different types of sensors to create situational awareness over
broad areas, as opposed to relying on 60 orbits of soda straws
to try and do very close targeting, the types of rules of
engagement we use for tracking in order to set up kinetic
operations or potential kinetic operations demand this kind of
work, but that kind of ROE does not match the resources we have
to support it in a large-scale approach, and it would not be
practical in a large war. It is just practical in a
counterinsurgency war or a counterterrorism fight.
So that is the kind of discussion we need to be having, the
efficiency of the operation. We just cannot keep throwing more
and more and more money at it. We are going to break the
Treasury.
Senator Heinrich. Well, I appreciate your attention to the
issue. I think it is absolutely critical especially given the
threats that we are facing today.
Secretary James and General Welsh, I am quite pleased to
see the second squadron of F-16s scheduled to arrive at
Holloman Air Force Base this year. As we welcome these new
aircraft, the airmen, and their families to New Mexico, I
continue to sort of keep my eyes on the future as well for the
military community in southern New Mexico. I am pleased to see
the budget request included increased production of F-35s.
It is my understanding that the next iterations of basing
decisions for an active duty bed-down of the F-35 would be in
2024. Is that still accurate, and will Holloman Air Force Base
remain a candidate for basing for the JSF at that time?
General Welsh. Senator, I believe it would be a bed-down,
an arrival of aircraft in 2024, which will mean the decision
would be in the early 2020s, 2 to 3 years prior to that when we
start to process for identifying the base to give us time to
ensure the proper funding, military construction (MILCON), that
was required, et cetera, would be available. So it will be just
after the turn of 2020.
Senator Heinrich. We are talking maybe 6 years.
General Welsh. Yes, sir. Every base that we have right now
that is capable of flying fighters off it will be part of the
candidate list.
Senator Heinrich. Great. I appreciate it. Thank you.
Thank you, Chairman McCain.
Chairman McCain. Senator Rounds?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for your service.
Mr. Chairman, I do have some questions for the witnesses,
but first I would like to briefly address an overarching theme
that has dominated this committee's dialogue since January.
That theme is, of course, the critical importance of properly
funding our armed forces. We have heard over and over from
leaders from throughout the Defense Department about the
devastating impacts that are accompanying sequestration.
But I believe sequestration is part of a larger threat to
our defense establishment and our national security. At a time
of great fiscal pressures, we are seeing ever-mounting pressure
to reduce defense spending below a level of acceptable risk. In
short, we can expect to see, as never before, advocacy of a
national security strategy that is budget- and not strategy-
driven. This committee is positioned to keep that from
happening.
So I would like to take this opportunity to state my strong
support and great appreciation for the ongoing efforts of
Chairman McCain and Ranking Member Reed to stop that from
happening and reduce the damage which is being caused by
sequestration.
With that, I have some questions for Secretary James and
General Welsh about one program for which we must provide
adequate funding, and that is the long-range strike bomber.
General Welsh, the Air Force says that the long-range
strike bomber is one of the Air Force's top modernization
priorities. Today the Air Force has either 95 or 96 operational
bombers. This is nearly half the number of bombers recommended
by the 1993 bottom-up review to support operations in the post-
Cold War era. During the Cold War, the Air Force's average
ratio of fighters to bombers was about 5 to 1. This ratio is
now 14 to 1, 14 fighters for every 1 bomber. I am not
suggesting the need to cut more fighters, but rather, I think
we ought to be talking about whether or not that original
balance was appropriate.
I am concerned, however, that DOD may be contemplating
making an unfavorable situation even worse by retiring more
bombers before the long-range strike bomber is fielded in
substantial numbers.
My questions are these. If the Air Force is not given
relief from the Budget Control Act, would you propose cuts to
the current bomber force?
General Welsh. No, Senator, we are not.
Senator Rounds. Will the long-range strike bombers replace
any of the current bombers, including the nuclear mission
capable B-2, or will they augment the current force?
General Welsh. The intent would be to replace the B-2 over
time with the long-range strike bomber.
Senator Rounds. Beginning?
General Welsh. Beginning in the mid-2020s.
Senator Rounds. Some have pointed to stealth technologies
as a diminishing advantage. Even if this is true, would you
think it necessary to make the air defense challenge as
difficult as possible for our Nation's enemies, and what other
alternatives would we have?
General Welsh. Sir, I have seen no technical data that says
stealth as a way to break a kill chain is a diminishing value.
It is about breaking any segment of the kill chain. There are
sensors that can see any stealth platform, but passing the data
that they draw to sensors and weapons that can target you is a
completely different problem for them, and stealth to this
point clearly can disrupt that kill chain.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cotton [presiding]. Senator Hirono?
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Senator.
The DOD is the biggest user of energy in the Federal
Government. The military is committed to lowering its energy
costs because the savings therefrom can go to other DOD
priorities such as modernization and readiness.
So I know that the DOD is making investments in research
and development (R&D) on alternative energy sources besides
oil. I wanted to ask Secretary James and Secretary McHugh, can
you tell us what your alternative energy goals are and whether
you are meeting those goals?
Ms. James. Well, Senator, what I would tell you is we have
a little saying in the Air Force, ``mission assurance requires
energy assurance,'' because obviously just as you stated,
energy is the backbone of everything that we do in the Air
Force. So I guess there are several points I would like to
bring up. It is partly about saving money. It is partly about
doing things differently and ultimately saving lives because
the transport of energy can cause damage on the battlefield, to
say the least.
So far in recent years, the Air Force has avoided about
$2.5 billion in energy expenses. This is mostly CONUS and
overseas, not the forward-operating base type locations but
this is through efficiencies at base level.
Second, we are shifting our strategy from one of self-
funding to third-party funding, wherever we possibly can. The
way I like to say that is using other people's money by
partnering and getting efficiencies in this way.
The third thing, to your point, is we have about 300
renewable energy projects on about 100 different installations,
all of which meet or beat utility prices, and most of those are
third-party funded, those partnerships that I talked about as
well.
So those are some of the key things, and maybe there is a
fourth point to throw in and that is that every type of
aircraft that we currently have has been certified to be able
to utilize alternative fuels. Now, we are not doing that in a
big way at this point. We do not have suppliers that can supply
that kind of thing in bulk, but that is a point just to raise
that at least we are prepared.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. I do understand that our
Services are looking for efficiencies because that is where you
determine what your baseline needs might be and then to move to
the alternative sources. So that would be a given.
Secretary McHugh, would you like to just address the
alternative question that I asked?
Mr. McHugh. Well, as Secretary James said, I think it is
true for all the Services. We are working very hard to try to
meet the alternative fuel mandates that were set both in law
and in executive order. In our tactical vehicle fleet
particularly, we have a goal that is established out to 2030.
We have actually reached that goal already. Similarly in other
areas, we are working hard to meet the legislatively mandated
benchmarks that are out there. I think it is important to note
for the Army that we have reduced our petroleum fuel
consumption since 2003 by 17 percent. You mentioned cost. It is
a little frustrating that all the while we have done that, our
actual costs have gone up about 45 percent given living Hawaii,
the cost of utilities and such. But nevertheless, it is a very
important initiative, and we are going to continue to develop
that.
We piloted about 3 years ago what we called the Net Zero
project, water waste and electricity. We started, I believe, it
was on seven bases. Highly successful. In fact, we have now
embedded that throughout the entire Army to try to be better
stewards of the environment but be better neighbors as well to
the communities that play host to us.
We have doubled our renewable fuel consumption from 2013 to
2014. That is the second year in a row we have doubled our
renewable construction. We have still got a ways to go to the 7
percent goal that Congress has set, but we are making progress
and whether it is now 380 renewable energy programs that we
administer where we leverage for every Army dollar $13 in
private investment, we are getting there. You mentioned
baseline. Given I think where we all started--and the Army is
the largest consumer in the Federal Government of energy and
petroleum products--we have a lot of room for improvement.
Senator Hirono. Secretary McHugh, your testimony mentions
the Ready and Resilient Campaigns that the Army established 2
years ago by your directive to promote resiliency among
servicemembers by streamlining programs, including those aimed
at eliminating sexual assault and harassment, substance abuse,
domestic violence, and any stigmas or barriers associated with
seeking help.
After 2 years, has the Army seen a measurable impact on
servicemembers and their families as a result of this program?
Mr. McHugh. I think if we are honest with ourselves when it
comes to the Ready and Resiliency Campaign, we still have a
ways to go before we fully integrate the--I think there are
seven major initiatives embedded within there. But if you look
at them individually, whether it be help-seeking behavior for
suicides and mental health, whether in sexual assault, it is
the double trend lines of incidents going down while reports
coming up and so on and so forth, the individual programmatic
pieces are showing progress.
As I know you understand, Senator, each one of these are
very serious challenges unto themselves. So when I talked about
dramatic increases in reports on sexual assault and equally, I
think, dramatic declination of incidents, I do not want to
paint that as too rosy a picture. This is still a scourge, I
think a fair word, in the U.S. Army, and we are going to
continue to work that as we are suicides, as we are substance
abuse and every other program. But we are still realigning
ourselves so that we have a more holistic approach to the Ready
and Resilience Campaign.
Senator Hirono. So 2 years may be too short a time, but I
commend you for taking a holistic approach to these issues.
Mr. McHugh. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Hirono. I also want to thank General Odierno for
your continuing commitment to addressing the scourge of sexual
assault in your testimony. Thank you very much, and I expect
that of all of our Services.
Again, Secretary McHugh, during the OSD posture hearing,
Secretary Carter testified that foreign leaders--and I quote--
get a very clear picture of the dangers of sequester. They
probably get an outsized picture of our lack of will, but this
is not good for our friends--end quote--much less our foes.
That being acknowledged, it is critical that we do
everything we can to multiply the effectiveness of our troops
and to reassure our allies. One of the ways, I believe, that we
are doing that is through Pacific Pathways.
Can you speak to the importance of military-to-military
(mil-to-mil) programs in maintaining stability and offering
reassurance to our regional partners, particularly in the Indo-
Asia-Pacific region? How does the President's budget support
these types of partnership building engagements?
Mr. McHugh. Well, Senator, as I know you recognize full
well, the entire DOD is refocusing on the Pacific. It is, I
think, understandable to view this somewhat as an air and water
domain, but the Army has had substantial presence in that
region for many, many years, and we see an opportunity at this
moment to increase that.
You mentioned Pacific Pathways. That is an initiative that
a four-star general who we elevated in the Army Pacific Command
to a four-star general to recognize the very factors that you
said. Pathways from General Brooks and Chief Odierno is the way
in which we are trying to articulate that. Eight of the 10
world's largest armies are located in the Pacific. Of the
military forces throughout that region, the vast majority are
headed up by army officers, land force officers. So we have a
natural affinity to deal with these partners and not to be war-
like in our posture toward China but rather to build assurance,
to build partnerships, and through Pacific Pathways, we are
actually in a more efficient way sending out forces to train
through a variety of our engagements and then return home.
General Brooks has spoken, I know, to the Chief--and
perhaps the Chief could comment more fully--about some of the
concerns. Particularly, obviously, at sequestration level, that
breaks his ability to go out and do, I believe, the three
rotations that he would like. But through various efficiencies
at the President's budget level, I think we can continue to
stay focused on this very important initiative.
But I would yield to the Chief if he wants to add.
Senator Hirono. Well, I know that my time is up. So I would
like to ask the chair if General Odierno can comment.
Senator Cotton. General Odierno, please comment.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
General Odierno. Senator, I would just say I think as you
know, Pacific Pathways is really key for us reaching out to new
and important allies. We have very sophisticated and long-term
programs. We deal with Korea, Japan. But now we are able to
reach out to other countries that we think are going to be
really important to us, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, and other
places like that that are really important to us as we continue
to develop our relationships and capabilities in the Pacific.
The Pacific Pathways is allowing us to do this.
I agree with Secretary McHugh, sequestration will basically
end Pacific Pathways for the next couple years if we do not get
that thrown out because that will be one of the issues that we
will have to cancel if we lose the dollars that are associated
with it.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cotton. Senator Wicker?
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is an
outstanding panel.
I became Secretary McHugh's House colleague some 21 years
ago. It is hard to believe.
Secretary James, there is a country song from the Grand Ole
Opry, ``I've Been Everywhere,'' and I think in the short time
you have been Secretary, you fulfilled the words to that
particular song.
But let me direct my questions to our two outstanding
uniformed witnesses today. General Odierno, I understand this
will be your last testimony before this committee. Maybe not
but perhaps. Congratulations on a great career.
General Odierno. Senator, I always get nervous when you say
it is my last one because you just never know. It is 6 months.
A lot can happen within 6 months.
Senator Wicker. That is true. That is true. But I hope you
will come back and tell us really good news.
You were in command of the surge in Iraq in 2007 and I do
not want to ask about Iraq. But suffice it to say that the
surge in my opinion was a success. We then left a vacuum and,
because of a number of reasons, things have gone to hell for
our interests in Iraq.
Now, I understand every situation is different, but I have
worried publicly about Afghanistan. I worry that we will leave
a vacuum that will come back to haunt us and I want you to
comment about that.
We have a friend in the presidency now in Afghanistan,
President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani. He and his wife had to leave
Afghanistan during the time of the Taliban. We have a situation
now where the people have elected him and he is back in office.
His chief opponent, as a patriotic citizen of Afghanistan, has
agreed, after a tough campaign, to be part of the government
and to be part of the solution, Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
Abdullah Abdullah. The tribal councils, the collective wisdom
of the various ethnic groups there, the Loya Jirga, have asked
us to stay. Frankly, I view the situation now in Afghanistan as
a success story.
Now, clearly mistakes were made. Clearly I wish we had not
been there as long as we were, and perhaps we were distracted
elsewhere. But the situation on the ground is favorable to us
in Afghanistan now. I fear that under the current timetable we
are going to risk losing the gains that we have made.
So give us your opinion about that, and to the extent you
can, tell us what, if any, movement there might be in the
administration toward a fact-based decisionmaking process
rather than a timetable. Then, of course, I will just toss that
over to General Welsh.
General Odierno. I will just say that, first, the things
you pointed out about President Ghani and Abdullah, who is kind
of the CEO of Afghanistan, is creating an environment that is
really, as you mentioned, positive. Frankly, it is positive
towards us. Whenever you try to be successful, it is a
combination of military capability to provide security, but
really, the most important piece is the political piece and you
have leadership that is able to bring the country forward. So I
think with Afghanistan now, the most positive thing is the fact
that we now have the political leadership, as you mentioned, in
place.
I believe that General John F. Campbell, the current
Commander of the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF), has been given flexibility between now and the end of
2016. I think that is very important. So I would think that
that is a first step, and I think that is because of the
positive political environment that we see. So I think there
has been a reaction to that, and I think we have to constantly
assess where we are and we can continue to have a discussion on
where we are a year from now and then have a discussion on, at
the end of 2016, which is the current plan, will we pull out,
and if not, then I think the Joint Chiefs and General Campbell
will give their best military advice to the President on
whether that is appropriate or not.
What I would say is I think because of the political
situation, I think there is more room now that General Campbell
has been given over the next year and a half or so as we
continue to downsize our presence to make sure we are
continuing to support the administration in Afghanistan and
achieve our goals. I think we will continue to revisit that as
we----
Senator Wicker. What are the risks to our troops if we stay
longer than that? There is not expected to be very much----
General Odierno. I think it just depends. I mean, I would
suggest that if we are staying, it is because we are continuing
to build their institutions. That is what is important is to
build their institutions. So that puts them at less risk as we
go forward. But again, that would have to be determined
depending on what the situation is at the time.
Senator Wicker. General Welsh, I was talking to a
parliamentarian from the United Kingdom yesterday. He thinks
the perception in his country is the same as it is here, that
things are really not going well in Afghanistan. I do not see
it that way. Do you? I think people have the wrong impression.
General Welsh. Well, sir, it may depend on where you are
standing or sitting in Afghanistan.
The Air Force's role there is to support a lot of different
activity. But the principal role is to support the development
of the Afghan air force as an institution and as part of the
security infrastructure of their nation. Many parts of that
development are going very well. They are showing signs of
independent ability to do tactical planning, operational
activities. The thing that will really set them up for success
over time, though, is the ability as an institution to survive
the big pieces of an air force, logistical infrastructure,
supply chains, managing infrastructure from airfields to new
equipment acquisition, things that they do not have any
experience with and they are not very proficient at yet. But
they have young talent with a lot of energy and a lot of desire
to learn.
I think clearly if NATO could stay even, for example, for a
period of time to continue this effort and get them to a point
where they are able to continue that development on their own,
there is a potential for their air force to be the cornerstone
of a budding aviation industry in Afghanistan at some point in
the future that would be immensely helpful to that country and
to the region.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cotton. Senator McCaskill?
Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
I was bitterly disappointed today to see that the Senate
budget that was released resembles a fairytale and does
absolutely nothing to address the looming crisis with
sequestration as it relates to our military. We have heard
witness after witness in this committee tell us what it is
going to do to our preparedness, to the excellence of our
military, to our national security. The fact that we are now
faced with a budget document that does nothing--zip, nada,
zero--to address this looming crisis is beyond disappointing.
I want to talk about a number of things. First, I want to
congratulate you and the other commanders that have worked so
hard on military sexual assault. We have a lot more work to do,
a lot more oversight, but the report, which a lot of people do
not get into the weeds in those reports--I certainly did, as
you probably are not surprised. I understand that incidents are
down, reporting is up. Those are both two good measures. Also,
what was most important was the confidence that victims showed
in terms of how commanders were handling this issue.
I think we have to get after retaliation. I have talked to
many of you individually about this. This is not commander
decision retaliation. This is lower level peer-to-peer
retaliation. I will look forward to information coming from all
of you about how you are specifically getting after that.
I want to talk about suicide in connection with stress and
substance abuse. This is going to be one for each of you.
First, Army. Back in 2008, we had a whistleblower at Fort
Leonard Wood expose the fact that people were not getting
substance abuse help at that base. It was a tragic story, and
as we all know, stress and substance abuse are two of the
predicates that sometimes are in place when you have a suicide.
We all want to do something about military suicides. So I think
substance abuse is pretty important.
Secretary McHugh, you made the decision in 2010 to move the
substance abuse program out of the Medical Command into the
Installation Command. We are having a problem with personnel,
clinical personnel, leaving the program, and you have shortages
now at places like Fort Hood where we have 45,000 soldiers. I
guarantee you the people who need outpatient substance abuse at
Fort Hood are not getting it because of the lack of personnel
that is available. Could you speak to that?
Mr. McHugh. I could. Just a little background because, as
you noted, Senator--and thank you for your interest. This is a
vitally important issue.
Just before I arrived as Secretary, then Vice Chief of
Staff of the Army, General Peter W. Chiarelli, who is well
known and wide in circles on suicide and other soldier care
programs, conducted a study, headed a study of the Army
Substance Abuse Program (ASAP) at large throughout the Army. He
was deeply concerned about what he felt was a disaggregated
program in that it was too dispersed at too high a level for
command and control to ensure that base by base, facility to
facility the proper things were being done.
The response that he put together and that Medical Command
and Installation Management Command (IMCOM) agreed upon was to
place the actual oversight of the ASAP program through IMCOM to
the base commanders. So those who have both responsibility and
eyes on for soldier care programs had a better view and a
better influence.
The--that was executed, as you noted correctly, in 2010 to
formalize what the vice had done ensured that all of the
clinical aspects, the certifications and the care programs were
still--and still are--overseen by Medical Command (MEDCOM).
You and I are in absolute agreement about the challenge of
ensuring that we have adequate providers. We do not. This is a
requirement that has been growing over time, as I discussed
with one of your colleagues a bit earlier. But I think it is
important to note that we have not had a hemorrhage or a loss
of providers since it was transferred authority to IMCOM. In
fact, right now we are about 88 percent of our stated
requirement, 99 percent is not good enough. We need to do
better. But we are actually at about 25 percent higher
providers on hand than were when Medical Command had control.
Having said that, there are concerns about this. So in
January, the Chief and I authorized, long before any of the
recent stories came out, for the Army Audit Agency to go out to
do a forensic examination of our structure to see if programs
were working to see what our actual status was. That
investigation, that audit is ongoing as we speak. Then in
response to some stories that, frankly, we take issue to some
of the data points that were brought up, nevertheless raise
some very serious questions. As I assured the Secretary of
Defense, we are not going to circle the wagons on this.
The Chief and I sent out a directive, I believe it was last
week, to the Inspector General providing him access to
virtually every resource in the Army and directing him to go
and take a hands-on look, eyes-on look at all 54 of our ASAP
facilities. As attendant to that, I called in the Surgeon
General, head of our Medical Command, and the commanding
general of IMCOM, to talk about how it is working. The Surgeon
General said to me when the transfer first occurred, it was an
appropriate structure. Since that time, our behavioral health
delivery capabilities have, in her words, matured, and she
felt--and the IMCOM Commander agreed--that it is time to take
another good look at our structure.
Senator McCaskill. Okay. Well, that is good.
Mr. McHugh. We are doing that, and I promise you we will
report back to you when we have those available.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
I know my time is gone, and I do not want to ask another
question. But if you would allow me 30 seconds to put something
in the record.
Secretary James and General Welsh, I want to make sure on
the stress side for our drone pilots--we have never before had
pilots working 12-hour shifts, killing the enemy, and then
going home to their wife and kids. This is a new thing in our
military. We have some of those guys at Whiteman Air Force
Base, and the demand is so high. They are not getting rest.
They are not getting leave. We have to do something about the
demand for RPA and we have to do something about the training
for RPA. But I would like you all to address to my office and
to the committee what you are doing to analyze the stress level
of these pilots. I do not think this has probably been given
enough thought about what psychologically this is doing to them
working these 12-hour shifts, killing the enemy, and then going
home to dinner with the children.
[The information referred to follows:]

In addition to access and routine assessments provided by flight
medicine and mental health outreach services at each unit, the United
States Air Force (USAF) has conducted multiple, comprehensive
aeromedical studies over the past several years assessing the
psychological health and disposition of weapons deploying Remotely
Piloted Aircraft (RPA) operators engaged in around-the-clock
operations. Many of these studies have been published in peer-reviewed
psychology journals as well as official USAF technical reports. The
main sources of operational and combat-related stress have been
identified, as well as the prevalence of occupational burnout, elevated
levels of psychological distress, post-traumatic stress disorder,
family and interpersonal relationship distress, and other behavioral
health issues (e.g., sleep and exercise, alcohol, and energy supplement
use). These studies routinely assess the psychological health and
disposition of RPA operators at each separate unit to provide outreach
specific to the needs of each organization as well as identify those at
elevated risk for psychological difficulties.
Although the trend and proportion of RPA operators with elevated
rates of exhaustion and psychological distress is higher than other
aviation-related career fields, several initiatives have been put in
place to mitigate the impact of shift work and weapons deployment, as
well as to identify those at risk for psychological and family-related
difficulties. The initiatives include, but are not limited to:
improving manning levels to reduce high workload and role overload,
developing and assessing shift rotations, work load distribution for
sustaining health and minimizing disruption to family lives;
modifications to the lighting and ergonomic design of ground control
stations to reduce fatigue and burnout, training leadership and medical
providers with early recognition, intervention of those with warning
signs for operational and combat-related stress, and improving upon
psychological health surveillance strategies. Additionally, we have
embedded operational mental health providers within active duty RPA
units with appropriate security clearances to increase access to mental
health care, as well as to engage and intervene, as needed, assisting
RPA operators with transitioning to home following weapons strikes, as
well as balancing their warfighter role with their personal life. The
most recent studies found these efforts have successfully led to
improvements in the psychological health and function of those within
active duty operational units. Work is in progress to adapt this
concept of support to RPA operations across the total force to
encompass units at Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve sites.
The comprehensive and in-depth aeromedical studies help leadership
remain vigilant to the changes, trends, and impact of specific
initiatives to mitigate the stressors and challenges (both to operators
and their families) unique to this form of warfare. The outcome of
these studies and current practices within flight medicine for
assessing the psychological health of RPA operators will continue to
shape force management strategies for sustaining and improving the
wellbeing of the warfighter and their families.

Senator Cotton. Senator Lee?
Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to all of you for taking the time to meet with us
today.
I am aware of the fact that you are all doing everything
you can to make adjustments to adapt your branches to the
emerging threats we are facing and to a very tough budgetary
environment with a lot of uncertainties.
Secretary James and General Welsh, during the confirmation
hearing with Secretary Carter last month, we discussed the
overall importance of having well-coordinated acquisition
sustainment and logistics processes to better achieve cost
efficiency and readiness for major weapons systems. I know this
has been a high priority for each of you. So can you describe
to our committee how the Air Force sustainment efforts have
performed in the last year, especially as you recover from
sequestration in 2013 and the direction the Air Force budget
request takes sustainment efforts through the next 5 years?
Ms. James. Senator, are you referring to sustainment of
weapons systems and trying to drive the costs down in the
sustainment world?
Senator Lee. Yes.
Ms. James. So I would say in that regard, we are laser-
focused. I think we are making progress. There is a lot of work
to be done, however, truth in advertising in that arena. We
talk frequently about unit costs of weapons systems, and we
track that very closely. But over time, we have not had as much
of a focus on that sustainment piece, and that frequently can
be as expensive, if not more expensive. So we are working it
hard. I think we are making progress, but lots more to come.
Senator Lee. Thank you. I appreciate your commitment to
that.
Do you have anything to add to that?
General Welsh. Senator, I had a rotation Air Force Materiel
Command a couple of years ago and the development of the five
centers that we have inside that command now to include the
lifecycle management center and the sustainment center is
changing the game for us on how we create efficiencies inside
the supply chains. I will tell you that the work that General
Janet C. Wolfenbarger has done leading this effort as the
Commander of Air Force Materiel Command and that Lieutenant
General Bruce A. Litchfield has done in particular as the
Commander of the Air Force Sustainment Center and also
Lieutenant General C.D. Moore, former Commander of Air Force
Life Cycle Management Center, who is now retired, has been
spectacular in launching us in a completely new direction in
how we sustain fleets of aircraft and equipment over time. I
think we are making remarkable progress, we just cannot slow
down now.
Senator Lee. I appreciate your commitment to that.
Now, the Air Force last year determined that it was
experiencing a shortfall in five and seven experience level
maintainer personnel for the undermanned legacy fleets and F-35
aircraft scheduled to be brought into service and recently
announced measures for a near-term solution to the issue.
Can you give the committee more detail about what
alternative solutions may have been considered by the Air Force
and why the Air Force chose to transfer maintainers from A-10
squadrons and how the Air Force will be impacted if a longer-
term solution to this maintainer issue cannot be found?
General Welsh. Senator, the issue was because of the
budgets that are lower than we anticipated a few years ago, we
are having to cut force structure. So we are not adding numbers
of squadrons. We are decreasing numbers of squadrons while we
are bringing a new weapons system on board. So we have to
replace squadron A or aircraft A with the new aircraft B and
take the people who are working A to be part of the new
aircraft B. We do not have 1,000 more maintenance personnel
standing around waiting for work.
Senator Lee. Right.
General Welsh. Because we are not transitioning that way
now, we are not retiring the squadrons we had planned to retire
to stand up the F-35 squadrons, we have to find that
maintenance manpower in some other way. The first effort we
were going to make was to just downsize the percentage of
manning within every other fighter squadron in the Air Force to
take the experienced maintainers we need to be able to build up
the F-35 fleet as opposed to delaying F-35 development and bed-
down at multiple bases.
Unfortunately, as we put that plan together, the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) became a reality and the
continued effort in the Middle East related Iraq and Syria came
on the books. We cannot take those squadrons down and still
support that effort.
So now we are looking at contracting an aircraft
maintenance unit at Luke Air Force Base to help us with the
training effort and to have contract maintainers instead of
active duty maintainers. The problem with that is we then are
not developing the active duty maintenance personnel that we
need to send out to Hill Air Force Base and to other places as
we bed down the F-35 because the maintainers there have to be
deployable. We are in a corner here. We have to develop active
duty F-35 maintenance people to bed down airplanes, and we do
not have them standing around.
Senator Lee. Yes. There is no question you are in a
difficult spot, and I appreciate your ongoing commitment to
that issue to make sure that we maintain our equipment that we
have and appreciate your insight into that. Thank you very
much.
Senator Cotton. Senator Blumenthal?
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thanks for being here. Thank
you for your service.
I want to pursue some of the questions that my colleague,
Senator McCaskill, began on behavioral health, mental health
care. The chairman of this committee, Senator McCain, and I
have successfully worked for the Clay Hunt Suicide Prevention
for American Veterans Act (SAV), the suicide prevention bill,
for our veterans which is promising as a first step, just a
down payment toward ending the scourge of 22 veterans every day
committing suicide. Obviously, these veterans come out of
service to our Army and our Air Force.
So I am wondering whether better coordination and
connectivity between our armed services and the Department of
Veterans Affairs (VA) is desirable and achievable and how,
maybe beginning with you, Mr. Secretary, if I may, that may be
advanced as a goal.
Mr. McHugh. Well, it absolutely is desirable, and it is
something that from our perspective in the Pentagon through the
Defense Suicide Prevention Office (DSPO) we are working
throughout the Services to coordinate with VA.
We are also looking at reaching beyond that for best
practices within the private sector. From the Army view, we
have what we call the Study to Assess Risk and Resilience in
Servicemembers (STARRS) program where we entered a 5-year
longitudinal study headed by the Institute of Mental Health and
a consortium of private universities to try to better
understand what we need to look for in soldiers in our case and
if there were any precursors that we could appropriately use.
We are not looking to stigmatize soldiers because of a single
behavior or a check on a medical record, but just trying to
find out how we can do a better job for those who are in or who
are quite possibly going to become--exercises of ideational
activity.
So we are making progress, but I think as you know so well,
it is beginning in its beginning stages.
I served for 4 years at the assignment of then-Secretary
Gates on a national suicide prevention alliance, bringing
together an amazing group of individuals from across society,
medical care, mental health care, the private industry. Now, I
think rightfully so, I have stepped down from that position. It
is actually held by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness.
So we are reaching beyond and recognizing this is not just
a military problem, not just an Army problem. It is a problem
throughout society, the civilian as well as the military.
Working together with the VA and others will do us all a great
deal of good.
Senator Blumenthal. I have heard you talk about it, General
Odierno. I wonder taking the word `stigma' that Secretary
McHugh used, whether the stigma that sometimes surrounds this
topic can be removed and what the Army is doing.
General Odierno. So I think first off, in the Army it is
about our commanders understanding the fact that our job and
the stress that we put onto people, it is important that we
deal with the behavioral health issues, and that we have to
make people realize and understand that it is okay to come
forward. Sometimes, as we have talked before, Senator, some of
our mantra actually works against that, but I think we are
making some progress.
The one thing I would say about the transition between us
and the Veterans Administration--one of the complaints the
soldiers have, as they do a transition, is that they are
getting treatment by a doctor in the Army, and then as they
change to a new doctor in VA, sometimes the treatment changes
and it is not what they are comfortable with. So one of the
things we are working at is how do we make that an easier
transition. We are not there yet, but we want to do a doctor-
to-doctor transition so you have a doctor who is working with
somebody in the Army talking to the VA doctor that is taking
over the case, and they get a treatment that is similar, at
least to begin with, because it is traumatic for somebody,
especially who has some behavioral health issues, that they are
maybe given different medicine or different types of treatment.
That really has an impact sometimes on our soldiers.
So that is one of the things I think we have to really work
on is that transition. The Surgeon General is working on that.
We are working more closely with the Veterans Administration,
but we have a long way to go on this issue because there still
is a gap.
Senator Blumenthal. My time has expired, but I think you
have really very pointedly and powerfully summarized what one
of the problems is in that transition, which is the change from
doctor to doctor, sometimes from medicine to medicine,
formulary to formulary among drugs. So I hope that we can help
you make that kind of progress. Thank you very much.
Senator Cotton. I will now recognize myself. Being the
acting chairman for John McCain is almost as powerful as I felt
as having staff duty at Fort Myer, checking on General
Odierno's house at 0200 in the morning, although he was not
there in 2007. He was in Iraq, and I want to thank him, as all
my colleagues have, for his many years of distinguished
service, particularly in that country. General Odierno, just in
case you are not back in front of us again, as you no doubt
hope that you are probably not.
General Welsh, thank you as well for your service. Both the
Secretaries, thank you for your service to our country, for
being here.
We have heard many members of this committee talk about the
dangers of sequestration to your services. We heard before from
the Navy and the Marine Corps as well. I think most of us, if
not all of us, are in agreement. We are now engaged in a debate
on exactly what to do about that during the budget season in
both the House and the Senate.
The House of Representatives proposed its budget today. I
believe the Senate Budget Committee is working on the budget
today as well. The drafts that have been introduced would keep
the DOD portion of the base budget at $498 billion and spend
some substantial more than that in so-called OCO funds,
overseas contingency operations, perhaps as much as $90
billion. I think when you add in the non-DOD parts of the
defense budget, it would get up to about 613 or so.
You do not necessarily need to comment on either budget,
but I would like to hear what General Odierno and General Welsh
have to say about the concept of funding the base budget at
$498 billion for defense and a much larger OCO request than
appears in the President's budget.
General Odierno. Thank you, Senator. So first, I would just
say there is risk to not funding the base and putting it in OCO
because with that has to come a flexibility within OCO for us
to spend it on the things that are necessary because OCO has
limits and it has restrictions and it has very strict rules
that have to be followed. So if we are inhibited by that, it
might not help us. What might happen at the end of the year, we
have a bunch of money we hand back because we are not able to
spend it. So the first thing is it would have to have some
level of flexibility.
Now, I would say that getting money in OCO, if there is
flexibility with it, is certainly better than not getting any
additional money. It could help us with readiness. There are
ways that maybe we could work with the committee to make it
work.
But I would tell you I would much rather have it in the
base budget because at some time we are going to have to shift
it to the base, and if we put it in OCO, we are just delaying
that potential. It is going to have to happen at some time.
Senator Cotton. Senator McCain and Senator Reed have both
called in their budget newsletter for $577 billion, and they
have endorsed in concept the National Defense Panel's
recommendation of $611 billion as a minimum floor. If that were
not to happen, if you did have the base budget somewhere around
$498 billion and OCO somewhere around $90 billion, would you be
able to stop some of the force reductions that you have
predicted in your testimony today?
General Odierno. We would still be going to 450,000:
335,000 in the Guard and 195,000 in the Reserve. But what that
money would do is it would help us with our readiness.
Senator Cotton. So force structure would probably not
change, but readiness of the remaining force would improve.
General Odierno. See, the problem with OCO, it is year-to-
year funding. So we do not know how long it would go. But our
ramp is continuing, down to 450,000.
Senator Cotton. General Welsh?
General Welsh. Senator, with modernization as a major issue
we face, OCO presents some problems because it is hard to start
a new program with OCO when you are looking at a 1-year budget
cycle. It is not guaranteed over time. There are limits on what
you can spend it on. So that is the big issue with us.
Modernization is a huge deal for the Air Force at this point in
time. But as Ray said, at some point in time, if it is green
and it smells pretty and it is not your St. Patrick's Day tie,
it is okay.
Senator Cotton. Are you talking primarily about longer-term
modernization like the long-range strike bomber or shorter-term
procurement matters as well?
General Welsh. I would think that Congress would probably
help us with flexibilities on the shorter-term things. I am
more worried about for a platform-based force, Air Force or
Navy, for example, the types of systems we buy will take longer
and produce overtime. It is not just the development. It is
also the production and supply chain that goes on for 20 to 30
years as you change hundreds of platforms.
Senator Cotton. General Odierno, we did not touch on
modernization. Obviously, the Army has much smaller, lower unit
cost platforms than does the Air Force. But would you care to
touch on modernization, how this approach might----
General Odierno. Yes. So, again, it depends. OCO limits
what we can do for modernization if it is in OCO. Now, there
are ways around that. So, for example, if you had end strength
over 475,000 or 450,000 funded in OCO, we could then use that
money to do potentially modernization. But again, the wording
and other things would have to be about right in order to make
that happen. But there is some potential that we could use it
for modernization depending on the flexibility that is inside
of that.
Senator Cotton. So my time has expired, but if I could
briefly synthesize what I think I am hearing from both of you,
it is not good, better than nothing, but depends heavily on the
details or the kind of flexibility that the OCO funding
provides.
General Welsh. Senator, if I could add. It would help us
continue the readiness recovery that the last 2 years of BBA
has allowed us to start, at least at the individual and unit
level.
Senator Cotton. Best for readiness, marginal for force
structure, not good for modernization. Thank you.
Senator King?
Senator King. I would like to congratulate the chair. To
deliver one's maiden speech and chair the Armed Services
Committee in the same week is a meteoric rise.
[Laughter.]
Also, Secretary James, I love your description of space:
congested, contested, and competitive. The first thing I
thought of was my old high school football coach who said we
want our boys to be agile, mobile, and hostile. That came back
to me when you said that.
I want to, first, for the record associate myself with
Senator Wicker's comments about Afghanistan. I think it would
be a tragedy if we pull our forces out of there prematurely. To
follow with the football, it would be like fumbling the ball on
the 5-yard line in my opinion based upon the tremendous
progress that has been made. I hope, General Odierno, you will
continue to relay those thoughts through General Campbell to
the appropriate officials.
Senator Wicker and I were at the budget meeting this
afternoon. I can report good news and bad news or I should say
bad news and good news on the budget. The budget that was
proposed by the majority in the Budget Committee does assume
sequestration. That is the bad news. The good news is that
there is language in it which is a kind of placeholder for a
replacement for sequestration if we can find it. I can assure
you that there are a lot of people, good people, working on
finding it, but I can also tell you because I am one of those
people that it is hard. There is no low-hanging fruit. There is
no easy solution to it.
That is why your testimony about the damage is so important
because as we look at difficult alternatives, we have to keep
in front of us the difficult reality that sequestration poses
for all of the Services. So it is very important to keep that
information flow going about what the real effects will be in
terms of squadrons grounded, pilots not being trained, force
structure. Readiness, of course, is the key, and I just urge
you to continue to make that case.
General Welsh and Secretary James, can you briefly on this
question of sequester touch upon the loss of ISR capabilities
in the sequester budget? I see that as a real problem for us.
Ms. James. Let me start and, please, Chief, you jump in as
well.
So we did make it a big point, as I was mentioning earlier
to talk to the combatant commanders and find out what their top
priority was for any additional dollars that the Air Force
could bring to the table, and they said ISR, ISR, ISR. That is
the way it went all the way.
So as a result, we put in additional things which would
have to be stripped back out under sequestration. So under
sequestration, we would have to divest the U-2, which would
reduce high altitude ISR capacity by 50 percent. We would have
to divest----
Senator King. Let me stop you there. It would reduce high
altitude ISR capability by 50 percent. That is a stunning fact,
it seems to me.
Ms. James. Yes. No, it is. It is very serious and it gets
worse. We would also have to divest the Global Hawk block 40.
We would have to reduce our combat air patrols, the Predators
and the Reapers, by 10 combat air patrols. By the way, 10 is
roughly the equivalent of what is in Iraq and Syria today. So
that is a substantial chunk. We would have to divest seven
AWACS, which of course are command and control aircraft. So the
list is draconian.
Senator King. This is like General Robert E. Lee losing
J.E.B. Stuart before the Battle of Gettysburg. As I remember,
General Lee's comment was ``I am blind.'' That is what we are
talking about.
Ms. James. That is what we are talking about.
Senator King. General Odierno and Secretary McHugh, you
have talked about a term ``velocity of instability in today's
world.'' Clearly that is where we are. All the testimony both
in the Intelligence Committee and Armed Services has been from
professionals. They have never seen anything quite like the
instability and unpredictability of the world that we are in.
Talk to me a little bit more, General, about OCO and if we
use OCO for what amounts to base, that means we do not have OCO
for OCO. What does that do to your flexibility of being able to
respond?
General Odierno. Well, I think what would happen is we
would have additional OCO dollars. The problem again is what
happens is OCO is supposed to fund our missions that are being
conducted, whether it be in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan. If they
increase the OCO, then we could use it for training of units
that are preparing to go to operate in those areas. What it
does not do is train our forces that have to go to unknown
contingencies. If, for example, we wanted to deploy a bunch of
soldiers to Europe, if something continued to go wrong there,
we might not be able to use the money to do it. Or if we had to
send people to Korea, we would not be able to use that number
to train our forces to be prepared to go to Korea.
Senator King. By definition, a contingency account is not a
contingency account if you are spending it for base budget
purposes.
General Odierno. That is correct.
Senator King. A final question for the record because I
know my time is up.
General Welsh, I would like you, if you could, to give the
committee a justification, if you would, for the new bomber,
for the long-range strike bomber in terms of what are we
gaining over the B-2, and how do we control for the risks of a
new airplane. The B-2, of course, we were going to get 100. We
ended up with, I think, in the 20s. How do we mitigate the risk
both in terms of cost and duration of project? Is it worth that
risk vis-a-vis the advantages of the new aircraft? You do not
have to answer now, but if you could give us some background to
the committee I would appreciate it. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]

One of the critical capabilities we bring with the Long Range
Strike Bomber (LRS-B) program is the capacity of 100 aircraft to fight
in our future conflicts. Currently, the Air Force has 20 B-2s and these
few numbers limit what we will be able to accomplish vice a fleet of
100 aircraft. Additionally, the LRS-B offers a significant leap in
survivability over the B-2 without inventing new technology. We will
mitigate cost and schedule by using mature technology and existing
systems. Doing so lessens the scope of the development effort and risk
involved in bringing many new subsystems together for the first time.
We also mitigate cost and schedule risk by tempering our expectations
from a requirements standpoint. LRS-B does not need to be unnecessarily
complicated to offer next generation capability. Senator King received
an LRS-B program brief in May, 2015.

Senator Reed [presiding]. Senator Cruz?
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank Secretaries McHugh and James and Generals
Odierno and Welsh for your distinguished service to our country
and for coming here today to testify to this committee.
I would like to start, Secretary McHugh, with you and
General Odierno. The Army force structure and personnel manning
projections were based on a set of assumptions about very
limited commitments to the Middle East, Europe, and
Afghanistan. Under the 2016 budget request, the Army's end
strength would decrease to 450,000 by the end of 2018. Mr.
Secretary and General Odierno, you have both testified in the
past that this level is the minimum force necessary to execute
national defense strategy, but you have also mentioned that
everything in that estimate relies on the underlying
assumptions regarding required operations.
With a resurgent Russia imposing violence on its neighbors,
ongoing commitments to fight radical Islamic terrorism and
groups like ISIS, and the potential for a longer-term
commitment to Afghanistan, how confident are you that these
numbers are enough to fight and win a regional conflict?
General Odierno. Senator, what I would say is there is
concern. Again, these numbers, what we originally developed,
were based on the fact that we would not have to have
significant presence in Europe. That was assumed that there
would not be significant issues there, that we would not have a
prolonged presence in the Middle East and I mean a larger
presence than we have there today, a prolonged, larger presence
than we have there, and if we have to have a presence in Europe
or if there is some significant more aggression than we have
had so far and we had to sustain that for a long period of
time, i.e., over a year or 2, then our force structure would
not be enough to meet those requirements.
Mr. McHugh. Senator, if I could add.
Senator Cruz. Sure.
Mr. McHugh. As you noted and as the Chief and I have
testified, the 450 number is the absolute minimum we need to do
the things we see today. As your remarks clearly illustrated, a
lot of the things we see today we did not see a year ago, 18
months ago. It is that unknown that truly troubles certainly me
and I think the rest of us at this table.
Former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates once said that
when it comes to predicting the future, our record is perfect.
We have been wrong every time.
I truly worry about that next thing that we do not see or
the things we are dealing with today that, all of a sudden,
exceed their bounds. We would be hard-pressed to answer that
bell.
Senator Cruz. General Odierno, in your personal judgment,
what number of soldiers would be required to perform the
functions that are needed?
General Odierno. In 2012, when we originally developed the
DSG, we developed it with an idea of an end state of 490,350 in
the Guard and 205,000 in the U.S. Army Reserve. That was based
on our analysis of what we thought we would have to do. So I
would say that that is about the level I think we should be at
in order to meet the future needs. But, again, I have
testified--and I stick with it--that I think 450,000 is the
minimum, but it assumes a lot of things. So if those
assumptions are right, we are okay. If they start to go wrong,
we have no wiggle room, and that is why I think the 490, 350,
205 is the right number.
Senator Cruz. Well, let me ask a follow-up question, which
is if we find ourselves in a situation where we have cut the
Army to 450 and suddenly we need to grow, we have too little
capacity. Can you provide an estimate on the length of time and
effort it takes to reconstitute the force and not just the size
but the readiness we would need?
General Odierno. So, Senator, in 2005 and 2006, when we
grew the Army, it took us 30 months to grow one brigade, and
that is to recruit it and that is to individually train it and
collectively train it. So it would take 30 months to develop a
new brigade if we had to do that.
Senator Cruz. Secretary James and General Welsh, the
National Defense Panel observed that the Air Force's bomber,
fighter, and surveillance forces are scheduled to draw down to
approximately 50 percent of the current inventory by 2019. What
do you believe is the proper approach to increasing the Air
Force's ISR and long-range strike capabilities?
General Welsh. Senator, I am not exactly sure what those
numbers mean. But we have been drawing down for quite some
time. As the chairman mentioned at the beginning of this
hearing, in the first Gulf War, the Air Force deployed 33
fighter squadrons, but we had five times that many in the
Reserve to do something else. This budget will take us to 49
fighter squadrons. If we have another event like the first Gulf
War, which is the last time we deployed a full airpower
package, it would be just on the fighter side--33 fighter
squadrons--it would require 14 for homeland security, if there
is any kind of increased risk to the homeland, which there
likely would be in that scenario. That would leave you with two
other squadrons to do whatever else you wanted to do in the
world, to include things like Iraq and Syria, Afghanistan,
anything in the Balkans, the Levant, Eastern Europe, all the
other things that we have force structure in today. The problem
is quantify does have a quality all its own in this business.
It just does.
Senator Cruz. So in your personal judgment, what level is
required to adequately protect this country?
General Welsh. Well, we understand we have to be part of
the solution of the debt problem. Everybody in the Department
understands that. What we cannot do is continue to downsize
every capability area not just fighter squadrons. We are
cutting every one of our five core mission areas in this
budget, as we did last year and the year before. The trend is
all in the wrong direction in every mission area, and we do not
see it stopping. That is the danger, Senator.
Ms. James. If I could add, Senator, the way I would put it
is we think just you heard the Army say, that the President's
budget level is our bare minimum in order to do what we are
supposed to do under the strategy. That does not mean it is
perfect. We already feel like we made some important down
payments, and we are certainly scrubbing all the time looking
for additional efficiencies. So I would say that budget level
is what we consider our bare minimum in order to do the
strategy as it is laid out right now. We will have to rewrite
the strategy if we do not get it.
Then a couple other points I would make on long-range
strike. We need to modernize it. So that is why we are
investing in the F-35, we are investing in the long-range
strike bomber. Then when it comes to ISR, of course, partly as
a result of the additional dollars in this President's budget
level above sequestration we were able to essentially buy back
some of the investment that we otherwise might have retired in
some of our systems like the U-2, for example, like the AWACS.
Some of these we are going to retire--we would prefer not to
retire them at least not so early because we need replacements
for these things. So the budget does provide for both long-
range strike and ISR investments.
Senator Cruz. Thank you very much.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Cruz.
On behalf of the chairman, Chairman McCain, I want to thank
you all for your testimony and for your service, your
commitment. Again, please thank all the men and women in
uniform for us.
With that and on behalf of Chairman McCain, the hearing is
adjourned.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
air force fighter force capacity
1. Senator McCain. General Welsh, in 2009, the Air Force had over
2,200 fighter aircraft in its total inventory, with 1,600 of them coded
for combat. By the end of 2016, you will have approximately 1,800 total
fighters with about 1,200 combat coded. Your maintenance experts
estimate an average fighter aircraft availability rate in 2016 of about
64 percent, meaning about 750 of the combat-coded aircraft would be
available to meet mission requirements. You state that today less than
half of your fighter squadrons are fully combat ready. If your combat
readiness rates improves even modestly, some number significantly less
than those would be ready to deploy to a contingency. Given the state
of your fighter force structure, does it make any sense at all to
reduce your limited capacity even further by retiring the A-10 fleet
while still involved in a fight against the Islamic State for an
undefined period, and still conducting combat operations in Afghanistan
during 2016?
General Welsh. The decision to retire the A-10 was the least
impactful of a menu of very bad options required to stay below Air
Force budget and manpower limits as a result of the Budget Control Act.
These very limitations have since driven further tough decisions on Air
Force capacity and full spectrum readiness. We have sufficient multi-
mission capable platforms available to meet Combatant Commander
requirements in Afghanistan and operations against ISIL. However, we
will not be able to build full-spectrum readiness at the current
deployment tempo. The President's Budget Request (PBR) provides enough
funding to marginally execute the Defense Strategic Guidance. In the
PBR, we prioritized readiness accounts and retaining capacity in the
Combatant Commanders' highest priority requirements; Intelligence,
Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Command and Control.
To answer in a more general way, I don't believe it makes any sense
to cut military spending by a trillion dollars with the state of the
world today, but Congress already made that decision. As long as that
decision stands, we will be forced to recommend very difficult choices
that will clearly reduce our capacity to conduct operations in many
mission areas.

2. Senator McCain. General Welsh, won't taking an additional five
A-10 combat squadrons out of your inventory in fiscal year 2016
exacerbate your readiness problems, causing the remaining squadrons to
deploy more often, and reducing readiness levels even further for the
combat air forces?
General Welsh. We agree that any reduction in overall fighter
capacity, without an equal reduction in deployment requirements, will
have a further detrimental effect on overall fighter full-spectrum
readiness. The department is undergoing a comprehensive review of how
the Air Force allocates and assigns forces in order to better manage
readiness and deployment tempo. The decision to retire the A-10 was the
least impactful of a menu of very bad options required to stay below
Air Force budget and manpower limits as a result of the Budget Control
Act, which impacts our readiness recovery efforts well beyond the A-10.

3. Senator McCain. General Welsh, you stated the inventory of Air
Force combat squadrons today is less than one-third of the level it was
during Operation Desert Storm, and less than half of those remaining
squadrons are fully combat ready. If you were asked to conduct an air
campaign today of the same magnitude as Operation Desert Storm, could
you do it?
General Welsh. Yes, but at much greater risk to the aircrews
involved and the forces they support, because some individuals/units
would be forced to deploy at lower the optimal levels of readiness.
Maintaining a heavy campaign, tempo over time would also be more
difficult and units that begin the fight will have to finish it. There
will be no rotational units.
The Air Force assets that enable major combat operations (Airlift,
ISR, C2) would have to be pulled from other operations around the world
to support the air campaign, dramatically impacting those operations.

4. Senator McCain. General Welsh, more broadly, can you fully
execute the requirements of the current defense strategy as it is
written today?
General Welsh. The Air Force is able to execute the requirements of
the current defense strategy, but only at significant risk--a situation
that will be exacerbated under another round of sequestration. An
increasingly constrained fiscal environment has resulted in the
smallest and oldest Air Force in history; this in turn means we may not
get to the fight on time, it will take longer to win, and could cost
more national blood and treasure in the end.

russian rocket engines
5. Senator McCain. Secretary James, the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2015 included provisions which
prohibited the use of Russian rocket engines past the current Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) block buy, and directed the Air Force
to develop a new U.S. engine by 2019. To illustrate the urgency for
ending our reliance on Russian rocket engines, the Senate Armed
Services Committee provided $220 million to expedite that effort. Is
the Air Force committed to eliminating our reliance on Russian rocket
engines?
Ms. James. Yes, the Air Force is committed to eliminating our
reliance on Russian rocket engines. Our long-term strategy for space
launch will assure our continued access to space. Toward this end, even
before the NDAA was enacted, the Air Force published a Request for
Information (RFI) to solicit industry input on the best approach to
transition off the RD-180. Since the NDAA was enacted, the Air Force
initiated three efforts aimed at near-term risk reduction for engine
development. These activities include the following:
1) Aerospace has completed 14 of 25 studies to understand business
cases and assess likely solutions.
2) Large-scale rocket engine combustion tests with NASA and AFRL,
to include engine test stand modifications, and NASA thrust chamber
through Interim Design Review (Critical Design Review in August). To
date, AFRL has completed five sub-scale pre-burner tests under this
effort.
3) The Air Force created a detailed, 2-year combustion stability
tools test program with AFRL and NASA--both AFRL and NASA activities
have started. The AF has initiated a contract with Georgia Tech to
develop these combustion stability tools for industry use to combat the
toughest challenges associated with large-scale Oxygen Rich Stage
Combustion engines.
The Request for Proposals (RFP) for a domestic rocket propulsion
system was released 2 Jun 15. Proposals were received on 23 Jun 15. The
source selection is ongoing for a 8$150 million effort expected to be
awarded this year, investing in multiple providers to deliver rocket
propulsion systems virtual or physical prototypes. In addition, we have
received proposals from our Broad Area Announcement to be awarded this
fall for technical maturation efforts worth up to $34 million to
advance the necessary engine technologies to be leveraged by engine
providers.

6. Senator McCain. Secretary James, if this is such a high
priority, why hasn't the Air Force moved forward with a heightened
level of urgency, or accelerated ongoing rocket engine research and
development efforts that could shorten the overall time needed to
produce a domestic engine?
Ms. James. The Air Force continues to invest in rocket propulsion
systems and associated technologies. Toward this end, even before the
NDAA was enacted, the Air Force published an Request for Information
(RFI) to solicit industry input on the best approach to transition off
the RD-180. Since the NDAA was enacted, the Air Force has initiated
three efforts aimed at near-term risk reduction for engine development.
These activities include the following:
1) Aerospace has completed 14 of 25 studies to understand business
cases and assess likely solutions.
2) Large-scale rocket engine combustion tests with NASA and AFRL,
to include engine test stand modifications, and NASA thrust chamber
through Interim Design Review (Critical Design Review in August). To
date, AFRL has completed three sub-scale pre-burner tests under this
effort.
3) The Air Force created detailed, 2-year combustion stability
tools test program with AFRL and NASA--both AFRL and NASA activities
have started. The Air Force is initiating contracts with academia to
develop these combustion stability tools for industry use to combat the
toughest challenges associated with large-scale Oxygen Rich Stage
Combustion engines.
The Air Force has released a draft Broad Area Announcement worth
8$34 million to be awarded later this summer or fall for technical
maturation efforts to advance the necessary engine technologies to be
leveraged by engine providers. In addition, we currently have a draft
Request for Proposal (RFP) released for a 8$150 million effort expected
to be awarded this year, investing in multiple providers to deliver
rocket propulsion systems virtual or physical prototypes. This complex
RFP, implements a public-private partnership approach to invest in
these rocket propulsion systems and is being released approximately 3
months after the appropriation (which is very fast for a contracting
action of this magnitude).

7. Senator McCain. Secretary James, if for a period of time after
2019 the Russian RD-180 is not available, will you still have options
from both SpaceX and United Launch Alliance to get you to space?
Ms. James. Without the RD-180, we will continue to have options for
assured access to space as long as the United Launch Alliance (ULA)
Delta IV family of launch vehicles is available and the Space X Falcon
Heavy is certified by 2020. However, ULA has announced their intent to
terminate the Delta IV launch vehicle production line because it is not
cost competitive. Without the Atlas V, we will not have a competitive
space launch market until ULA's Vulcan or another option becomes
available several years later. This would exchange one sole source
situation for another.

f-35a
8. Senator McCain. Secretary James, you have repeatedly stated the
F-35A is one of the Air Force's top three acquisition priorities. The
F-35 program suffered setbacks and was rebaselined after experiencing a
breach of the Nunn-McCurdy Act in 2012, delaying the Air Force's
declaration date for initial operational capability until 2016. Your
budget proposes to increase procurement from 28 F-35As in 2015 to 44 in
2016. Are you comfortable with the added risk to cost growth and
schedule delays by increasing procurement quantities while testing is
still ongoing?
Ms. James. The F-35 program is indeed one of the Air Force's top
three acquisition priorities and is on the right track to reach Initial
Operational Capability (IOC) in 2016. The price of F-35 aircraft lots
continues to decline steadily. The price of a single F-35A from Lot 7
was 4.3 percent less than an F-35A from Lot 6, and an F-35A from Lot 8
was 3.6 percent less than an F-35A from Lot 7 (including the engine and
profit). I expect these reductions to continue into the future,
especially as we continue to increase production quantities. In 2014,
Lockheed Martin met production goals, completing all planned
deliveries. Today, the production line is running approximately 2
months behind schedule, but delivery timelines are improving and the
current delays do not pose any long-term schedule or delivery risk to
the program. With the increase in procurement quantities, I do not
foresee added schedule risk going forward.

9. Senator McCain. Secretary James, what are your views on how
declining budgets and sequestration have affected the F-35A program to
date with regard to procurement quantities and schedule?
Ms. James. To date, sequestration has required the Air Force to
defer fiscal year 2015 procurement of two F-35A aircraft to outside the
FYDP. Sequestration of the fiscal year 2016 budget to BCA-imposed
levels would cause the Air Force to defer fiscal year 2016 procurement
of 14 x F-35A aircraft to outside the FYDP. Budgetary constraints and
sequestration have driven us to reprioritize efforts within the Air
Force to maintain stability in the F-35 program, and while aircraft
prices continue to drop by lot, the price reductions will not be as
great when we are required to cut procurement numbers due to these
constraints. The budgetary constraints have had little direct impact on
delivery of individual aircraft but could impact the Air Force's
ability to reach Full Operational Capability (FOC) in 2021 if
procurement deferrals continue.

space launch
10. Senator McCain. Secretary James, I was pleased to see the Air
Force reversed its short-sighted decision to reduce the number of
competitive opportunities from the budget last year. It is my
understanding that the Air Force believes that it will finally be able
to introduce competition for space launch and certify SpaceX later this
spring. What issues, if any, remain for this certification to take
place?
Ms. James. No issues remain that preclude certification. The open
issues all have resolution plans. Lt Gen Greaves, the Space and Missile
Systems Center commander, and the certifying authority, has briefed the
congressional defense and intelligence committee staffs on those plans
and the details of the remaining issues. The Air Force and Space X
teams worked well together to achieve enough progress on those plans to
allow certification. The commander of the Air Force Space and Missile
Systems Center certified Space X's Falcon 9 v1.1 system on 26 May 2015.

11. Senator McCain. Secretary James, are you committed to ensuring
that certification would occur prior to awarding any launches set aside
as competitive opportunities?
Ms. James. Yes. The commander of the Air Force Space and Missile
Systems Center certified Space X's Falcon 9 v1.1 system on 26 May 2015,
prior to any planned competitive award. The next RFP is planned to be
released this summer, with anticipated award in December 2015.

air force modernization
12. Senator McCain. Secretary James, the Air Force is facing many
large procurement programs over the next decade: the F-35A, the KC-46A,
the Long Range Strike Bomber, the T-X trainer replacement, the
Presidential Aircraft Replacement, to name just a top few that
represent hundreds of billions of dollars required to recapitalize and
modernize the force. While Congress only looks at one budget year at a
time, and the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Services formulate a
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) covering 5 years of projected
funding, what is the Air Force approach to fitting all these required
capabilities into its future budgets, and still deliver the
capabilities the Nation expects from its Air Force?
Ms. James. The Air Force is aggressively pursuing a path to
emphasize strategy-driven resourcing. The Air Force has developed a new
strategic planning and programming process that starts with a 30-year
strategic vision, which guides a 20-year resource-informed Strategic
Master Plan and Resource Allocation Plan, leading to a 10-year balanced
budget. There is recognition throughout these strategic documents that
in order to obtain the capabilities to provide what the Nation expects
from its Air Force, we must chart a different course. The path we are
pursuing delivers agility and adaptability in our weapon systems as
well as our processes.

air force munitions acquisition
13. Senator McCain. Secretary James, have you identified munitions
programs that would benefit from cost reduction initiatives, such as
multi-year procurement contracts and block buys, and if so, what are
they and what steps are being taken to implement them?
Ms. James. There are currently no Air Force weapons programs on
multi-year procurement contracts or block buys, but a number of cost-
reducing initiatives are in place (pricing bands, bundling and
competition) that are paying dividends. Multi-year contracts have
traditionally not been viewed as a realistic option. Weapons
procurements have historically faced a number of challenges to include
test issues/delays during development, buy-in on joint procurement
profiles, and commitment from Foreign Military Sales (FMS) partners.
However, the Miniature Air Launched Decoy-Jammer (MALD-J) is one
program that could easily benefit from a multi-year contract as the Air
Force is currently the only customer. We could certainly look at other
candidates such as the Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile
(AMRAAM), Hellfire missile, Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), and
Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM), as long as we receive
support for multi-year contracts from Congress, our joint partners, and
the Department of Defense.

national commission on the structure of the air force recommendations
response
14. Senator McCain. Secretary James, you stated in your National
Commission on the Structure of the Air Force (NCSAF) recommendation
response that you disagree with the recommendation to disestablish the
Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC). Can you provide your views regarding
this disagreement?
Ms. James. We remain committed to seeking efficiencies as we
explore the future of the Total Force. However, this recommendation
represents a departure from our current position on the Air Force
organizational construct. This recommendation would weaken the Chief of
Air Force Reserve's ability to execute key statutory obligations in the
management of congressionally authorized and appropriated resources.

15. Senator McCain. Secretary James, if AFRC were not
disestablished, does there still need to be what appears as redundant
staffs between AFRC headquarters and the staff for the Chief of the Air
Force Reserve in the Pentagon?
Ms. James. The elimination of the AFRC would not achieve either
substantial savings or organizational efficiencies, as nine different
Major Commands would have to assume the roles and responsibilities
currently accomplished by HQ AFRC. This would increase costs and lead
to a less efficient Total Force organizational structure.
While the Chief of the Air Force Reserve serves as the Commander of
HQ AFRC, the position also serves as the principal advisor on reserve
matters to the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the
Air Force. The ability to be involved in the Air Force Corporate
process is instrumental in determining the right answer in the shortest
amount of time. As the Air Force strives to increase its inclusiveness
among the Components and all external stakeholders, we believe personal
interaction among the Component Chiefs and Directors is vitally
important.

16. Senator McCain. Secretary James, do other major commands
maintain staffs at both their own headquarters and at the Air Staff?
Ms. James. Most Air Force Major Commands maintain liaison offices
at the Pentagon to support many corporate processes. The Air National
Guard, like HQ AFRC, maintains a headquarters staff. The function of
that headquarters is to provide resources, policy oversight, guidance
and support to ensure reserve component wings and all Geographically
Separated Units are trained and equipped across the full spectrum of
operations (homeland and global). The Air National Guard Readiness
Center (ANGRC) works in conjunction with the Air National Guard staff
to serve as a channel of communication among the 54 states, territories
and the District of Columbia. The offices of the Director Air National
Guard and Chief of the Air Force Reserve, both collocated at the
Pentagon, additionally serve as the principal advisors on reserve
matters to the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the
Air Force.
The ability to be involved in the Air Force Corporate process is
instrumental in determining the right answer in the shortest amount of
time. As the Air Force strives to increase its inclusiveness among the
Components and all external stakeholders, we believe personal
interaction among the Component Chiefs and Directors is vitally
important.

17. Senator McCain. General Welsh, in your February 2015 response
on the NCSAF report recommendations, where the Commission recommended
exploring a shift toward a 58 percent Active component/42 percent
Reserve component force mix ratio, you state your analysis shows an Air
Force aggregate of 64 percent/36 percent Active to Reserve component
ratio as more appropriate. Is the 80 percent level of review of Air
Force mission areas completed as you promised then-Chairman Levin last
year?
General Welsh. The Report on the Appropriate Contributions of the
Total Force (High Velocity Analysis Report) is required by section 135
of the fiscal year 2015 National Defense Authorization Act. Section 135
requires analysis and recommendations for not less than 80 percent of
the mission and aircraft platforms including a separate presentation of
mix of forces for each. The Air Force delivered the report to Congress
on 12 Jun 2015.

18. Senator McCain. General Welsh, many of the Air Force's
responses to the NCSAF recommendations reference results of high
velocity analyses that are not delineated in your response report; when
will you share the detailed results of your analysis with the
committee?
General Welsh. The Report on the Appropriate Contributions of the
Total Force (High Velocity Analysis Report) is required by section 135
of the fiscal year 2015 National Defense Authorization Act. Section 135
requires analysis and recommendations for not less than 80 percent of
the mission and aircraft platforms including a separate presentation of
mix of forces for each. The Air Force delivered the report to Congress
on 12 Jun 2015.
We are in the process of briefing your staff on the details and
would be happy to discuss them with you at your convenience.

19. Senator McCain. General Welsh, in your response to the NCSAF
recommendation on full-time and part-time mix, it appears there is some
disagreement from the Director, Air National Guard, and Chief, Air
Force Reserve on the value of the High Velocity Analyses with regard to
assumptions and methodology. What are your views on this apparent
disagreement?
General Welsh. The Air Force created the High Velocity Analysis
(HVA) tool to rapidly identify and evaluate force mix options. HVAs are
not used in isolation; their primary purpose is to provide
recommendations on the most viable candidates for further study by Air
Force leadership. HVAs trigger even more deliberate and detailed
development and evaluation of assumptions and analysis, ultimately
yielding refined recommendations for alternative future force structure
proposals.
The Director of the Air National Guard and the Chief of the Air
Force Reserve are closely involved in HVAs and are key stakeholders
whose views are fully incorporated into all stages this transparent
process. We continue to mature and refine the HVA process in
consideration of stakeholder views, and regularly adopt changes to
ensure the validity of the process output.

air force readiness
20. Senator McCain. General Welsh, Vladimir Putin's activities in
the Crimea vividly remind us that the Nation may face the possibility
of conflict with a more advanced military. Is Air Force readiness and
capacity sufficient to prosecute a fight against such a high-end
threat?
General Welsh. Yes, but at much greater risk to the aircrews
involved and the forces they support, because some individuals/units
would be forced to deploy at lower the optimal levels of readiness.
Maintaining a heavy campaign, tempo over time would also be more
difficult and units that begin the fight will have to finish it. There
will be no rotational units.
The Air Force assets that enable major combat operations (Airlift,
ISR, C2) would have to be pulled from other operations around the world
to support the air campaign, dramatically impacting those operations.

21. Senator McCain. General Welsh, does the Air Force have
sufficient inventory and procurement plans for air-to-air and air-to-
ground munitions necessary to meet combatant commander objectives, and
if not, what actions are you taking to address the shortfalls?
General Welsh. No, after three years of Budget Control Act
constraints, and over a decade of sustained contingency operations, the
Air Force is thousands of weapons short of Defense Strategic Guidance
requirements. The Air Force simply has not been resourced to achieve
required munitions inventory levels. To address these shortfalls, the
fiscal year 2016 President's budget achieves maximum annual production
capability for JASSM-ER and improves Hellfire, JDAM, SDB, AIM-9 and
AIM-120 procurement rates. However, higher expenditure rates, coupled
with limited industrial base capacity and diminishing manufacturing
sources, means it will take years, or even a decade, to achieve
required levels.
Note also that Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding
procedures further limit our capacity to reduce shortfalls. Allowing
only one-for-one replacement after munition expenditure results in a
time lag between budget authorization and munition delivery. This
drives a nearly four-year gap between munition expenditure and
replacement.
At Budget Control Act levels, all weapons procurement quantities
are reduced. Munitions (rockets, general purpose bombs, flares and
fuzes) are similarly reduced. OCO cannot be used to fund forecasted
weapons requirements. Some relief to these restrictions while our
operations continue in Iraq/Syria, would be very helpful.

a-10 backup active inventory
22. Senator McCain. General Welsh, the NDAA for fiscal year 2015
allowed you to place up to 36 A-10 aircraft into backup aircraft
inventory (BAI) status to free up maintenance personnel to start the
transition to the F-35. I understand you have opted to do this with 18
A-10s from three different bases. I also understand that aircraft in
backup status must still fly to avoid 21-day hanger queen status,
requiring periodic maintenance and other repairs as required. Doesn't
executing this plan place greater stress on the remaining maintenance
crews, who must still maintain these back up aircraft, perform crew
chief maintenance, etc.?
General Welsh. We have placed 18 x A-10s from three different bases
into BAI status, and we will still maintain these aircraft in mission
capable status in accordance with the weapons system's technical
requirements. Doing this will cause some scheduled maintenance actions
but we believe these actions will be manageable because the unit's
flying hours will be adjusted to support the fighter squadrons' new
Primary Assigned Aircraft inventory. Headquarters Air Combat Command
and unit commanders will manage the aircraft and flying hours to ensure
adequacy of training for aircrew is met without overburdening our
maintainers.
This extra work is driven by the fact that we don't have enough
experience maintenance personnel in the Air Force to bring the F-35 on
board and continue to operate every other fighter units we have today.

23. Senator McCain. General Welsh, will placing A-10s into backup
active inventory status result in longer duty days or work weeks for
your remaining maintenance professionals who must still maintain these
aircraft?
General Welsh. No. Placing A-10s into Backup Aircraft Inventory
(BAI) will cause some scheduled maintenance actions but we believe
these actions will be manageable because the unit's flying hours will
be adjusted to support the fighter squadrons' new Primary Assigned
Aircraft inventory. Headquarters Air Combat Command and unit commanders
will manage the aircraft and flying hours to ensure adequacy of
training for aircrew is met without overburdening our maintainers.

24. Senator McCain. General Welsh, will the reduced number of
funded A-10 aircraft impact these fighter squadrons' ability to deploy
to combat?
General Welsh. No, combat coded A-10 squadrons at Davis Monthan
AFB, AZ, and Moody AFB, GA, will continue to be able to deploy a 12
aircraft package.

ec-130h divestment
25. Senator McCain. General Welsh, the Air Force's fiscal year 2015
budget proposed retiring nearly half of your EC-130H COMPASS CALL fleet
of electronic warfare aircraft in fiscal year 2016. DOD formally
referred to this capability as Low Density/High Demand; wouldn't
retiring half of this fleet drop the density to dangerously low levels?
General Welsh. Our interest is to use the savings from the
divestiture of part of the fleet to begin recapitalization of the EC-
130 mission capability on a new platform. The remaining aircraft can
fulfill current levels of tasking.
We need this capability in any future large-scale conflict, but the
EC-130 is no longer a survivable platform in that environment. We
believe this is the best time to accept the risk of a temporarily
reduced fleet size.

26. Senator McCain. General Welsh, can you meet all combatant
commander demand and operations plan requirements with a fleet of eight
EC-130H aircraft?
General Welsh. The Air Force will maintain essential capabilities
to support current combat operations, but will not be able to meet the
capacity requirements of other combatant commander operations plans
once the fleet size drops to eight aircraft in fiscal year 2016,
accepting risk until a replacement for those capabilities is fielded.
Our interest is to use the savings from the divestiture of part of
the fleet to begin recapitalization of the EC-130 mission capability on
a new platform. The remaining aircraft can fulfill current levels of
tasking. We need this capability in any future large-scale conflict,
but the EC-130 is no longer a survivable platform in that environment.
We believe this is the best time to accept the risk of a temporarily
reduced fleet size.

27. Senator McCain. General Welsh, what is the Air Force's plan for
mitigating the loss of these seven aircraft, and what is the long-term
plan for replacing the EC-130H capability?
General Welsh. We have a three-phased plan. In the near-term, 7 x
EC-130H aircraft will be divested in fiscal year 2016, leaving 8 x EC-
130Hs in the Air Force until the capability is replaced. The reduced
number of aircraft will meet the requirements of the current fight and
U.S. Special Operations Command. For the mid-term, 2020 to 2030 or as
needed, we are evaluating options including re-hosting jamming systems
on a more effective and efficient platform to bridge the gap to the
far-term. For the long-term (2031-plus timeframe), we envision a system
of systems approach, to be determined based on results of an Analysis
of Alternatives (report due out in 2017).
______

Questions Submitted Senator James M. Inhofe
sequestration and readiness of the force
28. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh, Secretary James, General
Odierno, and General Welsh, Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter
testified to this committee a couple of weeks ago that ``readiness
remains at troubling levels across the force'' and ``that even with the
fiscal year 2016 budget, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps won't reach
their readiness goals until 2020 and the Air Force until 2023.''
General Dempsey testified that the fiscal year 2016 President's
budget is ``what we need to remain at the lower ragged edge of
manageable risk in our ability to execute the defense strategy'' and
that ``we have no slack, no margin left for error or strategic
surprise.''
Do you agree with Secretary Carter's and General Dempsey's
statements?
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. The Army agrees with the statements
of the Secretary of the Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
The unrelenting budget impasse has compelled us to degrade our
readiness to historically low levels. Today, only 33 percent of our
brigades are ready when our sustained readiness rate should be
somewhere around 70 percent. Under our current budget, Army readiness
will at best flatline over the next three to four years.
For the Army, the President's Budget represents the bare minimum
needed for us to carry out our missions and execute and meet the
requirements of our defense strategy. The compromises we have made to
modernization and readiness combined with reductions to our force size
and capabilities translates directly into strategic risk. Today, we are
generating just enough readiness to meet our day-to-day needs of
immediate consumption. We are unable to generate any residual readiness
to respond to an unknown contingency or to even reinforce ongoing
operations.
Ms. James and General Welsh. Yes.

29. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh, Secretary James, General
Odierno, and General Welsh, if sequestration is not repealed, even
partially, can you give us some context in terms of risks to readiness
of personnel, equipment, training, etc. and how that ragged edge
impacts you?
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. The compromises we have made to
modernization and readiness, combined with reductions to our force size
and capabilities, translates directly into strategic risk. Today, we
are generating just enough readiness to meet our day to day needs for
immediate consumption. Only 33 percent of our brigades are ready, when
our sustained readiness rate should be closer to 70 percent. We are
unable to generate any residual readiness to respond to unknown
contingencies or to even reinforce ongoing operations. This is a
dangerous balancing act. We have fewer Soldiers, the majority of whom
are in units that are not ready; and they are manning aging equipment
at a time when demand for Army forces is higher than we originally
anticipated.
Sequestration would compel us to reduce end strength even further,
forcing out another 70K from the Active Component, 35K from the
National Guard, and 10K from the Army Reserves. It would be necessary
to cut another 10-12 additional combat brigades. Modernization would be
slashed further, home station training would go unfunded, and readiness
rates would degrade further.
Anything below the President's budget compromises our strategic
flexibility. It will challenge us to meet even our current level of
commitments to our allies and partners around the world. It will
eliminate our capability, on any scale, to conduct simultaneous
operations, specifically deterring in one region while defeating in
another. Essentially, for ground forces, sequestration even puts into
question our ability to conduct even one prolonged multiphase, combined
arms, campaign against a determined enemy. We would significantly
degrade our capability to shape the security environment in multiple
regions simultaneously. It puts into question our ability to deter and
compel multiple adversaries simultaneously. Ultimately, sequestration
limits strategic flexibility and requires us to hope we are able to
predict the future with great accuracy. Something we have never been
able to do.
The impacts of continued sequestration will endure for at least a
decade. It is going to be the next Chief and the Chiefs after that who
must respond to the long term and hidden impacts of sequestration.
Readiness is not something that we can just fund piecemeal--once in a
while and year to year. It has to be funded consistently over time. If
not, it is fleeting, and it goes away. As we approach 2016, we can't
take end strength out any faster without impacting our ability to
conduct operations already committed. The Army will only be able to
meet priority Global Force Management missions, and must rely on OCO
funding to maintain any additional readiness for emergent needs. Under
sequestration, sustainment readiness remains extremely reliant on OCO
funding to mitigate risk to the program. In fiscal year 2013, the Army
deferred $323.3M in Depot Maintenance and was only recently funded
through the Army's fiscal year 2015 OCO submission. The Army must also
accept additional risk by deferring the emplacement of the Southwest
Asia Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) Fires and Sustainment brigades, an
important element of the Army's revised APS strategy, for two years.
The rolling sequestration impacts on readiness thus handcuff our
strategic flexibility.
Ms. James and General Welsh. Budget Control Act level funding will
further reduce the capacity and greatly extend the time required for
full-spectrum readiness recovery of the Air Force. Under the Budget
Control Act funding levels, the Air Force is planning to retire its
entire KC-10 fleet, retire the RQ-4 Global Hawk block 40 fleet, retire
the U-2, and divest 7 x AWACs aircraft. Additionally, we would reduce
the number of MQ-9 CAPs to 50. Investment in people, training
resources, and weapons system sustainment would be reduced or delayed.
Budget Control Act level funding, combined with current deployment
demands, would perpetuate a continued decrease in full-spectrum
readiness to historically low levels.

30. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh, Secretary James, General
Odierno, and General Welsh, we anticipate that Congress will pass a
budget resolution that funds defense at sequestration levels with
additional funding through Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO).
Assuming sequestration remains the law, do you have to take any actions
in fiscal year 2015 in your force structure to prepare for
sequestration in fiscal year 2016, and if so, when do those decisions
need to be made?
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. The Army is preparing to drawdown
to 980K (450K AC, 335K ARNG, and 195K USAR). But if sequestration
returns, the consequences for our Army will be dramatic. Another round
of cuts will render our force unable to meet all elements of the
Defense Strategic Guidance without creating additional risk to our
Soldiers. Total Army end strength will fall an additional 60K to 920K
(420K AC; 315K ARNG; 185K USAR). Reductions in end strength brought on
by sequestration will limit our ability to provide strategic options to
the President and pose unacceptable risk by placing into question our
capacity to execute even one prolonged, multi-phased major contingency
operation.
Readiness is not something that we can just fund piecemeal--once in
a while and year to year. It has to be funded consistently over time.
If not, it is fleeting, and it goes away.
We will be forced to further reduce modernization and readiness
levels over the next 5 years because we simply can't drawdown end
strength any quicker to generate the required savings. The compromises
we have made to readiness and modernization combined with reductions to
our force size and capabilities translates directly into strategic
risk. Today, we are generating just enough readiness to meet our day-
to-day needs of immediate consumption. We are unable to generate any
residual readiness to respond to an unknown contingency or to even
reinforce ongoing operations.
These are not cuts we want to make but rather cuts we are compelled
to make.
Ms. James and General Welsh. No force structure actions will be
taken in fiscal year 2015 to prepare for a possible sequestration in
fiscal year 2016. Should we face another sequestration, the Air Force
will begin taking action in fiscal year 2016.

readiness and meeting combatant command requirements
31. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, you testified before the
Subcommittee on Defense of the Senate Appropriations Committee that
``the overall combat capability of our combat coded squadrons in the
Air Force is still below 50 percent, so fewer than 50 percent of them
are fully combat capable.''
General Odierno, you previously stated that ``Current funding
levels afforded just over a third of our Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) the
training necessary to conduct decisive action. This year, we face
significant challenges to sustain even that level of readiness in our
dynamic operating environment.''
General Odierno and General Welsh, if those forces are not ready,
what is the impact on executing combatant commander operational plans?
General Odierno. The number one thing that keeps me up at night is
that if we are asked to respond to an unknown contingency, I will send
Soldiers to that contingency not properly trained and ready. We simply
cannot afford to do that. The American people expect our Soldiers to be
prepared--that they have had the ability to train, that they understand
their equipment, and that they have been able to integrate and
synchronize their activities so they are successful on the ground. I
worry that we may receive a request from a combatant commander that we
just aren't trained for.
Today, only 33 percent of our brigades are ready, when our
sustained readiness rate should be closer to 70 percent. We are taking
a small portion of the Army and are giving them the money to train to
the highest level, while the rest of the Army is training at a
significantly lower level. This really concerns me.
Under our current budget, Army readiness will, at best, flat-line
over the next three to four years. We are generating just enough
readiness to meet our day to day needs for immediate consumption. We
are unable to generate any residual readiness to respond to unknown
contingencies or to even reinforce ongoing operations.
The President's fiscal year 2016 Budget represents the bare minimum
needed for us to carry out our missions and execute and meet the
requirements of our defense strategy. Anything below the President's
budget compromises our strategic flexibility. It will challenge us to
meet even our current level of commitments to our allies and partners
around the world. It will eliminate our capability, on any scale, to
conduct simultaneous operations, specifically deterring in one region
while defeating in another. Essentially, for ground forces,
sequestration even puts into question our ability to conduct even one
prolonged multiphase, combined arms, campaign against a determined
enemy. We would significantly degrade our capability to shape the
security environment in multiple regions simultaneously. It puts into
question our ability to deter and compel multiple adversaries
simultaneously. Ultimately, sequestration limits strategic flexibility
and requires us to hope we are able to predict the future with great
accuracy. Something we have never been able to do.
General Welsh. In a time of dire need, our nation's Airmen have,
and always will, answer the call to arms. However, in our current
readiness crisis, we would be forced to respond to an OPLAN level
contingency with forces that are not full-spectrum ready. That means we
would not be able to leverage the full capability of our newest (and
legacy) weapon systems due to lack of training, familiarity, or
sustainment thus giving up the technological edge that we paid for and
expect from our Air Force.
We would also be accepting the much more important risk of sending
men and women into battle who are not as ready as they should be. They
are the ones who will pay the bill of increased risk.

32. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno and General Welsh, if a major
or even minor contingency operation were executed today given your
current state of readiness and current global commitments, is it
possible the Air Force would have to send forces into combat that are
not fully trained and ready?
General Odierno. The number one thing that keeps me up at night is
that if we are asked to respond to an unknown contingency, I will send
Soldiers to that contingency not properly trained and ready. We simply
are not used to doing that. The American people expect our Soldiers to
be prepared--that they have had the ability to train, that they
understand their equipment, and that they have been able to integrate
and synchronize their activities so they are successful on the ground.
I worry that we may receive a request from a combatant commander that
we just aren't trained for.
Today, only 33 percent of our brigades are ready, when our
sustained readiness rate should be closer to 70 percent. We are taking
a small portion of the Army and are giving them the money to train to
the highest level, while the rest of the Army is training at a
significantly lower level. This really concerns me.
Under our current budget, Army readiness will, at best, flat-line
over the next three to four years. We are generating just enough
readiness to meet our day to day needs for immediate consumption. We
are unable to generate any residual readiness to respond to unknown
contingencies or to even reinforce ongoing operations. Our Soldiers
trust that we will provide them the right resources--the training and
equipment--to properly prepare them and lead them into harm's way. It
is our shared responsibility, to provide our Soldiers and our Army with
the necessary resources to ensure they are trained, prepared, and
equipped to succeed.
General Welsh. We already are using forces that are not full-
spectrum ready. The current readiness crisis requires that we deploy
units that are fully trained and ready for their theater assigned tasks
as dictated by their scheduled deployment, but are not necessarily for
the full spectrum of missions/threats they could potentially face if
re-tasked to a new crisis or contingency.

33. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno and General Welsh, how do lower
readiness levels and a smaller force impact our ability to deter
aggression?
General Odierno. The President's fiscal year 2016 Budget represents
the bare minimum needed for us to carry out our missions and execute
and meet the requirements of our defense strategy. Anything below the
President's budget compromises our strategic flexibility. It will
challenge us to meet even our current level of commitments to our
allies and partners around the world. It will eliminate our capability,
on any scale, to conduct simultaneous operations, specifically
deterring in one region while defeating in another. Essentially, for
ground forces, sequestration even puts into question our ability to
conduct even one prolonged multiphase, combined arms, campaign against
a determined enemy. We would significantly degrade our capability to
shape the security environment in multiple regions simultaneously. It
puts into question our ability to deter and compel multiple adversaries
simultaneously. Ultimately, sequestration limits strategic flexibility
and requires us to hope we are able to predict the future with great
accuracy. Something we have never been able to do.
General Welsh. The sustained high level of deployment requirements
is the singularly largest reason for the steady decline in Air Force
full-spectrum readiness. This readiness decline is exacerbated by the
steady reduction of Air Force capacity; fewer units are available to
fill a constant number of deployments, further reducing time for those
units to train for their full-spectrum mission.
We are still the greatest Air Force in the world, but reduced
capacity and reduced readiness tilts the scale in the wrong direction.
Less capacity means fewer opportunities to deploy forces to Allied or
partner nations for training and exercises. These opportunities promote
trust, interoperability, and show commitment with our allies while
dissuading and deterring potential adversaries. A smaller force also
reduces our ability to rapidly respond to new taskings or expand
ongoing operations.

34. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno and General Welsh, should the
United States be postured to fight two major contingency operations
simultaneously?
General Odierno. Our National Security Strategy requires U.S.
forces to be able to project power globally to defeat and deny
aggression in multiple theaters when deterrence fails. Even when
committed in one region, we need to be capable of denying the
objectives of an aggressor in a second region.
The President's fiscal year 2016 Budget represents the bare minimum
needed for us to carry out our missions and execute and meet the
requirements of our defense strategy. Anything below the President's
budget compromises our strategic flexibility. It will challenge us to
meet even our current level of commitments to our allies and partners
around the world. It will eliminate our capability, on any scale, to
conduct simultaneous operations, specifically deterring in one region
while defeating in another. Essentially, for ground forces,
sequestration even puts into question our ability to conduct even one
prolonged multiphase, combined arms, campaign against a determined
enemy. We would significantly degrade our capability to shape the
security environment in multiple regions simultaneously. It puts into
question our ability to deter and compel multiple adversaries
simultaneously. Ultimately, sequestration limits strategic flexibility
and requires us to hope we are able to predict the future with great
accuracy. Something we have never been able to do.
General Welsh. The requirement to conduct two near-simultaneous
operations still exists and serves as the basis for our force structure
strategy and construct. A key component of our force planning
construct, as described in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, is to
defeat a regional adversary in a large-scale , multi-phased campaign;
while simultaneously denying the objectives of--or imposed unacceptable
costs on--another aggressor in another region. The smaller our force
becomes, the tougher this will be to do.

35. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno and General Welsh, what is the
impact of only being postured to fight one major contingency operation?
General Odierno. The velocity of instability around the world has
increased, and the Army is now operating on multiple continents
simultaneously in ways unforeseen a year ago. In short, our Army is
busy. In my best military judgment, if we posture the Army to only
fight one major contingency operation, we will not meet the
requirements of our defense strategy, and our strategic flexibility
will be compromised. We will be challenged to meet even our current
level of commitments to our allies and partners around the world. It
will eliminate our capability, on any scale, to conduct simultaneous
operations, specifically deterring in one region while defeating in
another. We would significantly degrade our capability to shape the
security environment in multiple regions simultaneously. Essentially,
it puts into question our ability to deter and compel multiple
adversaries simultaneously.
General Welsh. The current defense strategy requires the U.S.
military to engage in two near-simultaneous major contingencies while
maintaining an enhanced protective posture for the homeland. If/when
the President chooses to change the strategy, the Air Force will inform
the Secretary of Defense of the impact and potential risks via the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Additional discussion would require a classified
forum.
air force operations
36. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, how do our flying hours compare
to flying hours of China, Russia, India, and our European allies?
General Welsh. The United States Air Force flies approximately
2,000,000 hours per year, including all training and operational
missions. However, these flying hours vary a great deal depending on
weapon system type, pilot end-strength, and operations tempo. It is
helpful to consider the average annual hours flown per pilot. The table
below provides a breakdown of these averages by weapon system type and
provides the average flying hours per pilot for Russia, China, and our
European allies for comparison.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

* Majority of Flying Hours flown in Theater

37. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, how does reduced flying hours
impact:

a. The training and experience of pilots, flight leads, instructor
pilots and weapons instructors?
b. The training and experience of our maintainers, bomb loaders,
back-shop specialists, and all the support that goes into executing air
operations?
c. Your ability to meet the combatant command (COCOM) wartime
requirements?
d. The potential for safety incidents?
e. The moral, recruiting and retention of our airmen and soldiers?

General Welsh. Flying and training for full spectrum air combat is
difficult, expensive, and time consuming. The Air Force Flying Hour
Program (FHP) drives full spectrum training for nearly our entire Air
Force. A decrease in flying hours reduces flight training opportunities
and limits the experience of our pilot force. In the short-term,
reduced flight hours increases the time it takes to upgrade pilots from
copilot, to aircraft commander, to instructor/evaluator or from
wingman, to flight lead, to instructor, to weapons instructor. In the
mid-term, a pilot that has consistently experienced a reduced FHP will
have a reduced level of experience (or delayed experiencing) as an
instructor, weapons instructor and evaluator than the pilot cadre under
a robust FHP. In the long-term, pilots with a career of reduced flying
hours will become commanders and the future leaders of the Air Force
with considerably less flying experience than their predecessors.
Finally, this limited experience cycles back to the next generation of
new pilots who will have less experienced flight instructors, weapons
instructors, and leadership.
The operational Air Force is only as good as the maintainers needed
to support it; and in the same fashion as our pilot example, Air Force
aircraft maintenance professionals' training is driven by the FHP.
Reduced flying hours increases the time it takes to train and upgrade
maintainers, reduces the experience of our maintenance instructor
cadre, and reduces the experience of a generation of maintenance,
ammunition, and logistics leaders.
The Air Force defines its full spectrum combat/combat support
mission sets directly from COCOM requirements developed through war
planning. The Air Force structures its FHP so that each pilot and
aircrew member can complete the absolute minimum required training to
meet COCOM requirements. Due to a large reduction in Air Force
capacity, the preponderance of our Air Force is required to be full
spectrum ``ready'' at all times in order to meet the aggressive
timelines driven by COCOM war planning requirements (especially for
combat airpower). Reductions in the FHP lead directly to reductions in
full spectrum training opportunities and reductions in readiness.
Currently our Air Force's combat air forces are less than 50 percent
ready; directly impacting our ability to meet National Military
Strategy and COCOM wartime requirements.
Flight safety is critical to protecting priceless Airmen and
irreplaceable aircraft and resources. Reduced training opportunities
and experience have reduced confidence in our ability to safely
practice some of our most challenging skill sets. Bomber crews who once
routinely flew low-level practice missions below 500 feet are now
flying well above that level as the relatively low experience of our
crews requires more caution to reduce the risk of mishaps. Reductions
in overall readiness drive an increase in safety protocols in order to
continue to make appropriate risk management decisions and protect our
Airmen.
One of the most important ``levers'' of Air Force readiness is the
requirement for adequate dwell time at home station. This dwell time is
used to fully train our pilots, maintainers, air traffic controllers,
and all of the other skill sets required to meet our full spectrum
requirements. A marked drop in Air Force capacity combined with a
constant and very high COCOM deployment demand has eroded home station
dwell times to unsustainable levels. Lack of dwell time over the past
14 years has consistently reduced Air Force readiness. Some aircrew
specialties, like combat rescue, have a deploy-to-dwell ratio of less
than 1:1. This type of continued stress hurts morale, and with no end
in sight to very high operational tempo, hurts the ability to retain
Airmen with critical combat roles and skill sets.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
mobile camouflage system
38. Senator Wicker. Secretary McHugh, Secretary James, General
Odierno, and General Welsh, during combat operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq, many allied partner nations had adopted Mobile Camouflage Systems
(MCS) for their combat vehicle platforms--taking advantage not only of
the Mobile Camouflage System multi-spectral signature management sensor
defeat capabilities but also capitalizing on the MCS heat/temperature
reduction capability and significant fuel savings.
Recognizing the potential value and increased capabilities the MCS
enables, please provide the committee with details of your plan to
develop, demonstrate, test, and field MCS for use on U.S. combat
vehicle platforms in the next several years.
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. The Army's current camouflage
system is the Lightweight Camouflage Screening System (LCSS). The LCSS
is a modular system consisting of a hexagon screen, a diamond-shaped
screen, a support system, and a repair kit. The system conceals targets
by: casting patterned shadows that break up the characteristic outlines
of a target; scattering radar returns (except when radar-transparent
nets are used); trapping target heat and allowing it to disperse; and
simulating color and shadow patterns that are commonly found in a
particular region.
The Army is currently validating the requirements document for the
Ultra-light Camouflage Net System (ULCANS) as a replacement to the
legacy Lightweight Camouflage Screening System (LCSS). The ULCANS will
provide signature reduction for combat systems for near infrared (NIR),
radar, electro-optics (EO), visual, and significantly increases thermal
infrared suppression capability. As ULCANS is more snag resistant,
lighter in weight and less voluminous than the Lightweight Camouflage
Screening System (LCSS), it can be erected and removed faster and with
less manpower. This ease of use will encourage greater use of
camouflage, which will improve survivability for friendly personnel and
equipment. The system will be fielded in desert, arctic, woodland and
jungle patterns. The ULCANS Capability Development Document is in Army
staffing.
The Army will continue to review the capability in the Protection
Capability Portfolio Review (CPR) to refine methods for mobile
protection in the camouflage, concealment, and detection strategy.
Ms. James and General Welsh. We defer to the Army for a response as
the mobile camouflage system is an Army program.

signature management camouflage
39. Senator Wicker. Secretary McHugh, Secretary James, General
Odierno, and General Welsh, I am very interested in and concerned about
organic multi-spectral signature management sensor defeat capabilities,
especially given the current Short-Wave Infra-Red (SWIR) threat and the
ease of availability of multi-spectral sensors.
We on the committee are aware that the currently fielded Ultra-
Lightweight Camouflage Net System (ULCANS) does not afford SWIR
protection to our troops, and that camouflage assets specific to arctic
use are obsolete in age and capability. Also of concern is that the
existing ULCANS contract, which facilitates research and development as
well as production, will expire less than 18 months from now.
Recognizing these issues, please update the committee on your
acquisition strategy for acquiring the needed next generation of
signature management camouflage capabilities, including a timeline that
leads to contract award.
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. The next generation ULCANS
capabilities document is currently in staffing at Headquarters
Department of the Army. It contains the Short-wave infrared (SWIR)
requirement to provide protection from emerging threats. To meet the
current global defense posture, the Army will provide limited MTOE
procurement and fielding to support the Global Response Force,
Regionally Aligned Forces and Army Prepositioned Stocks. Other units
will be able to procure the ULCANS using unit funds. The new system
will be developed in desert, arctic, woodland and jungle patterns. Upon
approval of the next generation ULCANS capabilities document, it may
compete for funding beginning in fiscal year 2018.
Ms. James and General Welsh. We defer to the Army for a response as
the mobile camouflage system is an Army program.

40. Senator Wicker. Secretary McHugh, Secretary James, General
Odierno, and General Welsh, given the Short-Wave Infra-Red (SWIR)
threat that our Armed Forces face today, can you detail near-term
fielding plans for a SWIR-defeating signature management camouflage
system for Rapid Reaction Forces, given that Service-wide fielding may
take longer?
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. The Army is currently validating
the capabilities document for the next generation Ultra-Light
Camouflage Net System (ULCANS) designed to incorporate recent
technological advances. The next generation ULCANS will provide
improved protection from visual detection of Short-wave Infrared
(SWIR). To meet the current global defense posture, the Army will
provide limited MTOE procurement and fielding to support the Global
Response Force, Regionally Aligned Forces and Army Prepositioned
Stocks. Other units will be able to procure the ULCANS utilizing unit
funds.
Ms. James and General Welsh. We defer to the Army for a response as
the Short-Wave Infra-Red system is an Army program.

______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
kc-46a
41. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, do things remain on track for
delivery of the KC-46A to Pease Air National Guard Base in fiscal year
2018?
General Welsh. Pease Air National Guard Base is on track to accept
its first KC-46A in fiscal year 2018 as planned. All MILCON projects at
Pease Air National Guard Base are on track and there are no foreseeable
delays expected.

a-10
42. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, on March 17, 2015 in your House
Armed Services Committee testimony you said that ``there are
circumstances where you would prefer to have an A-10.'' Can you
describe those circumstances?
General Welsh. While there may be instances where I might prefer
any one of our current platforms, the changing complexion of the modern
battlefield coupled with an increasingly constrained fiscal environment
have left the Air Force without the necessary resources to retain a
single-role platform like the A-10.
Divesting the A-10 maximizes current and future Air Force combat
capability within the current fiscal environment. Divestiture of the A-
10 fleet is supported by analysis aimed at minimizing operational risk
today and tomorrow, preserving other legacy platforms and associated
modernization programs. Our decision to divest the fleet addresses the
budgetary pressure brought on by the Budget Control Act and
Sequestration.

43. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, please provide the Air Force's
plan for providing close air support (CAS) in situations involving
weather lower than 3,000 feet, Global Positioning System (GPS) jamming,
armor, and danger close inside of 100 meters that will ensure that we
will make every attempt to come to the aid of Americans in trouble.
Consider each separately and in combination.
General Welsh. The F-16 maintains a tank killing capability with
the AGM-65 Maverick Air-to-Ground Missile System. Both the F-16 and F-
15E have an internal guns capable of firing Armor Piercing Incendiary
rounds that are effective against armored personnel carriers and have
also been used danger close inside of 100 meters. The MQ-1/9 can employ
the AGM-114 Hellfire Air-to-Ground Missile System which provides heavy
anti-armor kill capability. The first three generations of Hellfire
missiles use a laser seeker; the fourth generation Hellfire uses a
radar frequency seeker.
All USAF multi-mission fighters are capable of providing CAS below
3000 feet. F-16, F-15E, and F-35A will add Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) II
inventory over the next few years. SDB II is a multi-mode weapon that
allows standoff employment (more than 45 miles). The seeker works in
three different modes to provide maximum operational flexibility in
potentially contested and degraded environments: a millimeter wave
radar to detect and track targets through weather, an imaging infrared
for enhanced target discrimination and a semi-active laser that enables
the weapon to track an airborne laser designator or one on the ground.
This powerful, integrated seeker seamlessly shares targeting
information among all three modes, enabling weapons to engage fixed or
moving targets at any time of day and in all-weather conditions.

44. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, before making its decision to
seek the divestment of the A-10, did the Air Force conduct analysis
with the COCOMs, Services, joint terminal attack controllers (JTAC), or
the A-10 community itself to identify the associated risks?
General Welsh. Divestiture is supported by extensive analysis aimed
at minimizing operational risk today and tomorrow, preserving our most
capable existing platforms and essential modernization programs. Air
Combat Command was an active participant in development of the fiscal
year 2015 budget that recommended A-10 divestiture and endorsed this
action for the fiscal year 2016 budget submission. The Combatant
Commands (to include Special Operations Command) and the other Military
Services were briefed on the Air Force's intent to retire the A-10 in
both fiscal year 2015 and fiscal year 2016.
I personally briefed every Combatant Commander on every Air Force
budget decision that impacted them, including the recommendations to
divest the A-10. While they didn't like the fact that the BCA is
forcing this type decision any more that I do, all of them agreed with
the priorities we established is on budget and understood that not
divesting the A-10 to fund higher priorities would have an even greater
impact on their ability to successfully conduct full-spectrum
operations in the future.

45. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, the A-10 was developed based on
a lack of CAS capability during the Vietnam War. High surface to air
threat forced the airplanes to operate at low altitude which
complicated targeting, and was too dangerous due to anti-aircraft fire.
The A-10 was developed out of the necessity to operate at low altitude
and have an airplane that was effective at targeting and survivable
against anti-aircraft fire. The other CAS aircraft mentioned appear to
be more susceptible to anti-aircraft artillery than those used during
Vietnam. What has changed that has led the Air Force to determine that
it no longer needs to possess such a capability?
General Welsh. Our projected funding levels. Under the BCA, we must
adjust our previously planned spending levels by $90B per year. That's
a lot of money. It has, and will continue, to drive very difficult
decisions. This is one of them. Our analysis of the future threat
environment also contributed to our decision to divest the A-10 in this
fiscally constrained time. Vietnam-era and some Cold War surface-to-air
missiles (SAM) were most effective at medium-to-high altitudes allowing
aircraft to fly below SAM radar coverage. Modern, layered, integrated
surface-to-air missile systems are more capable and can no longer be
under-flown. Other aircraft currently conducting the CAS mission are
more survivable and capable of other roles and missions.

46. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, in 2014, what percentage of all
JTAC Training and Certification CAS did the A-10 meet?
General Welsh. Over the last year, the A-10 has supported 70
percent of Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) Qualification
Training (QT) air support. Over the last 5 years, the A-10 has provided
around 45 percent of JTAC QT air support.

47. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, if the A-10 were divested, how
will this requirement be met? Please identify the plan to fulfill this
training shortfall and the associated annual costs.
General Welsh. We will bridge the JTAC Training and Certification
requirement from the A-10 using a mix of CAS capable multi-role
aircraft coupled with Live Virtual Constructive (LVC) operational
training and contract close air support. LVC will allow the JTAC Dome
simulator to connect to our aircraft simulators that enable a realistic
training environment for JTACs and aircrews. We will have fidelity on
the associated annual costs after the award of the Joint Terminal
Control Training and Rehearsal System contract.

48. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, how much would the Air Force
save by completely divesting the F-15C?
General Welsh. Excluding personnel costs, the total F-15C budget is
$5.8B for the 16-20 FYDP. This includes funding for both the active and
reserve components. Divesting the F-15C would also mean we are no
longer capable of providing air superiority over a major theater of
operations in a full-scale conflict. None of our combatant commanders
would support divesting F-15C's versus divesting A-10s.

49. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, discuss the funding for the F-16
Service Life Extension Program (SLEP). How many F-16 aircraft are
funded for SLEP?
General Welsh. Figure 1 highlights the current F-16 Service Life
Extension Program (SLEP) funding/procurement profile. There are 58 SLEP
kits funded within the FY16PB FYDP.

Figure 1: Current FY16PB SLEP funding/procurement profile

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

50. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, what is the cost per aircraft
for SLEP? Provide a schedule of when aircraft will no longer mission
capable with and without SLEP.
General Welsh. The Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) will cost
approximately $2.5M for each aircraft. It is our intent to only SLEP F-
16 Block 40/42/50/52 or ``post-block'' aircraft. We do not plan to SLEP
F-16 Block 25/30/32 or ``pre-block'' aircraft. The three figures below
show both pre-block and post-block aircraft service life predictions
without SLEP, and post-block aircraft service life predictions with
SLEP.
Figure 1: FY16PB Pre-Block (Without SLEP)
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Figure 2: FY16PB Post-Block (Without SLEP)

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Figure 3: FY16PB Post-Block (With SLEP)

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

51. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, did JTACs lead any of the
working groups at the CAS summit?
General Welsh. All working groups were led by Air Force Colonels
(pay grade O-6), which are the highest ranking Airmen involved daily
with JTACs. The JTACs were fully integrated into each working group as
active participants. Additionally, the 93d Air Ground Operations Wing
(AGOW) Commander led our ``Current CAS State of Affairs'' working
group. The 93 AGOW Commander is responsible for the 3d Air Support
Operations Group (ASOG) at Ft. Hood, TX, and the 18 ASOG at Pope Field,
NC--together they provide more than 1,500 air liaison officers, joint
terminal attack controllers, tactical air-control party members, and
battlefield weather airmen to the Army.

52. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, were there any differences in
the message (impacts of A-10 divestment) you received from the closed
door meeting with the Tactical Air Control Party Association and your
CAS summit?
General Welsh. The discussions with the Tactical Air Control Party
Association and at the CAS Summit were productive and there was no
variance in the matters discussed. Again, let me state the decision to
retire the A-10 was the lesser of a series of very bad options required
to stay below Air Force budget and manpower limits. One of the benefits
of the closed door meeting with the TACP Association members was that
they heard, for the first time, the full impact of the BCA on Air Force
programs in every mission area. By the end of the discussion they
expressed a greater appreciation for the difficult choices that must be
made if the BCA remains the law of the land.

53. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, what CAS requirements did the
Army and Marine Corps provide to the Air Force during your summit?
General Welsh. The Army and Marine Corps were heavily involved in
all working groups during the summit. In addition, the USN, Joint
Staff, SOCOM, DARPA, and RAND also made significant contributions. CAS
is not about the USAF or its aircraft; CAS is a joint mission that
requires detailed integration between all of the Services to be
effective--especially in the contested or highly contested environment
of the future. The Future CAS Focus Week was a success because all of
the Services came together and honestly assessed the reality of where
our joint force is today, the requirements for the future, and the gaps
we need to close to ensure we continue to deliver the outstanding
effects of CAS to which the ground forces have become accustomed. The
Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines have all looked at different
challenging scenarios of the environment that we may have to operate
in--at the end of the day there will be contested environments that we
will potentially have to operate in. All Service air components are
participating in CAS today and they'll continue to do so. Today, USAF
multi-role platforms, including RPAs, AC-130s, F-15Es, F-16s, B-1s, and
B-52s, continue to support the CAS mission. Likewise, the USN and USMC
have effectively used platforms like the F/A-18C/D/E and the AV-8B to
provide effective CAS. In the future, all three Services will continue
to leverage multi-role legacy platforms as well as integrate the F-35.
Once the F-35A reaches Full Operational Capability, we will be able to
gain synergistic effects with the USN and USMC variants. This synergy,
when you have F-35C's coming off of ships, F-35B's coming out of an
austere field, and F-35A's coming out of forward operating locations,
will be unmatched--I think that's one of the other reasons that the CAS
Integration Group is going to be incredibly important. This is an
evolution in how we will execute this critical mission in the coming
decades.

54. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, list the risks to CAS execution,
as identified during the CAS summit, due to A-10 divestment.
General Welsh. The Future CAS Focus Week attempted to answer three
very broad questions: (1) What is the current CAS state of affairs? (2)
Is there a gap? and (3) What do we do next? To properly constrain the
discussion, we set the following assumptions: A-10 Divestiture in 2019;
F-35 Remains on Timeline; Baseline Threat: MCO against Peer / Near-Peer
adversary; and CAS will be required in a contested environment. In this
way, the risks identified are not related only to the divestment of the
A-10, but rather represent the risks of performing CAS in the operating
environment we expect to encounter in 2020 and beyond.
Although some are more directly tied to the A-10, the following
gaps were highlighted in the Air Line of Effort:
Dedicated CAS focus due to multi-mission shift; just-in-
time training creates challenges for beyond permissive CAS
o The A-10 has CAS as a primary mission and they are asked to
be proficient at all times. Therefore, there is a minimal
training spin-up time required to send an A-10 squadron down
range to do CAS.
o Multi-mission units have CAS as a secondary mission.
Therefore, there is a just-in-time training spin-up required to
deploy an F-16 or F-15E unit down range to do CAS. The time
required for a multi-mission unit to spin-up will increase as
the complexity of the operating environment increases (e.g.
contested environment vs. permissive).
Capability and capacity to kill armor / moving / close
proximity targets
o A-10 was designed with capability (i.e. 30 mm gun) to kill
armor (moving and stationary). Other currently fielded weapons
(e.g. Hellfire, Laser Maverick) also have this capability, but
with a larger collateral damage / risk estimate footprint;
future weapons like the SDB II will bring this same capability
to the F-35. As the size of the Air Force is decreased, whether
it is the A-10 or another platform, our capacity to kill
anything on the ground is reduced.
Ability to employ direct fire weapons
o A-10 employs 30 mm gun (1150 rounds) and Laser Maverick (up
to 6)--both direct fire weapons. While other platforms also
employ the Laser Maverick, and the Hellfire (also a direct fire
weapon), divesting the A-10 will reduce our direct fire
capacity (especially the high capacity / low cost 30 mm).
CAS sortie capacity from fiscal year 2017 - fiscal year
2025
o Our joint warriors looked at combat power across the USAF's
CAS-capable fighter force (A-10, F-15E, F-16, and F-35) from
now until 2030. Factors considered included number of aircraft,
weapons stations, weapons types, and loiter time. When they put
it all together on a graph, there was a gap in combat power
from fiscal year 2017--fiscal year 2025. The gap grows from
2017-2020 and then shrinks from 2020-2025 (get well point 82023
when combat power is about equal to combat power in 2015). The
two biggest contributors to the gap are the divestment of the
A-10 (proceeding on time and as planned) and the addition of
the F-35 (proceeding late [both in aircraft delivery and
capability fielding] and slower than planned).
F-35A CAS maturation
o The USAF will declare initial operating capability with F-
35A Block 3i. Block 3i is lacking the ``BIG SAR''
functionality--Block 4's ``BIG SAR'' image will be of a larger
area at a higher resolution (think SD television vs. HD
television). This will enable the pilots to better assess the
situation on the ground using the stand-off gained by taking a
SAR map instead of flying close to the target and using the
EOTS (or a Targeting Pod or eyeballs on a legacy aircraft).
Block 3F brings Automatic Target Cueing (ATC)/Automatic Target
Recognition (ATR) and Ground Moving Target Track (GMTT). Block
4 brings Combat Identification (CID) for GMTT tracks. The
biggest additions in Block 4 with regard to CAS are the
Advanced EOTS and the SDB II. Advanced EOTS will bring an
increase in resolution (similar to modern SNIPER pod) and a
Night Vision Device-compatible IR Marker, among other
capabilities. Block 4 will also bring Video Data Link (VDL)--
commonly referred to as ``ROVER.'' SDB II is a multi-mode
weapon that allows standoff employment (more than 45 miles).
The seeker works in three different modes to provide maximum
operational flexibility: a millimeter wave radar to detect and
track targets through weather, an imaging infrared for enhanced
target discrimination and a semi-active laser that enables the
weapon to track an airborne laser designator or one on the
ground. This powerful, integrated seeker seamlessly shares
targeting information among all three modes, enabling weapons
to engage fixed or moving targets at any time of day and in
all-weather conditions.
FAC(A) qualified aircrew
o The A-10 community has the preponderance of FAC(A)
experience and qualified pilots. As this platform divests and
is replaced by multi-mission aircraft, FAC(A) mission will
suffer. FAC(A)s and JTACs are the only two entities recognized
across the joint community, trained to integrate and control
CAS fires on the battlefield. Without a conscious effort to
migrate FAC(A)s and their capabilities from the A-10C airframe
to other airframes, the USAF risks losing 2/3 to 3/4 of its
FAC(A) capability. The Navy also has FAC(A)s--38 are required
in deployable units and 10-15 are required in shore units. The
USMC has roughly 50 FAC(A) crews spread across F-18C/D and AH-
1.
Capability to operate from austere airfields
o With the A-10 divestiture the USAF will lose the capability
to operate from austere airfields (the RPA retains some limited
capability). This could limit a support to SOF in some
scenarios or increase the demand for tankers.
o Other Air Force aircraft (F-16s most notably) have performed
the FAC(A) mission very well in the past and will do so in the
future.
Increased O&M costs of 5th generation a/c and weapons
o Gap in munitions discussed previously would only worsen if
high-cost munitions are the only option available for every
target--including low-end targets. Also, the F-35 itself is a
high-cost asset. The Air Force clearly needs a low-threat CAS
aircraft with more firepower and a cheaper operating cost than
the A-10 to fill this role for the next 30 years. We simply
can't afford it right now.

55. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, list the mitigation to each of
the risks identified. Identify specifically how your mitigation efforts
will eliminate the associated risk. If some or all risk remains
following your mitigation efforts, discuss these shortfalls in detail.
General Welsh. Below are each identified risk and subsequent
mitigation measures to address them:
Dedicated CAS focus due to multi-mission shift; just-in-
time training creates challenges for beyond permissive CAS
o Designate Primary CAS units across the Total Force
o Live Virtual Constructive (LVC)--streamline platform
interoperability to augment training
Capability and capacity to kill armor / moving / close
proximity targets
o Shape F-35 block upgrades
o Weapons capacity: Maverick / Hellfire balance
o Rapid Point/Cue and shoot, forward firing, low cost, high
capacity
o Weapons Acquisition Strategy / AFRL enabling technologies /
New family of CAS weapons
Ability to employ direct fire weapons
o Shape F-35 block upgrades
o Weapons capacity: Maverick / Hellfire balance
o Rapid Point / Cue and shoot, forward firing, low cost, high
capacity
o Weapons Acquisition Strategy / AFRL enabling technologies /
New family of CAS weapons
CAS sortie capacity from fiscal year 2017--fiscal year
2025
o Can only be fixed with more money to keep platforms flying
longer and/or procure a light attack / armed reconnaissance
(LAAR) aircraft
F-35A CAS maturation
o Continue planned block upgrades
FAC(A) qualified aircrew
o Deliberate A-10 expertise transition to F-16/F-15E/F-35
(already in planning)
o CAS Integration Group (CIG) will train CAS, fires and
maneuver experts to dominate combined arms operations through
air-ground integration--specifically joint CAS-minded FAC(As),
JTACs, Fires, and JFOs.
Capability to operate from austere airfields
o Can only really be fixed with more money to keep platforms
flying longer and/or procure a light attack / armed
reconnaissance (LAAR) aircraft
o Uses the USMC F-35B in scenarios where this is required.
We're a joint fighting force.
Increased O&M costs of 5th generation a/c and weapons
The recommendation for the F-35 is not based solely on CAS. O&M
costs for 5th generation aircraft and weapons must be paid if the U.S.
expects its' military to be successful in the full range on
contingencies and conflicts it could face in the future. We will do
everything possible to minimize those costs.

56. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, how many F-16 or F-15E airframes
are needed to provide the same level of CAS support (loiter,
firepower), as the current number of A-10s on CAS target sets including
armor?
General Welsh. A 1:1 comparison is not possible because each
airframe along with the munitions they carry bring specific advantages
to the fight. The distinct differences in the capabilities of our CAS-
capable aircraft do not lend themselves to a numerical comparison in
terms of the number of airframes. The Air Force is confident that there
will be no degradation in CAS support as a result of A-10 divesture,
other than the fact that we will have fewer fighter squadrons to
conduct the nation's business as a result of BCA top lines.

57. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, is it a one-for-one swap, and if
not, won't this create a gap in capacity?
General Welsh. No, a one-for-one swap is not an appropriate basis
of comparison. No capability gap is created; rather our CAS tactics
allow us to use multiple assets capable of offering the flexibility,
range, speed, lethality, precision, and ability to mass at a desired
time and place.
The Air Force already has a capacity problem, in multiple mission
areas. We can't fully meet Combatant Commanders requirements today--
continued budget pressure driving difficult prioritization decisions
won't make them any better.

58. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, has the Air Force communicated
this to the Army and Marine Corps?
General Welsh. The Army and Marine Corps participated in our Close
Air Support Focus Week and the Chief of Staff, Army, and the
Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps, participated in the Focus Week out-
brief. I also personally briefed the Chief of Staff of the Army,
Commandant of the Marine Corps, Chief of Naval Operations, and Chief of
the National Guard Bureau on our fiscal year 2016 Budget submission,
including the impacts on the CAS mission area. They clearly understand
the impacts of the BCA and the tough decisions it drives. Both the
Chief of Staff of the Army and the Commandant of the Marine Corps
expressed that they trust the Air Force to provide CAS when ground
forces need it.

59. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, the fiscal year 2016 A-10
divestment schedule is the fiscal year 2015 plan, but with an
accelerated, aggressive divestment flow to catch up to the remainder of
fiscal year 2017 to fiscal year 2019. Won't this create a backlog of
pilots waiting to be trained on other platforms?
General Welsh. We constantly monitor leading indicators to minimize
training backlogs that can be caused by a variety of factors. We will
only cease A-10 specific training if and when we receive authorization
to eliminate the A-10 fleet from the inventory. Meanwhile, there are
several issues to be considered when assigning pilots to other
platforms, such as the current demand for pilots for those other
weapons systems. The experience level of each pilot is also considered.
Depending on the needs of the Air Force during the A-10 divestment
schedule, some A-10 pilots will get other fighter aircraft or fighter
training aircraft assignments while others may be needed for other
weapon systems.

60. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, can the other formal training
units handle the increased workload, and if not, what does the Air
Force plan to do with those A-10 pilots who cannot be trained
immediately?
General Welsh. There is no immediate increase in the workload of
our other formal training units as all of the A-10 pilots will remain
available for deployment through fiscal year 2018. We intend to assign
experienced A-10 pilots to multi-role aircraft squadrons. The
experienced pilots who haven't met their first gate (96 months in 12
years) will be moved from the A-10 to another fighter MDS (e.g. F-35,
F-15E or F-16 CAS-focused squadrons), to the RPA, or to the training
community where their expertise will be of tremendous value. The
experienced A-10 pilots who have met their first gate will primarily
fill vacant 11F positions to capitalize on their CAS experience.

61. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, is the F-15E ready to assume the
Combat Search and Rescue mission set from the A-10 community?
General Welsh. The Air Force will appropriately transfer the Combat
Search and Rescue (CSAR) mission whenever the A-10 leaves service. As
long as the A-10 remains a viable combat asset, we will continue to use
it in its role for CSAR, CAS and FAC(A).
The 53d Wing accomplished a Tactics Development and Evaluation
(TD&E) to evaluate the CSAR mission set in the F-15E and F-16. The
final test report has not been released, but it will include a draft
training syllabus to spin-up crews in both the F-15E and the F-16 to
accomplish the CSAR mission. Ready Aircrew Program (RAP) training
requirements are being reviewed to identify how the CSAR mission will
fit into the current F-15E and F-16 training programs, and what other
missions will be displaced in order to pick up this responsibility.
Upon notification of a divestment date for the A-10, crews from other
platforms will achieve proficiency in this mission set in less than a
year.

62. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, what is the status of their
testing for this mission?
General Welsh. [Note: the mission referred to in this question is
CSAR]
The purpose of the Multi-MDS CSAR Task Force (TF) TD&E was to
prepare/qualify two F-15E crews and two F-16 pilots in the Sandy-1
mission, develop an accompanying training plan, syllabus, and provide
baseline TTP. This test was broken down into two phases, Phase-1 and 2.
Phase-1: Executed from Aug-Dec 2014; consisted of 263 sorties flown
on the Nevada Test and Training Range. Using A-10C IPs, the upgrading
aircrew from the F-15E and F-16 followed a building block approach to
learn the various Sandy 1-4 roles in order to gain the necessary
proficiency for larger TF missions. Following this initial period, both
the F-15E and F-16 demonstrated CSAR TF integration during 27 different
large force exercises involving the following aircraft: A-10C, F-15, F-
22, E-3, C-130, tanker, HH-60, and unmanned aerial vehicles. At the
conclusion of Phase-1, the upgrading aircrew from both MDSs needed two
additional missions in order to meet the objectives of the test plan.
The interim Operational Test Bulletin summarizes the specific findings
of Phase-1 and provides a syllabus, training plan, and TTP for both the
F-15E and F-16.
Phase-2: Currently in execution during the Spring of 2015; consists
of four CSAR TFs in April, between two and four in May, and a TDY to
Eglin AFB (in order to assess the impact of a littoral environment on
the developed TTP). Phase-2 should conclude by June 1, 2015, and will
produce two qualified F-15E Sandy-1 crews and two qualified Sandy-1 F-
16 pilots.
Road Shows: In February 2015, our team of A-10 IPs and upgrading
Sandy-1 F-15E aircrew traveled to RAF Lakenheath, UK, to familiarize
and prepare the F-15E squadrons in the CSAR mission. Additionally, this
team of CSAR TF subject matter experts stands ready to prepare any F-
15E / F-16 unit in need of CSAR TF spin-up.

63. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, what are the operational costs
per flying hour, taking into account sustainment costs, of the B-52, B-
1, F-15E, AC-130, F-16, and A-10?

