[Senate Hearing 114-204, Part 7]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-204, Pt. 7
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2016 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 1376
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
----------
PART 7
STRATEGIC FORCES
----------
MARCH 4, 25; APRIL 15, 22, 29, 2015
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
S. Hrg. 114-204, Pt. 7
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2016 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 1376
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
__________
PART 7
STATEGIC FORCES
__________
MARCH 4, 25; APRIL 15, 22, 29, 2015
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JACK REED, Rhode Island
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama BILL NELSON, Florida
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
TOM COTTON, Arkansas KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JONI ERNST, Iowa JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska TIM KAINE, Virginia
MIKE LEE, Utah ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
TED CRUZ, Texas
Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama, Chairman
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska BILL NELSON, Florida
MIKE LEE, Utah JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
TED CRUZ, Texas MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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March 4, 2015
Page
U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, Programs, and Strategy.............. 1
Kendall, Hon. Frank, III, Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Hon. Brian P. McKeon,
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Michael
S. Elliott, Deputy Director for Strategic Stability, Strategic
Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5) Joint Chiefs of Staff; Adm
Cecil D. Haney, USN, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command; and LT.
Gen. Frank G. Klotz, USAF (Ret.), Under Secretary for Nuclear
Security, Department of Energy, and Administrator, National
Nuclear Security Administration................................ 4
Questions for the Record......................................... 29
March 25, 2015
Ballistic Missile Defense Programs............................... 31
McKeon, Brian P., Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, Department of Defense.................................. 33
Syring, Vice Admiral James D., USN, Director, Missile Defense
Agency Department of Defense................................... 39
Mann, Lieutenant General David L., USA, Commanding General, U.S.
Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic
Command and Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated
Missile Defense................................................ 49
Gilmore, Hon. J. Michael, Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation, Department of Defense.............................. 58
Questions for the Record......................................... 79
April 15, 2015
The National Nuclear Security Administration Plans and Programs.. 83
Klotz, Hon. Frank G., Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, and
Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration,
Department of Energy; Accompanied by Hon. Donald L. Cook,
Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, National Nuclear
Security Administration, Department of Energy; Hon. Anne M.
Harrington, Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration,
Department of Energy; and ADM John M. Richardson, USN,
Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion and Office of Naval
Reactors, National Nuclear Security Administration, Department
of Energy...................................................... 85
Trimble, David C., Director, Natural Resources and Environment,
Government Accountability Office............................... 97
Questions for the Record......................................... 140
April 22, 2015
Air Force and Navy Nuclear Programs and the Implementation of
Nuclear Enterprise Review Recommendations...................... 145
Creedon, Hon. Madelyn, Deputy Administrator, National Nuclear
Security Administration........................................ 146
Brumer, Dr. Yisroel E., Director, Strategic, Defensive and Space
Programs, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment
and Program Evaluation......................................... 150
Benedict, VADM Terry J., USN, Director, Strategic Systems
Programs....................................................... 153
Wilson, Lt. Gen. Stephen W., USAF, Commander, Air Force Global
Strike Command................................................. 160
Harencak, Maj. Gen. Garrett, USAF, Assistant Chief of Staff,
Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration................... 169
Questions for the Record......................................... 189
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2016 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 4, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY, PROGRAMS, AND STRATEGY
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:33 p.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jeff
Sessions (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Sessions, Fischer,
Nelson, King, and Heinrich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS, CHAIRMAN
Senator Sessions. The subcommittee welcomes Secretary
Kendall and other distinguished officials. The witnesses
represent the policy, acquisition, force structure and
warfighter components of the U.S. nuclear weapons. Collectively
they comprise the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC), a body
established by Congress in 1986 to facilitate cooperation and
coordination between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the
Department of Energy (DOE).
Today's hearing, however, will go beyond the specifics of
the nuclear stockpile to address broader nuclear policy and
strategy issues as the members see fit.
Let me just say, gentlemen, I believe the NWC is stronger
and more effective than it has ever been. I believe there is
better transparency. I believe there is better coordination
between DOE and DOD. I think the fact that you have produced
one statement that speaks for all of you is proof that you are
getting along better than we have had sometimes in the past or
a better coordination at least. It is something that I and I
think Senator Nelson and others have pushed for in recent
years, and it is really pleasing to me to see that we are
moving in this direction.
So on balance, the President's 2016 budget and out-year
spending profile represents a good faith effort, given the
budget constraints, to modernize all three legs of the nuclear
triad while addressing aging DOD [Department of Defense] and
DOE [Department of Energy] nuclear weapons and infrastructure
problems.
Notably, for the first time since fiscal year 2012, the
President's budget request for DOE and NNSA [National Nuclear
Security Administration] nuclear weapons activities, which is
$8.9 billion, meets the funding target established in the 2010
New START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] treaty ratification
process discussion and commitments that were made. So we are
pleased about that.
Also, notable is Secretary Carter's announcement that there
will be about $8 billion over the next 5 years to fund
improvements across the nuclear enterprise to address current
readiness, training, and infrastructure shortfalls. As Deputy
Secretary Work explained in February, ``our nuclear deterrent
force is aging. It will be modernized in the 20s and 30s. We
need to keep the old equipment and systems going, but it is
becoming more expensive to do so.''
Over the past few years, Congress moved forward with the
President's nuclear modernization program indicating broad
bipartisan support for nuclear modernization.
You know, to follow up on Bob Work's comments, General
Klotz, you said last fall at the end of the Cold War, we
entered into a sort of procurement holiday as far as our
strategic nuclear forces were concerned, and we were able to do
that because they were extraordinary capable systems. But now,
after a couple of decades of doing that, the bill is coming
due. I see some nods there. I think that is a fair statement of
where we are.
I have got a chart we will show later that really does show
the dramatic decline in the percentage of the defense budget
going to nuclear weapons and the fact that we are going to now
have to have some increase to maintain what I think is an
essential requirement.
So, unfortunately, there remains a net $2.5 billion
shortfall in DOE and NNSA weapons activity funding over the
past 4 years that has led to some delays. Likewise, there has
been a 2-year delay in fielding the new ballistic missile
submarine, which will have operational consequences. Mr.
Kendall, as you noted last year, quote, the program is fragile,
and any funding reductions at this point could pose
unacceptable risk to the health of the nuclear enterprise.
Critics of the nuclear weapons--and we have had some that
have been pretty aggressive at times, but I think they have not
prevailed in the battle of ideas. So their hopes to derail
modernization plans by claiming that nuclear modernization is
unaffordable or a distraction from more pressing nuclear
capabilities has not prevailed. So we will address this claim
today.
But I would note that according to CBO [Congressional
Budget Office] estimates--and I think, colleagues, this is
important--funding to maintain and modernize DOE and DOD
nuclear programs will account for roughly 5 to 6 percent of the
National defense budget funding 050 during the peak funding
years. This is out there 2024-2025. There are a few years it
peaks out there, but it is, I think, about less than 3 percent
today.
If we examine only modernization cost, the cost of
replacing existing delivery systems, missiles, planes, subs,
and costs for life extension of the warheads, CBO estimates
that during the period 2024 to 2030 modernization costs would
average about $15 billion per year. According to OMB [Office of
Management and Budget], national defense funding during that
time would be over $806 billion in 2024, $15 billion out of
$806 billion, which means that nuclear modernization will
account for less than 2 percent of the defense spending during
that period of peak funding. So the nuclear warheads themselves
are a particularly small part of the budget. Considering the
decades of decline in spending on nuclear forces, this level is
not only affordable but certainly necessary.
So, Senator Nelson, glad to have you with us and any
comments you would like to have. Welcome back to that seat. You
have held it and chaired this committee over the years, and you
have full experience in all of these issues.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON
Senator Nelson. I am standing in for Senator Donnelly today
who is away at a funeral.
But you remember those old times. The two of us got along
on very controversial issues. Miracles never ceased. I used to
persuade you to my position.
[Laughter.]
Senator Sessions. I always gave in to you whenever you were
right, which was normal.
Senator Nelson. I want to get on. So what I am going to do
is just insert my statement into the record. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Nelson follows:]
Prepared statement by Bill Nelson
Let me thank Senator Sessions for holding today's hearing. I will
be filling in for a short period as ranking member since Senator
Donnelly, the committee's ranking member, cannot make it today.
There are several issues I would like to consider today.
First the commitment we must make to our nuclear deterrent, which
as Secretary Carter so aptly described as the ``bedrock'' of our
national security strategy. This commitment is seen in two ways. What
we must do now to ensure the force is ready and able to execute its
mission if the President so chooses and second what we must spend in a
time of tight budget choices, to modernize the force to meet our
deterrence requirements for the next 20 to 30 years.
Second, I will want to understand how we are structuring our
deterrent now and in the future to meet challenges not only with
Russia, which is modernizing its triad but countries similar to China,
which is developing a ballistic missile submarine that will patrol the
South China seas or India and Pakistan which is increasing the size and
scope of their arsenals, and in India's case, a ballistic submarine
much like China.
Again, I want to thank Senator Sessions for holding this hearing
and I look forward to today's testimony.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Secretary Kendall, do you want to give us the statement
that you prepared?
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK KENDALL III, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS; HON. BRIAN P.
McKEON, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY;
MICHAEL S. ELLIOTT, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR STRATEGIC STABILITY,
STRATEGIC PLANS AND POLICY DIRECTORATE (J-5), JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF; ADM CECIL D. HANEY, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. STRATEGIC
COMMAND; AND LT. GEN. FRANK G. KLOTZ, USAF (RET.), UNDER
SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, AND
ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Kendall. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your kind
remarks at the beginning.
Chairman Sessions and I guess it is Acting Ranking Member
Nelson, distinguished members of the subcommittee, on behalf of
Admiral Haney, Lieutenant General Klotz, Honorable McKeon, and
Mr. Elliott, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today.
We are or we represent the statutory members of the Nuclear
Weapons Council. The Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) is a joint
Department of Defense and Department of Energy National Nuclear
Security Administration forum established to facilitate
priorities between the two Departments as they fulfill their
dual agency responsibilities for the U.S. nuclear weapons
stockpile.
We look forward to discussing both the role of the NWC, the
status of life extension programs, infrastructure, delivery
platform modernization programs, sustainability of the
stockpile and all other responsibilities charged to the
council, as well as the challenge that we face.
Sir, I would like my written testimony which provides more
detail--if I could ask it be admitted to record, please.
Senator Sessions. We will make it a part of the record,
without objection.
Mr. Kendall. Thank you, sir.
Our nuclear deterrent plays a unique and critical role in
ensuring our National security. The Departments of Defense and
Energy and the NWC have a fundamental and solemn obligation to
responsibly manage this capability, to ensure its effectiveness
and safety not only for today but into an uncertain and
challenging future.
The fundamental role of our nuclear forces is to deter a
nuclear attack on the United States and our allies, and no
other military capability we possess is more important and
deserving of our focus and attention more. For over 3 years, I
have had the privilege to serve as chairman of the NWC, along
with other professionals representing our nuclear enterprise
such as those here with me today. During this period, the NWC
has responded to policy direction, including the Nuclear
Posture Review, the implications of the New START treaty,
technical developments in the aging of the stockpile, the
Defense Department reviews of the nuclear enterprise conducted
last year, and other developments.
The strategy for our nuclear stockpile that forms the basis
for our plans has remained constant during this period. That
strategy known as the 3+2 strategy envisions three
interoperable nuclear explosive packages for ballistic
missiles, ground-based and sea-based, and two air-delivered
warheads. A nuclear warhead strategy is tied to the Defense
Department's delivery system modernization plans, which include
the Ohio replacement submarine, a replacement for our Minuteman
III ICBMs [Intercontinental Ballistic Missile's], a new long-
range strike bomber, and the replacement for the air-launched
cruise missile. It is also tied to our plan to modernize the
Department of Energy's infrastructure for plutonium, uranium,
and tritium and the plan to sustain the science and engineering
base that ensures our stockpile of nuclear weapons is safe,
secure, reliable, and effective.
The 3+2 strategy addresses stockpile sustainment and
modernization and meets policy objectives of sustained
deterrence through a smaller stockpile with fewer weapons types
and a modernized, responsive nuclear infrastructure capable of
addressing the technological and geological surprises that we
may face.
Making nuclear explosive packages interoperable on
different delivery systems will reduce the number of different
systems that must be maintained and provide sufficient
diversity among our deployed systems.
Over my 3 years as NWC chairman, budget constraints,
particularly the implementation of sequestration in fiscal year
2013, have forced the NWC to annually adjust its stockpile
maintenance and infrastructure plans to fit within the
resources appropriated. These adjustments cause delays or
cancellations, reduce work scope, or extend development or
production periods. Today we have reached a point where all
flexibility from nuclear weapons life extension programs has
been removed.
We have worked with the U.S. Strategic Command to adjust
stockpile requirements where possible. We continuously strive
to strike the best balance between the science and engineering
required to certify the stockpile, the program's plan to extend
the life of the stockpile, and the plans for a responsive
infrastructure. Achieving our plans for tomorrow's stockpile
will require adequate resources, national commitment, and
balanced investments. The NWC remains committed to our
responsibility to ensure a safe, secure, reliable, and
effective nuclear strategic deterrent, and we urge continued
congressional attention to the Nation's essential security
needs by sustaining a stable nuclear enterprise budget in
general and in specific removing the threat of sequestration.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your time, and we wait for
your questions.
[The prepared statement of the Nuclear Weapons Council
follows:]
Witness Statement of the Nuclear Weapons Council:
Hon. Frank Kendall, Chairman
ADM Cecil D. Haney
Hon. Lt Gen (Ret) Frank Klotz
Hon. Brian McKeon
Mr. Michael Elliott
Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, and distinguished
members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity for the
Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) to testify before you today. The NWC is a
joint Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Energy (DOE)/
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) organization
established to facilitate cooperation and coordination, reach
consensus, and institute priorities between the two departments as they
fulfill their dual-agency responsibilities for U.S. nuclear weapons
stockpile management. Together, the Council represents extraordinary
and highly skilled Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, Airmen, civilians,
laboratory personnel, and contractors who are the core of the nuclear
enterprise. They are professional, mission-oriented, and innovative
problem-solvers charged with ensuring our Nation sustains a safe,
secure, reliable, and effective nuclear deterrent. Today, we will
discuss the role of the NWC, the status of life extension programs,
infrastructure and delivery platform modernization programs, our
ability to sustain the stockpile, and all of the other responsibilities
of the NWC, along with our challenges.
nwc organization
As mandated by Title X, U.S. Code 179, the NWC manages and achieves
consensus on priorities for the nuclear weapons stockpile. Our
membership includes the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics (Chairman), the DOE Under Secretary for
Nuclear Security/Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
Administration, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Commander of the U.S.
Strategic Command. Additionally, to ensure all equities in the
enterprise are represented, we receive consistent, valuable
participation from the Military Services, the Comptroller, the DOD
Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), Department of
State, and the National Security Council. Over the last year, the NWC
convened 10 meetings, including our annual joint meeting with the
United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, which we hold to review our
continued cooperation in warhead development, the Ohio-class
submarines, and the D-5 missile program.
In order to engage at all levels of the enterprise, we utilize our
subordinate committees and action groups to identify and analyze issues
and to provide recommendations to the Council. The NWC Standing and
Safety Committee (NWCSSC), co-chaired by DOD and the NNSA, functions to
advise, assist, and provide information and analysis and
recommendations on issues and topics for the Council's consideration.
Additionally, NNSA details a member of its staff to DOD to serve as the
NWCSSC Executive Secretary, ensuring interagency representation in day-
to-day operations. Finally, a dedicated working group of staff,
representing the diverse stakeholders in the nuclear enterprise, meets
informally about twice a month to review weapon and infrastructure
programs. We continually analyze our current working relationships to
ensure a streamlined decision-making process and to ensure that our
teams are informed and empowered to assess issues and make
recommendations to the NWC. NWC issues are not only addressed when the
Members meet; our mission is executed every day through the
organizational structure just described.
nwc mission
The NWC convenes approximately monthly to ensure focused attention
on our greatest nuclear enterprise challenges in four vital areas.
First, we must maintain and strengthen our ability to extend the life
of warheads through comprehensive component reuse, refurbishment,
replacement and ensuring alignment with the delivery platform (see
Table 1 for a breakdown of the current and future nuclear weapons
stockpile). Second, we must safeguard our ability to provide the
intensive science and engineering required to assess an aging stockpile
and certify the safety and effectiveness without underground testing.
Third, we must remain steadfast in our commitment to sustain and
modernize our aging infrastructure that provides materials, components,
and testing facilities essential for our nuclear deterrent enterprise.
Finally, we must ensure that our nuclear weapons and delivery systems
modernization programs are aligned.
Table 1. The Current and Future Triad Composition
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICBM SLBM Air-Leg
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
..................
Current-----------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weapon System....................................... W87 Warhead W76 Warhead B61 Bomb
W78 Warhead W88 Warhead B83 Bomb
W80-1 Warhead
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Delivery Platform................................... Minuteman III Trident II D5 B-2A
B-52H
F15/F16
ALCM\1\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Future
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weapon System....................................... W78/88-1 IW-1\2\ W78/88-1 IW-1 B61-12 Bomb
IW-2 IW-2 W80-4 Warhead
IW-3 IW-3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Delivery Platform................................... GBSD\3\ D5 Follow-on B-2A
B-52H
JSF\4\
LRSB\5\
LRSO\6\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Air-Launched Cruise Missile
2 Interoperable Warhead
3 Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent
4 Joint Strike Fighter
5 Long Range Strike Bomber
6 Long Range Standoff
stockpile planning and life extension
The NWC sees our future nuclear stockpile as one that is flexible
and adaptable to technical and geopolitical changes. As envisioned, the
future stockpile plan will include three interoperable nuclear
explosive packages for ballistic missiles and two air-delivered
warheads, referred to as the ``3+2 strategy.'' The 3+2 strategy
addresses stockpile obsolescence and meets policy objectives of
sustaining deterrence through a smaller stockpile with fewer weapon
types and a modernized, responsive nuclear infrastructure capable of
addressing technological and geopolitical surprise. Making nuclear
explosive packages interoperable on different delivery platforms will
reduce the number of different systems that must be maintained and
serviced, while providing sufficient diversity among deployed systems.
The NWC oversees implementation planning for the strategy.
Established in 2012 for the fiscal year (FY) 2014 budget formulation,
the NWC's 25-year plan for the nuclear weapons stockpile--also known as
the Baseline Plan--aligned warhead life extension plans, platforms
modernization, and infrastructure needs. The coordinated Baseline Plan
integrated NNSA nuclear security enterprise requirements and plans with
operational warfighter requirements.
Budget realities have forced changes to the 2012 plan. Since the
plan was adopted, we endorsed deferrals to several key warhead life
extension programs (LEPs) and infrastructure modernization milestones,
delaying implementation of our 3+2 strategy. We deferred the
Interoperable Warhead 1 (IW-1) and delayed the Long Range Standoff
(LRSO) warhead schedules. For the B83-1 bomb, we adjusted the deployed
requirement to meet operational requirements and align with the air-
delivered gravity weapon strategy. For the B61-12 bomb LEP, we accepted
a schedule delay due to the sequestration cuts in the fiscal year 2014
budget. We have little, if any, margin left in the schedule for the
program, and both Departments are aggressively managing costs and
schedules. Plutonium pit production schedules and supporting plutonium
infrastructure investments experienced significant delays due to
shortfalls in the fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year 2015 budgets.
Additionally, we accept risk each year in NNSA's science and
engineering programs in order to achieve a balance between life
extension work and the science and engineering needed for
certification.
Continued uncertainty in our DOD and NNSA budgets, especially the
threat of sequestration, exacerbates long-term challenges to our
ability to sustain the stockpile. Despite these persistent challenges,
we have had many success stories. The following highlights the work
accomplished through the dedicated talent and focus of the people
working in the nuclear enterprise.
B61 Bomb (Aircraft-delivered)
We are working to extend the lifespan of the B61 gravity bomb. In
April 2010, the Nuclear Posture Review reaffirmed both the extended and
strategic deterrent roles of the B61 bomb and directed its life
extension. The B61-12 LEP with Air Force-provided Tailkit Assembly is
undergoing development engineering and remains on schedule and budget
to meet its March 2020 First Production Unit (FPU). The B61-12 LEP
consolidates four variants of the B61 bomb--the -3, -4, -7, and -10--
and improves the safety and security of the oldest nuclear weapon
system in the U.S. arsenal. The B61-12 LEP will achieve: 1) a 50
percent reduction in the number of nuclear gravity bombs in the
stockpile, 2) the removal of a megaton-class weapon--the B83-1, 3) an
80 percent reduction in the amount of special nuclear material in those
bombs, and 4) the first step toward implementing the 3+2 strategy.
W88 Warhead (SLBM-delivered)
Over the last year, the nuclear enterprise faced several pivotal
decisions for our future stockpile, one pertaining to the W88. The W88
SLBM warhead is in the development engineering phase for Alteration
(ALT) 370 to replace the aging arming, fuzing, and firing components
and is on schedule to achieve its December 2019 FPU. In August 2014,
the NWC agreed to address potential conventional high explosive (CHE)
scope for the W88, which was not part of the original ALT 370 program.
After extensive review by our national laboratories, NNSA, and the
Navy, the NWC made the decision to refresh the W88 CHE and identified
the majority of funding offsets needed for this work. The offsets were
generated by reducing sustainment activities and hedge quantities for
some legacy systems to make the majority of funds available for the CHE
refresh. The remaining required funds for CHE refresh in future years
will be resourced from within the NNSA. That decision, identified areas
where increased risk could be accepted to produce cost-savings within
the current program--without additional funding--and without additional
delays to future work.
Interoperable Warhead (for ballistic missile-delivered systems)
IW-1, also known as the W78/88-1, will be the first of three
ballistic missile warheads under the 3+2 strategy. The IW-1 was delayed
as part of the fiscal year 2015 budget request and is now scheduled for
a 2030 FPU. In 2014, the NNSA completed an abbreviated IW-1 feasibility
study and briefed the NWC with the conclusion that interoperable
nuclear explosive packages could be used in the ICBM and SLBM forces. A
full feasibility study is planned for completion in the early 2020s.
W80-4 (Long Range Standoff Cruise Missile Warhead)
Over the last two years, the NWC selected the follow-on warhead for
the Air-Launched Cruise Missile replacement, the Long Range Standoff
(LRSO) missile. We considered the B61, W80, and W84 warhead families.
The interagency effort analyzed the trade space of military
requirements, surety features, military characteristics, and cost. We
performed rigorous analysis at all levels of the NWC structure to
select the W80 Nuclear Explosive Package as the basis for the LRSO
warhead, and designated the LEP as the W80-4. In January 2014, the NWC
had delayed the LRSO warhead from an FPU of 2024 to fiscal year 2025-
2027 but as a result of the ongoing program review, the fiscal year
2016 President's Budget requests resources for an fiscal year 2025 FPU
and an fiscal year 2026 LRSO first missile delivery.
nnsa nuclear enterprise infrastructure and nuclear material commodities
The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review stressed the importance of a NNSA
infrastructure that can respond to technical challenges or geopolitical
surprises and ultimately enable our consideration of stockpile
reductions. The NWC focuses specifically on the plutonium, uranium, and
tritium capabilities to support the current and future stockpile as
documented in the NWC's Baseline Plan. Our nuclear enterprise
infrastructure challenges are two-fold: 1) addressing aged, end-of-life
facilities maintenance, recapitalization, and replacement and 2)
working to achieve a responsive infrastructure. In addition, NNSA's
general purpose infrastructure (e.g., electrical distribution systems)
that enables the plutonium, uranium, and tritium capabilities is also
aging, brittle, and a limiting factor.
We reinforce NNSA's need to fully develop responsive and productive
plutonium and uranium capabilities for this Nation. Today, these
capabilities and their enabling infrastructure are at great risk and
rank among our highest priority infrastructure challenges. We must
relocate our uranium production from 1950s-era buildings that are
deteriorating rapidly and creating a hazardous work environment for our
people. We must also have a plutonium pit production capability to
support future stockpile requirements, move toward a responsive
infrastructure, and address plutonium aging issues.
In January 2014, The Secretary of Defense revalidated the DOD
requirement for NNSA to produce 50-80 plutonium pits per year by 2030.
This analysis was predicated on four drivers for pit production: 1)
policy objectives for the U.S. nuclear deterrent, 2) stockpile aging,
3) military requirements, and 4) infrastructure costs and capacity. The
NWC is working with NNSA to achieve the requirement of 50-80 pits per
year in 2030. NNSA developed a strategy to achieve this goal, including
ramp-up time, through recapitalization of the existing Plutonium
Facility 4 at Los Alamos and the construction of additional smaller,
modular nuclear facilities for plutonium work. The concept of
constructing smaller, modular nuclear facilities over time alleviates
the cost associated with one large nuclear facility to replace all
capabilities at one time. Building large, one-of-a-kind nuclear
facilities presents significant challenges in terms of planning,
design, and development and thus NNSA adopted a modular approach. The
NWC engaged the DOD CAPE to assist NNSA on the benefits and feasibility
of this strategy through a Business Case Analysis completed in November
2013. The CAPE agreed with NWC's endorsement that a modular strategy
for nuclear facilities provides the most affordable and flexible
option. The NWC supports NNSA's plan to achieve two operational modular
plutonium facilities at Los Alamos by 2027. Success will require
continued sustained funding over the next decade to design, construct,
and ensure initial operational start-up.
Using lessons learned from the pit production approach, NNSA
applied the smaller, scalable modular facility strategy to the Uranium
Capabilities Replacement Project, the follow-on capability to produce
nuclear weapon secondaries at the Y-12 National Security Complex.
Congress has asked the DOD to validate its annual requirement for
secondaries, and we are in the process of providing this analysis. We
anticipate that our report will be consistent with our most recent NWC
Baseline Plan and that there will be no changes to our requirements.
Finally, the ability to enrich uranium to produce tritium for
stockpile use is a critical infrastructure issue, and the NWC remains
focused on sustaining a supply of enriched uranium for tritium
production. Under current policy guidelines, without a domestically
enriched uranium production capability, we will eventually be unable to
produce new tritium for stockpile use. The NWC remains cognizant of the
stockpile's requirement for tritium and is supporting a DOE update of
our tritium requirements. We will certify this requirement in a letter
to Congress by April of this year. As we update the NWC Baseline Plan,
we will include tritium along with plutonium and uranium infrastructure
plans in the next revision.
stockpile stewardship
Science is paramount to the NWC's ability to sustain a safe,
secure, reliable, and effective deterrent. NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship
Program, composed of research, development, testing, and evaluation
(RDT&E) facilities and personnel, enables the surveillance and
assessment of the stockpile condition by revealing anomalies,
evaluating impacts of anomalies on warhead performance, and
implementing solutions. In general, RDT&E supports broader national
security objectives by providing capabilities to avoid technological
surprise and to have confidence in system performance. The NWC Baseline
Plan relies on continued investments in research, development, design,
and production capabilities--something that sequestration would
threaten.
The link between science and engineering and the future stockpile
is inextricable. This science base capability allows the Laboratory
directors to conduct their annual assessment of the stockpile, certify
components for longer life in the stockpile, and resolve warhead issues
discovered during surveillance. Additionally, RDT&E plays an important
role in enabling key elements of the stockpile vision, including
interoperability, plutonium pit reuse, understanding plutonium aging
effects, and technology certification for life-extended warheads. In
fiscal year 2014, NNSA completed a comparative analysis of LEP options
for the W78, W88, and interoperability and presented the results. This
analysis demonstrated how the RDT&E capabilities of the Stockpile
Stewardship Program inform stockpile design decisions and provide
critical insight into the feasibility of the 3+2 strategy.
The nation needs a highly skilled nuclear workforce to meet future
demands of our long-term stockpile plan. With the end of underground
nuclear explosive testing, limited opportunities exist to exercise the
full range of weapon design and production skills, including materials
handling, code development, and design and production engineering.
Exacerbated by an aging workforce, the pressure and risk to sustain
critical skills is increasing.
In the era of science-based stewardship--that is, implementing new
components without underground testing--we must provide a strong
science and research program that includes research, experiment, and
advanced computation and modeling. The NWC endorses a balanced approach
between the near and longer term risk we must take in to meet the needs
of the nuclear deterrent within available budgets.
dod nuclear weapon platform modernization and enterprise review
As part of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the National Security
Council, DOD, and related agencies reviewed our deterrence requirements
and the range of scenarios for which we must prepare. This analysis
concluded that the Triad offers the flexibility needed for the range of
contingencies we might face. We cannot say exactly what mix of
capabilities the United States will require in the next 20, 30, or 40
years, but continued modernization of the Triad will provide future
policy makers with a flexible and resilient range of capabilities.
Our budget request is consistent with our plans to ensure that
current nuclear delivery systems can be sustained and that the
modernization/replacement programs are affordable, executable, and on
schedule to avoid capability gaps.
Most of the Nation's nuclear weapons delivery systems are reaching
their end of life in the 2025-2030 timeframe and have been extended
beyond their original service lives. While we can sustain these systems
until they can be replaced in the 2025-2030 timeframe, we have little
schedule margin between legacy systems' end-of-life and deployment of
the replacement systems.
The recent Secretary of Defense-directed Nuclear Enterprise and
Strategic Portfolio Reviews and the Program and Budget Review for the
fiscal year 2016 budget formulation focused significant attention on
recapitalization, sustainment, and modernization of our nuclear
deterrence systems and infrastructure.
In the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) leg of the Triad,
the Minuteman III will be replaced by a follow-on ICBM--the Ground
Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD). Within the SLBM leg, Ohio-class
Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs) will be replaced by new Ohio-class
Replacement SSBNs. The Trident D-5 SLBMs are undergoing a life-
extension, which is approximately 90 percent complete. Finally, for the
bomber leg, the B-52H and B-2A bombers will remain critical elements of
the Triad. The Long Range Strike-Bomber will become part of our long-
range penetrating strategic bomber force in the late 2020s. The current
air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) will be sustained through 2030 and
will be replaced by the LRSO cruise missile.
We remain concerned about the ability to fund these modernization
efforts within current resource levels. The replacement programs create
a bow-wave in nuclear delivery system costs and modernization will
require increased investment over current levels for much of the next
15 years.
The Defense Department is taking steps to control the costs of
these efforts. However, even with success in this regard, we face
difficult budget choices entering the 2020s in funding needed Navy
shipbuilding programs, the Ohio-class Replacement, and the Air Force
strategic deterrent recapitalization programs.
The NWC is working to ensure corresponding NNSA development
programs remain aligned with the Nation's nuclear Triad revitalization.
The NWC provides the Services, Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, and NNSA a senior-level forum to address warhead and delivery
platform system integration areas of concern, and develops budget and
program recommendations to the Departments' leadership. The B61-12 LEP
is an example of how the NWC coordinates planning and integration with
the closely linked B61-12 Tailkit Assembly and Bomb Assembly programs.
This integration allowed DOD to better tailor the acquisition plan for
the Tailkit Assembly, ensured minimal disruption to ongoing development
and testing activities, and supported a more effective stewardship of
taxpayer investments.
The DOD Nuclear Enterprise Review highlighted evidence of systemic
problems in the strategic deterrent forces that threaten the future
safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear forces. These
interrelated problems require cultural, structural, and sustained long-
term solutions. We are addressing these issues and implementing
solutions managed through monthly senior leadership meetings of the
Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise Review Group chaired by Deputy Secretary
of Defense Work. The review teams made clear the need to refocus
attention and resources at all levels of the DOD on this essential
mission with four targeted areas: 1) the morale and accountability of
personnel, 2) a culture of excessive inspections, 3) the age and
condition of the current infrastructure and maintenance, and 4) the
organization of the Nuclear Enterprise. The reinvigoration of the DOD
nuclear enterprise remains the Defense Department's highest priority,
and we are committed to treating it as such.
governance
The NWC's role expanded under the NDAA in 2013 to certify that the
NNSA budget request meets NWC requirements. This certification process
led to greater transparency between two Cabinet Departments, and it
strengthened and unified our interagency relationship. We understand
the congressional interest in the overall governance of the nuclear
enterprise as expressed in the Congressional Advisory Panel Report on
Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise. The NWC Members
participated in interviews with the panel and received briefings on the
final report's findings, conclusions, and recommendations. The NWC
supports strengthening NNSA's planning and costing functions. The NWC
is ready to assist NNSA with implementation, and we look forward to
providing Congress with comments on this report in the weeks to come as
requested in the fiscal year 2015 National Defense Authorization Act.
conclusion
Budget constraints have forced the NWC to annually adjust its
stockpile maintenance and infrastructure plans to fit within resources
appropriated. These adjustments cause delays or cancellations, reduce
work scope, or extend development or production periods. We have
reached a point where we have removed all flexibility from the nuclear
weapons life extension programs and have worked with the U.S. Strategic
Command to accept lower stockpile requirements where possible. We
continuously strive to strike the best balance between the science and
engineering required to certify the stockpile, the programs planned to
extend the life of the stockpile, and the plans for a responsive
infrastructure. Achieving our plans for tomorrow's stockpile will
require adequate resources, national commitment, and balanced
investments. The NWC remains committed to our responsibility to ensure
a safe, secure, reliable, and effective nuclear deterrent, and we urge
continued congressional attention to the Nation's essential security
needs by sustaining a stable nuclear enterprise budget in general, and
by removing the threat of sequestration specifically.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
I guess I will sum it up and ask all of you--and Secretary
Kendall, you are going to answer, I guess, first. But do you
believe that the basic plans that we have laid out that, as I
understand, you support in your opening statement, a move to
modernize our triad and our delivery systems and to modernize
the aging warheads is a substantial need for America? It needs
to be funded, and the general outline of funds can get this job
done?
Mr. Kendall. Yes, Mr. Chairman, absolutely. It is a
critical national security need. The funding that we have
requested for both Departments through the 5-year plan that we
submitted is adequate to execute our plan during that period.
After the end of that period, as we start to actually produce
the systems I talked about, we are going to have an
affordability program that we have to deal with. You alluded to
that earlier.
Senator Sessions. Your period is what time?
Mr. Kendall. This will surface in next year's budget. In
2021, we are going to start to have a problem finding ways to
afford these systems. We will work to do that. It is a very
high priority, and we will work to do that. But it is going to
be a challenge for us.
Senator Sessions. Do any of you have any comment about
that? Do you agree with the essential unity of statement of
purpose and goal? Any other comments you would like to
contribute?
Mr. Klotz. Senator, absolutely I agree with the statement.
I would add that from the NNSA [National Nuclear Security
Administration] Department of Energy side, we have taken a very
careful look at the requirements in terms of what it means for
our scientific, technical, and engineering base at the
laboratories and production facilities, the workload that they
will have as we move through the series of life extension
programs and modernization of our plutonium, uranium, and
tritium capabilities. This is a busy--it is a challenging but
it is an imminently executable plan that we have laid out.
With one caveat, just to underscore what Mr. Kendall said,
one of the most important things is stable and predictable
funding so that we can ensure that we have the right people,
the right tools, and the right facilities there to execute this
program.
Senator Sessions. Well, Secretary Kendall, you said in
March I believe of last year, quote, the program is fragile,
and any funding reductions at this point could pose
unacceptable risk to the health of the nuclear enterprise. You
noted that budget constraints force the Nuclear Weapons Council
to annually adjust its stockpile maintenance and infrastructure
plans to fit within the money actually appropriated. And,
quote, we have reached a point where we have removed all
flexibility from the nuclear weapon life extension programs and
have worked with the Strategic Command to lower stockpile
requirements where possible.
So what do you mean by ``fragile,'' and how serious do you
consider stable funding to be?
Mr. Kendall. It is very important.
What we have done is we have slipped the first production
of the new submarine about 2 years, which puts it right up
against--and we have to replace the existing submarine fleet.
There are aging effects on the current force structure that are
predictable and understood, and we have to deal with those. We
acquired a lot of the current force structure basically at the
same time historically. It is all aging out at the same time.
The submarines are aging out.
Senator Sessions. Yes, submarines. I know one is
celebrating its 30th anniversary in a few weeks, and others are
pushing 40 I believe. That is a long time to maintain a
sophisticated piece of equipment like that.
Mr. Kendall. It is a long time. Both the hulls themselves
and the reactors have predictable aging effects that have to be
dealt with. The rocket motors and our ICBM's are similar. We
have renewed those but we are going to be at a point where we
have to modernize those again. There are a lot of older
technologies in those systems that have to be replaced in the
ICBM force. The air-launched cruise missile is showing a lot of
reliability problems right now. It is becoming harder to
maintain, and it is going to have to be replaced as well.
What we did in this most recent budget, which you may have
noticed came in a little bit higher than last year's request in
the out-years in the 5-year plan, was we were able to
accelerate the Elkem replacement about 2 years because of those
aging effects.
We are also seeing some effects in the nuclear stockpile
itself. We found some money--and it is mentioned there, the
item about the requirement for maintaining the stockpile. We
found some money to address a conventional high-explosive
problem in one of our warheads, which we had hoped would last
longer than is going to be, but we are seeing signs that it
will not and we have to replace that. So that has added a few
hundred million dollars of cost, which we were able to cover.
But we are essentially out of room to maneuver in our plan.
Senator Sessions. Well, I think you are right. We have got
a chart. Let me just show it.
[Deleted.]
Senator Sessions. This chart, I think, is pretty revealing,
and it is produced by the Defense Department I believe. But it
shows the blue you cannot read there is investments, and the
red is operation and support for our nuclear enterprise, which
includes the triad, I mean, our launch system, as well as the
bombs. So you can see this dramatic reduction here in 2002 to
2010. We end up by 2017 to 2018, we got to start making some
changes. This yellow is a new submarine, the Ohio-class. The
new bomber. The orange is ICBM and the new SLBM [Submarine
Launched Ballistic Missile], submarine-launched ballistic
missile. Then it begins to drop again. It drops again in 2034
through 2042.
So I see that we have been able to go a long time, General
Klotz, without putting much money in the system, and if we can
get by and modernize our entire fleet for this small a
percentage--maximal is the 15 percent, I believe. If we can get
by at that, then we have not bankrupted the country and have
still been able to maintain a robust nuclear deterrence that I
think all of us share.
Senator Nelson?
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to
yield most of my time to Senator King.
But let me just say this is a plan that you put out for $35
billion a year for 10 years, which is that blue added above the
yellow there. Now, in the decade of the 2020s, you are
expecting to product 50 to 80 pits a year. Is that sufficient?
