    [Senate Hearing 114-204, Part 1]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                     S. Hrg. 114-204, Pt. 1

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2016 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 1376

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
       MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
                                    PURPOSES

                                   ----------

                                     PART 1

                      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE
                                  NAVY POSTURE
                U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND
                          ARMY AND AIR FORCE POSTURES
      U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND, AND U.S. CYBER
                                    COMMAND
     U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND AND U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS
                          COMMAND PROGRAMS AND BUDGET
                   U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES KOREA
                   U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND PROGRAMS AND BUDGET

                                   ----------

                MARCH 3, 10, 12, 18, 19, 26; APRIL 16, 30, 2015

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

      Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

                                                     S. Hrg. 114-204, Pt. 1

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2016 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 1376

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
       MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
                                    PURPOSES

                                   __________

                                     PART 1

                      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE
                                  NAVY POSTURE
                U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND
                          ARMY AND AIR FORCE POSTURES
      U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND, AND U.S. CYBER
                                    COMMAND
     U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND AND U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS
                          COMMAND PROGRAMS AND BUDGET
                   U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES KOREA
                   U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND PROGRAMS AND BUDGET

                                   __________

                MARCH 3, 10, 12, 18, 19, 26; APRIL 16, 30, 2015

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

            Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/

                                       ______

                             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

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                              Washington, DC 20402-0001

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                         JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman

    JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma            JACK REED, Rhode Island
    JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama               BILL NELSON, Florida
    ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi         CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
    KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire          JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
    DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas                 KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
    MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota            RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
    JONI ERNST, Iowa                     JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
    THOM TILLIS, North Carolina          MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
    DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska                 TIM KAINE, Virginia
    MIKE LEE, Utah                       ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
    LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina       MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
    TED CRUZ, Texas

                       Christian D. Brose, Staff Director

                   Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director

                                      (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                                 march 3, 2015

                                                                       Page

    Department of Defense Budget Posture.............................     1

    Carter, Hon. Ashton B., Secretary of Defense; Accompanied by Hon.
      Mike McCord, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Chief
      Financial Officer..............................................     5
    Dempsey, GEN Martin E., USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.....    22

    Questions for the Record.........................................    72

                                 march 10, 2015

    Navy Posture.....................................................   109

    Mabus, Hon. Raymond E., Jr., Secretary of the Navy...............   113
    Dunford, Gen. Joseph F., Jr., USMC, Commandant of the Marine
      Corps..........................................................   132
    Greenert, ADM Jonathan W., USN, Chief of Naval Operations........   145

    Questions for the Record.........................................   200

                                 march 12, 2015

    U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern Command..................   239

    Gortney, ADM William E., USN, Commander, U.S. Northern Command,
      and Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command........   242
    Kelly, Gen. John F., USMC, Commander, U.S. Southern Command......   244

                                 march 18, 2014

    Postures of the Department of The Army and the Department of The
      Air Force......................................................   279

    McHugh, Hon. John M., Secretary of the Army......................   283
    James, Hon. Deborah Lee, Secretary of the Air Force..............   300
    Odierno, Gen. Raymond T., USA, Chief of Staff of the Army........   308
    Welsh, Gen. Mark A., III, USAF, Chief of Staff of the Air Force..   310

    Questions for the Record.........................................   349

                                 march 19, 2015

    U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Transportation Command, and U.S.
      Cyber Command..................................................   387

    Haney, ADM Cecil D., USN, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command......   390
    Selva, Gen. Paul J., USAF, Commander, U.S. Transportation Command   401
    Rogers, ADM Michael S., USN, Commander, U.S. Cyber Command/
      Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security
      Services.......................................................   412

    Questions for the Record.........................................   437

                                 march 26, 2015

    U.S. Central Command, U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Special
      Operations Command Programs and Budget.........................   543

    Votel, GEN Joseph L., USA, Commander, U.S. Special Operations
      Command........................................................   547
    Rodriguez, GEN David M., USA, Commander, U.S. Africa Command.....   556
    Austin, GEN Lloyd J., III, USA, Commander, U.S. Central Command..   566

    Questions for the Record.........................................   614

                                 april 16, 2015

    U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Forces Korea.......................   621

    Locklear, ADM Samuel J., III, USN, Commander, U.S. Pacific
      Command........................................................   624
    Scaparrotti, GEN Curtis M., USA, Commander, United Nations
      Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea..............   639

    Questions for the Record.........................................   679

                                 april 30, 2015

    U.S. European Command Programs and Budget........................   687

    Breedlove, Gen. Philip M., USAF, Commander, U.S. European
      Command/Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.......................   691

    Questions for the Record.........................................   737

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2016 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, MARCH 3, 2015

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:43 p.m. in room
    SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Wicker,
    Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Lee,
    Graham, Reed, Nelson, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
    Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, and Heinrich.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman McCain. Good afternoon. I want to apologize for
    keeping you waiting, Secretary Carter and General Dempsey and
    Secretary McCord. We had a vote, and members will be arriving.
        The committee meets today to receive testimony on the
    Department of Defense's fiscal year 2016 budget request, the
    associated Future Years Defense Programs (FYDP), and the
    posture of U.S. Armed Forces.
        Let me start by thanking each of you for your service to
    our Nation and to the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines
    here at home and in harm's way around the globe, and to their
    families.
        Over just the past 6 weeks, this committee has undertaken a
    serious and rigorous review of the present global challenges we
    face, as well a review of the U.S. National Security Strategy.
        We have received testimony from some of America's most
    experienced statesmen and leading strategic thinkers. A unified
    and alarming assessment has emerged from these national
    leaders.
        As former Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger testified
    on January 29, ``The United States has not faced a more diverse
    and complex array of crises since the end of the Second World
    War.''
        Given the accumulating dangers we face, it is notable that
    the President supported the Department of Defense in requesting
    a level of defense spending that is roughly $38 billion above
    the caps imposed by the Budget Control Act [BCA] and
    sequestration, which mandates nearly $1 trillion in defense
    cuts over 10 years. In light of recent events, I think this
    approach was more than justified.
        With each passing year since the BCA was enacted in 2011,
    and with the United States slashing its defense spending as a
    result, the world has become more dangerous and threats to our
    Nation have grown. I don't think that is purely a coincidence.
        The President's budget request responds to many critical
    priorities, particularly addressing cyber and space
    vulnerabilities, military readiness shortfalls, and essential
    long-term modernization initiatives.
        At the same time, the President's request reflects budget-
    driven policy decisions that would reduce some critical
    military capabilities, either through the early retirement or
    cancellation of existing systems, deferred development or
    procurement of new systems, or withheld funding for proven
    requirements.
        This committee will closely scrutinize these decisions and
    seek to meet urgent and legitimate military needs, where
    possible.
        As for meeting our growing national security requirements,
    General Martin Dempsey's prepared testimony this afternoon
    states that the President's request is ``at the lower ragged
    edge of manageable risk'' and leaves ``no slack, no margin left
    for error or strategic surprise.''
        I would go further. I question whether the Defense
    Department's current strategy, which was released in January
    2012, has not been overtaken by world events, which would
    suggest the need for new strategic guidance and even more
    defense spending than the President's request.
        Just consider the events of the past year alone. Russia has
    challenged core principles of the postwar order in Europe by
    invading and annexing the territory of another sovereign
    Nation. A terrorist army that has proclaimed its desire to
    attack America and its allies now controls a vast swath of
    territory in the heart of the Middle East. Iran continues its
    pursuit of nuclear weapons while expanding its malign influence
    across the region. North Korea mounted the most brazen
    cyberattack ever on our territory. China has stepped up its
    coercive behavior in Asia, backed by its rapid military
    modernization.
        The findings of last year's National Defense Panel cast
    serious doubt on whether our military can fulfill even the
    current strategy at acceptable risk. This bipartisan group of
    military commanders and policymakers stated that the defense
    spending cuts imposed by the BCA and sequestration ``constitute
    a serious strategic misstep.'' More ominously, the Panel
    concluded that, ``In the extreme, the United States could find
    itself in a position where it must either abandon an important
    national interest or enter a conflict for which it is not fully
    prepared.''
        Based on its findings, the National Defense Panel
    recommended unanimously that Congress and the President
    immediately repeal the BCA and return, at a minimum, to the
    last strategy-driven budget proposed by former Secretary of
    Defense Robert Gates in 2011. That would mean $611 billion for
    the discretionary base budget for the Defense Department in
    fiscal year 2016.
        But here, too, I would note that the world has changed
    significantly since 2011, and this recommendation is more
    likely a floor, not a ceiling, of what we as a Nation should be
    considering for our own defense.
        While Senator Reed and I support the National Defense
    Panel's recommendations, we recognize that $611 billion for
    defense is neither realistic in the current political
    environment, nor is it likely that the department could
    responsibly execute this funding in fiscal year 2016. That is
    why Senator Reed and I came together in the Views and Estimates
    letter that we sent last week to the Budget Committee to
    propose an objective that, I hope, could be a new basis for
    bipartisan unity: ending sequestration for defense by
    allocating $577 billion in discretionary base budget authority
    for fiscal year 2016.
        I recognize there are differences of opinion over broader
    fiscal questions, especially how to approach nondefense
    discretionary spending, but continuing to live with the
    unacceptable effects of sequestration is a choice.
        Sequestration is the law, but Congress makes the laws. We
    can choose to end the debilitating effects of sequestration,
    and we must, because at sequestration levels, it is impossible
    to meet our constitutional responsibility to provide for our
    National defense.
        We look forward to the witnesses' testimony today and hope
    that they will cover a broad spectrum of the policy and
    resource issues the department confronts. I would also ask our
    witnesses to share their views on the current situations in
    Ukraine, Syria, and Iraq.
        I want to thank Senator Reed for his continued bipartisan
    cooperation that has characterized our relationship for many
    years, especially on this joint letter to the Budget Committee.
    I thank you.
        Senator Reed?

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me join you in
    welcoming Secretary Carter, Chairman Dempsey, and Mr. McCord.
        Gentlemen, I appreciate your willingness to be here today
    to talk about the President's fiscal year 2016 budget request,
    which the Chairman has noted is $38 billion above the Budget
    Control Act discretionary funding caps. But also as the
    Chairman noted, these BCA caps, coupled with the imminent
    threat of sequestration level cuts and the lack of budget
    stability necessary for military planning, create an urgent and
    growing strategic problem that we simply must address.
        Indeed, in my view, it creates a problem for every Federal
    agency and department. I think sequestration, across-the-board,
    must be ended.
        On January 28, this committee heard stark testimony from
    each of the service chiefs about the impact of reduced funding
    levels. All of the Services are working hard to maintain near-
    term readiness to meet the ``fight tonight'' requirement, but
    only by assuming increased risk in the form of cuts and delays
    to training, maintenance, modernization, and infrastructure
    sustainment, and by curtailing quality-of-life programs.
        As Air Force Chief of Staff General Welsh eloquently
    stated, ``When the bugle calls, we will win. But the
    vulnerabilities sequestration introduces into our forces will
    encourage our adversaries, worry our allies, limit the number
    of concurrent operations we can conduct, and increase risk to
    the men and women who fight America's next war.''
        The Services, the men and women in uniform, are the
    backbone of our Nation's defense, and they are under great
    strain. I am, certainly, interested in the witnesses' testimony
    on how the Department of Defense will continue to manage this
    problem while a solution is not yet on the horizon.
        If you do not get the $38 billion over the BCA, that is the
    President's request--again, Senator McCain and I are urging
    even more--what must be cut? If sequestration is not avoided,
    what else must be cut? What is your timetable for beginning to
    implement these cuts?
        As I stated earlier, the services are focused on near-term
    readiness, and they need to be, because they are actively
    engaged around the world, fighting significant challenges to
    U.S. national security interests.
        In Afghanistan, the commanding general of United States
    Forces, General Campbell, believes he has the resources and
    authorities he needs for the 2015 fighting season, but the
    Taliban remain resilient despite coming under pressure on both
    sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
        Operations against ISIS in Iraq and Syria continue at a
    pace that appears to be rolling back their territorial gains of
    last year and providing the time and space needed for advise-
    and-assist programs. But this critical campaign must continue
    unabated if it is going to be successful against such a
    dangerous enemy. The fight will be harder, each and every day,
    especially as Iraqi forces try to enter urban centers like
    Mosul.
        In Europe, the post-Cold War international order is under
    threat from a Russia that seeks to dominate Ukraine and
    intimidate its other neighbors, including by conducting
    increasingly aggressive military activities both within and
    outside its borders. Turmoil in Yemen and Libya provide safe
    havens for terrorists and must be closely watched. China's
    actions continue to make its neighbors uneasy.
        Meeting all of these threats requires ready troops and
    adequate funding, and I am interested in the witnesses' views
    on how you are prioritizing this funding.
        In addition to ongoing operations, there are emerging
    threats, which will require immediate and significant
    investments.
        The recent cyberattack on Sony by North Korea illustrates
    that even a relatively small and weak rogue nation can cause
    extensive damage to United States-based economic targets
    through cyberspace. The United States must work to counter this
    threat.
        In addition, I also understand that efforts are now
    underway to protect our space assets from hostile acts, an
    equally serious asymmetric threat and one that will require
    substantial funding.
        In focusing on emerging threats, we cannot disregard the
    significant funding necessary for the maintenance and
    modernization of our nuclear enterprise, including the Ohio-
    class replacement submarine.
        I am interested in hearing how the Department will balance
    new threats with legacy programs. Clearly, the department has
    many bills to pay, and they cannot do it without the help of
    Congress.
        Military personnel costs consume approximately a third of
    the Department's budget. The department has once again
    submitted several proposals aimed at slowing the growth of
    military personnel costs. This committee must carefully
    consider these proposals, as well as the recommendations of the
    Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission,
    in order to provide the Defense Department with flexibility in
    these areas.
        With regard to BRAC, I understand the department is again
    requesting an additional base realignment and closure, or BRAC,
    round in 2017. While BRAC has been controversial in the past, I
    do believe that we need to consider efforts to allow the
    Defense Department to shed what may be as much as 25 percent in
    excess infrastructure it does not necessarily need, and use
    these resources to invest in higher priorities.
        Again, I would appreciate your views on this matter.
        While the focus today is on the defense budget, the
    Pentagon simply cannot meet all these national security
    challenges without the help of other government departments and
    agencies, including State, Justice, Homeland Security, and the
    Intelligence Community.
        So, again, I would ask, as you speak, to comment on the
    interagency necessities that are facing the department.
        Let me commend all our witnesses for working hard. Let me
    commend the Chairman for his efforts, particularly in leading
    our mutual letter to the Budget Committee.
        I look forward to your testimony.
        Chairman McCain. Secretary Carter?

       STATEMENT OF HON. ASHTON B. CARTER, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE;
      ACCOMPANIED BY HON. MIKE McCORD, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
               (COMPTROLLER) AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

        Secretary Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
    Reed, all the members of the committee. Thank you for inviting
    me to be here today with you, and thank you for confirming me
    as Secretary of Defense. I am honored by the trust and
    confidence of President Obama in appointing me, and the Senate
    in confirming me.
        My care and respect for the men and women of the finest
    fighting force the world has ever known is as boundless as
    their skill and devotion. I know this committee shares the same
    devotion to them and shares responsibility for them and for the
    defense of our great country. I hope that my tenure as
    Secretary of Defense will be marked by partnership with you on
    their behalf.
        I am here to present the President's budget for the
    Department of Defense for fiscal year 2016. Since I have been
    on the job for exactly two weeks, it is plain that I did not
    have a role in shaping this budget. But I have studied it
    carefully, and I am fully prepared to answer your questions
    about it and to work with you to find common ground where you
    have concerns.
        Most importantly, I strongly support the President in
    requesting a defense budget above the artificial caps of the
    Budget Control Act, above the so-called sequester levels, next
    year and in the years thereafter. I share the President's
    desire to find a way forward that upholds the fundamental
    principles behind the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, and I
    support the President's commitment to vetoing any bill that
    locks in sequestration, because to do otherwise would be both
    unsafe and wasteful.
        Before I turn to the budget to explain what I mean by that,
    allow me to share some observations from my short time on the
    job, observations that help reinforce my testimony here.
    Shortly after I was sworn in, I spoke to the people of the
    Department of Defense--military, civilian, and contractor--and
    told them I had three commitments as Secretary of Defense.
        The first is to them and their families, to their safety,
    their welfare, and their effectiveness, and equally to those
    who came before them and to those who will come after them.
        The second commitment is to assist the President as he
    makes difficult decisions about how to defend the country in a
    turbulent world, and then to carry out those decisions where
    they involve the use of military force.
        The third commitment is to the future, to make sure our
    military remains the very best in an ever-changing world amidst
    fast-moving technological and commercial change, and as we seek
    to attract new generations to the mission of national security.
        Because of those commitments, I traveled at the end of my
    first week on the job to Afghanistan to visit our troops and
    commanders, and also the leaders of Afghanistan and some of
    their military leaders. I wanted to assess the conditions on
    the ground there as we enter a new phase of our long campaign
    and as we carry out the transition to an enduring presence that
    will ensure, as the President says, our progress in Afghanistan
    sticks.
        Next, I traveled to Kuwait, where I met with the emir
    before convening senior American diplomats and military leaders
    from throughout the region; Ambassadors from several countries;
    our commanders from CENTCOM [United States Central Command],
    EUCOM [United States European Command], AFRICOM [United States
    Africa Command], and SOCOM [United States Special Operations
    Command]; and the commanders of the campaign in Iraq and Syria
    against ISIL [the Islamic State of Syria and the Levant]. I
    wanted to hear directly from them about the complex political
    and military situation in the region and about the best
    approaches to leveraging U.S. leadership of the broad coalition
    combating this ugly scourge. This afternoon, I would be pleased
    to discuss these challenges or any others--the Chairman
    mentioned Ukraine--in addition to the budget.
        The point is that in these regions of the world, just as in
    the Asia-Pacific, in Europe and elsewhere, it is America's
    leadership and America's men and women in uniform who
    frequently stand between order and disorder, who stand up to
    malicious and destabilizing actors while standing with those
    who believe with us in a more secure, just, and prosperous
    future for all of our children.
        But this Congress will determine whether our troops can
    continue to do so. The administration is proposing to increase
    the defense budget in line with the projection submitted to
    Congress last year. By halting the decline in defense spending
    imposed by the Budget Control Act, the President's budget would
    give us the resources we need to execute our Nation's defense
    strategy.
        But, and I want to be clear about this, under
    sequestration, which is set to return in 212 days, our Nation
    would be less secure.
        Mr. Chairman, as you yourself have reminded Congress,
    sequestration threatens our military readiness, the size of our
    warfighting forces, the capabilities of our air and naval
    fleets, and, ultimately, the lives of our men and women in
    uniform.
        The Joint Chiefs have said the same before this committee,
    and they could not have been more clear in their assessment of
    the damage sequestration would do to our National security.
        I want to commend you and thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
    Member Reed, for your very thoughtful letter to the leadership
    of the Senate Budget Committee about the dangers the
    sequestration, and I completely agree with you that the threat
    of sequestration is, as you said, ``a national security crisis
    of the first order.''
        The great tragedy is that this corrosive damage to our
    National security is not the result of objective factors,
    logic, or reason. It is not that we have some new breakthrough
    in military technology or some novel strategic insight that
    somehow provides the same security for a smaller budget. It is
    not that sequester is forced upon us by economic emergency or
    dire recession that makes taking grave security risks
    absolutely necessary. It is surely not the case that the world
    has suddenly become more stable or that America has less to do
    to keep it safe, allowing us to take a peace dividend. It is
    not even that these cuts solve the Nation's overall fiscal
    challenges, because the sad math is that they are large and
    sudden enough to damage defense but fail to resolve our long-
    term fiscal issues and the real drivers of the deficit and
    debt.
        Sequester was not the result of objective factors.
    Sequester is purely the fallout of political gridlock. Its
    purpose was to compel prudent compromise on our long-term
    fiscal challenges, compromise that never came. This has been
    compounded in recent years because the Defense Department has
    suffered a double whammy, the worst of both worlds, that has
    coupled mindless sequestration with constraints on our ability
    to reform.
        We need your help with both. I know that Chairman McCain,
    Senator Reed, and others on this committee are as committed to
    reform as I am, and I look forward to working with you on new
    reforms.
        We at the Pentagon can and must do better at getting value
    for the defense dollar. Taxpayers have trouble comprehending,
    let alone supporting, the defense budget when they hear about
    cost overruns, insufficient accounting and accountability,
    needless overhead, excess infrastructure, and the like.
        There are significant savings to be found through new
    reforms across DOD [the Department of Defense], reforms that we
    are committed to pursuing. But sequester cuts don't help us
    achieve any of them. In fact, the nature of sequester
    frequently leads to waste as, for example, when it forces a
    reduction in contract production rates driving up unit costs.
        But at the same time that I am committed to new and further
    reforms, I must note that, in the past several years, painful
    but necessary reforms proposed by DOD, reforms involving
    elimination of overhead and unneeded infrastructure, retirement
    of older force structure, and reasonable adjustments and
    compensation, have been denied by Congress.
        I need your help with these reforms, which have been
    frustrated at the same time sequester looms and at the same
    time as we make new reforms. I will work with Congress to
    resolve concerns and find common ground, but we must have your
    help.
        If confronted with sequester-level budgets and continued
    obstacles to reform, I do not believe that we can simply keep
    making incremental cuts while maintaining the same general set
    of objectives that have anchored our defense strategy. We would
    have to change the shape and not just the size of our military,
    significantly impacting parts of our defense strategy. We
    cannot meet sequester with further half measures.
        As Secretary of Defense, I will not send our troops into a
    fight with outdated equipment, inadequate readiness, or
    ineffective doctrine. But everything else is on the table,
    including parts of our budget that have long been considered
    inviolate.
        This may lead to decisions that no Americans, including
    Members of Congress, want us to make.
        I'm not afraid to ask the difficult questions, but if we
    are stuck with sequestration's budget cuts over the long term,
    our entire Nation will have to live with the answers.
        So instead of sequestration, I urge you to urge your
    colleagues to embrace the alternative: building the force of
    the future powerful enough to underwrite our strategy, equipped
    with boldly new technology; leading in domains like cyber and
    space, as the Chairman and Senator Reed said; attracting and
    retaining the best Americans to our mission; being lean and
    efficient throughout our enterprise; and showing resolve to
    friends and potential foes alike.
        I think we can all agree that the world in 2014 was more
    complicated than anyone could've predicted. Given today's
    security environment, the President's proposed increase in
    defense spending over last year's budget is responsible, and
    it's prudent.
        I earnestly hope we can come together behind a long-term
    budget approach that dispels sequester and provides stability,
    rather than doing this one year at a time.
        I hope we can again unite behind what our great Nation
    should and must do to protect our people and make a better
    world. I hope we can provide our magnificent men and women of
    the Department of Defense, who make up the greatest fighting
    force the world has ever known, what they need and what they
    fully deserve.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Carter follows:]

                     Prepared Statement by Hon. Ash Carter
        Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, members of the committee:
    thank you for confirming me as Secretary of Defense, and for inviting
    me here today to discuss the President's fiscal year 2016 budget
    request for the Department of Defense (DOD). Oversight is key to our
    system of government. I not only welcome your wisdom and experience; I
    also want your partnership, and need your help.
        I also want to thank Chairman Dempsey for his leadership, as well
    as Deputy Secretary Work and Vice Chairman Winnefeld, in particular for
    all their hard work over the past year in helping develop the budget
    request we will be discussing today.
                          i. introduction and strategy
        Since I last appeared before this committee, I had the opportunity
    to see our troops in Afghanistan and Kuwait. Hearing from them was one
    of my highest priorities upon taking office.
        In Afghanistan, our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are
    helping cement progress made toward a more secure, stable, and
    prosperous future, by training, advising, and assisting Afghan forces
    and continuing their counterterrorism mission. They are working to
    ensure that Afghanistan never again becomes a safe haven for attacks on
    our homeland, or on our partners and allies.
        In Kuwait, our men and women in uniform are contributing to our
    counter-ISIL coalition in Iraq and Syria. They are working closely with
    Iraq and our global coalition partners to ensure that local forces can
    deliver lasting defeat to a vile enemy that has barbarically murdered
    American citizens, Iraqis, Syrians, and so many others, and that seeks
    to export its hateful and twisted ideology across the Middle East and
    North Africa, and beyond.
        No doubt the challenges and opportunities we face extend well
    beyond the Middle East.
        In Europe, our troops are helping reinforce and reassure our allies
    in Eastern Europe as we confront a reversion to archaic security
    thinking.
        In the Asia-Pacific--home to half the world's population and
    economy--they are working to modernize our alliances, build new
    partnerships, and helping the United States continue to underwrite
    stability, peace, and prosperity in the region--as we have for decades.
        As we still meet longtime challenges, such as the continuing
    imperative to counter the spread of weapons of mass destruction, our
    Armed Forces are also addressing new dangers, such as in cyberspace.
        Across the world, it is America's leadership, and America's men and
    women in uniform, who often stand between disorder and order--who stand
    up to malicious and destabilizing actors, while standing behind those
    who believe in a more secure, just, and prosperous future.
        Mr. Chairman, this committee and this Congress will determine
    whether our troops can continue to do so--whether they can continue to
    defend our Nation's interests around the world with the readiness,
    capability, and excellence our Nation has grown accustomed to, and
    sometimes taken for granted.
        Halting and reversing the decline in defense spending imposed by
    the Budget Control Act, the President's budget would give us the
    resources we need to execute our Nation's defense strategy.
        It would ensure we field a modern, ready force in a balanced way,
    while also embracing change and reform, because asking for more
    taxpayer dollars requires we hold up our end of the bargain--by
    ensuring that every dollar is well-spent.
        The President is proposing to increase the defense budget in fiscal
    year 2016, but in line with the projection he submitted to Congress
    last year in the fiscal year 2015 budget's Future Years Defense Program
    (FYDP). The department is executing the plan it presented last year.
    Accordingly, for fiscal year 2016, the President is proposing $534
    billion for DOD's base budget and $51 billion in Overseas Contingency
    Operations (OCO), totaling $585 billion to sustain America's national
    security and defense strategies.
        The Defense Department needs your support for this budget, which is
    driven by strategy, not the other way around. More specifically, it is
    driven by the defense strategy identified in the 2014 Quadrennial
    Defense Review, which reflects the longtime, bipartisan consensus that
    our military must protect the Homeland, build security globally, and
    project power and win decisively. We do so in line with our
    longstanding tradition of maintaining a superior force with an
    unmatched technological edge, working in close partnership with friends
    and allies, upholding the rules-based international order, and keeping
    our commitments to the people who make up the All-Volunteer Force.
        Our defense budget's priorities line up with our strategic
    priorities: sustaining America's global leadership by:

              rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region;
              maintaining a strong commitment to security and
            stability in Europe and the Middle East;
              sustaining a global counterterrorism campaign;
              strengthening key alliances and partnerships; and,
              prioritizing key modernization efforts. This budget
            ensures we can execute our defense strategy with manageable
            risk, even as it does require us to accept elevated risk in
            some areas.

        But--and I want to be clear about this--parts of our Nation's
    defense strategy cannot be executed under sequestration, which remains
    the law of the land and is set to return 212 days from today.
        As I have said before, the prospect of sequestration's serious
    damage to our national security and economy is tragically not a result
    of an economic emergency or recession.
        It is not because these budget cuts are a mathematical solution to
    the Nation's overall fiscal challenge--they are not.
        It is not because paths of curbing nondiscretionary spending and
    reforming our tax system have been explored and exhausted--they have
    not.
        It is not due to a breakthrough in military technology or a new
    strategic insight that somehow makes continued defense spending
    unnecessary--there has been no such silver bullet.
        It is not because the world has suddenly become more peaceful--for
    it is abundantly clear that it has not.
        Instead, sequestration is purely the collateral damage of political
    gridlock. Friends and potential enemies around the world are watching.
        We in DOD are prepared to make difficult strategic and budgetary
    choices. We are also committed--more than ever before--to finding new
    ways to improve the way we do business and be more efficient and
    accountable in our defense spending.
        But in order to ensure our military remains the world's finest
    fighting force, we need to banish the clouds of fiscal uncertainty that
    have obscured our plans and forced inefficient choices. We need a long-
    term restoration of normal budgeting and a deal that the President can
    sign, and that lives up to our responsibility of defending this country
    and the global order. That means, among other things, avoiding
    sequestration.
        To be sure, even under sequestration, America will remain the
    world's strongest military power. But under sequestration, our
    military--and our national security--would have to take on
    irresponsible and unnecessary risk--risk that previous administrations
    and congressional leaders have wisely chosen to avoid.
        Sequestration would lead over time to a military that looks
    fundamentally different and performs much differently than what we are
    used to. Not only as Secretary of Defense, but simply as an American, I
    deeply, earnestly hope we can avert that future. I am committed to
    working with the members of this committee, and your colleagues
    throughout the Congress to prevent it.
        I know how proud you and all Americans are that we field the finest
    fighting force in the world. But our military superiority was not
    built, and will not be sustained, by resting on our laurels. So instead
    of resigning ourselves to having the diminished military that
    sequestration would give us, I propose that we build the force of the
    future, together.
                      ii. building the force of the future
        Assuming the Congress funds the President's fiscal year 2016 budget
    and averts sequestration, we have the opportunity to build the force of
    the future. We have inherited a long tradition of military excellence
    from those who came before us, and we must preserve it for those who
    will come after.
        But to do so, DOD must embrace the future--and embrace change--
    throughout our institution. We must be open to new ideas and new ways
    of doing business that can help us operate more efficiently and perform
    more effectively in an increasingly dynamic and competitive
    environment.
    What DOD Needs To Do
        As DOD counters the very real dangers we face in the world, we will
    also grab hold of the bright opportunities before us--opportunities to
    be more competitive and reforge our Nation's military and defense
    establishment into a future force that harnesses and develops the
    latest, cutting-edge technology, and that remains superior to any
    potential adversary; one that is efficient and accountable to the
    taxpayers who support it; and one that competes and succeeds in
    attracting the next generation of talented Americans to fill its ranks.
        These are the three main pillars on which DOD will build the force
    of the future.
        Competitiveness through Technological and Operational Superiority
        As other nations pursue comprehensive military modernization
    programs and develop technologies designed to blunt our military's
    traditional advantages, the first pillar of our future force must be
    ensuring that we maintain--and extend--our technological edge over any
    potential adversary.
        The President's fiscal year 2016 budget includes targeted
    investments in modernized space, cyber, and missile defense
    capabilities geared toward countering emerging threats that could upend
    our technological superiority and our ability to project power. DOD
    would look forward to providing a full account of our proposed
    modernization investments, and the threats that compel them, in a
    classified setting.
        The budget also supports the Defense Innovation Initiative, which
    will help ensure the military continues to ride the leading edge of
    innovation, and makes deferred modernization investments that will
    ensure America's nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective.
    Across all these efforts, we must be open to global, commercial
    technology as well, and learn from advances in the private sector.
        Because we know that technology alone--however advanced--cannot
    sustain our military's superiority, just as important is a ruthless
    focus on operational excellence. This means using our existing forces
    and capabilities in new, creative, and fiscally prudent ways to achieve
    our objectives. This also means working to develop more innovative and
    effective strategic and military options for the President, introducing
    a new and more rapidly responsive global force management model,
    developing new operational concepts, and reforming and updating all our
    operational plans.
        Competitiveness through Accountability and Efficiency
        The second pillar of building the force of the future requires
    redoubling our efforts to make DOD more accountable and efficient. We
    live in a competitive world and need to be a competitive organization.
    If we don't lean ourselves out and maintain our fighting weight, we
    have no business asking our fellow citizens for more resources.
        As I made clear in my confirmation hearing, I cannot suggest
    greater support and stability for the defense budget without at the
    same time frankly noting that not every defense dollar is always spent
    as well as it should be.
        American taxpayers rightly have trouble comprehending--let alone
    supporting--the defense budget when they read of cost overruns, lack of
    accounting and accountability, needless overhead, and the like.
        If we're asking taxpayers to not only give us half a trillion of
    their hard-earned dollars, but also give us more than we got last year,
    we have to demonstrate that we can be responsible with it.
        We must do all we can to spend their money more wisely and more
    responsibly. We must reduce overhead, and we must curb wasteful
    spending practices wherever they are.
        DOD has sought to continuously improve our acquisition processes
    over the past 5 years, and I am proud myself to have been a part of
    that effort. Today, I am recommitting the Defense Department to working
    both with Congress, and on our own, to find new and more creative ways
    of stretching our defense dollars to give our troops the weapons and
    equipment they need.
        The department's Better Buying Power initiative is now on its third
    iteration since I established it in 2010, with Better Buying Power 3.0
    focused on achieving dominant capabilities through technical
    excellence. I know well and very much appreciate the strong support for
    acquisition reform demonstrated by the Senate and House Armed Services
    Committees, and their chairmen, and I share their deep desire to
    achieve real, lasting results that benefit both America's security and
    taxpayers.
        DOD is working closely with committee members and staff on ways to
    eliminate some of the burdensome and duplicative administrative
    requirements levied on our program managers. To that end, the
    President's fiscal year 2016 budget submission includes a number of
    legislative proposals designed to help streamline the program oversight
    process. We look forward to continuing our close partnership with
    Congress to see these measures implemented.
        As we sustain our focus on acquisition reform, I believe that DOD
    must concurrently undertake a wholesale review of our business
    practices and management systems.
        Our goal is to identify where we can further reduce the cost of
    doing business to free up funding for readiness and modernization--
    ensuring that our energy, focus, and resources are devoted to
    supporting our frontline operations as much as possible.
        We intend to work closely with industry partners--who execute or
    enable many of our programs, logistics, training, administrative, and
    other functions--throughout this process, both to explore how they
    could help us accomplish our missions at reduced cost, and because they
    may have new and innovative ideas worth considering.
        Additionally, the Defense Department is pursuing creative force
    structure changes to be more agile and efficient--such as how we're
    modernizing our cruisers and restructuring Army aviation. We've
    established a new Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency. Four previous
    rounds of efficiency and budget reduction initiatives have yielded
    approximately $78 billion in projected and actual savings in fiscal
    year 2016, helping to cushion our defense programs from successive
    years of budget cuts.
        We're also working hard to cut unnecessary overhead: from reducing
    management headquarters budgets by 20 percent across the department, to
    divesting excess bases and infrastructure.
        When DOD recently requested a round of domestic Base Realignment
    and Closure, Congress asked that we first pursue efficiencies in
    Europe. We did. DOD has approved and is pursuing a broad European
    Infrastructure Consolidation--which will result in some $500 million in
    annual recurring savings. We now need a round of domestic BRAC
    beginning in fiscal year 2017 to address excess infrastructure here at
    home.
        Simply put, we have more bases in more places than we need. We
    estimate DOD has about 25 percent more infrastructure capacity than
    necessary. We must be permitted to divest surplus infrastructure as we
    reduce and renew force structure. With projected recurring savings from
    a new BRAC round totaling some $2 billion a year, it would be
    irresponsible to cut tooth without also cutting tail.
        For base communities in question, it's important to remember that
    BRAC is often an opportunity to be seized. Communities have shown that
    BRAC is ultimately what you make of it, and there are plenty of places
    that have emerged from it stronger than they were before.
        Consider Lawrence, Indiana, which took advantage of Fort Harrison's
    closure in 1996 to create an enterprise zone, community college,
    recreational facilities, and commercial sites that in just 7 years not
    only replaced 100 percent of the jobs lost when the base closed, but
    created even more.
        Charleston, SC, stepped up when the Charleston Naval Complex closed
    in 1993, and now is home to more than 80 new industrial and Federal
    agency tenants. The former naval base is now producing millions of
    dollars' worth of goods that are exported to Europe, Africa, and the
    Middle East.
        At former Mather Air Force Base in Sacramento County, CA, the local
    redevelopment effort has invested $400 million and created more than
    6,500 jobs--over six times the number of jobs lost when the base closed
    in 1993. It's now home to scores of businesses, a mixture of private
    companies, government agencies, and non-profit organizations.
        These are just a few examples of what can happen when local
    leaders, communities, and businesses work together and take advantage
    of the opportunities for new jobs and new growth after BRAC.
        One more point on accountability: Whether we're improving
    acquisition or closing bases, it is not enough to simply tell taxpayers
    that we're spending their dollars responsibly. We have to also show
    them, which is why good cost accounting and financial auditability is
    so important to me.
        DOD has made significant progress over the past 5 years in adding
    more discipline to our business environment, but there is much work
    left to be done, and we remain fully committed to our current audit
    goals.
        Today, over 90 percent of DOD's current year, general fund
    budgetary resources are under some form of financial audit, with the
    Military Services all involved and following the model employed by the
    Marine Corps.
        We plan to submit every corner of DOD to this kind of audit regimen
    beginning in fiscal year 2016. With this foundation, the department
    will progressively expand the scope of these audits until all our
    organizations, funds, and financial statements will be under audit in
    fiscal year 2018, complying with Congress's statutory direction to be
    audit ready by the end of fiscal year 2017.
        There's a reason why auditing is a basic practice as ancient as the
    Domesday Book, and it is time that DOD finally lives up to its moral
    and legal obligation to be accountable to those who pay its bills. I
    intend to do everything we can--including holding people to account--to
    get this done.
        Competitiveness through Attracting Future Talent
        Third, but no less important, DOD must be competitive when it comes
    to attracting new generations of talented and dedicated Americans to
    our calling of defending the Nation.
        We know how the attacks of September 11th, 2001 motivated so many
    Americans to want to be part of this noble endeavor. Going forward, we
    must ensure our future force can continue to recruit the finest young
    men and women our country has to offer--military and civilian--like
    those who serve today.
        As we do this, we must be mindful that the next generation expects
    jobs that give them purpose, meaning, and dignity. They want to be able
    to make real contributions, have their voices heard, and gain valuable
    and transferable experience. We must shape the kind of force they want
    to be in. The battle for talent will demand enlightened and agile
    leaders, new training schemes, new educational opportunities, and new
    compensation approaches.
        DOD is already pursuing several initiatives that will help ensure
    the military is a compelling career option. In recent years, we've been
    expanding pilot programs that facilitate breaks in service that let our
    people gain diverse work experience. We've tailored our transition
    assistance program, Transition GPS, to better prepare servicemembers to
    enter the civilian workforce--providing different tracks for those who
    want to go to college, those who want skills training, and those who
    want to be entrepreneurs. We've put a renewed focus on military ethics
    and professionalism, as well as making sure our military health system
    is held to the same high-quality standards we expect from the
    servicemembers and military family members under its care.
        Because we know how important it is--both for today's
    servicemembers and the generation that will follow them--we're also
    deeply committed to creating an environment and culture where we live
    the values we defend and every servicemember is treated with the
    dignity and respect they deserve.
        That's why we're continuing to expand combat positions available to
    women--because everyone who's able and willing to serve their country
    should have full and equal opportunity to do so.
        It's why we're striving to eliminate sexual assault from the
    military.
        It's why we've been making sure gay and lesbian servicemembers can
    serve openly, and that their families receive the benefits their loved
    ones have earned.
        But for everything we're doing, DOD cannot build the force of the
    future by ourselves. We need Congress' help.
    What We Need Congress To Do
        Since our current defense budget drawdown began several years ago,
    I've observed something of a phenomenon here in Washington.
        Along with our troops, their families, and our defense civilians, I
    thank our supporters on Capitol Hill, including most members of this
    committee, who have joined with us in trying to do everything possible
    to get Congress to prevent more mindless cuts to our defense budget.
        Unfortunately, these combined efforts have been unsuccessful in
    actually restoring adequate and predictable resources for DOD. We have
    had to endure deep cuts to readiness, weather pay freezes and civilian
    furloughs, and cut badly needed investments in modernization and
    critical technologies. At the same time, Congress has sometimes sought
    to protect programs that DOD has argued are no longer needed, or
    require significant reform.
        We have had the worst of both worlds--a double whammy of mindless
    sequestration coupled with inability to reform.
        As many of you know, it wasn't always this way.
        During the defense drawdown after the Cold War, DOD had much more
    flexibility thanks to the help of Congress. For example, we were able
    to resize the Army, retire the A-6 Intruder and many other weapons
    systems, and implement multiple BRAC rounds, which freed up dollars we
    re-allocated to keep our force structure ready, capable, and deployable
    around the world.
        I know some of the changes and reforms we're proposing may feel
    like a significant change from how we currently do business. But if
    anyone can understand how the dots connect and how we need Congress'
    help to be able to defend our country, our allies, and our interests in
    an increasingly dangerous world, it's you--the members of this
    committee.
        The fact is, if we're not able to implement the changes and reforms
    we need, we will be forced to make painful tradeoffs, even at the
    higher topline the President is requesting. We will lose further ground
    on modernization and readiness--leaving tomorrow's force less capable
    and leaving our Nation less secure. We will face significant hurdles to
    executing our Nation's defense strategy. That's why we need your help.
                  iii. the president's fiscal year 2016 budget
        As we do every year when formulating our budget, this budget seeks
    to balance readiness, capability, and size--because we must ensure
    that, whatever the size of our force, we have the resources to provide
    every servicemember with the right training, the right equipment, the
    right compensation, and the right quality of fellow troops. That is the
    only way we can ensure our military is fully prepared to accomplish its
    missions.
        Almost two-thirds of DOD's fiscal year 2016 base budget--$348.4
    billion--funds our day-to-day expenses, similar to what a business
    would call its operating budget. This covers, among other expenses, the
    cost of fuel, spare parts, logistics support, maintenance, service
    contracts, and administration. It also includes pay and benefits for
    military and civilian personnel, which by themselves comprise nearly
    half of our total budget.
        The remaining third of our base budget--$185.9 billion--comprises
    investments in future defense needs, much like a business' capital
    improvement budget. It pays for the research, development, testing,
    evaluation, and ultimately acquisition of the weapons, equipment, and
    facilities that our servicemembers need.
        Broken down differently, our base budget includes the following
    categories:

              Military pay and benefits (including health care and
            retirement benefits)--$169 billion, or about 32 percent of the
            base budget.
              Civilian pay and benefits--$79 billion, or about 15
            percent of the base budget.
              Other operating costs--$105 billion, or about 20
            percent of the base
            budget.
              Acquisition and other investments (Procurement;
            research, development, testing, and evaluation; and new
            facilities construction)--$181 billion, or about 34 percent of
            the base budget.

    Modernization
        What makes this budget different is the focus it puts, more so than
    any other over the last decade, on new funding for modernization. After
    years of war, which required the deferral of longer-term modernization
    investments, this budget puts renewed emphasis on preparing for future
    threats--especially threats that challenge our military's power
    projection capabilities.
        Threats to Power Projection and our Technological Edge
        Being able to project power anywhere across the globe by rapidly
    surging aircraft, ships, troops, and supplies lies at the core of our
    defense strategy and what the American people have come to expect of
    their military. It guarantees that when an acute crisis erupts anywhere
    in the world, America can provide aid when disaster strikes, reinforce
    our allies when they are threatened, and protect our citizens and
    interests globally. It also assures freedom of navigation and
    overflight, and allows global commerce to flow freely.
        For decades, U.S. global power projection has relied on the ships,
    planes, submarines, bases, aircraft carriers, satellites, networks, and
    other advanced capabilities that comprise our military's unrivaled
    technological edge. But today that superiority is being challenged in
    unprecedented ways.
        Advanced military technologies, from rockets and drones to chemical
    and biological capabilities, have found their way into the arsenals of
    both non-state actors as well as previously less capable militaries.
    Other nations--among them Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea--have
    been pursuing long-term, comprehensive military modernization programs
    to close the technology gap that has long existed between them and the
    United States.
        These modernization programs are developing and fielding advanced
    aircraft, submarines, and both longer-range and more accurate ballistic
    and cruise missiles. They're developing new and advanced anti-ship and
    anti-air missiles, as well as new counter-space, cyber, electronic
    warfare, undersea, and air attack capabilities. In some areas, we see
    levels of new weapons development that we haven't seen since the mid-
    1980s, near the peak of the Soviet Union's surge in Cold War defense
    spending.
        Targeted Investments in the President's Budget
        One of the reasons we are asking for more money this year than last
    year is to reverse recent under-investment in new weapons systems by
    making targeted investments to help us stay ahead of emerging threats--
    adding substantial funding for space control and launch capabilities,
    missile defense, cyber, and advanced sensors, communications, and
    munitions--all of which are critical for power projection in contested
    environments.
        The budget also makes significant investments in the resilience and
    survivability of our infrastructure and forces, particularly in the
    western Pacific, with improved active defenses such as our Patriot and
    AEGIS systems, as well as selective hardening of key installations and
    facilities.
        DOD is also addressing the erosion of U.S. technological
    superiority with the Defense Innovation Initiative (DII). The DII is an
    ambitious department-wide effort to identify and invest in innovative
    ways to sustain and advance America's military dominance for the 21st
    century.
        The DII will identify, develop, and field breakthrough technologies
    and systems through a new Long-Range Research & Development Planning
    Program, and the President's budget supports this effort through
    specific investments in promising new technologies and capabilities
    such as high-speed strike weapons, advanced aeronautics, rail guns, and
    high energy lasers. The DII also involves the development of innovative
    operational concepts that would help us use our current capabilities in
    new and creative ways. The ultimate aim is to help craft `offset
    strategies' that maximize our strengths and exploit the weaknesses of
    potential adversaries.
        Our budget is also making focused and sustained investments in
    modernization and manning across the nuclear enterprise, even as we
    reduce the roles and numbers of nuclear weapons in the U.S. nuclear
    posture. These investments are critical for ensuring the continued
    safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent, as well
    as the long-term health of the force that supports our nuclear triad,
    particularly after recent troubling lapses in parts of DOD's nuclear
    enterprise. To help fund improvements across the nuclear enterprise, we
    are requesting an increase of approximately $1 billion in fiscal year
    2016, and about $8 billion over the FYDP.
    Readiness
        DOD must rebuild and recover after more than 13 years of
    uninterrupted war. But our effort to do so has been frustrated by two
    variables, both of which are out of our hands--one, the continued high
    operational tempo and high demand for our forces, and two, the
    uncertainty surrounding annual appropriations.
        Only over the last couple of years has readiness begun to recover
    from the strains of over a decade of war, exacerbated by sequestration
    in 2013. Nevertheless, readiness remains at troubling levels across the
    force.
        While our forward-deployed forces remain ready, our surge forces at
    home are not as ready as they need to be. The President's budget
    therefore invests in near-term unit readiness by adjusting service end-
    strength ramps to reduce personnel turbulence and stress on the force,
    while increasing funding to improve home station training and training-
    related infrastructure.
        This past year has demonstrated that our military must be ready to
    fight more than just the last war. We have to be prepared across all
    domains--air, land, sea, space, and in cyberspace--to engage in both
    low- and high-end missions and conflicts, as well as in the shadowy,
    so-called `hybrid warfare' space in between.
        While this budget submission's requested and projected funding
    levels will enable the military to continue making steady progress
    toward full-spectrum combat readiness, the gains we've recently made
    are fragile. Sustaining them to provide for ready and capable forces
    will require both time and a stable flow of resources, which is why,
    even under the budget we're requesting, the Army, Navy, and Marine
    Corps won't all reach their readiness goals until 2020, and the Air
    Force won't do so until 2023.
        Army:
        For fiscal year 2016, the Army's base budget of $126.5 billion
    supports an end strength of 1,015,000 soldiers--475,000 soldiers on
    active duty, 342,000 soldiers in the Army National Guard, and 198,000
    soldiers in the Army Reserve--comprising 57 total force brigade combat
    teams and associated enablers. The budget also supports 19 brigade-
    level training rotations at the Army's Combat Training Centers, which
    are critical to the Army's efforts to reach full-spectrum combat
    readiness.
        While the Army's postwar end-strength target remains a force of
    approximately 450,000 Active-Duty soldiers, 335,000 Army National Guard
    soldiers, and 195,000 Army Reserve soldiers, this year's budget slows
    the drawdown rate. Rather than planning to reduce the Active-Duty Force
    by 20,000 soldiers and the National Guard by 14,000 soldiers in fiscal
    year 2016, the Army will instead plan to reduce by 15,000 active-duty
    soldiers and 8,000 guardsmen, while still maintaining its schedule for
    reducing unit structure. This will help mitigate personnel turbulence
    and stress, while also improving unit manning as the Army approaches
    its target size.
        The Army's budget for fiscal year 2016 also includes $4.5 billion
    for Army helicopter modernization. Specifically:

              UH-60M Black Hawk: We are requesting $1.6 billion to
            support buying 94 multi-mission helicopters in fiscal year
            2016, and $6.1 billion for 301 helicopters over the FYDP.
              AH-64E Apache: We are requesting $1.4 billion to
            support development and purchase of 64 attack helicopters in
            fiscal year 2016, and $6.2 billion for 303 helicopters over the
            FYDP.
              CH-47F Chinook: We are requesting $1.1 billion to
            support development and purchase of 39 cargo helicopters in
            fiscal year 2016, and $3.2 billion for 95 helicopters over the
            FYDP.
              UH-72 Lakota: We are requesting $187 million in
            fiscal year 2016 to support the final buy of 28 light utility
            helicopters.

        These investments require difficult trade-offs given today's
    constrained fiscal environment. That is why the Army is resubmitting
    the Army's Aviation Restructure Initiative, which makes the most
    efficient use of taxpayer dollars by retiring outdated airframes and
    streamlining the Army's helicopter fleet so that platforms can be
    modernized and allocated where they are needed most.
        As you know, I am committed to reviewing the Army's Aviation
    Restructure Initiative. However, the Army believes that fully
    implementing the Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI), which includes
    shifting National Guard Apaches to Active-Duty units while providing
    Guard units with Black Hawks, is prudent for several reasons.
        For one, Apaches are in high demand at high levels of readiness
    that would require Guard units manning them to mobilize at
    unprecedentedly high rates; or alternatively, for the Army to spend a
    total of approximately $4.4 billion to fully equip the Guard's Apache
    battalions, and then $350 million per year to maintain them at those
    high levels of readiness. Meanwhile, Black Hawks are more suitable for
    Guard missions here at home. Whether homeland defense, disaster relief,
    support to civil authorities, or complementing our active-duty
    military, these missions tend to demand transport and medical
    capabilities more than the attack capabilities of Apaches. In sum, the
    initiative avoids approximately $12 billion in costs through fiscal
    year 2035 and saves over $1 billion annually starting in fiscal year
    2020. Considering these figures, implementing the Aviation Restructure
    Initiative is not only in the best warfighting interest of the Army,
    but also in the interest of the taxpayers who fund it.
        I know this is a contentious issue. However, we believe the ARI is
    the least cost, best solution for the Army's aviation enterprise. DOD
    looks forward to making its case to the National Commission on the
    Future of the Army established by the 2015 National Defense
    Authorization Act.
        Navy and Marine Corps:
        The Navy and Marine Corps are allocated $161 billion for fiscal
    year 2016, supporting a 282-ship fleet in 2016 and a 304-ship fleet by
    fiscal year 2020 with a return to 11 aircraft carriers, 386,600 Active-
    Duty and Reserve sailors, and 222,900 Active-Duty and Reserve marines.
        The President's budget invests $16.6 billion in shipbuilding for
    fiscal year 2016, and $95.9 billion over the FYDP. The budget protects
    critical Navy and Marine Corps investments in undersea, surface,
    amphibious, and airborne capabilities--all of which are critical for
    addressing emerging threats. Specifically:

              Submarines: We are requesting $5.7 billion for fiscal
            year 2016, and $30.9 billion over the FYDP, to support buying
            two Virginia-class attack submarines a year through fiscal year
            2020. We are also requesting $1.4 billion in fiscal year 2016,
            and $10.5 billion over the FYDP, to support the replacement for
            the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine.
              DDG-51 Guided Missile Destroyers: We are requesting
            $3.4 billion for fiscal year 2016, and $18.5 billion over the
            FYDP, to support the continued development and procurement of
            two DDG-51 destroyers a year through fiscal year 2020.
              Aircraft Carriers: The President's budget plan
            enables us to support 11 carrier strike groups. We are
            requesting $678 million in fiscal year 2016, and $3.9 billion
            over the FYDP, to support the refueling and overhaul of the USS
            George Washington. We are also requesting $2.8 billion in
            fiscal year 2016, and $12.5 billion over the FYDP, to support
            completion of the Gerald Ford, 4-year construction of the John
            F. Kennedy, and long-lead items for CVN-80, Enterprise.
              Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) and Small Surface
            Combatants: We are requesting $1.8 billion in fiscal year 2016,
            and $9.4 billion over the FYDP, to support development and
            procurement of 14 littoral combat ships over the FYDP--
            including 3 LCS in fiscal year 2016. We are also requesting $55
            million in fiscal year 2016, and $762.8 million over the FYDP,
            to support capability improvements to the survivability and
            lethality of the LCS required for the Navy to modify it into a
            small surface combatant.
              Fleet Replenishment Oiler: We are requesting $674
            million to support buying one new fleet replenishment oiler,
            the TAO(X), in fiscal year 2016--part of a $2.4 billion request
            to buy four of them over the FYDP.
              Amphibious Transport Docks: We are requesting $668
            million in fiscal year 2016 to finish buying one San Antonio-
            class amphibious transport dock.
              F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter: The
            Department of the Navy is procuring two F-35 variants, the Navy
            carrier-based F-35C and the Marine Corps short take-off and
            vertical landing F-35B. The Navy and Marine Corps are
            requesting $3.1 billion in fiscal year 2016 to support
            procurement of 13 aircraft--9 F-35Bs and 4 F-35Cs--and aircraft
            modifications and initial spares, and $20.9 billion over the
            FYDP to support procurement of 121 aircraft and aircraft
            modifications and initial spares.
              Patrol and Airborne Early Warning Aircraft: We are
            requesting $3.4 billion in fiscal year 2016, and $10.1 billion
            over the FYDP, to support continued development and procurement
            of 47 P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft through fiscal
            year 2020. We are also requesting $1.3 billion in fiscal year
            2016, and $6.1 billion over the FYDP, to support buying 24 E-2D
            Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft through fiscal year
            2020.

        Making these investments while also abiding by fiscal prudence, we
    had to make more difficult trade-offs. For that reason, we are
    resubmitting our request to place some of the Navy's cruisers and an
    amphibious landing ship--12 ships in total, including 11 cruisers--into
    a phased modernization program that will provide them with enhanced
    capability and a longer lifespan. Given that our cruisers are the most
    capable ships for controlling the air defenses of a carrier strike
    group, and in light of anti-ship missile capabilities being pursued by
    other nations, this modernization program will, over the next decade
    and a half, be a baseline requirement for sustaining both our cruiser
    fleet and 11 carrier strike groups through 2045.
        I acknowledge and appreciate the plan put forward in the 2015
    National Defense Authorization Act, which helps us get to our goal, and
    which we have begun to implement. However, this plan is more expensive,
    and results in shorter ship life. Considering that our plan is critical
    for our power projection capabilities, we believe it should be
    implemented in full, and look forward to working with the Congress as
    we move forward.
        Air Force:
        The Air Force is allocated a base budget of $152.9 billion for
    fiscal year 2016, supporting a force of 491,700 Active Duty, Guard, and
    Reserve airmen, 49 tactical fighter squadrons, 96 operational bombers
    out of a total 154-aircraft bomber fleet, and a safe, secure, and
    effective nuclear deterrent that includes 450 intercontinental
    ballistic missiles.
        The Air Force's budget reflects DOD's decision to protect
    modernization funding for advanced capabilities and platforms most
    relevant to both present and emerging threats--in this case, fifth-
    generation fighters, long-range bombers, and mid-air refueling aircraft
    to assure our air superiority and global reach; both manned and
    remotely-piloted aircraft to help meet combatant commanders' needs for
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and research and
    development to ensure continued and competitive space launch
    capabilities. Specifically:

              F-35A Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter: We are
            requesting $6 billion to support buying 44 aircraft, aircraft
            modifications, and initial spares in fiscal year 2016, and
            $33.5 billion to support buying 275 aircraft, modifications,
            and spares over the FYDP.
              KC-46A Pegasus Refueling Tanker: We are requesting
            $2.4 billion to buy 12 aircraft in fiscal year 2016, and $14.6
            billion to buy 72 aircraft over the FYDP.
              Long-Range Strike Bomber: We are requesting $1.2
            billion for research and development in fiscal year 2016, and
            $13.9 billion over the FYDP.
              Remotely-Piloted Aircraft: We are requesting $904
            million to support buying 29 MQ-9A Reapers in fiscal year 2016,
            and $4.8 billion to support buying 77 of them over the FYDP.
            This investment is critical to ensuring the Air Force has
            enough around-the-clock permissive ISR combat air patrols--in
            this case, allowing us to increase from 55 to 60--to meet
            increased battlefield demands.
              Competitive Space Launch: This budget supports year-
            over-year increases in competitive space launches--going up
            from two in fiscal year 2015 to three in fiscal year 2016, and
            further increasing to four competitive launches in fiscal year
            2017. The budget also supports investments to mitigate DOD
            reliance on the RD-180 space engine that powers the Atlas V
            Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle rockets.
              Combat Rescue Helicopter: We are requesting $156
            million in fiscal year 2016 for the Air Force's next-generation
            combat rescue helicopter--part of a total $1.6 billion request
            over the FYDP for research, development, testing, and
            evaluation--and requesting $717 million over the FYDP for
            procurement.

        In light of high demand coupled with congressional consultations,
    the Air Force budget reflects DOD's decision to slow the retirement
    timelines for three key ISR and battle management platforms.
        We chose to defer the retirement of the U-2 Dragon Lady
    reconnaissance aircraft until fiscal year 2019, when planned sensor
    upgrades to the RQ-4 Global Hawk will combine with other capabilities
    to mitigate the loss of the U-2. We chose to delay the previously
    planned retirement of seven E-3 Sentry AWACS until fiscal year 2019, so
    they can support air operations over Iraq and Syria. We chose to delay
    retirement of any E-8 JSTARS through fiscal year 2020, pending final
    approval of the Air Force's acquisition strategy for its replacement.
        The Air Force budget also supports a timeline that would phase out
    and retire the A-10 in fiscal year 2019. With the gradual retirement of
    the A-10 that we're proposing, the Air Force will better support legacy
    fleet readiness and the planned schedule for standing up the F-35A by
    filling in some of the overall fighter maintenance personnel shortfalls
    with trained and qualified personnel from the retiring A-10 squadrons.
        As you know, F-35 maintainer demand has already required the Air
    Force to use the authority Congress provided last year to move some A-
    10s into back-up aircraft inventory status. I should note that the Air
    Force is doing so only to the extent that it absolutely must, and so
    far intends to move far fewer A-10s into this status than what Congress
    has authorized. I know this is an important issue, and DOD looks
    forward to working with you on it.
        Defense-Wide:
        The remaining share of our base budget--about $94 billion--is
    allocated across DOD. This includes funding for cyber, United States
    Special Operations Command, the Defense Advanced Research Projects
    Agency, the Defense Health Agency, the Joint Staff, the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense, and missile defense.
        For fiscal year 2016, a $9.6 billion total investment in missile
    defense helps protect the U.S. Homeland, deployed forces, and our
    allies and partners. This includes $8.1 billion for the Missile Defense
    Agency, $1.6 billion of which will help ensure the reliability of U.S.
    ground-based interceptors, which are currently sited at Fort Greely,
    AK, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA. The budget also continues to
    support the President's timeline for implementing the European Phased
    Adaptive Approach.
        Overseas Contingency Operations:
        Separate from DOD's base budget, we are also requesting $50.9
    billion in Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding for fiscal
    year 2016. This represents a 21 percent decrease from last year's $64.2
    billion in OCO funding, continuing OCO's decline since 2010, while also
    reflecting continued operational demands on U.S. forces around the
    world. OCO comprises funding for:

             Afghanistan and Other Operations: We are requesting
            $42.5 billion to support Operation Freedom's Sentinel and other
            missions. This includes $7.8 billion for reset and retrograde
            of U.S. equipment from Afghanistan, as well as $3.8 billion for
            training and equipping the Afghan National Security Forces
            through our ongoing train, advise, and assist mission.
             Counter-ISIL Operations: We are requesting $5.3
            billion to support Operation Inherent Resolve. This includes
            $1.3 billion for training and equipping Iraqi forces, including
            Kurdish forces, and the vetted moderate Syrian opposition.
             Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund: Reflecting the
            vital role that our allies and partners play in countering
            terrorism that could threaten U.S. citizens, we are requesting
            $2.1 billion for the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund that
            President Obama established last year.
             NATO Reassurance: We are requesting $789 million for
            the European Reassurance Initiative, which the President
            created last year to help reassure our NATO allies and
            reinforce our Article V commitment in light of Russia's
            violations of Ukrainian sovereignty.

        The conclusion of major combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq
    has resulted in a 73 percent drop in DOD's OCO costs from their $187
    billion peak in fiscal year 2008.
        We are continuing to use OCO as appropriate to finance our
    military's response to unforeseen crises, but we must also account for
    those enduring priorities that we do not envision going away--such as
    supporting our Afghan partners, countering terrorism, maintaining a
    strong forward presence in the Middle East, and ensuring our military
    is ready to respond to a wide range of potential crises.
        The administration intends to transition OCO's enduring costs to
    the base budget between fiscal years 2017 and 2020. We will do this
    over time, and in a way that protects our defense strategy--including
    DOD's abilities to deter aggression, maintain crisis-ready forces, and
    project power across the globe. This transition, however, will not be
    possible unless the threat of sequestration has been removed.
        Having financed the costs of key military activities--such as
    counterterrorism operations and our Middle East posture--outside the
    base budget for 14 years, and knowing that the security situation in
    the Middle East remains volatile, it will take time to determine which
    OCO costs are most likely to be enduring, and which are not. But we
    will release a plan later this year, which will also address how we
    will budget for uncertainty surrounding unforeseen future crises, and
    implications for DOD's budget.
                                iv. compensation
        The choices we face about military compensation are vexing,
    critically important, and closely followed, so I want to be direct and
    upfront with you.
        When our troops go into battle--risking their lives--we owe to
    them, and their families, not only adequate pay and compensation, but
    also the right investments--in the right people, the right training,
    and the right weapons and equipment--so that they can accomplish their
    missions and come home safely.
        To meet all of these obligations at once, we have to balance how we
    allocate our dollars. It would be irresponsible to prioritize
    compensation, force size, equipment, or training in isolation, only to
    put our servicemembers' lives at unacceptable risk in battle.
        For the President's fiscal year 2016 budget, the Defense Department
    considered its compensation proposals very carefully, as well as those
    approved by Congress in the 2015 National Defense Authorization Act.
    Accordingly, this budget again proposes modest adjustments to shift
    funds from compensation into readiness, capability, and force
    structure, so that our people can continue executing their missions
    with continued excellence.
        As you know, the congressionally-commissioned Military Compensation
    and Retirement Modernization Commission has recently released its own
    compensation proposals. Their work, which DOD is continuing to analyze,
    shows thoughtfulness and good intent, which we deeply appreciate.
        Given that this hearing is being held before the department has
    submitted its recommendations on the commission's report to President
    Obama, it would not be appropriate for me to discuss them at this time.
    Many of these proposals would significantly affect our servicemembers
    and their families, and DOD owes them, the President, and the country
    our utmost diligence and most rigorous analysis.
        However, I can say that the department agrees with the overarching
    goals of the commission, especially providing servicemembers and
    beneficiaries more options--whether in preparing for retirement or in
    making health care choices.
        I can also say that the commission's proposals are complicated, and
    do not lend themselves to binary answers. Therefore, when we provide
    the President with our recommendations on each proposal, DOD will
    clarify not simply whether we support each proposal, but also where we
    recommend specific modifications to improve or enable us to fully
    support a given proposal.
        We believe there is something positive in almost every one of the
    commission's recommendations, and that they present a great opportunity
    to ensure we honor our servicemembers past, present, and future. I look
    forward to Congress' support and partnership as we work hard to take
    advantage of it.
                           v. impact of sequestration
        At the end of 2013, policymakers came together on a bipartisan
    basis to partially reverse sequestration and pay for higher
    discretionary funding levels with long-term reforms. We've seen how
    that bipartisan agreement has allowed us to invest in areas ranging
    from research and manufacturing to strengthening our military. We've
    also seen the positive impact on our economy, with a more responsible
    and orderly budget process helping contribute to the fastest job growth
    since the late 1990s.
        The President's budget builds on this progress by reversing
    sequestration, paid for with a balanced mix of commonsense spending
    cuts and tax loophole closures, while also proposing additional deficit
    reduction that would put debt on a downward path as a share of the
    economy. The President has also made clear that he will not accept a
    budget that locks in sequestration going forward.
        As the Joint Chiefs and others have outlined, and as I will detail
    in this testimony, sequestration would damage our national security,
    ultimately resulting in a military that is too small and insufficiently
    equipped to fully implement our defense strategy. This would reflect
    poorly on America's global leadership, which has been the one critical
    but defining constant in a turbulent and dangerous world. In fact, even
    the threat of sequestration has had real effects.
        You don't need me to tell you that the President has said he will
    not accept a budget that severs the vital link between our national and
    economic security. Why? Because the strength of our Nation depends on
    the strength of our economy, and a strong military depends on a strong
    educational system, thriving private-sector businesses, and innovative
    research. Because that principle--matching defense increases with non-
    defense increases dollar-for-dollar--was a basic condition of the
    bipartisan agreement we got in 2013. The President sees no reason why
    we shouldn't uphold those same principles in any agreement now.
        The only way we're going to get out of the wilderness of
    sequestration is if we work together. I therefore appeal to members of
    Congress, from both parties, to start looking for ways to find a truly
    bipartisan compromise. I hope they can make clear to their colleagues
    that sequestration would also damage America's long-term strength,
    preventing our country from making pro-growth investments in areas
    ranging from basic research to early childhood education--investments
    that, in the past, have helped make our military the finest fighting
    force the world has ever known.
        Sequestration is set to return in just over 200 days. Letting that
    happen would be unwise and unsafe for our national defense, over both
    the short and long term.
    Short-Term Impact
        DOD has had to live with uncertain budgets for the last three
    years, continuous and sudden downward revisions of our budget plans,
    and even a government closure. To continue meeting all of our mission
    requirements, we've done our best to manage through these
    circumstances, underfunding significant parts of our force and its
    support systems. Put bluntly, we have survived, but not thrived. Our
    military has made painful choices and tradeoffs among the size,
    capabilities, and readiness of our joint force, and we've amassed a
    number of bills that are now coming due.
        That's why the department has been counting on and planning for a
    budget increase of roughly $35 billion above sequestration-level caps
    in fiscal year 2016. If it looks like DOD will be operating at
    sequestration levels in 2016, on October 1 we will have to swiftly
    begin making cuts so that we don't end up $35 billion short as we
    approach year's end.
        A return to sequestration in fiscal year 2016 would affect all
    aspects of the department, but not all equally.
        More than one-third of the fiscal year 2016 cuts would come have to
    come from Operations and Maintenance accounts, with unavoidable
    reductions in readiness and our ability to shape world events in
    America's interest. Let me put this more plainly: allowing
    sequestration to return would deprive our troops of what they need to
    accomplish their missions.
        Approximately half of the cuts would have to come from the
    department's modernization accounts, undermining our efforts to secure
    technological superiority for U.S. forces in future conflicts. Because
    there are bills that DOD absolutely must pay--such as the salaries of
    our troops--many capabilities being developed to counter known threats
    from highly capable adversaries would be delayed or cancelled,
    deepening our Nation's vulnerabilities at a time when the world is
    growing more dangerous, not less. Sequestration would put a hold on
    critical programs like our Aerospace Innovation Initiative, the Next
    Generation Adaptive Engine, the Ground-Based Interceptor missile
    defense kill vehicle redesign, and several space control efforts.
        Deferring these investments is bad policy and makes the Defense
    Department less competitive for the future. What's more, it breaks
    faith with the troops of today and the troops of tomorrow. It
    undermines the defense industrial base that is a critical foundation
    for our national security.
    Long-Term Impact
        If sequestration were to persist over time, the long-term
    consequences would be harder hitting. We would ultimately have a
    military that looks fundamentally different, and that performs much
    differently, from what our Nation is accustomed to.
        If we are forced to sequestration-level budgets, I do not believe
    that we can continue to make incremental cuts and maintain the same
    general set of objectives as we've had in our defense strategy. I will
    insist that new cuts be accompanied by a frank reassessment of our
    strategic approach to addressing the threats we face around the world--
    what we are asking the Armed Forces to do and to be prepared to do.
        I cannot tell you right now exactly what that means--DOD is not
    resigned to the return of sequestration--but I can tell you that I will
    direct the department to look at all aspects of the defense budget to
    determine how best to absorb these cuts. No portion of our budget can
    remain inviolate.
        What I will not do is let DOD continue mortgaging our future
    readiness and capability. I will not send our troops into a fight with
    outdated equipment, inadequate readiness, and ineffective doctrine.
        Everything else is on the table.
        What does that mean? We could be forced to consider pay cuts, not
    just cuts in the growth of compensation. We could be forced to consider
    all means of shedding excess infrastructure, not just working within
    the congressional BRAC process. We could be forced to look at
    significant force structure cuts, not just trimming around the edges.
    We could be forced to ask our military to do--and be prepared to do--
    significantly less than what we have traditionally expected, and
    required of it.
        I am not afraid to ask these difficult questions, but if we are
    stuck with sequestration's budget cuts over the long term, our entire
    nation will have to live with the answers.
        A prolonged period of depressed defense budgets will almost
    certainly mean a smaller, less capable, and less ready military. No one
    can fully predict the impact on the future. But it could translate into
    future conflicts that last longer, and are more costly in both lives
    and dollars.
        That may sound severe to some, but it is a fact, and history should
    be our guide when we think about the true cost of sequestration.
    The Case for Repealing Sequestration
        I know I'm preaching to the choir here. If sequestration could have
    been reversed by just this committee and its counterpart in the House,
    it probably would have happened years ago. So I offer the following to
    members of the committee about what you can remind your colleagues when
    you ask for their vote to repeal sequestration:
        Remind them that even after the increase we're asking for, DOD's
    budget as a share of total Federal spending will still be at a near-
    historic low--a quarter of what it was during the Korean War, a third
    of what it was during the Vietnam war, and half of what it was during
    the Reagan buildup.
        Remind them that the increased funding is for modernization that's
    critical to keeping our military's technological edge and staying ahead
    of potential adversaries.
        Remind them that DOD has hands-on leadership from the very top--
    me--devoted to using taxpayer dollars better than they've been used in
    the past. You have my personal commitment to greater accountability,
    greater efficiency, and running this department better and leaner than
    before.
        Remind them that sequestration's cuts to long-term investments will
    likely make those investments more costly down the line. All who bemoan
    unnecessary Pentagon program delays and the associated cost overruns
    should know that sequestration will only make these problems worse. I
    can easily sympathize with my non-defense counterparts in this regard;
    knowing how wasteful and inefficient sequestration would be at DOD, I
    have no doubt the same is true at other departments and agencies as
    well.
        Remind them that sequestration's impact on our domestic budget will
    cause further longterm damage to our defense--because the strength of
    our Nation depends on the strength of our economy, and a strong
    military needs strong schools to provide the best people, strong
    businesses to provide the best weapons and equipment, and strong
    science and research sectors to provide the best new innovations and
    technologies.
        Remind them that we can't keep kicking this can down the road. The
    more we prolong tough decisions, the more difficult and more costly
    they will be later on.
                                 vi. conclusion
        The men and women of DOD are counting on Congress to help assure
    the strength of our military and American global leadership at a time
    of great change in the world.
        We must reverse the decline in defense budgets to execute our
    strategy and fund a modern, ready, leaner force in a balanced way. We
    must seize the opportunity to enact necessary reforms in how we do
    business. We must bring an end to the threat sequestration poses to the
    future of our force and American credibility around the world.
        As you evaluate the President's budget submission, I encourage you
    and your colleagues to keep it in perspective.
        In the years since the President's fiscal year 2012 budget
    request--the benchmark for cuts prescribed under the 2011 Budget
    Control Act--DOD's 10-year budget projections have absorbed more than
    $750 billion in cuts, or more than three-quarters of the trillion-
    dollar cuts that would be required should sequestration be allowed to
    run its course. While some claim this is our biggest budget ever, the
    fact is, as a share of total Federal spending, DOD's fiscal year 2016
    budget is at a near-historic low--representing about 14 percent of
    total Federal discretionary and non-discretionary outlays. DOD's total
    budget remains more than $100 billion below what it was at the height
    of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
        I think we can all agree that the world in 2014 was even more
    complicated than we could have foreseen. Given today's security
    environment--which has over 200,000 American servicemembers stationed
    in over 130 countries conducting nearly 60 named operations--our
    proposed increase in defense spending over last year's budget is a
    responsible, prudent approach.
        Some of you may recall how, in 1991, after America's Cold War
    victory and amid doubts about America's engagement with the world and
    calls for a bigger domestic peace dividend, a bipartisan group in
    Congress stepped forward to help shape America' global leadership and
    make long-term decisions from which we continue to benefit.
        Senators Sam Nunn and Dick Lugar helped craft, pass, and pay for
    the small Cooperative Threat Reduction Program that allowed the United
    States and DOD to provide the funding and expertise to help former
    Soviet states decommission their nuclear, biological, and chemical
    weapon stockpiles.
        The Nunn-Lugar program was initially opposed abroad, and there were
    also doubts at the Pentagon about whether we could implement it without
    losing track of funding. I know. I helped lead the program in its early
    years. But with slow and diligent effort by American defense officials,
    the Congress, and our foreign partners, it worked.
        It helped prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into the
    wrong hands. It helped establish a pattern of international cooperation
    and global norms in the post-Cold War international order. In the light
    of the current instability in Ukraine, it might have staved off several
    variants of nuclear disaster.
        But it also set an important precedent for our work on this budget
    and in the years ahead. It shows what congressional conviction--
    especially when it is bipartisan--can accomplish in foreign policy. It
    shows the value of foresight and planning for an uncertain future. It
    shows how spending a relatively few dollars today can generate huge
    value down the line.
        As the new Secretary of Defense, I hope it will be possible to
    again unite behind what our great nation should do to protect our
    people and make a better world, and provide our magnificent men and
    women of DOD--who make up the greatest fighting force the world has
    ever known--what they deserve.
        Thank you.

        Chairman McCain. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I hope that
    every Member of Congress is able to hear that message that you
    have just conveyed. Thank you.
        General Dempsey?

    STATEMENT OF GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS
                                OF STAFF

        General Dempsey. Thank you, Chairman, Ranking Member Reed,
    other distinguished members of this committee. I appreciate the
    opportunity to provide you an update on our Armed Forces and to
    discuss our defense budget for 2016.
        I would ask that my written statement be submitted for the
    record. I will touch on just a few points of emphasis.
        Our military remains strong today. However, with threats
    proliferating, resources declining, and sequestration just
    months away, our ability to assure our allies is in question
    and our advantages over our adversaries are shrinking.
        This is a major strategic challenge, affecting not only our
    military, but ultimately America's leadership in the global
    world order. We face the reemergence of nation states with the
    capability, and potentially the intent, to constrain us. In
    space and cyberspace, our adversaries are rapidly leveling the
    playing field. We face an increasingly capable network of non
    state actors, including the Islamic State in Iraq and the
    Levant [ISIL], who threaten our national security interests
    both overseas and at home.
        Our strategy against ISIL integrates and balances nine
    lines of effort, only two of which are military. ISIL's threat
    is transregional and will require a sustainable level of effort
    over an extended period of time to create an environment in
    which they will be expelled and ultimately defeated.
        In Europe, Russia seeks to reduce NATO [the North Atlantic
    Treaty Organization] and European Union influence in Eastern
    Europe and generate disagreement among our NATO allies on the
    very future of Europe. Russian leaders have chosen a very
    dangerous path to achieve their strategic objectives, lighting
    a fire of ethnicity and nationalism not seen in Europe in 65
    years, and it may burn out of control. Our strategy is to
    reassure and reinforce our NATO allies while considering other
    instruments of national power to counter Russian aggression.
        Altogether, the global security environment is as uncertain
    as I have seen it in my 40 years of service. We are at a point
    where our national aspirations are at risk of exceeding our
    available resources.
        That brings me to the budget. We have heard Congress loud
    and clear as over the years it has challenged us to become more
    efficient and to determine the minimum essential requirements
    we need to do what the Nation asks us to do. PB16 [The
    President's Budget for fiscal year 2016] is that answer.
        In my judgment, this budget represents a responsible
    combination of capability, capacity, and readiness investment.
    It is what we need to remain, however, at the bottom edge of
    manageable risk to our national defense. As the Chairman said,
    there is no slack, there is no margin left for error, nor for
    response to strategic surprise.
        Funding lower than PB16, and a lack of flexibility in
    making the internal reforms necessary, could and will, in fact,
    put us in a situation where our National Defense Strategy will
    simply no longer be viable.
        For the past 25 years, the United States military has
    secured the global commons. We have deterred adversaries,
    reassured allies, and responded to crises and to conflict by
    maintaining our presence abroad. It has been our strategy to
    shape the international security environment by our forward
    presence and by building relationships among regional partners.
        In general terms, one-third of the force is forward-
    deployed, one-third has just returned, and one-third is
    preparing to deploy. Of necessity, certain capabilities
    actually operate with half of our forces deployed and the other
    half recovering. This puts a significant strain on our men and
    women in uniform and on their families.
        Sequestration will fundamentally and significantly change
    the way we deploy the force and shape the security environment.
    We will be almost 20 percent smaller but our forward presence
    will be reduced by more than a third. We will have less
    influence, and we will be less responsive. Conflict will take
    longer to resolve and will be more costly, both in terms of
    dollars and in casualties.
        In an age when we are less certain about what will happen
    next, but quite certain that it will happen more quickly, we
    will be further away and less ready than we need to be.
        Simply stated, sequestration will result in a dramatic
    change in how we protect our Nation and how we promote our
    National interests.
        Mr. Chairman, members of this committee, our men and women
    in uniform are performing around the globe with extraordinary
    courage, character, and professionalism. We owe them and their
    families clarity and, importantly, predictability on everything
    from policy to compensation, health care, equipment, training,
    and readiness.
        Settling down this uncertainty in our decision-making
    processes will help keep the right people, our decisive edge,
    in our all-volunteer force and maintain the military that the
    American people deserve and expect.
        I am grateful for the continued support to our men and
    women in uniform from this committee and this Congress, and I
    look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Dempsey follows:]

              Prepared Statement by General Martin E. Dempsey, USA
        Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, members of this Committee, it is my
    privilege to report to you on the state of America's Armed Forces, the
    changes in the global security environment, and the opportunities and
    challenges ahead.
        I am exceptionally honored to represent the men and women of our
    Armed Forces. Those who defend this Nation and the families who support
    them remain our most valuable national treasure and our competitive
    advantage. Deeply experienced from fourteen years of continuous
    deployments in harm's way, our All-Volunteer Force has been adaptable
    and resilient beyond expectation. Our men and women in uniform have
    performed around the globe with extraordinary courage, character, and
    professionalism. I am grateful for the continued support they receive
    from this distinguished body and from the American people.
        What makes America's Armed Forces who we are is our ability to
    provide options to the national command authority and our elected
    leaders to keep our Nation safe from coercion. The American people and
    our Allies expect that of us.
        Our military remains strong today. However, with threats
    proliferating, resources declining, and sequestration just months away,
    our ability to assure our allies is in question and our advantages over
    our adversaries are shrinking. This is a major strategic challenge
    affecting not only our military, but ultimately, America's leadership
    in the global world order.
        With your support, we can--and we must--sustain our military's
    decisive edge by prioritizing investments in readiness, training,
    modernization, and leader development. We must make the tough, but
    necessary choices in our strategy, our structure, and our resources for
    our Nation's future. Our men and women in uniform and the American
    people are trusting us to get it right.
                             joint force operations
        It has been an extraordinarily busy time for America's military.
    During the past twelve months, the men and women of our Joint Force
    have been on point around the world. They have maintained our enduring
    global commitments, bolstered long-term partnerships, and responded to
    new threats.
        Over the past year, the Joint Force continued to support the Afghan
    National Security Forces through the first democratic transfer of power
    in Afghanistan's history. My regular visits to Afghanistan reinforce
    just how much our coalition and Afghan partners have accomplished
    together over thirteen years of significant investment. The end of 2014
    marked the completion of the International Security Assistance Force
    (ISAF) mission. While Afghanistan is headed in the right direction
    towards a fully-functioning inclusive government, the path is neither a
    straight line, nor is it short. Moving forward with NATO's Resolute
    Support mission, our remaining force of about 10,000 troops will assist
    our Afghan partners in strengthening the Afghan institutions, systems,
    and processes that will support long-term security and stability--
    ultimately giving the Afghan people the opportunity to succeed on their
    own.
        At the same time, the force has maintained pressure on Al Qaeda,
    the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and other violent
    extremist groups both directly and through our partners where United
    States and allied interests are threatened. We have reinforced our
    commitment to our NATO allies in Europe in the face of Russian
    aggression. We have helped to address urgent humanitarian crises such
    as the Yazidi refugees trapped on Mount Sinjar and the Ebola outbreak
    in West Africa. We have maintained an active presence in the South and
    East China Seas, while remaining prepared to respond to provocations on
    the Korean Peninsula. We have campaigned against sources of instability
    in Africa and in Latin America.
        We have also postured with our interagency partners to reinforce
    security to our homeland--to include providing ballistic missile
    defense, countering persistent threats of terrorism, and improving our
    defenses against cyber-attack on government networks and critical
    infrastructure.
        In the near term, we will sustain--in some cases adjust--these
    commitments around the globe to protect our national security
    interests. While our global mission requirements have decidedly gone
    up, we will manage all of these demands with constrained resources.
    Consequently, we will have to assume higher risk in some areas to
    create opportunity in others.
                       the changing security environment
        Our understanding of the security environment carries important
    consequences for our Nation and for our military. It drives our
    strategy and budget, shapes the size, structure, and capability of the
    force, and affects where and when we send America's sons and daughters
    into harm's way.
        Last year, I stated that the global security environment is as
    fluid and complex as we have ever seen. That has certainly played out
    over the past twelve months. We have seen significant shifts in an
    already complex strategic landscape--increasingly capable non-state
    actors who are taking advantage of the internal conflict within Islam
    and the reemergence of states with the capability and potentially the
    intent to constrain. This is increasing the strain on the international
    order.
        In what I often term the ``heavyweight'' category, Russia's
    coercive and destabilizing actions have threatened NATO's eastern
    flank. Russia is investing deeply in advancing their capabilities
    across the board, especially in Anti-Access Area-Denial (A2AD) and
    cyberspace. Meanwhile, China is also fielding new defense platforms at
    a startling pace. In almost everything we do globally, we must consider
    the second- and third-order effects on our relationships with Russia
    and China.
        In the ``middleweight'' category, Iran seeks to be a hegemon in the
    Middle East. Beyond Iran's nuclear aspirations, as one of the world's
    leading exporter of arms, Iran employs surrogates and proxies in many
    places across the globe. Iran is also becoming increasingly more active
    in cyberspace. We have significant interests in the region that would
    not be well-served should Iran achieve their purposes.
        North Korea is the other ``middleweight.'' Cyclical provocations by
    North Korea have increased the risk of potential miscalculation. We
    must use all instruments of national power to ensure North Korea does
    not achieve its intentions. We have a large stake in maintaining
    stability on the Korean Peninsula and supporting our Republic of Korea
    ally.
        We are also seeing power in the international system shifting below
    and beyond the nation-state, particularly across the network of radical
    movements that use terrorism as a tactic. This network extends across
    an already unstable Middle East and North Africa, vis-`-vis the complex
    situations we have seen unfold over the last year in Libya, Gaza, Iraq,
    Syria, Nigeria, and Yemen. Within the trans-regional terror network, we
    have seen ISIL gain prominence in Iraq and Syria, while inspiring
    existing radical franchises like Al Qaeda affiliates and Boko Haram to
    rebrand themselves into an even more aggressive ideology. That is what
    makes this movement so dangerous.
        With our partners, we must keep relentless pressure across the
    entire network with our full suite of capabilities to include
    intelligence, building partners, and in some cases, direct action. At
    the same time, we must be careful not to fixate on a single group, nor
    paint these violent extremist groups all with one brush. We have to
    apply the right mix of tools of national power at the right time, over
    the right length of time, in order to make a difference. Even more
    challenging is keeping pressure on a network that adapts and
    metastasizes. Overmatch in size and technology matters, but the rate in
    which we can innovate and adapt relative to these non-state actors
    matters more. This is a generational challenge.
        Running north and south in our own hemisphere, the well-financed
    transnational organized criminal network is growing extraordinarily
    capable. Beyond a drug trafficking network, it is capable of moving
    anything from arms and unaccompanied children to terrorists and weapons
    of mass destruction. This network deserves more attention not just
    because of its effect on the social fabric of our country, but because
    of the effect it could have--and is having--on the security of our
    Nation.
        In cyberspace, our adversaries have become increasingly more
    capable, attempting to level the playing field in this critical domain.
    While we have expanded authorities and capabilities to defend our
    military networks, critical civilian infrastructure and private sector
    companies are an Achilles' heel in our Nation's security. Together, we
    must reconcile these issues. To this end, cybersecurity legislation
    that facilitates information sharing and encourages public-private
    partnerships is required to ensure our continued security and
    prosperity. Staying ahead of our adversaries in the cyber domain will
    require a concerted effort of the whole nation.
        Across the board, as the international order trends towards
    instability, strategic risk trends higher. While our potential
    adversaries grow substantially stronger, most of our allies are growing
    more dependent on sustained U.S. assistance. I believe these trends
    will continue.
        We must bring to bear every tool of national power in America's
    arsenal in coordination to address these emerging trends. Likewise,
    deepening relationships of trust with our allies and building the
    capacity of our partners to be more self-sustaining will be even more
    vital in the years ahead.
                           preparing the joint force
        Within the context of the rapidly evolving security landscape, the
    Joint Force of the future will require exceptional agility in how we
    shape, prepare, and posture. Here are my five guideposts to sustain and
    improve the force:
                         the all-volunteer force (avf)
        Our competitive advantage is our people and their adaptability. I
    firmly believe that our Nation needs a professional All-Volunteer Force
    (AVF). The AVF is the right force for this Nation and the Nation should
    never take it for granted. Conversely, the force has earned the trust
    and confidence of the American people and must renew that contract
    daily.
        As part of strengthening the AVF, the Joint Chiefs and I are
    committed to offer everyone in uniform equal professional opportunities
    to contribute their talent. We are removing the legacy gender-based
    barriers to service that no longer make sense. The Services are
    progressing through validation of occupational standards and are on
    target to recommend final decisions to integrate remaining closed
    positions or any exceptions to policy by the end of the year.
        To keep the AVF on a viable path, getting our personnel costs in
    balance is a strategic imperative. Ultimately, we need to make sure
    that we can continue to recruit, retain, equip, and train the best
    fighting force on the planet and fairly compensate America's best for
    their service.
        We owe our men and women some clarity--and importantly,
    predictability--on everything from policy to compensation, health care,
    equipment, training, and readiness. Frankly, right now we are not
    delivering. Settling down uncertainty in our decision making processes
    will help keep the right people in the Service. To this end, I want to
    continue working with Congress to address the growing imbalances in our
    accounts in a sensible, holistic way that preserves the All-Volunteer
    Force well into the future.
        As such, we are looking closely at the recommendations of the
    Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission. We are
    pleased that the commission supported our request to grandfather any
    changes to retirement pay for those currently serving and retirees. We
    will continue to place a premium on efforts that support wounded
    warriors and mental health.
        We will also keep working with the Department of Veterans Affairs,
    other agencies, veteran service organizations, and communities across
    the country to make sure those who are transitioning home and
    reintegrating into civilian life have access to health care, quality
    education opportunities, and meaningful employment. This especially
    includes those with enduring mental and physical challenges. I
    appreciate Congress for recently passing legislation to improve the
    access of veterans to mental health and suicide prevention services.
        This remarkable generation is not done serving. As such, the Joint
    Chiefs and I recently signed a Call to Continued Service letter that
    will go to all transitioning service members, encouraging them to keep
    serving the Nation in their communities. Our collective effort to
    enable our veterans and their families to continue contributing their
    strengths is a direct investment in the future of America.
                              preserving jointness
        Our military has become more integrated operationally and
    organizationally across the Services and across the Active, Guard, and
    Reserve components, especially over the past decade. However, the
    institution tends to work like a rubber band--if you stretch it and
    then release it, it will return to its normal form and shape. This is
    especially true in a resource-constrained environment. This tension
    comes at a time when our ability to win together through jointness is
    at its peak. The Joint Chiefs and I are committed to preserving the
    strength we have gained as a more seamless force. We are likewise
    committed to preserving the vital relationships with our interagency
    partners.
        Additionally, across the Services, we are resetting how we train
    and develop our forces for conflict across the spectrum. For the past
    decade, the Joint Force primarily focused on counterinsurgency centered
    in the Middle East. As we work to institutionalize the lessons of our
    recent wars--for example, by establishing building partnership capacity
    as a competency of the entire force, not just Special Forces--we are
    also working to restore balance and strategic depth in our
    capabilities. This includes those critical conventional areas that were
    deemphasized over the past decade by necessity.
        Concurrently, we are adapting how we engage and posture around the
    world in ways that are more dynamic, more strategic, and more
    sustainable. We are reevaluating how we employ our assets around the
    globe to better identify opportunities that generate the greatest
    advantages. We are developing new approaches across and within commands
    in how we assign, allocate, and apportion forces inside a broader
    interagency construct.
        We are also adapting our learning institutions to maximize the
    diverse talent of our men and women and to better cultivate agile
    thinkers for a global Joint Force. Within our Joint Professional
    Military Education (JPME) programs, we are mapping desired strategic
    leader attributes to the curriculum to ensure we are delivering them.
        We are undergoing an integrated, Department-wide effort to identify
    and invest in innovative ways to reverse the erosion of U.S.
    technological superiority--ensuring that our military remains dominant
    now and in the future. We are seeking innovation not only in
    technology, but also in leader development, wargaming, operational
    concepts, and business processes.
                          the defense industrial base
        Our Nation cannot sustain the world's finest military without also
    sustaining the world's strongest and most innovative defense industrial
    base (DIB).
        An enduring source of strategic advantage, we count on the defense
    industry to be able to research, develop, produce, deliver, and
    maintain the world-class weapons systems on which our military has long
    relied.
        I remain concerned that an unstable budget environment will promise
    long-term damage to critical segments of the DIB, most significantly in
    the small businesses that support our Nation's defense. Furthermore,
    sequester-level cuts will lead to a hollow DIB that no longer holds all
    of the critical design and manufacturing capabilities our military
    needs.
        A strong, efficient, and technologically vibrant defense industry
    is fundamental to securing our Nation's defense.
                                   our allies
        Our alliances remain paramount to our own security. We are far more
    effective when we have a global network of capable partners with shared
    values. Our Allies and partners provide vital basing and access, offer
    complementary military capabilities, and help shape outcomes towards a
    common purpose. Improving partner capability and capacity in targeted
    ways is an important component of our military strategy.
        We are continuing the rebalance to the Asia Pacific as part of our
    government's larger priority effort to foster stability and growth in
    that region. We have old and new partners in the Asia Pacific and we
    will continue to develop our relationships, engage more at every level,
    and shift assets to the region, over time.
        Europe remains a central pillar to our national security and
    prosperity. NATO has the capability and must sustain the will to
    address the threats to its eastern and southern flanks. In the near
    term, we will continue to reassure allies and improve NATO's readiness.
    Over the long term, we will adapt our strategies and structures to meet
    new realities. NATO is and will remain the most important and most
    capable alliance in history.
        In every theater, we must guard against a slow erosion of our
    alliances and be careful not to shunt the steady work required to
    sustain these ties. Remaining the security partner of choice increases
    our Nation's collective ability to safeguard common interests and
    support greater stability in weaker areas of the world.
                                 the profession
        Rekindling our understanding and our resolve as a profession
    continues to be one of my foremost priorities as Chairman. On and off
    the battlefield, we must always be good stewards of the special trust
    and confidence gifted to us by our fellow citizens. We owe it to the
    American people and to ourselves to look introspectively at whether we
    are holding true to the bedrock values and standards of our profession.
        The vast majority of our force serves honorably with moral courage
    and distinction every day. But failures of leadership and ethics, and
    lapses of judgment by a fraction of the force show that we still have
    work to do.
        We are seeing substantial progress in sexual assault prevention and
    response, however, we will remain laser-focused on reinforcing a
    climate where sexual assault is unacceptable, not just because it is a
    crime, but because it is completely counter to our core values.
        All of these issues have my ongoing and full attention. We know we
    own the profession and must reinforce the enduring norms and values
    that define us to continue to be a source of trust and pride for our
    Nation.
                        resourcing our defense strategy
        I stated last year that the balance between our security demands
    and available resources has rarely been more delicate. The National
    Security Strategy (NSS) released last month addresses some of our top
    concerns--the decline in military readiness, the strategic risk that
    will result should sequester-level cuts return, and the need to pursue
    greater integration with our Allies and partners. We need the full
    proposed President's Budget (PB) for fiscal year 2016 to support this
    strategy and to maintain the military the American people deserve and
    expect.
        PB16 reverses the decline in national defense spending of the past
    five years and helps ensure we can manage risk, meeting near-term
    defense needs while preparing for the future. It represents a
    responsible combination of capability, capacity, and readiness
    investment--leading to a Joint Force that is global, networked, and can
    provide options for the Nation. As the risks to our national security
    are increasing, this budget resources the force to remain capable,
    ready, and appropriately sized--able to meet today's global commitments
    and prepare for tomorrow's challenges.
        The Joint Chiefs and I fully support the PB16 budget. It is what we
    need to remain at the lower ragged edge of manageable risk in our
    ability to execute the defense strategy.
        However, we have no slack, no margin left for error or strategic
    surprise. We remain concerned that we still lack support for the
    reforms necessary to ensure that the Joint Force is combat ready and
    that we can preserve military options for our Nation into the future.
    We need budget certainty and we need flexibility to reset the force for
    the challenges we see ahead.
        Congress--and the American people--challenged us to become more
    efficient and to determine the minimum floor we need to be able to do
    what the Nation asks us to do. PB16 is that answer. Funding lower than
    PB16, especially if sequestration-level cuts return next year, combined
    with a lack of flexibility to make the reforms we need, will render the
    overall risk to our defense strategy unmanageable. In other words, our
    Nation's current defense strategy will no longer be viable.
        I ask Congress to support the entirety of this budget and end the
    deep, indiscriminate cuts that sequestration will impose.
        Thank you for your enduring support.

        Chairman McCain. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Dempsey, in front of the House Armed Services
    Committee on February 25, General Breedlove testified, ``I
    think, first and foremost, Mr. Putin has not accomplished his
    objectives in Ukraine, so next is probably more action in
    Ukraine.''
        In your professional military opinion, do you think General
    Breedlove is correct, that Putin will continue kinetic military
    operations in Ukraine and places like Mariupol because he has
    not yet accomplished his objectives?
        General Dempsey. Mr. Chairman, in an April 2014 speech,
    President Putin actually referred to a concept he described as
    Novorossiya, which is New Russia, that stretches across eight
    oblasts in Ukraine, essentially the eastern, southern oblasts
    of Ukraine, and up into Transnistria.
        He said that was what his intention was to do. To this
    point, their actions seem to suggest to me that they may
    actually be intent on accomplishing it.
        Chairman McCain. Does that convince you or give you the
    view that we should be providing defensive weaponry to Ukraine?
        General Dempsey. Chairman, as you know, we have provided
    about $100 million in other kinds of aid. We have a program to
    provide training.
        Chairman McCain. My question is, do you believe that we
    should provide defensive weaponry to Ukraine?
        General Dempsey. If I could, Senator, the----
        Chairman McCain. I know what you have done.
        General Dempsey. Right.
        Chairman McCain. Not enough. Go ahead.
        General Dempsey. I think we should absolutely consider
    providing lethal aid, and it ought to be in the context of our
    NATO allies, because Putin's ultimate objective is to fracture
    NATO.
        Chairman McCain. I thank you, General.
        Today in Tikrit, Secretary Carter, the Shiite militia with
    the Iranian Revolutionary Guard leader, among others, and
    Iranian air, is now attacking Tikrit, the hometown of Saddam
    Hussein, as we recall. The majority of that effort, with a
    couple thousand Iraqis, is being undertaken by the Shiite
    militia, the same militia that we fought against in the surge,
    the same militia that, according to estimates, manufactured the
    IEDs [improvised explosive devices], which directly resulted in
    the deaths of some 1,000 or 2,000 young Americans.
        Are you concerned that Iran is basically taking over the
    fight? According to the Wall Street Journal this morning, we
    are observing that operation. Does that ring an alarm bell with
    you, Mr. Secretary?
        Secretary Carter. It does. It does. Our approach to
    combating ISIL in Iraq is to work with the Iraqi security
    forces and a multisectarian government that takes a
    multisectarian approach to defeating ISIL and regaining control
    of its own territory.
        Sectarianism is what brought us to the point where we are,
    and so I do look at it with concern. We are watching it very
    closely. The Shiite militia is involved. Also, the Iraqi
    security force is involved. Some Sunni forces are involved.
        I would note that some Sunni tribal leaders in Tikrit, and
    this is important, have signaled their support for this
    offensive. If that is true, it is good news, because it
    suggests that this is not purely a Shiite on Sunni thing.
        But this is the problem that brought Iraq low, so I am
    looking at it with great concern.
        Chairman McCain. Of course, there are well-documented human
    rights violations, significant, by Shiite militia on Sunni, as
    we all know.
        Secretary Carter, you just returned from Afghanistan, an
    excellent visit, from all reports. My understanding from media
    reports is that you will be reevaluating the calendar-driven
    plan for withdrawal from Afghanistan.
        Is that true? Can you tell us what recommendations you have
    in mind?
        By the way, we have been hearing about these
    recommendations for a year or two now. Do you have any timeline
    as to when a decision may be made, because according to the
    calendar-driven plan that is now a place, we are going to have
    to be withdrawing troops very soon.
        Can you update us on that?
        Secretary Carter. I certainly can. That was the reason that
    I went to Afghanistan, second only to the primary reason, which
    is to see our fantastic people who are there and let them know
    that we are all with them and think about them every day.
        But I had an opportunity to assess conditions on the ground
    there, to discuss them with President Ghani, and I will share
    my observations.
        But just to get to the answer to your question, I think the
    phrase I used when I came before you last was, we have a plan,
    but a plan is a plan, and a plan is something you adjust over
    time. So I think we can adjust our plan over the next year or
    two.
        I did discuss that with President Ghani. I have discussed
    that here in Washington. I don't know what decisions the
    President will make in that regard or the timetable on which he
    will make them, but I, certainly, have had the opportunity to
    acquaint myself with them.
        One other thing I would like to say is that President Ghani
    gave me a very articulate depiction of conditions and how they
    changed, and what the good things have been and what the bad
    things have been. I don't want to take too much time, but I
    just wanted to tell everybody on this committee that the first
    thing he said to me when he saw me was, would you please go
    home and tell everyone there, and especially the troops, that I
    know that almost 1 million Americans have come through here in
    the last decade to help my country, and that thousands of them
    have been killed and wounded, and I want you to know, thank
    you.
        I just wanted to tell you that, because I haven't heard
    that for a long time.
        Chairman McCain. But it is your opinion that the present
    plan needs to be revised?
        Secretary Carter. I think that there are going to be
    respects in which the President is going to want to consider
    the conditions that have changed. I will give you some examples
    of that.
        Chairman McCain. I understand the examples. But do you want
    to stick with the calendar-driven plan as it is now, or do you
    want it to be revised?
        Secretary Carter. No, I think we need to do conditions. In
    any military plan, we have to be conditions-based, absolutely,
    firmly.
        Chairman McCain. I thank you. I thank both of you for your
    testimony.
        Secretary McCord, do you want to add anything?
        Mr. McCord: Not on the subject of Afghanistan. Thank you.
        Chairman McCain. Thank you.
        Senator Reed?
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
    gentlemen, for your testimony, for your service.
        Just quickly following up, Mr. Secretary, you have been to
    Afghanistan, Iraq, and the region, and also been in
    communication with foreign leaders, your counterparts across
    the globe. Are they aware of the impending sort of budgetary
    train wreck in the United States? Does this create anxiety and
    the conclusion that we won't have the resources, even if we
    have the resolve?
        Secretary Carter. Well, in general, they are polite enough
    not to raise this question, but when I have had conversations
    with foreign leaders, I think it is distressing to me because
    they hear everything we say, and they see everything we do, and
    they get a very clear picture of the dangers of sequester. They
    probably get an outsized picture of our lack of will.
        But this is not good for our friends. Of course, I am only
    talking to our friends, so I can only imagine what our foes are
    thinking. But they are probably thinking the same thing, ``What
    are these guys doing to themselves?''
        This is why it's not only a substantive matter, but it is a
    matter of appearances and deterrence that we get our act
    together with respect to sequester.
        Senator Reed. So, essentially, this goes beyond just the
    numbers in the budget and what programs we are going to fund.
    This goes to the perception of the world of the United States
    being both capable and resourced to carry out a strategy to
    support their allies and oppose their adversaries. Is that
    accurate?
        Secretary Carter. That is exactly right.
        Senator Reed. The other side of this coin, too, is, we are
    not in a situation where our allies seem to be stepping up to
    the plate to fill in the gaps, either the NATO countries or
    even our Gulf allies.
        Secretary Carter. Amen to that. You mentioned the
    Europeans. Europeans, our NATO partners, made a pledge to take
    steps that would, for most of them, involve an increase in
    defense spending. They really need to take that step, because
    we can't be the only one on our team with military potential in
    that theater, which, as you and the Chairman have mentioned
    with respect to Ukraine, is a very dangerous one.
        Senator Reed. I don't want to beat a dead horse, but their
    enthusiasm to raise their defense budget is probably affected
    by our lack of will to raise ours, not just the defense budget,
    but other budgets. Is that correct?
        Secretary Carter. That well could be, and it is yet another
    reason for us to get it together here.
        Senator Reed. General Dempsey, you mentioned there are nine
    lines of operation against ISIL, and the Department of Defense
    has, I think you said, two. So there are seven lines being
    funded outside the DOD budget. Is that accurate?
        General Dempsey. Yes. Some of the lines, for example,
    counter messaging, reside partially within our budget, but
    generally, the answer to that is yes.
        Senator Reed. So that even if we were to restore some
    significant funding to the Department of Defense on the ground,
    you would still be without the resources you need to defeat
    ISIL and degrade ISIL?
        General Dempsey. Yes, sir. If what you mean is that we need
    the whole-of-government here, absolutely.
        Senator Reed. State, Homeland Security.
        General Dempsey. Right.
        Senator Reed. When you talk about the situation with Ebola
    recently.
        General Dempsey. Counter-foreign-financing, which works
    through Treasury.
        Senator Reed. The Treasury Department, et cetera, et
    cetera.
        So there is not a nice, neat separation between our
    National security and DOD and the rest of government.
        General Dempsey. Not on the ISIL campaign, no, sir.
        Senator Reed. Secretary Carter, just doubling back here for
    a moment, let's assume the worst and we don't move above the
    BCA and sequestration, how does this affect our overseas OCO
    [contingency operations] accounts? Is there an effect you see
    on our ability to fund them? Do you have to borrow from Peter
    to pay Paul?
        Secretary Carter. You mean if we are denied what we are
    asking for in the base budget? Well, we also have an OCO
    budget, as you say. There isn't slack in the OCO budget. That
    is money being spent for real things.
        It is being spent for the campaign against ISIL. It is
    being spent in Afghanistan. It is being spent in the Horn of
    Africa.
        So OCO is committed to the here-and-now ways that we are
    protecting our security, and we can't rob Peter to pay Paul.
        Senator Reed. Just in that same vein, General Dempsey,
    another way to approach the problem, how are you going to
    manage the strategic risk if we have the situation of
    sequestration in place, and the Budget Control Act?
        General Dempsey. As you know, sir, I have submitted the
    Chairman's risk assessment, which establishes the fact that we
    are at significant risk against the strategy as it was
    conceived in 2012 already. What we have been doing is we have
    been increasing risk over the past 3 or 4 years.
        What I would tell you now is that if we don't get funded at
    the PB16 level, and if we don't get the reforms inside of the
    budget, because it is $4.2 billion for this year, but it
    accrues to, I think, $40 billion over the FYDP [Future Year
    Defense Program], if we don't get that, the strategy is going
    to have to change.
        So if you are asking me how I am going to manage the
    current strategy, it is unmanageable.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Inhofe. Secretary Carter, you heard the answer
    General Dempsey just gave. Do you agree with his statement?
        Secretary Carter. I do.
        Senator Inhofe. You know, I wasn't here. I am sorry I
    missed your opening statement, and I didn't have the benefit of
    reading it. But I think it is worthwhile getting on the record
    again--you have heard many times the statements of James
    Clapper and others.
        The Clapper statement: ``Looking back over my now half
    century of intelligence, I have not experienced a time when we
    have been beset by more crises.'' He repeated that in a
    different way later.
        Of course, just last week, we had General Stewart saying
    essentially the same thing.
        Now I assume that you agree with those statements?
        Secretary Carter. I do. When I started in this business,
    there was one problem, which was the Soviet Union.
        Senator Inhofe. Those were the good old days, weren't they?
    I can say that.
        Secretary Carter. I remember enough not to be too
    nostalgic. It was pretty serious. But the world is so much more
    complicated, so much more is happening, exactly as you say.
        Senator Inhofe. Hearing Prime Minister Netanyahu this
    morning, that just drove that home. I was thinking how easy
    that was. Yes, the threat was terrible. We had two superpowers.
    We knew what they had, and they knew what we had. They were
    predictable. We were predictable. Mutual assured destruction
    meant something. It doesn't mean anything anymore.
        I was just thinking about that, how different that is
    today.
        The other thing I wanted to mention is that, General
    Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Welsh, and General Dunford
    all testified, and they talked about if sequester is coming in.
    Now you said something that I think is even more significant.
    You said even with the fiscal year 2016 budget, the Army, Navy,
    and Marine Corps won't reach their readiness goals until 2020
    and the Air Force until 2023. Is that accurate?
        So what you are saying there is even our budget, without
    the sequestration, you are saying that threat is there.
        Secretary Carter. What is going on there is digging
    ourselves out of a hole of sequester in the past, particularly
    the 2013 budget, the year in which the shutdown occurred, and
    so forth.
        The thing about readiness is that it is easy to have it
    fall off, but then it takes time to build it back. I think what
    the chiefs are saying absolutely accurately is we lost a lot of
    readiness through the turmoil of the last few years. Even if we
    are given the opportunity, as we hope with this budget, to
    start building back, it is just in the nature, it is in the
    nature of training, that it takes a while to get that readiness
    back. So I do agree with them.
        Senator Inhofe. Secretary Carter, you were over there. Of
    course, this is the first time you have appeared before this
    committee in this capacity. When you were over there and you
    apparently had some time, good quality time with President
    Ghani, when you were there, and it was observed, I think by
    General Dempsey, that we don't operate in a vacuum here. What
    we are saying the whole world knows. Is there anything you want
    to add with our relationship with President Ghani that would be
    beneficial to have the whole world know, or those who are
    participating in that theater?
        Secretary Carter. Yes. One thing, which is that he is a
    partner in a way that we have been looking for and without whom
    the sacrifice that we have made over these last 10 years can't
    be successful.
        He understands what we have tried to do for him. He knows
    that it has been a great benefit to his country and not just to
    protect our country, which, of course, it has, and was why we
    went there in the first place, to protect ourselves from the
    breeding ground of the 9/11 attacks on our own country.
        I think everybody who participated in this campaign ought
    to know that around the world and in our coalition, that we
    have now in President Ghani somebody who really gets the
    sacrifice that we have all made on behalf of Afghanistan, and
    is committed to making the progress that we made there stick.
    That is what I would say.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay. That's good. I appreciate that.
        Senator Reed talked about our limited resources now, and I
    wasn't sure I understood your answer there. Do you think people
    are out there--it doesn't matter where they are. It can be the
    Ukraine. It can be Georgia. It can be anyplace. Do they
    recognize that we don't have the resources we have historically
    had, and we are not able to do what we historically have done?
        Secretary Carter. Well, they hear us saying that, and they
    hear us debating that. You know, I hope, and this is something
    I try to say, and I am sure you all try to say, which is yes,
    we are having internal debates and so forth, and we don't like
    what is going on here, and I have, certainly, said that today.
    But don't underestimate the will and the power of the United
    States. I hope people understand that as well, because we still
    have the greatest fighting force the world has ever seen.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes, I understand that. We are aiming that
    toward others. People look at us, and yes, we do. But looking
    here at home, when even you admit that with the current budget,
    even without sequestration, our risk level is going to
    increase, right?
        Secretary Carter. That risk as measured in the readiness
    that needs to be restored, as you mentioned, yes.
        Senator Inhofe. Risk means lives, doesn't it?
        General Dempsey, should Congress pass AUMF [the
    Authorization to Use Military Force] without restrictions?
        General Dempsey. I am the military guy in the room, and I
    would always seek to preserve all of our options. I was
    consulted on the document passed in the Congress, and it will
    allow us to meet the campaign as we've designed it. You say
    without restriction. That really now becomes a decision between
    you and your colleagues.
        Senator Inhofe. All right. Secretary Carter?
        Secretary Carter. Exactly the same answer. Key to us is,
    can we do our campaign?
        Senator Inhofe. Okay, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. [presiding] Senator Hirono, please.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and your testimony.
        Secretary Carter, as the department continues to rebalance
    our military forces in the Asia Pacific and the Middle East,
    there are, clearly, challenges, in terms of available
    resources. I know from our January meeting that you agree that
    stability in the Asia-Pacific region is critical to our
    National security, even as there is instability in so many
    other parts of the world.
        So you mentioned today once again in your testimony that
    one of the priorities is to continue our commitment to the
    rebalance to the Asia Pacific. So I did want to highlight one
    related issue that I would like to continue to discuss with
    you, and that is, there are plans in place to shift a number of
    military personnel and assets from Hawaii to include naval
    vessels, aircraft, Air Force tankers, back to the continental
    United States by 2020.
        I am concerned about how moving these kinds of significant
    capabilities away from the region, while we are supposed to be
    committed to the rebalance to the Asia Pacific, will look to
    our allies and to our adversaries. So I would like to continue
    this discussion with you, as we go forward.
        This is a question relating to energy security. In April
    2014, there was a DOD directive to all of our service entities.
    It was signed by the acting Deputy Secretary of Defense. This
    was a new energy directive to enhance capabilities while
    improving energy security and mitigating costs, because we all
    acknowledge that the DOD is the largest user of energy in our
    country.
        Can you tell us where DOD stands in regards to implementing
    this directive, which, by the way, goes to 2024? How is it
    supported in the President's budget?
        Secretary Carter. Thank you, Senator.
        On the first point, I agree with you entirely. The Asia-
    Pacific rebalance is a critical part of our strategy going
    forward. We can't forget, as we are embroiled in the conflict
    against ISIL, which we must win, that it is a big world out
    there. We have interests and friends and challenges throughout
    the world, and the Asia-Pacific is where half the world's
    population and half the world's economy resides.
        So I agree with you, and I would be happy to discuss that.
    We have done that before, and that is a continuing commitment
    not only of mine and yours, but of our country. So I would be
    happy to talk to you about that.
        With respect to energy, a very important point. The energy
    landscape is changing a lot, and the Defense Department is, as
    you say, the largest user of energy in the Federal Government,
    by far, and, therefore, has a real stake in where we go with
    respect to energy and a role to play in getting us there.
        I signify, if I may, two ways in which we do that. One is
    R&D [research and development] in areas that are particularly
    important to defense, where because of our particular needs, we
    may be an early adopter of technology. That is a longstanding
    role of the Department of Defense in many things, like the
    Internet and everything else. We are doing it for defense, but
    it has spinoffs.
        The other way we play a role is in the country's overall
    energy strategy. Obviously, that is Secretary Moniz's
    responsibility, and the President's, but we try to make sure
    that what we are doing is aligned with them.
        Of course, finally--I don't want to go on too long--
    overall, our energy situation has improved tremendously in the
    last couple years, and our opportunities have widened. That has
    been good for defense, because we are, for example, a huge user
    of fuel. When oil prices come down, we benefit from it. Thank
    you.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you for your continuing commitment.
        General Dempsey, there was a recent RAND workplace survey
    report that indicated that 62 percent of women who reported an
    unwanted sexual contact to military authorities indicated that
    they experienced at least one form of retaliation. A
    significant number of these retaliations came from coworkers,
    not from the command structure.
        So this is a difficult situation, and I would like to know
    what your thoughts are on this type of retaliation and how it
    can be curtailed within the service.
        General Dempsey. Well, it is absolutely unacceptable. There
    were 12 metrics that we have established to track progress
    toward ridding the professional force from this stain. Ten of
    them trended positively, two of them negatively. One was the
    retribution issue.
        Thankfully, a companion piece was that the vast majority of
    respondents--and by the way, we had an unusual number of
    respondents for a survey--expressed faith in the chain of
    command. So we actually have been able to isolate the issue to
    peer-on-peer retribution.
        Senator Hirono. Yes.
        General Dempsey. So you ask what we are doing about it.
    Well, based on that survey, actually, we have had several
    meetings. The Secretary convenes a meeting every 2 weeks, I
    think it is. We had one yesterday. That is the topic. We are
    looking to get after that, but we actually are encouraged that
    we have been able to turn the trendline on 10 out of 12. We
    have to go to work on the other 2, and keep our eye on the
    first 10.
        Senator Hirono. Yes, there will be continuing, I think,
    interest on the part of most members, many members of this
    committee----
        General Dempsey. As there should be.
        Senator Hirono.--on how you are doing on the peer-to-peer.
        General Dempsey. We don't mind that a bit. We have to work
    on this.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Senator Wicker, please.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you.
        Secretary Carter and General Dempsey, I want to ask first
    about the big picture. In the 6 minutes that we have, I would
    like to drill down a little on Afghanistan.
        Last week, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper
    spoke to us, and he said, among other things, unpredictable
    instability is the new normal. Secretary Carter, I think this
    is what you and Senator Inhofe were talking about when you said
    we used to know the exact threats, and it was one big threat,
    and now it is unstable and unpredictable.
        General Clapper also said this. He noted that, last year,
    there were more deaths from state-sponsored mass killings, more
    people displaced from their homes, and a higher rate of
    political instability than we have seen in decades. It was the
    most lethal year for global terrorism in 45 years. That is
    Director Clapper.
        Now, only a few days before, Secretary of State Kerry told
    the House Foreign Affairs Committee that we are actually living
    in a period of less daily threat to Americans and to people in
    the world than normally, less deaths, less violent deaths today
    than through the last century.
        Now, Secretary Carter, are we living in a period of less
    daily threats to Americans?
        Secretary Carter. Senator, I haven't seen that particular
    comment of Secretary Kerry----
        Senator Wicker. That is the exact quote.
        Secretary Carter.--with what the context of that was.
        But I would say two things. One is, to get back to what
    Director Clapper said about an uncertain world and one in which
    new and different threats are constantly emerging, I would
    agree with that completely. I just simply don't know what
    Secretary Kerry said in that particular instance, Senator, what
    the context for it was.
        But we, certainly, have serious threats to the United
    States around the world. I guess it is a good thing that we
    have combated terrorism as vigorously as we have since 2001,
    and we have made a lot of changes, a new Department of Homeland
    Security, a lot of changes in intelligence in the Department of
    Defense. So I think we have upped our game considerably.
        At the same time, our opponents, both state opponents and
    terrorists, continue to be pretty ingenious.
        Senator Wicker. Mr. Secretary, I would just observe, in
    terms of the level of threat, it is hard to square the two
    statements coming from two members of the same administration.
    Either we are living in a time of higher instability and more
    deaths from state-sponsored mass killings, or we are in a
    period of less daily threats to Americans, this second
    statement coming from our chief negotiator with the Iranian
    regime.
        I will have to say to you, it causes me concern that
    Secretary Kerry would feel this way while at the same time
    trying to negotiate a nuclear deal with this terrorist nation.
        General Dempsey, if the Secretary of State is correct,
    perhaps we don't have to avoid sequestration, if we are living
    a period of less daily threats to American, less threats to the
    people of the world, than normally. Perhaps we could stick with
    sequestration, if that is the case. Wouldn't you agree?
        General Dempsey. Well, you know, I would say this, Senator,
    one of the ways the military actually contributes to this
    argument is by being forward-deployed, so that we can shape and
    influence the future.
        You may have heard me say in the past the last thing we
    want to do is play a home game. If you sequester us, we will be
    playing a home game.
        Senator Wicker. Well, you know where I stand on
    sequestration.
        General Dempsey. I do, sir.
        Senator Wicker. I am doing everything I can, working with
    the bipartisan leadership of this committee.
        I appreciate your testimony on page three, General Dempsey,
    that threats are proliferating. It seems to me that that is
    what is obvious out there.
        It does concern me, though, when the Secretary of State
    completely misses the point, as demonstrated by the
    juxtaposition of Director Clapper's statement and the Secretary
    of State's statement.
        Now, Secretary Carter, on the first page of your testimony,
    thank you for commending our troops. You say, in Afghanistan,
    our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are helping cement
    progress made toward a more secure, stable, and prosperous
    future.
        I want to salute you for saying that we have made progress.
    It seems to me that there are some people out there listening,
    maybe to the network news or some of the talking heads, who
    would conclude that things have gone to hell in Afghanistan.
        As a matter of fact, as you pointed out, in response to
    Senator Inhofe's question, President Ghani and his chief
    opposition leader are in a partnership. They appreciate our
    presence there, and we have made progress. Things are headed in
    the right direction. 10 years? worth of blood and sacrifice has
    gotten us to where we are.
        You say they are working to ensure that Afghanistan never
    again becomes a safe haven for attacks on our homeland or our
    partners and allies.
        I think 6 years ago, you might have been able to say that
    about Iraq. I just wonder what lessons we have learned from
    Iraq and what assurances you can give with the plan the
    administration has, with the President's plan for a drawdown of
    troops in Afghanistan, that we won't lose the progress that we
    have made that you have talked about, to cement the progress
    toward a more secure, stable, and prosperous future in
    Afghanistan, and toss that all away, as we have elsewhere.
        Secretary Carter. Thank you, Senator. We do have the
    opportunity to cement it. You said, what is the difference
    between Iraq and Afghanistan? They are very different
    situations in the following two ways.
        The first is that we, as President Ghani clearly indicated
    to me, but he has said this publicly, he wants us there. We
    have a willing partner. We have a bilateral security agreement,
    which we didn't get with Iraq, welcoming us to stay in
    Afghanistan. That is the first thing.
        The second thing is that we have a partner in President
    Ghani. You mentioned Dr. Abdullah, the Chief Executive Officer,
    and that is an important point, as you note.
        They are working together. I saw both of them. I saw both
    of them together. I kind of watched their relationship. They
    have agreed to work together in a multisectarian, if I can use
    that phrase, way, which is exactly what didn't happen in Iraq,
    the devolution to sectarianism. That is what led to the
    opportunity the cruel force of ISIL exploited and to the
    situation we are now in.
        So we have an opportunity in Afghanistan, for those two
    critical reasons that are so different from Iraq, to get an
    outcome that really is cemented.
        Senator Wicker. General, would you like to comment on that?
        General Dempsey. There is a terrorist network that
    stretches from Afghanistan to Nigeria, and we have to keep
    pressure on it along its entire length. I think Afghanistan is
    and will remain an anchor point for that pressure.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Senator Blumenthal, please.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to shift to an area where both of you have
    demonstrated a lot of attentiveness and caring, which is the
    well-being of the extraordinary men and women whom you command
    while they serve under you and afterward when they become
    veterans. I know that both of you have shown that, indeed, Mr.
    Secretary, in your prior life, when you worked as
    Undersecretary. General Dempsey, I was privileged to watch you
    perform at a recent event sponsored by the Woodruff Foundation,
    so I know how active you are in support of our troops and our
    wounded warriors.
        I want to focus on the connections between the DOD and the
    V.A., having now seen it from the perspective of the V.A., the
    Veterans Administration, in my capacity as ranking member. I am
    struck by the need for better information. The health
    electronics records have been a point of contention, but so
    have the formulary issue, the drug formulary issue. There are a
    variety of areas where there needs to be simply better
    coordination. That is a Washington word, ``coordination,''
    ``collaboration.''
        But can you see ways that we can improve the flow of
    information and the help that veterans get, particularly our
    veterans who suffer from posttraumatic stress and traumatic
    brain injury, which, as you know, both Chairman McCain and I
    have addressed in the Clay Hunt Veterans Suicide Prevention
    Bill that we cosponsored and that recently passed. But that is
    just a beginning, a down payment.
        I wonder what more we can do in that area. I know we have
    talked about it a little bit, and I wonder if you could address
    that in the context of the budget.
        Secretary Carter. I can, and thank you for that. We did
    discuss it. Accordingly, I have tried to see where things stand
    and assess it.
        I have a great partner in the Secretary of Veterans
    Affairs, and I have talked to him. To the soldier, sailor,
    airman, and marine, they shouldn't have to worry that there are
    two Cabinet departments that are responsible for taking care of
    them. They shouldn't have to worry about that. We should have
    to make it knit together.
        You mentioned IEHR, the Integrated Electronic Health Record
    program, formulary issues, which have to do with pharmacies and
    what they call drugs and so forth. So, yes, we do need to stay
    closely knitted, and we will.
        I wanted to particularly note your work on PTS [post-
    traumatic stress], simply because that is one of these things
    that we have learned through sad experience in the last decade
    or so is a serious thing that can also be treated. I think you
    have been the one championing, and I thank you for that. We
    will do it, making sure that veterans who came along before
    there was this awareness and before there were these treatments
    are given the benefits of this awareness and given the benefits
    of this treatment.
        I have looked into that since you and I have talked. I can
    say more about that and we can talk about it privately, but I
    understand exactly the need that you were pointing me to, and I
    think I see a way that we can address that. That is really
    important for our older veterans.
        Senator Blumenthal. Well, I appreciate those comments. You
    are absolutely right. The diagnosis for PTS began in the 1980s,
    but troops were suffering from it way before then. Part of the
    challenge is to not only care for them, and you mentioned there
    are treatments, but in many ways, PTS is still a mystery. There
    are centers of excellence that the V.A. has established. One of
    them happens to be at the V.A. facility in West Haven, in
    Connecticut, under the aegis of Yale New Haven and the
    psychiatrists and so forth there, and they are doing some great
    work.
        But with proper support, and I hope it will come from the
    Department of Defense as well as the V.A., so much more can be
    done and more effective treatment, which we are just beginning
    to discover, as you observed.
        Let me just conclude by going through some of the
    procurement issues that I think are important.
        The Joint Strike Fighter, I am pleased to see the increase
    there from 38 to 57, which, going back again to your prior
    service in the Department of Defense, might not have been
    predicted at that time, the, in effect, vote of confidence. I
    don't want to speak too strongly, but it looks to me like that
    procurement program is proceeding well. Am I correct?
        Secretary Carter. I think we have stability in the Joint
    Strike Fighter program, compared to 5 years ago. That is the
    basis on which the ramp-up of production is a prudent thing to
    do. That is a good opportunity for us, that the program is
    running that way.
        Senator Blumenthal. I am very pleased to see that both the
    Virginia-class and the Ohio replacement are moving ahead on a
    very good pace.
        Secretary Carter. True. Both necessary.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    Thank you, General.
        Secretary Carter. Thank you.
        Senator Reed. Senator Ayotte?
        Senator Ayotte. I want to thank the Chairman.
        I want to thank all of you for what you do for the country.
        Secretary Carter, I want to thank you very much for so
    quickly after your confirmation following through and meeting
    with the JTACs [joint terminal attack controllers] to hear
    their perspective on close air support on Friday, and for
    including me in that meeting.
        I appreciate your commitment to review the Air Force's
    decisions on the A-10 and appreciate your willingness to do
    that. So thank you very much.
        Secretary Carter. Thank you.
        Senator Ayotte. I wanted to follow up on the issue of
    Ukraine, on a different topic, and that is the issue of U.S.
    intelligence sharing, because there were reports recently in
    the Wall Street Journal that really troubled me about what we
    are doing to help the Ukrainians in terms of their defense, the
    information we can share with them to be able to minimize their
    casualties and defend their territory.
        In that article, basically what it said is that images are
    being significantly degraded to avoid provoking Russia and that
    what it was doing, in terms of Ukrainian officials, they said
    it has really hampered their ability of their forces to counter
    separatists because it is a 24-hour delay, in terms of
    intelligence sharing, and that they are actually approaching
    other countries like Canada because of these intelligence gaps.
        So can you help me understand, if we are not going to give
    them arms to defend themselves, because we haven't done that
    yet--and I appreciate that I hear from General Dempsey and you
    as well that this is something that you are very open to--at
    least we can share information with them because they are
    obviously dying by the thousands defending their own territory.
        So can you help me understand this issue; can we share
    intelligence with them so they can defend themselves?
        Secretary Carter. I can help you in a limited way, because
    that is not a decision that either the Chairman or I are
    involved in. This is an intelligence community thing, and it
    has to do with the sharing arrangement that we have with
    Ukraine. I think there are other considerations that they take
    into account when making that determination.
        But I think your larger point, which is that there are
    things that we can do to help the Ukrainians help themselves--
    and, of course, the main effort there is the political and
    economic ones, sanctions and so forth. But on the military
    side, there are ways that we can help the Ukrainians to help
    themselves. We are, as you say, working through them now.
        But I am afraid I can't speak to the intelligence. The
    intelligence community will have to answer that.
        General Dempsey. It is sources and methods, Senator. It has
    nothing to do with the fact that we are worried about angering
    Russia.
        I can assure you that both the Secretary and I are
    committed to finding ways to help Ukraine defend its sovereign
    territory and reduce the casualties. There is a
    disproportionate number of casualties on the Ukraine side. You
    are right, both the Europeans and us should be active in trying
    to help them.
        Senator Ayotte. So think about if you, General Dempsey,
    with all of your military experience, if you are fighting an
    enemy and you weren't getting intelligence in real-time. A 24-
    hour delay is like a lifetime in a wartime setting.
        So I guess the real-time intelligence, to me, there has to
    be a way to protect our sources and methods. But 24 hours later
    in an intelligence context is like a lifetime.
        So I really hope we will get them real-time intelligence,
    so that they can defend themselves. They have suffered too many
    casualties, and anything we can do to prevent those casualties,
    I think we have some responsibility here, given we were
    signatories to the Budapest Memorandum, too, and this is just
    outright aggression of one nation upon another. So I appreciate
    that.
        I wanted to ask as well about ISIL's activities beyond Iraq
    and Syria. We are hearing a lot about ISIL's activities in
    Libya.
        Can you help me understand what we see ISIL doing even
    beyond the grave challenges that we face of their establishing
    a caliphate along Iraq and Syria, in places like Libya? Where
    else are we seeing their presence? What are we going to do
    about it?
        Secretary Carter. Thank you, Senator. I will say something,
    and then the Chairman might want to add in.
        We are seeing it. We are seeing it throughout North Africa.
    We are seeing it in the Gulf area. I had a lengthy
    conversation, to get back to the previous conversation we were
    having on Afghanistan, with President Ghani, about it showing
    up in Afghanistan. Then we see people in Europe, individuals
    who are joining up, and so forth.
        I will give you the perspective I learned by talking to our
    folks over in the meeting I held in Kuwait last week, what I
    learned about it, which is, one, ISIL is attractive to younger
    members of older movements, where the leadership has gotten a
    little older. Maybe they have gotten a little staid. The
    younger guys who have more steam or are more deluded are
    attracted to this newer, more radical thing.
        The second thing I learned is that this is a social media-
    fueled terrorism group in a way that we haven't seen yet. So
    people who are very distant from any battlefield, very distant
    from any experience of radicalism, suddenly becoming enticed
    through social media.
        In terms of what we do about it, I think this is why I
    wanted people to come from all over the region and, indeed, in
    the case of Special Operations Command, all over the world. We
    need to be prepared for this, in terms of protecting our own
    people.
        I think it is also true the diplomatic and nondefense
    people who were in this conference have this knowledge and
    responsibility. But it is something that we need to combat in
    the information domain as well. That is going to be
    challenging, because this is a social media--if bin Laden was
    the Internet terrorist, these guys are the social media
    terrorists. I think that we will see people running up that
    flag or saying that they are attracted to that movement all
    over the world.
        By the way, and this is the last thing I will say, that is
    why it is important to inflict defeat upon ISIL. We have to
    take the steam out of this thing. These guys aren't invincible,
    and we have to make that clear.
        General Dempsey. The only thing I would add, Senator, in
    addition to what the Secretary said about it, the radical
    nature of its ideology makes it attractive to a population
    where governance has collapsed broadly across the region. They
    are extraordinarily in the social media. So we really are
    taking and continue to refine a transregional, sustainable,
    persistent approach to this.
        As I said, it stretches from al Qaeda in Iraq and Pakistan
    all the way over to Boko Haram. At different times and in
    different places, they syndicate with each other. We have to
    see it that way, in order to deal with it.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
        Chairman McCain [presiding]. Senator Manchin, and following
    Senator Manchin, at the request of Secretary Carter, he would
    like to take about a 15-minute break after Senator Manchin, and
    the committee will stand in recess for 15 minutes following
    Senator Manchin's questioning.
        Senator Manchin?
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank all of you for your great service to the country. I
    appreciate very much what you do every day.
        There is not a person that I know of in my state of West
    Virginia who doesn't support everything you do, doesn't support
    the military, how they fight. They will do anything you ask
    them to do.
        But they still ask questions about why we spend so much
    money on military, why we spend more than 8 of the next
    countries put together. So we have to be always gaining their
    trust, if you will.
        I know in procurement, we are not the best in procurement.
    We are not the best in developing weapons, as far as the
    costliness. Eisenhower said beware of the military-industrial
    complex. I think we all are in tune with all of this.
        So I know how detrimental sequestration is. We talked about
    flexibility at one time. Flexibility by itself won't do it. I
    understand that.
        Secretary Carter, you and I had a nice conversation. I
    think Secretary Hagel was trying to look at the budgets,
    reducing them by 20 percent and everything. But basically, it
    really comes down to the auditing, knowing where we are. I have
    talked about contracting. I have talked about the effectiveness
    of our National Guard. I have even asked the question, tell me
    the difference between the Reserve and the Guard, why do we
    have duplication? There is so much going on here.
        Are we allowing you to do everything that you need to do to
    run a very effective and efficient and cost-effective military
    for our country? The people in West Virginia are willing to
    spend their taxes and invest their taxes into the defense of
    this country. But with that, they would like to make sure they
    are getting pretty good bang for their buck, too, and not just
    throwing a lot of it away.
        So how do we do this? How do we help you? We ought to have
    an audit. We have been talking about that, and I know that the
    Chairman here has been very much concerned about that, and
    developing our arsenal, if you will, making sure we are able to
    get that to market, do what we are supposed to do, and get it
    there as quick as possible.
        So anybody on the panel, Secretary, if you wanted to start
    with that, and, General, chime in.
        Secretary Carter. Well, I think your constituents are very
    logical. They are saying, hey, look, I am willing to pay for
    defense, but I want to make sure that every dollar is spent
    well. So we need to pair our request for the funds that we need
    to defend our country with the assurances that we are using it
    well.
        We know we are not always using every dollar of the defense
    budget well. That is why I think Senator McCain, Chairman Reed,
    and this entire committee has been urging a movement toward
    reform, one I very much support and would like to partner with
    you on, because I think the taxpayer will find it easier to
    support what we are trying to do to defend ourselves if they
    also see us vigorously getting the best value for every tax
    dollar.
        You mentioned audit. Audit is, as you indicate, key. We
    have a plan for audit readiness for the Department. You and I
    have discussed that. Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
    and Chief Financial Officer Michael McCord is in charge of that
    effort. But I am completely committed to its success.
        Senator Manchin. Sorry to interrupt, sir. Just one thing,
    every time we hear about reduction in force, it is always on
    our frontline. It is always the people we are depending on to
    be on the frontline, fighting and defending us.
        But when you look at, basically, the size of the staffs, it
    is just overwhelming the size of the staff keeps growing, but
    we always continue to talk about the reduction in force of the
    people we need out front.
        What can we do to help you there, to get control of that,
    reduce that staff proportionately?
        Secretary Carter. Well, you are absolutely right. I hope
    you will support and continue to support us as we get rid of
    excess infrastructure and shed excess staff.
        This is the kind of thing we have to do, if we are going to
    go forward here with resources that are still going to be under
    pressure. They are going to be under pressure, so we have to
    make sure every dollar counts.
        Senator, while I am speaking, before I ask the Chairman to
    comment on the same thing, let me just say, Mr. Chairman, I
    appreciate your consideration. This is about my healing up my
    back, and I thank you. However, I am doing fine, so since
    everybody is here, unless others want to take it, I am okay
    going on. I very much appreciate your consideration.
        Chairman McCain. Well, I was trying to prevent you from
    having to be interrogated by Senator Fischer. She's next.
        [Laughter.]
        If you are ready for that.
        Secretary Carter. I just got another pang.
        General Dempsey. Yes, thanks, Senator.
        First, it is probably worth remembering that when I became
    the Chief of Staff of the Army, we were tasked to find $487
    billion in the budget. We did. When I became the Chairman, I
    think I am actually jinx, but we were then asked to achieve
    that level, an additional $520 billion--roughly speaking, a
    little over $1 trillion. We have actually found $750 billion of
    it. What we are debating now is the last $250 billion over the
    next 6 years.
        I think we have done pretty darn well, to be honest with
    you, Senator.
        In terms of what you can tell the people in West Virginia,
    they are going to see those Mountaineers, the 20th-ranked
    Mountaineers, playing basketball, and they don't have to worry
    about getting blown up while they are watching a basketball
    game. We are doing okay at the away game.
        Last but not least, I would venture to tell you all that
    this group at JCS [the Joint Chiefs of Staff], the Chiefs, have
    proposed some of the most controversial and emotional changes
    in terms of paid compensation, health care, basing, weapons
    systems, than any group in my memory in 40 years.
        If we get some help with that, and we get some topline, as
    the Chairman mentioned, for things that were unforecasted--for
    example, space, nuclear weapons, the emerging threats--we can
    actually manage it and look the American people in the eye, as
    I do my own family, and tell them that we are spending your
    money wisely.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed [presiding]. Senator Fischer?
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. I do appreciate
    your service.
        Secretary Carter, I appreciate your fortitude to stay, so
    you can have my questions.
        A lot of my colleagues have drilled down on some issues,
    and I have about three different areas I would like to touch
    on, if I may.
        As we look at the situation in Ukraine, and we see that the
    separatist forces are having success on the battlefield, do you
    believe that that may incentivize Putin to become more
    ambitious in Ukraine, so that he maybe would look at more
    ambitious goals with regard to that country?
        Secretary Carter. I am concerned about that. I think he has
    made his goals pretty clear. He speaks about them openly, which
    is to have all around him states that are in his orbit, rather
    than pursuing their own futures, their own independent futures.
    Ukraine is an example of that.
        I think that if we don't remain united on the political and
    economic pressure, which is having a real effect in Russia, and
    if we don't remain united in standing up for NATO in Europe,
    and if we don't remain united in sticking up for the ability of
    the Ukrainian Government and Ukraine to plot an independent
    path for itself, Putin will just keep pushing and keep pushing.
    My read of him is that that is the kind of guy he is.
        Senator Fischer. I would say, right now, that we are
    united. But I have fears for the future and how we move forward
    in this area. You mentioned NATO and our commitment there and
    the commitment that we have.
        What effect is it on the world when they see that we are
    not helping a country, Ukraine, with more lethal force to
    defend themselves when we signed an agreement that we would?
    What message does that send to our NATO allies and to the
    institution of NATO itself?
        Secretary Carter. As it happens, I was in Budapest in 1994
    when that agreement was signed, the very one that Vladimir
    Putin's Russia is violating, so I know it well.
        It was not a NATO-type agreement. But in it, Russia pledged
    to respect the territorial integrity of Ukraine, which it
    clearly has not done.
        Insofar as NATO is concerned, as you say, I think the point
    of our so-called reassurance initiative, but it basically means
    rotating more forces into Europe and taking steps to strengthen
    our presence in Europe, that is a way of saying, which I think
    we have to do, to NATO that we are with you in a very serious
    kind of obligation that we have under the NATO treaty.
        We have an obligation to Ukraine also. To get to your other
    point, I think that assisting them politically, economically,
    and we talked before about the military being something also
    under consideration, that is very important.
        Senator Fischer. As we look at Russia, they are not
    honoring the assurances that they gave to Ukraine. As you
    mentioned, that was an agreement. They have been in violation
    of the INF
    [Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] Treaty, which they don't
    admit to. But as has been discussed, they have been in
    violation of that treaty.
        How long does the United States wait before we start
    exploring options, not just with regard to Ukraine but with
    regard to Russia's blatant violations of a treaty agreement
    with our country?
        Secretary Carter. We haven't waited. We shouldn't wait. We
    haven't waited to explore alternatives. The INF Treaty is a
    two-sided treaty. They said they wouldn't do something. We said
    we wouldn't do something. They have done what they weren't
    supposed to do. So that means that we can react, in various
    ways.
        So if they don't get back into compliance, we can take
    steps that are defensive, in terms of defending ourselves, that
    are deterrent steps, and that are aimed at countering the
    effects of this weapons system that violates the INF Treaty
    that they are working on.
        I think they need to understand that the United States can
    react to this kind of thing. It was a two-way street. So it is
    not something that we asked them to do and they give us for
    free. It is something that we have. It is a two-way street, and
    we have begun to think about things we can do now.
        I mean, we signed the treaty because we thought it was, on
    the whole, best for both of us not to do that. That was the
    logic behind the treaty. I think that logic is still fine. But
    you can't be one-sided about it.
        Senator Fischer. I totally agree. I appreciate that you are
    looking for options. I hope you can be more public about that
    and also be very firm publicly in that the United States will
    react to treaty violations, especially when they are violations
    on treaties with our country. Thank you.
        Senator Reed. Senator Donnelly?
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you all for your service.
        General Dempsey, Secretary Carter, are you looking into how
    our plan for Mosul got out and what is going on with that?
        Secretary Carter. I have spoken to General Austin. The
    Chairman has as well. Clearly, that was an instance of
    speculation that, certainly, doesn't reflect what we need to be
    thinking, with respect to an offensive against Mosul, which is,
    we will conduct an offensive against Mosul when the Iraqi
    security forces can lead such an offensive helped by us,
    because it is important that that offensive succeed. So it will
    happen when it can succeed.
        Senator Donnelly. This would be for either you or General
    Dempsey. How do we make sure this doesn't happen again? What is
    being done to prevent it?
        General Dempsey. As the Secretary mentioned, General Austin
    and I have been in contact. He is conducting an internal
    inquiry into it. I know he will take the appropriate action.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
        Let me ask you this, and these are obviously not classified
    sources or whatever. These are newspapers you read, this and
    that. They said this morning, in the effort that is going on in
    Tikrit, that we are really kind of peripheral players in this
    and that General Soleimani from Iran is on the frontlines with
    the Shiite militia.
        What is going on there?
        Secretary Carter. This gets back to the point made earlier.
        Senator Donnelly. I apologize, if it was already mentioned.
        Secretary Carter. No, it is fine. I am sorry. Your question
    is right on.
        We operate in Iraq in support of the Iraqi Government. The
    Iraqi Government, in this case, did not ask for our support, in
    this particular operation. I think that we need to be watchful,
    together with the Iraqi Government, as we take back territory
    from ISIL, that we continue to conduct this campaign in a
    multisectarian way, because we have been down the road of
    sectarianism in Iraq, and it is important that the Government
    of Iraq today not go down that road again.
        So we need to have success against ISIL. But we need to
    have it in a way that doesn't inflame sectarianism again. That
    is why we are watching this so closely.
        General Dempsey. If I could add, Senator, the Soleimani
    report, by the way, is a pull off of social media. I have seen
    pictures myself. Our intel community will now go to work to
    decide whether he was personally there or not.
        But it is worth reminding ourselves that Iran and its
    proxies have been inside Iraq since 2004. This is the most
    overt conduct of Iranian support in the form of artillery and
    other things. Frankly, it will only be a problem if it results
    in sectarianism, as the Secretary said.
        So of the size of the force going to Tikrit, about a third
    of it is Iraqi security forces, the Fifth Division normally
    based just north of Taji, and then the other two-thirds are
    Shiite militia from the Popular Mobilization Committee.
        If they perform in a credible way, rid the city of Tikrit,
    turn it back over to its inhabitants, then it will, in the
    main, have been a positive thing in terms of the counter-ISIL
    campaign.
        At this point, as the Secretary has mentioned, it is
    supported by the Sunni members of parliament and the local
    leaders. But that is dependent on the behavior of the militia
    as they conduct this campaign.
        By the way, we are watching.
        Senator Donnelly. I was going to say, I am sure, like you,
    my concern is that these Sunni tribal leaders look up and go,
    these are the same people who have been working us over for
    years. At what point do they say, where's the good option here
    of these sides?
        Secretary Carter. That is exactly the concern. They did, as
    we understand it, make a statement today, the tribal leaders in
    the area, that they supported the offensive. I hope that is
    true, because what is very important is that we all be behind
    defeating ISIL and that sectarianism not raise its ugly head
    again, because that is what brought us to this place in the
    first place.
        Senator Donnelly. Let me ask one last question, because I
    have about a minute, and I know it will take up that much time.
        It has been mentioned in Syria that we plan to reduce ISIS,
    get rid of them. How do you bring Assad to the table?
        Secretary Carter. In Syria, it is a very good question. I
    will offer the following: He needs to come to the table in
    order to discuss his own receding from the scene in Syria.
        Senator Donnelly. Right.
        Secretary Carter. For that to occur, he needs to see the
    right combination of the doom of the strategy that he has set
    his country's course on, set the course of his country on, and
    also I believe the pressure from Russia and Iran, both of whom
    are supporting him. They need to withdraw their support of him,
    because of what he has done to his country. When he sees that
    combination, it seems to me that may cause him to recede.
        But no doubt on our point of view, which is he has done
    things to his people by this time that put him outside the
    pale, and he has to go.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Senator Sullivan, please.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Carter, it is good to see you again.
    Congratulations.
        General Dempsey, others, thank you for your service.
        I want to go back to a theme that we discussed during your
    confirmation hearing, and that is this broader theme of
    leveling with the American people on our threats. I think that
    you are seeing--I would call it a pretty general bipartisan
    concern that there is a disconnect sometimes between what we
    are hearing from the uniformed military and what we are hearing
    from the intelligence services and agencies, and, importantly,
    what we are hearing from the leadership of the country, the
    President. Senator Wicker was talking about the Secretary of
    State.
        You know, I think there is growing agreement, certainly
    here, about the importance of defense spending, and how we,
    certainly, think, I think most Americans think, we face a lot
    of threats in the world. Defense spending is a function of
    these threats.
        But when we hear kind of the disconnect between different
    members of the administration on what the threat levels are,
    and how the President in many ways paints a very benign picture
    of what is going on in the world and how we are making progress
    in a lot of areas, it undermines credibility in what we all are
    trying to do with regard to bolstering our National defense.
        So again, I am not going to go into the specific quotes
    from Secretary Kerry, the President's State of the Union, all
    of which seemed to tell Americans, hey, don't worry, everything
    is looking great. Things aren't looking great, and I think that
    you and the members of the military recognize that.
        What would you see right now as the top three biggest
    threats that the United States is facing, both of you,
    Secretary Carter and General Dempsey?
        Secretary Carter. Before I get to the top three, to your
    first point, I think that the President is requesting in this
    budget an end to sequester and more money than would be called
    for by sequester.
        Senator Sullivan. I recognize that. But it is harder to get
    through the Congress, if the President in his next breath or
    the Secretary, in his next breath, of State, says that, don't
    worry, everything is fine in the international world. The
    threat level is decreasing. The moment of crisis has passed. We
    are making progress with ISIS. I mean, I don't think any of
    those statements are accurate.
        Secretary Carter. Well, the only thing I would say is that
    I think the reason why we need the resources that we are
    requesting, both in the base budget and in the OCO budget, is
    because we are being asked to respond to and defend the country
    against a great variety of threats.
        I will do a stab at three of them, but it is very hard to
    rank things, because they are all important, otherwise we
    wouldn't be doing them. But just to pick the things that we are
    requesting additional funds for, that is OCO funds this year,
    which are new things. I think you have to count ISIL as one. We
    are requesting funds specifically in addition to the base
    budget for combating ISIL. I think the same is true of the
    European Reassurance Initiative, which is connected with the
    behavior of Russia in Europe and our NATO and other obligations
    in Europe. We are requesting extra money for that in the OCO
    budget. We are requesting, of course, funds for Afghanistan, to
    make sure that our success there can stick.
        So I don't know that those are the most important things,
    but they are very important things. There are other reasons why
    we are requesting the amount of money that we think the country
    needs, which is above the sequester level.
        Senator Sullivan. So, General Dempsey, do you generally
    agree with those top three?
        I am going to get to a couple other questions.
        General Dempsey. I might package them a little differently.
    I am actually concerned about European security for reasons we
    talked about earlier and, in particular, because--and it is not
    just about Russia. It is what Russia has done, as I mentioned.
    It has started a fire of ethnicity and nationalism. It may,
    actually, burn out of their control.
        So European security, for the first time in 20 years,
    concerns me.
        Second, the threat network that, as I mentioned, runs from
    Afghanistan, Pakistan, all the way to Boko Haram. We can't just
    deal with one of those groups. We have to deal with them in the
    aggregate. We have all kinds of tools, direct action, building
    partners, enabling others like we are doing with the French in
    Mali. But we have to keep the pressure on that entire network.
        The last one is one I would have to discuss in a closed
    session, and that would be on narrowing technological gaps in
    certain key areas.
        Senator Sullivan. Okay, thank you.
        I want to switch, gentlemen, to the Arctic and the
    strategic posture that we have up there.
        Mr. Secretary, in your last hearing here, you did mention
    that you agreed with me that Alaska occupied the most strategic
    place in the world, according to Billy Mitchell. I just want to
    straighten the record with the Chairman and the ranking member.
    Billy Mitchell was court-martialed, but he was court-martialed
    for insubordination after accusing Army and Navy leaders of
    ``almost treasonable administration of national defense'' for
    investing in battleships as opposed to aircraft carriers. He
    was later given a Congressional Medal of Honor by the Congress.
    So I think he has been vindicated, but I am going to ask a
    question that follows up on that.
        You put out a strategy on the Arctic, and yet the Russians
    are making huge moves in the Arctic with regard to new bases,
    with regard to new airfields, new Arctic command, claiming
    territory over huge swaths of the Arctic. We had big support in
    Alaska the last week, the Army task force that was up looking
    at potential force reductions, looking at two brigade combat
    teams potentially being moved out of Alaska.
        If the Army eliminated even one brigade combat team in
    Alaska, how do you think Kim Jong-Il or Vladimir Putin or our
    allies in Japan, Korea, Singapore, would react to that, given
    how important the Arctic is, given how important this new part
    of the country is? To be honest, we have a 13-page paper. The
    Russians are putting major, major troops and infrastructure in
    the Arctic.
        Does that concern you? Should we be looking at removing
    brigade combat teams, our only airborne brigade in the Pacific?
        Sorry, Mr. Chairman. I went on a little longer.
        Secretary Carter. I think both of your points are very
    important. The Arctic is going to be a place of growing
    strategic importance. The Russians are active there. We are, as
    your state is right on the point of, an Arctic power. That
    needs to be part of our strategy. It needs to be more than, and
    I think it is, more than a pamphlet, as you say.
        The other thing you raised with Kim Jong-Il's thinking, and
    so forth, this is why, whether we continue to invest in the
    defense that we need, whether it be BCTs [brigade combat
    teams], as you say, or any other part of our force, is
    something that others are watching. It is important, if we ever
    have to use it. But it is also important in ensuring that it is
    less likely that we will have to use it.
        I do worry about our foes being encouraged or heartened
    when they see us debate whether we should spend enough money on
    our defense. That is just yet another reason why I really hope
    we get the support for the defense spending we need.
        General Dempsey. I won't speak to the number of Army BCTs,
    brigade combat teams. But I will say the Russians have just
    taken a decision to activate six new brigades, and four of them
    will be in the Arctic.
        Chairman McCain. [presiding] Thank you.
        Some of us still believe in battleships, and we are not
    sure that Alaska should have ever been made a State.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator King?
        Senator King. With some trepidation, Mr. Chairman, I want
    to associate myself actually with the Senator from Alaska's
    questions, because the Arctic is emerging as an enormously
    important and strategic area. Just one of the simplest
    measurements is, we have one heavy icebreaker and one medium
    icebreaker. The estimates are that the Russians have 7 to 10
    icebreakers. That is just basic infrastructure. The resources
    up there, and the strategic implications, are enormous. So I
    appreciate the Senator raising that question.
        I think one of the things we have to do is put this
    discussion into context, in terms of your budget. This chart,
    which I am sure you are familiar with, is the last 50 years of
    defense spending as a percentage of GDP. Starting in 1962 at
    about 9 percent, today it is at 3.3 percent and headed down at
    a time of increasing threat and peril for our country.
        Often, we get confused about the absolute dollar amounts,
    but a percent of GDP is a way of comparing apples to apples
    throughout recent history. We are reducing the defense function
    dramatically--dramatically--at a time, as I said, of increasing
    threat.
        General Dempsey, I want to put a fine point on your
    testimony. You talked about numbers of deployments and
    readiness. If we aren't able to avoid the sequester, are
    American lives being put at risk?
        General Dempsey. Yes.
        Senator King. That is an eloquent answer, General. I
    appreciate it.
        Secretary Carter, I do want to talk about an area of your
    budget in a little more detail. $5.5 billion is scheduled for
    increased activities in cyber. I am extremely concerned about
    cyber. I think it is the next frontier of warfare. We have had
    plenty of warning shots across our bow in the last couple
    years. Yet Congress hasn't acted. I commend you for taking this
    initiative.
        Here's my concern, however. News reports are that the CIA
    [Central Intelligence Agency] is expanding their cyber
    capability. Of course, NSA [the National Security Agency] has a
    substantial cyber capability. You are building a substantial
    cyber capability. I don't want to return to the post-September
    11 days when we had a lot of intelligence capability, but they
    weren't talking to each other.
        Please assure me that you will be coordinating with CIA and
    NSA, so that we are not duplicating, overlapping, spending more
    of the taxpayers' money than we have to, and, worst of all, not
    sharing whatever information is being derived in this field.
        Secretary Carter. Well, thank you. You are absolutely
    right. This is a terribly important DOD mission, and that is
    why both I and, I think, the Chairman has been a great leader
    in this as well, and we are so determined to do more.
        But this is one of these things that, just like you
    analogized it to the war on terrorism before 9/11, it requires
    us to stitch together the efforts of different parts of the
    government. To the list you named, I would add also the FBI,
    which has some capabilities and some authorities in this area;
    DHS [Department of Homeland Security], which has capabilities
    and authorities in this area. We have to make the whole greater
    than the sum of the parts.
        So even as we in DOD move out and make the investments we
    need to, we need to coordinate with the others.
        Our investments are in two categories. One is to make sure
    that our networks are secure, because our forces depend for
    their effectiveness upon information networks. So the buying of
    planes, ships, and tanks doesn't get us anywhere unless we have
    the networks to go with them. They don't do any good in
    warfare, unless the networks are survivable and able to avoid
    penetration.
        Also, another thing we need to do is build cyber-weapons as
    weapons of war, because war comes out of being a dimension of
    future warfare, as many have noted.
        We also play a role----
        Senator King. Let me interrupt you there, if I might. I am
    concerned that our cyber-defense system is just that, it is
    defense, and that we don't have an offensive capability. Or if
    we do, it is not broadly known. Therefore, particularly nation
    states who act against our cyber, we are very vulnerable,
    because we are such a wired country. There is no price to be
    paid.
        I wonder if we shouldn't be developing a theory of
    deterrence similar to nuclear deterrence in the 1950s, 1960s,
    and 1970s, which served us well, actually, until today, so that
    people understand that if they come against our cyber-
    infrastructure, they are going to pay a price. Is that
    something that I hope you can consider?
        Secretary Carter. I think that is very wise, so I
    appreciate that thought.
        I think that is something that we need to think through
    better than we have. What does doctrine mean, what does
    deterrence mean, in this new domain?
        So at the same time we build capabilities, we have to build
    doctrine as well. So I think that is a very, very wise point.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Final question, and I am running out of time, so I will
    really ask you to respond to this perhaps on the record.
        That is, you have identified as a priority acquisition
    reform. I know that you once held that job, and I hope you will
    hold to that. I would like to see a little more detail about
    how you are going to tackle that.
        I know the Chairman has expressed this concern. How do we
    get at procurement not only in terms of cost, but in terms of
    timeliness, that we are not taking literally decades to develop
    a new aircraft, but that we have a more timely procurement
    process?
        So you don't have to respond now, but I would appreciate
    seeing something on that, because I think that is a very
    important part of your mission, going into this job.
        By the way, I am delighted that you are here with us today.
    Thank you.
        Secretary Carter. Thank you. Will do. I will respond.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Ernst?
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Secretary Carter, General Dempsey, for being
    here with us. We appreciate your service and your testimony
    today.
        Secretary Carter, in the beginning of your testimony, you
    had given quite an extensive list of the trips that you have
    taken, the people that you have met, the places you have been,
    and the impact with equipping and training our soldiers. So I
    can tell that is very important to you.
        Do I understand correctly that you also took a trip to
    Arlington?
        Secretary Carter. I did the morning I was sworn in, with my
    wife.
        Senator Ernst. I appreciate that so much, Secretary. That
    tells a lot about a person, that not only are you recognizing
    the sacrifice that the blue star families give to their loved
    ones who are serving overseas right now, but also to those gold
    star families that have left someone behind.
        Secretary Carter. Thank you.
        Senator Ernst. So thank you for doing that.
        Secretary Carter. Thank you.
        Senator Ernst. I learned of that, and I was significantly
    impressed that you would take the time to do that. So thank
    you.
        I do want to talk a little bit about, we have talked about
    this all day, with the Shiite militia. I know Senator McCain
    had spoken about this earlier. In the fiscal year 2015 budget,
    we had $1.6 billion that we used for the Iraq train and equip
    fund, and that was to train and equip the Iraqi security
    forces, the Kurdish Peshmerga, and Sunni tribes and, of course,
    other local forces. Now in this fiscal year 2016 budget, you
    are requesting $700 million for this fund.
        I do support this effort. I think we should be training and
    equipping the Kurdish Peshmerga. I think they have been
    important allies in the pushback against ISIS and others. But
    what I am concerned about, though, is the relationship between
    the Iraqi security forces, Iran, which has been the sidebar
    topic of many conversations today, and the Shiite militia
    forces.
        During the Iraq war, IEDs were a huge concern to American
    troops. I think as Senator McCain alluded to earlier, there
    were some types of IEDs, the EFPs, explosively formed
    projectiles, that were used. They were devastating to our men
    and women, left many gold star families out there.
        We know that those EFPs, a lot of those came from Iran. So
    right now, what I would like to hear from you is, are American
    taxpayer dollars going to the Shiite militia that once were
    fighting against American soldiers? How can we assure the
    American taxpayer that these dollars going to this fund to
    train and equip Iraqi forces will not be used against us, as we
    move forward?
        Secretary Carter, if you can address that?
        Secretary Carter. Thank you. Then Chairman Dempsey.
        First of all, I share your concern about the Shiite
    militias and the face of sectarianism looming again in Iraq,
    which, as you know extremely well from your own service, is the
    principal challenge that the Government of Iraq faces going
    forward.
        Our training and equipping is to Iraqi security forces
    through the Government of Iraq. Our assistance, by the way,
    also to Peshmerga is through the Government of Iraq. That
    reflects the view that a multisectarian Iraqi Government is the
    best way to keep Iraq together and to defeat ISIL in Iraq, and
    ultimately drive them out of the country.
        But I say I share your concern because what we have seen in
    the last few years has been sectarianism eroding the
    capabilities of the Iraqi security forces. That is why they
    collapsed in the face of ISIL.
        So I absolutely share your concern about EFPs. You know
    that extremely well from your own service. We have had that
    experience before.
        General Dempsey, who was there also in Iraq, does as well,
    so let me ask him to join in.
        General Dempsey. I will just express my own concern as
    well. I think if General Austin were here--I guess he will be
    here, actually--he would tell you that the reason his campaign
    plan is deliberate is that one of the lines of effort--I
    mentioned there were nine--is Iraqi governance. If the central
    government of Iraq does not achieve, let's call it
    reconciliation, because that is probably the right word, with
    the Shiite and the Kurds, then it does put our campaign at
    risk. So I am concerned about that.
        As far as the weapons that we have been issuing to the ISF
    [Iraqi Security Forces], as well as to the Peshmerga through
    the Government of Iraq, we have confidence that those are going
    into the right hands.
        Some of the weapons you have seen in the hands of the
    Shiite militia, because you can see it on YouTube and on
    Twitter and places, are things that were procured by the Iraqis
    through our foreign military sales process that they bought a
    couple years ago, two or three years ago. But we are monitoring
    it as well as we can.
        Senator Ernst. I thank you very much.
        Senator McCain, thank you.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Kaine?
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you to the witnesses for this excellent testimony. I
    want to ask about two items, sequester and the ISIL AUMF.
        On sequester, I received a letter last week as a member of
    the Budget Committee from Chairman McCain and Ranking Member
    Reed that I would ask unanimous consent that it be entered into
    the record.
        Chairman McCain. Without objection.
        [The information referred to follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Kaine. Highly important letter for Budget Committee
    members and all of us, and I just want to read one sentence to
    you and ask if you agree with it.
        ``If we continue on our current path, i.e., sequester, we
    risk undermining the central pillars of our all-volunteer force
    and with it the foundations of international peace and
    security, of which the United States military has been the most
    reliable guarantor since the end of World War II.''
        Do you agree with that statement?
        Secretary Carter. I do.
        Senator Kaine. General Dempsey?
        General Dempsey. I do, Senator.
        Senator Kaine. It strikes me, could we send up any sort of
    clearer white flag at the beginning of a partial disarmament
    than to place a vote on the BCA from August 2011 as a higher
    priority for the Nation than our security in a world that has
    changed and put new threats on the board since then? Could we
    do anything that would send a worse message to our allies about
    our weakening resolve?
        Secretary Carter. I am very concerned about what our
    internal budget debates look like to friends and foes alike
    internationally. It is yet another reason why we really need to
    knock it off and get ourselves on a stable budget path that
    gives us enough to defend ourselves properly.
        Senator Kaine. Let me just say that we have had an
    interesting set of discussions about Afghanistan. I think the
    committee has come to the position we should be conditions-
    based, not calendar-based. Let me apply that same analogy to
    our sequester issues.
        Shouldn't we be conditions-based? I mean, are we really
    going to elevate a BCA cap that we voted on in August 2011
    before North Korea's cyberattack, before Putin went into the
    Ukraine, before ISIL was grabbing acres? Are we really going to
    elevate that above a conditions-based national defense? For the
    same reasons that we shouldn't elevate a calendar over the
    conditions in Afghanistan, we shouldn't elevate an August 2011
    vote over the conditions of security that faces the country.
        I took that as the point of the letter, and I recommend it
    to all of my colleagues.
        With respect to the ISIL AUMF, an area where I sort of have
    disagreed sometimes with the Chairman, but where the back-and-
    forth has made me think about my position, is the question
    about the issue of ground troops as part of the ISIL AUMF. In
    listening to the Chairman about this, what I have realized is
    that my concern is not really about language, and it is not
    really about sort of the constitutional allocation of power. It
    is really about the definition of the mission. I would like to
    ask you a question on this.
        We have heard in last three weeks, in meetings with the
    Foreign Relations Committee by, first, King Abdullah of Jordan,
    and then the emir of Qatar last week, about the battle against
    ISIL in the region. Both of them said to us, essentially, U.S.
    ground troops aren't a good idea because this has to be our
    fight against our terrorist threat. We want your help. We want
    you to be deeply involved. But if it gets pitched as the U.S.
    against ISIL, or even as the West against ISIL, then it takes
    on a fundamentally different tenor and could even become kind
    of a recruiting bonanza for ISIL.
        King Abdullah, in a very courageous way, and sadly, we met
    with him on the very day that it was revealed that the
    Jordanian pilot was so horribly murdered, burned, he said, this
    is our fight and we have to show the world that this is our
    fight. If we are willing to do it, then we need all kinds of
    help from you. But we have to be up front that this is our
    fight. The United States didn't create ISIL. It didn't create
    this extremist ideology. It was birthed in our region by people
    claiming the mantle of the religious tradition that we honor,
    and perverting it for a bad end.
        So both of them have sort of guardedly advised us against
    ground troops, but toward the big picture goal that this battle
    against ISIL has to be the region policing itself, not the U.S.
    trying to counter them.
        As we think through this military mission, what is your
    response to that sentiment? Again, it is not about
    draftsmanship or about the allocation of power, but it is about
    isn't there a compelling need for the region to show that it
    will battle its own threat? If so, we will help them, rather
    than have it be the U.S. burden?
        General Dempsey. Senator, that is exactly how the campaign
    is designed. It is designed to leverage a coalition of regional
    partners, assisted by those outside the region, but very much
    relying upon those in the region to lead the effort, requiring
    the Government of Iraq to lead the effort, especially in terms
    of reaching out to form a coalition within Iraq of Sunni tribal
    leaders and Kurdistan Peshmerga.
        So I would simply say that is exactly how the campaign is
    designed.
        Secretary Carter. I second that. That is how the campaign
    is designed, and it is how it needs to be designed for the two
    reasons you say. The first is that we don't only seek the
    defeat of ISIL. We seek the lasting defeat of ISIL. That means
    after they are defeated, they need to stay defeated. That means
    somebody who is there ensuring that defeat. The second reason,
    that you also say, which is that if it becomes our war, it
    becomes a harder war.
        So for both of those reasons, we need to have others
    involved. That is, as the Chairman says, what the campaign
    calls for now.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you so much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Cotton?
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        Secretary Carter, welcome back in your capacity as
    Secretary. I have to go back to something that we were
    discussing a few series ago about the leak of our plans to
    Mosul. I believe Secretary Carter said you are looking into it.
    General Dempsey, I know you said you are looking into it.
        I don't understand what would take so long to get to the
    bottom of it. This was not a leak. It was a planned conference
    call with members of the media, if I understand the reporting
    correctly.
        Do I misunderstand something here?
        Secretary Carter. No, that is my understanding as well. I
    just would say two things about this whole incident.
        The first is, Senator, that when an operation is mounted
    against Mosul or anywhere else, it needs to be a success, and
    it needs to be Iraqi led, supported by us, and it has to be
    successful. That is a little bit like the conditions-based
    points that Senator Kaine--
        Senator Cotton. Mr. Secretary, I agree fully. I agree
    fully. I don't understand why announcing any timeline would
    have contributed to any idea it would have been a success, nor
    do I understand why it would take so long to understand why an
    organized conference call with the media was held.
        Secretary Carter. I will say something about that, and let
    the Chairman, who has also spoken to General Austin about that.
        That clearly was neither accurate information nor, had it
    been accurate, would it have been information that should have
    been blurted out to the press. So it is wrong on both scores.
        The only thing I will say is that we try, as the Department
    of Defense of a democracy, to be as open as we can. So there
    are lots of people out there talking all the time about what we
    are doing. Every once in a while, somebody gets out in front of
    their skis.
        But I also, even as we make sure that this particular
    incident doesn't happen again, I think that it is important
    that we be open as a Department, not with military secrets and
    not with war plans, which is the mistake made in this case. But
    we do try to keep the country informed of what we are doing. It
    is about protecting them. It is a democracy.
        So openness is important, but it has to have limits when it
    comes to security matters. Those limits, obviously, weren't
    respected in this case.
        Chairman?
        General Dempsey. Senators McCain and Graham have sent a
    letter through the President to the Secretary to me to General
    Austin, actually, to ask that very question. I must suggest
    that I will wait until we respond to the letter.
        Senator Cotton. Secretary Carter, during your confirmation
    hearings, you had mentioned that U.S. options to respond to the
    breach of INF Treaty by Russia and, this is a quote, and I
    think you alluded to this earlier when you were speaking with
    Senator Fischer, active defenses to counter intermediate-range
    ground-launch cruise missiles, counterforce capabilities to
    prevent intermediate-range ground-launch cruise missile
    attacks, and countervailing strike capabilities to enhance U.S.
    or allied forces.
        Could you elaborate on the size and scope of those
    capabilities, and what you think the Russian Government's
    reaction might be if we were to fund such capabilities?
        Secretary Carter. I think in this setting, I would like to
    limit the amount of detail that I go into. But I will affirm
    what you just said, which is that we have three kinds of
    options for responding to a violation of the INF Treaty. I
    think the Russians need to know that this is a two-way street.
    They signed, we signed, and we can and will react. Those are
    the three categories in which we could react militarily: active
    defenses, which are to protect ourselves and our allies and
    their territory against this new threat; counterforce, which is
    a way of making sure that if, God forbid, there is an actual
    military confrontation, they can't be used; and the third is
    this opens up the option for us to have systems which we
    decided to forgo in the interest of this INF Treaty years ago.
    We don't have to forgo them anymore because a treaty is a two-
    way street.
        With that, Chairman, do you want to add anything?
        General Dempsey. The only thing I will add, Senator, is
    that the development of capabilities to fit into the categories
    that the Secretary mentions would be INF-compliant. That is the
    difference between the two of us.
        Senator Cotton. Okay.
        This may be a question about military terms of art, so I
    will start with the Chairman, if that is okay, and let
    Secretary Carter bat cleanup.
        Mr. Chairman, what are ``enduring offensive ground combat
    operations''?
        General Dempsey. I will tell you that as the one who would
    have to assist in the implementation of that, I would consider
    ``enduring'' to be mission-by-mission. So if we were, for
    example, to decide that our advice to the President would be
    that we would have to introduce ground forces to accompany
    Iraqis into combat in Mosul because of the complexity of the
    terrain, then we can do that, but it would be mission-specific,
    as opposed to a temporal issue, mission-specific rather than a
    temporal dimension, meaning two weeks or two years.
        Senator Cotton. Secretary Carter, do you have anything to
    add?
        Secretary Carter. No, I think that is accurate.
        I think the important thing about the language of the AUMF,
    and however that discussion, debate, turns out from my point of
    view is, first, that we have the flexibility to run the
    campaign we need to defend the country. The second is that our
    troops see our government as a whole supporting them.
        Those are the two things that are important to me in this
    whole debate.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        Chairman McCain. General, you keep saying that if you
    decide to recommend to the President. We would like to know
    when you are going to decide to make that recommendation to the
    President.
        General Dempsey. Well, Senator, when the task at hand, when
    I get the advice from CENTCOM, of course, General Austin, and
    when the mission would require it. We have not reached that
    point.
        Chairman McCain. No, things are going fine.
        Senator Nelson?
        Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, it is good to see you.
        Mr. Chairman, in your professional military opinion, if
    additional arms are not provided to Ukraine, you have a little
    David fighting the Russian bear. Is it reasonable to assume
    that Russia, through their subterfuge of the rebels, would
    continue to advance right across the country?
        General Dempsey. I am concerned about two things, Senator.
    One is that it would be a Russian aspiration to do so, and
    then, second, the separatists may on their own decide to do so.
    There are capability gaps we have identified.
        Look, here's the other thing, Senator. If Russia wants to
    take Ukraine, it is going to take it, because of its geographic
    proximity and the size.
        On the other hand, there are some capability gaps that put
    the Ukraine forces at a real disadvantage. I think we ought to
    look for opportunities to provide those capabilities, so that
    on the chance that the Russians are actually telling the truth,
    which, frankly, I doubt very much, that the separatists and the
    sovereign state of Ukraine can compete on a level think field.
        Senator Nelson. Why do you think that the Russian policy is
    such that--as you say, if they decide to take Ukraine, they
    could. Why are they not moving more aggressively across
    Ukraine?
        General Dempsey. This is probably now speculative because
    the intelligence doesn't yet support it. I suspect it will. I
    think that their pace is designed to create uncertainty on the
    part of our European allies, because if they can maintain that
    level of uncertainty, then they have the potential to put
    friction inside of NATO, which is actually their larger
    strategic goal.
        Senator Nelson. If successful in Ukraine, and Russia wanted
    to continue to be aggressive, they could suddenly amass on the
    borders of the three Baltic states. There would be no match
    there, but now we have NATO members.
        What do you think is the resolve of the European NATO
    membership to stand and fight for the Baltics, if the Russian
    bear comes across the line?
        General Dempsey. That is the commitment they have made as a
    member of NATO. They all agreed to live up to their Article 5
    responsibilities.
        I will say that, based on the European Reassurance
    Initiative, that NATO has taken rotational force, Baltic air
    policing, establishment of a very high readiness joint task
    force. NATO and Wales made some commitments that indicate to me
    that they, all of them, take that responsibility seriously.
        The problem we could potentially have is the asymmetric
    nature of it, where there might be a dispute about whether it
    is actually happening. So we are working with our NATO allies
    to work through that.
        Senator Nelson. Of course, the situation there is, with
    those large Russian-speaking populations in the Baltics,
    especially in Estonia, it could give him the same excuse that
    he has tried to use with regard to Crimea.
        Let me ask you about mental health. I have been enormously
    impressed with some of our Special Operations Forces, that they
    are now realizing that the stigma against mental health
    counseling, they are really trying to turn it around, because
    it is performance enhancement, not only the body but the mind
    as well. To what degree are you all trying to implement that
    same thing across-the-board of the Department of Defense?
        General Dempsey. To a great degree, because it actually,
    when it started under Bill McRaven when he was the SOCOM
    [Special Operations Command] commander, now under Joe Votel,
    what they realized is exactly what you said, that it is not
    enough just to say it is not a stigma. So they found a way to
    turn it into a positive. We would call it a combat multiplier.
        So not only is it something you do after the fact but you
    build in the kind of resiliency you need right from the start.
    All the services are learning lessons with each other.
        Senator Nelson. Final question for either of you, training
    500 a month or every two months for the Free Syrian Army, is
    that really going to be productive?
        Secretary Carter. I will take that first, if I may,
    Chairman.
        That is a small number but grows over time. It is paced by
    the throughput of the training centers. I think that the U.S.
    effort needs to be just one effort. There need to be others in
    the region who participate in this. It gets back to something
    we were discussing earlier about the need for the defeat of
    ISIL to be a lasting defeat and for regional partners to be
    involved.
        So the only thing I would say is that there need to be
    other efforts beside the U.S. effort here, in accordance with
    the discussion we were having earlier.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Graham?
        Oh, I am sorry. General, did you want to--
        General Dempsey. Just to say that we need a partner on the
    ground, and we need something we can have this coalition
    coalesce around.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Graham?
        Senator Graham. Thank you. I think Senator Lee is allowing
    me to go ahead, and I appreciate it very, very much.
        Let's continue that thought.
        Have you been told, General, by the Arab forces in the
    region, the Arab leaders, that we are not going into Syria
    unless we can get rid of Assad?
        General Dempsey. There are some of them who say that, and
    others who don't. But, yes, I have heard that.
        Senator Graham. Well, the reason they are saying that is
    they don't want to defeat ISIL and turn Syria over to Iran,
    that Assad is a puppet of Iran. Do you agree with that?
        General Dempsey. I do.
        Senator Graham. So a lot of Arabs are saying, I want to
    destroy both enemies of the region, Assad as well as ISIL. So I
    don't see any chance of a regional force until you put Assad on
    the table.
        The Authorization to Use Military Force, I have a very
    specific question. The people we are training throughout the
    region to go in and fight ISIL, the Free Syrian Army, the young
    men who are going to join this cause, what would happen if the
    Assad air force, the airpower through MiGs and helicopters with
    barrel bombs, if they began to attack the people we trained
    because Assad knows one day they will turn on him.
        Under the Authorization to Use Military Force, can we
    protect the people we train against an attack by Assad?
        Secretary Carter. Well, first of all, I think we have an
    obligation to those we have trained to protect them. The manner
    in which that would be done is something that is being
    discussed. But in my view, we have an obligation to do that. It
    goes with the training part.
        Senator Graham. Do you agree with that, General?
        General Dempsey. I do, Senator.
        Senator Graham. Well, I agree with you both, and I have
    asked the White House General Counsel this very question and he
    told me very quickly, no, the Authorization to Use Military
    Force would not allow us, the United States, to engage the air
    forces of Assad. That is not included within the authorization.
        So that, to me, is a very important point. Could you check
    with the White House and see where they come out on this, at a
    later time?
        If the sanctions were relieved tomorrow, if the Iranians
    got sanction relief, General, what do you think they would do
    with the money, given their behavior on the ground today?
        General Dempsey. I can't speak to that, Senator. But here's
    what I will say, I am under no illusions that ending their
    nuclear program ends the problems we have with Iran in the
    region, whether it is surrogates and proxies, arms trafficking,
    cyber.
        So this is an adversary who, as someone pointed out
    earlier, has actually led to the deaths of American servicemen
    on the battlefield. So I think we have to keep an eye on them
    in that regard as well.
        Senator Graham. Would you agree with me that the most
    likely outcome, given their behavior today, is that they are
    not going to build hospitals and schools. They are probably
    going to put the money into their military?
        General Dempsey. You know, Senator, I think they will
    probably distribute their money like we do. I just hope they
    don't sequester it.
        Senator Graham. Well, I will tell you what, I just hope we
    don't give them more cash, because I think they are wreaking
    havoc as it is.
        Secretary Carter, do you agree with me that the Iranians as
    I speak are wreaking havoc throughout the region without a
    nuclear weapon?
        Secretary Carter. I do agree with that, Senator. You look
    at Yemen, from Yemen to Syria and Iraq and Lebanon and
    elsewhere, and that is why I think that it is important that we
    remain vigilant and prepared, and I think we, in the Department
    of Defense, need to and will be prepared for Iran across a very
    wide front.
        Senator Graham. Would you agree with the following
    statement? The Iranians with a nuclear weapon would be the most
    significant national security threat that Israel faces and the
    United States would face.
        Secretary Carter. Certainly, I would let the Israelis speak
    for themselves.
        Senator Graham. I think they have.
        Secretary Carter. I think so, too.
        The two things I would say is that we need to be concerned
    about Iranian behavior beyond their nuclear program.
        Senator Graham. Well, let's look at it the other way. Can
    you think of anything, off the top of your head, that would
    beat out an Iran with nuclear weapons?
        Secretary Carter. Well, there may be a close tie with North
    Korea with nuclear weapons.
        Senator Graham. Well, they already have nuclear weapons.
        Secretary Carter. I understand, but in terms of the danger
    posed by a difficult state in the possession of nuclear
    weapons.
        Senator Graham. Well, let's look at that. Do you think it
    is more destabilizing for Iran to get a nuclear weapon than
    North Korea, in terms of the Mideast?
        Secretary Carter. In terms of the Mideast, surely.
        Senator Graham. Have you been told by Arab allies that
    anything you give the Iranians on the nuclear front, we are
    going to want the same thing or more? If the Iranians get a
    nuclear capability, do you think the Arabs in the region will
    want nuclear capability to match the Iranians?
        Secretary Carter. There are those who have said that, and
    that is one of the reasons why we oppose Iran getting a nuclear
    weapon, because it could be the beginning of a powder train
    that would encourage others in the region to pursue a nuclear
    program as well. So that would just unleash proliferation in
    the Middle East.
        Senator Graham. So, the Prime Minister's warning in that
    regard today is probably well-heeded?
        Secretary Carter. I did not hear the Prime Minister today,
    but I, certainly, think that the danger of a runaway Iranian
    program stimulating runaway nuclear programs elsewhere in the
    Middle East is a very serious one.
        Senator Graham. Thank you, both, for your service.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Lee?
        Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thanks to each of you for being here, and thanks for all
    you do to keep our country safe.
        Secretary Carter, the Department of Defense is calling for
    a BRAC round in 2017, citing that it has nearly 20 percent more
    infrastructure than it finds necessary. Can you give a more
    detailed explanation as to what the department finds within its
    infrastructure that is unnecessary or in excess, and why? Also,
    can you describe to us what improvements you think need to be
    made to the BRAC process to avoid the kind of cost overruns
    that we experienced in the 2005 round?
        Secretary Carter. Thank you. We are requesting another
    round of BRAC. The basis for that is a measurement of our
    infrastructure against our current holdings of equipment and
    our needs.
        So, for example, it is aircraft fleets versus apron space.
    It is that kind of analysis that measures the amount of excess
    infrastructure that we are carrying.
        With respect to BRAC rounds, the 2005 BRAC round was not
    what we are seeking, that kind of BRAC round. We are looking
    for the kind of BRAC that occurred in the 1990s, where true
    savings occurred.
        You might say, why didn't savings occur in the 2005 BRAC
    round? It is because when it came time to reconfigure bases--
    that was, by the way, at a time when the defense budget was
    growing very rapidly--the department decided at the same time
    to modernize a lot of installations at the same time it was
    consolidating others. That created far fewer savings than a
    pure BRAC round would.
        So we are seeking BRAC authority. I know that that is not
    an easy thing to get, but we simply have to reduce tail, or we
    have to take it out of tooth, and I don't think anybody wants
    that.
        Senator Lee. Okay.
        A lot of Americans became frustrated last summer when we
    saw the Iraqi security forces, on whom we had just spent $25
    billion training and equipping over the course of the last
    decade, quickly free from a much smaller and less well-trained,
    less well-equipped ISIS force in northern Iraq, giving up
    ground and leaving behind a lot of weapons and leaving behind a
    lot of equipment that had been provided for them, a lot of it
    by us.
        So, Mr. Secretary, you just returned from a visit to the
    Middle East to look into our strategy there and how things are
    going there. Can you discuss with us a little bit the oversight
    we exercise over the train and equip missions in Iraq and in
    Syria, and tell us a little bit about what is being done to
    make those forces accountable for the training and equipment
    that we are giving them, just to make sure that something
    similar doesn't happen, make sure that our investment is not in
    vain?
        Secretary Carter. Thank you, Senator. Let me give that a
    start and then ask Chairman Dempsey to chime in, also.
        You exactly put your finger on it. What happened last year
    was an unwillingness of the Iraqi security forces to fight
    using the equipment and training that the United States had
    given them. The reason for that was a political failure on the
    part of their government to keep the promise that had been made
    to the country to keep it a multisectarian state. That is not
    what was happening under Maliki. That is the reason why the
    forces folded.
        So the most important thing we can do going forward is to
    make sure that Iraq doesn't decline again into sectarianism. So
    that is the most important thing we can do, and it is a
    political thing rather than a technical thing involving the
    training. But it is job one.
        Insofar as their training is concerned, I will let the
    Chairman speak to that. But we are giving them training and we
    are going to give them support when they go into battle. We are
    now, and we have been now for quite some time, conducting a
    bombing campaign against ISIL in order to blunt their offense
    and prepare the way for the counteroffensive.
        Let me ask the Chairman if he wants to add anything there.
        General Dempsey. Just in terms of the oversight, Senator,
    four locations: Irbil in the north, al Asad in the west, Taji
    just north of Baghdad, and Besmaya to the east of Baghdad. So
    the training is centralized.
        The oversight, once they deploy, is actually built around
    the supply chain, so the things that we are giving them, there
    is a tether that goes out to where they are operating.
        To this point, our program is to take and pull some units
    offline who exist, regroup them, put them back out, as well as
    to help the Iraqis manage their own training base.
        Does that answer the question?
        Senator Lee. Yes, I think that is helpful.
        As my clock is ticking down, if I can just ask one other
    quick question that either one of you can answer.
        How are U.S. defense and intelligence agencies adapting to
    the collapse of the Yemeni Government, and the loss of our
    primary counterterrorism partner against one of the most
    capable al Qaeda offshoots? What are we doing in that realm?
        Secretary Carter. Well, I will start, and the Chairman can,
    please, add.
        The first thing is that al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
    [AQAP], which is in Yemen, is a very serious offshoot of al
    Qaeda, very serious for us because they are determined to
    attack us. They make that absolutely clear. Therefore, our
    counterterrorism operations in Yemen are critically important.
    Therefore, the restoration of a government there that will
    cooperate with us is very important to us.
        Now, we are trying to do everything we can to continue to
    combat AQAP in the face of what is going on with the Houthis
    and the government in Sana'a. But it will be much better for us
    if we are able to reconstitute or assist in the reconstitution
    of a government there in Sana'a.
        I know our diplomatic colleagues are working on that, but
    it is important to our counterterrorism effort.
        Let me ask the Chairman.
        General Dempsey. Yes, what I would add, Senator, is our
    diplomatic effort is to try to keep the country together, but
    our counterterror effort is based mostly out of Aden in the
    south.
        We still have a partner there who has an interest in
    keeping al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula under pressure. Our
    fear is that if the country does devolve into civil war, we
    lose that platform.
        Senator Lee. Thank you. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. I want to thank the witnesses for a long
    afternoon of testimony. I believe that it is important that all
    of our colleagues, as well as the American people, understand
    your message, and that is that sequestration cannot continue
    without, as you responded to Senator King, without putting the
    lives of the men and women who are serving in uniform today in
    danger.
        I thank you for that frank and candid testimony. I thank
    you for being here this afternoon.
        Secretary Carter. Thank you.
        General Dempsey. Thank you.
        Chairman McCain. This hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 5:19 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
                            personnel and readiness
        1. Senator McCain. Secretary Carter and Chairman Dempsey: The
    Department's legislative proposals accompanying the fiscal year 2016
    budget request assume savings in the personnel and readiness accounts
    primarily: 1) by implementing new TRICARE fees or increasing existing
    fees; 2) by slowing the growth of military compensation (annual pay
    raises and BAH); and 3) by reducing commissary subsidies. If Congress
    does not authorize additional changes in compensation and benefits,
    where will the Department find the money in the budget to offset the
    savings assumed in the budget request? How would that impact force
    readiness?
        Secretary Carter. If Congress does not authorize the additional
    changes requested in compensation and benefits, the Department will be
    forced to take additional reductions within the readiness and
    modernization accounts and possibly make further force structure
    adjustments in the longer-term to offset the higher personnel costs.
        The proposed compensation adjustments are an important part of the
    Department's efforts to balance compensation with the required levels
    of readiness, capacity, and capability needed to ensure that our people
    can continue executing the Nation's Defense Strategy with continued
    excellence. Providing a robust pay and benefits package is a vital
    component of military quality-of-life and readiness, but we also owe
    our warriors the best possible training and equipment to ensure their
    superiority on the battlefield and bring them home safely to their
    families. A prolonged period of reduced investment in readiness and
    modernization will almost certainly mean a smaller, less capable, and
    less ready military, which could translate into future conflicts that
    last longer, and are more costly in both lives and dollars.
        General Dempsey. The President's Budget represents a strategic
    combination of capability, capacity, and readiness investments. The
    level of funding associated with each investment area creates a balance
    that allows the Department, albeit with manageable risk, to execute the
    Nation's defense strategy. Without support for the Department's reform
    initiatives to include those associated with military compensation we
    may need to adopt a defense strategy that is much less ambitious. Any
    significant changes to our PB proposals will challenge our already
    limited flexibility to operate. Compensation reforms were undertaken to
    slow the rate of growth of the military compensation and benefits
    package as part of a larger approach to preparing a future force that
    is balanced and ready to meet challenges known and unforeseen. Those
    savings are programmed against critical needs. Should those resources
    not become available the Department will have to revisit the strategic
    combination of investments in a holistic way to rebalance capability,
    capacity, and readiness within a new strategy.

        2. Senator John McCain. Secretary Carter and Chairman Dempsey: If
    sequestration continues in fiscal year 2016, how will it harm personnel
    and readiness programs?
        Secretary Carter. Sequestration would make it impossible to
    maintain a force trained and equipped to meet all the requirements that
    the Combatant Commanders and other military leadership have determined
    are necessary to ensure the Nation's defense against all the varied
    threats that exist today, and that might reasonably arise in the years
    ahead. Budget Control Act (BCA)-level funding in fiscal year (FY) 2016
    and beyond would require the Department to draw-down force structure,
    to fall short on our program to reset our equipment strained by more
    than a decade of war, and to forego some modernization programs
    necessary to keep out technological superiority. These are not just
    hard choices, these are bad choices.
        Over time, BCA level funding will erode our greatest strength--our
    people. Reductions in training and professional development programs
    will lead to a loss of proficiency and experience within the ranks,
    further degrading readiness, and substantially increasing the risk to
    the men and women in uniform. Reversing the harms of BCA-level funding
    will take longer than those harms to adversely affect the Department's
    ability to meet ever-changing threats. The money required to reverse
    these harms might well surpass the money saved.
        With regard to military personnel, the President exempted these
    accounts from the severe effects of the fiscal year 2013 sequester.
    Controlling the cost of pay and benefits to avoid further reducing the
    size of the force or sacrificing readiness would have to be considered
    if BCA-level funding returns.
        Lastly, sequestration will impact funding across the board for
    family programs and services. The Department remains committed to
    providing military families with support programs and resources that
    empower them to face the unique challenges of military life; these
    programs are crucial to the readiness and quality of life of military
    members and their families. Under sequestration, however, everything in
    the Department budget is subject to reduction or elimination. We will
    strive to protect the investment in these valuable programs, but cuts
    could directly impact support for families.
        General Dempsey. Sequestration would make it impossible to maintain
    a force trained and equipped to meet all the current requirements that
    our Combatant Commanders and other military leadership have determined
    are necessary to ensure the Nation's defense against all the varied
    threats that exist today, and that might reasonably arise in the years
    ahead. Budget Control Act (BCA)-level funding in fiscal year 2016 and
    beyond would require the Department to draw-down force structure, to
    fall short on our program to reset our equipment strained by more than
    a decade of war, and to forego some modernization programs necessary to
    keep our technological superiority. These are not just hard choices,
    these are bad choices.
        Over time, BCA-level funding will erode our greatest strength--our
    people. Reductions in our training and professional development
    programs will lead to a loss of proficiency and experience within our
    ranks, further degrading readiness, and substantially increasing the
    risk to our men and women in uniform. Reversing the harms that BCA-
    level funding would have, will take longer than it will take for the
    harms to adversely affect our ability to meet the ever-changing threats
    we face, and the money that will take to reverse these harms might well
    surpass the money we would save.
        With regard to military personnel, the President exempted these
    accounts from the severe effects of the fiscal year 2013 sequester. If
    we return to BCA-level funding, controlling the cost of pay and
    benefits to avoid further reducing the size of the force or sacrificing
    readiness would have to be considered.
        Lastly, sequestration will impact funding across the board for
    family programs and services. The Department remains committed to
    providing military families with support programs and resources that
    empower them to face the unique challenges of military life; these
    programs are crucial to the readiness and quality of life of military
    members and their families. Under sequestration, however, everything in
    the Department budget is subject to reduction or elimination. We will
    strive to protect the investment in these valuable programs, but cuts
    will be unavoidable, and will directly impact support for families.

        3. Senator John McCain. Secretary Carter and Chairman Dempsey: Do
    you believe that the current military compensation and benefit
    structure has a negative impact on military readiness?
        Secretary Carter. The structure of the military's compensation and
    benefits package is sound and has allowed the Department to recruit and
    retain the ready force that has successfully met the intense challenges
    of these past 14 years of conflict. Maintaining a sound compensation
    and benefits package requires periodic adjustments to ensure it remains
    competitive and relevant. The support of the Congress in adjusting the
    rates of pay and the flexibilities the Congress has provided the
    Department through broad special and incentive pay authorities have
    helped the Department respond timely to changes in labor market
    conditions. The Department also remains open to considering other
    changes to the military compensation and benefits package and is
    currently evaluating the recommendations of the Military Compensation
    and Retirement Modernization Commission.
        Maintaining a robust pay and benefits package is essential and must
    be sustained to execute the National Defense Strategy, yet it must
    remain in balance with readiness, capacity and capabilities needed. If
    there is reform, slowing the rate of growth of the military
    compensation and benefits package is one element in a larger approach
    to preparing a future force that is balanced, and ready to meet
    challenges known and unforeseen. Even with slowing the growth, the
    Department will maintain a compensation package that sustains the all-
    volunteer force. The Department is facing significant readiness
    challenges, and the prospect of returning to sequestration-level
    funding means these readiness challenges will not by fully met.
        General Dempsey. The structure of the military's compensation and
    benefits package is sound and has allowed the Department to recruit and
    retain the ready force that has successfully met the intense challenges
    of these past 14 years of conflict. Maintaining a sound compensation
    and benefits package requires periodic adjustments to ensure it remains
    competitive and relevant. The support of the Congress in adjusting the
    rates of pay and the flexibilities the Congress has provided the
    Department through broad special and incentive pay authorities have
    helped the Department respond timely to changes in labor market
    conditions. The Department also remains open to considering other
    changes to the military compensation and benefits package and is
    currently evaluating the recommendations of the Military Compensation
    and Retirement Modernization Commission.
        Maintaining a robust pay and benefits package is essential and must
    be sustained to execute the National Defense Strategy, yet it must
    remain in balance with readiness, capacity and capabilities needed. If
    there is reform, slowing the rate of growth of the military
    compensation and benefits package is one element in a larger approach
    to preparing a future force that is balanced, and ready to meet
    challenges known and unforeseen. The Department is facing significant
    readiness challenges, and the prospect of returning to sequestration-
    level funding means these readiness challenges will not by fully met.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
                                      iran
        4. Senator Ayotte. In his written statement to this committee
    several weeks ago, Dr. Henry Kissinger noted that international talks
    with Iran started as an effort ``to deny Iran the capability to develop
    a military nuclear option'' but have devolved into to a ``negotiation
    over the scope of that capability.'' Kissinger wrote that ``the impact
    of this approach will be to move from preventing proliferation to
    managing it.'' Why has Iran been able to successfully shift the U.S.-
    led negotiations from seeking full denial of an Iranian nuclear program
    to now negotiating over the scope of this program?
        Secretary Carter. From the beginning, the U.S. objective has been
    to negotiate a deal that seriously curbs Iran's nuclear activities and
    effectively cuts off Iran's pathways to a nuclear weapon. The U. S.
    policy is to deny Iran the capability to develop a nuclear weapon.
    Preventing the proliferation of nuclear technology, and especially
    nuclear weapons, is a cornerstone of U.S. national security. I believe
    these objectives will be advanced by reaching an agreement that
    peacefully prevents Iran from attaining a nuclear weapon.

        5. Senator Ayotte. If Iran is permitted to retain an enrichment
    capability, how will Saudi Arabia and others in the region respond?
        Secretary Carter. [Deleted.]
        General Dempsey. Saudi Arabia and others in the region have
    publically noted concerns over the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,
    emphasizing that they will obtain capabilities similar to what is
    approved for Iran, but it is unknown whether they will drastically
    alter pre-existing plans to develop domestic peaceful nuclear programs.
    We continue to work with our partners in the region regarding the
    development of peaceful nuclear power and to encourage a nuclear
    weapons-free middle east.
                                   guantanamo
        6. Senator Ayotte. The administration has been transferring and
    releasing detainees from Guantanamo who previously were assessed to
    pose a high or medium threat to the United States, its interests, or
    its allies. Secretary Carter, when the administration transfers a
    Guantanamo detainee, do you agree that the American people have a right
    to know what type of terrorist activities they have engaged in and
    which terrorist groups they have been associated with?
        Secretary Carter. The Department of Defense has publicly released
    information about detainees' terrorist activities and associated
    terrorist groups in response to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
    requests. This information is publicly available in the FOIA Reading
    Room on the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff's FOIA
    website: http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation--and--plans/Detainee/
        Upon the committee's request, the Department, in coordination with
    the Intelligence Community, would be prepared to provide the committee
    a classified briefing with additional information about detainees'
    terrorist activities and associated terrorist groups.
                                   dod audit
        7. Senator Ayotte. The Department of Defense is the last federal
    agency to fail to be auditable. Secretary Carter, in your answers to my
    earlier questions for the record you also indicated that you commit to
    achieve current DOD timelines for auditability and will be stressing
    your obligation to keep that effort on track. As this is a priority of
    yours, what actions have you taken thus far to accomplish those
    deadlines?
        Secretary Carter. I continue to firmly believe auditable financial
    statements are an imperative for the Department of Defense to be fully
    accountable to the Congress and to taxpayers. I have made this a part
    of a broader and evolving management reform agenda so that it is clear
    to all that this has my attention and full support. As mentioned in my
    earlier statements, over 90 percent of the Department's current year
    fiscal year 2015 general funds are currently under audit. I have asked
    my deputy, my chief financial officer, my deputy chief management
    officer, and the Service secretaries to keep me fully apprised on
    progress. I am convinced the Department is on the right track but I
    also know that much remains to be done. My plan is to monitor progress
    so that my team will position the Department to achieve the 2017 goal.
    To do this, I am prepared to make changes if we are not making
    sufficient progress and to hold our leaders--both civilian and
    military--accountable for progress.

        8. Senator Ayotte. The Department of Defense has repeatedly pushed
    back its timelines for producing a clean audit opinion. What actions
    are you prepared to take in order to ensure that DOD finally meets its
    timelines?
        Secretary Carter. As I have stated before, I'm convinced the
    Department is on the right track to meet statutory timelines. Over 90
    percent of the current year budget execution is now under audit and the
    feedback received from these audits will highlight areas needing
    attention. My goal is to position the Department to achieve current
    statutory goals for audit readiness and that is to have all financial
    statements ready for audit by the end of fiscal year (FY) 2017, then
    proceed to actually audit them in fiscal year 2018. This extends beyond
    my tenure, but I intend to make sure the Department and its future
    leaders will make those dates. I rely on my deputy, my chief financial
    officer, my deputy chief management officer, and the Service
    secretaries to make this happen. They know that Department auditability
    has my full support. I am prepared to make adjustments, including
    holding senior leaders at all levels and in all business lines
    accountable for successful results.
        General Dempsey. I fully support the intent of full auditability of
    the Joint Force to attain and sustain clean audit opinions of all
    financial statements on a continuing, annual basis. I am reasonably
    confident the Department will be audit ready by fiscal 2017.
        The Military Departments and Services, Combatant Commands, Combat
    Support Agencies, and other agencies are closely following DOD's
    Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Guidance and the
    schedule prescribed by the Department. There is clearly an all-out team
    effort to posture the Department for success--all are communicating,
    cross talking, and diligently working with independent public
    accounting firms to help identify areas needing improvement and to
    address corrective actions applicable to assessable units. In addition,
    to ensure personnel are dedicated, we are making accountability for
    results part of individual performance plans. Lastly, a number of
    ongoing interim audit assertions, attestation engagements,
    examinations, and mock audits are underway--consistent with a planned
    phased approach in meeting the Department's established FIAR timelines
    and objectives. By closely following existing published notices of
    audit findings and recommendations, harvesting from and applying
    lessons learned to each organization's domain, and taking steps to
    sustain consistent, repeatable, accurate, and timely business
    processes, I am reasonably confident these foundational measures will
    foster a culture of stewardship that will allow the Department to be
    audit ready by fiscal 2017.
                                  afghanistan
        9. Senator Ayotte. Setting aside our current force posture and the
    debates regarding that posture up to this point, what kind of military
    and intelligence posture does the United States require in Afghanistan
    to ensure it can never again be used as a training ground and launching
    pad for terrorist attacks against our country?
        Secretary Carter. The Department of Defense is working with its
    interagency partners to determine a post-2016 posture that will enable
    us to support the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF)
    in combating terrorists within Afghanistan and to conduct, if required,
    a national counterterrorism mission that supports U.S. interests. Under
    the terms of the Security and Defense Cooperation Agreement that the
    United States and Afghanistan signed last year, the United States and
    Afghanistan agreed to cooperate closely in the common fight against
    terrorism and acknowledged that continued U.S. military operations to
    defeat al Qaeda and its affiliates may be appropriate. The post-2016
    counterterrorism strategy will continue to require a well-synchronized
    interagency approach drawing on all the instruments of national power.
        General Dempsey. Under the terms of the Security and Defense
    Cooperation Agreement with Afghanistan, the United States maintains the
    authority to continue to target al Qaeda and other terrorists in
    Afghanistan who threaten the United States and its interests. The
    Department of Defense is working with the interagency to determine a
    post-2016 posture that will enable us to support the Afghan National
    Defense and Security Forces in combating terrorists within Afghanistan
    and to conduct, if required, a national counterterrorist mission that
    support U.S. interests.

        10. Senator Ayotte. The 2015 NDAA included language that supports
    that the U.S. government continue efforts with the Afghan Government to
    promote the rights of women and ensure their inclusion in political,
    economic, and security matters. Additionally, the language supports
    funding for recruiting and training female searchers and security
    officer to staff voting stations during elections. Can you describe the
    gains that women and girls have enjoyed in Afghanistan since the fall
    of the Taliban?
        Secretary Carter. Afghanistan has made significant progress during
    the past 13 years to promote the rights of women and ensure their
    inclusion in political, economic, and security matters. The Afghan
    Constitution states that all citizens of Afghanistan, men and women,
    have equal rights and duties before the law, including volunteering for
    public service. Women now constitute 20 percent of the civil service
    and 27 percent of Parliament. While girls were not permitted to go to
    school during the time of Taliban rule, girls currently constitute 40
    percent of students in Afghanistan.
        The high participation of women in the two rounds of presidential
    elections last year is a promising indicator of increased women's
    empowerment. A number of domestic and internationally funded campaigns
    encouraged women to vote. In addition, the Ministry of Interior's
    Female Searcher Program recruited enough female searchers to staff
    approximately 5,800 polling centers. Reports indicated that more than
    9,800 female searchers participated in the first round in April, and
    more than 10,800 were deployed for the presidential run-off in June. As
    a result of these efforts, female participation in the April election
    was estimated at 36 percent, and female participation in the June run-
    off election increased to approximately 38 percent.
        In addition, women now serve in the Afghan National Defense and
    Security Forces (ANDSF). Currently, approximately 2,300 women are in
    the Afghan National Police, and approximately 870 women are in the
    Afghan National Army. This includes Captain Niloofar Rhmani,
    Afghanistan's first female fixed-wing pilot since Taliban rule, who
    will be honored by the State Department during a visit to the United
    States in March. During her visit, she will also meet with female
    Marine aviators at Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, California, and
    fly with the Navy's Blue Angels.
        General Dempsey. Afghanistan has made significant progress since
    the fall of the Taliban in 2001.This progress includes nearly 8 million
    children in school, a third of which are girls, a rising life-
    expectancy, and improving economic growth. Afghan women have come out
    of the total seclusion they experienced during Taliban rule to take
    their rightful place in the society. Women now comprise 20 percent of
    the civil service, 27 percent of the parliament, and 40 percent of
    students. Female life expectancy rose from 44 years in 2001 to 64 years
    today.
        Since 2002, maternal mortality fell from 1600 to 327 deaths per
    100,000 births. Female literacy has increased to nearly 15 percent
    nationwide, 30 percent among girls aged 15-24, and almost 40 percent
    among young urban women. In the last five years, nearly 120,000 girls
    have graduated from secondary school, and an estimated 40,000 are
    enrolled in public and private universities. Of the 8.4 million
    students now in school, 37 percent (over 3 million) are girls.
        In 2014, the Afghan Ministry of Defense approved the annual
    Accession Plan for Capacity of Afghan National Army (ANA) Female
    Training Establishments, stating that 485 women can/will be trained in
    the coming year. The ANA officers' Academy graduated its first female
    class of 21 cadets in June 2014 and close to 200 police women recently
    graduated in training in Sivas, Turkey on February 27, 2015. There are
    currently 869 women in the Afghan National Army (includes Afghan Air
    Force), while the current female strength in the Afghan National Police
    is 2334.

        11. Senator Ayotte. Can you describe the pivotal role that women
    are now playing in Afghanistan and what role they will play in the
    future?
        Secretary Carter. Afghan women are exercising their rights to work,
    vote, receive an education, and serve in political office and in the
    national security forces. A powerful indicator of the dramatic
    improvement in conditions for Afghan women is in access to education.
    While girls were not permitted to go to school during the time of
    Taliban rule, currently more than three million girls in primary
    schools across the country are learning to participate openly and
    actively in the future of a democratic Afghanistan.
        President Ghani has indicated that he will promote continued
    improvements in conditions for women in Afghanistan, who continue to
    face discrimination, harassment, and abuse in many sectors of society,
    including in the security sector. The Department of Defense will assist
    the Afghan government by continuing to support efforts to integrate
    women into the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF).
    Changing societal norms in Afghanistan will be a slow and difficult
    process, but the future seems increasingly positive for women to play
    an increased role in the ANDSF. For example, the Afghan National Army
    Officers' Academy graduated its first class of 21 female cadets in June
    2014, and approximately 200 women graduated from Afghan National Police
    training in Sivas, Turkey, on February 27, 2015. The Department will
    continue to work with the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of
    Defense to implement strategies seeking to improve the treatment of
    women and to increase their recruitment.
        General Dempsey. The Afghan Constitution states that all citizens
    of Afghanistan, men and women, have equal rights and duties before the
    law. Women in Afghanistan have a major role to play in Afghanistan's
    future and are currently exercising their rights to work, vote, be
    educated, serve in political office and serve in the Afghan National
    Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF).
        Notably, of the 6.8 million votes cast in the April election, 36
    percent were cast by women. Three vice presidential running mates were
    women. 21 percent of the current members of provincial councils and
    11.5 percent of the candidates for provincial councils in April were
    also women.
        There are more than 3,000 woman-owned businesses and associations
    in Afghanistan today. Democracy International polling showed that 92
    percent of Afghan respondents agree that women have the right to
    participate in elections. The vast majority of respondents (83 percent)
    in a 2013 Asia Foundation survey agreed with the statement ``Women
    should have the same opportunities as men in education.'' The U.S.
    Government has more than $200 million per year programmed directly for
    gender-related issues.
                                    ukraine
        12. Senator Ayotte. On February 25, General Breedlove said, ``More
    than 1,000 pieces of Russian military equipment have been transferred
    into Ukraine, including tanks, armored personnel carriers, heavy
    artillery pieces and other military vehicles and equipment . . . These
    are not the actions of a good faith negotiating partner.'' Over the
    last few weeks, has Russia continued to send advanced weapons into
    Ukraine? What type? How many?
        General Dempsey. Russian military forces continue to operate in
    eastern Ukraine, where they provide command and control support,
    operate air defense systems, and have fought alongside pro-Russia
    separatist forces.
        Russia continues to transfer military equipment to pro-Russia
    separatists in eastern Ukraine. We can confirm that Russia has
    transferred additional tanks, armored vehicles, heavy artillery, rocket
    systems, and other military equipment to pro-Russia separatists.
        Pro-Russia separatists currently have a fighting force numbering in
    the hundreds of tanks, armored vehicles, heavy artillery pieces, and
    other military vehicles.

        13. Senator Ayotte. How many Russian troops are currently in
    Ukraine?
        General Dempsey. The intelligence community reports there are
    hundreds of troops currently in Ukraine.
                                     russia
        14. Senator Ayotte. According to news reports in January, Russia
    signed a military cooperation deal with Iran that includes joint
    exercises and military training. As you know, Russia has consistently
    served as Iran's primary foreign arms supplier, and Russia has
    reportedly deepened its economic ties with Iran in the last year. How
    would you characterize Russia's relationship with Iran? Should we be
    concerned?
        Secretary Carter. [Deleted.]
        General Dempsey. I believe it is a significant relationship from
    the perspective of the United States, Russia, and Iran. The Iran-Russia
    relationship has elements of promise but also risk. Given ongoing
    dialogue with Iran on its nuclear program, the Russia relationship can
    be pivotal to successful resolution of the issue. We need to retain an
    appropriate amount of caution given the dissonance of policy objectives
    between us, the Russians and the Iranians.
                                     china
        15. Senator Ayotte. China has stolen massive amounts of technology,
    intellectual property, and military secrets from the United States. How
    would you characterize the scale and severity of the cyber theft that
    China is committing against U.S. defense companies?
        Secretary Carter. [Deleted.]
        General Dempsey. We believe the intellectual property China
    collects from U.S. defense companies is provided to their indigenous
    companies for commercial benefit, to enhance China's international
    competitiveness and develop military capabilities without the added
    costs and time of research and development. This theft not only
    undermines the innovation of U.S. industry but more importantly our
    military superiority relative to China. Additionally, this potentially
    undermines U.S. military superiority relative to other states and non-
    state actors, since China is working to expand its own international
    arms sales.

        16. Senator Ayotte. How do you assess this theft impacts U.S.
    military superiority relative to China?
        Secretary Carter. China is likely using its cyber-espionage
    capabilities, along with other efforts, to support intelligence
    collection against certain U.S. national defense programs and
    acquisition of advanced technology. China could potentially use this
    information to benefit its defense industry and other civilian high
    technology industries. Differentiating between China's civil and
    military end-use remains a challenge due to opaque corporate
    structures, hidden asset ownership, and the connections between
    commercial personnel and the central government. This theft undermines
    U.S. military superiority relative to China. Additionally, this
    potentially undermines U.S. military superiority relative to other
    States and non-State actors as China expands its own international arms
    sales.
        General Dempsey. We assess that China is using its cyber-espionage
    capabilities, along with other efforts, to support intelligence
    collection against certain U.S. national defense programs in order to
    support their acquisition of advanced technology. The information
    targeted could potentially be used to benefit China's defense industry,
    as well as other civilian high technology industries. Differentiating
    between China's civil and military end-use remains a challenge due to
    opaque corporate structures, hidden asset ownership, and the
    connections of commercial personnel with the central government. This
    theft undermines U.S. military superiority relative to China.
    Additionally, this potentially undermines U.S. military superiority
    relative to other states and non-state actors, since China is working
    to expand its own international arms sales.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                       russian involvement in the arctic
        17. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Carter, recent news report shows a
    rapidly increasing Russian military involvement in the Arctic.
    Recently, the Russians have begun constructing as many as thirteen new
    airfields and ten air-defense radar stations, conducting Long-Range Air
    Patrols with their Bear-Bombers, including off the coast of Alaska, and
    creating a new ``Arctic Command'' and even activating and an Arctic
    Brigade. Additionally, Russia has made several large territorial claims
    into the Arctic, including the expressed desire to expand its Arctic
    borders by more than 460,000 square miles. Meanwhile, the U.S. has a
    thirteen-page Arctic Strategy. Rear Admiral J.C. Wylie, once said,
    ``The ultimate determinant in war is a man on scene with a gun . . . He
    is control, he determines who wins.'' How does our 13-page Arctic
    Strategy stack up against all the ``guns'' that Russia is putting in
    the Arctic?
        Secretary Carter. Our Arctic strategy ensures we continue to take
    tangible efforts to safeguard U.S. national security interests in the
    Arctic using all elements of national power, including military,
    diplomatic, and informational. The Department maintains a robust force
    structure in Alaska and has strong military-military ties with Arctic
    North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies. The Department also works
    closely with Canada to protect the northern approach to North America.
    These relationships play a critical role in deterring Russian behavior
    in the Arctic and will ensure coordinated response to any aggressive
    behavior.

        18. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Carter, it appears that woefully behind
    in our Arctic presence with just a 13-page strategy. How can we
    properly plan for and resource needed force structure in the Arctic
    when 13-pages seems to be all that we have?
        Secretary Carter. The Department's Arctic Strategy provides
    guidance on the ways and means to achieve the desired end-state in the
    Arctic, in support of the National Strategy for the Arctic region and
    the National Security Strategy: The Department seeks an Arctic that
    remains stable and free of conflict, where nations continue to act
    responsibly in a spirit of trust and cooperation, and where economic
    and energy resources are developed in a sustainable manner that
    respects both the fragile environment and the interests and cultures of
    indigenous peoples.
        The capabilities and activities to implement the Department's
    Arctic Strategy are subject to the same, established Departmental
    processes that prioritize and source other operational needs in the
    near- and long-term. The processes include the Global Force Management
    process and the annual Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
    cycle.
        Developing capabilities specific to the Arctic is a long-term
    process and is expensive. It is important to balance the changing
    region in the long-term with the opportunity cost of making premature
    and unnecessary investments. The Department will continue to review and
    assess appropriate communications; Intelligence, Surveillance, and
    Reconnaissance and domain awareness; infrastructure; and presence to
    outpace the potential challenges that accompany increased human
    activity in the Arctic.

        19. Senator Sullivan. Gen. Dempsey, you mentioned that Russia was
    building six new brigades--with four of being built in the Arctic. What
    type of brigades will these be and where specifically will each of
    these new brigades be located?
        General Dempsey. [Deleted.]

        20. Senator Sullivan. Gen. Dempsey, what are the operational and
    tactical implications of these locations?
        General Dempsey. [Deleted.]

        21. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Carter, what are the strategic
    implications of these four new brigades and each of their respective
    locations?
        Secretary Carter. [Deleted.]

        22. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Carter, in your opinion, how specifically
    does this force build-up affect Russia's Arctic Power projection?
        Secretary Carter. Russia's conventional force build-up in the
    Arctic will improve its power projection capability. The new Russian
    Joint Strategic Command North establishes a unified command and control
    structure that includes search and rescue operations along the Northern
    Sea Route, and the Russians have enhanced their maritime and air
    capabilities. The Department will continue to monitor the evolution and
    intent of Russia's force build-up. Additional, specific details on
    Russia's Arctic power projection capabilities can be provided in a
    classified setting.

        23. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Carter, what should be the appropriate
    U.S. response to these new land forces in an Arctic-forward posture?
        Secretary Carter. The Department is constantly reviewing military
    posture to provide the right mix of forces to assure partners and
    allies and meet national security objectives. If a threat to vital
    national interests is detected or anticipated, the Department of
    Defense will respond appropriately and ensure the safety of U.S.
    citizens and uphold any Article 5 security responsibilities.

        24. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Carter, should the U.S. respond and re-
    posture against these Russian forces, how should we re-posture, and if
    we should not, why not?
        Secretary Carter. It is likely the Russian force build-up in the
    Arctic is primarily defensive. It is also likely the build-up is
    intended to protect Russia's economic interests and conduct operations
    such as search and rescue. The United States will continue to remain
    vigilant in the Arctic in order to ensure that Russia and other nations
    abide by international norms and resolve any disputes peacefully.
    Should a credible maritime or air threat to vital United States
    national interests in the Arctic region materialize, the Department of
    Defense will review its options and respond appropriately.
                             arctic force structure
        25. Senator Sullivan. Gen. Dempsey, does the U.S.--and specifically
    USARAK--have sufficient capabilities, resources, and training to
    posture against these new Russian brigades?
        General Dempsey. Yes. The U.S. Army maintains capability to respond
    against these new brigades, but the effects of current operational
    demand for Army forces requires the Joint Staff and Headquarters
    Department of the Army to balance global requirements against the
    Army's inventory of forces. At times this response capability will
    reside solely within Army elements from USARAK, while at other times
    this requirement may be fulfilled with a Joint Force composed of ground
    elements sourced from all the Services' global inventory.

        26. Senator Sullivan. Gen. Dempsey, if no (to the above question),
    what capabilities, resources, and training are needed?
        General Dempsey. Answer not required (see #25)

        27. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Carter and General Dempsey, are there any
    units tasked within our Arctic Strategy or our Arctic OPLAN?
        Secretary Carter. Specific units are not tasked through strategies
    or contingency plans; however, some units, such as those stationed in
    Alaska, conduct training and engagements with partners in the Arctic
    region. These steady-state activities support the strategy and ability
    to respond to future contingencies.
        General Dempsey. The DOD Arctic Strategy, as well as other DOD
    strategies, are not the means for apportioning or assigning units to
    specific regions or to perform specific tasks. DOD apportions and tasks
    assets through its Global Force Management process. Units in Alaska may
    be apportioned to multiple OPLANS, to include operating in the Arctic.

        28. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Carter and General Dempsey, how do
    Alaska's units fit into our Arctic Strategy and OPLAN?
        Secretary Carter. Units in Alaska, like the missile defense units
    at Fort Greely, play a critical role in the ability to defend the
    homeland, as well as in the ability to project power. Alaska-based
    units also stand ready to provide defense support of civil authorities
    when directed by the Department. Alaska-based units work with a host of
    partners to ensure situational awareness of the Arctic environment, and
    these partnerships reinforce international cooperation in support of
    the Arctic Strategy.
        General Dempsey. Units assigned to Alaska provide a wide-range of
    military capabilities and a persistent presence on the outskirts of the
    Arctic to protect national interests. These units are capable of
    supporting air and space command and control (C2), weather forecasting,
    missile defense operations, mid-air refueling operations, and
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations.
    Despite the long distances and the harsh Arctic climate, military units
    in Alaska possess capabilities to respond to a wide range of
    contingencies.

        29. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Carter, do you believe that Alaska's BCTs
    are uniquely suited to help address strategic needs in our Pacific
    Pivot and new Arctic Strategy?
        Secretary Carter. There is an undeniable strategic requirement that
    defines the Department's presence in Alaska. This capacity cannot
    easily be replaced in alternate locations. Units based in Alaska afford
    the Army the ability to retain focus to the Pacific region. The
    strategic importance of having access to the seaways and routes that
    are becoming accessible in the Arctic is quickly being realized.
    European partners as well as the Russians have quickly assessed the
    same. Protecting access to the global commons and the Arctic is a key
    role of the Army. Likewise, the Russians have organized four brigades
    for Arctic operations. Furthermore, these stationing requirements
    endure not only because of location, but Alaska also offers unique and
    joint opportunities for training units in extreme weather environments.
    This is a capability that cannot be replicated elsewhere.
    Unfortunately, reductions in defense spending are forcing the Army to
    make difficult choices to reduce end-strength and unit structure. Prior
    to any inactivation decision, the Department will carefully weigh the
    strategic and local community impacts.

        30. Senator Sullivan. Gen. Dempsey, what other Army units in the
    U.S. could currently provide the Army with the force structure and
    equipment it would need for a conflict in an Arctic AOR?
        General Dempsey. Without identifying specific units, the Army's
    readiness capacity continues to improve for both active and reserve
    Brigade Combat Teams. Nevertheless, the Army still requires more time
    and consistent funding to sufficiently recover readiness across all
    formations. The Joint Staff regularly conducts assessments to determine
    our ability to meet the requirements of specified operational plans
    conducted in simultaneous execution. In this context, we will continue
    to review mitigation options and residual risk resulting from current
    operational and Combatant Commands' requirements.
                                   __________
                    Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Lee
                                 sequestration
        31. Senator Lee. Secretary Carter, can you give us more detail
    about why the Department decided not to develop an alternative budget
    that would be applicable in the case of sequestration, and what the
    Department is doing now to prepare for that scenario?
        Secretary Carter. The President's fiscal year 2016 budget proposes
    equal dollar add-backs for both defense and non-defense discretionary
    spending. These increases were more than paid for with smart spending
    cuts, program integrity measures, and commonsense loophole closers.
    Since the defense base budget at the sequester-level would undermine
    the Department's ability to meet the current defense strategy, the
    Administration has declined to submit an alternative, sequester-level
    plan to avoid serious consequences to economic growth and national
    security at a time when our military is stretched on a whole range of
    issues. Therefore, the Department urges Congress to support the budget
    the President has put forward that will avoid the harmful budget cuts
    of sequestration and reduce the deficit in a balanced way.
                                 force mixture
        32. Senator Lee. Do you believe that, especially in a difficult
    fiscal climate, missions should as much as possible be entrusted to
    Reserve Component forces in order to reduce the need for cuts to
    readiness, modernization, and recapitalization, as suggested by the
    National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force?
        Secretary Carter. After the past 14 years of combat operations, the
    Reserve Component (RC) is clearly capable of performing a wide variety
    of missions. Changes and updates to mobilization law (in regards to
    access authority) have made the RC a valid alternative for many
    operational missions. The Department needs to analyze what capabilities
    are being asked for, when that capability is needed, and how long it
    would take the RC to be ready to perform that specific mission. With
    the reduction in resources forecasted under the Budget Control Act,
    coupled with the current security environment, the Department will need
    to include the RC as part of the operational force.
        General Dempsey. Not necessarily. Our Reserve Components have and
    will continue to provide critical capability as part of our overall
    Total Force. But, there is an irreducible minimum below which the Joint
    Force cannot prudently cut Active Component end strength without
    jeopardizing war-fighting capability, institutional health, and the
    ability to generate future forces. The National Commission correctly
    identifies in their report that conducting operations with Reserve
    Component forces is not always less expensive than doing so with Active
    Component forces. While the Department is open to ideas for cost
    savings, we must carefully examine whether or not moving a particular
    mission to the Reserve Component will indeed generate savings over the
    long run, and whether or not that action will have any unintended
    consequences on our future war-fighting capability. Although the
    National Commission identified possible cost savings of roughly $2
    billion associated with moving about 36,000 additional active airmen
    into the Reserve Component, our mission analysis does not support that
    due to reduced rotational capacity and the corresponding increase in
    risk.

        33. Senator Lee. How do you intend to utilize the National Guard
    and Reserve forces in the upcoming fiscal year to take advantage of
    their cost- and combat-benefits to the military reported in the 2013
    CAPE report and 2014 Reserve Forces Policy Board report?
        Secretary Carter. Sufficient funding of readiness and modernization
    of the Reserve Component (RC) is vital to maintaining operational
    experience and capacity to meet National security requirements. The RC
    provides operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S.
    defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. Missions
    that are planned and predictable are best suited for the RC. However,
    some RC units and capabilities can respond on short notice for
    contingency operations, e.g. Air Force fighter units, National domestic
    support units, and some intelligence and cyber capabilities. In
    domestic roles, the RC will continue to be the most appropriate
    capability to support civil authorities due to its communal relations,
    proficiency in disaster response, and experiences in nation building in
    Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans, and other peace keeping and stability
    operations.
                               department reform
        34. Senator Lee. Secretary Carter, On January 22, the DOD's Defense
    Business Board issued recommendations that they believe could save up
    to $125 billion over the next five years for the Department through
    better business practices and reforms to contracting services. Have you
    had an opportunity to look over these recommendations and do you
    believe that if implemented they could make the desired budgetary
    impact without compromising mission effectiveness?
        Secretary Carter. I have had the opportunity to review the Defense
    Business Board recommendations and found them insightful on
    substantiating areas in which the Department can seek efficiencies. I
    have directed further analysis of each of the six core business
    processes. Furthermore, I have directed my staff to develop and
    implement a management structure to pursue potential opportunities that
    will be included in my management reform agenda. Any reduction to these
    costs will allow the Department to continue to sustain investments in
    readiness and modernization activities. While seeking cost reductions
    in these back office functions, the Department will remain focused on
    mission effectiveness to avoid any degradation to, or optimally
    improve, support to the warfighters.

        35. Senator Lee. Deputy Secretary Work stated in September `` . . .
    there's a lot of money in the OCO that should probably be in base. It's
    not because we didn't want it to be in the base; it's just happened
    over 12 years''. Do you agree with Deputy Secretary Work's comments,
    and how has the Department of Defense attempted to address these issues
    in this year's budget request?
        Secretary Carter. I agree with Secretary Work's comments. Over the
    last several years, both the Department and the Congress have leveraged
    the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget to provide funding for
    base requirements.
        The Administration is looking at all requirements funded under the
    OCO title. This includes requirements that may end in the near future
    and enduring requirements, which should transition to the base budget.
    In looking at these requirements, the Department must consider the
    appropriate financing mechanism for all costs that are above and beyond
    the Department's organize, train, and equip mission, including costs
    associated with providing support to Afghan partners, enduring overseas
    operations, responding to counter terrorism abroad, and maintaining a
    strong forward presence in the Middle East region. This transition will
    not be possible, however, if the sequester level discretionary spending
    caps remain in place.
        General Dempsey. Yes, I agree with Secretary Work's comments. For
    several years, both the Congress and the Department have leveraged the
    Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget to provide funding for
    things that may be more appropriately aligned with base requirements.
        The Department is engaged with the Administration to look at all
    requirements currently funded under the OCO title. This includes
    requirements that may end in the near future and enduring requirements,
    which we want to transition to the base budget. In looking at these
    requirements, we must consider the appropriate financing mechanism for
    all costs that are above and beyond the Department's organize, train,
    and equip mission, including costs associated with providing support to
    our Afghan partners, enduring overseas operations, conducting
    counterterrorism worldwide, reassuring our NATO allies, and maintaining
    a strong forward presence in the Middle East region. The transition of
    enduring OCO-funded requirements to the base budget will not be
    possible, however, if the sequester level discretionary spending caps
    remain in place.

        36. Senator Lee. Secretary Carter, the DOD budget overview states
    that ``the need to reduce unneeded facilities is so critical that, in
    the absence of authorization of a new round of BRAC, the Administration
    will pursue alternative options to reduce this wasteful spending''. Can
    you be more specific with what further options the Administration might
    pursue?
        Secretary Carter. As far as using other authorities, the Department
    only has authority to undertake a BRAC round if Congress authorizes it
    to do so. However, budget cuts require exploring any and all
    authorities Congress has provided to eliminate wasteful infrastructure.
    I have not yet decided which options to pursue if Congress does not
    provide BRAC authority.

        37. Senator Lee. Secretary Carter, one of the key initiatives for
    reducing costs and overhead in the Department of Defense is through
    decreasing the Department's major headquarters' operating budgets by 20
    percent. However, a GAO report from January found that ``without a
    systematic determination of personnel requirements and periodic
    reassessments of them, DOD will not be well positioned to proactively
    identify efficiencies and limit personnel growth within these
    headquarter organizations''. Has the Department been actively working
    with GAO to address this issue and what recommendations will you be
    adopting to satisfy these concerns?
        Secretary Carter. The Department remains committed to working with
    the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to implement the
    recommendations of previous reviews and to collaborate as part of
    ongoing reviews. The Department continues to undertake numerous
    initiatives to improve efficiency and reduce duplicative, low-priority,
    and non-value workload across the headquarters staffs. The Department,
    in its response to the GAO, only partially concurred with the GAO's
    recommendation in their January report.
        The Department will continue to use the Planning, Programming,
    Budgeting, and Execution process and leadership prioritization of
    missions, functions, and tasks to ensure appropriate workload
    determinations that limit personnel growth. Additionally, the
    Department is currently conducting Business Process and System Reviews
    of the Office of Secretary of Defense, Defense Agencies, and DOD Field
    Activities, to aid in aligning resources to mission responsibilities.
    Other ongoing efforts include an examination of the resources
    associated with, and the effectiveness of, the Department's performance
    of six core business processes (Human Resource Management, Health Care
    Management, Financial Flow Management, Acquisition and Procurement
    Management, Real Property Management, Logistics & Supply Chain
    Management). This work, directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and
    informed by a recent Defense Business Board report, will help identify
    efficiencies, cost savings, and personnel reductions, including those
    at headquarters.
                               national security
        38. Senator Lee. Secretary Carter, you stated in your testimony and
    when we met prior to your confirmation that one of the first acts you
    would undertake as Secretary would be to review the President's current
    strategy to defend the nation from an ISIS threat. What is your
    understanding of the threat that ISIS currently poses to the security
    of the United States, and how do you assess thus far the progress of
    President Obama's strategy to ``destroy and defeat'' ISIS? What
    specifically in your opinion needs to be accomplished regarding ISIS
    and other extremist groups operating in that area in order to protect
    the security of the United States, and how does this budget request
    reflect that?
        Secretary Carter. The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) poses
    an immediate threat to United States' interests in the Middle East as
    it seeks to control territory, destabilize and overthrow governments,
    and perpetuate acts of terror on the local population. If not
    addressed, ISIS will pose a growing threat to United States interests
    as demonstrated by its recruiting of foreign fighters and desire to
    lead the global jihad.
        The President's strategy to defeat ISIS has made progress in a
    short amount of time. ISIS' command and control, supply lines, and
    military and economic infrastructure are all degraded. ISIS also
    controls less territory in Iraq than they did before the air campaign
    and training and equipping of Iraq's security forces to re-take their
    country.
        The Department needs to continue to use air power in conjunction
    with advise and assist efforts on the ground to deny ISIS safe haven
    and to protect the security of the United States. The Department must
    work with the Iraqis to generate the forces required to go on the
    offensive against ISIS. Additionally, the training and equipping
    program for Syria will initiate this spring and is essential to the
    success of the strategy. Military efforts must be complemented by the
    contributions of other key actors in the U.S. government in order to
    disrupt ISIS's finances, support effective governance and multi-
    sectarian inclusiveness in Iraq, and counter ISIS's narrative and its
    appeal.
        The fiscal year 2016 Overseas Contingency Operations ``Operation:
    Inherent Resolve'' request of $5.3 billion, including for the Iraq
    Train and Equip and the training and equipping of vetted Syrian
    opposition, provides the resources needed for the Department to deny
    ISIS safe haven and build the capacity of partners to ultimately defeat
    ISIS. The Department must avoid a return to sequestration in fiscal
    year 2016.

        39. Senator Lee. A policy goal highlighted in the fiscal year 2016
    budget request is to work closely with European partners to strengthen
    their military capabilities. I believe it is especially important for
    our NATO allies to increase their defense budgets and collective
    capabilities as a deterrent to Russian aggression. These are
    longstanding goals of NATO that have not been met, how specifically do
    you intend to address this issue?
        Secretary Carter. One of the key 2014 North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization (NATO) Wales Summit outcomes was allied leaders' agreement
    to a Defense Investment Pledge to halt the negative defense spending
    trend now, and to move towards spending 2.0 percent of Gross Domestic
    Product (GDP) on defense within a decade with a view toward filling
    NATO's capability shortfalls. Progress toward this goal will require
    defense expenditures to increase in real terms as GDP grows. Allied
    defense ministers will review each ally's progress at least annually,
    and the United States intends to raise examples of inadequate progress
    at every defense ministerial and bilateral meeting, as appropriate. The
    United States also intends to engage intensively with allies, such as
    the United Kingdom and Germany, that are about to undergo strategic
    reviews that will affect their future defense investment decisions.
    NATO allies must not only increase defense spending, but must make
    investments in the types of capabilities that NATO needs to deter
    Russian aggression.
        General Dempsey. At the September Wales Summit, the Allies pledged
    to reverse the trend of declining defense budgets, to make the most
    effective use of that spending towards infrastructure and equipment,
    and to further a more balanced sharing of costs and responsibilities.
    In order to keep Allies on course in achieving the goals of that
    pledge, I will continue to stress the shared threats NATO members face
    and the critical need to continue to invest in defense capabilities to
    strengthen the Alliance. For Allies with larger economies, this means
    investment in military capabilities that that can be used to impose
    costs on any opponent with minimal cost and risk to Alliance forces.
    For those Allies with smaller economies, investment in capabilities
    that are needed by the Alliance, in which they may have a comparative
    advantage, is most needed.

        40. Senator Lee. Secretary Carter, the budget request for fiscal
    year 2016 highlights the need to continue the defense rebalance to the
    Asia-Pacific region while maintaining a focus on the Middle East. What
    steps have we taken thus far in the pivot to the Asia-Pacific region,
    and what are the next steps to be taken? Will continuing the pivot to
    this region necessitate a reduction in force from other areas of the
    world?
        Secretary Carter. The rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region remains
    a top whole-of-government priority effort rooted in an analysis of
    long-term U.S. security and economic interests. The Department of
    Defense's implementation is focused on modernizing alliances and
    partnerships, enhancing force posture, updating capabilities and
    concepts of operation, and strengthening multilateral defense
    cooperation in the region. To date, the Department has made significant
    progress toward enhancing both the capacity and capability of United
    States forces in the region. Sixty percent of our naval and overseas
    air assets are on track to be forward-based in the Pacific region by
    2020. The Department is also enhancing the rotational access and
    training opportunities for ground forces. This includes developing a
    more operationally resilient and politically sustainable laydown for
    the U.S. Marine Corps, as well as designating the U.S. Army's I Corps
    as regionally aligned to the Pacific.
        Looking ahead, the Department is developing new military
    capabilities and operational concepts to ensure that U.S. forces will
    continue to project power effectively in an environment of increasingly
    capable anti-access/area-denial threats. This year's budget includes
    investments in capabilities best suited to this region's challenges.
    The investments include continued upgrades to integrated air and
    missile defense systems; modernized maritime domain awareness
    platforms; swapping out the forward-based aircraft carrier, USS George
    Washington, for the more capable USS Ronald Reagan; resilient
    infrastructure on Guam; and development of future capabilities like the
    long range strike bomber, the Virginia Payload Module, and the F-35
    Joint Strike Fighter. These robust investments reflect the Department's
    conscious decision to send its most advanced capabilities to the Asia-
    Pacific first.
        The Department will continue to balance presence and posture
    requirements globally to protect U.S. national security interests.
    However, the continued strain of sequestration would affect the degree
    to which the Department could continue to support the modernization
    investments necessary to maintain our long-term technological edge in
    the Asia-Pacific region. Reduced funding would also lead to a reduced
    pace and scope of near-term presence activities, which would have a
    negative impact on successes to date.

        41. Senator Lee. How is this budget prioritizing our defense
    against cyber-threats to our military infrastructure? What objectives
    do you believe cyber-attackers will try to achieve against our military
    in the next decade?
        Secretary Carter. Defending against cyber threats is one of my top
    priorities. The Department must be well-postured to respond to the
    growing cyber threats confronting the U.S. Accordingly, the President's
    fiscal year 2016 budget requests $5.5B for cyberspace operations,
    invests in cyber-related Science and Technology, and supports
    organizing, training, and equipping the Cyber Mission Force.
        More than $2 billion of the Department's cyberspace operations
    budget request pertains to defensive cybersecurity measures. These
    measures include funding for public key infrastructure implementation,
    network intrusion detection systems, defense industrial base
    protections, and cryptography, as well as for the deployment of the
    Joint Regional Security Stacks (JRSS). The JRSS replace current
    individualized, localized security systems with an enterprise-wide
    capability that allows U.S. Cyber Command and local commanders to
    protect more effectively against the growing cyber threat. The JRSS
    will provide a more secure environment with improved command and
    control that operates at lower cost.
        Additionally, the Department has undertaken a rigorous process to
    identify, assess, and prioritize mitigation of cyber vulnerabilities of
    weapons systems. The Department is pursuing new approaches to ensuring
    platforms and weapons systems are hardened during the system's
    lifecycle and able to operate in a cyber-contested environment.
        Over the next decade, state and non-state actors will rapidly
    expand their malicious cyberspace capabilities and will target the
    public and private networks of the United States and its allies and
    partners. These hostile actors will continue to use cyberspace as an
    asymmetric capability to harm the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests,
    both directly and indirectly. Adversaries will continue to seek to hold
    our critical infrastructure, military missions, and defense-related
    intellectual property and trade secrets at risk. Protecting against
    these threats will require increased investment to defend military
    infrastructure.
        General Dempsey. Defending against cyber threats is one of my top
    priorities. Accordingly, the President's fiscal year 2016 budget
    requests $5.5B for cyberspace operations, both offensive and defensive,
    investing in cyber-related Science and Technology, as well as
    organizing, training, and equipping the Cyber Mission Force. We must be
    well-postured to respond to the growing cyber threats confronting our
    Nation.
        Specific to your question, more than $2 billion of the Department's
    cyberspace operations budget request pertains to defensive
    cybersecurity measures. These measures include funding for public key
    infrastructure implementation, network intrusion detection systems,
    Defense Industrial Base protections, and cryptography, as well as for
    the deployment of the Joint Regional Security Stacks (JRSS). The JRSS
    replace current localized security systems with an enterprise-wide
    capability that provides U.S. Cyber Command and local commanders with
    more effective defenses to counter the growing cyber threat. The JRSS
    will provide a more secure environment with improved command and
    control, and will operate at lower cost.
        Additionally, the Department has undertaken a rigorous process to
    identify, assess, and systematically prioritize mitigation of cyber
    vulnerabilities of DOD weapons systems. We are pursuing new approaches
    to ensuring platforms and weapons systems are hardened across the
    entire system's lifecycle and can operate in a cyber-contested
    environment.
        Over the next decade, state and non-state actors are expected to
    rapidly expand their malicious cyberspace capabilities and target the
    public and private networks of the United States and its allies and
    partners. These hostile actors continue to see cyberspace as an
    asymmetric capability to harm the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests,
    directly and indirectly. The Department assesses that adversaries will
    continue to seek to hold our critical infrastructure, military
    missions, and defense-related intellectual property and trade secrets
    at risk. This will require increased investment to defend military
    infrastructure.

        42. Senator Lee. We have seen the continued development of
    ballistic missile technology and capabilities in Iran and North Korea,
    as well as the modernization of nuclear weapons and delivery platforms
    from Russia and China. What is your assessment of the development and
    deployment of our missile defense technology, and do you believe that
    the proposed budget keeps us on the trajectory to keep up with the
    ballistic missile threats that we will face in the future?
        Secretary Carter. Yes. The Department is developing fiscally
    sustainable, off-setting technologies to address gaps in the Ballistic
    Missile Defense System (BMDS) and extend dominance in missile defense.
    The goal for these investments is to deploy a future BMDS architecture
    more capable of discriminating and destroying a reentry vehicle with a
    high degree of confidence.
        The Department's budget balances investment between homeland and
    regional missile defense capabilities while pursuing advanced
    technology to pace the emerging threat. We will do this by improving
    current system capabilities and investing in the most promising
    technology to reverse the adversary's numerical advantage.
        The President's fiscal year 2016 budget request invests in off-
    setting technology, including advanced sensor and kill vehicle
    technology that will enable us to deploy multiple kill vehicles from a
    single interceptor to counter advanced threats. The Department is also
    investing in directed energy technology that will revolutionize missile
    defense, dramatically reducing the cost per kill in our future BMDS.
        General Dempsey. The current missile defense programs and fiscal
    year 2016 budget request ensure that we can sustain and modernize our
    missile defense capability to keep up with the evolving BMD threat.
    This entails continued investment in improvements to the ground-based
    midcourse defense (GMD) system, including enhanced performance of the
    Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) kill vehicle and the deployment of new
    sensors. The U.S. remains on track to deploy 14 additional GBIs in
    Alaska by the end of 2017 to augment the 30 interceptors already
    deployed. The addition of the second forward-based missile defense
    radar in Japan strengthens our homeland and regional defenses in
    support of the GMD. In addition, the budget supports forward stationing
    and rotational deployment of BMD forces in a way that is phased to
    provide the best operational capability available in order to protect
    U.S. and allied forces while balancing dwell time and providing time
    for system modernization programs.

        43. Senator Lee. General Dempsey, last year Congress authorized the
    federal government to send defensive weapons to the government of
    Ukraine. What is DOD's assessment of the Ukrainian military's capacity
    and readiness level to receive such weapons and use them in an
    accountable and effective manner?
        General Dempsey. Any U.S. decision to provide defensive weapons to
    Ukraine would include consideration of requirements to provide
    equipment training. The defensive weapons under consideration are
    designed to require only a very basic level of training. Additionally,
    before weapons with technology are provided, DOD conducts a Technology
    Security/Foreign Disclosure process to ensure that if such weapons were
    lost on the battlefield, there would be no loss of either sensitive
    U.S. technology or military capabilities.

        44. Senator Lee. There have been several open-sourced reports today
    regarding the presence of Iranian fighters and military advisors in the
    Iraqi Security Force's current push against ISIS in Tikrit. How
    extensive is Iran's influence over the ISF and the Iraqi government,
    what specific assistance are they providing in this offensive, and are
    Iranian officials working with the ISF able to access intelligence
    information that we are sharing with the Iraqis?
        General Dempsey. [Deleted.]
                                   __________
                    Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Cruz
                              nuclear capabilities
        45. Senator Cruz. Secretary Carter, since 2000, the Russians have
    discussed strategy and designed training exercises around a theory of
    ``escalating to de-escalate'' by using a nuclear weapon to make the
    costs of military involvement too great for the U.S. or NATO. In such a
    scenario, the Russians believe they could use a nuclear weapon to
    accomplish their objections while the U.S. would be unwilling or unable
    to retaliate. Russia's recent aggression in Ukraine and Georgia raise
    concerns that Putin might eventually use nuclear weapons to achieve his
    strategic objective: incorporating elements of the former Soviet Union
    into the Russian Federation, or even reconstituting most of the former
    Soviet Union. Does a failure to modernize our nuclear forces act as an
    enabler for Russia to pursue this course of action in the future?
        Secretary Carter. Russia's recent behavior poses a serious
    strategic challenge. The U.S. response must be equally serious and
    integrated across all instruments of national power, including
    diplomatic, economic, as well as military.
        The nuclear modernization plan was specifically designed to hedge
    against geopolitical risk, including increasing strategic competition
    with Russia. It does so by sustaining a Triad that offers a range of
    capabilities that underwrite strategic stability. The President's
    budget request fully supports this plan through focused and sustained
    investments in nuclear modernization and manning across the nuclear
    enterprise. Congressional support for the modernization program is
    imperative. A prolonged period of reduced defense budgets would almost
    certainly mean a smaller, less capable, and less ready U.S. military--
    and that, in turn, could invite others to challenge us or create more
    risk.

        46. Senator Cruz. Secretary Carter, a few weeks ago at your
    confirmation hearing, we discussed the dangers posed by a nuclear Iran.
    You succinctly described it as ``exceptionally grave'' because it could
    launch a new regional nuclear arms race, greatly unbalance the Middle
    East, and also because of Iran's stated intent to annihilate Israel and
    the United States makes it unacceptably likely they might use them.
    Since that time, details of a pending agreement between the President
    and Iran have emerged in press reports that suggest such a deal would,
    at best, slow Iranian nuclear progress but would not in any meaningful
    way prevent it. President Netanyahu told a joint meeting of Congress
    that he believed we were at a ``fateful crossroads'' and that this deal
    would ultimately lead to a ``nuclear armed Iran.'' Do you agree with
    that assessment?
        Secretary Carter. Prime Minister Netanyahu certainly has the right
    to express his opinion on the nuclear negotiations. As has been
    repeatedly stated, however, the only deal that the U.S. is prepared to
    accept is one that prevents Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.
        I believe that a nuclear deal will have the effect of putting in
    place the conditions to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon,
    rather than inevitably lead to Iran acquiring one. The intention is not
    to prevent Iran from having a civilian nuclear program if it lives up
    to all of its obligations under any potential deal. Transparency and
    intense monitoring and verification measures will be in place to ensure
    that Iran's nuclear activities are exclusively peaceful, and that there
    is advance notice of any Iranian treachery in contravention of a deal.
    In any deal, the Department will remain poised as the hedge against
    Iranian non-compliance.

        47. Senator Cruz. Secretary Carter, since your confirmation, has
    the President consulted you on his negotiation efforts with Iran, and
    asked for your professional opinion as Secretary of Defense on the
    consequences of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons?
        Secretary Carter. Yes. The Department works closely with the
    Administration on all matters of national security.
                                missile defense
        48. Senator Cruz. Secretary Carter, during your confirmation
    hearing you said that, ``With respect to ballistic missiles that could
    threaten the United States, I think that's one of the reasons why we
    need to keep our missile defenses and especially our ICBM defenses
    current, capable and large enough in size to deal with both the
    prospective Iranian threat and the also very real North Korean ICBM
    threat.'' I agree with your assessment, and I was also pleased to see
    the Department of Defense give priority to midcourse and homeland
    defense programs in the fiscal year 2016 budget. Even so, the missile
    defense community has long voiced that interception of a ballistic
    missile in the boost or ascent phases is preferable due to a higher
    probability of successful intercept. We haven't had any active programs
    to develop intercept capabilities in the boost and ascent phases since
    2010. Can you share your vision of boost phase missile defense with the
    Committee and pledge your commitment to support development of
    technology to intercept ballistic missiles in this phase of flight?
        Secretary Carter. Destroying missiles during the boost phase puts
    pressure on adversary payload deployment timelines, thins out attacks,
    and denies unimpeded access into midcourse with complex
    countermeasures, which is the greatest challenge from the emerging
    threat. Technology advances in highly efficient, compact electric
    lasers that could be small and light enough to fit on high altitude
    unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) offer new opportunities for effective and
    affordable boost phase intercept.
        The Missile Defense Agency's fiscal year 2016 budget request
    includes funding to advance technology supporting boost phase
    intercept. Two short wavelength electric lasers are being scaled up in
    the laboratory from kilowatts to tens of kilowatts. Measurements of
    vibrations and high altitude turbulence and optical propagation are
    planned, using existing high altitude UAVs. We are also bringing on
    industry this year to assess the feasibility and develop concepts for a
    new missile defense laser demonstrator scheduled to fly before the end
    of this decade.

        49. Senator Cruz. Secretary Carter, with an emerging Iranian ICBM
    program and active North Korean ICBM Program, are you comfortable with
    the level of funding toward General Missile Defense for protecting
    against a threat to the U.S. Homeland? Do you believe that this program
    has the appropriate priorities for procurement, research, and
    development?
        Secretary Carter. The Department remains committed to operating,
    sustaining, and expanding the Nation's homeland missile defenses and
    requests $1.76 billion for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense program.
    This amount is $613 million over our President's Budget (PB) 2015
    request. I support the priorities laid out by the Missile Defense
    Agency in this budget request.
        The PB 2016 request supports expanding the number of currently
    deployed Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs) to 44 by the end of 2017. The
    request supports continued flight and system ground testing, Redesigned
    Kill Vehicle development, and enhancement of Stockpile Reliability
    Program to improve GBI performance, reliability, and reliability
    testing. The request also supports improvements to our sensor networks
    to increase battle space and discrimination.

        50. Senator Cruz. Secretary Carter, our closest ally in the Middle
    East, Israel, recently used the Iron Dome with great success against
    small rockets. However, as radical Islamic extremists and the Iranian
    regime develop new capabilities, do you believe that they have adequate
    defenses against nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons attacks by
    the Iranian regime or other radical Islamic terrorists?
        Secretary Carter. The U.S. commitment to Israel is ironclad. Israel
    faces very real missile threats from a number of actors in the region,
    and Israel's security remains a top priority. In addition to Foreign
    Military Financing assistance, the United States has provided more than
    $3 billion in missile defense assistance to Israel since 2001. The
    Department has worked with Israel to develop a multi-layered missile
    defense architecture that includes Iron Dome, David's Sling, and Arrow.
    However, the Government of Israel is in the best position to determine
    the overall adequacy of its national defense.
                                 cyber threats
        51. Senator Cruz. General Dempsey, how do you describe the
    Department of Defense's role in deterring and responding to
    cyberattacks from state actors and state sponsored actors against U.S.
    defense capabilities, research programs, and operational networks? Do
    you believe that this budget provides enough resources for us to stay
    ahead of state backed threats?
        General Dempsey. Deterrence in cyberspace, as with other domains,
    relies on two principal mechanisms: denying an adversary's objectives
    and, if necessary, imposing costs on an adversary for aggression. The
    Department of Defense plays a key role in our deterrence strategy,
    particularly regarding our defense capabilities and research programs,
    by providing military options to respond to attacks in cyberspace as
    with attacks in any other domain.
        To that end, the Department has spent several years building
    capabilities to provide a credible threat of response to deter
    malicious nation state activities against us in cyberspace. We view
    cyberspace as a global warfighting domain rather than simply an
    information technology resource, and have established U.S. Cyber
    Command and its associated forces dedicated to defending against and
    responding to adversary cyberspace attacks. We are also working with
    like-minded nations to establish an environment of expectations, or
    norms of behavior, that increase understanding of cyber doctrine, and
    guide Allied policies and international partnerships.
        This budget continues our investments in deterring and responding
    to state-sponsored aggression in cyberspace, consistent with the
    Department's other priorities. We continue to strengthen our defenses,
    resiliency, and monitoring capabilities in order to deny or minimize
    the benefit of malicious activity in cyberspace and ensure our ability
    to attribute malicious activity to its source and sponsor. We are also
    continuing to invest in U.S. Cyber Command's Cyber Mission Forces to
    provide a credible threat of response in cyberspace in addition to our
    response options in other domains. Along with the efforts of our
    nation's law enforcement, intelligence, and diplomatic communities, the
    Department of Defense will ensure the cost of a state-sponsored attack
    in cyberspace far outweighs any potential benefit an adversary may hope
    to gain.

        52. Senator Cruz. General Dempsey, do you have concerns about the
    capability of non-state actors to degrade or disrupt defense
    information systems as cyber weapons proliferate and are reengineered?
    What is our answer to this threat?
        General Dempsey. The cyberspace threat from non-state actors has
    been a consistent concern for as long as we have been leveraging
    information technology. The low cost and rapid proliferation of
    malicious cyberspace tools enables anyone with hostile intent, from
    amateur hackers to criminal and terrorist organizations, the capability
    to threaten our national interests.
        To counter this threat, we are building robust defensive
    capabilities and building better resiliency and monitoring
    capabilities. We have also built an operational force aligned to U. S.
    Cyber Command, consisting of active duty military, civilian, national
    guard, and reserve components, to actively defend against and respond
    to malicious cyberspace activity. We continue to leverage the Nation's
    ingenuity by recruiting and retaining an exceptional cyber workforce
    and enabling rapid technological innovation.
        In addition, the Department of Defense continues to work closely
    with its interagency partners, including the Departments of Justice and
    Homeland Security, to address threats to the United States from
    wherever they originate, through a whole-of-government approach. The
    Department is dedicated to the defense of the Nation, and to the
    privacy and the civil liberties of its citizens.
        We also continue to build robust relationships with private
    industry partners, U.S. Allies and international partners to enable
    information sharing and strengthen collective cybersecurity.
                                   __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                           electronic health records
        53. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Carter, one of my major
    priorities is to ensure that VA can exchange relevant health data with
    DOD and the private sector in a usable, computable, format to support
    clinical decisions. This initiative has faced changes in scope and
    project management issues in the past that have led to delays and have
    impacted cost estimates for this program. While VA and DOD are sharing
    more health data than ever, existing data-sharing mechanisms have
    limited utility in clinical encounters due to access limitations and
    usability issues. To that end, please provide a status update on the
    Defense Healthcare Management System Modernization (DHMSM) program,
    including a schedule that includes the estimated contract award date,
    and key dates for program rollout and retirement of legacy EHR systems.
        Secretary Carter. Each product under consideration for the Defense
    Healthcare Management System Modernization (DHMSM) Electronic Health
    Records (EHR) solution is being extensively tested by subject matter
    experts and users. To address access limitations, the DHMSM program is
    working closely with the Defense Military Information Exchange program
    (within the same Program Executive Office), which is providing
    technical solutions to allow the Department to increase the level of
    data shared with VA and the private sector. These enhancements will
    continue to improve existing data-sharing capabilities and address
    congressional directives.
        The DHMSM program has been open and transparent with industry and
    has consistently met acquisition goals on schedule over the last 18
    months. The program held four Industry Days, released three draft
    Requests for Proposals (RFPs), and released a final RFP in August 2014
    that resulted in extremely robust interest and corresponding industry
    competition. The program is currently in Source Selection with an
    anticipated contract award this fiscal year. The details of the source
    selection process are deemed extremely sensitive; however, competition
    remains robust. The program is on-track to begin deployment of the
    modernized EHR System prior to December 31, 2016, as required by the
    fiscal year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act requirement.
    Retirement of legacy EHR systems will depend on the selected solution
    and the proposed deployment schedule.

        54. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Carter, a recent report from the
    Center for a New American Security on modernizing military healthcare
    highlighted potential disadvantages to DOD's current commercial
    approach to replacing its health record, including the potential that
    health data may not be as interoperable as the Department hopes, and
    the limitations that can come with having only one company that can
    upgrade or improve the system. What is DOD doing to reduce the risk of
    vendor lock, data isolation, and potential bid protest inherent in the
    multibillion dollar DHMSM procurement?
        Secretary Carter. To address vendor lock, the Request for Proposal
    (RFP) uses a multi-pronged approach by including well-defined
    requirements consistent with the tenets of open systems architecture
    (OSA), standard and custom clauses that protect the Government's
    intellectual property and data rights, and evaluation criteria that
    assess proposed approaches to achieving OSA and interoperability and
    proposed intellectual property/data rights postures. The RFP requires a
    data architecture that supports open standards based data portability.
    Vendors will be evaluated on whether their product provides well-
    documented open Application Programing Interfaces and services to
    facilitate integration. System improvements will be through upgrades
    with newer modular components without redesign of entire system or
    large portions. The vendor must adopt emerging standards and maintain
    compliance and currency with the Office of the National Coordinator and
    other applicable national standards.
        To reduce the risk of data isolation, the DHMSM program is working
    closely with the Defense Medical Information Exchange program (within
    the same Program Executive Office), which is providing technical
    solutions to allow the Department to increase the level of data shared
    with the Department of Veterans Affairs and the private sector. These
    enhancements will stabilize existing data-sharing capabilities and
    address congressional directives. The second phase of work will enable
    the modernized Electronic Health Records to access legacy data,
    supporting better access to safer, higher-quality care for
    beneficiaries and providers.
        Regarding potential bid protest, the DHMSM program office includes
    acquisition, contracting, and legal professionals, whose collective
    knowledge and experience are informing the RFP and Source Selection
    process. The program informed industry of the requirements through
    multiple Industry Days and draft RFPs over a 10 month period. The
    program office remained open and transparent throughout this entire
    period, affording industry an opportunity to comment formally and
    directly throughout the requirements development and overall
    acquisition process. I cannot predict if there will be a protest, I am
    confident the source selection process is executing with a high level
    of integrity and process discipline and evaluating proposals within the
    parameters/criteria as described in the RFP.

        55. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Carter, the most recent health
    data interoperability management plan indicates that progress is being
    made on terminology standardization in a number of health data domains.
    What progress has been made on developing standards to govern health
    data transport and security between the two Departments?
        Secretary Carter. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Trusted
    Internet Connection Gateways provide secure communication between VA-
    based networks and Department of Defense networks via the medical
    community of interest (MED-COI) Enterprise Gateways. The MED-COI
    Gateway components provide a secure means to monitor, screen, and
    restrict traffic flows into and out of the Department's Medical Health
    System networks. The gateways provide a secure means of communication
    and access to both Personal Identifiable Information and Protected
    Health Information between the Departments.
        The Department leverages standard commercial off the shelf
    equipment on the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Approved
    Product List configured to adhere to DISA Security Technical
    Implementation Guide compliance. Data in transit is secured by
    leveraging commercial standard encryption (e.g., AES-256 encryption)
    per DODI 8500.2 over MED-COI dedicated transport, improving performance
    and availability. At the MED-COI Gateways, the data is decrypted for
    inspection prior to being re-encrypted for transport to systems at
    various sites. The VA is responsible for securing the traffic in
    transport across the VA network. The Department secures data at rest by
    leveraging multiple industry best practices (e.g., FIPS 140-2), which
    the Department is currently rationalizing into a single solution. From
    a network perimeter prospective, the Departement is proactively working
    to rationalize to a single Computer Network Defense Service Provider.
        With these various data transport security layers, the Department
    is providing infrastructure and services to enable comprehensive health
    data transport security. The Departments are continuing to work
    together to ensure stable, secure methods for health data transport
    between the Departments as technology and standards evolve.