------------------------------------------------------------------------
MDS GROUP Data 2014
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A-10C TY Operational Cost $19,041
per Flying Hour
----------------------------------------
PAA 225
----------------------------------------
Hours-Total 83,498
----------------------------------------
TY Operational Cost $1,589,917,752
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AC/MC-130W TY Operational Cost $23,284
per Flying Hour
----------------------------------------
PAA 11
----------------------------------------
Hours-Total 6,431
----------------------------------------
TY Operational Cost $149,735,322
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AC-130H TY Operational Cost $52,814
per Flying Hour
----------------------------------------
PAA 6
----------------------------------------
Hours-Total 1,818
----------------------------------------
TY Operational Cost $95,995,077
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AC-130U TY Operational Cost $51,373
per Flying Hour
----------------------------------------
PAA 16
----------------------------------------
Hours-Total 6,292
----------------------------------------
TY Operational Cost $323,238,885
------------------------------------------------------------------------
B-1B TY Operational Cost $58,838
per Flying Hour
----------------------------------------
PAA 52
----------------------------------------
Hours-Total 21,587
----------------------------------------
TY Operational Cost $1,270,130,668
------------------------------------------------------------------------
B-52H TY Operational Cost $67,785
per Flying Hour
----------------------------------------
PAA 63
----------------------------------------
Hours-Total 18,279
----------------------------------------
TY Operational Cost $1,239,027,603
------------------------------------------------------------------------
F-15E TY Operational Cost $33,260
per Flying Hour
----------------------------------------
PAA 193
----------------------------------------
Hours-Total 50,807
----------------------------------------
TY Operational Cost $1,689,823,978
------------------------------------------------------------------------

* Notes / Caveats to follow

------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Notes / Caveats
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Cost and FHs reflect FY14 data per AFCAP
version 8.0 which uses AFTOC FY14Q4
data.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2 Dollars provided in Then Year (TY)
dollars.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 Aircraft grouped into MDS Groupings,
where appropriate, to improve analysis
and match normal aircraft data
groupings.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
4 Data provided represents the FY14 OCPFH
(TY$). The Operational Cost per Fly Hour
(OCPFH) is a historically based metric
from the Air Force Total Ownership Cost
(AFTOC) system that provides visibility
into the total cost to operate an
aircraft during a specific year.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
5 The OCPFH is calculated by dividing the
total operating and sustainment costs
(excluding hardware modifications)
associated with a weapon system by the
total flying hours flown in the same
year. Operational Cost includes: Mission
Personnel, Unit Operations, Maintenance,
Sustaining Support, Continuing System
Improvements (excluding hardware
modifications), and Indirect Support.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
6 DO NOT use this single year of data as a
basis for future year requirements or as
a basis for a comparison between
aircraft. This data is not normalized
for differences between size of the
various MDS fleets and/or differences in
the hours flown per tail or per PAA. It
includes both fixed, variable, and semi
variable costs. The OPCPFH uses these
total costs spread against all flying
hours flown to derive an aggregate cost
per flying hour metric. OPCPFH should
not be used to estimate the cost of
flying more or less flying hours.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

64. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, how much has the Air Force spent
since September 11, 2001 to modernize the A-10?
General Welsh. We have spent a total of $1.56B ($234.4M for RDT&E
and $1.33B for procurement) since September 11, 2001, for A-10
modernization.

65. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, what are the differences in
capabilities and features between the A-10A and the A-10C?
General Welsh. The A-10 fleet completed the Precision Engagement
(PE) upgrade to the A-10C model in fiscal year 2011. PE modernized all
A-10As by integrating advanced targeting pods and a digital data link
with aircraft systems. Additionally, PE incorporated a data structure
that enabled employment of an assortment of precision weapons.
Altogether, PE provided a significant increase in capability and combat
effectiveness to the A-10A.

66. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, please provide a detailed update
on the A-10 re-wing program.
General Welsh. 173 enhanced wing assemblies (EWAs) were purchased,
with the last order occurring in fiscal year 2013 (56 wings). As of 10
April 2015, 108 EWAs have been delivered (65 are still on order) and 81
have been installed (27 of current deliveries are still to be
installed). Production of purchased EWAs will be complete by July 2016.

67. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, how many have received new
wings?
General Welsh. As of 10 April 2015, 81 aircraft have received an
enhanced wing assembly (EWA). 173 EWAs have been purchased, and 108
EWAs have been delivered (65 are still on order). 27 of the delivered
EWAs are still to be installed.

68. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, under the current contract, how
many more will receive new wings?
General Welsh. 92 additional aircraft will receive an enhanced wing
assembly (EWA). 173 EWAs were purchased, and 81 have been installed as
of 10 April 2015.

69. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, how many A-10s in need of new
wings would that leave?
General Welsh. Based on a fleet size of 283 A-10 aircraft, the USAF
would need to purchase 110 enhanced wing assemblies (EWAs) to modify
the entire fleet. 173 EWAs have been purchased.

70. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, when does the current contract
expire?
General Welsh. The last option is for 2016.

71. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, please provide a detailed update
on the current supply and production of 30mm rounds. Is there a
shortfall in training rounds, and if so, how much?
General Welsh. Last year, the Air Force discovered a procurement
shortfall for 30mm training rounds. The Air Force is approximately 1.2
million rounds short of our current inventory objective with the gap
expected to increase. To minimize the training impact we increased the
fiscal year 2014 funding of the 30mm. To further minimize impact, Air
Combat Command reduced fiscal year 2015 training requirements to
maintain combat capability within the inventory constraint. The Air
Force also encouraged the manufacturers to reduce manufacturing lead-
time and enable faster munitions deliveries.

72. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, what is the impact of that
shortfall, and what is being done to address the shortfall?
General Welsh. The impact of the 30mm round shortfall will depend
on: 1) A-10 divestiture actions, 2) actual expenditures, and 3)
realization of accelerated deliveries. If the Air Force is required to
retain the A-10, congressionally identified funds will be used to
procure A-10 ammunition and increase fiscal year 2016 allocations from
38 percent to approximately 52 percent of the training requirement. A-
10 Operations Group Commanders developed a training plan to mitigate
any impacts from a reduced allocation.

73. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, in your House Armed Services
Committee testimony, you say the F-35A will replace the A-10 for high
threat CAS. What will replace the A-10 for low threat CAS?
General Welsh. Several other CAS-capable multi-role platforms have
been accomplishing the CAS mission in the permissive low-threat
environment (F-16, F-15E, B-1, B-52, and MQ-1/9) and they will continue
to do so in the future.

special victims counsel
74. Senator Ayotte. General Odierno and General Welsh, section 1716
of the NDAA for fiscal year 2014 required the Services to establish
Special Victims' Counsel Program to provide independent legal
assistance for victims of sexual assault. Can you provide an update on
how your Special Victims Counsel programs are going, and what kind of
feedback are you getting from victims?
General Odierno. The Army Special Victims' Counsel (SVC) Program
adeptly serves as a voice for sexual assault victims, by providing
legal advice and representation through all stages of administrative
and military justice proceedings, from investigation to final
disposition. The Army SVC Program's major achievements include serving
over 1,880 clients, attending and advising clients at 375 Courts-
Martial, and filing four writs of mandamus with the Army Court of
Criminal Appeals (ACCA) and an amicus curiae brief with the Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF). The Program has developed
curriculum for internally managed courses, to include the Special
Victims' Counsel Certification Course, Child Advocacy Course,
Supervisor Training Course, and Continuing Legal Education (CLE)
training. Nearly 350 SVC have been trained, including members from
other Services.
The SVC Program resides in the Office of The Judge Advocate General
(TJAG) and all Judge Advocates who serve as SVC are specially trained
and certified by TJAG. Currently, 75 active component SVC serve in the
field under the direct supervision of the Chief of Legal Assistance
(CLA), with technical oversight provided by the SVC Program Manager.
This organizational structure provides several benefits. It maximizes
availability of SVC for face-to-face interaction with clients at
installations Army-wide; it ensures SVC independence by placing them
within the legal assistance function, which has a well established role
of representing individual clients, even when in opposition to
decisions of the client's command; and it gives SVC the resources they
need to provide legal assistance for any collateral issues a victim may
encounter.
Feedback received from victims has been extremely positive. SVC
clients have shared their experiences with the Judicial Proceedings
Panel (JPP), Congressional members and staff, and at numerous SVC
training events. Victims indicate that they feel empowered and better
able to participate in the military justice process because of their
SVC. As just one example, Specialist A.S. testified before the JPP
Public Meeting held on December 12, 2014, that her SVC `` . . . has
been there with me through the whole process, and I can honestly say
that without him I probably wouldn't have been able to survive a trial
and go through everything that I went through'' (p. 175; 12-16).
General Welsh. The Special Victims' Counsel (SVC) Program continues
to receive very positive feedback from represented victims and Air
Force leadership. The primary indication of the SVC Program's success
is the results of the Air Force's Victim Impact Survey (VIS). This
voluntary, anonymous survey of victims who have availed themselves of
Air Force SVC services has yielded unprecedented satisfaction rates.
Approximately 200 former clients out of a possible 790 have
participated in taking the VIS. Over the life of the program, the
following statistics are instructive:
90 percent ``extremely satisfied'' with the advice and
support the SVC provided during the Article 32 hearing and court-
martial (9 percent ``satisfied'')
99 percent would recommend other victims request an SVC
96 percent indicated their SVC advocated effectively on
their behalf
96 percent indicated their SVC helped them understand the
investigation and court-martial processes
A couple of quotes from the victims responding to the VIS:
``I can't imagine why anyone would do this without a SVC. She
explained everything and made sure I understood what was going on. Capt
XX was great. I really appreciate all she did to help me through the
process.''
``The SVC was both moral and legal support for me during the
duration of the case/investigation itself. When I had no one else, he
was the one who was by my side. He was professional, and knew when to
be personal to an appropriate extent. It was not only beneficial--it
was lifesaving. He did his best, and that is all I needed. He went
above and beyond his duty. I am very lucky to have worked with my SVC,
and I thank you for it.''
Although the SVC program only just completed its second year,
requests for SVC representation continue at a robust pace. We believe
the sustained high volume of victims seeking representation springs
from multiple sources including favorable experiences and
recommendations by other victims of sexual assault, increased
visibility throughout the DoD and AF communities, and a strong
partnership with SARC, FAP, legal offices and OSI. As such, in fiscal
year 2014, 86 percent of eligible victims who made an unrestricted
report of sexual assault utilized the AF SVC Program.
In response to the program's success and increasing caseloads due
to demand, as well as representation of child clients as of June 24,
2014, the Air Force created the new Senior Special Victims' Counsel
(SSVC) position to assist with mentoring, training and advising of SVCs
and Special Victims' Paralegals (SVPs) in the field, and to represent
their own clients. Organizationally, SSVCs are divided into five
geographic circuits worldwide. After beginning with only 24 full-time
SVCs and 10 SVPs, the Air Force has increased SVCs billets in order to
fully and competently represent victims and manage the increase in
caseload. By July 2015, there will be 35 SVCs, 5 Senior SVCs, and 24
SVPs located at 32 SVC offices worldwide. By the summer of 2016, the
Air Force expects to grow to 50 SVCs.
Finally, to continue to improve the AF SVC program, the Service SVC
Program leaders frequently collaborate to develop standardized rules
for practice, discuss new and proposed legislation, and expand SVC
training to ensure counsel have the appropriate level of expertise to
effectively represent their clients. The AF offers an intensive 8-day
SVC training course at the Air Force Judge Advocate General School
twice a year. The course is taught by civilian and military experts and
includes advanced topics such as representing child victims, strategies
to combat retaliation and ostracism and specialized trial tactics. SVCs
from all branches of the Service, to include the Air Reserve Component,
attend this course. Finally, SVCs and SVPs attend myriad victim-focused
courses offered by other federal, state and civilian agencies.

involuntary separation
75. Senator Ayotte Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, under the
President's budget request, the Army is dramatically reducing the size
of the force in the coming years. Consistent with section 525 of the
NDAA for fiscal year 2014, I understand that in the second half of
calendar year 2014, the Army involuntarily separated 420 soldiers.
General Odierno, I understand that the Army is being forced to reduce
its end strength and this requires difficult decisions you would rather
not make. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, how many soldiers do
you estimate you will have to involuntarily separate this year and how
many if defense sequestration returns in 2016?
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. A return to sequestration-
level funding would require the Army to size and equip the force based
on what we can afford, not what we need, increasing the risk that when
called to deploy, we will either not have enough Soldiers or will send
Soldiers that are not properly trained and equipped. As I have stated
before, if the discretionary cap reductions from sequestration occur,
the Army will be at grave risk of being unable to fully execute the
Defense Strategic Guidance requirements.
The Army's current plan to achieve required end strength reductions
calls for us to involuntarily separate approximately 2400 Officers
(including 650 promotion non-selects) and 780 enlisted soldiers in
fiscal year 2015. In fiscal year 2016, we will involuntarily separate
2600 Officers and 1200 enlisted members. When sequestration returns in
fiscal year 2016, our officer separations would increase by 100
Captains, and enlisted losses would not change; however, the true
effects of sequestration would be felt in future years with greatly
increased Officer and Enlisted involuntary separations.
If Congress does not act to mitigate the magnitude and method of
the reductions under the sequestration, the Army will be forced to make
blunt reductions in end strength, readiness, and modernization. We
cannot take the readiness of our force for granted. If we do not have
the resources to train and equip the force, our Soldiers, our young men
and women, are the ones who will pay the price, potentially with their
lives. It is our shared responsibility to ensure that we never send
members of our military into harm's way who are not trained, equipped,
well-led, and ready for any contingency to include war. We must come up
with a better solution than sequestration.

end strength reductions
76. Senator Ayotte. General Odierno, you have said that we need to
rethink the decision to reduce the Army's Active Duty endstrength to
450,000. You said, ``We made assumptions that we wouldn't be using Army
forces in Europe the way we used to, we made assumptions that we
wouldn't go back into Iraq--and here we are back in Iraq, here we are
worried about Russia again.'' Additionally, in the joint written
testimony, you and Secretary McHugh described this endstrength as
``tenuous''. Setting aside budget constraints for a moment, based on
our interests and the threats to our interests, what Active, Guard, and
Reserve end strength numbers do you believe our Nation needs?
General Odierno. Last year, we testified that the minimum force
necessary to execute the defense strategy was a force floor of 450,000
in the Regular Army, 335,000 in the Army National Guard and 195,000 in
the Army Reserve - a total of 980,000 Soldiers. That assessment has not
changed and is based on certain planning assumptions regarding the
duration, number and size of future missions. When determining these
assessed force levels, we also made clear that risks at this level
would grow if our underlying assumptions proved inaccurate. Although we
still believe we can meet the primary missions of the Defense Strategic
Guidance (DSG) today, our ability to do so has become tenuous. There is
a growing divide between the Budget Control Act's (BCA) arbitrary
funding mechanism - that has seen the Army budget drop in nominal terms
every year since enacted in 2011 - and the emerging geopolitical
realities confronting us now across Europe, the Middle East, Africa and
the Pacific, along with the growing threats to our homeland. Risk
thereby increases to our force, our national security and our Nation.
As the Army approaches a Total Army end strength of 980,000 Soldiers by
fiscal year 2018, we must constantly assess the operational tempo and
its impacts on the health and viability of the force. We must ensure we
have both the capability to respond to unforeseen demands and the
capacity to sustain high levels of readiness.

army readiness
77. Senator Ayotte. General Odierno, you said that only 33 percent
of our brigades are ready. What is the primary reason for this degraded
readiness: insufficient training, manning, or equipment--or poorly
maintained equipment?
General Odierno. The unrelenting budget impasse has compelled us to
degrade our readiness to historically low levels. Essentially,
readiness has been degraded to its lowest levels in 20 years. In fiscal
year 2013, under sequestration, only 10 percent of our Brigade Combat
Teams were ready. Combat Training Center rotations for seven brigade
combat teams were cancelled and over half a billion dollars of
maintenance was deferred, both affecting training and readiness of our
units. Even after additional support from the BBA, today, we only have
33 of our brigades ready, to the extent we would ask them to be if
asked to fight.
Readiness is not something that we can just fund piecemeal--once in
a while and year to year. It has to be funded consistently over time.
If not, it is fleeting, and it goes away.
The compromises we have made to readiness and modernization
combined with reductions to our force size and capabilities translates
directly into strategic risk. Today, we are generating just enough
readiness to meet our day-to-day needs of immediate consumption. We are
unable to generate any residual readiness to respond to an unknown
contingency or to even reinforce ongoing operations.
This is a dangerous balancing act. We have fewer soldiers, the
majority of whom are in units that are not ready, and they are manning
aging equipment at a time when demand for Army forces is higher than we
originally anticipated.

78. Senator Ayotte. General Odierno, if sequestration continues,
what percent of units would have degraded readiness?
General Odierno. It is difficult to provide precise percentages,
but what I am sure of is that sequestration puts the Army on a path of
accelerated and much deeper cuts to our forces while debilitating
readiness and reducing modernization and manpower. Funding fluctuations
force the Army to train and maintain the force in fits and starts,
which is cost inefficient and damaging to long-term readiness.
The impacts of continued sequestration will endure for at least a
decade. It is going to be the next Chief and the Chiefs after that who
must respond to the long term and hidden impacts of sequestration.
Readiness is not something that we can just fund piecemeal--once in a
while and year to year. It has to be funded consistently over time. If
not, it is fleeting, and it goes away.
Although the Army attempts to mitigate the impacts on training
readiness, we must continue to implement the Contingency Force model of
fiscal year 2015 in order to maintain readiness for the 24 of 60 BCTs
that will receive sufficient funding to conduct training at Combat
Training Centers (CTC) and home station. The remaining 36 BCTs will be
limited to minimum Individual/Crew/Squad resourcing levels through
sufficient Training Support Systems. In short, sequestration forces the
Army to ration readiness. But regardless of funding levels, we have
committed to keeping Combat Training Centers a priority. That means our
home station training goes unfunded except for brigades going to CTCs.
At the Soldier level, Institutional Training will also take a
significant reduction that will take years to recover. Already
strained, the Army will further reduce Specialized Skill Training by
85,007 seats (65 percent drop) and fund only the most critical courses
resulting in 47,659 seats funded out of 199,212 seats (23.9 percent).
Furthermore, this causes a training backload that will take years to
reduce, hindering units' abilities to train and negatively affecting
unit readiness. Ultimately, this further reduces the Army's ability to
meet Combatant Commander needs for critical capabilities and skills.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
440th airlift wing at pope army airfield
79. Senator Tillis. Secretary James, earlier in the year, I had
extensive discussions with Secretary Carter about the future of the
440th Airlift Wing at Pope Army Airfield. During his confirmation
hearing, Secretary Carter publicly committed to look into the matter
and sit down with my office and discuss the 440th's future.
I am distressed that in spite of the commitment, the Air Force
leadership is proceeding to finalize this matter before the Secretary
of Defense has had a chance to fulfill his public assurance.
First, the NDAA for fiscal year 2015 requires the Air Force to
report to Congress on the Service's future C-130 force structure.
Congress is then given 60 days to respond to that report.
General Welsh said it is undergoing changes and has not been
officially approved by Secretary James, much less provided to Congress
as required by the NDAA. My understanding is that the report still ill-
advisedly calls for the dismantling of the 440th.
Second, in contravention of the spirit of the NDAA, the Air Force
has already begun removing airmen from the 440th before the report has
even been provided to Congress, much less Congress having an
opportunity to respond. The 440th command recently held an all hands
meeting to help airmen look for other jobs.
A spokesman for the Air Force Reserve said that last year's law
says nothing about moving airmen and pilots out of Pope, it only
requires the planes to stay. That does not pass the laugh test unless
the Air Force Reserve Command expects the Pope C-130s to be converted
to drones--no pilots no air wing.
Third, last month the commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps,
General Joseph Anderson said, ``of all places to cut, why would they
[the Air Force] take that capability away from Fort Bragg?'' Fort Bragg
leadership says it was not consulted.
The response of the Air Staff is: we don't check Air Force
decisions with Army three stars.
I am disturbed that in spite of Secretary Carter's commitment to
sit down with me and discuss the future of the C-130s, the Air Force
will have dismantled the unit leaving us nothing to discuss.
I have asked for a private meeting with you along with my senior
colleague, Senator Burr, Chairman of the Select Committee on
Intelligence. Our first meeting was cancelled due to the change in the
scheduling of the posture of the Department of the Air Force hearing
before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Since that time, Air Force
schedulers have proffered prospective times for a new meeting in
Washington, DC when both Senator Burr and I are in North Carolina. We
stand ready to meet with you in the state if your schedule will not
accommodate us in Washington.
If the Air Force has not reached a decision on the future of the
440th, why are airmen at Pope being told to transfer elsewhere?
Ms. James. The fiscal year 2015 NDAA, Section 138, C-130 Force
structure report was delivered to the Defense Committees on April 14,
2015, and outlines the proposed force structure for the C-130 fleet as
amended by our Total Force analysis of the C-130 enterprise.
The personnel at the 440th Airlift Wing (AW) are not being directed
by the Air Force to seek employment elsewhere. Rather, these Reserve
Airmen are choosing to seek other opportunities. Faced with the choice
of helping them or not, the Air Force Reserve Command has, of course,
chosen to help and is aiding members of the 440 AW in finding alternate
positions. The Air Force believes that it is meeting the requirements
of Section 138 as enacted.
The divestiture of the 440 AW will have no impact on the XVIII
Airborne Corps to train or employ. Currently, only 33 percent of Ft.
Bragg training missions are flown by the 440 AW and 100 percent of the
XVIII Airborne Corps Global Response Force deployment requirements are
met through units external to Pope AAF. After inactivating the 440 AW
at Pope AAF, the Air Force will continue to support movement
requirements at Pope with non-collocated assets.
The Air Force remains committed to supporting U.S. Army airborne
training requirements through the Joint Airborne/Air Transportability
Training (JA/ATT) Joint Management System (JMS). This construct is
currently used to fill 66 percent of Ft. Bragg training missions. Using
JMS, the U.S. Army can schedule additional JA/AATs to make up for the
sorties currently flown by Pope AAF AFRC C-130Hs. The JA/ATT
construct--executed via the JMS--also supports 100 percent of the
missions at Fort Benning, Fort Campbell, and many other Army, USMC and
SOCOM units, whether they have collocated transport aircraft or not.

80. Senator Tillis. Secretary James, is this decision in keeping
with the intent of the Senate Armed Services Committee as made clear in
the NDAA regarding the mandatory report on the future of the C-130
fleet?
Ms. James. The fiscal year 2015 NDAA, Section 138, C-130 Force
structure report was delivered to the Defense Committees on 14 April
2015 and outlines the proposed force structure for the C-130 fleet as
amended by our Total Force analysis of the C-130 enterprise. The
personnel at the 440th Airlift Wing (AW) are not being directed by the
Air Force to seek employment elsewhere. Rather, these Reserve Airmen
are choosing to seek other opportunities. Faced with the choice of
helping them or not, the Air Force Reserve Command has, of course,
chosen to help and is aiding members of the 440 AW in finding alternate
positions. The Air Force believes that it is meeting the requirements
of Section 138 as enacted.

81. Senator Tillis. Secretary James, it is not sufficient to say
the Air Force consulted with Army Headquarters at the Pentagon
regarding the future of the 440th. Did the Air Force consult with its
clients, the leadership of the XVIII Airborne Corps, the 82nd Airborne,
and U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) before making the
decision to deactivate the 440th?
Ms. James. No, the Air Force did not consult with the Army XVIII
Airborne Corps leadership prior to making the decision to deactivate
the 440th Airlift Wing. Analysis of requirements, both operational and
training, was conducted and determined to have zero impact on the XVIII
Airborne Corps Global Response Force requirement and minimal impact to
training. The loss of organic airlift training capability at Ft Bragg
will be mitigated through increased use of the Joint Airborne/Air
Transportability Training process. The Department of the Army was fully
informed on the issue through appropriate, longstanding HQ's
coordination process.

82. Senator Tillis. Secretary James, I have asked for the metrics
used to determine why Pope is a lower priority than airfields that have
no comparable tactical mission--no metrics have been delivered. When
will the Air Force provide this information?
Ms. James. The fiscal year 2015 NDAA, Section 138, C-130 Force
structure report was delivered to the Defense Committees on April 14,
2015, and outlines the proposed force structure for the C-130 fleet as
amended by our Total Force analysis of the C-130 enterprise. This
report provides the metrics that led to the decision to divest the
440th Airlift Wing (AW). Of note, the 440 AW and the associated C-130
unit do not have a direct tactical mission supporting the XVIII
Airborne Corps. In fact, 100 percent of real-world contingency taskings
for the XVIII Airborne Corps are fulfilled by units not-collocated with
Fort Bragg. Under the current United States Transportation Command
model, the DoD can deliver the Global Response Force direct to an
objective via integrated packages of USAF C-17s and C-130s non-
collocated at Pope AAF.
Additionally, 66 percent of the XVIII Airborne Corps training
requirements are fulfilled by units external to Pope AAF via the Joint
Airborne/Air Transportability Training process. This construct will be
used to fulfill the remaining 34 percent of training requirements
following the deactivation of the 440 AW.

83. Senator Tillis. Secretary James, is it Secretary Carter's
intent to discuss the future of the 440th with North Carolina's
congressional delegation?
Ms. James. I would refer you to the Office of the Secretary of
Defense.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Lee
air force modernization
84. Senator Lee. General Odierno, do you believe that your forces
on the ground will receive the necessary close-air support to
efficiently and safely complete their missions if the A-10 is retired?
General Odierno. I have absolute confidence in the capability and
willingness of the United States Air Force to meet the needs of our
Soldiers on the ground; we believe close air support (CAS) is a
mission, not a platform. While we are not excited to potentially lose
the A-10, we know the Air Force, like the Army, is facing an extremely
difficult fiscal reality that necessitates making hard, unpopular
choices.

85. Senator Lee. General Welsh, an article published on
Military.com last week reported that the F-35 will not be able to fire
the Small Diameter Bomb II close air support weapon until 2022. What
other close-air support capabilities will the F-35 be capable of prior
to 2022?
General Welsh. At Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in late 2016,
the United States Air Force's F-35As will have various combat
capabilities to conduct Close Air Support. These capabilities will
include the full suite of fused sensors and mission systems used to
find, fix, track, target, and assess the battlefield. Additionally, at
IOC our F-35As will have the weapons inventory to successfully engage
targets to meet Ground Commander objectives, to include the GBU-12
laser guided 500-pound weapon and the 2000-pound GBU-31 Joint Direct
Attack Munition. Full CAS capability will be available as FOC in late
2021.

86. Senator Lee. Secretary James and General Welsh, the Air Force
has again highlighted the F-35, Long Range Strike Bomber, and the new
tanker as its highest procurement priorities, and lays the foundation
for acquiring other new weapons systems to replace legacy fleets. I
continue to be concerned though that cost-overruns and delays in the
acquisition process could magnify the negative effects of budget
reductions and harm the long-term viability of such programs. Will you
discuss how the Air Force is working to drive down the costs of major
acquisitions programs to ensure that cost increases do not affect the
readiness of the force?
Ms. James and General Welsh. Controlling the cost of our major
acquisition programs is a top concern for the Air Force. As such, the
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition regularly reviews
acquisition costs, both at the enterprise-wide level and for individual
programs. Furthermore, the Air Force is executing several major
initiatives to drive down the costs of major acquisition programs. Four
specific initiatives are: 1) Should Cost, 2) Own the Technical
Baseline, 3) Affordability, and 4) Bending the Cost Curve. All of these
initiatives contribute to a stronger, cost conscious acquisition
community.
1) ``Should Cost'' management is one of the Better Buying Power
initiatives that is generating a significant return on investment for
our acquisition community. Per DoD Instruction, Should Cost Management
is required for all Acquisition Category programs. Should Cost
Management challenges acquisition managers to identify and achieve
savings below most-likely budgeted costs. Should Cost savings are then
reinvested back in the program, the acquisition portfolio, or returned
to the Air Force Corporate Structure. Should Cost Management is one of
the tools that our acquisition managers use to schedule and control
cost in our program offices.
2) ``Own the Technical Baseline'' is directed at increasing the
Government's ability to be a better buyer by being an informed decision
maker. The Government applies technical baseline knowledge to establish
trade-offs for affordability and verify, change, accept, and sustain
functional capabilities. Own the Technical Baseline is essential to our
future and means the government program team, independent of the prime
contractor, has the wherewithal to make proper decisions to achieve
successful, cost-effective acquisition outcomes.
3) ``Affordability'' is one of the Better Buying Power initiatives
that challenges Air Force Core Function Leads to look at each program
and determine if the Air Force can afford it throughout its lifecycle.
Affordability is different in that we look at our entire portfolio
across at least 30 years and evaluate if we will allocate resources far
longer than the typical five year outlook. If a program is determined
to be unaffordable, we restructure, we re-scope, or we cancel it. We
are still in the early stages of this initiative, but we believe it is
a strong approach in controlling costs and avoiding those programs we
cannot afford.
4) In 2014, Air Force leaders initiated the ``Bending the Cost
Curve'' (BTCC) Initiative to address the escalation in weapon system
costs and development times. To accomplish this BTCC amplifies the
Better Buying Power principles by encouraging innovation through active
engagements with Industry and the acquisition workforce to identify,
evaluate, and implement transformational reforms. Unlike Better Buying
Power, which is a broader set of practices and techniques for the
workforce to employ, BTCC is a targeted initiative to encourage
innovation and active industry partnerships to improve the way we
procure our systems and to drive down cost. What began as a series of
discussions with industry has evolved into an ever growing set of
targeted actions aimed at addressing the most critical challenges
within the acquisition process. There are three things that
differentiate BTCC from other acquisition reform efforts pursued in the
past: a robust and proactive collaboration with industry; a focus on
prompt and tangible actions; and an emphasis on measurable results. An
improved dialogue with industry will enable us to better understand how
processes, procedures, and the choices we make may inadvertently
contribute to rising costs, the stifling of innovation, and slow
processes. With that understanding BTCC can then implement initiatives
designed to reverse the trend of escalating weapon system costs and
development times.

test and training ranges
87. Senator Lee. Secretary James and General Welsh, late last year
the Air Force began a study into the future needs of test ranges and
their infrastructure, a key to maintaining readiness and innovation in
the force. What do you believe are the most critical needs for Air
Force test ranges in order to enable your ranges to test fifth-
generation aircraft and weaponry against the threats that they will be
facing in the coming decades?
Ms. James and General Welsh. 5th generation aircraft and weapons
need to be tested on updated open air ranges and in ground test
facilities that present the system under test with an environment that
represents existing and emerging threat systems worldwide, including
Pacific theater threat systems. More specific details require a
classified response. Further, our ranges need to be upgraded to address
the increased distances for air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons
employment inherent in our 5th gen systems. An example would be
expanding the instrumented area in our Gulf Range. There are also
enhancements required to our sensor, datalink, and propulsion
facilities to fully accommodate development for 5th gen systems and
beyond. Finally, we will need to make investments in our test and
evaluation infrastructure to support continued relevance in testing.
This would include technology updates for data collection and
instrumentation systems in addition to basic facility sustainment,
repair, and modernization.

strategic forces
88. Senator Lee. Secretary James and General Welsh, you both should
be commended for undertaking a review of Air Force's nuclear forces
last year and your forward thinking outlook on this important
enterprise. Can you please give us an update on your implementation of
recommendations from this review and have been able to start tracking
results of their implementation?
Ms. James and General Welsh. We have made many positive changes and
continue to implement and track Nuclear Enterprise Review follow-on
actions through a systematic, deliberate, process structured to produce
tangible and lasting improvements. Numerous recommendations with
immediate solutions have already been implemented: increased manning in
critical nuclear specialties at AFGSC and AFMC (over 1,250 mil/civ
billets total), funded incentive pays for certain ICBM career fields,
funded urgent equipment and facility maintenance requirements at
missile wings, funded ROTC scholarships for cadets volunteering for
ICBM duties, key quality of life improvements at AFGSC northern-tier
bases, approval and implementation of the Nuclear Deterrence Operations
Service Medal, updated tactical gear and uniforms for AFGSC Security
Forces personnel that support ICBM operations, and the realignment of
the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center which will now be led by the head
of our program-executive office for strategic systems.
Long-term recommendations are also underway and will require long-
term investment, attention, and constant end-state evaluation. While
the total sum of individual action items determines the success of any
long-term solution, the individual results we see today are very
encouraging.

air force space launch
89. Senator Lee. Secretary James and General Welsh, the Senate
Armed Services Committee report for the NDAA for fiscal year 2015
includes an understanding that there are propulsion systems in addition
to liquid rocket engines that could provide future capabilities that
support requirements for medium and heavy launch vehicles and
encourages the Department of the Air Force to continually review the
potential for using such propulsion systems. To what extent is the Air
Force studying the advances in technology like solid-rocket motors to
fulfill some of your space-launch missions?
Ms. James and General Welsh. The Air Force supported the change in
language from ``liquid rocket engine'' to ``rocket propulsion system''
in order to not inadvertently prohibit review of the potential for
using solid propulsion systems. The Air Force intends to consider solid
rocket motors and casings industry proposals for technical maturation
and risk reduction awards this year.

90. Senator Lee. Secretary James and General Welsh, is the Air
Force committed to ensuring that all propulsion providers, including
solids, have the opportunity to participate in fair and open
competition to develop the next generation, domestically produced
engine?
Ms. James and General Welsh. The responses to the Request For
Information the Air Force published in August 2014 indicate there is a
broad range of propulsion solutions, including solid rocket propulsion
systems. The Air Force intends to consider both liquid engine and solid
rocket motor proposals for our competitive technical maturation and
risk reduction activities as well as our investment in rocket
propulsion system and launch system development.

nato defense spending
91. Senator Lee. General Odierno, you stated earlier this month
that you were concerned about potential cuts to the British defense
budget and the need for all allies to be able to invest more to address
global issues. The reduced defense budgets of our allies are an issue
that we have tried to address for over a decade with little success;
what differently do you think the United States needs to do to
encourage our allies to address their defense shortfalls?
General Odierno. In such challenging times, it is important that we
maintain sight of what history informs us--that the nature of warfare
is enduring; and that in particular, it begins, develops, and ends in
the human domain. But the character of warfare changes over time, as
tactics, techniques, and technologies; and ideas and beliefs, evolve.
So it is imperative--now more than ever--in the face of security
threats abroad; and troop reductions and fiscal uncertainties at home;
that our Army and our multinational allies and partners work
collaboratively in pursuit of lasting solutions. We must work together
to adapt and innovate in order to mitigate the many risks we face.

sergeant bergdahl report
92. Senator Lee. Secretary McHugh, the Army's investigation into
the disappearance of Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl was completed in October of
last year. What is the current status of that report and timeline for
action to be taken by the Army, and why has it taken nearly 6 months
for the reported to be acted upon or released?
Mr. McHugh. The investigating officer submitted his report of
investigation for legal review in October 2014. The legal review was
completed in late December 2014, at which time the report of
investigation was provided to the Commander, United States Army Forces
Command. Charges were preferred against Sergeant Bergdahl on March 25,
2015, and further proceedings will be conducted in accordance with the
Uniform Code of Military Justice.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
audit readiness
93. Senator Manchin. Secretary McHugh, Secretary James, General
Odierno, and General Welsh, how do you plan on holding leaders
accountable to make sure your Service is ready for a full financial
statement audit by the end of fiscal year 2017, and what do you believe
should happen if DOD misses that deadline?
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. The Army leadership is fully
committed to achieving audit readiness. We have added audit readiness
criteria to the annual performance metrics for all Senior Executive
Service civilians. Additionally, we have incorporated audit readiness
reviews into the Vice Chief's Strategic Readiness Updates (SRU). The
SRU is how we hold Army senior leaders accountable for operational
readiness. Incorporating review of progress toward our audit readiness
goals into the SRU raises the visibility of the audit readiness
efforts, and we believe this additional accountability has contributed
to the progress.
These initiatives as well as our semi-annual input to the DoD
Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness Status Report to Congress
ensures appropriate accountability in meeting our audit readiness
milestones as we prepare for full financial statement auditability by
the end of fiscal year 2017.
Ms. James and General Welsh. Full financial statement audit
readiness is an enterprise wide endeavor. Each one of our functional
areas is impacted and we are applying considerable energy towards
meeting the deadline. Our strategy is based on the fundamental of what
is required for achieving audit readiness, which includes improving
financial processes, correcting legacy system deficiencies directly
impacting financial statements, and deploying a new accounting system.
We are focusing our greatest efforts on areas that have the most
material impact on our financial statement. The Air Force has a
realistic expectation of having to undergo several audits before
ultimately receiving a clean audit opinion. That is consistent with the
experience of other federal agencies. The Air Force is on track to meet
the September 30, 2017, goal and to sustain that audit culture as we
continue to remediate deficiencies identified during the audit.
Audit readiness is a high priority for the Department and we are
convinced DoD will continue to work with the Congress to achieve full
financial statement audit readiness.

determining active component/reserve component mix
94. Senator Manchin. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, do you
agree with the Reserve Forces Policy Board assessment of cost
differences between the Active and Reserve Forces, and if not, what is
your assessment?
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. Cost is but one of many criteria in
determining an appropriate Active Component/Reserve Component (AC/RC)
force mix. The annual, fully burdened cost of an ARNG Soldier is less
than that of an AC soldier because the Guard Soldier is funded to train
for 39 days a year while an AC Soldier is funded to train and be
available for 365 days per year.
But as reflected in a recent RAND Study (Assessing the Army's AC/RC
Force Mix), there is no simple one-to-one cost comparison of AC and RC
units due to differences in terms of time needed to train and frequency
of deployments. RC unit operating costs are lower, on average, largely
because RC units train less than full-time AC units. This difference
results in longer response times for RC units in the event of a crisis.
Units such as transportation, personnel, finance, and construction
oriented engineering are generally cheaper to maintain in the RC
because the skills required are on balance sustained with fewer
training days and through civilian employment. However, complex
organizations such as Brigade Combat Teams and Combat Aviation Brigades
are far more cost effective and readily available in the AC because of
the considerable training requirements for proficiency and the
inability to easily sustain individual skills in civilian employment.
We look forward to the Commission on the Future of the Army
conducting further analysis of the cost differences between Active and
Reserve Forces to ensure that we maintain fiscal effectiveness, are
best postured, and have the right force mix in the years to come.

95. Senator Manchin. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, how does
cost influence the Active and Reserve Force mix?
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. While cost is certainly a factor in
determining Active Component/Reserve Component (AC/RC) Force Mix, cost
must be weighed against responsiveness and flexibility.
The Army agrees with the recent RAND Study (Assessing the Army's
AC/RC Force Mix), which demonstrates that units such as transportation,
personnel, finance, and construction oriented engineering are generally
preferred in the RC because the skills required are relatively easily
sustained with fewer training days and through civilian employment.
After more than 13 years of war, the Army has concluded that the AC
is best suited for unpredictable and frequent deployments into complex
operational environments and for dealing with unexpected contingencies.
The RC is best suited for predictable and infrequent deployments, for
providing Title 32 support to state and local authorities, and for
providing operational and strategic depth.
We look forward to the Commission on the Future of the Army
conducting further analysis of the cost differences between Active and
Reserve Forces to ensure that we maintain fiscal effectiveness, are
best postured, and have the right force mix in the years to come.

96. Senator Manchin. General Odierno, in January 2014, you stated
you believe the Active Duty Army should constitute 46 percent of the
Total Army, and that if the Army has to draw down due to the budget,
the Guard should be reduced to ensure the 46 percent ratio. How did you
come up with the 46 percent ratio?
General Odierno. In order to meet the reductions imposed by
sequestration, we have worked over the past two years on a Total Force
Policy that ensures the proper balance for the Active Component (AC),
Army National Guard (ARNG) and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR).
We started this journey with guidance from the Secretary of Defense
that we not retain structure at the expense of readiness. With that,
the Secretary of the Army and I wanted to be able to preserve our
capabilities and capacity to implement the defense strategy as best we
can within available funding while balancing forces (people and units),
modernization (equipment), and readiness (training and education). The
Secretary and I established a Task Force led by the Vice Chief of
Staff, Army to identify and assess alternative approaches through an
open and collaborative process. Various options were considered in
meetings between the Chief, National Guard Bureau and the Vice Chief
considering options, evaluating them not only on their potential
savings, but just as importantly on the Army's ability to provide our
combatant commanders with the forward, surge, and rotational forces
they require on their contingency timelines. We considered Combatant
Commander war-plan requirements, operational commitments, future
requirements, costs, and necessary readiness levels. I closely
monitored the workings of the Task Force and considered all options
presented. To achieve our goals, we must balance the readiness and
responsiveness inherent in our Regular forces with the depth and
reduced cost of our Guard and Reserve forces to provide the best value
to the American taxpayer at the least risk to mission success and the
American Soldier.
Taking all of this into consideration, we directed that cuts should
come disproportionately from the AC before the ARNG or USAR. Our Total
Force Policy was informed by lessons learned during more than 13 years
of war. The plan we established recognizes the unique attributes,
responsibilities, and complementary nature of the three Army
components, while ensuring the ARNG and USAR are maintained as an
operational, and not a strategic reserve.
In addition, we look forward to the Commission on the Future of the
Army conducting further analysis of the cost differences between Active
and Reserve Forces to ensure that we maintain fiscal effectiveness, are
best postured, and have the right force mix in the years to come.

readiness
97. Senator Manchin. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, over the
past 13 years, the Army and Air National Guard have proven to be a
battle-tested, ready operational force equal to the task when called to
serve. The Guard has accomplished every task assigned to them by
combatant commanders. How do you intend to keep readiness, training,
and modernized equipment at a high level so the National Guard will
remain an operational force?
Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. We recognize the significant
contributions made by the Army National Guard (ARNG) as a part of the
Total Force and can ill-afford to allow the skills and competencies to
atrophy. Our goal is to maintain the ARNG as an operational reserve, a
key component in meeting mission requirements at home and abroad. To
accomplish this, the Army continues to increase the mix of ARNG
formations at our Combat Training Centers and Warfighter events.
We will partner Active Component (AC) and ARNG formations during
annual training and will conduct integrated pre-deployment collective
training to capitalize on the experience and lessons learned during the
last 13 years of war. The recent Bold Shift Initiative reorganized 1st
U.S. Army to be more responsive to pre-mobilization training support
for ARNG formations while retaining capability to conduct post-
mobilization operations. The combined effect of these initiatives will
enhance ARNG readiness.

accessibility of the national guard
98. Senator Manchin. General Odierno, since September 11, 2001, how
many National Guard units have failed to meet a Federal mobilization
requirement?
General Odierno. The Joint Sourcing Process looks at all forces and
their ability to meet Combatant Commander requirements; meaning,
generally, that units are only placed against requirements they are
capable of meeting. The Army National Guard has met every requirement
we have given them through this process.

99. Senator Manchin. General Odierno, how many Governors have
rejected a Federal mobilization requirement?
General Odierno. No Governor has rejected any federal mobilization
requirement since September 11, 2001.

total force construct
100. Senator Manchin. Secretary James and General Welsh, it appears
that the Air Force has fully embraced the Total Force construct to
maintain and grow capability and human capital at a cost our Nation can
afford. Do you believe you are achieving success and will this approach
allow you to free up assets to assist in recapitalizing the Air Force
to meet the future threats we face?
Secretary James and General Welsh. Yes. While growth in the Reserve
Component provides an immediate, effective, and affordable option to
reduce risk and meet near-term demand, there are some mission areas and
platforms where growth in the Active Component is also necessary. We
are committed to finding the right balance between resources and
components to ensure we have the most effective and efficient Air Force
possible.

101. Senator Manchin. Secretary James and General Welsh, what
policies and support do you need from this committee and this Congress
to help you achieve full integration and long term success and
stability?
Ms. James and General Welsh. The Air Force cannot return to Budget
Control Act (BCA) level funding and meet Defense Strategic Guidance
requirements. The President's Budget (PB) takes a critical step toward
recovering the needed funding levels that will allow us the stability
we need to be successful. Our analysis indicates we must leverage
opportunities to eliminate excess infrastructure to free-up scarce
resources for our readiness and modernization accounts.
The Air Force is also studying 28 human capital related initiatives
that may require legislation to implement. We will need Congressional
support on various Total Force initiatives, as many of the initiatives
are groundbreaking. One proposal will allow the Air Force to use
Reserve Component instructor pilots more efficiently across components.
Congressional approval of this initiative is vital to enabling further
integration at flying training units.
Another example of important legislative change includes an
amendment enabling the Services to provide equitable death benefits for
Reserve Components. We look forward to working with Congress as we
transform into a more seamless and integrated Air Force.

______

Question Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
blood testing for perfluorooctane sulfonate acid exposure
102. Senator Shaheen. Secretary James, in May 2014, city officials
in Portsmouth, NH, closed the Haven drinking-water well located on the
site of the former Pease Air Force Base after the Air Force found
perfluorooctane sulfonic acid in the well at levels ten times higher
than the provisional health advisory set by the Environmental
Protection Agency. As a result of this finding, New Hampshire's
Department of Health and Human Services is working to develop a means
to test for possible chemical exposure for my constituents who work at
Pease, as well as the young children in daycare on site there. However,
New Hampshire State officials are concerned that the associated cost
for this testing could be prohibitively expensive. I deeply appreciate
the Air Force's well-demonstrated willingness to rectify issues related
to contamination at Pease in the past. Is the Air Force also willing to
work with officials in New Hampshire to ensure that those who may have
been exposed to harmful levels of this chemical are tested to ensure
there is not a threat to their health?
Ms. James. The Air Force is supportive of actions that effectively
contribute to protecting human health and the environment. The
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) places the federal authority and responsibility for conducting
public health assessments of the effects of contamination with the
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), which is
under the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. ATSDR has the
appropriate expertise to independently review the health risk posed by
PFCs at Pease International Tradeport and determine the need for
further actions including blood testing.
In the meantime the Air Force continues to focus its efforts on
stopping human exposure to releases of the contaminant attributable to
the Air Force. Under the CERCLA, the Air Force may fund environmental
response actions necessary to address unreasonable risks to human
health and the environment attributable to releases of hazardous
substances, pollutants, or contaminants from Air Force activities.
These actions may include identifying and removing the sources of
ground water contamination, halting further migration of contaminants,
and providing alternate sources of drinking water. The Air Force
sampled the Haven Well and notified city officials about the results
and they immediately shut down the well. The Air Force performed
further sampling of public and private wells and identified one private
residence well that had PFC levels above the Environmental Protection
Agency's provisional health advisory level. The Air Force funded the
installation of a water treatment system in the private residence. The
Air Force is working with city officials to determine the best location
for a new drinking water well for the city. Air Force is also
conducting follow-on testing for all public water wells, monitoring
wells, and surrounding community public wells and also 30 private wells
to verify the PFC levels do not increase above the Environmental
Protection Agency's provisional health advisory.
______

Question Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
technology buying
103. Senator Heinrich. General Odierno, the committee is
considering major legislation which will change the way the Department
of the Army buys new technology. One of the major considerations is our
ability to leverage commercial innovation over building legacy systems
from scratch. Greater commercial integration can save money for the
Department of the Army and hasten the deployment of needed technologies
to the battlefield. The Army's DCGS-A system seems to be at a critical
crossroads with the program considering a proposed 2-year development
cycle to develop capabilities that may already be available for
purchase from commercial vendors and fielded with other government
agencies. Can your staff provide a briefing to my staff about how it is
implementing this goal within the Increment 2 process?
General Odierno. The Army will maximize competition among
commercial vendors and harvest ``best of breed'' technologies to
support the timely, secure, and effective exchange of intelligence
information. DCGS-A Increment 2 will have a full and open competition
in fiscal year 2016. The program will incorporate existing commercial
technologies, but these tools must be able to interact with other
Intelligence and Command and Control commercial and government software
applications. A two year development cycle is necessary to ensure the
software applications are integrated, tested, and certified prior to
fielding. The Army will work with your staff to set up a briefing to
discuss how the Army integrates existing commercial products into the
DCGS-A, Increment 2 program.

[Whereupon, at 5:17 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 AND
THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

----------

THURSDAY, MARCH 19, 2015

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND, AND U.S. CYBER
COMMAND

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in Room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John McCain,
chairman of the committee, presiding.
Committee Members Present: Senators McCain [presiding],
Inhofe, Sessions, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Ernst, Tillis,
Sullivan, Lee, Reed, McCaskill, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, and Heinrich.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman McCain. Good morning. The committee meets today
for its annual posture hearings on U.S. Strategic Command, U.S.
Transportation Command, and U.S. Cyber Command.
I'd like to welcome our witnesses today, and thank them for
their honorable service.
For nearly 70 years during the cold war, deterrence
provided a strong foundation for strategic ability and
predictability. Despite frequent tensions throughout this time,
we knew who our enemies were, we knew what they were capable
of, and, as a result, we were able to develop deterrence
strategies by making our intent known, regularly demonstrating
our capabilities, and continuously training to hone our skills.
Asymmetric threats were a concern, but global stability was won
or lost at the nuclear level. The U.S. Homeland was beyond the
reach of all but the most advanced long-range missiles.
As Henry Kissinger explained to this committee in January,
world order today is being defined not by, ``objective
strength,'' but by psychological contests and asymmetric war.
Existing world war--order is being redefined.
Our hearings today, while part of our annual combatant
commander posture hearings, provides us with an opportunity to
hear from our witnesses how this changing world order impacts
their missions and strategic thinking. Dr. Kissinger, before
this committee, also noted that, ``serious attention must be
given to the lagging modernization of our strategic forces.''
Indeed, while spending on U.S. nuclear forces has declined
over the last two and a half decades, Russia and other nuclear
powers are increasing reliance on their nuclear forces. Today,
Russia thinks strategically about the role of nuclear weapons,
space, and cyber in its national security strategy; in
particular, its strategy in eastern Europe. Russia used cyber
capabilities in Estonia, Georgia, and Ukraine. It is
weaponizing space with new anti-satellite capabilities. It has
updated its nuclear doctrine and has threatened to deploy dual-
capable systems in Crimea. Its long-range bombers penetrate
U.S. and allied defensive zones more frequently. Russia is
developing a nuclear ground-launch cruise missile, in violation
of the 1987 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and
the Russian military is pursuing modernization across the
entire suite of nuclear systems. Russia is likely--Russia
likely is using its nuclear and cyber capabilities to
intimidate and coerce North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
as part of its broader strategy to prevent the West from
intervening in its invasion of the Ukraine.
It's not just Russia. Admiral Haney notes that, ``Nuclear
weapons ambitions are increasing the risk that others will
resort to weapons of mass destruction, coercion, and regional
crises or Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) use in future
conflicts.'' This warning is more dire, given the decline in
NATO Europe's military capabilities and the deterioration in
U.S. readiness from budget constraints. We will want to hear
from Admiral Haney whether the President's Budget request for
nuclear forces allows us to maintain and modernize the U.S.
nuclear triad and ensure that replacement systems are available
within when our aging nuclear submarines, bombers, and ICBMs
face retirement, next decade.
Admiral Haney, we also look forward to your assessment of
the increasingly serious threats that the United States faces
in space. The fact is, some states are actively militarizing
space, to our detriment, and we need to develop a strategy with
full resourcing of the ways and means to defend against this
growing threat.
With respect to Cyber Command, the North Korean attack on
Sony illustrated how cyber warfare has reshaped the
battlefield. As I have said, this incident and its apparent
success will breed future and more significant attacks, and has
exposed serious flaws in the administration's cyber strategy.
The failure to develop a meaningful cyber deterrence strategy
has increased the resolve of our adversaries, and will continue
to do so at a growing risk to our National security until we
demonstrate that the consequences of exploiting the United
States through cyber greatly outweigh any perceived benefit.
Our ability to keep pace with the cyber threat and deter
aggression requires that we effectively train, arm, and equip
the over-6,000-person cyber force we are currently building.
The fiscal year 2016 budget includes $5.5 billion in cyber
investments. Unfortunately, as it turns out, the budget is
disproportionately focused on network infrastructure, with only
8 percent of that $5.5 billion allocated for Cyber Command and
the development of our cyber mission forces. I'm concerned that
a strategy too heavily weighted toward defense is a losing
strategy. Moreover, at the current levels of investment, we are
at great risk of having a hollow cyber force.
For U.S. Transportation Command, just last year this
committee conducted an exhaustive investigation of the cyber
threats facing TRANSCOM. According to the Pentagon, Chinese
military analysts, for example, have identified logistics and
mobilization as potential U.S. vulnerabilities. Given
Transportation Command's dependence upon the private sector and
the fact that the vast majority of their business is conducted
on unclassified networks, this committee felt it important to
enhance the Department's ability to share information with its
critical transportation contractors in the system in detecting
and mitigating cyber attacks.
Additionally, U.S. Transportation Command faces challenges
from the reduction of the size and scope of U.S. forces in
their deployments overseas. As a result, Transportation Command
must intelligently reduce and streamline its budget and
management infrastructures while maintaining the ability to
expand rapidly to react to future contingencies.
As Dr. Kissinger stated, the role of the United States in
indispensable--is indispensable, especially in a time of global
upheaval. Failing to maintain nuclear deterrents, modernize the
nuclear triad, defend ourselves in space, and establish
effective cyber deterrents will threaten American leadership.
I thank our witnesses for being here today, and look
forward to their testimony.
Senator Reed.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me join you in welcoming our witnesses, and thank them
for their service to the Nation. Please pass on our thanks to
the men and women who serve in your commands.
Admiral Haney, the U.S. Strategic Command is responsible
for developing a wide range of deterrence strategies, whether
it's the realm of nuclear space or cyber space, to ensure that
potential adversaries understand the high price they will incur
if our homeland or its assets around the world are attacked.
One of the most important deterrence strategies is our nuclear
triad. All three legs of the triad need to be modernized. We
need to build the Ohio-class replacement submarine, procure the
long-range strike bomber, and begin the process to replace
their Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs).
Over the next 10 years, this modernization process will
cost approximately $35 billion annually, which is about 3 to 4
percent of our current Defense Department budget. Given the
importance of our triad, but also acknowledging the fiscal
reality, Admiral Haney, how does this Department of Defense
ensure that these modernization priorities remain in place?
That's a issue I hope you'll address in your testimony.
General Selva, Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) is the
unsung hero of the combatant commands. You are key to every
other command receiving the resources it needs, yet you receive
little publicity or credit. I think you like the credit; the
publicity, you could do without. But, anyway, the credit is
deserved. Let me thank you and your men and women in your
command for what you do every day.
Like other commands, TRANSCOM does face a number of
daunting issues. First, TRANSCOM has to rely on other agencies
and the private sector for a portion of its aircraft. The Ready
Reserve Force, a group of cargo ships held in readiness by the
Maritime Administration, is aging and will need to be
modernized over the next decade. I am interested to know if
there's a plan to do this, and the funds apportioned to
accomplish this mission.
TRANSCOM also works with the private sector with the
Civilian Reserve Air Fleet, or the CRAF program, which has
provided as much as 40 percent of the wartime airlift needs.
I'm interested in hearing how TRANSCOM plans to keep crafts
viable after military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
conclude and wind down, and the plan to provide needed surge
capacity for the future.
Also, because it must work with private-sector entities in
the transportation and shipping industries to support
Department of Defense (DOD) deployment operations, TRANSCOM
faces a unique set of cyber threats. The Chairman alluded to
them in his comments. Last year, the committee issued a report
on certain aspects of TRANSCOM's cybersecurity situation.
General Selva, I'd like to hear what steps you've taken to
accomplish those missions.
Admiral Rogers, North Korea and Iran have both executed
very destructive attacks on domestic economic targets, with the
cyber attacks on Sony Corporation and the Sands Casino in Las
Vegas, respectively. However, we are not currently postured to
deter such attacks. I would appreciate your insights on what
steps must be taken so that private entities are not left alone
to face attacks from nation--states.
Also, as the cyber threat evolves, Cyber Command itself
remains a work in progress. It now has about half of its
planned cyber mission forces, but lacks adequate training
ranges and the equipment and tools necessary to plan, control,
execute, and assess robust military operations in cyber space.
We would certainly like your comments on this issue.
Let me again thank the witnesses. I look forward to the
testimony.
Chairman McCain. Welcome, Admiral Haney.

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL CECIL D. HANEY, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
STRATEGIC COMMAND

Admiral Haney. Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, and
distinguished members of the committee, with your permission
I'd like to have my full statement made part of the record.
Chairman McCain. Without objection.
Admiral Haney. I am honored to join you today, along with
the other witnesses here, and I thank them for their
leadership.
Your Strategic Command executes a diverse set of global
responsibilities that directly contribute to national security.
I can say with full confidence that, today, Strategic Command
remains capable and is ready to meet our assigned missions, and
our strategic nuclear forces are safe, secure, and effective.
The current goal--global security environment, as you've
mentioned, is more complex and dynamic and uncertain than at
any time in recent history, as state and nonstate actors
challenge our democratic values and our security in so many
ways. We see emerging capabilities from adversaries or
potential adversaries, to include but not limited to the
modernization of strategic nuclear capabilities. Counterspace
and cyberspace activities, conventional and asymmetric threats,
and disturbing trends undermine the strategic balance, giving
rise for concern for our Nation and our allies and partners.
Russia is of particular interest, given their activities in
Ukraine and Crimea, violations in the INF Treaty, and a
significant number of long-range strategic aircraft flights
penetrating United States and ally air defense identification
zones, while not just modernizing but demonstrating significant
capacities with integrated strategic operation nuclear-force
exercises during heightened tensions. Russia is developing and
using significant cyber capabilities and is committed to
developing counterspace capabilities.
China is growing and developing its strategic capabilities.
Their demonstrated counterspace capabilities in cyberspace
intrusions are of concern. At the same time, China is investing
in strategic nuclear-force mobility with mobile
intercontinental ballistic missiles and their SSBN submarine
fleet.
Additionally, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan missile tests
portend new challenges in nonproliferation of missile
technologies and potential weapons of mass destruction
payloads.
My U.S. Strategic Command team remains focused on deterring
strategic attack and assuring allies by providing combat
support to our joint military forces and other combatant
commands across the spectrum of their operations to support
national security and strategic stability. Strategic deterrence
today is much more than just nuclear weapons, although it is
underpinned, first and foremost, by our nuclear capabilities.
Strategic deterrence includes a robust intelligence apparatus,
space, cyber, conventional, and missile defense capabilities,
treaties, and comprehensive plans that link organizations and
synchronize capabilities.
Ultimately, our deterrence capabilities must remain
credible in order to convince adversaries the cost of
escalation is far greater than any benefit they seek. This
drives my six command priorities: to deter strategic attack;
provide our Nation with a safe; secure and effective nuclear
deterrent force; build enduring relationships with partner
organizations to confront the broad range of global challenges;
address challenges in space; build cyberspace capability and
capacity, while anticipating change and confronting uncertainty
with agility and innovation.
Achieving strategic deterrence in the 21st century must be
a national priority that requires continued investment in
strategic capabilities and a renewed multigenerational
commitment of intellectual capital. These investments, seen
holistically, are our Nationals--Nation's insurance policy.
While that policy cost is not insignificant, when you think of
all it ensures, it is of great value.
We seek to recapitalize our strategic capabilities, not
because we have always had them, but because they deter the
threats we face today and expect to do the same in the
foreseeable future. My near-term funding requirements are
sustainment and modernization of our nuclear triad, which
includes the Ohio replacement program, long-range strike
bomber, the 3+2 warhead strategy, and groundbased strategic
deterrent initiative; modernization of our National nuclear
command and control and communication architecture--we must
have assured command and control; developing resiliency in
space, including robust space situational awareness; building
and fielding and equipping cyber teams; improving homeland
missile defense capability, while improving foundational
intelligence.
The President's Budget for 2016 strikes a responsible
balance between national priorities and fiscal realities, and
begins to reduce some of the risk we have accumulated because
of deferred maintenance and sustainment. This budget supports
my mission requirements, but there is no margin to absorb new
risk. Any cuts to this budget, including those imposed by
sequestration, will hamper our ability to sustain and modernize
our military forces. Without relief from the Budget Control
Act, we will experience significant risk in providing the
United States with the strategic capabilities it needs, and I'm
concerned that we risk losing faith with our current All-
Volunteer Force, thus hampering our ability to recruit the next
generation of strategic warriors. As a Nation, we cannot afford
to underfund these strategic missions.
As you know, the Secretary of Defense directed an internal
and external review of the entire Department of Defense nuclear
enterprise. I concur with the review's conclusions and support
the planned investments in the nuclear enterprise that will
ensure the future safety, security, and effectiveness of the
force. None of this--none of this work I've described can be
done without the trained, ready, and motivated people. They are
our most precious resource.
Your continued support, together with the ongoing work of
the outstanding men and women of U.S. Strategic Command, will
ensure we not only remain ready, agile, and effective in
deterring strategic attack and ensuring our allies and
partners, but are able to create additional opportunities to
better address future threats.
Thank you for your time, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Haney follows:]

Prepared Statement of Admiral Cecil D. Haney, USN
introduction
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, I am
honored to join you today. I appreciate the opportunity to testify
about the posture of United States strategic forces, my assessment of
the President's Fiscal Year 2016 (FY16) Budget, and how United States
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) is confronting today's complex global
security environment. I am also pleased to be here with General Paul
Selva, Commander of United States Transportation Command; and Admiral
Mike Rogers, Commander of United States Cyber Command. I thank Congress
and this committee for your support to our Nation's defense.
I am pleased to report that USSTRATCOM remains capable and ready to
meet our assigned missions and that the Nation's strategic nuclear
deterrent force remains safe, secure, and effective. USSTRATCOM is
focused on deterring strategic attack and providing assurance to our
allies while providing combat support to our Joint Military Forces and
other Combatant Commands across the spectrum of their operations to
support national security and strategic stability. While executing our
global responsibilities, we made progress toward forging enduring
partnerships with agencies and organizations across the U.S.
government, commercial industry, and Allied nations. We took part in a
number of vigorous exercises and thought-provoking wargames, and we
participated in and conducted penetrating reviews of our nuclear
enterprise.
Having traveled extensively to meet first-hand the men and women
who carry out and support our strategic missions, I can personally
attest to the talent, dedication and professionalism of the military
and civilian personnel conducting these missions. Without doubt, our
success to date is largely due to those who dedicate themselves to
national security in spite of uncertainty and resource challenges. I
want to publicly acknowledge their service and devotion to duty and
country.
Today's complex and dangerous global security environment demands
that we properly sustain and modernize our strategic capabilities. The
President's Fiscal Year 2016 Budget strikes a responsible balance
between national priorities and fiscal realities, and begins to reduce
some of the risk we have accumulated because of deferred maintenance
and sustainment as we pursue modernization. This budget supports my
mission requirements, but I remain concerned that if we do not receive
relief from the Budget Control Act, we will experience significant risk
in providing the U.S. with the strategic capabilities it needs. We
cannot as a Nation afford to underfund these vital missions.
global security environment
The world today remains complex, dynamic, and uncertain. The
military capabilities of nation states and non-state actors are
improving across all domains. Nations around the world continue to
execute long-term military modernization programs, including
capabilities that pose an existential threat to the United States.
Additionally, non-state actors show increasing ability to strategically
impact worldwide stability and the security of the U.S. and our key
allies. Nuclear weapon ambitions and nuclear, chemical and biological
technologies proliferation continue, increasing the risk that others
will resort to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) coercion in regional
crises or WMD use in future conflicts.
Russia took a number of troubling actions in 2014: intrusions into
Ukraine, to include the attempted annexation of Crimea, violation of
the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, long-range bomber flights
penetrating U.S. and Allied defensive zones, and strategic force
exercises conducted in the midst of the Ukraine crisis. Russia has
pursued more than a decade of investments and modernization across
their strategic nuclear forces. Russia also has significant cyber
capability, as evidenced by events in Estonia, Georgia and Ukraine.
Russia has also publicly stated they are developing non-nuclear
precision-strike, cyber and counter-space capabilities, and Russian
leaders openly maintain that they possess anti-satellite weapons and
conduct anti-satellite research.
China is increasingly using low intensity coercion to advance its
near abroad agenda with respect to sovereignty disputes. Combined with
an overall lack of military transparency, its investment in
capabilities such as counterspace technologies raises questions about
China's global aspirations. According to the International Monetary
Fund, China's gross purchasing power recently exceeded our own for the
first time. China is using that wealth to modernize its strategic
forces by enhancing existing silo-based ICBMs, conducting flight tests
of a new mobile missile, and developing a follow-on mobile system
capable of carrying multiple warheads. Strategic modernization extends
to naval capabilities as China continues testing and integration of new
ballistic missile submarines, their first sea-based strategic nuclear
deterrent. China is also developing multi-dimensional space
capabilities supporting their access-denial campaign. With more than 60
nations operating satellites in space, China needs to be more
forthcoming about missile tests that appear to be more focused on the
development of destructive space weapons. China has also made headlines
associated with exploitation of computer networks.
Other states such as North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan are working to
advance their strategic capabilities. North Korea in particular
continues work to advance their nuclear ambitions, to include
conducting multiple nuclear tests and claiming a miniaturized warhead
capable of delivery by ballistic missile. At the same time, North Korea
continues to advance its ballistic missile capability, including the
development of a new road-mobile ballistic missile and a submarine-
launched ballistic missile; and develop its offensive cyber
capabilities.
We remain concerned about Iran's nuclear activities and as a
government remain dedicated to preventing them from acquiring a nuclear
weapon. I remain hopeful that the P5-plus-1 negotiations will have the
desired effect. Like North Korea, there are also public examples of
Iran's cyber activities and capabilities.
Ungoverned or ineffectively governed regions remain incubators for
those who seek to attack targets in--and the values of--democratic
societies across the globe. Terrorist threats continue to morph in both
substance and style, and Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) recruit
and operate freely across political and social boundaries. While
natural biological threats such as Ebola challenge our capacity to
contain and control them, WMD in the hands of unrestrained VEOs could
prove catastrophic. Such a scenario highlights the importance of our
countering WMD and our non-proliferation efforts. Finally, the Assad
regime continues to engage in low-level tactical use of toxic
industrial chemicals as weapons in Syria, while failing to fully
address the omissions and discrepancies in its chemical weapons
declaration to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons.
Space systems continue to enable a wide range of services,
providing vital national, military, civil, scientific, and economic
benefits to the global community. As the number of space-faring nations
and commercial enterprises continue to grow, the space domain is
becoming increasingly congested, contested, and competitive. Given the
counter space initiatives by Russia, China, and others, we must
continue to reinforce the peaceful use of space while ensuring
continued space operations through partnerships and resiliency.
Our dependence on cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS)
creates risk. The worldwide cyber threat continues to grow, with state
and non-state actors targeting U.S. networks on a daily basis. Today, a
small number of cyber actors have the potential to create large-scale
damage. While most cyber threats can be characterized as criminal in
nature, wide-ranging intrusions and attacks have threatened critical
infrastructure and impacted commercial enterprise. Likewise, our use of
the EMS has become so commonplace that we largely take spectrum access
for granted. The global proliferation of once-restricted technologies
allows adversaries and potential adversaries to directly challenge our
freedom of maneuver and our ability to operate in the EMS and in
cyberspace.
Finally, uncertainty continues to manifest in other ways such as
social unrest and turmoil, regional competition for scarce resources
and economic opportunities, naturally occurring phenomena such as
climate change and disease, and rapid proliferation of empowering
technologies. Additionally, the concept of mating advanced weapon
systems with commonplace items--such as surface-to-surface cruise
missiles disguised as shipping containers--blurs the line between
military and civilian environments and complicates our deterrence
calculus.
usstratcom in the 21st century
USSTRATCOM counters these diverse and complex threats through the
execution of its fundamental mission: to deter and detect strategic
attacks against the U.S. and our allies, and to defeat those attacks if
deterrence fails. USSTRATCOM is assigned nine distinct
responsibilities: Strategic Deterrence; Space Operations; Cyberspace
Operations; Global Strike; Joint Electronic Warfare; Missile Defense;
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance; Countering Weapons of
Mass Destruction; and Analysis and Targeting. These diverse assignments
are strategic in nature, global in scope, and intertwined with Joint
Force capabilities, the interagency and the whole of government. Each
mission supports or is interconnected with the others, and their
combined capabilities create the conditions for strategic deterrence
against a variety of threats.
Deterrence is a fundamentally human endeavor, firmly rooted in
psychology and social behavior. At the most basic level, deterrence is
achieved through one of two mechanisms. The first is an aggressor's
recognition that unacceptable costs may be imposed for taking an action
and recognition that forgoing said action may avoid these costs. The
second is an aggressor's belief that the contemplated action will not
produce its perceived benefit, or that not acting will produce a
greater perceived benefit. These elements combine to convince potential
adversaries that they will not succeed in an attack, and even if they
try, the costs will far outweigh the benefits and thus restraint is the
preferred choice. These fundamental elements of deterrence are well
understood, and are supported by USSTRATCOM's capabilities.
Strategic deterrence in the 21st century is far more than just
nuclear, although our nuclear deterrent remains the ultimate guarantor
of our security. It includes a robust intelligence apparatus; space,
cyber, conventional, and missile defense capabilities; and
comprehensive plans that link organizations and knit their capabilities
together in a coherent way. America's nuclear deterrent--a synthesis of
dedicated sensors, assured command and control, the triad of delivery
systems, nuclear weapons, enabling infrastructure, trained ready
people, and treaties and non-proliferation activities--remains
foundational to our national security and has been a constant thread in
the geopolitical fabric of an uncertain world. The likelihood of major
conflict with other nuclear powers is remote today, and the ultimate
U.S. goal remains the achievement of a world without nuclear weapons.
Until that day comes, the U.S. requires a safe, secure and effective
nuclear deterrent force, even as it continues to reduce its nuclear
stockpile and the number of deployed nuclear warheads. As stated in the
2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), our nuclear deterrent
capabilities `` . . . deter nuclear attack on the United States, as
well as on our allies and partners'' and communicate `` . . . to
potential nuclear-armed adversaries that they cannot escalate their way
out of failed conventional aggression.''
USSTRATCOM efforts are guided by my six overarching priorities. My
number one priority is to deter strategic attack. Strategic attacks can
occur through a variety of mechanisms in any domain and are defined by
their scope and their decisive negative outcomes for the Nation. They
may impact many people or systems, affect large physical areas, act
across great distances, persist over long periods of time, disrupt
economic or social structures, or change the status quo in a
fundamental way. We must continue our efforts to deter strategic
threats to global stability.
Second, we will provide the Nation with a safe, secure and
effective nuclear deterrent force. Foundational documents such as the
2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the 2013 Report on Nuclear Weapons
Employment Strategy, and the 2014 QDR have consistently repeated this
mandate. It is my responsibility to provide our Nation with a viable
and credible nuclear deterrent force as long as nuclear weapons exist.
Third, we will build enduring relationships with partner
organizations to confront the broad range of global challenges. We aim
to work seamlessly across the federal government, commercial sector,
and with partners and Allies to apply the breadth of USSTRATCOM
capabilities toward a synchronized pursuit of national objectives.
Robust interaction occurs at all levels in our organization and
includes operations, exercises and wargames with other Combatant
Commands and Allies.
Fourth, we will continue to address challenges in space. Space
capabilities remain foundational to our way of life, yet are
increasingly vulnerable to hostile actions. Robust space domain
awareness remains central to our ability to maintain an advantage in
space.
Fifth, we must continue to build cyberspace capability and
capacity. Cyberspace supports operations extensively in all of my
mission areas and has become a critical facet of national power. We
must continue to develop a robust cyber mission force with the
authorities, skills, and resources to protect against a maturing set of
cyber threats.
Finally, geopolitical and fiscal realities demand that we
anticipate change and confront uncertainty with agility and innovation.
Sound decision-making requires thorough analysis to prioritize our
activities along with flexible, agile, adaptable thinking and systems.
I fully support the Defense Innovation Initiative and the associated
Advanced Capability and Deterrence Panel. These efforts will help us
identify new operational concepts, develop cutting edge technology, and
enable a continuing evolution of ideas on how to deter current and
potential adversaries.
mission area capabilities & requirements
Even the best analysis will never be error free, so we must
maintain adequate readiness to confront uncertainty. Prioritizing
resources to meet our requirements requires a thoughtful assessment of
national priorities in the context of fiscal realities. The President's
Fiscal Year 2016 Budget supports my mission requirements, but there is
no margin to absorb risk. Any cuts to that budget--including those
imposed by sequestration--will hamper our ability to sustain and
modernize our military forces, and will add significant risk to our
strategic capabilities now and in the future.
Nuclear Deterrent Forces
In the wake of a series of events involving the Nation's nuclear
forces and their leadership, Secretary Hagel directed an internal and
external review of the entire Department of Defense (DOD) nuclear
enterprise. The reviews concluded that while our nuclear forces are
currently meeting the demands of the mission, we needed to make
significant changes to ensure the future safety, security, and
effectiveness of the force. I fully support planned investments in the
nuclear enterprise that will improve and sustain current equipment in
response to these reviews.
Our nuclear deterrent is the ultimate insurance against a nuclear
attack on the United States. We must commit to investments that will
allow us to maintain this insurance in a safe and secure way for as
long as nuclear weapons exist, or risk degrading the deterrent and
stabilizing effect of a credible and capable nuclear force. Today we
spend less than 3 percent of the DOD budget on nuclear capabilities. As
stated by the Congressional Budget Office, recapitalization investments
that are necessary to ensure safety and security will increase this
number to ``roughly 5 percent to 6 percent.''
Sensors. Strategic missile warning remains one of our most
important missions. Along with persistent and tailored intelligence
capabilities, our Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment
network of sensors and processing facilities provide timely, accurate,
unambiguous, and continuous tactical early warning and allow us to
select the most suitable course of action in rapidly developing
situations. The Defense Support Program is nearing the end of its
operational life, but the Space-Based Infrared System program is on
track to provide continuous on-orbit capability. The survivable and
endurable segments of these systems, along with Early Warning Radars
and nuclear detonation detection elements, are in urgent need of
continued simultaneous sustainment and modernization. We must continue
to maintain legacy systems at ever-increasing risk to mission success.
Prompt and sufficient recapitalization of these critical facilities and
networks--to include electromagnetic pulse protection and survivable
endurable communications with other nodes in the system--will be
central to maintaining a credible deterrent. I fully support continued
investment in this critical area.
Nuclear Command, Control and Communications (NC3). Assured and
reliable NC3 is fundamental to the credibility of our nuclear
deterrent. The aging NC3 systems continue to meet their intended
purpose, but risk to mission success is increasing as key elements of
the system age. The unpredictable challenges posed by today's complex
security environment make it increasingly important to optimize our NC3
architecture while leveraging new technologies so that NC3 systems
operate together as a core set of survivable and endurable capabilities
that underpin a broader, national command and control system.
I appreciate Congress' direction last year to establish the Council
on Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control and
Communications System (CONLC3S). The CONLC3S has proven effective in
bringing NC3 stakeholders together to synchronize and prioritize NC3
modernization efforts, and then articulate those priorities to
Congress. Specific programs include the Family of Beyond-line-of-sight
Terminals, Presidential National Voice Conferencing, the Multi-Role
Tactical Common Data Link, Phoenix Air-to-Ground Communications
Network, the E-4B Low Frequency Transmit System, B-2 Common Very Low
Frequency Receiver, and the E-6B service life extension and Airborne
Launch Control System replacement programs.
The USSTRATCOM Command and Control (C2) Facility will support all
our missions and will feature prominently in our future nuclear and
national C2 architecture. The project is progressing well and will soon
transition from exterior construction to interior fit-out. Timely,
consistent, and stable funding is vital to keeping the project on-time
and on-budget. I appreciate the steadfast support that Congress
continues to provide for this effort.
Nuclear Triad. The policy of maintaining a nuclear triad of
strategic nuclear delivery systems was most recently re-iterated in the
2014 QDR. Our Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, Ballistic Missile
Submarines, and nuclear capable heavy bombers each provide unique and
complementary attributes that together underpin strategic deterrence--
and each element is in need of continued investment.
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). Our ICBM force
promotes deterrence and stability by fielding a responsive and
resilient capability that significantly complicates the decision
calculus of any potential adversary. Though first fielded in 1962, the
Minuteman Weapon System is sustainable through 2030, with near-term
investments in the Mk21 replacement fuze, ICBM Cryptographic Upgrade,
Payload Transporter vehicle replacement, Transporter-Erector vehicle
replacement, and UH-1N helicopter replacement programs to address age-
related issues. The Air Force is initiating the Ground Based Strategic
Deterrent program to begin recapitalizing the ICBM enterprise.
USSTRATCOM fully supports an integrated weapon system recapitalization
effort that synchronizes flight systems, ground systems, command and
control, infrastructure, and support equipment development and
deployment.
Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs). Recapitalizing our sea-based
strategic deterrent force is my top modernization priority. The Navy's
SSBNs and Trident II D5 ballistic missiles constitute the Triad's most
survivable leg. In 2014, the Ohio-class fleet completed the submarine
force's 4000th strategic deterrent patrol. This stealthy and highly
capable force is undergoing needed modernization to extend the life of
the D5 missile and replace the Ohio-class SSBNs which begin to retire
in 2027. No further extension is possible and maintaining operational
availability is a concern. We must resource sustainment of the Ohio
class SSBNs to maintain the required availability through the
transition period to the Ohio Replacement Program (ORP) SSBN and until
the last hull is decommissioned in 2040. Stable funding of the ORP, the
life-of-ship reactor core, and supporting systems and infrastructure is
critical to achieving a first deterrent patrol in 2031. In addition, we
must continue our commitment to the United Kingdom to develop and field
the Common Missile Compartment to ensure both nations' SSBNs achieve
operational capability on schedule.
Heavy Bombers. Our dual-capable B-52 and B-2 bombers continue to
provide significant conventional capabilities along with flexibility,
visibility and a rapid hedge against technical challenges in other legs
of the nuclear triad. Planned sustainment and modernization activities,
to include associated NC3, will ensure a credible nuclear bomber
capability through 2040. Looking forward, a new highly survivable
penetrating bomber is required to credibly sustain our broad range of
deterrence and strike options beyond the lifespan of today's platforms.
Maintaining an effective air-delivered standoff capability is vital to
meet our strategic and extended deterrence commitments and to
effectively conduct global strike operations in anti-access and area-
denial (A2AD) environments. The Long Range Stand-Off AoA completed
earlier this year recommended a follow-on nuclear cruise missile to
replace the aging Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) with a capability
designed for future adversary A2AD environments.
Weapons and Infrastructure. Nuclear weapons and their supporting
infrastructure underpin our nuclear triad, with the average warhead
today over 27 years old. Surveillance activities, Life Extension
Programs (LEPs), and Stockpile Stewardship efforts are key to
sustaining our nuclear arsenal by mitigating age-related effects and
incorporating improved safety and security features without a return to
nuclear testing.
As a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) I work in close
coordination with my DOD and Department of Energy counterparts to
ensure we maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear stockpile.
Active and sustained execution of the NWC's long-term ``3+2'' strategy
to deliver three ballistic missile and two air-delivered warheads is
crucial to achieving this goal while addressing both near-term
technical needs and future capability requirements. The W76-1 and B61-
12 LEPs are on track and are necessary to maintain confidence in the
reliability, safety and intrinsic security of our nuclear weapons.
Early activities are underway supporting the cruise missile replacement
by the late 2020s. The President's Fiscal Year 2016 Budget supports
this and ensures schedule alignment of the cruise missile delivery
platform and its associated weapon.
Sustaining and modernizing the nuclear enterprise infrastructure--
in physical and intellectual terms--is central to our long-term
strategy. Continued material investment and maintaining an adequate
pool of nuclear scientists and engineers is crucial to providing
critical capabilities that meet our stockpile requirements.
Treaties. International agreements such as New Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (New START), the Open Skies Treaty (OST), and the
Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty contribute to strategic
stability through transparency, confidence building, and verification.
The State Department has primary responsibility for treaty
administration, and USSTRATCOM remains closely involved in their
execution.
New START's central limits and verification mechanisms reduce the
likelihood of misperceptions and misunderstandings. Similarly, OST
demonstrated its utility during the crisis in the Ukraine, where
overflight missions allowed the 34 state parties to the treaty the
opportunity to observe the situation on the ground, thereby
supplementing other sources of information. In a similar vein, the INF
Treaty promoted strategic stability by addressing capabilities of
significant concern to our European Allies. While these agreements have
served valuable roles in promoting strategic stability, treaty
violations are a cause for concern.
The U.S. has a long-standing commitment to reducing the number of
nuclear weapons consistent with national policy and geopolitical
conditions. At the height of the Cold War, the U.S. had 31,000 nuclear
warheads. When New START was ratified in February 2011, we had 1,800
deployed warheads. USSTRATCOM continues to work with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Services to
implement New START. To date, the U.S. and Russia have together
conducted over 70 inspections and have exchanged more than 7,000 New
START message notifications. In 2014, the U.S. finalized the New START
force structure and completed de-MIRVing MM III ICBMs. Given the proper
authority and funding, we are on track to achieve New START's limits of
1,550 deployed warheads, 700 deployed delivery systems, and 800
deployed and non-deployed delivery systems by February 2018.
Space Operations
The U.S. must maintain assured access to space. Our national space
capabilities allow us to globally navigate, communicate, and observe
natural and man-made events in areas where non-space sensors are either
not available or not feasible. Space capabilities are also a key
component of strategic deterrence. Our space sensors, command and
control systems, and space situational awareness capabilities are
critical to supporting both our deployed forces and our national
decision making processes.
As articulated in the 2011 National Security Space Strategy, the
space domain is contested, congested, and competitive. Our potential
adversaries have signaled their ability to conduct hostile operations
in space as an extension of the terrestrial battlefield, and consider
these operations essential to deny U.S. forces the asymmetric
advantages of space. To mitigate this trend, the U.S. continues to
partner with responsible nations, international organizations and
commercial firms to promote responsible, peaceful and safe use of
space. We also strive to maximize the advantages provided by improved
space capabilities while reducing vulnerabilities; and seek to prevent,
deter, defeat and operate through attacks on our space capabilities.
Foundational to all of these efforts is sufficient Space
Situational Awareness (SSA)--the information that allows us to
understand what is on orbit, where it is and where it is going, and how
it is being used. Our goal is to ensure space remains a safe domain for
all legitimate users. Sharing SSA information and collaborating with
other nations and commercial firms promotes safe and responsible space
operations, reduces the potential for debris-producing collisions,
builds international confidence in U.S. space systems, fosters U.S.
space leadership, and improves our own SSA through knowledge of other
owner/operator satellite positional data.
USSTRATCOM is committed to using the full capabilities of our
overhead-persistent infrared systems for all relevant mission areas. We
are actively partnering with the Intelligence Community to more
effectively manage our intelligence requirements, share data, and
ensure all of our assets are effectively working to support national
priorities.
In accordance with U.S. law, USSTRATCOM has negotiated SSA Sharing
Agreements and Arrangements with 46 commercial entities, two
intergovernmental organizations (EUMETSAT and European Space Agency),
and eight nations (France, Italy, Japan, Australia, Canada, South
Korea, United Kingdom, and Germany) and is in the process of
negotiating agreements with additional nations. Through these sharing
agreements, USSTRATCOM assists partners with activities such as launch
support; maneuver planning; support for on-orbit anomaly resolution,
electromagnetic interference reporting and investigation; support for
launch anomalies and de-commissioning activities; and on-orbit
conjunction assessments.
At the nucleus of USSTRATCOM's approach to space security is both
strategic and tactical mission assurance--ensuring Combatant Commanders
have required access to space-based capabilities, achieved through
freedom of action in space. USSTRATCOM's Joint Functional Component
Command for Space (JFCC Space), located at Vandenberg Air Force Base in
California, leads the efforts to ensure continuous and integrated space
operations and routinely track tens of thousands of space objects in
orbit around the Earth. This includes more than 1,100 active satellites
owned and operated by approximately 60 nations and government
consortia, plus hundreds of small commercial and academic satellites.
In 2014, this allowed JFCC Space to issue more than 12,000 conjunction
alerts, resulting in 121 collision avoidance maneuvers, to include
several maneuvers by the International Space Station.
We must sustain judicious and stable investments to preserve the
advantages we hold in this dynamic and increasingly complex
environment. Examples include the Space Fence program which will
greatly expand the capacity of the Space Surveillance Network,
investments in modeling and simulation which will increase our
understanding of the space environment and adversary capabilities, and
funding for satellite communications that are resistant to
interference. We must also continue to seek out innovative and
cooperative solutions with Allies and partners to ensure the products
and services we derive from operating in space remain available, even
when threatened by natural events or the actions of a determined
adversary. These include both active and passive protection measures
for individual systems and constellations and a critical examination of
the architectural path we will follow to ensure resilience and
affordability in space.
Cyberspace Operations
This year marks the fifth anniversary of the activation of our
assigned sub-unified command, US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) located at
Ft. Meade, Maryland. USCYBERCOM seeks to impart an operational outlook
and attitude to the running of the DOD's roughly seven million
networked devices and 15,000 network enclaves--which represent a global
system that operates at the speed of light beyond geographic and
political boundaries.
Our primary focus for cyberspace operations within DOD is to
increase capacity and capability. The Cyber Mission Force (CMF)
construct addresses the significant challenges of recruiting, training,
and retaining the people, facilities and equipment necessary to
generate the workforce required for successful cyberspace operations.
Our plans call for the creation of 133 cyber mission teams manned by
more than 6,000 highly trained personnel by the end of fiscal year
2016. To date, 61 of those teams are fielded and engaged in a variety
of missions. The majority of these teams will support the combatant
commands, with the remainder supporting national missions. It is
imperative that we continue to pursue fulfilling our cyber
capabilities. Budget stability is key to achieving this vision, as
every training day we lose to fiscal constraints will cause further
delays in fielding the CMF.
In order to posture the DOD to better defend against the growing
number of threats, USSTRATCOM proposed the establishment of a Joint
Force Headquarters - DOD Information Network (JFHQ-DODIN). The JFHQ-
DODIN became operational in January 2015 and enables the Commander,
USCYBERCOM to delegate authority for the operational and tactical level
planning, execution, and oversight of DOD information network
operations and defense to a subordinate unit. This arrangement ensures
tactical mission success while allowing USCYBERCOM to remain focused on
operational and strategic concerns.
Global Strike
USSTRATCOM's Joint Functional Component Command for Global Strike
(JFCC-GS) operates from Offutt AFB, Nebraska with headquarters at
Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. JFCC-GS provides a unique ability to command
and control our global strike capabilities and build plans that rapidly
integrate into theater operations. This includes integration of combat
capability associated with kinetic and non-kinetic effects.
Conventional prompt strike (CPS) capability offers the opportunity
to rapidly engage high-value targets without resorting to nuclear
options. CPS can provide precision and responsiveness in A2AD
environments while simultaneously minimizing unintended military,
political, environmental, economic or cultural consequences. I support
continuing research and development of capabilities that help fill the
conventional strike gap with a discernible non-ballistic trajectory,
maneuverability for over-flight avoidance, and payload delivery
capability.
Effective strike solutions require dedicated analysis. USSTRATCOM's
Joint Warfare and Analysis Center (JWAC) in Dahlgren, Virginia enhances
our Strategic Deterrence and Global Strike missions by providing unique
and valuable insight into selected adversary networks. JWAC's ability
to solve complex challenges for our Nation's warfighters--using a
combination of social and physical science techniques and engineering
expertise--is invaluable to protecting the Nation and helping the Joint
Force accomplish its missions.
Joint Electronic Warfare
America's prosperity and security relies on assured access to the
electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) to achieve strategic advantage and
enable the instruments of national power. The EMS reaches across
geopolitical boundaries and warfighting domains, and is tightly
integrated into the operation of critical infrastructures and the
conduct of commerce, governance, and national security.
Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (JEMSO) underpin U.S.
national objectives and enable the combat capability of the Joint Force
by ensuring friendly access to the EMS while denying adversaries the
same. USSTRATCOM is engaged in developing JEMSO policy and doctrine,
and in addressing capability gaps across the DOD. Additionally, the
USSTRATCOM JEMSO Office in conjunction with the Joint Electronic
Warfare Center and Joint Electromagnetic Preparedness for Advanced
Combat Center work closely with the combatant commands, Services and
other Department agencies supporting the warfighter through advocacy,
planning, and training.
Effective operations in the EMS will require development of an
Electromagnetic Battle Management (EMBM) capability. The size and
complexity of the EMS drives the requirement for the EMBM to be
automated, interface at the machine level, and operate at near real-
time speeds. This effort provides guidance for Service interoperability
while retaining flexibility to meet Service-specific requirements.
Future efforts will further refine and add context to the approved
architectures.
Missile Defense
Effective missile defense is an essential element of the U.S.
commitment to strengthen strategic and regional deterrence against
states of concern. Today, 30 operational Ground Based Interceptors
protect the U.S. against a limited ICBM attack from potential regional
threats such as North Korea, but continued investment in three broad
categories is required to improve our capabilities against growing
threats: persistent and survivable engagement-quality tracking sensors,
increased interceptor inventories with improved performance and
reliability, and increased regional capability and capacity. These
needs can be addressed by funding priority programs such as: Long-Range
Discriminating Radar, a redesigned Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV),
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense and the Theater High-Altitude Area
Defense follow-on, Overhead Persistent Infra-Red sensors, Upgraded
Early Warning Radars, and Joint Tactical Ground Stations.
New technologies must be proven before we can count on them to
contribute to our operational plans. I fully support the concept of
``fly before you buy,'' and I was pleased by the Missile Defense
Agency's successful test in June 2014 of the Capability Enhancement II
EKV.
The European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) contributes to the
defense of the United States, our deployed forces in Europe, and our
Allies. For example, the forward-based radar deployed in Turkey is
capable of providing important early trajectory data on possible
Iranian missile launches. EPAA Phase 1 was completed in 2011 and
efforts are on track to fulfill Phase 2 and Phase 3 commitments in 2015
and 2018 respectively. Interoperability between NATO's Active Layered
Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence system and the U.S. command and
control network has been successfully demonstrated.
In December 2014, with the assistance of the Japanese Ministry of
Defense, the DOD fielded a second AN/TPY-2 radar in Japan. The radar
will augment the existing AN/TPY-2 radar and will enhance the ability
to defend Japan, our forward deployed forces, and the U.S. homeland
from North Korean ballistic missile threats.
The missile defense community--including USSTRATCOM's Joint
Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC-IMD)
located in Colorado Springs, Colorado--continued to refine its
understanding of missile defense challenges from technical and
resourcing perspectives. These include evaluating current and future
sensor architectures to better integrate missile defense and
situational awareness missions, studying potential CONUS interceptor
sites, understanding current and future cruise and ballistic missile
threats, improving hit-to-kill assessment capabilities, and optimizing
the location of missile defense assets.
Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconnaissance (ISR)
The demand for ISR will always outpace our ability to fully satisfy
all requirements. At the same time, we are focused on the goal of
increasing the effectiveness and persistence of our ISR capabilities
while reducing the ``cost of doing business.'' Located at Joint Base
Anacostia-Bolling AFB, Washington, D.C., USSTRATCOM's Joint Functional
Component Command for ISR (JFCC-ISR) is working with our headquarters,
the Joint Staff, the Services, the combatant commands and the
Intelligence Community to improve the management of the Department's
existing ISR capabilities given the high demands on these critical
assets. I fully support this maximizing the agile and effective use of
the capabilities we have, while also enhancing allied and partner
contribution and cooperation. These efforts are designed to increase
the persistence of our ISR capabilities, reduce the risk of strategic
surprise, and increase our ability to respond to crises.
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD)
In June, the Secretary of Defense issued a new Defense Strategy for
Countering WMD which affirms that the pursuit of WMD and potential use
by actors of concern pose a threat to U.S. national security and peace
and stability around the world. As DOD's global synchronizer for CWMD
planning efforts, USSTRATCOM supports this strategy by leveraging the
expertise resident in our Center for Countering Weapons of Mass
Destruction (SCC-WMD), the Standing Joint Force Headquarters for
Elimination (SJFHQ-E), and our partners at the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency (DTRA)--all located at Ft. Belvoir, Virginia. Together, our
organizations conduct real-world and exercise CWMD activities with the
other combatant commands to identify, prioritize, and mitigate WMD
risks posed by proliferation of WMD technology and expertise to nation
states and non-state actors.
USSTRATCOM contributed to the international effort to eliminate
Syria's declared chemical weapons program in support of United States
European and Central Commands. Additionally, SCC-WMD, SJFHQ-E, and DTRA
personnel supported United States Africa Command's response to the 2014
Ebola outbreak in West Africa through the establishment of Regional
Contingency Team - Ebola. The work conducted by this team--and the
lessons learned along the way--will enable more effective responses to
future natural or man-made biological threats.
To execute the DOD Strategy for CWMD, the CWMD community has
identified a need for a comprehensive situational awareness capability
that incorporates collaborative tools, continuously assesses the WMD
threat, and provides a shared holistic awareness of the WMD
environment. This capability would provide an enhanced awareness of
emergent catastrophic-scale WMD threats that require continued
collaboration across the interagency and partner nations to enable a
proactive rather than reactive approach. We work closely with DTRA to
develop this capability with input from our partners--such as the
Intelligence Community and the Departments of State, Energy, Homeland
Security and Justice--which will help us to clearly define operational
information needs. Finally, there is an urgent need to update aging
agent defeat weapons and develop modeling and simulation capabilities
to assess collateral damage during WMD weapon attacks.
our people
People remain our most precious resource and deserve our
unequivocal commitment to their well-being. My travels throughout the
past year visiting nuclear task forces, component commands, and
USCYBERCOM confirmed my belief that we have an outstanding team in
place across all of our mission areas. I am proud to serve alongside
the men and women of USSTRATCOM and have the utmost respect for their
professionalism, dedication to our missions, and sustained operational
excellence.
We must continue to recruit and retain those who support the
missions associated with strategic deterrence, from operators in the
field to scientists in laboratories conducting surveillance and life
extension work. We must directly support this unique workforce, but
also ensure we support initiatives to keep them aware of our Nation's
support for their important missions for the foreseeable future.
Whether they are underway on an SSBN, standing alert in a Launch
Control Center, or supporting a mission from cyberspace to outer space,
these great Americans will do all they can for their Nation, but are
rightly concerned about their futures given continuing manpower
reductions planned over the next several years. We are seeking the most
efficient ways to achieve the Department's goals and are on track to do
so, but cannot accommodate further cuts without a commensurate loss of
organizational agility and responsiveness.
conclusion
Achieving strategic deterrence in the 21st century requires an
investment in strategic capabilities and a renewed, multi-generational
commitment of intellectual capital. In today's uncertain times, I am
honored to lead such a focused, innovative and professional group
dedicated to delivering critical warfighting capabilities to the
Nation. Your support, together with the hard work of the exceptional
men and women of United States Strategic Command, will ensure that we
remain ready, agile and effective in deterring strategic attack,
assuring our Allies and partners, and addressing current and future
threats.

Chairman McCain. Thank you.
General Selva, welcome.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL PAUL J. SELVA, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

General Selva. Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, distinguished
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity and the
honor to represent the men and women of the U.S. Transportation
Command to this committee here today.
I'm proud to be able to testify with two fellow commanders
and friends as we go through this hearing.
I have traveled the world in the last 6 months, and watched
the men and women of the U.S. Transportation Command provide
the distribution, deployment, and sustainment solutions for our
combatant commanders. They do so without fanfare and often in
stressful conditions, supporting our soldiers, sailors, airmen,
marines, civilian employees, and their families at home and
abroad.
While U.S. Transportation Command is ready today to face
this challenge, we must pay attention to the health of the
global distribution enterprise of tomorrow. We rely on our
service component commands along with contracted commercial
augmentation to provide the distribution services that make us
successful. The readiness of our components and commercial
providers is key to our success in this global mission.
Maintaining the necessary commercial and organic readiness is
U.S. TRANSCOM's most significant challenge.
As the Department's demand for commercial sealift and
airlift decreases, U.S. TRANSCOM must continue to ensure the
required surge and force sustainment capabilities are available
when needed. Finding the right balance of organic and
commercial utilization will require us to carefully coordinate
across the entire enterprise with all of our partners using all
of the available authorities that exist in current law and
executive policy.
To secure our sealift surge capacity, we continue to work
with the Department of Transportation's Maritime Administration
to ensure the health of the Maritime Security Program, which
brings us 60 militarily useful ships to meet combatant
commander requirements, and the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift
Agreement, which gains us access to over $300 billion of
commercially owned sealift capacity and inland transportation
infrastructure. We must ensure that we are able to support the
full spectrum of defense needs with these capabilities. Both
programs provide critical sealift capacity and trained merchant
mariners during national security contingencies or humanitarian
relief and disaster assistance responses. I appreciate this
Congress's attention to full funding for the Maritime Security
Program, which reaffirms our commitment to industry and is
mitigating future risk to our strategic commercial sealift
capacity.
Of significant concern to me is the need to recapitalize
1.6 million square feet of our organic roll-on/roll-off
military capability. We're working closely with the U.S. Navy
to develop a plan that meets combatant commander requirements
and is sensitive to the capability that will be required during
future service force developments. This plan will look beyond
the near-term capability requirements and will be informed by
the Defense Department's ongoing sealift study and the Maritime
Administration's national maritime strategy.
I'm also concerned about the long-term health of our
merchant mariners. This group of civilian merchant mariners,
who crew our ships, both military and commercial, during
crisis. These patriotic Americans have crewed America's
merchant marine vessels for the entire history of this Nation.
We're also in the process of implementing several of the
Civilian Reserve Air Fleet program changes that are a result of
a recently concluded Civil Reserve Air Fleet study. When
implemented, these changes will ensure the continuation of a
viable and ready Civil Reserve Air Fleet that is capable of
answering any future requirements and provide best value to the
U.S. Government. We have worked closely with our commercial
partners and responded to many of their concerns as we navigate
these changes.
The transportation and distribution enterprise remains
ready today to respond to any contingency or to sustain our
forces in the field for any length of time. But, to ensure that
this command is ready to respond anytime with our commercial
carriers' assistance, I have directed that all contract
acquisitions for transportation now consider readiness-related
criteria, including the relationship of performance and cost to
enterprisewide readiness, as a factor in any decision to let a
contract. We will continue to work across the Defense
Department to ensure that TRANSCOM has the necessary organic
and commercial surge capabilities to respond when called upon.
Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, and all members of this
committee, thank you for the continued support that you have
given to U.S. Transportation Command and all of the men and
women that provide for the deployment, distribution, and
sustainment of our Services abroad.
I would ask that my written statement be submitted for the
record.
I look forward to your questions.
Chairman McCain. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of General Selva follows:]

Prepared Statement by General Paul J. Selva, USAF
introducing the united states transportation command 2015
No other nation can match the ability of the United States of
America to deploy and sustain forces on a global scale. The United
States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) leads a Total Force team of
Active Duty, Guard, Reserve, civilians, and commercial transportation
providers who operate a world-class Joint Deployment and Distribution
Enterprise. Our Service component commands, the Army's Military Surface
Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), the Navy's Military Sealift
Command (MSC), the Air Force's Air Mobility Command (AMC); our
functional component command, the Joint Transportation Reserve Unit
(JTRU); and our subordinate command, the Joint Enabling Capabilities
Command (JECC), in conjunction with the transportation industry,
provide unparalleled logistics support and enabling capabilities to our
forces, their families, and coalition partners around the world.
Deploying our Nation's military forces and ensuring they receive
sustainment at the times, places, and in the quantities they need to
succeed is USTRANSCOM's fundamental role in securing our Nation. Our
continued success in this role depends on preserving an agile and
resilient global distribution network--a complex array of capabilities,
infrastructure, access, partnerships, and command and control
mechanisms. This complex network underpins our Nation's response to
emerging crises, and undergirds our warfighters' successes.
USTRANSCOM's transportation operations are funded by the
Transportation Working Capital Fund (TWCF) which enables us to provide
timely transportation services to our supported commanders. We are, in
turn, reimbursed for the transportation we provide in support of their
requirements. We rely on our Service component commands--AMC, SDDC, and
MSC--along with contracted commercial augmentation, to provide these
vital transportation services. The components' and commercial
providers' capacity and readiness levels are key to the success of our
global mission and their ability to respond to USTRANSCOM taskings.
strategic environment
With the potential return to sequestration-level funding returning
in fiscal year (FY) 2016, I remain concerned the combined effect of
declining government transportation demand, reduced financial
resources, and other economic and regulatory restrictions may drive
readiness to unacceptable levels. Reductions in Service components'
readiness funding, a likely outcome of sequestration, will negatively
affect USTRANSCOM's ability to accomplish our mission. We will continue
to work across the Department of Defense (DOD) to ensure USTRANSCOM has
the necessary capabilities and capacity required to respond when called
upon. USTRANSCOM has always delivered when needed, and we will continue
to do so provided our component commands receive the resources they
need to execute our global mission.
The transportation resources and cyber infrastructure that enable
strategic mobility are key components of the United States' asymmetric
logistics advantage in both peace and war. In the future, we expect
great reliance on USTRANSCOM's ability to rapidly deploy continental
U.S. (CONUS)-based forces to operate in complex, noncontiguous
locations with simultaneous operations in multiple theaters. Our Forces
will have less access to secure, U.S.-controlled, overseas
installations, while operating in a contested communications and cyber
environment. Adversaries and competitor nations continue to develop
cyber capabilities to exploit and create harmful effects within our
areas of operation. For example, advanced persistent threats have the
potential to degrade command and control, possibly preventing troops
and materials from arriving on time, ready to support the geographic
combatant commander.
For our commercial providers, workload demand continues to decline
as retrograde operations from Afghanistan drawdown to fiscal year 2016
levels. The ocean liner sector, for example, has experienced a 50
percent reduction from fiscal year 2011 workload, including a 13
percent reduction from last year alone. As a result of this declining
workload, the U.S. flag shipping fleet has seen a 20 percent workload
reduction since January 2012. In 2013, 11 international trading vessels
within the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) program either
reflagged to foreign flag ships or were scrapped without replacement
due, in large part, to the reduction in demand. This realignment is
forcing our commercial sealift providers to make adjustments to the
services they provide by either removing liner capacity or expanding
alliances with other carriers to take advantage of larger vessels. The
net effect of these adjustments may likely require longer response
times to meet DOD requirements.
The Ready Reserve Force (RRF), the key first response strategic
sealift component for moving U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps units to
the fight, must also remain ready to meet the needs of geographic
combatant commands (GCCs). As 1.6 million square feet of RRF roll-on/
roll-off capacity ages out of service in the next 10 years, an
executable recapitalization plan must be in place to ensure long-term
viability of surge sealift. We are working closely with the U.S. Navy
to develop a plan which meets the combatant command requirements and is
compatible with future Service force development and budget
constraints.
Commercial airlift is also experiencing the effects of declining
workload. As our forces draw down from Afghanistan, business available
to commercial carriers has declined rapidly, threatening industry's
ability to support surge deployments should the need arise.
Implementing the recently concluded Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF)
study recommendations will be a starting point for ensuring commercial
airlift readiness, but will require continued vigilance as demand for
DOD cargo continues to decline.
Freedom of access to relevant areas of sea, air, space, and
cyberspace is crucial to the world's economy and our Nation's ability
to project and sustain global power and influence. USTRANSCOM is
working with U.S. Department of State (DOS) and geographic combatant
commanders through the En Route Infrastructure Master Plan (ERIMP) and
the Campaign Plan for Global Distribution to assure access to ports,
roads, and rail in key allied, friendly, and cooperating nations.
USTRANSCOM collaborates with government, industry, and academia to
develop innovative capabilities to enhance global access by addressing
anti access and area denial challenges. We also obtain access through
networks and relationships in foreign countries established by
commercial transportation providers. USTRANSCOM must continue to
leverage existing international infrastructure through close
coordination with DOS, the Services, GCCs, and commercial
transportation providers in order to ensure unimpeded transportation
and distribution networks for the coming years.
readiness--key to an uncertain future
Strategic Imperative
The Unified Command Plan (UCP) designates USTRANSCOM as the DOD
single manager for end-to-end transportation and for all aspects of
inter- and intra-theater patient movement. As such, USTRANSCOM is
responsible for the command and control of DOD common-user and
commercial air, land, and sea transportation; terminal management; and
aerial refueling to support the global deployment, employment,
sustainment, and redeployment of U.S. Forces.
USTRANSCOM is also responsible for synchronizing distribution
planning across combatant commands, Services and DOD agencies. As the
Global Distribution Synchronizer, we crafted the first Campaign Plan
for Global Distribution. This seminal effort is the first step in
facilitating logistics planning synchronization across all geographic
and functional combatant command boundaries, as well as identifying and
prioritizing necessary distribution network enhancements. In the first
year of execution, we examined the challenges posed by rebalancing and
rebasing forces as the DOD transitions to a more CONUS-based focus,
increased area access and area denial challenges, shifts in strategic
focus, and budget reductions affecting the distribution enterprise's
readiness for future operations. This year, we will conduct more in-
depth reviews of geographic combatant commanders' theater distribution
plans, incorporating strategic guidance from DOD's Guidance for
Employment of the Force and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.
While USTRANSCOM is ready to support operations today, we must pay
attention to the health of the global distribution enterprise of
tomorrow. In the years ahead, smaller and increasingly CONUS-based
forces will rely even more on the Defense Transportation System (DTS)
to deploy and sustain themselves in multiple theaters, sometimes
simultaneously. USTRANSCOM's number one priority is maintaining the
readiness of the global distribution enterprise to project combat power
or extend America's helping hand, anywhere, anytime, everyday.
Challenges to Enterprise Readiness
Maintaining our organic air mobility, sealift, and surface assets,
in tandem with our commercial transportation providers, ensures our
ability to be ready in times of need. Over the last year, USTRANSCOM
has developed and refined processes with our component commands to
track and address their specific organic readiness needs. As we gain
more fidelity with these new processes, we expect to more effectively
solve some of our critical organic readiness needs through appropriate
cargo allocation.
Airlift
The fiscal year 2016 President's Budget includes an end-state fleet
of 308 C-130s and 479 tankers to meet air mobility operational
requirements. The C-5 and C-17 fleets are undergoing modernization
efforts to replace aging components, as well as adding avionics to meet
mandated minimum aircraft separation capability to ensure aircraft
ability to meet worldwide commitments. This airlift force structure
meets the strategic airlift requirement for a single, large-scale
operation, while maintaining the flexibility and adaptability to
support smaller Joint Force requirements in another region. Likewise,
AMC's aerial refueling fleet can support a single, large-scale
operation with a limited capability to support the Joint Force in
another region.
Ongoing operations in Afghanistan, the operational surge in support
of the military intervention against the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS), and the mission to contain Ebola in West Africa have
placed increased demands on the Mobility Air Forces. Post-surge, the
air and ground crews will need time to regain proficiency in specific
skill sets that are not being utilized during these contingency
operations. Resetting these skills will restore units to the level of
capability commensurate with future combat mission requirements.
Likewise, the commercial airlift providers who move DOD cargo and
personnel, particularly those who participate in the CRAF, must be
ready to perform DOD's unique missions whenever the need arises.
Commercial airlift readiness is measured in terms of both fleet
subscription capacity and the timely availability of day-to-day
capacity in a non-activated environment. While we are confident the
National Airlift Policy is adequate to allow DOD to manage the support
our commercial carriers will provide us over the coming years,
implementation of that policy will continue to be advised by the CRAF
study.
To understand and improve CRAF's ability to support DOD, USTRANSCOM
and AMC, aided by outside subject matter experts and CRAF participant
interviews, completed a thorough CRAF study and are in the process of
implementing several CRAF program changes as a result. When implemented
within fiscal year 2016 Airlift Services in Support of the CRAF
Contract, the program changes will ensure continuation of a viable and
ready CRAF program that is capable of answering any future
requirements, and provide best value and service to the U.S.
Government.
Sealift
We rely on the organic sealift fleet provided by MSC and the RRF
managed by the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Maritime
Administration (MARAD). These government-owned vessels, along with
support from the U.S. flag commercial fleet, are vital in times of
national emergency.
USTRANSCOM's relationship with the commercial sealift industry is
formalized through agreements such as VISA, the Maritime Security
Program (MSP), and the Voluntary Tanker Agreement (VTA). MSP provides a
fleet of commercially viable, military-useful vessels to meet national
defense and other security requirements, while maintaining a U.S.
presence in international commercial shipping. Carriers enrolled in MSP
receive a stipend to offset operating costs associated with maintaining
U.S. flag registry and are required to enroll their U.S. flag capacity
in one of the established emergency preparedness programs, VISA or VTA.
However, reductions below full program funding, like we experienced
with fiscal year 2013 sequestration, threaten assured access to MSP
vessels and supporting infrastructure while reducing overall VISA
capacity. Full program funding reaffirms our commitment to industry and
mitigates future risk to our strategic commercial capacity.
Existing maritime laws also contribute to ensuring a responsive
U.S. mariner fleet is ready to meet any DOD contingency requirement.
For example, the Jones Act contributes to a robust domestic maritime
industry that helps to maintain the U.S. industrial shipyard base and
infrastructure to build, repair, and overhaul U.S. vessels. The Jones
Act requirement for U.S.-crewed and built vessels provides additional
capacity and trained U.S. merchant mariners that can crew RRF vessels
in times of war or national emergency.
Although the domestic maritime industry is thriving, the U.S. flag
international fleet continues to decline. The reduction in government-
impelled cargoes due to the drawdown in Afghanistan and reductions in
food aid from the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act
policy changes, are driving vessel owners to reflag to non-U.S. flag
out of economic necessity. This reflagging and subsequent reduction of
the U.S. flag international fleet has the unintended consequence of
reducing the U.S. merchant mariner labor base. A strong U.S. mariner
base is critical to crewing not only the merchant fleet in peacetime
but our DOD surge capacity in wartime. With the recent vessel
reductions, the mariner base is at the point where future reductions in
U.S. flag capacity puts our ability to fully activate, deploy, and
sustain forces at increased risk.
In order for the organic fleet to meet all National Defense needs,
these vessels and their crews must be maintained at a high degree of
reliability and readiness. Mariners must be trained and available to
crew ships in the RRF to meet contingency timelines. We periodically
test the readiness of the organic fleet through TURBO ACTIVATION
exercises, a Joint Staff program to help ensure our organic fleet's
capability. Due to the importance of this readiness measure, we will
monitor TURBO ACTIVATION funding closely as we potentially approach
sequestration-level funding in fiscal year 2016.
Surface
The U.S. highway and railway systems provide the means to transport
military equipment from deploying unit installations to designated
seaports of embarkation during a major contingency deployment. But a
significant portion of the commercial chain tiedown flatcar fleet, the
primary capability for transporting Army unit equipment, is nearing the
end of it's service life. To mitigate this impending shortfall, we are
collaborating with industry to use commercially-available flatcars not
previously considered as part of our solution. With the use of chain
tiedowns on this other family of commercial flatcars, we will
temporarily maintain railcar capacity as we work with the Army to
establish a railcar procurement program to address this surface
readiness concern.
Readiness within the ammunition transport industry also remains a
concern. Arms, Ammunition and Explosivies (AA&E) transport, a highly
specialized and limited capacity, is experiencing contracted capacity
in both drivers and vehicles, in part due to regulaltory restrictions
affecting the industry. Owner/operators, many from small companies, are
increasingly reluctant to accept full liability due to financial risks
involved, and are mitigating that risk through increased rates to DOD.
In addition to the financial pressure, the lack of qualified drivers is
also a factor in reduced trucking capacity. Many experienced owner/
operators are beginning to retire due to age and increased hours of
service rule changes, carrier safety administration requirements, and
increased environmental costs. At the same time, younger generations
are choosing this career in fewer numbers, further decreasing available
capacity in the trucking industry. We continue to work with the
trucking industry to find acceptable solutions, one of which is
streamlining certification requirements for military veterans who wish
to enter the industry, an effort showing great promise in DOD and with
the industry.
Preparing for the Future
While USTRANSCOM remains capable today to respond to any
contingency or geographic combatant command requirement for movement of
forces, significant recapitalization and modernization are necessary to
meet future expected demand for transportation services. We work
closely with each of the Services to ensure they understand our
validated requirements and are incorporating the necessary
recapitalization and modernization efforts into their programs.
To address future sealift concerns, USTRANSCOM is working closely
with the U.S. Navy to identify the most effective means to recapitalize
the RRF. We are also partnering with the Office of the Secretary of
Defense-Transportation Policy to produce a study on programs, policies,
and incentives that would ensure DOD has continued future access to
sufficient U.S. flag vessels and U.S. mariners. The study will assess
the continued viability of the industry's ability to support DOD
requirements with U.S. flag capacity and U.S. merchant mariners, along
with assessing the U.S. Government costs of current DOD and civilian
programs to support commercial sealift, evaluate cost-effective
alternatives to meet sealift requirements, and ascertain if major
policy, program, and acquisition changes are required to maintain and
protect readiness. Where possible, study findings will be shared with
MARAD to assist them in developing the National Maritime Strategy. The
final report is due in May of this year.
The most important airlift recapitalization effort, the KC-46A
program, which will replace the aging KC-135 air refueling tanker
aircraft, is on-track and has met every contractual requirement to
date. With the first flight anticipated this spring, the KC-46A will
provide aerial refueling support to the Air Force, Navy, and Marine
Corps, as well as our allies' and coalition partner aircraft. It will
also provide increased aircraft availability, more adaptable
technology, more flexible employment options, and greater overall
capability than current tanker aircraft. The KC-46A remains the most
essential element of future air mobility readiness for the DOD.
USTRANSCOM relies on a complex interdependent enterprise of both
DOD and commercially-owned domestic and foreign critical
infrastructure. DOD continues to evolve towards a comprehensive mission
assurance construct designed to synchronize all mission assurance
programs. Recognizing that cyber infrastructure underpins much of our
physical infrastructure, our Defense Critical Infrastructure Program
and Joint Cyber Center (JCC) are working in tandem to assess threats
and develop realistic mitigation strategies in conjunction with other
interagency cyber organizations. Additionally, our JCC is leading the
Command's efforts to ensure USTRANSCOM meets the requirement and intent
of the fiscal year 2015 National Defense Authorizations Act requiring
the reporting on cyber incidents with respect to networks and
information systems of operationally critical contractors.
USTRANSCOM also has an enduring interest in the civil sector
infrastructure supporting the surface movement of military forces. Our
programs for national defense collaborate with civil sector
counterparts to ensure the U.S. physical infrastructure is capable of
addressing military surface mobility needs. Since 2012, USTRANSCOM has
completed several congressionally-mandated studies, including: ``Update
to Port Look 2008: Strategic Seaports.'' This report assessed the road
and rail infrastructure, including the strategic highway network routes
and the Strategic Rail Corridor Network (STRACNET), in the vicinity of
strategic seaports. This analysis determined the highway and railroad
infrastructure were capable of supporting military deployments to the
ports. Our update of the STRACNET also ensures that it provides
sufficient service to our most important DOD installations. We also
assessed the structural integrity of the infrastructure outlined in the
port planning orders and infrastructure projects beneficial to the DOD,
and identified potential funding avenues for repairs. USTRANSCOM
reinvigorated its commitment to working with the other members of the
National Port Readiness Network on such commercial seaport-related
issues by signing a new memorandum of understanding effective, 27
August 2014. This agreement ensures the readiness of commercial seaport
infrastructure to support DOD deployment requirements.
U.S. Army Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point (MOTSU), in
Southport, North Carolina, is essential to USTRANSCOM's support of
operational plans in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Most of the
required, significant infrastructure improvements at MOTSU have been
completed in recent years. These improvements enhanced MOTSU's ability
to conduct missions and allowed the terminal to meet documented
throughput requirements. Infrastructure improvement projects at U.S.
Army Military Ocean Terminal Concord (MOTCO), in Concord, California,
are essential to USTRANSCOM's support of U.S. Pacific Command's
operational plans and the DOD's military capability in the Pacific
Theater for ammunition movements. DOD's current efforts are centered on
preserving the operability of MOTCO's primary pier until it can be
recapitalized with a rebuilt, replacement pier. Together with the Army,
we are compiling a comprehensive list of other infrastructure-related
requirements to upgrade MOTCO to a modern ammunition port, fully
capable of safe and efficient operations, and ultimately allowing
uninterrupted delivery of ammunition to the Pacific Theater.
Even in a period of fiscal uncertainty, investing in the readiness
of our joint force must remain a top priority. The USTRANSCOM Joint
Training Program, funded by the Combatant Commanders Exercise
Engagement and Training Transformation (CE2T2) Program, ensures
readiness of joint forces to accomplish assigned missions. CE2T2
continues as a vital readiness enabler that directly supports the
defense strategy of maintaining the ability to deploy and employ large-
scale military forces over transoceanic distances. DOD's largely CONUS-
based force of the future will become increasingly reliant upon joint
exercises to maintain readiness and achieve engagement objectives.
Commanders and Service Chiefs will be equally reliant upon USTRANSCOM
to deploy these forces to participate in combatant command exercises.
CE2T2 is an instrument for maintaining strategic agility and dynamic
presence and allows USTRANSCOM to leverage nearly 140 exercises
annually, including our own 18 joint exercises, to meet training
requirements that directly contribute to meeting assigned missions.
In addition to providing strategic lift during CE2T2 events,
USTRANSCOM exercises its command-and-control nodes and planning teams,
deploys strategic mobility personnel and assets, and provides in-
transit visibility of personnel, cargo, and patient movement on a
global scale. These exercises have immense strategic value including:
maintaining global agility--freedom of action and uninhibited access to
global mobility infrastructure; fostering regional, coalition,
interagency, and industry partnerships; using our organic and
commercial partner strategic lift assets to address readiness
requirements; maintaining expeditionary capabilities of the global
response force; and maintaining strategic airlift and sealift capacity
and readiness.
Joint forces participate in the full spectrum of operations ranging
from humanitarian assistance missions to major combat operations. To
properly support these forces, USTRANSCOM developed Joint Task Force--
Port Opening (JTF-PO), a capability specifically designed to rapidly
open and establish initial theater airport and seaport operations. The
requirement demands a joint force capability comprised of air, surface,
and/or naval elements to support rapid port opening and establish
initial distribution throughput. This operational construct builds upon
the capability and readiness of expeditionary port opening, emphasizing
JTF-PO's significance to expeditionary operations and its support to
the Geographic Combatant Commander/Joint Force Commander. Most recently
USTRANSCOM deployed JTF-PO elements to Monrovia, Liberia, and Dakar,
Senegal, in support of U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) and Operation
UNITED ASSISTANCE. JTF-PO provided port assessments, port opening,
planning, and communications for the Joint Force Commander and
USAFRICOM, and executed over 348 strategic air movements involving the
throughput of approximately 3,250 passengers and 7,600 short tons of
military equipment, vital medical equipment, and humanitarian aid
supplies.
Readiness of USTRANSCOM Enabling Capabilities
As an alert-postured, global response force, the Joint Enabling
Capabilities Command (JECC) continually trains to build the experience
necessary to succeed in complex and emerging operational environments.
By combining JECC-specific training requirements and regularly
participating in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's joint
training and mission rehearsal exercises, we increase the level of
professional knowledge and global awareness JECC deployers deliver to
the joint force commander. The JECC's unique blending of Active and
Reserve components requires some measure of overhead to ensure access
to Guard and Reserve personnel for immediate deployments. The JECC's
training program, assured access to Reserve component personnel, and
flexibility to deploy the most cost-effective and operationally
responsive workforce mix ensures the command produces well-rounded,
professional, and expeditionary joint command-and-control specialists
for the DOD.
The JECC maintains operational readiness to provide mission-
tailored, joint capability packages for planning and secure
communications to combatant commanders to facilitate rapid
establishment of Joint Force Headquarters, enable Global Response Force
execution, and bridge operational requirements around the globe. In
addition to recently facilitating operations in Libya, Mali, Senegal,
and Liberia, the JECC assisted in rebalancing the Joint Force
Headquarters in Afghanistan, supporting U.S. Central Command's efforts
against ISIS and the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons, while
supporting multiple theater security cooperation missions.
In an increasingly dynamic operating environment with diminishing
resources, the JECC will continue to enhance the readiness of the Joint
Force with globally available, responsive, adaptive capabilities to
mitigate strategic surprise, shape options, set the conditions for
successful contingency operations, and facilitate strategic and
operational transitions. Future demand for JECC capabilities is
expected to remain high.
Cyber and Information Technology (IT) Readiness
A continuing concern for the future is our ability to operate
effectively with our commercial providers in the face of increasing
cyber threats. As identified in the recently released Senate Armed
Service Committee report, ``Cyber Intrusions Affecting U.S.
Transportation Command Contractors,'' the Nation's adversaries actively
target and exploit the computer networks of commercial logistic
suppliers. As a result, interagency cooperation is critically important
to mission assurance. Building trust with these non-DOD partners is a
focus of our cyber readiness efforts. The National Cyber Investigative
Joint Task Force and regional Federal Bureau of Investigation offices
are increasing awareness and engagement, and providing additional
options to counter threats, and USTRANSCOM will continue to build
relationships to ensure national partnering and unity of effort.
USTRANSCOM is in the process of developing an information-centric
approach using service-oriented architecture (SOA) principles. This
transformation will improve our ability to make data-driven decisions
by improving the ability to share and reuse information and services.
This will be accomplished by focusing on five areas: supporting mode-
neutral business, complying with Joint Information Environment (JIE)
architecture and implementation guidance, standardizing and stabilizing
infrastructure and platform services to support the portfolio, enabling
SOA, and evolving the common computing environment.
USTRANSCOM must transition to the JIE in order to comply with the
Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiative as we seek to adopt
processes for mode-neutral requirements evaluation and multimodal
transportation execution. The intent is to transition the DOD's IT
environment from multiple nonstandard system-centric architectures to a
standardized information-centric architecture.
USTRANSCOM's focus on enabling SOA establishes intrinsic
interoperability between IT-enabled services to reduce the need for
complex and costly integration. This will allow the design of
applications and services to be compatible and interoperable. We are
working toward a federated architecture that will unify and standardize
disparate environments while allowing the environments to be
independently governed. As our SOA matures, there will be an increase
of business and technology alignment that will allow IT to mirror and
evolve with the business, with an expected reduction of the time and
effort required to fulfill new or changed business requirements.
Planning, integration, and direction of cyber operations in support
of USTRANSCOM global operations is conducted by the Command's Joint
Cyber Center (JCC). The JCC focus is on cyberspace operations and
cyberspace key terrain that supports critical transportation operations
and enabling capabilities. The JCC will continue to serve as the
command's focal point for all cyberspace operational concerns in the
future.
strengthening the enterprise
Enhancements to Supply Chain Management
Assured access to global en route infrastructure is essential to
our Nation's ability to project power and influence worldwide.
USTRANSCOM uses the Enroute Infrastructure Master Plan (ERIMP) to
articulate its strategic access and infrastructure requirements at key
overseas locations, providing a 5 to 15 year roadmap for USTRANSCOM
mobility operations. The ERIMP is synchronized with the geographic and
functional combatant command theater posture plans for an integrated
assessment of all posture elements, specifically focusing on current
access, transportation infrastructure capabilities, and the enabling
support required to meet the distribution mission. USTRANSCOM's ERIMP
is shared with our closest allies to enable coalition efforts and
strengthen partnership capacity. As DOD rebalances to a more CONUS-
based posture, access and infrastructure requirements outlined within
ERIMP 2015 are vital to preserving long-term readiness around the
globe.
In a broad-based effort to ensure access for the future, we
continue to support the Secretary of Defense-directed European
Infrastructure Consolidation (EIC) and the President's European
Reassurance Initiative (ERI). We are actively participating in each of
these efforts to ensure our mission requirements are both preserved
while divesting excess infrastructure, and enhanced by making focused
investments of benefit to the U.S. and our NATO allies. USTRANSCOM is
prepared to mitigate the global mobility risks associated with the
proposed basing actions, but remain concerned about any additional
reduction in U.S.-controlled mobility infrastructure in the European
theater. USTRANSCOM fully supports development of fuel and pavement
infrastructure at Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base, Romania, as examples of
investments that will provide deterrence effects in the short term, as
well as long-term benefits to strategic airlift.
The Distribution Process Owner (DPO) Strategic Opportunities (DSO)
effort identifies opportunities to reduce costs in the DOD supply chain
while simultaneously improving service levels to the warfighter.
Working closely with our strategic partners such as the Defense
Logistics Agency (DLA) and the General Services Administration (GSA)
and collaborating with the warfighting community, the DSO team pursues
process improvements, surface and air optimization, supply alignment,
and network optimization. Enhanced collaboration and the aligning of
business processes between DLA and USTRANSCOM have been significant
sources of cost avoidance through improved shipping container and
aircraft utilization. The DSO team achieved $201 million of cost
avoidance in fiscal year 2014 with $1.4 billion in cumulative cost
avoidance to date, by implementing practices commonly used by
commercial supply chains today.
Meeting the Mission Through Business Transformation
As the single manager of DOD's multi-billion dollar transportation
and distribution enterprise, USTRANSCOM must continually seek ways to
improve efficiency and reduce costs. An innovative example of this
effort is USTRANSCOM's award of the Total Delivery Services (TDS)
contract, effectively implementing a strategic sourcing initiative to
combine Worldwide Express and Domestic Express under one umbrella
contract. The TDS program provides international and domestic
commercial small package air delivery services for the U.S. Government,
upholding USTRANSCOM's commitment to be the provider of choice by
creating a one-stop shop to satisfy customers' express air delivery
requirements. The TDS program provides participating CRAF carriers
operational efficiency by combining networks, and it postures
USTRANSCOM to realize manpower savings through streamlined procurement
and administration of similar services. By including an on-ramp for
surface delivery requirements, TDS is poised to expand to meet all
customer demands for small package delivery.
We are also reviewing our TWCF rate-setting process and its impact
on operational results. We developed a cost and readiness driven
workload allocation process over the last year and identified ways to
standardize operations to deliver cost conscious courses of action to
our supported combatant commanders. This is just one of many
initiatives under way to ensure rates are cost-based, simplified,
standardized, and streamlined. Our goal is to identify areas of
improvement in systems and processes for the upcoming budget cycles.
Decreasing DTS workload, coupled with reduced financial resources, is
driving our intentions to provide TWCF billing rates that attract
additional customers who are influenced by price-based transportation
decisions.
The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) states, ``Sustaining
superior power projection forces--enabled by mobility capabilities
including airlift, aerial refueling, surface lift, sealift, and
prepositioning--will remain a top priority for force planning and
development, even in an austere fiscal environment.'' USTRANSCOM's
Deployment and Distribution Cost Based Decision Support (D2 CBDS)
program fulfills the QDR mandate of projecting power in an austere
fiscal environment while maintaining mission effectiveness by drawing
on the collective expertise of our transportation component commands,
Service customers, DLA, and USTRANSCOM subject matter experts. The D2
CBDS infuses cost and revenue consciousness into our operational
culture, providing cost-informed decision-making capabilities, and
supporting cost-metric development to drive desired behaviors. Numerous
cost avoidance initiatives, such as Multimodal, Mobility Air Forces
Cost Avoidance Tankering, Arctic Overflight, Contingency Efficiency
Effort, and Theater Express, illustrate instances where this capability
directly challenged the status quo to create tangible results in the
form of millions of dollars in costs avoided last year.
Optimization and effeciencies are not a quid pro quo for security.
We continue to work with our commercial providers to evaluate foreign
subcontractors and ensure illicit entities do not benefit from, or are
able to exploit, USTRANSCOM contracts. In collaboration with other
government agencies and supported combatant commanders, USTRANSCOM is
seeking to bring about whole-of-government awareness and action against
identified threats. These efforts strengthen our acquisition activities
by better safeguarding funds, adding a layer of defense that protects
the efficient and secure transit of goods and personnel, and ultimately
enhances the overall security of the global supply chain.
Interagency Coordination
The transportation and distribution enterprise requires close
coordination of all government agencies that move or facilitate
movement of cargo and personnel within the enterprise. Our drive to
improve efficiency and effectiveness, while operating within budget
constraints, has resulted in a reduction of redundant efforts,
particularly in our intelligence support.
The Transportation-Logistics Intelligence Enterprise (TIE) was
established 1 January 2014 and became fully operational on 1 September
2014. The TIE combines the unique skills and expertise of USTRANSCOM's
Joint Intelligence Operations Center for Transportation, the Defense
Intelligence Agency's Mobility and Sustainability Division, and the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to provide the best possible
transportation and logistics intelligence support to the full range of
transportation operations. The goal is to sustain mission-essential,
transportation intelligence capabilities supporting overseas DOD
operations in an era of declining resources; achieve resource
efficiencies by eliminating redundant intelligence efforts; and improve
mission effectiveness through enhanced management, alignment, and
integration of these capabilities.
Early TIE successes include generating resource efficiencies and
improving customer support. The TIE saved approximately 10,000 working
hours through database integration across multiple agencies. By
combining allied and interagency efforts, the TIE increased the
timeliness and quality of intelligence support to current operations
and crisis contingencies in the Middle East and North/West Africa.
These efforts improved U.S. strategic flexibility where troops are
providing security against violent extremists and humanitarian
assistance in Ebola-stricken countries.
Over the next 18 months, the TIE will maintain a robust core of
foundational intelligence on transportation-logistics infrastructure
and en route geographic locations; pursue synchronization of
multinational production efforts; create professional development
programs for intermodal intelligence that include standardized training
and joint-duty opportunities; and improve the customer experience for
consumers of transportation-logistics intelligence.
Allied, friendly, and cooperating nations enable access to the
critical waypoints and transportation nodes necessary for USTRANSCOM
operations. International agreements are pivotal to our continued
success and further synchronize global distribution. Access hinges on
mutually beneficial international relationships. The U.S. Government
team, led by the DOS and in cooperation with other non-defense agencies
that collaborate closely with USTRANSCOM, such as Customs and Border
Protection and the Departments of Transportation and Commerce, works to
incrementally improve international relations. On the DOD team, the
functional and geographic combatant commands, the Services, and the
other defense agencies and organizations work collaboratively to
strengthen international partnerships through security cooperation. We
leverage this collaboration and conduct multi-level engagements with
international partners who provide access or potential access in order
to build the relationships and trust that necessarily precede global
transportation and distribution.
USTRANSCOM's ability to meet global requirements relies in part on
the air, sea, and surface transportation capabilities that reside in
commercial industry. We maintain close, productive relationships with
the commercial transportation providers in all sectors, as well as
Federal agencies like the DOT that provide oversight and advocacy for
those sectors. USTRANSCOM uses a variety of meetings and forums, some
directly with other Federal agencies, and others through the National
Defense Transportation Association, to collaborate and work issues that
would affect our ability to respond to national needs.
A key agency in bridging USTRANSCOM to civil agencies, the Defense
Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), established guidance placing the
Defense Transportation System (DTS) on equal footing with freight
forwarders for moving foreign military sales (FMS) material by
approving the concept of ``Best Value.'' This is a significant step
forward in becoming a ``provider of choice'' for countries that are not
required to move their cargo in the DTS. Additionally, we have asked
DSCA to join our Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise
Governance Forums which will allow DSCA and USTRANSCOM to collaborate
in streamlining FMS distribution to our foreign partners.
USTRANSCOM continues to support our troops around the world by
moving cargo for the Army/Air Force Exchange Service and the Defense
Commissary Agency. This cargo is normally ``direct'' booked, which
leverages our overall negotiating power to provide a reduced cost to
the shipper. This ultimately translates to lower operating costs for
our nonappropriated funded activities. To expand our services, we are
also currently working with the Naval Exchange Service to support their
``time sensitive'' requirements supporting Sailors and Marines
overseas.
USTRANSCOM has also worked hard to overcome recent challenges in
other areas of our enterprise. For example, last May USTRANSCOM awarded
a new company the contract to move privately-owned vehicles (POVs) for
DOD and DOS employees globally. The underperformance of the contractor
during the initial summer peak moving season resulted in thousands of
POVs delivered late, and our Service members experiencing increased
stress during permanent change of station moves.
Significantly increased contract oversight, including identifying
problematic shipping processes, insufficient data management, and
unresponsive customer service practices, highlighted to the company
where they failed to meet contractual requirements, and communicated to
them our expectations for their improvement. While their performance
has improved dramatically over the last several months, we remain
vigilant as we approach the next peak moving season. Our evaluation of
their summer surge plan indicates they should perform to an acceptable
level.
Unique challenges sometimes provide an avenue to success. The
development of the Transport Isolation System (TIS) is one of those
instances. At the beginning of the Ebola crisis in Western Africa, the
U.S. Military was unable to safely evacuate people who had possibly
been exposured to Ebola. Working with the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency, USTRANSCOM identified a joint urgent operational need to
develop a system to move patients with exposure to highly infectious or
contagious diseases. This system would allow the DOD to safely move
patients on DOD aircraft and simultaneously provide treatment while en
route. Within 60 days of the identified requirement, the DOD awarded a
contract for initial production of a TIS capable of moving multiple
patients at one time, and achieved full certification and fielding of
this life-saving system this past January. While the Ebola crisis
served as a catalyst to initiate the acquisition process, the TIS will
serve as an enduring capability to transport patients with contagious
diseases anywhere in the world.
final thoughts
The transportation and distribution enterprise remains ready to
respond to any contingency or to sustain forces for any length of
time--a readiness underpinned by the dedicated professionals, military,
civilian, and contractors who work tirelessly to serve the Nation's
needs. However, that readiness is under stress and will require a
concerted effort across the enterprise, including DOD, the interagency,
and Congress to ensure our forces remain able to rapidly project
national power and influence anywhere, anytime. To ensure the necessary
authorities and policies are in place to manage the transportation and
distribution enterprise, we are working within DOD and with our
interagency partners to examine current laws, policies, and
transportation and distribution capabilities which may be needed in the
future to maintain our combat edge.
Going forward, we are facing, but will overcome future challenges
to providing rapid and responsive deployment, sustainment, and
redeployment operations, as well as mission-tailored enabling
capabilities to the Joint Force Commanders and the great Nation we
serve and protect. We will continue to personify our motto . . .
Together, we deliver!

Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Admiral Rogers.

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL MICHAEL S. ROGERS, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
CYBER COMMAND/DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CHIEF, CENTRAL
SECURITY SERVICES

Admiral Rogers. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and
distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to appear
before you today to discuss our military cyber posture. I'd
like to thank you for convening this forum.
I'd also ask that my full statement be made part of the
record.
I'm equally pleased to be sitting alongside my colleagues
from U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Transportation Command.
It gives me great pride to appear before you today to
highlight and commend the accomplishments of the uniformed and
civilian personnel of U.S. Cyber Command. I'm both grateful
for, and humbled by, the opportunity I have been given to lead
our cyber team in the important work they do in the defense of
our great Nation and our Department.
The current cyber threat environment is uncertain and ever
changing. What is certain, however, is the pervasive nature of
those cyber threats and the increasing sophistication of
adversaries. Our military networks are probed for
vulnerabilities literally thousands of times per day. The very
assets within our military that provide us formidable
advantages over any adversary are precisely the reason that our
enemies seek to map, understand, exploit, and potentially
disrupt our global network architecture.
The cyber intruders of today, in many cases, not only want
to disrupt our actions, but they seek to establish a persistent
presence on our networks. Quite simply, threats and
vulnerabilities are changing and expanding at an accelerated
and alarming pace in our mission set.
Compounding this threat is our national dependence on cyber
space. Operating freely and securely in cyber space is critical
not only to our military and our government, but also to the
private sector, which is responsible for maintaining much of
the Nation's critical infrastructure. The bottom line is,
weakness in cyber space has the potential to hold back our
successes in every field where our Nation is engaged.
An additional critical concern is the budget uncertainty
that will be caused by a potential return of the Budget Control
Act funding levels. To echo Senator Carter's testimony to the
House Armed Services Committee yesterday, the proposed across-
the-board cuts will significantly impact our defense strategy;
and, as a result, we run the very real risk of making our
Nation less secure. Given the evolving threat and our increased
dependence on our critical infrastructure, it is vital that we
continue and commit to our investment in the cyber mission
forces. If we do not continue to invest in our existing and
future capabilities, we will lack the necessary capacity and
risk being less prepared to address future threats.
U.S. Cyber Command has no flexibility in its base budget to
absorb a sequestration cut. Any reductions will have immediate
direct and indirect effects throughout our force and the
service cyber component commanders, including slowing the
necessary improvements to our network structures, including
improving the--excuse me--including slowing the necessary
improvements to our network structures. Such cuts will slow the
build of our cyber teams, their integration into the broader
defense structure, and, most importantly, slow the growth of
our capacity to form essential missions, which provides a real
potential advantage to adversaries. Your continued leadership
in providing the necessary resources to our servicemembers and
civilians dedicated to the success of our mission is critical
to defending our Nation, now and in the future.
Despite this challenging threat and fiscal environment, I'd
like to assure the committee that U.S. Cyber Command has made
considerable progress to date. We are achieving significant
operational outcomes, and we have a clear path ahead.
With that, thank you again, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee, for convening this forum and inviting all of us to
speak. Our progress has been made possible in no small part
because of the support from this committee and other
stakeholders. The global movement of activity in and through
cyber space blurs the U.S. Government's traditional
understanding of how to address domestic and foreign military,
criminal, and intelligence activities. While it complicates our
efforts to combat cyber threats, it also creates opportunities
for coordination and cooperation. Unity of effort across the
U.S. Government in this mission set is essential. I appreciate
our continued partnership as we build our Nation's cyber
defenses.
I welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Rogers follows:]

Prepared Statement by Admiral Michael S. Rogers, USN
Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, and distinguished members of the
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today on
behalf of the men and women of United States Cyber Command
(USCYBERCOM). This is the first time I have had the honor of testifying
before this Committee in a posture hearing about our Command's
dedicated uniformed and civilian personnel. It gives me not only pride
but great pleasure to commend their accomplishments, and I am both
grateful for and humbled by the opportunity I have been given to lead
them in the important work they are doing in defense of our nation.
USCYBERCOM is a subunified command of U.S. Strategic Command; we
are based at Fort Meade, Maryland. Approximately 1,100 people
(military, civilians, and contractors) serve at USCYBERCOM, with a
Congressionally-appropriated budget for Fiscal Year 2015 of
approximately $509 million for Operations and Maintenance (O&M),
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E), and military
construction (MILCON). USCYBERCOM also includes its key Service cyber
components: Army Cyber Command/Second Army, Marine Forces Cyberspace
Command, Fleet Cyber Command/Tenth Fleet, and Air Forces Cyber/24th Air
Force. Our collective missions are to direct the operation and defense
of the Department of Defense's information networks while denying
adversaries (when authorized) the freedom to maneuver against the
United States and its allies in and through cyberspace. On a daily
basis, we plan, coordinate, integrate, synchronize, and conduct
activities to direct the operations and defense of specified Department
of Defense information networks and the Department's critical
infrastructure; and prepare to and, when directed, conduct full-
spectrum military cyberspace operations in order to enable actions in
all domains, ensure U.S. and allied freedom of action in cyberspace and
deny the same to our adversaries.
USCYBERCOM operates with several key mission partners. Foremost is
the National Security Agency and its affiliated Central Security
Service (NSA/CSS). The President's decision to maintain the ``dual-
hat'' arrangement (under which the Commander of USCYBERCOM also serves
as the Director of NSA/Chief, CSS) means the partnership of USCYBERCOM
and NSA/CSS will continue to benefit our nation. NSA/CSS has
unparalleled capabilities for detecting foreign threats, producing
intelligence for our warfighters in all domains, analyzing cyber
events, and guarding national security information systems. The best,
and only, way to meet our nation's needs, to bring the military cyber
force to life, to exercise good stewardship of our nation's resources,
and to ensure respect for civil liberties and privacy, is to leverage
the capabilities (both human and technological) that have been
painstakingly built up at Fort Meade. Our nation has neither the time
nor the resources to re-learn or re-create the capabilities that we tap
now by working with our co-located NSA/CSS partners.
Let me also mention another key mission partner and neighbor at
Fort Meade, the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). DISA is
vital to the communications and the efficiency of the entire
Department, and its people (especially those supporting the new Joint
Force Headquarters--DOD Information Networks) operate in conjunction
with us at USCYBERCOM on a constant basis. We also work with other
federal government departments and agencies, particularly the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice and
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). We interact regularly with
private industry and key allied nations as they seek to secure their
networks, identify adversarial and criminal actors and intentions,
build resiliency for federal and critical infrastructure systems, and
investigate the theft and manipulation of data.
Where We Were
This year we will mark the fifth anniversary of USCYBERCOM's
activation. The Department authorized the creation of a Cyber Command
in 2009, and accelerated its establishment the following year. This
initiative was truly reflective of a broad consensus. The highest
levels of our government saw potential adversaries militarizing
cyberspace, mounting cyber espionage on a world-wide scale and using
cyber capabilities to intimidate their neighbors. We also saw cyber
efforts against DOD and realized the need to ensure our ability to
defend its networks and command and control our own Department's forces
and information systems. We in the U.S. military took the step of
creating a new warfighting organization for cyberspace because we
recognized that our nation's economy, infrastructure, and allies were
incurring grave risks from digital disruption, and that potential
adversaries were working aggressively to exploit those vulnerabilities.
We saw unfriendly states, organized criminals, and even unaffiliated
cyber actors stealing American intellectual property and using cyber
means for coercion. USCYBERCOM was established to help stop such
activities, or at least to minimize their effects on the United States
and its allies.
USCYBERCOM confronted serious challenges from the outset. DOD
networks had been planned and initially constructed decades earlier in
an environment in which redundancy, resiliency, and defensibility were
not always primary design characteristics. Operators in USCYBERCOM, not
surprisingly, could not even see all of our networks, let alone monitor
all the traffic coming into and out of them from the Internet. Our
people were and are professionals, so that issue was rapidly engaged,
but nonetheless the sheer volume of work involved in starting a new,
subunified command was substantial.
I have been at USCYBERCOM for approximately a year, and thus have
had time to form some impressions of the organization and its progress.
I knew when I took command that we had a sound foundation and could
build upon it with confidence. The organizations had been well scoped
and granted the authorities necessary to do our work. The bad news was
that USCYBERCOM was built from the ground up by cutting manning to the
bone, initially sacrificing vital support functions and institutional
infrastructure to build mission capabilities as fast as possible. I was
nonetheless pleased by the quality and dedication of the personnel
across USCYBERCOM and our Service cyber components. These are
professionals, in every sense of the word, and they are determined to
put in place military cyber capabilities that will keep the nation safe
in cyberspace. For their sake, and even more so for America's, I intend
to make our organizations even stronger--and provide my successors the
opportunity to do the same.
Where We Are Now
Over the last five years we have built USCYBERCOM to help defend
our networks in DOD and the nation. This has not always been a
straightforward process. Our Command is growing and operating at the
same time, performing a multitude of tasks across a diverse and complex
mission set. Of course, every command changes with events in its
mission space, adjusts to evolving policies and direction, and adapts
with the development of armaments and tactics. I do not want to foster
the impression that we are completely unique. It is true, nonetheless,
that we are constructing a new command and force while engaged on a 24-
hour a day basis, every day of the year, with smart, energetic actors
operating in an environment that is highly dynamic. Some of those
actors, I hasten to add, operate with no discernible legal or ethical
restraints. At the same time, we are writing doctrine, training people
to execute options, and keeping up with the ever-shifting topography of
cyberspace. That complexity presents us--and every nation that seeks a
military cyber capability--with a set of challenges that are
significant.
In essence, USCYBERCOM has been ``normalizing'' our operations in
cyberspace. We seek to afford an operational outlook and attitude to
the running of the Department's roughly 7 million networked devices and
15,000 network enclaves. Collectively these represent a weapons system
analogous to a carrier strike group or an aircraft strike package,
through which we deliver effects. Like conventional weapons systems,
our networks enable operations in other domains and distant locations,
they demand constant upkeep and skillful handling, and they can be a
target themselves for our adversaries. They give us the vital command
and control (C2), connectivity, and intelligence for a global, 21st
century military. No other nation enjoys such resources--they impart to
us formidable advantages over any conceivable adversary. It is for
exactly this reason that potential adversaries very much want to map,
understand, exploit, and possibly disrupt our global network
architecture.
In keeping with that operational mindset, we seek to impress upon
commanders that cyber defense is no longer information technology (IT)
it is not a mere support function that they can safely delegate to
someone on their staff. Cyber is now a central part of their ability to
execute their mission. It is commander's business. A successful
intrusion, or severance of connectivity, can result in a direct and
immediate impact to successful mission accomplishment. We have seen
this happen in recent years, and though we have not yet experienced a
serious, sustained disruption to the Department's information systems,
it may be only a matter of time before we face one, given the inherent
vulnerability of our networks.
The fragility of that legacy architecture motivates our emphasis on
deploying the Joint Information Enterprise (JIE) across DOD. We have
gained significantly more visibility in our networks, but that is only
a stopgap measure while the Department migrates its systems to a cloud
architecture that promises to increase security and efficiency while
facilitating data sharing across the enterprise. That means that the
warfighter at the forward edge of battle benefits from the same data
pools as our analysts, operators, and senior decisionmakers here in the
United States. While the JIE is being implemented, however, our
concerns about our legacy architecture collectively have spurred our
formation of our new Joint Force Headquarters to defend the
Department's information networks (JFHQ-DODIN). The JFHQ-DODIN gained
then-Secretary of Defense Hagel's authorization late last year and has
recently achieved initial operational capability, working at DISA under
my operational control at USCYBERCOM. JFHQ-DODIN's mission is to
oversee the day-to-day operation of DOD's networks and mount an active
defense of them, securing their key cyber terrain and being prepared to
neutralize any adversary who manages to bypass their perimeter
defenses. Placing the just-established JFHQ-DODIN under USCYBERCOM
gives us a direct lever for operating DOD's information systems in ways
that make them easier to defend, and tougher for an adversary to
affect. It also gets us closer to being able to manage risk on a
system-wide basis across DOD, balancing warfighter needs for access to
data and capabilities while maintaining the overall security of the
enterprise
USCYBERCOM directs the operation and defense of Department of
Defense networks, but it does much more as well, hence its formation of
a Cyber Mission Force (CMF) to turn strategy and plans into operational
outcomes. The Command's last two annual posture statements have
mentioned the CMF's authorization and initial steps, and I am pleased
to report that the Force is very much a reality. With continued support
from Congress, the Administration, and the Department, USCYBERCOM and
its Service cyber components are now about halfway through the force
build for the CMF. Indeed, many of its teams are generating capability
today. Three years ago we lacked capacity; we had vision and expertise
but were very thin on the ground. Today the new teams are actively
guarding DOD networks and prepared, when appropriate and authorized, to
help Combatant Commands deny freedom of maneuver to our adversaries in
cyberspace. Dozens of teams are now operating; and even though many of
them are still filling out their rosters and qualifying their
personnel, they are proving their value daily as well as confirming the
overall need for such a construct.
The work of building the CMF is not done yet. We have a target of
about 6,200 personnel in 133 teams, with the majority achieving at
least initial operational capability by the end of fiscal year 2016. I
have been working with the Services to accelerate the work we are doing
to keep on schedule, but I can promise you that will not be easy. We
are already hard pressed to find qualified personnel to man our CMF
rosters, to get them cleared, and to get them trained and supported
across all 133 teams. To address these gaps, I am working with our
Service components, Chief, National Guard Bureau, and Reserve Chiefs to
ensure we have considered a total force solution. In several areas,
such as critical infrastructure, both USCYBERCOM and the Services have
recognized that our Reserve Component brings us unique and valuable
skills. In addition, we are charting the proper command and control
relationships and structures for these teams, seeking to establish
proper headquarters support for them, and giving my commanders insight
into their activities so we can ensure the best possible
synchronization, deconfliction, and unity of effort across the CMF.
There are all sorts of good ideas for doing this; indeed, we hear no
shortage of suggestions. What I tell everyone, however, is that we have
admired this issue long enough. For instance, it is time to implement
and exercise measures like the objective C2 model that we agreed upon
as a Department almost two years ago, even if we believe it may not end
up as the permanent solution. Let us see how it works, and then change
what needs to be fixed later as we gain insights from operations and
the shifting threat.
Where we need help from you is with resources required to hire
personnel to fill the team seats as well as necessary operational and
strategic headquarters operations, intelligence, and planning staffs,
facilities where we can train and employ them, and resources to
properly equip them. Everyone involved knows this is a priority for the
Department as well as for the Administration writ large. We also know
that our Department in particular has a broad range of critical
priorities, each of which competes with cyberspace for resources. This
is a cold, hard reality--as is the fact that weaknesses in cyberspace
have the potential to hold back our successes in every other field
where the Department is engaged. Similarly, success in securing our
networks and denying adversaries freedom of maneuver in cyberspace can
and does bolster our DOD successes in all warfighting domains. That
should factor into our resource decisions, particularly as we face the
renewed possibility of sequestration--and mandatory, across-the-board
eight percent budget cuts--when Fiscal Year 2016 begins a few months
from now.
Let me emphasize the value of the intangibles in our work and our
environment. Collectively we in USCYBERCOM have gained priceless
experience in cyberspace operations, and that experience has given us
something even more valuable: insight into how force is and can be
employed in cyberspace. We have had the equivalent of a close-in fight
with an adversary, which taught us how to maneuver and gain the
initiative that means the difference between victory and defeat.
Enhancing such insight is increasingly urgent. Every conflict in
the world today has a cyber dimension. Actors with modest conventional
military capabilities have shown considerable capacity to harass,
disrupt, and distract their adversaries through digital means. This is
not, however, some on-line version of a Hobbesian state of nature; it
is not a war of all against all. What we are seeing are clear patterns
to cyber hostilities, and those patterns have four main trends:
First, it has to be noted that autocratic governments in
several regions view today's open Internet as a lethal threat to their
regimes. For example--as President Obama noted last December--North
Korea recently turned its cyber capabilities on Sony Pictures
Entertainment in revenge for a forthcoming movie. The North Koreans
employed unlawful cyber activities to steal and destroy data and
property, to intimidate and coerce U.S.-based businesses, to threaten
American citizens, and to disrupt free speech within the United States.
This is unacceptable. Democracies value Internet freedom and a multi-
stakeholder system of governance, in which the Internet is officially
neutral with regard to free and open political speech--with clear
protection for criticism and debate. We make no apologies for the fact
that such neutrality is abhorrent to regimes that fear their own
citizens; hence their ubiquitous and determined efforts to redefine
``cybersecurity'' to mean protection from ``dangerous'' ideas as well
as from malicious activity.
Second are the ongoing campaigns to steal intellectual
property. Massive thefts of personal and institutional information and
resources, by states and by criminals, have been observed over the last
decade or so. Criminals are mining personal information for use in
identity theft schemes, in a sense committing fraud on an industrial
scale. States have turned their much greater resources to theft as
well. These intrusions and breaches have drawn comments from the
highest levels of the U.S. Government. I would only add here the
observation that the most worrisome of these campaigns are state-
sponsored, persistent, and world-wide in scope. They are aimed at
governments, non-profits, and corporations wherever they might be
accruing intellectual capital that the attackers believe could be
valuable, whether for re-sale or passage to competing firms and
industries.
The third form of cyber tactic we see is disruption. Once
again, the actors, techniques, and targets of these incidents are
numerous and varied, ranging from denial-of-service attacks, network
traffic manipulation, and employment of destructive malware. We see
these used all over the world, particularly in most or all of the
conflicts pitting two armed adversaries against one another.
Finally, we see states developing capabilities and
attaining accesses for potential hostilities, perhaps with the idea of
enhancing deterrence or as a beachhead for future cyber sabotage.
Private security researchers over the last year have reported on
numerous malware finds in the industrial control systems of energy
sector organizations. As I suggested in my appearance before the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence last fall, we believe
potential adversaries might be leaving cyber fingerprints on our
critical infrastructure partly to convey a message that our homeland is
at risk if tensions ever escalate toward military conflict.
Despite the spread of cyber attacks and conflicts around the world,
we have increasing confidence in our operations-based approach. Though
it is still developing and not yet fully implemented, it has
nonetheless given us significant advantages in relation to potential
adversaries. For instance, I can tell you in some detail how USCYBERCOM
and our military partners dealt with the Heartbleed and ``Shellshock
vulnerabilities that emerged last year. These were unrelated but
serious flaws inadvertently left in the software that millions of
computers and networks in many nations depend upon; an attacker could
exploit those vulnerabilities to steal data or take control of systems.
Both of these security holes were discovered by responsible developers
who did just what they should have done in response--they kept their
findings quiet and worked with trusted colleagues to develop software
patches as quickly as possible--allowing systems administrators to gain
the jump on bad actors who read the same vulnerability announcements
and immediately began devising ways to identify and exploit unpatched
computers.
We at USCYBERCOM (and NSA/CSS) learned of Heartbleed and Shellshock
at the same time that everyone else did. Our military networks are
probed for vulnerabilities thousands of times every hour, so in both
cases it was not long before we detected new probes checking our
websites and systems for open locks, as it were, at the relevant doors
and windows. By this point our mission partners had devised ways to
filter such probes before they touched our systems. We were sheltered
while we pushed out patches across DOD networks and monitored
implementation, directing administrators to start with those systems
that were most vulnerable. Very quickly we could determine and report
how many systems had been remedied and how many remained at risk. Three
years ago, DOD would have required many, many months to assess the
danger and formulate responses to Heartbleed and Shellshock. Thanks to
the efforts we have made in recent years, our responses by contrast
were comparatively quick, thorough, and effective, and in both cases
they helped inform corresponding efforts on the civilian side of the
federal government. We also know that other countries, including
potential adversaries, struggled to cope with the Heartbleed and
Shellshock vulnerabilities. In military affairs it is often relative
speed and agility that can make a difference in operations; we
demonstrated that in these instances, and in others that we can discuss
in another setting.
This operational approach is what we need to be building in many
more places. The nation's government and critical infrastructure
networks are at risk as well, and we are finding that computer security
is really an enterprise-wide project. To cite one example, the U.S.
Government is moving toward cloud computing and mobile digital devices
across the enterprise, and DOD and the Defense Industrial Base (DIB)
are moving with this trend. We are working, moreover, to make our data
as secure from insider threats as from external adversaries. This could
eventually compel a recapitalization of government systems comparable
to the shift toward desktops in the 1980s and local-area networks in
the 1990s. In short, a lot of money and many people are involved at all
levels. USCYBERCOM is not running this transformation, of course, but
we are responsible for defending the DOD systems that will be changed
by it.
Neither the U.S. Government, the states, nor the private sector can
defend their information systems on their own against the most powerful
cyber forces. The public and private sectors need one another's help.
We saw in the recent hack of Sony Pictures Entertainment that we have
to be prepared to respond to cyber attacks with concerted actions
across the whole of government using our nation's unique insights and
complete range of capabilities in cooperation with the private sector.
This interdependence will only increase in the future. Indeed, the
cyber environment evolves rapidly--making the maturation of our
capabilities and their agility in this changing mission space still
more imperative for our ability to deter adversaries who might be
tempted to test our resolve.
Where We Are Headed
USCYBERCOM has accomplished a great deal, but we still have a long
road ahead. Cyberspace is dynamic--it changes constantly with the
actions of users and the equipment and software they connect on-line.
Compounding that routine volatility are two factors: the rapid
evolution of the technology itself, and the changing habits and
expectations of users. If current trends hold, then we can expect more
nations, and even state-less groups and individuals as well, to develop
and employ their own tools and cyber warfare units to cause effects in
targeted networks. The cyber strife that we see now in several regions
will continue and deepen in sophistication and intensity. In light of
our recent experience with the destructive attacks on Sony Pictures
Entertainment, we expect state and unaffiliated cyber actors to become
bolder and seek more capable means to affect us and our allies. Sadly,
we foresee increased tensions in cyberspace.
This is truly a period in history in which we are falling behind if
we are merely holding our position in the overall movement to forge new
capabilities. We in the U.S. Government and DOD must continue learning
and developing new skills and techniques just to tread water, given the
rapid pace of change in cyberspace. I liken our historical moment to
the situation that confronted the U.S. early in the Cold War, when it
became obvious that the Soviet Union and others could build hydrogen
bombs and the superpower competition showed worrying signs of
instability. We rapidly learned that we needed a nuclear force that was
deployed across the three legs of the riad and underpinned by robust
command and control mechanisms, far-reaching intelligence, and policy
structures including a declared deterrence posture. Building these
nuclear forces and the policy and support structures around them took
time and did not cause a nuclear war or make the world less safe. On
the contrary, it made deterrence predictable, helped to lower tensions,
and ultimately facilitated arms control negotiations. While the analogy
to cyberspace is not exact, it seems clear that our nation must
continue to commit time, effort, and resources to understanding our
historical situation and building cyber military capabilities, along
with the ``whole-of-nation'' structures and partnerships they work
among. Just as we fashioned a formidable nuclear capability that served
us through the Cold War and beyond, I am confident in our ability to
keep pace with adversaries who are determined to control ``their''
corners of cyberspace, to exfiltrate our intellectual property, and to
disrupt the functioning of our institutions. They are every bit as
determined, creative, and persistent in these efforts as the Soviet
leaders we contained during the Cold War, and unfortunately we see few
hints they will act more responsibly in cyberspace. Thus we must commit
to the long-term goal of building a truly open, secure cyberspace
governed collaboratively by many stakeholders, while we remain prepared
for crises and contingencies that can arise along the way--just as we
do in every other domain.
I can assure Congress, and the American people, that we are
executing and will carry out a well-conceived and systematic plan for
doing that. As we train our cyber mission teams, we are inculcating a
culture of respect for civil liberties and privacy while learning how
to assess their readiness and establishing expectations and an
institutional base that will serve to sustain this force, and even to
expand it further if that someday becomes necessary. The team members
we train today will furnish the leadership of the U.S. military's
cyberspace organizations of the future; they are digital natives,
having come up through the ranks thinking about cyber issues. I have no
doubt their perspectives will differ from our own, and that they will
see solutions to problems that vex us now. Building the capabilities of
USCYBERCOM and the CMF is also providing valuable lessons for the
reconfiguration of DOD's networked architecture to make it more
defensible. When the JIE is completely implemented a few years from
now, we will have a far more secure base from which to operate in
cyberspace, and all of our capabilities in the other domains will
benefit as well from the massive data support they receive from a cloud
architecture.
The sophistication of our defenses and operations must grow, of
course, in partnership with our allies and as part of a truly whole of
nation approach to the problem. Let me reiterate that there is no
Department of Defense solution to our cybersecurity dilemmas. The
global movement of threat activity in and through cyberspace blurs the
U.S. Government's traditional understandings of how to address domestic
and foreign military, criminal, and intelligence activities. This is
exacerbated further by the speed with which unforeseen threats can
impact U.S. interests and the fact that adversaries frequently use
(wittingly or unwittingly) U.S.-based resources due to the nation's
robust cyber infrastructure. This creates a circumstance in which unity
of effort across the U.S. Government is required. DOD's growing
capabilities and capacities need to be considered within this broader
context. Any plausible solutions will involve multiple actors and
stakeholders from within and across several agencies, governments, and
economic sectors. Everything we do in USCYBERCOM we do in partnership
with other commands, agencies, departments, industries, and countries.
As we saw over the last year in our collective response to the
Shellshock and Heartbleed vulnerabilities, we must all work together
across the U.S. Government, with the states, industry, and allies on a
constant basis to ensure we are ready to surge for incidents and crises
and thus provide the necessary assurance for inter-agency and foreign
partners.
What does the future hold for USCYBERCOM specifically? I will
strongly recommend to anyone who asks that we remain in the dual hat
relationship under which the Commander of USCYBERCOM also serves as the
Director, NSA/CSS. This is simply the right thing to do for now, as the
White House reiterated in late 2013. It might not be a permanent
solution, but it is a good one given where we are in this journey as it
allows us to build upon the strengths of both organizations to serve
our nation's defense.
Conclusion
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, for
inviting me to speak, and for all the support that you and this
Committee have provided USCYBERCOM. I appreciate our continued
partnership as we build our nation's defenses. Our progress has been
made possible because of support from all stakeholders, in terms of
resources, trust, and impetus. Cyberspace is more than a challenging
environment; it is now part of virtually everything we in the U.S.
military do in all domains of the battlespace and each of our lines of
effort. There is hardly any meaningful distinction to be made now
between events in cyberspace and events in the physical world, as they
are so tightly linked. We in USCYBERCOM have strived to direct the
operation and defense of DOD information systems and to protect and
further the nation's interests in cyberspace. We have a great deal of
work ahead of us, and thus accelerating USCYBERCOM's growth in
capability will remain my focus, and be a continuing emphasis for the
Department. We can all be proud of what our efforts, with your help,
have accomplished in building USCYBERCOM and positioning its men and
women for continued success.

Chairman McCain. Well, thank you, Admiral.
It's not very often we have a briefing that really has
significant impact, I think, on all members, but the briefing
and the information that you'll--Admiral Haney and Admiral
Rogers provided for us the other morning is very chilling and
very disturbing, and I would like to, over time, see some of
that information being made known to the American people,
because it certainly should give us a wake-up call about what
our adversaries are doing throughout the world.
Every once in a while, we read things, media reports that
get our attention. Admiral Haney, one is the New York Times,
March 11th, ``Russia says has right to deploy nuclear weapons
in Crimea. Russia has the right to deploy nuclear weapons in
the Black Sea peninsula.'' Crimea, which Moscow, a Foreign
Ministry official said Vladimir Putin--15 March--Vladimir Putin
prepared raising nuclear readiness over Crimea. I'm sure you're
aware of that, and much more, Admiral Haney. What's your
reaction to those kinds of news reports, particularly about
Vladimir Putin's apparent willingness to sort of--if not play
the nuclear card, certainly raise the nuclear issue?
Admiral Haney. Chairman McCain, you bring up very important
points here. It is interesting, in the open press all the way
through YouTube, the various signaling that Russia has done
associated with their strategic nuclear capabilities, including
the ones you mentioned there. They are very provocative, and
this, in combination with the whole-of-whole, in terms of these
demonstrations of their capability during crisis, such as I
mentioned--the long-range strategic aircraft flights, their
violation of the INF Treaty, et cetera--really shows where we
are as a world, including as the United States, and where
Russia is trying to ascribe to be, in terms of coercion,
including using weapons of mass destruction.
Chairman McCain. Obviously, lending much greater importance
and emphasis on our modernization of our triad, it seems to me.
Would you agree?
Admiral Haney. Absolutely, Senator. It's very important.
Chairman McCain. Admiral Rogers, also a Wall Street Journal
story, ``NSA's Rogers Calls for More Forceful Response to Cyber
Attacks.'' Obviously, that's not going to be possible if we
proceed with sequestration, would you agree?
Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
Chairman McCain. On--and yet, I--as I mentioned in my
earlier opening statement, the budget calls for 5.5 billion in
cyber investment, but only 8 percent will go towards your
capabilities in Cyber Command and the development of our cyber
mission forces. Does this raise the issue that you have talked
about in the past as to whether we have a policy, or not, as to
what to do in the event of cyber attacks? Do we just spend our
time trying to erect further defenses? By the way, I think most
of us agree, all of us agree, passage of legislation is
important. But--or do we start devising ways to raise a price
for those attacks?
You have said, earlier in the week, that right now it is
a--you said, ``Right now, if you're a nation-state, if you're a
group, if you're an individual, my assessment is that most come
to the conclusion that conducting a cyber attack is incredibly
low risk, that there's little price to pay for the actions that
they are taking.'' Doesn't that mean that we should start
devising methods and capabilities to enact a price for these
people to pay, whether they be nation-states or rogue
individuals or groups?
Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir. You look at our investment
strategy as part of a broader plan. We focus primarily on the
defensive piece, initially. I thought that was a sound
investment, but I think now we're at a tipping point, where we
not only need to continue to build on the defensive capability,
but we have got to broaden our capabilities to provide
policymakers and operational commanders with a broader range of
options. Because, in the end, a purely defensive, reactive
strategy will be both late to need and incredibly resource
intense. I don't think that's necessarily in our best long-
range interest. So, I have been an advocate of--we also need to
think about how can we increase our capacity on the offensive
side, here, to get to that point of deterrence as you've
raised.
Chairman McCain. Right now, as far as you know, that
decision has not been made, which would come from the President
of the United States.
Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir, the President retains that
authority right now.
Chairman McCain. That policy has not been decided on, as
far as any instructions to you are concerned.
Admiral Rogers. No, sir, no authority has been delegated at
my level for the offensive application of cyber.
Chairman McCain. You think it might be time?
Admiral Rogers. I think we still need to work our way
through this. It's not unlike, in some ways, what we saw in the
history of the nuclear arena or in the post---aftermath of 9/
11, as we were trying to figure out what--at what level, for
example, do--were we comfortable making the decision that we
were going to shoot down, potentially, a civilian airliner that
we thought had potentially become a weapon. We had much that
same discussion. I think we need to have that same discussion
now. We've got to increase our decisionmakers' comfort and
level of knowledge with what capabilities we have and what we
can do.
Chairman McCain. But, right now, the level of deterrence is
not deterring.
Admiral Rogers. That is true.
Chairman McCain. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Haney, we talked about the need to modernize the
triad. The first step seems to be in terms of just sequencing
the Ohio-class replacement, but we also need to begin to invest
in a long-range bomber. Can you just briefly describe the
platforms that we have to invest in, and also the need to start
immediately?
Admiral Haney. Senator Reed, the--look at the platforms
today. We have extended the Ohio, the current SSBN, to the max
extent possible. This was a platform designed for 30 years, and
we're taking it out to 42 years. We cannot extend it any
further. It has to be replaced.
When you look at our intercontinental ballistic missiles--
systems, they, too, are starting to fray from the maturity of
those systems. They've been around since the early '70s. As a
result, there is an analysis of alternative in progress, called
the groundbased strategic deterrent, that we have to continue
to work towards, that provides a very responsive capability for
deterrence.
In the bombers, the last B-52 came off the assembly line in
1962, and it will be around, even with the current plan, to
about 2040. Long time for that aircraft. Even our B-2 aircraft
has had to--two decades of intensive operations. So, the long-
range strike bomber is also a must that we have to
recapitalize.
So, all three of those platforms are coming to a point
where we're getting all we can get out of them, and we have to
recapitalize them. The triad is important to our strategic
deterrence.
Senator Reed. Let me ask a related question. The air-launch
cruise missile, is that another system that should be replaced
or modernized significantly?
Admiral Haney. Senator, absolutely. The air-launch cruise
missile, the current one, was designed for 10 years. It's at
the 30-year point today. It provides the combination, when you
take a credible bomber, a cruise missile, as well as the
gravity weapons--the combination of those provides the
complexity by which an adversary would have to think if they
went to escalate their way out of a conflict. Very important,
particularly as we look at the standoff. Standoff is still
required. Having combination of a credible bomber and standoff
capability. So, we must replace this air-launch cruise missile.
So, this long-range strike-option missile program is important
to me.
Senator Reed. Thank you, sir.
General Selva, you mentioned the various civilian
components of your, essentially, command. One of them is the
CRAF, the Civilian Reserve Air Fleet. As operations tend
downward, in terms of Afghanistan, Iraq, and other places, you
can rely more upon your organic aircraft, U.S. Air Force
aircraft and other military aircraft. How are you going to
reconcile this decreased demand with the need to maintain the
capabilities of the civilian fleet?
General Selva. Thank you, Senator.
In order to do justice to the readiness requirements for
the organic and civil fleet, we're going to have to balance how
we use the aircraft to move the cargo and passenger demand
signal that exists within the Department. It is markedly
diminished, to less than half of what it was just a year ago.
We've implemented a process inside the command, where we
actually use a readiness determination to allocate that lift.
But, there is a second part of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet
which is invisible to most users, and that is, the incentive
for carriers to come into the fleet is governmentwide business
that's managed through the Government Services Administration.
That represents several billion dollars of annual spend on
passenger and cargo movement that only Civil Reserve Air Fleet
carriers are eligible to participate in. So, we have worked
very, very closely with the industry as well as the Government
Services Administration to make sure that we've closed any
loopholes in that process so that the carriers get access to
the business that they deserve. That will keep the fleets
healthy, as the civilian airlines go through what is likely to
be an economic consolidation of their assets over time.
Senator Reed. What other agencies of the government
typically rely upon this other aspect, the government business?
Is it AID and entities like that? What----
General Selva. Sir, as a consequence of the Government
Services Administration City Pairs Program, all Federal
agencies rely on the passenger part of the Civil Reserve Air
Fleet. On the cargo side, in 2012 the Congress gave U.S.
TRANSCOM and the Department of Defense the authority to offer
defense transportation system rates to the whole of Federal
Government, which we have done in order to bring more mission
set into the network.
Senator Reed. But, again, one of the unintended
consequences of sequestration is not only reduction in your
funds to do this program, but in every Federal department,
because I would assume one of the first things the Department
of Commerce or the--it would start--cut back travel
dramatically, et cetera, putting more pressure on your ability
to manage the Civil Reserve Airfleet Allocations (CRAF). Is
that correct?
General Selva. Senator, that's exactly correct. If we lose
that business, if we lose that mission set as a consequence of
sequestration, it'll have an immediate readiness impact on the
Civil Reserve Air Fleet.
Senator Reed. Not just directly--again, my point, not just
directly from your efforts, but----
General Selva. Correct.
Senator Reed.--governmentwide.
General Selva. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. If you are spared, and eery other department,
your Civil Reserve Air Fleet is in--is really in tatters. Is
that correct?
General Selva. I wouldn't use the word ``in tatters,'' but
it'll make it a much more challenging process to keep it going.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
My time's expected. But, thank you, Admiral Rogers.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Haney, I don't think I've ever publicly thanked you
for the time and effort you spent--it's been 2 years now; it's
hard to believe--at the Joint Base Pearl Harbor, and the
dedication, the time that we spent there. That was beyond the
call of duty, and I thank you very much for that.
The--I think that Senator Reed and Senator McCain both
talked about the nuclear arsenal and some of the problems in
the triad delivery system. I think we can talk about the
problems that we have with ours, the age of the B-2--of the B-
52, and the ICBM, 34 years old, and the fact that we have--our
spending has just declined steadily since the cold war. You
know, we--when you look at what Admiral Rogers has taken on,
our--at least our spending has increased in that area, but it's
continued to decrease. I think you--when you're talking about
the triad, I guess that Russia is the only country that has a
triad system, even though it's my understanding that China and
India are developing a--such a system. Is that correct?
Admiral Haney. Senator, currently, China has both
submarines and intercontinental ballistic missiles, and they
are developing more and more of a bomber fleet. Their
intentions, as you know, in China are not very transparent. So,
time will tell on that answer.
Senator Inhofe. But, that's accurate, though. They're not
there yet, in terms of a triad.
Admiral Haney. That's correct. As you mentioned, Russia not
only is modernizing their triad, but they're also modernizing
their industrial base associated with it. That, too, is
something that we have to integrate into our calculus. Not just
India, but Pakistan is also developing----
Senator Inhofe. Where are they, now, in their delivery
system?
Admiral Haney. They have been clearly invested into cruise
missiles, and they have been recently--just recently having
tested a intercontinental ballistic missile capability.
[The information referred to follows:]

During my testimony, I erroneously said Pakistan was developing an
``intercontinental ballistic missile''. I meant to say ``medium range
ballistic missile''. Please accept this clarification of the record.

Senator Inhofe. Well, you spent some time talking about the
problems that we have, and we--you know, for the last 20 years,
we've been talking about this, and that--and the system gets
older and older, and we don't seem to do anything about it.
But, we don't talk as much about the others. The other people
out there, even Iran--I think it was--General Stewart was here
last week or the week before, and he warned us that, in Iran,
they're continuing to develop the nuclear weapons and could
soon test a space-launch vehicle that could double as a long-
range missile. That's pretty frightening, because it's--we're
no longer looking at just the superpowers that are developing
this capability.
Admiral Haney. That's correct, Senator. Very recently, Iran
also had a space-launch vehicle to send a satellite in space.
But, not just them; North Korea frequently parades their KN-08
intercontinental ballistic missile.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah. The KN-11, I guess it is. Well, then
you agree with General Stewart----
Admiral Haney. Yes, Senator.
Senator Inhofe.--that Iran is developing that capability,
too.
Admiral Rogers, I became very close to your predecessor,
Alexander. You and I have talked about that. One of the things
that's interesting about the cyber issue is, it's something
that people don't know anything about. Americans don't
understand it. They think about hackers and identity theft and
that type of thing, but they don't really know how it works.
But, they know it needs more funding. That puts you in a
different situation than anybody else is in. Now, that's one of
the few areas where the DOD budget has been enhanced. Right
now, it's up--it's 14 billion proposed increase in cyber
security this year, up 1 billion from last year.
Now, we have heard what would happen--what would be the
first thing that you would have to do, and the consequences,
should the sequestration come in?
Admiral Rogers. The first impact I'd probably see is that
the services would tell me I can't generate the mission force
that you're counting on execute the mission, so I'd have to go
to my fellow commanders, operationally, and say, ``I'm either
going to need to reprioritize and redistribute existing
manpower and capability, and remove it from you and provide it
to someone else, or you're just going to have to go without.''
The other thing that concerns me about sequestration--
because I still hear this from my civilian workforce; in
particular, at Cyber Command--my workforce still talks, at
times, about the impact of the government shutdown, when they
didn't come to work. I remember telling them at the time,
``Stay the course with us. The Nation needs you. We need you. I
believe that this is just a temporary aberration and that,
hopefully, over time, we'll have stability, and you can build a
long-term career with us.'' Because, quite frankly, for most of
the workforce that I'm responsible for leading, they could make
a whole lot more money on the outside, and they are gobbled
up--it's--whenever they decide they want to leave, they have no
problems getting jobs. If we go into the sequestration
scenario, one of my concerns is, Does the workforce say, ``Aha,
this is just another example of how I cannot count on stability
with the government, so maybe I need to go to the private
sector''?
Senator Inhofe. Yeah. You know, that--my time's expired,
but that was exactly the primary concern that Alexander had
when he was in that, because the people--there's a huge market
for your guys on the outside.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Heinrich.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
Admiral Haney, as you're well aware, STRATCOM set the
requirement for a common warhead to be used for both the
military requirements of the ICBM and the submarine-launch
ballistic missile. That warhead has now been shelved for at
least 5 years while we deal with other pressing concerns. I
wanted to ask you if it wouldn't make more sense, potentially,
that, instead of shelving the design, to, rather, keep a low-
level effort in place. I raise that issue, in large part,
because of the necessity of maintaining the requisite talent
and design skills capability among our physicists at Los Alamos
National Laboratories.
Admiral Haney. Senator Heinrich, I want to first salute the
work that the Laboratories do to support the missions of U.S.
Strategic Command. They are involved in a lot of life extension
program work for us, and surveillance program, which is
critical for us to be able to use these warheads that now are
of age of around 27 years.
In regards to your question, what we sometimes call the
``interoperable warhead,'' the business that we're already
working toward is where we can have commonality in some of the
electrical components and what have you. The designers are
working toward that.
As we've described here, the limits of sequestration in our
budget has required us to prioritize things. So, the Nuclear
Weapons Council, which is a big group that includes both
Department of Defense and Department of Energy and National
Security Agency (NSA), have been working hard to get that
prioritization right while at the same time paying close
attention to how we are keeping the workforce employed. These
life extension programs are challenges, and they're working
hard at those designs, too.
Senator Heinrich. Would you say that the limits of that
sequestration are so limiting that you're forced to make some
decisions that may be penny wise and pound foolish?
Admiral Haney. I wouldn't exactly--I would say, with
sequestration, across our Department, absolutely we will be
making decisions----
Senator Heinrich. Yeah, not referring to the President's
Budget, but if we go to full sequestration Budget Control Act
levels.
Admiral Haney. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Heinrich. Admiral Rogers, I wanted to return to
something you sort of touched on tangentially in the reality
that it's evident that many of the good people who do work for
you could make a lot more money on the outside. We're seeing an
increasing number of private-sector firms that are collecting
and analyzing, disseminating cyberthreat intelligence for
commercial customers. What do you--have you given much thought
to what you think the proper role is for the private sector to
play in cyberthreat intelligence collection and analysis? As
the market for cyberthreat intelligence continues to grow, how
does the IC plan to better leverage commercial efforts as part
of its overall mission balance?
Admiral Rogers. So, in the end, the nature of cyber, this
is the ultimate team sport, in my experience. This--the key to
our effectiveness as a Nation, I believe, in no small part will
be driven by, How can we bring together the capabilities of the
private sector and the public sector? It's one reason, for
example, why I believe that cyber information-sharing
legislation is so critical. We have got to provide incentives
and cover, if you will, for the private sector to be able to
move information to the government, and for the government to
be able to push information to the private sector.
In terms of the way we partner, the aftermath of Sony was a
very good example, where we not only collaborated, wearing my
NSA hat, between NSA, the FBI, Sony, as well as the private
security firm they had hired. It's--the four of us collaborated
together to come up with, Here's the conclusion, and here's the
basis out of the conclusion, the fact that it was the North
Koreans that did this. That was really powered in no small
part, and significantly aided by the fact, that we were able to
do it in partnership. That's a model, to me, for the future.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I'll yield back the remainder of my time.
Chairman McCain. Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your service to our country, and
for being here today.
Admiral Haney, when we look at our nuclear force structure,
I understand that we're locked in with the treaties that we
have with Russia, but yet the United States provides that
extended deterrence, and we have commitments with NATO and
Australia, South Korea, Japan. As we look at the world today,
we hear a lot of concern about other countries looking at
developing or buying a nuclear weapon. When we look at that
future proliferation that may be out there, how challenging is
it going to be for us to be able to provide that extended
deterrence to the allies that we now have commitments to?
Admiral Haney. Senator Fischer, I would say, first and
foremost, the assurance we provide those nations you mentioned
is as important as deterrence, and we take that mission very
seriously. With it, the key is not to have other nations go to
nuclear capabilities. In our various talks with our key allies
and partners, that piece is something that we do talk about
and--to make sure nations like North Korea, as you've
mentioned, understand that--I'm sorry, South Korea--understand
that they are under our umbrella, and that we take that mission
seriously.
If we were to allow other nations--if other nations were to
go off and build their own nuclear arsenal, the problem would
be worse, and my other mission set of combating weapons of mass
destruction at large would be problematic--problematic for the
Nation and for the globe as a whole.
Senator Fischer. How would that change our force structure?
How would that change the plans we have for future deployment?
Admiral Haney. That would more complicate our force
structure and operational planning associated with it.
Senator Fischer. Historically, we've looked at tactical
nuclear weapons and our strategic nuclear weapons differently.
They're considered differently when we have our arms
agreements. Is that correct?
Admiral Haney. Senator, they have, in the past; but I will
say that, if you had a nonstrategic or tactical nuclear weapon
go off anywhere in the world, that, too, would have a strategic
effect.
Senator Fischer. So, do you think the line between the two
is breaking down?
Admiral Haney. I wouldn't say the line is breaking down. I
think the business of making sure we can account for both
strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons is important today
as it is in our future. It's just the arms control agreements
we have today, such as New START Treaty, does not cover the
nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
Senator Fischer. Do we need to be looking at considering
that in future arms control treaties? How important is that?
Admiral Haney. I believe it's very important, given the
numbers of nuclear weapons that are in this nonstrategic
category. I've said that publicly before.
Senator Fischer. Admiral, when we look at cyber space and
cyber security, I've--I appreciated Admiral Rogers' comments
about not just being on the defense, but being on the offense.
How important do you think that is? What signals do we need to
send, not just to nations, other nations out there, but to the
criminal element, to unsavory characters that are continuing to
attack our agencies and private businesses? What kind of
signals do we need to send, and how are we going to be able to
draw that line in the sand to say that, ``You can't cross
this''?
Admiral Haney. Senator Fischer, I think it's important, as
we go forward, one, in working as we are with other nations
associated with cyber norms. I think the definitions are
required. As mentioned earlier in this hearing, the business of
solidifying policies, such that we can share that piece, is
required. So, we have to have the whole of whole, from defense
to offensive capabilities, in order to address this problem
and, again, to ensure others understand they can't escalate
their way.
Senator Fischer. As we work on these policies, should we be
working with our allies on those policies, as well, to make a
stronger statement?
Admiral Haney. I fundamentally believe we have to, because
we have to have an international norm, but we have to, as a
country, galvanize around the policies, ourselves, because the
threat is on us today.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir, I appreciate your
comments.
Chairman McCain. Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm sitting here listening particularly to Admiral Haney's
testimony about recapitalizing, and realizing one of the wacky
things about the Federal budgeting process is, we have no
capital budget. We're buying 30- and 40-year assets out of
cashflow. There are things it's appropriate to borrow for,
including 30- and 40-year assets, whether they're highways or
strategic bombers or Ohio-class submarines. Of course, now
we're borrowing to pay salaries and park rangers and soldiers
and sailors, so--but, it's--it is something--it's a larger
issue that we should be talking about, in terms of the budget
process. I'm going from here to the Budget Committee, and I
believe the Chair of the Budget Committee feels the same way,
that we should have--it's one of the few large institutions I
know of that doesn't have an operating budget and a capital
budget. That would be--it would be a lot more sensible to buy a
Ohio-class submarine and finance it over 30 years or 20 years,
particularly at interest rates that we have now. We're trying
to capitalize out of cash, which really doesn't make much
sense.
Second, Admiral Haney, you've talked about the nuclear
deterrent. Clearly it's been effective and important for almost
70 years. How do we deter nonstate actors who are irrational?
How does our deterrent--our--the theory of deterrence assumes a
state actor who is at least moderately rational and worries
about losing their lives or the lives of their--people of their
country. How does--how do we develop a new theory of
deterrence, or deterrence 2.0, that would have some impact on a
terrorist group that gets a hold of one of these warheads and
tucks it into the--a container headed into the Port of Newark?
Admiral Haney. Senator King, very important questions. As
we look at deterring nonstate actors, as you stated, the real
key here still is a cost-benefit deterrence equation. It's a
foundation to deterrence at large. So, we have to make sure
it's extremely costly to prevent them from, first off, eating
their hands when a weapon of mass destruction--in the first
place; but making sure, every step of the way, that we have to
put enough inhibitors in place so that, in order to even
achieve the objective of obtaining one is hard, and ultimately
so that they won't be able to get the benefit they seek to
attain. This is why efforts in combating weapons of mass
destruction are very important today, in nonproliferation, so
that----
Senator King. Intelligence, I assume, is big--a big part
of----
Admiral Haney. Foundational intelligence is huge. The
sharing of that intelligence from nation to nation is also very
important.
Senator King. I would just suggest that this is an area
that bears some very serious discussion and thought. I know
it's going on, but I think it is, as we think about deterrence.
I will report some good news. The Intelligence Committee,
last week, reported out a cyber-sharing--cyber information-
sharing bill, 14 to 1. We're hoping that will move forward
rather quickly. It's long overdue.
Admiral Rogers, I presume you are supportive of that.
Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir, I am.
Senator King. Finally, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to associate
myself with your comments. I--the--I just think it's critical
to develop an offensive cyber capability.
By the way, developing it isn't enough. We have to tell
people that we have it; otherwise, it's not a deterrent. There
has to be a price to be paid. I think the escalation of this
capability by our potential adversaries is alarming and very
real. We've--how many--I guess the question is, How many
warning shots do we have to have, between Target and Sony and
the Sands Casino, before we start telling the world, ``If you
do this to us, you will pay a price?'' Because right now, as I
think you testified, there's no price to be paid.
Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir, I agree very strongly with the
concerns you raise and the fact that we do have to take a look
at the offensive piece as a part of that whole deterrent idea.
Otherwise, we are on the wrong end of this equation, from a
cost and a results perspective, and that's not a good place for
us to be.
Senator King. But, remember Dr. Strangelove, ``If you build
a doomsday machine, you've got to tell people you have it.
Otherwise''----
Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir. It's all part of that deterrent
idea.
Senator King.--``the purpose is thwarted.''
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. You're showing your age.
[Laughter.]
Chairman McCain. Senator Cotton.
Senator King. I could come back, Mr. Chairman, but I'm not
going to.
[Laughter.]
Senator Cotton. Hopefully, I won't show my age.
Thank you, gentlemen, for coming. Thanks, to all those who
sit behind you and all the ones you represent in your various
commands, and all the work they do to help keep our country
safe.
Admiral Rogers, thank you for hosting me recently at the
NSA and Cyber Command. General Selva, Admiral Haney, I hope to
be able to visit your commands sometime soon, as well. Since
they're not right down the street, it makes it a little bit
harder to get there.
I, too, want to support the statement of Senator King and
Senator McCain about the need to develop offensive cyber
capacities. It's far beyond the technical means that I learned
as an infantryman, but basic infantry doctrine said, simply,
``You're on the offense when you're moving, and you're on the
defense when you're not on the offense.'' So, that means you're
on the defense when you're sitting there waiting for someone to
attack you, which is not the posture we want to have.
All of you have said in your statements, both written and
oral and in response to questions, about the ongoing negative
and severe impacts that sequestration has had on our
capabilities. We are now in a debate about what to do on that
topic. One proposal in the budgets of the House and Senate
Budget Committees, which are works in process--I don't expect
you to comment on them--is to leave the base budget where it
currently would be, at $498 billion, and potentially increase
wartime spending or what we call ``overseas contingency
operations'' spending in this building by up to $90 billion.
So, the total DOD budget would be almost $600 billion. I'd just
like to get your thoughts--again, not necessarily on those
budget documents, but on the general concept of keeping
sequestration caps in place, but having substantially higher
overseas contingency operations spending. We can start with
Admiral Haney and move down the line.
Admiral Haney. Senator Cotton, overseas contingency
operational funding can be problematic, in terms of what you
can use it for. But, even more importantly, I think, is the
long-term planning. When we talk about having the government,
the military, operate more efficiently, we have to be able to
deal with it on more than just one year at a time. Without the
ability to have that long-term planning and the flexibility,
where you take cuts and what have you, we will be even--we will
be inefficient, quite frankly, and it will raise havoc, in
terms of our joint military force capability at large.
Senator Cotton. General Selva.
General Selva. Senator, I worry that an incremental
approach to sequestration relief will put us in a place where,
as Senator King said, we'll find ourselves being penny wise and
pound foolish. Inside the transportation and distribution
enterprise, when we see a decrease in the demand signal that's
the result of bringing forces out of Afghanistan, that's a
reason to celebrate. When we watch a decrease in mission set
that's a consequence of services cutting their exercise and
readiness programs, that also plays a demand signal on the
transportation enterprise. That puts us in a place where we are
likely to be less ready than we ever have been in our prior
history. It's a consequence of the services not knowing where
the next marginal dollar is going to come from.
So, if we take an incremental approach to sequestration
relief, you still create the same kind of uncertainty that
makes us inefficient and ineffective. So, I would worry that,
with that proposal, not knowing any of the details behind it.
Senator Cotton. Admiral Rogers.
Admiral Rogers. I would echo the comments of my colleagues.
The other point I would make, from a Cyber Command perspective,
is, we're a relatively young, immature organization. We are
just starting, if you will, the buildout of our capabilities. I
don't have decades of investment that I can fall back on. So,
this is all--as we're trying to build a long-term sustained
plan in a high-threat and ever-growing environment, this up-
and-down annual incremental approach to doing business makes it
very difficult for us to build a long-term sustainable plan in
the face of this ever-increasing threat.
Senator Cotton. So, if I could maybe synthesize what I'm
hearing from the three of you, this approach of significantly
increasing Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) spending, but
leaving the base budget where it is, may be better than
nothing, only slightly better, though, because of the
inefficiencies and the difficulty for the long-term planning
you require?
Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
Admiral Haney. Absolutely. I'd also say it's a signal to
our adversaries of how serious we are on deterrence assurance
and ensuring we have a military capability.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Let me move to--from one--the very big topic to a very
small, but important, topic. General Selva, coming up on the
summer season, Permenant Change of Station (PCS) season, big
delays recently in shipping privately owned vehicles, Outside
the Continental United States (OCONUS) for our troops that are
going overseas. It's a significant emotional event whenever a
family gets OCONUS and doesn't have their vehicle. Can you talk
to us about what we've done to avoid that--those kind of delays
this year?
General Selva. Yes, sir. I had a meeting with the
contractor that holds that contract, on the 12th of February,
and the subject of the meeting was their training program,
their employment program, the number of employees they have
onboard, and the operational concepts that they intend to use
this summer to meet the--what we would call the ``summer
surge.'' We'll move about 40,000 cars through the summer season
as we move soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coastguardsmen,
and State Department employees around the world. They presented
a plan. The plan is reasonable. We have looked at--inside the
Command, at all of the metrics that we'll use to measure that
execution. I demanded from the company that they provide me
with the underlying subcontracts that I could review with the
people that are going to provide those services. It is a
reasonable operational plan. It's their responsibility to
execute. I'll use all the tools that exist in the contract to
compel them to execute throughout the summer.
Senator Cotton. Good.
Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Admiral Haney and General Selva and
Admiral, if you had a choice between OCO and the present
sequestration level, which would you choose?
General Selva. Sir, that's a choice between the devil and
the deep blue sea, but to balance the checkbook, I would take
the OCO.
Chairman McCain. Admiral?
Admiral Haney. Senator McCain, obviously having more money
is better than having less, so obviously I would take the
choice of having OCO. But, it doesn't do much for U.S.
Strategic Command, because procurement in those kind of things
aren't what we use OCO for.
Chairman McCain. Actually, we're putting provisions in to
allow that procurement and modernization in the OCO provision.
Admiral Rogers?
Admiral Rogers. Similar to General Selva, more money is
better than less. We--clearly, you'd be presenting us a
challenge, but we get paid to deal with challenges and work
through them.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Senator Donnelly.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here.
Admiral Rogers, the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane, in
Indiana, does a lot of work in counterfeit activities, and I
was wondering how you characterize this threat and its
potential impact on our systems.
Admiral Rogers. So, I assume we're talking about
substituting gray market or other----
Senator Donnelly. Correct.
Admiral Rogers.--material in the supply chain.
Senator Donnelly. Yes.
Admiral Rogers. I apologize. I just want to make sure we're
not talking about counterfeit money.
Senator Donnelly. No. Good.
Admiral Rogers. That was my fault.
It's something that we clearly, the services, and
particularly because of their function in the man, train, and
equip, that's primarily a service responsibility. In my
previous job, where I was a service-focused individual, it's a
topic we spent a good deal of time on, particularly in the more
important higher-tiered areas of readiness--for example, in the
nuclear arena, where we spend a lot of time ensuring that the
structure that we have purchased, that we have put in place,
does not have compromises and vulnerabilities built within it.
It's an area that I think we're going to need to increase our
focus over time. We just went through an issue, for example,
with one of the services, where we found, in a particular
system that they had been buying, a handful of instances where
the vendor had not complied fully with the contract and had put
some other components in. So, it is a topic we see.
Senator Donnelly. Okay, thank you.
Admiral Haney, I'd like to get your thoughts on the
conventional prompt-strike research and development efforts
that are underway and what you feel the value of the system is
to STRATCOM.
Admiral Haney. Senator Donnelly, I fully support the
research we're doing associated with the conventional prompt
global strike capability. It's a capability I see some of our
adversaries are working on--potential adversaries. To me, it's
all about, How do you hold at risk the enemy, particularly as I
look at a lot of the capability, whether it's counterspace,
whether it's jamming equipment, all the way to intercontinental
ballistic missiles that are on mobile transport capability. An
ability to hold it at risk in multiple ways is very important
in the deterrence equation. I think conventional prompt global
strike provides this, Senator.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
This would be for any of you who want to answer. We've seen
some extraordinarily loose talk from Putin recently regarding
nuclear weapons, regarding using them as an option in regards
to Crimea, that he was thinking about. They're presently
involved in exercises, which have expanded from the Arctic to
include activities along the Finnish border, the deployment of
strategic weapon systems to Kaliningrad in Crimea, positions
across the Baltic fleet, the Black Sea fleet, the western and
southern military districts. It seems to form a nuclear
narrative. You know, we have to take him at his word, it seems
to me, in his actions that he's showing and in what he's
saying.
Admiral Rogers, I'll start with you. Do you see this as a
significant increase in the posturing there? How do you regard
this as we move forward?
Admiral Rogers. If you look across the board, you've seen--
other combatant commanders have testified in front of you. I
remember seeing Admiral Gortney's testimony, highlighting that
we're seeing a spectrum of operations. Cyber is no different.
I'm seeing a much more active Russia in the cyber arena in a
much more visible way. I think just as we're seeing with their
use of long-range aviation, their public posturing, some of the
statements you and other members of the committee have
referenced. I think our Russian friends are definitely trying
to send us a very strong message about what is acceptable to
them and what is not.
Senator Donnelly. Admiral Haney, you are, I presume that--
you know, we had talked before--seeing the same kinds of ramp-
up in the cyber area. What do you expect in the years ahead?
Admiral Haney. Well, to enter the cyber domain, as has been
echoed by many folks, many pundits, it doesn't take a lot of
money to enter that domain, in terms of getting the equipment.
It does take money for adversaries to invest--become high-end
in it. I think Admiral Rogers would agree with me there. So,
consequently, I think it's very important that we continue to
work hard across the spectrum.
But, I will say, as we look at the future, we have to look
at cross-domain deterrence options and be mindful in each. For
strategic capability, I look at that in cyber, space, and
nuclear. Very important to not just look at just one. We have
to be effective across the whole of whole.
Senator Donnelly. General?
General Selva. Sir, you're taking me out of my----
Senator Donnelly. Oh. Then I'll----
General Selva.--comfort zone. But, I will say, the buildup
of the rhetoric puts us in a place where, strategically, we
have to be able to respond to that attempt to intimidate the
countries in Russia's near abroad. The two men sitting at both
of my sides are the guys that own the tools to do that.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. [presiding] Thank you, Senator.
Senator Lee, please.
Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks, to all of you, for being here today.
My first question, I'll direct to Admiral Haney and Admiral
Rogers, or either one of you or both of you if you both want to
answer it. On March 11th, the Russian government announced what
it referred to as a ``year of friendship with North Korea.'' It
appears that Kim Jong-un will visit Moscow in May. Do you
anticipate that the enhancement of the Russian/North Korean
relationship might result in the expedited developed of North
Korean nuclear weapons or cyber capabilities? Can you speak to
the relationship, specifically the military relationship,
between these two countries?
Admiral Haney. One, I would say, to really get in depth
would require a classified setting. I will echo what you said,
though, it is problematic seeing Russia and North Korea in
working any form of a partnership, our ability to see where
this will go for the future. We know North Korea's ambitions,
in terms of their demonstrated cyber, their ambitions for
nuclear weapons, the tests that they've already occurred. We
think they already have miniaturized some of these capability.
Clearly we know where their aspirations are. So, I see both
nations--Russia wanting to have partnerships with others, and
they're looking at whatever mechanism they can to--in order to
reduce strategic stability in their favor.
Admiral Rogers. I would echo Admiral Haney's comment.
Clearly, we're going to be spending a lot of time focused on
this, because a North Korea that is able to access nuclear and
cyber technology from Russia is of great concern to us. So,
it's something we'll be paying great attention to.
Senator Lee. Thank you.
Then, Admiral Haney, a recent report out of John Hopkins
University indicated that North Korea could possess nearly 100
nuclear devices by 2019, while continuing to make significant
progress in its ballistics program. Does our current schedule
to deploy 44 ground-based interceptors and upgrade their kill
vehicles keep pace with the development of the threat to the
homeland that may be presented by North Korea or perhaps other
ballistic missile threats to the United States?
Admiral Haney. Today, Senator, we are working to ensure we
have a system of systems, a layered system associated with our
missile defense capability, to include the ground-based
interceptors. Two areas I will highlight that we have to work
on--and I think President budget 2016 provides for that--that
is getting the kill vehicle right. It has to be effective in
order to enhance shot doctrine. Also our ability to have more
significant improvement in discrimination is important in order
to hold at risk things that would come toward the homeland.
Those are two areas--we can bean-count what North Korea may or
may not have and what we have and our capability, but we've got
to get those two pieces right, while, at the same time, when
you look at the whole of whole and other solutions. In order to
get any further into that, I'd have to have a classified
setting.
Senator Lee. Okay. Thank you. I understand.
Admiral Rogers, what level of command and control by the--
is there by the governments of Russia, China, and Iran over
their--what we might call their cyber warriors? In other words,
do they report into some sort of centralized command structure,
or do they enjoy a degree of autonomy that gives their
governments plausible deniability for their actions?
Admiral Rogers. In an unclassified structure, what I would
highlight is, each of the three use a slightly different
structure, but, in each case, the cyber activities we have seen
to date display a strong and direct linkage between the
individual actors doing the actual activity and the Nation-
state directing it.
One of the things we'll be looking for in the future,
though, Do nation-states start to try to confuse our
attribution ability by creating different relationship, for
example, using other partners, trying to distance themselves in
a visible way so their activity is not as directly
attributable? I think that's a trend that we're going to be
looking for.
Senator Lee. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I see my time has expired.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Lee.
Senator Gillibrand, please.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Rogers, CYBERCOM obviously, as we've discussed
today, has a wide range of responsibilities. How do you deal
with unexpected threats?
Admiral Rogers. Like any other military organization, we
quickly reprioritize and look to see where can we take risk
elsewhere.
Senator Gillibrand. Do you have the capability that you
need for those unexpected threats, particularly in cyber?
Admiral Rogers. One of the issues that I've raised
internally in the Department, to be honest, is the idea that,
in creating the force, we've allocated it all very specifically
across the board. So, one of the implications, which I think
goes to your point, is: So we perhaps didn't build in as much
flexibility as our experience now is telling us perhaps we
need. So, that's something, to be honest, within the Department
that we're going to be looking at.
Senator Gillibrand. Is that----
Admiral Rogers. We need to----
Senator Gillibrand.--sort of a perspective of----
Admiral Rogers.--relook----
Senator Gillibrand.--technology or personnel?
Admiral Rogers. It's less technology, to me, and it's much
more about just the resources, people, and the equipment, and
their focus.
Senator Gillibrand. So, if you're going to create a longer-
term, more resilient strategy for getting the personnel that
you need and the expertise that you need and the retention that
you need--because we talked about how these guys, you know, are
offered very high salaries at Google, the minute they walk
out--how do you deal with that?
Admiral Rogers. Knock on wood, across each of the services
we have met or exceeded all of our accession targets, bringing
manpower in, and our ability to retain people. It will never be
about competing head-to-head with salary. Where we are going to
compete, as we do in all--in many other areas of the military--
is the ethos of our organization, the culture of our
organization which is focused on service to the Nation, the
fact that we are going to give you an amazing mission that you
can't do anywhere else, the fact that we're going to give you a
lot of responsibility at a very young level. That's our model.
Then, lastly, we're going to let you do it in some really
interesting places around the world, to include, if you're a
real adrenaline junky, I can get you to Afghanistan, I can get
you to Iraq. We have capabilities there that we're using on a
regular basis.
Senator Gillibrand. So, we don't yet--we haven't developed
a built-in surge strategy yet, so we don't have the backup we
would need, given a crisis, yet.
Admiral Rogers. So--right, I have no capability right now
that we haven't allocated against the mission set. It's not
surprising--if I could--it's not surprising, in the sense that
we're in the early stage of this effort. But, you do raise a
concern that I have talked about.
Senator Gillibrand. Have you thought about creating a
stronger relationship with regard to that need within the
Reserve components?
Admiral Rogers. I would tell you that the Reserve component
is an active part of our--and a very important part of the
entire structure. That structure we're creating, of 6200
people, that isn't all Active. That isn't all military, either.
Senator Gillibrand. Because I could imagine, given the
needs of current day, that you might even create a
complementary recruiting strategy among the Reserves, with
experts in the field. Meaning you go directly to the people you
actually want and say, ``Would you consider joining the
Reserves?'' Have you considered that kind of active
recruitment?
Admiral Rogers. In fact, right now we're actually doing
kind of even interesting test pilot with the Reserves and the
capability we're creating in Silicon Valley.
Senator Gillibrand. Exactly. That's----
Admiral Rogers. It's a kind of interesting----
Senator Gillibrand.--exactly what I am talking about.
Admiral Rogers. Right.
Senator Gillibrand. Well, to the extent this is an approach
of a strategy that you think is meaningful, I would be
grateful, to the extent you need support for that, to ask the
committee.
Admiral Rogers. Yes, Senator.
Senator Gillibrand. Because I've had a long-term concern
that we need to get the best and brightest to work for us and
to be part of our cyber support, and also we need really strong
cyber warriors. You have to build them over time, they have to
understand how the military works, and that takes investment
and long-term----
Admiral Rogers. Right.
Senator Gillibrand.--investment. Frankly, very flexible
strategy. So, I'm grateful that you are starting that pilot
approach with Silicon Valley. I'd suggest that you amplify
that, because I think it is exactly where we need to go,
especially given budget concerns. If you----
Admiral Rogers. Right.
Senator Gillibrand.--can't have everyone full-time, and you
can't have the full complement you need at all times, at least
create the support you need through the Reserve components.
With regard to training, are you able to create the
training you need both with Active Duty and Reserve components,
and to keep it as up to date as necessary?
Admiral Rogers. To date, yes. But, I'll be honest, because
we're in the early parts of the journey, here. What we need to
do is generate more insight and knowledge to see what's our
ability to sustain this over time. Because we're still really
focused on the initial cadre. The challenge is going to be, So
how do you sustain it as people come and go? That's something
we're going to be, in the next year or two, in particular,
spending a lot of time on.
Senator Gillibrand. Well, again, I'd like to work with you
on meeting the needs that you have to meet these requirements.
I think it's vital that you have a very active conversation
with this committee so that we can support you.
Admiral Rogers. Yes, Senator.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
Admiral Rogers. Thank you for your concern.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Gillibrand.
Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony, thank you for your
service to the Nation.
On behalf of Chairman McCain, I would adjourn the hearing.

[Whereupon, at 11:00 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator James Inhofe
1. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Haney, General Selva, Admiral Rogers,
Secretary Carter testified to this committee a couple of weeks ago that
``readiness remains at troubling levels across the force'' and ``that
even with the fiscal year 2016 budget, the Army, Navy and Marine Corps
won't reach their readiness goals until 2020 and the Air Force until
2023.'' General Dempsey testified that the fiscal year 2016 President's
Budget is ``what we need to remain at the lower ragged edge of
manageable risk in our ability to execute the defense strategy'' and
that ``we have no slack, no margin left for error or strategic
surprise.'' Do you each agree with these statements?
Admiral Haney. Yes, I agree with these statements. Failure to pass
the fiscal year 2016 President's Budget will negatively impact our
ability to maintain and improve force readiness, particularly for my
Nuclear Deterrent Forces, Space Forces and Cyber Forces.
A return to sequestration levels, will inject significant risk into
our ability to provide the US with the strategic capabilities required
and fulfill the defense strategy outlined in the Quadrennial Defense
Review. Equally disconcerting is the lack of long-term budget
certainty, which serves to undermine readiness, strategic planning and
effective acquisition.
General Selva. Yes. USTRANSCOM remains ready today to respond to
any contingency or geographic combatant command requirement for
movement of forces; however, significant recapitalization and
modernization are necessary to meet future expected demand for
transportation services.
Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]

2. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Haney, General Selva, Admiral Rogers,
does the proposed fiscal year 2016 budget support/meet each of your
requirements?
Admiral Haney. The fiscal year 2016 President's Budget submission
supports USSTRATCOM's mission requirements. USSTRATCOM fully
participated in the formulation of the Department's budget, and the
President's submission strikes a responsible balance between national
priorities and fiscal realities. The President's Budget, albeit with
some risk, provides the funding necessary to maintain a safe, secure,
and effective nuclear deterrent force; address threats to the space-
based capabilities our forces depend upon; and field a robust
cyberspace force.
However, any substantial departure from the President's Budget, to
include a return to sequestration levels, will inject significant risk
into our ability to provide the US with the strategic capabilities
required and fulfill the defense strategy outlined in the Quadrennial
Defense Review.
Equally disconcerting is the lack of long-term budget certainty,
which serves to undermine readiness, strategic planning and effective
acquisition.
General Selva. Yes. USTRANSCOM operates under the Transportation
Working Capital Fund, a revolving fund for defense transportation.
USTRANSCOM manages cash on a daily basis by assessing whether the end-
of-day cash balance is within established tolerance limits and
associated risks. The fiscal year 2016 Transportation Working Capital
Fund's budgeted cash balance is sufficient to maintain mission
operations. In the event USTRANSCOM is directed to support real world,
unforeseen contingency/humanitarian missions, we are able to quickly
determine if we have sufficient cash available to initiate mission
operations until customers can be billed and these billings can be
liquidated by supported customers when they have secured appropriate
funding.
Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]

3. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Haney, General Selva, Admiral Rogers, if
sequestration is not repealed, even partially, can you give us some
context in terms of risks to readiness of personnel, equipment,
training, etc. and how that ``ragged edge'' impacts you?
Admiral Haney. While my Service partners are likely better
positioned to answer this question, I remain concerned that if fiscal
constraints are imposed by the Budget Control Act, I will no longer be
able to guarantee the strategic capabilities the Nation needs. Any
substantial departure from the President's Budget, to include a return
to sequestration levels, would weaken our national defense, provide
encouragement and momentum to America's foes, and will inject
significant risk into our ability to provide the US with the strategic
capabilities required to fulfill the defense strategy outlined in the
Quadrennial Defense Review.
While I share the Services' concerns over current and near-term
readiness my challenge is also structuring the force of tomorrow in the
face of clear, emerging strategic threats. So, the central issue for US
Strategic Command is long-term funding stability at President's Budget
levels to see us through a demanding, almost unprecedented, period of
simultaneous sustainment, recapitalization and building capacity across
our mission areas. For example, we've all taken notice of the growing
and projected nuclear capabilities of Russia and China. To prepare for
these developments we must sustain the current force while developing
the future force across every platform, payload and supporting
infrastructure. Sequestration jeopardizes the recent progress we've
made in carrying out the Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise improvements
identified in both the internal and external reviews as well as in a
modernization program that no longer has margin for delay. The Ohio
Class SSBN's service life, as one prime example, has been extended from
30 to 42 years, longer than any submarine in U.S. history. Another
example is our ability to modernize our National and Nuclear Command,
Control and Communications infrastructure to keep pace with adversary
developments and to ensure the President is able to maintain assured,
continuous connectivity to our strategic forces.
We face especially difficult challenges in two domains that are now
central to our National Security Strategy and Joint capabilities--space
and cyberspace. In space we are recapitalizing major segments of our
on-orbit systems while the domain itself is becoming dangerously
contested. The solution requires enhanced space domain awareness
capability, persistent development and fielding over several years to
create space control systems and a robust command and control
capability able to deal with the counterspace threat and preserve the
advantage we enjoy today from our space--based systems. Likewise in
cyberspace, we've seen enough evidence to know this is a potential
vector for an adversary's strategic attack--especially against our most
critical infrastructure. We are building capacity where little or none
existed before which, again, will take multiple budget cycles to
develop, train and field. We require sustained investment to counter
this cyber threat.
Our potential adversaries are working hard to deny us access
through their electronic warfare activities. Sequestration threatens
our ability to ensure future spectrum dominance essential to enabling
the Joint force.
While our current missile defense systems are protecting the
homeland against limited threats, those threats will likely not stay
limited forever. Rogue states continue to make advances which challenge
our indications and warning, and have the potential to saturate our
sensors and overwhelm our command and control. Stable funding allows us
to pursue game changing technologies to put us on the right end of the
cost curve and to stay relevant and effective against advancing
countermeasures.
In short, the challenges we face will require a consistent level of
funding across multiple budget years to have confidence we can develop
and field the right force in the future.
General Selva. When General Dempsey testified about our being on a
``ragged edge,'' I believe he was referring to the Department's ability
to manage risk given a $36 billion increase above sequestration that is
included in the President's fiscal year 2016 budget. I concur with his
statement and note that even if the President's Budget is approved as
requested and sustained through the Fiscal Year Defense Program (FYDP),
I anticipate that USTRANSCOM readiness issues would still persist
through at least fiscal year 2019. If, as implied by your question, the
budget is fully constrained below the President's Budget by
sequestration from fiscal year 2016 through the FYDP, USTRANSCOM would
undoubtedly fall off the ``ragged edge'' when it comes to our ability
to meet the defense transportation system demands set forth by
Functional and Geographic Combatant Commanders and their associated
operational plans. As a critical deployment and sustainment enabler to
all military operations, USTRANSCOM readiness directly impacts
readiness to global US military commitments and operations as a whole.
If implemented, sequestration would force major changes to our National
Strategic and Military Strategies. Sequestration in fiscal year 2016
through the FYDP would result in cuts to the military Services'
personnel, equipment, and training directly impacting USTRANSCOM
readiness and rendering the National Military Strategy unexecutable.
Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]

4. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Haney, General Selva, Admiral Rogers, we
anticipate that congress will pass a budget resolution that funds
defense at sequestration levels with additional funding through OCO.
Assuming sequestration remains the law, do you have to take any actions
in fiscal year 2015 in your force structure to prepare for
sequestration in fiscal year 2016? If so, when do those decision need
to be made?
Admiral Haney. While my Service partners are likely better
positioned to answer this question, I know of no force structure
actions I could take to prepare for a return to Sequestration.
General Selva. No. USTRANSCOM has not taken steps in fiscal year
2015 to adjust force structure in preparation for sequestration budget
levels in fiscal year 2016. If the fiscal year 2016 defense budget is
set at a sequestration level, USTRANSCOM budget planners will execute
the budget in coordination and synchronization with DOD leadership and
our service components.
Flexibility to execute additional OCO funding for USTRANSCOM
readiness requirements will provide some relief for one year, but is
not a long term fix. Our commercial providers, in particular, require
stable, predictable, funding to continue providing services to the DOD.
The implementation of sequestration puts those services at risk and
directly impacts USTRANSCOM's ability to do its mission.
Admiral Rogers. We are midway through fiscal year 2015 and plans to
execute current funding are underway leaving little flexibility to make
adjustments that could place us in a better position for fiscal year
2016 under Budget Control Act restrictions. Budgetary uncertainty due
to a potential return to Budget Control Act funding levels is a concern
for U.S. Cyber Command.
Budget Control Act reductions would have second and third order
effects to U.S. Cyber Command and would likely force acceptance of
higher operational risks due to Services inability to generate mission
forces needed, forcing a potential reprioritization and redistribution
of manpower and capability from lower priority Combatant Commands and
Service requirements leaving those mission severely degraded or not
accomplished.
nuclear weapons
5. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Haney, in your opinion, what role does
``nuclear deterrence'' play in today's world?
Admiral Haney. Strategic deterrence in the 21st century is far more
than just nuclear, although our nuclear deterrent remains the ultimate
guarantor of our security. We must shape our nuclear weapons policies
and force structure in ways that enable us to meet our most pressing
security challenges. As stated in the Nuclear Posture Review, the
fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons remains to deter nuclear
attack on the United States and its Allies and partners. The United
States will maintain a credible nuclear deterrent capable of convincing
any potential adversary that the adverse consequences of attacking the
United States or our Allies and partners far outweigh any potential
benefit they may seek to gain from such an attack.
U.S. nuclear Triad modernization and sustainment programs must be
fully funded. In doing so, the U.S. demonstrates our continued
assurance commitments to allies and partners; while also messaging
strategic resolve to potential adversaries.

6. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Haney, do you believe our nuclear
deterrence capability has been challenged by inadequate modernization
funding and continued modernization by other nuclear powers?
Admiral Haney. We have deferred our Triad modernization for as long
as possible. Any further slips will increase risks to carrying out our
nuclear deterrence and assurance missions and will cause a loss of
capability and likely increased cost. We have steadily delayed
investment in critical capabilities like the Ohio Replacement Program,
the Long Range Strike-Bomber, the Long Range Standoff cruise missile,
the B61-12 gravity weapon, and the Minuteman III replacement too long.
We cannot afford to delay or reduce planned modernization for these
programs any further and must provide stable, sufficient funding in
fiscal year 2016 and beyond. We must address these capability gaps in
the coming decade because there is no margin left in the timeline
required to modernize our strategic forces before our current
capabilities become unsustainable. Today's complex and dangerous global
security environment demands we properly sustain and modernize our
strategic capabilities. The President's fiscal year 2016 Budget
supports my mission requirements. We cannot afford to underfund these
vital missions, especially considering adversaries continue modernizing
their strategic capabilities which results in increased threat to our
national security.

7. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Haney, what do you assess as the current
state of our nuclear triad in relation to today's threats?
Admiral Haney. I assess the current state of our nuclear Triad
provides a safe, secure and effective deterrent against today's
threats. The Triad's combination of unique and complimentary
attributes, along with associated intelligence, warning, communications
and infrastructure, remains the foundation for strategic deterrence and
stability. We are mindful this critical capability requires persistent
and focused attention as highlighted in the recent Nuclear Enterprise
Review and the coordinated after-actions of the Department, Combatant
Commands and Services to ensure the morale and sustainment of the
force. I'm confident we are on the right path with the right level of
attention and support.
I am not, however, as confident going forward in the face of
emerging, future threats. We've all taken notice, for example, of the
growing and projected nuclear capabilities of Russia and China. To
prepare for these developments, we face the challenging situation of
simultaneous sustainment of the current force while developing the
future force across every platform and payload in a period of great
fiscal uncertainty. Indeed, stable funding at a modest fraction of the
overall DOD budget remains my top concern and priority.
Sustaining the current Triad is particularly challenging because we
have extended both platform and payload lifetimes far beyond their
initial designs while we deferred modernization. For example, the Ohio-
class SSBNs entered service in 1981, the B-52 bomber in 1952, the Air
Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) in 1982, the B-2 in 1993, and the
Minuteman III in 1970. Furthermore, the average age of the weapons in
our nation's stockpile is over 27 years. Deferred investment decisions
have eroded remaining margin in timeliness to field new capabilities
before their legacy counterparts age out.
Recapitalizing our sea-based strategic deterrence force is my top
priority. The Ohio Class SSBNs service life has been extended from 30
to 42 years, longer than any submarine in U.S. history, and will begin
to retire in 2027. No further extension is possible and maintaining
operational availability is a growing concern. Stable and consistent
funding of the Ohio Replacement Program, the life-of-ship reactor core,
and supporting systems and infrastructure is critical to achieving the
first deterrence patrol in 2031.
Planned sustainment and modernization of our dual-capable B-52 and
B-2 bombers will ensure a credible nuclear bomber capability through
2040. The follow-on long-range strike bomber (LRS-B), the Long Range
Stand-Off (LRSO) cruise missile, and the B61-12 gravity weapon ensure
the future viability of the Triad's air leg and our extended deterrence
commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
We can meet the Congressionally-mandated sustainment of the
Minuteman III through 2030 with near-term investments for the Mk21 fuze
replacement, ICBM Cryptographic Upgrade, Payload Transporter/
Transporter-Erector vehicle replacements, and the UH-1N helicopter
replacement to address age-related issues. An integrated Ground Based
Strategic Deterrence (GBSD) program will recapitalize the ICBM
enterprise. The GBSD Analysis of Alternatives is complete and the Air
Force is developing a fully integrated recapitalization plan to
maintain the land based force for the next 60 years.
Nuclear weapons surveillance activities, life extension programs,
and stockpile stewardship efforts are critical to mitigating age-
related effects and incorporating improved safety and security features
in our nuclear arsenal without a return to nuclear testing. Active and
sustained execution of the Nuclear Weapons Council's (NWC's) `3+2'
stockpile strategy will produce two air-delivered and three ballistic
missile warheads to reduce the overall stockpile while meeting
technical, capability and safety requirements. Sustainment and
modernization of the nuclear enterprise infrastructure--in physical and
intellectual terms--is central to implementing the NWC `3+2' strategy
to ensure critical capabilities are preserved to meet the nation's
stockpile needs.
Again, we believe the above sustainment and modernization
challenges are not only necessary to maintain strategic deterrence and
stability in the face of future threats but are also achievable with
continued, stable funding support at a fraction of historic DOD
spending levels.

8. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Haney, what happens if our allies that
rely on the US nuclear umbrella no longer believe it is viable?
Admiral Haney. The current US strategic force posture is sufficient
to protect our strategic interests and maintain a credible deterrence.
Loss of faith in the U.S. nuclear umbrella by U.S. Allies would
severely damage the credibility of U.S. commitments and could engender
several significant, cascading, and potentially far-reaching
consequences. These possibilities include a significant increase in the
proliferation of nuclear weapons.
cyber
9. Senator Inhofe. General Selva, what steps have you taken to
address cyber intrusion and reporting as a result of the Senate Armed
Services Committee Cyber Report on TRANSCOM?
General Selva. The Senate Armed Services Committee report brought
much-needed attention to an important set of challenges faced by
USTRANSCOM--challenges that translate to operational risk inherited by
the supported geographic combatant commanders. USTRANSCOM supported the
Department of Defense (DOD) led effort to identify solutions to the
broader challenges of risks to missions supported by contractors around
the department. The Department's effort is already improving
information sharing among the partners. In order to address the more
specific challenges that USTRANSCOM faces, the members of the DOD
interagency team will assemble as a Mission Analysis Task Force--hosted
by USTRANSCOM--to identify the peculiar information sharing process
challenges that support USTRANSCOM risk mitigation and responses within
planning and execution of deployment and distribution operations.
USTRANSCOM will continue to work with its partners in the Department,
Intelligence Community, and Interagency to bring to bear the necessary
authorities to reduce risk to deployment and distribution, and secure
our national interests.
USTRANSCOM continues to aggressively execute risk mitigation within
our existing authorities to address the challenges highlighted in the
report, including strengthening our contracts, expanding our partnering
efforts within the Intelligence Community and Interagency, increasing
internal oversight, and expanding outreach with industry.
With respect to our contracts, we have recently re-written our
cyber defense contract language to align with legislation, synchronize
with Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement requirements,
and tighten up the intrusion notification and incident reporting
requirements. Cyber defense requirements are currently in 55 percent
(165) of our contracts, and our goal remains 100 percent by end of
fiscal year 2016. Additionally, we increased engagement with the FBI,
and their support has been sensational. FBI intrusion reports are now
provided directly to USTRANSCOM's cyber center fusion analysts. Also,
FBI staff members participate in the USTRANSCOM Cyber Fusion Working
Group meetings twice a month. Internal to USTRANSCOM, cyber incidents
involving commercial partners have high visibility and are briefed to
myself and staff Directors on a regular basis. Finally, we worked with
the National Defense Transportation Association to create a Cyber Sub-
Committee to establish an enduring means of information exchange within
the industry on common cyber threats and defense best practices.
maritime security program (msp)
10. Senator Inhofe. General Selva, will there be enough U.S.
flagged ships the Maritime Security Program (MSP) and Voluntary
Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) programs to support DOD
requirements?
General Selva. The DOD Requirement for MSP is 60 ships. The
authorized composition of the MSP with its 60 ships currently provides
sufficient access to capacity to augment our organic surge fleet,
access to global commercial intermodal networks and the appropriate
number of commercial mariners needed to fully crew our surge fleet,
with acceptable risk. If sequestration returns this year, the loss of
MSP vessels caused by funding reductions may be considerably difficult
to recoup. I remain committed to retaining the current complement of
militarily useful ships in the MSP and VISA programs.

11. Senator Inhofe. General Selva, how do you plan to overcome any
shortfalls?
General Selva. Currently, there is sufficient capacity to meet
requirements, with acceptable risk. However, in recent years, there has
been a downward trend in the number of Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/RO) vessels
in the programs, with a net loss of 4 RO/ROs in the last 5 years. To
meet requirements, this loss can be mitigated by additional
volunteerism beyond VISA staged commitments or by vessel requisitioning
IAW 46 U.S.C. 56301.
cyber
12. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Rogers, on the 4th of March you stated
``a return to sequestration-level spending would be a major setback to
U.S. cyber forces that are steadily maturing.'' Can you explain what
cyber capabilities would have to be cut or scaled back should the
defense budget get sequestered?
Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
personally owned vehicle delivery
13. Senator Ayotte. General Selva, as you know, frequent moves are
one of the things that make active duty service difficult for service
members and their families. In addition to frequent deployments away
from loved ones, service members and their families often must endure
frequent moves. These moves force them to pull children out of school,
say goodbye to friends, and pack up household goods. If they are moving
overseas, they also often have to ship their personal vehicle. There
have been some issues with damage to vehicles or massive delays in the
delivery of personally-owned vehicle deliveries for our troops. This
adds unneeded stress for our service members and their families and is
unacceptable. I had one constituent contact my office. He dropped off
his vehicle in August 2014 for shipment. He was told the required
delivery date was October 6th. The vehicle did not arrive until January
5, 2015. That is three months without his vehicle, leaving him without
a car for the holidays. General Selva, would you agree that such
performance is not acceptable? In your statement, you note that your
``evaluation of [the contractor's] summer surge plan indicates they
should perform an acceptable level.'' Can you explain what you mean by
acceptable level?
General Selva. Certainly, a vehicle over 90 days late is
unacceptable, and as previously documented, International Auto
Logistics' (IAL) 2014 performance was below the contractual
requirements. In accordance with the contract, IAL is required to
deliver 98 percent of all vehicles on time. The numbers of overdue
vehicles and average days late for vehicles not meeting the required
delivery date have continually decreased from the levels experienced in
2014. IAL's surge plan, as briefed to me will position them for
successful performance during the 2015 permanent change of station peak
moving season, and includes detailed process improvements and
operations management changes in all major areas of contract
performance, the majority of which have already been implemented. The
plan addressed transportation planning and subcontractor management,
customs clearances, Vehicle Storage Facility and Vehicle Processing
Center site management, claims processing, customer service, and
employee training and staffing levels. An acceptable level of
performance is measured by IAL's ability to meet all contractual
requirements. If falling short, to mitigate all service member
inconveniences at no expense to the government and make appropriate
changes in their business practices to meet all contractual
requirements in the future.

14. Senator Ayotte. General Selva, what recourse under the current
contract with the shipper of personally-owned vehicles does the
government have if there are again massive delays with the delivery of
personally-owned vehicles to our troops?
General Selva. The Global Privately-Owned-Vehicle Contract (GPC)
III contract includes Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 52.212-4,
Contract Terms and Conditions--Commercial Items, which allows the
Government, at its discretion, to terminate for cause in the event of
contractor default, or if the contractor fails to comply with any
contract term or condition, or fails to provide the Government, upon
request, with adequate assurances of future performance. Recent
contract performance has markedly improved and International Auto
Logistics has provided a plan to meet performance requirements during
the peak season.
The contract also contains option periods which the Government has
a unilateral right to exercise. The Government could elect not to
exercise future option periods.
In addition, the contract contains provisions reducing payment when
the contractor misses a required delivery date (RDD) by 1-7 days,
requires payment of inconvenience claims (rental car and hotel
expenses) directly to the customer for missed RDDs beyond 8 days, and
forfeiture of all transportation payment for POVs delivered 60 days or
more past the RDD. These contract provisions will impose substantial
costs to the contractor if it were to experience widespread delays.
kc-46a
15. Senator Ayotte. General Selva, in your written statement, you
point out that the KC-46A is ``the most important airlift
recapitalization effort,'' and that the KC-46A is ``the most essential
element of future air mobility readiness for the DOD.'' The Air Force
has consistently listed the KC-46A as one of its top three
modernization priorities. General Selva, why do you view the KC-46A as
so important to DOD and the future of U.S. air mobility?
General Selva. As the backbone of our Nation's ability to project
global reach and combat power, tankers are a critical force multiplier
across the full range of global and theater employment scenarios.
Tankers directly enhance the operational flexibility of United States
and allied/coalition strike, support, and surveillance aircraft. Joint
force commanders rely heavily on the impacts that air refueling
aircraft provide. The direct effects enabled through global strike
support, theater support to combat air forces, and special operations
support are critical to mission success. Air bridge and aircraft
deployment support makes possible the rapid delivery of forces to a
theater of operations and is a key to the successful execution of the
aerospace expeditionary force concept. Tankers put the ``Global'' in
Global Power.
joint land-attack cruise missile defense elevated netted sensor system
16. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Haney, as you know, Joint Land-Attack
Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS) is now
undergoing an operational test at Aberdeen. What is the purpose of
JLENS in the national capital region?
Admiral Haney. The Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense
Elevated Netted Sensor (JLENS) aerostat is in the national capital
region to complete a three-year operational exercise, set to begin
later this year. The exercise is intended to assess JLENS' capability
to enhance surveillance capabilities against a potential cruise missile
threat from near-peer adversaries.

17. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Haney, how important is the
Department's fiscal year 2016 budget request in order to complete phase
one of this program?
Admiral Haney. Full funding for the Joint Land-Attack Cruise
Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS) fiscal year 2016
Presidential Budget Request is important to ensure the JLENS
operational exercise remains on track and on schedule. The exercise is
intended to assess JLENS' capability to enhance surveillance
capabilities against a potential cruise missile threat from near-peer
adversaries. Any changes to the fiscal year 2016 funding could impact
Phase I and delay the assessment of this capability.
civil reserve air fleet
18. Senator Ayotte. Senator Ayotte. General Selva, in your prepared
statement, you discuss the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). Can you
explain what the CRAF is and why it is important to DOD's readiness for
future conflicts?
General Selva. CRAF is a unique and significant part of the
nation's air mobility resource to support the warfighter. Selected
aircraft from U.S. airlines, contractually committed to CRAF, augment
Department of Defense (DOD) airlift requirements in emergencies when
the need for airlift exceeds the capability of military aircraft.
During peacetime carriers are offered DOD airlift missions for the
participation in CRAF.
The CRAF has two main segments: international and national. The
international segment is further divided into the long-range and short-
range sections and the national segment satisfies domestic
requirements. Assignment of aircraft to a segment depends on the nature
of the requirement and the capability of the aircraft needed.
The long-range international section consists of passenger and
cargo aircraft capable of transoceanic operations. The role of these
aircraft is to augment the Air Mobility Command's long-range
intertheater C-5s and C-17s during periods of increased airlift needs,
from minor contingencies up through full national defense emergencies.
Medium-sized passenger and cargo aircraft make up the short-range
international section supporting near offshore and select intra-theater
airlift requirements.
The airlines contractually pledge aircraft to the various segments
of CRAF, ready for activation when needed. To provide incentives for
civil carriers to commit aircraft to the CRAF program and to assure the
United States of adequate airlift reserves, the government makes
airlift business available to civilian airlines that offer aircraft to
the CRAF.

19. Senator Ayotte. General Selva, in your prepared statement you
note that ``As our forces draw down from Afghanistan, business
available to commercial carriers has declined rapidly, threatening
industry's ability to support surge deployments should the need
arise.'' Skeptics would say that these commercial carriers are flying
anyway. Why do commercial carriers supporting CRAF need to work with
DOD and receive a minimum number of flight hours during peacetime to be
ready to support DOD requirements in wartime?
General Selva. Policy and DOD regulation do not mandate a minimum
level of CRAF business from the DOD. The National Airlift Policy states
that DOD requirements for passenger and/or cargo airlift augmentation
shall be satisfied by the procurement of airlift from commercial air
carriers participating in the CRAF program to the extent that the DOD
determines that such airlift is suitable and responsive to the military
requirement. Consistent with that policy, DOD Instruction 4500.57
requires that DOD operate its fleet to meet its training requirements
while also using commercial sources of transportation to the ``maximum
extent practicable.'' The perception that commercial aircrews require
blockhours to maintain readiness is flawed, the purpose of our monthly
cargo missions through the various aerial ports is to ensure the ground
component is capable of supporting the commercial missions, not
validate the readiness of commercial aircrews.
US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and Air Mobility Command
(AMC) are addressing the need to increase CRAF carrier opportunities to
promote readiness and interoperability. Together, USTRANSCOM and AMC
are increasing our forecasting ability and actively sharing this
information at bi-annual Executive Working Groups and weekly
teleconferences.

20. Senator Ayotte. General Selva, what is the minimum number of
CRAF cargo block hours that is required annually to maintain that
commercial carrier readiness for wartime surge requirements? Please
explain why you believe this number is sufficient, and describe the
analyses utilized to arrive at this number.
General Selva. USTRANSCOM and Air Mobility Command (AMC) have
changed operational practices to better support objectives in the
National Airlift Policy (NAP). This policy states that military and
commercial resources are equally important to national defense and
interdependent, but prioritizes organic military airlift operations for
peacetime training. The policy indicates peacetime cargo airlift
augmentation should be established for CRAF effectiveness within the
Military Airlift System, but does not codify a minimum. Establishing a
minimum for cargo airlift augmentation, in law, would significantly
impinge upon the DOD's ability to appropriately manage its organic and
commercial resources. In accordance with the NAP direction to determine
readiness levels, AMC commissioned a CRAF Study (concluded in 2014)
that recommended a minimum port activity of approximately $31M, roughly
1,700 block hours, to train AMC port personnel. Within the study, the
minimum port activity level was derived by assuming one commercial
wide-body aircraft operating out of each of four major AMC aerial ports
per month.

21. Senator Ayotte. General Selva, in your written statement you
refer to implementing recommendations from a recently concluded Civil
Reserve Air Fleet study. Will you provide my office with a copy of this
study?
General Selva. See Attached as Appendix A: CRAF Phase 2 Study, 29
Apr 2014

22. Senator Ayotte. General Selva, what specific changes do you
intend to implement with respect to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet?
General Selva. AMC commissioned a CRAF Study, which concluded in
2014. The purpose of the CRAF study was to provide a viable program
capable of withstanding the ebbs and flows of current and future
airlift requirements. Changes were necessary in the CRAF to avoid the
``perfect storm'' due to the depressed commercial passenger and cargo
charter markets, consolidation and reduction of U.S. air carriers and
their fleets (recent carrier decisions to retire 747-400's), reductions
in military airlift requirements (Afghanistan drawdown), increased
organic capability (C-17, C-5Ms, and future state of the KC-46
beginning in fiscal year 2017), and a tightening of U.S. Government
budgets. To counter these effects the CRAF Study team identified
several areas where improvements were necessary, below is list of some
of the major topics addressed by industry that have also been addressed
in our implementation plans.
The changes incorporated into CRAF program will ensure our ability
to maintain readiness during non-activated periods in the most fair and
equitable manner for all players involved, as well as being able to
fully support the warfighter and combatant commanders when the need
arises.
Fiscal year 2015--Implemented:
Elimination of the Aeromedical Evacuation segment--Proven
success demonstrated with organic fleet (C-17 & KC-135's during OEF/
OIF)
Elimination of the 60/40 Rule
Fiscal year 2016--To Be Implemented:
Extension of the guaranteed daily utilization rate during
activation from 8 to 12 hours
Establishment of a 11-day minimum guaranteed activation
period and 7-day notice for de-activation for Stage I--This has been
amended to increase the time frame to 11 days as of 30 Mar 15
Retention of the flyer bonus, which will be examined at a
later date to determine necessary adjustments--Under evaluation for
fiscal year 2016 (possible reduction from.75 multiplier to .40
multiplier)
Alteration of the mobilization value point based
entitlement to awarding points only to carriers offering more than the
one-aircraft minimum to Stage I--Under evaluation for fiscal year 2016
(award MV for Stage I and II at a 4:1 ratio)
Increasing the minimum offer of 15 percent cargo / 30
percent passenger of CRAF capable aircraft to 40 percent for both
Reduction of Stage I requirements to 15 cargo and 16
passenger wide-body equivalents (WBEs)

23. Senator Ayotte. General Selva, have you reviewed the Booz Allen
Hamilton study regarding CRAF and what is your assessment of the
study's findings?
General Selva. Yes, my staff and I have reviewed the Booz Allen
Hamilton (BAH) study on CRAF. We also met with the study's author and
sponsor to gain a deeper understanding of their assumptions, thought
processes and conclusions. We all agree that the CRAF program and the
carriers within the program remain important to national defense. We
also agree we must carefully balance the readiness of our organic
airlift training needs and the viability of the commercial carriers
subscribed to the CRAF program by fully complying with the National
Airlift Policy.
The study focused on block hours deemed necessary for CRAF
readiness and interoperability. It concludes that the proficiency of
military ground personnel and military planning/control elements is the
limiting factor. From my perspective, that proficiency can be achieved
with commercial flights already planned as part of our annual fixed buy
and operating through our military airlift system at far fewer flying
hours than the study suggests. Furthermore, the BAH study does not
differentiate between proficiency to manage commercial airlift aircraft
in the military airlift system and the necessary incentives to sustain
adequate capacity to commercial capacity across the full range of
military operations.
The more pressing issue is maintaining the level of CRAF
subscription required to meet current Defense Planning Guidance. My
staff and I are working diligently on this issue with our commercial
providers. I believe we will quickly arrive at a ``shared risk''
solution which ensures both proficiency and incentives necessary to
retain capacity subscription are met.

24. Senator Ayotte. General Selva, what processes and analyses is
TRANSCOM using in the current fiscal year and in the FYDP to establish
the appropriate levels of CRAF cargo airlift augmentation and to
minimize any potential risks associated with reductions in CRAF cargo
airlift? To what extent, if any, are the CRAF carriers involved in
those processes and analyses? Do you believe that TRANSCOM and the CRAF
cargo carriers are aligned on the assessment of those risks?
General Selva. USTRANSCOM has very open and routine communications
with our commercial providers through the CRAF Executive Working Group,
the National Defense Transportation Association, and our Enterprise
Readiness Center. We've also recently begun weekly conference calls
with the carriers where we discuss upcoming commercial airlift
workload. During our many engagements, the carriers have provided us
feedback, and we are absolutely listening. While the National Airlift
Policy directs me to prioritize our own military readiness over
commercial readiness, I've directed a ``shared risk'' approach to
achieve a mutually acceptable outcome. In the last year, we advanced in
four key areas towards this goal.
First, we formalized our workload forecasting process which is the
foundation upon which we build our operating budget including our
expected expenditures on commercial airlift. That process is based on a
solid analytic foundation and now includes what we have termed
``anticipated but difficult to predict demand'' for things like
humanitarian assistance, potential regional conflicts and Noncombatant
evacuation operations. Second, we scrutinized our active duty and
reserve component crew seasoning requirements to ensure they are based
on the minimum number of flying hours needed to guarantee our readiness
at an acceptable level of risk. This resulted in some reductions to our
flying hour program which increased opportunities to use commercial
lift. Third, we established unambiguous metrics that measure our
current level of crew readiness, which allows us to better manage
allocation of military airlift to avoid overflying the minimum flying
hour program, enhancing opportunities for commercial airlift
augmentation. Finally, we continue to build on our capability to
predict near-term workload which allows more proactive engagement with
commercial lift providers when there is greater access to capacity.
As we look towards a dynamic future, these four advancements will
be critical to ensuring success in balancing military and CRAF risk.
USTRANSCOM has been working on these advancements and analysis, and
they've matured to the point where we've advised the CRAF carriers on
these enhancements to our processes and the potential positive workload
impacts. We will continue to communicate with our commercial providers
to bolster shared understanding under our ``shared risk'' construct.

25. Senator Ayotte. General Selva, what is TRANSCOM doing to ensure
that it continues to explore ``the full spectrum of options and
incentives'' available to strengthen the CRAF program and ensure the
continued participation of commercial partners?
General Selva. USTRANSCOM is committed to offering as much business
to commercial carriers as practicable, especially as current
transportation requirements decline across the board. In 2012,
USTRANSCOM stood up the Enterprise Readiness Center (ERC) to focus on
bringing in more business to the Defense Travel System (DTS). In this
effort, the ERC has successfully brought in new business from foreign
military sales (FMS) transportation requirements to the DTS. With
Congress' help, we are also expanding FMS opportunities and increased
business from other federal, state and local entities for CRAF
carriers.
As an enterprise-level initiative, USTRANSCOM and Air Mobility
Command (AMC) have been working tirelessly to find innovative ways to
continue optimizing the careful balance between organic and commercial
airlift allocation. AMC is reducing crew ratios for C-17s, and putting
some aircraft into backup aircraft inventory, effectively reducing the
total annual aircrew seasoning requirements for the organic fleet. This
will potentially free up additional airlift business for allocation to
commercial carriers. USTRANSCOM is improving requirements forecasting
methods, which will allow a more precise adherence to AMC's Flying Hour
Program, enabling more commercial airlift opportunities. Also,
USTRANSCOM is working to buy more commercial airlift up front for known
annual requirements by allocating more organic airlift to contingency
and special airlift missions as they emerge throughout the year.
In order to strengthen our integration and mutual understanding
with the CRAF carriers, USTRANSCOM hosts biannual Executive Working
Groups, holds weekly passenger and cargo forecast teleconferences with
CRAF carriers, and engages with industry at the National Defense
Transportation Association (NDTA) Fall Meeting, as well as many other
NDTA events throughout the year. AMC has implemented a CRAF activation
table top exercise cycle with commercial carriers intended to keep
carriers familiar with the military airlift system.

26. Senator Ayotte. General Selva, are some commercial carriers
communicating their intent to reduce their participation in the CRAF
program? Why is this happening? What are the ramifications of these
decisions? How does TRANSCOM intend to address this development?
General Selva. CRAF participants often change their level of
program participation during annual contract solicitation periods.
Carriers communicate their concerns to TRANSCOM, via letters, office
calls, or through our many collaborative venues. We encourage and
appreciate their feedback, as it promotes better understanding of
industry equities as they relate to the DOD.
For most of the early part of this century, airlift requirements
have been at very high levels, which corresponded to high levels of
commercial carrier business. This business dropped significantly as US
combat forces redeployed from Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result of the
reduction, several CRAF carriers have expressed concern that they are
not receiving enough compensation to remain in the CRAF program.
In anticipation of the drawdown, TRANSCOM went to great lengths to
increase the commercial business within the Defense Transportation
System, and shaped strategic contracts and partnerships to maximize
business opportunities for CRAF providers. These efforts have given the
CRAF carriers access to $3.8 billion of commercial business during
fiscal year 2014. In addition to driving increased revenue in the
Defense Transportation System, Air Mobility Command made adjustments to
the mission allocation processes, awarding additional business to
commercial carriers consistent with operational requirements and
reducing the potential to exceed planned military flying hours.
As TRANSCOM implements the fiscal year 2016 CRAF contract we will
monitor the health of the program and continue a robust dialogue with
CRAF carriers to ensure the success of the CRAF program. TRANSCOM is
concerned with maintaining the required level of overall CRAF program
subscription, but we do not currently expect a shortfall.
inf treaty
27. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Haney, in your written statement, you
wrote that the INF treaty promotes strategic stability for our European
allies by addressing their concerns. Admiral Haney, how important is
the INF treaty to the stability and security of Europe?
Admiral Haney. Historically, the INF Treaty is one of a number of
mechanisms that has supported the promotion of strategic stability in
Europe. While the US has concerns pertaining to Russia's compliance
with the Treaty, it remains a viable element of Euro-Atlantic security.
Consequently, I agree with the State Department that the INF Treaty
benefits the security of the United States, our allies and the Russian
Federation.

28. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Haney, you also wrote in your testimony
that Russia has violated the INF treaty, and has pursued more than a
decade of modernization of their strategic nuclear forces. Is the
United States going to continue to abide by the INF treaty if Russia
continues to violate it?
Admiral Haney. The US pursues bilateral and multilateral treaties
and agreements with a focus on internationally accepted norms of
behavior. Because I believe that the INF Treaty can continue to serve
in this capacity as well as promote Euro-Atlantic security, I agree
with the State Department that the US should continue pursuing
resolution of our concerns with Russia.
nuclear iran
29. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Haney, you point out in your written
statement that you ``remain concerned about Iran's nuclear
activities.'' What concerns you about Iran's nuclear activities? Have
those activities continued in recent months?
Admiral Haney. Iran has disguised its nuclear program for decades
by housing enrichment centrifuges at covert facilities. They have also
developed potential delivery systems through its space program. For
example, Iran's developing space program has a potential cross-over
support to their ballistic missile development. I must acknowledge
these threats as a high concern.
iranian cyber activities
30. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Rogers, can you describe Iranian cyber
activities?
Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]

31. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Rogers, how extensive are their
offensive cyber capabilities?
Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]

32. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Rogers, has Iran conducted cyberattacks
or cyber intrusion against the U.S. or our allies in the last year or
so?
Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]
russian activities against ukraine
33. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Rogers, can you provide your
perspective on Moscow's activities against Ukraine, focusing
specifically on the cyber and information operations domains?
Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]

34. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Rogers, have you observed similar
Russian activities in other parts of eastern Europe?
Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]
u.s. missile defense sites in alaska
35. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Haney, Admiral Gortney, the U.S.
Northern Command (NORTHCOM) Commander, recently said that Russia could
use long range missiles to ``reach critical infrastructure in Alaska
and Canada that we rely on for a Homeland defense mission.'' Could
Russia launch a cruise missile from inside Russia and target important
defense infrastructure in Alaska?
Admiral Haney. It is my understanding that the next generation of
air launched cruise missile being fielded by Russia will allow them to
launch from inside Russia and attack important infrastructure in Alaska
and Canada.
chinese cyber theft
36. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Rogers, China has stolen massive
amounts of technology, intellectual property, proprietary information,
and military secrets from the United States. Admiral Haney points out
in his written statement that ``China has also made headlines
associated with exploitation of computer networks.'' Can you help
quantify the magnitude of this theft for us?
Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]

37. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Rogers, does this theft threaten the
military and technological superiority of the United States?
Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]

38. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Rogers, what is at stake if we do not
stop this cyber theft?
Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]

39. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Rogers, what is the United States
currently doing about this problem?
Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]

40. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Rogers, what additional steps do we
need to take to ensure that China cannot continue to rob us of our
advantage?
Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]
chinese anti-satellite capabilities
41. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Haney, in your written statement, you
point out that ``China needs to be more forthcoming about missile tests
that appear to be more focused on the development of destructive space
weapons.'' The United States relies heavily on satellite-based systems
in conducting operations. If these missile tests are focused on the
development of destructive space weapons, what does that mean for the
United States?
Admiral Haney. Our potential adversaries have clearly signaled
their intent and ability to conduct hostile operations in space as a
natural extension of the terrestrial battlefield, and consider these
operations essential to deny U.S. forces the asymmetric advantages of
space. To mitigate this trend, the U.S. continues to pursue actions
such as partnering with responsible nations, international
organizations and commercial firms to promote responsible, peaceful and
safe use of space.
In that spirit, the President's Budget supports my mission
requirements, maintains our asymmetric advantage in space, and protects
our strategic capabilities.

42. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Haney, is DOD working to address this
threat? How can Congress help?
Admiral Haney. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Deb Fischer
expanding the nuclear umbrella
43. Senator Fischer. Admiral Haney, in addition to the complicating
effect we discussed that horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation
would have on our existing extended-deterrence commitments, how
challenging would it be to open our deterrent ``umbrella'' further and
provide extended deterrence guarantees to new countries in new regions?
Admiral Haney. Any sort of broadening of US deterrence commitments
must be weighed in terms of both operational and political
consequences. Military impacts must be evaluated on a case-by-case
basis; and may impact our planning requirements over the long term. I
would defer to the State Department regarding the political
implications.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Lee
strategic forces
44. Senator Lee. Admiral Haney, the United States government
accused the Russian government last year of violating the Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. This week, Russia stated it would station
nuclear-capable bombers in Crimea and Iskander Missiles into
Kaliningrad on the borders of NATO allies. You are well versed not only
in our strategic systems and defenses, but also in the military theory
underlying these programs. What do you think is an appropriate response
to these violations and maneuvers, and how have these developments
impacted the way you think of our strategic force and missile defense
posture?
Admiral Haney. These are matters of concern, and are among the many
areas that I monitor closely. Any options, whether informational,
economic, or otherwise, should be considered in close collaboration
with our allies. The current US strategic force posture is sufficient
to protect US/Allied strategic interests and maintain a credible
deterrent. With respect to missile defense, we are constantly
evaluating and assessing current and future capabilities that will
inform future missile defense posture planning.

45. Senator Lee. Admiral Haney, what are your biggest modernization
priorities for the nuclear triad in the coming decade?
Admiral Haney. Going forward, we are committed to the Ohio
Replacement Program, the Long Range Strike-Bomber, the Long Range
Standoff cruise missile, the B61-12 gravity weapon, and the Minuteman
III replacement programs. The global security environment demands we
properly sustain and modernize our strategic capabilities. We cannot
afford to delay or reduce planned modernization for these programs any
further and must provide stable and sufficient funding in fiscal year
2016 and beyond. The President's fiscal year 2016 Budget strikes a
responsible balance between national security priorities and fiscal
realities, and begins to reduce some of the risk we have accumulated
because of deferred maintenance.

46. Senator Lee. Admiral Haney, do you believe that all three legs
of the triad are being maintained to a level that keeps up with the
worldwide threats they are meant to deter?
Admiral Haney. Today, the Triad is well matched to the worldwide
threats and is an effective strategic deterrent. However, the global
security environment continues to change and we must ensure our Triad
remains safe, secure, and effective. While the President's fiscal year
2016 Budget supports my mission requirements, we cannot afford to
underfund these vital programs, especially as potential adversaries
continue modernizing their strategic capabilities. We cannot further
delay investments in critical capabilities like the Ohio Replacement
Program, the Long Range Strike-Bomber, the Long Range Standoff cruise
missile, the B61-12 gravity weapon, and the Minuteman III replacement.
We must provide stable, sufficient funding for these programs in fiscal
year 2016 and beyond to ensure the Triad remains an effective deterrent
in the future against evolving threats.

47. Senator Lee. Admiral Haney, last month, Iran successfully
launched a satellite into orbit aboard a two-stage rocket. How much
technological cross-over is there between the Iranian space-launch
program and its ballistic missile program, and what can you tell us
about the Iran timeline for Iran potentially testing a missile with the
capability of hitting the U.S. mainland?
Admiral Haney. As Defense Intelligence Agency Director Lieutenant
General Stewart testified, Iran publicly stated that it intends to
launch a new space-launch vehicle as early as this year capable of ICBM
ranges, if configured as such. While their previous space launch
vehicles did not seem to have this capability, I need to defer to the
Intelligence Community to characterize how specific technologies cross-
over between their space and ballistic missile programs. However,
Iran's space program clearly gives them experience with many aspects of
launching an ICBM.

48. Senator Lee. Admiral Haney, do you believe that expediting the
deployment of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) missile
defense system, or strengthening our missile defenses in Europe by
giving them anti-air and cruise missile capabilities would be useful
for deterring Russia and protecting our missile defense investments?
Admiral Haney. As stated in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense
Review, it is not our policy to build and array missile defenses which
would upset the strategic balance with Russia. But should the regional
situation decay such that a modification to our missile defense posture
was warranted, USSTRATCOM would work with the Services, USEUCOM, and
other combatant commands to provide the Secretary a recommendation.
cyber security
49. Senator Lee. Admiral Rogers, what are the specific areas of
U.S. infrastructure that cyber-attackers are targeting most often, and
how do you see the trends in target selection and attacker-capability
evolving in the coming years?
Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]
transcom
50. Senator Lee. General Selva, the State of Utah has funded an
ongoing analysis aimed at a potential move of the Utah Air National
Guard, including the 151st Air Refueling Wing, from Salt Lake
International Airport to Hill Air Force Base. One focus of the study is
the reserve component facilities exchange statute (title 10 U.S.C.
section 18240), which could enable the commercial re-use of ANG airport
property currently leased by the Air Force and Air National Guard. The
Utah State legislature recently passed a resolution unanimously
expressing continued support for the Utah ANG relocation and invited
the Air Force and other stakeholders to join these efforts and
collaboratively create a solution for the recapitalization of Air Force
facilities that will directly benefit TRANSCOM operations at a reduced
Federal contribution, saving scarce MILCON funding. Aside from the
savings and economic value of such a move, what operational synergies
and other benefits could be realized from the colocation of ANG
refueling assets with Air Force Reserve and active Air Force units at
Hill AFB, given the base's strategic location in the western United
States and its proximity to the Utah Test and Training Range?
General Selva. Although the Air Force will likely benefit from
efficiencies gained by moving the 151st Air Refueling Wing from Salt
Lake International Airport to Hill Air Force Base, there are no
significant advantages or disadvantages to USTRANSCOM for that move.

51. Senator Lee. General Selva, from a total force integration
perspective, does this initiative help to ensure the success of future
F-35 operations at Hill AFB, create additional opportunities for viable
unit associations, and help the AF implement recommendations from the
National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force which the Air
Force has largely endorsed?
General Selva. The Headquarters Department of the Air Force is in
the best position to describe how this initiative affects F-35
operations at Hill AFB and any opportunities for unit associations that
could occur as a result of the co-location of assets at Hill Air Force
Base.

52. Senator Lee. General Selva, from TRANSCOM's perspective, do you
have any recommendations for Utah State and Guard leadership regarding
the planning or facility design for this proposed move?
General Selva. The Headquarters Department of the Air Force is in
the best position to provide any recommendations for Utah State and
Guard leadership on the planning or facility design for this proposed
move as they are charged with organizing, training, and equipping the
Air Force.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Lindsey Graham
global pov contract (gpc iii)
53. Senator Graham. General Selva, you recently decided to continue
with the GPC contractor despite significant problems with the program
to date. What changes, in particular, has the new contractor made or
proposed in its plan that you approved that give you sufficient
confidence that it can handle the contract, especially during the
upcoming peak moving season?
General Selva. International Auto Logistics' (IAL) 2015 surge plan,
coupled with their current contract performance and process
improvements, will position them for successful performance during the
2015 permanent change of station peak moving season. IAL's Surge Plan
detailed process improvements and operations management changes in all
major areas of contract performance, the majority of which have already
been implemented. The plan addressed transportation planning and
subcontractor management, customs clearances, Vehicle Storage Facility
and Vehicle Processing Center site management, claims processing,
customer service, and employee training and staffing levels. IAL
presented each of these areas in detail and demonstrated its ability to
meet contract requirements.

54. Senator Graham. General Selva, the contractor's poor
performance has caused numerous Members of Congress to raise questions
about the program. What will you do if servicemembers experience
problems again during the peak moving season?
General Selva. We anticipate International Auto Logistics (IAL)
will perform successfully during peak season; however USTRANSCOM will
remain ready to execute appropriate options in the event IAL is
unsuccessful. The Global Privately-Owned-Vehicle Contract (GPC) III
contract includes Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 52.212-4,
Contract Terms and Conditions--Commercial Items, which allows the
Government, at its discretion, to terminate for cause in the event of
contractor default, or if the contractor fails to comply with any
contract term or condition, or fails to provide the Government, upon
request, with adequate assurances of future performance. Recent
contract performance has markedly improved and International Auto
Logistics has provided a plan to meet performance requirements during
the peak season.
The contract also contains option periods which the Government has
a unilateral right to exercise. The Government could elect not to
exercise future option periods.
In addition, the contract contains provisions reducing payment when
the contractor misses a required delivery date (RDD) by 1-7 days,
requires payment of inconvenience claims (rental car and hotel
expenses) directly to the customer for missed RDDs beyond 8 days, and
forfeiture of all transportation payment for POVs delivered 60 days or
more past the RDD. These contract provisions will impose substantial
costs to the contractor if it were to experience widespread delays.
Additionally, The Army's Surface Deployment and Distribution
Command has issued advisories to reiterate to service members their
rights under the inconvenience and damage claims processes provided by
the contract should they experience a problem.

55. Senator Graham. General Selva, do you have the option to
terminate and rebid the contract?
General Selva. The GPC III contract includes Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) 52.212-4, Contract Terms and Conditions--Commercial
Items, which allows the Government, at its discretion, to terminate for
cause in the event of contractor default, or if the contractor fails to
comply with any contract term or condition, or fails to provide the
Government, upon request, with adequate assurances of future
performance. The decision to terminate for cause is a subjective
decision based on numerous factors involving contract performance. The
FAR states a contracting officer should only exercise the Government's
right to terminate a contract for cause when it is determined such a
termination would be in the best interests of the Government. Recent
contract performance has markedly improved and the contractor,
International Auto Logistics, has provided a plan to meet performance
requirements during the peak season.

56. Senator Graham. General Selva, what other actions can you take?
General Selva. The contract also contains option periods which the
Government has a unilateral right to exercise. The contract base period
ends 29 February 2016. The Government could elect not to exercise
option period one which starts 1 March 2016.
maritime security program
57. Senator Graham. General Selva, how many ships do you need in
the Maritime Security Program to meet sealift capacity requirements?
General Selva. The authorized composition of the Maritime Security
Program (MSP) of 60 ships is required to provide access to capacity to
augment our organic surge fleet, access to global commercial intermodal
networks and the appropriate number of commercial mariners needed to
fully crew our surge fleet.
In addition to national defense requirements, MSP was also created
to ensure the Nation's economic security through presence in key
international trade lanes. The steady decline of the U.S.-flag
international dry cargo trading sector is of great concern, as it is
approaching the point where MSP is what is keeping the sector from
disappearing completely. I support the Department of Transportation and
the Maritime Administration's efforts to create a National Maritime
Strategy to reverse this trend and grow the U.S.-flag fleet. I can
provide the warfighter more options to meet requirements with a healthy
and stable Merchant Marine.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
should we ever attack the critical infrastructure of another nation?
58. Senator Reed. Admiral Rogers, the United States is the most
networked economy in the world. Our critical infrastructure is
accessible through the Internet and is quite exposed and vulnerable. As
the Sony attacks and others have demonstrated, even small countries
with no ability to attack the homeland with traditional military forces
can inflict significant damage on the United States through cyber-
attacks. There is an old adage that people who live in glass houses
should not throw stones. It may be tempting in a conflict for us to
employ cyber-attacks on another country's grid, or telecommunications
network, or banking institutions, but doing so sets precedents for
other nations to follow. Since we place more reliance on our
information systems and capabilities than almost anyone else, this
could lead to escalation that would not be to our advantage. Admiral
Rogers, do you think we should establish policies against using cyber
weapons against nonmilitary, infrastructure targets? This would be
something analogous to the no first use doctrines used in the nuclear
domain.
Admiral Rogers. As a matter of principle, the DOD does not attack
non-military targets. However, some infrastructure is dual-use in
nature supporting both civilian and military activities. In these cases
we would operate within the laws of armed conflict.
The United States is working with international partners, through
the UN Group of Governmental Experts, to develop norms of responsible
state behavior that would better assure mutual security if adopted by
all states. The United States position should focus on developing an
international peacetime cyber norm of not attacking another country's
critical infrastructure specifically providing services to the civilian
public. This norm reflects the basic principles of sovereignty and
conveys the unacceptable nature of using cyber means to cause damage to
a State's critical infrastructure during peacetime.
Additionally, the United States is focusing effort on hardening
networks associated with our own critical infrastructure, given the
reliance placed on it by both military and non-military entities. We
must take swift action to correct identified cybersecurity gaps and
vulnerabilities.
deterrence in cyberspace
59. Senator Reed. Admiral Rogers, it is a truism that nations
cannot be deterred by weapons or capabilities that they do not know
exist. So it is with the cyber domain. At the dawn of the nuclear age,
we showed the world the power of nuclear weapons, and in the first
decades after WWII, the nuclear powers regularly tested in ways that
educated the world on the effects of nuclear war. Twenty years after
Hiroshima, the U.S. had been through multiple full-fledged nuclear
deterrence doctrines--from the New Look to Massive Retaliation to
Flexible Response and Mutual Assured Destruction. Twenty years into the
Internet age, in contrast, we have yet to put forth any claims about
the power of cyber weapons or even the first comprehensive doctrinal
treatment of deterrence and the role of cyber warfare in U.S. military
strategy. Friends and adversaries alike are left to imagine what we are
capable of and what our intentions are. Admiral Rogers, what practical
impediments stand in the way of publicly defining the role and
significance of cyber warfare in our national security strategy?
Admiral Rogers. The unclassified 2011 DOD Strategy for Operating in
Cyberspace established a foundation for DOD's approach to cyberspace
operations with the treatment of cyberspace as an operational domain.
Military cyberspace capabilities are employed in a similar manner to
capabilities in the other domains (land, sea, air, and space) focused
on achieving military objectives in support of national security
interests. A forthcoming updated and unclassified DOD Cyberspace
Strategy will further expound on the role and significance of
cyberspace operations in U.S. National Security Strategy. However, some
challenges will remain. Much of our planning is sensitive and therefore
not publicly releasable. Because of operational security concerns we
are very careful not expose our specific tactics, techniques,
procedures or capabilities. We do however send a clear signal of our
resolve and potential capabilities when we conduct exercises with a
cyberspace component. Additional challenges include the lack of
international peacetime cyber norms and understanding of what
constitutes use of force in cyberspace.

60. Senator Reed. Admiral Rogers, alternatively, do you think that
the use of cyber weapons in the cyber domain is just not consequential
enough to merit the development of strategic concepts and doctrine, as
was done for nuclear warfare, air power, sea power, and the like?
Admiral Rogers. The potential consequences of a cyberspace attack
do merit the development of strategy and doctrine. Our evolving
strategies will aim to incorporate measures to not only deter
cyberattacks by denying their success and demonstrate our will to hold
adversaries accountable and impose costs for such a cyberattack.
We have joint doctrine as represented in Joint Publication 3-12 for
Cyberspace Operations and we continue our contributions to evolve that
doctrine and develop strategy. As described in the 2015 Department of
Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence
Community, it is considered feasible that malicious activities through
cyberspace can be used to disrupt or damage critical infrastructure in
the United States.
The United States must be able to respond to cyberattacks at a
time, manner, and place of our choosing as determined by the President
upon the advice of the U.S. national security team. United States
strategy to deter cyberattacks should not simply rest upon an in-kind
response through cyberspace. The United States must develop defensive
and cybersecurity capabilities to deny potential attack success.
Finally, the United States must be resilient to cyberattacks, able to
recover rapidly and provide mission assurance in the face of adversary
actions. This extends to all U.S. critical infrastructure owners and
operators.

61. Senator Reed. Admiral Haney and Admiral Rogers, North Korea was
not deterred from attacking the Sony Corporation of America, inflicting
hundreds of millions of dollars in damage. Iran was not deterred from
attacking U.S. banks and a U.S. casino. Many repressive regimes
consider themselves under mortal threat from so called ``color
revolutions'' aided by the global Internet if not purposefully fomented
by the United States. They may believe they are already engaged in a
deadly ``information war'' with the west. We have a web of mutual
deterrence relationships with major powers such as China and Russia
that may serve to deter these nations from launching devastating cyber-
attacks on our critical infrastructure in peacetime and even in a war.
But that is not true for rogue nations such as North Korea and Iran.
Admiral Haney and Admiral Rogers, if we felt compelled to use military
forces against their nuclear systems, for example, they would likely
strike at us with whatever means possible. In contemplating military
coercion against Iran or N01ih Korea in the future, would you agree
that future Presidents will have to consider that economic targets in
the homeland will be attacked through cyberspace? Is it realistic to
think that there is some way to deter such retaliation?
Admiral Haney. Protecting critical infrastructure from cyberspace
attacks is and will continue to be a high priority across the US
government. While I will not reference a specific scenario, we must
anticipate that any future conflict could start or be extended to
cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure. Yes, a disruptive or
destructive cyberattack could present a significant risk to US economic
interests and deterring such an event requires a whole of government
approach involving all of our nation's instruments of power. As
outlined in our Cyber Strategy, the US will employ full-spectrum cross-
domain solutions utilizing all elements of our national power.
Admiral Rogers. (U//FOUO) I would advise future Presidents that
yes, attacks against economic targets should be anticipated. Asymmetric
attacks can be expected as long as the U.S. maintains a conventional
military advantage. In particular, Iran may feel compelled to strike
financial institutions or order targets to offset real or perceived
shortfalls in military capability. Moreover, other types of critical
infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) within the U. S. may also be
subject to such asymmetric attacks, including electrical power control
systems or other similar targets. Our forthcoming DOD cyber strategy
will outline an approach to building a more comprehensive and effective
cyber deterrence strategy.
maturity of cyber command
62. Senator Reed. Admiral Rogers, Cyber Command was created in
2010. At that time, it was expected that the Command would largely
capitalize on the tools and techniques that NSA uses to collect
intelligence through cyberspace. Over time, however, DOD has realized
that military operations will be different from intelligence operations
in cyberspace, and that Cyber Command needs different network
infrastructure, different command and control capabilities, and
different tools and weapons. Approximately a year ago, the Secretary of
Defense signed a directive to the Department to create these
capabilities, which he collectively called the ``Unified Platform.''
Admiral Rogers, can you explain why it is important for Cyber Command
to have network infrastructure, command and control systems, and tools
and weapons that are distinct from and do not duplicate those that NSA
has developed to collect intelligence in cyberspace?
Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]

63. Senator Reed. Admiral Rogers, can you explain briefly what the
Secretary directed under the Unified Platform initiative last year?
Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]
measuring the readiness of cyber command forces
64. Senator Reed. Admiral Rogers, Cyber Command now has only about
half of its planned military forces fielded and trained. Cyber Command
does not yet have the set of robust command and control, network
infrastructure, and tools and weapons that the Secretary last year
directed be built under the Unified Platform initiative. Admiral
Rogers, in the absence of the capabilities envisioned under the Unified
Platform initiative, how can we measure the readiness of the Cyber
Mission Forces?
Admiral Rogers. (U//FOUO) As U.S. Cyber Command, the Cyber Service
Components, and Services work together towards fielding the Cyber
Mission Force (CMF), we are measuring operational readiness by
assessing the number of trained personnel, the type of training for
each individual and the collective cyber team, and the equipment each
team possesses.
(U//FOUO) A mature operational readiness reporting framework, which
assesses the unit's ability to perform core tasks outlined in our Joint
Mission Essential Tasks (JMET), is the key for measuring readiness of
the Cyber Mission Forces. We have developed a path using an operational
reporting framework on the road to Defense Readiness Reporting System--
Strategic (DRRS-S) in order to report in a manner similar to the rest
of the force. As we mature this operational readiness reporting
framework, we will use it to shape and drive the development of DRRS-S
modules as the JMETs reach final U.S. Strategic Command and Joint Staff
approval, targeted for spring next year. The ability to exercise and
rehearse based on the tasks, conditions and standards is a key element
of assessing operational readiness and a Persistent Training
Environment (PTE) will be the key to reaching the operational readiness
milestone. We have also developed a plan to address immediate needs for
PTE in fiscal year 2015 which will bring us closer to the Department's
long-term vision of PTE which allows us to use the proper environment
to regularly train and exercise CMF teams.
(U) I am committed to ensuring the Cyber Mission Force is fully
manned, trained, equipped, and ready to fulfill USCYBERCOM's mission by
the end of fiscal year 2018.

65. Senator Reed. Admiral Rogers, how capable can they be without
the capabilities called for by the Secretary?
Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]
readiness to be a unified command
66. Senator Reed. Admiral Haney and Admiral Rogers, Cyber Command
remains highly dependent on a combat support defense agency--National
Security Agency--for much of its current operational capability. Cyber
Command has only about half of its planned military cyber mission
forces on hand and trained. The Secretary of Defense's Unified Platform
directive indicates that the Command does not yet have the command and
control capabilities, network infrastructure for operating on the
global Internet, or the tools and weapons to execute operations
effectively at large scale in support of our war plans. Admiral Haney
and Admiral Rogers, do you believe that Cyber Command is ready to be
designated as a unified command able to stand on its own two feet? If
not, how long do you think it will take to reach the necessary level of
maturity?
Admiral Haney. Since USCYBERCOM reached full operational capability
in late-2010, we have continued to grow our cyber work force and
associated teams. USCYBERCOM has operated for over five years and has
proven it can function as a sub-unified or unified CCMD. I recommend,
however, that we retain CDRUSCYBERCOM's dual-hat status as Director,
NSA (DIRNSA). Transitioning USCYBERCOM to a unified CCMD may require
additional resourcing.
Admiral Rogers. This is a decision that must be made by the
President in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In my professional judgement, I believe U.S.
Cyber Command is ready to be designated as a Unified Combatant Command
(UCC). Most of U.S. Strategic Command's Unified Command Plan cyberspace
responsibilities have been delegated to us, and we regularly engage
with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, Services,
United States Government, Five Eyes partners, and Combatant Commands
for planning, synchronizing, and supporting mission activities.
However, the unique nature of cyberspace--a globally connected,
intricately linked domain without traditional borders--requires an
empowered, singularly focused, globally-oriented Combatant Commander to
oversee cyberspace activities and coordinate global operations.
Elevating U.S. Cyber Command will comport with tried and true tenets of
warfare--unity of command and unity of effort--for cyberspace
operations. Violating these tenets increases risk and creates
inefficiencies in the form of redundant processes and increased
timelines. Departmental-level unity of command and effort will be
achieved when Commander, U.S. Cyber Command is empowered as DOD's
single military voice for cyber in the Joint Strategic Planning System,
Joint Capability Integration Development System, and Planning,
Programming, Budget, and Execution processes. The Department and Nation
have already made the great majority of the investment required to have
this new functional Unified Combatant Command. If empowered to include
authorities to act as a Force Provider and Functional Manager for
training and workforce development and for expenditures and
acquisitions, U.S. Cyber Command will have to develop these
capabilities but will ultimately be better positioned to lead and
influence the Department to ensure the development and implementation
of a viable, trained workforce; cyberspace capabilities; appropriate
policies and directives; and, necessary supporting infrastructures.
Such an evolution will move U.S. Cyber Command towards full operational
autonomy.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
projected costs of u.s. nuclear forces
67. Senator Manchin. Admiral Haney, in your testimony you
referenced a recent Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report that
estimates that the administration's plan for nuclear forces over the
next 10 years will cost almost $350 billion--an average of roughly $35
billion a year. How can we modernize and maintain an effective nuclear
deterrent in a more cost effective manner?
Admiral Haney. Today we spend less than 3 percent of the DOD budget
on nuclear capabilities. As stated by the January 2015 Congressional
Budget Office report, recapitalization investments that are necessary
to ensure safety and security will increase this number to ``roughly 5
percent to 6 percent.'' We have maintained our legacy systems decades
beyond their planned life. This modest increase to the DOD budget is
necessary to ensure the Triad continues to deter potential adversaries,
assure allies, and preserve stability with countries that could pose an
existential threat to the United States.

68. Senator Manchin. Admiral Haney, during an earlier hearing this
year, General Mattis asked ``Is it time to reduce the Triad to a Diad,
removing the land?based missiles?'' How much would a decision like this
save the U.S. financially each year?
Admiral Haney. Every day, the Triad deters potential adversaries,
assures allies, and preserves stability with countries that pose an
existential threat to the United States. It is the combination of
attributes across the Triad that ensures potential adversaries
understand they cannot escalate their way out of a failed conventional
conflict. The Triad imposes unacceptable costs and denies the benefits
of a strategic attack against the United States. Maintaining the Triad
of air, sea, and land forces remains a strategic imperative. Any
changes to the Triad must be based on thoughtful strategic analysis, as
opposed to meeting a budgetary objective.
The three legs of the Triad provide the capability to mitigate risk
caused by technological failure of any weapon or platform, technical
advances by our adversaries, or significant changes in the geo-
political environment. If the nuclear forces were reduced to one or two
of its parts, the ability to deter, assure, and manage risk would be
significantly degraded.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
new start treaty
69. Senator Shaheen. Admiral Haney, is the New Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (START) still providing transparency into the Russian
nuclear force, notwithstanding deteriorating relations with that
country?
Admiral Haney. Yes, New START remains in force and continues to
provide access and transparency. A key component is the Treaty's
inspection regime which allows each side to conduct eighteen
inspections per year of the other nation's ICBM, submarine, and air
facilities. Similarly, the Treaty's notification system, of which both
sides have exchanged an average of 1,500 messages per year, has
effectively reduced the possibility of misperception and
misunderstanding. As a result, New START has proven to be durable and
continues to enhance security and strategic stability between the US
and Russia.
kc-46a program
70. Senator Shaheen. General Selva, how critical is the KC-46A
program to TRANSCOM's ability to meet future air mobility readiness for
the Department of Defense?
General Selva. The KC-46 is essential to meeting future air
mobility readiness for the DOD. The KC-46A is replacing the aging KC-
135 fleet and will be capable of operating in day/night and adverse
weather conditions over vast distances to enable deployment,
employment, sustainment and redeployment of U.S. joint, allied and
coalition forces.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
small business contracting
71. Senator Blumenthal. General Selva, a U.S.-flagged shipping
company based in Connecticut has raised concerns with my office that
the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) is failing to adhere to
historic protections and preferences for U.S.-flagged small shipping
companies that compete for military contracts to supply our military's
overseas bases. What assurances can you give me that small businesses
are able to compete for military contracts?
General Selva. USTRANSCOM seeks every opportunity for Small, Small
Disadvantaged, Women-Owned, Historically Underutilized Business Zone
and Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business concerns to obtain a
fair portion of contract awards. Extensive market research is
accomplished for each acquisition to determine if at least two
responsible small business concerns are expected to be capable of
performing at a fair market value in order to set-aside the
acquisition.
USTRANSCOM has exceeded the small business goal, set by the
Department of Defense, Office of Small Business Programs for the past
three fiscal years and is currently on track to do so in fiscal year
2015. In addition, record breaking achievements for socioeconomic
categories are being realized this fiscal year; USTRANSCOM already
awarded $30.6M more to Small Disadvantaged Businesses compared to
fiscal year 2014, $1.5M more to Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned and
$23.1M more to Women-Owned Small Businesses.
c-130 upgrades
72. Senator Blumenthal. General Selva, you indicated that the
``fiscal year 2016 President's Budget includes an end-state fleet of
308 C-130s and 479 tankers to meet air mobility operational
requirements. The C-5 and C-17 fleets are undergoing modernization
efforts to replace aging components, as well as adding avionics to meet
mandated minimum aircraft separation capability to ensure aircraft
ability to meet worldwide commitments.'' Please address what
modernization efforts are needed to ensure that the fleet of 308 C-130s
remain able to meet operational requirements.
General Selva. USTRANSCOM requires 308 C-130s as part of a vital
airlift force structure to meet our strategic airlift requirement. The
C-130 fleet plays a critical role in the Intratheater airlift
operations. I support Air Mobility Command's effort to modernize the C-
130 Fleet.
The Air Force report on C-130 modernization and recapitalization,
as directed by Section 140 of the ``Carl Levin and Howard P. `Buck'
McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015,'' is
nearing completion and will provide additional detail, including plans
to recapitalize Reserve Component C-130H aircraft with the C-130J.
Although the report describes the Air Force's current C-130
modernization plan, the Air Force intends further consultation with
Congress to discuss its modernization strategy for the C-130H fleet.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Donnelly
counterfeit electronics
73. Senator Donnelly. Admiral Rogers, following up on my questions
in the hearing, Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane in Indiana is
involved in a collaborative effort with DARPA and NSA to better
understand and protect us against threats posed by counterfeit
electronics making their way into DOD systems. The ultimate aim of
these efforts is to ensure that microelectronics in DOD weapon and
cyber systems function as intended for the lifecycle of the system.
Over the past couple years they have observed a dramatic escalation in
the technical sophistication of counterfeiting techniques. The findings
of a 2012 Senate Armed Services Committee investigation dealt primarily
with traditional counterfeits, motivated by profit and targeted
indiscriminately. Do you see a more sophisticated and potentially more
dangerous threat on the horizon?
Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]

74. Senator Donnelly. Admiral Rogers, are we seeing the development
of more disruptive and potentially malicious, targeted efforts to
deliver counterfeit electronics into the DOD supply chain?
Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]

75. Senator Donnelly. Admiral Rogers, we have seen efforts in the
past to monitor and report on counterfeits entering the DOD supply
chain. Are you aware of any past study or report focused on parts that
made their way through the supply chain and into DOD systems?
Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]
76. Senator Donnelly. Admiral Rogers, has the impact of these
counterfeit parts of unknown quality on DOD weapon and cyber systems
reliability and performance been investigated?
Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]
conventional prompt strike
77. Senator Donnelly. Admiral Haney, during your opening remarks
you stated the following, ``I support continuing research and
development of capabilities that help fill the conventional strike gap
with a discernible non-ballistic trajectory, maneuverability for over-
flight avoidance, and payload delivery capability.'' From your
perspective, what are the capability gaps and what resources are
necessary to fill the gaps?
Admiral Haney. We continue to require a conventional prompt strike
capability to provide the President a range of flexible military
options to address a small number of the highest-value targets,
including those within denied environments. The current budget request
continues to mature conventional prompt strike technologies and reduces
risk to place the Department in a position to make an informed decision
on which concept to develop.

78. Senator Donnelly. Admiral Haney, Conventional Prompt Strike
(CPS) research and development efforts will shift this year toward
testing a smaller glider capable of being launched from air, ground or
sea-based platforms. What are your views on the importance of
commonality in a potential future CPS program of record?
Admiral Haney. Commonality within the Conventional Prompt Strike
(CPS) research and development effort is important as the program
continues to mature critical technologies and control costs. The
current air-vehicle being developed dates back to the 1970s Sandia
Winged Engineering Research Vehicle (SWERVE) as well as incorporating
aspects from the 2010 and 2014 flights of the Army's Advanced
Hypersonic Weapon. This aero-vehicle will continue maturation through a
series of Navy flight experiments commencing in 2017. Technological
advances made by the Conventional Prompt Strike effort in areas such as
thermal protection systems, launch vehicles, aerodynamics, and
navigation, guidance, and control could span development and technology
efforts for multiple CPS applications.
commonality and collaboration
79. Senator Donnelly. Admiral Haney, in recent years, the Navy and
Air Force have been working to identify areas where they can achieve
critical strategic modernization while saving taxpayer dollars. I have
witnessed some of this effort through NSWC Crane in Indiana, and I
expect to see our Services working to best leverage each other's
research and investments going forward. From your perspective, what is
the value for the warfighter in enhancing commonality and collaboration
among nuclear systems?
Admiral Haney. The Air Force and Navy already share technology
within the ballistic missile mission area and USSTRATCOM has long
encouraged the Navy Strategic Applications and Air Force Demonstration/
Validation Programs as they support this goal. We believe collaboration
and commonality at the component/sub-component level is achievable and
worthwhile. Going forward, we will continue encouraging the Services to
share technologies that achieve efficiencies and savings. We believe
collaboration is particularly important as the Department recapitalizes
our ballistic missile deterrent forces.

80. Senator Donnelly. Admiral Haney, what do you see as key
opportunities for future collaboration?
Admiral Haney. The Air Force and Navy already share technology
within the ballistic missile mission area and USSTRATCOM has long
encouraged the Navy Strategic Applications and Air Force Demonstration/
Validation Programs as they support this goal. We believe collaboration
and commonality at the component/sub-component level is achievable and
worthwhile. Going forward, we will continue encouraging the Services to
share technologies that achieve efficiencies and savings. We believe
collaboration is particularly important as the Department recapitalizes
our ballistic missile deterrent forces.

[Appendix A to follow:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2016 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

----------

THURSDAY, MARCH 26, 2015

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND AND U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS
COMMAND PROGRAMS AND BUDGET

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Wicker,
Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Lee,
Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Manchin, Gillibrand, Donnelly, Hirono,
Kaine, and King.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman McCain. Well, good morning. Good morning, and
welcome to General Lloyd Austin, USA, Commander, U.S. Central
Command, General David Rodriguez, USA, Commander, U.S. Africa
Command, and General Joseph Votel, USA, Commander, U.S. Special
Operations Command.
The committee meets today to receive testimony on the
posture of U.S. Central Command, U.S. African Command, and U.S.
Special Operations Command.
I extend our appreciation to all three of you for your long
and distinguished service, and to the troops and their families
who defend our Nation every day.
From Mali to Libya and Somalia, and from Yemen to Iraq and
Syria, the old order across North Africa and the Middle East is
under siege. Both the regional balance among states and the
social order within states is collapsing, and no new vision has
emerged to take its place. Unfortunately, the lack of clear
U.S. strategy and lack of strong U.S. leadership has confused
our friends, encouraged our enemies, and created space for
malign influence to flourish.
Despite the fact that Dr. Kissinger testified that, ``The
United States has not faced a more diverse and complex array of
crises since the end of the second World War,'' to quote, the
looming threat of sequestration serves to compound that threat
and help create a leadership vacuum that fuels the chaos of our
current predicament.
Retired General Jim Mattis told this committee, ``No foe in
the field can wreak such havoc on our security that mindless
sequestration is achieving today.'' And I couldn't agree more.
Our witnesses are uniquely positioned to describe the
increased risk due to sequestration. To navigate this chaotic
time successfully, we must have unambiguous national security
priorities, clarity in our strategic thinking, and an
unwavering commitment to the resources required to support the
necessary courses of action.
For your sake, General Austin, let's hope that your job
performance is not measured by the number of crises you have to
juggle, but how you handle them. My fear is that you're
expected to juggle with one hand tied behind your back. Whether
it's sequestration or direction from above not to upset Iran
during sensitive nuclear negotiations, yours has to be one of
the most difficult jobs on the planet.
I'm deeply troubled by comments from senior administration
officials on Iran. Secretary Kerry recently said that the net
effect of Iran's military action in Iraq is ``positive.''
Similarly, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Dempsey,
said, ``As long as the Iraqi Government remains committed to
inclusivity of all the various groups inside the country, then
I think Iranian influence will be positive.''
General Austin, I know from our conversations that you do
not suffer the dangerous delusion that somehow Iran can be a
force for good in the region. In your position, you can't
afford that fantasy. Today, I want to discuss our strategy to
address the situation on the ground as it is, rather than as we
wish it to be.
General David Petraeus gave a realistic picture in a recent
interview, which is worth quoting; ``The current Iranian regime
is not our ally in the Middle East. It is ultimately part of
the problem, not the solution. The more the Iranians are seen
to be dominating the region, the more it's going to inflame
Sunni radicalism and fuel the rise of groups like the Islamic
State.'' I'll be interested if our witnesses agree with that
assessment from General David Petraeus.
Iran is not our ally, yet we learned, just yesterday, that
the United States is providing air support in Tikrit, which
media is reporting as being fought by 20 to 30,000 Iran-backed
Shiite militia fighters and only 3 to 4,000 Iraqi Security
Forces. I have many concerns and questions, about how and why
we are doing this, which I hope you can answer for us today.
In Yemen, a country that President Obama recently praised
model for United States counterterrorism a success story, the
prospect of radical groups like Iranian-backed Houthi militants
in charge of an air force and possessing ballistic missiles was
more than our Arab partners could withstand. The airstrikes by
these concerned Arab nations stems in part of their perception
of America's disengagement from the region and a total absence
of United States leadership.
In a scenario that you could not make up, while our Arab
partners conduct airstrikes to halt the offensive of Iranian
proxies in Yemen, the United States is conducting airstrikes to
support the offensive of Iranian proxies in Tikrit. This is as
bizarre as it is misguided, another tragic case of leading from
behind.
The complex intertwining of ISIL [the Islamic State in Iraq
and the Levant] and Iranian problem sets in Iraq and Syria
challenge us in an area the administration has poorly handled
to date, the ability to prioritize and deal with multiple
crises simultaneously.
We're also seeing increasing links between ISIL and
terrorist groups throughout Africa, including a growing
presence in Libya and a newfound relationship with Nigeria's
Boko Haram. Adding to the rising terrorist threat across the
continent, Africa remains plagued by longstanding conflicts
that have resulted in large displacements of people and rising
instability.
General Rodriguez, it's obvious, from our discussion this
week in my office, that none of this is news to you. Yet,
despite a growing array of threats, African Command
consistently suffers from significant resource shortfalls that
impact your ability to accomplish your mission.
One of the key components of our efforts to combat global
terrorism is the team of men and women of Special Operations
Command. In prepared remarks, General Votel has said our
special operators are deployed in more than 80 countries and
are often our first line of defense against an evolving and
increasingly dangerous terrorist threat. They defend the Nation
by training our partners, and, when required, conducting
direct-action operations. However, demand for Special
Operations Forces continues to far exceed supply, placing an
enormous strain on the readiness of the force. Compounding the
strain, the looming threat of sequestration, which will not
just degrade the capabilities of the force, but also the
service-provided enablers it depends on. General Votel, I look
to you to update the committee on the impact of sequestration
on the men and women you lead and the increased risk to the
troops you would be forced to accept as a result.
We need a strategy that spans the same geography as the
threat from the ISIL to al-Qaeda to Iran. Our witnesses work
tirelessly to combat these threats together, and we owe them
and their forces they lead better than a piecemeal approach
that lacks resources and fails to address the full spectrum of
threats we face.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
Senator Reed.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
good morning.
And let me join Senator McCain in not only welcoming the
witnesses, but also thanking them and the men and women of
their command for their extraordinary service to the Nation.
And you represent the combatant commands that are most
engaged in the fight against al-Qaeda and ISIS [the Islamic
State in Iraq and Syria], and threats that know no geographic
boundaries and require a regional, and sometimes a
transregional, approach to effectively dealing with them. The
rise of a military-capable ISIS threatens to erase national
boundaries between Iraq and Syria, and the areas under ISIS
control are providing a training ground for foreign fighters
who threaten to spread violence, upon returning to their homes
in Europe, Asia, or even the United States.
In Iraq, there's a recognition of the need for Sunni, Shia,
and Kurdish factions to overcome their divisions to confront
the ISIS threat. Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi has taken steps to
begin to address Sunni and Kurdish grievances. And, in these
efforts, he needs our support. In fact, one could argue that,
ultimately, the issues in Iraq need to have a political
solution, that military efforts will buy time but not ultimate
and decisive success.
Similarly, in Syria, addressing the root causes that helped
lead to the rise of ISIS will require promoting the conditions
for a political arrangement as well as success on the
battlefield. Yet, the growing influence of Shiite-dominated
militia in Iraq, many taking orders from the Iranian Quds
force, threatens to alienate the liberated Sunni community.
Reports of human rights abuses by Shiite militia may cause some
Iraqi Sunnis to conclude they are better off with ISIS under
the control of Iranian-backed militias. And that would be an
extraordinary setback for all of us.
General Austin, we'd be interested in your assessment of
the progress with the efforts to train, advise, and assist the
Iraqi Security Forces to build up the capability of the Kurdish
Peshmerga as they begin to retake territory from ISIS. We're
also interested in your views on the growing influence of Iran
in Iraq and the threat it poses over the long term to Iraq's
stability. And overnight, as Senator McCain indicated, in
Yemen, you were given an additional task of supporting GCC
[Gulf Cooperation Council] operations in their offensive
operations in Yemen. I hope, General Austin, you can give us an
update on those responsibilities and those operations.
Of course, an additional concern is the outcome of the
nuclear framework negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran. We
are approaching a deadline. And the implication of success,
failure, or something in between will have profound impacts in
the region. That, too, you have to assess.
In Afghanistan, our military forces are focused on training
Afghan Security Forces, conducting counterterrorism operations,
and solidifying the hard-won gains. And we all had the
privilege of listening to Afghanistan's President Ghani
yesterday. I think there's a new hope and a new opportunity,
and we have to move forward, understanding it's still a very
fragile situation.
General Rodriguez, you are increasingly facing challenges
that were located in adjacent ORs--the rise of ISIL, Boko
Haram, all of these things--jihad in Somalia. Their operations
challenge you in attempting to build the capacity up of the
Nations in that region and also to work with our European
allies very effectively to present a united front against these
terrorists. So, again, your efforts are critical. And also let
me commend you and your forces for the resolve with respect to
the ebola outbreak and what you were able to accomplish.
Senator McCain has made this point very clear, very
eloquently. Under sequestration, all of these efforts, both
civilian, military, interagency, will be hammered if it is
allowed to prevail. So, I hope you can provide assessment, not
just in AFRICOM, but in CENTCOM and in SOCOM, of the effects of
sequestration on your ability to operate.
General Votel, as the Special Operations Forces, you are
working across the globe. Your missions are critical. But, once
again, I think it would help us if you could indicate where the
effects of sequestration would actually undermine current and
projected operations. Again, one of the points that you made is
that you are sort of a global force, but you rely extensively
on the base operations of the United States Army, United States
Air Force, and every other service, and some civilian agencies.
And that would be helpful to point out.
Let me commend you and SOCOM for all of the operations
you've undertaken in the last 13 years. There's no force that's
more stressed, no group of individual men and women and their
families who give so much and go so often to the battle. So,
thank you, General, for your efforts. And please communicate
that to the men and women you lead.
Thank you very much.
Chairman McCain. General Votel, can we begin with you?

STATEMENT OF GEN JOSEPH L. VOTEL, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL
OPERATIONS COMMAND

General Votel. Good morning, Chairman McCain, Ranking
Member Reed, and other distinguished members of the committee.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss
the current posture of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM)
as we refer to it. I'm especially pleased to be here with my
two mission partners, Generals Lloyd Austin and Dave Rodriguez.
SOCOM was created by Congress to ensure that we always had
ready and capable SOF [Special Operation Forces] forces to meet
the Nation's challenges. Our ability to address these
challenges is due, in large part, to the strong support we get
from Congress, and especially from this distinguished
committee. Thank you very much.
I'd like to start out by commenting on the amazing actions
made daily by our Special Operations men and women: operators,
acquirers, logisticians, analysts, and many others, Active and
Reserve, military and civilian, the total SOF force. Alongside
our conventional force partners, the 69,000 quiet professionals
of SOCOM are committed to values-based excellence and service
to our Nation. They relentlessly pursue mission success. And
today, roughly 7500 of them are deployed to over 80 countries
worldwide, supporting geographic combatant commander
requirements and named operations.
We are a force who has been heavily deployed over the last
14 years, and our military members, civilians, and their
families have paid a significant price, physically and
emotionally, serving our country. We are very appreciative of
the support we receive from Congress to address the visible and
invisible challenges, and we never forget that, for SOCOM,
people are our most important asset.
SOCOM, in conjunction with its partners, supports the
geographic combatant commanders and the missions they are
assigned by the Secretary of Defense and the President. If they
are successful, we are successful. If they fail, we fail.Today,
the United States is faced with many challenges. The spread of
technology and the diffusion of power are not only being used
by responsible leaders to better societies, but, unfortunately,
by wicked actors to orchestrate terror and violence regionally
and globally. Nonstate actors like al-Qaeda and ISIL and other
violent extremist organizations, menacing state actors like
North Korea, destabilizing actors like Iran, and the growingly
coercive actors like Russia, are just a few examples of the
entities affecting the strategic environment in which SOF
forces operate. We are equally affected by the growing use of
cyber capabilities and social media, which make it easy for our
adversaries to communicate, coordinate, execute, and inspire
their actions.
The fiscal environment is of concern, as well. While SOCOM
has been well supported in recent years, I remain profoundly
concerned by the impact of another round of sequestration, and
not only how it impacts SOCOM, but, more importantly, how it
will affect the four services upon whom we are absolutely
dependent for mission support.
To address the challenging security environment, SOF
provides a portfolio of options for our national leaders and
the geographic combatant commanders. Through small-footprint
operations and by relying on a network of purposeful
partnerships, SOF provides a comparative advantage through
persistent engagement, partner enablement, network focus, and
discreet rapid response to crisis situations. While we support
military operations across the spectrum, SOF capabilities are
uniquely suited to operate and succeed in the gray zone between
normal international competition and open conflict. And it is
in this area that we see our very best opportunities to help
shape the future environment.
To enable our efforts, I have established five priorities
for the command:
First, we must ensure SOF readiness by developing the right
people, skills, and capabilities to meet current and future
requirements. To this end, we want to ensure effectiveness, now
and into the future, with the very best SOF operators and
support personnel, enabled by the best technology and
capabilities we can field. Along the way, we want to make the
very best use of the unique MFP-11 funding authorities that
Congress has granted us.
Second, we must help the Nation win by addressing today's
security challenges. We strive to provide coherent and well-
integrated SOF forces for the geographic combatant commanders,
focused on optimizing our SOF activities. Nearly everywhere,
you will find SOF forces working alongside, and often in
support of, their conventional force partners to accomplish our
security objectives.
Third, we must build purposeful relationships to improve
global understanding and awareness to create options for our
leaders. We don't own the network, but we are an important part
of it. And working with our partners will always produce the
best options for our Nation.
Fourth, we have to prepare for the future security
environment to ensure that SOF is ready to win in an
increasingly complex world. Ultimately, our goal is to match
exquisite people with cutting-edge capability and the very best
ideas and concepts to help our Nation succeed against the
looming challenges we will face in the future.
Finally, we must preserve our force and families to ensure
their long-term well-being. It is in this area that we are
specifically focused on a holistic approach to address the
invisible challenges of stress and suicide that are affecting
our servicemembers, civilians, and their family members.
I remain honored and humbled by the opportunity to command
the best Special Operations Forces in the world. I am
incredibly proud of each and every one of our team members and
their families.
I look forward to your questions and our dialogue today.
[The prepared statement of General Votel follows:]

Prepared Statement by General Joseph L. Votel, USA
opening remarks
Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you
for the opportunity to address you today, which is my first as the 10th
Commander of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). I am
honored to be here to convey our appreciation for your indispensable
support and to provide an update on our nation's special operations
forces (SOF). During my remarks, I will describe USSOCOM's posture,
purpose, and mission in the context of the emerging strategic
environment. I will then share my priorities and concerns, and explain
how we will accomplish our assigned missions and prepare for an
uncertain future.
sof ethic and culture
I would like to begin by commending the extraordinary efforts made
by our special operations forces to keep our nation safe. USSOCOM's
highly specialized military and civilian personnel, our ``quiet
professionals,'' are asked to respond to our nation's most complex,
demanding, and high-risk challenges. Building this skilled and
specialized force is a demanding, time-intensive process. Every day,
our forces put forth an extraordinary level of effort and personal
sacrifice, while enduring grueling physical and mental demands to meet
mission requirements. They deserve our admiration and gratitude, along
with all of our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines. They are all
part of a team doing essential work on behalf of our nation.
The SOF commitment to excellence is imperative in accomplishing
what our nation has asked of these dedicated men and women--I am proud
to serve as their commander. USSOCOM is a values-based organization--
always mindful that our personal and professional conduct reflects not
only on ourselves, but also on our nation. We will continue to earn the
high level of trust that our leaders have placed in us by maintaining
an open dialogue on the challenges we face, providing our best military
advice, and remaining responsible stewards of U.S. tax dollars.
ussocom's mission
As you know, Congress created USSOCOM in 1987 and gave it distinct
Service-like responsibilities, which makes it unique among the nine
Unified Combatant Commands. Under U.S. Code Title 10, Sections 164 and
167, it is my responsibility, as the Commander of USSOCOM, to organize,
train, and equip SOF for current and future challenges. Our mission is
to synchronize the planning of special operations and provide SOF to
support persistent, networked, and distributed Geographic Combatant
Command (GCC) operations to protect and advance our nation's interests.
As global security challenges become increasingly interconnected
and interdependent, USSOCOM is investing in our own connections,
deepening our relationships with the GCCs, our international partners,
and with U.S. national security decision-makers at home. These
relationships are helping us build common understandings of shared
threats and facilitate cooperation.
In short, USSOCOM sees its role as an indispensable supporting
command to our GCCs, working seamlessly with interagency and
international partners to provide capabilities critical to addressing
emerging problems and securing our nation's interests. Ultimately, the
best indicator of our success will be the success of the GCCs.
today's us special operations force
Since assuming command in August 2014, I have had the opportunity
to travel to every GCC to consult with the commanders and visit with
our forward deployed special operations units. I would like to give you
a snapshot of U.S. SOF and the range of missions they are executing,
and describe their experience as part of today's military.
Today, our United States Special Operations Forces are comprised of
over 69,000 men and women serving as operators, enablers, and support
personnel. The SOF community is made up of our nation's finest leaders
and organizational teams. Within the force of ``quiet professionals''
are Army Special Forces, SEALs (Sea, Air, Land Teams), Air Commandos,
Rangers, Night Stalker helicopter crews, Marine Raiders, civil affairs
personnel, psychological operations personnel, acquisition experts,
logisticians, administrators, analysts, planners, communicators, and
other specialists who are instrumental in fulfilling our mission. We
also rely heavily upon our Guard and Reserve units, as well as
government civilians and contractors.
Our SOF are deployed to more than 80 countries worldwide, filling
GCC requirements and supporting 10 named operations. In addition to the
nearly 3,500 personnel we have stationed forward, we also have over
7,000 service members deployed in support of a variety of GCC
requirements on any given day. These requirements span the range of our
core activities as directed by the Secretary of Defense. From working
with indigenous forces and local governments to improve local security,
to high-risk counterterrorism operations--SOF are in vital roles
performing essential tasks. They provide critical linkages to our
security partners and must be prepared to handle a wide range of
contingencies, despite a small footprint in their areas of
responsibility. These missions are often complicated, demanding, and
high-risk.
Because of the unique skill set SOF possess, we are seeing
increasing demand for these units across the GCCs. The typical operator
is older than counterparts in the conventional forces, has attended
multiple advanced tactical schools, and has received specialized
cultural and language training. This depth of experience and range of
expertise has been in high demand since 9/11. Over the last 14 years,
the average service member in SOF has deployed between 4 to 10 times--
with most toward the higher end of that range--and has frequently had
less than 12 months at home between deployments. About 50 percent of
our force is married with children and have sacrificed a great deal of
time with their families. High operational tempo has put a strain on
both our operators and their families, and most, if not all, of our SOF
operators have lost friends both overseas and at home. Our SOF warriors
have performed their duties superbly, but not without stress or loss;
we have sustained over 2,500 wounded and killed in action. We now have
approximately 7,500 members in our SOF Wounded Warrior program, many of
them due to the ``invisible wounds'' of traumatic stress. We have a
great deal of work to do to ensure these men and women receive proper
care.
On the positive side, the pressure exerted over this time has
created a self-confident, mature, knowledgeable, and agile force that
has a greater awareness of what is important to our nation. The range
of experience and expertise in special operations forces make them
uniquely suited to deal with many of the complex challenges we see
emerging in the security environment.
the strategic environment
We are living in a hyper-connected world; the spread of technology
into an increasing number of cultures and societies is driving change
in the strategic environment. The Cold War suppressed political
mobilization in a variety of ways. The removal of those constraints,
coupled with technology, is creating both challenges and opportunities.
Adversaries can now easily access tools that range from advanced
weapons systems and cyber capabilities to improvised explosive devices
(IEDs), which are providing an expanding variety of coercive options.
Yet we also see opportunities emerging as networked populations are
seeking improvements in governance, security, and economic opportunity.
Power and influence are now diffusing to a range of actors, both state
and non-state, who have not traditionally wielded it. Many governments
are struggling to adjust to the new realities. For the foreseeable
future, instability will be driven by conflicts within and across state
boundaries as much as it will be driven by conflicts between states
themselves.
Within states, it is becoming much easier for aggrieved populations
to network, organize, and demand change to the status quo; we have seen
this in a number of locations across the world. Populations are
increasingly challenging the legitimacy of their governments and
demanding change on a range of issues. Governments unwilling or unable
to accommodate change will face increasing pressure from dissatisfied
segments of their populations. Traditional responses to control these
situations may provide temporary respite, but too often fail to address
the underlying grievances, which can lead to further instability.
Across state boundaries, violent non-state actors such as ISIL are
exploiting local grievances among populations to advance their own
horrific ends. Their methods routinely violate international norms and
challenge regional governments' capabilities to respond. These groups
rely upon their ability to build common identities with sub-sets of
disaffected populations and magnify the potential for violence. Other
non-state actors have more criminal inclinations and avoid law
enforcement while building their power and influence.
Between states, technological advancement is providing rising
powers more options to pursue their interests. In some cases, countries
are seeking to expand their claims of sovereignty outside of recognized
borders. In other cases, they are sponsoring and relying upon non-state
actors to act on their behalf abroad. Traditional approaches to
deterrence are increasingly inadequate--particularly as some states are
becoming adept at avoiding conventional military responses while
advancing their interests through a combination of coercion, targeted
violence, and exploitation of local issues. Russia is taking this
approach and is systematically undermining neighboring governments and
complicating international responses to its aggressive actions.
There are two clear implications of these environmental conditions.
First, the diffusion of power is decreasing the ability of any state,
acting alone, to control outcomes unilaterally. Globalization has
created networked challenges on a massive scale. Only by working with a
variety of security partners can we begin to address these issues.
Second, our success in this environment will be determined by our
ability to adequately navigate conflicts that fall outside of the
traditional peace-or-war construct. Actors taking a ``gray zone''
approach seek to secure their objectives while minimizing the scope and
scale of actual fighting. In this ``gray zone,'' we are confronted with
ambiguity on the nature of the conflict, the parties involved, and the
validity of the legal and political claims at stake. These conflicts
defy our traditional views of war and require us to invest time and
effort in ensuring we prepare ourselves with the proper capabilities,
capacities, and authorities to safeguard U.S. interests.
sof's role in this environment
If the environment is populated with potential adversaries who are
adept at avoiding our conventional advantages, then we must be prepared
to respond with appropriate tools. The traditional rules of conflict
are changing--our ability to influence outcomes is not solely based on
our aggregate military capability. Our success will increasingly be
determined by our ability to respond with a range of capabilities while
becoming more attuned to the intricacies involved in an evolving
landscape of relationships.
U.S. Special Operations Forces provide a portfolio of options to
deal with complex security challenges. We are uniquely able to operate
in a variety of environments to support strategic progress in achieving
national security objectives. Our comparative advantage in this
environment is built upon three pillars: 1) persistent engagement, 2)
enabling partners, and 3) discreet action.
First, we conduct persistent engagement in a variety of
strategically important locations with a small-footprint approach that
integrates a network of partners. This engagement allows us to nurture
relationships prior to conflict. Our language and cultural expertise in
these regions help us facilitate stability and counter malign influence
with and through local security forces. Although SOF excel at short-
notice missions under politically-sensitive conditions, we are most
effective when we deliberately build inroads over time with partners
who share our interests. This engagement allows SOF to buy time to
prevent conflict in the first place.
Second, we integrate and enable both conventional forces and
interagency capabilities. On a daily basis, SOF are assisting the GCCs
across and between their areas of responsibility to address issues that
are not constrained by borders. When crises escalate, SOF develop
critical understanding, influence and relationships that aid
conventional force entry into theater. The close working relationships
we have built with GCCs are essential in ensuring we are able to
properly support and augment their operations. Today's crises will not
be resolved by a military-only approach; instead, the nature of these
challenges demands a whole-of-government response. SOF play an
important supporting, but not decisive, role. We continue to explore
how we can better augment the capabilities of the interagency to
support the National Security Strategy.
Third, USSOCOM provides the ability to conduct discreet action
against our most immediate threats. Regardless of our efforts to build
stability and favorably shape outcomes, the need remains for an
effective crisis response and a robust, proactive counterterrorism
program. For these cases, we must maintain the ability to conduct
operations under politically-sensitive conditions. This capability
provides a tailored military response that reduces the associated
strategic risks and the likelihood of conflict escalation. We are
continuing to disrupt the violent actions of extremist organizations in
conjunction with conventional forces, the interagency, and our
international SOF partners. These three pillars help us provide lower-
risk, timely, and tailored options to deal with the growing variety of
security problems in today's world.
ussocom and its partners
As an organization that deals with crises that occur in the ``gray
zone,'' I believe USSOCOM has an important role to play in facilitating
interagency discussion. For example, we hosted senior policymakers last
year from across the interagency to discuss options to address
transnational organized criminal networks. Just this past February, we
hosted a similar event in Tampa on behalf of the National
Counterterrorism Center to discuss the strategy to counter ISIL.
Challenges such as these will continue to evolve--and so must our
approach to dealing with them.
Unconventional strategies are increasingly becoming a feature of
the security environment. I believe it is time for us to have an in-
depth discussion on how we can best support our national interests in
these situations. Adversaries employing these strategies attempt to
maximize their coercive influence while limiting their risk of serious
retribution. They are becoming adept at avoiding crossing thresholds
that would clearly justify the use of conventional military force.
Destabilizing a government is becoming easier through non-attributable
methods that are relatively cheap and easy to employ. Our success will
therefore depend upon our ability to act with and through regional
partners, leveraging all instruments of national power, to counter
destabilizing influences.
Cyber threats are an increasingly common component of
unconventional strategies for which we must develop a more
comprehensive approach. Our ever-growing reliance on information
infrastructure makes us vulnerable to attacks; the same is true for
many governments around the world, to include our potential
adversaries. Simultaneously, there are a variety of areas in which we
must become more proficient to fully realize the potential of cyber
capabilities. I believe the interagency needs to maintain a continuing
focus on this area.
Social media is another component of unconventional strategies, and
the security environment in general, that is playing a central role in
recruiting individuals to causes. We must therefore develop our ability
to interact with key influencers through this medium, or else risk
blinding ourselves to this important conduit of information and
influence in unfolding crises. We all must view this space as a routine
operational area; it is redefining how humans interact. Our success in
leveraging these tools will be determined by how well we cultivate the
networks in which we participate; it is important to note that these
are not ``our'' networks--the very nature of these relationship tools
is decentralized and participatory, rather than centrally controlled.
We require new thinking on this subject.
We stand ready to support interagency efforts to work through these
challenges. Though there are military components to countering and
deterring unconventional challenges, whole-of-government strategies are
essential for building lasting stability and safeguarding U.S.
interests.
developing sof for the security environment
Through close collaboration with Congress, I hope to optimize the
allocation of our resources to develop the capabilities, capacities,
and authorities required by the GCCs. While this emerging security
environment will increase the demand for SOF, we are most effective
when we integrate our efforts with the GCCs, Services, and the
interagency. In order to strengthen SOF posture and capabilities, I
have established five priorities for USSOCOM. Focusing on these
priorities will enhance our ability to address the range of
conventional and unconventional challenges that are increasingly
characterizing the security environment.
First, we must ensure SOF readiness by developing the right people,
skills, and capabilities to meet current requirements as well as those
that will emerge in the future. As we face both fiscal and security
challenges, we must balance the readiness of the current force with
investment in future capabilities. Critical to this balance is ensuring
that we maintain superior selection, training, education, and talent
management for our people. In turn, our people must be supported by
timely development, acquisition, and sustainment of both Service-
provided and special operations-peculiar equipment.
Recognizing that humans are more important than hardware--our first
SOF Truth--we must invest wisely in our people to develop the right
talents our force requires. Over the past 14 years we have evolved our
approach to consistently produce operators who possess the attributes
and competencies we require. Developing language and cultural expertise
is essential to our ability to operate in complex situations to promote
the security of the U.S. and its allies. Operational success for SOF
often depends on being able to establish relationships with key
partners. The strength of these relationships is founded on culturally
attuned, regionally trained operators interacting directly with foreign
officials and security forces in their language. USSOCOM and its
Components continue to strengthen and rebalance regional capabilities
to provide appropriate expertise.
We have a shared responsibility with the Services for developing
our special operations forces and we are partnering with them on ways
we can better assess and manage talent. USSOCOM has the responsibility
for ensuring the combat readiness of its forces while the Services have
broad authority for career development, so we are working on improving
how we collaboratively prepare SOF for the challenges they face. Yet
reliance on the Services is not limited to recruitment and development
of our operators. The readiness of USSOCOM, the Services, and
Functional Combatant Commands are inextricably linked as SOF relies
heavily on Service training, logistics, facilities, and operational
enablers such as cyber networks, global distribution, and global
patient movement. Service and Functional Combatant Commanders' support
will remain a critical requirement as USSOCOM continues to deploy SOF
to meet increasing GCC demand.
In terms of funding, our readiness has remained relatively stable
over the past four years through a combination of consistent base and
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding, which has allowed
USSOCOM to fulfill the most critical GCC demands. Although the majority
of our efforts have focused on the CENTCOM AOR, our current budget
shifts efforts to improve support to all GCCs in accordance with
strategic guidance. As we begin to focus more heavily on emerging
networked threats around the world, we are aligning resources to
maintain current readiness through joint training and exercises,
operational unit readiness and training activities, and flying hours.
Our training exercises include a strong focus on building Service,
interagency, and international interoperability. We remain heavily
reliant upon OCO funding, which has been essential for responding to
today's threats, and appreciate the continued support of Congress in
this matter.
Second, we must help our nation win in today's challenges and
contribute to keeping the nation safe. The challenges faced by the
United States and our allies require unprecedented agility and
understanding. We must prioritize and synchronize SOF activities to
protect our nation's interests as the challenges grow more numerous and
complex. To accomplish this, we must continue to invest in a diverse
portfolio of SOF capabilities that meet both the immediate and long-
term needs of the GCCs and complements the capabilities of the
Services, the interagency, and our international partners.
DOD guidance identifies USSOCOM as the synchronizer for the
planning and provision of special operations capabilities in support of
the GCC. To meet this guidance, we are in the process of coordinating
with the Services, the Department, and the GCCs to collaboratively
develop a campaign plan for global special operations. The plan is
intended to help optimize and prioritize our support globally, promote
ongoing efforts to strengthen international partnerships and will
ultimately improve our ability to support the GCCs by providing
coherent options and recommendations for SOF employment.
Authorities such as Section 1208 play a critical role in ensuring
we can provide a more comprehensive set of options for security
challenges by leveraging the capabilities of local security partners.
They also help ensure we retain access and influence in regions where
we do not maintain a large military presence. We appreciate your
continued support for this authority. Going forward, we will work with
Congress to ensure we have the right authorities and programs in place
to properly support the GCCs.
Third, we are continuing to build relationships with international
and domestic partners through sustained security cooperation, expanded
communication architectures, and liaison activities. These partnerships
allow us to share the burden of managing conflicts and enhance regional
capabilities that can respond to threats at their origin. Over the past
few years, USSOCOM has prioritized strengthening the network of
military, interagency, and international partners across the globe,
through liaison exchange, and a multinational communications
infrastructure. These relationships build common understandings of
shared threats and facilitate cooperation.
Efforts such as our Special Operations Liaison Officers, or SOLOs,
are helping us build this network of international partners. Now
present in embassies in 15 nations and operating in every geographic
combatant command area of responsibility, SOLOs help us facilitate
coordination across GCC boundaries to address challenges that span the
globe. We also have liaison officers from 13 partner nations that work
with us at our Headquarters in Tampa. Similarly, our Special Operations
Support Teams (SOSTs) help us interface more effectively with the
interagency. By increasing transparency, communication, and
collaboration with our partners, we maximize the effectiveness of our
collective action against shared problem sets. USSOCOM will continue to
invest in these relationships so that our network development outpaces
that of threat networks.
The relationships USSOCOM has strengthened and the communications
architecture we have put in place allow us to coordinate with coalition
partners on matters such as hostage rescue, the movement of foreign
fighters, international training, and developing the capabilities for
responding to shared threats. In January of this year, USSOCOM
organized a dialogue that brought together senior military
representatives from 20 nations, as well as the Commanders of U.S.
Central Command, U.S. European Command, and NATO Special Operations
Headquarters, to discuss common security challenges and opportunities
for collective action.
Our expanded support to the Theater Special Operations Commands
(TSOCs) is another key effort that is helping us further develop our
regional capabilities and expertise. This support includes extending
the necessary communications infrastructure and providing key
operations support capabilities such as Civil-Military Engagement, and
ISR processing, exploitation, and dissemination. We are working closely
with the GCCs to determine how we can best support their operational
needs. We have realigned approximately 800 USSOCOM billets to push more
capability forward to the TSOCs in areas such as planning,
intelligence, analysis, and communications. We will continue to make
the necessary investments to ensure that we maintain regional access
and the ability to operate freely with our network of allies and
partners, and to encourage constructive defense cooperation.
As we operate with and through a growing network of global
partners, we will continually reassess relationships based on mission
prioritization and ensure we maintain the proper security protocols. As
an enterprise, USSOCOM understands the reality that what happens in
Latin America affects Africa, which affects Europe, and so on. With a
global approach--working with international partners to coordinate
activities and share critical information--we can more effectively deal
with global challenges. In my opinion, this network is an essential
capability in adapting to the emerging challenges to our interests.
Fourth, we must prepare for the future by investing in SOF that are
able to win in an increasingly complex world. To do so, we must be
innovators of strategic options. We will focus on developing the total
Special Operations Force through concepts, training, doctrine,
education, and research that are future-oriented and challenge our
current operational constructs. These concepts, in concert with robust
experimentation and a rigorous capability analysis and development
process, will ensure we are prepared for an uncertain and dynamic
future. Ultimately, preparing for the future is about ensuring that we
match the right people and capabilities with the very best ideas to
address our most pressing problems.
In today's environment, our effectiveness is directly tied to our
ability to operate with domestic and international partners. We, as a
joint force, must continue to institutionalize interoperability,
integration, and interdependence between conventional forces and
special operations forces through doctrine, training, and operational
deployments. A key aspect of building interoperability is through
USSOCOM's participation in Service Title 10 and Chairman of the Joint
Staff sponsored war games and experiments. These events provide a
critical venue for building partnerships with Service, interagency, and
international partners to address some of the most pressing challenges
facing our nation as we look to the future. We will also continue to
use USSOCOM events to advance our efforts to institutionalize whole-of-
government approaches.
Programmatic keys to preparing SOF for the future are a continued
emphasis on enhancing the overall capabilities of the SOF operator;
fielding new and recapitalized air, ground, and maritime platforms;
enhancing our SOF-specific ISR capabilities; and continuing to invest
in new communications infrastructure and equipment technology that
allow us to share information more effectively and integrate our
activities. We will work to ensure we are developing the right
technologies, equipment, and capabilities required for the future SOF
operator.
USSOCOM's tailored and streamlined rapid acquisition processes,
supported by Congress and enabled through the oversight of ASD(SO/LIC)
and USD(AT&L), have delivered critical capabilities to the battlefield,
in weeks and months, instead of years. For example, in 2014, conducting
combat evaluations allowed us to develop and deliver advanced weapons
and cutting-edge Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
sensors for our SOF MQ-9 unmanned aircraft that had immediate impact on
the battlefield. USSOCOM also successfully responded to an urgent
operational requirement to increase ballistic protection on its fleet
of CV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft. In less than six months, USSOCOM,
working alongside the Army and Navy, acquired lightweight armored
panels and modified its fleet of Ospreys.
USSOCOM is also focusing on improving acquisition processes to
support an adaptable strategy by leveraging its network of partnerships
with Services, the interagency, industry, academia, and international
partners. The Tactical Assault Light Operator Suit (TALOS) is an
example of our emphasis on acquisition process innovation. The effort
is designed to deliver a test-ready combat suit prototype that protects
our operators at their most vulnerable point. Through the use of a
small joint acquisition task force and rapid prototyping events, TALOS
is leveraging close relationships between operators, acquirers, and
technologists to achieve greater results than could be accomplished
through traditional acquisition processes. This approach is also
helping us ``spin off'' technologies from the larger TALOS effort that
are improving our capabilities at an accelerated rate. Continued
Congressional support of USSOCOM's acquisition of SOF-peculiar
capability and our commitment to innovative process improvement is
imperative to our continued ability to meet the needs of the
warfighter.
As we prepare for the future, we remain very concerned about the
detrimental effects of sequestration; drastic cuts to the Services will
have severe impacts on our own ability to support the GCCs. A great
deal of USSOCOM's procurement is focused on SOF-specific enhancements
to Service-managed programs. Therefore, SOF buying power is directly
connected to Service investments. Even with a steady base budget for
USSOCOM, our capabilities can still be reduced through cuts to programs
that we depend upon. A major reprioritization of these programs will
require us to reassess our own investments. Increased demand for SOF
across the GCCs combined with increased pressure on Service budgets may
compromise our capabilities. Internally, we are working hard to refine
our programmatic decisions to build our buying power and prepare for
the future.
Another important area of future development for SOF is emerging
from the Women in Service Review. Women have served in SOF for years in
Intelligence, Military Information Support and Civil Affairs units,
female engagement teams, cultural support teams, and Air Force Special
Operations aviation roles. Approximately two-thirds of our positions
are currently integrated. USSOCOM is sponsoring several research
efforts to assess possible impacts on unit performance to facilitate
further successful integrations. We are also working in close
coordination with the Services to develop recommendations for further
integration.
Fifth, we must preserve our force and families, providing for their
short- and long-term well-being. People--military, civilian, and
families--are our most important asset. We always take care of our
people, but after 13 years of war, their resiliency and readiness is a
primary concern. We must leverage every resource available--SOF,
Service, and community resources--to ensure our people are prepared for
the demanding tasks we ask them to execute. At the same time, we must
pay particular attention to the often invisible challenges that our
people and their families face, and ensure that the SOF culture is one
that fosters understanding and support.
In order to preserve our special operations force and families, we
are focusing on four areas: human, psychological, spiritual, and
family/social performance. In each area, we are taking steps to improve
the long-term health of our force. These initiatives are not intended
to supplant the Services' efforts in providing for the welfare of
military members and their families; but rather to provide SOF and
their families with access to services that meet their unique needs and
complement Service-provided programs. Given the high frequency of
combat deployments, high-stake missions, and extraordinarily demanding
environments in which the force operates, SOF and their families have
been under unprecedented levels of stress; it is imperative to address
the effects of more than 13 years of combat operations.
There are two specific areas that fall under preserving our force
and families that I would like to discuss in more detail: suicides and
personnel tempo, or PERSTEMPO. On the first subject, our goal is to do
everything possible to eliminate the incidence of suicide in the forces
and in our families. We have indications that our efforts in the four
areas I mentioned are making a difference by alleviating conditions
that contribute to suicide. There are now higher self-referral rates
and our leadership is improving its ability to recognize important
warning signs and provide tools to intervene more effectively. We are
moving in the right direction in changing our culture when it comes to
seeking psychological help, but still have work to do. This effort will
continue until seeking help is considered normal and expected by
everyone. We are grateful for the support Congress has provided to
address this challenge.
The second area I would like to mention is PERSTEMPO, which is the
rate at which we deploy our forces. Our policy is aimed at ensuring the
physical, mental and operational readiness and resiliency of assigned
forces. In 2010 a study was commissioned to examine the effects of a
decade of continuous combat operations on the SOF community. The study
identified one primary source of ongoing stress: the lack of
predictability resulting from a demanding operational tempo exacerbated
by significant time spent away from home for training. Predictability
is a key component of building resilience. USSOCOM's PERSTEMPO policy
is designed to improve operational readiness and retention by allowing
commanders to evaluate and balance mission requirements with the needs
of our service members. The intent is to enable the Commanders at the
lowest level to better monitor the use of assigned forces and make
informed risk decisions that help protect them from overuse, which will
also improve mission success. Ultimately, managing PERSTEMPO is about
ensuring the long-term health of the force and mission readiness while
continuing to meet our global mission requirements.
The preservation of our force and families is vitally important in
the preservation of capabilities that the nation depends upon to
respond to crises in an unpredictable environment. Ensuring we properly
care for those from whom we expect so much will allow us to meet
important requirements from the GCCs. As our people keep faith with our
nation, we will keep faith with them, now and in the future.
working with congress
I look forward to working with Congress to explore how we can best
enable our SOF operators to prepare for the complex situations we ask
them to deal with on a daily basis. Your oversight, support, and
partnership will ultimately help us provide better service to our
nation.
The fiscal situation requires the Department to make hard choices
about the allocation of our resources. It is imperative that this
process occurs with a clear understanding of impacts. We depend upon
the Services and Functional Combatant Commands to provide us with key
capabilities; most SOF operations require non-SOF support. As we adjust
to the changing demands in the operating environment, we must work to
ensure we are building the broadest possible portfolio of options for
our national security decision-makers through the innovation of low-
cost, small-footprint, and highly flexible SOF capabilities.
closing
In closing, I thank you for providing me with this opportunity to
discuss these issues that are critical to the health of our Special
Operations Forces and our ability to support the National Security
Strategy. I also thank you for your continued support of our SOF
personnel and their families; the tremendous demands we have placed
upon them requires a continued commitment to provide for their well-
being and support their mission success.

ChairmanMcCain. Thank you.
General Rodriguez.

STATEMENT OF GEN. DAVID M. RODRIGUEZ, USA, COMMANDER, U.S.
AFRICA COMMAND

General Rodriguez. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed,
and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to update you on the efforts of U.S. Africa
Command. And I'm glad to be between Joe and Lloyd today.
Let me express my gratitude for your support to our
servicemembers and their families who underwrite our Nation's
security in an increasingly complex world of accelerating
change.
Today, our Nation faces heightened strategic uncertainty;
risks to our National interests are significant, and growing.
Part of our strategic uncertainty is our fiscal uncertainty. If
sequestration returns in 2016, I'm concerned about our ability
to execute the current strategy at a manageable level of risk.
Threats and opportunities to advance national interests are
growing in Africa. In the past year, we achieved progress in
several areas through close cooperation with our allies and
partners. We have built significant partner capacity over the
years. This capacity has played a major role in regional
efforts to contain violent extremism, including al-Shabaab,
other al-Qaeda affiliates, and now the Islamic State of Iraq in
the Levant, as well as Boko Haram. With our support, French and
regional partners have disrupted violent extremist networks,
and a small number of our unilateral operations have applied
additional pressure.
We also achieved success with other partners against other
challenges. As an example, in Liberia, we supported USAID and
the Liberian nation in responding to the largest ebola epidemic
in history.
Another illustrative example is our support to
strengthening the capacity and coordination of regional
partners in the Gulf of Guinea.
Furthermore, in Central Africa, combined military and
civilian efforts significantly reduced the Lord's Resistance
Army's ability to threaten civilian populations.
Working closely with the State Department and our regional
partners has allowed us to improve our posture and capability
to protect U.S. personnel and facilities. When security in
Libya deteriorated, we assisted in the safe departure of United
States and allied personnel. Conversely, in the Central African
Republic, we provided security that enabled the resumption of
embassy operations.
We've had a lot of successes, but many challenges remain,
and there is much work to be done. Transregional terrorists and
criminal networks continue to adapt and expand aggressively.
While al-Shabaab is weakened in Somalia, it remains a
persistent threat to United States and regional interests. Al-
Shabaab has broadened its operations to conduct, or attempt to
conduct, asymmetric attacks against Uganda, Ethiopia, Djibouti,
and especially Kenya.
Libya-based threats are growing rapidly, including an
expanding ISIL presence. If left unchecked, they have the
highest potential among security challenges in Africa to
increase risk to United States strategic interests in the near
future.
Boko Haram threatens the ability of the Nigerian government
to provide security and basic services in large portions of the
northeast. Boko Haram has extended its reach beyond Nigeria's
borders to Cameroon, Niger, and Chad.
In Somalia, Libya, and Nigeria, the international community
is challenged to implement the comprehensive approaches
necessary to advance governance, security, and development.
Declining resources will make this more difficult.
To mitigate increasing risk, Africa Command is sharpening
our priorities and improving the alignment of resources to
strategy. We are coordinating with international and
interagency partners to harmonize our efforts across the
continent. And we are seeking to increase operational and
programmatic flexibility.
We continue to provide our best military advice to
policymakers to inform decisions about managing risk.
Thanks for your continued support to our mission and the
dedicated people advancing our Nation's defense interests in
Africa.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Rodriguez follows:]

Prepared Statement by General David M. Rodriguez, USA
united states africa command 2015 posture statement
introduction
Chairman, Ranking Member, distinguished members of the Committee,
thank you for this opportunity to update you on the efforts of United
States Africa Command. Africa continues to present a broad spectrum of
opportunities and challenges to the United States and our allies and
partners. U.S. Africa Command is working closely with allies and
partners to build relationships and capacity vital to advancing our
national interests of security, prosperity, international order, and
the promotion of universal values. American interests in Africa
Command's 53-country area of responsibility include the prevention of
terrorist attacks against U.S. interests, security of the global
economic system, and protection of our citizens abroad. In addition,
Africa's growing importance to allies and emerging powers presents
opportunities to reinforce United States global security objectives
through our engagement on the continent.
African states and regional organizations are important partners in
addressing security challenges, including terrorist and criminal
networks that link Africa with Europe, the Middle East, Southeast Asia,
and North and South America. Africa's role in the global economic
system is expanding: the continent is surrounded by international
shipping lanes and holds eight of the world's 15 fastest growing
economies. Africa is rich in natural resources and the human capital
represented by a large youth population. Forty-one percent of Africans
are under the age of 15, and by 2050, roughly one in four people on the
planet will live in Africa. The capacity of African partners to
contribute to multinational efforts, including those aimed at
preventing, mitigating, and resolving armed conflict, is increasing.
Many countries have made progress in developing institutions that
uphold the rule of law, as reflected by adherence to the law of war and
respect for human rights. However, in many countries, weak leadership
and corruption continue to constrain progress in governance, security,
and development.
The past year was a dynamic time for Africa Command and our
partners. Together, we made progress in several areas. In East Africa,
our regional partners continued to lead security efforts in Somalia and
demonstrated greater effectiveness and coordination in operations
against al-Qaeda affiliate al-Shabaab. By supporting the continued
development of partner capacities, and through enabling assistance and
selective unilateral operations, we enhanced the collective gains our
partners made against al-Shabaab. As a result of improved security, the
Somali people and government have greater opportunities to make
progress in the development of governance and economic institutions.
In North and West Africa, we expanded our collaboration with allies
and partners to address growing threats in Libya, Mali, and Nigeria,
including an increasingly cohesive network of al-Qaeda affiliates and
adherents, a growing Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant presence, and
Boko Haram. We built capacity and enabled our allies and partners to
disrupt transnational terrorist and criminal networks, strengthen
border security, and contribute to multinational peacekeeping
operations. We also ensured that cooperative security locations on the
continent are able to support the temporary staging of crisis response
forces to protect United States personnel and facilities. When
deteriorating security conditions in Libya led several countries to
suspend embassy operations, we supported the U.S. State Department in
ensuring the safe departure of American and allied personnel. We
captured suspected terrorists in support of efforts to bring justice to
the perpetrators of violence against American citizens and interests.
Although security declines in Libya have limited bilateral military
activities, we have improved our coordination with regional and
international partners and are prepared to expand our bilateral
engagement when conditions are more conducive to building the
capacities of defense institutions and forces. In Nigeria, we are
conducting a range of bilateral efforts and preparing to expand our
engagement as security and partner capacity allow. Simultaneously, we
are working with Nigeria, neighboring countries, and our international
partners to improve the planning and coordination of efforts to counter
Boko Haram.
In Liberia, we supported the Liberian government and United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) in addressing the complex
humanitarian emergency associated with the largest Ebola epidemic in
history. Our combined efforts with Liberian partners helped to save
lives and potentially avert a global health crisis. Nearly 3,000
Department of Defense personnel, including civilians and contractors,
deployed to Operation UNITED ASSISTANCE last fall. Under the superb
leadership of Major General Williams and U.S. Army Africa, followed by
Major General Volesky and the 101st Airborne (Air Assault), Joint Force
Command--United Assistance provided unique capabilities in coordination
and communication, logistics, engineering, and health worker training.
The speed and flexibility of the U.S. military response was enhanced by
U.S. Transportation Command's flexible joint expeditionary capabilities
in planning, communications, public affairs, and port opening, and the
presence of U.S. European Command and Africa Command forces forward-
positioned in Europe. The U.S. military demonstrated flexibility and
capability to assist when others could not, and ensured critical
initial gaps were filled while civilian partners ramped up their
capabilities. The deployment of U.S. forces helped boost the confidence
and courage of others to join the effort, and served as a catalyst for
the robust international response required to turn the tide of the
epidemic. Joint Force Command--United Assistance transitioned military
tasks to civilian partners as they attained sufficient capacity. We are
tailoring remaining Joint Force Command capabilities and Africa Command
security cooperation efforts to build additional capacity and ensure
our regional partners are prepared to respond to potential future
outbreaks.
Africa Command's operational requirements to support efforts in
East, North, and West Africa and the protection of United States
personnel and facilities across the continent increased in the past
year. In Fiscal Year 2014, we conducted 68 operations, 11 major joint
exercises, and 595 security cooperation activities. In comparison, we
conducted 55 operations, 10 major joint exercises, and 481 security
cooperation activities in Fiscal Year 2013. With our requirements
expanding faster than resources are increasing, we are utilizing
innovative and creative ways to mitigate capability gaps, including
sharing forces with other Combatant Commands and leveraging the
capabilities of multinational and interagency partners.
mission statement
U.S. Africa Command, with national and international partners,
disrupts transnational threats, protects U.S. personnel and facilities,
prevents and mitigates conflict, and builds defense capabilities in
order to promote regional stability and prosperity.
current trends
Africa's security environment remains dynamic and uncertain. Africa
is rising and so are the expectations of Africans. While greater
popular demands can accelerate needed political and economic reforms,
they can also be destabilizing, particularly in fragile states. Across
much of the continent, crime and corruption impede the development of
democratic institutions, reduce security and stability, and constrain
economic development. A number of autocratic regimes are failing to
meet the growing expectations of their people. Corrupt leadership,
persistent economic inequalities, swelling youth populations, expanding
urbanization, and ready access to technology can fuel popular
discontent and violent civil unrest. When populations cannot rely on
the ballot box for accountable governance, they are more likely to
resort to violence. Where governance is weak and steeped in corruption,
the government and security forces can be as feared and distrusted by
the population as criminal and terrorist organizations.
Corruption is a universal challenge that encourages the complicity
of public servants in criminal and terrorist activities and destroys
public trust in decision-making systems. To help our African partners
address corruption, we must carefully tailor the conditions for
military assistance. Where corruption permeates military institutions,
its consequences can be deadly. When resources are diverted from
military pay and sustainment, forces are less capable and more
vulnerable on the battlefield. They are less effective at protecting
civilians and may resort to predatory behavior. Corruption is corrosive
to the foundation of trust and mutual responsibility on which enduring
partnerships must be built.
Terrorist, insurgent, and criminal groups exploit corruption,
regional instability, and popular grievances to mobilize people and
resources, expand their networks, and establish safe havens. The nexus
between crime and terror is growing on the continent as terrorists and
criminals increasingly utilize the same illicit pathways to move
people, money, weapons, and other resources. The network of al-Qaeda
and its affiliates and adherents continues to exploit Africa's under-
governed regions and porous borders to train and conduct attacks. The
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant is expanding its presence in North
Africa. Terrorists with allegiances to multiple groups are expanding
their collaboration in recruitment, financing, training, and
operations, both within Africa and transregionally. Violent extremist
organizations are utilizing increasingly sophisticated improvised
explosive devices, and casualties from these weapons in Africa
increased by approximately 40 percent in 2014. These groups have also
successfully adapted to the internet and social media, and leverage
these tools to generate funds, recruit followers, and spread their
ideology to the United States and around the world.
In East Africa, al-Shabaab remains the primary security threat to
U.S. interests, despite progress by regional partners in liberating
parts of southern and central Somalia from the group's control. The
effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia continues to
increase. The security situation in Mogadishu is improving gradually
and several countries, including the United Kingdom, resumed or
expanded embassy operations in Somalia last year. Weakened by the
African Union Mission in Somalia's recent offensive, al-Shabaab has
modified its operational structure and tactics to increase the reach of
its attacks into troop-contributing countries. This underscores the
importance of both continuing to improve the effectiveness of the
African Union Mission in Somalia, as well as taking a regional approach
that counters al-Shabaab's expanding operational reach.
In North and West Africa, Libyan and Nigerian insecurity
increasingly threaten United States interests. In spite of
multinational security efforts, terrorist and criminal networks are
gaining strength and interoperability. Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the
Islamic Maghreb, Ansar al-Sharia, al-Murabitun, Boko Haram, the Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant, and other violent extremist organizations
are exploiting weak governance, corrupt leadership, and porous borders
across the Sahel and Maghreb to train and move fighters and distribute
resources.
Libya-based threats to United States interests are growing. If left
unchecked, I believe they have the highest potential among security
challenges on the continent to increase risks to United States and
European strategic interests in the next two years and beyond. Libyan
governance, security, and economic stability deteriorated significantly
in the past year. Competition between the House of Representatives and
General National Congress, each backed by various militias, has fueled
conflict over resources and power. Some North African and Gulf states
have complicated the situation by supporting military operations within
Libya. Today, armed groups control large areas of territory in Libya
and operate with impunity. Libya appears to be emerging as a safe haven
where terrorists, including al-Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant-affiliated groups, can train and rebuild with impunity. The
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant is increasingly active in Libya,
including in Derna, Benghazi, Tripoli, and Sebha.
Libyan leaders have yet to demobilize militias, create a sense of
national identity, build judicial capacity, and develop state security
institutions and forces representative of the population. Instead, they
have opted to contract militia groups for security. Despite political
commitments and coordination between the United Nations, North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, European Union, United States, United Kingdom,
Italy, Turkey, Morocco, and other partners to support security sector
development, the Libyan government's weak capacity has prevented the
execution of many initiatives.
The spillover effects of instability in Libya and northern Mali
increase risks to United States interests in Europe, the Middle East,
and Africa, including the success of Tunisia's democratic transition.
Tunisia held its first democratic elections last year and is the only
Arab Spring country that remains on a positive trajectory. Libya's
insecurity has created a regional humanitarian crisis and has enabled
increased foreign fighter, migrant, and drug flows that threaten the
stability of North Africa, Europe's southern flank, and the greater
Mediterranean basin. Weapons and fighters exported from Libya have
increased the capacity of criminal and terrorist organizations in North
and West Africa. Several thousand foreign fighters have traveled from
North Africa to Syria and Iraq, often via southeast Europe, and some
are beginning to return with increased training and experience.
The security situation in Nigeria also declined in the past year.
Boko Haram threatens the functioning of a government that is challenged
to maintain its people's trust and to provide security and other basic
services. In recent months, Nigeria has faced a confluence of stresses:
an escalation in terrorist attacks, economic stresses exacerbated by
falling oil revenues, and political -tension associated with highly
contested national elections. Boko Haram has launched attacks across
Nigeria's borders into Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Lake Chad Basin
states are now expanding their cooperation in efforts to counter Boko
Haram, including by beginning to develop a Multinational Joint Task
Force.
In Liberia, the government and military have demonstrated their
ability to lead through crisis. The military was called to assist in
responding to the Ebola epidemic and responded with pride and
professionalism, reflecting leadership at all levels and the positive
effects of U.S. engagement. The Liberian military was demobilized and
rebuilt from the ground up following 14 years of civil war, and the
United States has supported this effort with sustained investment in
developing the capacities of Liberian defense institutions and forces.
In addition to assisting in containing the Ebola epidemic, the Liberian
army's efforts strengthened the trust between the government, military,
and people of Liberia; bolstered the army's institutional and
operational capacities; and deepened the enduring partnership between
Liberia and the United States.
In the Gulf of Guinea, the international community is increasing
its cooperation to address maritime security challenges, including
piracy and armed robbery at sea; trafficking in drugs, arms, and
persons; and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. African,
European, and South American navies, as well as representatives from
the private sector, are increasing their participation in combined
maritime exercises in the Gulf of Guinea. Despite modest progress in
strengthening regional maritime security capacities and cooperation,
maritime crime continues to hinder trade, development, and food
security.
Central Africa remains fragile and vulnerable to humanitarian
disasters. The Lord's Resistance Army, an armed group that emerged in
northern Uganda in the late 1980s, has a small presence in border areas
of the Central African Republic, Sudan, South Sudan, and Democratic
Republic of the Congo. Over the course of its history, the group
committed atrocities against tens of thousands of civilians and
displaced hundreds of thousands of civilians. Military operations and
the efforts of civilian agencies and non-governmental organizations
have resulted in the capture or surrender of senior Lord's Resistance
Army leaders, facilitated defections, and increased civilian early
warning networks. Four of the top five Lord's Resistance Army leaders
have been apprehended or removed from the battlefield. Today, the
Lord's Resistance Army no longer threatens regional stability and its
ability to harm civilian populations has been reduced significantly.
The group continues to prey upon scattered and isolated local
communities for survival and is resorting to wildlife poaching as a
primary source of revenue.
United Nations, European Union, and French forces contributed to
modest improvements in security in the Central African Republic, where
conditions stabilized sufficiently to warrant resuming operations of
the United States Embassy in Bangui. However, both the Central African
Republic and Democratic Republic of the Congo are at risk of further
destabilization by insurgent groups, and simmering ethnic tensions in
the Great Lakes region have the potential to boil over violently in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Small elements of the Armed Forces of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo are making gradual progress in
professional development and institutional reform, and played
constructive roles in addressing insecurity in the Central African
Republic and countering the Lord's Resistance Army last year.
Southern Africa remains relatively stable. The region fields some
of the most professional and capable military forces on the continent
and is a net exporter of security. In the past year, South Africa,
Angola, and Tanzania contributed to regional and continental security,
including through participation in United Nations peacekeeping
operations in the Central African Republic and Democratic Republic of
the Congo. Despite its relative stability, the region faces economic
and social challenges that include poverty, crime, and social
inequality. Future leadership challenges in countries such as Zimbabwe
will increase the risk of regional instability.
approach
Africa Command works closely with allies and partners to share
information, reinforce shared priorities for democratic governance and
security, address immediate threats, and respond to crisis. We are
strengthening our relationships with other elements of the U.S.
government to improve our ability to align strategies, leverage and
support multinational and interagency partners, and ensure we
effectively support comprehensive U.S. government efforts led by U.S.
Ambassadors. We work closely with other combatant commands, especially
U.S. European Command, Central Command, Special Operations Command, and
Transportation Command, and Strategic Command's sub-unified Cyber
Command, to plan collaboratively and share capabilities when
appropriate. The trust and teamwork we build with partners are vital to
the success of our collective efforts.
Africa Command's primary tools for implementing our strategy are
posture, presence, programs, exercises, engagements, and operations.
Our strategic posture is the platform for our presence, programs,
exercises, engagements, and operations on the continent. Our posture is
designed to maximize operational flexibility and agility, and is
primarily comprised of expeditionary cooperative security locations and
contingency locations.
The single enduring element of our posture and presence in Africa
is a forward operating site at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, which
provides a critical platform for the activities of multiple combatant
commands. Camp Lemonnier and expeditionary facilities hosted by African
nations support the activities of the United States, allied, and
partner forces. This strategic posture was enhanced by the signing of
an Implementing Arrangement in May 2014 that secures our presence in
Djibouti through 2044. Posture and presence in Europe also provide
vital support to our mission, and include a joint intelligence analysis
support center in the United Kingdom and crisis response forces
stationed in Spain, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom to enable
rapid deployment to the African continent.
Our presence in Africa and Europe includes Defense Attache Offices
and Offices of Security Cooperation in U.S. Embassies in Africa.
Offices of Security Cooperation in the Africa Command area of
responsibility increased from nine in Fiscal Year 2007 to 33 in 2014.
We will add a 34th office, in Malawi, this year. Our presence also
includes a combined joint task force at Camp Lemonnier and five
component commands in Europe, some of which are shared with U.S.
European Command. We also have small advisory teams embedded in allied
and partner strategic, operational, and tactical headquarters. These
teams support our programs, exercises, engagements, and operations, and
their activities help build mutual trust and confidence and enhance
interoperability.
Our programs and combined exercises assist in the development of
partner defense capacities as part of a broader United States
Government effort, and also support the development of the African
continental and regional security architecture. We build partner
defense capacities in executive functions, including national military
staff functions associated with strategic planning, readiness, and
budgeting; generating force functions, such as recruiting, training,
equipping, and maintaining infrastructure; and operating force
functions necessary to conduct collective training and perform assigned
missions. When appropriate, we design combined training and exercises
to help maintain, and even enhance, the readiness of U.S. and partner
forces.
Our engagements play critical roles in strengthening our military-
to-military relationships, advancing our mutual interests, and
promoting shared values.
We closely coordinate our operations with allies, partners, and
other combatant commands. Most are planned with and executed by the
military forces of our African partners, with the United States in a
supporting role. Our operations play a role in building partner
capacity, especially when we enable partner operations with our advice
and assistance.
long-term objectives
Our long-term objectives are to support the development of
partnerships that can help expand the positive influence of nations
with the greatest potential to advance good governance, security, and
economic growth on the continent. Population size and prospective
economic, political, and military power can all contribute to this
potential influence. In addition to partnering with potential
continental influencers, we work closely with regional influencers--
countries that contribute to regional stability, and with whom our
pursuit of mutual objectives can reinforce U.S. interests.
Our tools for strengthening partnerships include programs for
building defense capacities in executive functions, generating forces,
and operating forces. The Department of State's programs, such as
International Military Education and Training, Peacekeeping Operations,
Foreign Military Financing, and Foreign Military Sales, are
particularly important in this regard.
The National Guard Bureau's State Partnership Program provides a
unique and vital mechanism for sustaining the long-term engagement
critical to building relationships and capacity. I appreciate the
Congress's support to new initiatives, such as the Security Governance
Initiative, Counter-terrorism Partnership Fund, and Africa Peacekeeping
Rapid Response Partnership, which will facilitate more comprehensive
U.S. Government security engagement in Africa.
Parallel efforts by civilian agencies to support progress in
democracy, governance, and security sector reform are essential to
achieving U.S. peace and security objectives, and I appreciate the
Congress's support to the Department of State and USAID in these
critical areas. Too often, efforts to strengthen progress in democracy,
governance, justice, and security in the non-military sphere fail to
keep pace with those in the defense sector. Without good governance and
the economic development it enables, security gains are rarely
sustainable. We continue to support interagency efforts to achieve the
more comprehensive approach to security sector assistance envisioned by
Presidential Policy Directive 23.
immediate priorities
As we strengthen partnerships with continental and regional
influencers, we simultaneously pursue five priorities:

1. Countering Violent Extremism and Enhancing Stability in East Africa
Several years of modest United States security assistance in East
Africa, including military training and mentoring, have helped our
partners gradually strengthen their capacity to conduct peacekeeping
operations and counter violent extremist organizations in Somalia. In
the past year, with advice and assistance from United States forces,
African Union forces improved their operational planning, demonstrated
increased proficiency on the battlefield, and gained significant
territory from al-Shabaab. During Operation INDIAN OCEAN, African Union
forces liberated key terrain from al-Shabaab's control and disrupted
the group's training, operations, and revenue generation. The African
Union Mission in Somalia, United Nations, and East African partners
improved their coordination in planning for offensive and stability
operations. United States forces also conducted successful unilateral
operations against high-value terrorists in Somalia this year,
including lethal strikes against al-Shabaab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane
and his intelligence chief.
Although al-Shabaab is weaker today than it was a year ago, it
remains a persistent threat to regional and western interests,
continues to conduct attacks, and is likely to regenerate its
operational capacity if given the opportunity. Over the past year, al-
Shabaab has either planned or executed increasingly complex and lethal
attacks in Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti, and Ethiopia aimed at
impeding Somalia's political development and discouraging African Union
Mission in Somalia troop contributing countries from sustaining
security commitments in Somalia. Additional military pressure on al-
Shabaab, strengthened governance, and expanded economic opportunity in
Somalia will contribute significantly to neutralizing this threat. Off
the coast of Somalia, multinational military efforts continue to
sustain maritime security improvements achieved over the past few
years, and no ships were successfully hijacked by pirates last year.
In the coming year, we will continue to support partner operations
against al-Shabaab, facilitate coordination in planning for offensive
and stability operations in Somalia, and support maritime security
efforts in the region. We will also continue to encourage multinational
coordination in efforts to develop the institutional, operational and
tactical capacities the Somali National Army will require to assume
security responsibilities in the future. The Somali government and
people will need to accelerate progress in state formation, preparing
for an on-time constitutional referendum and elections, strengthening
institutions, developing a sense of national identity, and building
security forces that are representative of the population. The Federal
Government of Somalia's ability to hold terrain, govern effectively and
democratically, and deliver services to the Somali people will
determine its ability to sustain security gains and stabilize the
country. We look forward to the establishment, when conditions permit,
of a permanent United States diplomatic presence in Mogadishu to
facilitate more robust political, economic, and security engagement.

2. Countering Violent Extremism and Enhancing Stability in North and
West Africa
In North and West Africa, allies and partners are increasing their
capacity and collaboration in addressing security threats across the
Maghreb, Sahel, and Lake Chad Basin regions. As conditions in Libya
declined significantly, Algeria expanded its assistance to neighboring
countries, and both Algeria and Tunisia strengthened counter-terrorism
and border security efforts. U.S. assistance facilitated the
strengthening of regional partnerships and capacity, and we expanded
dialogue and collaborative planning.
In the past year, we built partner capacity and enabled allies and
partners to disrupt terrorist and criminal threat networks in the
Maghreb and Sahel. We supported the State Department in preparing
partners for deployment to multilateral peacekeeping operations in
Mali, where 11 African countries are contributing troops to the United
Nations mission. United States forces captured Ahmed Abu Khattala, who
is a suspected ringleader in the 2012 attack against United States
facilities in Benghazi that resulted in the deaths of four Americans,
and Abu Anas al-Libi, who was suspected of planning the 1998 bombings
of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
In the year ahead, we will continue to look for opportunities to
constructively influence the situation in Libya. We will work with
partners to improve our overall effectiveness in containing the
spillover effects of Libyan insecurity; preventing the movement of
terrorist fighters, facilitators, and weapons into Libya; and
simultaneously disrupting the violent extremist networks within. We are
working within existing authorities to address the threat posed by
violent extremist groups, including the growing Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant presence in Libya. As required, we will also seek new
authorities to ensure that this threat does not grow. Working with U.S.
European Command, we will seek to align our efforts to disrupt foreign
fighter flows and illicit trafficking between North Africa and Southern
Europe with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Southern Flank
strategy. As conditions improve in Libya, we will be ready to support
the development of Libyan defense institutions and forces.
In the past year, allies and partners also increased their
cooperation in efforts to address Boko Haram and other regional
security challenges emanating from Nigeria. We provided training to and
expanded information-sharing with the Nigerian military and other
regional partners, such as Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.
In the coming year, we will continue to work with the Nigerian
military and will work with allies and partners to support the
development of the Lake Chad Basin Multinational Joint Task Force.

3. Protecting U.S. Personnel and Facilities
U.S. Africa Command is responsible for supporting the protection of
United States personnel and facilities in Africa. Fifteen high-risk,
high-threat diplomatic posts are located in the Africa Command area of
responsibility. Our response forces consist of U.S. Army and Air Force
elements staged in Djibouti and a Marine Corps Special Purpose Marine
Air Ground Task Force and two Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Teams based
in Spain. We also have Special Operations Crisis Response Force
elements located in Germany and the United Kingdom. With limited forces
and infrastructure, we are working to maximize our adaptability and
flexibility to respond effectively to crisis.
In the past year, we improved our ability to temporarily stage
response forces closer to hotspots when there are indications and
warnings of crisis. We leveraged force-sharing agreements with other
Combatant Commands to move personnel and equipment quickly between
theaters during crisis response operations. We also made progress in
securing resources and agreements to relocate intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance assets so they can be utilized more
effectively to build our situational understanding and support
operations.
Last year, U.S. Africa Command and our components reinforced the
security of U.S. Embassies in South Sudan and Libya and supported the
departure of United States, Korean, French, and other allied personnel
from Libya. We provided security to enable the resumption of U.S.
Embassy operations in the Central African Republic, complementing our
enabling support to French forces and to African partners participating
in the United Nations Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central
African Republic. In the coming year, we will continue to develop
additional expeditionary infrastructure in host nations and work with
the Department of State toward a common understanding of decision
points for reinforcing embassies, prepositioning response forces, and
executing military-assisted departures.

4. Enhancing Stability in the Gulf of Guinea
Regional partners are gradually building their capacity to address
maritime security challenges. U.S. programs and combined operations
like the Africa Partnership Station and African Maritime Law
Enforcement Partnership are supporting this progress. For example, in
January 2015, the Ghanaian Navy interdicted a hijacked tanker and
arrested eight pirates, demonstrating capacities we have helped to
strengthen through our maritime security initiatives. Naval forces from
Africa, Europe, and South America expanded their participation in our
regional maritime exercises, and we also increased our collaboration
with civilian agencies and the private sector. In the coming year, we
will continue to support regional maritime security activities and look
for opportunities to complement civilian initiatives that address the
root causes of maritime crime by strengthening good governance and
promoting economic development.

5. Countering the Lord's Resistance Army
Uganda, the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, and South Sudan are participating in the African Union Regional
Task Force against the Lord's Resistance Army and leading military
efforts to reduce the group's safe havens, capture key leaders, and
promote defections. The African Union Regional Task Force, with advice
and assistance from U.S. forces deployed to Operation OBSERVANT
COMPASS, made significant progress last year in weakening the Lord's
Resistance Army and reducing its ability to threaten civilian
populations. Today, fewer than 200 fighters remain, the group no longer
threatens regional stability, and local communities have greater
capacity to receive defectors and communicate warnings about attacks
from armed groups. In the coming year, we will continue to work with
our regional partners to tailor our support to reflect their efforts.
addressing future requirements and mitigating risk
Africa Command's capability gaps are likely to grow in the year
ahead, primarily as a result of growth in transregional threat networks
and the mission to protect U.S. personnel and facilities. Our greatest
capability shortfalls will likely remain intelligence support and
personnel recovery. To address future requirements and mitigate risks
to our national interests, Africa Command is pursuing the following
actions to increase collaboration with partners, enhance operational
flexibility, and close key capability gaps:

Increase collaboration and interoperability with
multinational and interagency partners to better leverage and support
allies and partners, including by working with policy-makers and the
intelligence community to expand information-sharing. Expanding our
sharing with multinational entities, in addition to bilateral sharing,
will enhance the trust, confidence, and interoperability of partners.
Refine our posture and presence in Africa and Europe to
reduce risk in operations to protect United States personnel and
facilities.
In coordination with interagency partners, improve our
use of informational tools to counter the spread of violent extremist
ideology, including by re-establishing regional information websites
and expanding into social media to provide platforms for regional
voices to counter violent extremist ideology and influence.
Leverage combined training and exercises to strengthen
interoperability and help maintain the readiness of U.S., allied, and
partner forces.
Employ new operational concepts and flexible, tailorable
capabilities, such as the Army's Regionally Aligned Force and the
Marine Corps' Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force.
Increase operational flexibility by expanding force-
sharing with other Combatant Commands and agreements with host nations
to facilitate access and overflight.
Work with the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of
Defense to pursue increased assignment or allocation of forces,
register the demand for critical capabilities, and mitigate gaps in key
enablers, such as intelligence, personnel recovery, medical support,
and tactical mobility.
Work with the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of
Defense to pursue authorities that will increase our ability to
implement programs and other activities regionally, which will allow us
to respond with greater agility and flexibility to emerging threats and
opportunities to advance our interests.

As we look to the future, I anticipate Africa's importance to our
national interests of security, prosperity, international order, and
the promotion of universal values will continue to grow. We are
contributing to progress in regional security through modest and
sustained investments in building partner capacity. In some places, the
enemy is growing capacity more quickly than our partners. Where our
national interests compel us to tip the scales and enhance collective
security gains, we may have to do more - either by enabling our allies
and partners, or acting unilaterally. Decreasing resources will make
this difficult. In addition, the United States and our allies and
partners will be increasingly challenged to implement the comprehensive
approaches necessary to advance governance, security, and development
on the continent. As our Nation's leaders make increasingly difficult
decisions about strategic risks and tradeoffs, Africa Command will
continue to sharpen our prioritization, align resources to strategy,
increase our flexibility, and inform risk management decisions.
Thank you for your continued support to our mission and to the
Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, civilians, and
contractors advancing our Nation's defense interests in Africa.

Chairman McCain. General Austin, welcome.