Mr. Kendall. We would like to have the capacity to produce
50 to 80. That number is, in part, a hedge against
uncertainties of aging effects on the current stockpile. It
puts us in a position--if there is a change in the geopolitical
environment or a problem with our stockpile, we can respond to
that. We do not know that we will have to actually produce that
many pits.
General Klotz can probably address that question more
fully.
Mr. Klotz. It does two things for us, Senator. The capacity
to produce pits--which, by the way, it used to be very
substantial during the Cold War period. We had a facility in
Colorado, Rocky Flats, 30,000 square feet, produced thousands
of pits, up to 2,000 pits a year. We now essentially have
60,000 square feet at Los Alamos in New Mexico to do the same
thing, and our pit production is way down.
We will have a need, as we move towards the interoperable
warhead, which will have an explosive package that could be
used on both an Air Force and a Navy ballistic missile in the
future that may require us to produce new pits, and I would be
happy to discuss that in a little more detail in a closed
session.
But also as Chairman Kendall said, this is also part of
having a responsive infrastructure and a capability to respond
to unforeseen political developments or unforeseen technical
challenges within the stockpile. It is a capability that we
need and that we are in the process of pursuing through a
plutonium strategy which has been approved by the Nuclear
Weapons Council in a collaborative fashion. In fact, Chairman
Kendall and I came up and briefed Members of the Hill, and it
has been approved in the appropriations and authorization
bills.
Senator Nelson. Well, I thought I was going to yield to
Senator King, but the time has just about run.
Let me just say--Admiral Haney, the fiscal year 2016 budget
begins a life extension of the air-launched cruise missile. Is
there a military requirement for replacing our current air-
launched cruise missile?
Admiral Haney. Senator, absolutely. As mentioned by
Chairman Kendall, the fact of the matter is the current air-
launched cruise missile has reliability problems. It is well
over its life, designed for about 10 years, and we are well
over the 30-year point for the current missile system. It is
important from a deterrence in warfighting requirement, given
that we need to have for our air leg, our flexible deterrent
part of the triad, the ability to have standoff capability now
and well into the future.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Senator Sessions. Senator Fischer?
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I was pleased to see in the budget request this
year that it moved up the development and the production of the
replacement cruise missile to 2025. Secretary Kendall,
previously the council had decided to delay that to 2027. Is
there a consensus now among the members that 2025 is the date
that you are anticipating and that you probably will stay with?
Mr. Kendall. Thank you, Senator. Our preference was always
to start that program earlier. Budget realities would not allow
us to do it last year. We did, as I mentioned, come in with a
slightly higher budget particularly in the out-years after 2016
in our 5-year plan. That allowed us to move it back up 2 years.
There was very strong--and Admiral Haney may want to address
this. There was very strong interest in accelerating that
program if we could find a way to do it, and we did so.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Admiral, if you can clarify there, there is a difference
between the nuclear cruise missiles and the nuclear gravity
bombs and what they do in their missions. Can you enlarge upon
that and why we need them?
Admiral Haney. When we look at our air leg, the flexible
leg of the deterrence, it is important as we look at today the
B-2 capability, and part of that comes with the bomber--bomb
piece. It does not have currently the capability to do an air-
launched cruise missile. The B-52 platform requires the air-
launched cruise missile to provide that standoff capability,
unlike the B-2, designed with stealth. Very important. This
platform, the B-52, will be around until around 2040. So we
have more decades to come in its utilization, and as a result,
we need to be able to have a reliable air-launched cruise
missile, the long-range strike option we talk about today, in
order to address, particularly as we look at how countries are
developing more and more anti-access, access denial type of
capability, to give us further reach and to make more complex
their decision matrix associated with escalating their way out
of a conflict.
Senator Fischer. It offers our commander in chief more
options as you provide advice when conflicts may arise.
Correct?
Admiral Haney. That is correct.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Mr. Elliott, if you could comment on this as well. These
systems are not redundant. Are they? The two systems. They are
specific in their missions?
Mr. Elliott. They are, Senator. I would add on the bomb,
for example, the B-61 that will replace the existing inventory
of those is carried by our dual-capable aircraft also. They do
not have a capability to carry the cruise missile. They do not
have the capability to carry some of our larger weapons like
the B-83. So it is critically important that we get that for
both the dual-capable aircraft and for the strategic systems
like the B-2, and it will be available for long-range strike
bomber later on.
At the same time, aging systems like the B-52, which when
the first Elkem came off the inventory or into the inventory,
was already 20 years old, now past 50 years old, is no longer
able to penetrate those defenses. Yet, it has significant
capabilities and a replacement air-launched cruise missile,
LRSO [Long Range Standoff Weapon] in this case, will extend its
utility to the plan in its primary role of deterring attacks on
the United States. So they are equally important and serve a
very different purpose in our plans.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
General Klotz, thank you once again for allowing Senator
King and I to come and giving us a very thorough tour of the
facilities. We appreciated it and learned so much.
But if you could comment on moving the warhead up, and does
it stabilize the load for the NNSA?
Mr. Klotz. Thank you very much for joining us out there in
New Mexico. I am sure Senator Heinrich would say you visited
two of the finest of the labs, but we love all our children in
NNSA.
Senator Fischer. We do, we do.
Mr. Klotz. If I could just make one point to what Mr.
Elliott just said. On the gravity bombs, the B-61, they, in
addition to the strategic bombers, also go into these dual-
capable aircraft. Those are fighter aircraft that can conduct
both conventional and nuclear missions. That capability is so
essential to our overall policy of extended deterrence, in
other words, providing that nuclear umbrella to our allies and
partners across the globe. So that is why it is very important.
On the issue with moving the date to the left for the long-
range standoff, we looked at that very carefully. This actually
fits in very well with our workload projections. We will be in
the phase of two other life extension programs where if we did
not have work to do, we would have a gap in work for our
employees at the laboratories, as well as the production plan.
So by moving that a couple years to the left, it actually has a
positive, beneficial effect by smoothing out the workflow, not
having to go through letting some people go and then hiring
them back at a later date.
Senator Fischer. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Senator King?
Senator King. I am not sure who to address this question
to, but I note that a lot of our nuclear force calculations are
based upon applying the terms of the New START treaty. My
question is, is Russia abiding by the terms of the New START
treaty, and do we know that?
Mr. McKeon. Senator King, what we are seeing is that Russia
is abiding by the New START treaty. The main, central limits of
the treaty do not come into effect until February 2018, but the
assessment of the intelligence community at the moment is that
we expect that they will fulfill their obligations under the
treaty.
We also have ongoing inspections and verification
mechanisms in place with mutual inspections, and those are
proceeding without any violations.
Senator King. Thank you.
Mr. Kendall, when I hear the word ``interoperable,'' it
gives me a sort of uneasy feeling because I next think of the
word ``Joint Strike Fighter.'' Execution is as important as
vision. ``Interoperable'' sounds good. Are there practical
problems? Please reassure me that we are not going to make
something more expensive and difficult by trying to make it
interoperable.
Mr. Kendall. We have completed a fair amount of study of
options for a common word that could be used by either of the
ballistic missiles. While we have delayed that 5 years now in
our plan--it does not start until late in the 5-year plan--we
do think that is technically feasible, and it will lead to
significant cost savings as well. So ``interoperable'' in this
case I think is a very, very different matter, the idea of
three largely common variants of aircraft which is what we
tried to do in the F-35.
Senator King. Command and control, a crucial part of the
nuclear deterrent. How do you feel about where we are in
command and control particularly in light of the developing
cyber threat?
Mr. Kendall. It is a concern. I co-chair a body with the
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Winnefeld, which by
statute now oversees the nuclear command and control
enterprise.
We have taken some steps over the last 2 or 3 years to put
some modernization funds into that part of the structure. Our
chief information officer is currently doing a review of that
and he is going to be reporting out very shortly to us. From
the preliminary indications I have from him, we do have some
additional things that we have to pay attention to. A lot of
that infrastructure, like other parts of the nuclear
enterprise, has been aging, and the cyber threats are getting
much more severe over time. So we have to pay close attention
to that.
Senator King. We had a hearing a week or so ago with some
deep thinkers on these issues, and one of the things they
talked about was the Soviet--sorry--the Russian--that is the
second time I have made that mistake.
Mr. Kendall. I do that all the time too.
Senator King. The Russian stockpile of tactical nuclear
weapons. Is this a gap, if you will, in our deterrent? We are
talking here about strategic weapons. If we are talking about
deterrence, it is important, it seems to me, to have something
to deter the tactical usage.
Mr. Kendall. That is a cause for concern. The Russians are
changing their doctrine and they are pursuing an approach that
we took at one time in the 1950s. We had a lot of small-yield,
short-range nuclear weapons. The Russians seem to be going down
a similar path and their doctrine is changing consistent with
that. That would suggest a more willingness to use those to try
to control escalation.
I would like to ask Secretary McKeon to address that
because I know Policy has been looking at that very closely.
Mr. McKeon. Senator, I probably cannot get into the numbers
in this forum, but it is not a secret that Russia has more
tactical nuclear weapons than we do. I think we still are of
the view that our conventional and nuclear forces, taken
together, provide us adequate capabilities to deal with that
disparity in tactical nuclear weapons.
Admiral Haney may also have a view on that.
Senator King. Ironically it appears that the world was
turned upside down in terms of perceptions. We had them because
we perceived the Red Army as a massive conventional threat, and
I gather they now consider us to have a more severe
conventional threat and therefore they are moving toward the
tactical weapons that we were relying upon.
Mr. McKeon. That is our assessment of why they have so
many. It is because of what they perceive to be our
overwhelming conventional spear.
Senator King. A question about deterrence. The whole theory
of deterrence rests upon rational state actors, and we are now
in a world of irrational non-state actors. How do we develop a
doctrine that is equivalent to deterrence? Deterrence was a
very effective doctrine for 50, 60, 70 years. But how do we
deter somebody who: (A) does not represent a country, and (B)
does not care about dying?
Let the record show they pointed at each other.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Kendall. It is a policy question, and I would like
Secretary McKeon to address it. But that is a cause for deep
concern, and that is why counter-proliferation is so important
to us. We do not want one of these groups, who is exactly as
you described them, get their hands on a weapon of mass
destruction of any type.
Mr. McKeon. I do not have much to add to it. Under
Secretary Kendall said there are certain people who cannot be
deterred. We keep a close eye on terrorist groups and others
who are trying to get either nuclear weapons or nuclear
material, and we have a lot of programs in this area that both
our Department and the Department of Energy work on, and they
are also a critically important part of our budget.
Admiral Haney. The only piece I would add, Senator, is that
as we look at the art of deterrence and the cost and benefit
ratio, it is the whole-of-government kind of approach
associated with that. As a result, as we look at that, although
you might argue that rational thought and terrorism, for
example--are they congruent or not? I would just say in terms
of a reactor state or not, there are costs and there are
benefits, and we have to get at that in terms of the deterrence
calculation.
Mr. Klotz. Can I pick up on a point that was raised
earlier? That is, a very, very important part of our overall
nuclear security strategy also deals with making sure that
would-be proliferators and would-be terrorists can never get
their hands on the special nuclear materials which they would
need to either make a bomb or to fashion a nuclear or
radiological device that they could use in a terrorist
scenario.
So a large part of what we do and a large part of our
budget requests, beyond the weapons activity, has to deal with
putting in place systems to prevent proliferators or terrorists
getting that material, if somehow they do, countering what they
can do with that material, and then, God forbid, if anything
ever actually happened, being able to respond to the
consequences of that. So that is a very, very large part of
what NNSA does, drawing upon the scientific, technical,
engineering capabilities that are resident in our network of
laboratories and production facilities.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Senator Heinrich?
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I want to thank you for bringing up the technical nuke
issue. I think it is something we need to put a lot of thought
into.
General Klotz and Under Secretary Kendall, I understand
that you are already working to address some of the
congressional advisory panel's recommendations for NNSA
governance reform, and I wanted to ask on the specific issue of
NNSA's structure, is that something you plan to address or do
you think that this committee should be looking at legislation
to improve on the current organization of NNSA within the
Department?
Mr. Kendall. I am going to let General Klotz deal with that
question because it is a DOE organizational question.
But I will say that I think our relationship with NNSA has
been very good. It has been very collegial. We have worked very
closely together to try to address problems together. I think
how the Department of Energy organizes itself and how the
Congress chooses to have that organization in place--we will
find a way to work together and get the job done in any
arrangement. But I think the current arrangements are working
fine from our point of view. I think my colleagues from the
Defense Department would agree with that.
Mr. Klotz. Well, Senator, first of all, we appreciate the
work that was done by the panel. They are a panel of
distinguished Americans, many former Members of Congress
represented on that, and they gave a lot of thought and spent a
lot of time coming up with a very comprehensive list of
recommendations.
Many of the recommendations that they make, particularly in
the area of management, cost estimation, analysis of
alternatives, project oversight, are things, quite frankly,
which the Department under Secretary Moniz's leadership--he has
been in the saddle between a year and a half-2 years. Now with
confirmed leadership in key positions at NNSA, we are already
moving out very smartly on in terms of enhancing the rigor and
the discipline and the process which we use for life extension
programs, construction projects. Many of the things that the
Secretary is doing and the Department is doing we can do within
existing authorities which the Secretary or the Administrator
of NNSA already have, and we are moving out on that.
In legislation that came out at the end of last year, I am
required to submit a report by March 17, and we will lay out in
some detail our views and our responses to each of the 19
overall recommendations and 63 sub-recommendations. I do not
think, however, we will comment on how the Congress should
organize itself as the panel suggested we do.
Senator Heinrich. Everyone else does. You might as well.
[Laughter.]
Senator Heinrich. General Klotz, I want to continue with
another issue. I am a strong supporter of a modest set-aside of
funding for laboratory-directed research and development, or
LDRD. LDRD investment in high-risk, high-payoff activities
supports the National security mission while allowing the lab
scientists to pursue innovative solutions to some of our
Nation's most challenging energy as well as national security
problems. One of the things that this really helps with is
attracting the best and the brightest talent. I actually
believe that a set-aside for LDRD of 8 or even 10 percent can
be justified.
I wanted to ask you more broadly. Do you agree that
Congress should maintain a robust LDRD program?
Mr. Klotz. Absolutely, Senator. I could not have said it
any better than you did. It has payoffs both in terms of the
basic research that is necessary to maintain the stockpile but,
more importantly, to recruit and retain the best and the
brightest out of STEM programs at our leading colleges and
universities by giving them the opportunity to work on leading-
edge scientific and engineering work to establish their bona
fides with their colleagues around the country. Once we allow
them to do that, we find they get very intrigued by the other
things that are going on in the laboratory, and we can hold----
Senator Heinrich. We suck them in and they are there for
30-plus years, which is really the goal. Some of our most
amazing scientists have been intrigued by these issues. It is
one of those things that for not only retention, but just
attracting them in the first place has been incredibly
powerful.
One of the things that I would encourage my colleagues to
do, as they get a chance to visit some of the labs, is to ask
for a specific brief on some of the things coming out of LDRD
because I have always been amazed. Not only is it really
important for this sort recruitment and retention piece, but
some of the most innovative things that spin off and end up
helping our warfighters, really saving lives, doing things in
the cyber field that we did not think was possible just a short
time ago come out of these projects. It is fascinating to see
that window. So I would encourage you all to do that.
I want to move on to Los Alamos really quickly. Your
submitted testimony says that we reinforced NNSA's need to
fully develop responsive and productive plutonium and uranium
capabilities for this Nation. Today these capabilities and
their enabling infrastructure are at great risk and rank among
our highest priority infrastructure challenges. General Klotz,
can you explain to the subcommittee how important it is to
ensure that the replacement for the plutonium facility is built
and that we get that rolling in order to address some of the
issues that my colleagues brought up regarding pit production
and unforeseen future events?
Mr. Klotz. Thank you, Senator. As I said earlier, we have
gone down dramatically in terms of our ability as a Nation to
produce pits either for future systems like the interoperable
warhead or in response to a technical challenge that we have to
deal with. Much of that work is going to be done at Los Alamos.
There is also work done at our other labs and our other
production facilities, but the heart and soul of that is at Los
Alamos.
We have a plutonium strategy which this whole Nuclear
Weapons Council has agreed to that will result in repurposing
and reusing some of the space that is in the PF-4 and at the
rad lab, and also later this year, we will establish a mission
need statement regarding building additional modules which will
allow us to move some of the work that requires the highest
degree of security and safety and free up more space within PF-
4 to actually do pit production.
Senator Heinrich. So it is important again that we keep
this on track. We have had great support from this committee
and other committees on the Hill in terms of moving forward. I
look forward to working with you on that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sessions. Senator Nelson?
Senator Nelson. First of all, I want you all to know how
much we appreciate what you do. It is not in the press, and it
is absolutely super important to the National security of this
country. You all do it in a collaborative fashion, and the
results speak for themselves. So thank you. Thank you.
Mr. Kendall, since you chair the council, it is my
understanding that as an acquisition body that works with the
NNSA to set requirements and develop planned warhead activities
as you collaborate, do you think it needs to be expanded to
include other groups such as the services or set requirements
for DOD delivery platforms?
Mr. Kendall. The short answer is, no, I do not. The council
operates by consensus, and if you expand the group, it is
harder to achieve consensus. I think we have the right people
here before you, Admiral Winnefeld represented by Mr. Elliott,
to represent the policy and the acquisition aspects from the
Pentagon, as well as the operational aspects and the services
through the Joint Staff and, of course, the Department of
Energy through NNSA's Director.
I just want to make the comment that we do include in
Nuclear Weapons Council meetings all the relevant stakeholders
whenever we meet. So we have people there from our comptroller,
financial side of the house, from our cost analysis and program
evaluation, CAPE [Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation],
organization, from each of the military departments, and
frequently from the national security staff or perhaps OMB as
well if they are engaged on the issue. So we are very
inclusive. We include people. We hear their points of view. We
take them into account, and I think the membership is suitable
as it is today.
I would invite my colleagues to comment on that if they
would like to as well.
Mr. McKeon. I agree with what Under Secretary Kendall said.
Everyone is in the room who needs to be in the room. In my
short time in the Department--I just got there in August--my
impression is it all works pretty well at our level. There may
be some skirmishes amongst our staff, but by the time it gets
to us, we come together on recommendations. I do not get the
sense that any of the services feel like they do not have an
adequate voice in that forum.
Senator Nelson. Well, let me ask you something. You all
have identified in your report, titled ``The Report on Balance
in Nuclear Weapons Programs,'' that you need to certify and
maintain the current stockpile, that you need to perform the
life extensions and you need to prepare to respond to future
uncertainties. Can you explain each of those functions?
Mr. Kendall. Sure. Our stockpile--because we cannot do any
underground testing anymore, we have to keep track of the
safety and security and reliability of the stockpile. So
surveilling the stockpile, testing it, looking for any aging
effects that might have been predicted is one activity that we
have to do.
There are aging effects that take place that we understand,
and those require us--and also, because there is some
obsolescence of technology, we have to upgrades to the weapons
over time. The B61, for example, is responding in part to some
very obvious aging effects, which we understand and are aware
of, and we are in a bit of a race against time to get that
program and other programs like it done. So those two aspects
deal with that.
We also have to consider any needs in the future in terms
of production and have the infrastructure in place that will
support those needs. Part of this, of course, is the life
extensions programs. We need production for that. But if we
were called upon to do more in the case of a geopolitical
change or something we did not foresee, the infrastructure
needs to be there to produce weapons as well as to meet the
needs that we do foresee.
So those are the basic three pieces.
Frank, do you want to add to that?
Mr. Klotz. If I could add just a bit, Senator. Sometimes
some people will make a distinction between production on the
one hand and science, engineering, and research on the other.
In my view, it is not an either/or situation. In order to do
surveillance of the current stockpile and also understand those
aging effects, we have to do some pretty leading-edge science
and engineering, particularly as these systems age. As the
components, the uranium, the plutonium, the tritium age, we
need to understand that. The way we understand it is by doing
diagnostic experiments and then putting the data from those
experiments and past test data into high performance computing
platforms which allow us to understand the effects of aging.
They also allow us to understand the effects of changing
components perhaps using new materials because the old
materials are no longer manufactured or available.
Mr. Kendall. If I could make a comment. I would encourage
all of you to find an opportunity to come see nuclear weapons,
come see what is in those designs. They are not simple devices.
They are extremely complicated devices. If you look at some of
the technology that is in some of our older weapons and you
compare that to some of the newer life extension program
designs, there is a remarkable difference. I think it will be
very obvious to you why we need to do this work.
The other thing I want to say is that we have devices which
are critical to national security which are terribly
destructive that we cannot test, and we have maintained them.
If you look at the chart that you have up there, this is
largely the platform side, but there is a similar set of charts
for the weapons side. We built a lot of weapons. We tried to
keep them for about 40 years. We want to be sure that those
weapons are safe, they will not go off accidentally. We want to
be that if they ever are asked to go off, that they will go off
reliably. These are very stringent requirements. This is a very
stressing, difficult, technical task. It demands the best from
our scientists and engineers. You should see for yourselves
what we are doing with these systems. This is a very difficult
task. What we are doing in the science and engineering program,
other aspects of it are all necessary to ensure the safety,
security, and reliability of that force structure.
Senator Nelson. Admiral Haney, in your opinion do we need
new nuclear weapons, or can we do the job with the existing
stockpile?
Admiral Haney. We can do the job with the existing
stockpile, Senator, as long as we work this 3+2 strategy, we
work the life extension programs, as we have been talking about
here. Those are critical for us to be able to sustain ourselves
through the future. So I cannot say enough about staying on
track with the 3+2 strategy.
Senator Sessions. Well, thank you, Senator Nelson.
Sort of to follow up on that and Senator Heinrich's
questions, the 2015 STRATCOM report on balance in the nuclear
weapons program suggests that due to the current funding
emphasis on certifying the nuclear stockpile and performing
life extension programs on aging weapons, there may be
insufficient funding in science activity to respond to future
uncertainties. In other words, there is concern about losing,
``a full design and production capability,'' which is, ``a
critical component of the U.S. nuclear deterrent.''
Maybe Admiral Haney and General Klotz, you can comment on
that.
It also relates to the idea that we do not want to have
legislation and funding so restricted that the good scientists
who come up with good ideas are not even able to research and
test them. Of course, Congress is not going to allow something
new to be done that they have not ultimately approved. But do
you feel like that is a problem? Would there be benefits
derived from directing our scientists and engineers to gain
practice and experience by designing at least, if not building,
a new prototype weapon as we determine--as we go forward in the
future?
Mr. Klotz. Thank you, Senator, for the question.
I am not a nuclear physicist. I am in awe of nuclear
physicists. But when I visit the laboratories and when I visit
the production plants, it seems to me that the work that our
people are doing requires and imbues in them a very thorough
understanding of the engineering and the operation of these
very sophisticated, complicated devices. They are fully engaged
and fully employed in that. Without going into the details of
all that that means because of the level of sensitivity, I
sense our people understand that.
We are, of course, concerned about the fact that a lot of
our workforce is aging. Many of them came of age the same time
I did, and they are about ready to pass the torch on to the
next generation. So we have to provide them challenging work to
do, but I think they have a full slate of challenging work to
do.
The other important thing, as far as legislation is
concerned on this or any other area--we have a broad consensus
in the Nuclear Weapons Council that this is the right path that
we are on. I think there is a broad consensus based upon
authorization and appropriations on the Congress that we are on
the right path. It seems to me that holding that consensus
about the body of work that we have to do both on delivery
systems and warheads that we have outlined in the 3+2 strategy
is important to preserve.
Mr. Kendall. Mr. Chairman, if I may. I am not a nuclear
physicist either, but I am an engineer. I think the scientific
and engineering challenge that we have placed upon our people
does certainly give them the experience to be confident of
their products.
I do not think we need to do new designs. We have very
state-of-the-art modeling and simulation capabilities. We are
doing laboratory testing and other testing, to the extent we
can, to verify the performance of our systems and the
components that we are upgrading or redesigning within the
existing weapons design framework basically I think is adequate
to keep the expertise at a reasonable level. I do not think we
need to do new designs.
Senator Sessions. Admiral Haney?
Admiral Haney. Chairman, I would also add the fact that
when you look at the intricacies associated with these life
extension programs that are underway or planned, those in
themselves are challenging to the workforce and to such an
extent that I think it also helps keep them proficient in terms
of if there was ever a need for a new design, that we would
have the workforce we need to do that, from the visits I have
had. This business of reuse, refurbishment, and then the
electronics associated with it is not trivial stuff, as Frank
Kendall mentioned, and I just want to sound off that that in
itself keeps them very gainfully not just employed but
requiring significant thinking and cranial power.
Senator Sessions. Well, let us just say it this way. There
is a consensus in the Congress, and when you say a consensus
among yourselves, I think you mean you consider a little bit of
the political world you live in when you make those statements
that you have made.
The lab directors, as I understand, are concerned about
having full design and production capability. They think that
is a critical component to a nuclear deterrent because there
could be future uncertainties and other developments by other
countries.
So I am not rocking the boat. We are not going to rock the
boat and say what some have said like if we are going to
refurbish this thing, why do we not just build a new one. It
will be safer, smaller, more capable, and more flexible, and
probably cost less money.
So we are just going to update the ones we have got. That
is the consensus that we have got.
But I think you do not want to hold your people back from
if not doing design, doing work on possible new systems in the
future. Would you agree with that? Maybe we could at least do
that, Secretary Kendall?
Mr. Kendall. I think we are constrained in what we can do,
but I do think, as we said, that the work that we give our
people is adequately challenging to maintain their expertise.
Mr. McKeon. If I can add one thing, Senator.
Senator Sessions. Yes.
Mr. McKeon. I was in a meeting in the first term with the
Vice President, my old boss, and Secretary Chu and the three
lab directors. General Klotz repeated this point the other day.
They all said to a person that they have learned more in the
last 20 years about nuclear weapons during the stockpile
stewardship program than they did through several decades of
testing. So you should ask them today if they still hold that
view. General Klotz said that in our prep session the other
day. So I think the work they have is definitely challenging.
Senator Sessions. Well, good. I think we can move forward
the way we are. We will move forward in a bipartisan way. Let
us do it that way.
General Klotz, look, I believe we need to complete the
goals we have got and to refurbish these weapons on the
timeframe we are. But it is an expensive proposition. We talk
about how little we spend, but still, it is billions of
dollars. We are talking about several years there at $15
billion a year. I guess what I would say to you and all of you
is that if we have to have more buildings, more infrastructure,
let us know, but do not ask for more than we need. We are not
able to just rebuild whole new nuclear laboratories and
research things. The initial idea was that there were going to
be $8 billion and $10 billion and $12 billion buildings took us
all a bit by surprise. So I think you are creatively working
forward with modular approaches that get you the new space you
need. So, again, if you have to have more, please let us know,
but if you can keep that cost down, that is going to free up
some money that we can do things we need to do with.
Mr. Klotz. Senator, I recall that when we met prior to my
confirmation, that was one of the things that you stressed, and
it has been uppermost in my mind ever since. I think you are
right in terms of the modular approaches we take, but also in
terms of repurposing some of the existing facilities we have
and also looking for processes that will allow us to do things
more effectively and with a greater margin of safety is also a
thing that we are exploring. But we are focused on bringing
discipline, rigor that is very much already a part of the DOD
into the way in which we approach our project management, as
well as program management.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Senator King?
Senator King. Just a couple of follow-up questions.
One is I think your chart, Mr. Chairman, is very
informative. It would be even interesting to compare it with
the decline of the defense budget as a percent of GDP because
what you have is a declining share of a declining share. The
defense budget in 1962 was something like 5-6 percent of GDP
[Gross Domestic Product]. It is now at 3.3. So it makes this
even more dramatic in terms of its cost to the taxpayers.
Senator Sessions. Can I say one thing about that chart? The
new bomber, as I understand it, is considered about three-
fourths non-nuclear costs. So we have got the full cost of the
new bomber in there, which is really a little higher. It makes
it look a little higher than otherwise would be.
Senator King. I do not think we have talked about this
directly. All these plans and well laid scenarios and what you
are going to do with refurbishing--what does sequester do to
all that?
Mr. Kendall. That is a great question, Senator.
Well, first of all, this is an extremely high priority for
us. We would, I think, have to reexamine everything that both
Departments do under sequester. That said, we are looking at
the percentage of our budget that is involved here. We would do
our best to protect this area because of the strategic
deterrence mission area is so vital. I think we would have to
make some adjustments, but I think we----
Senator King. Do you have a choice to do so, or would
sequester require cuts in this area as in all others? Would you
have that kind of flexibility and discretion under the way the
law is----
Mr. Kendall. My understanding--and I may be incorrect about
this--is that after fiscal year 2013, there is more discretion
in how sequester is implemented, and we would have some
discretion. I would hope that would be the case because doing
what we did in fiscal year 2013 and taking the same cuts from
everything essentially was a very dysfunctional way to take
cuts.
Senator King. But if you did protect this area, it would
simply mean that we would have to take it out of readiness or
end strength or modernization of the other part of the Defense
Department.
Mr. Kendall. That is right.
Senator King. So is it fair to say that sequester would be
damaging to this program?
Mr. Kendall. Yes, it is.
Senator King. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sessions. Senator Fischer?
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Klotz, you were discussing the issues that you
faced with your workforce, whether they are aging and looking
at retirement, to make sure that they are challenged with their
work, to keep a workload even so you do not have to have
layoffs and lose those people to other industries. I would ask
Admiral Haney, do you have issues like that with your workforce
at STRATCOM? Do you share some of those same concerns about
keeping a workforce that has the abilities and the needed
knowledge actively employed?
Admiral Haney. Senator Fischer, absolutely I remain
concerned. I would say we had the furlough. That was a signal
to all of our workforce. Quite frankly, we lost some people as
a result of that.
You combine that as well as how some of the pundits like to
talk about this capability we have here in this discussion, the
strategic nuclear capability, and as a result, in some of those
discussions, it further devalues what this workforce is about
that is so important to our country.
So this is an area that we spend time, just as I think
General Klotz and his team does, in terms of working intern
programs and what have you to connect this to universities to
bring in new talent while at the same time working hard to
retain the talent we have. Headquarters of your Strategic
Command is about 60 percent civilian, very important when you
look at the intricacies of the strategic deterrent that we keep
the right and relevant workforce.
Senator Fischer. We had a discussion earlier on the
effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent and looking at the
Russians and their tactical weapons. It kind of looked like
maybe you wanted to join in that discussion. Did you have
anything you wanted to say with regards to the effectiveness of
our deterrent and also with the Russian tactical weapons and
how those affect our outlook to the future as well?
Admiral Haney. I thought our discussion was rich, and I
agree with everything that was stated relative to our whole
capability, strategic capability, as well as conventional
capability that a joint military force operates day in and day
out.
The only piece that I would add is when people talk about
the use of a tactical nuke, I would just say if one of those
were to go off and our deterrence failed, that tactical nuclear
weapon or non-strategic nuclear weapon, as we sometimes call
it, would have a strategic effect, and that we can ill afford
to have.
Senator Fischer. Thank you very much.
Senator Sessions. Senator Heinrich?
Senator Heinrich. Let me follow up on that question just a
little bit because with regard to the Russian tactical nuclear
weapons, or non-strategic weapons, how do the rules of
deterrence differ for tactical versus strategic nuclear weapons
in your view? Are more tactical nukes, in other words, a better
deterrent than maybe the conventional forces? How do those
general rules--because I think everybody intuitively kind of
understands how our doctrine and deterrence works with
strategic nuclear weapons, but it seems to me that tactical
nuclear weapons do not exactly operate by the same set of
rules.
Admiral Haney. Well, I would say it is not the weapons that
operate by the rules. It is the actors, nation states, et
cetera that have those weapons at their disposal that are more
of a concern. I think it would be inappropriate for me to
compare a brigade or a conventional capability and say X number
of this equals one of that. I do not think that is what we are
talking about. I think the real key, when you look at our
strategic nuclear capability, it is to make deterrence work so
that we do not have any type of nuclear weapon utilization, and
a whole-of-government approach to that has to be part of that
equation.
Senator Heinrich. A related question sort of harkening back
to Senator King's mention of non-state actors. Do you have any
comments about how some of the more recent nuclear breakout
states, the Pakistans, Indias, fit into our overall doctrine of
deterrence?
Admiral Haney. I would just say that--interesting you would
ask that question. I had a deterrence symposium last year, and
I had a Pakistani individual associated with their program and
he had breakfast with me. I asked him about his program, and he
wanted to make sure he was clear to me it was not a program
against us. However, I would just say it is very problematic,
as we watch Pakistan modernize its capability. As we have
stated before here, part of this is being able to prevent more
development of nuclear weapons in the world and to contain that
piece. So looking at the modernization programs that Pakistan
has right now can be troubling as we look into the future and
how the world could change.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you.
Sort of moving back to slightly more mundane issues, there
has always been a little bit of a--and I will direct this back
to, General Klotz--a perpetual question about balancing
workload between Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos. There have
been a number of occasions where something was developed in Los
Alamos and then shifted over to Livermore for work balance. I
am curious. I would like your thoughts on what the future holds
for these two labs, as you see it, in terms of work balance.
Mr. Klotz. Thank you, Senator.
First of all, I think we need both labs.
Senator Heinrich. For the record, I would agree.
Mr. Klotz. Thank you, sir.
One of the key things that has been a part of our whole
enterprise for the past several decades is the fact that the
labs conduct peer review with each other. Without getting into
any of the details, there have been instances in the past
where, quite frankly, one lab was able to see things in a very
different way and come up with a slightly different solution.
On the issue of the W88, which we talked about, and the need
for CHE refresh, one lab did the primary work, and another lab
checked their homework. That as very useful to us I think in
our deliberations in the Nuclear Weapons Council that we had
that verification.
There is work the two labs do together that is very
similar, and that is where we do a lot of the balancing of the
work. But there are also some unique capabilities at each of
the laboratories. Clearly, as I said earlier, Los Alamos is the
center of excellence for plutonium science, chemistry, and
operations. It also has facilities like DARHT, which are one of
a kind. Lawrence Livermore in California has the National
Ignition Facility, which is very, very important to us. Then,
of course, Sandia in Albuquerque is the systems engineer for
the entire enterprise. So I think we have got sort of the right
mix there, and I think the balance is appropriate.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you very much.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Just to pursue one a little more. In South Korea, the
President said nuclear ambitions in the United States and
Russia--no. That is a different report.
Here it is. He said as President I changed our nuclear
posture to reduce the number and role of nuclear weapons in our
National security strategy. I made it clear that the United
States will not develop new nuclear warheads. So that is why we
have just agreed to agree. We will not pursue new military
missions for nuclear weapons. We have narrowed the range of
contingencies under which we would ever use or threaten to use
nuclear weapons. He said that at Hankuk University in South
Korea, and it caused a lot of unease among our Korean allies,
among others.
Under Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller in Prague in
December of last year said we have seen new and enduring
pressures on the nonproliferation regime, pressures that
threaten global stability. We are seeing nations turn away from
cooperation, turn away from the common good of nonproliferation
efforts, and cling ever more tightly to their nuclear arsenals.
I think that is true.
This is the U.S. National Intelligence Council, Global
Trends 2030 that was produced in December 2012. ``Nuclear
ambitions in the United States and Russia over the past 20
years have evolved in opposite directions. Reducing the role of
nuclear weapons in U.S. security is a U.S. objective, while
Russia is pursuing new concepts and capabilities for expanding
the role of nuclear weapons in its national security.''
It goes on to say, ``other nuclear powers, such as Pakistan
and potential aspirants, Iran and North Korea, desire nuclear
weapons as compensation for other security weaknesses.'' So I
think that is accurate.
I asked former Secretary Kissinger at a hearing a few weeks
ago about the negotiations with Iran, and he actually was
alarmed. He thought our negotiation position had moved too far,
that we are accepting too close an ability of Iran to have a
nuclear weapon, noting that if we were down to 9 months, he
explicitly said Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt he believed
would develop or buy a nuclear weapon.
So I do not know how we achieve nuclear stability around
the world. We have had it pretty good for a long time. But if
we have three or four Nations or five nations in the Middle
East all with nuclear weapons, this is taking us in the wrong
direction. It really is dangerous, and there would be a major
expansion of the number of countries that would have nuclear
weapons.
So forgive me if I am a bit concerned that de-emphasizing
our nuclear posture could have the perverse effect of lessening
confidence or increasing the desire of other nations to expand
theirs--well, I do not know that I will say any more about
that.
If any of you would like to comment on it, I would be--
Secretary McKeon, you are the policy man. Maybe you would like
to comment on it. But things are not going as well as we would
like with regard to the risk of nuclear proliferation.
Mr. McKeon. Senator, you have laid out a pretty complicated
set of statements there. Let me try to address some of them.
On the first one, in terms of the Koreans--Mr. Elliott may
be able to add some flavor to this--we spend a lot of time
worrying about extended deterrence and our commitments both in
Europe and in Asia. In fact, Mr. Elliott just returned from
some extended deterrence talks both with our Japanese and
Korean partners that he does in concert with somebody on my
staff, Elaine Bunn, who is the Deputy Assistant Secretary. So
he can speak to the current Korean frame of mind.
I would agree with Under Secretary Gottemoeller that the
nonproliferation system is under stress. We have an NPT review
conference coming up next month where the system will be
debated. In terms of the Middle East, there is no question. It
is one of the reasons that the President is trying to prevent
Iran from getting a nuclear weapon is the concerns among
proliferation among its neighbors if they were to have a
breakout capability, which is what these talks are about.
Senator Sessions. Well, thank you.
Do any of the others have any comments?
[No response.]
Then we will wrap it up. Thank you all. It was a very
excellent panel. I appreciate the good work of what you are
doing, and I think it has made a positive impact financially
and to our national security.
[Whereupon, at 4:50 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
supply chain management center
1. Senator Heinrich. General Klotz, many small businesses in New
Mexico are concerned about the NNSA's increasing the targets for M&O
contractors to use enterprise-side purchasing agreement through the
Supply Chain Management Center (SCMC). Small and disadvantaged
businesses believe NNSA's and EM's use of enterprise-wide agreements
tilts the playing field against them, resulting in lost business, lost
jobs, reduced community involvement, and harm to the local communities'
economies. Northern New Mexico is especially impacted given Los Alamos
National Laboratory's massive size relative to the local economy. As
use of the SCMC grows, M&O contractors will find it increasingly
difficult to meet their contracting goals for small and disadvantaged
businesses.
What are NNSA and EM doing to ensure small disadvantaged businesses
are notified of opportunities from SCMC and can successfully compete
for enterprise-wide purchase agreements?