        56. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Carter, what plans does DOD have
    to manage the conversion of legacy data for use in the proprietary
    system that will replace AHLTA?
        Secretary Carter. The Department will migrate the required
    operational AHLTA data to the new Defense Healthcare Management Systems
    Modernization (DHMSM) Electronic Health Records (EHR) system. This
    information will be accessible via interfaces based on industry/
    national-standards. The vendor must provide a Data Management Plan
    (CDRL A0027), in accordance with the DHMSM Engineering Master Plan,
    DHMSM Interface Strategy, and the Program Executive Office DHMS Data
    Strategy. This plan must align data management activities to enable
    Government compliance with the Department of Defense Instruction
    ``Sharing Data, Information, and Information Technology (IT) Services
    in the Department of Defense'' (DODI 8320.02), which conveys the data
    management activities that must take place to enable net-centric
    concepts. Additionally, this plan must support coordination between the
    DHMSM program, DHA, and the Defense Medical Information Exchange (DMIX)
    and Theater Medical Information Program-Joint (TMIP-J) programs
    regarding data management strategies, activities for access to clinical
    and patient health information, and data migration to support
    transition.
        In support of Initial Operational Capability Deployment, the DHMSM
    program has evaluation criteria (Section L) to support data migration.
    The vendor's proposal must include:
        (1) Approach and schedule to achieve product integration and
    installation of the proposed solution in Government test facilities.
        (2) Approach for legacy data migration.
        The remainder of the legacy AHLTA data will align with an
    enterprise data management strategy to shift most Medical Health System
    systems from receiving data directly from the DHMSM EHR system to
    receiving data from an enterprise data warehouse accessible via
    Industry/national-standards based interfaces.
        During the transition to the new DHMSM EHR system, DOD clinicians
    will be able to retrieve records through the tools created by the DMIX
    program from the AHLTA Clinical Data Repository and other legacy data
    stores through a web-based viewer called the Joint Legacy Viewer.
                           mental health of veterans
        57. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Carter and General Dempsey, last
    month, GAO published a report on the need for better tracking and
    oversight for service member separations for non-disability mental
    conditions. Three of the four military services: Army, Navy, and Marine
    Corps, are unable to track whether a separating service member has a
    mental condition. DOD and other stakeholders, must be able to assess
    separation frequency and trends in order to identify potential
    inappropriate separations. Will you implement the recommendations from
    GAO and conduct appropriate oversight into this matter to ensure that
    DOD has sound policies and processes to track whether a separating
    service member has a mental condition and ensure that service members
    are administratively separated for non-disability mental conditions?
        Secretary Carter. Yes, I agree with the Government Accountability
    Office (GAO) that there is a need to develop a method to uniformly
    track non-disability information. This is one of the reasons the
    Department is conducting a review of separation program designator
    codes beginning June 2015 and the information portrayed on the various
    copies of the DD Form 214, ``Certificate of Release or Discharge From
    Active Duty'' with a goal to bring greater clarity and standardization
    across the Department.
        General Dempsey. Yes, we agree with GAO that there is a need to
    develop a method to uniformly track non-disability information. This is
    one of the reasons we are planning to conduct a comprehensive review of
    separation program designator codes and the information portrayed on
    the various copies of the DD Form 214, ``Certificate of Release or
    Discharge From Active Duty,'' with a goal to bring greater clarity and
    standardization across the Department.

        58. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Carter, DOD and VA are not
    adequately coordinating continuity of access to mental health care for
    service members transitioning off of active duty. In many cases, DOD
    doctors have much more freedom to prescribe treatments for mental
    health conditions than VA doctors because of DOD's more expansive
    formulary. VA clinicians can get exceptions to provide specific
    treatments to veterans on an individual basis, but approving the
    exception takes time. Too frequently, after leaving active duty with a
    supply of effective prescription medication, veterans wait until their
    medication is about to run out before making an appointment with a VA
    clinician. If an exception to the formulary requirements is not already
    in the works, that veteran will leave VA frustrated and without access
    to a prescription medication/treatment that has proven successful while
    that veteran was on active duty. I find it unacceptable that a veteran
    loses access to a treatment that is working because of a lack of
    coordination between DOD and VA. When prescribing drugs/therapy not
    included in VA's formulary, do DOD clinicians notify service members of
    the time requirement associated with getting a waiver in the VA system?
        Secretary Carter. The Department of Defense is expanding the
    inTransition program to ensure that all Service members leaving
    military service or transferring duty stations while receiving care for
    mental health conditions are automatically enrolled in the program. The
    inTransition program provides coordination between the Department of
    Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) (for those who plan
    to access VA services) through personal assistance with arranging their
    transition to new care providers in the Department, VA or the
    community.
        Mental health providers caring for a Service member while on active
    status will dispense medication sufficient to cover the Service
    member's needs until the VA intake. This change in Department policy is
    accompanied by a 3-tiered education plan within the Department:
    providers will educate their patients, anticipatory guidance sheets
    will reflect the change (which takes tracking of impending discharges
    out of the equation), and our website will detail the change in VA
    policy. Regarding prescribing differences between the Department and VA
    providers, a waiver is no longer necessary and drugs prescribed while
    on active status will now be continued at the VA, if not already
    available from the VA formulary. In January, the VA policy was changed
    and the Department published an announcement that Service members who
    are currently prescribed medications for mental health conditions, who
    will be transitioning their care to the VA medical system, will be able
    to continue taking psychiatric medications that were previously
    unavailable owing to differences in the Department of Defense and VA
    medication formularies. This change is effective for Service members
    who are processing their separations on or after February 2015.
                   transitional assistance management program
        59. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Carter, the Transitional
    Assistance Management Program (TAMP) provides 180 days of premium-free
    transitional health care benefits after regular TRICARE benefits end.
    The benefits provided by TAMP are available to service members
    involuntarily separated from active duty under honorable conditions,
    but not to service members administratively separated under other-than-
    honorable conditions. I am concerned that a growing number of service
    members who are separated under other-than-honorable conditions also
    suffer from service-related medical or mental health concerns. Will you
    commit to work with me to provide transitional health care benefits to
    all deserving service members?
        Secretary Carter. The Department believes that separating Service
    members are sufficiently supported by current programs under existing
    law without any further expansion of Transitional Assistance Management
    Program (TAMP) eligibility. The Department of Defense has a robust
    Integrated Disability Evaluation System to evaluate Service members for
    any medical and mental health conditions that could potentially render
    them unfit for service. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has a
    very mature program to evaluate any medical and mental health
    conditions that do not manifest prior to separation that are service
    connected. VA eligibility for health care services for service
    connected disabilities is not precluded by a discharge from service
    characterized as under other-than-honorable conditions.

        60. Senator Blumenthal. Do you support extending TAMP to all
    service members involuntarily separated through administrative
    procedures?
        Secretary Carter. The Department believes that separating Service
    members are sufficiently supported by current programs under existing
    law without any further expansion of Transitional Assistance Management
    Program eligibility. VA eligibility for health care services for
    service connected disabilities is not precluded by a discharge from
    service characterized as under other-than-honorable conditions.

        61. Senator Blumenthal. Please identify whether you have the
    authority to implement such a change without new legislation?
        Secretary Carter. The Department does not have authority to
    implement such a change without new legislation. 10 U.S.C. 1141,
    paragraphs (1) through (4) specify `` . . . involuntarily discharged
    under other than adverse conditions . . . .'' as the eligibility
    requirement for Transitional Assistance Management Program.
                     record of service identification cards
        62. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Carter, I am deeply concerned by
    the growing threat of identity theft targeting military personnel and
    veterans when they share their personal information with third parties
    to provide proof of military service to obtain access to exclusive
    military discounts or other benefits. Currently, active duty, reserve,
    National Guard, or retired members possess a government-issued common
    access card (CAC) that satisfies merchants' requirements for on-site
    proof of service. Non-retired veterans have no such card. They are left
    to pursue a variety of unsecure methods to obtain promised discounts,
    including emailing or sending through the mail copies of DD-214 forms,
    photocopying identification cards, completing varied and complex
    application processes, or paying significant membership fees to for-
    profit entities--all in order to simply document their service to our
    country. Requiring our nation's heroes to provide this valuable private
    personal and financial information puts them at severe risk of identity
    theft, and other kinds of fraud and abuse. Secretary Carter and General
    Dempsey, would you agree that protecting these citizens who voluntarily
    served their country--yet are increasingly targeted for identity
    theft--should be a priority?
        Secretary Carter. Protecting the personal information of all
    military personnel and veterans is a priority. To help alleviate some
    of the unsecure methods veterans use to obtain private discounts, since
    January 2014, honorably separated members of the uniformed services
    have been able to obtain an identification (ID) card, similar to a
    proof of insurance card, through the joint Department of Defense/
    Department of Veterans Affairs eBenefits web portal. To date, over
    700,000 of these cards have been generated by eBenefits users. These ID
    cards provide veterans the ability to provide basic proof of service,
    while alleviating many of the risks you have mentioned.
        An alternative option for these veterans is also to utilize State-
    issued ID cards that designate veteran status. Veterans in 44 States
    and the District of Columbia may apply for a driver's license or State-
    issued ID card that designates veteran status. The remaining states
    either have statutes that provide for such State-issued cards but the
    statutes have not yet gone into effect, or have legislation providing
    for such cards pending in the legislatures.
        Lastly, retired veterans are issued an ID card, DD Form 2 that does
    not contain private personal and financial information.
        General Dempsey. Protecting the personal information of all
    military personnel and veterans is a priority. Since January 2014,
    honorably separated members of the uniformed services have been able to
    obtain an identification (ID) card, similar to a proof of insurance
    card, through the joint Department of Defense/Department of Veterans
    Affairs eBenefits web portal. To date, over 700,000 of these cards have
    been generated by eBenefits users. These ID cards provide veterans the
    ability to provide basic proof of service, while alleviating many of
    the risks you have mentioned, and has helped alleviate some of the
    unsecure methods veterans use to obtain private discounts.
        An alternative option for these veterans is also to utilize State-
    issued ID cards that designate veteran status. Veterans in 44 States
    and the District of Columbia may apply for a driver's license or State-
    issued ID card that designates veteran status. The remaining states
    either have statues that provide for such State-issued cards but the
    statues have into yet gone into effect, or have legislation providing
    for such cards pending in the legislatures.
        Lastly, retired veterans are issued an ID card, DD Form 2 that does
    not contain private personal and financial information.

        63. Senator Blumenthal. Will you agree to work with me to establish
    recognition of service cards to protect personal information while
    providing immediate and on-site verification to merchants nationwide,
    thus ensuring that more than 17 million non-retired veterans receive
    service-based discounts and other benefits?
        Secretary Carter. I understand the need for recognition of service
    identification (ID) cards for non-retired veterans. In order to address
    this need, since January 2014, honorably separated members of the
    uniformed services have been able to obtain an ID card, similar to a
    proof of insurance card, through the joint Department of Defense/
    Department of Veterans Affairs eBenefits web portal. To date, over
    700,000 of these cards have been generated by eBenefits users. These ID
    cards provide veterans the ability to provide basic proof of service,
    while alleviating many of the risks you have mentioned.
        An alternative option for these veterans is also to utilize State-
    issued ID cards that designate veteran status. Veterans in 44 States
    and the District of Columbia may apply for a driver's license or State-
    issued ID card that designates veteran status. The remaining states
    either have statutes that provide for such State-issued cards but the
    statutes have not yet gone into effect, or have legislation providing
    for such cards pending in the legislatures.
                             high altitude isr plan
        64. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Carter, I understand the Air
    Force is developing a High Altitude ISR plan that will transition the
    State Department and Long Range EO/IR/MSI missions from the U-2 to the
    Global Hawk and enable U-2 retirement by fiscal year 2019. Funding to
    begin this transition of mission, as required by previous NDAA
    language, was appropriated in fiscal year 2015 but is held up until the
    Department provides a High Altitude ISR plan. When will DOD submit the
    new plan to facilitate actions enabling the mission transitions from
    the U-2 to the Global Hawk by fiscal year 2019?
        Secretary Carter. The Air Force is developing the High Altitude
    Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance Plan, including the
    transition of missions from the U-2 to the Global Hawk. This transition
    plan is being coordinated with the key stakeholders within the
    Department of Defense. Staffing of the transition plan is expected to
    be complete by the end of fiscal year (FY) 2015, upon which the
    Department will provide the plan to Congress. In the President's Budget
    submission for fiscal year 2016, the transition of these missions from
    U-2 to Global Hawk is programmed to align with the retirement of U-2 in
    fiscal year 2019.
                                   __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand
              special victims' counsel/retaliation/sexual assault
        65. Senator Gillibrand. In both 2012 and 2014, 62 percent of
    victims who reported unwanted sexual contact indicated they had been
    retaliated against, socially and professionally. I am very concerned
    that nearly two-thirds of survivors perceive retaliation. To me that
    says that, whether it is professional or social retaliation, there is a
    problem with the command climate and that needs to be addressed. How do
    you plan to address this issue?
        Secretary Carter. The Department has an obligation to ensure that
    victims of sexual assault can report the crime without concern of
    retaliation, from their peers or anyone else. It is unacceptable that
    any military member who files a report perceives any kind of
    retaliation, to include social retaliation from co-workers or peers.
        A) Commanders set the tone in their units and they should be at the
    core of any effort to address retaliation. Recent Department survey
    data shows that most Service members highly rate their unit leadership
    efforts to advance sexual assault prevention and response. However,
    everyone in the chain of command must be just as supportive. To achieve
    this, several Secretary of Defense initiatives informed by these
    results were implemented directing the Chiefs of the Military Services
    and the National Guard Bureau to: (1) augment the training of junior
    officers, junior enlisted supervisors, and civilian employees that
    supervise military members on awareness and prevention of retaliation
    associated with reporting; (2) develop new procedures to engage command
    to prevent retaliation; and (3) conduct a comprehensive review of the
    means available to address both social and professional retaliation, to
    include appropriate conduct on social media.
        B) Since 2012, the Department has allowed members making an
    unrestricted report of sexual assault to request an expedited transfer
    from their assigned units. Members have broad latitude in deciding
    whether requesting this transfer would be right for their
    circumstances, whether they perceive retaliation or ostracism or simply
    want closer proximity to a certain support network. 216 members moved
    pursuant to expedited transfer rules in fiscal year 2012, in fiscal
    year 2013, there were 565 expedited transfers and there were
    approximately 549 in fiscal year 2014, the final figure for which will
    be reflected in the Department's Annual Report to Congress in April.
        General Dempsey. We have an obligation to ensure that victims of
    sexual assault can report the crime without concern of retaliation,
    from their peers or anyone else. It is unacceptable that any military
    member who files a report perceives any kind of retaliation, to include
    social retaliation from co-workers or peers.
        As commanders set the tone in their units, they should be at the
    core of any effort to address retaliation. Recent DOD survey data shows
    that most Service members highly rate their unit leadership efforts to
    advance sexual assault prevention and response. However, everyone in
    the chain of command must be just as supportive. To achieve this, the
    Department implemented several initiatives informed by these results
    directing the Department to: (1) augment the training of junior
    officers, junior enlisted supervisors, and civilian employees that
    supervise military members on awareness and prevention of retaliation
    associated with reporting (2) develop new procedures to engage command
    to prevent retaliation and; (3) conduct a comprehensive review of the
    means available to address both social and professional retaliation, to
    include appropriate conduct on social media.
        Additionally, since 2012 the Department has allowed members making
    an unrestricted report of sexual assault to request an expedited
    transfer from their assigned units. Members have broad latitude in
    deciding why this transfer would be right for their circumstances,
    whether they perceive retaliation or ostracism or simply want closer
    proximity to a certain support network.

        66. Senator Gillibrand. Do you have sufficient resources and
    authorities to address the problem?
        Secretary Carter. Yes. The President's Budget request has provided
    sufficient resources to continue the development and enhancement of the
    Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program to enable the Department
    better to address issues of retaliation proactively. That said, if
    sequestration takes effect, it will be difficult to maintain the
    momentum on all fronts. I have the authorities I need to address all of
    the sexual assault related issues.
        General Dempsey. The President's Budget request has provided
    sufficient resources to proactively continue the development and
    enhancement of the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program.

        67. Senator Gillibrand. The Special Victims' Counsel Program--which
    details a judge advocate to assist and represent sexual assault victims
    and help them navigate the military justice system--is an important
    step to increasing everyone's confidence in the system. Despite the
    downsizing that is taking place across the Services, I understand that
    the Air Force was able to increase its number of Air Force judge
    advocate slots by 58, the majority of which will be devoted to the
    Special Victims' Counsel Program. It is my understanding that the other
    Services have not seen that authorized slots increased. Do you have
    sufficient resources to dedicate to the Special Victims' Counsel
    Program?
        Secretary Carter. Yes. The Services have all relayed that they have
    sufficient resources to dedicate to the Special Victims' Counsel
    Program. The Services are constantly reassessing the demand for SVC
    services to ensure that victims of sexual assault are afforded this
    service.
        The Air Force recently authorized 58 officer billets and 15
    enlisted paralegal billets to increase the personnel strength of key
    trial practitioners in the military justice system. This action
    addresses rising caseloads in the provision of legal services to
    victims of sexual assault and the expansion of the Special Victims'
    Counsel program (SVC) as required by law (FY 2014 NDAA, Sec. 1716).
    These new authorizations will allow the SVC program to grow. With the
    addition of these manpower authorizations, the Air Force has dedicated
    the necessary resources to provide legal services to victims of sexual
    assault under the current construct of the program.
        The Army currently has 75 Special Victims' Counsel assigned in
    legal assistance offices at locations worldwide. When the program was
    implemented in 2013, the Army used its active duty attorneys to serve
    as SVCs and backfilled some positions with reserve component judge
    advocates, as necessary, to ensure continued support. Based on current
    workload, the Army believes that the end strength of 75 SVC in the
    Active Army will allow victims of sexual assault who request SVC
    services to have an SVC assigned at or near the victim's location.
        The Navy refers to its special victims counsel program as the
    Victim Legal Counsel Organization. The Navy has sufficient resources
    dedicated to the program at this time with 29 counsel supporting the
    program.
        The Marine Corps currently has sufficient resources to dedicate to
    the Special Victims' Counsel Program. The Marine Corps refers to the
    SVC program as the Victims' Legal Counsel Organization (VLCO), and to
    the judge advocates that provide these services as Victims' Legal
    Counsel (VLC). The VLCO presently has sixteen (16) VLC supporting
    victims. The VLC are assisted by 9 paralegals.
        General Dempsey. Yes. The Services have all relayed that they have
    sufficient resources to dedicate to the Special Victims' Counsel (SVC)
    Program.
        The Air Force recently authorized 58 officer billets and 15
    enlisted paralegal billets to increase the personnel strength of key
    trial practitioners in the military justice system. With the addition
    of these manpower authorizations, the Air Force has dedicated the
    necessary resources to provide legal services to victims of sexual
    assault under the current construct of the program.
        The Army currently has 75 SVC assigned in legal assistance offices
    at locations worldwide. Based on current workload, the Army believes
    that end strength of 75 SVC in the Active Army will allow victims of
    sexual assault who request SVC services to have an SVC assigned at or
    near the victim's location.
        The Navy refers to its SVC program as the Victim Legal Counsel
    Organization. The Navy has sufficient resources dedicated to the
    program at this time with 29 counsels supporting the program.
        The Marine Corps currently has sufficient resources to dedicate to
    the SVC Program. The Marine Corps also refers to the SVC program as the
    Victims' Legal Counsel Organization (VLCO), and refers to the judge
    advocates that provide these services as Victims' Legal Counsel (VLC).
    The VLCO presently has sixteen 16 VLCs supporting victims which are
    assisted by 9 paralegals.
        The Services are constantly reassessing the demand for SVC services
    to ensure that victims of sexual assault are afforded this service.

        68. Senator Gillibrand. The Special Victims' Counsel have testified
    at the Judicial Proceedings Panel on Sexual Assault, and told ME, that
    the program needs to be improved. Common criticisms are the current
    appellate process is nonresponsive and insufficient to protect victims'
    rights; victim access to information--including discovery, pleadings
    and motions--remains inconsistent; and that there is widespread
    confusion about procedures for representing victims in judicial
    proceedings and for enforcing other victim rights. Do you think you
    have sufficient authority to review and implement reforms that may be
    needed?
        Secretary Carter. Yes. I believe the Department has sufficient
    authorities to implement reforms. In the event that there are
    appropriate reforms that could be carried out only with the enactment
    of legislation, I will pursue such legislation
        The Department is working hard to make necessary improvements to
    the Special Victims' Counsel (SVC) program and implementing those
    changes through policy initiatives. As an example, the Department has
    directed implementation of numerous recommendations from the Response
    Systems to Adult Sexual Assault Crimes and Related Offenses Panel
    (RSP), including ensuring compliance by trial counsel with victim
    rights set forth in Article 6b of the Uniformed Code of Military
    Justice (UCMJ) and Department policy. The Department has also directed
    an assessment of the effectiveness of the processes used to receive and
    investigate complaints relating to violations or failures by military
    and civilian employees of all the Services to provide the rights
    guaranteed by Article 6b, UCMJ, and to determine whether a more uniform
    process is needed. With respect to the appellate process, the
    Department referred an RSP recommendation regarding SVC representation
    throughout the military justice process (including appellate review) to
    the Military Justice Review Group (MJRG) for consideration. The MJRG
    was tasked to conduct a comprehensive review of the military justice
    system and make recommendations for changes to the Uniform Code of
    Military Justice and the Manual for Courts-Martial. This review will
    inform the Department on military justice improvements, including SVC
    programs.
        General Dempsey. Yes. We believe the Department has sufficient
    authorities to implement reforms. The Department continues to make
    necessary improvements to the Special Victims' Counsel (SVC) Program
    and implementing those changes through policy initiatives. The
    Department has directed implementation of numerous recommendations from
    the Response Systems to Adult Sexual Assault Crimes and Related
    Offenses Panel (RSP) to include ensuring compliance by trial counsel
    with victim rights set forth in Article 6b of the UCMJ and DOD policy.
    It also directed an assessment of the effectiveness of the processes
    used to receive and investigate complaints relating to violations or
    failures by military and civilian employees of all the Services to
    provide the rights guaranteed by Article 6b, UCMJ, and to determine
    whether a more uniform process is needed.
        With respect to the appellate process, the Department referred an
    RSP recommendation regarding SVC representation throughout the military
    justice process (to include appellate review) to the Military Justice
    Review Group (MJRG) for consideration. The MJRG was tasked to conduct a
    comprehensive review of the military justice system and make
    recommendations for change to the Uniform Code of Military Justice and
    the Manual for Courts-Martial. We expect this review to inform the
    Department on military justice improvements, to include SVC.
                               combat integration
        69. Senator Gillibrand. January 2016 is the deadline for the
    implementation of combat integration in the military. Not only is this
    a readiness issue, since you want to have the best qualified people in
    position, regardless of gender, it is also a way to give women a fair
    shot to reach positions of leadership in the military. Secretary
    Carter, it will be up to you to make the final determination of whether
    to allow exceptions. What criteria do you intend to use to make this
    determination?
        Secretary Carter. In accordance with the 2013 Direct Ground Combat
    Definition and Assignment Rule rescission memo, all requests for
    exceptions to policy must be narrowly tailored and based on a rigorous
    analysis of factual data regarding the skills and abilities needed for
    the position. If I receive requests for exception to policy, I will
    carefully consider them in this light.

        70. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Carter, will you be looking
    across the services to see if one asks for an exception in a position
    whose equivalent another service does not request an exception for?
        Secretary Carter. Yes, this is a Department-wide effort and all
    final recommendations will be discussed collaboratively. Any requests
    for exception to policy must be personally approved, first by the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and then by me.

        71. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Carter, what kind of oversight
    are you currently doing to ensure that the services are developing
    gender neutral standards?
        Secretary Carter. In recognition of the lessons learned from
    ongoing overseas contingency operations, and in order to fully
    implement rescission of the Direct Ground Combat Definition and
    Assignment Rule, the Department directed the Services to review and
    validate all occupational standards to ensure they are current,
    operationally-relevant, and gender neutral by September 2015. Since the
    rescission of the rule, the Services have provided recurring progress
    updates on their efforts. Representatives from the Office of the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness have also spent
    considerable time visiting each Service and reviewing all Services'
    work in this area, as well as facilitating cross-service working groups
    to ensure all are informed of complementary efforts.
        Beyond this, the Department recently issued implementing guidance
    to the Military Department Secretaries requiring them to certify that
    their validated standards accurately predict the performance of actual,
    regular, and recurring duties of a military occupation as set forth in
    the fiscal year 2015 National Defense Authorization Act. To
    institutionalize these changes and to ensure continued compliance, the
    Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness further directed
    that Service Inspectors General establish procedures for conducting
    gender-neutral standards compliance inspections at least every three
    years, starting no later than fiscal year 2016.

        72. Senator Gillibrand. What else are the services doing to help
    with recruitment and retention of women?
        Secretary Carter. In addition to efforts associated with rescission
    of the Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule, over the
    last few years, the Services have considered and implemented additional
    initiatives to help improve the recruitment and retention of women in
    the military. Marketing and advertising campaigns across web, media and
    social platforms have been updated to integrate gender-diverse imagery.
    Gender-diverse imagery that resonates with women may increase the
    number of women seeking to enter military service. News articles about
    female service members with successful careers or unique service
    stories have been publicized. Senior military leaders have engaged in
    concerted efforts to build advocacy among women in positions of
    influence throughout our recruiting communities. Some Services have
    increased their target for the number of female recruits and
    established metrics that are frequently reported to heighten awareness
    and increase emphasis in this area. Additionally, some Services have
    increased the number of female recruiters. The Services are also
    reviewing enlistment bonuses in difficult to recruit occupations where
    females are under-represented, reviewing long-standing policies.
    Although not specifically related to the retention of women, all of the
    Services have begun to use the Career Intermission Pilot Program
    authority. This program allows an active duty Service member to
    temporarily transition to the Individual Ready Reserve while pursuing
    personal or professional growth outside the Service and then allows for
    a seamless return to active duty. While this is still a pilot program,
    there is some evidence that Service members, male and female, welcome
    the opportunity to take time away to focus on family and other personal
    needs without adversely impacting their career opportunities or their
    ability to continue to serve their country.
        General Dempsey. The Services have considered and implemented
    additional initiatives to help improve the recruitment and retention of
    women in the military. In an effort to increase female propensity for
    military service, marketing and advertising campaigns have been updated
    integrating gender-diverse imagery that resonates with women across
    web, media and social platforms, including news articles which
    highlight female service members who have successful careers or unique
    service stories. Our senior military leaders continue to build advocacy
    among women in positions of influence throughout our recruiting
    communities. Some Services have increased their target for the number
    of female recruits and established metrics that are frequently reported
    to heighten awareness and increase emphasis in that area. Additionally,
    some Services have increased the number of female recruiters. The
    Services are also reviewing long standing enlistment bonus policies in
    difficult to recruit occupations where females are under-represented,
    and where appropriate, they are revising them to be more favorable to
    potential female recruits.
                                 cyber-security
        73. Senator Gillibrand. Cybersecurity continues to grow in its
    importance as we face threats from state and non-state actors. I have
    long pushed for the importance of using the reserve component to
    address cyber both because of the recruitment and retention
    opportunities that the Guard and Reserve present and because of the
    surge capacity they can offer to both our federal and state
    governments. What do you see as the role of the reserve component in
    cyber?
        Secretary Carter. Over the past 18 months USCYBERCOM and the
    Services conducted an initial analysis of the Reserve Component's (RC)
    role in the Cyber Mission Force (CMF). The analysis is ongoing and
    additional assessments will occur in fiscal year 2016 and beyond. The
    objective is to develop an integrated military and civilian total force
    to achieve USCYBERCOM's three missions (defending the Department of
    Defense Information Network; providing support to combatant commanders
    for execution of their missions around the world; and, strengthening
    our nation's ability to withstand and respond to cyber-attacks), and
    support the Department's Federal partners, in conjunction with the
    National Guard Bureau and State cyber mission needs.
        The Department assesses there can be advantages to using RC
    resources for CMF missions, such as providing load sharing with active
    duty forces, providing available surge capacity if authorized to
    activate, and maintain Department-trained forces to defend national
    critical infrastructure, if authorized. Several factors should be
    considered when determining the CMF force structure and the mix within
    the total force. These factors include whether the position is military
    essential, peacetime and wartime demands, deployment frequency and
    duration, speed of response, unit readiness for specific missions, and
    costs.
        General Dempsey. Cybersecurity is a team effort and by including
    the Reserve Component (RC) in the Cyber Mission Force build, the
    Department creates opportunities for defense in depth and flexibility.
    Furthermore, the RC has the ability to allow Cyber trained military
    personnel to continue to serve as they transition to the civilian
    sector. As part of the whole of government efforts, RC personnel are a
    critical asset available to augment our response to a Cyber incident
    against our country's critical infrastructure in support of Federal,
    State and Local governments.

        74. Senator Gillibrand. The Army and Air Force have taken different
    approaches to integrating the reserve component into their cyber
    forces. How do you see the services moving forward on this?
        Secretary Carter. The Department recognizes the need to incorporate
    the strengths, skills, and authorities afforded to the Reserve
    Components (RC) into the overall cyber force structure. When the Cyber
    Mission Force (CMF) construct was approved, the Department initially
    determined its military personnel would be Active Duty. The analysis
    conducted for the section 933 report from the Fiscal Year 2014 National
    Defense Authorization Act concluded there are advantages to using RC
    resources for CMF missions, such as providing load sharing with active
    duty forces, providing available surge capacity, and maintaining
    Department-trained forces to defend national critical infrastructure if
    authorized.
        The Services' developed individual plans that incorporate the RC
    into the total cyber force structure. The Army's proposed plan will
    create an additional 21 RC Cyber Protection Teams (CPTs), above and
    beyond their CMF requirement. The Air Force's proposed plan will
    leverage 15 RC Squadrons to fill two of their CMF-required CPTs and the
    cyberspace operations component of one CMF-required National Mission
    Team. Meanwhile, the Navy and Marine Corps will continue to contribute
    Individual Mobilization Augmentees to fill specific holes on their CMF-
    required teams.
        Although the Services are employing their RC teams somewhat
    differently at present, all RC Forces will be trained and equipped to
    the same Joint standard, providing a sustainable approach to
    incorporating the RC into the CMF. This is consistent with the section
    933 report. The Services' proposed plans, in total, would integrate
    nearly 2,000 RC personnel into the cyber force structure, adequately
    addressing the opportunity for surge support and additional Service CPT
    support in the near-term.
        General Dempsey. The Air Force is integrating the Reserve Component
    (RC) into their requirement for the USCYBERCOM Cyber Mission Force. The
    Army has chosen to build RC capacity to support the ARCYBER missions. I
    believe both approaches are viable, and we will evaluate the pros and
    cons of each as we gain experience in this area. Providing trained,
    equipped and mission ready cyber warriors utilizes the strengths of the
    RC in recruiting and retention, as well as their civilian acquired
    skills and relationships. We as a department will continue to evaluate
    the opportunities for integration of the RC in the future.

        75. Senator Gillibrand. We just received a report from the services
    articulating their plans to either create separate specialties or
    designators for cyber. How do you envision the development not only of
    separate specialties for cyber but also career tracks?
        Secretary Carter. Success in cyberspace will rely on our people--
    just as it does in other domains. In order to outpace the threat, we
    need to ensure the Services present their best and brightest to the
    Cyber Mission Force. While serving as Deputy Secretary of Defense I
    directed the Services to develop plans to recruit and retain the most
    highly skilled personnel, while ensuring they remained competitive, in
    both rank and position, with personnel in other career specialties. As
    a result, the Services recognized that separate management constructs
    may be required for their military cyberspace workforce. Each Service
    has made progress on developing special designators for their cyber
    personnel, as well as creating special career tracks for the most
    highly skilled cyber operators. Though each Service's approach is
    different, they all address the need to provide incentives such as
    unique training opportunities, retention bonuses, and opportunities to
    work on challenging and highly rewarding missions. The Services are now
    working toward expanding their plans to include their civilian
    cyberspace workforce as well.
        The Services have a long history of excellence in recruitment, and
    I am confident they will continue to attract the best and brightest
    enlisted, officer, and civilian personnel to this growing career field.
    As referenced in the report, the Department will continue to monitor
    Services' progress at recruiting, training, retaining, and managing top
    cyber talent, and will assist the Services in implementing new
    personnel functional communities, series, and incentives as required. I
    am committed to ensuring the workforce for the cyberspace domain is as
    world class as the personnel in other warfighting domains, and
    specifically, to ensuring the Cyber Mission Force is fully manned,
    trained, equipped, and ready to fulfill USCYBERCOM's missions by the
    end of fiscal year 2018.
        General Dempsey. The Department has embraced the importance of
    Cyber, and the Services are leaning forward in human capital management
    for Cyber. Efforts are currently underway to carefully and properly
    create Cyber constructs that can then be used as the primer for
    developing the human resources life-cycle that ranges from recruiting
    to retirement. However, it is too early to speculate how the
    development of separate specialties and career tracks will unfold. We
    are committed to working with the Secretary and Service Chiefs to
    ensure the workforce for the cyberspace domain is able to meet today's
    national security challenges and we understand the importance for
    getting this right.

        76. Senator Gillibrand. How do we integrate cyber into the training
    of all of our service members so that we can better integrate it into
    all forms of combat?
        Secretary Carter. Cyber is a top area of focus for me. In fact, I
    selected Fort Meade, home of U.S. Cyber Command, as my first domestic
    troop talk as the Secretary of Defense. I did this because I wanted to
    hear directly from the troops on the cyber front lines.
        Integration of cyber into all echelons of training is underway. At
    an enterprise level, all Service members must complete annual Cyber
    Security Awareness training. This training covers basic education and
    competency of Information Assurance practices. Individual awareness and
    sensitivity are critical as they are the first line of cyber defense.
        Additionally, cyber training is prominent at CYBER FLAG, CYBER
    GUARD, and CYBER SHIELD exercises. These U.S. Cyber Command led
    exercises focus on cyber scenarios with participation by both the
    Combatant Commands and Services. The other Combatant Commands
    incorporate cyber scenarios into their annual exercises, such as United
    States Pacific Command's TERMINAL FURY, United States Strategic
    Command's GLOBAL LIGHTNING, United States Transportation Command's
    TURBO CHALLENGE, United States European Command's AUSTERE CHALLENGE,
    and United States Africa Command's JUDICIOUS RESPONSE.
        The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
    Readiness is drafting policy governing the acceleration of integrated
    cyber training, and the Combatant Commanders Exercise Engagement and
    Training Transformation program is placing a resourcing priority on
    Combatant Commands conducting exercises in degraded cyber environments.
    As a result, I expect the frequency of cyber exercises to increase
    during my service as Secretary of Defense.
        The Department's success in future combat operations depends on our
    ability to dominate in the cyber domain. As the Secretary of Defense, I
    have made integrating cyber training into the Department's training
    fabric priority number one.
        General Dempsey. The Department of Defense (DOD) uses a multi-
    tiered approach for cyberspace training that addresses individual
    training requirements for all service members, specialized training
    requirements for cyberspace operations professionals, and collective
    training requirements for units and higher level staffs.
        Individual training ranges from basic awareness on a variety of
    cyberspace topics (i.e., classes on defensive cyberspace operations,
    establishing cyberspace situational awareness, and knowledge
    management) to advanced coursework that obtains industry level
    certifications. All service members must complete annual information
    assurance training to use DOD computer systems. Web-enabled joint and
    service portals such as Joint Knowledge Online (JKO), Navy Knowledge
    Online (NKO), and the U.S. Army Information Assurance Virtual Training
    Portal, provide all service members access to an array of cyberspace
    training products and courses to meet Service specific training
    requirements.
        Cyberspace operations professionals, such as Joint Cyberspace
    Center personnel assigned to the combatant commands and the Cyber
    Mission Forces, are required to obtain and maintain additional
    qualifications. The Joint Staff, United States Strategic Command
    (USSTRATCOM), United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), and the
    Services are maturing this operational level capability through a
    rigorous training program that includes web-enabled training (DOD and/
    or industry run schools), and practical application. These
    professionals frequently leverage the Joint Information Operations
    Range (JIOR), a persistent closed-loop cyberspace training environment,
    to refine their skills.
        The Chairman's Annual Joint Training Guidance emphasizes cyberspace
    related training which has been incorporated into joint training plans
    and programs. Many exercises incorporate cyberspace operations against
    active opposing forces. These exercises include substantial Service
    participation and incorporate a diverse training audience in a joint
    environment.

        77. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Carter, last week, DOD acting
    Chief Information Officer Terry Halvorsen testified that DOD might need
    additional authorities to partner with the private sector on data
    storage and security. What does DOD envision in terms of data sharing?
        Secretary Carter. The Department is researching the ability of
    public-private partnerships to drive additional innovation and
    efficiency into the Department's information technology environment. In
    such an environment, the Department and our private partners would need
    to seamlessly share cybersecurity threat data in order to effectively
    detect, mitigate, and respond to emerging cyber threats. This ability
    would be critical to maintaining the Department's cyber defenses and
    ensuring dependable mission execution in the face of capable
    adversaries.

        78. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Carter, can you tell me what kind
    of authorities you might need?
        Secretary Carter. At this time, I cannot specifically identify the
    kinds of additional authorities that may be needed. The Department is
    researching the ability of public-private partnerships to drive
    additional innovation and efficiency into the Department's information
    technology (IT) environment. Additional authorities may be required to
    enable the Department to more effectively leverage public-private
    partnerships to support the modernization of our IT environment.
                       military compensation and benefits
        79. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Carter, last week we heard from
    representatives of military and veteran service organizations, as well
    as from the Commissioners from the Military Compensation and Retirement
    Modernization Commission, that there are significant problems with
    TRICARE but that there are mixed sentiments from service members,
    retirees and their families about whether they would rather see TRICARE
    reformed or replaced. For the past two years, you have come to us with
    the same recommendations about consolidating TRICARE plans. In
    developing these recommendations, what were your considerations?
        Secretary Carter. For the past two years the Department has
    submitted similar plans to modernize the TRICARE benefit. In doing so,
    the Department considered patient access and choice of care, along with
    a contemporary utilization management framework. Costs for our
    beneficiaries and costs to the Department were also considered.

        80. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Carter, we have heard that
    TRICARE's problems have diminished its quality, access and value, did
    you assess whether the changes you recommend would improve these?
        Secretary Carter. I believe that TRICARE offers our beneficiaries
    tremendous value. The 2016 budget proposal provides beneficiary choice
    by consolidating the current TRICARE plans into one Preferred Provider
    Organization (PPO)-like plan that includes utilization management
    tools. Active duty will continue to receive priority access to care.
    Active duty family members can choose to have their care managed by the
    Military Treatment Facility (a no cost option) or for maximum
    flexibility they can self-manage their care with complete freedom of
    choice with low co-pays depending on the venue of care. Utilization
    management tools guide patients to the appropriate location to receive
    care (e.g., lowest cost is their primary care provider) thereby
    improving continuity which is an important component for quality care.
    Together, these changes provide greater value than the existing health
    benefit package.

        81. Senator Gillibrand. Have you surveyed service members and their
    families about their satisfaction with TRICARE? If so, what did you
    find out?
        Secretary Carter. The Department manages an extensive, longstanding
    and continuous core survey program to monitor the experience of
    Military Health System (MHS) beneficiaries using any aspect of the
    direct or purchased care system. The Defense Health Agency (DHA) relies
    on three core surveys: the Health Care Survey of DOD Beneficiaries
    (HCSDB), the TRICARE Inpatient Satisfaction Survey (TRISS) and the
    TRICARE Outpatient Satisfaction Survey (TROSS). These surveys are based
    on nationally recognized surveys used by most major health plans in the
    U.S.--the Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems
    (CAHPS) family of surveys, sponsored by the Agency for Healthcare
    Research and Quality (AHRQ) and Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
    Services, (CMS).
        DHA surveys in general are designed to provide a standardized means
    of evaluating beneficiary experience of care whether in a military or
    civilian facility, and to benchmark that care to national civilian
    results represented by the CAHPS surveys for health plans, outpatient
    and inpatient care. The Army, Navy, and Air Force also measure various
    aspects of the patient experience, and focus specifically on care
    received in their military facilities in an outpatient (non-
    hospitalized) setting. The Services design their surveys with
    sufficient power to be able to drill down to examine each military
    treatment facility (MTF), as well as individual providers within each
    MTF. The Service surveys differ from each other in methodology,
    sampling, mode, and instrument to reflect Service preference for how
    and what types of information to collect on their MTF users. DHA
    surveys, on the other hand, use a standardized instrument, survey
    methodology, and mode to effectively examine beneficiary experience of
    care across the Services and between the direct and purchased care
    venues. As noted above, The DHA also capitalizes on national
    standardized survey instruments in order to compare to, or benchmark
    against, civilian health plan results (CAHPS surveys). As such, the DHA
    surveys are specifically designed to examine across Services and
    direct-purchased venues of care, but are not powered to examine the
    performance of clinics or providers within MTFs. DHA survey results are
    reported quarterly to support improvement efforts in the direct and
    purchased care venues.
        General findings across the DHA surveys:
        HCSDB survey findings: Adult beneficiary ratings of their ``Health
    Plan'' (based on ratings of an 8-10 on 0-10 scale) increased for all
    users from 1999 to 2014, and remained higher than the civilian CAHPS-
    Plan-based 50th percentile benchmark adjusted for age and health
    status. This increase and higher ratings applied to all beneficiary
    groups: enrolled in MTFs, enrolled with the Civilian plan, and non-
    enrollees (i.e. Standard/Extra). Ratings of ``health care'' also
    increased over this time period, for all users in general, and
    especially for enrollees with civilian PCM and non-enrollees. Direct
    care enrollee ratings for ``health care'' generally lagged beneficiary
    ratings of care in civilian facilities and the national benchmark
    average. Similar patterns were found in beneficiary ratings of access
    to care. Ratings by non-enrolled MHS beneficiaries are similar to or
    even higher than civilian benchmarks.
        TRISS survey findings: MHS beneficiaries rate their inpatient
    medical and surgical care in military treatment facilities and their
    care in civilian facilities equal to or higher than the national 50th
    percentile CAHPS inpatient benchmark survey results; but rate their
    obstetrical experience in military facilities, on average, lower than
    the civilian benchmarks; and, as such, the MHS is actively engaged in
    improving the obstetrical experience and process of care and support.
        TROSS survey findings: Focused on their experience with outpatient
    care. Beneficiary ratings of their access to care and provider
    communications in military facilities, while high, are slightly lower
    than the civilian benchmark top ratings (outpatient CAHPS). Conversely,
    MHS purchased care users report significantly higher scores than the
    civilian benchmark with courteous, respectful and helpful office staff
    members.
        The Service outpatient surveys generally report higher ratings of
    the care experience than the TROSS (outpatient) results, likely due to
    differences in the time frame users are asked to report on, that is,
    Service surveys focus on the specific outpatient visit with a specific
    provider on a specific data, while the DHA surveys, including the
    TROSS, focus on beneficiary experience over the previous twelve months
    similar to the CAHPS surveys. The Service survey results help identify
    positive and negative patterns at the military treatment facility and
    provider level for more immediate corrective action at the local level,
    but cannot be compared across Services or with national benchmarks.
        The Department is currently developing a Tri-Service Joint
    Outpatient Experience Survey (JOES) to be operational in fiscal year
    2015. The survey will consolidate the four separate outpatient surveys
    currently being conducted within the Military Health System (Army,
    Navy, Air Force and DHA). The combined, standardized survey will be
    used to compare and assess providers, clinics/sites and facilities
    using a uniform fielding methodology, sampling design and instrument.
    JOES will assess beneficiaries using outpatient services in a
    standardized way, while reducing survey burden on the beneficiary.
    Survey results will provide actionable feedback at the tactical level
    to improve the beneficiaries' experience, and the overall quality of
    care. Survey results will be monitored by senior leadership, and, a
    component of the survey will allow comparison to civilian health care
    practices across the U.S.
        General Dempsey. Yes. The Department's satisfaction surveys,
    including Individual Service and the TRICARE Outpatient Satisfaction
    Survey (TROSS) demonstrate that the majority of patients reported being
    satisfied with access to care. There is variance between satisfaction
    scores in the direct care and purchased care components.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
                           rd-180 engine replacement
        82. Senator Nelson. Secretary Carter, we rely heavily on the Atlas
    V rocket, and its Russian-made RD-180 engine, for getting our national
    security assets into space. Given the deteriorating situation with Mr.
    Putin, Congress authorized and appropriated $220 million to end our
    reliance on the RD-180. We gave a deadline of four years--2019--from
    now to do it. What are you doing to meet that deadline?
        Secretary Carter. The Department is committed to transitioning from
    its use of Russian rocket propulsion systems in the most efficient and
    affordable manner possible. As an initial step, the Department
    reprogrammed $40 million to initiate engine risk reduction activities.
    This funding, when combined with the $220 million included in the
    fiscal year 2015 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act
    (P.L. 113-235), will fund critical rocket propulsion work as directed
    in Section 1604 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon
    National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2015 (P.L. 113-291).
        The Department currently procures launch services, rather than
    launch vehicle hardware, and is working with industry to determine how
    to procure future, cost effective launch services utilizing
    domestically-produced propulsions systems. It should be noted that
    transitioning from reliance on the Russian RD-180 engine requires more
    than just development of a domestic propulsion system. The propulsion
    system must be integrated into a launch system in order to provide
    access to space. This integration process, while initiated in parallel,
    is likely to require as much as two additional years after completion
    of propulsion system development. Transitioning off the RD-180 onto a
    U.S designed and manufactured rocket propulsion system or a new launch
    system by 2019 represents significant cost, schedule, and technical
    challenges.

        83. Senator Nelson. Mr. Secretary, do you feel that the 2019 goal
    is attainable?
        Secretary Carter. Ending reliance on the Russian RD-180 engine
    requires more than just development of a domestic rocket propulsion
    system. The propulsion system must be integrated into a launch system
    in order to provide access to space. This integration process, while
    initiated in parallel, is likely to require as much as two additional
    years after completion of propulsion system development. Further, the
    system must complete certification before being allowed to service
    National Security Space missions. This combination of required events
    represents significant cost, schedule and technical challenges to
    attaining the 2019 goal. Nonetheless, we remain committed to
    transitioning from our use of the RD-180 engine in the most efficient,
    expeditious, and affordable manner possible that is consistent with the
    direction in Section 1604 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. ``Buck''
    McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2015 (P.L.
    113-291).
                                     cyber
        84. Senator Nelson. Secretary Carter, what do you see as the
    Department's role in cyber security?
        Secretary Carter. The Department of Defense has three missions in
    cyberspace: (1) defend Department of Defense information networks to
    assure Department of Defense missions; (2) provide integrated cyber
    capabilities to support combatant commands' contingency plans and
    military operations; and (3) defend the Nation against cyberattacks of
    significant consequence. For the defend the Nation mission, the
    Department works closely with other government agencies to synchronize
    capabilities and develop options to disrupt cyberattacks of significant
    consequence before they can impact the homeland. More broadly, the
    Department partners with other U.S. Departments and Agencies to
    investigate cyberattacks, develop indications and early warning of
    threats, and protect U.S. critical infrastructure. If required, the
    Department may provide cybersecurity support to other agencies of the
    Federal Government, state and local governments, and the private
    sector.

        85. Senator Nelson. Mr. Secretary, how will you work with other
    departments and agencies to secure our nation's cyber infrastructure?
        Secretary Carter. Cybersecurity requires a whole-of-government
    approach built on the unique authorities, missions, and capabilities of
    all departments and agencies. In general, the Department of Homeland
    Security (DHS) leads the national effort to protect against, prevent,
    mitigate, and recover from cyber incidents, and investigates
    cybercrimes within DHS's jurisdiction. The Department of Justice (DOJ)
    investigates, attributes, disrupts, and prosecutes malicious cyber
    actors and leads domestic intelligence activities. Finally, the
    Department of Defense securely operates and defends the Department's
    information networks and assures the ability of the Department to
    perform its national security mission. The Department's cyber force
    supports military operations in all domains by integrating cyber
    capabilities alongside traditional land, maritime, air and space
    capabilities. The Department also defends the Nation from attack, to
    include countering cyberattacks of significant consequence. In
    addition, both DOJ and the Department support the national effort to
    protect against, prevent, mitigate, and recover from cyber incidents.
                                      isil
        86. Senator Nelson. Mr. Secretary, now that you've had a chance to
    review the situation in the Middle East, what steps do you believe we
    need to take now against ISIL?
        Secretary Carter. The steps that are needed now against the Islamic
    State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) include keeping the military pressure on
    the ISIS network through the advise and assist presence in Iraq, and
    the continued use of airstrikes in both Iraq and Syria. Also, the
    training and equipping of a moderate Syrian opposition force to counter
    ISIS inside Syria will begin soon. While these lines of effort are
    underway, it is imperative that any military gains are complemented and
    enhanced by the contributions of other lines of effort from U.S.
    government partners. Other lines of effort include empowering Iraqi
    Prime Minister Abadi as he seeks to create a more inclusive, multi-
    sectarian government; maintaining pressure on ISIS' finances; and
    augmenting efforts to counter ISIS' narrative and its appeal,
    especially as the group seeks to expand its global network outside of
    Iraq and Syria to other parts of the Middle East, Africa, and beyond.
    Each of these efforts must also enable and empower the robust coalition
    of nations opposed to ISIS.
                                  nato allies
        87. Senator Nelson. In light of Russia's aggressive behavior
    towards Ukraine, what are we doing to reassure our NATO allies about
    our commitment to the region?
        Secretary Carter. The United States is undertaking several
    initiatives to reassure North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
    allies of our commitment to collective security.
        The President's European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) includes
    conducting additional military exercises and training on land, in the
    air, and at sea, while sustaining a rotational presence across Europe
    in support of Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE. ERI increases the
    responsiveness of U.S. forces to reinforce NATO allies' capabilities by
    prepositioning equipment and enhancing reception facilities in Europe,
    and increasing the participation of the U.S. Navy in NATO naval force
    deployments, including more persistent deployments to the Black and
    Baltic Seas. ERI also builds the capacity of close partners such as
    Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine to enhance interoperability with the
    United States and NATO forces and to provide for their own defense.
        In addition to ERI, the United States is fully committed to NATO's
    Readiness Action Plan (RAP). RAP is NATO's response to new security
    challenges along its eastern and southern borders. RAP will allow NATO
    to respond more quickly to security threats along its borders by
    creating a new Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) and
    establishing new headquarters elements in several eastern allied
    nations.
        All of these initiatives are in place to reassure our NATO Allies
    and partners of the United States' commitment to our central and
    eastern European partners, and to the transatlantic relationship.
        General Dempsey. Since early March 2014, the United States has
    taken action, both bilaterally and through NATO, to reassure Allies of
    our solemn commitment to their security and territorial integrity as
    members of the NATO Alliance.
        The European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) provides over $1 billion
    in new monies that will enable the United States to further support the
    defense and security of NATO Allies and bolster the security and
    capacity of U.S. partners. With ERI funding, DOD seeks to continue
    providing a visible U.S. presence for NATO Allies, as well as other
    partners in the region, who feel most threatened by Russia's actions
    against Ukraine.
        The ERI funding enables the United States to undertake the
    following measures:
          Increase exercises, training and rotational presence
    across Europe but especially on the territory of our newer Allies. Many
    of the U.S. air and ground forces participating in these activities
    would rotate in from the United States.
          As we have done in Poland, deploy detachments of U.S.
    planners to augment the capability of our Allies to design and host a
    broad range of training opportunities.
          Increase responsiveness of U.S. forces to reinforce NATO
    by exploring initiatives such as prepositioning of equipment and
    improving reception facilities in Europe.
          Increase participation by the U.S. Navy in NATO naval
    force deployments, including more persistent, rotational deployments to
    the Black and Baltic seas.
          Build the partner capacity of close partners such as
    Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine so they can better work alongside the
    United States and NATO, as well as provide for their own defense.
          This initiative will build on existing tools and
    authorities, and was included in the Department of Defense's Fiscal
    Year 2015 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) request to Congress and
    the Department of State's Fiscal Year 2015 Foreign Military Financing
    OCO Budget.
                                 climate change
        88. Senator Nelson. Mr. Secretary, our coasts and all of our people
    and assets, including our naval infrastructure, are at risk from sea
    level rise. Is the department making any plans to address this?
        Secretary Carter. Yes. In 2014, the Department of Defense issued
    the third update to the Department's Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap,
    which presents the Department's strategy for addressing immediate and
    long-term climate change challenges. Beginning in 2009, the Department
    recognized that climate change in general, and sea level rise in
    particular, could affect our ability to conduct our assigned missions.
    The Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program began a
    series of projects to develop and evaluate the information, models, and
    tools needed to examine climate change related effects on coastal
    installations. The results of these initial projects pointed out the
    need for further refinement of regional climate change scenario
    development beyond those available in the National Climate Assessment.
    The Department is leading a federal working group that includes the
    National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency, U.S. Geological Survey, U.S.
    Army Corps of Engineers Civil Works, Oceanographer of the Navy, and the
    South Florida Water Management District to develop more specific
    regional scenarios that account for both sea level rise and extreme
    water levels associated with storm surge.
        The Department is currently conducting a screening-level
    vulnerability assessment to identify where the Department is vulnerable
    to extreme weather events today and to what degree. The survey includes
    current vulnerabilities to inundation/flooding, temperature extremes,
    drought, wildfire, and wind, as well as identifying current sea level
    effects, potential vulnerabilities if levels rise, and the reference
    datum used for the analysis worldwide. This data will enable the
    Department to identify where more comprehensive and region- or
    installation-specific assessments are needed to determine what adaptive
    responses are the most appropriate. The survey will be complete in late
    2015.
        The Department has been actively reviewing policy, guidance, and
    directives to identify and integrate consideration of potential climate
    change effects into our infrastructure and operations. Long-range
    planning documents, like installation master plans and integrated
    natural resource management plans, now require planners to consider
    climate-related impacts in their design and management decisions. The
    Department has identified areas where new policies were needed, such as
    flood plain, water resource management, and sustainable building
    design, and issued them.

        89. Senator Nelson. Mr. Secretary, are there steps you can take now
    that will protect our investments from this happening? Would this
    include moving assets, such as naval vessels, to other locations?
        Secretary Carter. Sea level rise is a gradual occurrence and will
    manifest itself differently in different locations. In some locations
    the Department is already experiencing sea level rise, especially those
    areas where the shoreline is also subsiding (sinking). The two effects
    together produce higher than expected tidal and storm surge conditions
    and can lead to damage to infrastructure and equipment. Shore
    installations are prepared for dealing with these conditions in the
    near-term with sand bag plans, evacuation of ships and aircraft, and
    protective mooring practices.
        For the long-term, consideration of the effects of climate change,
    including sea level rise, are being made during master planning and
    design processes. Moreover, some areas are experiencing increased
    shoreline erosion. Infrastructure located along these shorelines is
    being monitored for adverse effects and reinforced or moved back as
    necessary.
        At this time, there are no plans to permanently relocate any
    assets, such as naval vessels, as a result of the effects of climate
    change.
                         support to special operations
        90. Senator Nelson. Mr. Secretary, last year, Admiral McRaven
    expressed concern about the impacts that budget cuts, including
    sequestration, could have on special operations. There are reports that
    the Services are considering cuts to capabilities that provide direct
    support to special operations forces, such as rotary wing aircraft.
    What are the responsibilities of the Services for providing that
    support to special operations forces? Are you comfortable that the
    fiscal year 2016 budget request provides an appropriate level of
    investment in such capabilities?
        Secretary Carter. The Services currently provide Special Operations
    Forces (SOF) with intelligence, communications, logistics, military
    construction, and medical support.
        Yes, I am comfortable with the level of investment funding that the
    fiscal year 2016 budget requests for Service capabilities, which
    support SOF. However, additional budget cuts or sequestrations could
    limit conventional force support to SOF and affect SOF's ability to
    perform their assigned missions. Potential budget cuts would impact
    SOF's access to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets,
    tactical fixed and rotary-wing lift, as well as disrupt modernization
    schedules, infrastructure construction projects, sustainment levels,
    and sea-based support to SOF.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
                              integration of women
        91. Senator Shaheen. General Dempsey, can you provide an update on
    the progress of the integration of women in the armed forces and share
    with us any circumstances that may lead to the services submitting
    exceptions to policy?
        General Dempsey. Since the Department rescinded the Direct Ground
    Combat and Assignment Rule in 2013, we have opened more than 91,000
    positions that were previously closed to women. Going forward, the
    major decisions for the Department concern the traditional, ground
    combat arms occupations, infantry, armor, artillery, and of course our
    Special Operations occupations. The Services continue to take a
    deliberate approach to validate occupational standards to ensure they
    are operationally specific, operationally relevant, and gender-neutral.
    The Joint Chiefs are committed to expanding opportunities for women in
    our military and ensuring every member of our Armed forces has an
    opportunity to succeed.
        While it would be premature to discuss exceptions to policy as laid
    out in the January 24, 2013 rescission memo, exceptions must be
    narrowly tailored and based on a rigorous analysis of factual data
    regarding the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed for the position.
                                    biofuels
        92. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Carter, can you discuss the
    military's efforts to diversify its energy resources to reduce its
    reliance on a volatile global oil market. Related to these efforts, can
    you provide an update on the current public-private joint agency
    initiative to develop a domestically produced, cost-competitive
    commercial supply of advanced biofuels? Additionally, can you discuss
    the development of biofuels and its importance to the Department's long
    term budget and operational planning?
        Secretary Carter. The Alternative Fuels Policy for Operational
    Platforms, states that the Department of Defense's ``primary
    alternative fuels goal is to ensure operational military readiness,
    improve battlespace effectiveness, and further flexibility of military
    operations through the ability to use multiple, reliable fuel
    sources.'' There is a clear long-term interest in being able to use
    globally sourced fuels, produced from a variety of feedstocks, to power
    the mission.
        Consistent with these policies, the Department has been supporting
    alternative fuel initiatives that generally fall into three categories:
    testing, fuel production support, and procurement.
          The majority of the Services' alternative fuels efforts
    focus on testing to see if alternative fuels can work properly with our
    equipment. This will enable us to buy and safely use alternative fuels
    that may become available in the commercial marketplace.
          The Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III Advanced Drop-
    in Biofuels Production Project is a Department of Defense partnership
    with the private sector and the Department of Energy. In September,
    three companies were selected for $70 million DPA Phase 2 awards to
    construct commercial-scale biofuel production facilities; these
    projects will also have private sector funding totaling approximately
    $700 million. Each project will be capable of producing more than ten
    million gallons per year of fuels meeting military specifications while
    the combined maximum capacity of the three projects will exceed 110
    million gallons per year of such fuels. Each project will use a
    different feedstock: municipal solid waste, woody biomass, and fats,
    oils, or greases.
          The ``Farm-to-Fleet'' initiative was announced in 2013
    with the goal of enabling biofuel blends to become a regular,
    operational fuel purchased for military use. These fuels will be
    purchased by the Defense Logistics Agency Energy through its regular
    competitive bulk fuel procurement program; the Department of
    Agriculture is making Commodity Credit Corporation funds available to
    this procurement program to support use of agricultural commodities in
    producing drop-in biofuels.
        Overall, these initiatives will contribute to ensuring that the
    Department is able to buy and use the fuel we need, where we need it,
    from a variety of feedstocks, at a competitive price.
                                     europe
        93. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Carter, the OCO request includes
    $789 million for the European Reassurance Initiative to demonstrate our
    support for our NATO allies and European partners. Do you believe this
    level of funding is adequate to counter the threat posed by Russia?
        Secretary Carter. The Department is confident that the funding
    levels for fiscal year 2016 European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) are
    adequate to counter the threat posed by Russia as it stands today and
    to continue the reassurance initiatives. The fiscal year 2016 ERI seeks
    to maintain a persistent presence of U.S. air, land, and sea forces in
    Eastern Europe; build allied and partner capacity; and increase
    readiness and responsiveness through additional exercises,
    prepositioning, and infrastructure improvements.
        Along with our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and
    partners, the United States is also helping to adapt the Alliance to
    the new security situation in Europe and counter the threat posed by
    Russia. The Readiness Action Plan, adopted by allied leaders at the
    2014 Wales Summit, seeks to go beyond assurance measures by enhancing
    NATO's command-and-control infrastructure and rapid response
    capability. Specific enhancements include: reforming the NATO Response
    Force, in particular by launching the Very High Readiness Joint Task
    Force; establishing small command-and-control elements on the territory
    of eastern allies, which will coordinate NATO activities in these
    nations and be prepared to receive reinforcing units, if necessary;
    reviewing and updating existing defense plans; and expanding the size
    and mission of the Multinational Corps Northeast in Poland, which will
    increase its focus on Article 5 planning and preparedness. Reassurance
    and these enhancements will make the United States and NATO better able
    to respond to threats emanating from Europe's east and south.

        94. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Carter, with continued aggression
    from Russia in Europe, unwavering support for our NATO allies is
    crucial. As you are aware, Poland is in the process of seeking to
    upgrade its air and missile defense program in light of threats
    associated with the Russian incursion in Ukraine. I understand that
    Poland seeks a transitional presence of American PATRIOT systems to
    protect itself until its modernization program is complete. Do you
    support the deployment of a transitional PATRIOT presence in Poland?
        Secretary Carter. The goal is to maintain close cooperation on
    missile defense with Poland. Given current global requirements for
    Patriot, the U.S. Army does not have the assets available to make a
    long-term deployment to Poland. However, the Army will look for
    opportunities to conduct Patriot training and exercises with Poland.
    The Department will also continue to identify additional opportunities
    to conduct joint training in Poland.

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2016 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            TUESDAY, MARCH 10, 2015

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                   THE POSTURE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m., in
    room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John
    McCain (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe,
    Sessions, Wicker, Ayotte, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis,
    Sullivan, Graham, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen,
    Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, and King.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman McCain. Good morning. I want to welcome the
    witnesses, and I thank you all for being here this morning. The
    committee meets to receive testimony on the plans and programs
    of the Department of the Navy for fiscal year 2016. I want to
    thank each of our witnesses for their distinguished service to
    the Nation as well as to the sailors, marines, and civilians
    they lead who are serving around the world today.
        This is Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert's last posture hearing
    before the committee, and I am sure he is relieved to know
    that, his last appearance as Chief of Naval Operations [CNO]. I
    would like to thank you, Admiral Greenert, for your 40 years of
    distinguished service to our Navy, and I wish you and Darlene
    all the best in the future.
        In the last 3 months, some of America's most experienced
    statesmen and strategic thinkers have offered this committee a
    clear, unified, and alarming assessment of current worldwide
    threats in U.S. national security strategy. As Dr. Henry
    Kissinger, former Secretary of State, testified on January
    29th, ``The United States has not faced a more diverse and
    complex array of crises since the end of the second World
    War.''
        The actual global challenges we face are compounded by the
    limitations of the Budget Control Act [BCA] of 2011 and
    sequestration, which are a self-inflicted national security
    crisis. Indeed, all four of the military Service Chiefs have
    testified that defense spending at sequestration levels would
    put American lives at risk. Now more than ever, a strong Navy
    and Marine Corps are central to our Nation's ability to deter
    adversaries, assure allies, and defend our national interests.
        From our strategy of rebalancing, to the Asia-Pacific
    region, to conducting ongoing operations against ISIL [the
    Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant], to deterring rogue
    actors like Iran or North Korea, to many other requirements,
    the United States Navy and Marine Corps are key pillars of our
    national security strategy. Yet by any measure, today's fleet
    of 275 ships is too small to address these critical security
    challenges. The Navy's force structure assessment requires is
    306 ships. The bipartisan National Defense Panel calls for a
    fleet of 323 to 346 ships, and our combatant commanders say
    they require 450 ships. But under sequestration, the Navy has
    said the fleet could shrink to 260 ships. Equally troubling,
    the Marine Corps continues personnel reductions down from
    202,000 Active Duty marines in 2012 to 184,000 today, to
    182,000 in 2017.
        With the demands on our sailors and marines rising, these
    force reductions, coupled with major readiness shortfalls due
    to sequestration, are lengthening deployments, cutting training
    and time at home with families, and putting our All-Volunteer
    Force under considerable strain. The President's Budget request
    attempts to buy as much readiness as the Department can execute
    for fiscal year 2016, and this is yet another reason why we
    cannot afford a defense budget at sequestration levels.
        The President's Budget also includes significant funding
    requests for major Navy and Marine Corps acquisition programs.
    In the current fiscal environment, it is all the more important
    for this committee to conduct rigorous oversight of these
    programs to ensure that the Department of the Navy is making
    the best use of limited taxpayer dollars. That is exactly what
    we will.
        With the Littoral Combat Ship [LCS], despite initial cost
    overruns that more doubled the cost per ship, the Navy appears
    to have stabilized the cost of the LCS frames. Yet the program
    still faces challenges to deliver the promised warfighting
    capability. All three of the LCS mission packages still need
    significant further testing and must overcome major technology
    integration challenges.
        Regarding of the Secretary of Defense's decision to upgrade
    the LCS, this committee will continue seeking further
    information to justify this decision. Without a clear
    capabilities-based assessment, it is unclear what operational
    requirements the upgraded LCS is designed to meet, and, thus,
    how much more lethal and survivable the ship needs to be. In
    short, the Navy must demonstrate what problem the upgraded LCS
    is trying to solve. We cannot afford to make this mistake
    again.
        With the first three Ford-class carriers, despite cost
    overruns of more than $2 billion each, this program has not
    exceeded the cost cap in the last 3 years. However, the second
    Ford-class carrier, the USS John F. Kennedy, will deliver in
    fiscal year 2022 less capable and less complete due to the
    Navy's proposed two-phase delivery approach. This plan would
    leave us with an incomplete ship should world events demand an
    additional aircraft carrier, or if the USS Nimitz encounters
    unforeseen problems in the final years of its 50-year service
    life. I am also concerned about the Navy's plan to delay full
    ship shock trials from the first to the second Ford-class
    carriers. That delay is hard to justify for a new ship that is
    this complex.
        This committee also has a duty to shape the future of our
    Navy and Marine Corps. With three Service combatant classes set
    to retire soon, now is the time to lay the analytical
    groundwork to replace those ships. As the Navy develops
    requirements for the next class of amphibious vessel, we must
    ensure that our warships are capable of supporting the Marines
    in the manner they plan to fight in the future. We must also
    carefully examine the future aircraft fleet and the carrier air
    wing. Twelve billion dollars or more for one ship is simply too
    expensive. We must do even more to reduce costs and increase
    competition within the aircraft carrier program, and as
    challenges to American air power projection grow, we must chart
    a path to achieve the unmanned strike capability from our
    aircraft carriers.
        We look forward to the witnesses' testimony today and hope
    that they will cover the broad spectrum of policy, procurement,
    readiness, personnel, and resource issues that the Department
    confronts. Senator Reed?

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let
    me join you in welcoming Secretary of the Navy Raymond E.
    Mabus, Jr., Admiral Greenert, and Commandant of Marine Corps
    General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., to this committee this morning
    to testify on the plans and programs of the Department of the
    Navy and the review of the annual budget request. Let me also
    thank Secretary Mabus for joining us last Saturday at Quonset
    Point for the keel laying ceremony for the USS Colorado. Thank
    you, Mr. Secretary.
        I want to welcome General Dunford to his first posture
    hearing, and I also want to join the chairman in commending the
    outstanding work of Admiral Greenert as he departs at least
    this venue. Thank you very much, sir, for your extraordinary
    service to the Navy and to the Nation.
        Our witnesses this morning face huge challenges as they
    strive to balance the need to support ongoing operations and
    sustained readiness with the need to modernize and keep the
    technological edge so critical to military success. These
    challenges have been made particularly difficult by the fiscal
    constraints of the BCA and sequestration. All the military
    departments have been forced to make painful tradeoffs, and now
    the threat of sequestration continues to loom. If Congress does
    not act to end sequestration, I believe our long-term national
    security interests will be threatened.
        Last year, the Department of the Navy was facing serious
    readiness problems caused by deferred maintenance, reduced
    steaming and flying hours, and cancelled training and
    deployments. The increased emphasis on readiness in this year's
    budget will address some of the Navy's most serious readiness
    problems, but results in a serious shortfall in modernization
    funds to meet future threats. I am interested in hearing the
    witnesses' views on the increase in this risk because of the
    shortfalls.
        All areas of our naval forces are overtaxed. The Navy is
    facing shortfalls on attack submarines, air and missile defense
    cruisers, destroyers, and strike fighter inventories. They have
    already been operating for 2 years now with fewer than their
    required 11 aircraft carriers. During the next decade, as a
    first priority the Navy will buy a new class of strategic
    missile submarines to replace the Ohio-class submarines, a very
    costly venture. I am interested in hearing how the Navy is
    managing its operational tempo with these shortfalls. I am also
    interested in the witnesses' views on how they will manage
    competing demands in the budget once the costs of the Ohio
    replacements begin.
        The President's Budget request calls for Marine Corps end
    strength of 184,000 marines, down from the war time high of
    over 20,000 marines. I am interested to learn how the Marine
    Corps will manage mission risk with a force this size,
    particularly with additional missions such as increased embassy
    security. For Marine Corps modernization, the fiscal year 2016
    request supports the decisions made last year that made the
    strategy for ground systems more sound.
        The Marine Corps clearly remains committed to
    revitalization of its armored amphibious assault capabilities
    with a budget request that includes funds for mobility and
    survivability upgrades for its current family of armored
    amphibious assault vehicles, and continues the competitive
    search for a new-wheeled amphibious combat vehicle. We
    understand that the Amphibious Combat Vehicle Program would
    integrate a number of existing technologies into a new vehicle.
    The Marine Corps has described this program as ``non-
    developmental,'' which raises a question about what ``non-
    developmental'' means when you are developing a new system. I
    am interested in your insights, Commandant, on what this whole
    program involves.
        It also is clear the Marine Corps' real amphibious
    challenge on what General Dunford has called the amphibious gap
    has more to do with ships and connectives than air and seaborne
    assault systems. Navy witnesses have testified about the number
    of ships required to meet amphibious shipping goals. Sometimes
    lost in that discussion is the fact that changes to the Marine
    Corps ground or air components ripple through the amphibious
    ship force requirement. I know that the Navy's planned purchase
    of the LPD-28 amphibious transport is one effort to address the
    amphibious shipping shortfall. I am interested to know what
    else the Department of the Navy is doing to close or mitigate
    the gap between requirements and capabilities to ensure our
    amphibious force meets our needs and is capable and ready.
        The Department of Defense [DOD] Defense Strategic Guidance
    issued in January 2012, followed by the 2014 QDR [Quadrennial
    Defense Review], and this January our national security
    strategy, all echo a renewed United States military orientation
    on the Asia-Pacific. Consistent with that strategy, the Defense
    Department has been working to realign United States military
    forces in South Korea and Okinawa, and plan to position Navy
    and Marine Corps forces in Australia, Singapore, and possibly
    elsewhere in the region. The problem has also been implementing
    a plan to forward deploy more ships, as shown by the Navy's
    second rotational deployment of a Littoral Combat Ship (LCS),
    the USS Fort Worth, in Singapore. I am interested in hearing
    more about these and other aspects of the deployment.
        Again, there are many questions, but I want to conclude by
    once again thanking all of you for your extraordinary service
    to the Nation, to the Navy, and to the Marine Corps. Thank you.
        Chairman McCain. Mr. Secretary?

     STATEMENT OF HON. RAYMOND E. MABUS, JR., SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

        Secretary Mabus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman McCain,
    Ranking Member Reed, members of this committee, thank you for
    this opportunity to discuss the Department of the Navy with CNO
    Jon Greenert and Commandant of the Marine Corps, Joe Dunford. I
    have the great privilege of representing the sailors and
    marines who serve our Nation around the world, the civilians
    who support them, and all of their families.
        As the chairman and Senator Reed pointed out, this is
    Admiral Greenert's last posture testimony before this
    committee. He has been a steady hand at the helm of the Navy
    through the past 4 years of international instability and
    budget turbulence, and every day his judgment, his advice, his
    good counsel have been critical. It is an honor to serve with
    him, and he will leave a lasting legacy.
        Today our security interests face an increasing array of
    threats and demands, while our budget situation, as you so
    clearly pointed out, Mr. Chairman, grows more challenging. But
    it is clear that the Navy and Marine Corps team offer the best
    value to advance both our global security and economic
    interests. Uniquely, the Navy and Marine Corps provide presence
    around the globe around the clock. We are the Nation's first
    line of defense, ready for anything that may come over the
    horizon. Presence means that we respond faster, we remain on
    station longer, we carry everything we need with us, and do
    whatever missions are assigned by our Nation's leaders without
    needing anyone else's permission.
        We have always said America's success depends on an
    exceptional Navy and Marine Corps. Article 1 of our
    Constitution authorizes Constitution to raise an Army when
    needed, but directs you to provide and maintain a Navy. From
    the first six frigates to our growing fleet of today, from
    Tripoli to Afghanistan, sailors and marines have proven the
    founders' wisdom. American leaders across the political
    spectrum have understood the vital significance of sea power.
        We are truly America's away team. We deploy in peace just
    as much as in war, and our role the last 7 years in securing
    sea lanes and freedom of commerce has boosted our own and the
    world's economy. Nearly half the world's population lives
    within 100 miles of the sea, 90 percent of all global trade
    goes by sea, and 95 percent of all voice and data goes under
    the ocean. The shelves of our stores are stocked with just-in-
    time delivery, with products from all over the globe, and some
    38 million American jobs are directly linked to seaborne
    international trade. For 7 decades, the Navy and Marine Corps
    have been the primary protector of this international system,
    and that is why our national defense strategy is so clearly
    focused on the maritime domain and requires investment in
    maritime assets.
        For the past few years, the Department of the Navy has
    attempted to minimize the impact of an uncertain budgetary
    environment marked by numerous continuing resolutions, the
    imposition of sequester-level funding, and the threat of the
    return of sequestration. This environment had made it much more
    difficult, but even more critical, to set priorities and to
    make some hard choices.
        The presence of our Navy and Marine Corps uniquely delivers
    is built on four foundations: people, platforms, power, and
    partnerships. These are key to the capability, capacity, and
    success of our naval services, and they remain my top
    priorities.
        People. Our sailors and marines are well known for their
    ability to exercise independent judgment and the flexibility to
    adapt to changing circumstances. We remain committed to
    providing our sailors, marines, and our civilians with the
    training and the support they need to maintain our naval
    presence, and we include in this their dedicated families, our
    injured, and our wounded.
        We have launched a comprehensive approach to assuring we
    have the world's healthiest, fittest, most resilient, and best
    educated force, one which truly America represents America's
    diversity. We continue to aggressively combat sexual assault,
    abuse, ethical failings, similar challenges, and we are
    exploring innovative means to improve the way we manage the
    force.
        In platforms, our people, as good as they are, cannot do
    their job without ships. Providing presence, being where we are
    needed when we are needed, requires those ships. Quantity has a
    quality all its own. That means we have to have a properly-
    sized and a properly-balanced fleet. On September 11, 2001, the
    Navy battle force stood at 316 ships. By 2008, our fleet had
    declined to 278 ships. Our focus on two ground wars only partly
    explains that decline.
        In the 5 years before I came to this office, the Navy
    contracted for only 27 ships, not enough to stop the slide and
    the size of the fleet. In my first 5 years, we have contracted
    for 70 ships, halting and reversing the decline. By the end of
    the decade, our fleet will once again top 300 ships. We have
    accomplished this with a direct and fundamental business
    approach based in large part on the legislation which
    originated in this committee, authored by Chairman McCain and
    then Chairman Levin, things like increasing competition,
    relying more on fixed price contracts. Thanks to this
    committee, Congress has helped multiyear and block buys.
        But budget instability, budget uncertainty seriously erode
    our ability to grow our fleet, manage our resources, and
    maintain the industrial base. Without a correctly sized and
    shaped fleet, the Navy and Marine Corps will not be able to
    meet the demands for the kinds of missions for which we are the
    best and often the only option. In the face of budgetary
    uncertainty, cutting ships is the most damaging and lease
    reversible course of action, which is why I am committed to
    preserving ship building to the maximum extent possible.
        Fueling the ships' aircrafts and vehicle of our Navy and
    Marine Corps is a vital operational concern and enables a
    global presence. That is why the Navy has a history of
    innovation, particularly in energy, moving from sail to steam
    to oil and pioneering nuclear power. We believe our national
    security interests and the ability of the Navy and Marine Corps
    to meets its missions must be enhanced by increasing our energy
    diversity and efficiency. Our ability to maintain presence and
    advance global security will also be augmented through
    partnerships. Cooperation makes us more effective and defuses
    tensions, reduces misunderstandings.
        Again and again, our naval forces have proven themselves
    the most immediate, the most capable, and the most adaptable
    option when a crisis develops. Overall, the President's fiscal
    year 2016 budget balances current readiness needed to execute
    assigned missions while sustaining a highly capable fleet, all
    within a tough fiscal climate. That climate demands, as you
    pointed out, Mr. Chairman, our most rigorous examination of
    every dollar we spent in continuing our aggressive efforts to
    cut unnecessary costs in every program and shift resources from
    tail to tooth.
        When America is called, the Navy and Marine Corps have
    always been there. In order to ensure that we continue to
    provide the naval force our Nation's leaders and the America
    expect, the Commandant, the Chief of Naval Operations, and I
    look forward to answering your questions, and to working
    together with this committee and with Congress to maintain our
    great Navy and Marine Corps. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Mabus follows:]
                      Prepared Statement by Hon. Ray Mabus
        Chairman McCain and Ranking Member Reed, members of the committee,
    thank you for affording this opportunity to discuss readiness and
    posture of the Department of the Navy. With Chief of Naval Operations
    (CNO) Jonathan Greenert and Commandant of the Marine Corps Joseph
    Dunford, I have the great privilege of representing the sailors and
    marines who serve our Nation around the world, the civilians who
    support them and all of their families.
        I cannot let it pass without noting that this will be Admiral
    Greenert's last posture testimony before this committee. He has been a
    steady hand on the helm for the U.S. Navy through the past 4 years of
    international instability and budget turbulence. Every day his
    judgment, his advice and his counsel have been critical. He has been a
    great CNO, and it has been an honor to serve with him. He will leave an
    enduring legacy of having advanced the interests and capabilities of
    our Navy and our Department, and I know this committee and our country
    want to share in offering our heartfelt thanks.
        This statement, together with those provided by General Dunford and
    Admiral Greenert, presents to you and to the American people, an
    overview of the Department of the Navy, and highlights our priorities
    as we move forward with the fiscal year 2016 budget process. As the
    Secretary of the Navy, I am responsible for recruiting, training, and
    equipping the almost 900,000 sailors, marines, and civilians who spend
    every day working to defend the American people and our national
    interests.
        This opportunity to review our current posture comes at a
    particularly critical juncture in our Nation's history. Our national
    security interests face an increasing array of threats and demands
    around the globe, even as our fiscal and budgetary situation grows more
    challenging. However, this is an opportune moment as well, as I firmly
    believe the threats and demands are best met with a strong and
    comprehensive maritime response. Similarly, I believe naval assets
    offer not only the best value to preserve our national security by
    advancing our global interests, but also the best value in supporting
    our own and the world's economy to help meet our fiscal challenges. The
    rationale for that belief is as simple as it is enduring.
                             the value of presence
        Uniquely, the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps provide presence
    around the globe, around the clock. We are the Nation's first line of
    defense, ready for any challenge that might come over the horizon.
    Presence means we respond faster, we remain on station longer, we carry
    everything we need with us, and we carry out the missions assigned by
    our national leaders without needing anyone else's permission.
        America's leadership role in the world is due in large part to our
    Nation's sea services capability and capacity to ensure stability,
    build on our relationships with allies and partners, deter adversaries,
    prevent wars, and provide our Nation's leaders with options in times of
    crisis. Should those measures fail, the combat power necessary to fight
    and win in any sort of conflict. As America's away team, performing
    most often far from home, the operational tempo of the Navy and Marine
    Corps are--unlike our sister Services--little different in times of
    peace or in times of conflict. There are no permanent homecomings for
    sailors and marines because we are never a garrison force.
        Born a maritime nation, we have known throughout our 239 years that
    for America to succeed, we must have an exceptional Navy and Marine
    Corps. Thomas Paine famously declared in Common Sense in 1776 that
    ``the cause of America is in a great measure the cause of all
    mankind.'' He was equally adamant that the defense of liberty required
    a capable naval force. More than just physical security and defense
    from European powers, Paine drew direct connections between the Navy
    and the economic success of the American experiment.
        Our Nation's founders, whether northern merchants and lawyers like
    John Adams or southern planters like Thomas Jefferson, also considered
    a Navy critical to our Nation's success. Article One of our
    Constitution grants Congress the power to ``raise'' an Army when
    needed, but directs Congress to ``provide and maintain a Navy.'' Over
    the past 2 centuries, American leaders from across the political
    spectrum have hewed to that Constitutional direction and have, in a
    nonpartisan fashion, promoted the vital significance of sea power. Over
    the past 2 centuries, from Tripoli to Iwo Jima to Tripoli, from the
    first six frigates to the Great White Fleet to the great fleets of
    World War II, our Navy and Marine Corps have protected and advanced
    American interests, stability and freedom around the world.
        Today, the value and importance of our naval assets to security and
    stability here at home and around the world has never been greater.
    Nearly half the world's population lives less than 60 miles from the
    sea. With 90 percent of global trade carried by sea, even those who
    live in landlocked states are dependent on the world's oceans. In these
    days of an internet-connected world, 95 percent of all the voice and
    data goes under the ocean through cables, including the data keeping
    the world's financial system running.
        We live in an age of globalization and worldwide trade. The shelves
    of stores of every variety are stocked through ``just in time''
    delivery with products from all over the globe. Estimates show that a
    single major port facility in the United States impacts more than 1
    million American jobs and contributes about $1 billion a day to our
    Nation's economic productivity. Overall, some 38 million American jobs
    are directly linked to seaborne international trade.
        The security and stability of the international system of trade and
    finance is tied irrevocably to the free movement of goods and data
    across and under the sea, and is more than just a military concern. It
    impacts potentially every American in the prices we pay for goods and
    services and in the very availability of those goods and services.
    While it is far away and out of sight to most Americans, our naval
    presence around the world isn't a theoretical construct.
        For 7 decades, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps have been the primary
    protector of this international system. There is a sound basis in the
    proposition that rising international prosperity is directly linked to
    the U.S. Navy. We have kept the sea-lanes open. We have kept freedom of
    navigation open for anybody engaged in peaceful and legitimate trade.
    As the President has said, we have ``been the anchor of global
    security.''
        We benefit from this enormously economically, but we also benefit
    from the way that shared economic success helps to limit conflict and
    war. Around the world, high unemployment, stagnant economies, financial
    struggles often lead to social disorder, political unrest, upheaval,
    and outright conflict. Maritime instability contributes to these
    problems, stoking the fires--as can increasing competition for scarce
    resources. By helping to secure the world's maritime commons, by
    providing a calming presence, and by responding to crises early to
    limit their escalation and enhance diplomatic opportunities, the
    ability of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps to be where it matters when
    it matters is vital to international stability. That is why our
    national defense strategy is so clearly focused on the maritime domain
    and requires investment in maritime assets.
                       around the globe, around the clock
        The best illustration of the extent and impact of the presence
    provided by our Nation's sea services can be seen in just a single day
    of operations. I've chosen July 26th not because it was especially
    important, but because it was reasonably typical. On that day, I was on
    a trip around the world, visiting sailors and marines and meeting with
    some of our international partners. In my nearly 6 years as Secretary,
    I've traveled to 131 countries and territories and traveled nearly 1
    million air miles. I believe I can do my job better by actually seeing
    and talking with the men and women who serve our Nation where they are
    serving, and by meeting face-to-face with representatives of other
    countries, and not just sitting behind a desk in Washington.
        My trip last July began in Hawaii, observing activities and
    operations in the world's largest maritime exercise, Rim of the Pacific
    (RIMPAC), which included the navies of 22 nations, including allies
    from the region, like Japan and Australia and South Korea, but also
    valued NATO allies like Norway, which sent a warship all the way from
    the Baltic Sea to join the exercises. For the first time it also
    involved ships from the People's Republic of China's Navy. During the
    exercise, these diverse forces worked together on everything from
    search and rescue and humanitarian missions to practicing counter-
    piracy tactics and maritime security missions.
        As I flew onward to Tokyo to meet with Japanese leaders, an annual
    exercise, Malabar, was just beginning in the Indian Ocean. This
    bilateral U.S.-Indian naval exercise, which has grown in scope and
    complexity since its first iteration, has fostered mutual understanding
    with our Indian counterparts and enhanced our ability to operate with
    one another in a wide range of missions. This year, the Maritime Self-
    Defense Force from Japan joined the exercise in an important
    demonstration of multilateral cooperation between Pacific and Indian
    Ocean nations. The relationship between the Nations of the Pacific and
    the Indian Oceans will continue to be critical in these important
    maritime regions.
        On the same day, in Afghanistan, our marines were increasing
    training of Afghan security forces, working toward turning over
    operational responsibilities to them, as the marines reduced their
    direct combat mission. On that day, we had more than 5,000 marines and
    sailors in the country, patrolling, training, and working with our
    Afghan partners and NATO allies.
        At the same time, our Marine Corps Black Sea Rotational Force was
    involved in Platinum Lion, a series of exercises with our Romanian,
    Bulgarian, and Serbian partners, taking place in Bulgaria. Working with
    these NATO allies and friends from Eastern Europe, this exercise is an
    important annual event in the Black Sea region to build the capacity
    and capability of our partners and to promote peace and stability in an
    area that has been in turmoil for the past several years. Our Marine
    Corps Black Sea Rotational Force regularly deploys throughout Europe,
    training with other forces, monitoring security developments, and
    enhancing our ability to operate with our partners and allies in future
    contingencies.
        On July 26, the United States Embassy in Tripoli was evacuated as
    the fighting in Libya intensified and the State Department decided
    United States personnel were no longer safe at the Mission. The Marines
    of the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force-Crisis Response, in
    support of United States Africa Command, helped coordinate the
    evacuation and escorted the vehicles that carried our diplomatic and
    military personnel to safety in Tunisia. This kind of operation,
    reacting to threats and problems as they develop, is the very reason
    our Navy and Marine Corps are forward deployed, and must be forward
    deployed to effectively give our leaders options.
        On that day about half of our Navy's ships and submarines were at
    sea, with 99 of our ships forward deployed and another 41 training near
    our shores. Tens of thousands of sailors and 36,000 marines were away
    from their homes, far from friends and family, forward deployed around
    the world, serving in both combat and cooperation missions.
        That was just one day last July. Each of these exercises on the
    world's oceans, training events, security cooperation engagements with
    friends and allies, combat operations in Afghanistan and contingency
    operations in North Africa, continued to build and strengthen our
    partnerships and alliances to help protect Americans and secure the
    global system.
        For 365 days per year, the Navy and Marine Corps operate across the
    planet. When strikes against Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
    targets in Iraq and Syria were ordered, Navy ships and aircraft were
    quickly in range and launched operations. In fact, for the first 54
    days, FA-18s off USS George H.W. Bush were the lone strike component.
    When the President decided to employ military assets to support the
    fight against Ebola in West Africa, V-22s and marines from our Special
    Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force-Crisis Response were on the ground
    within hours to provide logistical support to the medical responders.
        Our Nation's Defense Strategic Guidance is clearly a maritime-
    centric strategy focused on the Asia Pacific, on the Arabian Gulf, on
    building partnerships, all while maintaining our presence around the
    globe. To fulfill our role in this strategy the Navy and Marine Corps
    face daily demands ranging from humanitarian assistance and disaster
    relief, to protecting our embassies, to working with scores of partners
    and allies, to dealing with multiple asymmetric threats and potential
    conflicts. The Navy and Marine Corps meet these demands, and many more,
    using the same people and the same platforms and equipment
    demonstrating the versatility and flexibility that is the hallmark of
    this force.
        For the past few years, we at the Department of the Navy have
    attempted to minimize the impact of an uncertain budgetary environment,
    marked by numerous continuing resolutions, the imposition of sequester-
    level funding and the threat of the return of sequestration. That
    environment has made it more difficult, but even more critical, to set
    priorities to make hard choices and to find opportunities to improve
    our stewardship of taxpayer dollars.
        Almost 6 years ago, when I was preparing for my confirmation
    hearing to be Secretary and began closely examining the challenges our
    Navy and Marine Corps faced, it became clear to me there are four areas
    that demand our attention in order to provide and maintain the presence
    our Navy and Marine Corps uniquely deliver. Those four areas are
    People, Platforms, Power, and Partnerships. Those have been, and
    continue to be, the key factors in assuring the capability, capacity,
    and success of our naval services, and that is why they have been, and
    will remain, my top priorities.
    People--Our True Advantage
        It is one of the great maxims of naval history that sailors and
    marines are the sea services' greatest advantage and most important
    asset. In the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, we have the best people in
    the world. Our sailors and marines are well known for the ability to
    exercise independent judgment, to flexibly adapt to changing
    circumstances or environments that were unanticipated at the start of a
    deployment, but for which their training has fully prepared them.
    Perhaps less well known is how far down the chain of command we devolve
    critical responsibility. Aboard USS Ronald Reagan in the weeks after
    the earthquake and tsunami that ravaged Japan, I was surrounded by flag
    officers, but the briefing on relief operations I received came from a
    third class petty officer and a lieutenant junior grade because they
    had been instrumental not just in executing, but also in designing, the
    effort.
        Providing our sailors, marines, and civilian workforce the training
    to deal with the uncertainties they will certainly face and providing
    the support that they need to do their jobs is one of our most
    important responsibilities. This also extends to helping their
    dedicated families and ensuring we support our wounded or injured
    veterans.
        Three years ago, we introduced the 21st Century Sailor and Marine
    Initiative, to provide a more coordinated and comprehensive approach to
    assuring we have the healthiest, fittest, most resilient, and best
    educated force in the world. The goal is to help our sailors and
    marines maximize their personal and professional readiness, and to
    assist them and their families with the mental, physical and emotional
    challenges of military service. It eliminated the stovepipes that
    existed between many of the programs designed to support our people and
    helps us address issues like suicide, sexual assault, and alcohol
    related incidents in a comprehensive way that protects our sailors and
    marines and makes them stronger. A fleet full of successful sailors
    will ensure a successful Navy, and a force full of successful marines
    will ensure a successful Marine Corps.
        We are looking to expand the initiative by exploring new ways to
    improve the fitness of our force. We are reassessing our physical
    fitness requirements to make them more relevant to warfighting and to
    instill a ``culture of fitness'' instead of just training for a
    physical fitness test. This means reviewing nutritional standards,
    making efforts to reduce stress, and improving health care and support
    networks to deal with issues like suicide and abuse. We are also
    working hard across these areas to curb the all-too-common factor of
    alcohol-related incidents, which can end careers and, tragically,
    sometimes lives. Available data shows that the number of these damaging
    incidents has trended downward. To ensure we maintain that trend, we
    are using media and education campaigns, directed actions against the
    irresponsible use of alcohol like continuing to place reasonable limits
    on where and when alcohol is sold on base, and the continued use of the
    alcohol detection program implemented in 2013.
        Sexual assault and harassment remains a challenge that we are
    responding to aggressively. In the past several years we have taken
    numerous steps to address it. These include widespread training like
    our bystander intervention program, increased use of interactive means,
    victim support programs like the Victim's Legal Counsel, and new
    investigative resources. Combined with much more direct leadership
    engagement, evidence suggests that these efforts are improving the
    confidence of sailors and marines in the system and their belief that
    reports will be taken seriously. Because of this increased trust in
    their chain of command, we have seen survivors coming forward in larger
    numbers and also, increasingly, reporting incidents that took place
    earlier than the year it is being reported. This large increase in
    reports, especially since 2012 when many programs began to mature, is
    what we anticipated seeing if our efforts were successful, since they
    would represent increased confidence in the system. We are turning more
    attention to the risk of retaliation, especially by peers, as this
    issue has increased in prominence in our surveys. Our interactive
    education programs are having a measurable impact, and we will continue
    to develop and deploy those. Sexual assault is an ``insider threat''
    with devastating impacts on the Navy and Marine Corps. We've done
    myriad things to attack this insidious threat, but, no matter how much
    we've done, there is more to do until we've eliminated the scourge of
    sexual assault.
        Vice Admiral James Calvert, who earned two Silver Stars as a
    submariner in World War II, once wrote that ``as important as ships
    are, naval history is made by men.'' I would make one change to that
    statement: today naval history is made by men and women. From the
    appointment of Admiral Michelle Howard as the Vice Chief of Naval
    Operations, to our work expanding roles and missions open to women to
    the maximum extent possible, we are leading the military in our quest
    to ensure we're using our best and most talented servicemembers across
    the force. We will continue our efforts to recruit and retain a diverse
    force, including a more representative number of women. A more diverse
    force is a stronger force.
        For several years now, female officers have had the opportunity to
    serve on our ballistic and guided-missile submarines, and they have
    performed exceptionally well, as anticipated, earning their
    qualifications and opening a new path. We are expanding opportunities
    for them. USS Minnesota and USS Virginia, both fast attack submarines,
    are leading the integration of women into the rest of the submarine
    force at this moment. In January, the Navy also announced a plan and a
    set of milestones for fully including enlisted women on submarines that
    will begin next year.
        Women have also been integrated into the Coastal and Riverine
    Squadrons and have deployed. We have also opened 348 billets for Navy
    positions that support Marine Corps units. The Marine Corps continues
    on pace with their study of the positions that are currently closed to
    women and will have results later this year. In accordance with the
    Secretary of Defense's guidance, the default position will be that all
    currently closed positions will be opened to the assignment of women
    unless an exception is formally requested.
        Talent is best cultivated by promoting and advancing our sailors
    and marines on merit and competition. It also requires us to maximize
    their opportunities to broaden their experience and exposure to new
    ways of doing things. We have to look at things like moving away from
    year group management for our officers and expansion of the Career
    Intermission Program, as well as other reforms and adjustments within
    our current system. While a number of our initiatives can be undertaken
    within our current authorities, there are some that will require
    adjustments to the law, including changes to the Defense Officer
    Personnel Management Act, which is almost 4 decades old. We have made
    legislative proposals in this area, and we ask for your help in
    bringing our personnel system into the 21st century.
        Maintaining our presence around the world is hard on our force.
    That is one of the reasons why in 2014 we began the implementation of
    the Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP). This is a program that Navy
    is using to schedule and plan our deployments and the maintenance of
    our platforms. Over the course of the past 13 years of war, one of the
    biggest challenges for our sailors and marines has been predictability
    in their deployments. The goal of OFRP is to return some amount of
    scheduling to their lives. Missing holidays, birthdays, and other
    significant family events is hard enough, but not knowing when it will
    happen makes things even more difficult. There is no way to completely
    eliminate the unexpected. Events around the world can, and do, take on
    a life of their own, and our men and women know this. Increasing the
    predictability of deployments will help with the stress on our sailors
    and marines and their families and also has the added benefit of
    helping us properly support our maintenance requirements and readiness
    posture.
        There will be times when a crisis erupts somewhere in the world and
    our sailors and marines remain deployed in order to deal with it. The
    world gets a vote. For the past several years we have had a number of
    ships and units remain at sea far beyond the normal deployment length.
    In order to help our sailors and marines and their families during
    these extended deployments, we've implemented the Hardship Duty Pay-
    Tempo program. When operational tempo is high and a deployment extends
    beyond more than 220 consecutive days, this pro-rated additional
    payment kicks in. This is an effort to show our sailors and marines we
    understand the difficulty these extended deployments create for them
    and their families and to show them, in a tangible way, the gratitude
    of the Department of the Navy and the American people.
        Those sailors and marines on sea duty, deployed away from home
    around the world, are the backbone of the Navy and Marine Corps, and
    they enable us to provide and maintain our global presence. Despite the
    challenges involved, we need to ensure our men and women are
    incentivized to take on sea-going assignments. This past year, we
    increased Career Sea Pay for those who have spent a total of 3 years at
    sea in order to both improve critical sea-duty manning and reward those
    who take these challenging sea-going assignments. We also increased
    Career Sea Pay-Premium, which recognizes sailors and marines who spend
    more than 36 consecutive months in sea-going positions or who have
    spent a cumulative 8 years at sea during their career. These increases
    are long overdue since they were last adjusted in 2001.
        The Reserve component continues to be a vital part of the Navy and
    Marine Corps Team. In fiscal year 2014 we mobilized 2,700 individual
    Reserve sailors and marines to support operations around the world. As
    the force level shifts in Afghanistan, our Reserve component will be
    taking on the vast majority of the individual augment requirements
    requested by the joint force. This allows us to focus our Active
    component on filling critical sea billets to help ensure fleet
    wholeness and readiness. Reserve sailors and marines are deployed
    globally, and we will continue to maintain a Reserve that is ready,
    relevant, and responsive to the Nation's needs.
        Attracting and retaining our talent is critical to maintaining our
    innovative and adaptive force. An important part of that involves the
    challenge of military compensation. Cooperation between Congress and
    the Department of Defense on this issue will be vital as we look at
    slowing the growth rate of our personnel costs. We must keep the faith
    with the men and women who are in uniform. We must look for the right
    ways to build incentives and retain our most talented people. But we
    also must recognize that growth in pay and benefits must be contained
    or we will not be able to provide our sailors and marines with the
    training and equipment that they need.
        Our civilian workforce is also vital to the success of the
    Department of the Navy. They help design our ships, aircraft, and
    equipment and are critical enablers of our forces. Without them, we
    literally would not have a fleet to put to sea. We could not operate
    ashore at our bases across the globe. Over the past few years our
    civilian workforce has persevered through some very trying times. From
    pay freezes, to hiring freezes, and the huge, negative impact of
    furloughs, they have shown an immense amount of dedication to our Navy,
    Marine Corps, and our Nation. In 2013, 12 of our civilians were killed,
    and others injured in visible and invisible ways, in the attack on the
    Washington Navy Yard. There is no more tragic example of how our
    civilians share the burden with those in uniform. We continue to
    support the victims and the families who endured this tragic attack and
    have implemented numerous security measures to improve the safety of
    our workforce.
        This committed and patriotic workforce is the foundation of how the
    Department of the Navy operates. In order to ensure we have the most
    capable people, in the right positions, we run a number of leadership
    development programs. Annually we select participants for senior
    leader, executive leader, and developing leader programs to provide
    education and training that will help our people tackle the issues we
    face.
                           platforms--america's fleet
        The hard truth of providing the presence the American people and
    our Nation's leaders expect is that it requires platforms. To be where
    we are needed, when we are needed, we must have the ships, submarines,
    aircraft, vehicles, and equipment for our sailors and marines to
    operate. That means we must have a properly-sized fleet. Quantity has a
    quality all its own.
        Recently much has been said in many venues about the size of our
    fleet. The completely wrong assertion is made over and over that our
    fleet is shrinking. Let me state this very clearly: our fleet is
    growing and will number greater than 300 ships before the end of this
    decade.
        It is absolutely true that our fleet shrank dramatically between
    2001 and 2008. On September 11, 2001, the Navy's battle force stood at
    316 ships. But, by 2008, after one of the great military buildups in
    American history, our fleet had declined to 278 ships.
        Part of the reason for that was understandable: our focus was on
    two ground wars. But, frankly, it cannot all be attributed to that. In
    the 5 years before I took office as Secretary, the Navy only contracted
    for 27 ships, far too few to maintain the size of the fleet, much less
    grow it. In my first 5 years as Secretary, we contracted for 70 ships.
    We have halted and reversed the decline.
        We haven't done this at the cost of naval aviation. During my time
    in office we have bought 1,300 aircraft. That is 40 percent more than
    the Navy and Marine Corps bought in the 5 years before this
    administration took office.
        We have done this both in ships and aircraft by taking some direct
    and basic actions including: block buys and multi-year procurements;
    increased competition; stable designs and mature technologies; targeted
    reviews; pursuing cross-program common-equipment buys; and
    affordability through hard but fair bargaining. In addition, we have:
    supported shipyard facility improvements and optimal-build plans;
    conducted rigorous ``should cost'' studies; designed equipment for
    affordability and modularity; instituted strict controls to fight
    ``requirements creep;'' used open-architecture systems to the maximum
    extent possible; and signed shipbuilding capability preservation
    agreements resulting in more competitive shipyards and lower costs for
    the Navy.
        The amphibious and auxiliary ships industrial base is of concern to
    us and is at risk should future funding levels be reduced. We have
    recently introduced an integrated acquisition strategy for LHA 8, T-
    AO(X), and LX(R) to support stability and competition within this
    sector of the industrial base. The strategy will help ensure the ships
    are built affordably, while providing the greatest degree of stability
    for the industrial base.
        There are a number of references previously to the industrial base.
    A healthy design and production industrial base is critical to
    achieving what is needed for our fleet in ships, aircraft, weapons and
    all procurements. Stability and predictability are critical to the
    health and sustainment of this industrial base.
        This is especially true in shipbuilding. Changes in ship-build
    plans are significant because of the long lead time, specialized
    skills, and extent of integration needed to build military ships. Each
    ship is a significant fraction of not only the Navy's shipbuilding
    budget but also industry's workload and regional employment.
    Consequently, the timing of ship procurements is a critical matter to
    the health of American shipbuilding industries, and has economic
    impacts at the local, regional and national levels.
        It is important, therefore, to provide stability and predictability
    to the industrial base to maintain our ability to continue to build the
    future fleet. In the overall picture, we should not pay for one Navy
    ship by cutting another Navy ship; each ship is crucial in many, many
    ways.
        The Department's shipbuilding plan continues to build the balanced
    force we require. This year we have requested funding for nine new
    ships as well as for the refueling of the carrier USS George
    Washington. We also plan to modernize 11 cruisers, which are our most
    capable ships for controlling the air defense of a carrier strike
    group. The Navy's cruiser modernization plan, in accordance with fiscal
    year 2015 congressional direction, will allow the Navy to reduce
    overall funding requirements while most efficiently increasing the
    capability and extending the service life of these large surface
    combatants.
        Our efforts to maintain and affordably procure our fleet's ships
    and submarines have continued through this past year. The Department
    has established a steady state Ford-class procurement plan designed to
    deliver each new ship in close alignment with the Nimitz-class ship it
    replaces. CVN 78 (future USS Ford) cost performance has remained stable
    since 2011 and under the congressional cost cap. We are also committed
    to driving down and stabilizing aircraft carrier construction costs for
    the future John F. Kennedy (CVN 79) and the future Enterprise (CVN 80)
    and have made significant progress in doing so. As a result of the
    lessons learned on CVN 78, we have made significant changes to reduce
    the cost to build CVN 79, including improvements in material
    availability and pricing; major changes in build strategy and processes
    determined to execute construction activities where they can most
    efficiently be performed; incorporation of design changes only for
    safety, those mandated or lower costs; and aggressive measures for cost
    control in government-furnished equipment. The costs of CVN 79 also
    remain stable and under the congressional cost cap.
        In our attack submarine program we are continuing procurement of
    two Virginia-class submarines per year while reducing construction time
    and also developing the Virginia Payload Module (VPM). Thanks to the
    support of Congress in authorizing the use of a multi-year procurement
    (MYP), in April 2014, the Navy awarded the Block IV contract for 10
    submarines. The savings realized with this MYP contract was more than
    $2 billion, effectively giving the Navy 10 ships for the price of 9.
        SSBNs, coupled with the Trident II D-5 Strategic Weapons System,
    represent the most survivable leg of the Nation's strategic arsenal and
    provide the Nation's only assured nuclear response capability.
    Originally designed for a 30-year service life, the Ohio-class has been
    extended to 42 years of operation. They cannot be extended further. For
    this reason, we are intensively continuing development of the follow-on
    12-submarine Ohio Replacement Program (ORP). This effort is driven by
    meeting the program's performance requirements while reducing costs
    across design, production, operations and sustainment. However, in
    order to afford the ORP procurement costs beyond this Future Years
    Defense Program (FYDP) it is clear that this program must be funded by
    a significant increase in the Navy's shipbuilding budget, or from other
    sources. Otherwise, funding this necessary program will effectively
    keep the Navy from performing its other critical missions.
        The Arleigh Burke-class (DDG 51) program remains one of the Navy's
    most successful shipbuilding programs--62 of these ships are currently
    operating in the fleet. We are in the third year of an MYP. The second
    of our fiscal year 2016 ships will provide significant upgrades to
    integrated air and missile defense and additional ballistic missile
    defense capability by introducing the next flight (Flight III), which
    incorporates the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) designed to
    address a number of growing threats.
        With four Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) in service, operational
    experience continues to increase through at-sea testing and rotational
    deployments, and the value of this class continues to be demonstrated.
    USS Fort Worth began her maiden deployment to the western Pacific, and
    upon arrival in Singapore was sent to assist in the search and recovery
    efforts for the downed Air Asia airliner in the Java Sea. USS Fort
    Worth's deployment marks the beginning of continuous LCS forward
    presence in Southeast Asia and will validate the 3:2:1 (three crews,
    two ships, one ship always forward-deployed) rotational manning and
    crewing concept for the LCS class. This will also be the first
    deployment of the Navy's MH-60R Seahawk helicopter along with the MQ-8B
    Fire Scout on an LCS.
        After an exhaustive analysis by the Navy's Small Surface Combatant
    Task Force, in December 2014 the Secretary of Defense approved the
    Navy's proposal to procure a new small surface combatant based on an
    upgraded LCS. This followed his February guidance to review the program
    and consider development of a more lethal and survivable small surface
    combatant. The upgraded LCS will provide multi-mission anti-surface
    warfare and anti-submarine capabilities, as well as continuous and
    effective air, surface and underwater self-defense. They are both more
    lethal and more survivable, as well as continuing to be affordable and
    providing the fleet with the requirements it needs. As these
    capabilities are consistent with those of a frigate, I directed
    designation of these new small surface combatants as Frigates (FF).
        Our amphibious ships are incredibly versatile. Across the spectrum
    of maritime operations, from the humanitarian assistance and disaster
    relief efforts in the Philippines following super-typhoon Haiyan to the
    combat operations in Libya during Operation Odyssey Dawn, the Navy and
    Marine Corps team do a wide array of things with these ships. At this
    moment, the USS Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group and 24th Marine
    Expeditionary Unit are in the Fifth Fleet area of operations, ready for
    anything that might happen from Iraq and Syria to Yemen.
        Congress provided $1 billion of funding in the fiscal year 2015
    Appropriations Act toward a 12th LPD, and we have requested the balance
    of funding this year for this ship, LPD 28. Procurement of LPD 28 will
    assist in mitigating impacts to shipbuilding and combat systems
    industrial bases, and the ship's design and construction features will
    fully exploit some of the ongoing design innovations and cost reduction
    initiatives that are necessary for the LX(R) to achieve its
    affordability goals.
        Support vessels such as the Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) and the
    Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) provide many additional options and
    flexibility to Combatant Commanders. The future USNS Lewis B. Puller
    (MLP 3), the first Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) variant of the
    MLP, which includes a flight deck, was christened in early February in
    San Diego and will deliver in summer 2015. The Navy awarded MLP 4 AFSB
    in December 2014, and plans to request MLP 5 AFSB in fiscal year 2017.
    JHSV production continues with delivery of the fifth JHSV anticipated
    in April 2015. JHSVs 6 through 10 are also under contract. In fiscal
    year 2015, Congress provided funding for an eleventh JHSV, which we
    expect to be put under contract this coming summer.
        Combat Logistics Support ships fulfill the vital role of providing
    underway replenishment of fuel, food, repair parts, ammunition and
    equipment to forward deployed ships and embarked aircraft to enable
    them to operate at sea for extended periods of time. We will begin to
    replace the Fleet Replenishment Oilers beginning in fiscal year 2016
    with the TAO (X). These will be double-hulled and meet Oil Pollution
    Act of 1990 and International Marine Pollution Regulations.
        With the strong support of Congress, we continue to strengthen
    naval aviation as well. Adding new aircraft to our growing fleet will
    increase U.S. naval strength, in terms of both force capacity and
    capability. In the vertical lift community, multi-year production
    contracts for the MV-22 and MH-60R continue, as does the Marine Corps
    procurements of the AH-1Z and UH-1Y.
        The E-2D, our new and upgraded electronic early-warning aircraft,
    reached initial operating capability in October and is continuing
    production under a multi-year contract. We continue to buy P-8As to
    replace the venerable P-3. Last year, in 2014, we saw the first
    deployment of this aircraft and continuous rotational deployments to
    Seventh Fleet are now underway. This past year also continued the
    integration of the EA-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft into the
    fleet. With Congress' addition of 15 Growlers in 2015, we will have 153
    of these aircraft in 16 squadrons. With the final Navy deployment of
    the legacy EA-6B Prowler, and the looming retirement of the Marine
    Corps' last Prowlers, these incredibly capable new aircraft take over
    the Nation's airborne electronic attack mission.
        The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter remains a central part of the future
    of both Navy and Marine Corps aviation. This past year we saw the
    Marine Corps begin F-35B operations at two additional bases. The
    Marines are on track to have initial operating capability (IOC) for the
    first squadron this year. The Navy completed the F-35C's first flight
    operations at sea aboard USS Nimitz (CVN 68). According to plan, the
    Navy is the last Service to acquire the F-35 and is continuing an
    acquisition strategy to achieve IOC in the 2018-2019 timeframe.
    Incentive agreements with the builders have been achieved that will
    improve aircraft unit costs while also improving the learning curve on
    production.
        Unmanned systems are critical to our ability to be present; they
    lessen the risk to our sailors and marines and allow us to conduct
    missions that are longer, go farther, and take us beyond the physical
    limits of pilots and crews. Launching and recovering unmanned aircraft
    as large and capable as our manned fighters from the rolling decks of
    aircraft carriers, launching unmanned rotary-wing patrols from our
    small surface combatants, and deployment of unmanned underwater
    vehicles globally are elements of both the present and future of
    maritime presence and naval warfare.
        We are moving ahead with a number of unmanned programs in the
    effort to rapidly integrate them into the fleet. The MQ-8B Fire Scout
    has already begun regular deployments. When USS Fort Worth deployed to
    Singapore recently the ship took a mixed aviation detachment of a
    manned MH-60R helicopter and MQ-8B UAV's. This kind of hybrid
    employment, pairing our manned and unmanned systems to take advantage
    of the strengths of each, will be a hallmark of our future approach to
    unmanned systems. The first operational variant of the larger and more
    capable next generation Fire Scout, the MQ-8C, was delivered in 2014.
    This aircraft will bring double the endurance and double the payload of
    the older versions.
        We continue to work toward a full start of the Unmanned Carrier
    Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike system (UCLASS) program. This
    unmanned addition to the air wings aboard our aircraft carriers is a
    vital part of the future of naval aviation. Full start of this program
    has been delayed pending a defense-wide review. Having the proper
    balance of long-endurance surveillance capabilities and the ability to
    grow into long range, penetrating strike missions in the future is
    critical. Development also continues of the unmanned underwater systems
    that are part of our future mine warfare capabilities. These systems
    will see formal operational testing in the Littoral Combat Ship program
    in 2016.
        Maintaining the required pace of Navy shipbuilding while continuing
    the recapitalization of our aviation assets and other platforms made
    necessary by our deployment cycles and operational tempo is a very real
    issue. It will necessitate continued leadership, oversight and
    management to make sure we develop innovative solutions and maximize
    the efficiency in our acquisition system. Building our platforms is a
    unique public-private partnership and a key economic engine in nearly
    every state in the union. It provides more than 100,000 high-skill,
    high-paying jobs and helps ensure the foundation of global prosperity
    and security that our naval presence has assured since World War II.
        Because cuts to our shipbuilding programs are the least reversible
    in their impact on our fundamental mission of providing presence and in
    their consequences to the industrial base and to our economy, I am
    committed, to the maximum extent possible, to preserve ship
    construction and to seek reductions in every other area first, should
    further budget reductions such as sequestration become reality.
    Power--Energy and Efficiency
        For 2 centuries the U.S. Navy has had a history of leadership in
    energy innovation, transitioning from wind to coal, coal to oil and
    finally pioneering nuclear power. Fueling the ships, aircraft, and
    vehicles of our Navy and Marine Corps is a vital operational concern
    and enables the global presence necessary to keep the Nation secure.
    But power and energy are also issues of national and international
    security.
        My responsibility as Secretary of the Navy is to ensure that the
    Navy and Marine Corps have the right people, with the right training
    and the right tools to defend our country. Power and energy are an
    important part of ensuring our people have what they need and can get
    where they are needed. It is a critical element of our presence and why
    Navy has always been an energy innovator.
        Throughout human history, access to resources has been a major
    source of conflict. Energy and fuel can and are being used as weapons.
    Threats against the shipping lanes in the Middle East, European
    dependence on Russian gas supplies and the impact of Russian energy
    dependence by the Ukraine are the subject of daily headlines. This is
    true regardless of the price of a barrel of oil, although the price
    decline of the last year has certainly impacted strategic calculations
    around the globe.
        Here in the United States, with domestic production up and new oil
    and gas reserves being discovered even as prices have fallen, energy
    still remains a security concern. Even if we were able to produce every
    single drop of oil or gas that America needs domestically, we cannot
    control the price. Oil is the ultimate global commodity, often traded
    on world markets based on speculation and rumor. Oil price instability
    is often the result of global instability, and prices fluctuate with
    little warning. The volatility of oil prices, both up and down, has
    been repeatedly demonstrated in recent years. Energy supply will remain
    an issue for many of our allies and for others around the globe,
    creating the potential for instability and even conflict.
        Operationally, energy matters now more than ever. The ships and
    aircraft that we deploy include advanced capabilities that make us the
    most effective expeditionary fighting force in the world. But our
    weapons platforms also use far more energy than their predecessors. Our
    ability to maximize our capabilities depends on having the energy
    available to power them.
        In 2009, I established formal energy goals for the Department of
    the Navy to help drive the Navy and Marine Corps to strengthen our
    combat effectiveness by using energy more efficiently and by
    diversifying our sources of power. From the deployment of hybrid
    electric drives, to the introduction of alternative fuels into the
    fleet, to the Marines' use of expeditionary power systems in
    Afghanistan, we have made real progress over the last few years.
        This past year, we christened USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000), which has an
    electric propulsion system. This system is state-of-the-art and will
    significantly reduce fuel demand, which is a critical part of ensuring
    we have the fuel to power next generation weapons, like the Laser
    Weapon System (LaWS) and the electro-magnetic rail gun. This past fall
    we commissioned USS America (LHA 6) which is driven by hybrid electric
    power plants. This is the same engineering design used in USS Makin
    Island (LHD 8) that, for her maiden deployment, cut her fuel
    consumption nearly in half when compared to other big deck amphibious
    ships. We also took delivery of two more Virginia-class submarines,
    with their advanced nuclear power systems that lead the world in
    efficiency and safety.
        Our shore installations, like our shipyards, are critical to our
    operations. We continuously strive to be smarter and improve energy
    efficiency at our installations. We are leveraging private sector
    funding to accomplish that goal. In fact, the Department of the Navy is
    on track to have awarded nearly $1 billion in energy savings
    performance contracts by December 2016. That's $1 billion to improve
    our infrastructure and lower our energy bills in the process. The
    Renewable Energy Program Office (REPO) coordinates and manages our goal
    of producing or procuring one gigawatt of cost-effective renewable
    energy for our bases. We will reach this goal by December of this year.
    The power we are buying through our REPO projects will be cheaper, over
    the life of the contract, than our current rates.
        Last September, we announced contracts with three companies that
    have committed to produce drop-in, military-compatible biofuels at
    operational quantities. Let me be clear: we are not obligated to buy
    fuel from any producer and do not intend to buy any fuels unless they
    are cost competitive. That said, it is critical we continue to use
    alternative fuels in our ships and aircraft to ensure operational
    flexibility. The private sector, including major airlines, is expanding
    the use of alternative fuels just as we are.
        Diversifying our energy supply for our ships, our aircraft, and our
    bases helps guarantee our presence and ability to respond to any
    crisis. Increasing our energy efficiency assures that we can remain on
    station longer or extend our range, without the delays and
    vulnerability of refueling. The benefits of competition, as we have
    demonstrated in shipbuilding, are always welcome. In these ways, our
    focus on power and energy is helping to ensure the U.S. Navy and Marine
    Corps remain the most powerful expeditionary fighting force in the
    world and their ability to protect and advance American interests
    around the globe.
    Partnerships--Naval Diplomacy and International Cooperation
        In the 21st century, to be effective, all nations and people that
    seek freedom and security have to carry their own share of the
    responsibility of defending the global system. A collective effort will
    assure our navies can provide the necessary presence to maintain
    freedom of navigation and maritime security around the world. Whether
    blue water or brown, America's Navy and our other allies and partners
    help assure stability and security, creating and strengthening global
    relationships, providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief,
    deterring adversaries when possible, and defeating aggression when
    necessary.
        Cooperation on the world's oceans helps us diffuse tensions, reduce
    misunderstandings, and limit conflict. The world's maritime tradition
    is nearly as old as human history. From harbors near the Arctic Circle
    and around the Mediterranean, from the littorals of Asia to the shores
    of Africa, the Americas and Australia, human civilizations have
    launched one great fleet after another toward the horizon. Again and
    again naval forces have proven themselves the most immediate, the most
    capable, and the most adaptable option when a crisis develops.
        This is even more true when like-minded navies, with similar
    national policy objectives, can find ways to work together. Whether
    exercising together in the Baltic or in Southeast Asia, operating
    against pirates in the Gulf of Aden, or cooperating to provide relief
    in the aftermath of natural disasters, the strong cooperation between
    the United States and our partners and allies makes a difference all
    over the globe. Partnerships are a key contributor to presence.
        Building partnerships and establishing trust between our Nation and
    our Navy and countries around the world is why I travel to visit with
    foreign military and governmental leaders. Those meetings are critical
    to building the relationships that can help us deter conflict or
    respond in a more coordinated and effective manner to manmade or
    natural crises. It is critical in my job as Secretary of the Navy to
    understand the global landscape and the security challenges--and
    opportunities. Briefings and PowerPoint slides can never match the
    value of firsthand observation and interactions, as anyone who has
    served aboard a ship, at a forward outpost, or in a warzone can tell
    you. As the old Navy saying goes, ``You can surge people and you can
    surge platforms, but you cannot surge trust.''
        Our rebalance to the Pacific continues to be an important part of
    our partnership efforts. We must have the right platforms in the right
    places to ensure our friends and allies understand our commitment.
    We're moving more ships to the central and western Pacific, including
    forward basing an additional fast attack submarine in Guam and as I
    mentioned earlier we are forward stationing four Littoral Combat Ships
    out of Singapore. We are ensuring that our most advanced platforms are
    in the Pacific, so we're increasing the number of DDG's with the
    Ballistic Missile Defense systems based in Japan and the P-8A maritime
    patrol aircraft are making their first rotational deployments in the
    region. In the longer term, by 2018 we will deploy an additional
        Amphibious Ready Group to the Indo-Pacific region and we will
    deploy a growing number of Joint High Speed Vessels and Mobile Landing
    Platforms there. With these changes, and others, by the end of the
    decade 60 percent of our fleet will be based in the Pacific, a fleet
    which will be larger than the one we have today.
        The Marine Corps is also building its capacity to work with our
    Indo-Pacific partners. We continue to increase the rotational
    deployment of marines to Australia, which will culminate in the regular
    rotational deployment of a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) of
    approximately 2,500 marines. The Marines have increased the size of
    this deployment from just over 200 marines to more than 1,000 and over
    the past year these marines out of Darwin have conducted exercises and
    theater security operations throughout the region. We are also
    continuing forward on the plan to base another MAGTF (part rotational,
    part permanent) of about 5,000 marines in Guam, which will become a
    central hub for many of our Pacific operations.
        This past year saw dramatic developments in Eastern Europe and the
    Black Sea region. The Navy and Marine Corps have been central to
    demonstrating support for our allies and friends and American interests
    in the region. Alongside the Marine Corps' Black Sea Rotational Force's
    operations in Eastern Europe, a series of Navy ships have deployed into
    the Black Sea to ensure freedom of navigation and work with our
    partners there. The bonds between America and Europe and our shared
    values remain as strong today as ever.
        That is demonstrated in one of the world's strongest and most
    enduring defense partnerships: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
    It is true that America's defense strategy calls for an increased focus
    on the Western Pacific, Arabian Gulf, and Indian Oceans. But that same
    strategy also ensures that we aren't turning away from our longstanding
    allies in Europe and also calls for renewing our commitment to NATO. A
    very concrete example of this is the move of four ballistic missile
    defense capable DDGs to Rota, Spain. All of these efforts are a
    continuation of NATO's 65-year mission to keep all nations free, and
    not to claim territory or tribute.
        This past summer,USS America sailed from the Gulf Coast, where it
    was built in Mississippi, around South America to its new homeport in
    San Diego. As America sailed through the Americas, the sailors and
    marines aboard conducted theater security cooperation activities with
    countries in the region, training together and helping to develop the
    skills needed to counter illicit trafficking and conduct combined
    operations. Our new Joint High Speed Vessels are also deploying to the
    Americas with the ability to operate for longer periods and carry
    adaptive payloads. Our security is undeniably tied to our neighbors and
    we are working with innovative and small-footprint approaches to
    enhance this.
        This past September, I invited the leaders of our partner navies in
    West Africa to join me for a series of discussions in Newport, RI,
    called the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Dialogue. Naval leaders
    from 16 nations bordering the Gulf of Guinea came to discuss how we
    could increase collaboration in a region where piracy, extremism,
    trafficking and insecurity of all types are on the rise. We discussed a
    unified code of conduct for maritime law enforcement and encouraged
    more direct cooperation in the region. As the economy in the Gulf of
    Guinea continues to grow, so does the increasing relevance of guarding
    against transnational crime like maritime terrorism and the illegal
    movement of drugs and weapons. The United States Navy and Marine Corps
    will continue to work with our partners in West Africa and help them
    improve their capabilities and promote collaboration.
        Sailors and marines of every nation have much in common with other
    sailors and marines. Working together, we become more inter-operable,
    we can provide key training and develop the operational capabilities of
    like-minded countries and navies. This in itself increases stability
    for the global system. It distributes the burdens and costs of maritime
    security and makes us all safer by reducing the likelihood of conflict.
    Direct engagement with foreign leaders by our Department's senior
    leadership is a central component of building the human connections
    that are critical to successful partnership and combined operations.
    They are a large part of what builds the international relationships,
    trust, and inter-operability that is central to our globalized world.
        In this interconnected world, threats know no boundary, no
    international lines, so the burden of security has to be shared. Across
    239 years of history our Navy and Marine Corps have worked with allies
    and friends. From suppressing the slave trade on the coast of Africa in
    the mid-19th century to the combined operations of World War II, the
    examples are endless. From the exercises I mentioned earlier like
    RIMPAC, Malabar, and Platinum Lion, to our multi-lateral and bilateral
    meetings with both uniformed and government leaders, to our combined
    operations like the search for Air Asia Flight 8501 and counter-piracy
    patrols off the Horn of Africa; these examples illustrate that the
    partnerships we build and maintain today remain critical to our global
    presence.
                       fiscal year 2016 budget submission
        The Department of the Navy's proposed budget for fiscal year 2016
    is designed with a focus on the three objectives laid out 2014
    Quadrennial Defense Review: protect the homeland, build security
    globally, and project power and win decisively when called upon. In
    doing so we have looked across the FYDP to maintain our ability to
    conduct the 10 primary missions listed in the Defense Strategic
    Guidance to 2020 and beyond. Overall the fiscal year 2016 President's
    Budget balances current readiness needed to execute assigned missions
    while sustaining a highly capable fleet, all within a tough fiscal
    climate.
        Our approach to this budget has focused on six objectives. First,
    maintain a credible and modern sea-based strategic deterrent. Second,
    sustain our forward global presence to ensure our ability to impact
    world events. Third, preserve both the capability and capacity to
    defeat an aggressor in one multi-phase contingency operation while
    simultaneously denying another aggressor the ability to achieve their
    objectives. Fourth, ensure that the force is adequately ready for these
    operations through critical afloat and shore readiness and personnel
    issues. Fifth, continue and affordably enhance our asymmetric
    capabilities. Finally, sustain our industrial base to ensure our future
    capabilities, particularly in shipbuilding.
        Even as we deal with today's fiscal limitations, we cannot let slip
    away the progress we've made in shipbuilding. It takes a long time,
    measured in years, to produce a deployable ship. As I noted earlier, it
    is the least reversible thing we might do to deal with budget
    constraints. If we miss a year, if we cancel a ship, it is almost
    impossible to recover those ships because of the time involved and the
    fragile industrial base. To do the job America and our leaders expect
    and demand of us, we have to have those gray hulls on the horizon.
        This budget results in a 2020 fleet of 304 ships. We will purchase
    Virginia-class attack submarines at a rate of 2 per year for a total of
    10 across the FYDP, with the inclusion of the Virginia Payload Module
    by fiscal year 2019 for at least 1 boat per year. We also will continue
    to procure Arleigh Burke-class destroyers at a rate of 2 per year, with
    the first Flight III DDG funded in fiscal year 2016 and delivered in
    fiscal year 2021. Fourteen ships of the Littoral Combat Ship-class, of
    which at least the last five will be the frigate variant, will also be
    procured in this FYDP. We will also continue the construction of
    amphibious ships, mobile landing platforms, high speed vessels, and
    combat logistics ships.
        This budget carries on the development of the future carrier air
    wing. Procurement of both the F-35C and F-35B continues, with initial
    operating capability (IOC) of the F-35C coming sometime in late fiscal
    year 2018 or early fiscal year 2019. Our multi-year procurement of the
    E-2D will now include the introduction of inflight refueling capability
    for the new aircraft. We are continuing the integration and procurement
    of the Small Diameter Bomb II for the F/A-18 and fund advancements to
    the Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile to reach IOC for Block I in
    fiscal year 2017. The budget also funds the EA-18G into its Full
    Operating Capability and full air wing integration in fiscal year 2017,
    and we continue the development of the Next Generation Jammer.
        We are accelerating the purchase of P-8A maritime patrol aircraft
    to reverse the reductions that were made due to sequester cuts. Our
    plan is to complete the buy in fiscal year 2019 and have the entire
    inventory of 109 aircraft by the end of the FYDP. We are also
    addressing the future of our logistics support and carrier onboard-
    delivery aircraft. This budget funds the purchase of 24 Navy V-22
    Tiltrotor aircraft across the FYDP, with an IOC for Navy squadrons of
    fiscal year 2021.
        In order to face potential adversaries who are building
    technologically advanced platforms and weapons of their own, we must
    move forward on our development of new and innovative systems. This
    budget funds the accelerated acquisition of the Long Range Anti-Ship
    Missile (LRASM), which will reach early operating capability on the B-1
    in fiscal year 2018 and with F/A-18s in fiscal year 2019. We are also
    continuing procurement of SM-6 missiles. Funding for the next leap
    forward in weapons technologies, such as the LaWS and railgun programs,
    are included as well as the precision-guided Hyper-Velocity Projectile
    (HVP) for both our 5-inch guns (by fiscal year 2019) and for the
    railgun once development is complete.
        The fiscal year 2016 budget also places priority on emerging
    capabilities in the cyber and electronic warfare efforts. We will
    continue to recruit and train top talent to form 40 cyber mission teams
    by the end of 2016. We also include funding for Operation Rolling Tide
    and the results of Task Force Cyber Awakening, which invests in
    enhancements to our networks for cyber defense-in-depth, including
    defense solutions for ships, security improvements for our command and
    control networks, and the expansion of some of our defense initiatives
    to tactical IT systems. The Navy is developing capabilities to deliver
    cyber effects from land and sea-based platforms. We are continuing the
    build of the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) satellites with an IOC
    expected in fiscal year 2016 and the launch of the fifth satellite in
    late 2016.
        The Marine Corps end strength will hold at 184,000 marines for 2016
    while leadership assesses the impact of the drawdown that has been
    conducted over the past 4 years. This pause is for 1 year only. The
    marines will draw down to 182,100 under this budget in 2017. After
    coming down by 18,000 marines, we need to ensure we have the right
    number of small unit leaders and their ability to prepare their marines
    for deployment. We must also make sure that units preparing for
    overseas operations have adequate time and ability to train and to
    maintain unit cohesion.
        The Marine Corps will begin procurement and testing of the next
    generation ground combat maneuver capability, starting with the Joint
    Light Tactical Vehicle. We will also award engineering manufacturing
    and development contracts to two vendors to produce Amphibious Combat
    Vehicle 1.1 prototypes for testing and evaluations. The F-35B program
    also remains a high priority for the Marine Corps, and this budget
    ramps up production of airframes with the plan to stand up a third F-
    35B squadron by fiscal year 2018. These programs are important to our
    ability to maintain the Marine Corps as the Nation's expeditionary
    force-in-readiness. Our ability to remain forward engaged and ready to
    respond to crisis is dependent on the readiness of our forward deployed
    and home station units. The Marine Corps must remain the most ready
    when the Nation is least ready.
        Our support for our sailors and marines and their families is
    evident in the personnel initiatives in this budget, many of which were
    described earlier. We are continuing the Compensation Reform and
    Quality of Service initiatives that we first proposed in the budget for
    fiscal year 2015. This includes increasing our requested pay raise from
    1.0 percent to 1.3 percent in fiscal year 2016. To ensure fairness
    across the force, this budget also makes certain that every active duty
    family members has the option to receive health care with no co-pays/
    cost share regardless of their assigned duty station, including remote
    locations. The re-investment in our talented and innovative workforce
    also continues from the fiscal year 2015 budget to this one, including
    the new sea duty incentive pays and bonuses, barracks improvements for
    our junior personnel, and improved fleet training and spares
    availability to ensure our men and women have the tools they need to
    get their jobs done.
        The American people have every right to expect that after coming
    out of two wars there would be savings in the defense budget. Our
    Department is continuing its reform of acquisition practices, including
    fundamental changes to how we contract for services. We are
    establishing additional discipline in the contractual services
    process--from requirements to tracking to execution to surveillance--
    that ensures the integrity of the system remains high and to guard
    against fraud. Also, as a result of reformed contracting processes, we
    fully expect in this budget to achieve the reductions in contractual
    services that we began in last year, realigning those resources to
    buying more material equipment and readiness for the force.
        We continue to aggressively implement acquisition practices that
    improve the return for each taxpayer dollar we spend. Improved
    management of requirements, multiyear procurements, appropriate
    incentive contracts, additional competitions, and small business
    initiatives are but a few of the tools we are using to maximize the
    return on each dollar we invest on behalf of the taxpayer. However, the
    way some of the budget reductions have been executed in the law,
    through continuing resolutions and the sequester, have made planning
    virtually impossible and have not allowed us to approach reductions in
    a strategic way. After the initial return of a moderate amount of
    stability following last year's Bipartisan Budget Act and the recent
    Omnibus Spending Bill, the President's Budget for fiscal year 2016
    continues this stability to the Department's planning for the future.
    In order to maintain our constitutional responsibility to ``provide for
    and maintain a Navy,'' we must work together to ensure that our Navy
    and Marine Corps remain the most powerful expeditionary fighting force
    in the world.
        Over the past 3 years, the Navy and Marine Corps have had to make
    tough choices across a wide range of competing priorities in order to
    deal with funding instability. This proposed budget submission for
    fiscal year 2016 maintains the minimums necessary to accomplish the
    missions required by the DSG. We continue to accept some risk to our
    capacity to complete all ten of the missions, and we have continued
    reductions to the maintenance funds for our shore infrastructure,
    elements of our weapons capacity, and selected aviation accounts. While
    these reductions were seen as the most reversible, over a longer period
    of time the expenses have continued to add up. Because we have already
    taken these savings, a return to the funding level required by the 2011
    Budget Control Act certainly will have more dramatic impacts.
                                   conclusion
        In 2015 we commemorate the bicentennial of the end of the War of
    1812. At the Battle of New Orleans a joint force of sailors, marines,
    soldiers, and volunteers repelled a veteran British Army, battle
    hardened by their war against Napoleon. From the Navy's small
    combatants and gunboats that attacked the landing force in Lake Borgne,
    to the gunnery crews who joined the Army's artillery on the field of
    battle at Chalmette Plantation, sailors and marines ensured the defense
    of our homeland against invasion. Only weeks later off the coast of
    Africa, Captain Charles Stewart and USS Constitution fought the war's
    final battle at sea, bringing an end to the conflict that established
    the U.S. Navy as a player on the world's stage.
        When America has called, the Navy and Marine Corps have always been
    there. Two hundred years ago our squadrons sailed for the shores of
    Africa and the Second Barbary War, having just concluded that decisive
    role in the War of 1812. One hundred and fifty years ago, Admiral
    Farragut sailed up through Mobile Bay during the Civil War. One hundred
    years ago, as the first World War began, we prepared for convoy
    operations and anti-submarine missions in the battle for control of the
    Atlantic. Seventy years ago, sailors and marines fought their way
    across the Pacific toward Japan. For all of those 200 plus years, and
    continuing today, the Navy and Marine Corps have been ready to fight
    and to win our Nation's wars, whether coming from the sea or on, above
    or beneath the sea.
        Today, from the coast of Africa to the wide expanse of the Pacific,
    from the Arctic to the Antarctic, our sailors and marines continue to
    deploy to protect and defend the American people and our national
    interests. They, and our Navy and Marine Corps civilians, continue to
    ensure that America's Away Team is ready and present around the world,
    prepared for action in times of crisis or working with our partners in
    in times of peace.
        The United States of America faces an international security
    environment full of uncertainty. To face that world, the funding levels
    in the Department of the Navy's proposed budget for fiscal year 2016
    reflect the resources required to rapidly respond to a diverse scope of
    contingencies spanning extremist organizations, pandemic diseases and
    natural disasters, while continuing to deter assertive actors across
    the globe through our expeditionary presence and dominant warfighting
    capability. These investments will continue to provide the best value
    in dealing with that dynamic security environment, as well as securing
    and strengthening our own and the global economy.
        In order to ensure that we continue to provide the Navy and Marine
    Corps our Nation's leaders the American people have come to expect, the
    Commandant and Chief of Naval Operations and I look forward to working
    with this committee and Congress. From maintaining our momentum on our
    plan to build to a fleet of 304 by the end of the decade, to our
    continued efforts to purchase the aircraft, vehicles and weapons
    detailed in our budget submission, to the priority of ensuring we
    maintain and retain the talented sailors, marines, and civilians who
    make it all possible, we will need to work together. We look forward to
    answering your questions, at this hearing and in the future. We will
    continue to work to provide for, and maintain, our Navy and Marine
    Corps because, as President Theodore Roosevelt once said, ``A good Navy
    is not a provocation to war. It is the surest guaranty of peace.''

      [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman McCain. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and the complete
    statements that have been submitted by all three of you will be
    included in the record.
        General Dunford?

    STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., COMMANDANT OF THE
                              MARINE CORPS

        General Dunford. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and
    distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to be here
    today with Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert to represent
    your marines. I will begin by thanking the committee for your
    steadfast support. Due to your leadership, we have fielded the
    best trained and equipped Marine Corps our Nation has ever sent
    to war.
        I know this committee and the American people have high
    expectations for Marines as our expeditionary ready force. You
    expect your Marines to operate forward, engage with our
    partners, deter potential adversaries, and respond to crises,
    and when we fight, you expect us to win. You expect a lot from
    your marines, and you should. This morning as you hold this
    hearing, over 31,000 marines are forward deployed and engaged
    in doing exactly what you would expect of them.
        Our role as the Nation's expeditionary ready force informs
    how we man, train, and equip the force. It also prioritizes the
    allocation of resources that we receive from Congress. Over the
    last few years, we have prioritized the readiness of our
    forward deployed forces. These are the forces you can count on
    for immediate crisis response. These are the forces that
    supported the recent evacuation of United States citizens in
    South Sudan, Libya, and Yemen. These forces are currently
    conducting strikes in Syria and Iraq, training the Iraqi army,
    and protecting our embassy in Baghdad. These are 22,500 marines
    in the Pacific west of the international dateline.
        I can assure you that your forward deployed marines are
    well-trained, well-led, and well-equipped, but we have had to
    make tough choices to deal with the effects of two wars,
    sequestration in 2013, and reduced budgets in 2014 into 2015.
    In order to maintain the readiness of our forward deployed
    forces, we have not sufficiently invested in our home station
    readiness, modernization, infrastructure sustainment, and
    quality of life programs. As a result, approximately one-half
    of our non-deployed units--those are the units you depend on
    for unforeseen contingencies--are suffering personnel,
    equipment, and training shortfalls. In a major conflict, these
    shortfalls will result in a delayed response and/or the
    unnecessary loss of American lives.
        Over time, under investing in modernization will result in
    maintaining older and obsolete equipment at higher cost and
    degraded capabilities. In many areas, funding levels are
    forcing us to maintain legacy capabilities instead of
    innovating and adapting for tomorrow's threats. It will
    eventually erode our competitive advantage, and we do not ever
    want our marines and sailors in an unfair fight.
        The readiness challenges we have today provide context for
    my message this morning. We can meet the requirements of the
    defense strategic guidance with the President's Budget, but
    there is no margin. BCA funding levels will exacerbate the
    challenges that we have today. It will also result in a Marine
    Corps with fewer available active duty battalions and squadrons
    than would be required for a single major contingency. Perhaps
    more concerning, it will result in fewer marines and sailors
    being forward deployed and in a position to immediately respond
    to crises involving our diplomatic posts, American citizens, or
    U.S. interests. As we saw in the wake of Benghazi, the American
    people expect us to respond to today's crisis today, and we can
    only do that if we are properly postured forward.
        In closing, my assessment is that funding below the
    President's Budget level will require that we develop a new
    strategy. Thank you once again for the opportunity to appear
    before you this morning and for your leadership in addressing
    today's fiscal challenges. I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Dunford follows:]
               Prepared Statement by General Joseph Dunford, USMC
                                  introduction
        The Marine Corps is the Nation's expeditionary force-in-readiness.
    Congress, specifically and uniquely, structured and prescribed the role
    of the Marine Corps as a ``. . . balanced force-in-readiness, air and
    ground . . . to suppress or contain international disturbances short of
    large scale war.'' Under this mandate, marines are forward-deployed,
    forward-engaged, and postured to shape events, manage instability,
    project influence, and immediately respond to crises. As an inherently
    joint combined arms team, marines assure access and enable heavier
    contingency forces to deploy from the United States in response to a
    major contingency.
        Also, to meet the intent of Congress, the Marine Corps must
    maintain a high state of combat readiness. We look at readiness through
    the lens of our five pillars of readiness--high quality people, unit
    readiness, capacity to meet the combatant commanders' requirements,
    infrastructure sustainment, and equipment modernization. These pillars
    represent the operational and foundational components of readiness
    across the Marine Corps. Our role as America's 9-1-1 force informs how
    we man, train, and equip our force, and how we prioritize and allocate
    resources across the pillars of readiness. While we will always ensure
    that our forward-deployed marines and sailors are properly manned,
    trained, and equipped, we seek to maintain balanced investment across
    the pillars to ensure current and future readiness. We emphasize that
    all marines and all Marine units are physically and mentally ready to
    deploy to any clime and place, at anytime.
        The Marine Corps is a force of economy. For 6.0 percent of the
    defense budget, the Marine Corps provides 21 percent of the Nation's
    infantry battalions and 15 percent of the fighter/attack aircraft.
    These capabilities, organized as Marine Air Ground Task Forces with an
    organic logistical element, unprecedented complexity.
                              strategic landscape
        The challenges of the future operating environment will demand that
    our Nation maintains a force-in-readiness that is capable of global
    response. The strategic landscape will be characterized by competition
    for natural resources, violent extremism, natural disasters, social
    unrest, cyber-attacks, regional conflict, and proliferation of advanced
    weaponry and weapons of mass destruction. The expansion of modern
    conventional and cyber weapons to a broader range of state and non-
    state entities, along with the erosion of U.S. technological advantages
    in areas where we have long enjoyed relative superiority, is likely to
    continue. Further, the actions of transnational criminal organizations
    and violent extremist groups will continue to contribute to regional
    unrest and instability that directly threaten U.S. interests through
    piracy, trafficking and terrorism. The United States must expect a
    security landscape characterized by volatility, instability and
    complexity, and a growing potential among adversaries to employ weapons
    of mass destruction.
        As marines, we view global security challenges from a maritime
    perspective. The majority of these challenges reside in the congested
    and diverse areas where the sea and land merge--the littorals. Today,
    more than 80 percent of the world's population currently resides within
    100 miles of a coastline and this proportion is continuing to rise.
    Most maritime activities such as commercial shipping, fishing, and oil
    and gas extraction take place within 200 miles of the shore. It is no
    accident that the so-called ``Arc of Instability'' encompasses the
    littoral areas of South Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa. These
    geographic and demographic trends indicate a future security
    environment with a significant maritime element.
        We expect that the next 10 years will be largely characterized by
    small-scale crises and limited contingencies in and around coastal
    environments. Should major operations and campaigns occur, they are
    likely to involve a significant maritime and littoral dimension. Ready,
    responsive, flexible, and strategically mobile naval forces are
    essential to ensuring continued access and security in the global
    commons. The increased likelihood of operations in the littorals
    demands the Marine Corps focus on its Title 10 responsibilities to be
    organized, trained, and equipped to come from the sea across the range
    of military operations.
        America's responsibility as a world leader requires an approach to
    the current and future strategic landscape that leverages the forward
    presence of our military forces in support of our diplomatic and
    economic approaches. As stated in the 2012 President's Defense
    Strategic Guidance, ``The United States will continue to lead global
    efforts with capable allies and partners to assure access to and use of
    the global commons, both by strengthening international norms of
    responsible behavior and by maintaining relevant and interoperable
    military capabilities.'' The Marine Corps' unique capabilities support
    this strategic approach.
                                  your marines
        In 2014, marines responded to crises around the world and remained
    forward-deployed and forward-engaged managing instability, building
    partner capacity, strengthening alliances, and projecting influence.
    Your marines demonstrated the relevance of expeditionary naval forces
    by executing more than 30 amphibious operations, 150 Theater Security
    Cooperation (TSC) events, and 130 exercises around the globe. While we
    have drawn down our forces in Afghanistan, our operational tempo
    remains extraordinarily high. Most marines in the operating forces are
    is a strong demand signal for marines and tailored Marine Air Ground
    Task Forces.
    Operation Enduring Freedom--Afghanistan
        In 2014, the Marine Corps contributed to the mission in Afghanistan
    by training, advising and assisting the Afghanistan National Security
    Forces (ANSF) and supporting the fight against terrorism in Southwest
    Asia. Our operations focused on ensuring the success of the Afghanistan
    elections in the summer of 2014 and transitioning security
    responsibilities to the ANSF. With marines serving in an advisory
    capacity, the ANSF retained control of all district centers in Helmand
    Province. Regional Command (SW) also turned over operational
    responsibilities to the International Security Assistance Force Joint
    Command facilitating redeployment of Marine Expeditionary Brigade-
    Afghanistan (MEB-A) to home station. Today, a residual Marine presence
    continues to support the Resolute Support Mission (NATO)/Operation
    Freedom's Sentinel (United States) in Afghanistan.
        In more than 13 years of combat operations, 377 marines were killed
    and 4,946 injured in Afghanistan. We remember their selfless service
    and many sacrifices. Our success in RC-SW is directly related to the
    high quality men and women in our ranks, the training that prepared
    them to face the rigors of combat, and the equipment that provided
    protection and a tactical edge over the enemy. Due to the enduring
    support ofCongress and the American people, the marines who fought in
    Afghanistan had the training and equipment necessary to accomplish the
    mission. The full support of Congress for a variety of initiatives such
    as Mine Resistant Armor Protected Vehicles and upgraded individual
    protective equipment saved lives and enhanced combat effectiveness.
    Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG/MEU) Operations
        Our preferred method of deploying our marines is aboard Navy
    amphibious ships to form ARG/MEU Teams. These are the Nation's most-
    ready, forward-postured forces. This capability provides strategic
    speed, agility, and options to our National Command Authority. They
    operate in international waters retaining flexibility for the
    geographic combatant commander (GCC) while respecting the sovereign
    territory of individual nation states. The ARG/MEU team can respond
    faster from longer ranges with greater capabilities across the ROMO
    than any other conventional forces in the Department of Defense (DOD)
    and are also capable of enabling joint, interagency, and coalition
    forces. In 2014, the 11th, 13th, 22d, 24th, and 31st Marine
    Expeditionary Units (MEU) deployed and contributed to combatant
    commander requirements by participating in numerous exercises and
    operations throughout the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), U.S. Pacific
    Command (PACOM), U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), and U.S. European
    Command (EUCOM) areas of responsibility (AOR). When required, the ARG/
    MEU has the scalability and versatility to respond to simultaneous
    emergencies. Last summer, the 22d MEU/Bataan ARG was operating in the
    CENTCOM AOR conducting operations in Yemen. When needed, elements of
    the ARG/MEU rapidly transited into the Mediterranean Sea to support the
    suspension of embassy operations in Libya and relocation of its staff.
    During their return, they launched a force over 1,200 miles to
    contribute to the initial response to counter the Islamic State of Iraq
    and Syria. Concurrently, elements of the ARG/MEU continued to support
    United States operations in Yemen. Over the last year, we have also
    increased collaboration with SOF, significantly improving our
    complementary capabilities.
        Due to their forward presence, flexibility, ability to respond
    quickly and the decision space they afford our leaders, ARG/MEUs
    continue to be in high demand. Unfortunately, the Navy and Marine Corps
    can meet less than half of the GCC ARG/MEU crisis response force demand
    Corps forces stand ready aboard ships to assure allies, deter potential
    adversaries, and provide persistent U.S. presence. Our marines are
    forward deployed, with little to no footprint ashore, to respond and
    protect U.S. national security interests around the globe.
    Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force--Crisis Response
            Operations
        With the high demand for Marine crisis response capabilities and
    the shortage of amphibious platforms from which to forward deploy
    forces, Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force-Crisis Response
    (SPMAGTF-CR) were developed. While they don't provide the flexibility
    and responsiveness of an ARG/MEU, they mitigate a capability gap for
    the combatant commanders. Our SPMAGTF-CRs are tailored to respond to
    crisis and also conduct security cooperation activities with partner
    nations in order to develop interoperability, facilitate access, build
    partner capacity and security relationships, and gain regional
    understanding. This past year, SPMAGTF-CR units assigned to AFRICOM
    positioned forward in Moron, Spain, and Signonella, Italy safeguarded
    the lives of our diplomatic personnel and conducted military-assisted
    departures from the United States Embassy in South Sudan in January and
    our embassy in Libya in July. The Marine Corps SPMAGTF-CR unit assigned
    to CENTCOM (SPMAGTF-CR-CC) became fully operational on 1 November 2014
    and deployed to the CENTCOM AOR. Since November, SPMAGTF-CR-CC
    conducted embassy reinforcement, TSC exercises, and provided critical
    aviation and ground capabilities in the fight against ISIL. Most
    recently, marines from SPMAGTF-CR-CC supported the evacuation of our
    Embassy in Sana'a, Yemen. A third SPMAGTF deployed in support of U.S.
    Southern Command from June to September aboard USS America on her
    transit around the South American continent and The placement of these
    Marine Corps tailored task force capabilities forward, where GCCs need
    them, provides enhanced diplomatic protection and additional crisis
    response options.
    Marine Corps in the Pacific
        The Marine Corps' activities in the Pacific are led by III Marine
    Expeditionary Force (III MEF) headquartered on Okinawa, Japan. This
    past year, III MEF conducted 52 operations and exercises. In 2014, III
    MEF conducted Exercise SSong Yong--the largest amphibious exercise of
    the year with our Korean allies further demonstrating the United States
    commitment to South Korea. III MEF plays an important role in
    maintaining stability in East Asia and significantly contributes to
    peace and prosperity throughout the region. A number of TSC exercises
    were conducted using Maritime Prepositioning Ships. While these
    platforms were designed to deliver heavy equipment for a major
    contingency, adapting them for day-to-day engagement enabled us to
    better support the combatant commander's theater campaign plan and
    mitigated the number of amphibious lift in the Pacific.
        The Marine Corps continues to rebalance its force lay-down in the
    Pacific to support the Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG). The
    Distributed Laydown's planned end state of four geographically
    distributed, politically sustainable and operationally resilient MAGTFs
    in the Pacific (Australia, Guam, Japan, and Hawaii) is a long-term
    effort that will span the next 15 years. In 2014, we met the Secretary
    of Defense's guidance to have 22,500 marines west of the International
    Date Line, forward based and operating within the Asia-Pacific Theater.
    Marine rotational force-Darwin (MRF-D), based at Robertson Barracks, is
    in its third year of execution, and has rotated 1,263 marines through
    Darwin conducting bilateral training and exercises. This capable of
    Humanitarian Response/Disaster Relief (HA/DR), TSC, and crisis response
    operations. MRF-D has strengthened our alliance with our Australian
    allies and provided the GCC an immediate response option in the wake of
    an unforeseen crisis.
    Black Sea Rotational Force, Embassy Security Forces, and Theater
            Security Cooperation
        Marine Corps operational commitments span across all GCCs
    contributing to stronger alliances, stable international order, and
    security for our diplomatic stations. In the Republic of Georgia, the
    Marine Corps prepared three Georgian infantry battalions for their
    deployment to Afghanistan. There, the Georgian forces provided force
    protection and executed Quick Reaction Force (QRF) missions as the ISAF
    mission transitioned to the Resolute Support Mission. Enabling the
    deployment of Georgian battalions reduced the requirement for United
    States forces in Afghanistan while providing the commander with the
    requisite capabilities.
        In support of our strong commitment to the security and stability
    in Europe, Marines of the Black Sea Rotational Force (BSRF) mission
    conducted hundreds of TSC activities in EUCOM and provided a
    significant crisis response option for the EUCOM commander.
    Additionally, Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Teams provided forward-
    deployed platoons to four geographic combatant commanders in support of
    dynamic mission tasking such as embassy reinforcement in Baghdad, Iraq
    and Sana'a, Yemen.
        The 2015 President's National Security Strategy emphasizes the
    security of American citizens. This past year the Marine Corps worked
    closely with the State Department to increase baseline security at high
    risk embassies and consulates. Today marines are routinely serving at
    173 embassies and consulates in 141 countries around the globe. In
    2014, the Marine Corps Embassy Security Group added 237 Marine Security
    Guards (MSG) to new and current posts including Iraq, Lebanon, and
    Turkey. These marines represent our initial installment towards the
    additional 1,000 MSG requirement from Congress. The Marine Security
    Augmentation Unit (MSAU) also deployed 29 times at the request of the
    State Department executing 16 Embassy/Consulate security missions and
    13 VIP (POTUS/VPOTUS/SECSTATE) security missions. MSAU marines deployed
    to Iraq, Israel, South Korea, Chad, China, Poland, Philippines, France,
    Bahrain, Romania, Australia, Brazil, United Kingdom, Kenya, Ukraine,
    South Sudan, Turkey, Mexico, and Thailand.
                       fiscal year 2016 budget priorities
        The President's Budget for fiscal year 2016 (PB16) allocates $24
    billion to the Marine Corps' baseline budget. To meet our
    responsibilities as the Nation's 9-1-1 force, we prioritized near-term
    readiness while assuming risk in our home station readiness,
    modernization, infrastructure, and quality-of-life programs. We will
    attempt to reestablish an acceptable balance across the five Pillars of
    Readiness across the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). The following is
    a detailed description of the Marine Corps' budget priorities supported
    by PB16 of Force Structure, ACV, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV),
    JSF, CH-53K, C4, and naval programs of interest.
    Force Structure
        In 2010, the Marine Corps' internal force structure review
    concluded that the Marine Corp's optimal size to meet the requirements
    of the President's National Security Strategy was 186,800. This optimal
    size gives the Marine Corps the capacity we need to meet current steady
    state demand with a deployment-to-dwell (D2D) ratio greater than 1:2.
    We continue to support this review and conclusion. Today, the Marine
    Corps continues to execute its end strength reductions that began
    during fiscal year 2012, reducing the Corps from a high of 202,000. The
    Marine Corps is adjusting its active duty end strength to 182,000
    marines by 2017, emphasizing the enduring requirement to provide crisis
    response forces that meet today's demand. We can meet the DSG at this
    level, but with less than optimal time between deployments to train and
    allow marines to be with their families.
        Our most significant readiness challenge is the gap in the numbers
    of unit leaders with the right grade, experience, technical and
    leadership qualifications associated with their billets. Specifically,
    our current inventory of noncommissioned officers (NCO) and staff
    noncommissioned officers (SNCOs) is not meeting our force structure
    requirements. This dynamic directly affects our training, maintenance,
    and discipline resulting in degraded readiness and combat
    effectiveness. The Marine Corps' PB16 military personnel budget funds a
    fiscal year 2016 end strength of 184,000 in our base and supports
    right-sizing our NCO corps to provide our marines the small unit
    leadership they deserve.
    Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV)
        The Marine Corps appreciates the support of Congress in
    restructuring the ACV program in the fiscal year 2015 appropriations
    bill. That action has set us on a path to publishing a Request for
    Proposals (RFP) to industry in March of this year and enables a truly
    'streamlined acquisition process. Leveraging the stability of the
    Services' requirements and the mature technologies of nondevelopmental,
    modern, wheeled, armored combat vehicles, the combat developers and
    acquisition professionals have developed a way forward to field a
    capability for the marines in as little as 6 (vice 13 or more) years.
    Consistent with Marine Corps Ground Combat and Tactical Vehicle
    Strategy (GCTVS) and Expeditionary Force 21, the Amphibious Combat
    Vehicle (ACV) will be developed and procured in phases to incrementally
    field modern replacements for the aging Amphibious Assault Vehicle
    (AAV).
        The program is based on the most current threat projections and
    anticipated operational requirements, and is fully informed by the real
    world challenges that our marines have faced during 14 years of
    sustained combat. The ACV will provide our ground maneuver forces the
    ability to negotiate the challenging urban and cross-country terrain of
    the littorals while protecting them from ballistic and explosive
    threats and supporting them with precision heavy machine gun fire.
        The President's Budget fully funds ACV 1.1 within the FYDP. PB16
    will buy 86 vehicles over the FYDP or approximately 42 percent of the
    204 ACV 1.1 vehicles in the Approved Acquisition Objective (AAO). When
    Full Operational Capability (FOC) is achieved in fiscal year 2023, we
    will have modernized two Assault Amphibian (AA) Companies currently
    equipped with 4 decades old AAVs with 204 new vehicles. ACV 1.1 plus
    the 1.2 increment are currently planned to modernize 6 of 10 AA
    Companies. With PB16 funding, the Marine Corps will achieve Initial
    Operational Capability (IOC) which consists of an ACV platoon of 21
    armored vehicles, providing protected amphibious lift to an infantry
    company. IOC is achieved when the platoon is fully equipped, the unit
    is fully trained and judged combat ready for deployment, and the
    required maintenance and support personnel are in place to sustain the
    unit.
        The need for self-deploying, high-water speed vehicles remains our
    ultimate objective. The capability to come from the sea and operate in
    the littorals will be significantly dependent on the speed at which we
    can maneuver. ACV 1.1 provides a responsible and effective approach to
    mitigating the age of our AAV fleet while investing in needed
    capabilities for tomorrow. We will continue to prioritize our science
    and technology efforts to field an amphibious combat vehicle that will
    fully support our operating concepts in the future.
    Joint Light Tactical Vehicle
        Over the past 14 years of combat, we found that the HMMWV utility
    vehicle was not adequate for the modern battlefield due to its
    vulnerability to improvised explosive devices (IED). In 2006, we began
    development of a light tactical vehicle that could combine the land
    mobility performance, transportability profile and payload of the HMMWV
    with the protection of a combat vehicle within the weight constraints
    of the expeditionary force. Today, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle
    Program has three exceptionally strong designs in competition that will
    realize the initiating concept in production and deployment while
    increasing the protected mobility of the highest risk portion of the
    light combat and tactical vehicle fleet.
        The JLTV program is in the engineering and manufacturing
    development (EMD) phase with Milestone C and the low rate initial
    production contract award scheduled for fiscal year 2015. The PB16
    supports the Marine Corps' strategy to reach IOC for JLTV in the fourth
    quarter of fiscal year 2018 and FOC in the fourth quarter of fiscal
    year 2021. IOC consists of one infantry battalion fully fielded with
    the JLTV plus a training element.
        Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF), MARSOC, and critical
    supporting establishment training units will also be allocated a
    portion of PB16 funded vehicles. Vehicles will be allocated by unit
    based on the JLTV Fielding Plan, currently in development in support of
    Milestone C decision in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2015. PB16
    will buy 4,476 vehicles over the FYDP, or approximately 80 percent of
    the increment 1--5,500 vehicles--Approved Acquisition Objective (AAO).
    Joint Strike Fighter
        Our tried and true F/A-18s, AV-8Bs, and EA-68 Prowlers have
    performed magnificently in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, providing
    our Marine riflemen the fires they needed, in every clime and place
    from sea bases large and small, and expeditionary bases ashore. With
    the help of Congress, we have kept these aircraft as modern as possible
    and extracted every ounce of readiness we can from them; however, the
    high operational tempo has pushed these aircraft to more rapidly
    approach the end of their service lives. Due to the uncertainty
    prevalent in today's global security environment, the Nation requires
    we maintain a capability to respond quickly in contested regions
    regardless of weather conditions. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF),
    as part of the MAGTF, meets the Nation's needs.
        The Marine Corps remains committed to the recapitalization of our
    aging TACAIR fleet through the procurement of the F-35. The JSF brings
    a new capability to the battalion sized forces that sail with our
    Marine Expeditionary Units. Today, there are a multitude of high risk
    regions where a crisis response operation would require large joint
    strike packages to soften or blind the threat. These packages would
    have to include cruise missiles, fighter aircraft, electronic warfare
    platforms, aircraft which specialize in suppression and destruction of
    enemy air defenses, and strike aircraft--just for U.S. forces to gain
    access. Such strike packages require coordination across Services and
    combatant commands and take weeks and months to assemble. This same
    kind of access can be attained with a single detachment of four to
    eight F-35s--the same sized detachment which will reside with a Marine
    Expeditionary Unit. For major contingencies, a surge of F-35s to our
    amphibious carrier decks and forward austere bases enables even greater
    options and striking power. The F-35 provides a transformational
    capability to the Marine Corps and the Joint Force. It gives our Nation
    a day one, full spectrum capability against the most critical and
    prohibitive threats.
        The Marine Corps prioritizes putting our TACAIR as close to our
    infantry as we can by basing them from amphibious carriers or austere
    Forward Operating Bases and Forward Arming and Refueling Points ashore.
    This places the F-35's transformational capabilities in the hands of
    the infantry marine. The Marine rifleman is now supported immediately
    with close air support, electronic warfare capabilities, and
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support in threat and
    weather conditions which previously would have denied aviation support.
    The F-35's ability to develop, process, and display information to the
    pilot and disseminate it at tactical, operational, and strategic levels
    is what makes the platform truly unique, ``a server in the sky'' for
    the MAGTF. The sensors and communications equipment of our F-35s allow
    pilots and forward air controllers to see through the clouds to
    exchange high fidelity pictures in environments we would consider a no
    go today. Enhancing the C2, strike and intel capabilities of the MAGTF
    commander, the F-35 transforms the MAGTF into an element capable of
    penetrating any AOR in the world to set the conditions necessary to
    enable follow-on forces.
        The Marine Corps has maintained the lead in this transformational
    platform. The F-358 and C models will replace the over 23-year-old F/
    A-18 Hornet, 18-year-old AV-88 Harrier, and the 27-year-old EA-68
    Prowler; the same aircraft that have been passed from fathers to sons
    and daughters now serving. We have stood up our first two squadrons
    ofF-35Bs and will stand up a third in 2016. PB16 supports the Marine
    Corps' timeline to achieve IOC of its first F-358 squadron later this
    year and complete full transition by 2031. With the OPTEMPO expected to
    remain high, we will transition to F-35s as rapidly as possible.
    Continued congressional support for this transition is key to
    increasing our degraded aviation readiness and minimizing our exposure
    to ever increasing operations and support costs for aged aircraft.
    CH-53K
        The CH-53E, the Marine Corps' heavy lift helicopter, is the only
    vertical heavy lift helicopter in DOD. Like its predecessors, the CH-
    53A/D, the CH-53E has continued a proud lineage of worldwide support of
    the Marine rifleman and Joint Force in various tactical and logistical
    capacities. Though a workhorse for the Marine Air Ground Task Force
    since its acquisition, the CH-53E does not have the capacity to support
    the Marine Expeditionary Brigade of2024 with the payloads and ranges
    required to support the ship-to-objective maneuver concepts outlined in
    Expeditionary Force 21. Our CH-53 recapitalization effort is
    instrumental in maintaining a true heavy lift capability for the Marine
    Corps and the Nation for the future. Developmental testing is currently
    underway and the first flight of the CH-53K is scheduled for 2015 with
    an Initial Operational Capability in 2019. PB16 is instrumental in
    providing critical funding for the last test articles in support of a
    Milestone C decision in 2016.
        The CH-53K will meet all of the requirements of the modern Marine
    Expeditionary Unit and Marine Expeditionary Brigade and remain the only
    heavy lift rotary wing asset in the DOD inventory. The CH-53K is a
    state-of-the-art heavy lift vertical connector providing increased
    reliability, range and lift for the Marine Air Ground Task Force and
    Joint Force. The mainstay for the CH-53K will remain heavy lift
    external operations. To this end, its key performance parameter is the
    ability to externally transport a load weighing 27,000 pounds 110
    nautical miles, nearly three times the capability of the CH-53E.
    Additionally the CH-53K will incorporate a triple hook system,
    facilitating the delivery of three independent loads, to three
    different locations, in support of three separate units dispersed
    across the battlefield. The new cabin will support the transportation
    of the DOD standard 463L pallet enabling more efficient ``tail-to-
    tail'' logistical transitions with C-Ss, C-17s, and C-130s. The
    implementation of civil sector logistical advancements will facilitate
    near real time situational awareness of all cargo and passengers
    embarked and delivered by the CH-53K. The CH-53K will provide precision
    and tempo for the Marine rifleman, enabling mission success.
        PB16 provides Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E)
    funding for the continued CH-53K System Development Demonstration
    contract which includes continued design, part qualification,
    developmental and operational test. Additionally, PB16 provides ROT&E
    funding for the incremental procurement of System Demonstration Test
    Articles 5 and 6, which will be used to ensure production readiness,
    quality system verification, and production planning and validation. We
    remain committed to our Program of Record of 200 CH-53Ks in order to
    keep Marine Corps' heavy lift assets relevant and effective for the
    marine on the ground in the future MAGTF.
    Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4)
        Deployed warfighters require access to the right data at the right
    place at the right time. The demand for information will not tolerate a
    break in access. With the speed in which technology evolves today, we
    must continue to grow C4 capabilities down to the operational level.
    Information must be available through multiple mediums, from flag pole
    to fighting hole. Our end state is to enable command and control in an
    information enterprise that supports the way the Marine Corps operates,
    which includes a range of missions from crisis response to supporting
    our Expeditionary Force 21 concept--all characterized by mission-
    tailored forces. A single Marine Corps network will support the Marine
    Corps' component of the Joint Information Environment.
        Our main focus today is unifying our networks to seamlessly connect
    the deployed and engaged forces to joint information and data. This
    provides our marines, sailors, and supporting personnel the persistent
    information needed to conduct operations. We continue to increase our
    cyber capacity with trained personnel and emergent technology to
    protect this critical data.
        The Marine Corps must retain the ability to rapidly support the
    extension of the Marine Corps' information and data services to enhance
    our rapid response to crisis, provide contiguous command and control to
    a disaggregated force, and scale to support theater security and major
    combat operations. We will continue to invest in C\4\ down to the
    corporals and sergeants. This will allow our front line Marine rifleman
    to be more agile, lethal and responsive by directly leveraging the
    capabilities of the F-35 and communicating better with Special
    Operations Forces.
    Naval Integration and Programs of Interest
        As the Service with primary DOD Directive and Title 10
    responsibility for the development of amphibious doctrine, tactics,
    techniques, and equipment, our capabilities are reliant on the Nation's
    investment in our partnered Navy programs. Naval integration will
    increasingly form an important component of our exercise and
    experimentation programs. The Marine Corps fully supports the Secretary
    of the Navy and CNO's efforts to balance amphibious platforms and
    surface connectors that facilitate operational maneuver from the sea
    and ship-to-objective maneuver with the other service requirements of
    the Navy.
        The President's Budget investments in LPD-28, LX(R), and ship-to-
    shore connectors demonstrate our commitment to global maritime presence
    and the Nation's mandate to sustain an amphibious capability that can
    respond to deter, deny, and defeat threats on a global scale. We
    appreciate Congress providing a substantial portion of funding to
    procure a l2th LPD. The enhanced mission profiles of these new and
    additional platforms create operational flexibility, extended
    geographical reach, and surge capabilities to the geographical
    combatant commands.
        Naval investments in alternative seabasing platforms expand access
    and reduce dependence on land bases, supporting national global
    strategic objectives and providing operational flexibility in an
    uncertain world. The naval seabasing investments in the Mobile Landing
    Platform, the Large Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off Ship (LMSR) strategic
    sealift ship, and the T-AKE Dry Cargo and Ammunition Ship as part of
    the Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadrons, coupled with the Joint High
    Speed Vessel (JHSV) and connectors, provide the additional lift, speed,
    and maneuver necessary to augment Navy and Marine Corps future security
    capabilities. Although not a substitute for amphibious warships, these
    alternative lift platforms will complement amphibious ships.
        While the President's Budget moves us in the right direction, it
    will take many years and a sustained effort to address the risk in the
    current number of amphibious ships and to address the material
    readiness of our current inventory. The Marine Corps will continue to
    work closely with the Navy to implement the 30-year ship building plan
    and to address the current readiness challenges.
                                   readiness
        Proper balance across the five Pillars of Institutional Readiness
    is the most effective means of achieving a force capable of rapidly
    responding to challenges across the range of military operations while
    remaining good stewards of the Nation's resources. The five Pillars of
    Institutional Readiness involves operational readiness (i.e. Unit
    Readiness, and Capacity and Capabilities to Meet Requirements pillars)
    and foundational readiness (i.e. our investments in High Quality
    People, Infrastructure Sustainment, and Equipment Modernization
    pillars). The Marine Corps' ability to remain ready is enabled by the
    five pillars of readiness.
        Our current funding level protects near-term readiness; however, it
    does so at the expense of long-term modernization and infrastructure,
    threatening future readiness. We are funding critical readiness
    accounts to include: operating forces; depot, intermediate and
    organizational maintenance; repair and sustainment of training ranges,
    training and education, exercises, and fuel and repair parts. The
    Marine Corps is not adequately resourcing our non-deployed units; it
    will take time and sustained funding to address the deficiencies in
    personnel, equipment and training. This is a rational choice given the
    current fiscal situation, but it is not sustainable over time.
    Imbalance amongst the pillars for long periods will hollow the force
    and create unacceptable risk for our national defense. During these
    fiscally constrained times, we must remain ever vigilant in the
    allocation of resources to ensure the holistic readiness of the
    institution and ensure every dollar is going where it is needed most.
    Since 2012 our accounts are auditable. This gives confidence to the
    American people and commanders that we ask only for the amount of
    funding required to provide a lean, highly capable, mobile and ready
    force.
    High Quality People
        Our marines and civilians are the foundation of all that we do. We
    succeed because of our focus on people. They are the primary means by
    which the Marine Corps meets its defense responsibilities. The
    resources we dedicate to recruiting, retaining, and developing high
    quality people directly contribute to the success of our institution.
    Our commitment to quality must never waver.
        Our success in maintaining an elite force begins with recruiting
    young men and women who possess the character, mental aptitude,
    physical and psychological fitness, and desire required to earn the
    title ``Marine.'' The Marine Corps is committed to recruiting and
    retaining high-quality people who meet prescribed physical and mental
    standards, and are ready in mind, body, and spirit to execute their
    duties in the defense of our Nation.
        Today, the Marine Corps does not have the proper level of personnel
    stability or cohesion in our nondeployed units. The practice of moving
    marines between units to meet manning goals for deployments creates
    personnel turbulence, inhibits cohesion, and is not visible in our
    current readiness assessment tools. This personnel turbulence affects
    our combat readiness and our ability to take care of marines. Moving
    forward, we will improve cohesion by increasing our preparedness across
    the force and emphasizing consistency of leadership, personnel
    stability, and sustained readiness across the force. The overhaul of
    our manpower management and readiness reporting models, systems,
    policies, and processes will allow us to minimize personnel turbulence,
    increase unit stability, and develop cohesion. We ask Congress to
    support these measures through appropriations of the funds we have
    requested in PB16.
        Our civilian workforce continues to be a significant force and
    readiness enabler to our institution. They reflect the same high
    quality standard that propels a ready force with many having previously
    worn the uniform of our Nation--68 percent are veterans. They also
    remain a lean portion of our organization at a ratio of only 1
    appropriated funded civilian to every 10 Active Duty marines. Our
    civilians are contributing where we need them most. With 95 percent
    working outside the National Capitol Region, our civilians are directly
    supporting marines and the mission at our bases, stations, depots, and
    installations. Without these civilians, we would be forced to assign
    uniformed marines to these tasks taking away leadership and capacity in
    operational units.
        Our civilian workforce grew post-September 11, in large part due to
    military-to-civilian conversions, which allowed marines to move from
    support billets to the operating force. A Department-wide focus on
    insourcing, new requirements (e.g. cyber), and necessary support for
    our military surge to 202,000 also played a role in the growth. In
    2009, the Marine Corps proactively began reducing civilian structure
    and personnel, and we are continuing to reduce our workforce by another
    10 percent, including 20 percent at headquarters.
        A key element in our overall readiness is family readiness. The
    family members of our Marines are very much a part of the Marine Corps
    family. Their sacrifices and support are not taken for granted. As we
    return from 14 years of major combat operations, the Marine Corps is
    repositioning our capabilities to deliver core programs and services
    that best meet the needs of today's marines and families. We are
    renewing our programs and services consistent with our reduced end
    strength, changing demographics, mission, and budget environment. We
    are emphasizing the importance of maintaining a high level of
    readiness. Our Marine and Family Programs exist to support unit mission
    readiness, and individual health and wellness goals. In order to
    maintain the high standard of family support, we will develop a plan
    with a bias toward decentralizing decisionmaking and resource
    allocation. These programs and their impact on our marines will
    continue to be an area we focus on to judge our readiness. We thank
    Congress for your continued support of Marine and Family Readiness
    programs at the PB16 level.
    Unit Readiness
        Our operational tempo since September 11, 2001, has been high and
    remains high today. We expect this trend to continue. Your marines
    serving today in the operating forces are either deployed, getting
    ready to deploy, or have recently returned from deployment. Congress
    directed the Marine Corps to be the Nation's force-in-readiness. The
    current fiscal environment challenges the Marine Corps' ability to meet
    this mandate. In these circumstances, the Marine Corps has assumed some
    risks to fund unit readiness in the near term. The Corps provides units
    ready to meet core and assigned missions in support of steady state and
    crisis/contingency requirements. Our ability to sustain assigned
    mission requirements with units ready to deploy must be carefully
    managed while we continue end strength reductions.
        Over half of home-station/nondeployed units report unacceptable
    levels of readiness; nevertheless, the Marine Corps excels at
    generating ready units to meet operational requirements. Deployed units
    report high levels of readiness for core and assigned missions.
    Alternately, the ability of nondeployed units to conduct full spectrum
    operations continues to degrade as home-station personnel and equipment
    are sourced to protect the readiness of deployed and next-to-deploy
    units. We must remain cognizant that our home-stationed units
    constitute the ``ready forces'' that would surge to conduct full
    spectrum operations required in major contingencies. As the Nation's
    first responders, the Marine Corps' home stationed units are expected
    to be in the same high state of readiness as its deployed units.
        Our home station units' ability to train is challenged. Time is an
    essential component required to fix worn equipment and train units to
    standard. Lower end strength and unit deployment to dwell (D2D) ratios,
    shortages in personnel and equipment at the unit level, and the paucity
    of amphibious and maritime prepositioning ships contribute to degraded
    full spectrum capability across the Service. For example, a D2D ratio
    of 1:2 means your marines are deploying for 7 months and home for 14
    months before deploying again. During that 14 month ``dwell,'' units
    are affected by personnel changes and gaps, ship availability
    shortfalls, equipment reset requirements, degraded supply storages,
    training scheduling challenges and more. These challenges factor into
    every unit's mission to remain consistently ready.
        Marine Aviation contains some of our most stressed units. The
    Marine Corps has 55 Active component squadrons, 3 of which (2 VMM and 1
    VMFA) are in transition. Of the remaining 52 squadrons, 33 percent are
    deployed and 17 percent are in workups to deploy. Our minimum readiness
    goal to deploy is T-2.0. Deployed squadrons/detachments remain well-
    trained and properly resourced, averaging T-2.17. Next-to-deploy units
    are often achieving the minimum goal of T-2.0 just prior to deployment.
    Nondeployed squadrons experience significant resource challenges which
    manifest in training and readiness degradation, averaging T-2.96.
        The Marine Corps is applying resources to maintain the readiness of
    deployed and next-to-deploy units. Our focus is to continue to meet
    current requirements, while addressing the personnel, equipment, and
    training challenges across the remainder of the force. We are in the
    midst of a comprehensive review of our manning and readiness reporting
    systems. We will develop a detailed plan to enhance our overall
    readiness during 2015.
    Capacity to Meet Combatant Commanders' Requirements
        We are committed to meet the expeditionary requirements of our
    combatant commanders. The Marine Corps' PB16 military personnel budget
    funds a fiscal year 2016 end strength of 184,000 on the way to 182,000
    in fiscal year 2017. The Marine Corps of 182,000 includes the 1,000
    additional MSG marines directed by Congress to protect more of our
    embassies abroad, the Marine contribution to the special operations
    component, Marine Cyber forces, and SPMAGTF's assigned to support
    multiple COCOMs. Marines assigned to Marine Special Operations Command
    and Marine Forces Cyber Command continue to significantly contribute to
    the needs of the COCOMs through specialized capability sets and as
    enablers for the joint force.
        In order to meet COCOM requirements, the Marine Corps will sustain
    a D2D ratio in the Active component force of 1:2 vice a more
    sustainable D2D ratio of 1:3. That is the fundamental difference
    between an optimal force structure of 186,800 marines and 182,000. The
    Marine Corps has some high demand/low density units that maintain a
    current D2D ratio of less than 1:2. The Marine Corps will continue to
    provide ready forces to meet COCOM demands, but we are carefully
    assessing the impact of reduced D2D ratios on our training and quality
    of life.
    Facility Investments
        The President's Budget for fiscal year 2016 funds 81 percent of the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) facilities sustainment model
    requirement for the Marine Corps (an increase over the fiscal year 2015
    level). The OSD guideline is to fund 90 percent of the requirement. We
    remain aware that underfunding facilities sustainment increases the
    rate of degradation of Marine Corps infrastructure, which leads to more
    costly repairs, restoration, and new construction in the future.
        Our installations are critical to our ability to train forces and
    be ready. They provide our training ranges and care for marines and
    their families. However, we are forced to take risk in sustaining
    current infrastructure in support of operational readiness. With the
    help of Congress, the Corps has made significant progress over the last
    8 years in replacing old, unsatisfactory buildings. Our MILCON is now
    focused primarily on new platforms and PACOM force relocation efforts.
        The most important mission of our installations is to enable
    operating force readiness. We do this by being responsible stewards of
    land, air, and water resources, and by being good neighbors in our
    local communities. These conservation efforts maintain our valuable
    training ranges and much needed air and sea maneuver corridors. A
    consistent emphasis on community partnering and engagement creates
    good-will, enhances family quality of life, and reduces encroachment
    risks to our bases and stations. Congressional support and community
    partnering have resulted in the addition of training areas at the
    Townsend Bombing Range in Georgia, the Chocolate Mountains Aerial
    Gunnery Range in both Arizona and California, and the Marine Corps Air
    Ground Combat Center in California. We are also making great strides in
    reducing energy consumption on our bases and stations. By lowering
    utility use we are reducing costs, protecting the environment,
    improving the resiliency of energy-dependent infrastructure and
    ultimately enabling operational readiness.
    Equipment Modernization and Innovation
        For the last 14 years, the Marine Corps has focused our resources
    on providing the marines what they need for the current fight.
    Readiness remains our #1 priority to meet our national security
    responsibilities; however, our focus on the current fight coupled with
    our declining budget, has forced the Marine Corps to make difficult
    choices and reduce investment in modernization to maintain current and
    near-term readiness. In today's fiscal environment, the Marine Corps is
    investing only in essential modernization, focusing on those areas that
    underpin our core competencies.
        Though emphasis is placed on new or replacement programs such as
    the ACV, JLTV, CH-53K, and JSF, much of our modernization resources are
    focused on improving the capabilities and extending the life of current
    systems in order to fill the capabilities gaps that can be exploited by
    today's threats. These modernization efforts span from our AAVs to our
    current legacy aviation platforms.
        In order to balance modernization across the capabilities of the
    MAGTF, our top priorities for recapitalization and upgrades are the ACV
    and the F-358. Programs like ACV 1.1 with science and technology
    efforts for high-water speed, AAV survivability upgrades, Network On-
    The-Move (NOTM), Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR), JLTV, and
    aviation platforms such as the MV-22, CH-53K, and F-358 are required to
    modernize capabilities and provide the technology required to dominate
    our adversaries.
        Modernization consists of three elements: development of new
    technologies, the procurement of new capabilities, and investment in
    legacy systems. An over commitment in one element creates missed
    opportunities in another. The Marine Corps is investing heavily in
    legacy systems partially due to the time required to recapitalize
    needed capabilities. This necessary allocation with limited resources
    in turn results in less investment in areas needed for a rapidly
    changing world (i.e. live virtual training, digital interoperability,
    and connectivity across Service components). For example, the
    subcomponent shortfalls and age of the AAV fleet has led to lower
    reliability and increased risk in operational mission profiles. The
    need for recapitalization of the 42-year-old AAV is critical and the
    Nation cannot afford to gap this capability. The application of fiscal
    resources that would otherwise be focused on recapitalization and
    modernization is necessarily directed toward sustainment. Current
    maintenance for AAVs averages approximately $575,000 per AAV, per year
    with future depot maintenance costs growing to $700,000 per AAV in
    fiscal year 2016. This required allocation of precious resources works
    against our other modernization and recapitalization efforts.
        For our legacy aircraft platforms, the focus is on modernization to
    keep them relevant in today's fight while providing a bridge to our
    aviation recapitalization efforts. Rapid procurement of these new
    systems is critical to solving both our serious current and future
    readiness problems. Reduced modernization investment has also stretched
    our program timelines to the limit of their acquisition baseline. Any
    further extension of our program baselines could result in a Nunn-
    McCurdy breach and reduce industry interest in producing limited
    production items. We have also delayed the procurement of other major
    programs like CAC2S so that we now will not reach full operational
    capability until fiscal year 2022 vice fiscal year 2018.
        Limited to essential modernization efforts, the Marine Corps
    forecasts critical issues due to underfunding in several areas
    including:

             Recapitalization of our 30-year-old TRC-170 system
            needed to provide alternate communications networks in degraded
            spectrum contested environments.
             The Marine Corps' Composite Tracking Network resulting
            in the MAGTF's eventual inability to communicate with the
            Navy's network and participate in their Cooperative Engagement
            Capability.
             Our ability to maintain Joint Interoperability with
            other Services through the Tactical Communications
            Modernization (TCM) program.
             Continued underfunding of the NOTM program leaving two
            thirds of our operating forces without the ability to conduct
            mobile networking in distributed environments. Failure to
            procure military satellite communications kits for, all fielded
            NOTM systems, will result in continued reliance on expensive
            (leased) commercial satellite communications (SATCOM) services.

        Modernization and innovation are more than just procurement
    programs. We must invest in MAGTF experimentation and test new tactics,
    techniques, procedures, gear and concepts that will allow us to meet
    future challenges. Inadequate resources toward modernization will
    further close the technological gap between our capabilities and our
    adversaries. Our adversaries continue to develop new capabilities
    seeking any technology overmatch in specific domains and functions.
    Increasingly capable threats, the proliferation of A2/AD weapons, and
    the aging of key material capabilities create challenges where we will
    pursue science and technology (S&T) to maintain our decisive
    technological advantage. We are maintaining our commitment to S&T, and
    we continue to look for opportunities to expand our efforts in this
    critical area.
                            special interest topics
    Marine Corps Force Integration Program
        Since January 2013, the Marine Corps has opened 5,998 previously
    closed positions to women. We now have 94 percent of our Military
    Occupational Specialties (MOS) available to women. Some positions
    remain closed--mostly within infantry, artillery, tanks, and assault
    amphibian vehicle specialties. These specialties are the focus of
    ongoing Marine Corps research to establish occupationally specific,
    operationally relevant, gender-neutral physical standards.
        The Marine Corps continues its deliberate, measured, and
    responsible approach toward integrating female marines into previously
    closed occupational fields to the maximum extent possible. As the
    Marine Corps has studied gender integration, we have remained committed
    to high standards and combat effectiveness--from recruiting and entry-
    level training (ELT) to performance in the operating forces.
        During this effort, the Marine Corps has evaluated gender
    integration from ELT to full mission profiles as a complete ground
    combat arms integrated unit. Since this time last year, the Marine
    Corps has established the Ground Combat Element Integrated Task Force
    (GCEITF). The GCEITF is a gender-integrated, ground combat arms unit
    designed specifically to support the most in-depth, detailed study of
    the physical demands associated with ground combat and the associated
    physical performance standards as well as the physiological predictors
    of success. The results from the GCEITF research will inform the
    establishment of occupationally specific, operationally relevant,
    gender-neutral standards based on the required individual physical
    contributions to mission-oriented collective tasks.
        The GCEITF along with our other research and assessment efforts
    will inform a recommendation on further integration to the Secretary of
    the Navy and the Secretary of Defense. That recommendation will be
    provided in late 2015.
    Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
        The Marine Corps' Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR)
    mission is to develop and manage an evidence-based program that
    eliminates sexual assault within our ranks and provides world-class
    care to victims. Since fiscal year 2012, the Marine Corps has expended
    more than $16 million toward SAPR and special victim legal training
    initiatives.
        The Marine Corps continues to see an overall positive trend in
    closing the gap between the actual number of sexual assaults and those
    that are reported. While the prevalence of marines experiencing
    Unwanted Sexual Contact (USC) dropped from approximately 3,300 in
    fiscal year 2012 to approximately 2,300 in fiscal year 2014, the Marine
    Corps has seen an 89 percent increase in reports during that same time
    period. Closing the reporting gap is essential to both tackling the
    problem and providing supportive services to victims.
        The addendum to the SAPR Campaign Plan launched in 2012 was
    approved in April 2014 to build upon the positive momentum of the
    campaign thus far by extending the sustainment phase and incorporating
    additional tasks that strengthen SAPR capabilities. In July 2014, the
    Marine Corps released new training called ``Step Up'' that is designed
    specifically for junior marines, our highest at-risk population for
    sexual assault.
        The Marine Corps continues to improve victim services such as the
    credentialing and up staffing of SAPR victim advocates and the
    development of the Victims' Legal Counsel Organization, which has
    provided dedicated victim legal services to more than 680 clients
    including 388 victims of sexual assault. On the heels of positive
    indicators of SAPR progress, Headquarters Marine Corps' SAPR division
    is expanding its reach with an increased focus on prevention. Our goal
    is to eliminate sexual assault from our ranks. We believe that
    preserving the commanders' ability to lead in this area is a vital
    element of our continued improvement in this current issue.
    Suicide Prevention
        Each tragic loss to suicide has far-reaching impact on families,
    friends, and our entire Marine Corps community. The Marine Corps
    embraces prevention efforts through a series of actions to foster hope
    and connection to those at risk for suicide. Community Counseling
    Services located on Marine installations worldwide increase access to
    care and assist marines, attached sailors, and their families with
    navigating available support resources. The Marine Corps' Marine
    Intercept Program uses licensed clinical providers in care coordination
    and outreach services for marines who are identified as having suicidal
    ideations or have attempted suicide. The DSTRESS resource also provides
    phone, chat, and Skype support 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days
    a year. The Marine Corps continues to support DSTRESS as a critical
    resource in suicide prevention.
        Suicide prevention remains a priority for the Marine Corps, and we
    will continue to apply the resources necessary to combat this difficult
    issue.
    Wounded Warriors
        The Marine Corps' commitment to our wounded marines and their
    families is unwavering. Since 2007, the Wounded Warrior Regiment has
    provided meaningful recovery and transition assistance to wounded, ill,
    and injured marines, sailors in direct support of Marine units, and
    their families. Additionally, the WWR administers the Marine Corps'
    federally mandated Recovery Coordination Program, which seeks to
    integrate marines' medical and non-medical care.
        While the Marine Corps' reduced presence in Afghanistan will result
    in fewer combat casualties, non-combat injuries and illnesses will
    likely remain stable. In addition, instances of PTS and TBI will
    continue to increase due to delayed onset and as marines often delay
    seeking help.
        Our comprehensive capabilities create the optimal care to meet
    individual marine's needs. These capabilities include: Recovery Care
    Coordinators, District Injured Support Coordinators, WWR Transition
    Specialists, WWR Liaison Officers, and Wounded Warrior Hope and Care
    Centers. Our costs in personnel are more than just numbers. Ultimately,
    the cost of 14 years of war is calculated in lives. From March 2003
    through 7 January 2015, l,483 marines have given their lives and 13,992
    have been wounded in the service of our Nation. We remember their
    service and sacrifice and thank Congress for their continued support of
    our wounded warriors and their families. The Marine Corps will not
    forget the sacrifices our marines and sailors have made for the Nation.
    Transition Readiness
        The Marine Corps makes marines, wins battles, and returns
    responsible citizens following active service. Every year, the Marine
    Corps returns approximately 35,000 marines to the civilian sector. The
    transition from uniformed service to contributing members of America's
    prosperity as civilians is significant to the economic health of the
    Nation. The technical expertise that marines have learned during their
    service has significant application value to the country in the
    civilian sector.
        Our transition readiness program is designed to prepare marines for
    transition to civilian life by preparing and connecting them with
    resources to successfully meet educational, employment, or
    entrepreneurship goals. Implementation of transition readiness seminars
    (TRS) and separate ``track options'' classes that align marines future
    personal and professional goals with hands-on application have created
    an enhanced transition experience for marines. In fiscal year 2014 and
    the first quarter of fiscal year 2015, TRS attendance exceeded 42,500.
        In fiscal year 2015, Marine Corps Credentialing Opportunities On-
    Line (COOL) was launched. COOL is a credentialing awareness,
    information and resources capability for all marines, translating their
    Military Occupational Specialties into career development credentialing
    opportunities during and beyond their service. A leading example of the
    21st Sailor and Marine initiative, the establishment of Marine Corps
    COOL with the Navy also established the Department of the Navy (DON)
    COOL as a platform for the Navy/Marine Corps Team. DON COOL has, in
    turn, inspired an OSD initiative for a similar department-wide landing
    page for all the Services.
        The Marine Corps also launched the Spouse Transition and Readiness
    Seminar (STARS) at all Marine Corps installations in September 2014.
    This seminar addresses the transitional challenges and opportunities
    specifically for spouses as they prepare to transition with their
    marines into the civilian world. STARS has been embraced by OSD as a
    model for other Services to consider emulating.
        We have fully funded transition assistance in PB16. Effective 1
    October 2014, a new Personal Readiness Seminar (PRS) is being delivered
    to all incoming Active Duty marines upon check-in at their first
    permanent duty station. PRS provides an overview of the Marine For Life
    cycle, including personal and professional development programs and
    services, and introductory personal finance topics.
                                   conclusion
        The unpredictability of the future security environment facing our
    Nation today reaffirms the wisdom of the 82nd Congress--the United
    States must maintain a force-in-readiness. The Marine Corps remains
    that expeditionary force-in-readiness. We maintain a high state of
    readiness and remain postured for immediate crisis response across the
    globe. With the continued support of Congress, we will maintain balance
    across our pillars of readiness and deliver ready, relevant, and
    capable marines and Marine Air Ground Task Forces to our Nation today
    and tomorrow. During this period of budget austerity, we will set the
    standard for stewardship--every dollar will count. In the end, we will
    do what marines have always done--innovate for the future, adapt to
    overcome, and always win.

        Chairman McCain. Admiral Greenert?

       STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JONATHAN W. GREENERT, CHIEF OF NAVAL
                         OPERATIONS, U.S. NAVY

        Admiral Greenert. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and
    distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
    opportunity to testify today. It is my honor to serve and
    represent more than 600,000 Active and Reserve sailors, our
    civilians, and their families, especially the 41,000 sailors
    who are underway and deployed around the world today. It is my
    pleasure to testify to this morning beside Secretary Mabus and
    General Dunford.
        Mr. Chairman, Navy-Marine Corps team is united in
    fulfilling their longstanding mandate: to be where it matters
    when it matters, ready to respond to crises. Now, to that
    point, recent events exemplify the value of forward presence.
    Last August, the Bush Carrier Strike Group relocated from the
    Arabian Sea to the Arabian Gulf--it is about 750 miles--in less
    than 30 hours, and immediately began flying 20 to 30 combat
    sorties per day. for 54 days, that was the coalition strike
    option to project power against [the Islamic State of Iraq and
    Syria] ISIS.
        The destroyer Truxtun arrived in the Black Sea within a
    week after Russia invaded Crimea, and the LCS Fort Worth and
    the destroyer Sampson were among the first vessels to support
    the search effort for the Air Asia Flight 8501 in the Java Sea.
    So we have been where it matters when it matters.
        But, Mr. Chairman, as I have testified before, the
    continuing resolution and the sequestration of 2013 degraded
    our readiness and our capabilities, and we have not yet
    recovered. Budget reductions have forced reduction of afloat
    and ashore operations, generated maintenance backlogs, and have
    compelled us to extend unit deployments. Since 2013, many of
    our ships have been on deployment for 8 to 10 months or longer,
    and that exacts a cost on the resiliency of our people and the
    service lives of our ships.
        Now, this degraded readiness has reduced our ability to
    respond to contingencies. For example, our combatant commanders
    require that three carrier strike groups and three amphibious
    ready groups be ready to respond within 30 days to a crisis.
    That is our covenant to them. However, today on average we have
    been able to keep one carrier strike group and one amphibious
    ready group in this readiness posture, so we are at one-third
    of the requirement.
        Now, assuming the best case of an on-time adequate and
    stable budget and no major contingencies, we might be able to
    recover from the accumulated backlogs by 2018 for our carrier
    strike groups, and by 2020 for our amphibious ready groups. So
    that is at least 5 years after this first round of
    sequestration, and that is just a glimpse of the damage
    sequestration would cause if we go back there.
        We have been forced to slow Navy modernization. The overall
    impact of the budget shortfalls in the past 3 years has
    declined our relative warfighting advantages in several areas,
    notably anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, air-to-
    air warfare, and what we call integrated air and missile
    defense. So we have been compelled to accept significant risk
    in the execution of two key missions that are specified in the
    defense strategy. I provided each of you a handout that
    summarizes where the Navy stands with our missions and where we
    stand in relation to those missions under the two budgets, the
    President's Budget and sequestration.
        The first mission at risk is to deter and defeat
    aggression, which really means to win a war at sea while
    deterring another at sea in a different theater. The second
    mission at risk is to project power despite anti-access and
    area denial [A2/AD] challenges. Mr. Chairman, when I say
    ``risk,'' I mean that some of our platforms, our people, and
    our systems will arrive late to the fight. They will arrive
    with insufficient ordnance, and they will be without modern
    combat system sensors and networks that are required, and they
    will be inadequately prepared to fight. Now, ultimately this
    means more ships and aircraft out of action in battle, more
    sailors, marines, and merchant mariners killed, and less
    credibility, frankly, to deter adversaries and to ensure allies
    in the future.
        Given the circumstances, the President's Budget 2016
    submission represents the absolute minimum funding levels
    needed to execute our strategic guidance. To bring the Navy
    program into balance within that fiscal guidance, we focus to
    build the appropriate capability, and then deliver that
    capability at whatever capacity we could afford. We were once
    again compelled to defer upgrades in aircraft, upgrades in
    ships and submarines, and to take significant reductions in
    aircraft procurement, munitions, and shore infrastructure.
        So, Mr. Chairman, today's world is more complex, more
    uncertain, and more turbulent. Our adversaries are modernizing
    and expanding their capabilities. It is vital that we have and
    adequate, predictable, and a timely budget to remain an
    effective Navy. I thank you, and I thank this committee for
    what they have done for us, and I look forward to working with
    the Congress to find solutions that will ensure our Navy
    retains the ability to organize, train, and equip our great
    sailors and their families in the defense of this Nation. Thank
    you.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Greenert follows:]
              Prepared Statement by Admiral Jonathan Greenert, USN
                                  introduction
        Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of
    the committee, I am honored to represent more than 600,000 Active and
    Reserve sailors, Navy civilians, and their families, especially the
    41,000 sailors who are underway on ships and submarines and deployed in
    expeditionary roles, around the globe today.
        As the chartlet below shows, about 95 ships (one-third of the Navy)
    are deployed around the globe protecting the Nation's interests. This
    is our mandate: to be where it matters, when it matters.

       [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                      Figure 1: The Navy's forward presence today

        I would like to begin this statement describing for you the
    guidance that shaped our decisions within the President's Budget for
    fiscal year 2016 (PB-16) submission. I will address the Navy's
    situation following sequestration in fiscal year 2013, the Bipartisan
    Budget Act of 2013 (BBA), and the National Defense Authorization Act
    (NDAA) and Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2015. Then, I will
    provide details of our PB-16 submission.

                               strategic guidance
        The governing document for PB-16 is the Secretary of Defense's 2014
    Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR uses the President's 2012
    Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) as a foundation and builds on it to
    describe the Department of Defense's role in protecting and advancing
    U.S. interests and sustaining global American leadership. The DSG and
    its 10 Primary Missions of the U.S. Armed Forces have guided Navy's
    planning for the past 3 years. Validated by the QDR, those missions
    remain the baseline against which I measure our posture in various
    fiscal scenarios. Also, 2020 is the ``benchmark'' year identified by
    the DSG, and that remains the timeframe on which my assessments are
    focused.
        The QDR's updated strategy is built on three pillars: Protect the
    Homeland, Build Security Globally, and Project Power and Win
    Decisively. In support of these, it requires the Navy to ``continue to
    build a future Fleet that is able to deliver the required presence and
    capabilities and address the most important warfighting scenarios.''
        In order to improve its ability to meet the Nation's security needs
    in a time of increased fiscal constraint, the QDR also calls for the
    Joint Force to ``rebalance'' in four key areas: (1) rebalancing for a
    broad spectrum of conflict; (2) rebalancing and sustaining our presence
    and posture abroad; (3) rebalancing capability, capacity, and readiness
    within the Joint Force; and, (4) rebalancing tooth and tail. To satisfy
    these mandates of the QDR strategy, the Navy has been compelled to make
    tough choices between capability, capacity, and readiness across a wide
    range of competing priorities. Our fundamental approach to these
    choices has not changed since I assumed this position. We continue to
    view each decision through the lens of the tenets I established when I
    took office: Warfighting First, Operate Forward, Be Ready.

                                    overview
        Sequestration deeply affected the Navy budget in fiscal year 2013
    and we have not yet recovered. Stabilized funding in fiscal year 2014
    and 2015 provided by the BBA, along with an additional $2.2 billion
    above Navy's requested budget in fiscal year 2015, provided limited
    relief from sequestered Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA) funding levels
    and helped Navy's overall posture. However, the cumulative effect of
    budget shortfalls over these years has forced the Navy to accept
    significant risk in key mission areas, notably if the military is
    confronted with a technologically advanced adversary or forced to deny
    the objective of an opportunistic aggressor in a second region while
    engaged in a major contingency. By ``risk,'' we mean that some of our
    platforms will arrive late to the combat zone, and engage in conflict
    without the benefit of markedly superior combat systems, sensors and
    networks, or desired levels of munitions inventories. In real terms,
    this means longer timelines to achieve victory, more military and
    civilian lives lost, and potentially less credibility to deter
    adversaries and assure allies in the future.
        The PB-14 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) submission was the
    baseline required by Navy to carry out all 10 DSG missions. Over the
    last 3 years, however, the Navy funding under sequestration and the BBA
    was $25 billion less than the PB-13/14 submissions, shortfalls that
    manifest in the continued erosion of our warfighting advantages in many
    areas relative to potential adversaries. PB-16 represents the bare
    minimum to execute the DSG in the world we face, but still results in
    high risk in two of the most challenging DSG missions that depend on
    adequate numbers of modern, responsive forces. Should resources be
    further reduced below PB-16 levels, and certainly if sequestered, the
    DSG will need to be revised.
        If budgeted at PB-16 levels, we assess that the Navy of 2020 will:
    \1\
             Include 304 ships in the Battle Force, of which about
            115 will be deployed. This global deployed presence will
            include more than two Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) and two
            Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG) deployed, on average.
             In the best case, provide ``surge'' capacity of about
            three CSGs (by approximately 2018) and three ARGs (by
            approximately 2020), not deployed, but ready to respond to a
            contingency.
             Deliver forces to conduct the DSG primary mission
            Deter and Defeat Aggression, but with higher risk compared to
            PB-14 due to capacity and readiness challenges.
             Conduct, but with greater risk, the DSG primary
            mission Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD)
            Challenges against a technologically advanced adversary
            compared to PB-14. This is principally due to the slower
            delivery of new critical capabilities, particularly in air and
            missile defense, and overall ordnance capacity.

        To ensure the Navy remains a balanced and ready force while
    complying with the reduction in funding below our PB-14 plan, we were
    compelled to make difficult choices in PB-16, including: slowing cost
    growth in compensation and benefits; deferring some ship modernization;
    deferring procurement of 18 of Navy's most advanced aircraft; delaying
    over 1,000 planned weapons procurements; and continuing to reduce
    funding for base facilities sustainment, restoration, and
    modernization. Deferments in PB-16 compound modernization delays we
    were compelled to accept in PB-15 due to budget constraints.
        Additional challenges are on the horizon. In the long term beyond
    2020, I am increasingly concerned about our ability to fund the Ohio
    replacement ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) program--our highest
    priority program--within our current and projected resources. The Navy
    cannot procure the Ohio replacement in the 2020s within historical
    shipbuilding funding levels without severely impacting other Navy
    programs.
             continuing impact of sequestration in fiscal year 2013
        Sequestration in fiscal year 2013 resulted in a $9 billion
    shortfall in Navy's budget, as compared to the PB-13 submission. This
    instance of sequestration was not just a disruption, it created
    readiness consequences from which we are still recovering, particularly
    in ship and aircraft maintenance, Fleet response capacity, and
    excessive CSG and ARG deployment lengths. As I testified in November
    2013, March 2014, and January 2015, the continuing resolution and
    sequestration reductions in fiscal year 2013 compelled us to reduce
    both afloat and ashore operations, which created ship and aircraft
    maintenance and training backlogs. To budget for the procurement of
    ships and aircraft appropriated in fiscal year 2013, Navy was compelled
    to defer some purchases to future years and use prior-year investment
    balances to mitigate impacts to programs in fiscal year 2013 execution.
    The most visible impacts occurred in Operations and Maintenance funded
    activities. Specific impacts to Navy programs include:

              Cancelled five ship deployments
              Delayed deployment of USS Harry S. Truman strike
            group by 6 months
              Inactivated, instead of repaired, USS Miami
              Reduced facilities restoration and modernization by
            about 30 percent (to about 57 percent of the requirement)
              Reduced base operations, including port and airfield
            operations, by about 8 percent (to about 90 percent of the
            requirement)

    --------
        \1\ Navy revised the accounting guidelines for its Battle Force
    according to requirements set forth in the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015. Numbers in this statement are
    not directly comparable to those used in prior testimony, see chart
    below. The NDAA prohibits inclusion of `` . . . patrol coastal ships,
    noncommissioned combatant craft specifically designed for combat roles,
    or ships that are designated for potential mobilization.'' Ships that
    were counted last year, but are no longer counted, are Patrol Craft
    (PC) and Hospital Ships (T-AH).

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Current as of 1 Jan 2015               FY 2016                        FY 2020
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    PB-16: New guidelines......................................                           279                            282                            304
                                                                --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    PB-16: Old guidelines......................................                           288                            291                            308
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

              Furloughed civilian employees for 6 days, which,
            combined with a hiring freeze and no overtime for 6 months,
            reduced our maintenance and sustainment output through lost
            production and support from logisticians, comptrollers,
            engineers, contracting officers, and planners
              Cancelled Fleet engagements and most port visits,
            except for deployed ships

        While the Navy was able to reprioritize within available resources
    to continue to operate in fiscal year 2013, this is not a sustainable
    course for future budgets. The actions we took in 2013 to mitigate
    sequestration only served to transfer bills amounting to over $4
    billion to future years for many procurement programs--those carryover
    bills were addressed in Navy's fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015
    budgets. If we were sequestered again, we would be forced to degrade
    current and future Fleet readiness.
        Shortfalls caused by the fiscal year 2013 sequestration remain in a
    number of areas and the Navy is still working to recover from them. For
    example, we have not yet caught up from shipyard maintenance backlogs.
    We are working through shipyard personnel capacity issues to determine
    when ships can be fit back into the maintenance cycle and are balancing
    that against operational demands on the ships to ensure we meet the
    global force management requirement for combatant commands. The result
    of maintenance and training backlogs has meant delayed preparation for
    deployments, forcing us, in turn, to extend the deployments of those
    units already on deployment. Since 2013, many CSGs, ARGs, and
    destroyers have been on deployment for 8-10 months or longer. This
    comes at a cost to the resiliency of our people, sustainability of our
    equipment, and service lives of our ships.
        Maintenance and training backlogs have also reduced Navy's ability
    to maintain required forces for contingency response to meet combatant
    command operational plan requirements. Although the requirement calls,
    on average, for three additional CSGs and three additional ARGs to
    deploy within 30 days for a major crisis, Navy has only been able to
    maintain an average of one group each in this readiness posture. Root
    causes can be traced to the high operational tempo of the Fleet, longer
    than expected shipyard availabilities, and retirements of experienced
    shipyard workers, but the fiscal year 2013 sequestration exacerbated
    the depth of this problem and interfered with our efforts to recover.
        Assuming a stable budget and no major contingencies for the
    foreseeable future, I estimate it is possible to recover from the
    maintenance backlogs that have accumulated from the high operational
    tempo over the last decade of war and the additional effects of
    sequestration by approximately 2018 for CSGs and approximately 2020 for
    ARGs, 5 plus years after the first round of sequestration. This is a
    small glimpse of the readiness ``price'' of sequestration.
                               where we are today
        Before describing our fiscal year 2016 submission, I will discuss
    the Navy's current posture, which established the baseline for our PB-
    16 budget.
        Congress' passage of the BBA averted about $9 billion of an
    estimated $14 billion reduction we would have faced under sequestration
    in fiscal year 2014. It enabled us to fund all planned ship and
    aircraft procurement in fiscal year 2014, but cumulatively the
    shortfalls increased risk in Navy's ability to execute DSG missions.
    The BBA still left a $5 billion shortfall below PB-14 in our
    investment, operations, and maintenance accounts.\2\ The shortage in
    funding compelled us to reduce procurement of weapons (many missile
    types) and aircraft spare parts, defer asymmetric research and
    development projects, cancel repair and maintenance projects for
    facilities ashore, and defer procurement of maintenance/material
    support equipment for the Fleet.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ Congress subsequently added $3.4 billion in fiscal year 2014,
    which added an SSN and increased Navy's Ship Modernization, Operations,
    and Sustainment Fund (SMOSF).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The recent passage of the NDAA for fiscal year 2015 and
    Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act averted about $2
    billion of the estimated $13 billion reduction that Navy would have
    faced under sequestration; an $11 billion shortfall remains (as
    compared to PB-14). Although the funding enabled us to continue the
    refueling and complex overhaul of the USS George Washington (CVN 73),
    Navy was forced to balance its portfolio to mitigate the shortfall by
    making choices between capability, capacity, and readiness. We were
    compelled to further reduce the capacity of weapons and aircraft, slow
    modernization, and delay upgrades to all but the most critical shore
    infrastructure. As I described in testimony in March 2014, PB-15
    represented another iterative reduction from the resources we indicated
    were necessary to fully resource the DSG missions, making Navy less
    ready to successfully Deter and Defeat Aggression and Project Power
    Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) Challenges. Continuing along
    this budget trajectory means that by 2020, Navy will not have recovered
    sufficient contingency response capacity to execute large-scale
    operations in one region, while simultaneously deterring another
    adversary's aggression elsewhere. Also, we will lose our advantage over
    adversaries in key warfighting areas such as Anti-Surface Warfare,
    Anti-Submarine Warfare, Air-to-Air Warfare, and Integrated Air and
    Missile Defense.
                        our strategic approach to pb-16
        In developing our PB-16 submission, we evaluated the warfighting
    requirements to execute the primary missions of the DSG. These were
    informed by: (1) current and projected threat, (2) global presence
    requirements defined by the Global Force Management Allocation Plan
    (GFMAP), and (3) warfighting scenarios as described in combatant
    commanders' Operation Plans (OPLANs) and Secretary of Defense-approved
    Defense Planning Scenarios (DPS). We used these warfighting scenarios
    to assess our ability to execute more than 50 end-to-end capabilities,
    also known as ``kill chains'' or ``effects chains.'' These chains
    identify all the elements needed to provide a whole capability,
    including sensors, communications (networks), operators, platforms, and
    weapons. To arrive at a balanced program within fiscal guidance, we
    focused first on building appropriate capability, then delivering it at
    a capacity we could afford. Six budget priorities guided us:
        First, maintain a credible, modern, and survivable sea-based
    strategic deterrent. Under the New START treaty, the Navy SSBN force
    will carry about 70 percent of the U.S. strategic nuclear warheads by
    2020. Our PB-16 request sustains today's 14-ship SSBN force, the
    Trident D5 ballistic missile and support systems, and the Nuclear
    Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) suite. The Ohio-class SSBN
    will begin retiring, one per year, beginning in 2027. To continue to
    meet U.S. Strategic Command presence and surge requirements, PB-16
    continues to support construction of the first Ohio replacement SSBN in
    2021 for delivery in 2028 and first deterrent patrol in 2031. As part
    of the Navy's Nuclear Enterprise Review, our PB-16 submission also adds
    approximately $2.2 billion across the FYDP to: (1) increase shipyard
    and Nuclear Strategic Weapons Facilities (SWF) capacity by funding
    required civilian end-strength; (2) accelerate investments in shipyard
    infrastructure; (3) fund additional manpower associated with nuclear
    weapons surety; and (4) fund key nuclear weapons training systems.
        Second, sustain forward presence of ready forces distributed
    globally to be where it matters, when it matters. We continue to
    utilize cost-effective approaches such as forward basing, forward
    operating, and forward stationing ships in the Asia-Pacific, Europe,
    and the Middle East. Rotational deployments will be stabilized and more
    predictable through continued implementation of an improved deployment
    framework called the Optimized Fleet Response Plan (O-FRP). We will
    distribute our ships to align mission and capabilities to global
    regions, ensuring high-end combatants are allocated where their unique
    capabilities are needed most. We will meet the adjudicated fiscal year
    2016 GFMAP; this represents about 45 percent of the global geographic
    combatant commander (GCC) requests. Sourcing all GCC requests would
    require about 450 combatant ships with requisite supporting structure
    and readiness.
        Third, strengthen the means (capability and capacity) to win in one
    multi-phase contingency operation and deny the objectives of--or impose
    unacceptable costs on--another aggressor in another region. PB-16
    prioritizes investments to close gaps in critical kill chains, but
    accepts risk in capacity or in the rate at which some capabilities are
    integrated into the Fleet.
        Fourth, focus on critical afloat and ashore readiness. PB-16 helps
    improve the overall readiness of our non-deployed forces, but not to
    our satisfaction. With a stable budget and no major contingencies for
    the foreseeable future, I estimate it is possible to recover from the
    maintenance backlogs by approximately 2018 for CSGs and approximately
    2020 for ARGs. Facilities Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization
    (FSRM) funds are increased for fiscal year 2016 to arrest the decline
    of facilities conditions, but then FSRM funds are inadequate for the
    remainder of the FYDP, in order to fund afloat readiness. Our budget
    constraints prevent us from funding all but the most critical shore
    facility upgrades in fiscal year 2017 and beyond.
        Fifth, sustain or enhance Navy's asymmetric capabilities in the
    physical domains, as well as in cyberspace and the electromagnetic
    spectrum. PB-16 prioritizes capabilities to deal with adversary
    threats, including electromagnetic spectrum and cyber capabilities and
    those capabilities that provide joint access developed in concert with
    other Services under the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the
    Global Commons (formerly known as Air-Sea Battle). In line with
    CYBERCOM priorities, we are investing in cyber defense-in-depth and
    expansion of cyber defense initiatives to tactical platform Information
    Technology systems, boundary defense solutions for ships, and security
    improvements for our C\4\I systems.
        Sixth, sustain a relevant industrial base, particularly in
    shipbuilding. We will continue to evaluate the impact of our investment
    plans on our industrial base, including ship and aircraft builders,
    depot maintenance facilities, equipment and weapons manufacturers, and
    science and technology researchers. The government is the only customer
    for some of our suppliers, especially in specialized areas such as
    nuclear power. PB-16 addresses the health of the industrial base by
    sustaining adequate capacity, including competition, where needed and
    viable. While prioritizing required capabilities, we also sought to
    sustain a viable industrial base.
                                 what we can do
        As described earlier, due to the impact of prior year shortfalls
    and modernization deferrals in the PB-16 FYDP, we still face
    significant risk in executing at least 2 of 10 primary missions of the
    DSG in 2020. The 2014 update to the ``2012 Force Structure Assessment''
    (FSA) and other Navy analysis describe the baseline of ships needed to
    support meeting each mission. Against that baseline and using a
    rigorous assessment of over 50 capabilities (with appropriate capacity)
    necessary to be tactically successful (called ``end-to-end kill chain''
    analysis), we conclude that with PB-16, the Navy of 2020 will support
    each of the 10 DSG missions as follows:
    Provide a Stabilizing Presence
        PB-16 will meet the adjudicated presence requirements of this
    mission. By increasing the number of ships forward stationed and
    forward based, and by improving our deployment preparation process
    called the O-FRP, presence improves in some global regions as compared
    to previous budget submissions. The Navy of 2020:

              Provides a global presence of about 115 ships (same
            as PB-15); an increase over an average of 95 ships deployed
            today.
              Increases presence in the Asia-Pacific region. This
            includes forward deploying an additional SSN to Guam, the most
            capable DDG to Japan, Mobile Landing Platform (MLP), Joint High
            Speed Vessel (JHSV), both Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) variants,
            MQ-8C, P-8A, EA-18G, upgraded F/A-18E/F, and E-2D. MQ-4C Triton
            high endurance unmanned aerial vehicles will operate from Guam
            in 2017. This presence will assure allies, shape, and deter.
            However, a major maritime operation will require substantial
            naval forces to swing from other theaters or surge forward from
            CONUS bases.
              ``Places a premium on U.S. military presence in--and
            in support of--partner nations'' in the Middle East, by
            increasing presence by 40 percent to about 36 ships in 2020.
            Though not counted in Navy's Battle Force, 10 of our Patrol
            Craft (PC) serve as Forward Deployed Naval Forces (FDNF)
            operating out of Bahrain, and 7 LCS will join them by the end
            of 2020. In 2016, Navy's first Mobile Landing Platform/Afloat
            Forward Staging Base (MLP/AFSB) will augment the on-station
            AFSB-Interim (a modified dock landing ship) to support Special
            Operations Forces and augment mine countermeasure capability.
              Continues to ``evolve our posture'' in Europe by
            meeting ballistic missile defense (BMD) European Phased
            Adaptive Approach (EPAA) requirements with four BMD-capable
            guided missiles destroyers (DDG) in Rota, Spain, and two land-
            based sites in Poland and Romania. The first two DDGs arrived
            in 2014 and all four will be in place by the end of 2015.
            Additional presence in Europe will be provided by forward
            operating JHSVs and rotationally deployed combatants.
              Will provide ``innovative, low-cost and small-
            footprint approaches'' to security in Africa and South America
            by deploying one JHSV, on average, to each region. Beginning in
            fiscal year 2015, we will deploy one hospital ship (T-AH), on
            average, and, beginning in fiscal year 2016, add one PC ship,
            on average, to South America. AFSBs forward operating in the
            Middle East could also provide additional presence in Africa as
            required. As available, we are deploying ships for shorter
            periods (= 2 months) in theaters other than those which they
            would be primarily assigned (e.g., AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM).

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                Figure 2: The Navy's forward presence in fiscal year 2020

    Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare (CT/IW)
        We will have the capacity to conduct widely distributed CT/IW
    missions. This mission requires Special Operations Forces, Navy
    Expeditionary Combat capabilities such as Explosive Ordnance Disposal
    (EOD), Combined Explosive Exploitation Cells (CEXC), Intelligence
    Exploitation Teams (IET), and a variety of platforms that can
    accommodate adaptive force packages. PB-16 procures a third MLP/AFSB in
    fiscal year 2017 for delivery in fiscal year 2020, and funds an
    enhanced SOF capability on all three AFSBs, which provides more robust
    medical facilities, improved C\4\I, and increased accommodation for
    aircraft, and other SOF-specific equipment. PB-16 also procures 10 MQ-
    8C Fire Scout systems for deployments aboard LCS, which are
    fundamentally multi-mission.
    Deter and Defeat Aggression
        Navy inherits and continues to experience high risk in this
    warfighting mission. Our FSA described the ship force structure
    necessary to meet this mission's requirement: to be able to conduct one
    large-scale operation and ``simultaneously be capable of denying the
    objectives of--or imposing unacceptable costs on--an opportunistic
    aggressor in a second region.'' According to the FSA, the Navy has a
    requirement for a force of 11 CVN, 88 large surface combatants (DDG and
    CG), 48 attack submarines (SSN), 12 SSBN, 11 large amphibious assault
    ships (LHA/D), 12 amphibious transport docks (LPD), 11 dock landing
    ships (LSD), 52 small surface combatants, 10 JHSV, 29 combat logistics
    force (CLF) ships, and 24 command and support ships. Provided
    sufficient readiness is restored and maintained across the Fleet, this
    globally distributed force will yield a steady state deployed presence
    of more than two CSG and two ARG, with three CSG and three ARG ready to
    deploy within 30 days in response to a contingency (``surge''). PB-16
    puts Navy on a path to procure the right mix of ships as defined by the
    FSA; however, the 2020 Battle Force will have a shortfall of small
    surface combatants due to a gap in FFG and MCM retirements and LCS
    deliveries. Other sources of risk in this primary mission are less
    aircraft, modern sensors, networks, and weapon procurements across the
    FYDP. Slowed modernization across the Fleet is a serious concern.
    Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations
        The Navy of 2020 will be able to meet the requirements of this DSG
    mission.
    Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) Challenges
        Our power projection capability, reconstitution of weapons systems,
    and modernization programs to enable Joint Assured Access have been
    deferred due to budget constraints over the last 3 years. This reduces
    options and decreases our ability to assure access in all domains
    (space, air, surface, subsurface, and cyber). Over the last 3 years,
    funding shortfalls required us to reduce procurement in weapons by over
    4,000 planned quantities. We continue to take risk in capacity in order
    to preserve investments in developing future capabilities. This reduced
    procurement of weapons and deferring of air and missile defense
    capabilities, coupled with joint force deficiencies in wartime
    information transport, C2 resiliency, and airborne ISR, will result in
    high risk in conducting this DSG mission if we are faced with a
    technologically advanced adversary.
    Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction
        This mission has two parts: (1) interdicting weapons of mass
    destruction as they proliferate from suppliers, and (2) defeating the
    means of delivery during an attack. PB-16 will continue to meet the
    requirements for this mission by providing sufficient deployed CSG,
    ARG, and surface combatants, as well as Navy special warfare personnel
    (SEAL) and EOD platoons, to address the first part. For the second
    part, BMD-capable DDG exist in sufficient numbers to meet the majority
    of GCC presence requirements under the GFMAP, and can be postured to
    counter weapons delivered by ballistic missiles in regions where
    threats are more likely to originate. That said, missile defense
    capacity in some scenarios remains a challenge.
    Operate Effectively in Space and Cyberspace
        Our PB-16 submission continues to place priority on cyber efforts
    to build the Navy's portion of the DOD's Cyber Mission Forces and
    strengthen our cyber defense capabilities afloat and ashore. We have
    accessed about 80 percent of the 1,750 cyber operators that will form
    40 cyber mission teams by the end of 2016; we will continue to recruit,
    hire, and train this force. Additionally, we will align Navy networks
    with a more defensible DOD Joint Information Environment (JIE) through
    the implementation of the Next Generation Enterprise Network (NGEN)
    ashore and Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES)
    at sea. We will continue funding for the launch and sustainment of the
    Mobile User Objective System (MUOS), DOD's newest and most robust
    solution for extending narrowband Ultra High Frequency Satellite
    Communications (SATCOM) connectivity ashore, in flight, and at sea.
    Also critical to assured command and control, PB-16 continues funding
    the installation and sustainment of the Navy Multiband Terminal (NMT),
    our newest and most robust solution for giving surface and submarine
    forces access to wideband Super High Frequency and Extremely High
    Frequency SATCOM connectivity.
    Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent
        This mission is the Navy's top priority in any fiscal scenario, and
    our PB-16 submission meets its requirements. Our sea-based strategic
    deterrent remains safe, secure, credible, and effective today, but Navy
    is also implementing 27 specific actions based on the DOD Nuclear
    Enterprise Review recommendations, including oversight, training,
    policy, and process improvements, funded with an additional PB-16
    investment of over $400 million in fiscal year 2016 and over $2 billion
    across the FYDP. Our PB-16 submission satisfies STRATCOM demand for at-
    sea SSBN availability through the end of the current Ohio-class'
    service life. Navy's PB-16 submission also funds Nuclear Command,
    Control, and Communications (NC3) modernization, Trident D5 ballistic
    missile Life Extension Program (LEP) to maintain a 2017 Initial
    Operational Capability (IOC), and Common Missile Compartment
    development on a 2019 delivery timeline. Continued congressional
    support for Naval Reactors' Department of Energy (DOE) funding is
    essential to maintain life-of-the-ship core reactor design and
    development synchronization with our Ohio replacement shipbuilding
    schedule, which ensures lead ship procurement in 2021, and refueling of
    the land-based prototype. Naval Reactors' DOE budget also includes the
    second year of funding for the Spent Fuel Handling Project,
    recapitalization of which is critical to the Navy's refueling and
    defueling schedule of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and submarines.
    Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities
        PB-16 will maintain an appropriate capacity of aircraft carriers,
    surface combatants, amphibious ships, and aircraft that are not
    deployed and are ready for all homeland defense missions.
    Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations
        Navy's global presence and training is sufficient to conduct these
    operations.
                                 modernization
        The following paragraphs describe specific PB-16 programs that
    influence our ability to conduct the missions required by the DSG, and
    the impact of programmatic action:
    Shipbuilding
        Navy shipbuilding priorities remain largely consistent with PB-15.
    Navy will procure 48 ships across the fiscal year 2016-2020 period.
    Fourteen Battle Force ships will be delivered in fiscal year 2016
    alone. PB-16:

             Maintains funding to support RDT&E and advanced
            procurement of the first Ohio replacement SSBN, our highest
            priority program. Without increased shipbuilding funding in
            fiscal year 2021 and beyond, Ohio replacement SSBN funding will
            consume the majority of Navy's annual shipbuilding budget, and
            degrade other shipbuilding programs. Appropriations for SSBN
            recapitalization are historically consistent with the last
            period of SSBN procurement between 1974 and 1990.
             Fully funds USS George Washington (CVN 73) refueling
            and complex overhaul.
             Procures 10 Arleigh Burke-class DDG (1 Flight IIA and
            9 Flight III) in the FYDP, 2 per year, resulting in an
            inventory of 72 by 2020. The first Flight III DDG, which will
            incorporate the advanced AN/SPY-6 radar (formerly called the
            Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR)), will be procured in
            fiscal year 2016 and delivered in fiscal year 2021.
             Procures 10 Virginia-class SSNs in the FYDP, 2 per
            year, resulting in an inventory of 22 Virginia-class submarines
            (51 total SSNs of all types) by 2020.
             Funds the final nine LCS (Flt 0+) across the FYDP
            (three per year fiscal year 2016-2018). Then beginning in
            fiscal year 2019, Navy will procure new Small Surface
            Combatants (two in fiscal year 2019, three in fiscal year 2020)
            based on upgraded variants of the LCS that Navy will designate
            as ``Frigates'' (FF). There will be no construction gap between
            procurement of the last LCS (Flt 0+) and the first ``frigate.''
            The new ``frigate'' will offer improvements in capability,
            lethality, and survivability.
             Funds replacement of LSD amphibious ships with the
            LX(R) starting with advanced procurement in fiscal year 2019
            and procurement of the first LX(R) in fiscal year 2020. LX(R)
            serial production will begin in fiscal year 2022.
             Procures a 12th LPD, which will be developed in
            parallel with the LX(R) program and incorporate targeted design
            and construction initiatives to increase affordability. Adding
            LPD 28 to the inventory will help mitigate expeditionary
            capability and amphibious lift shortfalls.
             Funds four Fleet oilers (T-AO(X)) across the FYDP
            beginning in fiscal year 2016. T-AO(X) replaces the aging
            single hull fleet oiler. This new procurement ensures continued
            combat logistics support to our ships.
             Funds five Fleet salvage ships (T-ATS(X)) across the
            FYDP beginning in fiscal year 2017. These new ships replace the
            two aging salvage class ships with a single class while
            improving capability and performance.
    Combatant Ship Modernization
        In parallel with shipbuilding, PB-16 continues modernization of in-
    service platforms to allow our combatants to remain relevant and reach
    their expected service lives. The ship modernization program does not
    keep pace to deal with high-end adversary weapons systems by 2020.
    Flight I and II of the Arleigh Burke-class DDG began mid-life
    modernization in fiscal year 2010; 13 will have completed Hull
    Mechanical and Electrical (HM&E) modernization by the end of 2016, and
    6 of these ships will have also completed combat systems modernization.
    In fiscal year 2017, we will begin to modernize the Flight IIA DDGs.
    However, due to fiscal constraints we were compelled to reduce the
    combat systems procurements of one DDG Flight IIA per year, starting in
    fiscal year 2016. This will result in some destroyers not receiving
    combat systems upgrades when originally planned to allow them to pace
    the threat, particularly in Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) and Ballistic
    Missile Defense (BMD).
        In order to maintain force structure that provides Air Defense
    Commander support to the CSGs, Navy will induct two Guided Missile
    Cruisers (CGs) into phased modernization in fiscal year 2015 and an
    additional two in fiscal year 2016. This will place a total of four
    ships in modernization with the intent that each ship period will be
    limited to 4 years. We are committed to modernizing a total of 11 CGs
    in the current modernization program. Without any phased modernization
    program, the CG class will retire, without replacement, at the end of
    their service lives between 2020 and 2030. Using the congressionally-
    directed 2/4/6 plan, the final retirements will occur between 2036 and
    2039. Under the Navy's original PB-15 plan, the final CG retirement
    would have occurred in 2045, at a significantly reduced cost to the
    Navy, and would have relieved pressure on a shipbuilding account
    largely consumed in the 2030s with building Ohio replacement SSBNs and
    aircraft carriers. We request congressional support for Navy's original
    plan.
        Nine of 12 Whidbey Island-class LSDs have undergone a mid-life
    update and preservation program, 2 are currently being modernized, and
    1 more will be inducted into phased modernization in fiscal year 2016.
    Modernization of seven Wasp-class large deck amphibious assault ships
    (LHD) was delayed by 2 years, and they will now complete mid-life
    modernization by fiscal year 2024. Modernization of the eighth LHD, USS
    Makin Island, will be addressed in subsequent budget submissions.
                             warfighting capability
    Aviation
        PB-16 continues our transition, albeit more slowly than desired, to
    the ``Future Air Wing.'' This transition will dramatically improve our
    capabilities and warfighting capacity across critical ``kill chains.''
    But, funding shortfalls have stretched (deferred) modernization plans
    in this area. This delay will call into question our ability to deal
    with near peer competitors, especially if directed to carry out our DOD
    campaign plan in the 2020 timeframe. Specifically, we will continue to
    field more advanced land-based maritime patrol aircraft (manned and
    unmanned) to evolve our ISR, ASW, and sea control capabilities and
    capacity. To further these objectives, PB-16 provides the following
    capabilities:

             Navy Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA)
            Increment I capability will field with the E-2D Advanced
            Hawkeye aircraft in 2015, with four air wings transitioned to
            the E-2D by 2020. This integrates aircraft sensor and ship
            weapons capabilities, improving lethality against advanced air
            and missile threats. However, we deferred 2 E-2D outside the
            FYDP (procure 24 vice 26).
             The F-35C Lightning II, the carrier-based variant of
            the Joint Strike Fighter, is scheduled to achieve IOC in 2018.
            However, F-35C procurement will be reduced by 16 airframes
            (from 54 to 38) across the PB-16 FYDP when compared to PB-15.
            The F-35C, with its advanced sensors, data sharing capability,
            and ability to operate closer to threats, is designed to
            enhance the air wing's ability to find targets and coordinate
            attacks.
             Continued support for a Service Life Extension Program
            (SLEP) for the legacy F/A-18A-D Hornet to meet our strike
            fighter inventory needs while integrating the F-35C. With SLEP
            modifications, some of these aircraft will achieve as much as
            10,000 lifetime flight hours, or 4,000 hours and (16 years)
            beyond their originally-designed life.
             To address Navy electronic attack requirements, EA-18G
            will reach full operational capability in fiscal year 2017.
            Replacement of the aging ALQ-99 jamming pods begins in fiscal
            year 2021, when the Next Generation Jammer (NGJ) Increment I,
            featuring upgraded capabilities against mid-band frequencies,
            reaches IOC. NGJ Increment II research and development on low
            band frequencies remains funded for fiscal year 2016.
             All components of an improved air-to-air ``kill
            chain'' that employs infrared (IR) sensors to circumvent
            adversary radar jamming will be delayed another year. PB-16
            increased funding to procure an additional 28 Infrared Search
            and Track (IRST) Block I sensor pods for F/A-18E/F Super
            Hornet, for a total of 60, across the FYDP; however, the IRST
            Block I sensor system will field in 2018 (versus 2017 under PB-
            15) and the improved longer-range IRST Block II will not
            deliver until 2022 (versus 2019 under PB-15).
             Improvements continue to the air-to-air radio
            frequency ``kill chain'' that defeats enemy jamming at longer
            ranges. By 2020, 380 jamming protection upgrade kits for F/A-
            18E/F Super Hornets and EA-18G Growler will be delivered. But,
            we were compelled to defer 180 kits beyond the FYDP.
             Integrates the Small Diameter Bomb II (SDB II) on the
            F/A-18 by fiscal year 2020, and procures 1,590 units across the
            FYDP to enhance carrier air wing precision strike capabilities.
             V-22 (Navy variant) aircraft have been selected as the
            solution to the aging C-2 Carrier Onboard Delivery (COD)
            aircraft. PB-16 procures 24 aircraft over the FYDP with an IOC
            of fiscal year 2021. The V-22 (Navy variant) extends the range
            and in increases the flexibility of Strike Group resupply.
             Navy's commitment to the Unmanned Carrier-Launched
            Airborne Surveillance and Strike System (UCLASS) program
            continues. However, a DOD-wide Strategic Portfolio Review will
            delay UCLASS Air Vehicle segment contract award by at least 1
            year. The remaining UCLASS Carrier Integration and Connectivity
            and Control System segments will continue and are funded
            through the FYDP.
    Long Range Strike
        Our precision strike capabilities and capacity will be critical to
    success in any foreseeable future conflict. Potential adversaries have
    already fielded and continue to develop advanced, long range weapons
    that will require effective counters. We remain challenged in this
    area. Accordingly, PB-16:

             Funds Virginia Payload Module (VPM) RDT&E and SCN to
            accelerate inclusion of VPM on at least one Virginia Class
            Block V SSN per year in fiscal year 2019 and 2020. VPM will
            enable Virginia-class SSNs to mitigate the loss of SSGN strike
            capacity as they begin to retire in 2026. VPM will more than
            triple the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) Block IV strike
            capacity of a Virginia-class SSN from 12 to 40 missiles.
             Supports the existing Tactical Tomahawk cruise missile
            inventory by extending service life through investments in
            critical capability enhancements and vital parts to achieve
            maximum longevity. PB-16 adds 100 Tomahawks in fiscal year
            2016. Production deliveries will now continue through fiscal
            year 2018, which minimizes factory impact until the start of
            Tomahawk Block IV inventory recertification and modernization
            beginning in fiscal year 2019.
             Invests in future capability by commencing an analysis
            of alternatives for the Next Generation Land Attack Weapon
            (NGLAW), with a planned Fleet introduction in the 2024-2028
            timeframe, at least a decade prior to the sundown of TLAM Block
            IV in the 2040s.
    Anti-Surface Warfare
        Navy remains challenged in this mission area due to both capability
    and capacity shortfalls. To deal with potential adversaries' long-range
    anti-ship cruise missiles and maritime air defenses, PB-16 implements a
    plan to deliver a family of anti-surface warfare (ASuW) capabilities.
    The program maintains current ASuW capability inherent in the Harpoon
    missile, Standoff Land Attack Missile-Expanded Response (SLAM-ER),
    Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) C-1, and Mk48 Advanced Capability (ADCAP)
    torpedoes. In the near term, we are pursuing options to develop an
    improved, longer-range ASuW capability by leveraging existing weapons
    to minimize technical risk, costs, and development time. Five of 10
    Patrol Craft in the Arabian Gulf have been upgraded with short-range
    Griffin missiles, and the other 5 will receive them by the end of 2015.
    Additionally, PB-16 funds enhanced ASuW lethality for LCS by
    integrating surface-to-surface missiles (Hellfire Longbow) onto those
    platforms starting in 2017. Navy is evaluating which missile to select
    to provide upgraded LCS (``frigates'') an additional and even longer
    range over-the-horizon missile capability. Also, PB-16 continues to
    accelerate acquisition of the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) air-
    launched variant, which will achieve early operational capability on F/
    A-18E/F aircraft in fiscal year 2019.
    Anti-Submarine Warfare
        PB-16 sustains our advantage in the undersea domain by delivering
    the following capabilities, although capacity challenges persist:

             Procures 47 P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft,
            replacing the legacy P-3C Orion's capability, and completing
            the transition by fiscal year 2019. We continue investments in
            the development of a high-altitude anti-submarine warfare
            capability (HAAWC), which is composed of a MK 54 torpedo kit
            and software support system.
             Continues installation of ASW combat systems upgrades
            for DDGs and improved Multi-Function Towed Arrays (MFTA) for
            DDGs and CGs. Both installations will be complete on all DDGs
            forward based in the Western Pacific by 2018.
             Continues upgrades to all our P-8A and ASW helicopters
            in the Western Pacific with sonobuoys and advanced torpedoes by
            2018; however, in PB-16 we were compelled to reduce weapons
            capacity, which equated to cancelling 240 MK 54 lightweight
            torpedoes.
             Procures 145 MK 48 ADCAP torpedoes over the FYDP to
            reduce a wartime requirement shortfall from 30 percent to 20
            percent, and invests in modularity and endurance improvements
            to enable more efficient production, better performance, and
            future upgradability.
             Improves surface ASW capability in the LCS ASW Mission
            Package by employing an MFTA in concert with variable depth
            sonar (VDS) in 2016.
             Defers recapitalization of our ocean surveillance
            ship, T-AGOS(X), from fiscal year 2020 to outside the FYDP, a
            reflection of our intent to extend the service life of our
            current T-AGOS vessels.
             Develops and builds the Large Displacement Unmanned
            Undersea Vehicle (LDUUV) in the FYDP to augment submarine
            capabilities. We will use Office of Naval Research Innovative
            Naval Prototype large UUVs to train our Fleet operators,
            preparing them for LDUUV Fleet introduction in the early 2020s.
    Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare
        PB-16 puts Navy on a path to maneuver more freely in the
    electromagnetic spectrum, while strengthening our capability to degrade
    adversaries' ability to do so. It maintains our investment in the
    Ships' Signals Exploitation Equipment (SSEE) Increment F, which equips
    ships with a capability to interdict the communications and address and
    offset elements of adversary kill chains by 2020. PB-16 adds an
    advanced geo-location capability to SSEE Increment F, which contributes
    to defeating the ``left side'' of the adversary's ballistic missile
    kill chain and C4ISR systems. It also increases our investment in
    upgraded electromagnetic sensing capabilities for surface ships via the
    Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP) Block 2 that
    will deliver in 2016, procuring an additional 14 systems. PB-16 begins
    low rate initial production of SEWIP Block 3 in 2017 to add jamming and
    deception capabilities to counter advanced anti-ship cruise missiles.
    PB-16 also stands up Real-Time Spectrum Operations (RTSO) as a Program
    of Record. RTSO will provide ships and strike groups the ability to
    sense, control, and plan the use of spectrum, detect interference,
    notify the operators of spectrum issues, and provide recommended
    actions allowing for command and control of the electromagnetic
    spectrum.
        Our cyber capability continues to afford the Navy a competitive
    advantage, but we are growing increasingly concerned about potential
    vulnerabilities that could affect combat readiness. Recognizing these
    risks, in fiscal year 2015 the Navy stood up a dedicated task force to
    evaluate our cyber security posture and manage our investment portfolio
    to ensure we are spending money where it matters most. In addition to
    evaluating our cyber risk and informing our budget process, the task
    force will also recommend changes to the Navy's acquisition and
    management of our networks and cyber-connected systems.
    Mine Warfare
        To enhance our ability to counter mines in the Middle East and
    other theaters, our PB-16 program sustains investments in the LCS mine
    countermeasures mission package (MCM MP), completing initial testing of
    its first increment in 2015 and achieving full operational capability
    in 2019. The MCM MP provides significantly faster rates of waterspace
    mine clearance over legacy counterparts. PB-16 also sustains our
    interim AFSB, USS Ponce, in service through at least fiscal year 2017.
    USS Ponce provides forward logistics support and command and control to
    MCM ships and helicopters, allowing them to remain on station longer
    and sustain a more rapid mine clearance rate. In the near-term, PB-16
    continues funding for Mk 18 Kingfish unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV)
    and Sea Fox mine neutralization systems deployed to the Arabian Gulf
    today, as well as increased maintenance and manning support for
    forward-deployed MH-53 airborne mine countermeasures platforms and
    Avenger-class MCM ships forward based in Bahrain.
                                   readiness
    Afloat Readiness
        PB-16 funds ship operations to 45/20 (deployed/nondeployed)
    steaming days per quarter. Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds
    an additional 13/4 days (deployed/non-deployed), providing the training
    and operations required to meet our fiscal year 2016 GFMAP commitment.
    PB-16 baseline funds ship maintenance to 80 percent of the requirement,
    with OCO funding the remaining 20 percent, to continue life cycle
    maintenance reset of CVNs and surface force ships. To address the
    workload to be completed in our public shipyards, Navy funds additional
    workforce (up to 33,500 full-time equivalent workers by fiscal year
    2017) and will send selective submarines to private shipyards in fiscal
    year 2016 and fiscal year 2017.
        With respect to the Flying Hour Program, PB-16 achieves deployed
    readiness levels of T2.5/T2.0 (USN/USMC) in accordance with guidance
    for all carrier air wing (CVW) aircraft.\3\ Navy funds Aviation Depot
    Maintenance to 83 percent of the requirement, which puts the depots at
    capacity. As Aviation Depot Maintenance throughput improves, the
    associated F/A-18 flying hours and depot maintenance budgets will
    increase to the more notional level of 77 percent. PB-16 increases Navy
    Expeditionary Combat Command fiscal year 2016 base funding from 42
    percent to 80 percent. OCO funds the remaining 20 percent.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ Due to extended depot repair time, F/A-18A-D availability is
    reduced and shortfalls in aircraft will be borne by non-deployed
    forces. As more legacy F/A-18s approach their 6,000 hour design life
    and are inducted for assessment and life extension to 8,000 or 10,000
    hours, aviation depots are experiencing production challenges resulting
    in longer-than-expected repair cycle times for these aircraft. Navy has
    taken steps to better maintain and repair these legacy aircraft and
    expects to improve depot productivity by 2017, with the backlog fully
    recovered by 2019. In PB-16, Flying Hours for these aircraft will
    reflect the maximum executable profile and achieve T2.0 for deployment,
    with tailored T-ratings through the training cycle.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Year after year, the Navy has consistently provided more global
    presence than authorized and adjudicated by the GFMAP. In 2013 and
    2014, for example, Naval forces provided 6 percent and 5 percent more
    forward presence, respectively, than planned due to emergent operations
    and unanticipated contingencies. This unbudgeted usage amounted to
    greater than 2,200 days in theater over that planned in 2013 and
    greater than 1,800 days in theater over that planned in 2014. We should
    operate the Fleet at sustainable presence levels, in order for the Navy
    to meet requirements while still maintaining material readiness, giving
    ships time to modernize, and allowing them to reach their expected
    service lives.
    Ashore Readiness
        To comply with fiscal constraints, we are compelled to continue
    accepting risk in shore infrastructure investment and operations. PB-16
    prioritizes nuclear weapons support, base security, and airport/seaport
    operations while maintaining our commitment to quality of life programs
    for our sailors and families. We are funding the sustainment,
    restoration, and modernization of our facilities at a level to arrest
    the immediate decline in the overall condition of our most critical
    infrastructure. Although fiscal year 2016 marks an improvement in the
    facilities funding when compared to PB-15, Navy is still below the DOD
    goal for facilities sustainment. Facilities sustainment also declines
    in the PB-16 FYDP in order to preserve the operational readiness of our
    Fleet. When restoring and modernizing our infrastructure, we intend to
    prioritize life/safety issues and efficiency improvements to existing
    infrastructure and focus on repairing only the most critical components
    of our mission critical facilities. By deferring less critical repairs,
    especially for non-mission-critical facilities, we are allowing certain
    facilities to degrade and causing our overall facilities maintenance
    backlog to increase. We acknowledge this backlog must eventually be
    addressed.
        Navy will exceed the minimum 6 percent in capital investment in
    Naval Shipyards and Depots described in 10 U.S.C. 2476, with a
    projected 7.4 percent in fiscal year 2016. Additionally, we are on
    track to exceed the target in fiscal year 2015 with a projected 6.3
    percent investment. Our Naval Shipyards and depots are critical to
    maintaining the warfighting readiness of our force, and Navy will
    continue to prioritize investments to address the most critical safety
    and productivity deficiencies.
    Audit Readiness
        Navy is on course to achieve full auditability on all four
    financial statements by the end of fiscal year 2017, a legislative
    mandate. An audit of the Schedule of Budgetary Activity (SBA), began in
    December 2014. This initial audit is a critical step to identify any
    weaknesses in business systems and business processes. The Navy's Audit
    Plan has been greatly improved by lessons learned from our sister
    Service, the U.S. Marine Corps, which achieved a clean audit on their
    SBA in 2013. The remaining challenge to meeting the fiscal year 2017
    mandate is to achieve auditability on the other major financial
    statement, Navy's Balance Sheet. Audit readiness on the Balance Sheet
    depends primarily on the accuracy of the multi-billion-dollar Asset
    line; the Navy has been executing a plan to bring Service-wide
    accountability for major assets (by amounts and value) into compliance
    with financial audit standards. The Navy is confident that it will be
    able to undergo an audit of all of its financial statements by fiscal
    year 2017 to meet the congressional requirement.
    Family Readiness
        Family readiness is fully integrated into our Navy's call to be
    ready. PB-16 continues to provide support for critical programs that
    support our sailors and their families so that they can adapt to, and
    cope with, the challenges of balancing military commitment with family
    life. Navy Fleet and Family Support Centers ensure military families
    are informed, healthy, and resilient through robust programs that
    include: relocation assistance; non-medical and family counseling;
    personal and family life education; personal financial management
    services, information and referral services; deployment assistance,
    domestic violence prevention and response services, exceptional family
    member liaison; emergency family assistance and transition assistance.
    Increased stress and longer family separations have amplified program
    demand and underlined the importance of these support programs and
    services to ensure the psychological, emotional, and financial well-
    being of our sailors and their families.
        Navy Child and Youth Programs continue to provide accessible,
    affordable, and high-quality child and youth development programs
    through child development centers, youth centers, child development
    homes, and contract child care spaces. All Navy child development
    centers are DOD certified and nationally accredited, and provide
    consistent, high-quality care at affordable rates based on total family
    income.
                             military construction
        The PB-16 Military Construction program includes 38 projects valued
    at almost $1 billion to invest in our construction worldwide. We have
    prioritized funding to enable IOC of new platforms such as LCS, P-8A,
    F-35C, MH-60, and MQ-4C through the construction of hangars, mission
    control centers, and various support and training facilities. We are
    also supporting combatant commander requirements by constructing a
    land-based Aegis site in Poland and upgrading port facilities in
    Bahrain. A portion of MILCON funds will recapitalize infrastructure in
    three naval shipyards and improve the resiliency of utilities systems
    at seven bases. Three projects will improve the quality of life for our
    sailors and their families by addressing unaccompanied housing issues
    in Florida and Maryland and constructing a new child development center
    in Japan.
                              health of the force
        We measure and track the health of our force using Navy-wide
    metrics on recruiting, retention, manning levels; unit operational
    tempo; individual tempo (how often individual sailors are away from
    home); morale; stress; sexual assault rates; suicide rates; alcohol-
    related incidents, and other factors. Based on a comprehensive study of
    these metrics and trends, today we rate the overall health of our Navy
    force as good. Our sailors are our most important asset, they are our
    ``asymmetric advantage,'' and we have invested appropriately to keep a
    high caliber all-volunteer force. At work, the Navy is committed to
    providing our sailors a challenging, rewarding professional experience,
    underpinned by the tools and resources to do their jobs right. Our
    obligations don't stop at the bottom of the brow. I remain focused on
    dealing with enduring challenges that relate to the safety, health, and
    well-being of our people, no matter where they are located. We also
    support our Navy Families with the proper quality of life in terms of
    compensation, professional and personal development, and stability
    (i.e., deployment predictability). Navy's 21st Century Sailor Office
    (OPNAV N17), led by a flag officer, continues to integrate and
    synchronize our efforts to improve the readiness and resilience of
    sailors and their families. Specific initiatives that we continue to
    support in PB-16:
    21st Century Sailor Programs
        Suicide Prevention
        Preventing suicide is a command-led effort that leverages a
    comprehensive array of outreach and education. We continue to raise
    awareness regarding the combination of indicators most common to
    suicide-prone individuals such as post-traumatic stress, relationship
    problems, legal and financial problems, periods of transition and
    mental health issues. We have launched several key initiatives
    including: (1) mandatory Operational Stress Control (OSC) skills
    training for units within 6 months of deployment; (2) new guidance for
    Navy unit commanders and health professionals to reduce access to
    lethal instruments under certain conditions; (3) an interactive,
    scenario-based suicide prevention training tool; (4) an OSC curriculum
    specific to our Reserve sailors; and (5) specialized Chaplain Corps
    professional development training on suicide prevention. Our sailors
    continue to learn about the bystander intervention tool known as
    ``A.C.T.'' (Ask-Care-Treat). We also invest in the resilience of our
    people to help them deal with any challenge.
        Resilience
        Our research shows that a sailor's ability to steadily build
    resilience is a key factor in navigating stressful situations.
    Education and prevention initiatives train sailors to recognize
    operational stress early and to use tools to manage and reduce its
    effects. Our Operational Stress Control (OSC) program is the foundation
    of our efforts to teach sailors to recognize stressors in their lives
    and mitigate them before they become crises. We expanded our OSC mobile
    training teams, developed Bystander Intervention to the Fleet training,
    and deployed resiliency counselors on our aircraft carriers and large
    deck amphibious ships. The 21st Century Sailor Office is also
    conducting a Total Sailor Fitness curriculum review and developing a
    Resilience Management System to automate the collection and reporting
    of all destructive behaviors and better coordinate and integrate our
    resilience efforts. We also launched a new campaign across the Fleet in
    2015 called ``Every Sailor, Every Day,'' which emphasizes personal
    responsibility and peer support, so that sailors are even more
    empowered to look out for and help other sailors.
        Sexual Assault
        The Navy continues to pursue a deliberate strategy in combatting
    sexual assault. We continue to focus on preventing sexual assaults,
    ensuring victims are fully supported, improving investigation programs
    and processes, and ensuring appropriate accountability. These efforts
    include making sexual assault forensic exams available on all ships and
    24/7 ashore, having a cadre of professional and credentialed sexual
    assault response coordinators and victim advocates, special victim
    trained investigators and JAGs, and ensuring commands take all reports
    of sexual assault seriously and support the victim. We will enhance our
    response efforts by full implementation of deployed resiliency
    counselors on large deck ships, enhanced NCIS investigative capability
    using specially training Master-at-Arms, and continued legal assistance
    to victims through our Victims Legal Counsel program.
        Sustaining a professionalized response and victim advocacy system
    remains the top priority, but preventing sexual assaults in the first
    place is an imperative. Our strategy focuses on improving command
    climate, strengthening deterrence measures, and encouraging bystander
    intervention. To facilitate the latter, we trained facilitators to lead
    small, peer-group interactive discussions using various scenarios.
    Likewise, we have focused on raising awareness and accountability
    regarding retaliation to reduce the potential for re-victimization. A
    RAND survey of DOD found that 53 percent of retaliation is ``social''
    or ``peer,'' so we are focusing in on that area. Navy efforts are
    aligned with SECDEF direction to enhance first line supervisor skills
    and knowledge in recognizing signs of possible acts of retaliation.
    Recent Navy survey results show that prevalence of sexual assaults is
    decreasing, but we remain fully committed to creating and sustaining a
    culture where sailors understand the importance of treating shipmates
    with dignity and respect at all times, in all places.
    Manpower
        End Strength
        PB-16 supports an fiscal year 2016 Navy Active end strength of
    329,200 and Reserve end strength of 57,400. It appropriately balances
    risk, preserves capabilities to meet current Navy and Joint
    requirements, fosters growth in required mission areas, and provides
    support to sailors, Navy civilians, and families. Programmatic changes
    tied to force structure and fact-of-life additions resulted in modest
    PB-16 active component end strength growth. Examples of force
    structure-related changes include retaining personnel for CVN 73 and
    its air wing, restoring manpower to nine cruisers that will remain in
    operation, and building crews for new construction destroyers (DDG 51,
    DDG 1000) and submarines (Virginia-class). PB-16 end strength remains
    fairly stable across the FYDP, reaching approximately 330, 000 Active
    and 58,900 Reserves in fiscal year 2020.
        Sea Duty
        Navy continues to emphasize and reward sea duty. Aggregate Fleet
    manning (what we call ``fill'') increased from 93 percent in fiscal
    year 2013 to 96 percent in fiscal year 2014, the equivalent of roughly
    3,500 more sailors aboard surface ships. Also, we are very close to
    achieving our goal of ensuring that more than 90 percent of our sailors
    are serving in jobs at the required grade with requisite experience and
    training (what we call ``fit''). Navy is committed to reducing
    deployment lengths to 7 months, but in recognition of those who have
    been experiencing longer deployments (over 220 days), in 2014 we began
    providing additional pay called Hardship Duty Pay-Tempo (HDPT). We have
    also incentivized and rewarded sea duty, in general, by increasing Sea
    Pay.
    Personnel Management
        Recruiting and Retention
        Navy recruiting and retention remain strong, although retaining
    personnel in certain critical skills continues to present a challenge,
    particularly as the demands we place on sailors and their families
    remain high. The threat of looming sequestration, along with a
    recovering economy, is a troubling combination. We are beginning to see
    downward trends in retention, particularly among pilots, nuclear-
    trained officers, SEALs, and highly-skilled sailors in information
    technology, Aegis radar and nuclear specialties. We are using all tools
    at our disposal, including special and incentive pays, to motivate
    continued service in these critical fields.
        Gender Integration
        Integrating women across the force remain top priorities, because
    they allow the Navy to tap into the Nation's rich talent pool. Over 96
    percent of all Navy jobs are currently available to women and we expect
    to open all occupations by early next year. We are also focused on
    retaining women warfighters by increasing career flexibility through
    initiatives like the Career Intermission Program, which allows
    servicemembers to take a hiatus from their careers for up to 3 years to
    pursue personal priorities before re-entering the force. One of our
    major thrusts in fiscal year 2016 is to increase female accessions of
    both officer and enlisted in order to provide greater female
    representation in all operational units by 2025. We are setting a goal
    of increasing female enlisted accessions to 25 percent and changing the
    mix of ratings available to provide greater operational opportunity for
    women to serve. Integration of women into the submarine force is
    tracking well.
        Diversity
        Demonstrating our continued commitment to diversity, Navy recently
    established a Diversity Policy Review Board, chaired by the Vice Chief
    of Naval Operations. Individual community self-assessments focused on
    diversity trend analysis are also vetted at my level to ensure each
    warfighting enterprise remains free of barriers to advancement and
    committed to equal opportunity to our entire talent pool without regard
    to race, gender, country of origin, or religion. Additionally, Navy
    offers a range of Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics
    (STEM) education and outreach programs to generate interest by the
    Nation's youth in these fields and open up opportunities for them to
    consider potential Navy careers where STEM expertise could be applied.
        Quality of Service
        Navy continues to invest in projects designed to improve sailor's
    quality of service, which has two components: (1) quality of work, and
    (2) quality of life. Further, all funds saved through ``compensation
    reform'' are directly invested in quality of work and quality of life
    programs. PB-16 invests in quality of service initiatives such as
    barracks and training building improvements, greater travel and
    schools, expanded use of tactical trainers and simulators, and
    increased funding for spare parts and tools. It also leverages smart
    technology devices and applications through an ``eSailor'' initiative
    to enhance training, communication and sailor career management ashore
    and afloat.
        Talent Management
        As our economy improves and the labor marketplace becomes even more
    competitive, the battle for America's talented youth in service
    continues to heighten. Today's generation, while remarkably similar in
    their desire to serve as the rest of us, have different expectations
    for a career of service. Meanwhile, our personnel policies and
    information systems are rooted in the assumptions of a previous era.
    Much like any legacy weapons system, that personnel and learning
    structure is in need of modernization. Thus, we are examining
    initiatives to modernize how we manage our future force, for example:
    (1) phase out strict Year-Group management practices in favor of a
    milestone-based promotion system; (2) improve lateral flows between
    Reserve and Active components to offer more agile pathways of service;
    and (3) upgrade our information technology, software, and tools to
    enable a more mobile, flexible, and accurate personnel delivery system.
    Further, we plan to build upon our cultural strengths through a number
    of family-centered initiatives, such as expanded child development and
    fitness resources, along with greater career flexibility for dual-
    military and dual-professional families to grow together while serving
    our Nation.
        Transition Assistance
        A new Transition Goals, Plans, Success (GPS) curriculum replaced
    the 20-year old Transition Assistance Program (TAP) to improve career
    readiness standards and assist separating sailors. The mandatory 5-day
    core curriculum provides Veterans Affairs benefits briefings, the
    Department of Labor employment workshop, financial management and
    budgeting, and military to civilian skills crosswalk. Moreover, the DOD
    Military Life Cycle (MLC) Transition Model, implemented in 2014 in the
    Navy, is working to begin a sailor's transition preparation early in
    their career, by providing opportunities to align with civilian
    standards long before their intended separation, to achieve their post-
    military goals for employment, education, technical training, or
    starting a business.
    Character Development
        At all levels in the Navy, we emphasize a culture of integrity,
    accountability, and ethical behavior. All of these make up the
    character of our leaders. Good character enables unconditional trust
    throughout our ranks. This is essential to succeed as a unified,
    confident, and interdependent team. It must be inherent in all our
    operations.
        Navy continues to emphasize character development as a priority in
    our overall leader development efforts, which are outlined in Navy's
    2013 Navy Leader Development Strategy. In 2014, we established the
    Naval Leadership and Ethics Center (formerly known as the Command
    Leadership School), which serves as the means by which we guide our
    efforts. This new command, alongside our Senior Enlisted Academy, and
    Leadership and Ethics programs at the Naval War College, expands and
    improves character development initiatives at every level. We are
    developing an ethics curriculum (courses and modules) that will be
    embedded in schoolhouses across the Fleet. We are also strengthening
    our Navy Leader Development Continuum, which is the way in which we
    facilitate development of both officers and enlisted throughout all
    phases of their careers. We are not learning alone; we draw insights
    and share best practices with our sister Services. The Navy is
    committed to inculcating into every member of our profession the key
    attribute of good character. It reflects our Navy heritage and the
    citizens of our Nation expect that we uphold the highest standards of
    behavior and performance in the execution of duties.
                               navy reserve force
        Our Navy responded to extraordinary challenges over 13 years of war
    with the help of Reserve sailors. The men and women of our Navy Reserve
    have increasingly put their civilian careers on hold in order to
    operate forward, provide critical support to Fleet and Combatant
    Commanders, and enhance the performance of the Joint Force. The Navy
    Reserve is a valuable hedge against an uncertain and challenging
    security environment; they augment the Fleet with unique skills to see
    us through any challenge. Since September 11, Reserve contributions to
    the Active Duty Navy component have been significant--over 73,000 Navy
    Reserve sailors were mobilized in support of global contingency
    operations, providing tens of thousands of ``boots on the ground'' in
    Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa, as well as
    supporting key missions like those at Joint Task Force-Guantanamo Bay.
    On any given day, nearly 25 percent of the Navy Reserve Force directly
    supports the Navy worldwide--about 15,000 dailors.
        Based on our annual assessment of the Active/Reserve mix, PB-16
    continues investments in expanding critical capabilities within the
    Reserve component including: (1) surge maintenance, by selectively
    targeting reservists who bring specific, valuable civilian skill sets
    to the Navy Total Force; (2) intelligence support, by realigning end
    strength to support this vital mission; (3) cyber warfare, by ensuring
    the appropriate mix of Reserve manning to augment the Active Navy
    capability; and, (4) high value unit escort, by leveraging the Navy
    Reserve's ability to fill short notice requirements using Reserve
    Coastal Riverine Force units to assume CONUS high value unit escort
    missions from the Coast Guard. PB-16 maintains several vital Reserve
    capabilities, including all of the Navy-unique Fleet essential airlift
    assets (C-40A and C-130). These enable the Navy to meet short-notice,
    mission-critical airlift requirements more responsively than any other
    logistics option. It also supports Airborne Electronic Attack by fully
    funding a Reserve airborne electronic attack squadron, which is an
    integral component of Navy's cyclic operational expeditionary airborne
    electronic attack deployment capability.
                                   conclusion
        For the last 3 years, the Navy has been operating under reduced
    top-lines generating capability shortfalls amounting to $25 billion
    less than the President's Budget requests. With each year that the Navy
    receives less than requested, the loss of force structure, readiness,
    and future investments cause our options to become increasingly
    constrained. Navy has already divested 23 ships and 67,000 personnel
    between 2002 and 2012. We have been assuming significant risk by
    delaying critical modernizations of our force to keep pace and maintain
    technological advantage.
        Unless naval forces are properly sized, modernized at the right
    pace, ready to deploy with adequate training and equipment, and able to
    respond with the capacity and speed required by combatant commanders,
    they will not be able to carry out the defense strategy, as written.
    Most importantly, when facing major contingencies, our ability to fight
    and win will not be quick nor as decisive as required. To preclude a
    significantly diminished global security role for the Nation's
    military, we must address the growing mismatch in ends, ways, and
    means.
        The world is more complex, uncertain, and turbulent; this trend
    will likely continue. Our adversaries' capabilities are modernizing and
    expanding. It is, therefore, vital to have an adequate, predictable,
    and timely budget to remain an effective Navy. PB-16 proposes the best
    balance of Navy capabilities for the authorized amount of funding, and
    enables the Navy to conduct the 10 primary missions outlined in the
    President's DSG and the QDR. But, there is considerable risk. PB-16 is
    the absolute minimum funding needed to execute our DSG. Should
    resources be further reduced below PB-16 levels, the DSG will need to
    be revised. If sequestration is implemented in fiscal year 2016, it
    will damage our national security.
        I thank this committee for their abiding support and look forward
    to working together to develop viable options for our Nation's future.