STATEMENT OF GEN. LLOYD J. AUSTIN, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL
COMMAND

General Austin. Thank you, sir. Good morning. Chairman
McCain, Senator Reed, distinguished members of the committee, I
want to thank you for the opportunity to appear here today to
talk about the broad efforts and the current posture of United
States Central Command.
Up front, and most importantly, I'd like to thank all of
you for your continued and strong support of our men and women
in uniform and their families. I look forward to talking about
them and the exceptional contributions that they continue to
make on behalf of our Command and our Nation.
I'm pleased to appear here this morning alongside my
teammates, General Dave Rodriguez and General Joe Votel. And
I'll join them in making a free--a few brief opening comments,
and then we're prepared to answer your questions.
Ladies and gentlemen, much has happened in the CENTCOM area
of responsibility since I last appeared before this committee,
a year ago. Indeed, the central region is today more volatile
and chaotic than I have seen it at any other point. And the
stakes have never been higher. The forces of evil that threaten
our homeland and our interests in that strategically important
part of the world thrive in unstable environments marked by
poor governance, economic uncertainty, and ungoverned or
undergoverned spaces. And therefore, it's essential that we be
present and engaged, and that we cultivate strong partnerships
and continue to do our part to address emerging threats and to
move the region in a direction of greater stability and
security. And we must be properly resourced to do what is
required to effectively protect and promote our interests.
At CENTCOM, in addition to doing all that we can to prevent
problems from occurring while shaping future outcomes, we spend
a great deal of our time and energy managing real-world crisis.
Over the past year, we've dealt with conflicts in Iraq and
Syria. We transitioned from combat operations to a train,
advise, and assist and CT mission focus in Afghanistan. At the
same time, we dealt with a number of difficult challenges in
Yemen, Egypt, and Lebanon, and in a host of other locations
throughout our area of responsibility. We actively pursued
violent extremist groups, and we took measures to counter the
radical ideologies that are espoused by these groups. We also
dealt with Iran, which continues to act as a destabilizing
force in the region, primarily through its Quds forces and
through support to proxy actors such as Lebanese Hezbollah.
And, while we are hopeful that an acceptable agreement will
be reached with Iran with respect to its nuclear program,
either way, whether we reach an agreement or we don't reach an
agreement, Iran will continue to present a challenge for us,
going forward.
We are faced with a number of difficult issues in our
region. However, I firmly believe that challenges present
opportunities, and we make progress primarily by pursuing those
opportunities. And we do pursue them. And I am confident that
our broad efforts are having a measurable impact.
Of course, the most immediate threat facing us now is the
threat posed by ISIL, or Daesh. This barbaric organization must
be defeated, and it will be defeated. We are currently in a
process of executing our regional military campaign plan, and
I'm pleased to report that we are making significant progress.
At the outset, we said that we'd have to halt ISIL's
advance. And we've done that in Iraq. We said that we're going
to have to regenerate and restructure Iraq's Security Forces
and help them to reestablish their border. And we're in the
process of doing that right now. We said that we'd have to help
our partners in the region to bolster their defenses against
ISIL. And we continue to help our friends in Jordan and Lebanon
and Turkey. And we said that we'd have to build credible ground
forces to counter ISIL in Syria and to guard against ungoverned
spaces. And we'll soon begin doing so as a part of our Syria
train-and-equip program.
Ladies and gentlemen, we are making progress. In fact,
we're about where we said we would be in the execution of our
military campaign plan, which supports the broader whole-of-
government strategy designed to counter ISIL. And we're having
significant effects on the enemy. We continue to attrite its
forces in Iraq and Syria. We've attacked its command-and-
control capabilities. We've destroyed its training sites and
storage facilities, along with hundreds of its vehicles, tanks,
and heavy weapon systems. And, in doing so, we have
significantly degraded his capability, its ability to command
and control its forces, and also his primary sources of
revenue--namely, his refineries and crude collection points.
The fact is that ISIL can no longer do what he did at the
outset, which is to seize and hold new territory. He has
assumed a defensive crouch in Iraq. Although he has greater
freedom of movement in Syria, he's largely in a defensive
there, as well. He's having a tough time governing. And this is
crucial to his claims of a caliphate. Indeed, he has begun to
expand into other areas--namely, North Africa--in part, because
he knows that he's losing in Iraq and Syria, and he needs to
find other ways to maintain his legitimacy. Going forward, we
should expect this--to see this enemy continue to conduct
limited attacks and to orchestrate horrific scenes in order to
create IO opportunities and to distract and intimidate. But,
make no mistake, ISIL is losing this fight. And I am certain
that he will be defeated.
However, there is still work to be done to get to that
point. And we intend to continue to execute the campaign, as
designed. And I say that because how we go about this is very
important. If we don't first get things under control in Iraq,
where there is a government that we can work with and some
amount of reliable security forces, if we don't get things
there right first, before expanding our efforts in Syria, then
we risk making matters worse in both countries. But, done the
right way, in light of the limitations that exist, I believe
that we can, and we will, be successful in our efforts to
defeat ISIL. At the same time, we can be assured continued
progress in pursuit of our principal goal, which is to move the
strategically important region in a direction of increased
stability and security.
Going forward, we will all be required to make tough
choices. We'll need to find ways to do more, or at least as
much, with less in the current fiscal environment. That said, I
remain concerned by the fact that capability reductions can and
will impact our ability to respond to crisis, and especially in
the highly volatile central region. The resulting loss in
flexibility makes the U.S. and our interests increasingly
vulnerable to external pressures.
And so, I would ask Congress to do its part to make sure
that we avoid sequestration and other resourcing limitations
that serve to degrade the readiness of America's military
forces.
Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, members of the committee, I
want to thank you once more for your strong support that you
continue to show towards servicemembers, our civilians, and
their families. They are the very best in the world at what
they do, and they continue to demonstrate absolute
selflessness. And they make enormous sacrifices on behalf of
the mission in support of one another.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Austin follows:]

Prepared Statement by General Lloyd J. Austin III, USA
Introduction: We are in the midst of one of the most tumultuous
periods in history. There is growing unrest throughout much of the
world, while a vast array of malevolent actors seek to capitalize on
the increasing instability to promote their own interests. This trend
is especially pronounced in the Central Region, where state and non-
state actors are in conflict, and the resulting turmoil impacts the
affected countries and also directly affects the global economy and the
security of the United States. In light of this, the U.S. must continue
to exert strong leadership and act vigorously to protect our core
national interests in this strategically important region. An effective
`whole of government' approach is essential. At U.S. Central Command
(USCENTCOM), our aim is to see a positive transformation of the region
over time, achieved by, with, and through our regional partners.
Despite the challenges that exist in our area of responsibility (AOR),
we do see progress being made in some areas, along with many
opportunities. We are confident that our actions in pursuit of these
opportunities will continue to produce positive results in the coming
days.
Looking ahead, our partners will need to assume a larger share of
the burden for providing improved stability in the region. Given the
stakes involved, we must keep on assisting them in their efforts. At
the same time, we have to find additional methods for dealing with the
convergence of compound threats under increasing budget and resource
constraints. We must be judicious in our decision-making. Particularly
during this volatile period, we cannot afford restrictions or
reductions that would degrade our military posture and put our core
national interests at greater risk. Simply stated, if we hope to
achieve improved security which provides for greater stability and
prosperity around the globe, then the Central Region must remain a
foremost priority.
A Retrospective Look: This past year has been especially busy for
USCENTCOM. In Afghanistan, we completed our transition from combat
operations to our train, advise, and assist (TAA) and counter-terrorism
(CT) missions. The Afghans are now in the lead for all security
operations. They continue to demonstrate significant capability and a
strong desire to build upon the progress achieved over the past 13+
years. In recent months, we also saw significant advancements made on
the political front as a new unity government was established.
President Ashraf Ghani and CEO Abdullah Abdullah have indicated a
strong desire to work closely with USG leadership in pursuit of shared
objectives. While much work remains to be done in Afghanistan, I am
optimistic that developments will continue to trend in the right
direction. At the same time, we are focused on the situation in Iraq
and Syria. We responded quickly and effectively to the rapid expansion
of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in the early summer
of 2014. We continue to take the necessary measures to counter this
barbaric enemy which operates out of ungoverned and under-governed
spaces in both countries. We are currently executing our regional
campaign plan to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL, and we are doing
so with the support of a broad Coalition consisting of 62 other
countries and organizations. However, as was clearly stated at the
outset, this will take time and we must maintain strategic patience.
We also continue to closely monitor Iran's actions. Our diplomats
are working diligently to negotiate an acceptable agreement with
respect to Iran's nuclear program, and we hope that they will be
successful. But, regardless of the outcome of the P5+1 discussions, our
relationship with Iran will remain a challenging one, as we are very
concerned by their unhelpful behavior in a number of areas. We also are
paying especially close attention to the situation in Yemen.
Recent actions by the Huthis and also al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula coupled with the resignation of President Hadi and the
subsequent upheaval in the government are cause for significant and
growing concern. If the situation continues to erode, and it remains on
a negative trajectory now, Yemen could fracture and we could end up
losing a key partner in our counter-terrorism (CT) fight and cede
additional ungoverned space for our adversaries to operate out of.
Meanwhile, we are also watching with interest what occurs in Lebanon,
Egypt, Pakistan, and other parts of the region.
Without a doubt these are challenging times. There is a great deal
at stake for the U.S. and our partner nations. At USCENTCOM, we remain
confident that we have the right strategy in place to safeguard our
interests, to effectively address challenges and pursue opportunities,
and ultimately to accomplish our mission on behalf of the Nation. That
said, we depend upon the authorities and funding provided by Congress
to execute our strategy and to do what is required to defend our core
national interests at home and around the globe. Without question, our
ability to do so and our overall readiness are put at grave risk by the
continued reductions made to the defense budget, and specifically as a
result of the Budget Control Act. We are in the midst of a tumultuous
and unpredictable period. We are constantly responding to unforeseen
contingencies and facing multiple threats from a wide range of actors
that include nation states and transnational extremist groups. We
cannot afford to constrict our ability to do so effectively by
maintaining across-the-board spending cuts that severely limit our
flexibility and authority to apply critical defense resources based on
demand and the current security environment. If Sequestration goes back
into effect in FY 2016, we will be increasingly vulnerable to external
threats.
USCENTCOM's Mission. USCENTCOM's mission statement is: ``With
national and international partners, USCENTCOM promotes
cooperation among nations, responds to crises, and deters or
defeats state and non-state aggression, and supports
development and, when necessary, reconstruction in order to
establish the conditions for regional security, stability and
prosperity.''
Strategic Environment. The Central Region is an area rich in
history, culture, and tradition. It is one of the most strategically
important regions, holding well over half of the world's proven oil
reserves and plentiful natural gas deposits, which are crucial to the
global energy market. The U.S. and our partners have core national
interests in this part of the world; interests that include the free
flow of resources through key shipping lanes; the prevention of the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and, the defense of our
homeland against the very real and persistent threat of terrorism and
extremism. Unfortunately, it also is an area that is plagued by
violence and instability, political discord, economic stagnation,
resource shortages (e.g., water), ethnic and religious tensions, and
wide expanses of ungoverned or under-governed space. Alone or in
combination, these provocative factors often make for a volatile
environment that puts our interests and those of our partners at risk.
Indeed, when things go badly in the Central Region, it has a clear and
sizeable impact on the affected countries and other parts of the globe.
For this reason it is an area of the world that merits our continued
focus.
Of note, more so than in the past, individuals and groups today are
coalescing around ethnic and sectarian issues, rather than national
identity. This is fracturing institutions (e.g., governments,
militaries) along sectarian lines and creating factional rifts within
populations. This growing strain, coupled with other ``underlying
currents,'' fuels much of the tension and conflict that is present
today across the USCENTCOM AOR. The principal currents include the
growing ethno-sectarian divide; the struggle between moderates and
extremists, particularly Islamist-based extremists; rejection of
corruption and oppressive governments; and, the ``youth bulge,'' which
reflects the many young, educated, unemployed or under-employed and
disenfranchised individuals in the region who are ripe for recruitment
by extremist groups. To be effective, our approach in dealing with the
challenges that exist in the region must address these complex root
causes. In particular, the governments and people of the region must
bridge the growing ethno-sectarian divide, elevate the voice of
moderates, rid governments of corruption, guard against ungoverned and
under-governed spaces, and make sure that young people have better
opportunities and are able to contribute to society in meaningful ways.
Of course, change will not occur overnight. It will take time to
adjust peoples' mindsets and to counter deeply-engrained prejudices.
But, it must be done by the governments and people in the region. Only
they can bring about enduring, positive change, with our engagement and
support. Indeed, we do have a critical role to play in this important
endeavor and we must take action where necessary to counter exigent
threats. We are helping our partners to build additional capacity and
also foster stronger military-to-military relationships. The goal is to
enable them to assume a greater share of the responsibility and do what
is required to bring about improved stability in the region.
There are a number of challenges present in the Central Region that
require our engagement to mitigate the potential negative effects.
These include ongoing operations in Afghanistan, our activities in Iraq
and Syria in support of Operation Inherent Resolve, and our efforts in
a host of other locations in USCENTCOM's AOR. Ultimately, our goal in
all cases is to move things in the direction of greater stability and
to ensure assured access and freedom of movement, recognizing that a
secure, stable, and prosperous Central Region is in the best interest
of the United States and our partners and allies.
USCENTCOM Priorities. Looking ahead, USCENTCOM will remain ready,
engaged and vigilant--effectively integrated with other instruments of
power; strengthening relationships with partners; and supporting
bilateral and multilateral collective defense relationships to counter
adversaries, improve security, support enduring stability, and secure
our core interests in the Central Region. In support of this vision,
the command remains focused on a wide range of issues, activities, and
operations, including our priority efforts:

Degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL in order to prevent
the further spread of sectarian-fueled radical extremism, and to
mitigate the continuing Iraq-Syria crisis.
Continue support to Afghanistan, in partnership with
NATO, as a regionally integrated, secure, stable and developing
country.
Defeat Al Qaeda, deny violent extremists safe havens and
freedom of movement, and limit the reach of terrorists.
Counter malign Iranian influence, while reducing and
mitigating against the negative impacts of surrogates and proxies.
Support a whole of government approach to developments in
Yemen, preventing Yemen from becoming an ungoverned space for AQ/VEOs;
retain CT capacity in the region.
Maintain credible general and specific deterrent
capability and capacity to counter Iran.
Prevent, and if required, counter the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction; disrupt their development and prevent
their use.
Protect lines of communication, ensure free use of the
shared spaces (including the cyber commons), and secure unimpeded
global access for legal commerce.
Shape, support, and maintain ready, flexible regional
Coalitions and partners, as well as cross-CCMD and interagency U.S.
whole-of-government teams, to support crisis response; optimize
military resources.
Develop and execute security cooperation programs,
improving bilateral and multi-lateral partnerships, building partnered
``capacities,'' and improving information sharing, security, and
stability.
Critical Focus Areas. While we remain focused on the broad range of
challenges present today
in the Central Region, there are particular areas that merit a
sizeable portion of our attention and resources. These areas are
strategically important because of the potential impact on our core
national interests and those of our partners. Below are descriptions of
the current critical focus areas, along with a listing of some of the
key opportunities that we are actively pursuing in an effort to improve
stability in USCENTCOM's AOR.
Protection of Nation States. Historically, nation states have been
the dominant players globally. However, in recent years we have
witnessed the emergence of transnational extremist groups that desire
and, in some cases, demonstrate the ability to operate as major players
with unfavorable intentions. In many ways they are attempting to behave
like nation states and, in so doing, they threaten the structures,
rules, norms, and values that define the sovereignty of our nation-
state based international system.
These transnational violent extremist organizations (VEO) are
ideologically opposed to and target the nation states of the Central
Region. They conduct attacks and terrorize local populaces in an effort
to gain power and influence. This, in turn, weakens the nation states
and generates increased instability. This is of obvious concern to us,
given that nation states are typically anchors for stability across the
globe, with some exceptions (e.g., Iran, Syria). Thus, the U.S. has a
vested interest in buttressing our partner nations in the Central
Region when necessary as part of a larger `whole of government' effort
to build regional stability through effective security assistance and
support for inclusive governance.
As directed, we intervene to counter external threats, such as al-
Qaeda and ISIL. While our primary purpose for doing so is to protect
U.S. interests, we also take action to allow time and space for the
nation states in the region to build sufficient capacity to protect
their own sovereignty. And, we support them through our planned
regional engagements, our training and exercise programs, and foreign
military sales (FMS) and foreign military financing (FMF) programs; all
of which are designed to further enhance our partners nations' military
capacity.
One of the key opportunities that exist amidst the challenges posed
by transnational VEOs is to persuade our partners in the region of the
urgent need to build their military capacity so that they are better
able to defend their own sovereign territory against such threats. Our
regional partners are very concerned about the threat posed by ISIL and
other VEOs. More importantly, many in the region recognize that if they
do not do something to address the root causes of the growing
instability, they can all but guarantee continued political upheaval
and anarchy. Again, transformational change can only be achieved by the
governments and people of the region. They must decide that the
instability caused by the ``underlying currents'' merits greater action
on their part, and they must do more to address the root causes of many
of the problems that exist in their region. We can and will support
them; but, they must lead the effort.
Iraq-Syria (Operation Inherent Resolve). We remain highly focused
on the crisis in Iraq and in Syria. Since launching its major offensive
from eastern Syria into Iraq in early June, ISIL, which is commonly
referred to by our partners in the region as ``DA'ESH,'' has largely
erased the internationally recognized boundary between Iraq and Syria
and has sought to establish a proto state in the deserts of eastern
Syria and western Iraq. ISIL's goal is to spur regional instability in
order to establish an Islamic Caliphate. To achieve this end, ISIL has
employed three primary lines of effort: 1) instill fear and shape the
operational environment using unconventional warfare and traditional
terrorist tactics; 2) seize and hold territory; and 3) influence,
shape, and define the conflict using sophisticated information
operations. Importantly, although significantly degraded in recent
months, ISIL still possesses the resources and organizational structure
to pose a credible threat to the Government of Iraq (GoI). The erosion
of Iraqi and regional stability caused by ISIL places extreme political
and economic strain on Jordan, Lebanon, under-governed border areas,
and, by extension, the broader Gulf and Levant sub-regions.
That said, ISIL is not a monolith; rather it is a symptom of the
larger problems that continue to threaten the Central Region. In
particular, the growing divide between ethno-sectarian groups and
between religious moderates and radical Islamists, have created ideal
conditions for a group like ISIL to take root. Over a period of years
the previous government alienated important segments of its society,
notably the Sunni and Kurdish populations, which resulted in growing
disenfranchisement among these groups. ISIL capitalized on this
opportunity and launched a successful blitz into Iraq absent much
resistance and with support from local Sunnis who viewed ISIL as a
means for bringing about a change in their government. The Sunnis
simply refused to fight; and, in so doing, they facilitated ISIL's
offensive. The remaining Iraqi security forces were largely incapable
of mounting a credible defense against ISIL. After we departed Iraq in
2011, the leadership of the country made a series of poor decisions.
Among them was the decision to stop training the security forces, to
stop maintaining their equipment, and to assign leaders based on
sectarian loyalty rather than competence, merit, and experience. As a
result, the security forces' skills atrophied and the condition of
their vehicles and weapon systems deteriorated. This precipitated a
number of defeats early on in ISIL's push towards Baghdad.
This past September, President Obama announced to the American
people that the United States, with the support of a broad Coalition,
would take action to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL through a
comprehensive and sustained counter-terrorism strategy. We are
currently in the early stages of our counter-ISIL campaign, OIR
[Operation Inherent Resolve]. Our military campaign plan is comprised
of five key elements. They will be achieved in a logical progression;
although many of the efforts will occur simultaneously or near-
simultaneously. First, we must counter ISIL in Iraq and Syria. Our
intent is to employ a Coalition effort in Iraq to halt the advance of
ISIL and to enable the Iraqis to regain their territory and reestablish
control over their border. Once we've halted ISIL's advance in Iraq,
which we have done, we said that we would need to contain ISIL, and we
are doing so with the assistance of our Coalition partners, including
Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon. We are working with them to ensure they
have the capacity to secure their sovereign borders. We also said that
we would need to enable the moderate Syrian opposition forces through
our train and equip efforts. Our goal is to develop a reliable partner
that can assist in countering ISIL on the ground inside of Syria.
Eventually we want to eliminate ungoverned spaces out of which ISIL and
other terrorist groups have been operating by enabling the indigenous
security forces to defend their own sovereign territories. Once we do
all of these things, we will have defeated ISIL through a combination
of sustained pressure, a systematic dismantling of ISIL's capabilities,
and by effectively expanding our regional partners' CT capacities.
Our military campaign is having the desired effects. Iraqi security
forces, to include Iraqi Army and Counter-Terrorism Services (CTS)
forces, Kurdish Peshmerga, and tribal elements, with the support of
United States and Coalition air operations, have halted ISIL's advance
in Iraq. The enemy is now in a ``defensive crouch,'' and is unable to
conduct major operations and seize additional territory. We can expect
that ISIL will continue to conduct ineffective counter-attacks and
leverage their information operations to amplify the significance of
these attacks. However, they are unable to achieve decisive effects.
The effort in Iraq continues to represent our main focus. The actions
that we are taking now in Syria against ISIL are shaping the conditions
in Iraq.
Specifically, our precision air strikes are disrupting ISIL's
command and control, attriting its forces and leadership, slowing the
flow of reinforcements from Syria into Iraq, and interrupting the
resourcing of their operations. The more than 2,600 total air strikes
conducted in Iraq and Syria over the past several months have been
extremely effective.
Of course, the United States is not doing this alone. Our efforts
are intended to enable the broader, `whole of government' approach that
is currently underway among various departments and agencies in the
United States Government. Equally important are the contributions being
made by our Coalition partners. Indeed, the Coalition represents the
strength and cohesion of our campaign. In particular, the active and
public involvement of five Arab-led nations, specifically Saudi Arabia,
Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Qatar, has greatly
enhanced the fight and sends a clear message to ISIL and other VEOs
that their actions will not be tolerated.
Ultimately, the intent of our regional campaign is not simply to
destroy ISIL, although that is a primary objective. Even more
importantly, we want to do what we can to help change the conditions
inside of Iraq and Syria so that what we see happening there now, does
not happen again in the future. The key to doing so is enabling
indigenous forces to defend their own borders and provide for the
security of their sovereign territory. This is the goal of our advise
and assist and build partner capacity efforts currently underway in
Iraq, and soon in Syria. We are also working with the Government of
Iraq (GoI) to train Sunni tribal elements. Equally important, we are
providing, in coordination with the GoI, support for the Kurds who
continue to play a significant role in the fight against ISIL.
All that said, the effects of our military efforts will be short-
lived if the Iraqis do not effectively address their political
problems. The crisis in Iraq will not be solved through military means
alone. The Iraqis have a new government and Prime Minister Haider al-
Abadi has vowed to be more inclusive of the Sunnis and the Kurds and
other minority groups. We are encouraged by the early steps he has
taken to reach out to the Sunnis and Kurds and we are urging him to
follow through on pledges made in the near-term. This is not a minor
issue, as the government cannot succeed long-term without that support.
National reconciliation is absolutely critical to the success of the
counter-ISIL campaign.
A key opportunity that exists amidst the challenges posed by ISIL
is to create conditions that reduce ungoverned spaces and allow for
inclusion, security, and good governance in both Iraq and Syria. We
pursue this opportunity, in part, by training, advising, and assisting
the Iraqi Security Forces, helping them to re-build their capacity, and
restructuring them to ensure greater inclusiveness. With your support,
we have also have established a program to train, equip and sustain
elements of the Syrian moderate opposition. We anticipate that these
forces will make important contributions toward degrading and defeating
ISIL, and they also will help to guard against ungoverned spaces,
protect local populations, and help to create the conditions for a
negotiated political settlement to the conflict in Syria that leads to
more responsible and responsive governance.
Afghanistan (Operation Freedom's Sentinel). The engagement in
Afghanistan remains a top priority. We conducted a successful
transition from combat to stability operations, and we continue to help
the Afghans to build and mature a capable and sustainable Afghan
National Security Force (ANSF). Today, the ANSF consists of
approximately 326,000 Afghans. They, not us, are in the lead for all
security operations and they are managing to keep the levels of
violence comparatively low across the country.
It is also worth noting that the Afghan National Army (ANA)
consistently ranks as the country's most respected institution. This
popularity largely reflects the improved quality of life that many
Afghans are experiencing now as the country becomes increasingly safer
and more stable. In recent years, life expectancy rates for Afghans
have improved and the infant mortality rate has declined. Opportunities
for Afghan women also have expanded; women now represent one-quarter of
the labor force and 28 percent of the National Parliament. And,
education and literacy levels have increased. In 2001, 900,000 Afghans
were enrolled in primary and secondary schools.
Today, there are more than 8.0 million students enrolled in school;
and, 39 percent of them are females. Unemployment or underemployment
has also decreased from 50 percent to 35 percent. By almost all
metrics, progress in Afghanistan has been significant over the past 13+
years. Numerous polls conducted in 2014 indicate that the Government of
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) enjoys tremendous popular
support. Polling reports have shown that more than 80 percent of
Afghans believe their lives are improving. This is positive news;
however, there is still much work to be done and the Afghans will need
to continue to build upon the progress achieved thus far. They
recognize this and clearly demonstrate their intent to do the right
things going forward.
The Afghans have the capability to provide for the security of
their people and they demonstrate this on a daily basis. However, they
do still need some help with sustainment; and, that includes resupply
operations, particularly to remote or mountainous areas. They need help
with fixed-wing and rotary-wing aviation; and also with intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance support. Additionally, due to the
delay in government formation, some key leaders who will see the
Afghans through the upcoming fighting seasons have only recently
assumed their new positions. We will need to work closely with them to
enable their success and aid them in building additional needed
military capacity. We cannot afford for Afghanistan to once again
become a safe haven for extremist groups. Increased instability and
diminished security would not only affect Afghanistan, but also the
Central Asia region as a whole.
Of course, enduring stability in Afghanistan will not be achieved
through military means alone. There must be a credible, reliable, and
responsive government in place. Fortunately, after a challenging
election, Afghanistan has begun to move forward politically under the
National Unity Government led by President Ashraf Ghani and CEO
Abdullah Abdullah. Both leaders share similar priorities and beliefs,
and they have signaled a strong desire to see the government succeed.
They also are actively countering corruption, which represents a
principal inhibitor of GIRoA success. Theirs is not an easy
undertaking; however, I do believe that they can be effective together.
There is challenging work ahead for the government and people of
Afghanistan. However, as I look at the country, I remain cautiously
optimistic that developments will continue to trend in the right
direction. We have been in Afghanistan for more than 13 years,
representing the longest period of continuous conflict fought by our
Nation's all-volunteer force. Together with our Afghan and Coalition
partners, we have invested many lives and other precious resources with
the goal of improving stability in that country, and we want to do all
that we can to preserve those hard-earned gains.
Amidst the challenges posed by the current situation in Afghanistan
is the opportunity to foster a strong relationship between the United
States and Afghanistan and with other partner nations in the Central
and South Asia (CASA) sub-region. In particular, this would contribute
to improved Afghanistan-Pakistan relations, which would allow for
increased counter-terrorism cooperation in the region, along with
possibilities for reconciliation. President Ghani, CEO Abdullah, and
their new government have indicated their strong desire to work with us
and to continue to strengthen our partnership in the coming days.
Looking ahead, our intent is to maintain a close relationship with the
Afghan government and military as we work together to preserve improved
security and stability in the region. At the same time, while the size
of our footprint will decrease in the coming years, our continued
presence in Afghanistan will allow us to maintain much-needed pressure
on al-Qaeda and other extremist groups.
Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO). As
I travel around the region, I routinely hear from senior military
leaders that they do not necessarily fear groups like ISIL's military
prowess so much as they fear the groups' ideologies. These groups
clearly demonstrate their ability to inspire extremist behavior and to
recruit individuals in support of their causes.
In recent years, VEOs have increasingly exploited ungoverned or
under-governed spaces in USCENTCOM's AOR. The extremists' use of these
areas threatens regional security, as well as U.S. core national
interests. They are able to plan and launch attacks, undermine local
governments, and exercise malign influence from these spaces. At the
same time, VEOs and other militant proxies continue to exploit security
vacuums in countries experiencing political transitions and unrest,
namely Iraq and Syria, Yemen, Egypt, and Lebanon. Chronic instability,
disenfranchised populations, and weak regional governments provide new
footholds for a resilient and expanding global jihadist movement and an
ideal environment for Iran and its allies to aggressively undermine
United States regional goals.
Of note, ISIL's rise as a competitor to al-Qaeda (AQ) has
significantly impacted the jihadist landscape. The two groups are now
competing for recruits, resources, and publicity. This will likely
result in increased terrorist attacks in the near-term as ISIL, AQ, and
other elements attempt to out-do one another.
Meanwhile, the AQ movement is becoming more diffuse and
decentralized as compared to pre-9/11. The risk of affiliates and
allies operating in more areas and increasingly collaborating and
coordinating with one another as a transnational loosely-confederated
`syndicate' is cause for concern. The AQ ideology remains persuasive,
attracting and radicalizing susceptible individuals in the region.
Thus, it is critical that we maintain our vigilance in countering the
group and its narrative.
We must also continue to look for ways to effectively counter ISIL.
As noted earlier, ISIL seeks to broaden its reach beyond Iraq and
Syria, and will try to leverage regional instability to revive a
caliphate stretching from Europe to North Africa to South Asia. ISIL
has already received pledges of allegiance from smaller jihadist groups
in Yemen, Egypt, Libya and Algeria, and they have inspired lone-wolf
attacks in Algeria and the West.
Other extremist groups have leveraged Syria's security vacuum,
including the AQ-affiliated Al Nusrah Front (ANF). As the civil war in
Syria continues, ANF will threaten neighboring states, particularly
Israel and Lebanon, where the group has launched anti-Hezbollah
attacks. The ongoing Syrian conflict has also created a safe haven for
the Khorasan Group, a network of veteran AQ operatives, providing them
with territory to plot and train for attacks against the West and the
United States homeland.
The Iraq-Syria area of operations is the premier destination for
jihadist foreign fighters, with over 15,000 coming from around the
globe, and particularly Africa, Europe, Asia, and North America. The
majority of these fighters are joining ISIL's ranks, although some have
joined ANF and other Syrian opposition groups. As these conflicts carry
on, returning battle-hardened foreign fighters will pose increasing
risk to their home countries, including the United States. We must
sustain our active measures to address this growing threat.
An important opportunity that exists in the Central Region is to
limit the overall reach and effectiveness of VEOs, while also reducing
the amount of ungoverned or under-governed space in which these groups
typically operate. To do so, many of our partners acknowledge the need
to counter radical extremists' ideologies, in part by helping to
amplify the voice of moderates in the region. They also recognize the
need to limit access to ungoverned and under-governed spaces; thereby
diminishing the reach and effectiveness of violent extremists operating
in the region. By setting the right conditions and helping to promote
the efforts of moderate and influential regional leaders, we may
achieve significant and lasting improvements. And, these improvements
are likely to have pervasive positive effects on the global security
environment.
Iran. Iran represents the most significant threat to the Central
Region. Our diplomats have been hard at work, trying to reach an
agreement with Iran with respect to its nuclear program. The most
recent extension allows for continued negotiations through 1 July 2015.
While we remain hopeful that the two sides will eventually reach an
acceptable deal, it is presently unclear how things will play out. We
have to be prepared for what comes next. We will be prepared.
In the meantime, we remain very concerned about Iran's behavior in
other areas. Iran continues to pursue policies that threaten United
States strategic interests and goals throughout the Middle East. In
addition to its nuclear program, Iran has a significant cyber
capability, as well as the largest and most diverse ballistic missile
arsenal in the Middle East. With ranges up to 82,000 km, Iran is able
to strike targets throughout the region with increasing precision using
creatively adapted foreign technologies to improve its missile arsenal.
It also has increased its anti-access area-denial air defense
capabilities. Iran is improving its counter-maritime capabilities
(e.g., mines, small boats, cruise missiles, submarines), which serve to
threaten the flow of global commerce in the Strait of Hormuz. Perhaps
most concerning, Iran routinely engages in malign activity through the
Iranian Threat Network (ITN) consisting of the Islamic Revolutionary
Guards Corps-Qods Force, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, and
its surrogates, businesses, and logistics support. Iran also engages in
malign activity through support to proxy actors such as Lebanese
Hezbollah and Hamas which threatens the sovereignty and security of
Israel.
During the past year, the ITN primarily focused on Sunni groups in
the Iraq and Syria-based conflict (including the moderate opposition in
Syria) by bolstering the Syrian and Iraqi governments and overseeing
engagements involving its own militant forces. Iran also maintains the
ability to expand the scope of its activities. This is troubling as
Iranian malign influence is enflaming sectarian tensions that are all
too often exploited by violent extremist elements in the region.
Needless to say, our relationship with Iran remains a challenging one.
We will continue to pay close attention to their actions, and we will
remain steadfast with our regional partners and do what we can to help
improve their capacity to counter Iran and mitigate the effects of
their malign activity.
One of the key opportunities that exist with respect to Iran is the
prospect of an acceptable agreement regarding Iran's nuclear program.
If the P5+1 are able to reach a long-term resolution, that would
represent a step in the right direction and may present an
unprecedented opportunity for positive change in the Central Region.
A Regional Perspective. In many ways our military-to-military
relationships continue to represent the cornerstone of America's
partnerships with the nation states in the USCENTCOM AOR. Below are
synopses of the status of those relationships, along with the current
state of affairs in each of the 20 countries, minus Afghanistan, Iraq
and Syria, and Iran which were addressed in the previous section,
``Critical Focus Areas'' (see pages 8-21):
The Gulf States--The Gulf States have proven to be valuable
Coalition partners, engaging in and supporting offensive operations
against ISIL and providing the indispensable access, basing and
overflight privileges that are critical to the conduct of operations in
the region. In recent months, we have seen some improvement in
relations between and among the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United
Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Qatar after a period of increased tensions.
A convergence of interests, namely the need to counter the increasing
threat posed by ISIL and other violent extremists groups, has afforded
a unique opportunity to strengthen the Coalition and also contribute to
improving stability and security in the broader Middle East region. In
many ways, ISIL's expansion in Iraq has forced the Gulf States to take
more seriously the threat posed by ISIL and other violent extremist
groups. As a result, they have begun to take a more proactive approach
to countering extremist financing and foreign fighter facilitation.
They must maintain their focus and continue to make much-needed
progress in these areas. At the same time, we are strengthening our
partners' military capacity as part of a collective security
architecture designed to deter and, where necessary, counter Iranian
hegemonic ambitions. Going forward, we will play a key role in making
sure that our partners remain united on common interests and security
challenges.
In late January of this year, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) saw
a smooth transition of power, as King Salman bin Abdulaziz ascended to
the throne after the death of his brother, King Abdullah. King Salman
comes to power during a very challenging period. The threat from ISIL,
particularly along Saudi's northern border, and from al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Huthis in the south, has led KSA to
take a more proactive role in safeguarding the Kingdom's interests in
the region. In particular, KSA's prominent role in the campaign against
ISIL, to include its participation in air operations in Syria and in
support of the Syria Train & Equip program, has paved the way for other
Arab nations to join the Coalition efforts to counter ISIL. Recognizing
the need for enhanced maritime security in the Gulf, the Saudis assumed
command of the Gulf Maritime Security Task Force for the first time
this year. Their leadership is critically important in demonstrating
the cohesion of the Combined Maritime Forces generally and the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) nations in particular. Of note, the Saudis
have taken a lead role in reconciling the Gulf States. Looking ahead,
our continued support of advanced Saudi defense competencies and
further improvements in United States-Saudi military interoperability
are expected to yield positive impacts, which will in turn contribute
to greater stability in the region and beyond.
Kuwait remains a long-time partner and strong and reliable ally in
the region, providing critical support for United States and Coalition
troops, vehicles, and equipment deployed in support of Operation
Inherent Resolve. In addition to providing a permissive environment for
our deployed forces in the USCENTCOM AOR, Kuwait plays a significant
role in the retrograde of equipment from Afghanistan. They also
continue to provide critical basing and access for U.S. forces and
capabilities needed to address future contingencies. The Kuwaitis are
committed to advancing regional cooperative defense efforts as
evidenced by their role as a key interlocutor between Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain in response to recent tensions, as well as the
extensive preparation they have done to host the Eagle Resolve multi-
national training exercise in the spring of 2015. The Kuwaitis also
have made significant progress towards reconciling the sub-region's
long-standing issues with Iraq, leading Gulf Arab diplomatic outreach
efforts with the Government of Iraq. The Kuwaitis remain committed to
accommodating all segments of their population to preserve internal
stability, particularly Sunnis and Shia; and, this has made them
typically measured in their support for Gulf Arab regional initiatives.
Overall, Kuwait continues to provide critical support to the United
States and partner nations while managing these internal political
challenges.
Our military-to-military relationship with the United Arab Emirates
(UAE) continues along its historically positive trajectory. UAE's
growing concerns regarding the spread of extremist ideologies and the
threat that they pose to UAE's internal security and regional stability
prompted the Emirates to take an active role in the counter-ISIL
campaign. They continue to demonstrate their value as a strategic
partner by proactively addressing some of the region's toughest
problems. Their military capability is arguably the best among the GCC
states. UAE's is also the most expeditionary military, deploying forces
in support of operations in Afghanistan and Syria. In addition to their
participation in the ongoing air operations in Syria, UAE also has
offered to send forces and personnel to support the military advise and
assist mission and one of the four training sites in Iraq. Of note, the
Emirates have a much broader definition of extremism and they want to
expand the counter-ISIL military campaign to include a wide range of
groups they perceive as extremist, from Islamist political groups to
Salafi jihadist groups. Going forward, we will look to further
strengthen our security cooperation partnership with UAE through
continued engagement and through our FMS program.
Qatar remains one of our most stalwart partners in the Gulf,
hosting three of our forward headquarters (USCENTCOM, U.S. Air Forces
Central Command, Special Operations Command Central) and facilities and
providing us with unimpeded access to the region. The Qataris were
among the first to offer a site for the Syria Train & Equip program,
along with a place to host the now-established Combined Joint Inter-
Agency Task Force (CJIATF) headquarters. Qatar also continues to play
an active role in the counter-ISIL campaign. Unlike KSA, Bahrain, and
especially UAE, Qatar makes a distinction between Salafi jihadist and
political Islamist groups, which creates a challenge in terms of how we
approach countering extremist groups in the
region. That said, the Qataris' relationships with a wide range of
groups, including more moderate elements, could present potential
opportunities.
During the past 12 months, the Qatari Armed Forces have concluded
extensive FMS equipment purchases and submitted additional requests.
All told, 2014 saw the Qataris allocate billions of dollars to arm
their forces with cutting edge American weaponry. This show of renewed
and expanding cooperation with the U.S. defense industry clearly
reflects the Qataris' drive for greater military interoperability with
the United States. Future collaboration with Qatar may see the genesis
of a partner force that reflects the United States in organization,
arms, and training. We have a long history of cooperation with Bahrain,
to include hosting the headquarters of the United States Fifth Fleet
and Combined Maritime Forces in Manama. Amidst boycotting by opposition
members, the Bahraini government held elections in November and
December of 2014, which resulted in additional Shia representation.
However, there is still significant distrust between the Shia majority
and Sunni-led government. The government perceives a direct threat from
Shia opposition groups, which it believes are deliberately de-
stabilizing the country by attacking the security forces and
undermining the economy. The government believes these same Shia
opposition groups are influenced and supported by Iran, and that Iran
intends to eventually overthrow or supplant it with a Shia government.
Bahrain has been a strong member of the Coalition to counter-ISIL,
participating in the initial air strikes into Syria in September of
2014. However, the historically strong relationship between the United
States and Bahrain is showing significant strain as the United States
FMS-hold carries into its third full year. Despite this political
challenge, Bahrain continues to pursue the re-supply of munitions for
some of its aviation systems, and it remains firm in its support for
United States assets at Naval Support Activity Bahrain.
Oman continues to thrive as a moderate and peaceful interlocutor to
all equity holders in the Arabian Gulf. Exercising a publically-
declared non-interventionist foreign policy, the Sultanate maintains a
pragmatic relationship with both Iran and the United States. From our
perspective, cooperation between Oman and the United States remains
close with Oman providing regional access through the use of air and
sea ports and also freedom of navigation along the Strait of Hormuz. We
value the stability and predictability that Oman provides and will
strive to maintain our close relationship with the Sultanate. In the
meantime, the Omanis are understandably concerned about the
deteriorating situation in Yemen. Of note, the Omanis maintain
relationships with Iran and all of Yemen's competing factions,
including the Huthis. The Omanis are playing a constructive role in
helping to manage the volatile situation in Yemen. We will continue to
do what we can to support their efforts and to expand our collaboration
to improve Oman's border control, counter-terrorism, and maritime
security capacity.
Yemen's long-term outlook is uncertain based on multiple converging
drivers of instability. The Huthi takeover of the government and
President Hadi's subsequent resignation created a political power
vacuum and reenergized historical north/south tensions. Competing
factions, including the Huthis, former-President Saleh loyalists, the
Islamist Islah Party, and possibly other groups likely see this as an
opportunity to assert control over the long-term. Meanwhile, Hadi moved
south, rescinded his resignation, and indicated that he intends to
govern from Aden. For now, the Huthis have solidified their position as
the dominant force in the capital (Sanaa) and northern governorates,
controlling all governance and security mechanisms. UN-sponsored
negotiations over forming some type of transition government are
ongoing, but Yemen's multiple competing factions will make political
resolution very difficult to achieve. It is unclear if the southerners
will simply deny Sanaa's authority or unite and declare independence in
the near-term, although there are obvious signs of southern opposition
to Huthi rule. Southern leaders are likely waiting to see how the
situation develops, including the military's response and external
actors' willingness to provide them with support. Additionally,
Southern military commanders have indicated that they do not intend to
take orders from Sanaa.
Yemen's economy has been in a steady state of deterioration for
some time. Declining oil revenues and cuts to foreign assistance have
contributed to a fiscal crisis. Meanwhile, rampant unemployment further
exacerbates Yemen's problems, including making large segments of the
population susceptible to radicalization.
The lack of central government leadership coupled with Huthi
expansion [and the evacuation of all U.S. personnel in February 2015
have made it exceedingly difficult for us to [conduct partnered or
unilateral CT operations against AQAP. The Yemeni government has
generally curtailed its CT operations, and this has allowed AQAP to
regain some of its former territory and increase operations against
government and security forces. While some of AQAP's combat power may
be preoccupied with the Huthi incursion, their external operations
cells remain active, especially in the south. We must figure out how to
maintain our CT platform in Yemen in order to counter the threat from
AQAP. Also concerning is the influence that Iran has with the Huthis,
and the particular threat that poses to Saudi Arabia's southern border.
Additionally, Huthi control of Yemen's Hudaydah Port gives them, and
potentially Iran, direct influence over maritime traffic through the
Red Sea, which presents a significant vulnerability in terms of the
protection of core U.S. national and global economic interests.
The Levant--The greater Levant sub-region is struggling to deal
with a number of challenges, to include the increasing divide between
ethno-sectarian groups, the growing threat posed by ISIL, Al Nusrah
Front (ANF) and other violent extremist elements, a growing refugee
crisis, and the ongoing civil war in Syria which has now entered into
its fourth year. These various crises are straining nation states'
economies and worsening the overall security situation. There is also
the risk that they will expand further into neighboring areas. We
remain highly concerned and continue to do all that we can to assist
our partners in the Levant sub-region in their efforts to effectively
deal with these and other challenges.
The leadership and people of Lebanon continue to demonstrate
remarkable resilience in the face of continued social, military, and
political challenges. This resilience largely reflects the improved
performance of the multi-confessional Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF),
which is the most respected institution in the country. That said,
Lebanon is challenged by increasing incidents of sectarian violence and
terrorist attacks by ISIL and ANF. Thus, our continued support for the
LAF's CT operations is critical to ongoing efforts to insulate Lebanon
from the conflict in Syria and Iraq. This situation is further
exacerbated by a variety of contributing factors, including Lebanese
Hezbollah's (LH) involvement in the Syria conflict, the influx of more
than one million refugees from Syria, and the presidential vacancy that
has remained unfilled since May 2014. In particular, the absence of a
president has put Lebanon's stability at greater risk. It is also
breaking down the country's fragile power-sharing consensus.
There is a perception among some Sunnis that the LAF and the
Lebanese government favor Shia. Many also believe that the LAF has
acquiesced to LH and is unfairly targeting Sunnis. This has led to
increasing sectarian violence in traditionally Sunni areas like Arsal
and Tripoli. The growing unrest makes the Sunnis susceptible to
extremist messaging by ISIL and other violent extremist elements. The
LAF is doing a credible job of managing the current levels of violence
inside of the country, in an effort to protect the interests of the
Lebanese people. However, this could change if ISIL's narrative begins
to resonate with Lebanese Sunnis. ISIL, ANF, and other violent
extremist elements are attempting to establish footholds in Lebanon,
most notably in the border area adjacent to Syria. Needless to say, the
situation in Lebanon remains a very delicate one, and we will remain
focused on this important country.
Jordan remains a steadfast partner in the Central Region and the
Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) are among our strongest military partners.
The country's civil and military leadership continue to provide a
positive example of professionalism and moderation. That said, Jordan
does have a large Palestinian and refugee population vulnerable to
extremist messaging and influence. This challenge is further
exacerbated by a weakened economy and limited economic opportunity in
the country.
The Jordanians fought alongside United States forces in Afghanistan
and are currently flying combat sorties as part of the counter-ISIL
Coalition. The Jordanians also continue to provide critical basing
support for OIR missions. Our thoughts and prayers remain with the
family of the JAF pilot murdered by ISIL. This horrendous crime will
only serve to reinforce Coalition unity and resolve. It prompted a
significant increase in public support for the counter-ISIL campaign
among the Jordanian populace, which before was generally ambivalent
and, to some degree, even opposed to military involvement in the
current fight. At the request of the Jordanian government, we recently
conducted an assessment of the JAF and found several areas where we
could assist in increasing their military capacity and improving their
interoperability. We are also working to expedite the delivery of their
urgent FMS request to enable their continued active support of the
counter-ISIL campaign.
Meanwhile, we are doing all that we can to help Jordan to deal with
its significant refugee crisis. The refugee population (=600K) has
placed an enormous strain on the economy and on host communities. While
the Jordanians are to be commended for the professional and
compassionate manner in which they are handling this tough challenge,
the reality is that, even with international assistance, the Jordanians
are struggling to cope with the impacts. Our goal is to help ease the
burden on the nation's economy and infrastructure, while doing what we
can to further enhance stability and security in the country.
Egypt remains an anchor state in the USCENTCOM area of
responsibility. It is important for a number of reasons, to include the
country's geographic location, its enduring peace treaty with Israel,
its oversight of the Suez Canal, and its cultural and religious
influence across the region and the globe.
Egypt continues to deal with the effects of an improving, yet weak
economy, damaged by years of political instability and escalated
terrorist violence. President al-Sisi and the government are attempting
to strike a balance between promoting representative government and
countering what they perceive as a subversive form of political Islam
and violent extremism that they maintain has found voice through the
Muslim Brotherhood. The Egyptians believe that political Islam is bound
tightly to the violent extremist activity they are witnessing in the
Sinai and across mainland Egypt, into neighboring Libya. Our thoughts
and prayers are with the families of the 21 Coptic Christians brutally
murdered by ISIL last month in Libya.
Our strategic partnership with Egypt remains highly important and
our military-to-military relationship represents a key pillar of that
partnership. We have been very encouraged to see progress made by the
Egyptians with respect to the current holds on FMF and FMS. We continue
to work closely with Egypt's Armed Forces (EAF) to improve the security
of their borders, including the Sinai, and to stop the flow of fighters
and equipment transiting from Libya and Sudan through Egypt into the
Central Region. We need to support the EAF's efforts to secure the
Sinai so that it does not become an under-governed safe haven for
extremist elements. At the same time, we continue to look for ways to
integrate Egypt into the counter-ISIL Coalition and our broader
regional counter-terrorism campaign.
Central and South Asia (CASA)--The CASA sub-region is adjusting to
the shrinking United States and international military presence in
Afghanistan. The United States is now conducting train and advise (TAA)
and counter-terrorism missions in Afghanistan, as we normalize our
military-to-military relationship. This change has altered the
strategic calculus of CASA state and non-state actors as they look to
position themselves to protect their own interests in the event that
the Afghan government cannot maintain internal stability. A primary
driver of these hedging strategies, uncertainty about the United States
commitment to Afghanistan post-2014, so far has been countered by
Afghan President Ashraf Ghani's support for a continued partnership
with the United States and the international community at large, mainly
through his overwhelming support of the NATO Resolute Support TAA
mission. Of note, Russia also exerts significant influence in Central
Asia through economic, military, and informational means to undermine
the sovereignty and independence of the Central Asian states. Russia's
actions in the Ukraine have placed additional pressure on the former
Soviet republics in Central Asia, and this in turn has generated
additional challenges for our military-to-military relationships.
At the same time, the CASA sub-region remains an important focus
for increased partnerships with the U.S. In particular, concerns
regarding border security and the threat from extremist elements have
prompted a shared desire for greater cooperation. Going forward, we
will look for ways to strengthen our military-to-military partnerships
in support of CT, CN, and security assistance efforts.
Violent extremist organizations, to include the remnants of core
al-Qaeda (AQ), continue to operate in Pakistan's Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA) and, to a lesser extent, parts of eastern
Afghanistan. These groups threaten regional stability, plan attacks
against the U.S. and partner interests, and pursue weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). Of note, the Taliban insurgency continues to present
a credible threat to the Afghan government. Tension between Pakistan
and India also continue to threaten regional stability and largely
drives Pakistan's regional strategy, especially as it relates to
Afghanistan. Our drawdown from Afghanistan has created an opportunity
to normalize our relationships with Pakistan and Afghanistan, and this
may, in turn, encourage the two countries to find common ground in
countering the VEOs operating in their border region. We are working to
identify and facilitate implementation of confidence-and trust-building
measures between Pakistan and Afghanistan to further reduce border
tensions and increase military cooperation.
Our desired end-state is a stable sub-region characterized by a low
risk of conventional or nuclear war, with regional states committed to
non-interference with respect to their neighbors' internal affairs, the
denial of sanctuary for VEOs, and the non-proliferation of WMD. We will
maintain a unilateral capacity to conduct CT operations against high-
value targets and groups in the region that pose a threat to the U.S.
or our core national interests. To prevent future conflicts, we will
also work to improve military-to-military relationships by facilitating
more frequent contact between and among the region's military
leadership. This includes moving from bilateral to multi-lateral
exercises and encouraging multilateral training and operations.
We have made substantial progress in our efforts to strengthen
cooperation with Pakistan over the past year. We are encouraged by the
leaderships' commitment to counter-insurgency operations in the FATA
and openness to improve relations with Afghanistan. However, Pakistan
continues to face a number of political, economic, and security
challenges that threaten to undermine the long-term stability of the
state. Violent extremists operating in the country exploit these
conditions for their own purposes. This is hindering the security
forces' ability to protect the population from terrorist attacks and
prevent extremists from exporting violence across the region.
The United States-Pakistan military-to-military relationship
continues to improve. Key contributing factors are our FMF,
international military education and training, and the Coalition
Support Fund. In December 2014, we addressed respective expectations
for the scope and scale of our future military-to-military engagements.
We also prioritized our security cooperation at the Defense
Consultative Group Conference with the goal to help Pakistan to build
additional capacity in support of their counter-insurgency and CT
operations and other common objectives.
The Pakistani military's recent operations to clear militant
strongholds in North Waziristan and other FATA regions and to prevent
the militants' return have achieved near-term successes. However,
Pakistan will likely continue to face the threat of VEOs for the
foreseeable future. Nevertheless, more positive rhetoric on Afghan-
Pakistan relations from Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and
Chief of Army Staff General Raheel Sharif, combined with Afghan
President Ghani's expressed desire for better relations, may foretell
an effort by both sides to develop a more common view of the threat of
VEOs operating in the border region. Of note, in response to the
tragedy at the Army Public School and College in Peshawar in December
of 2014, the leaders of both countries have demonstrated a desire to
improve their cooperation going forward. This is encouraging and
represents progress; and, USCENTCOM will continue to do our part to
help strengthen and ultimately solidify this important relationship.
The United States military relationship with Uzbekistan has
strengthened considerably over the past year with implementation of the
first year of the five-year Plan for Military and Military Technical
Cooperation. Mutual interests related to improving border security, CT,
counter-narcotics, and countering the return of Uzbek fighters from
Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq, underpin our relationship. The provision
of Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles through the Excess
Defense Articles program improved protection provided to Uzbek security
forces. And, expanded U.S. Special Forces training will further improve
the Uzbek military's capacity to meet security challenges. Uzbekistan
remains committed to ensuring regional stability via continued support
for our operations in Afghanistan by providing access to the Northern
Distribution Network (NDN). It also provides electricity to northern
Afghanistan. As with other countries in Central Asia, Uzbekistan
continues to prefer bilateral vice multi-lateral military
relationships.
Our relationship with Tajikistan is advancing steadily in spite of
significant Ministry of Defense leadership changes and growing security
concerns. We continue to assist the Tajiks in developing the capacity
to meet a variety of CT, CN, and border security challenges, while also
supporting their development of a peacekeeping capability. Tajikistan
provides critical support to ongoing Afghanistan operations by allowing
transit along the NDN. That said, the Tajiks are concerned about the
near- and long-term effects of the Afghanistan transition on regional
security and stability.
The Kyrgyz Republic faces many of the same or similar security
challenges as its neighbors, particularly with respect to the threat
posed by violent extremist elements operating in the region. Bilateral
and multi-lateral engagements in the areas of CT, CN, and border
security continue on a case-by-case basis. Our military-to-military
relationship with the Kyrgyz has been positive. We are assisting them
with their development of an explosive ordnance disposal capability. We
look forward to full resumption of security cooperation activities,
pending the successful outcome of ongoing negotiations for a
replacement of the Defense Cooperation Agreement that expired in July
of 2014.
Our relationship with Kazakhstan is one of the most well developed
in the Central Asia sub-region. The Ministry of Defense continues its
transformation from a traditional Soviet-style territorial defense role
into a more modern, adaptable force capable of meeting multiple,
diverse security threats. Furthermore, the Kazaks have proactively
sought our assistance in improving their training, personnel
management, and logistics capabilities. Kazakhstan remains the largest
contributor among the Central Asian states to Afghan stability,
providing technical and financial support to the ANSF and educational
opportunities in Kazakhstan for young Afghans. We continue to leverage
Steppe Eagle, the annual multinational peacekeeping exercise co-
sponsored by the United States and Kazakhstan, to improve peacekeeping
capabilities and to foster regional integration.
Turkmenistan's humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan and efforts
to increase regional economic integration are important to enhancing
stability in the Central Asia sub-region. However, Turkmenistan's
declared policy of positive neutrality limits our opportunities for
substantive military-to-military collaboration. Engagements in the
areas of Caspian Sea security, disaster preparedness, medical services
readiness, and professional military education continue; however, they
are limited. The Turkmens recently expressed a desire to acquire United
States military equipment and technology to address threats to their
security along their southern border with Afghanistan. We will do what
we can to support those requests.
Our Strategic Approach. Our ability to effectively employ our
``Manage-Prevent-Shape'' strategic approach is largely dependent upon
the capacity and readiness of our forward-deployed military forces and
Service prepositioned materiel capabilities, working in concert with
other elements of U.S. power and influence. Equally important are our
efforts aimed at building our regional partners' capacity and
strengthening our bilateral and multilateral relationships. This is
achieved principally through key leader engagements and our training
and joint exercise programs.
Building Partner Capacity (BPC). To improve stability in the
USCENTCOM AOR and to lessen the need for costly U.S. military
intervention, we must be forward-leaning and empower our partners to
meet internal security challenges and work collectively to counter
common threats. When compared to periods of sustained conflict, BPC is
a low-cost and high-return investment. This is especially important in
today's resource-constrained environment. Joint training exercises, key
leader engagements, and FMS and FMF programs continue to represent the
key pillars of our BPC strategy. Also critical are relevant authorities
and programs noted in the FY16 President's Budget (PB), namely the
Global Train and Equip authority, Counter Terrorism Partnerships Fund,
and Section 1208 programs. Tangible by-products of our BPC efforts
include increased access and influence, enhanced interoperability, and
improved security for our forward deployed forces, diplomatic sites,
and other U.S. interests. Working ``by, with, and through'' our
regional partners also serves to enhance the legitimacy and durability
of our actions and presence in the region. In the event some type of
U.S. involvement is required, having strong partners allows for
increased burden sharing and improves the likelihood of success.
Joint Exercise and Training Program. The USCENTCOM Joint Exercise
and Training Program continues to grow in complexity and relevance with
extended participation throughout the USCENTCOM AOR during FY2014 and
into the 1st Quarter of FY2015. All five Component Commands developed
or continued to execute a robust exercise program across the complete
broad spectrum of USCENTCOM Theater Security Cooperation Objectives.
Over the past year, USCENTCOM conducted 45 bilateral and multi-
lateral exercises. Key among them was the Eager Lion 14 exercise, which
was hosted by Jordan and included naval, air, and land components from
14 different countries operating at 14 locations and totaling over
4,000 personnel from our partner nations and some 4,500 U.S. military
and civilian support members. The International Mine Countermeasures
Exercise 15, executed in late 2014, took place over 8,000 square miles
of navigable waterway and united some 43 nations, including over 7,000
global military service members and over 40 naval vessels and numerous
other warfighting assets in defense of the region's maritime commons.
All of the exercises had tangible and measurable impacts in terms of
advancing our national security objectives, demonstrating mutual
commitment to regional security, promoting combined command, control,
and communications, and enhancing interoperability. The ability of the
counter-ISIL Coalition to conduct very effective, unrehearsed short-
notice strike operations in Iraq and Syria in support of Operation
Inherent Resolve is clear evidence of the impact of this vibrant
exercise program.
Required Capabilities. In order to effectively protect and promote
U.S. and partner nation interests in the region, USCENTCOM must
maintain a strong presence and be adequately resourced and supported
with the necessary posture-forces, equipment, and enablers. Our
required capabilities include:
Forces and Equipment. Forward-deployed rotational joint forces that
include fighter and airlift assets, surveillance platforms, ballistic
missile defense assets, naval vessels, ground forces, and cyber teams
that are trained, equipped, mission-capable and ready to respond
quickly are indispensable to protecting our core interests and
supporting and reassuring our partners in the region. A capable force
presence forward deployed and enabled by a flexible and distributed
footprint with assured access is also required. This ready and capable
joint presence can prevent conflict through deterrence, manage crisis
escalation through early intervention, and allows for a broader set of
response options for consideration by national authorities, in addition
to rapid response to crises to quickly achieve stated objectives. We
will continue to work with the Department of Defense to determine a
sustainable, flexible long-term posture that provides us with the
presence, access and partnerships we need for enduring missions and
activities in the USCENTCOM AOR.
USCENTCOM requires continued regeneration, reset, and modernization
of designated Service prepositioned equipment capability sets. The
Services preposition equipment and materiel capabilities as capability
sets in support of deploying forces, to provide national leadership the
necessary capability and flexibility to respond to a diverse set of
crisis scenarios, to include preventing disruptions to trade and
security that could have disastrous impacts on the global economy, and
the ability to rapidly provide disaster relief support. The Services
aggressively reconstitute and regenerate sustainment stocks depleted
over the course of a decade-plus of major combat operations; however,
equipment shortfalls continue to impact indirect fire, sustainment, and
troop support capabilities. Shortcomings are largely the result of
budget cuts that were directed by the Budget Control Act. Service
prepositioned sets previously issued by each of the Services over the
course of contingency operations require appropriate reset and
reconstitution in order to posture the command for future contingency
operations.
Information Operations (IO). Information Operations (IO) remains a
top priority. Our investments in IO thus far have made it USCENTCOM's
most cost-effective method and the top non-lethal tool for disrupting
extremist activities across the Central Region. We have an enduring
responsibility to counter this asymmetric threat and recognize IO will
endure beyond major combat and counter-insurgency operations. As ISIL
has clearly demonstrated in Iraq and Syria, VEOs continue to expand and
increase their speed and effectiveness in the information environment
which directly impacts USCENTCOM's mission effectiveness. Our military
information support operations (MISO) programs serve as the model for
the Department and require baseline funding to allow for sustainment
and Department-wide expansion. Our IO efforts are synchronized and
carefully nested in support of a broader `whole of government' approach
to countering the extremist threat.
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD). Integrated Air and
Missile Defense is increasingly important to us and our regional
partners as threat technology improves and systems become more
flexible, mobile, survivable, reliable and accurate. Today, the global
demand for ballistic missile defense capabilities far exceeds supply.
In particular, there is a need for additional upper- and lower-tier
interceptors and surveillance and warning systems. The ability to
conduct early detection, identification, and engagement of possible
threats is essential. Thus, active measures will need to be taken to
address this capability shortage. Providing IAMD protection to deployed
U.S. forces and our critical infrastructure is crucial to mission
success and provides a visible deterrence to regional aggression.
Moreover, it signals U.S. commitment to regional partners and provides
flexibility to respond to regional contingencies. Our bases in the
USCENTCOM AOR will increasingly be at risk to the ballistic missile
threat if we continue along the current trajectory.
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) Assets.
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support continues to be
challenged by supply-versus-demand limitations. Due to our counter-ISIL
operations, demand for ISR increased substantially, along with the need
to maintain a persistent eye on strategic risks and possible threats to
U.S. national security interests. Collection in anti-access/area denial
environments continues to present a tough challenge. As evidenced by
recent events in Iraq and Syria, USCENTCOM's need for ISR and
collection platforms does not end once named operations cease. On the
contrary, our demand for multi-discipline, low-observable ISR with
strike capability that can operate in adverse weather conditions and
non-permissive environments is increasing. If we do not meet the
requirements, we can expect that our information dominance, situational
awareness, and security posture will diminish accordingly. As we reduce
our footprint in Afghanistan, it is imperative that our intelligence
collection capabilities be constant and robust to support our forces on
the ground. Likewise, with respect to Iraq and Syria, there is also a
need for a robust ISR capability to develop and maintain situational
awareness of the security environment, particularly in denied and
ungoverned spaces and in the absence of a large U.S. ground presence.
And, while we are looking to our coalition partners to help fill some
of the ISR demand, shortages do remain that will need to be addressed.
Ascertaining malign actor intentions and capabilities remains a
challenge. Full-motion video (FMV) has become fundamental to almost all
battlefield maneuvers, adversary detection, terrorist pattern of life
development, force protection operations, and a myriad of other
applications. We use FMV to buy down operational risk and to improve
visibility of the security environments where our forces are required
to operate. Full-motion video remains critical to our success;
although, we certainly recognize that we cannot rely on FMV for every
situation. Human intelligence, satellite, other airborne assets, and
other special collection capabilities also remain integral to solving
many of our problem sets.
Cyber Security. USCENTCOM must be effectively postured and have
sufficient capability to counter the growing cyber threat that the
United States and our regional partners now face. Maintaining an
effective cyber defense requires the collective efforts of partners who
share a common vision and are mutually committed.
Looking ahead, we will need to aggressively improve our cyber
posture to mitigate advanced persistent threats to our network and
critical information. As the cyber community matures, we will plan,
integrate, synchronize, and conduct cyber operations in cooperation
with other USG agencies and partner nations. USCENTCOM's cyber
activities necessitate the active pursuit of key requirements,
resourcing, training, as well as the build out of our cyber forces and
the acquisition of needed cyber capabilities. This requires a multi-
disciplined approach to address a diverse and changing threat, adequate
resourcing, and a command and control model aligned to the operational
chain of command in order to readily receive and synchronize orders and
execute cyber operations.
At the same time, we continue to support our regional partners in
building their capacity and expertise in the cyber domain. This partner
capacity is essential in the cyber domain, as the global economy relies
in part on key resources that reside across the Central Region. With
Congress' backing, we will continue to focus on cyber defense and cyber
security cooperation as key components of our theater strategy.
Required Authorities and Resources. The realities of the current
fiscal environment continue to impact USCENTCOM headquarters (HQs), our
five component commands, established combined/joint task forces, and 18
country teams. Persistent fiscal uncertainty hinders efficient and
timely implementation of operational, logistical, tactical, and
strategic milestones and objectives. We request your help in addressing
the budget uncertainty caused by the Budget Control Act and our
dependence on continuing resolutions at the start of the fiscal year.
Provided the right authorities and resources, our world-class DOD
Civ-Mil team can and will successfully accomplish any mission. With
that in mind, we sincerely appreciate Congress' continued support for
key authorities and appropriations needed to sustain current and future
operations in the Central Region and to respond to emerging crises.
Collectively, the below required authorities and resources enable our
efforts to shape positive outcomes for the future.
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)-funded Accounts. USCENTCOM's
programs, operations, and activities are resourced almost exclusively
by OCO appropriations vice Baseline funding. This funding strategy
potentially impacts our forward-deployed forces and our regional
partners. We remain concerned that this approach limits predictability,
does not allow for advanced planning, and conveys an unintentional
temporary nature to our strategy in the region. All involved
stakeholders must work together to develop an enduring approach to
resourcing the defense strategy in the USCENTCOM AOR.
Iraq and Syria Train & Equip Resources. Continued support for
flexible authorities is needed to effectively react to the urgent
threat posed by ISIL in Iraq and in Syria. Improving the capacity and
effectiveness of the Iraqi Security Forces, to include Kurdish and
Sunni tribal forces, and moderate opposition forces in Syria is key to
countering ISIL and other extremists operating in those countries. The
Congressional authorities and resourcing provided to initiate the
training and equipping of Syrian moderate opposition forces to counter
a degraded ISIL and to defend territorial gains will undoubtedly
contribute to the ultimate defeat of ISIL and the possibility of a
negotiated settlement with the Assad Regime. The turnaround of the dire
situation in Kobane, Syria is indicative of how, with a fairly limited,
precise application of authorities (allowing U.S. aircraft to airdrop
donated Kurdish weapons and equipment) and U.S. air support, and a
determined and willing partner, ISIL's momentum and narrative were
effectively countered.
The Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF) and authority demonstrate the
United States' commitment, in partnership with the international
community and the Government of Iraq, to build a diverse, inclusive,
and sustainable Iraq security force. We strongly endorse and support
extending the ITEF and establishing the stand-alone Syria Opposition
Train and Equip Fund and authority in FY16 to ensure that the ISF and
Syrian moderate opposition forces are professional and sufficiently
equipped to accomplish their mission, which consists of disrupting,
defeating, and ultimately destroying ISIL within their sovereign
territories.
The Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) remains pivotal to
ensuring the continued security and stability of the GIRoA and the
ANSF. Historically, ASFF has provided 80-90 percent of the ANSF
operating budget. While future ASFF requests are expected to decrease,
they will still remain ANSF's primary funding source for at least the
next few years. The ANSF is posturing for long-term supportability
through a program of ``Improve, Ready, Sustain.'' They are committed to
instilling fiscal discipline as they refine requirements generation and
define capabilities in a resource-constrained environment. The U.S.
Government and the GIRoA must continue to work hand-in-hand through
this period of transition. With continued United States support, the
ANSF is in a position to maintain stability within Afghanistan, while
reducing the influence of malign regional actors.
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS).
Our need for continued Congressional funding of FMF programs that
support USCENTCOM security cooperation objectives cannot be overstated.
The Central Region accounts for more than half of all global FMS. Our
partners in the region want U.S. equipment because they recognize that
it is the best in the world. It also represents a very effective means
for establishing long-term relationships between the U.S. and our
partner nations and ensures greater interoperability between our
militaries. We appreciate Congressional support for interagency
initiatives to streamline the FMS and FMF process to ensure that we
remain the partner of choice for our allies in the region and are able
to capitalize on emerging opportunities going forward.
Excess Defense Articles (EDA)/Foreign Excess Personal Property
(FEPP). The EDA program has allowed the Department of Defense to
transfer materiel determined to be excess to Service requirements. Over
the years, EDA has been an integral component in building partner
capacity and has proven beneficial in our engagements with our regional
partners. We have reaped the benefits of this authority several times
in the last year, enabling us to support requirements in Iraq,
Uzbekistan, and other countries located within the USCENTCOM AOR or
participating in operations with United States forces. Several other
EDA transfers to the UAE, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon and Egypt are
pending. Of note, USCENTCOM sourced as much EDA directly from
Afghanistan as was available without increasing risk to the Services
and the State Department at the time of the respective transfers.
In the same light, the FEPP authorization has allowed us to
transfer non-military type equipment (e.g., wall lockers, generators,
non-tactical vehicles) acquired as part of our base closures and
reductions to Iraqi and Afghan security forces, as well as to other
Afghan Government Ministries, Kuwait, and Kyrgyzstan. This authority
was beneficial in allowing turn-key transfer of select bases while also
reducing costs by allowing us to transfer items needed by the host
nation, rather than retrograding those same items to CONUS at a cost
higher than their actual value.
Coalition Support. Continued Congressional support for Coalition
Support authorities and funding, to include the Coalition Support Fund
(CSF), the associated Coalition Readiness Support Program (CSRP), and
the Lift and Sustain appropriation is key to maintaining effective
coalitions and facilitating the participation in combined military
operations of coalition partners who would not otherwise be able to
participate due to lack of resources. Without coalition partners'
participation, U.S. forces would be required to shoulder more of the
burden of conducting these operations; and, in some cases, the
operations simply could not be accomplished. This would pose additional
risks to the safety and security of U.S. forces in theater and
adversely impact critical U.S. missions, including the Afghanistan
Transition and the campaign to counter ISIL in Iraq and Syria.
Financial and logistical support to coalition partner nations helps to
ensure interoperability in the execution of current and pending
missions; enhances planning and force protection; and, also simplifies
logistical support mechanisms; while also improving our collective
ability to respond quickly to contingency requirements.
Our requirement to provide logistical support to our coalition
partners has not decreased despite the drawdown of forces in
Afghanistan. The extension of authorities outlined in Section 1223 of
the FY15 NDAA to provide logistical support to our coalition forces
participating in military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq will be
required to execute the Resolute Support Mission and are increasingly
relevant as the counter-ISIL Coalition continues to expand. Our
coalition partners have different sets of equipment and differing
abilities to wage expeditionary warfare. As the region changes focus,
we must ensure that we maintain the logistics authorities currently in
place in order to respond quickly to future contingencies.
Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP). As the United
States' role in Afghanistan continues to evolve, commanders must retain
the flexibility that the CERP provides in order to accomplish their
mission under Resolute Support. Urgent humanitarian needs cannot be
predicted and will remain a factor as long as we have security forces
on the ground in country.
Military Construction (MILCON). We continue to leverage existing
infrastructure and host nation funding where possible, as well as
maritime posture and reach back capabilities to meet steady state and
surge requirements. However, in some cases, MILCON is still required to
expand infrastructure capabilities to facilitate sustainment support
for U.S. forces and operations. Current projects are essential to our
contingency and steady state operations and support the defense pillars
outlined in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review.
Long-term C4 Sustainment Plan. USCENTCOM, our Service Components,
Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), and our deployed forces currently
rely heavily on command, control, communications, and computer (C4)
systems to support operations across the region. These capabilities,
primarily resourced through OCO funding, sustain C4 requirements at the
HQ and eight of 24 strategic operational locations in the AOR. A
diverse and survivable C4 infrastructure, via both SATCOM and
terrestrial means, is essential to the successful conduct of missions
in the USCENTCOM AOR.
The U.S. Central Command Team. At USCENTCOM, we continue to do our
part to keep our Nation and our interests around the globe safe and
secure. We have an exceptional and enormously capable team and, without
question, our greatest assets are our people. We owe it to them to make
sure they have everything they need to do their jobs in support of the
mission as well and as safely as possible. This includes making sure
that they have the best equipment, care and support, and, most
importantly, we must guarantee them safe, secure, and respectful
environments to live and work in. We should also do what we can to
support them when they return from deployments or have completed their
service obligations. Likewise, we must ensure that their families are
properly cared for and supported.
Conclusion. All of us have a vested interest in achieving a stable
and secure Central Region, and success will require everyone working
together towards this common goal. This is not just the military's
responsibility, or the U.S. Government's responsibility, or even
America's responsibility alone. As former Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger stated, ``Peace cannot be achieved by one man or one nation.
It results from the efforts of men of broad vision and goodwill
throughout the world.''
That said, the United States, and in particular our military, does
have a share in the task at hand. We are uniquely qualified in our
ability to lead and also leverage our partners' capabilities, while
enabling them to play a larger and more active role in combatting
common enemies, addressing challenges, and also actively pursuing the
many opportunities that exist in that strategically important part of
the world. Only the governments and people of the region can achieve
enduring transformational change. But, by supporting them and helping
to expand their capacity, and by providing them with the decision space
required to improve conditions and also provide for the security of
their sovereign territories, we will help to successfully move the
Central Region in the direction of greater stability and security. This
remains our ultimate goal.
The year ahead is certain to be an important one throughout the
Middle East and parts of Central and South Asia. The consequences of
our actions, or lack thereof, will undoubtedly prove significant. Our
intent at USCENTCOM is to build upon the progress achieved to date. We
will continue to manage existing conflicts and crises, while doing what
we can to prevent confrontations and developing situations from
worsening and becoming crises. We also will continue to pursue the many
opportunities present in the region, recognizing that it is through
them that we will shape positive outcomes and achieve improved
stability and security throughout our area of responsibility. Finally,
we will continue to support the efforts of our U.S. Government
colleagues; understanding that the effects of our individual
contributions are greatly amplified when we work together in a
constructive and collaborative fashion.
Today, more than 78,000 of the very best Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen,
Marines, Coastguardsmen and Civilians assigned to or associated with
U.S. Central Command are selflessly serving in difficult and dangerous
places around the globe. They continue to do an exceptional job in
support of the mission and this great country of ours. Without
question, we could not do what we do without them. We are enormously
proud of them and their families. They are and will remain our foremost
priority.
USCENTCOM: Ready, Engaged, Vigilant!

Chairman McCain. Thank you, General.
I'd ask the witnesses, do they agree with General
Petraeus's comments, a few days ago, that Iran was as great or
greater threat in the Middle East than ISIS? Do you agree with
that, General Austin? With that statement?
General Austin. Sir, I would say that, in terms of the
long-term threat in the region, Iran is the greatest threat to
stability. I would say the most pressing threat is ISIL, and
one that we have to deal with and defeat in the near term.
Chairman McCain. General Rodriguez?
General Rodriguez. Yes, I agree, sir, with both General
Austin and General Petraeus, the short- and long-term
challenges.
Chairman McCain. General Votel?
General Votel. Mr. Chairman, I agree.
Chairman McCain. General Austin, when were you told by the
Saudis that they were going to take military action in Yemen?
General Austin. Sir, I had a conversation with the CHOD
[Chief of Defense] right before they took action. And so, it
was shortly before.
Chairman McCain. Right before they took action.
General Austin. Yes, sir.
Chairman McCain. That's very interesting.
Now, you were talking about how we're defeating ISIL. Right
now, the battle for Tikrit is stalled, and we are then
launching airstrikes into Tikrit. Is that--isn't--that's
obviously correct. And it's my understanding--please correct me
if I'm wrong--that there's about 2,000 Iraqi military fighting
there and about 20,000 the--Shia militia that are doing the
majority of the fighting. Is that roughly correct?
General Austin. Sir, it's about 4,000 Iraqi Security
Forces, combined, in that area. Currently, there are no Shiite
militia. And, as reported by the Iraqis today, no PMF forces in
that area, as well.
Chairman McCain. So, there's 4,000 Iraqi. Who are the
others?
General Austin. The Shiite militia that were there have
pulled back from that area, sir.
Chairman McCain. So, the fighting is all being done by the
Iraqi forces?
General Austin. Sir, when the----
Chairman McCain. I've only got a few minutes, and maybe you
can shorten the answer. They're pretty straightforward
questions.
General Austin. Yes, sir. The clearance of the town of
Tikrit, which is, as you know, on the west side of the river,
is being done by the Iraqi Special Operations Forces and the
Federal police, with our air support.
Chairman McCain. So, why do we see pictures of Suleimani
everywhere, and leading and orchestrating this effort?
General Austin. Those pictures were from before. And, as
you know, that effort that Suleimani and the Iranians were
sponsoring, it stalled. It stalled because they didn't have----
Chairman McCain. So, they're no longer in the fight.
General Austin. He is no longer--well, he was no longer on
the ground, as of----
Chairman McCain. No, I mean, the Shiite militias are no
longer in the fight.
General Austin. The folks that we are supporting in
clearing Tikrit----
Chairman McCain. Are the Shiite militias still in the
fight?
General Austin. No, sir, they're not a part of the clearing
operations in Tikrit.
Chairman McCain. So, the airstrikes that we're carrying out
in support are only in support of Iraqi military activities.
General Austin. That's correct, sir. Preconditioned for us
to provide support was that the Iraqi government had to be in
charge of this operation, they had to know--we had to know
exactly who was on the ground, we had to be able to deconflict
our fires, they had to have a credible scheme of maneuver,
which they not only replanned, but we caused them to rehearse
it, and they had to be able to talk to the folks on the ground,
as well.
Chairman McCain. By the way, I totally disagree with you
about ignoring Syria. There's no strategy for Syria. And we all
know that. And ISIS doesn't respect those boundaries. But,
somehow you seem to, and the President does. There's no--they
know no boundaries. And so, to say that we are going to have a
strategy for Iraq first and then Syria, of course, is
sophistry.
Right now, in our airstrikes in Iraq and Syria, of the
12,000 sorties, 3,000 of them actually drop weapons. Is that
true?
General Austin. I think that's about right, sir.
Chairman McCain. Don't we put our pilots in great danger if
they're not going to drop weapons? And isn't it the argument
that we really need the Joint Terminal Attack Controllers
(JTAC) on the ground if we're going to be effective? Or are you
going to have three out of four fighter sorties fly around in
circles, and then return?
General Austin. Sir, the hours-flown-to-ordnance-employed
ratio is really based upon a couple of factors. One is, the
type of enemy that we're opposing. And the second is that--are
the distances that we're dealing on a daily basis.
If you take a look at an operation like Operation Desert
Storm, where you had fielded forces and infrastructure that you
could attack with preplanned sorties, then that ratio--
certainly, you'll have a greater ratio of hours flown to
ordnance employed.
The type of enemy that we're facing currently is--it
started out as an extremist element that wanted to behave like
an army. And because of that, we were able to attack his mass
formations early on, but he very quickly resorted to behaving
like an irregular force, where he began to blend in with the
population. As he did that, it became more difficult to----
Chairman McCain. Which should have surprised no one.
General Austin. It didn't surprise us, sir. But, the nature
of this fight is such that, you know, we need to be able to
support the----
Chairman McCain. So, we're satisfied with a situation where
we launch 12,000 sorties, when only one out of four actually
drop weapons.
General Austin. Sir, it's----
Chairman McCain. That, General, is not a viable or,
frankly, a good use of the taxpayers' dollars.
General Austin. Sir, I would just make the point that, as
we compare that ratio to what we've done in Afghanistan, it's
equal to that--because it's the same type of fighting there,
principally. And the ratios are comparable. In fact, the ratios
in OIR [Operation Inherent Resolve] are even better than what
we saw in Afghanistan.
Chairman McCain. Well, I would argue that that's comparing
apples and oranges, but my time has expired.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Austin, just again returning to Tikrit, we are
operating at the request of the Prime Minister of Iraq, Prime
Minister Abadi, who is the democratically elected leader, and
we set conditions as to what we would require before we would
be engaged. Is that correct?
General Austin. That's correct, sir.
Senator Reed. And your comments to Senator McCain suggest
that the popular mobilization forces, the Shiite militias, have
withdrawn. Initially, they were engaged in the fight, but
they've pulled back, and now the operation is being conducted
by Iraqi regular forces, their special operations----
General Austin. Special Operations Forces and the Federal
police, yes, sir.
Senator Reed. It appeared, just a few days ago, in fact,
that this fight would succeed simply with the mobilization
forces, the Shiite militias, and--which would have added a
significant sort of a at least rhetorical claim to both the
militias and to the Iranians. Now it appears that they cannot
effectively clear the city without the support of the United
States and our airpower. Is that----
General Austin. That's correct, sir. And if I could, make a
point, here, to highlight why it failed. It's the way that
these forces went about trying to do this. These forces
obviously were not being controlled by the Government of Iraq,
they didn't have a coherent scheme of maneuver, command, and
control. They didn't have precision fires to support this
effort. And so, trying to go about the difficult task of
clearing a place like Tikrit without that caused them to stall.
And what we have done is, number one, as you pointed out, sir,
highlighted a number of preconditions that must be present
before we would provide ISR and employ fires. And once those
conditions were met, which included Shiite militias not being
involved, then we're able to proceed.
And I'd like just--just to highlight, sir, that, you know,
three tours in Iraq, commanding troops who were brutalized by
some of these Shiite militias, I will not, and I hope we never,
coordinate or cooperate with Shiite militias.
Senator Reed. And part of the operation in Tikrit--and
we're doing all we can to assist the Iraqi regular forces to
succeed--will be a prelude to operations in Mosul, which have
always been contemplated to be conducted by Iraqi Security
Forces with--if they make the conditions, with our support. Is
that accurate?
General Austin. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. All right.
General Votel, we have the assistant Secretary of Defense
for SOLEC, and he is the service secretary-like
responsibilities for Special Operations Forces, your forces.
And do you have any views--because he's established a Special
Operations Policy and Oversight Council--do you work with the
Council? What's your relationship?
General Votel. Senator, we absolutely do. And I meet with
Secretary Lumpkin on a regular basis. And the SOPAC, as it's
referred to, the Special Operations Policy and Oversight
Council that meets in the Pentagon, really provides a good
forum to pull together a number of the senior leaders within
OSD and, frankly, on the Joint Staff in SOCOM to ensure that we
are looking at the requirements for SOF forces and ensuring
that it's well coordinated within the building. And we're
getting both oversight and advocacy for our activities.
Senator Reed. Let me ask an additional question. You've
talked about, in your prepared remarks, the campaign plan for
global special operations, which, of necessity, has to interact
with the campaign plans of AFRICOM and CENTCOM and NORTHCOM and
SOUTHCOM, et cetera, et cetera. So, can you comment about how
you manage this plan? And, just quickly, because my time
expired, General Rodriguez and General Austin might make a
comment, too.
General Votel. Absolutely. So, the campaign plan for global
special operations is really designed to support my principal
task of supporting my geographic partners out here. And it's
designed to synchronize our SOF activities to help us
prioritize our resources and where we are putting them in
support of the GCCs. It's designed to address the partnerships
that we need to have in place. It's designed to look at the
things that we will do to shape the environment for the
geographic combatant commanders. And then it ensures that we
have provided SOF aligned to those specific areas so that they
can develop the capacity and the skills and capabilities they
need to best support the geographic combatant commanders.
Senator Reed. General Rodriguez, your comments on this
interaction?
General Rodriguez. When we make our strategic plan, sir,
our theater Special Operation Command is fully involved. And
all those things that Joe does about allocating the forces and
the capabilities across the world all support my plan exactly
how I want it to be.
Senator Reed. General Austin, a quick comment or one for
the record? My time's expiring. Are you comfortable with the
interaction?
General Austin. I am very comfortable with it, sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As I told you, General Rodriguez, I was going to
concentrate my questions on AFRICOM. When Senator McCain talked
about being under-resourced, it is true that, when you were
formed, and up to the current time, you don't really have
resources. You depend on EUCOM for almost everything. Is that
correct?
General Rodriguez. We got a little bit more resources in
the last year and a half, Senator, to include a special-purpose
MAGTF, a commander's response force, a special operations
force, and we've also got a couple of key enablers for force.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah, and----
General Rodriguez. I also do depend quite a lot on EUCOM
capacity, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah. I think you do. And I think that
other things that come up, like the LRA [Lord's Resistance
Army] and things like that specifically, you inherit resources
to help put out those fires. However, with the restructuring,
the European infrastructure consolidation, are you concerned
about how that might affect what resources might be available
when called upon?
General Rodriguez. Right now, from the European
infrastructure consolidation, most of the moves have been to
the south and east to help the responsiveness of EUCOM forces
to support both CENTCOM and AFRICOM. So, the ones that got
enacted, I agree with, sir.
Senator Inhofe. I understand.
I don't know where you were when we put together the
whole--the AFRICOM. You know, before that, it was in three
different commands, and--PACOM, EUCOM, and, I guess, CENTCOM.
And that was a wise thing to do. But, the discussion at that
time was where to put the headquarters. And we were all
promoting the idea that it should actually be in Africa. That
continent is so huge. We understand what happened politically
at that time, that--this fear of colonization and all of that,
that people just wouldn't buy it. But, the presidents would. In
fact, I've talked to most of them, all of the presidents in
that area. They thought that would have been a good idea.
At the time that we put it together, AFRICOM, there was
some discussion that, after a period of time, they might
consider making that move. Have you heard anything at all about
that? Is there anything in the mill talking about----
General Rodriguez. No. Many of the African leaders have
talked to me about that, but the current assessment by the
Secretary of Defense is to continue to leave it where it is for
the foreseeable future, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah. Well, you know, the ``foreseeable
future'' is beyond us now from when they first put this thing
together. But, I don't know, I know that would still be a
problem.
Let me ask you, my first experience with Joseph Kony and
the LRA was way back in 2001. That's 14 years ago. Joseph Kony
was old and sick then. How is he now?
General Rodriguez. He's older and sicker, sir. [Laughter.]
Senator Inhofe. And do you think that we are getting in a
position right now--it appears to me, from the reports that we
get--and I think you'd probably agree; I'll ask you if you do
agree--that most of the stuff now he's doing is just trying to
move around and avoid it. He's no longer making the hits that
he did back at that time. And our involvement, which we are--
have been involved in, is actually being--is working.
General Rodriguez. Yes, sir, it is working. And it's in a
great team effort with all the country teams as well as many of
the civilian organizations that have built a durability in the
civilian population to better resist the problems he has. Right
now, he's about--down to about 200 real fighters, and the
impact on the civilian population is very minimal. He is using
illicit trafficking to continue to sustain his efforts. But,
it's tough for him, because of continual pressure over the last
14 years.
Senator Inhofe. As he's being chased around--places like
CAR, Eastern Congo, even, briefly, Rwanda, Uganda, South
Sudan--it seems like it was a trail of blood following him. And
it's not that way so much anymore. I just think that we haven't
talked about that in a long time. We need to get on the record
that some things are--seem to be working there.
General Rodriguez. Yes. A long-term effort against Kony,
with, really, you know, fairly modest resources. But, that
long-term effort has done exactly what you said, it has
significantly decreased his impact on any of the civilian
population, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah.
General Rodriguez, last year you testified that only 12
percent of your ISR requests are being met. I'm reading this
from the transcript last year. Has there been any change in
this intelligence gap?
General Rodriguez. Just a little bit more, sir. I'm about
13 percent now. But, that's a great question. As far as the
impacts of sequestration, just for the committee, we will lose
more CAPs in sequestration than I have in the theater right
now. So, you can see the impact that's going to have on our
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. Thank
you.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank all three of you for your service to our country
and things that you do every day.
With that, General Austin, I said, last year, if I believed
sending United States trainers and weapons to Syria would make
Americans safer, I would definitely have supported it. I did
not then, and what I'm hearing from the region further supports
my belief. Last week, reports emerged the Department of Defense
is unable to account for more than $500 million of military
assistance to Yemen, including weaponry, aircraft, and
equipment--and I'm sure that you all have seen the same
pictures on YouTube that we're getting, of our equipment being
used for people against us and against our efforts--all of
which could potentially fall into the hands of Iranian-backed
rebels or al-Qaeda.
In Syria, we've heard reports that al-Nusra Front seized
United States weapons from CIA-trained Syrian rebels, including
60 to 90 TOW antitank missiles. Two days ago, video footage was
posted of al-Nusra, allegedly showing them using a captured
United States TOW missile in a fight. And these are not just
immediate events. We supported individuals in the 1980s in
Afghanistan, who formed elements of Taliban. Last year, in
Iraq, we watched ISIS capture weapons, vehicles, and military
equipment that Iraqi Security Forces abandoned, which are
millions and millions and millions of dollars being used
against us now, even after we spent the better part of a decade
training them. We have a history of supplying weapons and
training that end up being used against us.
And, General Austin, who's responsible for the weapons and
equipment the U.S. has supplied in these cases? Or are these
reports accurate? And will any of this bring action be taken?
General Austin. Well, clearly, sir, what--with not having
the ability to be in Yemen currently to monitor the disposition
of the weapons, then certainly we can't--we don't have the
ability to oversee the safeguarding or the employment of those
weapon systems. That 500 million, I believe, was the amount of
funds that were required for both providing weapon systems and
training. And, as you know, training eats--takes up--it's
pretty expensive----
Senator Manchin. This was Yemen.
General Austin. Yes, sir.
Senator Manchin. I know about the 500 million requested for
Syria.
The only thing I'm saying is, Is there nobody in our
Government, in our Defense, Pentagon, that's responsible? Like
when we give all this equipment to Yemen, and then we see it
falling apart, do we not have any way to retrieve that?
General Austin. Certainly, in a case like Yemen, sir,
it's--we don't have the ability to go back and retrieve it. We
don't have----
Senator Manchin. But, as we see it falling apart, we can't
take any actions at all to keep it from falling into----
General Austin. Once we've provided the weapons to them,
sir, we----
Senator Manchin. It's theirs.
General Austin. Yes, sir. And we will continue to monitor
their--the usage of those weapons and make sure that, if
they're not being used properly, then we don't continue to
provide capability to them. So----
Senator Manchin. What--do you all confirm--I mean, do you
all agree with the reports of how much weapons and the lethal
volatility of these weapons being used against us? There are
weapons being used against us.
General Austin. I don't doubt that what's----
Senator Manchin. I mean, are these accurate? They're widely
reported.
General Austin. Yes, sir. If we're not there, then--and
we've provided weapons, and it's reasonable to expect that some
of that material will fall in the hands of the people----
Senator Manchin. Well, let's go with Mosul first, and the
Iraqi forces that abandoned. That was substantial, I'm sure.
Correct?
General Austin. It was, sir.
Senator Manchin. Okay. And we know that's being used
against us.
General Austin. Yes, sir.
Senator Manchin. Okay. Then we know about Yemen now. And we
have concerns about--you know, will this be repeated? And it--
are we taking any steps, from what we've seen happen? How can
you assure me that Syria--that whatever--whoever we support in
Syria, that won't fall in the wrong hands?
General Austin. There's no way we can absolutely assure you
that that won't happen, sir. What we do is to try to train the
folks that we're working with and providing capability to, to
be responsible as they use and safeguard these weapons. And, in
the event that they are not, then we certainly quit doing--we
quit providing them the capability.
Senator Manchin. And one quick question for General Votel.
General Votel, in West Virginia, I had the privilege of
observing the training of some of our National Guard--Special
Force soldiers in the National Guard. And both the 19th and
20th Army Special Forces group have fought with great success
in Iraq and Afghanistan, complementing our Active Duty Special
Forces groups. How do you see the future of the National Guard
Special Operations community moving forward?
General Votel. Well, as you just pointed out, they are
absolutely integrated into everything we are doing. So, not
just on the Army side with Special Forces, but on the Air Guard
side. And so, some of our unique ISR capabilities, our manned
ISR capabilities, will reside in some of our Air Guard and Air
Reserve organizations. So, they are absolutely and totally
integrated into everything that we are doing now and will do in
the future.
Senator Manchin. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Wicker. General Austin, when it comes to fighting
ISIL, I appreciate your determination, your military drive. And
that's coming through. I do question the sort of optimistic
note that you have in your testimony, because it just seems
that things are not going as positively as you're suggesting.
You mentioned, beginning on page 11 of your testimony,
``The President's announcement this past September, five key
elements to what the administration wants to do involving
coalition partners, Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon, train and
equip, having reliable partners to assist on the ground.'' And
then you say, ``Once we do all these things, we will have
defeated ISIL through a combination of sustained pressure, a
systematic dismantling of ISIL's capabilities, and by
effectively expanding our regional partners' CT capacities.''
It's just hard to see--hard to be very encouraged about that
happening, at this point. And I want to ask about our partners.
Now, not everything we hear is in these big hearings. We've
met with the King of Jordan, not in a classified setting, but
the King of Jordan tells us, ``We can't want this more than the
Arab neighborhood wants it.'' And so, I do want to ask you
about that. He said he'd be going back and trying to get the
partners together and make this work on the ground.
I think everybody has been saying boots on the ground are
going to be needed to defeat ISIL. Are those boots on the
ground going have to be Iraq--the Iraqi Army boots on the
ground? Because I don't see the Jordanians really having that
capacity. We met with the Ambassadors from UAE [United Arab
Emirates] and Saudi Arabia, just the other day, and they want
this coalition to take effect, and they want Egypt to be part
of it. I just wonder who, in that whole list of neighboring
countries, has the capacity to go in and retake this territory?
You mention, on page 12, that we're doing precision
airstrikes. But, I think we all know that that's not going to
get it done. And then you talk about, ``The intent of the
regional campaign is not simply to destroy ISIL, but--although
that's our primary objective.''
So, how is this going to be wrapped up by troops going in
and taking the territory back, and the United States not
employing boots on the ground?
General Austin. Thank you, sir.
One of--a couple of things that we said up front was,
number one, that this would take time, because we are working
with indigenous forces, we are using the Iraqi Security Forces
to conduct the ground operations.
As you pointed out, sir, we've also said that you can't do
this with just airpower alone. It has to be a complement of
fires and maneuver forces on the ground.
And our approach is to generate those forces by training
and equipping Iraqi Security Forces. And we're--you know, as we
have halted ISIL's advance into Iraq, we've started the
business of training and equipping new Iraqi Security Forces so
that they'll have the ability to train--to take back their
borders and secure their sovereign spaces.
Senator Wicker. Is there any prospect of Saudi forces being
there in numbers that would be significant? UAE? Jordanian
forces? They've got a police force, but not much else.
General Austin. They all have some capability, sir. None of
them have volunteered to come forward and put boots on the
ground in Iraq right now. In Iraq, certainly Iraq needs to want
to be able to take that on and take those forces in. But, to
this point, as you look at what Saudi's dealing with on its
borders with Yemen, it's currently focused on that right now.
So----
But, to answer your question, sir, there is capability with
countries in the region, but none--no countries have come
forward and volunteered to put boots on the ground in Iraq.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, sir. Well, good luck to you. And
again, I appreciate your determination and resolve. I hope
you're as successful as you believe you will be.
General Austin. We will be successful, sir.
Chairman McCain. Senator Donnelly.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank all of you for all your efforts.
General Votel, I'd just like to talk about a different
issue for just one minute, and that is, I want to thank you for
your top-down leadership on mental health with the Special
Operations. Since assuming command at SOCOM, you've been
incredibly frank about this challenge. And that, alone, sends
an important message to the troops.
Can you talk about the psychological component of your
Preservation of the Force and Family Program, and how that's
going today?
General Votel. I can. Thank you for the question, Senator.
We appreciate the continued support we get from Congress in
this very significant challenge to us.
We are looking at a variety of things. We are looking at
peer-to-peer programs that we use within organizations to help
provide access to our members and their family members and
others, to reach out and talk to their friends and their peers
about that. And I think this is an important component of it.
Likewise, we are pursuing training programs to ensure that
our leadership, our chaplains, and others are well trained in
the ability to identify those behaviors that we think are
related to stress, and potentially which can lead to suicide.
And, third, I think the--one of the most important things
we are doing is trying to send the very clear message across
the entire SOF force that it is absolutely normal and expected
to ask for help when you need it, and you can do that without
concern of stigma or any concerns about your standing within
the Command. And we are putting--really working double tides to
put effort on that particular theme and message throughout
this.
The real census of our program, here, is to empower people
by communicating early and often, by trying to enable them, by
giving them easy access to programs and resources so they can
get help, and then encouraging them with this message. So----
Senator Donnelly. And will you work us to help us take the
lessons that you've learned at SOCOM and work with the other
parts of our military?
General Votel. Absolutely. And we are well----
Senator Donnelly. Thank you very much. Thank you.
General Austin, it appears that the efforts in Tikrit are
stalled at the moment. And so, my concern, my--one of the areas
I'm looking at is, How do we empower the moderate Sunnis? Are
they the key to making this work? And if you're a moderate
Sunni--and I asked this the other day--the concern would be,
Why do you want to team up with the Shiite militia. When ISIS
is also Sunni, they may be like the bad cousin that shows up at
the event, but they're still your cousin. I mean, how do we
empower the moderate Sunnis? And do you see them as the key to
moving this thing along and to having success in Iraq?
General Austin. Sir, I do believe that getting the Sunni
population involved is really, really important, in terms of
being successful, going forward. And, you're right, the
previous operation in Tikrit did stall. And it stalled because,
I think, the wrong approach was taken. Those--many of the
forces that were being employed were not controlled or
supervised by the Ministry of Defense or Government of Iraq.
That has recently changed. As of the last several days and
today, when we--yesterday, when we started supporting this
effort. We think that this effort will begin to move forward
with the employment of the Special Operations Forces and the
help of our enablers.
But, I think----
Senator Donnelly. Can you----
General Austin.--that it's absolutely key that, number one,
the government has to be accommodating to both the Sunni and
the Kurd population, and we have to increasingly get the Sunnis
involved.
Senator Donnelly. Can you help make that happen? Because
the concern is Abadi--a lot of the folks that surround him are
still from the previous administration. And the other part
about this is, you've had extraordinary experience in the al-
Anbar area, in all the service you're done for our country
throughout Iraq. Can you help to identify the key Sunni
moderate leaders to make them part of this? And is that what's
going to--you know, you look, and you say, ``Hey, we think
we're going to get it right this time.'' How do you think this
turns out?
General Austin. Sir, to answer both your questions, we are
encouraged--we continue to encourage the leadership in Iraq to
do--to be more accommodating to the Sunni population and do
some things that are demonstrable, that are--that they--that
increases their confidence in the leadership, in the
government. And you may know that we are helping the Iraqi
Security Forces and the Government of Iraq reach out to the
tribal elements in Anbar and bring in some of those elements to
train and equip them and get them involved in the fight, as
well. And those that we have trained and equipped have
performed remarkably well.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Votel, when we met last week, you talked about how
the resources allowed you to meet threats with moderate risk.
And over the past year, we've seen that terror threat increase,
smaller problems become more serious, they become crisis. And
then this--do you believe that this is part of the result of
the strategy that accepts moderate risk? Are we less able to
nip those problems in the bud and so that they grow into these
serious threats?
General Votel. Senator, thanks for the question.
I--first of all, I think we can continue to--I think all
commanders operate in an area where they're constantly
balancing risk of their forces and the missions that are being
done on a regular basis. And I think that's what I'm
principally paid to do.
As we move forward and continue to deal with the changing
and complex situations--for me, I think it gets down to
prioritization. And, for us, what we will attempt to do is
offset the risk that is associated with increased operations by
ensuring that we prioritize on those operations for which we
can have the biggest impact and we can help support the
broadest national objectives.
Senator Fischer. Is Libya a place where we're going to
accept moderate risk?
General Votel. That--again, I think that perhaps may be a
policy question. Certainly, from my perspective, working with
my partner in AFRICOM, we are looking at the things that we can
do to address the threats that are in Libya today.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
General Rodriguez, in your opening statement, you say that,
``Libya-based threats to United States interests are growing.
If left unchecked, I believe they have the highest potential
among security challenges on the continent to increase risk to
United States and European strategic interests in the next 2
years and beyond.'' You also described Libya as ``emerging as a
safe haven, where terrorists, including al-Qaeda and the
Islamic State of Iraq in the Levant-affiliated groups can train
and rebuild with impunity.'' That, to me, doesn't sound like
we're on the right trajectory.
Do you think our approach to Libya is not adequate? Are we
accepting too much risk?
General Rodriguez. Thanks, Senator.
For--first of all, for--to make sure everybody's clear on
what we're doing in and around Libya, we're--a significant
effort is going in around Libya to prevent that from spilling
over. So, when you look at what is happening in Tunisia, in
Niger, Chad, and Egypt, we're working with our partners, as
much as we can and as much as we're--have the authorities to do
that, to strengthen their capacities to limit the spillover of
that effort. We're also working with our European partners to
increase their effort there. And we are supporting, at this
point in time, the U.N. [United Nations] effort to come to a
diplomatic solution. And anything past that will require a
policy decision, ma'am.
Senator Fischer. How would you rate the success of the
efforts that you just described? The spillover, the work with
our European partners in the U.N.
General Rodriguez. The work with our partners has, for the
most part, gone very well, with the exception of one or two
sensational attacks that you read about in Tunisia the other
day; but their capacities have continued to grow, and they
handle that threat every day, as does Niger and Chad. And the
work of the--the European efforts in the U.N. has not had as
much progress as anybody wants, to date, yet, ma'am.
Senator Fischer. Okay, thank you.
And, General Votel, if I can just return to that idea of
moderate risk for my closing questions here. Over the long
term, do you think that, if we see risk continue to increase,
and those smaller problems continue a--to accumulate--how do we
prioritize that? If they're viewed as smaller problems at the
time, but yet they continue to escalate and become greater and
greater risk to this country, not just the region they're in,
how are you going to prioritize? How are you going to address
it, and do you have the resources you need?
General Votel. Thanks. Thanks, Senator.
Right now, I think I do have the resources that I need to
support the GCC commanders at a moderate level of risk for the
things I'm being asked to do today. What I think we will do for
the future, as I mentioned in my opening comments here, I think
SOF plays a particular role in the gray zone, in the area
before operations, before we get to open conflict. And so, I
think the important piece that I bring to the geographic
combatant commanders is our ability to come in and help shape,
develop partnerships, to help build capacity, and support
relationships in all of those areas so that we can strengthen
partners before big problems grow into--or, before small
problems grow into big problems. And I really think that is the
direction in which we should be focusing SOF into the future.
Senator Fischer. General Rodriguez, did you have a
response?
General Rodriguez. Thanks, Senator.
The--as far as the prioritization is going, again, that's
done by the policymakers, relative to our National security
interests. And then, the input we put, in addition to the risk,
is what our partners can handle and what they're doing,
themselves. And we prioritize it based on a whole-of-government
and interagency effort and who can help most in different
places. So, I think that's what is done every day in the
Defense Department, ma'am.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, gentlemen. And thank you for
your service.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman McCain. Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
I'm now determined that budget gimmicks have no attachment
to party, that both parties are capable of using budget
gimmicks as we approach the challenges of sequestration and
defense spending. It is now being used, in the current budget
we're debating and the budget that passed the House yesterday.
Rather than confront sequestration and be honest about the
challenges we have in our base budget that we've all given a
lot of time, in terms of rhetoric, to, we are now going further
down the road of using OCO as a slush fund. It's not good for
fiscal accountability. It's not good for restoring faith of the
American people that we can face the tough decisions and not
retreat to rhetoric and gimmickry that is not really true.
We're not going to build a--as my colleague has said, we're not
going to build a PX someplace in America with OCO funds. The
question is, do you believe that the Army can buy back force
strength with OCO funds?
General Austin. I do not, Senator.
Senator McCaskill. Do you believe that the Navy can address
the shortfalls in shipping with OCO funds?
General Rodriguez. No, ma'am.
Senator McCaskill. Okay.
I just think that we've got to be--and I'm--believe me, I'm
not saying that we come to this with clean hands, as Democrats.
We don't, because we have engaged in gimmickry, also. But, I
know that the Chairman wants to face this head-on, and I know
it's a challenge in this political environment. But, I did want
to bring it up, that we have obviously not met the challenge
with the budget as it's currently configured.
I wanted to specifically ask you, General Austin, about
something that's very troubling to me, and that is that I've
been told that there has been a determination that Operation
Freedom Sentinel is a new contingency operation. It--do you see
it as a new contingency operation?
General Austin. It's a continuation of our efforts,
Senator, so, you know, I--in terms of the types of things that
we're doing, you know, we're continuing to train the--and
advise and assist the Afghan Security Forces. But, in terms of,
you know, how we account for the funding, that's--that we're
allocating to that, that's a different issue.
Senator McCaskill. Well, the reason I'm asking this is, I'm
told that there is an effort underway of naming a new lead
Inspector General in Afghanistan, as opposed to SIGAR of the
Special Inspector General on Afghanistan. And I think, if that
determination is made--I just want to make sure everybody
understands--that's going to impose a lot of additional
burdens, in terms of oversight requirements, on contracting.
You know, I know there's continuity in SIGAR. I don't
understand the value right now of changing Inspector Generals
at this point on the projects that are ongoing that the Special
Inspector General in Afghanistan is aware of and is working on.
I don't get it. And if there is really a sincere attempt to
replace him by labeling this a new contingency, somebody's
going to have some explaining to do, I think, to me and, I
hope, others on this committee, as to why that would be a good
idea. Are you aware of an effort to do that at this point?
General Austin. I don't know--I am not aware of the effort.
But, certainly, I'll go--I'll find out, I'll look into it,
Senator.
[The information referred to follows:]

My staff has been monitoring that the Council of Inspectors
General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) is examining
whether the triggers associated with the establishment of a
LIG-OCO for OFS in accordance with section 848 of FY 2013 NDAA
language have been met. If that determination is made, CENTCOM
has no issues with the designation of a Lead IG in accordance
with NDAA 13 and will support their oversight initiatives as we
have done for Operation INHERENT RESOLVE. Since oversight
initiatives are not mutually exclusive, the designation of a
lead IG for OFS in and of itself may have no bearing on SIGAR's
separate and independent statutory authority enumerated in its
enabling legislation. It could amplify the importance of
coordination between different oversight agencies executing
projects in Afghanistan moving forward. I will continue to
support all oversight objectives and encourage all IGs
operating in Afghanistan to continue regular coordination,
which will enable these agencies to avoid duplication of
activities and focus on the most beneficial projects. This will
be particularly important because audit agency inquiries have
remained relatively steady over the last 18 months while, at
the President's direction, our force levels have declined by
over 80 percent, resulting in sharp reductions in staffs to
respond to these agencies.

Senator McCaskill. That would be terrific. As you know,
we've worked very closely with the Special Inspector Generals,
both in Iraq and Afghanistan. I think the body of work they
have done is incredibly helpful to our Nation's military. As we
look at how we honestly confront sequestration, one of the ways
is being better stewards of the resources that we have
allocated to these efforts.
General Rodriguez, I understand that most of the
servicemembers who deployed to Africa as part of the ebola
response, Operation United Assistance, have begun returning
home. Is there any effort to keep track of the number of
contractors around this effort and how many of them have been
pulled and how many of them remain in ebola as we continually
try to stay on top of contractor costs?
General Rodriguez. Yes, ma'am, there is. There's a very,
very strict accounting that is done. We've had oversight from
the DOD IG from the beginning, and we were very cognizant of
the challenges with contractor oversight and also paying too
much money for contracts that's out of line with what the USAID
as well as the host nation is providing. So, we have a strict
accounting on it, yes, ma'am.
Senator McCaskill. That would be terrific.
General Rodriguez. Yes, ma'am.
[The information referred to follows:]

Yes, USAFRICOM is tracking the number of contractors
supporting Operation UNITED ASSISTANCE (OUA). We use the
Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) as
the central authoritative repository for monitoring Department
of Defense (DOD) contractor personnel. At the height of the
Ebola response, nearly 350 contractors supported OUA.
Currently, four local national contract personnel are working
on two remaining open contracts.
References: USAFRICOM monitors contractor accountability in
accordance with the following congressional acts and DOD
regulations:
Section 861 & 862 of the FY2008 National Defense
Authorization Act
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
Memorandum, dated 28 Jan 08
DOD Instruction 3020.50, dated 22 Jul 09
Section 813 of the FY2010 National Defense
Authorization Act
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual
(CJCSM) 3150.13C, dated 10 Mar 10
DOD Instruction 3020.41.41, dated 20 Dec 11
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
(DFARS) Clause 252.225-7040
DFARS Class Deviation 2013-O0015
DFARS 2013-O0017

Senator McCaskill. And also, General Austin, if you could
share with us how many contractors have been plussed-up in Iraq
as a result of our efforts against ISIL. You know, we had
gotten to the point that we were just counting contractors in
Afghanistan, now we're back to counting contractors again in
Iraq. And we would appreciate an update on that number, also.
General Austin. Yes, Senator. I'll take that for the
record.
[The information referred to follows:]

US Central Command recognizes the importance of balancing a
small contractor footprint in Iraq with supporting the current
operations. Currently, there are 579 Department of Defense
contractors in Iraq. This is an increase of approximately 450
contractors since October 2014.

Senator McCaskill. Thank you so much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen, for all your service
and for the men and women who sit behind you, not just on
behalf of all the troops you represent, but you, personally. I
know you've spent many years downrange.
General Austin, I want to return to the topic Senator
McCain was addressing about our airstrikes in Tikrit. So, do I
understand you correctly to say that there are now no Iranian
forces in Tikrit?
General Austin. The forces that are clearing Tikrit are ISF
forces, Special Operations Forces, and Federal police. And, as
of this morning, when I checked with my commanders, the Shiite
militia and PMF have pulled back.
Senator Cotton. So, by ``pull back,'' do we mean there are
still Shiite militias, like the Badr organization or even
Iranian forces from Quds Force, in the vicinity of Tikrit?
General Austin. I'm sure they're still in the area. I'm
sure that there are forces probably on the east side of the
river. And, as you know, Tikrit is--the city of Tikrit is on
the west side of the river.
Senator Cotton. Do we know the whereabouts of Qasem
Suleimani?
General Austin. To my understanding, Qasem Suleimani is--
you know, my last update, he was not in Tikrit or in that area.
Senator Cotton. In any way have we implemented fire control
measures to ensure that we don't strike any of the Shiite
paramilitary forces or Iranian elements that are in the
vicinity of Tikrit?
General Austin. We certainly have--we've caused the Iraqi
Security Forces to develop a scheme of maneuver that can
effectively accomplish the mission of clearing the town. And
our fires are supportive of that effort. And so, we're focused
on that. We always do everything that we can to ensure that
there's not excessive collateral damage. But, our focus is on
the ISF forces that we're supporting.
Senator Cotton. Would you consider it collateral damage if
members of the Quds Force, to include Qasem Suleimani, was in
the vicinity of an American airstrike?
General Austin. I would consider that unintended
consequences.
Senator Cotton. Does Qasem Suleimani have freedom of
movement within Iraq?
General Austin. I believe he does, Senator.
Senator Cotton. General Votel, 6 months ago, President
Obama cited Yemen as a example of a success of our
counterterrorism strategy. Do you believe Yemen is a success
story today?
General Votel. Certainly with the withdrawal of our SOF
forces over the weekend, it's certainly put us in a different
posture right now, particularly against the threat that we were
focused on, there, of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. So,
it's much more challenging today than it was when we had people
on the ground.
Senator Cotton. General Austin, do you consider Yemen a
success story today?
General Austin. Certainly Yemen is a very troubled country
today, with the challenges that it's facing and the activity of
the Houthis. And so, I think the country's in turmoil.
Senator Cotton. General Austin, approximately 10 months
ago, the President released five Taliban commanders in exchange
for Bowe Bergdahl, who yesterday was charged with desertion by
his chain of command. I believe their house arrest agreement
expires in 2 months. Is that correct?
General Austin. I believe that to be correct, Senator.
Senator Cotton. Do we know what will happen to those five
Taliban commanders in 2 months in Qatar when that agreement
expires?
General Austin. I don't, Senator.
Senator Cotton. Will they have freedom of movement both
inside and outside Qatar at that point?
General Austin. I think that's--I would probably have to
consult the Qatar Government--Qatari government and also the
elements in our government that are charged with monitoring the
movement of these elements. So, I can't answer that, Senator. I
can take that for the record and try to do the research on it.
Senator Cotton. I would like to get an answer for that for
the record. Thank you, General Austin.
And I'll address this to General Austin and General
Rodriguez. Given the situation in Yemen, if there were action
by militants there to block the Mandeb Strait, I presume that
American forces would immediately act to reopen that strait.
General Austin. We would work in conjunction with our GCC
partners to ensure that those straits remain open. It's one of
our core interests, to ensure that we have free flow of
commerce through both straits.
General Rodriguez. Yes, sir. We'd also work with both the
host nations of Africa as well as our European partners to
support those efforts, sir.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen. I appreciate your
answers. And, once again, I appreciate your service to our
country.
Chairman McCain. For the record, I'd like a response to
Senator Cotton's question. Do you consider Yemen a success
story, or not? Yes or no. It's pretty simple, straightforward
question.
General Austin. It's currently not a success story, sir.
Chairman McCain. General Votel?
General Votel. I agree, Senator, it's not a success story
today.
Chairman McCain. Thank you very much.
Senator King.
Senator King. When the President made that statement, he
was talking about our antiterrorism efforts against AQAP, was
he not, General Votel?
General Votel. I believe that's correct, Senator.
Senator King. He wasn't talking about Yemen, itself. He was
talking about the success of our counterterrorism against AQAP.
Naturally, the deterioration of the situation in Yemen has
compromised that.
My followup question is, How much has it compromised it?
Are we able to maintain that counterterrorism effort against
AQAP, or is that in abeyance, pending the dust settling in
Yemen?
General Votel. Well, I think right now, Senator--I think
what we'll obviously be doing is working in conjunction with
General Austin's headquarters and our other partners in the
area to try to look at how we regain situational awareness and
understanding of what's happening on the ground, and then look
at how we can continue to address the threats that emanate from
Yemen.
Senator King. Thank you.
I'd like to just briefly associate myself with Senator
McCaskill's comments about using OCO to solve the sequestration
problem. It obviously doesn't go the base budget. And it's
unpaid for. It's just absolutely the wrong way to approach this
problem. And I hope that Congress can find a more realistic and
responsible solution to sequestration.
Also, General Austin--again, without--because you've talked
to Senator Donnelly about this--it seems to me that it's
critically important that we use the leverage that we have,
which apparently was used in the Tikrit battle, to be sure that
this isn't a Shiite militia-led offensive. Because if this
becomes another version of a war of Shiites against Sunnis,
we've lost. This has to be inclusive. And I hope that your
relationship with the--with President Abadi and the Iraqi
government emphasizes that, because it's--it's just essential
to a successful outcome in Iraq, regardless of the short-term
strategic advantage in Tikrit or Mosul or--would you agree with
that?
General Austin. Sir, I would. And I would say, further,
that we take--I take every opportunity to emphasize those exact
points to the leadership in Iraq when I engage them.
Senator King. And it sounds like that--this airstrikes in
the last couple of days in Tikrit were, in fact, conditioned on
that kind of consideration. Is that correct?
General Austin. That's correct, sir. This operation had to
be under the control of the Government of Iraq and Iraqi
Security Forces. There had to be a force, once the city is
cleared, to maintain stability in that city. And that force
needs to be an Iraqi Security Force. And so, those things--
those conditions were met, early on, in terms of the planning
and the synchronization. And so, we were able to provide them
some support.
Senator King. Well, I certainly hope you stay that, but I
think you can argue that a lot of the problems we're having in
Iraq now are because of the Maliki government's failure to be
inclusive. And we can't make that mistake again.
Let's turn for a moment to Afghanistan. We heard a
wonderful, strong, passionate speech from President Ghani this
week. I'm concerned that we're still in a calendar-driven
status in Afghanistan. And even though the President has
allowed troops to stay through 2015, the--we're still talking
about Kabul-only at the end of 2016. Do you believe that's
going to be sufficient in order to support the Afghans? I mean,
we've made such progress there. I would just hate to see us
pull out, in terms of air support, authorities for air support,
and train-and-direct services. Give me your thoughts on that.
General Austin. Sir, I certainly agree with you that the
new leadership in Afghanistan causes all of us to be encouraged
and optimistic. And I think, from what I've seen both President
Ghani do and also the CEO [Chief Executive Officer] Abdullah
do, in terms of reaching out to the international community, in
terms of reaching out to the folks in the region as well, it's
all encouraging. The relationships with the security forces,
they're supportive of the security forces. Their statements of
common goals with the U.S., I think, all very encouraging.
So, I think this gives us opportunities--new opportunities
that, you know, we didn't have before. And we really have to
think about what we want our relationship to be with
Afghanistan, going forward, and what it means for the region.
Senator King. Well, I certainly hope you will counsel the
White House to think seriously about what I would consider a
modest additional investment to maintain the tremendous gains
that have been had. It's not for sure that the regime in--or
the Government of Afghanistan can withstand the Taliban on
their own. And, after what we've invested over the past 13
years, to walk away at the--at 5 minutes of midnight and see it
all collapse, I think would be a real shame. So, I hope you
will urge that on the policymakers, based upon General Campbell
and the other information you're receiving from the field. They
need not only those troops, but they need authorities, they--
President Ghani talked about air support. I think that's going
to be crucial. So, carry that message, will you, sir?
Chairman McCain. Senator Ernst.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Gentlemen, thank you very much for being here today, and
also to your staff. Thank you for your many years of combined
service to the United States.
General Votel, I just want to mention, in your testimony
today--I would like to thank you for mentioning not only our
Active Duty forces, but the Reserve and National Guard
components, your operators, your logisticians, your analysts,
and so forth. It's all one team, one fight. So, I appreciate
you acknowledging that today.
Something else that you brought up, and a couple of others
have mentioned, too, is stress and suicide with our Active Duty
members and with our veterans, those that have gotten off of
Active Duty. It is important that we continue with resiliency
programs and making sure that, not only are they physically fit
for the fight, but they're mentally fit, as well. So, thank you
for bringing that forward. A number of us are working on
initiatives to make sure that they are well cared for.
I would like to address my question and thoughts--General
Austin and General Votel. Last week was the 12th anniversary of
our entrance into Iraq with the Iraq War. We've had 3,000--
excuse me--4,000 American servicemen and -women that have lost
their lives in Iraq. And we've had another 40,000 that have
been injured in that war. And I want to thank you for your
service in that war. I know all of you have engaged, at one
point or another, in the war in Iraq. Many of our servicemen
and -women will come home with not only invisible injuries, but
physical injuries that will impact their lives for many, many
years. But, before we ever entered into Iraq on March 20th of
2003, the Iraqi Kurds were already engaged and preparing the
battlefield before we ever got there. They have been an
important part of our effort in Iraq. And so, I would like your
thoughts on involving--more involvement of the Iraqi Kurds, the
Peshmerga, in this fight, and, really, what their role has been
from 2003 forward. If you would please address that.
General Austin?
General Austin. Thank you, Senator.
And I agree. You know, I was, as you probably know, with
the elements when we went into Iraq, 12 years ago. And--
whereas, I didn't initially make it all the way up to
Kurdistan, I can tell you that what the Kurds were doing in the
north at that point in time was very instrumental to the
forces, our forces that followed in or flowed in later and
facilitated our work there.
Most recently, with their efforts in the current fight
against ISIL, they really have done a terrific job. And, you
know, I've talked with President Barzani and his staff, on
numerous occasions, about, you know, what we're doing, what the
requirements were, and what they needed to do more. As you look
at what they've done in the north up there, in terms of
actually inflicting damage on ISIL, I think their efforts have
really shaped this overall fight in a very positive direction.
And they continue to do more on a daily basis. So, they're a
big part of this fight. They've punched above their weight
class, and I think they will continue to do so.
Senator Ernst. General Votel?
General Votel. Thank you, Senator.
I absolutely agree with what General Austin said. I would
only add that a key part of the Kurdish relationship really has
been the long-term relationship with them. And so, they were a
key partner with SOF forces when we were there from 2003
through 2011, and helped us address a variety of networks. And
I do believe that the great and enduring relationship that we
have had with them, from a SOF force to Kurdish force aspect,
really was one of the initial successes we were able to achieve
when we went back in there late last summer. We were able to
quickly renew those relationships, draw on those partnerships,
and get going very, very quickly in some areas. And so, that--
to me, that highlights the importance of that--of the long-term
relationship that we've been able to develop with them.
Senator Ernst. Do you believe that our resources would be
best utilized if we were directly arming the Peshmerga, the
Kurdish forces?
General Votel. Well, that, I think, is a policy question.
Certainly, they are very capable forces. And so, I do think
they would make good use of any resources that are provided to
them.
Senator Ernst. Yes, I think they have been an exceptional
force and ally to our American forces in that region.
Thank you very much, gentlemen, for your service, and also
to your staff for being here in support today.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman McCain. Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, to the witnesses, for your strong testimony
this morning.
I want to begin with Yemen. I was intrigued with the
account in news this morning about the Saudi and other action
in Yemen; and, in particular, the number of partners that have
been part of this. In addition to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain,
Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Jordan, Morocco, there is press report that
Egypt is involved, and, perhaps a little surprisingly, Pakistan
and Sudan. So, nine nations, in addition to Saudi Arabia,
springing into action to deal with this threat of the Houthi
takeover of the government in Yemen.
I'm gratified by that. I want to see a region that will
stand up and try to deal with its own problems, rather than
telling us, you know, quietly, that they think it's a problem,
and not doing anything.
But, I was also struck by the fact that those nine nations
haven't come together and acted with dispatch against ISIL.
They're involved, but they are not acting with dispatch against
ISIL, even nearly a year into ISIL's sort of accelerated taking
of territory in Syria and Iraq.
And, just--you know, as experts who have spent a lot of
time in the region, what explains why these nine nations would
react with such speed and force to the Houthi takeover in
Yemen, but would not be so engaged in the fight against ISIL?
General Austin. Sir, like you, I am very encouraged that
we've seen what we've seen here in--recently, with a number of
nations coming together to address a problem. The core of these
nations is--are GCC nations. And I certainly believe that they
all think that Yemen is a very critical piece of real estate,
just based upon the geography. Most important, it shares a
border with Saudi Arabia and Oman. And I think--so, the GCC
countries are naturally predisposed to helping protect another
GCC country. And then, the relationships between the Saudis and
the Egyptians and others are really what's driving their
participation there.
I would remind you, Senator--I know you are very, very well
aware of this, but--the night that we flew into Syria for the
first time, we had five Sunni Arab-led nations fly in that
formation with us, which is really unprecedented. And we
continue to see them offer material support, and they also have
offered to train and equip forces. But, throughout, they have
remained with us, in terms of flying strikes against Syria. So,
they have continued to participate in that. Now, as they begin
to focus on the Yemen problem, naturally, because of resources,
we'll probably see less of an effort in Syria.
Senator Kaine. The--you indicated that you thought--in
response to earlier questioning--that you thought that ISIL was
our most pressing challenge, but Iran was our greatest long-
term challenge. Is a possible explanation for the force of the
action against Yemen is that all of these nations believe that
Iran is their more pressing challenge, and actually don't think
of ISIL as the same kind of pressing challenge that they view
when they look at Iran?
General Austin. I can attest to the fact that they do see
ISIL as a pressing challenge, sir. I do think that a big driver
here is that--you know, that the geography associated with
this--Yemen border, Saudi, and Oman--and clearly a direct
threat to their homeland. So----
Senator Kaine. Each of you work in the military lane, but
with partners. Partners: State, AID, DOJ, DEA, DHS, the intel
agencies. There's been questions here about the effect of
sequester on the military mission. But, would you not also
agree that, to the extent that sequester affects your allied
agencies that you work with in your COCOMs or in Special
Forces, that that is also an aspect of sequester that we need
to take seriously if we're trying to avoid challenges to our
National security?
General Austin. I agree, Senator.
General Rodriguez. I do, too, Senator.
General Votel. I definitely agree, Senator.
Senator Kaine. General Rodriguez, the attack in Tunisia was
particularly troubling. Tunisia, small country, but, you know,
kind of a bright spot, in a way, in terms of how they have come
out of the Arab Spring with a constitution, with Islamic
parties participating in democracy, even stepping back from
power. What has your observation been about the Tunisian
government's--newly formed, newly elected government's reaction
to the terrorist attack at the museum in Tunisia? And what's
your assessment of how they are, going forward, and how we can
help them succeed?
General Rodriguez. I think that their response has been
very effective. Their military institutions are strong and was
also a stabilizing influence as that--they went through that
transition. And we continue to work with them to build some of
their capacities with some of our interagency partners. Those
elements were involved in that effort. And we continue to also
share intelligence with them. And we will continue to build up
their capacity to ensure that they continue to move in a
positive trajectory, sir.
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Sullivan.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, gentlemen, thank you for your service.
Mr. Chairman, I want to let--wanted to let you know, 10
years ago, as a Marine Corps major, I had the privilege of
serving with General Austin. And I can tell you he's one of the
finest officers I've ever served with. So, I'm very heartened
that he's in this very important position.
Chairman McCain. He's not generally very nice to Marines,
so I'm glad to hear that.
[Laughter.]
Senator Sullivan. I see he's got one there on his staff,
so, keeping in full tradition of the CENTCOM respect for the
Marine Corps, I appreciate that.
General Votel, I wanted to ask you a question relating to--
really some clarification. You know, one of the things I think
it's very important for us, in the Congress and in the military
and in the administration, is to speak with language that's--
gives our citizens a sense of what's really happening. And one
of the things that you hear a lot about now--President, the
administration, talks a lot about, you know, ``winding down
combat operations,'' ``combat operations are over,'' ``we've
ended combat operations in Afghanistan.'' That's been stated
several times. The President of Afghanistan even mentioned that
in a joint session of Congress yesterday. But, you also
mentioned that we have a robust CT [Counter Terrorism] effort.
So, aren't we kind of speaking out of both sides of our mouths?
Isn't a robust CT effort the very definition of combat
operations? And don't we still have combat operations going on
in Afghanistan?
General Votel. We are--Senator, thanks for the question--we
are obviously supporting our Afghan partners in their execution
of what could be termed as combat operations, at their effort.
To your first part of your question with respect to, you
know, counterterrorism, you know, counterterrorism, I think,
is--as we pursue this here, isn't--is not just the kinetic
aspect of it. And----
Senator Sullivan. But, it is kind of the epitome of combat
operations.
General Votel. It is----
Senator Sullivan. Aren't American soldiers, when they're
conducting combat operations in Afghanistan, or
counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan--isn't that the
definition of combat operations? They're going in with weapons,
killing bad guys. Correct?
General Votel. We are not doing that today. What we----
Senator Sullivan. There's no----
General Votel.--are doing----
Senator Sullivan. There's no CT operations where we're
engaged----
General Votel. There are----
Senator Sullivan.--with the enemy?
General Votel. There are CT operations. But, CT operations
involve not only helping and enabling our partners, who are
helping us with our CT objectives, the conduct of discreet
action that we are taking, like kinetic strikes that are
specifically against threats there, and then how we address the
overall ideology and narrative aspect of this. So, there----
Senator Sullivan. But, our CT operations are not members of
the U.S. military in action against enemy forces?
General Votel. Right now, today, we are not putting people
as--in unilateral United States operations in against forces on
the ground in Afghanistan. We are supporting our Afghan
partners as we get after those, and we are doing other
operations related to those networks.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. I--again, I think that
clarification is important, just because--seems to me if we
have Special Forces operators in Afghanistan, in direct combat,
we should let the American people know. But, if you're saying
that's not the case, that there's no combat going on, there's
no SF actions, direct actions, against al-Qaeda operatives or
anything else like that--is that----
General Votel. Senator, I'm not saying there's no combat
going on. What I'm saying is, there's no unilateral U.S. combat
going on. We are working through our partners when we do
operations on the ground.
Senator Sullivan. Do we have JTACs [Joint Terminal Attack
Controllers] on the ground, either in Syria or Iraq, calling in
missions?
General Votel. We have JTACs that are operating at command-
and-control locations----
Senator Sullivan. But, they're not on the ground----
General Votel. They're----
Senator Sullivan.--front-line troops calling in----
General Votel. They're certainly not accompanying forces
forward, doing operations.
Senator Sullivan. General Austin, I was wondering--you
know, you mentioned the whole-of-government approach with
regard to ISIL. I appreciate that. Appreciate the fact that
you're focused on the military aspects of that. But, what are
the other instruments of power that we're bringing to bear with
regard to--American power with regard to ISIL? And--I just
haven't really seen the administration articulate that at all.
You mentioned it in your testimony. I think that's very
encouraging. But, what is it? We haven't really seen it. Again,
I know it's not your realm that you're responsible for, but it
would be heartening to know what other instruments of our
American power we're integrating to the fight with regard to
defeating ISIS.
General Austin. There are a couple of important things that
have to be done, Senator, as you know, in order to really
defeat this enemy. The kinetic piece of it's one issue. But,
you really have to take--do some very constructive things to
begin to cut off the enemy's ability to resource themselves.
So, countering the threat financing is one issue. And then
stopping the flow of foreign fighters, or slowing down the flow
of foreign fighters. Both of those issues have to be worked by,
you know, our government--whole-of-government, and they have to
be worked in conjunction with other countries, not only in the
region, but internationally.
And also, there is a requirement or a need to counter the
narrative. And so, I think we have to do more there. I know
there are some initial steps that have been taken to begin to
do that, but there's a lot of work yet to be done.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Chairman.
I want to thank the witnesses for being here and for what
you've done for our country, and continue to do.
I wanted to ask, General Austin again, a couple of
questions about Yemen. Senator Kaine had pointed out that there
were--in addition to the Saudis, there were nine other
countries that were participating in this coalition to assist
in Yemen. So, just to be clear, we've been, obviously,
participating, State Department side, on negotiations with Iran
for--very intensely, probably for the last year, at least, if
not more. And during that period, what has Iran been doing in
Yemen? And is it not the fact that Iran's influence in support
of the Houthis which is, in part, prompting the Saudis and
others to engage in this?
General Austin. Certainly, Senator, Iran is--has been
enabling the activity of the Houthis as they've done what
they've done. And I would go further to say that, you know,
Iran's desire is to be a hegemon in this region.
Senator Ayotte. Meaning regional domination.
General Austin. Right. Right.
Senator Ayotte. Yeah.
General Austin. And it--as it seeks to increase its
influence in various countries, it does so through the reach of
the Shiite populations in those countries. That won't allow
Iran to dominate any specific country in the region, but what
it does do is, it increases--it serves to increase sectarian
tension, and thereby, it serves as a destabilizing effort.
Senator Ayotte. Let me just be clear. When we're talking
support, both--I know, General Votel, you're familiar with
this, as well--when we're talking about the support, we're
talking about money and arms, aren't we? I mean, we're not just
talking about, ``Boy, we support you, because you're Shiite.''
I mean, we're talking about actual support. Aren't they
giving--on the ground?
General Austin. Yes, we--yes, Senator, we are talking about
material support, as well. And--but, again, I think that
support is provided through the Shiite----
Senator Ayotte. Through their proxies----
General Austin. Right.
Senator Ayotte.--they give them the money and the arms,
which has undermined our interests in the mission that we had,
and cooperation that we had, to try to deal with al-Qaeda.
Isn't that right, General Votel? In Yemen?
General Votel. I--yes, Senator, I think it is true.
Senator Ayotte. So, the other thing I wanted to ask about,
General Austin, is Bahrain. We have an important partnership in
Bahrain, do we not? In fact, we have the location there of the
United States 5th Fleet, correct?
General Austin. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Ayotte. And what's Iran doing with regard to the
Bahrain Government right now, which is a Sunni government? As I
understand it, they are also trying to destabilize that
government, which, of course, would, in my view, threaten our
interests there.
General Austin. Correct, Senator. We see the same reach
through the Shiite population, which increases sectarian
tension and serves as a destabilizing effect.
Senator Ayotte. Which--you know, obviously, Bahrain is a
different country than Yemen, but it's a similar playbook in a
different country, is it not?
General Austin. It's a similar approach. I----
Senator Ayotte. Similar approach, but I--I mean, obviously,
they're very different countries.
General Austin. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. But, I think we need to be clear here what
Iran's activities have been. And, as I look at your testimony,
you--one of the things you pointed out, General Austin, is that
the Iran routinely engages in malign activity through the
Iranian threat network. Iran is also engaging in malign
activity through support to proxy actors, such as Lebanese
Hezbollah and Hamas, which threatens the sovereignty and
security of Israel. This has all been going on in addition to
undermining our interests in Yemen, correct?
General Austin. That's correct.
Senator Ayotte. So, you know, this is obviously, I think,
as we look at this issue of the regional--attempt at regional
domination by Iran, this is of deep concern to us, in the long
term, and even in the short term, in terms of how this region
can be destabilized further. Is that true?
General Austin. There is a significant concern, for a long
time--long-term effects, in terms of this type of behavior
destabilizing the region and having effects in other parts of
the globe, as well.
Senator Ayotte. And, in fact, I think could further fuel
sort of a Sunni-Shiite fight in the region if they continue
their efforts towards regional domination. Would you agree?
General Austin. Yeah, I would.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
I just wanted to comment, as well, on Senator Cotton's
question to you about the status of the Taliban five. And I
know that you're going to get back to him on it, but I have to
say, I find it shocking, the fact that you are Commander of
AFRICOM and that the State Department has not already
coordinated with you. It's not--not putting this on you, is--my
point is, the fact that we've got these dangerous--you're--you
know, you're the Commander of CENTCOM. These two countries,
Qatar and also where the Taliban five is from and could return
and could prevent--and present great danger into Afghanistan.
It would seem to me that you would be, I would hope, most
closely consulted on this. So, I'm actually kind of dumfounded
that they aren't consulting you now and that there doesn't
appear to be a plan.
So, you know, I look forward to the followup, but, you
know, to the State Department, to everyone else out there, to
this administration, seems to me the Commander of CENTCOM needs
to be brought in this, in terms of the five potential
commanders that could get back on the ground in Afghanistan and
threaten our troops.
Chairman McCain. Senator Lee.
Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thanks, to all of you here today, and to the men and
women who serve under your command, and all you do to help
protect us.
Last year, I expressed some reluctance regarding the Syria
train-and-equip program, based on concerns that any lethal
assistance that we may provide might end up inadvertently--or,
in some cases, perhaps purposely--end up in the hands of some
of the very extremists that we're attempting to fight against.
And that could possibly fuel further violence in the region.
While I believe that the servicemembers who are under your
command, who are in the process of executing this program, are
the most skilled in the world at what they do--and that's
really what gives this program the very best chance of
success--the losses of United States-provided equipment by the
Iraqi Security Forces last year, and in Yemen this year, are
stark lessons that the fluid and volatile nature of the Middle
East can compromise even our best-laid plans.
I'm further concerned that, for this program to have the
best chance of success, the United States will need to become
more militarily involved in this conflict than many Americans
may realize.
Secretary Carter stated recently, when referring to the
forces that we train and equip in Syria, that, quote, ``We will
have some obligation to support them after they're trained,''
close quote. Yet, we don't know what that support would look
like, nor do we know, at this point, what the costs associated
with that would look like.
This program, as part of the administration's strategy to
address the ISIS threat, should be fully and openly debated in
this body so that the American people might have a say in how
their military forces are used.
General Austin, since this program was conceptualized, it
was reasonable to expect a situation in which Syrian rebels we
armed might face a larger or better-equipped army--larger or
better-equipped enemy. Why was the decision made to start the
train-and-equip program--why was that decision made before
determining whether the United States would provide further
protection or support for the groups once they were trained and
equipped and returned to Syria?
General Austin. It was made because we will need a--an
element on the ground to complement the work that we're doing
with our fires to begin to counter ISIL in Syria. And, you
know, my best military advice as we go forward is that, as we
introduce forces that we've trained and equipped, then we
should provide them support. We should not only look to provide
them fires, we should provide them logistics, we should provide
them intel support, as well. And so, I think that gives them
the best opportunity for success.
Senator Lee. So, do you think that Assad's forces in Syria
will attempt to attack some of these opposition members that
we've trained and equipped? And, if so, what level of military
involvement should we expect from American forces?
General Austin. I think there's a likelihood that that can
happen. We'll try to--initially, as we put forces in and begin
to build combat power, we'll put them in those positions where
they are focused on ISIL. That's the first task at hand. And
then, again, if they are attacked, then I think we should
protect them.
Senator Lee. What do we do if the forces that we train and
equip end up attacking Assad's forces?
General Austin. Well, initially, that's not the--that's not
what we--we're focused on. So, we will discontinue providing
support to those forces if they vector off and do things that
we haven't designed them to do initially and asked them to
focus on initially.
Senator Lee. Do you think that the success of the
opposition groups that we're training and equipping, that we're
supporting, do you think that'll require a new governing
structure in Damascus? And, if so, would the U.S. military be
involved in helping to facilitate that change?
General Austin. I think eventually forces will need to plug
into some type of structure, for sure. And again, that's not
what the military typically does. But, again, this is a whole-
of-government approach, here, so----
Senator Lee. Okay, thank you, General Austin.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. General, I'd just like to follow up on
what Senator Lee said. In Syria, these young people we are
training and we send them back into Syria, if they're attacked
by Assad, we're not going to protect them?
General Austin. Sir, I----
Chairman McCain. Are we going to protect them?
General Austin. My thought--my recommendation would be that
we protect them, no matter who's attacking them. So, we have to
protect these forces once we've trained them and put them on
the ground.
Chairman McCain. Well, are we going to have any provision
to protect them?
General Austin. We currently don't have that, that policy
decision, sir. But, as I----
Chairman McCain. So, we're going to train them to go back
into Syria; and, if Bashar Assad barrel-bombs them, we don't
have a policy yet as to whether we protect them, or not?
General Austin. We--currently, sir, that decision has not
been taken, and----
Chairman McCain. Well, then why are we training them if
we're not going to be able to tell them that we're not going
to--whether we're going to protect them, or not?
General Austin. I'm very hopeful that we will be able to
tell them that, sir.
Chairman McCain. Well, I'm very hopeful, too. But, hope
really doesn't stop barrel-bombing.
Could you--could I ask you again when it is that the Saudis
notified you that they were going to begin attacks in Yemen?
General Austin. Sir, I had a discussion with the Saudi CHOD
the day of the attack, so it was not much before that they
actually started the attacks.
Chairman McCain. Isn't that quite a commentary on our
relationship with Saudi Arabia and the other 13 countries in
their coalition, that they would--on literally the day of their
attacks, they tell you that--tell the United States of America
that they're going to launch a major campaign? I mean, that is
really a fantastic indicator of the deterioration of the trust
and confidence that these countries, particularly Saudi Arabia,
have in us. And it authenticates what has been quoted quite
frequently, that some people believe it's better to be an enemy
of the United States than a friend. And--I mean, this is really
quite remarkable.
And again, finally, I do not know how you recruit young
people to fight, and tell them that they're going to back in to
a country, and we don't have a policy yet whether we're going
to protect them, or not. General, that's immoral. It's not only
unworkable, it's immoral to tell people to not--to tell the--be
able to tell them that, if we train and equip them to go in and
fight, that we're not going to--that we haven't yet got a
policy on whether we're going to protect them, or not. I would
say that that would also be something of a disincentive for
recruitment.
So, I hope, for the sake of these young people's lives that
we are training now, that we at least have a policy decision as
to whether we're going to protect them, or not. And, of course,
the best way to do that is with a no-fly zone, which has been
recommended, years ago, without any result from this President.
Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to follow the Chairman's line of questioning. So,
what do you believe the strategy is for this new campaign? And
what's the ultimate goal? In Yemen, sorry.
General Austin. I don't know what the Saudis--the specifics
of their goals and objectives. I can tell you that they're
interested, number one, in protecting their homeland--they have
a border with Yemen, obviously--and also, that they received
requests from the President of Yemen to help with military
assistance. So----
Senator Gillibrand. What advice have you given, or will you
give, the President about what our role should be?
General Austin. Our current position is that we'll help the
Saudis with intelligence and logistics and planning support.
And again, they're great partners, and I think they're very
much appreciative of the help that we'll provide them.
Senator Gillibrand. What's your assessment of the
likelihood of success?
General Austin. In Yemen?
Senator Gillibrand. Yes.
General Austin. Again, Senator, I don't currently know the
specific goals and objectives of the Saudi campaign. And I'd
have to know that to be able to assess the likelihood of
success.
Senator Gillibrand. Well, I do hope you get that
information sooner than later, because, you know, more than
$500 million in United States military assistance to Yemen can
no longer be accounted for and has fallen into the wrong hands.
We have a role in Yemen that we have to have much greater
accountability for. How does something like that happen? And,
given the instability in the region, what steps should the U.S.
be taking to protect or prevent losses like that in the future?
General Austin. Yeah, so the $500 million, as I understand
it, Senator, were--is the amount of investment over an 8-year
period that we've made to help the Yemeni government, the
Yemeni military forces, or security forces, build capacity.
This not only includes materials, but it also includes
training. And, as you know, training can be somewhat costly.
When we are there, we have the ability to monitor how this
equipment's being used. But, of course, you know, the embassy's
no longer there, and it doesn't have a Office of Security
Cooperation that would typically do these things. And so, we
don't have that ability, currently. If we have the opportunity
to go back in and partner with the new government, or a
government, then I think, you know, that'll be a--one of our
focus areas.
Senator Gillibrand. Well, given that the Houthis are still
in control, how do you believe we should deal with al-Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula, given the state of Yemen?
General Austin. Thanks, Senator. I think that, as we have
done and will continue to do in every case where we don't have
people on the ground but there is a threat there that we need
to concerned about, we'll use every intelligence-collection
capability that's available to us to continue to monitor what's
going on with this extremist network. And we do have resources
that are in the region that we can use to apply to counter this
network once we've developed the appropriate intelligence.
Senator Gillibrand. And what do you see is the presence of
ISIL in the region? And is that going to be affected by the
state of Yemen today?
General Austin. If I could get you to--if I could ask a
question on--get you to ask that question again, Senator, I
missed a piece of it. How do I see----
Senator Gillibrand. How do you see the threat of ISIL in
that region?
General Austin. Well, I think the threat of ISIL in the
region, Senator, is the most pressing threat that we're facing.
And, as I----
Senator Gillibrand. In Yemen. I'm still on Yemen.
General Austin. In Yemen, that's really undetermined. I
know that the most recent attack was attributed to an ISIL
element in Yemen, but I think the intelligence agencies are
still working their way through that, you know, to determine
the veracity of whether or not this is really a hardcore ISIL
element or someone claiming to be ISIL or, you know, what this
really is. Clearly, AQAP [Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula] is
dominant in that country. And whether or not ISIL and AQAP can
coexist is left to be seen.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you very much.
Chairman McCain. I thank the witnesses, and----
Senator Cotton. Senator McCain, can----
Chairman McCain. Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. One point, to follow up on something that
he just said. There's a Breaking News Alert from the Associated
Press, General Austin, that Egypt and Saudi Arabia have begun a
ground incursion into Yemen. Did Saudi Arabia or any other
country give you or Central Command advance notice of this, if
this report is accurate?
General Austin. No, I did not have advance notice of that.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. That's quite a commentary.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:37 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
1. Senator Wicker. General Austin and General Rodriguez, U.S.
Africa Command (AFRICOM) and certain regions of U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM) have suffered from resource shortfalls, particularly when it
comes to persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR).
Last year, General Rodriguez testified before our Committee that
only 11 percent of his ISR requirements were being met. I also
understand that dynamic battle lines in Syria and Iraq have also
escalated CENTCOM's demand for persistent ISR. How much of your ISR
requirements are currently being met?
General Austin. [Deleted.]
General Rodriguez. [Deleted.]