General Klotz. Discounting Supply Chain Management Center (SCMC)
agreements for travel and procurement/bank cards, where there are no
opportunities for small businesses, 95 percent of SCMC agreement
dollars are with small businesses. The SCMC works with the 24 NNSA and
EM contractor locations that use its ePlatform tools and enterprise-
wide agreements to identify opportunities to educate potential small
business suppliers; individual companies contact SCMC directly to
request assistance; and, SCMC attends DOE's Small Business Expos to
provide demonstrations and information about SCMC, including its
platforms and processes. Additionally, SCMC has an initiative and
process to work with the DOE/NNSA contractors to identify potential
local agreements that can be expanded to all SCMC user contractors in
order to improve the financial impact to the local community. Enhancing
that initiative, the SCMC has planned to launch a web site this month
or in the very near future to provide a ``small business information
exchange.'' Also, SCMC, in collaboration with Los Alamos National
Laboratory (LANL), recently completed an initiative to address Northern
New Mexico small business concerns by incorporating the LANL
``subcontractor's Regional and Community Development Plan,'' clause to
its solicitations and agreements. Through SCMC agreements, small
businesses are able to reach the many DOE/NNSA contractors at once,
where previously they would have needed to compete for individual
contracting opportunities.
local spending
2. Senator Heinrich. General Klotz, the NNSA's national
laboratories and facilities play a vital role in my state's economy.
However, in fiscal year 2014, Sandia National Laboratories' spending in
New Mexico declined $58 million over fiscal year 2013 and LANL's New
Mexico spending declined $63 million. Are there ways to strengthen the
M&O contractors' annual performance management plans to ensure local
businesses have an equal opportunity to compete for procurements?
General Klotz. All NNSA management and operating contractors have
commitments to local community development which are often manifested
through subcontract awards to local businesses. Sandia National
Laboratories and Los Alamos National Laboratory routinely spend well
over half of their procurement dollars in New Mexico. Strategic
Sourcing agreements issued by the NNSA M&O Supply Chain Management
Center to Northern New Mexico small businesses are being used by
additional NNSA contractors and four DOE contractors as well. These
actions resulted in contractors spending $29 million in fiscal year
2014, and thereby expanding the business base on a national scale.
Additionally, the Supply Chain Management Center and Los Alamos
National Laboratory have collaborated to incorporate LANL's requirement
` Subcontractor's Regional and Community Development Plan'' into SCMC
solicitations; thus levelling the playing field for all suppliers and
ensuring further commitment to community development within Northern
New Mexico. Lastly, Los Alamos National Laboratory provides for a 5
percent pricing preference for Northern New Mexico businesses.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2016 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 25, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:32 p.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jeff
Sessions (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Sessions, Fischer,
Sullivan, Donnelly, and King.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Sessions. We just left an Armed Services Committee
briefing with President Ghani and Dr. Abdullah, so some of our
members are still there participating in that, but I wanted to
go on and get started on this important hearing.
Thank you for being with us. Thank you for the work you
have been doing, which I think is smart and sound and on the
right path, in general.
Ten years ago, the United States began initial operations
of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system, our homeland
missile capability. Today we enjoy a good measure of protection
against limited ICBM threats, especially from rogue nations
like North Korea or, potentially, Iran.
In 2 years, we will increase that capacity from 30 to 44
interceptors. I think that was a good step. In 5 years, we will
enhance the GMD sensor network and begin to retrofit the
ground-based interceptors with a high-performance, Redesigned
Kill Vehicle. Also, I believe it will be successful, and I
believe that will be a major step forward.
Within 10 years, the plan is, in the words of Admiral
Syring, to ``revolutionize our missile defense architecture''
by placing several kill vehicles atop each GBI, increasing the
number of lethal objects that can be intercepted with a single
GBI.
So the important question is whether Admiral Syring has
sufficient funding, because the threat continues to grow. As it
has evolved from the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization
to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization to today's
Missile Defense Agency, the men and women who design, develop,
and deploy our homeland and regional missile defenses deserve
the thanks of the Nation.
I know that we are working hard to make sure that THAAD is
alert and with good morale and excellent leadership.
Admiral Syring, in particular, deserves credit for his
recommendation to modernize the entire GMD system, including
the interceptors, the sensors, and ground components,
especially with the financial constraints we are under. In
fact, this year's 5-year spending plan for MDA is about $6
billion below the spending projection provided several years
ago.
A recent memo to the Secretary of Defense from the chief of
Naval Operations and chief of staff warns that ``ballistic
missile threats are increasingly capable, continue to outpace
our active defense systems, and exceed our Services' capacity
to meet combatant commanders' demand.''
Two Service Chiefs call for long-term BMD strategy that
addresses homeland and regional missile defense from a more
holistic approach, including nonkinetic means.
Perhaps General Mann can explain what prompted this appeal,
and Mr. McKeon can shed light on the Secretary's views on it.
The memo does raise an important point, which is, what is the
future of ballistic missile defense?
The MDA has been so focused on deploying our current
missile defense capabilities that it has had little time or
funding available to think about the next generation of missile
defense capabilities that will be necessary to address the
growing threat, although I know all of you have given thought
to that.
As Deputy Secretary Work recently noted, we need to come up
with other ideas to defeat this threat. I think that is a good
challenge to all of us.
While MDA does have an advanced technology component, it is
too limited, in my view, and what it can hope to accomplish
over the next 10 years is important. Perhaps what is needed is
a new Strategic Defense Initiative.
So I turn to our ranking member for his opening remarks,
and look forward to hearing from our excellent witnesses.
Without objection, all statements will be entered into the
record.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOE DONNELLY
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
Senator Sessions for holding this hearing.
Let me also thank our witnesses for testifying. We very
much appreciate the time you took to prepare for today's
hearing and for the work you do for our country.
Protecting our country and our forward-deployed troops
around the world is of utmost importance. I am pleased we have
begun to get our missile defense systems on track so they
perform reliably and effectively. We should continue to improve
our sensor and discrimination capabilities, so we have a better
picture of the threats.
We need to continue to conduct smart simulation and testing
before we commit to buying new technologies. Fly before you buy
has been a tough lesson learned in these programs.
While we continue to improve our homeland defense systems,
we should not take our eyes off the ball when it comes to
protecting our deployed troops and reassuring our allies and
partners. The demand from our combatant commanders for Aegis
ships, for THAAD, and for Patriot batteries remains high. We
need to consider how we can best allocate these systems and
effectively train the warfighters who will operate them to
provide the protection that is needed in today's budget-
constrained environment.
Finally, I would be remiss if I didn't note the great
relationship between MDA and my constituents at Purdue in West
Lafayette. You have formed a great partnership that I think
adds tremendous value to our Nation, and I know that the
Boilermakers are glad to support MDA's mission.
Thank you again for coming today, and I look forward to the
dialogue.
Chairman Sessions. Thank you, Senator Donnelly.
We will have 6-minute rounds, and maybe we can start right
off.
Senator King, do you have an opening statement?
Senator King. No, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Sessions. Oh, from the witnesses. Well, we would
like to hear your opening statements.
Mr. Secretary, would you like to start first?
STATEMENT HON. BRIAN P. McKEON, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. McKeon. I would be happy to, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Sessions. Pardon me for getting ahead of myself.
Mr. McKeon. No worries.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Donnelly, Senator King, thank you for
the opportunity to be here today to testify on the fiscal year
2016 budget request for missile defense, which we regard as a
critical national security priority. We are grateful for your
attention to and support of this critical mission of defending
our Homeland, our partners and allies, and deployed forces.
The President's budget requests $9.6 billion in fiscal year
2016, of which $8.1 billion is for the Missile Defense Agency
to develop and deploy missile defense capabilities that protect
the U.S. Homeland and strengthen regional missile defenses.
Sequestration levels would, of course, be significantly
lower and, as Secretary Carter has said, would make the Nation
less secure. Even without sequestration, however, in these
austere times, there is not enough money to fund every program
that we might wish to have. We are required to prioritize
investments accordingly.
As members of this subcommittee, you are well aware of the
ballistic missile threats and trends. I will focus on several
key policy priorities for addressing these threats: defending
the United States against limited long-range ballistic missile
attacks, strengthening defense against regional missile
threats, fostering defense cooperation with partners, and
examining how to advance the missile defense technology base in
a cost-effective manner.
The U.S. homeland is currently protected against potential
ICBM attacks from states like North Korea and Iran. To ensure
that we stay ahead of the threat, we are continuing to
strengthen our homeland defense posture and invest in
technologies to better enable us to address emerging threats in
the next decade. This requires continued improvement to the
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system, including enhanced
performance of the ground-based interceptor and deployment of
new sensors.
As you noted, Mr. Chairman, we are planning to deploy 14
additional interceptors in Alaska. We are on track to do that
by the end of 2017. These interceptors, along with the 30
currently deployed, will provide protection against both North
Korean and Iranian ICBM threats as they emerge and evolve.
We have also deployed a second forward base missile defense
radar in Japan that is operating today thanks to the hard work
of MDA and the Japanese Government. This radar strengthens both
our homeland and regional defenses.
This year's budget request also reflects the department's
commitment to modernizing the GMD system. It will move us
toward a more reliable and effective defense of the United
States. It includes funding for development of a new radar
that, when deployed in Alaska, will provide persistent sensor
coverage and improve our discrimination capabilities against
North Korea. It also continues funding for the redesign of the
kill vehicle for the ground-based interceptor.
As directed by the Congress, the MDA is also conducting
environmental impact studies at four sites in the Eastern part
of the United States that could host an additional GBI missile
field. These will be completed next year.
The cost of building an additional missile defense site in
the United States is very high. Given that the ICBM threat from
Iran has not yet emerged and the need to fix the current GBI
kill vehicles, the highest priorities for the protection of the
homeland are improving the reliability and effectiveness of the
GBI and improving the GMD sensor architecture.
The current GMD system provides coverage of the entire
United States from North Korean and potential Iranian ICBMs,
and no decision has been made to deploy an additional missile
field in the United States.
Our request also continues to implement deployment of
missile defenses tailored to security circumstances in Europe,
the Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific. Our focus is on
developing and fielding missile defense capabilities that are
mobile and relocatable, which allow us to address crises as
they emerge.
We also encourage our allies and partners to acquire
missile defense capabilities and to strengthen operational
missile defense cooperation.
This year, we initiated a Joint staff-led effort to update
the 2012 Joint Capabilities Mix study to ensure we are making
the most effective regional missile defense investments
possible. In a regional context, we know we will not be able to
purchase enough interceptors to rely purely on missile defense
for the duration of a conflict.
In such a situation, we must protect our most valuable
assets, while also drawing on our other capabilities to provide
a comprehensive approach to defeating the threat from ballistic
missiles.
We must continue to look ahead. This means ensuring that
our investment strategy and priorities balance the needs of
addressing the most dangerous threats we confront today while
positioning us to respond to threat developments in the next
decade. Our budget contains various technology investments in
that regard.
In conclusion, the austere budget environment will continue
to compel us to make difficult choices. Sequestration would
undermine our ability to improve the GBI fleet, place new and
advanced sensors, and defend our deployed forces and allies
against ballistic missile attack.
Quite simply, it would hinder our ability to keep up with
the growing threat. We believe we cannot let our guard down,
much less in the current security environment, so we urge you
to focus on repealing sequestration, and we would ask you to
fund our request for missile defense.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon follows:]
Prepared Statement of McKeon
Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Fiscal
Year 2016 Budget Request for missile defense, a critical national
security priority. I am grateful for your consistent attention to and
continuing support of the critical mission of defending our homeland,
our partners and Allies, and deployed forces from a growing ballistic
missile threat.
Let me offer my assessment of how the programs and fiscal year 2016
budget request for the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) ensure we are
sustaining and modernizing our homeland missile defense capability so
that we remain ahead of the threat while providing effective,
integrated, and interoperable regional ballistic missile defense (BMD)
capability. The President's budget requests $9.6 billion in fiscal year
2016, of which $8.1 billion is for the MDA to develop and deploy
missile defense capabilities that protect the U.S. homeland and
strengthen regional missile defenses. Sequestration levels would, of
course, be significantly lower and as Secretary Carter has said, would
make the nation less secure. Even without sequestration, however, in
these austere times, there is still not enough money to fund every
program we might wish to have, and we are required to prioritize
investments accordingly.
I will begin with a discussion of ballistic missile threats and
other trends, and then focus on several key policy priorities:
defending the United States against limited long-range ballistic
missile attacks, strengthening defense against regional missile
threats, fostering defense cooperation with partners, and examining how
to advance the missile defense technology base in a cost-effective
manner.
ballistic missile threats
Ballistic missiles continue to become more survivable, reliable,
and accurate at greater ranges, and regional powers are basing more
missiles on mobile platforms. Technical and operational measures to
defeat missile defenses are also increasing. Several countries are
designing missiles to launch from multiple transporters against a broad
array of targets, enhancing their mobility and capacity for salvo
fires, which increases their effectiveness on the battlefield. Shorter
launch time preparations are making newer systems more survivable.
Iran
Iran already has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the
Middle East, and today can strike targets throughout the region and
into Eastern Europe. In addition to its growing missile inventories,
Iran is seeking to enhance lethality and effectiveness of existing
systems with improvements in accuracy and warhead designs. Iran is
developing an anti-ship ballistic missile which could threaten maritime
activity throughout the Persian Gulf and Straits of Hormuz. While Iran
has not yet deployed an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), its
progress on space launch vehicles--along with its desire to deter the
United States and its allies--provides Tehran with the means and
motivation to develop longer-range missiles, including an ICBM. Iran
publicly stated that it intends to launch a space-launch vehicle as
early as this year capable of intercontinental ranges, if configured as
such.
North Korea
North Korea's weapons and missile programs pose a serious threat to
the United States and to East Asia. North Korea has conducted three
nuclear tests. It is also seeking to develop longer-range ballistic
missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons to the United States,
and continues efforts to bring its KN08 road mobile ICBM to operational
capacity. While the reliability of an untested North Korean ICBM is
likely to be very low, North Korea has used its Taepo-Dong-2 launch
vehicle to put a satellite in orbit, thus successfully demonstrating
technologies applicable to a long-range missile.
North Korea's efforts to produce and market ballistic missiles
raise broader regional and global security concerns, by threatening the
United States' allies and partners and increasing our concerns about
ballistic missile technology proliferation.
Syria
While Syria does not pose a ballistic missile threat to the U.S.
homeland, the Assad regime does possess short-range ballistic missiles,
and has shown a willingness to use them repeatedly against its own
people. Syria has several hundred short-range ballistic missiles, all
of which are mobile and can reach much of Israel and large portions of
Iraq, Jordan, and Turkey from launch sites well within the country.
Other Trends
In the regional ballistic missile context, one trend that
particularly concerns the United States is China's development of
advanced ballistic missiles. China is augmenting the over 1,200
conventional short-range ballistic missiles with a limited but growing
number of conventionally armed, medium- and intermediate range
ballistic missiles that will improve China's ability to strike regional
targets at greater ranges. China also continues to deploy growing
numbers of anti-ship ballistic missiles.
Russia's recent behavior currently poses one of our most pressing
and evolving strategic challenges--challenges felt across the strategic
forces mission space. We are confronted with Russia's occupation of
Crimea, continuing Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine, Russia's
increasingly aggressive nuclear posturing and threats, including the
prospect of nuclear weapons in Crimea, and its violation of the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.
Homeland Defense
The U.S. homeland is currently protected against potential ICBM
attacks from states like North Korea and Iran. To ensure that we stay
ahead of the threat, we are continuing to strengthen our homeland
defense posture and invest in technologies to better enable us to
address emerging threats in the next decade. This requires continued
improvement to the ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) system,
including enhanced performance of the Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI)
and the deployment of new sensors.
We remain on track to deploy 14 additional interceptors in Alaska
by the end of 2017. These interceptors, along with the 30 that are
currently deployed, will provide protection against both North Korean
and Iranian ICBM threats as they emerge and evolve. We have also
deployed a second forward-based missile defense radar to Japan, which
is operating today thanks to the hard work of the MDA and the Japanese
government, to meet our goal of having the radar deployed by the end of
2014. This radar strengthens both homeland and regional defense.
This year's budget request also reflects Department of Defense's
(DOD's) commitment to modernizing the GMD system. It will move us
towards a more reliable and effective defense of the United States. It
includes funding for development of a new radar that, when deployed in
Alaska, will provide persistent sensor coverage and improve
discrimination capabilities against North Korea. It also continues
funding for the redesign of the kill vehicle for the Ground-Based
Interceptor. Although we have fixed the causes of past failures in the
GBI related to the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle, the redesigned kill
vehicle will have greater performance and discrimination capability.
As directed by Congress, the MDA is also conducting environmental
impact studies (EIS) at four sites in the eastern United States that
could host an additional GBI missile field. These EISs will be
completed in 2016. The cost of building an additional missile defense
site in the United States is very high. Given that the ICBM threat from
Iran has not yet emerged, and the need to fix the current GBI kill
vehicles, the highest priorities for the protection of the homeland are
improving the reliability and effectiveness of the GBI and improving
the GMD sensor architecture. The current GMD system provides coverage
of the entire United States from North Korean and potential Iranian
ICBMs. No decision has been made to deploy an additional missile field
in the United States. If an ICBM threat were to emerge in numbers that
necessitated the deployment of additional interceptors, the steps being
taken now, to include conducting an environmental impact statement,
will shorten the construction timelines associated with deployment of a
new missile defense site.
regional defense
The Department's fiscal year 2016 budget request also continues to
implement deployment of missile defenses that are tailored to the
security circumstances in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia-Pacific.
Our focus is on developing and fielding missile defense capabilities
that are mobile and relocatable, which allows us to address crises as
they emerge. We are also encouraging our allies and partners to acquire
missile defense capabilities, and to strengthen operational missile
defense cooperation. This year, we initiated a Joint Staff-led effort
to update the 2012 Joint Capabilities Mix study to ensure that we are
making the most effective regional missile defense investments
possible. In a regional context, we know that we will not be able to
purchase enough interceptors to rely purely on missile defense for the
duration of a conflict. In such a situation, we must protect our most
valuable assets while also drawing on our other capabilities to provide
a comprehensive military approach to defeating the threat from
ballistic missiles.
Europe
We are continuing to implement the European Phased Adaptive
Approach (EPAA), and we are working in close collaboration with our
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies to develop an advanced
network of sensors and interceptors--on land and at sea--to protect
NATO European territory, our military forces, and facilities. Since
2011, the United States has operated a forward-based radar in Turkey
and maintained a sea-based missile defense presence in Europe. The
Aegis Ashore site in Romania is on schedule to be completed by the end
of 2015. Two additional U.S. Aegis BMD destroyers, the USS Carney and
USS Porter, will be joining USS Donald Cook and USS Ross later this
year as they forward deploy to the naval facility at Rota, Spain. These
multi-mission ships will support the missile defense mission, as well
as other U.S. European Command and NATO maritime missions.
The President's budget request also supports the Aegis Ashore site
that will be deployed in Poland in the 2018 timeframe and the
development of the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor that will be deployed on
land and at sea later this decade. As these capabilities become
operationally available, they will extend BMD coverage to all NATO
European territory.
Our NATO Allies are also making significant contributions to the
European missile defense mission. Romania, Spain, and Turkey are
hosting U.S. missile defense assets and provide the external security
for the facilities. Beyond hosting the second Aegis Ashore site in
Europe, Poland has also announced its intention to spend up to $10
billion to acquire advanced air and missile defense capabilities. DOD
is engaging directly with Poland to assist it obtaining a lower-tier
missile defense system to meet its missile defense requirements. The
U.S. Patriot system is a finalist in this competition. Several other
Allies are in the process of considering the purchase of air and
missile defense capabilities. The United States will continue to
encourage its NATO Allies to do more to cooperate and invest in missile
defenses that will contribute to Alliance security.
Several Allies have modern surface combatant ships that could be
equipped with BMD sensor or interceptor capability upgrades. The
Netherlands and Denmark have committed to upgrading the SMART-L radars
on their frigates to contribute to NATO BMD.
The Netherlands and Germany have committed Patriot PAC-3 systems to
NATO missile defense as demonstrated through the ongoing NATO
deployment in defense of Turkey. Spain recently replaced the
Netherlands in the defense of the Turkey mission through deployment of
a Patriot system, and is strengthening its air and missile defense
capabilities by acquiring additional Patriot systems from Germany.
France is planning to provide its Spirale satellite detection
system and a long-range radar for NATO territorial missile defense and
has offered the SAMP/T air and missile defense system, which became
operational in 2013, to NATO BMD.
The United States conducts exercises designed to hone our Alliance
missile defense capabilities and integration. U.S. European Command
(USEUCOM) is engaged with NATO in the development of a biennial NATO-
led BMD exercise event that serves to reinforce and expand upon other,
routine BMD training evolutions that take place on a quarterly and
semi-annual basis.
Many NATO Allies also participate in NIMBLE TITAN, an unclassified,
two-year, multinational, BMD campaign of experimentation. The
overarching purpose of NIMBLE TITAN is to serve as a venue for
collaboration, exchange of views, and coordination of BMD policy and
operational development among participating nations and organizations,
along with U.S. government agencies and military organizations. The
NIBLE TITAN 16 campaign, which began last year, has 25 participating
nations and organizations, including NATO.
Asia-Pacific
In the Asia-Pacific region, our force posture includes Aegis BMD
capable ships, along with Patriot batteries deployed in Japan and South
Korea. We have also maintained the THAAD battery deployment to Guam in
response to North Korean provocation.
The cornerstone of our security and diplomacy in the region has
been our strong bilateral alliances, including with South Korea, Japan,
and Australia. All three of these nations play an important role in our
regional efforts to achieve effective missile defense.
South Korea obviously has an immediate, proximate stake in
preventing missile strikes from North Korea. We have worked closely
with South Korea to ensure that our Alliance maintains the capacity to
do just that. The United States deploys Patriot PAC-3 batteries in
South Korea to defend U.S. and South Korean forces. In addition, South
Korea is taking steps to enhance its own air and missile defense
systems, which include sea- and land-based sensors and Patriot PAC-2
batteries. DOD has been consulting with South Korea about how it can
upgrade its missile defense capabilities as part of an Alliance
response to the growing North Korean missile threat.
Japan has its own layered missile defense system, which includes
Aegis BMD ships with Standard Missile-3 interceptors, PAC-3 batteries,
early-warning radars, and sophisticated command-and-control systems.
Japan is upgrading two ATAGO-class Aegis destroyers to BMD capability
with certification scheduled for fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year 2019,
and plans to build two additional Aegis BMD ships, which would increase
its inventory to a total of eight BMD-capable ships. As mentioned
earlier, Japan also hosts two U.S. missile defense radars.
Additionally, Japan is a critical international partner for BMD
development. One of our most significant cooperative efforts is the co-
development of an advanced version of the SM-3 interceptor, the SM-3
Block IIA.
The United States and Australia have forged a longstanding
partnership on missile defense research and development--most notably
with regard to sensors. In addition, Australia is involved in a
trilateral discussion on missile defense in the Pacific involving the
United States, Australia, and Japan.
We will continue to emphasize the importance of developing a
regional ballistic missile defense system that includes the sharing of
sensor data among Allies to take full advantage of the benefits of
system interoperability and integration.
Middle East
We also maintain a robust missile defense presence in the Middle
East including land- and sea-based assets deployed in defense of our
forward deployed forces, allies, and partners. This is in addition to
our efforts to build the capacity of those allies and partners that
will ultimately contribute to their ability to defend themselves.
The United States maintains a strong defense relationship with
Israel, and our cooperation on missile defense has resulted in a
comprehensive missile defense architecture. Israeli programs such as
Iron Dome, the David's Sling Weapon System, and the Arrow Weapon
System, in conjunction with operational cooperation with the United
States, create a multi-layered architecture designed to protect the
Israeli people from varying types of missile threats. Missile defense
figured prominently in the AUSTERE CHALLENGE exercise we conducted with
Israel in the fall of 2012, the largest U.S.-Israeli military exercise
in history. A similar exercise, JUNIPER COBRA, is scheduled to take
place in May of this year.
The United States is also working with a number of Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) countries on missile defense, including supporting the
purchase of missile defense systems through the Foreign Military Sales
program. The United Arab Emirates is procuring the Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, with the first delivery expected
later this year. This is in addition to the UAE's earlier purchase of
Patriot systems, which have been delivered. Saudi Arabia is in the
process of upgrading its existing Patriot PAC-2 batteries to the PAC-3
configuration. Kuwait is also purchasing Patriot PAC-3 batteries. Qatar
also joined the international community of U.S. Patriot partners late
last year--a community which also includes Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in
addition to the UAE.
U.S. Air Force Central Command maintains a series of regular
exchanges between United States and GCC air defense officers at the
Combined Air Operations Center located at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar.
These exchanges provide an opportunity for increased situational
awareness of missile threats in the region as well as the potential for
future BMD planning and operational cooperation.
As the GCC states begin to field more capable systems, the United
States and its Gulf partners must work toward greater integration of
those capabilities across the region. The desired end state is a
regional missile defense architecture in which GCC member states
participate and contribute to the extent practical, leading to a
networked, layered defense of key strategic centers that strengthens
deterrence and increases our collective ability to defeat a ballistic
missile attack.
Technology Development
We must continue to look ahead. This means ensuring that our
investment strategy and priorities balance the needs of addressing the
most dangerous threats we confront today while positioning us to
respond to threat developments in the next decade. Areas for priority
technology investment include persistent discrimination in the current
and future Ballistic Missile Defense System sensor architecture; high
power lasers for multiple BMD applications; common kill vehicle
technology leading to a multi-object kill vehicle; advanced technology
for high risk/high pay-off breakthroughs; and a rail gun to lower the
cost per kill.
Conclusion
The austere budget environment will continue to compel us to make
difficult choices here. Sequestration would undermine our ability to
improve the GBI fleet, emplace new and more advanced sensors, and
defend our deployed forces and Allies against ballistic missile attack.
Quite simply, it would hinder our ability to keep up with the growing
threat. We cannot let our guard down at any time, much less in the
current security environment. I urge you to repeal sequestration before
it causes irreparable damage to the nation's missile defenses.
Thank you for having me here today, and I look forward to your
questions.
Chairman Sessions. Thank you.
Admiral Syring?
STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL JAMES D. SYRING, USN, DIRECTOR,
MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Admiral Syring. Thank you, Chairman Sessions, Ranking
Member Donnelly, Senator King, Senator Fischer. I appreciate
the opportunity to testify today in front of you. I will be
very brief in my opening statement.
Our budget request for fiscal year 2016 maintains the
commitment to operate and sustain our homeland defenses,
including the planned deployment of 44 GBIs by the end of 2017
and GBI fleet reliability enhancements. As was noted, we will
also continue development of the Redesigned Kill Vehicle for
improved reliability, availability, performance, and
producibility, with initial deployment after successful testing
planned in 2020.
We anticipate contract award for the long-range
discrimination radar development, deployment, and initial
operation before the end of 2015 with fielding by 2020.
For regional missile defense, our 2016 budget request
supports the continued procurement of the SM-3 IB and THAAD
interceptors. Also, the Aegis Ashore site in Romania will be
completed by the end of 2015, and we are on track to deploy
Aegis Ashore Poland by the end of 2018.
Finally, will continue our discrimination sensor, weapons
technology, directed energy, Common Kill Vehicle, and other
technology maturation initiatives at an increased rate in this
budget request. These investments will help us deploy a future
BMDS architecture more capable of discriminating and killing
reentry vehicles with a high degree of confidence.
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, this is a sound
budget request. I believe our Nation is well-defended and that
our missile defense programs are on track to improve protection
for our deployed forces, allies, and friends with the support
of this budget.
Thank you, sir, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Syring follows:]
Prepared Statement of Vice Admiral J.D. Syring, USN
Good afternoon, Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly,
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I appreciate this
opportunity to testify before you today. Our current budget request of
$8.127 billion for fiscal year (FY) 2016 will continue the development
of defenses for our Nation, deployed forces, allies, and international
partners against increasingly capable ballistic missiles. The fiscal
year 2016 missile defense program will continue to support the
warfighter and needs of the Combatant Commands (COCOMs) with the
development and deployment of interceptors, sensors, and the command,
control, battle management and communications (C2BMC) system for the
integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). Our request for
fiscal year 2016 will improve and expand homeland and regional missile
defenses and invest in advanced technology development and future
capabilities to counter the increasingly complex threat.
ballistic missile threat
The threat continues to grow as our potential adversaries acquire a
greater number of ballistic missiles, increasing their range,
incorporating BMD countermeasures, and making them more complex,
survivable, reliable, and accurate. Space-launch activities involve
multistage systems that further the development of technologies for
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In addition to the Taepo
Dong 2 space launch vehicle/ICBM, North Korea is developing and has
paraded the KN08 road-mobile ICBM and an intermediate-range ballistic
missile (IRBM) capable of North Korea conducted multiple short- and
medium-range ballistic missile launches and threatened to conduct
additional longer-range launches. Today it fields hundreds of Scud and
No Dong missiles that can reach U.S. forces forward deployed to the
Republic of Korea and Japan.
Iran has publicly stated it intends to launch a space launch
vehicle as early as this year (2015) that could be capable of
intercontinental ballistic missile ranges if configured as such. Iran
also has steadily increased its ballistic missile force, deploying
next-generation short- and medium-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs and
MRBMs) with increasing accuracy and new submunition payloads. Tehran's
overall defense strategy relies on a substantial inventory of theater
ballistic missiles capable of striking targets in southeastern Europe.
Iran continues to develop more sophisticated missiles and improve the
range and accuracy of current missile systems, and it has publicly
demonstrated the ability to launch simultaneous salvos of multiple
rockets and missiles. Demonstrating it is capable of modifying
currently deployed ballistic missile systems, Iran has flight-tested a
Fateh-110 ballistic missile in an anti-ship role. By adding a seeker to
improve the missile's accuracy against sea-based targets, Iran could
threaten maritime activity throughout the Persian Gulf and Strait of
Hormuz.
support for the warfighter
Our overriding goal is to support the warfighter, which includes
delivering greater missile defense capability and capacity. With this
budget we will maintain our commitment to build out homeland defenses
to 44 Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs) by the end of 2017. We also will
maintain our commitment to deploy Phases 2 and 3 of the deployment of
Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IB missiles and SM-3 Block IIAs (first
available in 2018) on ships and at Aegis Ashore sites in Romania (2015)
and Poland (2018). We currently have 33 Aegis BMD ships, on the way to
35 by the end of fiscal year 2016. We are continuing efforts to improve
the performance of the Aegis Weapons System and plan to procure a total
of 209 SM-3 Block IBs by the end of fiscal year 2016. We announced a
Technical Capability Declaration this past December for the second
forward-based X-band AN/TPY-2 radar in Japan, which improves homeland
and regional defense capabilities and increases our global operational
AN/TPY-2 radar posture. By the end of fiscal year 2016, MDA is
scheduled to deliver 48 additional Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD) interceptors, for a total of 155 interceptors fielded, and we
are continuing our support of the operational Guam THAAD battery.
Last year we conducted or participated in several multi-event
exercises and wargames, which are critically important to the
warfighter and the intensive engineering efforts across the Agency. In
response to the continued fielding by U.S. adversaries of air, missile,
and rocket capabilities, as Technical Authority for Integrated Air and
Missile Defense (IAMD), MDA is leading the integration of evolving MDA,
Service, and COCOM command and control capabilities through systems
engineering analysis and development of technical integration
requirements and interface control documents. Other IAMD initiatives
include integrating C2BMC with the Army's Integrated Battlefield
Control System (IBCS) to exchange ballistic missile data and exploring
THAAD integration within the IBCS Army architecture.
(DOT&E), independent testers, and the Services to develop an
Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP) to execute a robust, cost-effective
flight test program that features operationally realistic conditions
and integrates U.S. government stakeholders--to include Soldiers,
Sailors, Airmen, and Marines--and allies to prove BMD capabilities. We
have entered a period of unprecedented testing complexity and increased
testing tempo. Our flight tests will involve increasingly stressful
threat representative targets as well as longer range interceptors for
our homeland and regional capabilities. From October 2013 to the
present, we have executed seven high profile flight tests. In fiscal
year 2015 we will conduct 12 flight tests, and in fiscal year 2016
seven flight tests.
homeland defense
MDA remains committed to operating, sustaining, and expanding our
nation's homeland missile defenses and requests $1.76 billion for the
Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) program, or $613 million over our
PB 2015 request. This budget request will allow us to grow the number
of currently deployed Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) fleet to 44 by the
end of 2017, continue flight and system ground testing, continue
Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV) development, enhance the Stockpile
Reliability Program, modify the current booster to increase
survivability and hardness to support RKV integration and expand the
battle space to enable later GBI engagements, upgrade the GMD ground
system, and deploy upgraded GMD fire control software to enhance our
ability to use land-based sensor discrimination data.
The successful FTG-06b intercept test this past June allowed us to
assess the performance and interoperability of homeland defense weapon
systems, including BMD ship acquired an Intermediate Range Ballistic
Missile (IRBM) target and forwarded the track through C2BMC to the GMD
fire control system, which developed a weapon task plan that the
warfighter used to launch a GBI. The SBX acquired the target objects
and forwarded precision tracks with discrimination data through the GMD
ground system to the in-flight GBI. The interceptor used SBX data to
locate the target objects, complete discrimination, and successfully
intercept the target. Our analysis indicates that all components of the
system performed as designed. This was the first flight test of an
operationally configured GBI that demonstrated the ability to correctly
discriminate and intercept the reentry vehicle in the presence of
countermeasures. FTG-06b also demonstrated that a Capability
Enhancement-II (CE-II) exo-atmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) with a
cradled Inertial Measurement Unit dampens the vibration environments
experienced during the failure of the FTG-06a flight test conducted in
December 2010. With this successful flight test we were able to resume
production of eight planned GBIs in the proven FTG-06b configuration.
We are implementing several fixes to address the failed FTG-07
flight test in July 2013. While the GBI was in flight, a voltage shift
caused by battery electrolyte leakage shut down the flight computer and
prevented EKV separation. We developed EKV software for CE-I GBIs,
which includes a capability to reset and recover the flight computer
following a voltage shift. This software was fully tested and is now
fielded to all deployed CE-Is. New battery and ground ties, once
tested, will be incorporated in the CE-II Block 1 deliveries beginning
in fiscal year 2016.
The next flight test of the GMD system will take place late this
year. GM CTV -02+ is a non-intercept test of a CE-II GBI to demonstrate
the performance of alternate divert thrusters in a flight environment
and test end-to-end discrimination of a complex target scene through
the GMD fire control loop. The EKV will use Aegis BMD SPY-1, SBX, and
AN/TPY-2 data for target selection. Data collected from this test will
be used to evaluate Discrimination Improvements for Homeland Defense
(DIHD) objectives. At the end of calendar year 2016 we plan to conduct
FTG-15, which will be the first intercept flight test for the CE-II
Block 1 GBI and the first intercept of an ICBM range target. Following
a successful intercept, the plan is to deliver 10 CE-II Block 1 GBIs
over the next year to achieve our goal of 44 GBIs by the end of 2017.
In addition to increasing the operational fleet from 30 to 44 GBIs
by 2017, MDA will complete the refurbishment and reactivation of
Missile Field 1 at Fort Greely by 2016 to provide sufficient silos for
44 GBIs. We will deliver eight new CE-IIs in 2015, upgrade eight
currently fielded CE-IIs in 2016, and deliver 10 new CE-II Block 1 GBIs
in 2017. Four previously fielded CE-II GBIs will be used for flight and
Stockpile Reliability testing.
MDA completed a GBI Fleet Assessment last year that pointed out the
need for improvements in reliability of the EKV, GBI, and ground
systems, and we will continue to implement its findings in fiscal year
2015 and beyond. We have introduced an enhanced Stockpile Reliability
program to better understand the service life and reliability of the
fielded fleet and are conducting design and reliability analysis on the
fielded CE-IIs and booster to establish performance margins. We are
analyzing the GBIs to identify potential failures modes and reliability
risks so that we can conduct the right ground development of the next
GBI with a Redesigned Kill Vehicle.
We will continue development of a Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV) for
initial deployment in 2020. The RKV will be a modular design using
mature subassemblies and components to improve reliability,
maintainability, producibility, and affordability when compared to the
current EKV. The program will perform full qualification and
reliability testing of components and subassemblies. The RKV will
incorporate performance enhancements in target acquisition and
discrimination and include on-demand communications. On-demand
communications enables better use of off-board sensor data and provides
improved situation awareness for the warfighter. The RKV also will
include survivability enhancements. The first flight test of the RKV is
planned for 2018, and the first intercept test is planned for 2019. We
will acquire two additional boosters beginning in fiscal year 2016 to
support RKV flight tests.
This year we will finish construction of the GBI In-Flight
Interceptor Communication System (IFICS) Data Terminal (IDT) at Fort
Drum, New York. The east coast IDT will enable communication with GBIs
launched from Fort Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base in
California over longer distances and improve defenses for the eastern
United States.
MDA will implement upgrades to the GMD ground system to improve
reliability, maintainability, and eliminate obsolescence problems. The
existing GMD ground system was built in 2004 using technology developed
in the 1990s. Without an upgrade, the ground system reliability would
decay and impact GBI availability to the warfighter. Phase I will
upgrade the GBI command launch equipment, GMD fire control Phase II
upgrades the GMD communications network and launch systems equipment
and modifies the IFICS data terminal to support on-demand
communications with the RKV by 2020.
Working with our Japanese partners, we completed the deployment of
the AN/TPY-2 radar in Kyogamisaki in southern Japan to complement the
radar currently operating in Shariki in northern Japan. This radar and
a new C2BMC capability will enhance the overall performance of the
Kyogamisaki and Shariki radars when operating in a mutually supporting
AN/TPY-2 dual radar mode. We made a Technical Capability Declaration
for the Kyogamisaki radar this past December. Together with the Shariki
AN/TPY-2 radar in the north, the new radar will enhance the ability to
defend our forward deployed forces, Japan, and the U.S. homeland from
ballistic missile attack by providing improved tracking coverage for
launches out of North Korea.
We will continue missile defense upgrades of the Early Warning
Radars in Clear, Alaska and Cape Cod, Massachusetts. We expect to
complete the Clear radar upgrade in 2017 and the Cape Cod upgrade in
2018. In fiscal year 2016 we will continue to support flight testing
with the SBX to demonstrate improvements to discrimination and debris
mitigation. Our budget request of $72.9 million for SBX includes funds
for improving reaction time and conducting contingency operations for
defense of the homeland. We also plan to support a near-term
discrimination capability in 2016 and fielding near-term discrimination
improvements for homeland defense in 2020 to enhance the tracking and
discrimination capabilities of currently deployed sensors.
Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR), the new midcourse tracking radar
that will provide persistent coverage and improve discrimination
capabilities against threats to the homeland from the Pacific theater.
LRDR will provide larger hit assessment coverage enabling improved
warfighting capability to manage GBI inventory and improving the
capacity of the BMDS. We have completed technical trade studies and
defined requirements for the LRDR and started acquisition planning and
pre-construction activities. MDA has released a Request for Proposal
(RFP) for the development, deployment, and initial operation of the
LRDR. We anticipate contract award before the end of fiscal year 2015.
In fiscal year 2016 we plan to conduct a System Requirement Review and
Preliminary Design Review. MDA worked closely with Air Force Space
Command to verify LRDR's inherent capabilities to support the space
situational awareness (SSA) mission. The Command is jointly exploring
system design and operations alternatives to maximize the exploitation
of LRDR's inherent SSA capabilities. Air Force Space Command envisions
using LRDR to augment the Space Surveillance Network capabilities as a
secondary mission if it proves viable.
A Continental United States (CONUS) Interceptor Site (CIS) study,
conducted in accordance with Section 227 of the fiscal year 2013
National Defense Authorization Act, determined the following sites were
viable candidates to be included in the Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS): Fort Drum, New York; Portsmouth SERE Training Area, Maine
(Rangley); Camp Ravenna, Ohio; and Fort Custer Combined Training
Center, Michigan. The Department is conducting EIS activities that will
evaluate each of the four candidate sites, to include potential impacts
to land use, water resources, air quality, transportation,
socioeconomics and other factors established by the National
Environmental Policy Act. The EIS will take approximately 30 months and
should conclude in 2016. There has been no decision by the Department
to move forward with an additional CONUS interceptor site. The current
GBI sites at Fort Greely and Vandenberg AFB provide capability
necessary to protect the U.S. homeland against the current and
projected ICBM threat from North Korea as well as the future Iranian
ICBM threat should it emerge. Even though an additional CONUS
interceptor site would add battle space and interceptor capacity, a
decision to construct the new site would come at a significant material
development and service sustainment cost. Near-term, upgrading the kill
vehicle on the GBI and enhancing the homeland defense sensor network
are higher priorities and prerequisites for improving protection
against limited ICBM attack.
regional defenses
Deployment of regional defenses to protect our deployed forces,
allies and international partners remains one of our top priorities.
Our fiscal year 2016 budget request funds the continued development and
deployment of defenses against SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs in support of
Combatant Commanders' near-term and future priorities and supports the
President's commitment to EPAA.
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
Today, four Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Weapon
System Batteries are delivered, with the fifth planned for activation
this year. To meet the demand from combatant commanders for THAAD, in
fiscal year 2014, MDA accelerated procurement of THAAD Battery 7 for
delivery in fiscal year 2017, two years earlier than Software Build
1.4, which includes critical updates to weapon system components and
Information Assurance update. MDA also continued its support of the
first deployed THAAD battery in Guam, exceeding the Army's required
operational readiness rate.
This year THAAD will participate in two flight tests, FTT-18 and
FTO-02. In FTT18 THAAD will demonstrate an intercept of a separating
IRBM target using the THAAD radar, launcher, fire control and
communication, interceptor operations and engagement functions. In FTO-
02, Event 2, THAAD will engage a SRBM and demonstrate advanced radar
algorithms. During this operational test of our regional defense
architecture, which will include the attempted intercept of an MRBM and
air-breathing target by Aegis BMD, THAAD will demonstrate a layered
defense capability.
For fiscal year 2016, MDA is requesting $464.1 million for THAAD
procurement, which includes the purchase of 30 THAAD interceptors and
procurement of training devices for the THAAD institutional training at
Fort Sill, OK. By the end of fiscal year 2016, MDA will deliver an
additional 48 THAAD interceptors to the U.S. Army, for a total of 155
interceptors delivered. We will continue to support the forward
deployed THAAD battery in Guam. We are requesting $228.0 million in
RDT&E funding in fiscal year 2016 as part of the continued development
of THAAD capabilities, and begin concept development and risk reduction
activities for THAAD follow-on capabilities. These activities will
explore and mature the design concept of expanding THAAD system
interoperability with air and missile defense systems, and expanding
the battlespace and defended area of the current baseline THAAD Weapon
System. We are also batteries.
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
In fiscal year 2014, MDA continued to expand global BMD capability
for the Aegis Fleet. Together with the U.S. Navy, we completed four BMD
Weapons System installations on Aegis ships--one Aegis BMD 3.6 ship and
three Aegis BMD 4.0 ships--and we commenced upgrades on existing BMD
ships, two from 3.6 to 4.0 and one from 3.6 to Aegis Baseline 9.C1 with
BMD 5.0CU. We now have a total of 33 BMD capable Aegis ships in the
Fleet. We continued delivery of Standard Missile-3s to the Fleet,
including 29 Block IAs and 26 Block IBs.
In fiscal year 2014, MDA conducted several critical flight tests to
prove the operational capability of the Aegis BMD weapon system. In
FTM-22, we successfully engaged and destroyed an MRBM target using the
Aegis BMD 4.0 weapon system and an SM-3 Block IB. This test exercised
the second-generation Aegis BMD 4.0 weapon system and supported
production decisions for the SM-3 Block IB by completing developmental
and operational testing for both the weapon system and missile. With
the successful completion of DOT&E testing requirements, Aegis BMD 4.0
and the SM-3 Block IB were found to be operationally suitable and
effective. FTM-22 was also the final flight test executed by the USS
Lake Erie, the BMD test ship for over 10 years.
We also brought ballistic missile defense flight testing back to
the east coast in fiscal year 2014. In FTX-18 we successfully simulated
engagements against a raid of three short-range targets using the Aegis
BMD 4.0 Weapons System and simulated SM-3 environment off the coast of
Virginia at NASA's Wallops Island facility.
As construction began at the Aegis Ashore site in Romania, we
conducted the first Controlled Test Vehicle at the Aegis Ashore Missile
Defense Test Complex at the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) in
Kauai, HI. This flight test proved the design of the Aegis Ashore
system and the ability to launch an SM-3 from land. The first Aegis
Ashore intercept test from PMRF will occur in the third quarter of this
year to support turn-over of the Romanian site to the Navy for
operation.
In its homeland defense role, Aegis BMD executed long range
surveillance and track to provide data for the GBI launch in FTG-06b.
In the test, USS Hopper, with the BMD 4.0 weapon system, acquired the
target and sent track data to the BMDS Command, Control, Battle
Management and Communications system, directly contributing to
successful intercept of the target.
This past fall we conducted two operationally representative tests
for certification of the Navy's Aegis Modernization Baseline 9 weapon
system. In FTX-20, we used our new MRBM target to exercise several BMDS
sensors and C2BMC. This was also the first tracking exercise for the
new Navy/MDA Integrated Air and Missile Defense Baseline 9 test ship,
USS John Paul Jones. A couple of weeks later, in FTM-25, USS John Paul
Jones launched an SM-3 Block IB to intercept an SRBM target while
simultaneously launching two SM-2 Block IIIAs against two air-breathing
threats, successfully exercising the Navy's Integrated Air and Missile
Defense capability inherent in Baseline 9.
In fiscal year 2016, we will continue our commitment to develop,
test, and deliver global naval capability to the warfighter and support
defense of our deployed forces and NATO in fiscal year 2016 to procure
40 SM-3 Block IBs, for a total of 209 procured and 107 delivered by the
end of fiscal year 2016. In anticipation of fiscal year 2016 and beyond
Multiyear Procurement Authorization for the SM-3 Block IB, MDA requests
$147.8 million in economic order quantity for missile components for
fiscal year 2016-19 Block IB multiyear procurements. By moving to a
multiyear procurement, we may realize an estimated cost savings of up
to 14 percent across the FYDP. To recertify SM-3 rounds which have been
previously delivered and deployed to the Fleet, MDA requests $19.8
million for sustainment of these assets.
We request $172.6 million for the SM-3 Block IIA cooperative
development effort with the Japan Ministry of Defense. In fiscal year
2014, the SM-3 Block IIA completed Propulsion Test Vehicle-01, in which
the missile and new composite canister both demonstrated successful and
safe ignition and egress from the vertical launching system. Upon
completion of this test and the system level critical design review,
the SM-3 Block IIA transitioned into the integration and testing phase
and will execute the first controlled test vehicle flight test in third
quarter fiscal year 2015. Along with a total of five flight tests for
the SM-3 Block IIA through fiscal year 2018, fiscal year 2016 will
focus on an extensive ground test campaign to prove system design and
missile capability. We are committed to delivering the SM-3 Block IIA
to the Fleet to meet global threat requirements, and specifically to
support EPAA Phase 3.
MDA is strongly committed to further enhancing capability of the
Aegis BMD weapon system to give Sailors the tools needed to
successfully execute their mission. MDA requests $40.7 million for the
BMD 4 series weapon systems to bring advanced 5.0CU development, MDA
has prioritized delivering BMD 5.1 capability on schedule and requests
$180.6 million to continue software development and testing to certify
in fiscal year 2018 and meet the delivery timeline of the SM-3 Block
IIA missile for deployment on ships and at Aegis Ashore sites. In
addition to weapon system development, MDA requests $110.9 million to
procure weapon system equipment for installation and upgrade to the BMD
Fleet and $12.6 million to sustain BMD specific equipment on the
existing Fleet.
We also continue development of a Sea Based Terminal capability to
provide protection of maritime forces against observed or demonstrated
advanced anti-ship ballistic missiles and increased layered defense for
forces ashore. Using an incremental development approach, we are
incorporating BMD capability into the Navy's Baseline 9 architecture,
to include terminal defense with the SM-6 guided missile and the BMD 5
series weapon systems. In 2014, we completed Sea Based Terminal
Increment 1 missile (SM-6 Dual I) software build 1, and we demonstrated
its performance in a simulated environment. We plan to test and certify
the first increment of Sea Based Terminal capability in fourth quarter
fiscal year 2015 in four Multi-Mission Warfare events, with follow-on
performance testing in fiscal year 2016. Sea Based Terminal Increment 2
is on schedule to be certified and operational in 2018.
European Phased Adaptive Approach
We will continue to expand the EPAA to provide additional coverage
of European NATO territory from Iranian ballistic missile threats by
investing resources for EPAA development, testing and deployment. EPAA
Phase 1 was implemented in 2011 with Eastern Mediterranean.
MDA is on schedule to deliver EPAA Phase 2 by the end of 2015,
which will enhance U.S. and NATO capabilities with the addition of more
capable Aegis BMD SM3 Block IBs and upgraded Baseline 9 weapon system
with BMD 5.0CU. Phase 2 will include deployment of Aegis Ashore to
Romania with capability to launch both SM-3 Block IA and IB variants
and upgraded versions of the Aegis BMD weapon system. Required military
construction, installation, integration and testing activities will be
complete for technical capability declaration in 2015. After having
tested the system at the Moorestown, New Jersey site in 2014, the
deckhouse, including all weapon system equipment was disassembled,
packed and shipped to Romania. MDA requests $33.4 million in fiscal
year 2016 to complete site activation, integration, and testing of the
system in-country and to maintain the test site at PMRF to support
system-wide testing for Phase 2 deployment. We are on track to turn
over Aegis Ashore Romania to the Navy, and in fiscal year 2016 we have
requested $13.9 million for sustainment of the system once it is
operational. MDA also completed installations and upgrades to the BMD-
capable multi-mission ships that are shifting homeports from Norfolk,
VA to Rota, Spain, which will support the EPAA Phase II architecture.
The homeport transfer of four multi-mission Aegis BMD ships to Rota,
Spain began in 2014 with the USS Donald Cook and USS Ross. The
remaining two Aegis BMD ships, USS Porter and USS Carney, will transfer
this year.
EPAA Phase 3 will improve defensive coverage against medium- and
intermediate-range threats with the deployment of a second Aegis Ashore
site in Block IIAs. Construction at Redzikowo, Poland is expected to
begin in fiscal year 2016. We request $30.6 million in fiscal year 2016
for procurement of Aegis Ashore equipment and $169.2 million for the
construction of the Aegis Ashore site in Poland. We need this funding
to complete this site by the end of 2018.
Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications and Sensors
C2BMC provides persistent tracking, cueing, discrimination, and
fire control quality data to Aegis BMD, GMD, THAAD, and coalition
partners to support homeland and regional defense objectives. Last June
we successfully forwarded Aegis BMD system track data through the C2BMC
system to the GMD fire control system during FTG-06b. We continue to
support warfighter command and control and battle management needs
across the globe by providing the strategic BMD planner, which provides
Combatant Commanders situational awareness tools to support weapons
release authority for homeland defense and control and tasking of
forward-based AN/TPY-2 radars. C2BMC operators and maintainers are
deployed forward in some of the world's highest threat spots and
continue to provide around-the-clock support to the local commanders.
As the BMDS integrating element, C2BMC has also demonstrated proven
interoperability across regional BMD architectures.
In addition to continuing the enhancement of global BMD survivable
communications and support for operations and sustainment of C2BMC at
fielded sites, this year we will integrate Space Based Infrared System
Increment 2 capabilities into C2BMC to support cueing of BMD sensors
worldwide. We have initiated a Space Based Kill Assessment (SKA)
demonstration that will host sensors on commercial and pass that
information on to the BMDS to support a multi-sensor kill assessment of
the target.
The Services and COCOMs, with logistical support from MDA, are
operating forward based X-band radars (AN/TPY-2(FBM)) in Japan, Israel,
Turkey, and United States Central Command. All of these radars
contribute to regional defense, and some, including the second AN/TPY-2
radar deployed to Japan last year, also provide a significant
contribution to the defense of the U.S. homeland. Last year we also
continued our AN/TPY-2 (Terminal Mode) support to warfighters on Guam.
We accepted AN/TPY-2 Radar #9, providing it to THAAD Battery #4, and
AN/TPY-2 Radar #10. We also awarded a production contract for AN/TPY-2
Radar#12, and for additional spares. In fiscal year 2016 we plan to
develop and test advanced discrimination algorithms to counter evolving
threats to provide additional capability to the Combatant Commanders as
well as close Materiel Release conditions for the Terminal Mode and
Forward-Based Mode AN/TPY-2 radars. We plan to deliver Radar #10 to
THAAD Battery #6, start production of an Antenna Equipment Unit Float,
and complete production of AN/TPY-2 Radar #12, which will be allocated
to THAAD Battery #7.
We request $536.5 million in fiscal year 2016 to develop, deploy
and test BMDS sensors (includes $138 million for the continued
development of the Long Range Discrimination Radar), and $187.5 million
to sustain the nine AN/TPY-2 radars and support the UEWRs and Cobra
Dane radar. We will continue communications support for the AN/TPY-2
radars and C2BMC upgrades. We request $450.1 million in fiscal year
2016 to develop, test, field, sustain, and operate all C2BMC spirals.
We also will integrate capabilities of C2BMC to provide fire control
quality data to BMD weapon systems in support of homeland and regional
defense. We request $31.6 million for continued operation of the Space
Tracking and Surveillance System in fiscal year 2016.
developing new capabilities
MDA is developing fiscally sustainable, off-setting technologies to
address gaps in the BMDS and extend our dominance in missile defense.
MDA's goal for these investments is to deploy a future BMDS
architecture more capable of discriminating and destroying a reentry
vehicle with a high degree of confidence.
In 2014 and 2015, the warfighters emphasized the importance of
improving discrimination capability, the missile defense function that
distinguishes between lethal and non-lethal objects, in order to reduce
the need for large, unaffordable interceptor inventories. Radars and
electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensors are central to this
capability. However, sensors require sufficient sensitivity and
resolution to measure features useful for inferring which objects are
lethal or non-lethal. Between now and 2020, we will use available
technology to improve existing sensors, battle management and fire
control, and kill vehicles. After 2020, our plan is to field new
advanced EO/IR sensors and upgrade discrimination capabilities based on
our new technology investments.
Relying purely on terrestrial radars for precision tracking and
discrimination of the threat is a potential weakness the enemy could
exploit in the future. Adding persistent electro-optical sensors to the
BMDS architecture is a high payoff solution for this gap. Last fall
during FTM-25 we accelerated the Discrimination Sensor Technology
flight test program by nearly six months to prove that our Aegis Weapon
System could launch a Standard Missile based solely on tracks generated
by remote sensors on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). MDA requests
$28.2 million for our Discrimination Sensor Technology development and
test plan to provide a cost-effective, stepping stone towards our goal
of achieving persistent discrimination coverage of enemy missiles in
all theaters, including ICBMs targeting the homeland. In fiscal year
2016, we plan to upgrade UAV-borne sensors and demonstrate even greater
discrimination capability in conjunction with Aegis flight testing in
the first quarter fiscal year 2017 as a precursor to the development
and test of a prototype advanced sensor under our Technology Maturation
Initiatives program element.
We request $45.4 million in Weapons Technology to continue
development, integration, and testing of our high-powered directed
energy program to build the foundation for the next-generation UAV-
borne laser system. A UAV-borne laser would be capable of acquiring,
tracking and eventually destroying an enemy missile at a much lower
cost than the existing BMDS. Within the Directed Energy project, we
will develop and demonstrate the technology necessary to scale laser
power jointly with our Air Force and DARPA partners. The Massachusetts
Institute of Technology's Lincoln Laboratory (MIT/LL) Fiber Combining
Laser achieved 34 kilowatts continuous power in October 2014, a record
for fiber combined lasers. The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
(LLNL) achieved similar success with their Diode Pumped Alkali Laser
system, reaching five kilowatts last year. In our effort to mature high
altitude, low Mach UAVs for directed energy applications, we
successfully completed five Phantom Eye flights at the Air Force's
Edwards Flight Test Center in California. The Phantom Eye data from
launch to landing.
In fiscal year 2016, MIT/LL will conduct a Fiber Combining Laser
critical design review and begin fabrication and integration of a
lighter, more compact Fiber Combining Laser system, driving the weight
of the system down from five kilograms per kilowatt to one kilogram per
kilowatt. LLNL will demonstrate a DPAL system at 30 kilowatts average
power, six times more powerful than ever achieved by a hybrid laser.
Within the Interceptor Technology project, MDA develops technology
to enhance the hit-to-kill capability within current and future BMDS
architectures. MDA will invest in cutting edge technology for the
competitive development of the next generation, solid Divert and
Attitude Control System (DACS) for the Multi-Object Kill Vehicle. We
will also investigate the suitability of rail gun technology for
missile defense missions.
MDA requests $96.3 million for Technology Maturation Initiatives to
build on the successes in weapons technology and discrimination sensor
technology. Airborne discrimination sensors and low power tracking
lasers are sufficiently mature to develop flight prototypes that
address complex tracking and discrimination challenges from evolving
threats to the homeland. In fiscal year 2016, MDA will incorporate an
advanced sensor into the tactically proven Multispectral Targeting
System and MQ-9 Reaper combination to prove precision track and
discrimination performance of airborne sensors at strategic ranges, or
thousands of kilometers. MDA will also contract with industry for the
design of a UAV-borne laser demonstrator to quantify the target
acquisition, tracking, and handover performance required for boost
phase missile defense under realistic conditions.
MDA requests $46.7 million for the Common Kill Vehicle Technology
effort. Last year, we began the first phase of a two phase, development
strategy for the next generation of our exo-atmospheric kill vehicles.
In that first phase, we defined concepts and developed requirements for
a new Redesigned Kill Vehicle for our ground-based interceptor program.
In fiscal year 2016, we are implementing phase II of that strategy
during which we will work jointly with industry to define concepts for
deploying multiple kill vehicles from a single booster. This year we
plan to award several contracts with industry to define concepts for
Multi-Object Kill Vehicles (MOKV). In parallel, we will reduce
technical risk in several areas that are critical to making this
revolutionary concept a reality. For example, we will develop and test,
by 2017, MOKV command and control strategies in both digital and
Hardware-in-the-Loop venues that will prove we can manage the
engagements of many kill vehicles on many targets from a single
interceptor. We will also invest in the communication architectures and
guidance technology that support this game changing approach.
Ultimately, these Multi-Object Kill Vehicles will revolutionize our
missile defense architecture, substantially reducing the interceptor
inventory required to defeat an evolving and more capable threat to the
Homeland.
MDA requests $17.4 million for Advanced Research and development
that capitalizes on the creativity and innovation of the Nation's small
business community and academia to enhance the BMDS. We are also
fostering research between U.S. and foreign universities of allied
nations through international cooperative science and technology
projects. We awarded 216 new contracts for innovative new research in
eight missile defense related topics last year.
MDA also requests $12.1 million for the Advanced Concepts &
Performance Assessment effort, which models the capability of advanced
BMD technology to address evolving threats to the warfighter. The
request will fund the digital simulation and hardware-in-the-loop
framework and models required for testing of the Airborne Advanced
Sensor, Kill Vehicle Modular Open Architecture test bed, and maturing
sensor fusion algorithms.
international cooperation
The fiscal year 2016 budget request includes funding for regional
missile defense capabilities in order to protect U.S. forces, reassure
allies and partners, and build cooperative regional security
architectures. MDA is engaged with over twenty countries and
international organizations, such as NATO. MDA remains committed to
expanding work with our international partners, to include conducting
joint analyses to support partner missile defense acquisition
decisions, cooperative research and development projects, deployments,
Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and co-production. Our major
international efforts reflect the Department's goals in the Asia-
Pacific, Middle East, and Europe and will help implement EPAA, build
partner BMD capacity, and support the strategic shift to Asia-Pacific.
As allies and partners invest in their own missile defense
capabilities, this will enable us to build more effective regional
security architectures and complement U.S. regional missile defense
capabilities. MDA is currently executing an FMS case with the United
Arab Emirates for two THAAD batteries and accompanying launchers,
radars, and interceptors. This calendar year, we will deliver the first
THAAD battery to our UAE partners to begin New Equipment Training. We
continue to be actively engaged with cost data that may inform future
decisions to procure THAAD.
We continue to have a very strong cooperative missile defense
partnership with Israel. In fiscal year 2014 the Israel Missile Defense
Organization (IMDO) and MDA achieved a second successful intercept
using the David's Sling Weapon System to defeat shorter-range ballistic
missiles and conducted the second fly-out of the Arrow-3 upper tier
interceptor, demonstrating its key functional capabilities in-flight.
Arrow-3 is intended to intercept longer-range threats. The Arrow Weapon
System 2 is a currently fielded capability operated by the Israeli Air
Force. This past September, IMDO and MDA conducted an intercept test of
the Arrow-2 interceptor missile against a MRBM target over the
Mediterranean. The Department also reached agreement in March 2014 with
Israel regarding coproduction of the Iron Dome defense system. The
agreement garnered approximately $263 million in U.S. work share for
coproduction of Iron Dome components. We are requesting $55.0 million
to procure Iron Dome radars and associated equipment.
MDA and our Japanese counterparts continue to make significant
progress with the SM-3 IIA interceptor, our largest co-development
effort. This development work, which remains on track for first
delivery in the 2018 time frame, would expand extended deterrence to
our friends and allies and establish an important vehicle for closer
defense cooperation ties. These cooperative activities enable U.S.
partners to be less vulnerable to coercion and ballistic missile
attack. In addition, our strong partnership with Japan enabled a
technical capability declaration of the second AN/TPY-2 radar now
located at the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) base in
Kyogamisaki, Japan with other strategic partners in the region.
In addition to implementing our EPAA commitments to our NATO
Allies, we continue to work with NATO to ensure U.S. C2BMC and NATO
command and control networks are fully interoperable. We have
successfully demonstrated interoperability between NATO and the U.S.
command and control networks. MDA will continue to engage our NATO
Allies to address international cooperation in missile defense.
cybersecurity/ supply chain risk management
We are very cognizant of the growing cyber threat and aggressively
working to ensure the Nation's missile defenses will be able to operate
in a highly contested cyber environment. Potential adversaries are
developing cyber forces as part of their military structure and
integrating them into their overall strategy. We are working with the
Armed Services, the Combatant Commands, especially Strategic Command's
USCYBERCOM, and other agencies in DOD and the Federal Government to
counter this growing threat.
We are improving the cyber hygiene of our missile defense
capabilities by ensuring our cybersecurity infrastructure has the
latest security upgrades. We are assessing our systems, suppliers, and
acquisition processes and ensure our critical software and hardware are
strongly configured and trusted to lessen the risk of malicious
activities. We have a rigorous cyber and Supply Chain Risk Management
inspection program to examine everything about our systems from the
trusted supply chain to the fielded capability. This helps us ensure
the highest possible compliance levels. In May 2014, DISA Field
Security Operations conducted a USCYBERCOMMissile Defense Integration
and Operations Center in Colorado. MDA received an ``Excellent'' score.
In June 2014 the MDA Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) was
inspected as a Tier 2 Computer Network Defense Service Provider by
USCYBERCOM/DISA Field Security Operations. The MDA CERT received a
``Commendable'' rating (second highest rating possible) and was awarded
another three year Authorization to Operate. Over the last year we
conducted four Enterprise Cyber Range Environment experiments with
independent, DOT&E red team penetration testing on the Joint
Information Operations Range. The purpose of these experiments is to
better understand the cyber robustness of BMDS capabilities to insider
threats. MDA also has one scheduled for May 2015. MDA completed 62
cybersecurity inspections worldwide to ensure DOD and MDA compliance.
We follow up on these inspections to ensure remediation of any
identified cyber risks.
We must build resilient cyber defenses that are capable of
detecting and mitigating threats without impeding operations in order
to ``fight through'' the cyber threat. MDA collaborates with the
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation to conduct cyber
penetration testing on key missile defense capabilities. We then use
the results of those tests to conduct risk assessments to prioritize
cybersecurity improvements, develop mitigation strategies, and improve
cyber training. We are also working to develop better cyber CONOPS to
ensure every network defender in every location knows how to quickly
react to cyber challenges.
We are working hard to incorporate cybersecurity requirements early
into our acquisition lifecycle to ensure we are building cybersecurity
into missile defenses, not the Defense Industrial Base to ensure they
can protect any missile defense program sensitive information from
getting into the hands of potential adversaries. We have seen too many
instances where malicious cyber actors attempt to exfiltrate
information from them, especially from their unclassified, commercial
networks that have exposure to the internet. We will continue to work
with Industry and the FBI to identify these issues and raise the costs
of this type of behavior to those responsible in coordination with
National authorities and in accordance with policy.
conclusion
This budget balances investment in homeland and regional missile
defense capabilities while pursuing advanced technology to pace the
emerging threat. We will do this by improving current system
capabilities and investing in the most promising technology to reverse
the adversary's numerical advantage. MDA continues to aggressively
pursue cost reduction measures through competition, partnering, and
cooperation. MDA is on track with the Department's schedule for
financial improvement and audit readiness, ensuring full accountability
of resources and processes.
Mr. Chairman, we have several critical developmental and
operational flight tests coming up this year and next. We will adhere
to our ``fly before you buy'' approach, testing elements of the system
to demonstrate they work before we commit to their fielding in order to
ensure the warfighter will have cost-effective and reliable weapon
systems. With the successful GMD intercept this past June, continued
emphasis on GMD reliability and commitment to increase GBI inventory,
planned RKV investments, and renewed focus on improved tracking and
discrimination, I believe we are turning the corner with our homeland
defenses. We remain on track with our EPAA deployments and continue to
make good progress with our international partners across the globe. am
also committed to investing in advanced technologies to defeat the
threat of the future and to looking for new and innovative ways to
deliver missile defense capability to protect our nation, our forward
deployed forces and our friends and allies at lower cost to the
government and the taxpayers.
I look forward to answering the committee's questions. Thank you.
Chairman Sessions. Thank you.
General Mann?
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL DAVID L. MANN, USA, COMMANDING
GENERAL, U.S. ARMY SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND/ARMY
FORCES STRATEGIC COMMAND AND JOINT FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMAND
FOR INTEGRATED MISSILE DEFENSE
General Mann. Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly,
Senator King, Senator Fischer, and also your staff, thank you
for your continued support of the soldiers and civilians and
our families.
This is my third appearance before the subcommittee. It is,
indeed, an honor to testify before you today to discuss the
importance of missile defense to our Nation and the need to
maintain these capabilities in the face of a maturing threat
and declining budgets.
Today, I want to briefly summarize the missions of the
organizations that I represent.
First, the Space and Missile Defense Command Army Forces
Strategic Command that serves as a force provider to our
combatant commands. Three core tasks for this organization:
first, to provide trained and ready global missile defenders
today; to build future capabilities and structure for tomorrow;
and then also to evaluate critical technologies to address
future threats.
I also represent the Joint Functional Component Command for
Integrated Missile Defense, which supports STRATCOM in
integrating and synchronizing our global missile defense
operations. As many of you know, for example, today, we have
over 300 full-time National Guardsmen located in Fort Greely,
Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, who operate
the ground-based missile defense system. It represents the
Nation's only ground-based defense against limited
intercontinental ballistic missile attack. The soldiers are
very good at what they do, and they take their mission very
seriously.
In addition, JFCC IMD executes five key tasks. Number one,
we synchronize operational level planning. We support ongoing
operations. We integrate training exercises and test activities
globally. We provide recommendations on the allocation of
missile defense assets. Finally, we advocate for future
capabilities.
Today, the missile defense threat continues to grow both in
terms of numbers and sophistication. We as a Nation cannot
afford a decrease in our readiness or capabilities. That said,
we are extremely concerned about sequestration's impact on our
readiness, and our ability to evaluate and test new
technologies in order to stay ahead of the threat.
This committee's continued support of missile defense
operations, and the men and women who develop and deploy our
systems, is essential.
Again, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss our Nation's
missile defense capabilities, and I look forward to addressing
any questions you may have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Mann follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General David L. Mann, USA
Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, and distinguished
Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for your continued support of
our Service Members, Civilians, and Families. In the same capacity as
my previous appearances before this subcommittee, I appear before you
today bringing both a Joint and Army perspective on effective missile
defense capabilities. Let me again express my appreciation to this
Subcommittee for its continued support of the Army, the U.S. Strategic
Command, the Department of Defense, and the missile defense community.
I am honored to testify before this Subcommittee along with these
distinguished witnesses who provide missile defense capabilities to our
Nation, forward deployed forces, partners, and allies.
As outlined during an appearance before this subcommittee last
year, my responsibilities encompass three main areas. First, as the
Commander of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command (USASMDC),
I have Title 10 responsibilities to train, maintain, and equip space
and global ballistic missile defense forces for the Army. Second, as
the Commander, Army Forces Strategic Command (ARSTRAT), I am the Army
Service Component Commander (ASCC) to the U.S. Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM). I am responsible for planning, integrating, and
coordinating all Army space and missile defense forces and capabilities
in support of USSTRATCOM missions. Third, as the Commander of
USSTRATCOM's Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile
Defense (JFCC IMD), I am responsible for synchronizing missile defense
planning, supporting ballistic missile defense operations, and
advocating for missile defense capabilities on behalf of the Combatant
Commanders.
In addition to the these three roles, the Chief of Staff of the
Army recently designated USASMDC as the Army's Air and Missile Defense
Enterprise Integrator with responsibility to synchronize the Army's air
and missile defense (AMD) strategy in coordination with other
organizations involved in providing this critical capability. My task
is to ensure the implementation of a holistic Army AMD strategy that
includes force planning requirements, coordinated combat and materiel
development, AMD acquisition and life cycle management, and strategic
communications.
In accordance with these responsibilities, my intent today is to
highlight the greatest missile defense asset--our great people; to
briefly outline the strategic environment; to emphasize USASMDC/
ARSTRAT's missile defense force provider responsibilities with respect
to the Army and the Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs); to outline
JFCC IMD's role as an operational integrator of Joint missile defense
for USSTRATCOM; and finally to summarize a few of the key Army
ballistic missile defense activities and developments in the context of
a comprehensive approach to addressing an evolving ballistic missile
threat.
the workforce--recognizing and protecting our greatest asset
The challenges that we face cannot be mitigated without the
dedication of our greatest asset--our people. Just as I mentioned last
year, I feel it important to highlight our workforce, my concern of
sequestration on our workforce, and the Army's continued commitment to
deter instances of sexual harassment and assault. At USASMDC/ARSTRAT
and JFCC IMD, our people remain our most enduring strength. The Service
Members, Civilians, and Contractors support the Army and Joint
Warfighter each and every day, both those stationed in the homeland and
those globally deployed. We remain committed to providing trained and
ready Service Members and Civilians to operate and pursue enhanced
capabilities for the Nation's ballistic missile defense system (BMDS).
As recently highlighted during Congressional testimony by the
Service Chiefs, the potential return of sequestration causes great
concern--especially with regards to its impact on the workforce and our
overall readiness. Within my commands, sequestration will negatively
impact the space and missile defense enablers our Soldiers and
Civilians provide to the Combatant Commanders. Specifically, readiness,
training, and enhancements to space and missile defense capabilities
will be degraded. Also, the return of sequestration will negatively
impact the morale of our workforce. I believe that a more prudent
course of action should be identified and implemented to ensure that we
can continue to meet our current global responsibilities and those of
tomorrow.
Sexual harassment and assault violate the Army's core values and
harm the Soldiers, Civilians, and Family Members that make up our
Army--it must be eliminated. In accordance with the Chief of Staff of
the Army's guidance and direction, my leadership team fully embraces
the importance and fundamental necessity of an effective Sexual
Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) Program. The SHARP
program effort has made noticeable strides in preventing assault and
encouraging reporting of sexual harassment incidents. In line with Army
requirements, our program provides Soldiers, Civilians, and Family
Members with a SHARP program manager, sexual assault response
coordinators, and victim advocates who are available 24/7/365 in order
to safeguard our personnel and maintain their trust. I require my
leadership to comprehensively investigate and report each claim of
sexual harassment or assault. I demand nothing less than upmost
prevention, accountability, and advocacy of our personnel--they deserve
nothing less.
the advancing threat
Ballistic missile threats of our adversaries continue to grow, both
quantitatively and qualitatively. Today, nine nations possess, or are
suspected of possessing, nuclear weapons and 22 have ballistic missile
capabilities that could carry nuclear weapons. Additionally,
approximately 75 countries are developing unmanned aerial systems and
several of these countries are exploiting land, sea, and air attack
cruise missile capabilities. In the future, we expect to encounter more
complex threats, to include advanced electronic and cyber intrusions,
multiple simultaneous attacks, and even directed energy or supersonic
capabilities.
To meet the objectives of the current Quadrennial Defense Strategic
Guidance, USSTRATCOM and the Army continue to provide and enhance
homeland and regional missile defense. In accordance with the
Department's strategy to rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, we have
worked with partners in U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), U.S. Northern
Command (USNORTHCOM), and USSTRATCOM to review and improve our
capabilities in the USPACOM area of responsibility. In addition to the
deployment of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery in
Guam that enhanced our ability to protect U.S. interests in the region,
we have deployed an additional forward-based sensor in Japan to bolster
our defense capabilities.
The emplacement of 14 additional Ground-Based Interceptors at Fort
Greely, Alaska, scheduled for completion in 2017, and an operational
second missile defense sensor in Japan will provide improved capability
and capacity to defend the Nation against a limited intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) attack. Toward this end, we continue to work
with regional partners and allies to increase our information and data
sharing and develop a global AMD force posture that leverages ever
growing partner nations' capabilities. This will result in reduced
strain on our force and enable more timely modernization of our AMD
assets.
The Quadrennial Defense Review also establishes a priority to
maintain a strong commitment to security and stability in Europe and
the Middle East. We are continuing to maintain capability and capacity
in these regions consistent with our regional security goals. In
conjunction with our allies and partners, the DOD has deployed Patriot
air and missile defense forces to Turkey and Jordan in order to enhance
our current AMD posture while sending a strategic deterrence message to
potential adversaries. It should be noted that these deployments add to
the stress of an already highly deployed Patriot force. Without
significant reduction in our worldwide deployments, it will be
challenging for the Army to execute critical planned modernization of
our AMD force over the next 5 years.
In summary, enemy air and missile threats continue to develop in
complexity, quantity and capacity. The evolution of multiple
sophisticated capabilities requires a holistic approach that
effectively integrates offensive and defensive, kinetic and non-
kinetic, and alternative capabilities to defeat air and missile
threats. The growing complexity of the strategic environment based on
technological advances of the threat and fiscal realities requires cost
efficient and effective methods of integrating current and future
capabilities. We continue to prioritize integrated missile defense
resources to optimize all our capabilities in support of the
Warfighter, particularly in light of the expense associated with
traditional approaches. We continue to partner with the Missile Defense
Agency (MDA), Combatant Commands, and Services to ensure we pursue a
fiscally responsible path to keep pace with evolving threats by
identifying and prioritizing additional capabilities that provide the
greatest operational value.
providing and enhancing missile defense capabilities
USASMDC/ARSTRAT, a force provider of missile defense capabilities,
is a split-based command with dispersed locations that are manned by
multi-component Soldiers, Civilians, and Contractors. Commands around
the world, including USSTRATCOM, USNORTHCOM, and the GCCs, leverage our
capabilities. Our Title 10 responsibilities include operations,
planning, integration, control, and coordination of Army forces and
capabilities in support of USSTRATCOM's missile defense mission.
USASMDC/ARSTRAT also serves as the Army's global operational integrator
for missile defense, the Army's proponent for global missile defense
force modernization, and the Army's technical center lead to conduct
air and missile defense related research and development in support of
Army Title 10 responsibilities.
Our operational function is to provide trained and ready missile
defense forces and capabilities to the GCCs and the Warfighter--in
other words, to address the requirements of today. For example,
USASMDC/ARSTRAT Soldiers serving in the homeland and in remote and
austere forward deployed locations operate the Ground-based Midcourse
Defense (GMD) system and the Army-Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance
Forward-Based Mode (AN/TPY-2 FBM) radars. Highlights of the ongoing
missile defense capabilities provided by our missile defense
professionals include:
Support to Global Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD): Soldiers from
the 100th Missile Defense Brigade, headquartered in Colorado Springs,
Colorado, and the 49th Missile Defense Battalion, headquartered at Fort
Greely, Alaska, remain ready, 24/7/365, to defend our Nation and its
territories from a limited intercontinental ballistic missile attack.