        Chairman McCain. I want to thank the witnesses, and those
    are very compelling remarks, Admiral Greenert. General Dunford,
    do you share Admiral Greenert's level of concern concerning the
    effects of sequestration, and the, as Admiral Greenert pointed
    out, a significant period of time before we can even recover
    from the present effects of sequestration?
        General Dunford. Mr. Chairman, I absolutely do. The
    sequestration of 2013 has certainly impacted our current level
    of readiness. Frankly, if we go to sequestration, we will be
    unable to meet the current strategy, and we will certainly have
    to reduce the capacity of marines that have forward deployed.
        Chairman McCain. I believe you were asked by another--I
    believe it was Senator King, does this sequestration put the
    lives of the men and women who are serving in uniform at
    greater risk.
        General Dunford. Mr. Chairman, I will take that. It
    absolutely does, Chairman, and in this way. We have readiness
    challenges at home station. My expectation is that when Marines
    are called, we will go, and they will either go late or they
    will go with shortfalls in equipment and training that would
    absolutely put young Americans' lives at risk.
        Chairman McCain. Admiral Greenert?
        Admiral Greenert. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. A lot of people
    write recently about today in Today's Navy, a nice article
    recently. This is about the future Navy. Our benchmark is 2020.
    If we do not modernize, we will be late. We will not be ready.
    We will not have what we need to defeat and deny.
        Chairman McCain. Is it affecting morale and retention of
    outstanding men and women?
        Admiral Greenert. It is. The families are angry with
    sequestration in general and the threat of it again. We have
    pilots, a very key part of our ability to project, who are--our
    retention is low on pilots. It is low on nuclear-trained
    operators, Aegis technicians, and cyber.
        Chairman McCain. General Dunford, the deployments are
    longer. Is that correct?
        General Dunford. Mr. Chairman, the biggest significance is
    the time between deployments. Most of our units, our infantry
    battalions, our fighting squadrons, are deploying for less than
    a one-to-two deployment to dwell ratio. What that means is they
    are deploying for 7 months, and they are actually home for less
    than 14 months before they deploy. That continues almost at
    infinitum.
        Chairman McCain. So that is another factor on reenlistment.
        General Dunford. Mr. Chairman, it will be over time. We
    have not seen the impact on the ability to recruit and retain
    high quality forces right now, but it does have an impact on
    two things. It has an impact on training across the range of
    military operations, and it also has an impact on the amount of
    time our marines are able to spend with their families between
    deployments.
        Chairman McCain. Mr. Secretary, you and I have had
    conversations about the situation of the cost overruns of the
    aircraft carriers, of the Gerald R. Ford. I understand that the
    follow-on 78 and 79, I guess, they are or will be around $12
    billion each. Is that correct?
        Secretary Mabus. The 79 has a congressional cost cap of
    $11,500, and we are under that.
        Chairman McCain. I hope, Mr. Secretary, given new
    technologies, and drones, and a lot of other aspects of
    warfare, including the F-35 capabilities, that we will be
    looking at alternatives as well to the Nimitz-class or the
    latest class of aircraft carriers. Is that correct?
        Secretary Mabus. It is, Senator. I think that as you and I
    discussed, everything is getting smaller and faster with the
    possible exception of the military.
        Chairman McCain. I guess I am not quite clear on why--is it
    not true that the major cost overruns were due to advances or
    new technology in launching and electromagnetic aircraft
    launching system, advanced arresting gear, dual band radar, and
    advanced weapons elevators. Are those still the greater risks
    on the cost problem with the Gerald R. Ford and the Kennedy?
        Secretary Mabus. Mr. Chairman, you are absolutely correct
    that those were some of the reasons for the cost overruns. You
    and I are in pretty violent agreement that the way the Ford was
    built is not the way to build a ship. It was being designed
    while it was being built. Too much new technology was trying to
    be forced in, and that technology was not mature.
        Today, though, the Ford is 87 percent complete. The testing
    on the electromagnetic launch and the advanced arresting gear
    is where it should be, and it is moving along. The risk of
    anymore cost overruns, as you pointed out in your opening
    statement, we have stable costs for the last 3 years or more
    now, and it goes down every day. There is still some risk in
    the testing of those brand new systems that we have never used
    before.
        Chairman McCain. General Dunford and Admiral Greenert,
    could you give a brief update on the progress of the F-35?
        General Dunford. Mr. Chairman, in our case, the 1st
    Squadron will be at initial operating capability [IOC] this
    summer. That is the VMFA 121 out in Yuma, Arizona. I visited
    the squadron a couple of weeks ago. I am confident that we are
    on path to bring that squadron up to IOC, and we also have a
    good number of aircraft laid in across the next--across the 5-
    year defense plan to bring the F-35B into service.
        Chairman McCain. Admiral?
        Admiral Greenert. We had our carrier test this past summer.
    It went great. Tailhook was certified. We had no bolters, so
    the avionics of the aircraft itself for the C model--that is
    ours--is good. We still have a way to go for the software. That
    is the 3F software. Right now we are on track for an IOC of
    late fiscal year 2018 or early 2019.
        My concern is that this software is able to integrate all
    of the weapons systems that we have on the current aircraft on
    our air wing, so this aircraft has to fit into our air wing. We
    cannot fit the air wing around the aircraft. But so far so
    good. We have to keep really close watch on it.
        Chairman McCain. Thank you. Senator Reed?
        Senator Reed. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me
    first say that the chairman's questions regarding sequestration
    and your responses about the real and dramatic effects on the
    lives of the men and women that we serve are, I think, another
    strong indication of the need for collective and bipartisan
    action to end sequestration. So thank you, gentlemen, and thank
    you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary and Admiral Greenert, last year in the
    defense authorization bill, we in section 1022 created the
    National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund, which was designed to help
    you from a DOD [Department of Defense] level to build or
    replacement the Ohio-class submarine. Can I just ask both of
    you how you intend to use this fund, and in general your plans
    for the replacement of the Ohio. Mr. Secretary, if you want to
    begin?
        Secretary Mabus. Well, we very much appreciate the
    establishment of this fund. CNO and I have been talking for
    some time now about when we begin to build the Ohio-class
    replacement in 2021, if it is a pure Navy build, it will
    devastate some part of the Navy, either our shipbuilding, or
    readiness, or something, because of the high cost of these, and
    because we do not recapitalize them very often.
        If you look back in history, there is precedent for either
    making this a national program because it is the most
    survivable leg of our deterrence triad, or adding funds to Navy
    shipbuilding to accommodate it. The 41 for Freedom in late
    1950s, early 1960s, and the Ohio-class in the late 1970s
    through 1992, both times Navy shipbuilding was increased pretty
    dramatically to accommodate these submarines. But to show you
    the effects from 1976 to 1980, the Navy shipbuilding budget
    doubled to accommodate the Ohio-class. Our fleet still declined
    by 40 percent because it simply was not enough to do both.
        Senator Reed. Admiral Greenert?
        Admiral Greenert. Senator, first of all, I think it is a
    great start. I think we need to pursue clarity of the intent of
    the Congress, and what I mean by that is the legal
    ramifications for sources of the fundings we could put in
    there. Is it just other Navy shipbuilding accounts? Is it just
    other Navy appropriations, or do we mean the whole DOD could
    contribute to this fund, which, in my view, would be great.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much. In my view it would be
    great, too, and that was the intent, I believe. The
    clarification we will try to produce for you, sir.
        General Dunford, again, in my opening remarks I talked
    about the Fighting Vehicle Program, and this has been an
    interesting and tortured path. The expeditionary fighting
    vehicle was cancelled. We have several different concepts, and
    this has spanned the careers of several commandants. Now, we
    are into this new amphibious combat vehicle, which is described
    as non-developmental. Seriously, your comments upon what you
    see is the challenge. What are you trying to accomplish by
    this, and how do you avoid the fate of the preceding vehicles,
    which we spent money on, but could never deliver?
        General Dunford. Senator, thanks. We have been working for
    some time, as you alluded to, to replace the 40-year-old
    amphibious assault vehicle. Until 2 years ago, we were trying
    to reconcile the protection required against today's threat,
    the costs that we could afford, and then the ship-to-shore
    capability, that high speed self-deploying capability.
        It turned out that we could not reconcile those three, and
    so a decision was made to break the program into thirds. So the
    third is to address the need for ground tactical vehicles with
    adequate protection from range-to-shore right now, and so that
    vehicle would be moved from ship-to-shore in a connector. The
    second phase would be to get our vehicles to at least have the
    same capabilities as today's assault amphibious vehicle. That
    is, it could self-deploy from an amphibious ship.
        From that point down the road, we have a decision point to
    then pursue again a self-deploying high speed vehicle. If at
    that time we can reconcile those three variables I talked
    about, or to continue to make improvements to the second phase,
    which is a vehicle with at or greater than capability to our
    current assault amphibious vehicle. But, Senator, the reason
    why we are where we are is we simply could not reconcile those
    three things--the cost, the capability, and the protection
    required against a current threat.
        Senator Reed. So you are focusing first on a vehicle that
    will be basically have some limited forwarding capability to
    get a short distance in a low surf, and then fight on land with
    all the protections we have seen against IEDs [improvised
    explosive devices] and those things, and all the lessons we
    have learned. That is the first phase.
        General Dunford. That is exactly right, Senator. We expect
    our vehicles will operate 90 percent of the time ashore, and so
    this first phase vehicle is optimized for ground protection and
    mobility ashore.
        Senator Reed. The second phase, is it going to be a
    completely different vehicle, or you are trying----
        General Dunford. No, Senator. I was out to the Nevada Auto
    Test Center about 3 weeks ago to look at the current state of
    the vehicles. Quite frankly, I think in most cases, we have
    asked for a vehicle that just provides adequate ground mobility
    and not necessarily a self-deploying vehicle. All of the
    individuals right now that are competitive in the process have
    a vehicle that actually I think may get pretty close to the
    second phase that we require.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, and just finally, Mr.
    Secretary, the director of operations, who will test the
    evaluation, has raised some concerns about the survivability of
    the LCS--and if Admiral Greenert wants to take the question
    also--and also the ones that have been modified to operate as
    frigates. Have you specifically established survivability
    requirements for the modified LCS, and have you--are those
    requirements much different than the initial requirements of
    LCS?
        Secretary Mabus. The small surface combatant task force
    looked at that and did upgrade the survivability by things like
    hardening the area around the magazine, around various combat
    systems. CNO has pointed out very accurately in the past, the
    best way to survive is not to get hit. So we have upped the
    defensive capabilities of that ship, and it is also a very
    ship, too.
        It is important to keep in mind that this is a small
    surface combatant, that the new upgraded ones have been
    designated a frigate. But they are not destroyers, they are not
    cruisers, and they have a very different role to play. But the
    survivability for a small surface combatant, particularly with
    the upgrades, meets our fleet requirements and meets the
    requirements that we have set.
        Senator Reed. Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe?
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would say to our
    panel we have good attendance up here, so we are going to be
    talking about a lot of systems, and I will kind of start off on
    one, Admiral Greenert, that I think has changed quite a bit,
    and that is the JSOW program [Joint Standoff Weapon]. I think a
    year ago they were talking about adding 4,400 or so of the
    JSOWs, and that was in the 2015 budget. I do not remember. What
    is the current inventory? If we were going to get--how many
    more would that represent when you said 4,400?
        Admiral Greenert. I will have to get you those numbers. I
    do not have them handy here.
        Senator Inhofe. I mean, is it like 2,000 now?
        Admiral Greenert. We benchmark against the combat
    requirement, and, again, I have to get you the number.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay, that is fine. But I guess my point
    is, if we were talking about projecting in last year's budget
    4,432 more of the JSOWs over the life of the program, which
    would have included at that time, because we have in this
    budget, or we had in this budget, 200 to be bought, then all of
    a sudden, at least it was to me, the program was terminated. I
    am just wondering what has happened that caused that not to be
    a necessary component as it was considered to be before now?
        Admiral Greenert. Well, we had to take some chances, and I
    am not happy at all. We do not have enough munitions. I am very
    concerned about it, and I think I expressed it. But the point
    was we felt we had the combat expenditure. We watched very
    closely how many we used during the year. When I say
    ``combat,'' I mean we have enough for what we believe would be
    the model number, and can we reconstitute the line, and we felt
    we could. So we are taking risks. It is not good.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay. That is a good point. You are adding
    risk by having to do this. You would prefer not to.
        Admiral Greenert. I would prefer not to. I have risk in
    other munitions that are just bad. It is not a good picture,
    Senator.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes. Yes. No, that is right. Senator Reed
    talked about, General Dunford, about the F-35. Just to
    elaborate a little bit more, that would actually be there in
    replacing the F-18s, is that correct, and the EA6Bs?
        General Dunford. The AV-8s, Senator. It will replace three
    aircraft----
        Senator Inhofe. All three.
        General Dunford.--all of which are over 20 years old.
        Senator Inhofe. All right. Yes, that is right, 23 years
    old, the F-18s and the E6B-27. So and you have looked at the
    missions of all these, and you are satisfied that these
    missions are going to be met with this change and getting rid
    of the older, and the F-35s are going to be capable of doing
    it?
        General Dunford. Well, Senator, it will do that, but it is
    probably also important to point out that this actually does
    not just replace the F-18, the AV-8, or the VA-6. It is a
    fundamentally different capability. It is a transformational
    capability. It will do everything that those three aircraft
    will do, but also in terms of the information environment, it
    will do a significant amount more for the Marine Air-Ground
    Task Force.
        Senator Inhofe. You talked about the--no, Admiral Greenert,
    you talked about the pilots, and we have a pilot shortage. You
    have talked to your--the Air Force and the problems that they
    are having right now. Are your problems similar to that?
        Admiral Greenert. They are. What happens is people get
    deployed. They are flying all the time. In fact, they are
    flying so much, working up quickly to go on deployment, some of
    them say I cannot even get a wheel done. Then when we come
    back, we shut down, and they sit around here, and they look out
    on the tarmac, and there is a Super Hornet they would love to
    be flying, but we do not have the funding to provide that. They
    say what is with this? This is not what I signed up for.
        Senator Inhofe. That is the same thing that General Walsh
    talked about.
        Admiral Greenert. It is, yes, sir.
        Senator Inhofe. It is the same situation. Now, tell me if
    this is true because I remember bringing this up kind of
    comparing the cost of replacing some training versus retention.
    As I understand, the 10 years of the retention bonus was around
    $250,000. That is in the Air Force. Is that comparable to the
    Navy?
        Admiral Greenert. It is comparable. We have the same thing.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes. Yes. Then also, that training, if you
    take to them F-22 capability, is going to be something like $17
    million. I mean, up here we look at the economics of this
    thing, and obviously it is far better if we can retain these
    people rather than go through training. Have you thought of
    anything specifically that would help you in that respect?
        Admiral Greenert. We have, yes, sir. So, we use the term--
    we want to optimize what we call our training plan, our fleet
    response training plan, and you hit the nail on the head. It is
    getting the flying done more consistently throughout, keep
    them, if you will, busy, proficient, that they feel a part,
    they have a predictable future out there instead of a cycling
    process as they get ready to deploy.
        Senator Inhofe. That is the message I get when I talk to
    those--we know there is a lot of competition with the airlines.
    We know that in the training, it is a supply and demand thing.
        Admiral Greenert. Senator, excuse me. A consistent budget
    will really help us be able to do that. Consistency is key.
        Senator Inhofe. Absolutely. I understand that. You said,
    General Dunford, when Senator McCain asked you some specific
    questions about it, you said, and I wrote it down, ``Funding
    below the President's Budget would require a new strategy.''
    You answered a couple of questions about some of the specifics,
    but what would an overall new strategy look like? What are we
    talking about?
        General Dunford. Well, Senator, what I really meant was
    that on a day-to-day basis, we would not have the marines that
    are forward deployed to meet the sure allies, part of the
    strategy, and to respond to crisis, part of the strategy. Then
    we would have fewer forces than were required to meet a single
    major contingency, and so, in my mind that does, from a
    marine's perspective, drive the need for a new strategy.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes, I understand.
        General Dunford. So it is a capacity issue as well as a
    readiness issue.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay. My time has expired, but if you want
    to expand on that for the record, please do because that would
    be something that we need to be equipped with her.
        General Dunford. We will do that, Senator. Thank you.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Inherently, the Marine Corps organizes, trains, equips, and
    provides forces to support the Nation's strategy which is where I will
    focus my remarks. Given the numerous and complex security challenges we
    face today, I believe DOD funding at the Budget Control Act level, with
    sequestration, will result in a need to review our strategy. Marine
    Corps Forces would not be able to execute the strategy given the
    implications of the potential resource constraints.
        As a forward deployed force in readiness, the Marine Corps is
    currently meeting the needs of the Nation, though at a cost to
    modernization and infrastructure. Over the coming years, maintaining a
    deployment to dwell ratio of 1 to 2 has the potential to consume
    readiness at a rate that exceeds the Corps' institutional ability to
    properly balance and sustain it. We are currently unable to maintain
    ready forces at acceptable levels of readiness for a major OPLAN though
    we are putting measures in place to improve future readiness. The
    potential for simultaneous OPLAN execution in multiple theaters exposes
    even greater risk. The aforementioned are exacerbated by sequestration
    and our initiatives to improve will never gain the irreversible
    momentum that I am seeking.
        The challenges we have under the current budget may result in a
    Marine Corps with fewer active duty battalions and squadrons than would
    be required for a single major contingency. Further budget reductions
    will result in fewer Marines and sailors being forward deployed in a
    position to immediately respond to crises involving our diplomatic
    posts, American citizens or our interests overseas. The Marine Corps
    will still be able to support OPLAN requirements and forward presence
    is okay in the short term; however, over time we will have to fix
    capacity and/or adapt strategy.
        The Marine Corps can currently meet the requirements of a major
    OPLAN in a single theater with challenges in lift and TACAIR capacity
    in the near term. A majority of the ground units are capable of meeting
    availability to load dates--some exceptions exist in key enablers,
    combat support such as tanks and AAVs, ground fire support,
    maintenance, logistics, and medical. Maintaining readiness levels for
    deployed and next-to-deploy forces impacts the ability for non-deployed
    forces to be ready to respond to other demands. An example of adjusting
    our service strategy would be to fulfill a requirement for a battalion
    with a two company battalion rather than a full three company
    battalion. Make no mistake, this battalion would be as ready and
    capable as the full battalion; it would just be more streamlined and
    tailored for the specific mission. Inherent in our Marine Corps ethos
    is the ability to be scalable and tailored for specific missions. We
    can use this strategy to mitigate capacity shortfalls while at the same
    time continue to fulfill the demand for Marine Corps capabilities and
    maintain readiness.
        Another strategy would be to provide in lieu of capabilities. For
    example, a potential increase in rotary wing attack aviation could
    partially mitigate shortfalls in artillery fires, though limitations
    such as weather and maintenance provide other considerations for risk.
    Shortfalls in capacity could be partially mitigated by the Joint Force,
    though capacity and readiness are also challenged for the Navy, Army,
    and Air Force. In total, mitigation strategies only increase our risk
    to supporting the defense strategy and serve to provide a false sense
    that the Marine Corps and Joint Force are appropriately sized and
    balanced.

        Chairman McCain. Senator Manchin?
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of
    you for your service, and appreciate it very much. I will take
    a little different twist than this. There is not a person I
    know of in West Virginia that is not extremely proud of the
    military that we have and have served with distinction, and
    truly is proud to have the greatest military that history has
    ever recorded.
        With that being said, I sat in my first meetings in this
    Armed Services, and at that time we had the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff and Admiral Mullen was here. The question was asked to
    Admiral Mullen, what is the greatest threat that the United
    States of America faces? I thought I was going to hear his
    depiction of an evaluation of the around the world terror that
    we were facing. He did not even hesitate, and he said that the
    finances of our country is the greatest threat we face.
        We are at $18 trillion and growing. We will grow another
    half a trillion this year. With that being said, people back
    home in West Virginia want us to be responsible. They ask the
    question, and they said, ``you know, we hear that our military,
    our DOD, will spend more than the next seven or eight countries
    combined. How come we cannot do it more efficiently or more
    effectively? If money is the problem, we have to make sure that
    we have the money to do it. But are we using the money
    wisely?''
        So through procurement we are trying to get OTTIS
    [Operational Test/Training Instrumentation System]. We are
    trying to find out why procurements--why we have--everyone has
    a different platform. Everything seems to be siloed, if you
    will, rather than integrated. I do not know if you all have a
    comment or an answer to that, but it is hard to go back home
    and explain, you know, we are going to be--I think the request
    is a little under $600 billion this year for fiscal year 2016.
    Is the request $585 [billion]? I think just from the Navy,
    yours has gone from $149 [billion] to $161 [billion], your
    request.
        So they are not going this way, and I know you are saying
    if sequestering kicks in. Sequestering has a real onerous, I
    think, connotation to it because of the way it is administered.
    If we allowed you all to do maybe things differently than us
    intervening in it and trying to tell you how to do your job, it
    might be a little bit better.
        I appreciate that, too, and I know it is hard for you all
    to make those comments, Secretary. But are there ways that we
    can do it more effective and efficiently, and what can we do to
    untie your hands to let you do more with maybe a little more
    challenging financial, but be able to have the ability to do
    more with what you have?
        Secretary Mabus. Senator, first, you are absolutely correct
    that we as a military have to be efficient, have to be
    effective, have to use the taxpayers' money very efficiently.
    My father was the cheapest human that God ever saw fit to put
    on this Earth I think, and I am his son. So, we have been using
    the tools that this committee and this Congress has given,
    things that I talked about--firm fixed price contracts, driving
    them down, things like that.
        But I will show you a chart. Here is what we have to do to
    buy anything. You cannot read it. I cannot either from here. It
    is spaghetti. It is a labyrinth that you have to go through.
    You could help us by taking out some of those things. Make us
    focus on what is important, and that is the outcome.
        [The chart referred to follows:]

      [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Secretary Mabus. We are also looking at things like
    contracts. The Navy spends about $40 billion a year on
    contracts, and until a couple of years ago we could not track
    that money from the time you appropriated--authorized and
    appropriated it until it got to the contract. We can today. We
    are saving today 10 percent a year, so $4 billion a year on
    contracts. We are going to do better than that. Those are hard
    things. Those are not easy things.
        The last thing is that there are really four parts to DOD
    or five parts. There are the four Services, the three
    departments--the Army, Navy, Air Force. But there is also DOD,
    the defense agencies, that are all overhead, and they have
    grown far, far faster than the Services.
        Senator Manchin. Let me just say one thing, and one final
    thing because my time will be running out real quick, and I am
    so sorry. But every time we talk about a lack of resources or
    money, General and Admiral both, it is always reduction-in-
    force, how it is going to affect the people on the front line.
    But when we look at you all's staff, your staff keeps growing
    and growing and growing, even though you talk about reduction-
    in-force. It does not make sense why we go to the front line
    immediately and have a reduction-in-force when the staff has
    made no sacrifices.
        Secretary Mabus. Can I take a shot at that, sir?
        Senator Manchin. Whoever. Whoever.
        Secretary Mabus. I am going to defend my two Service Chiefs
    here. Their staffs have not grown. The uniforms and the
    civilians in the Department of the Navy have not grown. In
    fact, from 2014 to 2016, we have a difference of 10 civilians.
    We are not growing. In fact, the Marines are shrinking, the
    Navy is staying steady, and the staffs are staying steady or
    going down. We are doing a 20 percent reduction in headquarters
    staff.
        But, again, it is what we call the fourth estate, DOD
    agencies, things like the Defense Finance and Accounting
    Service, things like the Defense Logistics Agency. Their
    contractors have just grown exponentially, and so that is where
    the growth is coming. It is not--I will speak just for the
    Department of the Navy, it is in not in the Department.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Wicker?
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Secretary Mabus, and maybe we
    will have time to get to that point, but let me go ahead with
    my planned questions. Admiral Greenert, we sort of decided on
    this rebalance to Asia before the latest provocations from
    Russia, before ISIS [the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] took
    over so much territory. If sequestration returns in October,
    what sort of gap will these cuts create between Asia's
    rebalance strategy and the already important tasks of deterring
    Russia and defeating ISIS? Can you highlight to this committee
    the role amphibious ships will have in executing these
    missions? Admiral Greenert?
        Admiral Greenert. Thanks, Senator. Yes, Senator, one of the
    top priorities we have is presence. So other than funding the
    sea-based strategic deterrent, I need to make sure that we are
    present around the world. So my point would be we will pursue
    forward presence. You will not see much reduction under a BCA
    scenario in our forward presence. Most of the rebalance to the
    Asia-Pacific is what we call forward stationed or forward-
    deployed naval force in Japan, in Singapore, and in Guam. Those
    will continue to, in fact, increase.
        Our distribution around the world is--we are increasing the
    forces in the [U.S.] European Command [EUCOM] as we look at how
    we are going to deploy in the future, strictly for the reason
    you stated with the instability in the AFRICOM [U.S. Africa
    Command] and in the EUCOM region. It is not dramatic, but it is
    there. Amphibious forces play a very important role, which we
    call the ``new normal,'' the ability to respond quickly to
    counter terrorism, to piracy, and to support our forces and
    defend Americans abroad, especially in our embassies.
        Senator Wicker. So the Asia-Pacific rebalance will not take
    a hit from sequestration, and our European presence will not
    take a hit from sequestration. Those hits will take place
    elsewhere. Is that----
        Admiral Greenert. Those hits, if you will, will take place
    in our ability to respond to supplement those forces forward,
    and those forces forward will not be as modern as they need to
    be. We will have dramatic decreases in modernization.
        Senator Wicker. Okay. General Dunford, I have been worrying
    aloud about Afghanistan. General Dempsey told our committee
    last week there is a terrorist network that stretches from
    Afghanistan to Nigeria, and we have to keep pressure on it
    throughout its entire length. He went on to say ``I think
    Afghanistan is and will remain an anchor point for that
    pressure.'' Do you agree with that, General Dunford?
        General Dunford. Senator, I do agree with that. I think of
    Afghanistan as a counterterrorism partner and as a platform
    from which the United States can protect its interest in
    Southwest Asia is absolutely critical.
        Senator Wicker. Am I right then to worry about the current
    plans for drawing down our forces in Afghanistan, to worry that
    those are based on more of a political calculation rather than
    the facts on the ground?
        General Dunford. Senator, my understanding from listening
    to Secretary Carter's testimony, and General Dempsey's
    testimony, and General Campbell's testimony is that they are
    all reviewing the current plan in light of the points you just
    made.
        Senator Wicker. I hope we do. Last week before the
    committee, I pointed out to Secretary Carter and General
    Dempsey that things are headed in the right direction in
    Afghanistan. I do not know if the American people appreciate
    that, but we have made great gains there. President Ghani and
    his chief opposition leader, Dr. Abdullah, and a partnership,
    they want us there as a stabilizing force, and I just hope that
    we are not about to throw away what progress we have made.
        Secretary Mabus, you and I have been friends a long time.
    Remarkable testimony actually. Very profound statement that you
    had, which you, of course, had to abridge during your oral
    remarks. You mentioned what Thomas Paine said about the cause
    of America is in a great measure the cause of all mankind. I
    almost want to substitute the word ``cost'' there, and it seems
    that it falls on the United States of America. You also
    correctly say for 7 decades the United States and Marine Corps
    have been the primary protector of this international system.
    We are doing it for everybody else.
        There is a sound basis in this proposition that rising
    international prosperity is directly linked to the U.S. Navy.
    Thank you to our military and to our Navy. We have kept the sea
    lanes open you say. We have kept freedom of navigation open for
    anybody engaged in peaceful and legitimate trade. As the
    President said, we've been the anchor of global security.
        This is for you, but also for our friends internationally
    listening to this. We are going to have to insist on more of a
    contribution from our international partners. We keep the lanes
    open for them. Our friends in Europe, our [North Atlantic
    Treaty Organization] NATO friends, our other friends in Europe
    are depending on what exactly you are talking about. I would
    just say we are going to have to collectively come up with a
    plan to convince our partners in international security that it
    is in their interests, too, to make the financial sacrifice to
    help us afford all of this protection that we are giving to the
    world. Would you like to comment on that, Mr. Secretary?
        Secretary Mabus. Well, first to say we have been friends
    for a long time, and second to say that it is one of the
    reasons that we are pursuing these partnerships, and that is a
    message that you just gave that I take to countries around the
    world that we cannot do it by ourselves, and that they have to
    bear their fair share of any burden.
        As part of that, to be interoperable with us, to exercise
    with us, to make sure that we go to--we go into things
    together. One of the things that--one of the tangible things
    that is happening right now is the French aircraft carrier
    Charles de Gaulle is in the Arabian Gulf conducting strikes
    against ISIS. That is a sort of partnership that not only we
    need, but that the world needs.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, and I have gone way over. I hope
    that I speak for Senator Hirono, my ranking member on the
    Subcommittee on Seapower, that you will perhaps give us some
    language to address the problems you pointed out in that very
    confusing chart. If there are suggestions you have for ways
    that we can cut through that red tape and make procurement of
    important weapon systems a little easier and a little more
    favorable to our fighting men and women, I hope you will get
    that to Senator Hirono and me. Thank you.
        Secretary Mabus. I would be very happy to. Thank you,
    Senator.
        Chairman McCain. The Senator is correct. He has gone way
    over. [Laughter.]
        Senator Donnelly?
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have taken
    warning of that comment that you just made. Mr. Secretary,
    thank you for your service, and I want to tell you, and you
    already know, you have a great team sitting there with you,
    General Dunford, Admiral Greenert. Admiral, thank you for
    everything you have done for our country. We were
    extraordinarily blessed to have you on command, and we
    appreciate it.
        I also want to mention, Mr. Secretary and to Admiral
    Greenert, I want to take a moment to recognize the superior
    performance of the Navy's nuclear forces. It has been
    exceptional. You have created a culture of outstanding
    performance, and it has not gone unnoticed. So, as a Nation, we
    really feel in your debt for having done all of that.
        Now I want to ask you about suicide prevention. It has been
    such a challenge for our Services. It has been something we
    have worked on together. What I want to talk about is physician
    assistance. They have a great reputation in the mission, a
    great reputation for medical care. The first is to Admiral
    Greenert and to Secretary Mabus, and then I will get to General
    Dunford second. But to Admiral and Mr. Secretary, what are your
    thoughts about expanding the Services' use of physician
    assistants specializing in psychiatric care to fill some of the
    provider gaps that we see?
        Admiral Greenert. It is an excellent idea. We have looked
    at things like this. I have to go back and take another round
    through that, but clearly we can use more folks to help us with
    the resiliency in the psychological arena.
        Secretary Mabus. Senator, I am a big fan of physician
    assistance, of nurse practitioners, of people that we can get
    out in bigger numbers to help with some of this resiliency,
    because as you pointed out, suicide is one of the big
    challenges we face, and not just in the military. It is the
    second leading cause of death of Americans 18 to 32 years old.
        Senator Donnelly. It is a staggering and scary statistic.
    General, you have done a great job in embedding mental health
    providers with the expeditionary units. What are your thoughts
    on the utility of physician assistance also helping in the
    Marine Corps with psychiatric care?
        General Dunford. No, Senator, thanks, and I think my answer
    would be similar to Admiral Greenert. It is in the sense that I
    would be supportive of anything that would increase the
    capacity of us to deal with the resilience of our marines and
    sailors, and also their mental health.
        Senator Donnelly. Okay, thank you. Mr. Secretary, at Crane
    in Indiana, we work on counterfeit part detection. How big a
    threat do you see that being in the years ahead?
        Secretary Mabus. Well, it is something that we have seen in
    the past, and it could be critical in the future. It is
    important for us to stay on top of that because some of the
    counterfeit parts that we have detected that Crane found
    earlier were critical parts in our submarines, for example, and
    you cannot take chances on things like that. It is one of those
    capabilities that we have absolutely got to keep up, and it is
    part of the acquisition strategy that we have to have adequate
    oversight.
        I will go a little bit further here in that our acquisition
    workforce, people at Crane, people around the country, that
    oversaw things like this, went down pretty considerably. Since
    2010, we have been rebuilding that workforce to do exactly some
    of those very specialized skills like that.
        Senator Donnelly. General Dunford, the Marines have played
    such a strong role in Anbar Province in Iraq over the years. A
    lot of extraordinary relations were created between the Marines
    and the Sunni tribes. As we take the battle to ISIL, can you
    give me an update as to what role the Marines are playing in
    terms of trying to cultivate those long-term relationships
    because they are so critical to our success?
        General Dunford. Thank you, Senator, and we do, in fact,
    have forces in Anbar Province today. We have two 25-man
    training teams that are with the Iraqi 7th Division. We also
    have a Marine Corps colonel who is the commander of our Special
    Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force, and that force now is
    focused on supporting General Austin's counter-ISIL efforts.
        In addition to developing those relationships in Anbar
    Province, we have marines protecting the embassy in Baghdad,
    and then also we provide the tactical recovery of aircraft and
    personnel missions. So we support the strikes that can win both
    with carriers and with joint force aircraft. We support the
    strikes that go into Iraq and Syria with the V-22 so that if
    something did happen, we would be in a position to recover
    aircraft and personnel.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Rounds?
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank
    you for your service. I would like to follow up a little bit on
    what Senator Inhofe was discussing, and, in particular, Admiral
    Greenert, you were responding to the munitions questions, but
    this would be for both you and General Dunford. In your
    judgment, are your munitions inventories sufficient to support
    current operations and the defense strategic guidance plan? Are
    there individual munitions whose inventories are either present
    or projected, which are insufficient to meet the requirements?
    If so, what are they, and what is being done to address the
    shortfalls?
        Admiral Greenert. For operations today, we have sufficient
    munitions. For operations in the future, my benchmark year, our
    benchmark year, is 2020. There is a series of missions we have
    to do. They are outlined on the card that I gave you. They are
    effectively based upon the war plans. We have insufficient
    munitions in 2020, even some munitions in the President's
    Budget. They are air-to-air. They are surface-to-surface, if
    you will, cruise missiles. Some of our air-to-ground, and as
    Senator Inhofe mentioned, the joint standoff weapon, the JSOW.
        Now, the air-to-air has two elements. There is a longer
    range and a medium range. Both of those have shortfalls. In our
    lightweight torpedo we have a shortfall, and our heavyweight
    torpedo we have a shortfall. A ``shortfall'' is defined as the
    combatant commander believes they need all of this to win in
    the model, you know, campaign, and you have to have enough to
    reload so that you are not just standing around here saying,
    well, we won, but we are empty, if you see what I mean. So that
    is kind of the baseline, sir.
        Senator Rounds. General Dunford?
        General Dunford. Senator, thank you. We have adequate
    ammunition for today. We have taken risk and ammunition that
    would be needed for a major contingency as we have dealt with
    the budget challenges. The three major areas that we have
    shortfalls are in our javelin systems and tow systems. Those
    are anti-tank weapon systems. The other areas in HIMARS [High
    Mobility Artillery Rocket System] rockets, that is an artillery
    system, a rocket for artillery. There are a large number of
    other smaller areas of ammunition that we are short. Those are
    the main areas. Again, it has been a decision that we have made
    as we try to balance risk.
        For the Marine Corps, as I mentioned in my opening
    statement, we always ensure that our units that are forward
    deployed or next to deployed have the wherewithal to accomplish
    the mission. So, what we end up doing is taking risks at home
    station and against a major contingency, and that is exactly
    what we have done in the case of ammunition.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. Secretary Mabus, you pointed out
    in the procurement process the complications and the added
    costs that come with that. Are there programs that would
    benefit from cost reduction initiatives, such as multiyear
    procurement or block buys that do not currently have those
    authorities? If there are, would you care to elaborate on them?
        Secretary Mabus. Well, Senator, thanks to this committee,
    in particular, thanks to Congress, we have multiyear authority
    on things like the Virginia-class submarines we bought 10
    submarines for the price of 9 because of that multiyear. Now we
    have a multiyear on the Marine Osprey V-22s, and it has
    dramatically driven down the costs. We have a multiyear on our
    VDG-51s, our destroyers, which has also pretty dramatically
    driven down the costs, block buys on the Littoral Combat Ship.
        Any time we can do that, we very much want to and
    appreciate this committee. Expanding those authorities to do
    that for weapon systems for things like that would certainly be
    helpful. But it is some of the things, as I said in my opening
    statement, it is just basic business concepts, getting more
    competition in, doing some of these longer-term things, so that
    industry knows what we are going to buy so that they can make
    the investments up front in infrastructure and job training so
    that they can buy things in economic order quantities so that
    we can drive the costs down. The chart I held up shows just
    some of the steps that we have to go through. Even if we get a
    multiyear, even if we get a block buy, we have to go through
    this very convoluted process that really adds no value at the
    end, and it does not give us a better weapons system.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back my 9
    seconds.
        Voice. You are a hero.
        Chairman McCain. Very thoughtful. Senator Blumenthal, you
    have an extra 9 seconds.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to
    begin by thanking all three of you for your extraordinary
    service to our Nation. Admiral Greenert, particularly, my
    personal thanks to you for your numerous visits to Connecticut
    and your strong advocacy of our Navy's strength, particularly
    when it comes to submarines. I know that all of us on this
    committee and the American people join me in gratitude to you.
        I want to ask a question about submarines, the Virginia
    Payload Module [VPM], which I think is critically important to
    the Virginia-class submarines that we are going to be
    procuring. The VPM adds significantly to the number of
    Tomahawks that can be prepared--I think it is 76 percent--which
    will be especially important at a time when the number of boats
    in our fleet diminishes to minimum or below minimum strength. I
    am wondering whether there is the possibility that that
    acquisition program--I know that the VPM, Virginia-class
    submarines are going to be procured beginning in 2019 with one,
    and then in subsequent year one. Whether that program can be
    accelerated so that more of the Virginia-class boats have the
    VPM and are able to increase their capacity to deliver that
    kind of attack.
        Admiral Greenert. We are going to look at that, Senator,
    and by I think in April/May we will be done studying that. We
    would like to do that. We have to look at the technical risks
    associated with that, so if it is feasible, we will give it a
    good try to get that one. If we go to that year, 2018, we are
    into--the Secretary just mentioned a block buy, that we have a
    block buy in there. So we are going to have to transition that
    bridge, if you will, into trying to manipulate such a major
    part into a block buy. So I do not know what it will do, but we
    will have to study that.
        Senator Blumenthal. What do you think is the timetable for
    making that determination?
        Admiral Greenert. By May we should have an answer. We will
    be working very closely with your committee and make sure they
    know--I am sorry, with your staff and make sure they know how
    it is coming along.
        Senator Blumenthal. If you could keep us informed, I would
    appreciate it.
        Admiral Greenert. Will do, yes, sir.
        Senator Blumenthal. Let me move to an issue that I know
    concerns all of you, the impact of post-traumatic stress, the
    care for our men and women in uniform. General Dunford, I know
    you have been very, very cognizant and attentive to this issue.
    Are you satisfied that this budget has enough in the way of
    resources to deal with post-traumatic stress and traumatic
    brain injury, which, as you also know, is the cause of not only
    a threat to readiness, but also suicide and other facts?
        General Dunford. Senator, we consciously protected those
    programs as we built the President's Budget in 2016. But I
    would tell you, again, it goes back to what happens with BCA
    levels or sequestration. It will become increasingly difficult
    to protect those kinds of programs as well as a number of other
    programs as we draw down the budget even further.
        Senator Blumenthal. On that topic, Secretary Mabus, the
    connectivity to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) on
    health issues, on a number of personnel-related issues has been
    questioned and challenged in this very room by the VA's
    officials and by other members of DOD. I wonder whether there
    is more that you can see being done to better relate and
    transfer information that is important to disability claims, to
    healthcare in the VA, and so forth.
        Secretary Mabus. Absolutely, Senator. That is one of the
    critical things we do, particularly for our wounded or injured
    as we move them from active duty to the VA. We have a goal in
    days of how long it takes to move someone. Both Navy and Marine
    Corps are under that goal. We are doing it faster.
        But the goal is not a quick goal. It is too long, and we
    need to get better at that. We need to get better at having
    systems that talk to each other between DOD and the VA. But it
    is something that we are very, very conscious of, and trying to
    eliminate some of disability determination that both DOD and
    the VA run, and sometimes they do the same things, just at
    different times.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Ernst?
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank
    you so much for being here today. I appreciate your service and
    your willingness to testify in front of this committee.
        General Dunford, I would like to start with you, sir. The
    budget that we have right now in front of us reflects a switch
    from land-based to operations, large-scale battles, back to
    being a quick reactionary force for the Marines, and I know
    that the Marines are going to adapt accordingly. They always do
    that very well. But I do worry that our forces are going
    through a lot of uncertainty with financial constraints, and we
    seem to be caught off guard by our adversaries.
        Our enemies are capturing stockpiles of weapons, some of
    which are the M-16s and the M-4s. We have been using this
    individual weapon system for 50 years now. It was developed in
    1964. This still remains our soldier and our airmen's basic
    rifle, and that puts us at an equal playing level with our
    adversaries on the ground. Is it possible that while we are
    taking a look at advancing our ships, modernizing our ships,
    modernizing our aviation platforms, within the budget, is there
    room to move on advancing individual weapon systems that put us
    at a technological advantage over our adversaries?
        General Dunford. Senator, thanks for that question, and
    that actually is one of my greatest concerns. We know
    historically the Marine Corps needs to invest a minimum of
    about 11 or 12 percent, and that is fairly small, of our
    overall obligation authority into modernization and capability
    development.
        This year we are at about 9 percent, so it is lower than it
    has been historically, and I am concerned. But today I think we
    are doing a pretty good job of resetting our capabilities to
    the fight that we had yesterday. I am not satisfied we are
    investing enough in the capabilities that we need to fight
    tomorrow. What you are suggesting is modernization of things
    like weapon systems.
        I would say this. I agree with your point that we need to
    be able to do that, but I also would just make a point that it
    is not just a weapon, it is who is behind that weapon. So, it
    is still not a fair fight even if the enemy has the same weapon
    as we do. It is the marine behind the weapon that makes the M-
    16 most effective.
        But your point about increased investment in these areas,
    that is one of the sacrifices we have made as we have continue
    to fight today's fight and make sure our marines that are
    forward deployed have what they need. We have taken risk in our
    capability development.
        Senator Ernst. Exceptional. Thank you, General, for
    pointing out it is that marine that is behind that weapon
    system, and making sure that we are training them appropriately
    and have the means to do that is extremely important. One thing
    that I would love to address to both Admiral and to you as
    well, General, and Secretary, in the statements we have talked
    a little bit about the total force that we have out there,
    which would include not only our active duty personnel, but
    those Reserve members that are being used as operational
    forces. I would love to hear you elaborate a little bit about
    the role that our Reserve members have played in backfilling
    for your components.
        Admiral Greenert. Well, I would be remiss if I did not
    acknowledge this is the 100th anniversary of the Navy Reserve
    this year, in fact, just a few days ago. So happy anniversary
    to the Navy Reserve.
        Senator Ernst. Yes, happy anniversary.
        Admiral Greenert. We are absolutely unable to function
    without our Navy Reserve today. They have gone from sort of
    folks that were there for a strategic force in case of the big
    war to now they are part of our total force. They do our
    logistics, all of our logistics, a lot of our medical. They are
    in cyber in a huge way. As we go to the unmanned in the remote
    areas, they are our operators in waiting, and a lot of them are
    integrating fully in that regard. They do our Riverine Squadron
    [RIVRON] force. That means our high value units, our
    submarines, our ships out and around the world, and they are
    building partnership capacity. So there are other areas that
    they are working their way into, so a very effective force
    woven into the fiber of who we are today.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you.
        General Dunford. Senator, thanks. Our ability to meet the
    combatant commanders' requirements on a day-to-day basis and in
    response to a major contingency is inextricably linked to the
    readiness of our Marine Corps Reserve. They are integrated into
    everything that we do to the point where when we look at our
    requirements over the next couple of years, we actually have a
    force generation plan that fully integrates our Reserves into
    our ability to meet those forward presence requirements every
    day.
        So that to us is what we mean by when you use the term
    ``operational reserve.'' What it means is that we are using
    them on a day-to-day basis to meet not only the routine
    requirements of the combatant commanders, but, again, the
    historic need for a strategic reserve that could respond to an
    unexpected major contingency.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you very much, gentlemen. Thank you,
    Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Hirono?
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank
    you for your service, and a particular aloha mahalo to Admiral
    Greenert, this being your last force posture testimony.
        Secretary Mabus, I am very committed to the rebalance of
    the Asia-Pacific, and we had a discussion about that yesterday
    between you and me. So, it is really important that our efforts
    to maintain stability in the Asia-Pacific area is important to
    our national security even as there are conflicts arising in
    other parts of the world. As you stated in your testimony, ``We
    must have the right platforms in the right places to ensure our
    friends and allied understand our commitment.'' So the
    rebalance has to be more than rhetoric, and as we discussed
    yesterday, I trust that the Navy, as it updates its strategic
    lay down and dispersal plans will, ensure that future plans
    will reflect the rebalance in terms of equipment, personnel,
    and partnership opportunities. I certainly look forward to
    further discussions with you.
        Secretary Mabus, do you think that this budget reflects our
    continued commitment to the rebalance with sufficient
    specificity?
        Secretary Mabus. Senator, I do. The commitment to the
    rebalance is real. It is absolute. You can begin to see the
    things that are already happening. You are seeing the second
    deployment of an LCS to Singapore, and by 2017 we will have
    four LCSs in Singapore. The crews will fall in on the ships
    instead of the ships coming back home.
        Today you are seeing more than 1,000 marines rotationally
    deployed to Darwin, Australia, and within the next year or 2
    that will go up to a full--nearly 2,500 marines, Special
    Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force. You are seeing the plans
    that we have to put our newest equipment, both ships and
    aircraft, in the region. We are going from about 55 percent of
    our fleet in the Pacific to 60 percent.
        But I think the important number is that the fleet is
    getting bigger so that 60 percent of this fleet is going to be
    bigger than the fleet of the past. We in this budget
    specifically have the resources to carry out that, but I will
    echo Admiral Greenert and General Dunford. This is the minimum
    that we have to have in order to do not only the rebalance, but
    all the other missions that we are called upon to do.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you. I think I heard your response to
    Senator Donnelly's question about your concern about
    counterfeit parts, and I believe you said that you do have a
    concern about that. I just wanted to ask you one question,
    though. You do have a concern about counterfeit parts.
        Secretary Mabus. Yes.
        Senator Hirono. So I was just wondering whether you were
    aware of any technological product that can be embedded in
    parts to ensure that it is not a counterfeit part.
        Secretary Mabus. Senator, I am not aware of any specific
    chip or whatever that you can imbed in it. What I am aware of
    is that our quality control folks, places like Crane, Indiana,
    that the Senator was talking about, are exceptionally good at
    spotting those counterfeits.
        Senator Hirono. I am aware of a particular product that I
    would love to talk with you further in a different context.
        Regarding your energy efforts, we do need a sustained long-
    term commitment to research and development in this area, and
    meeting our energy security needs and preserving the
    superiority of our forces in the face of energy supply
    challenges in the 21st century are important goals. In your
    testimony, you highlighted the 2009 formal energy goals for the
    Department of the Navy, which includes using energy more
    efficiently and diversifying our sources of power, and
    certainly, I will agree with your efforts. Could you give us an
    update briefly on the 2009 formal energy goals, and how does
    the President's Budget proposal support these energy goals?
        Secretary Mabus. I would be happy to. The biggest goal was
    by no later than 2020, at least half of all energy, both afloat
    and ashore, will come from non-fossil fuel sources. The goal is
    to make us better warfighters. In terms of our basis, we will
    be there at the end of 2015, and we are saving money by doing
    it. We will have a gigawatt of power into our bases from non-
    fossil fuel sources by the end of 2015.
        In terms of afloat, we will buy no alternative fuels unless
    it is absolutely cost competitive with traditional fuels, but
    that seems to be the case even with today's low oil prices, and
    we are moving pretty aggressively to do that. We have
    demonstrated--we have certified all of our ships. We have
    certified all our ships. We have certified all our aircraft on
    this. In terms of efficiencies, we are making great strides in
    efficiencies, and the President's Budget supports both the
    diversifying--the kinds of energy and also the efficiencies.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, and I appreciate the indulgence
    of the chair. I have gone over. Mahalo.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Ayotte?
        Senator Ayotte. I want to thank the chairman, and I want to
    thank all of you for your leadership to the country and our
    military at such an important time. I just wanted to associate
    myself with some of the comments that Senator Blumenthal made
    about the Virginia Payload Module. I am very interested if that
    is feasible as well, Admiral, in going forward, and I look
    forward to seeing what you come forward with in May. I think it
    is important if we can expedite that and it is possible to do
    that.
        I also wanted to follow up, Admiral. In your prepared
    statement, you noted that our naval shipyards and depots are
    critical to maintaining warfighter readiness for the force, and
    I certainly agree with that. In order to have a strong attack
    submarine fleet, we need to ensure that those submarines are
    maintained properly and quickly, and that they are combat
    ready.
        One thing that I wanted to ask about is making sure that
    the facilities we have are prepared to do that, and doing that
    in the most efficient way so that we can save dollars and get
    things done sooner. I know that Senator King shares my pride
    with the work done at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, and, in
    fact, they have--the workers at the shipyard have actually been
    producing ahead of schedule the maintenance--just recently in
    April of last year they undocked the USS Topeka days ahead of
    schedule--20 days ahead of schedule. In June following a
    maintenance availability, the workers at the Portsmouth Naval
    Shipyard returned the USS California to the fleet 14 days ahead
    of schedule. In September they delivered the USS Springfield
    back to the fleet ahead of schedule and under budget.
        One of the things that they have brought to attention of my
    office is that they are doing this with facilities that are
    frankly outdated in some instances. They are working in
    structural shops that are on average over 100 years old, and
    have deteriorated to the point of partial failure. For example,
    the heat treat forge area was recently condemned, and the
    buildings have exceeded their useful life. The fact that they
    are delivering faster and under budget even with these
    facilities, can you imagine what they could do with more modern
    facilities?
        There is a military construction project that has been
    submitted for reprogramming. It is called P-266 Structural
    Shops Consolidation. It will address many of the problems that
    I just talked about, and it will achieve efficiencies, improve
    working conditions, most importantly, save money and time,
    which I know we are all looking to do, and result in submarines
    being sent back to the fleet even more quickly. I am confident
    if we are able to do this, it will allow them to do an even
    better job, and they are doing an incredible job now.
        So, Admiral, I am not expecting you to be familiar with all
    of these projects offhand, but this is a very important one to
    our shipyard, and I think that will, most importantly, drive
    cost efficiencies and results for the Navy. So I would like an
    update on where this reprogramming request sits. Obviously I do
    not need you--if you have it now, great. If you do not, if that
    is something you could submit to your office as quickly as
    possible, I would appreciate it.
        Admiral Greenert. I will take it for the record and get you
    a complete answer, Senator.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you very much.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Naval Shipyards are critical to our warfighting readiness. Despite
    current fiscal constraints, we are working hard to address the most
    critical deficiencies at the shipyards. For example, between 2012 and
    2015, the Navy invested more than $240 million to repair and modernize
    the infrastructure at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard.
        One of Navy's investments at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is a fiscal
    year 2014 military construction project, also known as P-266, which
    will considerably update and consolidate the structural shops at the
    shipyard. Unfortunately, the project requires an additional $20 million
    to execute, so we are preparing a reprogramming package for Department
    of Defense and Congressional approval. Pending Congressional approval,
    we expect to award the project before the end of this fiscal year.

        Senator Ayotte. I also wanted to follow up just to ask in
    general about the importance of the Navy civilian workforce,
    and what we see, Secretary Mabus, in terms of the importance of
    the civilian workforce. Many of them--I think as the economy
    improves, the competition for the types of skills that they
    have, that they are able to work obviously on such important
    equipment like our attack submarines or other equipment, then
    we are going to see more competition for their skills. We want
    to make sure that they stay in the Navy and able to serve the
    Navy.
        So can you talk to me about what is the strength of the
    civilian workforce? How do we see recruitment going forward?
    What are the challenges we face there, and any concerns you may
    have?
        Secretary Mabus. Thank you, Senator. In terms of the public
    shipyards like Portsmouth, if you want to see the effects of
    sequestration, you do not have to look any further than that.
    There was a hiring freeze put in place because of
    sequestration, so as people left they could not be replaced.
    There was a furlough that some of them were exempt from, but
    not all. There was the government shutdown when they could not
    work.
        Because of all those things, we have a backlog in those
    public shipyards. They do great work, but they have to have
    enough of those artisans, enough of those people with the
    specific skills to do it. Again, that is a great tangible
    example of not only effects immediately of sequestration, but
    how it stretches out because it will take until about 2018, as
    the CNO said, to recover from that.
        The civilian workforce writ large, we would not have a
    fleet to put to sea without those civilians, and we lost 12
    civilians killed in the line of duty at the Washington Navy
    Yard. So they are in every way an integral, vital part of our
    Navy and Marine Corps.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Admiral?
        Admiral Greenert. Ma'am, this morning there is a great
    article on what the director for Office of Personnel Management
    is trying to do for quick hiring. We are trying desperately to
    hire people into our shipyards because we need to build it up.
    It is hard. The sequestration has hurt us, and the Gordian Knot
    is getting through the paperwork to hire someone. It is
    difficult to compete for this young talent.
        Senator Ayotte. These are incredibly talented people. I
    mean, I have had the chance to meet many of them, exactly.
        Admiral Greenert. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
        Chairman McCain. Senator King?
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Greenert, I
    want to associate my comments. It must be--I am sure you are
    very sad that this is your last hearing before this committee,
    but you have had a long and very distinguished career, and I
    want to thank you. Secretary Mabus, your dad should have met my
    dad. I can remember my dad standing in front of me on the long
    distance telephone looking at his watch watching the time go
    by. I think they would have had some spiritual kinship.
        Admiral Greenert, the Arctic is an important area of
    policy, and I know you have been looking at it. The Navy has
    developed a strategy. Just briefly, do you see the Arctic as an
    emerging area of important--of strategic importance, national
    security importance to this country?
        Admiral Greenert. Senator, I do. I think we need to look at
    it deliberately and understand it. Therefore, things like ICEX
    [Ice Exercise], where we were together almost a year ago, we
    need to do it more frequently, get industry up there and study
    the place, find out when is it going to melt, what are the sea
    lines of communication that will open, are there territorial
    disputes? Who has them? Are there threats? Russia is increasing
    their military presence. It sorts of makes sense, and if that
    is where a sea line of communication is. But also, how do we
    survive up there, our ships, our aircraft, and our people?
        Senator King. I think just a simple example about
    infrastructure, icebreakers, we have one heavy duty, one medium
    duty Coast Guard. The Russians have 17 icebreakers in the
    Arctic. If we are taking about innocent passage, trade,
    icebreakers are the highway builders, if you will, and that is
    an area. I know it is not a naval question, but, I mean, that
    is an example of how we are really not adequately, I believe,
    focusing on our strategic interests in that region.
        Again, for Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, it strikes
    me that one of the issues that really is not talked about--we
    talked a lot about sequestration, and I do not have to pile on
    on that subject. We all agree that it is a serious risk to the
    national security of this country. But the industrial base, you
    cannot turn off and on a shipyard. One of the things that
    worries me as I look at charts from Bath Iron Works, for
    example, in Maine that if we do not have the workload, the
    employment drops down. If a skilled shipbuilder leaves to go to
    some other area of the country or some other profession, they
    are gone and you cannot just turn that back on. Secretary
    Mabus, is that something that concerns you?
        Secretary Mabus. It concerns me every day, Senator, and it
    is one of the reasons that I said in my opening statement--the
    larger statement of the committee, that I will protect
    shipbuilding to the maximum extent possible because it not
    reversible. If you do not build a navy ship one year, you never
    build it. It is not something that money the next year can make
    up, and it is primarily because of that industrial base. If you
    lose those highly skilled workers and their unique skills, they
    are not easily learned. In fact, I was--as Senator Reed said, I
    was at Quonset Point with keel laying for the USS Colorado.
    They recognized more than 10 people who were celebrating their
    40th anniversary at that shipyard that had worked there for
    more than 40 years.
        So the industrial base if you lose it, if you lose these
    high quality, high-skilled shipbuilders, you do not get them
    back. You see the effects today in terms of Bath or some of our
    shipyards. What you see is the effects on our fleet 10 years
    from now, 15 years from now, 20 years from now. It is something
    that I have said--evidently I used a term that nobody else had
    used much, but I am going to protect shipbuilding until the
    last dog dies. We are going to try to stay there partly for the
    industrial base, but also for our Navy.
        Senator King. One of the problems is the long lead time
    means that the shortchanging we are doing now is going to have
    the effect 5, 10 years from now--I remember learning in
    driver's ed that if you are going above a certain speed, your
    headlights will not illuminate the wall in time for you to
    stop. In effect, there is a wall out there we are very close to
    hitting. We just will not know it for about 10 years because of
    the decisions we are making now in terms of the
    shortsightedness of this sequester policy.
        Secretary Mabus. We are living today with decisions that
    were made 10, 15 years ago in terms of the size of our fleet.
    The people sitting in all these chairs 15, 20 years from now
    will be living with the decisions we make today. As I said, in
    shipbuilding, they are not reversible.
        Senator King. Well, you ended your prepared testimony with
    a quote from Theodore Roosevelt about the Navy as an instrument
    of peace. From that same speech, Roosevelt said something that
    is extraordinarily applicable to the discussion we have been
    having today about readiness. He said, ``The veteran seamen of
    our warships are as of high a type as can be found in any Navy
    which rides the waters of the world. They are unsurpassed in
    daring and resolution, in readiness and thorough knowledge of
    their profession.'' This is Teddy Roosevelt 100 years ago. ``To
    build the finest ship with the deadliest battery and to send it
    afloat with a raw crew, no matter how brave they are
    individually would be ensure disaster if a foe of average
    capacity were encountered.'' This is the payoff line. ``Neither
    ships nor men can be improvised when the war has begun.''
        General Dunford, I would assume you--this is all about
    readiness and training and the irresponsibility of our not
    solving this funding problems so that you can have your men and
    women ready.
        General Dunford. Absolutely, Senator. I mean, that is what
    you expect from the Nation's ready force is that when you call
    us we are there. As I mentioned earlier, when you call us for
    today's crisis, we respond actually today, and that is what it
    is all about.
        Senator King. Thank you, gentlemen, for your service. Thank
    you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Kaine?
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to all
    the witnesses. Admiral Greenert, I add my comments to those of
    my colleagues about your service, and we will miss you at these
    hearings. I am sure Angus was joking a bit when he said you are
    so sad to be here for the last time, but you have been very,
    very helpful, and we all appreciate that.
        On sequester, I cannot resist, Secretary Mabus, since you
    started talking about how cheap your dad was. I have done a lot
    of budgets. I have done them as the managing director of a law
    firm with lawyers in three countries. I have done them as a
    mayor. I have done them as a governor. I am the only governor
    in the history of my State--this is a sad accolade, not a good
    one. I am the only one in the history of my State that left
    office with a smaller budget than the one I started with
    because of being governor in the worst recession in 75 years.
        Sequester violates every principle of good budgeting that
    any competent manager in the public or private sector would
    follow. Period, full stop. Sequester violates every principle
    of budgeting that any competent private or public sector
    manager would follow. I am proud that one of my first votes as
    a Senator in February 2013 was to eliminate the sequester. I
    know how to find budgetary savings. I have done it my whole
    life. But non-strategic across-the-board cuts can be done with
    the slide rule. It is not about the application of human
    judgment, and any budgetary philosophy that says we do not care
    about human judgment, we are just going to do this kind of
    across-the-board cutting is foolish.
        I have watched us have very significant discussions on this
    committee where I think we have all come to bipartisan
    consensus about Afghanistan, and let me make an analogy, that a
    calendar-based strategy is a bad idea, a conditions-based
    strategy is a good idea. I just want to analogize that to our
    budgetary reality. We are either going to be sequester-based
    and say, ``well, we are obligated to follow caps that Congress
    put in place in August 2011 before we saw the degree of cyber
    attacks from Northern Korea, before we saw the President of
    Russia, Vladimir Putin, go into the Ukraine, before ISIL was
    gobbling up territory in Iraq and Syria, before Boko Haram was
    slaughtering thousands upon thousands of people in Africa.''
        We are either going to be sequester-based and ignore every
    bit of reality that has occurred since August 2011, or we are
    going to be conditions based in our budgeting. I would just
    like to ask all my colleagues, we have decided on Afghanistan I
    think as a body, that we ought to be conditions-based, not
    calendar-based. I would say for purposes of funding our
    military and other priorities, let us be just as conditions-
    based, and let us not grab onto some bizarre, incompetent
    budgetary theory and elevate that over the security of the
    Nation. So that is just my editorial comment, and what I intend
    to do as a member of the Budget Committee, as a member of the
    Armed Services Committee, and certainly in any floor activity
    about budget or appropriations.
        I want to offer some praise to General Dunford and Admiral
    Greenert. In your written testimony, and you had to truncate it
    here today, you both talked about something that I think is
    really important, which is helping your marines and sailors
    transition from active life to civilian life. The transition of
    people into a civilian workforce where only 1 percent of adults
    have served in the military, so there is not a natural
    understanding for what a gunnery sergeant does or what an E-5
    is. They care about that transition, which is something that I
    think the DOD generally has kind of woken up to more recently
    as we have Iraq and Afghanistan war vets, especially enlisteds,
    with unemployment rates that are unacceptably high.
        I think you have all come a long way in the last couple of
    years in being really intentional about this. In both of your
    written testimonies, you talk about efforts that have been
    underway to help folks get credentials that match civilian work
    skills, and to help people think in a more significant way
    about that transition. General Dunford knows I have a son who
    is an officer in the Marine Corps, and about 2 weeks into
    taking his first platoon, he called me up and he said, ``hey,
    Dad, my NCO [noncommissioned officer], who is, you know, the
    guy I am really relying on, has just told me he is leaving in 2
    weeks, and he does not know how to find a job.''
        If you wait until somebody is at the end of their time and
    then try to cram it all into their head, and help them figure
    out how to transition in the last couple of weeks, it is not
    going to work very well. But if you start on day one and make
    that a priority, it will work a lot better, and our marines
    will be marines for life, and our sailors will be sailors for
    life. I give you all a lot of credit for making that a
    priority, and your written testimony today attributes to it.
        One question that I want to ask may be a question for the
    record because it may involve classified information. I am
    concerned about the civility of the Government of Bahrain. The
    5th Fleet is headquartered in Bahrain, and that 5th Fleet is
    not only important for our defense, but it keeps open sea lanes
    in an important part of the world that allow shipments of oil
    and other shipments that affect the global economy.
        The instability of Bahrain, in my view, causes me
    significant concern about the long-term viability of the 5th
    Fleet there as its headquarters. Certainly the security of the
    lives of those Americans who are serving, but also whether that
    is--can we have a 5th Fleet strategically positioned there
    given that instability? Maybe for the record, I would like to
    ask if you could just offer some thoughts, appropriately
    classified if need be, about what the instability issues, what
    threats that poses and what the Navy is doing to consider how
    to mitigate those threats, if you could, Admiral Greenert.
        Admiral Greenert. I will take that for the record and give
    you a complete answer, Senator.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [Deleted.]

        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Thank you, Senator Kaine. I thank you also
    for your eloquent dissertation on sequestration, and I totally
    agree with it. I thank you for that. Senator Cotton?
        Senator Cotton. Mr. Secretary, Admiral, General, thank you
    very much for your years of distinguished service to our
    country and for all of the men and women you represent, the
    sailors, the marines, and the civilians. I was an Army guy
    myself. General Dunford, I have had many of your marines tell
    me that the Army stands for ``ain't ready for Marines yet.''
    That is not true, is it?
        General Dunford. It just may be, Senator.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Cotton. That is a shocking revelation. Well, there
    is no substitute for an Army, but there is also certainly no
    substitute for a Navy and Marine Corps that is constantly on
    watch all around the globe, that is never in peacetime phase
    because it always deployed somewhere. We are very grateful for
    what you all do.
        Admiral Greenert, you have written and spoken at greater
    length in other forums about the concepts of payloads, not
    platforms. Could you give us maybe a truncated simple version
    here of what you mean by that and how it informs the
    procurement plan for the Navy in the future?
        Admiral Greenert. Yes, Senator. We are a capital intensive
    service, and so when we build a ship it is there for 30 years
    at least, and been longer. To put an integrated complicated
    system there in there inside--a weapon system in such a vessel,
    when you want to change it out, you have to take the ship out
    of service 18 months to 2 years. We cannot do that anymore. We
    cannot afford to take it out of service. That is one. Two, the
    industry and technology is moving so fast, they can put
    together a weapon system that can come in a modular fashion.
        So the deal today is to put together a platform, what I
    call a platform that has enough cooling volume, persistence and
    time at sea, and the ability to support the upgrades--quick and
    fast upgrades. The Enterprise was our first aircraft carrier
    built in 1961. Its first mission was the Cuban Missile Crisis.
    Its last mission was off Afghanistan in 2012, and it had the
    most modern systems we had, a platform with several changes of
    payloads. So, that is what I am getting at. It applies to
    aircraft, and it applies to ships for sure.
        Senator Cotton. General Dunford, would you care to comment
    on how that concept may or may not apply to a ground force like
    the Marine Corps or, for that matter, the Army?
        General Dunford. Senator, I would like to take that for the
    record. I am not sure I can answer that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        This concept of payloads, not platforms, is an important one for
    us, as a scalable and rapidly deployable force. One of the hallmarks of
    Marine Corps organization is that the Marine Air Ground Task Force
    (MAGTF) can be of variable size and possess a myriad of capabilities to
    meet the needs of Combatant Commanders. So this idea is deeply
    ingrained in our institutional culture. As far as how this impacts our
    development and procurement of equipment, I must first echo the Chief
    of Naval Operations comments related to shipbuilding. This is
    particularly applicable to the Navy's amphibious fleet which provides
    the ability to provide a number of various payloads to meet a number of
    different missions. Amphibious ships are inherently adaptive to the
    force package embarked and perform the widest range of missions of any
    ship in our battle force inventory. The ships, along with a MAGTF are
    the Swiss army knife in a commander's tool kit. The demand for this
    capability is rising as it proves to offer legitimate crisis response
    for our friends and deterrence to our foes.
        Additionally, when developing future systems, the USMC always
    anticipates both missions and technologies which do not currently
    exist. We seek to provide room for development in our equipment
    portfolios by procuring materiel with growth capacity that will allow
    for the expansion of capabilities to meet requirements that have not
    yet been levied.

        Senator Cotton. Admiral Greenert, would you like to
    comment, because obviously the Navy and the Air Force are much
    bigger platforms, more capital intensive investments than
    General Dunford tends to use in the Marine Corps than the Army
    uses in its ground operations.
        Admiral Greenert. Well, again, payloads and platforms. My
    support for General--I am a supporting entity for the Marine
    Corps, so when I build an amphibious ship, it has to be able to
    expand to bring in the Marines' systems as they evolve and
    expand. So it is very much a part of what I support for General
    Dunford, and, in fact, we fell behind in that regard. As the
    marines went ashore, if you will, in Afghanistan and Iraq, we
    did not evolve in our ships, and now we are making that
    adjustment working together.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you. I also would like to associate
    myself with the comments of Senator Kaine and Senator McCain
    about the impact of sequestration, in particular the impacts on
    readiness. I would be curious to hear from both Admiral
    Greenert and General Dunford about the timeline that you think
    may be required to get back to full readiness in your two
    Services.
        Admiral Greenert. If we have a predictable, stable budget
    at the right level, which we believe the President's Budget is
    minimally there, we will be back where we need to be in 2018
    for our carrier strike groups and 2020 for my amphibious
    readiness groups that are supporting General Dunford.
        General Dunford. Senator, our timeline is roughly the same,
    sometime between 2018 and 2020. But, of course, that very much
    is dependent on future budgets as well.
        Senator Cotton. Could you care to comment on the status of
    morale for your sailors and your marines, especially over the
    last 2 years, in a sequestration environment?
        Admiral Greenert. Well, when sequestration hit morale, it
    was hard on them. It was a hit to morale. They were angry. They
    did not understand. What is this? What did I do? So now the
    families are angry. They have gotten over that. Today they are
    anxious, but morale is good overall. It is not very good, and
    it is not poor. It is good. They understand that we are looking
    out for their basic needs, and we are providing them ready
    forces when they deploy. But there is a great anxiety out
    there, and if we go back to that, I am not sure exactly what is
    going to happen. I lived through this in the late 1970s and the
    early 1980s.
        General Dunford. On balance, Senator, we have a very young
    force. I would probably describe the reaction as angst at this
    point. They are concerned about it. Where I am mostly
    concerned, though, are the mid-grade staff NCOs and the mid-
    grade officers who are looking to the future of uncertainty,
    and would make decisions to leave the Marine Corps when we want
    them to stay.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you. Thank you all again for your
    service, and thank you again for all the hard work that marines
    and sailors you represent do as well as their families since
    there is no peacetime Navy or Marine Corps, and you are always
    on watch.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Shaheen?
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all
    very much for being here, Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert,
    and General Dunford, and thank you for your service to the
    country. Admiral Greenert, we are going to miss you, but we
    hope you will be back in another capacity at some point.
        As we were discussing, Admiral, before the hearing started,
    I had, as you all know, the great opportunity yesterday to
    embark with the USS New Hampshire submarine to go out for the
    day, to dive with the submarine. It was really an experience of
    a lifetime, and I very much appreciated that. I was especially
    impressed by the dedication and the professionalism of our men
    serving on that submarine as on all of our submarines,
    impressed by the teamwork that they experienced that, as they
    pointed out to me, that a submarine only runs if everybody
    works together. The cook knew as much about the ship and how it
    was laid out and the operations as the people in the operations
    room. So it was very impressive.
        One of the things that became clear as we were discussing
    with folks about their experience on the New Hampshire was that
    while--General Dunford can appreciate this. A lot of the
    discussion during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq has been
    about the toll that that has taken on our fighting men and
    women. One of the things that was clear yesterday, and not
    because anyone on the New Hampshire complained about it, but
    the toll that the reduction in our ships and their capacity has
    on the men and women who serve on those ships, because the
    deployments increase just as our deployments during Iraq and
    Afghanistan in a way that I think is less clear to the American
    public, and the toll that that takes.
        I wonder, Admiral or Secretary Mabus, if either of you
    would like to speak to what that shortfall in our ship
    capacity, the impact that that has on the men and women who are
    serving on those ships.
        Admiral Greenert. You explained it very well, Senator.
    There is a commitment, a covenant that we have for providing
    ready forces forward around the world to be able, as we like to
    say, where it matters when it matters. If you have less ships
    distribute, those which are there will stay on the watch
    longer. We have a phenomenon that we are trying to get out of,
    as we were just describing how long it would take to get our
    readiness right, and that is when we have sequestration, all of
    our maintenance slowed down in Portsmouth Naval Shipyard,
    Puget. All of our shipyards slowed down to kind of parade rest,
    as we like to say. So now, we are trying to get that back up,
    get the workforce back because many left as a result of
    sequestration.
        Somebody is out there standing the watch, and that is that
    longer deployment waiting for the other folks to get their
    maintenance and training done to come out to relieve them. That
    hurts and takes a while.
        Secretary Mabus. Senator, in the early 90s we had about a
    400-ship Navy, and we had on average 100 ships forward
    deployed. Today we have a little bit less than a 300-ship Navy,
    and we still have 100 ships forward deployed. So you explained
    it very well. Sailors are going out for longer. They are
    staying for longer.
        One of the things that we have been working on is trying to
    make those deployments more predictable, and not just the
    deployments, but the things the CNO was talking about--the
    training, the maintenance, and the surge capability when they
    come back--and it is called the optimized fleet response plan.
    We are doing it for our carriers first then our strike groups.
    We are going to do it for our amphibious ready groups next. But
    it is trying to do that.
        The last thing I would like to say is that it is one of the
    reasons that I remain so committed to shipbuilding, to getting
    the right number of those gray hulls so that it will ease some
    of the stress on the sailors who--the men and women who sail in
    them.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Well, one of the things I
    neglected to say that you all know is that the USS New
    Hampshire is a Virginia-class submarine, and one of the things
    that was very exciting to hear from folks on the ship was that
    they always feel very good when it is the Portsmouth Naval
    Shipyard who has done the work because they do such a great job
    at the shipyard. So I had to put that plug in for the
    Portsmouth Shipyard because they do such great work.
        I am really out of time, but, Mr. Chairman, if I could ask
    one more question?
        Chairman McCain. Other than a commercial? Yes.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Secretary Mabus, last September
    the Departments of Energy, Navy, and Agriculture awarded
    contracts to three companies to construct and commission bio
    refineries to produce drop-in fuels to help meet our
    transportation needs, drop-in bio fuels. Can you speak to why
    you think this is so important for the Navy?
        Secretary Mabus. It is important because it makes us better
    warfighters. It is important because it takes fuel away as a
    weapon to be used against us. All you have to do is look at the
    headlines about Crimea, the Ukraine, Europe today, and Russia
    using fuel as a weapon, and we are trying to avoid that. It
    will also help us smooth out some of these price swings in the
    oil and gas market.
        Finally, I am a big believer in the free market. I think
    you need competition in things like fuels. Now, we are--we will
    not buy any alternative fuel unless it is absolutely priced
    competitive with traditional fuels. The other two requirements
    that we have, one is that it be drop-in as you said. We are not
    changing engines or settings. Third, that it take no land out
    of food production. So we are looking at second generation,
    third generation biofuel production.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Graham?
        Senator Graham. Thank you all for your service. What is the
    morale in the Marine Corps like, General?
        General Dunford. Senator, it is high.
        Senator Graham. Yes, well, it should be high because you
    are the finest fighting force on Earth. I want to tell the
    Marine Corps and the Navy better days are coming to the
    families. We are going to get our act together in Congress. I
    do not know exactly how yet, but we will. We are not going to
    leave you hanging. We are not going to take modernization off
    the table so you cannot fight the next war effectively, and we
    are going to somehow solve the problem we have created, so just
    hang in there. Keep your chin up and focused on the mission.
        General, do you agree it would be smart to leave a residual
    force behind in Afghanistan if conditions require it?
        General Dunford. I do, Senator.
        Senator Graham. From a Navy perspective, Admiral, do you
    believe that the threats we face are growing as I speak?
        Admiral Greenert. I do, absolutely.
        Senator Graham. Do both of you agree that there are more
    terrorist organizations with more capability, with more safe
    havens, with more weapons, with more desire to attack the
    homeland than any time since 9/11?
        Admiral Greenert. I do.
        General Dunford. I do, Senator.
        Senator Graham. When it comes to Iraq and Syria, do you
    agree with me that if we take ISIL on, and when I say ``we, the
    United States and the region, that we must win?
        General Dunford. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Graham. How many marines were involved in the first
    battle and second battle of Fallujah?
        General Dunford. The first battle, Senator, was about two
    regimental combat teams of--in the order of 6,000. The second
    battle, and, of course, there were soldiers as well. The second
    battle was about 14,000 U.S. forces. That is marines and
    soldiers.
        Senator Graham. So do you agree with me without that
    capacity, it would have been very difficult for the Sunni
    tribes to prevail over al-Qaeda in Iraq at the time?
        General Dunford. Without, absolutely, Senator.
        Senator Graham. Okay. So we are about to fight a bigger
    force, and how many members of our military do we have in Iraq
    today?
        General Dunford. Senator, I do not know the exact numbers,
    but I think on the order of 3,000.
        Senator Graham. How many of those are marines?
        General Dunford. We have about 500 marines, Senator. They
    are actually on the ground in Iraq.
        Senator Graham. Do you agree with me, both of you, that
    ISIL represents a threat to us, not just the region?
        General Dunford. I do, Senator.
        Senator Graham. Do you agree with that, Admiral?
        Admiral Greenert. Yes, I do, Senator.
        Senator Graham. So anybody who thinks that defeating or
    destroying ISIL is their problem, not ours, is making a huge
    mistake?
        General Dunford. I agree with that, Senator.
        Admiral Greenert. We have to prevail, yes, Senator.
        Senator Graham. Do you agree that it is in our national
    security interests to make sure that not only are they degraded
    and destroyed, but they do not come back?
        General Dunford. I agree with that, Senator.
        Senator Graham. Do you agree with me that the best way to
    ensure that you degrade and destroy ISIL is having some
    American ground forces to help the regional forces?
        General Dunford. Senator, right now I think it is critical
    that we provide U.S. support, and I think we are waiting for
    General Austin to make a recommendation as to exactly what that
    support would be.
        Senator Graham. Does that not guarantee the highest chance
    of success is to have some American capability on the ground
    enhancing our regional partners?
        General Dunford. Certainly my perspective would be as a
    link to our supporting capability.
        Senator Graham. Do you agree with me that any marine, or
    soldier, or sailor, or airman who participate in these
    operations would be protecting the Homeland?
        General Dunford. I believe that, Senator.
        Senator Graham. If somebody died trying to deal with ISIL
    in Iraq or Syria, they would have died on behalf of protecting
    their Nation?
        General Dunford. They would have died in protecting our
    national interests is clear, Senator.
        Senator Graham. Do you agree with me that if we do not stop
    ISIL sooner rather than later, the likelihood of another attack
    against this country grows?
        General Dunford. I think it grows, but also I think if we
    do not stop them, there will be destabilization in the region
    as well. It is inimical to our national interests.
        Senator Graham. Do you worry about the king of Jordan if
    they do not at least get slowed down or degraded pretty
    quickly?
        General Dunford. I do, Senator.
        Senator Graham. Do you, Admiral?
        Admiral Greenert. I do, Senator, yes, I do.
        Senator Graham. So to both of you and to those who serve
    under you, I am sorry that some of you may have to go back. I
    regret it more than you will ever know. But I think you know
    better than anyone else why you may have to go back. The only
    commitment I will make as a Senator from South Carolina is that
    if you go back, you go back to win, and that we get this right
    this time. Thank you all for your service.
        Senator Reed [presiding]. Senator McCaskill?
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you. Thank you all for being here.
    I sometimes neglect to say how much respect I have for all of
    you. I am so busy getting after something that I forget to tell
    you, so let me do that before I get after something.
        Admiral Greenert, I am dismayed about the Fat Leonard
    scandal. I am dismayed because it rips at the fabric of honor
    and integrity that defines our military. One of the things that
    I have tried to do since I was allowed to join this important
    committee is make sure when we have those moments that
    consequences go to the very top instead of hanging out at the
    middle or the bottom, which has sometimes occurred when there
    is a scandal like this. So I would like you or Secretary Mabus
    to speak to the accountability of those at the top of the chain
    of command for this conduct that occurred on their watch.
        Secretary Mabus. The Leonard Francis scandal----
        Senator McCaskill. Correct.
        Secretary Mabus. Well, Senator, we are going to hold people
    accountable that violated either the law or Navy ethics, and I
    have already issued letters of censure to three admirals, one
    three-star, two two-star admirals. The two two-stars elected to
    retire. The three-star had already decided to retire.
        One thing, though, that I think is important about this
    situation is that the reason this was uncovered is that we set
    up financial trip wires that Glenn Defense Marine Asia [GDMA]
    went across, and so, red flags were raised. The [Naval Criminal
    Investigative Service] NCIS investigated this for 3 years with
    no leaks. We during that investigation found that an NCIS agent
    was furnishing Mr. Francis with information, that set up some
    false information to him, and it led to Mr. Francis believing
    that the investigation had been shut up down, and allowed us to
    arrest him on American soil. He has implicated a number of
    naval personnel.
        We are at the--on the timetable of the U.S. Attorney's
    Office in San Diego in terms of how quickly we get to these
    things, and that has been a frustration because we have--it has
    taken a long, long time. But I have set up a consolidated
    disposition authority, so if somebody was found not to be
    criminally liable, we are taking a look at them to see if they
    violated Navy ethics. We are stepping up ethics training for
    COs [commanding officers], XOs [executive officers], people in
    areas of responsibility. We have completely overhauled our
    procurement requirements and regulations in terms of husbanding
    these services that GDMA provided. We are auditing that on a
    routine basis.
        One thing I do want to say, though, is that you could have
    all the ethics training in the world. If somebody does not know
    it is wrong to steal, if somebody does not know it is wrong to
    take a bribe, they miss something at home.
        Senator McCaskill. Right.
        Secretary Mabus. What we have to do is set up a system that
    will catch them and will hold them accountable. You are right,
    it is up and down the chain. I think that by the first
    actions--I not only took the actions to censure three admirals.
    I have taken two more from access to classified information
    based on allegations. I do not know if those allegations are
    correct yet, but in order to protect the integrity of the
    Service.
        Finally, Senator, unique among the Services, when we make a
    change in command, when we do something to a senior officer, a
    CO or a flag officer, we announce it. We try to be completely
    transparent about this. Partly it is because of what we can--
    the learning effect that it will have on other people, but
    partly because people need to know what is happening in the
    Service. We have not seen the numbers go up, but because we
    announce it we tend to get more scrutiny.
        Senator McCaskill. Well, I appreciate that, and I
    appreciate that you all have done this. I wanted you to know I
    am very interested in how all of this shakes out, and if there
    is anything I can do to prod the U.S. attorney into doing
    justice in the most efficient, and effective, and time
    sensitive way let me know.
        I do not have much time left. I do want to ask a couple of
    questions that you all can respond on the record for me at a
    later date because I do not want to hold up the Senator from
    Alaska. But one is obviously the electronic capability platform
    as it relates to the growlers. I know you testified last week,
    Admiral, about a shortage of two to three squadrons. I am very
    concerned about that. I would be concerned about that if these
    amazing aircraft were not built in St. Louis because the
    capability of the electronic battlefield that we face now, and
    I would like you to respond to what--I am worried that this
    joint study that is going on now will not be completed in time
    for us to really evaluate whether the needs jointly even exceed
    what you have said, which is two to three squadrons in terms of
    a shortfall. So that I need on the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        In previous testimony, the 2-3 squadron shortfall that I mentioned
    was in reference to strike fighter aircraft. The Navy has the inventory
    of Growlers we need to support current Navy requirements. There is a
    study in progress to identify Joint warfighting requirements, Concept
    of Employment (CONEMPS) and future mission sets. The results of this
    study are expected to be released this summer and will provide insight
    that will allow the Department to determine the necessary force
    structure to meet Joint Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) requirements
    rather than just those requirements unique to the Navy.

        Senator McCaskill. For you, General Dunford, I would like
    an updating on the how the realigning of Guam is going. This is
    something that we have worked on in this committee, and when I
    used to chair the Readiness and Management Support
    Subcommittee, this was something we talked about a lot. If you
    would get to the committee, and specifically to my office,
    where we are with the realignment with Guam and what the
    situation is on that, I would be very appreciative.
        General Dunford. We will get that information to you,
    Senator, thank you.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        General Dunford. The nature of the program for the USMC is
    characterized by its duration and scope. The scope of the program is
    significant, and entails myriad actions prior to Marines moving off of
    Okinawa, and the duration is on the order of decades.
        The program has experienced some start and stops, but has continued
    to move forward. The most noticeable progress has been at MCAS Iwakuni.
    Last year we completed the move of VMGR-152 from Okinawa to MCAS
    Iwakuni and the base has been and continues to enlarge. CVW-5 is on
    track to commence their relocation from Atsugi to Iwakuni in fiscal
    year 2017. By the time Iwakuni is finished the base will have nearly
    doubled in size and capacity.
        Guam and the CJMT have both moved forward. The Supplemental
    Environmental Impact Study for Guam, and in the Environmental Impact
    Study for the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) Joint
    Military Training Complex have progressed. These NEPA actions are
    necessary to commence construction. Our first project, a range complex
    in Guam, is in the fiscal year 2016 budget request. We have also
    published a Guam master plan, as required by the NDAA, and are
    preparing to deliver a Hawaii master plan that will outline the early
    stages of preparation for moving Marines to Hawaii as a part of the
    realignment. While compliance with the Endangered Species Act and the
    associated consultation with the UFWS remains challenging for the Guam
    relocation, the DON anticipates issuing a Record of Decision (ROD) this
    summer. We anticipate that the consultations for CJMT will be similarly
    challenging, but still anticipate issuing the ROD for the CJMT in the
    summer of 2016.
        We continue to conduct rotational deployments to Darwin, Australia
    and the fourth rotation of approximately 1,170 Marines and an aviation
    detachment has just commenced. The size of the rotation increases apace
    of adequate facilities available with the force eventually being 2500
    Marines strong.
        While there is significant activity off of Okinawa to prepare for
    the realignment there is also significant activity on Okinawa. The
    Futenma replacement facility and Camp Schwab realignment are underway.
    This is a long term project with FOC for the airfield anticipated to be
    fiscal year 2025. Political challenges remain but we are pleased to see
    construction progressing and resolute commitment for the government of
    Japan. The sun will not set on this realignment program until planned
    land returns in Okinawa are complete. This is scheduled for fiscal year
    2032. Of note, the Marine Corps has already returned land in Okinawa
    and the most recent return took effect on 31 March of this year, when
    we transferred West Futenma housing back to the Japanese.

        Senator McCaskill. I know everybody has covered
    sequestration before I got here, but for whatever every other
    Senator said about sequestration, me, too. Thank you.
        Senator Reed. Senator Sullivan?
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator
    McCaskill, I might get a highlight of your final question is
    actually one of my first questions. So, gentlemen, I appreciate
    your service and your frank testimony. General Dunford, I also
    appreciate your highlighting the bang for the buck component of
    the Marine Corps' spending and warfighting capability, 6
    percent of the budget, 21 percent of the infantry battalions. I
    think that is important for the American people to understand
    and recognize.
        I do want to follow on a number of the general questions
    from Senators Wicker, Hirono, McCaskill on the redeployment,
    the pivot to Asia in particular with regard to some of our
    ground forces. As part of this committee's oversight
    responsibility, I will be heading to the region relatively soon
    to look at some of the issues in terms of what cost, training,
    readiness, deployment capabilities, as it relates to the Guam
    redeployment, but also some other issues.
        I would just like, General Dunford, from your perspective,
    what are the issues we should be thinking of when we are
    looking at that, and are you satisfied with how that
    redeployment is going? As you probably know, there are some
    concerns about that, and I think they have been consistent
    concerns over the years.
        General Dunford. Senator, thanks, and that clearly is one
    of the more important issues we are grappling with now is the
    Pacific. I think maybe break it down into three pieces. The
    first would be capacity, and for the U.S. Marine Corps what the
    rebalance means is 22,500 marines west of the Date Line, and we
    are there now. So as we have drawn down the force in Iraq and
    Afghanistan, we have reconstituted our unit deployment program
    and got those numbers back for our 3rd Marine Expeditionary
    Force, back to what they ought to be.
        The second piece is the reposture of forces, relieving some
    of the pressure in Okinawa, building up forces in Guam, and
    then as the Secretary talked about, forces in Australia as
    well. So there are several pieces. It is the Guam piece, it is
    the Australia piece, and then forces will go to Japan, and then
    some forces will eventually go to Hawaii as well. We are just
    getting started with that this year. In the President's Budget
    2016, there is a training range in Guam. That is one of the
    pre-conditions for us to bring forces down to Guam. We will
    bring a total of 5,000 forces to Guam eventually. We are
    rotating this spring another force of 1,000 marines into
    Australia with an eventual plan to bring that number up to
    2,500.
        But I think in terms of the issues that you should be
    concerned about, one clearly is the progress for the Futenma
    Replacement Facility and how that progress in Japan because
    that is going to be critical. We have to have the Futenma
    Replacement Facility in order for us to leave our current
    Futenma Air Station, and then make the deployment--make the re-
    deployment to Guam as well and properly support the marines
    that are in the area.
        The other piece is lift in the area. We are going to better
    support the combatant commanders' day-to-day requirements by
    disaggregating out there. So in other words, by moving to Guam
    and moving to Australia, we get better coverage in the Pacific
    on a day-to-day basis. But then in a contingency, we have to
    aggregate those forces, for example, in a conflict on the
    Korean peninsula. So, one of the real critical things we are
    working on within the Department of the Navy with the Secretary
    and the CNO's help is the additional lift that would be
    required to move marines around.
        So there is enabling capability, and the first is lift,
    amphibious lift and other forms of lift, to move marines around
    both for training and for contingency purposes. Then as well
    the training facilities and the quality of life support that
    will be on Guam over time. But all this is--we are a lot
    further--I have touched on this probably off and on for the
    last 10 years, Senator, and we are finally now starting to pour
    concrete. We are starting to actually move forward with the
    plan. So I feel much better about it than I have in recent
    years.
        Senator Sullivan. Great, thank you. I want to switch and
    follow on to the question that Senator King had talked about in
    terms of the Arctic, and I will be a little more blunt. We have
    a DOD 13-page Arctic strategy, and yet when you look at what
    the Russians are doing in the Arctic, it is actually quite
    impressive. Impressive, but disturbing. So I am sure you
    gentlemen are somewhat familiar, but General Dempsey mentioned
    in testimony with the Secretary of Defense last week that the
    Russians are looking at four new Arctic combat brigades as our
    U.S. Army is thinking about pulling them out of the Arctic. I
    think that would give Vladimir Putin a lot of joy.
        They are building new airfields, 13 new airfields. They are
    conducting long-range air patrols with their barrel bombers off
    the coast of Alaska again. They have incredibly 6 new
    icebreakers coming, 5 more planned to add to their fleet of 40.
    Meanwhile, the United States is thinking about an additional
    one to our fleet of five.
        Does it concern you, particularly when we talk about
    keeping sea lanes open, there is going to be a very, very
    important sea lane that is developing in the Northwest Arctic
    Passage there? Has the Navy given any thought to this in terms
    of particularly adding icebreakers to the Navy's shipping fleet
    if we are going to be remotely competitive with the Russians in
    the Arctic that they have stood up a new Arctic command? They
    are all in in the Arctic, and it is not 13 pages of paper. It
    is concrete. It is ships. It is airfields. We are thinking
    about removing forces from Alaska, and we do not have--I think
    we are number five or six in the world in terms of icebreakers.
    It seems to me a ludicrous situation that the Navy should be
    concerned about.
        Admiral Greenert. Well, the purview of the icebreakers is
    the Department of Homeland Security, the Coast Guard. So if we
    split that, then we will be clobbering our strategy. Although
    it sounds like a petty answer, somebody has to be in charge
    right here, and right now it resides with the Department of
    Homeland Security.
        Am I concerned? Yes, Senator, I am concerned because for us
    to take our combat ships up there, we have to work in
    conjunction with that and make sure that we can get up there as
    well. So we have to look at the hardening of our hulls, and we
    look toward that, and also it is not just surface ships which
    we tend to focus on. It is the aircraft in the undersea domain.
        So as I mentioned earlier, we have increased--I have
    directed the increase in our exercise capacity up there and our
    activity up there. We are spending a little bit more--it is
    modest right now, exercising with the Norwegians, with the
    Scandinavian countries, and with Canada in that arena to get
    used to operating up there.
        Senator Sullivan. Mr. Secretary, any thoughts?
        Secretary Mabus. As the ice melts in the Arctic, our
    responsibilities clearly are going up. We just--the CNO and I
    just issued the new Navy road map for the Arctic. We updated
    it. I stopped through the university at Fairbanks, the
    University of Alaska at Fairbanks. In terms of it is not just
    platforms, and it is not just capability. It is what we are
    facing up there. We not only have less ice, but it is freezing
    in different ways. So, as we send our submarines up there, they
    do not have a whole lot of clearance both above or below, and
    the ice is forming in different ways that are beginning to be a
    hazard to navigation.
        But as CNO said, we are upping our exercises. We are upping
    our research into the area. We are moving in terms of hardening
    hulls, in terms of warfighting capabilities. We have a SEAL
    [Sea, Air, Land] training unit on Kodiak specifically focused
    on cold weather combat. In fact, every SEAL goes through it
    right after they come out of BUD/S [Basic Underwater
    Demolition/SEAL] training. So we are concerned about it. We are
    trying to move on it. But it, again, is one of these things
    that in this budget situation you have to make some very, very
    hard choices, and we do not have the capability that we would
    like to have in the Arctic.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. On behalf of Chairman McCain, let me thank
    the witnesses for their excellent testimony and for their
    service to the Nation, and the Navy, and the Marine Corps, and
    adjourn the hearing. The hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:54 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
           littoral combat ship mine countermeasures mission package
        1. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, the mine
    countermeasures (MCM) mission package, which is more than 4 years
    behind schedule, will not achieve full capability until 2019. The
    fiscal year 2014 Director of Operational Testing and Evaluation annual
    report again stated, ``The MCM package has not yet demonstrated
    sufficient performance to achieve the Navy's minimal Increment 1
    requirements.'' Navy plans indicate two of the four Avenger-class mine
    countermeasures ships in Bahrain will be replaced with Littoral Combat
    Ships (LCS) in 2019 and the other two will be replaced in 2020. Please
    comment on the:

             Testing progress of the LCS mission packages
             Risk in delivering the full mine countermeasures
            capability, increment four, in fiscal year 2019
             Contingency plans to extend the Avenger-class in
            Bahrain, should the mine countermeasures mission package
            experience further delays
        Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. LCS Mine Countermeasures (MCM)
    Mission Package testing continues to make progress. While not all of
    the performance measures for the LCS MCM Mission Package (Phase 1) were
    fully demonstrated by the end of fiscal year 2014, systems testing and
    tactical proficiency events are currently ongoing in the Gulf of
    Mexico. Continued system refinements and improved operator performance
    are keeping the MCM Mission Package on track to demonstrate Phase 1
    effectiveness during Initial Operational Test and Evaluation later this
    year. The MCM Mission Package remains on schedule to support
    deployments beginning in fiscal year 2018, and will enable the
    scheduled decommissioning of the Avenger-class ships as they reach
    their end of service life.
        The Navy continues to assess the risks associated with meeting the
    full Phase 4 capability in 2019, and will be able to more clearly
    identify and mitigate any risk following the experience gained from
    this year's testing events. However, a significant overlap currently
    exists between the scheduled LCS MCM Mission Package deployments to
    Bahrain and the departure of the Avenger-class that would accommodate
    any unexpected delay in the arrival of MCM Mission Packages.
    Furthermore, Minehunting Units and Expeditionary MCM companies already
    deployed to Bahrain will provide additional MCM capacity during the
    transition to the LCS MCM Mission Package.
                           ford-class testing issues
        2. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, the Director of Operational
    Test and Evaluation's fiscal year 2014 Annual Report states the
    reliability of four systems--the electromagnetic aircraft launching
    system, advanced arresting gear, dual band radar, and advanced weapons
    elevators--are the most significant risks to the USS Gerald R. Ford
    (CVN-78) initial operational test and evaluation.
        Can you update us on the testing and reliability of these key
    systems on CVN-78, which is scheduled to deliver in March 2016?
        Mr. Mabus. The Electromagnetic Aircraft Launching System (EMALS)
    testing, to date, has shown an increased reliability growth trend as
    reported to the Director of Operational Testing and Evaluation (DOT&E)
    in December 2014. EMALS is currently preparing the land-based test site
    for the Repeated Deadload Phase of testing later this fiscal year. The
    purpose of this test is to perform additional deadload events to
    continue to grow the proven system reliability. EMALS motor/generator
    shipboard testing started on schedule in August 2014, as did catapult
    testing in December 2014. Testing will continue through the 1st
    quarter, fiscal year 2016, with data from the shipboard test program to
    be incorporated into the Reliability Growth Program.
        Performance testing for the Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) is
    scheduled to start later this fiscal year. Reliability growth tracking
    will re-commence with this phase. An update to AAG Reliability Growth
    metrics is expected to be available for the annual December Reliability
    brief to DOT&E. AAG shipboard testing will begin in August 2015.
        Dual Band Radar (DBR) began testing in March 2014, and will
    continue at Wallops Island through the 3rd quarter, fiscal year 2015. A
    Reliability Working Group, responsible for gathering and reporting
    reliability data, recently began tracking reliability data during Land-
    Based Engineering Testing at Wallops Island; no reliability reports
    have been generated to date. DBR shipboard testing begins in May 2015.
        Advanced Weapons Elevators shipboard testing began in March 2015,
    with testing of the first of 11 elevators now 70 percent complete.
    Reliability growth tracking begins following the completion of
    shipbuilder installation and testing, and data collection will begin in
    early fiscal year 2016.

        3. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, what is being done to ensure
    these key systems are ready for the next carrier, USS John F. Kennedy
    (CVN-79), which is scheduled to go under contract this spring of 2015?
        Mr. Mabus. All design changes made to key systems as the result of
    lessons learned from CVN 78 have been captured in the configurations to
    be installed on CVN 79. There is one exception; the Dual Band Radar
    will be replaced on CVN 79 by the Enterprise Surveillance Suite. The
    risk of further modifications discovered during shipboard testing that
    would impact ship integration is considered low, and the opportunity to
    incorporate system changes is maintained until installation on CVN 79.
                       movement of forces in the pacific
        4. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus and General Dunford, the
    movement of forces from Okinawa to Guam and other parts of the Pacific
    carries with it a significant cost and impact on our ability to respond
    in theater. I am very concerned that these costs are not yet fully
    accounted for, and that if we see over-runs which hinder our ability to
    build the replacement infrastructure, we will not be able to meet our
    operational plans in the Pacific theater. I am also concerned with the
    continued proposal to fund civilian infrastructure ``outside the
    fence'' on Guam, and the cost of family housing driven by those forces
    that will be on ``accompanied'' tours.
        Who is responsible for the analysis to determine the number of
    accompanied personnel?
        Secretary Mabus. The Marine Corps relocation provides for a
    holistic and operationally-responsive Marine Corps Air Ground Task
    Force capability on Guam based on a mix of assigned and rotational
    forces organized to meet regional needs. This force structure, as
    agreed by the United States and Japan in 2012, provides for
    approximately 5000 Marines on Guam. It will consist of 2,979
    rotationally assigned unaccompanied Marines through the Unit Deployment
    Program (UDP) and 1,796 permanently assigned personnel. To estimate the
    number of accompanied family members, the Marine Corps relies on
    standard planning factors for permanently assigned Marines to inform
    housing and other support requirements. This estimate is incorporated
    in the July 2014 Guam Master Plan, and we will continue to evaluate
    these requirements as the relocation moves forward to ensure housing
    and support facilities are appropriately sized and resourced.
        General Dunford. The Marine Corps relocation provides for a
    holistic and operationally-responsive Marine Corps Air Ground Task
    Force capability on Guam based on a mix of assigned and rotational
    forces organized to meet regional needs. This force structure, as
    agreed by the United States and Japan in 2012, provides for
    approximately 5000 Marines on Guam. It will consist of 2,979
    rotationally assigned unaccompanied Marines through the Unit Deployment
    Program (UDP) and 1,796 permanently assigned personnel. To estimate the
    number of accompanied family members, the Marine Corps relies on
    standard planning factors for permanently assigned Marines to inform
    housing and other support requirements. This estimate is incorporated
    in the July 2014 Guam Master Plan, and we will continue to evaluate
    these requirements as the relocation moves forward to ensure housing
    and support facilities are appropriately sized and resourced.

        5. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus and General Dunford, how certain
    are you that the costs and schedule now proposed will be met?
        Mr. Mabus. The Marine Corps is currently executing the Guam Master
    Plan that was submitted to Congress last summer (July 2014) and is on
    track to meet the scheduled milestones and is continuing to refine
    costs within the profile defined by the master plan. The Marine Corps
    is confident in the reliability of the cost estimate for the relocation
    of Marines off Okinawa as a planning figure and has employed the
    appropriate approach and methodology for determining the estimate.
    Since the 2012 initial estimates for Guam, a steadfast approach has
    further refined the estimates to better account for Area Cost Factor
    changes, environmental mitigation, and more fidelity on one-time costs.
    We are committed to the most cost effective laydown for the Marines on
    Guam. We will pursue all avenues for making the relocation as
    affordable as possible while controlling costs.
        General Dunford. The Marine Corps is currently executing the Guam
    Master Plan that was submitted to Congress last summer (July 2014) and
    is on track to meet the scheduled milestones and is continuing to
    refine costs within the profile defined by the master plan.

        6. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus and General Dunford, why is the
    Department requesting an additional $20 million for the civilian water
    and wastewater infrastructure on Guam?
        Mr. Mabus. The cost of public infrastructure improvements necessary
    to support the relocation--specifically for water and wastewater--
    exceed the current level of appropriated funding. If the $20 million
    request for fiscal year 2016 is not funded it will need to be requested
    again to support the Navy's requirement to support Initial Operating
    Capability of the future Marine Corps Base Guam.
        While appropriated, no funding was executed in fiscal year 2014 due
    to the Congressional restrictions on obligations and/or expenditures
    until an implementation plan is provided to Defense Committees. The
    plan is being prepared by the President's Economic Adjustment Committee
    (EAC) pursuant to the fiscal year 2014 NDAA and will capture the
    complete requirements for water/wastewater and other areas of
    investment. The plan will be released not later than the issuance of
    the Record of Decision pursuant to the requirements in the NDAA. fiscal
    year 2014 - $119.4; fiscal year 2015 - $0; fiscal year 2016 - $20.
        General Dunford. The cost of public infrastructure improvements
    necessary to support the relocation--specifically for water and
    wastewater--exceed the current level of appropriated funding. If the
    $20 million request for fiscal year 2016 is not funded it will need to
    be requested again to support the Navy's requirement to support Initial
    Operating Capability of the future Marine Corps Base Guam.
        While appropriated, no funding was executed in fiscal year 2014 due
    to the Congressional restrictions on obligations and/or expenditures
    until an implementation plan is provided to Defense Committees. The
    plan is being prepared by the President's Economic Adjustment Committee
    (EAC) pursuant to the fiscal year 2014 NDAA and will capture the
    complete requirements for water/wastewater and other areas of
    investment. The plan will be released not later than the issuance of
    the Record of Decision pursuant to the requirements in the NDAA. fiscal
    year 2014 - $119.4; fiscal year 2015 - $0; fiscal year 2016 - $20.
               cruiser and dock landing ship phased modernization
        7. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert, in your written statement you
    ``request congressional support for Navy's original plan'' for cruiser
    phased modernization, which would induct 9 additional cruisers into
    phased modernization in fiscal year 2016 for a total of 11 cruisers in
    this status. Could you explain your position, including the benefits
    and cost savings of supporting Navy's original plan?
        Admiral Greenert. The Navy continues to face challenging funding
    reductions instituted by the Budget Control Act of 2011, as amended by
    the Bipartisan Budget Agreement of 2013. The Navy's original Cruiser
    modernization plan provided a viable strategy to mitigate the cost of
    modernization while delaying recapitalization of the class. Navy's
    original plan would save $4.4 billion more than the ``2-4-6'' plan
    mandated by law in fiscal year 2015. Just based on the duration of the
    modernization period, the cost savings of our original plan would be
    roughly $75 million per year per ship compared to the traditional class
    average operations and sustainment (O&S) costs, primarily due to
    reduced crew and steaming days.
        Additionally, Navy's original plan maintained a minimum of 11
    active CG 47 class Air Defense Commander (ADC) platforms in the Fleet
    into the mid-2030s and final CG retirement would have occurred in 2045.
    The current ``2-4-6'' plan will see the last CG retire in 2038 due to
    the reduction in time the ships are in the modernization period. This
    seven year delay in fully recapitalizing the ship class would have
    relieved pressure on our shipbuilding account largely consumed in the
    2030s with building Ohio Replacement SSBNs and aircraft carriers.
        The reduced cost is a result of the pace and rate of modernization
    in our original PB 2015 plan. That plan would have inducted all 11 CGs
    into the program by early fiscal year 2016 and would have modernized
    the Cruisers starting at a rate of one per year in fiscal year 2017.
    Additional savings would have been achieved based on the duration each
    ship was in the modernization period (anywhere from 4 to 10 years). The
    cost savings during the modernization period, as compared to
    traditional class average O&S costs, are roughly $75M per year per
    ship, primarily based on reduced crew and steaming days. We estimate
    the PB 2015 plan would have cost the Navy about $4.4B less through the
    fiscal year 2015 FYDP than the Congressionally directed ``2-4-6'' plan.
    We anticipate similar cost avoidance though the fiscal year 2016 FYDP
    if allowed to return to the original plan.
                     upgraded littoral combat ship decision
        8. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, regarding
    the decision to upgrade the last 20 LCS, in his February 2014 memo,
    Secretary of Defense Charles T. Hagel asked the Navy to provide
    ``alternative proposals to procure a capable and lethal small surface
    combatant, generally consistent with the capabilities of a frigate.''
    Then, Navy conducted extensive analysis and produced their
    recommendation to upgrade the last 20 LCS, which will cost an
    additional $60 to $75 million per LCS.
        As the Congressional Research Service has noted, the missing piece
    of analysis is explaining why 20 upgraded LCS are operationally
    necessary--what specific gaps they will fill for our combatant
    commanders. This work should have been done to validate there is an
    actual problem that needs to be solved, before Secretary Hagel signed
    the memo, and the search for a solution began.
        Additionally, the continuous sensor and weapon upgrades of our
    destroyers and fast attack submarines are based on staying ahead of
    specific threats in order to achieve specific warfighting objectives.
    In other words, these ships are ``benchmarked'' in terms of capability
    and quantity against specific threat missiles, sensors, and so on. If
    LCS is to be upgraded to take on the role of a Frigate, we must
    understand its new warfighting role and benchmarks.
        Just as with our destroyers and submarines, benchmarking to a
    specific threat helps everyone understand when and if future upgrades
    are necessary. I presume these upgrades to LCS are just the beginning
    of what will be necessary to keep these ships relevant against future
    threats as they continue to operate out to 2050.
        Can you explain the extent to which analysis has been or will be
    done to explain the specific combatant commander gaps the upgraded LCS
    will fill and threat benchmarks the LCS upgrades should be measured
    against?
        Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. Navy's 2012 Force Structure
    Assessment (FSA) determined the need for 52 small surface combatants to
    meet Combatant Commander requirements. This requirement remains valid
    and Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) and Frigates (FF) will fill it. LCS is
    meeting its Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) validated
    requirements but in response to SECDEF direction, Navy will procure 20
    FFs with increased lethality and survivability to complete the 52 ship
    requirement.
        LCS and FFs are part of the same Program of Record and will address
    three primary anti-access threats documented as joint capability gaps:
    swarming fast attack craft/fast inshore attack craft (FAC/FIAC); diesel
    submarines; and maritime mines. LCS, with its ability to embark the
    mine countermeasure (MCM) mission package will execute the MCM mission
    exclusively, whereas the surface warfare (SUW) and anti-submarine
    warfare (ASW) missions can be executed by either LCS (with the
    appropriate mission package embarked) or the multi-mission Frigates.
    The FF, with additional lethality and survivability features, will
    address the same SUW and ASW missions as LCS while accepting less risk.
        The Office of Naval Intelligence provided the estimated threat
    environment that framed the Small Surface Combatant Task Force's
    (SSCTF) requirements analysis. Additionally, analytical input from Navy
    Component Commanders and Fleet Commanders prioritized SUW and ASW
    missions. This input ensured the proposed design was relevant and
    adaptable to meet warfighting needs.
        In addition, through extensive war gaming and campaign analysis,
    LCS was tested against various threats in typical areas of fleet
    operation around the world. The threat weapons employed in these areas
    were used to build the benchmarks against which the Frigate will be
    measured. The FF Increment to the LCS Flight 0+ Capability Development
    Document (CDD) is in Navy staffing but the draft includes specific
    threat weapon benchmarks that the ships will be measured against.
        The Frigate's increased organic capability will enable these ships
    to operate in multiple threat environments and their design will
    counter current and emerging threats.

        9. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, how did
    you arrive at 32 LCS and 20 upgraded LCS Frigates as the right mix of
    52 Small Surface Combatants?
        Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. In February 2014, Secretary of
    Defense Hagel directed Navy to provide alternative proposals to
    increase LCS lethality and survivability, prior to placing additional
    ships beyond 32 under contract. In December 2014, Secretary Hagel
    approved Navy's proposal to procure a small surface combatant based on
    the LCS Flight 0+ designs, designated as a Frigate (FF) by Secretary
    Mabus in January 2015.
        The FFs and LCS will address three documented joint capability
    gaps: swarming fast attack craft/fast inshore attack craft (FAC/FIAC);
    diesel submarines; and maritime mines. LCS will exclusively address the
    mine countermeasure mission due to its ability to embark the mine
    countermeasure mission package, whereas the surface warfare (SUW) and
    anti-submarine warfare (ASW) missions can be executed by either LCS
    (with the appropriate mission package embarked) or the multi-mission
    FFs. The FFs will have greater lethality, system redundancy, and
    survivability.
        Both the modular capability of LCS and multi-mission capabilities
    of the FF are vital to the future surface fleet in addressing SUW, ASW,
    and mine-countermeasure (MCM) missions. The break at 32 LCS/ 20
    Frigates represents a natural point in which the lethality and
    survivability improvements could be implemented, while best supporting
    cost and schedule concerns. In addition, 32 modular LCS supports
    maintaining the MCM mission aboard a sufficient number of ships to meet
    warfighting needs. As Frigate designs mature, Navy will evaluate the
    technical feasibility and cost to back-fit and forward-fit lethality,
    survivability, and capability improvements to LCS Flight 0+.
                                industrial base
        10. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and General
    Dunford, how would you describe the state of the industrial base that
    supports your programs?
        Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. Eleven different ship classes (DDG
    1000, CVN 78, SSN 774, DDG 51, LPD, LCS, LHA(R), JHSV, MLP, T-AGS, and
    AGOR) are currently under construction. In fiscal year 2014, six ships
    were delivered (USS Somerset (LPD 25), USNS John Glenn (MLP 2), USNS
    Millinocket (JHSV 3), USS America (LHA 6), USS North Dakota (SSN 784),
    and USNS Fall River (JHSV 4)). As of April 1, 2015, 66 ships are under
    contract.
        The U.S. naval shipbuilding industrial base is a complex, multi-
    tiered network of shipbuilders, equipment, system and component
    suppliers. The state of the shipbuilding industrial base today is
    stable, however, some shipyards will face challenges as their current
    workload completes. Our submarine shipbuilding yards are healthy;
    building two VA Class submarines per year, as opposed to the previous
    decades when they built one or fewer submarines per year. Given the
    priority and necessity for replacing the Ohio Class Ballistic Missile
    submarines, the two nuclear shipbuilders and their suppliers have a
    firm basis for production and non-production workload through the early
    2030s. In contrast, the non-nuclear (surface combatants, amphibious and
    auxiliary) shipbuilders and suppliers' risk may be greater during this
    same timeframe, depending upon the funding levels enacted. Since the
    non-nuclear ships do not have the same priority as the Ohio Replacement
    Program (ORP), if the DON is required to fund the entire ORP, these
    non-nuclear ships are more likely to be impacted by decreases in their
    funding levels. Less funding would lead to lower capacity and under-
    utilization, further impacting shipbuilding affordability for the
    Department, as well as the industrial base's ability to compete for
    additional work and make necessary investments in facilities, people,
    and processes. Discussions with shipyards are being pursued to evaluate
    possible investments to improve prime equipment supplier production, in
    order to further reduce costs and improve efficiencies. DON has and
    will continue to emphasize stability; competition; maximizing our
    buying power through economic order quantity procurements, block buys
    and multiyear procurement (MYP); and driving affordability earlier and
    throughout the life cycle of each ship. DON will continue to work with
    Congress and industry to evaluate opportunities for continued
    acquisition efficiency and cost-savings opportunities. This includes
    flexibility with the use of advanced procurement funding for long-lead
    time and materials as well as continued use of block buys and MYP in
    order to enable more efficient and effective shipbuilding and
    construction schedules.
        General Dunford. The defense industrial base is doing the maximum
    they can to cope with the turbulent budget of the last few years.
    However, with an unpredictable budget, they have had to make difficult
    decisions regarding investment in emerging technologies and their
    ability to engage in long term, low cost, contracts.
        The Marine Corps continues to work closely with the industrial base
    that supports our programs to create innovative solutions to identified
    requirements while keeping cost-effectiveness and sustainability in
    mind during this prolonged period of fiscal constraint. The primary
    concern, with regard to the industrial base, remains keeping
    procurement schedules predictable and on timeline which enables us to
    maximize productivity and cost savings. Stable and predictable budgets
    will enable this to the maximum extent possible by allowing both the
    Marine Corps and our industrial partners to plan procurement and
    construction in a rational manner which provides the taxpayers with the
    highest quality product at the best price. This can only be ensured
    when the industrial base is able to make capital investment and hiring
    decisions with a measure of certainty due to the high skill workers
    they require the complicated techniques which must be performed.
        Uncertain budgets make it very difficult for industry to have a
    stable or expanding business base, allowing them to invest in internal
    research and development and capital equipment to make them viable,
    innovative, and competitive, and making the industrial base reliable
    for the long term. Budget uncertainty also makes it difficult for
    industry and the Department to sustain legacy systems while investing
    in developing next generation systems necessary for U.S. technical
    superiority. The past few decades have seen a trend where most `new'
    weapons systems have really just ben upgrades of existing systems, and
    therefore do not exercise the industrial base and government skill sets
    necessary to design, develop and integrate a truly new weapon system.
    We have seen these skills atrophy severely, and are getting close to
    the point where they may be lost, just when the U.S. needs them to face
    ever increasing threats.

        11. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and General
    Dunford, in the event of further budget reductions, what must this
    committee be particularly mindful of related to the industrial base?
        Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The Navy has a direct relationship
    and a vested interest in the shipyards, their subcontractors, and the
    supply chain's performance and continued viability. Shipbuilding and
    industrial base stability is required in order to balance capability,
    affordability, and a robust industrial base. A shortage of funding
    would reverse the Navy's progress towards recapitalizing a 300 ship
    battleforce and would increase the pressure on the shipbuilding
    industry. Each shipyard faces challenges as their current workload
    completes. Lower capacity and under-utilization further impacts
    shipbuilding affordability for the Department, as well as impacts the
    industrial base's ability to compete for additional work and make
    necessary investments in facilities, people, and processes. Further
    budget reductions will have a negative impact on the U.S. economy as
    workers directly employed in the U.S. shipbuilding and repair industry
    in 2014 totaled 147,000. This total includes 31,000 workers at Naval
    Shipyards, 61,000 at yards with Navy new construction work, and 55,000
    at the remaining shipbuilding and repair yards.
        Funding stability is key to stability in shipbuilding programs.
    Because cuts to DON shipbuilding programs are the least reversible in
    their impact on the DON's fundamental mission of providing presence and
    in their consequences to the industrial base and to our economy, the
    Department is committed to the maximum extent possible, to preserve
    ship construction and to seek reductions in every other area first,
    should budget reductions such as sequestration become reality
        General Dunford. The Marine Corps continues to work closely with
    the industrial base that supports our programs to create innovative
    solutions to identified requirements while keeping cost-effectiveness
    and sustainability in mind during this prolonged period of fiscal
    constraint. The primary concern, with regard to the industrial base,
    remains keeping procurement schedules predictable and on timeline which
    enables us to maximize productivity and cost savings. Stable and
    predictable budgets will enable this to the maximum extent possible by
    allowing both the Marine Corps and our industrial partners to plan
    procurement and construction in a rational manner which provides the
    taxpayers with the highest quality product at the best price. This can
    only be ensured when the industrial base is able to make capital
    investment and hiring decisions with a measure of certainty due to the
    high skill workers they require the complicated techniques which must
    be performed.
                      two-phase aircraft carrier delivery
        12. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, the Navy is proposing to
    deliver CVN-79 in two phases, which extends the delivery of the full
    ship by what appears to be at least 16 months into 2025. While I
    understand there is a business case that suggests this will increase
    competition and lower costs, can you discuss the risk this plan assumes
    if the USS Nimitz (CVN-68) has operational availability issues as she
    approaches her 50-year service life? What would be the pros and cons of
    having 12 operational carriers for a period of time in the mid-2020s?
        Mr. Mabus. The Department has implemented a number of processes to
    improve performance on CVN 79 construction that minimizes risk to the
    two-phased delivery approach. The second phase of construction has been
    designed to include those items that are cheaper to complete outside of
    the shipyard, taking advantage of competition in installation and
    integration to reduce the overall cost of construction. CVN 79 will be
    introduced to the Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP) as the
    operational replacement for CVN 68 in fiscal year (FY) 2025, which is
    when CVN 68 is scheduled to begin inactivation. The opportunity to
    utilize a two-phased approach for CVN 79 delivery enables the Navy to
    maintain an 11 aircraft carrier force structure required by law and the
    Navy's latest Force Structure Assessment while reducing construction
    costs. This force structure supports a forward deployed naval posture
    which meets warfighting and peacetime requirements across the entire
    spectrum of current and potential future conflicts. Increasing the
    carrier force structure from 11 to 12 CVNs is in excess of what is
    foreseen to meet Carrier Strike Group presence and surge requirements
    projected at the time of NIMITZ inactivation. By completing CVN 79 in
    two phases, the timeframe with 12 operational CVNs is minimized, thus
    reducing operational costs associated with maintaining the CVN force.
                           future surface combatants
        13. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert, retirements of three surface
    combatant classes are on the horizon. The first cruiser will retire in
    2020, the first Flight I destroyer will retire in 2026, and the first
    LCS will retire in 2033. Can you describe your vision and current
    planning for the future surface combatant force? Is there a
    Capabilities Based Assessment in progress? If so, please describe the
    key elements and estimated completion date.
        Admiral Greenert. The Navy's vision and current planning for the
    future surface combatant force includes procuring up to 27 Flight III
    DDG 51s, 52 small surface combatants (the last 20 of which will be a
    modified LCS designated as a Frigate), and executing Cruiser phased
    modernization which extends their service lives into the late 2030s.
        A future surface combatant Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) will
    begin this year and is estimated to complete by early 2016. Key
    elements will include the identification of capability gaps as a result
    of retiring ship classes and projected future threats, prioritization
    of operational risks, and recommendations to address identified gaps.
                        ohio replacement program funding
        14. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, several
    Defense and Navy leaders have identified the challenge associated with
    procuring Ohio Replacement Program (ORP) submarines in the 2020s within
    historical shipbuilding funding levels and the severe impact doing so
    would have on other Navy programs. This committee recognizes the
    importance of the ORP and wants to work with you on the funding
    challenge. Given the first procurement in fiscal year 2021 will show up
    in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) beginning with the next
    budget, is there a proposal or discussion that this committee can help
    with?
        Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. Given the need to recapitalize this
    strategic asset, coupled with the ongoing need to support Navy force
    structure, the Navy continues to pursue the means to resource
    construction of the OHIO Replacement (OR) SSBN in accordance with the
    schedule to fulfill U.S. Strategic Command requirements in fiscal year
    2031.
        The Navy continues to need significant increases in our topline
    beyond the FYDP, not unlike that during the periods of 41 for Freedom
    (1958-1964) and Ohio (1974-1991) construction, in order to afford the
    OR SSBN procurement costs. Absent a significant increase to the SCN
    appropriation, OR SSBN construction will seriously impair construction
    of virtually all other ships in the battle force: attack submarines,
    destroyers, and amphibious warfare ships. The shipbuilding industrial
    base will be commensurately impacted and shipbuilding costs would
    spiral unfavorably. The resulting battle force would fall markedly
    short of the Force Structure Assessment, unable to meet fleet inventory
    requirements.
        The National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund (NSBDF) is a good first step
    in that it acknowledges the significant challenge of resourcing the OR
    SSBN, but the fund is unresourced and the Navy does not have other
    funds for the NSBDF to support OR.
        The Navy will work with the Congressional Defense Committees to
    determine reasonable options and funding alternatives to help solve the
    impact of OR on the shipbuilding budget.

        15. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, can you discuss the steps that
    are being taken to reduce the cost of ORP nuclear ballistic missile
    submarines?
        Mr. Mabus. The Ohio Replacement Program is the Department of the
    Navy's highest priority, and as such, numerous efforts are being
    conducted to reduce the program cost throughout design, production, and
    operations and sustainment. Some of these efforts include pursuing
    innovative acquisition strategies; new ideas and implementation through
    design for affordability; independent deep dive analysis; common
    material procurements and portfolio savings with Virginia-class
    submarines; use of prototyping, component development and reuse; and
    potential savings from continuous production of key materials.
        In December 2012, the Navy awarded a Research and Development
    contract for Ohio Replacement SSBN which focuses on meeting the
    program's performance requirements while reducing costs across design,
    production, and operations and sustainment. The average follow-on ship
    recurring cost estimate was reduced to $5.2 billion CY 2010 ($9.8B TY)
    dollars from $5.4 billion CY 2010 ($10.5B TY) dollars. Cost reduction
    efforts continue and bring the Navy closer to its cost goal of $4.9
    billion CY 2010 average follow-on ship recurring cost. The cost
    reduction efforts will continue throughout the design and construction
    phases.

        16. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, are you on track to meet the
    $4.9 billion target for hulls 2 through 12?
        Mr. Mabus. The Ohio Replacement Program is the Department of the
    Navy's highest priority, and as such, numerous efforts are being
    conducted to reduce the program cost throughout design, production, and
    operations and sustainment. Some of these efforts include pursuing
    innovative acquisition strategies; new ideas and implementation through
    design for affordability; independent deep dive analysis; common
    material procurements and portfolio savings with Virginia-class
    submarines; use of prototyping, component development and reuse; and
    potential savings from continuous production of key materials.
        In December 2012, the Navy awarded a research and development (R&D)
    contract for OR SSBN which focuses on meeting the program's performance
    requirements while reducing costs across design, production, and
    operations and sustainment. The average follow-on ship recurring cost
    estimate was reduced to $5.2 billion CY 2010 ($9.8B TY) dollars from
    $5.4 billion CY 2010 ($10.5B TY) dollars. Cost reduction efforts
    continue and bring the Navy closer to its cost goal of $4.9 billion CY
    2010 average follow-on ship recurring cost. The cost reduction efforts
    will continue throughout the design and construction phases.

                      carrier onboard delivery replacement
        17. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert, this budget proposes
    replacing the C-2 Greyhound with the V-22 Osprey. The transition from a
    fixed wing to tilt-rotor aircraft will mark a significant departure for
    this mission and carrier aviation. In your statement, you say, ``The V-
    22 (Navy variant) extends the range and in increases the flexibility of
    Strike Group resupply.'' Can you elaborate on this statement?
        Admiral Greenert. The Navy V-22 variant extends the range of the
    MV-22 by utilizing an extended range fuel system. This expands the
    range of the Carrier Onboard Delivery (COD) capability to 1,150
    nautical miles while carrying up to 6,000 pounds of cargo/passengers.
    The Navy V-22 will increase flexibility of Strike Group resupply
    operations by evolving the Aerial Logistics Concept of Operations from
    a CVN centric ``hub and spoke'' model to a flexible Sea Base support
    concept. Under this model, any V-22 capable ship or seabase, can serve
    as a logistics hub alleviating current COD mission limitations
    associated with solely traditional aircraft carrier cyclic launch and
    recovery operations.

        18. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, can you
    discuss the analysis and selection process behind this decision and why
    you're convinced this is the right platform for this mission in the
    future?
        Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The 35 remaining C-2A aircraft are
    nearing the end of their service life and becoming increasingly more
    expensive to operate. Accordingly, the Navy identified the need for a
    solution for the Carrier Onboard Delivery (COD) mission capability.
        Between 2004 and 2013 the Navy performed a series of analyses,
    which identified the COD capability as a critical force enabler that
    must have a material solution, and that a manned carrier based
    logistics aircraft was the preferred material concept. Other key
    analytic findings were that a force structure of 44 C-2 or V-22 class
    aircraft are required to conduct the COD mission into the future and
    that ``off-the-shelf'' solutions were available. Additionally, the
    latest analysis proved that a COD mission solution is required no later
    than 2026.
        In 2012, an update to the 2005 Analysis of Alternatives (AoA)
    focused on updating the cost estimates for the six most likely
    alternatives. The analysis concluded, in part, that transferring the
    COD mission to the V-22, already a part of the existing V-22 Program of
    Record, was a viable and cost-effective option; in fact, an option that
    provided the Navy ``the best value'' solution. This update was
    validated by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment
    and Program Evaluation (OSD CAPE) in December 2012. Following
    validation, an underway Military Utility Assessment (MUA) was performed
    in June 2013 onboard the USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75). This assessment
    demonstrated that the V-22 is an effective, flexible and safe platform
    to conduct the COD mission from an aircraft carrier.
        Based on in-depth analysis and demonstrated capability the
    Department of the Navy selected a Navy variant of V-22 as the solution
    to recapitalize the COD mission aircraft. This decision pursues an
    acquisition strategy which funds the existing Program of Record to
    procure 44 V-22 COD mission aircraft. This approach takes advantage of
    an existing full-rate production line, captures potential multiyear
    procurement savings and capitalizes on the benefits of operating a
    common Joint service aircraft. Overall, this decision is the most
    affordable, long-term solution with the least risk in meeting Navy
    requirements.
                   ballistic missile defense ship requirement
        19. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert, can you tell us what the
    ballistic missile defense requirement is for our surface ships (i.e.,
    how many ships must have this capability)?
        Admiral Greenert. The 2014 update to the 2012 Force Structure
    Assessment sets the requirement at 40 advanced capable BMD (AEGIS
    Baseline 9+) ships, as part of the 88 large surface combatant
    requirement, to meet Navy unique requirements to support defense of the
    sea base and limited expeditionary land base sites.
        The basic and intermediate capable BMD ships remaining in inventory
    will continue to contribute to the sourcing of Combatant Commander
    (CCDR) requests independent of the Navy unique requirement. This CCDR
    demand has increased from 44 in fiscal year 2012-2014 to 77 in fiscal
    year 2016. Navy continues to be challenged to meet all CCDR demand for
    BMD ships, but will meet 100 percent of Secretary of Defense
    adjudicated requirements in fiscal year 2016. To better meet CCDR
    demand and the Navy unique requirement, Navy is building advanced BMD
    capability in new construction ships and modernizing existing
    destroyers with advanced BMD capability.
        Basic BMD capability includes early baseline ships capable of
    tracking and engaging short and medium range ballistic missiles.
    Intermediate capable BMD ships provide improved capability against more
    complex ballistic missiles. Advanced capable BMD ships are those with
    the ability to conduct Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) (BMD
    and Air Defense simultaneously). Each improvement also provides a
    greater area of coverage (footprint) by the ship.
        The minimum requirement for 40 advanced capable BMD ships is based
    on the Navy unique requirement as follows. It accepts risk in the
    sourcing of CCDR requests for defense of land.
            - 27 to meet CVN escort demand for rotational deployment of the
            carrier strike groups
            - 9 in FDNF Japan to meet operational timelines in PACOM
            - 4 in FDNF Europe for rotational deployment in EUCOM

        20. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert, what time period is this
    requirement valid for?
        Admiral Greenert. The updated ballistic missile defense (BMD)
    requirement is set out in the 2014 Force Structure Assessment (FSA).
    The focus of the 2014 FSA update is 2030 in order to provide the
    subsequent shipbuilding plan time to appreciably impact/change the 2030
    force.
                         lx(r) amphibious ship program
        21. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, the Navy
    is developing the requirements now for the next class of amphibious
    ship, the LX(R). Those requirements should reflect an assessment of how
    the naval force, sailors and marines, will be expected to operate and
    fight in the future. I know the Marine Corps is experimenting with
    operations off a wider range of noncombatant ships, but we must ensure
    that our warships are capable of supporting them in the manner they
    plan to fight in the future. Can you update us on the progress of the
    LX(R) development effort?
        Admiral Greenert. LX(R) is the replacement program for the landing
    ship dock, LSD 41 and LSD 49 classes, which will begin reaching their
    estimated service life in the mid-2020s. The Analysis of Alternatives
    Report was completed in April 2014. After thorough analysis, the
    Department has determined that using a derivative of the LPD 17 hull
    form is the preferred alternative to meet LX(R) operational
    requirements. This determination sustains the program's focus on
    requirements, affordability and total ownership cost. Program focus
    during fiscal year 2016 will be to finalize the requirements in the
    Capability Development Document and execute contract design efforts to
    meet acquisition milestones for procurement of the lead ship in fiscal
    year 2020. Competition will play a key role in the LX(R) acquisition
    strategy.
        LX(R) is envisioned to be a flexible, multi-mission warship with
    capabilities that support execution of the full range of military
    operations. The need to support disaggregated or split operations away
    from the Amphibious Readiness Group or to deploy independently is a key
    driver for the design of the ship class. The inherent flexibility of
    amphibious ships is demonstrated by their support to 7 of the 10
    missions in the Defense Strategic Guidance. LX(R) will be a versatile,
    cost-effective amphibious ship--a success story in leveraging mature
    design while balancing cost and requirements to deliver key
    capabilities. The lead LX(R) will deliver in time for LSD 43's
    retirement in fiscal year 2027.
        General Dunford. First it must be noted both that you are correct
    that the wider range of noncombatant ships will help the force expand
    our operational capability and that those vessels are not a replacement
    for amphibious warships. Those noncombatant vessels can only operate
    effectively in permissive environments whereas amphibious warships are
    capable of operating across the range of military operations,
    particularly in ``most dangerous case scenarios.''
        LX(R) the next generation of amphibious warship is currently being
    developed and is templated to have 11 ships in its class to replace the
    LSD 41/49 class. In the most recent 30 year shipbuilding plan, advanced
    procurement is programmed for FY19 to procure the lead LX(R) class ship
    in FY20. It should be noted that development of the LX(R) on the LPD-17
    hull form has allowed us to achieve cost savings. Additionally, LPD-28,
    which the Congress had the wisdom to provide to the Navy and Marine
    Corps last session, allows us to bridge the gap from an industrial base
    perspective, also achieving cost savings. That decision also allows the
    shipyards to begin using naval architecture on LPD-28 that will be
    required on LX(R), again achieving cost savings and lowering the time
    required for construction on LX(R).
        LX(R) will possess the capacity to operate independently and will
    bridge existing LSD 41/49 operational capability shortfalls including
    embarkation capacity, command and control, medical, and aviation.

                      future carrier and carrier air wing
        22. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert, can you provide your vision
    for the future of aircraft carriers and the carrier air wing?
        Admiral Greenert. The fiscal year 2016 President's Budget request
    sustains the transitions for aircraft carriers and carrier air wings to
    ensure the Navy improves the proven capabilities required of these
    platforms to win in projected threat environments. The 2014 Quadrennial
    Defense Review (QDR) validated the requirements for these platforms as
    set forth in the approved Defense Planning Scenarios, Combatant
    Commanders' Operation Plans (OPLANs), and Fleet priorities outlined in
    the Naval Aviation Master Aviation Plan (MAP).
        The aircraft carrier is central to Navy core capabilities of
    forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime
    security, and humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR). The
    Department remains committed to maintaining a carrier force, and
    associated carrier air wings, that provide unparalleled responsiveness
    and flexibility to operational commanders across the full range of
    military options. Maintaining the aircraft carrier force structure at
    the level required by law requires a combination of a steady-state
    Ford-class procurement plan, recapitalization of the Nimitz-class via
    the Refueling and Complex Overhaul (RCOH) program, maintaining an in-
    service aircraft carrier life cycle support program, and inactivating
    current CVNs at their notional 50-year service life as Ford-class CVNs
    are delivered.
        The carrier air wing is currently evolving to improve its lethality
    as an integrated maritime power projection force. The future force
    structure features enhanced capabilities to achieve superiority in
    electromagnetic maneuver warfare, advanced strike, sea control,
    surveillance, command and control, and logistics. The Airborne
    Electronic Attack mission formerly fulfilled by the EA-6B is being
    recapitalized with the EA-18G. The carrier based squadron transition
    will be complete in 2015. The strike fighter contribution to the future
    carrier air wing requires the complementary capabilities of both the F/
    A-18E/F and F-35C, which will improve access in contested environments
    and kill chain effectiveness in all assigned mission areas. The F-35C
    will replace aging F/A-18C aircraft as they reach the end of their
    service life and will provide a 5th generation strike fighter aircraft
    that combines low observable technology, greatly improved sensors and
    data fusion to outpace future threats. The F/A-18E/F continues to
    receive advanced capability upgrades required to sustain its relevance
    until eventual replacement with the Next Generation Air Dominance
    family of systems, which is currently in the requirements definition
    phase. Improvements in surveillance and detection are integrated with
    the E-2D as it replaces the E-2C. An expanded helicopter footprint
    employs the MH-60R for Strike Group submarine defense and surface
    surveillance reconnaissance and strike, a role previously filled by the
    S-3B and SH-60F; while the MH-60S replaces the aging HH-60H for combat
    support and small boat defense within the Strike Group. Finally, a Navy
    variant of the V-22 will recapitalize the Carrier Onboard Delivery
    (COD) logistics mission and enable a flexible Sea Based logistics
    support concept.
        The Navy is also exploring unmanned options for carrier air wing
    integration. UCLASS is currently in the requirements definition phase
    of development and will capitalize on the proven capabilities of the
    UCAS-D.

        23. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert, how important is the
    attribute of strike in a contested environment to our first unmanned
    carrier launched aircraft system?
        Admiral Greenert. The Navy has a validated requirement for strike
    in a contested environment for the Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne
    Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) system.

        24. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert, you have mentioned a RAND
    study of less expensive aircraft carrier options. What are the major
    elements of this study and what is the estimated completion date?
        Admiral Greenert. This study will examine potential requirements,
    capabilities, and alternatives for future development of aircraft
    carrier alternatives that would replace or supplement the highly
    capable Ford-class CVN. The study will examine a range of mixes and
    alternatives for platforms with lower costs and potentially smaller air
    wings.
        The study will compare the current CVN 78 platform, a two-reactor
    nuclear propulsion system, and a conventionally-powered variant, in
    both existing and smaller, new design variants, with consideration of
    incorporating unmanned aircraft into the future carrier air wing. This
    study is expected to complete in early Summer of 2016.
                      flight iii guided missile destroyer
        25. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, what is your assessment of the
    readiness of the air and missile defense radar to begin procurement as
    part of the Flight III Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG) in fiscal year
    2016?
        Mr. Mabus. The Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR), officially
    designated SPY-6, is on track to begin procurement in fiscal year 2016
    as part of the Flight III DDG 51. Introducing SPY-6 through the proven
    Aegis combat system in the well-established DDG 51 hull remains the
    lowest risk and fastest way to get this capability to the Fleet.
        The AMDR program has met all major program milestones per plan,
    including successful completion of Hardware Critical Design Review
    (CDR) in December 2014 and is on track to complete System CDR in April
    2015. The tactical software that runs the radar is well into
    development, and is already integrated with, and running, radar
    hardware. The DDG 51 shipbuilders are designing the ship changes
    required to host the radar, based on detailed radar design information
    already delivered. Build-up of a full scale Engineering Development
    Model (EDM) array is in progress to support near field range testing
    later this summer.
        Test planning efforts are currently underway to support a six month
    campaign of increasingly complex tests using satellites, manned and
    unmanned aircraft, and dedicated targets.
        In summary, the radar hardware design is complete, and is already
    integrated with initial tactical software. The program is on track,
    with schedule margin, to support a production decision for procurement
    of the fiscal year 2016 Flight III DDG 51. Introducing the AMDR/SPY-6
    on the Flight III DDG 51 remains the lowest risk, fastest, and least
    expensive way to deliver this vitally needed capability to the Fleet.
                               amphibious assault
        26. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, what is
    the closest range from shore the Navy and Marine Corps can conduct an
    amphibious assault in a contested Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD)
    environment today and projected into the future?
        Admiral Greenert. The extent and effectiveness of shaping actions
    to neutralize threats to naval forces in advance of amphibious
    operations are highly dependent on the mission. Acceptable operational
    risk is determined by considering the mission, the nature of the
    threats that can potentially oppose that mission, and the capabilities
    of friendly forces to counter those threats. The final decision to
    conduct amphibious operations is based on mission requirements and risk
    regardless of range.
        The Joint Force Commander and Joint Force Maritime Component
    Commander will conduct shaping operations to mitigate the threat and
    establish the requisite conditions for an amphibious operation (e.g.,
    establishment of air and maritime superiority). The overall objective
    of setting these conditions is to permit the amphibious force to close
    the distance which will allow a faster buildup of combat power ashore
    of the landing force.
        General Dunford. There is no optimal or minimum distance for
    launching an amphibious assault--the answer is that it depends on the
    circumstances, the mission, and the risk we must accept. In our recent
    wargaming efforts, based on a scenario in the 2020's, we planned
    operations beyond 50 nautical miles (NMi), and amphibious assaults at
    30 NMi, 12 NMi, and 4 NMi against an A2AD enabled adversary.
        There is no fixed distance that will define how or when Marine
    forces come ashore during and amphibious assault in a contested area.
    Where Navy vessels are positioned and when amphibious forces are
    ordered ashore will be a decision made by the Joint Force Commander,
    Combatant Commander, or higher.
        The distance from the shore depends on the geography, the enemy's
    capabilities, the extent that we have been able to shape the
    environment in the landing areas, and the level of risk we are willing
    to accept. Tides, sand bars, reefs, currents, mangroves, and geography
    in the landing area will all impact the distance from which we can
    approach a landing area. These characteristics will vary depending on
    the objective area.
        Every adversary is going to have a different set of capabilities;
    the following are primary ones that need to be considered: off shore
    anti-access capabilities presented by submarines, ships, and long range
    aircraft; near shore capabilities like coastal defense missiles, mines,
    patrol boats and small boats that could be used for swarm attacks;
    maneuver forces ashore that are available to react to landing forces.
    Depending on the scope of A2AD capabilities and the adversary's ability
    to shift their defenses to different areas--our 'assault distance' will
    vary.
        The final factor is risk to the mission and the force. As the
    nation's expeditionary force in readiness, the Marine Corps will
    sometimes be asked to conduct crisis response and contingency missions
    in an uncertain or contested environment which are critical to our
    national security. If the strategic situation allows for a long build-
    up of forces we may be able to get closer. In every operation we will
    work to create an advantage for our forces--or shape the environment.
    Preparing for an amphibious assault requires us to address the enemy's
    capabilities and local geography but we will always be constrained by
    what forces we have available, how much time we have, and the risk we
    are willing to accept.
                            tomahawk cruise missiles
        27. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, the
    President's Budget for fiscal year 2016 includes procuring 100 Tomahawk
    missiles in fiscal year 2016 and proposes ending production thereafter,
    citing sufficient inventory to meet requirements. The Tomahawk's
    replacement, the Next Generation Land Attack Weapon (NGLAW) is not due
    to enter service until the mid-2020s at the earliest. Please comment on
    the:

             Effect of ending production on the size of the
            shortfall in Tomahawks in 2020
             Projected level and timing of low point of Tomahawk/
            NGLAW inventory
             Risk in ending production of the Tomahawk prior to
            introduction of its replacement
             Effect of a delay in the NGLAW program on the Navy's
            ability to meet its long-range precision strike requirements
             Effect of ending production on the ability of the
            supplier base to recertify the existing Block IV missiles

        Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The Navy has a sufficient inventory
    of Tomahawk cruise missiles through 2020. Beginning in 2019, the Navy
    plans a recertification and modernization of Tomahawk missiles which
    will extend service life from 15 to 30 years and is crucial to
    maintaining Tomahawk inventory beyond 2020. Based on operational
    planning scenarios and projected annual expenditures, the Tomahawk
    inventory in 2020 will be at 134 percent of the combat requirement.
        The Navy's Next Generation Strike Capability (NGSC) strategy will
    develop a family of more lethal, survivable and affordable multi-
    mission weapons. The NGSC strategy plans for NGLAW production to begin
    in 2026. The projected low point of combined Tomahawk/NGLAW inventory
    occurs in 2024 when the inventory decreases slightly to 132 percent of
    the combat requirement.
        The Navy takes an acceptable level of inventory risk in order to
    make capability investments to keep Tomahawk Block IV weapons relevant
    in all theaters through their 30 year service life while concurrently
    pursuing an overarching Next Generation Strike Capability strategy
    which supports introduction of the NGLAW capability in the mid to late
    2020 timeframe. Additionally, a recent Defense Contract Management
    Agency study concluded that the risk to restart TACTOM production was
    low to moderate.
        The Navy plans to mitigate the risk of any delay in the NGLAW
    program through its Tomahawk recertification and modernization plan.
    Beginning in 2019, the recertification and modernization will extend
    Tomahawk missile service life from 15 to 30 years. The first
    recertified and modernized Tomahawk missiles will be retired in 2035,
    with the last Tomahawks being removed from the active inventory in the
    mid to late 2040's time frame. Under this plan and even without any
    NGLAW contribution, Tomahawk inventory in 2035 is projected to be 130
    percent of the combat requirement.
        The Navy plans to procure up to 165 Tomahawk missiles in fiscal
    year 2016 (includes 18 procured through Replacement in Kind sale of
    Torpedo Tube Launched Missiles to the United Kingdom), with final
    delivery planned for the end of fiscal year 2018. The Tomahawk missile
    recertification and modernization program begins in the 1st Quarter of
    fiscal year 2019, and the majority of the supplier base will continue
    to be engaged during the transition from production to recertification
    and modernization. This significant continuation of effort across the
    supplier base, coupled with the fact that many of the Tomahawk missile
    vendors also support other weapons programs with similar parts, ensures
    the ability of the supplier base to support Tomahawk recertification
    and modernization.
                             joint standoff weapon
        28. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, the
    President's Budget for fiscal year 2015 included procuring an
    additional 4,432 Joint Standoff Weapons (JSOW) beyond fiscal year 2015,
    including 200 in fiscal year 2016. The Justification Book stated
    ``Production in fiscal year 2015 is focused on the AGM-154-C1 because
    of the low inventory''. The fiscal year 2016 President's Budget
    terminated JSOW production because, as the Justification Book states,
    ``the Department has determined that there are sufficient JSOW C (fixed
    target) and JSOW C-1 (maritime moving target) weapons in inventory, and
    that other weapons will provide a much more formidable capability in
    future near-peer surface warfare engagements''. Please comment on:

             What has changed since the submission of the
            President's Budget for fiscal year 2015 that has made those
            4,432 JSOWs no longer necessary to meet Navy requirements
             What constitutes ``sufficient weapons in inventory''
             What other weapons are being referred to in the fiscal
            year 2016 Justification Book
             What constitutes a ``much more formidable capability''
             The impact of termination on potential JSOW foreign
            military sales
             The impact of termination on the JSOW industrial base

        Mr. Mabus. [Deleted.]
        Admiral Greenert. [Deleted.]

                                other munitions
        29. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert, in your testimony before the
    Committee, you stated ``we have insufficient munitions in 2020, and
    even in some munitions in the [2016] budget''. What munitions
    specifically you are referring to, and their specific shortfalls?
        Admiral Greenert. [Deleted.]

        30. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert, what risks are being assumed
    with the insufficiencies?
        Admiral Greenert. [Deleted.]

        31. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert, what steps you would
    recommend to alleviate these insufficient inventories?
        Admiral Greenert. [Deleted.]

                             multiyear procurement
        32. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, a
    contract was recently signed for multiyear procurement (MYP) of the
    Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) which saved approximately 18.38
    percent over annual contracts. Are there other munitions programs that
    you believe would benefit from MYP, and if so, what are they and what
    steps are being taken to implement MYP?
        Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The Department of the Navy is
    always looking for opportunities to increase savings in the munitions
    portfolio.
        In the ship defense portfolio, both Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM)
    Block 2 and Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) have good potential for future
    multi-year procurements. fiscal year (FY) 2018 is the earliest RAM
    Block 2 would be considered for a MYP after it achieves Full Rate
    Production. fiscal year 2018 is the earliest for SM-6 after the Block
    1A Engineering Change Proposal completes testing and is approved for
    Full Production cut-in.
        While MYPs are a good method to generate savings they also come at
    the cost of decreased financial flexibility for future years. Given the
    unstable funding environment the department has faced with
    Sequestration and annual continuing resolution bills, the department
    must be judicious in pursuit of MYPs. Increased stability in current
    and future budgets would increase the department's ability to pursue
    more MYPs.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
                             readiness of the force
        33. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, General
    Dempsey testified that the fiscal year 2016 President's Budget is
    ``what we need to remain at the lower ragged edge of manageable risk in
    our ability to execute the defense strategy'' and that ``we have no
    slack, no margin left for error or strategic surprise.'' Do you agree
    with General Dempsey's statement?
        Admiral Greenert. Yes, PB-16 is the absolute minimum funding needed
    to execute our DSG. Should resources be further reduced below PB-16
    levels, the DSG will need to be revised.
        General Dunford. Anything less than the President's Budget
    restricts the ability to put ready Marines forward to protect our
    interests and provide decision-space for our nation's leaders. It also
    forces the Marine Corps to accept risk in responding to a major
    contingency operation.
        If your military, and specifically the Marine Corps, is tasked to
    do more but with decreased funding, it renders the current defense
    strategy unexecutable. The Marine Corps, as the nation's-force-in-
    readiness, defends the homeland by being forward postured, as we are in
    Europe/Africa with the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force for
    Crisis Response (SPMAGTF-CR-AF), in the Middle East with the Amphibious
    Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG/MEU--or Marines on
    amphibious ships) and the SPMAGTF-CR-CC, and with forward-based and
    forward deployed III MEF units in the Pacific. We forward position our
    Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Teams (FAST), which are under the
    operational control (OPCON) of the Navy, supporting each Geographic
    Combatant Commander. We have Marines stationed at State Department
    Posts throughout the world, safeguarding American lives and interests.
    However, this comes at a cost.

        34. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, can you
    give us some context in terms of readiness of personnel, equipment,
    training, and etcetera?
        Admiral Greenert. Sequestration in fiscal year 2013 resulted in a
    $9 billion shortfall in Navy's budget, as compared to the PB-13
    submission. This instance of sequestration was not just a disruption,
    it created readiness consequences from which we are still recovering,
    particularly in ship and aircraft maintenance, Fleet response capacity,
    and excessive CSG and ARG deployment lengths. The continuing resolution
    and sequestration reductions in fiscal year 2013 compelled us to reduce
    both afloat and ashore operations, which created ship and aircraft
    maintenance and training backlogs. To budget for the procurement of
    ships and aircraft appropriated in fiscal year 2013, Navy was compelled
    to defer some purchases to future years and use prior-year investment
    balances to mitigate impacts to programs in fiscal year 2013 execution.
    The most visible impacts occurred in Operations and Maintenance funded
    activities.
        While the Navy was able to reprioritize within available resources
    to continue to operate in fiscal year 2013, this is not a sustainable
    course for future budgets. The actions we took in 2013 to mitigate
    sequestration only served to transfer bills amounting to over $4
    billion to future years for many procurement programs--those carryover
    bills were addressed in Navy's fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015
    budgets.
        Shortfalls caused by the fiscal year 2013 sequestration remain in a
    number of areas and the Navy is still working to recover from them. For
    example, we have not yet caught up from shipyard maintenance backlogs.
    We are working through shipyard personnel capacity issues to determine
    when ships can be fit back into the maintenance cycle and are balancing
    that against operational demands on the ships to ensure we meet the
    global force management requirement for Combatant Commands. The result
    of maintenance and training backlogs has meant delayed preparation for
    deployments, forcing us, in turn, to extend the deployments of those
    units already on deployment. Since 2013, many CSGs, ARGs, and
    destroyers have been on deployment for 8-10 months or longer. This
    comes at a cost to the resiliency of our people, sustainability of our
    equipment, and service lives of our ships.
        Maintenance and training backlogs have also reduced Navy's ability
    to maintain required forces for contingency response to meet Combatant
    Command operational plan requirements. Although the requirement calls,
    on average, for three additional CSGs and three additional ARGs to
    deploy within 30 days for a major crisis, Navy has only been able to
    maintain an average of one group each in this readiness posture. Root
    causes can be traced to the high operational tempo of the Fleet, longer
    than expected shipyard availabilities, and retirements of experienced
    shipyard workers, but the fiscal year 2013 sequestration exacerbated
    the depth of this problem and interfered with our efforts to recover.
        Assuming a stable budget and no major contingencies for the
    foreseeable future, it is possible to recover from the maintenance
    backlogs that have accumulated from the high operational tempo over the
    last decade of war and the additional effects of sequestration by
    approximately 2018 for CSGs and approximately 2020 for ARGs.
        General Dunford. The Marine Corps, as the Nation's ready force,
    deploys ready Marines and Marine units to meet operational
    requirements. The Marine Corps is meeting its current operational
    requirements but at the cost of surge capacity, modernization, and
    infrastructure sustainment.
        Deployed and non-deployed units alike require personnel, equipment,
    and training resources to generate ready forces capable of responding
    to any crisis around the globe at a moment's notice. Non-deployed units
    are the bill payer for protecting deployed unit readiness. Operational
    necessity compels the re-allocation of non-deployed essential personnel
    and equipment to deployed and next-to-deploy units. But even when not
    deployed, Marine units are on a short tether and are required to
    maintain high levels of readiness to respond to emergent major
    contingencies and unforeseen crises.
        The paucity of operationally available amphibious shipping
    negatively impacts home station unit training. Aircraft maintenance
    backlogs in the depots contribute to higher over-utilization rates of
    available aircraft for needed training and certifications, which in
    turn hasten the induction of these aircraft into maintenance cycles.
    Training and certification opportunities are diminished as aircraft
    maintenance induction rates exceed depot outputs.
        Although all major equipment has returned from Afghanistan, the
    Marine Corps continues its reconstitution of the whole-of-force after
    over a decade of sustained conflict. The Marine Corps will not take an
    operational pause to reconstitute; rather, as war-torn equipment is
    repaired, returned back to units, and subsequently employed
    operationally, the Marine Corps will continue to develop and field
    equipment. The evolution of operational maneuver from the sea and ship-
    to-objective maneuver requires developing a complimentary portfolio of
    ground combat and tactical vehicle capabilities, such as sustaining a
    portion of the decades old amphibious assault vehicle and fielding its
    intended replacement--the Amphibious Combat Vehicle.

        35. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, what is
    your assessment of the global security environment, and how much risk
    is this nation accepting based on cuts to our military and reduced
    readiness levels?
        Admiral Greenert. Today's world is more complex, uncertain and
    turbulent, and this trend will likely continue. We face an environment
    in which our adversaries' capabilities are modernizing and expanding,
    and the ongoing development and fielding of anti-access/area denial
    (A2/AD) capabilities challenge our global maritime access. The
    environment is also marked by continued threats from expanding and
    evolving terrorist and criminal networks, the increasing frequency and
    intensity of maritime territorial disputes, and threats to maritime
    commerce, particularly the flow of energy.
        The cumulative effect of budget shortfalls over these past three
    years has forced the Navy to accept significant risk in key mission
    areas, notably if the military is confronted with a technologically
    advanced adversary or forced to deny the objective of an opportunistic
    aggressor in a second region while engaged in a major contingency. By
    ``risk,'' we mean that some of our platforms will arrive late to the
    combat zone, and engage in conflict without the benefit of markedly
    superior combat systems, sensors and networks, or desired levels of
    munitions inventories. In real terms, this means longer timelines to
    achieve victory, more military and civilian lives lost, and potentially
    less credibility to deter adversaries and assure allies in the future.
        The fiscal year 2016 Navy budget submission, including OCO, sets us
    on a course to restore our readiness over time, particularly to rebuild
    our capacity to surge forces for contingency operations. However, we
    continue to accept risk in two mission areas specified by the Defense
    Strategic Guidance: (1) Deter and Defeat Aggression and (2) Project
    Power despite Anti-Access/Area (A2/AD) Challenges, primarily as the
    result of reduced procurement of aircraft, slowed ship and aircraft
    modernization and decreased ordnance deliveries.
        General Dunford. The Global Security Environment. The current
    operating environment is volatile and complex. It is marked by a
    growing demand for Marine capabilities ranging from Amphibious Ready
    Groups/Marine Expeditionary Units (ARG/MEUs) and Special Purpose MAGTFs
    to Marines at embassies. There are no indications that the future will
    be any less challenging or that the demand for Marines will decrease.
    Threats will continue to include the proliferation of modern
    conventional, asymmetric, and cyber weapons, violent extremism,
    transnational crime, and piracy. Sources of conflict will include
    water, energy and food scarcity, weak governments resulting in
    ungoverned spaces, territorial and tribal disputes, and regional
    competition. Due to geography and demographics, the most likely
    locations for conflict will be in and around the littorals where our
    naval forces are uniquely capable of responding. The realities of
    reduced defense spending and an increasingly volatile and unpredictable
    global security environment presents tough choices for the services and
    what the nation wants its military to do.
        Risk. The Marine Corps is operating at an elevated risk level in
    meeting the tenants of the defense strategy. At funding below the
    President's Budget request, we would not have adequate forward presence
    to assure allies or respond to crisis in the manner needed. The defense
    strategy requires a sustained ability to deter aggression, operate
    effectively across all domains, and respond decisively to emerging
    crises and contingencies. The Marine Corps, as the nation's
    expeditionary-force-in-readiness, does this by defending the homeland
    with forward presence. Under sequestration, there will be less forward
    deployed forces resulting in increased risk to our national security
    interests.

        36. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, how has
    sequestration impacted your ability to sustain readiness and at the
    same time invest in modernization?
        Admiral Greenert. Sequestration in fiscal year 2013 resulted in a
    $9B shortfall in Navy's budget as compared to the PB 2013 submission.
    This instance of sequestration was not just a disruption; it created
    readiness consequences from which we are still recovering, particularly
    in ship and aircraft maintenance, fleet response capacity, and
    excessive deployment lengths. In combination with the impacts of the
    fiscal year 2013 Continuing Resolution, this compelled us to reduce
    both afloat and ashore operations, and create ship and aircraft
    maintenance backlogs.
        Shortfalls caused by the fiscal year 2013 sequestration remain in a
    number of areas and the Navy is still working to recover from them.
    Assuming a stable budget and no major contingencies for the foreseeable
    future, it is possible to recover from the maintenance backlogs that
    have accumulated from the high operational tempo over the last decade
    of war and the additional effects of sequestration by approximately
    2018 for CSGs and approximately 2020 for ARGs.
        Deferments in PB-16 compound modernization delays we were compelled
    to accept in PB-15 due to budget constraints. To budget for procurement
    and modernization for ships and aircraft, Navy was compelled to defer
    some purchases to future years, further reducing the capacity of
    weapons and aircraft, slow, shorten and delay modernization plans; and
    reduce quantities of ordnance procurement; and delay upgrades to all
    but the most critical shore infrastructure.
        PB-15 represented another iterative reduction from the resources
    necessary to fully resource the Defense Strategic Guidance missions,
    making Navy less ready to successfully Deter and Defeat Aggression and
    Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) Challenges.
    Continuing along this budget trajectory means that by 2020, Navy will
    not have recovered sufficient contingency response capacity to execute
    large-scale operations in one region, while simultaneously deterring
    another adversary's aggression elsewhere. Also, we will lose our
    advantage over adversaries in key warfighting areas such as Anti-
    Surface Warfare, Anti-Submarine Warfare, Air-to-Air Warfare, and
    Integrated Air and Missile Defense.
        General Dunford. Today, approximately half of the Marine Corps'
    home station units are at an unacceptable level of readiness.
    Investment in the future is less than what is required, and
    infrastructure sustainment is budgeted below the Department of Defense
    standard. Additionally, the deployment-to-dwell time ratio is being
    maintained at a very challenging level. The operating forces are
    deploying for up to 7 months and returning home for 14 or less months
    before redeploying. Additionally, the Marine Corps has significantly
    reduced many of the programs that have helped to maintain morale and
    family readiness through over a decade of war. These are some of the
    damages to date caused by sequestration and lower funding levels.
        The fiscal year 2016 President's Budget is the bare bones budget
    for the Marine Corps that can meet the current Defense Strategic
    Guidance. The budget prioritizes near-term readiness at the expense of
    modernization and facilities, and only achieves a 1 to 2 deployment to
    dwell ratio, which is unsustainable over the long term. Another round
    of sequestration would force the Marine Corps to significantly degrade
    the readiness of our home station units, which is the Marine Corps'
    Ready Force to respond to crises or major combat operations. The fiscal
    challenges we face today will be further exacerbated by assuming even
    more risk in long-term modernization and infrastructure in order to
    maintain ready forces forward. This is not sustainable and degrades our
    capacity as the Nation's force-in-readiness.

        37. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, how do
    lower readiness levels and a smaller force impact our ability to deter
    aggression?
        Admiral Greenert. The cumulative effect of budget shortfalls has
    forced Navy to accept significant risk in key mission areas, notably if
    the military is confronted with a technologically advanced adversary or
    forced to deny the objective of an opportunistic aggressor in a second
    region while engaged in a major contingency. This means that some of
    our platforms will arrive late to the combat zone and engage in
    conflict without the benefit of markedly superior combat systems,
    sensors and networks, or munitions inventories that are below desired
    levels. This means longer timelines to arrive and prevail, more ships
    and aircraft out of action in battle, more sailors, marines, and
    merchant mariners killed, and less credibility to deter adversaries and
    assure allies in the future.
        Lower readiness levels and a smaller force would degrade both our
    capability and capacity to deter aggression. Limiting our ability to
    provide sustained global presence with combat ready forces, where it
    matters, when it matters, will challenge our ability to deliver
    overpowering warfighting capabilities that can deter aggression. Navy
    presence is critical, not only for the immediate response that ready,
    maritime forces can deliver, but also through their ongoing
    contributions to the Combatant Commanders' theater campaign plans.
    Additional warfighting capacity, particularly to meet contingency
    response requirements, requires sustaining the readiness of non-
    deployed forces.
        General Dunford. The Marine Corps is operating with elevated risk
    in meeting the tenants of the defense strategy. At funding below the
    President's Budget request, we would have less readiness and inadequate
    forward presence to assure allies or respond to crisis in the manner
    needed. The defense strategy requires a sustained ability to deter
    aggression, operate effectively across all domains, and respond
    decisively to emerging crises and contingencies. The Marine Corps, as
    the nation's expeditionary-force-in-readiness, does this by defending
    the homeland with forward presence. Smaller, less ready forces will
    produce fewer forward deployed forces, resulting in increased risk to
    our national security interests.

        38. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, if those
    forces are not ready, what is the impact on executing combatant
    commander operational plans?
        Admiral Greenert. If sufficient numbers of our contingency response
    forces are not ready, there will be a delay in Navy's ability to fully
    support the Combatant Commanders' Operational Plans (OPLANs) in some
    cases.
        The cumulative effect of budget shortfalls has forced Navy to
    accept significant risk in key mission areas, notably if the military
    is confronted with a technologically advanced adversary or forced to
    deny the objective of an opportunistic aggressor in a second region
    while engaged in a major contingency. This means that some of our
    platforms will arrive late to the combat zone and engage in conflict
    without the benefit of markedly superior combat systems, sensors and
    networks, or munitions inventories that are below desired levels. This
    means longer timelines to arrive and prevail, more ships and aircraft
    out of action in battle, more sailors, marines, and merchant mariners
    killed, and less credibility to deter adversaries and assure allies in
    the future.
        General Dunford. Maintaining the readiness of our forward deployed
    forces during a period of high operational tempo while amidst fiscal
    uncertainty; as well as fiscal decline, comes with ever increasing
    operational and programmatic risk. Today, approximately half of the
    Marine Corps' home-station units are at an unacceptable level of
    readiness in their ability to execute wartime missions, respond to
    unexpected crises, and surge for major contingencies. Furthermore, the
    ability of non-deployed units to conduct full spectrum operations
    continues to degrade as home-station personnel and equipment are
    sourced to protect and project the readiness of deployed and next-to-
    deploy units. As the Nation's first responders, the Marine Corps' home-
    stationed units are expected to be at or near the same high state of
    readiness as our deployed units, since these non-deployed units will
    provide the capacity to respond with the capability required
    (leadership and training) in the event of unexpected crises and or
    major contingencies.
        Despite this challenge and imbalance, the Marine Corps continues to
    provide units ready and responsive to meet core and assigned missions
    in support of all directed current operational, crisis, and contingency
    requirements. However, we continue to assume long-term risk
    particularly in supporting major contingencies in order to fund unit
    readiness in the near term. Consequently, the Marine Corps' future
    capacity for crisis response and major contingency response is likely
    to be significantly reduced. Quite simply, if those units are not ready
    due to lack of training, equipment or manning, it could mean a delayed
    response to resolve a contingency or to execute an operational plan,
    both of which create unacceptable risk for our national defense
    strategy as well as risk to mission accomplishment and to the force as
    a whole. It means more lives lost because America's fighting men and
    women were not as ready as they should have been.

        39. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, if a
    major or even minor contingency operation were executed today given
    your current state of readiness and current global commitments, is it
    possible the Navy or the Marine Corps would have to send forces into
    combat that are not fully trained and ready?
        Admiral Greenert. Navy will not send forces forward into combat
    until they have completed essential training, maintenance, and other
    readiness requirements. The cumulative effect of budget shortfalls,
    however, has forced Navy to accept significant risk in key mission
    areas, notably if the military is confronted with a technologically
    advanced adversary or forced to deny the objective of an opportunistic
    aggressor in a second region while engaged in a major contingency. This
    means that some of our platforms will arrive late to the combat zone
    and engage in conflict without the benefit of markedly superior combat
    systems, sensors and networks, or munitions inventories that are below
    desired levels. In real terms, this means longer timelines to achieve
    victory, more military and civilian lives lost, and potentially less
    credibility to deter adversaries and assure allies in the future.
        For minor contingencies, the Navy will respond within required
    timelines by reallocating currently deployed units and/or employing our
    limited, but ready, contingency response capacity today.
        General Dunford. Although we are committed to generating ready
    forces, a strategic surprise or another situation of vital national
    interest may erupt where national leaders order the deployment of
    forces that are not sufficiently manned, trained, and equipped--
    essentially not fully ready for the mission.
            -  The Marine Corps continues to provide ready and responsive
            units to meet core and assigned missions in support of all
            directed current operational, crisis, and contingency
            requirements.
            -  Maintaining the readiness of our forward deployed forces
            during a period of high operational tempo amidst fiscal
            uncertainty, as well as fiscal decline, comes with ever
            increasing operational and programmatic risk.
            -  Today, approximately half of the Marine Corps' home-station
            units are at an unacceptable level of readiness in their
            ability to execute wartime missions, respond to unexpected
            crises, and surge for major contingencies
            -  As the Nation's first responders, the Marine Corps' home-
            stationed units are expected to be at or near the same high
            state of readiness as our deployed units. These non-deployed
            units will provide the capacity to respond with the capability
            required (leadership and training) in the event of unexpected
            crises and or major contingencies.

        40. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, would you
    please provide complete inventory of aircraft and ship munitions and
    shortages?
        Admiral Greenert. [Deleted.]
        General Dunford. [Deleted.]
                             joint standoff weapons
        41. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert, what has changed to make
    JSOWs no longer necessary to the Navy's requirements?
        Admiral Greenert. [Deleted.]

        42. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert, what will be the total
    inventory of JSOWs if the program is terminated in fiscal year 2016?
        Admiral Greenert. The total DON JSOW inventory, including 200
    weapons projected to be procured in fiscal year 2015, will be 4,600
    weapons. The variants are broken out as follows:
        JSOW A - 1,455
        JSOW C - 1,453
        JSOW C-1 - 1,692

        43. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert, is the inventory enough to
    meet all combatant commander wartime requirements?
        Admiral Greenert. The DON JSOW inventory is sufficient to meet
    wartime requirements. The Department's assessment is informed by the
    fiscal year 2015 Naval Munitions Requirement Planning (NMRP) modeling
    process.

        44. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Greenert, is there an existing weapon
    that can replace the JSOWs' capability, and if not, what is the plan to
    replace that lost capability?
        Admiral Greenert. [Deleted.]
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
                           virginia-class submarines
        45. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Greenert, what percentage of combatant
    commander requests for attack submarines is currently being met by the
    Navy?
        Admiral Greenert. Navy is currently sourcing approximately 55
    percent of Combatant Commander requests for attack submarines in fiscal
    year 2015.
        Navy projects we will source approximately 57 percent of Combatant
    Commander requests for attack submarines in fiscal year 2016.

        46. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Greenert, in light of the activities
    and advances of our potential adversaries, as well as the threats we
    will confront, do you see the need for attack submarines increasing or
    decreasing?
        Admiral Greenert. Combatant Commander (CCDR) requests for attack
    submarines will continue to increase as other countries expand their
    capacity and capabilities in the undersea domain. The Navy will only
    meet about 60 percent of CCDR demand in fiscal year 2016, and sourcing
    will become more challenging as the number of attack submarines decline
    below the 48 SSN requirement in the 2020s.
        PB-16 continues our ongoing effort to addresses this SSN shortfall
    through multiple parallel efforts:
             Continuing procurement of two Virginia-class
            submarines per year, resulting in an inventory of 22 Virginia-
            class submarines (51 total SSNs of all types) by 2020;
             Reducing the construction span of Virginia-class
            submarines;
             Extending the service lives of select attack
            submarines (SSN 688s) with the potential to eliminate 10-15
            attack submarine (SSN) years from the SSN shortfall of 51
            years; and
             Funding Virginia Payload Module (VPM) RDT&E and SCN to
            accelerate inclusion of VPM on at least one Virginia-Class
            Block V SSN per year in fiscal years 2019 and 2020. VPM will
            enable Virginia-class SSNs to mitigate the loss of SSGN strike
            capacity as they begin to retire in 2026. VPM will more than
            triple the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) Block IV strike
            capacity of a Virginia-class SSN from 12 to 40 missiles.

        47. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, how
    important is it that Congress provide reliable and sufficient funding
    so that the Navy can fully implement the Block Four MYP contract for 10
    Virginia-class submarines (2 per year)?
        Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The Virginia-class Submarine (VCS)
    program is successfully proceeding at the two-per-year pace that began
    in fiscal year 2011. PB16 includes funding for two VCS from fiscal year
    2016 to fiscal year 2020, which is required to mitigate the attack
    submarine shortfall below the minimum 48 SSNs in the late 2020's. The
    Navy awarded the VCS Block IV contract in April 2014 for ten ships from
    fiscal year 2014 to fiscal year 2018. The savings realized with a
    multi-year procurement (MYP) construction contract was over $2 billion,
    effectively getting ten ships for the price of nine as opposed to
    building the same ships under a more traditional annual procurement
    arrangement. Reliable and sufficient funding is critical to mitigate
    the attack submarine shortfall and achieve the savings realized with a
    MYP construction contract.

                          ship and submarine building
        48. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, I
    understand that the Navy proposes building 19 ships and submarines in
    fiscal year 2016. How would that number decline if defense
    sequestration returns fully, and what specific ships would be cut?
        Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The proposed 19 ships and
    submarines include the following: Large Surface Combatants (2); Small
    Surface Combatants (3); Attack Submarines (2); Amphibious Warfare Ships
    (1); Combat Logistics Force (1); Aircraft Carrier Refueling (1);
    Amphibious Warfare Ship Service Live Extension Program (SLEP) (4);
    Surface Support (5). A return to sequestration in fiscal year 2016
    would necessitate a revisit and revision of the Defense Strategic
    Guidance. Required cuts will force us to further delay critical
    warfighting capabilities, reduce readiness of forces needed for
    contingency response, further downsize weapons capacity, and forego or
    stretch procurement of ships and submarines, only if necessary. We will
    be unable to mitigate the shortfalls like we did in fiscal year 2013
    because prior-year investment balances were depleted under fiscal year
    2013 sequestration.
        Because of their irreversibility, force structure cuts represent
    options of last resort for the Navy. Disruptions in naval ship design
    and construction plans are significant because of the long-lead time,
    specialized skills, and extent of integration needed to build military
    ships. Because ship construction can span up to nine years, program
    procurement cancelled in fiscal year 2016 will not be felt by the
    Combatant Commanders until several years later when the size of the
    battle force begins to shrink as those ships are not delivered to the
    fleet at the planned time. Likewise, cancelled procurement in fiscal
    year 2016 will likely cause some suppliers and vendors of our
    shipbuilding industrial base to close their businesses. Further budget
    reductions will have a negative impact on the U.S. economy as workers
    directly employed in the U.S. shipbuilding and repair industry in 2014
    totaled 147,000. This total includes 31,000 workers at Naval Shipyards,
    61,000 at yards with Navy new construction work, and 55,000 at the
    remaining shipbuilding and repair yards. This skilled, experienced, and
    innovative workforce cannot be easily replaced and it could take years
    to recover from layoffs and shutdowns; and even longer if critical
    infrastructure is lost. As a result, the Navy is committed to
    protecting the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) appropriation
    that funds force structure and SCN will only be reduced as a last
    resort option for the Navy. Stability and predictability are critical
    to the health and sustainment of this vital sector of our Nation's
    industrial capacity.

        49. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, what
    would be the long-term impact of those reductions?
        Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. A return to sequestration in fiscal
    year 2016 would necessitate a revisit and revision of the Defense
    Strategic Guidance. Required cuts will force us to further delay
    critical warfighting capabilities, reduce readiness of forces needed
    for contingency response, further downsize weapons capacity, and forego
    or stretch procurement of ships and submarines only if necessary. We
    will be unable to mitigate the shortfalls like we did in fiscal year
    2013 because prior-year investment balances were depleted under fiscal
    year 2013 sequestration.
        Because of their irreversibility, force structure cuts represent
    options of last resort for the Navy. Disruptions in naval ship design
    and construction plans are significant because of the long-lead time,
    specialized skills, and extent of integration needed to build military
    ships. Because ship construction can span up to nine years, program
    procurement cancelled in fiscal year 2016 will not be felt by the
    Combatant Commanders until several years later when the size of the
    battle force begins to shrink as those ships are not delivered to the
    fleet at the planned time. Likewise, cancelled procurement in fiscal
    year 2016 will likely cause some suppliers and vendors of our
    shipbuilding industrial base to close their businesses. Further budget
    reductions will have a negative impact on the U.S. economy as workers
    directly employed in the U.S. shipbuilding and repair industry in 2014
    totaled 147,000. This total includes 31,000 workers at Naval Shipyards,
    61,000 at yards with Navy new construction work, and 55,000 at the
    remaining shipbuilding and repair yards. This skilled, experienced and
    innovative workforce cannot be easily replaced and it could take years
    to recover from layoffs and shutdowns; and even longer if critical
    infrastructure is lost. As a result, the Navy is committed to
    protecting the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) appropriation
    that funds force structure and SCN will only be reduced as a last
    resort option for the Navy. Stability and predictability are critical
    to the health and sustainment of this vital sector of our Nation's
    industrial capacity.

        50. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, it would
    be very difficult to make-up for those lost ships and submarines?
        Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. A return to sequestration in fiscal
    year (FY) 2016 would necessitate a revisit and revision of the Defense
    Strategic Guidance. Required cuts will force us to further delay
    critical warfighting capabilities, reduce readiness of forces needed
    for contingency response, further downsize weapons capacity, and forego
    or stretch procurement of ships and submarines only if necessary. We
    will be unable to mitigate the shortfalls like we did in fiscal year
    2013 because prior-year investment balances were depleted under fiscal
    year 2013 sequestration.
        Because of their irreversibility, force structure cuts represent
    options of last resort for the Navy. Disruptions in naval ship design
    and construction plans are significant because of the long-lead time,
    specialized skills, and extent of integration needed to build military
    ships. Because ship construction can span up to nine years, program
    procurement cancelled in fiscal year 2016 will not be felt by the
    Combatant Commanders until several years later when the size of the
    battle force begins to shrink as those ships are not delivered to the
    fleet at the planned time. Likewise, cancelled procurement in fiscal
    year 2016 will likely cause some suppliers and vendors of our
    shipbuilding industrial base to close their businesses. Further budget
    reductions will have a negative impact on the U.S. economy as workers
    directly employed in the U.S. shipbuilding and repair industry in 2014
    totaled 147,000. This total includes 31,000 workers at Naval Shipyards,
    61,000 at yards with Navy new construction work, and 55,000 at the
    remaining shipbuilding and repair yards. This skilled, experienced and
    innovative workforce cannot be easily replaced and it could take years
    to recover from layoffs and shutdowns; and even longer if critical
    infrastructure is lost. As a result, the Navy is committed to
    protecting the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) appropriation
    that funds force structure and SCN will only be reduced as a last
    resort option for the Navy. Stability and predictability are critical
    to the health and sustainment of this vital sector of our Nation's
    industrial capacity.
                             ohio-class submarines
        51. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Greenert, in your prepared statement,
    you discuss your concerns regarding the ability of the Navy to ``fund
    the Ohio replacement ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) program'' with
    current and projected resources. You say that the ``Navy cannot procure
    the Ohio replacement in the 2020s within historical shipbuilding
    funding levels without severely impacting other Navy programs.'' If
    additional funding is not provided for the procurement of the Ohio
    replacement, what specific impact will it potentially have on other
    important Navy programs?
        Admiral Greenert. The Ohio Replacement (OR) SSBN is our highest
    priority program and we are committed to executing the program to its
    current schedule. Without increased shipbuilding funding in fiscal year
    2021 and beyond, OR SSBN funding will consume the majority of Navy's
    annual shipbuilding budget, and degrade other shipbuilding programs.
    Appropriations for SSBN recapitalization are historically consistent
    with the last period of SSBN procurement between 1974 and 1990.
        Within the Navy's current and projected resources, the OR SSBN
    would consume about half of the shipbuilding funding available in a
    given year--and would do so for a period of over a decade. The
    significant drain on available shipbuilding resources would manifest in
    reduced procurement quantities in the remaining capital ship programs.
    Therefore, additional resources for shipbuilding will likely be
    required during this period.
        Since the CVN funding requirements are driven by the statutory
    requirement to maintain eleven CVNs, and accounting for one OR SSBN per
    year (starting in fiscal year 2026), there would only be about half of
    the resources normally available to procure the Navy's remaining
    capital ships. At these projected funding levels, Navy would be limited
    to on average, as few as two other capital ships (SSN, DDG, CG, LPD,
    LHA, etc.) per year throughout this decade.
        Such low shipbuilding rates for an extended period of time would
    result in a battle force inadequately sized to meet our naval
    requirements in support of the DSG. Further, there is significant risk
    to the industrial base in this case since low production rates outside
    of the SSBN and CVN production lines may not provide adequate work to
    keep shipyards operating at minimum sustaining levels and could result
    in shipyard closures. Navy's ability to recover Fast Attack Submarine,
    Large Surface Combatant, Small Surface Combatant and Amphibious Force
    inventories lost during the decade and a half in which the SSBNs were
    being procured would be challenged, particularly in those parts of the
    industrial base permitted to atrophy during this period.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                        pivot to the asia-pacific region
        52. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Mabus and General Dunford, in our
    Strategic Pivot to the Pacific, Navy and Marine Corps assets play a
    vital role in providing constant presence in the region that is often
    described by the phrase ``tyranny of distance.'' However, with just
    over 300 ships in the fleet by 2012 and a smaller than desired Marine
    Corps, it strikes me that budget challenges might be driving strategy.
    In a budget constrained environment, like the one we are in, what are
    your top priories in the pivot to the Asia-Pacific region?
        Mr. Mabus. Our rebalance to the Pacific continues to be an
    important part of our partnership efforts. We must have the right
    platforms in the right places to ensure our friends and allies
    understand our commitment. The Marine Corps continues to execute the
    Guam Master Plan submitted to Congress in July 2014 which will provide
    a holisitic and operationally-responsive Marine Corps Air Ground Task
    Force capability on Guam. The Navy is moving more ships to the central
    and western Pacific, including forward basing an additional fast attack
    submarine in Guam and forward stationing four Littoral Combat Ships out
    of Singapore. We are ensuring that our most advanced platforms are in
    the Pacific, so we're increasing the number of DDG's with the Ballistic
    Missile Defense systems based in Japan and the P-8A maritime patrol
    aircraft are making their first rotational deployments in the region.
    In the longer term, by 2018, we will deploy an additional Amphibious
    Ready Group to the Asia-Pacific region and we will deploy a growing
    number of Joint High Speed Vessels and Mobile Landing Platforms there.
    With these changes, and others, our presence will assure allies, shape
    behavior, and deter conflict.
        General Dunford. The nature of the pivot itself, duration,
    complexity, and a combination of reciprocal and sequential tasks makes
    it difficult to pinpoint one, or even a couple, top priorities. The
    Marine Corps' top priority has always been, and will always be,
    maintaining a forward deployed force that is most ready when the nation
    is least ready. To meet that commitment to the American people, the
    Marine Corps must, on a day to day basis be forward deployed, forward
    engaged, and prepared for crisis response, while maintaining readiness
    to respond in the event of a major contingency. Our operational
    imperatives remain our top priorities throughout the process of
    realigning our force structure in the Asia-Pacific.

        53. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Mabus and General Dunford, can you
    fully execute this Asia-Pacific region under sequestration?
        Mr. Mabus. A return to sequestration in fiscal year 2016 would
    necessitate a revisit and revision of the Defense Strategic Guide
    (DSG). We would be unable to sufficiently meet two of the ten missions
    in the DSG: Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges
    and Deter and Defeat Aggression. In addition, we would be forced to
    accept higher risk in five other DSG missions: Counter Terrorism and
    Irregular Warfare; Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil
    Authorities; Provide a Stabilizing Presence; Conduct Stability and
    Counterinsurgency Operations; and Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster
    Relief, and Other Operations. Additionally, at sequestration levels the
    risk to our readiness will be exacerbated and the condition of our
    infrastructure, including piers, runways, and mission-critical
    facilities, will further erode. This situation may lead to greater risk
    of mishaps, serious injury, or health hazards to personnel.
        General Dunford. A return to sequestration in fiscal year 2016
    would impact the Marine Corps' ability to execute the pivot through its
    effect on MILCON, as the pivot relies on rebasing Marines in Guam and
    Hawaii, and MILCON is an important part of those moves. Impacts to
    MILCON due to sequestration, including MILCON in the Pacific, would
    need to be part of a larger conversation about the priorities of the
    Department and the defense strategy under a sequestered budget.
    Specifically in fiscal year 2016 the construction of the Live Fire
    Training Range Complex (LFTRC), $126M, would not commence.
                       arctic challenges and icebreaking
        54. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Mabus, last week, Secretary of
    Defense Ashton B. Carter and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
    General Martin E. Dempsey, USA, testified before this committee. I
    asked them about Russian activities in the Arctic and I referenced a
    recent news report which shows a rapidly increasing Russian military
    involvement in the Arctic. In fact, the Russians have begun
    constructing as many as 13 new airfields and conducting Long-Range Air
    Patrols with their Bear-Bombers, some off the coast of Alaska, creating
    a new ``Arctic Command'' and even activating an Arctic Brigade, and
    building 6 new icebreakers, with 5 more planned, to add to their 40 at
    this point. Importantly, Newsweek also recently reported that ``Nuclear
    units in the Russian Navy have engaged in exercises in the
    international waters underneath the North Pole.'' Meanwhile, we have a
    13-page Arctic Strategy, a handful of icebreakers and not a lot of
    action in the Arctic. From the Navy's perspective, how are we not
    falling behind in the Arctic and failing to live up to our 13-page
    Arctic Strategy?
        Mr. Mabus. As part of the near-term strategy, the DON is partnering
    closely with OSD and the Combatant Commanders to identify warfighting
    requirements to determine the appropriate timing for future capability
    investments.
        The Navy recognizes that the opening of the Arctic Ocean has
    important national security implications and fully supports the U.S.
    Coast Guard's (USCG) efforts to modernize its icebreaking fleet and
    increase Arctic capabilities.
        We have sufficient capability to meet near-term operational needs.
    The U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014-2030 outlines the Navy's strategic
    approach for the Arctic Region and the ways and means to achieve the
    desired national end state. In support of Department of Defense Arctic
    Strategy, the U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014-2030 outlines deliberate
    and measured steps to achieve four strategic objectives over the near-
    term (2014-2020), mid-term (2020-2030), and far-term (beyond 2030)
    timeframes:
        1) Ensure United States Arctic sovereignty and provide homeland
    defense
        2) Provide ready naval forces
        3) Preserve freedom of the seas
        4) Promote partnerships
        Through annual and biennial exercises like ARCTIC ZEPHYR, COLD
    RESPONSE, and BALTOPS, we engage with our Artic partners, including
    Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.

        55. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Mabus, what are the obstacles to
    adding icebreakers to the Navy's fleet, especially given the Navy's
    Arctic responsibility to keep Arctic sea lanes open?
        Mr. Mabus. Congress assigned responsibility for icebreaking to the
    USCG per 14 U.S. Code Sec.  2-Primary duties, which states, ``the Coast
    Guard shall develop, establish, maintain, and operate with due regard
    to the requirements of national defense, aids to maritime navigation,
    icebreaking facilities, and rescue facilities for the promotion of
    safety on, under, and over the high seas and waters subject to the
    jurisdiction of the United States.''
        The Navy recognizes that the opening of the Arctic Ocean has
    important national security implications and fully supports the U.S.
    Coast Guard's (USCG) efforts to modernize its icebreaking fleet and
    increase Arctic capabilities.

        56. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Mabus, with a non-bureaucratic
    answer that shifts the responsibility to the Department of Homeland
    Security, how is the Navy going to acquire additional icebreaking
    capacity in the future and what will they do if they do not get it?
        Mr. Mabus. Current Navy capabilities are sufficient to meet near-
    term operational needs. The Navy recognizes, however, that the opening
    of the Arctic Ocean has important national security implications and
    fully supports the U.S. Coast Guard's (USCG) efforts to modernize its
    icebreaking fleet and increase Arctic capabilities. The USCG Cutter
    POLAR STAR's recent reactivation will provide the U.S. with heavy
    icebreaker capability for about another seven to ten years. POLAR STAR,
    along with the medium icebreaker USCG Cutter HEALY, provide the minimum
    capability necessary to address the Nation's near term icebreaking
    needs and will provide the USCG time to assess longer term national
    needs and requirements.
        In accordance with the U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap, in the near-term
    the Navy will refine or develop the necessary strategy, policy, plans
    and requirements for the Arctic Region. Additionally, the Navy will
    continue to study and make informed decisions on pursuing investments
    to better facilitate Arctic operations.

             marine training the joint pacific alaska range complex
        57. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, in your testimony, you talk
    about the Marine Corps' effort to be good stewards and maintain
    training ranges and air and sea maneuver corridors. I've trained in the
    Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC) and we have plenty of space.
    Our ground space is the size of Delaware, our air space is the size of
    Florida, and our sea space is the size of Virginia. What are the
    obstacles, if any, for the Marine Corps to do more training in the
    JPARC, especially cold weather and mountainous training?
        General Dunford. The Marine Corps already has a robust cold weather
    and mountain training area with installation and logistic
    infrastructure supporting operations and training requirements. The
    Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center (MCMWTC), Pickel Meadows,
    CA, is easily accessible, cost effective, and fully capable of meeting
    Marine Corps mountain and cold weather training requirements. We
    currently execute 6 service level training exercises, Mountain Exercise
    (MTX), annually onboard MCMWTC.
        Comparatively, training at MCMWTC is significantly more cost
    effective than it would be at JPARC. For example, any element of the
    1stMarine Division, one third of the USMC's Ground Combat Element
    (GCE), can travel, via ground, to MWTC in one day. Travel to JPARC is
    nearly cost prohibitive, so much so that Army Rangers have been sending
    companies to MTX at MCMWTC for the last year and intend to continue
    doing so for the coming years. MTX has a mature intelligence driven
    scenario run by Exercise Control (EXCON) staff. MWTC also incorporates
    Special Operation Forces (SOF), company sized opposing force,
    Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), and Simulated
    Close Air Support (SIMCAS) into every MTX at no additional cost to the
    battalion.

        58. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, what should I or Alaskan
    Command do to make JPARC more attractive and accessible to Marine Corps
    training?
        General Dunford. The primary obstacles to conducting training at
    JPARC are the costs, in both time and dollars, associated with
    transiting to the training areas. The Marine Corps Mountain Warfare
    Training Center (MCMWTC), Pickel Meadows, CA, is easily accessible,
    cost effective, and fully capable of meeting Marine Corps mountain and
    cold weather training requirements. We currently execute 6 service
    level training exercises, Mountain Exercise (MTX), annually onboard
    MCMWTC. It is designed and staffed to facilitate Marine Corps training.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
               decommissioning of helicopter sea combat squadrons
        59. Senator Nelson. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, in
    regards to the Navy's plan to decommission Helicopter Sea Combat (HSC)
    squadrons, if the mitigation strategy is to use existing Active Duty
    squadrons not already dedicated to special operations support, how will
    the Navy fully support the rotary wing needs of expeditionary and
    carrier strike groups to which these squadrons are already assigned?
        Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. We conducted a comprehensive
    program review of expeditionary and carrier strike group rotary wing
    requirements and determined that it was necessary to divest from all
    activities that did not directly support those missions. This includes
    dedicated rotary wing support to Special Operations Forces (SOF). As a
    result, requests for helicopter support to special operations will be
    addressed through the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP)
    process to match available Joint and Navy resources with the highest
    priority requirements. If dedicated Navy helicopter support to SOF is
    required and prioritized through the GFMAP, then we may have to assume
    risk in other missions.

        60. Senator Nelson. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, what is
    the Navy's assessment of the increase in risk associated with using
    less experienced aviators than those aviators in the units scheduled
    for decommissioning in supporting special operations--some of the most
    dangerous flight regimes flown by rotary wing aviators today?
        Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. Special Operations Forces (SOF)
    support capability currently resides as a mission subset of the
    Helicopter Sea Combat (HSC) community. As a risk mitigation strategy,
    the Navy will leverage the experience and expertise of HSC 84 and 85
    personnel by transitioning a cadre of the most seasoned aircrew to
    Tactical Support Units (TSU) resident with the HSC type wings. These
    seasoned aviators will in turn instruct aircrews on SOF support mission
    specifics thereby reducing risk to future SOF support missions. The
    Navy will maintain the ability to provide limited support with active
    duty HSC squadrons in accordance with existing Navy general purpose
    force requirements.

        61. Senator Nelson. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, what is
    the Navy's plan to recruit and maintain a Reserve of rotary wing
    aviators and maintainers now that the Navy Reserve will have just one
    rotary wing squadron if HSC-84 and HSC-85 are decommissioned on
    schedule?
        Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. A personnel transition plan will
    coincide with the disestablishment of these squadrons. Navy Reserve
    Full Time Support and Selective Reserve personnel may continue to serve
    in one of two newly established Helicopter Sea Combat (HSC) Tactical
    Support Units (TSU). They may also serve in one of two Fleet
    Replacement Squadron (FRS) Squadron Augment Units (SAU) or select
    reassignment to other Navy Reserve billets. These TSUs and SAUs will
    provide both a mission and viable career path for the current and next
    generation of HSC reservists.
                       littoral combat ship surface fires
        62. Senator Nelson. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, given the
    debate over the lethality of the LCS, what is the feasibility of using
    Mark 75 OTO Malara 76mm guns from the decommissioning Oliver Hazard
    Perry-class frigates on LCS instead of the currently used Mark 110 57mm
    guns?
        Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. As part of the Foreign Military
    Sales (FMS) programs, some of the retiring Oliver Hazard Perry-class
    Frigates (FFG 7) are being bought by other countries and the 76mm guns
    will remain with the ships. The other FFG 7 class ships not part of the
    FMS program were either disposed of, or scheduled to be disposed of due
    to the poor material condition of the ship.
        The Navy analyzed the feasibility of both the 57mm and the 76mm
    guns by comparing lethality, procurement cost, training infrastructure,
    manning, shipboard maintenance, operations/sustainment costs,
    commonality and design change impacts to the ships and their combat
    systems.
        The Navy's conclusion is reuse of the existing guns on new
    construction LCS ships is not advisable based the analysis and the
    service life left in these guns.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
                         navy strike-fighter inventory
        63. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Greenert, what impact has the Navy's
    strike-fighter shortfall had on training and operations?
        Admiral Greenert. The Navy prioritizes and continues to meet
    deployed readiness requirements set forth in the Fleet Response
    Training Plan (FRTP). Accordingly, the Department carefully monitors
    strike-fighter inventory requirements and projected aircraft
    availability to meet the requirements for operational deployment.
    However, achieving these standards has come at the expense of force
    training for operational squadrons in the early stages of the FRTP and
    the Fleet Replacement Squadrons responsible for aircrew initial and
    refresher training.
        The FRTP is based on a structure of tiered readiness that prepares
    units for operational deployment. To support more intensive aircraft
    maintenance efforts and reduced aircrew training requirements during
    the initial FRTP phases, operational squadrons are assigned and operate
    fewer aircraft than required for deployment. With an increased number
    of strike-fighter aircraft in an out-of-reporting status for planned or
    unplanned depot level maintenance, aircraft available for these
    squadrons are below their prescribed entitlements. Consequently, their
    readiness levels are degraded for lack of training opportunities due to
    insufficient aircraft. However, as each strike-fighter squadron
    approaches the intermediate and advanced phases of the FRTP, they
    receive the full complement of entitled aircraft and complete current
    and missed training events required to achieve deployed readiness
    standards.
        The compound effect of achieving deployed readiness standards in
    this manner is an overall reduced readiness posture of the non-deployed
    strike fighter-force. This results in a steeper training curve to
    maintain deployment readiness and also results in less surge (backup
    airwing/squadron) capacity to meet Combatant Command warfighting
    requirements. Additionally, this process strains the operational fleet
    of aircraft through overutilization in the advanced phases of the FRTP,
    which leads to greater service life consumption across the strike-
    fighter inventory. Improved depot throughput and careful management of
    aircraft utilization will return strike-fighter squadrons to the
    optimum readiness profiles across the FRTP, which in turn will improve
    non-deployed force readiness.

                      airborne electronic attack analysis
        64. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Greenert, last year the Navy
    conducted an analysis of the Navy's electronic attack requirement. This
    analysis justified the inclusion of 22 E/A18-G Growlers in the Navy's
    fiscal year 2015 unfunded requirements list. A follow-on study is now
    determining the electronic attack requirement of the joint force. When
    do you expect to have the results of this analysis?
        Admiral Greenert. The Navy's on-going study will identify Joint
    warfighting requirements, Concept of Employment (CONEMPS) and future
    mission sets. The results of this study are expected to be released
    this summer and will provide insight that will allow the Department to
    determine the necessary force structure to meet Joint Airborne
    Electronic Attack (AEA) requirements rather than just those
    requirements unique to the Navy.

        65. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Greenert, while the analysis is not
    yet complete, based on the work that has been done to date, do you have
    reason to believe that the final analysis will determine that the joint
    requirement would not be greater than the Navy-only requirement?
        Admiral Greenert. We have no reason to believe the requirement will
    decrease, but until the study is complete I cannot speculate on the
    findings. While last year's study focused only on Navy demand, the
    current study identifies Joint warfighting requirements, Concept of
    Employment (CONEMPS), and future mission sets. The results will provide
    insight that will allow the Navy to optimize our EA-18G procurement
    plan and force structure to meet all DoD requirements for Airborne
    Electronic Attack.
                                      guam
        66. Senator McCaskill. General Dunford, the Senate Armed Services
    Committee has been particularly concerned about the plans for the
    relocation of marines from Okinawa to other locations in the Pacific,
    and specifically, the affordability, sustainability and operational
    viability of those plans. Can you provide the current status of the
    efforts to implement the eventual move of marines from Okinawa to Guam
    and other locations?
        General Dunford. The nature of the program for the USMC is
    characterized by its duration and scope. The scope of the program is
    significant, and entails myriad actions prior to Marines moving off of
    Okinawa, and the duration is on the order of decades.
        The program has experienced some start and stops, but has continued
    to move forward. The most noticeable progress has been at MCAS Iwakuni.
    Last year we completed the move of VMGR-152 from Okinawa to MCAS
    Iwakuni and the base has been and continues to enlarge. CVW-5 is on
    track to commence their relocation from Atsugi to Iwakuni in fiscal
    year 2017. By the time Iwakuni is finished the base will have nearly
    doubled in size and capacity.
        Guam and the CJMT have both moved forward. The Supplemental
    Environmental Impact Study for Guam, and in the Environmental Impact
    Study for the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) Joint
    Military Training Complex have progressed. We anticipate a Record of
    Decision in the coming months for Guam and summer of 2016 for the CJMT.
    These NEPA actions are necessary to commence construction. Our first
    project, a range complex in Guam, is in the fiscal year 2016 budget
    request. We have also published a Guam master plan, as required by the
    NDAA, and are preparing to deliver a Hawaii master plan that will
    outline the early stages of preparation for moving Marines to Hawaii as
    a part of the realignment.
        We continue to conduct rotational deployments to Darwin, Australia
    and the fourth rotation of approximately 1,170 Marines and an aviation
    detachment has just commenced. The size of the rotation increases apace
    of adequate facilities available with the force eventually being 2500
    Marines strong.
        While there is significant activity off of Okinawa to prepare for
    the realignment there is also significant activity on Okinawa. The
    Futenma replacement facility and Camp Schwab realignment are underway.
    This is a long term project with FOC for the airfield anticipated to be
    fiscal year 2025. Political challenges remain but we are pleased to see
    construction progressing and resolute commitment for the government of
    Japan. The sun will not set on this realignment program until planned
    land returns in Okinawa are complete. This is scheduled for FY32. Of
    note, the Marine Corps has already returned land in Okinawa and the
    most recent return took effect on 31 March of this year, when we
    transferred West Futenma housing back to the Japanese.

        67. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Mabus, how is the Navy accounting
    for the costs of such a realignment that are not captured in the Guam
    Master plan, including the costs of additional strategic lift necessary
    to move marines around the theater?
        Mr. Mabus. The Guam Master Plan includes costs for the construction
    of facilities and infrastructure to execute the Marine Corps
    Distributed Laydown in Guam. The Guam Master Plan is central to our
    broader efforts to rebalance our forces to, and realign them within,
    the Asia-Pacific theater.
        The Marine Corps is currently executing the Guam Master Plan and is
    on track to meet the scheduled milestones and is continuing to refine
    costs within the profile defined by the master plan.
        The schedule that moves Marines and their gear from Okinawa to Guam
    will not be realized until there is a full operational capability for
    the USMC forces, which is expected to occur after 2021. The costs for
    relocation of the Force to Guam (one way movement of the units) will be
    included in the budget submission for the year of execution. The
    Department recognizes the critical importance of having sufficient lift
    to move Marines around the theater. Funding for this requirement is
    part of the DON budget submission and therefore any scheduled lifts
    would be included in future year budgets. If there is an event that
    requires movement other than scheduled, such that a Strategic Lift is
    ordered by a Combatant Commander, the costs would be identified by the
    requirements ordered.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
                                audit readiness
        68. Senator Manchin. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and General
    Dunford, how do you plan on holding leaders accountable to make sure
    your Service is ready for a full financial statement audit by the end
    of fiscal year 2017?
        General Dunford. Accountability is inherent in command throughout
    the Marine Corps. This includes the responsibility for financial
    management and is reflected in the Department of the Navy, Marine Corps
    Manual and the Marine Corps' Financial Guidebook for Commanders (NAVMC
    2664 Rev 1.0). As the first service under financial statement audit
    starting in fiscal year 2010, commanders and leaders throughout the
    Marine Corps are expected to play a leadership role in achieving a full
    financial statement audit. We will hold Marine Corps leaders
    accountable for achieving audit objectives, to include all aspects of
    financial management, similarly to how we hold leaders accountable for
    all other responsibilities inherent to command.
        Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. We have given commanders of major
    commands the responsibility of making the changes necessary to the
    business processes and systems within their purview so that our
    Departmental business environment will be audit ready. Coincident with
    this increased responsibility, commanders are accountable for results
    in financial auditability.
        As part of our auditability strategy, we have designated some
    commanders as leaders of the auditability efforts in selected
    functional areas. For example, one commander was responsible for
    preparing Military Payroll for audit, and another has spearheaded audit
    readiness in Real Property business operations; another was the lead in
    travel expenses. In addition, each command has tested samples of its
    own business transactions, determining if they were properly executed
    and documented. Below-threshold results require corrective actions and
    re-testing.
        Responsibility and accountability for reaching the mandated goals
    in financial auditability have been placed at the command and
    organizational level. Engaging the Department's leaders in this way not
    only ensures that audit readiness receives the appropriate priority;
    this approach also emphasizes that changes in Departmental business
    processes need to occur at the command level, where financial
    transactions are generated.

        69. Senator Manchin. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and General
    Dunford, what do you believe should happen if the Department of Defense
    misses that deadline?
        Mr. Mabus and Admiral Greenert. The Department of the Navy is
    executing its plan to achieve financial auditability by the end of
    fiscal year 2017, as the Congressional mandate requires. The other
    Military Departments, as well as other Defense Department
    organizations, also have roadmaps to reach this objective. Should any
    organization fail to reach financial audit readiness by the mandated
    date, causes for missing the deadline should be identified, shared, and
    corrected as soon as possible.
        General Dunford. The Marine Corps remains on track to meet the
    fiscal year 2017 timeline for full financial statement auditability for
    all areas under our control. The Marine Corps would expect that DoD
    would share the same philosophy as the Marine Corps of holding leaders
    and commanders accountable if we do not achieve our audit objectives by
    fiscal year 2017.
                                     ______

                  Question Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
                              integration of women
        70. Senator Shaheen. General Dunford, last fall the Marine Corps
    established the Ground Combat Element Integrated Task Force to evaluate
    the performance of women in collective tasks in combat units. I
    understand that this task force is preparing for evaluation and the
    results will be available later this year. Can you discuss the metrics
    in which you will evaluate women in order to determine whether or not
    they may serve in infantry units?
        General Dunford. Throughout this process, the Marine Corps has
    maintained a focus on combat effectiveness and combat readiness; the
    Marine Corps must ensure that we assign Marines to occupational
    specialties and units for which they are best qualified in order to
    maintain combat effectiveness and our ability to fulfill the unique
    role as the nation's expeditionary force in readiness. Therefore, the
    research effort underway is designed to provide the fullest
    understanding of all aspects of integration of females into all ground
    combat arms units of the Marine Corps, not just infantry units. While
    there is an emphasis on the development of gender neutral physical
    performance standards for service in these occupational specialties,
    the Marine Corps is also developing metrics that encompass
    physiological, anthropometric, and non-physical parameters to evaluate
    what contributes to successful ground combat arms units and mission
    accomplishment.
                                     ______

              Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand
             special victims' counsel, retaliation, sexual assault
        71. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, in
    both 2012 and 2014, 62 percent of victims who reported unwanted sexual
    contact indicated they had been retaliated against, socially and
    professionally. I am very concerned that nearly two-thirds of survivors
    perceive retaliation. To me that says that, whether it is professional
    or social retaliation, there is a problem with the command climate and
    that needs to be addressed. How do you plan to address this issue?
        Admiral Greenert. Sustaining a professionalized response and victim
    advocacy system remains the top priority, but preventing sexual
    assaults in the first place is an imperative. Our strategy focuses on
    improving command climate, strengthening deterrence measures, and
    encouraging bystander intervention. To facilitate the latter, we
    trained facilitators to lead small, peer-group interactive discussions
    using various scenarios. Likewise, we have focused on raising awareness
    and accountability regarding retaliation to reduce the potential for
    re-victimization. A RAND survey of DoD found that 53 percent of
    retaliation is ``social'' or ``peer,'' so we are focusing in on that
    area. Navy efforts are aligned with SECDEF direction to enhance first
    line supervisor skills and knowledge in recognizing signs of possible
    acts of retaliation. Recent Navy survey results show that prevalence of
    sexual assaults is decreasing, but we remain fully committed to
    creating and sustaining a culture where Sailors understand the
    importance of treating Shipmates with dignity and respect at all times,
    in all places.
        We are collecting and will assess data on reports and
    investigations of retaliation. We also use the Survivor Experience
    Survey to assess retaliation, and will use the forthcoming Military
    Justice Experience Survey similarly. Future survey questions will be
    better designed to understand more accurately what the victims
    perceived and experienced.
        We are providing training and awareness to the Fleet to include
    survey results and definitions of retaliation, and reporting options
    available to report retaliation. Retaliation has been the focus of
    senior leader Fleet engagements and media outreach efforts to ensure
    our Sailors understand the issue of retaliation and reprisal. Sexual
    Assault Prevention and Response annual training, and modules for First
    Line Supervisor training and Pre-Command courses will include
    retaliation in the curriculum.
        General Dunford. Our current approach to sexual assault prevention,
    which includes the prevention of victim retaliation, is built around
    the central role of the commander. The commanding officer of every unit
    is the centerpiece of an effective and professional warfighting
    organization. They are entrusted with our greatest asset--the
    individual Marine--and are charged with building and leading their team
    to withstand the rigors of combat by establishing the highest level of
    trust throughout their unit.
        Retaliation was incorporated into the Marine Corps Order (MCO)
    1752.5B in 2013, which specifically requires commanders to ``protect
    victims of sexual assault from coercion, retaliation, and reprisal.''
    Decisive and engaged leadership continues to be our greatest weapon in
    the battle against sexual assault. As outlined in MCO 1752.5B,
    commanding officers are responsible for creating a command climate that
    is non-permissive to sexual assault and protecting victims from
    retaliation.
        To better address this problem, we recently identified six areas of
    focus: strategic communications, training, prevention and response,
    research, legal and social media retaliation. Through these six areas
    of focus, our goal is to provide a clear framework--within the context
    of evidence-based best practices and based on Department of Defense,
    Department of the Navy, and Marine Corps policy--that enables us to
    effectively raise awareness of this issue; provide the tools for
    commanders and all Marines to identify and correct any instances of
    retaliation, no matter where it occurs; and prevent retaliation from
    occurring in the first place.

        72. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, do
    you have sufficient resources and authorities to address the problem?
        Admiral Greenert. Yes, Navy has sufficient resources and
    authorities to address the problem. Programmatic needs are regularly
    assessed to ensure that sufficient resources and authorities remain in
    place.
        General Dunford. Presently we have sufficient resources and
    authorities to address the problem. Our efforts are a subset of a
    broader effort across the Department of Defense (DOD) and the
    Department of the Navy (DON) to address retaliation, and we are working
    to implement related provisions of the National Defense Authorization
    Act and recommendations of the Response Systems Panel.

        73. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, the
    Special Victims' Counsel (SVC)/ Victims Legal Counsel Program, which
    details a judge advocate to assist and represent sexual assault victims
    and help them navigate the military justice system, is an important
    step to increasing everyone's confidence in the system. Despite the
    downsizing that is taking place across the Services, I understand that
    the Air Force was able to increase its number of Air Force judge
    advocate slots by 58, the majority of which will be devoted to the
    Special Victims' Counsel Program. It is my understanding that the Navy
    and Marine Corps have not seen their authorized slots increased. Do you
    have enough SVCs to meet your needs?
        Admiral Greenert. Based on the current demand level for the Navy
    Victims' Legal Counsel Program (VLCP), VLC staffing is appropriate.
    There are 31 judge advocates and 10 enlisted Yeoman assigned to VLCP.
    The JAG Corps continually assesses demand and locations for VLC
    services to ensure Navy is properly manned to respond to victims' legal
    needs.
        General Dunford. Yes, the Marine Corps currently has enough
    victims' counsel to meet our needs. (The Marine Corps refers to this
    program as the Victims' Legal Counsel Organization (VLCO), and to the
    judge advocates that provide these services as Victims' Legal Counsel
    (VLC).) Every major Marine Corps installation has a VLCO office, and to
    date, no eligible victim of sexual assault has been turned away from
    VLC services. Further, we have Reserve officers to help augment active
    duty VLC in supporting victims.
        The Marine Corps regularly reviews its personnel structure to
    ensure we have the right Marines in the right locations to most
    effectively accomplish the Marine Corps mission. I have recently
    directed a review of the personnel requirements for Marine judge
    advocates. As part of that review, the Staff Judge Advocate to the
    Commandant of the Marine Corps will examine the number of personnel
    assigned to the VLCO, and make recommendations on whether additional
    resources are required.
        I am committed to ensuring that the VLCO has the personnel needed
    to provide effective assistance to every eligible victim of sexual
    assault that seeks assistance from a VLC.

        74. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, the
    SVC has testified at the Judicial Proceedings Panel on Sexual Assault
    and told me that the program needs to be improved. Common criticisms
    are that the current appellate process is nonresponsive and
    insufficient to protect victims' rights; victim access to information--
    including discovery, pleadings and motions--remains inconsistent; and
    that there is widespread confusion about procedures for representing
    victims in judicial proceedings and for enforcing other victims'
    rights. Are you looking at these issues?
        Admiral Greenert. Yes. Navy addressed these issues. Specifically,
    in January 2015, the Deputy Judge Advocate General of the Navy in his
    role as Commander, Naval Legal Service Command, issued a Notice on
    Disclosure of Information to Crime Victims, establishing a standardized
    policy for disclosure of information to all victims who suffer harm as
    a result of an offense under the Uniform Code of Military Justice--
    including victims of a sexual assault. Also, in order to standardize
    procedures for representing victims in judicial proceedings, Uniform
    Rules of Practice for the Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary, including
    specific guidance on Victims' Legal Counsel, were promulgated on March
    1, 2015. Navy will continue to monitor procedures for representing
    victims in judicial proceedings at all stages.
        General Dunford. Yes, the Marine Corps has looked at these issues.
    The Marine Corps, along with the other Services, recently reviewed how
    to improve the integration of Victims' Legal Counsel /Special Victims'
    Counsel into the military justice system in light of the experiences of
    the first year of operations and additional legislation. Please see the
    following attachments that detail current policies and procedures
    victims' counsel and the military justice process: Staff Judge Advocate
    to the Commandant of the Marine Corps Practice Advisories 4-14, 3-15
    and 5-15 and excerpts from the Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary,
    Uniform Rules of Practice.
        In addition to this formal guidance, the Officer in Charge of the
    Victims' Legal Counsel Organization continually updates the Victims'
    Legal Counsel staff on best practices for enforcing victims' rights.
    Such guidance includes using Article 138 Complaint of Wrong procedures
    and other non-judicial enforcement mechanisms.

        75. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, what
    recommendations do you have to address them?
        Admiral Greenert. The Navy continues to pursue a deliberate
    strategy in combatting sexual assault. We continue to focus on
    preventing sexual assaults, ensuring victims are fully supported,
    improving investigation programs and processes, and ensuring
    appropriate accountability. These efforts include making sexual assault
    forensic exams available on all ships and 24/7 ashore, having a cadre
    of professional and credentialed sexual assault response coordinators
    and victim advocates, special victim trained investigators and JAGs,
    and ensuring commands take all reports of sexual assault seriously and
    support the victim. We will enhance our response efforts by full
    implementation of deployed resiliency counselors on large deck ships,
    enhanced NCIS investigative capability using specially training Master-
    at-Arms, and continued legal assistance to victims through our Victims
    Legal Counsel program.
        Sustaining a professionalized response and victim advocacy system
    remains the top priority, but preventing sexual assaults in the first
    place is an imperative. Our strategy focuses on improving command
    climate, strengthening deterrence measures, and encouraging bystander
    intervention. To facilitate the latter, we trained facilitators to lead
    small, peer-group interactive discussions using various scenarios.
    Likewise, we have focused on raising awareness and accountability
    regarding retaliation to reduce the potential for re-victimization. A
    RAND survey of DoD found that 53 percent of retaliation is ``social''
    or ``peer,'' so we are focusing in on that area. Navy efforts are
    aligned with SECDEF direction to enhance first line supervisor skills
    and knowledge in recognizing signs of possible acts of retaliation.
    Recent Navy survey results show that prevalence of sexual assaults is
    decreasing, but we remain fully committed to creating and sustaining a
    culture where Sailors understand the importance of treating Shipmates
    with dignity and respect at all times, in all places.
        General Dunford. These recent developments have significantly
    enhanced VLC ability to zealously advocate for victims' rights. The
    Marine Corps will continue to evaluate these enhancements and the need
    for others so that VLCs have the tools they need to properly represent
    victims.

        76. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, in
    both 2012 and 2014, 62 percent of victims who reported unwanted sexual
    contact indicated they had been retaliated against, socially and
    professionally. Nearly two-thirds of survivors perceiving retaliation
    and zero progress in addressing this problem indicates that there may
    be larger issues with the command climate. Since 2012, what policies or
    programs have the Navy and Marine Corps implemented to stop
    retaliation, and why do you think these programs have failed to reduce
    the amount of retaliation perceived by survivors?
        Admiral Greenert. One year ago, Secretary Mabus issued a written
    order making retaliation against an individual who reported a criminal
    offense, a violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).
    This past December, the Secretary signed a comprehensive revision of
    Military Whistleblower Protections, which: a) prohibits retaliation by
    superiors who threaten unfavorable or adverse action, or withhold, or
    threaten to withhold, a favorable action; b) defines and prohibits
    ostracism, and c) expands the definition of maltreatment.
        The Navy continues to pursue a deliberate strategy in combatting
    sexual assault. We continue to focus on preventing sexual assaults,
    ensuring victims are fully supported, improving investigation programs
    and processes, and ensuring appropriate accountability. These efforts
    include making sexual assault forensic exams available on all ships and
    24/7 ashore, having a cadre of professional and credentialed sexual
    assault response coordinators and victim advocates, special victim
    trained investigators and JAGs, and ensuring commands take all reports
    of sexual assault seriously and support the victim. We will enhance our
    response efforts by full implementation of deployed resiliency
    counselors on large deck ships, enhanced NCIS investigative capability
    using specially training Master-at-Arms, and continued legal assistance
    to victims through our Victims Legal Counsel program.
        Sustaining a professionalized response and victim advocacy system
    remains the top priority, but preventing sexual assaults in the first
    place is an imperative. Our strategy focuses on improving command
    climate, strengthening deterrence measures, and encouraging bystander
    intervention. To facilitate the latter, we trained facilitators to lead
    small, peer-group interactive discussions using various scenarios.
    Likewise, we have focused on raising awareness and accountability
    regarding retaliation to reduce the potential for re-victimization. A
    RAND survey of DoD found that 53 percent of retaliation is ``social''
    or ``peer,'' so we are focusing in on that area. Navy efforts are
    aligned with SECDEF direction to enhance first line supervisor skills
    and knowledge in recognizing signs of possible acts of retaliation.
    Recent Navy survey results show that prevalence of sexual assaults is
    decreasing, but we remain fully committed to creating and sustaining a
    culture where Sailors understand the importance of treating Shipmates
    with dignity and respect at all times, in all places.
        General Dunford. The Marine Corps takes the issues of sexual
    assault and retaliation very seriously and has implemented large-scale
    initiatives to eliminate these and other damaging behaviors from our
    ranks. Specific to retaliation, in 2013, language was inserted into
    Marine Corps Order 1752.5B that required commanders to ``protect
    victims of sexual assault from coercion, retaliation, and reprisal.''
    In addition, ALNAV 030/14 published in April 2014 defined retaliation
    as a prohibited criminal offense. On 4 December 2014, Secretary of the
    Navy (SECNAV) signed SECNAV Instruction 5370.7D, Military Whistleblower
    Protection, which prohibits retaliation against members of the DON who
    report a criminal offense.
        Since 2012, the Marine Corps has made significant improvements to
    our policies, processes, and the overall quality of victim services.
    This was part of a holistic approach to sexual assault designed to
    reinforce our core values and, by doing so, eliminate the underlying
    conditions that lead to sexual assault and other crimes and misconduct,
    including retaliation. Future Marine Corps efforts will address
    retaliation specifically, with initiatives centering on the following
    six areas of focus: strategic communications, training, prevention and
    response, research, legal and social media retaliation. However, we
    will continue our holistic approach to sexual assault, which has worked
    thus far to reduce sexual assault prevalence and increase reporting
    rates.

        77. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford,
    Congress legislated that retaliation is a crime under the Uniform Code
    of Military Justice. Are Marine Corps and Navy commanders using the
    full military justice toolkit provided by the Uniform Code of Military
    Conduct to reduce retaliation and maintain good order and discipline?
    In your response, please provide military justice statistics related to
    retaliation in fiscal year 2014 that includes: (a) the number of
    sailors and marines that were counselled or received letters of
    reprimand for retaliation, and whether any servicemember receiving
    counselling or letters of reprimand were senior noncommissioned
    officers or officers; (b) the number of servicemembers receiving non-
    judicial punishment for retaliation, and whether any were officers or
    senior noncommissioned officers; (c) the number of sailors and marines
    administratively separated for retaliation and the characterization of
    their discharges; and (d) the number of sailors and marines that were
    court-martialed for retaliation, the rank of the accused, and the
    results of trial.
        Admiral Greenert. Yes, commanders are using the UCMJ, as well as
    other administrative measures, to reduce retaliation and maintain good
    order and discipline. On April, 25, 2014, the Secretary of the Navy
    issued ALNAV 030/14, a lawful general order, which made retaliation
    against an individual who reported a criminal offense a violation of
    Article 92 of the UCMJ. On December, 4, 2014, the Secretary signed
    SECNAV Instruction 5370.7D, a comprehensive revision of Military
    Whistleblower Protections, including preventing retaliation or
    ostracism by superiors. To combat peer-to-peer retaliation, SECNAVINST
    5370.7D defines and prohibits ostracism as a form of retaliation. This
    expansion beyond the UCMJ offense of maltreatment requiring a senior-
    subordinate relationship directly addresses peer-to-peer retaliation or
    reprisal.
        (a) In fiscal year 2014, two Sailors were counseled or received
    letters of reprimand for retaliation. One of these alleged retaliators
    was reported to be the victim's peer or co-worker and one was within
    the victim's chains-of-command.
        (b) In fiscal year 2014, two Sailors received non-judicial
    punishment for retaliation. Both of these alleged retaliators were
    reported to be peers or co-workers of the victims.
        (c) In fiscal year 2014, no Sailors were administratively separated
    for retaliation offenses.
        (d) In fiscal year 2014, no Sailors were court-martialed for
    retaliation offenses.
        General Dunford. Marine Corps commanders have numerous methods in
    their toolkits to confront retaliation. They take appropriate action
    after review of investigations conducted by the Inspector General (IG),
    criminal investigators or command inquiries. Commanders can address
    retaliation reports through the informal resolution process by
    resolving a complaint directly with the complainant, through
    administrative counseling or separation of offenders, non-judicial
    punishment or court-martial action. Depending on the facts of the case,
    service members who retaliate against those who report crimes may be
    administratively sanctioned or court-martialed for an orders violation,
    obstruction of justice, or maltreatment.
        Victims of retaliation may report retaliation using numerous
    methods to include making a hotline complaint to the IG, making a
    complaint against a senior officer through a complaint under Article
    138, Uniform Code of Military Justice or a complaint under Article
    1150, of the U.S. Navy Regulations, a report to criminal investigators
    or through the chain of command.
        The Marine Corps has not formally tracked command investigations
    concerning retaliation, administrative actions, non-judicial punishment
    or court-martial actions against those who committed retaliation;
    however the Marine Corps is developing a formal tracking system to
    capture this information. This formal tracking mechanism will track
    cases falling under the expanded definition of retaliation found in the
    National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2014 and as
    implemented by the Secretary of the Navy in Instruction 5370.7D,
    Military Whistle Blower Protection, for retaliating against a victim
    through an unfavorable personnel action, ostracism or maltreatment.
                               combat integration
        78. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Mabus, January 2016 is the
    deadline for the implementation of combat integration in the military.
    Not only is this a readiness issue, since you want to have the best
    qualified people in position, regardless of gender, it is also a way to
    give women a fair shot to reach positions of leadership in the
    military. You said in your written testimony that ``In accordance with
    the Secretary of Defense's guidance, the default position will be that
    all currently closed positions will be opened to the assignment of
    women unless an exception is formally requested.'' Do you expect there
    to be requests for exceptions coming from the Navy or the Marine Corps?
        Mr. Mabus. The default position that all currently closed positions
    will be opened to the assignment of women unless an exception is
    formally requested is currently being reviewed at the JCS and OUSD(P&R)
    levels to synchronize decision impacts that will affect more than one
    Service and/or USSOCOM. Formally and informally, this synchronized
    approach is being applied to the Services and SOCOM in order to make
    recommendations for position/occupational openings and/or submission of
    an Exception to Policy, if needed. The decision timeline has shifted to
    September 2015 in order to align with all Service decisions. The bi-
    annual DON report to SECDEF on the progress of WISR implementation due
    in April 2015 will include this timeline shift.
        I approved the Navy's surface ship ETP requesting to keep FFGs,
    MCMs, and PCs closed to the assignment of enlisted women given the
    pending decommissioning schedules of these ship classes, habitability
    modifications would not be a judicious use of fiscal resources.
    Additionally, there is equal professional opportunity for women at sea
    on platforms other than FFGs, MCMs, and PCs. Opening these aging ship
    classes would not improve career opportunities for women; in fact, such
    assignments would be in lieu of assigning women to Navy's newest and
    most sophisticated platforms.

        79. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, are
    the Navy and Marine Corps working toward opening all positions to
    women?
        Admiral Greenert. Integrating women across the force remains a
    priority. Over 96 percent of all Navy jobs are currently available to
    women, and we expect to have all occupations open by early next year.
        General Dunford. We were directed by the Secretary of Defense to
    open all positions for women and to recommend exceptions to policy if
    required. We are on the path to accomplish that task.

        80. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, what
    might make you ask for exceptions to the policy?
        Admiral Greenert. Navy is on track to comply with the Secretary of
    Defense-directed rescission of the 1994 Direct Ground Combat Definition
    and Assignment Rule (DGCAR), and expects to have no closed occupations,
    few closed positions, and equal professional opportunity for females in
    every officer designator and enlisted rating by January 1, 2016.
    However, Navy may seek exceptions to policy when the cost of berthing
    modifications would make it imprudent to expend taxpayer dollars to
    open platforms expected to decommission in the near future.
        General Dunford. The Navy and Marine Corps will not compromise
    readiness and combat effectiveness or reduce our high standards because
    that is what America demands. A recommendation for an exception to
    policy may be based on any number of factors that could include a
    detrimental impact on combat effectiveness, unit readiness, or the
    health and welfare of Marines.

        81. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Mabus, what kind of oversight are
    you currently doing to ensure that the Navy and Marine Corps are
    developing gender neutral standards and working to meet the intent of
    the directive from former Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta and
    General Dempsey?
        Mr. Mabus. On January 23, 2013, then Secretary of Defense Leon
    Panetta, with the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and in
    collaboration with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS),
    rescinded the 1994 Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule
    which excluded women from assignment to units and positions whose
    primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground. As a
    result of that recession, Secretary Panetta directed the Services to
    integrate women into all positions and units by January 1, 2016, unless
    he or his successor approved narrowly tailored exceptions, based upon
    rigorous analysis, to keep an occupational specialty or unit closed.
        The recommendation to the Secretary of Defense to seek and
    exception to policy is to be made by a Secretary of a Military
    Department with the concurrence of the CJCS. On September 30, 2015, I
    provided the Department of the Navy recommendation, along with research
    from the Navy and Marine Corps, to the Secretary of Defense. This
    submission included certifications from the Chief of Naval Operations
    and the Commandant of the Marine Corps that the occupational standards
    used in their respective services are gender-neutral and operationally
    relevant, in accordance with the law. It has been my clear position
    that if you meet those standards, you should be allowed the opportunity
    to serve. By definition, if the standards are strictly met, combat
    effectiveness will not be diminished.
        Under 10 U.S.C. Sec.  652(a)(1), the Secretary of Defense must
    submit to Congress a report providing notice of a change to integrate
    women into closed positions and units. The Secretary may implement the
    change 30 days after congress receives this report. Should the
    Secretary of Defense, after having considered the recommendations of
    the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the CJCS, decide to
    continue to integrate women into closed positions and units, he will
    provide the requisite report to Congress. Such report will include all
    the information that is necessary to ensure that congress is fully
    informed of the reasons and justifications for this departmental
    change.

        82. Senator Gillibrand. General Dunford, how is the Marine Corps
    developing its gender neutral standards?
        General Dunford. MOS subject matter experts have been tasked to
    review what tasks Marines within an MOS are required to perform and to
    ensure the standards are gender-neutral. Using the expertise gained by
    cumulative knowledge of generations of Marines who have served in
    combat, these experts have reviewed what tasks are actually being done,
    the order and frequency in which tasks are performed, and the standards
    of performance necessary to adequately perform each task to accomplish
    the mission. This process will validate Marine Corps tasks, conditions
    and standards and will be the basis for Training & Readiness manuals
    for each MOS. Training and Readiness manuals provide the basis for all
    individual MOS instruction, sustainment training, and proficiency
    assessments as well as unit training and unit training readiness
    assessments.
        Additionally, the Marine Corps is using a number of studies to
    validate gender neutral standards. We established the Ground Combat
    Element Integrated Task Force primarily to better understand and refine
    gender-neutral skills in the context of more complex unit tasks. The
    GCEITF is a gender integrated ground combat arms unit built to conduct
    a research study and designed to determine the individual contribution
    to physically demanding ground combat arms MOS collective tasks. The
    goal is to validate what gender-neutral standards are required of
    individual Marines for the unit to be successful. The Marine Corps is
    using the data obtained from the task force and entry level training
    research studies to validate, refine, and implement gender-neutral
    occupational standards that can be applied to all Marines.

        83. Senator Gillibrand. General Dunford, what do you expect to
    learn from the Ground Combat Element Integrated Task-Force experiment?
        General Dunford. The Ground Combat Element Integrated Task Force
    (GCEITF) is a gender integrated ground combat arms unit built to
    conduct a research study and designed to determine how an individual
    contributes to physically demanding ground combat arms MOS collective
    tasks. The purpose of the research study is two-fold. The first is to
    build a data set that supports establishing MOS specific physical
    standards and assessments. The second is to determine the effects (if
    any) of gender integration on ground combat arms small unit mission
    effectiveness.
        (Source: USMC Response to Status Report in Hegar, et al v. Carter,
    No. 12-6005)

        84. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Greenert, the closed positions to
    women in the Navy are in large part special operations positions. What
    can you tell us about how the Navy is working with Special Operations
    Command to make the determination about how to open these positions?
        Admiral Greenert. Navy is closely coordinating with U.S. Special
    Operations Command in conducting a methodical and orderly evaluation to
    inform recommendations regarding integration of women into Naval
    Special Warfare/Special Operations occupations. This includes frequent
    exchanges of information and bi-weekly video tele-conferences to
    synchronize the decision process. This partnership and transparency
    will lead to a fully-informed recommendation that will be provided in
    parallel to Navy and U.S. Special Operations Command leadership.

        85. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, what
    else are the Services doing to help with recruitment and retention of
    women?
        Admiral Greenert. Navy efforts to help with recruiting women
    include generating female-centric marketing materials for use in direct
    mail and email campaigns, creating video products for use on Navy.com
    and the Navy's YouTube channel to highlight stories of successful
    female Sailors and Officers, and leveraging female influencers through
    the use of Carrier Embarks, Education Visits, and other outreach
    initiatives. Navy is focused on retaining women warfighters by
    increasing career flexibility through initiatives like the Career
    Intermission Program, which allows service-members to take a hiatus
    from their careers for up to three years to pursue personal and/or
    professional priorities before re-entering the force. Additionally,
    Navy has increased its female accession goal to 25 percent of all
    recruits for fiscal year 2015 and fiscal year 2016, in order to
    increase female representation in all operational platforms, and in
    particular in the most under-represented ratings.
        General Dunford. The Marine Corps does not have gender-specific
    recruiting or retention requirements. We strive to access and retain
    the best and most-fully qualified Marines, regardless of gender.
        However, the Marine Corps has taken deliberate actions to increase
    female accessions and will continue to actively monitor propensity and
    other market indicators to reach the female audience. Examples of
    advertising marketing channels include collateral material, direct
    mail, Marines.com websites, online display advertising, print media,
    and social media showing female Marines alongside their male
    counterparts. Overall, since 2008, the Marine Corps has increased
    female accessions, both enlisted and officer, by nearly five percent.
    It is noteworthy that, over the last two fiscal years, the NROTC
    scholarship acceptance rate for females has been higher than the male
    acceptance rate.
        Retention rates for females in the Marine Corps are essentially the
    same as that of their male counterparts after the first term. During
    the first term, female retention is lower. Female officer retention is
    actually higher than male between 20 and 30 years of service. The
    Marine Corps is always assessing its retention mission and has met all
    goals in recent history. The quality of our force has never been
    higher. Nevertheless, per the direction of the Secretary of the Navy,
    the Marine Corps is considering several policies intended to enhance
    retention of females across the ranks. We have also implemented a
    career intermission program that allows Marines to pause service for
    family or educational reasons as a retention measure.
                                 cyber security
        86. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford,
    Admiral Rogers testified last week that Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) was
    having trouble filling its target of 6,200 cyber troops by the close of
    2016. Are you able to fill your cyber positions as well as meet Cyber
    Command's needs?
        Admiral Greenert. Navy is contributing to the building of Cyber
    Mission Force teams for U.S. Cyber Command, with Navy teams organized
    into existing U.S. Fleet Cyber Command operational commands. Our
    contribution includes the sourcing of four National Mission Teams,
    eight Combat Mission Teams, 20 Cyber Protection Teams, three National
    Support Teams and five Combat Support Teams. We are on track to man
    these teams at the initial operational capability manning requirement
    of 50 percent in 2016, and at the full operational capability manning
    requirement of 80 percent in 2017.
        General Dunford. We project our manpower models to be sufficient to
    present forces to USCYBERCOM on track with the Cyber Mission Force
    build, and at the same time, build capacity to fill cyber positions in
    the Marine Corps. In fiscal year 2017, we will reach the ``assess''
    phase of the build-assess-build plan laid out by the Commander of
    USCYBERCOM, and will reevaluate manpower requirements for the Cyber
    Mission Force.

        87. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, do
    you have the training capacity you require?
        Admiral Greenert. The Navy training plan ensures that Cyber Mission
    Force (CMF) personnel gain the technical skills required through a
    combination of joint training pipelines, including accession level and
    advanced courses, educational opportunities, and operational Cyber
    exercises. The Navy also has sufficient joint training capacity (in
    conjunction with NSA, USCYBERCOM, and the other Services) to meet the
    training requirements of the CMF.
        However, the Navy needs a training environment--a ``cyber range''--
    to conduct the unit-level training of its Cyber Mission Teams. This
    Persistent Training Environment (PTE) will ensure we build proficiency
    leading up to certification events, maintain overall Cyber Mission Team
    proficiency, and allow teams to exercise in a realistic environment
    without the risk of harming operational computer systems or networks.
        General Dunford. Currently, we have the training capacity to man
    our service's portion of the National Mission Force and are making
    strong progress for that build. Additionally, we have already adjusted
    service level training to ensure we are expanding cyber training
    capacity in the Marine Corps. For example, by extending the length of
    the Marine Corps Cyber Security Technician course. Looking to the
    future, we are planning for additional training requirements as we
    continue to build the Cyber Mission Force and integrate cyberspace
    operations in the Marine Air-Ground Task Force. To account for this, we
    are working with mission partners and industry to build a persistent
    training environment where cyber warriors can continue to build their
    skills. Additionally, the Marine Corps is forming a Cyber Task Force to
    address issues like training and readiness in cyberspace to adjust to
    the needs of this increasingly critical mission.

        88. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, we
    just received a report from all of the Services articulating their
    plans to either create separate specialties or designators for cyber.
    It is my understanding training for building a cyber warrior can be up
    to 2 years. How do you envision the development not only of separate
    specialties for cyber but also career tracks and a way to retain these
    dedicated warriors?
        Admiral Greenert. The Navy denotes military personnel in the Cyber
    Mission Forces (CMF) through officer designators (1810/Information
    Warfare-IW; 1820/Information Professional - IP; 1840/Cyber Warfare
    Engineer-CWE) and enlisted ratings (Cryptologic Technician Networks -
    CTN; Cryptologic Technician Collection - CTR; Cryptologic Technician
    Linguist - CTI; Information Systems Technician - IT; and, Intelligence
    Specialist-IS).
        Today, Navy CMF officer designators and enlisted ratings are
    meeting retention goals. For officers, the Navy is making efforts to
    retain CWE technical expertise by encouraging them to cross designate
    to the IW or IP communities. Career paths include increasing
    opportunities for graduate-level Cyber education, currently offered
    through a combination of service and private sector institutions such
    as the Naval Post Graduate School, Naval War College, and Rensselaer
    Polytechnic Institute.
        For enlisted Sailors, five ratings in the CMF will increase by more
    than 900 billets by the end of fiscal year 2016, with the CTN rating
    experiencing the most growth. The Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB)
    contributes significantly to our retention of enlisted Sailors in
    ratings with crucial skill sets.
        General Dunford. In order to attract and retain the best people,
    the Marine Corps has followed multiple lines of effort. To improve
    continuity and reap greater return-on-investment in the lowest density
    highest demand military occupational specialties (MOS), we have
    coordinated with our Service to extend standard assignments to four
    years. Additionally, the number of feeder MOS's available to lateral
    move into critical cyber related specialties has been increased in
    order to obtain a larger talent pool of qualified and experienced
    Marines. We are currently accessing sixteen feeder occupational
    specialties from the communications, signals intelligence, electronic
    warfare, data, and aviation specialty fields to meet the personnel
    demands of cyber occupational field. The largest reenlistment or
    lateral move bonus offered in the past year of $60,750 was offered to
    Sergeants who move into the Cyber Security Technician specialty. To
    drive home the point of how seriously the Marine Corps takes its cyber
    talent management, this bonus consumed 16 percent of the retention
    bonus budget for the last fiscal year. In the future, our focus will
    broaden to include generating a sustainable force generation model that
    retains a unique, skilled expertise within the larger contexts of cyber
    ready MAGTFs. Additionally, we commissioned a personnel occupational
    specialty life cycle management study by the Center for Naval Analysis
    to further develop the way ahead for our cyber work force development.

        89. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Greenert and General Dunford, how
    do we integrate cyber into the training of all of our servicemembers so
    that we can better integrate it into all forms of combat?
        Admiral Greenert. We are addressing Cybersecurity and Cyberspace
    Operations holistically. From Cybersecurity, as a component of the
    Navy's Mission Assurance Program to protect critical infrastructure, to
    Cyberspace Operations in the Information Environment (led by Fleet
    Cyber Command/Commander TENTH Fleet) and everything in between, the
    Navy is preparing to fight and win in cyberspace. Additionally,
    Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare will be fully integrated across the
    Navy training continuum from accession training to advanced education
    and leadership development programs. Training and education initiatives
    are already in place to incorporate Cybersecurity and Cyberspace
    Operations into our enlisted and officer accession programs and career
    development pipelines. Further, expanded coordination between the Naval
    Academy, Naval Postgraduate School, and Naval War College is leveraging
    the capabilities of these uniquely Navy educational institutions.
    Efforts are underway today to integrate rigorous Cybersecurity
    standards, metrics, and certifications that will enhance combat
    readiness and effectiveness Afloat and Ashore. We are making strides to
    prepare the Fleet for Cyberspace operations. The Navy Cyberspace
    Operations Manual is currently under revision, and in 2013, we
    published the ``Information Operations at the Operational Level of War
    Concept.'' This launched the Navy's Warfighter doctrine development
    process for the integration of operations in the Information
    Environment, including the Cyberspace Operations Concept of Operations
    and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures development to inform Fleet
    Readiness and Training. We are also developing an ``All Hands'' cyber
    training with Navy context that builds upon the DoD-mandated
    Information Assurance/Cyber Challenge for our total force, this
    training will use case studies based on cyber issues we have seen from
    internal and external sources.
        General Dunford. Since 2014, the Marine Corps has dramatically
    increased cyber integration into the training cycle by leading,
    supporting, or participating in over 31 combined, joint, and service
    exercises. Additionally, Headquarters, Marine Corps recently
    established a Cyber Task Force that will develop a comprehensive plan
    to integrate cyber-MOS qualified Marines to support our MAGTF
    warfighting capabilities; defend our key cyber terrain; provide an
    operational, secure, effective and efficient Marine Corps Enterprise
    Network to the MAGTF; and enhance command and control (C2) and digital
    interoperability across all elements. Our end state will be to increase
    the capacity and capability of the MAGTF to operate in and exploit the
    cyber domain. However, the Marine Corps MAGTF is designed to be part of
    a broader Joint Force. We expect our Joint, interagency and coalition
    partners to complement our cyberspace operations through information
    sharing, development of capabilities, and operational coordination.
    Likewise, as we integrate cyber capabilities into the MAGTF and the
    Marine Corps as a service, we expect to expand our role of providing
    cyber capabilities to the joint force through our commitment to
    USCYBERCOM.

        90. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Greenert, you've spoken about the
    importance of the Reserve component for the Navy's cyber efforts. Can
    you please explain how the Navy uses its Reserve component in terms of
    staffing its own cyber needs as well as its support of CYBERCOM?
        Admiral Greenert. Through ongoing mission analysis of the Navy
    Total Force Integration Strategy, we developed a Reserve Cyber Mission
    Force (CMF) Integration Strategy that leverages our Reserve Sailors'
    skill sets and expertise to maximize the Reserve Component's support to
    the full spectrum of Cyber mission areas. Within this strategy, the 298
    Reserve billets, which are phasing into service from fiscal year 2015
    through fiscal year 2018, will be individually aligned to Active Duty
    CMF teams and the Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber (JFHQ-C). Accordingly,
    each Navy Reservist assigned to a CMF billet provides operational
    support to the team's respective operational commander, including Fleet
    Commanders, US Pacific Command, US Southern Command, US Cyber Command,
    and DoD/Defense Information Security Agency. As the Navy builds its
    Reserve CMF support structure, Fleet Cyber Command and TENTH Fleet
    conduct ongoing assessments to maximize the Reserve Force's support to
    CMF operational objectives.
                                     ______

               Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                              joint strike fighter
        91. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Mabus, the stealthy F-35 is a
    supersonic, multi-role, fifth Generation fighter designed to replace
    aging AV-8B Harriers, F/A-18 Hornets, F-16 Fighting Falcons, and A-10
    Thunderbolt IIs. Analysis indicates that F-35 will be six times more
    effective than legacy fighters in air-to-air combat, five times more
    effective in air-to-ground combat, and six times more effective in
    reconnaissance and suppression of air defenses--all while having better
    range and requiring less logistics support. Replacing multiple classes
    of aircraft with the F-35 reduces operating costs by streamlining spare
    pools, supply chain management, infrastructure, etc. The F-35 program
    will be able to keep costs down by capturing economies of scale by
    ramping up production as quickly as possible. It is my understanding
    that the Navy's fiscal year 2016 budget request includes 16 fewer F-35
    aircraft in the last 3 years of the FYDP instead of efforts to keep
    open the production line of legacy F-18 aircraft or defer their
    retirement. What is your view of bringing forward production of F-35
    aircraft to meet any gap in capabilities that has arisen due to delays
    in the program?
        Mr. Mabus. The fiscal year 2016 budget request delivers a balanced
    approach that adheres to fiscal guidance. Due to fiscal constraints,
    the Navy was compelled to defer procurement of 16 F-35C aircraft as a
    budgetary decision. While the Department remains fully committed to
    integrating the F-35C into the future carrier air wing, this decision
    has increased risk in strike fighter inventory management as new
    aircraft procurement is the solution to far-term inventory challenges.
    In an effort to advance our current capability and reduce risk in
    managing our strike fighter inventory, the Department's goal is to
    increase F-35C development and procurement funding over the next five
    years to achieve full rate production.

        92. Senator Blumenthal. General Dunford, the Marine Corps is
    scheduled to declare initial operational capability for the F-35 later
    this year. To me that demonstrates that the program is maturing and
    reaching a point where there would be benefits to increasing
    production. What can be done to bring forward the estimated 2022 date
    for close air support capability and how can we close this capability
    gap with regards to the fiscal year 2016 budget request by the Marine
    Corps?
        General Dunford. The Marine Corps will achieve initial operational
    capability (IOC) in a Block 2B software configuration of the F-35B this
    summer. At IOC, the F-35B will be capable of conducting effective close
    air support (CAS). The funds requested in this year's fiscal year 2016
    budget go towards the planned schedule of development and production.
    The F-35 program already has a continuous series of upgrades in
    capabilities scheduled in the coming years to increase its abilities.
    The best way to help in the continued improvement of the F-35 is to
    support the fiscal year 2016 budget request along with the Marine
    Corps' Unfunded Priority List, including six F-35Bs.

                      taiwan indigenous submarine program
        93. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Mabus, I understand Taiwan is
    open to the participation of private contractors from the U.S.
    submarine industrial base to develop the contract design and provide
    program management, post-delivery testing, and evaluation for their $5
    billion effort to establish an indigenous submarine program. What is
    the Navy's position and guidance regarding enabling the U.S. submarine
    industrial base to provide the requested services and equipment and
    what should the process be for companies that want to participate with
    regards to ensuring we protect our technology and maintain our undersea
    warfare advantage?
        Mr. Mabus. Each individual request for an export license receives
    careful scrutiny and is evaluated by the Navy department that manages a
    like or similar system. Several other agencies and organizations within
    DOD will conduct additional reviews before the Department of State
    makes the final decision on release of that technology to a foreign
    customer. With this export license review, each decision is evaluated
    on a ``case by case'' basis with specific attention to issues of
    protection of key technologies and maintenance of our undersea warfare
    superiority. When such a decision is made, the specifics of that
    decision will be released in accordance with classification and policy
    guidance.

        [Whereupon, at 11:54 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2016 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, MARCH 12, 2015

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Wicker,
    Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Lee,
    Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand,
    Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, and King.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman McCain. Good morning. The committee meets today to
    receive testimony on the posture of U.S. Northern Command and
    U.S. Southern Command to inform its review of the Defense
    Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2016.
        I would like to extend our appreciation to the witnesses
    for their many years of distinguished service, and to the
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and their families, who
    serve our Nation with distinction.
        General Kelly, this is likely your final appearance before
    the committee in your current position. And I know how upset
    you are about that. But, it must be said that the Nation owes
    you the highest debt of gratitude for your more than 40 years
    of dedicated service, at which time you have given the most to
    our Nation that can ever be asked of a military officer and a
    citizen. I know that I speak for my colleagues when I say that
    your candor has been as refreshing as it has been valuable to
    the work we do on the committee. And I implore my colleagues to
    pay close attention to your testimony today and to heed your
    warnings to us. It is my sincere hope that your service to the
    Nation will continue for many years to come.
        Over the last month, the committee has heard from some of
    the Nation's most respected leaders on the current global
    security environment, and their testimony has been crystal
    clear: Our Nation faces the most complex and challenging array
    of threats it has in over a half a century. This situation in
    our own hemisphere is no exception.
        Compounding the enormous security challenges facing our
    Nation is the looming threat of sequestration, which is having
    a devastating impact on the readiness and capabilities of our
    men and women in uniform. Retired General Jim Mattis rightly
    told this committee last month, ``No foe in the field can wreak
    such havoc on our security that mindless sequestration is
    achieving today.''
        I expect our witnesses to candidly update the committee on
    what sequestration will mean for their ability to accomplish
    their missions and protect the force. More starkly, we'd like
    to know, at what point does sequestration push us beyond
    accepting risk and towards mission failure?
        Admiral Gortney, this is your first time testifying before
    the committee as the Commander of U.S. Northern Command and
    North American Aerospace Defense Command. After nearly 4 months
    in command, I look to your assessment of the challenges within
    your area of responsibility, as well as your strategy to
    confront them. I am particularly interested in your views on
    the current state of U.S.-Mexican security cooperation and ways
    in which our two nations can strengthen this vital partnership.
    Though the President of Mexico's efforts against transnational
    organized crime have resulted in some notable successes,
    including the removal of several senior cartel leaders from the
    battlefield, the security situation remains highly volatile and
    continues to directly impact the security of our southern
    border as well as more than 1,200 American cities where these
    ruthless criminal networks now operate.
        Additionally, with North Korea moving closer to an
    operational road-mobile ICBM [Intercontinental Ballistic
    Missile] and Iran publicly stating it intends to launch, as
    early as this year, a space-launched vehicle capable of ICBM
    ranges, it's all the more important that the United States
    expand and modernize its homeland ballistic missile defense
    system. I support the increase of ground-based interceptors
    from 30 to 44 by 2017, but we need to be assured that the
    planned improvements to the ground-based midcourse defense
    system will stay ahead of the ballistic missile threats to our
    homeland that are anticipated by the intelligence community.
        General Kelly, the situation within your area of
    responsibility represents as complex and challenging a set of
    problems as I have ever seen in the hemisphere. While there are
    important success stories like Colombia, the situation in many
    other parts of the region remain highly unstable. We are all
    particularly concerned about Central America, which is mired by
    feeble governance and weak security institutions, high rates of
    corruption, and is home to several of the most violent
    countries in the world. Increasingly capable transnational
    criminal organizations exploit these shortcomings and command
    multibillion-dollar global networks that traffic in weapons,
    drugs, bulk cash, human beings, and anything that will earn a
    profit. Increasingly, their activities directly threaten our
    National security. Working with our regional partners to arrest
    the troubling rise in instability must be a priority.
        I agree with you, General Kelly, that our approach to
    Central America requires a sustained multiyear commitment
    similar to what we pursued under Plan Colombia. I hope you will
    describe in greater detail what a Plan Central America should
    look like and what role Southern Command would play in such an
    effort.
        Additionally, I remain troubled by the lack of appropriate
    and persistent U.S. support and engagement in the Western
    Hemisphere, and how sequestration would further erode our
    already limited presence and programs in the region. We cannot
    afford to go on treating our own neighborhood as our lowest
    geographic priority which only receives the level of resources
    and focus that it deserves when it erupts into crisis. This is
    a recipe for failure. And I know you feel the same way.
        In closing, I want to ask you, General Kelly, to pass on
    the deepest thanks and gratitude of the members of this
    committee to the military men and women conducting detention
    operations at Guantanamo Bay. Putting aside politics and the
    broader debate about the future of this detention facility, the
    Americans serving there today deserve our utmost appreciation.
    Theirs is an extraordinarily trying and difficult mission. And,
    through it all, they continue to serve honorably and with the
    utmost professionalism. So, General, please extend our thanks
    to them.
        Thank the--you, again, for--our witnesses for appearing
    before us today.
        Senator Reed.

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        And let me join you in welcoming our witnesses and thank
    General Kelly for his extraordinary service and his advice and
    counsel over many years.
        And welcome, Admiral Gortney. This is your first appearance
    in your role as the NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command] Commander.
        And let me also ask you to thank the men and women under
    your command, and their families, because the--families
    service, not just individual servicemen and -women. And no one
    has served more, as the Senator has pointed out, than the Kelly
    family. So, thank you, General Kelly.
        Admiral Gortney, as you know, one of the three pillars of
    our defense strategy, as laid out in last year's Quadrennial
    Defense Review, is to protect the homeland, to deter and defeat
    attacks on the United States, and to support civil authorities
    in mitigating the effects of potential attacks and natural
    disasters. Similarly, President Obama's National Security
    Strategy, released last month, emphasizes the defense of our
    homeland as a primary responsibility. This, simply stated, is
    your very important mission.
        To that end, while Admiral Haney, the Commander of STRATCOM
    [U.S. Strategic Command], is responsible for synchronizing
    global missile defense planning and operational support, you
    are responsible for the operation of our homeland ballistic
    missile defense system. And we look forward to hearing about
    the improvements that are planned for the ground-based missile
    defense system, the progress being made to test, correct, and
    field additional interceptors, the enhancement of sensors and
    discrimination capabilities, and the status of the redesigned
    kill vehicle.
        In addition, NORTHCOM works closely with other Federal
    agencies, the Governors, and the National Guard to collaborate
    on responding to national and manmade disasters, and partners
    with Canada and Mexico to promote security across our borders.
    I look forward to hearing, also, about your current efforts on
    how these would be impacted by the return of sequestration.
        In Southern Command, one of the primary threats is posed by
    illegal narcotics trafficking and organized criminal networks.
    These organizations create devastating instability in nations
    throughout our hemisphere, including the corruption of civilian
    and security institutions and brutal violence inflicted upon
    the people of the region. Whether it is illegal drugs for sale
    or individuals escaping violence in their hometowns, the
    consequences of crime do not stop at the border. And what often
    starts as SOUTHCOM's [U.S. Southern Command] problem soon
    becomes NORTHCOM's problem. An obvious answer, then, is to
    address the problem at its root. But, complicating SOUTHCOM's
    ability to respond is the fact that sequestration has reduced
    the military services' support of your requirements and reduced
    the funding in a defensewide counterdrug account. In your
    submitted opening statement, General Kelly, you characterized
    the impact of these reductions as, quote, ``managing to keep
    the pilot light of U.S. military engagement on in the region,
    but just barely.'' This is a stark warning, and one that is
    certainly amplified when considering the cuts on the civilian
    side of our government, as well.
        General Kelly, given the physical constraints that are
    likely to face you, I am interested in your insights into how
    SOUTHCOM can successfully engage in the region. For example,
    SOUTHCOM is also training and equipping security forces of
    friendly nations, training and equipping peacekeepers for
    deployment to peacekeeping operations across the globe, and
    enabling, advising, and supporting Colombian military and law
    enforcement operations. These activities often provide benefits
    far beyond the investment. How can we leverage these low-cost,
    high-yield activities? Are there other innovative ideas we
    should be implementing?
        General Kelly, Admiral Gortney, you are both exceptional
    officers whom I am glad are leading these commands, and I look
    forward to your testimony.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Welcome.
        Who--Admiral Gortney, do you want to be first? Or General
    Kelly?
        Admiral Gortney. We are long-time shipmates.

       STATEMENT OF ADM WILLIAM E. GORTNEY, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
       NORTHERN COMMAND AND COMMANDER, NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE
                            DEFENSE COMMAND

        Admiral Gortney. Well, Chairman McCain, Ranking Member
    Reed, members of the committee, thank you so much for having my
    shipmate and myself here to talk to you today. It means a great
    deal.
        In preparing for today, I thought I would open--I first
    thought I would open with my--a summation of my prepared
    remarks that I had forwarded for the record. But, after
    spending, over the past 2 weeks, time with you--thank you for
    giving me your valuable time--I think the time would be better
    spent if we talk about the threats that--as I see them, in the
    defense of the homeland, and how it affects us. So, I am going
    to set my prepared remarks aside, and I want to talk to those
    threats.
        And when we look at threats, we look at threats from the
    most likely to the most dangerous. And so, I want to talk about
    from the most likely to the most dangerous threats to the
    homeland. And I think the most likely threat is that
    transnational criminal network that is using the seams between
    General Kelly's and my COCOMs [Combatant Commanders] and PACOMs
    [U.S. Pacific Command], our interagency partners and us, seams
    between us and our partner nations, and the seams within those
    countries themselves. In those seams, people are moving drugs,
    money. As the Chairman said, they are just moving product for
    profit. And, through those seams--we need to close those seams,
    because in those seams, if someone wants to move something that
    is going to do great damage to our Nation, that is where they
    will come.
        The second is homegrown violent extremists. And it's not--
    it's a very effective, I'm sorry to say, but sophisticated
    social media campaign to stir up distrust from American
    citizens to do harm to American citizens.
        The third is cyber. The cyber, I am responsible for
    defending my known networks and to help the lead Federal agency
    in the aftermath of a cyberattack. But, it's far more
    significant in that--is that it would effect--directly effect a
    cyberattack against a critical infrastructure that I rely on to
    defend the Nation and we rely on for our Nation to operate. I
    see that as a significant threat.
        The next is the North Korean threat, who has the intent
    and, we assess, the capability to shoot a ballistic missile at
    our homeland, and, of course, whether Iran will continue on its
    path.
        And finally, and the most dangerous, China to Russia.
        However, as significant as those threats are, as I look at
    mostly likely and most dangerous, I see the mostly likely and
    most dangerous threat to my ability to protect the homeland,
    and that is sequestration. And it's because of how
    sequestration affects the forces that John and myself and our
    shipmates that are the other geographic combatant commanders,
    how it affects the services as they implement the sequestration
    effect, how it hollows out the force. The services can only
    go--have to--to generate the revenue to meet the sequestration,
    they must go into the readiness accounts, and as--which leads
    to a hollow force. And, as Admiral Greenert said to you a
    couple of days ago, it delays capability that prevents us from
    outpacing the threats that is our technological and our
    advantage in the future battlefield.
        As NORTHCOM and General Kelly, in SOUTHCOM, we rely on the
    services in order for us to do our mission. Our forward-
    deployed commanders, we--they rely on that capability. And the
    specific impacts to each one of the missions, I'd like to
    answer in the questions.
        And I look forward to your questions.
        Chairman McCain. General Kelly.

    STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN F. KELLY, USMC, COMMANDER, U.S. SOUTHERN
                                COMMAND

        General Kelly. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed,
    distinguished members of the committee, thanks for the
    opportunity to speak here today about SOUTHCOM's soldiers,
    sailors, airmen, marines, coastguardsmen, and, just as
    importantly, the civilian workforce.
        It's great to be here with my good friend Admiral Gortney.
    And I can assure you, as he just did, that there is really no
    gap, no seam, no space between our two organizations. We work
    very closely together, and we collaborate very, very closely
    together.
        I believe SOUTHCOM is the only government organization that
    is 100-percent dedicated to looking at the issues of Latin
    America and the Caribbean. My folks don't just pay attention to
    what's going on in this region of the world. They understand it
    intimately. They care about it, and they support it. They have
    helped countries in Latin America improve human rights, worked
    hand-in-hand with the region to professionalize security and
    defense forces and rebuild institutions, and they've supported
    our partners as they win back their streets and countries from
    drug trafficking and criminal networks, much of which is
    directly attributable to the drug demand in the United States.
    I'm proud to lead this outstanding group of people, and I'm
    proud of the work we're doing in Latin America.
        As the committee knows, I think, SOUTHCOM's most important
    mission is to protect the southern approaches to the United
    States. We do not and cannot do this mission alone. We work
    side by side with law enforcement professionals in the
    Department of Homeland Security, the Coast Guard, DEA [Drug
    Enforcement Agency], FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], and
    the Department of Treasury. Together, we all defend the U.S.
    homeland against transnational criminal networks, illicit
    trafficking, and the potential movement of terrorists or WMD
    [weapon of mass destruction] into the homeland.
        Mr. Chairman, I'd like to take a moment to commend one of
    our most valued partners in the U.S. Government, and that is
    the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]. I've had the honor of
    serving with the CIA all over the world for my entire career,
    and this includes Iraq and Latin America. Like our men and
    women in uniform, I believe the men and women of the CIA are
    the best of their generation. When our country needs them most,
    the CIA always answers the call. They do what the President
    asks them to do, as we all do, and they do it with a
    selflessness and a bravery that is very, very seldom
    recognized. They step forward without question, without
    hesitation, with the knowledge they will receive zero
    recognition for the important work that they do. They willingly
    put their lives on the line every day. They serve in some of
    the world's darkest and most dangerous places, executing the
    most complex, high-risk missions imaginable. And, most often,
    they do it armed only with their wits.
        Along with our Armed Forces, law enforcement, intelligence
    agencies, the CIA is part of an extraordinary team doing
    essential work to keep our Nation safe. And I believe most of
    our citizens sleep safe at night because of what the entire
    team does, and that team starts overseas with what the CIA
    does.
        I'd also like to say a few words about our partners in
    Latin America, one relationship in particular. Mr. Chairman,
    members, as you know, the United States has a very special
    relationship with a handful of countries around the world.
    These relationships are with countries that we rely on as
    regional stabilizers. These countries are our strongest friends
    and most steadfast allies. They look at--in the same--they look
    at life and live their lives in the same way that we do.
        Colombia clearly plays that role in Latin America. But,
    they are more than just our--among our most trusted partners,
    they are the model for winning the fight against violent
    insurgencies in criminal networks. Colombia has shown us that
    the key to defeating terrorists in criminal groups is by
    upholding and defending the very values that these groups
    threaten: freedom, democracy, and the protection of human
    rights. Colombia has shown us that security and economic
    prosperity really do go hand in hand. And at a--and at great
    expense in Colombia blood--Colombian blood and Colombian
    national treasure, they've shown us what the term ``national
    will'' really means.
        In my 30 years in uniform--over 30 years in uniform, I have
    never seen a better success story than what I see every day in
    Colombia. It's one place I believe we got it right, where our
    support, coupled with a committed partner, brought a country
    back from the brink, where our engagement in Latin America made
    a real and lasting difference that's plain to see. Colombia is
    now stable, thriving, and taking on greater responsibilities to
    improve international security, not just in Latin America and
    the Caribbean, but they are looking overseas, as well. In an
    uncertain and turbulent world, we're lucky to have partners
    like Colombia.
        I'd like to thank the committee for its continued support
    to the Colombian people as they work to achieve a just and
    lasting peace, which is just about in sight.
        Members of the committee, I look forward to your questions.
        Thank you.
        Chairman McCain. Thank you, General.
        [The prepared statement of General Kelly follows:]
        Chairman McCain. We're now looking at a proposal for a
    budget that leaves the sequestration numbers in the numbers as
    they have been following since we passed the Budget Control
    Act. If that remains the case, General Kelly, what is your view
    of what sequestration will do to your ability to carry out your
    mission and the impact in increased risk to the lives of
    American men and women serving in uniform?
        General Kelly. Thanks for that question, Senator.
        I would tell you, in Latin American Southern Command, it
    is--it will be a--just simply put, a catastrophe. It will
    essentially put me out of business. I have very, very little
    work with now. We do most of our work partnering small--small
    groups of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, even law
    enforcement that go down, spend short periods of time advising,
    assisting many of these groups, whether it's maintenance, human
    rights, these kind of things.
        I've queried my components--the Army, Navy, Air Force,
    Marines. Their cuts would range from anywhere between 75
    percent of--in the case of the Marines, maybe about 25 percent.
    But, the point is, I will no longer able to partner at--almost
    at all with the Nations that we work with every day. From a
    drug-flow point of view, I got--we got, collectively--the DOD
    [Department of Defense] and all of the agencies that do this--
    we got 158 metric tons of cocaine last year, without violence,
    before it ever even made it to Central America. I do that with
    very, very few ships. I know that if sequestrations happen, I
    will be down to maybe one Coast Guard, maybe two Coast Guard
    cutters. That means, of the 158 tons I would expect to get this
    year, I probably, if I'm lucky, will get 20 tons; and all the
    rest of it just comes into the United States along this
    incredibly efficient network. So----
        Chairman McCain. And the risk----
        General Kelly.--a catastrophe, Senator.
        Chairman McCain. And the risk to the lives of the men and
    women serving?
        General Kelly. In my part of the world, it'll be, to say
    the least, a heightened risk in--again, I'm in a part of the
    world, as you know, sir, that is relatively peaceful, that
    there is no real state-on-state problems. But, in other parts
    of the world, like CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] and EUCOM
    [U.S. European Command], potentially, these are--you know, we
    could be talking--in my opinion, as just one guy talking, we
    could be talking not high risk anymore, or severe risk, to our
    plans, but really we could be talking defeat if sequestration
    happens.
        Chairman McCain. Admiral Gortney----
        Admiral Gortney. Well, I'll----
        Chairman McCain.--same question.
        Admiral Gortney.--I'll pile onto what General Kelly was
    saying. In a similar role in countering the transnational
    criminal networks and our ability to do mil-to-mil training
    with our partners, particularly in Mexico and in the Bahamas,
    it's going to have a huge impact. We execute those missions
    through service-retained forces. As soldiers, sailors, airmen,
    and marines and coastguardsmen are training for their own
    future deployment, they come down and do that mil-to-mil
    activity for us, work for us, but it's training they receive.
    And we've received, from our components, that that training is
    going to have to be curtailed significantly. So, that will have
    a huge impact on us on that.
        The other impact would be in missile defense. Because the
    services can only generate the revenue by going into readiness
    or delaying delivery of a capability, the Missile Defense
    Agency will--does not have a readiness account that they can go
    to, so they're going to have to go to their new starts, they
    will have to put the long-range discrimination radar, the
    improvements to the advanced kill vehicle and a multi-object
    kill vehicle--they'll have to put those on hold and will delay
    the ability for them to field those capability which allows us
    to outpace the growing proliferation of ballistic missiles.
        And so, those are the two primary impacts to me, sir.
        Chairman McCain. Thank you.
        General Kelly, in your written statement, you said, quote,
    ``In addition to thousands of Central Americans fleeing poverty
    and violence, foreign nationals from countries like Somalia,
    Bangladesh, Lebanon, and Pakistan are using the region's human
    smuggling networks to enter the United States. While many are
    merely seeking economic opportunity or fleeing war, a small
    subset could potentially be seeking to do us harm. Last year,
    ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] adherents posted
    discussions on social media, calling for the infiltration of
    the U.S. southern border.'' Can you tell us how serious you
    think that threat is?
        General Kelly. I think, Senator, that the kind of people
    that you're referring to will--of course, their intent is to do
    us the greatest amount of harm possible. This network that Bill
    and I deal with every day, not to mention the law enforcement
    folks, is so efficient that if a terrorist, or almost anyone,
    wants to get into our country, they just pay the fare. No one
    checks their passports, no one--you know, they don't go through
    metal detectors. No one cares why they're coming. They just
    ride this network. And if someone wanted to come in here with
    nuclear material--I was just down at Emory University, at the
    ebola facility there, talking about how ebola spreads and
    potentially could be used as a weapon. It's an--it's a scary
    proposition when----
        Chairman McCain. Well----
        General Kelly.--I think of this network.
        Chairman McCain. So, how serious, in your view, is it that,
    over time, there may be an effort by terrorists to cross our
    southern border?
        General Kelly. Extremely serious.
        Chairman McCain. I thank you, General Kelly. And I thank
    you for your honorable service.
        And thank you, Admiral.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And I think the chairman's questions and your answers has
    really illustrated the critical and corrosive effect of
    sequestration on everything you do--literally everything you
    do. But, I think there's a point that also has to be
    emphasized, because you don't do things alone, you do it with
    other agencies, some of them civilian agencies.
        General Kelly, you just said you were down at Emory, at
    CDC, talking about the potential of a ebola-type epidemic being
    transported into the United States. The border is the
    jurisdiction, primarily, of Department of Homeland Security. I
    could go on and on and on. So, the question is--because there's
    been some discussion of, ``Well, we need relief for Department
    of Defense.'' And both Senator McCain and I have urged that.
    But, without relief across the board, without funding for DHS
    [Department of Homeland Security], Department of Justice, FBI,
    CDC [Center for Disease Control], can you do your mission,
    Admiral Gortney?
        Admiral Gortney. Sir, thank you for asking that question.
        As we look at how we perform the range of missions that
    we've been assigned, our homeland partnerships, our interagency
    partnerships with the interagency--Homeland Security, with the
    law enforcement efforts--that's actually our center of
    gravity--the National Guard, our Governors, et cetera. But, to
    your point on--those interagency relationships are absolutely
    critical. Those interdependencies, many of which I am
    supporting to them, but I am still tasked to do that--should
    they be affected, it's going to have a significant effect
    against how I'm able to do my missions to support them and
    then, again, to defend the Homeland.
        Senator Reed. General Kelly, your response?
        General Kelly. I'd associate myself with that. If--this is
    a team effort. And if anyone--if any of us get hit with a
    sequestration-type impact, you know, again, the defense of the
    homeland is, to me, absolute, and it would be seriously
    degraded.
        Senator Reed. You know, there are other aspects that--not
    just reactive, but proactive. I'm told that, for example, the
    Millennium Challenge, which is a quasi-Federal agency, gets
    some funding from us, has been significant, in terms of road-
    building and economic development in your area of operations.
    And I would assume that's just--sometimes just as important as
    the reactive, defensive measure. Is that accurate?
        General Kelly. It is. Yes, sir. I mean, we could get into a
    long discussion about what we're trying to do in the Central
    American region to stabilize the region so that we don't have
    another occurrence of, you know, 100,000 migrants coming up all
    at once. And the Millennium Challenge Corporation is--things
    like that or the Inter-American Developmental Bank--those are
    organizations that we should invest in, because they do it
    right, in terms of economic development, in working with
    countries in identifying projects that will--everything from
    stabilize their national institutions to economic development
    to social development, protects human rights, things like that.
    I really believe that investment in those kind of organizations
    is the way to go, as opposed to, you know, we try to do our own
    standalone-type investment, because they don't seem to work
    very well.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Admiral Gortney, you are the operational, effectively,
    commander for missile defense. Missile Defense Agency does all
    the sophisticated development. You have pointed out how they
    would be harmed. But, from your sense as to--as you described,
    the trigger-pull or--what should be the priorities, in terms of
    invest in national missile defense?
        Admiral Gortney. Well, my priorities are completely aligned
    with Admiral Syring's from the Missile Defense Agency. And the
    priorities actually are concurrent priorities. All three have
    to be taken into account.
        The first is, we need to continue to improve our sensors.
    The sensors are the ability for us to discriminate and track as
    early as possible to be able to defeat the threat.
        The second is, we need to enhance the lethality of our kill
    vehicles. The--it's a very expensive proposition to shoot a
    rocket with a rocket. And so, we want every one of our kill
    vehicles to be as effective and as lethal as possible, and as
    well as the means to develop other ways that we can get more
    kill vehicles into space.
        And the last is, as in any weapon system, you need to
    invest in the sustainment piece of it so that all of--it's a
    system of systems, and all of the system of systems are at
    their peak physical condition, and that includes the ability
    for us to test and exercise them. And they all have to be done
    concurrently.
        Senator Reed. And so, these priorities are higher, I can
    assume, than expanding the basing of missiles around the
    country?
        Admiral Gortney. Yes. Admiral Syring and I are in agreement
    that, before we put additional money, we want to make sure we
    assure the three that we just talked about. That's the most
    important piece.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Admiral.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        You're recognized, I think.
        Senator Inhofe. May I proceed?
        Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I think both of you were watching, a couple of weeks ago,
    when we had Secretary Carter here. And you're familiar with his
    testimony, wherein he--one of his statements was, ``Readiness
    remains at troubling levels across the force,'' that, even with
    the fiscal year budget, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps won't
    reach their readiness goals until 2020; and the Air Force,
    2023. And then General Dempsey stated that we--what we need to
    remain at the lower ragged edge of manageable risk in our
    ability to execute the defense strategy. Now, do both of you
    agree with these statements?
        General Kelly. Yes.
        Admiral Gortney. Yes.
        Senator Inhofe. The defense planning requirements are that
    you guys are the one that--are in charge homeland security. And
    that's supposed to be our number-one requirement, number-one
    guidance. Is that correct?
        Admiral Gortney. Homeland defense, sir.
        Senator Inhofe. Homeland defense, yeah.
        Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir.
        Senator Inhofe. Well, the requirements are found in the
    homeland defense, that's correct.
        What concerns me is that, for the past 14 years, I think
    that everyone's aware, and you're certainly aware, that both of
    your areas of responsibility have been prioritized behind the
    wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Is that correct?
        General Kelly. Yes, sir.
        Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir.
        Senator Inhofe. Well, that's a big deal. I don't think many
    people out there in the real world, or in America, understand
    that--sure, we understand that our top priority should be
    homeland defense. Everyone understands that. But, what the
    budget--forgetting about sequestration, bringing us up to where
    we are today as taking away your ability, or that priority for
    homeland defense--you know, I think it's something that we have
    to be talking about up here. Are--do you think--I'd ask both of
    you, in your opinions, are we accepting too much risk as it
    relates to our number-one priority, homeland defense?
        Admiral Gortney. I'll take that, sir.
        You know, our--the way we execute, the way and the means
    that we execute homeland defense is an away game. It's better
    to fight the fight at the further reaches through the forward-
    deployed geographic commanders, such as General Kelly, here.
    And the challenge that we're having, even though we've been in
    14 years of war, as we come out of these wars, you're usually
    entering a better security situation than when you went into
    war. That's why we went to war. But, as Dr. Kissinger testified
    to you a few weeks ago, clearly that's not what we had, and
    it's--we just didn't predict it, even 3 short years ago. And
    the forward-deployed combatant commanders, each and every
    single one of them, are dealing with a crisis in their AOR
    [Area of Responsibility] on their doorsteps today. And they're
    seeking, and they need--in order for them to defend the Nation
    in the far game, they need the forward-deployed forces and the
    forward-based forces to deal with those crises, get them into
    an off-ramp, and not let them escalate any more than they
    already are. And that's where the risk is. They own that risk,
    and that's the--their ability to execute that mission is very
    tattered because of our--how thin we are, because we have to
    distribute them globally. And as the service chief said, our
    ability to surge them release--surge them greater capability
    from the homeland so the game's--the fight is still overseas,
    is reduced. And how that also impacts is those servicemembers
    that are executing that mission----
        Senator Inhofe. All right. Admiral----
        Admiral Gortney.--their risk and the acceptable losses have
    gone up significantly.
        Senator Inhofe. Admiral--and I appreciate the answer. It's
    a very good answer. It's a long way of saying ``yes.'' And so,
    we----
        Do you agree with that, General Kelly?
        General Kelly. I do, yes, sir.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay.
        General Kelly, the area that I'm really familiar with--I
    spent 20 years of my life in the--building and developing down
    in south Texas. I'm familiar, not with the rest of the border,
    but the Texas border, I am. And you talk about--you said--and I
    wrote it down, here--your people understand it intimately.
    Included in what they understand intimately, does that include
    the border--the Texas-Mexico border?
        General Kelly. No, sir, not in my case. My boundary ends
    with the south Mexican----
        Senator Inhofe. I see.
        General Kelly.--border.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay.
        Admiral Gortney. So, Bill's your guy.
        Senator Inhofe. Yeah. Oh, well--yeah, all right.
        Are they very familiar with that? The reason I say that--
    there's danger on the border down there. In fact, it's
    misunderstood, because it's mostly between two cartels or two
    drug groups firing. One of the few places in that border where
    people can go over from the United States was a little
    community called Progreso. And, even the other day, that ended
    up a battleground. Is everyone on top of that and familiar with
    that and aware of the risk that that gives some of our people?
        Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir. Everybody's aware of the risk.
    Do we have 100-percent visibility into everything of that? No,
    sir, we don't. We work that very, very hard with our
    interagency partners--Homeland Security and our interagency
    partners inside----
        Senator Inhofe. Yeah.
        Admiral Gortney.--inside Mexico. And our responsibility is
    to expand the capacity through training with the army, the
    navy, and their marine corps, Sedena and Semar. And we're----
        Senator Inhofe. Okay. I've got a problem with my timing,
    here, and I did want to get into some statements that have been
    made.
        General Kelly, you talked about, in--on GTMO [Guantanamo
    Bay], ever--the history of that, when we got it, the good deal
    it is even today, and what all is there other than the
    incarceration of terrorists that are down there. So, I'm going
    to ask you this question for the record and--because I am very
    interested in some of the other things that are going on down
    there.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Naval Station Guantanamo (GTMO) is irreplaceable as a forward
    staging base for the U.S. assets critical to the layered defense
    against threats to the U.S. homeland--both existential and potential.
    GTMO's strategic importance dates back to its establishment in 1903 as
    a coaling station for the Navy. That tradition continues today by
    providing a secure location for the Department of Defense (DOD) and
    Interagency to conduct their missions and operations. The U.S. Navy and
    Coast Guard regularly use GTMO to refuel and conduct maintenance on
    their vessels and aircraft patrolling the Caribbean. This maximizes
    operating cost efficiency and time on station by preventing or reducing
    unnecessary returns to the Continental United States. GTMO also
    provides the only option for the DOD to meet its obligations under
    National Presidential Security Directive 52 to safely house migrants
    outside of the United States in the event of a mass migration.
    Additionally, both Guantanamo's port and airfield were critical in
    ensuring rapid and sustained response by the U.S. Military in the wake
    of the devastating 2010 Haiti earthquake.
        The State Department, Navy, Coast Guard, and other DHS components
    rely on this Naval Station for mass migration events, humanitarian
    assistance and disaster-relief operations in the Caribbean. A joint
    white paper signed by the USCG Deputy Commandant for Operations and the
    USN Acting Deputy CNO for Operations Plans and Strategy (N3/5) states
    ``For the near and far terms, the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard
    confirm Naval Station GTMO's role as a strategic USG enabler for
    security and stability in Latin America and the Caribbean region.'' I
    concur with this assessment.

        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Donnelly.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And I want to thank both of you for being here.
        General Kelly, I know this is your last time that you will
    be here as SOUTHCOM Commander. And my father-in-law was a
    Guadalcanal marine. And I think if he was still around, he
    would say, ``If you want to know what a marine is, look at
    General Kelly.'' So, we're very grateful for your service.
        And, Admiral Gortney, my dad was in the Navy. He chipped a
    lot of paint. He didn't see a lot of admirals, but we--he'd be
    very grateful for your service.
        To General Kelly, when you look--one of the things we're
    dealing with in my home State of Indiana is, there's been a
    huge influx of heroin into our State. And I was wondering if
    you could tell us a little bit about the challenges you face in
    trying to interdict that, in trying to stop it. And what is,
    maybe, the best thing we could do to help you in that effort?
        General Kelly. Senator, the first thing everyone should--
    needs to understand is, really 100 percent of the heroin that's
    consumed in the United States--and we, in fact, are right in
    the middle of a heroin epidemic, a drug epidemic. A lot of
    people in this town will say no to that, but we are in the
    middle of a serious epidemic in--particularly in--when it comes
    to the heroin. So, 100 percent of it is produced here in the
    United--or, here in the--in Latin America. About half of it is
    produced in Mexico, and the rest of it is produced further
    south, in various parts of the isthmus--Central American
    isthmus in South America. It's a relatively small amount--40-50
    tons, we think--of heroin that feeds the heroin epidemic in the
    United States.
        What's the first step in stopping it? Stopping the drug
    demand in the United States. That's the first step. And I don't
    think we take that very seriously, as we do, say, tobacco use
    and seatbelt use and things like that. So, we don't do much to
    reduce the demand in the United States. If we did that, there
    would be less of a market for it, obviously. But, because of
    this network--and I say it a lot--this network has got to be
    broken. And the way the network stays in place is drug demand
    in--primarily drug demand in the United States, and then the
    unbelievable profits that come out of that drug demand. Cocaine
    alone, $85 billion a year in profits from cocaine sales alone
    in the United States. And, of course, that's an unlimited
    amount of money to either bribe officials, in our own country
    as well as in Latin America, or to kill people or have people
    killed. And until we really get around the drug demand issue,
    there's not an awful lot we're going to be able to do to that
    network.
        Senator Donnelly. Is there anything you can do on the
    ground, in terms of interdiction? Any other things that we can
    help you with? Obviously, resources, but--what is the key to
    their success in getting that into our country?
        General Kelly. It's just years and years and years of a
    very, very elaborate--development of this very elaborate, very
    efficient network.
        Some of the things we do do--and I'll go back to Colombia
    for a second. I mean, Colombia is absolutely heroic in their
    attempts to eradicate coca and poppy before it's ever
    harvested. They knocked down about 1400 jungle laboratories
    last year that make cocaine and make heroin. And they,
    themselves--cocaine, alone--150 tons before it ever left--of
    cocaine--before it ever left Colombia on its way north. So,
    Colombia is deep into the fight. In fact, they, frankly, do
    more to fight drugs in our country than I think the United
    States does, sometimes.
        Further north, in these countries that we're trying to help
    in Central America, where an awful lot of the poppies are, in
    fact, grown, we're just starting to see these countries--their
    security forces able to stand up on their own. And then,
    Mexico, about 40--about 50 percent of the heroin consumed in
    the United States is--the poppies are grown and the heroin is
    produced in Mexico. And that's really Bill's bailiwick.
        Senator Donnelly. In terms of interdiction, you had
    mentioned about the Coast Guard cutters and other resources
    that you have--I may be mistaken with the exact number, but I
    thought last year you told us you were able to--or had the
    physical capability to stop about 25 percent of the traffic
    that came through. Is that--is----
        General Kelly. We're stopping----
        Senator Donnelly.--is that----
        General Kelly.--we think, about 20 percent.
        Senator Donnelly. Okay.
        General Kelly. With very few cutters. More cutters, more
    ships mean we get more. Less means less.
        Senator Donnelly. So, it's simply a direct--your ability to
    stop is simply a direct correlation to the resources that you
    have in that area.
        General Kelly. That's correct, sir.
        Senator Donnelly. Okay.
        What--could you give us a little bit of a primer for a few
    seconds on Venezuela and what's going on there right now?
        General Kelly. It's a sad thing to watch. Two years ago,
    when I took this job, the discussion was, How long would it be
    before it collapses or implodes? I mean, I think we're kind of
    there. Inflation rates of over 80 percent, there's almost
    nothing on the shelves that common people can buy. Their--the
    government there is, to say the least, restricting the free
    press more and more every day. They're arresting opposition
    leaders. Of course, they're blaming us for everything from coup
    planning to this recent move by our President to put
    sanctions--or, not sanctions, but to put restrictions in place.
    They see that as an attempt to topple the government. They
    don't need any help toppling their government. I mean, it's
    just a really, really sad state of affairs to watch.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
        Thank you both very, very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Sullivan.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And I also want to thank both of the members of the panel
    for their distinguished service to our country.
        Admiral Gortney, I was--it was great seeing you in Alaska
    recently. I wanted to dig into a little bit more on the Arctic
    strategy that's highlighted in your testimony. And I actually
    really appreciate how much emphasis you've been giving that in
    your new position and in your testimony.
        You know, one of the things that I think has come up in a
    lot of the hearings here, whether it was General Dempsey or
    the--Secretary Carter's growing importance, but also kind of
    the fluidity of what's going on in the Arctic, particularly
    with regard to the Russian moves that I know you've been
    keeping an eye on. As a matter of fact, your testimony mentions
    the aggressiveness that we haven't seen since the cold war, in
    terms of the bomber runs. As you know, they--they're building
    new airfields in the Arctic, they're--have a new Arctic
    Command. General Dempsey testified last week, three--four new
    Arctic combat brigades being deployed by the Russians in the
    Arctic, a huge icebreaker fleet with as many as 11 more new
    icebreakers. So, they're clearly seeing it as a strategic area.
    For the world, resource development, new sea lanes that are
    developing there.
        And my concern is that we're well behind the Russians, in
    terms of this, not only as an opportunity, but also as a
    growing area of military competition that they're clearly
    making it out to be. I'll give you a few examples on that. You
    know, the Army is looking--our Army is looking at reducing, in
    the light of what the Russians are doing--reducing two combat
    brigades based in Alaska. That's a big concern.
        I just have a couple of questions. And they're all kind of
    related, so I'll just pose them to you. Do we have an Arctic O-
    plan right now? And how would the Army troops in the Arctic, in
    Alaska, fit into that? And does it make sense to significantly
    reduce our military presence in the Arctic before we even put
    out an O-plan and in the face of what clearly is a Russian
    dramatic increase in the militarization of the Arctic? You
    know, General Odierno mentioned, yesterday in testimony before
    the Appropriations Committee, that he was waiting on NORTHCOM's
    Arctic strategy to kind of get a sense of what they're going to
    do with troop levels. So, you talk about seams. I--as you and I
    have discussed, Alaska is really at the seams of NORTHCOM,
    PACOM, EUCOM. And sometimes that's helpful. Other times I think
    we can have our strategy fall through the seams. Can you just
    comment on that, please?
        Admiral Gortney. Yes. I'm assigned to be the ``advocate of
    the Arctic,'' which is not a doctrinal term, it's not--I can't
    direct anybody to do anything, but we are working on answering
    that question: What are the requirements that we're going to
    need to be able to inform our own operational plans, as you
    mentioned, on the future of the Arctic, and then what we feel
    are recommendations for all of DOD, not just the services, for
    what necessary investments that get up there?
        Senator Sullivan. Great. Because, you know, another thing
    that kind of looks like it's falling through the seams, at
    least within DOD and outside of the DOD, is icebreakers. When
    the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] was here last week, talked
    about the importance of those. Everybody agrees they're
    important, and yet the Navy's not in charge of those; it's the
    Coast Guard. So, there doesn't seem to be a coordinated focus
    on that, as well.
        Admiral Gortney. Which goes to the impact of our
    interagency relationships and the impacts of sequestration. The
    Coast Guard is responsible for the icebreakers. We don't--as
    CNO said, we don't have any ships up there, but we--but--that
    are--that float on top of the ocean, but we have submarines up
    there quite frequently. So--but, we need to figure out, What
    are the capabilities that we need? Because it's a very harsh
    place. I mean, I graded--I loved visiting your State, but it's
    a hard place to live and operate. And we have a difficulty--we
    have the inability right now to reliably navigate, communicate,
    and then sustain ourselves as we're up there. So, that's what
    we're trying to answer, what we will endeavor to answer as the
    advocate. And that report will be due out this spring, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you.
        And I do think the hardness actually makes for great
    training, whether it's the Marines or the Army or the Navy, Air
    Force, out there.
        I'd like to turn to missile defense. You know, I think your
    testimony highlights the growing threat, the ICBM threat,
    whether it's from North Korea, whether it's from Iran--you
    know, even potentially with, you know, weapons of mass
    destruction in the future. Can you just comment on the role
    that Fort Greely plays in that, and how important it is to
    continue the focus, I think, which is a bipartisan focus here,
    on increased missile defense?
        Admiral Gortney. Absolutely.
        You know, the strategic location of Alaska cannot be
    overstated. Location, location, location. It's easier to deploy
    forces from, say, our F-22s that are based there around the
    world. They get wherever we need to put them quicker than, say,
    we launched them out of Langley. So, the strategic importance
    of Alaska can't be overstated. And, as a result of that, that's
    where the Missile Defense Agency decided to put the vast
    majority of our interceptors, up at Fort Greely, which we were
    just up there visiting about a month ago.
        We're on track. The first, which--the first missile field--
    there's three missile fields, as you're aware--the first was a
    test and evaluation. They're refurbishing that. And by the end
    of '17, we'll have all 40 missiles up there, which brings our
    numbers to 44. There's nothing preventing us from getting there
    to maximize the investment that we've made for the
    effectiveness of our missile defense program.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to join our Chairman in thanking both of you for
    your distinguished service, but particularly, General Kelly,
    thank you for your candid and thoughtful and insightful
    remarks, but also for your and your family's service to our
    Nation, which, as the Chairman said so eloquently, should
    elicit our gratitude. And certainly members of the committee
    feel it.
        You mentioned the porousness of our borders and the
    efficiency of the network that can transport drugs and people
    into this country. As you may know, the Senate is now debating,
    with uncertain prospects, a bill that would provide greater
    assistance to the victims of human trafficking. And as a strong
    supporter and leading cosponsor of that measure, I'm very
    interested in what can be done by both of your commands in
    stopping the flow of women and children who are exploited for
    sex and slave labor. This kind of trafficking is modern
    slavery, in effect. And you've spoken very powerfully on the
    importance of human rights and the rule of law as it's been
    vindicated in Colombia. I wonder what can be done, in your
    view, in Central America, where the flow of both drugs and
    human trafficking has gone. In the wake of success in Colombia,
    perhaps you can give us your general comment on the trafficking
    issue.
        General Kelly. Thanks for the question, Senator. It's a
    really important one. And my answer is not a military one for
    sure; it's to give the people from that part of the world a
    reason to stay home. All of the polling and all the indicators
    are, they prefer to stay where their families are, where their
    culture is, where they're comfortable. But, without better
    human rights--and that is getting better in these countries--
    without some access to economic well-being--and I think that is
    the key--without lowering of the violence, basically due to--to
    a large degree, to our drug consumption--and the countries are,
    in fact, getting their arms around that. It's controversial, in
    some respects, how they're doing it. But, the violence is going
    down. And the human rights--accusations of violations are not
    going up. And that's hugely important in the way they're doing
    business there. Again, we've sometimes, in our interagency,
    criticized the way people get at problems locally. The fact is,
    they're getting at the problems.
        But, really, the answer is, they won't leave if they can
    get a job and live a decent life. We know that.
        Senator Blumenthal. And, as you said, the solution isn't
    going to be exclusively military, although law enforcement is a
    part of it. And I think Senator Reed, in his remarks, made the
    point that sequestration in affecting the non-Department of
    Defense aid and functions in those areas is important in
    fighting the flow of human trafficking, as well. Is that
    correct?
        General Kelly. Yes, sir, it is.
        Senator Blumenthal. Admiral, I wonder if you, in your
    command, have any insights into stopping the flow of
    trafficking.
        Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir. We work very closely in the mil-
    to-mil relationship with both Sedena and Semar, because they've
    been asked by their government to go after the--some of the
    internal challenges that they have. And so, we have been very,
    very effective. And in the last 24 to 36 months, a significant
    change and an increase in receptiveness and desire to partner
    with us and work with us and help them train to be more
    effective. And I just received and we've just started on a path
    to really assist their efforts on their southern border,
    because, as they said, ``If we fix our southern border, it'll
    help with so many challenges inside of our country.'' And
    that's why the impact of sequestration will cut back that
    ability--our ability, the amount of mil-to-mil training
    capacity that we'll be able to give them so that they can
    assist and make their country better.
        Senator Blumenthal. In effect, the result of sequestration
    is a kind of ripple effect that affects not only our military
    readiness, but also the impacts we can have on cultural and
    governance change for the better in these countries, that
    eventually effects us, because trafficking of drugs and slave
    labor across our borders affects our quality of life, as well.
        Admiral Gortney. Absolutely. It's a--as General Kelly said,
    this is a team sport. It requires unity of effort, whole of
    government, things we speak to infrequently but are just such a
    huge part of our--of how we deal with our partners to our
    southern border.
        Senator Blumenthal. My time is expired. I want to thank you
    both for your testimony here today. Thank you. And thank you
    for your service.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Lee.
        Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you very much, Admiral Gortney and General Kelly.
    We really appreciate your service to our country.
        I'm mindful of the ongoing search and rescue efforts in
    connection with the soldiers and marines who were involved in
    the helicopter crash off the coast of Florida in the last 2
    days. Our prayers go out to them and to their family members.
        General Kelly, you stated, last year, that the threats
    associated with the drug trade and with the flow of
    undocumented immigrants across our southern border presented an
    existential threat to the National security of the United
    States. I was wondering if I could just get--both of you--get
    each of you to tell the committee, in your opinion, what the
    greatest threats are to our National security in connection
    with this--that is, the greatest threats that exist as a result
    of an unsecure southern border, and how significant these
    threats are if we're not able to achieve a greater degree of
    control over who and what might be crossing our southern
    border.
        General Kelly. Well, sir, I would start with--I mean,
    there's many different threats against our country. And
    oftentimes we focus, certainly I'm--lectured repeatedly on--the
    threats that I concern myself most with are not, kind of,
    military threats, they're maybe law enforcement threats,
    they're immigration threats. But, you know, I am a problem-
    solver, and I am tasked to try to protect the southern
    approaches to the United States. I don't just focus on military
    threats, because, frankly, from my part of the world, there's
    very few military threats. But, you know, on a--there's 40,000
    Americans that die every year from the drugs that move up
    through my part of the world into Bill's and then into our
    Homeland. 40,000 people a year. You know, since September 11,
    there's--half a million people have died from narcoterrorism,
    as we call it in--down where I live. Narcoterrorism. 500,000
    Americans have died. Very few have died from, you know,
    traditional terrorism, if you will, since September 11. It
    costs our country $200 billion a year to deal with the people
    that are into drugs but are not, you know, dying. So, I see
    that as a huge, huge, huge threat.
        And I'm--I won't just limit myself to worrying about
    traditional military threats, because, as Bill says, it's a
    team sport, and most of the--all of the law enforcement--the
    CIA, the DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency]--everyone's doing
    their part, but, at the end of the day, I'm not going to
    concern myself with, ``Look, General Kelly, it's not a military
    threat, so don't worry about it.'' That's why--I mean, 95
    percent of my activities in the course of the--of my time--all
    of my time--95 percent, I focus on nonmilitary things--
    economics, human rights, developing relationships with
    presidents and ministers of defense to--and police chiefs in
    all of these countries, particularly the Central American
    countries, so I can move them in the direction of solving their
    problems, which will ultimately solve our problems.
        Senator Lee. Great.
        Admiral?
        Admiral Gortney. To add on exactly what John said, you
    know, these businesses that are moving product have outstripped
    the capacity of the Nations to our southern--from our southern
    border--their capacity to be able to handle these challenges.
    And that's why it requires the team effort from all of our
    elements of government to assist them to build their
    capacities, whether it's in a mil-to-mil capacity, which is
    what my responsibility is, whether it's a law enforcement,
    whether it's capacity-building in governance, in the judicial
    system. That's what has to occur. It just can't be focused
    exclusively on the military. It takes everything to deal with
    the challenges that these countries are being faced with.
        Senator Lee. Thank you.
        General Kelly, can you discuss the level in the recent
    trends and activity of Islamic terrorist organizations within
    the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility?
        General Kelly. I'm comfortable to say, Senator, that the
    Islamic extremist, you know, organizations are not very well
    entrenched in my part of the world. I don't see any direct
    terrorist threat right now. And I'm--you know, the people
    that'll look the hardest at this are CIA and FBI. So, I'm
    comfortable. But, there is a fair amount of activity by both
    Iran and recruiting, or at least attempts to recruit, by other
    Islamic extremist organizations. They're--we expect--or we
    calculate right now somewhere less than 100, but close to 100,
    young people that have left the Caribbean region, in
    particular, who now have gone to Syria to fight for the Islamic
    extremist organizations. And, of course, these small countries
    that don't have anything approaching our FBI or any of the law
    enforcement, they're extremely concerned about them coming
    back, as we are to our own country. And western Europe has the
    same concerns. The difference is, these small countries that
    I--that I'm describing have no real ability to deal with them.
    And, of course, if they come back, or when they come back, they
    can--they conduct operations in their own country or they can
    simply get on the network, ride up into our country, and do
    whatever someone tells them to do.
        Senator Lee. Because they're right at our backdoor.
        Thank you.
        Thank you both.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Just to be clear about your answers to
    Senator Lee, is the southern border secure, or not secure?
        Admiral Gortney. The southern border can be more secure, as
    can the Mexican border be more secure.
        Chairman McCain. That's the only question I had.
        General?
        General Kelly. Sir, I think, with the amount of drugs and
    people that move across our southwest border, it doesn't seem
    all that secure to me.
        Chairman McCain. Senator King.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Gortney, I want to thank you. In fact, I want to
    thank you both for your emphasis on the importance of the
    effect of sequestration on your commands and on your ability to
    carry out your responsibilities.
        As I talk to people at home, often I run into people to
    say, ``Well, sequestration is not such a big deal. It's only 2
    percent of the Federal budget.'' What people don't realize is,
    two-thirds of the Federal budget isn't subject to
    sequestration. So, what it really amounts to, in your case, is
    about a 10-percent cut, which is very significant. Two percent
    of one-third, you end up with about a 10-percent cut. And
    that's what you're facing.
        The other thing that I think we have to realize around
    here--everybody's worried about sequestration. In talking to my
    colleagues, the solutions are not easy, and we have to keep in
    front of us the danger of sequestration. When we're talking
    about the solutions, finding other alternatives to replace it
    are--there's no low-hanging fruit, here. It's going to be
    difficult. But, I'm very happy to have your testimony, this
    morning, which underlines for this committee and for the
    country how serious a threat this is to our National security.
        Admiral Gortney, if--with regard to your responsibilities
    in the Arctic, is--would it be in the National interest for
    this country to accede to the Law of the Sea Treaty?
        Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir. The Department of Defense, the
    Chief of Naval Operations, and myself are all in agreement that
    we should accede. It would--especially as we take on the role
    as a lead for the Arctic Council, it would give us a better
    strength, a better position of strength as we negotiate through
    there.
        Senator King. And, as I understand it, it's actually
    compromised--our failure to be a member of that treaty is
    actually compromising our ability, for example, to stake claims
    to where the Continental Shelf is and those kinds of things.
        Admiral Gortney. That's one of the reasons why we feel it's
    a--it would be a good idea to accede.
        Senator King. General Kelly, you agree with that?
        General Kelly. I don't have a lot of experience, in my part
    of the world, with the treaty and the issues related to the
    treaty, but certainly, in my broader opinion, I agree with Bill
    exactly, yes, sir.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        General Kelly, you talked--it was kind of amazing----
        Well, first, let me say, I really appreciate your comments
    about the CIA, because I've--I--as I travel, and as a member of
    the Intelligence Committee, I generally meet with CIA personnel
    around the world, and I have found them to be uniformly
    patriotic, intelligent, passionate about their work on behalf
    of this country. And, as you mentioned, they live in a
    dangerous world. There are places in the world where, if they--
    they can--you know, it's a danger to go outside and have lunch
    downtown. And I think it's very important to recognize these
    people that don't get recognition generally, and I really
    appreciate the statement that you've made.
        You talked about Colombia as a model partner. And I had to
    think, you know, 15-20 years ago, we wouldn't have been saying
    that. And in--we're dealing with so many unstable regimes
    around the world. How do we replicate what happened in
    Colombia? What are the steps that they took in order to take
    their country back, if you will, from the chaos that they were
    in 20 years ago?
        General Kelly. Well, sir, they--when you're looking over
    the abyss--and it's a long way down--you have kind of a--you
    know, a come-to-God point, I think, and you make--you have to
    make some decisions. And they made those decisions. And really
    Plan Colombia, such as it was--very, very successful--really
    started on this side of the hill, I think, and--but, certainly
    it started in the Congress.
        And there's a real misconception about what--in some
    places, about what Plan Colombia was. We gave--our money was 4
    cents on the dollar, as to what the Colombians contributed. So,
    we didn't bankroll it. A lot of think--I have people tell me
    that, ``We shouldn't put boots on the ground like we did in
    Colombia.'' We didn't put boots on the ground. They did all
    their own fighting, they did their own dying. And, while they
    were committed--or, making these commitments, they made social
    changes. Their elites were taxed and had to make a commitment
    to Plan Colombia. It is a remarkable reorientation of their
    society that they had to conduct.
        And, frankly, the good-news story there is that what we're
    doing in Central America now--because they face similar
    problems; they're in the abyss, they're about to be failed
    states--so, the Colombians--I just was down in Colombia, I met
    with the President and the Minister of Defense, and we talked
    about this at length--but, I've brought the Colombians up to
    have seminars, to Miami, and invited all of the senior-most
    officials of the three countries that I'm particularly
    concerned with--Guatemala, el Salvador, and Honduras. And a
    daylong seminar is to--``This is where my country, Colombia,
    was, 20 years ago. This is how close we were to being a failed
    narco state. These are the decisions we had to make. And, oh,
    by the way, they're exactly the decisions you have to make. You
    have to redo your tax codes. You have to get your own wealthy
    people investing--instead of investing in Miami, in high-end
    South Beach real estate, to invest in your own country,'' these
    kind of things. We've done that twice now, focusing, the second
    time, on economics. And I'm going to do another one in--with
    all three presidents and their teams coming up in Miami to do a
    higher-level economic development conference. As I say, 95
    percent of my efforts are not military. It's economic
    development.
        Senator King. And, as you testified earlier, that's the key
    to stopping the flow of illegal immigrants into this country,
    is to make their countries more attractive places to live. And,
    in fact, that's happened with Mexico, hasn't it? Don't we--
    isn't it a net-zero immigration from Mexico at this point?
        General Kelly. As I understand, it is net-zero, and it is
    because of the economy in Mexico.
        Senator King. Thank you, General.
        Thank you.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Ernst.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thank you, Admiral, General.
        It was a pleasure to meet with you the other day, General.
    I thank you for your time and attention, and thank both of you
    for your testimony today.
        Of course, I've shared with many folks that I am a very
    proud member of the Iowa Army National Guard. And our members
    have been very involved in a number of SOUTHCOM's missions,
    whether it's counterdrug, security missions--I had an MP
    detachment that served in Honduras as part of their security
    mission--but, we also have National Guard members from all over
    the United States that serve in Guantanamo Bay at the Detainee
    Center. And unfortunately, a lot of folks will want to
    politicize Guantanamo Bay, or, as we all it, ``Gitmo.'' But,
    I'm very proud of the service that is given there, and I
    believe it is a very important mission. I believe that this is
    vital to our National interests, to keep these terrorists at
    Guantanamo Bay.
        So, General Kelly, if you would, if you could describe the
    treatment that our citizen soldiers, or those that work at the
    Detainment Center, receive from the inmates. And if you could
    also describe, just in your own words or your personal thoughts
    based on your experiences, whether you think that these
    terrorists that are housed there--do you think that they would
    return to the fight if they were released?
        General Kelly. Well, maybe--thanks for the question,
    Senator. I think the--I'll take the first part--the second part
    first and just simply say there's--and again, I don't track
    these kind of things. I'm not responsible to track these kind
    of things. But, I think the--the best estimate on about how
    many of them return to the fight is about 30--30 percent. So,
    it's a fair number. We know for sure something in the
    neighborhood of about 18 percent have. With the kind of
    intelligence people, CIA and others, their estimate is about 30
    percent. So, they do return to the fight. Less so recently,
    but, of course, the more recent detainees that have been
    released, they've got plenty--you know, they've got plenty of
    time to get back in the fight if they want to. But, for right
    now, in the most recent detainee transfers or releases, we
    don't see any of them going back. But, again, they've just been
    released.
        As far as the treatment goes--first, as the Chairman said
    at the beginning, the troops down there that guard--that do the
    detention, that carry out the mission--I mean, we do exactly
    what the President of the United States tasked us to do, and it
    goes from the President to SECDEF [Secretary of Defense] to me
    to GTMO. And you'll see it when you go down there on Friday.
    The detainees are treated very, very, very well. Their medical
    care is excellent. Their--they're treated humanely, with
    dignity, all of that.
        Now, if they cross the line, they're disciplined--they're
    treated firmly, with minimum use of force. And there's a
    percentage of them down there that we have to--that are pretty
    abusive to my guys and gals down there. I won't go into what
    ``splashing'' is, but it's pretty vile stuff. They'll tell you
    all about it. Physical assaults.
        But, at the end of the day, you know, we're the good guys,
    they're not. We carry out the mission that the President gives
    us. And all of the human rights groups that go down there give
    us very, very high marks on how that's done. And again, we can
    decide--talk to policy, which I'm not into; but, at the end of
    the day, it's a very, very important mission to this country,
    and it's done superbly well by the men and women that are down
    there.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you very much, General.
        We also did discuss the State Partnership Program the other
    day during our discussion. And I do feel that this is a very
    important program for many of our National Guards. Currently,
    we are involved in a State Partnership Program with Kosovo. I
    know other States are involved with a number of countries. If
    you would please, in your own words, just describe how
    important you believe this program to be.
        General Kelly. Yeah. The Partnership Program is very, very
    high impact and very, very low cost. And what I have seen over
    my years in working with other countries, whether in the part
    of the world I'm in now or in the Central Command area, you
    know, in--among the Arab countries, it's our example that
    they--that catches their attention. The fact that men and women
    are--come down from Iowa or wherever and work together.
        You know, the role--or the status of women in many of these
    countries is very low. Yet, they see American units come by,
    come down, and men and women working together; in many, many
    cases, women actually in command of the unit, the small unit
    that comes down. That's startling to them.
        And I think, over time, that is what changes these
    countries for the better, how--just working alongside American
    servicemen and -women, and really, just as importantly,
    Homeland Security men and women that are sprinkled around the
    world--FBI, DEA, at--our good example is what changes these
    countries over time. Where we touch, they notice, they take
    notice, and then they change. We have very, very positive
    effect on these societies.
        Senator Ernst. I appreciate that so much.
        And I do want to take the time to thank all of the staff
    members that join us here today for the testimony. Lots of
    great servicemembers come out of the IOS. So, thank you,
    Sergeant Major, very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Kaine.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thanks, to you both.
        I want to offer a thank you and then two questions. So, on
    the thank you side, you each helped prepared Senator Cornyn and
    I for our recent visit to Mexico, Honduras, and Colombia. And
    it was a very successful visit. We saw evidence of what you had
    said, Admiral Gortney, the increasing mil-to-mil cooperation
    between the United States and Mexico that's very laudable. We
    went to Honduras, General Kelly, at your request, to meet with
    President Hernandez. Our Ambassador, when we landed, first took
    us to a neighborhood that he said, ``I'm now going to take you
    to the most dangerous neighborhood in the most dangerous city
    in the most dangerous country in the world,'' the Chermelecon
    neighborhood in San Pedro Sula. But, we saw USAID [United
    States Agency for International Development] projects in that
    very dangerous neighborhood that are helping folks, visited
    your--some of your folks at JTF-Bravo at Soto Cano, and then
    had a chance to talk to the President about the proposed
    budgetary investment in the region. And then, finally, in
    Colombia, we went out to Tolemaida and saw the U.S. and
    Colombian military, together, talk about the progress that
    they've made in helping turn the failed state into a reliable
    ally of the United States. And it was remarkable.
        I saw all the challenges that you've testified to and that
    my colleagues have asked you about, and I think you've done a
    good job at responding to those. But--and I came back mindful
    of challenges, but I also came back thinking of some upside
    opportunities if we get it right. If we get it right. And I
    want to ask you about that.
        Senator McCain, in his opening comments, kind of talked
    about, ``We don't necessarily pay that much attention to the
    region, as we do other places, and more sustained effort could
    be helpful.'' What I came away from our trip thinking is, of
    the deep cultural connections that we have in this 36 nations
    in the Americas, from Canada to Patagonia, where all this
    mixture of an indigenous culture that has welcomed European,
    African, and Asian immigration--in that mix is a common
    feature, north to south. We all call ourselves Americans--
    North, Central, or South. We are all Americans. There is a
    growing middle class in these nations, and growing economic
    prospects, and growing trade. The most significant number of
    free trade agreements that the United States has is with
    nations in the Americas.
        There is the prospect for no war in the Americas, maybe for
    the first time in history, and certainly in a very different
    way than any other continent. The peace negotiation between the
    Colombian government and the FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces
    of Colombia], if it reaches a successful point in the sort of
    final chapter, could make us two continents, with millions of
    challenges, but two continents without a war, when you can't
    say the same thing about Europe, you can't say the same thing
    about Africa, you can't say the same thing about Asia.
        And so, I really see some opportunities for an Americas, a
    billion people strong, with cultural ties, with trade ties,
    with better and better military ties, even in the midst of all
    these challenges, which are real. And I just wanted to ask you,
    Do you have that same sense of--there are really upside
    opportunities in both of your areas of responsibility if we pay
    persistent attention, rather than episodic attention, sort of
    across all of government?
        General Kelly. Couldn't agree more, Senator. The one
    thing--my takeaway in the part of the world I work in, with the
    exception--with very few exceptions--you know, the people that
    didn't get the memo about, you know, human rights and things
    like that--Venezuela is an example--the vast majority of the
    continent, all the way down to Patagonia, as you say, they want
    to be best friends with the United States, they want to partner
    with us economically, socially. I mean, it's--they very, very--
    and they're disappointed that we pay so little attention to
    them.
        Now, there are some competitors. You know, the Chinese are
    very heavily involved, in terms of economics and things like
    that. The Russians in--much less. But, they're, you know,
    competitors, in a way. But, the frustration that the countries
    have is, they would rather deal with us on a--on the very
    issues they deal with China and Russia on, but we sometimes
    just show a lack of interest. But, they want to partner with
    us, and they love the fact that the United States no longer
    comes down carrying a big stick, but, rather, equal partners.
    And an awful lot of that good feeling comes as a direct result,
    I think, of the men and women out of the command that I
    command, and how much time and effort they put in, in
    partnering across the region.
        Senator Kaine. Admiral Gortney?
        Admiral Gortney. I'll echo what John said. You know, our
    partners know that we are a really great nation, and we're with
    them for the long haul. We may have some ups and downs, like
    most relationships, but we'll be there, we're stable, and we'll
    be there with them for the long haul. So, a little bit of
    investment of a--a little bit more investment of our time and
    energy from all the elements of our government will go a long
    way, because they need our help. Some--they have some immense
    challenges out there.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Fischer.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you, gentlemen, for your service and for being
    here today.
        Admiral, in your prepared testimony, you discuss the
    growing threat that's posed by cruise missiles, to the United
    States; and you say that Russia is progressing towards its goal
    of deploying long-range conventionally-armed cruise missiles,
    and, if that trend continues, that, over time, NORAD [North
    American Aerospace Defense Command] is going to face increased
    risks in its ability to defend North America. Does the budget
    support your plans for the cruise-missile defense that we need
    for this country?
        Admiral Gortney. Provided we're given the account that the
    Department has asked for, I think we'll be on a good path. When
    it comes to the particular cruise-missile threat, you know,
    we're experimenting with JLENS [Joint Land Attack Cruise
    Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System], up at Aberdeen.
    That shows great promise. It's not without challenges any test
    program is going to have, but--there's a lot of air traffic up
    there. And to be able to integrate that into the rest of our
    architecture, to include our Aegis ships that will be off of
    our coast, so that we can deal with the leakers--you know, I've
    been in the cruise-missile threat since I was a lieutenant JG,
    and I've shot over 1300 of them, so I know how effective they
    are, and I know how hard they are to defeat. And it really
    requires us to have a layered approach that we--it's more
    effective--it's only effective if we get the archer and not
    just deal with the arrows, and have the ability to reach deep
    to get the cruise-missile shooter so that we're only dealing
    with a few of the leakers out here.
        The long-range aviation--Russian long-range aviation, it's
    a pretty significant increase in numbers. And what concerns me
    more are two things. It's the--where they're flying, even
    through the English--down the English Channel--it's where
    they're flying that has not been what they have done in the
    past, even back with the Soviet Union. And the development of
    the cruise missiles that they have, that have a very long
    range, that--from the Russian--from eastern Russia, they can
    range critical infrastructure in Alaska and in Canada that we
    rely on for our homeland defense mission. So, we have to look
    at this in a more expansive manner. But, if we have the
    investments that we've asked for, we'll be able to outpace that
    technology.
        Senator Fischer. And so, also in this year's budget, when
    we look at those investments in the next-generation defense
    technology, which I support--I think it's needed, and I support
    it strongly--I am concerned, though, that those capabilities
    are not going to be deployed anytime soon. I believe it will be
    in the next decade, at the earliest. Do you have concerns with
    that, as well? Are you satisfied with that timeline, or are you
    just, I guess, accepting of that timeline?
        Admiral Gortney. Well, there's--as a military officer,
    we'll take capability earlier than later any day. And--but, for
    the necessary investments, as the technology is advancing, I'm
    satisfied with where we are.
        Senator Fischer. Okay, good to hear.
        With your cyberspace mission, you state that it would be
    rather simplistic to assume that a large-scale cyberattack on
    the Nation's infrastructure would somehow not impact both us
    and our partners' ability to successfully perform the DSCA
    [Defense Security Cooperation Agency] mission, the support that
    we give to our civil authorities. And it makes strategic sense
    to consider the steps that could be taken to mitigate or
    prevent those types of attacks. Can you elaborate a little bit
    on that statement that you made?
        Admiral Gortney. Yes, ma'am. My assigned responsibility is
    to defend my own networks and to help the lead Federal agency
    in the defense support for civil authorities. But, effectively,
    it can be a mission kill. We are very reliant on critical
    infrastructure--held by the private and public--but critical
    infrastructure in order for us to defend the Nation. A
    cyberattack in Ottawa would take out the northeast quadrant of
    our air-defense sector. It would be, effectively, a mission
    kill. So, not only would it affect me to be able to do my
    mission, more--quite frankly, more importantly, we, as a
    Nation, rely on this same infrastructure for us to operate,
    whether it's banking, rail, aviation, power, movement of water.
    All of these things have critical infrastructure that we must
    have, and they need to be hardened against an adversary.
        Senator Fischer. Can you give us, specifically, some of the
    steps that you would recommend we take so that we can look
    towards that prevention when it comes to our cyber?
        Admiral Gortney. Well, ma'am, this is out of my league, as
    the technical aspects, I'm going to defer to my good friend,
    Mike Rogers, at DSCA. He's--he really understands it. I don't
    know a switch from a router.
        But, the real issue comes down--is from you all. It
    requires law and policy that are very difficult for us to come
    across as a nation. Some--it's privacy--some privacy concerns,
    some things that you might even say cross the Bill of Rights,
    many of the same issues that we had before 9/11. And, as a
    result of 9/11, we passed new laws and got new policy that gave
    us the ability to better protect our Nation. And I would hope
    that it wouldn't take a cyber 9/11 or a cyber Pearl Harbor for
    us to finally realize we need to do that sort of thing. And you
    all have done--you have taken great strides, and we're grateful
    for that. And we need to continue that momentum.
        Senator Fischer. And do you think that it is imperative
    that the government be able to share some information with
    private businesses, and private businesses also share that
    information with each other, so that we can look more towards
    defense, deterrence, and, if necessary, offensive use of our
    capabilities?
        Admiral Gortney. Yes, ma'am. And I'm really focused on the
    defense. You don't transmit until you're ready to receive. And
    we need to shore up that defense.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Gillibrand.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you both for your testimony here today, and your
    service.
        I want to continue Senator Fischer's questions about
    cybersecurity. Cyberattacks against the homeland are growing as
    a threat to U.S. infrastructure, business, and defense. A
    critical mission of NORTHCOM is to coordinate the response to
    attacks on the homeland with the Department of Homeland
    Security. Admiral Rogers told our colleagues on the House side
    that the Obama administration isn't where it needs to be yet in
    planning the coordination between the military and civilian
    agencies' response to a major cyberattack. How would you assess
    the coordination between NORTHCOM and DHS?
        Admiral Gortney. We're supporting the DHS in that regard,
    predominantly in the aftermath of the event, in my defense
    support for civil authorities. The difficulty that they have
    are exactly what we were just discussing. It goes to the laws
    that we need as a Nation so that then DHS has the authorities
    they need to be able to better defend our Nation in that
    regard.
        Senator Gillibrand. From your perspective, how is the
    overall coordination between Federal, State, and local
    governments, and how, beyond what you've suggested, do you
    think we could improve?
        Admiral Gortney. Federal, local, and--we just--just a
    couple of weeks ago, we met with the Council of Governors
    within DOD. And I'm a member of that particular board in my
    capacity as Northern Command. And we have a long way to go to
    sharing information. We're doing a pretty good job sharing gov-
    to-gov, from local/State to Homeland Security. The challenges,
    we're working our way through. Homeland Security is working
    their way through, sharing private-to-Homeland Security. But,
    there are even some reasons why private can't talk to State and
    local. And so, it's expanding those authorities that are
    required to better communicate, to better defend.
        Senator Gillibrand. I'd now like to turn to your Arctic
    mission. Obviously, NORTHCOM plays an integral role in the
    Arctic. How important are international cooperative agreements
    and partnerships such as Tri-Command Framework for Arctic
    Cooperation for U.S. NORTHCOM's success in the Arctic?
        Admiral Gortney. Absolutely critical. You know, it's a
    very, very difficult place to navigate, communicate, and
    sustain ourselves. And so, those partnerships that we can share
    capability and capacity, as we do with Canada through the NORAD
    role, cannot be overstated.
        Senator Gillibrand. New York's 109th Airlift Wing is home
    to the only LC-130 Skibirds in the U.S. Air Force. Their unique
    ability to provide airlift on snow and ice has made them
    valuable resource to the National Science Foundation,
    supporting science missions in Greenland and Antarctica. Last
    year, the unit showed the full range of their capabilities by
    successfully supporting exercises with the Canadian military in
    the Arctic. Based on the current types of threats you see in
    the Arctic, how important is this type of airlift capability to
    the future success of the NORTHCOM?
        Admiral Gortney. Absolutely critical. Once again, it goes
    to, How are we going to navigate, communicate, sustain
    ourselves, and the C-130s with skids, our helicopters with
    skids from our other Guard outfits to help us out there,
    absolutely critical.
        Senator Gillibrand. I've read a lot of recent articles
    about sort of--some sort of rush to use the Arctic for natural
    resources, for other leverage. Do you think we need more of
    this particular capability or other capabilities in the future
    as our Arctic presence increases?
        Admiral Gortney. I do. And that's why, as I'm working on
    our--``Arctic Way Ahead'' is the atticad for the Arctic that
    will be addressing those issues, and I'll have that out in the
    spring.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
        My last question, for General Kelly, is: Specifically, what
    is your assessment with regard to Iran's role in the SOUTHCOM
    area of operation?
        General Kelly. Senator, the Iranians have, over the last
    decade or so, been increasing the number of embassies, as an
    example, in the region. I think they've tripled the number of
    embassies. They've opened what they call ``cultural centers''
    to--you know, trying to--try to garner support, in terms of
    their country, and certainly to try to circumvent the
    sanctions, I think. But, the point is, they've opened up these
    cultural centers. And, you know, frankly, I don't see a lot of
    similarity between the Latin culture and the Iranian culture,
    for sure. I'm a little bit suspicious of these--of this
    activity, just because there is such a vast different--
    difference between the two countries--or the two regions, two
    cultures. So, we keep an--we keep a watchful eye on them.
        You know, there's a fair amount of concern about, you know,
    local Jewish communities in Latin America, of which there are
    many, actually. You know, I'm sure the Senator knows about the
    issue in the '90s, the 85 deaths that were--that took place in
    the Jewish Community Center there in Buenos Aires. So, we keep
    a close eye on that. They're generally a country that, whatever
    they're up to, it's--generally, they're up to no good, and we
    have to watch them closely.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Cotton.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and
    for your time here today.
        I have two say, General Kelly, I agree with your statement
    that there doesn't seem to be all that many similarities
    between Latin American culture and Persian culture. I would
    also like to point out that Iran has been implicated in the
    murders of many Jews in South Africa and Argentina. The
    investigator, which mysteriously turned up dead a few weeks
    ago.
        And, Admiral Gortney, I'd just like to highlight in your
    testimony on page 6, that you say Iran recently launched
    another satellite into orbit and, quote, ``Despite
    international condemnation and sanctions, Iran has failed to
    cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency to
    resolve all outstanding concerns regarding its nuclear program,
    particularly those concerning its possible military
    dimensions,'' end quote. So, before we even reach any further
    deal with Iran, Iran is already not living up to its
    obligations under multiple U.N. Security Council Resolutions.
        But, now I'd like to turn to Russia. General Kelly, on page
    8 of your written testimony, you say, quote, ``Under President
    Putin, we have seen a clear return to cold war tactics,'' end
    quote. Could you please elaborate on what you mean,
    specifically in your AOR?
        General Kelly. Well, yes, Senator.
        For a number of years, we saw almost no real activity of
    any kind from the Russians. And just in the last couple of
    years, there's been some long-range bomber missions, they
    deployed a small task force of warships to the Caribbean, made
    various stops in, you know, countries like Cuba, Venezuela, and
    Nicaragua.
        They're, you know, from my perspective, really a nuisance,
    but they seem to be ratcheting up their kind of in-your-face
    ``We can go anywhere we want, and we have friends around the
    globe.'' We know that they're in discussions, not to open
    bases, but to have, you know, agreements to where they can
    either bring ships to refuel and--or aircraft to land and
    refuel. So----
        But, as I say, they're more of a nuisance, but they're
    really up to, I think, just kind of making their point that
    they can go anywhere they want and challenge us in various
    ways.
        There's also a pretty steady stream of electronic warfare
    collection vessels that, you know, ply the waters of the
    Caribbean in the Atlantic--our Atlantic coast. And
    periodically, you know, they'll stop and get fuel, as I say, or
    pull liberty in some of the countries that they're friendliest
    with.
        Senator Cotton. Admiral Gortney, could--would you share
    your perspective on growing Russian influence and activity in
    your AOR?
        Admiral Gortney. Absolutely, sir.
        You know, qualitatively, the Russians are--have developed a
    better military than the quantitative military of the Soviet
    Union. And they're--and they've also developed a new doctrine,
    and we're seeing that military and that doctrine playing out in
    the Ukraine.
        In the homelands, we're seeing them use that better
    military with long-range aviation and the deployment of their
    submarines and of the collection vessels that John was taken
    about.
        So, what bothers me is the intent. What is their intent?
    They're clearly messaging us. That's--we do that, as well. But,
    what is the intent as they employ that doctrine through the
    spectrum of conflict? That's what concerns me.
        Senator Cotton. And now this is a question for both of you.
    If the United States proceeds with the sequestration cuts to
    our defense budget, would you expect to see Russian influence
    and activity in the western hemisphere continue to grow or
    decrease?
        Admiral Gortney. I think any opponent will seize an
    opportunity when they see it. And I think that that's exactly
    what would happen.
        General Kelly. I agree, sir. And the sequestration thing,
    again, is--the--what our partners around the world are looking
    at is this kind of almost withdrawal of our leadership role,
    depending on what part of the world and who you're talking to.
    But, to take away the ability to partner with nations, to do
    deployments, to--would really, really, I think, send a shock
    wave through many of the countries that we're--that are--that
    most--that we're most aligned with and allied with. I know, in
    my part of the world, they're already very, very concerned at
    the limited amount of engagement that already takes place.
        Senator Cotton. So, let me get this straight. Twenty-five
    years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 50 years after
    the Cuban missile crisis, 200 years after the Monroe Doctrine,
    your opinion is that, if this Congress proceeds with the
    sequestration cuts to our defense, we will see continued and
    growing Russian adventurism in the western hemisphere. Admiral
    Gortney, yes or no?
        Admiral Gortney. I would agree with that.
        Senator Cotton. General Kelly?
        General Kelly. Yes, sir.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you both for you being here and for your service
    to the country. I apologize for missing the--your remarks.
    Unfortunately, there are too many things going on at one time,
    which I know you appreciate.
        General Kelly, last year during the crisis on the southern
    border with unaccompanied minors, you gave a briefing to a
    number of Senators. And one of the things you talked about is
    the impact of cutbacks on your ability to address drug
    interdiction and interdiction of illegals coming across the
    border. Can you talk a little bit about that here and what the
    impact of these budget cuts have had on your ability to address
    those issues?
        General Kelly. Yes, Senator.
        As far as the interdiction of drugs go--and we've talked
    about it a little bit here in the hearing, previously--it's
    all--in my world, it's all about having an ability to see them,
    detection and monitoring. That's really my mission. And then I
    work closely with law enforcement, particularly Coast Guard, to
    do the final interdiction phase.
        The interdiction phase really takes ships or cutters that
    you can fly a--or some vessel that you can fly a helicopter
    from. Last year, we interdicted 158--collectively, we
    interdicted 158 metric tons of cocaine, with no violence. Once
    it gets ashore--and that's the key--once it gets ashore in
    Central America and moves up through Mexico, we're taking
    almost nothing off the market, and the violence is
    unbelievable. More ships, more cutters means more cocaine.
        You're never going to get to the point of going--you know,
    stopping it all. That includes heroin and methamphetamine.
    Again, all that comes up through the network that runs through
    my zone and into Bill's. You're never going to stop it all.
    But, the key--what you're trying to do is drive down
    availability and drive up price, and then people--less people
    won't start toying around with drugs and get--you know, get
    hooked on drugs and all that kind of thing.
        And you weren't here, but, you know, 40,000 Americans a
    year die from drugs. It costs our country $200 billion a year,
    and then all the human misery that goes with that. So, that's
    kind of the--more vessels that I can fly helicopters from.
        Another option, and something I'm doing more and more of,
    is--that is working with the department of militaries,
    particularly in Central America--moving their militaries away
    from the internal parts of their country to the--recommending
    that they move to the borders, and then work together with
    border--with their neighbors, north/south, to include Mexico,
    in--to try to--you know, this year, in fact, the Hondurans, for
    the first time, I think, in history, interdicted multiple tons
    of cocaine, a lot of it because of how we recommended they go
    about their business.
        So, the partners have ponied up to this in a big way,
    because they see it as--much of it is because their countries
    are in the conditions they're in because of the drug
    trafficking.
        Senator Shaheen. And how is--how important is it to those
    countries in Central America to have--to be able to see us as a
    strong partner in those efforts? And what will be the impact of
    further cuts on our ability to do that?
        General Kelly. Well, the--they see us, as I mentioned just
    a few minutes ago--they want to be partnering with us, they
    want to trade with us, they want to interact with us, they want
    our help, our investment--a better way to put it. And if we
    walk away--frankly, if we walk away--if we reduce any more of
    what I'm doing in Latin America, it'll be--it'll go to zero. I
    mean, we're doing so little now, and we could do so much more
    with just a little bit more.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, we certainly appreciate that in New
    Hampshire and northern New England, where we've seen a real
    epidemic of heroin and drug abuse and deaths from heroin
    overdoses. So, we very much appreciate that.
        Can I also ask--and again, you may have covered this--but,
    are you seeing terrorists from other parts of the world
    exploiting the smuggling routes that are used by organized
    crime?
        General Kelly. That's actually a great question, Senator.
    We are beginning to see a real convergence of the two. We know,
    as an--the biggest problem these traffickers have is not
    getting drugs and things into the United States. The biggest
    problem they have is laundering the $85 billion of illicitly-
    gained funds. And we know, to one degree or another, that there
    are Lebanese Hezbollah associates that are helping launder some
    of that money. And we don't know exactly how much they're
    taking as a fee, but we know it's an awful lot--tens of
    millions of dollars, for sure.
        Senator Shaheen. And do we know what banks they're using to
    launder? Is it Lebanese banks?
        General Kelly. There are connections with the Lebanese
    banks back in Lebanon. And beyond that, I'm over my head.
    We'd--you'd have to get Treasury in here to talk about it. But,
    they're very aggressive. Our Treasury Department, very
    aggressive, and increasingly so, going after this issue. Yes,
    ma'am.
        Senator Shaheen. My time is up, but thank you both.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Ayotte.
        Senator Ayotte. I want to thank the Chairman.
        I want to thank both of you for your leadership and what
    you do for our country.
        I wanted to ask you, General Kelly--I note, in your
    prepared statement, the superb work done by our guards and
    medical force at Guantanamo. And I wanted to follow up and ask
    you about an article I had read in the New York Times about a
    court order that was not allowing female--certain female guards
    to do all the same functions as men at Guantanamo, which
    obviously--to me, strikes me as somewhat unusual, because I
    don't think we would find that in other prison-type settings.
    So, could you tell me a little bit about that and what's
    happening? And if there's a specific group of detainees that
    has generated this court order, who are they and why are they
    there?
        General Kelly. Yes, Senator. This issue on the women--and
    you're exactly right, I have court orders against using women,
    because they are women, with certain detainees--the high-value
    detainees. But, this is really just a series of--they
    manipulate us. They're experts at manipulating us, them and
    their proponents. This is just a series. You know, 2 years ago,
    it was Koran desecration, which we don't do, and they had
    motions in the courts, and we got past that. Then it was how we
    search them, that we were searching their genitals, which we
    don't search that way. And right--you know, the temperature in
    the cells, the noise in the cells. And this is just one of a
    series.
        I mean, frankly, we're dealing with women now. We have two
    orders from two different judges, in the Commission side, to
    not use women, because they were women, because the high-value
    detainees felt it was against their religion, which anyone that
    knows anything about the Muslim religion knows that it's not
    against their religion. But, the point is, they're--you know,
    we had women restricted from doing the jobs they're trained to
    do----
        Senator Ayotte. And who--you know, give us a sense of who
    some of these high-level detainees who have brought this action
    to prevent women guards, who, by the way, we're very proud of--
    --
        General Kelly. Yeah.
        Senator Ayotte.--are doing great work at----
        General Kelly. Well, certainly the----
        Senator Ayotte.--Guantanamo?
        General Kelly.--the September 11 five.
        Senator Ayotte. So, the September 11 five----
        General Kelly. Right.
        Senator Ayotte.--want to tell us that our women--that women
    who serve our country can't guard them?
        General Kelly. That's exactly right. And then the Cole
    bomber.
        Senator Ayotte. And the Cole bomber.
        General Kelly. The Cole bomber. And the expectation is,
    once we get through this--we have two judges, two court orders.
    One has been lifted, the other one is still under
    consideration. And, as soon as this is over, it'll be, ``We
    don't want to be touched by Jews,'' or ``We don't want to be
    touched by, you know, black soldiers,'' or ``We don't want to
    be touched by Roman Catholics.'' It's just a series. It's
    beyond me why we even consider some of these requests, but I'm
    not a lawyer, I'm not smart enough to figure this out.
        Senator Ayotte. Well, it's beyond me, too, because I think
    they'll find that, in the United States of America, we believe
    very firmly in equality for women. And so, to me this is just
    absurd that we're even entertaining these challenges.
        But, I want to commend the women guards at Guantanamo. And
    I know that you're every bit as good. And, you know, when the
    9/11 attackers don't want women guarding them, it's absurd, and
    I don't think we should be accommodating that.
        So, please say thank you, for me, and that we support them
    fully.
        General Kelly. Sure will.
        Senator Ayotte. I also wanted to follow up on the recent
    transfers from Guantanamo to Uruguay and just ask you--I
    understand there were a number of transfers made there in
    December. And can you tell me whether you have any concerns
    about the resettlement of these detainees in Uruguay? And I did
    see public reports that one of them actually left Uruguay
    already and went to Argentina. And can you help me understand
    how we're keeping tabs on these folks?
        General Kelly. I can tell you that--first, I'm not in any
    way involved with the decision to transfer them. That's all
    done by an interagency group. And I'm not privy at all to the
    agreements that may or may not be made with countries that
    receive these guys. Sometimes--the Algerians, as an example,
    the Saudis, very specifically, when they take control of these
    guys, they put them in a setting that is very, very
    restrictive. It's my understanding, probably from reading the
    same open press reports, that the--in particular, the Uruguayan
    President, who said, once they arrived, that they are free men,
    and that there are very few restrictions on them.
        At a--there's another concern I have, that I cannot talk in
    an open setting like this, about some of their activities; the
    Uruguayans, in particular. But, you know, generally speaking,
    if you believe the newspaper reports, some of them want to come
    back to Guantanamo, because they're not living the lifestyle
    they thought they would lead in Uruguay. It was kind of an
    interesting twist.
        But, again, I'm concerned somewhat about their activities,
    but it's really not part of my responsibility to track them at
    all.
        Senator Ayotte. Well, I would like to follow up, certainly
    offline, about some of the concerns that you may have about
    Uruguay so that we can understand that.
        And I just want to thank both of you for your tremendous
    service to the country.
        Chairman McCain. Senator King has a additional comment.
        Senator King. Just--no, just a quick question for General
    Kelly.
        You've talked several times about the sophistication of
    this network that's moving, principally, drugs in and out of
    the country. Do you have any specificity on where they
    penetrate the border? Is it in a particular area? Is it by
    land, sea? What's the--how do they make it through? I guess,
    Admiral, your jurisdiction, but either of you. I'm interested
    in more specificity about where they come through.
        General Kelly. I'll push it to the Admiral, but the answer
    is ``everywhere you can imagine.''
        Chairman McCain. Isn't--could I interrupt? Isn't the answer
    also, it's like squeezing a balloon? And right now the Arizona-
    Mexico border is one of the major transshipment points. One
    reason is because we have mountains that--they come right up
    and actually station guides on the mountains to lead them
    forward.
        I didn't mean to interrupt, but right now the Tucson sector
    of the Arizona-Mexico border is one of the most heavily
    trafficked, I'm sorry to say. But, it--but, please respond,
    both of you.
        Admiral Gortney. Chairman, that's exactly right. Part of
    the challenge of--John and his predecessor's success in the
    maritime pushed it up through the peninsula. And so, as we--
    wherever we squeeze, we've got to squeeze equally on the
    balloon. The efforts in the maritime right now is pushing it up
    outside through the Bahamas into the east of the Bahamas. So,
    wherever we apply pressure, we will be effective for a period
    of time, and they're going to find the weakness. It's like
    water. And so, it's understanding and have the intelligence as
    to where to apply the pressure and where will they go next,
    which is the real challenge. It sounds----
        Chairman McCain. But, isn't it true that right now the
    Arizona-----
        Admiral Gortney. You have a----
        Chairman McCain:--Mexico border is----
        Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir.
        Chairman McCain:--one of the major trafficking points? Is
    that correct?
        Admiral Gortney. That is correct, sir.
        Chairman McCain. Thank you.
        Senator King. But, again, I'm just trying to understand
    this. As you seal up one place, you're going to find other--
    some of the routes seem to be by water?
        Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir.
        General Kelly. The example I would give you--one of--2\1/2\
    years ago, when I first took this job, we had the vast majority
    of cocaine moving up Central America, Mexico, into the United
    States, 2 or 3 percent moving up the islands into, say,
    Dominican Republic and over to Puerto Rico. Now we see about--
    we've had a lot of success on the isthmus. We've put a kind of
    a shield in place, so we've deflected a lot of the cocaine. Now
    it's moving--maybe 14-15 percent is moving up in a way that had
    not been used since the 1980s.
        In my JIATF-South--Joint Interagency Task Force-South, down
    in Key West--we've just stood up a container cell, because we
    know they're starting to move things now increasingly by
    container. And we just got, I think--just the other day, 156
    kilos in a container. As we've done things with----
        Senator King. The container, which came over--came by sea.
        General Kelly. By sea, yes, sir.
        Heroin, we know, because it's very, very high value,
    travels primarily by air. That is, a passenger with a couple or
    3 kilos in--you know, in his bag. We see the aviation flights
    that used to come out of Venezuela--exclusively out of
    Venezuela, in--going into Honduras, because of things we've
    done with the Hondurans, in the Honduran--recommendations we
    made to the Hondurans and the Guatemalans--we're now seeing the
    jets--or the aircraft, they've transitioned from, say,
    propeller aircraft to jets. And now they're going deeper, to
    Mexico. So, it----
        Senator King. It would be----
        General Kelly. They change very quickly.
        Senator King. It would be helpful to us, in terms of
    allocating resources to protect against this, to have some
    analysis--and perhaps you could get together with the DEA, the
    FBI, CIA, other--Homeland Security--about where the--not
    necessarily where, but the types of routes--sea, air, land--
    just so we know where we should be putting our resources.
        General Kelly. We certainly have that, Senator. I mean, I
    could sit here for 3 hours and tell you.
        But, the bottom line is, my organization can see,
    electronically as well as through intel, working with DEA and
    FBI and all--we can detect and monitor this stuff to a very,
    very high rate of accuracy. What I can't do--what the
    interagency can't do very effectively, because we don't have
    ships and cutters, is interdict it.
        Senator King. And that's a question of resources, getting
    back to the sequester.
        I--for the record, if you would supply a one-pager on where
    you see the paths, that would----
        General Kelly. Yes, sir.
        Senator King.--be helpful.
        General Kelly. Yes, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The United States and Europe remain the two major markets for South
    American cocaine, with the bulk of Colombian cocaine destined for the
    U.S. Most U.S. bound cocaine moved through Central America in 2014.
    Colombia and Ecuador will very likely remain the primary maritime
    departure countries, delivering cocaine to Panama, Costa Rica, and
    Guatemala for follow-on ground movement through Mexico and into the
    U.S. Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, and parts of the
    Eastern Caribbean will likely continue to pale in comparison to
    trafficking through Central America; however, trend analysis suggests
    use of the Caribbean maritime vector is likely increasing. With regard
    to air transport, Venezuela to Honduras or Belize will likely remain
    the primary vector for non-commercial air trafficking; however, Mexican
    cartels are seeking more direct air and maritime routes to Mexico and
    the northern Tier, with flights originating primarily out of Ecuador
    and Peru.

        Chairman McCain. Could I also mention, while we're in this
    conversation, that, because of the legalization of marijuana in
    Colorado and other places, that we are seeing a reduction in
    marijuana shipments and an increase in methamphetamines,
    heroin, and other so-called ``hard'' drugs. Do you want to
    comment on that phenomenon?
        Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir. It's one of the common questions
    that come up in my partnership with the Bahamas and Mexico,
    is--is the legalization of marijuana. It concerns them, it
    concerns us, it especially----
        Chairman McCain. Yeah, but hasn't it affected the kinds of
    drugs that are being sent up? Less marijuana.
        Admiral Gortney. The drug traffic has evolved. Is--I'm not
    aware if it's a direct result, yet, of a--less of a demand for
    marijuana that is legally grown and sold here in the States. I
    can't help but think that, in the future, that is exactly
    what's going to happen.
        Chairman McCain. Thank you.
        General?
        General Kelly. Yes, sir. The heroin issue is remarkable,
    and the methamphetamine, as you point out. You know,
    methamphetamine used to be produced in the United States, but,
    because of different laws that the Congress changed, it's
    harder and harder for the local labs to get the precursors to
    make the methamphetamine. So, now I think it's something in the
    neighborhood of 87--90 percent of all the methamphetamine now
    consumed in the United States is produced in Mexico and then
    smuggled in.
        As far as the heroin goes, illegal pharmaceuticals--you
    know, oxycontin, that kind of thing--have--is very, very
    expensive. I'm told that if you went out here and bought a
    single oxycontin pill on--illegally on Capitol Hill, it would
    cost you about $60 and get you a certain place. That same
    amount of heroin is about $6. So, we see--as the Federal
    Government has really gotten its arms around illegal
    pharmaceuticals and the availability of illegal pharmaceuticals
    would come down, now the heroin has just exploded. And it's not
    just in--as I've--I think I testified last year, it's not--it's
    just not in inner-city communities now, it's everywhere. I
    mean, it's in New Hampshire, it's in, you know, Capitol Hill,
    it's in Beacon Hill, it's on the Harvard campus, you know, and
    it's really very, very, very disturbing.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Ayotte had an additional question.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Chairman.
        Let me just say that, you know, this issue of heroin, it's
    devastating in a State like mine. We've seen almost a 60-
    percent increase in drug deaths because of, you know, the
    inexpensive nature of heroin, and the addictive nature of it.
    So, thank you for everything you're doing on that. And I think
    that's an area where we should work together in this committee
    to get more resources for you to--the more we can drive up the
    price of heroin, obviously, and interdict more of it, the more
    we can try to combat this along other ways, too. So, thank you.
        I had a followup question, though, about Guantanamo. And,
    you know, there's been a lot of talk about Guantanamo being
    used as a--by our enemies as a recruitment tool. And has anyone
    ever looked at the issue of--if we move these terrorists, we
    move some of these high-level detainees, to a facility in the
    United States, does anyone know whether--have we looked at the
    idea of whether that facility would also be used as an example
    of a recruitment tool? Seems to me that our enemies--almost
    anything that becomes symbolic of the United States of America
    and our fight against them can be used as a radicalization and
    recruitment tool. Have you looked at this issue or have any
    thoughts on that?
        General Kelly. I have a lot of thoughts on it, Senator.
        Senator Ayotte. Well, what are your thoughts?
        General Kelly. I don't believe--well, my belief is, the
    people that--these Islamic terrorists are focused on doing us
    so much harm, not because of GTMO or wherever we house these
    guys; it's really about us, as a people, as a country.
        Senator Ayotte. And what we stand for.
        General Kelly. And what we stand for, the way we live our
    lives, the way we worship any god we want to worship, the way
    we educate in--our little girls. That's why they hate us. I
    don't--they don't need GTMO to hate us. And if you--and if we
    move them to Charleston, then they'd--then it would be--
    Charleston would be--they--it's because of who we are and who
    they are as to why they hate us so much.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you, General.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Tillis.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you.
        Thank you both for your extraordinary leadership and
    service.
        I want to go back to expand on something that Senator
    Donnelly asked. And this has to do--General Kelly, you and I
    met earlier this week, and we were talking about the level of
    situational awareness you have. You know where a lot of these
    bad people are, you may even know their phone number. You know
    where they're moving and when they're moving. So, there's got
    to be a high degree of frustration that you could do so much
    more if you had the resources available. Can you kind of replay
    what we talked about, in terms of just how much you know about
    what's going on down there that you can't really stop because
    you have priorities that you have to leverage your assets?
        General Kelly. Yes, Senator.
        The fusion of intelligence, most of it coming from DEA,
    FBI--and they have agents in many of these countries, living
    full-time, and they work with the law enforcement--the local
    law enforcement. So, the human intelligence is collected by
    them, and it is just remarkable, the clarity that--and then,
    the technical intelligence that the military provides, whether
    it's NSA, satellites--we've got radars that triangulate and
    watch the entire Caribbean. So, we fuse all of that together in
    a place called JIATF-South, in Key West. And the picture we
    have is really remarkable. I mean, as I was mentioning in your
    office, oftentimes we'll know within a couple of hours when one
    of the go-fasts, the speedboats, is going to leave Cartagena
    Harbor, the fact that they have a ton and a half of cocaine
    onboard, that there's two guys, one of whom is--you know, first
    name is Jose, maybe have his phone number. The frustrating
    thing is, we have insufficient airborne ISR [Intelligence,
    Survelliance, Reconnaissance] to then really get the detail on
    him as he's moving. And then, the end game is a law enforcement
    helicopter, usually Coast Guard.
        So, we see it. It's amazing picture, a very, very clear
    picture. It's that we don't have the assets.
        Now, what we've been doing more and more, since we don't
    have the assets and we're getting less and less assets--
    although I will say the Coast Guard Commandant has made a real
    commitment to double the number of Coast Guard cutters. But,
    that'll go from three to six. And he also--the Coast Guard also
    has an awful lot of other missions to accomplish--migration up
    in the Florida straits and all--you know, a lot of other
    things. But, the point is, we're working more and more with the
    partners. The Panamanians are very good partners in this, and
    they take X-number of tons. The Nicaraguans, believe it or not,
    are cooperative in this. And then, certainly the Hondurans or
    Guatemalans.
        The one thing we don't get when--if we--``we,'' the United
    States--apprehend these guys, we bring them into the Federal
    court system, and they very quickly plea bargain, and we get an
    awful lot of intelligence that then goes back into the cycle.
    When our partners get these guys, we kind of lose that ability
    to interrogate them and then offer them a deal they can't
    refuse.
        But, the point is, since I don't have the assets--I've got
    two Navy ships right now. That'll go to zero, forever, in--by
    the summer. And that's not even with sequestration. As I say,
    the Coast Guard Commandant's doubled his commitment, but
    that's, you know, five or six ships.
        So, the answer now is the partners, and try to get them to
    play. And I have to give credit, as well--we, about 6 months a
    year, will have a--at least one Canadian frigate, and they turn
    themselves over to us. And so, we use them in the same way that
    we would use a Coast Guard cutter or Navy ship. The British
    occasionally have a ship down. The Dutch are very cooperative.
    But, they don't have many ships in the region very often. The
    French, out of Martinique. When they're working together with
    us, they plug into our system, and we work them hard.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you.
        Another question for the both of you. Secretary Schultz was
    here a few weeks ago, and he was talking about the border
    security. And he said, when you're talking about the southern
    border, you need to ask the question, ``Which southern
    border?'' That would be the--relating to the Mexican southern
    border. We know it's unsafe, and we know that 80 percent of the
    people coming across our border are not from Mexico. So, there
    seems to be something to be said for looking at both borders
    and trying to figure out how to prioritize.
        And I want y'all to speak on the subject. But, in a general
    way, if we were giving you a dollar and you were setting the
    border security strategy, you had a dollar to spend, how much
    would that be spent on our southern border versus the Mexican
    southern border?
        I know it's an unfair question. You can get back with me if
    you need to. But----
        Admiral Gortney. Well, I'm----
        Senator Tillis.--I think it's important to talk about----
        Admiral Gortney. If----
        Senator Tillis.--how the two are----
        Admiral Gortney. If it's----
        Senator Tillis.--intrinsically liked.
        Admiral Gortney. If it's my dollar, I'm going to put it on
    the Mexican southern border, partnering with Sedena and Semar,
    helping strengthen their southern border, because Homeland
    Security is in charge of our border between Mexico and the
    United States. So, I think my dollar would be better spent
    partnering with Mexico so we can shore up--help assist them
    shore up their southern border so it's less of a challenge up
    on our border.
        General Kelly. And if I had--if had the same dollar, I'd
    work my northern boundary, which is Guatemala, Honduras, and El
    Salvador.
        Senator Tillis. And, Mr. Chair, just--if I may just--as a
    closing comment, I think that the comment, Admiral, in your
    opening comments on page 6 with respect to Iran and their
    trustworthiness--should be emphasized by anybody who hasn't
    read the statements.
        And the last question I have is, in your discussions with
    leaders in Latin America, how do they feel about the current
    administration's policy towards Cuba?
        General Kelly. Actually, in general, they think it's a good
    idea. They know, as they point out to me, that Cuba's problems
    are not due to American embargo or whatever. I mean, it's--
    everyone else on the planet trades with Cuba except us. But,
    their advice is, you know, ``This is a good thing to do,
    because now it gets everyone--all the naysayers off your back,
    you know, all of the people that would criticize United
    States.'' But, at the end of the day, they understand that--you
    know, that the Cubans are--have the worst human rights record
    in the western hemisphere, it's a completely repressive regime,
    and their economic problems are due to their incompetence, not
    due to the embargo. And so, they--but, they think it's a good
    idea, because it gets--friend to friend, it gets people off our
    back, in terms of their--they no longer can criticize us about
    ``the terrible things we've done to Cuba.''
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Well, I thank you both. And it's been very
    helpful.
        And again, General Kelly, we wish you every success in the
    future, and thank you for your service.
        Admiral Gortney, it's great to have you here, and I am sure
    you're looking forward to next year.
        This hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:32 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2016 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                           WEDNESDAY, MARCH 18, 2015

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

     THE POSTURES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY AND THE DEPARTMENT OF THE
                                   AIR FORCE

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m. in room
    SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
    (chairman) of the committee, presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Wicker,
    Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Lee, Cruz, Reed,
    Nelson, McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
    Donnelly, Hirono, King, and Heinrich.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman McCain. Good afternoon.
        This committee meets today to consider the posture of the
    Army and the Air Force in the context of our review and
    oversight of the fiscal year 2016 defense budget request. Both
    of these Services, tested by years of war, are confronting
    growing threats and increasing demands with shrinking forces
    and aging equipment.
        By the end of this fiscal year, the Army will decline from
    a peak of about 570,000 to 490,000 Active Duty personnel. In
    the next few years, the Army will continue cutting its end
    strength down to 450,000 soldiers, a budget-driven force level
    reduction that predated the rise of ISIL, Russia's invasion of
    Ukraine and the Ebola crisis. If mindless sequestration cuts
    are allowed to return, the Army will shrink to 420,000 troops,
    increasing the risk that in a crisis we will have too few
    soldiers who could enter a fight without proper training and
    equipment. With global instability is only increasing and with
    just 33 percent of the Army's Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) ready
    for deployment and decisive operations, I simply do not see any
    strategic basis for the Army Active Force structure to be
    reduced below the pre-September 11 level of 490,000.
        The Air Force posture statement makes clear that there is,
    ``a fundamental disconnect between America's airpower
    expectations and its airpower capability. A quarter century of
    near continuous deployments, frequent aircraft divestments, and
    a decade's long procurement holiday left us with the oldest and
    smallest Air Force in history. The Service's current 54 fighter
    squadrons represent just one-third of the combat power mustered
    for Operation Desert Storm. Less than half of today's already
    insufficient number of fighter squadrons are completely combat
    ready, and they are not expected to return to full readiness
    until 2023 due to the damaging effects of sequestration
    suffered in 2013. Meanwhile, the Service is increasingly
    challenged by potential adversaries who are fielding fifth
    generation fighters and advanced air defense systems.''
        The Air Force posture statement also indicates that,
    ``there was a time when the Air Force could trade some capacity
    in order to retain capability, but we have reached the point
    where the two are inextricable. Lose any more capacity and the
    capability will cease to exist.''
        This statement makes the proposal in the Air Force budget
    request to retire 164 A-10 aircraft in fiscal year 2016 before
    the F-35 is fully operational is all the more confusing. If the
    Air Force cannot afford to lose capacity, why is it
    volunteering to retire its most proven aircraft for close air
    support missions?
        Meanwhile, both Services have critical modernization needs
    that must be met if they are to meet future threats and
    challenges. The Army remains reliant on shrinking wartime
    Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding to replace,
    repair, and recondition equipment that has been lost, damaged,
    or used extensively in more than a decade of war in Iraq and
    Afghanistan. We must ensure this reset is placed on a firm
    fiscal footing which requires the Army to learn the lessons of
    its failed acquisition programs of recent years. These lessons,
    together with the experience of more than a decade of war, must
    guide the procurement of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle
    (JLTV) and the Armored Multipurpose Vehicle (AMPV) by enhancing
    tactical mobility, command and control, medical evacuation, and
    other critical combat functions while significantly improving
    the protection and safety of our soldiers.
        The future of American airpower rests on a number of
    current Air Force modernization programs. With program costs
    approaching $400 billion, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
    is the department's most costly and ambitious acquisition
    program in history. After suffering years of unacceptable cost
    growth and schedule delays, the program appears to have started
    to stabilize. Still, cost, affordability, and technological
    challenges remain. The plan to increase production at the same
    time that development and testing continue will likely add risk
    to this program and could result in further cost growth and
    schedule delays in the future.
        This committee will continue closely scrutinize the overall
    management and performance of the F-35 program and we will hold
    individuals accountable. This committee will provide the same
    close oversight to other critical programs such as the long-
    range strike bomber, the KC-46A tanker, and the presidential
    airlift replacement programs. These very expensive programs
    must be kept on cost and on schedule and deliver the
    capabilities the American taxpayer deserves at the best
    possible value.
        In particular, the committee will closely monitor the Air
    Force's ambitious $550 million unit cost target for the long-
    range strike bomber. This program is essential to overcoming
    growing operational risk to our ability to project power in
    anti-access and denying environments, and it must be delivered
    on time and on budget.
        I must also note my concern with the Air Force's troubling
    lack of urgency in ending our reliance on the Russian RD-180
    rocket engine. Russia annexed Crimea over a year ago. Yet, the
    Air Force does not even have an acquisition strategy yet for a
    new rocket engine. Congress gave the Air Force $220 million in
    fiscal year 2015 and set a deadline of 2019. Instead of giving
    this effort the level of attention needed, the Air Force has
    wasted a year doing very little to end our reliance on Russian
    rocket engines. If the Air Force is unwilling to do what is
    necessary to meet the 2019 deadline, they are going to have to
    figure out how to meet our space launch needs without the RD-
    180. Continued reliance on Russian rocket engines is
    unacceptable, and it is time the Air Force conduct itself
    accordingly.
        I am gravely concerned about the dangerous choice we are
    forcing upon our military, especially the Army and Air Force.
    With the present operational tempo and drastic reductions to
    defense spending, we will inevitably confront depleted
    readiness, chronic modernization plans, and deteriorating
    morale. We must chart a different course or else continue the
    downward spiral of Army and Air Force capacity and readiness
    that will compromise each Service's ability to execute the
    administration's stated defense strategy at a time of
    accumulating danger to America's national security. Such a
    course is within our power. The President's budget request is a
    start, but I believe this Congress can and must do better.
        Senator Reed?

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let
    me welcome the witnesses and thank them for their service and
    also ask them, on behalf of all of us, to thank the soldiers,
    the airmen, and their families who selflessly serve every day.
    If you would do that, I would appreciate it.
        This committee has heard testimony from numerous witnesses
    expressing concern about the effect of the Budget Control Act
    of 2011 (BCA) caps, the threat of sequestration, and the lack
    of budget predictability. Chief of Staff of the Army, General
    Raymond T. Odierno, and Chief of Staff of the Air Force,
    General Mark A. Welsh III, you made a compelling case to the
    committee a month ago about the risks of continued fiscal
    constraints. Recently Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
    General Martin E. Dempsey, testified that funding at the
    President's budget request, which is already $38 billion above
    the BCA caps, will keep the Department of Defense (DOD) at
    the--his words--``lower ragged edge of manageable risk'' and
    will leave ``no slack, no margin for error or strategic
    surprise.'' I do not believe--I share the chairman's view--that
    this is the way to remain the finest fighting force in the
    world.
        The fiscal year 2016 budget request continues
    implementation of the Army size and force structure changes
    directed in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) and the
    2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. At the end of fiscal year
    2016, Active Army end strength will be down to approximately
    475,000 soldiers and combat brigades to 30. The funding request
    for personnel next year is essentially flat compared to this
    year. I would appreciate in your testimony an update about how
    the Army is managing the pace and scope of end strength
    reductions and force structure changes.
        The Army's readiness request in operation and maintenance
    continues to slowly build depth in non-deployed units,
    including 19 combat training center rotations, of which 15 are
    for active and 2 for National Guard combat brigades. I am
    interested in learning how the Army plans to sustain momentum
    in building the readiness of more units over the next several
    years. What are the most important capabilities, capacities,
    and readiness levels in the Army and how does this request fund
    them to meet the missions of today and tomorrow? How would the
    BCA caps impact the Army's management of these changes and the
    associated strategic risk in readiness to meet urgent
    contingencies?
        The challenges of declining resources and the high cost of
    new technologies have driven the Army to make tough choices in
    its major modernization programs. The fiscal year 2016 request
    includes a modest increase over last year for research,
    development, and acquisition emphasizing aviation and science
    and technology programs while deferring investment for a next
    generation combat vehicle or a replacement on the Aerial Scout.
    Again, I am interested in how the Army's budget request and the
    Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), the FYDP supports a
    stable, affordable, and achievable modernization strategy.
        For the Air Force, this budget request reverses a recent
    downward trend in end strength and increases military personnel
    by more than 6,000 airmen, mostly in active duty personnel. I
    am interested in learning how these personnel will be utilized
    because it is my understanding that they will not be allocated
    for remotely piloted aircraft, which is an area recently facing
    a manpower crisis.
        The Air Force wanted to reduce the number of Predator and
    Reaper remotely piloted aircraft combat air patrols it will
    support, but demand from combatant commanders prevented it.
    High tempo Predator and Reaper combat air patrols strain their
    supporting ground crews so much that the Commander of the Air
    Combat Command recently sounded an alarm that we are near the
    point of breaking this critical force. Unfortunately, we have
    been facing the prospect of breaking the Reaper and the
    Predator force for at least the past 6 years, while demand
    continues to exceed supply. The Air Force appears to have made
    little progress in solving this operational problem, and I
    would like to hear, General Welsh, what your thoughts are on
    this issue.
        Once again, the Air Force is proposing significant force
    structure reductions in fiscal year 2016 and the FYDP. For
    example, the Air Force will retire the entire A-10 fighter
    force, will retire roughly 26 older C-130 aircraft leaving
    roughly 275 aircraft to support tactical operations, and would
    make significant reductions in certain high-demand/low-density
    forces such as the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS),
    Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), and
    Compass Call fleets. I am interested to hear how you are
    balancing these savings with mission requirements.
        Finally, Mr. Chairman, we just received the Air Force's
    report on how it intends to implement the recommendations in
    the report of the National Commission on the Structure of the
    Air Force. One of the principle efficiency recommendations of
    the commission would move approximately, in their view, 36,000
    additional active airmen into the Reserve components and
    achieve related savings of roughly $2 billion. The Air Force
    report, however, states that their mission area analysis does
    not support this concept due to the reduction in rotational
    capacity and the resulting increase in risk. So we will need to
    understand why your views are accurate and you would reject
    these recommendations.
        Let me again thank you all for your service and I look
    forward to the testimony.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. I think we begin with Secretary of the
    Army, John M. McHugh. Welcome.

        STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. McHUGH, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

        Mr. McHugh. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, distinguished Ranking
    Member Reed, other equally distinguished members of the
    committee, I deeply appreciate the opportunity to be here with
    you today to discuss further the danger, truly, that lies ahead
    should this budget not be enacted and, most importantly, if
    sequestration is allowed to return.
        In short, it is truly amazing how much can change in just 1
    year. Over the last 12 months, we have been the geopolitical
    landscape morph at really an astonishing pace. As the chairman
    so accurately noted in his opening remarks, from renewed
    aggression by Russia and increased threats from North Korea to
    gains by radical terrorists in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, not to
    mention the fight against Ebola, the demand for your Army to
    take contingencies around the world has grown at an alarming
    rate. Far from being foreseeable, our requirements have been
    more unexpected, our enemies more unpredictable, and our
    ability to handle multiple, simultaneous operations more
    uncertain.
        Yet, with such volatility and instability around the world,
    America's Army is faced yet again with an enemy here at home,
    the return of sequestration, unprepared units, un-maintained
    equipment, untrained soldiers. Ladies and gentlemen, our Army,
    your Army faces a dark and dangerous future unless this
    Congress acts now to end these ill-conceived and inflexible
    budget cuts.
        Moreover, I want to be very clear here. Every installation,
    every component, and nearly every program will feel the brunt
    of these cuts. Under sequestration, by 2019 we will be forced
    to reduce our end strength to unconscionable levels, likely
    losing another six Brigate Combat Teams (BCT) and potentially a
    division headquarters, not to mention the impacts to associated
    enablers, contracts, facilities, and civilian personnel.
        Let me share with you some accomplishments of America's
    Army this past year. As Russian-backed forces rolled into
    Ukraine, annexed Crimea, and threatened regional stability, our
    soldiers rapidly deployed to Eastern Europe in a demonstration
    of U.S. commitment and resolve. From Latvia and Lithuania to
    Poland and Estonia, soldiers from the 173rd Airborne and the
    1st Cavalry showed the world that America would stand with our
    North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and respond to
    unbridled aggression.
        In West Africa, as thousands suffered from the scourge of
    Ebola, your Army acted. Elements of several units led by the
    101st Airborne provided command and control, equipment, and
    expertise to support efforts to stop this deadly and
    destabilizing disease.
        In response to rapid gains by the Islamic State of Iraq and
    the Levant (ISIL), your soldiers quickly returned to Iraq to
    advise and assist security forces in turning the tide on this
    barbaric group of radical terrorists.
        In the Pacific, thousands of soldiers and civilians
    supported operations to strengthen our partnerships and
    increase our substantial presence.
        Today, the headquarters of nine Active Army and two Guard
    divisions are committed to combatant commanders. Some 143,000
    soldiers are deployed, forward-stationed, or committed,
    including over 19,000 Reserve component soldiers.
        Moreover, we have done all of this while continuing to
    transform to make our units leaner, more agile, and far more
    lethal. As all of you know so well, such extraordinary success
    comes at a price, for in the end, the young lieutenant meeting
    his or her platoon, the sergeants training and mentoring their
    soldiers, the invaluable civilian workforce labor in countless
    orders to support them, and the young family waiting patiently
    at home are all human. The stress of war, multiple deployments,
    and unpredictable requirements does not change in the face of
    indiscriminate funding cuts.
        Through it all, we have and we will remain committed to
    supporting the needs of our warriors and their families. From
    programs to increase resilience and improve behavioral health
    to the prevention of sexual assault and the protection of
    victims from retaliation, we will keep faith with our soldiers.
    Rest assured, the return to sequestration will directly impact
    critical installation and family programs Army-wide.
        Let me put it simply. We need the President's budget. Our
    $126.5 billion request, as the chairman noted, is some $6
    billion over the potential sequester level and is specifically
    designed to preserve our modest gains in readiness over the
    last year and take care of your soldiers.
        Moreover, this request seeks vital reforms to compensation
    and force structure that will ensure funding needed to support
    near-term readiness and help place the Army on a predictable
    path to balance. The modest changes to pay and allowances
    through our aviation restructuring initiatives, our reforms are
    both necessary and prudent to sustain the readiness of our
    forces and move the Army toward eventual balance. I cannot
    emphasize enough how critical these funds and reforms are to
    ensuring that your Army has sufficiently trained and ready
    soldiers to protect our Nation.
        I also recognize that we have the duty to prudently use the
    scarce resources that the American people provide through all
    of you. From my first day in office, I sought and supported
    numerous reforms and efficiencies from improving our
    procurement process to drastically cutting our headquarters. We
    take stewardship very seriously. Frankly, historically the
    Army's track record on acquisition programs is too often a tale
    of failure, too many under-performing or canceled programs, too
    few successful fieldings of developmental designs, and far too
    many taxpayer dollars wasted. We know this and we will do
    better.
        In this critical area, while many significant strides have
    been made over the last 5 years in reducing bureaucracy and
    improving our oversight, we have a long way to go. Mr.
    Chairman, I would note that we are especially heartened by your
    and Chairman Thornberry's commitment to making measured,
    deliberate, and comprehensive reforms to the defense
    acquisition system, and we look forward to working with you on
    these vital efforts.
        Ladies and gentlemen, this is a historic moment. We need to
    stop talking and we need together to start acting. We need
    wisdom not words. We need results not rhetoric. As I said
    before this distinguished panel last year, we need
    predictability not politics. As we face extreme instability
    around the world, we must have certainty here at home. Your
    soldiers--and I know you agree--deserve no less. We must have
    an end to sequestration this year, and we must have this
    budget.
        On behalf of the nearly 1.3 million men and women of
    America's Army--Active, Guard, Reserve, and civilian--thank you
    for your continued oversight, partnership, your leadership and
    support. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the
    committee's questions.
        [The joint prepared statement of Mr. McHugh and General
    Odierno follows:]
      Joint Prepared Statement by Hon. John M. McHugh and GEN Raymond T.
                                  Odierno, USA
                               executive summary
        Now more than ever, in today's uncertain and dynamic security
    environment, we must be prepared to meet multiple, wide-ranging
    requirements across the globe simultaneously while retaining the
    ability to react to the unknown. The velocity of instability around the
    world has increased, and the Army is now operating on multiple
    continents simultaneously in ways unforeseen a year ago. In short, our
    Army is busy. We are fully engaged and our operational tempo will not
    subside for the foreseeable future. In the wake of Russia's
    intervention in Ukraine, the Army deployed forces to Eastern Europe in
    a demonstration of U.S. commitment and resolve. In West Africa, the
    Army provided support for the U.S. Agency for International
    Development's humanitarian mission to stem the tide of the Ebola virus.
    In response to regional instability in the Middle East, Army forces
    have recommitted to advise and assist Iraqi Government forces and the
    Kurdish Peshmerga. Across the Pacific, thousands of Army forces are
    supporting operations to strengthen our partnerships and alliances as
    part of Pacific Pathways in places like Thailand, the Philippines,
    Malaysia, Australia, Indonesia, and the Republic of Korea. We remain
    committed to protecting the enduring Armistice on the Korean Peninsula.
    Our soldiers remain on point in Afghanistan, even as we draw down our
    forces there. Currently, 9 of 10 Regular Army and 2 Army National Guard
    division headquarters are committed in support of combatant commands,
    with more than 143,000 soldiers deployed, forward stationed, or
    committed and 19,000 Reserve soldiers mobilized.
        Last year, we testified that the minimum force necessary to execute
    the defense strategy was a force floor of 450,000 in the Regular Army,
    335,000 in the Army National Guard and 195,000 in the Army Reserve--a
    total of 980,000 soldiers. That assessment has not changed and is based
    on certain planning assumptions regarding the duration, number and size
    of future missions. When determining these assessed force levels, we
    also made clear that risks at this level would grow if our underlying
    assumptions proved inaccurate. Although we still believe we can meet
    the primary missions of the Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) today, our
    ability to do so has become tenuous. There is a growing divide between
    the Budget Control Act's (BCA) arbitrary funding mechanism--that has
    seen the Army budget drop in nominal terms every year since enacted in
    2011--and the emerging geopolitical realities confronting us now across
    Europe, the Middle East, Africa and the Pacific, along with the growing
    threats to our Homeland. Risk thereby increases to our force, our
    national security and our Nation. As the Army approaches a Total Army
    end strength of 980,000 soldiers by fiscal year 2018, we must
    constantly assess the operational tempo and its impacts on the health
    and viability of the force. We must ensure we have both the capability
    to respond to unforeseen demands and the capacity to sustain high
    levels of readiness.
        So, as the Army looks to the future and continues to downsize, we
    have developed a new Army Operating Concept, ``Win in a Complex
    World.'' The foundation of the Army Operating Concept is our ability to
    conduct joint combined arms maneuver. The Army Operating Concept
    endeavors to build a force operating alongside multiple partners able
    to create multiple dilemmas for our adversaries, while giving
    commanders multiple options and synchronizing and integrating effects
    from multiple domains onto and from land. Recognizing the changing
    world around us, the Army Operating Concept envisions an Army that is
    expeditionary, tailorable, scalable, and prepared to meet the
    challenges of the global environment. The Army Operating Concept sets
    the foundation upon which our leaders can focus our efforts and
    resources to maintain strategic and operational flexibility to deter
    and operate in multiple regions simultaneously--in all phases of
    military operations--to prevent conflict, shape the security
    environment, and win wars now and in the future.
        Nevertheless, fiscal challenges brought on by the BCA strain our
    ability to bring into balance readiness, modernization and end
    strength. The BCA puts at significant risk the Army's ability to meet
    the Army's obligations within the DSG and fulfill its national security
    requirements. Even as demand for Army forces is growing, budget cuts
    are forcing us to reduce end strength to dangerously low levels. We
    face an ``ends'' and ``means'' mismatch between requirements and
    resources available.
        The BCA and sequestration have already had a detrimental impact on
    readiness and modernization. Budget constraints have significantly
    impacted every Army modernization program, forcing the delay of
    critical investments in next generation capabilities, to include
    training support and power projection capabilities across Army
    installations. Although the Bipartisan Budget Agreement (BBA) provided
    fiscal relief to the Army in fiscal year 2014, in fiscal year 2015 the
    Army budget decreased by $6B. We now face a fiscal year 2016 defense
    spending cap insufficient for operating in an unstable global security
    environment that presents the Army with a number of urgent, complex and
    challenging missions. The fiscal year 2016 spending cap--set almost 4
    years ago--has not kept pace with the geopolitical reality unfolding
    around the world.
        We know we must strike a balance between resources and capacity.
    The Army fully supports fiscal responsibility and has worked diligently
    and consistently to be a good steward of taxpayer dollars. In that
    regard, we have made many tough choices. There are critical cost-saving
    measures that allow the Army to further reallocate scarce resources to
    ensure Army forces remain as trained and ready as possible. These
    include compensation reform, sustainable energy and resource
    initiatives, a new round of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) and the
    Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI). We ask Congress to support these
    initiatives because without the flexibility to manage our budgets to
    achieve the greatest capability possible, we will be forced to make
    reductions to manpower, modernization and training that are larger,
    less efficient and longer-standing in the damage they inflict on the
    Army.
        We also need consistent and predictable funding. The use of
    Continuing Resolutions wreaks havoc with Army readiness, modernization
    and end strength. It makes long term planning difficult, especially
    with the uncertainties that exist if we return to sequestration in
    fiscal year 2016. As a result, we are forced to train intermittently
    and the materiel and equipment we buy costs more and takes longer to
    acquire. This ongoing budgetary unpredictability is neither militarily
    nor fiscally responsible. To maintain an appropriate level of
    readiness, the Army must receive consistent funding for training each
    year. Unless Congress eases the BCA defense caps, the Army will
    experience degraded readiness coupled with increased risk, making it
    more difficult for us to provide for the common defense. Each passing
    year, the BCA increases risk for sending insufficiently trained and
    equipped soldiers into harm's way, and that is not a risk our Nation
    should accept.
        Lastly, our profession is built on trust. In holding true to that
    trust, our Nation expects our competence, commitment and character to
    reflect our Army values. To that end, we are working to reduce and, in
    the future, eliminate sexual assault and sexual harassment, which
    destroys good order and discipline and is contrary to our core values.
    We are also increasing opportunities for women and opening positions
    based on standards free on any gender bias. Finally, our programs like
    Soldier for Life and the Ready and Resilient Campaign are demonstrating
    our sacred commitment to care for our soldiers, our civilians and their
    families who selflessly sacrifice so much. These are actions we have
    taken because it is the right thing to do.
                                  introduction
        Last year, we testified before Congress that the minimum end
    strength the Army requires to execute the 2012 Defense Strategic
    Guidance is 980,000 soldiers--450,000 in the Regular Army, 335,000 in
    the Army National Guard and 195,000 in the Army Reserve. We described
    how the Army moved to implement the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review
    (QDR) guidance by shaping the force while supporting the fight in
    Afghanistan and deploying forces to address several unexpected
    challenges around the world. In contrast to the projections outlined in
    the defense strategy, the regional security and stability in Europe,
    Africa, the Middle East and the Pacific have deteriorated over the past
    12-24 months in ways we did not anticipate. These growing and emerging
    threats to the global security environment compel us to rethink our
    assessment of the drawdown. For the next 3 years, as we restructure to
    operate as a smaller force, the Army faces readiness challenges and
    extensive modernization delays. Under the President's budget, we will
    begin to regain balance between end strength, modernization, and
    readiness beyond fiscal year 2017. Although we still believe we can
    meet the fundamental requirements of the DSG at 980,000 regular, Guard,
    and Reserve soldiers, it is a tenuous balance. The risk to our national
    security and our force itself continues to increase with rising
    instability and uncertainty across Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and
    the Pacific, along with a growing threat to the Homeland. Any force
    reductions below 980,000 soldiers will render our Army unable to meet
    all elements of the DSG, and we will not be able to meet the multiple
    challenges to U.S. national interests without incurring an imprudent
    level of risk to our Nation's security.
                   increasing velocity of global instability
        The accelerating insecurity and instability across Europe, the
    Middle East, Africa, and the Pacific, coupled with the continued threat
    to the homeland and our ongoing operations in Afghanistan, remain a
    significant concern to the Army. The Islamic State in Iraq and the
    Levant's (ISIL) unforeseen expansion and the rapid disintegration of
    order in Iraq and Syria have dramatically escalated conflict in the
    region. Order within Yemen is splintering; the al Qaeda insurgency and
    Houthi expansion continues there; and the country is quickly
    approaching a civil war. In North and West Africa, anarchy, extremism
    and terrorism continue to threaten the interests of the United States,
    as well as our allies and partners. In Europe, Russia's intervention in
    Ukraine challenges the resolve of the European Union. Across the Asia-
    Pacific, China's lack of transparency regarding its military
    modernization efforts raise concerns with the United States and our
    allies, and the continuing development of North Korea's nuclear and
    missile programs contributes to instability. The rate of humanitarian
    and disaster relief missions, such as the recent threat of Ebola,
    heightens the level of uncertainty we face around the world, along with
    constantly evolving threats to the homeland. With the velocity of
    instability increasing around the world, continuing unrest in the
    Middle East, and the threat of terrorism growing rather than receding--
    witness the recent tragedies in Paris and Nigeria--now is not the time
    to drastically reduce capability and capacity.
        The Army, as part of the Joint Force, operates globally in
    environments characterized by growing urbanization, the potential for
    the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, malicious cyber and
    information operations, humanitarian crises and the deleterious effects
    of climate change. Sectarian violence exploited by state and non-state
    actors, irredentism and terrorist activities are driving conflict
    around the world. The corrosive effects of drug and human trafficking
    by transnational criminal organizations undermine State authority and
    trigger a destabilizing level of violence in places such as Central and
    South America. These combined factors lead to vulnerable populations
    and threats that appear across multiple domains, the sum of which will
    continue to challenge global security and cooperation in ways that are
    difficult to anticipate.
        No single strategic challenger is likely to gain overall
    superiority over U.S. military capabilities in the near future. Even
    so, competitors of the United States seek to negate our strengths,
    exploit our vulnerabilities, and gain temporary or local superiority in
    one or more capability areas. It is unlikely any of these challengers
    will choose traditional force-on-force confrontation with American
    forces. Instead, potential adversaries are likely to pursue and
    emphasize indirect and asymmetric techniques. Their strategies may
    include employing anti-access/area denial capabilities, using
    surrogates, subverting our allies, using cyber and information
    operations, staying under our threshold for combat or simply prolonging
    conflict to test our resolve.
        One of the most important global security bulwarks is the U.S.
    network of security alliances and partners. This valuable asset to U.S.
    national security and global stability is entering a period of
    transition. Traditional allies in Europe face significant economic and
    demographic burdens that exert downward pressure on defense budgets. As
    a consequence, allies and partners who have joined us in past coalition
    operations may be less apt to do so in the future. Building the
    security capacity necessary for regional stability requires sustained
    and focused engagement. Active engagement with allies, friends and
    partners is resource-intensive, but will be essential to sustaining
    global multilateral security. This combination of threats and
    conditions creates an increasingly dangerous and unpredictable
    operational environment and underscores the need for a U.S. Army that
    is agile, responsive and regionally engaged.
          demand for a globally responsive and regionally engaged army
        It is imperative we maintain strategic and operational flexibility
    to deter and operate in multiple regions simultaneously--in all phases
    of military operations--to prevent conflicts, shape the security
    environment and, when necessary, win in support of U.S. policy
    objectives. The Army is and will continue to be the backbone of the
    Joint Force, providing fundamental capabilities to each of the
    combatant commanders such as command and control, logistics,
    intelligence and communications support to set the theater, as well as
    providing ground combat forces, Special Operations Forces, and Joint
    Task Force (JTF) headquarters. Demand for Army capabilities and
    presence continues to increase across combatant commands in response to
    emerging contingencies. The Army has sent rotational forces to Europe,
    Kuwait, and the Republic of Korea, and established JTF Headquarters in
    Iraq, Afghanistan, Honduras, the Horn of Africa and Jordan. In multiple
    areas of responsibility, the Army is meeting simultaneous requirements
    based on our 10 primary DSG missions. As part of the Joint Force, we
    support combatant commanders and work with interagency partners and our
    allies to enhance security cooperation, provide foreign humanitarian
    assistance, build partner capacity and participate in multi-lateral
    exercises.
        We are making the Army more agile, adaptable and expeditionary than
    ever before. For example, there is an infantry battalion forward-
    deployed in Djibouti, and units in Kuwait positioned to quickly respond
    anywhere in the Middle East. Even as we reduce our presence in
    Afghanistan, the global demand for Brigade Combat Teams (BCT), the
    Army's basic warfighting units, is projected to decrease by only one
    before 2016. Combatant commanders' demand for Patriot missile
    battalions and Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) batteries
    exceeds our capacity, significantly limiting options in emerging
    crises, and exceeding the Army's ability to meet Department of Defense
    (DOD) deployment-to-dwell rotation goals for these units. In fiscal
    year 2016, we expect combatant command and interagency demand for Army
    forces will increase further in areas such as logistics, intelligence,
    cyber, space, air and missile defense, signal, aviation, Special
    Operations Forces and mission command.
        Demand for Army division headquarters is already high and we expect
    this trend to continue. Combatant commanders rely upon the proven
    mission-command capabilities of our division headquarters and the
    essential shaping effects of Army enabler units including Intelligence,
    Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms. In the last year, we
    deployed the 1st Infantry Division headquarters to U.S. Central Command
    in support of the multinational effort to defeat ISIL, and we delivered
    the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) headquarters to synchronize
    national and international efforts to counter the Ebola virus in West
    Africa. Additionally, 1st Armored Division Headquarters conducts
    operations in Jordan; 2nd Infantry Division protects the Republic of
    Korea; 3rd Infantry Division advises and assists in Afghanistan; and
    4th Infantry Division assures our allies in Europe. All told, elements
    of 9 out of 10 Regular Army division headquarters and 2 Army National
    Guard division headquarters, including the Global Response Force, are
    currently deployed or prepared to deploy around the globe supporting
    commitments to the Pacific Theater and the Republic of Korea;
    Afghanistan, Jordan, Iraq and Kuwait; Africa; Eastern Europe; and the
    Homeland.
        Consequently, we must size and shape the Army for the world in
    which we live. First, through the Army, and the presence it provides,
    we will fulfill our collective security obligations, defend our
    citizens and protect our national interests when the Nation calls upon
    us. Second, a robust Army provides combatant commanders with essential
    capacity to more fully engage allies and shape the security environment
    across their areas of responsibility. Finally, appropriate Army force
    levels reduce the risk of being ``too wrong'' in our assumptions about
    the future.
        Unlike previous eras and conflicts, today's fast-paced world simply
    does not allow us the time to regenerate capabilities after a crisis
    erupts. Faced with a national crisis, we will fight with the Army we
    have, but there will be consequences. Generating the Army is a complex
    endeavor that requires policy decisions, dollars, soldiers,
    infrastructure and, most importantly, time. It takes approximately 30
    months to generate a fully manned and trained Regular Army BCT once the
    Army decides to expand the force. Senior command and control
    headquarters, such as divisions and corps, take even longer to generate
    and train to be effective given the skill sets and training required of
    soldiers manning these formations. Overall, we must acknowledge that
    today's highly-technological, All-Volunteer Force is much different
    than the industrial age armies of the past.
        Finally, with flexibility to balance structure, modernization and
    readiness within budgetary authority, we can best mitigate the risk
    imposed by budget reductions and end strength reductions to adapt to a
    rapidly-changing operating environment. Achieving this balance will
    enhance our ability to redesign the force for the future, experiment
    with new, innovative operational concepts and rebuild critical
    collective skills, all while taking care of our soldiers and their
    families in a manner consistent with their service and sacrifice.
    Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World
        Even as the Army confronts the many challenges wrought by
    sequestration, we continue to seek efficiencies while adapting to the
    complexities of an evolving and unstable security environment. It is
    imperative that our Army adapts to the future joint operating
    environment, one that consists of diverse enemies that employ
    traditional, irregular and hybrid strategies which threaten U.S.
    security and vital interests. In October of last year, we introduced
    the new Army Operating Concept, ``Win in a Complex World.'' The
    foundation of this concept is our ability to conduct joint combined
    arms maneuver. It endeavors to build a force operating alongside
    multiple partners able to create multiple dilemmas for our adversaries,
    while giving commanders multiple options and synchronizing and
    integrating effects from multiple domains onto and from land.
    Recognizing the changing world around us, the Army Operating Concept
    envisions an Army that is expeditionary, tailorable, scalable and
    prepared to meet the challenges of the global environment. The Army
    Operating Concept reinforces our five strategic priorities:

        1.  Develop adaptive Army leaders for a complex world;
        2.  Build a globally responsive and regionally engaged Army;
        3.  Provide a ready and modern Army;
        4.  Strengthen our commitment to our Army profession; and
        5.  Sustain the premier All-Volunteer Army.

        The Army Operating Concept also describes the Army's contribution
    to globally integrated operations. Army forces provide foundational
    capabilities required by the combat commanders to synchronize and
    integrate effects across land and from land into the air, maritime,
    space, and cyberspace domains. The Army Operating Concept ensures that
    we are prepared to lead joint, interorganizational, and multinational
    teams in complex security environments.
        Through a dedicated ``Campaign of Learning'' under Force 2025
    Maneuvers, we will assess new capabilities, design and doctrine. This
    enables future innovation of our expeditionary capabilities and
    enhanced agility. We are assessing key capabilities such as manned-
    unmanned teaming, operational energy and expeditionary command posts.
    We are focusing our innovation efforts in this Campaign of Learning to
    ensure we address the 20 Army Warfighting Challenges. The Army
    Warfighting Challenges are the enduring first-order problems, and
    solving them will improve combat effectiveness. These challenges range
    from shaping the Security Environment, to countering Weapons of Mass
    Destruction, to conducting Space and Cyber Operations, to Integrating
    and Delivering Fires to Exercising Mission Command. The Army Operating
    Concept represents a long-term, cost-effective way to enhance
    readiness, improve interoperability and modernize the force. It is also
    a cost-effective way to assess and demonstrate Joint and multinational
    interoperability and readiness. We must continue to learn and apply
    what we learn as we rethink how the Army operates to ``Win in a Complex
    World.''
    President's Budget Request
        This year, the President's budget requests $126.5 billion for the
    Army base budget. This budget request is about $5.4 billion above what
    Congress enacted in fiscal year 2015. The President's budget requests
    $6 billion more than an expected sequester-level budget. This
    additional $6 billion will be invested in readiness and procurement:

             $3.4 billion for training, sustainment and
            installation programs directly supporting combat readiness;
            and,
             $2.6 billion for Research and Development, and
            Acquisition accounts in order to equip soldiers across the
            regular, Guard, and Reserve Forces, sustain critical parts of
            the industrial base and invest in innovation supporting the
            Army Operating Concept.

        These increases are critical to achieving sustainable readiness
    needed to meet the demands of today's complex environment, while
    preserving manpower needed to prevent hollowness in our formations.
        As Congress reviews our budget for this year, we ask that you
    compare our funding levels to what we asked for and executed in fiscal
    year 2013 and fiscal year 2014, rather than to the near-sequestration
    level funding enacted in fiscal year 2015. With the support of
    Congress, the Army executed $125 billion in fiscal year 2014 to begin
    rebuilding readiness lost in fiscal year 2013 due to sequestration. The
    fiscal year 2015--enacted level of $121 billion is challenging
    commanders across the Army to sustain readiness while reorganizing
    formations to operate as smaller forces. In fiscal year 2015, we are
    significantly reducing key installation and family services, individual
    training events and modernization to such an extent as to jeopardize
    future readiness and quality of life. The Army's budget request for
    fiscal year 2016 continues to focus on building near-term readiness
    through predictability and continuity in funding levels.
        One critical assumption in the President's budget request is that
    Congress will enact necessary compensation and force restructuring. We
    fully support modest reforms to pay raises, health care and other
    benefits that have been proposed. Without these reforms, savings
    assumptions we have included in our planning will not be realized,
    placing increasing pressure on further end strength reductions and
    reducing funding needed to sustain readiness. The President is
    proposing over $25 billion in compensation reforms including slowing
    the growth of Basic Allowance for Housing, changing TRICARE, reducing
    the commissary subsidy and slowing the growth in basic pay. Should
    Congress fail to enact these reforms, the effects of budget shortfalls
    in programs and services throughout the force will wreak havoc on our
    formations. We will have to make decisions at every Army installation
    that will impact the quality of life, morale and readiness of our
    soldiers. Without appropriate compensation reform, the Army would need
    an additional $10.4 billion across the program years to meet our basic
    requirements. To the extent Congress does not approve the extra topline
    or the reforms, we would have to find another $2-3 billion per year in
    reductions, thereby further diminishing the size and capability of our
    fighting force. None of these reforms are easy, but all are necessary.
        One of our most important reforms is the Aviation Restructuring
    Initiative (ARI), which we continued in fiscal year 2015. Our current
    aviation structure is unaffordable, so the Army's plan avoids $12
    billion in costs and saves an additional $1 billion annually if we
    fully implement ARI. We simply cannot afford to maintain our current
    aviation structure and sustain modernization while providing trained
    and ready aviation units across all three components. Our comprehensive
    approach through ARI will ultimately allow us to eliminate obsolete
    airframes, sustain a modernized fleet, and reduce sustainment costs.
        Through ARI, we will eliminate nearly 700 aircraft and 3 Combat
    Aviation Brigades from the Active component, while only reducing 111
    airframes from the Reserve component. ARI eliminates and reorganizes
    structure, while increasing capabilities in order to minimize risk to
    meeting operational requirements within the capacity of remaining
    aviation units across all components. If the Army does not execute ARI,
    we will incur additional costs associated with buying additional
    aircraft and structure at the expense of modernizing current and future
    aviation systems in the total force.
        Although we disagree with the need for a Commission on the Future
    of the Army, as directed in the National Defense Authorization Act, we
    will fully support the Commission as it examines and assesses the force
    structure and force mix decisions the Army has proposed for Active and
    Reserve components.
    Impacts of Sequestration
        In support of the President's fiscal year 2015 budget request,
    which reflected the outcomes of the Secretary of Defense's 2013
    Strategic Choices and Management Review and the 2014 QDR, we emphasized
    that the updated defense strategy, combined with reduced Army force
    levels, had increased the risk level to ``significant,'' and would
    become manageable only after the Army achieved balance between end
    strength, readiness and modernization. At force levels driven by
    affordability under full sequestration, the Army cannot fully implement
    its role in the defense strategy. Sequestration would require the Army
    to further reduce our Total Army end strength to at least 920,000, or
    60,000 below the 980,000 currently reflected in the President's budget
    request.
        Global demands for the Army are increasing, but end strength,
    readiness and modernization cuts greatly reduce our ability to respond
    at a time when the instability is accelerating worldwide. As a result,
    we are faced with an ends and means disparity between what is required
    of us and what we are resourced to accomplish. This has real impacts
    for our national security. Long-term fiscal predictability will allow
    the Army to balance force structure, end strength, modernization and
    readiness, while providing the Nation a trained and ready force
    prepared to win in a complex world. Without this investment, we will
    see immediate degradations in recruiting, manning, training, equipping
    and sustaining Army readiness during a time of great uncertainty and
    growing worldwide instability.
        Although we are already expecting a decline in the overall
    readiness of our forces in fiscal year 2015, it pales in comparison to
    the decrease of readiness under expected sequester levels in fiscal
    year 2016. Sequestration measures will not only dissipate the modest
    gains we achieved, but will leave the Army in a hollow and precarious
    state. The impact of sequestration on the Army's fiscal year 2016
    funding levels would cause an abrupt and immediate degradation of
    training, readiness and modernization. Relief from full sequester-
    levels in fiscal year 2014 provided some predictability and allowed for
    partial recovery from fiscal year 2013's low readiness levels. However,
    the Army demonstrated a need for funding above the enacted $121 billion
    topline in fiscal year 2015, as savings from drawing down end strength
    are manifesting as rapidly as possible. Current funding levels afforded
    just over a third of our BCTs the training necessary to conduct
    decisive action. This year, we face significant challenges to sustain
    even that level of readiness in our dynamic operating environment.
        If sequestration remains unchanged, the consequences for our Army
    will be dramatic. Another round of cuts will render our force unable to
    meet all elements of the DSG without creating additional risk to our
    soldiers. Reductions in end strength brought on by sequestration will
    limit our ability to provide strategic options to the President and
    pose unacceptable risk by placing into question our capacity to execute
    even one prolonged, multi-phased major contingency operation. We will
    experience significant degradations in readiness and modernization,
    which will extend adverse impacts well into the next decade,
    exacerbating the time the Army requires to regain full readiness. The
    Nation cannot afford the impacts of sequestration. Our national
    security is at stake.
    Achieving End Strength Reductions
        By the end of fiscal year 2015, we will have reduced the Regular
    Army by over 80,000 soldiers, 8,000 in the Army National Guard, and
    7,000 in the Army Reserve. Commensurate with these reductions, the Army
    will achieve an end strength by the end of fiscal year 2015 of 490,000
    Regular Army, 350,000 Army National Guard, and 202,000 Army Reserve.
    Consistent with available budget resources, the 2014 Quadrennial
    Defense Review and the DSG, the Army will continue to reduce its end
    strength in fiscal year 2016 as follows: the Regular Army will shrink
    by 15,000 (3.1 percent) to 475,000; the Army National Guard will shrink
    by 8,000 (2.3 percent) to 342,000; and the Army Reserve will shrink by
    4,000 (2 percent) to 198,000.
        To achieve required end strength reductions, we will need to
    separate soldiers who have served their nation honorably. Cumulatively,
    we will have reduced our Regular Army end strength from a wartime high
    of 570,000 to 475,000 by the end of 2016 (17 percent reduction), while
    our Army National Guard will have reduced its end strength from a
    wartime high of 358,000 to 342,000 (4.5 percent reduction) and the Army
    Reserve will have reduced its end strength from a wartime high of
    205,000 to 198,000 (3.4 percent reduction). These reductions put the
    Army on a glide path to meet the targeted force of 980,000 in fiscal
    year 2018. For all components of the Army, this end strength is smaller
    than the pre-2001 force structure.
        Although we are making reductions in the overall end strength of
    the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve, we have continued to
    invest in higher full-time support levels, including Active, Guard, and
    Reserve, military technicians and civilians. This budget supports
    82,720 full-time support positions in fiscal year 2016 as compared to
    68,000 in fiscal year 2001. This level of full-time support constitutes
    a 20 percent increase since 2001.
        In the Army civilian workforce, we have reduced Department of the
    Army civilians from the wartime high levels of 285,000 and will
    continue to reduce appropriately over the coming years. While
    necessary, these reductions in the civilian workforce have and will
    continue to adversely impact capabilities such as medical treatment,
    training, depot and range maintenance, installation emergency services,
    physical security and select intelligence functions. In all of the
    reductions across the Total Army, we are taking prudent measures to
    ensure we balance requirements and capacity.
        To achieve planned end strength reductions, the Army expects to use
    various types of separation authorities across all elements of the
    Total Force. The National Defense Authorization Acts for fiscal year
    2012 and fiscal year 2013 provided several authorities to help the Army
    shape the force over the drawdown period, along with the flexibility to
    apply them to meet specific grade and skill requirements. Under normal
    loss rates, we would not be able to reach our end strength goal during
    the fiscal year 2015--fiscal year 2017 period. There is no single
    force-shaping method among the choices of accession, retention and
    separation that allows the Army to achieve its end strength goals;
    inevitably, we will have to involuntarily separate quality soldiers.
    Closely managing accession levels, selectively promoting and following
    more stringent retention standards will help shape the force over time.
        Although the Army expects to lose combat-seasoned soldiers and
    leaders, throughout this process, our focus will be on retaining
    individuals with the greatest potential for future service in the right
    grades and skills. As soldiers depart the Regular Army, we are
    committed to assisting them and their Families as they reintegrate into
    civilian communities. Leaders across the Army are engaged in ``Soldier
    for Life,'' a continuum of service concept that facilitates transition
    to civilian employment, educational opportunities and service in the
    Reserve components.
                             ensuring a ready army
        During this period of drawdown, the Army is reorganizing,
    realigning and restructuring forces. The Brigade Combat Team
    reorganization enhances brigade combat power by adding a third maneuver
    battalion to 38 BCTs by the end of fiscal year 2015 and reducing the
    total number of BCTs to 60 (32 Regular Army and 28 Army National Guard)
    in the Total Force.
        Since May 2014, we have been developing a sustainable force
    generation and readiness model to account for the new, volatile,
    strategic operating environment; the need to remain regionally-engaged
    and budgetary and force sizing realities. The Sustainable Readiness
    Model will provide force generation policies and processes that
    optimize the readiness of the force and balance the Army's steady state
    missions, contingency response capability and available resources. We
    cannot predict the specific events that will cause the next demand for
    Army forces, but history suggests it will come sooner than we expect.
    All components of the Army must remain sized and postured as essential
    members of the Joint Force to protect the Nation and its interests.
        Even with funding relief from sequestration in fiscal year 2014, in
    fiscal year 2015 we returned to near-sequestration level funding,
    resulting in just a third of our BCTs trained in their core mission
    capabilities in decisive action. The President's budget request
    increases readiness funding above fiscal year 2015 levels, which is
    critical to sustaining and improving readiness of the force. In fiscal
    year 2014, the Army completed 19 rotations at the Combat Training
    Centers (CTCs), including 6 rotations for deploying BCTs and 13
    decisive action training rotations (12 Regular Army and one Army
    National Guard). Fiscal year 2015 funding levels challenge Army
    commanders to sustain continuity in readiness across the force;
    however, we remain committed to CTC rotations to build leader and unit
    readiness. Fiscal year 2015 plans fund 19 CTC rotations, with 15
    Regular Army and 2 Army National Guard decisive action rotations, with
    fiscal year 2016 continuing this level of CTC exercises. We are
    improving Training Support Systems to enable more realistic home
    station training, increase collective training proficiency and enhance
    operational readiness for contingencies across the globe; however,
    funding constraints in fiscal year 2015 impede our ability to maximize
    home station training goals. The President's budget request for fiscal
    year 2016 allows the Army to increase training readiness to battalion-
    level across the Active component force and to platoon-level in the
    Reserves. Lower funding levels will not allow us to achieve this
    balanced readiness.
        Although the Army attempts to mitigate the impacts on training
    readiness, we must continue to implement the Contingency Force model of
    fiscal year 2015 in order to maintain readiness for the 24 of 60 BCTs
    that will receive sufficient funding to conduct training at CTCs and
    home station. Funding shortages will limit the remaining 36 BCTs to
    minimum Individual/Crew/Squad resourcing levels through sufficient
    Training Support Systems (TSS). In short, sequestration forces the Army
    to ration readiness. Regardless of funding levels, we are committed to
    keeping CTCs a priority.
        Our aim is to provide tough, realistic multi-echelon home station
    training using a mix of live, virtual and constructive methods that
    efficiently and effectively build soldier, leader, and unit competency
    over time, contributing to the effectiveness of the current and future
    forces. Training will integrate the unique capabilities of the Light,
    Medium and Heavy forces, as well as the capabilities of Conventional
    and Special Operations Forces. Furthermore, we are optimizing the use
    of existing training capacity and leveraging other opportunities such
    as CTCs, exercises and operational deployments to maximize the training
    benefits of fixed overhead and operational costs. Training centers such
    as Joint Multinational Readiness Center will increase our
    interoperability with Allies. Our goal is to increase readiness from 33
    percent to 70 percent of our Regular Army BCTs, allowing the Army to
    balance combatant command force requirements while maintaining surge
    capability--but we need consistent resources to get there. We are also
    increasing funding for our individual and institutional training.
    Funding increases focus on leader development, entry-level training and
    flight training. This allows the Army to develop its future leaders,
    prepare its soldiers to operate in today's dynamic combat environment
    and provide trained and ready soldiers to meet combatant commanders'
    requirements.
        The Army continues to make progress in integrating the unique
    capabilities of each of its components to support the needs of the
    combatant commanders. As part of the Army's Total Force Policy, the
    U.S. Army Forces Command is leading the way by partnering every Guard
    and Reserve division and brigade with a Regular Army peer unit. The
    Army is also piloting a program to assign Guard and Reserve personnel
    directly to each Regular Army corps and division headquarters. For
    example, the Reserve component rapidly provided support capabilities in
    support of Operation United Assistance in Liberia to augment and
    replace elements of the initial Active component response.
        As we transition from combat operations in Afghanistan, our Army is
    focused on our ability to rapidly deploy forces around the world in
    order to meet the needs of our combatant commanders. To do this, we
    enhanced prepositioned equipment sets and created activity sets to
    support operations in Europe, the Pacific and around the world.
    Activity sets are prepositioned sets of equipment that enable U.S.
    regionally-aligned forces and multinational partners in Europe to train
    and operate. We have also reinvigorated our Emergency Deployment
    Readiness Exercise program and enhanced the en route mission command
    capability of our Global Response Force. The President's budget request
    provides sufficient capability to respond in each geographical
    combatant command's area of responsibility.
        The Army continues to be a good steward of the resources
    appropriated for replacement, recapitalization and repair of materiel
    returning from operations conducted in Afghanistan. In 2014, the Army
    efficiently synchronized equipment retrograde out of theater.
    Redeployment and retrograde operations remain on schedule; however, the
    Army continues to forecast a need for reset funding for 3 years after
    redeployment of the last piece of equipment from theater. A steady,
    responsible drawdown of personnel and equipment demonstrates good
    stewardship of resources while facilitating transition to the post-2014
    Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan. In addition, we identified
    almost $2 billion of potential requirement reductions in Contractor
    Logistics and Training Support, and took advantage of our wartime reset
    program to reduce Depot Maintenance by over $1.3 billion over 5 years.
    These changes allowed the Army to increase the capability of its
    prepositioned stocks program without an increase in the associated
    costs.
        The proliferation of information and communications technologies
    increases the momentum of human interaction, creating a constantly
    shifting geopolitical landscape. An Army that is globally engaged and
    regionally aligned requires access at the point of need, robust network
    capacity and capability that is tailorable and scalable. The Army's
    strategy is to effectively leverage joint networks, transition to
    cloud-based solutions and services, reduce the culture of controlling
    network resources and divest legacy systems to make way for resources
    to build network modernization. Over time, this will significantly
    boost information technology operational efficiency, improve mission
    effectiveness and posture the Army to more quickly adapt and innovate.
        The Army continually seeks incremental improvements to its
    institutional organizations, processes and business systems in order to
    provide ready forces in the most fiscally responsible way for the
    Nation. The Army is expanding its efforts to control the cost of
    business operations by reducing the size of headquarters units, which
    we view as a fiscal imperative. Progressive fielding of Enterprise
    Resource Planning systems is enhancing accountability, changing
    business processes and enabling the retirement of legacy systems that
    will ultimately reduce our overall costs. Our workforce is adapting to
    new systems and processes inherent in increased internal controls and
    enterprise connectivity across business domains. Army leaders are
    actively engaged in change management and committed to meeting audit
    readiness goals and the September 2017 audit assertion of our financial
    statements. We continue to challenge the status quo, enabling the
    institutional Army to perform its activities smarter, faster and at
    reduced cost to provide more resources for readiness.
                             ensuring a modern army
    Modernization
        Decreases to the Army budget over the past several years have had
    significant impacts on Army modernization and threaten our ability to
    retain overmatch through the next decade. Since 2011, the Army has
    ended 20 programs, delayed 125 and restructured 124. Between 2011 and
    2015, Research and Development and Acquisition accounts plunged 35
    percent from $31 billion to $20 billion. Procurement alone dropped from
    $21.3 billion to $13.9 billion. We estimate sequestration will affect
    over 80 Army programs. Major impacts include delays in equipping to
    support expeditionary forces, delays in combat vehicle and aviation
    modernization, increases in sustainment costs to fix older equipment
    and increases in capability gaps.
        Our intent is to modernize and equip soldiers with effective,
    affordable and sustainable equipment that is ready and tailorable to
    support the full range of combatant command requirements. The
    President's budget request would provide over $2 billion to address the
    growing gaps in our modernization accounts. Even with this additional
    funding, modernization remains more than $3 billion short of the
    historical average as a percentage of the Army's budget.
        The Army will continue to protect Science and Technology (S&T)
    investments critical to identifying, developing and demonstrating
    technology options that inform and enable affordable capabilities for
    the soldier. S&T efforts will foster innovation, maturation and
    demonstration of technology-enabled capabilities, maximizing the
    potential of emergent game-changing landpower technologies. Key
    investments include Joint Multi-Role Helicopter, the foundation for the
    Army's Future Vertical Lift capability; combat vehicle prototyping;
    assured Position, Navigation and Timing and enhancing cyber operations
    and network protections. We continue to explore the possibilities of
    cyber, high-energy laser, materials, human performance and quantum
    science technologies for a variety of applications.
        The centerpiece of the Army's Modernization Strategy continues to
    be the soldier and the squad. The Army's objective is to rapidly
    integrate technologies and applications that empower, protect and
    unburden the soldier and our formations, thus providing the soldier
    with the right equipment, at the right time, to accomplish the assigned
    mission. The Army will support this priority by investing in
    technologies that provide the soldier and squad with advanced
    warfighting capabilities such as enhanced weapon effects, next
    generation optics and night vision devices, advanced body armor and
    individual protective equipment, unmanned aerial systems, ground-based
    robots and soldier power systems.
        Improvements to mission command will facilitate the decisionmaking
    of leaders and soldiers across all tactical echelons for Unified Land
    Operations in support of the Joint Force and allies. The Army will
    develop and field a robust, integrated tactical mission command network
    linking command posts, and extending out to the tactical edge and
    across platforms. We will build enhanced mission command capabilities
    and platform integration by fielding software applications for the
    Common Operating Environment, while working to converge operations and
    intelligence networks. Based on the current and projected demands for
    ISR, the Army adjusted the Gray Eagle unmanned aerial system program's
    fielding schedule to make more assets available to strategic and
    operational commanders this year. The Army also expanded the Aerial
    Intelligence Brigade with an additional 18 Gray Eagles for a total of
    36 aircraft, and an increase from 48 to 165 soldiers per company.
        With respect to combat platforms, and those desired to enable
    greater protected mobility, the Army's objective is to consider the
    most stressing contingency operations and make its fleets more capable.
    In addition to the Apache AH-64E and Blackhawk UH-60M investments,
    which support the Army's Aviation Restructure Initiative, the Army will
    continue development of the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle to replace
    the obsolete M113 family of vehicles and begin to produce the Joint
    Light Tactical family of vehicles. The Army will also continue to make
    improvements to the survivability, lethality, mobility and protection
    of the Abrams tank, Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle and Paladin self-
    propelled howitzer fleets. While resource constraints will force the
    Army to delay new system development and investment in the next
    generation of capabilities, we will execute incremental upgrades to
    increase capabilities and modernize existing systems.
        Few choices remain if modernization accounts continue to bear the
    brunt of sequestration. Most programs are already at minimum economic
    sustaining levels, and further reductions will rapidly increase the
    number of cancellations. Those programs remaining will have higher unit
    costs and extended acquisition schedules. Sequestration will create
    severe reductions in buying power and further delays filling capability
    gaps, forcing the Army to tier modernization--creating a situation of
    ``haves and have nots'' in the force. Rapid regeneration to fill
    modernization gaps and the ability to ensure interoperable, networked
    formations will come at a premium in cost and time. Most complex
    systems in production now take 24-36 months to deliver once Congress
    appropriates funding, while new starts or restarts take even longer. To
    address the steep reductions in modernization accounts, the Army
    emphasizes early affordability reviews, establishing cost caps (funding
    and procurement objectives), synchronizing multiple processes and
    divesting older equipment quickly.
    Organic and Commercial Industrial Base
        The Army's Industrial Base consists of Government-owned (organic)
    and commercial industrial capability and capacity that must be readily
    available to manufacture and repair items during both peacetime and
    national emergencies. We are concerned that we will not be able to
    retain an Army Industrial Base that provides unique capabilities,
    sustains the capacity for reversibility and meets the manufacturing and
    repair materiel demands of the Joint Force. In the Commercial
    Industrial Base, prime suppliers have increased their role as
    integrators, and delegated key innovation and development roles to a
    vast and complex network of sub-tier suppliers. Sub-tier suppliers have
    responded with their own complex network of suppliers, some of which
    are small, highly skilled and defense dependent firms--these small and
    specialized firms serve as the warning indicator that gauges the health
    of the overall industrial base. In fiscal year 2014, the Army
    identified those commercial sector industrial capabilities vital to our
    national defense and sustainment of a credible and capable smaller
    force. We must continue to protect these capabilities.
    Cyber
        Network dominance and defense is an integral part of our national
    security, and the Army is focused on proactively providing increased
    capability to the Joint Force. With the evolving cyber environment, the
    Army has been proactively adapting to cyber threats and vulnerabilities
    by transforming processes, organizations and operating practices. As
    the Army restructures LandWarNet to support operations worldwide, it is
    imperative we rapidly innovate and fund network and cyber
    infrastructure, services, security, and capabilities.
        A number of institutional transformations are in place or ongoing
    to build and sustain the Army's future cyberspace force requirements.
    To be more agile and responsive, while improving unity of command and
    synchronization of cyberspace operations, we have consolidated Army
    Cyber Command (ARCYBER), 2nd Army and the Joint Force Headquarters-
    Cyber under one commander. The Army has established the Cyber Center of
    Excellence at Fort Gordon, GA, and will serve as our focal point to
    drive change across the Army. The proponent lead for cyberspace
    operations shifted from ARCYBER to the Cyber Center of Excellence under
    the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Additionally,
    we established an Army Cyber Institute at West Point to collaborate
    with government partners, industry and other higher education
    institutions to develop cyber solutions. The creation of a cyber
    network defender enlisted specialty and the Cyber Branch within the
    officer corps was an effort to help focus and manage the Army's cyber
    talent.
        In terms of new and emerging initiatives, ARCYBER and the
    acquisition community are pursuing ways to bring capabilities,
    including big data analytics, to Army operations in order to improve
    our cyber defense capability. We play a vital role in cyber operations
    across the DOD and the Joint Force by providing Cyber Protection Teams
    and Cyber Support Teams. Recent DOD decisions have resulted in the
    pursuit of a defense-wide global implementation of network
    modernization, including the Joint Regional Security Stacks, to enhance
    the security of our networks. We continually conduct assessments to
    better understand cyber vulnerabilities in our combat platforms and
    communications systems. We must make prudent investments in our cyber
    infrastructure, including facilities, networks and equipment to ensure
    a capable force. The Army is currently reviewing cyber training range
    capabilities and capacities to better assess future requirements. All
    these efforts will generate resourcing requirements, which will have to
    compete against other equally urgent priorities within the Army.
    Installations, Water and Energy
        Since 2012, as the Army implemented several rounds of budget
    reductions, our installation programs have seen dramatically reduced
    services and sustainment. Although we have survived for 2 years at
    these reduced funding levels by deferring critical facility maintenance
    and cutting back on services, should the increases proposed by the
    President not materialize, we will seriously impair our facilities and
    have to permanently reduce important programs and services. Even with
    these increased funds, facilities maintenance is funded at only 79
    percent in fiscal year 2016, which translates to higher future repair
    and renovation costs.
        As stated in previous testimony, we need another round of BRAC. We
    simply have too much surplus infrastructure and will have even more as
    we downsize. We are already in the process of separating nearly 152,000
    soldiers, and sequestration would force us to separate another 60,000--
    for a total reduction of 212,000. In addition, we have reduced over
    50,000 civilians from these same installations. Without a BRAC and the
    realized cost savings, the only alternative is to make additional cuts
    in training, manpower and modernization to make up for shortages in
    installation funding. These are not cuts we can afford to make. To
    date, we have been able to mitigate the adverse impact by focusing
    reductions on Europe and eliminating facilities not associated with
    U.S. installations. Through analysis and evaluation, we continue to
    examine other ways to reduce infrastructure within our authorities
    around the world. We are now reducing personnel at U.S. installations
    and we expect excess facility capacity will be about 18 percent Army-
    wide when we reach the end strength ramp of 490,000 for the Regular
    Army in fiscal year 2015.
        To improve the resilience and efficiency of our remaining
    infrastructure today and in future years, the Army will continue its
    efforts to increase energy efficiency, expand the use of onsite
    renewable energy, reduce water consumption, and reduce waste
    generation. This year, we will issue an Energy and Sustainability
    Strategy that focuses on building resiliency. Implementation of this
    strategy will facilitate continuity of operations and improve the
    Army's energy, water and sustainability posture. These actions will
    also enhance the Army's ability to mitigate and adapt to the
    deleterious effects of climate change.
          soldiers and civilians committed to our army and profession
        We must never forget our soldiers will bear the burden of our
    decisions with their lives and health. As Army professionals, we must
    do everything possible to maintain the trust of our soldiers,
    civilians, and families who selflessly sacrifice so much. Today, they
    trust that we properly prepare them with the right tools and resources
    necessary to accomplish the missions that take them into harm's way. To
    ensure the Army maintains the trust of the American people we serve,
    the Army is evaluating ways to further develop our military and
    civilian professionals, and ensure an uncompromising culture of
    accountability exists at every level of command. As the Army prepares
    for the environment that lies ahead, we must anticipate the unique
    ethical and moral challenges the future may present, and remain
    committed to developing Army Professionals of Competence, Commitment,
    and Character.
        The Army Ethic defines the moral principles that guide us in the
    conduct of our missions, performance of duty and all aspects of life.
    Our ethic is reflected in law, Army Values, creeds, oaths, ethos and
    shared beliefs embedded within Army culture. It inspires and motivates
    all of us to make right decisions and to take right actions at all
    times. The Army Ethic is the heart of our shared professional identity,
    our sense of who we are, our purpose in life and why and how we serve
    the American people. To violate the Army Ethic is to break our sacred
    bond of trust with each other and with those whom we serve. Army
    Professionals must fulfill distinctive roles as honorable servants,
    military experts and stewards of our profession.
    Adaptive Army Leaders for a Complex World
        The Army Operating Concept will require evolutionary change as we
    deal with the growing complexity of the operational environment, and
    this change begins by changing mindsets. The Army's competitive
    advantage, today and into the future, will always be our soldiers and
    civilians. Our top priority is to develop agile and adaptive leaders at
    the tactical, operational and strategic levels. Today and into the
    future, the Army must provide well-led and highly trained soldiers
    organized into tailorable and scalable organizations that provide our
    Nation's leaders an array of options, both lethal and nonlethal, across
    the entire range of missions. The Army Leader Development Strategy
    calls for the development of leaders through a career-long synthesis of
    training, education and experiences acquired through opportunities in
    institutional, operational, broadening and self-development learning
    formats, supported by peer and developmental relationships. Leader
    development and optimized soldier performance are directly linked to
    the Army's ability to operate in the future. We must develop
    multidimensional, adaptive and innovative leaders who thrive in
    decentralized, dynamic and interconnected environments.
        Leader development is the deliberate, continuous and progressive
    process--built on a foundation of trust and founded in Army values--
    that grows soldiers and civilians into competent, committed
    professional leaders of character. As an institution transitioning from
    extended combat rotations, we must regain our expertise as trainers and
    improve the support and delivery of realistic training. Home station
    and centralized training must leverage both current and emergent
    technologies and integrate the latest capabilities, such as cyber;
    hybrid threats and joint, interorganizational and multinational
    organizations.
        Today's combat environment requires dynamic leaders and soldiers.
    To ensure all soldiers are adequately prepared, entry-level soldier
    training focuses on fostering individual resiliency, battlefield
    skills, Army values and developing the credentials to succeed in the
    Army and excel afterward. The NCO development model is a deliberate,
    analytical and data-driven process that constantly evaluates and
    adjusts to ensure all leaders have the right tools to lead and mentor
    others in today's and tomorrow's dynamic worlds. This model is
    collectively known as NCO 2020, which looks at training from the
    operational, institutional and self-development domains to ensure a
    career of lifelong learning and of harnessing experience and
    proficiency at all levels. This includes a revamping of the NCO
    education system and a renewed emphasis on individual and collective
    task training to help mitigate the effects of a reduction in Combat
    Training Center rotations.
        Today, the Army is expanding broadening opportunities for its NCOs,
    warrant officers, and officers with programs like Training with
    Industry, Strategic Broadening Seminars and the Congressional
    Fellowship Program. Broadening and educational experiences for senior
    field grade through general officers is also an area that must not be
    overlooked. Developing well-rounded senior leaders who are capable of
    effectively communicating the needs and capabilities of the profession
    to Civilian leaders within the larger context of national concerns is
    critical to the Nation.
        It is imperative that our leaders and organizations are capable of
    thriving in joint interorganizational and multinational teams, and that
    they seamlessly integrate multi-domain effects from air, sea, space,
    cyber, or land. This places a premium on innovation--on leveraging
    current and emerging concepts and technologies both today and going
    forward. Encouraging innovation and empowering all leaders with the
    skills required to win in a complex world, manage complex institutional
    processes and influence strategic decisionmaking within a broader
    operating environment is paramount to the Army's future.
        More than 250,000 people working in nearly 500 unique job series--
    about 20 percent of the Total Army Force--comprise the Army Civilian
    corps. Given the size, complexity, impact and importance of the
    civilian cohort to the Army, we established the Army Civilian Workforce
    Transformation (CWT). CWT is the Army's strategic campaign to transform
    the Army's civilian cohort for the future and develop a more adaptable,
    capable and technically proficient Army civilian who is well grounded
    as a leader.
    Soldier 2020 and Increased Opportunities for Women
        In 2012, the Army initiated a deliberate Service-wide effort--
    Soldier 2020--to ensure our units are filled with the best-qualified
    soldiers. This effort includes opening previously closed positions and
    occupational specialties to women, while maintaining our combat
    effectiveness. The Soldier 2020 initiative seeks to remove as many
    barriers as possible and allow talented people--regardless of gender--
    to serve in any position in which they are capable of performing to
    standard.
        Over the past 27 months, we have opened 6 previously closed
    Military Occupational Specialties and over 55,000 positions across all
    Army components to women. This includes opening 1,562 positions in U.S.
    Army Special Operations Command, including the 160th Special Operations
    Aviation Regiment. The Army is validating gender-neutral physical
    standards and completing a gender integration study, work that will
    inform decisions on opening the 14 remaining Military Occupational
    Specialties currently closed to women. Once the study is completed, we
    will make a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense on opening as
    many as 166,000 positions across the Active and Reserve components to
    our women in uniform. As part of the Soldier 2020 initiative, the Army
    Ranger School assessment program will begin this spring to assess
    female soldiers and officers into Army Ranger School. The Army
    continues to proceed in an incremental and scientific-based approach to
    integrating women into previously closed units, positions and
    occupations while preserving unit readiness, cohesion, discipline and
    morale. The Army will complete all actions to meet Office of the
    Secretary of Defense requirements prior to January 1, 2016.
    Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) Program
        From the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army down to our
    newest soldiers, we continue to attack the complex challenges of sexual
    assault. While we have made progress, much work remains. Sexual assault
    is a crime that violates the core values on which the Army functions,
    and sexual harassment shatters good order and discipline. Sexual
    harassment and sexual assault must be stamped out, and doing so remains
    a top priority throughout the Army. Commanders, the Chain of Command,
    and the Uniform Code of Military Justice provide the vital tools needed
    to prosecute offenders and hold all soldiers and leaders appropriately
    responsible.
        Across the Army, we are committed to maintaining momentum in Army
    SHARP and making further advances along our five lines of efforts:
    Prevention, Investigation, Accountability, Advocacy and Assessment. In
    the last year, our efforts along the Prevention Line of Effort resulted
    in actions such as consolidating SHARP training under TRADOC and
    Initial Entry Training and Professional Military Education to increase
    the quality and accessibility of our prevention tools. Our
    Investigation Line of Effort showed advances in Special Victim
    capabilities and Trial Counsel Assistance Programs. The Accountability
    Line of Effort had successes through our Special Victim Investigation
    and Prosecution capability and through tools such as Command Climate
    Surveys and Commander 360 degree assessments. Our Advocacy Line of
    Effort resulted in initial indicators of progress in establishing SHARP
    resource centers in over 12 installations. We continue to see interim
    progress along our Assessment Line of Effort as noted in the
    President's report and we continue to closely monitor the established
    metrics to measure compliance.
        In sum, we have seen some progress as evident in the recent
    statistics outlined in the 2014 ``Department of Defense Report to the
    President of the United States on Sexual Assault Prevention and
    Response'' that indicate a decrease in unwanted sexual contact in
    fiscal year 2014 compared to fiscal year 2012. Within the Army, survey-
    estimated rates of unwanted sexual contact for the past year decreased
    significantly for active duty women (4.6 percent), compared to fiscal
    year 2012 (7.1 percent). In addition, reporting data demonstrates more
    victims are coming forward to report sexual harassment and sexual
    assault. In fiscal year 2014, sexual assault reporting in the Army
    increased by 12 percent over the previous year. We view this as a vote
    of confidence and a sign of increased trust in our leaders, in our
    response services and in changing Army culture. The decline in
    prevalence of unwanted sexual contact, combined with the increase in
    reports received, suggests the Army's efforts to prevent sexual assault
    and build victim confidence in our response system are making progress.
    Nevertheless, we must continue to work on fostering a climate where
    individuals are not afraid of retaliation or stigma for reporting a
    crime by ensuring individuals, units, organizations and specifically
    commanders and leaders understand their responsibilities. Retaliation
    takes many forms and originates from many sources--leaders, family,
    friends and, most pervasively, peer to peer. Retaliation in its
    simplest form is bullying. It is intimidation that deters people from
    acting. It enables offenders, threatens survivors, pushes bystanders to
    shy from action, and breeds a culture of complacence. Retaliation has
    no place in the Army and we must stamp it out.
        Sexual Assault Response Coordinators and Sexual Assault Prevention
    and Response Victim Advocates are now credentialed through the DOD
    Sexual Assault Advocate Certification Program, and the Army's SHARP
    Academy is expanding their knowledge, skills and abilities. Based on
    national experts' guidance, the Army's Sexual Assault Medical Forensic
    Examiner's course now surpasses Department of Justice requirements and
    establishes a best practice for all DOD to follow.
        The chain of command is at the center of any solution to combat
    sexual assault and harassment, and we must ensure it remains fully
    engaged, involved and vigilant. Toward this end, we enhanced the
    Officer and Enlisted Evaluation Reporting Systems to assess how
    officers and NCOs are meeting their commitments--holding them
    accountable through mandatory comments on how those leaders are acting
    to foster a climate of dignity and respect and their adherence to our
    SHARP program. With commanders at the center of our efforts, we will
    continue to decrease the prevalence of sexual assault through
    prevention and encourage greater reporting of the crime. We expect to
    see reporting numbers to continue to rise. As our efforts to enforce
    discipline, prosecute offenders and eliminate criminal behavior mature,
    we expect the number of sexual assaults occurring within the Army to
    eventually decrease. There is no place for sexual harassment or sexual
    assault in our Army or our society.
        The problems of sexual assault and sexual harassment will only be
    solved when every soldier, civilian, and family member stands up and
    unequivocally acts to stamp it out. Together, we have an obligation to
    do all we can to safeguard America's sons and daughters, as well as
    maintain trust between soldiers, civilians, families, and the Nation.
    Army leaders, at every level of the chain of command, are doing this
    through prevention, investigation, accountability, advocacy and
    assessments.
                   maintaining the premier all volunteer army
        As we shape the force of the future, we must enhance force
    readiness, while taking care of the men and women who serve. This
    means, while providing combatant commanders with versatile and trained
    forces, we also have an obligation to support our soldiers, families
    and civilians while they serve in the Army, and as they transition back
    to civilian life. Those who make up the Total Army--soldiers, families
    and civilians; Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve--
    represent its strength. ``Total Army Strong'' expresses our enduring
    commitment to soldiers, families, and civilians, and to sustain a
    system of programs and services to mitigate the unique demands of
    military life, foster life skills, strengthen resilience and promote a
    strong and ready Army. ``Total Army Strong'' provides commanders
    flexibility to prioritize and adjust programs and services, regardless
    of geographic location.
        We recognize that attracting and retaining highly-qualified
    individuals in all three components is critical to readiness. However,
    the stronger economy, including lower unemployment, poses challenges to
    recruiting and retention in fiscal year 2016. Due to obesity, medical
    conditions and other reasons, less than one-third of otherwise-eligible
    Americans would even qualify for military service. Though we face
    recruiting challenges in fiscal year 2016, we will man our formations
    with highly-qualified and diverse soldiers by continuing and
    strengthening those recruitment and retention programs that best
    enhance and sustain the All-Volunteer Army.
    Ready and Resilient Campaign
        We must support and appropriately resource the Army's Ready and
    Resilient Campaign. This campaign provides holistic, evidence-based
    tools, training and resources to our commands and leaders who care for
    our soldiers, civilians, and family members so they can strengthen
    their resilience and achieve and sustain personal readiness. The Army's
    Ready and Resilient capabilities improve the physical, emotional, and
    psychological resilience of the entire force, attack the foundation of
    acts of indiscipline and prevent negative behaviors from escalating to
    damaging events such as suicide or sexual assault. We must ensure the
    overall readiness and resilience of the Total Army Family through
    optimal sleep, activity and nutrition--the Performance Triad. The
    Performance Triad strengthens individual and unit readiness through a
    comprehensive approach that promotes leadership and behavior change
    strategies to improve personal and unit readiness and resilience, as
    well as physical, emotional, and cognitive dominance through optimized
    sleep, physical activity, and nutrition. The Performance Triad empowers
    leaders to coach and mentor health readiness using technology to
    actuate behaviors that support lasting cultural change as a mandate of
    the Army profession.
    Soldier for Life
        Soldier for Life is not just a program; it is a change in mindset.
    One way we encourage this frame of mind is through senior leader and
    installation engagements, as well as changes in training curriculum. We
    want soldiers to understand and believe from the time they come into
    the Army and for the rest of their lives, that they deserve our utmost
    care and attention throughout the soldier lifecycle--``Once a Soldier,
    always a Soldier . . . a Soldier for Life!'' As soldiers return to
    civilian life, they will continue to influence young people to join the
    Army and, along with retired soldiers, will connect communities across
    the Nation with its Army.
        As we reduce the Army's end strength, we owe it to our soldiers and
    their families to facilitate their transition to civilian life. The
    Army supports continuum of service initiatives to help in this effort
    by communicating the benefits of continued service in the Reserve
    Components. Additionally, the ``Soldier for Life'' Program connects
    Army, governmental and community efforts to facilitate the successful
    reintegration of our soldiers and families back into communities across
    the Nation through networks in employment, education and health. Our
    pre- and post-retirement services ensure those who served become and
    remain leaders in their community. For example, we have developed
    strong relationships with government, nongovernment, and private sector
    entities to include direct collaboration with the Departments of
    Veterans Affairs, Labor, and the Chamber of Commerce to bring
    employment summits to installations worldwide.
                                    closing
        We face a period of critical decisions that will impact the Army's
    capability and capacity for the next decade. It is important that we
    make the right decisions now. The operational and fiscal environments
    are straining the Army as we attempt to balance end strength, readiness
    and modernization to meet current demands while building the
    foundations of a force that can meet future challenges. The velocity of
    instability continues to increase worldwide, whether of ISIL and
    terrorism in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen; anarchy and extremism in North
    Africa; Russian belligerence; provocation by North Korea; or complex
    humanitarian assistance requirements and the unpredictable nature of
    disaster relief missions. But despite all of this, we continue to
    reduce our military capabilities, degrade readiness and erode trust
    with the specter of sequestration. We ask the help of Congress to
    eliminate sequestration and provide our soldiers with greater
    predictability in these uncertain times. We must not reduce the Army
    below 980,000 soldiers and leave the Army unprepared to meet Defense
    Strategic Guidance or respond to some unforeseen event.
        Our strategic partnership with Congress is absolutely critical to
    the Army's success. Simply put, our soldiers and civilians could not do
    what they do each day without your support. Our Army needs
    congressional support now more than ever. The decisions we make this
    year and next on our fiscal policy, and related end strength, readiness
    and modernization will directly impact the security of the United
    States and the world for decades to come. Today, we have the most
    capable and professional Army in the world. Our soldiers have gained
    invaluable experience and expertise; built relationships among
    interagency partners, allies and each other and developed an intimate
    understanding of the world we live in. As we reduce the size of our
    Army, each soldier leaving the ranks takes with him or her invaluable
    experiences and a deep understanding that has come at great cost and is
    impossible to replace in short order.
        We look forward to working with Congress to ensure the Army is
    capable of fulfilling its many missions, while continuing to be good
    stewards of the taxpayers' money. Despite ongoing fiscal uncertainties,
    we are pleased to report professionalism and morale within the Army
    remains strong. Whether advising and assisting in Afghanistan and Iraq,
    supporting allies in Europe and the Republic of Korea, serving in the
    homeland or engaging our partners around the world, the indomitable
    spirit of our greatest assets, our soldiers--our Nation's Trusted
    Professionals--stands ready: Ready to safeguard our Nation's liberty,
    deter aggression and protect our national interests at home and abroad.
    With your assistance, we will continue to resource the best-trained,
    best-equipped, and best-led fighting force in the world: the U.S. Army.

        Chairman McCain. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Secretary James?

    STATEMENT OF HON. DEBORAH LEE JAMES, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

        Ms. James. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Reed
    and the rest of the committee. We very much appreciate the
    opportunity to come before you today. It certainly is an honor
    for me to be here as always with my wingman, General Mark
    Welsh, a phenomenal leader, and with my colleagues as well,
    Secretary McHugh and General Odierno from the Army.
        Mr. Chairman, this morning--or this afternoon rather, I
    would like to share with you some of my key takeaways that I
    have accumulated over the last 15 months that I have had the
    privilege to serve as the Secretary of the Air Force. You have
    already touched upon several of them. So this is really a foot
    stomp on my part.
        So, number one, is that today we indeed are the smallest
    Air Force that we have ever been since our inception as an air
    force in the year 1947. Moreover, our aircraft in the Air Force
    are the oldest that they have ever been. 27 years of age is the
    average age, and that means that a lot of our fleets are
    actually substantially older than 27 years of age. Here is
    perhaps the most shocking statistic of all. The chairman
    already said it. But more than half of our combat Air Force is
    not sufficiently ready today for a high-end fight. Moreover, we
    certainly all know that the budgets are extremely tight, and
    all of these factors are coming together at a time when world
    conditions are as unpredictable and dangerous as certainly I
    can ever remember them ever being, at least in the 34 years
    that I have been working on defense issues.
        Now, your Air Force is working very, very hard to meet the
    combatant commanders' most urgent needs, but I have to join
    with my colleague, Secretary McHugh, in saying that if we are
    forced to live with the sequestration level budget, simply we
    will not be able to sustain this pace. Put plainly,
    sequestration I believe will place American lives at greater
    risk and that will be the case both here at home and abroad.
    Under sequestration, we will not be able to simultaneously
    defeat one adversary in one part of the world, deny a second
    adversary elsewhere, their objectives, as well as defend the
    homeland. That, of course, is our strategy, and under
    sequestration, I am telling you we cannot do it all
    simultaneously.
        Mr. Chairman, at a recent hearing on sequestration, you
    said if we continue with these arbitrary defense cuts, we will
    harm our military's ability to keep us safe. I just want to say
    I think you are absolutely correct, and this is simply not
    acceptable. Something has to give. We thank you, Mr. Chairman
    and other members of the committee, because we know that you
    are working hard to get sequestration lifted, and we just ask
    you to please keep that up because we do need it lifted
    permanently.
        Now, rather than simply living with the forced
    sequestration levels and submitting a budget under those
    levels, instead we are looking for a budget figure in fiscal
    year 2016 which is substantially closer to what we need. For
    the Air Force, this means about a $10 billion differential in
    fiscal year 2016, $10 billion more than what sequestration
    level funding would ordinarily provide to the Air Force. This
    $10 billion increase provides both the forces needed to meet
    our most pressing combatant commander requirements, and it also
    makes the most important investments in our top priorities.
    Here are our top priorities.
        Number one, taking care of people. There is a lot in this
    budget as it relates to people, but the number one priority on
    people that I want to call to your attention is that General
    Welsh and I firmly believe that this downsizing that we have
    been going through for the better part of 20-some years has to
    stop. If anything, we think we may have gone too far, which is
    precisely why we are calling for a modest upward adjustment in
    our total force end strength of about 6,600. That will be some
    to the active duty, some to the Guard, and some to the Reserve.
    Indeed, Mr. Reed, one of the reasons why we know now we have
    downsized perhaps too much is because our High Velocity
    Analysis (HVA), which came from the Guard and Reserve follow-up
    report, indicated that we are short in every single component.
    So we think we need a modest upward adjustment. That will help
    us to alleviate strains in our nuclear enterprise, in our cyber
    arena, as well as in maintenance. There are a number of other
    areas as well. We have a program for Remotely Piloted Aircraft
    (RPA), which we can talk about in the questions and answers
    (Q&A).
        Our second priority is getting the balance right between
    the readiness of today and modernizing for tomorrow. Now,
    General Welsh and I both consulted very closely with our
    combatant commanders as we built this budget, and we consulted
    closely with our sister Services as well. I can tell you the
    number one thing that the combatant commanders say they want
    from our Air Force is more intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance (ISR), ISR, ISR. That is the number one
    priority. So this budget, which is before you, ramps up support
    to the most urgent needs of ISR, to include support for 60
    steady state ISR patrols, as well as extending the life of the
    U-2 and the AWACS programs. We will also support vital space
    programs, strengthen the nuclear enterprise. We will fund our
    flying hours to the maximum executable level. We will invest in
    weapons system sustainment, and ensure that combat exercises
    like the Red Flags and the Green Flags remain strong. All of
    that is the readiness of today, but the readiness of tomorrow,
    modernization is important as well.
        When it comes to modernization, strengthening the nuclear
    enterprise remains the Air Force's number one mission priority,
    and we have quite a lot in this 5-year plan for the nuclear
    enterprise. There are our top three modernization programs, the
    KC-46, the F-35, the long-range strike bomber. All of those are
    supported in this budget submission. In addition, we will make
    important investments in space, science and technology, and
    other areas.
        Finally, priority number three and the last priority is
    what we call ``make every dollar count,'' and that is because
    we get it that the taxpayer dollar is precious and we cannot
    afford to waste a single dollar. We are constantly looking for
    efficiencies and ways to do things differently to free up
    resources and to give back to our people some of their valuable
    time.
        So, for example, we took an aggressive 20 percent
    headquarters reduction in funding in fiscal year 2015, which
    includes civilians, contractors, and redirecting military
    personnel. We did not have to do it in 1 year. The Secretary of
    Defense's (SecDef) challenge was over 5, but we did do it in 1
    year because we thought it was the right thing to do and it
    would free up the dollars more quickly.
        Not only that, we have reduced our service contractor
    workforce, about $7 billion in obligations, and 30,000 contract
    full-time equivalents in the last few years. We plan to
    continue scrubbing and scrubbing and scrubbing both the
    civilian and the contractor workforce over the years.
        We also have a series of initiatives we call ``bend the
    cost curve,'' and we think, Mr. Chairman, these are very much
    in line and in the spirit of your acquisition reform pitch.
        So all in all, there is a lot of good in this budget, but
    as you said, Mr. Chairman, there are some hard choices as well.
    Even though we are $10 billion up from sequestration, we are
    still $10 billion down from where we were just a few years ago.
    So we are proposing to reduce the A-10 and to slow the growth
    in military compensation. For example, these are the hard
    choices.
        We realize these proposals are very controversial. They are
    not popular and some simply do not agree, and that there are
    risks associated with all of this. We understand that. But we
    would just ask everyone to keep in mind that it gets uglier and
    uglier and uglier in terms of choices if we have to go to
    sequestration.
        So our Air Force under a sequestered budget would mean
    divesting the U-2 and the Global Hawk block 40 and the KC-10s
    and reducing MQ-1s and MQ-9s by 10 combat air patrols and
    deferring 14 F-35s, canceling the adaptive engine program. Then
    there would be a series of reductions we would have to take in
    space, in cyber, in nuclear. Really everything under
    sequestration would be at risk. It threatens everything.
        So we thank you and we ask you to please continue to push
    to lift it permanently. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The joint prepared statement of Ms. James and General
    Welsh follows:]
      Joint Prepared Statement by Hon. Deborah Lee James and Gen. Mark A.
                                Welsh III, USAF
                                i. introduction
        The U.S. Air Force is the most globally engaged air force on the
    planet. American airmen are in constant defense of our national
    interests, whether dropping bombs, commanding satellites in space,
    delivering humanitarian relief, or protecting the homeland with an
    array of air, space, and cyberspace capabilities our forefathers could
    never have imagined. Airmen collaborate and train with allies--
    expanding and strengthening our collective capabilities--and guarantee
    the global freedom of movement and access that Americans have come to
    expect. Alongside its sister Services, America's Air Force delivers our
    Nation the power, influence, agility, and global reach no other country
    currently possesses . . . no matter the effort, no matter the odds. Our
    airmen are warfighters and they bring airpower to bear on behalf of
    America every day.
        But 24 years of continual combat operations, coupled with
    constrained and unstable budgets, has taken its toll. America needs a
    force ready for a spectrum of operations more global and complex than
    ever before. Instead, a relentless operations tempo, with fewer
    resources to fund, coordinate, and execute training and exercises, has
    left a force proficient in only those portions of the mission necessary
    for current operations. This is not the Air Force America expects . . .
    but today, it is the Air Force America owns.
        Today's Air Force is the smallest and oldest it has ever been, even
    while the demand for airpower continues to climb. There is no excess;
    there is no ``bench'' . . . everything is committed. When called into
    action, today's Air Force cannot respond in one corner of the Earth
    without diluting its presence elsewhere. The blanket of American
    airpower covering the globe has thinned; in places, it is nearly
    threadbare. As we have cut our capacity, we have found our capability
    equally diminished--the two qualities are inextricably linked.
        The Nation deserves an Air Force that can outmatch its most
    dangerous enemies at their peak of power--the most demanding
    warfighting scenario, not just the ``low-end fight.'' The President's
    budget (PB) takes a critical step toward recovering that Air Force, but
    make no mistake: even at President's budget levels, the Air Force
    remains stressed to do what the Nation asks of us. To truly reverse the
    erosion of American airpower requires sustained commitment, stability,
    and the decision-space to invest each taxpayer dollar where it can best
    deliver the most combat power.
        Without bold leadership today--difficult decisions and a commitment
    to air, space, and cyberspace investment--America's airpower advantage
    is increasingly at risk.
                          ii. a globally engaged force
        At the Nation's call, American airmen leap to defend her interests.
    They respond at all hours, on any day, anywhere in the world, and they
    do it whether the requirement has been planned for or not. After all,
    enemies (and disasters) rarely strike when expected.
        On the eve of 2014, the Nation--and the Air Force--planned for a
    relatively quiet year. We expected to draw down combat forces in
    Afghanistan, and have an opportunity to reset and reconstitute our
    forces.
        Instead, the Ukraine and a resurgent Russia happened. Ebola
    happened. The Islamic State happened. Airmen flew 19,959 offensive
    sorties, releasing 8,249 weapons \1\ in support of U.S. Central Command
    alone. Air Force tankers offloaded 172 million gallons of fuel to Joint
    and coalition air forces, and airmen flew 79,445 airlift missions in
    operations on every continent.\2\ We kept watch over our enemies,
    collecting and analyzing over 18 million images and 1.6 million hours
    of full motion video . . . and we evacuated 6,075 wounded soldiers,
    sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians from the battle space. Instead
    of slowing down, our force sped up.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ These include Close Air Support, Escort, and Interdiction
    sorties. Data from AFCENT Airpower Summary
        \2\ Tanker Airlift Control Center Office of Public Affairs
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Air Force was equally busy at home, providing capability most
    Americans never have to think about. Airmen launched nine national
    security space missions--bolstering GPS, weather, and Space Situational
    Awareness capabilities to benefit military and civilian users alike.
    They engaged with allies to build America's space partnerships; and
    worked to qualify potential new launch providers to increase
    competition, reduce costs, and assure American access to space in the
    future. Airmen began the long, critical work of revitalizing two of the
    three legs of our Nation's nuclear triad, gathering over 300
    recommendations from the field on how to improve Air Force nuclear
    culture . . . and then implemented those ideas, to the tune of $50
    million in fiscal year 2014 and a planned $154 million in fiscal year
    2015.
        Airmen provide access, overwatch, protection, and staying power for
    American and coalition forces the world over. They degrade adversary
    capabilities, and re-affirm every day that America can project power
    anywhere in the world, at the time and place of our choosing. That
    power--that presence, at home and abroad--is among the strongest
    deterrents confronting the Nation's would-be enemies . . . and
    protecting our national interests.
                  iii. capacity and capability: a dual problem
        Americans have invested in airpower for well over 60 years to
    ensure the fight is never fair. But today--after many years of
    continual operations and a few fiscal upheavals--the Nation is at a
    crossroads, with a fundamental disconnect between its airpower
    expectations and its airpower capability.
        There was a time when the Air Force could trade some capacity in
    order to retain capability. But we have reached the point where the two
    are inextricable; lose any more capacity, and the capability will cease
    to exist.
        The Service's intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
    force is a sobering example of this critical nexus. In today's
    warfighting environment there is nearly infinite appetite for Air Force
    ISR \3\--we simply do not have the capacity to fulfill it. To meet as
    much of the demand as possible, airmen work 10- to 12-hour shifts on a
    ``7-on, 1-off'' pattern, flying over 900 hours a year--a rate that can
    accumulate a career's worth of flying hours in a single assignment.
    These are combat shifts, physically, mentally, and emotionally taxing .
    . . and to get it done, they are sometimes diverted from training that
    allows them to improve, advance, and build a professional military
    career. When such airmen are faced with the decision to separate or
    continue to serve, it is difficult to convince them that staying is in
    their best interests. We are losing them at a rate faster than we can
    replace them.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ A return to sequestration would result in 50 percent of the
    high-altitude ISR missions being flown today no longer being available.
    Commanders would lose 30 percent of their ability to collect
    intelligence and targeting data against moving vehicles on the
    battlefield.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        At some point, no level of effort will cover the capacity gap
    created by continual worldwide operations and dwindling, uncertain
    budgets. The capability itself will fail.
        The fleet offers another case in point. Today's Air Force is both
    the smallest and oldest it has ever been. Since Operation Desert Storm
    in 1991, the Air Force cut its total aircraft inventory from 8,600 to
    5,452. During that same time period, we cut Active, Guard, Reserve, and
    civilian airmen from 946,000 to little more than 662,000 (just 313,000
    on active duty). The average age of Air Force aircraft is 27 years,
    with many fleets substantially older.
        The newest B-52 bomber is 53 years old. In at least one Air Force
    family, three generations of airmen have piloted the Stratofortress, in
    combat engagements from Vietnam to Operation Enduring Freedom (see
    boxed text below).

       [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        By automobile standards, 12 fleets of Air Force aircraft are
    authorized antique license plates in the State of Virginia. The Air
    Force can (and does) continue to patch these older platforms up and fly
    them in combat. But after extending their service life time and time
    again, each airframe reaches the point where it cannot be ``patched
    up'' anymore. It must be replaced or it fails.
        With aging aircraft and stressed fleets, today's capacity, as small
    as it is, is something of an illusion. The numbers are there--barely--
    but the capability to command global influence is tenuous. What was, in
    earlier times, a blanket of airpower covering the globe, has been worn
    to mere threads.
                          iv. policy and purse strings
        The world continues to change at an unprecedented pace and
    operational requirements continue unabated. The demands for global
    engagement is challenging under any circumstance . . . but when
    combined with an uncertain budget environment, it drives the Air
    Force--indeed, all Services--to make incredibly difficult choices,
    pitting vital requirement against vital requirement.
        When budgets contract and budgetary policy is continually
    postponed, or written in a way that limits Service solutions to budget
    problems, decision-space shrinks, and already difficult budget choices
    become nearly impossible.
        In fiscal year 2012, when the Air Force originally forecast its
    requirements to meet the Defense Strategic Guidance, the Service
    planned an fiscal year 2016 topline of $134 billion. Today--as enacted
    in fiscal year 2015, and so requested in the fiscal year 2016
    President's budget--that topline has decreased to $122 billion. In
    aggregate, the loss across those 5 years is $64 billion (see chart I
    below).

      [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        To put this into perspective, if the Air Force shut off all
    utilities--turned off the lights, the heating and air conditioning, the
    water supply--at all our major installations for 12 years \4\. . . or
    if it quit flying for 20 months--did not burn any jet fuel at all for
    nearly 2 years . . . it would save only $12 billion. Enough to buy back
    1 year of sequestered funds. Money matters; the lost capability is
    real; and the impact is going to be significant.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ This number reflects the cost of utilities only at U.S. Air
    Force installations--it does not reflect installations investments writ
    large (and thus does not portray in any way the savings which could be
    associated with base realignment and closure)
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In addition, both budget uncertainty and legislative programming
    restrictions have left the Air Force with very limited decision-space
    over the past 3 years. Tightly constrained on aircraft divestiture and
    denied Base Realignment and Closure, leaves the Service with only a few
    accounts to yield savings from quickly and cleanly, without violating
    ``must pay'' requirements: readiness, people, and modernization. From
    these, the Air Force worked hard to identify the least catastrophic
    choices it could.
        The Air Force took risk in infrastructure. Our investment in
    maintenance and repair--including restoration, modernization,
    sustainment, and new construction to recapitalize Air Force facilities
    and infrastructure--is just 1.9 percent of the Service's plant
    replacement value. Private industry standard is between 6 and 8 percent
    investment.\5\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ . . . and National Research Council studies indicate that an
    investment between 2 and 4 percent of PRV is warranted to avoid risk of
    accelerated deterioration and infrastructure failure.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Unable to cut airframes we believe we need to divest or to reduce
    excess base capacity; the Service has cut personnel--taking risk in
    human capital. Since 2001, even as the Nation fought in Afghanistan and
    Iraq, Air Force uniformed end strength dropped by 44,000 airmen.\6\ We
    simply cannot get any smaller or we risk being too small to succeed.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ Fiscal year 2011-fiscal year 2014 Active, Guard, and Reserve
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        We have also been forced to cut into some of the programs that keep
    airmen and airpower a step ahead of the enemy at all times. In 2013,
    for example, an entire Weapons School class--which produces the world's
    best tactical and operational airpower experts--was cancelled.
        Risk and tough choices are part of every business. The problem, for
    the Air Force, is that failure is never an option. Airmen will fix it,
    patch it, make do, and work until they drop to cover shortfalls. But
    asking it of them, year in and year out, risks unbearable strain on a
    force heavily engaged around the globe.
                              v. doing what we can
        Recognizing that budget uncertainty--and a need for fiscal
    restraint--may be here to stay, the Air Force has extended its
    institutional gaze out 30 years to synchronize budget and acquisition
    decisions with strategy. To guide this effort, in 2014 the Service
    published America's Air Force: A Call to the Future,\7\ a ground-
    breaking new strategic framework. This framework calls for strategic
    agility to confront the rapidly-changing global environment, and--in
    conjunction with the upcoming Air Force Strategic Master Plan--will
    provide guideposts and long-range resourcing vectors with which to make
    the difficult tradeoffs required in years to come.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ http://airman.dodlive.mil/files/2014/07/
    AF_30_Year_Strategy_2.pdf
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In the more immediate-term, the Air Force has realized value
    through its ``Every Dollar Counts'' (EDC) campaign. At the heart of EDC
    is the Secretary of the Air Force's challenge to every airman to take
    ownership of the processes they touch and to look for better ways to do
    business. EDC initiatives run the gamut, from soliciting grassroots
    savings ideas to overhauling Air Force acquisition practices. Efforts
    within the campaign have reduced energy costs by approximately $1
    billion, and identified another $1.3 billion in potential savings
    through Better Buying Power practices and the Air Force's partner
    initiative, Bending the Cost Curve. We project another $35.4 million in
    savings proposed by airmen, and have found opportunities to save $190
    million over the next 5 years by analyzing War Readiness Engine
    requirements. The savings are already planned for reinvestment in
    readiness, as well as to modernize equipment and infrastructure.
        Budgetary constraints also spurred the Air Force to re-evaluate the
    way it does business with its installations' host communities, and seek
    alternatives to the status quo. The Air Force Community Partnerships
    Initiative makes unprecedented use of public-public and public-private
    (P4) partnerships, leveraging the existing resources and capabilities
    of installations, state and local communities, and commercial entities
    to achieve mutual value and benefit for all. There are now 47
    installations in the Air Force Partnership Program who identified more
    than 1,000 initiatives across the spectrum of installation services and
    mission support . . . and many of these initiatives are developing
    further with potential application Air Force-wide.
        Additionally, the Air Force unequivocally relies on three strong
    components--Active, Guard, and Reserve--to sustain the force required
    to meet strategic uncertainty, fiscal constraint, and rapidly evolving
    threats head-on. The Air Force is absolutely committed to leveraging
    the distinct and complementary characteristics of its Total Force more
    effectively . . . and to do that, airmen must be postured to operate
    cohesively and seamlessly as one team. Over the last year, dialogue
    with stakeholders provided valuable perspective--and mutual
    understanding--about the necessary size and shape of the future Air
    Force. The Service spent 2014 thoroughly analyzing 80 percent of its
    mission areas and platforms, taking a close look at component balance.
    Over the course of the next year, the Air Force will continue
    evaluating the remaining 20 percent of the mission areas . . . and
    continue ongoing work to break down organizational, policy, and
    cultural barriers to seamless operations.
        The Air Force is a committed steward of America's resources,
    saving--or avoiding costs--to the tune of billions of dollars through
    the ingenuity of airmen. Yet even those billions fall far short of
    making up the losses of the past 3 years. We need a stable funding
    profile, and support for the tough fiscal decisions required, if we are
    to meet the complex global challenges of the coming years.
                     vi. an investment in global influence
        America is an airpower nation; we have enjoyed unrivaled success in
    the air for the past 70 years. But future success is not a birthright,
    and air and space superiority is not an entitlement. It must be earned.
    Without it, American influence diminishes and the U.S. military will be
    forced to radically change how it goes to war. Americans will be put in
    danger, and our leaders' options will be markedly limited. Our
    adversaries know this and are taking steps to tip the balance in their
    favor.
        We cannot let this happen. We must invest in the force required
    today and invest in the force we will need tomorrow.
        The fiscal year 2016 President's budget request is the result of
    difficult, purposeful, strategy-based resourcing decisions made to meet
    obligations set in the Defense Strategic Guidance. It aligns with
    Department of Defense and Air Force 30-year strategies; continues to
    regain ground in our ability to wage full-spectrum operations;
    maximizes the contributions of the Total Force; reinforces investments
    in nuclear deterrence and space control operations; emphasizes global,
    long-range and non-permissive capabilities; and focuses on unique
    capabilities the Air Force provides to the joint fight. It funds our
    greatest asset--airmen--by halting the active duty manpower drawdown
    and reinvesting pay and compensation savings in airmen's quality-of-
    life programs. It preserves the Air Force's top three acquisition
    priorities: F-35; KC-46; and the long-range strike bomber.
        The fiscal year 2016 President's budget request also reflects
    changes in the global landscape, buying back combat capabilities in
    areas where the Air Force accepted risk in the fiscal year 2015
    President's budget--the E-8, Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar
    System, and F-15C. U-2 and E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System
    divestment is rephased to fiscal year 2019, so we can continue to
    operate those platforms and meet combatant commanders' most urgent
    needs. We've increased funding for the nuclear enterprise, space,
    cyber, ISR, and command and control improvements, investing in the
    Nation's strategic deterrence and high demand airpower assets.
        This budget cannot stand alone--it must serve as a point of
    departure for future years' stable, committed investment in global
    airpower for America. A return to sequestration-level funding will
    devastate readiness and modernization; it will force the Air Force to
    depart from a long-term, strategic planning framework in favor of one
    that triages only those things absolutely required in the short-term.
    It will reverse incremental progress made over the past 2 years in the
    recovery from fiscal year 2013's sequestration-level funding and will
    make it impossible to meet current operational requirements or execute
    the Defense Strategic Guidance. Under a sequestration-level budget, we
    will be forced to recommend divesting critical airpower capabilities--
    like the KC-10 and U-2 fleets. Overdue investments in the nuclear
    enterprise will be reduced and technologies vital to future capability
    and the American industrial base--like the promising Adaptive Engine
    Program--will be halted.
                                vii. conclusion
        The U.S. Air Force is the world's best. American airmen are
    warfighters. The air, space, and cyberspace capabilities they bring to
    bear strike fear in the hearts of our enemies. If you are a threat, the
    Air Force can see you; it can reach you; and it can strike you. We must
    keep it that way.
        As airmen continue to support and defend America's interests around
    the globe--engaging in active combat and operational missions
    worldwide--the Nation must acknowledge the serious disconnect between
    the Air Force it expects, the Air Force it has today, and the Air Force
    it is funding for the future. Today's Air Force is the smallest and
    oldest it has ever been . . . and a high operational tempo, paired with
    a constrained and uncertain budget environment, only accelerates this
    trend. The Nation must invest in new technologies, in training,
    infrastructure, and personnel, if it intends to continue operating as a
    global superpower.
        The fiscal year 2016 President's budget request preserves the
    minimum requirement to meet current strategy. But even at the
    President's budget level, the Air Force remains stressed and shortfalls
    exist. Reversion to sequestration-level funding will carry great risk
    for American airmen, and for America itself.
        The fiscal year 2016 President's budget request is an investment in
    a force we hope the Nation will never have to use. But if the
    turbulent--and largely unexpected--global developments of 2014 prove
    anything, they prove this: America's Air Force must be ready to engage
    anytime, anywhere, and across the full spectrum of warfare. America
    expects it, combatant commanders require it, and our airmen deserve it.

        Chairman McCain. General Odierno?

     STATEMENT OF GEN. RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA, CHIEF OF STAFF OF
                                THE ARMY

        General Odierno. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, the
    rest of the members of the committee, thank you so much for
    allowing us to be here.
        I think it is still imperative that I repeat again that we
    today are experiencing a diverse and complex array of threats
    that are unprecedented through a combination of transnational
    extremist organizations and nation states. We continue to
    witness an increase in the velocity of instability around the
    world that was just unforeseen just a few years ago. In Iraq
    and Syria, we continue to see the ruthless behavior of ISIL and
    the smoldering of a sectarian conflict which is threatening
    regional stability and the potential to escalate international
    terrorism. Order within Yemen has splintered. Anarchy,
    extremism, and terrorism are running rampant in Libya and other
    parts of North and Central Africa. In Europe, Russian
    aggression and its intervention in Ukraine challenges the
    resolve of both the European Union (EU) and NATO. Across the
    Pacific, China's military modernization efforts alarm our
    allies and concern our regional interests, while North Korean
    belligerence continues. We continue to have ever-evolving
    threats against the Homeland.
        In my opinion, this should not be a time to divest of our
    military capability and capacity, but that is what we are
    doing.
        We have already taken a significant decrease in Active
    component end strength, which has been said by both the
    chairman and the Secretary of the Army. We have deactivated 13
    BCTs in the Active component. We are in the process of
    eliminating three complete aviation brigades out of the Active
    component. We are taking 700 aircraft out of the Active
    component. We are taking another 100 aircraft out of the
    National Guard. We have slashed our investments in
    modernization by 25 percent. We have already purged the much-
    needed entry fighting vehicle modernization program and Scout
    helicopter developmental programs. We have considerably delayed
    other upgrades for many of our systems and aging platforms.
        The unrelenting budget impasse has also compelled us to
    degrade our readiness to historically low levels. Today only 33
    percent of our brigades are ready, when our sustained readiness
    rate should be somewhere around 70 percent. Under our current
    budget, Army readiness will, at best, flat-line over the next 3
    to 4 years. The compromises we have made to modernization and
    readiness, combined with reductions to our force size and
    capabilities, translates directly into strategic risk. Today we
    are generating just enough readiness to meet our day-to-day
    needs of immediate consumption. We are unable to generate any
    residual readiness to respond to an unknown contingency or to
    even reinforce ongoing operations. This is a dangerous
    balancing act. We have fewer soldiers. The majority of our
    units are not ready. They are manning aging equipment at a time
    when demand for Army forces is higher than we originally
    anticipated.
        Our soldiers and leaders continue to perform superbly,
    though. Just look how busy we are and where the Army is around
    the world today, whether it is their engagement in Iraq,
    Afghanistan, Jordan, Kosovo, the Korean Peninsula, and across
    the African continent. We have rotational forces in Europe,
    Kuwait, and the Pacific. We are conducting a wide range of
    missions from humanitarian assistance to training and advising
    forces in contact to reassuring our allies with dedicated
    presence. This is the reality we face as we discuss Army
    posture.
        The President's fiscal year 2016 budget submission
    recognizes these challenges, but even the President's budget
    represents the bare minimum needed for us to carry out our
    missions and execute and meet the requirements of our defense
    strategy. It is in fact a tenuous house of cards. In order for
    it to work, all of our proposed reforms in pay and compensation
    must be approved. All our force structure reforms must be
    supported to include the aviation restructuring issue, and we
    must be allowed to eliminate a half a billion per year of
    excess infrastructure that we have in the Army.
        We potentially face a $12 billion shortfall in our budget.
    If BCA caps remain, that adds another $6 billion in potential
    problems. We can no longer execute the Defense Strategic
    Guidance (DSG). Sequestration would compel us to reduce end
    strength even further. That has been noted by several different
    people here today, which is of great concern to all of us.
        Anything below the President's Budget compromises our
    strategic flexibility and inadequately funds readiness. It
    further degrades an already underfunded modernization program.
    It impacts our ability to conduct simultaneous operations and
    shape regional security environments. It puts into question our
    capacity to deter and compel multiple adversaries. If the
    unpredictable does happen, we will no longer have the depth to
    react.
        We continue to work on achieving efficiencies within our
    own budget. We have taken advantage of a wartime reset program
    to reduce depot maintenance by $3.2 billion. We are reducing
    our reliance on contractor logistics, saving nearly $2 billion
    this year. We have identified and are avoiding costs in excess
    of $12 billion through the aviation restructure initiative
    (ARI). We have reorganized our BCTs throughout the force
    eliminating overhead and maximizing our combat capacity. We
    have eliminated nearly 12,000 positions by reducing all two-
    star and above headquarters by 25 percent. We continue today to
    look to ways to achieve individual collective training
    efficiency.
        I would ask that we also look hard at our acquisition
    reform, to readdress the role of the Service Chiefs and also
    the role of lifecycle management and logistics. We must address
    the expansion of the bureaucracy which has added so much time
    and costs to all of our programs.
        We also continue to work very hard at sexual harassment and
    sexual assault. It remains our top priority. While recent
    reports show some indications that we have made some initial
    progress, we have much work to do. Our men and women deserve to
    be treated with dignity and respect and should expect a work
    environment that is free of harassment, assault, and
    retribution. A culture of inclusion and of mutual and shared
    trust is essential to the Army.
        Mr. Chairman, I continue to be inspired by the unparalleled
    experience and professionalism of our men and women in the U.S.
    Army. They demonstrate an unwavering dedication and a
    commitment to the mission, to the Army, and to the Nation. We
    owe it to them to ensure they have the right equipment, the
    best training, the appropriate family programs, health care and
    compensation packages commensurate with their sacrifices.
        The decisions we make today and in the near future will
    impact our soldiers, our Army, and the Nation for the next 10
    years. The burden of miscalculation and under-investment will
    directly fall on the shoulders of our men and women who will be
    asked to defend this Nation in many places around the world. I
    want to lessen that burden on our soldiers and ensure that they
    have all the equipment, the readiness in order to accomplish
    their mission.
        Mr. Chairman, I look forward to any questions I will have
    as you move forward.
        Chairman McCain. General Welsh?

     STATEMENT OF GEN. MARK A. WELSH III, USAF, CHIEF OF STAFF OF
                             THE AIR FORCE

        General Welsh. Thank you, Chairman McCain and Ranking
    Member Reed, and members of the committee. It is always a
    privilege to be here, and it is a huge privilege to be here
    with the boss representing the greatest men and women on earth.
    It is also a special honor to be here with Secretary McHugh and
    General Odierno because the members of this committee and the
    body of this committee, along with Secretary McHugh, General
    Odierno, and the men and women who have led the Army in the
    past built the blueprint for the greatest army on earth. You
    and your airmen also wrote the blueprint for the greatest air
    force on earth. Other nations have watched that Air Force in
    action for some time now, and now a few of them are following
    the blueprint.
        The capability gap that separates from other air forces is
    narrowing and it is narrowing noticeably, and that gap will
    close even faster under BCA levels of funding. The Budget
    Control Act is essentially forcing us to choose between
    readiness, force structure, and modernization.
        If we choose to sacrifice readiness in order to modernize,
    we risk failure in today's fight. As an example, when
    sequestration first hit in 2013, we saw the domino effect it
    had on pilots, maintainers, weapons loaders, air traffic
    controllers, fighter squadrons, bomber squadrons. The readiness
    levels plummeted across the Air Force and every organization
    central to combat operations. We were not fully ready if the
    Nation had needed us for a larger effort, and we simply cannot
    accept that.
        If, on the other hand, we choose to fund readiness and walk
    away from modernization, we risk losing tomorrow's fight, which
    could be much more significant than the one we are engaged in
    today. We cannot accept that risk. So not modernizing is simply
    not an option. That is why we are protecting programs like the
    F-35, the long-range strike bomber, and the KC-46 so
    vigorously.
        If we choose to trade force structure, people, and
    equipment in order to fund both readiness and modernization, as
    we have for the past decade-plus, we are now at the point where
    we will be too small to succeed in the missions we have already
    been given to do today. We are way past easy choices.
        What sequestration really means is that it is time for
    tough decisions. If Congress makes the decision that this
    committee has been fighting so hard for them not to make to
    stay at BCA levels of funding and then delays making the hard
    decisions that will allow us to reshape the Air Force to be
    successful at that level of funding, then our Air Force could
    very quickly become irrelevant. If our Air Force is irrelevant,
    our joint force is irrelevant because in modern warfare,
    without the full spectrum of airspace and cyber capabilities
    that airpower brings to the table, you will lose.
        We understand that the Department must be part of the debt
    solution for our Nation, but the fiscal year 2016 President's
    budget (PB) reflects the minimum funding required to be ready
    for today's fight and still able to win in 2025 and beyond. I
    believe our Nation still expects that of us.
        Thank you for having us today, and I know we all look
    forward to your questions.
        Chairman McCain. Well, thank you very much. General
    Odierno, I believe that this probably is your last appearance
    before this committee as Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. Is
    that correct?
        General Odierno. I have about 6 months, Senator.
        Chairman McCain. Well, I want to thank you for your
    leadership, your service. I was just thinking. I think you and
    I first met some 14 years ago in Iraq. One of the blessings of
    my life is to have the opportunity to know great leaders and
    warriors such as you are, and I want to thank you for all you--
    and I am sure you will continue to--do.
        Do you believe that we should be sending defensive weapons
    to Ukraine?
        General Odierno. I believe that there are some things that
    we could to do to help them to defend themselves, specifically
    radars. That could help them specifically in a down-fire.
        Chairman McCain. Weapons?
        General Odierno. I think it depends on the type of weapons.
    I am more concerned initially in helping them to defend
    themselves, and I think that is a tack we should at least take
    a look at.
        Chairman McCain. At a press briefing by Secretary of State,
    John F. Kerry, in 2014, Secretary Kerry said I think it is
    self-evident that if Iran is taking on ISIL in some particular
    place and it is confined to taking on ISIL, it has an impact
    that is going to be--quote--the net effect is positive.
        Speaking of Iran's role in Iraq and its specific military
    assistance for Shia militias in the battle for Tikrit, Chairman
    of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dempsey said on March
    4th, if they perform in a credible way, then it will in the
    main have been a positive thing in terms of the counter-ISIL
    campaign.
        General Odierno, do you think Iranian influence in Iraq is
    a positive?
        General Odierno. It depends, Senator. I would say this. I
    have some concern over the Shia militias, who they report to,
    who controls them, who controls their activities.
        Chairman McCain. Is it not pretty obvious who is since the
    pictures of Iranian Army Major General Qasem Suleimani are
    widespread?
        General Odierno. So that has some concern and the fact that
    how close are they working with the Iraqi Security Force (ISF),
    are they actually working with them. All that portends to have
    some concern. I will tell you we all understand that in order
    to be successful in Iraq, you have to have a government that
    supports all the different groups, to include the Sunni, the
    Shia, and the Kurds.
        Chairman McCain. Is this not the same guy that sent in
    copper-tipped Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) that killed
    your soldiers and wounded them?
        General Odierno. Absolutely, Senator.
        Chairman McCain. It must be a bit disturbing.
        General Odierno. It is.
        Chairman McCain. So are you comfortable with the Shia
    militias who I believe in the Badr Brigades that I believe we
    took on during the surge are playing such a key role?
        General Odierno. I am not comfortable with it.
        Chairman McCain. Do you believe we have a strategy as
    regards to ISIL in Syria?
        General Odierno. I do. I do believe that our ability to
    train the moderate Syrian opposition is a good strategy.
        Chairman McCain. You think it is a good strategy. How is it
    going?
        General Odierno. Well, we have just begun or are just in
    the process of beginning training them. I think we are still
    waiting on approval of----
        Chairman McCain. Four years after the President of Syria,
    Bashar al-Assad, began his slaughter of the Syrian people.
        I guess what I would like to ask you--today the Budget
    Committee here in the Senate begins their deliberation as to
    the budget that we will be taking up on the floor of the
    Senate. I understand your words in your written statement and
    your verbal statement. But if you had a chance to address the
    Budget Committee in their work today as they frame a budget,
    what would your words of advice be concerning the budget and
    sequestration?
        General Odierno. If we continue to go down the road we are
    going, we will not have a trained and ready force prepared to
    meet the requirements of our national security strategy. We are
    mortgaging our future for today, and I think there is great
    danger in that as we potentially have to ask our forces to do
    some very important missions in the coming years.
        Chairman McCain. Does it put the lives of the men and women
    who are serving under you at greater risk?
        General Odierno. Whenever we have this problem, it directly
    affects the soldiers, sailors, and marines, everyone who will
    be asked to do their job. The possibility of them giving their
    lives increases significantly.
        Chairman McCain. I thank you, General. Again, thank you for
    your service.
        Senator Reed?
        Senator Reed. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too want to
    add my great respect and commendation to General Odierno. We
    met about the same time, 14 years ago, in Iraq. What is
    remarkable is we see eye to eye on everything. Of course, I am
    looking at your sort of chest at the same time, but that is a
    whole different story.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Reed. Let me raise a question that came up with
    Secretary McHugh's testimony and your testimony. That is
    acquisition reform. Secretary McHugh, you were very candid in
    saying there are some distinct failures in acquisition policy.
    General Odierno, yesterday and again today you suggested that
    the Chief of Staff, you and your successor, should be more
    involved.
        Now, my understanding is you set the requirements
    basically, but then it has to meet the testing and evaluation
    of DOD.
        A question for both of you. In terms of reform--and I must
    recognize Senator McCain's and retired Senator Carl M. Levin of
    Michigan's role in this dramatically. But what do you want to
    change? You set the requirements. You are not going to test
    yourself. Let me put it that way.
        General Odierno. No, but it is more than just testing. It
    is the application of the entire program. What I would say is
    at our level, there is not a problem. The Secretary and I--we
    talk extensively about these issues.
        However, there is a message that gets sent throughout the
    acquisition force that they do not work for the uniformed
    military. They work for the civilians. I think that is a
    dangerous message because I think our experience and support in
    the process is very important, and I think we should play a
    bigger role in approving where we are going, milestones, how
    the requirements meet with what is being done by the
    acquisition. I think an oversight by the military would be more
    important and could add some potential positive energy towards
    building better acquisition programs.
        Senator Reed. Secretary McHugh, your thoughts?
        Mr. McHugh. Well, and it may be because of, as the Chief
    just said, our close personal relationship and good working
    partnership, but as I look across the history of our
    acquisition programs, clearly many things have happened
    negatively on some of those. I do not want to ascribe it all to
    a service chief not having enough reach and visibility at the
    latter points of the process, but to me, the Chief's proposal
    makes some sense. You do have, at the end of the day, the need
    to ensure the Title 10 authorities of the civilian command, but
    I do not think the two are mutually exclusive. As I said, I
    think there are some good and certainly at a minimum it ought
    to be discussed and looked at.
        Senator Reed. Well, I think at a minimum you are absolutely
    right, and the chairman is going to do that with the committee
    and our colleagues. But one, there is the civilian control and
    ultimately, two, one hopes that the testing and evaluation--the
    people giving the tests are not the people who are making up
    the requirements and then there could be a problem there in
    terms of everybody is average or at least everybody passes.
    That is not good either.
        Madam Secretary and General Welsh, I talked about the
    Reaper and the Predator issue. I know you get huge pressures in
    terms of personnel. You are asking for about 6,000-plus
    additional personnel. You, Madam Secretary, laid out where you
    have problems within missile command in terms of getting that
    staffed up. You have other issues, cyber. That is always--more
    can be added to in this moment.
        How are you going to deal with this issue, which has been
    around for several years, of the stress on these crews that are
    flying the remote vehicles?
        Ms. James. So, Senator Reed, maybe I could begin and the
    Chief can then jump in and tell you about some of the immediate
    actions that we have taken just in the last couple of months,
    but then there is more to follow.
        So fundamentally, as I mentioned, we have 60 Combat Air
    Patrols (CAP) funded in the budget with the ability to surge to
    65, and we are at 65 today. But we have 55 CAP's worth of
    people. So there is the fundamental problem. We are doing 65
    CAP's worth of work with 55 CAP's worth of people. As the years
    have progressed, even as we have built our force, the
    requirements or the desires of the combatant commanders, given
    all that has been happening around the world, has been going
    up, up, up, up to the point where we have not been able to
    catch up with ourselves. In order to keep pace with what the
    combatant commanders are asking of us, we in fact have had to
    rob from the schoolhouse those individuals who we were teaching
    to put them on to operational missions which, in effect, is
    another way that puts us behind.
        So some actions that we have taken recently. We are using
    more of our Guard and Reserve in this area. We are bringing
    more onto active duty. We are getting recently qualified RPA
    specialists who have left that field and gone back to their
    other flying specialty. We are bringing some of those back. We
    are delaying the departure of some who would have gone back to
    their airframes. We are asking them to stay a bit longer, and
    they have agreed to do so. I have used my authority that I have
    as Secretary of the Air Force to incentivize our career RPA-
    only pilots whose service obligations were about to expire,
    which meant they could have left the Air Force, but I used my
    authority to increase their pay to try to keep them with us. We
    are working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)--
    and I am certain that we are going to get this--to be able to
    offer additional monetary incentives to the full panoply of
    those who are serving in the RPA.
        Then I will yield to General Welsh to tell about some of
    the things that we are looking at for the future.
        Senator Reed. Just very quickly, sir, because my time is--
    --
        General Welsh. Sir, the fundamental problem is we cannot
    train as many people as we lose in a given year because we have
    had to build the crew force to do the operational mission
    before we built the training infrastructure. We are losing
    almost 50 more people a year than we are training. So slowing
    down the operational demand for enough time to get our training
    pipeline completely full will fix this problem. We have been
    chasing this requirements rabbit so long that we just have not
    been able to catch it. Once we get ahead of it--it is getting
    ahead of the training curve that is the problem. If we can do
    that, we are okay.
        Senator Reed. Well, just a final comment. Whatever we do in
    Afghanistan, for example, I have a feeling we will need more
    remote vehicles for protection, for exploitation of
    intelligence, for counterterrorism operations. So I do not see
    this demand coming down. Let us know how we can be helpful.
        General Welsh. Yes.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe?
        Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh, about 100 years ago when
    you and I sat next to each other on the House Armed Services
    Committee, did you ever dream we would be in a situation like
    this?
        Mr. McHugh. I never dreamt I would be here either. But, no,
    if we had those discussions, I think, Senator, we considered
    them pure fantasy.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes, because I can remember some of the
    discussions at that time. At that time, we were wondering about
    whether the B-1 bomber was going to be successful and carrying
    on that program. It did not seem like there was anything really
    traumatic. It is kind of a serious observation as I am going
    from memory.
        You mentioned sending some troops to some of these places
    that might surprise people. You mentioned Estonia, Latvia,
    Lithuania. I was over there. When you have some troops going
    over there, generally it is for a fairly restricted period of
    time. Is it not? A shorter period of time.
        I wonder about the wisdom of that program because all of
    them, to the last one, said where are they. We need to have
    them back. They all expect that to be a permanent transfer.
    When that happens, you might think about that.
        You talked about, General Odierno, all the different
    contingencies and things that are taking place right now all
    over the world. It is totally unprecedented. I wonder if you
    were to be forced into another totally different major
    contingency, what would you do?
        General Odierno. We would end up sending troops over that
    are not properly trained.
        Senator Inhofe. That is exactly what I thought.
        You addressed this a little bit, Secretary James, in your
    one, two, three things you outlined. Your second one was you
    got to keep the balance right between today and then
    modernization. So you have two things that are being drained
    right now: training and I suspect modernization. You talked
    about what we are looking at in terms of the future. But I am
    sure that you are not reaching the goals that you had a year
    ago on where we should be. So that is suffering now. Is it not?
        Ms. James. You are right, Senator. Moreover, of course, the
    message here is sequestration would make all of this much, much
    worse. Of course, the first goal is taking care of people. Even
    though under sequestration in the past, people were protected,
    the numbers of people and so forth, there are Morale, Welfare,
    and Recreation (MWR) programs. There is a variety of other
    things which might not survive in the forms that we would like
    and the funding levels that we would like. We would have to
    look at all of those things. So we think everything would be
    hurt.
        Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, you and I talked. We talked
    over in Arkansas when we all went over to a meeting over there.
    I see our Senator Tom Cotton from Arkansas, was in the same
    meeting. But at that time we talked about flying hours because
    we were both flying in there. I have changed the figures that I
    used to use because a Lazer (Senator Inhofe's assistant,
    Anthony ``Laser'' Lazarski) update had informed me, and it is
    more to retain a pilot of the F-22 level would be a bonus over
    9 years of $225,000. You addressed this, Madam Secretary, and
    yet, to train a new one from the beginning, it would be $9
    million. That is still huge.
        Now, do I understand from your statement that this
    retention is not as bad as it was, say, a year ago? Does it not
    kind of go with the economy? If the economy improves from where
    it is today, there will be more competition with the airlines.
    Is this true?
        General Welsh. Senator, it is absolutely true. Historically
    all of the Services have lost pilots as the airlines hire. We
    expect the airline industry to hire roughly 20,000 pilots over
    the next 10 years. So 2,000 a year. Their change in
    requirements for their hiring means that military aviators will
    be a target for them.
        Senator Inhofe. One of their motives to get out is a lot of
    them do not feel they are getting adequate flying hours in. Is
    that true today?
        General Welsh. Senator, it is true, although the Bipartisan
    Budget Act (BBA) over the last 2 years has allowed us to fly at
    a much more regular pace than we had in the years before that.
    BCA will bring back the frustrations.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes. I think that is one of a lot of things
    that can really help the situation. People on this committee
    are doing all we can right now during this budget time. We are
    running out of time.
        I have just one last question that is something to be
    thinking about. If Congress would pass a budget resolution that
    funds at the sequestration levels with the intent to raise
    defense funding levels later in the year, when is the Army and
    the Air Force forced to take irreversible action with regard to
    force structure, personnel programs if you were forced in that
    situation? Do you have any idea about when that would happen?
        General Welsh. Senator, just to make sure I understood you
    right, if the initial----
        Senator Inhofe. If we come out with a budget that brings it
    down, so you are suffering from the sequestration, but with a
    message and language that we are going to come back later in
    the year, when do you reach that point where it is kind of
    irreversible, you cannot recover? Have you thought about that?
        General Welsh. Senator, if we were funded at the
    President's budget level with a promise of more later, I do not
    see the catastrophic action that will be required. The BCA
    level would be different, and I would need to get back to you
    with that, unless the boss has a better----
        Senator Inhofe. Just some thoughts.
        Ms. James. I believe the answer, Senator, is if we are
    funded, come October 1st, at the BCA level, we have to
    immediately start taking actions. Perhaps immediately it is not
    catastrophic, but I think it very soon would become very
    serious. So that is sort of my off-the-cuff answer, but I would
    like to come back as well.
        Senator Inhofe. Well, yes. It is not necessary to come back
    on that. It is kind of the nature of the beast during this
    process to say, well, we are going to have to hurt you now, but
    we are going to figure out something later in the year. So just
    keep that in mind.
        General Odierno. Senator, if I could, I would like to--Mr.
    Chairman, if I may?
        Senator Inhofe. Yes, of course.
        General Odierno. So the one issue here that we keep running
    into is for us we stop training and so that cannot just be
    fixed with money. It is time and money. So every bit of time we
    lose pushes us back further. So if we go to sequestration
    levels, for us we cannot take any more force structure out. We
    are already on that road. So it comes directly out of
    modernization and training dollars. So what will happen is we
    will start canceling training, and if we get it 3 or 4 months
    later, we have lost 3 or 4 months of training. In fact, to
    reschedule it, you will have units that will then miss a whole
    cycle of training because they will have missed their
    opportunity and it might not come around again for a whole
    other year. So you then get on this cycle of really downward
    readiness capability, and that is why it is so important to us.
        Senator Inhofe. You would have to be sending troops forward
    perhaps not trained.
        General Odierno. That is correct.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Manchin?
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of
    you for your service. There is not a West Virginian I know who
    does not support the military and DOD. We have some wonderful
    people in our State that would pay more taxes, would do
    whatever they had to do and sacrifice for the defense that you
    have given and the comfort you give to them.
        With that being said, we have to answer to them also, our
    constituents, and all of us here who are elected and go back,
    how we are spending their tax dollars and are we getting the
    best bang for our buck. When you look at the whole scenario--
    and we just read today where Yemen--the Pentagon cannot account
    for $500 million of missing weapons. Then you look at Mosul
    when we trained and armed Iraq, and they abandoned and left
    millions and millions. So we start wondering. Then we start
    talking about we are not training our people adequately because
    of a lack of money, and then you think about Admiral Michael G.
    Mullen when he was before us when he was Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff. He said the greatest threat that we face as a
    nation is our finances. He did not speak about another country,
    not a terrorist group, nothing. Finances, and here we are
    talking about finances as being our Achilles heel.
        So the only thing I would say is when you start looking at
    military expenditures, I think that if you look at China and
    Russia, everything I am hearing in all the briefings that I
    receive--they are still moving forward. They are doing positive
    things with their military. Correct? China, Russia, even in
    crippling challenges they have with their economy.
        So if you look at figures from the World Bank--and this is
    2013. China's economy--their GDP is $9.2 trillion as of 2013,
    and they spend about 2.1 percent of that money for their
    military. But yet, they are getting, it looks like, a pretty
    good bang for their buck.
        You look at Russia, a $2.09 trillion Gross Domestic Product
    (GDP), and they are spending about 4.2 percent of their GDP on
    their military.
        The United States has a $17-plus trillion GDP, and we spend
    about 3.8 percent. So we are not out of that realm.
        We are going this way. So you would have to ask the
    question, are we getting the best bang for our buck? Have we
    crippled you all? Have we put so much layers of bureaucracy you
    cannot do your job? Have we given you so much mandates? Are you
    buying equipment you do not need? Are you having overlap and
    redundancies? I mean, we are not that far out. When you look at
    the amount of sheer dollars, we are way far and above everybody
    and a bunch of them put together. That is what we have to come
    to grips with.
        So I have to say, how do we answer? How do we work with you
    all to help you do a better job? Because in all honesty, it
    gets back--Admiral Mullen said, finances is the greatest threat
    we face. So whoever wants to take a crack----
        General Odierno. Senator, if I could just start out. I
    think there are two issues. First off, I think what our
    military is asked to do is very different than what the Russian
    military and the Chinese military is asked to do. I think our
    worldwide presence and our reassurance of our allies and
    partnerships is more expensive. So I think we have to start
    there. So I would say there is a policy perspective to it as we
    are an arm of executing our foreign policy.
        The second piece I would just say is that, yes, we can be
    more efficient. But I think it has to do with some of the
    things we just talked about. Budgets on time. I could tell you
    that we do not make the best use of our budget every year as
    soon as we get continuing resolutions, and we have had a
    continuing resolution every year since I have been the Chief.
        Senator Manchin. We always said we want to get rid of
    sequestering. Get a budget. That is up to us.
        General Odierno. So I think that adds to this as well.
        There are things we need to do as well.
        Senator Manchin. When you look at the figures, if you take
    the additional responsibilities we have--and people start
    saying have we done that and are we a safer world of the things
    we have done, whether it be in North Africa, whatever. When you
    look at what we are doing now, now with Syria and all the
    threats that we have there--there has to be a better, more
    effective, efficient way. The procurement. The chairman and I
    have been on this procurement thing, and it is just
    unbelievable and then getting an audit to find out where you
    all--and the cutbacks. I think, Secretary James, you said you
    are going to meet the 20 percent reduction?
        Ms. James. Yes.
        Senator Manchin. All the other branches met theirs.
        Mr. McHugh. Actually our target was upped by the Chief and
    myself to 25 percent. We will reach 20 percent. The last 5
    percent that we added voluntarily is a bit of a squeeze, but it
    is vitally important. Your points about our doing better, as I
    mentioned in my opening remarks, are absolutely essential. We
    need to be a part of America's solution to the very challenge
    that Admiral Mullen spoke about and that you have referenced as
    well.
        I think there is an interesting data point, however. Of our
    total budget, the Army actually controls about $50 billion of
    it once you take away civilian pay, military pay----
        Senator Manchin. Contractors.
        Mr. McHugh. Operations and Maintenance (O&M) and
    contractors, we actually have some control over because we
    decide which contracts we are going to enter into. But we do
    have costs associated with utilities, all of these things. So
    just intuitively I would think there would be some things we
    could cooperatively look at together, not ceding Congress?
    rightful authorities of oversight, but rather giving us some
    flexibility to operate better administratively.
        The acquisition process that I spoke about, you have spoken
    about and Senator McCain referenced, is an absolutely important
    place for us to work together so that we can do better. The
    Army, as I mentioned, has a history of failures. Most of them
    were a little while ago. But we need to get better and show you
    and the American taxpayer we deserve every dollar we get.
        Senator Manchin. I am just concerned about the global
    military presence and the buildup of China and Russia, what
    they are doing, and what we keep hearing all the time of what
    we are not going to be able to do.
        Mr. McHugh. We all are.
        Senator Manchin. We are still in the same realm of
    percentages of GDPs and all that. I want to make sure we are
    getting the best bang for our buck.
        Ms. James. Senator, I just wanted to add. First of all, I
    certainly agree with my two colleagues about the need to
    continue to press on the acquisition side, efficiency side, and
    so forth, and we are all in when it comes to that.
        The other piece, though, I wanted to point out is I believe
    Russia and China have a very, very different philosophy in
    terms of their people issues and how they treat pay and
    compensation and health care and housing and training and all
    the things related to support of people. They are very
    different than we are.
        Senator Manchin. You are saying support of the troops.
        Ms. James. Support of the troops, and I am glad that we are
    the way we are. Maybe our system is not perfect, but I would
    not want to have their system of pay and compensation and so
    forth.
        Chairman McCain. Twice the 20 percent has been mentioned.
    Were those 20 percent of the people removed from the payroll of
    the Air Force?
        Ms. James. In the case of the Air Force, it is 20 percent
    of our headquarters funding was reduced.
        Chairman McCain. Were 20 percent of the people removed from
    the payroll of the Air Force?
        Ms. James. No.
        Chairman McCain. That is what I thought.
        Senator Sullivan?
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to thank all of you for your great service to our
    country. I also want to thank your staffs. I know how much work
    goes into what they do and I appreciate that and all the
    members of the Army and the Air Force.
        General Odierno, this is your last hearing. I want to echo
    the chairman's statements about your decades of service to our
    country. I very, very much appreciate that.
        I wanted to focus a little bit on some recent headlines.
    There is a lot of discussion about Russia, particularly with
    regard to Ukraine. But there has been a lot of discussion
    recently about Russia with regard to the Arctic. Here is a
    headline just a couple of days ago. Russia launches a massive
    Arctic military drill that included a 5-day drill, 38,000
    service men, 50 surface ships and submarines, 110 aircraft in
    the Arctic. This is in addition to the new Arctic Command.
    General Dempsey was testifying here a couple weeks ago and
    talked about the Russians four new Arctic combat brigades, huge
    icebreaker fleet that they are dramatically increasing, 13 new
    airfields they are building now in the Arctic, Cold War level
    bombers, bomber patrols off the coast of Alaska.
        Then you have other headlines. U.S. Army mulls cutting
    troops in Alaska, possibly by two combat brigades.
        So I just wanted to ask the question. Particularly in light
    of the way we understand Vladimir Putin, I certainly think that
    the idea that weakness is provocative applies to him. General
    Odierno, as the Russians build up in the Arctic, what do you
    think that Vladimir Putin would be thinking about us even
    removing one Arctic soldier from Alaska, let alone two combat
    brigades?
        General Odierno. Senator, I think that as he looks to
    increase Russia's influence, that he will look to see that as
    maybe a place that is not as much challenge as what might have
    been if we had more troops in that area.
        Senator Sullivan. So when you are looking at your strategic
    guidance that informs--I know the Army is looking at some tough
    decisions, and we have discussed this, Secretary McHugh. I know
    that these are hard decisions right now. But in terms of the
    strategic guidance, Admiral Gortney testified that there is not
    even an Arctic Operational Plan (OPLAN) right now, but there
    will be one soon, given these new military buildups.
        In your military opinion, at the very least, should we not
    delay any drawdowns in the Arctic until we have a strategy and
    a validated OPLAN that lays out the strategic guidance that we
    need from a national security perspective? It seems a little
    backwards in what we are doing, no OPLAN and reducing forces
    when we should have an OPLAN that actually guides the strategy.
        General Odierno. Senator, we base our force sizing
    construct on contingency plans (CONPLANS) that are selected by
    the Department of Defense. We have not sized towards an Arctic
    threat. We have other CONPLANS that we simply cannot meet
    either with our structure. We are reducing because of budget
    restrictions. We are not reducing because of our inability to
    respond to com plans because that is true today. We cannot
    respond fully to many of the com plans that we have developed.
    So in my mind it applies not only there but in other places as
    well.
        Senator Sullivan. This is actually a little bit of good
    news. This is a recent joint exercise, Army-Air Force exercise
    a Spartan Pegasus, first U.S. airborne mission north of the
    Arctic Circle in more than a decade. It was the 425 and many
    airmen from Alaska. Could Spartan Pegasus have been done with
    any other Army airborne unit in the Pacific or Contiguous
    United States (CONUS) right now given their training?
        General Odierno. Well, I think in the Arctic environment,
    no, because they are specifically trained to operate in Arctic
    weather. It would take months of training for them to be
    prepared to operate in such a harsh environment.
        Senator Sullivan. I want to just end with a broader
    question on training. Secretary James, you talked about the
    importance of taking care of people. I agree with that
    certainly. I think also the best way to take care of our troops
    is to train them hard to make sure when and if they go to war,
    they come back alive. That is the best way to do it.
        With regard to sequestration, I know that the Army
    certainly focuses a lot in their classes on the Korean War,
    looking at Task Force Smith in 1950, the saying of ``no more
    Task Force Smiths,'' given how horribly our troops were trained
    back then in 1950 and what ended up happening during that
    drawdown. Are we at risk of repeating this dark chapter of U.S.
    history right now? That is for all of you.
        General Odierno. I would say potentially we are. It is
    interesting. Back then Task Force Smith was composed of about
    30 percent of those who had significant World War II
    experience. All the leaders had significant World War II
    experience, but the troops that were underneath them were not
    trained to do the job. So when they got there, they were
    overrun and thousands lost their lives. It was just not Task
    Force Smith but the units that followed on behind them. I think
    there is a lesson that we need to take heed as we move forward.
        Mr. McHugh. The Chief and I talk often about what keeps up
    at night, and I think he and I are in accord. The greatest fear
    we have is sending particularly young soldiers into harm's way
    without the proper training that they need to succeed and come
    home. By whatever name you put on it, Task Force Smith or
    anyone else, if sequestration returns and we are forced to
    continue to do all the mission sets we are doing right now and
    we have that next unforeseen occasion, we are going to have to
    make those kinds of choices.
        General Welsh. Senator, our Task Force Smith was actually
    Vietnam, and when we came out of Vietnam, the Air Force learned
    the lesson that most of our losses occurred in the first 10
    combat sorties. I think the other Services learned the same.
    Our response to that was to build the training curriculum, an
    exercise called Red Flag, which was designed to simulate the
    highest threat environment we could simulate for a training
    environment to do exactly what you described, train hard and be
    ready for combat. The problem we have in continuing that is
    that we have spent the last 15 years not investing in the
    infrastructure required to do that right because we have been
    trading that for readiness.
        We have not, for example, improved the threat arrays to be
    current and modern. We have to transition to a simulation-based
    environment, a virtual constructive live environment as opposed
    to a live virtual constructive because we simply cannot afford
    to keep the threat arrays current with the rapid pace of
    technology, change of enemy threats system in the future. That
    investment has not been made routinely just as investment in
    nuclear infrastructure, investment in black and white world
    test infrastructure, investment in space launch infrastructure.
    Those are the things that are hurting our long-term readiness
    and that are driving our requirement to go 8 to 10 years to
    recover it as opposed to a couple of years to gain individual
    readiness.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Donnelly?
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary McHugh, it was an honor to serve with you in the
    House and to travel with you. General Odierno, thank you for
    everything. You performed extraordinary leadership every tour
    you have had.
        To our Air Force friends, thank you so very much.
        To our Air Force friends, I have the privilege of serving
    on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, and I want to show
    something that I know you are familiar with. This is an 8-inch
    floppy disk. This is used with our intercontinental ballistic
    missile (ICBM) systems that we have for a system built in the
    1980s based on technology from the 1970s. I would love to get
    your opinion on what you think about using 8-inch floppy disks
    in our ICBM systems. I guess the alternative is that it helps
    to protect us from cyber in a strange way, but what are we
    going to be doing to modernize this as we look forward?
        Ms. James. Senator, in our 5-year plan as part of our
    fiscal year 2016 submission, we have $5.6 billion more for the
    nuclear enterprise overall than we had in our last 5-year plan
    that we brought before you last year. So we have redirected a
    lot of money in general. That particular item that you just
    indicated is part of the modernization program over the next 5
    years. I will have to get back to you with exactly how much
    money is devoted to that and whether or not that will get
    completely fixed over the next 5 years. I have learned that
    nothing in the nuclear world is as easy as it might sound or
    seem in the beginning because everything is so interconnected.
    But it is part of it. We do have money against it, and please
    allow me to come back to you with the details.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The 8-inch floppy disks are one element of the Strategic Automated
    Command and Control System (SACCS), an essential communications
    capability our nuclear forces rely on for dissemination and receipt of
    Emergency Action Messages and Force Direction Messages. Like many other
    critical systems the Air Force depends on to perform the nuclear
    mission every day, SACCS utilizes multi-decade old technology that
    presents significant obsolescence and sustainment challenges. We
    anticipate replacing the last of the 8-inch floppy disk drives in the
    SACCS network by the end of fiscal year 2016 with solid-state, secure
    digital storage media as part of the Data Storage Service Life
    Extension Program (SLEP). Initiated in 2012, this SLEP provides $17.7M
    in funds for replacement equipment, support, and training.
        The Air Force requested $5.5M in the fiscal year 2016 President's
    Budget and $24.9M over the Future Years Defense Plan in order to begin
    a broader SACCS replacement effort. We estimate the first phase of this
    initiative will be completed in 2020, with the timing of subsequent
    phases dependent on the findings of a SACCS Longevity Study scheduled
    to be completed in late-2015. This detailed assessment will report on
    the current health of SACCS and identify the requirements needed to
    ensure this vital capability remains credible and effective in the
    years ahead.

        Senator Donnelly. That would be great.
        General Welsh. Senator, could I add that one of the things
    that we walked away from as an institution, when Air Force
    Systems Command went away, was developmental planning, the
    effort for us as a Service to identify future gaps, shortfalls,
    and then institutionally develop game plans to make sure that
    we do not end up with these infrastructure problems that are 20
    years too late to a solution. We are restarting that, and one
    of the two areas that we will focus on is the nuclear
    enterprise, and this will be part of it. How do we recapitalize
    this in a responsible way with predictable, consistent funding?
    We will certainly need your support for that.
        Senator Donnelly. Great.
        I know how hard all of you have been working on reducing
    suicide numbers in the military. What do you think about the
    use of physician assistants to help provide additional people
    who our military may be able to go talk to, spend time with?
        Mr. McHugh. Senator, I will begin. As you are aware just
    painting the larger picture, our requirement for these kinds of
    providers has grown dramatically. When I first came to the
    Army, our requirement for those individuals was about 2,300. We
    are now over 5,500 and we are still chasing that. We are pretty
    close to meeting the requirement. But these are highly skilled,
    highly competitive between the military and the civilian
    sector. So I know that you have been working on a series of
    pieces of legislation that we are very anxious to work with
    you. Given the right training, which I know you understand and
    support, we think there is a high likelihood of them being a
    very valuable addition to our clinical staff.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
        General Odierno, switching tracks a little bit. In Syria we
    are working on training the moderates. If they go back into
    Syria without a buffer zone, are you concerned that President
    of Syria Bashar al-Assad could go after them as soon as they
    come in with barrel bombs or other things?
        General Odierno. I think that as we look at employing those
    forces, once they are trained, I think we will have to be very
    careful about how we do that. I think we would work with maybe
    some of our allies that might be able to put some people in
    there with them, and I think we would be very careful in where
    we place them and what their initial missions would be as they
    continue to develop capability. I also believe there would be
    some enabler support that would be necessary in order to help
    them as we reinsert them in to conduct fights. I think what we
    should try to do initially is try to put them in a place where
    they are not at risk from the regime because our focus really
    is on ISIL, and I think we would have to work very carefully to
    try to find places that would protect them from such an attack.
        Senator Donnelly. Do you think Assad would go after them?
    Even though our first goal is to go after ISIL at that point,
    do you think Assad tries to get them before they can even get
    started?
        General Odierno. Senator, I think if we put them in the
    right place, it would be very difficult for them to do that.
    However, I would be inaccurate if I tried to predict what Assad
    would do, but I think we would try to do it in such a way that
    it would be difficult for him to do that, at least initially.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Ernst?
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        General Odierno, thank you for being here. Secretary
    McHugh, Secretary James, and General Welsh, thank you and your
    staffs for being here today and providing testimony.
        Sequestration has been very detrimental to all of our
    forces. We know that. There are stress and strains that go
    along with that.
        What I would like to focus my attention on today is the
    stress and the strain that exists not only between our Active
    Forces but also the Reserve Forces and the Guard.
        Many of you have mentioned the important role that our
    Reserve Forces bring to the table. They are important to back
    up our Active-Duty Forces. At the beginning of this week, I did
    hear some interesting quotes coming from one of our State's
    adjutant generals of the National Guard. His quote was that his
    relationship between his State's Guard and Army leaders was not
    good, and it was really disheartening to hear that. He also
    said it has gotten very difficult for either one to talk to
    each other. Again, this is extremely disheartening to me, and
    maybe, Secretary McHugh, you can help me with this.
        But I have been here for now about 2\1/2\ months, and I do
    see some level of strain between our Reserve Forces and our
    Active Forces, at least in this manner. I know that this has
    existed. It ebbs and flows through all of the years. I
    understand that. Sequestration has put a lot of pressure on us,
    as well as time in rotations, men and women being away from
    home, frequency of mobilizations and deployments. But again, it
    is disheartening. We are one team, one fight. My husband spent
    28 wonderful years on Active Duty Army, and I spent over 20 in
    the Reserve and National Guard. We understand the need to work
    together to resolve differences.
        So if you could, could you address this issue? Again, we
    are in difficult times right now, and our soldiers look to
    their leadership to set a good example.
        Mr. McHugh. I can certainly begin. As I am sure you would
    appreciate, I am unable to speak to the general's comments, but
    I can tell you it was disheartening to hear them. If you have
    had the chance to visit our forward troops--and I know your
    experience would teach you as well--there is not a lot of
    dissension when you are forward. Guard and Reserve and Active
    components work seamlessly, and frankly, that is our view of
    the future, and we want to preserve the operational
    capabilities that we have spent a lot of money to gain over the
    last decade-plus within the Reserve component.
        I think it is fair to say that in most respects that that
    particular attitude or feeling derives out of our aircraft
    reconstruction initiative, ARI. As to the Guard and the Active
    component disagreeing, that is true, but we included the Guard
    in virtually every phase, every meeting of that development and
    that plan. Obviously, we are at a point where we are not in
    agreement, but we have worked hard to try to include them in
    our future forecasting whether it is ARI or any other measure.
        The other thing I would tell you, I as Secretary, when we
    first began our initiatives to, frankly, cut the budget, gave a
    directive that we would start with the Active component. In
    fact, for the first 2 years of our reforming and reconstructing
    our fiscal posture, we did not take any cuts out of the Guard.
    As well, whether it is in ARI or whether it is in end strength
    reduction, we have taken the vast majority of our cuts out of
    the Active component. For the aircraft, it is about three to
    one, more out of the active than the Guard, and when you get to
    end strength, it is about that same percentage, about three to
    one, just over 20 percent to just over 7 percent. So we have
    tried to be equitable and fair not just to be good partners
    because we do not want to go to war without the Guard and
    Reserve. We cannot go to war without the Guard and Reserve.
        It has been my experience in some 23 years in this town
    that we will have differences, but as we have forward,
    particularly in the last decade and a half, I am optimistic we
    will get back together and go forward and do America's hard
    work of freedom.
        Senator Ernst. Well, thank you. I do appreciate your
    service. I appreciate the discussion. I do hope that as we move
    forward, we continue to include Guard and Reserve members in
    the discussions. Anytime there are cutbacks, it does hurt. It
    does not matter who it is on the receiving end of that, but we
    need to keep an open dialogue and set a great example for the
    rest of our young men and women that serve.
        So thank you all very much for your service. Thank you.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Shaheen?
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to each
    of our panelists today.
        You have all been very eloquent in your testimony to the
    impact of sequestration. Chairman McCain and Ranking Member
    Reed have done an excellent job in this committee from the
    start of this congressional session of holding a series of
    hearings pointing out the folly of continuing sequestration and
    what the consequences would be of going back to those caps.
        As we all know, sequestration was never designed to work.
    It was designed not to work, and that is why it is having such
    devastating consequences. I think that is our responsibility as
    Members of Congress to do what we can to address the results of
    sequestration, and I think the reason that did not happen
    before it went into effect the first time is because we could
    not get a compromise around how to do that. There was no
    agreement that in order to address this, we were going to have
    to look at both the defense and the domestic side of the budget
    and to look at both revenues and expenditures.
        So I certainly am committed to doing that. I hope all of us
    will be committed to doing that because we all understand what
    the devastating consequences would be of having it kick back in
    for the next budget cycle.
        So thank you very much for your testimony with respect to
    those impacts.
        Secretary James, we had the great honor of hosting you at
    Pease, the first base chosen to receive the new KC-46A tankers,
    the 157th Air Refueling Wing. I think we were all very excited
    to have you come and see what the capacity is at Pease.
        I was disappointed to see a story yesterday about the first
    flight facing delay for the KC-46A, and I wonder if you could
    share some light on what the cause of that delay is and whether
    there is any reason to be concerned about the long-term
    production of the KC-46A.
        Ms. James. You are right, Senator Shaheen. The slack is
    gone from the schedule for meeting that first flight. So I will
    say there is good news and there is not so good news. So the
    good news on the KC-46 is that they did have a successful first
    flight of what is called that green aircraft. So if you recall,
    that happened several months ago. So that was good. However,
    there have been these testing and integration challenges, and
    as a result, some of the internal targets that the company has
    set for itself along the path to doing what it must do for the
    milestones and for the contractual obligations--some of those
    internal targets have slipped.
        So back to the good news. They have met the milestone
    requirements so far and they have met the contractual
    requirements, but everything internal that they indicated--not
    everything but several of them have slipped.
        So what I am trying to say is in any program, there is a
    certain amount of slack that is built in. There is margin
    because in any developmental program, you know certain things
    are going to go wrong. But a lot of that slack now has been
    used up.
        So the key thing is the key date, which is contractual, of
    course, is that they have to reach what is called required
    assets available (RAA). The target is August 17th and that is
    to have 18 aircraft. That is the next contractual deadline. So
    the company feels that they can still make it, that yes, they
    have used up margin but it is not to the point where they are
    going to miss that deadline. They have recently introduced to
    us a new integrated master schedule, which we are reviewing so
    that we can kind of review with ourselves whether we believe
    that or not.
        Again, back to a piece of good news. The costs, of course,
    are capped on this contract. So any cost overruns that may have
    occurred or may occur in the future are on the company, not on
    the Government. So we are tracking it very closely but it does
    appear that that April timeframe is likely to slip for that
    first flight.
        Senator Shaheen. So do we have any idea what the timeframe
    might be in the future and how much that will affect the end
    production?
        Ms. James. The timeframe that we are looking at as more
    likely is probably later on in the summer vice April for that.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Staying at Pease--and I am almost out of time. So I will
    submit this for the record. But as I am sure you are aware,
    Pease was the first base closed in the first Base Realignment
    and Closure (BRAC) round, and there were a number of
    environmental issues there. There were agreements made between
    the State and the Air Force to address those environmental
    issues. One of them has recently appeared in the drinking water
    for the City of Portsmouth, and it is contaminated. There are
    children that go to school, daycare on the site, and there is
    some concern about whether the State will be able to fund the
    testing for everyone who might need to be tested. So we will
    submit this for the record. But I hope the Air Force will be
    willing to look at this situation, recognizing the agreement to
    address the environmental results of having the Air Force there
    and will be willing to take a look at helping with those costs.
        Thank you all very much.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Tillis?
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Welsh, Secretary McHugh, and General Odierno, thank
    you for the time that you spent with me in the office and
    speaking on this. Secretary James, I look forward to the
    opportunity to meet with you. Our schedules have been hard to
    coordinate, but hopefully we can do that soon.
        General Odierno, I would like for you to go back to a
    comment that you made in your opening, and it was about the
    stresses on the budget even with the President's budget and
    increased spending. You mentioned two different sources, I
    think a $12 billion number and a $6 billion number that related
    to efficiencies or things that you have to achieve that you are
    saying are potentially at risk.
        So the first question I would have was, could you give me a
    little bit more information on these areas and what they are
    funding? Second, what the threats are in terms of achieving
    that, and if you do not achieve it, then what are the
    consequences in other areas of the budget?
        General Odierno. So in the President's budget that was
    submitted, about $6 billion of the Army budget is tied up in
    the pay and compensation requests that we made, specifically
    pay raises, TRICARE, and other potential savings to reduce the
    rate of growth. If those are not accepted, those will come back
    as bills to the Army.
        The second is the ARI which we have put in there--if that
    is not approved, that will also have a significant bill in
    2016. So the combination of those two things totals about $6
    billion.
        In addition to that, the Army has excess infrastructure
    that is costing us about a half a billion dollars a year, and
    we are unable to deal with that problem because of BRAC. So
    that is an additional bill that is not included inside of the
    budget.
        Then we have about $6 billion that are currently in
    Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) that is supposed to be in
    the base. At some time, we will move that back to the base.
    Now, it might happen in 2016 or it might happen in 2017, but
    that is another $6 billion that we have to account for that is
    really base money, but right now we are paying for it in OCO.
    Depending on how OCO is interpreted, we could be required to
    pay that out of the base, and so that is the $12 billion.
        The other $6 billion was the difference between the $126
    billion the Army is getting and the $120 billion, which is the
    sequester level. So that would be another $6 billion we have to
    find.
        So potentially it is somewhere between $12 billion and $18
    billion we would have to find. That comes directly out of
    readiness and it comes directly out of modernization because we
    cannot take Active component end strength down any faster than
    we already are and still meet all our commitments. So for us,
    it would have a devastating effect on our readiness, and it
    would really also cause us to reduce more of our modernization
    programs. Frankly, we would probably have several breaches of
    the Nunn-McCurdy Amendment if we were required to do that.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you.
        Senator Manchin brought up a good point about comparisons
    between our budget and the others. I think, Secretary James,
    you did a great job of explaining it is really an apple and an
    orange. Not really responding now, but I would like to get more
    information so that people can better understand the
    disparities in terms of priorities we have for our people and
    the amount of money being spent on modernization and
    technologies that ultimately over time I think could provide
    other nations with a technological advantage in spite of the
    fact that we may be better off on the people side. But I think
    it would be very helpful to hear from the staff and others to
    get everybody thinking about the real apples-to-apples
    comparison.
        General Welsh, I had a question that relates. We spoke a
    lot about aircraft and things on the ground. But can you talk a
    little bit about the budget as it relates to space-based assets
    and the investment that we are making there and any risks you
    see going forward?
        General Welsh. Senator, I can. Let me give you a quick
    overview and then turn it over to the boss here who is the DOD
    executive agent for space and spends a lot of her time talking
    about this issue.
        The real key for us, as General John Hyten, our Commander
    of Space Command, has said recently, is that we have to look at
    space now as a warfighting domain because whether we ever
    decide we want to compete in that way in space, others clearly
    are going there. So we have to be able to survive to operate in
    that environment, and so General Hyten is leading the effort to
    look at different ways of building, maintaining, and improving
    the assets we currently have in space and the capabilities they
    provide in new and different ways than the very--basically
    functionally developed, large programs, large investment over
    long periods of time that have dominated the space architecture
    up till this point. So that is what he is trying to do.
        The Secretary has put a great emphasis on prioritizing
    operational capability in space when it comes to priority
    funding decisions inside the Air Force. I will turn it over to
    her from there.
        Ms. James. As General Welsh was saying, some years ago,
    Senator Tillis--I will say this might be a bit of an
    exaggeration, but the United States and maybe a handful of
    others really owned space in the sense that we were up there
    and there were not a whole lot of others up there. But in more
    recent years, space has become contested, congested, and very
    competitive. So there are just dozens of countries now that
    have assets in space. So what we want to make sure is that we
    remain on top of our situation, that we are able to see what is
    going on in space, and that we are able to have the use of
    space for our needs, both military and civilian, because space
    is very important to civilian needs as well.
        So in this budget, there are additional investments
    particularly in the area of space situational awareness. So
    this is knowing what is going on, being able to track not only
    satellites but also thousands and thousands of pieces of debris
    and to know what some of these satellites are. So that is space
    situational awareness. We have more investments there.
        We also have investments in space control. So these are a
    variety of things to be able to defend and deter any kind of
    attacks against our assets. So we have a counter-communications
    system as an example, which is designed to jam those who would
    try to interfere with us in space, additional monies for
    command and control.
        So we do have additional investments there and we are
    working it hard because it is very, very important to us both
    from a military and a civilian use perspective.
        Senator Tillis. It seems to me that in that area, there may
    not be that much of a disparity between what we are spending
    and what others may be spending to have a greater command in
    space. That is the reason for my question. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Heinrich?
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman McCain.
        I want to return to that issue. I like that phrase.
    ``Congested, contested, and competitive'' was it?
        Ms. James. Yes.
        Senator Heinrich. I think that is a very accurate picture
    that you are painting.
        I want to, in particular, Secretary James, thank you and
    General Hyten for your leadership on the operationally
    responsive space program. It is one of many solutions to what
    we are seeing where we need to build and launch smaller
    satellites quicker and at lower cost. As you well know, these
    threats are only increasing and seemingly ever more quickly.
        Shifting gears for a minute, Secretary McHugh, it is good
    to see you. It was an honor to serve with you on the House
    Armed Services Committee all too briefly. But I want to thank
    you for your blunt words on sequestration. This weekend I will
    be heading down to White Sands Missile Range. I know we have
    talked about that a little bit. I am going to be participating
    in their annual Bataan death march memorial marathon.
        But what really pains me is to see the sequestration-driven
    decisions and the associated impacts to both Wismer and the 2nd
    Engineering Battalion and in particular the some 130,000 square
    feet of brand new facilities that today sit empty at White
    Sands without any sort of active duty presence.
        So it is my hope that this committee and, frankly, the full
    Senate recognize the seriousness of sequestration budget levels
    and at a minimum, I think we need to support the President's
    budget, and frankly, I think we need to do a little better than
    that. When we return to responsible budget levels, I look
    forward to working with you on putting those facilities to work
    again, especially considering their brand new condition with
    some sort of active duty mission.
        General Welsh, I want to switch to you real quick. I thank
    Senator Reed for bringing this up earlier, but I wanted to talk
    a little bit more about the RPA issue and wanted to ask you,
    other than sequestration relief, which is somewhat obvious, are
    there other things that Congress can do to help with the strain
    that we are seeing because of increased tempo and demand
    overseas and the fact that we are losing more RPA pilots than
    we are able to train?
        General Welsh. Senator, the immediate problem is the
    training one. If the requirement continued to grow and we were
    tasked to continue to find hundreds or thousands of people to
    now go into this mission area, they have to come out of some
    other mission area with our current budget so that we do not
    have extra people waiting to do some other job. So the tradeoff
    there would be catastrophic really for support to the combatant
    commanders in other mission areas, or we would have to grow the
    Air Force, or we would have to significantly grow the Guard and
    Reserve. This is a difficult mission for the Guard and Reserve
    to support in huge numbers because of the 24/7 nature of it.
    They do a great job of supporting it at the level where we are
    now, and they have been spectacularly helpful in doing that.
    But it is not one you can plant quickly into the Reserve
    component and grow it over night. It takes a lot of
    development.
        The biggest thing I think we need to look at is the
    efficiency of the ISR enterprise itself and the way we use it.
    The interaction between DOD ISR and national ISR, the ability
    to use both networks to collect against your collection
    requirements whether you are a national leader or whether you
    are a military leader in a combatant command. The way we use
    different types of sensors to create situational awareness over
    broad areas, as opposed to relying on 60 orbits of soda straws
    to try and do very close targeting, the types of rules of
    engagement we use for tracking in order to set up kinetic
    operations or potential kinetic operations demand this kind of
    work, but that kind of ROE does not match the resources we have
    to support it in a large-scale approach, and it would not be
    practical in a large war. It is just practical in a
    counterinsurgency war or a counterterrorism fight.
        So that is the kind of discussion we need to be having, the
    efficiency of the operation. We just cannot keep throwing more
    and more and more money at it. We are going to break the
    Treasury.
        Senator Heinrich. Well, I appreciate your attention to the
    issue. I think it is absolutely critical especially given the
    threats that we are facing today.
        Secretary James and General Welsh, I am quite pleased to
    see the second squadron of F-16s scheduled to arrive at
    Holloman Air Force Base this year. As we welcome these new
    aircraft, the airmen, and their families to New Mexico, I
    continue to sort of keep my eyes on the future as well for the
    military community in southern New Mexico. I am pleased to see
    the budget request included increased production of F-35s.
        It is my understanding that the next iterations of basing
    decisions for an active duty bed-down of the F-35 would be in
    2024. Is that still accurate, and will Holloman Air Force Base
    remain a candidate for basing for the JSF at that time?
        General Welsh. Senator, I believe it would be a bed-down,
    an arrival of aircraft in 2024, which will mean the decision
    would be in the early 2020s, 2 to 3 years prior to that when we
    start to process for identifying the base to give us time to
    ensure the proper funding, military construction (MILCON), that
    was required, et cetera, would be available. So it will be just
    after the turn of 2020.
        Senator Heinrich. We are talking maybe 6 years.
        General Welsh. Yes, sir. Every base that we have right now
    that is capable of flying fighters off it will be part of the
    candidate list.
        Senator Heinrich. Great. I appreciate it. Thank you.
        Thank you, Chairman McCain.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Rounds?
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you for your service.
        Mr. Chairman, I do have some questions for the witnesses,
    but first I would like to briefly address an overarching theme
    that has dominated this committee's dialogue since January.
    That theme is, of course, the critical importance of properly
    funding our armed forces. We have heard over and over from
    leaders from throughout the Defense Department about the
    devastating impacts that are accompanying sequestration.
        But I believe sequestration is part of a larger threat to
    our defense establishment and our national security. At a time
    of great fiscal pressures, we are seeing ever-mounting pressure
    to reduce defense spending below a level of acceptable risk. In
    short, we can expect to see, as never before, advocacy of a
    national security strategy that is budget- and not strategy-
    driven. This committee is positioned to keep that from
    happening.
        So I would like to take this opportunity to state my strong
    support and great appreciation for the ongoing efforts of
    Chairman McCain and Ranking Member Reed to stop that from
    happening and reduce the damage which is being caused by
    sequestration.
        With that, I have some questions for Secretary James and
    General Welsh about one program for which we must provide
    adequate funding, and that is the long-range strike bomber.
        General Welsh, the Air Force says that the long-range
    strike bomber is one of the Air Force's top modernization
    priorities. Today the Air Force has either 95 or 96 operational
    bombers. This is nearly half the number of bombers recommended
    by the 1993 bottom-up review to support operations in the post-
    Cold War era. During the Cold War, the Air Force's average
    ratio of fighters to bombers was about 5 to 1. This ratio is
    now 14 to 1, 14 fighters for every 1 bomber. I am not
    suggesting the need to cut more fighters, but rather, I think
    we ought to be talking about whether or not that original
    balance was appropriate.
        I am concerned, however, that DOD may be contemplating
    making an unfavorable situation even worse by retiring more
    bombers before the long-range strike bomber is fielded in
    substantial numbers.
        My questions are these. If the Air Force is not given
    relief from the Budget Control Act, would you propose cuts to
    the current bomber force?
        General Welsh. No, Senator, we are not.
        Senator Rounds. Will the long-range strike bombers replace
    any of the current bombers, including the nuclear mission
    capable B-2, or will they augment the current force?
        General Welsh. The intent would be to replace the B-2 over
    time with the long-range strike bomber.
        Senator Rounds. Beginning?
        General Welsh. Beginning in the mid-2020s.
        Senator Rounds. Some have pointed to stealth technologies
    as a diminishing advantage. Even if this is true, would you
    think it necessary to make the air defense challenge as
    difficult as possible for our Nation's enemies, and what other
    alternatives would we have?
        General Welsh. Sir, I have seen no technical data that says
    stealth as a way to break a kill chain is a diminishing value.
    It is about breaking any segment of the kill chain. There are
    sensors that can see any stealth platform, but passing the data
    that they draw to sensors and weapons that can target you is a
    completely different problem for them, and stealth to this
    point clearly can disrupt that kill chain.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cotton [presiding]. Senator Hirono?
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Senator.
        The DOD is the biggest user of energy in the Federal
    Government. The military is committed to lowering its energy
    costs because the savings therefrom can go to other DOD
    priorities such as modernization and readiness.
        So I know that the DOD is making investments in research
    and development (R&D) on alternative energy sources besides
    oil. I wanted to ask Secretary James and Secretary McHugh, can
    you tell us what your alternative energy goals are and whether
    you are meeting those goals?
        Ms. James. Well, Senator, what I would tell you is we have
    a little saying in the Air Force, ``mission assurance requires
    energy assurance,'' because obviously just as you stated,
    energy is the backbone of everything that we do in the Air
    Force. So I guess there are several points I would like to
    bring up. It is partly about saving money. It is partly about
    doing things differently and ultimately saving lives because
    the transport of energy can cause damage on the battlefield, to
    say the least.
        So far in recent years, the Air Force has avoided about
    $2.5 billion in energy expenses. This is mostly CONUS and
    overseas, not the forward-operating base type locations but
    this is through efficiencies at base level.
        Second, we are shifting our strategy from one of self-
    funding to third-party funding, wherever we possibly can. The
    way I like to say that is using other people's money by
    partnering and getting efficiencies in this way.
        The third thing, to your point, is we have about 300
    renewable energy projects on about 100 different installations,
    all of which meet or beat utility prices, and most of those are
    third-party funded, those partnerships that I talked about as
    well.
        So those are some of the key things, and maybe there is a
    fourth point to throw in and that is that every type of
    aircraft that we currently have has been certified to be able
    to utilize alternative fuels. Now, we are not doing that in a
    big way at this point. We do not have suppliers that can supply
    that kind of thing in bulk, but that is a point just to raise
    that at least we are prepared.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you. I do understand that our
    Services are looking for efficiencies because that is where you
    determine what your baseline needs might be and then to move to
    the alternative sources. So that would be a given.
        Secretary McHugh, would you like to just address the
    alternative question that I asked?
        Mr. McHugh. Well, as Secretary James said, I think it is
    true for all the Services. We are working very hard to try to
    meet the alternative fuel mandates that were set both in law
    and in executive order. In our tactical vehicle fleet
    particularly, we have a goal that is established out to 2030.
    We have actually reached that goal already. Similarly in other
    areas, we are working hard to meet the legislatively mandated
    benchmarks that are out there. I think it is important to note
    for the Army that we have reduced our petroleum fuel
    consumption since 2003 by 17 percent. You mentioned cost. It is
    a little frustrating that all the while we have done that, our
    actual costs have gone up about 45 percent given living Hawaii,
    the cost of utilities and such. But nevertheless, it is a very
    important initiative, and we are going to continue to develop
    that.
        We piloted about 3 years ago what we called the Net Zero
    project, water waste and electricity. We started, I believe, it
    was on seven bases. Highly successful. In fact, we have now
    embedded that throughout the entire Army to try to be better
    stewards of the environment but be better neighbors as well to
    the communities that play host to us.
        We have doubled our renewable fuel consumption from 2013 to
    2014. That is the second year in a row we have doubled our
    renewable construction. We have still got a ways to go to the 7
    percent goal that Congress has set, but we are making progress
    and whether it is now 380 renewable energy programs that we
    administer where we leverage for every Army dollar $13 in
    private investment, we are getting there. You mentioned
    baseline. Given I think where we all started--and the Army is
    the largest consumer in the Federal Government of energy and
    petroleum products--we have a lot of room for improvement.
        Senator Hirono. Secretary McHugh, your testimony mentions
    the Ready and Resilient Campaigns that the Army established 2
    years ago by your directive to promote resiliency among
    servicemembers by streamlining programs, including those aimed
    at eliminating sexual assault and harassment, substance abuse,
    domestic violence, and any stigmas or barriers associated with
    seeking help.
        After 2 years, has the Army seen a measurable impact on
    servicemembers and their families as a result of this program?
        Mr. McHugh. I think if we are honest with ourselves when it
    comes to the Ready and Resiliency Campaign, we still have a
    ways to go before we fully integrate the--I think there are
    seven major initiatives embedded within there. But if you look
    at them individually, whether it be help-seeking behavior for
    suicides and mental health, whether in sexual assault, it is
    the double trend lines of incidents going down while reports
    coming up and so on and so forth, the individual programmatic
    pieces are showing progress.
        As I know you understand, Senator, each one of these are
    very serious challenges unto themselves. So when I talked about
    dramatic increases in reports on sexual assault and equally, I
    think, dramatic declination of incidents, I do not want to
    paint that as too rosy a picture. This is still a scourge, I
    think a fair word, in the U.S. Army, and we are going to
    continue to work that as we are suicides, as we are substance
    abuse and every other program. But we are still realigning
    ourselves so that we have a more holistic approach to the Ready
    and Resilience Campaign.
        Senator Hirono. So 2 years may be too short a time, but I
    commend you for taking a holistic approach to these issues.
        Mr. McHugh. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Hirono. I also want to thank General Odierno for
    your continuing commitment to addressing the scourge of sexual
    assault in your testimony. Thank you very much, and I expect
    that of all of our Services.
        Again, Secretary McHugh, during the OSD posture hearing,
    Secretary Carter testified that foreign leaders--and I quote--
    get a very clear picture of the dangers of sequester. They
    probably get an outsized picture of our lack of will, but this
    is not good for our friends--end quote--much less our foes.
        That being acknowledged, it is critical that we do
    everything we can to multiply the effectiveness of our troops
    and to reassure our allies. One of the ways, I believe, that we
    are doing that is through Pacific Pathways.
        Can you speak to the importance of military-to-military
    (mil-to-mil) programs in maintaining stability and offering
    reassurance to our regional partners, particularly in the Indo-
    Asia-Pacific region? How does the President's budget support
    these types of partnership building engagements?
        Mr. McHugh. Well, Senator, as I know you recognize full
    well, the entire DOD is refocusing on the Pacific. It is, I
    think, understandable to view this somewhat as an air and water
    domain, but the Army has had substantial presence in that
    region for many, many years, and we see an opportunity at this
    moment to increase that.
        You mentioned Pacific Pathways. That is an initiative that
    a four-star general who we elevated in the Army Pacific Command
    to a four-star general to recognize the very factors that you
    said. Pathways from General Brooks and Chief Odierno is the way
    in which we are trying to articulate that. Eight of the 10
    world's largest armies are located in the Pacific. Of the
    military forces throughout that region, the vast majority are
    headed up by army officers, land force officers. So we have a
    natural affinity to deal with these partners and not to be war-
    like in our posture toward China but rather to build assurance,
    to build partnerships, and through Pacific Pathways, we are
    actually in a more efficient way sending out forces to train
    through a variety of our engagements and then return home.
        General Brooks has spoken, I know, to the Chief--and
    perhaps the Chief could comment more fully--about some of the
    concerns. Particularly, obviously, at sequestration level, that
    breaks his ability to go out and do, I believe, the three
    rotations that he would like. But through various efficiencies
    at the President's budget level, I think we can continue to
    stay focused on this very important initiative.
        But I would yield to the Chief if he wants to add.
        Senator Hirono. Well, I know that my time is up. So I would
    like to ask the chair if General Odierno can comment.
        Senator Cotton. General Odierno, please comment.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you.
        General Odierno. Senator, I would just say I think as you
    know, Pacific Pathways is really key for us reaching out to new
    and important allies. We have very sophisticated and long-term
    programs. We deal with Korea, Japan. But now we are able to
    reach out to other countries that we think are going to be
    really important to us, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, and other
    places like that that are really important to us as we continue
    to develop our relationships and capabilities in the Pacific.
    The Pacific Pathways is allowing us to do this.
        I agree with Secretary McHugh, sequestration will basically
    end Pacific Pathways for the next couple years if we do not get
    that thrown out because that will be one of the issues that we
    will have to cancel if we lose the dollars that are associated
    with it.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cotton. Senator Wicker?
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is an
    outstanding panel.
        I became Secretary McHugh's House colleague some 21 years
    ago. It is hard to believe.
        Secretary James, there is a country song from the Grand Ole
    Opry, ``I've Been Everywhere,'' and I think in the short time
    you have been Secretary, you fulfilled the words to that
    particular song.
        But let me direct my questions to our two outstanding
    uniformed witnesses today. General Odierno, I understand this
    will be your last testimony before this committee. Maybe not
    but perhaps. Congratulations on a great career.
        General Odierno. Senator, I always get nervous when you say
    it is my last one because you just never know. It is 6 months.
    A lot can happen within 6 months.
        Senator Wicker. That is true. That is true. But I hope you
    will come back and tell us really good news.
        You were in command of the surge in Iraq in 2007 and I do
    not want to ask about Iraq. But suffice it to say that the
    surge in my opinion was a success. We then left a vacuum and,
    because of a number of reasons, things have gone to hell for
    our interests in Iraq.
        Now, I understand every situation is different, but I have
    worried publicly about Afghanistan. I worry that we will leave
    a vacuum that will come back to haunt us and I want you to
    comment about that.
        We have a friend in the presidency now in Afghanistan,
    President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani. He and his wife had to leave
    Afghanistan during the time of the Taliban. We have a situation
    now where the people have elected him and he is back in office.
    His chief opponent, as a patriotic citizen of Afghanistan, has
    agreed, after a tough campaign, to be part of the government
    and to be part of the solution, Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
    Abdullah Abdullah. The tribal councils, the collective wisdom
    of the various ethnic groups there, the Loya Jirga, have asked
    us to stay. Frankly, I view the situation now in Afghanistan as
    a success story.
        Now, clearly mistakes were made. Clearly I wish we had not
    been there as long as we were, and perhaps we were distracted
    elsewhere. But the situation on the ground is favorable to us
    in Afghanistan now. I fear that under the current timetable we
    are going to risk losing the gains that we have made.
        So give us your opinion about that, and to the extent you
    can, tell us what, if any, movement there might be in the
    administration toward a fact-based decisionmaking process
    rather than a timetable. Then, of course, I will just toss that
    over to General Welsh.
        General Odierno. I will just say that, first, the things
    you pointed out about President Ghani and Abdullah, who is kind
    of the CEO of Afghanistan, is creating an environment that is
    really, as you mentioned, positive. Frankly, it is positive
    towards us. Whenever you try to be successful, it is a
    combination of military capability to provide security, but
    really, the most important piece is the political piece and you
    have leadership that is able to bring the country forward. So I
    think with Afghanistan now, the most positive thing is the fact
    that we now have the political leadership, as you mentioned, in
    place.
        I believe that General John F. Campbell, the current
    Commander of the International Security Assistance Force
    (ISAF), has been given flexibility between now and the end of
    2016. I think that is very important. So I would think that
    that is a first step, and I think that is because of the
    positive political environment that we see. So I think there
    has been a reaction to that, and I think we have to constantly
    assess where we are and we can continue to have a discussion on
    where we are a year from now and then have a discussion on, at
    the end of 2016, which is the current plan, will we pull out,
    and if not, then I think the Joint Chiefs and General Campbell
    will give their best military advice to the President on
    whether that is appropriate or not.
        What I would say is I think because of the political
    situation, I think there is more room now that General Campbell
    has been given over the next year and a half or so as we
    continue to downsize our presence to make sure we are
    continuing to support the administration in Afghanistan and
    achieve our goals. I think we will continue to revisit that as
    we----
        Senator Wicker. What are the risks to our troops if we stay
    longer than that? There is not expected to be very much----
        General Odierno. I think it just depends. I mean, I would
    suggest that if we are staying, it is because we are continuing
    to build their institutions. That is what is important is to
    build their institutions. So that puts them at less risk as we
    go forward. But again, that would have to be determined
    depending on what the situation is at the time.
        Senator Wicker. General Welsh, I was talking to a
    parliamentarian from the United Kingdom yesterday. He thinks
    the perception in his country is the same as it is here, that
    things are really not going well in Afghanistan. I do not see
    it that way. Do you? I think people have the wrong impression.
        General Welsh. Well, sir, it may depend on where you are
    standing or sitting in Afghanistan.
        The Air Force's role there is to support a lot of different
    activity. But the principal role is to support the development
    of the Afghan air force as an institution and as part of the
    security infrastructure of their nation. Many parts of that
    development are going very well. They are showing signs of
    independent ability to do tactical planning, operational
    activities. The thing that will really set them up for success
    over time, though, is the ability as an institution to survive
    the big pieces of an air force, logistical infrastructure,
    supply chains, managing infrastructure from airfields to new
    equipment acquisition, things that they do not have any
    experience with and they are not very proficient at yet. But
    they have young talent with a lot of energy and a lot of desire
    to learn.
        I think clearly if NATO could stay even, for example, for a
    period of time to continue this effort and get them to a point
    where they are able to continue that development on their own,
    there is a potential for their air force to be the cornerstone
    of a budding aviation industry in Afghanistan at some point in
    the future that would be immensely helpful to that country and
    to the region.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cotton. Senator McCaskill?
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
        I was bitterly disappointed today to see that the Senate
    budget that was released resembles a fairytale and does
    absolutely nothing to address the looming crisis with
    sequestration as it relates to our military. We have heard
    witness after witness in this committee tell us what it is
    going to do to our preparedness, to the excellence of our
    military, to our national security. The fact that we are now
    faced with a budget document that does nothing--zip, nada,
    zero--to address this looming crisis is beyond disappointing.
        I want to talk about a number of things. First, I want to
    congratulate you and the other commanders that have worked so
    hard on military sexual assault. We have a lot more work to do,
    a lot more oversight, but the report, which a lot of people do
    not get into the weeds in those reports--I certainly did, as
    you probably are not surprised. I understand that incidents are
    down, reporting is up. Those are both two good measures. Also,
    what was most important was the confidence that victims showed
    in terms of how commanders were handling this issue.
        I think we have to get after retaliation. I have talked to
    many of you individually about this. This is not commander
    decision retaliation. This is lower level peer-to-peer
    retaliation. I will look forward to information coming from all
    of you about how you are specifically getting after that.
        I want to talk about suicide in connection with stress and
    substance abuse. This is going to be one for each of you.
        First, Army. Back in 2008, we had a whistleblower at Fort
    Leonard Wood expose the fact that people were not getting
    substance abuse help at that base. It was a tragic story, and
    as we all know, stress and substance abuse are two of the
    predicates that sometimes are in place when you have a suicide.
    We all want to do something about military suicides. So I think
    substance abuse is pretty important.
        Secretary McHugh, you made the decision in 2010 to move the
    substance abuse program out of the Medical Command into the
    Installation Command. We are having a problem with personnel,
    clinical personnel, leaving the program, and you have shortages
    now at places like Fort Hood where we have 45,000 soldiers. I
    guarantee you the people who need outpatient substance abuse at
    Fort Hood are not getting it because of the lack of personnel
    that is available. Could you speak to that?
        Mr. McHugh. I could. Just a little background because, as
    you noted, Senator--and thank you for your interest. This is a
    vitally important issue.
        Just before I arrived as Secretary, then Vice Chief of
    Staff of the Army, General Peter W. Chiarelli, who is well
    known and wide in circles on suicide and other soldier care
    programs, conducted a study, headed a study of the Army
    Substance Abuse Program (ASAP) at large throughout the Army. He
    was deeply concerned about what he felt was a disaggregated
    program in that it was too dispersed at too high a level for
    command and control to ensure that base by base, facility to
    facility the proper things were being done.
        The response that he put together and that Medical Command
    and Installation Management Command (IMCOM) agreed upon was to
    place the actual oversight of the ASAP program through IMCOM to
    the base commanders. So those who have both responsibility and
    eyes on for soldier care programs had a better view and a
    better influence.
        The--that was executed, as you noted correctly, in 2010 to
    formalize what the vice had done ensured that all of the
    clinical aspects, the certifications and the care programs were
    still--and still are--overseen by Medical Command (MEDCOM).
        You and I are in absolute agreement about the challenge of
    ensuring that we have adequate providers. We do not. This is a
    requirement that has been growing over time, as I discussed
    with one of your colleagues a bit earlier. But I think it is
    important to note that we have not had a hemorrhage or a loss
    of providers since it was transferred authority to IMCOM. In
    fact, right now we are about 88 percent of our stated
    requirement, 99 percent is not good enough. We need to do
    better. But we are actually at about 25 percent higher
    providers on hand than were when Medical Command had control.
        Having said that, there are concerns about this. So in
    January, the Chief and I authorized, long before any of the
    recent stories came out, for the Army Audit Agency to go out to
    do a forensic examination of our structure to see if programs
    were working to see what our actual status was. That
    investigation, that audit is ongoing as we speak. Then in
    response to some stories that, frankly, we take issue to some
    of the data points that were brought up, nevertheless raise
    some very serious questions. As I assured the Secretary of
    Defense, we are not going to circle the wagons on this.
        The Chief and I sent out a directive, I believe it was last
    week, to the Inspector General providing him access to
    virtually every resource in the Army and directing him to go
    and take a hands-on look, eyes-on look at all 54 of our ASAP
    facilities. As attendant to that, I called in the Surgeon
    General, head of our Medical Command, and the commanding
    general of IMCOM, to talk about how it is working. The Surgeon
    General said to me when the transfer first occurred, it was an
    appropriate structure. Since that time, our behavioral health
    delivery capabilities have, in her words, matured, and she
    felt--and the IMCOM Commander agreed--that it is time to take
    another good look at our structure.
        Senator McCaskill. Okay. Well, that is good.
        Mr. McHugh. We are doing that, and I promise you we will
    report back to you when we have those available.
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
        I know my time is gone, and I do not want to ask another
    question. But if you would allow me 30 seconds to put something
    in the record.
        Secretary James and General Welsh, I want to make sure on
    the stress side for our drone pilots--we have never before had
    pilots working 12-hour shifts, killing the enemy, and then
    going home to their wife and kids. This is a new thing in our
    military. We have some of those guys at Whiteman Air Force
    Base, and the demand is so high. They are not getting rest.
    They are not getting leave. We have to do something about the
    demand for RPA and we have to do something about the training
    for RPA. But I would like you all to address to my office and
    to the committee what you are doing to analyze the stress level
    of these pilots. I do not think this has probably been given
    enough thought about what psychologically this is doing to them
    working these 12-hour shifts, killing the enemy, and then going
    home to dinner with the children.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        In addition to access and routine assessments provided by flight
    medicine and mental health outreach services at each unit, the United
    States Air Force (USAF) has conducted multiple, comprehensive
    aeromedical studies over the past several years assessing the
    psychological health and disposition of weapons deploying Remotely
    Piloted Aircraft (RPA) operators engaged in around-the-clock
    operations. Many of these studies have been published in peer-reviewed
    psychology journals as well as official USAF technical reports. The
    main sources of operational and combat-related stress have been
    identified, as well as the prevalence of occupational burnout, elevated
    levels of psychological distress, post-traumatic stress disorder,
    family and interpersonal relationship distress, and other behavioral
    health issues (e.g., sleep and exercise, alcohol, and energy supplement
    use). These studies routinely assess the psychological health and
    disposition of RPA operators at each separate unit to provide outreach
    specific to the needs of each organization as well as identify those at
    elevated risk for psychological difficulties.
        Although the trend and proportion of RPA operators with elevated
    rates of exhaustion and psychological distress is higher than other
    aviation-related career fields, several initiatives have been put in
    place to mitigate the impact of shift work and weapons deployment, as
    well as to identify those at risk for psychological and family-related
    difficulties. The initiatives include, but are not limited to:
    improving manning levels to reduce high workload and role overload,
    developing and assessing shift rotations, work load distribution for
    sustaining health and minimizing disruption to family lives;
    modifications to the lighting and ergonomic design of ground control
    stations to reduce fatigue and burnout, training leadership and medical
    providers with early recognition, intervention of those with warning
    signs for operational and combat-related stress, and improving upon
    psychological health surveillance strategies. Additionally, we have
    embedded operational mental health providers within active duty RPA
    units with appropriate security clearances to increase access to mental
    health care, as well as to engage and intervene, as needed, assisting
    RPA operators with transitioning to home following weapons strikes, as
    well as balancing their warfighter role with their personal life. The
    most recent studies found these efforts have successfully led to
    improvements in the psychological health and function of those within
    active duty operational units. Work is in progress to adapt this
    concept of support to RPA operations across the total force to
    encompass units at Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve sites.
        The comprehensive and in-depth aeromedical studies help leadership
    remain vigilant to the changes, trends, and impact of specific
    initiatives to mitigate the stressors and challenges (both to operators
    and their families) unique to this form of warfare. The outcome of
    these studies and current practices within flight medicine for
    assessing the psychological health of RPA operators will continue to
    shape force management strategies for sustaining and improving the
    wellbeing of the warfighter and their families.