2. Senator Wicker. General Austin and General Rodriguez, can you
describe how resource shortfalls impact your ability to accomplish your
missions?
General Austin. [Deleted.]
General Rodriguez. [Deleted.]

3. Senator Wicker. General Austin and General Rodriguez, Congress
will do what it can to expedite delivery of the tools you need in the
field. Will you provide to the committee a written list of your
Combatant Commander Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs) as they
relate to ISR?
General Austin. [Deleted.]
General Rodriguez. USAFRICOM does not have any active JUONs.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
detention policy
4. Senator Ayotte. General Austin, General Rodriguez, and General
Votel, if we capture Ayman al-Zawahiri tonight, how much useful
intelligence do you think he would have?
General Austin. We believe it is likely that Ayman al-Zawahiri has
extensive knowledge of al-Qaeda's global network, which would include
plans for attacks against the West. Zawahiri may also have in his
possession a large cache of documents and electronic media which would
be valuable to the intelligence community.
General Rodriguez. [Deleted.]
General Votel. Capturing Zawahiri would be a significant victory
for all nations that have been engaged in counterterrorism operations
against al-Qaeda since 2001. Zawahiri has been the architect for al-
Qaeda's jihadist narrative for more than two decades and would be the
most senior al-Qaeda leader ever detained. Intelligence collection and
reporting on Zawahiri's activities have been limited since he became
the leader of al-Qaeda following the death of Usama bin Laden in May
2011. However, we believe Zawahiri could provide valuable information
regarding the status of operations that are being planned by the core
elements in Afghanistan/Pakistan and possibly by his affiliate groups
in Yemen, Syria, Somalia, and Algeria. Zawahiri could also provide an
understanding of his current and past relationships with the leaders of
the Taliban, Haqqani Network, and other affiliate groups that help to
form the Salafi-jihadist global network. Zawahiri could also describe
his succession plan for the organization, including the status of the
sons of senior al-Qaeda members who have been killed or captured (Bin
Laden sons and Abu Khayr al-Masri sons) or emerging leaders yet known
to the Intelligence Community and their potential to resurrect the next
generation of jihad for al-Qaeda. Finally, Zawahiri may provide ways to
help counter or undermine ISIL's activities using information
operations.

5. Senator Ayotte. General Austin, General Rodriguez, and General
Votel, how long do you think it might take to gather that information
from him?
General Austin. Any hard copy or electronic material recovered from
the capture of Ayman al-Zawahiri could be exploited relatively quickly,
to include at the point of capture. That said, we cannot predict with
certainty what or how much information of intelligence value Zawahiri
will reveal.
General Rodriguez. [Deleted.]
General Votel. If/when Zawahiri is detained, he would be
interrogated by the FBI-led High Value Interrogation Group (HIG) and
this question could best be answered by the HIG. With that said, if
Zawahiri was going to cooperate and provide information, the
debriefings could potentially last months. However, it should be
assumed that Zawahiri has been exposed to resistance training and he
may never divulge information of intelligence value.

6. Senator Ayotte. General Austin, General Rodriguez, and General
Votel, where would we detain and interrogate him?
General Austin. [Deleted.]
General Rodriguez. Where to interrogate al-Zawahiri is a decision
for senior U.S. policy makers.
General Votel. The capture of Zawahiri would occur under the
operational authority of the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) of
the location of the capture, with Special Operations Forces assigned in
support to that GCC. The location for the initial detention of Zawahiri
will be dependent on the circumstances of capture, including the
country in which he was located, the location of US forces and
facilities, and agreements we may have with coalition partners or the
country in which he was captured.
Among the options for detention of Zawahiri, assuming the US
intends to maintain full control of the target once captured, is
removing him to a location under US control. Options, therefore,
include removal to the continental US, to the Guantanamo Bay detention
facility, or to a US Navy ship at sea.
We could ask the host nation to hold Zawahiri in one of their
national facilities. Removal of Zawahiri to a third country member of
the coalition is a less likely course of action.
afghanistan
7. Senator Ayotte. General Austin and General Votel, from the
perspective of protecting our country and securing our interests,
please describe the importance of continuing to build the Afghans'
counterterrorism capabilities, as well as retaining a robust American
counterterrorism capability in Afghanistan to support our mutual
interests there.
General Austin. [Deleted.]
General Votel. A continued U.S. commitment to Afghanistan's
security efforts enables the lasting mutually beneficial relationships
needed to achieve U.S. objectives in the region to include ensuring
Afghanistan does not fracture into safe havens from which terrorist
organizations could attack the U.S. homeland. The Afghan Special
Security Forces (ASSF) is central to ensuring the relative stability
and security of Afghanistan over the long-term. These ASSF currently
conduct unilateral security operations and are integrated into the
Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior, maximizing strategic
effects. U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) continue to train,
advise, and assist ASSF in the areas of logistics and command and
control to ensure a sustainable counterterrorism capability and partner
in the region to help protect and secure U.S. interests.
By the end of 2016, we expect the ASSF to make significant
improvements to their core enabling functions. This is critical to U.S.
interests in the region as we will be reliant upon a capable ASSF
partner to conduct effective counterterrorism (CT) missions in
Afghanistan. To achieve these objectives, the Department of Defense is
making appropriate recommendations to the essential requirements to
accomplish the tasks as outlined in the global employment of the force
(GEF) directive and enable us to protect our vital national interests
in the region. These recommendations will ensure we are appropriately
resourced and authorized to conduct those activities essential for our
national security.
human rights oversight
8. Senator Ayotte. General Austin, General Rodriguez, and General
Votel, section 1204 of the 2015 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) prohibits funding or training foreign units that have committed
gross violations of human rights. Have there been any examples where a
violation of human rights was discovered and funding or training was
cut off until corrective measures were taken?
General Austin. Although instances of human rights violations have
significantly reduced in recent years, there have been reports of
potential violations that resulted in holds being placed on funding and
training pending corrective measures.
In Pakistan, there have been three high-profile equipment-related
cases impacted by derogatory Leahy vetting information in 2011-2012.
There also have been several training events planned by U.S. Special
Operations Forces units in Pakistan with the Special Services Group
that were cancelled between 2008-2010 due to a number of units failing
Leahy vetting. In Egypt, training for Military Police was halted due to
an Oct 2011 incident and training their Presidential Guard was halted
due to a Jul 2013 incident. In 2012, the Department of State placed a
hold on military grant assistance for Tajikistan after allegations of
human rights violations by military and security forces in Khorough. In
Afghanistan, while there have been allegations of human rights
violations by Afghan security forces, none have been validated
therefore no assistance has been cut off. However, several of the non-
validated reports have resulted in requests for exception to policy.
Lastly, all training and equipping was suspended for three Lebanese
Armed Forces Intervention Regiments after suspected human rights
violations in October 2012. Further investigation proved that just one
company-sized element in one of the Intervention Regiments was
involved; this finding allowed for the resumption of security
assistance.
CENTCOM is committed to complying with the Leahy provision and will
continue to closely monitor potential human rights violations and take
appropriate actions when necessary.
General Rodriguez. USAFRICOM is not aware of any cases where
training, equipment, or other assistance was provided then subsequently
cut off due to a gross violation of human rights. In every case where
vetting occurred and a gross violation of human rights was discovered,
training, equipment, or other assistance did not occur. Currently,
USAFRICOM has no cases submitted for remediation.
In FY14, 4001 cases from USAFRICOM AOR were vetted and approved,
\1\ 1265 were suspended, \2\ 17 wererejected, \3\ and 11 were
cancelled. We also suspect that ``self-selection'' occurs as our
Offices of Security Cooperation, Chiefs of Mission, and partner nations
steer the provision of training, equipment, and other assistance toward
units that will not present vetting problems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Approved: Case has successfully gone through Leahy Vetting and
training occurred.
\2\ Suspended: Case was suspended in the system for a variety of
reasons. Most common are administrative reasons such as duplicate
entries, change in training date, wrong information, wrong funding
codes, insufficient information unresolved hits for Gross Violations of
Human Rights (GVHR) (Rape, Torture, EJK, Forced Disappearance under the
cover of law), unresolved hits for NON-GVHR (Murder, Robbery, Assault,
other crimes committed by the individual, policy).
\3\ Rejected: Gross Violations of Human Rights (GVHR) (Rape,
Torture, EJK, Forced Disappearance under the cover of law), NON-GVHR
(Murder, Robbery, Assault, other crimes committed by the individual,
policy).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
General Votel. The short answer, from a Special Operations Forces-
event perspective, is ``no.'' I had the opportunity to review the
recent Congressional Report on the DOD Leahy Law that had an excellent
summary of the FY14 submissions and rejections. As I recall, out of the
more than 18,000 DOD-funded activities (not all of them SOF) that
required Human Rights Vetting, only 33 cases were rejected for Human
Rights issues. Most of these rejections were for individuals vice the
rejection of a complete unit. I think this illustrates that the
rejections are, by far, the exception, not the rule. For FY14 and FY15,
SOF have not had any events cancelled due to Human Rights issues. That
being said, there have been several cases that have involved
modifications to training activities due to the past behavior of one or
two individuals. In each of these cases, the Country Teams worked with
the appropriate Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) and SOCOM to
exclude the suspected individuals and proceed with the planned events.
The GCCs and Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) work very
closely with the Country Teams and will not even submit an event for
Human Rights Vetting, if there are concerns or knowledge that the unit
may be rejected.
I can tell you that almost all of the issues SOF have with the
Leahy Vetting process are administrative in nature, not actual
violations of human rights.

9. Senator Ayotte. General Austin, General Rodriguez, and General
Votel, generally speaking, do our partner nations holding their own
forces accountable if they commit unlawful or predatory acts against
their populations?
General Austin. Generally speaking, all countries do have the legal
framework and ability to hold their forces accountable if they commit
unlawful or predatory acts against their populations. And, in recent
years, we have seen marked improvements in the enforcement of those
laws and regulations made by many of our partner nations in CENTCOM's
area of responsibility. Of course, there is still room for improvement
in some areas, and reported human rights violations have resulted in
minor to moderate impacts on relevant security cooperation
relationships. Going forward, we will continue to closely monitor
potential violations and take appropriate actions where necessary.
General Rodriguez. Almost all countries in the USAFRICOM area of
responsibility have been the subject of reports of human rights abuses
and limited accountability. Generally speaking, our partners have
legislation and legal systems in place which require military forces to
be held accountable for unlawful acts against civilians. However, the
ability or political will to use those legal systems as intended to
prosecute unlawful acts is not always present, and USAFRICOM continues
to work with our partners to build this capacity.
General Votel. Generally speaking I believe that most countries
with whom we engage are genuinely trying to meet standards and
expectations with respect to protecting Human Rights. Two recent
examples come to mind: The government of Indonesia publically tried,
convicted, and punished several members of one of their elite units for
a serious crime they committed a few years ago. The second example is
currently playing out in Bangladesh where charges have been brought
against 25 officers from the Rapid Action Battalion for the killing of
seven people in April 2014. In contrast to these countries, and others
like them who are trying to ensure accountability, several countries
seem to accept the reality that some of their security force units will
probably never train with US forces, since there is no government
intention of submitting to remediation requirements.
special operations equipment
10. Senator Ayotte. General Votel, on March 26, the Associated
Press reported that six Army special operations units soon to deploy
have requested human information system software produced by a private
firm, but that the Army has only approved two requests and is instead
is pressuring troops to use the Distributed Common Ground System
(DCGS). Have all six of these requests now been met? Please provide
details. If not, please provide an explanation.
General Votel. The current requests from Army special operations
units are requesting a variant of the US Army's Distributed Common
Ground System (DCGS-A) while others are requesting an intelligence
Analysis tool. In each case, the Army special operations unit used the
U.S. Army's process of operational needs statements (ONS) to identify
urgent operational needs. USSOCOM has a similar process to address
urgent and compelling Special Operations-peculiar (SO-p) capability
gaps using a Combat Mission Needs Statement (CMNS) that the Army units,
US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), and Special Operations
Command Central (SOCCENT) did not invoke.
USSOCOM is aware of 7 ONS and the recent U.S. Army's decision to
validate the four most urgent ONS that support the deployed 1st and 5th
Special Forces Groups. USSOCOM is consulting with the U.S. Army at the
acquisition Program Manager level as they design and implement their
fielding plan to ensure interoperability with any SO-p equipment.
Three ONS from Army special operations units have not yet been
acted upon but are also for units that are not deploying to emergent
crisis. These ONS are still in the Army ONS process and have not yet
been validated. USASOC is conducting detailed analysis on the ONS and
will make recommendations and decisions within Army channels. The U.S.
Army is best postured to answer questions on their process, the status,
and Army fielding plans for the ONS.
quality of special operators
11. Senator Ayotte. General Votel, Special Operations experts long
have emphasized that special operators cannot be mass produced. As the
demand for special operations forces continues to increase, it is
important that standards not be lowered. At the Advanced Special
Operations Techniques Course, how many students have enrolled in each
course (for both East and West Coast locations) over the last 10 years?
General Votel. [For official use only.]

12. Senator Ayotte. General Votel, how many students have graduated
from each course over the last 10 years?
General Votel. [For official use only.]

13. Senator Ayotte. General Votel, how many instructors
administered each course over the last 10 years?
General Votel. [For official use only.]

14. Senator Ayotte. General Votel, has any incident occurred at
this course over the last 10 years that actually compromised or
threatened to compromise the course material, the nature of the course,
or any classified or sensitive methods, techniques, or information? If
so, please describe each incident and whether the offending student was
allowed to complete the course.
General Votel. There have been minor security incidents/violations
but no incidents which can be proven to have directly compromised or
threatened to compromise the course material to our knowledge.

15. Senator Ayotte. General Votel, at the Defense Advanced
Tradecraft Course, how many students have enrolled in each course over
the last 10 years?
General Votel. The Defense Advanced Tradecraft Course (DATC),
formerly Advanced Source Operations Course, is conducted by the HUMINT
Training-Joint Center of Excellence (HT-JCOE) at Fort Huachuca, AZ. The
Army serves as the executive agent for HT-JCOE, with the training
administration managed by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). In my
role as Commander USSOCOM, I do not have visibility on DATC and will
have to respectfully defer to the Army or DIA.

16. Senator Ayotte. General Votel, how many students have graduated
from each course over the last 10 years?
General Votel. The Army serves as the executive agent for Defense
Advanced Tradecraft Course (DATC), with the training administration
managed by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). In my role as
Commander USSOCOM, I do not have visibility on the number of students
graduating from the course over the last 10 years.

17. Senator Ayotte. General Votel, how many instructors
administered each course over the last 10 years?
General Votel. The Army serves as the executive agent for Defense
Advanced Tradecraft Course (DATC), with the training administration
managed by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). In my role as
Commander USSOCOM, I do not have visibility on the number of
instructors administering the course over the last 10 years.

18. Senator Ayotte. General Votel, how much has administering the
course cost for each of the last 10 years? If funding has decreased,
has it had any effect on the quality of each graduating class?
General Votel. The Army serves as the executive agent for Defense
Advanced Tradecraft Course (DATC), with the training administration
managed by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). In my role as
Commander USSOCOM, I do not have visibility on the costs administering
the course over the last 10 years.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
taliban 5
19. Senator Cotton. General Austin, both Qatar and Afghanistan are
in your area of responsibility (AOR). As you know the Taliban 5 are
currently in Qatar under what is nominally referred to as house arrest.
Are you aware of the press reports that one to three members of the
Taliban 5 have reengaged and are in violation of the Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU)?
General Austin. [Deleted.]

20. Senator Cotton. General Austin, in your opinion, are any of the
Taliban 5 currently taking actions, which could cause and incite
attacks against U.S. personnel, allies, or interests?
General Austin. [Deleted.]

21. Senator Cotton. General Austin, the Taliban 5 house arrest
expires in approximately 2 months. After this expiration, do you
believe that any of them will return to the fight against the U.S. or
our allies?
General Austin. [Deleted.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2016 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

----------

THURSDAY, APRIL 16, 2015

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES KOREA

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe,
Sessions, Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Tillis, Sullivan, Graham, Reed, McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, and
Heinrich.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman McCain. Good morning. The committee meets today to
receive testimony on U.S. Pacific Command [PACOM] and U.S.
Forces Korea.
I'd like to thank both of our witnesses, Admiral Locklear
and General Scaparrotti, for appearing before us today and for
their many years of distinguished service.
The past 3 months, this committee has received testimony
from many of America's most respected statesmen, thinkers, and
former military commanders. These leaders have all told us that
we are experiencing a more diverse and complex array of crises
than at any time since the end of World War II.
As we confront immediate challenges in Europe and the
Middle East, the United States cannot afford to neglect the
Asia-Pacific region, which Secretary Carter has called ``the
defining region for our Nation's future.'' Put simply, if the
21st century is to be another American century, the United
States must remain an Asia-Pacific power. Our national
interests in the Asia-Pacific are deep and enduring. We seek to
extend free trade, free markets, free navigation, and free
commons--air, sea, space, and now cyber. We seek to maintain a
balance of power that fosters the peaceful expansion of human
rights, democracy, rule of law, and many other values that we
share with increasing numbers of Asian citizens. And we seek to
defend ourselves and our allies by maintaining the capability
to prevent, deter, and, if necessary, prevail in a conflict.
Achieving these objectives will require sustained American
leadership. We must use all elements of our national power. In
particular, I am hopeful that Congress will pass trade
promotion authority for the Trans-Pacific Partnership [TPP].
This vital trade agreement will open new opportunities for
trade and level the playing field for American businesses and
workers, while sending a powerful strategic signal about
America's commitment to the Asia-Pacific.
Yet, we must remember that our soft power is the shadow
cast by our hard power. That's why the United States must
continue to sustain a favorable military balance in the region.
The Department of Defense [DOD] will need to update concepts of
operations with emerging military technology to enable our
military to operate in contested environments. From projecting
power over long distances and exploiting the undersea domain to
developing new precision-guided munitions and to investing in
innovative ways to build the resiliency of our forward-deployed
forces, we have a great deal of work to do if we aim to sustain
our traditional military advantages in the Asia-Pacific region.
None of these will be possible if we continue to live with
mindless sequestration and a broken acquisitions system.
As we build and posture forces to secure America's interest
in the Asia-Pacific, we must remain clear-eyed about the
implications of China's rise and its evolving foreign and
defense policy. As Director of National Intelligence James
Clapper told this committee back in February, China is engaged
in a rapid military modernization deliberately designed to
counteract or thwart American military strengths. I believe
China can and should play a constructive role in the Pacific--
Asia-Pacific region. Unfortunately in recent years, China has
behaved less like a responsible stakeholder and more like a
bully.
In the South China Sea, we have seen the latest example of
a trend toward more assertive behavior. China's land
reclamation and construction activities on multiple islands
across the Spratly Chain and the potential command-and-control,
surveillance, and military capabilities it could bring to bear
from these new land features are a challenge to the interests
of the United States and the Nations of the Asia-Pacific
region. Such unilateral efforts to change the status quo
through force, intimidation, or coercion threaten the peace and
stability that have extended prosperity across the Asia-Pacific
for 7 decades.
As I wrote in a letter, together with my colleagues,
Senator Reed, Corker, and Menendez, the United States must work
together with like-minded partners and allies to develop and
employ a comprehensive strategy that aims to shape China's
coercive peacetime behavior. This will not be easy and will
likely have impacts on other areas of our bilateral
relationship. But, if China continues to pursue a coercive and
escalatory approach to the resolution of maritime disputes, the
cost to regional security and prosperity, as well as to
American interests, will only grow.
I'm also concerned by the recent assessment from Admiral
Bill Gortney, the head of NORAD [North American Aerospace
Defense Command] in Northern Command, that North Korea has an
operational road-mobile missile that could carry nuclear
weapons to the United States. General Scaparrotti, I look
forward to hearing your assessment of this potential
breakthrough and the implications of our--to our national
security if the erratic and unpredictable regime of Kim Jung-Un
achieves the ability to carry out a nuclear strike against our
Homeland.
I thank the witnesses and look forward to their testimony.
Senator Reed.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me join you in welcoming Admiral Locklear and General
Scaparrotti. Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and
sacrifice, and that of your family. And, particularly, convey
to your men and women under your commands our deepest
appreciation for what they do every day.
On Tuesday, we had an extremely insightful hearing on some
of the challenges we face in the Asia-Pacific region. The
consensus from the panel is that we face some very serious
challenges, especially in light of China's increasing military
budget and destabilizing activities in the region. And one of
the biggest challenges will be to continue to provide, as we
have for 70 years, security, stability, and free transit in the
Pacific, particularly, as Senator McCain emphasized, with
pending sequestration in the face of declining resources that
we have. And I echo his call for the end of sequestration.
Admiral Locklear, we'd be very interested in your views
about the land reclamation activities of China in the Spratlys
and elsewhere. That is something, as the Chairman has noted,
that we both, along with Senators Menendez and Corker, objected
to, or at least criticized. What more, also, must we do to
build the capacity of our partners in the region, to help them
with the maritime domain awareness, and to encourage all the
regional actors to seek legal redress to problems, not to
invoke lethal threats with respect to sovereignty and respect
to stability in the region?
As the Chairman indicated, Admiral Gortney's comments this
week, and I will quote him as he said, North Korea, ``has the
ability to put a nuclear weapon on a KN-08 and shoot it at the
homeland.'' Quite disturbing. And, General Scaparrotti, would
you, in your comments or questions, please let us know about
the dimensions of this threat as it exists today and as it
might evolve in the future?
Again, we thank you, because the North Koreans appear to be
not only, unfortunately, well armed, but very difficult to
predict their behaviors, and your views and insights will be
extremely important. Also, if you could comment on the possible
deployment of a THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense]
missile defense system and its contribution to the defense of
our allies, the Republic of South Korea.
We are considering all of these challenges, once again,
under the constraint of serious budget limitations. And,
Admiral Locklear and General Scaparrotti, please indicate to us
the impact of sequestration on your operations. It would be
very helpful, I think.
Thank you very much for joining us.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. I thank the witnesses.
Admiral Locklear.

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL SAMUEL J. LOCKLEAR III, USN, COMMANDER,
U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

Admiral Locklear. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed,
and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for this
opportunity to appear before you today with General
Scaparrotti.
Before we begin, I'd like to ask that my written statement
be submitted for the record.
Chairman McCain. Without objection.
Admiral Locklear. For more than 3 years, I've had the honor
and privilege of leading the exceptional men and women,
military and civilian, of the U.S. Pacific Command [U.S.
PACOM]. These volunteers are skilled professionals dedicated to
the defense of our Nation, they're serving as superb
ambassadors to represent the values, the strengths that make
our Nation great. I want to go on record to formally thank them
for our--for their service, and their families for their
sacrifices.
In PACOM, we continue to strengthen alliances, our
partnerships, maintain an assured presence in the region, and
demonstrate an intent and resolve to safeguard U.S. national
interests.
When I spoke to you last year, I highlighted my concern for
several issues that could challenge the security environment
across the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Those challenges included
responding to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief,
dealing with an increasingly dangerous and unpredictable North
Korea, a challenge that General Scaparrotti and I remain
aligned in addressing, a continued escalation of complex
territorial disputes, increasing regional transnational
threats, and the complexity associated with China's continued
rise. In the past year, these challenges have not eased. They
will not go away soon. But, the Asia rebalance strategy has
taken hold and is achieving intended goals.
However, the greatest challenge remains the continual
physical uncertainty resulting from sequestration. If the
Budget Control Act of 2011 remains in force, the greatest
challenge in the Indo-Asia-Pacific will be dealing with the
consequences to the security of our National interests and to
respond to a rapidly changing world. I echo the Secretary of
Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the
Service Chiefs' testimony before Congress. Our Nation is being
forced into a resource-driven national security strategy
instead of one properly resourced and driven by our enduring
interests. In the Indo-Asia-Pacific, we are accepting more
risk, not less. Sequestration will force harmful reductions in
force size, structure, and readiness. It will reduce my ability
to manage crisis space, provide options to the President, and
diminishes United States prestige and credibility in the region
and around the globe.
In the last year, the great--at great expense to the
readiness of the surge forces' position in the continental
United States, PACOM has been able to maintain its forward
forces focused on protecting the Homeland, deterring aggressors
such as North Korea, strengthening alliances and partnerships,
and developing the concepts and capabilities required remain
dominant in a world that is growing in complexity with threats
that continue to increase against a seemingly unending stream
of constraints. Without adequate resources, we will be forced
to make difficult choices today that will have strategic
consequences to our future.
I'd like to thank the committee for your continued interest
and support. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Locklear follows:]

prepared statement by admiral samuel j. locklear iii, usn
Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, and distinguished members, thank you
for the opportunity to address the committee. This will be my fourth
and final opportunity to provide an Indo-Asia-Pacific assessment since
taking command of United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) in March
2012. For over three years, I have had the extraordinary privilege to
lead Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and civilians
selflessly serving our nation. These dedicated men and women and their
families are doing an amazing job and I am proud to serve alongside
them.
In concert with allies and partners, USPACOM balances historical
and cultural factors against modern day political and economic events
in an ever-evolving effort to manage friction and conflict in the most
militarized region in the world. These actions are designed to defend
the homeland, strengthen and modernize our alliances and partnerships,
maintain access to areas of common interest, counter aggression,
prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and defeat
violent extremism.
What follows is my assessment of the region's security environment,
including the current and future challenges and opportunities for
USPACOM forces. My testimony includes an update on major areas of
concern in the security environment, allies and partners in the region,
building and strengthening relationships, and maintaining an effective
and assured presence.
security environment
The Indo-Asia-Pacific remains one of the most dynamic regions on
earth. It is vital to U.S. economic and security interests, and
activities in the region will shape much of our nation's future. The
region encompasses 52 percent of the earth's surface and is composed of
83 percent water and 17 percent land. Over half of the people on the
planet reside on that 17 percent of land, and by the middle of the
century, the Indo-Asia-Pacific will potentially contain 70 percent of
the world's population. This high population density coupled with
destabilizing factors such as natural disasters, climate change,
ideological radicalism, and population migration will continue to put
immense pressure on regional governments. Contained in the thirty-six
nations in USPACOM's area of responsibility are the world's two largest
economies after the U.S. (China and Japan), and five smallest
economies. The region also contains the world's most populous nation
(China), the largest democracy (India), the largest Muslim-majority
(Indonesia), and the smallest republic (Nauru). It contains seven of
the ten largest standing militaries, five nuclear nations, and five of
the U.S.'s seven mutual defense treaty alliances. The socioeconomic
diversity and population density throughout the USPACOM area of
responsibility (AOR) create strategic long-term challenges. These
challenges include: political instability, social inequality, poverty,
increased sensitivity to climate change and natural disasters, risk of
pandemic disease, and epidemic drug use and distribution.
In addition to these challenges, the U.S. must continue to deter
North Korean provocation, ensure access to air and sea lanes, encourage
peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes in the East
and South China Seas, respond to natural disasters and theater health
issues, check the flow of violent extremists from the Middle East to
violent extremist organizations (VEOs) in the Indo-Asia-Pacific,
address transnational crimes, monitor an increasingly active Russia,
and constructively engage a rising China. Despite all of the
challenges, the theater possesses opportunities for the U.S., its
allies, and its partners. In order to capitalize on these
opportunities, foster the region's economic potential, and provide the
security and stability necessary to protect areas of common interest,
USPACOM remains engaged.
The Indo-Asia-Pacific requires stable political institutions to
effectively govern and prosper. Overall, but with notable exceptions,
the countries of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region are more politically
stable than in previous years. The general health of democratic
institutions across the region is evidenced by several critical
leadership transitions which occurred last year. Successful, peaceful
participatory elections occurred in India and Indonesia. Sri Lanka
achieved a peaceful transition of power following its January election.
Fiji took a major step toward moving past its 2006 military coup by
holding elections last September. Citizens in many countries were able
to peacefully protest without fear of oppressive action. While these
activities are reassuring, challenges remain. For example, Thailand's
military coup removed a democratically elected administration, and
interim leaders have yet to restore a democratic government.
North Korea: North Korea remains the most dangerous and
unpredictable security challenge. The regime continues its aggressive
attitude while advancing its nuclear capability and ballistic missile
programs. While the international community continues to urge North
Korea to live up to its international obligations and return to
authentic credible negotiations under the Six-Party Talks framework,
North Korea has unfortunately shown no willingness to seriously discuss
its denuclearization commitments and obligations, and additional
nuclear tests remain possible. It is expected that North Korea will
continue to showcase ballistic missile development (to include mobile
intercontinental ballistic missiles and intermediate range Musudan
missiles) and conduct launches in direct violation of several United
Nations Security Council Resolutions (such as the short-range ballistic
missile launches in March 2015). North Korea already announced its
intent to conduct ``annual and regular'' drills to advance this
prohibited capability.
Additionally, North Korea demonstrated the will to employ cyber
techniques to impose costly damage to civilian companies, as was
demonstrated in the high-profile attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment.
North Korean cyber actors continue to conduct cyber actions against
South Korean military and civilian networks. USPACOM remains concerned
about the destructive nature of this state sponsored cyber-attack
targeting a commercial entity and its employees in the United States.
These actions demonstrate North Korea's disregard for international
norms. North Korea's actions are beyond the bounds of acceptable state
behavior in cyberspace.
Territorial and Maritime Issues: Territorial and maritime issues in
the East and South China Seas, if not handled properly, may negatively
impact stability in the regional and the security environment. The
claimants' use of maritime law enforcement vessels to enforce their
claims has largely kept these issues out of the military sphere,
despite a steady increase in military air and sea patrols. While no
country appears to desire military conflict, an escalation due to a
tactical miscalculation cannot be ruled out.
In the East China Sea, Japan and China both claim sovereignty over
the Senkaku Islands. While the United States does not take a position
on ultimate sovereignty over the islands, it has long recognized
Japanese administration of them. China's behavior in the area has
resulted in close encounters at sea, aggressive Chinese air intercepts
of Japanese reconnaissance flights, inflammatory strategic messaging,
and the no-notice declaration of a Chinese Air Defense Identification
Zone in the East China Sea.
The South China Sea issues are complex. Six claimants (China,
Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan, and the Philippines) have
overlapping claims in the South China Sea. As the South China Sea
claimants' populations and economies continue to grow, access to the
oil, gas, minerals, and fisheries within the South China Sea becomes
more important. Claimants appear to be asserting their claims through
increased maritime patrols, outpost and facility construction, and land
reclamation.
China has the broadest claim with its self-proclaimed ``Nine-Dash
line'' that covers almost the entire South China Sea. China's lack of
clarity with regard to its South China Sea claims, and China's attempts
to unilaterally enforce its ambiguous claims, has created uncertainty
in the region. Any use of the nine-dash line by China to claim maritime
rights not based on claimed land features would not align with
international law. The international community would welcome China to
clarify or adjust its nine-dash line claim and bring it into accordance
with the international law of the sea, as reflected in the Law of the
Sea Convention.
To achieve its long-term goals in the region, China is executing a
strategy that includes expanding outposts in contested areas through
land reclamation on South China Sea features, taking actions to prevent
other nations from establishing / maintaining outposts, exploring for
natural resources in disputed waters, and increasing its naval and air
forces' presence through exercises and patrols. China's aggressive land
reclamation and construction projects at eight South China Sea military
outposts include new buildings, more capable berthing space for ships,
and presumably an airfield on the Fiery Cross Reef (China's largest
reclamation project). Although land reclamation cannot, for example,
change a submerged feature into a natural island that generates any
legal entitlements to maritime zones, the completion of these projects
will give China the ability for greater presence, increase dwell time
for military and coast guard assets, and expand the areas covered by
surveillance and area-denial systems. Examples of activities supporting
China's long-term strategy include attempts to block resupply missions
to the small Philippine garrison at Second Thomas Shoal and exclude
Philippine and other fishermen from the disputed Scarborough Reef. Last
year, China also moved a China National Offshore Oil Corporation
drilling platform into Vietnam's claimed Exclusive Economic Zone
resulting in a tense standoff between Vietnamese and Chinese maritime
assets substantially increasing the possibility of miscalculation
between the two countries.
The U.S. does not take a position on issues of sovereignty with
respect to territorial claims in the East and South China Sea, but we
do insist that all maritime claims must be derived from land features
in accordance with international law as reflected in the Law of the Sea
Convention. The U.S. also continues to emphasize the importance that
maritime and territorial disagreements be resolved peacefully in
accordance with international law and opposes the use of intimidation,
coercion, or force to assert claims. An example of such an attempt at
peaceful resolution is the Philippines' arbitration against China under
the Law of the Sea Convention that is being heard by a tribunal in The
Hague. Of note, China has refused to participate in this arbitration to
date.
Natural Disasters: The Indo-Asia-Pacific accounted for over 40
percent (1,690 incidences) of the world's reported natural disasters
during the period between 2004 and 2013, and, because of the region's
coastal population density, these disasters were particularly deadly,
claiming more than 700,000 lives. The Pacific Rim's tectonic plate
structure produces its well-known Ring of Fire, which regularly
triggers earthquakes, volcanoes, and tsunamis. Weather extremes and
anomalies continue to plague the region. Understanding the scope and
severity of long-term climate change, unexpected climate shocks, and
climate variability events such as El Nino are shared global
challenges.
In addition to seismic and climate challenges, areas of large
populations, dense living conditions, and poor sanitary conditions in
the region create optimal conditions for the rapid spread of human- or
animal-borne diseases. To address these challenges, USPACOM focuses on
pre-crisis preparedness with training and exercises. For example, many
of the lessons learned and preparedness measures implemented after
Typhoon Haiyan (Operation Damayan, November 2013) resulted in less
damage and loss of life when Typhoon Hagupit passed over the
Philippines last December. U.S. forces regularly train with allies and
partners on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations and
stand ready to respond in support of interagency partners to a natural
disaster or the frequent vectors of disease that plague the region.
Regional information sharing and rapid response to health crises are
improving, but the danger remains high. USPACOM will continue to focus
on improving pre-crisis preparedness and working with allies and
partners in the region to ensure an effective response when an event
occurs.
Violent Extremism: The ongoing conflict in Syria and Iraq attracts
foreign fighters from countries throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific.
Current assessments indicate approximately 1,300 foreign personnel
fighting alongside the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant are from the Indo-Asia-Pacific. A small number of these combat-
experienced fighters who return home could enhance the capability of
regional extremist networks within the most densely populated areas of
the world. In South Asia, partner nations maintain pressure on
extremist networks but face a persistent threat from transnational
groups that continue adapting to shifting geopolitical factors,
competition among global extremist groups, and counterterrorism actions
by the U.S. and its regional allies. Al-Qa'ida's increased rhetoric
focused on South Asia and the announcement of a new affiliate, ``Al-
Qa'ida in the Indian Subcontinent,'' suggest Al-Qai'da will focus
resources on uniting established terrorist groups to engage in jihad in
South Asia. Lashkar-e Tayyiba and other Pakistan-based groups continue
fighting in Afghanistan, but they will likely shift some of their
operational focus to the Indian Subcontinent in the next one to three
years as Coalition forces drawdown. In Southeast Asia, regional
partners maintain persistent pressure on extremist networks; however,
competing security priorities in the region, coupled with the
sensationalism of developments in the Middle East, have pressurized
counter-terrorism attention. Extremist groups are increasingly
interconnected and the region remains a potential safe haven,
facilitation hub, and area of operations for extremists.
Proliferation Issues: Rapidly developing technology manufacturing
sectors in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region have in many states outpaced
the concurrent development of those states' effective export controls.
The region includes some of the busiest maritime and air ports in the
world with shipments of proliferation concern likely passing through
these ports almost daily. These shipments include dual-use items--
commercial items controlled by the nuclear, ballistic missile, and
chemical/biological weapons control regimes, others covered by
associated catch all controls--manufactured in or re-exported from
states with spotty export control enforcement. Iran built its robust
nuclear infrastructure and advanced its ballistic missile systems with
materials that passed through the USPACOM AOR; North Korea continues to
procure for its nuclear and ballistic missile programs--and proliferate
conventional arms for revenue generation--using a network of
individuals and entities throughout the region. PACOM engages regional
partners in capacity-building activities designed to improve export
controls and interdiction capabilities in the region. In August 2014
PACOM hosted personnel from 31 nations as part of the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI) Exercise Fortune Guard, which marked the
beginning of a six-year series of exercises that various ``expert''
nations in the region will host. (New Zealand, Australia, Singapore,
Japan, South Korea and the United States) Exercises such as Fortune
Guard provide nations a forum to demonstrate the intention to act and
share the best tactics against proliferators, emphasizing a whole-of-
government approach to confront this complex challenge.
Transnational Crime: There is a growing trend for regional human
and drug trafficking organizations to operate as global enterprises. In
addition to the devastating impact widespread drug use has on a
society, the revenue generated from these illicit activities fund
terrorists and Violent Extremist Organizations. Methamphetamine and
amphetamine-type stimulants continue to be the primary drug threat in
the USPACOM AOR. The majority of Methamphetamine available in the
United States comes from Mexico, primarily across the South West Border
Region, and an estimated 90 percent of the precursor chemicals used to
produce Mexican Methamphetamine comes from China. Further, the annual
volume of Methamphetamine seizures made along the United States South
West Border Region has exceeded Cocaine seizures in the past three
years.
Nearly 21 million victims of human trafficking are estimated
worldwide and nearly two-thirds are from Asia, with India, China,
Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Thailand among the countries with the
highest number of victims. Women and children--especially those from
the lowest socioeconomic sectors--are the most vulnerable demographics.
Roughly a quarter end up in the commercial sex trade, while others are
forced into difficult and dangerous positions in factories, farms, or
as child soldiers. Still others are bound to families as domestic
servants. Human trafficking victims often suffer physical and emotional
abuse and social stigmatization while being denied their basic human
rights and fundamental freedoms. While awareness is rising, much
remains to be done to combat this particularly heinous crime. USPACOM
forces build partnership capacity and share intelligence in order to
combat these transnational threats.
Russian Intent: Russia is reasserting itself politically and
militarily in the Pacific. In the USPACOM AOR, Russian Navy and Long
Range Aviation operational tempo have recently increased significantly,
but not above Cold War levels. Though challenged by maintenance and
logistical issues, Russian Navy cruisers, destroyers and frigates have
increased their operations and reach. The Russian Pacific Fleet sent
ships to support operations in the Middle East and Europe, while
Russian ships from the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets deployed into the
Asia-Pacific. Russian BEAR bombers and reconnaissance aircraft
regularly fly missions in the Sea of Japan and continue operations as
far east as Alaska and the west coast of the continental U.S. The
anticipated fielding later this year of Russia's newest class of
nuclear ballistic missile submarine (Borei-class SSBN) and upgrades to
Russia's land-based ballistic missiles will modernize Moscow's nuclear
capability in the Asia-Pacific. Russian ballistic missile and attack
submarines remain active in our region. Russia aims to demonstrate
military capabilities commensurate with its Pacific interests: ensuring
Russian sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction in the Asia-
Pacific, strengthening its sphere of influence, and projecting a
credible deterrent force.
Chinese Military Modernization and Strategic Intent: Recent
statements by senior PRC leaders, such as PRC President Xi Jinping,
suggest that the PRC may be attempting to advance a vision for an
alternative security architecture in Asia that affords Beijing
increased influence in the region and diminishes the role of the United
States. This Chinese view was highlighted in Shanghai last summer at
the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia.
At the conference, President Xi Jinping called on all of Asia to
support the development of a new security order centered on China. The
proposed new order also requires a curtailment of alliance-
strengthening diplomacy, of which the ``U.S. Rebalance to Asia'' is
noted as the greatest offender. China is proposing an alternative
strategy to regional security issues where the U.S. plays, at best, a
deferential role.
China is engaged in a comprehensive military modernization program
to transform its forces into a high-tech military capable of conducting
complex operations. Many of China's initiatives are intended to develop
capabilities to deter or counter third-party intervention in regional
contingencies. These anti-access/area denial (A2AD) capabilities are
focused on controlling access and freedom of operations in vast
portions of the air and maritime domains, as well as space and
cyberspace. These include a series of sophisticated and increasingly
long-range anti-ship cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, air-to-air
and air-to-ground missiles, and kinetic and non-kinetic counter-space
systems. China is also making significant advances in electronic
warfare capabilities, which are contributing to the A2AD challenge.
China continues an aggressive ship building program to produce and
field advanced frigates, destroyers, and the first in-class cruiser-
sized warship. Chinese shipyards are also producing newer, more capable
submarines as they inactivate older submarines, resulting in a fleet
that is not growing substantially in number but is significantly more
capable. Advances in China's strategic capabilities remain significant.
China now has three operational JIN-class ballistic missile submarines
(Type 094), and up to five more may enter service by the end of the
decade. The JIN-class submarine carries the JL-2 submarine launched
ballistic missile with a range capable of reaching the U.S. and will
give China its first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent. Nuclear
deterrence patrols will likely commence this year. Lastly, we expect
China to soon begin constructing an indigenous aircraft carrier.
China is using computer network exploitation capabilities to
support intelligence collection to advance its defense and high-tech
industries. Through a sophisticated cyber program, China is generating
insights on U.S. security policies, defense networks, logistics, and
military capabilities.
As the Chinese military modernizes its capabilities and expands its
presence in Asia, U.S. forces are drawn into closer and more frequent
contact and the risk of an accident or miscalculation increases. This
places a premium on efforts to increase mutual understanding and trust
in order to reduce risk. The Chinese Navy is more frequently operating
in the Indian Ocean, expanding the area and duration of operations and
exercises in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, and periodically
venturing into other non-traditional areas, as exemplified by recent
port visits to Europe. The complexity of the regional and global
security environment, as well as China's military advancements,
necessitates a continuous dialogue between the U.S. and Chinese
militaries to expand practical cooperation where national interests
converge and discuss areas where goals diverge, especially during
periods of friction.
allies and partners
The U.S.' five treaty allies in the Indo-Asia-Pacific are:
Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Philippines, and Thailand. In
addition to U.S. treaty alliances, the U.S. continues to strengthen
existing partnerships and build new relationships to advance common
interests and address shared concerns. U.S. allies and key partners in
the theater play a fundamental role in addressing the security
challenges. Strengthening and modernizing alliances and partnerships is
a top USPACOM priority.
Australia: Australia continues to be a close, steadfast, and
effective ally in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. The alliance anchors peace and
stability in the region, and Australia has taken a leading role in
addressing regional security and capacity-building issues, including
lead roles in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief events.
Australia is also a key contributor to global security, including
counter-ISIL efforts in Iraq and the Resolute Support mission in
Afghanistan. With the ongoing implementation of the Force Posture
Initiatives, which provide expanded opportunities for bilateral and
multilateral engagement, the Marine Rotational Force-Darwin
successfully completed its third rotation while increasing its presence
from 250 to 1,177 U.S. Marines. The U.S. Air Force is increasing its
rotation of aircraft to Australia. In addition to the Force Posture
Initiatives, the U.S. and Australia are identifying additional
opportunities to increase collaboration in counter-terrorism, space,
cyber, and integrated air missile defense and regional capacity
building. Australia is procuring a number of high-tech platforms that
will increase interoperability such as the F-35 Lightning II, P-8
Poseidon, C-17 Globemaster III, and EA-18G Growler aircraft as well as
Global Hawk UAVs and MH-60R helicopters. To ensure greater
synchronization and integration, the Australian Government provides a
General Officer and a Senior Executive to USPACOM, as well as another
General Officer to U.S. Army Pacific, as tangible examples of a mutual
commitment to the alliance.
Japan: The U.S.-Japan alliance remains strong and productive
through both countries' shared commitment to a full range of military
capabilities with expanding responsibility for training, exercises,
interoperability, and bilateral planning. Japan's 2013 National
Security Strategy and the 1 July 2014 cabinet decision on collective
self-defense are positive developments and indicators of Japan's
ability and willingness to assume a greater role in the regional
security architecture. The Abe administration will submit implementing
legislation to the National Diet during its spring session, and debate
is expected to conclude in summer 2015. The US-Japan Guidelines for
Defense Cooperation are being revised, and that process will conclude
with public presentation of the Guidelines in the near future. We are
hopeful that Japan's upcoming legislative changes support new and
expanded forms of cooperation.
U.S. Forces Japan continues to build its close relationship with
the Japanese Joint Staff to enhance interoperability and information
sharing through realistic training, exercises, and bilateral planning.
USPACOM will continue to maintain a robust military presence in Japan
to meet future security challenges and encourage greater trilateral
military engagements with the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Australia.
Efforts continue toward improving US-Japan-ROK trilateral
coordination in response to North Korean provocative behavior. The
December 2014 signature of the US-Japan-ROK Trilateral Information
Sharing Arrangement is a positive first step toward greater information
sharing on North Korean missile and nuclear threats.
As Japan increases its defense spending, it is procuring a number
of high-tech platforms that will increase interoperability such as the
F-35 Lightning II aircraft, MV-22 Ospreys, and the Global Hawk UAV, as
well as upgrading existing AEGIS destroyers with the latest BMD
capability and constructing two additional AEGIS destroyers (for a
total of eight BMD capable platforms). Each North Korean ballistic
missile provocation validates the investment of the AN/TPY-2 radars in
Japan to provide ISR against missile threats. Last year's addition of
the second radar in Japan and forward deploying two additional BMD
capable ships will enhance our ability to defend our ally and the
region, as well as provide early warning of missile threats to the U.S.
homeland. Lastly, Japan continues to make significant infrastructure
investments in country that complement the realignment of U.S. Marines
from Okinawa to Guam including expanding the airfield and associated
facilities at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni and construction of the
Futenma Replacement Facility. It is important that these initiatives
remain on track.
Philippines: The U.S.-Philippine alliance remains a positive source
of strength and regional stability. Building upon the 1951 Mutual
Defense Treaty, the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)
between the U.S. and the Government of the Philippines was signed last
April. Through enhanced U.S. rotational presence, the EDCA provides
expanded opportunities to conduct theater security cooperation
activities and supports the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) as it
shifts focus from internal security to external defense. Full EDCA
implementation awaits the outcome of a case before the Philippine
Supreme Court, where deliberations could last into this summer.
After more than a decade, the Joint Special Operations Task Force
created to counter Violent Extremist Organizations in the Philippines
will stand down and the AFP will sustain that mission. Training and
advising objectives that were set to address organizations such as the
Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah Islamiyah have been met. Although the Task
Force is standing down, a small USPACOM footprint will remain embedded
in the Philippines to continue working with the AFP leadership and
planning staffs. The AFP has demonstrated an increased capacity and
capability to handle domestic threats inside their country, but USPACOM
will remain committed to supporting and advising the AFP at the
operational level.
Competing claims in the South China Sea continue to be a source of
friction and instability. China continues large-scale land reclamation
around disputed features. Furthermore, periodic resupply and troop
rotations to the small Philippine outpost at Second Thomas Shoal (also
known as Ayungin Shoal) are well-known points of contention with the
Chinese government.
Republic of Korea: The U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance
remains strong and vital, and enduring for over six decades. Our
militaries integrate complementary capabilities and enhance the
relationship with honest and frank dialogue. During the most recent
annual discussions, the U.S. and ROK made arrangements to delay wartime
operational control transfer and adopt a conditions-based approach,
rather than a calendar-based deadline. The U.S. and ROK intend to
modernize the alliance to better inform the development or acquisition
of Alliance capabilities required to address future threats from North
Korea.
USPACOM will continue to work with the ROK to address the North
Korean threat. North Korea continues to be a challenge due to
provocations and uncertainty, which are viewed as a threat to peace and
stability in the region. The ability to rapidly respond to aggression
with combined U.S.-ROK-Japan capabilities is the best way to ensure
deterrence and maintain regional stability. Trilateral cooperation will
improve each participant's understanding of the mutual challenges and
shared opportunities that exist in and around the Korean Peninsula.
Thailand: As Thailand is the oldest U.S. treaty partner (182
years), the U.S. values its friendship with the people of Thailand. The
Thai military's decision to suspend its constitution and assume control
of the civilian government has impacted that relationship. Military
engagements and exercises have been appropriately adjusted in a whole
of government response to the coup, pending a return to a
democratically-elected government. USPACOM will continue to demonstrate
commitment to the U.S.' ally while reinforcing democratic values and
ideals. The annual COBRA GOLD exercise co-sponsored with the Royal Thai
Armed Forces is an important multi-lateral warfighting training event.
This year's exercise was significantly limited in scope and scale in
response to the Thai coup, and heavily focused on humanitarian
assistance activities.
India: Last year, India held the largest election in its history.
With new leadership in place, India is energizing the U.S.-India
strategic partnership. Prime Minister Modi has focused India's foreign
policy on building strong regional cohesion in South Asia. India's two
decade-long ``Look East Policy'' has resulted in growing partnerships
with Southeast Asian countries.
The U.S. military remains heavily engaged with New Delhi's
military, having conducted 69 major exercises in the past five years.
The Indian Navy continues its strong participation in multilateral
exercises including INDRA with Russia, MALABAR with the U.S. and Japan,
and RIMPAC with 23 navies from across the Indo-Asia-Pacific. India's
participation in these exercises signals their commitment as a regional
security provider. Additionally, over the past three years the U.S. has
been India's largest defense trading partner. Through military
modernization, robust defense trade (C-17s, C-130Js, and P-8Is, among
other items), and a growing network of defense partnerships, India is
asserting its role as an important regional actor determined to protect
common interests and ensure free access to economically vital sea
lanes, although with respect to military activities, India still
asserts a security interest in its EEZ that does not conform to the law
of the sea.
Indonesia: Indonesia is a capable security partner in Southeast
Asia, and is increasingly focused on its role as a regional power,
which USPACOM continues to support as a main pillar of mil-mil
engagement. Presidential elections last July demonstrated a commitment
to democratic principles, and the August opening of Indonesia's new
Peace and Security Center to train regional partners on peacekeeping
operations reinforces its position as a leader in security assistance.
A growing area of cooperation with Indonesia is defense trade, which
includes the sale of AH-64E Apache helicopters and initial delivery of
F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft. Indonesia remains concerned about
maintaining security and stability in the South China Sea. While their
Chief of Defense has articulated a zero-war policy in the South China
Sea, there are signs they are increasingly concerned over China's so-
called nine dash line overlapping with part of their claimed EEZ. While
Indonesia continues a foreign policy rooted in the Non Aligned
Movement, USPACOM has seen significant gains in security cooperation
activities. Indonesia will continue to balance its partnership with the
U.S. with other nations such as Russia and China, but security
cooperation with the U.S. remains a top priority.
New Zealand: New Zealand is a respected voice in international
politics and a recognized leader in Oceania that shares common security
concerns with the U.S., such as terrorism, transnational crime, and
maritime security. Military-to-military relations and defense
engagements with New Zealand continue to improve, and the U.S. and New
Zealand executed the second series of annual bilateral defense
dialogues last year. New Zealand's establishment of a Consulate General
in Honolulu has also provided additional opportunities for USPACOM and
New Zealand to engage on issues of mutual interest. This new Consulate
General addition to Hawaii is timely as the U.S. celebrates the 100th
Anniversary of ANZAC with New Zealand and the Australians this year.
Oceania: Maintaining our close partnerships in Oceania is important
to national security. The Compacts of Free Association with the
Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands,
and the Republic of Palau are important agreements that guide the
relationships. The U.S. defense obligations to these nations are
reflected in our defense planning and preparation. In return, these
compact agreements provide assured access to the three Compact Nations
and their associated 5.5 million square kilometers of Pacific in a
contingency situation. They also give the U.S. authority to grant or
deny access to another nation's military forces, which allows the
maintenance of a clear strategic line of communication across the
Pacific. The U.S.'s continued commitment to defend the Compact Nations
and to partner with other Pacific island countries sends a strong
message throughout the region and reinforces its commitment to the
Pacific Rebalance.
Fiji currently has its first democratically elected government
since its military coup in 2006. In 2015, Fiji will re-enter into
regional forums (e.g., Pacific Island Forum) and have new opportunities
for engagement with the U.S. Several other countries (Papua New Guinea,
the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu) may face government reorganizations
over the next year. These events may set back specific projects but
will not likely impact stability or affect overall U.S. engagement.
Climate change will continue to be an important issue across the
Oceania region. This year's forecasted El Nino event will likely result
in drought and increased tropical cyclone activity. The Republic of
Marshall Islands will almost certainly face water shortage resulting in
requests for aid or disaster declarations under a subsidiary agreement
to the Amended Compact of Free Association. Fiji, Kiribati, the
Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, and Tonga will
likely face similar situations. The December 2014 United Nations
Climate Change Conference addressed the impact of rising sea levels--a
keen interest to Pacific Island Nations.
Singapore: Singapore continues its important role in regional
security initiatives. Singapore's role as a `Major Security Cooperation
Partner' is underscored by longstanding support of U.S. naval forces.
For example, USS Freedom completed a ten month deployment in 2013, and
USS Fort Worth is currently on a 16 month deployment. These forward
forces contribute to naval readiness and partner capacity building and
enable rapid response to many crises, including Operation Damayan in
the Philippines and Air Asia recovery efforts. Additionally,
Singapore's Changi Naval Base remains a key enabler to providing
critical support to the USS Fort Worth and other forward operating
forces.
U.S.-China: In light of an increasingly complex regional and global
security environment, including advances in China's military
capabilities and its expanding military operations and missions, the
overall U.S. approach to China calls for a continuous dialogue between
the armed forces of both countries to expand practical cooperation
where national interests converge and to constructively manage
differences through sustained and substantive dialogue. As a key
element, the U.S.'s military engagement with China, within the
guidelines of the 2000 NDAA, benefits the region, improves
transparency, and reduces risk of unintended incidents, contributing to
overall regional stability. The U.S. military has increased the depth
of engagement with China in recent years and executed over 50 bilateral
and numerous multilateral engagements last year. While these
engagements are critical to improving transparency and reducing risk,
the U.S. military must continue to take a pragmatic approach as the
U.S. attempts to help integrate China into the existing security
architecture. China's military investments, including A2AD
capabilities, focused on the ability to control access and deny freedom
of operations in vast portions of the air, maritime, space, and
cyberspace domains raise concerns. The U.S. will need more transparency
and understanding of Chinese intentions in order to minimize friction
and avoid miscalculation or conflict in the future. Absent greater
transparency from China, its ambiguous dashed-line claim, military
modernization efforts and aggressive land reclamation in the South
China Sea have significant implications for regional stability and the
current security architecture.
Over the past year, the U.S. and China have agreed to mechanisms
such as the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) on Notification of
Major Military Activities and Rules of Behavior (RoB) for Safety of Air
and Maritime Encounters, designed to underscore and reinforce existing
international law and standards while improving transparency, building
trust, and reducing risk of unintended incidents. The surface-to-
surface encounters annex of the RoB CBM was signed last year and the
air-to-air annex is scheduled to be completed by the end of this year.
These new Rules of Behavior are non-binding and capture existing legal
rules and standards. Additionally, the U.S. and China continue to use
the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement meetings to discuss safety
in the maritime domain and avoid crises. As China continues to grow its
military capacity and capability and operate further from its
territory, these mechanisms become more important.
Both militaries have had success addressing areas of common
interest, such as counter piracy, military medicine, and HA/DR. Some of
the most successful engagements were focused on military medical
cooperation and shared health concerns. For example, the USPACOM
surgeon hosted Chinese counterparts in Hawaii and Washington, DC, which
resulted in concrete opportunities for continued military medical
cooperation focused on Disaster Response, Pandemic and Emerging
Infectious Diseases, and Soldier Care. In January 2015, the PLA hosted
the USPACOM Surgeon and component surgeons for a highly successful
reciprocal visit. Demonstrating China's increasing ability to operate
beyond the Western Pacific and a successful engagement on an area of
common concern, last December, U.S. and Chinese ships conducted counter
piracy exercises in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa.
China's participation in international efforts to address these
problems and to operate and exercise with the U.S. and its allies and
partners in a manner consistent with international law and standards is
welcomed.
building and strengthening relationships
The future security and prosperity of the Indo-Asia-Pacific depends
upon building bilateral and multilateral relationships. Strong
relationships, facilitated by a U.S. forward presence, advance common
interests and address shared threats. USPACOM strengthens relationships
with U.S. allies and partners through security cooperation and capacity
building, bilateral and multilateral approaches, and senior leader
engagement.
Security Cooperation and Capacity Building: USPACOM enhances
interoperability and information sharing with allies and partners in
order to cooperatively address regional challenges. USPACOM's Security
Cooperation approach is focused on building partner readiness,
assisting with partner capability gaps, identifying partner shortfalls,
and addressing the most critical capacity shortfalls. Last year,
USPACOM identified C4ISR as a top priority for Security Cooperation
with the Republic of Korea (ROK) and contributed to the U.S. supporting
the ROK purchase of Global Hawk--a High Altitude UAV platform that will
help close the gap in some of the security challenges on the Korean
Peninsula. Supporting USPACOM's approach to addressing partner
capability and capacity shortfalls will reduce risk, effectively use
Security Cooperation and Assistance resources, and maintain the
momentum to bring the right capabilities into the AOR.
As mentioned earlier, the progress the Republic of the Philippines
continues to make in addressing violent extremists groups inside their
country is a testament to building capacity in USPACOM's foreign
internal defense efforts. USPACOM is also building capacity to counter
drug trafficking in the AOR through Joint Interagency Task Force--West
(JIATF-W) engagements with China. Through a partnership with the
Internal Revenue Service, JIATF-W has leveraged Department of Defense
counternarcotic authorities to open up an additional avenue of
cooperation with Chinese officials by providing anti-money laundering
training linked to counterdrug efforts. These efforts are only just
beginning, but show promise in improving communication, cooperation,
and information sharing on significant criminal enterprises operating
in both the U.S. and China.
Lastly, increasing international representation at the USPACOM
headquarters has improved collaboration with allies and partners and
created a more agile and effective command and control architecture.
The new USPACOM model integrates sixteen foreign exchange officers and
liaison officers from six countries and facilitates a seamless
transition from routine business to crisis. Included in these numbers
are three foreign exchange Flag Officers and Senior Executives in key
billets on the USPACOM staff.
Bilateral and Multilateral Approaches: With the exception of North
Korea, USPACOM continues to build and strengthen bilateral
relationships with all of the nations in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. USPACOM
maintains a close link with the five U.S. treaty allies and other
partners in the region through a series of formal bilateral mechanisms.
In Australia, key engagements stem from the ANZUS treaty obligations,
guided by USPACOM's premier bilateral event with Australia, the
Military Representatives Meeting. Similarly, USPACOM's military to
military relationship with Japan is guided annually by the Japan Senior
Leader Seminar, which USPACOM utilizes to ensure the bond with Japan
remains strong. USPACOM continues to rely on the alliance with the
Republic of Korea to maintain peace and stability in Northeast Asia,
and the annual Military Committee and Security Consultative Meetings
are the preeminent bilateral mechanism to guide this alliance forward.
Each year, USPACOM co-hosts the Mutual Defense Board and Security
Engagement Board with the Armed Forces of the Philippines to discuss
ways this critical alliance can modernize to meet 21st-century
challenges. Lastly, USPACOM depends on annual Senior Staff Talks with
Thailand to address shared regional security concerns while reinforcing
U.S. commitment to democratic principles.
Similar bilateral mechanisms exist with partners throughout the
USPACOM AOR, including Bilateral Defense Discussions with Indonesia,
Vietnam, and others, as USPACOM continues to foster bilateral ties to
enhance regional stability. Bilateral mechanisms with allies and
partners form the strategic foundation of the security architecture
that ensures peace and stability while defending U.S. interests in the
Indo-Asia-Pacific.
While bilateral mechanisms remain important, USPACOM continues to
emphasize multilateral approaches. USPACOM works with regional forums
such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to encourage
multilateral relationships that build trust, prevent misperceptions
that can lead to conflict, and reinforce international standards of
conduct. For example, USPACOM arranges an annual Chiefs of Defense
(CHOD) Conference as its premier multilateral engagement tool for
candid discussions with 20-plus Chiefs of Defense in the region. Each
year the CHOD Conference alternates between USPACOM and a co-host
country; Brunei hosted last year's successful conference. The 2015 CHOD
Conference will be held in Hawaii and is designed to promote
multilateral cooperation and provide a forum for the theater's military
leaders to share regional and global perspectives on common challenges.
USPACOM also participated in other multilateral events in the region,
such as the Fullerton Forum and Shangri-La Dialogue, to encourage
multilateral solutions to shared challenges, as well as provide a venue
for continued dialogue and strengthening security partnerships in the
region.
One of the most important multilateral forums in the theater is
ASEAN. The ten member states in ASEAN, under the chairmanship of Burma
last year and Malaysia this year, seek to improve multilateral security
activities and advance stability in the Indo-Asia-Pacific.
Approximately $5.3 trillion of global trade ($1.2 trillion is U.S.)
passes through ASEAN waterways each year. The ten member states of
ASEAN form the fourth largest U.S. export market and fifth major trade
partner. ASEAN continues to address common threats in the region
including Maritime Security, Terrorism, Transnational Crimes, Cyber
Security, and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response. ASEAN
demonstrated during past disasters, such as Typhoon Haiyan and the
Malaysian Flight 370 search operations, that practical cooperation
among member states can enable civilian and military agencies to be
more effective and efficient.
Last April, Defense Secretary Hagel hosted the ten ASEAN Defense
Ministers, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA), and other non-government
organizations in Hawaii to discuss disaster response and maritime
security. UNOCHA hosted an Integrated Civil-Military Regional Response
Planning Workshop for Large-Scale International Disaster Relief last
October and the USPACOM staff will continue the maritime security
dialogue by hosting a Maritime Domain Awareness discussion this May.
USPACOM will continue supporting ASEAN as it builds regional tools and
forums such as the ASEAN Economic Community by the end of 2015.
Additionally, there is hope that the ASEAN members and China can
conclude a binding and enforceable Code of Conduct mechanism for the
South China Sea.
The Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
(APCSS) also contributes to multilateral engagements and rules-based
security governance. Through its executive education courses,
workshops, and sustained alumni engagement activities, the Center
contributes to the USPACOM Theater Campaign Plan by building U.S. and
partner nation capacities. Success stories include the APCSS-
facilitated development of Papua New Guinea's first-ever national
security policy, a framework for an Indonesian defense white paper, and
Bangladesh's first comprehensive maritime security strategy proposal.
Additionally, APCSS helped with the successful completion of Nepal's
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program for dealing with
Maoist ex-combatants, and the signing of an inter-party agreement to
overcome political crisis--both led by a core group of APCSS alumni.
Senior Leader Engagement: USPACOM and its components leverage
senior leader visits to increase dialogue on issues of shared concern,
build and strengthen relationships, and convey U.S. commitment to the
region. Each year, hundreds of senior military and government leaders
address security challenges through counterpart visits which greatly
enhance understanding, interoperability, and trust. Examples of senior
leadership engagements in the Indo-Asia-Pacific over the past year
include:
The President attended the G-20 Summit in Australia, the
Republic Day ceremony in India, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
Forum in China, and the East Asia Summit in Burma.
The President also increased engagements in the theater
to strengthen alliances in the Republic of Korea, Japan, and the
Philippines, and to deepen ties with Malaysia.
The Secretary of State visited the Republic of Korea;
China; and Indonesia. He also traveled to India for the 5th Strategic
Dialogue Conference; to Burma for a series of ASEAN discussions;
Australia for annual Ministerial Consultations; and the Solomon
Islands.
The Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense held a
2+2 meeting with their ROK counterparts in Washington.
The Secretary of Defense traveled to Japan for bilateral
security discussions; Mongolia and Singapore for key leadership
meetings; India for defense consultations; Australia for AUSMINs and to
sign the Force Posture Agreement; and China for Confidence Building
Measure discussions.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs toured the Changi
facilities in Singapore; participated in security and military
discussions in Vietnam (first CJCS to visit since 1971); Australia for
the Defense Chiefs Strategic Dialogue conference and bilateral events;
and both Japan and the Republic of Korea for key counterpart visits.
These senior leader engagements are critical to identifying
opportunities and addressing security challenges in the region.
Additionally, Congressional delegations to the theater are of
significant benefit.
effective and assured presence
Effective and assured presence of USPACOM forces is required to
meet the challenges and opportunities within USPACOM's AOR. As
strategic warning timelines decrease, early identification of potential
crises is key to rapidly assessing and shaping events. It also places a
premium on robust, modern, agile, forward-deployed forces, maintained
at high levels of readiness. Assured presence is supported by posturing
forward-deployed forces, fielding new capabilities and concepts,
addressing critical gaps, and maintaining readiness in order to defend
the homeland, strengthen and modernize our alliances and partnerships,
maintain access in the air and maritime domains, counter aggression,
and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
violent extremism.
Posture: Sustaining effective and forward presence begins with
having the necessary military infrastructure and access to support
forward-stationed and rotational forces. USPACOM's posture effectively
communicates U.S. intent and resolve to safeguard U.S. national
interests, strengthen alliances and partnerships, maintain an assured
presence in the region, prevent conflict, and if necessary, respond
rapidly and effectively across the full range of military operations.
USPACOM faces three key challenges related to force posture. The
first is operating in an AOR that covers 52 percent of the earth's
surface. The vast distances complicate ISR, movement/maneuver, and
sustainment, and require a geographically distributed force laydown to
rapidly respond to crisis. The second challenge is the growth of
military capabilities in the region. The Indo-Asia-Pacific is the most
militarized region in the world. Maintaining the ability to defend
strategic national security interests in an increasingly complex and
lethal environment requires a force posture that is operationally
resilient. Finally, expanding access to regions in South and Southeast
Asia requires access and forward staging arrangements that are
politically sustainable. In support of USPACOM's objectives, the
military services and our allies and partners are making investments to
improve U.S. force posture. Examples of these investments are:
Construction in Iwakuni, Japan to allow a carrier air
wing to relocate from Atsugi
Expanding base facilities and capabilities in Okinawa for
Futenma replacement
Operationalizing Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement
with the Philippines
Expanding future capabilities through construction at
Camp Humphreys, ROK
Reinforcing Guam's munitions and fuels piers at Apra
Harbor
Implementing Force Posture Initiatives through troop
rotations and, ultimately, facility upgrades and construction in
Darwin, Australia
Building hardened C2 and aircraft shelters at Andersen
AFB, Guam
Installing and fortifying fuel nodes, manifolds, and
lines in Guam and Japan
Implementing rotational forces through USFK
Developing divert options and training ranges in the
Northern Marianas Islands
Dredging port facilities to requisite depths to allow
pier operations in Naha, Japan
These posture investments are part of USPACOM's holistic
infrastructure investment strategy and are key to continued mission
success.
Much of the supporting infrastructure in the Pacific and on the
West Coast of the U.S. mainland was established during World War II and
during the early years of the Cold War. The infrastructure now requires
investment to extend its service life. The military services continue
to invest in sustainment, restoration, and modernization (SRM) to
provide quality facilities to support service members and their
families; however, during times of austere budgets, the military
services struggle to maintain infrastructure SRM funding levels. These
forced decisions undermine the significant investment in facilities
made by DoD and Host Nation Funded Construction programs over past
decades.
Reduced SRM funding will negatively impact the ability to bring new
forces and capabilities into the theater and maintain critical
infrastructure. The U.S. and the theater benefit from the significant
levels of investment made by allies and partners. For example, the
Republic of Korea is significantly contributing to the cost of keeping
U.S. Forces on the Korean Peninsula. The Government of Japan has
committed up to $3.1 billion to help realign U.S. Marines from Okinawa
to Guam and other locations and $4.5 billion to expand the airfield and
associated facilities at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni.
The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) Joint
Military Training initiative (CJMT) is an important posture
undertaking. CNMI remains strategically important as a forward and
sovereign U.S. location with lease rights until 2033 and extendable to
2083. When the U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative moves
approximately 4,700 U.S. Marines from Japan to Guam, the CJMT will
enable this U.S. Marine force to train and maintain operational
readiness. Specifically on the island of Tinian, the CJMT initiative
will provide live-fire ranges and training areas. The CJMT will
optimize future training ranges for joint and combined exercises with
allies and foreign forces. As a part of aviation resiliency
initiatives, divert and alternate air fields are also being explored on
the islands of Saipan and Tinian along with other locations in the
broader Western Pacific.
Forward Deployed Forces: The tyranny of distance, which defines the
USPACOM AOR, requires forward deployed forces to engage with allies and
partners, respond rapidly to crisis or contingencies, defend the
homeland, and reinforce U.S. commitment to the region. To increase
USPACOM's forward deployed forces and capabilities, the military
services are:
Rotationally deploying Navy Littoral Combat Ships into
Singapore
Forward deploying two additional ballistic missile
defense-capable surface ships to Japan
Increased deployments and rotations of E-8 JSTARS, E-3
AWACS, and E-2D Advanced Hawkeye in theater
Replacing the USS George Washington with the more capable
USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier in Japan
Installing an advanced radar in Australia
Continuing to deploy and operate F-22s in theater
Completing a second ballistic missile defense radar in
Japan
Stationing additional submarines in Guam
Improving rotational force presence in the Philippines,
Singapore, and Australia
New Systems and Operating Concepts: Crafting new concepts and
fielding new systems is fundamental to employing a credible force. For
example, the military services are:
Replacing P-3 maritime patrol aircraft with newer and
more capable P-8s
Deploying tilt rotor aircraft for Marines and Special
Forces and new unmanned capabilities throughout the AOR
Forward stationing High Speed Vessels and Mobile Landing
Platforms in the USPACOM AOR
Introducing Naval Integrated Fire Control--Counter Air
Aegis Destroyers
Expanding the U.S. Army Pacific Pathways deployment
concept
Preparing for F-35 Joint Strike Fighters deployment with
maintenance hubs in Japan and Australia
Addressing Critical Capability Gaps: The most technical, high-end
military challenges are in the USPACOM AOR, and are growing. While many
improvements to posture, forward deployed forces, capabilities, and
concepts have been made to address these challenges, there are a number
of mission sets and enablers that require continuous focus and
attention. These include areas such as Undersea Warfare, Intelligence/
Surveillance/Reconnaissance, space, battle management, command and
control, cyber, munitions, Ballistic Missile Defense and Integrated Air
and Missile Defense systems, and capacity shortfalls in theater
enablers such as petroleum redistribution and lift.
Undersea Warfare is a mission set that requires constant attention
to maintain a decisive advantage. Of the world's 300 foreign
submarines, roughly 200 are in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region; of which,
150 belong to China, North Korea, and Russia. Countries operating these
systems view the platforms as a mechanism to affect the balance of
power in their favor. Even small navies that possess submarines hold a
distinct advantage over a navy without the capability.
There is a significant leap underway in the Indo-Asia-Pacific in
undersea capability as newer submarines replace older variants. In the
past few years, Singapore, India, Vietnam and Malaysia have all
received modern diesel submarines and China is on a modernization path
to improve the lethality and survivability of its attack submarines
with the introduction of quiet, high-end, diesel-powered and nuclear-
powered submarines. Russia is also modernizing its existing fleet of
Oscar-class multi-purpose attack nuclear submarines (SSGNs) and
producing their next generation Yasen-class SSGNs.
In addition to attack submarines, there are important developments
underway that will increase Chinese and Russian strategic deterrent
patrol capability and capacity. China has three operational JIN-class
ballistic missile submarines and up to five more may enter service by
the end of the decade. Additionally, Russia is planning to field its
newest Borei-class nuclear ballistic missile submarines in the Pacific
later this year. Submarine detection and tracking is a complex problem
set and will continue to be one of the most important functions of
naval forces. A continued and sustained investment in the U.S. nuclear
submarine force, advanced Undersea Warfare technologies, capabilities
and capacity, and readiness is necessary to outpace the growing
challenges.
Persistent and deep-look ISR capabilities and supporting
architecture are required to prevent strategic surprise, assess the
security environment, and support actions that impose cost or defeat
potential adversaries. Although ISR capacity and capabilities have
increased, significant capacity issues remain. Efforts to mitigate ISR
capacity issues, as well as develop new capabilities, are ongoing.
Additionally, an ISR processing, exploitation, and dissemination
enterprise that is interoperable and shared with Allies and Partners is
important. Without a concerted effort to continue advancing U.S.
capabilities, the U.S. risks missing key indications and warnings in an
environment where situational awareness affects decision space.
Satellite communications (SATCOM) is an essential enabler to
exercise Command & Control (C2) and enabling ISR. Satellite space
continues to grow increasingly congested and contested, and adversaries
continue developing means to curtail access to space-enabled
capabilities. A resilient space-based command, control, and ISR
architecture remains a USPACOM priority.
There is a growing need to sustain and modernize airborne early
warning systems to execute multi-mission, multi-domain integrated
command and control. The cruise missile, air, and UAV threats in the
USPACOM AOR require robust, long range Battle Management, Command and
Control (BMC2) and Wide-Area Surveillance (WAS) platforms capable of
operating in a contested environment. Developing and modernizing the
capabilities within the BMC2 and WAS platforms to track and operate in
a communications contested or degraded environment is necessary to meet
the challenges of future operational environments in the Pacific; these
platforms must be interoperable with military services, partners, and
allies.
Related, the Joint Information Environment (JIE) increments I and
II have the potential for consolidation of each military services'
command, control, communication, and computers programs. JIE II will
further strengthen collective cyber security and defense posture in the
region, improve staff efficiency and support, and strengthen
interagency and international relationships. JIE II will require an
information infrastructure adaptable enough to accommodate multiple
security classification levels with the interoperability and sharing
capability to maximize mission effectiveness. JIE II is a necessary
next step to mitigate the risk posed by persistent cyber threats. These
threats continue to grow.
Increased cyber capacity and use, especially by China, North Korea,
and Russia, underscore the growing requirement to evolve our command,
control, and operational structure authorities. In order to fully
leverage the Cyber domain, Combatant Commanders require an enduring
theater cyber operational command resourced to provide regional cyber
planning, integration, synchronization, and direction of cyberspace
forces. The theater cyber operational command will provide direction of
operations against increasingly capable threats in coordination with
USCYBERCOM, the interagency, and allies and partners. USPACOM sees a
future where Joint Force Cyber Component Command (JFCCC) are aligned
regionally under Combatant Commands. JFCCCs will provide staffing and
expertise required to oversee persistent operations and defense of
theater information networks, synchronization of cyber risk assessments
and intelligence, and development of flexible cyber effects.
Munitions are a critical component of combat effectiveness and
readiness. A number of munitions improvements in lethality, production,
and precision are required. There is a growing need for ship-to-ship
and air-to-ship munitions to allow U.S. forces to defeat an aggressor
from greater range. Specifically, there are troubling gaps in Anti-
Surface Warfare capability and readiness that compel the accelerated
fielding of a long range anti-ship missile. A long-range stand-off
weapon, such as the Defense Advanced Research Programs Agency / Office
of Naval Research developed Long Range Anti-Ship Missile, will meet the
urgent need for an offensive anti-surface warfare capability against
combatants in a contested environment. There is also a need for
advancements in the air-to-air realm and for Hard Target Munitions
capabilities to engage hardened targets that are growing in numbers and
complexity. Area Effects Munitions are required to prevent open space
aggression. Lastly, along with lethal munitions, non-lethal
capabilities can prove equally valuable in supporting USPACOM's
strategy and deterrence.
With North Korea continuing to advance its ballistic missile
capabilities, USPACOM will continue its efforts in maintaining a
credible, sustainable ballistic missile defense. The recent deployment
of long range second TPY-2 radar to Japan (December 2014) along with
THAAD on Guam achieving full Fully Operational Capability further
enhanced U.S. homeland defense capabilities which are required to
protect key regional nodes from aggressive action. In addition, over
the last year the U.S., Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Australia
have had better coordination and information sharing. USPACOM looks
forward to continuing our work with our regional IAMD partners and
expanding our ballistic missile defense cooperation and information
sharing.
Equally important to having the right equipment and capabilities is
the capacity of critical logistics. The time and distance required to
move assets across the Pacific make it an imperative to preposition and
secure munitions. Dedicated sealift must be adequately funded to
posture munitions, fuel, and other supplies within theater. Agile,
responsive, and sustained operations demand a resilient network of
capabilities to deploy and sustain USPACOM forces. USTRANSCOM's
prepositioning strategy has emphasized positioning equipment and
materiel afloat to optimize flexibility, ensure rapid responses to
crises, and provide force presence; however, USPACOM still does not
have enough lift to satisfy all operational requirements.
Readiness: Fundamental to USPACOM's mission is the ability to deter
aggression and prevail in crisis. USPACOM's readiness is evaluated
against its ability to execute operational and contingency plans, which
places a premium on forward-deployed, ready forces that can exercise,
train, and operate with our partner nations' militaries and follow-on
forces able to respond to operational contingencies.
USPACOM maintains forward-deployed ready forces as credible
deterrents, to support and defend national security interests, and to
provide assurance and protection to allies and partners. Forward
deployed forces, west of the International Date Line, remain responsive
and relevant to mitigating risk in the event of escalating regional
security events and greatly benefit from training with allies and
partners in a complex environment. Ready, forward-deployed forces
increase decision space and decrease response time, bolster allies' and
partners' confidence, and reduce the chance of miscalculation by
potential adversaries. However, redistribution of global forces that
lead to moving forces out of the Indo-Asia-Pacific diminishes USPACOM's
impact and effectiveness. Additionally, short-notice redeployment of
USPACOM's ready, forward deployed forces to fill emergent requirements
to other areas of operation increases risk to our nation's Indo-Asia-
Pacific interests and objectives.
In addition to concerns with the forward deployed forces, there are
troubling readiness trends associated with follow-on forces. The
ability of the U.S. to surge and globally maneuver ready forces has
historically been an asymmetric advantage that is now diminishing. Over
the past year, the U.S. has been forced to prioritize the readiness of
forward-deployed forces, at the expense of the readiness of follow-on-
forces and critical investments needed to outpace emerging threats. A
lack of ready surge forces resulting from high operational demands,
delayed maintenance periods, and training limitations will limit
responsiveness to emergent contingencies and greatly increases risk.
Budget reductions and uncertainty directly impact operations and
combat readiness. Fiscal constraints disrupt the predictable,
persistent funding needed to organize, train, and equip a ready force.
Fiscal uncertainty degrades and disrupts long-term engagement
opportunities with strategic consequences to U.S. relationships and
prestige. Resource pressures have triggered deferrals in exercises,
operations, and senior leader engagement opportunities; have introduced
regional doubt; and compound the risk to U.S. interests in the region.
As the Service Chiefs recently testified, continuation of sequestration
will further delay critical warfighting capabilities, reduce readiness
of forces needed for contingency response, forego procurement of new
platforms and weapon systems and further downsize weapons capacity . .
. all of which are required for success in the USPACOM AOR. I am in
full agreement with their assessments and remain deeply concerned about
the growing risk to U.S. interests in the Indo-Asia-Pacific.
conclusion
It has been over three years since the President announced the U.S.
Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. The Rebalance is focused on modernizing
and strengthening treaty alliances and partnerships through cooperative
agreements, building partner capacity, and increasing regional
cooperation, interoperability, and security capabilities. From the
military perspective, the U.S. is accomplishing what it set out to do
and the Rebalance is working. However, fiscal uncertainty resulting
from the Budget Control Act could arrest progress and place some
initiatives at risk. Building on the positive momentum of the Rebalance
to the Pacific is critical to protecting U.S. interests in the region.
Thank you for your continued support to USPACOM and our men and women,
and their families, who live and work in the Indo-Asia-Pacific.

Chairman McCain. General Scaparrotti.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI, USA, COMMANDER,
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND/COMBINED FORCES COMMAND/U.S. FORCES
KOREA

General Scaparrotti. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed,
and distinguished members of the committee, I'm honored to
testify today as the Commander of the United Nations Command,
Combined Forces Command, and U.S. Forces Korea.
On behalf of the servicemembers, civilians, contractors,
and their families who serve our great Nation in the Republic
of Korea, one of our most important allies, thank you for your
support.
I've prepared brief opening remarks, but I would like to
ask that my written posture statement be entered into the
record.
Chairman McCain. Without objection.
General Scaparrotti. Last year, I testified that the
combined and joint forces of the United States and the Republic
of Korea were capable and ready to deter and, if necessary,
respond to North Korean threats and actions. Due to our
accomplishments in 2014, I report to you that our strong
alliance is more capable of addressing the rapidly evolving and
increasingly asymmetric North Korean threat.
In recent years, North Korea has aggressively developed and
utilized asymmetric capabilities, such as cyber warfare,
nuclear weapons, and ballistic missiles, to advance its
interests. To put this in perspective over time, in 2012 my
predecessor noted North Korea's advancements in cyber and
nuclear capabilities during his opening statement to this
committee. A year later, North Korea conducted cyber attacks on
South Korea's banks and broadcasting stations. And in 2014,
they boldly projected their cyber capabilities against Sony
Pictures in the United States, in an effort to inflict economic
damage and pressure--and suppress free speech. This example
represents a trend that is persistent across several North
Korean asymmetric capabilities.
My top concern is that we will have little to no warning of
a North Korean asymmetric provocation which could start a cycle
of action and counteraction leading to unintended escalation.
This underscores the need for an alliance to--for the alliance
to maintain a high level of readiness and vigilance.
Last year, the alliance took significant steps in improving
its capabilities and capacities to deter aggression and to
reduce its operational risk. But, our work is not done. In
2015, we will maintain this momentum by focusing on my top
priority: sustaining and strengthening the alliance, with an
emphasis on our combined readiness. This includes ensuring the
rapid flow of ready forces into Korea in the early phases of
hostilities and improving ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance] capabilities in critical munitions.
Mr. Chairman, the return of sequestration would negatively
impact these priorities, reduce readiness, and delay deployment
of the forces required to defend the Republic of Korea and U.S.
interests. In crisis on the Peninsula, this will result in more
military and civilian casualties for the Republic of Korea and
the United States, and potentially place the mission at risk.
The men and women serving on freedom's frontier, defending
the Republic of Korea, remain thankful for this committee's
unwavering support in prioritizing resources that enable us to
defend our national interests in Asia while advancing universal
values and international order. I'm extremely proud of our
servicemembers, civilians, and their families serving in the
Republic of Korea, who never lose sight of the fact that we are
at freedom's frontier, defending one of our most important
allies and vital American interests.
Thank you. And I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Scaparrotti follows:]

prepared statement of general curtis m. scaparrotti commander, united
nations command; commander, united states-republic of korea combined
forces command; and commander, united states forces korea before the
senate armed services committee april 16, 2015
1. introduction
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee, I am
honored to testify as the Commander of the multinational United Nations
Command (UNC), the combined United States-Republic of Korea (ROK)
Combined Forces Command (CFC), and the joint United States Forces Korea
(USFK). Thank you for your support of our Service Members, Civilians,
Contractors, and their Families who serve our great nation and the
U.S.-ROK Alliance. The Asia-Pacific region is critical to our nation's
security and prosperity, and the U.S.-ROK Alliance is indispensable to
the stability that enables the region to thrive despite serious threats
and challenges. The men and women of this Command are committed every
day to each other, our mission, and our nation's calling. We are very
proud of our partnership with the Republic of Korea and of our
contributions to stability and prosperity in Korea and the region. The
U.S.-ROK Alliance is one of history's most successful alliances, and we
are confident that we can further enhance it to serve both of our
nations.
Last year, I testified that the Alliance is strong, but that we
would not become complacent in our daily mission to deter and defend
against the North Korean threat. I also stated that we would face
challenges and opportunities in adapting the Alliance to that threat.
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members, I report to you that the
Alliance is even stronger today due to our accomplishments in 2014. In
2015, we will build on that momentum based on four guiding Command
priorities.
Sustain and Strengthen the Alliance.
Maintain the Armistice. Be Ready to ``Fight Tonight'' to
Deter and Defeat Aggression.
Transform the Alliance.
Sustain the Force and Enhance the UNC/CFC/USFK Team.
2. alliance accomplishments in 2014
In 2014, the United States and the Republic of Korea took
significant steps to improve our overall readiness and the strength of
the Alliance. We started the year with the annual KEY RESOLVE exercise
in February-March, followed by the ULCHI FREEDOM GUARDIAN exercise in
August. These annual exercises, along with my personal visits to ROK
and U.S. units throughout South Korea, helped me confirm our strengths
and note some areas we must improve. The Command's greatest strength
rests in the close, collaborative, and cooperative working relationship
with not only our ROK ally, but with the larger United Nations Command
team.
The strength and importance of the Alliance were highlighted last
April by our two Presidents' first visit to CFC. President Park praised
the close relationship of the Alliance in the steadfast defense of the
Republic of Korea. President Obama called the Alliance ``special,
forged on the battlefield'' and commented that we are ``more than
allies--we are friends.'' He also noted that it is ``this foundation of
trust . . . that allows both our nations to thrive economically and
socially.''
In 2014, we made progress on two initiatives against the growing
North Korean missile threat. We further developed our comprehensive
Tailored Deterrence Strategy (TDS) to counter the North Korean missile
and WMD threats. We also concluded the ``Concepts and Principles for
Comprehensive Alliance Counter-Missile Operations,'' with a ``4D
Strategy'' to detect, defend, disrupt, and destroy North Korean
missiles. This important step will help us gain important synergies and
efficiencies, not only in terms of the capabilities each nation
develops, but how we use these capabilities operationally.
Over the past year, our drive to strengthen the Alliance has
improved our combined readiness. For example, the U.S. Army began and
the U.S. Air Force continued to deploy forces to Korea on a rotational
basis. This added commitment complemented units based in Korea,
improving overall readiness. Additionally, the ROK Army and Air Force
participated in National Training Center and Red Flag exercises in the
United States. These challenging exercises improved the Alliance's
interoperability and transformed air crews into seasoned veterans.
South Korea made progress in enhancing future warfighting and
interoperability capabilities by taking steps toward procuring Patriot
Advanced Capability missiles, F35 Joint Strike Fighters, and RQ-4
Global Hawk Surveillance Aircraft. Once integrated into our Alliance
force structure, these systems will enhance the capabilities of our
Alliance.
We also agreed to establish a U.S.-ROK Combined Division in wartime
with a functioning combined staff during Armistice. Once in place later
this year, the division will enhance our combined combat posture at the
tactical level.
We signed the five-year Special Measures Agreement which
established the sharing of costs for stationing U.S. forces in South
Korea. ROK contributions through the SMA help maintain the Alliance's
readiness and infrastructure to support U.S. forces.
We ended the year with the signing of a much needed trilateral
information-sharing arrangement between the United States, South Korea,
and Japan. Under this arrangement, our two closest allies in the region
can share classified information related to the nuclear and missile
threats posed by North Korea. Our strategic and military initiatives in
2014 comprise what we call a ``Quality Alliance.'' We continue to use
this concept to focus on military qualities and capabilities, and to
provide a framework and context to align senior leadership decision-
making.
3. strategic environment
Our accomplishments last year advanced U.S. security and
prosperity, which are inextricably linked to stability in the Asia-
Pacific region. In the 21st century, the Asia-Pacific region is
expected to serve as an engine of the global economy, grow in political
influence, and remain the focus of a variety of complex security
challenges. The troubled history of the region, combined with the
dynamic regional security situation, render strong alliances and
partnerships critical to our nation's ability to defend our interests.
In the face of strategic changes and security threats, and lacking
regional security institutions, the United States serves as the
constant that provides presence, stability, and a framework for
conflict avoidance and resolution. The United States has taken a vital
role in Asia, as it has worldwide, in promoting international
cooperation and the effectiveness of international rules and norms.
This role is supported by America's enduring military presence, which
serves as a foundational and visible element of U.S. leadership and
commitment in Asia. In South Korea, forward-deployed American forces
stand together with our ROK ally and demonstrate unwavering resolve in
the face of the growing North Korean asymmetric threat.
A. CHINA, RUSSIA, AND JAPAN
China is continuing on a comprehensive military modernization
program, at times acting assertively to press its interests in the
region. China remains North Korea's most significant supporter, even
though the relationship has been strained since Kim Jong-un assumed
control of North Korea. Russia has increased its focus on the region,
including military presence and engagement, in a reassertion of its
strategic interests. Meanwhile, Japan is adapting its strategy to allow
it to exercise collective self-defense. This change constitutes a
natural evolution in Japan's defense policy, and its alliance with the
U.S. should reassure the region that by accepting increased defense
responsibilities it will contribute to regional and global security and
enable a more effective defense of the Korean Peninsula.
B. NORTH KOREA
An unpredictable North Korea remains a significant threat to
American interests, the security and prosperity of South Korea, and the
stability of the international community. North Korea is willing to use
coercion, continue development of nuclear weapons technology and long-
range ballistic missile programs, engage in proliferation of arms,
missiles and related materiel and technologies, and conduct cyber
attacks, all while continuing to deny its citizens the most basic human
rights. Due to the strength of the U.S.-ROK Alliance, North Korea lacks
the ability to unify the Korean Peninsula by force with its large but
aging conventional military. Recognizing this, North Korea has opted
for an asymmetric strategy capable of little to no notice provocations
and limited attacks. North Korea's strategy is designed to ensure the
survival of the Kim regime, with options to disrupt peninsular,
regional, or global security. To achieve this, Kim Jong-un must
maintain internal security and a strong military deterrent. North
Korea's nuclear program serves both objectives by enhancing domestic
regime legitimacy and threatening neighbors and the United States.
What's Changed Since Last Year? North Korea has placed significant
emphasis and resources into its asymmetric capabilities, especially its
missiles and cyber threats. In 2014, North Korea conducted a series of
long-range artillery, rocket, and ballistic missile tests with very
little to no notice. During the summer training period, North Korea
military units conducted more realistic training and increased
activities along the Demilitarized Zone and in the North West Islands
region. The North West Islands region--where North and South Korea
actively monitor fishing vessels operated by both countries and by
China--remains the primary hotspot on the Korean Peninsula. In
November, North Korea sought to intimidate and pressure the U.S. media
and entertainment industries by projecting its cyber capabilities
against Sony Pictures. This was a significant action that demonstrated
North Korea's willingness to use cyber-attacks in defiance of
international norms.
Provocation and Engagement. North Korea's strategy involves
combining provocation and engagement in what is often characterized as
coercive diplomacy to pursue objectives that enhance regime
survivability. This includes initiatives to compel international
acceptance of its nuclear program, play regional actors, including the
U.S., against one another, and split alliances, particularly the ROK-
U.S. Alliance. North Korea recognizes the strength of the ROK-U.S.
Alliance as its greatest threat, so it tries to fracture the Alliance
in order to deal with each nation separately on its terms. The North
Korean People's Army (KPA) retains the capability to inflict heavy
costs on South Korea. However, KPA senior leaders likely understand it
is not capable of defeating the Alliance, despite its propaganda to the
contrary. North Korea's asymmetric strategy and capabilities enable
limited objective military actions, which have the risk of
miscalculation and escalation.
Asymmetric Capabilities. North Korea has conducted three nuclear
tests--in 2006, 2009, and 2013. It continues to prepare its test site
and could conduct another test at any time. In recent years, North
Korea has continued to develop its asymmetric capabilities including
several hundred ballistic missiles, a sizeable long range artillery
force, one of the world's largest chemical weapons stockpiles, a
biological weapons research program, the world's largest special
operations forces, and an active cyber warfare capability. These
capabilities can be employed with minimal warning, and threaten South
Korea and potentially the United States and Japan.
Since assuming power three years ago, Kim Jong-un has taken a
number of confrontational steps to solidify his control over the North
Korean people, military, and political apparatus. The regime conducted
a satellite launch in December 2012 and conducted its third nuclear
test in February 2013, in defiance of United Nations Security Council
Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and 2094 (2013). In
2014, North Korea continued to develop its ballistic missile program,
conducting no-notice Scud and No Dong missile tests from several launch
locations, all violations of UN Security Council resolutions.
These asymmetric capabilities, along with the fourth largest
military in the world that is 70-75 percent forward deployed within 60
miles of the DMZ, challenges the Alliance to assess potential
indications of a North Korean provocation or attack.
What Are We Doing to Address the Threat? The Alliance is constantly
using readiness, vigilance, and cooperation to counter the North Korean
threat. All three Commands--United Nations Command, Combined Forces
Command, and U.S. Forces Korea--in close coordination with the ROK
military train and posture our forces and capabilities to deter and
defend against North Korea. We continue to press ahead on tailored
deterrence, counter-missile capabilities, improving plans, and adding
rotational forces and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
(ISR). We have also taken steps to enhance the United Nations Command
to increase multinational influence. A strong Alliance and ready
military posture continue to provide the opportunity for further
diplomatic, political, and economic engagements. The military dimension
of national power is fully integrated into larger national efforts to
address the North Korean threat, and more broadly to meet U.S. national
security objectives in the region.
C. REPUBLIC OF KOREA
The ROK is a dynamic nation of 50 million people in a region
critical to U.S. interests, as well as regional and global stability.
The ROK's success, the ``Miracle on the Han River,'' is truly
remarkable considering that less than 60 years ago it was one of the
poorest nations in the world. Emerging from the destruction of the
Korean War, the ROK is among the most vibrant democracies and economies
in the world. The drive and spirit of the Korean people along with the
security provided by our Alliance forces have helped the Korean people
propel their country to become an increasingly important and prominent
player in the international community and one of America's closest
allies.
Politically and economically, the ROK provides an example for other
nations seeking to improve the lives of their citizens. Today, South
Korea boasts the world's 12th largest economy. With world-class
universities and research and development centers, the ROK is also a
leader in science and technology, with the world's fastest average
internet connection speed. As a nation with growing influence, South
Korea is increasing its role in setting the international agenda, to
include establishing a series of free trade agreements and hosting
international defense talks.
D. UNITED NATIONS COMMAND: THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION IN KOREA
In response to North Korea's invasion of South Korea in 1950, the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) called for members to provide
military forces to South Korea under the leadership of the United
States. The UNSC chartered the United Nations Command (UNC) to repel
the attack and restore peace and security. In 1953, the UNC, North
Korea, and China agreed to an Armistice to halt hostilities. Today, the
18 nation UNC remains an international coalition that maintains the
Armistice and contributes to deterrence. If hostilities resume, UNC
provides a multinational enabler to ensure broad international support
to defend the ROK.
The ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command is the powerful warfighting
command that deters North Korean aggression and leads U.S.-ROK forces
in the defense of South Korea. CFC enables us to organize, plan, and
exercise U.S. and ROK forces so that the Alliance is ready to ``Fight
Tonight.''
U.S. Forces Korea, as a sub-unified command of U.S. Pacific
Command, is responsible for organizing, training, and equipping U.S.
forces on the Peninsula to be agile, adaptable, and ready to support
CFC and UNC.
4. advancing security on the korean peninsula: priorities for 2015
In the context of the strategic environment I described above, I
have four priorities for the Command: first, to sustain and strengthen
the Alliance; second, to maintain the Armistice, while remaining ready
to ``Fight Tonight'' to deter and defeat aggression; third, to
transform the Alliance; and, finally, to sustain the force and enhance
the UNC/CFC/USFK Team. I would like to describe the progress we've made
over the last year on each of these priorities, and then conclude by
looking ahead to how we will continue to build on these successes.
A. Sustain and Strengthen the Alliance
Our national leaders have established the ROK-U.S. Alliance as the
linchpin of our common defense of South Korea. Our efforts on this
priority have borne much fruit in this last year. We are increasing
activities and communications, so that we keep the Alliance at the
center of the Command's actions. By putting the Alliance first, we will
be better able to address Alliance issues to find Alliance solutions.
Strong Relationships. The U.S.-ROK Alliance is based on common
values and interests, as well as strong relationships. Taken together
with the national security strategies of both of our nations,
presidential statements, and legislation, the U.S. is set to continue
to be an indispensable strategic partner to the ROK, and the ROK is
well poised to be an enduring and increasingly important ally to the
U.S. We have shared an uncommon level of trust that has been central to
the defense of South Korea, and key to addressing the regional and
global implications of North Korea's disruptive behavior. But the
Alliance is about much more than North Korea. Together we are working
to address a broad range of security challenges, and to also create new
opportunities, mechanisms, and initiatives for an enduring peace,
stability, and prosperity. Going forward together, we are poised for a
shared future of growth and prosperity.
ROK National Security Strategy. The ROK recently promulgated a new
national security strategy titled ``A New Era of Hope.'' The strategy
seeks to build on the foundation provided by the ROK-U.S Alliance to
pave the way toward peaceful unification and an enhanced international
leadership role. The strategy provides a framework for making
substantive civil and economic preparations for unification, but keeps
in sharp focus the necessity of maintaining a robust defense posture
and developing future-oriented capabilities. The strategy also looks
outward in terms of enhancing the ROK's relations with other nations
and contributing to what the strategy calls ``the co-prosperity of
humankind.''
Republic of Korea Military: A Formidable Force. The ROK military is
a modern and capable force with superb leaders. Considering all that is
at stake on the Korean Peninsula, we are fortunate to have such a
capable ally to tackle challenges and pursue common objectives. In line
with the ROK military's growing capabilities, it is proving to be an
increasingly valuable partner that contributes to disaster relief,
anti-piracy, and non-proliferation operations worldwide. Since South
Korea joined the United Nations in September 1991, it has deployed
40,000 troops all around the world in peacekeeping and assistance
missions. In 2014, the ROK military deployed to more than 15 countries
in various operations, including an Ebola relief team to West Africa.
Military Strategy. The ROK military strategy continues to
call for a rapid and firm response to North Korean provocations,
believing such a response is essential to deterrence and self-defense.
As I testified last year, I remain concerned about the potential for
miscalculation and escalation, so an Alliance response based on timely
consultation is the best way to maintain the Armistice and stability.
Manning and Budget. The South Korean military has an
active duty force of 639,000 personnel and 2.9 million reservists.
South Korea plans to offset a force reduction to 517,000 in the 2020s
with better and more high-tech capabilities. In December, the ROK
Ministry of National Defense submitted a budget of $37.09 billion, a
4.9 percent increase from last year and representing about 2.5 percent
of its GDP.
Capabilities and Force Improvement. South Korea continues
to prioritize capabilities and training based on the North Korean
threat, but it is also considering other factors such as the defense of
sea lines of communication and maritime exclusive economic zones, and
building its domestic defense industries.
B. Maintain the Armistice. Be Ready To ``Fight Tonight'' To Deter and
Defeat Aggression
To advance this priority, we must expedite the completion of our
plans, enhance BMD posture, and maximize training and exercise
opportunities. In order to do those things, we have to provide the
combined and joint force in Korea with the best capabilities the
Alliance can muster.
U.S. Rotational Forces: Delivering Better Capabilities in Korea.
Rotational assets are modular, multi-functional, and operational across
the full range of military operations. They enhance our ability to
sustain a diverse mix of rapidly deployable capabilities and adapt to a
broader range of requirements to defend the Republic of Korea.
The movement of U.S. Air Force fighters into the Pacific has been a
routine and integral part of U.S. Pacific Command's combat capable air
forces and regional force posture since March 2004, as has the forward
stationing of Air Force bomber assets in the Pacific under the
Continuous Bomber Presence initiative. These have maintained a prudent
deterrent against threats to regional security and stability.
Eighth Army was among the first units to receive an Attack
Reconnaissance Squadron in October 2013, and it will continue to
support routine rotational deployments as part of the U.S. rebalancing
efforts in the Asia-Pacific region. The decision to rotate units to
South Korea represents the Army's commitment to provide mission-ready
and culturally attuned capabilities to the region. The rotational
deployments to Eighth Army also expose more Army units to the Korean
Peninsula, while providing the Alliance with an improved ability to
conduct bilateral exercises and improve readiness. These rotations have
already achieved results. The 4-6th Attack Reconnaissance Squadron,
16th Combat Aviation Brigade, rotated to Korea from Joint Base Lewis-
McChord, WA (October 2013 to June 2014). In nine months, they increased
their combat readiness by exercising close combat attack,
reconnaissance, and security operations as air and ground forces worked
together in a combined arms live-fire environment.
The first brigade-sized unit to support Eighth Army will arrive in
June 2015 when the 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), 1st Cavalry
Division from Fort Hood, TX arrives to replace the 1st ABCT, 2nd
Infantry Division. This brigade is scheduled to inactivate in July
after 50 years of proud service on the Korean Peninsula.
Missile Defense: Countering Growing North Korean Capabilities. The
ROK-U.S. Alliance endeavors to strengthen our ability to counter North
Korea's growing ballistic missile threat. At the October 2014 Security
Consultative Meeting (SCM), the ROK Minister of National Defense and
U.S. Secretary of Defense endorsed ``Concepts and Principles for
Comprehensive Alliance Counter-Missile Operations'' or the ``4D
Strategy.'' This strategy will posture the Alliance to detect, defend,
disrupt, and destroy North Korean ballistic missile threats. This will
not only improve Alliance defenses, it will bolster efforts to deter
North Korean WMD and missile use. Further, it will guide operational
decision-making, planning, exercises, capability development, and
acquisitions. The capabilities include the ROK's ``Kill Chain'' and
Korean Air and Missile Defense System (KAMD), as well as U.S.
capabilities on and off Peninsula. The Alliance continues to pursue
upgrades and improvements to existing ballistic missile defense
capability to include increasing interoperability in systems and
procedures.
Tailored Deterrence: Influencing North Korean Decision-Making. The
bilateral Tailored Deterrence Strategy (TDS) was created in 2013 to
outline a range of Alliance options to influence the North Korean
regime's decision making. The strategy focuses on options that raise
the cost of North Korean WMD or ballistic missile use; deny the
benefits of their use; and encourage restraint from using WMD or
ballistic missiles. The strategy provides bilaterally agreed upon
concepts and principles for deterring North Korean WMD use and
countering North Korean coercion.
Exercises: Enhancing Readiness. Exercising our combined and
multinational force is an important component of readiness and is
fundamental to sustaining and strengthening the Alliance. Combined
Forces Command and ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) conduct three annual
joint and combined exercises: KEY RESOLVE (KR), FOAL EAGLE (FE), and
ULCHI FREEDOM GUARDIAN (UFG). KR and UFG are computer-simulated,
theater-level command post exercises that ensure our readiness to
respond to provocations, attacks, and instability. UNC routinely
invites participation from its 18 Sending States to strengthen
Coalition interoperability, while observers from the Swedish and Swiss
Delegations of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission promote an
independent and internationally credible assessment of the defensive
nature of these exercises.
C. Transform the Alliance
To achieve transformation, we must synchronize, transform, and re-
station the force. We also need to advance theater C4I and cyber
capabilities.
Conditions-based Wartime Operational Control Transition. At the
2014 SCM, in light of the evolving security environment in the region
including the enduring North Korean nuclear and missile threat, the ROK
Minister of National Defense and U.S. Secretary of Defense agreed to
implement a conditions-based approach to the transition of wartime
operational control (OPCON) from the U.S.-led Combined Forces Command
(CFC) to a new ROK-led combined defense command. This will ensure our
combined defense remains strong while the ROK develops or acquires the
critical military capabilities necessary to assume the lead in its
defense.
As a result of this decision, CFC will retain its wartime
leadership until the Alliance agrees conditions are met and are
conducive for a stable OPCON transition. We will continue to refine our
strategy to create adaptive, agile plans and field combined forces that
deter and defeat an enemy's provocations, deter aggression, and if
deterrence fails, to fight and win.
Additionally, the CFC headquarters will temporarily remain in its
current location in Yongsan and maintain the personnel and
infrastructure required to command and control the combined force until
OPCON transition occurs. Similarly, USFK will keep the U.S. 210th Field
Artillery Brigade north of the Han River until the ROK fields a
comparable capability.
U.S. Force Relocation: Posturing to Enhance Readiness. To posture
forces in support of U.S. and ROK national interests, both governments
agreed to consolidate USFK into two enduring hubs south of Seoul near
the cities of Pyeongtaek and Daegu. USFK will enhance readiness,
improve efficiencies, and further augment Alliance capabilities through
two major plans: the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP) and the Land
Partnership Plan (LPP).
YRP is funded by the ROK government to relocate USFK and UNC from
Seoul to U.S. Army Garrison-Humphreys (USAG-H) in Pyeongtaek. LPP
consolidates forces from north of Seoul to USAG-H south of Seoul, while
still providing access to northern training areas and ranges. The
majority of relocations involves U.S. Army units and supports the
Army's Force Generation rotational plan.
The YRP/LPP's $10.7B transformation program, which includes over
600 facilities, is well underway with over $1B in construction. The
construction at USAG-H has tripled the garrison size. Key construction
projects include unit headquarters, motor pools, barracks, family
housing, medical facilities, communication centers, a ``Midtown
Community'' complex, schools, installation service facilities, and
underground utilities systems. In 2013 and 2014, ROK and U.S. funded
projects completed an elementary school, a high school, family housing
towers, a child development center, the waste water treatment plant, an
airfield operations building, and supporting land fill for garrison
expansion. In these efforts, we are particularly attentive to housing
needs--to meet our goal of 40 percent command-sponsored families living
on post, so we can maintain readiness and ensure quality of life.
Along with Eighth Army, the Marine Corps Forces Korea (MARFORK)
headquarters located in Yongsan will relocate to USAG-H. Commander,
U.S. Naval Forces Korea (CNFK) will relocate its headquarters to co-
locate with the ROK Fleet Headquarters at Busan in 2015. This will
strengthen day-to-day cooperation in the combined naval component,
while leveraging the capabilities of nearby Commander Fleet Activities
Chinhae, the only U.S. Navy base on the Asian mainland.
For Seventh Air Force at Osan Air Base, USFK will return real
estate hosting dilapidated munitions storage areas to the ROK, and in
turn the ROK will grant a larger parcel of land to construct new
storage facilities which will enhance safety. Also, while not a YRP/LPP
initiative, planning has advanced for a new Combined Air and Space
Operations Center at Osan, to be funded in large part with host-nation
funds, which will ensure a survivable, capable command and control
capability for Airpower.
D. Sustain the Force and Enhance the UNC/CFC/USFK Team
To sustain U.S. forces in Korea, we will continue to focus on
proper command climates, enforcement of discipline, and comprehensive
fitness and wellness. Particularly in the areas of preventing crime,
sexual harassment, and sexual assault, we have been taking proactive
steps that have led to a downward trend in incidents. To prevent sexual
harassment and sexual assault, the Command Sergeant Major and I conduct
regular sensing sessions that provide insights on what leaders need to
be more aware of for effective prevention strategies. We are committed
to this priority, so we can build trust and readiness to prevail in
armistice and the crucible of war.
To enhance the international team in Korea, we have also made
important progress. We are expanding UNC participation in exercises.
For example, participation during the annual exercise ULCHI FREEDOM
GUARDIAN increased from three countries and seven officers in 2009 to
seven countries and 153 officers in 2014. Multinational officers also
play a critical role on the UNC staff, to include shaping UNC strategy,
strategic communication, and other critical functions. This
increasingly impactful and visible multinational presence is a clear
message from the international community of continued international
support for the defense of South Korea and for stability in the region.
5. what we must achieve
With the progress I have described, there is still much work to do.
I am proud to testify that, as a result of the progress we have
achieved on the Command's four priorities, our defense is capable and
better prepared to respond effectively to any provocation, instability,
or aggression.
Our top concern is that we could have very little warning of a
North Korean asymmetric provocation, which could start a cycle of
action and counter-action, leading to unintended escalation. This
underscores the need for the Alliance to maintain a high level of
readiness and vigilance, and to do so together.
Critical Capabilities. During the recent SCM, our national leaders
reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening the combined defense of
South Korea. They also confirmed several critical capabilities the
Alliance must improve to ensure continued readiness to respond. These
are:
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, or ISR.
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and
Intelligence, or C4I.
Ballistic Missile Defense, or BMD.
Critical Munitions.
We must continue to pursue ISR capabilities. The Alliance's ability
to distinguish the indications and warnings associated with an
impending North Korean asymmetric or conventional attack directly
impacts the Alliance's decision space. Investments here can mitigate
the risk of miscalculation and escalation by providing a more accurate
and timely picture of North Korean actions.
During this past year, South Korea began to invest in new tactical
equipment that will comprise a reliable C4I architecture. We must
maintain this momentum in improving C4I capabilities and
interoperability, so we can communicate from tactical to strategic
levels and between units in the field.
Due to the nature of the evolving threat, particularly ballistic
missiles, it is critical for the Alliance to build a layered and
interoperable BMD capability. Each nation has unique contributions to
make to missile defense. While the U.S. has an existing layered BMD
capability, the ROK is moving forward in the development of its KAMD
and ``Kill Chain.'' It is essential that we work together to ensure
interoperability of Alliance BMD capabilities.
In the early phases of hostilities, we will rely on a rapid flow of
ready forces into the ROK. During this time, we will rely on U.S. and
ROK Air Forces to establish air superiority to defeat North Korean
threats which could inflict great damage on Seoul. In order to ensure
maximum Alliance capability and interoperability, we will also work
closely with the Republic of Korea to ensure it procures the
appropriate types and numbers of critical munitions for the early
phases of hostilities.
Force Relocation Plans. We will continue executing the Yongsan
Relocation Plan and the Land Partnership Plan, and as required, we will
work together to refine relocation plans to support the conditions-
based OPCON transition.
Operational Plans. Finally, with CFC retaining its wartime
leadership role, we will expedite updating our operational plans.
Executable plans will ensure an effective Alliance response to a
crisis.
6. closing
2014 was a positive year for the ROK-U.S. Alliance in many
respects, even in the face of unpredictable North Korean asymmetric
actions. We have been fortunate and thankful for the strong support of
all our partners and the priority of resources that allow us to carry
out what our Alliance demands of the Command. In 2015, I am looking
forward to working with senior U.S. and ROK civilian and military
leaders, Ambassador Mark Lippert, ADM Locklear, and the new PACOM
Commander as we maintain stability in Korea and the region. The men and
women of this multinational, combined, and joint warfighting Command
are very thankful for the support from this Committee and the American
people which is so crucial in maintaining our readiness against the
North Korean threat. We will never lose sight of the fact that we are
at ``Freedom's Frontier'' defending one of our most important allies
and vital American interests. Thank you, and I look forward to our
discussion.