Under the operational control of USNORTHCOM, Army National Guard and
active component Soldiers operate the Ground-based Midcourse Defense
Fire Control Systems located at the Fire Direction Center in Alaska,
the Missile Defense Element in Colorado, and the GMD Command Launch
Element at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. These Soldiers, in
conjunction with USNORTHCOM, also oversee the maintenance of GMD
interceptors and ground system components. At the Missile Defense
Complex at the Fort Greely site, 49th Missile Defense Battalion
military police secure the interceptors and communications capabilities
at the Missile Defense Complex from physical threats. This brigade will
also soon be responsible for security at the Fort Drum, New York, In-
Flight Interceptor Communication System Data Terminal. The GMD system
remains our Nation's only defense against an ICBM attack.
GMD System Test and Development: In addition, Soldiers from the
100th Missile Defense Brigade actively participate in GMD test
activities and continue to work with MDA developers on future
improvements to the GMD system.
Support to Regional Capabilities: The 100th Missile Defense Brigade
also provides GCCs with trained and certified AN/TPY-2 FBM radar
detachments. These operational capabilities are present today at
strategic locations around the globe.
Ballistic Missile Early Warning: In support of the Joint Force
Commander's theater force protection, USASMDC/ARSTRAT continues to
provide ballistic missile early warning within various theaters of
operations. The 1st Space Brigade's Joint Tactical Ground Station
(JTAGS) Detachments, under the tactical control of USSTRATCOM's Joint
Functional Component Command for Space, but operated by USASMDC/ARSTRAT
space-professional Soldiers, monitor launch activity and other infrared
events. They provide essential information to members of the air,
missile defense, and operational communities. Our JTAGS Detachments are
forward deployed around the globe, providing 24/7/365, dedicated,
assured missile warning to USSTRATCOM and GCCs in support of deployed
and forward-based forces.
Our second major task is to build and mature future missile defense
forces--our capability development function. These are the missile
defense capabilities we will provide tomorrow. A major component of our
capability development function is to provide relevant and updated
training on our global missile defense systems. During the past year,
USASMDC/ARSTRAT trained over 350 Soldiers and was recertified as an
Army Learning Institution of Excellence for missile defense training.
The Army uses established and emerging processes to document its
missile defense needs and pursue Joint and Army validation of its
requirements. As a recognized Army Center for Analysis, USASMDC/ARSTRAT
conducts studies to determine how to best meet the Army's assigned
missile defense responsibilities. With these insights, we develop the
Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education,
Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) domains to address evolving threats
and potential vulnerabilities to the GMD and AN/TPY-2 FBM missile
defense systems. This disciplined approach helps to ensure limited
resources are applied where Warfighter operational utility can be most
effectively served.
In our third major missile defense task, USASMDC/ARSTRAT provides
critical technologies to address future needs that will enhance
Warfighter effectiveness--our materiel development function. In
USASMDC/ARSTRAT, our technology development function is primarily
focused on the space and high altitude domains. However, while MDA is
the principal materiel developer for ballistic missile defense
capabilities, USASMDC/ARSTRAT has a number of supporting missile
defense related materiel development efforts, to include supporting
research and development of an OSD-sponsored conventional prompt global
strike capability to address ballistic missile threats. Following is a
brief summary of two of our research and development efforts, as well
as an overview of the capabilities of an essential Army testing range.
High Energy Laser Mobile Demonstrator: The technology objective of
the High Energy Laser Mobile Demonstrator (HEL MD) is to demonstrate a
solid-state laser weapon system to complement kinetic energy
capabilities in countering rockets, artillery, and mortar (RAM)
projectiles. This directed energy weapon system will also have a
significant capability against unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
Considerable technology developments were realized over the past year
for the HEL MD. Successful demonstrations were conducted for a
pathfinder 10 kilowatt-class laser at White Sands Missile Range, New
Mexico, and Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. These demonstrations served
as a risk reduction for future subsystem development and integration
while advancing this technology effort to a 50 kilowatt demonstration
in 2017. The 50 kilowatt HEL MD will consist of a ruggedized and
supportable high energy laser installed on a tactical military vehicle
to enhance the safety of deployed forces. Another major component of
the HEL MD is the beam director which will provide full sky coverage
and engage below-the-horizon targets. As technology matures, higher
power lasers will integrate with improved pointing and tracking
capabilities to extend range and increase system effectiveness. The
continued positive technology advances and testing results were
recognized by the Army's senior leadership as HEL MD was recently
selected by the Army Science and Technology Working Group as one of
only three Army Capability Enabler programs to be further evaluated.
The synergy of both directed and kinetic energy systems has the
potential to significantly enhance both regional and homeland defense
capabilities, particularly against cruise missile and indirect fire
threats.
Low-Cost Target Development: The Army continues to pursue a
technology effort to develop a suite of low-cost targets for the
Patriot testing program. The intent is to design threat-representative
targets at a substantially reduced cost for short-range ballistic
missile testing. Over the past year, we completed preliminary designs
for three new short range ballistic missile targets based on existing
excess solid rocket motors. The Army will realize significant savings
conducting operational test events using these new targets beginning in
Fiscal Year 2017. In addition, the Missile Defense Agency will use our
targets in its test program later this year. We will continue to
leverage existing missile inventory and technology advancements to
develop less expensive targets that are representative of real world
threats.
Missile Defense Testing: USASMDC/ARSTRAT operates the Ronald Reagan
Ballistic Missile Test Site (RTS). RTS, located on the U.S. Army
Garrison--Kwajalein Atoll in the Republic of the Marshall Islands, is
critical to both offensive and defensive missile testing requirements,
such as the GMD system and the U.S. Air Force strategic ballistic
missile systems. In addition to their testing mission, personnel at the
Reagan Test Site conduct continuous deep space surveillance and object
identification missions. Just this past month, the U.S. Air Force began
construction of their most advanced surveillance system--the Space
Fence. In a few years, this improved surveillance capability will
enable proactive space situational awareness while complementing
existing systems at Reagan Test Site.
joint functional component command for integrated missile defense--
synchronizing global missile defense planning, force management, and
operations support
The Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile
Defense, or JFCC IMD, is USSTRATCOM's missile defense integrating
element. This past January, we held a ceremony to honor the 10 year
anniversary of the JFCC IMD. Like the other Joint Functional Component
Commands, JFCC IMD was formed to operationalize USSTRATCOM missions and
allow the headquarters to focus on integration and advocacy.
Headquartered at Schriever Air Force Base in Colorado Springs,
Colorado, the JFCC IMD is manned by professional Army, Navy, Air Force,
Marine Corps, Civilian, and Contractor personnel.
As the Secretary of Defense and various Combatant Commanders have
previously testified, the Warfighter remains confident in our ability
to protect the Nation against a limited intercontinental ballistic
missile attack, even in the face of the changing fiscal environment.
Over the past year, we have deployed a new forward-based sensor in
Japan to bolster regional and homeland defense capability and,
following the June 2014 successful ground-based interceptor (GBI) test,
we are in the process of integrating enhanced interceptors at Fort
Greely. Additionally, MDA is on schedule to complete construction of
the new Aegis Ashore site in Romania to meet our commitment to our
allies in Phase 2 of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) and we
continue to collaborate with MDA to initiate the procurement of the
Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) and the redesign of the GBI kill
vehicle. These developments and deployment efforts are in line with
warfighter priorities, which consist of sensor improvements, improved
GBI reliability and performance, and increased regional capability and
capacity.
On behalf of USSTRATCOM, JFCC IMD is working across our DOD
enterprise to improve the integration of existing capabilities in order
to maximize our efficiency and effectiveness to protect the homeland,
deployed forces, partners, and allies. The key force multiplier is
``integration,'' which is a critically important mission area for JFCC
IMD and directly supports USSTRATCOM's assigned Unified Command Plan
(UCP) responsibilities for missile defense.
As an operational and functional component command of USSTRATCOM,
JFCC IMD has derived five key mission tasks from the USSTRATCOM UCP
responsibilities:
Synchronize operational missile defense planning,
security cooperation activities, and the global force management
process for missile defense capabilities.
Conduct global ballistic missile defense operations
support, above element joint ballistic missile defense training, asset
management, and alternative execution support.
Integrate, synchronize, and conduct training, exercises,
and test activities. As the Warfighter interface, lead the planning and
development of operational input for execution of the Integrated Master
Test Plan (IMTP).
Advocate and coordinate for global missile defense
capabilities, conduct analysis and assessments of current and future
capabilities, and recommend operational acceptance.
Protect information systems and provide network support
for ballistic missile defense operations.
To accomplish each of these five tasks, we maintain close
collaborative relationships with the GCCs, MDA, the Services, the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, and our
allies. Through collaborative processes, we continually enhance our
deployed capabilities while gaining operational experience and
confidence in our collective ability to defend the Nation, deployed
forces, partners, and allies. Furthermore, I will highlight some of our
collaborative efforts to enhance missile defense planning and
capabilities for both the homeland and regional architectures.
Expansion and Integration of the Missile Defense Architecture: In
response to the evolving strategic environment, we continue to bolster
homeland and regional missile defense capabilities. In addition to the
deployed AN/TPY-2 FBM radars and deployment of the THAAD battery to
Guam, we are expanding our missile defense collaboration with allies.
We continue to mature the European PAA with the forward deployment of
Aegis BMD ships in Rota, Spain, developing the Aegis Ashore site in
Romania, and continuing the production of the SM-3 IB interceptors used
for ballistic missile defense. Given many of the challenges associated
with implementation of these architectures, JFCC IMD, supporting
USSTRATCOM as the global synchronizer for missile defense, is
collaborating with the GCCs to assess and address the cross-regional
gaps in the areas of planning, policy, capabilities, and operations.
Global Planning and Assessment: Regional and global missile threats
continue to increase in numbers and complexity. This year, JFCC IMD led
the missile defense community in the development of the Global Missile
Defense Concept of Operations which better articulates systemic risk
with the likely simultaneous execution of GCC operational plans across
multiple areas of operations. This fundamentally changes the way the
missile defense enterprise analyzes and assesses the operational
environment. The output of this analysis directly informs the Global
Integrated Air and Missile Defense Assessment (GIAMDA). The GIAMDA
serves to shape recommendations for global force management and
advocacy efforts for future capability investments. We have completed
the 2014 GIAMDA and are currently conducting the 2015 assessment. For
the 2014 assessment, we continued to expand the assessment to look at
integrating cyber, electronic warfare, and global strike in order to
provide a more holistic set of military capabilities to counter an
evolving adversary threat.
Global Force Management: The increasing demand of BMD assets is
managed by the Joint Staff and the Services. USSTRATCOM, as the
designated Joint Functional Manager for missile defense, relies upon
JFCC IMD to evaluate and recommend sourcing of BMD requirements based
on assessed risk. Due to the high demand, low-density nature of missile
defense assets, all sourcing decisions have a direct and significant
impact to other Combatant Commanders' campaign and contingency plans.
The Global Force Management process enables senior leaders to make more
informed BMD sourcing decisions based on global risk.
Multi-Regional BMD Asset Management: JFCC IMD, in coordination with
USSTRATCOM and the GCCs, manages the availability of missile defense
assets to balance operational readiness postures, scheduled and
unscheduled maintenance activities, and the MDA and Services' test
requirements. This important process allows us to continually assess
our readiness to defend against a ballistic missile attack and to
recommend adjustments to optimize the overall BMD architecture.
Allied Ballistic Missile Defense Integration: JFCC IMD continues to
focus on the integration of allies into regional missile defense
architectures, enhanced security cooperation between missile defense
capable nations, and shared regional deterrence and defense
responsibilities across partner nations. One tool employed to promote
cooperation is the Nimble Titan campaign, a biennial series of multi-
national missile defense experiments designed to explore policy and
operational concepts required for coalition missile defense. The Nimble
Titan campaign provides a unique venue to advance U.S. missile defense
policies and combatant command regional security objectives. The Nimble
Titan community of interest consists of 23 nations and 2 international
organizations. The campaign goals for Nimble Titan are four fold:
Examine national and multinational BMD decision making
processes and their effects on planning, design, and execution.
Explore the effects of policy guidance on defense design.
Develop a common understanding of integrated air and
missile defense.
Examine and identify opportunities to support planning
and execution of integrated air and missile defense operations.
In April 2014, we concluded our fourth biennial series--Nimble
Titan 14. Nimble Titan 14 included Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Ministry of Defense representatives from 21 nations and 2 international
organizations, along with Department of State, OSD, Joint Staff, MDA,
and combatant command representatives. In addition, 40 senior leaders
from the United States and 13 other nations participated in a
concurrent senior leader program. For the first time, Nimble Titan 14
included participants from the Middle East and non-NATO aligned
European nations. Through Nimble Titan, we continue to focus on cross-
regional coordination, sensor integration, and multinational MD
planning solutions.
Nimble Titan is critical to developing a common understanding of
policy hurdles associated with combined missile defense architectures
and to influence future U.S., ally, and partner missile defense policy
development and cooperation. Additionally, this exercise provides
participating nations with critical experience in information-sharing
as well as command and control procedures that enhance synchronized
missile defense capabilities. Conclusions derived from this exercise
continue to inform policy decisions and multinational BMD planning.
Planning has already begun for the next iteration of this war game--
Nimble Titan 16.
Joint BMD Training: DOD designated USSTRATCOM as the lead for
integrating and synchronizing Joint BMD training. In coordination with
USSTRATCOM, the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, and the Services, we
have developed a comprehensive and innovative training program to close
gaps between Service, Joint, and regional BMD training and education.
New and updated courseware has been developed and fielded to enhance
combatant command and warfighter training needs. Blended learning
courseware and a Joint BMD Training Community of Practice are under
development to improve efficiency in delivery and reduce costs. Over
the past year, JFCC IMD provided 140 courses to over 2,300 students
around the world via the Joint BMD Training and Education Center.
Additionally, in keeping with Joint Vision 2020, JFCC IMD provided
several training courses to ally and partner nations.
Warfighter Acceptance and Integrated Master Test Plan: As the
missile defense architectures mature, Warfighters require a credible,
comprehensive assessment of new capabilities to inform operational
acceptance. In 2014, we tested our new AN/TPY-2 FBM in Japan, conducted
a successful intercept flight test of the GMD system, and flight tested
a triple engagement of both cruise and ballistic missiles with our
Aegis BMD system. The focus of this year's operational tests is to
demonstrate the integrated capability of Phase 2 of the European PAA
architecture, which will include Aegis BMD ships and Aegis Ashore.
Additionally, JFCC IMD continues to work closely with the MDA, the
Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, and USNORTHCOM
to address issues future improvements of both the Capability
Enhancement (CE)-I and CE-II variants.
In summary, JFCC IMD serves an integrating role for missile defense
across multiple regions as we operationalize new capabilities, enhance
command relationships, and reinforce our missile defense partnerships
with allies. In view of worldwide events and current fiscal challenges,
JFCC IMD remains focused on our key mission task to collaborate with
the GCCs and MDA to meet current and future ballistic missile threats.
While work remains to be done, we have made significant progress in
evolving our global missile defense capabilities, thereby strengthening
the defense of the homeland and advancing our partnerships with allies
in this pressing endeavor.
army contributions to the nation's missile defense capabilities
The Army works closely with MDA and continually supports its
materiel development efforts to develop and field systems that are
integral to our Nation's air and missile defense capabilities. A
summary of the Army's major air and missile defense programs follows.
Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD): As we transition
from an Army at war to one of deterrence, air and missile defense (AMD)
units have become a key strategic enabler. AMD is an enduring Army core
function and an essential component of the Army mission to provide wide
area security. In addition to defense against ballistic missiles, the
current AMD strategy seeks to develop a more comprehensive portfolio of
IAMD capabilities to provide protection against cruise missiles,
unmanned aerial systems, and long-range precision rocket, artillery,
and mortar attacks.
The IAMD Battle Management Command System (IBCS) remains an Army
priority effort and serves as the foundation for Army AMD
modernization. Modernization is critical in our quest to stay ahead of
the advancement of the threat. The program will field a common mission
command system to all echelons of Army AMD forces in order to defend
against cruise missiles, manned and unmanned aircraft, air-to-ground
missiles, tactical ballistic missiles, and rocket, artillery, and
mortar attacks. IBCS will provide a common and flexible AMD mission
command network capable of coordinating air surveillance and fire
control across Services and with coalition partners. When fielded, IBCS
will componentize the AMD force, breaking the current system-centric
paradigm, which will facilitate open industry competition in support of
the AMD community. Additional efforts are underway to integrate IBCS
and Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC)
to support the BMD mission.
As the lead integrator for the AMD enterprise, one area of concern
is the ever increasing operational demand and how this demand will
impact planned modernization. Starting next fiscal year, the AMD
enterprise will begin its most comprehensive modernization effort ever
undertaken as IBCS is fielded to the AMD force. IBCS will interact with
every AMD weapon component--shooters, sensors, and C2BMC. The AMD
convergence between the existing demand and upcoming modernization
effort will be a major undertaking for the AMD enterprise and the Army.
Patriot/Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3): The Patriot air and
missile defense system remains the cornerstone of our BMD forces
deployed in support of GCCs. It remains the Army's premier weapon
system against air and tactical ballistic missile threats. The Patriot
system is now over 35 years old and, not surprisingly, the effort and
costs associated with maintaining operational reliability rise steadily
each year. Fortunately, several years ago, the Army embarked on a
comprehensive modernization strategy that will completely replace
Patriot's command and control hardware and upgrade the radar, launcher,
and interceptor components through competitive development and
procurement. The aim is to increase reliability, drive down operational
and sustainment costs, and remain viable well into the future. Each
facet of this strategy, development of IBCS, radar and launcher
modernization and the Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) are critical to
our Nation's ability to provide our Combatant Commanders with more
innovation and capabilities in the face of an ever evolving threat.
With nearly half of all Patriot units currently deployed, operational
tempo and stress remain high.
A number of significant Patriot/PAC-3 capability enhancements have
been accomplished over the past year. Among the accomplishments were
the completion of the Army's planned PAC-3 capability upgrades of all
15 Patriot battalions and continued successful operational flight tests
of the next generation PAC-3 missile, the MSE. During recent successful
testing, both tactical ballistic missiles and air breathing threats
were simultaneously engaged. The Army remains on track for delivery of
the MSE to the Warfighter by the fourth quarter of 2015. Additionally,
the Patriot radar is receiving a new radar digital processor. Coupled
with recent software upgrades, the new processor increases performance
of the radar against evolving threats while dramatically improving
reliability, availability, and maintainability. To make maximum use of
the MSE missile and the radar upgrades, the Army is also preparing to
test the next version of the Patriot software, Post Deployment Build-8.
Successful testing and fielding of this software will advance the
Patriot system into the next generation of hardware capability.
Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor
System (JLENS): Homeland air and missile defense is heavily reliant on
early warning and over-the-horizon target acquisition in order to
provide decision and battle space. In accordance with guidance from OSD
and the Joint Staff, the Army has deployed the JLENS system to Aberdeen
Proving Grounds, Maryland, for a three-year operational exercise. This
exercise will demonstrate the capability to detect, track, and identify
potential air threats to the greater Washington, D.C. area, and to
integrate JLENS into the North American Aerospace Defense Command's
(NORAD) air defense architecture. During the 3-year exercise window,
JLENS capabilities will be fully explored in a real-world environment
and evaluated for its operational utility in support of NORAD's
homeland defense mission.
The JLENS system leverages proven aerostat technology to provide
situational awareness and track airborne objects such as cruise
missiles, manned and unmanned aircraft, and large caliber rockets. The
JLENS consists of two unmanned aerostats with radar systems for
surveillance and fire control. Each radar system employs a separate 74-
meter tethered aerostat, a mobile mooring station, radar and
communications payloads, a processing station, and associated ground
support equipment.
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System: THAAD, a key component
of the BMDS architecture, is designed to defend deployed and allied
forces, population centers, and critical infrastructure against short
and medium-range ballistic missiles. THAAD is a high demand, low-
density asset that is mobile and globally transportable. A fully
operational THAAD battery consists of 95 Soldiers, an AN/TPY-2 radar,
six launchers, a fire control and communications element, a battery
support center, and a support element. THAAD has a unique intercept
capability in both the endo- and exo-atmosphere using proven hit-to-
kill technology. There are now four activated THAAD batteries.
Equipment training and fielding has been completed for three of the
batteries. In April 2013, one of these batteries conducted the first-
ever operational deployment of THAAD in response to the escalation of
tensions in the Pacific region. The fourth THAAD battery is currently
undergoing training and will be operationally available next year. A
fifth battery is scheduled to become fully operational the following
year. By 2019, the THAAD force is scheduled to consist of seven
batteries. A new training facility, which enables virtual training for
the Soldiers who will operate the THAAD system, recently opened at Fort
Sill, Oklahoma. The addition of THAAD capabilities to the Army's air
and missile defense portfolio brings an unprecedented level of
protection against missile attacks to deployed U.S. forces, partners,
and allies.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Donnelly, as a member of the Joint
missile defense community, the Army continues to pursue enhancements to
the Nation's missile defense system. As a Service, the Army has lead
responsibility for GMD, AN/TPY-2 FBM, Patriot, JLENS, and THAAD. Our
trained and ready Soldiers operating GMD elements in Colorado, Alaska,
and California remain on point to defend the homeland against a limited
intercontinental ballistic missile attack. As a force provider to the
GCCs, our Soldiers provide essential regional sensor capabilities and
ballistic missile early warning. Our regional forces continue to
leverage ally collaboration and planning efforts in developing
integrated and interoperable defenses against the various threat sets.
USSTRATCOM, through the JFCC IMD, continues to integrate BMDS
capabilities to counter global ballistic missile threats and to protect
our Nation, deployed forces, partners, and allies.
While the operational, doctrine, and materiel development
enhancements of the BMDS are essential, our most essential assets are
the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Civilians, and Contractors who
develop, deploy, and operate our missile defense system. I appreciate
having the opportunity to address missile defense matters and look
forward to addressing your questions.
Chairman Sessions. Thank you.
Mr. Gilmore?
STATEMENT OF HON. J. MICHAEL GILMORE, DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL
TEST AND EVALUATION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Gilmore. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I will
briefly summarize the highlights of my written testimony.
Testing conducted during the past 5 years of the regional
theater missile defense systems--that is Aegis, Terminal High
Altitude Aerial Defense, and Patriot--have demonstrated their
effectiveness under an expanding set of realistic operational
conditions.
During that same period, testing of the Ground-Based
Midcourse Defense system has revealed a number of important
engineering shortfalls that needed correction, but the
intercept failures caused by those shortfalls precluded
demonstration of GMDs effectiveness under a broader set of
realistic operational conditions.
However, if we execute the integrated master test plan that
Admiral Syring has developed over the next several years, that
will expand our knowledge and demonstration of the capabilities
of GMD under a broader set of operational conditions, to
include an upcoming test against an ICBM target, testing of
salvos using salvos of interceptors, and testing of multiple
simultaneous engagements, as well as testing in the presence of
more realistic countermeasures.
As I mentioned, several Exo-Atmospheric Kill Vehicle fixes
that were important were demonstrated during last year's
developmental flight test, which successfully intercepted the
target. That is definite progress.
Nonetheless, as Admiral Syring himself has pointed out, the
reliability and availability of the operational ground-based
interceptors are less than desired. That is why the Admiral is
undertaking a reliability improvement program that is now
funded. That is very important to improve the reliability and
availability of the interceptors.
Although, in the long run, the solution there is the
Redesigned Kill Vehicle based on a more rigorous systems
engineering process.
The next flight test of the GMD system will take place
later this year. It will be a nonintercept test of a Capability
Enhancement-II kill vehicle, similar to the one that was just
tested, to demonstrate the performance of alternate different
thrusters, which again are supposed to help with some of the
problems that have been demonstrated in past tests, and the
end-to-end discrimination of a complex target scene including
countermeasures.
In my view, a robust ability to discriminate is critical
for an effective homeland defense. The planning and analysis
being conducted for this test have already revealed significant
issues that Admiral Syring is using to plan his future program.
In the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2016, MDA plans to
conduct, as I mentioned just a moment ago, the first intercept
of intercontinental ballistic missile. This is a critical
flight test, as well as subsequent salvo tests and multiple
simultaneous engagement tests, because those are going to be
conducted under realistic conditions reflecting how the system
would actually be used.
The CE-I interceptor is the oldest in the GMD inventory.
Its last flight test in fiscal year 2013 was a failure, so I
recommend that we retest as soon as possible a CE-I
interceptor, CE-I equipped interceptor, incorporating changes
in hardware and software that are being made to correct the
problems that were revealed in the past flight test.
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense with Standard Missile-3
Block IB completed initial operational testing and evaluation
in early fiscal year 2014. Testing has demonstrated Aegis is
capable of defeating short-range and simple separating medium-
range ballistic missile threats and shorter range intermediate-
range threats, and its effectiveness depends upon the specifics
of the threat and the circumstances of deployment.
However, there have been third stage rocket motor failures
common to the SM-3 IA and IB, and MDA has determined that a
redesign of that Third-Stage Rocket Motor nozzle is needed to
increase the missile's reliability. In my view, the new design
will have to be flight tested, not just ground tested, a number
of times before we can have confidence that those fixes and
improved reliability is as desired.
Later this year, we are going to do Flight Test
Operational-02, the second operational flight test at a system
level, of BMDS elements. That will be important. There are two
events that are planned, one involving Aegis Ashore, the
testing facility at the Pacific Missile Range Facility, as well
as testing using Aegis ships in a second event. Both of those
events will provide information that is critical to my
evaluation of the effectiveness of European Phased Adaptive
Approach Phase 2, which the Nation wants to declare operational
by the end of the year.
In the fiscal year 2015 appropriations bill, Congress
reduced MDA's funding for testing and flight test targets. In
response, MDA, consistent with its priorities, eliminated one
particular Aegis BMD flight test. I would, certainly, urge that
MDA work with the Congress, if at all possible, to restore that
flight test because it is against a critical ballistic missile
threat. I would be happy to elaborate on the details in the
appropriate setting.
THAAD, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, has
demonstrated effectiveness against short- and medium-range
targets. As part of FTO-02 later this year, it will hopefully
demonstrate effectiveness against complex separating short-
range ballistic missiles and prove the effectiveness of its
advanced discrimination algorithms. So that test will provide
important information not just about Aegis, but also about
THAAD.
In my written testimony, I discuss concerns with Patriot
reliability and training. I certainly recommend the Services
and MDA work to address those concerns.
Finally, flight testing and modeling and simulation of the
regional theater BMDS systems--that is Patriot, THAAD, and
Aegis--are sufficient to support a quantitative assessment of
the systems performance against short- and medium-range
ballistic missile threats.
I provide those estimates, they are classified, in the
classified section of the annual report I just submitted to
Congress.
However, flight testing and modeling and simulation are not
yet sufficient. In my judgment, based on current program plans
and the pace of testing, they will not be until the beginning
of the next decade to enable me to provide a rigorous
quantitative assessment of GMD effectiveness.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gilmore follows:]
Prepared Statement by J. Michael Gilmore
Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, and distinguished
Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss
missile defense testing and my assessment of the Ballistic Missile
Defense System (BMDS) and the elements that comprise it.
Testing conducted during the past five years of the Regional/
Theater missile defense elements has demonstrated their effectiveness
under an expanding set of realistic operational conditions. Testing
conducted during that period of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense
(GMD) element has revealed a number of important engineering shortfalls
that needed correction, but the intercept failures caused by these
problems precluded increased demonstration of GMD's effectiveness under
a broader set of realistic operational conditions.
gmd assessment
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has demonstrated GMD's capability
to defend the United States against small numbers of simple ballistic
missile threats launched from North Korea and Iran. Several Exo-
atmospheric Kill Vehicle fixes were demonstrated during last year's
developmental flight test (FTG-06b), which successfully intercepted the
target. However, the reliability and availability of the operational
Ground-based Interceptors are less than desired and need to be
substantially improved; MDA is taking steps that, over time, should
yield improvement.
The next flight test of the GMD system will take place later this
year. Ground-based Midcourse Controlled Test Vehicle-02+ (GM CTV-02+)
is a non-intercept test of a Capability Enhancement-II (CE-II) kill
vehicle that will demonstrate the performance of alternate divert
thrusters in a flight environment and the end-to-end discrimination of
a complex target scene including countermeasures through the GMD fire
control loop. Data collected from this test will be used to evaluate
discrimination techniques which can help distinguish a real warhead
from a decoy. A robust ability to discriminate is critical for an
effective homeland defense and the planning and analysis being
conducted for this test have already revealed issues regarding GMD's
discrimination capabilities. The MDA is using this information to
determine the content of the Agency's future research and development
efforts. In the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2016, the MDA plans to
conduct Flight Test GMD-15 (FTG-15), which will be the first intercept
flight test for the CE-II Block 1 Ground-Based Interceptor and the
first intercept attempt of an intercontinental ballistic missile-range
target. This is also a critical flight test.
The CE-I interceptor is the oldest in the GMD inventory, and its
last flight test in fiscal year 2013 was a failure. Numerous CE-I
interceptors remain deployed as part of the GMD system. Consistent with
the high priority of the Homeland Defense mission, I recommend the MDA
retest as soon as feasible the CE-I interceptor incorporating changes
in its hardware and software made to correct the problems that caused
the flight test failure to demonstrate the problems have actually been
fixed.
As documented in MDA's Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP), GMD
flight testing is proceeding at a pace of one test per year. For these
expensive flight tests to add value to the GMD program, enough time
must be given to conduct analyses of the previous flight test data, to
make system improvements based on the previous flight test results, and
to plan for the next test. Substantial overlaps between analysis of
data from a just-conducted test and planning for the next test would be
counter-productive. The pace at which all these activities can be
conducted depends on the quality, experience, and size of MDA's
engineering staff and the capacity of the Agency's ground-test and
analysis capabilities, not only on the number of interceptors available
for flight testing or the number of targets available (target
availability and readiness continue to be problematic). So, while it
would be possible to increase the pace of GMD testing somewhat relative
to the current (and historical) pace of about one test per year, doing
so would require expanding MDA's staff of competent engineers and test
infrastructure, both of which would require substantial resources and
time to execute.
aegis ballistic missile defense (bmd) assessment
The Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) 4.0 system with Standard
Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IB guided missiles completed Initial Operational
Test and Evaluation in early fiscal year 2014. Testing has demonstrated
that the Aegis BMD 4.0 system is capable of defeating short-range and
simple-separating medium-range ballistic missiles and shorter-range
intermediate-range threats in the midcourse phase of flight for many
realistic operational scenarios. Analysis of data obtained during
flight testing and the maintenance demonstration showed that the Aegis
BMD 4.0 system is also suitable.
However, SM-3 Third-Stage Rocket Motor failures encountered during
flight testing have affected the reliability of the SM-3 missile. The
MDA has determined that a re-design of the Third-Stage Rocket Motor
nozzle is needed to increase the missile's reliability. The MDA
generated new design concepts and began the initial ground testing of
the redesigned parts in fiscal year 2014. The new design will have to
be flight tested (not just ground tested) multiple times before its
reliability can be determined with confidence.
The MDA also demonstrated the capability of the Aegis Ashore test
site at the Pacific Missile Range Facility to fire, establish uplink/
downlink communication, provide guidance commands, and provide target
information to an SM-3 Block IB guided missile. The Aegis Ashore
Controlled Test Vehicle-01 test was the first SM-3 missile firing from
Aegis Ashore. Flight Test Operational-02 (FTO-02), scheduled for fiscal
year 2015, is a BMDS system-level operational test, consisting of two
events. Event 1 will provide critical data needed for my assessment of
Aegis Ashore's capability to defend Europe as part of the President's
European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). An AN/TPY-2 radar in forward-
based mode will provide the target track data that will enable Aegis
Ashore to conduct a launch-on-remote engagement. Space-based sensors
and command, control, battle management, and communications systems
will also participate. Event 1 will be the first intercept test of
Aegis Ashore and it will be conducted against an intermediate-range
ballistic missile target. Event 2, which will also provide data
critical to my assessment of the EPAA's ability to integrate the
defense provided by Aegis Ashore with the defense capabilities of Aegis
ships, will use a U.S. European Command scenario to test the Aegis BMD
capability to engage a medium-range ballistic missile in the presence
of post-intercept debris while simultaneously conducting anti-air
warfare operations against a cruise missile surrogate. To create the
debris scene for Aegis BMD, THAAD will engage a short-range ballistic
missile with its advanced radar algorithms and new Lot 4 interceptor.
As a result of a successful critical design review conducted in
2013, the design of the new and larger SM-3 Block IIA guided missile is
now complete and the program is proceeding to product development and
testing. In October 2013, the MDA conducted a propulsion test vehicle
test called PTV-1. It demonstrated that the SM-3 Block IIA missile can
launch from the Aegis BMD vertical launch system.
In its fiscal year 2015 appropriations bill, Congress reduced MDA's
funding for testing and flight test targets. The MDA addressed these
funding cuts by eliminating the FTM-24 Aegis BMD flight test. In my
view, this flight test is critical to determining the Aegis BMD system
performance against a key ballistic missile threat. I urge MDA to work
with the Congress to restore FTM-24 as soon as possible. I would be
happy to elaborate further on this issue in the appropriate forum.
terminal high altitude area defense (thaad) assessment
The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system has
demonstrated effectiveness against short- and medium-range targets. In
9 flight tests, beginning with FTT-06 and including one multi-
simultaneous engagement, conducted between fiscal year 2007 and fiscal
year 2013, THAAD intercepted all 10 target ballistic missiles including
8 short-range and 2 medium-range ballistic missiles. One flight test in
fiscal year 2009 demonstrated a salvo engagement and another flight
test in fiscal year 2012 demonstrated a multiple simultaneous
engagement. Further flight testing is planned to demonstrate the
performance of the radar's advanced algorithms against more complex
short- and medium-range ballistic missile targets and the system's
capabilities against intermediate-range ballistic missile threats
(which could be employed against Guam), with the latter test now
scheduled to occur during the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2015.
Analyses of data from the Reliability Confidence Test and multiple
flight tests suggest that THAAD system components are not exhibiting
consistent or steadily increasing reliability growth between test
events. The tools and diagnostic equipment available to Soldiers are
insufficient to accurately emplace, maintain, and assess the
operational status of THAAD equipment. THAAD has also demonstrated
deficiencies during natural environment testing, which tests a system's
ability to withstand expected temperature extremes, temperature shock,
humidity, rain, ice, snow, sand, and dust. The deficiencies need to be
addressed to ensure THAAD is capable of operating properly when and
where it is needed.
A primary concern to me is the training being offered to THAAD
Soldiers. The high demand for operational THAAD units overseas has
reduced the time available for operator training, and I urge both MDA
and the Army to work together to address this issue. For example,
during recent tests, THAAD operators commented on the lack of
opportunities to train with THAAD in an operationally realistic
environment alongside other missile defense systems like Aegis BMD and
Patriot. These systems are frequently expected to operate in
conjunction with THAAD, and operators' ability to conduct proper
coordination among all BMD systems is necessary for these missile
defense systems to operate together effectively.
patriot assessment
Patriot is effective against many types of short-range tactical
ballistic missiles, and has demonstrated capability against a medium-
range missile target. Patriot successfully engaged tactical ballistic
missiles in flight tests against more than 30 short-range ballistic
missile targets since 1999 and in one flight test against a medium-
range ballistic missile target in 2002. Sixteen flight tests since 2000
included multiple simultaneous Patriot engagements against two targets.
In its most recent operational test conducted between May 2012 and
January 2013, Patriot did not meet its operational requirements for
reliability, maintainability, or availability.
The recent operational test highlighted the growing complexity of
the Patriot system, which requires a higher level of operator expertise
and more intensive training than that which the Army currently
provides. As with THAAD, there is a high demand for operational Patriot
units in the field. In response to this demand, the Army deactivated
its dedicated Patriot test unit in fiscal year 2013. Soldiers from the
Patriot Test Battalion provided valuable user insight during
development testing and provided operationally representative Soldiers
for operational testing. The Test Battalion helped ensure proper
training materials were developed and tested. The deactivation of the
Test Battalion will lengthen the duration of operational testing and
delay the fielding decisions for the Patriot Missile Segment
Enhancement and Post-Deployment Build-8 software. The loss of the Test
Battalion has reduced the Army's ability to ensure Patriot unit
Soldiers are trained to operate the system safely and effectively in
combat, when U.S. and coalition aircraft and other BMD systems will be
sharing Patriot's battlespace. Also, Patriot's ability to operate (or
not) in the presence of the proliferating and increasingly effective
capabilities for electronic attack our potential adversaries are
developing and fielding needs to be fully characterized through robust
testing, and key shortfalls in performance revealed by that testing
corrected without delay. I commend the Army for its recent efforts to
begin that characterization testing.
command, control, battle management, and communications (c2bmc)
assessment
Effective battle management is crucial for the success of the
integrated BMDS, and Command, Control, Battle Management, and
Communications (C2BMC) is the primary element intended to enable battle
management at the system level. Battle management capability is needed
to ensure effective engagement of threat missiles in a complex
battlespace with multiple BMD systems, and to prevent interceptors
being wasted by firing at enemy missiles which have already been
engaged by other systems.
Spiral 6.4, operational since 2011, is the currently deployed
version of C2BMC. Spiral 6.4 provides situational awareness for the
BMDS, forwards track data between BMDS elements, and provides battle
management and engagement monitoring. However, it does not have the
capability to provide automated engagement direction among BMD
elements.
With the addition of the Global Engagement Manager Suite, Spiral
6.4 added the capability to manage multiple AN/TPY-2 forward-based
radars. Dual radar management by the Global Engagement Manager was
demonstrated during distributed ground testing in the United States
European Command in support of European Phased Adaptive Approach Phase
1. Spiral 6.4 has participated in flight tests FTM-15, FTG-06a, FTI-01,
and FTO-01, in which it collectively demonstrated control of a single
AN/TPY-2 radar and track forwarding capabilities. Spiral 6.4 also
participated in FTG-07 and FTG-06b by forwarding Aegis Weapon System
tracks to GMD.
test adequacy
The MDA conducted eight flight tests and five ground tests during
FY/CY14. Data from a ninth flight test conducted at the end of fiscal
year 2013, the first system-level operational test, Flight Test,
Operational-01 (FTO-01) were also analyzed during the year. The MDA
conducted these tests in accordance with the DOT&E-approved IMTP. In
fiscal year 2015, the MDA plans to conduct 12 flight tests, and in
fiscal year 2016, 7 flight tests.