        Senator Cotton. Senator Lee?
        Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thanks to all of you for taking the time to meet with us
    today.
        I am aware of the fact that you are all doing everything
    you can to make adjustments to adapt your branches to the
    emerging threats we are facing and to a very tough budgetary
    environment with a lot of uncertainties.
        Secretary James and General Welsh, during the confirmation
    hearing with Secretary Carter last month, we discussed the
    overall importance of having well-coordinated acquisition
    sustainment and logistics processes to better achieve cost
    efficiency and readiness for major weapons systems. I know this
    has been a high priority for each of you. So can you describe
    to our committee how the Air Force sustainment efforts have
    performed in the last year, especially as you recover from
    sequestration in 2013 and the direction the Air Force budget
    request takes sustainment efforts through the next 5 years?
        Ms. James. Senator, are you referring to sustainment of
    weapons systems and trying to drive the costs down in the
    sustainment world?
        Senator Lee. Yes.
        Ms. James. So I would say in that regard, we are laser-
    focused. I think we are making progress. There is a lot of work
    to be done, however, truth in advertising in that arena. We
    talk frequently about unit costs of weapons systems, and we
    track that very closely. But over time, we have not had as much
    of a focus on that sustainment piece, and that frequently can
    be as expensive, if not more expensive. So we are working it
    hard. I think we are making progress, but lots more to come.
        Senator Lee. Thank you. I appreciate your commitment to
    that.
        Do you have anything to add to that?
        General Welsh. Senator, I had a rotation Air Force Materiel
    Command a couple of years ago and the development of the five
    centers that we have inside that command now to include the
    lifecycle management center and the sustainment center is
    changing the game for us on how we create efficiencies inside
    the supply chains. I will tell you that the work that General
    Janet C. Wolfenbarger has done leading this effort as the
    Commander of Air Force Materiel Command and that Lieutenant
    General Bruce A. Litchfield has done in particular as the
    Commander of the Air Force Sustainment Center and also
    Lieutenant General C.D. Moore, former Commander of Air Force
    Life Cycle Management Center, who is now retired, has been
    spectacular in launching us in a completely new direction in
    how we sustain fleets of aircraft and equipment over time. I
    think we are making remarkable progress, we just cannot slow
    down now.
        Senator Lee. I appreciate your commitment to that.
        Now, the Air Force last year determined that it was
    experiencing a shortfall in five and seven experience level
    maintainer personnel for the undermanned legacy fleets and F-35
    aircraft scheduled to be brought into service and recently
    announced measures for a near-term solution to the issue.
        Can you give the committee more detail about what
    alternative solutions may have been considered by the Air Force
    and why the Air Force chose to transfer maintainers from A-10
    squadrons and how the Air Force will be impacted if a longer-
    term solution to this maintainer issue cannot be found?
        General Welsh. Senator, the issue was because of the
    budgets that are lower than we anticipated a few years ago, we
    are having to cut force structure. So we are not adding numbers
    of squadrons. We are decreasing numbers of squadrons while we
    are bringing a new weapons system on board. So we have to
    replace squadron A or aircraft A with the new aircraft B and
    take the people who are working A to be part of the new
    aircraft B. We do not have 1,000 more maintenance personnel
    standing around waiting for work.
        Senator Lee. Right.
        General Welsh. Because we are not transitioning that way
    now, we are not retiring the squadrons we had planned to retire
    to stand up the F-35 squadrons, we have to find that
    maintenance manpower in some other way. The first effort we
    were going to make was to just downsize the percentage of
    manning within every other fighter squadron in the Air Force to
    take the experienced maintainers we need to be able to build up
    the F-35 fleet as opposed to delaying F-35 development and bed-
    down at multiple bases.
        Unfortunately, as we put that plan together, the Islamic
    State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) became a reality and the
    continued effort in the Middle East related Iraq and Syria came
    on the books. We cannot take those squadrons down and still
    support that effort.
        So now we are looking at contracting an aircraft
    maintenance unit at Luke Air Force Base to help us with the
    training effort and to have contract maintainers instead of
    active duty maintainers. The problem with that is we then are
    not developing the active duty maintenance personnel that we
    need to send out to Hill Air Force Base and to other places as
    we bed down the F-35 because the maintainers there have to be
    deployable. We are in a corner here. We have to develop active
    duty F-35 maintenance people to bed down airplanes, and we do
    not have them standing around.
        Senator Lee. Yes. There is no question you are in a
    difficult spot, and I appreciate your ongoing commitment to
    that issue to make sure that we maintain our equipment that we
    have and appreciate your insight into that. Thank you very
    much.
        Senator Cotton. Senator Blumenthal?
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thanks for being here. Thank
    you for your service.
        I want to pursue some of the questions that my colleague,
    Senator McCaskill, began on behavioral health, mental health
    care. The chairman of this committee, Senator McCain, and I
    have successfully worked for the Clay Hunt Suicide Prevention
    for American Veterans Act (SAV), the suicide prevention bill,
    for our veterans which is promising as a first step, just a
    down payment toward ending the scourge of 22 veterans every day
    committing suicide. Obviously, these veterans come out of
    service to our Army and our Air Force.
        So I am wondering whether better coordination and
    connectivity between our armed services and the Department of
    Veterans Affairs (VA) is desirable and achievable and how,
    maybe beginning with you, Mr. Secretary, if I may, that may be
    advanced as a goal.
        Mr. McHugh. Well, it absolutely is desirable, and it is
    something that from our perspective in the Pentagon through the
    Defense Suicide Prevention Office (DSPO) we are working
    throughout the Services to coordinate with VA.
        We are also looking at reaching beyond that for best
    practices within the private sector. From the Army view, we
    have what we call the Study to Assess Risk and Resilience in
    Servicemembers (STARRS) program where we entered a 5-year
    longitudinal study headed by the Institute of Mental Health and
    a consortium of private universities to try to better
    understand what we need to look for in soldiers in our case and
    if there were any precursors that we could appropriately use.
    We are not looking to stigmatize soldiers because of a single
    behavior or a check on a medical record, but just trying to
    find out how we can do a better job for those who are in or who
    are quite possibly going to become--exercises of ideational
    activity.
        So we are making progress, but I think as you know so well,
    it is beginning in its beginning stages.
        I served for 4 years at the assignment of then-Secretary
    Gates on a national suicide prevention alliance, bringing
    together an amazing group of individuals from across society,
    medical care, mental health care, the private industry. Now, I
    think rightfully so, I have stepped down from that position. It
    is actually held by the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Personnel and Readiness.
        So we are reaching beyond and recognizing this is not just
    a military problem, not just an Army problem. It is a problem
    throughout society, the civilian as well as the military.
    Working together with the VA and others will do us all a great
    deal of good.
        Senator Blumenthal. I have heard you talk about it, General
    Odierno. I wonder taking the word `stigma' that Secretary
    McHugh used, whether the stigma that sometimes surrounds this
    topic can be removed and what the Army is doing.
        General Odierno. So I think first off, in the Army it is
    about our commanders understanding the fact that our job and
    the stress that we put onto people, it is important that we
    deal with the behavioral health issues, and that we have to
    make people realize and understand that it is okay to come
    forward. Sometimes, as we have talked before, Senator, some of
    our mantra actually works against that, but I think we are
    making some progress.
        The one thing I would say about the transition between us
    and the Veterans Administration--one of the complaints the
    soldiers have, as they do a transition, is that they are
    getting treatment by a doctor in the Army, and then as they
    change to a new doctor in VA, sometimes the treatment changes
    and it is not what they are comfortable with. So one of the
    things we are working at is how do we make that an easier
    transition. We are not there yet, but we want to do a doctor-
    to-doctor transition so you have a doctor who is working with
    somebody in the Army talking to the VA doctor that is taking
    over the case, and they get a treatment that is similar, at
    least to begin with, because it is traumatic for somebody,
    especially who has some behavioral health issues, that they are
    maybe given different medicine or different types of treatment.
    That really has an impact sometimes on our soldiers.
        So that is one of the things I think we have to really work
    on is that transition. The Surgeon General is working on that.
    We are working more closely with the Veterans Administration,
    but we have a long way to go on this issue because there still
    is a gap.
        Senator Blumenthal. My time has expired, but I think you
    have really very pointedly and powerfully summarized what one
    of the problems is in that transition, which is the change from
    doctor to doctor, sometimes from medicine to medicine,
    formulary to formulary among drugs. So I hope that we can help
    you make that kind of progress. Thank you very much.
        Senator Cotton. I will now recognize myself. Being the
    acting chairman for John McCain is almost as powerful as I felt
    as having staff duty at Fort Myer, checking on General
    Odierno's house at 0200 in the morning, although he was not
    there in 2007. He was in Iraq, and I want to thank him, as all
    my colleagues have, for his many years of distinguished
    service, particularly in that country. General Odierno, just in
    case you are not back in front of us again, as you no doubt
    hope that you are probably not.
        General Welsh, thank you as well for your service. Both the
    Secretaries, thank you for your service to our country, for
    being here.
        We have heard many members of this committee talk about the
    dangers of sequestration to your services. We heard before from
    the Navy and the Marine Corps as well. I think most of us, if
    not all of us, are in agreement. We are now engaged in a debate
    on exactly what to do about that during the budget season in
    both the House and the Senate.
        The House of Representatives proposed its budget today. I
    believe the Senate Budget Committee is working on the budget
    today as well. The drafts that have been introduced would keep
    the DOD portion of the base budget at $498 billion and spend
    some substantial more than that in so-called OCO funds,
    overseas contingency operations, perhaps as much as $90
    billion. I think when you add in the non-DOD parts of the
    defense budget, it would get up to about 613 or so.
        You do not necessarily need to comment on either budget,
    but I would like to hear what General Odierno and General Welsh
    have to say about the concept of funding the base budget at
    $498 billion for defense and a much larger OCO request than
    appears in the President's budget.
        General Odierno. Thank you, Senator. So first, I would just
    say there is risk to not funding the base and putting it in OCO
    because with that has to come a flexibility within OCO for us
    to spend it on the things that are necessary because OCO has
    limits and it has restrictions and it has very strict rules
    that have to be followed. So if we are inhibited by that, it
    might not help us. What might happen at the end of the year, we
    have a bunch of money we hand back because we are not able to
    spend it. So the first thing is it would have to have some
    level of flexibility.
        Now, I would say that getting money in OCO, if there is
    flexibility with it, is certainly better than not getting any
    additional money. It could help us with readiness. There are
    ways that maybe we could work with the committee to make it
    work.
        But I would tell you I would much rather have it in the
    base budget because at some time we are going to have to shift
    it to the base, and if we put it in OCO, we are just delaying
    that potential. It is going to have to happen at some time.
        Senator Cotton. Senator McCain and Senator Reed have both
    called in their budget newsletter for $577 billion, and they
    have endorsed in concept the National Defense Panel's
    recommendation of $611 billion as a minimum floor. If that were
    not to happen, if you did have the base budget somewhere around
    $498 billion and OCO somewhere around $90 billion, would you be
    able to stop some of the force reductions that you have
    predicted in your testimony today?
        General Odierno. We would still be going to 450,000:
    335,000 in the Guard and 195,000 in the Reserve. But what that
    money would do is it would help us with our readiness.
        Senator Cotton. So force structure would probably not
    change, but readiness of the remaining force would improve.
        General Odierno. See, the problem with OCO, it is year-to-
    year funding. So we do not know how long it would go. But our
    ramp is continuing, down to 450,000.
        Senator Cotton. General Welsh?
        General Welsh. Senator, with modernization as a major issue
    we face, OCO presents some problems because it is hard to start
    a new program with OCO when you are looking at a 1-year budget
    cycle. It is not guaranteed over time. There are limits on what
    you can spend it on. So that is the big issue with us.
    Modernization is a huge deal for the Air Force at this point in
    time. But as Ray said, at some point in time, if it is green
    and it smells pretty and it is not your St. Patrick's Day tie,
    it is okay.
        Senator Cotton. Are you talking primarily about longer-term
    modernization like the long-range strike bomber or shorter-term
    procurement matters as well?
        General Welsh. I would think that Congress would probably
    help us with flexibilities on the shorter-term things. I am
    more worried about for a platform-based force, Air Force or
    Navy, for example, the types of systems we buy will take longer
    and produce overtime. It is not just the development. It is
    also the production and supply chain that goes on for 20 to 30
    years as you change hundreds of platforms.
        Senator Cotton. General Odierno, we did not touch on
    modernization. Obviously, the Army has much smaller, lower unit
    cost platforms than does the Air Force. But would you care to
    touch on modernization, how this approach might----
        General Odierno. Yes. So, again, it depends. OCO limits
    what we can do for modernization if it is in OCO. Now, there
    are ways around that. So, for example, if you had end strength
    over 475,000 or 450,000 funded in OCO, we could then use that
    money to do potentially modernization. But again, the wording
    and other things would have to be about right in order to make
    that happen. But there is some potential that we could use it
    for modernization depending on the flexibility that is inside
    of that.
        Senator Cotton. So my time has expired, but if I could
    briefly synthesize what I think I am hearing from both of you,
    it is not good, better than nothing, but depends heavily on the
    details or the kind of flexibility that the OCO funding
    provides.
        General Welsh. Senator, if I could add. It would help us
    continue the readiness recovery that the last 2 years of BBA
    has allowed us to start, at least at the individual and unit
    level.
        Senator Cotton. Best for readiness, marginal for force
    structure, not good for modernization. Thank you.
        Senator King?
        Senator King. I would like to congratulate the chair. To
    deliver one's maiden speech and chair the Armed Services
    Committee in the same week is a meteoric rise.
        [Laughter.]
        Also, Secretary James, I love your description of space:
    congested, contested, and competitive. The first thing I
    thought of was my old high school football coach who said we
    want our boys to be agile, mobile, and hostile. That came back
    to me when you said that.
        I want to, first, for the record associate myself with
    Senator Wicker's comments about Afghanistan. I think it would
    be a tragedy if we pull our forces out of there prematurely. To
    follow with the football, it would be like fumbling the ball on
    the 5-yard line in my opinion based upon the tremendous
    progress that has been made. I hope, General Odierno, you will
    continue to relay those thoughts through General Campbell to
    the appropriate officials.
        Senator Wicker and I were at the budget meeting this
    afternoon. I can report good news and bad news or I should say
    bad news and good news on the budget. The budget that was
    proposed by the majority in the Budget Committee does assume
    sequestration. That is the bad news. The good news is that
    there is language in it which is a kind of placeholder for a
    replacement for sequestration if we can find it. I can assure
    you that there are a lot of people, good people, working on
    finding it, but I can also tell you because I am one of those
    people that it is hard. There is no low-hanging fruit. There is
    no easy solution to it.
        That is why your testimony about the damage is so important
    because as we look at difficult alternatives, we have to keep
    in front of us the difficult reality that sequestration poses
    for all of the Services. So it is very important to keep that
    information flow going about what the real effects will be in
    terms of squadrons grounded, pilots not being trained, force
    structure. Readiness, of course, is the key, and I just urge
    you to continue to make that case.
        General Welsh and Secretary James, can you briefly on this
    question of sequester touch upon the loss of ISR capabilities
    in the sequester budget? I see that as a real problem for us.
        Ms. James. Let me start and, please, Chief, you jump in as
    well.
        So we did make it a big point, as I was mentioning earlier
    to talk to the combatant commanders and find out what their top
    priority was for any additional dollars that the Air Force
    could bring to the table, and they said ISR, ISR, ISR. That is
    the way it went all the way.
        So as a result, we put in additional things which would
    have to be stripped back out under sequestration. So under
    sequestration, we would have to divest the U-2, which would
    reduce high altitude ISR capacity by 50 percent. We would have
    to divest----
        Senator King. Let me stop you there. It would reduce high
    altitude ISR capability by 50 percent. That is a stunning fact,
    it seems to me.
        Ms. James. Yes. No, it is. It is very serious and it gets
    worse. We would also have to divest the Global Hawk block 40.
    We would have to reduce our combat air patrols, the Predators
    and the Reapers, by 10 combat air patrols. By the way, 10 is
    roughly the equivalent of what is in Iraq and Syria today. So
    that is a substantial chunk. We would have to divest seven
    AWACS, which of course are command and control aircraft. So the
    list is draconian.
        Senator King. This is like General Robert E. Lee losing
    J.E.B. Stuart before the Battle of Gettysburg. As I remember,
    General Lee's comment was ``I am blind.'' That is what we are
    talking about.
        Ms. James. That is what we are talking about.
        Senator King. General Odierno and Secretary McHugh, you
    have talked about a term ``velocity of instability in today's
    world.'' Clearly that is where we are. All the testimony both
    in the Intelligence Committee and Armed Services has been from
    professionals. They have never seen anything quite like the
    instability and unpredictability of the world that we are in.
        Talk to me a little bit more, General, about OCO and if we
    use OCO for what amounts to base, that means we do not have OCO
    for OCO. What does that do to your flexibility of being able to
    respond?
        General Odierno. Well, I think what would happen is we
    would have additional OCO dollars. The problem again is what
    happens is OCO is supposed to fund our missions that are being
    conducted, whether it be in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan. If they
    increase the OCO, then we could use it for training of units
    that are preparing to go to operate in those areas. What it
    does not do is train our forces that have to go to unknown
    contingencies. If, for example, we wanted to deploy a bunch of
    soldiers to Europe, if something continued to go wrong there,
    we might not be able to use the money to do it. Or if we had to
    send people to Korea, we would not be able to use that number
    to train our forces to be prepared to go to Korea.
        Senator King. By definition, a contingency account is not a
    contingency account if you are spending it for base budget
    purposes.
        General Odierno. That is correct.
        Senator King. A final question for the record because I
    know my time is up.
        General Welsh, I would like you, if you could, to give the
    committee a justification, if you would, for the new bomber,
    for the long-range strike bomber in terms of what are we
    gaining over the B-2, and how do we control for the risks of a
    new airplane. The B-2, of course, we were going to get 100. We
    ended up with, I think, in the 20s. How do we mitigate the risk
    both in terms of cost and duration of project? Is it worth that
    risk vis-a-vis the advantages of the new aircraft? You do not
    have to answer now, but if you could give us some background to
    the committee I would appreciate it. Thank you.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        One of the critical capabilities we bring with the Long Range
    Strike Bomber (LRS-B) program is the capacity of 100 aircraft to fight
    in our future conflicts. Currently, the Air Force has 20 B-2s and these
    few numbers limit what we will be able to accomplish vice a fleet of
    100 aircraft. Additionally, the LRS-B offers a significant leap in
    survivability over the B-2 without inventing new technology. We will
    mitigate cost and schedule by using mature technology and existing
    systems. Doing so lessens the scope of the development effort and risk
    involved in bringing many new subsystems together for the first time.
    We also mitigate cost and schedule risk by tempering our expectations
    from a requirements standpoint. LRS-B does not need to be unnecessarily
    complicated to offer next generation capability. Senator King received
    an LRS-B program brief in May, 2015.

        Senator Reed [presiding]. Senator Cruz?
        Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to thank Secretaries McHugh and James and Generals
    Odierno and Welsh for your distinguished service to our country
    and for coming here today to testify to this committee.
        I would like to start, Secretary McHugh, with you and
    General Odierno. The Army force structure and personnel manning
    projections were based on a set of assumptions about very
    limited commitments to the Middle East, Europe, and
    Afghanistan. Under the 2016 budget request, the Army's end
    strength would decrease to 450,000 by the end of 2018. Mr.
    Secretary and General Odierno, you have both testified in the
    past that this level is the minimum force necessary to execute
    national defense strategy, but you have also mentioned that
    everything in that estimate relies on the underlying
    assumptions regarding required operations.
        With a resurgent Russia imposing violence on its neighbors,
    ongoing commitments to fight radical Islamic terrorism and
    groups like ISIS, and the potential for a longer-term
    commitment to Afghanistan, how confident are you that these
    numbers are enough to fight and win a regional conflict?
        General Odierno. Senator, what I would say is there is
    concern. Again, these numbers, what we originally developed,
    were based on the fact that we would not have to have
    significant presence in Europe. That was assumed that there
    would not be significant issues there, that we would not have a
    prolonged presence in the Middle East and I mean a larger
    presence than we have there today, a prolonged, larger presence
    than we have there, and if we have to have a presence in Europe
    or if there is some significant more aggression than we have
    had so far and we had to sustain that for a long period of
    time, i.e., over a year or 2, then our force structure would
    not be enough to meet those requirements.
        Mr. McHugh. Senator, if I could add.
        Senator Cruz. Sure.
        Mr. McHugh. As you noted and as the Chief and I have
    testified, the 450 number is the absolute minimum we need to do
    the things we see today. As your remarks clearly illustrated, a
    lot of the things we see today we did not see a year ago, 18
    months ago. It is that unknown that truly troubles certainly me
    and I think the rest of us at this table.
        Former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates once said that
    when it comes to predicting the future, our record is perfect.
    We have been wrong every time.
        I truly worry about that next thing that we do not see or
    the things we are dealing with today that, all of a sudden,
    exceed their bounds. We would be hard-pressed to answer that
    bell.
        Senator Cruz. General Odierno, in your personal judgment,
    what number of soldiers would be required to perform the
    functions that are needed?
        General Odierno. In 2012, when we originally developed the
    DSG, we developed it with an idea of an end state of 490,350 in
    the Guard and 205,000 in the U.S. Army Reserve. That was based
    on our analysis of what we thought we would have to do. So I
    would say that that is about the level I think we should be at
    in order to meet the future needs. But, again, I have
    testified--and I stick with it--that I think 450,000 is the
    minimum, but it assumes a lot of things. So if those
    assumptions are right, we are okay. If they start to go wrong,
    we have no wiggle room, and that is why I think the 490, 350,
    205 is the right number.
        Senator Cruz. Well, let me ask a follow-up question, which
    is if we find ourselves in a situation where we have cut the
    Army to 450 and suddenly we need to grow, we have too little
    capacity. Can you provide an estimate on the length of time and
    effort it takes to reconstitute the force and not just the size
    but the readiness we would need?
        General Odierno. So, Senator, in 2005 and 2006, when we
    grew the Army, it took us 30 months to grow one brigade, and
    that is to recruit it and that is to individually train it and
    collectively train it. So it would take 30 months to develop a
    new brigade if we had to do that.
        Senator Cruz. Secretary James and General Welsh, the
    National Defense Panel observed that the Air Force's bomber,
    fighter, and surveillance forces are scheduled to draw down to
    approximately 50 percent of the current inventory by 2019. What
    do you believe is the proper approach to increasing the Air
    Force's ISR and long-range strike capabilities?
        General Welsh. Senator, I am not exactly sure what those
    numbers mean. But we have been drawing down for quite some
    time. As the chairman mentioned at the beginning of this
    hearing, in the first Gulf War, the Air Force deployed 33
    fighter squadrons, but we had five times that many in the
    Reserve to do something else. This budget will take us to 49
    fighter squadrons. If we have another event like the first Gulf
    War, which is the last time we deployed a full airpower
    package, it would be just on the fighter side--33 fighter
    squadrons--it would require 14 for homeland security, if there
    is any kind of increased risk to the homeland, which there
    likely would be in that scenario. That would leave you with two
    other squadrons to do whatever else you wanted to do in the
    world, to include things like Iraq and Syria, Afghanistan,
    anything in the Balkans, the Levant, Eastern Europe, all the
    other things that we have force structure in today. The problem
    is quantify does have a quality all its own in this business.
    It just does.
        Senator Cruz. So in your personal judgment, what level is
    required to adequately protect this country?
        General Welsh. Well, we understand we have to be part of
    the solution of the debt problem. Everybody in the Department
    understands that. What we cannot do is continue to downsize
    every capability area not just fighter squadrons. We are
    cutting every one of our five core mission areas in this
    budget, as we did last year and the year before. The trend is
    all in the wrong direction in every mission area, and we do not
    see it stopping. That is the danger, Senator.
        Ms. James. If I could add, Senator, the way I would put it
    is we think just you heard the Army say, that the President's
    budget level is our bare minimum in order to do what we are
    supposed to do under the strategy. That does not mean it is
    perfect. We already feel like we made some important down
    payments, and we are certainly scrubbing all the time looking
    for additional efficiencies. So I would say that budget level
    is what we consider our bare minimum in order to do the
    strategy as it is laid out right now. We will have to rewrite
    the strategy if we do not get it.
        Then a couple other points I would make on long-range
    strike. We need to modernize it. So that is why we are
    investing in the F-35, we are investing in the long-range
    strike bomber. Then when it comes to ISR, of course, partly as
    a result of the additional dollars in this President's budget
    level above sequestration we were able to essentially buy back
    some of the investment that we otherwise might have retired in
    some of our systems like the U-2, for example, like the AWACS.
    Some of these we are going to retire--we would prefer not to
    retire them at least not so early because we need replacements
    for these things. So the budget does provide for both long-
    range strike and ISR investments.
        Senator Cruz. Thank you very much.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Cruz.
        On behalf of the chairman, Chairman McCain, I want to thank
    you all for your testimony and for your service, your
    commitment. Again, please thank all the men and women in
    uniform for us.
        With that and on behalf of Chairman McCain, the hearing is
    adjourned.

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
                        air force fighter force capacity
        1. Senator McCain. General Welsh, in 2009, the Air Force had over
    2,200 fighter aircraft in its total inventory, with 1,600 of them coded
    for combat. By the end of 2016, you will have approximately 1,800 total
    fighters with about 1,200 combat coded. Your maintenance experts
    estimate an average fighter aircraft availability rate in 2016 of about
    64 percent, meaning about 750 of the combat-coded aircraft would be
    available to meet mission requirements. You state that today less than
    half of your fighter squadrons are fully combat ready. If your combat
    readiness rates improves even modestly, some number significantly less
    than those would be ready to deploy to a contingency. Given the state
    of your fighter force structure, does it make any sense at all to
    reduce your limited capacity even further by retiring the A-10 fleet
    while still involved in a fight against the Islamic State for an
    undefined period, and still conducting combat operations in Afghanistan
    during 2016?
        General Welsh. The decision to retire the A-10 was the least
    impactful of a menu of very bad options required to stay below Air
    Force budget and manpower limits as a result of the Budget Control Act.
    These very limitations have since driven further tough decisions on Air
    Force capacity and full spectrum readiness. We have sufficient multi-
    mission capable platforms available to meet Combatant Commander
    requirements in Afghanistan and operations against ISIL. However, we
    will not be able to build full-spectrum readiness at the current
    deployment tempo. The President's Budget Request (PBR) provides enough
    funding to marginally execute the Defense Strategic Guidance. In the
    PBR, we prioritized readiness accounts and retaining capacity in the
    Combatant Commanders' highest priority requirements; Intelligence,
    Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Command and Control.
        To answer in a more general way, I don't believe it makes any sense
    to cut military spending by a trillion dollars with the state of the
    world today, but Congress already made that decision. As long as that
    decision stands, we will be forced to recommend very difficult choices
    that will clearly reduce our capacity to conduct operations in many
    mission areas.

        2. Senator McCain. General Welsh, won't taking an additional five
    A-10 combat squadrons out of your inventory in fiscal year 2016
    exacerbate your readiness problems, causing the remaining squadrons to
    deploy more often, and reducing readiness levels even further for the
    combat air forces?
        General Welsh. We agree that any reduction in overall fighter
    capacity, without an equal reduction in deployment requirements, will
    have a further detrimental effect on overall fighter full-spectrum
    readiness. The department is undergoing a comprehensive review of how
    the Air Force allocates and assigns forces in order to better manage
    readiness and deployment tempo. The decision to retire the A-10 was the
    least impactful of a menu of very bad options required to stay below
    Air Force budget and manpower limits as a result of the Budget Control
    Act, which impacts our readiness recovery efforts well beyond the A-10.

        3. Senator McCain. General Welsh, you stated the inventory of Air
    Force combat squadrons today is less than one-third of the level it was
    during Operation Desert Storm, and less than half of those remaining
    squadrons are fully combat ready. If you were asked to conduct an air
    campaign today of the same magnitude as Operation Desert Storm, could
    you do it?
        General Welsh. Yes, but at much greater risk to the aircrews
    involved and the forces they support, because some individuals/units
    would be forced to deploy at lower the optimal levels of readiness.
    Maintaining a heavy campaign, tempo over time would also be more
    difficult and units that begin the fight will have to finish it. There
    will be no rotational units.
        The Air Force assets that enable major combat operations (Airlift,
    ISR, C2) would have to be pulled from other operations around the world
    to support the air campaign, dramatically impacting those operations.

        4. Senator McCain. General Welsh, more broadly, can you fully
    execute the requirements of the current defense strategy as it is
    written today?
        General Welsh. The Air Force is able to execute the requirements of
    the current defense strategy, but only at significant risk--a situation
    that will be exacerbated under another round of sequestration. An
    increasingly constrained fiscal environment has resulted in the
    smallest and oldest Air Force in history; this in turn means we may not
    get to the fight on time, it will take longer to win, and could cost
    more national blood and treasure in the end.

                             russian rocket engines
        5. Senator McCain. Secretary James, the National Defense
    Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2015 included provisions which
    prohibited the use of Russian rocket engines past the current Evolved
    Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) block buy, and directed the Air Force
    to develop a new U.S. engine by 2019. To illustrate the urgency for
    ending our reliance on Russian rocket engines, the Senate Armed
    Services Committee provided $220 million to expedite that effort. Is
    the Air Force committed to eliminating our reliance on Russian rocket
    engines?
        Ms. James. Yes, the Air Force is committed to eliminating our
    reliance on Russian rocket engines. Our long-term strategy for space
    launch will assure our continued access to space. Toward this end, even
    before the NDAA was enacted, the Air Force published a Request for
    Information (RFI) to solicit industry input on the best approach to
    transition off the RD-180. Since the NDAA was enacted, the Air Force
    initiated three efforts aimed at near-term risk reduction for engine
    development. These activities include the following:
        1) Aerospace has completed 14 of 25 studies to understand business
    cases and assess likely solutions.
        2) Large-scale rocket engine combustion tests with NASA and AFRL,
    to include engine test stand modifications, and NASA thrust chamber
    through Interim Design Review (Critical Design Review in August). To
    date, AFRL has completed five sub-scale pre-burner tests under this
    effort.
        3) The Air Force created a detailed, 2-year combustion stability
    tools test program with AFRL and NASA--both AFRL and NASA activities
    have started. The AF has initiated a contract with Georgia Tech to
    develop these combustion stability tools for industry use to combat the
    toughest challenges associated with large-scale Oxygen Rich Stage
    Combustion engines.
        The Request for Proposals (RFP) for a domestic rocket propulsion
    system was released 2 Jun 15. Proposals were received on 23 Jun 15. The
    source selection is ongoing for a 8$150 million effort expected to be
    awarded this year, investing in multiple providers to deliver rocket
    propulsion systems virtual or physical prototypes. In addition, we have
    received proposals from our Broad Area Announcement to be awarded this
    fall for technical maturation efforts worth up to $34 million to
    advance the necessary engine technologies to be leveraged by engine
    providers.

        6. Senator McCain. Secretary James, if this is such a high
    priority, why hasn't the Air Force moved forward with a heightened
    level of urgency, or accelerated ongoing rocket engine research and
    development efforts that could shorten the overall time needed to
    produce a domestic engine?
        Ms. James. The Air Force continues to invest in rocket propulsion
    systems and associated technologies. Toward this end, even before the
    NDAA was enacted, the Air Force published an Request for Information
    (RFI) to solicit industry input on the best approach to transition off
    the RD-180. Since the NDAA was enacted, the Air Force has initiated
    three efforts aimed at near-term risk reduction for engine development.
    These activities include the following:
        1) Aerospace has completed 14 of 25 studies to understand business
    cases and assess likely solutions.
        2) Large-scale rocket engine combustion tests with NASA and AFRL,
    to include engine test stand modifications, and NASA thrust chamber
    through Interim Design Review (Critical Design Review in August). To
    date, AFRL has completed three sub-scale pre-burner tests under this
    effort.
        3) The Air Force created detailed, 2-year combustion stability
    tools test program with AFRL and NASA--both AFRL and NASA activities
    have started. The Air Force is initiating contracts with academia to
    develop these combustion stability tools for industry use to combat the
    toughest challenges associated with large-scale Oxygen Rich Stage
    Combustion engines.
        The Air Force has released a draft Broad Area Announcement worth
    8$34 million to be awarded later this summer or fall for technical
    maturation efforts to advance the necessary engine technologies to be
    leveraged by engine providers. In addition, we currently have a draft
    Request for Proposal (RFP) released for a 8$150 million effort expected
    to be awarded this year, investing in multiple providers to deliver
    rocket propulsion systems virtual or physical prototypes. This complex
    RFP, implements a public-private partnership approach to invest in
    these rocket propulsion systems and is being released approximately 3
    months after the appropriation (which is very fast for a contracting
    action of this magnitude).

        7. Senator McCain. Secretary James, if for a period of time after
    2019 the Russian RD-180 is not available, will you still have options
    from both SpaceX and United Launch Alliance to get you to space?
        Ms. James. Without the RD-180, we will continue to have options for
    assured access to space as long as the United Launch Alliance (ULA)
    Delta IV family of launch vehicles is available and the Space X Falcon
    Heavy is certified by 2020. However, ULA has announced their intent to
    terminate the Delta IV launch vehicle production line because it is not
    cost competitive. Without the Atlas V, we will not have a competitive
    space launch market until ULA's Vulcan or another option becomes
    available several years later. This would exchange one sole source
    situation for another.

                                     f-35a
        8. Senator McCain. Secretary James, you have repeatedly stated the
    F-35A is one of the Air Force's top three acquisition priorities. The
    F-35 program suffered setbacks and was rebaselined after experiencing a
    breach of the Nunn-McCurdy Act in 2012, delaying the Air Force's
    declaration date for initial operational capability until 2016. Your
    budget proposes to increase procurement from 28 F-35As in 2015 to 44 in
    2016. Are you comfortable with the added risk to cost growth and
    schedule delays by increasing procurement quantities while testing is
    still ongoing?
        Ms. James. The F-35 program is indeed one of the Air Force's top
    three acquisition priorities and is on the right track to reach Initial
    Operational Capability (IOC) in 2016. The price of F-35 aircraft lots
    continues to decline steadily. The price of a single F-35A from Lot 7
    was 4.3 percent less than an F-35A from Lot 6, and an F-35A from Lot 8
    was 3.6 percent less than an F-35A from Lot 7 (including the engine and
    profit). I expect these reductions to continue into the future,
    especially as we continue to increase production quantities. In 2014,
    Lockheed Martin met production goals, completing all planned
    deliveries. Today, the production line is running approximately 2
    months behind schedule, but delivery timelines are improving and the
    current delays do not pose any long-term schedule or delivery risk to
    the program. With the increase in procurement quantities, I do not
    foresee added schedule risk going forward.

        9. Senator McCain. Secretary James, what are your views on how
    declining budgets and sequestration have affected the F-35A program to
    date with regard to procurement quantities and schedule?
        Ms. James. To date, sequestration has required the Air Force to
    defer fiscal year 2015 procurement of two F-35A aircraft to outside the
    FYDP. Sequestration of the fiscal year 2016 budget to BCA-imposed
    levels would cause the Air Force to defer fiscal year 2016 procurement
    of 14 x F-35A aircraft to outside the FYDP. Budgetary constraints and
    sequestration have driven us to reprioritize efforts within the Air
    Force to maintain stability in the F-35 program, and while aircraft
    prices continue to drop by lot, the price reductions will not be as
    great when we are required to cut procurement numbers due to these
    constraints. The budgetary constraints have had little direct impact on
    delivery of individual aircraft but could impact the Air Force's
    ability to reach Full Operational Capability (FOC) in 2021 if
    procurement deferrals continue.

                                  space launch
        10. Senator McCain. Secretary James, I was pleased to see the Air
    Force reversed its short-sighted decision to reduce the number of
    competitive opportunities from the budget last year. It is my
    understanding that the Air Force believes that it will finally be able
    to introduce competition for space launch and certify SpaceX later this
    spring. What issues, if any, remain for this certification to take
    place?
        Ms. James. No issues remain that preclude certification. The open
    issues all have resolution plans. Lt Gen Greaves, the Space and Missile
    Systems Center commander, and the certifying authority, has briefed the
    congressional defense and intelligence committee staffs on those plans
    and the details of the remaining issues. The Air Force and Space X
    teams worked well together to achieve enough progress on those plans to
    allow certification. The commander of the Air Force Space and Missile
    Systems Center certified Space X's Falcon 9 v1.1 system on 26 May 2015.

        11. Senator McCain. Secretary James, are you committed to ensuring
    that certification would occur prior to awarding any launches set aside
    as competitive opportunities?
        Ms. James. Yes. The commander of the Air Force Space and Missile
    Systems Center certified Space X's Falcon 9 v1.1 system on 26 May 2015,
    prior to any planned competitive award. The next RFP is planned to be
    released this summer, with anticipated award in December 2015.

                            air force modernization
        12. Senator McCain. Secretary James, the Air Force is facing many
    large procurement programs over the next decade: the F-35A, the KC-46A,
    the Long Range Strike Bomber, the T-X trainer replacement, the
    Presidential Aircraft Replacement, to name just a top few that
    represent hundreds of billions of dollars required to recapitalize and
    modernize the force. While Congress only looks at one budget year at a
    time, and the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Services formulate a
    Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) covering 5 years of projected
    funding, what is the Air Force approach to fitting all these required
    capabilities into its future budgets, and still deliver the
    capabilities the Nation expects from its Air Force?
        Ms. James. The Air Force is aggressively pursuing a path to
    emphasize strategy-driven resourcing. The Air Force has developed a new
    strategic planning and programming process that starts with a 30-year
    strategic vision, which guides a 20-year resource-informed Strategic
    Master Plan and Resource Allocation Plan, leading to a 10-year balanced
    budget. There is recognition throughout these strategic documents that
    in order to obtain the capabilities to provide what the Nation expects
    from its Air Force, we must chart a different course. The path we are
    pursuing delivers agility and adaptability in our weapon systems as
    well as our processes.

                        air force munitions acquisition
        13. Senator McCain. Secretary James, have you identified munitions
    programs that would benefit from cost reduction initiatives, such as
    multi-year procurement contracts and block buys, and if so, what are
    they and what steps are being taken to implement them?
        Ms. James. There are currently no Air Force weapons programs on
    multi-year procurement contracts or block buys, but a number of cost-
    reducing initiatives are in place (pricing bands, bundling and
    competition) that are paying dividends. Multi-year contracts have
    traditionally not been viewed as a realistic option. Weapons
    procurements have historically faced a number of challenges to include
    test issues/delays during development, buy-in on joint procurement
    profiles, and commitment from Foreign Military Sales (FMS) partners.
    However, the Miniature Air Launched Decoy-Jammer (MALD-J) is one
    program that could easily benefit from a multi-year contract as the Air
    Force is currently the only customer. We could certainly look at other
    candidates such as the Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile
    (AMRAAM), Hellfire missile, Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), and
    Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM), as long as we receive
    support for multi-year contracts from Congress, our joint partners, and
    the Department of Defense.

     national commission on the structure of the air force recommendations
                                    response
        14. Senator McCain. Secretary James, you stated in your National
    Commission on the Structure of the Air Force (NCSAF) recommendation
    response that you disagree with the recommendation to disestablish the
    Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC). Can you provide your views regarding
    this disagreement?
        Ms. James. We remain committed to seeking efficiencies as we
    explore the future of the Total Force. However, this recommendation
    represents a departure from our current position on the Air Force
    organizational construct. This recommendation would weaken the Chief of
    Air Force Reserve's ability to execute key statutory obligations in the
    management of congressionally authorized and appropriated resources.

        15. Senator McCain. Secretary James, if AFRC were not
    disestablished, does there still need to be what appears as redundant
    staffs between AFRC headquarters and the staff for the Chief of the Air
    Force Reserve in the Pentagon?
        Ms. James. The elimination of the AFRC would not achieve either
    substantial savings or organizational efficiencies, as nine different
    Major Commands would have to assume the roles and responsibilities
    currently accomplished by HQ AFRC. This would increase costs and lead
    to a less efficient Total Force organizational structure.
        While the Chief of the Air Force Reserve serves as the Commander of
    HQ AFRC, the position also serves as the principal advisor on reserve
    matters to the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the
    Air Force. The ability to be involved in the Air Force Corporate
    process is instrumental in determining the right answer in the shortest
    amount of time. As the Air Force strives to increase its inclusiveness
    among the Components and all external stakeholders, we believe personal
    interaction among the Component Chiefs and Directors is vitally
    important.

        16. Senator McCain. Secretary James, do other major commands
    maintain staffs at both their own headquarters and at the Air Staff?
        Ms. James. Most Air Force Major Commands maintain liaison offices
    at the Pentagon to support many corporate processes. The Air National
    Guard, like HQ AFRC, maintains a headquarters staff. The function of
    that headquarters is to provide resources, policy oversight, guidance
    and support to ensure reserve component wings and all Geographically
    Separated Units are trained and equipped across the full spectrum of
    operations (homeland and global). The Air National Guard Readiness
    Center (ANGRC) works in conjunction with the Air National Guard staff
    to serve as a channel of communication among the 54 states, territories
    and the District of Columbia. The offices of the Director Air National
    Guard and Chief of the Air Force Reserve, both collocated at the
    Pentagon, additionally serve as the principal advisors on reserve
    matters to the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the
    Air Force.
        The ability to be involved in the Air Force Corporate process is
    instrumental in determining the right answer in the shortest amount of
    time. As the Air Force strives to increase its inclusiveness among the
    Components and all external stakeholders, we believe personal
    interaction among the Component Chiefs and Directors is vitally
    important.

        17. Senator McCain. General Welsh, in your February 2015 response
    on the NCSAF report recommendations, where the Commission recommended
    exploring a shift toward a 58 percent Active component/42 percent
    Reserve component force mix ratio, you state your analysis shows an Air
    Force aggregate of 64 percent/36 percent Active to Reserve component
    ratio as more appropriate. Is the 80 percent level of review of Air
    Force mission areas completed as you promised then-Chairman Levin last
    year?
        General Welsh. The Report on the Appropriate Contributions of the
    Total Force (High Velocity Analysis Report) is required by section 135
    of the fiscal year 2015 National Defense Authorization Act. Section 135
    requires analysis and recommendations for not less than 80 percent of
    the mission and aircraft platforms including a separate presentation of
    mix of forces for each. The Air Force delivered the report to Congress
    on 12 Jun 2015.

        18. Senator McCain. General Welsh, many of the Air Force's
    responses to the NCSAF recommendations reference results of high
    velocity analyses that are not delineated in your response report; when
    will you share the detailed results of your analysis with the
    committee?
        General Welsh. The Report on the Appropriate Contributions of the
    Total Force (High Velocity Analysis Report) is required by section 135
    of the fiscal year 2015 National Defense Authorization Act. Section 135
    requires analysis and recommendations for not less than 80 percent of
    the mission and aircraft platforms including a separate presentation of
    mix of forces for each. The Air Force delivered the report to Congress
    on 12 Jun 2015.
        We are in the process of briefing your staff on the details and
    would be happy to discuss them with you at your convenience.

        19. Senator McCain. General Welsh, in your response to the NCSAF
    recommendation on full-time and part-time mix, it appears there is some
    disagreement from the Director, Air National Guard, and Chief, Air
    Force Reserve on the value of the High Velocity Analyses with regard to
    assumptions and methodology. What are your views on this apparent
    disagreement?
        General Welsh. The Air Force created the High Velocity Analysis
    (HVA) tool to rapidly identify and evaluate force mix options. HVAs are
    not used in isolation; their primary purpose is to provide
    recommendations on the most viable candidates for further study by Air
    Force leadership. HVAs trigger even more deliberate and detailed
    development and evaluation of assumptions and analysis, ultimately
    yielding refined recommendations for alternative future force structure
    proposals.
        The Director of the Air National Guard and the Chief of the Air
    Force Reserve are closely involved in HVAs and are key stakeholders
    whose views are fully incorporated into all stages this transparent
    process. We continue to mature and refine the HVA process in
    consideration of stakeholder views, and regularly adopt changes to
    ensure the validity of the process output.

                              air force readiness
        20. Senator McCain. General Welsh, Vladimir Putin's activities in
    the Crimea vividly remind us that the Nation may face the possibility
    of conflict with a more advanced military. Is Air Force readiness and
    capacity sufficient to prosecute a fight against such a high-end
    threat?
        General Welsh. Yes, but at much greater risk to the aircrews
    involved and the forces they support, because some individuals/units
    would be forced to deploy at lower the optimal levels of readiness.
    Maintaining a heavy campaign, tempo over time would also be more
    difficult and units that begin the fight will have to finish it. There
    will be no rotational units.
        The Air Force assets that enable major combat operations (Airlift,
    ISR, C2) would have to be pulled from other operations around the world
    to support the air campaign, dramatically impacting those operations.

        21. Senator McCain. General Welsh, does the Air Force have
    sufficient inventory and procurement plans for air-to-air and air-to-
    ground munitions necessary to meet combatant commander objectives, and
    if not, what actions are you taking to address the shortfalls?
        General Welsh. No, after three years of Budget Control Act
    constraints, and over a decade of sustained contingency operations, the
    Air Force is thousands of weapons short of Defense Strategic Guidance
    requirements. The Air Force simply has not been resourced to achieve
    required munitions inventory levels. To address these shortfalls, the
    fiscal year 2016 President's budget achieves maximum annual production
    capability for JASSM-ER and improves Hellfire, JDAM, SDB, AIM-9 and
    AIM-120 procurement rates. However, higher expenditure rates, coupled
    with limited industrial base capacity and diminishing manufacturing
    sources, means it will take years, or even a decade, to achieve
    required levels.
        Note also that Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding
    procedures further limit our capacity to reduce shortfalls. Allowing
    only one-for-one replacement after munition expenditure results in a
    time lag between budget authorization and munition delivery. This
    drives a nearly four-year gap between munition expenditure and
    replacement.
        At Budget Control Act levels, all weapons procurement quantities
    are reduced. Munitions (rockets, general purpose bombs, flares and
    fuzes) are similarly reduced. OCO cannot be used to fund forecasted
    weapons requirements. Some relief to these restrictions while our
    operations continue in Iraq/Syria, would be very helpful.

                          a-10 backup active inventory
        22. Senator McCain. General Welsh, the NDAA for fiscal year 2015
    allowed you to place up to 36 A-10 aircraft into backup aircraft
    inventory (BAI) status to free up maintenance personnel to start the
    transition to the F-35. I understand you have opted to do this with 18
    A-10s from three different bases. I also understand that aircraft in
    backup status must still fly to avoid 21-day hanger queen status,
    requiring periodic maintenance and other repairs as required. Doesn't
    executing this plan place greater stress on the remaining maintenance
    crews, who must still maintain these back up aircraft, perform crew
    chief maintenance, etc.?
        General Welsh. We have placed 18 x A-10s from three different bases
    into BAI status, and we will still maintain these aircraft in mission
    capable status in accordance with the weapons system's technical
    requirements. Doing this will cause some scheduled maintenance actions
    but we believe these actions will be manageable because the unit's
    flying hours will be adjusted to support the fighter squadrons' new
    Primary Assigned Aircraft inventory. Headquarters Air Combat Command
    and unit commanders will manage the aircraft and flying hours to ensure
    adequacy of training for aircrew is met without overburdening our
    maintainers.
        This extra work is driven by the fact that we don't have enough
    experience maintenance personnel in the Air Force to bring the F-35 on
    board and continue to operate every other fighter units we have today.

        23. Senator McCain. General Welsh, will placing A-10s into backup
    active inventory status result in longer duty days or work weeks for
    your remaining maintenance professionals who must still maintain these
    aircraft?
        General Welsh. No. Placing A-10s into Backup Aircraft Inventory
    (BAI) will cause some scheduled maintenance actions but we believe
    these actions will be manageable because the unit's flying hours will
    be adjusted to support the fighter squadrons' new Primary Assigned
    Aircraft inventory. Headquarters Air Combat Command and unit commanders
    will manage the aircraft and flying hours to ensure adequacy of
    training for aircrew is met without overburdening our maintainers.

        24. Senator McCain. General Welsh, will the reduced number of
    funded A-10 aircraft impact these fighter squadrons' ability to deploy
    to combat?
        General Welsh. No, combat coded A-10 squadrons at Davis Monthan
    AFB, AZ, and Moody AFB, GA, will continue to be able to deploy a 12
    aircraft package.

                               ec-130h divestment
        25. Senator McCain. General Welsh, the Air Force's fiscal year 2015
    budget proposed retiring nearly half of your EC-130H COMPASS CALL fleet
    of electronic warfare aircraft in fiscal year 2016. DOD formally
    referred to this capability as Low Density/High Demand; wouldn't
    retiring half of this fleet drop the density to dangerously low levels?
        General Welsh. Our interest is to use the savings from the
    divestiture of part of the fleet to begin recapitalization of the EC-
    130 mission capability on a new platform. The remaining aircraft can
    fulfill current levels of tasking.
        We need this capability in any future large-scale conflict, but the
    EC-130 is no longer a survivable platform in that environment. We
    believe this is the best time to accept the risk of a temporarily
    reduced fleet size.

        26. Senator McCain. General Welsh, can you meet all combatant
    commander demand and operations plan requirements with a fleet of eight
    EC-130H aircraft?
        General Welsh. The Air Force will maintain essential capabilities
    to support current combat operations, but will not be able to meet the
    capacity requirements of other combatant commander operations plans
    once the fleet size drops to eight aircraft in fiscal year 2016,
    accepting risk until a replacement for those capabilities is fielded.
        Our interest is to use the savings from the divestiture of part of
    the fleet to begin recapitalization of the EC-130 mission capability on
    a new platform. The remaining aircraft can fulfill current levels of
    tasking. We need this capability in any future large-scale conflict,
    but the EC-130 is no longer a survivable platform in that environment.
    We believe this is the best time to accept the risk of a temporarily
    reduced fleet size.

        27. Senator McCain. General Welsh, what is the Air Force's plan for
    mitigating the loss of these seven aircraft, and what is the long-term
    plan for replacing the EC-130H capability?
        General Welsh. We have a three-phased plan. In the near-term, 7 x
    EC-130H aircraft will be divested in fiscal year 2016, leaving 8 x EC-
    130Hs in the Air Force until the capability is replaced. The reduced
    number of aircraft will meet the requirements of the current fight and
    U.S. Special Operations Command. For the mid-term, 2020 to 2030 or as
    needed, we are evaluating options including re-hosting jamming systems
    on a more effective and efficient platform to bridge the gap to the
    far-term. For the long-term (2031-plus timeframe), we envision a system
    of systems approach, to be determined based on results of an Analysis
    of Alternatives (report due out in 2017).
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted Senator James M. Inhofe
                    sequestration and readiness of the force
        28. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh, Secretary James, General
    Odierno, and General Welsh, Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter
    testified to this committee a couple of weeks ago that ``readiness
    remains at troubling levels across the force'' and ``that even with the
    fiscal year 2016 budget, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps won't reach
    their readiness goals until 2020 and the Air Force until 2023.''
        General Dempsey testified that the fiscal year 2016 President's
    budget is ``what we need to remain at the lower ragged edge of
    manageable risk in our ability to execute the defense strategy'' and
    that ``we have no slack, no margin left for error or strategic
    surprise.''
        Do you agree with Secretary Carter's and General Dempsey's
    statements?
        Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. The Army agrees with the statements
    of the Secretary of the Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
    The unrelenting budget impasse has compelled us to degrade our
    readiness to historically low levels. Today, only 33 percent of our
    brigades are ready when our sustained readiness rate should be
    somewhere around 70 percent. Under our current budget, Army readiness
    will at best flatline over the next three to four years.
        For the Army, the President's Budget represents the bare minimum
    needed for us to carry out our missions and execute and meet the
    requirements of our defense strategy. The compromises we have made to
    modernization and readiness combined with reductions to our force size
    and capabilities translates directly into strategic risk. Today, we are
    generating just enough readiness to meet our day-to-day needs of
    immediate consumption. We are unable to generate any residual readiness
    to respond to an unknown contingency or to even reinforce ongoing
    operations.
        Ms. James and General Welsh. Yes.

        29. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh, Secretary James, General
    Odierno, and General Welsh, if sequestration is not repealed, even
    partially, can you give us some context in terms of risks to readiness
    of personnel, equipment, training, etc. and how that ragged edge
    impacts you?
        Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. The compromises we have made to
    modernization and readiness, combined with reductions to our force size
    and capabilities, translates directly into strategic risk. Today, we
    are generating just enough readiness to meet our day to day needs for
    immediate consumption. Only 33 percent of our brigades are ready, when
    our sustained readiness rate should be closer to 70 percent. We are
    unable to generate any residual readiness to respond to unknown
    contingencies or to even reinforce ongoing operations. This is a
    dangerous balancing act. We have fewer Soldiers, the majority of whom
    are in units that are not ready; and they are manning aging equipment
    at a time when demand for Army forces is higher than we originally
    anticipated.
        Sequestration would compel us to reduce end strength even further,
    forcing out another 70K from the Active Component, 35K from the
    National Guard, and 10K from the Army Reserves. It would be necessary
    to cut another 10-12 additional combat brigades. Modernization would be
    slashed further, home station training would go unfunded, and readiness
    rates would degrade further.
        Anything below the President's budget compromises our strategic
    flexibility. It will challenge us to meet even our current level of
    commitments to our allies and partners around the world. It will
    eliminate our capability, on any scale, to conduct simultaneous
    operations, specifically deterring in one region while defeating in
    another. Essentially, for ground forces, sequestration even puts into
    question our ability to conduct even one prolonged multiphase, combined
    arms, campaign against a determined enemy. We would significantly
    degrade our capability to shape the security environment in multiple
    regions simultaneously. It puts into question our ability to deter and
    compel multiple adversaries simultaneously. Ultimately, sequestration
    limits strategic flexibility and requires us to hope we are able to
    predict the future with great accuracy. Something we have never been
    able to do.
        The impacts of continued sequestration will endure for at least a
    decade. It is going to be the next Chief and the Chiefs after that who
    must respond to the long term and hidden impacts of sequestration.
    Readiness is not something that we can just fund piecemeal--once in a
    while and year to year. It has to be funded consistently over time. If
    not, it is fleeting, and it goes away. As we approach 2016, we can't
    take end strength out any faster without impacting our ability to
    conduct operations already committed. The Army will only be able to
    meet priority Global Force Management missions, and must rely on OCO
    funding to maintain any additional readiness for emergent needs. Under
    sequestration, sustainment readiness remains extremely reliant on OCO
    funding to mitigate risk to the program. In fiscal year 2013, the Army
    deferred $323.3M in Depot Maintenance and was only recently funded
    through the Army's fiscal year 2015 OCO submission. The Army must also
    accept additional risk by deferring the emplacement of the Southwest
    Asia Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) Fires and Sustainment brigades, an
    important element of the Army's revised APS strategy, for two years.
    The rolling sequestration impacts on readiness thus handcuff our
    strategic flexibility.
        Ms. James and General Welsh. Budget Control Act level funding will
    further reduce the capacity and greatly extend the time required for
    full-spectrum readiness recovery of the Air Force. Under the Budget
    Control Act funding levels, the Air Force is planning to retire its
    entire KC-10 fleet, retire the RQ-4 Global Hawk block 40 fleet, retire
    the U-2, and divest 7 x AWACs aircraft. Additionally, we would reduce
    the number of MQ-9 CAPs to 50. Investment in people, training
    resources, and weapons system sustainment would be reduced or delayed.
    Budget Control Act level funding, combined with current deployment
    demands, would perpetuate a continued decrease in full-spectrum
    readiness to historically low levels.

        30. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh, Secretary James, General
    Odierno, and General Welsh, we anticipate that Congress will pass a
    budget resolution that funds defense at sequestration levels with
    additional funding through Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO).
    Assuming sequestration remains the law, do you have to take any actions
    in fiscal year 2015 in your force structure to prepare for
    sequestration in fiscal year 2016, and if so, when do those decisions
    need to be made?
        Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. The Army is preparing to drawdown
    to 980K (450K AC, 335K ARNG, and 195K USAR). But if sequestration
    returns, the consequences for our Army will be dramatic. Another round
    of cuts will render our force unable to meet all elements of the
    Defense Strategic Guidance without creating additional risk to our
    Soldiers. Total Army end strength will fall an additional 60K to 920K
    (420K AC; 315K ARNG; 185K USAR). Reductions in end strength brought on
    by sequestration will limit our ability to provide strategic options to
    the President and pose unacceptable risk by placing into question our
    capacity to execute even one prolonged, multi-phased major contingency
    operation.
        Readiness is not something that we can just fund piecemeal--once in
    a while and year to year. It has to be funded consistently over time.
    If not, it is fleeting, and it goes away.
        We will be forced to further reduce modernization and readiness
    levels over the next 5 years because we simply can't drawdown end
    strength any quicker to generate the required savings. The compromises
    we have made to readiness and modernization combined with reductions to
    our force size and capabilities translates directly into strategic
    risk. Today, we are generating just enough readiness to meet our day-
    to-day needs of immediate consumption. We are unable to generate any
    residual readiness to respond to an unknown contingency or to even
    reinforce ongoing operations.
        These are not cuts we want to make but rather cuts we are compelled
    to make.
        Ms. James and General Welsh. No force structure actions will be
    taken in fiscal year 2015 to prepare for a possible sequestration in
    fiscal year 2016. Should we face another sequestration, the Air Force
    will begin taking action in fiscal year 2016.

              readiness and meeting combatant command requirements
        31. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, you testified before the
    Subcommittee on Defense of the Senate Appropriations Committee that
    ``the overall combat capability of our combat coded squadrons in the
    Air Force is still below 50 percent, so fewer than 50 percent of them
    are fully combat capable.''
        General Odierno, you previously stated that ``Current funding
    levels afforded just over a third of our Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) the
    training necessary to conduct decisive action. This year, we face
    significant challenges to sustain even that level of readiness in our
    dynamic operating environment.''
        General Odierno and General Welsh, if those forces are not ready,
    what is the impact on executing combatant commander operational plans?
        General Odierno. The number one thing that keeps me up at night is
    that if we are asked to respond to an unknown contingency, I will send
    Soldiers to that contingency not properly trained and ready. We simply
    cannot afford to do that. The American people expect our Soldiers to be
    prepared--that they have had the ability to train, that they understand
    their equipment, and that they have been able to integrate and
    synchronize their activities so they are successful on the ground. I
    worry that we may receive a request from a combatant commander that we
    just aren't trained for.
        Today, only 33 percent of our brigades are ready, when our
    sustained readiness rate should be closer to 70 percent. We are taking
    a small portion of the Army and are giving them the money to train to
    the highest level, while the rest of the Army is training at a
    significantly lower level. This really concerns me.
        Under our current budget, Army readiness will, at best, flat-line
    over the next three to four years. We are generating just enough
    readiness to meet our day to day needs for immediate consumption. We
    are unable to generate any residual readiness to respond to unknown
    contingencies or to even reinforce ongoing operations.
        The President's fiscal year 2016 Budget represents the bare minimum
    needed for us to carry out our missions and execute and meet the
    requirements of our defense strategy. Anything below the President's
    budget compromises our strategic flexibility. It will challenge us to
    meet even our current level of commitments to our allies and partners
    around the world. It will eliminate our capability, on any scale, to
    conduct simultaneous operations, specifically deterring in one region
    while defeating in another. Essentially, for ground forces,
    sequestration even puts into question our ability to conduct even one
    prolonged multiphase, combined arms, campaign against a determined
    enemy. We would significantly degrade our capability to shape the
    security environment in multiple regions simultaneously. It puts into
    question our ability to deter and compel multiple adversaries
    simultaneously. Ultimately, sequestration limits strategic flexibility
    and requires us to hope we are able to predict the future with great
    accuracy. Something we have never been able to do.
        General Welsh. In a time of dire need, our nation's Airmen have,
    and always will, answer the call to arms. However, in our current
    readiness crisis, we would be forced to respond to an OPLAN level
    contingency with forces that are not full-spectrum ready. That means we
    would not be able to leverage the full capability of our newest (and
    legacy) weapon systems due to lack of training, familiarity, or
    sustainment thus giving up the technological edge that we paid for and
    expect from our Air Force.
        We would also be accepting the much more important risk of sending
    men and women into battle who are not as ready as they should be. They
    are the ones who will pay the bill of increased risk.

        32. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno and General Welsh, if a major
    or even minor contingency operation were executed today given your
    current state of readiness and current global commitments, is it
    possible the Air Force would have to send forces into combat that are
    not fully trained and ready?
        General Odierno. The number one thing that keeps me up at night is
    that if we are asked to respond to an unknown contingency, I will send
    Soldiers to that contingency not properly trained and ready. We simply
    are not used to doing that. The American people expect our Soldiers to
    be prepared--that they have had the ability to train, that they
    understand their equipment, and that they have been able to integrate
    and synchronize their activities so they are successful on the ground.
    I worry that we may receive a request from a combatant commander that
    we just aren't trained for.
        Today, only 33 percent of our brigades are ready, when our
    sustained readiness rate should be closer to 70 percent. We are taking
    a small portion of the Army and are giving them the money to train to
    the highest level, while the rest of the Army is training at a
    significantly lower level. This really concerns me.
        Under our current budget, Army readiness will, at best, flat-line
    over the next three to four years. We are generating just enough
    readiness to meet our day to day needs for immediate consumption. We
    are unable to generate any residual readiness to respond to unknown
    contingencies or to even reinforce ongoing operations. Our Soldiers
    trust that we will provide them the right resources--the training and
    equipment--to properly prepare them and lead them into harm's way. It
    is our shared responsibility, to provide our Soldiers and our Army with
    the necessary resources to ensure they are trained, prepared, and
    equipped to succeed.
        General Welsh. We already are using forces that are not full-
    spectrum ready. The current readiness crisis requires that we deploy
    units that are fully trained and ready for their theater assigned tasks
    as dictated by their scheduled deployment, but are not necessarily for
    the full spectrum of missions/threats they could potentially face if
    re-tasked to a new crisis or contingency.

        33. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno and General Welsh, how do lower
    readiness levels and a smaller force impact our ability to deter
    aggression?
        General Odierno. The President's fiscal year 2016 Budget represents
    the bare minimum needed for us to carry out our missions and execute
    and meet the requirements of our defense strategy. Anything below the
    President's budget compromises our strategic flexibility. It will
    challenge us to meet even our current level of commitments to our
    allies and partners around the world. It will eliminate our capability,
    on any scale, to conduct simultaneous operations, specifically
    deterring in one region while defeating in another. Essentially, for
    ground forces, sequestration even puts into question our ability to
    conduct even one prolonged multiphase, combined arms, campaign against
    a determined enemy. We would significantly degrade our capability to
    shape the security environment in multiple regions simultaneously. It
    puts into question our ability to deter and compel multiple adversaries
    simultaneously. Ultimately, sequestration limits strategic flexibility
    and requires us to hope we are able to predict the future with great
    accuracy. Something we have never been able to do.
        General Welsh. The sustained high level of deployment requirements
    is the singularly largest reason for the steady decline in Air Force
    full-spectrum readiness. This readiness decline is exacerbated by the
    steady reduction of Air Force capacity; fewer units are available to
    fill a constant number of deployments, further reducing time for those
    units to train for their full-spectrum mission.
        We are still the greatest Air Force in the world, but reduced
    capacity and reduced readiness tilts the scale in the wrong direction.
    Less capacity means fewer opportunities to deploy forces to Allied or
    partner nations for training and exercises. These opportunities promote
    trust, interoperability, and show commitment with our allies while
    dissuading and deterring potential adversaries. A smaller force also
    reduces our ability to rapidly respond to new taskings or expand
    ongoing operations.

        34. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno and General Welsh, should the
    United States be postured to fight two major contingency operations
    simultaneously?
        General Odierno. Our National Security Strategy requires U.S.
    forces to be able to project power globally to defeat and deny
    aggression in multiple theaters when deterrence fails. Even when
    committed in one region, we need to be capable of denying the
    objectives of an aggressor in a second region.
        The President's fiscal year 2016 Budget represents the bare minimum
    needed for us to carry out our missions and execute and meet the
    requirements of our defense strategy. Anything below the President's
    budget compromises our strategic flexibility. It will challenge us to
    meet even our current level of commitments to our allies and partners
    around the world. It will eliminate our capability, on any scale, to
    conduct simultaneous operations, specifically deterring in one region
    while defeating in another. Essentially, for ground forces,
    sequestration even puts into question our ability to conduct even one
    prolonged multiphase, combined arms, campaign against a determined
    enemy. We would significantly degrade our capability to shape the
    security environment in multiple regions simultaneously. It puts into
    question our ability to deter and compel multiple adversaries
    simultaneously. Ultimately, sequestration limits strategic flexibility
    and requires us to hope we are able to predict the future with great
    accuracy. Something we have never been able to do.
        General Welsh. The requirement to conduct two near-simultaneous
    operations still exists and serves as the basis for our force structure
    strategy and construct. A key component of our force planning
    construct, as described in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, is to
    defeat a regional adversary in a large-scale , multi-phased campaign;
    while simultaneously denying the objectives of--or imposed unacceptable
    costs on--another aggressor in another region. The smaller our force
    becomes, the tougher this will be to do.

        35. Senator Inhofe. General Odierno and General Welsh, what is the
    impact of only being postured to fight one major contingency operation?
        General Odierno. The velocity of instability around the world has
    increased, and the Army is now operating on multiple continents
    simultaneously in ways unforeseen a year ago. In short, our Army is
    busy. In my best military judgment, if we posture the Army to only
    fight one major contingency operation, we will not meet the
    requirements of our defense strategy, and our strategic flexibility
    will be compromised. We will be challenged to meet even our current
    level of commitments to our allies and partners around the world. It
    will eliminate our capability, on any scale, to conduct simultaneous
    operations, specifically deterring in one region while defeating in
    another. We would significantly degrade our capability to shape the
    security environment in multiple regions simultaneously. Essentially,
    it puts into question our ability to deter and compel multiple
    adversaries simultaneously.
        General Welsh. The current defense strategy requires the U.S.
    military to engage in two near-simultaneous major contingencies while
    maintaining an enhanced protective posture for the homeland. If/when
    the President chooses to change the strategy, the Air Force will inform
    the Secretary of Defense of the impact and potential risks via the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff. Additional discussion would require a classified
    forum.
                              air force operations
        36. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, how do our flying hours compare
    to flying hours of China, Russia, India, and our European allies?
        General Welsh. The United States Air Force flies approximately
    2,000,000 hours per year, including all training and operational
    missions. However, these flying hours vary a great deal depending on
    weapon system type, pilot end-strength, and operations tempo. It is
    helpful to consider the average annual hours flown per pilot. The table
    below provides a breakdown of these averages by weapon system type and
    provides the average flying hours per pilot for Russia, China, and our
    European allies for comparison.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                      * Majority of Flying Hours flown in Theater

        37. Senator Inhofe. General Welsh, how does reduced flying hours
    impact:

        a.  The training and experience of pilots, flight leads, instructor
    pilots and weapons instructors?
        b.  The training and experience of our maintainers, bomb loaders,
    back-shop specialists, and all the support that goes into executing air
    operations?
        c.  Your ability to meet the combatant command (COCOM) wartime
    requirements?
        d.  The potential for safety incidents?
        e.  The moral, recruiting and retention of our airmen and soldiers?

        General Welsh. Flying and training for full spectrum air combat is
    difficult, expensive, and time consuming. The Air Force Flying Hour
    Program (FHP) drives full spectrum training for nearly our entire Air
    Force. A decrease in flying hours reduces flight training opportunities
    and limits the experience of our pilot force. In the short-term,
    reduced flight hours increases the time it takes to upgrade pilots from
    copilot, to aircraft commander, to instructor/evaluator or from
    wingman, to flight lead, to instructor, to weapons instructor. In the
    mid-term, a pilot that has consistently experienced a reduced FHP will
    have a reduced level of experience (or delayed experiencing) as an
    instructor, weapons instructor and evaluator than the pilot cadre under
    a robust FHP. In the long-term, pilots with a career of reduced flying
    hours will become commanders and the future leaders of the Air Force
    with considerably less flying experience than their predecessors.
    Finally, this limited experience cycles back to the next generation of
    new pilots who will have less experienced flight instructors, weapons
    instructors, and leadership.
        The operational Air Force is only as good as the maintainers needed
    to support it; and in the same fashion as our pilot example, Air Force
    aircraft maintenance professionals' training is driven by the FHP.
    Reduced flying hours increases the time it takes to train and upgrade
    maintainers, reduces the experience of our maintenance instructor
    cadre, and reduces the experience of a generation of maintenance,
    ammunition, and logistics leaders.
        The Air Force defines its full spectrum combat/combat support
    mission sets directly from COCOM requirements developed through war
    planning. The Air Force structures its FHP so that each pilot and
    aircrew member can complete the absolute minimum required training to
    meet COCOM requirements. Due to a large reduction in Air Force
    capacity, the preponderance of our Air Force is required to be full
    spectrum ``ready'' at all times in order to meet the aggressive
    timelines driven by COCOM war planning requirements (especially for
    combat airpower). Reductions in the FHP lead directly to reductions in
    full spectrum training opportunities and reductions in readiness.
    Currently our Air Force's combat air forces are less than 50 percent
    ready; directly impacting our ability to meet National Military
    Strategy and COCOM wartime requirements.
        Flight safety is critical to protecting priceless Airmen and
    irreplaceable aircraft and resources. Reduced training opportunities
    and experience have reduced confidence in our ability to safely
    practice some of our most challenging skill sets. Bomber crews who once
    routinely flew low-level practice missions below 500 feet are now
    flying well above that level as the relatively low experience of our
    crews requires more caution to reduce the risk of mishaps. Reductions
    in overall readiness drive an increase in safety protocols in order to
    continue to make appropriate risk management decisions and protect our
    Airmen.
        One of the most important ``levers'' of Air Force readiness is the
    requirement for adequate dwell time at home station. This dwell time is
    used to fully train our pilots, maintainers, air traffic controllers,
    and all of the other skill sets required to meet our full spectrum
    requirements. A marked drop in Air Force capacity combined with a
    constant and very high COCOM deployment demand has eroded home station
    dwell times to unsustainable levels. Lack of dwell time over the past
    14 years has consistently reduced Air Force readiness. Some aircrew
    specialties, like combat rescue, have a deploy-to-dwell ratio of less
    than 1:1. This type of continued stress hurts morale, and with no end
    in sight to very high operational tempo, hurts the ability to retain
    Airmen with critical combat roles and skill sets.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
                            mobile camouflage system
        38. Senator Wicker. Secretary McHugh, Secretary James, General
    Odierno, and General Welsh, during combat operations in Afghanistan and
    Iraq, many allied partner nations had adopted Mobile Camouflage Systems
    (MCS) for their combat vehicle platforms--taking advantage not only of
    the Mobile Camouflage System multi-spectral signature management sensor
    defeat capabilities but also capitalizing on the MCS heat/temperature
    reduction capability and significant fuel savings.
        Recognizing the potential value and increased capabilities the MCS
    enables, please provide the committee with details of your plan to
    develop, demonstrate, test, and field MCS for use on U.S. combat
    vehicle platforms in the next several years.
        Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. The Army's current camouflage
    system is the Lightweight Camouflage Screening System (LCSS). The LCSS
    is a modular system consisting of a hexagon screen, a diamond-shaped
    screen, a support system, and a repair kit. The system conceals targets
    by: casting patterned shadows that break up the characteristic outlines
    of a target; scattering radar returns (except when radar-transparent
    nets are used); trapping target heat and allowing it to disperse; and
    simulating color and shadow patterns that are commonly found in a
    particular region.
        The Army is currently validating the requirements document for the
    Ultra-light Camouflage Net System (ULCANS) as a replacement to the
    legacy Lightweight Camouflage Screening System (LCSS). The ULCANS will
    provide signature reduction for combat systems for near infrared (NIR),
    radar, electro-optics (EO), visual, and significantly increases thermal
    infrared suppression capability. As ULCANS is more snag resistant,
    lighter in weight and less voluminous than the Lightweight Camouflage
    Screening System (LCSS), it can be erected and removed faster and with
    less manpower. This ease of use will encourage greater use of
    camouflage, which will improve survivability for friendly personnel and
    equipment. The system will be fielded in desert, arctic, woodland and
    jungle patterns. The ULCANS Capability Development Document is in Army
    staffing.
        The Army will continue to review the capability in the Protection
    Capability Portfolio Review (CPR) to refine methods for mobile
    protection in the camouflage, concealment, and detection strategy.
        Ms. James and General Welsh. We defer to the Army for a response as
    the mobile camouflage system is an Army program.

                        signature management camouflage
        39. Senator Wicker. Secretary McHugh, Secretary James, General
    Odierno, and General Welsh, I am very interested in and concerned about
    organic multi-spectral signature management sensor defeat capabilities,
    especially given the current Short-Wave Infra-Red (SWIR) threat and the
    ease of availability of multi-spectral sensors.
        We on the committee are aware that the currently fielded Ultra-
    Lightweight Camouflage Net System (ULCANS) does not afford SWIR
    protection to our troops, and that camouflage assets specific to arctic
    use are obsolete in age and capability. Also of concern is that the
    existing ULCANS contract, which facilitates research and development as
    well as production, will expire less than 18 months from now.
        Recognizing these issues, please update the committee on your
    acquisition strategy for acquiring the needed next generation of
    signature management camouflage capabilities, including a timeline that
    leads to contract award.
        Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. The next generation ULCANS
    capabilities document is currently in staffing at Headquarters
    Department of the Army. It contains the Short-wave infrared (SWIR)
    requirement to provide protection from emerging threats. To meet the
    current global defense posture, the Army will provide limited MTOE
    procurement and fielding to support the Global Response Force,
    Regionally Aligned Forces and Army Prepositioned Stocks. Other units
    will be able to procure the ULCANS using unit funds. The new system
    will be developed in desert, arctic, woodland and jungle patterns. Upon
    approval of the next generation ULCANS capabilities document, it may
    compete for funding beginning in fiscal year 2018.
        Ms. James and General Welsh. We defer to the Army for a response as
    the mobile camouflage system is an Army program.

        40. Senator Wicker. Secretary McHugh, Secretary James, General
    Odierno, and General Welsh, given the Short-Wave Infra-Red (SWIR)
    threat that our Armed Forces face today, can you detail near-term
    fielding plans for a SWIR-defeating signature management camouflage
    system for Rapid Reaction Forces, given that Service-wide fielding may
    take longer?
        Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. The Army is currently validating
    the capabilities document for the next generation Ultra-Light
    Camouflage Net System (ULCANS) designed to incorporate recent
    technological advances. The next generation ULCANS will provide
    improved protection from visual detection of Short-wave Infrared
    (SWIR). To meet the current global defense posture, the Army will
    provide limited MTOE procurement and fielding to support the Global
    Response Force, Regionally Aligned Forces and Army Prepositioned
    Stocks. Other units will be able to procure the ULCANS utilizing unit
    funds.
        Ms. James and General Welsh. We defer to the Army for a response as
    the Short-Wave Infra-Red system is an Army program.

                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
                                     kc-46a
        41. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, do things remain on track for
    delivery of the KC-46A to Pease Air National Guard Base in fiscal year
    2018?
        General Welsh. Pease Air National Guard Base is on track to accept
    its first KC-46A in fiscal year 2018 as planned. All MILCON projects at
    Pease Air National Guard Base are on track and there are no foreseeable
    delays expected.

                                      a-10
        42. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, on March 17, 2015 in your House
    Armed Services Committee testimony you said that ``there are
    circumstances where you would prefer to have an A-10.'' Can you
    describe those circumstances?
        General Welsh. While there may be instances where I might prefer
    any one of our current platforms, the changing complexion of the modern
    battlefield coupled with an increasingly constrained fiscal environment
    have left the Air Force without the necessary resources to retain a
    single-role platform like the A-10.
        Divesting the A-10 maximizes current and future Air Force combat
    capability within the current fiscal environment. Divestiture of the A-
    10 fleet is supported by analysis aimed at minimizing operational risk
    today and tomorrow, preserving other legacy platforms and associated
    modernization programs. Our decision to divest the fleet addresses the
    budgetary pressure brought on by the Budget Control Act and
    Sequestration.

        43. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, please provide the Air Force's
    plan for providing close air support (CAS) in situations involving
    weather lower than 3,000 feet, Global Positioning System (GPS) jamming,
    armor, and danger close inside of 100 meters that will ensure that we
    will make every attempt to come to the aid of Americans in trouble.
    Consider each separately and in combination.
        General Welsh. The F-16 maintains a tank killing capability with
    the AGM-65 Maverick Air-to-Ground Missile System. Both the F-16 and F-
    15E have an internal guns capable of firing Armor Piercing Incendiary
    rounds that are effective against armored personnel carriers and have
    also been used danger close inside of 100 meters. The MQ-1/9 can employ
    the AGM-114 Hellfire Air-to-Ground Missile System which provides heavy
    anti-armor kill capability. The first three generations of Hellfire
    missiles use a laser seeker; the fourth generation Hellfire uses a
    radar frequency seeker.
        All USAF multi-mission fighters are capable of providing CAS below
    3000 feet. F-16, F-15E, and F-35A will add Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) II
    inventory over the next few years. SDB II is a multi-mode weapon that
    allows standoff employment (more than 45 miles). The seeker works in
    three different modes to provide maximum operational flexibility in
    potentially contested and degraded environments: a millimeter wave
    radar to detect and track targets through weather, an imaging infrared
    for enhanced target discrimination and a semi-active laser that enables
    the weapon to track an airborne laser designator or one on the ground.
    This powerful, integrated seeker seamlessly shares targeting
    information among all three modes, enabling weapons to engage fixed or
    moving targets at any time of day and in all-weather conditions.

        44. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, before making its decision to
    seek the divestment of the A-10, did the Air Force conduct analysis
    with the COCOMs, Services, joint terminal attack controllers (JTAC), or
    the A-10 community itself to identify the associated risks?
        General Welsh. Divestiture is supported by extensive analysis aimed
    at minimizing operational risk today and tomorrow, preserving our most
    capable existing platforms and essential modernization programs. Air
    Combat Command was an active participant in development of the fiscal
    year 2015 budget that recommended A-10 divestiture and endorsed this
    action for the fiscal year 2016 budget submission. The Combatant
    Commands (to include Special Operations Command) and the other Military
    Services were briefed on the Air Force's intent to retire the A-10 in
    both fiscal year 2015 and fiscal year 2016.
        I personally briefed every Combatant Commander on every Air Force
    budget decision that impacted them, including the recommendations to
    divest the A-10. While they didn't like the fact that the BCA is
    forcing this type decision any more that I do, all of them agreed with
    the priorities we established is on budget and understood that not
    divesting the A-10 to fund higher priorities would have an even greater
    impact on their ability to successfully conduct full-spectrum
    operations in the future.

        45. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, the A-10 was developed based on
    a lack of CAS capability during the Vietnam War. High surface to air
    threat forced the airplanes to operate at low altitude which
    complicated targeting, and was too dangerous due to anti-aircraft fire.
    The A-10 was developed out of the necessity to operate at low altitude
    and have an airplane that was effective at targeting and survivable
    against anti-aircraft fire. The other CAS aircraft mentioned appear to
    be more susceptible to anti-aircraft artillery than those used during
    Vietnam. What has changed that has led the Air Force to determine that
    it no longer needs to possess such a capability?
        General Welsh. Our projected funding levels. Under the BCA, we must
    adjust our previously planned spending levels by $90B per year. That's
    a lot of money. It has, and will continue, to drive very difficult
    decisions. This is one of them. Our analysis of the future threat
    environment also contributed to our decision to divest the A-10 in this
    fiscally constrained time. Vietnam-era and some Cold War surface-to-air
    missiles (SAM) were most effective at medium-to-high altitudes allowing
    aircraft to fly below SAM radar coverage. Modern, layered, integrated
    surface-to-air missile systems are more capable and can no longer be
    under-flown. Other aircraft currently conducting the CAS mission are
    more survivable and capable of other roles and missions.

        46. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, in 2014, what percentage of all
    JTAC Training and Certification CAS did the A-10 meet?
        General Welsh. Over the last year, the A-10 has supported 70
    percent of Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) Qualification
    Training (QT) air support. Over the last 5 years, the A-10 has provided
    around 45 percent of JTAC QT air support.

        47. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, if the A-10 were divested, how
    will this requirement be met? Please identify the plan to fulfill this
    training shortfall and the associated annual costs.
        General Welsh. We will bridge the JTAC Training and Certification
    requirement from the A-10 using a mix of CAS capable multi-role
    aircraft coupled with Live Virtual Constructive (LVC) operational
    training and contract close air support. LVC will allow the JTAC Dome
    simulator to connect to our aircraft simulators that enable a realistic
    training environment for JTACs and aircrews. We will have fidelity on
    the associated annual costs after the award of the Joint Terminal
    Control Training and Rehearsal System contract.

        48. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, how much would the Air Force
    save by completely divesting the F-15C?
        General Welsh. Excluding personnel costs, the total F-15C budget is
    $5.8B for the 16-20 FYDP. This includes funding for both the active and
    reserve components. Divesting the F-15C would also mean we are no
    longer capable of providing air superiority over a major theater of
    operations in a full-scale conflict. None of our combatant commanders
    would support divesting F-15C's versus divesting A-10s.

        49. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, discuss the funding for the F-16
    Service Life Extension Program (SLEP). How many F-16 aircraft are
    funded for SLEP?
        General Welsh. Figure 1 highlights the current F-16 Service Life
    Extension Program (SLEP) funding/procurement profile. There are 58 SLEP
    kits funded within the FY16PB FYDP.

                Figure 1: Current FY16PB SLEP funding/procurement profile

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        50. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, what is the cost per aircraft
    for SLEP? Provide a schedule of when aircraft will no longer mission
    capable with and without SLEP.
        General Welsh. The Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) will cost
    approximately $2.5M for each aircraft. It is our intent to only SLEP F-
    16 Block 40/42/50/52 or ``post-block'' aircraft. We do not plan to SLEP
    F-16 Block 25/30/32 or ``pre-block'' aircraft. The three figures below
    show both pre-block and post-block aircraft service life predictions
    without SLEP, and post-block aircraft service life predictions with
    SLEP.
                Figure 1: FY16PB Pre-Block (Without SLEP)
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                Figure 2: FY16PB Post-Block (Without SLEP)

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                Figure 3: FY16PB Post-Block (With SLEP)

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        51. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, did JTACs lead any of the
    working groups at the CAS summit?
        General Welsh. All working groups were led by Air Force Colonels
    (pay grade O-6), which are the highest ranking Airmen involved daily
    with JTACs. The JTACs were fully integrated into each working group as
    active participants. Additionally, the 93d Air Ground Operations Wing
    (AGOW) Commander led our ``Current CAS State of Affairs'' working
    group. The 93 AGOW Commander is responsible for the 3d Air Support
    Operations Group (ASOG) at Ft. Hood, TX, and the 18 ASOG at Pope Field,
    NC--together they provide more than 1,500 air liaison officers, joint
    terminal attack controllers, tactical air-control party members, and
    battlefield weather airmen to the Army.

        52. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, were there any differences in
    the message (impacts of A-10 divestment) you received from the closed
    door meeting with the Tactical Air Control Party Association and your
    CAS summit?
        General Welsh. The discussions with the Tactical Air Control Party
    Association and at the CAS Summit were productive and there was no
    variance in the matters discussed. Again, let me state the decision to
    retire the A-10 was the lesser of a series of very bad options required
    to stay below Air Force budget and manpower limits. One of the benefits
    of the closed door meeting with the TACP Association members was that
    they heard, for the first time, the full impact of the BCA on Air Force
    programs in every mission area. By the end of the discussion they
    expressed a greater appreciation for the difficult choices that must be
    made if the BCA remains the law of the land.

        53. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, what CAS requirements did the
    Army and Marine Corps provide to the Air Force during your summit?
        General Welsh. The Army and Marine Corps were heavily involved in
    all working groups during the summit. In addition, the USN, Joint
    Staff, SOCOM, DARPA, and RAND also made significant contributions. CAS
    is not about the USAF or its aircraft; CAS is a joint mission that
    requires detailed integration between all of the Services to be
    effective--especially in the contested or highly contested environment
    of the future. The Future CAS Focus Week was a success because all of
    the Services came together and honestly assessed the reality of where
    our joint force is today, the requirements for the future, and the gaps
    we need to close to ensure we continue to deliver the outstanding
    effects of CAS to which the ground forces have become accustomed. The
    Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines have all looked at different
    challenging scenarios of the environment that we may have to operate
    in--at the end of the day there will be contested environments that we
    will potentially have to operate in. All Service air components are
    participating in CAS today and they'll continue to do so. Today, USAF
    multi-role platforms, including RPAs, AC-130s, F-15Es, F-16s, B-1s, and
    B-52s, continue to support the CAS mission. Likewise, the USN and USMC
    have effectively used platforms like the F/A-18C/D/E and the AV-8B to
    provide effective CAS. In the future, all three Services will continue
    to leverage multi-role legacy platforms as well as integrate the F-35.
    Once the F-35A reaches Full Operational Capability, we will be able to
    gain synergistic effects with the USN and USMC variants. This synergy,
    when you have F-35C's coming off of ships, F-35B's coming out of an
    austere field, and F-35A's coming out of forward operating locations,
    will be unmatched--I think that's one of the other reasons that the CAS
    Integration Group is going to be incredibly important. This is an
    evolution in how we will execute this critical mission in the coming
    decades.

        54. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, list the risks to CAS execution,
    as identified during the CAS summit, due to A-10 divestment.
        General Welsh. The Future CAS Focus Week attempted to answer three
    very broad questions: (1) What is the current CAS state of affairs? (2)
    Is there a gap? and (3) What do we do next? To properly constrain the
    discussion, we set the following assumptions: A-10 Divestiture in 2019;
    F-35 Remains on Timeline; Baseline Threat: MCO against Peer / Near-Peer
    adversary; and CAS will be required in a contested environment. In this
    way, the risks identified are not related only to the divestment of the
    A-10, but rather represent the risks of performing CAS in the operating
    environment we expect to encounter in 2020 and beyond.
        Although some are more directly tied to the A-10, the following
    gaps were highlighted in the Air Line of Effort:
          Dedicated CAS focus due to multi-mission shift; just-in-
    time training creates challenges for beyond permissive CAS
            o  The A-10 has CAS as a primary mission and they are asked to
            be proficient at all times. Therefore, there is a minimal
            training spin-up time required to send an A-10 squadron down
            range to do CAS.
            o  Multi-mission units have CAS as a secondary mission.
            Therefore, there is a just-in-time training spin-up required to
            deploy an F-16 or F-15E unit down range to do CAS. The time
            required for a multi-mission unit to spin-up will increase as
            the complexity of the operating environment increases (e.g.
            contested environment vs. permissive).
          Capability and capacity to kill armor / moving / close
    proximity targets
            o  A-10 was designed with capability (i.e. 30 mm gun) to kill
            armor (moving and stationary). Other currently fielded weapons
            (e.g. Hellfire, Laser Maverick) also have this capability, but
            with a larger collateral damage / risk estimate footprint;
            future weapons like the SDB II will bring this same capability
            to the F-35. As the size of the Air Force is decreased, whether
            it is the A-10 or another platform, our capacity to kill
            anything on the ground is reduced.
          Ability to employ direct fire weapons
            o  A-10 employs 30 mm gun (1150 rounds) and Laser Maverick (up
            to 6)--both direct fire weapons. While other platforms also
            employ the Laser Maverick, and the Hellfire (also a direct fire
            weapon), divesting the A-10 will reduce our direct fire
            capacity (especially the high capacity / low cost 30 mm).
          CAS sortie capacity from fiscal year 2017 - fiscal year
    2025
            o  Our joint warriors looked at combat power across the USAF's
            CAS-capable fighter force (A-10, F-15E, F-16, and F-35) from
            now until 2030. Factors considered included number of aircraft,
            weapons stations, weapons types, and loiter time. When they put
            it all together on a graph, there was a gap in combat power
            from fiscal year 2017--fiscal year 2025. The gap grows from
            2017-2020 and then shrinks from 2020-2025 (get well point 82023
            when combat power is about equal to combat power in 2015). The
            two biggest contributors to the gap are the divestment of the
            A-10 (proceeding on time and as planned) and the addition of
            the F-35 (proceeding late [both in aircraft delivery and
            capability fielding] and slower than planned).
          F-35A CAS maturation
            o  The USAF will declare initial operating capability with F-
            35A Block 3i. Block 3i is lacking the ``BIG SAR''
            functionality--Block 4's ``BIG SAR'' image will be of a larger
            area at a higher resolution (think SD television vs. HD
            television). This will enable the pilots to better assess the
            situation on the ground using the stand-off gained by taking a
            SAR map instead of flying close to the target and using the
            EOTS (or a Targeting Pod or eyeballs on a legacy aircraft).
            Block 3F brings Automatic Target Cueing (ATC)/Automatic Target
            Recognition (ATR) and Ground Moving Target Track (GMTT). Block
            4 brings Combat Identification (CID) for GMTT tracks. The
            biggest additions in Block 4 with regard to CAS are the
            Advanced EOTS and the SDB II. Advanced EOTS will bring an
            increase in resolution (similar to modern SNIPER pod) and a
            Night Vision Device-compatible IR Marker, among other
            capabilities. Block 4 will also bring Video Data Link (VDL)--
            commonly referred to as ``ROVER.'' SDB II is a multi-mode
            weapon that allows standoff employment (more than 45 miles).
            The seeker works in three different modes to provide maximum
            operational flexibility: a millimeter wave radar to detect and
            track targets through weather, an imaging infrared for enhanced
            target discrimination and a semi-active laser that enables the
            weapon to track an airborne laser designator or one on the
            ground. This powerful, integrated seeker seamlessly shares
            targeting information among all three modes, enabling weapons
            to engage fixed or moving targets at any time of day and in
            all-weather conditions.
          FAC(A) qualified aircrew
            o  The A-10 community has the preponderance of FAC(A)
            experience and qualified pilots. As this platform divests and
            is replaced by multi-mission aircraft, FAC(A) mission will
            suffer. FAC(A)s and JTACs are the only two entities recognized
            across the joint community, trained to integrate and control
            CAS fires on the battlefield. Without a conscious effort to
            migrate FAC(A)s and their capabilities from the A-10C airframe
            to other airframes, the USAF risks losing 2/3 to 3/4 of its
            FAC(A) capability. The Navy also has FAC(A)s--38 are required
            in deployable units and 10-15 are required in shore units. The
            USMC has roughly 50 FAC(A) crews spread across F-18C/D and AH-
            1.
          Capability to operate from austere airfields
            o  With the A-10 divestiture the USAF will lose the capability
            to operate from austere airfields (the RPA retains some limited
            capability). This could limit a support to SOF in some
            scenarios or increase the demand for tankers.
            o  Other Air Force aircraft (F-16s most notably) have performed
            the FAC(A) mission very well in the past and will do so in the
            future.
          Increased O&M costs of 5th generation a/c and weapons
            o  Gap in munitions discussed previously would only worsen if
            high-cost munitions are the only option available for every
            target--including low-end targets. Also, the F-35 itself is a
            high-cost asset. The Air Force clearly needs a low-threat CAS
            aircraft with more firepower and a cheaper operating cost than
            the A-10 to fill this role for the next 30 years. We simply
            can't afford it right now.

        55. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, list the mitigation to each of
    the risks identified. Identify specifically how your mitigation efforts
    will eliminate the associated risk. If some or all risk remains
    following your mitigation efforts, discuss these shortfalls in detail.
        General Welsh. Below are each identified risk and subsequent
    mitigation measures to address them:
          Dedicated CAS focus due to multi-mission shift; just-in-
    time training creates challenges for beyond permissive CAS
            o  Designate Primary CAS units across the Total Force
            o  Live Virtual Constructive (LVC)--streamline platform
            interoperability to augment training
          Capability and capacity to kill armor / moving / close
    proximity targets
            o  Shape F-35 block upgrades
            o  Weapons capacity: Maverick / Hellfire balance
            o  Rapid Point/Cue and shoot, forward firing, low cost, high
            capacity
            o  Weapons Acquisition Strategy / AFRL enabling technologies /
            New family of CAS weapons
          Ability to employ direct fire weapons
            o  Shape F-35 block upgrades
            o  Weapons capacity: Maverick / Hellfire balance
            o  Rapid Point / Cue and shoot, forward firing, low cost, high
            capacity
            o  Weapons Acquisition Strategy / AFRL enabling technologies /
            New family of CAS weapons
          CAS sortie capacity from fiscal year 2017--fiscal year
    2025
            o  Can only be fixed with more money to keep platforms flying
            longer and/or procure a light attack / armed reconnaissance
            (LAAR) aircraft
          F-35A CAS maturation
            o  Continue planned block upgrades
          FAC(A) qualified aircrew
            o  Deliberate A-10 expertise transition to F-16/F-15E/F-35
            (already in planning)
            o  CAS Integration Group (CIG) will train CAS, fires and
            maneuver experts to dominate combined arms operations through
            air-ground integration--specifically joint CAS-minded FAC(As),
            JTACs, Fires, and JFOs.
          Capability to operate from austere airfields
            o  Can only really be fixed with more money to keep platforms
            flying longer and/or procure a light attack / armed
            reconnaissance (LAAR) aircraft
            o  Uses the USMC F-35B in scenarios where this is required.
            We're a joint fighting force.
          Increased O&M costs of 5th generation a/c and weapons
        The recommendation for the F-35 is not based solely on CAS. O&M
    costs for 5th generation aircraft and weapons must be paid if the U.S.
    expects its' military to be successful in the full range on
    contingencies and conflicts it could face in the future. We will do
    everything possible to minimize those costs.

        56. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, how many F-16 or F-15E airframes
    are needed to provide the same level of CAS support (loiter,
    firepower), as the current number of A-10s on CAS target sets including
    armor?
        General Welsh. A 1:1 comparison is not possible because each
    airframe along with the munitions they carry bring specific advantages
    to the fight. The distinct differences in the capabilities of our CAS-
    capable aircraft do not lend themselves to a numerical comparison in
    terms of the number of airframes. The Air Force is confident that there
    will be no degradation in CAS support as a result of A-10 divesture,
    other than the fact that we will have fewer fighter squadrons to
    conduct the nation's business as a result of BCA top lines.

        57. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, is it a one-for-one swap, and if
    not, won't this create a gap in capacity?
        General Welsh. No, a one-for-one swap is not an appropriate basis
    of comparison. No capability gap is created; rather our CAS tactics
    allow us to use multiple assets capable of offering the flexibility,
    range, speed, lethality, precision, and ability to mass at a desired
    time and place.
        The Air Force already has a capacity problem, in multiple mission
    areas. We can't fully meet Combatant Commanders requirements today--
    continued budget pressure driving difficult prioritization decisions
    won't make them any better.

        58. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, has the Air Force communicated
    this to the Army and Marine Corps?
        General Welsh. The Army and Marine Corps participated in our Close
    Air Support Focus Week and the Chief of Staff, Army, and the
    Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps, participated in the Focus Week out-
    brief. I also personally briefed the Chief of Staff of the Army,
    Commandant of the Marine Corps, Chief of Naval Operations, and Chief of
    the National Guard Bureau on our fiscal year 2016 Budget submission,
    including the impacts on the CAS mission area. They clearly understand
    the impacts of the BCA and the tough decisions it drives. Both the
    Chief of Staff of the Army and the Commandant of the Marine Corps
    expressed that they trust the Air Force to provide CAS when ground
    forces need it.

        59. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, the fiscal year 2016 A-10
    divestment schedule is the fiscal year 2015 plan, but with an
    accelerated, aggressive divestment flow to catch up to the remainder of
    fiscal year 2017 to fiscal year 2019. Won't this create a backlog of
    pilots waiting to be trained on other platforms?
        General Welsh. We constantly monitor leading indicators to minimize
    training backlogs that can be caused by a variety of factors. We will
    only cease A-10 specific training if and when we receive authorization
    to eliminate the A-10 fleet from the inventory. Meanwhile, there are
    several issues to be considered when assigning pilots to other
    platforms, such as the current demand for pilots for those other
    weapons systems. The experience level of each pilot is also considered.
    Depending on the needs of the Air Force during the A-10 divestment
    schedule, some A-10 pilots will get other fighter aircraft or fighter
    training aircraft assignments while others may be needed for other
    weapon systems.

        60. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, can the other formal training
    units handle the increased workload, and if not, what does the Air
    Force plan to do with those A-10 pilots who cannot be trained
    immediately?
        General Welsh. There is no immediate increase in the workload of
    our other formal training units as all of the A-10 pilots will remain
    available for deployment through fiscal year 2018. We intend to assign
    experienced A-10 pilots to multi-role aircraft squadrons. The
    experienced pilots who haven't met their first gate (96 months in 12
    years) will be moved from the A-10 to another fighter MDS (e.g. F-35,
    F-15E or F-16 CAS-focused squadrons), to the RPA, or to the training
    community where their expertise will be of tremendous value. The
    experienced A-10 pilots who have met their first gate will primarily
    fill vacant 11F positions to capitalize on their CAS experience.

        61. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, is the F-15E ready to assume the
    Combat Search and Rescue mission set from the A-10 community?
        General Welsh. The Air Force will appropriately transfer the Combat
    Search and Rescue (CSAR) mission whenever the A-10 leaves service. As
    long as the A-10 remains a viable combat asset, we will continue to use
    it in its role for CSAR, CAS and FAC(A).
        The 53d Wing accomplished a Tactics Development and Evaluation
    (TD&E) to evaluate the CSAR mission set in the F-15E and F-16. The
    final test report has not been released, but it will include a draft
    training syllabus to spin-up crews in both the F-15E and the F-16 to
    accomplish the CSAR mission. Ready Aircrew Program (RAP) training
    requirements are being reviewed to identify how the CSAR mission will
    fit into the current F-15E and F-16 training programs, and what other
    missions will be displaced in order to pick up this responsibility.
    Upon notification of a divestment date for the A-10, crews from other
    platforms will achieve proficiency in this mission set in less than a
    year.

        62. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, what is the status of their
    testing for this mission?
        General Welsh. [Note: the mission referred to in this question is
    CSAR]
        The purpose of the Multi-MDS CSAR Task Force (TF) TD&E was to
    prepare/qualify two F-15E crews and two F-16 pilots in the Sandy-1
    mission, develop an accompanying training plan, syllabus, and provide
    baseline TTP. This test was broken down into two phases, Phase-1 and 2.
        Phase-1: Executed from Aug-Dec 2014; consisted of 263 sorties flown
    on the Nevada Test and Training Range. Using A-10C IPs, the upgrading
    aircrew from the F-15E and F-16 followed a building block approach to
    learn the various Sandy 1-4 roles in order to gain the necessary
    proficiency for larger TF missions. Following this initial period, both
    the F-15E and F-16 demonstrated CSAR TF integration during 27 different
    large force exercises involving the following aircraft: A-10C, F-15, F-
    22, E-3, C-130, tanker, HH-60, and unmanned aerial vehicles. At the
    conclusion of Phase-1, the upgrading aircrew from both MDSs needed two
    additional missions in order to meet the objectives of the test plan.
    The interim Operational Test Bulletin summarizes the specific findings
    of Phase-1 and provides a syllabus, training plan, and TTP for both the
    F-15E and F-16.
        Phase-2: Currently in execution during the Spring of 2015; consists
    of four CSAR TFs in April, between two and four in May, and a TDY to
    Eglin AFB (in order to assess the impact of a littoral environment on
    the developed TTP). Phase-2 should conclude by June 1, 2015, and will
    produce two qualified F-15E Sandy-1 crews and two qualified Sandy-1 F-
    16 pilots.
        Road Shows: In February 2015, our team of A-10 IPs and upgrading
    Sandy-1 F-15E aircrew traveled to RAF Lakenheath, UK, to familiarize
    and prepare the F-15E squadrons in the CSAR mission. Additionally, this
    team of CSAR TF subject matter experts stands ready to prepare any F-
    15E / F-16 unit in need of CSAR TF spin-up.

        63. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, what are the operational costs
    per flying hour, taking into account sustainment costs, of the B-52, B-
    1, F-15E, AC-130, F-16, and A-10?

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
               MDS GROUP                     Data                 2014
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A-10C                            TY Operational Cost             $19,041
                                      per Flying Hour
                                    ----------------------------------------
                                     PAA                                 225
                                    ----------------------------------------
                                     Hours-Total                      83,498
                                    ----------------------------------------
                                     TY Operational Cost      $1,589,917,752
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    AC/MC-130W                       TY Operational Cost             $23,284
                                      per Flying Hour
                                    ----------------------------------------
                                     PAA                                  11
                                    ----------------------------------------
                                     Hours-Total                       6,431
                                    ----------------------------------------
                                     TY Operational Cost        $149,735,322
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    AC-130H                          TY Operational Cost             $52,814
                                      per Flying Hour
                                    ----------------------------------------
                                     PAA                                   6
                                    ----------------------------------------
                                     Hours-Total                       1,818
                                    ----------------------------------------
                                     TY Operational Cost         $95,995,077
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    AC-130U                          TY Operational Cost             $51,373
                                      per Flying Hour
                                    ----------------------------------------
                                     PAA                                  16
                                    ----------------------------------------
                                     Hours-Total                       6,292
                                    ----------------------------------------
                                     TY Operational Cost        $323,238,885
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    B-1B                             TY Operational Cost             $58,838
                                      per Flying Hour
                                    ----------------------------------------
                                     PAA                                  52
                                    ----------------------------------------
                                     Hours-Total                      21,587
                                    ----------------------------------------
                                     TY Operational Cost      $1,270,130,668
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    B-52H                            TY Operational Cost             $67,785
                                      per Flying Hour
                                    ----------------------------------------
                                     PAA                                  63
                                    ----------------------------------------
                                     Hours-Total                      18,279
                                    ----------------------------------------
                                     TY Operational Cost      $1,239,027,603
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    F-15E                            TY Operational Cost             $33,260
                                      per Flying Hour
                                    ----------------------------------------
                                     PAA                                 193
                                    ----------------------------------------
                                     Hours-Total                      50,807
                                    ----------------------------------------
                                     TY Operational Cost      $1,689,823,978
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
               MDS GROUP                     Data                 2014
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    F-16C/D                          TY Operational Cost             $21,415
                                      per Flying Hour
                                    ----------------------------------------
                                     PAA                                 813
                                    ----------------------------------------
                                     Hours-Total                     195,005
                                    ----------------------------------------
                                     TY Operational Cost      $4,176,001,223
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        * Notes / Caveats to follow

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  #                             Notes / Caveats
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    1                              Cost and FHs reflect FY14 data per AFCAP
                                    version 8.0 which uses AFTOC FY14Q4
                                    data.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2                              Dollars provided in Then Year (TY)
                                    dollars.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    3                              Aircraft grouped into MDS Groupings,
                                    where appropriate, to improve analysis
                                    and match normal aircraft data
                                    groupings.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    4                              Data provided represents the FY14 OCPFH
                                    (TY$). The Operational Cost per Fly Hour
                                    (OCPFH) is a historically based metric
                                    from the Air Force Total Ownership Cost
                                    (AFTOC) system that provides visibility
                                    into the total cost to operate an
                                    aircraft during a specific year.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    5                              The OCPFH is calculated by dividing the
                                    total operating and sustainment costs
                                    (excluding hardware modifications)
                                    associated with a weapon system by the
                                    total flying hours flown in the same
                                    year. Operational Cost includes: Mission
                                    Personnel, Unit Operations, Maintenance,
                                    Sustaining Support, Continuing System
                                    Improvements (excluding hardware
                                    modifications), and Indirect Support.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    6                              DO NOT use this single year of data as a
                                    basis for future year requirements or as
                                    a basis for a comparison between
                                    aircraft. This data is not normalized
                                    for differences between size of the
                                    various MDS fleets and/or differences in
                                    the hours flown per tail or per PAA. It
                                    includes both fixed, variable, and semi
                                    variable costs. The OPCPFH uses these
                                    total costs spread against all flying
                                    hours flown to derive an aggregate cost
                                    per flying hour metric. OPCPFH should
                                    not be used to estimate the cost of
                                    flying more or less flying hours.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        64. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, how much has the Air Force spent
    since September 11, 2001 to modernize the A-10?
        General Welsh. We have spent a total of $1.56B ($234.4M for RDT&E
    and $1.33B for procurement) since September 11, 2001, for A-10
    modernization.

        65. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, what are the differences in
    capabilities and features between the A-10A and the A-10C?
        General Welsh. The A-10 fleet completed the Precision Engagement
    (PE) upgrade to the A-10C model in fiscal year 2011. PE modernized all
    A-10As by integrating advanced targeting pods and a digital data link
    with aircraft systems. Additionally, PE incorporated a data structure
    that enabled employment of an assortment of precision weapons.
    Altogether, PE provided a significant increase in capability and combat
    effectiveness to the A-10A.

        66. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, please provide a detailed update
    on the A-10 re-wing program.
        General Welsh. 173 enhanced wing assemblies (EWAs) were purchased,
    with the last order occurring in fiscal year 2013 (56 wings). As of 10
    April 2015, 108 EWAs have been delivered (65 are still on order) and 81
    have been installed (27 of current deliveries are still to be
    installed). Production of purchased EWAs will be complete by July 2016.

        67. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, how many have received new
    wings?
        General Welsh. As of 10 April 2015, 81 aircraft have received an
    enhanced wing assembly (EWA). 173 EWAs have been purchased, and 108
    EWAs have been delivered (65 are still on order). 27 of the delivered
    EWAs are still to be installed.

        68. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, under the current contract, how
    many more will receive new wings?
        General Welsh. 92 additional aircraft will receive an enhanced wing
    assembly (EWA). 173 EWAs were purchased, and 81 have been installed as
    of 10 April 2015.

        69. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, how many A-10s in need of new
    wings would that leave?
        General Welsh. Based on a fleet size of 283 A-10 aircraft, the USAF
    would need to purchase 110 enhanced wing assemblies (EWAs) to modify
    the entire fleet. 173 EWAs have been purchased.

        70. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, when does the current contract
    expire?
        General Welsh. The last option is for 2016.

        71. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, please provide a detailed update
    on the current supply and production of 30mm rounds. Is there a
    shortfall in training rounds, and if so, how much?
        General Welsh. Last year, the Air Force discovered a procurement
    shortfall for 30mm training rounds. The Air Force is approximately 1.2
    million rounds short of our current inventory objective with the gap
    expected to increase. To minimize the training impact we increased the
    fiscal year 2014 funding of the 30mm. To further minimize impact, Air
    Combat Command reduced fiscal year 2015 training requirements to
    maintain combat capability within the inventory constraint. The Air
    Force also encouraged the manufacturers to reduce manufacturing lead-
    time and enable faster munitions deliveries.

        72. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, what is the impact of that
    shortfall, and what is being done to address the shortfall?
        General Welsh. The impact of the 30mm round shortfall will depend
    on: 1) A-10 divestiture actions, 2) actual expenditures, and 3)
    realization of accelerated deliveries. If the Air Force is required to
    retain the A-10, congressionally identified funds will be used to
    procure A-10 ammunition and increase fiscal year 2016 allocations from
    38 percent to approximately 52 percent of the training requirement. A-
    10 Operations Group Commanders developed a training plan to mitigate
    any impacts from a reduced allocation.

        73. Senator Ayotte. General Welsh, in your House Armed Services
    Committee testimony, you say the F-35A will replace the A-10 for high
    threat CAS. What will replace the A-10 for low threat CAS?
        General Welsh. Several other CAS-capable multi-role platforms have
    been accomplishing the CAS mission in the permissive low-threat
    environment (F-16, F-15E, B-1, B-52, and MQ-1/9) and they will continue
    to do so in the future.

                            special victims counsel
        74. Senator Ayotte. General Odierno and General Welsh, section 1716
    of the NDAA for fiscal year 2014 required the Services to establish
    Special Victims' Counsel Program to provide independent legal
    assistance for victims of sexual assault. Can you provide an update on
    how your Special Victims Counsel programs are going, and what kind of
    feedback are you getting from victims?
        General Odierno. The Army Special Victims' Counsel (SVC) Program
    adeptly serves as a voice for sexual assault victims, by providing
    legal advice and representation through all stages of administrative
    and military justice proceedings, from investigation to final
    disposition. The Army SVC Program's major achievements include serving
    over 1,880 clients, attending and advising clients at 375 Courts-
    Martial, and filing four writs of mandamus with the Army Court of
    Criminal Appeals (ACCA) and an amicus curiae brief with the Court of
    Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF). The Program has developed
    curriculum for internally managed courses, to include the Special
    Victims' Counsel Certification Course, Child Advocacy Course,
    Supervisor Training Course, and Continuing Legal Education (CLE)
    training. Nearly 350 SVC have been trained, including members from
    other Services.
        The SVC Program resides in the Office of The Judge Advocate General
    (TJAG) and all Judge Advocates who serve as SVC are specially trained
    and certified by TJAG. Currently, 75 active component SVC serve in the
    field under the direct supervision of the Chief of Legal Assistance
    (CLA), with technical oversight provided by the SVC Program Manager.
    This organizational structure provides several benefits. It maximizes
    availability of SVC for face-to-face interaction with clients at
    installations Army-wide; it ensures SVC independence by placing them
    within the legal assistance function, which has a well established role
    of representing individual clients, even when in opposition to
    decisions of the client's command; and it gives SVC the resources they
    need to provide legal assistance for any collateral issues a victim may
    encounter.
        Feedback received from victims has been extremely positive. SVC
    clients have shared their experiences with the Judicial Proceedings
    Panel (JPP), Congressional members and staff, and at numerous SVC
    training events. Victims indicate that they feel empowered and better
    able to participate in the military justice process because of their
    SVC. As just one example, Specialist A.S. testified before the JPP
    Public Meeting held on December 12, 2014, that her SVC `` . . . has
    been there with me through the whole process, and I can honestly say
    that without him I probably wouldn't have been able to survive a trial
    and go through everything that I went through'' (p. 175; 12-16).
        General Welsh. The Special Victims' Counsel (SVC) Program continues
    to receive very positive feedback from represented victims and Air
    Force leadership. The primary indication of the SVC Program's success
    is the results of the Air Force's Victim Impact Survey (VIS). This
    voluntary, anonymous survey of victims who have availed themselves of
    Air Force SVC services has yielded unprecedented satisfaction rates.
    Approximately 200 former clients out of a possible 790 have
    participated in taking the VIS. Over the life of the program, the
    following statistics are instructive:
          90 percent ``extremely satisfied'' with the advice and
    support the SVC provided during the Article 32 hearing and court-
    martial (9 percent ``satisfied'')
          99 percent would recommend other victims request an SVC
          96 percent indicated their SVC advocated effectively on
    their behalf
          96 percent indicated their SVC helped them understand the
    investigation and court-martial processes
        A couple of quotes from the victims responding to the VIS:
        ``I can't imagine why anyone would do this without a SVC. She
    explained everything and made sure I understood what was going on. Capt
    XX was great. I really appreciate all she did to help me through the
    process.''
        ``The SVC was both moral and legal support for me during the
    duration of the case/investigation itself. When I had no one else, he
    was the one who was by my side. He was professional, and knew when to
    be personal to an appropriate extent. It was not only beneficial--it
    was lifesaving. He did his best, and that is all I needed. He went
    above and beyond his duty. I am very lucky to have worked with my SVC,
    and I thank you for it.''
        Although the SVC program only just completed its second year,
    requests for SVC representation continue at a robust pace. We believe
    the sustained high volume of victims seeking representation springs
    from multiple sources including favorable experiences and
    recommendations by other victims of sexual assault, increased
    visibility throughout the DoD and AF communities, and a strong
    partnership with SARC, FAP, legal offices and OSI. As such, in fiscal
    year 2014, 86 percent of eligible victims who made an unrestricted
    report of sexual assault utilized the AF SVC Program.
        In response to the program's success and increasing caseloads due
    to demand, as well as representation of child clients as of June 24,
    2014, the Air Force created the new Senior Special Victims' Counsel
    (SSVC) position to assist with mentoring, training and advising of SVCs
    and Special Victims' Paralegals (SVPs) in the field, and to represent
    their own clients. Organizationally, SSVCs are divided into five
    geographic circuits worldwide. After beginning with only 24 full-time
    SVCs and 10 SVPs, the Air Force has increased SVCs billets in order to
    fully and competently represent victims and manage the increase in
    caseload. By July 2015, there will be 35 SVCs, 5 Senior SVCs, and 24
    SVPs located at 32 SVC offices worldwide. By the summer of 2016, the
    Air Force expects to grow to 50 SVCs.
        Finally, to continue to improve the AF SVC program, the Service SVC
    Program leaders frequently collaborate to develop standardized rules
    for practice, discuss new and proposed legislation, and expand SVC
    training to ensure counsel have the appropriate level of expertise to
    effectively represent their clients. The AF offers an intensive 8-day
    SVC training course at the Air Force Judge Advocate General School
    twice a year. The course is taught by civilian and military experts and
    includes advanced topics such as representing child victims, strategies
    to combat retaliation and ostracism and specialized trial tactics. SVCs
    from all branches of the Service, to include the Air Reserve Component,
    attend this course. Finally, SVCs and SVPs attend myriad victim-focused
    courses offered by other federal, state and civilian agencies.

                             involuntary separation
        75. Senator Ayotte Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, under the
    President's budget request, the Army is dramatically reducing the size
    of the force in the coming years. Consistent with section 525 of the
    NDAA for fiscal year 2014, I understand that in the second half of
    calendar year 2014, the Army involuntarily separated 420 soldiers.
    General Odierno, I understand that the Army is being forced to reduce
    its end strength and this requires difficult decisions you would rather
    not make. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, how many soldiers do
    you estimate you will have to involuntarily separate this year and how
    many if defense sequestration returns in 2016?
        Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. A return to sequestration-
    level funding would require the Army to size and equip the force based
    on what we can afford, not what we need, increasing the risk that when
    called to deploy, we will either not have enough Soldiers or will send
    Soldiers that are not properly trained and equipped. As I have stated
    before, if the discretionary cap reductions from sequestration occur,
    the Army will be at grave risk of being unable to fully execute the
    Defense Strategic Guidance requirements.
        The Army's current plan to achieve required end strength reductions
    calls for us to involuntarily separate approximately 2400 Officers
    (including 650 promotion non-selects) and 780 enlisted soldiers in
    fiscal year 2015. In fiscal year 2016, we will involuntarily separate
    2600 Officers and 1200 enlisted members. When sequestration returns in
    fiscal year 2016, our officer separations would increase by 100
    Captains, and enlisted losses would not change; however, the true
    effects of sequestration would be felt in future years with greatly
    increased Officer and Enlisted involuntary separations.
        If Congress does not act to mitigate the magnitude and method of
    the reductions under the sequestration, the Army will be forced to make
    blunt reductions in end strength, readiness, and modernization. We
    cannot take the readiness of our force for granted. If we do not have
    the resources to train and equip the force, our Soldiers, our young men
    and women, are the ones who will pay the price, potentially with their
    lives. It is our shared responsibility to ensure that we never send
    members of our military into harm's way who are not trained, equipped,
    well-led, and ready for any contingency to include war. We must come up
    with a better solution than sequestration.

                            end strength reductions
        76. Senator Ayotte. General Odierno, you have said that we need to
    rethink the decision to reduce the Army's Active Duty endstrength to
    450,000. You said, ``We made assumptions that we wouldn't be using Army
    forces in Europe the way we used to, we made assumptions that we
    wouldn't go back into Iraq--and here we are back in Iraq, here we are
    worried about Russia again.'' Additionally, in the joint written
    testimony, you and Secretary McHugh described this endstrength as
    ``tenuous''. Setting aside budget constraints for a moment, based on
    our interests and the threats to our interests, what Active, Guard, and
    Reserve end strength numbers do you believe our Nation needs?
        General Odierno. Last year, we testified that the minimum force
    necessary to execute the defense strategy was a force floor of 450,000
    in the Regular Army, 335,000 in the Army National Guard and 195,000 in
    the Army Reserve - a total of 980,000 Soldiers. That assessment has not
    changed and is based on certain planning assumptions regarding the
    duration, number and size of future missions. When determining these
    assessed force levels, we also made clear that risks at this level
    would grow if our underlying assumptions proved inaccurate. Although we
    still believe we can meet the primary missions of the Defense Strategic
    Guidance (DSG) today, our ability to do so has become tenuous. There is
    a growing divide between the Budget Control Act's (BCA) arbitrary
    funding mechanism - that has seen the Army budget drop in nominal terms
    every year since enacted in 2011 - and the emerging geopolitical
    realities confronting us now across Europe, the Middle East, Africa and
    the Pacific, along with the growing threats to our homeland. Risk
    thereby increases to our force, our national security and our Nation.
    As the Army approaches a Total Army end strength of 980,000 Soldiers by
    fiscal year 2018, we must constantly assess the operational tempo and
    its impacts on the health and viability of the force. We must ensure we
    have both the capability to respond to unforeseen demands and the
    capacity to sustain high levels of readiness.

                                 army readiness
        77. Senator Ayotte. General Odierno, you said that only 33 percent
    of our brigades are ready. What is the primary reason for this degraded
    readiness: insufficient training, manning, or equipment--or poorly
    maintained equipment?
        General Odierno. The unrelenting budget impasse has compelled us to
    degrade our readiness to historically low levels. Essentially,
    readiness has been degraded to its lowest levels in 20 years. In fiscal
    year 2013, under sequestration, only 10 percent of our Brigade Combat
    Teams were ready. Combat Training Center rotations for seven brigade
    combat teams were cancelled and over half a billion dollars of
    maintenance was deferred, both affecting training and readiness of our
    units. Even after additional support from the BBA, today, we only have
    33 of our brigades ready, to the extent we would ask them to be if
    asked to fight.
        Readiness is not something that we can just fund piecemeal--once in
    a while and year to year. It has to be funded consistently over time.
    If not, it is fleeting, and it goes away.
        The compromises we have made to readiness and modernization
    combined with reductions to our force size and capabilities translates
    directly into strategic risk. Today, we are generating just enough
    readiness to meet our day-to-day needs of immediate consumption. We are
    unable to generate any residual readiness to respond to an unknown
    contingency or to even reinforce ongoing operations.
        This is a dangerous balancing act. We have fewer soldiers, the
    majority of whom are in units that are not ready, and they are manning
    aging equipment at a time when demand for Army forces is higher than we
    originally anticipated.

        78. Senator Ayotte. General Odierno, if sequestration continues,
    what percent of units would have degraded readiness?
        General Odierno. It is difficult to provide precise percentages,
    but what I am sure of is that sequestration puts the Army on a path of
    accelerated and much deeper cuts to our forces while debilitating
    readiness and reducing modernization and manpower. Funding fluctuations
    force the Army to train and maintain the force in fits and starts,
    which is cost inefficient and damaging to long-term readiness.
        The impacts of continued sequestration will endure for at least a
    decade. It is going to be the next Chief and the Chiefs after that who
    must respond to the long term and hidden impacts of sequestration.
    Readiness is not something that we can just fund piecemeal--once in a
    while and year to year. It has to be funded consistently over time. If
    not, it is fleeting, and it goes away.
        Although the Army attempts to mitigate the impacts on training
    readiness, we must continue to implement the Contingency Force model of
    fiscal year 2015 in order to maintain readiness for the 24 of 60 BCTs
    that will receive sufficient funding to conduct training at Combat
    Training Centers (CTC) and home station. The remaining 36 BCTs will be
    limited to minimum Individual/Crew/Squad resourcing levels through
    sufficient Training Support Systems. In short, sequestration forces the
    Army to ration readiness. But regardless of funding levels, we have
    committed to keeping Combat Training Centers a priority. That means our
    home station training goes unfunded except for brigades going to CTCs.
        At the Soldier level, Institutional Training will also take a
    significant reduction that will take years to recover. Already
    strained, the Army will further reduce Specialized Skill Training by
    85,007 seats (65 percent drop) and fund only the most critical courses
    resulting in 47,659 seats funded out of 199,212 seats (23.9 percent).
    Furthermore, this causes a training backload that will take years to
    reduce, hindering units' abilities to train and negatively affecting
    unit readiness. Ultimately, this further reduces the Army's ability to
    meet Combatant Commander needs for critical capabilities and skills.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
                    440th airlift wing at pope army airfield
        79. Senator Tillis. Secretary James, earlier in the year, I had
    extensive discussions with Secretary Carter about the future of the
    440th Airlift Wing at Pope Army Airfield. During his confirmation
    hearing, Secretary Carter publicly committed to look into the matter
    and sit down with my office and discuss the 440th's future.
        I am distressed that in spite of the commitment, the Air Force
    leadership is proceeding to finalize this matter before the Secretary
    of Defense has had a chance to fulfill his public assurance.
        First, the NDAA for fiscal year 2015 requires the Air Force to
    report to Congress on the Service's future C-130 force structure.
    Congress is then given 60 days to respond to that report.
        General Welsh said it is undergoing changes and has not been
    officially approved by Secretary James, much less provided to Congress
    as required by the NDAA. My understanding is that the report still ill-
    advisedly calls for the dismantling of the 440th.
        Second, in contravention of the spirit of the NDAA, the Air Force
    has already begun removing airmen from the 440th before the report has
    even been provided to Congress, much less Congress having an
    opportunity to respond. The 440th command recently held an all hands
    meeting to help airmen look for other jobs.
        A spokesman for the Air Force Reserve said that last year's law
    says nothing about moving airmen and pilots out of Pope, it only
    requires the planes to stay. That does not pass the laugh test unless
    the Air Force Reserve Command expects the Pope C-130s to be converted
    to drones--no pilots no air wing.
        Third, last month the commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps,
    General Joseph Anderson said, ``of all places to cut, why would they
    [the Air Force] take that capability away from Fort Bragg?'' Fort Bragg
    leadership says it was not consulted.
        The response of the Air Staff is: we don't check Air Force
    decisions with Army three stars.
        I am disturbed that in spite of Secretary Carter's commitment to
    sit down with me and discuss the future of the C-130s, the Air Force
    will have dismantled the unit leaving us nothing to discuss.
        I have asked for a private meeting with you along with my senior
    colleague, Senator Burr, Chairman of the Select Committee on
    Intelligence. Our first meeting was cancelled due to the change in the
    scheduling of the posture of the Department of the Air Force hearing
    before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Since that time, Air Force
    schedulers have proffered prospective times for a new meeting in
    Washington, DC when both Senator Burr and I are in North Carolina. We
    stand ready to meet with you in the state if your schedule will not
    accommodate us in Washington.
        If the Air Force has not reached a decision on the future of the
    440th, why are airmen at Pope being told to transfer elsewhere?
        Ms. James. The fiscal year 2015 NDAA, Section 138, C-130 Force
    structure report was delivered to the Defense Committees on April 14,
    2015, and outlines the proposed force structure for the C-130 fleet as
    amended by our Total Force analysis of the C-130 enterprise.
        The personnel at the 440th Airlift Wing (AW) are not being directed
    by the Air Force to seek employment elsewhere. Rather, these Reserve
    Airmen are choosing to seek other opportunities. Faced with the choice
    of helping them or not, the Air Force Reserve Command has, of course,
    chosen to help and is aiding members of the 440 AW in finding alternate
    positions. The Air Force believes that it is meeting the requirements
    of Section 138 as enacted.
        The divestiture of the 440 AW will have no impact on the XVIII
    Airborne Corps to train or employ. Currently, only 33 percent of Ft.
    Bragg training missions are flown by the 440 AW and 100 percent of the
    XVIII Airborne Corps Global Response Force deployment requirements are
    met through units external to Pope AAF. After inactivating the 440 AW
    at Pope AAF, the Air Force will continue to support movement
    requirements at Pope with non-collocated assets.
        The Air Force remains committed to supporting U.S. Army airborne
    training requirements through the Joint Airborne/Air Transportability
    Training (JA/ATT) Joint Management System (JMS). This construct is
    currently used to fill 66 percent of Ft. Bragg training missions. Using
    JMS, the U.S. Army can schedule additional JA/AATs to make up for the
    sorties currently flown by Pope AAF AFRC C-130Hs. The JA/ATT
    construct--executed via the JMS--also supports 100 percent of the
    missions at Fort Benning, Fort Campbell, and many other Army, USMC and
    SOCOM units, whether they have collocated transport aircraft or not.

        80. Senator Tillis. Secretary James, is this decision in keeping
    with the intent of the Senate Armed Services Committee as made clear in
    the NDAA regarding the mandatory report on the future of the C-130
    fleet?
        Ms. James. The fiscal year 2015 NDAA, Section 138, C-130 Force
    structure report was delivered to the Defense Committees on 14 April
    2015 and outlines the proposed force structure for the C-130 fleet as
    amended by our Total Force analysis of the C-130 enterprise. The
    personnel at the 440th Airlift Wing (AW) are not being directed by the
    Air Force to seek employment elsewhere. Rather, these Reserve Airmen
    are choosing to seek other opportunities. Faced with the choice of
    helping them or not, the Air Force Reserve Command has, of course,
    chosen to help and is aiding members of the 440 AW in finding alternate
    positions. The Air Force believes that it is meeting the requirements
    of Section 138 as enacted.

        81. Senator Tillis. Secretary James, it is not sufficient to say
    the Air Force consulted with Army Headquarters at the Pentagon
    regarding the future of the 440th. Did the Air Force consult with its
    clients, the leadership of the XVIII Airborne Corps, the 82nd Airborne,
    and U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) before making the
    decision to deactivate the 440th?
        Ms. James. No, the Air Force did not consult with the Army XVIII
    Airborne Corps leadership prior to making the decision to deactivate
    the 440th Airlift Wing. Analysis of requirements, both operational and
    training, was conducted and determined to have zero impact on the XVIII
    Airborne Corps Global Response Force requirement and minimal impact to
    training. The loss of organic airlift training capability at Ft Bragg
    will be mitigated through increased use of the Joint Airborne/Air
    Transportability Training process. The Department of the Army was fully
    informed on the issue through appropriate, longstanding HQ's
    coordination process.

        82. Senator Tillis. Secretary James, I have asked for the metrics
    used to determine why Pope is a lower priority than airfields that have
    no comparable tactical mission--no metrics have been delivered. When
    will the Air Force provide this information?
        Ms. James. The fiscal year 2015 NDAA, Section 138, C-130 Force
    structure report was delivered to the Defense Committees on April 14,
    2015, and outlines the proposed force structure for the C-130 fleet as
    amended by our Total Force analysis of the C-130 enterprise. This
    report provides the metrics that led to the decision to divest the
    440th Airlift Wing (AW). Of note, the 440 AW and the associated C-130
    unit do not have a direct tactical mission supporting the XVIII
    Airborne Corps. In fact, 100 percent of real-world contingency taskings
    for the XVIII Airborne Corps are fulfilled by units not-collocated with
    Fort Bragg. Under the current United States Transportation Command
    model, the DoD can deliver the Global Response Force direct to an
    objective via integrated packages of USAF C-17s and C-130s non-
    collocated at Pope AAF.
        Additionally, 66 percent of the XVIII Airborne Corps training
    requirements are fulfilled by units external to Pope AAF via the Joint
    Airborne/Air Transportability Training process. This construct will be
    used to fulfill the remaining 34 percent of training requirements
    following the deactivation of the 440 AW.

        83. Senator Tillis. Secretary James, is it Secretary Carter's
    intent to discuss the future of the 440th with North Carolina's
    congressional delegation?
        Ms. James. I would refer you to the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense.
                                     ______

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Lee
                            air force modernization
        84. Senator Lee. General Odierno, do you believe that your forces
    on the ground will receive the necessary close-air support to
    efficiently and safely complete their missions if the A-10 is retired?
        General Odierno. I have absolute confidence in the capability and
    willingness of the United States Air Force to meet the needs of our
    Soldiers on the ground; we believe close air support (CAS) is a
    mission, not a platform. While we are not excited to potentially lose
    the A-10, we know the Air Force, like the Army, is facing an extremely
    difficult fiscal reality that necessitates making hard, unpopular
    choices.

        85. Senator Lee. General Welsh, an article published on
    Military.com last week reported that the F-35 will not be able to fire
    the Small Diameter Bomb II close air support weapon until 2022. What
    other close-air support capabilities will the F-35 be capable of prior
    to 2022?
        General Welsh. At Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in late 2016,
    the United States Air Force's F-35As will have various combat
    capabilities to conduct Close Air Support. These capabilities will
    include the full suite of fused sensors and mission systems used to
    find, fix, track, target, and assess the battlefield. Additionally, at
    IOC our F-35As will have the weapons inventory to successfully engage
    targets to meet Ground Commander objectives, to include the GBU-12
    laser guided 500-pound weapon and the 2000-pound GBU-31 Joint Direct
    Attack Munition. Full CAS capability will be available as FOC in late
    2021.

        86. Senator Lee. Secretary James and General Welsh, the Air Force
    has again highlighted the F-35, Long Range Strike Bomber, and the new
    tanker as its highest procurement priorities, and lays the foundation
    for acquiring other new weapons systems to replace legacy fleets. I
    continue to be concerned though that cost-overruns and delays in the
    acquisition process could magnify the negative effects of budget
    reductions and harm the long-term viability of such programs. Will you
    discuss how the Air Force is working to drive down the costs of major
    acquisitions programs to ensure that cost increases do not affect the
    readiness of the force?
        Ms. James and General Welsh. Controlling the cost of our major
    acquisition programs is a top concern for the Air Force. As such, the
    Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition regularly reviews
    acquisition costs, both at the enterprise-wide level and for individual
    programs. Furthermore, the Air Force is executing several major
    initiatives to drive down the costs of major acquisition programs. Four
    specific initiatives are: 1) Should Cost, 2) Own the Technical
    Baseline, 3) Affordability, and 4) Bending the Cost Curve. All of these
    initiatives contribute to a stronger, cost conscious acquisition
    community.
        1) ``Should Cost'' management is one of the Better Buying Power
    initiatives that is generating a significant return on investment for
    our acquisition community. Per DoD Instruction, Should Cost Management
    is required for all Acquisition Category programs. Should Cost
    Management challenges acquisition managers to identify and achieve
    savings below most-likely budgeted costs. Should Cost savings are then
    reinvested back in the program, the acquisition portfolio, or returned
    to the Air Force Corporate Structure. Should Cost Management is one of
    the tools that our acquisition managers use to schedule and control
    cost in our program offices.
        2) ``Own the Technical Baseline'' is directed at increasing the
    Government's ability to be a better buyer by being an informed decision
    maker. The Government applies technical baseline knowledge to establish
    trade-offs for affordability and verify, change, accept, and sustain
    functional capabilities. Own the Technical Baseline is essential to our
    future and means the government program team, independent of the prime
    contractor, has the wherewithal to make proper decisions to achieve
    successful, cost-effective acquisition outcomes.
        3) ``Affordability'' is one of the Better Buying Power initiatives
    that challenges Air Force Core Function Leads to look at each program
    and determine if the Air Force can afford it throughout its lifecycle.
    Affordability is different in that we look at our entire portfolio
    across at least 30 years and evaluate if we will allocate resources far
    longer than the typical five year outlook. If a program is determined
    to be unaffordable, we restructure, we re-scope, or we cancel it. We
    are still in the early stages of this initiative, but we believe it is
    a strong approach in controlling costs and avoiding those programs we
    cannot afford.
        4) In 2014, Air Force leaders initiated the ``Bending the Cost
    Curve'' (BTCC) Initiative to address the escalation in weapon system
    costs and development times. To accomplish this BTCC amplifies the
    Better Buying Power principles by encouraging innovation through active
    engagements with Industry and the acquisition workforce to identify,
    evaluate, and implement transformational reforms. Unlike Better Buying
    Power, which is a broader set of practices and techniques for the
    workforce to employ, BTCC is a targeted initiative to encourage
    innovation and active industry partnerships to improve the way we
    procure our systems and to drive down cost. What began as a series of
    discussions with industry has evolved into an ever growing set of
    targeted actions aimed at addressing the most critical challenges
    within the acquisition process. There are three things that
    differentiate BTCC from other acquisition reform efforts pursued in the
    past: a robust and proactive collaboration with industry; a focus on
    prompt and tangible actions; and an emphasis on measurable results. An
    improved dialogue with industry will enable us to better understand how
    processes, procedures, and the choices we make may inadvertently
    contribute to rising costs, the stifling of innovation, and slow
    processes. With that understanding BTCC can then implement initiatives
    designed to reverse the trend of escalating weapon system costs and
    development times.

                            test and training ranges
        87. Senator Lee. Secretary James and General Welsh, late last year
    the Air Force began a study into the future needs of test ranges and
    their infrastructure, a key to maintaining readiness and innovation in
    the force. What do you believe are the most critical needs for Air
    Force test ranges in order to enable your ranges to test fifth-
    generation aircraft and weaponry against the threats that they will be
    facing in the coming decades?
        Ms. James and General Welsh. 5th generation aircraft and weapons
    need to be tested on updated open air ranges and in ground test
    facilities that present the system under test with an environment that
    represents existing and emerging threat systems worldwide, including
    Pacific theater threat systems. More specific details require a
    classified response. Further, our ranges need to be upgraded to address
    the increased distances for air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons
    employment inherent in our 5th gen systems. An example would be
    expanding the instrumented area in our Gulf Range. There are also
    enhancements required to our sensor, datalink, and propulsion
    facilities to fully accommodate development for 5th gen systems and
    beyond. Finally, we will need to make investments in our test and
    evaluation infrastructure to support continued relevance in testing.
    This would include technology updates for data collection and
    instrumentation systems in addition to basic facility sustainment,
    repair, and modernization.

                                strategic forces
        88. Senator Lee. Secretary James and General Welsh, you both should
    be commended for undertaking a review of Air Force's nuclear forces
    last year and your forward thinking outlook on this important
    enterprise. Can you please give us an update on your implementation of
    recommendations from this review and have been able to start tracking
    results of their implementation?
        Ms. James and General Welsh. We have made many positive changes and
    continue to implement and track Nuclear Enterprise Review follow-on
    actions through a systematic, deliberate, process structured to produce
    tangible and lasting improvements. Numerous recommendations with
    immediate solutions have already been implemented: increased manning in
    critical nuclear specialties at AFGSC and AFMC (over 1,250 mil/civ
    billets total), funded incentive pays for certain ICBM career fields,
    funded urgent equipment and facility maintenance requirements at
    missile wings, funded ROTC scholarships for cadets volunteering for
    ICBM duties, key quality of life improvements at AFGSC northern-tier
    bases, approval and implementation of the Nuclear Deterrence Operations
    Service Medal, updated tactical gear and uniforms for AFGSC Security
    Forces personnel that support ICBM operations, and the realignment of
    the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center which will now be led by the head
    of our program-executive office for strategic systems.
        Long-term recommendations are also underway and will require long-
    term investment, attention, and constant end-state evaluation. While
    the total sum of individual action items determines the success of any
    long-term solution, the individual results we see today are very
    encouraging.

                             air force space launch
        89. Senator Lee. Secretary James and General Welsh, the Senate
    Armed Services Committee report for the NDAA for fiscal year 2015
    includes an understanding that there are propulsion systems in addition
    to liquid rocket engines that could provide future capabilities that
    support requirements for medium and heavy launch vehicles and
    encourages the Department of the Air Force to continually review the
    potential for using such propulsion systems. To what extent is the Air
    Force studying the advances in technology like solid-rocket motors to
    fulfill some of your space-launch missions?
        Ms. James and General Welsh. The Air Force supported the change in
    language from ``liquid rocket engine'' to ``rocket propulsion system''
    in order to not inadvertently prohibit review of the potential for
    using solid propulsion systems. The Air Force intends to consider solid
    rocket motors and casings industry proposals for technical maturation
    and risk reduction awards this year.

        90. Senator Lee. Secretary James and General Welsh, is the Air
    Force committed to ensuring that all propulsion providers, including
    solids, have the opportunity to participate in fair and open
    competition to develop the next generation, domestically produced
    engine?
        Ms. James and General Welsh. The responses to the Request For
    Information the Air Force published in August 2014 indicate there is a
    broad range of propulsion solutions, including solid rocket propulsion
    systems. The Air Force intends to consider both liquid engine and solid
    rocket motor proposals for our competitive technical maturation and
    risk reduction activities as well as our investment in rocket
    propulsion system and launch system development.

                             nato defense spending
        91. Senator Lee. General Odierno, you stated earlier this month
    that you were concerned about potential cuts to the British defense
    budget and the need for all allies to be able to invest more to address
    global issues. The reduced defense budgets of our allies are an issue
    that we have tried to address for over a decade with little success;
    what differently do you think the United States needs to do to
    encourage our allies to address their defense shortfalls?
        General Odierno. In such challenging times, it is important that we
    maintain sight of what history informs us--that the nature of warfare
    is enduring; and that in particular, it begins, develops, and ends in
    the human domain. But the character of warfare changes over time, as
    tactics, techniques, and technologies; and ideas and beliefs, evolve.
    So it is imperative--now more than ever--in the face of security
    threats abroad; and troop reductions and fiscal uncertainties at home;
    that our Army and our multinational allies and partners work
    collaboratively in pursuit of lasting solutions. We must work together
    to adapt and innovate in order to mitigate the many risks we face.

                            sergeant bergdahl report
        92. Senator Lee. Secretary McHugh, the Army's investigation into
    the disappearance of Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl was completed in October of
    last year. What is the current status of that report and timeline for
    action to be taken by the Army, and why has it taken nearly 6 months
    for the reported to be acted upon or released?
        Mr. McHugh. The investigating officer submitted his report of
    investigation for legal review in October 2014. The legal review was
    completed in late December 2014, at which time the report of
    investigation was provided to the Commander, United States Army Forces
    Command. Charges were preferred against Sergeant Bergdahl on March 25,
    2015, and further proceedings will be conducted in accordance with the
    Uniform Code of Military Justice.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
                                audit readiness
        93. Senator Manchin. Secretary McHugh, Secretary James, General
    Odierno, and General Welsh, how do you plan on holding leaders
    accountable to make sure your Service is ready for a full financial
    statement audit by the end of fiscal year 2017, and what do you believe
    should happen if DOD misses that deadline?
        Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. The Army leadership is fully
    committed to achieving audit readiness. We have added audit readiness
    criteria to the annual performance metrics for all Senior Executive
    Service civilians. Additionally, we have incorporated audit readiness
    reviews into the Vice Chief's Strategic Readiness Updates (SRU). The
    SRU is how we hold Army senior leaders accountable for operational
    readiness. Incorporating review of progress toward our audit readiness
    goals into the SRU raises the visibility of the audit readiness
    efforts, and we believe this additional accountability has contributed
    to the progress.
        These initiatives as well as our semi-annual input to the DoD
    Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness Status Report to Congress
    ensures appropriate accountability in meeting our audit readiness
    milestones as we prepare for full financial statement auditability by
    the end of fiscal year 2017.
        Ms. James and General Welsh. Full financial statement audit
    readiness is an enterprise wide endeavor. Each one of our functional
    areas is impacted and we are applying considerable energy towards
    meeting the deadline. Our strategy is based on the fundamental of what
    is required for achieving audit readiness, which includes improving
    financial processes, correcting legacy system deficiencies directly
    impacting financial statements, and deploying a new accounting system.
    We are focusing our greatest efforts on areas that have the most
    material impact on our financial statement. The Air Force has a
    realistic expectation of having to undergo several audits before
    ultimately receiving a clean audit opinion. That is consistent with the
    experience of other federal agencies. The Air Force is on track to meet
    the September 30, 2017, goal and to sustain that audit culture as we
    continue to remediate deficiencies identified during the audit.
        Audit readiness is a high priority for the Department and we are
    convinced DoD will continue to work with the Congress to achieve full
    financial statement audit readiness.

               determining active component/reserve component mix
        94. Senator Manchin. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, do you
    agree with the Reserve Forces Policy Board assessment of cost
    differences between the Active and Reserve Forces, and if not, what is
    your assessment?
        Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. Cost is but one of many criteria in
    determining an appropriate Active Component/Reserve Component (AC/RC)
    force mix. The annual, fully burdened cost of an ARNG Soldier is less
    than that of an AC soldier because the Guard Soldier is funded to train
    for 39 days a year while an AC Soldier is funded to train and be
    available for 365 days per year.
        But as reflected in a recent RAND Study (Assessing the Army's AC/RC
    Force Mix), there is no simple one-to-one cost comparison of AC and RC
    units due to differences in terms of time needed to train and frequency
    of deployments. RC unit operating costs are lower, on average, largely
    because RC units train less than full-time AC units. This difference
    results in longer response times for RC units in the event of a crisis.
    Units such as transportation, personnel, finance, and construction
    oriented engineering are generally cheaper to maintain in the RC
    because the skills required are on balance sustained with fewer
    training days and through civilian employment. However, complex
    organizations such as Brigade Combat Teams and Combat Aviation Brigades
    are far more cost effective and readily available in the AC because of
    the considerable training requirements for proficiency and the
    inability to easily sustain individual skills in civilian employment.
        We look forward to the Commission on the Future of the Army
    conducting further analysis of the cost differences between Active and
    Reserve Forces to ensure that we maintain fiscal effectiveness, are
    best postured, and have the right force mix in the years to come.

        95. Senator Manchin. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, how does
    cost influence the Active and Reserve Force mix?
        Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. While cost is certainly a factor in
    determining Active Component/Reserve Component (AC/RC) Force Mix, cost
    must be weighed against responsiveness and flexibility.
        The Army agrees with the recent RAND Study (Assessing the Army's
    AC/RC Force Mix), which demonstrates that units such as transportation,
    personnel, finance, and construction oriented engineering are generally
    preferred in the RC because the skills required are relatively easily
    sustained with fewer training days and through civilian employment.
        After more than 13 years of war, the Army has concluded that the AC
    is best suited for unpredictable and frequent deployments into complex
    operational environments and for dealing with unexpected contingencies.
    The RC is best suited for predictable and infrequent deployments, for
    providing Title 32 support to state and local authorities, and for
    providing operational and strategic depth.
        We look forward to the Commission on the Future of the Army
    conducting further analysis of the cost differences between Active and
    Reserve Forces to ensure that we maintain fiscal effectiveness, are
    best postured, and have the right force mix in the years to come.

        96. Senator Manchin. General Odierno, in January 2014, you stated
    you believe the Active Duty Army should constitute 46 percent of the
    Total Army, and that if the Army has to draw down due to the budget,
    the Guard should be reduced to ensure the 46 percent ratio. How did you
    come up with the 46 percent ratio?
        General Odierno. In order to meet the reductions imposed by
    sequestration, we have worked over the past two years on a Total Force
    Policy that ensures the proper balance for the Active Component (AC),
    Army National Guard (ARNG) and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR).
        We started this journey with guidance from the Secretary of Defense
    that we not retain structure at the expense of readiness. With that,
    the Secretary of the Army and I wanted to be able to preserve our
    capabilities and capacity to implement the defense strategy as best we
    can within available funding while balancing forces (people and units),
    modernization (equipment), and readiness (training and education). The
    Secretary and I established a Task Force led by the Vice Chief of
    Staff, Army to identify and assess alternative approaches through an
    open and collaborative process. Various options were considered in
    meetings between the Chief, National Guard Bureau and the Vice Chief
    considering options, evaluating them not only on their potential
    savings, but just as importantly on the Army's ability to provide our
    combatant commanders with the forward, surge, and rotational forces
    they require on their contingency timelines. We considered Combatant
    Commander war-plan requirements, operational commitments, future
    requirements, costs, and necessary readiness levels. I closely
    monitored the workings of the Task Force and considered all options
    presented. To achieve our goals, we must balance the readiness and
    responsiveness inherent in our Regular forces with the depth and
    reduced cost of our Guard and Reserve forces to provide the best value
    to the American taxpayer at the least risk to mission success and the
    American Soldier.
        Taking all of this into consideration, we directed that cuts should
    come disproportionately from the AC before the ARNG or USAR. Our Total
    Force Policy was informed by lessons learned during more than 13 years
    of war. The plan we established recognizes the unique attributes,
    responsibilities, and complementary nature of the three Army
    components, while ensuring the ARNG and USAR are maintained as an
    operational, and not a strategic reserve.
        In addition, we look forward to the Commission on the Future of the
    Army conducting further analysis of the cost differences between Active
    and Reserve Forces to ensure that we maintain fiscal effectiveness, are
    best postured, and have the right force mix in the years to come.

                                   readiness
        97. Senator Manchin. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, over the
    past 13 years, the Army and Air National Guard have proven to be a
    battle-tested, ready operational force equal to the task when called to
    serve. The Guard has accomplished every task assigned to them by
    combatant commanders. How do you intend to keep readiness, training,
    and modernized equipment at a high level so the National Guard will
    remain an operational force?
        Mr. McHugh and General Odierno. We recognize the significant
    contributions made by the Army National Guard (ARNG) as a part of the
    Total Force and can ill-afford to allow the skills and competencies to
    atrophy. Our goal is to maintain the ARNG as an operational reserve, a
    key component in meeting mission requirements at home and abroad. To
    accomplish this, the Army continues to increase the mix of ARNG
    formations at our Combat Training Centers and Warfighter events.
        We will partner Active Component (AC) and ARNG formations during
    annual training and will conduct integrated pre-deployment collective
    training to capitalize on the experience and lessons learned during the
    last 13 years of war. The recent Bold Shift Initiative reorganized 1st
    U.S. Army to be more responsive to pre-mobilization training support
    for ARNG formations while retaining capability to conduct post-
    mobilization operations. The combined effect of these initiatives will
    enhance ARNG readiness.

                      accessibility of the national guard
        98. Senator Manchin. General Odierno, since September 11, 2001, how
    many National Guard units have failed to meet a Federal mobilization
    requirement?
        General Odierno. The Joint Sourcing Process looks at all forces and
    their ability to meet Combatant Commander requirements; meaning,
    generally, that units are only placed against requirements they are
    capable of meeting. The Army National Guard has met every requirement
    we have given them through this process.

        99. Senator Manchin. General Odierno, how many Governors have
    rejected a Federal mobilization requirement?
        General Odierno. No Governor has rejected any federal mobilization
    requirement since September 11, 2001.

                             total force construct
        100. Senator Manchin. Secretary James and General Welsh, it appears
    that the Air Force has fully embraced the Total Force construct to
    maintain and grow capability and human capital at a cost our Nation can
    afford. Do you believe you are achieving success and will this approach
    allow you to free up assets to assist in recapitalizing the Air Force
    to meet the future threats we face?
        Secretary James and General Welsh. Yes. While growth in the Reserve
    Component provides an immediate, effective, and affordable option to
    reduce risk and meet near-term demand, there are some mission areas and
    platforms where growth in the Active Component is also necessary. We
    are committed to finding the right balance between resources and
    components to ensure we have the most effective and efficient Air Force
    possible.

        101. Senator Manchin. Secretary James and General Welsh, what
    policies and support do you need from this committee and this Congress
    to help you achieve full integration and long term success and
    stability?
        Ms. James and General Welsh. The Air Force cannot return to Budget
    Control Act (BCA) level funding and meet Defense Strategic Guidance
    requirements. The President's Budget (PB) takes a critical step toward
    recovering the needed funding levels that will allow us the stability
    we need to be successful. Our analysis indicates we must leverage
    opportunities to eliminate excess infrastructure to free-up scarce
    resources for our readiness and modernization accounts.
        The Air Force is also studying 28 human capital related initiatives
    that may require legislation to implement. We will need Congressional
    support on various Total Force initiatives, as many of the initiatives
    are groundbreaking. One proposal will allow the Air Force to use
    Reserve Component instructor pilots more efficiently across components.
    Congressional approval of this initiative is vital to enabling further
    integration at flying training units.
        Another example of important legislative change includes an
    amendment enabling the Services to provide equitable death benefits for
    Reserve Components. We look forward to working with Congress as we
    transform into a more seamless and integrated Air Force.

                                     ______

                  Question Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
           blood testing for perfluorooctane sulfonate acid exposure
        102. Senator Shaheen. Secretary James, in May 2014, city officials
    in Portsmouth, NH, closed the Haven drinking-water well located on the
    site of the former Pease Air Force Base after the Air Force found
    perfluorooctane sulfonic acid in the well at levels ten times higher
    than the provisional health advisory set by the Environmental
    Protection Agency. As a result of this finding, New Hampshire's
    Department of Health and Human Services is working to develop a means
    to test for possible chemical exposure for my constituents who work at
    Pease, as well as the young children in daycare on site there. However,
    New Hampshire State officials are concerned that the associated cost
    for this testing could be prohibitively expensive. I deeply appreciate
    the Air Force's well-demonstrated willingness to rectify issues related
    to contamination at Pease in the past. Is the Air Force also willing to
    work with officials in New Hampshire to ensure that those who may have
    been exposed to harmful levels of this chemical are tested to ensure
    there is not a threat to their health?
        Ms. James. The Air Force is supportive of actions that effectively
    contribute to protecting human health and the environment. The
    Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
    (CERCLA) places the federal authority and responsibility for conducting
    public health assessments of the effects of contamination with the
    Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), which is
    under the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. ATSDR has the
    appropriate expertise to independently review the health risk posed by
    PFCs at Pease International Tradeport and determine the need for
    further actions including blood testing.
        In the meantime the Air Force continues to focus its efforts on
    stopping human exposure to releases of the contaminant attributable to
    the Air Force. Under the CERCLA, the Air Force may fund environmental
    response actions necessary to address unreasonable risks to human
    health and the environment attributable to releases of hazardous
    substances, pollutants, or contaminants from Air Force activities.
    These actions may include identifying and removing the sources of
    ground water contamination, halting further migration of contaminants,
    and providing alternate sources of drinking water. The Air Force
    sampled the Haven Well and notified city officials about the results
    and they immediately shut down the well. The Air Force performed
    further sampling of public and private wells and identified one private
    residence well that had PFC levels above the Environmental Protection
    Agency's provisional health advisory level. The Air Force funded the
    installation of a water treatment system in the private residence. The
    Air Force is working with city officials to determine the best location
    for a new drinking water well for the city. Air Force is also
    conducting follow-on testing for all public water wells, monitoring
    wells, and surrounding community public wells and also 30 private wells
    to verify the PFC levels do not increase above the Environmental
    Protection Agency's provisional health advisory.
                                     ______

                 Question Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
                               technology buying
        103. Senator Heinrich. General Odierno, the committee is
    considering major legislation which will change the way the Department
    of the Army buys new technology. One of the major considerations is our
    ability to leverage commercial innovation over building legacy systems
    from scratch. Greater commercial integration can save money for the
    Department of the Army and hasten the deployment of needed technologies
    to the battlefield. The Army's DCGS-A system seems to be at a critical
    crossroads with the program considering a proposed 2-year development
    cycle to develop capabilities that may already be available for
    purchase from commercial vendors and fielded with other government
    agencies. Can your staff provide a briefing to my staff about how it is
    implementing this goal within the Increment 2 process?
        General Odierno. The Army will maximize competition among
    commercial vendors and harvest ``best of breed'' technologies to
    support the timely, secure, and effective exchange of intelligence
    information. DCGS-A Increment 2 will have a full and open competition
    in fiscal year 2016. The program will incorporate existing commercial
    technologies, but these tools must be able to interact with other
    Intelligence and Command and Control commercial and government software
    applications. A two year development cycle is necessary to ensure the
    software applications are integrated, tested, and certified prior to
    fielding. The Army will work with your staff to set up a briefing to
    discuss how the Army integrates existing commercial products into the
    DCGS-A, Increment 2 program.

        [Whereupon, at 5:17 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 AND
                        THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, MARCH 19, 2015

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

      U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND, AND U.S. CYBER
                                    COMMAND

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in Room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John McCain,
    chairman of the committee, presiding.
        Committee Members Present: Senators McCain [presiding],
    Inhofe, Sessions, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Ernst, Tillis,
    Sullivan, Lee, Reed, McCaskill, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
    Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, and Heinrich.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman McCain. Good morning. The committee meets today
    for its annual posture hearings on U.S. Strategic Command, U.S.
    Transportation Command, and U.S. Cyber Command.
        I'd like to welcome our witnesses today, and thank them for
    their honorable service.
        For nearly 70 years during the cold war, deterrence
    provided a strong foundation for strategic ability and
    predictability. Despite frequent tensions throughout this time,
    we knew who our enemies were, we knew what they were capable
    of, and, as a result, we were able to develop deterrence
    strategies by making our intent known, regularly demonstrating
    our capabilities, and continuously training to hone our skills.
    Asymmetric threats were a concern, but global stability was won
    or lost at the nuclear level. The U.S. Homeland was beyond the
    reach of all but the most advanced long-range missiles.
        As Henry Kissinger explained to this committee in January,
    world order today is being defined not by, ``objective
    strength,'' but by psychological contests and asymmetric war.
    Existing world war--order is being redefined.
        Our hearings today, while part of our annual combatant
    commander posture hearings, provides us with an opportunity to
    hear from our witnesses how this changing world order impacts
    their missions and strategic thinking. Dr. Kissinger, before
    this committee, also noted that, ``serious attention must be
    given to the lagging modernization of our strategic forces.''
        Indeed, while spending on U.S. nuclear forces has declined
    over the last two and a half decades, Russia and other nuclear
    powers are increasing reliance on their nuclear forces. Today,
    Russia thinks strategically about the role of nuclear weapons,
    space, and cyber in its national security strategy; in
    particular, its strategy in eastern Europe. Russia used cyber
    capabilities in Estonia, Georgia, and Ukraine. It is
    weaponizing space with new anti-satellite capabilities. It has
    updated its nuclear doctrine and has threatened to deploy dual-
    capable systems in Crimea. Its long-range bombers penetrate
    U.S. and allied defensive zones more frequently. Russia is
    developing a nuclear ground-launch cruise missile, in violation
    of the 1987 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and
    the Russian military is pursuing modernization across the
    entire suite of nuclear systems. Russia is likely--Russia
    likely is using its nuclear and cyber capabilities to
    intimidate and coerce North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
    as part of its broader strategy to prevent the West from
    intervening in its invasion of the Ukraine.
        It's not just Russia. Admiral Haney notes that, ``Nuclear
    weapons ambitions are increasing the risk that others will
    resort to weapons of mass destruction, coercion, and regional
    crises or Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) use in future
    conflicts.'' This warning is more dire, given the decline in
    NATO Europe's military capabilities and the deterioration in
    U.S. readiness from budget constraints. We will want to hear
    from Admiral Haney whether the President's Budget request for
    nuclear forces allows us to maintain and modernize the U.S.
    nuclear triad and ensure that replacement systems are available
    within when our aging nuclear submarines, bombers, and ICBMs
    face retirement, next decade.
        Admiral Haney, we also look forward to your assessment of
    the increasingly serious threats that the United States faces
    in space. The fact is, some states are actively militarizing
    space, to our detriment, and we need to develop a strategy with
    full resourcing of the ways and means to defend against this
    growing threat.
        With respect to Cyber Command, the North Korean attack on
    Sony illustrated how cyber warfare has reshaped the
    battlefield. As I have said, this incident and its apparent
    success will breed future and more significant attacks, and has
    exposed serious flaws in the administration's cyber strategy.
    The failure to develop a meaningful cyber deterrence strategy
    has increased the resolve of our adversaries, and will continue
    to do so at a growing risk to our National security until we
    demonstrate that the consequences of exploiting the United
    States through cyber greatly outweigh any perceived benefit.
        Our ability to keep pace with the cyber threat and deter
    aggression requires that we effectively train, arm, and equip
    the over-6,000-person cyber force we are currently building.
    The fiscal year 2016 budget includes $5.5 billion in cyber
    investments. Unfortunately, as it turns out, the budget is
    disproportionately focused on network infrastructure, with only
    8 percent of that $5.5 billion allocated for Cyber Command and
    the development of our cyber mission forces. I'm concerned that
    a strategy too heavily weighted toward defense is a losing
    strategy. Moreover, at the current levels of investment, we are
    at great risk of having a hollow cyber force.
        For U.S. Transportation Command, just last year this
    committee conducted an exhaustive investigation of the cyber
    threats facing TRANSCOM. According to the Pentagon, Chinese
    military analysts, for example, have identified logistics and
    mobilization as potential U.S. vulnerabilities. Given
    Transportation Command's dependence upon the private sector and
    the fact that the vast majority of their business is conducted
    on unclassified networks, this committee felt it important to
    enhance the Department's ability to share information with its
    critical transportation contractors in the system in detecting
    and mitigating cyber attacks.
        Additionally, U.S. Transportation Command faces challenges
    from the reduction of the size and scope of U.S. forces in
    their deployments overseas. As a result, Transportation Command
    must intelligently reduce and streamline its budget and
    management infrastructures while maintaining the ability to
    expand rapidly to react to future contingencies.
        As Dr. Kissinger stated, the role of the United States in
    indispensable--is indispensable, especially in a time of global
    upheaval. Failing to maintain nuclear deterrents, modernize the
    nuclear triad, defend ourselves in space, and establish
    effective cyber deterrents will threaten American leadership.
        I thank our witnesses for being here today, and look
    forward to their testimony.
        Senator Reed.

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me join you in welcoming our witnesses, and thank them
    for their service to the Nation. Please pass on our thanks to
    the men and women who serve in your commands.
        Admiral Haney, the U.S. Strategic Command is responsible
    for developing a wide range of deterrence strategies, whether
    it's the realm of nuclear space or cyber space, to ensure that
    potential adversaries understand the high price they will incur
    if our homeland or its assets around the world are attacked.
    One of the most important deterrence strategies is our nuclear
    triad. All three legs of the triad need to be modernized. We
    need to build the Ohio-class replacement submarine, procure the
    long-range strike bomber, and begin the process to replace
    their Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs).
        Over the next 10 years, this modernization process will
    cost approximately $35 billion annually, which is about 3 to 4
    percent of our current Defense Department budget. Given the
    importance of our triad, but also acknowledging the fiscal
    reality, Admiral Haney, how does this Department of Defense
    ensure that these modernization priorities remain in place?
    That's a issue I hope you'll address in your testimony.
        General Selva, Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) is the
    unsung hero of the combatant commands. You are key to every
    other command receiving the resources it needs, yet you receive
    little publicity or credit. I think you like the credit; the
    publicity, you could do without. But, anyway, the credit is
    deserved. Let me thank you and your men and women in your
    command for what you do every day.
        Like other commands, TRANSCOM does face a number of
    daunting issues. First, TRANSCOM has to rely on other agencies
    and the private sector for a portion of its aircraft. The Ready
    Reserve Force, a group of cargo ships held in readiness by the
    Maritime Administration, is aging and will need to be
    modernized over the next decade. I am interested to know if
    there's a plan to do this, and the funds apportioned to
    accomplish this mission.
        TRANSCOM also works with the private sector with the
    Civilian Reserve Air Fleet, or the CRAF program, which has
    provided as much as 40 percent of the wartime airlift needs.
    I'm interested in hearing how TRANSCOM plans to keep crafts
    viable after military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
    conclude and wind down, and the plan to provide needed surge
    capacity for the future.
        Also, because it must work with private-sector entities in
    the transportation and shipping industries to support
    Department of Defense (DOD) deployment operations, TRANSCOM
    faces a unique set of cyber threats. The Chairman alluded to
    them in his comments. Last year, the committee issued a report
    on certain aspects of TRANSCOM's cybersecurity situation.
    General Selva, I'd like to hear what steps you've taken to
    accomplish those missions.
        Admiral Rogers, North Korea and Iran have both executed
    very destructive attacks on domestic economic targets, with the
    cyber attacks on Sony Corporation and the Sands Casino in Las
    Vegas, respectively. However, we are not currently postured to
    deter such attacks. I would appreciate your insights on what
    steps must be taken so that private entities are not left alone
    to face attacks from nation--states.
        Also, as the cyber threat evolves, Cyber Command itself
    remains a work in progress. It now has about half of its
    planned cyber mission forces, but lacks adequate training
    ranges and the equipment and tools necessary to plan, control,
    execute, and assess robust military operations in cyber space.
    We would certainly like your comments on this issue.
        Let me again thank the witnesses. I look forward to the
    testimony.
        Chairman McCain. Welcome, Admiral Haney.

       STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL CECIL D. HANEY, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
                           STRATEGIC COMMAND

        Admiral Haney. Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, and
    distinguished members of the committee, with your permission
    I'd like to have my full statement made part of the record.
        Chairman McCain. Without objection.
        Admiral Haney. I am honored to join you today, along with
    the other witnesses here, and I thank them for their
    leadership.
        Your Strategic Command executes a diverse set of global
    responsibilities that directly contribute to national security.
    I can say with full confidence that, today, Strategic Command
    remains capable and is ready to meet our assigned missions, and
    our strategic nuclear forces are safe, secure, and effective.
        The current goal--global security environment, as you've
    mentioned, is more complex and dynamic and uncertain than at
    any time in recent history, as state and nonstate actors
    challenge our democratic values and our security in so many
    ways. We see emerging capabilities from adversaries or
    potential adversaries, to include but not limited to the
    modernization of strategic nuclear capabilities. Counterspace
    and cyberspace activities, conventional and asymmetric threats,
    and disturbing trends undermine the strategic balance, giving
    rise for concern for our Nation and our allies and partners.
        Russia is of particular interest, given their activities in
    Ukraine and Crimea, violations in the INF Treaty, and a
    significant number of long-range strategic aircraft flights
    penetrating United States and ally air defense identification
    zones, while not just modernizing but demonstrating significant
    capacities with integrated strategic operation nuclear-force
    exercises during heightened tensions. Russia is developing and
    using significant cyber capabilities and is committed to
    developing counterspace capabilities.
        China is growing and developing its strategic capabilities.
    Their demonstrated counterspace capabilities in cyberspace
    intrusions are of concern. At the same time, China is investing
    in strategic nuclear-force mobility with mobile
    intercontinental ballistic missiles and their SSBN submarine
    fleet.
        Additionally, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan missile tests
    portend new challenges in nonproliferation of missile
    technologies and potential weapons of mass destruction
    payloads.
        My U.S. Strategic Command team remains focused on deterring
    strategic attack and assuring allies by providing combat
    support to our joint military forces and other combatant
    commands across the spectrum of their operations to support
    national security and strategic stability. Strategic deterrence
    today is much more than just nuclear weapons, although it is
    underpinned, first and foremost, by our nuclear capabilities.
    Strategic deterrence includes a robust intelligence apparatus,
    space, cyber, conventional, and missile defense capabilities,
    treaties, and comprehensive plans that link organizations and
    synchronize capabilities.
        Ultimately, our deterrence capabilities must remain
    credible in order to convince adversaries the cost of
    escalation is far greater than any benefit they seek. This
    drives my six command priorities: to deter strategic attack;
    provide our Nation with a safe; secure and effective nuclear
    deterrent force; build enduring relationships with partner
    organizations to confront the broad range of global challenges;
    address challenges in space; build cyberspace capability and
    capacity, while anticipating change and confronting uncertainty
    with agility and innovation.
        Achieving strategic deterrence in the 21st century must be
    a national priority that requires continued investment in
    strategic capabilities and a renewed multigenerational
    commitment of intellectual capital. These investments, seen
    holistically, are our Nationals--Nation's insurance policy.
    While that policy cost is not insignificant, when you think of
    all it ensures, it is of great value.
        We seek to recapitalize our strategic capabilities, not
    because we have always had them, but because they deter the
    threats we face today and expect to do the same in the
    foreseeable future. My near-term funding requirements are
    sustainment and modernization of our nuclear triad, which
    includes the Ohio replacement program, long-range strike
    bomber, the 3+2 warhead strategy, and groundbased strategic
    deterrent initiative; modernization of our National nuclear
    command and control and communication architecture--we must
    have assured command and control; developing resiliency in
    space, including robust space situational awareness; building
    and fielding and equipping cyber teams; improving homeland
    missile defense capability, while improving foundational
    intelligence.
        The President's Budget for 2016 strikes a responsible
    balance between national priorities and fiscal realities, and
    begins to reduce some of the risk we have accumulated because
    of deferred maintenance and sustainment. This budget supports
    my mission requirements, but there is no margin to absorb new
    risk. Any cuts to this budget, including those imposed by
    sequestration, will hamper our ability to sustain and modernize
    our military forces. Without relief from the Budget Control
    Act, we will experience significant risk in providing the
    United States with the strategic capabilities it needs, and I'm
    concerned that we risk losing faith with our current All-
    Volunteer Force, thus hampering our ability to recruit the next
    generation of strategic warriors. As a Nation, we cannot afford
    to underfund these strategic missions.
        As you know, the Secretary of Defense directed an internal
    and external review of the entire Department of Defense nuclear
    enterprise. I concur with the review's conclusions and support
    the planned investments in the nuclear enterprise that will
    ensure the future safety, security, and effectiveness of the
    force. None of this--none of this work I've described can be
    done without the trained, ready, and motivated people. They are
    our most precious resource.
        Your continued support, together with the ongoing work of
    the outstanding men and women of U.S. Strategic Command, will
    ensure we not only remain ready, agile, and effective in
    deterring strategic attack and ensuring our allies and
    partners, but are able to create additional opportunities to
    better address future threats.
        Thank you for your time, and I look forward to your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Haney follows:]

               Prepared Statement of Admiral Cecil D. Haney, USN
                                  introduction
        Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, I am
    honored to join you today. I appreciate the opportunity to testify
    about the posture of United States strategic forces, my assessment of
    the President's Fiscal Year 2016 (FY16) Budget, and how United States
    Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) is confronting today's complex global
    security environment. I am also pleased to be here with General Paul
    Selva, Commander of United States Transportation Command; and Admiral
    Mike Rogers, Commander of United States Cyber Command. I thank Congress
    and this committee for your support to our Nation's defense.
        I am pleased to report that USSTRATCOM remains capable and ready to
    meet our assigned missions and that the Nation's strategic nuclear
    deterrent force remains safe, secure, and effective. USSTRATCOM is
    focused on deterring strategic attack and providing assurance to our
    allies while providing combat support to our Joint Military Forces and
    other Combatant Commands across the spectrum of their operations to
    support national security and strategic stability. While executing our
    global responsibilities, we made progress toward forging enduring
    partnerships with agencies and organizations across the U.S.
    government, commercial industry, and Allied nations. We took part in a
    number of vigorous exercises and thought-provoking wargames, and we
    participated in and conducted penetrating reviews of our nuclear
    enterprise.
        Having traveled extensively to meet first-hand the men and women
    who carry out and support our strategic missions, I can personally
    attest to the talent, dedication and professionalism of the military
    and civilian personnel conducting these missions. Without doubt, our
    success to date is largely due to those who dedicate themselves to
    national security in spite of uncertainty and resource challenges. I
    want to publicly acknowledge their service and devotion to duty and
    country.
        Today's complex and dangerous global security environment demands
    that we properly sustain and modernize our strategic capabilities. The
    President's Fiscal Year 2016 Budget strikes a responsible balance
    between national priorities and fiscal realities, and begins to reduce
    some of the risk we have accumulated because of deferred maintenance
    and sustainment as we pursue modernization. This budget supports my
    mission requirements, but I remain concerned that if we do not receive
    relief from the Budget Control Act, we will experience significant risk
    in providing the U.S. with the strategic capabilities it needs. We
    cannot as a Nation afford to underfund these vital missions.
                          global security environment
        The world today remains complex, dynamic, and uncertain. The
    military capabilities of nation states and non-state actors are
    improving across all domains. Nations around the world continue to
    execute long-term military modernization programs, including
    capabilities that pose an existential threat to the United States.
    Additionally, non-state actors show increasing ability to strategically
    impact worldwide stability and the security of the U.S. and our key
    allies. Nuclear weapon ambitions and nuclear, chemical and biological
    technologies proliferation continue, increasing the risk that others
    will resort to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) coercion in regional
    crises or WMD use in future conflicts.
        Russia took a number of troubling actions in 2014: intrusions into
    Ukraine, to include the attempted annexation of Crimea, violation of
    the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, long-range bomber flights
    penetrating U.S. and Allied defensive zones, and strategic force
    exercises conducted in the midst of the Ukraine crisis. Russia has
    pursued more than a decade of investments and modernization across
    their strategic nuclear forces. Russia also has significant cyber
    capability, as evidenced by events in Estonia, Georgia and Ukraine.
    Russia has also publicly stated they are developing non-nuclear
    precision-strike, cyber and counter-space capabilities, and Russian
    leaders openly maintain that they possess anti-satellite weapons and
    conduct anti-satellite research.
        China is increasingly using low intensity coercion to advance its
    near abroad agenda with respect to sovereignty disputes. Combined with
    an overall lack of military transparency, its investment in
    capabilities such as counterspace technologies raises questions about
    China's global aspirations. According to the International Monetary
    Fund, China's gross purchasing power recently exceeded our own for the
    first time. China is using that wealth to modernize its strategic
    forces by enhancing existing silo-based ICBMs, conducting flight tests
    of a new mobile missile, and developing a follow-on mobile system
    capable of carrying multiple warheads. Strategic modernization extends
    to naval capabilities as China continues testing and integration of new
    ballistic missile submarines, their first sea-based strategic nuclear
    deterrent. China is also developing multi-dimensional space
    capabilities supporting their access-denial campaign. With more than 60
    nations operating satellites in space, China needs to be more
    forthcoming about missile tests that appear to be more focused on the
    development of destructive space weapons. China has also made headlines
    associated with exploitation of computer networks.
        Other states such as North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan are working to
    advance their strategic capabilities. North Korea in particular
    continues work to advance their nuclear ambitions, to include
    conducting multiple nuclear tests and claiming a miniaturized warhead
    capable of delivery by ballistic missile. At the same time, North Korea
    continues to advance its ballistic missile capability, including the
    development of a new road-mobile ballistic missile and a submarine-
    launched ballistic missile; and develop its offensive cyber
    capabilities.
        We remain concerned about Iran's nuclear activities and as a
    government remain dedicated to preventing them from acquiring a nuclear
    weapon. I remain hopeful that the P5-plus-1 negotiations will have the
    desired effect. Like North Korea, there are also public examples of
    Iran's cyber activities and capabilities.
        Ungoverned or ineffectively governed regions remain incubators for
    those who seek to attack targets in--and the values of--democratic
    societies across the globe. Terrorist threats continue to morph in both
    substance and style, and Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) recruit
    and operate freely across political and social boundaries. While
    natural biological threats such as Ebola challenge our capacity to
    contain and control them, WMD in the hands of unrestrained VEOs could
    prove catastrophic. Such a scenario highlights the importance of our
    countering WMD and our non-proliferation efforts. Finally, the Assad
    regime continues to engage in low-level tactical use of toxic
    industrial chemicals as weapons in Syria, while failing to fully
    address the omissions and discrepancies in its chemical weapons
    declaration to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
    Weapons.
        Space systems continue to enable a wide range of services,
    providing vital national, military, civil, scientific, and economic
    benefits to the global community. As the number of space-faring nations
    and commercial enterprises continue to grow, the space domain is
    becoming increasingly congested, contested, and competitive. Given the
    counter space initiatives by Russia, China, and others, we must
    continue to reinforce the peaceful use of space while ensuring
    continued space operations through partnerships and resiliency.
        Our dependence on cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS)
    creates risk. The worldwide cyber threat continues to grow, with state
    and non-state actors targeting U.S. networks on a daily basis. Today, a
    small number of cyber actors have the potential to create large-scale
    damage. While most cyber threats can be characterized as criminal in
    nature, wide-ranging intrusions and attacks have threatened critical
    infrastructure and impacted commercial enterprise. Likewise, our use of
    the EMS has become so commonplace that we largely take spectrum access
    for granted. The global proliferation of once-restricted technologies
    allows adversaries and potential adversaries to directly challenge our
    freedom of maneuver and our ability to operate in the EMS and in
    cyberspace.
        Finally, uncertainty continues to manifest in other ways such as
    social unrest and turmoil, regional competition for scarce resources
    and economic opportunities, naturally occurring phenomena such as
    climate change and disease, and rapid proliferation of empowering
    technologies. Additionally, the concept of mating advanced weapon
    systems with commonplace items--such as surface-to-surface cruise
    missiles disguised as shipping containers--blurs the line between
    military and civilian environments and complicates our deterrence
    calculus.
                         usstratcom in the 21st century
        USSTRATCOM counters these diverse and complex threats through the
    execution of its fundamental mission: to deter and detect strategic
    attacks against the U.S. and our allies, and to defeat those attacks if
    deterrence fails. USSTRATCOM is assigned nine distinct
    responsibilities: Strategic Deterrence; Space Operations; Cyberspace
    Operations; Global Strike; Joint Electronic Warfare; Missile Defense;
    Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance; Countering Weapons of
    Mass Destruction; and Analysis and Targeting. These diverse assignments
    are strategic in nature, global in scope, and intertwined with Joint
    Force capabilities, the interagency and the whole of government. Each
    mission supports or is interconnected with the others, and their
    combined capabilities create the conditions for strategic deterrence
    against a variety of threats.
        Deterrence is a fundamentally human endeavor, firmly rooted in
    psychology and social behavior. At the most basic level, deterrence is
    achieved through one of two mechanisms. The first is an aggressor's
    recognition that unacceptable costs may be imposed for taking an action
    and recognition that forgoing said action may avoid these costs. The
    second is an aggressor's belief that the contemplated action will not
    produce its perceived benefit, or that not acting will produce a
    greater perceived benefit. These elements combine to convince potential
    adversaries that they will not succeed in an attack, and even if they
    try, the costs will far outweigh the benefits and thus restraint is the
    preferred choice. These fundamental elements of deterrence are well
    understood, and are supported by USSTRATCOM's capabilities.
        Strategic deterrence in the 21st century is far more than just
    nuclear, although our nuclear deterrent remains the ultimate guarantor
    of our security. It includes a robust intelligence apparatus; space,
    cyber, conventional, and missile defense capabilities; and
    comprehensive plans that link organizations and knit their capabilities
    together in a coherent way. America's nuclear deterrent--a synthesis of
    dedicated sensors, assured command and control, the triad of delivery
    systems, nuclear weapons, enabling infrastructure, trained ready
    people, and treaties and non-proliferation activities--remains
    foundational to our national security and has been a constant thread in
    the geopolitical fabric of an uncertain world. The likelihood of major
    conflict with other nuclear powers is remote today, and the ultimate
    U.S. goal remains the achievement of a world without nuclear weapons.
    Until that day comes, the U.S. requires a safe, secure and effective
    nuclear deterrent force, even as it continues to reduce its nuclear
    stockpile and the number of deployed nuclear warheads. As stated in the
    2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), our nuclear deterrent
    capabilities `` . . . deter nuclear attack on the United States, as
    well as on our allies and partners'' and communicate `` . . . to
    potential nuclear-armed adversaries that they cannot escalate their way
    out of failed conventional aggression.''
        USSTRATCOM efforts are guided by my six overarching priorities. My
    number one priority is to deter strategic attack. Strategic attacks can
    occur through a variety of mechanisms in any domain and are defined by
    their scope and their decisive negative outcomes for the Nation. They
    may impact many people or systems, affect large physical areas, act
    across great distances, persist over long periods of time, disrupt
    economic or social structures, or change the status quo in a
    fundamental way. We must continue our efforts to deter strategic
    threats to global stability.
        Second, we will provide the Nation with a safe, secure and
    effective nuclear deterrent force. Foundational documents such as the
    2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the 2013 Report on Nuclear Weapons
    Employment Strategy, and the 2014 QDR have consistently repeated this
    mandate. It is my responsibility to provide our Nation with a viable
    and credible nuclear deterrent force as long as nuclear weapons exist.
        Third, we will build enduring relationships with partner
    organizations to confront the broad range of global challenges. We aim
    to work seamlessly across the federal government, commercial sector,
    and with partners and Allies to apply the breadth of USSTRATCOM
    capabilities toward a synchronized pursuit of national objectives.
    Robust interaction occurs at all levels in our organization and
    includes operations, exercises and wargames with other Combatant
    Commands and Allies.
        Fourth, we will continue to address challenges in space. Space
    capabilities remain foundational to our way of life, yet are
    increasingly vulnerable to hostile actions. Robust space domain
    awareness remains central to our ability to maintain an advantage in
    space.
        Fifth, we must continue to build cyberspace capability and
    capacity. Cyberspace supports operations extensively in all of my
    mission areas and has become a critical facet of national power. We
    must continue to develop a robust cyber mission force with the
    authorities, skills, and resources to protect against a maturing set of
    cyber threats.
        Finally, geopolitical and fiscal realities demand that we
    anticipate change and confront uncertainty with agility and innovation.
    Sound decision-making requires thorough analysis to prioritize our
    activities along with flexible, agile, adaptable thinking and systems.
    I fully support the Defense Innovation Initiative and the associated
    Advanced Capability and Deterrence Panel. These efforts will help us
    identify new operational concepts, develop cutting edge technology, and
    enable a continuing evolution of ideas on how to deter current and
    potential adversaries.
                    mission area capabilities & requirements
        Even the best analysis will never be error free, so we must
    maintain adequate readiness to confront uncertainty. Prioritizing
    resources to meet our requirements requires a thoughtful assessment of
    national priorities in the context of fiscal realities. The President's
    Fiscal Year 2016 Budget supports my mission requirements, but there is
    no margin to absorb risk. Any cuts to that budget--including those
    imposed by sequestration--will hamper our ability to sustain and
    modernize our military forces, and will add significant risk to our
    strategic capabilities now and in the future.
    Nuclear Deterrent Forces
        In the wake of a series of events involving the Nation's nuclear
    forces and their leadership, Secretary Hagel directed an internal and
    external review of the entire Department of Defense (DOD) nuclear
    enterprise. The reviews concluded that while our nuclear forces are
    currently meeting the demands of the mission, we needed to make
    significant changes to ensure the future safety, security, and
    effectiveness of the force. I fully support planned investments in the
    nuclear enterprise that will improve and sustain current equipment in
    response to these reviews.
        Our nuclear deterrent is the ultimate insurance against a nuclear
    attack on the United States. We must commit to investments that will
    allow us to maintain this insurance in a safe and secure way for as
    long as nuclear weapons exist, or risk degrading the deterrent and
    stabilizing effect of a credible and capable nuclear force. Today we
    spend less than 3 percent of the DOD budget on nuclear capabilities. As
    stated by the Congressional Budget Office, recapitalization investments
    that are necessary to ensure safety and security will increase this
    number to ``roughly 5 percent to 6 percent.''
        Sensors. Strategic missile warning remains one of our most
    important missions. Along with persistent and tailored intelligence
    capabilities, our Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment
    network of sensors and processing facilities provide timely, accurate,
    unambiguous, and continuous tactical early warning and allow us to
    select the most suitable course of action in rapidly developing
    situations. The Defense Support Program is nearing the end of its
    operational life, but the Space-Based Infrared System program is on
    track to provide continuous on-orbit capability. The survivable and
    endurable segments of these systems, along with Early Warning Radars
    and nuclear detonation detection elements, are in urgent need of
    continued simultaneous sustainment and modernization. We must continue
    to maintain legacy systems at ever-increasing risk to mission success.
    Prompt and sufficient recapitalization of these critical facilities and
    networks--to include electromagnetic pulse protection and survivable
    endurable communications with other nodes in the system--will be
    central to maintaining a credible deterrent. I fully support continued
    investment in this critical area.
        Nuclear Command, Control and Communications (NC3). Assured and
    reliable NC3 is fundamental to the credibility of our nuclear
    deterrent. The aging NC3 systems continue to meet their intended
    purpose, but risk to mission success is increasing as key elements of
    the system age. The unpredictable challenges posed by today's complex
    security environment make it increasingly important to optimize our NC3
    architecture while leveraging new technologies so that NC3 systems
    operate together as a core set of survivable and endurable capabilities
    that underpin a broader, national command and control system.
        I appreciate Congress' direction last year to establish the Council
    on Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control and
    Communications System (CONLC3S). The CONLC3S has proven effective in
    bringing NC3 stakeholders together to synchronize and prioritize NC3
    modernization efforts, and then articulate those priorities to
    Congress. Specific programs include the Family of Beyond-line-of-sight
    Terminals, Presidential National Voice Conferencing, the Multi-Role
    Tactical Common Data Link, Phoenix Air-to-Ground Communications
    Network, the E-4B Low Frequency Transmit System, B-2 Common Very Low
    Frequency Receiver, and the E-6B service life extension and Airborne
    Launch Control System replacement programs.
        The USSTRATCOM Command and Control (C2) Facility will support all
    our missions and will feature prominently in our future nuclear and
    national C2 architecture. The project is progressing well and will soon
    transition from exterior construction to interior fit-out. Timely,
    consistent, and stable funding is vital to keeping the project on-time
    and on-budget. I appreciate the steadfast support that Congress
    continues to provide for this effort.
        Nuclear Triad. The policy of maintaining a nuclear triad of
    strategic nuclear delivery systems was most recently re-iterated in the
    2014 QDR. Our Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, Ballistic Missile
    Submarines, and nuclear capable heavy bombers each provide unique and
    complementary attributes that together underpin strategic deterrence--
    and each element is in need of continued investment.
        Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). Our ICBM force
    promotes deterrence and stability by fielding a responsive and
    resilient capability that significantly complicates the decision
    calculus of any potential adversary. Though first fielded in 1962, the
    Minuteman Weapon System is sustainable through 2030, with near-term
    investments in the Mk21 replacement fuze, ICBM Cryptographic Upgrade,
    Payload Transporter vehicle replacement, Transporter-Erector vehicle
    replacement, and UH-1N helicopter replacement programs to address age-
    related issues. The Air Force is initiating the Ground Based Strategic
    Deterrent program to begin recapitalizing the ICBM enterprise.
    USSTRATCOM fully supports an integrated weapon system recapitalization
    effort that synchronizes flight systems, ground systems, command and
    control, infrastructure, and support equipment development and
    deployment.
        Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs). Recapitalizing our sea-based
    strategic deterrent force is my top modernization priority. The Navy's
    SSBNs and Trident II D5 ballistic missiles constitute the Triad's most
    survivable leg. In 2014, the Ohio-class fleet completed the submarine
    force's 4000th strategic deterrent patrol. This stealthy and highly
    capable force is undergoing needed modernization to extend the life of
    the D5 missile and replace the Ohio-class SSBNs which begin to retire
    in 2027. No further extension is possible and maintaining operational
    availability is a concern. We must resource sustainment of the Ohio
    class SSBNs to maintain the required availability through the
    transition period to the Ohio Replacement Program (ORP) SSBN and until
    the last hull is decommissioned in 2040. Stable funding of the ORP, the
    life-of-ship reactor core, and supporting systems and infrastructure is
    critical to achieving a first deterrent patrol in 2031. In addition, we
    must continue our commitment to the United Kingdom to develop and field
    the Common Missile Compartment to ensure both nations' SSBNs achieve
    operational capability on schedule.
        Heavy Bombers. Our dual-capable B-52 and B-2 bombers continue to
    provide significant conventional capabilities along with flexibility,
    visibility and a rapid hedge against technical challenges in other legs
    of the nuclear triad. Planned sustainment and modernization activities,
    to include associated NC3, will ensure a credible nuclear bomber
    capability through 2040. Looking forward, a new highly survivable
    penetrating bomber is required to credibly sustain our broad range of
    deterrence and strike options beyond the lifespan of today's platforms.
    Maintaining an effective air-delivered standoff capability is vital to
    meet our strategic and extended deterrence commitments and to
    effectively conduct global strike operations in anti-access and area-
    denial (A2AD) environments. The Long Range Stand-Off AoA completed
    earlier this year recommended a follow-on nuclear cruise missile to
    replace the aging Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) with a capability
    designed for future adversary A2AD environments.
        Weapons and Infrastructure. Nuclear weapons and their supporting
    infrastructure underpin our nuclear triad, with the average warhead
    today over 27 years old. Surveillance activities, Life Extension
    Programs (LEPs), and Stockpile Stewardship efforts are key to
    sustaining our nuclear arsenal by mitigating age-related effects and
    incorporating improved safety and security features without a return to
    nuclear testing.
        As a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) I work in close
    coordination with my DOD and Department of Energy counterparts to
    ensure we maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear stockpile.
    Active and sustained execution of the NWC's long-term ``3+2'' strategy
    to deliver three ballistic missile and two air-delivered warheads is
    crucial to achieving this goal while addressing both near-term
    technical needs and future capability requirements. The W76-1 and B61-
    12 LEPs are on track and are necessary to maintain confidence in the
    reliability, safety and intrinsic security of our nuclear weapons.
    Early activities are underway supporting the cruise missile replacement
    by the late 2020s. The President's Fiscal Year 2016 Budget supports
    this and ensures schedule alignment of the cruise missile delivery
    platform and its associated weapon.
        Sustaining and modernizing the nuclear enterprise infrastructure--
    in physical and intellectual terms--is central to our long-term
    strategy. Continued material investment and maintaining an adequate
    pool of nuclear scientists and engineers is crucial to providing
    critical capabilities that meet our stockpile requirements.
        Treaties. International agreements such as New Strategic Arms
    Reduction Treaty (New START), the Open Skies Treaty (OST), and the
    Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty contribute to strategic
    stability through transparency, confidence building, and verification.
    The State Department has primary responsibility for treaty
    administration, and USSTRATCOM remains closely involved in their
    execution.
        New START's central limits and verification mechanisms reduce the
    likelihood of misperceptions and misunderstandings. Similarly, OST
    demonstrated its utility during the crisis in the Ukraine, where
    overflight missions allowed the 34 state parties to the treaty the
    opportunity to observe the situation on the ground, thereby
    supplementing other sources of information. In a similar vein, the INF
    Treaty promoted strategic stability by addressing capabilities of
    significant concern to our European Allies. While these agreements have
    served valuable roles in promoting strategic stability, treaty
    violations are a cause for concern.
        The U.S. has a long-standing commitment to reducing the number of
    nuclear weapons consistent with national policy and geopolitical
    conditions. At the height of the Cold War, the U.S. had 31,000 nuclear
    warheads. When New START was ratified in February 2011, we had 1,800
    deployed warheads. USSTRATCOM continues to work with the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Services to
    implement New START. To date, the U.S. and Russia have together
    conducted over 70 inspections and have exchanged more than 7,000 New
    START message notifications. In 2014, the U.S. finalized the New START
    force structure and completed de-MIRVing MM III ICBMs. Given the proper
    authority and funding, we are on track to achieve New START's limits of
    1,550 deployed warheads, 700 deployed delivery systems, and 800
    deployed and non-deployed delivery systems by February 2018.
    Space Operations
        The U.S. must maintain assured access to space. Our national space
    capabilities allow us to globally navigate, communicate, and observe
    natural and man-made events in areas where non-space sensors are either
    not available or not feasible. Space capabilities are also a key
    component of strategic deterrence. Our space sensors, command and
    control systems, and space situational awareness capabilities are
    critical to supporting both our deployed forces and our national
    decision making processes.
        As articulated in the 2011 National Security Space Strategy, the
    space domain is contested, congested, and competitive. Our potential
    adversaries have signaled their ability to conduct hostile operations
    in space as an extension of the terrestrial battlefield, and consider
    these operations essential to deny U.S. forces the asymmetric
    advantages of space. To mitigate this trend, the U.S. continues to
    partner with responsible nations, international organizations and
    commercial firms to promote responsible, peaceful and safe use of
    space. We also strive to maximize the advantages provided by improved
    space capabilities while reducing vulnerabilities; and seek to prevent,
    deter, defeat and operate through attacks on our space capabilities.
        Foundational to all of these efforts is sufficient Space
    Situational Awareness (SSA)--the information that allows us to
    understand what is on orbit, where it is and where it is going, and how
    it is being used. Our goal is to ensure space remains a safe domain for
    all legitimate users. Sharing SSA information and collaborating with
    other nations and commercial firms promotes safe and responsible space
    operations, reduces the potential for debris-producing collisions,
    builds international confidence in U.S. space systems, fosters U.S.
    space leadership, and improves our own SSA through knowledge of other
    owner/operator satellite positional data.
        USSTRATCOM is committed to using the full capabilities of our
    overhead-persistent infrared systems for all relevant mission areas. We
    are actively partnering with the Intelligence Community to more
    effectively manage our intelligence requirements, share data, and
    ensure all of our assets are effectively working to support national
    priorities.
        In accordance with U.S. law, USSTRATCOM has negotiated SSA Sharing
    Agreements and Arrangements with 46 commercial entities, two
    intergovernmental organizations (EUMETSAT and European Space Agency),
    and eight nations (France, Italy, Japan, Australia, Canada, South
    Korea, United Kingdom, and Germany) and is in the process of
    negotiating agreements with additional nations. Through these sharing
    agreements, USSTRATCOM assists partners with activities such as launch
    support; maneuver planning; support for on-orbit anomaly resolution,
    electromagnetic interference reporting and investigation; support for
    launch anomalies and de-commissioning activities; and on-orbit
    conjunction assessments.
        At the nucleus of USSTRATCOM's approach to space security is both
    strategic and tactical mission assurance--ensuring Combatant Commanders
    have required access to space-based capabilities, achieved through
    freedom of action in space. USSTRATCOM's Joint Functional Component
    Command for Space (JFCC Space), located at Vandenberg Air Force Base in
    California, leads the efforts to ensure continuous and integrated space
    operations and routinely track tens of thousands of space objects in
    orbit around the Earth. This includes more than 1,100 active satellites
    owned and operated by approximately 60 nations and government
    consortia, plus hundreds of small commercial and academic satellites.
    In 2014, this allowed JFCC Space to issue more than 12,000 conjunction
    alerts, resulting in 121 collision avoidance maneuvers, to include
    several maneuvers by the International Space Station.
        We must sustain judicious and stable investments to preserve the
    advantages we hold in this dynamic and increasingly complex
    environment. Examples include the Space Fence program which will
    greatly expand the capacity of the Space Surveillance Network,
    investments in modeling and simulation which will increase our
    understanding of the space environment and adversary capabilities, and
    funding for satellite communications that are resistant to
    interference. We must also continue to seek out innovative and
    cooperative solutions with Allies and partners to ensure the products
    and services we derive from operating in space remain available, even
    when threatened by natural events or the actions of a determined
    adversary. These include both active and passive protection measures
    for individual systems and constellations and a critical examination of
    the architectural path we will follow to ensure resilience and
    affordability in space.
    Cyberspace Operations
        This year marks the fifth anniversary of the activation of our
    assigned sub-unified command, US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) located at
    Ft. Meade, Maryland. USCYBERCOM seeks to impart an operational outlook
    and attitude to the running of the DOD's roughly seven million
    networked devices and 15,000 network enclaves--which represent a global
    system that operates at the speed of light beyond geographic and
    political boundaries.
        Our primary focus for cyberspace operations within DOD is to
    increase capacity and capability. The Cyber Mission Force (CMF)
    construct addresses the significant challenges of recruiting, training,
    and retaining the people, facilities and equipment necessary to
    generate the workforce required for successful cyberspace operations.
    Our plans call for the creation of 133 cyber mission teams manned by
    more than 6,000 highly trained personnel by the end of fiscal year
    2016. To date, 61 of those teams are fielded and engaged in a variety
    of missions. The majority of these teams will support the combatant
    commands, with the remainder supporting national missions. It is
    imperative that we continue to pursue fulfilling our cyber
    capabilities. Budget stability is key to achieving this vision, as
    every training day we lose to fiscal constraints will cause further
    delays in fielding the CMF.
        In order to posture the DOD to better defend against the growing
    number of threats, USSTRATCOM proposed the establishment of a Joint
    Force Headquarters - DOD Information Network (JFHQ-DODIN). The JFHQ-
    DODIN became operational in January 2015 and enables the Commander,
    USCYBERCOM to delegate authority for the operational and tactical level
    planning, execution, and oversight of DOD information network
    operations and defense to a subordinate unit. This arrangement ensures
    tactical mission success while allowing USCYBERCOM to remain focused on
    operational and strategic concerns.
    Global Strike
        USSTRATCOM's Joint Functional Component Command for Global Strike
    (JFCC-GS) operates from Offutt AFB, Nebraska with headquarters at
    Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. JFCC-GS provides a unique ability to command
    and control our global strike capabilities and build plans that rapidly
    integrate into theater operations. This includes integration of combat
    capability associated with kinetic and non-kinetic effects.
        Conventional prompt strike (CPS) capability offers the opportunity
    to rapidly engage high-value targets without resorting to nuclear
    options. CPS can provide precision and responsiveness in A2AD
    environments while simultaneously minimizing unintended military,
    political, environmental, economic or cultural consequences. I support
    continuing research and development of capabilities that help fill the
    conventional strike gap with a discernible non-ballistic trajectory,
    maneuverability for over-flight avoidance, and payload delivery
    capability.
        Effective strike solutions require dedicated analysis. USSTRATCOM's
    Joint Warfare and Analysis Center (JWAC) in Dahlgren, Virginia enhances
    our Strategic Deterrence and Global Strike missions by providing unique
    and valuable insight into selected adversary networks. JWAC's ability
    to solve complex challenges for our Nation's warfighters--using a
    combination of social and physical science techniques and engineering
    expertise--is invaluable to protecting the Nation and helping the Joint
    Force accomplish its missions.
    Joint Electronic Warfare
        America's prosperity and security relies on assured access to the
    electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) to achieve strategic advantage and
    enable the instruments of national power. The EMS reaches across
    geopolitical boundaries and warfighting domains, and is tightly
    integrated into the operation of critical infrastructures and the
    conduct of commerce, governance, and national security.
        Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (JEMSO) underpin U.S.
    national objectives and enable the combat capability of the Joint Force
    by ensuring friendly access to the EMS while denying adversaries the
    same. USSTRATCOM is engaged in developing JEMSO policy and doctrine,
    and in addressing capability gaps across the DOD. Additionally, the
    USSTRATCOM JEMSO Office in conjunction with the Joint Electronic
    Warfare Center and Joint Electromagnetic Preparedness for Advanced
    Combat Center work closely with the combatant commands, Services and
    other Department agencies supporting the warfighter through advocacy,
    planning, and training.
        Effective operations in the EMS will require development of an
    Electromagnetic Battle Management (EMBM) capability. The size and
    complexity of the EMS drives the requirement for the EMBM to be
    automated, interface at the machine level, and operate at near real-
    time speeds. This effort provides guidance for Service interoperability
    while retaining flexibility to meet Service-specific requirements.
    Future efforts will further refine and add context to the approved
    architectures.
    Missile Defense
        Effective missile defense is an essential element of the U.S.
    commitment to strengthen strategic and regional deterrence against
    states of concern. Today, 30 operational Ground Based Interceptors
    protect the U.S. against a limited ICBM attack from potential regional
    threats such as North Korea, but continued investment in three broad
    categories is required to improve our capabilities against growing
    threats: persistent and survivable engagement-quality tracking sensors,
    increased interceptor inventories with improved performance and
    reliability, and increased regional capability and capacity. These
    needs can be addressed by funding priority programs such as: Long-Range
    Discriminating Radar, a redesigned Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV),
    Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense and the Theater High-Altitude Area
    Defense follow-on, Overhead Persistent Infra-Red sensors, Upgraded
    Early Warning Radars, and Joint Tactical Ground Stations.
        New technologies must be proven before we can count on them to
    contribute to our operational plans. I fully support the concept of
    ``fly before you buy,'' and I was pleased by the Missile Defense
    Agency's successful test in June 2014 of the Capability Enhancement II
    EKV.
        The European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) contributes to the
    defense of the United States, our deployed forces in Europe, and our
    Allies. For example, the forward-based radar deployed in Turkey is
    capable of providing important early trajectory data on possible
    Iranian missile launches. EPAA Phase 1 was completed in 2011 and
    efforts are on track to fulfill Phase 2 and Phase 3 commitments in 2015
    and 2018 respectively. Interoperability between NATO's Active Layered
    Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence system and the U.S. command and
    control network has been successfully demonstrated.
        In December 2014, with the assistance of the Japanese Ministry of
    Defense, the DOD fielded a second AN/TPY-2 radar in Japan. The radar
    will augment the existing AN/TPY-2 radar and will enhance the ability
    to defend Japan, our forward deployed forces, and the U.S. homeland
    from North Korean ballistic missile threats.
        The missile defense community--including USSTRATCOM's Joint
    Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC-IMD)
    located in Colorado Springs, Colorado--continued to refine its
    understanding of missile defense challenges from technical and
    resourcing perspectives. These include evaluating current and future
    sensor architectures to better integrate missile defense and
    situational awareness missions, studying potential CONUS interceptor
    sites, understanding current and future cruise and ballistic missile
    threats, improving hit-to-kill assessment capabilities, and optimizing
    the location of missile defense assets.
    Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconnaissance (ISR)
        The demand for ISR will always outpace our ability to fully satisfy
    all requirements. At the same time, we are focused on the goal of
    increasing the effectiveness and persistence of our ISR capabilities
    while reducing the ``cost of doing business.'' Located at Joint Base
    Anacostia-Bolling AFB, Washington, D.C., USSTRATCOM's Joint Functional
    Component Command for ISR (JFCC-ISR) is working with our headquarters,
    the Joint Staff, the Services, the combatant commands and the
    Intelligence Community to improve the management of the Department's
    existing ISR capabilities given the high demands on these critical
    assets. I fully support this maximizing the agile and effective use of
    the capabilities we have, while also enhancing allied and partner
    contribution and cooperation. These efforts are designed to increase
    the persistence of our ISR capabilities, reduce the risk of strategic
    surprise, and increase our ability to respond to crises.
    Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD)
        In June, the Secretary of Defense issued a new Defense Strategy for
    Countering WMD which affirms that the pursuit of WMD and potential use
    by actors of concern pose a threat to U.S. national security and peace
    and stability around the world. As DOD's global synchronizer for CWMD
    planning efforts, USSTRATCOM supports this strategy by leveraging the
    expertise resident in our Center for Countering Weapons of Mass
    Destruction (SCC-WMD), the Standing Joint Force Headquarters for
    Elimination (SJFHQ-E), and our partners at the Defense Threat Reduction
    Agency (DTRA)--all located at Ft. Belvoir, Virginia. Together, our
    organizations conduct real-world and exercise CWMD activities with the
    other combatant commands to identify, prioritize, and mitigate WMD
    risks posed by proliferation of WMD technology and expertise to nation
    states and non-state actors.
        USSTRATCOM contributed to the international effort to eliminate
    Syria's declared chemical weapons program in support of United States
    European and Central Commands. Additionally, SCC-WMD, SJFHQ-E, and DTRA
    personnel supported United States Africa Command's response to the 2014
    Ebola outbreak in West Africa through the establishment of Regional
    Contingency Team - Ebola. The work conducted by this team--and the
    lessons learned along the way--will enable more effective responses to
    future natural or man-made biological threats.
        To execute the DOD Strategy for CWMD, the CWMD community has
    identified a need for a comprehensive situational awareness capability
    that incorporates collaborative tools, continuously assesses the WMD
    threat, and provides a shared holistic awareness of the WMD
    environment. This capability would provide an enhanced awareness of
    emergent catastrophic-scale WMD threats that require continued
    collaboration across the interagency and partner nations to enable a
    proactive rather than reactive approach. We work closely with DTRA to
    develop this capability with input from our partners--such as the
    Intelligence Community and the Departments of State, Energy, Homeland
    Security and Justice--which will help us to clearly define operational
    information needs. Finally, there is an urgent need to update aging
    agent defeat weapons and develop modeling and simulation capabilities
    to assess collateral damage during WMD weapon attacks.
                                   our people
        People remain our most precious resource and deserve our
    unequivocal commitment to their well-being. My travels throughout the
    past year visiting nuclear task forces, component commands, and
    USCYBERCOM confirmed my belief that we have an outstanding team in
    place across all of our mission areas. I am proud to serve alongside
    the men and women of USSTRATCOM and have the utmost respect for their
    professionalism, dedication to our missions, and sustained operational
    excellence.
        We must continue to recruit and retain those who support the
    missions associated with strategic deterrence, from operators in the
    field to scientists in laboratories conducting surveillance and life
    extension work. We must directly support this unique workforce, but
    also ensure we support initiatives to keep them aware of our Nation's
    support for their important missions for the foreseeable future.
        Whether they are underway on an SSBN, standing alert in a Launch
    Control Center, or supporting a mission from cyberspace to outer space,
    these great Americans will do all they can for their Nation, but are
    rightly concerned about their futures given continuing manpower
    reductions planned over the next several years. We are seeking the most
    efficient ways to achieve the Department's goals and are on track to do
    so, but cannot accommodate further cuts without a commensurate loss of
    organizational agility and responsiveness.
                                   conclusion
        Achieving strategic deterrence in the 21st century requires an
    investment in strategic capabilities and a renewed, multi-generational
    commitment of intellectual capital. In today's uncertain times, I am
    honored to lead such a focused, innovative and professional group
    dedicated to delivering critical warfighting capabilities to the
    Nation. Your support, together with the hard work of the exceptional
    men and women of United States Strategic Command, will ensure that we
    remain ready, agile and effective in deterring strategic attack,
    assuring our Allies and partners, and addressing current and future
    threats.

        Chairman McCain. Thank you.
        General Selva, welcome.

       STATEMENT OF GENERAL PAUL J. SELVA, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
                         TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

        General Selva. Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, distinguished
    members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity and the
    honor to represent the men and women of the U.S. Transportation
    Command to this committee here today.
        I'm proud to be able to testify with two fellow commanders
    and friends as we go through this hearing.
        I have traveled the world in the last 6 months, and watched
    the men and women of the U.S. Transportation Command provide
    the distribution, deployment, and sustainment solutions for our
    combatant commanders. They do so without fanfare and often in
    stressful conditions, supporting our soldiers, sailors, airmen,
    marines, civilian employees, and their families at home and
    abroad.
        While U.S. Transportation Command is ready today to face
    this challenge, we must pay attention to the health of the
    global distribution enterprise of tomorrow. We rely on our
    service component commands along with contracted commercial
    augmentation to provide the distribution services that make us
    successful. The readiness of our components and commercial
    providers is key to our success in this global mission.
    Maintaining the necessary commercial and organic readiness is
    U.S. TRANSCOM's most significant challenge.
        As the Department's demand for commercial sealift and
    airlift decreases, U.S. TRANSCOM must continue to ensure the
    required surge and force sustainment capabilities are available
    when needed. Finding the right balance of organic and
    commercial utilization will require us to carefully coordinate
    across the entire enterprise with all of our partners using all
    of the available authorities that exist in current law and
    executive policy.
        To secure our sealift surge capacity, we continue to work
    with the Department of Transportation's Maritime Administration
    to ensure the health of the Maritime Security Program, which
    brings us 60 militarily useful ships to meet combatant
    commander requirements, and the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift
    Agreement, which gains us access to over $300 billion of
    commercially owned sealift capacity and inland transportation
    infrastructure. We must ensure that we are able to support the
    full spectrum of defense needs with these capabilities. Both
    programs provide critical sealift capacity and trained merchant
    mariners during national security contingencies or humanitarian
    relief and disaster assistance responses. I appreciate this
    Congress's attention to full funding for the Maritime Security
    Program, which reaffirms our commitment to industry and is
    mitigating future risk to our strategic commercial sealift
    capacity.
        Of significant concern to me is the need to recapitalize
    1.6 million square feet of our organic roll-on/roll-off
    military capability. We're working closely with the U.S. Navy
    to develop a plan that meets combatant commander requirements
    and is sensitive to the capability that will be required during
    future service force developments. This plan will look beyond
    the near-term capability requirements and will be informed by
    the Defense Department's ongoing sealift study and the Maritime
    Administration's national maritime strategy.
        I'm also concerned about the long-term health of our
    merchant mariners. This group of civilian merchant mariners,
    who crew our ships, both military and commercial, during
    crisis. These patriotic Americans have crewed America's
    merchant marine vessels for the entire history of this Nation.
        We're also in the process of implementing several of the
    Civilian Reserve Air Fleet program changes that are a result of
    a recently concluded Civil Reserve Air Fleet study. When
    implemented, these changes will ensure the continuation of a
    viable and ready Civil Reserve Air Fleet that is capable of
    answering any future requirements and provide best value to the
    U.S. Government. We have worked closely with our commercial
    partners and responded to many of their concerns as we navigate
    these changes.
        The transportation and distribution enterprise remains
    ready today to respond to any contingency or to sustain our
    forces in the field for any length of time. But, to ensure that
    this command is ready to respond anytime with our commercial
    carriers' assistance, I have directed that all contract
    acquisitions for transportation now consider readiness-related
    criteria, including the relationship of performance and cost to
    enterprisewide readiness, as a factor in any decision to let a
    contract. We will continue to work across the Defense
    Department to ensure that TRANSCOM has the necessary organic
    and commercial surge capabilities to respond when called upon.
        Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, and all members of this
    committee, thank you for the continued support that you have
    given to U.S. Transportation Command and all of the men and
    women that provide for the deployment, distribution, and
    sustainment of our Services abroad.
        I would ask that my written statement be submitted for the
    record.
        I look forward to your questions.
        Chairman McCain. Without objection.
        [The prepared statement of General Selva follows:]

               Prepared Statement by General Paul J. Selva, USAF
           introducing the united states transportation command 2015
        No other nation can match the ability of the United States of
    America to deploy and sustain forces on a global scale. The United
    States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) leads a Total Force team of
    Active Duty, Guard, Reserve, civilians, and commercial transportation
    providers who operate a world-class Joint Deployment and Distribution
    Enterprise. Our Service component commands, the Army's Military Surface
    Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), the Navy's Military Sealift
    Command (MSC), the Air Force's Air Mobility Command (AMC); our
    functional component command, the Joint Transportation Reserve Unit
    (JTRU); and our subordinate command, the Joint Enabling Capabilities
    Command (JECC), in conjunction with the transportation industry,
    provide unparalleled logistics support and enabling capabilities to our
    forces, their families, and coalition partners around the world.
        Deploying our Nation's military forces and ensuring they receive
    sustainment at the times, places, and in the quantities they need to
    succeed is USTRANSCOM's fundamental role in securing our Nation. Our
    continued success in this role depends on preserving an agile and
    resilient global distribution network--a complex array of capabilities,
    infrastructure, access, partnerships, and command and control
    mechanisms. This complex network underpins our Nation's response to
    emerging crises, and undergirds our warfighters' successes.
        USTRANSCOM's transportation operations are funded by the
    Transportation Working Capital Fund (TWCF) which enables us to provide
    timely transportation services to our supported commanders. We are, in
    turn, reimbursed for the transportation we provide in support of their
    requirements. We rely on our Service component commands--AMC, SDDC, and
    MSC--along with contracted commercial augmentation, to provide these
    vital transportation services. The components' and commercial
    providers' capacity and readiness levels are key to the success of our
    global mission and their ability to respond to USTRANSCOM taskings.
                             strategic environment
        With the potential return to sequestration-level funding returning
    in fiscal year (FY) 2016, I remain concerned the combined effect of
    declining government transportation demand, reduced financial
    resources, and other economic and regulatory restrictions may drive
    readiness to unacceptable levels. Reductions in Service components'
    readiness funding, a likely outcome of sequestration, will negatively
    affect USTRANSCOM's ability to accomplish our mission. We will continue
    to work across the Department of Defense (DOD) to ensure USTRANSCOM has
    the necessary capabilities and capacity required to respond when called
    upon. USTRANSCOM has always delivered when needed, and we will continue
    to do so provided our component commands receive the resources they
    need to execute our global mission.
        The transportation resources and cyber infrastructure that enable
    strategic mobility are key components of the United States' asymmetric
    logistics advantage in both peace and war. In the future, we expect
    great reliance on USTRANSCOM's ability to rapidly deploy continental
    U.S. (CONUS)-based forces to operate in complex, noncontiguous
    locations with simultaneous operations in multiple theaters. Our Forces
    will have less access to secure, U.S.-controlled, overseas
    installations, while operating in a contested communications and cyber
    environment. Adversaries and competitor nations continue to develop
    cyber capabilities to exploit and create harmful effects within our
    areas of operation. For example, advanced persistent threats have the
    potential to degrade command and control, possibly preventing troops
    and materials from arriving on time, ready to support the geographic
    combatant commander.
        For our commercial providers, workload demand continues to decline
    as retrograde operations from Afghanistan drawdown to fiscal year 2016
    levels. The ocean liner sector, for example, has experienced a 50
    percent reduction from fiscal year 2011 workload, including a 13
    percent reduction from last year alone. As a result of this declining
    workload, the U.S. flag shipping fleet has seen a 20 percent workload
    reduction since January 2012. In 2013, 11 international trading vessels
    within the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) program either
    reflagged to foreign flag ships or were scrapped without replacement
    due, in large part, to the reduction in demand. This realignment is
    forcing our commercial sealift providers to make adjustments to the
    services they provide by either removing liner capacity or expanding
    alliances with other carriers to take advantage of larger vessels. The
    net effect of these adjustments may likely require longer response
    times to meet DOD requirements.
        The Ready Reserve Force (RRF), the key first response strategic
    sealift component for moving U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps units to
    the fight, must also remain ready to meet the needs of geographic
    combatant commands (GCCs). As 1.6 million square feet of RRF roll-on/
    roll-off capacity ages out of service in the next 10 years, an
    executable recapitalization plan must be in place to ensure long-term
    viability of surge sealift. We are working closely with the U.S. Navy
    to develop a plan which meets the combatant command requirements and is
    compatible with future Service force development and budget
    constraints.
        Commercial airlift is also experiencing the effects of declining
    workload. As our forces draw down from Afghanistan, business available
    to commercial carriers has declined rapidly, threatening industry's
    ability to support surge deployments should the need arise.
    Implementing the recently concluded Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF)
    study recommendations will be a starting point for ensuring commercial
    airlift readiness, but will require continued vigilance as demand for
    DOD cargo continues to decline.
        Freedom of access to relevant areas of sea, air, space, and
    cyberspace is crucial to the world's economy and our Nation's ability
    to project and sustain global power and influence. USTRANSCOM is
    working with U.S. Department of State (DOS) and geographic combatant
    commanders through the En Route Infrastructure Master Plan (ERIMP) and
    the Campaign Plan for Global Distribution to assure access to ports,
    roads, and rail in key allied, friendly, and cooperating nations.
    USTRANSCOM collaborates with government, industry, and academia to
    develop innovative capabilities to enhance global access by addressing
    anti access and area denial challenges. We also obtain access through
    networks and relationships in foreign countries established by
    commercial transportation providers. USTRANSCOM must continue to
    leverage existing international infrastructure through close
    coordination with DOS, the Services, GCCs, and commercial
    transportation providers in order to ensure unimpeded transportation
    and distribution networks for the coming years.
                     readiness--key to an uncertain future
    Strategic Imperative
        The Unified Command Plan (UCP) designates USTRANSCOM as the DOD
    single manager for end-to-end transportation and for all aspects of
    inter- and intra-theater patient movement. As such, USTRANSCOM is
    responsible for the command and control of DOD common-user and
    commercial air, land, and sea transportation; terminal management; and
    aerial refueling to support the global deployment, employment,
    sustainment, and redeployment of U.S. Forces.
        USTRANSCOM is also responsible for synchronizing distribution
    planning across combatant commands, Services and DOD agencies. As the
    Global Distribution Synchronizer, we crafted the first Campaign Plan
    for Global Distribution. This seminal effort is the first step in
    facilitating logistics planning synchronization across all geographic
    and functional combatant command boundaries, as well as identifying and
    prioritizing necessary distribution network enhancements. In the first
    year of execution, we examined the challenges posed by rebalancing and
    rebasing forces as the DOD transitions to a more CONUS-based focus,
    increased area access and area denial challenges, shifts in strategic
    focus, and budget reductions affecting the distribution enterprise's
    readiness for future operations. This year, we will conduct more in-
    depth reviews of geographic combatant commanders' theater distribution
    plans, incorporating strategic guidance from DOD's Guidance for
    Employment of the Force and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.
        While USTRANSCOM is ready to support operations today, we must pay
    attention to the health of the global distribution enterprise of
    tomorrow. In the years ahead, smaller and increasingly CONUS-based
    forces will rely even more on the Defense Transportation System (DTS)
    to deploy and sustain themselves in multiple theaters, sometimes
    simultaneously. USTRANSCOM's number one priority is maintaining the
    readiness of the global distribution enterprise to project combat power
    or extend America's helping hand, anywhere, anytime, everyday.
    Challenges to Enterprise Readiness
        Maintaining our organic air mobility, sealift, and surface assets,
    in tandem with our commercial transportation providers, ensures our
    ability to be ready in times of need. Over the last year, USTRANSCOM
    has developed and refined processes with our component commands to
    track and address their specific organic readiness needs. As we gain
    more fidelity with these new processes, we expect to more effectively
    solve some of our critical organic readiness needs through appropriate
    cargo allocation.
    Airlift
        The fiscal year 2016 President's Budget includes an end-state fleet
    of 308 C-130s and 479 tankers to meet air mobility operational
    requirements. The C-5 and C-17 fleets are undergoing modernization
    efforts to replace aging components, as well as adding avionics to meet
    mandated minimum aircraft separation capability to ensure aircraft
    ability to meet worldwide commitments. This airlift force structure
    meets the strategic airlift requirement for a single, large-scale
    operation, while maintaining the flexibility and adaptability to
    support smaller Joint Force requirements in another region. Likewise,
    AMC's aerial refueling fleet can support a single, large-scale
    operation with a limited capability to support the Joint Force in
    another region.
        Ongoing operations in Afghanistan, the operational surge in support
    of the military intervention against the Islamic State of Iraq and
    Syria (ISIS), and the mission to contain Ebola in West Africa have
    placed increased demands on the Mobility Air Forces. Post-surge, the
    air and ground crews will need time to regain proficiency in specific
    skill sets that are not being utilized during these contingency
    operations. Resetting these skills will restore units to the level of
    capability commensurate with future combat mission requirements.
        Likewise, the commercial airlift providers who move DOD cargo and
    personnel, particularly those who participate in the CRAF, must be
    ready to perform DOD's unique missions whenever the need arises.
    Commercial airlift readiness is measured in terms of both fleet
    subscription capacity and the timely availability of day-to-day
    capacity in a non-activated environment. While we are confident the
    National Airlift Policy is adequate to allow DOD to manage the support
    our commercial carriers will provide us over the coming years,
    implementation of that policy will continue to be advised by the CRAF
    study.
        To understand and improve CRAF's ability to support DOD, USTRANSCOM
    and AMC, aided by outside subject matter experts and CRAF participant
    interviews, completed a thorough CRAF study and are in the process of
    implementing several CRAF program changes as a result. When implemented
    within fiscal year 2016 Airlift Services in Support of the CRAF
    Contract, the program changes will ensure continuation of a viable and
    ready CRAF program that is capable of answering any future
    requirements, and provide best value and service to the U.S.
    Government.
    Sealift
        We rely on the organic sealift fleet provided by MSC and the RRF
    managed by the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Maritime
    Administration (MARAD). These government-owned vessels, along with
    support from the U.S. flag commercial fleet, are vital in times of
    national emergency.
        USTRANSCOM's relationship with the commercial sealift industry is
    formalized through agreements such as VISA, the Maritime Security
    Program (MSP), and the Voluntary Tanker Agreement (VTA). MSP provides a
    fleet of commercially viable, military-useful vessels to meet national
    defense and other security requirements, while maintaining a U.S.
    presence in international commercial shipping. Carriers enrolled in MSP
    receive a stipend to offset operating costs associated with maintaining
    U.S. flag registry and are required to enroll their U.S. flag capacity
    in one of the established emergency preparedness programs, VISA or VTA.
    However, reductions below full program funding, like we experienced
    with fiscal year 2013 sequestration, threaten assured access to MSP
    vessels and supporting infrastructure while reducing overall VISA
    capacity. Full program funding reaffirms our commitment to industry and
    mitigates future risk to our strategic commercial capacity.
        Existing maritime laws also contribute to ensuring a responsive
    U.S. mariner fleet is ready to meet any DOD contingency requirement.
    For example, the Jones Act contributes to a robust domestic maritime
    industry that helps to maintain the U.S. industrial shipyard base and
    infrastructure to build, repair, and overhaul U.S. vessels. The Jones
    Act requirement for U.S.-crewed and built vessels provides additional
    capacity and trained U.S. merchant mariners that can crew RRF vessels
    in times of war or national emergency.
        Although the domestic maritime industry is thriving, the U.S. flag
    international fleet continues to decline. The reduction in government-
    impelled cargoes due to the drawdown in Afghanistan and reductions in
    food aid from the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act
    policy changes, are driving vessel owners to reflag to non-U.S. flag
    out of economic necessity. This reflagging and subsequent reduction of
    the U.S. flag international fleet has the unintended consequence of
    reducing the U.S. merchant mariner labor base. A strong U.S. mariner
    base is critical to crewing not only the merchant fleet in peacetime
    but our DOD surge capacity in wartime. With the recent vessel
    reductions, the mariner base is at the point where future reductions in
    U.S. flag capacity puts our ability to fully activate, deploy, and
    sustain forces at increased risk.
        In order for the organic fleet to meet all National Defense needs,
    these vessels and their crews must be maintained at a high degree of
    reliability and readiness. Mariners must be trained and available to
    crew ships in the RRF to meet contingency timelines. We periodically
    test the readiness of the organic fleet through TURBO ACTIVATION
    exercises, a Joint Staff program to help ensure our organic fleet's
    capability. Due to the importance of this readiness measure, we will
    monitor TURBO ACTIVATION funding closely as we potentially approach
    sequestration-level funding in fiscal year 2016.
    Surface
        The U.S. highway and railway systems provide the means to transport
    military equipment from deploying unit installations to designated
    seaports of embarkation during a major contingency deployment. But a
    significant portion of the commercial chain tiedown flatcar fleet, the
    primary capability for transporting Army unit equipment, is nearing the
    end of it's service life. To mitigate this impending shortfall, we are
    collaborating with industry to use commercially-available flatcars not
    previously considered as part of our solution. With the use of chain
    tiedowns on this other family of commercial flatcars, we will
    temporarily maintain railcar capacity as we work with the Army to
    establish a railcar procurement program to address this surface
    readiness concern.
        Readiness within the ammunition transport industry also remains a
    concern. Arms, Ammunition and Explosivies (AA&E) transport, a highly
    specialized and limited capacity, is experiencing contracted capacity
    in both drivers and vehicles, in part due to regulaltory restrictions
    affecting the industry. Owner/operators, many from small companies, are
    increasingly reluctant to accept full liability due to financial risks
    involved, and are mitigating that risk through increased rates to DOD.
    In addition to the financial pressure, the lack of qualified drivers is
    also a factor in reduced trucking capacity. Many experienced owner/
    operators are beginning to retire due to age and increased hours of
    service rule changes, carrier safety administration requirements, and
    increased environmental costs. At the same time, younger generations
    are choosing this career in fewer numbers, further decreasing available
    capacity in the trucking industry. We continue to work with the
    trucking industry to find acceptable solutions, one of which is
    streamlining certification requirements for military veterans who wish
    to enter the industry, an effort showing great promise in DOD and with
    the industry.
    Preparing for the Future
        While USTRANSCOM remains capable today to respond to any
    contingency or geographic combatant command requirement for movement of
    forces, significant recapitalization and modernization are necessary to
    meet future expected demand for transportation services. We work
    closely with each of the Services to ensure they understand our
    validated requirements and are incorporating the necessary
    recapitalization and modernization efforts into their programs.
        To address future sealift concerns, USTRANSCOM is working closely
    with the U.S. Navy to identify the most effective means to recapitalize
    the RRF. We are also partnering with the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense-Transportation Policy to produce a study on programs, policies,
    and incentives that would ensure DOD has continued future access to
    sufficient U.S. flag vessels and U.S. mariners. The study will assess
    the continued viability of the industry's ability to support DOD
    requirements with U.S. flag capacity and U.S. merchant mariners, along
    with assessing the U.S. Government costs of current DOD and civilian
    programs to support commercial sealift, evaluate cost-effective
    alternatives to meet sealift requirements, and ascertain if major
    policy, program, and acquisition changes are required to maintain and
    protect readiness. Where possible, study findings will be shared with
    MARAD to assist them in developing the National Maritime Strategy. The
    final report is due in May of this year.
        The most important airlift recapitalization effort, the KC-46A
    program, which will replace the aging KC-135 air refueling tanker
    aircraft, is on-track and has met every contractual requirement to
    date. With the first flight anticipated this spring, the KC-46A will
    provide aerial refueling support to the Air Force, Navy, and Marine
    Corps, as well as our allies' and coalition partner aircraft. It will
    also provide increased aircraft availability, more adaptable
    technology, more flexible employment options, and greater overall
    capability than current tanker aircraft. The KC-46A remains the most
    essential element of future air mobility readiness for the DOD.
        USTRANSCOM relies on a complex interdependent enterprise of both
    DOD and commercially-owned domestic and foreign critical
    infrastructure. DOD continues to evolve towards a comprehensive mission
    assurance construct designed to synchronize all mission assurance
    programs. Recognizing that cyber infrastructure underpins much of our
    physical infrastructure, our Defense Critical Infrastructure Program
    and Joint Cyber Center (JCC) are working in tandem to assess threats
    and develop realistic mitigation strategies in conjunction with other
    interagency cyber organizations. Additionally, our JCC is leading the
    Command's efforts to ensure USTRANSCOM meets the requirement and intent
    of the fiscal year 2015 National Defense Authorizations Act requiring
    the reporting on cyber incidents with respect to networks and
    information systems of operationally critical contractors.
        USTRANSCOM also has an enduring interest in the civil sector
    infrastructure supporting the surface movement of military forces. Our
    programs for national defense collaborate with civil sector
    counterparts to ensure the U.S. physical infrastructure is capable of
    addressing military surface mobility needs. Since 2012, USTRANSCOM has
    completed several congressionally-mandated studies, including: ``Update
    to Port Look 2008: Strategic Seaports.'' This report assessed the road
    and rail infrastructure, including the strategic highway network routes
    and the Strategic Rail Corridor Network (STRACNET), in the vicinity of
    strategic seaports. This analysis determined the highway and railroad
    infrastructure were capable of supporting military deployments to the
    ports. Our update of the STRACNET also ensures that it provides
    sufficient service to our most important DOD installations. We also
    assessed the structural integrity of the infrastructure outlined in the
    port planning orders and infrastructure projects beneficial to the DOD,
    and identified potential funding avenues for repairs. USTRANSCOM
    reinvigorated its commitment to working with the other members of the
    National Port Readiness Network on such commercial seaport-related
    issues by signing a new memorandum of understanding effective, 27
    August 2014. This agreement ensures the readiness of commercial seaport
    infrastructure to support DOD deployment requirements.
        U.S. Army Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point (MOTSU), in
    Southport, North Carolina, is essential to USTRANSCOM's support of
    operational plans in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Most of the
    required, significant infrastructure improvements at MOTSU have been
    completed in recent years. These improvements enhanced MOTSU's ability
    to conduct missions and allowed the terminal to meet documented
    throughput requirements. Infrastructure improvement projects at U.S.
    Army Military Ocean Terminal Concord (MOTCO), in Concord, California,
    are essential to USTRANSCOM's support of U.S. Pacific Command's
    operational plans and the DOD's military capability in the Pacific
    Theater for ammunition movements. DOD's current efforts are centered on
    preserving the operability of MOTCO's primary pier until it can be
    recapitalized with a rebuilt, replacement pier. Together with the Army,
    we are compiling a comprehensive list of other infrastructure-related
    requirements to upgrade MOTCO to a modern ammunition port, fully
    capable of safe and efficient operations, and ultimately allowing
    uninterrupted delivery of ammunition to the Pacific Theater.
        Even in a period of fiscal uncertainty, investing in the readiness
    of our joint force must remain a top priority. The USTRANSCOM Joint
    Training Program, funded by the Combatant Commanders Exercise
    Engagement and Training Transformation (CE2T2) Program, ensures
    readiness of joint forces to accomplish assigned missions. CE2T2
    continues as a vital readiness enabler that directly supports the
    defense strategy of maintaining the ability to deploy and employ large-
    scale military forces over transoceanic distances. DOD's largely CONUS-
    based force of the future will become increasingly reliant upon joint
    exercises to maintain readiness and achieve engagement objectives.
    Commanders and Service Chiefs will be equally reliant upon USTRANSCOM
    to deploy these forces to participate in combatant command exercises.
    CE2T2 is an instrument for maintaining strategic agility and dynamic
    presence and allows USTRANSCOM to leverage nearly 140 exercises
    annually, including our own 18 joint exercises, to meet training
    requirements that directly contribute to meeting assigned missions.
        In addition to providing strategic lift during CE2T2 events,
    USTRANSCOM exercises its command-and-control nodes and planning teams,
    deploys strategic mobility personnel and assets, and provides in-
    transit visibility of personnel, cargo, and patient movement on a
    global scale. These exercises have immense strategic value including:
    maintaining global agility--freedom of action and uninhibited access to
    global mobility infrastructure; fostering regional, coalition,
    interagency, and industry partnerships; using our organic and
    commercial partner strategic lift assets to address readiness
    requirements; maintaining expeditionary capabilities of the global
    response force; and maintaining strategic airlift and sealift capacity
    and readiness.
        Joint forces participate in the full spectrum of operations ranging
    from humanitarian assistance missions to major combat operations. To
    properly support these forces, USTRANSCOM developed Joint Task Force--
    Port Opening (JTF-PO), a capability specifically designed to rapidly
    open and establish initial theater airport and seaport operations. The
    requirement demands a joint force capability comprised of air, surface,
    and/or naval elements to support rapid port opening and establish
    initial distribution throughput. This operational construct builds upon
    the capability and readiness of expeditionary port opening, emphasizing
    JTF-PO's significance to expeditionary operations and its support to
    the Geographic Combatant Commander/Joint Force Commander. Most recently
    USTRANSCOM deployed JTF-PO elements to Monrovia, Liberia, and Dakar,
    Senegal, in support of U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) and Operation
    UNITED ASSISTANCE. JTF-PO provided port assessments, port opening,
    planning, and communications for the Joint Force Commander and
    USAFRICOM, and executed over 348 strategic air movements involving the
    throughput of approximately 3,250 passengers and 7,600 short tons of
    military equipment, vital medical equipment, and humanitarian aid
    supplies.
    Readiness of USTRANSCOM Enabling Capabilities
        As an alert-postured, global response force, the Joint Enabling
    Capabilities Command (JECC) continually trains to build the experience
    necessary to succeed in complex and emerging operational environments.
    By combining JECC-specific training requirements and regularly
    participating in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's joint
    training and mission rehearsal exercises, we increase the level of
    professional knowledge and global awareness JECC deployers deliver to
    the joint force commander. The JECC's unique blending of Active and
    Reserve components requires some measure of overhead to ensure access
    to Guard and Reserve personnel for immediate deployments. The JECC's
    training program, assured access to Reserve component personnel, and
    flexibility to deploy the most cost-effective and operationally
    responsive workforce mix ensures the command produces well-rounded,
    professional, and expeditionary joint command-and-control specialists
    for the DOD.
        The JECC maintains operational readiness to provide mission-
    tailored, joint capability packages for planning and secure
    communications to combatant commanders to facilitate rapid
    establishment of Joint Force Headquarters, enable Global Response Force
    execution, and bridge operational requirements around the globe. In
    addition to recently facilitating operations in Libya, Mali, Senegal,
    and Liberia, the JECC assisted in rebalancing the Joint Force
    Headquarters in Afghanistan, supporting U.S. Central Command's efforts
    against ISIS and the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons, while
    supporting multiple theater security cooperation missions.
        In an increasingly dynamic operating environment with diminishing
    resources, the JECC will continue to enhance the readiness of the Joint
    Force with globally available, responsive, adaptive capabilities to
    mitigate strategic surprise, shape options, set the conditions for
    successful contingency operations, and facilitate strategic and
    operational transitions. Future demand for JECC capabilities is
    expected to remain high.
    Cyber and Information Technology (IT) Readiness
        A continuing concern for the future is our ability to operate
    effectively with our commercial providers in the face of increasing
    cyber threats. As identified in the recently released Senate Armed
    Service Committee report, ``Cyber Intrusions Affecting U.S.
    Transportation Command Contractors,'' the Nation's adversaries actively
    target and exploit the computer networks of commercial logistic
    suppliers. As a result, interagency cooperation is critically important
    to mission assurance. Building trust with these non-DOD partners is a
    focus of our cyber readiness efforts. The National Cyber Investigative
    Joint Task Force and regional Federal Bureau of Investigation offices
    are increasing awareness and engagement, and providing additional
    options to counter threats, and USTRANSCOM will continue to build
    relationships to ensure national partnering and unity of effort.
        USTRANSCOM is in the process of developing an information-centric
    approach using service-oriented architecture (SOA) principles. This
    transformation will improve our ability to make data-driven decisions
    by improving the ability to share and reuse information and services.
    This will be accomplished by focusing on five areas: supporting mode-
    neutral business, complying with Joint Information Environment (JIE)
    architecture and implementation guidance, standardizing and stabilizing
    infrastructure and platform services to support the portfolio, enabling
    SOA, and evolving the common computing environment.
        USTRANSCOM must transition to the JIE in order to comply with the
    Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiative as we seek to adopt
    processes for mode-neutral requirements evaluation and multimodal
    transportation execution. The intent is to transition the DOD's IT
    environment from multiple nonstandard system-centric architectures to a
    standardized information-centric architecture.
        USTRANSCOM's focus on enabling SOA establishes intrinsic
    interoperability between IT-enabled services to reduce the need for
    complex and costly integration. This will allow the design of
    applications and services to be compatible and interoperable. We are
    working toward a federated architecture that will unify and standardize
    disparate environments while allowing the environments to be
    independently governed. As our SOA matures, there will be an increase
    of business and technology alignment that will allow IT to mirror and
    evolve with the business, with an expected reduction of the time and
    effort required to fulfill new or changed business requirements.
        Planning, integration, and direction of cyber operations in support
    of USTRANSCOM global operations is conducted by the Command's Joint
    Cyber Center (JCC). The JCC focus is on cyberspace operations and
    cyberspace key terrain that supports critical transportation operations
    and enabling capabilities. The JCC will continue to serve as the
    command's focal point for all cyberspace operational concerns in the
    future.
                          strengthening the enterprise
    Enhancements to Supply Chain Management
        Assured access to global en route infrastructure is essential to
    our Nation's ability to project power and influence worldwide.
    USTRANSCOM uses the Enroute Infrastructure Master Plan (ERIMP) to
    articulate its strategic access and infrastructure requirements at key
    overseas locations, providing a 5 to 15 year roadmap for USTRANSCOM
    mobility operations. The ERIMP is synchronized with the geographic and
    functional combatant command theater posture plans for an integrated
    assessment of all posture elements, specifically focusing on current
    access, transportation infrastructure capabilities, and the enabling
    support required to meet the distribution mission. USTRANSCOM's ERIMP
    is shared with our closest allies to enable coalition efforts and
    strengthen partnership capacity. As DOD rebalances to a more CONUS-
    based posture, access and infrastructure requirements outlined within
    ERIMP 2015 are vital to preserving long-term readiness around the
    globe.
        In a broad-based effort to ensure access for the future, we
    continue to support the Secretary of Defense-directed European
    Infrastructure Consolidation (EIC) and the President's European
    Reassurance Initiative (ERI). We are actively participating in each of
    these efforts to ensure our mission requirements are both preserved
    while divesting excess infrastructure, and enhanced by making focused
    investments of benefit to the U.S. and our NATO allies. USTRANSCOM is
    prepared to mitigate the global mobility risks associated with the
    proposed basing actions, but remain concerned about any additional
    reduction in U.S.-controlled mobility infrastructure in the European
    theater. USTRANSCOM fully supports development of fuel and pavement
    infrastructure at Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base, Romania, as examples of
    investments that will provide deterrence effects in the short term, as
    well as long-term benefits to strategic airlift.
        The Distribution Process Owner (DPO) Strategic Opportunities (DSO)
    effort identifies opportunities to reduce costs in the DOD supply chain
    while simultaneously improving service levels to the warfighter.
    Working closely with our strategic partners such as the Defense
    Logistics Agency (DLA) and the General Services Administration (GSA)
    and collaborating with the warfighting community, the DSO team pursues
    process improvements, surface and air optimization, supply alignment,
    and network optimization. Enhanced collaboration and the aligning of
    business processes between DLA and USTRANSCOM have been significant
    sources of cost avoidance through improved shipping container and
    aircraft utilization. The DSO team achieved $201 million of cost
    avoidance in fiscal year 2014 with $1.4 billion in cumulative cost
    avoidance to date, by implementing practices commonly used by
    commercial supply chains today.
    Meeting the Mission Through Business Transformation
        As the single manager of DOD's multi-billion dollar transportation
    and distribution enterprise, USTRANSCOM must continually seek ways to
    improve efficiency and reduce costs. An innovative example of this
    effort is USTRANSCOM's award of the Total Delivery Services (TDS)
    contract, effectively implementing a strategic sourcing initiative to
    combine Worldwide Express and Domestic Express under one umbrella
    contract. The TDS program provides international and domestic
    commercial small package air delivery services for the U.S. Government,
    upholding USTRANSCOM's commitment to be the provider of choice by
    creating a one-stop shop to satisfy customers' express air delivery
    requirements. The TDS program provides participating CRAF carriers
    operational efficiency by combining networks, and it postures
    USTRANSCOM to realize manpower savings through streamlined procurement
    and administration of similar services. By including an on-ramp for
    surface delivery requirements, TDS is poised to expand to meet all
    customer demands for small package delivery.
        We are also reviewing our TWCF rate-setting process and its impact
    on operational results. We developed a cost and readiness driven
    workload allocation process over the last year and identified ways to
    standardize operations to deliver cost conscious courses of action to
    our supported combatant commanders. This is just one of many
    initiatives under way to ensure rates are cost-based, simplified,
    standardized, and streamlined. Our goal is to identify areas of
    improvement in systems and processes for the upcoming budget cycles.
    Decreasing DTS workload, coupled with reduced financial resources, is
    driving our intentions to provide TWCF billing rates that attract
    additional customers who are influenced by price-based transportation
    decisions.
        The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) states, ``Sustaining
    superior power projection forces--enabled by mobility capabilities
    including airlift, aerial refueling, surface lift, sealift, and
    prepositioning--will remain a top priority for force planning and
    development, even in an austere fiscal environment.'' USTRANSCOM's
    Deployment and Distribution Cost Based Decision Support (D2 CBDS)
    program fulfills the QDR mandate of projecting power in an austere
    fiscal environment while maintaining mission effectiveness by drawing
    on the collective expertise of our transportation component commands,
    Service customers, DLA, and USTRANSCOM subject matter experts. The D2
    CBDS infuses cost and revenue consciousness into our operational
    culture, providing cost-informed decision-making capabilities, and
    supporting cost-metric development to drive desired behaviors. Numerous
    cost avoidance initiatives, such as Multimodal, Mobility Air Forces
    Cost Avoidance Tankering, Arctic Overflight, Contingency Efficiency
    Effort, and Theater Express, illustrate instances where this capability
    directly challenged the status quo to create tangible results in the
    form of millions of dollars in costs avoided last year.
        Optimization and effeciencies are not a quid pro quo for security.
    We continue to work with our commercial providers to evaluate foreign
    subcontractors and ensure illicit entities do not benefit from, or are
    able to exploit, USTRANSCOM contracts. In collaboration with other
    government agencies and supported combatant commanders, USTRANSCOM is
    seeking to bring about whole-of-government awareness and action against
    identified threats. These efforts strengthen our acquisition activities
    by better safeguarding funds, adding a layer of defense that protects
    the efficient and secure transit of goods and personnel, and ultimately
    enhances the overall security of the global supply chain.
    Interagency Coordination
        The transportation and distribution enterprise requires close
    coordination of all government agencies that move or facilitate
    movement of cargo and personnel within the enterprise. Our drive to
    improve efficiency and effectiveness, while operating within budget
    constraints, has resulted in a reduction of redundant efforts,
    particularly in our intelligence support.
        The Transportation-Logistics Intelligence Enterprise (TIE) was
    established 1 January 2014 and became fully operational on 1 September
    2014. The TIE combines the unique skills and expertise of USTRANSCOM's
    Joint Intelligence Operations Center for Transportation, the Defense
    Intelligence Agency's Mobility and Sustainability Division, and the
    National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to provide the best possible
    transportation and logistics intelligence support to the full range of
    transportation operations. The goal is to sustain mission-essential,
    transportation intelligence capabilities supporting overseas DOD
    operations in an era of declining resources; achieve resource
    efficiencies by eliminating redundant intelligence efforts; and improve
    mission effectiveness through enhanced management, alignment, and
    integration of these capabilities.
        Early TIE successes include generating resource efficiencies and
    improving customer support. The TIE saved approximately 10,000 working
    hours through database integration across multiple agencies. By
    combining allied and interagency efforts, the TIE increased the
    timeliness and quality of intelligence support to current operations
    and crisis contingencies in the Middle East and North/West Africa.
    These efforts improved U.S. strategic flexibility where troops are
    providing security against violent extremists and humanitarian
    assistance in Ebola-stricken countries.
        Over the next 18 months, the TIE will maintain a robust core of
    foundational intelligence on transportation-logistics infrastructure
    and en route geographic locations; pursue synchronization of
    multinational production efforts; create professional development
    programs for intermodal intelligence that include standardized training
    and joint-duty opportunities; and improve the customer experience for
    consumers of transportation-logistics intelligence.
        Allied, friendly, and cooperating nations enable access to the
    critical waypoints and transportation nodes necessary for USTRANSCOM
    operations. International agreements are pivotal to our continued
    success and further synchronize global distribution. Access hinges on
    mutually beneficial international relationships. The U.S. Government
    team, led by the DOS and in cooperation with other non-defense agencies
    that collaborate closely with USTRANSCOM, such as Customs and Border
    Protection and the Departments of Transportation and Commerce, works to
    incrementally improve international relations. On the DOD team, the
    functional and geographic combatant commands, the Services, and the
    other defense agencies and organizations work collaboratively to
    strengthen international partnerships through security cooperation. We
    leverage this collaboration and conduct multi-level engagements with
    international partners who provide access or potential access in order
    to build the relationships and trust that necessarily precede global
    transportation and distribution.
        USTRANSCOM's ability to meet global requirements relies in part on
    the air, sea, and surface transportation capabilities that reside in
    commercial industry. We maintain close, productive relationships with
    the commercial transportation providers in all sectors, as well as
    Federal agencies like the DOT that provide oversight and advocacy for
    those sectors. USTRANSCOM uses a variety of meetings and forums, some
    directly with other Federal agencies, and others through the National
    Defense Transportation Association, to collaborate and work issues that
    would affect our ability to respond to national needs.
        A key agency in bridging USTRANSCOM to civil agencies, the Defense
    Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), established guidance placing the
    Defense Transportation System (DTS) on equal footing with freight
    forwarders for moving foreign military sales (FMS) material by
    approving the concept of ``Best Value.'' This is a significant step
    forward in becoming a ``provider of choice'' for countries that are not
    required to move their cargo in the DTS. Additionally, we have asked
    DSCA to join our Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise
    Governance Forums which will allow DSCA and USTRANSCOM to collaborate
    in streamlining FMS distribution to our foreign partners.
        USTRANSCOM continues to support our troops around the world by
    moving cargo for the Army/Air Force Exchange Service and the Defense
    Commissary Agency. This cargo is normally ``direct'' booked, which
    leverages our overall negotiating power to provide a reduced cost to
    the shipper. This ultimately translates to lower operating costs for
    our nonappropriated funded activities. To expand our services, we are
    also currently working with the Naval Exchange Service to support their
    ``time sensitive'' requirements supporting Sailors and Marines
    overseas.
        USTRANSCOM has also worked hard to overcome recent challenges in
    other areas of our enterprise. For example, last May USTRANSCOM awarded
    a new company the contract to move privately-owned vehicles (POVs) for
    DOD and DOS employees globally. The underperformance of the contractor
    during the initial summer peak moving season resulted in thousands of
    POVs delivered late, and our Service members experiencing increased
    stress during permanent change of station moves.
        Significantly increased contract oversight, including identifying
    problematic shipping processes, insufficient data management, and
    unresponsive customer service practices, highlighted to the company
    where they failed to meet contractual requirements, and communicated to
    them our expectations for their improvement. While their performance
    has improved dramatically over the last several months, we remain
    vigilant as we approach the next peak moving season. Our evaluation of
    their summer surge plan indicates they should perform to an acceptable
    level.
        Unique challenges sometimes provide an avenue to success. The
    development of the Transport Isolation System (TIS) is one of those
    instances. At the beginning of the Ebola crisis in Western Africa, the
    U.S. Military was unable to safely evacuate people who had possibly
    been exposured to Ebola. Working with the Defense Threat Reduction
    Agency, USTRANSCOM identified a joint urgent operational need to
    develop a system to move patients with exposure to highly infectious or
    contagious diseases. This system would allow the DOD to safely move
    patients on DOD aircraft and simultaneously provide treatment while en
    route. Within 60 days of the identified requirement, the DOD awarded a
    contract for initial production of a TIS capable of moving multiple
    patients at one time, and achieved full certification and fielding of
    this life-saving system this past January. While the Ebola crisis
    served as a catalyst to initiate the acquisition process, the TIS will
    serve as an enduring capability to transport patients with contagious
    diseases anywhere in the world.
                                 final thoughts
        The transportation and distribution enterprise remains ready to
    respond to any contingency or to sustain forces for any length of
    time--a readiness underpinned by the dedicated professionals, military,
    civilian, and contractors who work tirelessly to serve the Nation's
    needs. However, that readiness is under stress and will require a
    concerted effort across the enterprise, including DOD, the interagency,
    and Congress to ensure our forces remain able to rapidly project
    national power and influence anywhere, anytime. To ensure the necessary
    authorities and policies are in place to manage the transportation and
    distribution enterprise, we are working within DOD and with our
    interagency partners to examine current laws, policies, and
    transportation and distribution capabilities which may be needed in the
    future to maintain our combat edge.
        Going forward, we are facing, but will overcome future challenges
    to providing rapid and responsive deployment, sustainment, and
    redeployment operations, as well as mission-tailored enabling
    capabilities to the Joint Force Commanders and the great Nation we
    serve and protect. We will continue to personify our motto . . .
    Together, we deliver!