Chairman McCain. Thank you very much.
General, I mentioned in my remarks, Admiral Gortney said
that North Korea has an operational road-mobile missile that
could carry nuclear weapons to the United States. Do you agree
with that assessment?
General Scaparrotti. Senator, I believe that they've had
the time and the capability to miniaturize a nuclear warhead.
They've stated that they have an intercontinental ballistic
missile that has nuclear capability. They've paraded it. And I
think, as a commander, we must assume that they have that
capability.
Chairman McCain. Admiral?
Admiral Locklear. I would agree with that assessment. I
mean, we haven't seen them effectively test it. But, we--you
know, as commanders, all the indications are that we have to be
prepared to defend the homeland from it. And we're taking
actions to do that.
Chairman McCain. And those actions are?
Admiral Locklear. Well, first, we work very--in PACOM, we
work very closely with NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command] to
ensure that the defensive capabilities of our ballistic
missiles systems are optimized. Forces forward in the theater
that I and General Scaparrotti have command of are integral to
that. Our ability to--in the region, to partner with our
Japanese allies and our South Korean allies to bring the BMD
[ballistic missile defense] capabilities to bear has been
productive. In addition, we've been in discussions about
potential deployment of an additional THAAD battery, not--
beyond the one that's in Guam, but on the Korean Peninsula.
Chairman McCain. General, this is rather disturbing,
particularly given the unpredictability of this overweight
young man in North Korea. Is that----
General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir, that's----
Chairman McCain. Is that a disturbing factor?
General Scaparrotti. That's a disturbing factor, sir. And I
think--you know, I believe that Kim Jung-Un is unpredictable.
He has a mind that he can intimidate. He does that with
provocations. He's committed provocations this year. So, I
think it's a great concern, given the leadership there, as
well.
Chairman McCain. Let's talk about China and the
reclamation. Admiral, we, from time to time, put a picture up
of the areas that are reclaimed by China out in the East China
Sea--or South China Sea. And the problem is, our pictures don't
keep up with their activities. Is it--it's my information that
they have now, in the last year, filled in some 600 acres of
land and are constructing runways and possibly artillery and
missile defense systems.
The Congressional Research Service, on April 6th, issued a
report on this issue, and I quote their report, saying ``The
publicly visible current U.S. strategy for dissuading China
from continuing its land reclamation activities appears to
focus primarily on having U.S. officials make statements
expressing the U.S. view that China should stop these
activities, on the grounds that they are destabilizing and
inconsistent with commitments China has made under the
nonbinding 2002 DOC [Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties
in the South China Sea].''
Do you know anything else about our strategy concerning
China's continued expanding and filling in these areas, which
are international waters? And how great a threat do you--does
that appear to you, Admiral, as far as long-term threat to our
commitment to freedom of the seas?
Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir.
Well, the overall U.S. strategy, I think, is well--goes
well beyond the military component of what I deal with each
day. And so, I only make recommendations on the military side.
So, I'd refer the policy decisions about----
Chairman McCain. And your----
Admiral Locklear.--how we deal with----
Chairman McCain. And your recommendations are?
Admiral Locklear. Well, in general, where you find that the
United States has a clear policy on how it feels about
something, military solutions or diplomatic solutions become
easier for that. The policy we have in the South China Sea, as
I understand it today, as is, we take--globally, on territorial
disputes--is that we don't take sides in those territorial
disputes, that there's--but that we do want them worked out in
peaceful, non-coercive ways in legal matters. And that's been
expressed----
Chairman McCain.--those actions----
Admiral Locklear.--to all the countries in the region.
Chairman McCain.--could, over time, impede our ability to
navigate through those areas----
Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir. Well, I think that, given the
fact that the--my view--of all the claimants in the South China
Sea--and some of them--well, they all own some of these land
features and have different postures and different----
Chairman McCain. I mean, we don't fill in areas of some 600
acres, either.
Admiral Locklear. No, sir. No, they don't. And so, my
assessment is that all the claimants, except for China, are
just kind of doing what they agreed to in 2002, is, they're
just maintaining them in--as--while the legal processes would
work out. The Chinese, however, are doing much different than
that. They're--obviously, as you've stated, it's been
aggressive. I think it's been--how fast they've been able to do
it has been actually astonishing. They're building a network of
outposts to enforce control over most of the South China Sea.
The Southeast Asian nations are increasingly worried that PRC's
[People's Republic of China] new capabilities will allow China
to take de facto control of the surrounding waters, you know,
places like Fiery Cross Reef, where they're putting in a
runway. I mean, just in the last 10 months, it went from a
barely noticeable feature to now having a deepwater port on it
and a potential runway. This will allow the PRC to--number one,
to improve their ability to put their maritime security force
down there, which is the equivalent to a coast guard or a
fisheries patrol, which, to give you a magnitude of the size of
the PRC's capabilities, if you take all the Southeast-Asian
countries' coast guards and put them together, it's still a
smaller number than what China has been able to produce. I have
also observed that they've taken what would have been
considered, a couple of years ago, gray-hulled warships and
painted them white and turned them into maritime security
craft. So, it has been astonishing.
And to get--we--you know, we portray this--I think, try to,
to the PRC, to China, and their response is generally, ``Well,
this is our sovereign territory,'' and, ``Stay out of our
business,'' which is for them to enforce their ``nine dash
line'' claim.
So, the implications are, if this activity continues at
pace, is that it really would give them de facto control, I
think, in peacetime, of much of the world's most important
waterways, of where much of the world's economic energy is
created. It would--if they desired, it would, in the future,
them the opportunity to have outposts to put long-range
detection radars in there, to place--put more warships. They
could put warplanes to enforce potential, down the road, air
defense zones. So, those are the kind of scenarios we have to
think about. And it certainly complicates the security
environment.
So far, the ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations]
nations, who have tried to work with China on this to develop a
code of conduct, in my view has been--not produced very much at
all. In fact, you know, the ASEAN is an effective diplomatic
organization, but it's not designed to handle these security
issues that pop up.
So, I think we've got to watch this situation very
carefully.
Chairman McCain. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And, General Scaparrotti, we have a--very complicated
relations with the Chinese, and it's particularly in the
context of North Korea. To what degree do you have, sort of,
the--a contingency plan to communicate with them if there is a
provocation--a serious provocation by the North Koreans that
would introduce the idea of using, you know, force?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir.
Well, you know, as we--even in our exercises, one of the
first priorities is communications with China if there's
conflict on the Peninsula. And so, we exercise that in
communications even in our exercises. And, of course, it's very
important for us to understand that and ensure that they
understand our intent.
Senator Reed. Now, that's one side of the equation. The
other side of the equation is, to the extent that they're
facilitating some of these activities by the North Koreans,
particularly cyber, do you have any sort of sense of that
degree of facilitation? And the general question is--you know,
they have to appreciate the instability of this regime, the
irrationality of the regime. They like the buffer between South
Korea. They like it because they're affecting our behavior and
disturbing us. But, they have to, I hope, realize there's the
danger of, you know, looking the other way. Is that--
General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir.
I'd--and I think they do. My sense is--in those who had
conversations with them--I haven't talked to their military
directly--but, that they also are concerned and have some
frustrations with the Kim regime.
I--in terms of cyber, you specifically asked that question.
You know, we know that North Korea has--some of their cyber
activities take place in China. But, I don't know, and I
haven't seen intelligence that would lead me to believe, that
they've had a direct relationship with North Korea in their
cyber development.
Senator Reed. And just, finally--and then this spans not
just the military capacity, but diplomatic capacity--are there
efforts to try to move the Chinese government to be more
proactive, in terms of with financial pressures, with
diplomatic pressures, to at least demonstrate to the North
Korean regime that, you know, they're--they can't do these
things?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir, there has been.
Senator Reed. Yeah.
Admiral Locklear, you've described a situation in the South
Pacific and the Southeast Pacific as one where China is
exerting itself. The witnesses in the last panel suggested
that, in terms of the North Pacific--Korea, Japan, et cetera--
we're fairly well positioned against potential operational
threats. But, it's not the case in the Southern Pacific and the
Southeast Pacific. Is that fair?
Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir. It's a large region. You know,
as we've talked about, the beginning of the whole rebalance
discussion was trying to move ourselves from what had been a
post-Cold-War to kind of a location in Northeast Asia, and to
bring that to be more relevant to the security challenges
throughout the region.
So, a number of initiatives. One is that we, with our
Filipino allies, have reinvigorated that alliance and are
looking at the capabilities to help them improve their minimum
defense, but also to improve access to the region to ensure
better security.
We've opened partnerships with nations in Southeast Asia
that we probably wouldn't have considered possible in the last
couple of decades--Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia--countries that
have become increasingly important to the security of the
region and to the global security environment.
Senator Reed. As the Chinese are creating these artificial
islands in the Pacific, there are a lot of, you know, real
geographic islands that our allies control. Are we thinking
about, in conjunction with our allies, positioning forces
forward--in effect, using the islands as sort of a way to deny,
you know, ocean to the Chinese, they appear trying to do to us?
Admiral Locklear. Well, I wouldn't go into specifics of
where we would--where our planning would take us, in this
forum, sir. But, I would say that, first, we're doing is, we're
ensuring that the five alliances that we have there are set
right for the security that we're going to--the security
environment we're going to see ourselves in in this century.
And we're encouraging--and, to their credit, most of them are
spending money, and spending money on defense assets, and are--
and they want the things that allow them to be able to be
complementary to us. So, we're--we are working hard in that
area.
Senator Reed. A final question, Admiral Locklear. Admiral
Roughead was here on Tuesday and indicated that the--one of the
clear advantages we have is our submarine fleet in the Pacific.
In fact, he recommended doubling the number of deployed
submarines. Is that your view also, in terms of a--particularly
with their aerial denial, their surface capabilities--is that
your view also?
Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir. Well, I've said to this forum
before, we have the best submarines in the world. We continue,
I think, to outpace the rest of the world in that capability.
In my AOR [area of responsibility], they are essential to any
operations that I have, both in peacetime and in crisis and
contingency. I have concern about the size of the submarine
force as we go into this--middle of this century, and our--and
its ability for it to remain relevant, globally. Plus, we're
going to have to figure out this replacement of our strategic
nuclear submarine force, which is the most survivable leg of
our triad, and the importance of that as we see the
modernization of strategic nuclear capabilities in both
countries like China and Russia.
Senator Reed. Just, finally, the submarine appears to be
the only weapon system that still can approach virtually to the
shores of China and deliver, if necessary, weapons. Is that
true?
Admiral Locklear. Well, sir, I wouldn't say it's the only
system.
Senator Reed. Okay. That--that's more encouraging.
Thank you very much.
Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, Admiral Locklear, let me thank you again for
the hospitality you accorded us and our whole group when we
were in Hawaii and we laid the wreath on the memorial of the
USS Oklahoma. And that was--you went out of your--beyond your
call of duty.
On that same trip, we went to South Korea. At that time, I
recall, in some of our meetings there, they were talking about
the use of a--well, now, the--banning the use of the cluster
munitions, which have been very effective. In fact, that's
probably the place where they were--because of the proximity
between North Korea and South Korea--where they were most
effectively used at that time. Now we have a policy, which is a
self-imposed policy--I'm not criticizing it, and I know the
reasons for it--but, we're being forced to discontinue that.
And I'd like to ask you, what are we doing, in the place, to
perform those functions, those missions that we were depending
upon the clusters?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. As you know, the cluster
munitions, as you indicated, very important to our plans in--
particularly on the Peninsula, if there were a crisis. There is
presently work underway to replace our present munitions with
those that will provide the same effects, but with less--you
know, meeting the requirements of the treaty. In essence, less
than 1 percent dud rate.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah, you talked about the--you've both
talked about the increase in the casualties as a result of some
of the lack of abilities to use some of the equipment we've
used in the past. Is this something that could expose more risk
and more casualties by not having this capability and not
replacing it with something as effective?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir, absolutely. It's a critical
component of our planning on the Peninsula.
Senator Inhofe. Okay.
Let me--I know that both of you agree with this statement
that was made by James Clapper, so we don't need to rehash all
that, but when he said, ``Looking back over by now more than a
half century of intelligence, we've not experienced a time when
we've been beset by more crises and threats around the globe.''
I think both of you agree with that. You've stated that in the
past.
I'd like to get, in kind of the remainder of the time,
Admiral Locklear, talking about the submarines thing. Senator
Rounds and I were on the USS Carl Vinson last week. And,
without having any details in this setting, it was--they were
very busy. We're now down to 10 submarines. Admiral Roughead
said, on Friday, that we're going to have to be moving one--or
we should move one of those into the Pacific.
Now, my question would be--and, Admiral Locklear, I think
it was a year ago, before HASC [the House Armed Services
Committee], you were quite outspoken in the fact that we should
have 11 carriers to carry out the mission. Will you still--do
you still feel that way?
Admiral Locklear. I do. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator Inhofe. You'd like to get back to that, wouldn't
you?
Admiral Locklear. I'd like to get back to it. I mean,
we've--I think the Navy is undergoing a bathtub--I call it a
``bathtub of readiness'' now, because we delayed--through the
war years, we delayed readiness--maintenance on these nuclear
aircraft carriers. So, on one hand, they are magnificent
machines; on the other hand, you have to take care of them
correctly to make sure they're----
Senator Inhofe. Yeah.
Admiral Locklear.--safe. And so, we'll be enduring that, I
think, for the next 5 to 6 years before we get back to where--
the level we need to be, I think, for kind of day-to-day
operations in my AOR.
Senator Inhofe. Well, of course, maintenance and
modernization are the first two things to go when you're faced
with what we've been faced with. And I--in the event that you
do move one into the Asia-Pacific area, where would it come
from? What kind of a vacuum would be left behind in other AORs?
Admiral Locklear. Well, I think that decision would have to
be made at the Secretary of Defense level. But, we have--you
know, generally, we have 11 aircraft carriers, and, out of that
11, we--they generate a global presence of some number, kind
of, for day-to-day operations, and another level that would be
able to surge in times of crisis or in times of conflict. I
think that aircraft carriers are probably best suited for the
types of missions that we do in the Asia-Pacific today. And
where it would come from, I can't say, but my guess is, it
would probably come out of the Middle East, given that that's
been the primary demand signal for a carrier presence in the
last decade and a half.
Senator Inhofe. Well, when Senator Reed's--in your final
response to his last question, I--it came to my mind that--the
carrier capability.
Well, that's very helpful. And I--but, I'd like to have,
for the record, something in a little bit more detail, because
some of us are not as familiar as we should be with that
capability. In fact, I'm going down to Norfolk this weekend to
try to become a little bit more informed on this. So, if you
could, for the record, try to come out with where we might have
the capacity of where we could afford to move something into
the Pacific, and then how busy everybody is at the present
time, it would be helpful.
Admiral Locklear. All right, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]

Navy Carrier requirement is 11 CVN. Both the Chief of Naval
Operations and the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command support this.
Additionally, 11 CVNs are reflected in the Department of the Navy (DON)
Five-Year Shipbuilding Plan for Fiscal Year 2016 to Fiscal Year 2020.
Currently, Navy has 10 CVN and will achieve an inventory of 11 when USS
GERALD R FORD delivers to the Fleet in Fiscal Year 2016.
The CVN is the centerpiece of a Carrier Strike Group and its
employability is limited due to Navy Title 10 responsibility to man,
train, maintain, and equip the CVN force. With the current inventory
limitation of 10 CVNs, notional distribution is as follows:
1 CVN in Refueling and Complex Overhaul (RCOH)
1 CVN in pre-refueling or post-refueling
2 CVN (1 West Coast, 1 East Coast) in Ship Maintenance
(Planned Incremental Availability (PIA) or Docking Planned Incremental
Availability (DPIA))
4 CVN (2 West Coast, 2 East Coast) in Basic or Integrated
Training or Sustainment
1 CVN Forward Deployed Naval Force (FDNF) (cycle of four
months in maintenance and eight months operational)
1 CVN ``rotationally'' deployed
Navy organizes its primary combat units into a Carrier Strike Group
to ensure it has the capabilities required to support the Combatant
Commander throughout the range of military operations. Combatant
Commander demand for Carrier Strike Groups always exceeds Carrier
Strike Group operationally availability. The Joint Staff is responsible
to allocate the limited number of Carrier Strike Groups to Combatant
Commanders to best meet global security requirements.

Chairman McCain. Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank both of you gentlemen for your service,
and, of course, the service of the men and women who serve
under your commands.
And, Admiral Locklear, my very best to you in your future
endeavors. Thank you very much for being PACOM Commander.
Admiral Locklear, I know that Secretary of Defense Ash
Carter spent, as I understand it, a day with you. And so, are--
were the discussions that you had with him reflective of the
priorities as you've laid out in your testimony today?
Admiral Locklear. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Hirono. You did mention that, with everything that
is going on in South and East China Seas, and the provocation
of North Korea, that we do need to strengthen our alliances
with our partners and also establish new relationships. And, in
this regard, despite historical differences, last December the
United States, South Korea, and Japan signed an information-
sharing arrangement in what appears to have been a first step
in what Deputy Secretary of State Tony Blinken calls, and I
quote, ``a profoundly positive trajectory.'' Admiral, please
discuss the relationships between South Korea and Japan, and
the challenges we face in furthering a trilateral U.S./Japan/
South Korea alliance.
Admiral Locklear. The challenges we face, from my
perspective, are primarily political and social challenges. On
the military side, the militaries, if allowed, are able to work
together for--I think, for the common good of the security in
Northeast Asia, in particular. The impediments--what's happened
thus far is, because of the political pressure to not have true
information-sharing agreements between Japan and Korea, limit
our ability to allowed us to bring together, in a trilateral
way that optimizes the forces that they've invested in and
we've invested in, and particularly in critical areas, such as
ballistic missile defense, et cetera. So, I highly encourage
both Korea and Japan to move forward, at the highest level of
governments, with the types of agreements that allow us to
optimize the military capability that this trilateral
arrangement can bring.
Senator Hirono. So, the information-sharing arrangement
that was agreed to, you're saying that that is not enough. It's
not what you would consider a true information-sharing
arrangement.
Admiral Locklear. Well, it is a good start.
Senator Hirono. Again, to you, Admiral. Many countries
within the Indo-Asia-Pacific region are increasing their
defense capabilities. China is procuring submarines quickly.
We've heard all of this. Japan, India, South Korea, Singapore,
and Australia have been shoring up their military capabilities.
Malaysia and Indonesia have a couple of more submarines. And
Vietnam recently announced the purchase of Russian-made
submarines. How will the continued growth of the region's
submarine fleet impact the balance of power within the South
China Sea region? Does this cause us to adjust our strategies
or basing decisions if growth continues on its current
trajectory?
Admiral Locklear. Well, the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, or
the PACOM region, is the most militarized part of the world.
And it's increasing in its militarization, because most of the
countries there have the resources now, and the will and the
desire, to grow their militaries.
Those that have the military capability to actually operate
a submarine force are pursuing that, because they understand
the symmetric advantages that it brings, they understand the
ability for access and aerial-denial capabilities that
submarines bring. And they also recognize the significant
deterrent value that submarines bring.
So, my numbers are--roughly are--there's about 300
submarines in the world that aren't U.S. submarines. Two
hundred of them are in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Now, some of
those are owned by our partners and allies. But, many of them
are not. And so, the increasing number of submarines that have
increasing lethality, increasing quietening technology,
certainly does change the dynamic of how we have to operate in
that--in the area, and the type of tactics and procedures and
operational concepts that we have to develop to ensure we
remain dominant.
But, I look at it as like a fact of life. It's going to
happen. And we have to deal with it.
Senator Hirono. So, in our dealing with it, though,
especially with our partner--with our allies--does this require
us to be very--much more collaborative and to share information
so that we're on the same page, so to speak, in that part of
the world?
Admiral Locklear. It does. It not only requires us to
share, bilaterally, more in a particularly difficult
environment--undersea and maritime domain--but it also requires
them to be able to share with their other neighbors that have
that capacity, as well. And, as you know, in the Indo-Asia-
Pacific, those multilateral organizations don't exist to
facilitate that. So, we're seeing the growth of that, but it's
a work in progress.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your service.
We have a memo, here, talking about noteworthy challenges
in the Pacific area. And they list, of course, North Korea as
the most dangerous and unpredictable challenge. And I'm sure
both of you agree with that. But also, territorial disputes in
the East and South China Seas; natural disasters, including
weather and disease; violent extremism; transnational crime;
Russian intent and Chinese intent.
Are there any of these, gentlemen, that would not involve a
need to deliver our marines quickly and effectively through
amphibious ships?
Admiral?
Admiral Locklear. Well, I think, historically, the Marine
Corps is a cornerstone of the force structure that we have in
the Asia-Pacific. I mean, it's uniquely suited for large
archipelagos, large sea spaces. It uses the sea as a--as
highways to move around on. And it's--I can't--of all the ones
you listed there, I can't think of one that the Marine Corps
does not play as a part of the joint force in a significant
way. So, yes, they do play in all of those.
The question of whether or not they have enough lift? The
answer to that's no. We don't have enough lift. And I've said
this before, we've got to--not only is it our--the number of
amphibious ships that we can build in our own shipyards, but
we've got to look at connectors, we've got to look at the types
of alternative platforms that allow us to operate in more
unique----
Senator Wicker. Connectors.
Admiral Locklear.--security environments.
Senator Wicker. Connectors and alternatives.
Admiral Locklear. Connectors and alternatives. I mean,
connectors are like joint high-speed vessels that move marines
and troops around faster. There's--so, it--it also gets into
the whole issue of, How do you--in huge crisis, in large
crisis, what is your military sealift command? What is the
condition----
Senator Wicker. Okay.
Admiral Locklear.--of that?
Senator Wicker. Well, I want the General to get a crack at
this question, too. But, let's talk about that. We understand
that we have a requirement for 50 amphibious ships. Is that
correct?
Admiral Locklear. Well, I don't know that I would--I've
heard the number 50. I think you'd have to go back to the
Department of the Navy for them to calculate, globally, how
many they need.
But, we've had a greater pressure on our amphibious force,
particularly in--when we have operations in the Middle East
that now require us to put marine units in position to be able
to monitor things like embassy safety and for embassy
extraction in the very hot spots. So, all that's put a demand
signal that's pulled the amphibious capability----
Senator Wicker. It's a very real contingency that happens.
Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir.
Senator Wicker. Correct? Well, okay, the information I have
is that we have a requirement for 50, and we only have 30
amphibs in our inventory. And, of those ships, approximately 15
to 20 are operationally available. Would you say that that is
pretty close to being correct information, Admiral? Thirty in
the inventory and 15 to 20 operationally----
Admiral Locklear. Thirty is about my understanding of it.
Senator Wicker. Okay.
Admiral Locklear. And operation availability, depending on
how they define it--I mean, my AOR, I have a amphibious
readiness group that's in--west of the Date Line all the time,
that's available on a much greater basis than that. But,
globally, I would say that's probably about right.
Senator Wicker. General, let's let you weigh in on this.
And how would the effectiveness of our marines be diminished if
there are insufficient amphibious ships to get them delivered
effectively?
General Scaparrotti. Senator, I would just say this, that
they're very important to me, on the Peninsula, for rapid
response, and they're a critical part of all of our plans.
Operating on the Peninsula, it's the Marine Corps and their
ability to be lifted quickly to different places. They provide
me agility. It's the quickest, you know, kind of the most
succinct way to put it. I am very concerned about the amount of
lift available in order to support our plans, and the
maintenance of that lift, as well.
Senator Wicker. Now--so, if we don't have enough amphibs,
the connectors alone are not a solution, are they?
General Scaparrotti. Well, sir, you know, we've looked at
alternative methods of--and the use of alternate ships in order
to help us with the delivery of marines. I can be more
specific, you know, in a response for record, as to how we look
at our planning.
[The information referred to follows:]

[DELETED]

Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Heinrich.
Senator Heinrich. Mr. Chairman? Oh, thank you.
Admiral Locklear, I want to start with a little bit on
missile defense. And, obviously, the Asia-Pacific is of
critical importance to the United States, both economically and
strategically, yet the current security environment in your
combatant command is increasingly complex. Countries in the
region continue to invest in greater quantities of ballistic
missiles with extended range and new capabilities. While I
think we should continue to invest in missile defense programs
that are proven and effective, I also think we should be
investing in left-of-launch and other nonkinetic means of
defense.
Given the vast number of incoming missiles that an
adversary could use to potentially overwhelm U.S. missile
defense systems, I want to get your thoughts on what steps are
being taken in the realm of left-of-launch technologies, like
electronic warfare, cyber, that could blind, deceive, or
destroy enemy sensors before they actually launch.
Admiral Locklear. Well, Senator, I agree very much with
your assessment that the ballistic missile defense threat grows
because of the ability for them to--you know, for people to
produce ballistic missiles at greater distances--that have
greater distances and greater accuracies, and have multiple
reentry vehicles, and those types of things that complicate the
problem and that you can't build enough interceptors to take
them all out. You just can't. You're in a tail chase that you
can't do.
That said, I think there is a good place for a good, solid
amount of ballistic missile defense. It's a deterrent. It buys
decision space. It makes the decision for the--whoever's going
to fire it at you a lot harder for them to make. And, when they
do, it gives your troops that are in the way of them some
confidence that at least they'll be able to get through the
first few minutes of this thing before we have to take other
action. So, we are working left-of-launch and thinking
differently about how we would produce--how we would attack
this particular problem.
One of the things that--it's not just about electronic
warfare and cyber. Those events are being worked, and I won't
go into them in this particular forum, but they are being
pursued. But, it's also more about thinking differently about
how you employ your forces and at what trigger points would you
do things like dispersal of your force in a different way
throughout the region. How would you do selective hardening of
places that would--and put in place things like rapid runway
repair kits in the place of where you have to have them?
Through this body, you all have allowed us to go forward with
some of those initiatives in some of the places that we have in
the Asia-Pacific. Hardening some fuel heads and those types of
things make--can make a big difference.
So, left-of-launch is a priority for us.
Senator Heinrich. Let me ask a question that sort of
overlays on that, in terms of emerging technologies. What's
your assessment, at this point, on the value of directed energy
systems to support defeating missile threats? And do you think
that directed energy should be a priority for the research-and-
development community, given the advancements in the last
couple of years?
Admiral Locklear. Well, we've seen some progress. I think
the Navy has some directed energy systems that are employed in
operations routinely that have proven effective, at least in
the tactical area.
I'm in favor of directed energy weapons if they get the job
done, if the technology is there. I kind of live in the here-
and-now problem.
Senator Heinrich. Right.
Admiral Locklear. And I project----
Senator Heinrich. I understand.
Admiral Locklear.--hopefully, project into the future what
we might need. Directed energy, if it solves a--if it's a good,
solid solution set for the types of threat we're facing, then
we should pursue it.
Senator Heinrich. Speaking of here and now, are you
familiar with CHAMP, the Counter-electronics High-Power
Microwave Advanced Missile Project?
Admiral Locklear. I am familiar with it.
Senator Heinrich. What kind of value do you think that
could bring to the theater?
Admiral Locklear. I think, if it was properly tested and
then fielded, that it would be something that would be of
interest and benefit.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you very much.
I'll yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today.
General, in your prepared remarks, you talk about North
Korea's emphasis on asymmetric capabilities, especially its
missiles and its cyber threats. Can you elaborate on North
Korea's ballistic missile and cyber programs, and discuss what
the Command is doing to counter them? And then, can you let us
know, How do you see their investment in these areas impacting
your needs in the future?
General Scaparrotti. Thank you, Senator.
Well, first of all, North Korea has focused its resources
within its military on their asymmetric capabilities, which are
several. Probably the most important are the ballistic missile
and nuclear. We discussed the nuclear here. You know, we've
seen a number of indicators of how they're advancing their
nuclear capabilities. And then, within their missile force,
they have more than several hundred ballistic missiles. The
predominance of those are close-range and short-range ballistic
missiles that affect or influence the Peninsula, but they've
also deployed both medium- and intermediate-range that
influence the region. And, of course, the development of the
intercontinental ballistic missile has impact here in homeland
security in the United States.
They've not slowed down at this. We've seen, as you've
seen, this past year, they demonstrated their capabilities and
conducted tests. They had more missile events or launches in
'14 than they've had in the previous 5 years together. Each of
these being a--you know, a violation of the United Nation
Security Council Resolutions.
We have been taking steps, both in, you know, material
capability, in terms of our ballistic missile defense, to
counter that, as well as work with the Republic of Korea in
their ballistic missile defense. They just recently funded an
upgrade to their Patriot 2s to PAC-3s [Patriot Advanced
Capability-3], which is very important. We're working with them
closely, in terms of interoperability, and we're also working
with them on their material solutions, particularly, you know,
their Air Missile Defense Center and system that they've
recently established. We're working closely on that.
And then, finally, as the Admiral just noted, you know, we
look at the posture of our force, the preparation of our force
and our plans; and all of those things, in the last couple of
years, has been rather dynamic in order to change as our threat
in North Korea changes.
Senator Fischer. And as we talk about missile defense, how
do you interpret China and their vocal opposition to placing a
THAAD battery on that Peninsula?
General Scaparrotti. Well, personally, I--you know, I think
this is a decision for South Korea, having to do with the
defense of their country, and, from my perspective as a
commander there, defense of our troops.
Senator Fischer. But, do you think that they are narrowly
focused on missile defense, or do you think they're trying to,
maybe, exert some greater influence over the Republic of
Korea's defensive strategy as a whole?
General Scaparrotti. I think it's a greater influence. The
THAAD system, if employed, is focused on the defense of the
Peninsula. That's what it is specialized to do. It doesn't have
any influence beyond that.
Senator Fischer. So, that would improve their defenses,
then, against North Korea, correct?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, ma'am, it would.
Senator Fischer. And do you think that South Korea and the
United States would push against the Chinese reaction to that?
General Scaparrotti. Well, ma'am, you know, this is a--the
decision process is underway right now, and it is--I can
discuss, in a military perspective, but, you know, from a
political and strategic perspective, I think both countries are
taking that into consideration right now, in terms of the other
impacts that have to do with the employment of THAAD on the
Peninsula.
Senator Fischer. And as we look at the North Koreans and
their missiles, are they moving away from their more
traditional conventional forces, which they have--what is it,
the fourth largest in the world now--are they moving away from
that?
General Scaparrotti. Ma'am, I wouldn't say they're moving
away from it. I think they've changed their strategy a bit. It
is the fourth-largest military in the world. It's a very large
conventional force that's postured forward along the DMZ
[demilitarized zone]. So, it is a--it's still a very present
and dangerous threat. But, they're not resourcing it in the
same way that they had in the past. So, we've seen a reduction
in their capability, conventionally.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, we had some fascinating testimony 2 days ago on
this subject. I commend the record to you. One of the pieces of
testimony was the historical record of the confrontation
between a rising power and an existing power. Graham Allison,
from Harvard, called it the ``Thucydides Trap,'' wherein 12 of
16 instances in world history where you had a rapidly rising
power confronting an established power ended in war. And
there--obviously, that's a daunting observation--there has
never been a power that has risen as far and as fast as China
in the last 25 years. Do you see military conflict with China
in any way inevitable? But, given the ``Thucydides Trap,'' how
can we avoid it?
Admiral Locklear. Well, I don't think that conflict is
inevitable. I think that the world we're in today is probably a
different world than the ones we've been in before, when a
great power rose. The effects of globalization and economic
globalization and the movement of people, the
interconnectedness of banks, of industry, of all these things
that you know very well about, I think have made it imperative
that we understand the rise of China, in that we, to some
degree, accommodate the rise of China, where we can, to attempt
to shape the rise of China. I've said, on many occasions, that
a China that would--and a China with a military that would come
forward as a net provider of security rather than a net user of
security would be beneficial to, not only the region, but would
be beneficial to us, as well. And I think that's an achievable
goal. I think that has to be looked at how do we deal with
China globally, in global institutions, from their role in the
United Nations to how they're behaving and conducting
themselves in other regions of the world, and how we interact
with them there. I also think it will require us to have a
pinpoint focused on how we see their influence in this region
that we've been talking about today, which is primarily East--
Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia, and to understand--we have
to try to understand what their side of the equation is. And,
to be honest with you, some of the things they've done are
quite--aren't really clear today.
So, we always get into the debate about whether we should
continue mil-to-mil if we're unhappy with the things they're
doing--mil-to-mil engagement. I am a proponent of continuing to
take some risk there, because there is benefit in us continuing
to have dialogue to try to establish those types of frameworks
that allow us to communicate with each other in crisis. We've
had some good work with the PRC lately, of building some
confidence-building measures that allow us to understand how to
operate with each other in these constrained waterways so that
we don't have a bunch of lieutenants and captains and
commanders of ships out there making, you know, bad decisions
that might escalate us to something that we didn't--escalate us
into a ``Thucydides Trap.''
So, we need to, I think, continue to keep engaging them,
but I think we need to be forthright about how we feel about
these things and what the U.S. position is on behavior when it
doesn't match what our allies and our partners and our value
systems support.
Senator King. Well, clearly, in recent years, the thrust of
the Chinese has been economic. But, in even more recent years,
it's been military, as you have testified today, tremendous
growth in subsurface, everything else. What do you make of
these actions, which can only be characterized as aggressive,
building islands off the shore, and the increased patrols in
the South China Sea? What do you read into that, in terms of
China's military or expansionist intentions?
Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir. Well, I think it--the Chinese
communicate to us pretty clearly what they're doing. They see
themselves as a renewing power. They have the assets to build a
military. They're building particularly in the army--I mean,
the navy and the air force, because they understand the
importance of protection of a--of the global areas that--and
you're starting to see them operate globally in different
places, which they didn't operate, years ago.
They've told us, over and over again, that they believe
that the ``nine dash line'' in the South China Sea is their
historic territorial waters. They have--as far as I have--
understand, they refuse to participate in international legal
venues. You know, the Filipinos have a case at the U.N. Law of
the Sea Convention Tribunal now to--challenging the ``nine dash
line.'' And, far as I know, the Chinese have refused to
participate in that.
And so, what they are doing is, they're--through what they
articulate as peaceful means, they're building these land
reclamations, they're establishing their position in the South
China Sea, which opens their options for down the road as this
thing--as this situation continues to unfold.
Senator King. I'm out of time. A one-word answer. Do you
believe it would be beneficial to the United States to accede
to the Law of the Sea Treaty?
Admiral Locklear. Yes.
Senator King. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Sullivan.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, gentlemen, thanks for your testimony and your service.
Admiral Locklear, thank you for hosting me a couple of
weeks ago. Appreciate the time. Please send my regards to your
staff. Three hours on a Saturday is well above and beyond the
call of duty for anybody, so let them know how much I
appreciate that.
You know, I've been critical of many aspects of the
President's national security strategy, in part because I think
we've lacked credibility. When we say something that we're
going to do as a country, we need to do it. And, I think, in
certain areas of the world, we haven't done that. And I think
it undermines our National security when we do that.
One area of the President's strategy that I have been
supportive of, both militarily and economically, is as--the
chairman stated, about TPP [the Trans-Pacific Partnership]--is
the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. And I'm--you know, I believe
we need to make sure this rebalance and optimization of our
military forces in the region is credible. We're saying that
we're going to rebalance. We need to actually do it. Do you
agree with that?
Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir, I do. And I think that the
rebalance is--goes far beyond just military, though.
Senator Sullivan. Right.
Admiral Locklear. I think we have to also get our economic
house in order, as well. Otherwise, all the military
rebalancing we do will not have the effect that we want it to
have.
Senator Sullivan. I agree with that. I appreciate the map,
the AOR map. Wanted to talk briefly--you know, Alaska is no
longer in your AOR, but, as we discussed, the troops and--which
are significant, both in terms of Army BCTs [brigade combat
teams] and a very robust Air Force presence--those troops are
still OPCON [operational control] to you, in the event of
contingencies, aren't they?
Admiral Locklear. That's correct, sir.
Senator Sullivan. And how critical do you see these
troops--and, General Scaparrotti, please comment--in the
region, in terms of not only shaping, but also contingency
forces, with regard to your Op Plans?
Admiral Locklear. Well, Senator, the forces in Alaska, you
know, if you take a look at the globe, they're as far west as--
or maybe even farther west, in some cases, than Hawaii is. So,
the response time that those forces would have into any
significant contingency in Northeast Asia or Southeast Asia
would--is quite good, and important. That's why the forces, I
think, have been OPCON or, to PACOM, for a long time. There's a
variety of forces up there that are important to us--the
fighter squadrons that are there, the BCTs that are there--
including the ranges. The range complexes that we have in
Alaska are very important, because that's where we get our
high-end training for, sort of, our hardest types of
environments that our aviators may have to fly in. So, it's----
Senator Sullivan. General Scaparrotti, how about you, in
terms of just the Korean contingency issues?
General Scaparrotti. Well, I agree with Admiral Locklear.
We rely on those forces as a part of our quick response, which
we'll need in crisis. We also train with them regularly, and we
also send forces to train there, too, to----
Senator Sullivan. Do you think if we removed one or two
BCTs from Alaska, do you think that would show that we're
committed to a rebalance or undermine our rebalance commitment?
Again, this goes to credibility.
General Scaparrotti. Well, I think that--from the
perspective of, you know, what the other outcomes were of that,
from a regional perspective, there would be questions about the
loss of troops in----
Senator Sullivan. And the credibility of our rebalance
strategy?
General Scaparrotti. I think you'd have to look at it
holistically. I'd prefer not to take it from just one
perspective, here. But, I think you'd--I'd have to understand
the remainder of the changes that were taking place if, in
fact, that were to happen.
Senator Sullivan. Admiral Locklear, do you think that would
undermine our rebalance credibility? Two BCTs----
Admiral Locklear. Well----
Senator Sullivan.--in the region leaving the region?
Admiral Locklear. Yeah, I would answer it in general terms.
I think that any significant force-structure moves out of the--
my AOR in the middle of a rebalance would have to be understood
and have to be explained, because it would be counterintuitive
to a rebalance to move significant forces in another direction.
Senator Sullivan. I agree with that. And I think it's a
really important issue as we look at the rebalance as a
successful rebalance that's credible.
Can I turn to--I want to also commend you for what you
stated in Senator Wicker on the strategic lift issue. I think
that that was certainly something I saw, on my recent trip,
that was a concern. We're moving forces to different parts of
the region, but the strategic lift seems to be lacking, both
Air Force and ARG [amphibious ready group] capacity. But, to
get there, we need to have a successful laydown. Are you
confident that the realignment of forces from Okinawa to Guam
and Australia and other places is going to be on schedule, in
terms of costs and timelines that the Department has laid out?
I know that's something that this committee, as you know, has
been very focused on.
Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir. Well, you know, in the last 3
years, I've had a lot of time to take a look at this and to
work through it. And my overall assessment is that we're on
plan at this point in time.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Admiral, in March GAO [the Government
Accountability Office] published a report on operational
contract support. And I'm nerdy enough about operational
contracts that I pay close attention to this stuff. As you
know, we wasted billions of dollars in Iraq and Afghanistan
because we had not embraced training on contracting as a core
capacity of our commands engaged in the contingency. And in
that report, it indicated that your command is the furthest
behind in incorporating operational contract support in its
joint training exercises and operation plans. Now, I know that
GAO noted that you have taken some recent positive steps to
address this, but I'd like you to lay out, if you would
briefly, the steps you're taking to include operational
contract support in your command's joint training exercises.
Admiral Locklear. Well, thank you. I--not to make excuses,
but I think the reason that we're probably behind is because we
haven't had the demand signal that was put on the commanders in
the Middle East in the last several wars, and we haven't had
that type of a massive, rapid buildup to support a war effort
anywhere.
That said, we did recognize it, after that report, as a
deficiency. And we're looking hard at, Where are those
contracting decisions made? How is the commander have
visibility to those contracting decisions during the execution
of a crisis or an execution of a campaign? Because, you know,
when a crisis occurs, stuff just starts coming. And that's
good. That's what makes us so strong. But, when it starts
coming, then, at some point in time, you have to decide what's
enough and what's not enough, and then who's going to be the
steward of it down the road. So, we're trying to understand the
command and control of those contractors and how much the
leadership knows, and what they need to know, and when.
Senator McCaskill. Well, I think it's so critical that we
never lose sight of this contracting oversight and planning and
training as a core capacity, because we're never going to go
back to the day--my father peeled potatoes in World War II--
we're not going to have our trained warfighters peeling
potatoes ever again. And all we have to do is look at the long,
ugly saga of all the LOGCAP [Logistics Civil Augmentation
Program] contracts to realize what happens when contracting is
not considered a huge priority. So, I appreciate your attention
to that.
On another note, I know that you are the primary jammer
provider, in the Navy, for DOD. Could you speak about the role
of airborne electronic attacks and how critical they are? And
how critical is the asset of our really only electronic warfare
capability that is provided by the Growler?
Admiral Locklear. I've been a huge supporter of Growler for
my entire Navy career. The transition of the Prowler squadrons,
which were so significant in many of our conflicts, and provide
us what I thought was a asymmetric advantage in our airspace
because of their capabilities, I was glad to see that--those
capabilities, and jammer types of capabilities, transition to
a--you know, basically, a fourth-generation-plus aircraft that
can operate effectively in denied airspaces.
So, in any campaign that I would envision that would be of
a higher-end warfare in my AOR, electronic warfare attack
provides me battlespace that I have--may have to go fight for.
And those Growlers and, to some degree, the other higher-end
capabilities that we have are critical to allowing us to have
that access.
Senator McCaskill. I--finally, I want to touch on the
stresses that we're feeling on remote piloted aircraft [RPA].
As you know, Whiteman is the home to the 20th Reconnaissance
Squadron, and those pilots and those sensor operators and those
intelligence personnels, along with the airmen who are
operating the Predator and the Reaper, are very important. We
are putting incredibly high demands on these folks. I mean,
they're not getting normal rest. They are not getting time for
training. We can't even rotate some of them into a training
capacity, because the demand is so high.
Could you briefly talk about what steps can be taken to
alleviate what I think is a critical problem? I mean, these
guys are--they're--they are working round the clock, and
getting very little break. I don't know that we would do this
to a traditional warfighter, but we're doing it to these RPAs.
Admiral Locklear. Well, the advent of these systems in the
past couple of decades, and the obvious benefit that they've
brought to the battlespace, has put pressure, I think, on the
Air Force to be able to produce the types of people and to be
able to man them. But, the--unfortunately, the demand signal
just goes up and up and up.
One of the asymmetric strengths of the United States is our
ability to sense and understand what's going on. We have the
best ISR in the world, but it's way overtaxed for the number of
demands we have globally. And that's where it's showing, is in
the faces and the working hours of these young people. So, we
need to rationalize, number one, what are the platforms that
we're going to invest in the future, and then build a structure
of man, train, and equip underneath it that's sustainable.
Senator McCaskill. Yeah, I particularly worry, because I
think we have a tendency to think of these as machines, and
don't realize the human component of this and the stresses they
have. I mean, these guys are manning these things for 10-12
hours, and then going home to their families for supper and
homework, and then getting up pretty quickly and going back at
it. And it's a unique kind of role, and certainly
nontraditional, as we look at the history of our military. And
I just want you to share with your colleagues that, talking to
some of these folks, you know, it's clear to me that we need to
be thinking about their well-being and whether or not we are
overutilizing them, and what kind of stresses we're going to
see in that personnel.
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ernst.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, Admiral Locklear and General Scaparrotti, for
being here today, and for your men and women that serve, as
well. I appreciate it very much.
As you know, the DOD is planning to transfer operational
control, or OPCON, of South Korea forces to the South Korean
Government in the event of another conflict on the Peninsula.
And this OPCON transfer has been discussed for many, many
years. It was originally supposed to take place in 2007. It's
been delayed many, many times in the past number of years. And
it does appear to be, currently, indefinitely postponed. So,
can you describe some of those challenges that we're being
faced with, and those that the South Koreans are facing in
their efforts to create conditions which would allow us to
successfully do the OPCON transfer?
General?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, ma'am, thank you.
As you know, this past October, the Secretary of Defense
and the MINDEF [South Korea Ministry of Defense] agreed upon a
conditional approach to OPCON transition--or OPCON transition.
In the past, it had been focused on a date with capabilities.
So, in short, I agreed with the change that we made to focus on
capabilities and conditions, as opposed to shooting for a date.
Three general conditions. The first is, is that South Korea
develop the command-and-control capacity to be able to lead a
combined and multinational force in a high-intensity conflict.
The second is that it--that they have the capabilities to
respond to the growing nuclear and missile threat in North
Korea. And the third general condition is that this transition
take time at a--take place at a time that is conducive to a
transition.
Now, there are specific capabilities I mentioned that are
listed in detail as a part of this--a part of the agreement.
I'll cover, generally, the main areas.
The first was C4 [Command and Control, Communications, and
Computers] in terms of their capability there, which I
mentioned earlier; ballistic missile defense, generally, and
their capability there; the munitions that they have to have on
hand for us to conduct a high-intensity conflict; and then,
finally, the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
assets necessary in an environment that is very challenging for
ISR, and particularly with the assets and the asymmetric assets
that North Korea is developing.
So, in a nutshell, those are the things that are the
challenges that we have, as an alliance, and Republic of Korea
is focused on enhancing.
Senator Ernst. Thank you.
Admiral, do you have any thoughts?
Admiral Locklear. No, I think the dynamic that's most
changing in this dialogue about OPCON transfer is the behavior
of Kim Jung-Un. And so, that has to be brought in the
calculation, as well.
Senator Ernst. Thank you.
And, General, I do agree, absolutely, it's capabilities
versus calendar. We have to look at those capabilities.
So, realistically, do you think moving forward with OPCON
transfer--is that in foreseeable future? And if it is, what are
the benefits to us, then, of doing the OPCON transfer?
General Scaparrotti. Well, I think it is foreseeable. I
don't think it's in the short term. And I think it's of
benefit, in terms of--you know, our presence in the alliance
that we have with Republic of Korea, I think, is very important
for regional security. It plays into global security, as well,
because they've been a very good partner of ours for a number
of years, and they're developing the capability, and they've
actually employed forces around the world, and they've deployed
in support of us, as well, in some of the conflicts that we've
been involved in.
So, I think, in the long term, the alliance and its
development in this regard is good for both countries.
Senator Ernst. Very good. I do know the South Koreans were
engaged at Tallil Air Force Base when my trucks were rolling
through that area. And we do appreciate their support of those
types of efforts.
I have very little time left, but I do want to thank you,
gentlemen, for being here today, as well as the service of your
men and women.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, to the
witnesses, for your testimony today.
Mr. Chair, I appreciate the way you're doing these
hearings. I now see the method in the madness. To have the
strategic hearing a couple of days ago--we had a wonderful
hearing with some strategic experts on this topic--before we
get to ask you questions actually makes this discussion work
very well. And I appreciate the chairman setting it up that
way.
Three quick questions. Admiral Locklear, as our military
lead in PACOM, describe why U.S. support for the Law of the Sea
Treaty is something you'd support. You gave the one-word answer
to Senator King, and I'm asking the ``Why?'' question.
Admiral Locklear. Well, I'll speak about it from the
military side, or from the sea side. It's----
Senator Kaine. There are additional elements, as well.
Admiral Locklear. There are additional elements----
Senator Kaine. From the military side.
Admiral Locklear.--in it that I won't comment on, because
it's not my area to do.
But, first of all, it's widely accepted, after a lot of
years of deliberation by many, many countries, most countries
in my AOR. It provides a framework that we--that most countries
that look at it believe is useful for us determining who,
particularly in these sea spaces and these EEZs [exclusive
ecomonic zones] and things that aren't quite, provides a proper
framework for how to go about dealing with those disputes. So,
it's a rule of law, a rule of process that's a good thing. By
not being in--to be honest with you, on the military side,
we've been directed by numerous Presidents to comply with the
Law of the Sea, at least as it reflects the way we interact
with our--with other countries and our partners.
That said, when we're not a signatory, it reduces our
overall credibility when we bring it up as a choice to--of how
you might solve a dispute of any kind.
Senator Kaine. Second question, to the ``Thucydides Trap.''
You indicated that the United States should do what we can,
reasonably, that is within our interests, to accommodate the
rise of China within the network of global institutions. And I
think you laid out a pretty good rationale. The more they are
engaged in the global institutions, that can have a pro-
stability effect.
One current matter that is pending before Congress is
reforms to the IMF [International Monetary Fund] that would
enable China to have more of a role--more voting power, but
also more of a financial obligation, in terms of the work of
the IMF. I don't want you to comment on, you know, IMF reform
if that's not your lane and you don't have an opinion. But,
that is the kind of thing, wouldn't you agree, that we ought to
be taking a look at if we're going to try to accommodate
China's growing influence? Having them more engaged and play
more of a leadership role in global institutions--you mentioned
the U.N. [United Nations] as one--but, global institutions like
the IMF is one way to accomplish that integration that can be
ultimately a pro-stability move? Would you not agree?
Admiral Locklear. Yes, I absolutely agree. I mean, you
know, if China is--inevitable rise to be a world power in the
many different venues, they inevitably have to participate and
be part of those institutions. And they have to take some
responsibility for these things.
Senator Kaine. Kind of the commonsense--you know, the law
firms that get founded by strong partners, they often run
aground when the next generation of young, excited partners
want leadership roles. And, you know, law firms that don't make
room for the young leaders as they come up find that they split
away and then they end up being harsh competitors. If they find
a way to accommodate them in, it often holds it together. I
mean, it--you know, it just seems like that's kind of a basic
analogy that we see a lot in human situations.
Well, I would hope that, on both Law of the Sea and IMF
reform, that we would take it seriously, here, because, while
they have nonmilitary dimensions, I do think they bear directly
upon some of the military issues that we might have.
Last thing I'd like to just commend you on and ask you one
final question. I like the fact that you, in your written
testimony--and I like the fact that some of our witnesses the
other day--talk about Indo-Asia-Pacific. You know, the--India
has had an interesting history, militarily, with the United
States. And, more generally, the Congress Party kind of have a
long nonaligned tradition that actually made them slant a
little bit toward Russia, in terms of purchasing materiel. But,
now they are significantly engaged with the United States and
U.S. companies. They do more military exercises with the United
States than they do with any other nation. I think there is an
opportunity, under Prime Minister Modi--I know the Chair has
spent time with him, and others have, too--to deepen that
relationship. Just, as I conclude, could you share your thought
on the U.S./India military partnership at this moment?
Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir.
Part of the rebalance was to develop a strategy for a
longer-term security relationship with India. We're doing that.
We have, I think, a tremendous opportunity, here, as the
leadership changes in India, and the world changes, for them to
be a growing partner with the United States--not necessarily an
aligned partner, but a growing partner. I believe that some of
the defense trade initiatives that we have with them will help
bring us together in a more productive way for many years to
come.
Senator Kaine. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you very much.
And thank both of you for your work.
And we--General Scaparrotti, I do believe that the work in
South Korea is important. And we've been able to draw down our
numbers. And I know the South Korean military is more
effective, in many ways, than they have been. But, I think it
is an important relationship. They've been good allies, as have
the Japanese and others in the Pacific. And that long-term
umbrella relationship/partnership that we've had remains
important, I think, to the world and to United States
interests. So, I appreciate the work that you're doing. I
appreciate the importance of the Pacific. It's just undeniable,
it seems to me.
Our Strategic Forces Subcommittee has dealt a good bit with
nuclear weapons, our relationship with Russia, the drawdown of
our treaty--under the treaty, our nuclear weapon system,
Admiral Locklear, but we don't talk enough about China's
position. They've built a nuclear weapons capability, and I
assume they have the ability to surge that at any point they
choose to. They have the finances and the technology and the
capability of doing that. Is that correct?
Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir. We've observed them pursuing a
deliberate modernization of their nuclear forces, both those
that are land-based and the ones that are subsurface-based.
They now have, I believe, three operational submarines in the
Pacific--ballistic missile submarines. That could grow, I
think, to four or five in the future. And we know that they're
pursuing missile systems to be--missiles to be able to put on
there that will extend their ability for nuclear--second-strike
nuclear attack is what they explain--how they explain it. But,
it is growing, and I think that it will be a continued
consideration for us as war planners.
Senator Sessions. We, in Congress, and policymakers in
Washington, need to understand the reality of the--a nuclear-
armed submarine. How many missiles would that--those
submarines--Chinese submarines be able to handle and launch,
and how many warheads could they launch?
Admiral Locklear. To give you an accurate answer, let me
respond to that for the record, if you don't mind. But,
multiple.
[The information referred to follows:]

China currently has 4 operational Jin-class (Type 094) ballistic
missile submarines (SSBNs). Each submarine can carry 12 JL-2 submarine
launched ballistic missiles each equipped with up to a single 1MT
nuclear warhead.

Senator Sessions. Would it compete with our capabilities?
Or--if you're able to say. If not, that's all right.
Admiral Locklear. I wouldn't say, sir.
Senator Sessions. All right.
One of the strategies that China has used has been to
create a zone outside the Nation to make it difficult for our
ships to inhabit, and put them at risk. Is that continue--is
that part of a DF-21 missile plan? And do they have other plans
designed to make it more difficult for our ships to be within
hundreds of miles of the shore?
Admiral Locklear. Across the board, the Chinese have
improved their--greatly improved their ability to build
missiles of all kinds--cruise missiles, ballistic missile
defense, air defense missiles. So, they do have, I think, quite
credible technology. The DF-21 missiles you're talking about is
a missile that I--that they're fielding and testing and
producing, that could potentially, if employed properly and
work right, it would put U.S. forces at sea at risk at greater
and greater distances. But, it's one of those things that we
are dealing with and trying to answer.
Senator Sessions. I think you're correct. And I think the
Navy's thinking clearly about that, and in a wise way.
What about the capabilities that we have? Army has some
potential land-based missiles that could create, also, a zone
around our interests, our country, our territories, that could
protect us. Has any thought been given, as I believe Secretary
Hagel mentioned, of using some of those capabilities to--from
land--to provide a better safe zone around our bases and
territories?
Admiral Locklear. I wouldn't know, Senator, exactly what
Secretary Hagel was talking about that time, but I'd be glad to
get specifics and to answer it.
[The information referred to follows:]

The US Army currently deploys air and missile defense systems such
as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), AN/TPY-2 surveillance
radars, and Patriot missile systems at US bases throughout the Pacific
that are designed to protect US strategic interests. Army Missile
defense capabilities found in the Patriot and THAAD defense systems
create the most meaningful ``safe zones.'' The rapid fielding of
Patriot PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement interceptors, Indirect Fire
Protection Capability (IFPC) 2-I, and Integrated Air and Missile
Defense Battle Command System (IBCS) to USPACOM Air and Missile Defense
units along with maturing directed energy and rail gun technologies
will extend our protection capabilities, further increasing US freedom
of maneuver and access.

Senator Sessions. All right.
Well, thank you both for your service. And I believe we
have a fabulously capable military, well led by talented
leaders. And we thank you for that.
Chairman McCain. Senator Donnelly.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for your service.
Admiral Locklear, what would you say is--and I apologize, I
haven't been here the entire time--when you look, the two
biggest challenges you look at in your command?
Admiral Locklear. Well, the biggest challenge, off the bat,
is making sure that we can respond effectively to what I think
is the most dangerous situation, is the North Korea Peninsula.
So, I have a huge responsibility for helping NORTHCOM with the
defense of homeland, defensing--defense of Hawaii, defense of
Guam, and then follow-on forces on things that flow in to
support General Scaparrotti on what could be a very short-line
problem in Korea. So--North Korea--so, that's kind of number
one problem.
Senator Donnelly. Okay.
Admiral Locklear. But, the second, I think, is just
ensuring that the rebalance does what it needs to, to ensure
that United States is properly positioned in the Asia-Pacific
for the rest of this century. And under that fall a lot of
things: ensuring that the alliances are as strong as they can
be, building new partnerships, and, in some cases, ensuring
that the rise of China doesn't turn into a ``Thucydides Trap.''
Senator Donnelly. Okay.
General Scaparrotti, as you look at Kim Jung-Un, when you
look at the decision-making process that he uses--and I don't
know that the appropriate word is ``random,'' but would you
say, is there, like, a chain of command or a general structured
way that decisions are made, or is it pretty much--you're not
usually certain as to which way something's going to go with
him?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir, thank you.
We don't know a lot about the decision-making process
inside of that regime. If you look at just the 3 years he's
been the leader, he's changed his senior leadership more than
his father and his grandfather, put together. And so, from one
perspective, the use of carrot and stick, the use of brutality,
in many cases, in order to ensure absolute loyalty to him, I
think, undercuts and leaves concern with me that, one, he's got
a group around him that will be frank with him, that won't only
tell him what he wants to hear. So, I think that's a dynamic
within that decisionmaking process that gives me concern.
Senator Donnelly. And as you look at the way the
decisionmaking is going on right now, it appears there is
somewhat of a move toward Russia, toward creating an additional
strengthening of bonds between them. Do you think that provides
any more stability for them, or do you think it just makes them
more dangerous?
General Scaparrotti. Well, I think you can see, not only
the outreach to Russia, but others in the last year, as an
attempt by them to get around the sanctions, which are having
an effect, and to develop others that would provide trade and
funds to them, which, you know, their economy, they're very
tight, particularly given the percentage of it that he puts
into his military. So, I think that's his attempt, there. We
don't see a lot of return on those efforts at this point.
Senator Donnelly. Admiral, when the North Koreans start to
saber-rattle and start to make a lot of noise, ofttimes, your
command brings a presence into the area there and helps to
change the discussion. Do you have fears or concerns about any
plans they might have to come after your fleet, in particular?
Admiral Locklear. Well, certainly, when we're talking in
the context of North Koreans, you can't rule out any
unpredictable type of--
Senator Donnelly. Right.
Admiral Locklear.--activity. So, we know that they also
pursue a pretty significant sea--you know, missile program,
whether--how good it is, sometimes we're not sure. But, that's
not just a ballistic missile capability, but a--cruise missile
capabilities that would have to be considered when forces were
put in the area. But--and they also have a submarine force
that's--if it's operational, could be quite unpredictable, with
mini-subs and things like that.
But, they're generally locally contained, not far-reaching.
So, at this point, I'm not really concerned about our ability
to project power, should we have to support a contingency in
North Korea.
Senator Donnelly. General, what is the one thing in your
command that you're most concerned about?
General Scaparrotti. Sir, I'm most concerned about a
provocation, which North Korea commits two or three every year,
and one of those provocations escalating into conflict.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. Admiral Locklear, General Scaparrotti,
thank you both for your time and for your service, and, more
importantly, for the service of all the men and women in
uniform that you represent in your commands.
Admiral Locklear, do you believe that China's increasing
aggression in the South China Sea reflects their calculations
that the United States lacks the willpower and capability to
challenge them in the South China Sea?
Admiral Locklear. Well, I'd--you'd have to ask the Chinese
if that's the way they feel about it. My guess is that they--as
they always do, I believe, they listen carefully to how the
United States feels about things, globally as well as in that
region, and, where they have a clear understanding of U.S.
position, they have a more--a tendency to understand it and
respect it.
Senator Cotton. Do you think the balance of power is
shifting to the point where they believe that they now have a
military advantage over us in their regional waters inside the
first island chain?
Admiral Locklear. I don't think they think they have a
military advantage over us, because they also recognize that
we're a global power, and that they're not a global power. I
think that they believe that their ability to build and produce
the military they have has provided additional decision space
for them in their local region.
Senator Cotton. One point you mentioned is the importance
of clarity. Deterrence works best whenever the lines we draw
are clear and strongly enforced. I've read press reports
recently that, during Prime Minister Abe's visit to Washington
later this month, the United States may make an explicit pledge
to protect the Senkaku Islands, which are currently under
administrative control of Japan. But, China also claims them.
Do you think that would be a wise step to take for the purposes
of stability in the East-Asian theater?
Admiral Locklear. Well, my understanding is, we have pretty
much made it clear our position in the East China Sea, as it
relates to the Senkaku Islands. We still maintain we don't take
a side on territorial disputes, so, in the long run, the issue
of the sovereignty of Senkakus is for them to figure out. But,
what we have said, and it's been said at numerous levels, is
that the Senkakus Islands do fall within the administrative
control of Japan and do fall within the mutual defense treaty
with Japan. And I believe that that, alone, has provided a
level of stability to the issues in the East China Sea,
Northeast Asia.
Senator Cotton. The press reports--I appreciate and
understand and agree with the points you have made--the press
reports I've seen have suggested that we would be reducing that
to writing, though. And writing, in these matters, I think, can
provide some more clarity than words.
Could you comment briefly on your military-to-military
relations with Thailand at the time?
Admiral Locklear. Well, we maintain military-to-military
contact with Thailand. We do it at a lower level, a post-coup
or post---post-coup. We were on a very good glide slope, a very
positive glide slope. I think the--prior to the coup, the
opportunities that we were pursuing together were quite good
for the region. Thailand is our oldest ally. In the end, it's
my expectation that we want to keep Thailand. We love the Thai
people. They're very close to American people. And we have
similar value systems. And so, it's important for that.
But, post-coup, we have truncated a number of military-to-
military activities, reduced them in scope. And we're managing
those through an interagency process, where we go through and
decide, ``Is this one that we want to continue, or not?'' What
we're hopeful for is that the leadership--current leadership in
Thailand will move actively and aggressively to restore, you
know, rule of law, constitutional processes, and civilian
control of government.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
And, General Scaparrotti, Korea is, in many ways, a unique
area of operations in the world, calling for some unique
capabilities. I want to speak briefly about cluster munitions.
Our stated policy is, as of January 1, 2019, we will no longer
use such munitions that have a greater-than-1-percent
unexploded rate. Can you describe the effect this policy will
have on current operations and contingency planning, and also
maybe the challenges it'll--we'll face achieving that rate?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir.
The cluster munitions are an important part of the munition
inventory that I have. They--because of the effect that they
create for me. There are plans right now, work being done, for
a replacement munition that would meet the requirements of less
than 1 percent dud rate. But, I--that's a requirement that we
must meet, as you said, before 2019. We would use other
munitions, but the munitions that we have available just simply
don't provide the effect that the--of those that I have today
in my inventory.
Senator Cotton. Okay.
Gentlemen, thank you both again for your service and the
service of all those you represent, and your families and
theirs.
Chairman McCain. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Locklear, General Scaparrotti, thank you both for
being here this morning.
Admiral Locklear, in your testimony, you point out the
significance of China's military modernization efforts. And,
earlier this week, we heard from Admiral Roughead, from some
other experts on East Asia, about China's modernization and how
swiftly that has happened. What do we need to do to respond to
what's happening in China? And can you also talk about how, if
we go back to a level of funding that's required by
sequestration, what that does to our efforts to make sure that
we are technologically ahead of where the Chinese are?
Admiral Locklear. Well, I think, first of all, we need to
continue to encourage the Chinese to be more transparent, and
to be more forward-leaning in how they respond to their
neighbors, how they respond in the international community, to
be a responsible leader in the region. I mean, if they're going
to have a military, and they want to use it for security, then
they should be part of the global security environment,
participating with others, not being at odds with them. And
that's a choice they have to make. We also have to make a
choice to accept them into that environment. So, that's
something we have to always consider. And there may be some
risk as we do it, because we--as they rise as a power, it will
be collaborative, on one hand, and competitive, on another. And
that kind of relationship resorts in friction, and it will
always be friction. And then that friction, some of it, may end
up happening in the South China Sea or the East China Sea. So,
managing that friction, and understanding how to manage it so
it doesn't escalate into a large contingency, is very, very
important for all us, particularly between the United States
and China. So, we're working that part of it.
Senator Shaheen. And so, before you answer the sequester
question, how important is the effort to rebalance--I use that
term in parenthesis--to Asia that----
Admiral Locklear. Right.
Senator Shaheen.--has been set out in doing those kinds of
things----
Admiral Locklear. Right.
Senator Shaheen.--with respect to China?
Admiral Locklear. Well, the rebalance is not about China.
China is just one of many issues around----
Senator Shaheen. Right.
Admiral Locklear.--why the United States should be in Asia-
Pacific, why we should have a security posture there. But, they
are a big concern in that. And so, the rebalance is--and, on
the military side, ensuring that we have the right assets to be
able to manage the situations, to be able to understand the
environment, and to be able to respond effectively, are
extremely critical. The readiness of those assets, the
readiness of the men and women that man them, are critical.
So, in sequestration, what happens is that, in general, you
have less force structure that's less ready, that's less
technologically capable. So, we get under fiscal pressure, like
we're in now, the first--one of the first things to go is
technological advances, because we've got to keep what we've
got, right? Because nobody wants to change. So, the things that
we need to stay relative, not only in that part of the world,
but globally, in the technological arena in warfighting, starts
to get pushed off the table, and pushed to the right. And it
gets pushed into timelines that make us start to lose our
technological advantages in warfighting.
Senator Shaheen. One of the things we heard from former
Admiral Roughead earlier this week was the importance of
continuing the carrier-launched UAVs [unmanned aerial
vehicles], and that that program would become even more
important as we look at what we need to do in the Asia-Pacific.
Do you share that view? And how do you see that affecting what
we need to do in that part of the world?
Admiral Locklear. Well, I think, in general, the--whether
they're launched off of carriers or launched anywhere else in
my particular area, that unmanned vehicles, both air and
surface and subsurface, are a significant part of the future.
So--because anytime you can take man out of the loop, you
operate in denied environment. It's a much easier--there's a
lot of benefits to it.
So, to the degree that the--a UAV would be from a carrier--
a carrier, for me, is just a very flexible airfield that can
operate widely through the theater. So, I would see huge
benefits in being able to operate long-range ISR, long-range
strike, if necessary, from those platforms.
Senator Shaheen. And, General Scaparrotti, is this
something that would be beneficial to you in the Korean
theater?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, ma'am, absolutely.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, both of you, for what you're
doing for the country.
I wanted to ask about--follow up, Admiral Locklear, on your
written testimony, where you said, ``Iran has built its robust
nuclear infrastructure and advanced its ballistic missile
systems with materials that have passed through PACOM AOR. Can
you help us understand how are they getting these materials?
And also, could you describe for us what you understand is the
cooperation between Iran and North Korea, in particular on
their missile programs?
Admiral Locklear. Well, I think it's pretty well known that
there's been a movement of proliferation activity from our--
from North Korea into Iran, in this case, of the types of
technologies Iran was looking for. And I think that's been
known through the interagency for some time.
Senator Ayotte. And do you think that's how they're
advancing their intercontinental ballistic missile program?
With advice from North Korea?
Admiral Locklear. I would say I wouldn't discount that as a
possibility.
Senator Ayotte. Yeah. So, in addition to that, you've also
noted that North Korea continues to procure for its nuclear and
ballistics missiles program and--from the region in a network
of individuals and entities in the region. And, as you know,
that violates U.N. Security Council Resolution 1718, in terms
of the ability of member states to directly or indirectly
supply to North Korea these kinds of materials. And obviously
there are many U.N. resolutions that apply to Iran, as well.
But--so, as I look at that testimony, what more can we do to
isolate North Korea, in terms of those that are supplying the
country things that we don't want them to have and are against
U.N. resolutions? And who do we need to be tougher on in the
region in that regard?
General Scaparrotti. Well, I think that, primarily in terms
of proliferation security, we have a proliferation security
initiative that's global in nature, and multinational. I think
that's also an important key, because we have to bring in--we
have to deal with other nations that help provide intelligence
and also forces that may help us in interdiction, et cetera.
We--and continuing our training in that regard, which we do.
In terms of the Nations that I think we have to be
concerned about, I'd prefer to answer that actually for the
record in a classified document, as opposed to here in the open
forum, if I could.
[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Senator Ayotte. Of course. Thank you, General. I appreciate
that.
I also wanted to follow up, Admiral Locklear--I note, in
your written testimony, you mentioned Taiwan, I believe, once,
in passing. In light of China's major military buildup, what's
your assessment of the current balance of military capabilities
in the Taiwan Strait, between the PLA and Taiwan? And where
does Taiwan have an advantage? And where is the PLA's
advantage? So, what concerns are you hearing from the
Taiwanese, and what platforms, weapons, assistance, and
training has Taiwan requested from the United States that we
haven't yet provided?
Admiral Locklear. Well, we have a robust interaction from
the PACOM headquarters with Taiwan. In fact, we have, ongoing
right now over there, their major annual exercise, where we
participate with them. We send advisors, overseers, and we go--
and, in fact, we sent General Thurman, who used to be
Scaparrotti's predecessor, who will be over there with them, at
my request, advising them and assisting them. And so, that's
important.
I think that, in general, over time, the capabilities of
the PLA--the PRC--will vastly eclipse what the Taiwanese could
produce on their own. It's just a matter of magnitude of force
size if China--the PRC stays on the course that it's on now.
We--my task is to support the Taiwan Relations Act and to
provide my advice to the--up to the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and then up to the President for him to decide on what
we--what kind of things we provide.
I know that they have requested our assistance in submarine
programs, and we're contemplating that at this point in time,
but not--have not committed them one way or the other. They are
particularly interested in us helping them in cyber security
areas that allow them to pursue asymmetric capabilities that
will improve their defense and improve their confidence that
they can make decisions on their own and not be coerced.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Colonel Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Captain.
Admiral, would you describe China's behavior toward their
neighbors as provocative?
Admiral Locklear. I would call it aggressive. And I guess
provocative would be in the eyes of the beholder. But, from my
view, it's aggressive.
Senator Graham. From the eyes of the Japanese, would you
say it's provocative?
Admiral Locklear. I think they would say yes.
Senator Graham. Okay.
North Korea. General, would you say the regime, on a good
day, is unstable?
General Scaparrotti. No, sir. I'd say the Kim Jong-un is in
control. We see no indicators of instability at this time.
Senator Graham. So, you think we don't have to worry much
about North Korea?
General Scaparrotti. Oh, no, sir, that's not----
Senator Graham. Okay. When I----
General Scaparrotti.--what I'm trying to say.
Senator Graham.--say ``unstable,'' I mean unpredictable,
provocative.
General Scaparrotti. Unpredictable, provocative----
Senator Graham. Yeah.
General Scaparrotti.--danger. Yes.
Senator Graham. Yeah, that's what I meant. I was----
General Scaparrotti. Willing to--I think, willing to be
provocative, as well.
Senator Graham. So, in your backyard, you've got dangerous,
provocative, unstable, with nukes in North Korea, right?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir, within short distance from
the capital.
Senator Graham. The leader of North Korea seems to be,
like, nuts. I don't know how else you'd describe the guy, but
he seems nutty to me.
So, under sequestration, at the end of the day, how will
your ability to defend the Korean Peninsula and our interests
in that region be affected, from an Army point of view?
General Scaparrotti. Well, from a holistic point of view,
sequestration would, as Admiral Locklear just said, end up with
a smaller force, a less ready force, probably a force----
Senator Graham. Well, if the Army goes down to 420,000--
let's say that's the number they one day hit if we don't fix
sequestration----
General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham.--how does your theater of operations fare,
in terms of threats and----
General Scaparrotti. Sir, in high-intensity conflict that
you'll have on the Korean Peninsula, I'd be very concerned
about having a force that had enough depth, particularly for
sustained operation.
Senator Graham. So, it would be seen as weakening our
position in Asia, right?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Admiral, under sequestration, the Navy
would have approximately how many ships if it was fully
implemented?
Admiral Locklear. Well, I'd have to refer that back to the
Navy. I don't have the exact numbers.
Senator Graham. How many do you have in your----
Admiral Locklear. I have about 150 ships in my AOR that are
assigned from--all the way from San Diego to the theater.
Probably about 50 or so of those are west of the Date Line at
any given time. So, what would be impacted by the size of the
Navy is their ability to rotate forces forward to augment the
ones that are west of the Date Line all the time, which is the
problem we're having now with sustaining our numbers, because
of the readiness bathtub we're in, even with the size we have
today. So, sequestration would just drive that further into the
ground.
Senator Graham. It would be hard to pivot to Asia under
sequestration.
Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. All right. So, the likelihood of a armed
conflict between South Korea and North Korea, how would you
evaluate that on a 1-to-10 scale--1 being very unlikely, 10
being highly likely--say, in the next 10 years?
General?
General Scaparrotti. Well, sir, I think that--I'd caveat by
saying that I think that KJU [Kim Jong-un] knows that if he
were to conduct a conventional attack on South Korea, it would
be the end. So, I don't think that's his purpose. I think it's
to maintain his regime. But, I think, over a 10-year period,
it's above a 5. It's a 6, probably.
Senator Graham. And the more we reduce our forces, the less
deterrent--it may go up a 7.
General Scaparrotti. Sir, I think, with less deterrence, it
becomes more likely that we'd have a conflict.
Senator Graham. Okay.
Admiral, from your point of view, if we reduce our forces
in your theater of operations to sequestration level, do you
think that encourages China to be more provocative?
Admiral Locklear. I think any signal that we send that
we're less interested in the Asia-Pacific, on the security
side, than we currently are would be an invitation for change
in the region and that China would be interested in pursuing.
Senator Graham. Do our allies in the region--are they
beginning to hedge their bets? What's their view toward our
footprint and where we're headed?
Admiral Locklear. I don't think they're necessarily
unsatisfied with our military footprint. I think what they're
concerned about most is that--is the growing divide between
what they see as the economic center of gravity, which is
predominantly Asia or--and more and more around China, and
their security center of gravity, which is around us. So, that
creates a conundrum for them as they have to deal with
strategic decisionmaking. You know, they want us as a security
grantor, because they believe that we're--I mean, they see us
as a benevolent power, and they like how we operate, but they
also see us as a diminished economic power in the region that
they have to deal with that.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Admiral and General, I would appreciate it
if, for the record, you would give a written estimate to this
committee as to the effects of sequestration on your ability to
carry out your responsibilities. And please make it as detailed
as you wish. We're going to have this fight again on
sequestration, ongoing. And members of this committee are
dedicated to the proposition that we have to repeal
sequestration. And your testimony as to the effects of
sequestration can affect that government--that argument
probably more effectively than anything that members on this
side of the dais could accomplish. So, I would very much
appreciate it if you would give us, as detailed as possible,
short-term and long-term effects of sequestration on your
ability to carry out your responsibilities.
Chairman McCain. Admiral, is this your last appearance
before this committee?
Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir, it is.
Chairman McCain. Well, I want to take the opportunity, on
behalf of all of us on this committee and in the U.S. Senate,
thanking you for your outstanding service. I think you can be
very proud of the many contributions that you've made to this
Nation's security. And you're one of the reasons why leaders in
uniform are so highly respected and regarded by the people of
this Nation. So, I thank you, Admiral.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:27 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
partner capacity/foreign military financing
1. Senator McCain. Admiral Locklear, we heard testimony from Dr.
Mike Green before this committee on April 14, 2015, that the U.S.
Pacific Command (PACOM) area of responsibility only receives about one
percent of total Foreign Military Financing (FMF). The committee hears
frequently about the importance of helping Asia-Pacific states build
better maritime domain awareness and Coast Guard capabilities, but
these efforts appear limited in scope. Can you discuss any potential
gaps between your desired level of FMF for the USPACOM theater and the
actual financing the region receives? Can you provide an update for the
committee on our efforts to help build the maritime capacity of states
like the Philippines and Vietnam?
Admiral Locklear. The USPACOM Theater Security Cooperation process
is a disciplined process that since 2013 resulted in decreased
disparity between FMF requests and actual FMF allocations. This is
evidence of the rigorous security cooperation planning process we've
instituted in recent years, producing disciplined resource demand
signals. Current FMF budget requests draw direct linkages between the
Country Team's Integrated Country Strategy/Mission Resource Request
goals and USPACOM Theater Campaign Plan country objectives and Country
Security Cooperation Plans.
The fiscal year 2016 USPACOM budget request totals $96.5 million.
However, the fiscal year 2016 Department of State (DoS) proposed
allocation for USPACOM is $79.1 million. Funding for the USPACOM FMF
request in its entirety for fiscal year 2016 represents a 22 percent
increase over the DoS proposed allocation; a reasonable request that
would actively demonstrate DoS's continued support to the Rebalance to
the Pacific.
Philippines: The clear majority of FMF activity since 2012 in the
South China Sea region is geared toward building key Maritime Security
(MARSEC) and Maritime Domain Awareness capabilities. 73 percent of the
fiscal year 2012-2014 FMF allocation for the Philippines is dedicated
to MARSEC and Territorial Defense. Fiscal year 2013-2017 allocations
support projects that build Navy and Coast Guard maritime self-
sufficiency, maritime fleet upgrades and maintenance capacity
building.on of Vietnam's MARSEC capabilities. FMF maritime capacity
building efforts with Vietnam currently consist of a multi-year plan
for Coast Guard fast patrol boats, training, maintenance and support.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jim Inhofe
readiness impact on us asia-pacific policy
2. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear and General Scaparrotti, are
you concerned about the training of follow-on-forces and their ability
to get to the fight on time?
Admiral Locklear. USPACOM is absolutely concerned with the
readiness of follow-on-forces as their contributions amplify our own
capabilities and capacities that are required to carry out the
command's assigned mission(s). USTRANSCOM is in a better position to
discuss the ability to get forces to the USPACOM AOR on time. However,
the more pressing concern to USPACOM is, over the past year, the U.S.
has been forced to prioritize the readiness of forward-deployed forces,
at the expense of the readiness of follow-on-forces and critical
investments needed to outpace emerging threats. A lack of ready surge
forces resulting from high operational demands, delayed maintenance
periods, and training limitations will limit responsiveness to emergent
contingencies and greatly increases risk.
General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]

3. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, does PACOM have the resources
to maintain a sufficient level of presence in its Area of
Responsibility, to include the East China Sea and South China Sea, to
deter aggression and reassure U.S. partners and allies in the region?
Admiral Locklear. USPACOM's AOR is vast and encompasses 52 percent
of the earth's surface. This large expanse complicates ISR, movement/
maneuver, sustainment and requires a geographically distributed force
laydown to rapidly respond to crisis. Growth of military capabilities
in the region is accelerating and the Indo-Asia-Pacific is the most
militarized region in the world. Although we are meeting our
commitments, the capability/capacity margin that we've enjoyed in the
past is decreasing. USPACOM's ability to defend strategic national
security interests in an increasingly complex and lethal environment
requires a force posture that is operationally resilient and is
properly resourced.
In order to maintain USPACOM's ability to perform our mission the
following resources areas require improvement:
a. Persistent and deep look Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (ISR) to provide adequate adversary indications and
warnings.
b. Robust and interoperable ISR processing, exploitation, and
dissemination enterprise to utilize critical information gathered.
c. Munition improvements in lethality, production, and precision. A
growing need for ship-to-ship and air-to-ship munitions to defeat
aggressors at greater distances while reducing risk to our service
members. Advancements in air-to-air and Hard Target Munitions
capabilities are also required.
d. Sustaining Ballistic Missile Defense gains to address potential
aggressors and protect U.S. interests.
e. Robust CVN and Amphibious presence to ensure regional stability,
reassure allies/partners.
f. Continued focus on Undersea Warfare to maintain advantage toward
potential adversaries.
g. Robust logistics networks including dedicated sealift to posture
munitions, fuel and supplies.
h. Sustainable communication architecture meeting spectrum of
requirements while postured to address cyber threat.

4. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear and General Scaparrotti,
assuming sequestration remains the law, what are the key impacts to
readiness, our ability to deter, and our ability to execute combat
operations in PACOM and on the Korean Peninsula?
Admiral Locklear. If sequestration remains the law, it will make it
increasingly difficult to execute the USPACOM Theater Campaign Plan and
other mission areas. Negative readiness trends that we're seeing in our
reinforcement forces will be exacerbated should sequestration
continue.''
Projected sequestration impact areas are:
o Fight Tonight
Service funding cuts will drive fewer flying hours,
steaming days, and fewer opportunities to practice required skills.
Cancelled/scaled down training/exercises will reduce
joint integration opportunities necessary for coordinated mission
execution.
Forward deployed force readiness maintained at cost of
follow-on required forces.
Reduced availability of Intelligence, Surveillance,
Reconnaissance aircraft will reduce awareness and decision space.
o Sustainment of equipment
Interruption or delays of ship, aircraft, and other
equipment modernization, reset maintenance, and/or sustainment will
prolong impacts beyond funding reduction periods.
o Assure Allies/Deter Enemies
Reduced or cancelled exercises, reduced presence,
reduced regional engagements signal lack of commitment to our partners
and allies
Reduced US presence with aggressor unpredictability,
rapid regional military modernization, and expansion of state actor
presence further reemphasize a sequestration return will have far
reaching unintended consequences.
General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]
u.s. rebalance to asia-pacific
5. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear and General Scaparrotti, what
are your current critical capability gaps on PACOM and on the Korean
Peninsula?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]
General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]

6. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear and General Scaparrotti, has
the decreased readiness of the U.S. military and the reduction in size,
forcing rotational forces to fill capability gaps, impacted our ability
to maintain stability, deter aggression and assure our allies and
partners in the region?
Admiral Locklear. Decreased readiness and the reduction in size of
the U.S. military is an issue that has been addressed daily within
USPACOM for over two years. The entire Department is working on
prioritization of effort and resource-informed means of ensuring that
goals and objectives can be met in accordance with National Guidance.
The readiness rebuild and downsizing of the force are multi-year
endeavors; thus the impacts to the areas in question have been minimal
since we just started the processes. However, it is a compounding
dilemma and as both cycles continue we will see a parallel decrease in
our ability to maintain stability, deter aggression, and assure allies
and partners--all in the face of a rising China and unpredictable
Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Our concern is that we are at
risk of losing ground on numerous Rebalance-related initiatives because
there simply will not be the resources available to accomplish what is
required in the AOR. The greatest threat to the United States would be
to fight a war in the USPACOM AOR that we could have deterred.
General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]

7. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, what is the perception of the
``rebalance'' by our allies and partners?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

8. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, how has China reacted to the
U.S. ``rebalance?''
Admiral Locklear. China has reacted to the U.S. ``rebalance'' with
wariness. On the one hand, China has responded by embracing some
opportunities to expand engagement with the U.S. military, such as
participating in RIMPAC and our ongoing disaster management exchanges.
On the other hand, however, China has criticized our support for allies
and democratic ideals as efforts to contain its rise, to encircle it,
and even to split it.
global security environment
9. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear and General Scaparrotti, how
would each of you assess the national security environment in the Asia-
Pacific and on the Korean Peninsula over the next five years--becoming
more or less stable?
Admiral Locklear. The security environment in the Indo-Asia-Pacific
is likely to change in both positive and negative ways over the next
five years.
We will continue to face a variety of regional challenges to
stability. We expect North Korea to continue to try to develop, test
and field long-range missiles and nuclear weapons, while remaining
largely isolated from the international community and incapable of
solving its economic shortcomings. China's dramatic military growth,
especially if it remains coupled with a lack of transparency and
aggressive actions, will continue to be of concern to the region.
Resource disputes of all kinds--including water, energy, fish, and
other natural resources--will probably become more contentious. Violent
extremists are likely to continue to adapt to more comprehensive
regional counter terrorism efforts by leveraging technology and
possibly drawing upon the relationships and skills being acquired today
in Iraq and Syria. And the impacts of climate change may become more
pronounced, especially on the small island nations and the many nations
with large, vulnerable populations.
However, we also expect the positive trends of increased
information sharing and multi-national approaches to problem solving to
continue. The Indo-Asia-Pacific is becoming more interconnected and
interoperable, providing additional regional approaches to these
challenges.
General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]
sensor-fused weapon (sfw)
10. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, last year you said the
Sensor-Fused Weapon (SFW) is ``essential to meet the strategic and
operational requirements at a time-critical juncture in our rebalance
strategy.'' Is this still the case?
Admiral Locklear. Area Effects Munitions (AEM) remain essential to
meeting the strategic and operational requirements of USPACOM. I
support the Services' AEM Roadmaps to develop an effective replacement
capability for AEM that is compliant with Department of Defense policy.
Current Air Force assessments indicate that projected inventories of
SFW are sufficient to meet near term USPACOM requirements.

11. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, how does the capability of
the Sensor-Fused Weapon (SFW) compare to that of the cast ductile iron
version of the BLU-111 general purpose bomb, which the US Air Force is
also considering to address area weapons requirements? Which has a
better cost-per-kill ratio? Which has a better sorties-per-kill ratio?
Which presents an aggregate lower aircrew risk when deploying the
system?
Admiral Locklear. These weapons have different design features and
capabilities because they are designed to engage different target
types; it would not be appropriate to compare them on a cost benefit or
aircrew risk basis for the same target set. Advanced fragmentation
weapons in general, do not provide the anti-armor capabilities of the
SFW and they do not provide persistence; similarly, the SFW does not
provide effects against large formations of personnel in the way that
the CDI BLU-111 does.

12. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, how does the Sensor-Fused
Weapon (SFW) address the humanitarian concerns that have been raised
about the use of other munitions?
Admiral Locklear. DoD and USPACOM apply heavy scrutiny to the
conditions under which all munitions are or would be employed,
including potential humanitarian impact during and after combat
engagements. Employment of cluster munitions by US forces is guided by
a strict policy to address humanitarian concerns. SFW contains advanced
features that further minimize any potential humanitarian concerns.

13. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear and General Scaparrotti, what
consequences would you foresee if U.S. forces could rely only on
unitary systems to defend against threats in the PACOM Area of
Operations, including a DPRK armored attack, or elsewhere? What costs
in terms of protecting friendly forces, materiel and dollars would be
incurred?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]
General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]

14. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, what efforts have been
undertaken to replace by 2018 the pre-P3I Sensor-Fused Weapon (SFW)
units that are prohibited by the 2008 Policy on Cluster Munitions and
Unintended Harm to Civilians with the advanced version of this system?
Admiral Locklear. There is not currently an effort to specifically
replace or upgrade the pre-P3I SFW in the Air Force inventory. Current
Air Force requirements indicate that projected inventories of SFW are
sufficient for USPACOM requirements. However, there are larger DoD
efforts ongoing to (1) assess the warfighting impacts of the DoD
Cluster Munition (CM) policy and assess some mitigation approaches, and
(2) refine Service Area Effects Munitions (AEM) roadmaps to identify
fiscally achievable paths to provide appropriate AEM capability and
capacity.

15. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, what steps are being taken to
ensure that the Sensor-Fused Weapon (SFW) industrial base is sustained
so that it can meet expected future requirements and undertake research
and development needed to devise more advanced systems?
Admiral Locklear. This is beyond my scope as a Combatant Commander;
The Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics maintains an aggressive program to identify and address
concerns with the US defense industrial base.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
virginia class submarine
16. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, how is the Virginia-class
Attack submarine performing in the PACOM area of responsibility?
Admiral Locklear. We have had for decades the best submarines in
the world. As Virginia-class Attack Submarines deploy to the Pacific,
they have demonstrated that we continue to have the best submarines in
the world. Submarines are essential to any operations that I have, both
in peacetime and in crisis and contingency.
A continued and sustained investment in the U.S. nuclear submarine
force, advanced undersea warfare technologies, capabilities and
capacity, and readiness is necessary to maintain our edge against
growing challenges.

17. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, what percentage of your
attack submarine requests in PACOM is the Navy currently meeting?
Admiral Locklear. For Fiscal Year 2015 the Navy is projected to
meet 56 percent of my attack submarine request. This percentage is
consistent with previous years.
north korea

18. Senator Ayotte. General Scaparrotti, on April 7, 2015, the
Pentagon said that North Korea had developed the KN-08 missile that is
capable of reaching the homeland, and that North Korea is capable of
miniaturizing a nuclear warhead to be fit on an ICBM. Please provide an
update.
General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]
china
19. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, since China's 2013
declaration of an East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone
(ADIZ), how has China's practical behavior and activities in that area
changed?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

20. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, since that declaration, how
has U.S. behavior changed in that area, if at all? In practice, are
United States military forces recognizing China's East China Sea ADIZ
in any way or changing our operations in any way in the wake of that
2013 declaration? Why or why not?
Admiral Locklear. The PRC's East China Sea ADIZ policy has not in
any way changed how the U.S. conducts military operations in the
region. We continue to conduct flight operations in the region,
including with our allies and partners. The U.S. will not acquiesce to
unilateral acts of other states designed to restrict the rights,
freedoms, and uses of the sea and airspace, as reflected in
international law. Specifically, the U.S. does not recognize a right of
a coastal state to apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign aircraft,
including U.S. military aircraft, if those aircraft do not intend to
enter the national airspace of the coastal state.

21. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, when China completes its land
reclamation projects, do you expect China to declare an Air Defense
Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea, as they did in the
East China Sea in November 2013?
Admiral Locklear. Yes, we expect that China will eventually declare
an ADIZ in the South China Sea. Their ongoing land reclamation in the
Spratly Islands will give them a new capability to enforce such an ADIZ
throughout the South China Sea.

22. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, if China were to establish an
ADIZ in the South China Sea, how would this impact U.S. air operations
in the region?
Admiral Locklear. As with the PRC's declaration of an East China
Sea ADIZ, the potential establishment of a PRC South China Sea ADIZ
will not change how the U.S. conducts military operations in the
region.

23. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, over the last several years,
China has engaged in coercive diplomacy to achieve its political and
territorial aims in the East and South China Seas. The administration
has responded with efforts to build partner capacity and strengthen
regional institutions. What additional steps can the administration
take to deter Chinese assertiveness in the short and medium term?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

24. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, do you share the view that
China's actions have violated U.S. national security interests in the
Freedom of Navigation, the free flow of commerce, and the peaceful
settlement of disputes in accordance with international law?
Admiral Locklear. Though to date China's actions in the South China
Sea have not impacted U.S. freedom of navigation or free flow of
commerce, and though the U.S. does not take a position on competing
claims to sovereignty over land features in the South China Sea, we
observe that actions and steps they have taken to significantly
increase the physical size or functionality of disputed features or to
militarize them is provocative and has the potential to raise tensions.
Large scale construction or major steps--such as dramatically expanding
the actual size of a disputed feature through land reclamation--with
the intent to militarize or expand law enforcement operations at
outposts has the effect of ``complicating or escalating'' the
situation.

25. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, how many combat patrols did
the PLA (People's Liberation Army) Navy conduct in the East China Sea
and South China Sea in 2014? How does that compare to previous years?
How has USPACOM responded in order to assure the freedom of navigation
for the U.S. and our partners?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]
u.s. force posture
26. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, as the range and precision of
Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles have increased, U.S. forces
operating from forward bases have come under increased threat. What new
operating concepts and/or passive and active defenses are we adopting
to help address this challenge?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]
combatant command integration
27. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, how do you assess the
integration between PACOM and STRATCOM regarding strategic challenges
like nuclear forces? What about PACOM integration with NORTHCOM on
ballistic missile defense?
Admiral Locklear. USPACOM coordinates throughout the planning
process with USSTRATCOM and USNORTHCOM; all deliberate plans are
thoroughly integrated. USPACOM maintains a supporting role to
USNORTHCOM for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) of the Homeland. Given
expected indications and warnings (I&W), USNORTHCOM and USPACOM can
defend the U.S. Homeland (including Guam) against DPRK ballistic
missile threats using a combination of active and passive means. To
demonstrate our capability and will to integrate the supported/
supporting relationship, PACFLT recently led a Fleet Synthetic
Training-Joint (FST-J) that included USPACOM and USNORTHCOM components
in a command post exercise environment for tactical level BMD
execution.
concerns about u.s. capability and will
28. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, as you talk with our allies
in Asia, are you hearing any concerns regarding the capability or
willingness of the U.S. stand by our allies there if there were a
conflict in the future? What are they saying?
Admiral Locklear. Our relationships with Allies and Partners are
essential for maintaining security and prosperity in the region; key to
remaining the security partner of choice is demonstrating commitment
through sustained forward presence, continual engagement, and effective
capabilities.
There is some concern in the region that U.S. security commitments
may not be sustainable. Countries are watching the U.S. budget process
closely--budget uncertainty in Washington has created concern,
especially as it relates to Sequestration's impact on acquisition,
deployments, training, readiness, and partner capacity building.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Lee
north korea-iran relationship
29. Senator Lee, Admiral Locklear and General Scaparrotti, can you
confirm, as recent news reports have suggested, that North Korea
transferred ballistic missile technology to Iran in the past year? If
so, how long has this been known to the U.S. Government, and do you
consider it a violation of international prohibitions against the
illicit transfer of such material?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]
General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]
pacific interests
30. Senator Lee, Admiral Locklear, maintaining order and security
in the Asia/Pacific region is important for U.S. defensive and economic
security, and I believe that this can be best achieved when our allies
and partners in the region have a strong national security apparatus to
support and compliment U.S. efforts and ensure responsible burden
sharing. Can you outline for the committee examples of successful
partnerships you have seen since the United States undertook its
strategic shift to the Asia/Pacific region, and where is more work
needed, especially in terms of allied defensive capacity? Specifically,
do you believe that the burden of security responsibility in the
Pacific is being appropriately shared among Pacific nations?
Admiral Locklear. I agree completely with the importance of
developing partners' capabilities, and we work very hard to do so.
Examples of successful partnering realized under the Rebalance include:
Japan is pressing forward with a historic and challenging re-
orientation toward regional security roles; U.S. forces and aircraft
will rotate through Northern Australia, facilitating increased
multilateral engagement, exercises, and contingency response capacity;
new bilateral Defense Cooperation Guidelines with Japan will enable
enhanced U.S.-Japan interoperability and broader combined operations
across the region; and, the U.S.-Philippines Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement will allow enhanced maritime security cooperation
in the South China Sea. We are also working with the ASEAN-centered
organizations to build an effective and cooperative regional security
architecture through our participation in expert working groups and
multilateral exercises on counterterrorism, maritime security, search
and rescue, humanitarian assistance /disaster relief, peace keeping
operations, nonproliferation, biosecurity, cybersecurity, and health
and military medicine.
While we have made progress, more work remains. Security sector
reform and shifting the focus from internal to external security
remains an issue in the theater. In Northeast Asia, our capacity-
building efforts include strengthening Allies' capabilities with
cutting-edge aircraft, air and missile defense, realizing joint
capability, cyber security, information security, and high end counter-
Anti Access/Area Denial (A2AD) interoperability. Work also continues
toward building the Republic of Korea's capacity to assume full
operational control of its self-defense; to do so the ROK must invest
in C2, among other capabilities.
Finally, burden sharing is robust, but more can be done. Key Allies
such as South Korea and Japan provide substantial host nation support.
We routinely encourage regional states to invest further in their
defense budgets, and work with them to become net security providers.
We also encourage them to support regional security by providing us
operational access. Key enablers include educating their publics on the
value of security partnering with the U.S., and overcoming regional/
historical animosities with neighbors. Finally, we continue to press
regional institutions, such as ASEAN, to advance toward providing
preventative diplomacy, effective conflict resolution, and de-
escalation strategies.

31. Senator Lee, Admiral Locklear, what impact has Chinese naval
development and aggression had on the ability of the United States and
our economic partners to freely trade in the Asia-Pacific region? Do
you view Chinese activity as something that will inhibit economic
development in that region in the future?
Admiral Locklear. Chinese naval development and aggression creates
uncertainty that can inhibit trade and investment. The governments and
militaries of the region have a responsibility to provide a stable and
secure environment where business can flourish. Three areas of economic
activity that could be impacted include shipping, fishing, and resource
development.
Commercial shipping is the life blood of our interconnected global
economy and requires freedom of navigation and access to nations and
their ports. Chinese naval development and aggression have not limited
the free flow of commercial shipping so far. However, conflicts over
competing claims in the South China Sea increasingly risk conflict,
which could elevate insurance rates and otherwise interfere with free
navigation in regional waters and skies.
The nations of Southeast Asia obtain a significant portion of their
diet through commercial fishing in the South China Sea, leading to an
uncommonly recognized source of friction. Since 1999, China has
annually declared a unilateral ban on fishing in the northern half of
the South China Sea for several months each year; although, it has not
significantly enforced it. Other regional states reject Chinese
authority to ban their fishermen and continue to allow their fishing
boats to operate in South China Sea. China's ban has the effect of
pushing the Chinese fishing fleet and Chinese Coast Guard patrol craft
farther south, increasing the likelihood of incidents. Added to an
already complex situation, Chinese reclamation activities in the area
will likely facilitate a more rapid Chinese response, and is likely to
further exacerbate regional tensions.
Recurring tensions and Chinese militarization of the region, as
well as the unsettled legal status of regional claims, have reportedly
forestalled exploration for, and exploitation of, sea bed resources.
China's actions are creating uncertainty and risk; given the high
initial cost of entry, the private sector has been hesitant to explore
and develop resources inside China's almost total claim on the South
China Sea.

32. Senator Lee, Admiral Locklear, what is your assessment of
Taiwan's security situation and how do you see the cross-Strait balance
of power developing over the next few years? Where do you believe the
United States needs to assist or enable the Taiwanese military to have
the most effective and cost-efficient security gains?
Admiral Locklear. There have been no signs that China's military
posture opposite Taiwan has changed significantly over the past several
years. The PLA continues to develop and deploy military capabilities,
which would allow it to undertake increasingly sophisticated military
action against Taiwan. Taiwan has historically relied on technological
and operational superiority as well as geographic advantages to counter
the PLA. Taiwan has taken important steps to professionalize its force
and develop its defense industrial base, which have partially addressed
Taiwan's declining defense advantages. However, China's increasingly
modern platforms and weapons--including more, and more capable,
ballistic missiles, ships and submarines, combat aircraft, and improved
C4ISR capabilities--are tipping the balance of power further in China's
favor.
USPACOM's assistance to help Taiwan modernize its military have
provided the security and confidence for Taiwan to work with the PRC
improve cross-strait relations. However, the growing military power
disparity will continue to pose a challenge to cross-strait stability.
In order to maintain the relative peace that categorized the last eight
years cross-strait relations, USPACOM seeks to assist the Taiwan
military by looking into efficient (right side of cost asymmetry) and
effective (real capabilities) solutions.
terrorism
33. Senator Lee, Admiral Locklear, to what extent are al-Qaeda and
other Islamic terrorist organizations operating, recruiting personnel,
and accessing finance in your area of responsibility, and how do you
assess the intelligence and counterterrorism efforts of the United
States and our regional partners?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]
north korea
34. Senator Lee, General Scaparrotti, the Russian government
recently announced a ``Year of Friendship'' with North Korea and that
Kim Jong-un will visit Moscow in May. What is your assessment of the
Russia-North Korea relationship, and how will closer ties between these
two countries impact our Pacific security?
General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]

35. Senator Lee, General Scaparrotti, in your study of North Korean
military strategy and the government's overall mentality, what do you
believe are the most effective ways to deter their belligerent behavior
towards the United States and our allies?
General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]

36. Senator Lee, General Scaparrotti, US Forces Korea is currently
authorized to have more than 28,000 personnel in South Korea, a trend
that has historically declined over but remained nearly even since
2005. What factors do you take into consideration when making your
recommendation for U.S. force levels in South Korea, and how do you see
force levels trending in the coming decade?
General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]

37. Senator Lee, General Scaparrotti, what is the status of the
plan to transfer war-time operational control to the South Korean
military? What do you think needs to be done by the South Korean
government and military to increase their military capabilities and
decrease their reliance upon international forces on the Peninsula?
General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2016 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

----------

THURSDAY, APRIL 30, 2015

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND PROGRAMS AND BUDGET

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Wicker,
Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Lee,
Graham, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand,
Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, and King.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman McCain. Good morning. The committee meets today to
receive testimony on the posture of U.S. European Commander. I
want to welcome our old friend, General Philip Breedlove, the
Commander of the U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied
Commander, Europe.
General Breedlove, I want to thank you and your family for
your dedicated service to the Nation. This committee relies on
the candor of each of those in--of those in positions such as
yours to conduct the oversight work we're sent here to do. So,
I especially want to thank you, on behalf of this committee,
for your honest and forthright presentation of the ongoing
crisis in Ukraine over the past year. I might point out that
each one of your predictions to this committee has been--and to
the world--has, unfortunately, been proven to be true about the
actions that Vladimir Putin continues to take in dismembering a
sovereign nation.
As Ian Brzezinski of--explained before this committee
earlier this week, Europe and the NATO alliance face,
``challenges on multiple fronts of unprecedented complexity and
increasing urgency.'' To its south, the alliance faces a
treacherous combination of state sponsors of terrorism, failed
states, and extremist organizations. Already this year, radical
Islamists attacked Paris and Copenhagen. Last week, in the
Mediterranean, over 700 migrants perished tragically in a
shipwreck, fleeing the conflict and instability of North
Africa. And then there's Russia. To its north, the
transatlantic community faces Russian militarization of the
Arctic. And, to the east, NATO confronts Russia's invasion of
Ukraine.
Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. policy toward Russia
was based on a bipartisan assumption that the Russian
Government sought to integrate peacefully into the
international order in Europe and to forge a constructive
relationship with the United States. The events of the past
year have overturned that assumption. Russia became the first
state in seven decades on the European continent to send its
military forces across an internationally recognized border and
forcibly annex the sovereign territory of another state. Today,
Russia maintains sizable numbers of artillery pieces and
multiple rocket launchers on the territory of Ukraine, in
violation of the February cease-fire agreement. The Russian
military has recently deployed additional air-defense systems
near the front lines in eastern Ukraine, the highest amount
since last August, according to the State Department. It's a
disturbing sign that another offensive may be imminent.
In response, it is not that the United States and our
European allies have done nothing. It is that nothing we have
done has succeeded in deterring Putin's aggression and halted
his slow-motion annexation of eastern Ukraine. Despite the
advice of nearly every statesman and policy expert that has
appeared before this committee in recent months, Henry
Kissinger, George Shultz, Madeleine Albright, Zbig Brzezinski
and others, and against the advice of both his Secretary of
State and Secretary of Defense, the President of the United
States has refused to provide defensive lethal assistance to
Ukraine. The Ukrainian people aren't asking for U.S. troops.
They're simply asking for the right tools to defend themselves
and their country. The President's continued inaction for fear
of provoking Russia is seen by Putin as weakness, and invites
the very aggression we seek to avoid, and it only increases the
likelihood this aggression could expand to places like Moldova,
Georgia, the Baltic states, and Central Asia.
Of course, there is no military solution in Ukraine, but
there is a clear military dimension to achieving a political
solution. As three major think tanks wrote recently, and I
quote, ``Assisting Ukraine to deter attack and defend itself is
not inconsistent with the search for a peaceful political
solution, and it's essential to achieving it. Only if the
Kremlin knows that the risks and cost of further military
action are high will it seek to find an acceptable political
solution.''
Ultimately, we must recognize that we are confronting a
challenge that many had assumed was resigned to the history
books, a strong, militarily capable state that is hostile to
our interests and our values, and seeks to overturn the
international order in Europe that American leaders of both
parties have sought to maintain since World War II. U.S.
strategy and military posture in Europe should adjust to
reflect this harsh reality. Yet, as Russia builds up, America
draws down. The Obama administration eliminated two heavy
brigades stationed in Europe in 2012. Yesterday, the Army
announced the departure of 24 Apache helicopters and 30 Black
Hawk helicopters from Germany. And we'll want to hear more from
General Breedlove on a plan for a rotational presence and other
efforts to reassure our allies.
As Admiral Stavridis, the former SACEUR and EUCOM
Commander, told this committee on Tuesday, ``Since the end of
the Cold War, we're down 75 percent in personnel, we're down 75
percent in the number of bases we have. We have, in my view,
come to a line that we should not continue to diminish that
presence further.''
I'm also concerned about the fact that too many of our NATO
allies continue to fail to provide for their own defense.
Despite promises at the Wales Summit to reverse the trend of
declining defense budgets, soon Poland and Estonia may be the
only other allies meeting our alliance's commitment to spend 2
percent of GDP on defense.
In response to the broader challenge that Russia poses to
security in Europe, it's not that the United States and NATO
have done nothing. We have created a modest rapid-reaction
force, increased air policing and sea patrols, expanded
training and exercises, and deployed small numbers of
additional forces to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.
The problem is, the actions we have taken seem inadequate to
the scope, scale, and seriousness of the challenges we face.
None of us want a return to the Cold War, but we need to
face the reality that we are dealing with a Russian ruler who
wants exactly that. The reason for maintaining a U.S. strong
military presence in Europe is the same as ever: to deter
conflict and aggression. But, we must revisit the question of
what it will take to achieve this goal when confronting a
revisionist Russia that is undergoing a significant military
modernization and that is willing to use force, not as a last
resort, but as a primary tool to achieve it's neo-imperial
objectives. I hope today's hearing will help us to better
understand the magnitude of the challenge we face in Europe.
I thank General Breedlove for joining us today, and look
forward to your testimony.
Senator Reed.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And, General Breedlove, welcome. Thank you for your many
years of service, you and your family. And please pass along
our gratitude to the service men and women of the U.S. European
Command for their great service.
Let me also thank the chairman for holding an excellent
hearing on Tuesday with witnesses from outside the government
on the security situation in Europe. That hearing, along with
today's hearing, will help inform the committee's markup of the
annual defense authorization bill. I must also say that the
series of hearings that the Chairman has prepared over the
course of this session has been extremely useful by having
policy experts and then the relevant commanders come in. And
thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's really enhanced this discussion
and our insight.
General Breedlove, you have responsibility to maintain the
critical transatlantic relationship with Europe. As our
witnesses on Tuesday emphasized, Europe does, indeed, matter
for U.S. national security. Our European partners have made,
and continue to make, significant contributions to coalition
operations in the Middle East and South Asia. Our longstanding
basing arrangements in Europe provide vital support to
operations in CENTCOM and AFRICOM. And NATO remains a critical
component of U.S. security, based on its members' shared values
and interests.
Today, EUCOM confronts a range of challenges in or around
the European area, many of which have just recently arisen.
Foremost is the threat from an increasingly confrontational and
antagonistic Russia, which has revived old fears of a divided
Europe. Russia's aggression against Ukraine has challenged the
post-Cold War vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace.
EUCOM is leading efforts to respond to the hybrid warfare
tactics used by Russia in seizing Crimea and secretly
supporting separatist forces in eastern Ukraine. EUCOM and NATO
have sought to counter Russia's false narrative on Ukraine,
highlighting the continuing flow of heavy weapons, Russian
military leadership and training to the separatists, in
violation of the Minsk cease-fire agreements.
General Breedlove, we would be interested in your
assessment of the security situation in Ukraine and whether you
believe heavy fighting is likely to resume in the coming weeks,
as some are predicting. From early in the Ukrainian crisis,
EUCOM has been working with the Ukranian government to identify
military and security shortfalls, and advise in building
Ukraine's capability to defend itself. There is broad support
in this committee and in Congress for providing Ukraine
military assistance, including lethal defensive weapons
necessary for it to defend itself against further attacks. As
discussed at Tuesday's hearing, any arming of Ukraine involves
risk and needs to be done carefully and thoughtfully. But, as a
recent report by several leading think tanks concluded,
assisting Ukraine to deter attack and defend itself is not
inconsistent with the search for a peaceful political solution.
It is essential to achieving it.
EUCOM has also played a critical role in reassuring our
NATO allies closest to Russia. EUCOM has increased the
presence, on a rotational basis, of U.S. military forces in
eastern Europe, on the land, sea, and in the air. At the NATO
Wales Summit, members approved a Readiness Action Plan and
other steps to strengthen the alliance's capability to come to
the aid of a member whose security is threatened. One issue I
hope General Breedlove will address is whether U.S. forces in
Europe are postured to deter further Russian aggression and
whether this mission can be carried out over the coming years
with the use of U.S. forces rotating into the European theater
from bases back home.
Ultimately, much will depend on whether NATO members
fulfill their Wales commitments to achieve defense spending at
a level of 2 percent of GDP in the coming years. The budget
request includes nearly $800 million, on top of the 1 billion
approved last year, for the European Reassurance Initiative to
enhance the U.S. military presence and activities in Europe.
EUCOM also must contend with security challenges along
Europe's other borders. The transit across the Mediterranean of
tens of thousands, possibly more, migrants fleeing instability
in Libya, Syria, Eritrea, and elsewhere has overwhelmed
countries in southern Europe. Efforts to respond to this crisis
have been mixed, to date, and clearly more must be done soon as
the violence and instability in Libya and elsewhere continues
unabated.
To the southeast, Turkey's porous border with Syria
continues to attract foreign fighters traveling to the Syrian
conflict and back, heightening the risk of future anti-Western
attacks like those in Paris and Brussels, and adding to
concerns about a rising ISIL presence in European cities.
In the north, Russia's expanding militarization of the
Arctic is potentially at odds with international efforts to
promote cooperation and increase economic activity in this
region.
This is a long list. We look forward to your testimony and
thank you for your service.
Chairman McCain. Welcome back, General Breedlove. Thank
you. Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF GEN. PHILIP M. BREEDLOVE, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
EUROPEAN COMMAND/SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE

General Breedlove. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today.
It is an honor to be here representing the dedicated
soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, civilians, and the
families, as you have both mentioned, of the U.S. European
Command. Thank you for all you do to support them as they serve
our Nation.
Compared to just 1 year ago, Europe faces a very different
and much more challenging security environment, one with
significant lasting implications for U.S. national security
interests. Our top concern, as both of you have mentioned, is a
revanchist Russia.
Russia is blatantly challenging the rules and principles
that have been the bedrock of European security for decades.
This is global, it's not regional. And it is enduring, not
temporary. Russian aggression is clearly visible in its illegal
occupation of Crimea and its continued operations in eastern
Ukraine.
In Ukraine, Russia has supplied their proxies with heavy
weapons, training and mentoring, command and control,
artillery, fire support, tactical and operational-level air
defense, among others. Russia has transferred many pieces of
military equipment into Ukraine, including tanks, armored
personnel carriers, heavy artillery pieces, and other military
vehicles. What we have seen over the course of the fight was
that, when the Russian proxy offensive would ever run into
trouble, Russian forces intervened directly to right the
course.
Today on the ground, the situation is volatile and it's
fragile. Russian forces used the opportunities provided by the
recent lull in fighting to reset and reposition while
protecting their gains. Many of their actions are consistent
with preparations for another offensive.
The hope remains that both parties will fully implement an
effective cease-fire as an important step towards an acceptable
political resolution of the conflict, one that represents the
internationally recognized border. I'm often asked, Should the
United States and other provide weapons to Ukraine? What we see
in Russia is an aggressive application of all elements of
national power--diplomatic, informational, economic, as well as
military. So, in my view, it would not make sense to
unnecessarily take any of our own tools off the table.
But, the crisis in Ukraine is about more than just Ukraine.
Russian activities are destabilizing neighbor states and the
region as a whole, and Russia's illegal actions are pushing
instability ever closer to the boundaries of NATO. We cannot be
fully certain what Russia will do next, and we cannot fully
grasp Putin's intent. What we can do is learn from his actions.
And what we see suggests growing Russian capabilities,
significant military modernization, and an ambitious strategic
intent. We also know that Putin responds to strength and seeks
opportunities in weakness. We must strengthen our deterrence in
order to manage this opportunist confidence.
At the same time, Europe also faces the challenge of a
surge in violent extremism. European nations are rightly
worried about foreign fighters returning home to Europe from
the fight in Syria and Iraq with new skills and with malign
intent. Attacks like those in France, Belgium, and Denmark are
only likely to become more frequent. Foreign fighters are part
of a much broader pattern of insecurity to Europe's south, with
roots in the Middle East and North Africa, transit routes are
shared by violent extremists, organized criminal networks, and
migrant populations fleeing difficult conditions in Libya and
other undergoverned spaces. The spread of instability into
Europe and the transnational terrorism we all face could have a
direct bearing on the National security of the U.S. homeland.
EUCOM is working with European nations bilaterally and
supporting NATO alliance initiatives to meet and counter this
new and more complex security environment. Based on the
decisions made at NATO's Wales Summit last year, the alliance
is adapting in order to improve its readiness and its
responsiveness. The Readiness Action Plan, or RAP, is well
underway. Our allies are stepping up, making contributions that
give them a real stake in the outcome. The United States will
have a key and sustained role to play in supporting and
enabling these changes, especially in critical areas that are
hardest for our allies to provide, like lift, sustainment, and
enablers such as intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance.
At the same time, our own U.S. efforts in Europe remain
essential. Our leadership is perhaps more important now than at
any time in recent history. Since Russian troops illegally
occupied Crimea last year, U.S. forces, under the banner of
Operation Atlantic Resolve, have continued to take concerted
steps to assure allies of our commitment to their security and
to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the common defense
cornerstone of our transatlantic security. EUCOM air, land,
maritime, and Special Operation Forces have maintained presence
in all three of our NATO allies in the Baltics, Poland,
Romania, and Bulgaria, as well as the Black Sea, providing an
array of capabilities, including airborne armor, mobile
infantry, light fighter, strike fighter, advanced air, and
maritime presence, in addition to training, advising, and
exercising with host-nation forces. You have made most of this
persistent presence possible through your support of the
European Reassurance Initiative, or, ERI. The assurance
measures it supports enable the alliance to remain strong and
cohesive in this new security environment.
In facing both of these serious challenges to Europe's east
and to its south, EUCOM is working closely with many others--
our sister COCOMs, NATO partners, as well as allies and other
international organizations, including the European Union.
There is plenty of work to go around. And our collaboration and
our unity are essential. EUCOM is also drawing heavily on great
new efforts underway in the Department of Defense, not the
least the Defense Innovation Initiative, which applies cutting-
edge approaches to some of the toughest challenges in our
theater, like anti-access area denial.
The strong threat posed by Russia and the growing challenge
to the south lead me to three areas where EUCOM could
particularly use your help:
First, sufficient forward--persistent forward presence. Our
forward presence in Europe is the bedrock of our ability to
assure allies, to deter real and potential adversaries, and to
be postured to act in a timely manner, should deterrence fail.
It was our permanent presence in Europe that gave EUCOM the
ability to respond immediately after Russian troops illegally
occupied Crimea. Soldiers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade in
Germany deployed to the Baltic states and Poland within 96
hours of receiving their mission. And our F-15s from
Lakenheath, England, began flying missions out of Poland within
18 hours of being giving the mission. That same permanent
presence ensures that EUCOM can play a full array of essential
supporting roles for other combatant commands, from neighboring
AFRICOM and CENTCOM to STRATCOM and TRANSCOM. Rotational
presence is not a substitute for permanent forward presence in
building relationships or signaling our commitment, but a fully
funded rotational presence can play an important role in
helping meet the requirements in our theater if it is heel-to-
toe and properly resourced.
The second area is sufficient intelligence support. Since
the end of the Cold War, our Nation's community of Russian-area
experts has shrunk considerably, and intelligence assets of all
kinds have been shifted to the wars we've been fighting or to
understanding potential future threats. Russian military
operations over the past year in Ukraine and the region more
broadly have underscored that there are critical gaps in our
collection and analysis. Some Russian military exercise have
caught us by surprise, and our textured feel for Russian
involvement on the ground in Ukraine has been quite limited.
Earlier indications and warning and the ability to better
understand Moscow's thinking and intent are absolutely critical
for avoiding future surprise and miscalculation, for deterring
effectively, and for preparing to respond, if required. Getting
this right requires more ISR, high-power analytical support,
and appropriate intelligence-sharing with allies and partners.
The same holds true for effectively waging counterterrorism and
counter-ISIL operations in and through the European theater. A
small investment in this capability could lead to a large
return in our understanding of the complex challenges we face.
Third and finally is sufficient future resourcing. In the
near term, EUCOM's particular request for your support for a
European Reassurance Initiative for fiscal year 2016 is
important. Your support for ERI in 2015 demonstrated commitment
to our allies, increased our ability to shape the European
theater, and allowed EUCOM to build and sustain the capacity of
our allies and partners. The request for ERI in fiscal year16
builds on this initiative. Key components include maintaining
air superiority presence, participating in NATO exercises,
supporting the rotational presence of an armored brigade combat
team, pre-positioning equipment, funding the Global Response
Force exercises, and fostering SACEUR engagement with partners,
and increasing Guard and Reserve participation across the
field.
We understand these reassurance measures come at a cost,
and in the current budget environment, additional cost means
making tough decisions. As a result of previous constraints,
our EUCOM readiness has already assumed greater risk.
Specifically, our deployment timelines are longer, our
preparations are less robust, and our fundamental ability to
deter and defeat in a timely and effective manner is less sure
than it was a decade ago. As Secretary Carter testified
recently, further reductions would damage our National security
and have a direct and lasting impact on our ability to protect
and defend the Nation in and from the European theater.
Meanwhile, the security challenges in and around Europe are
growing sharper and more complicated. Your support for EUCOM's
mission and your tireless efforts to chart a long-term path
toward resourcing a strong national defense are critical steps
to ensuring the enduring ability of EUCOM and DOD to protect
and defend this great Nation.
From the dedicated men and women serving in our European
theater, thank you. Thank you for your time and your attention.
And I now look forward to taking your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Breedlove follows:]