Flight testing of the Regional/Theater BMDS autonomous combat
systems is sufficient to support a quantitative assessment of the
systems' performance against short- and medium-range ballistic missile
threats. However, flight testing is not adequate to provide
quantitative assessments of effectiveness against intermediate-range
ballistic missile threats. The classified sections of my annual report
on BMD provide those quantitative estimates of effectiveness for the
cases in which they are feasible.
Homeland Defense flight test data and modeling and simulation
(discussed subsequently) are not yet sufficient, and likely will not be
until the beginning of the next decade, to enable a rigorous
quantitative assessment of GMD effectiveness.
As discussed above, MDA addressed a Congressionally-directed cut to
the MDA test and targets programs in fiscal year 2015 by deleting FTM-
24, a critical test of the SM-3 Block IB guided missile. This test
should be restored and conducted as soon as feasible.
cybersecurity
The United States faces a growing cyber threat, and our Nation's
ballistic missile defenses need to be secure against that threat. Over
the last year the MDA conducted four experiments on a cyber testing
range using independent cyber red teams provided by my office. The
purpose of these experiments was to better understand the cyber
robustness of BMDS capabilities to insider threats, and to address any
cybersecurity vulnerabilities that were found. The MDA plans to
continue to use cyber ranges to improve its cybersecurity posture, and
plans to conduct its next cyber range experiment in May 2015.
thaad and patriot training
As I mentioned previously, there are deficiencies in the training
provided to THAAD and Patriot Soldiers. THAAD is a complex automated
system that is designed to operate effectively with other BMD systems
in the region where it is deployed. Training issues continue to surface
during test events and as Soldiers rotate into and out of THAAD units.
Some of these issues have been mitigated through the installation of a
THAAD-specific training facility at the Ft. Sill Schoolhouse; by
increasing the amount of training; and by developing training aids,
devices, simulators, and simulation. However, the need to make
additional improvements remains.
Current Army training for THAAD emphasizes training for individual
Soldiers. Current THAAD training does not provide the Soldier with a
crew, team, or Joint-based operationally realistic fighting experience
as part of an integrated BMDS. Hence, currently THAAD soldiers are not
``trained as they will fight.''
Current institutional training devices do not implement the latest
system software version and do not provide the Soldier with timely
feedback. Training devices that do not accurately emulate the system
and prepare the Soldier to operate and maintain the system to yield the
best system performance can result in missed intercepts.
THAAD-specific training gaps and deficiencies continue to be
discovered. Soldiers are assigned to a THAAD unit without THAAD-
specific training support. This impedes the Soldier's ability to
effectively and efficiently carry out the THAAD mission, resulting in a
greater reliance on contract support.
An integrated, team-based, and Joint interoperability training
environment is essential to ensuring THAAD effectiveness during a
conflict. The Army, in coordination with the MDA, should modify its
institutional training policy and move from an individual Military
Occupational Specialties (MOS)-centric training approach to a systemic,
integrated, team-based approach that includes Joint interoperability
training.
To properly implement such an approach, the Army should ensure the
availability of adequate funding, training aids, software and radar
simulator capabilities, and evaluate whether changes to career
progression, crew rotation, and professional development programs are
required.
The Army should implement an objective and quantifiable Army
training standard that reflects the level of expertise required for
team and Joint operations, develop and fund a training plan with a
sufficient number of training weeks to develop Soldier expertise, and
consider the benefit of a THAAD-specific MOS.
Patriot training is currently provided to Patriot unit Soldiers and
as a foundation for THAAD unit Soldiers. However, the level of Patriot
training is insufficient, given the complexity of the Patriot system
and the fact that in combat a Patriot unit may be called upon to
operate in a congested battlespace with friendly and enemy aircraft,
high numbers of threat missiles, and numerous other U.S. and coalition
BMD assets. Since my fiscal year 2010 Annual Report to Congress, I have
recommended that the Army improve Patriot training to equip Soldiers
with the required level of expertise to ensure a Patriot unit can
effectively operate in a realistic combat environment. The Army should
consider reestablishing the Patriot Test Battalion to help address both
Patriot and THAAD training deficiencies.
modeling and simulation
Realistic flight tests of BMD systems are expensive, and there is
no practical way to conduct a flight test for all possible BMD
scenarios. Hence, verified, validated and accredited modeling and
simulation, grounded in flight test data, is required to ensure BMD
systems will be effective in combat. My BMDS assessments are limited by
the lack of properly accredited modeling and simulation. As the MDA
executes its flight test program over the next several years and
additional validation data are gathered, the MDA should ensure those
data are used to improve the Agency's modeling and simulation
capabilities. This effort will require dedicated resources and the
support of MDA leadership.
My BMD assessments often contain subjective content due to the
limited amount of flight test data and the limited progress toward
verification, validation, and accreditation of the BMDS models and
simulations. This is especially true for the GMD program. Many of the
models and simulations used in BMD system ground testing are still not
accredited for performance assessment, thereby limiting quantitative
assessments based on their results. I recommend strongly that the MDA
work with the Congress to assure robust funding enabling timely
development and rigorous accreditation of the models and simulations
critical to understanding and assuring the effectiveness of all
elements of the BMDS, including, in particular, GMD.
imtp assessment
Admiral Syring leads a rigorous IMTP development process that has
produced a well-justified set of tests within a budget-constrained
environment. In 2014, the MDA continued to emphasize operational
realism when planning for and conducting both ground and flight testing
and my office continues to be involved substantively with each update
of the IMTP. The process has enabled the IMTP to be revised in a timely
manner consistent with policy changes, flight test results, and changes
in budgetary resources. The IMTP continues to be a defensible and
rigorous plan for obtaining the test information needed to assess BMDS
performance more quantitatively over time.
Chairman Sessions. Thank you, Dr. Gilmore. I know that you
are the director of the Office of Test of Evaluation. You take
pride in your independence. You might share with the committee
how it is that you're structured as to give you independent
analysis on what we're funding and the testing of it.
Mr. Gilmore. Well, under the law, my office reports
directly to the Secretary of Defense, as well as to the
Congress, on the effectiveness, suitability, and survivability
of weapon systems. Under subsequent NDAAs, we were given full
access to information from the Missile Defense Agency,
notwithstanding its removal from the normal acquisition
oversight process in the department.
I have worked very cooperatively with both Lieutenant
General O'Reilly and Admiral Syring. There has been a complete
free flow of information between our offices. I have found our
interactions to be very useful, and I would invite Admiral
Syring to make any comments he wants to make in that regard,
obviously.
But Admiral Syring and no one else in the department
reviews or coordinates on the reports that I write, including
the report that I just recently submitted to Congress, which is
mandated by a past National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA),
although they can certainly point out if we have made any
mistakes, and so far, no one has done that.
Chairman Sessions. That is unusual.
Let me just say this, we have a lot to do, but I do think
it is important that we have an independent evaluator not in
the normal chain of command that reviews these key activities,
because they are complex, and we need to be careful about it.
Admiral Syring, we are going to be adding the 44 Ground-
based Midcourse Defense System (GBIs), and we have the plans to
bring forward the newer, updated Capability Enhancement-2 (CE-
II) kill vehicle.
But then again, you want to move forward with the
Relativistic Kill Vehicle (RKV). The RKV will be a new and more
advanced system that could defend against simultaneous attack
from North Korea or Iran by 2025, as I understand it.
So explain to us what advantages we get from the RVK. Are
the plans moving forward technologically as you would like? Do
you foresee any engineering problems that would be difficult or
impossible to overcome?
Admiral Syring. Sir, thank you.
The plan for the RVK was started last year, and it was
started because of the concerns that we have had with the early
design of the EKV, which has evolved over the years with
different versions. But essentially, the prototype nature of
the design has remained, in terms of it was fielded very
rapidly and without a complete system engineering turn, which I
have testified on publicly in the past.
The RVK will allow us to take a step back with what we have
learned and design a kill vehicle that is modular, producible,
testable, before we flight test. I think that is very
important, to be able to have that modularity and test at the
component level and find issues on the ground before you find
them in flight, as we have experienced.
We need to get the reliability up of the overall GBI, and
the RVK will do that as we begin to field in 2020 with the pace
up to 2025 not yet defined. But if that is successful, we will
want to field that very rapidly back to the older Capability-
enhancement-1 (CE-I) fleet and some of the older CE-IIs, and
upgrade all 44 in a very short amount of time, hopefully.
Chairman Sessions. You have 44. We are going to 44. This
new kill vehicle, what can you tell us in this open session
about the advantages of making the 44 missile interceptors more
effective and valuable with this Redesigned Kill Vehicle.
Admiral Syring. Sir, to make the best use of the 44 that
will be in the ground by 2017, there are two fundamental issues
that improve our capability and capacity. One is the
reliability of the interceptor, and two is the discrimination
capability of the system. Those two fundamental precepts go
into defining the Northern Command commanders shot doctrine and
his use of interceptors to defeat more threats with more
complexity.
Chairman Sessions. Well, I will talk to you about that. I
think we have had closed hearings on that. I think you are on
the right track. I think that is a smart step. It will make
each one of those 44 interceptors more valuable.
What about the Multi-Object Kill Vehicle, the MOKV? You
said in your prepared statement, ultimately, these Multi-Object
Kill Vehicles will revolutionize our missile defense
architecture.
What kind of revolutionary advance would that be? How
confident are you that it can be done? Do we have, at this
point, the funding necessary to keep it on track?
Admiral Syring. Sir, let me take that in parts.
Several years ago, we explored technology and matured
technology to a point on the Multiple-Object Kill Vehicle, the
MKV, at the time, up to a point where the department decided
that the technology was not maturing fast enough. The
requirements were really not firm. For a whole bunch of reasons
that I am not familiar with at a detailed level, that was
terminated. Secretary Gates was eloquent in the BMDR on those
reasons that are available.
That said, ultimately, we want to be able to get Multiple
Kill Vehicles into a complex discrimination scene to be able to
shoot less interceptors that can go after multiple lethal
objects. That is what the MKV, MOKV, can bring to us.
Now, sir, we have asked for money in this year's budget to
ramp that effort up. It is not a program yet. We have requested
money to get us down the path of concept development and to
revisit the technology and to understand where that technology
is today, and then come back with a program plan on how best to
achieve that.
But I can assure you, sir, it will be done independently,
in terms of not concurrently with what is going on with the
RVK. The RVK will, certainly, inform our assessment of the
feasibility of an MOKV, but it is not a new development effort
at this point. I would characterize it as a concept development
effort with us doing a lot of work this year to define that
better.
Chairman Sessions. Well, thank you. The way I understand
this, you are talking about having a system that can identify
more accurately the nontargets instead of junk, going after
junk, having multiple kill vehicles on one rocket launch
vehicle, and be more effective. So it will multiply the
capabilities of the interceptors that we have.
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir.
Chairman Sessions. Senator Donnelly?
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to all
the witnesses.
Admiral Syring, you testified before other committees on
this particular topic I am going to ask you about, but for the
public record of this committee, does our current ground-based
missile defense system cover all the United States, including
the East Coast, against potential threats from North Korea and
Iran?
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir.
Senator Donnelly. You have also stated that the greater
priority for investment is improving your sensors, your
discrimination capabilities, and the overall reliability of the
GMD system. Could you describe how this will address the
evolving threat?
Admiral Syring. The threat is from North Korea, and let me
just take North Korea first.
The threat from North Korea is, at least at the short-range
level, increasing in complexity. We have to assume that
technology at the short- and medium-range level will eventually
migrate to the longer range level.
So the complexity of the threat must be accounted for, and
the potential of that to increase, and we must be prepared for
that. That is the whole premise of the discrimination radar, to
be able to better defend against a more complex threat with
fewer interceptors.
Senator Donnelly. There has been some discussion regarding
Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA's) assessment of Iran's
Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability. Are you
familiar with this assessment? Can you clarify a little bit for
us?
Admiral Syring. Thank you for the opportunity to clarify
what I said at the hearing last week.
The DIA's assessment is that Iran is capable of flight
testing an ICBM in 2015. There is not a likelihood expressed
with that assessment. Any future assessment, I will leave to
DIA as they evaluate that this year.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
Secretary McKeon and General Mann, what is the department's
plan for responding to the high demand for THAAD and Patriot
systems? Are there options you are looking at to increase the
coverage or flexibility of these systems?
Mr. McKeon. Senator Donnelly, as you are aware, we have a
lot of stress on the Patriot force, and we have more demand
from the COCOMs for Patriot battalions than we have in the
Army.
We are working on a modernization on the Patriot, which
will effectively allow them to deploy without the headquarters
unit, which will allow us to have more units able to deploy. We
will be able to significantly increase the number of deployable
battalions. So that modernization program is going on over the
next several years.
General Mann. Yes, Senator. In addition to what the
Secretary has also shared, as you know, there is a holistic
review that is taking place. There are a lot of different
studies that are underway, led by the Joint staff, looking at
how we address an evolving threat.
Quite frankly, it goes beyond just the number of active
defense platforms, whether Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
ships, or Patriot, or Terminal High Attitutude Area Defense
(THAAD). We really need to take a broader look at it, at the
dilemma, and really try to leverage, whether cyber, electronic
warfare, attack operations, where instead of waiting until
after the missile is shot, go after the archer, as Admiral
Gortney likes to say. So that is one of the things that we are
looking at.
Also, we are looking at nonkinetic applications, like
directed energy. A lot of applications, a lot of promise in
those technologies. They are still being developed. MDA is
looking at some of that directed energy and where it could be
applied against ballistic missiles.
In the Army, we are looking at how we can use directed
energy. We have had a lot of very, very successful tests
against mortars and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and how
can we utilize directed energy and also our indirect fire
protection capability to address the cruise missile threat.
So there are a lot of modernization efforts. But also, we
need to look more holistically versus just the number of
platforms you put out there.
Senator Donnelly. Okay.
I guess, Dr. Gilmore, this would be a follow-up to that
question, which is in your prepared statement, you expressed
concerns with the amount and quality of training that our
soldiers are getting on THAAD and on Patriot.
Could you elaborate a little bit on this? Are there ways
that this committee can help solve that problem?
General Mann, if you would also kick in on this.
Mr. Gilmore. It all comes down to resources. There are a
finite number of resources, in terms of training capability,
training aids, simulators. The Army has a plan to improve those
training aids and training systems for both THAAD and Patriot
over the long run.
But as the other members of the panel have testified, there
is a great deal of demand for the use of these assets, and
there is a large number of deployments that are ongoing. So the
pace of training in what we have seen in tests isn't keeping up
with the demand and isn't keeping up with the increasing
complexity of the capabilities of the system as they are
modernizing. That is true, in particular, of Patriot.
So I think it is a matter of resources. In a resource-
constrained environment, Admiral Syring and the Services have
to make hard judgments. If there are high demands for deploying
these systems and having a larger number of systems, it is
possible that some of the training can be given--
Senator Donnelly. General, I'm about out of time, if you
want to kick in for a few seconds?
General Mann. Yes. First of all, I just want to make sure
that I assure this committee that our soldiers are properly
prepared to execute operations. Naturally, it would be great to
have a test battalion capability that we have had in the past.
But because of the demand for this capability, we have had to
use that test battalion to meet operational requirements. So I
just want to make that very clear to the committee.
We are looking at training aids and devices that we can use
to help with the training and getting after that. We continue
to raise the level of difficulty with our testing and our
exercises, and continue to push the envelope in terms of
presenting a challenging scenario for our soldiers to get
after.
This goes back to my earlier comments about the importance
of sequestration. I don't want to belabor the point, but when
you are looking at the effects of sequestration, not only does
it have an impact on the readiness, which we are talking about,
but on how we are able to address some of these evolving
threats that are out there with new technologies. That is the
reason why we are very, very concerned.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Sessions. Senator Fischer?
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
gentlemen, for being here today.
Admiral, as we look at the threats out there, what benefits
do you see if we would deploy the Sea-based X-band Radar (SBX)
to the East Coast, given the threats that we are looking at
with Iran, especially in 2020 into 2025? Wouldn't additional
sensor capabilities be beneficial, even necessary?
Admiral Syring. Thank you for your question, ma'am.
Let me start with the last. Yes, additional sensor
capabilities are not just nice to have but will be necessary
beyond what we have asked for in this budget.
Second, SBX is fulfilling a very important role today in
the Pacific, with all the testing that we do and for a surge
capability that we provided to the Northern Command commander
when the situation arises.
That is the importance, ma'am, of what we are doing with
the continued request of the long-range radar in Alaska, some
thinking about additional sensor capability in Hawaii.
I think, in that priority order, when those are complete,
you will see us offer the option to the Northern Command
commander to move SBX to the East Coast. That will be his
decision, and it will be predicated on the ability to do our
testing in the Pacific, giving comfort to him that he is
covered in an operation, if he needs the platform.
I think we have it right, in terms of the priority of that
order, in terms of North Korea certainly, as the DIA has said,
can flight test at any time. We are focused on that assessment
and that very real threat today in the Pacific.
Senator Fischer. If you would, though, be looking at the
possibility of deploying it to the East Coast, how much lead
time would you need for that?
Admiral Syring. The approvals would have to happen, and it
would be months, not years.
Senator Fischer. Have you broached the topic at all with
NORTHCOM command?
Admiral Syring. Not on a formal level, in any way.
Senator Fischer. Do you know how it would be paid for and
who would man it?
Admiral Syring. The request this year is roughly $70
million a year for the limited test support that it provides
today in the underway time. I assume we would assess that
budget adequacy for the future and the operational need on the
East Coast.
Senator Fischer. Where you would say it would take months,
not years, to have this completed, are you comfortable with
that in assessing the threats that are before us?
Admiral Syring. Yes, ma'am. I am comfortable with what I
understand, in terms of where Iran is today and the development
of their ICBM technology and that threat.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Mr. McKeon, has the department looked at any policy, at
improving the sensor capabilities, as we look to the growing
threats from Iran?
Mr. McKeon. Well, Senator, as Admiral Syring just said, the
SBX in the Atlantic would be an option down the line, once we
get our long-range discrimination radar in place in Alaska to
face the North Korean threat. That is the focus right now,
improving our sensor capability against North Korea.
Senator Fischer. Do you agree that we would have plenty of
lead time with the threats from Iran that we are going to be
facing I think in the not too far future?
Mr. McKeon. Yes, I believe so. Our current system is still
adequate to deal with the current Iranian threat and how we
expect it to evolve in the next several years.
Senator Fischer. Is the department, though, taking any
formal policy discussions on this?
Mr. McKeon. We have not had that at my level. If somebody
has at a lower level, it hasn't bubbled up to me. I can double
check for you, Senator, but I don't think we have taken a
formal policy review of this question.
Admiral Syring. If I may, sir, there is an extensive sensor
angle of attack (AOA) that the department is conducting. It is
looking at all sensor options for many different applications,
but missile defense is part of that. It, certainly, will
account for our need on the East Coast in the future.
I would also add, if I can, that the work we have done with
integrated data terminal in Fort Drum, the System Data Terminal
(IDT) in Fort Drum that will come online in 2017, helps us a
lot with the Iranian threat today. I'm very comfortable and the
warfighter is very comfortable with that increasing capability
that will be online here.
Senator Fischer. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Sessions. Thank you.
Senator King?
Senator King. Gentlemen, you may have heard that there is
an idea kicking around here to end-run the Budget Control Act
and the sequester by pumping up the Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO) funds.
Have you done any analysis of how that would actually work
and where that money would go within the department? Would that
help with your issues? Talk to me about this idea.
Mr. McKeon. Senator King, I don't know that we have done a
formal analysis. That would probably be the comptroller who
would be looking at that. In terms of Admiral Syring's budget,
there is not any money requested in the OCO. It is all in the
base. So I'm not sure it would make much of a difference for
missile defense.
Senator King. My understanding of this idea is just to send
a bunch of OCO money to the Pentagon and say, do with it what
you will. I may be incorrect.
Is that the way you are hearing it?
Chairman Sessions. That has some truth to it. [Laughter.]
Not completely so.
Senator King. All right, I don't know the details, but my
question is, if there was an additional $50 billion of OCO
money, would it end up with you? Perhaps you just don't know at
this point, because we don't know the details of what this
proposal looks like.
Admiral Syring. Sir, I don't know. I don't know the
mechanics of that.
Senator King. Okay.
General Mann. Senator, if I could just add, though, because
I think there has been discussion about the President's budget
versus the House version of what you are alluding to. I can
just say that it would be very, very important to really look
at the base versus OCO. Because of predictability and making
sure that our programs are stable over years versus episodic
rises in the budget and falling off the next year, we would be
recommending that the base be looked at.
Senator King. That is a very important point. In other
words, a one-time OCO infusion doesn't necessarily--in fact,
given your sort of by definition long-range program, it would
not be necessarily all that helpful. That is your testimony?
General Mann. Obviously, we would be thankful for any
additional resources that we would be given, but where you
place them, again, I think placing them in the base would be a
lot more advantageous to our programs.
Senator King. Thank you. There are many of us trying to
find a way to do that.
How much does one GBI missile with kill vehicle cost?
Admiral Syring. The budget number today, in today's costs,
we don't have any requested this year, Senator. The request for
additional GBI starts out in 2018. The budget number is $75
million each, buying two per year.
Senator King. That leads me to my next question. You
mentioned directed energy. It seems to me that is a very
promising development, because the cost of each missile, if you
will, or railgun would be in the dollars instead of millions
dollars. Is that part of your calculus?
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir. We are requesting this year an
increase in directed energy funding, which is detailed in the
budget that we have submitted for continued technology
maturation, and then demonstration of a down-select of a
technology by 2018, and then a demonstration by 2020 of a low-
power directed energy platform.
Senator King. Directed energy wouldn't work at the top, at
the apogee. Where would it come into play? On the downward
slope or on the upward slope?
Admiral Syring. So two applications, sir, in terms of how
we view directed energy. There are other parts of the Ballistic
Missile Defense System (BMDS) that it will help with, and I
will just leave it at that, in an unclassified setting.
Senator King. Thank you.
Admiral Syring. But there is no doubt a boost phase
intercept concept that we pursued with airborne laser in the
last decade, that the technology that I am working on today
with electric lasers, solid-state lasers, would build upon that
success in a different technology.
Senator King. Would sequestration impact that budget for
this development of this directed energy program?
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir. It would impact everything in
terms of the numbers that are being talked about. I cannot get
all of that budget reduction out of just the new start
programs, which are critically important. There are other parts
of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) budget that we would have
to go to maintain the commitment of 44 GBIs by 2017, and our
European commitment as well.
So, no doubt, directed energy would be impacted.
Senator King. That would be pennywise and pound foolish, in
my view.
To what extent is this whole program reliant on satellite
information?
Admiral Syring. I will keep it unclassified, sir.
Senator King. To the extent you can.
Admiral Syring. The Overhead Persistent Infrared assets,
specifically the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR)
program, that brings Defense Support Program (DSP) and the Low
Earth Orbit (LEO) and Highly Elipitical Earth Orbits (HEO)
satellites, provide the initial detection of the lunch at the
areas that we are interested in.
Senator King. So the persistence and vulnerability or lack
thereof of our satellite assets is an important part of this
whole strategy?
Admiral Syring. Absolutely.
Senator King. Because we have had testimony on that subject
as well. I think that is something we need to pay close
attention to, in terms of where we go in our satellite
strategy.
Admiral Syring. I would agree.
Senator King. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Sessions. Senator King, I think it is still
incumbent on the Congress, when we appropriate money for the
Defense Department Overseas Contingency Operating and base
budget, to set forth where those monies are going to be spent.
So we have to pay real attention to that in our authorizing and
Appropriations Committee. I think the numbers that they have
asked for, for this program, at the President's budget, we
ought to try to achieve that.
I think there will be a way to do that, but I appreciate
your concern. It is worth talking about.
Senator Sullivan, we are glad to have you on the committee.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Sessions. You bring the Alaska perspective.
Senator Sullivan. Yes. As a matter fact, I was going to
talk a little bit about that to begin with.
Senator Donnelly. We are stunned to hear that, Senator
Sullivan. [Laughter.]
Senator Sullivan. No rolling of the eyes, gentlemen.
[Laughter.]
Gentlemen, first, thank you for your service. I really,
really appreciate it. I was looking at everybody's bio and it
is just decades of service to our country. So I am very
appreciative of that.
I am going to start out a little bit, and I think this is
important only for my constituents to hear but for the
Congress, the American people. You may have seen the Secretary
of Defense in his confirmation hearing was very focused after
an exchange he had with me on agreeing with the famous quote
from Billy Mitchell, the father of the U.S. Air Force, that
Alaska was the most strategic location in the world.
Can you just give me a very quick sense, because I know you
can probably go on forever, but you are free to use
superlatives, just how important in terms of location Alaska is
with regard to the country's missile defense?
General Mann. I will go ahead and start.
First of all, Senator, I am a big fan of those missile
defenders you have up there that provide 24/7 coverage, those
National Guardsmen, full-time National Guardsmen. But its
location on the Earth, its proximity to North Korea and to the
polls, I think is critically important.
So from a strategic homeland defense standpoint, it is
critical, where it is located.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Admiral?
Admiral Syring. From a material developer, technology
standpoint, in terms of the location of Alaska, there is a
reason that we are there with the GBIs at Fort Greely. There is
a reason that I am working with the NORTHCOM commander and
STRATCOM commander on putting another radar in Alaska, because
of that strategic importance to the threat from North Korea.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you.
I do want to talk about the strategic threat and follow up
on Senator Fischer's concerns.
I am sure you have seen both classified and even public
reports that have come out recently about both the strategic
threats from North Korea, from Iran. Johns Hopkins had a report
recently that, by 2020, North Korea could have as many as 100
nuclear weapons.
Given the concerns that we are now seeing with regard to
Iran and the negotiations that some of us have a lot of
concerns about, are we in danger of falling behind the evolving
North Korean or even Iranian ICBM threat, nuclear threat? What
would falling behind mean for cities like Anchorage or L.A. or
New York?
Admiral Syring?
Admiral Syring. Sir, let me take it.
The Secretary's announcement back in 2013 to increase GBIs
from 30 to 44 was in direct response to the escalation that we
see in North Korea.
Senator Sullivan. Okay.
Admiral Syring. Numbers matter in terms of what that was
able to provide in a very short amount time.
We see North Korea and Iran continuing to progress.
Senator Sullivan. Right.
Admiral Syring. In terms of not just the numbers of ICBMs
they may have, but the complexity of what those threats may
represent to us. That is why the budget request this year is so
important, that we get the radar built and are able to stay
ahead of the threat in terms of its complexity, and make the
best and most efficient use of the 44 that we have in the
ground.
Senator Sullivan. So of course, we appreciate the 44 and
think that is a good idea. If we see the threat continuing,
though, is there capacity? Do you think we could possibly need
at Fort Greely beyond the 44? Will we need it? Let's assume
this threat gets beyond what we are anticipating today in 5
years.
Admiral Syring. The capacity, I will call it surge
capacity, the extra capacity in Fort Greely does exist.
Senator Sullivan. Okay.
Admiral Syring. That would be assessed on how we see the
numbers, in terms of threats from North Korea progressing.
Certainly, that would be an option available to the Secretary
of Defense, to use that capability. That option would be, I
think, weighed in terms of how those would be used versus
future discrimination radar to the East Coast as well, in terms
of how Iran may progress, and the complexity of that threat as
well.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. You are talking radar. I do want to
focus for a minute on the Long Range Discrimination Radar
(LRDR) program.
Can you give us just an update on the proposal, when the
decision on the location will be made? Who actually makes that
decision? Is that MDA? Is that contractors? What are the
tradeoffs between the two different Alaska locations you are
looking at?
Admiral Syring. First, on the program, we have received
proposals from the contractors, and our plan is to award by the
end of this fiscal year.
Senator Sullivan. Great.
Admiral Syring. That said, we do need a location decision
and we are working closely with NORTHCOM and STRATCOM on that
location. Since I am the material developer, I need their
warfighter input on the best location for performance.
Certainly, cost and schedule play to that as well.
Senator Sullivan. Okay.
I am glad you mentioned you are working because you know
one of the things in Alaska, we are kind of at the seams. We
are very important militarily but we are at the seams of
NORTHCOM, STRATCOM, PACOM, EUCOM. I mean, we kind of fall into
all those different areas.
Let's assume, if there were a location chosen at Clear,
what is the power usage that we would be looking at with regard
to that kind of significant radar system?
There is a coal facility being shut down. A lot of us are
questioning why that was happening, whether it was strategic or
whether it was some kind of clean air initiative that I didn't
think it belonged in the DOD strategic outlook.
What would be the kind of power generation required for
that kind of radar system? Should we be looking at shutting
down power generation in that part of Alaska when we might need
a surge of power generation that is obviously not happening at
Clear right now?
Admiral Syring. Sir, in the interest of competition
sensitivities with the ongoing competition on the radar today,
I would like to take that to a closed session.
Senator Sullivan. Sure. Again, I am not at all trying to
get involved in one way or the other, in terms of location. It
is just a question. You probably know there was a GAO study
that was requested on that.
Admiral Syring. Yes, I do. I would be happy to share my
thoughts with you privately on that.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Mann. Senator, one thing, you asked about the
decision, where it is going to be made. I can tell you that MDA
and STRATCOM and NORTHCOM are working very, very closely
together and will provide a recommendation to the department.
So I am sure that at very, very high levels, that is where
the decision is going to be made.
Senator Sullivan. Great. That is expected soon?
Admiral Syring. Sir, within the next several months.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Sessions. Admiral Syring, just briefly, first, I
believe the money you requested is appropriate, and I don't
mean to suggest otherwise. But I asked you some questions
earlier about, could we see savings as technology matures? I
thought it was some good news, colleagues.
Maybe you can give us some expectations as developments of
these systems go forward. The per copy price isn't going to
continue to go up, but might actually drop some.
Thank you for your focus on cost. It is important.
Admiral Syring. Sir, it is the agency's focus, and they
embrace it every day. It is a matter of getting the results
that we are after.
I think this is a good news story on where we believe,
after evaluating three of the contractors' proposals that
ultimately we decided to use as a team in terms of how we are
structured, with the government as the design authority with
support from the three major contractors.
Chairman Sessions. What project is this you are talking
about?
Admiral Syring. All the prices were very----
Chairman Sessions. What project is this?
Admiral Syring. This is for the new kill vehicle.
Chairman Sessions. The new kill vehicle.
Admiral Syring. The Redesigned Kill Vehicle. Our price
objective would be in the neighborhood of $15 million for the
new kill vehicle. I think that is achievable. I know that is
achievable. That would be a huge savings over what we pay
today, which is upwards of $35 million a kill vehicle.
Chairman Sessions. It will be a considerably improved
vehicle, too, right?
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir, because we have given the team
the runway and the space to system engineer it with the right
amount of time and the right effort from the beginning.
Chairman Sessions. General Mann, have you seen any ideas of
that kind, Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC) or others,
that save money?
General Mann. We continue to look at directed energy, and I
think, like Admiral Syring was saying, that has a lot of
promise. We have a high-energy laser mobile demonstrator that
has been very, very effective against 60 mm mortars and UAVs.
It also has the ability capability of the tracking beyond 30
klicks, 30 km.
We think it has a lot of promise. Right now, it is at the
10 kW level. We expect by 2017 to have it up to the 50 kW,
giving us the capability to address cruise missiles more
effectively.
As far as from a cost savings, when you are able to use
directed energy or something like that versus an interceptor,
there is a significant cost savings. So we are very encouraged
by a lot of our tests.
Chairman Sessions. Well, good. I remember, after much
concern, we did not advance with the airborne laser concept,
but it looks like we're coming forward with some new ideas that
are more plausible.
Admiral Syring, do you want to comment on that?
Admiral Syring. Sir, I would say that and I would say that
Dr. Gilmore's organization has been very helpful in helping us
strive for alternatives to reduce the cost of testing, in
targets and test layout. We have had a close relationship on
that. I have to say, it is across the department, in terms of
focus on that.
Chairman Sessions. Good. That is good news.
We are going to have a vote at 4:45. Any other questions?
Senator King. Just a quick question. Could you give us an
update on the status of the Environmental Impact Statement's
(EISs) for the ground-based sites, U.S.-based?
Admiral Syring. Senator King, thank you. There are four
sites that are being evaluated, one in Maine, one in Ohio, one
in Michigan, and one in New York. Those sites are well-known.
That activity has progressed very well. We are going to
need another season this summer for refinement of the analysis
that we took last summer, and we will go out with a draft by
the end of the year for public comment. I think you will see us
get that through the department for publication in the 2016
timeframe.
Senator King. If you could find some excuse, I would urge
you to come to Maine this summer.
Admiral Syring. Maine is beautiful in the summertime.
Senator King. Yes, sir.
Senator Donnelly. Does that include the entire committee,
Mr. King?
Senator King. An inspection trip, yes, sir.
Senator Donnelly. I wanted to ask, is it your priority to
fix the problems in the GMD system, and to demonstrate those
fixes in realistic intercept tests before we build or deploy
any additional interceptors?
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir. That is the premise of the entire
test plan that I have laid through the Future Years Defense
Program (FYDP).
Senator Donnelly. Let me ask just one other one, which is
the Aegis Ashore site in Poland is expected to be completed by
the end of 2018.
Is Poland asking for additional capabilities?
Mr. McKeon. Senator Donnelly, they have talked to us, not
about additional capabilities along the lines of Aegis Ashore,
but they have talked to us about Patriots.
They are investing in a big program, a big buy upwards of
$10 billion in integrated air and missile defense, and our
Patriots are one of the competitors for that, and they are
going to be making that decision in the near future. We have
been talking to them very actively.
What we have said to them about their request for Patriots
is, as was discussed earlier with you, we don't have a lot of
spares in the inventory, but we have talked to them about
having some exercises and occasional rotations of Patriots into
Poland. In fact, there is an exercise going on this month in
Poland with the Patriot unit.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Sessions. Senator Sullivan?
Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chairman, I just have two quick
questions, follow up.
Gentlemen, with regard to Fort Greely and the requested
budget, it is a strategic location. As you know, it is also an
incredibly harsh environment. It is below zero there much of
the winter and pretty remote.
Are there areas that are not funded in the budget or budget
areas that you are focused on that focus on ground system
upgrades or even just capacity upgrades at Fort Greely?
Admiral Syring. Sir, when I talk about the need to
modernize the GMD system, the ground system is a big part of
that. That is included in this year's budget request.
Senator Sullivan. Right.
Admiral Syring. Vitally important to keep up the
reliability of the overall system.
Senator Sullivan. But I am talking about any facility
upgrades or anything that is in addition, or that you see that
is not in the budget right now.
General Mann. Quite honestly, Senator, I have some really
good news because the Army has made some significant
investments in the infrastructure there at Fort Greely. We are
about to open up later on this year a medical facility that is
much-needed up there.
So we are trying to bring them up, in terms of the quality-
of-life. It is a very, very harsh environment, and the Army is
really stepping up.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you, General.
Then finally, you have obviously a hugely important
mission. We are talking about an austere, in some ways, budget
environment. You have many priorities.
Can you just list what you would say are your top three or
four right now, so we have a real solid understanding of that?
Admiral Syring. The homeland defense system and everything
that is being asked for in this budget, and the need to get to
44 GBIs by 2017 is, certainly, my top priority and the
department's top priority for missile defense.
A close second is the regional capacity and capability of
the European phased adaptive approach and all the other
regional commitments that we have made around the world.
Senator Sullivan. Okay.
General?
General Mann. In addition to that, I look at it two ways. I
look at it from homeland defense standpoint, and Admiral Syring
has talked a lot about the different improvements to the EKV
system. But we are also looking at the regional, so Patriot
modernization is critically important. The battle command
system that we have for Patriot, where we get away from
stovepipes and we're able to bring our different systems using
one command-and-control system, a network, we're able to
optimize our components versus having to deploy, as the
Secretary was talking, a full Patriot battalion. Being able to
use a network where you can break it up into pieces, cover more
space more effectively and more cost informed is another thing
that we are getting after.
Then the third modernization effort that we would really
ask for the committee's support is the indirect fire protection
system. That will help us really get after the cruise missile
threats that are out there, as well as being part of the
networks.
So modernization efforts are critically important, upgrades
to the Patriot radar. This is a very, very old system, as you
well know, and heavily utilized.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Sessions. Thank you. That is very good. I
appreciate that.
We may submit further questions for the record.
Chairman Sessions. I believe that we have excellent
leadership in these programs, and we thank you for that. The
committee is ready to respond, if you have a new breakthrough
that could make us more effective and you need to alter the
course we are on. But in general, I believe the course that you
have laid out, Admiral Syring, General Mann, is a sound course.
Our committee has been supportive and will continue to be.
Anything further that you would like to add before we
break?
Thank you very much. We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
directed energy
1. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Syring and General Mann, in the House
of Representatives, I founded the first-ever Congressional Directed
Energy Caucus. I am a strong supporter of directed energy and remain a
strong supporter of directed energy applications for military purposes,
including missile defense. Can you provide an update to the committee
on what programs you are pursuing as it relates to directed energy and
missile defense?
Admiral Syring. Our vision is to shift the calculus of our
potential adversaries by introducing directed energy into the Ballistic
Missile Defense System (BMDS) architecture. This will revolutionize
missile defense, dramatically reducing, if not eliminating, the role of
interceptors.
Our long term goal is to use megawatt-class lasers on high
altitude; long endurance unmanned aerial vehicle platforms to destroy
intercontinental ballistic missiles in the boost phase at long standoff
ranges. To achieve this vision we must prove two key elements: laser
scaling to megawatt-class with high efficiency and excellent beam
quality; and demonstration of a high altitude, long endurance aircraft
to carry the laser and its beam pointing and control system.
Our President's Budget 2016 request funds a structured plan that
includes laser power scaling in the laboratory in parallel with
reducing the risk of integrating a laser system onto an airborne
platform and testing it in the field. The agency is pursuing two
promising laser technologies today: Combined fiber lasers (MIT Lincoln
Laboratory) and diode pumped alkali lasers (Lawrence Livermore). We are
demonstrating high electrical-to-optical efficiency with excellent beam
quality at incrementally increasing power levels in the laboratory.
Lincoln has demonstrated up to 34 kW, with a plan to reach 50 kW,
in a compact form factor, by 2018. Livermore has demonstrated 5 kW, and
is on track to demonstrate 10 kW by May of this year with a plan to
reach 120 kW by 2018. We are also monitoring the steady gains made by
industry both in laser power and packaging.