        Chairman McCain. Thank you.
        Admiral Rogers.

     STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL MICHAEL S. ROGERS, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
    CYBER COMMAND/DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CHIEF, CENTRAL
                           SECURITY SERVICES

        Admiral Rogers. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and
    distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to appear
    before you today to discuss our military cyber posture. I'd
    like to thank you for convening this forum.
        I'd also ask that my full statement be made part of the
    record.
        I'm equally pleased to be sitting alongside my colleagues
    from U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Transportation Command.
        It gives me great pride to appear before you today to
    highlight and commend the accomplishments of the uniformed and
    civilian personnel of U.S. Cyber Command. I'm both grateful
    for, and humbled by, the opportunity I have been given to lead
    our cyber team in the important work they do in the defense of
    our great Nation and our Department.
        The current cyber threat environment is uncertain and ever
    changing. What is certain, however, is the pervasive nature of
    those cyber threats and the increasing sophistication of
    adversaries. Our military networks are probed for
    vulnerabilities literally thousands of times per day. The very
    assets within our military that provide us formidable
    advantages over any adversary are precisely the reason that our
    enemies seek to map, understand, exploit, and potentially
    disrupt our global network architecture.
        The cyber intruders of today, in many cases, not only want
    to disrupt our actions, but they seek to establish a persistent
    presence on our networks. Quite simply, threats and
    vulnerabilities are changing and expanding at an accelerated
    and alarming pace in our mission set.
        Compounding this threat is our national dependence on cyber
    space. Operating freely and securely in cyber space is critical
    not only to our military and our government, but also to the
    private sector, which is responsible for maintaining much of
    the Nation's critical infrastructure. The bottom line is,
    weakness in cyber space has the potential to hold back our
    successes in every field where our Nation is engaged.
        An additional critical concern is the budget uncertainty
    that will be caused by a potential return of the Budget Control
    Act funding levels. To echo Senator Carter's testimony to the
    House Armed Services Committee yesterday, the proposed across-
    the-board cuts will significantly impact our defense strategy;
    and, as a result, we run the very real risk of making our
    Nation less secure. Given the evolving threat and our increased
    dependence on our critical infrastructure, it is vital that we
    continue and commit to our investment in the cyber mission
    forces. If we do not continue to invest in our existing and
    future capabilities, we will lack the necessary capacity and
    risk being less prepared to address future threats.
        U.S. Cyber Command has no flexibility in its base budget to
    absorb a sequestration cut. Any reductions will have immediate
    direct and indirect effects throughout our force and the
    service cyber component commanders, including slowing the
    necessary improvements to our network structures, including
    improving the--excuse me--including slowing the necessary
    improvements to our network structures. Such cuts will slow the
    build of our cyber teams, their integration into the broader
    defense structure, and, most importantly, slow the growth of
    our capacity to form essential missions, which provides a real
    potential advantage to adversaries. Your continued leadership
    in providing the necessary resources to our servicemembers and
    civilians dedicated to the success of our mission is critical
    to defending our Nation, now and in the future.
        Despite this challenging threat and fiscal environment, I'd
    like to assure the committee that U.S. Cyber Command has made
    considerable progress to date. We are achieving significant
    operational outcomes, and we have a clear path ahead.
        With that, thank you again, Mr. Chairman and members of the
    committee, for convening this forum and inviting all of us to
    speak. Our progress has been made possible in no small part
    because of the support from this committee and other
    stakeholders. The global movement of activity in and through
    cyber space blurs the U.S. Government's traditional
    understanding of how to address domestic and foreign military,
    criminal, and intelligence activities. While it complicates our
    efforts to combat cyber threats, it also creates opportunities
    for coordination and cooperation. Unity of effort across the
    U.S. Government in this mission set is essential. I appreciate
    our continued partnership as we build our Nation's cyber
    defenses.
        I welcome your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Rogers follows:]

              Prepared Statement by Admiral Michael S. Rogers, USN
        Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, and distinguished members of the
    Committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today on
    behalf of the men and women of United States Cyber Command
    (USCYBERCOM). This is the first time I have had the honor of testifying
    before this Committee in a posture hearing about our Command's
    dedicated uniformed and civilian personnel. It gives me not only pride
    but great pleasure to commend their accomplishments, and I am both
    grateful for and humbled by the opportunity I have been given to lead
    them in the important work they are doing in defense of our nation.
        USCYBERCOM is a subunified command of U.S. Strategic Command; we
    are based at Fort Meade, Maryland. Approximately 1,100 people
    (military, civilians, and contractors) serve at USCYBERCOM, with a
    Congressionally-appropriated budget for Fiscal Year 2015 of
    approximately $509 million for Operations and Maintenance (O&M),
    Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E), and military
    construction (MILCON). USCYBERCOM also includes its key Service cyber
    components: Army Cyber Command/Second Army, Marine Forces Cyberspace
    Command, Fleet Cyber Command/Tenth Fleet, and Air Forces Cyber/24th Air
    Force. Our collective missions are to direct the operation and defense
    of the Department of Defense's information networks while denying
    adversaries (when authorized) the freedom to maneuver against the
    United States and its allies in and through cyberspace. On a daily
    basis, we plan, coordinate, integrate, synchronize, and conduct
    activities to direct the operations and defense of specified Department
    of Defense information networks and the Department's critical
    infrastructure; and prepare to and, when directed, conduct full-
    spectrum military cyberspace operations in order to enable actions in
    all domains, ensure U.S. and allied freedom of action in cyberspace and
    deny the same to our adversaries.
        USCYBERCOM operates with several key mission partners. Foremost is
    the National Security Agency and its affiliated Central Security
    Service (NSA/CSS). The President's decision to maintain the ``dual-
    hat'' arrangement (under which the Commander of USCYBERCOM also serves
    as the Director of NSA/Chief, CSS) means the partnership of USCYBERCOM
    and NSA/CSS will continue to benefit our nation. NSA/CSS has
    unparalleled capabilities for detecting foreign threats, producing
    intelligence for our warfighters in all domains, analyzing cyber
    events, and guarding national security information systems. The best,
    and only, way to meet our nation's needs, to bring the military cyber
    force to life, to exercise good stewardship of our nation's resources,
    and to ensure respect for civil liberties and privacy, is to leverage
    the capabilities (both human and technological) that have been
    painstakingly built up at Fort Meade. Our nation has neither the time
    nor the resources to re-learn or re-create the capabilities that we tap
    now by working with our co-located NSA/CSS partners.
        Let me also mention another key mission partner and neighbor at
    Fort Meade, the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). DISA is
    vital to the communications and the efficiency of the entire
    Department, and its people (especially those supporting the new Joint
    Force Headquarters--DOD Information Networks) operate in conjunction
    with us at USCYBERCOM on a constant basis. We also work with other
    federal government departments and agencies, particularly the
    Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice and
    Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). We interact regularly with
    private industry and key allied nations as they seek to secure their
    networks, identify adversarial and criminal actors and intentions,
    build resiliency for federal and critical infrastructure systems, and
    investigate the theft and manipulation of data.
    Where We Were
        This year we will mark the fifth anniversary of USCYBERCOM's
    activation. The Department authorized the creation of a Cyber Command
    in 2009, and accelerated its establishment the following year. This
    initiative was truly reflective of a broad consensus. The highest
    levels of our government saw potential adversaries militarizing
    cyberspace, mounting cyber espionage on a world-wide scale and using
    cyber capabilities to intimidate their neighbors. We also saw cyber
    efforts against DOD and realized the need to ensure our ability to
    defend its networks and command and control our own Department's forces
    and information systems. We in the U.S. military took the step of
    creating a new warfighting organization for cyberspace because we
    recognized that our nation's economy, infrastructure, and allies were
    incurring grave risks from digital disruption, and that potential
    adversaries were working aggressively to exploit those vulnerabilities.
    We saw unfriendly states, organized criminals, and even unaffiliated
    cyber actors stealing American intellectual property and using cyber
    means for coercion. USCYBERCOM was established to help stop such
    activities, or at least to minimize their effects on the United States
    and its allies.
        USCYBERCOM confronted serious challenges from the outset. DOD
    networks had been planned and initially constructed decades earlier in
    an environment in which redundancy, resiliency, and defensibility were
    not always primary design characteristics. Operators in USCYBERCOM, not
    surprisingly, could not even see all of our networks, let alone monitor
    all the traffic coming into and out of them from the Internet. Our
    people were and are professionals, so that issue was rapidly engaged,
    but nonetheless the sheer volume of work involved in starting a new,
    subunified command was substantial.
        I have been at USCYBERCOM for approximately a year, and thus have
    had time to form some impressions of the organization and its progress.
    I knew when I took command that we had a sound foundation and could
    build upon it with confidence. The organizations had been well scoped
    and granted the authorities necessary to do our work. The bad news was
    that USCYBERCOM was built from the ground up by cutting manning to the
    bone, initially sacrificing vital support functions and institutional
    infrastructure to build mission capabilities as fast as possible. I was
    nonetheless pleased by the quality and dedication of the personnel
    across USCYBERCOM and our Service cyber components. These are
    professionals, in every sense of the word, and they are determined to
    put in place military cyber capabilities that will keep the nation safe
    in cyberspace. For their sake, and even more so for America's, I intend
    to make our organizations even stronger--and provide my successors the
    opportunity to do the same.
    Where We Are Now
        Over the last five years we have built USCYBERCOM to help defend
    our networks in DOD and the nation. This has not always been a
    straightforward process. Our Command is growing and operating at the
    same time, performing a multitude of tasks across a diverse and complex
    mission set. Of course, every command changes with events in its
    mission space, adjusts to evolving policies and direction, and adapts
    with the development of armaments and tactics. I do not want to foster
    the impression that we are completely unique. It is true, nonetheless,
    that we are constructing a new command and force while engaged on a 24-
    hour a day basis, every day of the year, with smart, energetic actors
    operating in an environment that is highly dynamic. Some of those
    actors, I hasten to add, operate with no discernible legal or ethical
    restraints. At the same time, we are writing doctrine, training people
    to execute options, and keeping up with the ever-shifting topography of
    cyberspace. That complexity presents us--and every nation that seeks a
    military cyber capability--with a set of challenges that are
    significant.
        In essence, USCYBERCOM has been ``normalizing'' our operations in
    cyberspace. We seek to afford an operational outlook and attitude to
    the running of the Department's roughly 7 million networked devices and
    15,000 network enclaves. Collectively these represent a weapons system
    analogous to a carrier strike group or an aircraft strike package,
    through which we deliver effects. Like conventional weapons systems,
    our networks enable operations in other domains and distant locations,
    they demand constant upkeep and skillful handling, and they can be a
    target themselves for our adversaries. They give us the vital command
    and control (C2), connectivity, and intelligence for a global, 21st
    century military. No other nation enjoys such resources--they impart to
    us formidable advantages over any conceivable adversary. It is for
    exactly this reason that potential adversaries very much want to map,
    understand, exploit, and possibly disrupt our global network
    architecture.
        In keeping with that operational mindset, we seek to impress upon
    commanders that cyber defense is no longer information technology (IT)
    it is not a mere support function that they can safely delegate to
    someone on their staff. Cyber is now a central part of their ability to
    execute their mission. It is commander's business. A successful
    intrusion, or severance of connectivity, can result in a direct and
    immediate impact to successful mission accomplishment. We have seen
    this happen in recent years, and though we have not yet experienced a
    serious, sustained disruption to the Department's information systems,
    it may be only a matter of time before we face one, given the inherent
    vulnerability of our networks.
        The fragility of that legacy architecture motivates our emphasis on
    deploying the Joint Information Enterprise (JIE) across DOD. We have
    gained significantly more visibility in our networks, but that is only
    a stopgap measure while the Department migrates its systems to a cloud
    architecture that promises to increase security and efficiency while
    facilitating data sharing across the enterprise. That means that the
    warfighter at the forward edge of battle benefits from the same data
    pools as our analysts, operators, and senior decisionmakers here in the
    United States. While the JIE is being implemented, however, our
    concerns about our legacy architecture collectively have spurred our
    formation of our new Joint Force Headquarters to defend the
    Department's information networks (JFHQ-DODIN). The JFHQ-DODIN gained
    then-Secretary of Defense Hagel's authorization late last year and has
    recently achieved initial operational capability, working at DISA under
    my operational control at USCYBERCOM. JFHQ-DODIN's mission is to
    oversee the day-to-day operation of DOD's networks and mount an active
    defense of them, securing their key cyber terrain and being prepared to
    neutralize any adversary who manages to bypass their perimeter
    defenses. Placing the just-established JFHQ-DODIN under USCYBERCOM
    gives us a direct lever for operating DOD's information systems in ways
    that make them easier to defend, and tougher for an adversary to
    affect. It also gets us closer to being able to manage risk on a
    system-wide basis across DOD, balancing warfighter needs for access to
    data and capabilities while maintaining the overall security of the
    enterprise
        USCYBERCOM directs the operation and defense of Department of
    Defense networks, but it does much more as well, hence its formation of
    a Cyber Mission Force (CMF) to turn strategy and plans into operational
    outcomes. The Command's last two annual posture statements have
    mentioned the CMF's authorization and initial steps, and I am pleased
    to report that the Force is very much a reality. With continued support
    from Congress, the Administration, and the Department, USCYBERCOM and
    its Service cyber components are now about halfway through the force
    build for the CMF. Indeed, many of its teams are generating capability
    today. Three years ago we lacked capacity; we had vision and expertise
    but were very thin on the ground. Today the new teams are actively
    guarding DOD networks and prepared, when appropriate and authorized, to
    help Combatant Commands deny freedom of maneuver to our adversaries in
    cyberspace. Dozens of teams are now operating; and even though many of
    them are still filling out their rosters and qualifying their
    personnel, they are proving their value daily as well as confirming the
    overall need for such a construct.
        The work of building the CMF is not done yet. We have a target of
    about 6,200 personnel in 133 teams, with the majority achieving at
    least initial operational capability by the end of fiscal year 2016. I
    have been working with the Services to accelerate the work we are doing
    to keep on schedule, but I can promise you that will not be easy. We
    are already hard pressed to find qualified personnel to man our CMF
    rosters, to get them cleared, and to get them trained and supported
    across all 133 teams. To address these gaps, I am working with our
    Service components, Chief, National Guard Bureau, and Reserve Chiefs to
    ensure we have considered a total force solution. In several areas,
    such as critical infrastructure, both USCYBERCOM and the Services have
    recognized that our Reserve Component brings us unique and valuable
    skills. In addition, we are charting the proper command and control
    relationships and structures for these teams, seeking to establish
    proper headquarters support for them, and giving my commanders insight
    into their activities so we can ensure the best possible
    synchronization, deconfliction, and unity of effort across the CMF.
    There are all sorts of good ideas for doing this; indeed, we hear no
    shortage of suggestions. What I tell everyone, however, is that we have
    admired this issue long enough. For instance, it is time to implement
    and exercise measures like the objective C2 model that we agreed upon
    as a Department almost two years ago, even if we believe it may not end
    up as the permanent solution. Let us see how it works, and then change
    what needs to be fixed later as we gain insights from operations and
    the shifting threat.
        Where we need help from you is with resources required to hire
    personnel to fill the team seats as well as necessary operational and
    strategic headquarters operations, intelligence, and planning staffs,
    facilities where we can train and employ them, and resources to
    properly equip them. Everyone involved knows this is a priority for the
    Department as well as for the Administration writ large. We also know
    that our Department in particular has a broad range of critical
    priorities, each of which competes with cyberspace for resources. This
    is a cold, hard reality--as is the fact that weaknesses in cyberspace
    have the potential to hold back our successes in every other field
    where the Department is engaged. Similarly, success in securing our
    networks and denying adversaries freedom of maneuver in cyberspace can
    and does bolster our DOD successes in all warfighting domains. That
    should factor into our resource decisions, particularly as we face the
    renewed possibility of sequestration--and mandatory, across-the-board
    eight percent budget cuts--when Fiscal Year 2016 begins a few months
    from now.
        Let me emphasize the value of the intangibles in our work and our
    environment. Collectively we in USCYBERCOM have gained priceless
    experience in cyberspace operations, and that experience has given us
    something even more valuable: insight into how force is and can be
    employed in cyberspace. We have had the equivalent of a close-in fight
    with an adversary, which taught us how to maneuver and gain the
    initiative that means the difference between victory and defeat.
        Enhancing such insight is increasingly urgent. Every conflict in
    the world today has a cyber dimension. Actors with modest conventional
    military capabilities have shown considerable capacity to harass,
    disrupt, and distract their adversaries through digital means. This is
    not, however, some on-line version of a Hobbesian state of nature; it
    is not a war of all against all. What we are seeing are clear patterns
    to cyber hostilities, and those patterns have four main trends:
          First, it has to be noted that autocratic governments in
    several regions view today's open Internet as a lethal threat to their
    regimes. For example--as President Obama noted last December--North
    Korea recently turned its cyber capabilities on Sony Pictures
    Entertainment in revenge for a forthcoming movie. The North Koreans
    employed unlawful cyber activities to steal and destroy data and
    property, to intimidate and coerce U.S.-based businesses, to threaten
    American citizens, and to disrupt free speech within the United States.
    This is unacceptable. Democracies value Internet freedom and a multi-
    stakeholder system of governance, in which the Internet is officially
    neutral with regard to free and open political speech--with clear
    protection for criticism and debate. We make no apologies for the fact
    that such neutrality is abhorrent to regimes that fear their own
    citizens; hence their ubiquitous and determined efforts to redefine
    ``cybersecurity'' to mean protection from ``dangerous'' ideas as well
    as from malicious activity.
          Second are the ongoing campaigns to steal intellectual
    property. Massive thefts of personal and institutional information and
    resources, by states and by criminals, have been observed over the last
    decade or so. Criminals are mining personal information for use in
    identity theft schemes, in a sense committing fraud on an industrial
    scale. States have turned their much greater resources to theft as
    well. These intrusions and breaches have drawn comments from the
    highest levels of the U.S. Government. I would only add here the
    observation that the most worrisome of these campaigns are state-
    sponsored, persistent, and world-wide in scope. They are aimed at
    governments, non-profits, and corporations wherever they might be
    accruing intellectual capital that the attackers believe could be
    valuable, whether for re-sale or passage to competing firms and
    industries.
          The third form of cyber tactic we see is disruption. Once
    again, the actors, techniques, and targets of these incidents are
    numerous and varied, ranging from denial-of-service attacks, network
    traffic manipulation, and employment of destructive malware. We see
    these used all over the world, particularly in most or all of the
    conflicts pitting two armed adversaries against one another.
          Finally, we see states developing capabilities and
    attaining accesses for potential hostilities, perhaps with the idea of
    enhancing deterrence or as a beachhead for future cyber sabotage.
    Private security researchers over the last year have reported on
    numerous malware finds in the industrial control systems of energy
    sector organizations. As I suggested in my appearance before the House
    Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence last fall, we believe
    potential adversaries might be leaving cyber fingerprints on our
    critical infrastructure partly to convey a message that our homeland is
    at risk if tensions ever escalate toward military conflict.
        Despite the spread of cyber attacks and conflicts around the world,
    we have increasing confidence in our operations-based approach. Though
    it is still developing and not yet fully implemented, it has
    nonetheless given us significant advantages in relation to potential
    adversaries. For instance, I can tell you in some detail how USCYBERCOM
    and our military partners dealt with the Heartbleed and ``Shellshock
    vulnerabilities that emerged last year. These were unrelated but
    serious flaws inadvertently left in the software that millions of
    computers and networks in many nations depend upon; an attacker could
    exploit those vulnerabilities to steal data or take control of systems.
    Both of these security holes were discovered by responsible developers
    who did just what they should have done in response--they kept their
    findings quiet and worked with trusted colleagues to develop software
    patches as quickly as possible--allowing systems administrators to gain
    the jump on bad actors who read the same vulnerability announcements
    and immediately began devising ways to identify and exploit unpatched
    computers.
        We at USCYBERCOM (and NSA/CSS) learned of Heartbleed and Shellshock
    at the same time that everyone else did. Our military networks are
    probed for vulnerabilities thousands of times every hour, so in both
    cases it was not long before we detected new probes checking our
    websites and systems for open locks, as it were, at the relevant doors
    and windows. By this point our mission partners had devised ways to
    filter such probes before they touched our systems. We were sheltered
    while we pushed out patches across DOD networks and monitored
    implementation, directing administrators to start with those systems
    that were most vulnerable. Very quickly we could determine and report
    how many systems had been remedied and how many remained at risk. Three
    years ago, DOD would have required many, many months to assess the
    danger and formulate responses to Heartbleed and Shellshock. Thanks to
    the efforts we have made in recent years, our responses by contrast
    were comparatively quick, thorough, and effective, and in both cases
    they helped inform corresponding efforts on the civilian side of the
    federal government. We also know that other countries, including
    potential adversaries, struggled to cope with the Heartbleed and
    Shellshock vulnerabilities. In military affairs it is often relative
    speed and agility that can make a difference in operations; we
    demonstrated that in these instances, and in others that we can discuss
    in another setting.
        This operational approach is what we need to be building in many
    more places. The nation's government and critical infrastructure
    networks are at risk as well, and we are finding that computer security
    is really an enterprise-wide project. To cite one example, the U.S.
    Government is moving toward cloud computing and mobile digital devices
    across the enterprise, and DOD and the Defense Industrial Base (DIB)
    are moving with this trend. We are working, moreover, to make our data
    as secure from insider threats as from external adversaries. This could
    eventually compel a recapitalization of government systems comparable
    to the shift toward desktops in the 1980s and local-area networks in
    the 1990s. In short, a lot of money and many people are involved at all
    levels. USCYBERCOM is not running this transformation, of course, but
    we are responsible for defending the DOD systems that will be changed
    by it.
        Neither the U.S. Government, the states, nor the private sector can
    defend their information systems on their own against the most powerful
    cyber forces. The public and private sectors need one another's help.
    We saw in the recent hack of Sony Pictures Entertainment that we have
    to be prepared to respond to cyber attacks with concerted actions
    across the whole of government using our nation's unique insights and
    complete range of capabilities in cooperation with the private sector.
    This interdependence will only increase in the future. Indeed, the
    cyber environment evolves rapidly--making the maturation of our
    capabilities and their agility in this changing mission space still
    more imperative for our ability to deter adversaries who might be
    tempted to test our resolve.
    Where We Are Headed
        USCYBERCOM has accomplished a great deal, but we still have a long
    road ahead. Cyberspace is dynamic--it changes constantly with the
    actions of users and the equipment and software they connect on-line.
    Compounding that routine volatility are two factors: the rapid
    evolution of the technology itself, and the changing habits and
    expectations of users. If current trends hold, then we can expect more
    nations, and even state-less groups and individuals as well, to develop
    and employ their own tools and cyber warfare units to cause effects in
    targeted networks. The cyber strife that we see now in several regions
    will continue and deepen in sophistication and intensity. In light of
    our recent experience with the destructive attacks on Sony Pictures
    Entertainment, we expect state and unaffiliated cyber actors to become
    bolder and seek more capable means to affect us and our allies. Sadly,
    we foresee increased tensions in cyberspace.
        This is truly a period in history in which we are falling behind if
    we are merely holding our position in the overall movement to forge new
    capabilities. We in the U.S. Government and DOD must continue learning
    and developing new skills and techniques just to tread water, given the
    rapid pace of change in cyberspace. I liken our historical moment to
    the situation that confronted the U.S. early in the Cold War, when it
    became obvious that the Soviet Union and others could build hydrogen
    bombs and the superpower competition showed worrying signs of
    instability. We rapidly learned that we needed a nuclear force that was
    deployed across the three legs of the riad and underpinned by robust
    command and control mechanisms, far-reaching intelligence, and policy
    structures including a declared deterrence posture. Building these
    nuclear forces and the policy and support structures around them took
    time and did not cause a nuclear war or make the world less safe. On
    the contrary, it made deterrence predictable, helped to lower tensions,
    and ultimately facilitated arms control negotiations. While the analogy
    to cyberspace is not exact, it seems clear that our nation must
    continue to commit time, effort, and resources to understanding our
    historical situation and building cyber military capabilities, along
    with the ``whole-of-nation'' structures and partnerships they work
    among. Just as we fashioned a formidable nuclear capability that served
    us through the Cold War and beyond, I am confident in our ability to
    keep pace with adversaries who are determined to control ``their''
    corners of cyberspace, to exfiltrate our intellectual property, and to
    disrupt the functioning of our institutions. They are every bit as
    determined, creative, and persistent in these efforts as the Soviet
    leaders we contained during the Cold War, and unfortunately we see few
    hints they will act more responsibly in cyberspace. Thus we must commit
    to the long-term goal of building a truly open, secure cyberspace
    governed collaboratively by many stakeholders, while we remain prepared
    for crises and contingencies that can arise along the way--just as we
    do in every other domain.
        I can assure Congress, and the American people, that we are
    executing and will carry out a well-conceived and systematic plan for
    doing that. As we train our cyber mission teams, we are inculcating a
    culture of respect for civil liberties and privacy while learning how
    to assess their readiness and establishing expectations and an
    institutional base that will serve to sustain this force, and even to
    expand it further if that someday becomes necessary. The team members
    we train today will furnish the leadership of the U.S. military's
    cyberspace organizations of the future; they are digital natives,
    having come up through the ranks thinking about cyber issues. I have no
    doubt their perspectives will differ from our own, and that they will
    see solutions to problems that vex us now. Building the capabilities of
    USCYBERCOM and the CMF is also providing valuable lessons for the
    reconfiguration of DOD's networked architecture to make it more
    defensible. When the JIE is completely implemented a few years from
    now, we will have a far more secure base from which to operate in
    cyberspace, and all of our capabilities in the other domains will
    benefit as well from the massive data support they receive from a cloud
    architecture.
        The sophistication of our defenses and operations must grow, of
    course, in partnership with our allies and as part of a truly whole of
    nation approach to the problem. Let me reiterate that there is no
    Department of Defense solution to our cybersecurity dilemmas. The
    global movement of threat activity in and through cyberspace blurs the
    U.S. Government's traditional understandings of how to address domestic
    and foreign military, criminal, and intelligence activities. This is
    exacerbated further by the speed with which unforeseen threats can
    impact U.S. interests and the fact that adversaries frequently use
    (wittingly or unwittingly) U.S.-based resources due to the nation's
    robust cyber infrastructure. This creates a circumstance in which unity
    of effort across the U.S. Government is required. DOD's growing
    capabilities and capacities need to be considered within this broader
    context. Any plausible solutions will involve multiple actors and
    stakeholders from within and across several agencies, governments, and
    economic sectors. Everything we do in USCYBERCOM we do in partnership
    with other commands, agencies, departments, industries, and countries.
    As we saw over the last year in our collective response to the
    Shellshock and Heartbleed vulnerabilities, we must all work together
    across the U.S. Government, with the states, industry, and allies on a
    constant basis to ensure we are ready to surge for incidents and crises
    and thus provide the necessary assurance for inter-agency and foreign
    partners.
        What does the future hold for USCYBERCOM specifically? I will
    strongly recommend to anyone who asks that we remain in the dual hat
    relationship under which the Commander of USCYBERCOM also serves as the
    Director, NSA/CSS. This is simply the right thing to do for now, as the
    White House reiterated in late 2013. It might not be a permanent
    solution, but it is a good one given where we are in this journey as it
    allows us to build upon the strengths of both organizations to serve
    our nation's defense.
    Conclusion
        Thank you again, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, for
    inviting me to speak, and for all the support that you and this
    Committee have provided USCYBERCOM. I appreciate our continued
    partnership as we build our nation's defenses. Our progress has been
    made possible because of support from all stakeholders, in terms of
    resources, trust, and impetus. Cyberspace is more than a challenging
    environment; it is now part of virtually everything we in the U.S.
    military do in all domains of the battlespace and each of our lines of
    effort. There is hardly any meaningful distinction to be made now
    between events in cyberspace and events in the physical world, as they
    are so tightly linked. We in USCYBERCOM have strived to direct the
    operation and defense of DOD information systems and to protect and
    further the nation's interests in cyberspace. We have a great deal of
    work ahead of us, and thus accelerating USCYBERCOM's growth in
    capability will remain my focus, and be a continuing emphasis for the
    Department. We can all be proud of what our efforts, with your help,
    have accomplished in building USCYBERCOM and positioning its men and
    women for continued success.

        Chairman McCain. Well, thank you, Admiral.
        It's not very often we have a briefing that really has
    significant impact, I think, on all members, but the briefing
    and the information that you'll--Admiral Haney and Admiral
    Rogers provided for us the other morning is very chilling and
    very disturbing, and I would like to, over time, see some of
    that information being made known to the American people,
    because it certainly should give us a wake-up call about what
    our adversaries are doing throughout the world.
        Every once in a while, we read things, media reports that
    get our attention. Admiral Haney, one is the New York Times,
    March 11th, ``Russia says has right to deploy nuclear weapons
    in Crimea. Russia has the right to deploy nuclear weapons in
    the Black Sea peninsula.'' Crimea, which Moscow, a Foreign
    Ministry official said Vladimir Putin--15 March--Vladimir Putin
    prepared raising nuclear readiness over Crimea. I'm sure you're
    aware of that, and much more, Admiral Haney. What's your
    reaction to those kinds of news reports, particularly about
    Vladimir Putin's apparent willingness to sort of--if not play
    the nuclear card, certainly raise the nuclear issue?
        Admiral Haney. Chairman McCain, you bring up very important
    points here. It is interesting, in the open press all the way
    through YouTube, the various signaling that Russia has done
    associated with their strategic nuclear capabilities, including
    the ones you mentioned there. They are very provocative, and
    this, in combination with the whole-of-whole, in terms of these
    demonstrations of their capability during crisis, such as I
    mentioned--the long-range strategic aircraft flights, their
    violation of the INF Treaty, et cetera--really shows where we
    are as a world, including as the United States, and where
    Russia is trying to ascribe to be, in terms of coercion,
    including using weapons of mass destruction.
        Chairman McCain. Obviously, lending much greater importance
    and emphasis on our modernization of our triad, it seems to me.
    Would you agree?
        Admiral Haney. Absolutely, Senator. It's very important.
        Chairman McCain. Admiral Rogers, also a Wall Street Journal
    story, ``NSA's Rogers Calls for More Forceful Response to Cyber
    Attacks.'' Obviously, that's not going to be possible if we
    proceed with sequestration, would you agree?
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
        Chairman McCain. On--and yet, I--as I mentioned in my
    earlier opening statement, the budget calls for 5.5 billion in
    cyber investment, but only 8 percent will go towards your
    capabilities in Cyber Command and the development of our cyber
    mission forces. Does this raise the issue that you have talked
    about in the past as to whether we have a policy, or not, as to
    what to do in the event of cyber attacks? Do we just spend our
    time trying to erect further defenses? By the way, I think most
    of us agree, all of us agree, passage of legislation is
    important. But--or do we start devising ways to raise a price
    for those attacks?
        You have said, earlier in the week, that right now it is
    a--you said, ``Right now, if you're a nation-state, if you're a
    group, if you're an individual, my assessment is that most come
    to the conclusion that conducting a cyber attack is incredibly
    low risk, that there's little price to pay for the actions that
    they are taking.'' Doesn't that mean that we should start
    devising methods and capabilities to enact a price for these
    people to pay, whether they be nation-states or rogue
    individuals or groups?
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir. You look at our investment
    strategy as part of a broader plan. We focus primarily on the
    defensive piece, initially. I thought that was a sound
    investment, but I think now we're at a tipping point, where we
    not only need to continue to build on the defensive capability,
    but we have got to broaden our capabilities to provide
    policymakers and operational commanders with a broader range of
    options. Because, in the end, a purely defensive, reactive
    strategy will be both late to need and incredibly resource
    intense. I don't think that's necessarily in our best long-
    range interest. So, I have been an advocate of--we also need to
    think about how can we increase our capacity on the offensive
    side, here, to get to that point of deterrence as you've
    raised.
        Chairman McCain. Right now, as far as you know, that
    decision has not been made, which would come from the President
    of the United States.
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir, the President retains that
    authority right now.
        Chairman McCain. That policy has not been decided on, as
    far as any instructions to you are concerned.
        Admiral Rogers. No, sir, no authority has been delegated at
    my level for the offensive application of cyber.
        Chairman McCain. You think it might be time?
        Admiral Rogers. I think we still need to work our way
    through this. It's not unlike, in some ways, what we saw in the
    history of the nuclear arena or in the post---aftermath of 9/
    11, as we were trying to figure out what--at what level, for
    example, do--were we comfortable making the decision that we
    were going to shoot down, potentially, a civilian airliner that
    we thought had potentially become a weapon. We had much that
    same discussion. I think we need to have that same discussion
    now. We've got to increase our decisionmakers' comfort and
    level of knowledge with what capabilities we have and what we
    can do.
        Chairman McCain. But, right now, the level of deterrence is
    not deterring.
        Admiral Rogers. That is true.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Haney, we talked about the need to modernize the
    triad. The first step seems to be in terms of just sequencing
    the Ohio-class replacement, but we also need to begin to invest
    in a long-range bomber. Can you just briefly describe the
    platforms that we have to invest in, and also the need to start
    immediately?
        Admiral Haney. Senator Reed, the--look at the platforms
    today. We have extended the Ohio, the current SSBN, to the max
    extent possible. This was a platform designed for 30 years, and
    we're taking it out to 42 years. We cannot extend it any
    further. It has to be replaced.
        When you look at our intercontinental ballistic missiles--
    systems, they, too, are starting to fray from the maturity of
    those systems. They've been around since the early '70s. As a
    result, there is an analysis of alternative in progress, called
    the groundbased strategic deterrent, that we have to continue
    to work towards, that provides a very responsive capability for
    deterrence.
        In the bombers, the last B-52 came off the assembly line in
    1962, and it will be around, even with the current plan, to
    about 2040. Long time for that aircraft. Even our B-2 aircraft
    has had to--two decades of intensive operations. So, the long-
    range strike bomber is also a must that we have to
    recapitalize.
        So, all three of those platforms are coming to a point
    where we're getting all we can get out of them, and we have to
    recapitalize them. The triad is important to our strategic
    deterrence.
        Senator Reed. Let me ask a related question. The air-launch
    cruise missile, is that another system that should be replaced
    or modernized significantly?
        Admiral Haney. Senator, absolutely. The air-launch cruise
    missile, the current one, was designed for 10 years. It's at
    the 30-year point today. It provides the combination, when you
    take a credible bomber, a cruise missile, as well as the
    gravity weapons--the combination of those provides the
    complexity by which an adversary would have to think if they
    went to escalate their way out of a conflict. Very important,
    particularly as we look at the standoff. Standoff is still
    required. Having combination of a credible bomber and standoff
    capability. So, we must replace this air-launch cruise missile.
    So, this long-range strike-option missile program is important
    to me.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, sir.
        General Selva, you mentioned the various civilian
    components of your, essentially, command. One of them is the
    CRAF, the Civilian Reserve Air Fleet. As operations tend
    downward, in terms of Afghanistan, Iraq, and other places, you
    can rely more upon your organic aircraft, U.S. Air Force
    aircraft and other military aircraft. How are you going to
    reconcile this decreased demand with the need to maintain the
    capabilities of the civilian fleet?
        General Selva. Thank you, Senator.
        In order to do justice to the readiness requirements for
    the organic and civil fleet, we're going to have to balance how
    we use the aircraft to move the cargo and passenger demand
    signal that exists within the Department. It is markedly
    diminished, to less than half of what it was just a year ago.
    We've implemented a process inside the command, where we
    actually use a readiness determination to allocate that lift.
        But, there is a second part of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet
    which is invisible to most users, and that is, the incentive
    for carriers to come into the fleet is governmentwide business
    that's managed through the Government Services Administration.
    That represents several billion dollars of annual spend on
    passenger and cargo movement that only Civil Reserve Air Fleet
    carriers are eligible to participate in. So, we have worked
    very, very closely with the industry as well as the Government
    Services Administration to make sure that we've closed any
    loopholes in that process so that the carriers get access to
    the business that they deserve. That will keep the fleets
    healthy, as the civilian airlines go through what is likely to
    be an economic consolidation of their assets over time.
        Senator Reed. What other agencies of the government
    typically rely upon this other aspect, the government business?
    Is it AID and entities like that? What----
        General Selva. Sir, as a consequence of the Government
    Services Administration City Pairs Program, all Federal
    agencies rely on the passenger part of the Civil Reserve Air
    Fleet. On the cargo side, in 2012 the Congress gave U.S.
    TRANSCOM and the Department of Defense the authority to offer
    defense transportation system rates to the whole of Federal
    Government, which we have done in order to bring more mission
    set into the network.
        Senator Reed. But, again, one of the unintended
    consequences of sequestration is not only reduction in your
    funds to do this program, but in every Federal department,
    because I would assume one of the first things the Department
    of Commerce or the--it would start--cut back travel
    dramatically, et cetera, putting more pressure on your ability
    to manage the Civil Reserve Airfleet Allocations (CRAF). Is
    that correct?
        General Selva. Senator, that's exactly correct. If we lose
    that business, if we lose that mission set as a consequence of
    sequestration, it'll have an immediate readiness impact on the
    Civil Reserve Air Fleet.
        Senator Reed. Not just directly--again, my point, not just
    directly from your efforts, but----
        General Selva. Correct.
        Senator Reed.--governmentwide.
        General Selva. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. If you are spared, and eery other department,
    your Civil Reserve Air Fleet is in--is really in tatters. Is
    that correct?
        General Selva. I wouldn't use the word ``in tatters,'' but
    it'll make it a much more challenging process to keep it going.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        My time's expected. But, thank you, Admiral Rogers.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Haney, I don't think I've ever publicly thanked you
    for the time and effort you spent--it's been 2 years now; it's
    hard to believe--at the Joint Base Pearl Harbor, and the
    dedication, the time that we spent there. That was beyond the
    call of duty, and I thank you very much for that.
        The--I think that Senator Reed and Senator McCain both
    talked about the nuclear arsenal and some of the problems in
    the triad delivery system. I think we can talk about the
    problems that we have with ours, the age of the B-2--of the B-
    52, and the ICBM, 34 years old, and the fact that we have--our
    spending has just declined steadily since the cold war. You
    know, we--when you look at what Admiral Rogers has taken on,
    our--at least our spending has increased in that area, but it's
    continued to decrease. I think you--when you're talking about
    the triad, I guess that Russia is the only country that has a
    triad system, even though it's my understanding that China and
    India are developing a--such a system. Is that correct?
        Admiral Haney. Senator, currently, China has both
    submarines and intercontinental ballistic missiles, and they
    are developing more and more of a bomber fleet. Their
    intentions, as you know, in China are not very transparent. So,
    time will tell on that answer.
        Senator Inhofe. But, that's accurate, though. They're not
    there yet, in terms of a triad.
        Admiral Haney. That's correct. As you mentioned, Russia not
    only is modernizing their triad, but they're also modernizing
    their industrial base associated with it. That, too, is
    something that we have to integrate into our calculus. Not just
    India, but Pakistan is also developing----
        Senator Inhofe. Where are they, now, in their delivery
    system?
        Admiral Haney. They have been clearly invested into cruise
    missiles, and they have been recently--just recently having
    tested a intercontinental ballistic missile capability.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        During my testimony, I erroneously said Pakistan was developing an
    ``intercontinental ballistic missile''. I meant to say ``medium range
    ballistic missile''. Please accept this clarification of the record.

        Senator Inhofe. Well, you spent some time talking about the
    problems that we have, and we--you know, for the last 20 years,
    we've been talking about this, and that--and the system gets
    older and older, and we don't seem to do anything about it.
    But, we don't talk as much about the others. The other people
    out there, even Iran--I think it was--General Stewart was here
    last week or the week before, and he warned us that, in Iran,
    they're continuing to develop the nuclear weapons and could
    soon test a space-launch vehicle that could double as a long-
    range missile. That's pretty frightening, because it's--we're
    no longer looking at just the superpowers that are developing
    this capability.
        Admiral Haney. That's correct, Senator. Very recently, Iran
    also had a space-launch vehicle to send a satellite in space.
    But, not just them; North Korea frequently parades their KN-08
    intercontinental ballistic missile.
        Senator Inhofe. Yeah. The KN-11, I guess it is. Well, then
    you agree with General Stewart----
        Admiral Haney. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Inhofe.--that Iran is developing that capability,
    too.
        Admiral Rogers, I became very close to your predecessor,
    Alexander. You and I have talked about that. One of the things
    that's interesting about the cyber issue is, it's something
    that people don't know anything about. Americans don't
    understand it. They think about hackers and identity theft and
    that type of thing, but they don't really know how it works.
    But, they know it needs more funding. That puts you in a
    different situation than anybody else is in. Now, that's one of
    the few areas where the DOD budget has been enhanced. Right
    now, it's up--it's 14 billion proposed increase in cyber
    security this year, up 1 billion from last year.
        Now, we have heard what would happen--what would be the
    first thing that you would have to do, and the consequences,
    should the sequestration come in?
        Admiral Rogers. The first impact I'd probably see is that
    the services would tell me I can't generate the mission force
    that you're counting on execute the mission, so I'd have to go
    to my fellow commanders, operationally, and say, ``I'm either
    going to need to reprioritize and redistribute existing
    manpower and capability, and remove it from you and provide it
    to someone else, or you're just going to have to go without.''
        The other thing that concerns me about sequestration--
    because I still hear this from my civilian workforce; in
    particular, at Cyber Command--my workforce still talks, at
    times, about the impact of the government shutdown, when they
    didn't come to work. I remember telling them at the time,
    ``Stay the course with us. The Nation needs you. We need you. I
    believe that this is just a temporary aberration and that,
    hopefully, over time, we'll have stability, and you can build a
    long-term career with us.'' Because, quite frankly, for most of
    the workforce that I'm responsible for leading, they could make
    a whole lot more money on the outside, and they are gobbled
    up--it's--whenever they decide they want to leave, they have no
    problems getting jobs. If we go into the sequestration
    scenario, one of my concerns is, Does the workforce say, ``Aha,
    this is just another example of how I cannot count on stability
    with the government, so maybe I need to go to the private
    sector''?
        Senator Inhofe. Yeah. You know, that--my time's expired,
    but that was exactly the primary concern that Alexander had
    when he was in that, because the people--there's a huge market
    for your guys on the outside.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Heinrich.
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
        Admiral Haney, as you're well aware, STRATCOM set the
    requirement for a common warhead to be used for both the
    military requirements of the ICBM and the submarine-launch
    ballistic missile. That warhead has now been shelved for at
    least 5 years while we deal with other pressing concerns. I
    wanted to ask you if it wouldn't make more sense, potentially,
    that, instead of shelving the design, to, rather, keep a low-
    level effort in place. I raise that issue, in large part,
    because of the necessity of maintaining the requisite talent
    and design skills capability among our physicists at Los Alamos
    National Laboratories.
        Admiral Haney. Senator Heinrich, I want to first salute the
    work that the Laboratories do to support the missions of U.S.
    Strategic Command. They are involved in a lot of life extension
    program work for us, and surveillance program, which is
    critical for us to be able to use these warheads that now are
    of age of around 27 years.
        In regards to your question, what we sometimes call the
    ``interoperable warhead,'' the business that we're already
    working toward is where we can have commonality in some of the
    electrical components and what have you. The designers are
    working toward that.
        As we've described here, the limits of sequestration in our
    budget has required us to prioritize things. So, the Nuclear
    Weapons Council, which is a big group that includes both
    Department of Defense and Department of Energy and National
    Security Agency (NSA), have been working hard to get that
    prioritization right while at the same time paying close
    attention to how we are keeping the workforce employed. These
    life extension programs are challenges, and they're working
    hard at those designs, too.
        Senator Heinrich. Would you say that the limits of that
    sequestration are so limiting that you're forced to make some
    decisions that may be penny wise and pound foolish?
        Admiral Haney. I wouldn't exactly--I would say, with
    sequestration, across our Department, absolutely we will be
    making decisions----
        Senator Heinrich. Yeah, not referring to the President's
    Budget, but if we go to full sequestration Budget Control Act
    levels.
        Admiral Haney. Absolutely, Senator.
        Senator Heinrich. Admiral Rogers, I wanted to return to
    something you sort of touched on tangentially in the reality
    that it's evident that many of the good people who do work for
    you could make a lot more money on the outside. We're seeing an
    increasing number of private-sector firms that are collecting
    and analyzing, disseminating cyberthreat intelligence for
    commercial customers. What do you--have you given much thought
    to what you think the proper role is for the private sector to
    play in cyberthreat intelligence collection and analysis? As
    the market for cyberthreat intelligence continues to grow, how
    does the IC plan to better leverage commercial efforts as part
    of its overall mission balance?
        Admiral Rogers. So, in the end, the nature of cyber, this
    is the ultimate team sport, in my experience. This--the key to
    our effectiveness as a Nation, I believe, in no small part will
    be driven by, How can we bring together the capabilities of the
    private sector and the public sector? It's one reason, for
    example, why I believe that cyber information-sharing
    legislation is so critical. We have got to provide incentives
    and cover, if you will, for the private sector to be able to
    move information to the government, and for the government to
    be able to push information to the private sector.
        In terms of the way we partner, the aftermath of Sony was a
    very good example, where we not only collaborated, wearing my
    NSA hat, between NSA, the FBI, Sony, as well as the private
    security firm they had hired. It's--the four of us collaborated
    together to come up with, Here's the conclusion, and here's the
    basis out of the conclusion, the fact that it was the North
    Koreans that did this. That was really powered in no small
    part, and significantly aided by the fact, that we were able to
    do it in partnership. That's a model, to me, for the future.
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you.
        Mr. Chairman, I'll yield back the remainder of my time.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Fischer.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for your service to our country, and
    for being here today.
        Admiral Haney, when we look at our nuclear force structure,
    I understand that we're locked in with the treaties that we
    have with Russia, but yet the United States provides that
    extended deterrence, and we have commitments with NATO and
    Australia, South Korea, Japan. As we look at the world today,
    we hear a lot of concern about other countries looking at
    developing or buying a nuclear weapon. When we look at that
    future proliferation that may be out there, how challenging is
    it going to be for us to be able to provide that extended
    deterrence to the allies that we now have commitments to?
        Admiral Haney. Senator Fischer, I would say, first and
    foremost, the assurance we provide those nations you mentioned
    is as important as deterrence, and we take that mission very
    seriously. With it, the key is not to have other nations go to
    nuclear capabilities. In our various talks with our key allies
    and partners, that piece is something that we do talk about
    and--to make sure nations like North Korea, as you've
    mentioned, understand that--I'm sorry, South Korea--understand
    that they are under our umbrella, and that we take that mission
    seriously.
        If we were to allow other nations--if other nations were to
    go off and build their own nuclear arsenal, the problem would
    be worse, and my other mission set of combating weapons of mass
    destruction at large would be problematic--problematic for the
    Nation and for the globe as a whole.
        Senator Fischer. How would that change our force structure?
    How would that change the plans we have for future deployment?
        Admiral Haney. That would more complicate our force
    structure and operational planning associated with it.
        Senator Fischer. Historically, we've looked at tactical
    nuclear weapons and our strategic nuclear weapons differently.
    They're considered differently when we have our arms
    agreements. Is that correct?
        Admiral Haney. Senator, they have, in the past; but I will
    say that, if you had a nonstrategic or tactical nuclear weapon
    go off anywhere in the world, that, too, would have a strategic
    effect.
        Senator Fischer. So, do you think the line between the two
    is breaking down?
        Admiral Haney. I wouldn't say the line is breaking down. I
    think the business of making sure we can account for both
    strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons is important today
    as it is in our future. It's just the arms control agreements
    we have today, such as New START Treaty, does not cover the
    nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
        Senator Fischer. Do we need to be looking at considering
    that in future arms control treaties? How important is that?
        Admiral Haney. I believe it's very important, given the
    numbers of nuclear weapons that are in this nonstrategic
    category. I've said that publicly before.
        Senator Fischer. Admiral, when we look at cyber space and
    cyber security, I've--I appreciated Admiral Rogers' comments
    about not just being on the defense, but being on the offense.
    How important do you think that is? What signals do we need to
    send, not just to nations, other nations out there, but to the
    criminal element, to unsavory characters that are continuing to
    attack our agencies and private businesses? What kind of
    signals do we need to send, and how are we going to be able to
    draw that line in the sand to say that, ``You can't cross
    this''?
        Admiral Haney. Senator Fischer, I think it's important, as
    we go forward, one, in working as we are with other nations
    associated with cyber norms. I think the definitions are
    required. As mentioned earlier in this hearing, the business of
    solidifying policies, such that we can share that piece, is
    required. So, we have to have the whole of whole, from defense
    to offensive capabilities, in order to address this problem
    and, again, to ensure others understand they can't escalate
    their way.
        Senator Fischer. As we work on these policies, should we be
    working with our allies on those policies, as well, to make a
    stronger statement?
        Admiral Haney. I fundamentally believe we have to, because
    we have to have an international norm, but we have to, as a
    country, galvanize around the policies, ourselves, because the
    threat is on us today.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir, I appreciate your
    comments.
        Chairman McCain. Senator King.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I'm sitting here listening particularly to Admiral Haney's
    testimony about recapitalizing, and realizing one of the wacky
    things about the Federal budgeting process is, we have no
    capital budget. We're buying 30- and 40-year assets out of
    cashflow. There are things it's appropriate to borrow for,
    including 30- and 40-year assets, whether they're highways or
    strategic bombers or Ohio-class submarines. Of course, now
    we're borrowing to pay salaries and park rangers and soldiers
    and sailors, so--but, it's--it is something--it's a larger
    issue that we should be talking about, in terms of the budget
    process. I'm going from here to the Budget Committee, and I
    believe the Chair of the Budget Committee feels the same way,
    that we should have--it's one of the few large institutions I
    know of that doesn't have an operating budget and a capital
    budget. That would be--it would be a lot more sensible to buy a
    Ohio-class submarine and finance it over 30 years or 20 years,
    particularly at interest rates that we have now. We're trying
    to capitalize out of cash, which really doesn't make much
    sense.
        Second, Admiral Haney, you've talked about the nuclear
    deterrent. Clearly it's been effective and important for almost
    70 years. How do we deter nonstate actors who are irrational?
    How does our deterrent--our--the theory of deterrence assumes a
    state actor who is at least moderately rational and worries
    about losing their lives or the lives of their--people of their
    country. How does--how do we develop a new theory of
    deterrence, or deterrence 2.0, that would have some impact on a
    terrorist group that gets a hold of one of these warheads and
    tucks it into the--a container headed into the Port of Newark?
        Admiral Haney. Senator King, very important questions. As
    we look at deterring nonstate actors, as you stated, the real
    key here still is a cost-benefit deterrence equation. It's a
    foundation to deterrence at large. So, we have to make sure
    it's extremely costly to prevent them from, first off, eating
    their hands when a weapon of mass destruction--in the first
    place; but making sure, every step of the way, that we have to
    put enough inhibitors in place so that, in order to even
    achieve the objective of obtaining one is hard, and ultimately
    so that they won't be able to get the benefit they seek to
    attain. This is why efforts in combating weapons of mass
    destruction are very important today, in nonproliferation, so
    that----
        Senator King. Intelligence, I assume, is big--a big part
    of----
        Admiral Haney. Foundational intelligence is huge. The
    sharing of that intelligence from nation to nation is also very
    important.
        Senator King. I would just suggest that this is an area
    that bears some very serious discussion and thought. I know
    it's going on, but I think it is, as we think about deterrence.
        I will report some good news. The Intelligence Committee,
    last week, reported out a cyber-sharing--cyber information-
    sharing bill, 14 to 1. We're hoping that will move forward
    rather quickly. It's long overdue.
        Admiral Rogers, I presume you are supportive of that.
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir, I am.
        Senator King. Finally, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to associate
    myself with your comments. I--the--I just think it's critical
    to develop an offensive cyber capability.
        By the way, developing it isn't enough. We have to tell
    people that we have it; otherwise, it's not a deterrent. There
    has to be a price to be paid. I think the escalation of this
    capability by our potential adversaries is alarming and very
    real. We've--how many--I guess the question is, How many
    warning shots do we have to have, between Target and Sony and
    the Sands Casino, before we start telling the world, ``If you
    do this to us, you will pay a price?'' Because right now, as I
    think you testified, there's no price to be paid.
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir, I agree very strongly with the
    concerns you raise and the fact that we do have to take a look
    at the offensive piece as a part of that whole deterrent idea.
    Otherwise, we are on the wrong end of this equation, from a
    cost and a results perspective, and that's not a good place for
    us to be.
        Senator King. But, remember Dr. Strangelove, ``If you build
    a doomsday machine, you've got to tell people you have it.
    Otherwise''----
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir. It's all part of that deterrent
    idea.
        Senator King.--``the purpose is thwarted.''
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. You're showing your age.
        [Laughter.]
        Chairman McCain. Senator Cotton.
        Senator King. I could come back, Mr. Chairman, but I'm not
    going to.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Cotton. Hopefully, I won't show my age.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for coming. Thanks, to all those who
    sit behind you and all the ones you represent in your various
    commands, and all the work they do to help keep our country
    safe.
        Admiral Rogers, thank you for hosting me recently at the
    NSA and Cyber Command. General Selva, Admiral Haney, I hope to
    be able to visit your commands sometime soon, as well. Since
    they're not right down the street, it makes it a little bit
    harder to get there.
        I, too, want to support the statement of Senator King and
    Senator McCain about the need to develop offensive cyber
    capacities. It's far beyond the technical means that I learned
    as an infantryman, but basic infantry doctrine said, simply,
    ``You're on the offense when you're moving, and you're on the
    defense when you're not on the offense.'' So, that means you're
    on the defense when you're sitting there waiting for someone to
    attack you, which is not the posture we want to have.
        All of you have said in your statements, both written and
    oral and in response to questions, about the ongoing negative
    and severe impacts that sequestration has had on our
    capabilities. We are now in a debate about what to do on that
    topic. One proposal in the budgets of the House and Senate
    Budget Committees, which are works in process--I don't expect
    you to comment on them--is to leave the base budget where it
    currently would be, at $498 billion, and potentially increase
    wartime spending or what we call ``overseas contingency
    operations'' spending in this building by up to $90 billion.
    So, the total DOD budget would be almost $600 billion. I'd just
    like to get your thoughts--again, not necessarily on those
    budget documents, but on the general concept of keeping
    sequestration caps in place, but having substantially higher
    overseas contingency operations spending. We can start with
    Admiral Haney and move down the line.
        Admiral Haney. Senator Cotton, overseas contingency
    operational funding can be problematic, in terms of what you
    can use it for. But, even more importantly, I think, is the
    long-term planning. When we talk about having the government,
    the military, operate more efficiently, we have to be able to
    deal with it on more than just one year at a time. Without the
    ability to have that long-term planning and the flexibility,
    where you take cuts and what have you, we will be even--we will
    be inefficient, quite frankly, and it will raise havoc, in
    terms of our joint military force capability at large.
        Senator Cotton. General Selva.
        General Selva. Senator, I worry that an incremental
    approach to sequestration relief will put us in a place where,
    as Senator King said, we'll find ourselves being penny wise and
    pound foolish. Inside the transportation and distribution
    enterprise, when we see a decrease in the demand signal that's
    the result of bringing forces out of Afghanistan, that's a
    reason to celebrate. When we watch a decrease in mission set
    that's a consequence of services cutting their exercise and
    readiness programs, that also plays a demand signal on the
    transportation enterprise. That puts us in a place where we are
    likely to be less ready than we ever have been in our prior
    history. It's a consequence of the services not knowing where
    the next marginal dollar is going to come from.
        So, if we take an incremental approach to sequestration
    relief, you still create the same kind of uncertainty that
    makes us inefficient and ineffective. So, I would worry that,
    with that proposal, not knowing any of the details behind it.
        Senator Cotton. Admiral Rogers.
        Admiral Rogers. I would echo the comments of my colleagues.
    The other point I would make, from a Cyber Command perspective,
    is, we're a relatively young, immature organization. We are
    just starting, if you will, the buildout of our capabilities. I
    don't have decades of investment that I can fall back on. So,
    this is all--as we're trying to build a long-term sustained
    plan in a high-threat and ever-growing environment, this up-
    and-down annual incremental approach to doing business makes it
    very difficult for us to build a long-term sustainable plan in
    the face of this ever-increasing threat.
        Senator Cotton. So, if I could maybe synthesize what I'm
    hearing from the three of you, this approach of significantly
    increasing Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) spending, but
    leaving the base budget where it is, may be better than
    nothing, only slightly better, though, because of the
    inefficiencies and the difficulty for the long-term planning
    you require?
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
        Admiral Haney. Absolutely. I'd also say it's a signal to
    our adversaries of how serious we are on deterrence assurance
    and ensuring we have a military capability.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        Let me move to--from one--the very big topic to a very
    small, but important, topic. General Selva, coming up on the
    summer season, Permenant Change of Station (PCS) season, big
    delays recently in shipping privately owned vehicles, Outside
    the Continental United States (OCONUS) for our troops that are
    going overseas. It's a significant emotional event whenever a
    family gets OCONUS and doesn't have their vehicle. Can you talk
    to us about what we've done to avoid that--those kind of delays
    this year?
        General Selva. Yes, sir. I had a meeting with the
    contractor that holds that contract, on the 12th of February,
    and the subject of the meeting was their training program,
    their employment program, the number of employees they have
    onboard, and the operational concepts that they intend to use
    this summer to meet the--what we would call the ``summer
    surge.'' We'll move about 40,000 cars through the summer season
    as we move soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coastguardsmen,
    and State Department employees around the world. They presented
    a plan. The plan is reasonable. We have looked at--inside the
    Command, at all of the metrics that we'll use to measure that
    execution. I demanded from the company that they provide me
    with the underlying subcontracts that I could review with the
    people that are going to provide those services. It is a
    reasonable operational plan. It's their responsibility to
    execute. I'll use all the tools that exist in the contract to
    compel them to execute throughout the summer.
        Senator Cotton. Good.
        Thank you.
        Chairman McCain. Admiral Haney and General Selva and
    Admiral, if you had a choice between OCO and the present
    sequestration level, which would you choose?
        General Selva. Sir, that's a choice between the devil and
    the deep blue sea, but to balance the checkbook, I would take
    the OCO.
        Chairman McCain. Admiral?
        Admiral Haney. Senator McCain, obviously having more money
    is better than having less, so obviously I would take the
    choice of having OCO. But, it doesn't do much for U.S.
    Strategic Command, because procurement in those kind of things
    aren't what we use OCO for.
        Chairman McCain. Actually, we're putting provisions in to
    allow that procurement and modernization in the OCO provision.
        Admiral Rogers?
        Admiral Rogers. Similar to General Selva, more money is
    better than less. We--clearly, you'd be presenting us a
    challenge, but we get paid to deal with challenges and work
    through them.
        Chairman McCain. Thank you.
        Senator Donnelly.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you all for being here.
        Admiral Rogers, the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane, in
    Indiana, does a lot of work in counterfeit activities, and I
    was wondering how you characterize this threat and its
    potential impact on our systems.
        Admiral Rogers. So, I assume we're talking about
    substituting gray market or other----
        Senator Donnelly. Correct.
        Admiral Rogers.--material in the supply chain.
        Senator Donnelly. Yes.
        Admiral Rogers. I apologize. I just want to make sure we're
    not talking about counterfeit money.
        Senator Donnelly. No. Good.
        Admiral Rogers. That was my fault.
        It's something that we clearly, the services, and
    particularly because of their function in the man, train, and
    equip, that's primarily a service responsibility. In my
    previous job, where I was a service-focused individual, it's a
    topic we spent a good deal of time on, particularly in the more
    important higher-tiered areas of readiness--for example, in the
    nuclear arena, where we spend a lot of time ensuring that the
    structure that we have purchased, that we have put in place,
    does not have compromises and vulnerabilities built within it.
    It's an area that I think we're going to need to increase our
    focus over time. We just went through an issue, for example,
    with one of the services, where we found, in a particular
    system that they had been buying, a handful of instances where
    the vendor had not complied fully with the contract and had put
    some other components in. So, it is a topic we see.
        Senator Donnelly. Okay, thank you.
        Admiral Haney, I'd like to get your thoughts on the
    conventional prompt-strike research and development efforts
    that are underway and what you feel the value of the system is
    to STRATCOM.
        Admiral Haney. Senator Donnelly, I fully support the
    research we're doing associated with the conventional prompt
    global strike capability. It's a capability I see some of our
    adversaries are working on--potential adversaries. To me, it's
    all about, How do you hold at risk the enemy, particularly as I
    look at a lot of the capability, whether it's counterspace,
    whether it's jamming equipment, all the way to intercontinental
    ballistic missiles that are on mobile transport capability. An
    ability to hold it at risk in multiple ways is very important
    in the deterrence equation. I think conventional prompt global
    strike provides this, Senator.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
        This would be for any of you who want to answer. We've seen
    some extraordinarily loose talk from Putin recently regarding
    nuclear weapons, regarding using them as an option in regards
    to Crimea, that he was thinking about. They're presently
    involved in exercises, which have expanded from the Arctic to
    include activities along the Finnish border, the deployment of
    strategic weapon systems to Kaliningrad in Crimea, positions
    across the Baltic fleet, the Black Sea fleet, the western and
    southern military districts. It seems to form a nuclear
    narrative. You know, we have to take him at his word, it seems
    to me, in his actions that he's showing and in what he's
    saying.
        Admiral Rogers, I'll start with you. Do you see this as a
    significant increase in the posturing there? How do you regard
    this as we move forward?
        Admiral Rogers. If you look across the board, you've seen--
    other combatant commanders have testified in front of you. I
    remember seeing Admiral Gortney's testimony, highlighting that
    we're seeing a spectrum of operations. Cyber is no different.
    I'm seeing a much more active Russia in the cyber arena in a
    much more visible way. I think just as we're seeing with their
    use of long-range aviation, their public posturing, some of the
    statements you and other members of the committee have
    referenced. I think our Russian friends are definitely trying
    to send us a very strong message about what is acceptable to
    them and what is not.
        Senator Donnelly. Admiral Haney, you are, I presume that--
    you know, we had talked before--seeing the same kinds of ramp-
    up in the cyber area. What do you expect in the years ahead?
        Admiral Haney. Well, to enter the cyber domain, as has been
    echoed by many folks, many pundits, it doesn't take a lot of
    money to enter that domain, in terms of getting the equipment.
    It does take money for adversaries to invest--become high-end
    in it. I think Admiral Rogers would agree with me there. So,
    consequently, I think it's very important that we continue to
    work hard across the spectrum.
        But, I will say, as we look at the future, we have to look
    at cross-domain deterrence options and be mindful in each. For
    strategic capability, I look at that in cyber, space, and
    nuclear. Very important to not just look at just one. We have
    to be effective across the whole of whole.
        Senator Donnelly. General?
        General Selva. Sir, you're taking me out of my----
        Senator Donnelly. Oh. Then I'll----
        General Selva.--comfort zone. But, I will say, the buildup
    of the rhetoric puts us in a place where, strategically, we
    have to be able to respond to that attempt to intimidate the
    countries in Russia's near abroad. The two men sitting at both
    of my sides are the guys that own the tools to do that.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. [presiding] Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Lee, please.
        Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thanks, to all of you, for being here today.
        My first question, I'll direct to Admiral Haney and Admiral
    Rogers, or either one of you or both of you if you both want to
    answer it. On March 11th, the Russian government announced what
    it referred to as a ``year of friendship with North Korea.'' It
    appears that Kim Jong-un will visit Moscow in May. Do you
    anticipate that the enhancement of the Russian/North Korean
    relationship might result in the expedited developed of North
    Korean nuclear weapons or cyber capabilities? Can you speak to
    the relationship, specifically the military relationship,
    between these two countries?
        Admiral Haney. One, I would say, to really get in depth
    would require a classified setting. I will echo what you said,
    though, it is problematic seeing Russia and North Korea in
    working any form of a partnership, our ability to see where
    this will go for the future. We know North Korea's ambitions,
    in terms of their demonstrated cyber, their ambitions for
    nuclear weapons, the tests that they've already occurred. We
    think they already have miniaturized some of these capability.
    Clearly we know where their aspirations are. So, I see both
    nations--Russia wanting to have partnerships with others, and
    they're looking at whatever mechanism they can to--in order to
    reduce strategic stability in their favor.
        Admiral Rogers. I would echo Admiral Haney's comment.
    Clearly, we're going to be spending a lot of time focused on
    this, because a North Korea that is able to access nuclear and
    cyber technology from Russia is of great concern to us. So,
    it's something we'll be paying great attention to.
        Senator Lee. Thank you.
        Then, Admiral Haney, a recent report out of John Hopkins
    University indicated that North Korea could possess nearly 100
    nuclear devices by 2019, while continuing to make significant
    progress in its ballistics program. Does our current schedule
    to deploy 44 ground-based interceptors and upgrade their kill
    vehicles keep pace with the development of the threat to the
    homeland that may be presented by North Korea or perhaps other
    ballistic missile threats to the United States?
        Admiral Haney. Today, Senator, we are working to ensure we
    have a system of systems, a layered system associated with our
    missile defense capability, to include the ground-based
    interceptors. Two areas I will highlight that we have to work
    on--and I think President budget 2016 provides for that--that
    is getting the kill vehicle right. It has to be effective in
    order to enhance shot doctrine. Also our ability to have more
    significant improvement in discrimination is important in order
    to hold at risk things that would come toward the homeland.
    Those are two areas--we can bean-count what North Korea may or
    may not have and what we have and our capability, but we've got
    to get those two pieces right, while, at the same time, when
    you look at the whole of whole and other solutions. In order to
    get any further into that, I'd have to have a classified
    setting.
        Senator Lee. Okay. Thank you. I understand.
        Admiral Rogers, what level of command and control by the--
    is there by the governments of Russia, China, and Iran over
    their--what we might call their cyber warriors? In other words,
    do they report into some sort of centralized command structure,
    or do they enjoy a degree of autonomy that gives their
    governments plausible deniability for their actions?
        Admiral Rogers. In an unclassified structure, what I would
    highlight is, each of the three use a slightly different
    structure, but, in each case, the cyber activities we have seen
    to date display a strong and direct linkage between the
    individual actors doing the actual activity and the Nation-
    state directing it.
        One of the things we'll be looking for in the future,
    though, Do nation-states start to try to confuse our
    attribution ability by creating different relationship, for
    example, using other partners, trying to distance themselves in
    a visible way so their activity is not as directly
    attributable? I think that's a trend that we're going to be
    looking for.
        Senator Lee. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I see my time has expired.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Lee.
        Senator Gillibrand, please.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Rogers, CYBERCOM obviously, as we've discussed
    today, has a wide range of responsibilities. How do you deal
    with unexpected threats?
        Admiral Rogers. Like any other military organization, we
    quickly reprioritize and look to see where can we take risk
    elsewhere.
        Senator Gillibrand. Do you have the capability that you
    need for those unexpected threats, particularly in cyber?
        Admiral Rogers. One of the issues that I've raised
    internally in the Department, to be honest, is the idea that,
    in creating the force, we've allocated it all very specifically
    across the board. So, one of the implications, which I think
    goes to your point, is: So we perhaps didn't build in as much
    flexibility as our experience now is telling us perhaps we
    need. So, that's something, to be honest, within the Department
    that we're going to be looking at.
        Senator Gillibrand. Is that----
        Admiral Rogers. We need to----
        Senator Gillibrand.--sort of a perspective of----
        Admiral Rogers.--relook----
        Senator Gillibrand.--technology or personnel?
        Admiral Rogers. It's less technology, to me, and it's much
    more about just the resources, people, and the equipment, and
    their focus.
        Senator Gillibrand. So, if you're going to create a longer-
    term, more resilient strategy for getting the personnel that
    you need and the expertise that you need and the retention that
    you need--because we talked about how these guys, you know, are
    offered very high salaries at Google, the minute they walk
    out--how do you deal with that?
        Admiral Rogers. Knock on wood, across each of the services
    we have met or exceeded all of our accession targets, bringing
    manpower in, and our ability to retain people. It will never be
    about competing head-to-head with salary. Where we are going to
    compete, as we do in all--in many other areas of the military--
    is the ethos of our organization, the culture of our
    organization which is focused on service to the Nation, the
    fact that we are going to give you an amazing mission that you
    can't do anywhere else, the fact that we're going to give you a
    lot of responsibility at a very young level. That's our model.
    Then, lastly, we're going to let you do it in some really
    interesting places around the world, to include, if you're a
    real adrenaline junky, I can get you to Afghanistan, I can get
    you to Iraq. We have capabilities there that we're using on a
    regular basis.
        Senator Gillibrand. So, we don't yet--we haven't developed
    a built-in surge strategy yet, so we don't have the backup we
    would need, given a crisis, yet.
        Admiral Rogers. So--right, I have no capability right now
    that we haven't allocated against the mission set. It's not
    surprising--if I could--it's not surprising, in the sense that
    we're in the early stage of this effort. But, you do raise a
    concern that I have talked about.
        Senator Gillibrand. Have you thought about creating a
    stronger relationship with regard to that need within the
    Reserve components?
        Admiral Rogers. I would tell you that the Reserve component
    is an active part of our--and a very important part of the
    entire structure. That structure we're creating, of 6200
    people, that isn't all Active. That isn't all military, either.
        Senator Gillibrand. Because I could imagine, given the
    needs of current day, that you might even create a
    complementary recruiting strategy among the Reserves, with
    experts in the field. Meaning you go directly to the people you
    actually want and say, ``Would you consider joining the
    Reserves?'' Have you considered that kind of active
    recruitment?
        Admiral Rogers. In fact, right now we're actually doing
    kind of even interesting test pilot with the Reserves and the
    capability we're creating in Silicon Valley.
        Senator Gillibrand. Exactly. That's----
        Admiral Rogers. It's a kind of interesting----
        Senator Gillibrand.--exactly what I am talking about.
        Admiral Rogers. Right.
        Senator Gillibrand. Well, to the extent this is an approach
    of a strategy that you think is meaningful, I would be
    grateful, to the extent you need support for that, to ask the
    committee.
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Gillibrand. Because I've had a long-term concern
    that we need to get the best and brightest to work for us and
    to be part of our cyber support, and also we need really strong
    cyber warriors. You have to build them over time, they have to
    understand how the military works, and that takes investment
    and long-term----
        Admiral Rogers. Right.
        Senator Gillibrand.--investment. Frankly, very flexible
    strategy. So, I'm grateful that you are starting that pilot
    approach with Silicon Valley. I'd suggest that you amplify
    that, because I think it is exactly where we need to go,
    especially given budget concerns. If you----
        Admiral Rogers. Right.
        Senator Gillibrand.--can't have everyone full-time, and you
    can't have the full complement you need at all times, at least
    create the support you need through the Reserve components.
        With regard to training, are you able to create the
    training you need both with Active Duty and Reserve components,
    and to keep it as up to date as necessary?
        Admiral Rogers. To date, yes. But, I'll be honest, because
    we're in the early parts of the journey, here. What we need to
    do is generate more insight and knowledge to see what's our
    ability to sustain this over time. Because we're still really
    focused on the initial cadre. The challenge is going to be, So
    how do you sustain it as people come and go? That's something
    we're going to be, in the next year or two, in particular,
    spending a lot of time on.
        Senator Gillibrand. Well, again, I'd like to work with you
    on meeting the needs that you have to meet these requirements.
    I think it's vital that you have a very active conversation
    with this committee so that we can support you.
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
        Admiral Rogers. Thank you for your concern.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Gillibrand.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony, thank you for your
    service to the Nation.
        On behalf of Chairman McCain, I would adjourn the hearing.

        [Whereupon, at 11:00 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                  Questions Submitted by Senator James Inhofe
        1. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Haney, General Selva, Admiral Rogers,
    Secretary Carter testified to this committee a couple of weeks ago that
    ``readiness remains at troubling levels across the force'' and ``that
    even with the fiscal year 2016 budget, the Army, Navy and Marine Corps
    won't reach their readiness goals until 2020 and the Air Force until
    2023.'' General Dempsey testified that the fiscal year 2016 President's
    Budget is ``what we need to remain at the lower ragged edge of
    manageable risk in our ability to execute the defense strategy'' and
    that ``we have no slack, no margin left for error or strategic
    surprise.'' Do you each agree with these statements?
        Admiral Haney. Yes, I agree with these statements. Failure to pass
    the fiscal year 2016 President's Budget will negatively impact our
    ability to maintain and improve force readiness, particularly for my
    Nuclear Deterrent Forces, Space Forces and Cyber Forces.
        A return to sequestration levels, will inject significant risk into
    our ability to provide the US with the strategic capabilities required
    and fulfill the defense strategy outlined in the Quadrennial Defense
    Review. Equally disconcerting is the lack of long-term budget
    certainty, which serves to undermine readiness, strategic planning and
    effective acquisition.
        General Selva. Yes. USTRANSCOM remains ready today to respond to
    any contingency or geographic combatant command requirement for
    movement of forces; however, significant recapitalization and
    modernization are necessary to meet future expected demand for
    transportation services.
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]

        2. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Haney, General Selva, Admiral Rogers,
    does the proposed fiscal year 2016 budget support/meet each of your
    requirements?
        Admiral Haney. The fiscal year 2016 President's Budget submission
    supports USSTRATCOM's mission requirements. USSTRATCOM fully
    participated in the formulation of the Department's budget, and the
    President's submission strikes a responsible balance between national
    priorities and fiscal realities. The President's Budget, albeit with
    some risk, provides the funding necessary to maintain a safe, secure,
    and effective nuclear deterrent force; address threats to the space-
    based capabilities our forces depend upon; and field a robust
    cyberspace force.
        However, any substantial departure from the President's Budget, to
    include a return to sequestration levels, will inject significant risk
    into our ability to provide the US with the strategic capabilities
    required and fulfill the defense strategy outlined in the Quadrennial
    Defense Review.
        Equally disconcerting is the lack of long-term budget certainty,
    which serves to undermine readiness, strategic planning and effective
    acquisition.
        General Selva. Yes. USTRANSCOM operates under the Transportation
    Working Capital Fund, a revolving fund for defense transportation.
    USTRANSCOM manages cash on a daily basis by assessing whether the end-
    of-day cash balance is within established tolerance limits and
    associated risks. The fiscal year 2016 Transportation Working Capital
    Fund's budgeted cash balance is sufficient to maintain mission
    operations. In the event USTRANSCOM is directed to support real world,
    unforeseen contingency/humanitarian missions, we are able to quickly
    determine if we have sufficient cash available to initiate mission
    operations until customers can be billed and these billings can be
    liquidated by supported customers when they have secured appropriate
    funding.
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]

        3. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Haney, General Selva, Admiral Rogers, if
    sequestration is not repealed, even partially, can you give us some
    context in terms of risks to readiness of personnel, equipment,
    training, etc. and how that ``ragged edge'' impacts you?
        Admiral Haney. While my Service partners are likely better
    positioned to answer this question, I remain concerned that if fiscal
    constraints are imposed by the Budget Control Act, I will no longer be
    able to guarantee the strategic capabilities the Nation needs. Any
    substantial departure from the President's Budget, to include a return
    to sequestration levels, would weaken our national defense, provide
    encouragement and momentum to America's foes, and will inject
    significant risk into our ability to provide the US with the strategic
    capabilities required to fulfill the defense strategy outlined in the
    Quadrennial Defense Review.
        While I share the Services' concerns over current and near-term
    readiness my challenge is also structuring the force of tomorrow in the
    face of clear, emerging strategic threats. So, the central issue for US
    Strategic Command is long-term funding stability at President's Budget
    levels to see us through a demanding, almost unprecedented, period of
    simultaneous sustainment, recapitalization and building capacity across
    our mission areas. For example, we've all taken notice of the growing
    and projected nuclear capabilities of Russia and China. To prepare for
    these developments we must sustain the current force while developing
    the future force across every platform, payload and supporting
    infrastructure. Sequestration jeopardizes the recent progress we've
    made in carrying out the Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise improvements
    identified in both the internal and external reviews as well as in a
    modernization program that no longer has margin for delay. The Ohio
    Class SSBN's service life, as one prime example, has been extended from
    30 to 42 years, longer than any submarine in U.S. history. Another
    example is our ability to modernize our National and Nuclear Command,
    Control and Communications infrastructure to keep pace with adversary
    developments and to ensure the President is able to maintain assured,
    continuous connectivity to our strategic forces.
        We face especially difficult challenges in two domains that are now
    central to our National Security Strategy and Joint capabilities--space
    and cyberspace. In space we are recapitalizing major segments of our
    on-orbit systems while the domain itself is becoming dangerously
    contested. The solution requires enhanced space domain awareness
    capability, persistent development and fielding over several years to
    create space control systems and a robust command and control
    capability able to deal with the counterspace threat and preserve the
    advantage we enjoy today from our space--based systems. Likewise in
    cyberspace, we've seen enough evidence to know this is a potential
    vector for an adversary's strategic attack--especially against our most
    critical infrastructure. We are building capacity where little or none
    existed before which, again, will take multiple budget cycles to
    develop, train and field. We require sustained investment to counter
    this cyber threat.
        Our potential adversaries are working hard to deny us access
    through their electronic warfare activities. Sequestration threatens
    our ability to ensure future spectrum dominance essential to enabling
    the Joint force.
        While our current missile defense systems are protecting the
    homeland against limited threats, those threats will likely not stay
    limited forever. Rogue states continue to make advances which challenge
    our indications and warning, and have the potential to saturate our
    sensors and overwhelm our command and control. Stable funding allows us
    to pursue game changing technologies to put us on the right end of the
    cost curve and to stay relevant and effective against advancing
    countermeasures.
        In short, the challenges we face will require a consistent level of
    funding across multiple budget years to have confidence we can develop
    and field the right force in the future.
        General Selva. When General Dempsey testified about our being on a
    ``ragged edge,'' I believe he was referring to the Department's ability
    to manage risk given a $36 billion increase above sequestration that is
    included in the President's fiscal year 2016 budget. I concur with his
    statement and note that even if the President's Budget is approved as
    requested and sustained through the Fiscal Year Defense Program (FYDP),
    I anticipate that USTRANSCOM readiness issues would still persist
    through at least fiscal year 2019. If, as implied by your question, the
    budget is fully constrained below the President's Budget by
    sequestration from fiscal year 2016 through the FYDP, USTRANSCOM would
    undoubtedly fall off the ``ragged edge'' when it comes to our ability
    to meet the defense transportation system demands set forth by
    Functional and Geographic Combatant Commanders and their associated
    operational plans. As a critical deployment and sustainment enabler to
    all military operations, USTRANSCOM readiness directly impacts
    readiness to global US military commitments and operations as a whole.
    If implemented, sequestration would force major changes to our National
    Strategic and Military Strategies. Sequestration in fiscal year 2016
    through the FYDP would result in cuts to the military Services'
    personnel, equipment, and training directly impacting USTRANSCOM
    readiness and rendering the National Military Strategy unexecutable.
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]

        4. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Haney, General Selva, Admiral Rogers, we
    anticipate that congress will pass a budget resolution that funds
    defense at sequestration levels with additional funding through OCO.
    Assuming sequestration remains the law, do you have to take any actions
    in fiscal year 2015 in your force structure to prepare for
    sequestration in fiscal year 2016? If so, when do those decision need
    to be made?
        Admiral Haney. While my Service partners are likely better
    positioned to answer this question, I know of no force structure
    actions I could take to prepare for a return to Sequestration.
        General Selva. No. USTRANSCOM has not taken steps in fiscal year
    2015 to adjust force structure in preparation for sequestration budget
    levels in fiscal year 2016. If the fiscal year 2016 defense budget is
    set at a sequestration level, USTRANSCOM budget planners will execute
    the budget in coordination and synchronization with DOD leadership and
    our service components.
        Flexibility to execute additional OCO funding for USTRANSCOM
    readiness requirements will provide some relief for one year, but is
    not a long term fix. Our commercial providers, in particular, require
    stable, predictable, funding to continue providing services to the DOD.
    The implementation of sequestration puts those services at risk and
    directly impacts USTRANSCOM's ability to do its mission.
        Admiral Rogers. We are midway through fiscal year 2015 and plans to
    execute current funding are underway leaving little flexibility to make
    adjustments that could place us in a better position for fiscal year
    2016 under Budget Control Act restrictions. Budgetary uncertainty due
    to a potential return to Budget Control Act funding levels is a concern
    for U.S. Cyber Command.
        Budget Control Act reductions would have second and third order
    effects to U.S. Cyber Command and would likely force acceptance of
    higher operational risks due to Services inability to generate mission
    forces needed, forcing a potential reprioritization and redistribution
    of manpower and capability from lower priority Combatant Commands and
    Service requirements leaving those mission severely degraded or not
    accomplished.
                                nuclear weapons
        5. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Haney, in your opinion, what role does
    ``nuclear deterrence'' play in today's world?
        Admiral Haney. Strategic deterrence in the 21st century is far more
    than just nuclear, although our nuclear deterrent remains the ultimate
    guarantor of our security. We must shape our nuclear weapons policies
    and force structure in ways that enable us to meet our most pressing
    security challenges. As stated in the Nuclear Posture Review, the
    fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons remains to deter nuclear
    attack on the United States and its Allies and partners. The United
    States will maintain a credible nuclear deterrent capable of convincing
    any potential adversary that the adverse consequences of attacking the
    United States or our Allies and partners far outweigh any potential
    benefit they may seek to gain from such an attack.
        U.S. nuclear Triad modernization and sustainment programs must be
    fully funded. In doing so, the U.S. demonstrates our continued
    assurance commitments to allies and partners; while also messaging
    strategic resolve to potential adversaries.

        6. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Haney, do you believe our nuclear
    deterrence capability has been challenged by inadequate modernization
    funding and continued modernization by other nuclear powers?
        Admiral Haney. We have deferred our Triad modernization for as long
    as possible. Any further slips will increase risks to carrying out our
    nuclear deterrence and assurance missions and will cause a loss of
    capability and likely increased cost. We have steadily delayed
    investment in critical capabilities like the Ohio Replacement Program,
    the Long Range Strike-Bomber, the Long Range Standoff cruise missile,
    the B61-12 gravity weapon, and the Minuteman III replacement too long.
    We cannot afford to delay or reduce planned modernization for these
    programs any further and must provide stable, sufficient funding in
    fiscal year 2016 and beyond. We must address these capability gaps in
    the coming decade because there is no margin left in the timeline
    required to modernize our strategic forces before our current
    capabilities become unsustainable. Today's complex and dangerous global
    security environment demands we properly sustain and modernize our
    strategic capabilities. The President's fiscal year 2016 Budget
    supports my mission requirements. We cannot afford to underfund these
    vital missions, especially considering adversaries continue modernizing
    their strategic capabilities which results in increased threat to our
    national security.

        7. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Haney, what do you assess as the current
    state of our nuclear triad in relation to today's threats?
        Admiral Haney. I assess the current state of our nuclear Triad
    provides a safe, secure and effective deterrent against today's
    threats. The Triad's combination of unique and complimentary
    attributes, along with associated intelligence, warning, communications
    and infrastructure, remains the foundation for strategic deterrence and
    stability. We are mindful this critical capability requires persistent
    and focused attention as highlighted in the recent Nuclear Enterprise
    Review and the coordinated after-actions of the Department, Combatant
    Commands and Services to ensure the morale and sustainment of the
    force. I'm confident we are on the right path with the right level of
    attention and support.
        I am not, however, as confident going forward in the face of
    emerging, future threats. We've all taken notice, for example, of the
    growing and projected nuclear capabilities of Russia and China. To
    prepare for these developments, we face the challenging situation of
    simultaneous sustainment of the current force while developing the
    future force across every platform and payload in a period of great
    fiscal uncertainty. Indeed, stable funding at a modest fraction of the
    overall DOD budget remains my top concern and priority.
        Sustaining the current Triad is particularly challenging because we
    have extended both platform and payload lifetimes far beyond their
    initial designs while we deferred modernization. For example, the Ohio-
    class SSBNs entered service in 1981, the B-52 bomber in 1952, the Air
    Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) in 1982, the B-2 in 1993, and the
    Minuteman III in 1970. Furthermore, the average age of the weapons in
    our nation's stockpile is over 27 years. Deferred investment decisions
    have eroded remaining margin in timeliness to field new capabilities
    before their legacy counterparts age out.
        Recapitalizing our sea-based strategic deterrence force is my top
    priority. The Ohio Class SSBNs service life has been extended from 30
    to 42 years, longer than any submarine in U.S. history, and will begin
    to retire in 2027. No further extension is possible and maintaining
    operational availability is a growing concern. Stable and consistent
    funding of the Ohio Replacement Program, the life-of-ship reactor core,
    and supporting systems and infrastructure is critical to achieving the
    first deterrence patrol in 2031.
        Planned sustainment and modernization of our dual-capable B-52 and
    B-2 bombers will ensure a credible nuclear bomber capability through
    2040. The follow-on long-range strike bomber (LRS-B), the Long Range
    Stand-Off (LRSO) cruise missile, and the B61-12 gravity weapon ensure
    the future viability of the Triad's air leg and our extended deterrence
    commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
        We can meet the Congressionally-mandated sustainment of the
    Minuteman III through 2030 with near-term investments for the Mk21 fuze
    replacement, ICBM Cryptographic Upgrade, Payload Transporter/
    Transporter-Erector vehicle replacements, and the UH-1N helicopter
    replacement to address age-related issues. An integrated Ground Based
    Strategic Deterrence (GBSD) program will recapitalize the ICBM
    enterprise. The GBSD Analysis of Alternatives is complete and the Air
    Force is developing a fully integrated recapitalization plan to
    maintain the land based force for the next 60 years.
        Nuclear weapons surveillance activities, life extension programs,
    and stockpile stewardship efforts are critical to mitigating age-
    related effects and incorporating improved safety and security features
    in our nuclear arsenal without a return to nuclear testing. Active and
    sustained execution of the Nuclear Weapons Council's (NWC's) `3+2'
    stockpile strategy will produce two air-delivered and three ballistic
    missile warheads to reduce the overall stockpile while meeting
    technical, capability and safety requirements. Sustainment and
    modernization of the nuclear enterprise infrastructure--in physical and
    intellectual terms--is central to implementing the NWC `3+2' strategy
    to ensure critical capabilities are preserved to meet the nation's
    stockpile needs.
        Again, we believe the above sustainment and modernization
    challenges are not only necessary to maintain strategic deterrence and
    stability in the face of future threats but are also achievable with
    continued, stable funding support at a fraction of historic DOD
    spending levels.

        8. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Haney, what happens if our allies that
    rely on the US nuclear umbrella no longer believe it is viable?
        Admiral Haney. The current US strategic force posture is sufficient
    to protect our strategic interests and maintain a credible deterrence.
    Loss of faith in the U.S. nuclear umbrella by U.S. Allies would
    severely damage the credibility of U.S. commitments and could engender
    several significant, cascading, and potentially far-reaching
    consequences. These possibilities include a significant increase in the
    proliferation of nuclear weapons.
                                     cyber
        9. Senator Inhofe. General Selva, what steps have you taken to
    address cyber intrusion and reporting as a result of the Senate Armed
    Services Committee Cyber Report on TRANSCOM?
        General Selva. The Senate Armed Services Committee report brought
    much-needed attention to an important set of challenges faced by
    USTRANSCOM--challenges that translate to operational risk inherited by
    the supported geographic combatant commanders. USTRANSCOM supported the
    Department of Defense (DOD) led effort to identify solutions to the
    broader challenges of risks to missions supported by contractors around
    the department. The Department's effort is already improving
    information sharing among the partners. In order to address the more
    specific challenges that USTRANSCOM faces, the members of the DOD
    interagency team will assemble as a Mission Analysis Task Force--hosted
    by USTRANSCOM--to identify the peculiar information sharing process
    challenges that support USTRANSCOM risk mitigation and responses within
    planning and execution of deployment and distribution operations.
    USTRANSCOM will continue to work with its partners in the Department,
    Intelligence Community, and Interagency to bring to bear the necessary
    authorities to reduce risk to deployment and distribution, and secure
    our national interests.
        USTRANSCOM continues to aggressively execute risk mitigation within
    our existing authorities to address the challenges highlighted in the
    report, including strengthening our contracts, expanding our partnering
    efforts within the Intelligence Community and Interagency, increasing
    internal oversight, and expanding outreach with industry.
        With respect to our contracts, we have recently re-written our
    cyber defense contract language to align with legislation, synchronize
    with Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement requirements,
    and tighten up the intrusion notification and incident reporting
    requirements. Cyber defense requirements are currently in 55 percent
    (165) of our contracts, and our goal remains 100 percent by end of
    fiscal year 2016. Additionally, we increased engagement with the FBI,
    and their support has been sensational. FBI intrusion reports are now
    provided directly to USTRANSCOM's cyber center fusion analysts. Also,
    FBI staff members participate in the USTRANSCOM Cyber Fusion Working
    Group meetings twice a month. Internal to USTRANSCOM, cyber incidents
    involving commercial partners have high visibility and are briefed to
    myself and staff Directors on a regular basis. Finally, we worked with
    the National Defense Transportation Association to create a Cyber Sub-
    Committee to establish an enduring means of information exchange within
    the industry on common cyber threats and defense best practices.
                        maritime security program (msp)
        10. Senator Inhofe. General Selva, will there be enough U.S.
    flagged ships the Maritime Security Program (MSP) and Voluntary
    Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) programs to support DOD
    requirements?
        General Selva. The DOD Requirement for MSP is 60 ships. The
    authorized composition of the MSP with its 60 ships currently provides
    sufficient access to capacity to augment our organic surge fleet,
    access to global commercial intermodal networks and the appropriate
    number of commercial mariners needed to fully crew our surge fleet,
    with acceptable risk. If sequestration returns this year, the loss of
    MSP vessels caused by funding reductions may be considerably difficult
    to recoup. I remain committed to retaining the current complement of
    militarily useful ships in the MSP and VISA programs.

        11. Senator Inhofe. General Selva, how do you plan to overcome any
    shortfalls?
        General Selva. Currently, there is sufficient capacity to meet
    requirements, with acceptable risk. However, in recent years, there has
    been a downward trend in the number of Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/RO) vessels
    in the programs, with a net loss of 4 RO/ROs in the last 5 years. To
    meet requirements, this loss can be mitigated by additional
    volunteerism beyond VISA staged commitments or by vessel requisitioning
    IAW 46 U.S.C. 56301.
                                     cyber
        12. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Rogers, on the 4th of March you stated
    ``a return to sequestration-level spending would be a major setback to
    U.S. cyber forces that are steadily maturing.'' Can you explain what
    cyber capabilities would have to be cut or scaled back should the
    defense budget get sequestered?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
                       personally owned vehicle delivery
        13. Senator Ayotte. General Selva, as you know, frequent moves are
    one of the things that make active duty service difficult for service
    members and their families. In addition to frequent deployments away
    from loved ones, service members and their families often must endure
    frequent moves. These moves force them to pull children out of school,
    say goodbye to friends, and pack up household goods. If they are moving
    overseas, they also often have to ship their personal vehicle. There
    have been some issues with damage to vehicles or massive delays in the
    delivery of personally-owned vehicle deliveries for our troops. This
    adds unneeded stress for our service members and their families and is
    unacceptable. I had one constituent contact my office. He dropped off
    his vehicle in August 2014 for shipment. He was told the required
    delivery date was October 6th. The vehicle did not arrive until January
    5, 2015. That is three months without his vehicle, leaving him without
    a car for the holidays. General Selva, would you agree that such
    performance is not acceptable? In your statement, you note that your
    ``evaluation of [the contractor's] summer surge plan indicates they
    should perform an acceptable level.'' Can you explain what you mean by
    acceptable level?
        General Selva. Certainly, a vehicle over 90 days late is
    unacceptable, and as previously documented, International Auto
    Logistics' (IAL) 2014 performance was below the contractual
    requirements. In accordance with the contract, IAL is required to
    deliver 98 percent of all vehicles on time. The numbers of overdue
    vehicles and average days late for vehicles not meeting the required
    delivery date have continually decreased from the levels experienced in
    2014. IAL's surge plan, as briefed to me will position them for
    successful performance during the 2015 permanent change of station peak
    moving season, and includes detailed process improvements and
    operations management changes in all major areas of contract
    performance, the majority of which have already been implemented. The
    plan addressed transportation planning and subcontractor management,
    customs clearances, Vehicle Storage Facility and Vehicle Processing
    Center site management, claims processing, customer service, and
    employee training and staffing levels. An acceptable level of
    performance is measured by IAL's ability to meet all contractual
    requirements. If falling short, to mitigate all service member
    inconveniences at no expense to the government and make appropriate
    changes in their business practices to meet all contractual
    requirements in the future.

        14. Senator Ayotte. General Selva, what recourse under the current
    contract with the shipper of personally-owned vehicles does the
    government have if there are again massive delays with the delivery of
    personally-owned vehicles to our troops?
        General Selva. The Global Privately-Owned-Vehicle Contract (GPC)
    III contract includes Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 52.212-4,
    Contract Terms and Conditions--Commercial Items, which allows the
    Government, at its discretion, to terminate for cause in the event of
    contractor default, or if the contractor fails to comply with any
    contract term or condition, or fails to provide the Government, upon
    request, with adequate assurances of future performance. Recent
    contract performance has markedly improved and International Auto
    Logistics has provided a plan to meet performance requirements during
    the peak season.
        The contract also contains option periods which the Government has
    a unilateral right to exercise. The Government could elect not to
    exercise future option periods.
        In addition, the contract contains provisions reducing payment when
    the contractor misses a required delivery date (RDD) by 1-7 days,
    requires payment of inconvenience claims (rental car and hotel
    expenses) directly to the customer for missed RDDs beyond 8 days, and
    forfeiture of all transportation payment for POVs delivered 60 days or
    more past the RDD. These contract provisions will impose substantial
    costs to the contractor if it were to experience widespread delays.
                                     kc-46a
        15. Senator Ayotte. General Selva, in your written statement, you
    point out that the KC-46A is ``the most important airlift
    recapitalization effort,'' and that the KC-46A is ``the most essential
    element of future air mobility readiness for the DOD.'' The Air Force
    has consistently listed the KC-46A as one of its top three
    modernization priorities. General Selva, why do you view the KC-46A as
    so important to DOD and the future of U.S. air mobility?
        General Selva. As the backbone of our Nation's ability to project
    global reach and combat power, tankers are a critical force multiplier
    across the full range of global and theater employment scenarios.
    Tankers directly enhance the operational flexibility of United States
    and allied/coalition strike, support, and surveillance aircraft. Joint
    force commanders rely heavily on the impacts that air refueling
    aircraft provide. The direct effects enabled through global strike
    support, theater support to combat air forces, and special operations
    support are critical to mission success. Air bridge and aircraft
    deployment support makes possible the rapid delivery of forces to a
    theater of operations and is a key to the successful execution of the
    aerospace expeditionary force concept. Tankers put the ``Global'' in
    Global Power.
     joint land-attack cruise missile defense elevated netted sensor system
        16. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Haney, as you know, Joint Land-Attack
    Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS) is now
    undergoing an operational test at Aberdeen. What is the purpose of
    JLENS in the national capital region?
        Admiral Haney. The Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense
    Elevated Netted Sensor (JLENS) aerostat is in the national capital
    region to complete a three-year operational exercise, set to begin
    later this year. The exercise is intended to assess JLENS' capability
    to enhance surveillance capabilities against a potential cruise missile
    threat from near-peer adversaries.

        17. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Haney, how important is the
    Department's fiscal year 2016 budget request in order to complete phase
    one of this program?
        Admiral Haney. Full funding for the Joint Land-Attack Cruise
    Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS) fiscal year 2016
    Presidential Budget Request is important to ensure the JLENS
    operational exercise remains on track and on schedule. The exercise is
    intended to assess JLENS' capability to enhance surveillance
    capabilities against a potential cruise missile threat from near-peer
    adversaries. Any changes to the fiscal year 2016 funding could impact
    Phase I and delay the assessment of this capability.
                            civil reserve air fleet
        18. Senator Ayotte. Senator Ayotte. General Selva, in your prepared
    statement, you discuss the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). Can you
    explain what the CRAF is and why it is important to DOD's readiness for
    future conflicts?
        General Selva. CRAF is a unique and significant part of the
    nation's air mobility resource to support the warfighter. Selected
    aircraft from U.S. airlines, contractually committed to CRAF, augment
    Department of Defense (DOD) airlift requirements in emergencies when
    the need for airlift exceeds the capability of military aircraft.
    During peacetime carriers are offered DOD airlift missions for the
    participation in CRAF.
        The CRAF has two main segments: international and national. The
    international segment is further divided into the long-range and short-
    range sections and the national segment satisfies domestic
    requirements. Assignment of aircraft to a segment depends on the nature
    of the requirement and the capability of the aircraft needed.
        The long-range international section consists of passenger and
    cargo aircraft capable of transoceanic operations. The role of these
    aircraft is to augment the Air Mobility Command's long-range
    intertheater C-5s and C-17s during periods of increased airlift needs,
    from minor contingencies up through full national defense emergencies.
        Medium-sized passenger and cargo aircraft make up the short-range
    international section supporting near offshore and select intra-theater
    airlift requirements.
        The airlines contractually pledge aircraft to the various segments
    of CRAF, ready for activation when needed. To provide incentives for
    civil carriers to commit aircraft to the CRAF program and to assure the
    United States of adequate airlift reserves, the government makes
    airlift business available to civilian airlines that offer aircraft to
    the CRAF.

        19. Senator Ayotte. General Selva, in your prepared statement you
    note that ``As our forces draw down from Afghanistan, business
    available to commercial carriers has declined rapidly, threatening
    industry's ability to support surge deployments should the need
    arise.'' Skeptics would say that these commercial carriers are flying
    anyway. Why do commercial carriers supporting CRAF need to work with
    DOD and receive a minimum number of flight hours during peacetime to be
    ready to support DOD requirements in wartime?
        General Selva. Policy and DOD regulation do not mandate a minimum
    level of CRAF business from the DOD. The National Airlift Policy states
    that DOD requirements for passenger and/or cargo airlift augmentation
    shall be satisfied by the procurement of airlift from commercial air
    carriers participating in the CRAF program to the extent that the DOD
    determines that such airlift is suitable and responsive to the military
    requirement. Consistent with that policy, DOD Instruction 4500.57
    requires that DOD operate its fleet to meet its training requirements
    while also using commercial sources of transportation to the ``maximum
    extent practicable.'' The perception that commercial aircrews require
    blockhours to maintain readiness is flawed, the purpose of our monthly
    cargo missions through the various aerial ports is to ensure the ground
    component is capable of supporting the commercial missions, not
    validate the readiness of commercial aircrews.
        US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and Air Mobility Command
    (AMC) are addressing the need to increase CRAF carrier opportunities to
    promote readiness and interoperability. Together, USTRANSCOM and AMC
    are increasing our forecasting ability and actively sharing this
    information at bi-annual Executive Working Groups and weekly
    teleconferences.

        20. Senator Ayotte. General Selva, what is the minimum number of
    CRAF cargo block hours that is required annually to maintain that
    commercial carrier readiness for wartime surge requirements? Please
    explain why you believe this number is sufficient, and describe the
    analyses utilized to arrive at this number.
        General Selva. USTRANSCOM and Air Mobility Command (AMC) have
    changed operational practices to better support objectives in the
    National Airlift Policy (NAP). This policy states that military and
    commercial resources are equally important to national defense and
    interdependent, but prioritizes organic military airlift operations for
    peacetime training. The policy indicates peacetime cargo airlift
    augmentation should be established for CRAF effectiveness within the
    Military Airlift System, but does not codify a minimum. Establishing a
    minimum for cargo airlift augmentation, in law, would significantly
    impinge upon the DOD's ability to appropriately manage its organic and
    commercial resources. In accordance with the NAP direction to determine
    readiness levels, AMC commissioned a CRAF Study (concluded in 2014)
    that recommended a minimum port activity of approximately $31M, roughly
    1,700 block hours, to train AMC port personnel. Within the study, the
    minimum port activity level was derived by assuming one commercial
    wide-body aircraft operating out of each of four major AMC aerial ports
    per month.

        21. Senator Ayotte. General Selva, in your written statement you
    refer to implementing recommendations from a recently concluded Civil
    Reserve Air Fleet study. Will you provide my office with a copy of this
    study?
        General Selva. See Attached as Appendix A: CRAF Phase 2 Study, 29
    Apr 2014

        22. Senator Ayotte. General Selva, what specific changes do you
    intend to implement with respect to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet?
        General Selva. AMC commissioned a CRAF Study, which concluded in
    2014. The purpose of the CRAF study was to provide a viable program
    capable of withstanding the ebbs and flows of current and future
    airlift requirements. Changes were necessary in the CRAF to avoid the
    ``perfect storm'' due to the depressed commercial passenger and cargo
    charter markets, consolidation and reduction of U.S. air carriers and
    their fleets (recent carrier decisions to retire 747-400's), reductions
    in military airlift requirements (Afghanistan drawdown), increased
    organic capability (C-17, C-5Ms, and future state of the KC-46
    beginning in fiscal year 2017), and a tightening of U.S. Government
    budgets. To counter these effects the CRAF Study team identified
    several areas where improvements were necessary, below is list of some
    of the major topics addressed by industry that have also been addressed
    in our implementation plans.
        The changes incorporated into CRAF program will ensure our ability
    to maintain readiness during non-activated periods in the most fair and
    equitable manner for all players involved, as well as being able to
    fully support the warfighter and combatant commanders when the need
    arises.
        Fiscal year 2015--Implemented:
          Elimination of the Aeromedical Evacuation segment--Proven
    success demonstrated with organic fleet (C-17 & KC-135's during OEF/
    OIF)
          Elimination of the 60/40 Rule
        Fiscal year 2016--To Be Implemented:
          Extension of the guaranteed daily utilization rate during
    activation from 8 to 12 hours
          Establishment of a 11-day minimum guaranteed activation
    period and 7-day notice for de-activation for Stage I--This has been
    amended to increase the time frame to 11 days as of 30 Mar 15
          Retention of the flyer bonus, which will be examined at a
    later date to determine necessary adjustments--Under evaluation for
    fiscal year 2016 (possible reduction from.75 multiplier to .40
    multiplier)
          Alteration of the mobilization value point based
    entitlement to awarding points only to carriers offering more than the
    one-aircraft minimum to Stage I--Under evaluation for fiscal year 2016
    (award MV for Stage I and II at a 4:1 ratio)
          Increasing the minimum offer of 15 percent cargo / 30
    percent passenger of CRAF capable aircraft to 40 percent for both
          Reduction of Stage I requirements to 15 cargo and 16
    passenger wide-body equivalents (WBEs)

        23. Senator Ayotte. General Selva, have you reviewed the Booz Allen
    Hamilton study regarding CRAF and what is your assessment of the
    study's findings?
        General Selva. Yes, my staff and I have reviewed the Booz Allen
    Hamilton (BAH) study on CRAF. We also met with the study's author and
    sponsor to gain a deeper understanding of their assumptions, thought
    processes and conclusions. We all agree that the CRAF program and the
    carriers within the program remain important to national defense. We
    also agree we must carefully balance the readiness of our organic
    airlift training needs and the viability of the commercial carriers
    subscribed to the CRAF program by fully complying with the National
    Airlift Policy.
        The study focused on block hours deemed necessary for CRAF
    readiness and interoperability. It concludes that the proficiency of
    military ground personnel and military planning/control elements is the
    limiting factor. From my perspective, that proficiency can be achieved
    with commercial flights already planned as part of our annual fixed buy
    and operating through our military airlift system at far fewer flying
    hours than the study suggests. Furthermore, the BAH study does not
    differentiate between proficiency to manage commercial airlift aircraft
    in the military airlift system and the necessary incentives to sustain
    adequate capacity to commercial capacity across the full range of
    military operations.
        The more pressing issue is maintaining the level of CRAF
    subscription required to meet current Defense Planning Guidance. My
    staff and I are working diligently on this issue with our commercial
    providers. I believe we will quickly arrive at a ``shared risk''
    solution which ensures both proficiency and incentives necessary to
    retain capacity subscription are met.

        24. Senator Ayotte. General Selva, what processes and analyses is
    TRANSCOM using in the current fiscal year and in the FYDP to establish
    the appropriate levels of CRAF cargo airlift augmentation and to
    minimize any potential risks associated with reductions in CRAF cargo
    airlift? To what extent, if any, are the CRAF carriers involved in
    those processes and analyses? Do you believe that TRANSCOM and the CRAF
    cargo carriers are aligned on the assessment of those risks?
        General Selva. USTRANSCOM has very open and routine communications
    with our commercial providers through the CRAF Executive Working Group,
    the National Defense Transportation Association, and our Enterprise
    Readiness Center. We've also recently begun weekly conference calls
    with the carriers where we discuss upcoming commercial airlift
    workload. During our many engagements, the carriers have provided us
    feedback, and we are absolutely listening. While the National Airlift
    Policy directs me to prioritize our own military readiness over
    commercial readiness, I've directed a ``shared risk'' approach to
    achieve a mutually acceptable outcome. In the last year, we advanced in
    four key areas towards this goal.
        First, we formalized our workload forecasting process which is the
    foundation upon which we build our operating budget including our
    expected expenditures on commercial airlift. That process is based on a
    solid analytic foundation and now includes what we have termed
    ``anticipated but difficult to predict demand'' for things like
    humanitarian assistance, potential regional conflicts and Noncombatant
    evacuation operations. Second, we scrutinized our active duty and
    reserve component crew seasoning requirements to ensure they are based
    on the minimum number of flying hours needed to guarantee our readiness
    at an acceptable level of risk. This resulted in some reductions to our
    flying hour program which increased opportunities to use commercial
    lift. Third, we established unambiguous metrics that measure our
    current level of crew readiness, which allows us to better manage
    allocation of military airlift to avoid overflying the minimum flying
    hour program, enhancing opportunities for commercial airlift
    augmentation. Finally, we continue to build on our capability to
    predict near-term workload which allows more proactive engagement with
    commercial lift providers when there is greater access to capacity.
        As we look towards a dynamic future, these four advancements will
    be critical to ensuring success in balancing military and CRAF risk.
    USTRANSCOM has been working on these advancements and analysis, and
    they've matured to the point where we've advised the CRAF carriers on
    these enhancements to our processes and the potential positive workload
    impacts. We will continue to communicate with our commercial providers
    to bolster shared understanding under our ``shared risk'' construct.

        25. Senator Ayotte. General Selva, what is TRANSCOM doing to ensure
    that it continues to explore ``the full spectrum of options and
    incentives'' available to strengthen the CRAF program and ensure the
    continued participation of commercial partners?
        General Selva. USTRANSCOM is committed to offering as much business
    to commercial carriers as practicable, especially as current
    transportation requirements decline across the board. In 2012,
    USTRANSCOM stood up the Enterprise Readiness Center (ERC) to focus on
    bringing in more business to the Defense Travel System (DTS). In this
    effort, the ERC has successfully brought in new business from foreign
    military sales (FMS) transportation requirements to the DTS. With
    Congress' help, we are also expanding FMS opportunities and increased
    business from other federal, state and local entities for CRAF
    carriers.
        As an enterprise-level initiative, USTRANSCOM and Air Mobility
    Command (AMC) have been working tirelessly to find innovative ways to
    continue optimizing the careful balance between organic and commercial
    airlift allocation. AMC is reducing crew ratios for C-17s, and putting
    some aircraft into backup aircraft inventory, effectively reducing the
    total annual aircrew seasoning requirements for the organic fleet. This
    will potentially free up additional airlift business for allocation to
    commercial carriers. USTRANSCOM is improving requirements forecasting
    methods, which will allow a more precise adherence to AMC's Flying Hour
    Program, enabling more commercial airlift opportunities. Also,
    USTRANSCOM is working to buy more commercial airlift up front for known
    annual requirements by allocating more organic airlift to contingency
    and special airlift missions as they emerge throughout the year.
        In order to strengthen our integration and mutual understanding
    with the CRAF carriers, USTRANSCOM hosts biannual Executive Working
    Groups, holds weekly passenger and cargo forecast teleconferences with
    CRAF carriers, and engages with industry at the National Defense
    Transportation Association (NDTA) Fall Meeting, as well as many other
    NDTA events throughout the year. AMC has implemented a CRAF activation
    table top exercise cycle with commercial carriers intended to keep
    carriers familiar with the military airlift system.

        26. Senator Ayotte. General Selva, are some commercial carriers
    communicating their intent to reduce their participation in the CRAF
    program? Why is this happening? What are the ramifications of these
    decisions? How does TRANSCOM intend to address this development?
        General Selva. CRAF participants often change their level of
    program participation during annual contract solicitation periods.
    Carriers communicate their concerns to TRANSCOM, via letters, office
    calls, or through our many collaborative venues. We encourage and
    appreciate their feedback, as it promotes better understanding of
    industry equities as they relate to the DOD.
        For most of the early part of this century, airlift requirements
    have been at very high levels, which corresponded to high levels of
    commercial carrier business. This business dropped significantly as US
    combat forces redeployed from Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result of the
    reduction, several CRAF carriers have expressed concern that they are
    not receiving enough compensation to remain in the CRAF program.
        In anticipation of the drawdown, TRANSCOM went to great lengths to
    increase the commercial business within the Defense Transportation
    System, and shaped strategic contracts and partnerships to maximize
    business opportunities for CRAF providers. These efforts have given the
    CRAF carriers access to $3.8 billion of commercial business during
    fiscal year 2014. In addition to driving increased revenue in the
    Defense Transportation System, Air Mobility Command made adjustments to
    the mission allocation processes, awarding additional business to
    commercial carriers consistent with operational requirements and
    reducing the potential to exceed planned military flying hours.
        As TRANSCOM implements the fiscal year 2016 CRAF contract we will
    monitor the health of the program and continue a robust dialogue with
    CRAF carriers to ensure the success of the CRAF program. TRANSCOM is
    concerned with maintaining the required level of overall CRAF program
    subscription, but we do not currently expect a shortfall.
                                   inf treaty
        27. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Haney, in your written statement, you
    wrote that the INF treaty promotes strategic stability for our European
    allies by addressing their concerns. Admiral Haney, how important is
    the INF treaty to the stability and security of Europe?
        Admiral Haney. Historically, the INF Treaty is one of a number of
    mechanisms that has supported the promotion of strategic stability in
    Europe. While the US has concerns pertaining to Russia's compliance
    with the Treaty, it remains a viable element of Euro-Atlantic security.
    Consequently, I agree with the State Department that the INF Treaty
    benefits the security of the United States, our allies and the Russian
    Federation.

        28. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Haney, you also wrote in your testimony
    that Russia has violated the INF treaty, and has pursued more than a
    decade of modernization of their strategic nuclear forces. Is the
    United States going to continue to abide by the INF treaty if Russia
    continues to violate it?
        Admiral Haney. The US pursues bilateral and multilateral treaties
    and agreements with a focus on internationally accepted norms of
    behavior. Because I believe that the INF Treaty can continue to serve
    in this capacity as well as promote Euro-Atlantic security, I agree
    with the State Department that the US should continue pursuing
    resolution of our concerns with Russia.
                                  nuclear iran
        29. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Haney, you point out in your written
    statement that you ``remain concerned about Iran's nuclear
    activities.'' What concerns you about Iran's nuclear activities? Have
    those activities continued in recent months?
        Admiral Haney. Iran has disguised its nuclear program for decades
    by housing enrichment centrifuges at covert facilities. They have also
    developed potential delivery systems through its space program. For
    example, Iran's developing space program has a potential cross-over
    support to their ballistic missile development. I must acknowledge
    these threats as a high concern.
                            iranian cyber activities
        30. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Rogers, can you describe Iranian cyber
    activities?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]

        31. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Rogers, how extensive are their
    offensive cyber capabilities?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]

        32. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Rogers, has Iran conducted cyberattacks
    or cyber intrusion against the U.S. or our allies in the last year or
    so?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]
                       russian activities against ukraine
        33. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Rogers, can you provide your
    perspective on Moscow's activities against Ukraine, focusing
    specifically on the cyber and information operations domains?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]

        34. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Rogers, have you observed similar
    Russian activities in other parts of eastern Europe?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]
                      u.s. missile defense sites in alaska
        35. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Haney, Admiral Gortney, the U.S.
    Northern Command (NORTHCOM) Commander, recently said that Russia could
    use long range missiles to ``reach critical infrastructure in Alaska
    and Canada that we rely on for a Homeland defense mission.'' Could
    Russia launch a cruise missile from inside Russia and target important
    defense infrastructure in Alaska?
        Admiral Haney. It is my understanding that the next generation of
    air launched cruise missile being fielded by Russia will allow them to
    launch from inside Russia and attack important infrastructure in Alaska
    and Canada.
                              chinese cyber theft
        36. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Rogers, China has stolen massive
    amounts of technology, intellectual property, proprietary information,
    and military secrets from the United States. Admiral Haney points out
    in his written statement that ``China has also made headlines
    associated with exploitation of computer networks.'' Can you help
    quantify the magnitude of this theft for us?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]

        37. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Rogers, does this theft threaten the
    military and technological superiority of the United States?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]

        38. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Rogers, what is at stake if we do not
    stop this cyber theft?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]

        39. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Rogers, what is the United States
    currently doing about this problem?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]

        40. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Rogers, what additional steps do we
    need to take to ensure that China cannot continue to rob us of our
    advantage?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]
                      chinese anti-satellite capabilities
        41. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Haney, in your written statement, you
    point out that ``China needs to be more forthcoming about missile tests
    that appear to be more focused on the development of destructive space
    weapons.'' The United States relies heavily on satellite-based systems
    in conducting operations. If these missile tests are focused on the
    development of destructive space weapons, what does that mean for the
    United States?
        Admiral Haney. Our potential adversaries have clearly signaled
    their intent and ability to conduct hostile operations in space as a
    natural extension of the terrestrial battlefield, and consider these
    operations essential to deny U.S. forces the asymmetric advantages of
    space. To mitigate this trend, the U.S. continues to pursue actions
    such as partnering with responsible nations, international
    organizations and commercial firms to promote responsible, peaceful and
    safe use of space.
        In that spirit, the President's Budget supports my mission
    requirements, maintains our asymmetric advantage in space, and protects
    our strategic capabilities.

        42. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Haney, is DOD working to address this
    threat? How can Congress help?
        Admiral Haney. [Deleted.]
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Deb Fischer
                         expanding the nuclear umbrella
        43. Senator Fischer. Admiral Haney, in addition to the complicating
    effect we discussed that horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation
    would have on our existing extended-deterrence commitments, how
    challenging would it be to open our deterrent ``umbrella'' further and
    provide extended deterrence guarantees to new countries in new regions?
        Admiral Haney. Any sort of broadening of US deterrence commitments
    must be weighed in terms of both operational and political
    consequences. Military impacts must be evaluated on a case-by-case
    basis; and may impact our planning requirements over the long term. I
    would defer to the State Department regarding the political
    implications.
                                   __________
                    Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Lee
                                strategic forces
        44. Senator Lee. Admiral Haney, the United States government
    accused the Russian government last year of violating the Intermediate-
    Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. This week, Russia stated it would station
    nuclear-capable bombers in Crimea and Iskander Missiles into
    Kaliningrad on the borders of NATO allies. You are well versed not only
    in our strategic systems and defenses, but also in the military theory
    underlying these programs. What do you think is an appropriate response
    to these violations and maneuvers, and how have these developments
    impacted the way you think of our strategic force and missile defense
    posture?
        Admiral Haney. These are matters of concern, and are among the many
    areas that I monitor closely. Any options, whether informational,
    economic, or otherwise, should be considered in close collaboration
    with our allies. The current US strategic force posture is sufficient
    to protect US/Allied strategic interests and maintain a credible
    deterrent. With respect to missile defense, we are constantly
    evaluating and assessing current and future capabilities that will
    inform future missile defense posture planning.

        45. Senator Lee. Admiral Haney, what are your biggest modernization
    priorities for the nuclear triad in the coming decade?
        Admiral Haney. Going forward, we are committed to the Ohio
    Replacement Program, the Long Range Strike-Bomber, the Long Range
    Standoff cruise missile, the B61-12 gravity weapon, and the Minuteman
    III replacement programs. The global security environment demands we
    properly sustain and modernize our strategic capabilities. We cannot
    afford to delay or reduce planned modernization for these programs any
    further and must provide stable and sufficient funding in fiscal year
    2016 and beyond. The President's fiscal year 2016 Budget strikes a
    responsible balance between national security priorities and fiscal
    realities, and begins to reduce some of the risk we have accumulated
    because of deferred maintenance.

        46. Senator Lee. Admiral Haney, do you believe that all three legs
    of the triad are being maintained to a level that keeps up with the
    worldwide threats they are meant to deter?
        Admiral Haney. Today, the Triad is well matched to the worldwide
    threats and is an effective strategic deterrent. However, the global
    security environment continues to change and we must ensure our Triad
    remains safe, secure, and effective. While the President's fiscal year
    2016 Budget supports my mission requirements, we cannot afford to
    underfund these vital programs, especially as potential adversaries
    continue modernizing their strategic capabilities. We cannot further
    delay investments in critical capabilities like the Ohio Replacement
    Program, the Long Range Strike-Bomber, the Long Range Standoff cruise
    missile, the B61-12 gravity weapon, and the Minuteman III replacement.
    We must provide stable, sufficient funding for these programs in fiscal
    year 2016 and beyond to ensure the Triad remains an effective deterrent
    in the future against evolving threats.

        47. Senator Lee. Admiral Haney, last month, Iran successfully
    launched a satellite into orbit aboard a two-stage rocket. How much
    technological cross-over is there between the Iranian space-launch
    program and its ballistic missile program, and what can you tell us
    about the Iran timeline for Iran potentially testing a missile with the
    capability of hitting the U.S. mainland?
        Admiral Haney. As Defense Intelligence Agency Director Lieutenant
    General Stewart testified, Iran publicly stated that it intends to
    launch a new space-launch vehicle as early as this year capable of ICBM
    ranges, if configured as such. While their previous space launch
    vehicles did not seem to have this capability, I need to defer to the
    Intelligence Community to characterize how specific technologies cross-
    over between their space and ballistic missile programs. However,
    Iran's space program clearly gives them experience with many aspects of
    launching an ICBM.

        48. Senator Lee. Admiral Haney, do you believe that expediting the
    deployment of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) missile
    defense system, or strengthening our missile defenses in Europe by
    giving them anti-air and cruise missile capabilities would be useful
    for deterring Russia and protecting our missile defense investments?
        Admiral Haney. As stated in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense
    Review, it is not our policy to build and array missile defenses which
    would upset the strategic balance with Russia. But should the regional
    situation decay such that a modification to our missile defense posture
    was warranted, USSTRATCOM would work with the Services, USEUCOM, and
    other combatant commands to provide the Secretary a recommendation.
                                 cyber security
        49. Senator Lee. Admiral Rogers, what are the specific areas of
    U.S. infrastructure that cyber-attackers are targeting most often, and
    how do you see the trends in target selection and attacker-capability
    evolving in the coming years?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]
                                    transcom
        50. Senator Lee. General Selva, the State of Utah has funded an
    ongoing analysis aimed at a potential move of the Utah Air National
    Guard, including the 151st Air Refueling Wing, from Salt Lake
    International Airport to Hill Air Force Base. One focus of the study is
    the reserve component facilities exchange statute (title 10 U.S.C.
    section 18240), which could enable the commercial re-use of ANG airport
    property currently leased by the Air Force and Air National Guard. The
    Utah State legislature recently passed a resolution unanimously
    expressing continued support for the Utah ANG relocation and invited
    the Air Force and other stakeholders to join these efforts and
    collaboratively create a solution for the recapitalization of Air Force
    facilities that will directly benefit TRANSCOM operations at a reduced
    Federal contribution, saving scarce MILCON funding. Aside from the
    savings and economic value of such a move, what operational synergies
    and other benefits could be realized from the colocation of ANG
    refueling assets with Air Force Reserve and active Air Force units at
    Hill AFB, given the base's strategic location in the western United
    States and its proximity to the Utah Test and Training Range?
        General Selva. Although the Air Force will likely benefit from
    efficiencies gained by moving the 151st Air Refueling Wing from Salt
    Lake International Airport to Hill Air Force Base, there are no
    significant advantages or disadvantages to USTRANSCOM for that move.

        51. Senator Lee. General Selva, from a total force integration
    perspective, does this initiative help to ensure the success of future
    F-35 operations at Hill AFB, create additional opportunities for viable
    unit associations, and help the AF implement recommendations from the
    National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force which the Air
    Force has largely endorsed?
        General Selva. The Headquarters Department of the Air Force is in
    the best position to describe how this initiative affects F-35
    operations at Hill AFB and any opportunities for unit associations that
    could occur as a result of the co-location of assets at Hill Air Force
    Base.

        52. Senator Lee. General Selva, from TRANSCOM's perspective, do you
    have any recommendations for Utah State and Guard leadership regarding
    the planning or facility design for this proposed move?
        General Selva. The Headquarters Department of the Air Force is in
    the best position to provide any recommendations for Utah State and
    Guard leadership on the planning or facility design for this proposed
    move as they are charged with organizing, training, and equipping the
    Air Force.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Lindsey Graham
                         global pov contract (gpc iii)
        53. Senator Graham. General Selva, you recently decided to continue
    with the GPC contractor despite significant problems with the program
    to date. What changes, in particular, has the new contractor made or
    proposed in its plan that you approved that give you sufficient
    confidence that it can handle the contract, especially during the
    upcoming peak moving season?
        General Selva. International Auto Logistics' (IAL) 2015 surge plan,
    coupled with their current contract performance and process
    improvements, will position them for successful performance during the
    2015 permanent change of station peak moving season. IAL's Surge Plan
    detailed process improvements and operations management changes in all
    major areas of contract performance, the majority of which have already
    been implemented. The plan addressed transportation planning and
    subcontractor management, customs clearances, Vehicle Storage Facility
    and Vehicle Processing Center site management, claims processing,
    customer service, and employee training and staffing levels. IAL
    presented each of these areas in detail and demonstrated its ability to
    meet contract requirements.

        54. Senator Graham. General Selva, the contractor's poor
    performance has caused numerous Members of Congress to raise questions
    about the program. What will you do if servicemembers experience
    problems again during the peak moving season?
        General Selva. We anticipate International Auto Logistics (IAL)
    will perform successfully during peak season; however USTRANSCOM will
    remain ready to execute appropriate options in the event IAL is
    unsuccessful. The Global Privately-Owned-Vehicle Contract (GPC) III
    contract includes Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 52.212-4,
    Contract Terms and Conditions--Commercial Items, which allows the
    Government, at its discretion, to terminate for cause in the event of
    contractor default, or if the contractor fails to comply with any
    contract term or condition, or fails to provide the Government, upon
    request, with adequate assurances of future performance. Recent
    contract performance has markedly improved and International Auto
    Logistics has provided a plan to meet performance requirements during
    the peak season.
        The contract also contains option periods which the Government has
    a unilateral right to exercise. The Government could elect not to
    exercise future option periods.
        In addition, the contract contains provisions reducing payment when
    the contractor misses a required delivery date (RDD) by 1-7 days,
    requires payment of inconvenience claims (rental car and hotel
    expenses) directly to the customer for missed RDDs beyond 8 days, and
    forfeiture of all transportation payment for POVs delivered 60 days or
    more past the RDD. These contract provisions will impose substantial
    costs to the contractor if it were to experience widespread delays.
        Additionally, The Army's Surface Deployment and Distribution
    Command has issued advisories to reiterate to service members their
    rights under the inconvenience and damage claims processes provided by
    the contract should they experience a problem.

        55. Senator Graham. General Selva, do you have the option to
    terminate and rebid the contract?
        General Selva. The GPC III contract includes Federal Acquisition
    Regulation (FAR) 52.212-4, Contract Terms and Conditions--Commercial
    Items, which allows the Government, at its discretion, to terminate for
    cause in the event of contractor default, or if the contractor fails to
    comply with any contract term or condition, or fails to provide the
    Government, upon request, with adequate assurances of future
    performance. The decision to terminate for cause is a subjective
    decision based on numerous factors involving contract performance. The
    FAR states a contracting officer should only exercise the Government's
    right to terminate a contract for cause when it is determined such a
    termination would be in the best interests of the Government. Recent
    contract performance has markedly improved and the contractor,
    International Auto Logistics, has provided a plan to meet performance
    requirements during the peak season.

        56. Senator Graham. General Selva, what other actions can you take?
        General Selva. The contract also contains option periods which the
    Government has a unilateral right to exercise. The contract base period
    ends 29 February 2016. The Government could elect not to exercise
    option period one which starts 1 March 2016.
                           maritime security program
        57. Senator Graham. General Selva, how many ships do you need in
    the Maritime Security Program to meet sealift capacity requirements?
        General Selva. The authorized composition of the Maritime Security
    Program (MSP) of 60 ships is required to provide access to capacity to
    augment our organic surge fleet, access to global commercial intermodal
    networks and the appropriate number of commercial mariners needed to
    fully crew our surge fleet.
        In addition to national defense requirements, MSP was also created
    to ensure the Nation's economic security through presence in key
    international trade lanes. The steady decline of the U.S.-flag
    international dry cargo trading sector is of great concern, as it is
    approaching the point where MSP is what is keeping the sector from
    disappearing completely. I support the Department of Transportation and
    the Maritime Administration's efforts to create a National Maritime
    Strategy to reverse this trend and grow the U.S.-flag fleet. I can
    provide the warfighter more options to meet requirements with a healthy
    and stable Merchant Marine.
                                   __________
                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
      should we ever attack the critical infrastructure of another nation?
        58. Senator Reed. Admiral Rogers, the United States is the most
    networked economy in the world. Our critical infrastructure is
    accessible through the Internet and is quite exposed and vulnerable. As
    the Sony attacks and others have demonstrated, even small countries
    with no ability to attack the homeland with traditional military forces
    can inflict significant damage on the United States through cyber-
    attacks. There is an old adage that people who live in glass houses
    should not throw stones. It may be tempting in a conflict for us to
    employ cyber-attacks on another country's grid, or telecommunications
    network, or banking institutions, but doing so sets precedents for
    other nations to follow. Since we place more reliance on our
    information systems and capabilities than almost anyone else, this
    could lead to escalation that would not be to our advantage. Admiral
    Rogers, do you think we should establish policies against using cyber
    weapons against nonmilitary, infrastructure targets? This would be
    something analogous to the no first use doctrines used in the nuclear
    domain.
        Admiral Rogers. As a matter of principle, the DOD does not attack
    non-military targets. However, some infrastructure is dual-use in
    nature supporting both civilian and military activities. In these cases
    we would operate within the laws of armed conflict.
        The United States is working with international partners, through
    the UN Group of Governmental Experts, to develop norms of responsible
    state behavior that would better assure mutual security if adopted by
    all states. The United States position should focus on developing an
    international peacetime cyber norm of not attacking another country's
    critical infrastructure specifically providing services to the civilian
    public. This norm reflects the basic principles of sovereignty and
    conveys the unacceptable nature of using cyber means to cause damage to
    a State's critical infrastructure during peacetime.
        Additionally, the United States is focusing effort on hardening
    networks associated with our own critical infrastructure, given the
    reliance placed on it by both military and non-military entities. We
    must take swift action to correct identified cybersecurity gaps and
    vulnerabilities.
                            deterrence in cyberspace
        59. Senator Reed. Admiral Rogers, it is a truism that nations
    cannot be deterred by weapons or capabilities that they do not know
    exist. So it is with the cyber domain. At the dawn of the nuclear age,
    we showed the world the power of nuclear weapons, and in the first
    decades after WWII, the nuclear powers regularly tested in ways that
    educated the world on the effects of nuclear war. Twenty years after
    Hiroshima, the U.S. had been through multiple full-fledged nuclear
    deterrence doctrines--from the New Look to Massive Retaliation to
    Flexible Response and Mutual Assured Destruction. Twenty years into the
    Internet age, in contrast, we have yet to put forth any claims about
    the power of cyber weapons or even the first comprehensive doctrinal
    treatment of deterrence and the role of cyber warfare in U.S. military
    strategy. Friends and adversaries alike are left to imagine what we are
    capable of and what our intentions are. Admiral Rogers, what practical
    impediments stand in the way of publicly defining the role and
    significance of cyber warfare in our national security strategy?
        Admiral Rogers. The unclassified 2011 DOD Strategy for Operating in
    Cyberspace established a foundation for DOD's approach to cyberspace
    operations with the treatment of cyberspace as an operational domain.
    Military cyberspace capabilities are employed in a similar manner to
    capabilities in the other domains (land, sea, air, and space) focused
    on achieving military objectives in support of national security
    interests. A forthcoming updated and unclassified DOD Cyberspace
    Strategy will further expound on the role and significance of
    cyberspace operations in U.S. National Security Strategy. However, some
    challenges will remain. Much of our planning is sensitive and therefore
    not publicly releasable. Because of operational security concerns we
    are very careful not expose our specific tactics, techniques,
    procedures or capabilities. We do however send a clear signal of our
    resolve and potential capabilities when we conduct exercises with a
    cyberspace component. Additional challenges include the lack of
    international peacetime cyber norms and understanding of what
    constitutes use of force in cyberspace.

        60. Senator Reed. Admiral Rogers, alternatively, do you think that
    the use of cyber weapons in the cyber domain is just not consequential
    enough to merit the development of strategic concepts and doctrine, as
    was done for nuclear warfare, air power, sea power, and the like?
        Admiral Rogers. The potential consequences of a cyberspace attack
    do merit the development of strategy and doctrine. Our evolving
    strategies will aim to incorporate measures to not only deter
    cyberattacks by denying their success and demonstrate our will to hold
    adversaries accountable and impose costs for such a cyberattack.
        We have joint doctrine as represented in Joint Publication 3-12 for
    Cyberspace Operations and we continue our contributions to evolve that
    doctrine and develop strategy. As described in the 2015 Department of
    Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence
    Community, it is considered feasible that malicious activities through
    cyberspace can be used to disrupt or damage critical infrastructure in
    the United States.
        The United States must be able to respond to cyberattacks at a
    time, manner, and place of our choosing as determined by the President
    upon the advice of the U.S. national security team. United States
    strategy to deter cyberattacks should not simply rest upon an in-kind
    response through cyberspace. The United States must develop defensive
    and cybersecurity capabilities to deny potential attack success.
    Finally, the United States must be resilient to cyberattacks, able to
    recover rapidly and provide mission assurance in the face of adversary
    actions. This extends to all U.S. critical infrastructure owners and
    operators.

        61. Senator Reed. Admiral Haney and Admiral Rogers, North Korea was
    not deterred from attacking the Sony Corporation of America, inflicting
    hundreds of millions of dollars in damage. Iran was not deterred from
    attacking U.S. banks and a U.S. casino. Many repressive regimes
    consider themselves under mortal threat from so called ``color
    revolutions'' aided by the global Internet if not purposefully fomented
    by the United States. They may believe they are already engaged in a
    deadly ``information war'' with the west. We have a web of mutual
    deterrence relationships with major powers such as China and Russia
    that may serve to deter these nations from launching devastating cyber-
    attacks on our critical infrastructure in peacetime and even in a war.
    But that is not true for rogue nations such as North Korea and Iran.
    Admiral Haney and Admiral Rogers, if we felt compelled to use military
    forces against their nuclear systems, for example, they would likely
    strike at us with whatever means possible. In contemplating military
    coercion against Iran or N01ih Korea in the future, would you agree
    that future Presidents will have to consider that economic targets in
    the homeland will be attacked through cyberspace? Is it realistic to
    think that there is some way to deter such retaliation?
        Admiral Haney. Protecting critical infrastructure from cyberspace
    attacks is and will continue to be a high priority across the US
    government. While I will not reference a specific scenario, we must
    anticipate that any future conflict could start or be extended to
    cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure. Yes, a disruptive or
    destructive cyberattack could present a significant risk to US economic
    interests and deterring such an event requires a whole of government
    approach involving all of our nation's instruments of power. As
    outlined in our Cyber Strategy, the US will employ full-spectrum cross-
    domain solutions utilizing all elements of our national power.
        Admiral Rogers. (U//FOUO) I would advise future Presidents that
    yes, attacks against economic targets should be anticipated. Asymmetric
    attacks can be expected as long as the U.S. maintains a conventional
    military advantage. In particular, Iran may feel compelled to strike
    financial institutions or order targets to offset real or perceived
    shortfalls in military capability. Moreover, other types of critical
    infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) within the U. S. may also be
    subject to such asymmetric attacks, including electrical power control
    systems or other similar targets. Our forthcoming DOD cyber strategy
    will outline an approach to building a more comprehensive and effective
    cyber deterrence strategy.
                           maturity of cyber command
        62. Senator Reed. Admiral Rogers, Cyber Command was created in
    2010. At that time, it was expected that the Command would largely
    capitalize on the tools and techniques that NSA uses to collect
    intelligence through cyberspace. Over time, however, DOD has realized
    that military operations will be different from intelligence operations
    in cyberspace, and that Cyber Command needs different network
    infrastructure, different command and control capabilities, and
    different tools and weapons. Approximately a year ago, the Secretary of
    Defense signed a directive to the Department to create these
    capabilities, which he collectively called the ``Unified Platform.''
    Admiral Rogers, can you explain why it is important for Cyber Command
    to have network infrastructure, command and control systems, and tools
    and weapons that are distinct from and do not duplicate those that NSA
    has developed to collect intelligence in cyberspace?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]

        63. Senator Reed. Admiral Rogers, can you explain briefly what the
    Secretary directed under the Unified Platform initiative last year?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]
                measuring the readiness of cyber command forces
        64. Senator Reed. Admiral Rogers, Cyber Command now has only about
    half of its planned military forces fielded and trained. Cyber Command
    does not yet have the set of robust command and control, network
    infrastructure, and tools and weapons that the Secretary last year
    directed be built under the Unified Platform initiative. Admiral
    Rogers, in the absence of the capabilities envisioned under the Unified
    Platform initiative, how can we measure the readiness of the Cyber
    Mission Forces?
        Admiral Rogers. (U//FOUO) As U.S. Cyber Command, the Cyber Service
    Components, and Services work together towards fielding the Cyber
    Mission Force (CMF), we are measuring operational readiness by
    assessing the number of trained personnel, the type of training for
    each individual and the collective cyber team, and the equipment each
    team possesses.
        (U//FOUO) A mature operational readiness reporting framework, which
    assesses the unit's ability to perform core tasks outlined in our Joint
    Mission Essential Tasks (JMET), is the key for measuring readiness of
    the Cyber Mission Forces. We have developed a path using an operational
    reporting framework on the road to Defense Readiness Reporting System--
    Strategic (DRRS-S) in order to report in a manner similar to the rest
    of the force. As we mature this operational readiness reporting
    framework, we will use it to shape and drive the development of DRRS-S
    modules as the JMETs reach final U.S. Strategic Command and Joint Staff
    approval, targeted for spring next year. The ability to exercise and
    rehearse based on the tasks, conditions and standards is a key element
    of assessing operational readiness and a Persistent Training
    Environment (PTE) will be the key to reaching the operational readiness
    milestone. We have also developed a plan to address immediate needs for
    PTE in fiscal year 2015 which will bring us closer to the Department's
    long-term vision of PTE which allows us to use the proper environment
    to regularly train and exercise CMF teams.
        (U) I am committed to ensuring the Cyber Mission Force is fully
    manned, trained, equipped, and ready to fulfill USCYBERCOM's mission by
    the end of fiscal year 2018.

        65. Senator Reed. Admiral Rogers, how capable can they be without
    the capabilities called for by the Secretary?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]
                       readiness to be a unified command
        66. Senator Reed. Admiral Haney and Admiral Rogers, Cyber Command
    remains highly dependent on a combat support defense agency--National
    Security Agency--for much of its current operational capability. Cyber
    Command has only about half of its planned military cyber mission
    forces on hand and trained. The Secretary of Defense's Unified Platform
    directive indicates that the Command does not yet have the command and
    control capabilities, network infrastructure for operating on the
    global Internet, or the tools and weapons to execute operations
    effectively at large scale in support of our war plans. Admiral Haney
    and Admiral Rogers, do you believe that Cyber Command is ready to be
    designated as a unified command able to stand on its own two feet? If
    not, how long do you think it will take to reach the necessary level of
    maturity?
        Admiral Haney. Since USCYBERCOM reached full operational capability
    in late-2010, we have continued to grow our cyber work force and
    associated teams. USCYBERCOM has operated for over five years and has
    proven it can function as a sub-unified or unified CCMD. I recommend,
    however, that we retain CDRUSCYBERCOM's dual-hat status as Director,
    NSA (DIRNSA). Transitioning USCYBERCOM to a unified CCMD may require
    additional resourcing.
        Admiral Rogers. This is a decision that must be made by the
    President in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In my professional judgement, I believe U.S.
    Cyber Command is ready to be designated as a Unified Combatant Command
    (UCC). Most of U.S. Strategic Command's Unified Command Plan cyberspace
    responsibilities have been delegated to us, and we regularly engage
    with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, Services,
    United States Government, Five Eyes partners, and Combatant Commands
    for planning, synchronizing, and supporting mission activities.
    However, the unique nature of cyberspace--a globally connected,
    intricately linked domain without traditional borders--requires an
    empowered, singularly focused, globally-oriented Combatant Commander to
    oversee cyberspace activities and coordinate global operations.
    Elevating U.S. Cyber Command will comport with tried and true tenets of
    warfare--unity of command and unity of effort--for cyberspace
    operations. Violating these tenets increases risk and creates
    inefficiencies in the form of redundant processes and increased
    timelines. Departmental-level unity of command and effort will be
    achieved when Commander, U.S. Cyber Command is empowered as DOD's
    single military voice for cyber in the Joint Strategic Planning System,
    Joint Capability Integration Development System, and Planning,
    Programming, Budget, and Execution processes. The Department and Nation
    have already made the great majority of the investment required to have
    this new functional Unified Combatant Command. If empowered to include
    authorities to act as a Force Provider and Functional Manager for
    training and workforce development and for expenditures and
    acquisitions, U.S. Cyber Command will have to develop these
    capabilities but will ultimately be better positioned to lead and
    influence the Department to ensure the development and implementation
    of a viable, trained workforce; cyberspace capabilities; appropriate
    policies and directives; and, necessary supporting infrastructures.
    Such an evolution will move U.S. Cyber Command towards full operational
    autonomy.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
                     projected costs of u.s. nuclear forces
        67. Senator Manchin. Admiral Haney, in your testimony you
    referenced a recent Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report that
    estimates that the administration's plan for nuclear forces over the
    next 10 years will cost almost $350 billion--an average of roughly $35
    billion a year. How can we modernize and maintain an effective nuclear
    deterrent in a more cost effective manner?
        Admiral Haney. Today we spend less than 3 percent of the DOD budget
    on nuclear capabilities. As stated by the January 2015 Congressional
    Budget Office report, recapitalization investments that are necessary
    to ensure safety and security will increase this number to ``roughly 5
    percent to 6 percent.'' We have maintained our legacy systems decades
    beyond their planned life. This modest increase to the DOD budget is
    necessary to ensure the Triad continues to deter potential adversaries,
    assure allies, and preserve stability with countries that could pose an
    existential threat to the United States.

        68. Senator Manchin. Admiral Haney, during an earlier hearing this
    year, General Mattis asked ``Is it time to reduce the Triad to a Diad,
    removing the land?based missiles?'' How much would a decision like this
    save the U.S. financially each year?
        Admiral Haney. Every day, the Triad deters potential adversaries,
    assures allies, and preserves stability with countries that pose an
    existential threat to the United States. It is the combination of
    attributes across the Triad that ensures potential adversaries
    understand they cannot escalate their way out of a failed conventional
    conflict. The Triad imposes unacceptable costs and denies the benefits
    of a strategic attack against the United States. Maintaining the Triad
    of air, sea, and land forces remains a strategic imperative. Any
    changes to the Triad must be based on thoughtful strategic analysis, as
    opposed to meeting a budgetary objective.
        The three legs of the Triad provide the capability to mitigate risk
    caused by technological failure of any weapon or platform, technical
    advances by our adversaries, or significant changes in the geo-
    political environment. If the nuclear forces were reduced to one or two
    of its parts, the ability to deter, assure, and manage risk would be
    significantly degraded.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
                                new start treaty
        69. Senator Shaheen. Admiral Haney, is the New Strategic Arms
    Reduction Treaty (START) still providing transparency into the Russian
    nuclear force, notwithstanding deteriorating relations with that
    country?
        Admiral Haney. Yes, New START remains in force and continues to
    provide access and transparency. A key component is the Treaty's
    inspection regime which allows each side to conduct eighteen
    inspections per year of the other nation's ICBM, submarine, and air
    facilities. Similarly, the Treaty's notification system, of which both
    sides have exchanged an average of 1,500 messages per year, has
    effectively reduced the possibility of misperception and
    misunderstanding. As a result, New START has proven to be durable and
    continues to enhance security and strategic stability between the US
    and Russia.
                                 kc-46a program
        70. Senator Shaheen. General Selva, how critical is the KC-46A
    program to TRANSCOM's ability to meet future air mobility readiness for
    the Department of Defense?
        General Selva. The KC-46 is essential to meeting future air
    mobility readiness for the DOD. The KC-46A is replacing the aging KC-
    135 fleet and will be capable of operating in day/night and adverse
    weather conditions over vast distances to enable deployment,
    employment, sustainment and redeployment of U.S. joint, allied and
    coalition forces.
                                   __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                           small business contracting
        71. Senator Blumenthal. General Selva, a U.S.-flagged shipping
    company based in Connecticut has raised concerns with my office that
    the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) is failing to adhere to
    historic protections and preferences for U.S.-flagged small shipping
    companies that compete for military contracts to supply our military's
    overseas bases. What assurances can you give me that small businesses
    are able to compete for military contracts?
        General Selva. USTRANSCOM seeks every opportunity for Small, Small
    Disadvantaged, Women-Owned, Historically Underutilized Business Zone
    and Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business concerns to obtain a
    fair portion of contract awards. Extensive market research is
    accomplished for each acquisition to determine if at least two
    responsible small business concerns are expected to be capable of
    performing at a fair market value in order to set-aside the
    acquisition.
        USTRANSCOM has exceeded the small business goal, set by the
    Department of Defense, Office of Small Business Programs for the past
    three fiscal years and is currently on track to do so in fiscal year
    2015. In addition, record breaking achievements for socioeconomic
    categories are being realized this fiscal year; USTRANSCOM already
    awarded $30.6M more to Small Disadvantaged Businesses compared to
    fiscal year 2014, $1.5M more to Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned and
    $23.1M more to Women-Owned Small Businesses.
                                 c-130 upgrades
        72. Senator Blumenthal. General Selva, you indicated that the
    ``fiscal year 2016 President's Budget includes an end-state fleet of
    308 C-130s and 479 tankers to meet air mobility operational
    requirements. The C-5 and C-17 fleets are undergoing modernization
    efforts to replace aging components, as well as adding avionics to meet
    mandated minimum aircraft separation capability to ensure aircraft
    ability to meet worldwide commitments.'' Please address what
    modernization efforts are needed to ensure that the fleet of 308 C-130s
    remain able to meet operational requirements.
        General Selva. USTRANSCOM requires 308 C-130s as part of a vital
    airlift force structure to meet our strategic airlift requirement. The
    C-130 fleet plays a critical role in the Intratheater airlift
    operations. I support Air Mobility Command's effort to modernize the C-
    130 Fleet.
        The Air Force report on C-130 modernization and recapitalization,
    as directed by Section 140 of the ``Carl Levin and Howard P. `Buck'
    McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015,'' is
    nearing completion and will provide additional detail, including plans
    to recapitalize Reserve Component C-130H aircraft with the C-130J.
    Although the report describes the Air Force's current C-130
    modernization plan, the Air Force intends further consultation with
    Congress to discuss its modernization strategy for the C-130H fleet.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Donnelly
                            counterfeit electronics
        73. Senator Donnelly. Admiral Rogers, following up on my questions
    in the hearing, Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane in Indiana is
    involved in a collaborative effort with DARPA and NSA to better
    understand and protect us against threats posed by counterfeit
    electronics making their way into DOD systems. The ultimate aim of
    these efforts is to ensure that microelectronics in DOD weapon and
    cyber systems function as intended for the lifecycle of the system.
    Over the past couple years they have observed a dramatic escalation in
    the technical sophistication of counterfeiting techniques. The findings
    of a 2012 Senate Armed Services Committee investigation dealt primarily
    with traditional counterfeits, motivated by profit and targeted
    indiscriminately. Do you see a more sophisticated and potentially more
    dangerous threat on the horizon?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]

        74. Senator Donnelly. Admiral Rogers, are we seeing the development
    of more disruptive and potentially malicious, targeted efforts to
    deliver counterfeit electronics into the DOD supply chain?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]

        75. Senator Donnelly. Admiral Rogers, we have seen efforts in the
    past to monitor and report on counterfeits entering the DOD supply
    chain. Are you aware of any past study or report focused on parts that
    made their way through the supply chain and into DOD systems?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]
        76. Senator Donnelly. Admiral Rogers, has the impact of these
    counterfeit parts of unknown quality on DOD weapon and cyber systems
    reliability and performance been investigated?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted.]
                           conventional prompt strike
        77. Senator Donnelly. Admiral Haney, during your opening remarks
    you stated the following, ``I support continuing research and
    development of capabilities that help fill the conventional strike gap
    with a discernible non-ballistic trajectory, maneuverability for over-
    flight avoidance, and payload delivery capability.'' From your
    perspective, what are the capability gaps and what resources are
    necessary to fill the gaps?
        Admiral Haney. We continue to require a conventional prompt strike
    capability to provide the President a range of flexible military
    options to address a small number of the highest-value targets,
    including those within denied environments. The current budget request
    continues to mature conventional prompt strike technologies and reduces
    risk to place the Department in a position to make an informed decision
    on which concept to develop.

        78. Senator Donnelly. Admiral Haney, Conventional Prompt Strike
    (CPS) research and development efforts will shift this year toward
    testing a smaller glider capable of being launched from air, ground or
    sea-based platforms. What are your views on the importance of
    commonality in a potential future CPS program of record?
        Admiral Haney. Commonality within the Conventional Prompt Strike
    (CPS) research and development effort is important as the program
    continues to mature critical technologies and control costs. The
    current air-vehicle being developed dates back to the 1970s Sandia
    Winged Engineering Research Vehicle (SWERVE) as well as incorporating
    aspects from the 2010 and 2014 flights of the Army's Advanced
    Hypersonic Weapon. This aero-vehicle will continue maturation through a
    series of Navy flight experiments commencing in 2017. Technological
    advances made by the Conventional Prompt Strike effort in areas such as
    thermal protection systems, launch vehicles, aerodynamics, and
    navigation, guidance, and control could span development and technology
    efforts for multiple CPS applications.
                         commonality and collaboration
        79. Senator Donnelly. Admiral Haney, in recent years, the Navy and
    Air Force have been working to identify areas where they can achieve
    critical strategic modernization while saving taxpayer dollars. I have
    witnessed some of this effort through NSWC Crane in Indiana, and I
    expect to see our Services working to best leverage each other's
    research and investments going forward. From your perspective, what is
    the value for the warfighter in enhancing commonality and collaboration
    among nuclear systems?
        Admiral Haney. The Air Force and Navy already share technology
    within the ballistic missile mission area and USSTRATCOM has long
    encouraged the Navy Strategic Applications and Air Force Demonstration/
    Validation Programs as they support this goal. We believe collaboration
    and commonality at the component/sub-component level is achievable and
    worthwhile. Going forward, we will continue encouraging the Services to
    share technologies that achieve efficiencies and savings. We believe
    collaboration is particularly important as the Department recapitalizes
    our ballistic missile deterrent forces.

        80. Senator Donnelly. Admiral Haney, what do you see as key
    opportunities for future collaboration?
        Admiral Haney. The Air Force and Navy already share technology
    within the ballistic missile mission area and USSTRATCOM has long
    encouraged the Navy Strategic Applications and Air Force Demonstration/
    Validation Programs as they support this goal. We believe collaboration
    and commonality at the component/sub-component level is achievable and
    worthwhile. Going forward, we will continue encouraging the Services to
    share technologies that achieve efficiencies and savings. We believe
    collaboration is particularly important as the Department recapitalizes
    our ballistic missile deterrent forces.

        [Appendix A to follow:]

      [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2016 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, MARCH 26, 2015

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

     U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND AND U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS
                          COMMAND PROGRAMS AND BUDGET

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Wicker,
    Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Lee,
    Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Manchin, Gillibrand, Donnelly, Hirono,
    Kaine, and King.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman McCain. Well, good morning. Good morning, and
    welcome to General Lloyd Austin, USA, Commander, U.S. Central
    Command, General David Rodriguez, USA, Commander, U.S. Africa
    Command, and General Joseph Votel, USA, Commander, U.S. Special
    Operations Command.
        The committee meets today to receive testimony on the
    posture of U.S. Central Command, U.S. African Command, and U.S.
    Special Operations Command.
        I extend our appreciation to all three of you for your long
    and distinguished service, and to the troops and their families
    who defend our Nation every day.
        From Mali to Libya and Somalia, and from Yemen to Iraq and
    Syria, the old order across North Africa and the Middle East is
    under siege. Both the regional balance among states and the
    social order within states is collapsing, and no new vision has
    emerged to take its place. Unfortunately, the lack of clear
    U.S. strategy and lack of strong U.S. leadership has confused
    our friends, encouraged our enemies, and created space for
    malign influence to flourish.
        Despite the fact that Dr. Kissinger testified that, ``The
    United States has not faced a more diverse and complex array of
    crises since the end of the second World War,'' to quote, the
    looming threat of sequestration serves to compound that threat
    and help create a leadership vacuum that fuels the chaos of our
    current predicament.
        Retired General Jim Mattis told this committee, ``No foe in
    the field can wreak such havoc on our security that mindless
    sequestration is achieving today.'' And I couldn't agree more.
        Our witnesses are uniquely positioned to describe the
    increased risk due to sequestration. To navigate this chaotic
    time successfully, we must have unambiguous national security
    priorities, clarity in our strategic thinking, and an
    unwavering commitment to the resources required to support the
    necessary courses of action.
        For your sake, General Austin, let's hope that your job
    performance is not measured by the number of crises you have to
    juggle, but how you handle them. My fear is that you're
    expected to juggle with one hand tied behind your back. Whether
    it's sequestration or direction from above not to upset Iran
    during sensitive nuclear negotiations, yours has to be one of
    the most difficult jobs on the planet.
        I'm deeply troubled by comments from senior administration
    officials on Iran. Secretary Kerry recently said that the net
    effect of Iran's military action in Iraq is ``positive.''
    Similarly, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Dempsey,
    said, ``As long as the Iraqi Government remains committed to
    inclusivity of all the various groups inside the country, then
    I think Iranian influence will be positive.''
        General Austin, I know from our conversations that you do
    not suffer the dangerous delusion that somehow Iran can be a
    force for good in the region. In your position, you can't
    afford that fantasy. Today, I want to discuss our strategy to
    address the situation on the ground as it is, rather than as we
    wish it to be.
        General David Petraeus gave a realistic picture in a recent
    interview, which is worth quoting; ``The current Iranian regime
    is not our ally in the Middle East. It is ultimately part of
    the problem, not the solution. The more the Iranians are seen
    to be dominating the region, the more it's going to inflame
    Sunni radicalism and fuel the rise of groups like the Islamic
    State.'' I'll be interested if our witnesses agree with that
    assessment from General David Petraeus.
        Iran is not our ally, yet we learned, just yesterday, that
    the United States is providing air support in Tikrit, which
    media is reporting as being fought by 20 to 30,000 Iran-backed
    Shiite militia fighters and only 3 to 4,000 Iraqi Security
    Forces. I have many concerns and questions, about how and why
    we are doing this, which I hope you can answer for us today.
        In Yemen, a country that President Obama recently praised
    model for United States counterterrorism a success story, the
    prospect of radical groups like Iranian-backed Houthi militants
    in charge of an air force and possessing ballistic missiles was
    more than our Arab partners could withstand. The airstrikes by
    these concerned Arab nations stems in part of their perception
    of America's disengagement from the region and a total absence
    of United States leadership.
        In a scenario that you could not make up, while our Arab
    partners conduct airstrikes to halt the offensive of Iranian
    proxies in Yemen, the United States is conducting airstrikes to
    support the offensive of Iranian proxies in Tikrit. This is as
    bizarre as it is misguided, another tragic case of leading from
    behind.
        The complex intertwining of ISIL [the Islamic State in Iraq
    and the Levant] and Iranian problem sets in Iraq and Syria
    challenge us in an area the administration has poorly handled
    to date, the ability to prioritize and deal with multiple
    crises simultaneously.
        We're also seeing increasing links between ISIL and
    terrorist groups throughout Africa, including a growing
    presence in Libya and a newfound relationship with Nigeria's
    Boko Haram. Adding to the rising terrorist threat across the
    continent, Africa remains plagued by longstanding conflicts
    that have resulted in large displacements of people and rising
    instability.
        General Rodriguez, it's obvious, from our discussion this
    week in my office, that none of this is news to you. Yet,
    despite a growing array of threats, African Command
    consistently suffers from significant resource shortfalls that
    impact your ability to accomplish your mission.
        One of the key components of our efforts to combat global
    terrorism is the team of men and women of Special Operations
    Command. In prepared remarks, General Votel has said our
    special operators are deployed in more than 80 countries and
    are often our first line of defense against an evolving and
    increasingly dangerous terrorist threat. They defend the Nation
    by training our partners, and, when required, conducting
    direct-action operations. However, demand for Special
    Operations Forces continues to far exceed supply, placing an
    enormous strain on the readiness of the force. Compounding the
    strain, the looming threat of sequestration, which will not
    just degrade the capabilities of the force, but also the
    service-provided enablers it depends on. General Votel, I look
    to you to update the committee on the impact of sequestration
    on the men and women you lead and the increased risk to the
    troops you would be forced to accept as a result.
        We need a strategy that spans the same geography as the
    threat from the ISIL to al-Qaeda to Iran. Our witnesses work
    tirelessly to combat these threats together, and we owe them
    and their forces they lead better than a piecemeal approach
    that lacks resources and fails to address the full spectrum of
    threats we face.
        I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
        Senator Reed.

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
    good morning.
        And let me join Senator McCain in not only welcoming the
    witnesses, but also thanking them and the men and women of
    their command for their extraordinary service to the Nation.
        And you represent the combatant commands that are most
    engaged in the fight against al-Qaeda and ISIS [the Islamic
    State in Iraq and Syria], and threats that know no geographic
    boundaries and require a regional, and sometimes a
    transregional, approach to effectively dealing with them. The
    rise of a military-capable ISIS threatens to erase national
    boundaries between Iraq and Syria, and the areas under ISIS
    control are providing a training ground for foreign fighters
    who threaten to spread violence, upon returning to their homes
    in Europe, Asia, or even the United States.
        In Iraq, there's a recognition of the need for Sunni, Shia,
    and Kurdish factions to overcome their divisions to confront
    the ISIS threat. Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi has taken steps to
    begin to address Sunni and Kurdish grievances. And, in these
    efforts, he needs our support. In fact, one could argue that,
    ultimately, the issues in Iraq need to have a political
    solution, that military efforts will buy time but not ultimate
    and decisive success.
        Similarly, in Syria, addressing the root causes that helped
    lead to the rise of ISIS will require promoting the conditions
    for a political arrangement as well as success on the
    battlefield. Yet, the growing influence of Shiite-dominated
    militia in Iraq, many taking orders from the Iranian Quds
    force, threatens to alienate the liberated Sunni community.
    Reports of human rights abuses by Shiite militia may cause some
    Iraqi Sunnis to conclude they are better off with ISIS under
    the control of Iranian-backed militias. And that would be an
    extraordinary setback for all of us.
        General Austin, we'd be interested in your assessment of
    the progress with the efforts to train, advise, and assist the
    Iraqi Security Forces to build up the capability of the Kurdish
    Peshmerga as they begin to retake territory from ISIS. We're
    also interested in your views on the growing influence of Iran
    in Iraq and the threat it poses over the long term to Iraq's
    stability. And overnight, as Senator McCain indicated, in
    Yemen, you were given an additional task of supporting GCC
    [Gulf Cooperation Council] operations in their offensive
    operations in Yemen. I hope, General Austin, you can give us an
    update on those responsibilities and those operations.
        Of course, an additional concern is the outcome of the
    nuclear framework negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran. We
    are approaching a deadline. And the implication of success,
    failure, or something in between will have profound impacts in
    the region. That, too, you have to assess.
        In Afghanistan, our military forces are focused on training
    Afghan Security Forces, conducting counterterrorism operations,
    and solidifying the hard-won gains. And we all had the
    privilege of listening to Afghanistan's President Ghani
    yesterday. I think there's a new hope and a new opportunity,
    and we have to move forward, understanding it's still a very
    fragile situation.
        General Rodriguez, you are increasingly facing challenges
    that were located in adjacent ORs--the rise of ISIL, Boko
    Haram, all of these things--jihad in Somalia. Their operations
    challenge you in attempting to build the capacity up of the
    Nations in that region and also to work with our European
    allies very effectively to present a united front against these
    terrorists. So, again, your efforts are critical. And also let
    me commend you and your forces for the resolve with respect to
    the ebola outbreak and what you were able to accomplish.
        Senator McCain has made this point very clear, very
    eloquently. Under sequestration, all of these efforts, both
    civilian, military, interagency, will be hammered if it is
    allowed to prevail. So, I hope you can provide assessment, not
    just in AFRICOM, but in CENTCOM and in SOCOM, of the effects of
    sequestration on your ability to operate.
        General Votel, as the Special Operations Forces, you are
    working across the globe. Your missions are critical. But, once
    again, I think it would help us if you could indicate where the
    effects of sequestration would actually undermine current and
    projected operations. Again, one of the points that you made is
    that you are sort of a global force, but you rely extensively
    on the base operations of the United States Army, United States
    Air Force, and every other service, and some civilian agencies.
    And that would be helpful to point out.
        Let me commend you and SOCOM for all of the operations
    you've undertaken in the last 13 years. There's no force that's
    more stressed, no group of individual men and women and their
    families who give so much and go so often to the battle. So,
    thank you, General, for your efforts. And please communicate
    that to the men and women you lead.
        Thank you very much.
        Chairman McCain. General Votel, can we begin with you?

    STATEMENT OF GEN JOSEPH L. VOTEL, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL
                           OPERATIONS COMMAND

        General Votel. Good morning, Chairman McCain, Ranking
    Member Reed, and other distinguished members of the committee.
    Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss
    the current posture of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM)
    as we refer to it. I'm especially pleased to be here with my
    two mission partners, Generals Lloyd Austin and Dave Rodriguez.
        SOCOM was created by Congress to ensure that we always had
    ready and capable SOF [Special Operation Forces] forces to meet
    the Nation's challenges. Our ability to address these
    challenges is due, in large part, to the strong support we get
    from Congress, and especially from this distinguished
    committee. Thank you very much.
        I'd like to start out by commenting on the amazing actions
    made daily by our Special Operations men and women: operators,
    acquirers, logisticians, analysts, and many others, Active and
    Reserve, military and civilian, the total SOF force. Alongside
    our conventional force partners, the 69,000 quiet professionals
    of SOCOM are committed to values-based excellence and service
    to our Nation. They relentlessly pursue mission success. And
    today, roughly 7500 of them are deployed to over 80 countries
    worldwide, supporting geographic combatant commander
    requirements and named operations.
        We are a force who has been heavily deployed over the last
    14 years, and our military members, civilians, and their
    families have paid a significant price, physically and
    emotionally, serving our country. We are very appreciative of
    the support we receive from Congress to address the visible and
    invisible challenges, and we never forget that, for SOCOM,
    people are our most important asset.
        SOCOM, in conjunction with its partners, supports the
    geographic combatant commanders and the missions they are
    assigned by the Secretary of Defense and the President. If they
    are successful, we are successful. If they fail, we fail.Today,
    the United States is faced with many challenges. The spread of
    technology and the diffusion of power are not only being used
    by responsible leaders to better societies, but, unfortunately,
    by wicked actors to orchestrate terror and violence regionally
    and globally. Nonstate actors like al-Qaeda and ISIL and other
    violent extremist organizations, menacing state actors like
    North Korea, destabilizing actors like Iran, and the growingly
    coercive actors like Russia, are just a few examples of the
    entities affecting the strategic environment in which SOF
    forces operate. We are equally affected by the growing use of
    cyber capabilities and social media, which make it easy for our
    adversaries to communicate, coordinate, execute, and inspire
    their actions.
        The fiscal environment is of concern, as well. While SOCOM
    has been well supported in recent years, I remain profoundly
    concerned by the impact of another round of sequestration, and
    not only how it impacts SOCOM, but, more importantly, how it
    will affect the four services upon whom we are absolutely
    dependent for mission support.
        To address the challenging security environment, SOF
    provides a portfolio of options for our national leaders and
    the geographic combatant commanders. Through small-footprint
    operations and by relying on a network of purposeful
    partnerships, SOF provides a comparative advantage through
    persistent engagement, partner enablement, network focus, and
    discreet rapid response to crisis situations. While we support
    military operations across the spectrum, SOF capabilities are
    uniquely suited to operate and succeed in the gray zone between
    normal international competition and open conflict. And it is
    in this area that we see our very best opportunities to help
    shape the future environment.
        To enable our efforts, I have established five priorities
    for the command:
        First, we must ensure SOF readiness by developing the right
    people, skills, and capabilities to meet current and future
    requirements. To this end, we want to ensure effectiveness, now
    and into the future, with the very best SOF operators and
    support personnel, enabled by the best technology and
    capabilities we can field. Along the way, we want to make the
    very best use of the unique MFP-11 funding authorities that
    Congress has granted us.
        Second, we must help the Nation win by addressing today's
    security challenges. We strive to provide coherent and well-
    integrated SOF forces for the geographic combatant commanders,
    focused on optimizing our SOF activities. Nearly everywhere,
    you will find SOF forces working alongside, and often in
    support of, their conventional force partners to accomplish our
    security objectives.
        Third, we must build purposeful relationships to improve
    global understanding and awareness to create options for our
    leaders. We don't own the network, but we are an important part
    of it. And working with our partners will always produce the
    best options for our Nation.
        Fourth, we have to prepare for the future security
    environment to ensure that SOF is ready to win in an
    increasingly complex world. Ultimately, our goal is to match
    exquisite people with cutting-edge capability and the very best
    ideas and concepts to help our Nation succeed against the
    looming challenges we will face in the future.
        Finally, we must preserve our force and families to ensure
    their long-term well-being. It is in this area that we are
    specifically focused on a holistic approach to address the
    invisible challenges of stress and suicide that are affecting
    our servicemembers, civilians, and their family members.
        I remain honored and humbled by the opportunity to command
    the best Special Operations Forces in the world. I am
    incredibly proud of each and every one of our team members and
    their families.
        I look forward to your questions and our dialogue today.
        [The prepared statement of General Votel follows:]

               Prepared Statement by General Joseph L. Votel, USA
                                opening remarks
        Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you
    for the opportunity to address you today, which is my first as the 10th
    Commander of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). I am
    honored to be here to convey our appreciation for your indispensable
    support and to provide an update on our nation's special operations
    forces (SOF). During my remarks, I will describe USSOCOM's posture,
    purpose, and mission in the context of the emerging strategic
    environment. I will then share my priorities and concerns, and explain
    how we will accomplish our assigned missions and prepare for an
    uncertain future.
                             sof ethic and culture
        I would like to begin by commending the extraordinary efforts made
    by our special operations forces to keep our nation safe. USSOCOM's
    highly specialized military and civilian personnel, our ``quiet
    professionals,'' are asked to respond to our nation's most complex,
    demanding, and high-risk challenges. Building this skilled and
    specialized force is a demanding, time-intensive process. Every day,
    our forces put forth an extraordinary level of effort and personal
    sacrifice, while enduring grueling physical and mental demands to meet
    mission requirements. They deserve our admiration and gratitude, along
    with all of our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines. They are all
    part of a team doing essential work on behalf of our nation.
        The SOF commitment to excellence is imperative in accomplishing
    what our nation has asked of these dedicated men and women--I am proud
    to serve as their commander. USSOCOM is a values-based organization--
    always mindful that our personal and professional conduct reflects not
    only on ourselves, but also on our nation. We will continue to earn the
    high level of trust that our leaders have placed in us by maintaining
    an open dialogue on the challenges we face, providing our best military
    advice, and remaining responsible stewards of U.S. tax dollars.
                               ussocom's mission
        As you know, Congress created USSOCOM in 1987 and gave it distinct
    Service-like responsibilities, which makes it unique among the nine
    Unified Combatant Commands. Under U.S. Code Title 10, Sections 164 and
    167, it is my responsibility, as the Commander of USSOCOM, to organize,
    train, and equip SOF for current and future challenges. Our mission is
    to synchronize the planning of special operations and provide SOF to
    support persistent, networked, and distributed Geographic Combatant
    Command (GCC) operations to protect and advance our nation's interests.
        As global security challenges become increasingly interconnected
    and interdependent, USSOCOM is investing in our own connections,
    deepening our relationships with the GCCs, our international partners,
    and with U.S. national security decision-makers at home. These
    relationships are helping us build common understandings of shared
    threats and facilitate cooperation.
        In short, USSOCOM sees its role as an indispensable supporting
    command to our GCCs, working seamlessly with interagency and
    international partners to provide capabilities critical to addressing
    emerging problems and securing our nation's interests. Ultimately, the
    best indicator of our success will be the success of the GCCs.
                      today's us special operations force
        Since assuming command in August 2014, I have had the opportunity
    to travel to every GCC to consult with the commanders and visit with
    our forward deployed special operations units. I would like to give you
    a snapshot of U.S. SOF and the range of missions they are executing,
    and describe their experience as part of today's military.
        Today, our United States Special Operations Forces are comprised of
    over 69,000 men and women serving as operators, enablers, and support
    personnel. The SOF community is made up of our nation's finest leaders
    and organizational teams. Within the force of ``quiet professionals''
    are Army Special Forces, SEALs (Sea, Air, Land Teams), Air Commandos,
    Rangers, Night Stalker helicopter crews, Marine Raiders, civil affairs
    personnel, psychological operations personnel, acquisition experts,
    logisticians, administrators, analysts, planners, communicators, and
    other specialists who are instrumental in fulfilling our mission. We
    also rely heavily upon our Guard and Reserve units, as well as
    government civilians and contractors.
        Our SOF are deployed to more than 80 countries worldwide, filling
    GCC requirements and supporting 10 named operations. In addition to the
    nearly 3,500 personnel we have stationed forward, we also have over
    7,000 service members deployed in support of a variety of GCC
    requirements on any given day. These requirements span the range of our
    core activities as directed by the Secretary of Defense. From working
    with indigenous forces and local governments to improve local security,
    to high-risk counterterrorism operations--SOF are in vital roles
    performing essential tasks. They provide critical linkages to our
    security partners and must be prepared to handle a wide range of
    contingencies, despite a small footprint in their areas of
    responsibility. These missions are often complicated, demanding, and
    high-risk.
        Because of the unique skill set SOF possess, we are seeing
    increasing demand for these units across the GCCs. The typical operator
    is older than counterparts in the conventional forces, has attended
    multiple advanced tactical schools, and has received specialized
    cultural and language training. This depth of experience and range of
    expertise has been in high demand since 9/11. Over the last 14 years,
    the average service member in SOF has deployed between 4 to 10 times--
    with most toward the higher end of that range--and has frequently had
    less than 12 months at home between deployments. About 50 percent of
    our force is married with children and have sacrificed a great deal of
    time with their families. High operational tempo has put a strain on
    both our operators and their families, and most, if not all, of our SOF
    operators have lost friends both overseas and at home. Our SOF warriors
    have performed their duties superbly, but not without stress or loss;
    we have sustained over 2,500 wounded and killed in action. We now have
    approximately 7,500 members in our SOF Wounded Warrior program, many of
    them due to the ``invisible wounds'' of traumatic stress. We have a
    great deal of work to do to ensure these men and women receive proper
    care.
        On the positive side, the pressure exerted over this time has
    created a self-confident, mature, knowledgeable, and agile force that
    has a greater awareness of what is important to our nation. The range
    of experience and expertise in special operations forces make them
    uniquely suited to deal with many of the complex challenges we see
    emerging in the security environment.
                           the strategic environment
        We are living in a hyper-connected world; the spread of technology
    into an increasing number of cultures and societies is driving change
    in the strategic environment. The Cold War suppressed political
    mobilization in a variety of ways. The removal of those constraints,
    coupled with technology, is creating both challenges and opportunities.
    Adversaries can now easily access tools that range from advanced
    weapons systems and cyber capabilities to improvised explosive devices
    (IEDs), which are providing an expanding variety of coercive options.
    Yet we also see opportunities emerging as networked populations are
    seeking improvements in governance, security, and economic opportunity.
    Power and influence are now diffusing to a range of actors, both state
    and non-state, who have not traditionally wielded it. Many governments
    are struggling to adjust to the new realities. For the foreseeable
    future, instability will be driven by conflicts within and across state
    boundaries as much as it will be driven by conflicts between states
    themselves.
        Within states, it is becoming much easier for aggrieved populations
    to network, organize, and demand change to the status quo; we have seen
    this in a number of locations across the world. Populations are
    increasingly challenging the legitimacy of their governments and
    demanding change on a range of issues. Governments unwilling or unable
    to accommodate change will face increasing pressure from dissatisfied
    segments of their populations. Traditional responses to control these
    situations may provide temporary respite, but too often fail to address
    the underlying grievances, which can lead to further instability.
        Across state boundaries, violent non-state actors such as ISIL are
    exploiting local grievances among populations to advance their own
    horrific ends. Their methods routinely violate international norms and
    challenge regional governments' capabilities to respond. These groups
    rely upon their ability to build common identities with sub-sets of
    disaffected populations and magnify the potential for violence. Other
    non-state actors have more criminal inclinations and avoid law
    enforcement while building their power and influence.
        Between states, technological advancement is providing rising
    powers more options to pursue their interests. In some cases, countries
    are seeking to expand their claims of sovereignty outside of recognized
    borders. In other cases, they are sponsoring and relying upon non-state
    actors to act on their behalf abroad. Traditional approaches to
    deterrence are increasingly inadequate--particularly as some states are
    becoming adept at avoiding conventional military responses while
    advancing their interests through a combination of coercion, targeted
    violence, and exploitation of local issues. Russia is taking this
    approach and is systematically undermining neighboring governments and
    complicating international responses to its aggressive actions.
        There are two clear implications of these environmental conditions.
    First, the diffusion of power is decreasing the ability of any state,
    acting alone, to control outcomes unilaterally. Globalization has
    created networked challenges on a massive scale. Only by working with a
    variety of security partners can we begin to address these issues.
        Second, our success in this environment will be determined by our
    ability to adequately navigate conflicts that fall outside of the
    traditional peace-or-war construct. Actors taking a ``gray zone''
    approach seek to secure their objectives while minimizing the scope and
    scale of actual fighting. In this ``gray zone,'' we are confronted with
    ambiguity on the nature of the conflict, the parties involved, and the
    validity of the legal and political claims at stake. These conflicts
    defy our traditional views of war and require us to invest time and
    effort in ensuring we prepare ourselves with the proper capabilities,
    capacities, and authorities to safeguard U.S. interests.
                         sof's role in this environment
        If the environment is populated with potential adversaries who are
    adept at avoiding our conventional advantages, then we must be prepared
    to respond with appropriate tools. The traditional rules of conflict
    are changing--our ability to influence outcomes is not solely based on
    our aggregate military capability. Our success will increasingly be
    determined by our ability to respond with a range of capabilities while
    becoming more attuned to the intricacies involved in an evolving
    landscape of relationships.
        U.S. Special Operations Forces provide a portfolio of options to
    deal with complex security challenges. We are uniquely able to operate
    in a variety of environments to support strategic progress in achieving
    national security objectives. Our comparative advantage in this
    environment is built upon three pillars: 1) persistent engagement, 2)
    enabling partners, and 3) discreet action.
        First, we conduct persistent engagement in a variety of
    strategically important locations with a small-footprint approach that
    integrates a network of partners. This engagement allows us to nurture
    relationships prior to conflict. Our language and cultural expertise in
    these regions help us facilitate stability and counter malign influence
    with and through local security forces. Although SOF excel at short-
    notice missions under politically-sensitive conditions, we are most
    effective when we deliberately build inroads over time with partners
    who share our interests. This engagement allows SOF to buy time to
    prevent conflict in the first place.
        Second, we integrate and enable both conventional forces and
    interagency capabilities. On a daily basis, SOF are assisting the GCCs
    across and between their areas of responsibility to address issues that
    are not constrained by borders. When crises escalate, SOF develop
    critical understanding, influence and relationships that aid
    conventional force entry into theater. The close working relationships
    we have built with GCCs are essential in ensuring we are able to
    properly support and augment their operations. Today's crises will not
    be resolved by a military-only approach; instead, the nature of these
    challenges demands a whole-of-government response. SOF play an
    important supporting, but not decisive, role. We continue to explore
    how we can better augment the capabilities of the interagency to
    support the National Security Strategy.
        Third, USSOCOM provides the ability to conduct discreet action
    against our most immediate threats. Regardless of our efforts to build
    stability and favorably shape outcomes, the need remains for an
    effective crisis response and a robust, proactive counterterrorism
    program. For these cases, we must maintain the ability to conduct
    operations under politically-sensitive conditions. This capability
    provides a tailored military response that reduces the associated
    strategic risks and the likelihood of conflict escalation. We are
    continuing to disrupt the violent actions of extremist organizations in
    conjunction with conventional forces, the interagency, and our
    international SOF partners. These three pillars help us provide lower-
    risk, timely, and tailored options to deal with the growing variety of
    security problems in today's world.
                            ussocom and its partners
        As an organization that deals with crises that occur in the ``gray
    zone,'' I believe USSOCOM has an important role to play in facilitating
    interagency discussion. For example, we hosted senior policymakers last
    year from across the interagency to discuss options to address
    transnational organized criminal networks. Just this past February, we
    hosted a similar event in Tampa on behalf of the National
    Counterterrorism Center to discuss the strategy to counter ISIL.
    Challenges such as these will continue to evolve--and so must our
    approach to dealing with them.
        Unconventional strategies are increasingly becoming a feature of
    the security environment. I believe it is time for us to have an in-
    depth discussion on how we can best support our national interests in
    these situations. Adversaries employing these strategies attempt to
    maximize their coercive influence while limiting their risk of serious
    retribution. They are becoming adept at avoiding crossing thresholds
    that would clearly justify the use of conventional military force.
    Destabilizing a government is becoming easier through non-attributable
    methods that are relatively cheap and easy to employ. Our success will
    therefore depend upon our ability to act with and through regional
    partners, leveraging all instruments of national power, to counter
    destabilizing influences.
        Cyber threats are an increasingly common component of
    unconventional strategies for which we must develop a more
    comprehensive approach. Our ever-growing reliance on information
    infrastructure makes us vulnerable to attacks; the same is true for
    many governments around the world, to include our potential
    adversaries. Simultaneously, there are a variety of areas in which we
    must become more proficient to fully realize the potential of cyber
    capabilities. I believe the interagency needs to maintain a continuing
    focus on this area.
        Social media is another component of unconventional strategies, and
    the security environment in general, that is playing a central role in
    recruiting individuals to causes. We must therefore develop our ability
    to interact with key influencers through this medium, or else risk
    blinding ourselves to this important conduit of information and
    influence in unfolding crises. We all must view this space as a routine
    operational area; it is redefining how humans interact. Our success in
    leveraging these tools will be determined by how well we cultivate the
    networks in which we participate; it is important to note that these
    are not ``our'' networks--the very nature of these relationship tools
    is decentralized and participatory, rather than centrally controlled.
    We require new thinking on this subject.
        We stand ready to support interagency efforts to work through these
    challenges. Though there are military components to countering and
    deterring unconventional challenges, whole-of-government strategies are
    essential for building lasting stability and safeguarding U.S.
    interests.
                  developing sof for the security environment
        Through close collaboration with Congress, I hope to optimize the
    allocation of our resources to develop the capabilities, capacities,
    and authorities required by the GCCs. While this emerging security
    environment will increase the demand for SOF, we are most effective
    when we integrate our efforts with the GCCs, Services, and the
    interagency. In order to strengthen SOF posture and capabilities, I
    have established five priorities for USSOCOM. Focusing on these
    priorities will enhance our ability to address the range of
    conventional and unconventional challenges that are increasingly
    characterizing the security environment.
        First, we must ensure SOF readiness by developing the right people,
    skills, and capabilities to meet current requirements as well as those
    that will emerge in the future. As we face both fiscal and security
    challenges, we must balance the readiness of the current force with
    investment in future capabilities. Critical to this balance is ensuring
    that we maintain superior selection, training, education, and talent
    management for our people. In turn, our people must be supported by
    timely development, acquisition, and sustainment of both Service-
    provided and special operations-peculiar equipment.
        Recognizing that humans are more important than hardware--our first
    SOF Truth--we must invest wisely in our people to develop the right
    talents our force requires. Over the past 14 years we have evolved our
    approach to consistently produce operators who possess the attributes
    and competencies we require. Developing language and cultural expertise
    is essential to our ability to operate in complex situations to promote
    the security of the U.S. and its allies. Operational success for SOF
    often depends on being able to establish relationships with key
    partners. The strength of these relationships is founded on culturally
    attuned, regionally trained operators interacting directly with foreign
    officials and security forces in their language. USSOCOM and its
    Components continue to strengthen and rebalance regional capabilities
    to provide appropriate expertise.
        We have a shared responsibility with the Services for developing
    our special operations forces and we are partnering with them on ways
    we can better assess and manage talent. USSOCOM has the responsibility
    for ensuring the combat readiness of its forces while the Services have
    broad authority for career development, so we are working on improving
    how we collaboratively prepare SOF for the challenges they face. Yet
    reliance on the Services is not limited to recruitment and development
    of our operators. The readiness of USSOCOM, the Services, and
    Functional Combatant Commands are inextricably linked as SOF relies
    heavily on Service training, logistics, facilities, and operational
    enablers such as cyber networks, global distribution, and global
    patient movement. Service and Functional Combatant Commanders' support
    will remain a critical requirement as USSOCOM continues to deploy SOF
    to meet increasing GCC demand.
        In terms of funding, our readiness has remained relatively stable
    over the past four years through a combination of consistent base and
    Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding, which has allowed
    USSOCOM to fulfill the most critical GCC demands. Although the majority
    of our efforts have focused on the CENTCOM AOR, our current budget
    shifts efforts to improve support to all GCCs in accordance with
    strategic guidance. As we begin to focus more heavily on emerging
    networked threats around the world, we are aligning resources to
    maintain current readiness through joint training and exercises,
    operational unit readiness and training activities, and flying hours.
    Our training exercises include a strong focus on building Service,
    interagency, and international interoperability. We remain heavily
    reliant upon OCO funding, which has been essential for responding to
    today's threats, and appreciate the continued support of Congress in
    this matter.
        Second, we must help our nation win in today's challenges and
    contribute to keeping the nation safe. The challenges faced by the
    United States and our allies require unprecedented agility and
    understanding. We must prioritize and synchronize SOF activities to
    protect our nation's interests as the challenges grow more numerous and
    complex. To accomplish this, we must continue to invest in a diverse
    portfolio of SOF capabilities that meet both the immediate and long-
    term needs of the GCCs and complements the capabilities of the
    Services, the interagency, and our international partners.
        DOD guidance identifies USSOCOM as the synchronizer for the
    planning and provision of special operations capabilities in support of
    the GCC. To meet this guidance, we are in the process of coordinating
    with the Services, the Department, and the GCCs to collaboratively
    develop a campaign plan for global special operations. The plan is
    intended to help optimize and prioritize our support globally, promote
    ongoing efforts to strengthen international partnerships and will
    ultimately improve our ability to support the GCCs by providing
    coherent options and recommendations for SOF employment.
        Authorities such as Section 1208 play a critical role in ensuring
    we can provide a more comprehensive set of options for security
    challenges by leveraging the capabilities of local security partners.
    They also help ensure we retain access and influence in regions where
    we do not maintain a large military presence. We appreciate your
    continued support for this authority. Going forward, we will work with
    Congress to ensure we have the right authorities and programs in place
    to properly support the GCCs.
        Third, we are continuing to build relationships with international
    and domestic partners through sustained security cooperation, expanded
    communication architectures, and liaison activities. These partnerships
    allow us to share the burden of managing conflicts and enhance regional
    capabilities that can respond to threats at their origin. Over the past
    few years, USSOCOM has prioritized strengthening the network of
    military, interagency, and international partners across the globe,
    through liaison exchange, and a multinational communications
    infrastructure. These relationships build common understandings of
    shared threats and facilitate cooperation.
        Efforts such as our Special Operations Liaison Officers, or SOLOs,
    are helping us build this network of international partners. Now
    present in embassies in 15 nations and operating in every geographic
    combatant command area of responsibility, SOLOs help us facilitate
    coordination across GCC boundaries to address challenges that span the
    globe. We also have liaison officers from 13 partner nations that work
    with us at our Headquarters in Tampa. Similarly, our Special Operations
    Support Teams (SOSTs) help us interface more effectively with the
    interagency. By increasing transparency, communication, and
    collaboration with our partners, we maximize the effectiveness of our
    collective action against shared problem sets. USSOCOM will continue to
    invest in these relationships so that our network development outpaces
    that of threat networks.
        The relationships USSOCOM has strengthened and the communications
    architecture we have put in place allow us to coordinate with coalition
    partners on matters such as hostage rescue, the movement of foreign
    fighters, international training, and developing the capabilities for
    responding to shared threats. In January of this year, USSOCOM
    organized a dialogue that brought together senior military
    representatives from 20 nations, as well as the Commanders of U.S.
    Central Command, U.S. European Command, and NATO Special Operations
    Headquarters, to discuss common security challenges and opportunities
    for collective action.
        Our expanded support to the Theater Special Operations Commands
    (TSOCs) is another key effort that is helping us further develop our
    regional capabilities and expertise. This support includes extending
    the necessary communications infrastructure and providing key
    operations support capabilities such as Civil-Military Engagement, and
    ISR processing, exploitation, and dissemination. We are working closely
    with the GCCs to determine how we can best support their operational
    needs. We have realigned approximately 800 USSOCOM billets to push more
    capability forward to the TSOCs in areas such as planning,
    intelligence, analysis, and communications. We will continue to make
    the necessary investments to ensure that we maintain regional access
    and the ability to operate freely with our network of allies and
    partners, and to encourage constructive defense cooperation.
        As we operate with and through a growing network of global
    partners, we will continually reassess relationships based on mission
    prioritization and ensure we maintain the proper security protocols. As
    an enterprise, USSOCOM understands the reality that what happens in
    Latin America affects Africa, which affects Europe, and so on. With a
    global approach--working with international partners to coordinate
    activities and share critical information--we can more effectively deal
    with global challenges. In my opinion, this network is an essential
    capability in adapting to the emerging challenges to our interests.
        Fourth, we must prepare for the future by investing in SOF that are
    able to win in an increasingly complex world. To do so, we must be
    innovators of strategic options. We will focus on developing the total
    Special Operations Force through concepts, training, doctrine,
    education, and research that are future-oriented and challenge our
    current operational constructs. These concepts, in concert with robust
    experimentation and a rigorous capability analysis and development
    process, will ensure we are prepared for an uncertain and dynamic
    future. Ultimately, preparing for the future is about ensuring that we
    match the right people and capabilities with the very best ideas to
    address our most pressing problems.
        In today's environment, our effectiveness is directly tied to our
    ability to operate with domestic and international partners. We, as a
    joint force, must continue to institutionalize interoperability,
    integration, and interdependence between conventional forces and
    special operations forces through doctrine, training, and operational
    deployments. A key aspect of building interoperability is through
    USSOCOM's participation in Service Title 10 and Chairman of the Joint
    Staff sponsored war games and experiments. These events provide a
    critical venue for building partnerships with Service, interagency, and
    international partners to address some of the most pressing challenges
    facing our nation as we look to the future. We will also continue to
    use USSOCOM events to advance our efforts to institutionalize whole-of-
    government approaches.
        Programmatic keys to preparing SOF for the future are a continued
    emphasis on enhancing the overall capabilities of the SOF operator;
    fielding new and recapitalized air, ground, and maritime platforms;
    enhancing our SOF-specific ISR capabilities; and continuing to invest
    in new communications infrastructure and equipment technology that
    allow us to share information more effectively and integrate our
    activities. We will work to ensure we are developing the right
    technologies, equipment, and capabilities required for the future SOF
    operator.
        USSOCOM's tailored and streamlined rapid acquisition processes,
    supported by Congress and enabled through the oversight of ASD(SO/LIC)
    and USD(AT&L), have delivered critical capabilities to the battlefield,
    in weeks and months, instead of years. For example, in 2014, conducting
    combat evaluations allowed us to develop and deliver advanced weapons
    and cutting-edge Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
    sensors for our SOF MQ-9 unmanned aircraft that had immediate impact on
    the battlefield. USSOCOM also successfully responded to an urgent
    operational requirement to increase ballistic protection on its fleet
    of CV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft. In less than six months, USSOCOM,
    working alongside the Army and Navy, acquired lightweight armored
    panels and modified its fleet of Ospreys.
        USSOCOM is also focusing on improving acquisition processes to
    support an adaptable strategy by leveraging its network of partnerships
    with Services, the interagency, industry, academia, and international
    partners. The Tactical Assault Light Operator Suit (TALOS) is an
    example of our emphasis on acquisition process innovation. The effort
    is designed to deliver a test-ready combat suit prototype that protects
    our operators at their most vulnerable point. Through the use of a
    small joint acquisition task force and rapid prototyping events, TALOS
    is leveraging close relationships between operators, acquirers, and
    technologists to achieve greater results than could be accomplished
    through traditional acquisition processes. This approach is also
    helping us ``spin off'' technologies from the larger TALOS effort that
    are improving our capabilities at an accelerated rate. Continued
    Congressional support of USSOCOM's acquisition of SOF-peculiar
    capability and our commitment to innovative process improvement is
    imperative to our continued ability to meet the needs of the
    warfighter.
        As we prepare for the future, we remain very concerned about the
    detrimental effects of sequestration; drastic cuts to the Services will
    have severe impacts on our own ability to support the GCCs. A great
    deal of USSOCOM's procurement is focused on SOF-specific enhancements
    to Service-managed programs. Therefore, SOF buying power is directly
    connected to Service investments. Even with a steady base budget for
    USSOCOM, our capabilities can still be reduced through cuts to programs
    that we depend upon. A major reprioritization of these programs will
    require us to reassess our own investments. Increased demand for SOF
    across the GCCs combined with increased pressure on Service budgets may
    compromise our capabilities. Internally, we are working hard to refine
    our programmatic decisions to build our buying power and prepare for
    the future.
        Another important area of future development for SOF is emerging
    from the Women in Service Review. Women have served in SOF for years in
    Intelligence, Military Information Support and Civil Affairs units,
    female engagement teams, cultural support teams, and Air Force Special
    Operations aviation roles. Approximately two-thirds of our positions
    are currently integrated. USSOCOM is sponsoring several research
    efforts to assess possible impacts on unit performance to facilitate
    further successful integrations. We are also working in close
    coordination with the Services to develop recommendations for further
    integration.
        Fifth, we must preserve our force and families, providing for their
    short- and long-term well-being. People--military, civilian, and
    families--are our most important asset. We always take care of our
    people, but after 13 years of war, their resiliency and readiness is a
    primary concern. We must leverage every resource available--SOF,
    Service, and community resources--to ensure our people are prepared for
    the demanding tasks we ask them to execute. At the same time, we must
    pay particular attention to the often invisible challenges that our
    people and their families face, and ensure that the SOF culture is one
    that fosters understanding and support.
        In order to preserve our special operations force and families, we
    are focusing on four areas: human, psychological, spiritual, and
    family/social performance. In each area, we are taking steps to improve
    the long-term health of our force. These initiatives are not intended
    to supplant the Services' efforts in providing for the welfare of
    military members and their families; but rather to provide SOF and
    their families with access to services that meet their unique needs and
    complement Service-provided programs. Given the high frequency of
    combat deployments, high-stake missions, and extraordinarily demanding
    environments in which the force operates, SOF and their families have
    been under unprecedented levels of stress; it is imperative to address
    the effects of more than 13 years of combat operations.
        There are two specific areas that fall under preserving our force
    and families that I would like to discuss in more detail: suicides and
    personnel tempo, or PERSTEMPO. On the first subject, our goal is to do
    everything possible to eliminate the incidence of suicide in the forces
    and in our families. We have indications that our efforts in the four
    areas I mentioned are making a difference by alleviating conditions
    that contribute to suicide. There are now higher self-referral rates
    and our leadership is improving its ability to recognize important
    warning signs and provide tools to intervene more effectively. We are
    moving in the right direction in changing our culture when it comes to
    seeking psychological help, but still have work to do. This effort will
    continue until seeking help is considered normal and expected by
    everyone. We are grateful for the support Congress has provided to
    address this challenge.
        The second area I would like to mention is PERSTEMPO, which is the
    rate at which we deploy our forces. Our policy is aimed at ensuring the
    physical, mental and operational readiness and resiliency of assigned
    forces. In 2010 a study was commissioned to examine the effects of a
    decade of continuous combat operations on the SOF community. The study
    identified one primary source of ongoing stress: the lack of
    predictability resulting from a demanding operational tempo exacerbated
    by significant time spent away from home for training. Predictability
    is a key component of building resilience. USSOCOM's PERSTEMPO policy
    is designed to improve operational readiness and retention by allowing
    commanders to evaluate and balance mission requirements with the needs
    of our service members. The intent is to enable the Commanders at the
    lowest level to better monitor the use of assigned forces and make
    informed risk decisions that help protect them from overuse, which will
    also improve mission success. Ultimately, managing PERSTEMPO is about
    ensuring the long-term health of the force and mission readiness while
    continuing to meet our global mission requirements.
        The preservation of our force and families is vitally important in
    the preservation of capabilities that the nation depends upon to
    respond to crises in an unpredictable environment. Ensuring we properly
    care for those from whom we expect so much will allow us to meet
    important requirements from the GCCs. As our people keep faith with our
    nation, we will keep faith with them, now and in the future.
                             working with congress
        I look forward to working with Congress to explore how we can best
    enable our SOF operators to prepare for the complex situations we ask
    them to deal with on a daily basis. Your oversight, support, and
    partnership will ultimately help us provide better service to our
    nation.
        The fiscal situation requires the Department to make hard choices
    about the allocation of our resources. It is imperative that this
    process occurs with a clear understanding of impacts. We depend upon
    the Services and Functional Combatant Commands to provide us with key
    capabilities; most SOF operations require non-SOF support. As we adjust
    to the changing demands in the operating environment, we must work to
    ensure we are building the broadest possible portfolio of options for
    our national security decision-makers through the innovation of low-
    cost, small-footprint, and highly flexible SOF capabilities.
                                    closing
        In closing, I thank you for providing me with this opportunity to
    discuss these issues that are critical to the health of our Special
    Operations Forces and our ability to support the National Security
    Strategy. I also thank you for your continued support of our SOF
    personnel and their families; the tremendous demands we have placed
    upon them requires a continued commitment to provide for their well-
    being and support their mission success.

        ChairmanMcCain. Thank you.
        General Rodriguez.

      STATEMENT OF GEN. DAVID M. RODRIGUEZ, USA, COMMANDER, U.S.
                             AFRICA COMMAND

        General Rodriguez. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed,
    and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
    opportunity to update you on the efforts of U.S. Africa
    Command. And I'm glad to be between Joe and Lloyd today.
        Let me express my gratitude for your support to our
    servicemembers and their families who underwrite our Nation's
    security in an increasingly complex world of accelerating
    change.
        Today, our Nation faces heightened strategic uncertainty;
    risks to our National interests are significant, and growing.
    Part of our strategic uncertainty is our fiscal uncertainty. If
    sequestration returns in 2016, I'm concerned about our ability
    to execute the current strategy at a manageable level of risk.
        Threats and opportunities to advance national interests are
    growing in Africa. In the past year, we achieved progress in
    several areas through close cooperation with our allies and
    partners. We have built significant partner capacity over the
    years. This capacity has played a major role in regional
    efforts to contain violent extremism, including al-Shabaab,
    other al-Qaeda affiliates, and now the Islamic State of Iraq in
    the Levant, as well as Boko Haram. With our support, French and
    regional partners have disrupted violent extremist networks,
    and a small number of our unilateral operations have applied
    additional pressure.
        We also achieved success with other partners against other
    challenges. As an example, in Liberia, we supported USAID and
    the Liberian nation in responding to the largest ebola epidemic
    in history.
        Another illustrative example is our support to
    strengthening the capacity and coordination of regional
    partners in the Gulf of Guinea.
        Furthermore, in Central Africa, combined military and
    civilian efforts significantly reduced the Lord's Resistance
    Army's ability to threaten civilian populations.
        Working closely with the State Department and our regional
    partners has allowed us to improve our posture and capability
    to protect U.S. personnel and facilities. When security in
    Libya deteriorated, we assisted in the safe departure of United
    States and allied personnel. Conversely, in the Central African
    Republic, we provided security that enabled the resumption of
    embassy operations.
        We've had a lot of successes, but many challenges remain,
    and there is much work to be done. Transregional terrorists and
    criminal networks continue to adapt and expand aggressively.
    While al-Shabaab is weakened in Somalia, it remains a
    persistent threat to United States and regional interests. Al-
    Shabaab has broadened its operations to conduct, or attempt to
    conduct, asymmetric attacks against Uganda, Ethiopia, Djibouti,
    and especially Kenya.
        Libya-based threats are growing rapidly, including an
    expanding ISIL presence. If left unchecked, they have the
    highest potential among security challenges in Africa to
    increase risk to United States strategic interests in the near
    future.
        Boko Haram threatens the ability of the Nigerian government
    to provide security and basic services in large portions of the
    northeast. Boko Haram has extended its reach beyond Nigeria's
    borders to Cameroon, Niger, and Chad.
        In Somalia, Libya, and Nigeria, the international community
    is challenged to implement the comprehensive approaches
    necessary to advance governance, security, and development.
    Declining resources will make this more difficult.
        To mitigate increasing risk, Africa Command is sharpening
    our priorities and improving the alignment of resources to
    strategy. We are coordinating with international and
    interagency partners to harmonize our efforts across the
    continent. And we are seeking to increase operational and
    programmatic flexibility.
        We continue to provide our best military advice to
    policymakers to inform decisions about managing risk.
        Thanks for your continued support to our mission and the
    dedicated people advancing our Nation's defense interests in
    Africa.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of General Rodriguez follows:]

             Prepared Statement by General David M. Rodriguez, USA
              united states africa command 2015 posture statement
                                  introduction
        Chairman, Ranking Member, distinguished members of the Committee,
    thank you for this opportunity to update you on the efforts of United
    States Africa Command. Africa continues to present a broad spectrum of
    opportunities and challenges to the United States and our allies and
    partners. U.S. Africa Command is working closely with allies and
    partners to build relationships and capacity vital to advancing our
    national interests of security, prosperity, international order, and
    the promotion of universal values. American interests in Africa
    Command's 53-country area of responsibility include the prevention of
    terrorist attacks against U.S. interests, security of the global
    economic system, and protection of our citizens abroad. In addition,
    Africa's growing importance to allies and emerging powers presents
    opportunities to reinforce United States global security objectives
    through our engagement on the continent.
        African states and regional organizations are important partners in
    addressing security challenges, including terrorist and criminal
    networks that link Africa with Europe, the Middle East, Southeast Asia,
    and North and South America. Africa's role in the global economic
    system is expanding: the continent is surrounded by international
    shipping lanes and holds eight of the world's 15 fastest growing
    economies. Africa is rich in natural resources and the human capital
    represented by a large youth population. Forty-one percent of Africans
    are under the age of 15, and by 2050, roughly one in four people on the
    planet will live in Africa. The capacity of African partners to
    contribute to multinational efforts, including those aimed at
    preventing, mitigating, and resolving armed conflict, is increasing.
    Many countries have made progress in developing institutions that
    uphold the rule of law, as reflected by adherence to the law of war and
    respect for human rights. However, in many countries, weak leadership
    and corruption continue to constrain progress in governance, security,
    and development.
        The past year was a dynamic time for Africa Command and our
    partners. Together, we made progress in several areas. In East Africa,
    our regional partners continued to lead security efforts in Somalia and
    demonstrated greater effectiveness and coordination in operations
    against al-Qaeda affiliate al-Shabaab. By supporting the continued
    development of partner capacities, and through enabling assistance and
    selective unilateral operations, we enhanced the collective gains our
    partners made against al-Shabaab. As a result of improved security, the
    Somali people and government have greater opportunities to make
    progress in the development of governance and economic institutions.
        In North and West Africa, we expanded our collaboration with allies
    and partners to address growing threats in Libya, Mali, and Nigeria,
    including an increasingly cohesive network of al-Qaeda affiliates and
    adherents, a growing Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant presence, and
    Boko Haram. We built capacity and enabled our allies and partners to
    disrupt transnational terrorist and criminal networks, strengthen
    border security, and contribute to multinational peacekeeping
    operations. We also ensured that cooperative security locations on the
    continent are able to support the temporary staging of crisis response
    forces to protect United States personnel and facilities. When
    deteriorating security conditions in Libya led several countries to
    suspend embassy operations, we supported the U.S. State Department in
    ensuring the safe departure of American and allied personnel. We
    captured suspected terrorists in support of efforts to bring justice to
    the perpetrators of violence against American citizens and interests.
    Although security declines in Libya have limited bilateral military
    activities, we have improved our coordination with regional and
    international partners and are prepared to expand our bilateral
    engagement when conditions are more conducive to building the
    capacities of defense institutions and forces. In Nigeria, we are
    conducting a range of bilateral efforts and preparing to expand our
    engagement as security and partner capacity allow. Simultaneously, we
    are working with Nigeria, neighboring countries, and our international
    partners to improve the planning and coordination of efforts to counter
    Boko Haram.
        In Liberia, we supported the Liberian government and United States
    Agency for International Development (USAID) in addressing the complex
    humanitarian emergency associated with the largest Ebola epidemic in
    history. Our combined efforts with Liberian partners helped to save
    lives and potentially avert a global health crisis. Nearly 3,000
    Department of Defense personnel, including civilians and contractors,
    deployed to Operation UNITED ASSISTANCE last fall. Under the superb
    leadership of Major General Williams and U.S. Army Africa, followed by
    Major General Volesky and the 101st Airborne (Air Assault), Joint Force
    Command--United Assistance provided unique capabilities in coordination
    and communication, logistics, engineering, and health worker training.
    The speed and flexibility of the U.S. military response was enhanced by
    U.S. Transportation Command's flexible joint expeditionary capabilities
    in planning, communications, public affairs, and port opening, and the
    presence of U.S. European Command and Africa Command forces forward-
    positioned in Europe. The U.S. military demonstrated flexibility and
    capability to assist when others could not, and ensured critical
    initial gaps were filled while civilian partners ramped up their
    capabilities. The deployment of U.S. forces helped boost the confidence
    and courage of others to join the effort, and served as a catalyst for
    the robust international response required to turn the tide of the
    epidemic. Joint Force Command--United Assistance transitioned military
    tasks to civilian partners as they attained sufficient capacity. We are
    tailoring remaining Joint Force Command capabilities and Africa Command
    security cooperation efforts to build additional capacity and ensure
    our regional partners are prepared to respond to potential future
    outbreaks.
        Africa Command's operational requirements to support efforts in
    East, North, and West Africa and the protection of United States
    personnel and facilities across the continent increased in the past
    year. In Fiscal Year 2014, we conducted 68 operations, 11 major joint
    exercises, and 595 security cooperation activities. In comparison, we
    conducted 55 operations, 10 major joint exercises, and 481 security
    cooperation activities in Fiscal Year 2013. With our requirements
    expanding faster than resources are increasing, we are utilizing
    innovative and creative ways to mitigate capability gaps, including
    sharing forces with other Combatant Commands and leveraging the
    capabilities of multinational and interagency partners.
                               mission statement
        U.S. Africa Command, with national and international partners,
    disrupts transnational threats, protects U.S. personnel and facilities,
    prevents and mitigates conflict, and builds defense capabilities in
    order to promote regional stability and prosperity.
                                 current trends
        Africa's security environment remains dynamic and uncertain. Africa
    is rising and so are the expectations of Africans. While greater
    popular demands can accelerate needed political and economic reforms,
    they can also be destabilizing, particularly in fragile states. Across
    much of the continent, crime and corruption impede the development of
    democratic institutions, reduce security and stability, and constrain
    economic development. A number of autocratic regimes are failing to
    meet the growing expectations of their people. Corrupt leadership,
    persistent economic inequalities, swelling youth populations, expanding
    urbanization, and ready access to technology can fuel popular
    discontent and violent civil unrest. When populations cannot rely on
    the ballot box for accountable governance, they are more likely to
    resort to violence. Where governance is weak and steeped in corruption,
    the government and security forces can be as feared and distrusted by
    the population as criminal and terrorist organizations.
        Corruption is a universal challenge that encourages the complicity
    of public servants in criminal and terrorist activities and destroys
    public trust in decision-making systems. To help our African partners
    address corruption, we must carefully tailor the conditions for
    military assistance. Where corruption permeates military institutions,
    its consequences can be deadly. When resources are diverted from
    military pay and sustainment, forces are less capable and more
    vulnerable on the battlefield. They are less effective at protecting
    civilians and may resort to predatory behavior. Corruption is corrosive
    to the foundation of trust and mutual responsibility on which enduring
    partnerships must be built.
        Terrorist, insurgent, and criminal groups exploit corruption,
    regional instability, and popular grievances to mobilize people and
    resources, expand their networks, and establish safe havens. The nexus
    between crime and terror is growing on the continent as terrorists and
    criminals increasingly utilize the same illicit pathways to move
    people, money, weapons, and other resources. The network of al-Qaeda
    and its affiliates and adherents continues to exploit Africa's under-
    governed regions and porous borders to train and conduct attacks. The
    Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant is expanding its presence in North
    Africa. Terrorists with allegiances to multiple groups are expanding
    their collaboration in recruitment, financing, training, and
    operations, both within Africa and transregionally. Violent extremist
    organizations are utilizing increasingly sophisticated improvised
    explosive devices, and casualties from these weapons in Africa
    increased by approximately 40 percent in 2014. These groups have also
    successfully adapted to the internet and social media, and leverage
    these tools to generate funds, recruit followers, and spread their
    ideology to the United States and around the world.
        In East Africa, al-Shabaab remains the primary security threat to
    U.S. interests, despite progress by regional partners in liberating
    parts of southern and central Somalia from the group's control. The
    effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia continues to
    increase. The security situation in Mogadishu is improving gradually
    and several countries, including the United Kingdom, resumed or
    expanded embassy operations in Somalia last year. Weakened by the
    African Union Mission in Somalia's recent offensive, al-Shabaab has
    modified its operational structure and tactics to increase the reach of
    its attacks into troop-contributing countries. This underscores the
    importance of both continuing to improve the effectiveness of the
    African Union Mission in Somalia, as well as taking a regional approach
    that counters al-Shabaab's expanding operational reach.
        In North and West Africa, Libyan and Nigerian insecurity
    increasingly threaten United States interests. In spite of
    multinational security efforts, terrorist and criminal networks are
    gaining strength and interoperability. Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the
    Islamic Maghreb, Ansar al-Sharia, al-Murabitun, Boko Haram, the Islamic
    State of Iraq and the Levant, and other violent extremist organizations
    are exploiting weak governance, corrupt leadership, and porous borders
    across the Sahel and Maghreb to train and move fighters and distribute
    resources.
        Libya-based threats to United States interests are growing. If left
    unchecked, I believe they have the highest potential among security
    challenges on the continent to increase risks to United States and
    European strategic interests in the next two years and beyond. Libyan
    governance, security, and economic stability deteriorated significantly
    in the past year. Competition between the House of Representatives and
    General National Congress, each backed by various militias, has fueled
    conflict over resources and power. Some North African and Gulf states
    have complicated the situation by supporting military operations within
    Libya. Today, armed groups control large areas of territory in Libya
    and operate with impunity. Libya appears to be emerging as a safe haven
    where terrorists, including al-Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq and the
    Levant-affiliated groups, can train and rebuild with impunity. The
    Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant is increasingly active in Libya,
    including in Derna, Benghazi, Tripoli, and Sebha.
        Libyan leaders have yet to demobilize militias, create a sense of
    national identity, build judicial capacity, and develop state security
    institutions and forces representative of the population. Instead, they
    have opted to contract militia groups for security. Despite political
    commitments and coordination between the United Nations, North Atlantic
    Treaty Organization, European Union, United States, United Kingdom,
    Italy, Turkey, Morocco, and other partners to support security sector
    development, the Libyan government's weak capacity has prevented the
    execution of many initiatives.
        The spillover effects of instability in Libya and northern Mali
    increase risks to United States interests in Europe, the Middle East,
    and Africa, including the success of Tunisia's democratic transition.
    Tunisia held its first democratic elections last year and is the only
    Arab Spring country that remains on a positive trajectory. Libya's
    insecurity has created a regional humanitarian crisis and has enabled
    increased foreign fighter, migrant, and drug flows that threaten the
    stability of North Africa, Europe's southern flank, and the greater
    Mediterranean basin. Weapons and fighters exported from Libya have
    increased the capacity of criminal and terrorist organizations in North
    and West Africa. Several thousand foreign fighters have traveled from
    North Africa to Syria and Iraq, often via southeast Europe, and some
    are beginning to return with increased training and experience.
        The security situation in Nigeria also declined in the past year.
    Boko Haram threatens the functioning of a government that is challenged
    to maintain its people's trust and to provide security and other basic
    services. In recent months, Nigeria has faced a confluence of stresses:
    an escalation in terrorist attacks, economic stresses exacerbated by
    falling oil revenues, and political -tension associated with highly
    contested national elections. Boko Haram has launched attacks across
    Nigeria's borders into Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Lake Chad Basin
    states are now expanding their cooperation in efforts to counter Boko
    Haram, including by beginning to develop a Multinational Joint Task
    Force.
        In Liberia, the government and military have demonstrated their
    ability to lead through crisis. The military was called to assist in
    responding to the Ebola epidemic and responded with pride and
    professionalism, reflecting leadership at all levels and the positive
    effects of U.S. engagement. The Liberian military was demobilized and
    rebuilt from the ground up following 14 years of civil war, and the
    United States has supported this effort with sustained investment in
    developing the capacities of Liberian defense institutions and forces.
    In addition to assisting in containing the Ebola epidemic, the Liberian
    army's efforts strengthened the trust between the government, military,
    and people of Liberia; bolstered the army's institutional and
    operational capacities; and deepened the enduring partnership between
    Liberia and the United States.
        In the Gulf of Guinea, the international community is increasing
    its cooperation to address maritime security challenges, including
    piracy and armed robbery at sea; trafficking in drugs, arms, and
    persons; and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. African,
    European, and South American navies, as well as representatives from
    the private sector, are increasing their participation in combined
    maritime exercises in the Gulf of Guinea. Despite modest progress in
    strengthening regional maritime security capacities and cooperation,
    maritime crime continues to hinder trade, development, and food
    security.
        Central Africa remains fragile and vulnerable to humanitarian
    disasters. The Lord's Resistance Army, an armed group that emerged in
    northern Uganda in the late 1980s, has a small presence in border areas
    of the Central African Republic, Sudan, South Sudan, and Democratic
    Republic of the Congo. Over the course of its history, the group
    committed atrocities against tens of thousands of civilians and
    displaced hundreds of thousands of civilians. Military operations and
    the efforts of civilian agencies and non-governmental organizations
    have resulted in the capture or surrender of senior Lord's Resistance
    Army leaders, facilitated defections, and increased civilian early
    warning networks. Four of the top five Lord's Resistance Army leaders
    have been apprehended or removed from the battlefield. Today, the
    Lord's Resistance Army no longer threatens regional stability and its
    ability to harm civilian populations has been reduced significantly.
    The group continues to prey upon scattered and isolated local
    communities for survival and is resorting to wildlife poaching as a
    primary source of revenue.
        United Nations, European Union, and French forces contributed to
    modest improvements in security in the Central African Republic, where
    conditions stabilized sufficiently to warrant resuming operations of
    the United States Embassy in Bangui. However, both the Central African
    Republic and Democratic Republic of the Congo are at risk of further
    destabilization by insurgent groups, and simmering ethnic tensions in
    the Great Lakes region have the potential to boil over violently in the
    Democratic Republic of the Congo. Small elements of the Armed Forces of
    the Democratic Republic of the Congo are making gradual progress in
    professional development and institutional reform, and played
    constructive roles in addressing insecurity in the Central African
    Republic and countering the Lord's Resistance Army last year.
        Southern Africa remains relatively stable. The region fields some
    of the most professional and capable military forces on the continent
    and is a net exporter of security. In the past year, South Africa,
    Angola, and Tanzania contributed to regional and continental security,
    including through participation in United Nations peacekeeping
    operations in the Central African Republic and Democratic Republic of
    the Congo. Despite its relative stability, the region faces economic
    and social challenges that include poverty, crime, and social
    inequality. Future leadership challenges in countries such as Zimbabwe
    will increase the risk of regional instability.
                                    approach
        Africa Command works closely with allies and partners to share
    information, reinforce shared priorities for democratic governance and
    security, address immediate threats, and respond to crisis. We are
    strengthening our relationships with other elements of the U.S.
    government to improve our ability to align strategies, leverage and
    support multinational and interagency partners, and ensure we
    effectively support comprehensive U.S. government efforts led by U.S.
    Ambassadors. We work closely with other combatant commands, especially
    U.S. European Command, Central Command, Special Operations Command, and
    Transportation Command, and Strategic Command's sub-unified Cyber
    Command, to plan collaboratively and share capabilities when
    appropriate. The trust and teamwork we build with partners are vital to
    the success of our collective efforts.
        Africa Command's primary tools for implementing our strategy are
    posture, presence, programs, exercises, engagements, and operations.
        Our strategic posture is the platform for our presence, programs,
    exercises, engagements, and operations on the continent. Our posture is
    designed to maximize operational flexibility and agility, and is
    primarily comprised of expeditionary cooperative security locations and
    contingency locations.
        The single enduring element of our posture and presence in Africa
    is a forward operating site at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, which
    provides a critical platform for the activities of multiple combatant
    commands. Camp Lemonnier and expeditionary facilities hosted by African
    nations support the activities of the United States, allied, and
    partner forces. This strategic posture was enhanced by the signing of
    an Implementing Arrangement in May 2014 that secures our presence in
    Djibouti through 2044. Posture and presence in Europe also provide
    vital support to our mission, and include a joint intelligence analysis
    support center in the United Kingdom and crisis response forces
    stationed in Spain, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom to enable
    rapid deployment to the African continent.
        Our presence in Africa and Europe includes Defense Attache Offices
    and Offices of Security Cooperation in U.S. Embassies in Africa.
    Offices of Security Cooperation in the Africa Command area of
    responsibility increased from nine in Fiscal Year 2007 to 33 in 2014.
    We will add a 34th office, in Malawi, this year. Our presence also
    includes a combined joint task force at Camp Lemonnier and five
    component commands in Europe, some of which are shared with U.S.
    European Command. We also have small advisory teams embedded in allied
    and partner strategic, operational, and tactical headquarters. These
    teams support our programs, exercises, engagements, and operations, and
    their activities help build mutual trust and confidence and enhance
    interoperability.
        Our programs and combined exercises assist in the development of
    partner defense capacities as part of a broader United States
    Government effort, and also support the development of the African
    continental and regional security architecture. We build partner
    defense capacities in executive functions, including national military
    staff functions associated with strategic planning, readiness, and
    budgeting; generating force functions, such as recruiting, training,
    equipping, and maintaining infrastructure; and operating force
    functions necessary to conduct collective training and perform assigned
    missions. When appropriate, we design combined training and exercises
    to help maintain, and even enhance, the readiness of U.S. and partner
    forces.
        Our engagements play critical roles in strengthening our military-
    to-military relationships, advancing our mutual interests, and
    promoting shared values.
        We closely coordinate our operations with allies, partners, and
    other combatant commands. Most are planned with and executed by the
    military forces of our African partners, with the United States in a
    supporting role. Our operations play a role in building partner
    capacity, especially when we enable partner operations with our advice
    and assistance.
                              long-term objectives
        Our long-term objectives are to support the development of
    partnerships that can help expand the positive influence of nations
    with the greatest potential to advance good governance, security, and
    economic growth on the continent. Population size and prospective
    economic, political, and military power can all contribute to this
    potential influence. In addition to partnering with potential
    continental influencers, we work closely with regional influencers--
    countries that contribute to regional stability, and with whom our
    pursuit of mutual objectives can reinforce U.S. interests.
        Our tools for strengthening partnerships include programs for
    building defense capacities in executive functions, generating forces,
    and operating forces. The Department of State's programs, such as
    International Military Education and Training, Peacekeeping Operations,
    Foreign Military Financing, and Foreign Military Sales, are
    particularly important in this regard.
        The National Guard Bureau's State Partnership Program provides a
    unique and vital mechanism for sustaining the long-term engagement
    critical to building relationships and capacity. I appreciate the
    Congress's support to new initiatives, such as the Security Governance
    Initiative, Counter-terrorism Partnership Fund, and Africa Peacekeeping
    Rapid Response Partnership, which will facilitate more comprehensive
    U.S. Government security engagement in Africa.
        Parallel efforts by civilian agencies to support progress in
    democracy, governance, and security sector reform are essential to
    achieving U.S. peace and security objectives, and I appreciate the
    Congress's support to the Department of State and USAID in these
    critical areas. Too often, efforts to strengthen progress in democracy,
    governance, justice, and security in the non-military sphere fail to
    keep pace with those in the defense sector. Without good governance and
    the economic development it enables, security gains are rarely
    sustainable. We continue to support interagency efforts to achieve the
    more comprehensive approach to security sector assistance envisioned by
    Presidential Policy Directive 23.
                              immediate priorities
        As we strengthen partnerships with continental and regional
    influencers, we simultaneously pursue five priorities:

    1. Countering Violent Extremism and Enhancing Stability in East Africa
        Several years of modest United States security assistance in East
    Africa, including military training and mentoring, have helped our
    partners gradually strengthen their capacity to conduct peacekeeping
    operations and counter violent extremist organizations in Somalia. In
    the past year, with advice and assistance from United States forces,
    African Union forces improved their operational planning, demonstrated
    increased proficiency on the battlefield, and gained significant
    territory from al-Shabaab. During Operation INDIAN OCEAN, African Union
    forces liberated key terrain from al-Shabaab's control and disrupted
    the group's training, operations, and revenue generation. The African
    Union Mission in Somalia, United Nations, and East African partners
    improved their coordination in planning for offensive and stability
    operations. United States forces also conducted successful unilateral
    operations against high-value terrorists in Somalia this year,
    including lethal strikes against al-Shabaab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane
    and his intelligence chief.
        Although al-Shabaab is weaker today than it was a year ago, it
    remains a persistent threat to regional and western interests,
    continues to conduct attacks, and is likely to regenerate its
    operational capacity if given the opportunity. Over the past year, al-
    Shabaab has either planned or executed increasingly complex and lethal
    attacks in Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti, and Ethiopia aimed at
    impeding Somalia's political development and discouraging African Union
    Mission in Somalia troop contributing countries from sustaining
    security commitments in Somalia. Additional military pressure on al-
    Shabaab, strengthened governance, and expanded economic opportunity in
    Somalia will contribute significantly to neutralizing this threat. Off
    the coast of Somalia, multinational military efforts continue to
    sustain maritime security improvements achieved over the past few
    years, and no ships were successfully hijacked by pirates last year.
        In the coming year, we will continue to support partner operations
    against al-Shabaab, facilitate coordination in planning for offensive
    and stability operations in Somalia, and support maritime security
    efforts in the region. We will also continue to encourage multinational
    coordination in efforts to develop the institutional, operational and
    tactical capacities the Somali National Army will require to assume
    security responsibilities in the future. The Somali government and
    people will need to accelerate progress in state formation, preparing
    for an on-time constitutional referendum and elections, strengthening
    institutions, developing a sense of national identity, and building
    security forces that are representative of the population. The Federal
    Government of Somalia's ability to hold terrain, govern effectively and
    democratically, and deliver services to the Somali people will
    determine its ability to sustain security gains and stabilize the
    country. We look forward to the establishment, when conditions permit,
    of a permanent United States diplomatic presence in Mogadishu to
    facilitate more robust political, economic, and security engagement.

    2. Countering Violent Extremism and Enhancing Stability in North and
    West Africa
        In North and West Africa, allies and partners are increasing their
    capacity and collaboration in addressing security threats across the
    Maghreb, Sahel, and Lake Chad Basin regions. As conditions in Libya
    declined significantly, Algeria expanded its assistance to neighboring
    countries, and both Algeria and Tunisia strengthened counter-terrorism
    and border security efforts. U.S. assistance facilitated the
    strengthening of regional partnerships and capacity, and we expanded
    dialogue and collaborative planning.
        In the past year, we built partner capacity and enabled allies and
    partners to disrupt terrorist and criminal threat networks in the
    Maghreb and Sahel. We supported the State Department in preparing
    partners for deployment to multilateral peacekeeping operations in
    Mali, where 11 African countries are contributing troops to the United
    Nations mission. United States forces captured Ahmed Abu Khattala, who
    is a suspected ringleader in the 2012 attack against United States
    facilities in Benghazi that resulted in the deaths of four Americans,
    and Abu Anas al-Libi, who was suspected of planning the 1998 bombings
    of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
        In the year ahead, we will continue to look for opportunities to
    constructively influence the situation in Libya. We will work with
    partners to improve our overall effectiveness in containing the
    spillover effects of Libyan insecurity; preventing the movement of
    terrorist fighters, facilitators, and weapons into Libya; and
    simultaneously disrupting the violent extremist networks within. We are
    working within existing authorities to address the threat posed by
    violent extremist groups, including the growing Islamic State of Iraq
    and the Levant presence in Libya. As required, we will also seek new
    authorities to ensure that this threat does not grow. Working with U.S.
    European Command, we will seek to align our efforts to disrupt foreign
    fighter flows and illicit trafficking between North Africa and Southern
    Europe with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Southern Flank
    strategy. As conditions improve in Libya, we will be ready to support
    the development of Libyan defense institutions and forces.
        In the past year, allies and partners also increased their
    cooperation in efforts to address Boko Haram and other regional
    security challenges emanating from Nigeria. We provided training to and
    expanded information-sharing with the Nigerian military and other
    regional partners, such as Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.
        In the coming year, we will continue to work with the Nigerian
    military and will work with allies and partners to support the
    development of the Lake Chad Basin Multinational Joint Task Force.

    3. Protecting U.S. Personnel and Facilities
        U.S. Africa Command is responsible for supporting the protection of
    United States personnel and facilities in Africa. Fifteen high-risk,
    high-threat diplomatic posts are located in the Africa Command area of
    responsibility. Our response forces consist of U.S. Army and Air Force
    elements staged in Djibouti and a Marine Corps Special Purpose Marine
    Air Ground Task Force and two Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Teams based
    in Spain. We also have Special Operations Crisis Response Force
    elements located in Germany and the United Kingdom. With limited forces
    and infrastructure, we are working to maximize our adaptability and
    flexibility to respond effectively to crisis.
        In the past year, we improved our ability to temporarily stage
    response forces closer to hotspots when there are indications and
    warnings of crisis. We leveraged force-sharing agreements with other
    Combatant Commands to move personnel and equipment quickly between
    theaters during crisis response operations. We also made progress in
    securing resources and agreements to relocate intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance assets so they can be utilized more
    effectively to build our situational understanding and support
    operations.
        Last year, U.S. Africa Command and our components reinforced the
    security of U.S. Embassies in South Sudan and Libya and supported the
    departure of United States, Korean, French, and other allied personnel
    from Libya. We provided security to enable the resumption of U.S.
    Embassy operations in the Central African Republic, complementing our
    enabling support to French forces and to African partners participating
    in the United Nations Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central
    African Republic. In the coming year, we will continue to develop
    additional expeditionary infrastructure in host nations and work with
    the Department of State toward a common understanding of decision
    points for reinforcing embassies, prepositioning response forces, and
    executing military-assisted departures.

    4. Enhancing Stability in the Gulf of Guinea
        Regional partners are gradually building their capacity to address
    maritime security challenges. U.S. programs and combined operations
    like the Africa Partnership Station and African Maritime Law
    Enforcement Partnership are supporting this progress. For example, in
    January 2015, the Ghanaian Navy interdicted a hijacked tanker and
    arrested eight pirates, demonstrating capacities we have helped to
    strengthen through our maritime security initiatives. Naval forces from
    Africa, Europe, and South America expanded their participation in our
    regional maritime exercises, and we also increased our collaboration
    with civilian agencies and the private sector. In the coming year, we
    will continue to support regional maritime security activities and look
    for opportunities to complement civilian initiatives that address the
    root causes of maritime crime by strengthening good governance and
    promoting economic development.

    5. Countering the Lord's Resistance Army
        Uganda, the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the
    Congo, and South Sudan are participating in the African Union Regional
    Task Force against the Lord's Resistance Army and leading military
    efforts to reduce the group's safe havens, capture key leaders, and
    promote defections. The African Union Regional Task Force, with advice
    and assistance from U.S. forces deployed to Operation OBSERVANT
    COMPASS, made significant progress last year in weakening the Lord's
    Resistance Army and reducing its ability to threaten civilian
    populations. Today, fewer than 200 fighters remain, the group no longer
    threatens regional stability, and local communities have greater
    capacity to receive defectors and communicate warnings about attacks
    from armed groups. In the coming year, we will continue to work with
    our regional partners to tailor our support to reflect their efforts.
               addressing future requirements and mitigating risk
        Africa Command's capability gaps are likely to grow in the year
    ahead, primarily as a result of growth in transregional threat networks
    and the mission to protect U.S. personnel and facilities. Our greatest
    capability shortfalls will likely remain intelligence support and
    personnel recovery. To address future requirements and mitigate risks
    to our national interests, Africa Command is pursuing the following
    actions to increase collaboration with partners, enhance operational
    flexibility, and close key capability gaps:

          Increase collaboration and interoperability with
    multinational and interagency partners to better leverage and support
    allies and partners, including by working with policy-makers and the
    intelligence community to expand information-sharing. Expanding our
    sharing with multinational entities, in addition to bilateral sharing,
    will enhance the trust, confidence, and interoperability of partners.
          Refine our posture and presence in Africa and Europe to
    reduce risk in operations to protect United States personnel and
    facilities.
          In coordination with interagency partners, improve our
    use of informational tools to counter the spread of violent extremist
    ideology, including by re-establishing regional information websites
    and expanding into social media to provide platforms for regional
    voices to counter violent extremist ideology and influence.
          Leverage combined training and exercises to strengthen
    interoperability and help maintain the readiness of U.S., allied, and
    partner forces.
          Employ new operational concepts and flexible, tailorable
    capabilities, such as the Army's Regionally Aligned Force and the
    Marine Corps' Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force.
          Increase operational flexibility by expanding force-
    sharing with other Combatant Commands and agreements with host nations
    to facilitate access and overflight.
          Work with the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of
    Defense to pursue increased assignment or allocation of forces,
    register the demand for critical capabilities, and mitigate gaps in key
    enablers, such as intelligence, personnel recovery, medical support,
    and tactical mobility.
          Work with the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of
    Defense to pursue authorities that will increase our ability to
    implement programs and other activities regionally, which will allow us
    to respond with greater agility and flexibility to emerging threats and
    opportunities to advance our interests.

        As we look to the future, I anticipate Africa's importance to our
    national interests of security, prosperity, international order, and
    the promotion of universal values will continue to grow. We are
    contributing to progress in regional security through modest and
    sustained investments in building partner capacity. In some places, the
    enemy is growing capacity more quickly than our partners. Where our
    national interests compel us to tip the scales and enhance collective
    security gains, we may have to do more - either by enabling our allies
    and partners, or acting unilaterally. Decreasing resources will make
    this difficult. In addition, the United States and our allies and
    partners will be increasingly challenged to implement the comprehensive
    approaches necessary to advance governance, security, and development
    on the continent. As our Nation's leaders make increasingly difficult
    decisions about strategic risks and tradeoffs, Africa Command will
    continue to sharpen our prioritization, align resources to strategy,
    increase our flexibility, and inform risk management decisions.
        Thank you for your continued support to our mission and to the
    Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, civilians, and
    contractors advancing our Nation's defense interests in Africa.

        Chairman McCain. General Austin, welcome.