Prepared Statement by Gen. Philip Breedlove, USAF
i. introduction
It is an honor for me to lead the soldiers, sailors, airmen,
marines, and civilians of the U.S. European Command (EUCOM). Those
assigned and deployed from the European theater sent into harm's way,
in Afghanistan and elsewhere, are particularly within the thoughts of
the command. I want to thank this committee for all of the support it
has offered them.
EUCOM has experienced dramatic changes in the security situation on
the European continent over the last 12 months, forming a new European
security environment. These changes have significant ramifications for
U.S. national security interests and those of our European allies and
partners. As a result, we are assessing the threat to U.S. and North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies in the theater and beyond.
Even as we continue to lean forward with our NATO allies and partners
in response to the conditions in this new environment, fully addressing
these growing challenges and their long-term implications requires a
reformulation of the U.S. strategic calculus and corresponding
resourcing levied towards Europe.
In the statement I submitted to this committee last year, I
described in detail how important our NATO allies and non-NATO partners
in Europe are to American safety and security--their importance is even
greater today. EUCOM must be able to assure, deter, and defend against
Russian aggression; support ongoing and future contingency operations;
counter transnational threats; and help build our partners' capability
to help us accomplish these missions, thereby enhancing regional and
global security.
Our many shared values, interests, and economic interdependence
with Europe provides unique opportunities and assets for collective
security as well as global security cooperation. The United States
depends on our willing and capable allies and partners throughout
Europe to work with us to fully defend our national security interests
and to respond to crises around the world. Time and again, our allies
and partners in Europe have proven essential to U.S. military
operations by allowing us access, including bases, transit, and
overflight rights for U.S. forces as well as providing enhanced
legitimacy and operational capability through the participation of ally
and partner nation military forces in undertakings in Europe, around
Europe and often far from Europe.
Maintaining our strategic alliance with Europe is vital to
maintaining U.S. national security and is not to be taken for granted.
We must reassure our European allies and partners through the United
States' commitment to NATO and the credibility of that commitment
fundamentally rests upon the capabilities, readiness, and
responsiveness of U.S. military personnel stationed in Europe. The
forces assigned to EUCOM are the United States' preeminent forward
deployed force and fulfill the United States' primary treaty obligation
to NATO. Our permanent presence also allows us to maximize the military
capabilities of our allies. Permanently stationed forces are a force
multiplier that rotational deployments can never match. EUCOM must be a
stabilizing force on multiple fronts. Nations on Europe's Southern
flank are concerned the focus on Eastern Europe may draw attention and
resources away from their region, allowing for an unmonitored flow of
foreign fighters, economic and political refugees, and unchecked
illicit trafficking of goods and humans from an arc of instability
stretching across large parts of northern Africa through the Middle
East. In the Levant, persistent threats from other countries and non-
state actors drives continued security concerns in Israel.
Multiple ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and Africa also
require EUCOM to use its limited resources to support missions
occurring in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and U.S. Africa Command
(AFRICOM) areas of responsibility. EUCOM works closely with our
bordering Combatant Commands to ensure there are no seams as we address
issues crossing geographic boundaries, supporting CENTCOM and AFRICOM
operations to protect U.S. national interests. Each of these security
situations reinforces the importance of EUCOM and NATO to our long-term
vital national security interests.
After years of force structure and other personnel reductions,
fewer than 65,000 U.S. military personnel remain permanently stationed
in Europe to secure and advance U.S. national interests from Greenland
to Azerbaijan and from the Arctic to Israel. The size of our military
presence forces difficult decisions daily on how to best use the
limited resources we have to assure, stabilize, and support. I ask you
for your support and favorable consideration of the U.S. role in
addressing the new European security environment and helping me set the
theater. As the Commander of EUCOM, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers
Europe (SHAPE) and Allied Command Operations for NATO, I support the
goal of a Europe that is whole, free, at peace, and prosperous. It is
with this in mind that I consider Europe's current security situation.
ii. assessing the threat
As mentioned, EUCOM is working within the framework of a new
European security environment, focused on countering three primary
security threats: Russian aggression in the East, foreign fighter flow
between Europe and the Levant, and transnational threats stemming from
North Africa.
A. Eastern Flank: Russia and Periphery
For almost 2 decades, the United States and Europe have engaged
with Russia as a partner, seeking to build relationships militarily,
economically, and culturally. In 1994, Russia became a Partnership for
Peace member with NATO. That same year, Russia, the United States, and
the United Kingdom signed the Budapest Memorandum, reaffirming
commitments made by all parties under the Helsinki Final Act and the UN
Charter to ``respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing
borders of Ukraine.'' Under the 1997 Founding Act, NATO made a
political commitment that, ``in the current and foreseeable security
environment,'' the Alliance would carry out its collective defense and
other missions without ``additional permanent stationing of substantial
combat forces.'' In 2009, the United States sought to ``reset'' its
relationship with Russia, which had been damaged by the 2008 Russian
invasion of the Republic of Georgia. During this period, the Department
of Defense made security and force posture determinations significantly
reducing European force structure based on the assumption that Russia
was a partner.
Despite these and many other U.S. and European overtures of
partnership, Russia has continued to view its own security from a zero-
sum point of view. Since the beginning of 2014, President Putin's
Russia has abandoned all pretense of participating in a collaborative
security process with its European neighbors and the international
community. Instead, Russia has employed ``hybrid warfare'' (which
includes regular, irregular, and cyber forms of war as well as
political and economic intimidations) to illegally seize Crimea, foment
separatist fever in several sovereign nations, and maintain frozen
conflicts within its so-called ``sphere of influence'' or ``near
abroad.'' Undergirding all of these direct approaches is the pervasive
presence of the Russia propaganda machine, which inserts itself into
media outlets globally and attempts to exploit potential sympathetic or
aggrieved populations.
Russia uses energy as a tool of coercion. Many former-Soviet bloc
and Eastern and Central European states have long been concerned about
Russia's intentions in Europe and they consider the Ukraine crisis the
latest validation of their concerns. Recent Ukrainian and Russian
energy negotiations show how Russian coercion threatens broader
European cooperation as individual countries must weigh their own
security and economic concerns. Russia's coercion using energy has
grown along with Russia's threats and outright use of force.
As a result, there are growing security concerns among Central and
Eastern European countries that are members of NATO and the European
Union or are seeking closer ties with the trans-Atlantic community.
Having already experienced the use of Russian military force in the
1990s and in 2008, Georgia is especially threatened by Russian
occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Baltic States have
demonstrated their concern by increasing military interaction with U.S.
and NATO forces, which has resulted in more U.S. and allied forces in
NATO's Baltic Air Policing mission and the deployment of U.S.
rotational ground forces to the Baltics and Poland to foster
interoperability through training and exercises. U.S. Special
Operations Forces training events were also initiated throughout the
Baltics and Eastern Europe at the request of the host nations. We must
continue to work with NATO to provide enduring support to the security
of our allies and partners in this area.
Russia views Ukraine as part of its sphere of influence, regardless
of the views of the Ukrainian people. While Russia's aggressive actions
in Ukraine are the most current manifestation in a pattern of
continuing behavior to coerce its neighbors in Central and Eastern
Europe. Beyond its actions in Georgia and Ukraine, other examples of
this pattern are suspending participation in the Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe Treaties; the ZAPAD 2013 snap exercise along the
borders of the Baltics and Poland; intercepts of U.S. aircraft and
shadowing of U.S. ships in international airspace and waters; basing
Russian fighter aircraft in Belarus; threats to deploy nuclear-capable
Iskander-M missiles in Kaliningrad; and pressure on former Soviet
states through the manipulation of prolonged, ``frozen'' conflicts.
B. Eastern Flank: Vulnerability of NATO Partnership for Peace Countries
As U.S. partners, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine face a different
security challenge from Russia than that facing NATO allies. All three
countries have implemented political and economic reforms to advance
democracy and integrate with Europe; however, their ability to make
further progress is significantly constrained by Russian interference
and pressure. Russia occupies portions of their territory with its
military forces, wields economic leverage and energy dependence as
coercive instruments, exploits minority Russian populations to serve
its interests, interferes in democratic processes, engages in bribery
and coercion of government officials, and generates a constant
propaganda deluge.
Even as these three countries face severe threats to their
sovereignty and territorial integrity, they continue to make meaningful
contributions to international security. Since 2010, Georgia has
rotated 14 battalions to Afghanistan in support of the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and 3 additional battalions in support
of the Resolute Support mission, and is currently the second largest
contributor after the United States. Ukraine has been the largest
provider of vertical lift capability to U.N. peacekeeping operations
around the world and has also contributed troops and resources to ISAF,
NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR), and NATO's maritime operations, and Moldova
contributes a platoon to KFOR.
In addition to conducting expeditionary operations and while having
differing objectives regarding the scope of their integration with
NATO, all three countries strive to develop military forces meeting
NATO standards and interoperability requirements; however, their
efforts face a number of challenges, as all three countries require
deep institutional reforms to efficiently generate, organize, equip,
and sustain their armed forces. They must also continue and accelerate
their transition from Soviet-era systems to modern, NATO-interoperable
systems and equipment. These countries have severely limited resources
available to address these requirements. Thus, U.S. security assistance
to train, advise, and equip the national security forces of Georgia,
Ukraine, and Moldova is absolutely essential.
Recent Russian activities are forcing our partners to reevaluate
their strategic requirements, including reassessing the relative
importance of their ability to contribute toward NATO or U.N.
operations. These countries must balance the national responsibility of
their armed forces to defend their own sovereignty and territorial
integrity with that of contributing to regional and global security
beyond their borders. For many years, a partner's contribution to
regional security was measured, at least in part, by its force
contribution to international peacekeeping missions. Now that these
nations face an even more aggressive Russia, their ability to protect
their own borders and enforce their own sovereignty is understandably
more urgent than acting as a force provider for peacekeeping missions
abroad.
C. Eastern Flank: Russian Use of Frozen Conflicts as a Foreign Policy
Tool
Describing the prolonged conflicts in states around the Russian
periphery as ``frozen'' belies the fact that these are ongoing and
deadly affairs. In Georgia, there are conflicts in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. A clear purpose behind Russia's invasion of Georgia and its
continued occupation of Georgian territory is to prevent Tbilisi from
pursuing its rightful and legitimate intentions to become a full member
of the European and transatlantic communities. Toward that end, Russia
has signed a ``treaty'' with Abkhazia and is pushing for another with
South Ossetia to increase its influence while hampering Georgia's Euro-
Atlantic integration In Moldova, Russian forces have conducted supposed
``stability operations'' since 1992 to contain the conflict in
Transnistria. In fact, Russia deliberately and actively perpetuates
these conflicts by manipulating its support to the participants, while
engaging in international diplomatic resolution efforts only to the
extent necessary to prevent the resumption of all-out violence.
Russia uses these conflicts to maintain its influence and deny
these states' ability to make their own foreign and security policy
choices and chart their own futures. Those pretending to lead these
Russian-created quasi-states rely on Russia to maintain the status quo
and therefore, cannot stray far from Russia's preferences. These
unresolved disputes may not represent active war, but impede the
democratic development of the concerned states. Just as the oppressed
nations of the Warsaw Pact served as strategic buffers to the Soviet
Union, so the current arc of frozen conflicts is part of a security
buffer for a modern, paranoid Russia. This fits into a greater ``buffer
policy'' sought by Russia, complemented by other dubious--yet
aggressive--claims, such as its militarization of the Arctic and its
military exercises on the Kuril Islands over its dispute with Japan.
D. Western Balkans: Challenges and Unresolved Issues
Significant challenges to peace and prosperity with the Western
Balkans persist. EUCOM engages in a number of cooperative endeavors
that provide an area of common interest, building confidence and good
relations between former warring factions to reduce the likelihood of
renewed fighting in the region. The Balkans Medical Task Force is one
specific example of how EUCOM helps foster such cooperation by
assisting the Balkan states in building a regional, deployable
humanitarian assistance and disaster response capability.
E. Southern Flank: Turkey as a Lynchpin to Security in the Black Sea
Persistent instability in the Levant and beyond remains a top U.S.
and European national security concern and threatens U.S. interests
throughout Europe and the Homeland. The Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL) controls territory just across NATO's southern border and
it actively recruits and trains foreign fighters destined to return to
their countries of origin. Extremist actors, exemplified by ISIL, have
an inordinate impact on Europe's periphery. The Syrian crisis is
destabilizing the entire region, and the regional repercussions are
likely to persist for years to come. Israel faces a more complex
environment, complicating their political and military calculus and
their need for U.S. support.
Turkey is in the unenviable position of having to hold NATO's
Southern Flank. Turkey, and important NATO ally, is understandably very
concerned by the ongoing crises in Syria and Iraq, which are generating
significant security, political, economic, and humanitarian challenges
across the region. These challenges include the influx of refugees and
foreign terrorist fighters, and increased terrorist activity. EUCOM
continues to work with Turkey and CENTCOM to address these multiple
threats.
Finally the flow of returning foreign terrorist fighters to Europe
and the United States in both the near- and mid-term poses a
significant risk, including to our forward based forces in Europe.
Foreign terrorist fighters are active in multiple conflict zones,
gaining experience and contacts that could lead them to conduct
terrorist attacks after returning home. Actively encouraged by ISIL,
returned foreign fighters are mounting so-called ``lone wolf'' attacks.
This problem will grow in scope as the flow of returning individuals
increases over time.
F. Southern Flank: Instability in the Middle East and North Africa
Region
The security environment on Europe's Southern Flank, broadly
defined as the Middle East and North Africa, is likely to remain
unstable and likely grow more complex for the next decade or longer.
This environment is characterized by political chaos; ethnic, tribal,
and religious tensions; pervasive corruption; and weak security
institutions. These factors have created conditions that allow illicit
trafficking, to include the smuggling of narcotics, humans, and weapons
into Southern Europe and beyond. Transnational criminal organizations
continue to take hold and further destabilize the region, posing a
growing economic and security risk to countries on Europe's Southern
Flank. The threat of highly contagious diseases spreading through
unmonitored personnel movements and illicit trafficking channels, such
as the Ebola virus, represent another potential threat.
The countries of southern Europe are currently facing massive
migration flows from Northern Africa. In August 2012, Greece began an
operation to curb and tackle illegal migration into its country. In
October 2013, Italy began a similar operation to patrol the Strait of
Sicily and the southern Mediterranean following the death of more than
350 African refugees off the Italian island of Lampedusa. Since its
start, Italy has intercepted or rescued more than 100,000 illegal
migrants while 3,000 have drowned in the Mediterranean Sea. Dealing
with illegal migration adds to the burdens of Allied Navies,
particularly Italy's, and pulls them from other missions. Due to
concerns raised by European countries along the Mediterranean Sea,
FRONTEX launched Operation Orion Triton in October 2014 to help nations
cope with the illegal migration crossings from North Africa and the
Middle East. Although most European countries do not perceive the
ongoing situation in North Africa as a direct threat to their national
security, the majority views the increased illegal migration flow as a
serious economic and humanitarian problem. EUCOM continues to work with
our allies on this issue.
Continued tensions between Israel and the Hamas-led Government in
Gaza resulted in open warfare beginning in June 2014 leading Israel to
launch Operation Protective Edge. Scores of infiltration tunnels were
found and between June and September 2014 over 2,500 rockets were
launched from Gaza into Israel. Fortunately, the Iron Dome system
effectively neutralized many of these rockets. EUCOM monitors the
situation between Israel and Hamas closely, consulting with Israel and
providing logistical support.
G. Arctic Region
The Arctic region is a growing strategic area of concern from both
an environmental, resource, and security perspective. Environmentally,
changing climate conditions will allow the Northern Sea Route and
Northwest Passage to open for longer periods each year, meaning greater
access to the Arctic. Less ice coverage will lead to increased shipping
traffic and attract more industry and tourism. From a resource
perspective, we seek to work cooperatively to ensure exploration and
extraction does not lead to conflict. From a security perspective,
Russia's behavior in the Arctic is increasingly troubling. Their
increase in stationing military forces, building and reopening bases,
and creating an Arctic military district to counter an imagined threat
to their internationally undisputed territories does not fit the
direction or interests of the seven other Arctic nations. Despite
Russia's increasing militarization of the Arctic, EUCOM continues to
work with our Arctic public and private partners to create a secure and
stable region. This is critical to safeguarding U.S. national
interests, insuring the U.S. Homeland is protected, and for nations
working cooperatively to address challenges through our sponsorship of
the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable and combined Arctic specific
exercises like Arctic Zephyr.
iii. reassuring our allies and deterring russian aggression
A. Operation Atlantic Resolve
Operation Atlantic Resolve uses U.S. access and strategic reach to
develop a unified response to revanchist Russia. EUCOM continues to
take positive steps to reassure our allies along NATO's eastern flank
and to deter potential Russian aggression against our NATO allies and
partners. Since the beginning of Russia's intervention in Ukraine,
EUCOM's strategy has continued to evolve and demonstrates the
commitment of the United States to NATO's overarching principle of
collective defense. The cornerstone of EUCOM's strategy is physical
presence. Coupled with our visible commitment to maintain capabilities,
readiness, responsiveness, and our strategic level messaging, our
presence demonstrates, to friend and foe alike, our absolute commitment
to the sovereignty and security of every Ally.
The credibility and effectiveness of our response to Russian
aggression in the east and growing threats in Southern Europe depend
not only on the operational scale and geographic scope of our
operations, but also their persistence and longevity. A temporary surge
in rotational presence, for example, will not have lasting effect
unless it is followed by the development and fielding of credible and
persistent deterrent capabilities. Forward deployed air, land, and sea
capabilities permits the United States to respond within hours versus
days as crises emerge. We must follow our near-term measures with
medium-term efforts to adapt the capabilities and posture of United
States, NATO, allies, and partners to meeting these new challenges. We
must accelerate this adaptation because we now face urgent threats
instead of the peacetime environment previously anticipated. NATO and
our European allies have recognized the absolute requirement to
effectively counter Russian coercive pressure in the east as well as
urgent threats in the south.
NATO has adopted the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) designed to meet
quickly emerging threats emanating from both NATO's eastern and
southern flanks. The RAP features forces that can deploy in days--not
weeks, an improved command and control capability (including forward
headquarters), and the regular presence of NATO rotational forces in
Eastern Europe for exercises and training. U.S. support to the RAP will
be essential to its long-term success. Our European allies have already
offered to serve as primary contributors of land forces to the
envisioned Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), but U.S.
participation with key enablers is critical to Alliance cohesion and
capability. EUCOM is also responsible for implementing other key
aspects of our support to the RAP, such as maintaining continuous
presence in the East, enhancing the capabilities of Multinational Corps
North East, and the establishment of a NATO command and control
presence on the territories of eastern allies.
1. The Baltics and Poland
As a response to events in Ukraine, EUCOM augmented scheduled
multinational and joint exercises and deployments to provide a near-
continuous air, land, and sea presence in the Baltic States and Poland,
assuring them of the U.S. commitment to NATO. The intent of our actions
is to demonstrate the ability and resolve to act together as an
Alliance in the face of the challenges from Russia, while avoiding
escalation. Our continuous presence and engagement activities in the
Baltics and Poland fall under the umbrella of Operation Atlantic
Resolve.
U.S. rotational force to the Baltics began on March 6, 2014, when
the United States deployed an additional six F-15Cs to augment the four
already in Lithuania, fulfilling a NATO Baltic Air Policing peacetime
requirement to have quick reaction interceptor aircraft ``ramp-ready.''
Poland took over the Baltic Air Policing mission on May 1, 2014 with
augmentation from the United Kingdom, Denmark, and France. Polish and
British aircraft operated from Siauliai Air Base in Lithuania, Danish
aircraft from Amari Air Base in Estonia, and French aircraft from
Malbork Air Base in Poland. This pattern of enhanced Baltic Air
Policing continues with 4-month rotations. Simultaneously, the United
States established a persistent flight training deployment in Poland,
consisting of either fighter or transport aircraft. These deployments
continue to be a method to increase allied force interoperability as
well as provide assurance to Poland and other regional allies. Also,
beginning in March 2014, U.S. Air Forces Europe (USAFE) began providing
air-to-air refueling support to NATO AWACS aircraft conducting
operations along NATO's eastern flank.
At the end of April 2014, the U.S. Army's 173rd Infantry Brigade
Combat Team (Airborne) quickly deployed company-sized contingents of
U.S. paratroopers to Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to begin
expanding land forces training. These deployments established a
persistent U.S. military presence in these countries and demonstrated
U.S. assurance and a commitment to Article 5. These exercises, which
came at the request of the host nations, work to improve
interoperability through small unit and leader training. In October,
the 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (1/1 CD) out of Fort Hood, TX,
conducted a Relief in Place (RIP) with units of the 173d in the Baltic
States and Poland. Since assuming the mission from the 173d, 1/1 CD has
participated in exercises, such as Playground and Iron Sword. Most
recently, soldiers from the 2nd Cavalry Regiment stationed in Germany
have deployed to the Baltics and Poland, continuing our persistent
reassurance to our NATO allies. Additionally, USAFE elements deployed
to Poland to conduct bi-lateral training with the Polish Air Force and
rotations will continue through 2015.
In 2014, beyond previously scheduled exercises, U.S. Special
Operations Forces expanded the number and frequency of Joint Combined
Exchange Training (JCET) events in the Baltic States and Poland.
Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) has maintained a near
continuous presence in the Baltic States and Poland from June 2014 to
the present. These training deployments have proven invaluable for our
special forces, with indirect benefits for their Allied counterparts.
Additionally, EUCOM forces conducted 67 other significant military-to-
military engagements with the Baltic States and Poland from April to
October 2014.
2. Romania and Bulgaria
Romania and Bulgaria continue to be steadfast U.S. allies. Access
to training areas and transit locations in these nations provide a
basis to send a strong signal to Russia, while forging stronger
bilateral working partnerships. Romania remains a key ally, offering
tremendous support to ISAF's retrograde from Afghanistan and the
Resolute Support Mission by allowing U.S. and NATO forces use of its
base in Mihail Kogalniceanu (MK). MK is a key node for multi-modal
operations and an ideal example of the bilateral cooperation and
strategic access forward deployed forces in the European theater
provides.
Romania has offered to host a new Multinational Division
Headquarters. Bulgaria has committed to play a greater role in NATO and
European defense by 2020, and made contributions to our efforts in
Afghanistan. These offers demonstrate Romanian and Bulgarian resolve to
be key allies in deterring Russian aggression and building a stronger
eastern flank. In Romania, Bulgaria, and Georgia, the Marine Corps'
Black Sea Rotational Force provides EUCOM with a limited land-based and
contingency response force in the Region, while additional rotational
forces from the U.S. Army will come into Romania and Bulgaria this
summer.
Romania's cooperation on such areas as missile defense, the
Resolute Support Mission, and Afghanistan retrograde, and Bulgaria's
work to expand Alliance and bilateral use of the Novo Selo Training
area, are positive contributions to regional and Alliance Security.
3. Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine
Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine continue to offer significant
opportunities for cooperation, furthering both regional security, and
in some cases, acting as willing and capable partners in coalition
operations. In Georgia, NATO and the United States have long invested
in improving defensive capabilities, continuing multinational exercises
that contribute towards both enhanced capability and deterrence efforts
in the region. In Ukraine, we have increased our security assistance in
response to the crisis, committing over $118 million in 2014 to help
Ukrainian forces better monitor and secure their borders and operate
more safely and effectively, and preserve Ukraine's territorial
integrity. We also continue to conduct planned exercises such as Rapid
Trident to increase interoperability among Ukraine, U.S., NATO and
Partnership for Peace member nations. The most recent Rapid Trident
iteration in September 2014 consisted of multinational battalion-level
field training exercise and saw the participation of 15 countries with
approximately 1,300 personnel. An upcoming train and equip program for
its security forces demonstrates U.S. resolve towards increasing
Ukrainian capacity to provide for its internal and territorial defense.
Despite increasing Russian presence in the region, EUCOM has
increased U.S. maritime presence in the Black Sea through Passing
Exercises (PASSEXes) and other bilateral and multinational exercises.
Since April 2014, U.S. Naval Forces Europe (NAVEUR) has maintained a
monthly periodic presence in the Black Sea, and led the Baltics
Operations exercise in the Black Sea with numerous Allied and partner
nations. Despite Russia's increased and aggressive posture in the
region, NAVEUR also conducted exercise Sea Breeze in September 2014
with multinational support from Turkey, Romania, and Georgia. Active
discussions are underway for next year's iteration of Sea Breeze, which
will continue our engagement with the Ukrainian Navy and other Black
Sea maritime partners.
B. European Reassurance Initiative
I would like to thank this committee for supporting the European
Reassurance Initiative (ERI). Your support directly enables EUCOM's
ability to strengthen its posture along NATO's eastern flank in order
to demonstrate commitment to our NATO allies, and deter further Russian
aggression. The ERI will provide temporary support to bolster the
security of NATO allies and partner states in Europe, enable
adjustments to U.S. defense posture along NATO's eastern flank, and
maintain momentum in conducting operations to demonstrate our
commitment to our European Allies and partners. ERI funds will enable
the development of infrastructure at key locations in the east to
support exercise and training activities for both the United States and
NATO, as well as support contingency operations. Additionally, ERI will
fund improvements to airfields in Eastern and Central Europe along with
improvements at training ranges and operations centers. Finally, our
plan also includes enhancing available prepositioning, focused on the
addition of a rotational Armored Brigade Combat Team set and related
assets into several NATO Member nations.
C. Building Partnership Capacities (BPC)
Congressional support over the past several years enabled EUCOM to
accelerate and expand efforts to build capacity of Eastern European
allies and partners to contribute to operations in Afghanistan. With
U.S. training and equipment, these countries made substantial strides
in developing NATO-interoperable capabilities to conduct special
operations, intelligence analysis and exploitation, counter improvised
explosive devices, coordinate close air support, and maneuver in
combat. They brought these capabilities to bear in support of ISAF,
further developing their interoperability and gaining experience on the
battlefield in Afghanistan now in support of NATO's Resolute Support
mission in Afghanistan.
Even prior to the recent events in Ukraine, EUCOM was examining
ways to preserve interoperability gains and expeditionary capability
following ISAF. EUCOM launched our first ``post-ISAF'' program in 2014,
implementing the Secretary of Defense's 2012 decision to reinvigorate
U.S. land forces participation in the NATO Response Force (NRF). The
1st Armor Brigade Combat Team, 1st Calvary Division (1/1 CD ABCT),
based in Fort Hood, TX, began its 12-month mission as the U.S.
contribution to NRF in January 2014. In May 2014, the Brigade deployed
2nd Battalion, 5th Calvary Regiment (2-5 CAV) to Germany to exercise
with our allies and partners. While here, 2-5 CAV conducted Exercise
Combined Resolve II at the U.S. Army Europe's (USAEUR) Joint
Multinational Training Command, which trained 1,451 personnel from 13
countries and helped to enhance NRF interoperability and readiness.
The end of ISAF and the events in Ukraine require the United States
to shift the focus of our foreign military training and equipping
programs preparing allies and partners for deployment to Afghanistan,
to restoring and/or building ally and partner nation capability to
address the challenges of hybrid warfare and to territorial defense.
However, the BPC authorities and funding available to EUCOM to equip
and train foreign military forces are largely limited to preparing
forces for counterterrorism and deployment to Afghanistan. EUCOM needs
continued assistance from Congress to provide adequate funding under
existing authorities, to build partner capacity and address the complex
challenges of the new European security environment.
For example, section 2282 and other authorities have been
invaluable in providing allies and partners with the equipment needed
to deploy to Afghanistan. Much of this equipment--such as night vision
goggles; communications; counter-improvised explosive devices; and
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems--is
equally relevant to joint combined arms warfare. With the end of ISAF,
our allies and partners are bringing much of this equipment home. To
ensure the capabilities we have helped build are enduring and available
to meet the urgent challenges we now face, the United States needs to
be prepared to assist these countries, as appropriate, with sustainment
of U.S.-provided systems. The only U.S. Government program with this
ability is Foreign Military Financing (FMF), which has been reduced for
the EUCOM AOR (not including Israel) by more than 50 percent since
fiscal year 2010. Congressional support for an increase in FMF for the
Europe and Eurasian region would greatly assist in helping to address
this sustainment challenge. Additionally, to facilitate and enable our
allies and partners to preserve capabilities, there is a need for
authorities that allow for multilateral Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to
support NATO Smart Defense and pooling and sharing initiatives. The
United States benefits from a Europe that is whole, free, at peace, and
prosperous. Building allied and partner capability to provide for their
own national defense, as well as to deploy in support of global
stability and security, will sustain these substantial benefits for the
United States.
iv. stabilizing the middle east and north africa
A. U.S. Support to Israel
Israel has witnessed a deterioration of security along its borders
over the last several years. Spillover from the Syrian civil war,
continued threats from Hezbollah rockets, and ISIL pose a threat to the
stability of Israel and the entire region. ISIL has especially used
violence in an attempt to impose their self-proclaimed religious
authority and political control over the Middle East. Given this
situation, it is feasible that, with limited warning, war could erupt
from multiple directions within the Levant with grave implications to
Israeli security, regional stability, and U.S. security interests.
EUCOM primarily engages with Israel through our Strategic
Cooperative Initiative Program and numerous annual military-to-military
engagement activities. These engagements strengthen both nations'
enduring ties and military activities. EUCOM chairs four bilateral and
semiannual conferences with Israel. These conferences address planning,
logistics, exercises and interoperability. EUCOM also supports the
Joint Staff's bilateral engagements, including meetings at the highest
levels within the Department of Defense. The U.S.-Israel exercise
portfolio includes five major recurring exercises and as a result of
continued engagement, U.S.-Israeli military and intelligence
cooperation relationships have never been closer or our joint exercises
more robust. Through these engagements, our leaders and staff maintain
uniquely strong, frequent, personal, and direct relationships with
their Israeli Defense Force counterparts.
EUCOM diligently works to strengthen our relationship with Israel,
which includes $3.1 billion in annual FMF, support for Israel's
layered-missile defense program--including the Iron Dome and David's
Sling systems, and the approval to release advanced military
capabilities, including the F-35 and the V-22 aircraft. Finally, EUCOM
works closely with CENTCOM to keep abreast of all emerging threats that
may cross into EUCOM's AOR.
B. Countering Threats along the Southeastern Flank
In August 2014, the U.S. Departments of Defense and State, in close
consultation with the Government of Iraq, formed a task force to
bolster the resupply of lethal aid to Kurdish Peshmerga security forces
in northern Iraq. EUCOM has supported CENTCOM by facilitating the
integration of European forces and efforts into the larger CENTCOM
coalition. EUCOM led the European resupply effort by soliciting,
coordinating, and transferring donated arms, ammunition, and material
from a multitude of European allies and partners. By early October
2014, over 2 million pounds of donated lethal aid had been delivered to
the Kurdish Regional Government via 45 airlift missions to Iraq. The
vast majority of these donations and a significant portion of the
aircraft were provided by European nations under the direction of
EUCOM. These efforts are expected to last through 2015.
EUCOM has also led numerous interactions between U.S. interagency
partners, the Custom and Border Protection Agency, and the Drug
Enforcement Administration. These actions have focused on countering
transnational threats, including trafficking of persons and illicit
substances, as well as prosecution actions to build partner capacity.
EUCOM works in conjunction with the Department of State to monitor and
thwart the flow of foreign fighters going to and from Syria and the
Levant, dismantle extremist facilitation networks, and build partner
nation capacity to counter the flow of foreign fighters on their own.
v. supporting other combatant commands and contingencies
A. Resolute Support: Enabling the NATO mission to Afghanistan
U.S. and NATO forces completed Afghan combat operations in December
2014. On 1 January 2015, ISAF transitioned to the Resolute Support
Mission. Our European allies and partners have borne and will continue
to bear the burden of providing the bulk of forces, second only to the
United States.
As we conduct the Resolute Support Mission, EUCOM will continue to
help prepare our allies and partners for deployments to support the
train, advise, and assist mission, all the while maintaining maximum
readiness to protect the force and to conduct full-spectrum operations,
as required. Authorities to include allowing EUCOM to provide
operational logistics, lift and sustain support for allies and partners
in Afghanistan, and section 1202 have been invaluable in providing our
Allies and partners with logistical support in the form of inter-
theater lift, sustainment, and equipment loans. On the training side,
the Coalition Readiness Support Program enables us to provide crucial
pre-deployment training to prepare 12 of our Ally and partner nations
for the missions they will support during the Resolute Support Mission.
Section 1206 was absolutely vital in fiscal year 2014, and previous
years, to procure the equipment needed to fill critical shortfalls for
nine of our Allied nations. This much needed equipment includes
interoperable communications gear, counter-IED and explosive ordinance
disposal equipment, medical equipment, and night vision devices.
B. Operation Inherent Resolve: Supporting military intervention against
ISIL
The United States is considering options for enabling moderate
Syrian opposition and EUCOM is in support of CENTCOM on this planning
effort and continues to assist in developing options. Operation
Inherent Resolve is intended to reflect the unwavering resolve and deep
commitment of the United States and partner nations in the region and
around the globe to eliminate the terrorist group ISIL and the threat
they pose to Iraq, the region, and the wider international community.
It also symbolized the willingness and dedication of coalition members
to work closely with our allies and partners to apply all available
dimensions of national power necessary--diplomatic, informational,
military, economic--to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL.
C. Operation United Assistance: Fighting Ebola in Africa
EUCOM has worked in support of AFRICOM's efforts to stop the spread
of Ebola from epidemic plagued countries in Africa, providing intra-
theater lift, equipment, and personnel through and from the EUCOM AOR
through established basing and access. EUCOM has proactively and
aggressively engaged a number of European nations to secure permissions
for U.S. Forces to use facilities and infrastructure for DOD-directed
21-day controlled monitoring in Europe and to relay the protocols
necessary to prevent the inadvertent transmission of the Ebola disease
onto the European continent. Furthermore, EUCOM has worked closely with
various U.S. Embassies and other Combatant Command personnel to help
shape the development of host nation permission requirements, while
identifying and allying European fears via robust information and
intelligence sharing efforts.
D. Protection of U.S. Embassies and Facilities in North Africa and the
Middle East
EUCOM continues to posture both land and air forces for quick
reactions to volatile environments in North Africa and the Middle East.
Forces, such as the Special-Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force-Crisis
Response-Africa (SPMAGTF) currently located in Spain, Italy, and
Romania provides a crisis response force of 1,550 marines. Aircraft
stationed in Germany, Italy, and elsewhere in Europe are on high alert
to react to crises as needed. EUCOM supports this mission through its
strategically located facilities and access agreements within Europe.
The protection mission is vital, albeit costly, as a large number of
embassies and consulates are at risk on the Africa continent and
AFRICOM has no bases in Africa that can support forces assigned to the
mission.
vi. setting the theater
EUCOM needs sufficient resources to maintain readiness, execute
assigned missions, and build capability and capacity of our allies and
partners to defend themselves and bolster regional security.
A. U.S. Defense Posture
1. Forces
Overall reductions in the Department of Defense's budget have meant
the reduction of force posture in Europe. Nevertheless, in light of
recent, significant changes to the European strategic environment, it
is my judgment we must immediately halt any additional reductions to
the number of assigned forces in Europe. At the height of the Cold War,
there were more than 450,000 uniformed personnel stationed across the
European Theater. Today there are fewer than 65,000 permanent military
personnel stationed throughout the EUCOM AOR, of which 55,000 are in
direct support of EUCOM missions, and 9,000 support the missions of
other organizations, such as AFRICOM, TRANSCOM, NATO, and others. The
EUCOM assigned forces are tasked with the same deterrent and
reassurance missions we have performed for the past several decades. It
is important to understand the critical roles these forces play in this
theater before the Services recommend further reducing the current
force posture in Europe.
On any given day, forces throughout Europe are engaged in a variety
of activities and missions to include: (1) Training of our forces in
order to be ready, if called upon, to conduct full spectrum military
operations; (2) Assuring our allies of our commitment to collective
defense; (3) Training and collaborating with our NATO allies and
partners to maintain interoperability; and (4) Working with our allies
and partners to effectively prepare for and support humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief operations.
In addition to my responsibilities as a warfighting commander, I
also often serve in the role of a supporting commander. EUCOM forces
are ready to support the needs and missions of four other geographic
combatant commanders, three functional combatant commanders, and
numerous Defense agencies, including the ability to appropriately base
and provide logistics support functions to forces assigned to
operations in the AFRICOM and CENTCOM areas of responsibility.
Some have suggested we can mitigate the impact felt from a
reduction in assigned forces through the augmentation of rotational
forces from the United States. Rotational forces from the continental
United States to Europe cannot completely fulfill strategic roles. The
temporary presence of rotational forces may complement, but does not
substitute for an enduring forward deployed presence that is tangible
and real. Rotational forces also have an impact on our relationships
with various host nations we will count on to enable operations; we
might over reach to assume host nations will readily accept our new
readiness construct. As I have said previously, virtual presence means
actual absence. The constant presence of U.S. forces in Europe since
World War II has enabled the United States to enjoy the relatively free
access we have come to count on--and require--in times of crisis.
Further reductions of both infrastructure and forces will reduce our
access to key strategic locations during times of crisis.
2. Footprint
a. European Infrastructure Consolidation (EIC)

Since the end of the Cold War, EUCOM has reduced its footprint in
Europe to less than 25 percent of the total controlled, European real
estate inventory once held by the United States. Our current network of
U.S.-controlled bases throughout Europe provides for superb training
and enables power projection in support of steady-state and contingency
operations. As EUCOM begins to implement the Secretary of Defense's
direction on EIC, the Department must focus to ensure remaining
infrastructure properly supports operational requirements and strategic
commitments.
EIC reductions will yield cost savings with the remaining
infrastructure sufficient to support steady-state and crisis
activities. Upon full implementation of EIC, EUCOM will have 17 main
operating bases in Europe. As we continue to implement EIC
recommendations, EUCOM will work towards minimizing any negative
effects the reduction of bases may have on our strategy, operations,
and the political-military relationships the U.S. has built in Europe.

b. Key Military Construction (MILCON) Priorities

EUCOM's fiscal year 2016 military construction program continues to
support key posture initiatives, recapitalize key infrastructure, and
consolidate enduring locations. I am thankful Congress continues to
fund EUCOM's priorities, in particular the Landstuhl Regional Medical
Center/Rhine Ordnance Barracks theater medical consolidation and
recapitalization project (ROBMC), European Phased Adaptive Approach
(EPAA) missile defense projects, and the relocation of the Joint
Intelligence Operations Center Europe (JIOCEUR) and Joint Analysis
Center (JAC) to Croughton, United Kingdom.
ROBMC remains one of the command's highest priority military
construction projects, providing a vitally important replacement to
theater-based combat and contingency operation medical support from the
aged and failing infrastructure at the current facility. The official
ground-breaking ceremony, conducted jointly by the United States and
Germany, took place this past October and signified continued support
and commitment from both nations. This project is vital to ensuring the
availability of the highest level trauma care to future U.S.
warfighters.
Congressional support for the EPAA Phase 1 projects, including
approval to replace expeditionary facilities in Turkey with semi-
permanent facilities, has been critical to achieving a high degree of
readiness at the AN/TPY-2 radar site. In fiscal year 2013 and fiscal
year 2014, the command began EPAA Phase 2 projects, including an Aegis
Ashore site in Romania.
Another key EUCOM MILCON priority project is the consolidation of
the JIOCEUR Analytic Center and other intelligence elements at RAF
Croughton, UK. The Department requested planning and design funding for
the consolidation during fiscal year 2015, with three phases of MILCON
construction in fiscal year 2015-2017 respectively. We anticipate the
construction completion will occur in fiscal year 2019, with movement
of units occurring in fiscal year 2019/2020.
Phase 1 includes EUCOM's Joint Analysis Center (JAC) as well as
Defense Intelligence Agency's Regional Support Center. The planned
replacement facility will consolidate intelligence operations into an
efficient, purpose-built building which will save the U.S. Government
$74 million per year and reduce significant operational risk associated
with current substandard, deteriorating facilities. The RAF Croughton
site also ensures continuation of the strong EUCOM-UK intelligence
relationships our sponsorship of the co-located NATO Intelligence
Fusion Center.
The maintenance of our intelligence relationships with the UK and
NATO remains vital to EUCOM's capability to conduct military operations
from and within Europe. Phase 2, programmed for fiscal year 2016, adds
AFRICOM intelligence activities (currently at RAF Molesworth), the NATO
Intelligence Fusion Center, and the Battlefield Information Collection
and Exploitation System (BICES), which provides classified
communications to our NATO partners.
3. Missile Defense
The changing security environment in the EUCOM AOR makes it
critical for the United States to take proactive measures and ensure
our allies and partners have the capability and capacity to defend
themselves, their region, and support global coalition requirements.

a. Progress on implementation of EPAA

EUCOM continues to implement the European Phased Adaptive Approach
(EPAA) to missile defense in Europe, and further develops partnerships
and assurances in NATO. Within the next year, EUCOM expects to complete
Phase 2 of the EPAA when the Aegis Ashore site, currently under
construction in Deveselu, Romania, becomes operational. Phase 2 of the
EPAA will provide enhanced medium-range missile defense capability,
expanding upon Phase 1 of the EPAA, which has been operational since
2011. The deployment of Aegis Ashore will be the final building block
in finalizing the Phase 2 EPAA capability in Europe. While completion
of the site in Deveselu, Romania is still on schedule, there have been
some delays in construction. EUCOM and Missile Defense Agency
leadership have been tracking this progress closely and firmly believe
there will be no slippage in schedule. We expect the Aegis Ashore
capability to be delivered on 31 December 2015.
EPAA Phase 3, which is primarily composed of a second Aegis Ashore
site at Redzikowo, Poland, is on track to support completion in the
2018 timeframe. The broader basing agreement is complete and the
implementing arrangement negotiations are on schedule and meeting both
U.S. and Polish expectations. EPAA Phase 3 builds upon the pre-existing
intermediate-range missile defense capabilities of Phases 1 and 2 of
the EPAA. Once in place EPAA Phase 3 will support EUCOM Plans and
Operations and represents the U.S. voluntary national contribution
Ballistic Missile Defense of NATO.

b. Increasing Allied engagement and commitment

EUCOM is encouraging allies and partners to invest in their own air
and missile defense capabilities to ensure that they are interoperable
with our systems. Building an integrated network of interoperable IAMD
systems will leverage cost-sharing and help spread the commitment among
willing participants. The allies are listening, and they are beginning
to respond. The allies are also making investments in BMD capabilities,
such as the Netherlands-Denmark-Germany effort to study the upgrade of
the Smart-L radar systems onboard their Air defense ships, and the
comprehensive programs underway in Poland and Turkey to upgrade their
lower-tier air and missile defense capabilities. EUCOM is working with
the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and the Department of Defense
on developing authorities that will enable the United States to sell
missiles and other weapons systems with retransfer rights to groups of
NATO and other authorized nations.

c. Support to Israeli Missile Defense

U.S. efforts to enhance the BMD for Israel are well-developed. The
threat posed by longer range ballistic missiles, larger raid sizes, and
increased accuracy of ballistic missiles and rockets poses a
significant challenge to Israel. EUCOM maintains plans to deploy forces
in support of the defense of Israel against ballistic missile attack if
requested. EUCOM also conducts maritime BMD patrols in cooperation with
Israel. In addition, EUCOM conducts regular BMD training exercises with
Israel on a weekly and quarterly basis.
In late 2013, U.S. and Israeli representatives signed the
``Combined U.S.-Israel BMD Architecture Enhancement Program'' (AEP). In
addition to providing guidance on combined U.S.-Israel operations, the
AEP provides direction on how the United States and Israel will jointly
address the full range of potential BMD enhancements developed by both
sides.
4. Cyber
Among the most dangerous threats facing Europe's new security
environment are those that can manifest asymmetrically through
Cyberspace. Adversaries can easily hide their identities and locations
in Cyberspace, and attempt to exploit our people, our systems, our
information, and our infrastructure. EUCOM must defend against these
adversaries who can threaten our forces from anywhere in the world, by
identifying and securing key parts of our critical infrastructure in
what has become our cyber flank. Through a defensible architecture,
ready cyber forces, and improved situational awareness, EUCOM will
protect this flank just like eastern and southern flanks that see
increasing threats today. While doctrine and concepts for operating in
cyberspace are still being formulated and debated, our adversaries are
aggressively searching for new vulnerabilities to exploit in the cyber
flank.
EUCOM's first Cyber Combat Mission Team (CMT) and Cyber Protection
Team (CPT) reached Initial Operational Capability (IOC) this past year
providing us with new capabilities to protect our people, systems,
information, and infrastructure while holding adversaries at risk. As
these teams continue to improve, EUCOM will have an enhanced ability to
plan and conduct Cyberspace Operations to enhance our situational
awareness and protect our cyber flank.
The Joint Information Environment (JIE) is moving ahead in the
European theater as the as a way to reduce risk to missions by
providing better situational awareness into networks, improving
security, and better integrating information technology across all the
Services within the Department of Defense. As a result of this effort,
EUCOM has seen improved mission effectiveness through the
implementation of unified capabilities, virtual desktops, and an
enterprise operations center that is capable of tracking all of our
component information technology systems. As EUCOM enters into the next
phase of JIE, we are improving our ability to better operate with
allies, friends, and partners in a Mission Partner Environment that has
enhanced capabilities for information sharing and situational
awareness. As demonstrated during Operations Atlantic Resolve, Unified
Assistance, and Inherent Resolve, EUCOM's information technology
infrastructure must remain relevant, interoperable, and resilient to
support a range of missions that transit our theater in support of what
our national leaders may ask us to do with like-minded friends,
partners, and allies. As part of JIE, EUCOM continues to enhance our
interoperability so that we can rapidly share information, enhance
understanding, and dominate any potential adversary.
5. Maintaining U.S. Nuclear Deterrent with NATO aLlies
NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept, 2012 Deterrence and Defense Posture
Review, and 2014 Wales Summit Declaration all affirmed that deterrence,
based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile
defense capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy,
and that ``as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear
alliance.'' EUCOM maintains a safe, secure, and effective theater
nuclear deterrent in support of NATO and enduring U.S. security
commitment within the EUCOM AOR. Through rigorous and effective
training, exercises, evaluations, inspections, operations, and
sustainment, EUCOM ensures that United States nuclear weapons and the
means to support and deploy those weapons are ready to support national
and Alliance strategic objectives.
Consistent with NATO's commitment to the broadest possible
participation of allies in the alliance's nuclear sharing arrangements,
EUCOM stands side-by-side with our NATO allies to provide nuclear
forces that are safe, secure, reliable, and effective, and that
contribute to a robust deterrence and defense posture that strengthens
Alliance cohesion and the transatlantic link. The supreme guarantee of
the security of the allies, moreover, is provided by the strategic
nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United
States. EUCOM, therefore, works closely with STRATCOM to assure allies
of the U.S. commitment to the Alliance. For example, by conducting
bomber assurance and deterrence missions in support of NATO and
regional exercises as part of Operation Atlantic Resolve.
6. Information Operations
Information Operations are essential to EUCOM's ability to shape
the security environment and achieve our military objectives.
Activities conducted under Operation Assured Voice provide a powerful
means to counter Russian aggression, challenge extremist ideology, and
prepare for contingency operations. The EUCOM AOR has the highest
internet usage rate of any OCONUS geographic combatant command; that
characteristic simultaneously presents the command with an
unprecedented opportunity and efficient conduit for influence in the
region. We know from experience that our adversaries will seek to gain
an edge by using the internet to present false narratives and spread
propaganda. We will leverage the advanced technological environment in
the EUCOM AOR and use the internet as a principal, cost-effective means
to reach target audiences critical to our objectives. These leading-
edge capabilities and methods will augment and complement the more
traditional military influence measures we currently employ. To
effectively move forward, we must clarify the roles, expectations, and
authorities required for steady state military influence operations on
the internet and continue to advance these activities in close
coordination with other departments and agencies.
7. Global Mobility Operations
The footprint within the EUCOM Theater is essential to TRANSCOM's
global strategy and directly supports AFRICOM, CENTCOM, EUCOM, SOCOM,
STRATCOM, and NATO operations. TRANSCOM will continue to depend on
relationships with European host nations for overflight and access to
European infrastructure.
8. Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction, Counter Trafficking, and
Counter Narcotics
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), in the hands of a rogue state or
non-state actor, continue to represent a grave threat to the United
States and the international community. Our allies, partners, and NATO
share these concerns; we continue to work with them on building
capacity and capabilities for countering WMD and pursuing efforts
bilaterally, regionally, and in a NATO construct to collaborate on
reducing the potential for successful WMD trafficking and use. We are
also working in a whole-of-government manner to counter the trafficking
of other illegal items, especially drugs crossing through Europe into
the United States.
vii. conclusion
Those of us assigned to Europe on behalf of the United States work
every day to maintain peace with our European allies and partners,
striving to meet the security challenges we face as a nation and as a
member of NATO. This includes continuing to demonstrate U.S. leadership
and commitment to NATO and supporting the implementation of the NATO
Readiness Action Plan.
The resurgence of a revanchist Russia, and the emergence of new
risks emanating from across the Mediterranian, places us in a new
security environment that drives new ways of thinking. Accurately
assessing these changes is critical to ensure we react properly to
state and non-state actors who are not complying with international
norms. As one of only two forward positioned combatant commands, EUCOM
is in a front row seat for the action, and our staff, both at the
headquarters and component levels, has the expertise and relationships
to adapt.
We must continue to leverage and build upon the expeditionary
capability and interoperability gained over a decade of operations in
Afghanistan and increase opportunities to work together in the future.
Many of these capabilities are essential to confronting current
security challenges. Our allies and partners have benefited from our
sustained efforts to build partnership capacity with EUCOM and we see
this process as a keystone to countering threats like Russian
aggression and influence. We need to protect our investment to leverage
it in response to near and medium-term threats and challenges. We must
also continue exercising with and training our allies and partners and
enabling the NATO Alliance to make the transition from expeditionary
and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, to conducting a full
spectrum of joint, combined operations, including high-end combined
arms warfare. Our Nation's security interests require we preserve their
capabilities and their willingness to act so that they remain able to
respond to threats to U.S. and European security as well as global
contingencies.
While preserving expeditionary capabilities developed over the last
decade, we must address and help our allies and partners address
renewed challenges, including along Europe's eastern periphery.
Reassuring, stabilizing, and supporting allies and partners in Europe
are vital to protecting American interests both on the continent and at
home. As the Commander of EUCOM, we need the resources to remain
decisively engaged in the EUCOM Theater, to have the stabilized force
structure to effectively meet our challenges brought by the new
European security environment, and to defend our Nation forward. If we
do not stand up and take the initiative to set the theater, someone
else will. We need credible, enduring capabilities that will assure,
deter, and defend while shaping the theater with a coordinated whole-
of-government approach. As long as I have the watch over EUCOM, I will
relentlessly pursue a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace.

Chairman McCain. Thank you, General.
Item of business. A quorum is now present. I ask the
committee to consider one civilian nomination and a list of 361
pending military nominations.
First, I ask the committee to consider the nomination of
Mr. Peter Levine to be Deputy Chief Management Officer,
Department of Defense. Is there a motion to favorably report--
--
Senator Reed. So moved.
Chairman McCain. Is there a second?
Senator Manchin. Second.
Chairman McCain. All in favor, say aye. [A chorus of ayes.]
Chairman McCain. Motion carries.
Finally, I ask the committee to consider a list of 361
pending military nominations. All of these nominations have
been before the committee the required length of time. There's
a motion to favorably report these 360.
Senator Reed. So moved.
Chairman McCain. Is there a second?
Senator Manchin. Second.
Chairman McCain. All in favor, say aye. [A chorus of ayes.]
Those opposed? [No response.]
The motion carries.
Thank you, General. And thank you for your final remarks
about the situation that will evolve if we continue with
sequestration. I think that's what you're talking about, right?
General Breedlove. Yes, Chairman, it is.
Chairman McCain. And that would seriously impair your
ability, or our Nation's ability, to carry out our
responsibilities in Europe.
General Breedlove. That's correct, Mr. Chairman. And
challenge our forward presence.
Chairman McCain. And put the lives of the men and women who
are serving in the military in greater danger.
General Breedlove. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Very quickly, literally thousands of refugees, migrants,
are freeing North Africa and trying to arrive in Europe. In
some cases, that's not too great a distant. Wouldn't it be
logical for terrorist organizations, like ISIS, to maybe place
some people on those boats and transport them to Europe?
General Breedlove. Mr. Chairman, this is one of our great
concerns, and also one of the great concerns of our allies.
Chairman McCain. Have we seen any indication of that so
far?
General Breedlove. Mr. Chairman, I can't talk to specifics,
but I will look into that and get back to you.
General Breedlove. I have not seen specific named reports
yet, but we are following several threat strings.
Chairman McCain. I get the impression from your testimony
that, as you have in the past, you are predicting that we're in
a period of pause with the Russians in eastern Ukraine, and
it's very likely, within a certain period--relatively short
period of time, they will mount additional--the ``separatists''
will be mounting further conflicts in the region--in eastern
Ukraine. Is that accurate?
General Breedlove. Mr. Chairman, what we--I cannot
accurately predict what they'll do, but I can watch what they
have done in the past and what they have done in this lull, as
you correctly describe. During this lull, we have seen a period
of what I would call ``resetting'' and preparing, training and
equipping to have the capacity to again take an offensive.
Chairman McCain. So, they aren't doing all of what they're
doing now for nothing.
General Breedlove. In the past, they have not wasted their
effort.
Chairman McCain. In January, we had a hearing, and
Secretary Albright was there, and Shultz and Kissinger. And all
of them said that they believed we should provide defensive
weapons to the Ukrainian government. I asked Secretary Carter,
in his nomination hearing. He said, ``I am inclined in the
direction of providing them with arms.'' The list goes on and
on.
And I'm not asking you to make policy. And so, I will
phrase my question in a way--wouldn't it have a significant
impact on the military situation in eastern Ukraine today if we
gave the Ukrainian military the weapons that they so badly need
defensively?
General Breedlove. Mr. Chairman, first, the--first of all,
I agree with the Secretary of Defense, and I believe that--as I
mentioned in my opening statement, that our--Mr. Putin and his
forces have taken and used every tool to their great advantage,
to including the military tool. And, as you have phrased, it is
important that we should consider all those tools. And I
support the use--the consideration of using offensive weapons
to change decision calculus on the ground and to facilitate
bringing our opponent to the table for a solution--a final
solution.
Chairman McCain. I had the impression that our European
allies are reluctant to impose serious sanctions, or seem to be
seeking ways to lift sanctions, is directly related to their
dependence on Russian energy. Do you think it would be helpful
if we developed a strategy for getting energy to our eastern
Europeans friends, particularly Ukraine, but also eastern
Europe and even Germany?
General Breedlove. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I completely
agree with your premise. As I said, Russians use every tool,
and this economic tool of energy--using energy as a tool or a
weapon is clearly a part of the calculus that is affecting the
decision of many of our allied nations. And any efforts we
would take to make Europe more energy independent from Russia
would help in this calculus. I agree.
Chairman McCain. What do your European friends say when we
admonish them that every--all but two of them are spending less
than 2 percent of their GDP on defense? It seems to me that
they don't have much of a sense of alarm.
General Breedlove. Mr. Chairman, there's--there is good
news here, and there remains concern here. We do see several of
the Nations, in the last weeks, setting a plan to achieve 2-
percent spending. Those numbers are still small, but we see
nations doing that. We see a few nations committing to, in the
short term, getting to the NATO average, which is below 2
percent and not the goal that we have asked them to set. So, at
least there is a commitment to turn around a decline. But,
there is concern about the spending.
I would say that, to the positive side of the ledger, as
you know and we have talked about, the--many of these nations
are stepping up and putting their forces where they're required
in our Readiness Action Plan in the Very High Readiness Joint
Task Force, committing, as European nations, to be centerpieces
of that Very High Readiness Task Force.
So, I don't want to gloss over the challenge. We need to
remain focused on the spending and our pledges that all the
Nations made at the Wales Summit. And we will be continually
focused on that.
Chairman McCain. Thank you, General. And I'll, again, thank
you for your service and, frankly, for your very forthcoming
responses to the questions of this committee. I thank you.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, just a point of clarification. I think, in response
to Senator McCain's question, you talked about offensive
weapons. Is that----
General Breedlove. Senator, yes. I have been steady on the
record as saying that I believe all our tools should be
considered.
Senator Reed. Very good.
Let me follow up also on Senator McCain's question about
the potential flow into Europe and beyond of foreign fighters,
particularly coming from the Maghreb in the Middle East. That
is essentially a law enforcement problem at this juncture. And
I would assume that you're collaborating with Department of
Homeland Security, with the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), and with all our law enforcement. Is that the major
thrust of----
General Breedlove. Sir, I would broaden the answer a little
bit. The short answer to your questions are yes. And, in fact,
we have, on our staff in EUCOM, representatives of law
enforcement agencies and others in a directorate that we
created for just this problem in our J-9.
But, the--if I could just broaden the answer just a little
bit, the example of Operation Ocean Shield off of the Horn of
Africa, and the example of Kosovo, the European Rule of Law
(EULEX) mission from the European Union (EU), and North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) K-4 mission are great
examples of where EUCOM is able to work with other agencies in
Europe, and where NATO is able to work with other agencies in
Europe. NATO brings a great command-and-control military
structure and military discipline to the problem. So, in Ocean
Shield, they took care of the sea approaches to the Horn. And
then the EU has that great all-of-government more Ministry of
Interior connections to judiciary, to policing, and others. And
so, the combined excellence of NATO military with the European
Union's ability to reach ashore and do, these nexuses are where
I think we have a lot of good to do in the future to problems
like the foreign fighters that both you and the Chairman have
identified.
Senator Reed. But, part of this is being able to rely upon
Homeland Security, FBI, et cetera. And, in the same context of
your issue with sequestration, if these Departments fell under
sequestration, if they had limited resources, that could
materially affect your ability to stop this threat?
General Breedlove. This is a broad response required across
those agencies, as well as military agencies, Senator.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Let me ask--focus on Ukraine. There are several dimensions.
The two most significant, the operational readiness of the
Ukrainian military forces and the economic reforms that they
have to undertake to literally survive. I think we had a chance
to talk about this in the office. Can you give us your--from--
we focus significantly on situation of weapons, but what are
the top, sort of, items that they need to be operationally
capable of resisting? It's not just weapons, it's a list. And,
in fact, you might sort of prioritize the list.
General Breedlove. Senator, thank you for the opportunity
to talk to this. And I would just open by saying that we have
what is called the Ukraine Commission, the Joint Commission,
where our EUCOM soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines have
done a series of bilateral visits and worked with the
leadership of the military and their ministries to do exactly
what you talk about, which is to identify their needs in this
business. We did many of those visits before the Russian
offensive last August, so we had to go back and redo a few,
because that Russian offensive seriously altered the complexion
of the Ukrainian military.
So, we have done a very exhaustive series, about 25 visits.
And we have done exactly as you have described. We have
outlined things that we think are important. I think the top
three bins, in a purely military sense, not a political or
economic sense, are, first of all, in communication and
counter-communication. The Russian forces were able to take the
Ukrainians off the air in certain areas, herd them, by turning
off military communications, onto their cell phones, and then
use their cell phones to attack them on the field. So, the
ability to communicate and also defend against counter-
communication, sort of item one.
Item two in a group is a what I call ``counter-battery
capabilities.'' About 70 percent of the Ukrainian casualties
and deaths have been to Russian and separatist artillery. And
so, I would put in the second group of capabilities and
capacities that we need to work with on--them on, is that
counter-battery and how to survive artillery fire.
And then the third is a broad range that I call ``counter-
mobility.'' Russian forces and the separatist forces in the
east enjoy a wide range of armored capabilities that have been
supplied by Russia. And the ability for the Ukrainians to
address that capability is important.
So, those are the three broad areas that I think are
probably the key.
And what I would say, also, Senator, in closing, is that
what we found in our visits, with our disciplined approach to
this, is pretty close to what President Poroshenko and others
are asking for as they talk back to us.
Senator Reed. Just a final point. I know this is out of
your field, but if--the economic reforms, from both a quality
of life and a--the politics and the willingness of the
Ukrainian people to support the government, are absolutely
critical. And if they fail at that, that would have a--
significant consequences, beyond just sort of a--further
aggression by the Russians.
General Breedlove. Senator, as you know, I'm in and out of
Ukraine. And, as I have talked to both the President and the
Prime Minister, they were both elected under a format of reform
to--economic and also getting at corruption. They both know
they have to deliver. And this is important. And it's hard to
deliver on that kind of reform when you're in the field,
fighting. We need to get that fighting over so that they can
begin to address the issues that their electorate put them in
office to correct.
Chairman McCain. Senator Sullivan.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, General, I really appreciate not only your testimony,
which lays out the significant challenges that we have, that
your combatant command faces, but also how forthright you've
been, not only in testimony, but also in public statements. I
think you've been a real leader for our country, in terms of
telling it like it is, in terms of what the challenges are and
what we can do.
I want to dive deeper into what the chairman mentioned at
the outset of his remarks. One of the aspects of Russians--
Russia's activities is the militarization of the Arctic. And I
have a map here. I'm going to pass it out to my colleagues.
But, it's a pretty informative map of how the Russians are
militarizing the Arctic. That's new--a new Arctic command, as
you know, four new Arctic brigades, 11 new airfields, a huge
icebreaker fleet, land claims that they're making now in the
Arctic, increased long-range air patrols. And, General, you and
I have talked about their recent Arctic exercise, which I think
caught a number of people by surprise--38,000 troops, close to
3,400 military vehicles, 41 ships, 15 submarines, 110
aircraft--lasted 5 days and included long-range destruction of
simulated enemy land and naval units as the mission.
You talk about the COCOM seams in your testimony. And the
Arctic, in my view is a classic place for the COCOM seams--
EUCOM, PACOM, NORTHCOM. What do you think the Russians are up
to? And do we need an Arctic O-Plan that can help us coordinate
efforts between the different seams that we have in our COCOMs?
General Breedlove. Senator, thank you for the opportunity
to comment on that important issue. And I share many of the
concerns--all of the concerns that you identify.
One would hope that we could see what is happening in the
high north as an opportunity, economically. That shorter route,
even if it's only for several months a year, saves lots of
money and would make for a great push to all of our economies--
--
Senator Sullivan. It's going to be an important route, and
there's a lot of resources there. Is that what you think the
Russians are doing? What are they doing?
General Breedlove. So, Senator, I think they are, in--to
your concern, making sure that they have the military
infrastructure to be able to influence the high north. Of
course, their words are that this is all in a peaceful manner.
And again, as----
Senator Sullivan. Pretty big military exercise to be in a
peaceful manner.
General Breedlove. Yes, sir. We have to watch their actions
and see if we can derive their intents from those.
But, to the seams, Senator, they're--the good news here is
that we recognize those seams. Admiral, as I call him, Shortney
Gortney, and I are--have been friends for many years. And we
have met recently on this very issue. And we have an
initiative, called the Russia Strategic Initiative, where all
of the COCOMs who touch Russia have come together, and EUCOM
will lead an effort that we make sure we don't have any seams
in the way----
Senator Sullivan. Do you think we need an Arctic O-Plan,
though, to help address that and know what the requirements are
in the Arctic and other places?
General Breedlove. Sir, if you would allow, that's more of
a policy way ahead. I think----
Senator Sullivan. In your personal opinion, do you believe
that we----
General Breedlove. I think it's important that I am aligned
well with the other COCOMs in how we would address the north.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask another more specific
question. You know, the Army is contemplating removing, not
one, but two BCTs from Alaska. If you look at the map there,
you show--it certainly shows how important that strategic
location is. Many military officials have testified in front of
this committee that they think that would be a bad strategy, in
terms of the signal it would send, our readiness. In light of
your testimony that Putin responds to strengths and weaknesses,
and that a critical element of our strategy is a persistent
forward presence, and that your PACOM counterpart is focused on
a, ``rebalancing of forces to the Pacific,'' in your personal
opinion, given all of these items, do you think it makes sense
to reduce one Army soldier in Alaska, let alone one or two
entire BCTs, particularly our only airborne BCT in the entire
Pacific and the Arctic? And what do you think Mr. Putin would
think about us removing one or two BCTs from the Arctic at this
time, when he's certainly trying to muscle his way into there?
General Breedlove. Senator, that--Alaska and the forces in
Alaska are critical to our approach to Russia. You rightly
recognize that this is a strategic area and an important area,
and Putin will be watching. I don't mean to be flip, but it's
an important area for General Breedlove, because his young
daughter in--serves in this service, as well, and will soon
land in Alaska to serve for the next 3 years.
Senator Sullivan. Oh, we'll be glad to host her.
General Breedlove. So, Senator, this is important. And the
signature that we have there to be able to respond is
important. I know that the Army is facing some physics problems
as it relates to funding. And I'm not tracking their thought
process there, but I do believe it is important that we keep
the right capabilities to address aggression in the north.
Senator Sullivan. Should we remove one single soldier from
Alaska right now?
General Breedlove. Sir, I would ask maybe that the Pacific
Commander would be better positioned to answer that. I would
not recommend reducing our capabilities in the north.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, General Breedlove, for your testimony today.
I want to talk about a different seam. I'll pick up on
Senator Sullivan's talking about the seams, the seam between
EUCOM and AFRICOM. You talk about your eastern flank challenges
and your southern flank challenges. And a number of the
southern flank challenges are because of instability in
Africa--North Africa. And I think it's important for the
committee just to kind of be reminded. EUCOM and AFRICOM share
a lot of resources, correct?
General Breedlove. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Kaine. And in--the resources that you share are
getting pretty stretched, because, just as you talk about
increasing challenges in the EUCOM region, if General Rodriguez
were here, he would talk about the number of increasing
challenges in AFRICOM, whether it be Boko Haram, Lord's
Resistance Army, you know, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL), or al-Qaeda, splinter groups, al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). He would be singing the same tune
about increasing challenges, correct?
General Breedlove. Yes, Senator. And I think there's just a
couple of things to mention here that are good and challenges.
First, with AFRICOM, we have an authority that COCOMs have
never had in the past. The Secretary of Defense has given us
the authority, at the COCOM level, to share forces quickly and
easily, when required and the two commanders agree that those
forces should be shared. And this process works very well
between Rod Rodriguez and myself and our staffs. That's good.
But, to your other point, sir, I would like to seize on
that just a moment. Our forces in Europe, which I share with
General Rodriguez, have been sized, over the last two decades,
for Russia that we were looking----
Senator Kaine. Yeah.
General Breedlove.--to make a partner. And so our forces
have come down, as the--as was described in the opening
remarks, drastically since the end of the Cold War. And our
headquarters size has come down drastically across the past few
years. We are now the smallest COCOM headquarters in the
military.
And so, now we do, as you correctly point out, point--we
face literally what I call three new missions and three new
threats. First and foremost, as we described earlier, a
revanchist Russia, which we're not sized for. Second is this
entire problem that the Ranking and the Chairman both spoke to
of this flow of migrants and other people out of the under-
governed spaces in North Africa. And then, third is this Iraq/
Syria/Levant problem that could lap over our great ally to the
east, Turkey's borders, and become a problem. And so, our
forces in Europe were not sized for any of those three
challenges----
Senator Kaine. And if I can just sort of summarize, you
were not sized for these challenges, you share resources with
an AFRICOM that is also seeing a significant uptick in
challenges, and you're dealing with the potential reality of a
budget sequester that would impose an even tighter tightening
of the belt at a--at the very time when the challenges are
increasing. So, this has got to be something that keeps you up
at night.
General Breedlove. It is, Senator. And I--but I, again,
want to say that the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) are beginning to address those issues. As you
know, we have begun--again, with the support of the European
Reassurance Initiative (ERI), we have started a firm rotational
force, and we're looking for continued support of that
rotational force in the next year. And then, the Army has
committed and has shown signs of building that, then, into
their 2017 budget and beyond. These rotational forces will be
key to addressing the shortfalls that we talked about, Senator.
Senator Kaine. I want to switch for a minute. You talked
about using all the tools at our disposal. The tools that we
most often talk about on this committee or in the Foreign
Relations Committee, or three of the four--you used the DIME
acronym--diplomacy, information, military, economic. We talk a
lot about diplomacy, we talk a lot about military, we talk a
lot about economic, but we don't talk much about information.
Talk about the information offensive that Russia is using, and
how weak or modest are the efforts that we are putting on the
field to counter it.
General Breedlove. Senator, we are facing a dedicated,
capable, and very lively information campaign from Russia. They
are in all of the spaces, from printed to Internet to TV, and
they are in those spaces in a dedicated and capable way.
I will use a number that I have seen reported and in the
papers. I do not know it to be true. But, Russia has put over
$330 million, we think, into these campaigns in the very recent
past in order to win these spaces. And their TV capability into
our northern Baltic nations is very impressive. It's very good
TV. It draws people to listen, and then the message is passed.
Senator Kaine. And what are we doing to counter that?
General Breedlove. Sir, we are beginning--we are in the
very beginning stages of organizing to get after this. The
Department of State has a dedicated team now. I will meet with
that team next Monday, here, after the weekend, to discuss how
we and Europe can move in this business. We do have capability
in some of our Special Forces to help teach and train nations
to deal with this challenge, and we are doing that. Our Special
Operation Forces are working with the capitals in our allied
nations; and now also our NATO forces are beginning to look at
these challenges, as well.
Senator Kaine. I think that's a big challenge ahead.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Breedlove.
Chairman McCain. Senator Lee.
Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, General, for joining us today.
In September of last year, NATO allies agreed, at Wales,
to, among other things, ``reverse the trend of declining
defense budgets to make the most effective use of our funds and
to further a more balanced sharing of costs and
responsibilities,'' Between 2001 and 2013, the U.S. share of
total allied defense spending increased from 63 percent at the
outset to 72 percent at the end of that period while allies
have decreased their spending, on average, by 20 percent since
2008, according to the Congressional Research Service. So, I've
got a couple of questions for you that relate to this.
First, do you think increased military investments by our
European allies, both individually and also collectively, would
likely help us deter Russian aggression? And also, how do you
think a more balanced sharing of costs and responsibilities
might impact U.S. national security and also its fiscal
interests?
General Breedlove. Thank you, Senator, for the question.
And I must agree with all the facts. These are
straightforward. We do--we are concerned about our allies'
spending. It was a big part of the discussion at Wales. And
yes, our Nations did, as you described, pledge that, by 2024, a
decade, they would reach 2 percent. As I mentioned earlier,
we've seen nations now, a few of them--I think as many as
five--have now made a pledge to increase their spending. But,
this is a slow process, and the Nations that are closest to the
problem are more apt now to forward in their increased
spending. But, we do see other large nations--even today, news
of a large nation--committing to increase spending.
The--will an increased investment deter? Not if spent
unwisely. But, if we increase investment across all of our
allies, and invest in those capabilities that do add to our
military deterrence value, yes, it can make a difference. And I
think that's what you see, Poland leading the way, increasing
their spending, and increasing their spending in targeted areas
that they knew not only they needed, but the NATO alliance
needs. And so, these are important.
Senator Lee. It would make a difference, and it would make
a difference to us, and it would also make a difference for
deterring Russian aggression.
And, on the point of Russian aggression--so, Secretary
Kerry, on April 27th, very recently, at the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, stated that the
United States is still willing to negotiate with Russia a
series of nuclear reductions that would take us below the New
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) Treaty levels. All of
this, despite Russia's aggression in Ukraine, and despite
Russia's violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty announced last year.
So, let me ask it--do you think that the security situation
in Europe today is more stable or less stable than it was
before the New START Treaty was ratified?
General Breedlove. Senator, I would say that the security
situation in Europe is less stable, but it's not, based on the
nuclear piece. That's not what worries me. What worries me is
Russia, as a nation, now adopting an approach that says they
can and will use military power to change international borders
or take over international states. That's what I truly worry
about every day.
Senator Lee. And I share that concern, and you're right to
be worried about that. And, in light of that, and in light of
your experiences as EUCOM Commander and working at NATO, do you
think negotiating a new nuclear reduction treaty should be a
higher priority for us right now than addressing Russia's
violation of the INF Treaty or its aggressive behavior toward
its neighbors, like Ukraine?
General Breedlove. So, Senator, I kind of agree with your
construction at the end, there. It's very important that we
continue to address my--I think, a lot of people's--primary
concern, which is this more conventional problem. And your
point about the INF, this is very concerning. We do need to
address what we all recognize is operations outside of the INF.
And we do need to address that.
Senator Lee. I see my time's expired, General and Mr.
Chairman, but I'd just--I cannot fathom a world in which we
would see that it would make any sense at all for us to
negotiate further nuclear reductions with Russia when Russia is
in violation of existing treaty obligations and Russia is
behaving the way that it is toward neighbors like Ukraine. I
cannot fathom it. And I don't think the American people can
support it. And I hope this administration will reconsider that
very ill-considered policy.
Thank you.
Chairman McCain [presiding]. Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, General, for your service and your
explaining the complex situation we deal with.
Let me ask a question concerning on oil production and,
basically, United States reconsidering, if you will, our crude
oil exportation or a ban--removing that ban. The way Russia has
been able to use, as far as I'm seeing in Europe, Europe
remains heavily dependent on Russia for energy, with one-third
of the EU oil imports coming from Russia. Do you think we
should consider, strategically--would it be something that we
could look at that would help us with the European allies that
we have, if we used our newfound wealth, as far as the riches
and deposits of energy, towards using it from our military
standpoint?
General Breedlove. Thank you, Senator.
As a fighter pilot, it's a little bit out of my league, but
I do have some feelings there. The bottom line is that we have
clearly seen that Russia uses energy as a tool----
Senator Manchin. Right.
General Breedlove.--as a weapon, as we talked about in the
DIME model in that economic end. Threatening, changing,
adjusting prices, cutting off the flow of energy has been a
tool and I expect will be a tool in the future.
I think that the current drop in oil prices, coupled with
sanctions, have caused a lot of problems for Mr. Putin. And so,
that may be somewhat diminished now. But, clearly, energy will
remain a tool in the toolkit that the Russian Federation
considers. And that--efforts that we could make to help Europe
and some of our key allies to be more energy independent would
clearly aid our concern.
Senator Manchin. Or less dependent on Russia. And I agree.
Next of all, the relationship seems to have degraded to the
point to where the Cold War is colder today than it was during
the Cold War of yesteryear. I just came back from a conference
on Russia and Ukraine in Berlin, and it was very enlightening.
And they were both Russian scholars, people who know the
Russian thought process, that were saying we should be careful
about Ukraine--arming Ukraine. I would have thought--as a West
Virginian, we always stand up for the underdog and try to help
them, but they said we should rethink that position. You might
want to give a thought on that, and you already have on some.
But, what--the relationship--what are we doing to build a
relationship or a dialogue? I mean, has it deteriorated to the
point we're not talking to a country that's extremely powerful,
as far as in the line of nuclear weapons?
General Breedlove. So, Senator, again, thank you.
I think that there are places where we're talking a lot. I
watch our Secretary of State, Secretary Kerry, work with his
counterpart, Lavrov, a lot. So, there are avenues where there
is great conversation.
I would tell you, sir, what's worrisome is that the
military level of conversation has been diminished.
Senator Manchin. From your standpoint, your cohort, as far
as, I guess, on your level----
General Breedlove. Valery Gerasimov.
Senator Manchin.--is not--it's nonexistent?
General Breedlove. We--I'll be very distinct in how I
answer this--we have a line of communication that works. We
know that I can talk to him and he can talk to me. We know that
we have the right translators and things.
Senator Manchin. You haven't had lunch for a while, right?
General Breedlove. I haven't had a lot of conversations
with him----
Senator Manchin. I understand.
General Breedlove.--since he went into Crimea.
Senator Manchin. S-300. Knowing that we have this
conversation going on, knowing that we have a pending outline
of a deal, the Iran deal, what did you make of the Russians
stepping up and making an announcement, in the middle of this
negotiations, on furnishing S-300s to Iran? How did you read
that?
General Breedlove. Senator, I think that this is a tool to
influence the conversation, as many other tools have been used
in the past to influence conversations. I think that President
Putin's first goals are really not about Ukraine, it's about
changing the West. Mr. Putin doesn't like to deal with the EU,
in an economic sense, and he doesn't like to deal with NATO, in
a military sense. And so, many of the tools he used are to try
to drive wedges in the EU and NATO. And if he can divide those
organizations, then all the other things he needs falls into
place. And I think that he uses many tools to force these
conversations----
Senator Manchin. But, the P5+1 were working with him on
this whole framework, and here he is, it looks like,
undercutting it or, basically, sending a different message
completely. How are we going to trust that he would be part of
the P5 if we have to make some decisions, or participate?
General Breedlove. I agree with your concern.
Senator Manchin. I have some others, but we'll talk later.
Thank you so much, General.
General Breedlove. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed [presiding]. Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
Good morning, General, it's nice to see you.
As you know, General Rodriguez testified that he thought
Libya-based threats have the highest potential of threats in
his region to increase risk to the United States and the
European strategic interests in the next 2 years. Do you share
that concern? And are you satisfied with the response that we
have had to that crisis in Libya?
General Breedlove. Senator, I am concerned about Libya, and
I think, as important, as the European Commander, it's key that
I should tell you that many of our key allies are very
concerned about Libya. I would say that, rightfully so, our
Italian friends are very focused on what's going on in Libya.
You know, they're--are very close to the African continent, and
are under great pressure from migrations of all manner of
people, some of which could be nefarious and some of which
could be just legitimate refugees. But, what is happening in
North Africa, and Libya sort of being at the nexus of it right
now, concerns me and concerns our allies.
Senator Fischer. You mentioned specifically the Italians.
Do you see the refugees that are landing and being transferred
into Italy? Are they staying in Italy or are they moving
through Italy to other countries? And, if so, what's the
response of those countries?
General Breedlove. The answer is yes to both. Some are
staying in Italy and some are quickly transiting in the
Schengen Zone into other nations. And all of the Nations of
Europe are concerned about these flows, because--what they
could possibly bring and, frankly, they put pressure on all the
social systems of these nations.
Senator Fischer. Have any of our European allies come up
with a coordinated strategy in how to deal with refugees? But,
really more importantly, how are they going to deal with Libya,
and are we involved in those conversations?
General Breedlove. So, first, ma'am, as you know, Italy
started out with an--a military operation if its own, Mare
Nostrum. And this operation was tough and consumed almost their
entire naval capacity for a certain amount of time. That
military operation has been supplanted now by a European Union
operation, which is right now being stressed pretty badly by
what is happening on the Mediterranean oceans. And you've seen
a couple of disastrous results, here, recently.
These are concerns. And the Nations are talking about how
to handle it and how the Nations that are most effective may
need other nations' help. It is primarily a conversation inside
the EU, because these--this has a--lots of reaches into what we
discussed earlier. These are, in many cases, Ministry of
Interior issues when they come to the land, as opposed to
Ministry of Defense issues.
But, the answer, ma'am, is yes, we are talking, and we are
looking at this problem. And I expect that it will be a growing
conversation, because this problem will get worse before it
gets better.
Senator Fischer. If I can move back to some of the
questions and responses you had on the INF Treaty violation
with--that the Russians committed. Have they acknowledged that
they violated that Treaty yet?
General Breedlove. Ma'am, I don't think they've
acknowledged. What they continually do when we bring up the INF
issue is, they point to how the West has busted the INF. They
continually point to our missile defenses as being outside of
the INF. They point to some of the test missiles we have used
to--in the past, et cetera. So, the conversation is, we address
their--what we think they're outside of the INF, and, rather
than answering, they address where they think we're outside of
the INF.
Senator Fischer. So, what actions have we taken to date to
respond to their violation? Are we being forceful in any way in
trying to get the Russians to respond to us in any kind of
meaningful way, or are we going to continue with this back-and-
forth cat-and-mouse game?
General Breedlove. Senator, I actually think that the
Department of State--and Secretary Gottemoeller is pushing
pretty hard on this--and that's the first stage of this, is to
try to do this through those kinds of conversations. So, I am
actually maybe a little more optimistic than you sound at this
point on Rose Gottemoeller's efforts and how she's working it.
Senator Fischer. And I appreciate your comments, and thank
you, sir, for your service.
General Breedlove. Thank you, ma'am.
Senator Reed. Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I understand you had some discussion with
Secretary Sullivan--I had to be at another committee meeting
briefly--on the question of the Arctic. I'd like to put a
slightly different twist on that.
Five of the eight Arctic nations are NATO nations. Are they
taking this seriously? Are they engaged? Has there been
communication, in terms of NATO's position, with regard to the
Russian buildup in the Arctic?
General Breedlove. Senator, thank you. Yes, our NATO
nations are concerned about this. And the--while only five or
eight are allies, others are very close partners in the way
that we do business. And so, the eight nations, of course, are
on the Arctic Council together. The United States took charge
of the chairmanship of the Arctic Council this year. We also
work closely with Norway and another venue in the Arctic. So,
there is a consorted concern. Nations are not completely
unified in the approach yet. But, there is strong conversation
about, What is it that we do, going forward?
Senator King. Would you agree that one of the things we
certainly need to do is infrastructure, in terms of things like
icebreakers? We are woefully under-resourced, in terms of that
kind of asset. Is that correct? Is that your understanding?
General Breedlove. Sir, I have had the same reports you
have, and we are limited in our icebreaker capacity. And I
think it is important that all of the Arctic nations now begin
to look at, What are our capabilities and capacities to deal
with this new environment?
Senator King. Thank you.
To go back to--there was a moment in your opening remarks
that caught my attention. And I don't think I wrote it down
exactly, but it goes to the question of the Ukrainians and
arming the Ukrainians. And you said something to the effect,
``When the proxy forces run into trouble, Russian forces step
in to right the balance.'' That goes to the heart of my concern
about arming the Ukrainians. And the consensus seems to be
developing that that's the right thing to do.
My question is, Does not the principle that you stated in
that sentence apply, in that our arming of the Ukrainians would
simply provoke a counter-reaction from Russia, a kind of
escalation? And have you gamed that out? Where does it stop?
They're not going to ignore our more direct intervention, in
terms of lethal arms. And I'd like to know your thinking on
that.
General Breedlove. Senator, thank you. This is one of the
toughest things that we look at and consider, and we are war-
gaming and table-topping to work our way through it, because I
have been consistent, in my remarks and other testimony, that
yes, we need to be intellectually honest that anything we do--
anything we do--is going to provoke a Russian response. This is
the way they do business.
And I have also said, Senator, that inaction is also an
action, and the Russians will react to it. As I said in my
opening statement, Mr. Putin does understand weakness, and
takes advantage of it.
So, we need to look at both sides of the ledger. And we are
doing that. We have all agreed, and, as the Chairman mentioned
in his opening statement, we do not believe that there is any--
there is a good course in trying to arm the Ukrainians to the
points that they could defeat Russian forces in the field. We
don't--no one thinks that's the path ahead. What we do believe
is that we should consider changing the decision calculus of
Mr. Putin. And that's what we look at. And we acknowledge, as
you have said, that if we do consider and eventually yes-or-no
on more lethal weapons, it could have a detrimental effect, as
well.
Senator King. Everyone around here is trying to
psychoanalyze Mr. Putin, but do you believe that his incursion
or his support of the separatists in the Ukraine was provoked
by a Russian national strategy, if you will, of trying to
piecemeal rebuild the Russian empire, the Soviet Union, or was
it provoked by his concern that the Ukraine was moving too
closely toward the West, there was talk of joining the EU, talk
of joining NATO? Do--in other words, where did all this start?
I think--and you mentioned, in your prepared testimony, that
clearly Russia views Ukraine as within their sphere of
influence, just as we view Canada, Mexico, the Caribbean as
within our sphere of influence, and we would react if there was
a movement of those organizations into what would be considered
a hostile camp. What--do you understand my--understand where
I'm going with it?
General Breedlove. I do. I do, Senator. And I would answer
yes to both of your first questions. Yes, this is partially due
to the sudden movement as the government changed, following the
Maidan. That certainly had a part of the calculus. Also,
there--as you rightly described----
Senator King. I think the question is, Was that the
motivation or an excuse? That's what it----
General Breedlove. I would--the answer is yes to both of
those, as well. I--there are those who have said--and I follow
the logic--that--and has been reported recently--that Mr. Putin
had designs on Crimea long before any of this. You've seen it
reported in the press. And so, we do believe that he has
thought through these possibilities in the past. So, none of
this was a spur-of-the-moment action. But, it could also have
been a reaction to what we saw in the change of government
following the Maidan.
I think what is important to understand is the second part
of your two-question pair, which is that Russia does want to
have a sphere of influence that buys a buffer zone between them
and the West, and they very much see Ukraine as part of that
sphere of influence. I've shortened this to a quip that does
not--it should not be trivialized, but the bottom line is,
Russia wants Kiev out of the West, and wants the West out of
Kiev. And he would like to have Russia driving all of the
levers in what happens in Ukraine to maintain that in the
future. And I think that's where this is headed.
Senator King. Thank you, General, for your thoughtful
answers, and thank you for your extraordinary leadership on
this difficult issue.
Senator, thank you.
Chairman McCain. Didn't he also say, on many occasions, the
worst event of the 20th century was the breakup of the Soviet
Union?
Senator Ernst.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General, very much for being here today, and
thank you for your service, and your staff's, as well.
In your posture statement, you stated that one of EUCOM's
top three--in the top three security threats is the flow of
foreign fighters between Europe and the Levant. So, with that
statement, what is the impact to the security of our European
allies and to U.S. interests in that region brought by ISIL,
al-Nusra, and any number of those other extremist organizations
that have been radicalized by them, who benefit from the use of
Turkish soil as a means of their lines of communication, that
territory for transit, for recruiting, financial services,
purchase of goods, weapons? What is the threat there that you
see, General?
General Breedlove. So, thank you, Senator.
And it is one of those three sort of threats that have
arisen from North Africa, from the Levant, especially Iraq and
into--or Syria and into Iraq, and then, of course, Russia was
the third. But, this is a problem for all of Europe. It is an
immediate problem for our Turkish ally, because it's on their
border, and the possibility of it spilling over into Turkey,
the impact of well over 1.6 million migrants, et cetera, et
cetera--Turkey is facing direct impact from what is happening
there. And we cannot discount that at--I think it's highly
unlikely, let me tell you, but we cannot discount that there
might actually be a military incursion across it sometime in
this calculation. So, these are things we need to worry about.
But, the most pressing issue is what you and others have
talked about, and that is this flow of fighters, a large number
of fighters in Iraq and Syria, and many of them will return,
with new skills and malicious intent, back to their nations. We
have seen this already disrupted in a few of the Nations. So,
how do we address that flow? Again, we're in the nascent stage
of two very good projects, where we are bringing nations
together to address this. And those, ma'am, I would need to
talk about in a different setting.
Senator Ernst. Certainly.
And the fact, fact or otherwise, that Turkey is an ally--I
think it could be disputed, on any different day. I think there
is a lot that goes on through Turkey that we would rather not
see happening. And so, in your opinion, then, is the risk of
any sort of action coming through Turkey, would you consider
that that would be--whether it's ISIS or any of these other
organizations into Europe--would you say that that threat is
low--low risk or high risk?
General Breedlove. Ma'am, I would not single out Turkey. I
think that the flows are in several areas, as was--as we
discussed earlier. Some of this threat vector may be coming
across in this flow into Italy, the diaspora from the Libya
area, as these people move freely across the northern Africa
and the Maghreb and there--have multiple points of entry into
Europe. Turkey is--clearly has had issues with flows. They are
addressing those flows. And I--this is a broader problem than
just their borders.
Senator Ernst. Okay. And that is a good point, General,
thank you.
And you mentioned earlier you are a fighter pilot. And
thank you for your service in doing that. Could you please
describe how important it is to have search-and-rescue
capabilities close to those areas of the fight? We had seen
recently, of course, that Turkey refused to allow the United
States access to the search-and-rescue missions, or having
those types of search-and-rescue missions out of Incirlik. So,
could you please describe what effects that has to the combat
fighters and those types of missions?
General Breedlove. So, to the overall question, first, as a
single-seat fighter pilot, we don't allow search-and-rescue
pilots to buy their beers when they're in the bars, because
their job is incredibly important to what we do. So, I'll stop
on that one. There is--the necessity and the importance of
search and rescue cannot be overstated.
Ma'am, we have been working with Turkey on some very key
things. One I can talk about in this venue, our training and
equipping missions is now up and running.
Senator Ernst. Very good.
General Breedlove. And so, we've made progress there.
Senator Ernst. Very good.
General Breedlove. On the other two, I would like to have
someone come by and talk to you about----
Senator Ernst. Absolutely.
General Breedlove.--the progress there.
Senator Ernst. We will do that.
Thank you very much, General.
And my time is expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
General Breedlove, can you describe the importance of
providing security assistance training to our NATO allies,
particularly in eastern Europe? And is there more that we can
do? And I understand that there's--there may be some question
about authority to actually provide the assistance that we
might want to. And is this something that this committee should
be looking at as we look at making sure you have the ability to
do what you need to do with respect to training?
General Breedlove. So, ma'am, this is important. May I just
make a couple of key examples?
Senator Shaheen. Please.
General Breedlove. Georgia and Romania, today the number-
two and number-four contributor of forces to Resolute Support.
The number-two troop-contributing nation to our efforts now,
our NATO efforts and U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, is Georgia, a
non-ally. We've had a great program with our U.S. Marine Corps
in training Georgian troops, and Georgia has gone to
Afghanistan during the kinetic fighting, and they've died
alongside our forces in the toughest parts of southern
Afghanistan, where they fought without caveat. So, all of these
efforts that we have, where we train our eastern allies and
partners--Romania being an ally, and I'll talk to them in just
a moment--but, these efforts that we have, where we train our
allies and partners means two things: their nations draw closer
to our Western values and morals and capabilities; and, two, as
they serve alongside of us, that means our soldiers, sailors,
marines, and airmen do not have to go there in the same
numbers. And so, it's absolutely key.
Romania, now, the number-four contributor to Resolute
Support and, I think, an anchor in the south on the Black Sea,
and the things that they're doing in our NATO RAP program,
where they are providing headquarters to lead in the south--so,
the bottom line is that these allies and partners are
incredibly important to us a nation and an alliance as we
address in the future.
And, ma'am, there are a lot of authorities out there. What
we have asked is to be considered to have one created for
eastern Europe, because we don't compete well sometimes with
other places in the world where fighting and things are going
on, and that's what we've asked you to consider, ma'am. And we
would appreciate your support.
Senator Shaheen. And so, just to be clear, this is
something that would need to be done through statute, and it's
something that we can consider as we're looking at the
authorization bill this year.
General Breedlove. Yes, ma'am. And if you're interested, we
will have the right people talk with your staff.
Senator Shaheen. Absolutely. Thank you.
Can you--you mentioned in your statement, the European
Reassurance Initiative, which I think is something that has not
gotten a lot of attention. And I wonder if you could assess how
it's working, talk a little bit more about what key areas we
should be investing in. How is the implementation of this
going?
General Breedlove. Ma'am, I would never sound like I was
correcting. Maybe it doesn't get a lot of interest back here,
but let me tell you, in Europe and amongst our European allies,
it gets a lot of attention, and it's being used well. We are
using this year's ERI to do a myriad of things: rotational
force, the division that has been rotating into our northern
nations now in that rotational army force funded by the ERI;
bringing aircraft over, such as the A-10s in Campia Turzii and
others--these are brought over in these funds.
Second of all, if I could show you on a map where all of
the investments in infrastructure have been made, you would see
a very clear move to the east and the south into our newer
nations, providing them with small things that would help us if
we had to rapidly reinforce--fixing railheads, fixing landing
strips and cargo pads, things that allow us to more quickly
join that partner, if we had to in the first, and plot it on a
map, you would see a string of investments that is
demonstratively in the east and in the south to address these
new nations.
And so, the ERI has had a direct impact already. And, as
you know, ma'am, we have asked for it to be continued in 2016.
Senator Shaheen. So, you are feeling positive about how
it's going, and the response from our European partners has
been very positive.
General Breedlove. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
My time is up. But, I just wanted to echo the comments that
you made about Georgia's contributions to the Afghanistan
effort and to support for NATO. I agree, I think they've been a
terrific partner, and hopefully will continue to be.
Thank you, General Breedlove.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, General, for your service and
leadership.
I wanted to ask you, if another Benghazi-type attack
occurred tomorrow or tonight in North Africa, would European
Command be better prepared to respond more quickly and
effectively to this type of attack in a region that we see even
more activity, more terrorism, and more instability at this
point?
General Breedlove. Senator, first and foremost, AFRICOM
would be better prepared to respond to this attack. And part of
the reason AFRICOM would be better prepared is because of our
hosting, preparing, training, on a day-to-day basis, of those
forces that AFRICOM would use. As you know, AFRICOM, we share
forces with AFRICOM. Our Special Forces, our airlift forces,
our fighters that are on alert are all EUCOM assets, but are at
the ready to rapidly support AFRICOM if it goes forward.
AFRICOM has been given a Special Purpose MAGTF Crisis Response,
which we host--we, EUCOM, host primarily at----
Senator Ayotte. You host that response team, correct?
General Breedlove. I do, ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. Yup.
General Breedlove. And Moron Airbase, in Spain. And today
we have several pieces of it deployed forward to be even more
ready because of concern.
Senator Ayotte. So, the answer would be, we'd be in a
better position, I hope?
General Breedlove. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. Good. That's really important. I appreciate
that.
And one of the questions I wanted to ask about--the
Associated Press reported today that Russia has significantly
deepened its command and control of the militants in eastern
Ukraine in recent months. And this greater level of Russian
involvement has evidently resulted in a new term, called
``combined Russian separatist forces.'' General Breedlove, can
you comment on that? Have you seen increased levels of Russian
command and control of the separatists, which I think none of
us were any--under any illusion from the beginning that they
were controlling these separatists, but it seems that they're
upping their game in that regard.
General Breedlove. I do agree with that, and I agree with
the reporting.
Senator Ayotte. And if that's the case, and we look at
what's happening right now--and I know that you were asked
earlier about some of Russia's other activities, including its
violation of the INF Treaty--you know, one of the things that
concerns, I think, all of us is that Russia doesn't seem to be
getting the message with the sanctions that are in place alone
right now, and with some of the support we're providing in the
absence of lethal weapons. So, how do you provide assurance to
us that we can stop Russia from further destabilizing eastern
Ukraine, and that the--the world understands. I mean, we--you
know, these separatists are really--we might as well just call
them what they are: Russian agents.
General Breedlove. Ma'am, it's a broad question, and I'll
try to attack it in a couple of pieces, here.
We do see a very distinct Russian set of command and
control in the eastern part of Ukraine. And that, I think, has
become necessary for them, because there was disunity in some
of the earlier attacks. I think the--command and control is
also required because they are bringing so much capability in
there, it needed to be structured, and it needed to be arranged
in a way that it could accomplish the goals there in eastern
Ukraine.
So, command and control, air defense, support to artillery,
all of these things increased and making a more coherent
organized force out of the separatists--I've never called them
``separatists,'' I've always called them ``Russian-led
separatists'' or ``Russian-backed separatists.'' There is a new
term out there. I think that term is being created because it
is becoming much more structured by Russian leadership.
How do we get the--whether Russia is getting the message or
not? There has been a lively conversation about whether what we
have done has affected Mr. Putin's calculus. I must admit that,
in the past, I did not think much so. But, I do now believe
that Mr. Putin is concerned about further sanctions in some of
the things. And that may be affecting how he currently does
things in eastern Ukraine. But, we really have no way of
knowing, one way or the other.
Senator Ayotte. So, can we expect--since we've heard from
some of our European partners, including Germany, that they
don't believe we should provide lethal weapons, can we expect
them to double down on sanctions, at least, in terms of where
Russia is right now? And I hope that this is something that
they don't back off on and, in fact, we increase sanctions.
General Breedlove. Ma'am, I really am unable to speak to
what our allies are thinking about, but we hear all of these
discussions and debates going on now about keeping the pressure
on. And I think there is a strong current which says that both
sides of the agreement are--need to be held to meeting this 12
February agreement that was made in Minsk, and that that will
have a direct bearing on whether sanctions are relieved, or
not.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you. I think all of us are very
frustrated, because we've been calling for so long for what
needs to be done in Ukraine to push back on Russia. And I just
hope that the administration is listening to the--what we've
heard, which has been continuous testimony, consistent in this
committee, about providing lethal support and additional
sanctions.
Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
Let's--I'd like to talk a little bit about the immigration
crisis. We now have some of our NATO allies that are down to
spending less than 1.5 percent of their GDP on defense.
Obviously, we have had a tragedy that has occurred with
hundreds of people going to their death because of their
efforts to immigrate to Europe from Africa and parts of the
Middle East. Can you tell me in what ways the American military
are involved in supporting or working with our European allies
as they work to humanely deal with all of the refugees that are
attempting to get to Europe?
General Breedlove. Ma'am, if I could dissect just a little
bit. There is a big problem, as you have identified, with this
flow of immigrants across from North Africa into southern
Europe; probably most acute in Italy, but there is a big
problem. We have talked today, and I agree with the
supposition, that this is primarily an immigration problem, but
also inside of these immigrants are organized crime and very
likely also terrorists and foreign fighters that are attempting
to get across. So, this is a problem broader than just the
immigration. But, certainly that is a major driver.
First and foremost, the Nations have addressed this, as we
talked about earlier. The Italian operation, Mare Nostrum,
worked this hard, and then the European Union has taken this
mission over and now is beginning to work that.
Your direct question about what the United States is doing,
we have a broad NATO network of sharing of information about
what's going on, on ths seas, where things are moving. To
explain the military term, we have a maritime cop, which is
just the picture of what's going on, on the sea, that we help
our neighbors understand and characterize what their--what is--
they're facing.
Senator McCaskill. I just worry that, as Italy is--you
know, they're spending so little on defense, and it--if they
are using any of their resources to address this, it certainly
limits their ability to participate in NATO with us in a more
robust fashion.
You know, I just am curious if you have any take on the
rise of the Scottish National Party, and what, if any, impact
you see. And if you want to take it for the record, you can,
General. I just--it's fascinating to me. These elections are
coming in a few days after they voted to not leave the United
Kingdom (U.K.) You're seeing a remarkable surge of political
power for the Scottish National Party. And a lot of
commentators are now saying that the Scottish National Party is
going to be the kingpin, in terms of the formation of a
government in what is obviously one of our most important
allies on the planet. Have you all discussed this? Is this
being talked about? It is--you know, I mean, Labor is really
getting swamped, according to the polling, by SNP. And what
impact is that going to have on U.K. and their robust
participation with us as an ally, particularly in NATO?
General Breedlove. Ma'am, can I take your generous offer
and take that for the record----
Senator McCaskill. Absolutely.
Senator McCaskill. What about Europeans leaving to fight
for the Islamic State? Are there any specific actions that the
European Command is taking to assist the effort of
identifying--they have a much bigger problem than we do, in
terms of citizens of Europe leaving to go and join the fight
with ISIS--is there any specific actions that you all have
taken in regards to this problem?
General Breedlove. Ma'am, the short answer is yes. Much of
that, we can't talk about in this room, and I would like to
send some of my people to maybe brief you and your staff.
Senator McCaskill. That would be terrific. We would be
interested in understanding what our role is in trying to
assist in stopping this flow of fighters to these barbarians.
Thank you very much, General, for your service. And thank
you, to your team.
Chairman McCain. Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General, for your service.
This is a question relating to the U.S. rebalance to Asia
while threats continue to materialize in other regions. In the
case of Russia, which crosses both the European and Pacific
Command areas of responsibility, do you see a potential for
leveraging our Asia-Pacific posture to influence Russia and its
actions in the European AOR, and vice versa? If you can briefly
comment. Because you did talk about the need to change Putin's
decision calculus by--i.e., possibly arming the Ukrainians or
of further economic sanctions.
General Breedlove. Senator, you have hit at the heart of
the matter. The--Russia does touch many COCOMs--essentially,
EUCOM, PACOM, NORTHCOM, because of the existential nuclear
capabilities in Alaska and the northern passage. Russia also
touches many of our specific non geographic COCOMs: STRATCOM,
CYBERCOM, TRANSCOM. There are so many that Russia touches.
We have had a model in the past in Asia that is called the
Chinese Strategic Initiative, and it has been a great model to
bring focus to the Asia-Pacific area. We have been treating
Russia as a partner for many years, and now we see that we're
going to have to take the same broad approach in Russia. And
so, EUCOM has led the formation of a Russia Strategic
Initiative, where we've brought together all of the COCOMs that
touch Russia, and we are working on just these concerns and
these opportunities that you mentioned in your question.
So, yes, we intend to look at Russia more holistically.
We've had a great start. And I expect that this will be a good
investment of stafftime.
Senator Hirono. So, I hope that, at some point, you might
be able to talk with us a bit more about how this strategic
initiative with regard to Russia is working out with all of the
different commands.
You--okay, you--I think you talked about the U.S. ballistic
missile defense, which is very much in high demand. So, can you
discuss the importance of the European Phase Adaptive Approach
and the benefits that Aegis Ashore provides in this approach?
And can you also update us on the progress of installing Aegis
Ashore in Romania and eventually in Poland?
General Breedlove. Let me answer the second part, because
it's very easy, and then I'll use what time you want for--to
talk more about European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA).
Our two sites in--first, in Deveselu, Romania, is on
course, on schedule to deliver technically on time. We're
slightly--and I emphasize ``slightly,'' because this is a good-
news story--we're slightly behind in the construction. But, the
team completely believes that we're on track for the technical
handover on time. And we are on or under budget, so far. So,
this is good news.
To the site in Poland, we are--just this week, have signed
almost every one of the agreements that are required in order
to start that work, so I think we are on track on our site in
Poland, as well.
So, these two missile sites will be, obviously, incredibly
important to our missile defense in Europe. And I am very--I am
well over--way over a ``glass half full'' that we are on track
with these.
To the larger question of European Phase Adaptive Approach,
the Europe--the American contributions are all moving apace. We
will close out with our fourth destroyer in Rota this year on
time. Our first two, and now third, are already doing their
mission. And our connection and our command and control C2BMC
capabilities are all proceeding apace. So, the U.S.
contribution to EPAA is on track. We see the--where we lead,
the Europeans follow. And I think that we see good cooperation
now from Europe as they bring alongside what is called ACS,
which is another command-and-control structure which they have
put over the--our--not only our air, naval, and our ground
capabilities to control these assets. We see several of the
northern European nations now, one committing and one thinking
about upgrading their Aegis platforms to be able to
participate.
So, the goal in NATO is 28 for 28, every nation contributes
some way. It may just be ground-based defense of a site, but we
want all 28 nations involved in this. And I am optimistic, at
this moment.
Senator Hirono. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up.
Chairman McCain. Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
Well, along the lines of everyone participating, it seems
to me, General, that, in talking to European Ministries of
Defense recently, and parliamentarians from various NATO and
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
countries, that there is a realization now among our European
allies that they're going to have to do a better job of getting
to the 2 percent GDP. I think I'm learning that the French, for
example, aren't quite there, but there's a determination to get
to 2 percent of GDP for defense quicker. So, how are we doing--
without taking my whole 5 minutes--across the board, in getting
our NATO allies to realize that they need to pony up as we're
coming to that realization here in Washington?
General Breedlove. Senator, I cannot confirm, but, on the
way here this morning, I read in the press that the French have
announced that they are going to raise their defense spending.
And so, I don't have any details. It's literally watching the
press releases as I came to this.
But, this is--I think there are several nations that are
trending in the right direction, here. I must admit that most
of them are those nations that are in our easternmost positions
in our alliance. But, we do have nations--Poland, others--that
are doing the right thing with their investments.
But, there are still challenges. The nations made this
pledge at Wales, as you know. They gave themselves to 2024 to
arrive at that. We see nations moving out now. In general, the
trend is that----
Senator Wicker. Well, we certainly need movement in the
right direction well before that.
General Breedlove. Sir, I could--I agree completely.
Senator Wicker. And do you agree, General, that it's not so
much our persuasiveness as the reality of what they see and the
actions of people that would be our adversaries over there?
General Breedlove. That is correct. And, Senator, the other
piece of this also is that, with their forces, they are
beginning to do all the right things. Great commitment to the
VJTF by six of our largest nations--European nations committing
to be the center brigade of the VJTF. The United States will
not be that center brigade right now. And so, six European
nations.
Senator Wicker. You know, with regard to the thing that
Chairman McCain started out talking about with the--supplying
defensive weapons to our Ukrainian friends, he noted that
Madeleine Albright, Henry Kissinger, Secretary Carter--and I
think you said you agree with the Secretary of Defense--have
all expressed, publicly before this committee, support for
arming our friends with defensive weapons. And I would simply
point out, they're--these are not jingoistic cowboys. You know,
they're very thoughtful people, some of the most preeminent
experts we have, and we have the benefit of their counsel here.
It seems to me that, with a substantial portion of our NATO
friends, there's a nervousness that somehow giving people the
ability to defend themselves with defensive weapons is going to
be a provocation to Mr. Putin and allow him to gen up his
propaganda machine. So, could you comment on that? And then, I
do want to ask you about being caught by surprise with what
happened in eastern Ukraine. So, if we could squeeze that in,
in my few moments.
General Breedlove. Senator, a weapon is a weapon. And
whether it's defensive or offensive is sort of in the hands of
the holder of the weapon. But, I--there is, as you have----
Senator Wicker. Acknowledged. Yes.
General Breedlove. Yeah. As you have described, Senator,
rightly, there is a conversation inside of our alliance. There
are nations that do want to provide lethal weapons. And there
are other nations who do believe that this is not the correct
approach. It is a lively debate. And my position has been
stated.
Senator Wicker. Well, let me just ask you. To me, it was
stunning to hear you admit that we were caught by surprise. And
I think you were referring to what happened in Crimea and in
eastern Ukraine. If we had--and I think you said that right
before you advocated a small additional investment in ISR--if
we had already had that small investment, would that have
prevented us from being caught by surprise by these ``little
green men'' coming into--men dressed in green uniforms--coming
into Crimea? And what would we have done, had we not--had we
been aware, with better ISR and better intel?
General Breedlove. Right. Senator, I'll have to go back and
look at the way I used those words. We have been caught by
surprise, but mostly it's as it relates to some of these large
exercises, like this last exercise that started off being
billed as an Arctic exercise; it really turned into a western
military district, southern military district, and Arctic
exercise. And, yes, sir, we were caught by surprise for that.
In fact, our first tipper to that came from social media, which
is an interesting thing.
But, my concern is that we are in a position where, for all
the right reasons over the past decade and a half, we have
refocused our intelligence apparatus, our analysts, our tools
on the wars that were going on, and on the new threats. And so,
I blame no one for these decisions. We were focused in areas
like Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Levant, et cetera.
But, what I think we need to consider now--what we, as a
Nation, need to consider, is, based on the new approach that we
see Russia taking to eastern Europe, we should look at, Do we
need to refocus any of those assets, be them analysts or actual
assets, towards the European program? And I would like to
compliment the Intelligence Community, because they have begun
a very dedicated reallocation of analysts to bring to our
problem. And it--I think the problem--and that, I have to just
absolutely thank them for, but I think that also we need to be
rethinking our ISR and other platforms that allow us to have
this feel for what's going on in eastern Europe that we have
not considered important for some time now.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
Well, I just commend you--and I--and I'll have to say, we--
apparently, the decisionmakers in this town have decided that
we will rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific. And that may be the
right decision, or it may not. But, I cannot think of a troop
that's in a hotter spot than you are. And I just--I hope that
this Congress and this Government understands that the area of
responsibility over which you preside is, indeed, very, very
consequential to us right now, here and now.
Thank you, sir.
Chairman McCain. Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
What's the likelihood, in your view, that Moldova will be
in Putin's crosshairs in the next year?
General Breedlove. Senator, I think it is an area of his
concern and emphasis. I think you are aware, and it's fairly
open knowledge, that the forces in Moldova have been
retrofitted with new equipment, et cetera, across the past year
or so. And we see the sort of interest and rhetoric in that
Transnistria region----
Senator Graham. Right.
General Breedlove.--that is concerning. And now we----
Senator Graham. Is it kind of almost what we saw in Crimea?
General Breedlove. Senator, I don't think it's to that
level yet, but it is the leading edge of these kinds of issues.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with me it's most likely to
occur unless he changes his mind through some recalculation of
cost-benefit analysis of what he's doing in the Ukraine right
now?
General Breedlove. Senator, I agree that I think Mr. Putin
is not done in Ukraine.
Senator Graham. He's not done in the Ukraine. Moldova may
be next. Let's talk about the Baltic states. Can you see a
situation--well, is it fair to say that the Russians are trying
to stir up problems for the Baltic states with a Russian-
speaking population? Is that ongoing right now?
General Breedlove. Senator, I think some of the information
outreach to these Russian speakers around eastern Europe,
specifically in the Baltics, is very--I'm trying--searching for
the word--it is very good. As we talked about earlier, Senator,
before you came----
Senator Graham. Good, from a Russian point of view.
General Breedlove. Sir, exactly.
Senator Graham. Bad for us.
General Breedlove. Very ``sophisticated'' was the word I
was looking for----
Senator Graham. Okay.
General Breedlove.--and I couldn't find it.
Senator Graham. What's the worst-case scenario for the
Ukraine?
General Breedlove. Senator, I worry a lot about the
military problem. I worry almost more about their fiscal
issues. We desperately for Ukraine to be able to address the
things that the people of Ukraine voted for in their last
election, and that is to reform, in a lot of ways, and, second,
they need to get their fiscal business in order. And it's hard
to do when your military is in the field, fighting.
Senator Graham. So, one way to bleed Kiev dry is to keep
the fight, keep them deployed.
General Breedlove. Keep the pressure on, keep the Ukrainian
military in the field. Investors are not going to want to
invest in a situation where there could be a military
conflict----
Senator Graham. So, that's one way of basically
dismembering the Ukraine without having to move to Kiev,
itself, right?
General Breedlove. I believe that's the case, Senator.
Senator Graham. Mariupol, the port city, is there a way for
the separatists, in collaboration with the Russians, to
basically cut that port off from the Ukrainian Government?
General Breedlove. Senator, I believe that it is one of the
courses of actions that may be considered. The town of Mariupol
is a big one, about half a million people.
Senator Graham. So, you don't have to invade it, but they
can basically isolate it.
General Breedlove. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Graham. And what would that mean for the economic
survivability of the Ukraine?
General Breedlove. Mariupol is very important to Ukraine,
because it is the port that most of their agriculture passes
through, because that area is----
Senator Graham. So, if you were the separatists or Putin,
and you really wanted to punish the government in Kiev, that
would be a move you would make.
General Breedlove. It is a good option to do that----
Senator Graham. And would you agree with me, if he takes
that option, that is just an--basically, an all-out declaration
of war through economic activity?
General Breedlove. That is an incredibly big step.
Senator Graham. Okay. So, if that step happens, what should
the Western response be?
General Breedlove. Senator, I can't speak for all of the
other nations, but I do know that most nations consider
Mariupol an important point----
Senator Graham. What will we do? Will they increase
sanctions?
General Breedlove. I--Senator, I can't answer for them. I
think that's certainly one of the----
Senator Graham. Should we increase sanctions if they do
this?
General Breedlove. I think it's most important that we
maintain the ones we have, first, and not release the----
Senator Graham. But, do you see this as a provocation
taking the whole conflict to a new level?
General Breedlove. I do, Senator.
Senator Graham. So, they--should be some red line regarding
this port city?
General Breedlove. Senator, I don't like to talk about red
lines. If you draw one----
Senator Graham. Well, I just want----
General Breedlove.--you have----
Senator Graham.--the committee and the country to start
thinking about what I think is almost inevitable. And we need a
plan. So, I--you don't have to do it here, but I want somebody
from the Pentagon to tell me what you recommend if they did
this provocative act of basically cutting off the port city,
which would destroy the Ukraine in a different fashion.
Senator Graham. Finally, in one second--you can take a
little bit of time--how does sequestration, over time, affect
your ability to deal with the Ukraine, Russia, and all the
problems you have in your backyard from migration, from a
exploding Mideast, the ability to defend our Nation from a
rogue missile attack coming from the Mideast, just the general
ability of you to do your job? And what kind of signal would
that send to NATO nations if we fully implement sequestration?
General Breedlove. Senator, thank you for that question.
It--sequestration would be very detrimental to our ability
to do our job forward. And I'll try to break it into a couple
of things, if the Chairman will give me a minute or two. I
can't do this in 10 seconds.
The first example, we talked about earlier. Part of our
budget in what we do in Europe is train our partners and
allies. As we talked about before, the ability to train
Russians--or, Russians, excuse me--Georgians and Romanians so
that they can serve beside us in places like Afghanistan, that
money will be cut, less Georgians will be trained, more
Americans would have to go to the field. So, sequestration
affects our ability to train and equip our partners and allies.
This also affects things as close to us as problems with
having airfields open when we need them. That's--the first BCA,
the first $478 billion cut, is what brought us to having to
make changes to things like Lajes, like Moron, and only have
Moron open during certain hours, which affects our ability to
use things like the Special Purpose MAGTF, et cetera.
And then, finally, our own ability to train ourselves and
to bring rotational forces into Europe. If--we talked earlier
about how the rotational forces are a part of a way that we
solve our forward-presence problem. Sequestration would affect
the funding for those rotational forces. Our rotational force
doesn't accomplish its objective unless it is heel-to-toe, no
air, and fully funded.
Senator Graham. Thank you for your outstanding service.
You've done a good job for us.
Chairman McCain. So, we didn't--General, you didn't mention
the effect on morale and retention of this lurching from one
year to another. Do you want to mention that?
General Breedlove. Senator--or, excuse me--Chairman,
clearly the things that we are able to do--let me first talk to
the morale of some of those that are in the fight. It's
important that we, I think, show faith with nations like
Georgia and others who have come alongside of us, and our
ability to continue to train and to provide, as you know, some
incredibly good medical care. I think you visited the five
Georgian soldiers who were in Walter Reed. And these things
that we do for them with our budget would be under challenge
and clearly affect their morale. For our troops, sir, you flew;
you knew that, when you were current and you had had enough
flying hours, you had one approach to your job; when you were
less current and had fewer flying hours, you had a different
approach to your job. And so, it's important that we give our
own soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines the training
opportunities and support they need.
Chairman McCain. And they're not getting it under
sequestration.
General Breedlove. Sequestration will challenge our ability
to do that, Senator.
Chairman McCain. I just wanted to mention one other issue
very briefly. The Portuguese are our great friends, and this
issue of Lajes has turned into one of their biggest issues.
Have you looked at alternative uses for the base, such as
putting AFRICOM or SOCOM there, or move intelligence? Would you
evaluate that again for us? It is such a huge issue for a small
country that has been very helpful to us in Afghanistan and
Iraq and Iran. It's just--I've been visited, frankly, by their
Foreign Minister and many others that are deeply concerned. So,
I'd appreciate if you'd have another look at it to see if we
can have greater use of the--of Lajes.
General Breedlove. Senator, we'll do that. You are correct,
they are a great ally. They are about to deploy a pretty large
aviation contingency into Romania to do air policing in the
middle part of our eastern part of our alliance. Portugal is a
great ally. And we have done a lot of work already to try to
make things better in this Lajes issue. Even in the civilian
sector, our business executives and defense BENS have been
there. So, we are on this problem, Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Thank you very much.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I'm sorry, General Breedlove, I had to be gone at a
news conference. And so, I'm not sure what all you've covered.
I wanted to mention one thing that I was aware of. First of
all, I'm sure you've talked about the Ukraine. I had occasion
to be in the Ukraine at the time that they had their elections.
It was the first time that--it takes 5 percent in order to get
a seat in Parliament--this is the first time in 96 years that
there will not be one Communist in the Parliament of Ukraine.
That's huge. That's really a big deal. And I'm very
disappointed in what the military has done there. You know,
immediately after that, you had Putin come in, and he's still
over there. And I'm sure you've discussed this, but I just
wanted to say to you that, when I--when you're there, as I was,
and experience a major change taking place that hasn't happened
in 96 years, and it's all--their allegiance to the west and to
the United States of America, we haven't done nearly as much to
assist them as I believe we should. What are your thoughts
about that?
General Breedlove. Senator, first of all, I--as I visit, I
see the same things. Let me just make a silly example. In the
past, it has been said of what used to be called ``The
Ukraine,'' rather than ``Ukraine,'' that its identity was
primarily Russian. I know that, as you were driven through the
city to go see President Poroshenko or Prime Minister
Yatsenyuk, you probably saw the same thing as I did: bridges
painted blue and yellow. This is a nation that has woken up to
its nationality, and it is a great people. And I believe they
are worthy of our attention and help.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah. Well, I do, too. And I'm glad you
mentioned Yatsenyuk, because he's a different political party--
--
General Breedlove. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe.--than Poroshenko, and yet they are together
in this one thing, and that is their allegiance to us and to
the West.
Let me ask you about this, because I was following this
thing when their--the idea of consolidating the intelligence
assets to Croughton--is that pronounced right? ``Krowton''?
General Breedlove. It is, Senator, thank you.
Senator Inhofe. And it made sense to me, after what
happened in Molesworth. And it would seem the logical place.
Now, we're talking about the U.K. And yet, I understand--I
guess in the House, where there is some effort to move that to,
of all places, the Azores or someplace like that. I'd just like
to get your--do you feel as I do, that it's--when the--you
know, if it's--it just seems to me that there is a reason to
consolidate these assets in a place like U.K. And I think it
should be done that--what are your thoughts?
General Breedlove. Senator, thank you. The--there was a lot
of work done when the siting of this consolidation was
considered. Many locations were considered. The business case,
first, is a first point. It points to the current siting plan
in the United Kingdom. There are other intangibles. The
communication pipes in the U.K. are extremely good, and would
not have to be altered to take on the new--in Croughton, would
not have to be altered. We were--we would be there, close to
our United Kingdom and other allies who have a great
relationship with us in intel.
In my NATO job, the NIFC, we call it, the NATO Intelligence
Fusion Center, is there in United Kingdom. It would not be able
to relocate, because this is 28 nations who have negotiated
with the United Kingdom to stay there. And I think the
synergies of keeping our U.S. and AFRICOM and EUCOM
capabilities next to our United Kingdom partners, next to the
NATO NIFC--all of these synergies point to a good solution
there at Croughton.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah. But, you know, I--and I agree with
that. You're making my argument, there. And you--and for all
those reasons. Can you tell me, is there a specific reason that
you know of why somehow the Lajes location might be attractive?
General Breedlove. Senator, I think there are--there are
opportunities there, because there is room that is being
created by the downsizing of our mission there. There would
have to be some changes made, as----
Senator Inhofe. Yeah.
General Breedlove.--I mentioned before--communications
capabilities, et cetera.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah. Well, I appreciate that.
My time is expired, but I'm looking forward to the chip of
the old block, Dan, coming in to be my intern. Looking forward
to that.
General Breedlove. Sir, thank you. I am--I will make sure
that he is squared away. [Laughter.]
Senator Inhofe [presiding]. Yeah. Thank you.
Are there others who want to be heard?
Senator King. I want to, as well.
Senator Reed. I want to--just a brief comment.
The Chairman and Senator Inhofe raised the issue of Lajes.
This is an issue of very great importance. We've worked very
closely with the Department of Defense. Any efforts that you
could bring to bear to repurpose the facility, to provide
continuing presence of a significant nature, would--I would
appreciate personally, also, General. And again, thank you for
your efforts.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
Senator King.
Senator King. General Breedlove, this comment really isn't
directed at you. I--and so, I don't want you to batten down the
hatches, or pull over the canopy, I guess, in your case.
This government spends over $70 billion a year on
intelligence. And I hate hearing the word ``surprise'' in any
hearing. And I get frustrated when I hear about your need for
ISR. And I have the greatest respect for the people in the
Intelligence Community. I work with them quite frequently as a
member of the Intelligence Committee. But, I want you to think
of yourself as a customer and suggest that you might talk to
your colleagues in the other commands, because I think
sometimes we forget who needs the intelligence. And you--you're
the guy that needs it, you're the customer, and you need to
advocate for the--for adequate intelligence resources, whether
it's from the civilian Intelligence Community or the Department
of Defense, which, as you know, has a very substantial
intelligence budget. And I think this is something we need to
continue to think, because--think about, because sometimes
these agencies go on their own momentum and lose track of who
needs the information and what they actually need.
So, this really isn't a question, General, except a--more
of a suggestion. But, I've got to tell you, when I think about
$70 billion of the taxpayers' money, like I say, I don't like
hearing the word ``surprise'' in any of these hearings.
I appreciate your testimony.
General Breedlove. Senator, at risk--can I--may I respond,
just a little?
Senator Inhofe. Yes, certainly.
Senator King. Absolutely.
General Breedlove. I want to pay the proper respect to
decisions that have been made across the last 15 or 20 years,
because I do believe we've been trying to make Russia a
partner, and we have come into conflicts in Iraq, in
Afghanistan, we've come into great issues in the northern part
of Africa. So, I do not want to stand as critical to the
decisions that have been made with the limited assets of
intelligence. And I believe that our Intelligence Community has
kept a great focus on--those things are very dear to us in
Russia, if I can stop at that point.
But, I think that you are absolutely correct, that now we
see that there is a different problem, and we need to look at
how we apportion and allocate. I already see, as I mentioned
earlier, the Intelligence Community making clear decisions to
reallocate analytical capabilities, et cetera. And I will be a
customer, sir. I have been vocal, and I had it I my opening
remarks, here, as you saw. I am beginning to advocate that we
look at reapportionment of those assets, as well. So, I agree
with your line of logic, Senator.
Senator King. Minimal trust and lots of verification may be
this answer.
General Breedlove. Yes, sir.
Senator King. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Wicker, anything else?
Senator Wicker. No, thank you.
Senator Inhofe. All right. We will adjourn this meeting.
Thank you so much for your attention today and for your
service.
[Whereupon, at 11:41 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
military assistance for ukraine
1. Senator Jack Reed. At the April 30th hearing, in response to a
question from Chairman McCain regarding military assistance for
Ukraine, you stated that you support consideration of the use of
``offensive'' weapons to change President Putin's decision calculus.
For the record, please clarify what types of military assistance you
believe should be considered.
General Breedlove. [Deleted].

[all]