This year, we are bringing industry into the game by funding six
month study contracts with five prime integrators; Boeing, General
Atomics, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon, to define
concepts and assess the feasibility, schedule and cost of building and
testing an airborne laser. In fiscal year 2016, we will award a
contract to one of the five to integrate a laser into an aircraft and
``piggyback'' BMDS tests at the Pacific Missile Range Facility in 2020
to prove missile defense missions at lower power. In the 2025 time
frame, our goal is to integrate a compact, efficient, high power
(megawatt-class) laser into a high altitude, long endurance aircraft
capable of carrying that laser and destroying targets in the boost
phase.
General Mann. USASMDC/ARSTRAT manages the high energy laser (HEL)
program for the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research &
Technology). This program includes basic research, applied technology
development, and advanced technology demonstration through the High
Energy Laser Mobile Demonstrator (HEL MD) effort. The HEL MD integrates
the laser source, power, and thermal management subsystems for the
laser--a beam control subsystem that tracks and directs the laser
energy to the intended target--and a command and control subsystem
which interfaces with an external queuing radar. The HEL MD, using a
modified 10 kilowatt (kW) commercial laser, demonstrated the ability to
shoot down lightweight mortars and small unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) in 2013. Future demonstrations at more weapon-relevant power
levels (50-100 kW) will occur in fiscal years 2017-2022. These
configurations will demonstrate robust performance against rockets,
artillery, mortars, UAVs, and a subset of the cruise missile threat.
The demonstrations will provide valuable data to support decisions
regarding a future program of record for a laser weapon system that is
complementary to kinetic energy capabilities.
A laser weapon system for ballistic missile defense applications
will require significantly higher power levels, and we are working in
cooperation with the Missile Defense Agency to support their directed
energy development activities.
2. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Syring and General Mann, Iron Dome is
a program has been extremely successful (80 percent success rate) but
each Iron Dome Tamir missile that Israel fires--and usually two are
sent up to intercept each descending rocket--costs at least $50,000.
Are we pursuing anything similar to what Israel has developed in the
form of their directed energy Iron Beam system to protect against
short-range rockets, artillery shells, and mortar bombs?
Admiral Syring. The Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) efforts are
focused on activities to defend the U.S. homeland, deployed forces, and
international Allies and friends from ballistic missile threats. MDA is
not focused on defense against shorter-range rockets and mortars. MDA
is investing in directed energy technology, but only from a ballistic
missile defense perspective. I defer to the U.S. Army on Department of
Defense investments to address these shorter-range threats.
General Mann. Yes, USASMDC/ARSTRAT is developing and demonstrating
laser weapon capabilities to complement kinetic energy capabilities in
countering rockets, artillery, mortars, unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs), and cruise missiles. This work is done on behalf of the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research & Technology). The
cornerstone of our high energy laser program is the High Energy Laser
Mobile Demonstrator (HEL MD) effort. The HEL MD, using a modified 10
kilowatt (kW) commercial laser, demonstrated the ability to shoot down
lightweight mortars and small unmanned aerial vehicles in late 2013.
Future demonstrations at more weapon-relevant power levels (50-100 kW)
will occur in fiscal years 2017-2022. These configurations are expected
to demonstrate robust performance against rockets, artillery, mortars,
UAVs, and a subset of the cruise missile threat.
Iron Dome Co-Production
3. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Syring, in August 2013, I sent a
letter to you and then-Secretary Hagel voicing support for co-
production of Iron Dome. I later secured an amendment in the Fiscal
Year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) authorizing $15
million for the production of the Iron Dome short-range rocket defense
system in the United States. To date, the United States has provided
nearly a billion dollars to Israel for Iron Dome batteries,
interceptors, and general maintenance. Despite these significant
investments, the United States had not shared in production of this
missile defense system until now. What kind of progress has been made
on Iron Dome co-production?
Admiral Syring. The United States and Israel signed the Iron Dome
Procurement Agreement in March 2014. This agreement provides U.S.
fiscal year (FY) 2013-2015 funding to procure Iron Dome components for
the defense of Israel.
The agreement includes spending requirements for Israel to obligate
over $260 million (M) to U.S. suppliers from DOD funding provided in
fiscal years 2014 and 2015. Thus far, contracts for co-production in
the U.S. have been awarded to Raytheon ($149.3 million) and Elta-North
America ($12.6 million). I anticipate Israel will reach the $260
million goal.
As the prime U.S. subcontractor to Israeli industry (Rafael),
Raytheon is on track executing the current co-production program,
providing Iron Dome component deliveries through the end of fiscal year
2018. Twenty of twenty-three Raytheon purchase orders were awarded and
the remaining orders are estimated to be finalized by the end of April
2015.
Overall, twenty-six suppliers located in twenty different states
are currently involved with U.S. co-production of Iron Dome
subcomponents. An additional procurement contract for Tamir missile
hardware is expected to fully exercise all funding through fiscal year
2015. The terms of this contract have not been finalized. U.S. delivery
timeline for additional quantities will be finalized with an expected
contract award between Rafael and Raytheon by December 2015.
Additionally, Raytheon has received all technical data packages
required for U.S. co-production of Iron Dome components. The DOD
closely monitors the program and receives regular Industry and Israel
Missile Defense Organization updates on program status.
4. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Syring, given the near-billion-dollars
the United States has provided in assistance for this critical system,
do you foresee a path toward eventual full production, as opposed to
component production, in the United States to support American jobs?
Admiral Syring. U.S. suppliers are on track to produce 70 percent
of Iron Dome components for Israel security purposes. For the U.S. to
produce, integrate and test the remaining 30 percent of components,
additional factors will need to be addressed to include security,
transportation, special equipment, and transfer of technical data
packages. The non-recurring engineering / recurring engineering cost to
develop the U.S. production capability to co-produce the Tamir
Interceptor is estimated at over $175 million. In addition to the
established costs, facilities capable of producing, integrating and
testing the All-Up-Round in the U.S will be necessary. Depending on the
total future procurement, this option may not be cost-effective.
5. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Syring, do you envision co-production
for other systems such as David's Sling?
Admiral Syring. The Department of Defense is considering Israel's
request for full-rate production of the David's Sling Weapon System and
Arrow-3 interceptors and coordinating a consolidated position.
Electronic Warfare
6. Senator Heinrich. Secretary McKeon, given the complexity and
difficulty of missile defense, the enormous costs of each launch, and
the vast number of incoming missiles that an adversary could
potentially overwhelm U.S. missile defense systems, what steps are
being taken in the realm of ``left of launch'' technologies such as
electronic warfare and cyber that could blind, deceive, or burn enemy's
sensors before they launch?
Mr. McKeon. DOD continues to explore a wide range of technologies
to defeat missiles in all phases of flight and ``left of launch.''
Ballistic missile defense systems will remain a vital component of
protecting our territory and forces from ballistic missile attack, and
we will continue to pursue technologies to enhance our capabilities to
defend against such threats.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2016 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 15, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
THE NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION PLANS AND PROGRAMS
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jeff
Sessions (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Sessions, Fischer,
Graham, Donnelly, King, and Heinrich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS, CHAIRMAN
Senator Sessions. Good afternoon. Our subcommittee will
come to order.
I thank all of you for being here, and we look forward to
our good meeting.
The Strategic Forces Subcommittee will receive testimony on
the NNSA [National Nuclear Security Administration's] plans and
programs for fiscal year 2016 and the Future Years Defense
Program.
We are pleased to have NNSA [National Nuclear Security
Administration] Administrator Frank Klotz and his colleagues:
Dr. Donald Cook for defense programs; Anne Harrington, Deputy
for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation; and Admiral John
Richardson, Director of the Office of Naval Reactors. We are
also pleased to have with us Mr. David Trimble, Director of
Natural Resources and Environment for the GAO [Government
Accountability Office].
As I stated on March 4th at that hearing with our Nuclear
Weapons Council Chairman, Mr. Frank Kendall, the President's
fiscal year 2016 budget request and out-year spending profiles
represent a good faith effort given our financial difficulties,
an effort that can help us modernize the nuclear triad and
address the aging Department of Energy [DOE] nuclear weapons
infrastructure problems.
The President's budget request for nuclear weapons
activities, $8.9 billion, meets the funding target established
during the 2010 New START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty]
ratification process.
Administrator Klotz, I am hopeful that though funding
constraints and in some cases poor management over the years
have delayed NNSA modernization plans, the course you have
charted over the next 2 decades I think is sound. And I want to
congratulate you on certain cost containment measures. Your
creative building review, created some using modular designs,
has saved as much as $3 billion on two major buildings. So that
is the kind of smart management we like to celebrate. So I
wanted to thank you for that.
So moving forward, I think that we are on a path to achieve
the requirements we have for our Nation rather than, as we have
so often been doing in recent years, just pushing things out
further and further into the future.
Based on the geopolitical situation today and as far as I
can see into the future, I believe you will have the necessary
congressional support. We want you to be frugal, all of you,
and manage well, but I hope today that you can assure me that
NNSA will be able to execute without huge cost overruns or
delays.
Looking ahead, it is apparent that future costs will be
significant. NNSA's estimates for three planned interoperable
warheads in the 2020-2040 timeframe have grown substantially.
So it raises the question, is there more cost-effective design
and production processes that can help contain these costs in
the future.
Finally, I would note that this is the first time the
Strategic Forces Subcommittee will review defense nuclear
nonproliferation programs, Ms. Harrington. While this work
continues to receive less attention maybe than in the past and
our activities with weapons today, NNSA's activities to
prevent, counter, and especially respond to the threat of
nuclear proliferation and terrorism is extremely important.
With that, Ranking Member Donnelly, I will turn it over to
you for comments and thank you for your strong and effective
contributions to this subcommittee.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOE DONNELLY
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
Senator Sessions for arranging this hearing and today's
witnesses for agreeing to take time from your schedules to
testify on a topic that is very important to the subcommittee.
The National Nuclear Security Administration is the busiest
it has ever been since it was created in 2000. It is
overhauling our entire stockpile while struggling to keep our
weapons scientists at the forefront to hedge against future
uncertainties. It is providing critical expertise on issues
related to negotiations on Iran's centrifuges and reactors. It
is servicing the Navy's nuclear fleet while designing a reactor
plan for the Ohio replacement submarine. Most of these efforts
are long-term with little room for slippage in milestones.
Four years ago, the NNSA was plagued with cost and schedule
overruns. My impression today is that the management team under
the leadership of Administrator Klotz, Madelyn Creedon, and all
of you seem to be making headway in getting everything back on
track. In that regard, I hope today's hearing will help us find
out more about what the NNSA is doing to rein in cost growth to
ensure the programs remain on track.
Let me again thank today's witnesses for coming, and we
look forward to your testimony.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator Donnelly.
I believe, Administrator Klotz and Mr. Trimble, you have
agree that you two would have opening statements, and please
commence, General Klotz.
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK G. KLOTZ, UNDER SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR
SECURITY, AND ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; ACCOMPANIED BY HON.
DONALD L. COOK, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS,
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY;
HON. ANNE M. HARRINGTON, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; AND ADM JOHN M.
RICHARDSON, USN, DIRECTOR, NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION AND OFFICE
OF NAVAL REACTORS, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Dr. Klotz. Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, and
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
present the President's fiscal year 2016 budget request for the
Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security
Administration.
I am pleased to be joined by my esteemed colleagues here
today that you have already introduced.
We have also provided the subcommittee a written statement
and respectfully request that it be submitted for the record.
Senator Sessions. It will be made a part of the record.
Dr. Klotz. Thank you, sir.
We value this committee's leadership in national security,
as well as its robust and abiding support for the mission and
the people of NNSA.
Our budget request, which comprises more than 40 percent of
the Department of Energy's budget, is $12.6 billion. This is an
increase of $1.2 billion, or 10.2 percent, over the fiscal year
2015 enacted level. This funding is extraordinarily important
to NNSA's missions to provide and maintain a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear weapons stockpile, to prevent, counter, and
respond to the threat of nuclear proliferation and terrorism,
and to support the capability of our nuclear-powered Navy to
project power and protect American and allied interests around
the world.
By supporting growth in each of our four appropriations
accounts, this budget represents the commitment by the
administration to NNSA's vital and enduring mission and to
NNSA's role in ensuring a strong national defense.
This mission is accomplished through the hard work and
innovative spirit of a highly talented workforce committed to
public service. To provide them the tools they need to carry
out their complex and challenging tasks both now and in the
future, we must continue to maintain and modernize our
scientific, technical, and engineering capabilities and
infrastructure. In doing so, we are mindful of our obligation
to continually improve our business practices and to be
responsible stewards of the resources that Congress and the
American people have entrusted to us.
To this end, NNSA continues to make progress on key
surveillance and life extension programs which directly support
the President's direction to maintain a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear arsenal. Funding at the fiscal year 2016
budget request level will ensure that these key life extension
programs stay on track.
For NNSA's important mission to reduce nuclear dangers, the
fiscal year 2016 budget request shifts funding for our
counterterrorism and emergency response missions to the defense
nuclear nonproliferation account in order to better align funds
across the spectrum of activities related to preventing,
countering, and responding to nuclear threats.
Additionally, the nuclear nonproliferation programs have
been realigned into four business lines that better reflect the
core competencies resident across that program.
And the request for naval reactors? mission provides
funding for three major initiatives, the Ohio-class reactor
plant system development, the land-based prototype refueling
overhaul, and the spent fuel handling recapitalization project
in Idaho.
For all of these missions, NNSA will continue driving
improvements in acquisition and program management practices
and policies and Federal oversight of the enterprise.
Those highlights are just a handful of the critical
national security work that this budget funds. However, if our
appropriation from Congress remains at the Budget Control Act
level for fiscal year 2016, NNSA's ability to meet our mission
requirements will be at risk. In developing the budget, NNSA
was directed to request the funds we need to accomplish the
missions we have been tasked to do. The fiscal year 2016 budget
request reflects this guidance. Any significant reduction to
the amount would disrupt the science, technology, and
engineering work taking place at our laboratories and plants,
work that underpins our National security and broader national
security missions.
Again, sir, I thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today.
[The prepared statements of Dr. Klotz and Admiral
Richardson follow:]
Prepared Statement of Lt. Gen. Frank G. Klotz, USAF (Ret)
Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to present the President's
Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 Budget Request for the Department of Energy's
(DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). We value this
Committee's leadership in national security, as well as its strong and
abiding support for the mission and people of the NNSA.
The President's Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request for NNSA, which
comprises more than 40 percent of the DOE's budget, is $12.6 billion,
up $1.2 billion or 10.2 percent over the fiscal year 2015 enacted
level. The NNSA has a unique and special responsibility for maintaining
a safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile for as long as
nuclear weapons exist; preventing, countering and responding to
evolving and emerging threats of nuclear proliferation and terrorism;
and, supporting the capability of our nuclear-powered Navy to project
power and protect American and Allied interests around the world. By
supporting growth in each of our four appropriations accounts, this
budget request represents a strong endorsement of NNSA's vital and
enduring mission, and is indicative of the Administration's unwavering
commitment to a strong national defense.
The NNSA's mission is accomplished through the hard work and
innovative spirit of a highly talented workforce committed to public
service. To provide them the tools they need to carry out their complex
and challenging task, both now and in the future, we must continue to
modernize our scientific, technical and engineering capabilities and
infrastructure. In doing so, we are mindful of our obligation to
continually improve our business practices and to be responsible
stewards of the resources that Congress and the American people have
entrusted to us. The NNSA took several significant steps toward this
objective during the past year.
NNSA's Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request reflects the close working
partnership between NNSA and the Department of Defense (DoD) in
providing for our Nation's nuclear deterrence capabilities and
modernizing the nuclear security enterprise. As in last year's Budget,
DoD is carrying a separate account in its Fiscal Year 2016 Budget
Request for the out years, fiscal year 2017 and beyond, which
identifies funds for NNSA's Weapons Activities and Naval Reactors. We
urge this Subcommittee's support for alignment of its appropriations
process and national defense or ``050'' allocations, including the
subcommittee 302(b) allocations, with the President's Budget. The
requested allocation supports NNSA and DoD priorities.
Tough decisions and trades in fiscal year 2016 have been made to
meet military commitments and nuclear security priorities. If the
request is not fully supported, modernization of our nuclear enterprise
and implementation of our long-term stockpile sustainment strategy
could be put at risk. The program we have proposed is highly integrated
and interdependent across the stockpile management, science and
infrastructure accounts.
Apart from the need for national defense allocation alignment, the
looming possibility of sequestration is a major threat to all NNSA
missions. The NNSA Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request exceeds the caps set
on national security spending in the Budget Control Act (BCA); but is
necessary to meet our national security commitments. Reduced funding
levels will place these commitments at risk. We have made some tough
resource decisions across the NNSA, but the Secretary of Energy and I
believe that our enduring missions are too vital to the Nation's
security to be further constrained by the current BCA spending caps.
Details of the Fiscal Year 2016 President's Budget Request for the
NNSA follow:
weapons activities appropriation
The Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request for the Weapons Activities
account is $8.8 billion, an increase of $666.6 million or 8.1 percent
over fiscal year 2015 enacted levels. It is comprised not only of the
Defense Programs portfolio, which is responsible for all aspects of
stockpile stewardship and management; but also the enterprise-wide
infrastructure sustainment activities managed by our Office of Safety,
Infrastructure and Operations, as well as our physical and
cybersecurity activities. It should be noted that in this budget
request we have moved NNSA's on-going emergency response and
counterterrorism and counterproliferation capabilities out of the
Weapons Activities account and into the Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation account. This action aligns activities for preventing,
countering and responding to global nuclear threats into a single
account.
Maintaining the Stockpile
Last year, we again successfully used science-based stockpile
stewardship to certify to the President that the American nuclear
weapons stockpile remains safe, secure, and effective--without the need
for underground nuclear testing. It is important to periodically remind
ourselves that we have been able to do this every year largely due to
the investments we have made and continue to make in state-of-the-art
diagnostic tools, high performance computing platforms, and modern
facilities staffed by extraordinarily talented scientists, engineers
and technicians.
For Directed Stockpile Work (DSW), the fiscal year 2016 request is
$3.2 billion, a $494.7 million increase over fiscal year 2015 enacted
levels, or about 18.4 percent. Approximately $133 million of this
increase reflects a restructuring of the accounts when compared to the
fiscal year 2015 budget request. These changes are discussed below.
With respect to the major life extension programs (LEP), we have
now passed the halfway mark in the production phase of the W76-1 LEP.
This LEP, which directly supports the Navy, is now on track and on
budget. Our fiscal year 2016 Request of $244.0 million will keep us on
track to complete production in fiscal year 2019.
We are also making significant progress in the engineering
development phase of the B61-12 LEP. The B61 is a gravity bomb
associated with Air Force long-range nuclear-capable bombers, as well
as dual-capable fighter aircraft. Working with the Air Force, we
successfully completed environmental flight tests on the F-15, F-16,
and B-2 aircraft on or ahead of schedule. The B61-12 LEP will enter
Phase 6.4 Production Engineering in 2016; and, with the $643.3 million
requested, we will remain on track to deliver the First Production Unit
(FPU) in fiscal year 2020.
Based on results from the ongoing surveillance of the nuclear
weapons stockpile performed by NNSA's laboratories and plants, the
Nuclear Weapons Council decided that it was prudent to expand the
planned W88 Alteration (ALT) 370 to now include replacement of the
conventional high explosive in the warhead. The budget request reflects
this decision and includes $220.2 million to support the FPU in fiscal
year 2020.
The budget request also includes $195.0 million to support the
Nuclear Weapons Council decision to accelerate by two years an LEP of
the W80 to serve as the warhead for the Air Force's Long Range Stand-
Off system (LRSO). FPU is now slated for 2025.
This budget request also supports our goal of dismantling all
weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by fiscal year 2022. In fact,
we have already dismantled more than 42 percent of these weapons in 38
percent of the time allotted. This funding will ensure that we stay on
track to meet our dismantlement commitment.
Within DSW, the budget request also includes $415.0 million for a
new ``Nuclear Materials Commodities'' subprogram to support the
investment needed in nuclear materials to maintain the viability of the
enduring stockpile. Included in this subprogram are Uranium
Sustainment, Plutonium Sustainment, and Tritium Sustainment which are
all crucial to sustain our stockpile, even as we move to lower levels
in our nuclear stockpile. Since last year, we have created and
empowered new program manager positions to oversee each of these
nuclear materials programs. Also included within DSW, is a subprogram
for Domestic Uranium Enrichment. Ensuring we have a domestic uranium
enrichment capability for national security needs is particularly
important in maintaining a domestic source of LEU to produce tritium
and for research reactor conversion program and eventually to produce
HEU for Naval Reactors fuel.
Consistent with the Consolidated and Further Continuing
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2015, activities formerly carried
out under Campaigns are now included under Research, Development, Test,
and Evaluation (RDT&E). The funding request for RDT&E is about $1.8
billion, essentially the same as the fiscal year 2015 enacted level.
This includes $623.0 million for the Advanced Simulation and Computing
(ASC) Program, an increase of $25.0 million for the Advanced Technology
Development and Mitigation (ATDM) subprogram that supports high
performance computing; $130.1 million for Advanced Manufacturing
Development, an increase of $22.9 million. This funding will support
work related to electronics-based arming, fusing, and firing, as well
as other technologies that require significant technical effort to
ensure production readiness for manufacturing technologies needed to
replace sunset technologies. We continue to develop and mature additive
manufacturing technologies that can provide significant cost avoidance
by reducing costs to prototype and manufacture tooling and certain
weapons components. These increases are largely offset by relatively
small decreases in the Science (-$22.5 million for a total request of
$389.6 million), Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield
Program (-$10.4 million for a total request of $502.5 million), and
Engineering (-$4.6 million for a total request of $131.4 million)
Programs.
The Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield program has
spearheaded ongoing improvements in both management and operational
efficiencies at NNSA's major high energy density (HED) facilities,
including the National Ignition Facility (NIF) at Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory (LLNL). As a result of these improvements, LLNL has
been able to increase the shot rate at NIF. NNSA recently completed a
10-year HED Science Strategic Plan to guide work in this important
field.
Partnering with the DOE Office of Science, NNSA continues to make
much needed investments in exascale computing. NNSA's ASC Program
provides leading edge, high-end modeling and simulation capabilities to
sustain and modernize the stockpile today and into the future. The
fiscal year 2016 Request includes $64 million for the ASC's Advanced
Technology Development and Mitigation subprogram to pursue long-term
simulation and computing goals relevant to the exascale computing
needed to support the broad national security missions of the NNSA.
Both the NNSA and DOE's Office of Science continue to collaborate with
the Office of Science providing $209 million towards the development of
capable exascale systems.
Defense Programs also supports the vitality of the broader National
Security Enterprise. An important aspect of this is investing in
Laboratory-, Site- and Plant-Directed Research and Development (LDRD).
Independent reviews have consistently affirmed the importance of the
program to the long-term vitality of the labs. LDRD provides basic
research funding to foster innovation and to attract and retain young
scientific and technical talent. Congressional support is essential to
sustaining this essential national capability.
Finally, another important accomplishment within Weapons Activities
in 2014 was the renewal of the Mutual Defense Agreement with the United
Kingdom. Since 1958, this enduring agreement has enabled mutually
beneficial exchange of nuclear expertise between the United States and
UK, contributing to a long and proud history of defense cooperation
between our two nations. In this case, the Administration and the
Congress worked closely together to achieve a shared goal. We are truly
grateful for your support.
Improving Safety, Operations and Infrastructure
In order to support all of these critical programmatic activities,
we are making important strides in recapitalizing our aging
infrastructure throughout the enterprise. In August 2014, DOE and NNSA
formally dedicated the new National Security Campus (NSC) in Kansas
City, Missouri. The former Kansas City Plant was relocated from the
Bannister Federal Complex, a 70-year-old facility, to the NSC with half
the footprint and a modern operating environment. The move was safely
and securely completed one month ahead of schedule and $10 million
under budget. The NSC manufactures or purchases 85 percent of the non-
nuclear components that make up our nuclear weapons, and thus plays a
major role in keeping the Nation's nuclear stockpile safe, secure and
effective.
The fiscal year 2016 request restructures many of the activities
formerly conducted under the Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities
(RTBF) into the Infrastructure and Safety program. This new program
will maintain, operate and modernize the NNSA general purpose
infrastructure in a safe, secure, and cost-effective manner.
Infrastructure and Safety efforts are organized around five elements--
Operations of Facilities; Safety Operations; Maintenance;
Recapitalization; and, Line Item Construction. Together, these elements
provide a comprehensive approach to arresting the declining state of
NNSA infrastructure. The fiscal year 2016 request for Infrastructure
and Safety is $1.5 billion and reflects an increase of $79.4 million
for comparable activities from the fiscal year 2015 enacted level. This
funding will allow NNSA to modernize and upgrade aging infrastructure
and address safety and programmatic risks.
We are developing a 10-year strategic plan that identifies the
activities NNSA is undertaking to arrest the declining state of NNSA
infrastructure, reduce Deferred Maintenance (DM), and dispose of excess
facilities. The major elements of the plan include improving
infrastructure decision-making with implementation of new, risk-
informed analytical methods to better evaluate the ability of an asset
to support program core capabilities; improving program management
tools through implementation of standardized and automated processes
and systems for scope, cost, and schedule management; accelerating
recapitalization and construction efforts to revitalize infrastructure
and make better use of the resources by strategically procuring common
systems and components used across the enterprise; and shrinking the
NNSA footprint by deactivating and disposing of excess facilities, with
increased focus on timely deactivation and on repurposing and reuse as
a strategy to avoid new construction. Within this 10-year plan, the
transferring of the old Kansas City Bannister Road facility to a
private developer to repurpose the site for local community use will
eliminate $250 million in DM. We recognize that these goals will not be
met quickly, and that arresting the declining state of NNSA
infrastructure will require steady commitment at all levels of the
organization over many years. We believe that the tools and processes
we are developing and implementing, along with sustained investment in
our infrastructure, will set NNSA on the right path to ensuring a
viable, safe, and effective nuclear security enterprise well into the
future.
The Infrastructure and Safety program addresses the needs of
program specific infrastructure, primarily the Uranium Processing
Facility (UPF) and the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement
(CMRR) project. RTBF provides a defined level of readiness and
capability through infrastructure investments and strategy development
that are dedicated to special nuclear material processing and inventory
management. The RTBF program accomplishes this mission by modernizing
stockpile stewardship and management infrastructure through capability
investments, strategic development, and line-item construction projects
for the sustainment or enhancement of capabilities. The fiscal year
2016 request is $1.1 billion, with a reduction of $1.4 billion, due to
the transfer of select activities to Infrastructure and Safety. For
comparability purposes, the fiscal year 2016 request for RTBF is
increased more than 50 percent to support a new source of high-purity
depleted uranium, to realign recapitalization of Defense Programs
capabilities through the Capabilities Based Investments (CBI), and to
increase funding for the UPF at Y-12 to $430.0 million and the CMRR
Project at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to $156.0 million.
Last year, NNSA successfully executed one of the largest and most
complex contract transitions in the history of the Department with the
award of a contract to Consolidated Nuclear Security to operate and
manage both the Pantex Plant and the Y-12 National Security Complex.
The consolidated contract was written to require efficiencies and
improved operations as a requirement for continued performance beyond
the initial five-year base period. This is a departure from other
management and operating contracts where efficiencies and effectiveness
are considered but are not mandatory.
Our Office of Secure Transportation (OST) provides safe, secure
movement of nuclear weapons, special nuclear material, and weapon
components to meet projected DOE, DoD, and other customer requirements.
It continues to modernize assets by extending the life of the
Safeguards Transporter and is currently looking at options for the next
generation transporter, the Mobile Guardian Transporter. To meet an
increasing workload, OST is planning a small increase in the number of
federal agents.
The primary mission of NNSA's Office of Defense Nuclear Security
(DNS) and the Chief Security Officer is to develop and implement sound
security programs to protect Special Nuclear Material (SNM), people,
information, and facilities throughout the nuclear security enterprise.
The NNSA's Defense Nuclear Security Fiscal Year 2016 request is $632.9
million. The request manages risk among important competing needs even
as NNSA continues to face the challenges associated with an aging
physical security infrastructure that must be effectively addressed in
the coming years. The request includes $13 million to initiate
installation of Argus at the Device Assembly Facility at the Nevada
National Security Site. Argus is the enterprise security system for
Category 1 SNM facilities that integrates access control, intrusion
detection, and video assessment of alarms to protect and control high-
consequence assets. DNS also has a prioritized list of smaller
infrastructure upgrade projects it will execute as General Plant
Projects within available O&M funding, for example, lighting systems
supporting perimeter camera assessment, replacement and upgrades to
Argus Field Processors, replacement of ported coax cables and buried
cable electronics that will extend lifecycles and delay total system
replacements. DNS initiated an Enterprise Vulnerability Assessment
process across the enterprise with a focus on standardizing how
vulnerability assessments are conducted and site protection strategies
are formulated.
The Information Technology and Cybersecurity fiscal year 2016
request is $157.6 million, a decrease of $22.1 million or about 12.3
percent from fiscal year 2015 enacted levels. The difference is
attributed to a one-time investment in fiscal year 2015 in the
Infrastructure Program to implement a more secure classified computing
environment. All activities related to the one-time increase were
completed. Information Technology and Cybersecurity supports the
nuclear security enterprise. This work includes continuous monitoring
and enterprise wireless and security technologies (i.e., identity,
credential, and access management) to help meet security challenges. In
fiscal year 2016, NNSA plans to complete the recapitalization of the
Enterprise Secure Network, modernize the Cybersecurity infrastructure,
implement the Identity Control and Access Management project at NNSA
Headquarters and site elements, and implement and coordinate all
Committee on National Security Systems and Public Key Infrastructure
capabilities. In addition, we will leverage the NNSA Network Vision
framework to increase the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of NNSA
Information Technology (IT) services.
defense nuclear nonproliferation appropriation
In fiscal year 2016, we have realigned the NNSA programs that
continue to support the President's Prague Agenda to address the threat
of nuclear proliferation and terrorism into the Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation (DNN) appropriation. NNSA's activities work across the
spectrum to prevent, counter and respond to the threat of nuclear and
radiological proliferation and terrorism. We work to prevent the
acquisition of nuclear or radiological materials, technology, and
expertise; we actively counter efforts to develop the materials and
scientific knowledge needed to construct a nuclear threat device; and
we are poised to respond to terrorist acts by searching for and
rendering safe any such devices.
The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) account request is $1.9
billion, an increase of $325 million or about 20.1 percent from fiscal
year 2015 enacted levels. At first glance, this figure looks like a
very big increase but the number actually reflects a reorganization of
our budget to include the Nuclear Counterterrorism Incident Response
(NCTIR) and the Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation (CTCP)
Programs from the Weapons Activities account. For comparability
purposes, the DNN account increase is $101.0 million or over 5 percent
above fiscal year 2015 enacted levels. Additionally, we have combined
the NCTIR and CTCP programs into a single budget program line to
eliminate confusion about NNSA nuclear counterterrorism programs and
activities. We also changed the NCTIR name to Nuclear Counterterrorism
and Incident Response Program, reflecting this realignment. The DNN
Appropriation will now support two enduring mission areas: 1) The
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program and 2) The Nuclear
Counterterrorism and Incident Response Program. The Nuclear
Nonproliferation Program is also restructuring to place more emphasis
on capabilities as opposed to specific programs. This organizational
restructuring is reflected in the DNN budget restructuring.
To achieve all of these mission objectives, NNSA has restructured
the budget request under the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account
as follows:
Material Management and Minimization
Global Material Security
Nonproliferation and Arms Control
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation R&D
Nonproliferation Construction
Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response Program.
Together, this restructuring aligns funding for preventing,
countering, and responding to global nuclear dangers in one
appropriation.
Nonproliferation Efforts
The fiscal year 2016 request for the DNN Program, excluding NCTIR
and Legacy Contractor Pensions, is $1.6 billion, an increase of $67.9
million or about 4.4 percent above fiscal year 2015 enacted levels.
This past year was a big year for our nonproliferation efforts. Our
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation organization was responsible for many
of the significant deliverables at the third Nuclear Security Summit
held in The Hague last spring. Of particular note, Japan announced at
the Summit that it would work with us to remove and dispose of all
highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium from its Fast
Critical Assembly. NNSA is currently working with its counterparts in
Japan to resolve technical and logistical issues to complete this
effort in a timely manner.
Also during the Summit, the United States joined 22 countries in
signing up to a ``Gift Basket'' to secure all Category 1 radioactive
sealed sources by 2016. In the United States, there are approximately
465 buildings with Category 1 devices. Of these, NNSA has completed
security enhancements at 300 and is currently involved in a targeted
outreach campaign to engage the remaining 165 buildings by the end of
spring 2015.
And finally, NNSA partnered with five countries to remove 190 kg of
HEU and plutonium from civilian facilities; which brings our cumulative
total at the end of fiscal year 2014 to an impressive 5,207 kg; this is
more than enough material for 200 nuclear weapons. While relations with
Russia are severely strained, we anticipate that we will continue to
cooperate in efforts to repatriate Russian-origin weapons-usable HEU
material to Russia.
The Material Management and Minimization (M3) program presents an
integrated approach to addressing the persistent threat posed by
nuclear materials through a full cycle of materials management and
minimization efforts. Consistent with the priorities articulated in the
National Security Strategy of the United States and the Nuclear Posture
Review, the primary objective of the program is to achieve permanent
threat reduction by minimizing and, when possible, eliminating weapons-
usable nuclear material around the world. This program includes
elements of the former Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and
Fissile Materials Disposition Programs. The fiscal year 2016 request
for this program is $311.6 million. For comparability purposes, the
request reflects an increase of $38.7 million or about a 14.2 percent
increase above the fiscal year 2015 enacted levels. The funding
increases are primarily for the removal of HEU from miniature neutron
source reactors in Africa as well as preparatory activities for future
shipments from Europe and Japan, which will proceed with appropriate
cost-sharing.
The Global Material Security (GMS) program supports the President's
nuclear and radiological security agenda and the Secretary's goal of
enhancing nuclear security through nonproliferation. We work with
partner countries to increase the security of vulnerable stockpiles of
nuclear weapons, weapons-usable nuclear materials, and radiological
materials, and to improve partner countries' abilities to deter,
detect, and interdict illicit trafficking. Elements of the former GTRI
program, International Material Protection and Cooperation (IMPC)
program, and Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) program
are being combined in GMS, in order to better integrate capabilities
required to support DNN's enduring mission. The fiscal year 2016
request for this program is $426.8 million. For comparability purposes
the request reflects a slight increase of $2.5 million above the fiscal
year 2015 enacted levels. This increase will accelerate the protection
of International Atomic Energy Agency Category 1 radiological sources
in order to meet the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit commitment to secure
these sources by 2016.
The Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC) program supports the
President's nonproliferation agenda and NNSA efforts to prevent the
proliferation or use of weapons of mass destruction by state and non-
state actors. To carry out the goals of this program, we work with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and foreign partners to build
global capacity to safeguard nuclear materials and prevent illicit
transfers of dual-use materials, equipment, technology and expertise.
We also work with our partners and the IAEA to develop technologies and
approaches to verify and monitor current and future arms control
treaties and agreements. This funding also supports statutorily
mandated activities such as technical reviews of export licenses and
interdiction cases, and technical support for the negotiation and
implementation of civil nuclear cooperation agreements (123
Agreements), as well as international export control outreach
activities, and activities to support and improve the execution of the
NPAC 10 CFR Part 810 application process. The fiscal year 2016 request
for this program is $126.7 million, and reflects a slight increase of
$0.8 million above the fiscal year 2015 enacted level.
The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN
R&D) program supports innovative, unilateral and multi-lateral
technical capabilities to detect, identify, and characterize: 1)
foreign nuclear weapons programs, 2) illicit diversion of special
nuclear materials, and 3) nuclear detonations. To meet national and
Departmental nuclear security requirements, DNN R&D leverages the
unique facilities and scientific skills of the Department of Energy,
academia, and industry to perform research, including counterterrorism-
related R&D. DNN R&D conducts technology demonstrations, and develops
prototypes for integration into operational systems. The fiscal year
2016 request for this program is $419.3 million, a $25.9 million
increase or about 6.6 percent above fiscal year 2015 levels. Increased
funding is requested for nuclear and energetic materials
characterization experiments and development of advanced diagnostic
equipment capabilities, for long-range nuclear detonation detection,
and technical forensics research. This increase over fiscal year 2015
levels is partially offset by a return to baseline funding for the
Proliferation Detection subprogram after a one-time Congressional
increase in fiscal year 2015 for test bed development and field
experiments.
Nonproliferation Construction consolidates construction costs for
DNN projects previously contained within each program budget.
Currently, the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) is the only project
in this program. The fiscal year 2016 request for MFFF is $345 million
which is the same as the fiscal year 2015 enacted level. The National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 and the Consolidated and
Further Continuing Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2015 directed the
Department to conduct additional analyses of the MFFF construction
project. These analyses will include independent cost and schedule
estimates, and examination of alternative approaches for disposition of
the 34 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium and their relationship to
the Plutonium Management Disposition Agreement (PMDA). The Department
has requested Aerospace Corporation, a federally funded research and
development center, to perform these analyses. They will be completed
during fiscal year 2015, and will inform a final decision on the path
forward. The fiscal year 2016 request emphasizes that while the
Department continues to evaluate disposition paths (including the MFFF)
to determine the most responsible path forward, any viable alternative
will require a significant amount of funds to implement.
Nuclear Counterterrorism and Emergency Response
The fiscal year 2016 Request consolidates counterterrorism and
emergency response funding into a single Nuclear Counterterrorism and
Incident Response line in the amount of $234.4 million.
Within NCTIR, the Nuclear Counterterrorism Assessment program
represents the primary scientific program to assess the threat of
nuclear terrorism and develop technical countermeasures against it. The
knowledge generated under this program ensures that NNSA's technical
expertise on nuclear threat devices informs DoD and FBI emergency
response capabilities. We have taken steps to address funding
reductions to the nuclear counterterrorism activities. Over the last
two years these activities, formerly known as Counterterrorism and
Counterproliferation within the Weapons Activities appropriation, have
been funded at a level significantly below the requested amount--70
percent of the Request in fiscal year 2014 and 60 percent in fiscal
year 2015. The fiscal year 2016 request would dedicate $57.8M to
Nuclear Counterterrorism Assessment in support of improvised nuclear
device analysis. Additionally, the request includes funds within
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation R&D for materials characterization
experiments and other research, which supports nuclear counterterrorism
and incident response missions. Full funding of both lines will make it
possible to continue NNSA's vital counterterrorism work at the national
laboratories.