    STATEMENT OF GEN. LLOYD J. AUSTIN, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL
                                COMMAND

        General Austin. Thank you, sir. Good morning. Chairman
    McCain, Senator Reed, distinguished members of the committee, I
    want to thank you for the opportunity to appear here today to
    talk about the broad efforts and the current posture of United
    States Central Command.
        Up front, and most importantly, I'd like to thank all of
    you for your continued and strong support of our men and women
    in uniform and their families. I look forward to talking about
    them and the exceptional contributions that they continue to
    make on behalf of our Command and our Nation.
        I'm pleased to appear here this morning alongside my
    teammates, General Dave Rodriguez and General Joe Votel. And
    I'll join them in making a free--a few brief opening comments,
    and then we're prepared to answer your questions.
        Ladies and gentlemen, much has happened in the CENTCOM area
    of responsibility since I last appeared before this committee,
    a year ago. Indeed, the central region is today more volatile
    and chaotic than I have seen it at any other point. And the
    stakes have never been higher. The forces of evil that threaten
    our homeland and our interests in that strategically important
    part of the world thrive in unstable environments marked by
    poor governance, economic uncertainty, and ungoverned or
    undergoverned spaces. And therefore, it's essential that we be
    present and engaged, and that we cultivate strong partnerships
    and continue to do our part to address emerging threats and to
    move the region in a direction of greater stability and
    security. And we must be properly resourced to do what is
    required to effectively protect and promote our interests.
        At CENTCOM, in addition to doing all that we can to prevent
    problems from occurring while shaping future outcomes, we spend
    a great deal of our time and energy managing real-world crisis.
    Over the past year, we've dealt with conflicts in Iraq and
    Syria. We transitioned from combat operations to a train,
    advise, and assist and CT mission focus in Afghanistan. At the
    same time, we dealt with a number of difficult challenges in
    Yemen, Egypt, and Lebanon, and in a host of other locations
    throughout our area of responsibility. We actively pursued
    violent extremist groups, and we took measures to counter the
    radical ideologies that are espoused by these groups. We also
    dealt with Iran, which continues to act as a destabilizing
    force in the region, primarily through its Quds forces and
    through support to proxy actors such as Lebanese Hezbollah.
        And, while we are hopeful that an acceptable agreement will
    be reached with Iran with respect to its nuclear program,
    either way, whether we reach an agreement or we don't reach an
    agreement, Iran will continue to present a challenge for us,
    going forward.
        We are faced with a number of difficult issues in our
    region. However, I firmly believe that challenges present
    opportunities, and we make progress primarily by pursuing those
    opportunities. And we do pursue them. And I am confident that
    our broad efforts are having a measurable impact.
        Of course, the most immediate threat facing us now is the
    threat posed by ISIL, or Daesh. This barbaric organization must
    be defeated, and it will be defeated. We are currently in a
    process of executing our regional military campaign plan, and
    I'm pleased to report that we are making significant progress.
        At the outset, we said that we'd have to halt ISIL's
    advance. And we've done that in Iraq. We said that we're going
    to have to regenerate and restructure Iraq's Security Forces
    and help them to reestablish their border. And we're in the
    process of doing that right now. We said that we'd have to help
    our partners in the region to bolster their defenses against
    ISIL. And we continue to help our friends in Jordan and Lebanon
    and Turkey. And we said that we'd have to build credible ground
    forces to counter ISIL in Syria and to guard against ungoverned
    spaces. And we'll soon begin doing so as a part of our Syria
    train-and-equip program.
        Ladies and gentlemen, we are making progress. In fact,
    we're about where we said we would be in the execution of our
    military campaign plan, which supports the broader whole-of-
    government strategy designed to counter ISIL. And we're having
    significant effects on the enemy. We continue to attrite its
    forces in Iraq and Syria. We've attacked its command-and-
    control capabilities. We've destroyed its training sites and
    storage facilities, along with hundreds of its vehicles, tanks,
    and heavy weapon systems. And, in doing so, we have
    significantly degraded his capability, its ability to command
    and control its forces, and also his primary sources of
    revenue--namely, his refineries and crude collection points.
    The fact is that ISIL can no longer do what he did at the
    outset, which is to seize and hold new territory. He has
    assumed a defensive crouch in Iraq. Although he has greater
    freedom of movement in Syria, he's largely in a defensive
    there, as well. He's having a tough time governing. And this is
    crucial to his claims of a caliphate. Indeed, he has begun to
    expand into other areas--namely, North Africa--in part, because
    he knows that he's losing in Iraq and Syria, and he needs to
    find other ways to maintain his legitimacy. Going forward, we
    should expect this--to see this enemy continue to conduct
    limited attacks and to orchestrate horrific scenes in order to
    create IO opportunities and to distract and intimidate. But,
    make no mistake, ISIL is losing this fight. And I am certain
    that he will be defeated.
        However, there is still work to be done to get to that
    point. And we intend to continue to execute the campaign, as
    designed. And I say that because how we go about this is very
    important. If we don't first get things under control in Iraq,
    where there is a government that we can work with and some
    amount of reliable security forces, if we don't get things
    there right first, before expanding our efforts in Syria, then
    we risk making matters worse in both countries. But, done the
    right way, in light of the limitations that exist, I believe
    that we can, and we will, be successful in our efforts to
    defeat ISIL. At the same time, we can be assured continued
    progress in pursuit of our principal goal, which is to move the
    strategically important region in a direction of increased
    stability and security.
        Going forward, we will all be required to make tough
    choices. We'll need to find ways to do more, or at least as
    much, with less in the current fiscal environment. That said, I
    remain concerned by the fact that capability reductions can and
    will impact our ability to respond to crisis, and especially in
    the highly volatile central region. The resulting loss in
    flexibility makes the U.S. and our interests increasingly
    vulnerable to external pressures.
        And so, I would ask Congress to do its part to make sure
    that we avoid sequestration and other resourcing limitations
    that serve to degrade the readiness of America's military
    forces.
        Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, members of the committee, I
    want to thank you once more for your strong support that you
    continue to show towards servicemembers, our civilians, and
    their families. They are the very best in the world at what
    they do, and they continue to demonstrate absolute
    selflessness. And they make enormous sacrifices on behalf of
    the mission in support of one another.
        Thank you, sir.
        [The prepared statement of General Austin follows:]

             Prepared Statement by General Lloyd J. Austin III, USA
        Introduction: We are in the midst of one of the most tumultuous
    periods in history. There is growing unrest throughout much of the
    world, while a vast array of malevolent actors seek to capitalize on
    the increasing instability to promote their own interests. This trend
    is especially pronounced in the Central Region, where state and non-
    state actors are in conflict, and the resulting turmoil impacts the
    affected countries and also directly affects the global economy and the
    security of the United States. In light of this, the U.S. must continue
    to exert strong leadership and act vigorously to protect our core
    national interests in this strategically important region. An effective
    `whole of government' approach is essential. At U.S. Central Command
    (USCENTCOM), our aim is to see a positive transformation of the region
    over time, achieved by, with, and through our regional partners.
    Despite the challenges that exist in our area of responsibility (AOR),
    we do see progress being made in some areas, along with many
    opportunities. We are confident that our actions in pursuit of these
    opportunities will continue to produce positive results in the coming
    days.
        Looking ahead, our partners will need to assume a larger share of
    the burden for providing improved stability in the region. Given the
    stakes involved, we must keep on assisting them in their efforts. At
    the same time, we have to find additional methods for dealing with the
    convergence of compound threats under increasing budget and resource
    constraints. We must be judicious in our decision-making. Particularly
    during this volatile period, we cannot afford restrictions or
    reductions that would degrade our military posture and put our core
    national interests at greater risk. Simply stated, if we hope to
    achieve improved security which provides for greater stability and
    prosperity around the globe, then the Central Region must remain a
    foremost priority.
        A Retrospective Look: This past year has been especially busy for
    USCENTCOM. In Afghanistan, we completed our transition from combat
    operations to our train, advise, and assist (TAA) and counter-terrorism
    (CT) missions. The Afghans are now in the lead for all security
    operations. They continue to demonstrate significant capability and a
    strong desire to build upon the progress achieved over the past 13+
    years. In recent months, we also saw significant advancements made on
    the political front as a new unity government was established.
    President Ashraf Ghani and CEO Abdullah Abdullah have indicated a
    strong desire to work closely with USG leadership in pursuit of shared
    objectives. While much work remains to be done in Afghanistan, I am
    optimistic that developments will continue to trend in the right
    direction. At the same time, we are focused on the situation in Iraq
    and Syria. We responded quickly and effectively to the rapid expansion
    of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in the early summer
    of 2014. We continue to take the necessary measures to counter this
    barbaric enemy which operates out of ungoverned and under-governed
    spaces in both countries. We are currently executing our regional
    campaign plan to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL, and we are doing
    so with the support of a broad Coalition consisting of 62 other
    countries and organizations. However, as was clearly stated at the
    outset, this will take time and we must maintain strategic patience.
        We also continue to closely monitor Iran's actions. Our diplomats
    are working diligently to negotiate an acceptable agreement with
    respect to Iran's nuclear program, and we hope that they will be
    successful. But, regardless of the outcome of the P5+1 discussions, our
    relationship with Iran will remain a challenging one, as we are very
    concerned by their unhelpful behavior in a number of areas. We also are
    paying especially close attention to the situation in Yemen.
        Recent actions by the Huthis and also al-Qaeda in the Arabian
    Peninsula coupled with the resignation of President Hadi and the
    subsequent upheaval in the government are cause for significant and
    growing concern. If the situation continues to erode, and it remains on
    a negative trajectory now, Yemen could fracture and we could end up
    losing a key partner in our counter-terrorism (CT) fight and cede
    additional ungoverned space for our adversaries to operate out of.
    Meanwhile, we are also watching with interest what occurs in Lebanon,
    Egypt, Pakistan, and other parts of the region.
        Without a doubt these are challenging times. There is a great deal
    at stake for the U.S. and our partner nations. At USCENTCOM, we remain
    confident that we have the right strategy in place to safeguard our
    interests, to effectively address challenges and pursue opportunities,
    and ultimately to accomplish our mission on behalf of the Nation. That
    said, we depend upon the authorities and funding provided by Congress
    to execute our strategy and to do what is required to defend our core
    national interests at home and around the globe. Without question, our
    ability to do so and our overall readiness are put at grave risk by the
    continued reductions made to the defense budget, and specifically as a
    result of the Budget Control Act. We are in the midst of a tumultuous
    and unpredictable period. We are constantly responding to unforeseen
    contingencies and facing multiple threats from a wide range of actors
    that include nation states and transnational extremist groups. We
    cannot afford to constrict our ability to do so effectively by
    maintaining across-the-board spending cuts that severely limit our
    flexibility and authority to apply critical defense resources based on
    demand and the current security environment. If Sequestration goes back
    into effect in FY 2016, we will be increasingly vulnerable to external
    threats.
            USCENTCOM's Mission. USCENTCOM's mission statement is: ``With
            national and international partners, USCENTCOM promotes
            cooperation among nations, responds to crises, and deters or
            defeats state and non-state aggression, and supports
            development and, when necessary, reconstruction in order to
            establish the conditions for regional security, stability and
            prosperity.''
        Strategic Environment. The Central Region is an area rich in
    history, culture, and tradition. It is one of the most strategically
    important regions, holding well over half of the world's proven oil
    reserves and plentiful natural gas deposits, which are crucial to the
    global energy market. The U.S. and our partners have core national
    interests in this part of the world; interests that include the free
    flow of resources through key shipping lanes; the prevention of the
    proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and, the defense of our
    homeland against the very real and persistent threat of terrorism and
    extremism. Unfortunately, it also is an area that is plagued by
    violence and instability, political discord, economic stagnation,
    resource shortages (e.g., water), ethnic and religious tensions, and
    wide expanses of ungoverned or under-governed space. Alone or in
    combination, these provocative factors often make for a volatile
    environment that puts our interests and those of our partners at risk.
    Indeed, when things go badly in the Central Region, it has a clear and
    sizeable impact on the affected countries and other parts of the globe.
    For this reason it is an area of the world that merits our continued
    focus.
        Of note, more so than in the past, individuals and groups today are
    coalescing around ethnic and sectarian issues, rather than national
    identity. This is fracturing institutions (e.g., governments,
    militaries) along sectarian lines and creating factional rifts within
    populations. This growing strain, coupled with other ``underlying
    currents,'' fuels much of the tension and conflict that is present
    today across the USCENTCOM AOR. The principal currents include the
    growing ethno-sectarian divide; the struggle between moderates and
    extremists, particularly Islamist-based extremists; rejection of
    corruption and oppressive governments; and, the ``youth bulge,'' which
    reflects the many young, educated, unemployed or under-employed and
    disenfranchised individuals in the region who are ripe for recruitment
    by extremist groups. To be effective, our approach in dealing with the
    challenges that exist in the region must address these complex root
    causes. In particular, the governments and people of the region must
    bridge the growing ethno-sectarian divide, elevate the voice of
    moderates, rid governments of corruption, guard against ungoverned and
    under-governed spaces, and make sure that young people have better
    opportunities and are able to contribute to society in meaningful ways.
        Of course, change will not occur overnight. It will take time to
    adjust peoples' mindsets and to counter deeply-engrained prejudices.
    But, it must be done by the governments and people in the region. Only
    they can bring about enduring, positive change, with our engagement and
    support. Indeed, we do have a critical role to play in this important
    endeavor and we must take action where necessary to counter exigent
    threats. We are helping our partners to build additional capacity and
    also foster stronger military-to-military relationships. The goal is to
    enable them to assume a greater share of the responsibility and do what
    is required to bring about improved stability in the region.
        There are a number of challenges present in the Central Region that
    require our engagement to mitigate the potential negative effects.
    These include ongoing operations in Afghanistan, our activities in Iraq
    and Syria in support of Operation Inherent Resolve, and our efforts in
    a host of other locations in USCENTCOM's AOR. Ultimately, our goal in
    all cases is to move things in the direction of greater stability and
    to ensure assured access and freedom of movement, recognizing that a
    secure, stable, and prosperous Central Region is in the best interest
    of the United States and our partners and allies.
        USCENTCOM Priorities. Looking ahead, USCENTCOM will remain ready,
    engaged and vigilant--effectively integrated with other instruments of
    power; strengthening relationships with partners; and supporting
    bilateral and multilateral collective defense relationships to counter
    adversaries, improve security, support enduring stability, and secure
    our core interests in the Central Region. In support of this vision,
    the command remains focused on a wide range of issues, activities, and
    operations, including our priority efforts:

          Degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL in order to prevent
    the further spread of sectarian-fueled radical extremism, and to
    mitigate the continuing Iraq-Syria crisis.
          Continue support to Afghanistan, in partnership with
    NATO, as a regionally integrated, secure, stable and developing
    country.
          Defeat Al Qaeda, deny violent extremists safe havens and
    freedom of movement, and limit the reach of terrorists.
          Counter malign Iranian influence, while reducing and
    mitigating against the negative impacts of surrogates and proxies.
          Support a whole of government approach to developments in
    Yemen, preventing Yemen from becoming an ungoverned space for AQ/VEOs;
    retain CT capacity in the region.
          Maintain credible general and specific deterrent
    capability and capacity to counter Iran.
          Prevent, and if required, counter the proliferation of
    weapons of mass destruction; disrupt their development and prevent
    their use.
          Protect lines of communication, ensure free use of the
    shared spaces (including the cyber commons), and secure unimpeded
    global access for legal commerce.
          Shape, support, and maintain ready, flexible regional
    Coalitions and partners, as well as cross-CCMD and interagency U.S.
    whole-of-government teams, to support crisis response; optimize
    military resources.
          Develop and execute security cooperation programs,
    improving bilateral and multi-lateral partnerships, building partnered
    ``capacities,'' and improving information sharing, security, and
    stability.
        Critical Focus Areas. While we remain focused on the broad range of
    challenges present today
        in the Central Region, there are particular areas that merit a
    sizeable portion of our attention and resources. These areas are
    strategically important because of the potential impact on our core
    national interests and those of our partners. Below are descriptions of
    the current critical focus areas, along with a listing of some of the
    key opportunities that we are actively pursuing in an effort to improve
    stability in USCENTCOM's AOR.
        Protection of Nation States. Historically, nation states have been
    the dominant players globally. However, in recent years we have
    witnessed the emergence of transnational extremist groups that desire
    and, in some cases, demonstrate the ability to operate as major players
    with unfavorable intentions. In many ways they are attempting to behave
    like nation states and, in so doing, they threaten the structures,
    rules, norms, and values that define the sovereignty of our nation-
    state based international system.
        These transnational violent extremist organizations (VEO) are
    ideologically opposed to and target the nation states of the Central
    Region. They conduct attacks and terrorize local populaces in an effort
    to gain power and influence. This, in turn, weakens the nation states
    and generates increased instability. This is of obvious concern to us,
    given that nation states are typically anchors for stability across the
    globe, with some exceptions (e.g., Iran, Syria). Thus, the U.S. has a
    vested interest in buttressing our partner nations in the Central
    Region when necessary as part of a larger `whole of government' effort
    to build regional stability through effective security assistance and
    support for inclusive governance.
        As directed, we intervene to counter external threats, such as al-
    Qaeda and ISIL. While our primary purpose for doing so is to protect
    U.S. interests, we also take action to allow time and space for the
    nation states in the region to build sufficient capacity to protect
    their own sovereignty. And, we support them through our planned
    regional engagements, our training and exercise programs, and foreign
    military sales (FMS) and foreign military financing (FMF) programs; all
    of which are designed to further enhance our partners nations' military
    capacity.
        One of the key opportunities that exist amidst the challenges posed
    by transnational VEOs is to persuade our partners in the region of the
    urgent need to build their military capacity so that they are better
    able to defend their own sovereign territory against such threats. Our
    regional partners are very concerned about the threat posed by ISIL and
    other VEOs. More importantly, many in the region recognize that if they
    do not do something to address the root causes of the growing
    instability, they can all but guarantee continued political upheaval
    and anarchy. Again, transformational change can only be achieved by the
    governments and people of the region. They must decide that the
    instability caused by the ``underlying currents'' merits greater action
    on their part, and they must do more to address the root causes of many
    of the problems that exist in their region. We can and will support
    them; but, they must lead the effort.
        Iraq-Syria (Operation Inherent Resolve). We remain highly focused
    on the crisis in Iraq and in Syria. Since launching its major offensive
    from eastern Syria into Iraq in early June, ISIL, which is commonly
    referred to by our partners in the region as ``DA'ESH,'' has largely
    erased the internationally recognized boundary between Iraq and Syria
    and has sought to establish a proto state in the deserts of eastern
    Syria and western Iraq. ISIL's goal is to spur regional instability in
    order to establish an Islamic Caliphate. To achieve this end, ISIL has
    employed three primary lines of effort: 1) instill fear and shape the
    operational environment using unconventional warfare and traditional
    terrorist tactics; 2) seize and hold territory; and 3) influence,
    shape, and define the conflict using sophisticated information
    operations. Importantly, although significantly degraded in recent
    months, ISIL still possesses the resources and organizational structure
    to pose a credible threat to the Government of Iraq (GoI). The erosion
    of Iraqi and regional stability caused by ISIL places extreme political
    and economic strain on Jordan, Lebanon, under-governed border areas,
    and, by extension, the broader Gulf and Levant sub-regions.
        That said, ISIL is not a monolith; rather it is a symptom of the
    larger problems that continue to threaten the Central Region. In
    particular, the growing divide between ethno-sectarian groups and
    between religious moderates and radical Islamists, have created ideal
    conditions for a group like ISIL to take root. Over a period of years
    the previous government alienated important segments of its society,
    notably the Sunni and Kurdish populations, which resulted in growing
    disenfranchisement among these groups. ISIL capitalized on this
    opportunity and launched a successful blitz into Iraq absent much
    resistance and with support from local Sunnis who viewed ISIL as a
    means for bringing about a change in their government. The Sunnis
    simply refused to fight; and, in so doing, they facilitated ISIL's
    offensive. The remaining Iraqi security forces were largely incapable
    of mounting a credible defense against ISIL. After we departed Iraq in
    2011, the leadership of the country made a series of poor decisions.
    Among them was the decision to stop training the security forces, to
    stop maintaining their equipment, and to assign leaders based on
    sectarian loyalty rather than competence, merit, and experience. As a
    result, the security forces' skills atrophied and the condition of
    their vehicles and weapon systems deteriorated. This precipitated a
    number of defeats early on in ISIL's push towards Baghdad.
        This past September, President Obama announced to the American
    people that the United States, with the support of a broad Coalition,
    would take action to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL through a
    comprehensive and sustained counter-terrorism strategy. We are
    currently in the early stages of our counter-ISIL campaign, OIR
    [Operation Inherent Resolve]. Our military campaign plan is comprised
    of five key elements. They will be achieved in a logical progression;
    although many of the efforts will occur simultaneously or near-
    simultaneously. First, we must counter ISIL in Iraq and Syria. Our
    intent is to employ a Coalition effort in Iraq to halt the advance of
    ISIL and to enable the Iraqis to regain their territory and reestablish
    control over their border. Once we've halted ISIL's advance in Iraq,
    which we have done, we said that we would need to contain ISIL, and we
    are doing so with the assistance of our Coalition partners, including
    Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon. We are working with them to ensure they
    have the capacity to secure their sovereign borders. We also said that
    we would need to enable the moderate Syrian opposition forces through
    our train and equip efforts. Our goal is to develop a reliable partner
    that can assist in countering ISIL on the ground inside of Syria.
    Eventually we want to eliminate ungoverned spaces out of which ISIL and
    other terrorist groups have been operating by enabling the indigenous
    security forces to defend their own sovereign territories. Once we do
    all of these things, we will have defeated ISIL through a combination
    of sustained pressure, a systematic dismantling of ISIL's capabilities,
    and by effectively expanding our regional partners' CT capacities.
        Our military campaign is having the desired effects. Iraqi security
    forces, to include Iraqi Army and Counter-Terrorism Services (CTS)
    forces, Kurdish Peshmerga, and tribal elements, with the support of
    United States and Coalition air operations, have halted ISIL's advance
    in Iraq. The enemy is now in a ``defensive crouch,'' and is unable to
    conduct major operations and seize additional territory. We can expect
    that ISIL will continue to conduct ineffective counter-attacks and
    leverage their information operations to amplify the significance of
    these attacks. However, they are unable to achieve decisive effects.
    The effort in Iraq continues to represent our main focus. The actions
    that we are taking now in Syria against ISIL are shaping the conditions
    in Iraq.
        Specifically, our precision air strikes are disrupting ISIL's
    command and control, attriting its forces and leadership, slowing the
    flow of reinforcements from Syria into Iraq, and interrupting the
    resourcing of their operations. The more than 2,600 total air strikes
    conducted in Iraq and Syria over the past several months have been
    extremely effective.
        Of course, the United States is not doing this alone. Our efforts
    are intended to enable the broader, `whole of government' approach that
    is currently underway among various departments and agencies in the
    United States Government. Equally important are the contributions being
    made by our Coalition partners. Indeed, the Coalition represents the
    strength and cohesion of our campaign. In particular, the active and
    public involvement of five Arab-led nations, specifically Saudi Arabia,
    Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Qatar, has greatly
    enhanced the fight and sends a clear message to ISIL and other VEOs
    that their actions will not be tolerated.
        Ultimately, the intent of our regional campaign is not simply to
    destroy ISIL, although that is a primary objective. Even more
    importantly, we want to do what we can to help change the conditions
    inside of Iraq and Syria so that what we see happening there now, does
    not happen again in the future. The key to doing so is enabling
    indigenous forces to defend their own borders and provide for the
    security of their sovereign territory. This is the goal of our advise
    and assist and build partner capacity efforts currently underway in
    Iraq, and soon in Syria. We are also working with the Government of
    Iraq (GoI) to train Sunni tribal elements. Equally important, we are
    providing, in coordination with the GoI, support for the Kurds who
    continue to play a significant role in the fight against ISIL.
        All that said, the effects of our military efforts will be short-
    lived if the Iraqis do not effectively address their political
    problems. The crisis in Iraq will not be solved through military means
    alone. The Iraqis have a new government and Prime Minister Haider al-
    Abadi has vowed to be more inclusive of the Sunnis and the Kurds and
    other minority groups. We are encouraged by the early steps he has
    taken to reach out to the Sunnis and Kurds and we are urging him to
    follow through on pledges made in the near-term. This is not a minor
    issue, as the government cannot succeed long-term without that support.
    National reconciliation is absolutely critical to the success of the
    counter-ISIL campaign.
        A key opportunity that exists amidst the challenges posed by ISIL
    is to create conditions that reduce ungoverned spaces and allow for
    inclusion, security, and good governance in both Iraq and Syria. We
    pursue this opportunity, in part, by training, advising, and assisting
    the Iraqi Security Forces, helping them to re-build their capacity, and
    restructuring them to ensure greater inclusiveness. With your support,
    we have also have established a program to train, equip and sustain
    elements of the Syrian moderate opposition. We anticipate that these
    forces will make important contributions toward degrading and defeating
    ISIL, and they also will help to guard against ungoverned spaces,
    protect local populations, and help to create the conditions for a
    negotiated political settlement to the conflict in Syria that leads to
    more responsible and responsive governance.
        Afghanistan (Operation Freedom's Sentinel). The engagement in
    Afghanistan remains a top priority. We conducted a successful
    transition from combat to stability operations, and we continue to help
    the Afghans to build and mature a capable and sustainable Afghan
    National Security Force (ANSF). Today, the ANSF consists of
    approximately 326,000 Afghans. They, not us, are in the lead for all
    security operations and they are managing to keep the levels of
    violence comparatively low across the country.
        It is also worth noting that the Afghan National Army (ANA)
    consistently ranks as the country's most respected institution. This
    popularity largely reflects the improved quality of life that many
    Afghans are experiencing now as the country becomes increasingly safer
    and more stable. In recent years, life expectancy rates for Afghans
    have improved and the infant mortality rate has declined. Opportunities
    for Afghan women also have expanded; women now represent one-quarter of
    the labor force and 28 percent of the National Parliament. And,
    education and literacy levels have increased. In 2001, 900,000 Afghans
    were enrolled in primary and secondary schools.
        Today, there are more than 8.0 million students enrolled in school;
    and, 39 percent of them are females. Unemployment or underemployment
    has also decreased from 50 percent to 35 percent. By almost all
    metrics, progress in Afghanistan has been significant over the past 13+
    years. Numerous polls conducted in 2014 indicate that the Government of
    the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) enjoys tremendous popular
    support. Polling reports have shown that more than 80 percent of
    Afghans believe their lives are improving. This is positive news;
    however, there is still much work to be done and the Afghans will need
    to continue to build upon the progress achieved thus far. They
    recognize this and clearly demonstrate their intent to do the right
    things going forward.
        The Afghans have the capability to provide for the security of
    their people and they demonstrate this on a daily basis. However, they
    do still need some help with sustainment; and, that includes resupply
    operations, particularly to remote or mountainous areas. They need help
    with fixed-wing and rotary-wing aviation; and also with intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance support. Additionally, due to the
    delay in government formation, some key leaders who will see the
    Afghans through the upcoming fighting seasons have only recently
    assumed their new positions. We will need to work closely with them to
    enable their success and aid them in building additional needed
    military capacity. We cannot afford for Afghanistan to once again
    become a safe haven for extremist groups. Increased instability and
    diminished security would not only affect Afghanistan, but also the
    Central Asia region as a whole.
        Of course, enduring stability in Afghanistan will not be achieved
    through military means alone. There must be a credible, reliable, and
    responsive government in place. Fortunately, after a challenging
    election, Afghanistan has begun to move forward politically under the
    National Unity Government led by President Ashraf Ghani and CEO
    Abdullah Abdullah. Both leaders share similar priorities and beliefs,
    and they have signaled a strong desire to see the government succeed.
    They also are actively countering corruption, which represents a
    principal inhibitor of GIRoA success. Theirs is not an easy
    undertaking; however, I do believe that they can be effective together.
        There is challenging work ahead for the government and people of
    Afghanistan. However, as I look at the country, I remain cautiously
    optimistic that developments will continue to trend in the right
    direction. We have been in Afghanistan for more than 13 years,
    representing the longest period of continuous conflict fought by our
    Nation's all-volunteer force. Together with our Afghan and Coalition
    partners, we have invested many lives and other precious resources with
    the goal of improving stability in that country, and we want to do all
    that we can to preserve those hard-earned gains.
        Amidst the challenges posed by the current situation in Afghanistan
    is the opportunity to foster a strong relationship between the United
    States and Afghanistan and with other partner nations in the Central
    and South Asia (CASA) sub-region. In particular, this would contribute
    to improved Afghanistan-Pakistan relations, which would allow for
    increased counter-terrorism cooperation in the region, along with
    possibilities for reconciliation. President Ghani, CEO Abdullah, and
    their new government have indicated their strong desire to work with us
    and to continue to strengthen our partnership in the coming days.
    Looking ahead, our intent is to maintain a close relationship with the
    Afghan government and military as we work together to preserve improved
    security and stability in the region. At the same time, while the size
    of our footprint will decrease in the coming years, our continued
    presence in Afghanistan will allow us to maintain much-needed pressure
    on al-Qaeda and other extremist groups.
        Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO). As
    I travel around the region, I routinely hear from senior military
    leaders that they do not necessarily fear groups like ISIL's military
    prowess so much as they fear the groups' ideologies. These groups
    clearly demonstrate their ability to inspire extremist behavior and to
    recruit individuals in support of their causes.
        In recent years, VEOs have increasingly exploited ungoverned or
    under-governed spaces in USCENTCOM's AOR. The extremists' use of these
    areas threatens regional security, as well as U.S. core national
    interests. They are able to plan and launch attacks, undermine local
    governments, and exercise malign influence from these spaces. At the
    same time, VEOs and other militant proxies continue to exploit security
    vacuums in countries experiencing political transitions and unrest,
    namely Iraq and Syria, Yemen, Egypt, and Lebanon. Chronic instability,
    disenfranchised populations, and weak regional governments provide new
    footholds for a resilient and expanding global jihadist movement and an
    ideal environment for Iran and its allies to aggressively undermine
    United States regional goals.
        Of note, ISIL's rise as a competitor to al-Qaeda (AQ) has
    significantly impacted the jihadist landscape. The two groups are now
    competing for recruits, resources, and publicity. This will likely
    result in increased terrorist attacks in the near-term as ISIL, AQ, and
    other elements attempt to out-do one another.
        Meanwhile, the AQ movement is becoming more diffuse and
    decentralized as compared to pre-9/11. The risk of affiliates and
    allies operating in more areas and increasingly collaborating and
    coordinating with one another as a transnational loosely-confederated
    `syndicate' is cause for concern. The AQ ideology remains persuasive,
    attracting and radicalizing susceptible individuals in the region.
    Thus, it is critical that we maintain our vigilance in countering the
    group and its narrative.
        We must also continue to look for ways to effectively counter ISIL.
    As noted earlier, ISIL seeks to broaden its reach beyond Iraq and
    Syria, and will try to leverage regional instability to revive a
    caliphate stretching from Europe to North Africa to South Asia. ISIL
    has already received pledges of allegiance from smaller jihadist groups
    in Yemen, Egypt, Libya and Algeria, and they have inspired lone-wolf
    attacks in Algeria and the West.
        Other extremist groups have leveraged Syria's security vacuum,
    including the AQ-affiliated Al Nusrah Front (ANF). As the civil war in
    Syria continues, ANF will threaten neighboring states, particularly
    Israel and Lebanon, where the group has launched anti-Hezbollah
    attacks. The ongoing Syrian conflict has also created a safe haven for
    the Khorasan Group, a network of veteran AQ operatives, providing them
    with territory to plot and train for attacks against the West and the
    United States homeland.
        The Iraq-Syria area of operations is the premier destination for
    jihadist foreign fighters, with over 15,000 coming from around the
    globe, and particularly Africa, Europe, Asia, and North America. The
    majority of these fighters are joining ISIL's ranks, although some have
    joined ANF and other Syrian opposition groups. As these conflicts carry
    on, returning battle-hardened foreign fighters will pose increasing
    risk to their home countries, including the United States. We must
    sustain our active measures to address this growing threat.
        An important opportunity that exists in the Central Region is to
    limit the overall reach and effectiveness of VEOs, while also reducing
    the amount of ungoverned or under-governed space in which these groups
    typically operate. To do so, many of our partners acknowledge the need
    to counter radical extremists' ideologies, in part by helping to
    amplify the voice of moderates in the region. They also recognize the
    need to limit access to ungoverned and under-governed spaces; thereby
    diminishing the reach and effectiveness of violent extremists operating
    in the region. By setting the right conditions and helping to promote
    the efforts of moderate and influential regional leaders, we may
    achieve significant and lasting improvements. And, these improvements
    are likely to have pervasive positive effects on the global security
    environment.
        Iran. Iran represents the most significant threat to the Central
    Region. Our diplomats have been hard at work, trying to reach an
    agreement with Iran with respect to its nuclear program. The most
    recent extension allows for continued negotiations through 1 July 2015.
    While we remain hopeful that the two sides will eventually reach an
    acceptable deal, it is presently unclear how things will play out. We
    have to be prepared for what comes next. We will be prepared.
        In the meantime, we remain very concerned about Iran's behavior in
    other areas. Iran continues to pursue policies that threaten United
    States strategic interests and goals throughout the Middle East. In
    addition to its nuclear program, Iran has a significant cyber
    capability, as well as the largest and most diverse ballistic missile
    arsenal in the Middle East. With ranges up to 82,000 km, Iran is able
    to strike targets throughout the region with increasing precision using
    creatively adapted foreign technologies to improve its missile arsenal.
    It also has increased its anti-access area-denial air defense
    capabilities. Iran is improving its counter-maritime capabilities
    (e.g., mines, small boats, cruise missiles, submarines), which serve to
    threaten the flow of global commerce in the Strait of Hormuz. Perhaps
    most concerning, Iran routinely engages in malign activity through the
    Iranian Threat Network (ITN) consisting of the Islamic Revolutionary
    Guards Corps-Qods Force, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, and
    its surrogates, businesses, and logistics support. Iran also engages in
    malign activity through support to proxy actors such as Lebanese
    Hezbollah and Hamas which threatens the sovereignty and security of
    Israel.
        During the past year, the ITN primarily focused on Sunni groups in
    the Iraq and Syria-based conflict (including the moderate opposition in
    Syria) by bolstering the Syrian and Iraqi governments and overseeing
    engagements involving its own militant forces. Iran also maintains the
    ability to expand the scope of its activities. This is troubling as
    Iranian malign influence is enflaming sectarian tensions that are all
    too often exploited by violent extremist elements in the region.
    Needless to say, our relationship with Iran remains a challenging one.
    We will continue to pay close attention to their actions, and we will
    remain steadfast with our regional partners and do what we can to help
    improve their capacity to counter Iran and mitigate the effects of
    their malign activity.
        One of the key opportunities that exist with respect to Iran is the
    prospect of an acceptable agreement regarding Iran's nuclear program.
    If the P5+1 are able to reach a long-term resolution, that would
    represent a step in the right direction and may present an
    unprecedented opportunity for positive change in the Central Region.
        A Regional Perspective. In many ways our military-to-military
    relationships continue to represent the cornerstone of America's
    partnerships with the nation states in the USCENTCOM AOR. Below are
    synopses of the status of those relationships, along with the current
    state of affairs in each of the 20 countries, minus Afghanistan, Iraq
    and Syria, and Iran which were addressed in the previous section,
    ``Critical Focus Areas'' (see pages 8-21):
        The Gulf States--The Gulf States have proven to be valuable
    Coalition partners, engaging in and supporting offensive operations
    against ISIL and providing the indispensable access, basing and
    overflight privileges that are critical to the conduct of operations in
    the region. In recent months, we have seen some improvement in
    relations between and among the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United
    Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Qatar after a period of increased tensions.
    A convergence of interests, namely the need to counter the increasing
    threat posed by ISIL and other violent extremists groups, has afforded
    a unique opportunity to strengthen the Coalition and also contribute to
    improving stability and security in the broader Middle East region. In
    many ways, ISIL's expansion in Iraq has forced the Gulf States to take
    more seriously the threat posed by ISIL and other violent extremist
    groups. As a result, they have begun to take a more proactive approach
    to countering extremist financing and foreign fighter facilitation.
    They must maintain their focus and continue to make much-needed
    progress in these areas. At the same time, we are strengthening our
    partners' military capacity as part of a collective security
    architecture designed to deter and, where necessary, counter Iranian
    hegemonic ambitions. Going forward, we will play a key role in making
    sure that our partners remain united on common interests and security
    challenges.
        In late January of this year, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) saw
    a smooth transition of power, as King Salman bin Abdulaziz ascended to
    the throne after the death of his brother, King Abdullah. King Salman
    comes to power during a very challenging period. The threat from ISIL,
    particularly along Saudi's northern border, and from al-Qaeda in the
    Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Huthis in the south, has led KSA to
    take a more proactive role in safeguarding the Kingdom's interests in
    the region. In particular, KSA's prominent role in the campaign against
    ISIL, to include its participation in air operations in Syria and in
    support of the Syria Train & Equip program, has paved the way for other
    Arab nations to join the Coalition efforts to counter ISIL. Recognizing
    the need for enhanced maritime security in the Gulf, the Saudis assumed
    command of the Gulf Maritime Security Task Force for the first time
    this year. Their leadership is critically important in demonstrating
    the cohesion of the Combined Maritime Forces generally and the Gulf
    Cooperation Council (GCC) nations in particular. Of note, the Saudis
    have taken a lead role in reconciling the Gulf States. Looking ahead,
    our continued support of advanced Saudi defense competencies and
    further improvements in United States-Saudi military interoperability
    are expected to yield positive impacts, which will in turn contribute
    to greater stability in the region and beyond.
        Kuwait remains a long-time partner and strong and reliable ally in
    the region, providing critical support for United States and Coalition
    troops, vehicles, and equipment deployed in support of Operation
    Inherent Resolve. In addition to providing a permissive environment for
    our deployed forces in the USCENTCOM AOR, Kuwait plays a significant
    role in the retrograde of equipment from Afghanistan. They also
    continue to provide critical basing and access for U.S. forces and
    capabilities needed to address future contingencies. The Kuwaitis are
    committed to advancing regional cooperative defense efforts as
    evidenced by their role as a key interlocutor between Qatar, Saudi
    Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain in response to recent tensions, as well as the
    extensive preparation they have done to host the Eagle Resolve multi-
    national training exercise in the spring of 2015. The Kuwaitis also
    have made significant progress towards reconciling the sub-region's
    long-standing issues with Iraq, leading Gulf Arab diplomatic outreach
    efforts with the Government of Iraq. The Kuwaitis remain committed to
    accommodating all segments of their population to preserve internal
    stability, particularly Sunnis and Shia; and, this has made them
    typically measured in their support for Gulf Arab regional initiatives.
    Overall, Kuwait continues to provide critical support to the United
    States and partner nations while managing these internal political
    challenges.
        Our military-to-military relationship with the United Arab Emirates
    (UAE) continues along its historically positive trajectory. UAE's
    growing concerns regarding the spread of extremist ideologies and the
    threat that they pose to UAE's internal security and regional stability
    prompted the Emirates to take an active role in the counter-ISIL
    campaign. They continue to demonstrate their value as a strategic
    partner by proactively addressing some of the region's toughest
    problems. Their military capability is arguably the best among the GCC
    states. UAE's is also the most expeditionary military, deploying forces
    in support of operations in Afghanistan and Syria. In addition to their
    participation in the ongoing air operations in Syria, UAE also has
    offered to send forces and personnel to support the military advise and
    assist mission and one of the four training sites in Iraq. Of note, the
    Emirates have a much broader definition of extremism and they want to
    expand the counter-ISIL military campaign to include a wide range of
    groups they perceive as extremist, from Islamist political groups to
    Salafi jihadist groups. Going forward, we will look to further
    strengthen our security cooperation partnership with UAE through
    continued engagement and through our FMS program.
        Qatar remains one of our most stalwart partners in the Gulf,
    hosting three of our forward headquarters (USCENTCOM, U.S. Air Forces
    Central Command, Special Operations Command Central) and facilities and
    providing us with unimpeded access to the region. The Qataris were
    among the first to offer a site for the Syria Train & Equip program,
    along with a place to host the now-established Combined Joint Inter-
    Agency Task Force (CJIATF) headquarters. Qatar also continues to play
    an active role in the counter-ISIL campaign. Unlike KSA, Bahrain, and
    especially UAE, Qatar makes a distinction between Salafi jihadist and
    political Islamist groups, which creates a challenge in terms of how we
    approach countering extremist groups in the
        region. That said, the Qataris' relationships with a wide range of
    groups, including more moderate elements, could present potential
    opportunities.
        During the past 12 months, the Qatari Armed Forces have concluded
    extensive FMS equipment purchases and submitted additional requests.
    All told, 2014 saw the Qataris allocate billions of dollars to arm
    their forces with cutting edge American weaponry. This show of renewed
    and expanding cooperation with the U.S. defense industry clearly
    reflects the Qataris' drive for greater military interoperability with
    the United States. Future collaboration with Qatar may see the genesis
    of a partner force that reflects the United States in organization,
    arms, and training. We have a long history of cooperation with Bahrain,
    to include hosting the headquarters of the United States Fifth Fleet
    and Combined Maritime Forces in Manama. Amidst boycotting by opposition
    members, the Bahraini government held elections in November and
    December of 2014, which resulted in additional Shia representation.
    However, there is still significant distrust between the Shia majority
    and Sunni-led government. The government perceives a direct threat from
    Shia opposition groups, which it believes are deliberately de-
    stabilizing the country by attacking the security forces and
    undermining the economy. The government believes these same Shia
    opposition groups are influenced and supported by Iran, and that Iran
    intends to eventually overthrow or supplant it with a Shia government.
        Bahrain has been a strong member of the Coalition to counter-ISIL,
    participating in the initial air strikes into Syria in September of
    2014. However, the historically strong relationship between the United
    States and Bahrain is showing significant strain as the United States
    FMS-hold carries into its third full year. Despite this political
    challenge, Bahrain continues to pursue the re-supply of munitions for
    some of its aviation systems, and it remains firm in its support for
    United States assets at Naval Support Activity Bahrain.
        Oman continues to thrive as a moderate and peaceful interlocutor to
    all equity holders in the Arabian Gulf. Exercising a publically-
    declared non-interventionist foreign policy, the Sultanate maintains a
    pragmatic relationship with both Iran and the United States. From our
    perspective, cooperation between Oman and the United States remains
    close with Oman providing regional access through the use of air and
    sea ports and also freedom of navigation along the Strait of Hormuz. We
    value the stability and predictability that Oman provides and will
    strive to maintain our close relationship with the Sultanate. In the
    meantime, the Omanis are understandably concerned about the
    deteriorating situation in Yemen. Of note, the Omanis maintain
    relationships with Iran and all of Yemen's competing factions,
    including the Huthis. The Omanis are playing a constructive role in
    helping to manage the volatile situation in Yemen. We will continue to
    do what we can to support their efforts and to expand our collaboration
    to improve Oman's border control, counter-terrorism, and maritime
    security capacity.
        Yemen's long-term outlook is uncertain based on multiple converging
    drivers of instability. The Huthi takeover of the government and
    President Hadi's subsequent resignation created a political power
    vacuum and reenergized historical north/south tensions. Competing
    factions, including the Huthis, former-President Saleh loyalists, the
    Islamist Islah Party, and possibly other groups likely see this as an
    opportunity to assert control over the long-term. Meanwhile, Hadi moved
    south, rescinded his resignation, and indicated that he intends to
    govern from Aden. For now, the Huthis have solidified their position as
    the dominant force in the capital (Sanaa) and northern governorates,
    controlling all governance and security mechanisms. UN-sponsored
    negotiations over forming some type of transition government are
    ongoing, but Yemen's multiple competing factions will make political
    resolution very difficult to achieve. It is unclear if the southerners
    will simply deny Sanaa's authority or unite and declare independence in
    the near-term, although there are obvious signs of southern opposition
    to Huthi rule. Southern leaders are likely waiting to see how the
    situation develops, including the military's response and external
    actors' willingness to provide them with support. Additionally,
    Southern military commanders have indicated that they do not intend to
    take orders from Sanaa.
        Yemen's economy has been in a steady state of deterioration for
    some time. Declining oil revenues and cuts to foreign assistance have
    contributed to a fiscal crisis. Meanwhile, rampant unemployment further
    exacerbates Yemen's problems, including making large segments of the
    population susceptible to radicalization.
        The lack of central government leadership coupled with Huthi
    expansion [and the evacuation of all U.S. personnel in February 2015
    have made it exceedingly difficult for us to [conduct partnered or
    unilateral CT operations against AQAP. The Yemeni government has
    generally curtailed its CT operations, and this has allowed AQAP to
    regain some of its former territory and increase operations against
    government and security forces. While some of AQAP's combat power may
    be preoccupied with the Huthi incursion, their external operations
    cells remain active, especially in the south. We must figure out how to
    maintain our CT platform in Yemen in order to counter the threat from
    AQAP. Also concerning is the influence that Iran has with the Huthis,
    and the particular threat that poses to Saudi Arabia's southern border.
    Additionally, Huthi control of Yemen's Hudaydah Port gives them, and
    potentially Iran, direct influence over maritime traffic through the
    Red Sea, which presents a significant vulnerability in terms of the
    protection of core U.S. national and global economic interests.
        The Levant--The greater Levant sub-region is struggling to deal
    with a number of challenges, to include the increasing divide between
    ethno-sectarian groups, the growing threat posed by ISIL, Al Nusrah
    Front (ANF) and other violent extremist elements, a growing refugee
    crisis, and the ongoing civil war in Syria which has now entered into
    its fourth year. These various crises are straining nation states'
    economies and worsening the overall security situation. There is also
    the risk that they will expand further into neighboring areas. We
    remain highly concerned and continue to do all that we can to assist
    our partners in the Levant sub-region in their efforts to effectively
    deal with these and other challenges.
        The leadership and people of Lebanon continue to demonstrate
    remarkable resilience in the face of continued social, military, and
    political challenges. This resilience largely reflects the improved
    performance of the multi-confessional Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF),
    which is the most respected institution in the country. That said,
    Lebanon is challenged by increasing incidents of sectarian violence and
    terrorist attacks by ISIL and ANF. Thus, our continued support for the
    LAF's CT operations is critical to ongoing efforts to insulate Lebanon
    from the conflict in Syria and Iraq. This situation is further
    exacerbated by a variety of contributing factors, including Lebanese
    Hezbollah's (LH) involvement in the Syria conflict, the influx of more
    than one million refugees from Syria, and the presidential vacancy that
    has remained unfilled since May 2014. In particular, the absence of a
    president has put Lebanon's stability at greater risk. It is also
    breaking down the country's fragile power-sharing consensus.
        There is a perception among some Sunnis that the LAF and the
    Lebanese government favor Shia. Many also believe that the LAF has
    acquiesced to LH and is unfairly targeting Sunnis. This has led to
    increasing sectarian violence in traditionally Sunni areas like Arsal
    and Tripoli. The growing unrest makes the Sunnis susceptible to
    extremist messaging by ISIL and other violent extremist elements. The
    LAF is doing a credible job of managing the current levels of violence
    inside of the country, in an effort to protect the interests of the
    Lebanese people. However, this could change if ISIL's narrative begins
    to resonate with Lebanese Sunnis. ISIL, ANF, and other violent
    extremist elements are attempting to establish footholds in Lebanon,
    most notably in the border area adjacent to Syria. Needless to say, the
    situation in Lebanon remains a very delicate one, and we will remain
    focused on this important country.
        Jordan remains a steadfast partner in the Central Region and the
    Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) are among our strongest military partners.
    The country's civil and military leadership continue to provide a
    positive example of professionalism and moderation. That said, Jordan
    does have a large Palestinian and refugee population vulnerable to
    extremist messaging and influence. This challenge is further
    exacerbated by a weakened economy and limited economic opportunity in
    the country.
        The Jordanians fought alongside United States forces in Afghanistan
    and are currently flying combat sorties as part of the counter-ISIL
    Coalition. The Jordanians also continue to provide critical basing
    support for OIR missions. Our thoughts and prayers remain with the
    family of the JAF pilot murdered by ISIL. This horrendous crime will
    only serve to reinforce Coalition unity and resolve. It prompted a
    significant increase in public support for the counter-ISIL campaign
    among the Jordanian populace, which before was generally ambivalent
    and, to some degree, even opposed to military involvement in the
    current fight. At the request of the Jordanian government, we recently
    conducted an assessment of the JAF and found several areas where we
    could assist in increasing their military capacity and improving their
    interoperability. We are also working to expedite the delivery of their
    urgent FMS request to enable their continued active support of the
    counter-ISIL campaign.
        Meanwhile, we are doing all that we can to help Jordan to deal with
    its significant refugee crisis. The refugee population (=600K) has
    placed an enormous strain on the economy and on host communities. While
    the Jordanians are to be commended for the professional and
    compassionate manner in which they are handling this tough challenge,
    the reality is that, even with international assistance, the Jordanians
    are struggling to cope with the impacts. Our goal is to help ease the
    burden on the nation's economy and infrastructure, while doing what we
    can to further enhance stability and security in the country.
        Egypt remains an anchor state in the USCENTCOM area of
    responsibility. It is important for a number of reasons, to include the
    country's geographic location, its enduring peace treaty with Israel,
    its oversight of the Suez Canal, and its cultural and religious
    influence across the region and the globe.
        Egypt continues to deal with the effects of an improving, yet weak
    economy, damaged by years of political instability and escalated
    terrorist violence. President al-Sisi and the government are attempting
    to strike a balance between promoting representative government and
    countering what they perceive as a subversive form of political Islam
    and violent extremism that they maintain has found voice through the
    Muslim Brotherhood. The Egyptians believe that political Islam is bound
    tightly to the violent extremist activity they are witnessing in the
    Sinai and across mainland Egypt, into neighboring Libya. Our thoughts
    and prayers are with the families of the 21 Coptic Christians brutally
    murdered by ISIL last month in Libya.
        Our strategic partnership with Egypt remains highly important and
    our military-to-military relationship represents a key pillar of that
    partnership. We have been very encouraged to see progress made by the
    Egyptians with respect to the current holds on FMF and FMS. We continue
    to work closely with Egypt's Armed Forces (EAF) to improve the security
    of their borders, including the Sinai, and to stop the flow of fighters
    and equipment transiting from Libya and Sudan through Egypt into the
    Central Region. We need to support the EAF's efforts to secure the
    Sinai so that it does not become an under-governed safe haven for
    extremist elements. At the same time, we continue to look for ways to
    integrate Egypt into the counter-ISIL Coalition and our broader
    regional counter-terrorism campaign.
        Central and South Asia (CASA)--The CASA sub-region is adjusting to
    the shrinking United States and international military presence in
    Afghanistan. The United States is now conducting train and advise (TAA)
    and counter-terrorism missions in Afghanistan, as we normalize our
    military-to-military relationship. This change has altered the
    strategic calculus of CASA state and non-state actors as they look to
    position themselves to protect their own interests in the event that
    the Afghan government cannot maintain internal stability. A primary
    driver of these hedging strategies, uncertainty about the United States
    commitment to Afghanistan post-2014, so far has been countered by
    Afghan President Ashraf Ghani's support for a continued partnership
    with the United States and the international community at large, mainly
    through his overwhelming support of the NATO Resolute Support TAA
    mission. Of note, Russia also exerts significant influence in Central
    Asia through economic, military, and informational means to undermine
    the sovereignty and independence of the Central Asian states. Russia's
    actions in the Ukraine have placed additional pressure on the former
    Soviet republics in Central Asia, and this in turn has generated
    additional challenges for our military-to-military relationships.
        At the same time, the CASA sub-region remains an important focus
    for increased partnerships with the U.S. In particular, concerns
    regarding border security and the threat from extremist elements have
    prompted a shared desire for greater cooperation. Going forward, we
    will look for ways to strengthen our military-to-military partnerships
    in support of CT, CN, and security assistance efforts.
        Violent extremist organizations, to include the remnants of core
    al-Qaeda (AQ), continue to operate in Pakistan's Federally Administered
    Tribal Areas (FATA) and, to a lesser extent, parts of eastern
    Afghanistan. These groups threaten regional stability, plan attacks
    against the U.S. and partner interests, and pursue weapons of mass
    destruction (WMD). Of note, the Taliban insurgency continues to present
    a credible threat to the Afghan government. Tension between Pakistan
    and India also continue to threaten regional stability and largely
    drives Pakistan's regional strategy, especially as it relates to
    Afghanistan. Our drawdown from Afghanistan has created an opportunity
    to normalize our relationships with Pakistan and Afghanistan, and this
    may, in turn, encourage the two countries to find common ground in
    countering the VEOs operating in their border region. We are working to
    identify and facilitate implementation of confidence-and trust-building
    measures between Pakistan and Afghanistan to further reduce border
    tensions and increase military cooperation.
        Our desired end-state is a stable sub-region characterized by a low
    risk of conventional or nuclear war, with regional states committed to
    non-interference with respect to their neighbors' internal affairs, the
    denial of sanctuary for VEOs, and the non-proliferation of WMD. We will
    maintain a unilateral capacity to conduct CT operations against high-
    value targets and groups in the region that pose a threat to the U.S.
    or our core national interests. To prevent future conflicts, we will
    also work to improve military-to-military relationships by facilitating
    more frequent contact between and among the region's military
    leadership. This includes moving from bilateral to multi-lateral
    exercises and encouraging multilateral training and operations.
        We have made substantial progress in our efforts to strengthen
    cooperation with Pakistan over the past year. We are encouraged by the
    leaderships' commitment to counter-insurgency operations in the FATA
    and openness to improve relations with Afghanistan. However, Pakistan
    continues to face a number of political, economic, and security
    challenges that threaten to undermine the long-term stability of the
    state. Violent extremists operating in the country exploit these
    conditions for their own purposes. This is hindering the security
    forces' ability to protect the population from terrorist attacks and
    prevent extremists from exporting violence across the region.
        The United States-Pakistan military-to-military relationship
    continues to improve. Key contributing factors are our FMF,
    international military education and training, and the Coalition
    Support Fund. In December 2014, we addressed respective expectations
    for the scope and scale of our future military-to-military engagements.
    We also prioritized our security cooperation at the Defense
    Consultative Group Conference with the goal to help Pakistan to build
    additional capacity in support of their counter-insurgency and CT
    operations and other common objectives.
        The Pakistani military's recent operations to clear militant
    strongholds in North Waziristan and other FATA regions and to prevent
    the militants' return have achieved near-term successes. However,
    Pakistan will likely continue to face the threat of VEOs for the
    foreseeable future. Nevertheless, more positive rhetoric on Afghan-
    Pakistan relations from Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and
    Chief of Army Staff General Raheel Sharif, combined with Afghan
    President Ghani's expressed desire for better relations, may foretell
    an effort by both sides to develop a more common view of the threat of
    VEOs operating in the border region. Of note, in response to the
    tragedy at the Army Public School and College in Peshawar in December
    of 2014, the leaders of both countries have demonstrated a desire to
    improve their cooperation going forward. This is encouraging and
    represents progress; and, USCENTCOM will continue to do our part to
    help strengthen and ultimately solidify this important relationship.
        The United States military relationship with Uzbekistan has
    strengthened considerably over the past year with implementation of the
    first year of the five-year Plan for Military and Military Technical
    Cooperation. Mutual interests related to improving border security, CT,
    counter-narcotics, and countering the return of Uzbek fighters from
    Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq, underpin our relationship. The provision
    of Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles through the Excess
    Defense Articles program improved protection provided to Uzbek security
    forces. And, expanded U.S. Special Forces training will further improve
    the Uzbek military's capacity to meet security challenges. Uzbekistan
    remains committed to ensuring regional stability via continued support
    for our operations in Afghanistan by providing access to the Northern
    Distribution Network (NDN). It also provides electricity to northern
    Afghanistan. As with other countries in Central Asia, Uzbekistan
    continues to prefer bilateral vice multi-lateral military
    relationships.
        Our relationship with Tajikistan is advancing steadily in spite of
    significant Ministry of Defense leadership changes and growing security
    concerns. We continue to assist the Tajiks in developing the capacity
    to meet a variety of CT, CN, and border security challenges, while also
    supporting their development of a peacekeeping capability. Tajikistan
    provides critical support to ongoing Afghanistan operations by allowing
    transit along the NDN. That said, the Tajiks are concerned about the
    near- and long-term effects of the Afghanistan transition on regional
    security and stability.
        The Kyrgyz Republic faces many of the same or similar security
    challenges as its neighbors, particularly with respect to the threat
    posed by violent extremist elements operating in the region. Bilateral
    and multi-lateral engagements in the areas of CT, CN, and border
    security continue on a case-by-case basis. Our military-to-military
    relationship with the Kyrgyz has been positive. We are assisting them
    with their development of an explosive ordnance disposal capability. We
    look forward to full resumption of security cooperation activities,
    pending the successful outcome of ongoing negotiations for a
    replacement of the Defense Cooperation Agreement that expired in July
    of 2014.
        Our relationship with Kazakhstan is one of the most well developed
    in the Central Asia sub-region. The Ministry of Defense continues its
    transformation from a traditional Soviet-style territorial defense role
    into a more modern, adaptable force capable of meeting multiple,
    diverse security threats. Furthermore, the Kazaks have proactively
    sought our assistance in improving their training, personnel
    management, and logistics capabilities. Kazakhstan remains the largest
    contributor among the Central Asian states to Afghan stability,
    providing technical and financial support to the ANSF and educational
    opportunities in Kazakhstan for young Afghans. We continue to leverage
    Steppe Eagle, the annual multinational peacekeeping exercise co-
    sponsored by the United States and Kazakhstan, to improve peacekeeping
    capabilities and to foster regional integration.
        Turkmenistan's humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan and efforts
    to increase regional economic integration are important to enhancing
    stability in the Central Asia sub-region. However, Turkmenistan's
    declared policy of positive neutrality limits our opportunities for
    substantive military-to-military collaboration. Engagements in the
    areas of Caspian Sea security, disaster preparedness, medical services
    readiness, and professional military education continue; however, they
    are limited. The Turkmens recently expressed a desire to acquire United
    States military equipment and technology to address threats to their
    security along their southern border with Afghanistan. We will do what
    we can to support those requests.
        Our Strategic Approach. Our ability to effectively employ our
    ``Manage-Prevent-Shape'' strategic approach is largely dependent upon
    the capacity and readiness of our forward-deployed military forces and
    Service prepositioned materiel capabilities, working in concert with
    other elements of U.S. power and influence. Equally important are our
    efforts aimed at building our regional partners' capacity and
    strengthening our bilateral and multilateral relationships. This is
    achieved principally through key leader engagements and our training
    and joint exercise programs.
        Building Partner Capacity (BPC). To improve stability in the
    USCENTCOM AOR and to lessen the need for costly U.S. military
    intervention, we must be forward-leaning and empower our partners to
    meet internal security challenges and work collectively to counter
    common threats. When compared to periods of sustained conflict, BPC is
    a low-cost and high-return investment. This is especially important in
    today's resource-constrained environment. Joint training exercises, key
    leader engagements, and FMS and FMF programs continue to represent the
    key pillars of our BPC strategy. Also critical are relevant authorities
    and programs noted in the FY16 President's Budget (PB), namely the
    Global Train and Equip authority, Counter Terrorism Partnerships Fund,
    and Section 1208 programs. Tangible by-products of our BPC efforts
    include increased access and influence, enhanced interoperability, and
    improved security for our forward deployed forces, diplomatic sites,
    and other U.S. interests. Working ``by, with, and through'' our
    regional partners also serves to enhance the legitimacy and durability
    of our actions and presence in the region. In the event some type of
    U.S. involvement is required, having strong partners allows for
    increased burden sharing and improves the likelihood of success.
        Joint Exercise and Training Program. The USCENTCOM Joint Exercise
    and Training Program continues to grow in complexity and relevance with
    extended participation throughout the USCENTCOM AOR during FY2014 and
    into the 1st Quarter of FY2015. All five Component Commands developed
    or continued to execute a robust exercise program across the complete
    broad spectrum of USCENTCOM Theater Security Cooperation Objectives.
        Over the past year, USCENTCOM conducted 45 bilateral and multi-
    lateral exercises. Key among them was the Eager Lion 14 exercise, which
    was hosted by Jordan and included naval, air, and land components from
    14 different countries operating at 14 locations and totaling over
    4,000 personnel from our partner nations and some 4,500 U.S. military
    and civilian support members. The International Mine Countermeasures
    Exercise 15, executed in late 2014, took place over 8,000 square miles
    of navigable waterway and united some 43 nations, including over 7,000
    global military service members and over 40 naval vessels and numerous
    other warfighting assets in defense of the region's maritime commons.
    All of the exercises had tangible and measurable impacts in terms of
    advancing our national security objectives, demonstrating mutual
    commitment to regional security, promoting combined command, control,
    and communications, and enhancing interoperability. The ability of the
    counter-ISIL Coalition to conduct very effective, unrehearsed short-
    notice strike operations in Iraq and Syria in support of Operation
    Inherent Resolve is clear evidence of the impact of this vibrant
    exercise program.
        Required Capabilities. In order to effectively protect and promote
    U.S. and partner nation interests in the region, USCENTCOM must
    maintain a strong presence and be adequately resourced and supported
    with the necessary posture-forces, equipment, and enablers. Our
    required capabilities include:
        Forces and Equipment. Forward-deployed rotational joint forces that
    include fighter and airlift assets, surveillance platforms, ballistic
    missile defense assets, naval vessels, ground forces, and cyber teams
    that are trained, equipped, mission-capable and ready to respond
    quickly are indispensable to protecting our core interests and
    supporting and reassuring our partners in the region. A capable force
    presence forward deployed and enabled by a flexible and distributed
    footprint with assured access is also required. This ready and capable
    joint presence can prevent conflict through deterrence, manage crisis
    escalation through early intervention, and allows for a broader set of
    response options for consideration by national authorities, in addition
    to rapid response to crises to quickly achieve stated objectives. We
    will continue to work with the Department of Defense to determine a
    sustainable, flexible long-term posture that provides us with the
    presence, access and partnerships we need for enduring missions and
    activities in the USCENTCOM AOR.
        USCENTCOM requires continued regeneration, reset, and modernization
    of designated Service prepositioned equipment capability sets. The
    Services preposition equipment and materiel capabilities as capability
    sets in support of deploying forces, to provide national leadership the
    necessary capability and flexibility to respond to a diverse set of
    crisis scenarios, to include preventing disruptions to trade and
    security that could have disastrous impacts on the global economy, and
    the ability to rapidly provide disaster relief support. The Services
    aggressively reconstitute and regenerate sustainment stocks depleted
    over the course of a decade-plus of major combat operations; however,
    equipment shortfalls continue to impact indirect fire, sustainment, and
    troop support capabilities. Shortcomings are largely the result of
    budget cuts that were directed by the Budget Control Act. Service
    prepositioned sets previously issued by each of the Services over the
    course of contingency operations require appropriate reset and
    reconstitution in order to posture the command for future contingency
    operations.
        Information Operations (IO). Information Operations (IO) remains a
    top priority. Our investments in IO thus far have made it USCENTCOM's
    most cost-effective method and the top non-lethal tool for disrupting
    extremist activities across the Central Region. We have an enduring
    responsibility to counter this asymmetric threat and recognize IO will
    endure beyond major combat and counter-insurgency operations. As ISIL
    has clearly demonstrated in Iraq and Syria, VEOs continue to expand and
    increase their speed and effectiveness in the information environment
    which directly impacts USCENTCOM's mission effectiveness. Our military
    information support operations (MISO) programs serve as the model for
    the Department and require baseline funding to allow for sustainment
    and Department-wide expansion. Our IO efforts are synchronized and
    carefully nested in support of a broader `whole of government' approach
    to countering the extremist threat.
        Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD). Integrated Air and
    Missile Defense is increasingly important to us and our regional
    partners as threat technology improves and systems become more
    flexible, mobile, survivable, reliable and accurate. Today, the global
    demand for ballistic missile defense capabilities far exceeds supply.
    In particular, there is a need for additional upper- and lower-tier
    interceptors and surveillance and warning systems. The ability to
    conduct early detection, identification, and engagement of possible
    threats is essential. Thus, active measures will need to be taken to
    address this capability shortage. Providing IAMD protection to deployed
    U.S. forces and our critical infrastructure is crucial to mission
    success and provides a visible deterrence to regional aggression.
    Moreover, it signals U.S. commitment to regional partners and provides
    flexibility to respond to regional contingencies. Our bases in the
    USCENTCOM AOR will increasingly be at risk to the ballistic missile
    threat if we continue along the current trajectory.
        Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) Assets.
    Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support continues to be
    challenged by supply-versus-demand limitations. Due to our counter-ISIL
    operations, demand for ISR increased substantially, along with the need
    to maintain a persistent eye on strategic risks and possible threats to
    U.S. national security interests. Collection in anti-access/area denial
    environments continues to present a tough challenge. As evidenced by
    recent events in Iraq and Syria, USCENTCOM's need for ISR and
    collection platforms does not end once named operations cease. On the
    contrary, our demand for multi-discipline, low-observable ISR with
    strike capability that can operate in adverse weather conditions and
    non-permissive environments is increasing. If we do not meet the
    requirements, we can expect that our information dominance, situational
    awareness, and security posture will diminish accordingly. As we reduce
    our footprint in Afghanistan, it is imperative that our intelligence
    collection capabilities be constant and robust to support our forces on
    the ground. Likewise, with respect to Iraq and Syria, there is also a
    need for a robust ISR capability to develop and maintain situational
    awareness of the security environment, particularly in denied and
    ungoverned spaces and in the absence of a large U.S. ground presence.
    And, while we are looking to our coalition partners to help fill some
    of the ISR demand, shortages do remain that will need to be addressed.
        Ascertaining malign actor intentions and capabilities remains a
    challenge. Full-motion video (FMV) has become fundamental to almost all
    battlefield maneuvers, adversary detection, terrorist pattern of life
    development, force protection operations, and a myriad of other
    applications. We use FMV to buy down operational risk and to improve
    visibility of the security environments where our forces are required
    to operate. Full-motion video remains critical to our success;
    although, we certainly recognize that we cannot rely on FMV for every
    situation. Human intelligence, satellite, other airborne assets, and
    other special collection capabilities also remain integral to solving
    many of our problem sets.
        Cyber Security. USCENTCOM must be effectively postured and have
    sufficient capability to counter the growing cyber threat that the
    United States and our regional partners now face. Maintaining an
    effective cyber defense requires the collective efforts of partners who
    share a common vision and are mutually committed.
        Looking ahead, we will need to aggressively improve our cyber
    posture to mitigate advanced persistent threats to our network and
    critical information. As the cyber community matures, we will plan,
    integrate, synchronize, and conduct cyber operations in cooperation
    with other USG agencies and partner nations. USCENTCOM's cyber
    activities necessitate the active pursuit of key requirements,
    resourcing, training, as well as the build out of our cyber forces and
    the acquisition of needed cyber capabilities. This requires a multi-
    disciplined approach to address a diverse and changing threat, adequate
    resourcing, and a command and control model aligned to the operational
    chain of command in order to readily receive and synchronize orders and
    execute cyber operations.
        At the same time, we continue to support our regional partners in
    building their capacity and expertise in the cyber domain. This partner
    capacity is essential in the cyber domain, as the global economy relies
    in part on key resources that reside across the Central Region. With
    Congress' backing, we will continue to focus on cyber defense and cyber
    security cooperation as key components of our theater strategy.
        Required Authorities and Resources. The realities of the current
    fiscal environment continue to impact USCENTCOM headquarters (HQs), our
    five component commands, established combined/joint task forces, and 18
    country teams. Persistent fiscal uncertainty hinders efficient and
    timely implementation of operational, logistical, tactical, and
    strategic milestones and objectives. We request your help in addressing
    the budget uncertainty caused by the Budget Control Act and our
    dependence on continuing resolutions at the start of the fiscal year.
        Provided the right authorities and resources, our world-class DOD
    Civ-Mil team can and will successfully accomplish any mission. With
    that in mind, we sincerely appreciate Congress' continued support for
    key authorities and appropriations needed to sustain current and future
    operations in the Central Region and to respond to emerging crises.
    Collectively, the below required authorities and resources enable our
    efforts to shape positive outcomes for the future.
        Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)-funded Accounts. USCENTCOM's
    programs, operations, and activities are resourced almost exclusively
    by OCO appropriations vice Baseline funding. This funding strategy
    potentially impacts our forward-deployed forces and our regional
    partners. We remain concerned that this approach limits predictability,
    does not allow for advanced planning, and conveys an unintentional
    temporary nature to our strategy in the region. All involved
    stakeholders must work together to develop an enduring approach to
    resourcing the defense strategy in the USCENTCOM AOR.
        Iraq and Syria Train & Equip Resources. Continued support for
    flexible authorities is needed to effectively react to the urgent
    threat posed by ISIL in Iraq and in Syria. Improving the capacity and
    effectiveness of the Iraqi Security Forces, to include Kurdish and
    Sunni tribal forces, and moderate opposition forces in Syria is key to
    countering ISIL and other extremists operating in those countries. The
    Congressional authorities and resourcing provided to initiate the
    training and equipping of Syrian moderate opposition forces to counter
    a degraded ISIL and to defend territorial gains will undoubtedly
    contribute to the ultimate defeat of ISIL and the possibility of a
    negotiated settlement with the Assad Regime. The turnaround of the dire
    situation in Kobane, Syria is indicative of how, with a fairly limited,
    precise application of authorities (allowing U.S. aircraft to airdrop
    donated Kurdish weapons and equipment) and U.S. air support, and a
    determined and willing partner, ISIL's momentum and narrative were
    effectively countered.
        The Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF) and authority demonstrate the
    United States' commitment, in partnership with the international
    community and the Government of Iraq, to build a diverse, inclusive,
    and sustainable Iraq security force. We strongly endorse and support
    extending the ITEF and establishing the stand-alone Syria Opposition
    Train and Equip Fund and authority in FY16 to ensure that the ISF and
    Syrian moderate opposition forces are professional and sufficiently
    equipped to accomplish their mission, which consists of disrupting,
    defeating, and ultimately destroying ISIL within their sovereign
    territories.
        The Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) remains pivotal to
    ensuring the continued security and stability of the GIRoA and the
    ANSF. Historically, ASFF has provided 80-90 percent of the ANSF
    operating budget. While future ASFF requests are expected to decrease,
    they will still remain ANSF's primary funding source for at least the
    next few years. The ANSF is posturing for long-term supportability
    through a program of ``Improve, Ready, Sustain.'' They are committed to
    instilling fiscal discipline as they refine requirements generation and
    define capabilities in a resource-constrained environment. The U.S.
    Government and the GIRoA must continue to work hand-in-hand through
    this period of transition. With continued United States support, the
    ANSF is in a position to maintain stability within Afghanistan, while
    reducing the influence of malign regional actors.
        Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS).
    Our need for continued Congressional funding of FMF programs that
    support USCENTCOM security cooperation objectives cannot be overstated.
    The Central Region accounts for more than half of all global FMS. Our
    partners in the region want U.S. equipment because they recognize that
    it is the best in the world. It also represents a very effective means
    for establishing long-term relationships between the U.S. and our
    partner nations and ensures greater interoperability between our
    militaries. We appreciate Congressional support for interagency
    initiatives to streamline the FMS and FMF process to ensure that we
    remain the partner of choice for our allies in the region and are able
    to capitalize on emerging opportunities going forward.
        Excess Defense Articles (EDA)/Foreign Excess Personal Property
    (FEPP). The EDA program has allowed the Department of Defense to
    transfer materiel determined to be excess to Service requirements. Over
    the years, EDA has been an integral component in building partner
    capacity and has proven beneficial in our engagements with our regional
    partners. We have reaped the benefits of this authority several times
    in the last year, enabling us to support requirements in Iraq,
    Uzbekistan, and other countries located within the USCENTCOM AOR or
    participating in operations with United States forces. Several other
    EDA transfers to the UAE, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon and Egypt are
    pending. Of note, USCENTCOM sourced as much EDA directly from
    Afghanistan as was available without increasing risk to the Services
    and the State Department at the time of the respective transfers.
        In the same light, the FEPP authorization has allowed us to
    transfer non-military type equipment (e.g., wall lockers, generators,
    non-tactical vehicles) acquired as part of our base closures and
    reductions to Iraqi and Afghan security forces, as well as to other
    Afghan Government Ministries, Kuwait, and Kyrgyzstan. This authority
    was beneficial in allowing turn-key transfer of select bases while also
    reducing costs by allowing us to transfer items needed by the host
    nation, rather than retrograding those same items to CONUS at a cost
    higher than their actual value.
        Coalition Support. Continued Congressional support for Coalition
    Support authorities and funding, to include the Coalition Support Fund
    (CSF), the associated Coalition Readiness Support Program (CSRP), and
    the Lift and Sustain appropriation is key to maintaining effective
    coalitions and facilitating the participation in combined military
    operations of coalition partners who would not otherwise be able to
    participate due to lack of resources. Without coalition partners'
    participation, U.S. forces would be required to shoulder more of the
    burden of conducting these operations; and, in some cases, the
    operations simply could not be accomplished. This would pose additional
    risks to the safety and security of U.S. forces in theater and
    adversely impact critical U.S. missions, including the Afghanistan
    Transition and the campaign to counter ISIL in Iraq and Syria.
    Financial and logistical support to coalition partner nations helps to
    ensure interoperability in the execution of current and pending
    missions; enhances planning and force protection; and, also simplifies
    logistical support mechanisms; while also improving our collective
    ability to respond quickly to contingency requirements.
        Our requirement to provide logistical support to our coalition
    partners has not decreased despite the drawdown of forces in
    Afghanistan. The extension of authorities outlined in Section 1223 of
    the FY15 NDAA to provide logistical support to our coalition forces
    participating in military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq will be
    required to execute the Resolute Support Mission and are increasingly
    relevant as the counter-ISIL Coalition continues to expand. Our
    coalition partners have different sets of equipment and differing
    abilities to wage expeditionary warfare. As the region changes focus,
    we must ensure that we maintain the logistics authorities currently in
    place in order to respond quickly to future contingencies.
        Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP). As the United
    States' role in Afghanistan continues to evolve, commanders must retain
    the flexibility that the CERP provides in order to accomplish their
    mission under Resolute Support. Urgent humanitarian needs cannot be
    predicted and will remain a factor as long as we have security forces
    on the ground in country.
        Military Construction (MILCON). We continue to leverage existing
    infrastructure and host nation funding where possible, as well as
    maritime posture and reach back capabilities to meet steady state and
    surge requirements. However, in some cases, MILCON is still required to
    expand infrastructure capabilities to facilitate sustainment support
    for U.S. forces and operations. Current projects are essential to our
    contingency and steady state operations and support the defense pillars
    outlined in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review.
        Long-term C4 Sustainment Plan. USCENTCOM, our Service Components,
    Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), and our deployed forces currently
    rely heavily on command, control, communications, and computer (C4)
    systems to support operations across the region. These capabilities,
    primarily resourced through OCO funding, sustain C4 requirements at the
    HQ and eight of 24 strategic operational locations in the AOR. A
    diverse and survivable C4 infrastructure, via both SATCOM and
    terrestrial means, is essential to the successful conduct of missions
    in the USCENTCOM AOR.
        The U.S. Central Command Team. At USCENTCOM, we continue to do our
    part to keep our Nation and our interests around the globe safe and
    secure. We have an exceptional and enormously capable team and, without
    question, our greatest assets are our people. We owe it to them to make
    sure they have everything they need to do their jobs in support of the
    mission as well and as safely as possible. This includes making sure
    that they have the best equipment, care and support, and, most
    importantly, we must guarantee them safe, secure, and respectful
    environments to live and work in. We should also do what we can to
    support them when they return from deployments or have completed their
    service obligations. Likewise, we must ensure that their families are
    properly cared for and supported.
        Conclusion. All of us have a vested interest in achieving a stable
    and secure Central Region, and success will require everyone working
    together towards this common goal. This is not just the military's
    responsibility, or the U.S. Government's responsibility, or even
    America's responsibility alone. As former Secretary of State Henry
    Kissinger stated, ``Peace cannot be achieved by one man or one nation.
    It results from the efforts of men of broad vision and goodwill
    throughout the world.''
        That said, the United States, and in particular our military, does
    have a share in the task at hand. We are uniquely qualified in our
    ability to lead and also leverage our partners' capabilities, while
    enabling them to play a larger and more active role in combatting
    common enemies, addressing challenges, and also actively pursuing the
    many opportunities that exist in that strategically important part of
    the world. Only the governments and people of the region can achieve
    enduring transformational change. But, by supporting them and helping
    to expand their capacity, and by providing them with the decision space
    required to improve conditions and also provide for the security of
    their sovereign territories, we will help to successfully move the
    Central Region in the direction of greater stability and security. This
    remains our ultimate goal.
        The year ahead is certain to be an important one throughout the
    Middle East and parts of Central and South Asia. The consequences of
    our actions, or lack thereof, will undoubtedly prove significant. Our
    intent at USCENTCOM is to build upon the progress achieved to date. We
    will continue to manage existing conflicts and crises, while doing what
    we can to prevent confrontations and developing situations from
    worsening and becoming crises. We also will continue to pursue the many
    opportunities present in the region, recognizing that it is through
    them that we will shape positive outcomes and achieve improved
    stability and security throughout our area of responsibility. Finally,
    we will continue to support the efforts of our U.S. Government
    colleagues; understanding that the effects of our individual
    contributions are greatly amplified when we work together in a
    constructive and collaborative fashion.
        Today, more than 78,000 of the very best Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen,
    Marines, Coastguardsmen and Civilians assigned to or associated with
    U.S. Central Command are selflessly serving in difficult and dangerous
    places around the globe. They continue to do an exceptional job in
    support of the mission and this great country of ours. Without
    question, we could not do what we do without them. We are enormously
    proud of them and their families. They are and will remain our foremost
    priority.
                              USCENTCOM: Ready, Engaged, Vigilant!

        Chairman McCain. Thank you, General.
        I'd ask the witnesses, do they agree with General
    Petraeus's comments, a few days ago, that Iran was as great or
    greater threat in the Middle East than ISIS? Do you agree with
    that, General Austin? With that statement?
        General Austin. Sir, I would say that, in terms of the
    long-term threat in the region, Iran is the greatest threat to
    stability. I would say the most pressing threat is ISIL, and
    one that we have to deal with and defeat in the near term.
        Chairman McCain. General Rodriguez?
        General Rodriguez. Yes, I agree, sir, with both General
    Austin and General Petraeus, the short- and long-term
    challenges.
        Chairman McCain. General Votel?
        General Votel. Mr. Chairman, I agree.
        Chairman McCain. General Austin, when were you told by the
    Saudis that they were going to take military action in Yemen?
        General Austin. Sir, I had a conversation with the CHOD
    [Chief of Defense] right before they took action. And so, it
    was shortly before.
        Chairman McCain. Right before they took action.
        General Austin. Yes, sir.
        Chairman McCain. That's very interesting.
        Now, you were talking about how we're defeating ISIL. Right
    now, the battle for Tikrit is stalled, and we are then
    launching airstrikes into Tikrit. Is that--isn't--that's
    obviously correct. And it's my understanding--please correct me
    if I'm wrong--that there's about 2,000 Iraqi military fighting
    there and about 20,000 the--Shia militia that are doing the
    majority of the fighting. Is that roughly correct?
        General Austin. Sir, it's about 4,000 Iraqi Security
    Forces, combined, in that area. Currently, there are no Shiite
    militia. And, as reported by the Iraqis today, no PMF forces in
    that area, as well.
        Chairman McCain. So, there's 4,000 Iraqi. Who are the
    others?
        General Austin. The Shiite militia that were there have
    pulled back from that area, sir.
        Chairman McCain. So, the fighting is all being done by the
    Iraqi forces?
        General Austin. Sir, when the----
        Chairman McCain. I've only got a few minutes, and maybe you
    can shorten the answer. They're pretty straightforward
    questions.
        General Austin. Yes, sir. The clearance of the town of
    Tikrit, which is, as you know, on the west side of the river,
    is being done by the Iraqi Special Operations Forces and the
    Federal police, with our air support.
        Chairman McCain. So, why do we see pictures of Suleimani
    everywhere, and leading and orchestrating this effort?
        General Austin. Those pictures were from before. And, as
    you know, that effort that Suleimani and the Iranians were
    sponsoring, it stalled. It stalled because they didn't have----
        Chairman McCain. So, they're no longer in the fight.
        General Austin. He is no longer--well, he was no longer on
    the ground, as of----
        Chairman McCain. No, I mean, the Shiite militias are no
    longer in the fight.
        General Austin. The folks that we are supporting in
    clearing Tikrit----
        Chairman McCain. Are the Shiite militias still in the
    fight?
        General Austin. No, sir, they're not a part of the clearing
    operations in Tikrit.
        Chairman McCain. So, the airstrikes that we're carrying out
    in support are only in support of Iraqi military activities.
        General Austin. That's correct, sir. Preconditioned for us
    to provide support was that the Iraqi government had to be in
    charge of this operation, they had to know--we had to know
    exactly who was on the ground, we had to be able to deconflict
    our fires, they had to have a credible scheme of maneuver,
    which they not only replanned, but we caused them to rehearse
    it, and they had to be able to talk to the folks on the ground,
    as well.
        Chairman McCain. By the way, I totally disagree with you
    about ignoring Syria. There's no strategy for Syria. And we all
    know that. And ISIS doesn't respect those boundaries. But,
    somehow you seem to, and the President does. There's no--they
    know no boundaries. And so, to say that we are going to have a
    strategy for Iraq first and then Syria, of course, is
    sophistry.
        Right now, in our airstrikes in Iraq and Syria, of the
    12,000 sorties, 3,000 of them actually drop weapons. Is that
    true?
        General Austin. I think that's about right, sir.
        Chairman McCain. Don't we put our pilots in great danger if
    they're not going to drop weapons? And isn't it the argument
    that we really need the Joint Terminal Attack Controllers
    (JTAC) on the ground if we're going to be effective? Or are you
    going to have three out of four fighter sorties fly around in
    circles, and then return?
        General Austin. Sir, the hours-flown-to-ordnance-employed
    ratio is really based upon a couple of factors. One is, the
    type of enemy that we're opposing. And the second is that--are
    the distances that we're dealing on a daily basis.
        If you take a look at an operation like Operation Desert
    Storm, where you had fielded forces and infrastructure that you
    could attack with preplanned sorties, then that ratio--
    certainly, you'll have a greater ratio of hours flown to
    ordnance employed.
        The type of enemy that we're facing currently is--it
    started out as an extremist element that wanted to behave like
    an army. And because of that, we were able to attack his mass
    formations early on, but he very quickly resorted to behaving
    like an irregular force, where he began to blend in with the
    population. As he did that, it became more difficult to----
        Chairman McCain. Which should have surprised no one.
        General Austin. It didn't surprise us, sir. But, the nature
    of this fight is such that, you know, we need to be able to
    support the----
        Chairman McCain. So, we're satisfied with a situation where
    we launch 12,000 sorties, when only one out of four actually
    drop weapons.
        General Austin. Sir, it's----
        Chairman McCain. That, General, is not a viable or,
    frankly, a good use of the taxpayers' dollars.
        General Austin. Sir, I would just make the point that, as
    we compare that ratio to what we've done in Afghanistan, it's
    equal to that--because it's the same type of fighting there,
    principally. And the ratios are comparable. In fact, the ratios
    in OIR [Operation Inherent Resolve] are even better than what
    we saw in Afghanistan.
        Chairman McCain. Well, I would argue that that's comparing
    apples and oranges, but my time has expired.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        General Austin, just again returning to Tikrit, we are
    operating at the request of the Prime Minister of Iraq, Prime
    Minister Abadi, who is the democratically elected leader, and
    we set conditions as to what we would require before we would
    be engaged. Is that correct?
        General Austin. That's correct, sir.
        Senator Reed. And your comments to Senator McCain suggest
    that the popular mobilization forces, the Shiite militias, have
    withdrawn. Initially, they were engaged in the fight, but
    they've pulled back, and now the operation is being conducted
    by Iraqi regular forces, their special operations----
        General Austin. Special Operations Forces and the Federal
    police, yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. It appeared, just a few days ago, in fact,
    that this fight would succeed simply with the mobilization
    forces, the Shiite militias, and--which would have added a
    significant sort of a at least rhetorical claim to both the
    militias and to the Iranians. Now it appears that they cannot
    effectively clear the city without the support of the United
    States and our airpower. Is that----
        General Austin. That's correct, sir. And if I could, make a
    point, here, to highlight why it failed. It's the way that
    these forces went about trying to do this. These forces
    obviously were not being controlled by the Government of Iraq,
    they didn't have a coherent scheme of maneuver, command, and
    control. They didn't have precision fires to support this
    effort. And so, trying to go about the difficult task of
    clearing a place like Tikrit without that caused them to stall.
    And what we have done is, number one, as you pointed out, sir,
    highlighted a number of preconditions that must be present
    before we would provide ISR and employ fires. And once those
    conditions were met, which included Shiite militias not being
    involved, then we're able to proceed.
        And I'd like just--just to highlight, sir, that, you know,
    three tours in Iraq, commanding troops who were brutalized by
    some of these Shiite militias, I will not, and I hope we never,
    coordinate or cooperate with Shiite militias.
        Senator Reed. And part of the operation in Tikrit--and
    we're doing all we can to assist the Iraqi regular forces to
    succeed--will be a prelude to operations in Mosul, which have
    always been contemplated to be conducted by Iraqi Security
    Forces with--if they make the conditions, with our support. Is
    that accurate?
        General Austin. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. All right.
        General Votel, we have the assistant Secretary of Defense
    for SOLEC, and he is the service secretary-like
    responsibilities for Special Operations Forces, your forces.
    And do you have any views--because he's established a Special
    Operations Policy and Oversight Council--do you work with the
    Council? What's your relationship?
        General Votel. Senator, we absolutely do. And I meet with
    Secretary Lumpkin on a regular basis. And the SOPAC, as it's
    referred to, the Special Operations Policy and Oversight
    Council that meets in the Pentagon, really provides a good
    forum to pull together a number of the senior leaders within
    OSD and, frankly, on the Joint Staff in SOCOM to ensure that we
    are looking at the requirements for SOF forces and ensuring
    that it's well coordinated within the building. And we're
    getting both oversight and advocacy for our activities.
        Senator Reed. Let me ask an additional question. You've
    talked about, in your prepared remarks, the campaign plan for
    global special operations, which, of necessity, has to interact
    with the campaign plans of AFRICOM and CENTCOM and NORTHCOM and
    SOUTHCOM, et cetera, et cetera. So, can you comment about how
    you manage this plan? And, just quickly, because my time
    expired, General Rodriguez and General Austin might make a
    comment, too.
        General Votel. Absolutely. So, the campaign plan for global
    special operations is really designed to support my principal
    task of supporting my geographic partners out here. And it's
    designed to synchronize our SOF activities to help us
    prioritize our resources and where we are putting them in
    support of the GCCs. It's designed to address the partnerships
    that we need to have in place. It's designed to look at the
    things that we will do to shape the environment for the
    geographic combatant commanders. And then it ensures that we
    have provided SOF aligned to those specific areas so that they
    can develop the capacity and the skills and capabilities they
    need to best support the geographic combatant commanders.
        Senator Reed. General Rodriguez, your comments on this
    interaction?
        General Rodriguez. When we make our strategic plan, sir,
    our theater Special Operation Command is fully involved. And
    all those things that Joe does about allocating the forces and
    the capabilities across the world all support my plan exactly
    how I want it to be.
        Senator Reed. General Austin, a quick comment or one for
    the record? My time's expiring. Are you comfortable with the
    interaction?
        General Austin. I am very comfortable with it, sir.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Thank you, gentlemen.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        As I told you, General Rodriguez, I was going to
    concentrate my questions on AFRICOM. When Senator McCain talked
    about being under-resourced, it is true that, when you were
    formed, and up to the current time, you don't really have
    resources. You depend on EUCOM for almost everything. Is that
    correct?
        General Rodriguez. We got a little bit more resources in
    the last year and a half, Senator, to include a special-purpose
    MAGTF, a commander's response force, a special operations
    force, and we've also got a couple of key enablers for force.
        Senator Inhofe. Yeah, and----
        General Rodriguez. I also do depend quite a lot on EUCOM
    capacity, sir.
        Senator Inhofe. Yeah. I think you do. And I think that
    other things that come up, like the LRA [Lord's Resistance
    Army] and things like that specifically, you inherit resources
    to help put out those fires. However, with the restructuring,
    the European infrastructure consolidation, are you concerned
    about how that might affect what resources might be available
    when called upon?
        General Rodriguez. Right now, from the European
    infrastructure consolidation, most of the moves have been to
    the south and east to help the responsiveness of EUCOM forces
    to support both CENTCOM and AFRICOM. So, the ones that got
    enacted, I agree with, sir.
        Senator Inhofe. I understand.
        I don't know where you were when we put together the
    whole--the AFRICOM. You know, before that, it was in three
    different commands, and--PACOM, EUCOM, and, I guess, CENTCOM.
    And that was a wise thing to do. But, the discussion at that
    time was where to put the headquarters. And we were all
    promoting the idea that it should actually be in Africa. That
    continent is so huge. We understand what happened politically
    at that time, that--this fear of colonization and all of that,
    that people just wouldn't buy it. But, the presidents would. In
    fact, I've talked to most of them, all of the presidents in
    that area. They thought that would have been a good idea.
        At the time that we put it together, AFRICOM, there was
    some discussion that, after a period of time, they might
    consider making that move. Have you heard anything at all about
    that? Is there anything in the mill talking about----
        General Rodriguez. No. Many of the African leaders have
    talked to me about that, but the current assessment by the
    Secretary of Defense is to continue to leave it where it is for
    the foreseeable future, sir.
        Senator Inhofe. Yeah. Well, you know, the ``foreseeable
    future'' is beyond us now from when they first put this thing
    together. But, I don't know, I know that would still be a
    problem.
        Let me ask you, my first experience with Joseph Kony and
    the LRA was way back in 2001. That's 14 years ago. Joseph Kony
    was old and sick then. How is he now?
        General Rodriguez. He's older and sicker, sir. [Laughter.]
        Senator Inhofe. And do you think that we are getting in a
    position right now--it appears to me, from the reports that we
    get--and I think you'd probably agree; I'll ask you if you do
    agree--that most of the stuff now he's doing is just trying to
    move around and avoid it. He's no longer making the hits that
    he did back at that time. And our involvement, which we are--
    have been involved in, is actually being--is working.
        General Rodriguez. Yes, sir, it is working. And it's in a
    great team effort with all the country teams as well as many of
    the civilian organizations that have built a durability in the
    civilian population to better resist the problems he has. Right
    now, he's about--down to about 200 real fighters, and the
    impact on the civilian population is very minimal. He is using
    illicit trafficking to continue to sustain his efforts. But,
    it's tough for him, because of continual pressure over the last
    14 years.
        Senator Inhofe. As he's being chased around--places like
    CAR, Eastern Congo, even, briefly, Rwanda, Uganda, South
    Sudan--it seems like it was a trail of blood following him. And
    it's not that way so much anymore. I just think that we haven't
    talked about that in a long time. We need to get on the record
    that some things are--seem to be working there.
        General Rodriguez. Yes. A long-term effort against Kony,
    with, really, you know, fairly modest resources. But, that
    long-term effort has done exactly what you said, it has
    significantly decreased his impact on any of the civilian
    population, sir.
        Senator Inhofe. Yeah.
        General Rodriguez, last year you testified that only 12
    percent of your ISR requests are being met. I'm reading this
    from the transcript last year. Has there been any change in
    this intelligence gap?
        General Rodriguez. Just a little bit more, sir. I'm about
    13 percent now. But, that's a great question. As far as the
    impacts of sequestration, just for the committee, we will lose
    more CAPs in sequestration than I have in the theater right
    now. So, you can see the impact that's going to have on our
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. Thank
    you.
        Senator Inhofe. Yeah. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Manchin.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank all three of you for your service to our country
    and things that you do every day.
        With that, General Austin, I said, last year, if I believed
    sending United States trainers and weapons to Syria would make
    Americans safer, I would definitely have supported it. I did
    not then, and what I'm hearing from the region further supports
    my belief. Last week, reports emerged the Department of Defense
    is unable to account for more than $500 million of military
    assistance to Yemen, including weaponry, aircraft, and
    equipment--and I'm sure that you all have seen the same
    pictures on YouTube that we're getting, of our equipment being
    used for people against us and against our efforts--all of
    which could potentially fall into the hands of Iranian-backed
    rebels or al-Qaeda.
        In Syria, we've heard reports that al-Nusra Front seized
    United States weapons from CIA-trained Syrian rebels, including
    60 to 90 TOW antitank missiles. Two days ago, video footage was
    posted of al-Nusra, allegedly showing them using a captured
    United States TOW missile in a fight. And these are not just
    immediate events. We supported individuals in the 1980s in
    Afghanistan, who formed elements of Taliban. Last year, in
    Iraq, we watched ISIS capture weapons, vehicles, and military
    equipment that Iraqi Security Forces abandoned, which are
    millions and millions and millions of dollars being used
    against us now, even after we spent the better part of a decade
    training them. We have a history of supplying weapons and
    training that end up being used against us.
        And, General Austin, who's responsible for the weapons and
    equipment the U.S. has supplied in these cases? Or are these
    reports accurate? And will any of this bring action be taken?
        General Austin. Well, clearly, sir, what--with not having
    the ability to be in Yemen currently to monitor the disposition
    of the weapons, then certainly we can't--we don't have the
    ability to oversee the safeguarding or the employment of those
    weapon systems. That 500 million, I believe, was the amount of
    funds that were required for both providing weapon systems and
    training. And, as you know, training eats--takes up--it's
    pretty expensive----
        Senator Manchin. This was Yemen.
        General Austin. Yes, sir.
        Senator Manchin. I know about the 500 million requested for
    Syria.
        The only thing I'm saying is, Is there nobody in our
    Government, in our Defense, Pentagon, that's responsible? Like
    when we give all this equipment to Yemen, and then we see it
    falling apart, do we not have any way to retrieve that?
        General Austin. Certainly, in a case like Yemen, sir,
    it's--we don't have the ability to go back and retrieve it. We
    don't have----
        Senator Manchin. But, as we see it falling apart, we can't
    take any actions at all to keep it from falling into----
        General Austin. Once we've provided the weapons to them,
    sir, we----
        Senator Manchin. It's theirs.
        General Austin. Yes, sir. And we will continue to monitor
    their--the usage of those weapons and make sure that, if
    they're not being used properly, then we don't continue to
    provide capability to them. So----
        Senator Manchin. What--do you all confirm--I mean, do you
    all agree with the reports of how much weapons and the lethal
    volatility of these weapons being used against us? There are
    weapons being used against us.
        General Austin. I don't doubt that what's----
        Senator Manchin. I mean, are these accurate? They're widely
    reported.
        General Austin. Yes, sir. If we're not there, then--and
    we've provided weapons, and it's reasonable to expect that some
    of that material will fall in the hands of the people----
        Senator Manchin. Well, let's go with Mosul first, and the
    Iraqi forces that abandoned. That was substantial, I'm sure.
    Correct?
        General Austin. It was, sir.
        Senator Manchin. Okay. And we know that's being used
    against us.
        General Austin. Yes, sir.
        Senator Manchin. Okay. Then we know about Yemen now. And we
    have concerns about--you know, will this be repeated? And it--
    are we taking any steps, from what we've seen happen? How can
    you assure me that Syria--that whatever--whoever we support in
    Syria, that won't fall in the wrong hands?
        General Austin. There's no way we can absolutely assure you
    that that won't happen, sir. What we do is to try to train the
    folks that we're working with and providing capability to, to
    be responsible as they use and safeguard these weapons. And, in
    the event that they are not, then we certainly quit doing--we
    quit providing them the capability.
        Senator Manchin. And one quick question for General Votel.
        General Votel, in West Virginia, I had the privilege of
    observing the training of some of our National Guard--Special
    Force soldiers in the National Guard. And both the 19th and
    20th Army Special Forces group have fought with great success
    in Iraq and Afghanistan, complementing our Active Duty Special
    Forces groups. How do you see the future of the National Guard
    Special Operations community moving forward?
        General Votel. Well, as you just pointed out, they are
    absolutely integrated into everything we are doing. So, not
    just on the Army side with Special Forces, but on the Air Guard
    side. And so, some of our unique ISR capabilities, our manned
    ISR capabilities, will reside in some of our Air Guard and Air
    Reserve organizations. So, they are absolutely and totally
    integrated into everything that we are doing now and will do in
    the future.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Wicker. General Austin, when it comes to fighting
    ISIL, I appreciate your determination, your military drive. And
    that's coming through. I do question the sort of optimistic
    note that you have in your testimony, because it just seems
    that things are not going as positively as you're suggesting.
        You mentioned, beginning on page 11 of your testimony,
    ``The President's announcement this past September, five key
    elements to what the administration wants to do involving
    coalition partners, Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon, train and
    equip, having reliable partners to assist on the ground.'' And
    then you say, ``Once we do all these things, we will have
    defeated ISIL through a combination of sustained pressure, a
    systematic dismantling of ISIL's capabilities, and by
    effectively expanding our regional partners' CT capacities.''
    It's just hard to see--hard to be very encouraged about that
    happening, at this point. And I want to ask about our partners.
        Now, not everything we hear is in these big hearings. We've
    met with the King of Jordan, not in a classified setting, but
    the King of Jordan tells us, ``We can't want this more than the
    Arab neighborhood wants it.'' And so, I do want to ask you
    about that. He said he'd be going back and trying to get the
    partners together and make this work on the ground.
        I think everybody has been saying boots on the ground are
    going to be needed to defeat ISIL. Are those boots on the
    ground going have to be Iraq--the Iraqi Army boots on the
    ground? Because I don't see the Jordanians really having that
    capacity. We met with the Ambassadors from UAE [United Arab
    Emirates] and Saudi Arabia, just the other day, and they want
    this coalition to take effect, and they want Egypt to be part
    of it. I just wonder who, in that whole list of neighboring
    countries, has the capacity to go in and retake this territory?
        You mention, on page 12, that we're doing precision
    airstrikes. But, I think we all know that that's not going to
    get it done. And then you talk about, ``The intent of the
    regional campaign is not simply to destroy ISIL, but--although
    that's our primary objective.''
        So, how is this going to be wrapped up by troops going in
    and taking the territory back, and the United States not
    employing boots on the ground?
        General Austin. Thank you, sir.
        One of--a couple of things that we said up front was,
    number one, that this would take time, because we are working
    with indigenous forces, we are using the Iraqi Security Forces
    to conduct the ground operations.
        As you pointed out, sir, we've also said that you can't do
    this with just airpower alone. It has to be a complement of
    fires and maneuver forces on the ground.
        And our approach is to generate those forces by training
    and equipping Iraqi Security Forces. And we're--you know, as we
    have halted ISIL's advance into Iraq, we've started the
    business of training and equipping new Iraqi Security Forces so
    that they'll have the ability to train--to take back their
    borders and secure their sovereign spaces.
        Senator Wicker. Is there any prospect of Saudi forces being
    there in numbers that would be significant? UAE? Jordanian
    forces? They've got a police force, but not much else.
        General Austin. They all have some capability, sir. None of
    them have volunteered to come forward and put boots on the
    ground in Iraq right now. In Iraq, certainly Iraq needs to want
    to be able to take that on and take those forces in. But, to
    this point, as you look at what Saudi's dealing with on its
    borders with Yemen, it's currently focused on that right now.
    So----
        But, to answer your question, sir, there is capability with
    countries in the region, but none--no countries have come
    forward and volunteered to put boots on the ground in Iraq.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, sir. Well, good luck to you. And
    again, I appreciate your determination and resolve. I hope
    you're as successful as you believe you will be.
        General Austin. We will be successful, sir.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Donnelly.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank all of you for all your efforts.
        General Votel, I'd just like to talk about a different
    issue for just one minute, and that is, I want to thank you for
    your top-down leadership on mental health with the Special
    Operations. Since assuming command at SOCOM, you've been
    incredibly frank about this challenge. And that, alone, sends
    an important message to the troops.
        Can you talk about the psychological component of your
    Preservation of the Force and Family Program, and how that's
    going today?
        General Votel. I can. Thank you for the question, Senator.
    We appreciate the continued support we get from Congress in
    this very significant challenge to us.
        We are looking at a variety of things. We are looking at
    peer-to-peer programs that we use within organizations to help
    provide access to our members and their family members and
    others, to reach out and talk to their friends and their peers
    about that. And I think this is an important component of it.
        Likewise, we are pursuing training programs to ensure that
    our leadership, our chaplains, and others are well trained in
    the ability to identify those behaviors that we think are
    related to stress, and potentially which can lead to suicide.
        And, third, I think the--one of the most important things
    we are doing is trying to send the very clear message across
    the entire SOF force that it is absolutely normal and expected
    to ask for help when you need it, and you can do that without
    concern of stigma or any concerns about your standing within
    the Command. And we are putting--really working double tides to
    put effort on that particular theme and message throughout
    this.
        The real census of our program, here, is to empower people
    by communicating early and often, by trying to enable them, by
    giving them easy access to programs and resources so they can
    get help, and then encouraging them with this message. So----
        Senator Donnelly. And will you work us to help us take the
    lessons that you've learned at SOCOM and work with the other
    parts of our military?
        General Votel. Absolutely. And we are well----
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you very much. Thank you.
        General Austin, it appears that the efforts in Tikrit are
    stalled at the moment. And so, my concern, my--one of the areas
    I'm looking at is, How do we empower the moderate Sunnis? Are
    they the key to making this work? And if you're a moderate
    Sunni--and I asked this the other day--the concern would be,
    Why do you want to team up with the Shiite militia. When ISIS
    is also Sunni, they may be like the bad cousin that shows up at
    the event, but they're still your cousin. I mean, how do we
    empower the moderate Sunnis? And do you see them as the key to
    moving this thing along and to having success in Iraq?
        General Austin. Sir, I do believe that getting the Sunni
    population involved is really, really important, in terms of
    being successful, going forward. And, you're right, the
    previous operation in Tikrit did stall. And it stalled because,
    I think, the wrong approach was taken. Those--many of the
    forces that were being employed were not controlled or
    supervised by the Ministry of Defense or Government of Iraq.
    That has recently changed. As of the last several days and
    today, when we--yesterday, when we started supporting this
    effort. We think that this effort will begin to move forward
    with the employment of the Special Operations Forces and the
    help of our enablers.
        But, I think----
        Senator Donnelly. Can you----
        General Austin.--that it's absolutely key that, number one,
    the government has to be accommodating to both the Sunni and
    the Kurd population, and we have to increasingly get the Sunnis
    involved.
        Senator Donnelly. Can you help make that happen? Because
    the concern is Abadi--a lot of the folks that surround him are
    still from the previous administration. And the other part
    about this is, you've had extraordinary experience in the al-
    Anbar area, in all the service you're done for our country
    throughout Iraq. Can you help to identify the key Sunni
    moderate leaders to make them part of this? And is that what's
    going to--you know, you look, and you say, ``Hey, we think
    we're going to get it right this time.'' How do you think this
    turns out?
        General Austin. Sir, to answer both your questions, we are
    encouraged--we continue to encourage the leadership in Iraq to
    do--to be more accommodating to the Sunni population and do
    some things that are demonstrable, that are--that they--that
    increases their confidence in the leadership, in the
    government. And you may know that we are helping the Iraqi
    Security Forces and the Government of Iraq reach out to the
    tribal elements in Anbar and bring in some of those elements to
    train and equip them and get them involved in the fight, as
    well. And those that we have trained and equipped have
    performed remarkably well.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Fischer.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Votel, when we met last week, you talked about how
    the resources allowed you to meet threats with moderate risk.
    And over the past year, we've seen that terror threat increase,
    smaller problems become more serious, they become crisis. And
    then this--do you believe that this is part of the result of
    the strategy that accepts moderate risk? Are we less able to
    nip those problems in the bud and so that they grow into these
    serious threats?
        General Votel. Senator, thanks for the question.
        I--first of all, I think we can continue to--I think all
    commanders operate in an area where they're constantly
    balancing risk of their forces and the missions that are being
    done on a regular basis. And I think that's what I'm
    principally paid to do.
        As we move forward and continue to deal with the changing
    and complex situations--for me, I think it gets down to
    prioritization. And, for us, what we will attempt to do is
    offset the risk that is associated with increased operations by
    ensuring that we prioritize on those operations for which we
    can have the biggest impact and we can help support the
    broadest national objectives.
        Senator Fischer. Is Libya a place where we're going to
    accept moderate risk?
        General Votel. That--again, I think that perhaps may be a
    policy question. Certainly, from my perspective, working with
    my partner in AFRICOM, we are looking at the things that we can
    do to address the threats that are in Libya today.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        General Rodriguez, in your opening statement, you say that,
    ``Libya-based threats to United States interests are growing.
    If left unchecked, I believe they have the highest potential
    among security challenges on the continent to increase risk to
    United States and European strategic interests in the next 2
    years and beyond.'' You also described Libya as ``emerging as a
    safe haven, where terrorists, including al-Qaeda and the
    Islamic State of Iraq in the Levant-affiliated groups can train
    and rebuild with impunity.'' That, to me, doesn't sound like
    we're on the right trajectory.
        Do you think our approach to Libya is not adequate? Are we
    accepting too much risk?
        General Rodriguez. Thanks, Senator.
        For--first of all, for--to make sure everybody's clear on
    what we're doing in and around Libya, we're--a significant
    effort is going in around Libya to prevent that from spilling
    over. So, when you look at what is happening in Tunisia, in
    Niger, Chad, and Egypt, we're working with our partners, as
    much as we can and as much as we're--have the authorities to do
    that, to strengthen their capacities to limit the spillover of
    that effort. We're also working with our European partners to
    increase their effort there. And we are supporting, at this
    point in time, the U.N. [United Nations] effort to come to a
    diplomatic solution. And anything past that will require a
    policy decision, ma'am.
        Senator Fischer. How would you rate the success of the
    efforts that you just described? The spillover, the work with
    our European partners in the U.N.
        General Rodriguez. The work with our partners has, for the
    most part, gone very well, with the exception of one or two
    sensational attacks that you read about in Tunisia the other
    day; but their capacities have continued to grow, and they
    handle that threat every day, as does Niger and Chad. And the
    work of the--the European efforts in the U.N. has not had as
    much progress as anybody wants, to date, yet, ma'am.
        Senator Fischer. Okay, thank you.
        And, General Votel, if I can just return to that idea of
    moderate risk for my closing questions here. Over the long
    term, do you think that, if we see risk continue to increase,
    and those smaller problems continue a--to accumulate--how do we
    prioritize that? If they're viewed as smaller problems at the
    time, but yet they continue to escalate and become greater and
    greater risk to this country, not just the region they're in,
    how are you going to prioritize? How are you going to address
    it, and do you have the resources you need?
        General Votel. Thanks. Thanks, Senator.
        Right now, I think I do have the resources that I need to
    support the GCC commanders at a moderate level of risk for the
    things I'm being asked to do today. What I think we will do for
    the future, as I mentioned in my opening comments here, I think
    SOF plays a particular role in the gray zone, in the area
    before operations, before we get to open conflict. And so, I
    think the important piece that I bring to the geographic
    combatant commanders is our ability to come in and help shape,
    develop partnerships, to help build capacity, and support
    relationships in all of those areas so that we can strengthen
    partners before big problems grow into--or, before small
    problems grow into big problems. And I really think that is the
    direction in which we should be focusing SOF into the future.
        Senator Fischer. General Rodriguez, did you have a
    response?
        General Rodriguez. Thanks, Senator.
        The--as far as the prioritization is going, again, that's
    done by the policymakers, relative to our National security
    interests. And then, the input we put, in addition to the risk,
    is what our partners can handle and what they're doing,
    themselves. And we prioritize it based on a whole-of-government
    and interagency effort and who can help most in different
    places. So, I think that's what is done every day in the
    Defense Department, ma'am.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, gentlemen. And thank you for
    your service.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman McCain. Senator McCaskill.
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
        I'm now determined that budget gimmicks have no attachment
    to party, that both parties are capable of using budget
    gimmicks as we approach the challenges of sequestration and
    defense spending. It is now being used, in the current budget
    we're debating and the budget that passed the House yesterday.
    Rather than confront sequestration and be honest about the
    challenges we have in our base budget that we've all given a
    lot of time, in terms of rhetoric, to, we are now going further
    down the road of using OCO as a slush fund. It's not good for
    fiscal accountability. It's not good for restoring faith of the
    American people that we can face the tough decisions and not
    retreat to rhetoric and gimmickry that is not really true.
    We're not going to build a--as my colleague has said, we're not
    going to build a PX someplace in America with OCO funds. The
    question is, do you believe that the Army can buy back force
    strength with OCO funds?
        General Austin. I do not, Senator.
        Senator McCaskill. Do you believe that the Navy can address
    the shortfalls in shipping with OCO funds?
        General Rodriguez. No, ma'am.
        Senator McCaskill. Okay.
        I just think that we've got to be--and I'm--believe me, I'm
    not saying that we come to this with clean hands, as Democrats.
    We don't, because we have engaged in gimmickry, also. But, I
    know that the Chairman wants to face this head-on, and I know
    it's a challenge in this political environment. But, I did want
    to bring it up, that we have obviously not met the challenge
    with the budget as it's currently configured.
        I wanted to specifically ask you, General Austin, about
    something that's very troubling to me, and that is that I've
    been told that there has been a determination that Operation
    Freedom Sentinel is a new contingency operation. It--do you see
    it as a new contingency operation?
        General Austin. It's a continuation of our efforts,
    Senator, so, you know, I--in terms of the types of things that
    we're doing, you know, we're continuing to train the--and
    advise and assist the Afghan Security Forces. But, in terms of,
    you know, how we account for the funding, that's--that we're
    allocating to that, that's a different issue.
        Senator McCaskill. Well, the reason I'm asking this is, I'm
    told that there is an effort underway of naming a new lead
    Inspector General in Afghanistan, as opposed to SIGAR of the
    Special Inspector General on Afghanistan. And I think, if that
    determination is made--I just want to make sure everybody
    understands--that's going to impose a lot of additional
    burdens, in terms of oversight requirements, on contracting.
    You know, I know there's continuity in SIGAR. I don't
    understand the value right now of changing Inspector Generals
    at this point on the projects that are ongoing that the Special
    Inspector General in Afghanistan is aware of and is working on.
    I don't get it. And if there is really a sincere attempt to
    replace him by labeling this a new contingency, somebody's
    going to have some explaining to do, I think, to me and, I
    hope, others on this committee, as to why that would be a good
    idea. Are you aware of an effort to do that at this point?
        General Austin. I don't know--I am not aware of the effort.
    But, certainly, I'll go--I'll find out, I'll look into it,
    Senator.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        My staff has been monitoring that the Council of Inspectors
    General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) is examining
    whether the triggers associated with the establishment of a
    LIG-OCO for OFS in accordance with section 848 of FY 2013 NDAA
    language have been met. If that determination is made, CENTCOM
    has no issues with the designation of a Lead IG in accordance
    with NDAA 13 and will support their oversight initiatives as we
    have done for Operation INHERENT RESOLVE. Since oversight
    initiatives are not mutually exclusive, the designation of a
    lead IG for OFS in and of itself may have no bearing on SIGAR's
    separate and independent statutory authority enumerated in its
    enabling legislation. It could amplify the importance of
    coordination between different oversight agencies executing
    projects in Afghanistan moving forward. I will continue to
    support all oversight objectives and encourage all IGs
    operating in Afghanistan to continue regular coordination,
    which will enable these agencies to avoid duplication of
    activities and focus on the most beneficial projects. This will
    be particularly important because audit agency inquiries have
    remained relatively steady over the last 18 months while, at
    the President's direction, our force levels have declined by
    over 80 percent, resulting in sharp reductions in staffs to
    respond to these agencies.

        Senator McCaskill. That would be terrific. As you know,
    we've worked very closely with the Special Inspector Generals,
    both in Iraq and Afghanistan. I think the body of work they
    have done is incredibly helpful to our Nation's military. As we
    look at how we honestly confront sequestration, one of the ways
    is being better stewards of the resources that we have
    allocated to these efforts.
        General Rodriguez, I understand that most of the
    servicemembers who deployed to Africa as part of the ebola
    response, Operation United Assistance, have begun returning
    home. Is there any effort to keep track of the number of
    contractors around this effort and how many of them have been
    pulled and how many of them remain in ebola as we continually
    try to stay on top of contractor costs?
        General Rodriguez. Yes, ma'am, there is. There's a very,
    very strict accounting that is done. We've had oversight from
    the DOD IG from the beginning, and we were very cognizant of
    the challenges with contractor oversight and also paying too
    much money for contracts that's out of line with what the USAID
    as well as the host nation is providing. So, we have a strict
    accounting on it, yes, ma'am.
        Senator McCaskill. That would be terrific.
        General Rodriguez. Yes, ma'am.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Yes, USAFRICOM is tracking the number of contractors
    supporting Operation UNITED ASSISTANCE (OUA). We use the
    Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) as
    the central authoritative repository for monitoring Department
    of Defense (DOD) contractor personnel. At the height of the
    Ebola response, nearly 350 contractors supported OUA.
    Currently, four local national contract personnel are working
    on two remaining open contracts.
        References: USAFRICOM monitors contractor accountability in
    accordance with the following congressional acts and DOD
    regulations:
          Section 861 & 862 of the FY2008 National Defense
    Authorization Act
          Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
    Memorandum, dated 28 Jan 08
          DOD Instruction 3020.50, dated 22 Jul 09
          Section 813 of the FY2010 National Defense
    Authorization Act
          Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual
    (CJCSM) 3150.13C, dated 10 Mar 10
          DOD Instruction 3020.41.41, dated 20 Dec 11
          Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
    (DFARS) Clause 252.225-7040
          DFARS Class Deviation 2013-O0015
          DFARS 2013-O0017

        Senator McCaskill. And also, General Austin, if you could
    share with us how many contractors have been plussed-up in Iraq
    as a result of our efforts against ISIL. You know, we had
    gotten to the point that we were just counting contractors in
    Afghanistan, now we're back to counting contractors again in
    Iraq. And we would appreciate an update on that number, also.
        General Austin. Yes, Senator. I'll take that for the
    record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        US Central Command recognizes the importance of balancing a
    small contractor footprint in Iraq with supporting the current
    operations. Currently, there are 579 Department of Defense
    contractors in Iraq. This is an increase of approximately 450
    contractors since October 2014.

        Senator McCaskill. Thank you so much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Cotton.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen, for all your service
    and for the men and women who sit behind you, not just on
    behalf of all the troops you represent, but you, personally. I
    know you've spent many years downrange.
        General Austin, I want to return to the topic Senator
    McCain was addressing about our airstrikes in Tikrit. So, do I
    understand you correctly to say that there are now no Iranian
    forces in Tikrit?
        General Austin. The forces that are clearing Tikrit are ISF
    forces, Special Operations Forces, and Federal police. And, as
    of this morning, when I checked with my commanders, the Shiite
    militia and PMF have pulled back.
        Senator Cotton. So, by ``pull back,'' do we mean there are
    still Shiite militias, like the Badr organization or even
    Iranian forces from Quds Force, in the vicinity of Tikrit?
        General Austin. I'm sure they're still in the area. I'm
    sure that there are forces probably on the east side of the
    river. And, as you know, Tikrit is--the city of Tikrit is on
    the west side of the river.
        Senator Cotton. Do we know the whereabouts of Qasem
    Suleimani?
        General Austin. To my understanding, Qasem Suleimani is--
    you know, my last update, he was not in Tikrit or in that area.
        Senator Cotton. In any way have we implemented fire control
    measures to ensure that we don't strike any of the Shiite
    paramilitary forces or Iranian elements that are in the
    vicinity of Tikrit?
        General Austin. We certainly have--we've caused the Iraqi
    Security Forces to develop a scheme of maneuver that can
    effectively accomplish the mission of clearing the town. And
    our fires are supportive of that effort. And so, we're focused
    on that. We always do everything that we can to ensure that
    there's not excessive collateral damage. But, our focus is on
    the ISF forces that we're supporting.
        Senator Cotton. Would you consider it collateral damage if
    members of the Quds Force, to include Qasem Suleimani, was in
    the vicinity of an American airstrike?
        General Austin. I would consider that unintended
    consequences.
        Senator Cotton. Does Qasem Suleimani have freedom of
    movement within Iraq?
        General Austin. I believe he does, Senator.
        Senator Cotton. General Votel, 6 months ago, President
    Obama cited Yemen as a example of a success of our
    counterterrorism strategy. Do you believe Yemen is a success
    story today?
        General Votel. Certainly with the withdrawal of our SOF
    forces over the weekend, it's certainly put us in a different
    posture right now, particularly against the threat that we were
    focused on, there, of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. So,
    it's much more challenging today than it was when we had people
    on the ground.
        Senator Cotton. General Austin, do you consider Yemen a
    success story today?
        General Austin. Certainly Yemen is a very troubled country
    today, with the challenges that it's facing and the activity of
    the Houthis. And so, I think the country's in turmoil.
        Senator Cotton. General Austin, approximately 10 months
    ago, the President released five Taliban commanders in exchange
    for Bowe Bergdahl, who yesterday was charged with desertion by
    his chain of command. I believe their house arrest agreement
    expires in 2 months. Is that correct?
        General Austin. I believe that to be correct, Senator.
        Senator Cotton. Do we know what will happen to those five
    Taliban commanders in 2 months in Qatar when that agreement
    expires?
        General Austin. I don't, Senator.
        Senator Cotton. Will they have freedom of movement both
    inside and outside Qatar at that point?
        General Austin. I think that's--I would probably have to
    consult the Qatar Government--Qatari government and also the
    elements in our government that are charged with monitoring the
    movement of these elements. So, I can't answer that, Senator. I
    can take that for the record and try to do the research on it.
        Senator Cotton. I would like to get an answer for that for
    the record. Thank you, General Austin.
        And I'll address this to General Austin and General
    Rodriguez. Given the situation in Yemen, if there were action
    by militants there to block the Mandeb Strait, I presume that
    American forces would immediately act to reopen that strait.
        General Austin. We would work in conjunction with our GCC
    partners to ensure that those straits remain open. It's one of
    our core interests, to ensure that we have free flow of
    commerce through both straits.
        General Rodriguez. Yes, sir. We'd also work with both the
    host nations of Africa as well as our European partners to
    support those efforts, sir.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen. I appreciate your
    answers. And, once again, I appreciate your service to our
    country.
        Chairman McCain. For the record, I'd like a response to
    Senator Cotton's question. Do you consider Yemen a success
    story, or not? Yes or no. It's pretty simple, straightforward
    question.
        General Austin. It's currently not a success story, sir.
        Chairman McCain. General Votel?
        General Votel. I agree, Senator, it's not a success story
    today.
        Chairman McCain. Thank you very much.
        Senator King.
        Senator King. When the President made that statement, he
    was talking about our antiterrorism efforts against AQAP, was
    he not, General Votel?
        General Votel. I believe that's correct, Senator.
        Senator King. He wasn't talking about Yemen, itself. He was
    talking about the success of our counterterrorism against AQAP.
    Naturally, the deterioration of the situation in Yemen has
    compromised that.
        My followup question is, How much has it compromised it?
    Are we able to maintain that counterterrorism effort against
    AQAP, or is that in abeyance, pending the dust settling in
    Yemen?
        General Votel. Well, I think right now, Senator--I think
    what we'll obviously be doing is working in conjunction with
    General Austin's headquarters and our other partners in the
    area to try to look at how we regain situational awareness and
    understanding of what's happening on the ground, and then look
    at how we can continue to address the threats that emanate from
    Yemen.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        I'd like to just briefly associate myself with Senator
    McCaskill's comments about using OCO to solve the sequestration
    problem. It obviously doesn't go the base budget. And it's
    unpaid for. It's just absolutely the wrong way to approach this
    problem. And I hope that Congress can find a more realistic and
    responsible solution to sequestration.
        Also, General Austin--again, without--because you've talked
    to Senator Donnelly about this--it seems to me that it's
    critically important that we use the leverage that we have,
    which apparently was used in the Tikrit battle, to be sure that
    this isn't a Shiite militia-led offensive. Because if this
    becomes another version of a war of Shiites against Sunnis,
    we've lost. This has to be inclusive. And I hope that your
    relationship with the--with President Abadi and the Iraqi
    government emphasizes that, because it's--it's just essential
    to a successful outcome in Iraq, regardless of the short-term
    strategic advantage in Tikrit or Mosul or--would you agree with
    that?
        General Austin. Sir, I would. And I would say, further,
    that we take--I take every opportunity to emphasize those exact
    points to the leadership in Iraq when I engage them.
        Senator King. And it sounds like that--this airstrikes in
    the last couple of days in Tikrit were, in fact, conditioned on
    that kind of consideration. Is that correct?
        General Austin. That's correct, sir. This operation had to
    be under the control of the Government of Iraq and Iraqi
    Security Forces. There had to be a force, once the city is
    cleared, to maintain stability in that city. And that force
    needs to be an Iraqi Security Force. And so, those things--
    those conditions were met, early on, in terms of the planning
    and the synchronization. And so, we were able to provide them
    some support.
        Senator King. Well, I certainly hope you stay that, but I
    think you can argue that a lot of the problems we're having in
    Iraq now are because of the Maliki government's failure to be
    inclusive. And we can't make that mistake again.
        Let's turn for a moment to Afghanistan. We heard a
    wonderful, strong, passionate speech from President Ghani this
    week. I'm concerned that we're still in a calendar-driven
    status in Afghanistan. And even though the President has
    allowed troops to stay through 2015, the--we're still talking
    about Kabul-only at the end of 2016. Do you believe that's
    going to be sufficient in order to support the Afghans? I mean,
    we've made such progress there. I would just hate to see us
    pull out, in terms of air support, authorities for air support,
    and train-and-direct services. Give me your thoughts on that.
        General Austin. Sir, I certainly agree with you that the
    new leadership in Afghanistan causes all of us to be encouraged
    and optimistic. And I think, from what I've seen both President
    Ghani do and also the CEO [Chief Executive Officer] Abdullah
    do, in terms of reaching out to the international community, in
    terms of reaching out to the folks in the region as well, it's
    all encouraging. The relationships with the security forces,
    they're supportive of the security forces. Their statements of
    common goals with the U.S., I think, all very encouraging.
        So, I think this gives us opportunities--new opportunities
    that, you know, we didn't have before. And we really have to
    think about what we want our relationship to be with
    Afghanistan, going forward, and what it means for the region.
        Senator King. Well, I certainly hope you will counsel the
    White House to think seriously about what I would consider a
    modest additional investment to maintain the tremendous gains
    that have been had. It's not for sure that the regime in--or
    the Government of Afghanistan can withstand the Taliban on
    their own. And, after what we've invested over the past 13
    years, to walk away at the--at 5 minutes of midnight and see it
    all collapse, I think would be a real shame. So, I hope you
    will urge that on the policymakers, based upon General Campbell
    and the other information you're receiving from the field. They
    need not only those troops, but they need authorities, they--
    President Ghani talked about air support. I think that's going
    to be crucial. So, carry that message, will you, sir?
        Chairman McCain. Senator Ernst.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Gentlemen, thank you very much for being here today, and
    also to your staff. Thank you for your many years of combined
    service to the United States.
        General Votel, I just want to mention, in your testimony
    today--I would like to thank you for mentioning not only our
    Active Duty forces, but the Reserve and National Guard
    components, your operators, your logisticians, your analysts,
    and so forth. It's all one team, one fight. So, I appreciate
    you acknowledging that today.
        Something else that you brought up, and a couple of others
    have mentioned, too, is stress and suicide with our Active Duty
    members and with our veterans, those that have gotten off of
    Active Duty. It is important that we continue with resiliency
    programs and making sure that, not only are they physically fit
    for the fight, but they're mentally fit, as well. So, thank you
    for bringing that forward. A number of us are working on
    initiatives to make sure that they are well cared for.
        I would like to address my question and thoughts--General
    Austin and General Votel. Last week was the 12th anniversary of
    our entrance into Iraq with the Iraq War. We've had 3,000--
    excuse me--4,000 American servicemen and -women that have lost
    their lives in Iraq. And we've had another 40,000 that have
    been injured in that war. And I want to thank you for your
    service in that war. I know all of you have engaged, at one
    point or another, in the war in Iraq. Many of our servicemen
    and -women will come home with not only invisible injuries, but
    physical injuries that will impact their lives for many, many
    years. But, before we ever entered into Iraq on March 20th of
    2003, the Iraqi Kurds were already engaged and preparing the
    battlefield before we ever got there. They have been an
    important part of our effort in Iraq. And so, I would like your
    thoughts on involving--more involvement of the Iraqi Kurds, the
    Peshmerga, in this fight, and, really, what their role has been
    from 2003 forward. If you would please address that.
        General Austin?
        General Austin. Thank you, Senator.
        And I agree. You know, I was, as you probably know, with
    the elements when we went into Iraq, 12 years ago. And--
    whereas, I didn't initially make it all the way up to
    Kurdistan, I can tell you that what the Kurds were doing in the
    north at that point in time was very instrumental to the
    forces, our forces that followed in or flowed in later and
    facilitated our work there.
        Most recently, with their efforts in the current fight
    against ISIL, they really have done a terrific job. And, you
    know, I've talked with President Barzani and his staff, on
    numerous occasions, about, you know, what we're doing, what the
    requirements were, and what they needed to do more. As you look
    at what they've done in the north up there, in terms of
    actually inflicting damage on ISIL, I think their efforts have
    really shaped this overall fight in a very positive direction.
    And they continue to do more on a daily basis. So, they're a
    big part of this fight. They've punched above their weight
    class, and I think they will continue to do so.
        Senator Ernst. General Votel?
        General Votel. Thank you, Senator.
        I absolutely agree with what General Austin said. I would
    only add that a key part of the Kurdish relationship really has
    been the long-term relationship with them. And so, they were a
    key partner with SOF forces when we were there from 2003
    through 2011, and helped us address a variety of networks. And
    I do believe that the great and enduring relationship that we
    have had with them, from a SOF force to Kurdish force aspect,
    really was one of the initial successes we were able to achieve
    when we went back in there late last summer. We were able to
    quickly renew those relationships, draw on those partnerships,
    and get going very, very quickly in some areas. And so, that--
    to me, that highlights the importance of that--of the long-term
    relationship that we've been able to develop with them.
        Senator Ernst. Do you believe that our resources would be
    best utilized if we were directly arming the Peshmerga, the
    Kurdish forces?
        General Votel. Well, that, I think, is a policy question.
    Certainly, they are very capable forces. And so, I do think
    they would make good use of any resources that are provided to
    them.
        Senator Ernst. Yes, I think they have been an exceptional
    force and ally to our American forces in that region.
        Thank you very much, gentlemen, for your service, and also
    to your staff for being here in support today.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Kaine.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you, to the witnesses, for your strong testimony
    this morning.
        I want to begin with Yemen. I was intrigued with the
    account in news this morning about the Saudi and other action
    in Yemen; and, in particular, the number of partners that have
    been part of this. In addition to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain,
    Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Jordan, Morocco, there is press report that
    Egypt is involved, and, perhaps a little surprisingly, Pakistan
    and Sudan. So, nine nations, in addition to Saudi Arabia,
    springing into action to deal with this threat of the Houthi
    takeover of the government in Yemen.
        I'm gratified by that. I want to see a region that will
    stand up and try to deal with its own problems, rather than
    telling us, you know, quietly, that they think it's a problem,
    and not doing anything.
        But, I was also struck by the fact that those nine nations
    haven't come together and acted with dispatch against ISIL.
    They're involved, but they are not acting with dispatch against
    ISIL, even nearly a year into ISIL's sort of accelerated taking
    of territory in Syria and Iraq.
        And, just--you know, as experts who have spent a lot of
    time in the region, what explains why these nine nations would
    react with such speed and force to the Houthi takeover in
    Yemen, but would not be so engaged in the fight against ISIL?
        General Austin. Sir, like you, I am very encouraged that
    we've seen what we've seen here in--recently, with a number of
    nations coming together to address a problem. The core of these
    nations is--are GCC nations. And I certainly believe that they
    all think that Yemen is a very critical piece of real estate,
    just based upon the geography. Most important, it shares a
    border with Saudi Arabia and Oman. And I think--so, the GCC
    countries are naturally predisposed to helping protect another
    GCC country. And then, the relationships between the Saudis and
    the Egyptians and others are really what's driving their
    participation there.
        I would remind you, Senator--I know you are very, very well
    aware of this, but--the night that we flew into Syria for the
    first time, we had five Sunni Arab-led nations fly in that
    formation with us, which is really unprecedented. And we
    continue to see them offer material support, and they also have
    offered to train and equip forces. But, throughout, they have
    remained with us, in terms of flying strikes against Syria. So,
    they have continued to participate in that. Now, as they begin
    to focus on the Yemen problem, naturally, because of resources,
    we'll probably see less of an effort in Syria.
        Senator Kaine. The--you indicated that you thought--in
    response to earlier questioning--that you thought that ISIL was
    our most pressing challenge, but Iran was our greatest long-
    term challenge. Is a possible explanation for the force of the
    action against Yemen is that all of these nations believe that
    Iran is their more pressing challenge, and actually don't think
    of ISIL as the same kind of pressing challenge that they view
    when they look at Iran?
        General Austin. I can attest to the fact that they do see
    ISIL as a pressing challenge, sir. I do think that a big driver
    here is that--you know, that the geography associated with
    this--Yemen border, Saudi, and Oman--and clearly a direct
    threat to their homeland. So----
        Senator Kaine. Each of you work in the military lane, but
    with partners. Partners: State, AID, DOJ, DEA, DHS, the intel
    agencies. There's been questions here about the effect of
    sequester on the military mission. But, would you not also
    agree that, to the extent that sequester affects your allied
    agencies that you work with in your COCOMs or in Special
    Forces, that that is also an aspect of sequester that we need
    to take seriously if we're trying to avoid challenges to our
    National security?
        General Austin. I agree, Senator.
        General Rodriguez. I do, too, Senator.
        General Votel. I definitely agree, Senator.
        Senator Kaine. General Rodriguez, the attack in Tunisia was
    particularly troubling. Tunisia, small country, but, you know,
    kind of a bright spot, in a way, in terms of how they have come
    out of the Arab Spring with a constitution, with Islamic
    parties participating in democracy, even stepping back from
    power. What has your observation been about the Tunisian
    government's--newly formed, newly elected government's reaction
    to the terrorist attack at the museum in Tunisia? And what's
    your assessment of how they are, going forward, and how we can
    help them succeed?
        General Rodriguez. I think that their response has been
    very effective. Their military institutions are strong and was
    also a stabilizing influence as that--they went through that
    transition. And we continue to work with them to build some of
    their capacities with some of our interagency partners. Those
    elements were involved in that effort. And we continue to also
    share intelligence with them. And we will continue to build up
    their capacity to ensure that they continue to move in a
    positive trajectory, sir.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Sullivan.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And, gentlemen, thank you for your service.
        Mr. Chairman, I want to let--wanted to let you know, 10
    years ago, as a Marine Corps major, I had the privilege of
    serving with General Austin. And I can tell you he's one of the
    finest officers I've ever served with. So, I'm very heartened
    that he's in this very important position.
        Chairman McCain. He's not generally very nice to Marines,
    so I'm glad to hear that.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Sullivan. I see he's got one there on his staff,
    so, keeping in full tradition of the CENTCOM respect for the
    Marine Corps, I appreciate that.
        General Votel, I wanted to ask you a question relating to--
    really some clarification. You know, one of the things I think
    it's very important for us, in the Congress and in the military
    and in the administration, is to speak with language that's--
    gives our citizens a sense of what's really happening. And one
    of the things that you hear a lot about now--President, the
    administration, talks a lot about, you know, ``winding down
    combat operations,'' ``combat operations are over,'' ``we've
    ended combat operations in Afghanistan.'' That's been stated
    several times. The President of Afghanistan even mentioned that
    in a joint session of Congress yesterday. But, you also
    mentioned that we have a robust CT [Counter Terrorism] effort.
    So, aren't we kind of speaking out of both sides of our mouths?
    Isn't a robust CT effort the very definition of combat
    operations? And don't we still have combat operations going on
    in Afghanistan?
        General Votel. We are--Senator, thanks for the question--we
    are obviously supporting our Afghan partners in their execution
    of what could be termed as combat operations, at their effort.
        To your first part of your question with respect to, you
    know, counterterrorism, you know, counterterrorism, I think,
    is--as we pursue this here, isn't--is not just the kinetic
    aspect of it. And----
        Senator Sullivan. But, it is kind of the epitome of combat
    operations.
        General Votel. It is----
        Senator Sullivan. Aren't American soldiers, when they're
    conducting combat operations in Afghanistan, or
    counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan--isn't that the
    definition of combat operations? They're going in with weapons,
    killing bad guys. Correct?
        General Votel. We are not doing that today. What we----
        Senator Sullivan. There's no----
        General Votel.--are doing----
        Senator Sullivan. There's no CT operations where we're
    engaged----
        General Votel. There are----
        Senator Sullivan.--with the enemy?
        General Votel. There are CT operations. But, CT operations
    involve not only helping and enabling our partners, who are
    helping us with our CT objectives, the conduct of discreet
    action that we are taking, like kinetic strikes that are
    specifically against threats there, and then how we address the
    overall ideology and narrative aspect of this. So, there----
        Senator Sullivan. But, our CT operations are not members of
    the U.S. military in action against enemy forces?
        General Votel. Right now, today, we are not putting people
    as--in unilateral United States operations in against forces on
    the ground in Afghanistan. We are supporting our Afghan
    partners as we get after those, and we are doing other
    operations related to those networks.
        Senator Sullivan. Okay. I--again, I think that
    clarification is important, just because--seems to me if we
    have Special Forces operators in Afghanistan, in direct combat,
    we should let the American people know. But, if you're saying
    that's not the case, that there's no combat going on, there's
    no SF actions, direct actions, against al-Qaeda operatives or
    anything else like that--is that----
        General Votel. Senator, I'm not saying there's no combat
    going on. What I'm saying is, there's no unilateral U.S. combat
    going on. We are working through our partners when we do
    operations on the ground.
        Senator Sullivan. Do we have JTACs [Joint Terminal Attack
    Controllers] on the ground, either in Syria or Iraq, calling in
    missions?
        General Votel. We have JTACs that are operating at command-
    and-control locations----
        Senator Sullivan. But, they're not on the ground----
        General Votel. They're----
        Senator Sullivan.--front-line troops calling in----
        General Votel. They're certainly not accompanying forces
    forward, doing operations.
        Senator Sullivan. General Austin, I was wondering--you
    know, you mentioned the whole-of-government approach with
    regard to ISIL. I appreciate that. Appreciate the fact that
    you're focused on the military aspects of that. But, what are
    the other instruments of power that we're bringing to bear with
    regard to--American power with regard to ISIL? And--I just
    haven't really seen the administration articulate that at all.
    You mentioned it in your testimony. I think that's very
    encouraging. But, what is it? We haven't really seen it. Again,
    I know it's not your realm that you're responsible for, but it
    would be heartening to know what other instruments of our
    American power we're integrating to the fight with regard to
    defeating ISIS.
        General Austin. There are a couple of important things that
    have to be done, Senator, as you know, in order to really
    defeat this enemy. The kinetic piece of it's one issue. But,
    you really have to take--do some very constructive things to
    begin to cut off the enemy's ability to resource themselves.
    So, countering the threat financing is one issue. And then
    stopping the flow of foreign fighters, or slowing down the flow
    of foreign fighters. Both of those issues have to be worked by,
    you know, our government--whole-of-government, and they have to
    be worked in conjunction with other countries, not only in the
    region, but internationally.
        And also, there is a requirement or a need to counter the
    narrative. And so, I think we have to do more there. I know
    there are some initial steps that have been taken to begin to
    do that, but there's a lot of work yet to be done.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Ayotte.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Chairman.
        I want to thank the witnesses for being here and for what
    you've done for our country, and continue to do.
        I wanted to ask, General Austin again, a couple of
    questions about Yemen. Senator Kaine had pointed out that there
    were--in addition to the Saudis, there were nine other
    countries that were participating in this coalition to assist
    in Yemen. So, just to be clear, we've been, obviously,
    participating, State Department side, on negotiations with Iran
    for--very intensely, probably for the last year, at least, if
    not more. And during that period, what has Iran been doing in
    Yemen? And is it not the fact that Iran's influence in support
    of the Houthis which is, in part, prompting the Saudis and
    others to engage in this?
        General Austin. Certainly, Senator, Iran is--has been
    enabling the activity of the Houthis as they've done what
    they've done. And I would go further to say that, you know,
    Iran's desire is to be a hegemon in this region.
        Senator Ayotte. Meaning regional domination.
        General Austin. Right. Right.
        Senator Ayotte. Yeah.
        General Austin. And it--as it seeks to increase its
    influence in various countries, it does so through the reach of
    the Shiite populations in those countries. That won't allow
    Iran to dominate any specific country in the region, but what
    it does do is, it increases--it serves to increase sectarian
    tension, and thereby, it serves as a destabilizing effort.
        Senator Ayotte. Let me just be clear. When we're talking
    support, both--I know, General Votel, you're familiar with
    this, as well--when we're talking about the support, we're
    talking about money and arms, aren't we? I mean, we're not just
    talking about, ``Boy, we support you, because you're Shiite.''
    I mean, we're talking about actual support. Aren't they
    giving--on the ground?
        General Austin. Yes, we--yes, Senator, we are talking about
    material support, as well. And--but, again, I think that
    support is provided through the Shiite----
        Senator Ayotte. Through their proxies----
        General Austin. Right.
        Senator Ayotte.--they give them the money and the arms,
    which has undermined our interests in the mission that we had,
    and cooperation that we had, to try to deal with al-Qaeda.
    Isn't that right, General Votel? In Yemen?
        General Votel. I--yes, Senator, I think it is true.
        Senator Ayotte. So, the other thing I wanted to ask about,
    General Austin, is Bahrain. We have an important partnership in
    Bahrain, do we not? In fact, we have the location there of the
    United States 5th Fleet, correct?
        General Austin. That's correct, Senator.
        Senator Ayotte. And what's Iran doing with regard to the
    Bahrain Government right now, which is a Sunni government? As I
    understand it, they are also trying to destabilize that
    government, which, of course, would, in my view, threaten our
    interests there.
        General Austin. Correct, Senator. We see the same reach
    through the Shiite population, which increases sectarian
    tension and serves as a destabilizing effect.
        Senator Ayotte. Which--you know, obviously, Bahrain is a
    different country than Yemen, but it's a similar playbook in a
    different country, is it not?
        General Austin. It's a similar approach. I----
        Senator Ayotte. Similar approach, but I--I mean, obviously,
    they're very different countries.
        General Austin. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Ayotte. But, I think we need to be clear here what
    Iran's activities have been. And, as I look at your testimony,
    you--one of the things you pointed out, General Austin, is that
    the Iran routinely engages in malign activity through the
    Iranian threat network. Iran is also engaging in malign
    activity through support to proxy actors, such as Lebanese
    Hezbollah and Hamas, which threatens the sovereignty and
    security of Israel. This has all been going on in addition to
    undermining our interests in Yemen, correct?
        General Austin. That's correct.
        Senator Ayotte. So, you know, this is obviously, I think,
    as we look at this issue of the regional--attempt at regional
    domination by Iran, this is of deep concern to us, in the long
    term, and even in the short term, in terms of how this region
    can be destabilized further. Is that true?
        General Austin. There is a significant concern, for a long
    time--long-term effects, in terms of this type of behavior
    destabilizing the region and having effects in other parts of
    the globe, as well.
        Senator Ayotte. And, in fact, I think could further fuel
    sort of a Sunni-Shiite fight in the region if they continue
    their efforts towards regional domination. Would you agree?
        General Austin. Yeah, I would.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
        I just wanted to comment, as well, on Senator Cotton's
    question to you about the status of the Taliban five. And I
    know that you're going to get back to him on it, but I have to
    say, I find it shocking, the fact that you are Commander of
    AFRICOM and that the State Department has not already
    coordinated with you. It's not--not putting this on you, is--my
    point is, the fact that we've got these dangerous--you're--you
    know, you're the Commander of CENTCOM. These two countries,
    Qatar and also where the Taliban five is from and could return
    and could prevent--and present great danger into Afghanistan.
    It would seem to me that you would be, I would hope, most
    closely consulted on this. So, I'm actually kind of dumfounded
    that they aren't consulting you now and that there doesn't
    appear to be a plan.
        So, you know, I look forward to the followup, but, you
    know, to the State Department, to everyone else out there, to
    this administration, seems to me the Commander of CENTCOM needs
    to be brought in this, in terms of the five potential
    commanders that could get back on the ground in Afghanistan and
    threaten our troops.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Lee.
        Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thanks, to all of you here today, and to the men and
    women who serve under your command, and all you do to help
    protect us.
        Last year, I expressed some reluctance regarding the Syria
    train-and-equip program, based on concerns that any lethal
    assistance that we may provide might end up inadvertently--or,
    in some cases, perhaps purposely--end up in the hands of some
    of the very extremists that we're attempting to fight against.
    And that could possibly fuel further violence in the region.
        While I believe that the servicemembers who are under your
    command, who are in the process of executing this program, are
    the most skilled in the world at what they do--and that's
    really what gives this program the very best chance of
    success--the losses of United States-provided equipment by the
    Iraqi Security Forces last year, and in Yemen this year, are
    stark lessons that the fluid and volatile nature of the Middle
    East can compromise even our best-laid plans.
        I'm further concerned that, for this program to have the
    best chance of success, the United States will need to become
    more militarily involved in this conflict than many Americans
    may realize.
        Secretary Carter stated recently, when referring to the
    forces that we train and equip in Syria, that, quote, ``We will
    have some obligation to support them after they're trained,''
    close quote. Yet, we don't know what that support would look
    like, nor do we know, at this point, what the costs associated
    with that would look like.
        This program, as part of the administration's strategy to
    address the ISIS threat, should be fully and openly debated in
    this body so that the American people might have a say in how
    their military forces are used.
        General Austin, since this program was conceptualized, it
    was reasonable to expect a situation in which Syrian rebels we
    armed might face a larger or better-equipped army--larger or
    better-equipped enemy. Why was the decision made to start the
    train-and-equip program--why was that decision made before
    determining whether the United States would provide further
    protection or support for the groups once they were trained and
    equipped and returned to Syria?
        General Austin. It was made because we will need a--an
    element on the ground to complement the work that we're doing
    with our fires to begin to counter ISIL in Syria. And, you
    know, my best military advice as we go forward is that, as we
    introduce forces that we've trained and equipped, then we
    should provide them support. We should not only look to provide
    them fires, we should provide them logistics, we should provide
    them intel support, as well. And so, I think that gives them
    the best opportunity for success.
        Senator Lee. So, do you think that Assad's forces in Syria
    will attempt to attack some of these opposition members that
    we've trained and equipped? And, if so, what level of military
    involvement should we expect from American forces?
        General Austin. I think there's a likelihood that that can
    happen. We'll try to--initially, as we put forces in and begin
    to build combat power, we'll put them in those positions where
    they are focused on ISIL. That's the first task at hand. And
    then, again, if they are attacked, then I think we should
    protect them.
        Senator Lee. What do we do if the forces that we train and
    equip end up attacking Assad's forces?
        General Austin. Well, initially, that's not the--that's not
    what we--we're focused on. So, we will discontinue providing
    support to those forces if they vector off and do things that
    we haven't designed them to do initially and asked them to
    focus on initially.
        Senator Lee. Do you think that the success of the
    opposition groups that we're training and equipping, that we're
    supporting, do you think that'll require a new governing
    structure in Damascus? And, if so, would the U.S. military be
    involved in helping to facilitate that change?
        General Austin. I think eventually forces will need to plug
    into some type of structure, for sure. And again, that's not
    what the military typically does. But, again, this is a whole-
    of-government approach, here, so----
        Senator Lee. Okay, thank you, General Austin.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. General, I'd just like to follow up on
    what Senator Lee said. In Syria, these young people we are
    training and we send them back into Syria, if they're attacked
    by Assad, we're not going to protect them?
        General Austin. Sir, I----
        Chairman McCain. Are we going to protect them?
        General Austin. My thought--my recommendation would be that
    we protect them, no matter who's attacking them. So, we have to
    protect these forces once we've trained them and put them on
    the ground.
        Chairman McCain. Well, are we going to have any provision
    to protect them?
        General Austin. We currently don't have that, that policy
    decision, sir. But, as I----
        Chairman McCain. So, we're going to train them to go back
    into Syria; and, if Bashar Assad barrel-bombs them, we don't
    have a policy yet as to whether we protect them, or not?
        General Austin. We--currently, sir, that decision has not
    been taken, and----
        Chairman McCain. Well, then why are we training them if
    we're not going to be able to tell them that we're not going
    to--whether we're going to protect them, or not?
        General Austin. I'm very hopeful that we will be able to
    tell them that, sir.
        Chairman McCain. Well, I'm very hopeful, too. But, hope
    really doesn't stop barrel-bombing.
        Could you--could I ask you again when it is that the Saudis
    notified you that they were going to begin attacks in Yemen?
        General Austin. Sir, I had a discussion with the Saudi CHOD
    the day of the attack, so it was not much before that they
    actually started the attacks.
        Chairman McCain. Isn't that quite a commentary on our
    relationship with Saudi Arabia and the other 13 countries in
    their coalition, that they would--on literally the day of their
    attacks, they tell you that--tell the United States of America
    that they're going to launch a major campaign? I mean, that is
    really a fantastic indicator of the deterioration of the trust
    and confidence that these countries, particularly Saudi Arabia,
    have in us. And it authenticates what has been quoted quite
    frequently, that some people believe it's better to be an enemy
    of the United States than a friend. And--I mean, this is really
    quite remarkable.
        And again, finally, I do not know how you recruit young
    people to fight, and tell them that they're going to back in to
    a country, and we don't have a policy yet whether we're going
    to protect them, or not. General, that's immoral. It's not only
    unworkable, it's immoral to tell people to not--to tell the--be
    able to tell them that, if we train and equip them to go in and
    fight, that we're not going to--that we haven't yet got a
    policy on whether we're going to protect them, or not. I would
    say that that would also be something of a disincentive for
    recruitment.
        So, I hope, for the sake of these young people's lives that
    we are training now, that we at least have a policy decision as
    to whether we're going to protect them, or not. And, of course,
    the best way to do that is with a no-fly zone, which has been
    recommended, years ago, without any result from this President.
        Senator Gillibrand.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to follow the Chairman's line of questioning. So,
    what do you believe the strategy is for this new campaign? And
    what's the ultimate goal? In Yemen, sorry.
        General Austin. I don't know what the Saudis--the specifics
    of their goals and objectives. I can tell you that they're
    interested, number one, in protecting their homeland--they have
    a border with Yemen, obviously--and also, that they received
    requests from the President of Yemen to help with military
    assistance. So----
        Senator Gillibrand. What advice have you given, or will you
    give, the President about what our role should be?
        General Austin. Our current position is that we'll help the
    Saudis with intelligence and logistics and planning support.
    And again, they're great partners, and I think they're very
    much appreciative of the help that we'll provide them.
        Senator Gillibrand. What's your assessment of the
    likelihood of success?
        General Austin. In Yemen?
        Senator Gillibrand. Yes.
        General Austin. Again, Senator, I don't currently know the
    specific goals and objectives of the Saudi campaign. And I'd
    have to know that to be able to assess the likelihood of
    success.
        Senator Gillibrand. Well, I do hope you get that
    information sooner than later, because, you know, more than
    $500 million in United States military assistance to Yemen can
    no longer be accounted for and has fallen into the wrong hands.
    We have a role in Yemen that we have to have much greater
    accountability for. How does something like that happen? And,
    given the instability in the region, what steps should the U.S.
    be taking to protect or prevent losses like that in the future?
        General Austin. Yeah, so the $500 million, as I understand
    it, Senator, were--is the amount of investment over an 8-year
    period that we've made to help the Yemeni government, the
    Yemeni military forces, or security forces, build capacity.
    This not only includes materials, but it also includes
    training. And, as you know, training can be somewhat costly.
    When we are there, we have the ability to monitor how this
    equipment's being used. But, of course, you know, the embassy's
    no longer there, and it doesn't have a Office of Security
    Cooperation that would typically do these things. And so, we
    don't have that ability, currently. If we have the opportunity
    to go back in and partner with the new government, or a
    government, then I think, you know, that'll be a--one of our
    focus areas.
        Senator Gillibrand. Well, given that the Houthis are still
    in control, how do you believe we should deal with al-Qaeda in
    the Arabian Peninsula, given the state of Yemen?
        General Austin. Thanks, Senator. I think that, as we have
    done and will continue to do in every case where we don't have
    people on the ground but there is a threat there that we need
    to concerned about, we'll use every intelligence-collection
    capability that's available to us to continue to monitor what's
    going on with this extremist network. And we do have resources
    that are in the region that we can use to apply to counter this
    network once we've developed the appropriate intelligence.
        Senator Gillibrand. And what do you see is the presence of
    ISIL in the region? And is that going to be affected by the
    state of Yemen today?
        General Austin. If I could get you to--if I could ask a
    question on--get you to ask that question again, Senator, I
    missed a piece of it. How do I see----
        Senator Gillibrand. How do you see the threat of ISIL in
    that region?
        General Austin. Well, I think the threat of ISIL in the
    region, Senator, is the most pressing threat that we're facing.
    And, as I----
        Senator Gillibrand. In Yemen. I'm still on Yemen.
        General Austin. In Yemen, that's really undetermined. I
    know that the most recent attack was attributed to an ISIL
    element in Yemen, but I think the intelligence agencies are
    still working their way through that, you know, to determine
    the veracity of whether or not this is really a hardcore ISIL
    element or someone claiming to be ISIL or, you know, what this
    really is. Clearly, AQAP [Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula] is
    dominant in that country. And whether or not ISIL and AQAP can
    coexist is left to be seen.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you very much.
        Chairman McCain. I thank the witnesses, and----
        Senator Cotton. Senator McCain, can----
        Chairman McCain. Senator Cotton.
        Senator Cotton. One point, to follow up on something that
    he just said. There's a Breaking News Alert from the Associated
    Press, General Austin, that Egypt and Saudi Arabia have begun a
    ground incursion into Yemen. Did Saudi Arabia or any other
    country give you or Central Command advance notice of this, if
    this report is accurate?
        General Austin. No, I did not have advance notice of that.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        Chairman McCain. That's quite a commentary.
        This hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:37 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
        1. Senator Wicker. General Austin and General Rodriguez, U.S.
    Africa Command (AFRICOM) and certain regions of U.S. Central Command
    (CENTCOM) have suffered from resource shortfalls, particularly when it
    comes to persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
    (ISR).
        Last year, General Rodriguez testified before our Committee that
    only 11 percent of his ISR requirements were being met. I also
    understand that dynamic battle lines in Syria and Iraq have also
    escalated CENTCOM's demand for persistent ISR. How much of your ISR
    requirements are currently being met?
        General Austin. [Deleted.]
        General Rodriguez. [Deleted.]

        2. Senator Wicker. General Austin and General Rodriguez, can you
    describe how resource shortfalls impact your ability to accomplish your
    missions?
        General Austin. [Deleted.]
        General Rodriguez. [Deleted.]

        3. Senator Wicker. General Austin and General Rodriguez, Congress
    will do what it can to expedite delivery of the tools you need in the
    field. Will you provide to the committee a written list of your
    Combatant Commander Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs) as they
    relate to ISR?
        General Austin. [Deleted.]
        General Rodriguez. USAFRICOM does not have any active JUONs.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
                                detention policy
        4. Senator Ayotte. General Austin, General Rodriguez, and General
    Votel, if we capture Ayman al-Zawahiri tonight, how much useful
    intelligence do you think he would have?
        General Austin. We believe it is likely that Ayman al-Zawahiri has
    extensive knowledge of al-Qaeda's global network, which would include
    plans for attacks against the West. Zawahiri may also have in his
    possession a large cache of documents and electronic media which would
    be valuable to the intelligence community.
        General Rodriguez. [Deleted.]
        General Votel. Capturing Zawahiri would be a significant victory
    for all nations that have been engaged in counterterrorism operations
    against al-Qaeda since 2001. Zawahiri has been the architect for al-
    Qaeda's jihadist narrative for more than two decades and would be the
    most senior al-Qaeda leader ever detained. Intelligence collection and
    reporting on Zawahiri's activities have been limited since he became
    the leader of al-Qaeda following the death of Usama bin Laden in May
    2011. However, we believe Zawahiri could provide valuable information
    regarding the status of operations that are being planned by the core
    elements in Afghanistan/Pakistan and possibly by his affiliate groups
    in Yemen, Syria, Somalia, and Algeria. Zawahiri could also provide an
    understanding of his current and past relationships with the leaders of
    the Taliban, Haqqani Network, and other affiliate groups that help to
    form the Salafi-jihadist global network. Zawahiri could also describe
    his succession plan for the organization, including the status of the
    sons of senior al-Qaeda members who have been killed or captured (Bin
    Laden sons and Abu Khayr al-Masri sons) or emerging leaders yet known
    to the Intelligence Community and their potential to resurrect the next
    generation of jihad for al-Qaeda. Finally, Zawahiri may provide ways to
    help counter or undermine ISIL's activities using information
    operations.

        5. Senator Ayotte. General Austin, General Rodriguez, and General
    Votel, how long do you think it might take to gather that information
    from him?
        General Austin. Any hard copy or electronic material recovered from
    the capture of Ayman al-Zawahiri could be exploited relatively quickly,
    to include at the point of capture. That said, we cannot predict with
    certainty what or how much information of intelligence value Zawahiri
    will reveal.
        General Rodriguez. [Deleted.]
        General Votel. If/when Zawahiri is detained, he would be
    interrogated by the FBI-led High Value Interrogation Group (HIG) and
    this question could best be answered by the HIG. With that said, if
    Zawahiri was going to cooperate and provide information, the
    debriefings could potentially last months. However, it should be
    assumed that Zawahiri has been exposed to resistance training and he
    may never divulge information of intelligence value.

        6. Senator Ayotte. General Austin, General Rodriguez, and General
    Votel, where would we detain and interrogate him?
        General Austin. [Deleted.]
        General Rodriguez. Where to interrogate al-Zawahiri is a decision
    for senior U.S. policy makers.
        General Votel. The capture of Zawahiri would occur under the
    operational authority of the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) of
    the location of the capture, with Special Operations Forces assigned in
    support to that GCC. The location for the initial detention of Zawahiri
    will be dependent on the circumstances of capture, including the
    country in which he was located, the location of US forces and
    facilities, and agreements we may have with coalition partners or the
    country in which he was captured.
        Among the options for detention of Zawahiri, assuming the US
    intends to maintain full control of the target once captured, is
    removing him to a location under US control. Options, therefore,
    include removal to the continental US, to the Guantanamo Bay detention
    facility, or to a US Navy ship at sea.
        We could ask the host nation to hold Zawahiri in one of their
    national facilities. Removal of Zawahiri to a third country member of
    the coalition is a less likely course of action.
                                  afghanistan
        7. Senator Ayotte. General Austin and General Votel, from the
    perspective of protecting our country and securing our interests,
    please describe the importance of continuing to build the Afghans'
    counterterrorism capabilities, as well as retaining a robust American
    counterterrorism capability in Afghanistan to support our mutual
    interests there.
        General Austin. [Deleted.]
        General Votel. A continued U.S. commitment to Afghanistan's
    security efforts enables the lasting mutually beneficial relationships
    needed to achieve U.S. objectives in the region to include ensuring
    Afghanistan does not fracture into safe havens from which terrorist
    organizations could attack the U.S. homeland. The Afghan Special
    Security Forces (ASSF) is central to ensuring the relative stability
    and security of Afghanistan over the long-term. These ASSF currently
    conduct unilateral security operations and are integrated into the
    Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior, maximizing strategic
    effects. U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) continue to train,
    advise, and assist ASSF in the areas of logistics and command and
    control to ensure a sustainable counterterrorism capability and partner
    in the region to help protect and secure U.S. interests.
        By the end of 2016, we expect the ASSF to make significant
    improvements to their core enabling functions. This is critical to U.S.
    interests in the region as we will be reliant upon a capable ASSF
    partner to conduct effective counterterrorism (CT) missions in
    Afghanistan. To achieve these objectives, the Department of Defense is
    making appropriate recommendations to the essential requirements to
    accomplish the tasks as outlined in the global employment of the force
    (GEF) directive and enable us to protect our vital national interests
    in the region. These recommendations will ensure we are appropriately
    resourced and authorized to conduct those activities essential for our
    national security.
                             human rights oversight
        8. Senator Ayotte. General Austin, General Rodriguez, and General
    Votel, section 1204 of the 2015 National Defense Authorization Act
    (NDAA) prohibits funding or training foreign units that have committed
    gross violations of human rights. Have there been any examples where a
    violation of human rights was discovered and funding or training was
    cut off until corrective measures were taken?
        General Austin. Although instances of human rights violations have
    significantly reduced in recent years, there have been reports of
    potential violations that resulted in holds being placed on funding and
    training pending corrective measures.
        In Pakistan, there have been three high-profile equipment-related
    cases impacted by derogatory Leahy vetting information in 2011-2012.
    There also have been several training events planned by U.S. Special
    Operations Forces units in Pakistan with the Special Services Group
    that were cancelled between 2008-2010 due to a number of units failing
    Leahy vetting. In Egypt, training for Military Police was halted due to
    an Oct 2011 incident and training their Presidential Guard was halted
    due to a Jul 2013 incident. In 2012, the Department of State placed a
    hold on military grant assistance for Tajikistan after allegations of
    human rights violations by military and security forces in Khorough. In
    Afghanistan, while there have been allegations of human rights
    violations by Afghan security forces, none have been validated
    therefore no assistance has been cut off. However, several of the non-
    validated reports have resulted in requests for exception to policy.
    Lastly, all training and equipping was suspended for three Lebanese
    Armed Forces Intervention Regiments after suspected human rights
    violations in October 2012. Further investigation proved that just one
    company-sized element in one of the Intervention Regiments was
    involved; this finding allowed for the resumption of security
    assistance.
        CENTCOM is committed to complying with the Leahy provision and will
    continue to closely monitor potential human rights violations and take
    appropriate actions when necessary.
        General Rodriguez. USAFRICOM is not aware of any cases where
    training, equipment, or other assistance was provided then subsequently
    cut off due to a gross violation of human rights. In every case where
    vetting occurred and a gross violation of human rights was discovered,
    training, equipment, or other assistance did not occur. Currently,
    USAFRICOM has no cases submitted for remediation.
        In FY14, 4001 cases from USAFRICOM AOR were vetted and approved,
    \1\ 1265 were suspended, \2\ 17 wererejected, \3\ and 11 were
    cancelled. We also suspect that ``self-selection'' occurs as our
    Offices of Security Cooperation, Chiefs of Mission, and partner nations
    steer the provision of training, equipment, and other assistance toward
    units that will not present vetting problems.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Approved: Case has successfully gone through Leahy Vetting and
    training occurred.
        \2\ Suspended: Case was suspended in the system for a variety of
    reasons. Most common are administrative reasons such as duplicate
    entries, change in training date, wrong information, wrong funding
    codes, insufficient information unresolved hits for Gross Violations of
    Human Rights (GVHR) (Rape, Torture, EJK, Forced Disappearance under the
    cover of law), unresolved hits for NON-GVHR (Murder, Robbery, Assault,
    other crimes committed by the individual, policy).
        \3\ Rejected: Gross Violations of Human Rights (GVHR) (Rape,
    Torture, EJK, Forced Disappearance under the cover of law), NON-GVHR
    (Murder, Robbery, Assault, other crimes committed by the individual,
    policy).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        General Votel. The short answer, from a Special Operations Forces-
    event perspective, is ``no.'' I had the opportunity to review the
    recent Congressional Report on the DOD Leahy Law that had an excellent
    summary of the FY14 submissions and rejections. As I recall, out of the
    more than 18,000 DOD-funded activities (not all of them SOF) that
    required Human Rights Vetting, only 33 cases were rejected for Human
    Rights issues. Most of these rejections were for individuals vice the
    rejection of a complete unit. I think this illustrates that the
    rejections are, by far, the exception, not the rule. For FY14 and FY15,
    SOF have not had any events cancelled due to Human Rights issues. That
    being said, there have been several cases that have involved
    modifications to training activities due to the past behavior of one or
    two individuals. In each of these cases, the Country Teams worked with
    the appropriate Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) and SOCOM to
    exclude the suspected individuals and proceed with the planned events.
    The GCCs and Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) work very
    closely with the Country Teams and will not even submit an event for
    Human Rights Vetting, if there are concerns or knowledge that the unit
    may be rejected.
        I can tell you that almost all of the issues SOF have with the
    Leahy Vetting process are administrative in nature, not actual
    violations of human rights.

        9. Senator Ayotte. General Austin, General Rodriguez, and General
    Votel, generally speaking, do our partner nations holding their own
    forces accountable if they commit unlawful or predatory acts against
    their populations?
        General Austin. Generally speaking, all countries do have the legal
    framework and ability to hold their forces accountable if they commit
    unlawful or predatory acts against their populations. And, in recent
    years, we have seen marked improvements in the enforcement of those
    laws and regulations made by many of our partner nations in CENTCOM's
    area of responsibility. Of course, there is still room for improvement
    in some areas, and reported human rights violations have resulted in
    minor to moderate impacts on relevant security cooperation
    relationships. Going forward, we will continue to closely monitor
    potential violations and take appropriate actions where necessary.
        General Rodriguez. Almost all countries in the USAFRICOM area of
    responsibility have been the subject of reports of human rights abuses
    and limited accountability. Generally speaking, our partners have
    legislation and legal systems in place which require military forces to
    be held accountable for unlawful acts against civilians. However, the
    ability or political will to use those legal systems as intended to
    prosecute unlawful acts is not always present, and USAFRICOM continues
    to work with our partners to build this capacity.
        General Votel. Generally speaking I believe that most countries
    with whom we engage are genuinely trying to meet standards and
    expectations with respect to protecting Human Rights. Two recent
    examples come to mind: The government of Indonesia publically tried,
    convicted, and punished several members of one of their elite units for
    a serious crime they committed a few years ago. The second example is
    currently playing out in Bangladesh where charges have been brought
    against 25 officers from the Rapid Action Battalion for the killing of
    seven people in April 2014. In contrast to these countries, and others
    like them who are trying to ensure accountability, several countries
    seem to accept the reality that some of their security force units will
    probably never train with US forces, since there is no government
    intention of submitting to remediation requirements.
                          special operations equipment
        10. Senator Ayotte. General Votel, on March 26, the Associated
    Press reported that six Army special operations units soon to deploy
    have requested human information system software produced by a private
    firm, but that the Army has only approved two requests and is instead
    is pressuring troops to use the Distributed Common Ground System
    (DCGS). Have all six of these requests now been met? Please provide
    details. If not, please provide an explanation.
        General Votel. The current requests from Army special operations
    units are requesting a variant of the US Army's Distributed Common
    Ground System (DCGS-A) while others are requesting an intelligence
    Analysis tool. In each case, the Army special operations unit used the
    U.S. Army's process of operational needs statements (ONS) to identify
    urgent operational needs. USSOCOM has a similar process to address
    urgent and compelling Special Operations-peculiar (SO-p) capability
    gaps using a Combat Mission Needs Statement (CMNS) that the Army units,
    US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), and Special Operations
    Command Central (SOCCENT) did not invoke.
        USSOCOM is aware of 7 ONS and the recent U.S. Army's decision to
    validate the four most urgent ONS that support the deployed 1st and 5th
    Special Forces Groups. USSOCOM is consulting with the U.S. Army at the
    acquisition Program Manager level as they design and implement their
    fielding plan to ensure interoperability with any SO-p equipment.
        Three ONS from Army special operations units have not yet been
    acted upon but are also for units that are not deploying to emergent
    crisis. These ONS are still in the Army ONS process and have not yet
    been validated. USASOC is conducting detailed analysis on the ONS and
    will make recommendations and decisions within Army channels. The U.S.
    Army is best postured to answer questions on their process, the status,
    and Army fielding plans for the ONS.
                          quality of special operators
        11. Senator Ayotte. General Votel, Special Operations experts long
    have emphasized that special operators cannot be mass produced. As the
    demand for special operations forces continues to increase, it is
    important that standards not be lowered. At the Advanced Special
    Operations Techniques Course, how many students have enrolled in each
    course (for both East and West Coast locations) over the last 10 years?
        General Votel. [For official use only.]

        12. Senator Ayotte. General Votel, how many students have graduated
    from each course over the last 10 years?
        General Votel. [For official use only.]

        13. Senator Ayotte. General Votel, how many instructors
    administered each course over the last 10 years?
        General Votel. [For official use only.]

        14. Senator Ayotte. General Votel, has any incident occurred at
    this course over the last 10 years that actually compromised or
    threatened to compromise the course material, the nature of the course,
    or any classified or sensitive methods, techniques, or information? If
    so, please describe each incident and whether the offending student was
    allowed to complete the course.
        General Votel. There have been minor security incidents/violations
    but no incidents which can be proven to have directly compromised or
    threatened to compromise the course material to our knowledge.

        15. Senator Ayotte. General Votel, at the Defense Advanced
    Tradecraft Course, how many students have enrolled in each course over
    the last 10 years?
        General Votel. The Defense Advanced Tradecraft Course (DATC),
    formerly Advanced Source Operations Course, is conducted by the HUMINT
    Training-Joint Center of Excellence (HT-JCOE) at Fort Huachuca, AZ. The
    Army serves as the executive agent for HT-JCOE, with the training
    administration managed by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). In my
    role as Commander USSOCOM, I do not have visibility on DATC and will
    have to respectfully defer to the Army or DIA.

        16. Senator Ayotte. General Votel, how many students have graduated
    from each course over the last 10 years?
        General Votel. The Army serves as the executive agent for Defense
    Advanced Tradecraft Course (DATC), with the training administration
    managed by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). In my role as
    Commander USSOCOM, I do not have visibility on the number of students
    graduating from the course over the last 10 years.

        17. Senator Ayotte. General Votel, how many instructors
    administered each course over the last 10 years?
        General Votel. The Army serves as the executive agent for Defense
    Advanced Tradecraft Course (DATC), with the training administration
    managed by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). In my role as
    Commander USSOCOM, I do not have visibility on the number of
    instructors administering the course over the last 10 years.

        18. Senator Ayotte. General Votel, how much has administering the
    course cost for each of the last 10 years? If funding has decreased,
    has it had any effect on the quality of each graduating class?
        General Votel. The Army serves as the executive agent for Defense
    Advanced Tradecraft Course (DATC), with the training administration
    managed by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). In my role as
    Commander USSOCOM, I do not have visibility on the costs administering
    the course over the last 10 years.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
                                   taliban 5
        19. Senator Cotton. General Austin, both Qatar and Afghanistan are
    in your area of responsibility (AOR). As you know the Taliban 5 are
    currently in Qatar under what is nominally referred to as house arrest.
    Are you aware of the press reports that one to three members of the
    Taliban 5 have reengaged and are in violation of the Memorandum of
    Understanding (MOU)?
        General Austin. [Deleted.]

        20. Senator Cotton. General Austin, in your opinion, are any of the
    Taliban 5 currently taking actions, which could cause and incite
    attacks against U.S. personnel, allies, or interests?
        General Austin. [Deleted.]

        21. Senator Cotton. General Austin, the Taliban 5 house arrest
    expires in approximately 2 months. After this expiration, do you
    believe that any of them will return to the fight against the U.S. or
    our allies?
        General Austin. [Deleted.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2016 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, APRIL 16, 2015

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                   U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES KOREA

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe,
    Sessions, Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
    Tillis, Sullivan, Graham, Reed, McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen,
    Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, and
    Heinrich.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman McCain. Good morning. The committee meets today to
    receive testimony on U.S. Pacific Command [PACOM] and U.S.
    Forces Korea.
        I'd like to thank both of our witnesses, Admiral Locklear
    and General Scaparrotti, for appearing before us today and for
    their many years of distinguished service.
        The past 3 months, this committee has received testimony
    from many of America's most respected statesmen, thinkers, and
    former military commanders. These leaders have all told us that
    we are experiencing a more diverse and complex array of crises
    than at any time since the end of World War II.
        As we confront immediate challenges in Europe and the
    Middle East, the United States cannot afford to neglect the
    Asia-Pacific region, which Secretary Carter has called ``the
    defining region for our Nation's future.'' Put simply, if the
    21st century is to be another American century, the United
    States must remain an Asia-Pacific power. Our national
    interests in the Asia-Pacific are deep and enduring. We seek to
    extend free trade, free markets, free navigation, and free
    commons--air, sea, space, and now cyber. We seek to maintain a
    balance of power that fosters the peaceful expansion of human
    rights, democracy, rule of law, and many other values that we
    share with increasing numbers of Asian citizens. And we seek to
    defend ourselves and our allies by maintaining the capability
    to prevent, deter, and, if necessary, prevail in a conflict.
        Achieving these objectives will require sustained American
    leadership. We must use all elements of our national power. In
    particular, I am hopeful that Congress will pass trade
    promotion authority for the Trans-Pacific Partnership [TPP].
    This vital trade agreement will open new opportunities for
    trade and level the playing field for American businesses and
    workers, while sending a powerful strategic signal about
    America's commitment to the Asia-Pacific.
        Yet, we must remember that our soft power is the shadow
    cast by our hard power. That's why the United States must
    continue to sustain a favorable military balance in the region.
    The Department of Defense [DOD] will need to update concepts of
    operations with emerging military technology to enable our
    military to operate in contested environments. From projecting
    power over long distances and exploiting the undersea domain to
    developing new precision-guided munitions and to investing in
    innovative ways to build the resiliency of our forward-deployed
    forces, we have a great deal of work to do if we aim to sustain
    our traditional military advantages in the Asia-Pacific region.
    None of these will be possible if we continue to live with
    mindless sequestration and a broken acquisitions system.
        As we build and posture forces to secure America's interest
    in the Asia-Pacific, we must remain clear-eyed about the
    implications of China's rise and its evolving foreign and
    defense policy. As Director of National Intelligence James
    Clapper told this committee back in February, China is engaged
    in a rapid military modernization deliberately designed to
    counteract or thwart American military strengths. I believe
    China can and should play a constructive role in the Pacific--
    Asia-Pacific region. Unfortunately in recent years, China has
    behaved less like a responsible stakeholder and more like a
    bully.
        In the South China Sea, we have seen the latest example of
    a trend toward more assertive behavior. China's land
    reclamation and construction activities on multiple islands
    across the Spratly Chain and the potential command-and-control,
    surveillance, and military capabilities it could bring to bear
    from these new land features are a challenge to the interests
    of the United States and the Nations of the Asia-Pacific
    region. Such unilateral efforts to change the status quo
    through force, intimidation, or coercion threaten the peace and
    stability that have extended prosperity across the Asia-Pacific
    for 7 decades.
        As I wrote in a letter, together with my colleagues,
    Senator Reed, Corker, and Menendez, the United States must work
    together with like-minded partners and allies to develop and
    employ a comprehensive strategy that aims to shape China's
    coercive peacetime behavior. This will not be easy and will
    likely have impacts on other areas of our bilateral
    relationship. But, if China continues to pursue a coercive and
    escalatory approach to the resolution of maritime disputes, the
    cost to regional security and prosperity, as well as to
    American interests, will only grow.
        I'm also concerned by the recent assessment from Admiral
    Bill Gortney, the head of NORAD [North American Aerospace
    Defense Command] in Northern Command, that North Korea has an
    operational road-mobile missile that could carry nuclear
    weapons to the United States. General Scaparrotti, I look
    forward to hearing your assessment of this potential
    breakthrough and the implications of our--to our national
    security if the erratic and unpredictable regime of Kim Jung-Un
    achieves the ability to carry out a nuclear strike against our
    Homeland.
        I thank the witnesses and look forward to their testimony.
        Senator Reed.

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me join you in welcoming Admiral Locklear and General
    Scaparrotti. Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and
    sacrifice, and that of your family. And, particularly, convey
    to your men and women under your commands our deepest
    appreciation for what they do every day.
        On Tuesday, we had an extremely insightful hearing on some
    of the challenges we face in the Asia-Pacific region. The
    consensus from the panel is that we face some very serious
    challenges, especially in light of China's increasing military
    budget and destabilizing activities in the region. And one of
    the biggest challenges will be to continue to provide, as we
    have for 70 years, security, stability, and free transit in the
    Pacific, particularly, as Senator McCain emphasized, with
    pending sequestration in the face of declining resources that
    we have. And I echo his call for the end of sequestration.
        Admiral Locklear, we'd be very interested in your views
    about the land reclamation activities of China in the Spratlys
    and elsewhere. That is something, as the Chairman has noted,
    that we both, along with Senators Menendez and Corker, objected
    to, or at least criticized. What more, also, must we do to
    build the capacity of our partners in the region, to help them
    with the maritime domain awareness, and to encourage all the
    regional actors to seek legal redress to problems, not to
    invoke lethal threats with respect to sovereignty and respect
    to stability in the region?
        As the Chairman indicated, Admiral Gortney's comments this
    week, and I will quote him as he said, North Korea, ``has the
    ability to put a nuclear weapon on a KN-08 and shoot it at the
    homeland.'' Quite disturbing. And, General Scaparrotti, would
    you, in your comments or questions, please let us know about
    the dimensions of this threat as it exists today and as it
    might evolve in the future?
        Again, we thank you, because the North Koreans appear to be
    not only, unfortunately, well armed, but very difficult to
    predict their behaviors, and your views and insights will be
    extremely important. Also, if you could comment on the possible
    deployment of a THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense]
    missile defense system and its contribution to the defense of
    our allies, the Republic of South Korea.
        We are considering all of these challenges, once again,
    under the constraint of serious budget limitations. And,
    Admiral Locklear and General Scaparrotti, please indicate to us
    the impact of sequestration on your operations. It would be
    very helpful, I think.
        Thank you very much for joining us.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. I thank the witnesses.
        Admiral Locklear.

     STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL SAMUEL J. LOCKLEAR III, USN, COMMANDER,
                          U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

        Admiral Locklear. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed,
    and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for this
    opportunity to appear before you today with General
    Scaparrotti.
        Before we begin, I'd like to ask that my written statement
    be submitted for the record.
        Chairman McCain. Without objection.
        Admiral Locklear. For more than 3 years, I've had the honor
    and privilege of leading the exceptional men and women,
    military and civilian, of the U.S. Pacific Command [U.S.
    PACOM]. These volunteers are skilled professionals dedicated to
    the defense of our Nation, they're serving as superb
    ambassadors to represent the values, the strengths that make
    our Nation great. I want to go on record to formally thank them
    for our--for their service, and their families for their
    sacrifices.
        In PACOM, we continue to strengthen alliances, our
    partnerships, maintain an assured presence in the region, and
    demonstrate an intent and resolve to safeguard U.S. national
    interests.
        When I spoke to you last year, I highlighted my concern for
    several issues that could challenge the security environment
    across the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Those challenges included
    responding to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief,
    dealing with an increasingly dangerous and unpredictable North
    Korea, a challenge that General Scaparrotti and I remain
    aligned in addressing, a continued escalation of complex
    territorial disputes, increasing regional transnational
    threats, and the complexity associated with China's continued
    rise. In the past year, these challenges have not eased. They
    will not go away soon. But, the Asia rebalance strategy has
    taken hold and is achieving intended goals.
        However, the greatest challenge remains the continual
    physical uncertainty resulting from sequestration. If the
    Budget Control Act of 2011 remains in force, the greatest
    challenge in the Indo-Asia-Pacific will be dealing with the
    consequences to the security of our National interests and to
    respond to a rapidly changing world. I echo the Secretary of
    Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the
    Service Chiefs' testimony before Congress. Our Nation is being
    forced into a resource-driven national security strategy
    instead of one properly resourced and driven by our enduring
    interests. In the Indo-Asia-Pacific, we are accepting more
    risk, not less. Sequestration will force harmful reductions in
    force size, structure, and readiness. It will reduce my ability
    to manage crisis space, provide options to the President, and
    diminishes United States prestige and credibility in the region
    and around the globe.
        In the last year, the great--at great expense to the
    readiness of the surge forces' position in the continental
    United States, PACOM has been able to maintain its forward
    forces focused on protecting the Homeland, deterring aggressors
    such as North Korea, strengthening alliances and partnerships,
    and developing the concepts and capabilities required remain
    dominant in a world that is growing in complexity with threats
    that continue to increase against a seemingly unending stream
    of constraints. Without adequate resources, we will be forced
    to make difficult choices today that will have strategic
    consequences to our future.
        I'd like to thank the committee for your continued interest
    and support. I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Locklear follows:]

           prepared statement by admiral samuel j. locklear iii, usn
        Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, and distinguished members, thank you
    for the opportunity to address the committee. This will be my fourth
    and final opportunity to provide an Indo-Asia-Pacific assessment since
    taking command of United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) in March
    2012. For over three years, I have had the extraordinary privilege to
    lead Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and civilians
    selflessly serving our nation. These dedicated men and women and their
    families are doing an amazing job and I am proud to serve alongside
    them.
        In concert with allies and partners, USPACOM balances historical
    and cultural factors against modern day political and economic events
    in an ever-evolving effort to manage friction and conflict in the most
    militarized region in the world. These actions are designed to defend
    the homeland, strengthen and modernize our alliances and partnerships,
    maintain access to areas of common interest, counter aggression,
    prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and defeat
    violent extremism.
        What follows is my assessment of the region's security environment,
    including the current and future challenges and opportunities for
    USPACOM forces. My testimony includes an update on major areas of
    concern in the security environment, allies and partners in the region,
    building and strengthening relationships, and maintaining an effective
    and assured presence.
                              security environment
        The Indo-Asia-Pacific remains one of the most dynamic regions on
    earth. It is vital to U.S. economic and security interests, and
    activities in the region will shape much of our nation's future. The
    region encompasses 52 percent of the earth's surface and is composed of
    83 percent water and 17 percent land. Over half of the people on the
    planet reside on that 17 percent of land, and by the middle of the
    century, the Indo-Asia-Pacific will potentially contain 70 percent of
    the world's population. This high population density coupled with
    destabilizing factors such as natural disasters, climate change,
    ideological radicalism, and population migration will continue to put
    immense pressure on regional governments. Contained in the thirty-six
    nations in USPACOM's area of responsibility are the world's two largest
    economies after the U.S. (China and Japan), and five smallest
    economies. The region also contains the world's most populous nation
    (China), the largest democracy (India), the largest Muslim-majority
    (Indonesia), and the smallest republic (Nauru). It contains seven of
    the ten largest standing militaries, five nuclear nations, and five of
    the U.S.'s seven mutual defense treaty alliances. The socioeconomic
    diversity and population density throughout the USPACOM area of
    responsibility (AOR) create strategic long-term challenges. These
    challenges include: political instability, social inequality, poverty,
    increased sensitivity to climate change and natural disasters, risk of
    pandemic disease, and epidemic drug use and distribution.
        In addition to these challenges, the U.S. must continue to deter
    North Korean provocation, ensure access to air and sea lanes, encourage
    peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes in the East
    and South China Seas, respond to natural disasters and theater health
    issues, check the flow of violent extremists from the Middle East to
    violent extremist organizations (VEOs) in the Indo-Asia-Pacific,
    address transnational crimes, monitor an increasingly active Russia,
    and constructively engage a rising China. Despite all of the
    challenges, the theater possesses opportunities for the U.S., its
    allies, and its partners. In order to capitalize on these
    opportunities, foster the region's economic potential, and provide the
    security and stability necessary to protect areas of common interest,
    USPACOM remains engaged.
        The Indo-Asia-Pacific requires stable political institutions to
    effectively govern and prosper. Overall, but with notable exceptions,
    the countries of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region are more politically
    stable than in previous years. The general health of democratic
    institutions across the region is evidenced by several critical
    leadership transitions which occurred last year. Successful, peaceful
    participatory elections occurred in India and Indonesia. Sri Lanka
    achieved a peaceful transition of power following its January election.
    Fiji took a major step toward moving past its 2006 military coup by
    holding elections last September. Citizens in many countries were able
    to peacefully protest without fear of oppressive action. While these
    activities are reassuring, challenges remain. For example, Thailand's
    military coup removed a democratically elected administration, and
    interim leaders have yet to restore a democratic government.
        North Korea: North Korea remains the most dangerous and
    unpredictable security challenge. The regime continues its aggressive
    attitude while advancing its nuclear capability and ballistic missile
    programs. While the international community continues to urge North
    Korea to live up to its international obligations and return to
    authentic credible negotiations under the Six-Party Talks framework,
    North Korea has unfortunately shown no willingness to seriously discuss
    its denuclearization commitments and obligations, and additional
    nuclear tests remain possible. It is expected that North Korea will
    continue to showcase ballistic missile development (to include mobile
    intercontinental ballistic missiles and intermediate range Musudan
    missiles) and conduct launches in direct violation of several United
    Nations Security Council Resolutions (such as the short-range ballistic
    missile launches in March 2015). North Korea already announced its
    intent to conduct ``annual and regular'' drills to advance this
    prohibited capability.
        Additionally, North Korea demonstrated the will to employ cyber
    techniques to impose costly damage to civilian companies, as was
    demonstrated in the high-profile attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment.
    North Korean cyber actors continue to conduct cyber actions against
    South Korean military and civilian networks. USPACOM remains concerned
    about the destructive nature of this state sponsored cyber-attack
    targeting a commercial entity and its employees in the United States.
    These actions demonstrate North Korea's disregard for international
    norms. North Korea's actions are beyond the bounds of acceptable state
    behavior in cyberspace.
        Territorial and Maritime Issues: Territorial and maritime issues in
    the East and South China Seas, if not handled properly, may negatively
    impact stability in the regional and the security environment. The
    claimants' use of maritime law enforcement vessels to enforce their
    claims has largely kept these issues out of the military sphere,
    despite a steady increase in military air and sea patrols. While no
    country appears to desire military conflict, an escalation due to a
    tactical miscalculation cannot be ruled out.
        In the East China Sea, Japan and China both claim sovereignty over
    the Senkaku Islands. While the United States does not take a position
    on ultimate sovereignty over the islands, it has long recognized
    Japanese administration of them. China's behavior in the area has
    resulted in close encounters at sea, aggressive Chinese air intercepts
    of Japanese reconnaissance flights, inflammatory strategic messaging,
    and the no-notice declaration of a Chinese Air Defense Identification
    Zone in the East China Sea.
        The South China Sea issues are complex. Six claimants (China,
    Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan, and the Philippines) have
    overlapping claims in the South China Sea. As the South China Sea
    claimants' populations and economies continue to grow, access to the
    oil, gas, minerals, and fisheries within the South China Sea becomes
    more important. Claimants appear to be asserting their claims through
    increased maritime patrols, outpost and facility construction, and land
    reclamation.
        China has the broadest claim with its self-proclaimed ``Nine-Dash
    line'' that covers almost the entire South China Sea. China's lack of
    clarity with regard to its South China Sea claims, and China's attempts
    to unilaterally enforce its ambiguous claims, has created uncertainty
    in the region. Any use of the nine-dash line by China to claim maritime
    rights not based on claimed land features would not align with
    international law. The international community would welcome China to
    clarify or adjust its nine-dash line claim and bring it into accordance
    with the international law of the sea, as reflected in the Law of the
    Sea Convention.
        To achieve its long-term goals in the region, China is executing a
    strategy that includes expanding outposts in contested areas through
    land reclamation on South China Sea features, taking actions to prevent
    other nations from establishing / maintaining outposts, exploring for
    natural resources in disputed waters, and increasing its naval and air
    forces' presence through exercises and patrols. China's aggressive land
    reclamation and construction projects at eight South China Sea military
    outposts include new buildings, more capable berthing space for ships,
    and presumably an airfield on the Fiery Cross Reef (China's largest
    reclamation project). Although land reclamation cannot, for example,
    change a submerged feature into a natural island that generates any
    legal entitlements to maritime zones, the completion of these projects
    will give China the ability for greater presence, increase dwell time
    for military and coast guard assets, and expand the areas covered by
    surveillance and area-denial systems. Examples of activities supporting
    China's long-term strategy include attempts to block resupply missions
    to the small Philippine garrison at Second Thomas Shoal and exclude
    Philippine and other fishermen from the disputed Scarborough Reef. Last
    year, China also moved a China National Offshore Oil Corporation
    drilling platform into Vietnam's claimed Exclusive Economic Zone
    resulting in a tense standoff between Vietnamese and Chinese maritime
    assets substantially increasing the possibility of miscalculation
    between the two countries.
        The U.S. does not take a position on issues of sovereignty with
    respect to territorial claims in the East and South China Sea, but we
    do insist that all maritime claims must be derived from land features
    in accordance with international law as reflected in the Law of the Sea
    Convention. The U.S. also continues to emphasize the importance that
    maritime and territorial disagreements be resolved peacefully in
    accordance with international law and opposes the use of intimidation,
    coercion, or force to assert claims. An example of such an attempt at
    peaceful resolution is the Philippines' arbitration against China under
    the Law of the Sea Convention that is being heard by a tribunal in The
    Hague. Of note, China has refused to participate in this arbitration to
    date.
        Natural Disasters: The Indo-Asia-Pacific accounted for over 40
    percent (1,690 incidences) of the world's reported natural disasters
    during the period between 2004 and 2013, and, because of the region's
    coastal population density, these disasters were particularly deadly,
    claiming more than 700,000 lives. The Pacific Rim's tectonic plate
    structure produces its well-known Ring of Fire, which regularly
    triggers earthquakes, volcanoes, and tsunamis. Weather extremes and
    anomalies continue to plague the region. Understanding the scope and
    severity of long-term climate change, unexpected climate shocks, and
    climate variability events such as El Nino are shared global
    challenges.
        In addition to seismic and climate challenges, areas of large
    populations, dense living conditions, and poor sanitary conditions in
    the region create optimal conditions for the rapid spread of human- or
    animal-borne diseases. To address these challenges, USPACOM focuses on
    pre-crisis preparedness with training and exercises. For example, many
    of the lessons learned and preparedness measures implemented after
    Typhoon Haiyan (Operation Damayan, November 2013) resulted in less
    damage and loss of life when Typhoon Hagupit passed over the
    Philippines last December. U.S. forces regularly train with allies and
    partners on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations and
    stand ready to respond in support of interagency partners to a natural
    disaster or the frequent vectors of disease that plague the region.
    Regional information sharing and rapid response to health crises are
    improving, but the danger remains high. USPACOM will continue to focus
    on improving pre-crisis preparedness and working with allies and
    partners in the region to ensure an effective response when an event
    occurs.
        Violent Extremism: The ongoing conflict in Syria and Iraq attracts
    foreign fighters from countries throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific.
    Current assessments indicate approximately 1,300 foreign personnel
    fighting alongside the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the
    Levant are from the Indo-Asia-Pacific. A small number of these combat-
    experienced fighters who return home could enhance the capability of
    regional extremist networks within the most densely populated areas of
    the world. In South Asia, partner nations maintain pressure on
    extremist networks but face a persistent threat from transnational
    groups that continue adapting to shifting geopolitical factors,
    competition among global extremist groups, and counterterrorism actions
    by the U.S. and its regional allies. Al-Qa'ida's increased rhetoric
    focused on South Asia and the announcement of a new affiliate, ``Al-
    Qa'ida in the Indian Subcontinent,'' suggest Al-Qai'da will focus
    resources on uniting established terrorist groups to engage in jihad in
    South Asia. Lashkar-e Tayyiba and other Pakistan-based groups continue
    fighting in Afghanistan, but they will likely shift some of their
    operational focus to the Indian Subcontinent in the next one to three
    years as Coalition forces drawdown. In Southeast Asia, regional
    partners maintain persistent pressure on extremist networks; however,
    competing security priorities in the region, coupled with the
    sensationalism of developments in the Middle East, have pressurized
    counter-terrorism attention. Extremist groups are increasingly
    interconnected and the region remains a potential safe haven,
    facilitation hub, and area of operations for extremists.
        Proliferation Issues: Rapidly developing technology manufacturing
    sectors in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region have in many states outpaced
    the concurrent development of those states' effective export controls.
    The region includes some of the busiest maritime and air ports in the
    world with shipments of proliferation concern likely passing through
    these ports almost daily. These shipments include dual-use items--
    commercial items controlled by the nuclear, ballistic missile, and
    chemical/biological weapons control regimes, others covered by
    associated catch all controls--manufactured in or re-exported from
    states with spotty export control enforcement. Iran built its robust
    nuclear infrastructure and advanced its ballistic missile systems with
    materials that passed through the USPACOM AOR; North Korea continues to
    procure for its nuclear and ballistic missile programs--and proliferate
    conventional arms for revenue generation--using a network of
    individuals and entities throughout the region. PACOM engages regional
    partners in capacity-building activities designed to improve export
    controls and interdiction capabilities in the region. In August 2014
    PACOM hosted personnel from 31 nations as part of the Proliferation
    Security Initiative (PSI) Exercise Fortune Guard, which marked the
    beginning of a six-year series of exercises that various ``expert''
    nations in the region will host. (New Zealand, Australia, Singapore,
    Japan, South Korea and the United States) Exercises such as Fortune
    Guard provide nations a forum to demonstrate the intention to act and
    share the best tactics against proliferators, emphasizing a whole-of-
    government approach to confront this complex challenge.
        Transnational Crime: There is a growing trend for regional human
    and drug trafficking organizations to operate as global enterprises. In
    addition to the devastating impact widespread drug use has on a
    society, the revenue generated from these illicit activities fund
    terrorists and Violent Extremist Organizations. Methamphetamine and
    amphetamine-type stimulants continue to be the primary drug threat in
    the USPACOM AOR. The majority of Methamphetamine available in the
    United States comes from Mexico, primarily across the South West Border
    Region, and an estimated 90 percent of the precursor chemicals used to
    produce Mexican Methamphetamine comes from China. Further, the annual
    volume of Methamphetamine seizures made along the United States South
    West Border Region has exceeded Cocaine seizures in the past three
    years.
        Nearly 21 million victims of human trafficking are estimated
    worldwide and nearly two-thirds are from Asia, with India, China,
    Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Thailand among the countries with the
    highest number of victims. Women and children--especially those from
    the lowest socioeconomic sectors--are the most vulnerable demographics.
    Roughly a quarter end up in the commercial sex trade, while others are
    forced into difficult and dangerous positions in factories, farms, or
    as child soldiers. Still others are bound to families as domestic
    servants. Human trafficking victims often suffer physical and emotional
    abuse and social stigmatization while being denied their basic human
    rights and fundamental freedoms. While awareness is rising, much
    remains to be done to combat this particularly heinous crime. USPACOM
    forces build partnership capacity and share intelligence in order to
    combat these transnational threats.
        Russian Intent: Russia is reasserting itself politically and
    militarily in the Pacific. In the USPACOM AOR, Russian Navy and Long
    Range Aviation operational tempo have recently increased significantly,
    but not above Cold War levels. Though challenged by maintenance and
    logistical issues, Russian Navy cruisers, destroyers and frigates have
    increased their operations and reach. The Russian Pacific Fleet sent
    ships to support operations in the Middle East and Europe, while
    Russian ships from the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets deployed into the
    Asia-Pacific. Russian BEAR bombers and reconnaissance aircraft
    regularly fly missions in the Sea of Japan and continue operations as
    far east as Alaska and the west coast of the continental U.S. The
    anticipated fielding later this year of Russia's newest class of
    nuclear ballistic missile submarine (Borei-class SSBN) and upgrades to
    Russia's land-based ballistic missiles will modernize Moscow's nuclear
    capability in the Asia-Pacific. Russian ballistic missile and attack
    submarines remain active in our region. Russia aims to demonstrate
    military capabilities commensurate with its Pacific interests: ensuring
    Russian sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction in the Asia-
    Pacific, strengthening its sphere of influence, and projecting a
    credible deterrent force.
        Chinese Military Modernization and Strategic Intent: Recent
    statements by senior PRC leaders, such as PRC President Xi Jinping,
    suggest that the PRC may be attempting to advance a vision for an
    alternative security architecture in Asia that affords Beijing
    increased influence in the region and diminishes the role of the United
    States. This Chinese view was highlighted in Shanghai last summer at
    the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia.
    At the conference, President Xi Jinping called on all of Asia to
    support the development of a new security order centered on China. The
    proposed new order also requires a curtailment of alliance-
    strengthening diplomacy, of which the ``U.S. Rebalance to Asia'' is
    noted as the greatest offender. China is proposing an alternative
    strategy to regional security issues where the U.S. plays, at best, a
    deferential role.
        China is engaged in a comprehensive military modernization program
    to transform its forces into a high-tech military capable of conducting
    complex operations. Many of China's initiatives are intended to develop
    capabilities to deter or counter third-party intervention in regional
    contingencies. These anti-access/area denial (A2AD) capabilities are
    focused on controlling access and freedom of operations in vast
    portions of the air and maritime domains, as well as space and
    cyberspace. These include a series of sophisticated and increasingly
    long-range anti-ship cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, air-to-air
    and air-to-ground missiles, and kinetic and non-kinetic counter-space
    systems. China is also making significant advances in electronic
    warfare capabilities, which are contributing to the A2AD challenge.
        China continues an aggressive ship building program to produce and
    field advanced frigates, destroyers, and the first in-class cruiser-
    sized warship. Chinese shipyards are also producing newer, more capable
    submarines as they inactivate older submarines, resulting in a fleet
    that is not growing substantially in number but is significantly more
    capable. Advances in China's strategic capabilities remain significant.
    China now has three operational JIN-class ballistic missile submarines
    (Type 094), and up to five more may enter service by the end of the
    decade. The JIN-class submarine carries the JL-2 submarine launched
    ballistic missile with a range capable of reaching the U.S. and will
    give China its first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent. Nuclear
    deterrence patrols will likely commence this year. Lastly, we expect
    China to soon begin constructing an indigenous aircraft carrier.
        China is using computer network exploitation capabilities to
    support intelligence collection to advance its defense and high-tech
    industries. Through a sophisticated cyber program, China is generating
    insights on U.S. security policies, defense networks, logistics, and
    military capabilities.
        As the Chinese military modernizes its capabilities and expands its
    presence in Asia, U.S. forces are drawn into closer and more frequent
    contact and the risk of an accident or miscalculation increases. This
    places a premium on efforts to increase mutual understanding and trust
    in order to reduce risk. The Chinese Navy is more frequently operating
    in the Indian Ocean, expanding the area and duration of operations and
    exercises in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, and periodically
    venturing into other non-traditional areas, as exemplified by recent
    port visits to Europe. The complexity of the regional and global
    security environment, as well as China's military advancements,
    necessitates a continuous dialogue between the U.S. and Chinese
    militaries to expand practical cooperation where national interests
    converge and discuss areas where goals diverge, especially during
    periods of friction.
                              allies and partners
        The U.S.' five treaty allies in the Indo-Asia-Pacific are:
    Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Philippines, and Thailand. In
    addition to U.S. treaty alliances, the U.S. continues to strengthen
    existing partnerships and build new relationships to advance common
    interests and address shared concerns. U.S. allies and key partners in
    the theater play a fundamental role in addressing the security
    challenges. Strengthening and modernizing alliances and partnerships is
    a top USPACOM priority.
        Australia: Australia continues to be a close, steadfast, and
    effective ally in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. The alliance anchors peace and
    stability in the region, and Australia has taken a leading role in
    addressing regional security and capacity-building issues, including
    lead roles in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief events.
    Australia is also a key contributor to global security, including
    counter-ISIL efforts in Iraq and the Resolute Support mission in
    Afghanistan. With the ongoing implementation of the Force Posture
    Initiatives, which provide expanded opportunities for bilateral and
    multilateral engagement, the Marine Rotational Force-Darwin
    successfully completed its third rotation while increasing its presence
    from 250 to 1,177 U.S. Marines. The U.S. Air Force is increasing its
    rotation of aircraft to Australia. In addition to the Force Posture
    Initiatives, the U.S. and Australia are identifying additional
    opportunities to increase collaboration in counter-terrorism, space,
    cyber, and integrated air missile defense and regional capacity
    building. Australia is procuring a number of high-tech platforms that
    will increase interoperability such as the F-35 Lightning II, P-8
    Poseidon, C-17 Globemaster III, and EA-18G Growler aircraft as well as
    Global Hawk UAVs and MH-60R helicopters. To ensure greater
    synchronization and integration, the Australian Government provides a
    General Officer and a Senior Executive to USPACOM, as well as another
    General Officer to U.S. Army Pacific, as tangible examples of a mutual
    commitment to the alliance.
        Japan: The U.S.-Japan alliance remains strong and productive
    through both countries' shared commitment to a full range of military
    capabilities with expanding responsibility for training, exercises,
    interoperability, and bilateral planning. Japan's 2013 National
    Security Strategy and the 1 July 2014 cabinet decision on collective
    self-defense are positive developments and indicators of Japan's
    ability and willingness to assume a greater role in the regional
    security architecture. The Abe administration will submit implementing
    legislation to the National Diet during its spring session, and debate
    is expected to conclude in summer 2015. The US-Japan Guidelines for
    Defense Cooperation are being revised, and that process will conclude
    with public presentation of the Guidelines in the near future. We are
    hopeful that Japan's upcoming legislative changes support new and
    expanded forms of cooperation.
        U.S. Forces Japan continues to build its close relationship with
    the Japanese Joint Staff to enhance interoperability and information
    sharing through realistic training, exercises, and bilateral planning.
    USPACOM will continue to maintain a robust military presence in Japan
    to meet future security challenges and encourage greater trilateral
    military engagements with the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Australia.
        Efforts continue toward improving US-Japan-ROK trilateral
    coordination in response to North Korean provocative behavior. The
    December 2014 signature of the US-Japan-ROK Trilateral Information
    Sharing Arrangement is a positive first step toward greater information
    sharing on North Korean missile and nuclear threats.
        As Japan increases its defense spending, it is procuring a number
    of high-tech platforms that will increase interoperability such as the
    F-35 Lightning II aircraft, MV-22 Ospreys, and the Global Hawk UAV, as
    well as upgrading existing AEGIS destroyers with the latest BMD
    capability and constructing two additional AEGIS destroyers (for a
    total of eight BMD capable platforms). Each North Korean ballistic
    missile provocation validates the investment of the AN/TPY-2 radars in
    Japan to provide ISR against missile threats. Last year's addition of
    the second radar in Japan and forward deploying two additional BMD
    capable ships will enhance our ability to defend our ally and the
    region, as well as provide early warning of missile threats to the U.S.
    homeland. Lastly, Japan continues to make significant infrastructure
    investments in country that complement the realignment of U.S. Marines
    from Okinawa to Guam including expanding the airfield and associated
    facilities at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni and construction of the
    Futenma Replacement Facility. It is important that these initiatives
    remain on track.
        Philippines: The U.S.-Philippine alliance remains a positive source
    of strength and regional stability. Building upon the 1951 Mutual
    Defense Treaty, the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)
    between the U.S. and the Government of the Philippines was signed last
    April. Through enhanced U.S. rotational presence, the EDCA provides
    expanded opportunities to conduct theater security cooperation
    activities and supports the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) as it
    shifts focus from internal security to external defense. Full EDCA
    implementation awaits the outcome of a case before the Philippine
    Supreme Court, where deliberations could last into this summer.
        After more than a decade, the Joint Special Operations Task Force
    created to counter Violent Extremist Organizations in the Philippines
    will stand down and the AFP will sustain that mission. Training and
    advising objectives that were set to address organizations such as the
    Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah Islamiyah have been met. Although the Task
    Force is standing down, a small USPACOM footprint will remain embedded
    in the Philippines to continue working with the AFP leadership and
    planning staffs. The AFP has demonstrated an increased capacity and
    capability to handle domestic threats inside their country, but USPACOM
    will remain committed to supporting and advising the AFP at the
    operational level.
        Competing claims in the South China Sea continue to be a source of
    friction and instability. China continues large-scale land reclamation
    around disputed features. Furthermore, periodic resupply and troop
    rotations to the small Philippine outpost at Second Thomas Shoal (also
    known as Ayungin Shoal) are well-known points of contention with the
    Chinese government.
        Republic of Korea: The U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance
    remains strong and vital, and enduring for over six decades. Our
    militaries integrate complementary capabilities and enhance the
    relationship with honest and frank dialogue. During the most recent
    annual discussions, the U.S. and ROK made arrangements to delay wartime
    operational control transfer and adopt a conditions-based approach,
    rather than a calendar-based deadline. The U.S. and ROK intend to
    modernize the alliance to better inform the development or acquisition
    of Alliance capabilities required to address future threats from North
    Korea.
        USPACOM will continue to work with the ROK to address the North
    Korean threat. North Korea continues to be a challenge due to
    provocations and uncertainty, which are viewed as a threat to peace and
    stability in the region. The ability to rapidly respond to aggression
    with combined U.S.-ROK-Japan capabilities is the best way to ensure
    deterrence and maintain regional stability. Trilateral cooperation will
    improve each participant's understanding of the mutual challenges and
    shared opportunities that exist in and around the Korean Peninsula.
        Thailand: As Thailand is the oldest U.S. treaty partner (182
    years), the U.S. values its friendship with the people of Thailand. The
    Thai military's decision to suspend its constitution and assume control
    of the civilian government has impacted that relationship. Military
    engagements and exercises have been appropriately adjusted in a whole
    of government response to the coup, pending a return to a
    democratically-elected government. USPACOM will continue to demonstrate
    commitment to the U.S.' ally while reinforcing democratic values and
    ideals. The annual COBRA GOLD exercise co-sponsored with the Royal Thai
    Armed Forces is an important multi-lateral warfighting training event.
    This year's exercise was significantly limited in scope and scale in
    response to the Thai coup, and heavily focused on humanitarian
    assistance activities.
        India: Last year, India held the largest election in its history.
    With new leadership in place, India is energizing the U.S.-India
    strategic partnership. Prime Minister Modi has focused India's foreign
    policy on building strong regional cohesion in South Asia. India's two
    decade-long ``Look East Policy'' has resulted in growing partnerships
    with Southeast Asian countries.
        The U.S. military remains heavily engaged with New Delhi's
    military, having conducted 69 major exercises in the past five years.
    The Indian Navy continues its strong participation in multilateral
    exercises including INDRA with Russia, MALABAR with the U.S. and Japan,
    and RIMPAC with 23 navies from across the Indo-Asia-Pacific. India's
    participation in these exercises signals their commitment as a regional
    security provider. Additionally, over the past three years the U.S. has
    been India's largest defense trading partner. Through military
    modernization, robust defense trade (C-17s, C-130Js, and P-8Is, among
    other items), and a growing network of defense partnerships, India is
    asserting its role as an important regional actor determined to protect
    common interests and ensure free access to economically vital sea
    lanes, although with respect to military activities, India still
    asserts a security interest in its EEZ that does not conform to the law
    of the sea.
        Indonesia: Indonesia is a capable security partner in Southeast
    Asia, and is increasingly focused on its role as a regional power,
    which USPACOM continues to support as a main pillar of mil-mil
    engagement. Presidential elections last July demonstrated a commitment
    to democratic principles, and the August opening of Indonesia's new
    Peace and Security Center to train regional partners on peacekeeping
    operations reinforces its position as a leader in security assistance.
    A growing area of cooperation with Indonesia is defense trade, which
    includes the sale of AH-64E Apache helicopters and initial delivery of
    F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft. Indonesia remains concerned about
    maintaining security and stability in the South China Sea. While their
    Chief of Defense has articulated a zero-war policy in the South China
    Sea, there are signs they are increasingly concerned over China's so-
    called nine dash line overlapping with part of their claimed EEZ. While
    Indonesia continues a foreign policy rooted in the Non Aligned
    Movement, USPACOM has seen significant gains in security cooperation
    activities. Indonesia will continue to balance its partnership with the
    U.S. with other nations such as Russia and China, but security
    cooperation with the U.S. remains a top priority.
        New Zealand: New Zealand is a respected voice in international
    politics and a recognized leader in Oceania that shares common security
    concerns with the U.S., such as terrorism, transnational crime, and
    maritime security. Military-to-military relations and defense
    engagements with New Zealand continue to improve, and the U.S. and New
    Zealand executed the second series of annual bilateral defense
    dialogues last year. New Zealand's establishment of a Consulate General
    in Honolulu has also provided additional opportunities for USPACOM and
    New Zealand to engage on issues of mutual interest. This new Consulate
    General addition to Hawaii is timely as the U.S. celebrates the 100th
    Anniversary of ANZAC with New Zealand and the Australians this year.
        Oceania: Maintaining our close partnerships in Oceania is important
    to national security. The Compacts of Free Association with the
    Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands,
    and the Republic of Palau are important agreements that guide the
    relationships. The U.S. defense obligations to these nations are
    reflected in our defense planning and preparation. In return, these
    compact agreements provide assured access to the three Compact Nations
    and their associated 5.5 million square kilometers of Pacific in a
    contingency situation. They also give the U.S. authority to grant or
    deny access to another nation's military forces, which allows the
    maintenance of a clear strategic line of communication across the
    Pacific. The U.S.'s continued commitment to defend the Compact Nations
    and to partner with other Pacific island countries sends a strong
    message throughout the region and reinforces its commitment to the
    Pacific Rebalance.
        Fiji currently has its first democratically elected government
    since its military coup in 2006. In 2015, Fiji will re-enter into
    regional forums (e.g., Pacific Island Forum) and have new opportunities
    for engagement with the U.S. Several other countries (Papua New Guinea,
    the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu) may face government reorganizations
    over the next year. These events may set back specific projects but
    will not likely impact stability or affect overall U.S. engagement.
        Climate change will continue to be an important issue across the
    Oceania region. This year's forecasted El Nino event will likely result
    in drought and increased tropical cyclone activity. The Republic of
    Marshall Islands will almost certainly face water shortage resulting in
    requests for aid or disaster declarations under a subsidiary agreement
    to the Amended Compact of Free Association. Fiji, Kiribati, the
    Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, and Tonga will
    likely face similar situations. The December 2014 United Nations
    Climate Change Conference addressed the impact of rising sea levels--a
    keen interest to Pacific Island Nations.
        Singapore: Singapore continues its important role in regional
    security initiatives. Singapore's role as a `Major Security Cooperation
    Partner' is underscored by longstanding support of U.S. naval forces.
    For example, USS Freedom completed a ten month deployment in 2013, and
    USS Fort Worth is currently on a 16 month deployment. These forward
    forces contribute to naval readiness and partner capacity building and
    enable rapid response to many crises, including Operation Damayan in
    the Philippines and Air Asia recovery efforts. Additionally,
    Singapore's Changi Naval Base remains a key enabler to providing
    critical support to the USS Fort Worth and other forward operating
    forces.
        U.S.-China: In light of an increasingly complex regional and global
    security environment, including advances in China's military
    capabilities and its expanding military operations and missions, the
    overall U.S. approach to China calls for a continuous dialogue between
    the armed forces of both countries to expand practical cooperation
    where national interests converge and to constructively manage
    differences through sustained and substantive dialogue. As a key
    element, the U.S.'s military engagement with China, within the
    guidelines of the 2000 NDAA, benefits the region, improves
    transparency, and reduces risk of unintended incidents, contributing to
    overall regional stability. The U.S. military has increased the depth
    of engagement with China in recent years and executed over 50 bilateral
    and numerous multilateral engagements last year. While these
    engagements are critical to improving transparency and reducing risk,
    the U.S. military must continue to take a pragmatic approach as the
    U.S. attempts to help integrate China into the existing security
    architecture. China's military investments, including A2AD
    capabilities, focused on the ability to control access and deny freedom
    of operations in vast portions of the air, maritime, space, and
    cyberspace domains raise concerns. The U.S. will need more transparency
    and understanding of Chinese intentions in order to minimize friction
    and avoid miscalculation or conflict in the future. Absent greater
    transparency from China, its ambiguous dashed-line claim, military
    modernization efforts and aggressive land reclamation in the South
    China Sea have significant implications for regional stability and the
    current security architecture.
        Over the past year, the U.S. and China have agreed to mechanisms
    such as the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) on Notification of
    Major Military Activities and Rules of Behavior (RoB) for Safety of Air
    and Maritime Encounters, designed to underscore and reinforce existing
    international law and standards while improving transparency, building
    trust, and reducing risk of unintended incidents. The surface-to-
    surface encounters annex of the RoB CBM was signed last year and the
    air-to-air annex is scheduled to be completed by the end of this year.
    These new Rules of Behavior are non-binding and capture existing legal
    rules and standards. Additionally, the U.S. and China continue to use
    the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement meetings to discuss safety
    in the maritime domain and avoid crises. As China continues to grow its
    military capacity and capability and operate further from its
    territory, these mechanisms become more important.
        Both militaries have had success addressing areas of common
    interest, such as counter piracy, military medicine, and HA/DR. Some of
    the most successful engagements were focused on military medical
    cooperation and shared health concerns. For example, the USPACOM
    surgeon hosted Chinese counterparts in Hawaii and Washington, DC, which
    resulted in concrete opportunities for continued military medical
    cooperation focused on Disaster Response, Pandemic and Emerging
    Infectious Diseases, and Soldier Care. In January 2015, the PLA hosted
    the USPACOM Surgeon and component surgeons for a highly successful
    reciprocal visit. Demonstrating China's increasing ability to operate
    beyond the Western Pacific and a successful engagement on an area of
    common concern, last December, U.S. and Chinese ships conducted counter
    piracy exercises in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa.
    China's participation in international efforts to address these
    problems and to operate and exercise with the U.S. and its allies and
    partners in a manner consistent with international law and standards is
    welcomed.
                    building and strengthening relationships
        The future security and prosperity of the Indo-Asia-Pacific depends
    upon building bilateral and multilateral relationships. Strong
    relationships, facilitated by a U.S. forward presence, advance common
    interests and address shared threats. USPACOM strengthens relationships
    with U.S. allies and partners through security cooperation and capacity
    building, bilateral and multilateral approaches, and senior leader
    engagement.
        Security Cooperation and Capacity Building: USPACOM enhances
    interoperability and information sharing with allies and partners in
    order to cooperatively address regional challenges. USPACOM's Security
    Cooperation approach is focused on building partner readiness,
    assisting with partner capability gaps, identifying partner shortfalls,
    and addressing the most critical capacity shortfalls. Last year,
    USPACOM identified C4ISR as a top priority for Security Cooperation
    with the Republic of Korea (ROK) and contributed to the U.S. supporting
    the ROK purchase of Global Hawk--a High Altitude UAV platform that will
    help close the gap in some of the security challenges on the Korean
    Peninsula. Supporting USPACOM's approach to addressing partner
    capability and capacity shortfalls will reduce risk, effectively use
    Security Cooperation and Assistance resources, and maintain the
    momentum to bring the right capabilities into the AOR.
        As mentioned earlier, the progress the Republic of the Philippines
    continues to make in addressing violent extremists groups inside their
    country is a testament to building capacity in USPACOM's foreign
    internal defense efforts. USPACOM is also building capacity to counter
    drug trafficking in the AOR through Joint Interagency Task Force--West
    (JIATF-W) engagements with China. Through a partnership with the
    Internal Revenue Service, JIATF-W has leveraged Department of Defense
    counternarcotic authorities to open up an additional avenue of
    cooperation with Chinese officials by providing anti-money laundering
    training linked to counterdrug efforts. These efforts are only just
    beginning, but show promise in improving communication, cooperation,
    and information sharing on significant criminal enterprises operating
    in both the U.S. and China.
        Lastly, increasing international representation at the USPACOM
    headquarters has improved collaboration with allies and partners and
    created a more agile and effective command and control architecture.
    The new USPACOM model integrates sixteen foreign exchange officers and
    liaison officers from six countries and facilitates a seamless
    transition from routine business to crisis. Included in these numbers
    are three foreign exchange Flag Officers and Senior Executives in key
    billets on the USPACOM staff.
        Bilateral and Multilateral Approaches: With the exception of North
    Korea, USPACOM continues to build and strengthen bilateral
    relationships with all of the nations in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. USPACOM
    maintains a close link with the five U.S. treaty allies and other
    partners in the region through a series of formal bilateral mechanisms.
    In Australia, key engagements stem from the ANZUS treaty obligations,
    guided by USPACOM's premier bilateral event with Australia, the
    Military Representatives Meeting. Similarly, USPACOM's military to
    military relationship with Japan is guided annually by the Japan Senior
    Leader Seminar, which USPACOM utilizes to ensure the bond with Japan
    remains strong. USPACOM continues to rely on the alliance with the
    Republic of Korea to maintain peace and stability in Northeast Asia,
    and the annual Military Committee and Security Consultative Meetings
    are the preeminent bilateral mechanism to guide this alliance forward.
    Each year, USPACOM co-hosts the Mutual Defense Board and Security
    Engagement Board with the Armed Forces of the Philippines to discuss
    ways this critical alliance can modernize to meet 21st-century
    challenges. Lastly, USPACOM depends on annual Senior Staff Talks with
    Thailand to address shared regional security concerns while reinforcing
    U.S. commitment to democratic principles.
        Similar bilateral mechanisms exist with partners throughout the
    USPACOM AOR, including Bilateral Defense Discussions with Indonesia,
    Vietnam, and others, as USPACOM continues to foster bilateral ties to
    enhance regional stability. Bilateral mechanisms with allies and
    partners form the strategic foundation of the security architecture
    that ensures peace and stability while defending U.S. interests in the
    Indo-Asia-Pacific.
        While bilateral mechanisms remain important, USPACOM continues to
    emphasize multilateral approaches. USPACOM works with regional forums
    such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to encourage
    multilateral relationships that build trust, prevent misperceptions
    that can lead to conflict, and reinforce international standards of
    conduct. For example, USPACOM arranges an annual Chiefs of Defense
    (CHOD) Conference as its premier multilateral engagement tool for
    candid discussions with 20-plus Chiefs of Defense in the region. Each
    year the CHOD Conference alternates between USPACOM and a co-host
    country; Brunei hosted last year's successful conference. The 2015 CHOD
    Conference will be held in Hawaii and is designed to promote
    multilateral cooperation and provide a forum for the theater's military
    leaders to share regional and global perspectives on common challenges.
    USPACOM also participated in other multilateral events in the region,
    such as the Fullerton Forum and Shangri-La Dialogue, to encourage
    multilateral solutions to shared challenges, as well as provide a venue
    for continued dialogue and strengthening security partnerships in the
    region.
        One of the most important multilateral forums in the theater is
    ASEAN. The ten member states in ASEAN, under the chairmanship of Burma
    last year and Malaysia this year, seek to improve multilateral security
    activities and advance stability in the Indo-Asia-Pacific.
    Approximately $5.3 trillion of global trade ($1.2 trillion is U.S.)
    passes through ASEAN waterways each year. The ten member states of
    ASEAN form the fourth largest U.S. export market and fifth major trade
    partner. ASEAN continues to address common threats in the region
    including Maritime Security, Terrorism, Transnational Crimes, Cyber
    Security, and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response. ASEAN
    demonstrated during past disasters, such as Typhoon Haiyan and the
    Malaysian Flight 370 search operations, that practical cooperation
    among member states can enable civilian and military agencies to be
    more effective and efficient.
        Last April, Defense Secretary Hagel hosted the ten ASEAN Defense
    Ministers, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of
    Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA), and other non-government
    organizations in Hawaii to discuss disaster response and maritime
    security. UNOCHA hosted an Integrated Civil-Military Regional Response
    Planning Workshop for Large-Scale International Disaster Relief last
    October and the USPACOM staff will continue the maritime security
    dialogue by hosting a Maritime Domain Awareness discussion this May.
    USPACOM will continue supporting ASEAN as it builds regional tools and
    forums such as the ASEAN Economic Community by the end of 2015.
    Additionally, there is hope that the ASEAN members and China can
    conclude a binding and enforceable Code of Conduct mechanism for the
    South China Sea.
        The Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
    (APCSS) also contributes to multilateral engagements and rules-based
    security governance. Through its executive education courses,
    workshops, and sustained alumni engagement activities, the Center
    contributes to the USPACOM Theater Campaign Plan by building U.S. and
    partner nation capacities. Success stories include the APCSS-
    facilitated development of Papua New Guinea's first-ever national
    security policy, a framework for an Indonesian defense white paper, and
    Bangladesh's first comprehensive maritime security strategy proposal.
    Additionally, APCSS helped with the successful completion of Nepal's
    disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program for dealing with
    Maoist ex-combatants, and the signing of an inter-party agreement to
    overcome political crisis--both led by a core group of APCSS alumni.
        Senior Leader Engagement: USPACOM and its components leverage
    senior leader visits to increase dialogue on issues of shared concern,
    build and strengthen relationships, and convey U.S. commitment to the
    region. Each year, hundreds of senior military and government leaders
    address security challenges through counterpart visits which greatly
    enhance understanding, interoperability, and trust. Examples of senior
    leadership engagements in the Indo-Asia-Pacific over the past year
    include:
          The President attended the G-20 Summit in Australia, the
    Republic Day ceremony in India, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
    Forum in China, and the East Asia Summit in Burma.
          The President also increased engagements in the theater
    to strengthen alliances in the Republic of Korea, Japan, and the
    Philippines, and to deepen ties with Malaysia.
          The Secretary of State visited the Republic of Korea;
    China; and Indonesia. He also traveled to India for the 5th Strategic
    Dialogue Conference; to Burma for a series of ASEAN discussions;
    Australia for annual Ministerial Consultations; and the Solomon
    Islands.
          The Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense held a
    2+2 meeting with their ROK counterparts in Washington.
          The Secretary of Defense traveled to Japan for bilateral
    security discussions; Mongolia and Singapore for key leadership
    meetings; India for defense consultations; Australia for AUSMINs and to
    sign the Force Posture Agreement; and China for Confidence Building
    Measure discussions.
          The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs toured the Changi
    facilities in Singapore; participated in security and military
    discussions in Vietnam (first CJCS to visit since 1971); Australia for
    the Defense Chiefs Strategic Dialogue conference and bilateral events;
    and both Japan and the Republic of Korea for key counterpart visits.
        These senior leader engagements are critical to identifying
    opportunities and addressing security challenges in the region.
    Additionally, Congressional delegations to the theater are of
    significant benefit.
                         effective and assured presence
        Effective and assured presence of USPACOM forces is required to
    meet the challenges and opportunities within USPACOM's AOR. As
    strategic warning timelines decrease, early identification of potential
    crises is key to rapidly assessing and shaping events. It also places a
    premium on robust, modern, agile, forward-deployed forces, maintained
    at high levels of readiness. Assured presence is supported by posturing
    forward-deployed forces, fielding new capabilities and concepts,
    addressing critical gaps, and maintaining readiness in order to defend
    the homeland, strengthen and modernize our alliances and partnerships,
    maintain access in the air and maritime domains, counter aggression,
    and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
    violent extremism.
        Posture: Sustaining effective and forward presence begins with
    having the necessary military infrastructure and access to support
    forward-stationed and rotational forces. USPACOM's posture effectively
    communicates U.S. intent and resolve to safeguard U.S. national
    interests, strengthen alliances and partnerships, maintain an assured
    presence in the region, prevent conflict, and if necessary, respond
    rapidly and effectively across the full range of military operations.
        USPACOM faces three key challenges related to force posture. The
    first is operating in an AOR that covers 52 percent of the earth's
    surface. The vast distances complicate ISR, movement/maneuver, and
    sustainment, and require a geographically distributed force laydown to
    rapidly respond to crisis. The second challenge is the growth of
    military capabilities in the region. The Indo-Asia-Pacific is the most
    militarized region in the world. Maintaining the ability to defend
    strategic national security interests in an increasingly complex and
    lethal environment requires a force posture that is operationally
    resilient. Finally, expanding access to regions in South and Southeast
    Asia requires access and forward staging arrangements that are
    politically sustainable. In support of USPACOM's objectives, the
    military services and our allies and partners are making investments to
    improve U.S. force posture. Examples of these investments are:
          Construction in Iwakuni, Japan to allow a carrier air
    wing to relocate from Atsugi
          Expanding base facilities and capabilities in Okinawa for
    Futenma replacement
          Operationalizing Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement
    with the Philippines
          Expanding future capabilities through construction at
    Camp Humphreys, ROK
          Reinforcing Guam's munitions and fuels piers at Apra
    Harbor
          Implementing Force Posture Initiatives through troop
    rotations and, ultimately, facility upgrades and construction in
    Darwin, Australia
          Building hardened C2 and aircraft shelters at Andersen
    AFB, Guam
          Installing and fortifying fuel nodes, manifolds, and
    lines in Guam and Japan
          Implementing rotational forces through USFK
          Developing divert options and training ranges in the
    Northern Marianas Islands
          Dredging port facilities to requisite depths to allow
    pier operations in Naha, Japan
        These posture investments are part of USPACOM's holistic
    infrastructure investment strategy and are key to continued mission
    success.
        Much of the supporting infrastructure in the Pacific and on the
    West Coast of the U.S. mainland was established during World War II and
    during the early years of the Cold War. The infrastructure now requires
    investment to extend its service life. The military services continue
    to invest in sustainment, restoration, and modernization (SRM) to
    provide quality facilities to support service members and their
    families; however, during times of austere budgets, the military
    services struggle to maintain infrastructure SRM funding levels. These
    forced decisions undermine the significant investment in facilities
    made by DoD and Host Nation Funded Construction programs over past
    decades.
        Reduced SRM funding will negatively impact the ability to bring new
    forces and capabilities into the theater and maintain critical
    infrastructure. The U.S. and the theater benefit from the significant
    levels of investment made by allies and partners. For example, the
    Republic of Korea is significantly contributing to the cost of keeping
    U.S. Forces on the Korean Peninsula. The Government of Japan has
    committed up to $3.1 billion to help realign U.S. Marines from Okinawa
    to Guam and other locations and $4.5 billion to expand the airfield and
    associated facilities at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni.
        The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) Joint
    Military Training initiative (CJMT) is an important posture
    undertaking. CNMI remains strategically important as a forward and
    sovereign U.S. location with lease rights until 2033 and extendable to
    2083. When the U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative moves
    approximately 4,700 U.S. Marines from Japan to Guam, the CJMT will
    enable this U.S. Marine force to train and maintain operational
    readiness. Specifically on the island of Tinian, the CJMT initiative
    will provide live-fire ranges and training areas. The CJMT will
    optimize future training ranges for joint and combined exercises with
    allies and foreign forces. As a part of aviation resiliency
    initiatives, divert and alternate air fields are also being explored on
    the islands of Saipan and Tinian along with other locations in the
    broader Western Pacific.
        Forward Deployed Forces: The tyranny of distance, which defines the
    USPACOM AOR, requires forward deployed forces to engage with allies and
    partners, respond rapidly to crisis or contingencies, defend the
    homeland, and reinforce U.S. commitment to the region. To increase
    USPACOM's forward deployed forces and capabilities, the military
    services are:
          Rotationally deploying Navy Littoral Combat Ships into
    Singapore
          Forward deploying two additional ballistic missile
    defense-capable surface ships to Japan
          Increased deployments and rotations of E-8 JSTARS, E-3
    AWACS, and E-2D Advanced Hawkeye in theater
          Replacing the USS George Washington with the more capable
    USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier in Japan
          Installing an advanced radar in Australia
          Continuing to deploy and operate F-22s in theater
          Completing a second ballistic missile defense radar in
    Japan
          Stationing additional submarines in Guam
          Improving rotational force presence in the Philippines,
    Singapore, and Australia
        New Systems and Operating Concepts: Crafting new concepts and
    fielding new systems is fundamental to employing a credible force. For
    example, the military services are:
          Replacing P-3 maritime patrol aircraft with newer and
    more capable P-8s
          Deploying tilt rotor aircraft for Marines and Special
    Forces and new unmanned capabilities throughout the AOR
          Forward stationing High Speed Vessels and Mobile Landing
    Platforms in the USPACOM AOR
          Introducing Naval Integrated Fire Control--Counter Air
    Aegis Destroyers
          Expanding the U.S. Army Pacific Pathways deployment
    concept
          Preparing for F-35 Joint Strike Fighters deployment with
    maintenance hubs in Japan and Australia
        Addressing Critical Capability Gaps: The most technical, high-end
    military challenges are in the USPACOM AOR, and are growing. While many
    improvements to posture, forward deployed forces, capabilities, and
    concepts have been made to address these challenges, there are a number
    of mission sets and enablers that require continuous focus and
    attention. These include areas such as Undersea Warfare, Intelligence/
    Surveillance/Reconnaissance, space, battle management, command and
    control, cyber, munitions, Ballistic Missile Defense and Integrated Air
    and Missile Defense systems, and capacity shortfalls in theater
    enablers such as petroleum redistribution and lift.
        Undersea Warfare is a mission set that requires constant attention
    to maintain a decisive advantage. Of the world's 300 foreign
    submarines, roughly 200 are in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region; of which,
    150 belong to China, North Korea, and Russia. Countries operating these
    systems view the platforms as a mechanism to affect the balance of
    power in their favor. Even small navies that possess submarines hold a
    distinct advantage over a navy without the capability.
        There is a significant leap underway in the Indo-Asia-Pacific in
    undersea capability as newer submarines replace older variants. In the
    past few years, Singapore, India, Vietnam and Malaysia have all
    received modern diesel submarines and China is on a modernization path
    to improve the lethality and survivability of its attack submarines
    with the introduction of quiet, high-end, diesel-powered and nuclear-
    powered submarines. Russia is also modernizing its existing fleet of
    Oscar-class multi-purpose attack nuclear submarines (SSGNs) and
    producing their next generation Yasen-class SSGNs.
        In addition to attack submarines, there are important developments
    underway that will increase Chinese and Russian strategic deterrent
    patrol capability and capacity. China has three operational JIN-class
    ballistic missile submarines and up to five more may enter service by
    the end of the decade. Additionally, Russia is planning to field its
    newest Borei-class nuclear ballistic missile submarines in the Pacific
    later this year. Submarine detection and tracking is a complex problem
    set and will continue to be one of the most important functions of
    naval forces. A continued and sustained investment in the U.S. nuclear
    submarine force, advanced Undersea Warfare technologies, capabilities
    and capacity, and readiness is necessary to outpace the growing
    challenges.
        Persistent and deep-look ISR capabilities and supporting
    architecture are required to prevent strategic surprise, assess the
    security environment, and support actions that impose cost or defeat
    potential adversaries. Although ISR capacity and capabilities have
    increased, significant capacity issues remain. Efforts to mitigate ISR
    capacity issues, as well as develop new capabilities, are ongoing.
    Additionally, an ISR processing, exploitation, and dissemination
    enterprise that is interoperable and shared with Allies and Partners is
    important. Without a concerted effort to continue advancing U.S.
    capabilities, the U.S. risks missing key indications and warnings in an
    environment where situational awareness affects decision space.
        Satellite communications (SATCOM) is an essential enabler to
    exercise Command & Control (C2) and enabling ISR. Satellite space
    continues to grow increasingly congested and contested, and adversaries
    continue developing means to curtail access to space-enabled
    capabilities. A resilient space-based command, control, and ISR
    architecture remains a USPACOM priority.
        There is a growing need to sustain and modernize airborne early
    warning systems to execute multi-mission, multi-domain integrated
    command and control. The cruise missile, air, and UAV threats in the
    USPACOM AOR require robust, long range Battle Management, Command and
    Control (BMC2) and Wide-Area Surveillance (WAS) platforms capable of
    operating in a contested environment. Developing and modernizing the
    capabilities within the BMC2 and WAS platforms to track and operate in
    a communications contested or degraded environment is necessary to meet
    the challenges of future operational environments in the Pacific; these
    platforms must be interoperable with military services, partners, and
    allies.
        Related, the Joint Information Environment (JIE) increments I and
    II have the potential for consolidation of each military services'
    command, control, communication, and computers programs. JIE II will
    further strengthen collective cyber security and defense posture in the
    region, improve staff efficiency and support, and strengthen
    interagency and international relationships. JIE II will require an
    information infrastructure adaptable enough to accommodate multiple
    security classification levels with the interoperability and sharing
    capability to maximize mission effectiveness. JIE II is a necessary
    next step to mitigate the risk posed by persistent cyber threats. These
    threats continue to grow.
        Increased cyber capacity and use, especially by China, North Korea,
    and Russia, underscore the growing requirement to evolve our command,
    control, and operational structure authorities. In order to fully
    leverage the Cyber domain, Combatant Commanders require an enduring
    theater cyber operational command resourced to provide regional cyber
    planning, integration, synchronization, and direction of cyberspace
    forces. The theater cyber operational command will provide direction of
    operations against increasingly capable threats in coordination with
    USCYBERCOM, the interagency, and allies and partners. USPACOM sees a
    future where Joint Force Cyber Component Command (JFCCC) are aligned
    regionally under Combatant Commands. JFCCCs will provide staffing and
    expertise required to oversee persistent operations and defense of
    theater information networks, synchronization of cyber risk assessments
    and intelligence, and development of flexible cyber effects.
        Munitions are a critical component of combat effectiveness and
    readiness. A number of munitions improvements in lethality, production,
    and precision are required. There is a growing need for ship-to-ship
    and air-to-ship munitions to allow U.S. forces to defeat an aggressor
    from greater range. Specifically, there are troubling gaps in Anti-
    Surface Warfare capability and readiness that compel the accelerated
    fielding of a long range anti-ship missile. A long-range stand-off
    weapon, such as the Defense Advanced Research Programs Agency / Office
    of Naval Research developed Long Range Anti-Ship Missile, will meet the
    urgent need for an offensive anti-surface warfare capability against
    combatants in a contested environment. There is also a need for
    advancements in the air-to-air realm and for Hard Target Munitions
    capabilities to engage hardened targets that are growing in numbers and
    complexity. Area Effects Munitions are required to prevent open space
    aggression. Lastly, along with lethal munitions, non-lethal
    capabilities can prove equally valuable in supporting USPACOM's
    strategy and deterrence.
        With North Korea continuing to advance its ballistic missile
    capabilities, USPACOM will continue its efforts in maintaining a
    credible, sustainable ballistic missile defense. The recent deployment
    of long range second TPY-2 radar to Japan (December 2014) along with
    THAAD on Guam achieving full Fully Operational Capability further
    enhanced U.S. homeland defense capabilities which are required to
    protect key regional nodes from aggressive action. In addition, over
    the last year the U.S., Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Australia
    have had better coordination and information sharing. USPACOM looks
    forward to continuing our work with our regional IAMD partners and
    expanding our ballistic missile defense cooperation and information
    sharing.
        Equally important to having the right equipment and capabilities is
    the capacity of critical logistics. The time and distance required to
    move assets across the Pacific make it an imperative to preposition and
    secure munitions. Dedicated sealift must be adequately funded to
    posture munitions, fuel, and other supplies within theater. Agile,
    responsive, and sustained operations demand a resilient network of
    capabilities to deploy and sustain USPACOM forces. USTRANSCOM's
    prepositioning strategy has emphasized positioning equipment and
    materiel afloat to optimize flexibility, ensure rapid responses to
    crises, and provide force presence; however, USPACOM still does not
    have enough lift to satisfy all operational requirements.
        Readiness: Fundamental to USPACOM's mission is the ability to deter
    aggression and prevail in crisis. USPACOM's readiness is evaluated
    against its ability to execute operational and contingency plans, which
    places a premium on forward-deployed, ready forces that can exercise,
    train, and operate with our partner nations' militaries and follow-on
    forces able to respond to operational contingencies.
        USPACOM maintains forward-deployed ready forces as credible
    deterrents, to support and defend national security interests, and to
    provide assurance and protection to allies and partners. Forward
    deployed forces, west of the International Date Line, remain responsive
    and relevant to mitigating risk in the event of escalating regional
    security events and greatly benefit from training with allies and
    partners in a complex environment. Ready, forward-deployed forces
    increase decision space and decrease response time, bolster allies' and
    partners' confidence, and reduce the chance of miscalculation by
    potential adversaries. However, redistribution of global forces that
    lead to moving forces out of the Indo-Asia-Pacific diminishes USPACOM's
    impact and effectiveness. Additionally, short-notice redeployment of
    USPACOM's ready, forward deployed forces to fill emergent requirements
    to other areas of operation increases risk to our nation's Indo-Asia-
    Pacific interests and objectives.
        In addition to concerns with the forward deployed forces, there are
    troubling readiness trends associated with follow-on forces. The
    ability of the U.S. to surge and globally maneuver ready forces has
    historically been an asymmetric advantage that is now diminishing. Over
    the past year, the U.S. has been forced to prioritize the readiness of
    forward-deployed forces, at the expense of the readiness of follow-on-
    forces and critical investments needed to outpace emerging threats. A
    lack of ready surge forces resulting from high operational demands,
    delayed maintenance periods, and training limitations will limit
    responsiveness to emergent contingencies and greatly increases risk.
        Budget reductions and uncertainty directly impact operations and
    combat readiness. Fiscal constraints disrupt the predictable,
    persistent funding needed to organize, train, and equip a ready force.
    Fiscal uncertainty degrades and disrupts long-term engagement
    opportunities with strategic consequences to U.S. relationships and
    prestige. Resource pressures have triggered deferrals in exercises,
    operations, and senior leader engagement opportunities; have introduced
    regional doubt; and compound the risk to U.S. interests in the region.
    As the Service Chiefs recently testified, continuation of sequestration
    will further delay critical warfighting capabilities, reduce readiness
    of forces needed for contingency response, forego procurement of new
    platforms and weapon systems and further downsize weapons capacity . .
    . all of which are required for success in the USPACOM AOR. I am in
    full agreement with their assessments and remain deeply concerned about
    the growing risk to U.S. interests in the Indo-Asia-Pacific.
                                   conclusion
        It has been over three years since the President announced the U.S.
    Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. The Rebalance is focused on modernizing
    and strengthening treaty alliances and partnerships through cooperative
    agreements, building partner capacity, and increasing regional
    cooperation, interoperability, and security capabilities. From the
    military perspective, the U.S. is accomplishing what it set out to do
    and the Rebalance is working. However, fiscal uncertainty resulting
    from the Budget Control Act could arrest progress and place some
    initiatives at risk. Building on the positive momentum of the Rebalance
    to the Pacific is critical to protecting U.S. interests in the region.
    Thank you for your continued support to USPACOM and our men and women,
    and their families, who live and work in the Indo-Asia-Pacific.

        Chairman McCain. General Scaparrotti.

      STATEMENT OF GENERAL CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI, USA, COMMANDER,
      UNITED NATIONS COMMAND/COMBINED FORCES COMMAND/U.S. FORCES
                                 KOREA

        General Scaparrotti. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed,
    and distinguished members of the committee, I'm honored to
    testify today as the Commander of the United Nations Command,
    Combined Forces Command, and U.S. Forces Korea.
        On behalf of the servicemembers, civilians, contractors,
    and their families who serve our great Nation in the Republic
    of Korea, one of our most important allies, thank you for your
    support.
        I've prepared brief opening remarks, but I would like to
    ask that my written posture statement be entered into the
    record.
        Chairman McCain. Without objection.
        General Scaparrotti. Last year, I testified that the
    combined and joint forces of the United States and the Republic
    of Korea were capable and ready to deter and, if necessary,
    respond to North Korean threats and actions. Due to our
    accomplishments in 2014, I report to you that our strong
    alliance is more capable of addressing the rapidly evolving and
    increasingly asymmetric North Korean threat.
        In recent years, North Korea has aggressively developed and
    utilized asymmetric capabilities, such as cyber warfare,
    nuclear weapons, and ballistic missiles, to advance its
    interests. To put this in perspective over time, in 2012 my
    predecessor noted North Korea's advancements in cyber and
    nuclear capabilities during his opening statement to this
    committee. A year later, North Korea conducted cyber attacks on
    South Korea's banks and broadcasting stations. And in 2014,
    they boldly projected their cyber capabilities against Sony
    Pictures in the United States, in an effort to inflict economic
    damage and pressure--and suppress free speech. This example
    represents a trend that is persistent across several North
    Korean asymmetric capabilities.
        My top concern is that we will have little to no warning of
    a North Korean asymmetric provocation which could start a cycle
    of action and counteraction leading to unintended escalation.
    This underscores the need for an alliance to--for the alliance
    to maintain a high level of readiness and vigilance.
        Last year, the alliance took significant steps in improving
    its capabilities and capacities to deter aggression and to
    reduce its operational risk. But, our work is not done. In
    2015, we will maintain this momentum by focusing on my top
    priority: sustaining and strengthening the alliance, with an
    emphasis on our combined readiness. This includes ensuring the
    rapid flow of ready forces into Korea in the early phases of
    hostilities and improving ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance] capabilities in critical munitions.
        Mr. Chairman, the return of sequestration would negatively
    impact these priorities, reduce readiness, and delay deployment
    of the forces required to defend the Republic of Korea and U.S.
    interests. In crisis on the Peninsula, this will result in more
    military and civilian casualties for the Republic of Korea and
    the United States, and potentially place the mission at risk.
        The men and women serving on freedom's frontier, defending
    the Republic of Korea, remain thankful for this committee's
    unwavering support in prioritizing resources that enable us to
    defend our national interests in Asia while advancing universal
    values and international order. I'm extremely proud of our
    servicemembers, civilians, and their families serving in the
    Republic of Korea, who never lose sight of the fact that we are
    at freedom's frontier, defending one of our most important
    allies and vital American interests.
        Thank you. And I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Scaparrotti follows:]

     prepared statement of general curtis m. scaparrotti commander, united
     nations command; commander, united states-republic of korea combined
     forces command; and commander, united states forces korea before the
                 senate armed services committee april 16, 2015
                                1. introduction
        Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee, I am
    honored to testify as the Commander of the multinational United Nations
    Command (UNC), the combined United States-Republic of Korea (ROK)
    Combined Forces Command (CFC), and the joint United States Forces Korea
    (USFK). Thank you for your support of our Service Members, Civilians,
    Contractors, and their Families who serve our great nation and the
    U.S.-ROK Alliance. The Asia-Pacific region is critical to our nation's
    security and prosperity, and the U.S.-ROK Alliance is indispensable to
    the stability that enables the region to thrive despite serious threats
    and challenges. The men and women of this Command are committed every
    day to each other, our mission, and our nation's calling. We are very
    proud of our partnership with the Republic of Korea and of our
    contributions to stability and prosperity in Korea and the region. The
    U.S.-ROK Alliance is one of history's most successful alliances, and we
    are confident that we can further enhance it to serve both of our
    nations.
        Last year, I testified that the Alliance is strong, but that we
    would not become complacent in our daily mission to deter and defend
    against the North Korean threat. I also stated that we would face
    challenges and opportunities in adapting the Alliance to that threat.
    Mr. Chairman and distinguished members, I report to you that the
    Alliance is even stronger today due to our accomplishments in 2014. In
    2015, we will build on that momentum based on four guiding Command
    priorities.
          Sustain and Strengthen the Alliance.
          Maintain the Armistice. Be Ready to ``Fight Tonight'' to
    Deter and Defeat Aggression.
          Transform the Alliance.
          Sustain the Force and Enhance the UNC/CFC/USFK Team.
                      2. alliance accomplishments in 2014
        In 2014, the United States and the Republic of Korea took
    significant steps to improve our overall readiness and the strength of
    the Alliance. We started the year with the annual KEY RESOLVE exercise
    in February-March, followed by the ULCHI FREEDOM GUARDIAN exercise in
    August. These annual exercises, along with my personal visits to ROK
    and U.S. units throughout South Korea, helped me confirm our strengths
    and note some areas we must improve. The Command's greatest strength
    rests in the close, collaborative, and cooperative working relationship
    with not only our ROK ally, but with the larger United Nations Command
    team.
        The strength and importance of the Alliance were highlighted last
    April by our two Presidents' first visit to CFC. President Park praised
    the close relationship of the Alliance in the steadfast defense of the
    Republic of Korea. President Obama called the Alliance ``special,
    forged on the battlefield'' and commented that we are ``more than
    allies--we are friends.'' He also noted that it is ``this foundation of
    trust . . . that allows both our nations to thrive economically and
    socially.''
        In 2014, we made progress on two initiatives against the growing
    North Korean missile threat. We further developed our comprehensive
    Tailored Deterrence Strategy (TDS) to counter the North Korean missile
    and WMD threats. We also concluded the ``Concepts and Principles for
    Comprehensive Alliance Counter-Missile Operations,'' with a ``4D
    Strategy'' to detect, defend, disrupt, and destroy North Korean
    missiles. This important step will help us gain important synergies and
    efficiencies, not only in terms of the capabilities each nation
    develops, but how we use these capabilities operationally.
        Over the past year, our drive to strengthen the Alliance has
    improved our combined readiness. For example, the U.S. Army began and
    the U.S. Air Force continued to deploy forces to Korea on a rotational
    basis. This added commitment complemented units based in Korea,
    improving overall readiness. Additionally, the ROK Army and Air Force
    participated in National Training Center and Red Flag exercises in the
    United States. These challenging exercises improved the Alliance's
    interoperability and transformed air crews into seasoned veterans.
        South Korea made progress in enhancing future warfighting and
    interoperability capabilities by taking steps toward procuring Patriot
    Advanced Capability missiles, F35 Joint Strike Fighters, and RQ-4
    Global Hawk Surveillance Aircraft. Once integrated into our Alliance
    force structure, these systems will enhance the capabilities of our
    Alliance.
        We also agreed to establish a U.S.-ROK Combined Division in wartime
    with a functioning combined staff during Armistice. Once in place later
    this year, the division will enhance our combined combat posture at the
    tactical level.
        We signed the five-year Special Measures Agreement which
    established the sharing of costs for stationing U.S. forces in South
    Korea. ROK contributions through the SMA help maintain the Alliance's
    readiness and infrastructure to support U.S. forces.
        We ended the year with the signing of a much needed trilateral
    information-sharing arrangement between the United States, South Korea,
    and Japan. Under this arrangement, our two closest allies in the region
    can share classified information related to the nuclear and missile
    threats posed by North Korea. Our strategic and military initiatives in
    2014 comprise what we call a ``Quality Alliance.'' We continue to use
    this concept to focus on military qualities and capabilities, and to
    provide a framework and context to align senior leadership decision-
    making.
                            3. strategic environment
        Our accomplishments last year advanced U.S. security and
    prosperity, which are inextricably linked to stability in the Asia-
    Pacific region. In the 21st century, the Asia-Pacific region is
    expected to serve as an engine of the global economy, grow in political
    influence, and remain the focus of a variety of complex security
    challenges. The troubled history of the region, combined with the
    dynamic regional security situation, render strong alliances and
    partnerships critical to our nation's ability to defend our interests.
    In the face of strategic changes and security threats, and lacking
    regional security institutions, the United States serves as the
    constant that provides presence, stability, and a framework for
    conflict avoidance and resolution. The United States has taken a vital
    role in Asia, as it has worldwide, in promoting international
    cooperation and the effectiveness of international rules and norms.
    This role is supported by America's enduring military presence, which
    serves as a foundational and visible element of U.S. leadership and
    commitment in Asia. In South Korea, forward-deployed American forces
    stand together with our ROK ally and demonstrate unwavering resolve in
    the face of the growing North Korean asymmetric threat.
    A. CHINA, RUSSIA, AND JAPAN
        China is continuing on a comprehensive military modernization
    program, at times acting assertively to press its interests in the
    region. China remains North Korea's most significant supporter, even
    though the relationship has been strained since Kim Jong-un assumed
    control of North Korea. Russia has increased its focus on the region,
    including military presence and engagement, in a reassertion of its
    strategic interests. Meanwhile, Japan is adapting its strategy to allow
    it to exercise collective self-defense. This change constitutes a
    natural evolution in Japan's defense policy, and its alliance with the
    U.S. should reassure the region that by accepting increased defense
    responsibilities it will contribute to regional and global security and
    enable a more effective defense of the Korean Peninsula.
    B. NORTH KOREA
        An unpredictable North Korea remains a significant threat to
    American interests, the security and prosperity of South Korea, and the
    stability of the international community. North Korea is willing to use
    coercion, continue development of nuclear weapons technology and long-
    range ballistic missile programs, engage in proliferation of arms,
    missiles and related materiel and technologies, and conduct cyber
    attacks, all while continuing to deny its citizens the most basic human
    rights. Due to the strength of the U.S.-ROK Alliance, North Korea lacks
    the ability to unify the Korean Peninsula by force with its large but
    aging conventional military. Recognizing this, North Korea has opted
    for an asymmetric strategy capable of little to no notice provocations
    and limited attacks. North Korea's strategy is designed to ensure the
    survival of the Kim regime, with options to disrupt peninsular,
    regional, or global security. To achieve this, Kim Jong-un must
    maintain internal security and a strong military deterrent. North
    Korea's nuclear program serves both objectives by enhancing domestic
    regime legitimacy and threatening neighbors and the United States.
        What's Changed Since Last Year? North Korea has placed significant
    emphasis and resources into its asymmetric capabilities, especially its
    missiles and cyber threats. In 2014, North Korea conducted a series of
    long-range artillery, rocket, and ballistic missile tests with very
    little to no notice. During the summer training period, North Korea
    military units conducted more realistic training and increased
    activities along the Demilitarized Zone and in the North West Islands
    region. The North West Islands region--where North and South Korea
    actively monitor fishing vessels operated by both countries and by
    China--remains the primary hotspot on the Korean Peninsula. In
    November, North Korea sought to intimidate and pressure the U.S. media
    and entertainment industries by projecting its cyber capabilities
    against Sony Pictures. This was a significant action that demonstrated
    North Korea's willingness to use cyber-attacks in defiance of
    international norms.
        Provocation and Engagement. North Korea's strategy involves
    combining provocation and engagement in what is often characterized as
    coercive diplomacy to pursue objectives that enhance regime
    survivability. This includes initiatives to compel international
    acceptance of its nuclear program, play regional actors, including the
    U.S., against one another, and split alliances, particularly the ROK-
    U.S. Alliance. North Korea recognizes the strength of the ROK-U.S.
    Alliance as its greatest threat, so it tries to fracture the Alliance
    in order to deal with each nation separately on its terms. The North
    Korean People's Army (KPA) retains the capability to inflict heavy
    costs on South Korea. However, KPA senior leaders likely understand it
    is not capable of defeating the Alliance, despite its propaganda to the
    contrary. North Korea's asymmetric strategy and capabilities enable
    limited objective military actions, which have the risk of
    miscalculation and escalation.
        Asymmetric Capabilities. North Korea has conducted three nuclear
    tests--in 2006, 2009, and 2013. It continues to prepare its test site
    and could conduct another test at any time. In recent years, North
    Korea has continued to develop its asymmetric capabilities including
    several hundred ballistic missiles, a sizeable long range artillery
    force, one of the world's largest chemical weapons stockpiles, a
    biological weapons research program, the world's largest special
    operations forces, and an active cyber warfare capability. These
    capabilities can be employed with minimal warning, and threaten South
    Korea and potentially the United States and Japan.
        Since assuming power three years ago, Kim Jong-un has taken a
    number of confrontational steps to solidify his control over the North
    Korean people, military, and political apparatus. The regime conducted
    a satellite launch in December 2012 and conducted its third nuclear
    test in February 2013, in defiance of United Nations Security Council
    Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and 2094 (2013). In
    2014, North Korea continued to develop its ballistic missile program,
    conducting no-notice Scud and No Dong missile tests from several launch
    locations, all violations of UN Security Council resolutions.
        These asymmetric capabilities, along with the fourth largest
    military in the world that is 70-75 percent forward deployed within 60
    miles of the DMZ, challenges the Alliance to assess potential
    indications of a North Korean provocation or attack.
        What Are We Doing to Address the Threat? The Alliance is constantly
    using readiness, vigilance, and cooperation to counter the North Korean
    threat. All three Commands--United Nations Command, Combined Forces
    Command, and U.S. Forces Korea--in close coordination with the ROK
    military train and posture our forces and capabilities to deter and
    defend against North Korea. We continue to press ahead on tailored
    deterrence, counter-missile capabilities, improving plans, and adding
    rotational forces and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
    (ISR). We have also taken steps to enhance the United Nations Command
    to increase multinational influence. A strong Alliance and ready
    military posture continue to provide the opportunity for further
    diplomatic, political, and economic engagements. The military dimension
    of national power is fully integrated into larger national efforts to
    address the North Korean threat, and more broadly to meet U.S. national
    security objectives in the region.
    C. REPUBLIC OF KOREA
        The ROK is a dynamic nation of 50 million people in a region
    critical to U.S. interests, as well as regional and global stability.
    The ROK's success, the ``Miracle on the Han River,'' is truly
    remarkable considering that less than 60 years ago it was one of the
    poorest nations in the world. Emerging from the destruction of the
    Korean War, the ROK is among the most vibrant democracies and economies
    in the world. The drive and spirit of the Korean people along with the
    security provided by our Alliance forces have helped the Korean people
    propel their country to become an increasingly important and prominent
    player in the international community and one of America's closest
    allies.
        Politically and economically, the ROK provides an example for other
    nations seeking to improve the lives of their citizens. Today, South
    Korea boasts the world's 12th largest economy. With world-class
    universities and research and development centers, the ROK is also a
    leader in science and technology, with the world's fastest average
    internet connection speed. As a nation with growing influence, South
    Korea is increasing its role in setting the international agenda, to
    include establishing a series of free trade agreements and hosting
    international defense talks.
    D. UNITED NATIONS COMMAND: THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION IN KOREA
        In response to North Korea's invasion of South Korea in 1950, the
    United Nations Security Council (UNSC) called for members to provide
    military forces to South Korea under the leadership of the United
    States. The UNSC chartered the United Nations Command (UNC) to repel
    the attack and restore peace and security. In 1953, the UNC, North
    Korea, and China agreed to an Armistice to halt hostilities. Today, the
    18 nation UNC remains an international coalition that maintains the
    Armistice and contributes to deterrence. If hostilities resume, UNC
    provides a multinational enabler to ensure broad international support
    to defend the ROK.
        The ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command is the powerful warfighting
    command that deters North Korean aggression and leads U.S.-ROK forces
    in the defense of South Korea. CFC enables us to organize, plan, and
    exercise U.S. and ROK forces so that the Alliance is ready to ``Fight
    Tonight.''
        U.S. Forces Korea, as a sub-unified command of U.S. Pacific
    Command, is responsible for organizing, training, and equipping U.S.
    forces on the Peninsula to be agile, adaptable, and ready to support
    CFC and UNC.
       4. advancing security on the korean peninsula: priorities for 2015
        In the context of the strategic environment I described above, I
    have four priorities for the Command: first, to sustain and strengthen
    the Alliance; second, to maintain the Armistice, while remaining ready
    to ``Fight Tonight'' to deter and defeat aggression; third, to
    transform the Alliance; and, finally, to sustain the force and enhance
    the UNC/CFC/USFK Team. I would like to describe the progress we've made
    over the last year on each of these priorities, and then conclude by
    looking ahead to how we will continue to build on these successes.
    A. Sustain and Strengthen the Alliance
        Our national leaders have established the ROK-U.S. Alliance as the
    linchpin of our common defense of South Korea. Our efforts on this
    priority have borne much fruit in this last year. We are increasing
    activities and communications, so that we keep the Alliance at the
    center of the Command's actions. By putting the Alliance first, we will
    be better able to address Alliance issues to find Alliance solutions.
        Strong Relationships. The U.S.-ROK Alliance is based on common
    values and interests, as well as strong relationships. Taken together
    with the national security strategies of both of our nations,
    presidential statements, and legislation, the U.S. is set to continue
    to be an indispensable strategic partner to the ROK, and the ROK is
    well poised to be an enduring and increasingly important ally to the
    U.S. We have shared an uncommon level of trust that has been central to
    the defense of South Korea, and key to addressing the regional and
    global implications of North Korea's disruptive behavior. But the
    Alliance is about much more than North Korea. Together we are working
    to address a broad range of security challenges, and to also create new
    opportunities, mechanisms, and initiatives for an enduring peace,
    stability, and prosperity. Going forward together, we are poised for a
    shared future of growth and prosperity.
        ROK National Security Strategy. The ROK recently promulgated a new
    national security strategy titled ``A New Era of Hope.'' The strategy
    seeks to build on the foundation provided by the ROK-U.S Alliance to
    pave the way toward peaceful unification and an enhanced international
    leadership role. The strategy provides a framework for making
    substantive civil and economic preparations for unification, but keeps
    in sharp focus the necessity of maintaining a robust defense posture
    and developing future-oriented capabilities. The strategy also looks
    outward in terms of enhancing the ROK's relations with other nations
    and contributing to what the strategy calls ``the co-prosperity of
    humankind.''
        Republic of Korea Military: A Formidable Force. The ROK military is
    a modern and capable force with superb leaders. Considering all that is
    at stake on the Korean Peninsula, we are fortunate to have such a
    capable ally to tackle challenges and pursue common objectives. In line
    with the ROK military's growing capabilities, it is proving to be an
    increasingly valuable partner that contributes to disaster relief,
    anti-piracy, and non-proliferation operations worldwide. Since South
    Korea joined the United Nations in September 1991, it has deployed
    40,000 troops all around the world in peacekeeping and assistance
    missions. In 2014, the ROK military deployed to more than 15 countries
    in various operations, including an Ebola relief team to West Africa.
          Military Strategy. The ROK military strategy continues to
    call for a rapid and firm response to North Korean provocations,
    believing such a response is essential to deterrence and self-defense.
    As I testified last year, I remain concerned about the potential for
    miscalculation and escalation, so an Alliance response based on timely
    consultation is the best way to maintain the Armistice and stability.
          Manning and Budget. The South Korean military has an
    active duty force of 639,000 personnel and 2.9 million reservists.
    South Korea plans to offset a force reduction to 517,000 in the 2020s
    with better and more high-tech capabilities. In December, the ROK
    Ministry of National Defense submitted a budget of $37.09 billion, a
    4.9 percent increase from last year and representing about 2.5 percent
    of its GDP.
          Capabilities and Force Improvement. South Korea continues
    to prioritize capabilities and training based on the North Korean
    threat, but it is also considering other factors such as the defense of
    sea lines of communication and maritime exclusive economic zones, and
    building its domestic defense industries.
    B. Maintain the Armistice. Be Ready To ``Fight Tonight'' To Deter and
            Defeat Aggression
        To advance this priority, we must expedite the completion of our
    plans, enhance BMD posture, and maximize training and exercise
    opportunities. In order to do those things, we have to provide the
    combined and joint force in Korea with the best capabilities the
    Alliance can muster.
        U.S. Rotational Forces: Delivering Better Capabilities in Korea.
    Rotational assets are modular, multi-functional, and operational across
    the full range of military operations. They enhance our ability to
    sustain a diverse mix of rapidly deployable capabilities and adapt to a
    broader range of requirements to defend the Republic of Korea.
        The movement of U.S. Air Force fighters into the Pacific has been a
    routine and integral part of U.S. Pacific Command's combat capable air
    forces and regional force posture since March 2004, as has the forward
    stationing of Air Force bomber assets in the Pacific under the
    Continuous Bomber Presence initiative. These have maintained a prudent
    deterrent against threats to regional security and stability.
        Eighth Army was among the first units to receive an Attack
    Reconnaissance Squadron in October 2013, and it will continue to
    support routine rotational deployments as part of the U.S. rebalancing
    efforts in the Asia-Pacific region. The decision to rotate units to
    South Korea represents the Army's commitment to provide mission-ready
    and culturally attuned capabilities to the region. The rotational
    deployments to Eighth Army also expose more Army units to the Korean
    Peninsula, while providing the Alliance with an improved ability to
    conduct bilateral exercises and improve readiness. These rotations have
    already achieved results. The 4-6th Attack Reconnaissance Squadron,
    16th Combat Aviation Brigade, rotated to Korea from Joint Base Lewis-
    McChord, WA (October 2013 to June 2014). In nine months, they increased
    their combat readiness by exercising close combat attack,
    reconnaissance, and security operations as air and ground forces worked
    together in a combined arms live-fire environment.
        The first brigade-sized unit to support Eighth Army will arrive in
    June 2015 when the 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), 1st Cavalry
    Division from Fort Hood, TX arrives to replace the 1st ABCT, 2nd
    Infantry Division. This brigade is scheduled to inactivate in July
    after 50 years of proud service on the Korean Peninsula.
        Missile Defense: Countering Growing North Korean Capabilities. The
    ROK-U.S. Alliance endeavors to strengthen our ability to counter North
    Korea's growing ballistic missile threat. At the October 2014 Security
    Consultative Meeting (SCM), the ROK Minister of National Defense and
    U.S. Secretary of Defense endorsed ``Concepts and Principles for
    Comprehensive Alliance Counter-Missile Operations'' or the ``4D
    Strategy.'' This strategy will posture the Alliance to detect, defend,
    disrupt, and destroy North Korean ballistic missile threats. This will
    not only improve Alliance defenses, it will bolster efforts to deter
    North Korean WMD and missile use. Further, it will guide operational
    decision-making, planning, exercises, capability development, and
    acquisitions. The capabilities include the ROK's ``Kill Chain'' and
    Korean Air and Missile Defense System (KAMD), as well as U.S.
    capabilities on and off Peninsula. The Alliance continues to pursue
    upgrades and improvements to existing ballistic missile defense
    capability to include increasing interoperability in systems and
    procedures.
        Tailored Deterrence: Influencing North Korean Decision-Making. The
    bilateral Tailored Deterrence Strategy (TDS) was created in 2013 to
    outline a range of Alliance options to influence the North Korean
    regime's decision making. The strategy focuses on options that raise
    the cost of North Korean WMD or ballistic missile use; deny the
    benefits of their use; and encourage restraint from using WMD or
    ballistic missiles. The strategy provides bilaterally agreed upon
    concepts and principles for deterring North Korean WMD use and
    countering North Korean coercion.
        Exercises: Enhancing Readiness. Exercising our combined and
    multinational force is an important component of readiness and is
    fundamental to sustaining and strengthening the Alliance. Combined
    Forces Command and ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) conduct three annual
    joint and combined exercises: KEY RESOLVE (KR), FOAL EAGLE (FE), and
    ULCHI FREEDOM GUARDIAN (UFG). KR and UFG are computer-simulated,
    theater-level command post exercises that ensure our readiness to
    respond to provocations, attacks, and instability. UNC routinely
    invites participation from its 18 Sending States to strengthen
    Coalition interoperability, while observers from the Swedish and Swiss
    Delegations of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission promote an
    independent and internationally credible assessment of the defensive
    nature of these exercises.
    C. Transform the Alliance
        To achieve transformation, we must synchronize, transform, and re-
    station the force. We also need to advance theater C4I and cyber
    capabilities.
        Conditions-based Wartime Operational Control Transition. At the
    2014 SCM, in light of the evolving security environment in the region
    including the enduring North Korean nuclear and missile threat, the ROK
    Minister of National Defense and U.S. Secretary of Defense agreed to
    implement a conditions-based approach to the transition of wartime
    operational control (OPCON) from the U.S.-led Combined Forces Command
    (CFC) to a new ROK-led combined defense command. This will ensure our
    combined defense remains strong while the ROK develops or acquires the
    critical military capabilities necessary to assume the lead in its
    defense.
        As a result of this decision, CFC will retain its wartime
    leadership until the Alliance agrees conditions are met and are
    conducive for a stable OPCON transition. We will continue to refine our
    strategy to create adaptive, agile plans and field combined forces that
    deter and defeat an enemy's provocations, deter aggression, and if
    deterrence fails, to fight and win.
        Additionally, the CFC headquarters will temporarily remain in its
    current location in Yongsan and maintain the personnel and
    infrastructure required to command and control the combined force until
    OPCON transition occurs. Similarly, USFK will keep the U.S. 210th Field
    Artillery Brigade north of the Han River until the ROK fields a
    comparable capability.
        U.S. Force Relocation: Posturing to Enhance Readiness. To posture
    forces in support of U.S. and ROK national interests, both governments
    agreed to consolidate USFK into two enduring hubs south of Seoul near
    the cities of Pyeongtaek and Daegu. USFK will enhance readiness,
    improve efficiencies, and further augment Alliance capabilities through
    two major plans: the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP) and the Land
    Partnership Plan (LPP).
        YRP is funded by the ROK government to relocate USFK and UNC from
    Seoul to U.S. Army Garrison-Humphreys (USAG-H) in Pyeongtaek. LPP
    consolidates forces from north of Seoul to USAG-H south of Seoul, while
    still providing access to northern training areas and ranges. The
    majority of relocations involves U.S. Army units and supports the
    Army's Force Generation rotational plan.
        The YRP/LPP's $10.7B transformation program, which includes over
    600 facilities, is well underway with over $1B in construction. The
    construction at USAG-H has tripled the garrison size. Key construction
    projects include unit headquarters, motor pools, barracks, family
    housing, medical facilities, communication centers, a ``Midtown
    Community'' complex, schools, installation service facilities, and
    underground utilities systems. In 2013 and 2014, ROK and U.S. funded
    projects completed an elementary school, a high school, family housing
    towers, a child development center, the waste water treatment plant, an
    airfield operations building, and supporting land fill for garrison
    expansion. In these efforts, we are particularly attentive to housing
    needs--to meet our goal of 40 percent command-sponsored families living
    on post, so we can maintain readiness and ensure quality of life.
        Along with Eighth Army, the Marine Corps Forces Korea (MARFORK)
    headquarters located in Yongsan will relocate to USAG-H. Commander,
    U.S. Naval Forces Korea (CNFK) will relocate its headquarters to co-
    locate with the ROK Fleet Headquarters at Busan in 2015. This will
    strengthen day-to-day cooperation in the combined naval component,
    while leveraging the capabilities of nearby Commander Fleet Activities
    Chinhae, the only U.S. Navy base on the Asian mainland.
        For Seventh Air Force at Osan Air Base, USFK will return real
    estate hosting dilapidated munitions storage areas to the ROK, and in
    turn the ROK will grant a larger parcel of land to construct new
    storage facilities which will enhance safety. Also, while not a YRP/LPP
    initiative, planning has advanced for a new Combined Air and Space
    Operations Center at Osan, to be funded in large part with host-nation
    funds, which will ensure a survivable, capable command and control
    capability for Airpower.
    D. Sustain the Force and Enhance the UNC/CFC/USFK Team
        To sustain U.S. forces in Korea, we will continue to focus on
    proper command climates, enforcement of discipline, and comprehensive
    fitness and wellness. Particularly in the areas of preventing crime,
    sexual harassment, and sexual assault, we have been taking proactive
    steps that have led to a downward trend in incidents. To prevent sexual
    harassment and sexual assault, the Command Sergeant Major and I conduct
    regular sensing sessions that provide insights on what leaders need to
    be more aware of for effective prevention strategies. We are committed
    to this priority, so we can build trust and readiness to prevail in
    armistice and the crucible of war.
        To enhance the international team in Korea, we have also made
    important progress. We are expanding UNC participation in exercises.
    For example, participation during the annual exercise ULCHI FREEDOM
    GUARDIAN increased from three countries and seven officers in 2009 to
    seven countries and 153 officers in 2014. Multinational officers also
    play a critical role on the UNC staff, to include shaping UNC strategy,
    strategic communication, and other critical functions. This
    increasingly impactful and visible multinational presence is a clear
    message from the international community of continued international
    support for the defense of South Korea and for stability in the region.
                            5. what we must achieve
        With the progress I have described, there is still much work to do.
    I am proud to testify that, as a result of the progress we have
    achieved on the Command's four priorities, our defense is capable and
    better prepared to respond effectively to any provocation, instability,
    or aggression.
        Our top concern is that we could have very little warning of a
    North Korean asymmetric provocation, which could start a cycle of
    action and counter-action, leading to unintended escalation. This
    underscores the need for the Alliance to maintain a high level of
    readiness and vigilance, and to do so together.
        Critical Capabilities. During the recent SCM, our national leaders
    reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening the combined defense of
    South Korea. They also confirmed several critical capabilities the
    Alliance must improve to ensure continued readiness to respond. These
    are:
          Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, or ISR.
          Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and
    Intelligence, or C4I.
          Ballistic Missile Defense, or BMD.
          Critical Munitions.
        We must continue to pursue ISR capabilities. The Alliance's ability
    to distinguish the indications and warnings associated with an
    impending North Korean asymmetric or conventional attack directly
    impacts the Alliance's decision space. Investments here can mitigate
    the risk of miscalculation and escalation by providing a more accurate
    and timely picture of North Korean actions.
        During this past year, South Korea began to invest in new tactical
    equipment that will comprise a reliable C4I architecture. We must
    maintain this momentum in improving C4I capabilities and
    interoperability, so we can communicate from tactical to strategic
    levels and between units in the field.
        Due to the nature of the evolving threat, particularly ballistic
    missiles, it is critical for the Alliance to build a layered and
    interoperable BMD capability. Each nation has unique contributions to
    make to missile defense. While the U.S. has an existing layered BMD
    capability, the ROK is moving forward in the development of its KAMD
    and ``Kill Chain.'' It is essential that we work together to ensure
    interoperability of Alliance BMD capabilities.
        In the early phases of hostilities, we will rely on a rapid flow of
    ready forces into the ROK. During this time, we will rely on U.S. and
    ROK Air Forces to establish air superiority to defeat North Korean
    threats which could inflict great damage on Seoul. In order to ensure
    maximum Alliance capability and interoperability, we will also work
    closely with the Republic of Korea to ensure it procures the
    appropriate types and numbers of critical munitions for the early
    phases of hostilities.
        Force Relocation Plans. We will continue executing the Yongsan
    Relocation Plan and the Land Partnership Plan, and as required, we will
    work together to refine relocation plans to support the conditions-
    based OPCON transition.
        Operational Plans. Finally, with CFC retaining its wartime
    leadership role, we will expedite updating our operational plans.
    Executable plans will ensure an effective Alliance response to a
    crisis.
                                   6. closing
        2014 was a positive year for the ROK-U.S. Alliance in many
    respects, even in the face of unpredictable North Korean asymmetric
    actions. We have been fortunate and thankful for the strong support of
    all our partners and the priority of resources that allow us to carry
    out what our Alliance demands of the Command. In 2015, I am looking
    forward to working with senior U.S. and ROK civilian and military
    leaders, Ambassador Mark Lippert, ADM Locklear, and the new PACOM
    Commander as we maintain stability in Korea and the region. The men and
    women of this multinational, combined, and joint warfighting Command
    are very thankful for the support from this Committee and the American
    people which is so crucial in maintaining our readiness against the
    North Korean threat. We will never lose sight of the fact that we are
    at ``Freedom's Frontier'' defending one of our most important allies
    and vital American interests. Thank you, and I look forward to our
    discussion.

        Chairman McCain. Thank you very much.
        General, I mentioned in my remarks, Admiral Gortney said
    that North Korea has an operational road-mobile missile that
    could carry nuclear weapons to the United States. Do you agree
    with that assessment?
        General Scaparrotti. Senator, I believe that they've had
    the time and the capability to miniaturize a nuclear warhead.
    They've stated that they have an intercontinental ballistic
    missile that has nuclear capability. They've paraded it. And I
    think, as a commander, we must assume that they have that
    capability.
        Chairman McCain. Admiral?
        Admiral Locklear. I would agree with that assessment. I
    mean, we haven't seen them effectively test it. But, we--you
    know, as commanders, all the indications are that we have to be
    prepared to defend the homeland from it. And we're taking
    actions to do that.
        Chairman McCain. And those actions are?
        Admiral Locklear. Well, first, we work very--in PACOM, we
    work very closely with NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command] to
    ensure that the defensive capabilities of our ballistic
    missiles systems are optimized. Forces forward in the theater
    that I and General Scaparrotti have command of are integral to
    that. Our ability to--in the region, to partner with our
    Japanese allies and our South Korean allies to bring the BMD
    [ballistic missile defense] capabilities to bear has been
    productive. In addition, we've been in discussions about
    potential deployment of an additional THAAD battery, not--
    beyond the one that's in Guam, but on the Korean Peninsula.
        Chairman McCain. General, this is rather disturbing,
    particularly given the unpredictability of this overweight
    young man in North Korea. Is that----
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir, that's----
        Chairman McCain. Is that a disturbing factor?
        General Scaparrotti. That's a disturbing factor, sir. And I
    think--you know, I believe that Kim Jung-Un is unpredictable.
    He has a mind that he can intimidate. He does that with
    provocations. He's committed provocations this year. So, I
    think it's a great concern, given the leadership there, as
    well.
        Chairman McCain. Let's talk about China and the
    reclamation. Admiral, we, from time to time, put a picture up
    of the areas that are reclaimed by China out in the East China
    Sea--or South China Sea. And the problem is, our pictures don't
    keep up with their activities. Is it--it's my information that
    they have now, in the last year, filled in some 600 acres of
    land and are constructing runways and possibly artillery and
    missile defense systems.
        The Congressional Research Service, on April 6th, issued a
    report on this issue, and I quote their report, saying ``The
    publicly visible current U.S. strategy for dissuading China
    from continuing its land reclamation activities appears to
    focus primarily on having U.S. officials make statements
    expressing the U.S. view that China should stop these
    activities, on the grounds that they are destabilizing and
    inconsistent with commitments China has made under the
    nonbinding 2002 DOC [Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties
    in the South China Sea].''
        Do you know anything else about our strategy concerning
    China's continued expanding and filling in these areas, which
    are international waters? And how great a threat do you--does
    that appear to you, Admiral, as far as long-term threat to our
    commitment to freedom of the seas?
        Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir.
        Well, the overall U.S. strategy, I think, is well--goes
    well beyond the military component of what I deal with each
    day. And so, I only make recommendations on the military side.
    So, I'd refer the policy decisions about----
        Chairman McCain. And your----
        Admiral Locklear.--how we deal with----
        Chairman McCain. And your recommendations are?
        Admiral Locklear. Well, in general, where you find that the
    United States has a clear policy on how it feels about
    something, military solutions or diplomatic solutions become
    easier for that. The policy we have in the South China Sea, as
    I understand it today, as is, we take--globally, on territorial
    disputes--is that we don't take sides in those territorial
    disputes, that there's--but that we do want them worked out in
    peaceful, non-coercive ways in legal matters. And that's been
    expressed----
        Chairman McCain.--those actions----
        Admiral Locklear.--to all the countries in the region.
        Chairman McCain.--could, over time, impede our ability to
    navigate through those areas----
        Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir. Well, I think that, given the
    fact that the--my view--of all the claimants in the South China
    Sea--and some of them--well, they all own some of these land
    features and have different postures and different----
        Chairman McCain. I mean, we don't fill in areas of some 600
    acres, either.
        Admiral Locklear. No, sir. No, they don't. And so, my
    assessment is that all the claimants, except for China, are
    just kind of doing what they agreed to in 2002, is, they're
    just maintaining them in--as--while the legal processes would
    work out. The Chinese, however, are doing much different than
    that. They're--obviously, as you've stated, it's been
    aggressive. I think it's been--how fast they've been able to do
    it has been actually astonishing. They're building a network of
    outposts to enforce control over most of the South China Sea.
    The Southeast Asian nations are increasingly worried that PRC's
    [People's Republic of China] new capabilities will allow China
    to take de facto control of the surrounding waters, you know,
    places like Fiery Cross Reef, where they're putting in a
    runway. I mean, just in the last 10 months, it went from a
    barely noticeable feature to now having a deepwater port on it
    and a potential runway. This will allow the PRC to--number one,
    to improve their ability to put their maritime security force
    down there, which is the equivalent to a coast guard or a
    fisheries patrol, which, to give you a magnitude of the size of
    the PRC's capabilities, if you take all the Southeast-Asian
    countries' coast guards and put them together, it's still a
    smaller number than what China has been able to produce. I have
    also observed that they've taken what would have been
    considered, a couple of years ago, gray-hulled warships and
    painted them white and turned them into maritime security
    craft. So, it has been astonishing.
        And to get--we--you know, we portray this--I think, try to,
    to the PRC, to China, and their response is generally, ``Well,
    this is our sovereign territory,'' and, ``Stay out of our
    business,'' which is for them to enforce their ``nine dash
    line'' claim.
        So, the implications are, if this activity continues at
    pace, is that it really would give them de facto control, I
    think, in peacetime, of much of the world's most important
    waterways, of where much of the world's economic energy is
    created. It would--if they desired, it would, in the future,
    them the opportunity to have outposts to put long-range
    detection radars in there, to place--put more warships. They
    could put warplanes to enforce potential, down the road, air
    defense zones. So, those are the kind of scenarios we have to
    think about. And it certainly complicates the security
    environment.
        So far, the ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations]
    nations, who have tried to work with China on this to develop a
    code of conduct, in my view has been--not produced very much at
    all. In fact, you know, the ASEAN is an effective diplomatic
    organization, but it's not designed to handle these security
    issues that pop up.
        So, I think we've got to watch this situation very
    carefully.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        And, General Scaparrotti, we have a--very complicated
    relations with the Chinese, and it's particularly in the
    context of North Korea. To what degree do you have, sort of,
    the--a contingency plan to communicate with them if there is a
    provocation--a serious provocation by the North Koreans that
    would introduce the idea of using, you know, force?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir.
        Well, you know, as we--even in our exercises, one of the
    first priorities is communications with China if there's
    conflict on the Peninsula. And so, we exercise that in
    communications even in our exercises. And, of course, it's very
    important for us to understand that and ensure that they
    understand our intent.
        Senator Reed. Now, that's one side of the equation. The
    other side of the equation is, to the extent that they're
    facilitating some of these activities by the North Koreans,
    particularly cyber, do you have any sort of sense of that
    degree of facilitation? And the general question is--you know,
    they have to appreciate the instability of this regime, the
    irrationality of the regime. They like the buffer between South
    Korea. They like it because they're affecting our behavior and
    disturbing us. But, they have to, I hope, realize there's the
    danger of, you know, looking the other way. Is that--
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir.
        I'd--and I think they do. My sense is--in those who had
    conversations with them--I haven't talked to their military
    directly--but, that they also are concerned and have some
    frustrations with the Kim regime.
        I--in terms of cyber, you specifically asked that question.
    You know, we know that North Korea has--some of their cyber
    activities take place in China. But, I don't know, and I
    haven't seen intelligence that would lead me to believe, that
    they've had a direct relationship with North Korea in their
    cyber development.
        Senator Reed. And just, finally--and then this spans not
    just the military capacity, but diplomatic capacity--are there
    efforts to try to move the Chinese government to be more
    proactive, in terms of with financial pressures, with
    diplomatic pressures, to at least demonstrate to the North
    Korean regime that, you know, they're--they can't do these
    things?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir, there has been.
        Senator Reed. Yeah.
        Admiral Locklear, you've described a situation in the South
    Pacific and the Southeast Pacific as one where China is
    exerting itself. The witnesses in the last panel suggested
    that, in terms of the North Pacific--Korea, Japan, et cetera--
    we're fairly well positioned against potential operational
    threats. But, it's not the case in the Southern Pacific and the
    Southeast Pacific. Is that fair?
        Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir. It's a large region. You know,
    as we've talked about, the beginning of the whole rebalance
    discussion was trying to move ourselves from what had been a
    post-Cold-War to kind of a location in Northeast Asia, and to
    bring that to be more relevant to the security challenges
    throughout the region.
        So, a number of initiatives. One is that we, with our
    Filipino allies, have reinvigorated that alliance and are
    looking at the capabilities to help them improve their minimum
    defense, but also to improve access to the region to ensure
    better security.
        We've opened partnerships with nations in Southeast Asia
    that we probably wouldn't have considered possible in the last
    couple of decades--Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia--countries that
    have become increasingly important to the security of the
    region and to the global security environment.
        Senator Reed. As the Chinese are creating these artificial
    islands in the Pacific, there are a lot of, you know, real
    geographic islands that our allies control. Are we thinking
    about, in conjunction with our allies, positioning forces
    forward--in effect, using the islands as sort of a way to deny,
    you know, ocean to the Chinese, they appear trying to do to us?
        Admiral Locklear. Well, I wouldn't go into specifics of
    where we would--where our planning would take us, in this
    forum, sir. But, I would say that, first, we're doing is, we're
    ensuring that the five alliances that we have there are set
    right for the security that we're going to--the security
    environment we're going to see ourselves in in this century.
    And we're encouraging--and, to their credit, most of them are
    spending money, and spending money on defense assets, and are--
    and they want the things that allow them to be able to be
    complementary to us. So, we're--we are working hard in that
    area.
        Senator Reed. A final question, Admiral Locklear. Admiral
    Roughead was here on Tuesday and indicated that the--one of the
    clear advantages we have is our submarine fleet in the Pacific.
    In fact, he recommended doubling the number of deployed
    submarines. Is that your view also, in terms of a--particularly
    with their aerial denial, their surface capabilities--is that
    your view also?
        Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir. Well, I've said to this forum
    before, we have the best submarines in the world. We continue,
    I think, to outpace the rest of the world in that capability.
    In my AOR [area of responsibility], they are essential to any
    operations that I have, both in peacetime and in crisis and
    contingency. I have concern about the size of the submarine
    force as we go into this--middle of this century, and our--and
    its ability for it to remain relevant, globally. Plus, we're
    going to have to figure out this replacement of our strategic
    nuclear submarine force, which is the most survivable leg of
    our triad, and the importance of that as we see the
    modernization of strategic nuclear capabilities in both
    countries like China and Russia.
        Senator Reed. Just, finally, the submarine appears to be
    the only weapon system that still can approach virtually to the
    shores of China and deliver, if necessary, weapons. Is that
    true?
        Admiral Locklear. Well, sir, I wouldn't say it's the only
    system.
        Senator Reed. Okay. That--that's more encouraging.
        Thank you very much.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First of all, Admiral Locklear, let me thank you again for
    the hospitality you accorded us and our whole group when we
    were in Hawaii and we laid the wreath on the memorial of the
    USS Oklahoma. And that was--you went out of your--beyond your
    call of duty.
        On that same trip, we went to South Korea. At that time, I
    recall, in some of our meetings there, they were talking about
    the use of a--well, now, the--banning the use of the cluster
    munitions, which have been very effective. In fact, that's
    probably the place where they were--because of the proximity
    between North Korea and South Korea--where they were most
    effectively used at that time. Now we have a policy, which is a
    self-imposed policy--I'm not criticizing it, and I know the
    reasons for it--but, we're being forced to discontinue that.
    And I'd like to ask you, what are we doing, in the place, to
    perform those functions, those missions that we were depending
    upon the clusters?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. As you know, the cluster
    munitions, as you indicated, very important to our plans in--
    particularly on the Peninsula, if there were a crisis. There is
    presently work underway to replace our present munitions with
    those that will provide the same effects, but with less--you
    know, meeting the requirements of the treaty. In essence, less
    than 1 percent dud rate.
        Senator Inhofe. Yeah, you talked about the--you've both
    talked about the increase in the casualties as a result of some
    of the lack of abilities to use some of the equipment we've
    used in the past. Is this something that could expose more risk
    and more casualties by not having this capability and not
    replacing it with something as effective?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir, absolutely. It's a critical
    component of our planning on the Peninsula.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay.
        Let me--I know that both of you agree with this statement
    that was made by James Clapper, so we don't need to rehash all
    that, but when he said, ``Looking back over by now more than a
    half century of intelligence, we've not experienced a time when
    we've been beset by more crises and threats around the globe.''
    I think both of you agree with that. You've stated that in the
    past.
        I'd like to get, in kind of the remainder of the time,
    Admiral Locklear, talking about the submarines thing. Senator
    Rounds and I were on the USS Carl Vinson last week. And,
    without having any details in this setting, it was--they were
    very busy. We're now down to 10 submarines. Admiral Roughead
    said, on Friday, that we're going to have to be moving one--or
    we should move one of those into the Pacific.
        Now, my question would be--and, Admiral Locklear, I think
    it was a year ago, before HASC [the House Armed Services
    Committee], you were quite outspoken in the fact that we should
    have 11 carriers to carry out the mission. Will you still--do
    you still feel that way?
        Admiral Locklear. I do. Yes, sir, I do.
        Senator Inhofe. You'd like to get back to that, wouldn't
    you?
        Admiral Locklear. I'd like to get back to it. I mean,
    we've--I think the Navy is undergoing a bathtub--I call it a
    ``bathtub of readiness'' now, because we delayed--through the
    war years, we delayed readiness--maintenance on these nuclear
    aircraft carriers. So, on one hand, they are magnificent
    machines; on the other hand, you have to take care of them
    correctly to make sure they're----
        Senator Inhofe. Yeah.
        Admiral Locklear.--safe. And so, we'll be enduring that, I
    think, for the next 5 to 6 years before we get back to where--
    the level we need to be, I think, for kind of day-to-day
    operations in my AOR.
        Senator Inhofe. Well, of course, maintenance and
    modernization are the first two things to go when you're faced
    with what we've been faced with. And I--in the event that you
    do move one into the Asia-Pacific area, where would it come
    from? What kind of a vacuum would be left behind in other AORs?
        Admiral Locklear. Well, I think that decision would have to
    be made at the Secretary of Defense level. But, we have--you
    know, generally, we have 11 aircraft carriers, and, out of that
    11, we--they generate a global presence of some number, kind
    of, for day-to-day operations, and another level that would be
    able to surge in times of crisis or in times of conflict. I
    think that aircraft carriers are probably best suited for the
    types of missions that we do in the Asia-Pacific today. And
    where it would come from, I can't say, but my guess is, it
    would probably come out of the Middle East, given that that's
    been the primary demand signal for a carrier presence in the
    last decade and a half.
        Senator Inhofe. Well, when Senator Reed's--in your final
    response to his last question, I--it came to my mind that--the
    carrier capability.
        Well, that's very helpful. And I--but, I'd like to have,
    for the record, something in a little bit more detail, because
    some of us are not as familiar as we should be with that
    capability. In fact, I'm going down to Norfolk this weekend to
    try to become a little bit more informed on this. So, if you
    could, for the record, try to come out with where we might have
    the capacity of where we could afford to move something into
    the Pacific, and then how busy everybody is at the present
    time, it would be helpful.
        Admiral Locklear. All right, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Navy Carrier requirement is 11 CVN. Both the Chief of Naval
    Operations and the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command support this.
    Additionally, 11 CVNs are reflected in the Department of the Navy (DON)
    Five-Year Shipbuilding Plan for Fiscal Year 2016 to Fiscal Year 2020.
    Currently, Navy has 10 CVN and will achieve an inventory of 11 when USS
    GERALD R FORD delivers to the Fleet in Fiscal Year 2016.
        The CVN is the centerpiece of a Carrier Strike Group and its
    employability is limited due to Navy Title 10 responsibility to man,
    train, maintain, and equip the CVN force. With the current inventory
    limitation of 10 CVNs, notional distribution is as follows:
          1 CVN in Refueling and Complex Overhaul (RCOH)
          1 CVN in pre-refueling or post-refueling
          2 CVN (1 West Coast, 1 East Coast) in Ship Maintenance
    (Planned Incremental Availability (PIA) or Docking Planned Incremental
    Availability (DPIA))
          4 CVN (2 West Coast, 2 East Coast) in Basic or Integrated
    Training or Sustainment
          1 CVN Forward Deployed Naval Force (FDNF) (cycle of four
    months in maintenance and eight months operational)
          1 CVN ``rotationally'' deployed
        Navy organizes its primary combat units into a Carrier Strike Group
    to ensure it has the capabilities required to support the Combatant
    Commander throughout the range of military operations. Combatant
    Commander demand for Carrier Strike Groups always exceeds Carrier
    Strike Group operationally availability. The Joint Staff is responsible
    to allocate the limited number of Carrier Strike Groups to Combatant
    Commanders to best meet global security requirements.

        Chairman McCain. Senator Hirono.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to thank both of you gentlemen for your service,
    and, of course, the service of the men and women who serve
    under your commands.
        And, Admiral Locklear, my very best to you in your future
    endeavors. Thank you very much for being PACOM Commander.
        Admiral Locklear, I know that Secretary of Defense Ash
    Carter spent, as I understand it, a day with you. And so, are--
    were the discussions that you had with him reflective of the
    priorities as you've laid out in your testimony today?
        Admiral Locklear. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Hirono. You did mention that, with everything that
    is going on in South and East China Seas, and the provocation
    of North Korea, that we do need to strengthen our alliances
    with our partners and also establish new relationships. And, in
    this regard, despite historical differences, last December the
    United States, South Korea, and Japan signed an information-
    sharing arrangement in what appears to have been a first step
    in what Deputy Secretary of State Tony Blinken calls, and I
    quote, ``a profoundly positive trajectory.'' Admiral, please
    discuss the relationships between South Korea and Japan, and
    the challenges we face in furthering a trilateral U.S./Japan/
    South Korea alliance.
        Admiral Locklear. The challenges we face, from my
    perspective, are primarily political and social challenges. On
    the military side, the militaries, if allowed, are able to work
    together for--I think, for the common good of the security in
    Northeast Asia, in particular. The impediments--what's happened
    thus far is, because of the political pressure to not have true
    information-sharing agreements between Japan and Korea, limit
    our ability to allowed us to bring together, in a trilateral
    way that optimizes the forces that they've invested in and
    we've invested in, and particularly in critical areas, such as
    ballistic missile defense, et cetera. So, I highly encourage
    both Korea and Japan to move forward, at the highest level of
    governments, with the types of agreements that allow us to
    optimize the military capability that this trilateral
    arrangement can bring.
        Senator Hirono. So, the information-sharing arrangement
    that was agreed to, you're saying that that is not enough. It's
    not what you would consider a true information-sharing
    arrangement.
        Admiral Locklear. Well, it is a good start.
        Senator Hirono. Again, to you, Admiral. Many countries
    within the Indo-Asia-Pacific region are increasing their
    defense capabilities. China is procuring submarines quickly.
    We've heard all of this. Japan, India, South Korea, Singapore,
    and Australia have been shoring up their military capabilities.
    Malaysia and Indonesia have a couple of more submarines. And
    Vietnam recently announced the purchase of Russian-made
    submarines. How will the continued growth of the region's
    submarine fleet impact the balance of power within the South
    China Sea region? Does this cause us to adjust our strategies
    or basing decisions if growth continues on its current
    trajectory?
        Admiral Locklear. Well, the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, or
    the PACOM region, is the most militarized part of the world.
    And it's increasing in its militarization, because most of the
    countries there have the resources now, and the will and the
    desire, to grow their militaries.
        Those that have the military capability to actually operate
    a submarine force are pursuing that, because they understand
    the symmetric advantages that it brings, they understand the
    ability for access and aerial-denial capabilities that
    submarines bring. And they also recognize the significant
    deterrent value that submarines bring.
        So, my numbers are--roughly are--there's about 300
    submarines in the world that aren't U.S. submarines. Two
    hundred of them are in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Now, some of
    those are owned by our partners and allies. But, many of them
    are not. And so, the increasing number of submarines that have
    increasing lethality, increasing quietening technology,
    certainly does change the dynamic of how we have to operate in
    that--in the area, and the type of tactics and procedures and
    operational concepts that we have to develop to ensure we
    remain dominant.
        But, I look at it as like a fact of life. It's going to
    happen. And we have to deal with it.
        Senator Hirono. So, in our dealing with it, though,
    especially with our partner--with our allies--does this require
    us to be very--much more collaborative and to share information
    so that we're on the same page, so to speak, in that part of
    the world?
        Admiral Locklear. It does. It not only requires us to
    share, bilaterally, more in a particularly difficult
    environment--undersea and maritime domain--but it also requires
    them to be able to share with their other neighbors that have
    that capacity, as well. And, as you know, in the Indo-Asia-
    Pacific, those multilateral organizations don't exist to
    facilitate that. So, we're seeing the growth of that, but it's
    a work in progress.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Wicker.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for your service.
        We have a memo, here, talking about noteworthy challenges
    in the Pacific area. And they list, of course, North Korea as
    the most dangerous and unpredictable challenge. And I'm sure
    both of you agree with that. But also, territorial disputes in
    the East and South China Seas; natural disasters, including
    weather and disease; violent extremism; transnational crime;
    Russian intent and Chinese intent.
        Are there any of these, gentlemen, that would not involve a
    need to deliver our marines quickly and effectively through
    amphibious ships?
        Admiral?
        Admiral Locklear. Well, I think, historically, the Marine
    Corps is a cornerstone of the force structure that we have in
    the Asia-Pacific. I mean, it's uniquely suited for large
    archipelagos, large sea spaces. It uses the sea as a--as
    highways to move around on. And it's--I can't--of all the ones
    you listed there, I can't think of one that the Marine Corps
    does not play as a part of the joint force in a significant
    way. So, yes, they do play in all of those.
        The question of whether or not they have enough lift? The
    answer to that's no. We don't have enough lift. And I've said
    this before, we've got to--not only is it our--the number of
    amphibious ships that we can build in our own shipyards, but
    we've got to look at connectors, we've got to look at the types
    of alternative platforms that allow us to operate in more
    unique----
        Senator Wicker. Connectors.
        Admiral Locklear.--security environments.
        Senator Wicker. Connectors and alternatives.
        Admiral Locklear. Connectors and alternatives. I mean,
    connectors are like joint high-speed vessels that move marines
    and troops around faster. There's--so, it--it also gets into
    the whole issue of, How do you--in huge crisis, in large
    crisis, what is your military sealift command? What is the
    condition----
        Senator Wicker. Okay.
        Admiral Locklear.--of that?
        Senator Wicker. Well, I want the General to get a crack at
    this question, too. But, let's talk about that. We understand
    that we have a requirement for 50 amphibious ships. Is that
    correct?
        Admiral Locklear. Well, I don't know that I would--I've
    heard the number 50. I think you'd have to go back to the
    Department of the Navy for them to calculate, globally, how
    many they need.
        But, we've had a greater pressure on our amphibious force,
    particularly in--when we have operations in the Middle East
    that now require us to put marine units in position to be able
    to monitor things like embassy safety and for embassy
    extraction in the very hot spots. So, all that's put a demand
    signal that's pulled the amphibious capability----
        Senator Wicker. It's a very real contingency that happens.
        Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir.
        Senator Wicker. Correct? Well, okay, the information I have
    is that we have a requirement for 50, and we only have 30
    amphibs in our inventory. And, of those ships, approximately 15
    to 20 are operationally available. Would you say that that is
    pretty close to being correct information, Admiral? Thirty in
    the inventory and 15 to 20 operationally----
        Admiral Locklear. Thirty is about my understanding of it.
        Senator Wicker. Okay.
        Admiral Locklear. And operation availability, depending on
    how they define it--I mean, my AOR, I have a amphibious
    readiness group that's in--west of the Date Line all the time,
    that's available on a much greater basis than that. But,
    globally, I would say that's probably about right.
        Senator Wicker. General, let's let you weigh in on this.
    And how would the effectiveness of our marines be diminished if
    there are insufficient amphibious ships to get them delivered
    effectively?
        General Scaparrotti. Senator, I would just say this, that
    they're very important to me, on the Peninsula, for rapid
    response, and they're a critical part of all of our plans.
    Operating on the Peninsula, it's the Marine Corps and their
    ability to be lifted quickly to different places. They provide
    me agility. It's the quickest, you know, kind of the most
    succinct way to put it. I am very concerned about the amount of
    lift available in order to support our plans, and the
    maintenance of that lift, as well.
        Senator Wicker. Now--so, if we don't have enough amphibs,
    the connectors alone are not a solution, are they?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, sir, you know, we've looked at
    alternative methods of--and the use of alternate ships in order
    to help us with the delivery of marines. I can be more
    specific, you know, in a response for record, as to how we look
    at our planning.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [DELETED]

        Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
        And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Heinrich.
        Senator Heinrich. Mr. Chairman? Oh, thank you.
        Admiral Locklear, I want to start with a little bit on
    missile defense. And, obviously, the Asia-Pacific is of
    critical importance to the United States, both economically and
    strategically, yet the current security environment in your
    combatant command is increasingly complex. Countries in the
    region continue to invest in greater quantities of ballistic
    missiles with extended range and new capabilities. While I
    think we should continue to invest in missile defense programs
    that are proven and effective, I also think we should be
    investing in left-of-launch and other nonkinetic means of
    defense.
        Given the vast number of incoming missiles that an
    adversary could use to potentially overwhelm U.S. missile
    defense systems, I want to get your thoughts on what steps are
    being taken in the realm of left-of-launch technologies, like
    electronic warfare, cyber, that could blind, deceive, or
    destroy enemy sensors before they actually launch.
        Admiral Locklear. Well, Senator, I agree very much with
    your assessment that the ballistic missile defense threat grows
    because of the ability for them to--you know, for people to
    produce ballistic missiles at greater distances--that have
    greater distances and greater accuracies, and have multiple
    reentry vehicles, and those types of things that complicate the
    problem and that you can't build enough interceptors to take
    them all out. You just can't. You're in a tail chase that you
    can't do.
        That said, I think there is a good place for a good, solid
    amount of ballistic missile defense. It's a deterrent. It buys
    decision space. It makes the decision for the--whoever's going
    to fire it at you a lot harder for them to make. And, when they
    do, it gives your troops that are in the way of them some
    confidence that at least they'll be able to get through the
    first few minutes of this thing before we have to take other
    action. So, we are working left-of-launch and thinking
    differently about how we would produce--how we would attack
    this particular problem.
        One of the things that--it's not just about electronic
    warfare and cyber. Those events are being worked, and I won't
    go into them in this particular forum, but they are being
    pursued. But, it's also more about thinking differently about
    how you employ your forces and at what trigger points would you
    do things like dispersal of your force in a different way
    throughout the region. How would you do selective hardening of
    places that would--and put in place things like rapid runway
    repair kits in the place of where you have to have them?
    Through this body, you all have allowed us to go forward with
    some of those initiatives in some of the places that we have in
    the Asia-Pacific. Hardening some fuel heads and those types of
    things make--can make a big difference.
        So, left-of-launch is a priority for us.
        Senator Heinrich. Let me ask a question that sort of
    overlays on that, in terms of emerging technologies. What's
    your assessment, at this point, on the value of directed energy
    systems to support defeating missile threats? And do you think
    that directed energy should be a priority for the research-and-
    development community, given the advancements in the last
    couple of years?
        Admiral Locklear. Well, we've seen some progress. I think
    the Navy has some directed energy systems that are employed in
    operations routinely that have proven effective, at least in
    the tactical area.
        I'm in favor of directed energy weapons if they get the job
    done, if the technology is there. I kind of live in the here-
    and-now problem.
        Senator Heinrich. Right.
        Admiral Locklear. And I project----
        Senator Heinrich. I understand.
        Admiral Locklear.--hopefully, project into the future what
    we might need. Directed energy, if it solves a--if it's a good,
    solid solution set for the types of threat we're facing, then
    we should pursue it.
        Senator Heinrich. Speaking of here and now, are you
    familiar with CHAMP, the Counter-electronics High-Power
    Microwave Advanced Missile Project?
        Admiral Locklear. I am familiar with it.
        Senator Heinrich. What kind of value do you think that
    could bring to the theater?
        Admiral Locklear. I think, if it was properly tested and
    then fielded, that it would be something that would be of
    interest and benefit.
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you very much.
        I'll yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Fischer.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today.
        General, in your prepared remarks, you talk about North
    Korea's emphasis on asymmetric capabilities, especially its
    missiles and its cyber threats. Can you elaborate on North
    Korea's ballistic missile and cyber programs, and discuss what
    the Command is doing to counter them? And then, can you let us
    know, How do you see their investment in these areas impacting
    your needs in the future?
        General Scaparrotti. Thank you, Senator.
        Well, first of all, North Korea has focused its resources
    within its military on their asymmetric capabilities, which are
    several. Probably the most important are the ballistic missile
    and nuclear. We discussed the nuclear here. You know, we've
    seen a number of indicators of how they're advancing their
    nuclear capabilities. And then, within their missile force,
    they have more than several hundred ballistic missiles. The
    predominance of those are close-range and short-range ballistic
    missiles that affect or influence the Peninsula, but they've
    also deployed both medium- and intermediate-range that
    influence the region. And, of course, the development of the
    intercontinental ballistic missile has impact here in homeland
    security in the United States.
        They've not slowed down at this. We've seen, as you've
    seen, this past year, they demonstrated their capabilities and
    conducted tests. They had more missile events or launches in
    '14 than they've had in the previous 5 years together. Each of
    these being a--you know, a violation of the United Nation
    Security Council Resolutions.
        We have been taking steps, both in, you know, material
    capability, in terms of our ballistic missile defense, to
    counter that, as well as work with the Republic of Korea in
    their ballistic missile defense. They just recently funded an
    upgrade to their Patriot 2s to PAC-3s [Patriot Advanced
    Capability-3], which is very important. We're working with them
    closely, in terms of interoperability, and we're also working
    with them on their material solutions, particularly, you know,
    their Air Missile Defense Center and system that they've
    recently established. We're working closely on that.
        And then, finally, as the Admiral just noted, you know, we
    look at the posture of our force, the preparation of our force
    and our plans; and all of those things, in the last couple of
    years, has been rather dynamic in order to change as our threat
    in North Korea changes.
        Senator Fischer. And as we talk about missile defense, how
    do you interpret China and their vocal opposition to placing a
    THAAD battery on that Peninsula?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, personally, I--you know, I think
    this is a decision for South Korea, having to do with the
    defense of their country, and, from my perspective as a
    commander there, defense of our troops.
        Senator Fischer. But, do you think that they are narrowly
    focused on missile defense, or do you think they're trying to,
    maybe, exert some greater influence over the Republic of
    Korea's defensive strategy as a whole?
        General Scaparrotti. I think it's a greater influence. The
    THAAD system, if employed, is focused on the defense of the
    Peninsula. That's what it is specialized to do. It doesn't have
    any influence beyond that.
        Senator Fischer. So, that would improve their defenses,
    then, against North Korea, correct?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, ma'am, it would.
        Senator Fischer. And do you think that South Korea and the
    United States would push against the Chinese reaction to that?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, ma'am, you know, this is a--the
    decision process is underway right now, and it is--I can
    discuss, in a military perspective, but, you know, from a
    political and strategic perspective, I think both countries are
    taking that into consideration right now, in terms of the other
    impacts that have to do with the employment of THAAD on the
    Peninsula.
        Senator Fischer. And as we look at the North Koreans and
    their missiles, are they moving away from their more
    traditional conventional forces, which they have--what is it,
    the fourth largest in the world now--are they moving away from
    that?
        General Scaparrotti. Ma'am, I wouldn't say they're moving
    away from it. I think they've changed their strategy a bit. It
    is the fourth-largest military in the world. It's a very large
    conventional force that's postured forward along the DMZ
    [demilitarized zone]. So, it is a--it's still a very present
    and dangerous threat. But, they're not resourcing it in the
    same way that they had in the past. So, we've seen a reduction
    in their capability, conventionally.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, General.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator King.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral, we had some fascinating testimony 2 days ago on
    this subject. I commend the record to you. One of the pieces of
    testimony was the historical record of the confrontation
    between a rising power and an existing power. Graham Allison,
    from Harvard, called it the ``Thucydides Trap,'' wherein 12 of
    16 instances in world history where you had a rapidly rising
    power confronting an established power ended in war. And
    there--obviously, that's a daunting observation--there has
    never been a power that has risen as far and as fast as China
    in the last 25 years. Do you see military conflict with China
    in any way inevitable? But, given the ``Thucydides Trap,'' how
    can we avoid it?
        Admiral Locklear. Well, I don't think that conflict is
    inevitable. I think that the world we're in today is probably a
    different world than the ones we've been in before, when a
    great power rose. The effects of globalization and economic
    globalization and the movement of people, the
    interconnectedness of banks, of industry, of all these things
    that you know very well about, I think have made it imperative
    that we understand the rise of China, in that we, to some
    degree, accommodate the rise of China, where we can, to attempt
    to shape the rise of China. I've said, on many occasions, that
    a China that would--and a China with a military that would come
    forward as a net provider of security rather than a net user of
    security would be beneficial to, not only the region, but would
    be beneficial to us, as well. And I think that's an achievable
    goal. I think that has to be looked at how do we deal with
    China globally, in global institutions, from their role in the
    United Nations to how they're behaving and conducting
    themselves in other regions of the world, and how we interact
    with them there. I also think it will require us to have a
    pinpoint focused on how we see their influence in this region
    that we've been talking about today, which is primarily East--
    Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia, and to understand--we have
    to try to understand what their side of the equation is. And,
    to be honest with you, some of the things they've done are
    quite--aren't really clear today.
        So, we always get into the debate about whether we should
    continue mil-to-mil if we're unhappy with the things they're
    doing--mil-to-mil engagement. I am a proponent of continuing to
    take some risk there, because there is benefit in us continuing
    to have dialogue to try to establish those types of frameworks
    that allow us to communicate with each other in crisis. We've
    had some good work with the PRC lately, of building some
    confidence-building measures that allow us to understand how to
    operate with each other in these constrained waterways so that
    we don't have a bunch of lieutenants and captains and
    commanders of ships out there making, you know, bad decisions
    that might escalate us to something that we didn't--escalate us
    into a ``Thucydides Trap.''
        So, we need to, I think, continue to keep engaging them,
    but I think we need to be forthright about how we feel about
    these things and what the U.S. position is on behavior when it
    doesn't match what our allies and our partners and our value
    systems support.
        Senator King. Well, clearly, in recent years, the thrust of
    the Chinese has been economic. But, in even more recent years,
    it's been military, as you have testified today, tremendous
    growth in subsurface, everything else. What do you make of
    these actions, which can only be characterized as aggressive,
    building islands off the shore, and the increased patrols in
    the South China Sea? What do you read into that, in terms of
    China's military or expansionist intentions?
        Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir. Well, I think it--the Chinese
    communicate to us pretty clearly what they're doing. They see
    themselves as a renewing power. They have the assets to build a
    military. They're building particularly in the army--I mean,
    the navy and the air force, because they understand the
    importance of protection of a--of the global areas that--and
    you're starting to see them operate globally in different
    places, which they didn't operate, years ago.
        They've told us, over and over again, that they believe
    that the ``nine dash line'' in the South China Sea is their
    historic territorial waters. They have--as far as I have--
    understand, they refuse to participate in international legal
    venues. You know, the Filipinos have a case at the U.N. Law of
    the Sea Convention Tribunal now to--challenging the ``nine dash
    line.'' And, far as I know, the Chinese have refused to
    participate in that.
        And so, what they are doing is, they're--through what they
    articulate as peaceful means, they're building these land
    reclamations, they're establishing their position in the South
    China Sea, which opens their options for down the road as this
    thing--as this situation continues to unfold.
        Senator King. I'm out of time. A one-word answer. Do you
    believe it would be beneficial to the United States to accede
    to the Law of the Sea Treaty?
        Admiral Locklear. Yes.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Sullivan.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And, gentlemen, thanks for your testimony and your service.
        Admiral Locklear, thank you for hosting me a couple of
    weeks ago. Appreciate the time. Please send my regards to your
    staff. Three hours on a Saturday is well above and beyond the
    call of duty for anybody, so let them know how much I
    appreciate that.
        You know, I've been critical of many aspects of the
    President's national security strategy, in part because I think
    we've lacked credibility. When we say something that we're
    going to do as a country, we need to do it. And, I think, in
    certain areas of the world, we haven't done that. And I think
    it undermines our National security when we do that.
        One area of the President's strategy that I have been
    supportive of, both militarily and economically, is as--the
    chairman stated, about TPP [the Trans-Pacific Partnership]--is
    the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. And I'm--you know, I believe
    we need to make sure this rebalance and optimization of our
    military forces in the region is credible. We're saying that
    we're going to rebalance. We need to actually do it. Do you
    agree with that?
        Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir, I do. And I think that the
    rebalance is--goes far beyond just military, though.
        Senator Sullivan. Right.
        Admiral Locklear. I think we have to also get our economic
    house in order, as well. Otherwise, all the military
    rebalancing we do will not have the effect that we want it to
    have.
        Senator Sullivan. I agree with that. I appreciate the map,
    the AOR map. Wanted to talk briefly--you know, Alaska is no
    longer in your AOR, but, as we discussed, the troops and--which
    are significant, both in terms of Army BCTs [brigade combat
    teams] and a very robust Air Force presence--those troops are
    still OPCON [operational control] to you, in the event of
    contingencies, aren't they?
        Admiral Locklear. That's correct, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. And how critical do you see these
    troops--and, General Scaparrotti, please comment--in the
    region, in terms of not only shaping, but also contingency
    forces, with regard to your Op Plans?
        Admiral Locklear. Well, Senator, the forces in Alaska, you
    know, if you take a look at the globe, they're as far west as--
    or maybe even farther west, in some cases, than Hawaii is. So,
    the response time that those forces would have into any
    significant contingency in Northeast Asia or Southeast Asia
    would--is quite good, and important. That's why the forces, I
    think, have been OPCON or, to PACOM, for a long time. There's a
    variety of forces up there that are important to us--the
    fighter squadrons that are there, the BCTs that are there--
    including the ranges. The range complexes that we have in
    Alaska are very important, because that's where we get our
    high-end training for, sort of, our hardest types of
    environments that our aviators may have to fly in. So, it's----
        Senator Sullivan. General Scaparrotti, how about you, in
    terms of just the Korean contingency issues?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I agree with Admiral Locklear.
    We rely on those forces as a part of our quick response, which
    we'll need in crisis. We also train with them regularly, and we
    also send forces to train there, too, to----
        Senator Sullivan. Do you think if we removed one or two
    BCTs from Alaska, do you think that would show that we're
    committed to a rebalance or undermine our rebalance commitment?
    Again, this goes to credibility.
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I think that--from the
    perspective of, you know, what the other outcomes were of that,
    from a regional perspective, there would be questions about the
    loss of troops in----
        Senator Sullivan. And the credibility of our rebalance
    strategy?
        General Scaparrotti. I think you'd have to look at it
    holistically. I'd prefer not to take it from just one
    perspective, here. But, I think you'd--I'd have to understand
    the remainder of the changes that were taking place if, in
    fact, that were to happen.
        Senator Sullivan. Admiral Locklear, do you think that would
    undermine our rebalance credibility? Two BCTs----
        Admiral Locklear. Well----
        Senator Sullivan.--in the region leaving the region?
        Admiral Locklear. Yeah, I would answer it in general terms.
    I think that any significant force-structure moves out of the--
    my AOR in the middle of a rebalance would have to be understood
    and have to be explained, because it would be counterintuitive
    to a rebalance to move significant forces in another direction.
        Senator Sullivan. I agree with that. And I think it's a
    really important issue as we look at the rebalance as a
    successful rebalance that's credible.
        Can I turn to--I want to also commend you for what you
    stated in Senator Wicker on the strategic lift issue. I think
    that that was certainly something I saw, on my recent trip,
    that was a concern. We're moving forces to different parts of
    the region, but the strategic lift seems to be lacking, both
    Air Force and ARG [amphibious ready group] capacity. But, to
    get there, we need to have a successful laydown. Are you
    confident that the realignment of forces from Okinawa to Guam
    and Australia and other places is going to be on schedule, in
    terms of costs and timelines that the Department has laid out?
    I know that's something that this committee, as you know, has
    been very focused on.
        Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir. Well, you know, in the last 3
    years, I've had a lot of time to take a look at this and to
    work through it. And my overall assessment is that we're on
    plan at this point in time.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator McCaskill.
        Senator McCaskill. Admiral, in March GAO [the Government
    Accountability Office] published a report on operational
    contract support. And I'm nerdy enough about operational
    contracts that I pay close attention to this stuff. As you
    know, we wasted billions of dollars in Iraq and Afghanistan
    because we had not embraced training on contracting as a core
    capacity of our commands engaged in the contingency. And in
    that report, it indicated that your command is the furthest
    behind in incorporating operational contract support in its
    joint training exercises and operation plans. Now, I know that
    GAO noted that you have taken some recent positive steps to
    address this, but I'd like you to lay out, if you would
    briefly, the steps you're taking to include operational
    contract support in your command's joint training exercises.
        Admiral Locklear. Well, thank you. I--not to make excuses,
    but I think the reason that we're probably behind is because we
    haven't had the demand signal that was put on the commanders in
    the Middle East in the last several wars, and we haven't had
    that type of a massive, rapid buildup to support a war effort
    anywhere.
        That said, we did recognize it, after that report, as a
    deficiency. And we're looking hard at, Where are those
    contracting decisions made? How is the commander have
    visibility to those contracting decisions during the execution
    of a crisis or an execution of a campaign? Because, you know,
    when a crisis occurs, stuff just starts coming. And that's
    good. That's what makes us so strong. But, when it starts
    coming, then, at some point in time, you have to decide what's
    enough and what's not enough, and then who's going to be the
    steward of it down the road. So, we're trying to understand the
    command and control of those contractors and how much the
    leadership knows, and what they need to know, and when.
        Senator McCaskill. Well, I think it's so critical that we
    never lose sight of this contracting oversight and planning and
    training as a core capacity, because we're never going to go
    back to the day--my father peeled potatoes in World War II--
    we're not going to have our trained warfighters peeling
    potatoes ever again. And all we have to do is look at the long,
    ugly saga of all the LOGCAP [Logistics Civil Augmentation
    Program] contracts to realize what happens when contracting is
    not considered a huge priority. So, I appreciate your attention
    to that.
        On another note, I know that you are the primary jammer
    provider, in the Navy, for DOD. Could you speak about the role
    of airborne electronic attacks and how critical they are? And
    how critical is the asset of our really only electronic warfare
    capability that is provided by the Growler?
        Admiral Locklear. I've been a huge supporter of Growler for
    my entire Navy career. The transition of the Prowler squadrons,
    which were so significant in many of our conflicts, and provide
    us what I thought was a asymmetric advantage in our airspace
    because of their capabilities, I was glad to see that--those
    capabilities, and jammer types of capabilities, transition to
    a--you know, basically, a fourth-generation-plus aircraft that
    can operate effectively in denied airspaces.
        So, in any campaign that I would envision that would be of
    a higher-end warfare in my AOR, electronic warfare attack
    provides me battlespace that I have--may have to go fight for.
    And those Growlers and, to some degree, the other higher-end
    capabilities that we have are critical to allowing us to have
    that access.
        Senator McCaskill. I--finally, I want to touch on the
    stresses that we're feeling on remote piloted aircraft [RPA].
    As you know, Whiteman is the home to the 20th Reconnaissance
    Squadron, and those pilots and those sensor operators and those
    intelligence personnels, along with the airmen who are
    operating the Predator and the Reaper, are very important. We
    are putting incredibly high demands on these folks. I mean,
    they're not getting normal rest. They are not getting time for
    training. We can't even rotate some of them into a training
    capacity, because the demand is so high.
        Could you briefly talk about what steps can be taken to
    alleviate what I think is a critical problem? I mean, these
    guys are--they're--they are working round the clock, and
    getting very little break. I don't know that we would do this
    to a traditional warfighter, but we're doing it to these RPAs.
        Admiral Locklear. Well, the advent of these systems in the
    past couple of decades, and the obvious benefit that they've
    brought to the battlespace, has put pressure, I think, on the
    Air Force to be able to produce the types of people and to be
    able to man them. But, the--unfortunately, the demand signal
    just goes up and up and up.
        One of the asymmetric strengths of the United States is our
    ability to sense and understand what's going on. We have the
    best ISR in the world, but it's way overtaxed for the number of
    demands we have globally. And that's where it's showing, is in
    the faces and the working hours of these young people. So, we
    need to rationalize, number one, what are the platforms that
    we're going to invest in the future, and then build a structure
    of man, train, and equip underneath it that's sustainable.
        Senator McCaskill. Yeah, I particularly worry, because I
    think we have a tendency to think of these as machines, and
    don't realize the human component of this and the stresses they
    have. I mean, these guys are manning these things for 10-12
    hours, and then going home to their families for supper and
    homework, and then getting up pretty quickly and going back at
    it. And it's a unique kind of role, and certainly
    nontraditional, as we look at the history of our military. And
    I just want you to share with your colleagues that, talking to
    some of these folks, you know, it's clear to me that we need to
    be thinking about their well-being and whether or not we are
    overutilizing them, and what kind of stresses we're going to
    see in that personnel.
        Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Ernst.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thank you, Admiral Locklear and General Scaparrotti, for
    being here today, and for your men and women that serve, as
    well. I appreciate it very much.
        As you know, the DOD is planning to transfer operational
    control, or OPCON, of South Korea forces to the South Korean
    Government in the event of another conflict on the Peninsula.
    And this OPCON transfer has been discussed for many, many
    years. It was originally supposed to take place in 2007. It's
    been delayed many, many times in the past number of years. And
    it does appear to be, currently, indefinitely postponed. So,
    can you describe some of those challenges that we're being
    faced with, and those that the South Koreans are facing in
    their efforts to create conditions which would allow us to
    successfully do the OPCON transfer?
        General?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, ma'am, thank you.
        As you know, this past October, the Secretary of Defense
    and the MINDEF [South Korea Ministry of Defense] agreed upon a
    conditional approach to OPCON transition--or OPCON transition.
    In the past, it had been focused on a date with capabilities.
    So, in short, I agreed with the change that we made to focus on
    capabilities and conditions, as opposed to shooting for a date.
        Three general conditions. The first is, is that South Korea
    develop the command-and-control capacity to be able to lead a
    combined and multinational force in a high-intensity conflict.
    The second is that it--that they have the capabilities to
    respond to the growing nuclear and missile threat in North
    Korea. And the third general condition is that this transition
    take time at a--take place at a time that is conducive to a
    transition.
        Now, there are specific capabilities I mentioned that are
    listed in detail as a part of this--a part of the agreement.
    I'll cover, generally, the main areas.
        The first was C4 [Command and Control, Communications, and
    Computers] in terms of their capability there, which I
    mentioned earlier; ballistic missile defense, generally, and
    their capability there; the munitions that they have to have on
    hand for us to conduct a high-intensity conflict; and then,
    finally, the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
    assets necessary in an environment that is very challenging for
    ISR, and particularly with the assets and the asymmetric assets
    that North Korea is developing.
        So, in a nutshell, those are the things that are the
    challenges that we have, as an alliance, and Republic of Korea
    is focused on enhancing.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you.
        Admiral, do you have any thoughts?
        Admiral Locklear. No, I think the dynamic that's most
    changing in this dialogue about OPCON transfer is the behavior
    of Kim Jung-Un. And so, that has to be brought in the
    calculation, as well.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you.
        And, General, I do agree, absolutely, it's capabilities
    versus calendar. We have to look at those capabilities.
        So, realistically, do you think moving forward with OPCON
    transfer--is that in foreseeable future? And if it is, what are
    the benefits to us, then, of doing the OPCON transfer?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I think it is foreseeable. I
    don't think it's in the short term. And I think it's of
    benefit, in terms of--you know, our presence in the alliance
    that we have with Republic of Korea, I think, is very important
    for regional security. It plays into global security, as well,
    because they've been a very good partner of ours for a number
    of years, and they're developing the capability, and they've
    actually employed forces around the world, and they've deployed
    in support of us, as well, in some of the conflicts that we've
    been involved in.
        So, I think, in the long term, the alliance and its
    development in this regard is good for both countries.
        Senator Ernst. Very good. I do know the South Koreans were
    engaged at Tallil Air Force Base when my trucks were rolling
    through that area. And we do appreciate their support of those
    types of efforts.
        I have very little time left, but I do want to thank you,
    gentlemen, for being here today, as well as the service of your
    men and women.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Kaine.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, to the
    witnesses, for your testimony today.
        Mr. Chair, I appreciate the way you're doing these
    hearings. I now see the method in the madness. To have the
    strategic hearing a couple of days ago--we had a wonderful
    hearing with some strategic experts on this topic--before we
    get to ask you questions actually makes this discussion work
    very well. And I appreciate the chairman setting it up that
    way.
        Three quick questions. Admiral Locklear, as our military
    lead in PACOM, describe why U.S. support for the Law of the Sea
    Treaty is something you'd support. You gave the one-word answer
    to Senator King, and I'm asking the ``Why?'' question.
        Admiral Locklear. Well, I'll speak about it from the
    military side, or from the sea side. It's----
        Senator Kaine. There are additional elements, as well.
        Admiral Locklear. There are additional elements----
        Senator Kaine. From the military side.
        Admiral Locklear.--in it that I won't comment on, because
    it's not my area to do.
        But, first of all, it's widely accepted, after a lot of
    years of deliberation by many, many countries, most countries
    in my AOR. It provides a framework that we--that most countries
    that look at it believe is useful for us determining who,
    particularly in these sea spaces and these EEZs [exclusive
    ecomonic zones] and things that aren't quite, provides a proper
    framework for how to go about dealing with those disputes. So,
    it's a rule of law, a rule of process that's a good thing. By
    not being in--to be honest with you, on the military side,
    we've been directed by numerous Presidents to comply with the
    Law of the Sea, at least as it reflects the way we interact
    with our--with other countries and our partners.
        That said, when we're not a signatory, it reduces our
    overall credibility when we bring it up as a choice to--of how
    you might solve a dispute of any kind.
        Senator Kaine. Second question, to the ``Thucydides Trap.''
    You indicated that the United States should do what we can,
    reasonably, that is within our interests, to accommodate the
    rise of China within the network of global institutions. And I
    think you laid out a pretty good rationale. The more they are
    engaged in the global institutions, that can have a pro-
    stability effect.
        One current matter that is pending before Congress is
    reforms to the IMF [International Monetary Fund] that would
    enable China to have more of a role--more voting power, but
    also more of a financial obligation, in terms of the work of
    the IMF. I don't want you to comment on, you know, IMF reform
    if that's not your lane and you don't have an opinion. But,
    that is the kind of thing, wouldn't you agree, that we ought to
    be taking a look at if we're going to try to accommodate
    China's growing influence? Having them more engaged and play
    more of a leadership role in global institutions--you mentioned
    the U.N. [United Nations] as one--but, global institutions like
    the IMF is one way to accomplish that integration that can be
    ultimately a pro-stability move? Would you not agree?
        Admiral Locklear. Yes, I absolutely agree. I mean, you
    know, if China is--inevitable rise to be a world power in the
    many different venues, they inevitably have to participate and
    be part of those institutions. And they have to take some
    responsibility for these things.
        Senator Kaine. Kind of the commonsense--you know, the law
    firms that get founded by strong partners, they often run
    aground when the next generation of young, excited partners
    want leadership roles. And, you know, law firms that don't make
    room for the young leaders as they come up find that they split
    away and then they end up being harsh competitors. If they find
    a way to accommodate them in, it often holds it together. I
    mean, it--you know, it just seems like that's kind of a basic
    analogy that we see a lot in human situations.
        Well, I would hope that, on both Law of the Sea and IMF
    reform, that we would take it seriously, here, because, while
    they have nonmilitary dimensions, I do think they bear directly
    upon some of the military issues that we might have.
        Last thing I'd like to just commend you on and ask you one
    final question. I like the fact that you, in your written
    testimony--and I like the fact that some of our witnesses the
    other day--talk about Indo-Asia-Pacific. You know, the--India
    has had an interesting history, militarily, with the United
    States. And, more generally, the Congress Party kind of have a
    long nonaligned tradition that actually made them slant a
    little bit toward Russia, in terms of purchasing materiel. But,
    now they are significantly engaged with the United States and
    U.S. companies. They do more military exercises with the United
    States than they do with any other nation. I think there is an
    opportunity, under Prime Minister Modi--I know the Chair has
    spent time with him, and others have, too--to deepen that
    relationship. Just, as I conclude, could you share your thought
    on the U.S./India military partnership at this moment?
        Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir.
        Part of the rebalance was to develop a strategy for a
    longer-term security relationship with India. We're doing that.
    We have, I think, a tremendous opportunity, here, as the
    leadership changes in India, and the world changes, for them to
    be a growing partner with the United States--not necessarily an
    aligned partner, but a growing partner. I believe that some of
    the defense trade initiatives that we have with them will help
    bring us together in a more productive way for many years to
    come.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you very much.
        And thank both of you for your work.
        And we--General Scaparrotti, I do believe that the work in
    South Korea is important. And we've been able to draw down our
    numbers. And I know the South Korean military is more
    effective, in many ways, than they have been. But, I think it
    is an important relationship. They've been good allies, as have
    the Japanese and others in the Pacific. And that long-term
    umbrella relationship/partnership that we've had remains
    important, I think, to the world and to United States
    interests. So, I appreciate the work that you're doing. I
    appreciate the importance of the Pacific. It's just undeniable,
    it seems to me.
        Our Strategic Forces Subcommittee has dealt a good bit with
    nuclear weapons, our relationship with Russia, the drawdown of
    our treaty--under the treaty, our nuclear weapon system,
    Admiral Locklear, but we don't talk enough about China's
    position. They've built a nuclear weapons capability, and I
    assume they have the ability to surge that at any point they
    choose to. They have the finances and the technology and the
    capability of doing that. Is that correct?
        Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir. We've observed them pursuing a
    deliberate modernization of their nuclear forces, both those
    that are land-based and the ones that are subsurface-based.
    They now have, I believe, three operational submarines in the
    Pacific--ballistic missile submarines. That could grow, I
    think, to four or five in the future. And we know that they're
    pursuing missile systems to be--missiles to be able to put on
    there that will extend their ability for nuclear--second-strike
    nuclear attack is what they explain--how they explain it. But,
    it is growing, and I think that it will be a continued
    consideration for us as war planners.
        Senator Sessions. We, in Congress, and policymakers in
    Washington, need to understand the reality of the--a nuclear-
    armed submarine. How many missiles would that--those
    submarines--Chinese submarines be able to handle and launch,
    and how many warheads could they launch?
        Admiral Locklear. To give you an accurate answer, let me
    respond to that for the record, if you don't mind. But,
    multiple.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        China currently has 4 operational Jin-class (Type 094) ballistic
    missile submarines (SSBNs). Each submarine can carry 12 JL-2 submarine
    launched ballistic missiles each equipped with up to a single 1MT
    nuclear warhead.

        Senator Sessions. Would it compete with our capabilities?
    Or--if you're able to say. If not, that's all right.
        Admiral Locklear. I wouldn't say, sir.
        Senator Sessions. All right.
        One of the strategies that China has used has been to
    create a zone outside the Nation to make it difficult for our
    ships to inhabit, and put them at risk. Is that continue--is
    that part of a DF-21 missile plan? And do they have other plans
    designed to make it more difficult for our ships to be within
    hundreds of miles of the shore?
        Admiral Locklear. Across the board, the Chinese have
    improved their--greatly improved their ability to build
    missiles of all kinds--cruise missiles, ballistic missile
    defense, air defense missiles. So, they do have, I think, quite
    credible technology. The DF-21 missiles you're talking about is
    a missile that I--that they're fielding and testing and
    producing, that could potentially, if employed properly and
    work right, it would put U.S. forces at sea at risk at greater
    and greater distances. But, it's one of those things that we
    are dealing with and trying to answer.
        Senator Sessions. I think you're correct. And I think the
    Navy's thinking clearly about that, and in a wise way.
        What about the capabilities that we have? Army has some
    potential land-based missiles that could create, also, a zone
    around our interests, our country, our territories, that could
    protect us. Has any thought been given, as I believe Secretary
    Hagel mentioned, of using some of those capabilities to--from
    land--to provide a better safe zone around our bases and
    territories?
        Admiral Locklear. I wouldn't know, Senator, exactly what
    Secretary Hagel was talking about that time, but I'd be glad to
    get specifics and to answer it.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The US Army currently deploys air and missile defense systems such
    as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), AN/TPY-2 surveillance
    radars, and Patriot missile systems at US bases throughout the Pacific
    that are designed to protect US strategic interests. Army Missile
    defense capabilities found in the Patriot and THAAD defense systems
    create the most meaningful ``safe zones.'' The rapid fielding of
    Patriot PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement interceptors, Indirect Fire
    Protection Capability (IFPC) 2-I, and Integrated Air and Missile
    Defense Battle Command System (IBCS) to USPACOM Air and Missile Defense
    units along with maturing directed energy and rail gun technologies
    will extend our protection capabilities, further increasing US freedom
    of maneuver and access.

        Senator Sessions. All right.
        Well, thank you both for your service. And I believe we
    have a fabulously capable military, well led by talented
    leaders. And we thank you for that.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Donnelly.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you both for your service.
        Admiral Locklear, what would you say is--and I apologize, I
    haven't been here the entire time--when you look, the two
    biggest challenges you look at in your command?
        Admiral Locklear. Well, the biggest challenge, off the bat,
    is making sure that we can respond effectively to what I think
    is the most dangerous situation, is the North Korea Peninsula.
    So, I have a huge responsibility for helping NORTHCOM with the
    defense of homeland, defensing--defense of Hawaii, defense of
    Guam, and then follow-on forces on things that flow in to
    support General Scaparrotti on what could be a very short-line
    problem in Korea. So--North Korea--so, that's kind of number
    one problem.
        Senator Donnelly. Okay.
        Admiral Locklear. But, the second, I think, is just
    ensuring that the rebalance does what it needs to, to ensure
    that United States is properly positioned in the Asia-Pacific
    for the rest of this century. And under that fall a lot of
    things: ensuring that the alliances are as strong as they can
    be, building new partnerships, and, in some cases, ensuring
    that the rise of China doesn't turn into a ``Thucydides Trap.''
        Senator Donnelly. Okay.
        General Scaparrotti, as you look at Kim Jung-Un, when you
    look at the decision-making process that he uses--and I don't
    know that the appropriate word is ``random,'' but would you
    say, is there, like, a chain of command or a general structured
    way that decisions are made, or is it pretty much--you're not
    usually certain as to which way something's going to go with
    him?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir, thank you.
        We don't know a lot about the decision-making process
    inside of that regime. If you look at just the 3 years he's
    been the leader, he's changed his senior leadership more than
    his father and his grandfather, put together. And so, from one
    perspective, the use of carrot and stick, the use of brutality,
    in many cases, in order to ensure absolute loyalty to him, I
    think, undercuts and leaves concern with me that, one, he's got
    a group around him that will be frank with him, that won't only
    tell him what he wants to hear. So, I think that's a dynamic
    within that decisionmaking process that gives me concern.
        Senator Donnelly. And as you look at the way the
    decisionmaking is going on right now, it appears there is
    somewhat of a move toward Russia, toward creating an additional
    strengthening of bonds between them. Do you think that provides
    any more stability for them, or do you think it just makes them
    more dangerous?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I think you can see, not only
    the outreach to Russia, but others in the last year, as an
    attempt by them to get around the sanctions, which are having
    an effect, and to develop others that would provide trade and
    funds to them, which, you know, their economy, they're very
    tight, particularly given the percentage of it that he puts
    into his military. So, I think that's his attempt, there. We
    don't see a lot of return on those efforts at this point.
        Senator Donnelly. Admiral, when the North Koreans start to
    saber-rattle and start to make a lot of noise, ofttimes, your
    command brings a presence into the area there and helps to
    change the discussion. Do you have fears or concerns about any
    plans they might have to come after your fleet, in particular?
        Admiral Locklear. Well, certainly, when we're talking in
    the context of North Koreans, you can't rule out any
    unpredictable type of--
        Senator Donnelly. Right.
        Admiral Locklear.--activity. So, we know that they also
    pursue a pretty significant sea--you know, missile program,
    whether--how good it is, sometimes we're not sure. But, that's
    not just a ballistic missile capability, but a--cruise missile
    capabilities that would have to be considered when forces were
    put in the area. But--and they also have a submarine force
    that's--if it's operational, could be quite unpredictable, with
    mini-subs and things like that.
        But, they're generally locally contained, not far-reaching.
    So, at this point, I'm not really concerned about our ability
    to project power, should we have to support a contingency in
    North Korea.
        Senator Donnelly. General, what is the one thing in your
    command that you're most concerned about?
        General Scaparrotti. Sir, I'm most concerned about a
    provocation, which North Korea commits two or three every year,
    and one of those provocations escalating into conflict.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Cotton.
        Senator Cotton. Admiral Locklear, General Scaparrotti,
    thank you both for your time and for your service, and, more
    importantly, for the service of all the men and women in
    uniform that you represent in your commands.
        Admiral Locklear, do you believe that China's increasing
    aggression in the South China Sea reflects their calculations
    that the United States lacks the willpower and capability to
    challenge them in the South China Sea?
        Admiral Locklear. Well, I'd--you'd have to ask the Chinese
    if that's the way they feel about it. My guess is that they--as
    they always do, I believe, they listen carefully to how the
    United States feels about things, globally as well as in that
    region, and, where they have a clear understanding of U.S.
    position, they have a more--a tendency to understand it and
    respect it.
        Senator Cotton. Do you think the balance of power is
    shifting to the point where they believe that they now have a
    military advantage over us in their regional waters inside the
    first island chain?
        Admiral Locklear. I don't think they think they have a
    military advantage over us, because they also recognize that
    we're a global power, and that they're not a global power. I
    think that they believe that their ability to build and produce
    the military they have has provided additional decision space
    for them in their local region.
        Senator Cotton. One point you mentioned is the importance
    of clarity. Deterrence works best whenever the lines we draw
    are clear and strongly enforced. I've read press reports
    recently that, during Prime Minister Abe's visit to Washington
    later this month, the United States may make an explicit pledge
    to protect the Senkaku Islands, which are currently under
    administrative control of Japan. But, China also claims them.
    Do you think that would be a wise step to take for the purposes
    of stability in the East-Asian theater?
        Admiral Locklear. Well, my understanding is, we have pretty
    much made it clear our position in the East China Sea, as it
    relates to the Senkaku Islands. We still maintain we don't take
    a side on territorial disputes, so, in the long run, the issue
    of the sovereignty of Senkakus is for them to figure out. But,
    what we have said, and it's been said at numerous levels, is
    that the Senkakus Islands do fall within the administrative
    control of Japan and do fall within the mutual defense treaty
    with Japan. And I believe that that, alone, has provided a
    level of stability to the issues in the East China Sea,
    Northeast Asia.
        Senator Cotton. The press reports--I appreciate and
    understand and agree with the points you have made--the press
    reports I've seen have suggested that we would be reducing that
    to writing, though. And writing, in these matters, I think, can
    provide some more clarity than words.
        Could you comment briefly on your military-to-military
    relations with Thailand at the time?
        Admiral Locklear. Well, we maintain military-to-military
    contact with Thailand. We do it at a lower level, a post-coup
    or post---post-coup. We were on a very good glide slope, a very
    positive glide slope. I think the--prior to the coup, the
    opportunities that we were pursuing together were quite good
    for the region. Thailand is our oldest ally. In the end, it's
    my expectation that we want to keep Thailand. We love the Thai
    people. They're very close to American people. And we have
    similar value systems. And so, it's important for that.
        But, post-coup, we have truncated a number of military-to-
    military activities, reduced them in scope. And we're managing
    those through an interagency process, where we go through and
    decide, ``Is this one that we want to continue, or not?'' What
    we're hopeful for is that the leadership--current leadership in
    Thailand will move actively and aggressively to restore, you
    know, rule of law, constitutional processes, and civilian
    control of government.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        And, General Scaparrotti, Korea is, in many ways, a unique
    area of operations in the world, calling for some unique
    capabilities. I want to speak briefly about cluster munitions.
    Our stated policy is, as of January 1, 2019, we will no longer
    use such munitions that have a greater-than-1-percent
    unexploded rate. Can you describe the effect this policy will
    have on current operations and contingency planning, and also
    maybe the challenges it'll--we'll face achieving that rate?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir.
        The cluster munitions are an important part of the munition
    inventory that I have. They--because of the effect that they
    create for me. There are plans right now, work being done, for
    a replacement munition that would meet the requirements of less
    than 1 percent dud rate. But, I--that's a requirement that we
    must meet, as you said, before 2019. We would use other
    munitions, but the munitions that we have available just simply
    don't provide the effect that the--of those that I have today
    in my inventory.
        Senator Cotton. Okay.
        Gentlemen, thank you both again for your service and the
    service of all those you represent, and your families and
    theirs.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Locklear, General Scaparrotti, thank you both for
    being here this morning.
        Admiral Locklear, in your testimony, you point out the
    significance of China's military modernization efforts. And,
    earlier this week, we heard from Admiral Roughead, from some
    other experts on East Asia, about China's modernization and how
    swiftly that has happened. What do we need to do to respond to
    what's happening in China? And can you also talk about how, if
    we go back to a level of funding that's required by
    sequestration, what that does to our efforts to make sure that
    we are technologically ahead of where the Chinese are?
        Admiral Locklear. Well, I think, first of all, we need to
    continue to encourage the Chinese to be more transparent, and
    to be more forward-leaning in how they respond to their
    neighbors, how they respond in the international community, to
    be a responsible leader in the region. I mean, if they're going
    to have a military, and they want to use it for security, then
    they should be part of the global security environment,
    participating with others, not being at odds with them. And
    that's a choice they have to make. We also have to make a
    choice to accept them into that environment. So, that's
    something we have to always consider. And there may be some
    risk as we do it, because we--as they rise as a power, it will
    be collaborative, on one hand, and competitive, on another. And
    that kind of relationship resorts in friction, and it will
    always be friction. And then that friction, some of it, may end
    up happening in the South China Sea or the East China Sea. So,
    managing that friction, and understanding how to manage it so
    it doesn't escalate into a large contingency, is very, very
    important for all us, particularly between the United States
    and China. So, we're working that part of it.
        Senator Shaheen. And so, before you answer the sequester
    question, how important is the effort to rebalance--I use that
    term in parenthesis--to Asia that----
        Admiral Locklear. Right.
        Senator Shaheen.--has been set out in doing those kinds of
    things----
        Admiral Locklear. Right.
        Senator Shaheen.--with respect to China?
        Admiral Locklear. Well, the rebalance is not about China.
    China is just one of many issues around----
        Senator Shaheen. Right.
        Admiral Locklear.--why the United States should be in Asia-
    Pacific, why we should have a security posture there. But, they
    are a big concern in that. And so, the rebalance is--and, on
    the military side, ensuring that we have the right assets to be
    able to manage the situations, to be able to understand the
    environment, and to be able to respond effectively, are
    extremely critical. The readiness of those assets, the
    readiness of the men and women that man them, are critical.
        So, in sequestration, what happens is that, in general, you
    have less force structure that's less ready, that's less
    technologically capable. So, we get under fiscal pressure, like
    we're in now, the first--one of the first things to go is
    technological advances, because we've got to keep what we've
    got, right? Because nobody wants to change. So, the things that
    we need to stay relative, not only in that part of the world,
    but globally, in the technological arena in warfighting, starts
    to get pushed off the table, and pushed to the right. And it
    gets pushed into timelines that make us start to lose our
    technological advantages in warfighting.
        Senator Shaheen. One of the things we heard from former
    Admiral Roughead earlier this week was the importance of
    continuing the carrier-launched UAVs [unmanned aerial
    vehicles], and that that program would become even more
    important as we look at what we need to do in the Asia-Pacific.
    Do you share that view? And how do you see that affecting what
    we need to do in that part of the world?
        Admiral Locklear. Well, I think, in general, the--whether
    they're launched off of carriers or launched anywhere else in
    my particular area, that unmanned vehicles, both air and
    surface and subsurface, are a significant part of the future.
    So--because anytime you can take man out of the loop, you
    operate in denied environment. It's a much easier--there's a
    lot of benefits to it.
        So, to the degree that the--a UAV would be from a carrier--
    a carrier, for me, is just a very flexible airfield that can
    operate widely through the theater. So, I would see huge
    benefits in being able to operate long-range ISR, long-range
    strike, if necessary, from those platforms.
        Senator Shaheen. And, General Scaparrotti, is this
    something that would be beneficial to you in the Korean
    theater?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, ma'am, absolutely.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Ayotte.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you, both of you, for what you're
    doing for the country.
        I wanted to ask about--follow up, Admiral Locklear, on your
    written testimony, where you said, ``Iran has built its robust
    nuclear infrastructure and advanced its ballistic missile
    systems with materials that have passed through PACOM AOR. Can
    you help us understand how are they getting these materials?
    And also, could you describe for us what you understand is the
    cooperation between Iran and North Korea, in particular on
    their missile programs?
        Admiral Locklear. Well, I think it's pretty well known that
    there's been a movement of proliferation activity from our--
    from North Korea into Iran, in this case, of the types of
    technologies Iran was looking for. And I think that's been
    known through the interagency for some time.
        Senator Ayotte. And do you think that's how they're
    advancing their intercontinental ballistic missile program?
    With advice from North Korea?
        Admiral Locklear. I would say I wouldn't discount that as a
    possibility.
        Senator Ayotte. Yeah. So, in addition to that, you've also
    noted that North Korea continues to procure for its nuclear and
    ballistics missiles program and--from the region in a network
    of individuals and entities in the region. And, as you know,
    that violates U.N. Security Council Resolution 1718, in terms
    of the ability of member states to directly or indirectly
    supply to North Korea these kinds of materials. And obviously
    there are many U.N. resolutions that apply to Iran, as well.
    But--so, as I look at that testimony, what more can we do to
    isolate North Korea, in terms of those that are supplying the
    country things that we don't want them to have and are against
    U.N. resolutions? And who do we need to be tougher on in the
    region in that regard?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I think that, primarily in terms
    of proliferation security, we have a proliferation security
    initiative that's global in nature, and multinational. I think
    that's also an important key, because we have to bring in--we
    have to deal with other nations that help provide intelligence
    and also forces that may help us in interdiction, et cetera.
    We--and continuing our training in that regard, which we do.
        In terms of the Nations that I think we have to be
    concerned about, I'd prefer to answer that actually for the
    record in a classified document, as opposed to here in the open
    forum, if I could.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [Deleted.]

        Senator Ayotte. Of course. Thank you, General. I appreciate
    that.
        I also wanted to follow up, Admiral Locklear--I note, in
    your written testimony, you mentioned Taiwan, I believe, once,
    in passing. In light of China's major military buildup, what's
    your assessment of the current balance of military capabilities
    in the Taiwan Strait, between the PLA and Taiwan? And where
    does Taiwan have an advantage? And where is the PLA's
    advantage? So, what concerns are you hearing from the
    Taiwanese, and what platforms, weapons, assistance, and
    training has Taiwan requested from the United States that we
    haven't yet provided?
        Admiral Locklear. Well, we have a robust interaction from
    the PACOM headquarters with Taiwan. In fact, we have, ongoing
    right now over there, their major annual exercise, where we
    participate with them. We send advisors, overseers, and we go--
    and, in fact, we sent General Thurman, who used to be
    Scaparrotti's predecessor, who will be over there with them, at
    my request, advising them and assisting them. And so, that's
    important.
        I think that, in general, over time, the capabilities of
    the PLA--the PRC--will vastly eclipse what the Taiwanese could
    produce on their own. It's just a matter of magnitude of force
    size if China--the PRC stays on the course that it's on now.
        We--my task is to support the Taiwan Relations Act and to
    provide my advice to the--up to the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense and then up to the President for him to decide on what
    we--what kind of things we provide.
        I know that they have requested our assistance in submarine
    programs, and we're contemplating that at this point in time,
    but not--have not committed them one way or the other. They are
    particularly interested in us helping them in cyber security
    areas that allow them to pursue asymmetric capabilities that
    will improve their defense and improve their confidence that
    they can make decisions on their own and not be coerced.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
        Chairman McCain. Colonel Graham.
        Senator Graham. Thank you, Captain.
        Admiral, would you describe China's behavior toward their
    neighbors as provocative?
        Admiral Locklear. I would call it aggressive. And I guess
    provocative would be in the eyes of the beholder. But, from my
    view, it's aggressive.
        Senator Graham. From the eyes of the Japanese, would you
    say it's provocative?
        Admiral Locklear. I think they would say yes.
        Senator Graham. Okay.
        North Korea. General, would you say the regime, on a good
    day, is unstable?
        General Scaparrotti. No, sir. I'd say the Kim Jong-un is in
    control. We see no indicators of instability at this time.
        Senator Graham. So, you think we don't have to worry much
    about North Korea?
        General Scaparrotti. Oh, no, sir, that's not----
        Senator Graham. Okay. When I----
        General Scaparrotti.--what I'm trying to say.
        Senator Graham.--say ``unstable,'' I mean unpredictable,
    provocative.
        General Scaparrotti. Unpredictable, provocative----
        Senator Graham. Yeah.
        General Scaparrotti.--danger. Yes.
        Senator Graham. Yeah, that's what I meant. I was----
        General Scaparrotti. Willing to--I think, willing to be
    provocative, as well.
        Senator Graham. So, in your backyard, you've got dangerous,
    provocative, unstable, with nukes in North Korea, right?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir, within short distance from
    the capital.
        Senator Graham. The leader of North Korea seems to be,
    like, nuts. I don't know how else you'd describe the guy, but
    he seems nutty to me.
        So, under sequestration, at the end of the day, how will
    your ability to defend the Korean Peninsula and our interests
    in that region be affected, from an Army point of view?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, from a holistic point of view,
    sequestration would, as Admiral Locklear just said, end up with
    a smaller force, a less ready force, probably a force----
        Senator Graham. Well, if the Army goes down to 420,000--
    let's say that's the number they one day hit if we don't fix
    sequestration----
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham.--how does your theater of operations fare,
    in terms of threats and----
        General Scaparrotti. Sir, in high-intensity conflict that
    you'll have on the Korean Peninsula, I'd be very concerned
    about having a force that had enough depth, particularly for
    sustained operation.
        Senator Graham. So, it would be seen as weakening our
    position in Asia, right?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. Admiral, under sequestration, the Navy
    would have approximately how many ships if it was fully
    implemented?
        Admiral Locklear. Well, I'd have to refer that back to the
    Navy. I don't have the exact numbers.
        Senator Graham. How many do you have in your----
        Admiral Locklear. I have about 150 ships in my AOR that are
    assigned from--all the way from San Diego to the theater.
    Probably about 50 or so of those are west of the Date Line at
    any given time. So, what would be impacted by the size of the
    Navy is their ability to rotate forces forward to augment the
    ones that are west of the Date Line all the time, which is the
    problem we're having now with sustaining our numbers, because
    of the readiness bathtub we're in, even with the size we have
    today. So, sequestration would just drive that further into the
    ground.
        Senator Graham. It would be hard to pivot to Asia under
    sequestration.
        Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. All right. So, the likelihood of a armed
    conflict between South Korea and North Korea, how would you
    evaluate that on a 1-to-10 scale--1 being very unlikely, 10
    being highly likely--say, in the next 10 years?
        General?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, sir, I think that--I'd caveat by
    saying that I think that KJU [Kim Jong-un] knows that if he
    were to conduct a conventional attack on South Korea, it would
    be the end. So, I don't think that's his purpose. I think it's
    to maintain his regime. But, I think, over a 10-year period,
    it's above a 5. It's a 6, probably.
        Senator Graham. And the more we reduce our forces, the less
    deterrent--it may go up a 7.
        General Scaparrotti. Sir, I think, with less deterrence, it
    becomes more likely that we'd have a conflict.
        Senator Graham. Okay.
        Admiral, from your point of view, if we reduce our forces
    in your theater of operations to sequestration level, do you
    think that encourages China to be more provocative?
        Admiral Locklear. I think any signal that we send that
    we're less interested in the Asia-Pacific, on the security
    side, than we currently are would be an invitation for change
    in the region and that China would be interested in pursuing.
        Senator Graham. Do our allies in the region--are they
    beginning to hedge their bets? What's their view toward our
    footprint and where we're headed?
        Admiral Locklear. I don't think they're necessarily
    unsatisfied with our military footprint. I think what they're
    concerned about most is that--is the growing divide between
    what they see as the economic center of gravity, which is
    predominantly Asia or--and more and more around China, and
    their security center of gravity, which is around us. So, that
    creates a conundrum for them as they have to deal with
    strategic decisionmaking. You know, they want us as a security
    grantor, because they believe that we're--I mean, they see us
    as a benevolent power, and they like how we operate, but they
    also see us as a diminished economic power in the region that
    they have to deal with that.
        Senator Graham. Thank you.
        Chairman McCain. Admiral and General, I would appreciate it
    if, for the record, you would give a written estimate to this
    committee as to the effects of sequestration on your ability to
    carry out your responsibilities. And please make it as detailed
    as you wish. We're going to have this fight again on
    sequestration, ongoing. And members of this committee are
    dedicated to the proposition that we have to repeal
    sequestration. And your testimony as to the effects of
    sequestration can affect that government--that argument
    probably more effectively than anything that members on this
    side of the dais could accomplish. So, I would very much
    appreciate it if you would give us, as detailed as possible,
    short-term and long-term effects of sequestration on your
    ability to carry out your responsibilities.
        Chairman McCain. Admiral, is this your last appearance
    before this committee?
        Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir, it is.
        Chairman McCain. Well, I want to take the opportunity, on
    behalf of all of us on this committee and in the U.S. Senate,
    thanking you for your outstanding service. I think you can be
    very proud of the many contributions that you've made to this
    Nation's security. And you're one of the reasons why leaders in
    uniform are so highly respected and regarded by the people of
    this Nation. So, I thank you, Admiral.
        This hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:27 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
                  partner capacity/foreign military financing
        1. Senator McCain. Admiral Locklear, we heard testimony from Dr.
    Mike Green before this committee on April 14, 2015, that the U.S.
    Pacific Command (PACOM) area of responsibility only receives about one
    percent of total Foreign Military Financing (FMF). The committee hears
    frequently about the importance of helping Asia-Pacific states build
    better maritime domain awareness and Coast Guard capabilities, but
    these efforts appear limited in scope. Can you discuss any potential
    gaps between your desired level of FMF for the USPACOM theater and the
    actual financing the region receives? Can you provide an update for the
    committee on our efforts to help build the maritime capacity of states
    like the Philippines and Vietnam?
        Admiral Locklear. The USPACOM Theater Security Cooperation process
    is a disciplined process that since 2013 resulted in decreased
    disparity between FMF requests and actual FMF allocations. This is
    evidence of the rigorous security cooperation planning process we've
    instituted in recent years, producing disciplined resource demand
    signals. Current FMF budget requests draw direct linkages between the
    Country Team's Integrated Country Strategy/Mission Resource Request
    goals and USPACOM Theater Campaign Plan country objectives and Country
    Security Cooperation Plans.
        The fiscal year 2016 USPACOM budget request totals $96.5 million.
    However, the fiscal year 2016 Department of State (DoS) proposed
    allocation for USPACOM is $79.1 million. Funding for the USPACOM FMF
    request in its entirety for fiscal year 2016 represents a 22 percent
    increase over the DoS proposed allocation; a reasonable request that
    would actively demonstrate DoS's continued support to the Rebalance to
    the Pacific.
        Philippines: The clear majority of FMF activity since 2012 in the
    South China Sea region is geared toward building key Maritime Security
    (MARSEC) and Maritime Domain Awareness capabilities. 73 percent of the
    fiscal year 2012-2014 FMF allocation for the Philippines is dedicated
    to MARSEC and Territorial Defense. Fiscal year 2013-2017 allocations
    support projects that build Navy and Coast Guard maritime self-
    sufficiency, maritime fleet upgrades and maintenance capacity
    building.on of Vietnam's MARSEC capabilities. FMF maritime capacity
    building efforts with Vietnam currently consist of a multi-year plan
    for Coast Guard fast patrol boats, training, maintenance and support.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Jim Inhofe
                   readiness impact on us asia-pacific policy
        2. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear and General Scaparrotti, are
    you concerned about the training of follow-on-forces and their ability
    to get to the fight on time?
        Admiral Locklear. USPACOM is absolutely concerned with the
    readiness of follow-on-forces as their contributions amplify our own
    capabilities and capacities that are required to carry out the
    command's assigned mission(s). USTRANSCOM is in a better position to
    discuss the ability to get forces to the USPACOM AOR on time. However,
    the more pressing concern to USPACOM is, over the past year, the U.S.
    has been forced to prioritize the readiness of forward-deployed forces,
    at the expense of the readiness of follow-on-forces and critical
    investments needed to outpace emerging threats. A lack of ready surge
    forces resulting from high operational demands, delayed maintenance
    periods, and training limitations will limit responsiveness to emergent
    contingencies and greatly increases risk.
        General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]

        3. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, does PACOM have the resources
    to maintain a sufficient level of presence in its Area of
    Responsibility, to include the East China Sea and South China Sea, to
    deter aggression and reassure U.S. partners and allies in the region?
        Admiral Locklear. USPACOM's AOR is vast and encompasses 52 percent
    of the earth's surface. This large expanse complicates ISR, movement/
    maneuver, sustainment and requires a geographically distributed force
    laydown to rapidly respond to crisis. Growth of military capabilities
    in the region is accelerating and the Indo-Asia-Pacific is the most
    militarized region in the world. Although we are meeting our
    commitments, the capability/capacity margin that we've enjoyed in the
    past is decreasing. USPACOM's ability to defend strategic national
    security interests in an increasingly complex and lethal environment
    requires a force posture that is operationally resilient and is
    properly resourced.
        In order to maintain USPACOM's ability to perform our mission the
    following resources areas require improvement:
        a. Persistent and deep look Intelligence, Surveillance and
    Reconnaissance (ISR) to provide adequate adversary indications and
    warnings.
        b. Robust and interoperable ISR processing, exploitation, and
    dissemination enterprise to utilize critical information gathered.
        c. Munition improvements in lethality, production, and precision. A
    growing need for ship-to-ship and air-to-ship munitions to defeat
    aggressors at greater distances while reducing risk to our service
    members. Advancements in air-to-air and Hard Target Munitions
    capabilities are also required.
        d. Sustaining Ballistic Missile Defense gains to address potential
    aggressors and protect U.S. interests.
        e. Robust CVN and Amphibious presence to ensure regional stability,
    reassure allies/partners.
        f. Continued focus on Undersea Warfare to maintain advantage toward
    potential adversaries.
        g. Robust logistics networks including dedicated sealift to posture
    munitions, fuel and supplies.
        h. Sustainable communication architecture meeting spectrum of
    requirements while postured to address cyber threat.

        4. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear and General Scaparrotti,
    assuming sequestration remains the law, what are the key impacts to
    readiness, our ability to deter, and our ability to execute combat
    operations in PACOM and on the Korean Peninsula?
        Admiral Locklear. If sequestration remains the law, it will make it
    increasingly difficult to execute the USPACOM Theater Campaign Plan and
    other mission areas. Negative readiness trends that we're seeing in our
    reinforcement forces will be exacerbated should sequestration
    continue.''
        Projected sequestration impact areas are:
        o Fight Tonight
            Service funding cuts will drive fewer flying hours,
    steaming days, and fewer opportunities to practice required skills.
            Cancelled/scaled down training/exercises will reduce
    joint integration opportunities necessary for coordinated mission
    execution.
            Forward deployed force readiness maintained at cost of
    follow-on required forces.
            Reduced availability of Intelligence, Surveillance,
    Reconnaissance aircraft will reduce awareness and decision space.
        o Sustainment of equipment
            Interruption or delays of ship, aircraft, and other
    equipment modernization, reset maintenance, and/or sustainment will
    prolong impacts beyond funding reduction periods.
        o Assure Allies/Deter Enemies
            Reduced or cancelled exercises, reduced presence,
    reduced regional engagements signal lack of commitment to our partners
    and allies
            Reduced US presence with aggressor unpredictability,
    rapid regional military modernization, and expansion of state actor
    presence further reemphasize a sequestration return will have far
    reaching unintended consequences.
        General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]
                         u.s. rebalance to asia-pacific
        5. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear and General Scaparrotti, what
    are your current critical capability gaps on PACOM and on the Korean
    Peninsula?
        Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]
        General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]

        6. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear and General Scaparrotti, has
    the decreased readiness of the U.S. military and the reduction in size,
    forcing rotational forces to fill capability gaps, impacted our ability
    to maintain stability, deter aggression and assure our allies and
    partners in the region?
        Admiral Locklear. Decreased readiness and the reduction in size of
    the U.S. military is an issue that has been addressed daily within
    USPACOM for over two years. The entire Department is working on
    prioritization of effort and resource-informed means of ensuring that
    goals and objectives can be met in accordance with National Guidance.
    The readiness rebuild and downsizing of the force are multi-year
    endeavors; thus the impacts to the areas in question have been minimal
    since we just started the processes. However, it is a compounding
    dilemma and as both cycles continue we will see a parallel decrease in
    our ability to maintain stability, deter aggression, and assure allies
    and partners--all in the face of a rising China and unpredictable
    Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Our concern is that we are at
    risk of losing ground on numerous Rebalance-related initiatives because
    there simply will not be the resources available to accomplish what is
    required in the AOR. The greatest threat to the United States would be
    to fight a war in the USPACOM AOR that we could have deterred.
        General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]

        7. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, what is the perception of the
    ``rebalance'' by our allies and partners?
        Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

        8. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, how has China reacted to the
    U.S. ``rebalance?''
        Admiral Locklear. China has reacted to the U.S. ``rebalance'' with
    wariness. On the one hand, China has responded by embracing some
    opportunities to expand engagement with the U.S. military, such as
    participating in RIMPAC and our ongoing disaster management exchanges.
    On the other hand, however, China has criticized our support for allies
    and democratic ideals as efforts to contain its rise, to encircle it,
    and even to split it.
                          global security environment
        9. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear and General Scaparrotti, how
    would each of you assess the national security environment in the Asia-
    Pacific and on the Korean Peninsula over the next five years--becoming
    more or less stable?
        Admiral Locklear. The security environment in the Indo-Asia-Pacific
    is likely to change in both positive and negative ways over the next
    five years.
        We will continue to face a variety of regional challenges to
    stability. We expect North Korea to continue to try to develop, test
    and field long-range missiles and nuclear weapons, while remaining
    largely isolated from the international community and incapable of
    solving its economic shortcomings. China's dramatic military growth,
    especially if it remains coupled with a lack of transparency and
    aggressive actions, will continue to be of concern to the region.
    Resource disputes of all kinds--including water, energy, fish, and
    other natural resources--will probably become more contentious. Violent
    extremists are likely to continue to adapt to more comprehensive
    regional counter terrorism efforts by leveraging technology and
    possibly drawing upon the relationships and skills being acquired today
    in Iraq and Syria. And the impacts of climate change may become more
    pronounced, especially on the small island nations and the many nations
    with large, vulnerable populations.
        However, we also expect the positive trends of increased
    information sharing and multi-national approaches to problem solving to
    continue. The Indo-Asia-Pacific is becoming more interconnected and
    interoperable, providing additional regional approaches to these
    challenges.
        General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]
                           sensor-fused weapon (sfw)
        10. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, last year you said the
    Sensor-Fused Weapon (SFW) is ``essential to meet the strategic and
    operational requirements at a time-critical juncture in our rebalance
    strategy.'' Is this still the case?
        Admiral Locklear. Area Effects Munitions (AEM) remain essential to
    meeting the strategic and operational requirements of USPACOM. I
    support the Services' AEM Roadmaps to develop an effective replacement
    capability for AEM that is compliant with Department of Defense policy.
    Current Air Force assessments indicate that projected inventories of
    SFW are sufficient to meet near term USPACOM requirements.

        11. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, how does the capability of
    the Sensor-Fused Weapon (SFW) compare to that of the cast ductile iron
    version of the BLU-111 general purpose bomb, which the US Air Force is
    also considering to address area weapons requirements? Which has a
    better cost-per-kill ratio? Which has a better sorties-per-kill ratio?
    Which presents an aggregate lower aircrew risk when deploying the
    system?
        Admiral Locklear. These weapons have different design features and
    capabilities because they are designed to engage different target
    types; it would not be appropriate to compare them on a cost benefit or
    aircrew risk basis for the same target set. Advanced fragmentation
    weapons in general, do not provide the anti-armor capabilities of the
    SFW and they do not provide persistence; similarly, the SFW does not
    provide effects against large formations of personnel in the way that
    the CDI BLU-111 does.

        12. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, how does the Sensor-Fused
    Weapon (SFW) address the humanitarian concerns that have been raised
    about the use of other munitions?
        Admiral Locklear. DoD and USPACOM apply heavy scrutiny to the
    conditions under which all munitions are or would be employed,
    including potential humanitarian impact during and after combat
    engagements. Employment of cluster munitions by US forces is guided by
    a strict policy to address humanitarian concerns. SFW contains advanced
    features that further minimize any potential humanitarian concerns.

        13. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear and General Scaparrotti, what
    consequences would you foresee if U.S. forces could rely only on
    unitary systems to defend against threats in the PACOM Area of
    Operations, including a DPRK armored attack, or elsewhere? What costs
    in terms of protecting friendly forces, materiel and dollars would be
    incurred?
        Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]
        General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]

        14. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, what efforts have been
    undertaken to replace by 2018 the pre-P3I Sensor-Fused Weapon (SFW)
    units that are prohibited by the 2008 Policy on Cluster Munitions and
    Unintended Harm to Civilians with the advanced version of this system?
        Admiral Locklear. There is not currently an effort to specifically
    replace or upgrade the pre-P3I SFW in the Air Force inventory. Current
    Air Force requirements indicate that projected inventories of SFW are
    sufficient for USPACOM requirements. However, there are larger DoD
    efforts ongoing to (1) assess the warfighting impacts of the DoD
    Cluster Munition (CM) policy and assess some mitigation approaches, and
    (2) refine Service Area Effects Munitions (AEM) roadmaps to identify
    fiscally achievable paths to provide appropriate AEM capability and
    capacity.

        15. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Locklear, what steps are being taken to
    ensure that the Sensor-Fused Weapon (SFW) industrial base is sustained
    so that it can meet expected future requirements and undertake research
    and development needed to devise more advanced systems?
        Admiral Locklear. This is beyond my scope as a Combatant Commander;
    The Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
    Logistics maintains an aggressive program to identify and address
    concerns with the US defense industrial base.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
                            virginia class submarine
        16. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, how is the Virginia-class
    Attack submarine performing in the PACOM area of responsibility?
        Admiral Locklear. We have had for decades the best submarines in
    the world. As Virginia-class Attack Submarines deploy to the Pacific,
    they have demonstrated that we continue to have the best submarines in
    the world. Submarines are essential to any operations that I have, both
    in peacetime and in crisis and contingency.
        A continued and sustained investment in the U.S. nuclear submarine
    force, advanced undersea warfare technologies, capabilities and
    capacity, and readiness is necessary to maintain our edge against
    growing challenges.

        17. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, what percentage of your
    attack submarine requests in PACOM is the Navy currently meeting?
        Admiral Locklear. For Fiscal Year 2015 the Navy is projected to
    meet 56 percent of my attack submarine request. This percentage is
    consistent with previous years.
                                  north korea

        18. Senator Ayotte. General Scaparrotti, on April 7, 2015, the
    Pentagon said that North Korea had developed the KN-08 missile that is
    capable of reaching the homeland, and that North Korea is capable of
    miniaturizing a nuclear warhead to be fit on an ICBM. Please provide an
    update.
        General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]
                                     china
        19. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, since China's 2013
    declaration of an East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone
    (ADIZ), how has China's practical behavior and activities in that area
    changed?
        Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

        20. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, since that declaration, how
    has U.S. behavior changed in that area, if at all? In practice, are
    United States military forces recognizing China's East China Sea ADIZ
    in any way or changing our operations in any way in the wake of that
    2013 declaration? Why or why not?
        Admiral Locklear. The PRC's East China Sea ADIZ policy has not in
    any way changed how the U.S. conducts military operations in the
    region. We continue to conduct flight operations in the region,
    including with our allies and partners. The U.S. will not acquiesce to
    unilateral acts of other states designed to restrict the rights,
    freedoms, and uses of the sea and airspace, as reflected in
    international law. Specifically, the U.S. does not recognize a right of
    a coastal state to apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign aircraft,
    including U.S. military aircraft, if those aircraft do not intend to
    enter the national airspace of the coastal state.

        21. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, when China completes its land
    reclamation projects, do you expect China to declare an Air Defense
    Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea, as they did in the
    East China Sea in November 2013?
        Admiral Locklear. Yes, we expect that China will eventually declare
    an ADIZ in the South China Sea. Their ongoing land reclamation in the
    Spratly Islands will give them a new capability to enforce such an ADIZ
    throughout the South China Sea.

        22. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, if China were to establish an
    ADIZ in the South China Sea, how would this impact U.S. air operations
    in the region?
        Admiral Locklear. As with the PRC's declaration of an East China
    Sea ADIZ, the potential establishment of a PRC South China Sea ADIZ
    will not change how the U.S. conducts military operations in the
    region.

        23. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, over the last several years,
    China has engaged in coercive diplomacy to achieve its political and
    territorial aims in the East and South China Seas. The administration
    has responded with efforts to build partner capacity and strengthen
    regional institutions. What additional steps can the administration
    take to deter Chinese assertiveness in the short and medium term?
        Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]

        24. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, do you share the view that
    China's actions have violated U.S. national security interests in the
    Freedom of Navigation, the free flow of commerce, and the peaceful
    settlement of disputes in accordance with international law?
        Admiral Locklear. Though to date China's actions in the South China
    Sea have not impacted U.S. freedom of navigation or free flow of
    commerce, and though the U.S. does not take a position on competing
    claims to sovereignty over land features in the South China Sea, we
    observe that actions and steps they have taken to significantly
    increase the physical size or functionality of disputed features or to
    militarize them is provocative and has the potential to raise tensions.
    Large scale construction or major steps--such as dramatically expanding
    the actual size of a disputed feature through land reclamation--with
    the intent to militarize or expand law enforcement operations at
    outposts has the effect of ``complicating or escalating'' the
    situation.

        25. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, how many combat patrols did
    the PLA (People's Liberation Army) Navy conduct in the East China Sea
    and South China Sea in 2014? How does that compare to previous years?
    How has USPACOM responded in order to assure the freedom of navigation
    for the U.S. and our partners?
        Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]
                               u.s. force posture
        26. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, as the range and precision of
    Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles have increased, U.S. forces
    operating from forward bases have come under increased threat. What new
    operating concepts and/or passive and active defenses are we adopting
    to help address this challenge?
        Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]
                         combatant command integration
        27. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, how do you assess the
    integration between PACOM and STRATCOM regarding strategic challenges
    like nuclear forces? What about PACOM integration with NORTHCOM on
    ballistic missile defense?
        Admiral Locklear. USPACOM coordinates throughout the planning
    process with USSTRATCOM and USNORTHCOM; all deliberate plans are
    thoroughly integrated. USPACOM maintains a supporting role to
    USNORTHCOM for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) of the Homeland. Given
    expected indications and warnings (I&W), USNORTHCOM and USPACOM can
    defend the U.S. Homeland (including Guam) against DPRK ballistic
    missile threats using a combination of active and passive means. To
    demonstrate our capability and will to integrate the supported/
    supporting relationship, PACFLT recently led a Fleet Synthetic
    Training-Joint (FST-J) that included USPACOM and USNORTHCOM components
    in a command post exercise environment for tactical level BMD
    execution.
                    concerns about u.s. capability and will
        28. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Locklear, as you talk with our allies
    in Asia, are you hearing any concerns regarding the capability or
    willingness of the U.S. stand by our allies there if there were a
    conflict in the future? What are they saying?
        Admiral Locklear. Our relationships with Allies and Partners are
    essential for maintaining security and prosperity in the region; key to
    remaining the security partner of choice is demonstrating commitment
    through sustained forward presence, continual engagement, and effective
    capabilities.
        There is some concern in the region that U.S. security commitments
    may not be sustainable. Countries are watching the U.S. budget process
    closely--budget uncertainty in Washington has created concern,
    especially as it relates to Sequestration's impact on acquisition,
    deployments, training, readiness, and partner capacity building.
                                     ______

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Lee
                         north korea-iran relationship
        29. Senator Lee, Admiral Locklear and General Scaparrotti, can you
    confirm, as recent news reports have suggested, that North Korea
    transferred ballistic missile technology to Iran in the past year? If
    so, how long has this been known to the U.S. Government, and do you
    consider it a violation of international prohibitions against the
    illicit transfer of such material?
        Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]
        General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]
                               pacific interests
        30. Senator Lee, Admiral Locklear, maintaining order and security
    in the Asia/Pacific region is important for U.S. defensive and economic
    security, and I believe that this can be best achieved when our allies
    and partners in the region have a strong national security apparatus to
    support and compliment U.S. efforts and ensure responsible burden
    sharing. Can you outline for the committee examples of successful
    partnerships you have seen since the United States undertook its
    strategic shift to the Asia/Pacific region, and where is more work
    needed, especially in terms of allied defensive capacity? Specifically,
    do you believe that the burden of security responsibility in the
    Pacific is being appropriately shared among Pacific nations?
        Admiral Locklear. I agree completely with the importance of
    developing partners' capabilities, and we work very hard to do so.
    Examples of successful partnering realized under the Rebalance include:
    Japan is pressing forward with a historic and challenging re-
    orientation toward regional security roles; U.S. forces and aircraft
    will rotate through Northern Australia, facilitating increased
    multilateral engagement, exercises, and contingency response capacity;
    new bilateral Defense Cooperation Guidelines with Japan will enable
    enhanced U.S.-Japan interoperability and broader combined operations
    across the region; and, the U.S.-Philippines Enhanced Defense
    Cooperation Agreement will allow enhanced maritime security cooperation
    in the South China Sea. We are also working with the ASEAN-centered
    organizations to build an effective and cooperative regional security
    architecture through our participation in expert working groups and
    multilateral exercises on counterterrorism, maritime security, search
    and rescue, humanitarian assistance /disaster relief, peace keeping
    operations, nonproliferation, biosecurity, cybersecurity, and health
    and military medicine.
        While we have made progress, more work remains. Security sector
    reform and shifting the focus from internal to external security
    remains an issue in the theater. In Northeast Asia, our capacity-
    building efforts include strengthening Allies' capabilities with
    cutting-edge aircraft, air and missile defense, realizing joint
    capability, cyber security, information security, and high end counter-
    Anti Access/Area Denial (A2AD) interoperability. Work also continues
    toward building the Republic of Korea's capacity to assume full
    operational control of its self-defense; to do so the ROK must invest
    in C2, among other capabilities.
        Finally, burden sharing is robust, but more can be done. Key Allies
    such as South Korea and Japan provide substantial host nation support.
    We routinely encourage regional states to invest further in their
    defense budgets, and work with them to become net security providers.
    We also encourage them to support regional security by providing us
    operational access. Key enablers include educating their publics on the
    value of security partnering with the U.S., and overcoming regional/
    historical animosities with neighbors. Finally, we continue to press
    regional institutions, such as ASEAN, to advance toward providing
    preventative diplomacy, effective conflict resolution, and de-
    escalation strategies.

        31. Senator Lee, Admiral Locklear, what impact has Chinese naval
    development and aggression had on the ability of the United States and
    our economic partners to freely trade in the Asia-Pacific region? Do
    you view Chinese activity as something that will inhibit economic
    development in that region in the future?
        Admiral Locklear. Chinese naval development and aggression creates
    uncertainty that can inhibit trade and investment. The governments and
    militaries of the region have a responsibility to provide a stable and
    secure environment where business can flourish. Three areas of economic
    activity that could be impacted include shipping, fishing, and resource
    development.
        Commercial shipping is the life blood of our interconnected global
    economy and requires freedom of navigation and access to nations and
    their ports. Chinese naval development and aggression have not limited
    the free flow of commercial shipping so far. However, conflicts over
    competing claims in the South China Sea increasingly risk conflict,
    which could elevate insurance rates and otherwise interfere with free
    navigation in regional waters and skies.
        The nations of Southeast Asia obtain a significant portion of their
    diet through commercial fishing in the South China Sea, leading to an
    uncommonly recognized source of friction. Since 1999, China has
    annually declared a unilateral ban on fishing in the northern half of
    the South China Sea for several months each year; although, it has not
    significantly enforced it. Other regional states reject Chinese
    authority to ban their fishermen and continue to allow their fishing
    boats to operate in South China Sea. China's ban has the effect of
    pushing the Chinese fishing fleet and Chinese Coast Guard patrol craft
    farther south, increasing the likelihood of incidents. Added to an
    already complex situation, Chinese reclamation activities in the area
    will likely facilitate a more rapid Chinese response, and is likely to
    further exacerbate regional tensions.
        Recurring tensions and Chinese militarization of the region, as
    well as the unsettled legal status of regional claims, have reportedly
    forestalled exploration for, and exploitation of, sea bed resources.
    China's actions are creating uncertainty and risk; given the high
    initial cost of entry, the private sector has been hesitant to explore
    and develop resources inside China's almost total claim on the South
    China Sea.

        32. Senator Lee, Admiral Locklear, what is your assessment of
    Taiwan's security situation and how do you see the cross-Strait balance
    of power developing over the next few years? Where do you believe the
    United States needs to assist or enable the Taiwanese military to have
    the most effective and cost-efficient security gains?
        Admiral Locklear. There have been no signs that China's military
    posture opposite Taiwan has changed significantly over the past several
    years. The PLA continues to develop and deploy military capabilities,
    which would allow it to undertake increasingly sophisticated military
    action against Taiwan. Taiwan has historically relied on technological
    and operational superiority as well as geographic advantages to counter
    the PLA. Taiwan has taken important steps to professionalize its force
    and develop its defense industrial base, which have partially addressed
    Taiwan's declining defense advantages. However, China's increasingly
    modern platforms and weapons--including more, and more capable,
    ballistic missiles, ships and submarines, combat aircraft, and improved
    C4ISR capabilities--are tipping the balance of power further in China's
    favor.
        USPACOM's assistance to help Taiwan modernize its military have
    provided the security and confidence for Taiwan to work with the PRC
    improve cross-strait relations. However, the growing military power
    disparity will continue to pose a challenge to cross-strait stability.
    In order to maintain the relative peace that categorized the last eight
    years cross-strait relations, USPACOM seeks to assist the Taiwan
    military by looking into efficient (right side of cost asymmetry) and
    effective (real capabilities) solutions.
                                   terrorism
        33. Senator Lee, Admiral Locklear, to what extent are al-Qaeda and
    other Islamic terrorist organizations operating, recruiting personnel,
    and accessing finance in your area of responsibility, and how do you
    assess the intelligence and counterterrorism efforts of the United
    States and our regional partners?
        Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]
                                  north korea
        34. Senator Lee, General Scaparrotti, the Russian government
    recently announced a ``Year of Friendship'' with North Korea and that
    Kim Jong-un will visit Moscow in May. What is your assessment of the
    Russia-North Korea relationship, and how will closer ties between these
    two countries impact our Pacific security?
        General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]

        35. Senator Lee, General Scaparrotti, in your study of North Korean
    military strategy and the government's overall mentality, what do you
    believe are the most effective ways to deter their belligerent behavior
    towards the United States and our allies?
        General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]

        36. Senator Lee, General Scaparrotti, US Forces Korea is currently
    authorized to have more than 28,000 personnel in South Korea, a trend
    that has historically declined over but remained nearly even since
    2005. What factors do you take into consideration when making your
    recommendation for U.S. force levels in South Korea, and how do you see
    force levels trending in the coming decade?
        General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]

        37. Senator Lee, General Scaparrotti, what is the status of the
    plan to transfer war-time operational control to the South Korean
    military? What do you think needs to be done by the South Korean
    government and military to increase their military capabilities and
    decrease their reliance upon international forces on the Peninsula?
        General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2016 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, APRIL 30, 2015

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                   U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND PROGRAMS AND BUDGET

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Wicker,
    Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Lee,
    Graham, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand,
    Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, and King.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman McCain. Good morning. The committee meets today to
    receive testimony on the posture of U.S. European Commander. I
    want to welcome our old friend, General Philip Breedlove, the
    Commander of the U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied
    Commander, Europe.
        General Breedlove, I want to thank you and your family for
    your dedicated service to the Nation. This committee relies on
    the candor of each of those in--of those in positions such as
    yours to conduct the oversight work we're sent here to do. So,
    I especially want to thank you, on behalf of this committee,
    for your honest and forthright presentation of the ongoing
    crisis in Ukraine over the past year. I might point out that
    each one of your predictions to this committee has been--and to
    the world--has, unfortunately, been proven to be true about the
    actions that Vladimir Putin continues to take in dismembering a
    sovereign nation.
        As Ian Brzezinski of--explained before this committee
    earlier this week, Europe and the NATO alliance face,
    ``challenges on multiple fronts of unprecedented complexity and
    increasing urgency.'' To its south, the alliance faces a
    treacherous combination of state sponsors of terrorism, failed
    states, and extremist organizations. Already this year, radical
    Islamists attacked Paris and Copenhagen. Last week, in the
    Mediterranean, over 700 migrants perished tragically in a
    shipwreck, fleeing the conflict and instability of North
    Africa. And then there's Russia. To its north, the
    transatlantic community faces Russian militarization of the
    Arctic. And, to the east, NATO confronts Russia's invasion of
    Ukraine.
        Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. policy toward Russia
    was based on a bipartisan assumption that the Russian
    Government sought to integrate peacefully into the
    international order in Europe and to forge a constructive
    relationship with the United States. The events of the past
    year have overturned that assumption. Russia became the first
    state in seven decades on the European continent to send its
    military forces across an internationally recognized border and
    forcibly annex the sovereign territory of another state. Today,
    Russia maintains sizable numbers of artillery pieces and
    multiple rocket launchers on the territory of Ukraine, in
    violation of the February cease-fire agreement. The Russian
    military has recently deployed additional air-defense systems
    near the front lines in eastern Ukraine, the highest amount
    since last August, according to the State Department. It's a
    disturbing sign that another offensive may be imminent.
        In response, it is not that the United States and our
    European allies have done nothing. It is that nothing we have
    done has succeeded in deterring Putin's aggression and halted
    his slow-motion annexation of eastern Ukraine. Despite the
    advice of nearly every statesman and policy expert that has
    appeared before this committee in recent months, Henry
    Kissinger, George Shultz, Madeleine Albright, Zbig Brzezinski
    and others, and against the advice of both his Secretary of
    State and Secretary of Defense, the President of the United
    States has refused to provide defensive lethal assistance to
    Ukraine. The Ukrainian people aren't asking for U.S. troops.
    They're simply asking for the right tools to defend themselves
    and their country. The President's continued inaction for fear
    of provoking Russia is seen by Putin as weakness, and invites
    the very aggression we seek to avoid, and it only increases the
    likelihood this aggression could expand to places like Moldova,
    Georgia, the Baltic states, and Central Asia.
        Of course, there is no military solution in Ukraine, but
    there is a clear military dimension to achieving a political
    solution. As three major think tanks wrote recently, and I
    quote, ``Assisting Ukraine to deter attack and defend itself is
    not inconsistent with the search for a peaceful political
    solution, and it's essential to achieving it. Only if the
    Kremlin knows that the risks and cost of further military
    action are high will it seek to find an acceptable political
    solution.''
        Ultimately, we must recognize that we are confronting a
    challenge that many had assumed was resigned to the history
    books, a strong, militarily capable state that is hostile to
    our interests and our values, and seeks to overturn the
    international order in Europe that American leaders of both
    parties have sought to maintain since World War II. U.S.
    strategy and military posture in Europe should adjust to
    reflect this harsh reality. Yet, as Russia builds up, America
    draws down. The Obama administration eliminated two heavy
    brigades stationed in Europe in 2012. Yesterday, the Army
    announced the departure of 24 Apache helicopters and 30 Black
    Hawk helicopters from Germany. And we'll want to hear more from
    General Breedlove on a plan for a rotational presence and other
    efforts to reassure our allies.
        As Admiral Stavridis, the former SACEUR and EUCOM
    Commander, told this committee on Tuesday, ``Since the end of
    the Cold War, we're down 75 percent in personnel, we're down 75
    percent in the number of bases we have. We have, in my view,
    come to a line that we should not continue to diminish that
    presence further.''
        I'm also concerned about the fact that too many of our NATO
    allies continue to fail to provide for their own defense.
    Despite promises at the Wales Summit to reverse the trend of
    declining defense budgets, soon Poland and Estonia may be the
    only other allies meeting our alliance's commitment to spend 2
    percent of GDP on defense.
        In response to the broader challenge that Russia poses to
    security in Europe, it's not that the United States and NATO
    have done nothing. We have created a modest rapid-reaction
    force, increased air policing and sea patrols, expanded
    training and exercises, and deployed small numbers of
    additional forces to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.
    The problem is, the actions we have taken seem inadequate to
    the scope, scale, and seriousness of the challenges we face.
        None of us want a return to the Cold War, but we need to
    face the reality that we are dealing with a Russian ruler who
    wants exactly that. The reason for maintaining a U.S. strong
    military presence in Europe is the same as ever: to deter
    conflict and aggression. But, we must revisit the question of
    what it will take to achieve this goal when confronting a
    revisionist Russia that is undergoing a significant military
    modernization and that is willing to use force, not as a last
    resort, but as a primary tool to achieve it's neo-imperial
    objectives. I hope today's hearing will help us to better
    understand the magnitude of the challenge we face in Europe.
        I thank General Breedlove for joining us today, and look
    forward to your testimony.
        Senator Reed.

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        And, General Breedlove, welcome. Thank you for your many
    years of service, you and your family. And please pass along
    our gratitude to the service men and women of the U.S. European
    Command for their great service.
        Let me also thank the chairman for holding an excellent
    hearing on Tuesday with witnesses from outside the government
    on the security situation in Europe. That hearing, along with
    today's hearing, will help inform the committee's markup of the
    annual defense authorization bill. I must also say that the
    series of hearings that the Chairman has prepared over the
    course of this session has been extremely useful by having
    policy experts and then the relevant commanders come in. And
    thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's really enhanced this discussion
    and our insight.
        General Breedlove, you have responsibility to maintain the
    critical transatlantic relationship with Europe. As our
    witnesses on Tuesday emphasized, Europe does, indeed, matter
    for U.S. national security. Our European partners have made,
    and continue to make, significant contributions to coalition
    operations in the Middle East and South Asia. Our longstanding
    basing arrangements in Europe provide vital support to
    operations in CENTCOM and AFRICOM. And NATO remains a critical
    component of U.S. security, based on its members' shared values
    and interests.
        Today, EUCOM confronts a range of challenges in or around
    the European area, many of which have just recently arisen.
    Foremost is the threat from an increasingly confrontational and
    antagonistic Russia, which has revived old fears of a divided
    Europe. Russia's aggression against Ukraine has challenged the
    post-Cold War vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace.
    EUCOM is leading efforts to respond to the hybrid warfare
    tactics used by Russia in seizing Crimea and secretly
    supporting separatist forces in eastern Ukraine. EUCOM and NATO
    have sought to counter Russia's false narrative on Ukraine,
    highlighting the continuing flow of heavy weapons, Russian
    military leadership and training to the separatists, in
    violation of the Minsk cease-fire agreements.
        General Breedlove, we would be interested in your
    assessment of the security situation in Ukraine and whether you
    believe heavy fighting is likely to resume in the coming weeks,
    as some are predicting. From early in the Ukrainian crisis,
    EUCOM has been working with the Ukranian government to identify
    military and security shortfalls, and advise in building
    Ukraine's capability to defend itself. There is broad support
    in this committee and in Congress for providing Ukraine
    military assistance, including lethal defensive weapons
    necessary for it to defend itself against further attacks. As
    discussed at Tuesday's hearing, any arming of Ukraine involves
    risk and needs to be done carefully and thoughtfully. But, as a
    recent report by several leading think tanks concluded,
    assisting Ukraine to deter attack and defend itself is not
    inconsistent with the search for a peaceful political solution.
    It is essential to achieving it.
        EUCOM has also played a critical role in reassuring our
    NATO allies closest to Russia. EUCOM has increased the
    presence, on a rotational basis, of U.S. military forces in
    eastern Europe, on the land, sea, and in the air. At the NATO
    Wales Summit, members approved a Readiness Action Plan and
    other steps to strengthen the alliance's capability to come to
    the aid of a member whose security is threatened. One issue I
    hope General Breedlove will address is whether U.S. forces in
    Europe are postured to deter further Russian aggression and
    whether this mission can be carried out over the coming years
    with the use of U.S. forces rotating into the European theater
    from bases back home.
        Ultimately, much will depend on whether NATO members
    fulfill their Wales commitments to achieve defense spending at
    a level of 2 percent of GDP in the coming years. The budget
    request includes nearly $800 million, on top of the 1 billion
    approved last year, for the European Reassurance Initiative to
    enhance the U.S. military presence and activities in Europe.
        EUCOM also must contend with security challenges along
    Europe's other borders. The transit across the Mediterranean of
    tens of thousands, possibly more, migrants fleeing instability
    in Libya, Syria, Eritrea, and elsewhere has overwhelmed
    countries in southern Europe. Efforts to respond to this crisis
    have been mixed, to date, and clearly more must be done soon as
    the violence and instability in Libya and elsewhere continues
    unabated.
        To the southeast, Turkey's porous border with Syria
    continues to attract foreign fighters traveling to the Syrian
    conflict and back, heightening the risk of future anti-Western
    attacks like those in Paris and Brussels, and adding to
    concerns about a rising ISIL presence in European cities.
        In the north, Russia's expanding militarization of the
    Arctic is potentially at odds with international efforts to
    promote cooperation and increase economic activity in this
    region.
        This is a long list. We look forward to your testimony and
    thank you for your service.
        Chairman McCain. Welcome back, General Breedlove. Thank
    you. Please proceed.

     STATEMENT OF GEN. PHILIP M. BREEDLOVE, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
           EUROPEAN COMMAND/SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE

        General Breedlove. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed,
    distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
    opportunity to appear before you today.
        It is an honor to be here representing the dedicated
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, civilians, and the
    families, as you have both mentioned, of the U.S. European
    Command. Thank you for all you do to support them as they serve
    our Nation.
        Compared to just 1 year ago, Europe faces a very different
    and much more challenging security environment, one with
    significant lasting implications for U.S. national security
    interests. Our top concern, as both of you have mentioned, is a
    revanchist Russia.
        Russia is blatantly challenging the rules and principles
    that have been the bedrock of European security for decades.
    This is global, it's not regional. And it is enduring, not
    temporary. Russian aggression is clearly visible in its illegal
    occupation of Crimea and its continued operations in eastern
    Ukraine.
        In Ukraine, Russia has supplied their proxies with heavy
    weapons, training and mentoring, command and control,
    artillery, fire support, tactical and operational-level air
    defense, among others. Russia has transferred many pieces of
    military equipment into Ukraine, including tanks, armored
    personnel carriers, heavy artillery pieces, and other military
    vehicles. What we have seen over the course of the fight was
    that, when the Russian proxy offensive would ever run into
    trouble, Russian forces intervened directly to right the
    course.
        Today on the ground, the situation is volatile and it's
    fragile. Russian forces used the opportunities provided by the
    recent lull in fighting to reset and reposition while
    protecting their gains. Many of their actions are consistent
    with preparations for another offensive.
        The hope remains that both parties will fully implement an
    effective cease-fire as an important step towards an acceptable
    political resolution of the conflict, one that represents the
    internationally recognized border. I'm often asked, Should the
    United States and other provide weapons to Ukraine? What we see
    in Russia is an aggressive application of all elements of
    national power--diplomatic, informational, economic, as well as
    military. So, in my view, it would not make sense to
    unnecessarily take any of our own tools off the table.
        But, the crisis in Ukraine is about more than just Ukraine.
    Russian activities are destabilizing neighbor states and the
    region as a whole, and Russia's illegal actions are pushing
    instability ever closer to the boundaries of NATO. We cannot be
    fully certain what Russia will do next, and we cannot fully
    grasp Putin's intent. What we can do is learn from his actions.
    And what we see suggests growing Russian capabilities,
    significant military modernization, and an ambitious strategic
    intent. We also know that Putin responds to strength and seeks
    opportunities in weakness. We must strengthen our deterrence in
    order to manage this opportunist confidence.
        At the same time, Europe also faces the challenge of a
    surge in violent extremism. European nations are rightly
    worried about foreign fighters returning home to Europe from
    the fight in Syria and Iraq with new skills and with malign
    intent. Attacks like those in France, Belgium, and Denmark are
    only likely to become more frequent. Foreign fighters are part
    of a much broader pattern of insecurity to Europe's south, with
    roots in the Middle East and North Africa, transit routes are
    shared by violent extremists, organized criminal networks, and
    migrant populations fleeing difficult conditions in Libya and
    other undergoverned spaces. The spread of instability into
    Europe and the transnational terrorism we all face could have a
    direct bearing on the National security of the U.S. homeland.
        EUCOM is working with European nations bilaterally and
    supporting NATO alliance initiatives to meet and counter this
    new and more complex security environment. Based on the
    decisions made at NATO's Wales Summit last year, the alliance
    is adapting in order to improve its readiness and its
    responsiveness. The Readiness Action Plan, or RAP, is well
    underway. Our allies are stepping up, making contributions that
    give them a real stake in the outcome. The United States will
    have a key and sustained role to play in supporting and
    enabling these changes, especially in critical areas that are
    hardest for our allies to provide, like lift, sustainment, and
    enablers such as intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance.
        At the same time, our own U.S. efforts in Europe remain
    essential. Our leadership is perhaps more important now than at
    any time in recent history. Since Russian troops illegally
    occupied Crimea last year, U.S. forces, under the banner of
    Operation Atlantic Resolve, have continued to take concerted
    steps to assure allies of our commitment to their security and
    to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the common defense
    cornerstone of our transatlantic security. EUCOM air, land,
    maritime, and Special Operation Forces have maintained presence
    in all three of our NATO allies in the Baltics, Poland,
    Romania, and Bulgaria, as well as the Black Sea, providing an
    array of capabilities, including airborne armor, mobile
    infantry, light fighter, strike fighter, advanced air, and
    maritime presence, in addition to training, advising, and
    exercising with host-nation forces. You have made most of this
    persistent presence possible through your support of the
    European Reassurance Initiative, or, ERI. The assurance
    measures it supports enable the alliance to remain strong and
    cohesive in this new security environment.
        In facing both of these serious challenges to Europe's east
    and to its south, EUCOM is working closely with many others--
    our sister COCOMs, NATO partners, as well as allies and other
    international organizations, including the European Union.
    There is plenty of work to go around. And our collaboration and
    our unity are essential. EUCOM is also drawing heavily on great
    new efforts underway in the Department of Defense, not the
    least the Defense Innovation Initiative, which applies cutting-
    edge approaches to some of the toughest challenges in our
    theater, like anti-access area denial.
        The strong threat posed by Russia and the growing challenge
    to the south lead me to three areas where EUCOM could
    particularly use your help:
        First, sufficient forward--persistent forward presence. Our
    forward presence in Europe is the bedrock of our ability to
    assure allies, to deter real and potential adversaries, and to
    be postured to act in a timely manner, should deterrence fail.
    It was our permanent presence in Europe that gave EUCOM the
    ability to respond immediately after Russian troops illegally
    occupied Crimea. Soldiers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade in
    Germany deployed to the Baltic states and Poland within 96
    hours of receiving their mission. And our F-15s from
    Lakenheath, England, began flying missions out of Poland within
    18 hours of being giving the mission. That same permanent
    presence ensures that EUCOM can play a full array of essential
    supporting roles for other combatant commands, from neighboring
    AFRICOM and CENTCOM to STRATCOM and TRANSCOM. Rotational
    presence is not a substitute for permanent forward presence in
    building relationships or signaling our commitment, but a fully
    funded rotational presence can play an important role in
    helping meet the requirements in our theater if it is heel-to-
    toe and properly resourced.
        The second area is sufficient intelligence support. Since
    the end of the Cold War, our Nation's community of Russian-area
    experts has shrunk considerably, and intelligence assets of all
    kinds have been shifted to the wars we've been fighting or to
    understanding potential future threats. Russian military
    operations over the past year in Ukraine and the region more
    broadly have underscored that there are critical gaps in our
    collection and analysis. Some Russian military exercise have
    caught us by surprise, and our textured feel for Russian
    involvement on the ground in Ukraine has been quite limited.
    Earlier indications and warning and the ability to better
    understand Moscow's thinking and intent are absolutely critical
    for avoiding future surprise and miscalculation, for deterring
    effectively, and for preparing to respond, if required. Getting
    this right requires more ISR, high-power analytical support,
    and appropriate intelligence-sharing with allies and partners.
    The same holds true for effectively waging counterterrorism and
    counter-ISIL operations in and through the European theater. A
    small investment in this capability could lead to a large
    return in our understanding of the complex challenges we face.
        Third and finally is sufficient future resourcing. In the
    near term, EUCOM's particular request for your support for a
    European Reassurance Initiative for fiscal year 2016 is
    important. Your support for ERI in 2015 demonstrated commitment
    to our allies, increased our ability to shape the European
    theater, and allowed EUCOM to build and sustain the capacity of
    our allies and partners. The request for ERI in fiscal year16
    builds on this initiative. Key components include maintaining
    air superiority presence, participating in NATO exercises,
    supporting the rotational presence of an armored brigade combat
    team, pre-positioning equipment, funding the Global Response
    Force exercises, and fostering SACEUR engagement with partners,
    and increasing Guard and Reserve participation across the
    field.
        We understand these reassurance measures come at a cost,
    and in the current budget environment, additional cost means
    making tough decisions. As a result of previous constraints,
    our EUCOM readiness has already assumed greater risk.
    Specifically, our deployment timelines are longer, our
    preparations are less robust, and our fundamental ability to
    deter and defeat in a timely and effective manner is less sure
    than it was a decade ago. As Secretary Carter testified
    recently, further reductions would damage our National security
    and have a direct and lasting impact on our ability to protect
    and defend the Nation in and from the European theater.
        Meanwhile, the security challenges in and around Europe are
    growing sharper and more complicated. Your support for EUCOM's
    mission and your tireless efforts to chart a long-term path
    toward resourcing a strong national defense are critical steps
    to ensuring the enduring ability of EUCOM and DOD to protect
    and defend this great Nation.
        From the dedicated men and women serving in our European
    theater, thank you. Thank you for your time and your attention.
    And I now look forward to taking your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Breedlove follows:]

               Prepared Statement by Gen. Philip Breedlove, USAF
                                i. introduction
        It is an honor for me to lead the soldiers, sailors, airmen,
    marines, and civilians of the U.S. European Command (EUCOM). Those
    assigned and deployed from the European theater sent into harm's way,
    in Afghanistan and elsewhere, are particularly within the thoughts of
    the command. I want to thank this committee for all of the support it
    has offered them.
        EUCOM has experienced dramatic changes in the security situation on
    the European continent over the last 12 months, forming a new European
    security environment. These changes have significant ramifications for
    U.S. national security interests and those of our European allies and
    partners. As a result, we are assessing the threat to U.S. and North
    Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies in the theater and beyond.
    Even as we continue to lean forward with our NATO allies and partners
    in response to the conditions in this new environment, fully addressing
    these growing challenges and their long-term implications requires a
    reformulation of the U.S. strategic calculus and corresponding
    resourcing levied towards Europe.
        In the statement I submitted to this committee last year, I
    described in detail how important our NATO allies and non-NATO partners
    in Europe are to American safety and security--their importance is even
    greater today. EUCOM must be able to assure, deter, and defend against
    Russian aggression; support ongoing and future contingency operations;
    counter transnational threats; and help build our partners' capability
    to help us accomplish these missions, thereby enhancing regional and
    global security.
        Our many shared values, interests, and economic interdependence
    with Europe provides unique opportunities and assets for collective
    security as well as global security cooperation. The United States
    depends on our willing and capable allies and partners throughout
    Europe to work with us to fully defend our national security interests
    and to respond to crises around the world. Time and again, our allies
    and partners in Europe have proven essential to U.S. military
    operations by allowing us access, including bases, transit, and
    overflight rights for U.S. forces as well as providing enhanced
    legitimacy and operational capability through the participation of ally
    and partner nation military forces in undertakings in Europe, around
    Europe and often far from Europe.
        Maintaining our strategic alliance with Europe is vital to
    maintaining U.S. national security and is not to be taken for granted.
    We must reassure our European allies and partners through the United
    States' commitment to NATO and the credibility of that commitment
    fundamentally rests upon the capabilities, readiness, and
    responsiveness of U.S. military personnel stationed in Europe. The
    forces assigned to EUCOM are the United States' preeminent forward
    deployed force and fulfill the United States' primary treaty obligation
    to NATO. Our permanent presence also allows us to maximize the military
    capabilities of our allies. Permanently stationed forces are a force
    multiplier that rotational deployments can never match. EUCOM must be a
    stabilizing force on multiple fronts. Nations on Europe's Southern
    flank are concerned the focus on Eastern Europe may draw attention and
    resources away from their region, allowing for an unmonitored flow of
    foreign fighters, economic and political refugees, and unchecked
    illicit trafficking of goods and humans from an arc of instability
    stretching across large parts of northern Africa through the Middle
    East. In the Levant, persistent threats from other countries and non-
    state actors drives continued security concerns in Israel.
        Multiple ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and Africa also
    require EUCOM to use its limited resources to support missions
    occurring in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and U.S. Africa Command
    (AFRICOM) areas of responsibility. EUCOM works closely with our
    bordering Combatant Commands to ensure there are no seams as we address
    issues crossing geographic boundaries, supporting CENTCOM and AFRICOM
    operations to protect U.S. national interests. Each of these security
    situations reinforces the importance of EUCOM and NATO to our long-term
    vital national security interests.
        After years of force structure and other personnel reductions,
    fewer than 65,000 U.S. military personnel remain permanently stationed
    in Europe to secure and advance U.S. national interests from Greenland
    to Azerbaijan and from the Arctic to Israel. The size of our military
    presence forces difficult decisions daily on how to best use the
    limited resources we have to assure, stabilize, and support. I ask you
    for your support and favorable consideration of the U.S. role in
    addressing the new European security environment and helping me set the
    theater. As the Commander of EUCOM, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers
    Europe (SHAPE) and Allied Command Operations for NATO, I support the
    goal of a Europe that is whole, free, at peace, and prosperous. It is
    with this in mind that I consider Europe's current security situation.
                            ii. assessing the threat
        As mentioned, EUCOM is working within the framework of a new
    European security environment, focused on countering three primary
    security threats: Russian aggression in the East, foreign fighter flow
    between Europe and the Levant, and transnational threats stemming from
    North Africa.
    A. Eastern Flank: Russia and Periphery
        For almost 2 decades, the United States and Europe have engaged
    with Russia as a partner, seeking to build relationships militarily,
    economically, and culturally. In 1994, Russia became a Partnership for
    Peace member with NATO. That same year, Russia, the United States, and
    the United Kingdom signed the Budapest Memorandum, reaffirming
    commitments made by all parties under the Helsinki Final Act and the UN
    Charter to ``respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing
    borders of Ukraine.'' Under the 1997 Founding Act, NATO made a
    political commitment that, ``in the current and foreseeable security
    environment,'' the Alliance would carry out its collective defense and
    other missions without ``additional permanent stationing of substantial
    combat forces.'' In 2009, the United States sought to ``reset'' its
    relationship with Russia, which had been damaged by the 2008 Russian
    invasion of the Republic of Georgia. During this period, the Department
    of Defense made security and force posture determinations significantly
    reducing European force structure based on the assumption that Russia
    was a partner.
        Despite these and many other U.S. and European overtures of
    partnership, Russia has continued to view its own security from a zero-
    sum point of view. Since the beginning of 2014, President Putin's
    Russia has abandoned all pretense of participating in a collaborative
    security process with its European neighbors and the international
    community. Instead, Russia has employed ``hybrid warfare'' (which
    includes regular, irregular, and cyber forms of war as well as
    political and economic intimidations) to illegally seize Crimea, foment
    separatist fever in several sovereign nations, and maintain frozen
    conflicts within its so-called ``sphere of influence'' or ``near
    abroad.'' Undergirding all of these direct approaches is the pervasive
    presence of the Russia propaganda machine, which inserts itself into
    media outlets globally and attempts to exploit potential sympathetic or
    aggrieved populations.
        Russia uses energy as a tool of coercion. Many former-Soviet bloc
    and Eastern and Central European states have long been concerned about
    Russia's intentions in Europe and they consider the Ukraine crisis the
    latest validation of their concerns. Recent Ukrainian and Russian
    energy negotiations show how Russian coercion threatens broader
    European cooperation as individual countries must weigh their own
    security and economic concerns. Russia's coercion using energy has
    grown along with Russia's threats and outright use of force.
        As a result, there are growing security concerns among Central and
    Eastern European countries that are members of NATO and the European
    Union or are seeking closer ties with the trans-Atlantic community.
    Having already experienced the use of Russian military force in the
    1990s and in 2008, Georgia is especially threatened by Russian
    occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Baltic States have
    demonstrated their concern by increasing military interaction with U.S.
    and NATO forces, which has resulted in more U.S. and allied forces in
    NATO's Baltic Air Policing mission and the deployment of U.S.
    rotational ground forces to the Baltics and Poland to foster
    interoperability through training and exercises. U.S. Special
    Operations Forces training events were also initiated throughout the
    Baltics and Eastern Europe at the request of the host nations. We must
    continue to work with NATO to provide enduring support to the security
    of our allies and partners in this area.
        Russia views Ukraine as part of its sphere of influence, regardless
    of the views of the Ukrainian people. While Russia's aggressive actions
    in Ukraine are the most current manifestation in a pattern of
    continuing behavior to coerce its neighbors in Central and Eastern
    Europe. Beyond its actions in Georgia and Ukraine, other examples of
    this pattern are suspending participation in the Conventional Armed
    Forces in Europe Treaties; the ZAPAD 2013 snap exercise along the
    borders of the Baltics and Poland; intercepts of U.S. aircraft and
    shadowing of U.S. ships in international airspace and waters; basing
    Russian fighter aircraft in Belarus; threats to deploy nuclear-capable
    Iskander-M missiles in Kaliningrad; and pressure on former Soviet
    states through the manipulation of prolonged, ``frozen'' conflicts.
    B. Eastern Flank: Vulnerability of NATO Partnership for Peace Countries
        As U.S. partners, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine face a different
    security challenge from Russia than that facing NATO allies. All three
    countries have implemented political and economic reforms to advance
    democracy and integrate with Europe; however, their ability to make
    further progress is significantly constrained by Russian interference
    and pressure. Russia occupies portions of their territory with its
    military forces, wields economic leverage and energy dependence as
    coercive instruments, exploits minority Russian populations to serve
    its interests, interferes in democratic processes, engages in bribery
    and coercion of government officials, and generates a constant
    propaganda deluge.
        Even as these three countries face severe threats to their
    sovereignty and territorial integrity, they continue to make meaningful
    contributions to international security. Since 2010, Georgia has
    rotated 14 battalions to Afghanistan in support of the International
    Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and 3 additional battalions in support
    of the Resolute Support mission, and is currently the second largest
    contributor after the United States. Ukraine has been the largest
    provider of vertical lift capability to U.N. peacekeeping operations
    around the world and has also contributed troops and resources to ISAF,
    NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR), and NATO's maritime operations, and Moldova
    contributes a platoon to KFOR.
        In addition to conducting expeditionary operations and while having
    differing objectives regarding the scope of their integration with
    NATO, all three countries strive to develop military forces meeting
    NATO standards and interoperability requirements; however, their
    efforts face a number of challenges, as all three countries require
    deep institutional reforms to efficiently generate, organize, equip,
    and sustain their armed forces. They must also continue and accelerate
    their transition from Soviet-era systems to modern, NATO-interoperable
    systems and equipment. These countries have severely limited resources
    available to address these requirements. Thus, U.S. security assistance
    to train, advise, and equip the national security forces of Georgia,
    Ukraine, and Moldova is absolutely essential.
        Recent Russian activities are forcing our partners to reevaluate
    their strategic requirements, including reassessing the relative
    importance of their ability to contribute toward NATO or U.N.
    operations. These countries must balance the national responsibility of
    their armed forces to defend their own sovereignty and territorial
    integrity with that of contributing to regional and global security
    beyond their borders. For many years, a partner's contribution to
    regional security was measured, at least in part, by its force
    contribution to international peacekeeping missions. Now that these
    nations face an even more aggressive Russia, their ability to protect
    their own borders and enforce their own sovereignty is understandably
    more urgent than acting as a force provider for peacekeeping missions
    abroad.
    C. Eastern Flank: Russian Use of Frozen Conflicts as a Foreign Policy
            Tool
        Describing the prolonged conflicts in states around the Russian
    periphery as ``frozen'' belies the fact that these are ongoing and
    deadly affairs. In Georgia, there are conflicts in Abkhazia and South
    Ossetia. A clear purpose behind Russia's invasion of Georgia and its
    continued occupation of Georgian territory is to prevent Tbilisi from
    pursuing its rightful and legitimate intentions to become a full member
    of the European and transatlantic communities. Toward that end, Russia
    has signed a ``treaty'' with Abkhazia and is pushing for another with
    South Ossetia to increase its influence while hampering Georgia's Euro-
    Atlantic integration In Moldova, Russian forces have conducted supposed
    ``stability operations'' since 1992 to contain the conflict in
    Transnistria. In fact, Russia deliberately and actively perpetuates
    these conflicts by manipulating its support to the participants, while
    engaging in international diplomatic resolution efforts only to the
    extent necessary to prevent the resumption of all-out violence.
        Russia uses these conflicts to maintain its influence and deny
    these states' ability to make their own foreign and security policy
    choices and chart their own futures. Those pretending to lead these
    Russian-created quasi-states rely on Russia to maintain the status quo
    and therefore, cannot stray far from Russia's preferences. These
    unresolved disputes may not represent active war, but impede the
    democratic development of the concerned states. Just as the oppressed
    nations of the Warsaw Pact served as strategic buffers to the Soviet
    Union, so the current arc of frozen conflicts is part of a security
    buffer for a modern, paranoid Russia. This fits into a greater ``buffer
    policy'' sought by Russia, complemented by other dubious--yet
    aggressive--claims, such as its militarization of the Arctic and its
    military exercises on the Kuril Islands over its dispute with Japan.
    D. Western Balkans: Challenges and Unresolved Issues
        Significant challenges to peace and prosperity with the Western
    Balkans persist. EUCOM engages in a number of cooperative endeavors
    that provide an area of common interest, building confidence and good
    relations between former warring factions to reduce the likelihood of
    renewed fighting in the region. The Balkans Medical Task Force is one
    specific example of how EUCOM helps foster such cooperation by
    assisting the Balkan states in building a regional, deployable
    humanitarian assistance and disaster response capability.
    E. Southern Flank: Turkey as a Lynchpin to Security in the Black Sea
        Persistent instability in the Levant and beyond remains a top U.S.
    and European national security concern and threatens U.S. interests
    throughout Europe and the Homeland. The Islamic State of Iraq and the
    Levant (ISIL) controls territory just across NATO's southern border and
    it actively recruits and trains foreign fighters destined to return to
    their countries of origin. Extremist actors, exemplified by ISIL, have
    an inordinate impact on Europe's periphery. The Syrian crisis is
    destabilizing the entire region, and the regional repercussions are
    likely to persist for years to come. Israel faces a more complex
    environment, complicating their political and military calculus and
    their need for U.S. support.
        Turkey is in the unenviable position of having to hold NATO's
    Southern Flank. Turkey, and important NATO ally, is understandably very
    concerned by the ongoing crises in Syria and Iraq, which are generating
    significant security, political, economic, and humanitarian challenges
    across the region. These challenges include the influx of refugees and
    foreign terrorist fighters, and increased terrorist activity. EUCOM
    continues to work with Turkey and CENTCOM to address these multiple
    threats.
        Finally the flow of returning foreign terrorist fighters to Europe
    and the United States in both the near- and mid-term poses a
    significant risk, including to our forward based forces in Europe.
    Foreign terrorist fighters are active in multiple conflict zones,
    gaining experience and contacts that could lead them to conduct
    terrorist attacks after returning home. Actively encouraged by ISIL,
    returned foreign fighters are mounting so-called ``lone wolf'' attacks.
    This problem will grow in scope as the flow of returning individuals
    increases over time.
    F. Southern Flank: Instability in the Middle East and North Africa
            Region
        The security environment on Europe's Southern Flank, broadly
    defined as the Middle East and North Africa, is likely to remain
    unstable and likely grow more complex for the next decade or longer.
    This environment is characterized by political chaos; ethnic, tribal,
    and religious tensions; pervasive corruption; and weak security
    institutions. These factors have created conditions that allow illicit
    trafficking, to include the smuggling of narcotics, humans, and weapons
    into Southern Europe and beyond. Transnational criminal organizations
    continue to take hold and further destabilize the region, posing a
    growing economic and security risk to countries on Europe's Southern
    Flank. The threat of highly contagious diseases spreading through
    unmonitored personnel movements and illicit trafficking channels, such
    as the Ebola virus, represent another potential threat.
        The countries of southern Europe are currently facing massive
    migration flows from Northern Africa. In August 2012, Greece began an
    operation to curb and tackle illegal migration into its country. In
    October 2013, Italy began a similar operation to patrol the Strait of
    Sicily and the southern Mediterranean following the death of more than
    350 African refugees off the Italian island of Lampedusa. Since its
    start, Italy has intercepted or rescued more than 100,000 illegal
    migrants while 3,000 have drowned in the Mediterranean Sea. Dealing
    with illegal migration adds to the burdens of Allied Navies,
    particularly Italy's, and pulls them from other missions. Due to
    concerns raised by European countries along the Mediterranean Sea,
    FRONTEX launched Operation Orion Triton in October 2014 to help nations
    cope with the illegal migration crossings from North Africa and the
    Middle East. Although most European countries do not perceive the
    ongoing situation in North Africa as a direct threat to their national
    security, the majority views the increased illegal migration flow as a
    serious economic and humanitarian problem. EUCOM continues to work with
    our allies on this issue.
        Continued tensions between Israel and the Hamas-led Government in
    Gaza resulted in open warfare beginning in June 2014 leading Israel to
    launch Operation Protective Edge. Scores of infiltration tunnels were
    found and between June and September 2014 over 2,500 rockets were
    launched from Gaza into Israel. Fortunately, the Iron Dome system
    effectively neutralized many of these rockets. EUCOM monitors the
    situation between Israel and Hamas closely, consulting with Israel and
    providing logistical support.
    G. Arctic Region
        The Arctic region is a growing strategic area of concern from both
    an environmental, resource, and security perspective. Environmentally,
    changing climate conditions will allow the Northern Sea Route and
    Northwest Passage to open for longer periods each year, meaning greater
    access to the Arctic. Less ice coverage will lead to increased shipping
    traffic and attract more industry and tourism. From a resource
    perspective, we seek to work cooperatively to ensure exploration and
    extraction does not lead to conflict. From a security perspective,
    Russia's behavior in the Arctic is increasingly troubling. Their
    increase in stationing military forces, building and reopening bases,
    and creating an Arctic military district to counter an imagined threat
    to their internationally undisputed territories does not fit the
    direction or interests of the seven other Arctic nations. Despite
    Russia's increasing militarization of the Arctic, EUCOM continues to
    work with our Arctic public and private partners to create a secure and
    stable region. This is critical to safeguarding U.S. national
    interests, insuring the U.S. Homeland is protected, and for nations
    working cooperatively to address challenges through our sponsorship of
    the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable and combined Arctic specific
    exercises like Arctic Zephyr.
          iii. reassuring our allies and deterring russian aggression
    A. Operation Atlantic Resolve
        Operation Atlantic Resolve uses U.S. access and strategic reach to
    develop a unified response to revanchist Russia. EUCOM continues to
    take positive steps to reassure our allies along NATO's eastern flank
    and to deter potential Russian aggression against our NATO allies and
    partners. Since the beginning of Russia's intervention in Ukraine,
    EUCOM's strategy has continued to evolve and demonstrates the
    commitment of the United States to NATO's overarching principle of
    collective defense. The cornerstone of EUCOM's strategy is physical
    presence. Coupled with our visible commitment to maintain capabilities,
    readiness, responsiveness, and our strategic level messaging, our
    presence demonstrates, to friend and foe alike, our absolute commitment
    to the sovereignty and security of every Ally.
        The credibility and effectiveness of our response to Russian
    aggression in the east and growing threats in Southern Europe depend
    not only on the operational scale and geographic scope of our
    operations, but also their persistence and longevity. A temporary surge
    in rotational presence, for example, will not have lasting effect
    unless it is followed by the development and fielding of credible and
    persistent deterrent capabilities. Forward deployed air, land, and sea
    capabilities permits the United States to respond within hours versus
    days as crises emerge. We must follow our near-term measures with
    medium-term efforts to adapt the capabilities and posture of United
    States, NATO, allies, and partners to meeting these new challenges. We
    must accelerate this adaptation because we now face urgent threats
    instead of the peacetime environment previously anticipated. NATO and
    our European allies have recognized the absolute requirement to
    effectively counter Russian coercive pressure in the east as well as
    urgent threats in the south.
        NATO has adopted the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) designed to meet
    quickly emerging threats emanating from both NATO's eastern and
    southern flanks. The RAP features forces that can deploy in days--not
    weeks, an improved command and control capability (including forward
    headquarters), and the regular presence of NATO rotational forces in
    Eastern Europe for exercises and training. U.S. support to the RAP will
    be essential to its long-term success. Our European allies have already
    offered to serve as primary contributors of land forces to the
    envisioned Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), but U.S.
    participation with key enablers is critical to Alliance cohesion and
    capability. EUCOM is also responsible for implementing other key
    aspects of our support to the RAP, such as maintaining continuous
    presence in the East, enhancing the capabilities of Multinational Corps
    North East, and the establishment of a NATO command and control
    presence on the territories of eastern allies.
        1. The Baltics and Poland
        As a response to events in Ukraine, EUCOM augmented scheduled
    multinational and joint exercises and deployments to provide a near-
    continuous air, land, and sea presence in the Baltic States and Poland,
    assuring them of the U.S. commitment to NATO. The intent of our actions
    is to demonstrate the ability and resolve to act together as an
    Alliance in the face of the challenges from Russia, while avoiding
    escalation. Our continuous presence and engagement activities in the
    Baltics and Poland fall under the umbrella of Operation Atlantic
    Resolve.
        U.S. rotational force to the Baltics began on March 6, 2014, when
    the United States deployed an additional six F-15Cs to augment the four
    already in Lithuania, fulfilling a NATO Baltic Air Policing peacetime
    requirement to have quick reaction interceptor aircraft ``ramp-ready.''
    Poland took over the Baltic Air Policing mission on May 1, 2014 with
    augmentation from the United Kingdom, Denmark, and France. Polish and
    British aircraft operated from Siauliai Air Base in Lithuania, Danish
    aircraft from Amari Air Base in Estonia, and French aircraft from
    Malbork Air Base in Poland. This pattern of enhanced Baltic Air
    Policing continues with 4-month rotations. Simultaneously, the United
    States established a persistent flight training deployment in Poland,
    consisting of either fighter or transport aircraft. These deployments
    continue to be a method to increase allied force interoperability as
    well as provide assurance to Poland and other regional allies. Also,
    beginning in March 2014, U.S. Air Forces Europe (USAFE) began providing
    air-to-air refueling support to NATO AWACS aircraft conducting
    operations along NATO's eastern flank.
        At the end of April 2014, the U.S. Army's 173rd Infantry Brigade
    Combat Team (Airborne) quickly deployed company-sized contingents of
    U.S. paratroopers to Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to begin
    expanding land forces training. These deployments established a
    persistent U.S. military presence in these countries and demonstrated
    U.S. assurance and a commitment to Article 5. These exercises, which
    came at the request of the host nations, work to improve
    interoperability through small unit and leader training. In October,
    the 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (1/1 CD) out of Fort Hood, TX,
    conducted a Relief in Place (RIP) with units of the 173d in the Baltic
    States and Poland. Since assuming the mission from the 173d, 1/1 CD has
    participated in exercises, such as Playground and Iron Sword. Most
    recently, soldiers from the 2nd Cavalry Regiment stationed in Germany
    have deployed to the Baltics and Poland, continuing our persistent
    reassurance to our NATO allies. Additionally, USAFE elements deployed
    to Poland to conduct bi-lateral training with the Polish Air Force and
    rotations will continue through 2015.
        In 2014, beyond previously scheduled exercises, U.S. Special
    Operations Forces expanded the number and frequency of Joint Combined
    Exchange Training (JCET) events in the Baltic States and Poland.
    Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) has maintained a near
    continuous presence in the Baltic States and Poland from June 2014 to
    the present. These training deployments have proven invaluable for our
    special forces, with indirect benefits for their Allied counterparts.
    Additionally, EUCOM forces conducted 67 other significant military-to-
    military engagements with the Baltic States and Poland from April to
    October 2014.
        2. Romania and Bulgaria
        Romania and Bulgaria continue to be steadfast U.S. allies. Access
    to training areas and transit locations in these nations provide a
    basis to send a strong signal to Russia, while forging stronger
    bilateral working partnerships. Romania remains a key ally, offering
    tremendous support to ISAF's retrograde from Afghanistan and the
    Resolute Support Mission by allowing U.S. and NATO forces use of its
    base in Mihail Kogalniceanu (MK). MK is a key node for multi-modal
    operations and an ideal example of the bilateral cooperation and
    strategic access forward deployed forces in the European theater
    provides.
        Romania has offered to host a new Multinational Division
    Headquarters. Bulgaria has committed to play a greater role in NATO and
    European defense by 2020, and made contributions to our efforts in
    Afghanistan. These offers demonstrate Romanian and Bulgarian resolve to
    be key allies in deterring Russian aggression and building a stronger
    eastern flank. In Romania, Bulgaria, and Georgia, the Marine Corps'
    Black Sea Rotational Force provides EUCOM with a limited land-based and
    contingency response force in the Region, while additional rotational
    forces from the U.S. Army will come into Romania and Bulgaria this
    summer.
        Romania's cooperation on such areas as missile defense, the
    Resolute Support Mission, and Afghanistan retrograde, and Bulgaria's
    work to expand Alliance and bilateral use of the Novo Selo Training
    area, are positive contributions to regional and Alliance Security.
        3. Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine
        Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine continue to offer significant
    opportunities for cooperation, furthering both regional security, and
    in some cases, acting as willing and capable partners in coalition
    operations. In Georgia, NATO and the United States have long invested
    in improving defensive capabilities, continuing multinational exercises
    that contribute towards both enhanced capability and deterrence efforts
    in the region. In Ukraine, we have increased our security assistance in
    response to the crisis, committing over $118 million in 2014 to help
    Ukrainian forces better monitor and secure their borders and operate
    more safely and effectively, and preserve Ukraine's territorial
    integrity. We also continue to conduct planned exercises such as Rapid
    Trident to increase interoperability among Ukraine, U.S., NATO and
    Partnership for Peace member nations. The most recent Rapid Trident
    iteration in September 2014 consisted of multinational battalion-level
    field training exercise and saw the participation of 15 countries with
    approximately 1,300 personnel. An upcoming train and equip program for
    its security forces demonstrates U.S. resolve towards increasing
    Ukrainian capacity to provide for its internal and territorial defense.
        Despite increasing Russian presence in the region, EUCOM has
    increased U.S. maritime presence in the Black Sea through Passing
    Exercises (PASSEXes) and other bilateral and multinational exercises.
    Since April 2014, U.S. Naval Forces Europe (NAVEUR) has maintained a
    monthly periodic presence in the Black Sea, and led the Baltics
    Operations exercise in the Black Sea with numerous Allied and partner
    nations. Despite Russia's increased and aggressive posture in the
    region, NAVEUR also conducted exercise Sea Breeze in September 2014
    with multinational support from Turkey, Romania, and Georgia. Active
    discussions are underway for next year's iteration of Sea Breeze, which
    will continue our engagement with the Ukrainian Navy and other Black
    Sea maritime partners.
    B. European Reassurance Initiative
        I would like to thank this committee for supporting the European
    Reassurance Initiative (ERI). Your support directly enables EUCOM's
    ability to strengthen its posture along NATO's eastern flank in order
    to demonstrate commitment to our NATO allies, and deter further Russian
    aggression. The ERI will provide temporary support to bolster the
    security of NATO allies and partner states in Europe, enable
    adjustments to U.S. defense posture along NATO's eastern flank, and
    maintain momentum in conducting operations to demonstrate our
    commitment to our European Allies and partners. ERI funds will enable
    the development of infrastructure at key locations in the east to
    support exercise and training activities for both the United States and
    NATO, as well as support contingency operations. Additionally, ERI will
    fund improvements to airfields in Eastern and Central Europe along with
    improvements at training ranges and operations centers. Finally, our
    plan also includes enhancing available prepositioning, focused on the
    addition of a rotational Armored Brigade Combat Team set and related
    assets into several NATO Member nations.
    C. Building Partnership Capacities (BPC)
        Congressional support over the past several years enabled EUCOM to
    accelerate and expand efforts to build capacity of Eastern European
    allies and partners to contribute to operations in Afghanistan. With
    U.S. training and equipment, these countries made substantial strides
    in developing NATO-interoperable capabilities to conduct special
    operations, intelligence analysis and exploitation, counter improvised
    explosive devices, coordinate close air support, and maneuver in
    combat. They brought these capabilities to bear in support of ISAF,
    further developing their interoperability and gaining experience on the
    battlefield in Afghanistan now in support of NATO's Resolute Support
    mission in Afghanistan.
        Even prior to the recent events in Ukraine, EUCOM was examining
    ways to preserve interoperability gains and expeditionary capability
    following ISAF. EUCOM launched our first ``post-ISAF'' program in 2014,
    implementing the Secretary of Defense's 2012 decision to reinvigorate
    U.S. land forces participation in the NATO Response Force (NRF). The
    1st Armor Brigade Combat Team, 1st Calvary Division (1/1 CD ABCT),
    based in Fort Hood, TX, began its 12-month mission as the U.S.
    contribution to NRF in January 2014. In May 2014, the Brigade deployed
    2nd Battalion, 5th Calvary Regiment (2-5 CAV) to Germany to exercise
    with our allies and partners. While here, 2-5 CAV conducted Exercise
    Combined Resolve II at the U.S. Army Europe's (USAEUR) Joint
    Multinational Training Command, which trained 1,451 personnel from 13
    countries and helped to enhance NRF interoperability and readiness.
        The end of ISAF and the events in Ukraine require the United States
    to shift the focus of our foreign military training and equipping
    programs preparing allies and partners for deployment to Afghanistan,
    to restoring and/or building ally and partner nation capability to
    address the challenges of hybrid warfare and to territorial defense.
    However, the BPC authorities and funding available to EUCOM to equip
    and train foreign military forces are largely limited to preparing
    forces for counterterrorism and deployment to Afghanistan. EUCOM needs
    continued assistance from Congress to provide adequate funding under
    existing authorities, to build partner capacity and address the complex
    challenges of the new European security environment.
        For example, section 2282 and other authorities have been
    invaluable in providing allies and partners with the equipment needed
    to deploy to Afghanistan. Much of this equipment--such as night vision
    goggles; communications; counter-improvised explosive devices; and
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems--is
    equally relevant to joint combined arms warfare. With the end of ISAF,
    our allies and partners are bringing much of this equipment home. To
    ensure the capabilities we have helped build are enduring and available
    to meet the urgent challenges we now face, the United States needs to
    be prepared to assist these countries, as appropriate, with sustainment
    of U.S.-provided systems. The only U.S. Government program with this
    ability is Foreign Military Financing (FMF), which has been reduced for
    the EUCOM AOR (not including Israel) by more than 50 percent since
    fiscal year 2010. Congressional support for an increase in FMF for the
    Europe and Eurasian region would greatly assist in helping to address
    this sustainment challenge. Additionally, to facilitate and enable our
    allies and partners to preserve capabilities, there is a need for
    authorities that allow for multilateral Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to
    support NATO Smart Defense and pooling and sharing initiatives. The
    United States benefits from a Europe that is whole, free, at peace, and
    prosperous. Building allied and partner capability to provide for their
    own national defense, as well as to deploy in support of global
    stability and security, will sustain these substantial benefits for the
    United States.
                iv. stabilizing the middle east and north africa
    A. U.S. Support to Israel
        Israel has witnessed a deterioration of security along its borders
    over the last several years. Spillover from the Syrian civil war,
    continued threats from Hezbollah rockets, and ISIL pose a threat to the
    stability of Israel and the entire region. ISIL has especially used
    violence in an attempt to impose their self-proclaimed religious
    authority and political control over the Middle East. Given this
    situation, it is feasible that, with limited warning, war could erupt
    from multiple directions within the Levant with grave implications to
    Israeli security, regional stability, and U.S. security interests.
        EUCOM primarily engages with Israel through our Strategic
    Cooperative Initiative Program and numerous annual military-to-military
    engagement activities. These engagements strengthen both nations'
    enduring ties and military activities. EUCOM chairs four bilateral and
    semiannual conferences with Israel. These conferences address planning,
    logistics, exercises and interoperability. EUCOM also supports the
    Joint Staff's bilateral engagements, including meetings at the highest
    levels within the Department of Defense. The U.S.-Israel exercise
    portfolio includes five major recurring exercises and as a result of
    continued engagement, U.S.-Israeli military and intelligence
    cooperation relationships have never been closer or our joint exercises
    more robust. Through these engagements, our leaders and staff maintain
    uniquely strong, frequent, personal, and direct relationships with
    their Israeli Defense Force counterparts.
        EUCOM diligently works to strengthen our relationship with Israel,
    which includes $3.1 billion in annual FMF, support for Israel's
    layered-missile defense program--including the Iron Dome and David's
    Sling systems, and the approval to release advanced military
    capabilities, including the F-35 and the V-22 aircraft. Finally, EUCOM
    works closely with CENTCOM to keep abreast of all emerging threats that
    may cross into EUCOM's AOR.
    B. Countering Threats along the Southeastern Flank
        In August 2014, the U.S. Departments of Defense and State, in close
    consultation with the Government of Iraq, formed a task force to
    bolster the resupply of lethal aid to Kurdish Peshmerga security forces
    in northern Iraq. EUCOM has supported CENTCOM by facilitating the
    integration of European forces and efforts into the larger CENTCOM
    coalition. EUCOM led the European resupply effort by soliciting,
    coordinating, and transferring donated arms, ammunition, and material
    from a multitude of European allies and partners. By early October
    2014, over 2 million pounds of donated lethal aid had been delivered to
    the Kurdish Regional Government via 45 airlift missions to Iraq. The
    vast majority of these donations and a significant portion of the
    aircraft were provided by European nations under the direction of
    EUCOM. These efforts are expected to last through 2015.
        EUCOM has also led numerous interactions between U.S. interagency
    partners, the Custom and Border Protection Agency, and the Drug
    Enforcement Administration. These actions have focused on countering
    transnational threats, including trafficking of persons and illicit
    substances, as well as prosecution actions to build partner capacity.
    EUCOM works in conjunction with the Department of State to monitor and
    thwart the flow of foreign fighters going to and from Syria and the
    Levant, dismantle extremist facilitation networks, and build partner
    nation capacity to counter the flow of foreign fighters on their own.
            v. supporting other combatant commands and contingencies
    A. Resolute Support: Enabling the NATO mission to Afghanistan
        U.S. and NATO forces completed Afghan combat operations in December
    2014. On 1 January 2015, ISAF transitioned to the Resolute Support
    Mission. Our European allies and partners have borne and will continue
    to bear the burden of providing the bulk of forces, second only to the
    United States.
        As we conduct the Resolute Support Mission, EUCOM will continue to
    help prepare our allies and partners for deployments to support the
    train, advise, and assist mission, all the while maintaining maximum
    readiness to protect the force and to conduct full-spectrum operations,
    as required. Authorities to include allowing EUCOM to provide
    operational logistics, lift and sustain support for allies and partners
    in Afghanistan, and section 1202 have been invaluable in providing our
    Allies and partners with logistical support in the form of inter-
    theater lift, sustainment, and equipment loans. On the training side,
    the Coalition Readiness Support Program enables us to provide crucial
    pre-deployment training to prepare 12 of our Ally and partner nations
    for the missions they will support during the Resolute Support Mission.
    Section 1206 was absolutely vital in fiscal year 2014, and previous
    years, to procure the equipment needed to fill critical shortfalls for
    nine of our Allied nations. This much needed equipment includes
    interoperable communications gear, counter-IED and explosive ordinance
    disposal equipment, medical equipment, and night vision devices.
    B. Operation Inherent Resolve: Supporting military intervention against
            ISIL
        The United States is considering options for enabling moderate
    Syrian opposition and EUCOM is in support of CENTCOM on this planning
    effort and continues to assist in developing options. Operation
    Inherent Resolve is intended to reflect the unwavering resolve and deep
    commitment of the United States and partner nations in the region and
    around the globe to eliminate the terrorist group ISIL and the threat
    they pose to Iraq, the region, and the wider international community.
    It also symbolized the willingness and dedication of coalition members
    to work closely with our allies and partners to apply all available
    dimensions of national power necessary--diplomatic, informational,
    military, economic--to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL.
    C. Operation United Assistance: Fighting Ebola in Africa
        EUCOM has worked in support of AFRICOM's efforts to stop the spread
    of Ebola from epidemic plagued countries in Africa, providing intra-
    theater lift, equipment, and personnel through and from the EUCOM AOR
    through established basing and access. EUCOM has proactively and
    aggressively engaged a number of European nations to secure permissions
    for U.S. Forces to use facilities and infrastructure for DOD-directed
    21-day controlled monitoring in Europe and to relay the protocols
    necessary to prevent the inadvertent transmission of the Ebola disease
    onto the European continent. Furthermore, EUCOM has worked closely with
    various U.S. Embassies and other Combatant Command personnel to help
    shape the development of host nation permission requirements, while
    identifying and allying European fears via robust information and
    intelligence sharing efforts.
    D. Protection of U.S. Embassies and Facilities in North Africa and the
            Middle East
        EUCOM continues to posture both land and air forces for quick
    reactions to volatile environments in North Africa and the Middle East.
    Forces, such as the Special-Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force-Crisis
    Response-Africa (SPMAGTF) currently located in Spain, Italy, and
    Romania provides a crisis response force of 1,550 marines. Aircraft
    stationed in Germany, Italy, and elsewhere in Europe are on high alert
    to react to crises as needed. EUCOM supports this mission through its
    strategically located facilities and access agreements within Europe.
    The protection mission is vital, albeit costly, as a large number of
    embassies and consulates are at risk on the Africa continent and
    AFRICOM has no bases in Africa that can support forces assigned to the
    mission.
                            vi. setting the theater
        EUCOM needs sufficient resources to maintain readiness, execute
    assigned missions, and build capability and capacity of our allies and
    partners to defend themselves and bolster regional security.
    A. U.S. Defense Posture
        1. Forces
        Overall reductions in the Department of Defense's budget have meant
    the reduction of force posture in Europe. Nevertheless, in light of
    recent, significant changes to the European strategic environment, it
    is my judgment we must immediately halt any additional reductions to
    the number of assigned forces in Europe. At the height of the Cold War,
    there were more than 450,000 uniformed personnel stationed across the
    European Theater. Today there are fewer than 65,000 permanent military
    personnel stationed throughout the EUCOM AOR, of which 55,000 are in
    direct support of EUCOM missions, and 9,000 support the missions of
    other organizations, such as AFRICOM, TRANSCOM, NATO, and others. The
    EUCOM assigned forces are tasked with the same deterrent and
    reassurance missions we have performed for the past several decades. It
    is important to understand the critical roles these forces play in this
    theater before the Services recommend further reducing the current
    force posture in Europe.
        On any given day, forces throughout Europe are engaged in a variety
    of activities and missions to include: (1) Training of our forces in
    order to be ready, if called upon, to conduct full spectrum military
    operations; (2) Assuring our allies of our commitment to collective
    defense; (3) Training and collaborating with our NATO allies and
    partners to maintain interoperability; and (4) Working with our allies
    and partners to effectively prepare for and support humanitarian
    assistance and disaster relief operations.
        In addition to my responsibilities as a warfighting commander, I
    also often serve in the role of a supporting commander. EUCOM forces
    are ready to support the needs and missions of four other geographic
    combatant commanders, three functional combatant commanders, and
    numerous Defense agencies, including the ability to appropriately base
    and provide logistics support functions to forces assigned to
    operations in the AFRICOM and CENTCOM areas of responsibility.
        Some have suggested we can mitigate the impact felt from a
    reduction in assigned forces through the augmentation of rotational
    forces from the United States. Rotational forces from the continental
    United States to Europe cannot completely fulfill strategic roles. The
    temporary presence of rotational forces may complement, but does not
    substitute for an enduring forward deployed presence that is tangible
    and real. Rotational forces also have an impact on our relationships
    with various host nations we will count on to enable operations; we
    might over reach to assume host nations will readily accept our new
    readiness construct. As I have said previously, virtual presence means
    actual absence. The constant presence of U.S. forces in Europe since
    World War II has enabled the United States to enjoy the relatively free
    access we have come to count on--and require--in times of crisis.
    Further reductions of both infrastructure and forces will reduce our
    access to key strategic locations during times of crisis.
        2. Footprint
            a.  European Infrastructure Consolidation (EIC)

        Since the end of the Cold War, EUCOM has reduced its footprint in
    Europe to less than 25 percent of the total controlled, European real
    estate inventory once held by the United States. Our current network of
    U.S.-controlled bases throughout Europe provides for superb training
    and enables power projection in support of steady-state and contingency
    operations. As EUCOM begins to implement the Secretary of Defense's
    direction on EIC, the Department must focus to ensure remaining
    infrastructure properly supports operational requirements and strategic
    commitments.
        EIC reductions will yield cost savings with the remaining
    infrastructure sufficient to support steady-state and crisis
    activities. Upon full implementation of EIC, EUCOM will have 17 main
    operating bases in Europe. As we continue to implement EIC
    recommendations, EUCOM will work towards minimizing any negative
    effects the reduction of bases may have on our strategy, operations,
    and the political-military relationships the U.S. has built in Europe.

            b.  Key Military Construction (MILCON) Priorities

        EUCOM's fiscal year 2016 military construction program continues to
    support key posture initiatives, recapitalize key infrastructure, and
    consolidate enduring locations. I am thankful Congress continues to
    fund EUCOM's priorities, in particular the Landstuhl Regional Medical
    Center/Rhine Ordnance Barracks theater medical consolidation and
    recapitalization project (ROBMC), European Phased Adaptive Approach
    (EPAA) missile defense projects, and the relocation of the Joint
    Intelligence Operations Center Europe (JIOCEUR) and Joint Analysis
    Center (JAC) to Croughton, United Kingdom.
        ROBMC remains one of the command's highest priority military
    construction projects, providing a vitally important replacement to
    theater-based combat and contingency operation medical support from the
    aged and failing infrastructure at the current facility. The official
    ground-breaking ceremony, conducted jointly by the United States and
    Germany, took place this past October and signified continued support
    and commitment from both nations. This project is vital to ensuring the
    availability of the highest level trauma care to future U.S.
    warfighters.
        Congressional support for the EPAA Phase 1 projects, including
    approval to replace expeditionary facilities in Turkey with semi-
    permanent facilities, has been critical to achieving a high degree of
    readiness at the AN/TPY-2 radar site. In fiscal year 2013 and fiscal
    year 2014, the command began EPAA Phase 2 projects, including an Aegis
    Ashore site in Romania.
        Another key EUCOM MILCON priority project is the consolidation of
    the JIOCEUR Analytic Center and other intelligence elements at RAF
    Croughton, UK. The Department requested planning and design funding for
    the consolidation during fiscal year 2015, with three phases of MILCON
    construction in fiscal year 2015-2017 respectively. We anticipate the
    construction completion will occur in fiscal year 2019, with movement
    of units occurring in fiscal year 2019/2020.
        Phase 1 includes EUCOM's Joint Analysis Center (JAC) as well as
    Defense Intelligence Agency's Regional Support Center. The planned
    replacement facility will consolidate intelligence operations into an
    efficient, purpose-built building which will save the U.S. Government
    $74 million per year and reduce significant operational risk associated
    with current substandard, deteriorating facilities. The RAF Croughton
    site also ensures continuation of the strong EUCOM-UK intelligence
    relationships our sponsorship of the co-located NATO Intelligence
    Fusion Center.
        The maintenance of our intelligence relationships with the UK and
    NATO remains vital to EUCOM's capability to conduct military operations
    from and within Europe. Phase 2, programmed for fiscal year 2016, adds
    AFRICOM intelligence activities (currently at RAF Molesworth), the NATO
    Intelligence Fusion Center, and the Battlefield Information Collection
    and Exploitation System (BICES), which provides classified
    communications to our NATO partners.
        3. Missile Defense
        The changing security environment in the EUCOM AOR makes it
    critical for the United States to take proactive measures and ensure
    our allies and partners have the capability and capacity to defend
    themselves, their region, and support global coalition requirements.

            a.  Progress on implementation of EPAA

        EUCOM continues to implement the European Phased Adaptive Approach
    (EPAA) to missile defense in Europe, and further develops partnerships
    and assurances in NATO. Within the next year, EUCOM expects to complete
    Phase 2 of the EPAA when the Aegis Ashore site, currently under
    construction in Deveselu, Romania, becomes operational. Phase 2 of the
    EPAA will provide enhanced medium-range missile defense capability,
    expanding upon Phase 1 of the EPAA, which has been operational since
    2011. The deployment of Aegis Ashore will be the final building block
    in finalizing the Phase 2 EPAA capability in Europe. While completion
    of the site in Deveselu, Romania is still on schedule, there have been
    some delays in construction. EUCOM and Missile Defense Agency
    leadership have been tracking this progress closely and firmly believe
    there will be no slippage in schedule. We expect the Aegis Ashore
    capability to be delivered on 31 December 2015.
        EPAA Phase 3, which is primarily composed of a second Aegis Ashore
    site at Redzikowo, Poland, is on track to support completion in the
    2018 timeframe. The broader basing agreement is complete and the
    implementing arrangement negotiations are on schedule and meeting both
    U.S. and Polish expectations. EPAA Phase 3 builds upon the pre-existing
    intermediate-range missile defense capabilities of Phases 1 and 2 of
    the EPAA. Once in place EPAA Phase 3 will support EUCOM Plans and
    Operations and represents the U.S. voluntary national contribution
    Ballistic Missile Defense of NATO.

            b.  Increasing Allied engagement and commitment

        EUCOM is encouraging allies and partners to invest in their own air
    and missile defense capabilities to ensure that they are interoperable
    with our systems. Building an integrated network of interoperable IAMD
    systems will leverage cost-sharing and help spread the commitment among
    willing participants. The allies are listening, and they are beginning
    to respond. The allies are also making investments in BMD capabilities,
    such as the Netherlands-Denmark-Germany effort to study the upgrade of
    the Smart-L radar systems onboard their Air defense ships, and the
    comprehensive programs underway in Poland and Turkey to upgrade their
    lower-tier air and missile defense capabilities. EUCOM is working with
    the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and the Department of Defense
    on developing authorities that will enable the United States to sell
    missiles and other weapons systems with retransfer rights to groups of
    NATO and other authorized nations.

            c.  Support to Israeli Missile Defense

        U.S. efforts to enhance the BMD for Israel are well-developed. The
    threat posed by longer range ballistic missiles, larger raid sizes, and
    increased accuracy of ballistic missiles and rockets poses a
    significant challenge to Israel. EUCOM maintains plans to deploy forces
    in support of the defense of Israel against ballistic missile attack if
    requested. EUCOM also conducts maritime BMD patrols in cooperation with
    Israel. In addition, EUCOM conducts regular BMD training exercises with
    Israel on a weekly and quarterly basis.
        In late 2013, U.S. and Israeli representatives signed the
    ``Combined U.S.-Israel BMD Architecture Enhancement Program'' (AEP). In
    addition to providing guidance on combined U.S.-Israel operations, the
    AEP provides direction on how the United States and Israel will jointly
    address the full range of potential BMD enhancements developed by both
    sides.
        4. Cyber
        Among the most dangerous threats facing Europe's new security
    environment are those that can manifest asymmetrically through
    Cyberspace. Adversaries can easily hide their identities and locations
    in Cyberspace, and attempt to exploit our people, our systems, our
    information, and our infrastructure. EUCOM must defend against these
    adversaries who can threaten our forces from anywhere in the world, by
    identifying and securing key parts of our critical infrastructure in
    what has become our cyber flank. Through a defensible architecture,
    ready cyber forces, and improved situational awareness, EUCOM will
    protect this flank just like eastern and southern flanks that see
    increasing threats today. While doctrine and concepts for operating in
    cyberspace are still being formulated and debated, our adversaries are
    aggressively searching for new vulnerabilities to exploit in the cyber
    flank.
        EUCOM's first Cyber Combat Mission Team (CMT) and Cyber Protection
    Team (CPT) reached Initial Operational Capability (IOC) this past year
    providing us with new capabilities to protect our people, systems,
    information, and infrastructure while holding adversaries at risk. As
    these teams continue to improve, EUCOM will have an enhanced ability to
    plan and conduct Cyberspace Operations to enhance our situational
    awareness and protect our cyber flank.
        The Joint Information Environment (JIE) is moving ahead in the
    European theater as the as a way to reduce risk to missions by
    providing better situational awareness into networks, improving
    security, and better integrating information technology across all the
    Services within the Department of Defense. As a result of this effort,
    EUCOM has seen improved mission effectiveness through the
    implementation of unified capabilities, virtual desktops, and an
    enterprise operations center that is capable of tracking all of our
    component information technology systems. As EUCOM enters into the next
    phase of JIE, we are improving our ability to better operate with
    allies, friends, and partners in a Mission Partner Environment that has
    enhanced capabilities for information sharing and situational
    awareness. As demonstrated during Operations Atlantic Resolve, Unified
    Assistance, and Inherent Resolve, EUCOM's information technology
    infrastructure must remain relevant, interoperable, and resilient to
    support a range of missions that transit our theater in support of what
    our national leaders may ask us to do with like-minded friends,
    partners, and allies. As part of JIE, EUCOM continues to enhance our
    interoperability so that we can rapidly share information, enhance
    understanding, and dominate any potential adversary.
        5. Maintaining U.S. Nuclear Deterrent with NATO aLlies
        NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept, 2012 Deterrence and Defense Posture
    Review, and 2014 Wales Summit Declaration all affirmed that deterrence,
    based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile
    defense capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy,
    and that ``as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear
    alliance.'' EUCOM maintains a safe, secure, and effective theater
    nuclear deterrent in support of NATO and enduring U.S. security
    commitment within the EUCOM AOR. Through rigorous and effective
    training, exercises, evaluations, inspections, operations, and
    sustainment, EUCOM ensures that United States nuclear weapons and the
    means to support and deploy those weapons are ready to support national
    and Alliance strategic objectives.
        Consistent with NATO's commitment to the broadest possible
    participation of allies in the alliance's nuclear sharing arrangements,
    EUCOM stands side-by-side with our NATO allies to provide nuclear
    forces that are safe, secure, reliable, and effective, and that
    contribute to a robust deterrence and defense posture that strengthens
    Alliance cohesion and the transatlantic link. The supreme guarantee of
    the security of the allies, moreover, is provided by the strategic
    nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United
    States. EUCOM, therefore, works closely with STRATCOM to assure allies
    of the U.S. commitment to the Alliance. For example, by conducting
    bomber assurance and deterrence missions in support of NATO and
    regional exercises as part of Operation Atlantic Resolve.
        6. Information Operations
        Information Operations are essential to EUCOM's ability to shape
    the security environment and achieve our military objectives.
    Activities conducted under Operation Assured Voice provide a powerful
    means to counter Russian aggression, challenge extremist ideology, and
    prepare for contingency operations. The EUCOM AOR has the highest
    internet usage rate of any OCONUS geographic combatant command; that
    characteristic simultaneously presents the command with an
    unprecedented opportunity and efficient conduit for influence in the
    region. We know from experience that our adversaries will seek to gain
    an edge by using the internet to present false narratives and spread
    propaganda. We will leverage the advanced technological environment in
    the EUCOM AOR and use the internet as a principal, cost-effective means
    to reach target audiences critical to our objectives. These leading-
    edge capabilities and methods will augment and complement the more
    traditional military influence measures we currently employ. To
    effectively move forward, we must clarify the roles, expectations, and
    authorities required for steady state military influence operations on
    the internet and continue to advance these activities in close
    coordination with other departments and agencies.
        7. Global Mobility Operations
        The footprint within the EUCOM Theater is essential to TRANSCOM's
    global strategy and directly supports AFRICOM, CENTCOM, EUCOM, SOCOM,
    STRATCOM, and NATO operations. TRANSCOM will continue to depend on
    relationships with European host nations for overflight and access to
    European infrastructure.
        8. Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction, Counter Trafficking, and
            Counter Narcotics
        Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), in the hands of a rogue state or
    non-state actor, continue to represent a grave threat to the United
    States and the international community. Our allies, partners, and NATO
    share these concerns; we continue to work with them on building
    capacity and capabilities for countering WMD and pursuing efforts
    bilaterally, regionally, and in a NATO construct to collaborate on
    reducing the potential for successful WMD trafficking and use. We are
    also working in a whole-of-government manner to counter the trafficking
    of other illegal items, especially drugs crossing through Europe into
    the United States.
                                vii. conclusion
        Those of us assigned to Europe on behalf of the United States work
    every day to maintain peace with our European allies and partners,
    striving to meet the security challenges we face as a nation and as a
    member of NATO. This includes continuing to demonstrate U.S. leadership
    and commitment to NATO and supporting the implementation of the NATO
    Readiness Action Plan.
        The resurgence of a revanchist Russia, and the emergence of new
    risks emanating from across the Mediterranian, places us in a new
    security environment that drives new ways of thinking. Accurately
    assessing these changes is critical to ensure we react properly to
    state and non-state actors who are not complying with international
    norms. As one of only two forward positioned combatant commands, EUCOM
    is in a front row seat for the action, and our staff, both at the
    headquarters and component levels, has the expertise and relationships
    to adapt.
        We must continue to leverage and build upon the expeditionary
    capability and interoperability gained over a decade of operations in
    Afghanistan and increase opportunities to work together in the future.
    Many of these capabilities are essential to confronting current
    security challenges. Our allies and partners have benefited from our
    sustained efforts to build partnership capacity with EUCOM and we see
    this process as a keystone to countering threats like Russian
    aggression and influence. We need to protect our investment to leverage
    it in response to near and medium-term threats and challenges. We must
    also continue exercising with and training our allies and partners and
    enabling the NATO Alliance to make the transition from expeditionary
    and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, to conducting a full
    spectrum of joint, combined operations, including high-end combined
    arms warfare. Our Nation's security interests require we preserve their
    capabilities and their willingness to act so that they remain able to
    respond to threats to U.S. and European security as well as global
    contingencies.
        While preserving expeditionary capabilities developed over the last
    decade, we must address and help our allies and partners address
    renewed challenges, including along Europe's eastern periphery.
    Reassuring, stabilizing, and supporting allies and partners in Europe
    are vital to protecting American interests both on the continent and at
    home. As the Commander of EUCOM, we need the resources to remain
    decisively engaged in the EUCOM Theater, to have the stabilized force
    structure to effectively meet our challenges brought by the new
    European security environment, and to defend our Nation forward. If we
    do not stand up and take the initiative to set the theater, someone
    else will. We need credible, enduring capabilities that will assure,
    deter, and defend while shaping the theater with a coordinated whole-
    of-government approach. As long as I have the watch over EUCOM, I will
    relentlessly pursue a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace.

        Chairman McCain. Thank you, General.
        Item of business. A quorum is now present. I ask the
    committee to consider one civilian nomination and a list of 361
    pending military nominations.
        First, I ask the committee to consider the nomination of
    Mr. Peter Levine to be Deputy Chief Management Officer,
    Department of Defense. Is there a motion to favorably report--
    --
        Senator Reed. So moved.
        Chairman McCain. Is there a second?
        Senator Manchin. Second.
        Chairman McCain. All in favor, say aye. [A chorus of ayes.]
        Chairman McCain. Motion carries.
        Finally, I ask the committee to consider a list of 361
    pending military nominations. All of these nominations have
    been before the committee the required length of time. There's
    a motion to favorably report these 360.
        Senator Reed. So moved.
        Chairman McCain. Is there a second?
        Senator Manchin. Second.
        Chairman McCain. All in favor, say aye. [A chorus of ayes.]
        Those opposed? [No response.]
        The motion carries.
        Thank you, General. And thank you for your final remarks
    about the situation that will evolve if we continue with
    sequestration. I think that's what you're talking about, right?
        General Breedlove. Yes, Chairman, it is.
        Chairman McCain. And that would seriously impair your
    ability, or our Nation's ability, to carry out our
    responsibilities in Europe.
        General Breedlove. That's correct, Mr. Chairman. And
    challenge our forward presence.
        Chairman McCain. And put the lives of the men and women who
    are serving in the military in greater danger.
        General Breedlove. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Thank you.
        Very quickly, literally thousands of refugees, migrants,
    are freeing North Africa and trying to arrive in Europe. In
    some cases, that's not too great a distant. Wouldn't it be
    logical for terrorist organizations, like ISIS, to maybe place
    some people on those boats and transport them to Europe?
        General Breedlove. Mr. Chairman, this is one of our great
    concerns, and also one of the great concerns of our allies.
        Chairman McCain. Have we seen any indication of that so
    far?
        General Breedlove. Mr. Chairman, I can't talk to specifics,
    but I will look into that and get back to you.
        General Breedlove. I have not seen specific named reports
    yet, but we are following several threat strings.
        Chairman McCain. I get the impression from your testimony
    that, as you have in the past, you are predicting that we're in
    a period of pause with the Russians in eastern Ukraine, and
    it's very likely, within a certain period--relatively short
    period of time, they will mount additional--the ``separatists''
    will be mounting further conflicts in the region--in eastern
    Ukraine. Is that accurate?
        General Breedlove. Mr. Chairman, what we--I cannot
    accurately predict what they'll do, but I can watch what they
    have done in the past and what they have done in this lull, as
    you correctly describe. During this lull, we have seen a period
    of what I would call ``resetting'' and preparing, training and
    equipping to have the capacity to again take an offensive.
        Chairman McCain. So, they aren't doing all of what they're
    doing now for nothing.
        General Breedlove. In the past, they have not wasted their
    effort.
        Chairman McCain. In January, we had a hearing, and
    Secretary Albright was there, and Shultz and Kissinger. And all
    of them said that they believed we should provide defensive
    weapons to the Ukrainian government. I asked Secretary Carter,
    in his nomination hearing. He said, ``I am inclined in the
    direction of providing them with arms.'' The list goes on and
    on.
        And I'm not asking you to make policy. And so, I will
    phrase my question in a way--wouldn't it have a significant
    impact on the military situation in eastern Ukraine today if we
    gave the Ukrainian military the weapons that they so badly need
    defensively?
        General Breedlove. Mr. Chairman, first, the--first of all,
    I agree with the Secretary of Defense, and I believe that--as I
    mentioned in my opening statement, that our--Mr. Putin and his
    forces have taken and used every tool to their great advantage,
    to including the military tool. And, as you have phrased, it is
    important that we should consider all those tools. And I
    support the use--the consideration of using offensive weapons
    to change decision calculus on the ground and to facilitate
    bringing our opponent to the table for a solution--a final
    solution.
        Chairman McCain. I had the impression that our European
    allies are reluctant to impose serious sanctions, or seem to be
    seeking ways to lift sanctions, is directly related to their
    dependence on Russian energy. Do you think it would be helpful
    if we developed a strategy for getting energy to our eastern
    Europeans friends, particularly Ukraine, but also eastern
    Europe and even Germany?
        General Breedlove. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I completely
    agree with your premise. As I said, Russians use every tool,
    and this economic tool of energy--using energy as a tool or a
    weapon is clearly a part of the calculus that is affecting the
    decision of many of our allied nations. And any efforts we
    would take to make Europe more energy independent from Russia
    would help in this calculus. I agree.
        Chairman McCain. What do your European friends say when we
    admonish them that every--all but two of them are spending less
    than 2 percent of their GDP on defense? It seems to me that
    they don't have much of a sense of alarm.
        General Breedlove. Mr. Chairman, there's--there is good
    news here, and there remains concern here. We do see several of
    the Nations, in the last weeks, setting a plan to achieve 2-
    percent spending. Those numbers are still small, but we see
    nations doing that. We see a few nations committing to, in the
    short term, getting to the NATO average, which is below 2
    percent and not the goal that we have asked them to set. So, at
    least there is a commitment to turn around a decline. But,
    there is concern about the spending.
        I would say that, to the positive side of the ledger, as
    you know and we have talked about, the--many of these nations
    are stepping up and putting their forces where they're required
    in our Readiness Action Plan in the Very High Readiness Joint
    Task Force, committing, as European nations, to be centerpieces
    of that Very High Readiness Task Force.
        So, I don't want to gloss over the challenge. We need to
    remain focused on the spending and our pledges that all the
    Nations made at the Wales Summit. And we will be continually
    focused on that.
        Chairman McCain. Thank you, General. And I'll, again, thank
    you for your service and, frankly, for your very forthcoming
    responses to the questions of this committee. I thank you.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First, just a point of clarification. I think, in response
    to Senator McCain's question, you talked about offensive
    weapons. Is that----
        General Breedlove. Senator, yes. I have been steady on the
    record as saying that I believe all our tools should be
    considered.
        Senator Reed. Very good.
        Let me follow up also on Senator McCain's question about
    the potential flow into Europe and beyond of foreign fighters,
    particularly coming from the Maghreb in the Middle East. That
    is essentially a law enforcement problem at this juncture. And
    I would assume that you're collaborating with Department of
    Homeland Security, with the Federal Bureau of Investigation
    (FBI), and with all our law enforcement. Is that the major
    thrust of----
        General Breedlove. Sir, I would broaden the answer a little
    bit. The short answer to your questions are yes. And, in fact,
    we have, on our staff in EUCOM, representatives of law
    enforcement agencies and others in a directorate that we
    created for just this problem in our J-9.
        But, the--if I could just broaden the answer just a little
    bit, the example of Operation Ocean Shield off of the Horn of
    Africa, and the example of Kosovo, the European Rule of Law
    (EULEX) mission from the European Union (EU), and North
    Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) K-4 mission are great
    examples of where EUCOM is able to work with other agencies in
    Europe, and where NATO is able to work with other agencies in
    Europe. NATO brings a great command-and-control military
    structure and military discipline to the problem. So, in Ocean
    Shield, they took care of the sea approaches to the Horn. And
    then the EU has that great all-of-government more Ministry of
    Interior connections to judiciary, to policing, and others. And
    so, the combined excellence of NATO military with the European
    Union's ability to reach ashore and do, these nexuses are where
    I think we have a lot of good to do in the future to problems
    like the foreign fighters that both you and the Chairman have
    identified.
        Senator Reed. But, part of this is being able to rely upon
    Homeland Security, FBI, et cetera. And, in the same context of
    your issue with sequestration, if these Departments fell under
    sequestration, if they had limited resources, that could
    materially affect your ability to stop this threat?
        General Breedlove. This is a broad response required across
    those agencies, as well as military agencies, Senator.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Let me ask--focus on Ukraine. There are several dimensions.
    The two most significant, the operational readiness of the
    Ukrainian military forces and the economic reforms that they
    have to undertake to literally survive. I think we had a chance
    to talk about this in the office. Can you give us your--from--
    we focus significantly on situation of weapons, but what are
    the top, sort of, items that they need to be operationally
    capable of resisting? It's not just weapons, it's a list. And,
    in fact, you might sort of prioritize the list.
        General Breedlove. Senator, thank you for the opportunity
    to talk to this. And I would just open by saying that we have
    what is called the Ukraine Commission, the Joint Commission,
    where our EUCOM soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines have
    done a series of bilateral visits and worked with the
    leadership of the military and their ministries to do exactly
    what you talk about, which is to identify their needs in this
    business. We did many of those visits before the Russian
    offensive last August, so we had to go back and redo a few,
    because that Russian offensive seriously altered the complexion
    of the Ukrainian military.
        So, we have done a very exhaustive series, about 25 visits.
    And we have done exactly as you have described. We have
    outlined things that we think are important. I think the top
    three bins, in a purely military sense, not a political or
    economic sense, are, first of all, in communication and
    counter-communication. The Russian forces were able to take the
    Ukrainians off the air in certain areas, herd them, by turning
    off military communications, onto their cell phones, and then
    use their cell phones to attack them on the field. So, the
    ability to communicate and also defend against counter-
    communication, sort of item one.
        Item two in a group is a what I call ``counter-battery
    capabilities.'' About 70 percent of the Ukrainian casualties
    and deaths have been to Russian and separatist artillery. And
    so, I would put in the second group of capabilities and
    capacities that we need to work with on--them on, is that
    counter-battery and how to survive artillery fire.
        And then the third is a broad range that I call ``counter-
    mobility.'' Russian forces and the separatist forces in the
    east enjoy a wide range of armored capabilities that have been
    supplied by Russia. And the ability for the Ukrainians to
    address that capability is important.
        So, those are the three broad areas that I think are
    probably the key.
        And what I would say, also, Senator, in closing, is that
    what we found in our visits, with our disciplined approach to
    this, is pretty close to what President Poroshenko and others
    are asking for as they talk back to us.
        Senator Reed. Just a final point. I know this is out of
    your field, but if--the economic reforms, from both a quality
    of life and a--the politics and the willingness of the
    Ukrainian people to support the government, are absolutely
    critical. And if they fail at that, that would have a--
    significant consequences, beyond just sort of a--further
    aggression by the Russians.
        General Breedlove. Senator, as you know, I'm in and out of
    Ukraine. And, as I have talked to both the President and the
    Prime Minister, they were both elected under a format of reform
    to--economic and also getting at corruption. They both know
    they have to deliver. And this is important. And it's hard to
    deliver on that kind of reform when you're in the field,
    fighting. We need to get that fighting over so that they can
    begin to address the issues that their electorate put them in
    office to correct.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Sullivan.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And, General, I really appreciate not only your testimony,
    which lays out the significant challenges that we have, that
    your combatant command faces, but also how forthright you've
    been, not only in testimony, but also in public statements. I
    think you've been a real leader for our country, in terms of
    telling it like it is, in terms of what the challenges are and
    what we can do.
        I want to dive deeper into what the chairman mentioned at
    the outset of his remarks. One of the aspects of Russians--
    Russia's activities is the militarization of the Arctic. And I
    have a map here. I'm going to pass it out to my colleagues.
    But, it's a pretty informative map of how the Russians are
    militarizing the Arctic. That's new--a new Arctic command, as
    you know, four new Arctic brigades, 11 new airfields, a huge
    icebreaker fleet, land claims that they're making now in the
    Arctic, increased long-range air patrols. And, General, you and
    I have talked about their recent Arctic exercise, which I think
    caught a number of people by surprise--38,000 troops, close to
    3,400 military vehicles, 41 ships, 15 submarines, 110
    aircraft--lasted 5 days and included long-range destruction of
    simulated enemy land and naval units as the mission.
        You talk about the COCOM seams in your testimony. And the
    Arctic, in my view is a classic place for the COCOM seams--
    EUCOM, PACOM, NORTHCOM. What do you think the Russians are up
    to? And do we need an Arctic O-Plan that can help us coordinate
    efforts between the different seams that we have in our COCOMs?
        General Breedlove. Senator, thank you for the opportunity
    to comment on that important issue. And I share many of the
    concerns--all of the concerns that you identify.
        One would hope that we could see what is happening in the
    high north as an opportunity, economically. That shorter route,
    even if it's only for several months a year, saves lots of
    money and would make for a great push to all of our economies--
    --
        Senator Sullivan. It's going to be an important route, and
    there's a lot of resources there. Is that what you think the
    Russians are doing? What are they doing?
        General Breedlove. So, Senator, I think they are, in--to
    your concern, making sure that they have the military
    infrastructure to be able to influence the high north. Of
    course, their words are that this is all in a peaceful manner.
    And again, as----
        Senator Sullivan. Pretty big military exercise to be in a
    peaceful manner.
        General Breedlove. Yes, sir. We have to watch their actions
    and see if we can derive their intents from those.
        But, to the seams, Senator, they're--the good news here is
    that we recognize those seams. Admiral, as I call him, Shortney
    Gortney, and I are--have been friends for many years. And we
    have met recently on this very issue. And we have an
    initiative, called the Russia Strategic Initiative, where all
    of the COCOMs who touch Russia have come together, and EUCOM
    will lead an effort that we make sure we don't have any seams
    in the way----
        Senator Sullivan. Do you think we need an Arctic O-Plan,
    though, to help address that and know what the requirements are
    in the Arctic and other places?
        General Breedlove. Sir, if you would allow, that's more of
    a policy way ahead. I think----
        Senator Sullivan. In your personal opinion, do you believe
    that we----
        General Breedlove. I think it's important that I am aligned
    well with the other COCOMs in how we would address the north.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me ask another more specific
    question. You know, the Army is contemplating removing, not
    one, but two BCTs from Alaska. If you look at the map there,
    you show--it certainly shows how important that strategic
    location is. Many military officials have testified in front of
    this committee that they think that would be a bad strategy, in
    terms of the signal it would send, our readiness. In light of
    your testimony that Putin responds to strengths and weaknesses,
    and that a critical element of our strategy is a persistent
    forward presence, and that your PACOM counterpart is focused on
    a, ``rebalancing of forces to the Pacific,'' in your personal
    opinion, given all of these items, do you think it makes sense
    to reduce one Army soldier in Alaska, let alone one or two
    entire BCTs, particularly our only airborne BCT in the entire
    Pacific and the Arctic? And what do you think Mr. Putin would
    think about us removing one or two BCTs from the Arctic at this
    time, when he's certainly trying to muscle his way into there?
        General Breedlove. Senator, that--Alaska and the forces in
    Alaska are critical to our approach to Russia. You rightly
    recognize that this is a strategic area and an important area,
    and Putin will be watching. I don't mean to be flip, but it's
    an important area for General Breedlove, because his young
    daughter in--serves in this service, as well, and will soon
    land in Alaska to serve for the next 3 years.
        Senator Sullivan. Oh, we'll be glad to host her.
        General Breedlove. So, Senator, this is important. And the
    signature that we have there to be able to respond is
    important. I know that the Army is facing some physics problems
    as it relates to funding. And I'm not tracking their thought
    process there, but I do believe it is important that we keep
    the right capabilities to address aggression in the north.
        Senator Sullivan. Should we remove one single soldier from
    Alaska right now?
        General Breedlove. Sir, I would ask maybe that the Pacific
    Commander would be better positioned to answer that. I would
    not recommend reducing our capabilities in the north.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Kaine.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you, General Breedlove, for your testimony today.
        I want to talk about a different seam. I'll pick up on
    Senator Sullivan's talking about the seams, the seam between
    EUCOM and AFRICOM. You talk about your eastern flank challenges
    and your southern flank challenges. And a number of the
    southern flank challenges are because of instability in
    Africa--North Africa. And I think it's important for the
    committee just to kind of be reminded. EUCOM and AFRICOM share
    a lot of resources, correct?
        General Breedlove. That's correct, Senator.
        Senator Kaine. And in--the resources that you share are
    getting pretty stretched, because, just as you talk about
    increasing challenges in the EUCOM region, if General Rodriguez
    were here, he would talk about the number of increasing
    challenges in AFRICOM, whether it be Boko Haram, Lord's
    Resistance Army, you know, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
    (ISIL), or al-Qaeda, splinter groups, al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda in
    the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). He would be singing the same tune
    about increasing challenges, correct?
        General Breedlove. Yes, Senator. And I think there's just a
    couple of things to mention here that are good and challenges.
    First, with AFRICOM, we have an authority that COCOMs have
    never had in the past. The Secretary of Defense has given us
    the authority, at the COCOM level, to share forces quickly and
    easily, when required and the two commanders agree that those
    forces should be shared. And this process works very well
    between Rod Rodriguez and myself and our staffs. That's good.
        But, to your other point, sir, I would like to seize on
    that just a moment. Our forces in Europe, which I share with
    General Rodriguez, have been sized, over the last two decades,
    for Russia that we were looking----
        Senator Kaine. Yeah.
        General Breedlove.--to make a partner. And so our forces
    have come down, as the--as was described in the opening
    remarks, drastically since the end of the Cold War. And our
    headquarters size has come down drastically across the past few
    years. We are now the smallest COCOM headquarters in the
    military.
        And so, now we do, as you correctly point out, point--we
    face literally what I call three new missions and three new
    threats. First and foremost, as we described earlier, a
    revanchist Russia, which we're not sized for. Second is this
    entire problem that the Ranking and the Chairman both spoke to
    of this flow of migrants and other people out of the under-
    governed spaces in North Africa. And then, third is this Iraq/
    Syria/Levant problem that could lap over our great ally to the
    east, Turkey's borders, and become a problem. And so, our
    forces in Europe were not sized for any of those three
    challenges----
        Senator Kaine. And if I can just sort of summarize, you
    were not sized for these challenges, you share resources with
    an AFRICOM that is also seeing a significant uptick in
    challenges, and you're dealing with the potential reality of a
    budget sequester that would impose an even tighter tightening
    of the belt at a--at the very time when the challenges are
    increasing. So, this has got to be something that keeps you up
    at night.
        General Breedlove. It is, Senator. And I--but I, again,
    want to say that the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of
    Defense (OSD) are beginning to address those issues. As you
    know, we have begun--again, with the support of the European
    Reassurance Initiative (ERI), we have started a firm rotational
    force, and we're looking for continued support of that
    rotational force in the next year. And then, the Army has
    committed and has shown signs of building that, then, into
    their 2017 budget and beyond. These rotational forces will be
    key to addressing the shortfalls that we talked about, Senator.
        Senator Kaine. I want to switch for a minute. You talked
    about using all the tools at our disposal. The tools that we
    most often talk about on this committee or in the Foreign
    Relations Committee, or three of the four--you used the DIME
    acronym--diplomacy, information, military, economic. We talk a
    lot about diplomacy, we talk a lot about military, we talk a
    lot about economic, but we don't talk much about information.
    Talk about the information offensive that Russia is using, and
    how weak or modest are the efforts that we are putting on the
    field to counter it.
        General Breedlove. Senator, we are facing a dedicated,
    capable, and very lively information campaign from Russia. They
    are in all of the spaces, from printed to Internet to TV, and
    they are in those spaces in a dedicated and capable way.
        I will use a number that I have seen reported and in the
    papers. I do not know it to be true. But, Russia has put over
    $330 million, we think, into these campaigns in the very recent
    past in order to win these spaces. And their TV capability into
    our northern Baltic nations is very impressive. It's very good
    TV. It draws people to listen, and then the message is passed.
        Senator Kaine. And what are we doing to counter that?
        General Breedlove. Sir, we are beginning--we are in the
    very beginning stages of organizing to get after this. The
    Department of State has a dedicated team now. I will meet with
    that team next Monday, here, after the weekend, to discuss how
    we and Europe can move in this business. We do have capability
    in some of our Special Forces to help teach and train nations
    to deal with this challenge, and we are doing that. Our Special
    Operation Forces are working with the capitals in our allied
    nations; and now also our NATO forces are beginning to look at
    these challenges, as well.
        Senator Kaine. I think that's a big challenge ahead.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, General Breedlove.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Lee.
        Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you, General, for joining us today.
        In September of last year, NATO allies agreed, at Wales,
    to, among other things, ``reverse the trend of declining
    defense budgets to make the most effective use of our funds and
    to further a more balanced sharing of costs and
    responsibilities,'' Between 2001 and 2013, the U.S. share of
    total allied defense spending increased from 63 percent at the
    outset to 72 percent at the end of that period while allies
    have decreased their spending, on average, by 20 percent since
    2008, according to the Congressional Research Service. So, I've
    got a couple of questions for you that relate to this.
        First, do you think increased military investments by our
    European allies, both individually and also collectively, would
    likely help us deter Russian aggression? And also, how do you
    think a more balanced sharing of costs and responsibilities
    might impact U.S. national security and also its fiscal
    interests?
        General Breedlove. Thank you, Senator, for the question.
        And I must agree with all the facts. These are
    straightforward. We do--we are concerned about our allies'
    spending. It was a big part of the discussion at Wales. And
    yes, our Nations did, as you described, pledge that, by 2024, a
    decade, they would reach 2 percent. As I mentioned earlier,
    we've seen nations now, a few of them--I think as many as
    five--have now made a pledge to increase their spending. But,
    this is a slow process, and the Nations that are closest to the
    problem are more apt now to forward in their increased
    spending. But, we do see other large nations--even today, news
    of a large nation--committing to increase spending.
        The--will an increased investment deter? Not if spent
    unwisely. But, if we increase investment across all of our
    allies, and invest in those capabilities that do add to our
    military deterrence value, yes, it can make a difference. And I
    think that's what you see, Poland leading the way, increasing
    their spending, and increasing their spending in targeted areas
    that they knew not only they needed, but the NATO alliance
    needs. And so, these are important.
        Senator Lee. It would make a difference, and it would make
    a difference to us, and it would also make a difference for
    deterring Russian aggression.
        And, on the point of Russian aggression--so, Secretary
    Kerry, on April 27th, very recently, at the Nuclear
    Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, stated that the
    United States is still willing to negotiate with Russia a
    series of nuclear reductions that would take us below the New
    Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) Treaty levels. All of
    this, despite Russia's aggression in Ukraine, and despite
    Russia's violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
    (INF) Treaty announced last year.
        So, let me ask it--do you think that the security situation
    in Europe today is more stable or less stable than it was
    before the New START Treaty was ratified?
        General Breedlove. Senator, I would say that the security
    situation in Europe is less stable, but it's not, based on the
    nuclear piece. That's not what worries me. What worries me is
    Russia, as a nation, now adopting an approach that says they
    can and will use military power to change international borders
    or take over international states. That's what I truly worry
    about every day.
        Senator Lee. And I share that concern, and you're right to
    be worried about that. And, in light of that, and in light of
    your experiences as EUCOM Commander and working at NATO, do you
    think negotiating a new nuclear reduction treaty should be a
    higher priority for us right now than addressing Russia's
    violation of the INF Treaty or its aggressive behavior toward
    its neighbors, like Ukraine?
        General Breedlove. So, Senator, I kind of agree with your
    construction at the end, there. It's very important that we
    continue to address my--I think, a lot of people's--primary
    concern, which is this more conventional problem. And your
    point about the INF, this is very concerning. We do need to
    address what we all recognize is operations outside of the INF.
    And we do need to address that.
        Senator Lee. I see my time's expired, General and Mr.
    Chairman, but I'd just--I cannot fathom a world in which we
    would see that it would make any sense at all for us to
    negotiate further nuclear reductions with Russia when Russia is
    in violation of existing treaty obligations and Russia is
    behaving the way that it is toward neighbors like Ukraine. I
    cannot fathom it. And I don't think the American people can
    support it. And I hope this administration will reconsider that
    very ill-considered policy.
        Thank you.
        Chairman McCain [presiding]. Senator Manchin.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you, General, for your service and your
    explaining the complex situation we deal with.
        Let me ask a question concerning on oil production and,
    basically, United States reconsidering, if you will, our crude
    oil exportation or a ban--removing that ban. The way Russia has
    been able to use, as far as I'm seeing in Europe, Europe
    remains heavily dependent on Russia for energy, with one-third
    of the EU oil imports coming from Russia. Do you think we
    should consider, strategically--would it be something that we
    could look at that would help us with the European allies that
    we have, if we used our newfound wealth, as far as the riches
    and deposits of energy, towards using it from our military
    standpoint?
        General Breedlove. Thank you, Senator.
        As a fighter pilot, it's a little bit out of my league, but
    I do have some feelings there. The bottom line is that we have
    clearly seen that Russia uses energy as a tool----
        Senator Manchin. Right.
        General Breedlove.--as a weapon, as we talked about in the
    DIME model in that economic end. Threatening, changing,
    adjusting prices, cutting off the flow of energy has been a
    tool and I expect will be a tool in the future.
        I think that the current drop in oil prices, coupled with
    sanctions, have caused a lot of problems for Mr. Putin. And so,
    that may be somewhat diminished now. But, clearly, energy will
    remain a tool in the toolkit that the Russian Federation
    considers. And that--efforts that we could make to help Europe
    and some of our key allies to be more energy independent would
    clearly aid our concern.
        Senator Manchin. Or less dependent on Russia. And I agree.
        Next of all, the relationship seems to have degraded to the
    point to where the Cold War is colder today than it was during
    the Cold War of yesteryear. I just came back from a conference
    on Russia and Ukraine in Berlin, and it was very enlightening.
    And they were both Russian scholars, people who know the
    Russian thought process, that were saying we should be careful
    about Ukraine--arming Ukraine. I would have thought--as a West
    Virginian, we always stand up for the underdog and try to help
    them, but they said we should rethink that position. You might
    want to give a thought on that, and you already have on some.
    But, what--the relationship--what are we doing to build a
    relationship or a dialogue? I mean, has it deteriorated to the
    point we're not talking to a country that's extremely powerful,
    as far as in the line of nuclear weapons?
        General Breedlove. So, Senator, again, thank you.
        I think that there are places where we're talking a lot. I
    watch our Secretary of State, Secretary Kerry, work with his
    counterpart, Lavrov, a lot. So, there are avenues where there
    is great conversation.
        I would tell you, sir, what's worrisome is that the
    military level of conversation has been diminished.
        Senator Manchin. From your standpoint, your cohort, as far
    as, I guess, on your level----
        General Breedlove. Valery Gerasimov.
        Senator Manchin.--is not--it's nonexistent?
        General Breedlove. We--I'll be very distinct in how I
    answer this--we have a line of communication that works. We
    know that I can talk to him and he can talk to me. We know that
    we have the right translators and things.
        Senator Manchin. You haven't had lunch for a while, right?
        General Breedlove. I haven't had a lot of conversations
    with him----
        Senator Manchin. I understand.
        General Breedlove.--since he went into Crimea.
        Senator Manchin. S-300. Knowing that we have this
    conversation going on, knowing that we have a pending outline
    of a deal, the Iran deal, what did you make of the Russians
    stepping up and making an announcement, in the middle of this
    negotiations, on furnishing S-300s to Iran? How did you read
    that?
        General Breedlove. Senator, I think that this is a tool to
    influence the conversation, as many other tools have been used
    in the past to influence conversations. I think that President
    Putin's first goals are really not about Ukraine, it's about
    changing the West. Mr. Putin doesn't like to deal with the EU,
    in an economic sense, and he doesn't like to deal with NATO, in
    a military sense. And so, many of the tools he used are to try
    to drive wedges in the EU and NATO. And if he can divide those
    organizations, then all the other things he needs falls into
    place. And I think that he uses many tools to force these
    conversations----
        Senator Manchin. But, the P5+1 were working with him on
    this whole framework, and here he is, it looks like,
    undercutting it or, basically, sending a different message
    completely. How are we going to trust that he would be part of
    the P5 if we have to make some decisions, or participate?
        General Breedlove. I agree with your concern.
        Senator Manchin. I have some others, but we'll talk later.
    Thank you so much, General.
        General Breedlove. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed [presiding]. Senator Fischer.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
        Good morning, General, it's nice to see you.
        As you know, General Rodriguez testified that he thought
    Libya-based threats have the highest potential of threats in
    his region to increase risk to the United States and the
    European strategic interests in the next 2 years. Do you share
    that concern? And are you satisfied with the response that we
    have had to that crisis in Libya?
        General Breedlove. Senator, I am concerned about Libya, and
    I think, as important, as the European Commander, it's key that
    I should tell you that many of our key allies are very
    concerned about Libya. I would say that, rightfully so, our
    Italian friends are very focused on what's going on in Libya.
    You know, they're--are very close to the African continent, and
    are under great pressure from migrations of all manner of
    people, some of which could be nefarious and some of which
    could be just legitimate refugees. But, what is happening in
    North Africa, and Libya sort of being at the nexus of it right
    now, concerns me and concerns our allies.
        Senator Fischer. You mentioned specifically the Italians.
    Do you see the refugees that are landing and being transferred
    into Italy? Are they staying in Italy or are they moving
    through Italy to other countries? And, if so, what's the
    response of those countries?
        General Breedlove. The answer is yes to both. Some are
    staying in Italy and some are quickly transiting in the
    Schengen Zone into other nations. And all of the Nations of
    Europe are concerned about these flows, because--what they
    could possibly bring and, frankly, they put pressure on all the
    social systems of these nations.
        Senator Fischer. Have any of our European allies come up
    with a coordinated strategy in how to deal with refugees? But,
    really more importantly, how are they going to deal with Libya,
    and are we involved in those conversations?
        General Breedlove. So, first, ma'am, as you know, Italy
    started out with an--a military operation if its own, Mare
    Nostrum. And this operation was tough and consumed almost their
    entire naval capacity for a certain amount of time. That
    military operation has been supplanted now by a European Union
    operation, which is right now being stressed pretty badly by
    what is happening on the Mediterranean oceans. And you've seen
    a couple of disastrous results, here, recently.
        These are concerns. And the Nations are talking about how
    to handle it and how the Nations that are most effective may
    need other nations' help. It is primarily a conversation inside
    the EU, because these--this has a--lots of reaches into what we
    discussed earlier. These are, in many cases, Ministry of
    Interior issues when they come to the land, as opposed to
    Ministry of Defense issues.
        But, the answer, ma'am, is yes, we are talking, and we are
    looking at this problem. And I expect that it will be a growing
    conversation, because this problem will get worse before it
    gets better.
        Senator Fischer. If I can move back to some of the
    questions and responses you had on the INF Treaty violation
    with--that the Russians committed. Have they acknowledged that
    they violated that Treaty yet?
        General Breedlove. Ma'am, I don't think they've
    acknowledged. What they continually do when we bring up the INF
    issue is, they point to how the West has busted the INF. They
    continually point to our missile defenses as being outside of
    the INF. They point to some of the test missiles we have used
    to--in the past, et cetera. So, the conversation is, we address
    their--what we think they're outside of the INF, and, rather
    than answering, they address where they think we're outside of
    the INF.
        Senator Fischer. So, what actions have we taken to date to
    respond to their violation? Are we being forceful in any way in
    trying to get the Russians to respond to us in any kind of
    meaningful way, or are we going to continue with this back-and-
    forth cat-and-mouse game?
        General Breedlove. Senator, I actually think that the
    Department of State--and Secretary Gottemoeller is pushing
    pretty hard on this--and that's the first stage of this, is to
    try to do this through those kinds of conversations. So, I am
    actually maybe a little more optimistic than you sound at this
    point on Rose Gottemoeller's efforts and how she's working it.
        Senator Fischer. And I appreciate your comments, and thank
    you, sir, for your service.
        General Breedlove. Thank you, ma'am.
        Senator Reed. Senator King.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, I understand you had some discussion with
    Secretary Sullivan--I had to be at another committee meeting
    briefly--on the question of the Arctic. I'd like to put a
    slightly different twist on that.
        Five of the eight Arctic nations are NATO nations. Are they
    taking this seriously? Are they engaged? Has there been
    communication, in terms of NATO's position, with regard to the
    Russian buildup in the Arctic?
        General Breedlove. Senator, thank you. Yes, our NATO
    nations are concerned about this. And the--while only five or
    eight are allies, others are very close partners in the way
    that we do business. And so, the eight nations, of course, are
    on the Arctic Council together. The United States took charge
    of the chairmanship of the Arctic Council this year. We also
    work closely with Norway and another venue in the Arctic. So,
    there is a consorted concern. Nations are not completely
    unified in the approach yet. But, there is strong conversation
    about, What is it that we do, going forward?
        Senator King. Would you agree that one of the things we
    certainly need to do is infrastructure, in terms of things like
    icebreakers? We are woefully under-resourced, in terms of that
    kind of asset. Is that correct? Is that your understanding?
        General Breedlove. Sir, I have had the same reports you
    have, and we are limited in our icebreaker capacity. And I
    think it is important that all of the Arctic nations now begin
    to look at, What are our capabilities and capacities to deal
    with this new environment?
        Senator King. Thank you.
        To go back to--there was a moment in your opening remarks
    that caught my attention. And I don't think I wrote it down
    exactly, but it goes to the question of the Ukrainians and
    arming the Ukrainians. And you said something to the effect,
    ``When the proxy forces run into trouble, Russian forces step
    in to right the balance.'' That goes to the heart of my concern
    about arming the Ukrainians. And the consensus seems to be
    developing that that's the right thing to do.
        My question is, Does not the principle that you stated in
    that sentence apply, in that our arming of the Ukrainians would
    simply provoke a counter-reaction from Russia, a kind of
    escalation? And have you gamed that out? Where does it stop?
    They're not going to ignore our more direct intervention, in
    terms of lethal arms. And I'd like to know your thinking on
    that.
        General Breedlove. Senator, thank you. This is one of the
    toughest things that we look at and consider, and we are war-
    gaming and table-topping to work our way through it, because I
    have been consistent, in my remarks and other testimony, that
    yes, we need to be intellectually honest that anything we do--
    anything we do--is going to provoke a Russian response. This is
    the way they do business.
        And I have also said, Senator, that inaction is also an
    action, and the Russians will react to it. As I said in my
    opening statement, Mr. Putin does understand weakness, and
    takes advantage of it.
        So, we need to look at both sides of the ledger. And we are
    doing that. We have all agreed, and, as the Chairman mentioned
    in his opening statement, we do not believe that there is any--
    there is a good course in trying to arm the Ukrainians to the
    points that they could defeat Russian forces in the field. We
    don't--no one thinks that's the path ahead. What we do believe
    is that we should consider changing the decision calculus of
    Mr. Putin. And that's what we look at. And we acknowledge, as
    you have said, that if we do consider and eventually yes-or-no
    on more lethal weapons, it could have a detrimental effect, as
    well.
        Senator King. Everyone around here is trying to
    psychoanalyze Mr. Putin, but do you believe that his incursion
    or his support of the separatists in the Ukraine was provoked
    by a Russian national strategy, if you will, of trying to
    piecemeal rebuild the Russian empire, the Soviet Union, or was
    it provoked by his concern that the Ukraine was moving too
    closely toward the West, there was talk of joining the EU, talk
    of joining NATO? Do--in other words, where did all this start?
    I think--and you mentioned, in your prepared testimony, that
    clearly Russia views Ukraine as within their sphere of
    influence, just as we view Canada, Mexico, the Caribbean as
    within our sphere of influence, and we would react if there was
    a movement of those organizations into what would be considered
    a hostile camp. What--do you understand my--understand where
    I'm going with it?
        General Breedlove. I do. I do, Senator. And I would answer
    yes to both of your first questions. Yes, this is partially due
    to the sudden movement as the government changed, following the
    Maidan. That certainly had a part of the calculus. Also,
    there--as you rightly described----
        Senator King. I think the question is, Was that the
    motivation or an excuse? That's what it----
        General Breedlove. I would--the answer is yes to both of
    those, as well. I--there are those who have said--and I follow
    the logic--that--and has been reported recently--that Mr. Putin
    had designs on Crimea long before any of this. You've seen it
    reported in the press. And so, we do believe that he has
    thought through these possibilities in the past. So, none of
    this was a spur-of-the-moment action. But, it could also have
    been a reaction to what we saw in the change of government
    following the Maidan.
        I think what is important to understand is the second part
    of your two-question pair, which is that Russia does want to
    have a sphere of influence that buys a buffer zone between them
    and the West, and they very much see Ukraine as part of that
    sphere of influence. I've shortened this to a quip that does
    not--it should not be trivialized, but the bottom line is,
    Russia wants Kiev out of the West, and wants the West out of
    Kiev. And he would like to have Russia driving all of the
    levers in what happens in Ukraine to maintain that in the
    future. And I think that's where this is headed.
        Senator King. Thank you, General, for your thoughtful
    answers, and thank you for your extraordinary leadership on
    this difficult issue.
        Senator, thank you.
        Chairman McCain. Didn't he also say, on many occasions, the
    worst event of the 20th century was the breakup of the Soviet
    Union?
        Senator Ernst.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, General, very much for being here today, and
    thank you for your service, and your staff's, as well.
        In your posture statement, you stated that one of EUCOM's
    top three--in the top three security threats is the flow of
    foreign fighters between Europe and the Levant. So, with that
    statement, what is the impact to the security of our European
    allies and to U.S. interests in that region brought by ISIL,
    al-Nusra, and any number of those other extremist organizations
    that have been radicalized by them, who benefit from the use of
    Turkish soil as a means of their lines of communication, that
    territory for transit, for recruiting, financial services,
    purchase of goods, weapons? What is the threat there that you
    see, General?
        General Breedlove. So, thank you, Senator.
        And it is one of those three sort of threats that have
    arisen from North Africa, from the Levant, especially Iraq and
    into--or Syria and into Iraq, and then, of course, Russia was
    the third. But, this is a problem for all of Europe. It is an
    immediate problem for our Turkish ally, because it's on their
    border, and the possibility of it spilling over into Turkey,
    the impact of well over 1.6 million migrants, et cetera, et
    cetera--Turkey is facing direct impact from what is happening
    there. And we cannot discount that at--I think it's highly
    unlikely, let me tell you, but we cannot discount that there
    might actually be a military incursion across it sometime in
    this calculation. So, these are things we need to worry about.
        But, the most pressing issue is what you and others have
    talked about, and that is this flow of fighters, a large number
    of fighters in Iraq and Syria, and many of them will return,
    with new skills and malicious intent, back to their nations. We
    have seen this already disrupted in a few of the Nations. So,
    how do we address that flow? Again, we're in the nascent stage
    of two very good projects, where we are bringing nations
    together to address this. And those, ma'am, I would need to
    talk about in a different setting.
        Senator Ernst. Certainly.
        And the fact, fact or otherwise, that Turkey is an ally--I
    think it could be disputed, on any different day. I think there
    is a lot that goes on through Turkey that we would rather not
    see happening. And so, in your opinion, then, is the risk of
    any sort of action coming through Turkey, would you consider
    that that would be--whether it's ISIS or any of these other
    organizations into Europe--would you say that that threat is
    low--low risk or high risk?
        General Breedlove. Ma'am, I would not single out Turkey. I
    think that the flows are in several areas, as was--as we
    discussed earlier. Some of this threat vector may be coming
    across in this flow into Italy, the diaspora from the Libya
    area, as these people move freely across the northern Africa
    and the Maghreb and there--have multiple points of entry into
    Europe. Turkey is--clearly has had issues with flows. They are
    addressing those flows. And I--this is a broader problem than
    just their borders.
        Senator Ernst. Okay. And that is a good point, General,
    thank you.
        And you mentioned earlier you are a fighter pilot. And
    thank you for your service in doing that. Could you please
    describe how important it is to have search-and-rescue
    capabilities close to those areas of the fight? We had seen
    recently, of course, that Turkey refused to allow the United
    States access to the search-and-rescue missions, or having
    those types of search-and-rescue missions out of Incirlik. So,
    could you please describe what effects that has to the combat
    fighters and those types of missions?
        General Breedlove. So, to the overall question, first, as a
    single-seat fighter pilot, we don't allow search-and-rescue
    pilots to buy their beers when they're in the bars, because
    their job is incredibly important to what we do. So, I'll stop
    on that one. There is--the necessity and the importance of
    search and rescue cannot be overstated.
        Ma'am, we have been working with Turkey on some very key
    things. One I can talk about in this venue, our training and
    equipping missions is now up and running.
        Senator Ernst. Very good.
        General Breedlove. And so, we've made progress there.
        Senator Ernst. Very good.
        General Breedlove. On the other two, I would like to have
    someone come by and talk to you about----
        Senator Ernst. Absolutely.
        General Breedlove.--the progress there.
        Senator Ernst. We will do that.
        Thank you very much, General.
        And my time is expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        General Breedlove, can you describe the importance of
    providing security assistance training to our NATO allies,
    particularly in eastern Europe? And is there more that we can
    do? And I understand that there's--there may be some question
    about authority to actually provide the assistance that we
    might want to. And is this something that this committee should
    be looking at as we look at making sure you have the ability to
    do what you need to do with respect to training?
        General Breedlove. So, ma'am, this is important. May I just
    make a couple of key examples?
        Senator Shaheen. Please.
        General Breedlove. Georgia and Romania, today the number-
    two and number-four contributor of forces to Resolute Support.
    The number-two troop-contributing nation to our efforts now,
    our NATO efforts and U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, is Georgia, a
    non-ally. We've had a great program with our U.S. Marine Corps
    in training Georgian troops, and Georgia has gone to
    Afghanistan during the kinetic fighting, and they've died
    alongside our forces in the toughest parts of southern
    Afghanistan, where they fought without caveat. So, all of these
    efforts that we have, where we train our eastern allies and
    partners--Romania being an ally, and I'll talk to them in just
    a moment--but, these efforts that we have, where we train our
    allies and partners means two things: their nations draw closer
    to our Western values and morals and capabilities; and, two, as
    they serve alongside of us, that means our soldiers, sailors,
    marines, and airmen do not have to go there in the same
    numbers. And so, it's absolutely key.
        Romania, now, the number-four contributor to Resolute
    Support and, I think, an anchor in the south on the Black Sea,
    and the things that they're doing in our NATO RAP program,
    where they are providing headquarters to lead in the south--so,
    the bottom line is that these allies and partners are
    incredibly important to us a nation and an alliance as we
    address in the future.
        And, ma'am, there are a lot of authorities out there. What
    we have asked is to be considered to have one created for
    eastern Europe, because we don't compete well sometimes with
    other places in the world where fighting and things are going
    on, and that's what we've asked you to consider, ma'am. And we
    would appreciate your support.
        Senator Shaheen. And so, just to be clear, this is
    something that would need to be done through statute, and it's
    something that we can consider as we're looking at the
    authorization bill this year.
        General Breedlove. Yes, ma'am. And if you're interested, we
    will have the right people talk with your staff.
        Senator Shaheen. Absolutely. Thank you.
        Can you--you mentioned in your statement, the European
    Reassurance Initiative, which I think is something that has not
    gotten a lot of attention. And I wonder if you could assess how
    it's working, talk a little bit more about what key areas we
    should be investing in. How is the implementation of this
    going?
        General Breedlove. Ma'am, I would never sound like I was
    correcting. Maybe it doesn't get a lot of interest back here,
    but let me tell you, in Europe and amongst our European allies,
    it gets a lot of attention, and it's being used well. We are
    using this year's ERI to do a myriad of things: rotational
    force, the division that has been rotating into our northern
    nations now in that rotational army force funded by the ERI;
    bringing aircraft over, such as the A-10s in Campia Turzii and
    others--these are brought over in these funds.
        Second of all, if I could show you on a map where all of
    the investments in infrastructure have been made, you would see
    a very clear move to the east and the south into our newer
    nations, providing them with small things that would help us if
    we had to rapidly reinforce--fixing railheads, fixing landing
    strips and cargo pads, things that allow us to more quickly
    join that partner, if we had to in the first, and plot it on a
    map, you would see a string of investments that is
    demonstratively in the east and in the south to address these
    new nations.
        And so, the ERI has had a direct impact already. And, as
    you know, ma'am, we have asked for it to be continued in 2016.
        Senator Shaheen. So, you are feeling positive about how
    it's going, and the response from our European partners has
    been very positive.
        General Breedlove. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        My time is up. But, I just wanted to echo the comments that
    you made about Georgia's contributions to the Afghanistan
    effort and to support for NATO. I agree, I think they've been a
    terrific partner, and hopefully will continue to be.
        Thank you, General Breedlove.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Ayotte.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you, General, for your service and
    leadership.
        I wanted to ask you, if another Benghazi-type attack
    occurred tomorrow or tonight in North Africa, would European
    Command be better prepared to respond more quickly and
    effectively to this type of attack in a region that we see even
    more activity, more terrorism, and more instability at this
    point?
        General Breedlove. Senator, first and foremost, AFRICOM
    would be better prepared to respond to this attack. And part of
    the reason AFRICOM would be better prepared is because of our
    hosting, preparing, training, on a day-to-day basis, of those
    forces that AFRICOM would use. As you know, AFRICOM, we share
    forces with AFRICOM. Our Special Forces, our airlift forces,
    our fighters that are on alert are all EUCOM assets, but are at
    the ready to rapidly support AFRICOM if it goes forward.
    AFRICOM has been given a Special Purpose MAGTF Crisis Response,
    which we host--we, EUCOM, host primarily at----
        Senator Ayotte. You host that response team, correct?
        General Breedlove. I do, ma'am.
        Senator Ayotte. Yup.
        General Breedlove. And Moron Airbase, in Spain. And today
    we have several pieces of it deployed forward to be even more
    ready because of concern.
        Senator Ayotte. So, the answer would be, we'd be in a
    better position, I hope?
        General Breedlove. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Ayotte. Good. That's really important. I appreciate
    that.
        And one of the questions I wanted to ask about--the
    Associated Press reported today that Russia has significantly
    deepened its command and control of the militants in eastern
    Ukraine in recent months. And this greater level of Russian
    involvement has evidently resulted in a new term, called
    ``combined Russian separatist forces.'' General Breedlove, can
    you comment on that? Have you seen increased levels of Russian
    command and control of the separatists, which I think none of
    us were any--under any illusion from the beginning that they
    were controlling these separatists, but it seems that they're
    upping their game in that regard.
        General Breedlove. I do agree with that, and I agree with
    the reporting.
        Senator Ayotte. And if that's the case, and we look at
    what's happening right now--and I know that you were asked
    earlier about some of Russia's other activities, including its
    violation of the INF Treaty--you know, one of the things that
    concerns, I think, all of us is that Russia doesn't seem to be
    getting the message with the sanctions that are in place alone
    right now, and with some of the support we're providing in the
    absence of lethal weapons. So, how do you provide assurance to
    us that we can stop Russia from further destabilizing eastern
    Ukraine, and that the--the world understands. I mean, we--you
    know, these separatists are really--we might as well just call
    them what they are: Russian agents.
        General Breedlove. Ma'am, it's a broad question, and I'll
    try to attack it in a couple of pieces, here.
        We do see a very distinct Russian set of command and
    control in the eastern part of Ukraine. And that, I think, has
    become necessary for them, because there was disunity in some
    of the earlier attacks. I think the--command and control is
    also required because they are bringing so much capability in
    there, it needed to be structured, and it needed to be arranged
    in a way that it could accomplish the goals there in eastern
    Ukraine.
        So, command and control, air defense, support to artillery,
    all of these things increased and making a more coherent
    organized force out of the separatists--I've never called them
    ``separatists,'' I've always called them ``Russian-led
    separatists'' or ``Russian-backed separatists.'' There is a new
    term out there. I think that term is being created because it
    is becoming much more structured by Russian leadership.
        How do we get the--whether Russia is getting the message or
    not? There has been a lively conversation about whether what we
    have done has affected Mr. Putin's calculus. I must admit that,
    in the past, I did not think much so. But, I do now believe
    that Mr. Putin is concerned about further sanctions in some of
    the things. And that may be affecting how he currently does
    things in eastern Ukraine. But, we really have no way of
    knowing, one way or the other.
        Senator Ayotte. So, can we expect--since we've heard from
    some of our European partners, including Germany, that they
    don't believe we should provide lethal weapons, can we expect
    them to double down on sanctions, at least, in terms of where
    Russia is right now? And I hope that this is something that
    they don't back off on and, in fact, we increase sanctions.
        General Breedlove. Ma'am, I really am unable to speak to
    what our allies are thinking about, but we hear all of these
    discussions and debates going on now about keeping the pressure
    on. And I think there is a strong current which says that both
    sides of the agreement are--need to be held to meeting this 12
    February agreement that was made in Minsk, and that that will
    have a direct bearing on whether sanctions are relieved, or
    not.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you. I think all of us are very
    frustrated, because we've been calling for so long for what
    needs to be done in Ukraine to push back on Russia. And I just
    hope that the administration is listening to the--what we've
    heard, which has been continuous testimony, consistent in this
    committee, about providing lethal support and additional
    sanctions.
        Thank you.
        Chairman McCain. Senator McCaskill.
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
        Let's--I'd like to talk a little bit about the immigration
    crisis. We now have some of our NATO allies that are down to
    spending less than 1.5 percent of their GDP on defense.
    Obviously, we have had a tragedy that has occurred with
    hundreds of people going to their death because of their
    efforts to immigrate to Europe from Africa and parts of the
    Middle East. Can you tell me in what ways the American military
    are involved in supporting or working with our European allies
    as they work to humanely deal with all of the refugees that are
    attempting to get to Europe?
        General Breedlove. Ma'am, if I could dissect just a little
    bit. There is a big problem, as you have identified, with this
    flow of immigrants across from North Africa into southern
    Europe; probably most acute in Italy, but there is a big
    problem. We have talked today, and I agree with the
    supposition, that this is primarily an immigration problem, but
    also inside of these immigrants are organized crime and very
    likely also terrorists and foreign fighters that are attempting
    to get across. So, this is a problem broader than just the
    immigration. But, certainly that is a major driver.
        First and foremost, the Nations have addressed this, as we
    talked about earlier. The Italian operation, Mare Nostrum,
    worked this hard, and then the European Union has taken this
    mission over and now is beginning to work that.
        Your direct question about what the United States is doing,
    we have a broad NATO network of sharing of information about
    what's going on, on ths seas, where things are moving. To
    explain the military term, we have a maritime cop, which is
    just the picture of what's going on, on the sea, that we help
    our neighbors understand and characterize what their--what is--
    they're facing.
        Senator McCaskill. I just worry that, as Italy is--you
    know, they're spending so little on defense, and it--if they
    are using any of their resources to address this, it certainly
    limits their ability to participate in NATO with us in a more
    robust fashion.
        You know, I just am curious if you have any take on the
    rise of the Scottish National Party, and what, if any, impact
    you see. And if you want to take it for the record, you can,
    General. I just--it's fascinating to me. These elections are
    coming in a few days after they voted to not leave the United
    Kingdom (U.K.) You're seeing a remarkable surge of political
    power for the Scottish National Party. And a lot of
    commentators are now saying that the Scottish National Party is
    going to be the kingpin, in terms of the formation of a
    government in what is obviously one of our most important
    allies on the planet. Have you all discussed this? Is this
    being talked about? It is--you know, I mean, Labor is really
    getting swamped, according to the polling, by SNP. And what
    impact is that going to have on U.K. and their robust
    participation with us as an ally, particularly in NATO?
        General Breedlove. Ma'am, can I take your generous offer
    and take that for the record----
        Senator McCaskill. Absolutely.
        Senator McCaskill. What about Europeans leaving to fight
    for the Islamic State? Are there any specific actions that the
    European Command is taking to assist the effort of
    identifying--they have a much bigger problem than we do, in
    terms of citizens of Europe leaving to go and join the fight
    with ISIS--is there any specific actions that you all have
    taken in regards to this problem?
        General Breedlove. Ma'am, the short answer is yes. Much of
    that, we can't talk about in this room, and I would like to
    send some of my people to maybe brief you and your staff.
        Senator McCaskill. That would be terrific. We would be
    interested in understanding what our role is in trying to
    assist in stopping this flow of fighters to these barbarians.
        Thank you very much, General, for your service. And thank
    you, to your team.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Hirono.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, General, for your service.
        This is a question relating to the U.S. rebalance to Asia
    while threats continue to materialize in other regions. In the
    case of Russia, which crosses both the European and Pacific
    Command areas of responsibility, do you see a potential for
    leveraging our Asia-Pacific posture to influence Russia and its
    actions in the European AOR, and vice versa? If you can briefly
    comment. Because you did talk about the need to change Putin's
    decision calculus by--i.e., possibly arming the Ukrainians or
    of further economic sanctions.
        General Breedlove. Senator, you have hit at the heart of
    the matter. The--Russia does touch many COCOMs--essentially,
    EUCOM, PACOM, NORTHCOM, because of the existential nuclear
    capabilities in Alaska and the northern passage. Russia also
    touches many of our specific non geographic COCOMs: STRATCOM,
    CYBERCOM, TRANSCOM. There are so many that Russia touches.
        We have had a model in the past in Asia that is called the
    Chinese Strategic Initiative, and it has been a great model to
    bring focus to the Asia-Pacific area. We have been treating
    Russia as a partner for many years, and now we see that we're
    going to have to take the same broad approach in Russia. And
    so, EUCOM has led the formation of a Russia Strategic
    Initiative, where we've brought together all of the COCOMs that
    touch Russia, and we are working on just these concerns and
    these opportunities that you mentioned in your question.
        So, yes, we intend to look at Russia more holistically.
    We've had a great start. And I expect that this will be a good
    investment of stafftime.
        Senator Hirono. So, I hope that, at some point, you might
    be able to talk with us a bit more about how this strategic
    initiative with regard to Russia is working out with all of the
    different commands.
        You--okay, you--I think you talked about the U.S. ballistic
    missile defense, which is very much in high demand. So, can you
    discuss the importance of the European Phase Adaptive Approach
    and the benefits that Aegis Ashore provides in this approach?
    And can you also update us on the progress of installing Aegis
    Ashore in Romania and eventually in Poland?
        General Breedlove. Let me answer the second part, because
    it's very easy, and then I'll use what time you want for--to
    talk more about European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA).
        Our two sites in--first, in Deveselu, Romania, is on
    course, on schedule to deliver technically on time. We're
    slightly--and I emphasize ``slightly,'' because this is a good-
    news story--we're slightly behind in the construction. But, the
    team completely believes that we're on track for the technical
    handover on time. And we are on or under budget, so far. So,
    this is good news.
        To the site in Poland, we are--just this week, have signed
    almost every one of the agreements that are required in order
    to start that work, so I think we are on track on our site in
    Poland, as well.
        So, these two missile sites will be, obviously, incredibly
    important to our missile defense in Europe. And I am very--I am
    well over--way over a ``glass half full'' that we are on track
    with these.
        To the larger question of European Phase Adaptive Approach,
    the Europe--the American contributions are all moving apace. We
    will close out with our fourth destroyer in Rota this year on
    time. Our first two, and now third, are already doing their
    mission. And our connection and our command and control C2BMC
    capabilities are all proceeding apace. So, the U.S.
    contribution to EPAA is on track. We see the--where we lead,
    the Europeans follow. And I think that we see good cooperation
    now from Europe as they bring alongside what is called ACS,
    which is another command-and-control structure which they have
    put over the--our--not only our air, naval, and our ground
    capabilities to control these assets. We see several of the
    northern European nations now, one committing and one thinking
    about upgrading their Aegis platforms to be able to
    participate.
        So, the goal in NATO is 28 for 28, every nation contributes
    some way. It may just be ground-based defense of a site, but we
    want all 28 nations involved in this. And I am optimistic, at
    this moment.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Wicker.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you.
        Well, along the lines of everyone participating, it seems
    to me, General, that, in talking to European Ministries of
    Defense recently, and parliamentarians from various NATO and
    Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
    countries, that there is a realization now among our European
    allies that they're going to have to do a better job of getting
    to the 2 percent GDP. I think I'm learning that the French, for
    example, aren't quite there, but there's a determination to get
    to 2 percent of GDP for defense quicker. So, how are we doing--
    without taking my whole 5 minutes--across the board, in getting
    our NATO allies to realize that they need to pony up as we're
    coming to that realization here in Washington?
        General Breedlove. Senator, I cannot confirm, but, on the
    way here this morning, I read in the press that the French have
    announced that they are going to raise their defense spending.
    And so, I don't have any details. It's literally watching the
    press releases as I came to this.
        But, this is--I think there are several nations that are
    trending in the right direction, here. I must admit that most
    of them are those nations that are in our easternmost positions
    in our alliance. But, we do have nations--Poland, others--that
    are doing the right thing with their investments.
        But, there are still challenges. The nations made this
    pledge at Wales, as you know. They gave themselves to 2024 to
    arrive at that. We see nations moving out now. In general, the
    trend is that----
        Senator Wicker. Well, we certainly need movement in the
    right direction well before that.
        General Breedlove. Sir, I could--I agree completely.
        Senator Wicker. And do you agree, General, that it's not so
    much our persuasiveness as the reality of what they see and the
    actions of people that would be our adversaries over there?
        General Breedlove. That is correct. And, Senator, the other
    piece of this also is that, with their forces, they are
    beginning to do all the right things. Great commitment to the
    VJTF by six of our largest nations--European nations committing
    to be the center brigade of the VJTF. The United States will
    not be that center brigade right now. And so, six European
    nations.
        Senator Wicker. You know, with regard to the thing that
    Chairman McCain started out talking about with the--supplying
    defensive weapons to our Ukrainian friends, he noted that
    Madeleine Albright, Henry Kissinger, Secretary Carter--and I
    think you said you agree with the Secretary of Defense--have
    all expressed, publicly before this committee, support for
    arming our friends with defensive weapons. And I would simply
    point out, they're--these are not jingoistic cowboys. You know,
    they're very thoughtful people, some of the most preeminent
    experts we have, and we have the benefit of their counsel here.
    It seems to me that, with a substantial portion of our NATO
    friends, there's a nervousness that somehow giving people the
    ability to defend themselves with defensive weapons is going to
    be a provocation to Mr. Putin and allow him to gen up his
    propaganda machine. So, could you comment on that? And then, I
    do want to ask you about being caught by surprise with what
    happened in eastern Ukraine. So, if we could squeeze that in,
    in my few moments.
        General Breedlove. Senator, a weapon is a weapon. And
    whether it's defensive or offensive is sort of in the hands of
    the holder of the weapon. But, I--there is, as you have----
        Senator Wicker. Acknowledged. Yes.
        General Breedlove. Yeah. As you have described, Senator,
    rightly, there is a conversation inside of our alliance. There
    are nations that do want to provide lethal weapons. And there
    are other nations who do believe that this is not the correct
    approach. It is a lively debate. And my position has been
    stated.
        Senator Wicker. Well, let me just ask you. To me, it was
    stunning to hear you admit that we were caught by surprise. And
    I think you were referring to what happened in Crimea and in
    eastern Ukraine. If we had--and I think you said that right
    before you advocated a small additional investment in ISR--if
    we had already had that small investment, would that have
    prevented us from being caught by surprise by these ``little
    green men'' coming into--men dressed in green uniforms--coming
    into Crimea? And what would we have done, had we not--had we
    been aware, with better ISR and better intel?
        General Breedlove. Right. Senator, I'll have to go back and
    look at the way I used those words. We have been caught by
    surprise, but mostly it's as it relates to some of these large
    exercises, like this last exercise that started off being
    billed as an Arctic exercise; it really turned into a western
    military district, southern military district, and Arctic
    exercise. And, yes, sir, we were caught by surprise for that.
    In fact, our first tipper to that came from social media, which
    is an interesting thing.
        But, my concern is that we are in a position where, for all
    the right reasons over the past decade and a half, we have
    refocused our intelligence apparatus, our analysts, our tools
    on the wars that were going on, and on the new threats. And so,
    I blame no one for these decisions. We were focused in areas
    like Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Levant, et cetera.
        But, what I think we need to consider now--what we, as a
    Nation, need to consider, is, based on the new approach that we
    see Russia taking to eastern Europe, we should look at, Do we
    need to refocus any of those assets, be them analysts or actual
    assets, towards the European program? And I would like to
    compliment the Intelligence Community, because they have begun
    a very dedicated reallocation of analysts to bring to our
    problem. And it--I think the problem--and that, I have to just
    absolutely thank them for, but I think that also we need to be
    rethinking our ISR and other platforms that allow us to have
    this feel for what's going on in eastern Europe that we have
    not considered important for some time now.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
        Well, I just commend you--and I--and I'll have to say, we--
    apparently, the decisionmakers in this town have decided that
    we will rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific. And that may be the
    right decision, or it may not. But, I cannot think of a troop
    that's in a hotter spot than you are. And I just--I hope that
    this Congress and this Government understands that the area of
    responsibility over which you preside is, indeed, very, very
    consequential to us right now, here and now.
        Thank you, sir.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Graham.
        Senator Graham. Thank you.
        What's the likelihood, in your view, that Moldova will be
    in Putin's crosshairs in the next year?
        General Breedlove. Senator, I think it is an area of his
    concern and emphasis. I think you are aware, and it's fairly
    open knowledge, that the forces in Moldova have been
    retrofitted with new equipment, et cetera, across the past year
    or so. And we see the sort of interest and rhetoric in that
    Transnistria region----
        Senator Graham. Right.
        General Breedlove.--that is concerning. And now we----
        Senator Graham. Is it kind of almost what we saw in Crimea?
        General Breedlove. Senator, I don't think it's to that
    level yet, but it is the leading edge of these kinds of issues.
        Senator Graham. Do you agree with me it's most likely to
    occur unless he changes his mind through some recalculation of
    cost-benefit analysis of what he's doing in the Ukraine right
    now?
        General Breedlove. Senator, I agree that I think Mr. Putin
    is not done in Ukraine.
        Senator Graham. He's not done in the Ukraine. Moldova may
    be next. Let's talk about the Baltic states. Can you see a
    situation--well, is it fair to say that the Russians are trying
    to stir up problems for the Baltic states with a Russian-
    speaking population? Is that ongoing right now?
        General Breedlove. Senator, I think some of the information
    outreach to these Russian speakers around eastern Europe,
    specifically in the Baltics, is very--I'm trying--searching for
    the word--it is very good. As we talked about earlier, Senator,
    before you came----
        Senator Graham. Good, from a Russian point of view.
        General Breedlove. Sir, exactly.
        Senator Graham. Bad for us.
        General Breedlove. Very ``sophisticated'' was the word I
    was looking for----
        Senator Graham. Okay.
        General Breedlove.--and I couldn't find it.
        Senator Graham. What's the worst-case scenario for the
    Ukraine?
        General Breedlove. Senator, I worry a lot about the
    military problem. I worry almost more about their fiscal
    issues. We desperately for Ukraine to be able to address the
    things that the people of Ukraine voted for in their last
    election, and that is to reform, in a lot of ways, and, second,
    they need to get their fiscal business in order. And it's hard
    to do when your military is in the field, fighting.
        Senator Graham. So, one way to bleed Kiev dry is to keep
    the fight, keep them deployed.
        General Breedlove. Keep the pressure on, keep the Ukrainian
    military in the field. Investors are not going to want to
    invest in a situation where there could be a military
    conflict----
        Senator Graham. So, that's one way of basically
    dismembering the Ukraine without having to move to Kiev,
    itself, right?
        General Breedlove. I believe that's the case, Senator.
        Senator Graham. Mariupol, the port city, is there a way for
    the separatists, in collaboration with the Russians, to
    basically cut that port off from the Ukrainian Government?
        General Breedlove. Senator, I believe that it is one of the
    courses of actions that may be considered. The town of Mariupol
    is a big one, about half a million people.
        Senator Graham. So, you don't have to invade it, but they
    can basically isolate it.
        General Breedlove. That's correct, Senator.
        Senator Graham. And what would that mean for the economic
    survivability of the Ukraine?
        General Breedlove. Mariupol is very important to Ukraine,
    because it is the port that most of their agriculture passes
    through, because that area is----
        Senator Graham. So, if you were the separatists or Putin,
    and you really wanted to punish the government in Kiev, that
    would be a move you would make.
        General Breedlove. It is a good option to do that----
        Senator Graham. And would you agree with me, if he takes
    that option, that is just an--basically, an all-out declaration
    of war through economic activity?
        General Breedlove. That is an incredibly big step.
        Senator Graham. Okay. So, if that step happens, what should
    the Western response be?
        General Breedlove. Senator, I can't speak for all of the
    other nations, but I do know that most nations consider
    Mariupol an important point----
        Senator Graham. What will we do? Will they increase
    sanctions?
        General Breedlove. I--Senator, I can't answer for them. I
    think that's certainly one of the----
        Senator Graham. Should we increase sanctions if they do
    this?
        General Breedlove. I think it's most important that we
    maintain the ones we have, first, and not release the----
        Senator Graham. But, do you see this as a provocation
    taking the whole conflict to a new level?
        General Breedlove. I do, Senator.
        Senator Graham. So, they--should be some red line regarding
    this port city?
        General Breedlove. Senator, I don't like to talk about red
    lines. If you draw one----
        Senator Graham. Well, I just want----
        General Breedlove.--you have----
        Senator Graham.--the committee and the country to start
    thinking about what I think is almost inevitable. And we need a
    plan. So, I--you don't have to do it here, but I want somebody
    from the Pentagon to tell me what you recommend if they did
    this provocative act of basically cutting off the port city,
    which would destroy the Ukraine in a different fashion.
        Senator Graham. Finally, in one second--you can take a
    little bit of time--how does sequestration, over time, affect
    your ability to deal with the Ukraine, Russia, and all the
    problems you have in your backyard from migration, from a
    exploding Mideast, the ability to defend our Nation from a
    rogue missile attack coming from the Mideast, just the general
    ability of you to do your job? And what kind of signal would
    that send to NATO nations if we fully implement sequestration?
        General Breedlove. Senator, thank you for that question.
        It--sequestration would be very detrimental to our ability
    to do our job forward. And I'll try to break it into a couple
    of things, if the Chairman will give me a minute or two. I
    can't do this in 10 seconds.
        The first example, we talked about earlier. Part of our
    budget in what we do in Europe is train our partners and
    allies. As we talked about before, the ability to train
    Russians--or, Russians, excuse me--Georgians and Romanians so
    that they can serve beside us in places like Afghanistan, that
    money will be cut, less Georgians will be trained, more
    Americans would have to go to the field. So, sequestration
    affects our ability to train and equip our partners and allies.
        This also affects things as close to us as problems with
    having airfields open when we need them. That's--the first BCA,
    the first $478 billion cut, is what brought us to having to
    make changes to things like Lajes, like Moron, and only have
    Moron open during certain hours, which affects our ability to
    use things like the Special Purpose MAGTF, et cetera.
        And then, finally, our own ability to train ourselves and
    to bring rotational forces into Europe. If--we talked earlier
    about how the rotational forces are a part of a way that we
    solve our forward-presence problem. Sequestration would affect
    the funding for those rotational forces. Our rotational force
    doesn't accomplish its objective unless it is heel-to-toe, no
    air, and fully funded.
        Senator Graham. Thank you for your outstanding service.
    You've done a good job for us.
        Chairman McCain. So, we didn't--General, you didn't mention
    the effect on morale and retention of this lurching from one
    year to another. Do you want to mention that?
        General Breedlove. Senator--or, excuse me--Chairman,
    clearly the things that we are able to do--let me first talk to
    the morale of some of those that are in the fight. It's
    important that we, I think, show faith with nations like
    Georgia and others who have come alongside of us, and our
    ability to continue to train and to provide, as you know, some
    incredibly good medical care. I think you visited the five
    Georgian soldiers who were in Walter Reed. And these things
    that we do for them with our budget would be under challenge
    and clearly affect their morale. For our troops, sir, you flew;
    you knew that, when you were current and you had had enough
    flying hours, you had one approach to your job; when you were
    less current and had fewer flying hours, you had a different
    approach to your job. And so, it's important that we give our
    own soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines the training
    opportunities and support they need.
        Chairman McCain. And they're not getting it under
    sequestration.
        General Breedlove. Sequestration will challenge our ability
    to do that, Senator.
        Chairman McCain. I just wanted to mention one other issue
    very briefly. The Portuguese are our great friends, and this
    issue of Lajes has turned into one of their biggest issues.
    Have you looked at alternative uses for the base, such as
    putting AFRICOM or SOCOM there, or move intelligence? Would you
    evaluate that again for us? It is such a huge issue for a small
    country that has been very helpful to us in Afghanistan and
    Iraq and Iran. It's just--I've been visited, frankly, by their
    Foreign Minister and many others that are deeply concerned. So,
    I'd appreciate if you'd have another look at it to see if we
    can have greater use of the--of Lajes.
        General Breedlove. Senator, we'll do that. You are correct,
    they are a great ally. They are about to deploy a pretty large
    aviation contingency into Romania to do air policing in the
    middle part of our eastern part of our alliance. Portugal is a
    great ally. And we have done a lot of work already to try to
    make things better in this Lajes issue. Even in the civilian
    sector, our business executives and defense BENS have been
    there. So, we are on this problem, Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Thank you very much.
        Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And I'm sorry, General Breedlove, I had to be gone at a
    news conference. And so, I'm not sure what all you've covered.
        I wanted to mention one thing that I was aware of. First of
    all, I'm sure you've talked about the Ukraine. I had occasion
    to be in the Ukraine at the time that they had their elections.
    It was the first time that--it takes 5 percent in order to get
    a seat in Parliament--this is the first time in 96 years that
    there will not be one Communist in the Parliament of Ukraine.
    That's huge. That's really a big deal. And I'm very
    disappointed in what the military has done there. You know,
    immediately after that, you had Putin come in, and he's still
    over there. And I'm sure you've discussed this, but I just
    wanted to say to you that, when I--when you're there, as I was,
    and experience a major change taking place that hasn't happened
    in 96 years, and it's all--their allegiance to the west and to
    the United States of America, we haven't done nearly as much to
    assist them as I believe we should. What are your thoughts
    about that?
        General Breedlove. Senator, first of all, I--as I visit, I
    see the same things. Let me just make a silly example. In the
    past, it has been said of what used to be called ``The
    Ukraine,'' rather than ``Ukraine,'' that its identity was
    primarily Russian. I know that, as you were driven through the
    city to go see President Poroshenko or Prime Minister
    Yatsenyuk, you probably saw the same thing as I did: bridges
    painted blue and yellow. This is a nation that has woken up to
    its nationality, and it is a great people. And I believe they
    are worthy of our attention and help.
        Senator Inhofe. Yeah. Well, I do, too. And I'm glad you
    mentioned Yatsenyuk, because he's a different political party--
    --
        General Breedlove. Yes, sir.
        Senator Inhofe.--than Poroshenko, and yet they are together
    in this one thing, and that is their allegiance to us and to
    the West.
        Let me ask you about this, because I was following this
    thing when their--the idea of consolidating the intelligence
    assets to Croughton--is that pronounced right? ``Krowton''?
        General Breedlove. It is, Senator, thank you.
        Senator Inhofe. And it made sense to me, after what
    happened in Molesworth. And it would seem the logical place.
    Now, we're talking about the U.K. And yet, I understand--I
    guess in the House, where there is some effort to move that to,
    of all places, the Azores or someplace like that. I'd just like
    to get your--do you feel as I do, that it's--when the--you
    know, if it's--it just seems to me that there is a reason to
    consolidate these assets in a place like U.K. And I think it
    should be done that--what are your thoughts?
        General Breedlove. Senator, thank you. The--there was a lot
    of work done when the siting of this consolidation was
    considered. Many locations were considered. The business case,
    first, is a first point. It points to the current siting plan
    in the United Kingdom. There are other intangibles. The
    communication pipes in the U.K. are extremely good, and would
    not have to be altered to take on the new--in Croughton, would
    not have to be altered. We were--we would be there, close to
    our United Kingdom and other allies who have a great
    relationship with us in intel.
        In my NATO job, the NIFC, we call it, the NATO Intelligence
    Fusion Center, is there in United Kingdom. It would not be able
    to relocate, because this is 28 nations who have negotiated
    with the United Kingdom to stay there. And I think the
    synergies of keeping our U.S. and AFRICOM and EUCOM
    capabilities next to our United Kingdom partners, next to the
    NATO NIFC--all of these synergies point to a good solution
    there at Croughton.
        Senator Inhofe. Yeah. But, you know, I--and I agree with
    that. You're making my argument, there. And you--and for all
    those reasons. Can you tell me, is there a specific reason that
    you know of why somehow the Lajes location might be attractive?
        General Breedlove. Senator, I think there are--there are
    opportunities there, because there is room that is being
    created by the downsizing of our mission there. There would
    have to be some changes made, as----
        Senator Inhofe. Yeah.
        General Breedlove.--I mentioned before--communications
    capabilities, et cetera.
        Senator Inhofe. Yeah. Well, I appreciate that.
        My time is expired, but I'm looking forward to the chip of
    the old block, Dan, coming in to be my intern. Looking forward
    to that.
        General Breedlove. Sir, thank you. I am--I will make sure
    that he is squared away. [Laughter.]
        Senator Inhofe [presiding]. Yeah. Thank you.
        Are there others who want to be heard?
        Senator King. I want to, as well.
        Senator Reed. I want to--just a brief comment.
        The Chairman and Senator Inhofe raised the issue of Lajes.
    This is an issue of very great importance. We've worked very
    closely with the Department of Defense. Any efforts that you
    could bring to bear to repurpose the facility, to provide
    continuing presence of a significant nature, would--I would
    appreciate personally, also, General. And again, thank you for
    your efforts.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
        Senator King.
        Senator King. General Breedlove, this comment really isn't
    directed at you. I--and so, I don't want you to batten down the
    hatches, or pull over the canopy, I guess, in your case.
        This government spends over $70 billion a year on
    intelligence. And I hate hearing the word ``surprise'' in any
    hearing. And I get frustrated when I hear about your need for
    ISR. And I have the greatest respect for the people in the
    Intelligence Community. I work with them quite frequently as a
    member of the Intelligence Committee. But, I want you to think
    of yourself as a customer and suggest that you might talk to
    your colleagues in the other commands, because I think
    sometimes we forget who needs the intelligence. And you--you're
    the guy that needs it, you're the customer, and you need to
    advocate for the--for adequate intelligence resources, whether
    it's from the civilian Intelligence Community or the Department
    of Defense, which, as you know, has a very substantial
    intelligence budget. And I think this is something we need to
    continue to think, because--think about, because sometimes
    these agencies go on their own momentum and lose track of who
    needs the information and what they actually need.
        So, this really isn't a question, General, except a--more
    of a suggestion. But, I've got to tell you, when I think about
    $70 billion of the taxpayers' money, like I say, I don't like
    hearing the word ``surprise'' in any of these hearings.
        I appreciate your testimony.
        General Breedlove. Senator, at risk--can I--may I respond,
    just a little?
        Senator Inhofe. Yes, certainly.
        Senator King. Absolutely.
        General Breedlove. I want to pay the proper respect to
    decisions that have been made across the last 15 or 20 years,
    because I do believe we've been trying to make Russia a
    partner, and we have come into conflicts in Iraq, in
    Afghanistan, we've come into great issues in the northern part
    of Africa. So, I do not want to stand as critical to the
    decisions that have been made with the limited assets of
    intelligence. And I believe that our Intelligence Community has
    kept a great focus on--those things are very dear to us in
    Russia, if I can stop at that point.
        But, I think that you are absolutely correct, that now we
    see that there is a different problem, and we need to look at
    how we apportion and allocate. I already see, as I mentioned
    earlier, the Intelligence Community making clear decisions to
    reallocate analytical capabilities, et cetera. And I will be a
    customer, sir. I have been vocal, and I had it I my opening
    remarks, here, as you saw. I am beginning to advocate that we
    look at reapportionment of those assets, as well. So, I agree
    with your line of logic, Senator.
        Senator King. Minimal trust and lots of verification may be
    this answer.
        General Breedlove. Yes, sir.
        Senator King. Thank you, General.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
        Senator Wicker, anything else?
        Senator Wicker. No, thank you.
        Senator Inhofe. All right. We will adjourn this meeting.
    Thank you so much for your attention today and for your
    service.
        [Whereupon, at 11:41 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
                        military assistance for ukraine
        1. Senator Jack Reed. At the April 30th hearing, in response to a
    question from Chairman McCain regarding military assistance for
    Ukraine, you stated that you support consideration of the use of
    ``offensive'' weapons to change President Putin's decision calculus.
    For the record, please clarify what types of military assistance you
    believe should be considered.
        General Breedlove. [Deleted].

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