NCTIR continues to work domestically and around the world to
improve preparedness and emergency response capabilities. Its expert
scientific teams and equipment provide a technically trained, rapid
response to nuclear or radiological incidents worldwide. NCTIR assesses
nuclear or radiological threats and leverages that knowledge to provide
contingency planning and training to support national and international
counterterrorism and incident response capabilities. In 2014, NNSA's
emergency response teams deployed more than 100 times in support of law
enforcement and for major public events, such as the Super Bowl, and
conducted five large-scale field exercises with partners from the FBI,
DoD, and FEMA In addition, they deployed over 70 times in support of
DHS Domestic Nuclear Detection Office support to state and local first
responders. Internationally, NNSA conducted 16 training courses to
improve its foreign partners' emergency management capabilities and
continued to work bilaterally with Israel, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand,
Chile, China, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Taiwan, Canada, France,
Jordan, the Nordic countries, Armenia and Kazakhstan. New programs were
also started with Romania, Belarus and the Philippines. These
initiatives represent our effort to create a truly global defense
against the threat of nuclear terrorism.
NCTIR will also continue the initiative to equip cities with
stabilization equipment and training, to ensure a prompt and effective
response to nuclear terror threats.
NCTIR also executes the DOE's Emergency Management and Operations
Support program that manages the Emergency Operations Centers,
Emergency Communications Network, and Continuity Programs for all of
DOE, including NNSA.
naval reactors appropriation
Advancing Naval Nuclear Propulsion
During the past year, NNSA helped celebrate the 60th Anniversary of
the USS Nautilus first getting underway on nuclear propulsion. The
Naval Nuclear Propulsion program pioneered advances in nuclear reactor
and warship design--such as improving reactor lifetimes, increasing
submarine stealth, and reducing propulsion plant crewing. An example is
the technology being developed by Naval Reactors that will enable the
Ohio-class Replacement submarine to be designed for a 40-plus year
operational life without refueling, resulting in significant savings.
During 2014, Naval Reactors continued its record of operational
excellence by providing the technical expertise required to resolve
emergent issues in the Nation's nuclear-powered Fleet, enabling the
Fleet to steam more 2 million miles. Through the work of its laboratory
and highly skilled personnel, Naval Reactors also advanced the Ohio-
class Replacement and the S8G Prototype Refueling projects as well as
initiating integrated testing of the lead A1B reactor plant for the
next generation Ford-class aircraft carrier.
It is generally not well-known that if anything goes wrong with a
reactor on one of the Navy's nuclear carriers or submarines while they
are at sea, Naval Reactors' cadre of experts provide around-the-clock
technical support, and can often resolve the problem and prevent the
ship from having to return to port to be checked out and repaired--
which would be quite costly and disruptive to the Navy's deployment
schedules.
The budget request for Naval Reactors is $1.4 billion, an increase
of $141.6 million, about 11.5 percent from the fiscal year 2015 enacted
level. The request includes the base funding required to safely
maintain, operate and oversee the Navy's 83 nuclear-powered warships,
constituting over 45 percent of the Navy's major combatants. The
increase supports three high priority activities: $186.8 million to
continue development of the advanced Ohio-class Replacement reactor;
$133 million to continue preparations for the refueling and overhaul of
the Land-Based Prototype reactor plant; and $86 million to continue the
design work of the Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project started
in fiscal year 2015. To this end, we would like to thank the
Subcommittee's support for appropriating $70 million for Spent Fuel
Handling Recapitalization Project in the fiscal year 2015 enacted
budget. These activities are essential to maintaining a credible sea-
based strategic deterrent, to maintain the research and training
capabilities of the Land-based Prototype, and to maintain the
capability to safely inspect, store and package naval spent nuclear
fuel.
nnsa federal salaries and expenses appropriation
NNSA Federal Salaries and Expenses (FSE) Request is $402.7 million,
essentially equal to the rate of operations in fiscal year 2015, but
8.9 percent above the fiscal year 2015 enacted level. The Request
provides funding for 1,690 full-time equivalents (FTEs) and support
expenses needed to meet mission requirements. We are actively engaged
in hiring to that number in a thoughtful and strategic manner. I would
note that the Request represents an increase of only $1.5 million from
the fiscal year 2015 planned execution level of $401.2 million. This is
due to the fact that the fiscal year 2015 enacted level was
significantly below the request and we will need to use over $30
million of planned carryover to sustain the currently projected
operations of the NNSA federal workforce. We built up that reserve
through prudent planning and execution to enable us to pay for large
one-time costs, such as the movement of much of our federal workforce
in Albuquerque into newer leased space. The increase includes a 1.3
percent cost of living adjustment and benefits escalation, additional
support to stand up the Office of Cost Estimation and Program
Evaluation (CEPE) office in accordance with Section 3112 of the fiscal
year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), and funding to
improve financial systems integration within the nuclear security
enterprise in accordance with Section 3128 of the fiscal year 2014
NDAA.
In fiscal year 2016, NNSA will continue its on-going efforts to
plan strategically to meet current and future workforce needs by
analyzing how evolving missions are affecting job requirements.
Reshaping of the workforce over the next several years will be
essential, including obtaining both the right staffing size and skill
sets. NNSA will also continue to identify efficiencies, particularly in
travel and support services, to provide a lean and efficient
organization and to support the President's Executive Order ``Promoting
Efficient Spending''.
management & performance
To enhance our ability to carry out our mission and execute this
budget request, we will continue to focus on improving our project
management and cost estimating capabilities. In keeping with the
Secretary of Energy's increased focus on Management and Performance,
the NNSA is committed to manage its operations, contracts and costs in
an effective and efficient manner. The NNSA's Office of Acquisition and
Project Management (APM) is driving continued improvement in contract
and project management practices. APM is leading the NNSA's effort to
deliver results by instituting rigorous analyses of alternatives,
providing clear lines of authority and accountability for federal and
contractor program and project management, and improving cost and
schedule performance. NNSA participates in the Secretary's Project
Management Risk Committee as a means to institutionalize and share best
practices across the Department.
We have used strategic partnerships with the National Laboratories
to rethink some of our most challenging projects. As a result of the
Red Team review of the UPF at the Y-12 National Security Complex, led
by the director of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and a similar
approach to the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR)
Facility capability at Los Alamos National Laboratory, we are
developing a disciplined, modular approach for both sites that will
remove risks early in the process, and establish a well-defined cost
and schedule, both of which were lacking in earlier efforts. This
process will be an important and recurring project management theme at
the NNSA and across the Department of Energy.
The CEPE was established in September 2014 pursuant to the fiscal
year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act. This legislation
recognized the effort to improve cost estimating that the NNSA had
already started. The CEPE office is a prime example of actions taken to
improve our cost estimation efforts. Forging a strong partnership with
the Department of Defense (DoD) Office of Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation (CAPE), including joint training activities with CAPE, we
have made good progress in establishing CEPE as an independent office.
CEPE will provide independent cost estimating leadership, rigorous
program analysis, and prudent fiscal guidance. Getting CEPE fully
functional is a high priority for NNSA, and we will closely monitor its
progress as it grows into its full potential over the next few years.
conclusion
The NNSA executes vital missions to ensure nuclear security at home
and abroad. We do this by delivering the technology, capabilities and
infrastructure essential to a 21st century national security
organization. Our workforce continues to rise to the challenge and
deliver mission effective and cost efficient nuclear security solutions
critical for the NNSA to succeed in today's fiscal climate.
In closing, I would also like to mention that the President's
Budget Request is just the first in a series of documents slated for
release this spring. The most important of those yet to be released is
the NNSA Strategic Plan, last updated in May 2011. The goal of this
document is to provide a single integrated guidepost for NNSA's
leaders, our partners at the labs and plants, and Congress and our
external stakeholders. The new strategic plan will articulate a clear
direction and mission to everyone--no matter their rank or position.
Also to be released is the Congressionally-mandated Stockpile
Stewardship Management Plan (SSMP) which details NNSA's multi-year plan
for delivering a safe, secure and effective nuclear stockpile. And for
the first time, we plan to release a companion plan to the SSMP,
tentatively titled, ``Prevent, Counter and Respond'' to address our
plans for nonproliferation, counterterrorism and emergency response
programs. Finally, a report is being prepared for Congress in response
to the Final Report from the Congressional Advisory Panel on the
Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise, co-chaired by Norm
Augustine and Admiral Rich Mies.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
Prepared Statement of Admiral John Richardson
Since my last testimony before this subcommittee, U.S. Nuclear
Powered Warships - 10 aircraft carriers, 14 ballistic missile
submarines, 53 attack submarines, and 4 guided missile submarines -
operated for another year safely and effectively, steaming more than 2
million miles in support of our nation's interests. Some highlights of
those operations include the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, USS
George H.W. Bush (CVN 77), the only coalition strike option in the
fight against ISIL militants for 54 days, executing 20-30 sorties each
day. Our ballistic missile submarine force completed their 4000th
strategic patrol, continuing over 50 years of peacekeeping capability
through strategic deterrence. The USS Gerald R. Ford began her
propulsion plant test program and will proudly set sail for the first
time next year. The attack submarine USS North Dakota (SSN 784) was
commissioned in November. We christened the USS John Warner, a
submarine named after a truly great member of the Senate. We laid the
keel for the USS Illinois, our thirteenth Virginia-class submarine.
Finally, this past January, we commemorated a truly historic event for
Naval Reactors and the Nation. We celebrated the 60th anniversary of
the submarine USS Nautilus (SSN 571), the world's first nuclear-powered
ship.
Additionally, we finally completed construction and infrastructure
projects, some deferred from 2010, to maintain and upgrade the
facilities our engineers require to attain these important successes in
the fleet. The $75 million Cask Shipping and Receiving Facility in
Idaho completed and opened this year under budget and will soon begin
receiving shipments of Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel in support of the USS
Enterprise defueling.
This progress and service to the fleet is only possible through the
firm support of this subcommittee. Naval Reactors' request for fiscal
year 2016 allows us to continue this work. The funding request is for
$1.375 billion, an increase of $136 million (11 percent) over the
fiscal year 2015 enacted funding level. The requested funding permits
Naval Reactors to continue to support today's operational fleet, as
well as deliver tomorrow's fleet by funding three national priority
projects. The projects are:
Designing a new reactor plant for the replacement for the
Ohio-class SSBN
Refueling a Research and Training Reactor in New York
Build a new spent fuel handling facility in Idaho
The fiscal year 2016 request adequately funds all of our
requirements: the highly-qualified people, equipment, facilities, and
technology development needed to support today's nuclear-powered fleet,
and the three projects in support of tomorrow's fleet.
Uncompromising and timely support for safe nuclear fleet operation
will always be the highest priority for Naval Reactors. $973 million of
my budget request funds the technical support base for the 96 operating
reactors at sea on ships and at our training and research sites. The
extremely talented men and women, along with the equipment and
facilities upon which they depend, stand ready 24 hours per day, 365
days per year to respond to advance the mission and respond to emergent
fleet needs for assistance. They are the principal reason that the
Program has delivered 60 years of safe and effective operations by
ships on station supporting our national interests. The teams at our
four Program sites - the Bettis Laboratory in Pittsburgh, the Knolls
Laboratory and Kesselring Site in greater Albany, and our spent nuclear
fuel facilities in Idaho - perform the research and development,
analysis, engineering and testing needed to both support today's Fleet
and develop future nuclear-powered warships. Importantly, they perform
the technical evaluations that enable me to thoroughly assess emergent
issues and deliver timely responses that both ensure nuclear safety and
maximize operational flexibility. This technical support base is
essential to enabling our submarines and aircraft carriers to deploy.
Funding reductions in fiscal year 2015 most directly impacted this
technical support base. The funding levels provided in fiscal year 2015
will result in a delay to the start of the Engineroom Team Trainer
facility in upstate New York, a structure that will host a first-of-a-
kind nuclear simulation technology. This training simulation
technology, when built, will lower the cost and improve the
effectiveness of providing nuclear-trained sailors in the future. The
delay in building this technology also reduces our future training
capacity and will limit the number of nuclear-trained sailors provided
to the fleet. I have again requested funding for this essential
facility in my fiscal year 2016 request. fiscal year 2015 funding
levels also prevented construction of the Central Office and Prototype
Staff Buildings in New York. These buildings were planned to
accommodate the over 200 engineers and training staff that will arrive
at the site in fiscal year 2017-21 to conduct the S8G Prototype
Refueling Overhaul discussed below. As a result, I will have to
procure, at nearly the same total cost, temporary office spaces and
trailers, reducing worker efficiency, effectiveness, and quality of
life.
In addition to funding the technical support base, my request in
fiscal year 2016 includes $186 million to continue Naval Reactors'
efforts in designing a new reactor plant for the Ohio-class
Replacement. Activity this year includes reactor plant design and
component development to support procurement of long lead components
starting in fiscal year 2019. Progress in these areas in fiscal year
2016 will ensure that the advanced capability that the life-of-the-ship
reactor core provides is delivered in a technically satisfactory and
cost effective manner in time to support lead ship construction
beginning in fiscal year 2021.
Related to the Ohio-class Replacement, the fiscal year 2016 request
includes $133 million in funding for the Land-based Prototype Refueling
Overhaul in upstate New York. Refueling this reactor supports two major
purposes: reducing cost and schedule risk to the life-of-ship core for
Ohio-class Replacement project and supporting training of about 1000
Sailors per year for the next 20 years. In fiscal year 2015 and fiscal
year 2016, Naval Reactors continues the core manufacturing development
work needed for the Refueling Overhaul and the plant service life
engineering design to ensure that the Land-based Prototype plant
overhaul is performed concurrently with the refueling that starts in
fiscal year 2018.
Finally my fiscal year 2016 request contains $86 million to
continue the Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project (SFHP).
Thanks to the support Congress provided in fiscal year 2015, we will
complete the facility conceptual design and issue a draft Environmental
Impact Statement this year. The fiscal year 2016 request will allow us
to publish the final Environmental Impact Statement, set key facility
dimensions, and continue to advance the design. Continued support in
fiscal year 2016 and beyond is essential to ensure the facility can
begin receiving spent fuel from the fleet in fiscal year 2025. Further
delays to the project schedule incur costs of approximately $150
million per year to procure shipping containers to temporarily store
the spent fuel from aircraft carrier refuelings. Delays to date have
incurred over $500M in costs for temporary containers. More of these
containers will not be necessary if the project stays on track.
In developing our request, I have worked closely with the
leadership of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the
Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Management and Budget and the
Department of Defense. This budget not only reflects my priorities for
Naval Reactors but also integrates them with the other important work
of my colleagues at NNSA. There is clear recognition of the valuable
capabilities Naval Reactors provides and our history in effectively
meeting our obligations. I understand the difficult budget environment
in which Congress must craft legislation and I respectfully urge your
support for aligning allocations with the fiscal year 2016 Budget
Request.
Naval Reactors' fiscal year 2016 budget request will ensure that I
can meet my statutory responsibilities to maintain a safe and effective
nuclear-powered Fleet, continue environmental stewardship at my program
sites, and progress Ohio-class replacement, Land-based Prototype
Refueling Overhaul and the Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization
Project.
With the help of Congress, Naval Reactors is committed to executing
our projects on time and on budget, and I to continue to search for the
most cost effective way to support safe operations of the nuclear
fleet.
Senator Sessions. Mr. Trimble?
STATEMENT OF DAVID C. TRIMBLE, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND
ENVIRONMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Trimble. Thank you. Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member
Donnelly, and members of the subcommittee, my testimony today
is based on our past work and will address NNSA's modernization
plans, difficulties in managing programs to cost and schedule,
management and governance of the enterprise, and NNSA's
nonproliferation programs.
Regarding modernization, GAO annually reviews NNSA's plans
and budget estimates for the modernization of the nuclear
secured enterprise, and every year that we have reviewed it,
significant changes have occurred. The Augustine-Mies Panel
also observed that the SSMP has varied from year to year in the
cost and schedules for the delivery of LEP's and nuclear
facilities, concluding that the lack of a stable, executable
plan for modernization is a fundamental weakness for NNSA.
In our 2014 work, we also noted such changes. For example--
Senator Sessions. A stable what kind of plan?
Mr. Trimble. I am sorry. I am sorry. Concluding that the
lack of a stable, executable plan for modernization is a
fundamental weakness for NNSA.
Senator Sessions. Okay.
Mr. Trimble. That is from the Augustine-Mies report.
In our 2014 work, we also noted such changes.
Senator Sessions. That is the August of 2014 report?
Mr. Trimble. The Augustine-Mies report on governance.
Senator Sessions. When was it?
Mr. Trimble. 2014.
Senator Sessions. Go ahead.
Mr. Trimble. In our 2014 work, we also noted such changes.
For example, in fiscal year 2014, production of the
interoperable W78/88 warhead was pushed back 2 years and
production of the B61-12 and W88 Alt 370 were also delayed. By
fiscal year 2015, the W78/88 LEP was pushed back another 5
years, and the B61 and W88 were each pushed back another year.
NNSA has, however, taken actions to improve its plans. In
the fiscal year 2015 plan, NNSA incorporated estimates
previously omitted for UPF [the Uranium Processing Facility]
and CMRR [the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement],
improved the transparency of some budget estimates and based
its LEP estimates on more current data.
Regarding NNSA's contract and project management
challenges, much work remains to be done. Modernization plans
require NNSA to design and build new large nuclear facilities
on time and on budget. Such projects have historically posed a
challenge for DOE [the Department of Energy] and NNSA. DOE has
shown progress in managing smaller projects, and DOE leadership
continues to demonstrate a strong commitment to address its
longstanding contract and project management challenges.
However, our recent high risk report noted that DOE's cycle
of identifying root causes and corrective actions raises
concerns that DOE has not fully identified the root causes
behind its problems. In 2008, DOE issued a corrective action
plan which identified root causes, including front-end
planning, project funding, accountability, cost estimating
management workforce, and project oversight. In 2010, DOE
identified six additional barriers and new corrective actions.
In 2011, DOE stated that its corrective actions had mitigated
most of the root causes of its issues. Most recently in 2014,
DOE identified four factors that contribute to project
management success or failure. Notably, all four are discussed
in DOE's 2008 report and among those that DOE said in 2011 it
had at least partially mitigated.
Our recent reports have made numerous recommendations to
help DOE in this area, but in some cases, DOE has appeared
hesitant to implement them. In our 2014 report on MOX [mixed
oxide fuel], we recommended that DOE require a root cause
analysis for projects that experience cost increases or
schedule delays exceeding a certain threshold, similar to a
requirement that DOD [the Department of Defense] has. DOE
disagreed with our recommendation.
In 2014, we found that DOE and NNSA requirements for cost
estimating and conducting analyses of alternatives generally do
not reflect best practices. While DOE agreed with our
recommendations to incorporate best practices into
requirements, it did not specify a timeline for implementation.
NNSA is embracing a new modular approach to address the
mission of both UPF and CMRR. While this approach may simplify
the challenge of managing a large construction project, it
creates other challenges, including the need to coordinate
activities across multiple facilities and the need to renovate
facilities that were once expected to close. We plan to examine
NNSA's new approaches to both UPF and CMRR this year.
Regarding governance, the Augustine-Mies report highlighted
many of the same issues we have reported on, including the
management of capital projects, cost estimating, and workforce
planning.
The panel also examined NNSA's oversight of its M&O
contractors and raised questions regarding the effectiveness of
contract requirements and performance metrics on mission
execution. We have ongoing work examining NNSA's contract
oversight policies and the extent to which it relies on
contractor assurance systems for evaluating and rewarding
performance. We should complete this work in May of this year.
Finally, regarding nonproliferation, NNSA has made progress
in the President's 2009 initiative to secure all vulnerable
nuclear material around the world.
Senator Sessions. Mr. Trimble, if I could interrupt you. We
think it is appropriate, Senator Donnelly and I, that we have a
moment of silence for the Boston Marathon bombing. The time is
now. So if you would join us in a moment of silence.
[A moment of silence was observed.]
Senator Sessions. Okay, move on.
Senator Donnelly. One other thing that I think Senator
Sessions and I would both like to join in on is this is a
special day. At 3 o'clock, they are going to give the
Congressional Gold Medal to Doolittle Raiders just down the
hall. They set a pretty good standard for all of us, and we
would like you to keep them in your thoughts today for
everything they did for our country.
Senator Sessions. That is a good point. I remember as a
young kid reading about those brave Americans and that critical
event in our history.
All right. Mr. Trimble, I am sorry to interrupt you. You
may continue.
Mr. Trimble. I am almost done. No problems.
So finally regarding nonproliferation, NNSA has made
progress in the President's 2009 initiative to secure all
vulnerable nuclear material around the world, but challenges
remain. In 2011, we reported that DNN faced difficulties in
ensuring the security of U.S. weapons usable nuclear materials
that have been transferred to other nations. DNN's programs
heavily depend on the cooperation of other countries. Notably,
the decision by the Russian Government to cease joint
cooperation with NNSA raises questions about the sustainability
of past progress. Last year, NNSA reorganized DNN and has been
assessing over-the-horizon nuclear and radiological
proliferation threats. We have ongoing work directed by this
committee looking at NNSA's long-term nonproliferation planning
efforts.
Thank you. I would be happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Trimble follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Yes, Senator King?
Senator King. Mr. Chairman, I apologize. I want to
apologize to the witnesses. I have an unusual Wednesday
afternoon Intelligence meeting on overhead architecture which
is also related to this, and I have to excuse myself. But we
will be submitting questions for the record.
Senator Sessions. Thank you. And if you would like to ask a
few questions before you leave----
Senator King. No. That is all right. I will submit the
questions for the record.
Thank you all very much and thanks for the work that you
do. Senator Fischer and I had the opportunity to visit two of
the labs, and Dr. Klotz, it was very impressive what the people
are doing out there. I commend to you gentlemen a visit to
those labs in New Mexico. Where are they? They are in New
Mexico.
[Laughter.]
So I follow with interest what you are doing and apologize
for having to absent myself. The Intelligence Committee very
rarely meets on a Wednesday, but this is an important issue. So
thank you.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator King. And thanks for
your faithful attendance and interest in this subcommittee.
So, General Klotz, let me just sort of ask you quickly a
serious of questions about projects that are ongoing that we
need to keep on track at cost and schedule. My overall question
is I believe it would be appropriate and necessary for you to
let us know if there are problems in these areas that you know
are going to be there or may be there. So give us a heads-up
warning. So can you give us a quick update on the life
extension programs in general? Dr. Cook, you contribute to this
as you all agree. Are they on schedule? Are we having any cost
overruns? Are they synchronized with the respective DOD
delivery systems? Can you give us insight into that and how are
we doing?
Dr. Klotz. Yes, sir, I can. And I would welcome Dr. Cook,
who has----
Senator Sessions. I have about six of these I am going to
ask. I would kind of like to just be on the record if you see a
problem, and then maybe we can pursue that after we run the
list to kind of give us a perspective of where we are.
So let me start this way then. The W76-1, submarine-
launched ballistic missile warhead. In production, it was
expected to be complete by the end of 2019. How are we doing on
that?
Dr. Klotz. W76-1 is currently in the production phase. This
past year, 2014, we past the halfway point. Everything is on
track for completing the program in fiscal year 2019.
Dr. Cook. It is meeting its full cost, schedule, and scope
objectives, right now on track.
Senator Sessions. Good.
What about the B61-12, the tactical strategic bomb?
Dr. Klotz. The B61-12 is in engineering development or
development engineering. We had a very good year last year in
terms of the initial tests and in terms of the funding, and it
is on track to deliver the first production unit in 2020.
Dr. Cook. Additionally, it is now in its fourth full year
of full-scale engineering development and again meeting all
cost, schedule, and scope milestones.
Senator Sessions. Good.
The W88 alternate 370, the submarine-launched ballistic
missile warhead.
Dr. Klotz. Senator, this is one of the significant changes
in this year's budget submission. We had originally intended to
do an alteration to the W88 affecting its arming, fusing, and
firing assembly, as well as some other limited life component
changes to the warhead. Based upon ongoing surveillance
conducted by our laboratories and our plants, we detected an
aging issue, and it made sense to us and to the United States
Navy that when we bring these warheads back for this
alteration, that we also change out the conventional high
explosive, which is one of the components within the warhead.
So that has required a cost increase in this year's budget
submission. Yet we are still on track for doing the alteration
and having the first production unit available in fiscal year
2020.
Dr. Cook. This one is in its third year of full-scale
engineering development, and as Under Secretary Klotz said, we
are adding new scope that results in new cost. But all of the
existing scope is meeting cost and schedule requirements.
Senator Sessions. Well, tell me about what do you expect--
my understanding from previous discussions with General Klotz,
this is a necessary thing. It is an appropriate, wise decision
to do the explosive replacement at the same time. What kind of
cost are we looking at? Is that in the budget?
Dr. Cook. The cost estimate that we have for the whole
refresh of the explosive is $530 million. We have expended
about $30 million of that if you look through last year and you
project this year to the end. It is in the budget. We have
worked thoroughly with DOD and with U.S. Strategic Command
[STRATCOM], and we have decided to cut out some other parts of
the budget giving this higher priority, not requesting
additional money.
Dr. Klotz. Senator, if I could just stress, though, the W88
warhead is a safe, secure, and effective warhead. This is the
reason why we have a scientifically based stockpile stewardship
program. We surveil these systems as they age, and we are
trying to prudently head off a problem down the road while we
are doing the already scheduled work on the W88. This decision
was endorsed by the Nuclear Weapons Council and by the Navy. So
we are going forward as a joint team on this.
Senator Sessions. Good.
And one more and I will go to Senator Donnelly. The W80-4,
the air-launched cruise missile warhead.
Dr. Klotz. Another change, Senator, to our budget
submission this year. In the last year's budget submission, we
had forecasted providing the first production unit in fiscal
year 2027. That is how the budget was built. Again, because of
discussions with DOD and STRATCOM and the Air Force over its
requirements for a follow-on to the air-launched cruise
missile, a system that has been in the Air Force for decades
now, they wanted to deliver that capability earlier, and so we
have moved up the delivery of the first production unit from
2027 to 2025 with this budget request. And again, the
additional cost for that acceleration is covered within our
budget submission.
Dr. Cook. This W80 Mod 4, as it is now called, is in the
first phase 6-1, where we get the requirements right. We lay
out the approaches to be taken. We are doing that analysis. We
will conclude that work by June of this year, so just a couple
of months. And then we will begin the phase 6-2. Again, it is
meeting cost, scope, and schedule requirements and is strongly
joined by the Air Force, STRATCOM, and NNSA. And given a down-
selection to the W80 family made by Nuke Weapons Council last
year, that is progressing well.
Senator Sessions. Good.
Senator Donnelly?
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Administrator Klotz, in regards to the cost analysis and
program evaluation office that was created in the NDAA
[National Defense Authorization Act] for Fiscal Year 2014, are
you still fully committed to filling that out?
Dr. Klotz. Yes, Senator Donnelly, we are. We have worked
very closely with the DOD Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation (CAPE) organization in putting together a staffing
plan, as well as a training plan to have a similar capability
within NNSA. We formally chartered that in September of this
past year, and we are beginning to build out the number of
people in the organization. We ultimately expect to have 18
people, Federal employees, in the organization by 2017, and
nine people by the end of this year. We currently stand at
seven Federal officials in the office.
Senator Donnelly. Well, that kind of leads into last year
we upped the number of personnel to 1,690 positions. I was
wondering what your long-term projections are for personnel, as
well as the skill mix that you see.
Dr. Klotz. Well, first of all, Senator, I would like to
actually thank this committee for their help and assistance in
preventing the cap which was set at 1,690 last year from being
even lower than we feared it might by in the fiscal year 2015
legislative cycle.
NNSA staff has decreased by 10.4 percent since 2012. Yet at
the same time, the scope and scale of our work has greatly
expanded. As Senator Sessions just led us through, we have four
ongoing life extension programs. We have three major capital
construction projects. Yet the NNSA manpower to oversee this
work and to look out for the Government and the taxpayers?
interest is decreasing.
By the way, this is not the way in which DOD does work. For
instance, in the B61-12 life extension program, NNSA's
responsibility for that joint program is $8.1 billion, and the
Air Force is $1.6 billion. But to do our work, we have 20
people for $8.1 billion, whereas the Air Force has 93 Federal
officials and contractors for $1.6 billion. So our people are
stretched. We are asking them to do a lot. So the 1,690 cap--we
would hate to see that go any lower this year. In fact, we
would actually like to see it lifted a bit.
Senator Donnelly. Ms. Harrington, the NNSA is a world
leader in emergency response to nuclear incidents. What are we
doing to help build capacity around the world so other
countries can deal with the same kind of events that we are
training for constantly?
Ms. Harrington. Thank you for that question.
The international emergency response programs have
leveraged what we do here domestically in emergency response.
Our International Emergency Response Cooperation (IEMC)
program, has adapted our domestic emergency training programs
and other capacity-building programs, including development of
plans and procedures, drills. Particularly important are the
exercises. We help other countries organize and other
assistance as requested worldwide.
We use the same personnel for these international programs
and to train people internationally that we use here in the
United States to do the same thing. So we take the best of the
best. And most importantly, we are working with the
International Atomic Energy Agency to help build their
capacity.
Senator Donnelly. Let me ask you. One of the major programs
you work with is installing radiation detectors at ports and
border crossings and similar things. And some have said maybe
this does not have as much value because it is easy to simply
smuggle the materials around these sites. What do you think of
that claim?
Ms. Harrington. I have to confess that when I hear that
sort of thing, I wonder what else would you do. Every one of
us, when we go through an airport, has to walk through a
detector, and that is there for a purpose because if you try to
go around it, the TSA will not think kindly of it and will
probably escort you aside to give you a secondary inspection.
The same is true when you look at border crossings, airports,
seaports.
But what is important here, just like in an airport, a
detector is not effective on its own. It takes people. It takes
training. It takes other capabilities along with it. For us,
that means mobile units. That means handheld units. That means
reaching out to local law enforcement, local intelligence, and
bringing them all together as a community to work together on
this counter-smuggling effort.
So when people try to say, well, you just stick one piece
of equipment someplace, it is not going to work. We would agree
with that. But that is not what we do. That is not how we
design our programs. And we just actually had--I did not bring
this for this reason, but we have a little quarterly
newsletter, and a couple of the articles in here happen to be
about how we work with the Federal Bureau Of Investigation to
develop training programs because we believe that that is an
essential element of how we actually are successful in
preventing smuggling.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
Senator Sessions. Senator Fischer?
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here today.
General Klotz, it is great to see you again. I really
appreciated the tours we had of the two facilities in New
Mexico but also Lawrence Livermore. It was very educational.
And again, thank you for doing that.
General, there is concern that investment in the
laboratories is really too limited right now to be able to
support any kind of balanced portfolio. You know, we are
looking at production and modernization, which should be, I
think, the first priority, but you also have to meet necessary
scientific capabilities. We need to look at infrastructure. We
have to look at attracting creative minds that are able to not
just refurbish the weapons that we have but have an
understanding of how to create those weapons as well if we are
going to, I think, continue to be prepared in the future.
How do you approach that necessary need to balance?
Dr. Klotz. Well, thank you very much, Senator, for that
question. And I will give, if I could, a broad, general
comment, and then, of course, Dr. Cook, who is the scientist
here, might like to add something.
You are absolutely right. The scientific, technical,
engineering base that we have to do this work is essential not
only for production but for maintaining our capability over the
longer term, but also addressing other pressing national
security needs which all of our laboratories do. So we need to
make sure that we attract the very best minds out of technical
schools, the very best minds our of graduate schools.
The work that they are given at the laboratories, as you
had an opportunity to see firsthand, is leading edge physics.
It is leading edge chemistry. It is leading edge materials
science. And by attracting people in to do that work, giving
them projects to do under our lab-directed research and
development, which is an extraordinarily important part of our
recruitment and retention capability, in many respects draws
them in and keeps them there to work in this laboratory.
I have always thought that in addition to the actual
weapons systems themselves and all the people that organize,
train, and equip those weapons systems, that our scientific,
technical, and engineering base is also an essential pillar of
our overall national deterrence policy and the power that we
project to nations across the world.
Senator Fischer. Do you think you are able to then achieve
that balance right now with the programs you have in place, or
do you think that it is going to have to be phased in in the
future, that we take care of the number one priority now and
then worry about it in the future? Can we do it now?
Dr. Cook. So we can do some of the balance now. The balance
will always change. There is no question that the labs and
plants along with them are under the mission assignment of
changing the oldest stockpile we have ever had and the smallest
since the Eisenhower administration to one that is both smaller
and younger. It has to be just as effective. Labs are not
developing new nuclear explosive packages, but they are
absolutely changing things within those packages and they are
doing it with the best simulation that has ever existed, a
factor of a million increase since the end of underground
testing.
And to give you one example of where excitement is--and it
comes right directly to the comment by the chairman about cost
reduction and schedule constraint--it is additive
manufacturing. So there are ways of really getting right into
the science of materials, of making parts.
On the unclassified side, a lot can be published about
application to non-weapons products. On the classified side, we
are doing some exceptional work at the Lawrence Livermore Lab,
Sandia Lab, Los Alamos Lab, and the Kansas City plant. And I
would invite you to go through any one of those with us. When
you do that, you can see that excitement is palpable, and it
drives right to the issue of constraining cost.
And another very quick example, a very important part of
additive manufacturing--
Senator Fischer. I have another question, if I could.
Dr. Cook. All right. You can see the enthusiasm.
Senator Fischer. I see the enthusiasm. [Laughter.]
I am going to pick up on your comment about the smallest
arsenal since Eisenhower. When you look at the size and the
cost that is associated with that arsenal, you have commented
in the past that those two items do not directly correspond to
each other. Nevertheless, we have some that are calling for
more reductions, particularly in the hedge that we have, and
they view that as a way that we can pursue more cost savings.
First, can you tell me why we have a hedge? Those old
weapons--they do not have capabilities. I would like you
publicly to be able to address that. And do you believe that
reductions in that hedge are going to produce any kind of
sizable cost savings?
Dr. Cook. I will try to give you a couple of simple
concepts.
We believe that we have to go to the New START force
balance by 2018. So deployed weapons will come down to the
central limits of the treaty. In doing so, we also believe that
we can reduce the hedge, which is the technical hedge, and the
way we will get there is through the program of life
extensions. What is not so often understood is that the path to
reduction of the technical hedge is the path of life
extensions. That gets us increased confidence. It gets us a
newer set of weapons. We use parts that we have in the
technical hedge because we are doing high reuse life extension
programs. But these too are moving to a smaller, more trusted
deterrent, which is also newer and has a higher ratio of
deployed to total, and is entirely within reason.
Senator Fischer. But would you say cost savings is a false
narrative when it comes to the hedge?
Dr. Cook. I would say that with any counting of the weapons
only, it is a false narrative to think if you cut the numbers,
you are going to save money. The cost is dependent on many
other things, and there are large fixed costs.
Senator Fischer. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sessions. Senator Heinrich?
Senator Heinrich. Well, I want to start out and just thank
Senator Fischer for making it eminently clear that there is not
a linear relationship between the number of devices and the
budget ramifications here. I want to thank you as well for
coming out to New Mexico to those two facilities, as well as
the one in California, and invite any of you any time. I know
many of you have visited those in the past, but please come
back often.
Admiral Klotz, I was really pleased to hear you talk a
little bit about LDRD [Laboratory Directed Research and
Development] and its importance for long-term retention. I want
to say that the success I think of the ongoing life extension
programs generally are largely dependent on the previous
investments that we have made in programs like stockpile
stewardship that help maintain the unique capabilities at our
National labs. And as you know, these capabilities support many
other Government agencies in addressing not just nuclear but an
entire variety of national security challenges.
I would like your thoughts on whether you think NNSA is
doing enough now to ensure that we continue to have the
expertise and the technical capabilities to anticipate and
respond to future security challenges. And in particular, I am
concerned about the labs? continued ability to attract and to
retain that top talent that you talked about.
Dr. Klotz. I think we do, but it is a challenge. As you
well know, Senator, at all of our laboratories and our
production facilities as well, a significant portion, in some
cases more than half in some locations, of our enterprise, more
than 50 percent of the workforce is eligible for retirement on
both the Federal side, as well as on the management and
operation contractor side. So again, attracting those people
into replace them in a timely fashion is something that we have
to deal with in many cases in a marketplace where the same
science and engineering and technical skills are highly sought
after by startups and high-tech industry.
So it is important, one, I think that we continue to stress
to our workforce that what they do is important and it is of
enduring importance to the security of this country, and that
they are making a contribution to that.
Additionally, it is important that we have consistent,
predictable funding in the work they do. Nothing is more
dispiriting and demoralizing I think to our workforce than fear
of whether what they are working on is going to be seen through
to completion.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you.
As you know, technology transfer is incredibly important to
me. It is a primary issue for me. It is not just a secondary
one. And this year I introduced a bill, Senate bill 784, with
Senator Gardner of Colorado to accelerate tech transfer by
establishing an off-campus micro-lab that would serve sort of
as a front door for national laboratories. Our 17 national labs
annually conduct more than $12.5 billion in publicly funded
research, but often times that is behind the fences. While it
has proven to deliver a number of spin-off technologies, that
is a real challenge for the kind of collaboration that we have
really seen effectively accelerate those things. So the goal of
this legislation is to give business owners and regional
academia, even local government greater ability to interface
with those resources.
As NNSA Administrator overseeing three of the largest labs
in the country, I would love your thoughts on this concept
generally and if the Federal share of funding were available
from existing tech transfer funds, would you be willing to
carry out a pilot program at one of the labs to explore this
concept further and to be able to evaluate the results?
Dr. Klotz. Thank you, Senator, and thank you for your
personal interest on this as well. As you know, the NNSA labs
have already transferred a lot of their innovations to
industry, a lot of it in the engineering area, but also in
medicine, in climate prediction, a whole host of issues.
An ongoing challenge, as you pointed out, has been how do
you have an interface between the entrepreneurial community and
the broader academic community when a lot of our work is done
behind the wire, behind the fence, and there are security
barriers to doing that.
So we are very supportive of the efforts that you have
outlined to accelerate technology transfer within the statutory
and appropriations constraints that we have to live with. And
we support the notion of a pilot plant. And as you know, Sandia
Laboratories has been in the lead in setting up a center for--
or proposing a center for collaboration and commercialization
in Albuquerque, as well as joining with Livermore National
Laboratory in setting up the Livermore Valley Open Campus
concept. So these are things which I know Secretary Moniz is
very interested in pursuing. In fact, he has set up an office
especially to do tech transfer, and we in NNSA fully support
that and will be doing that in our own mission space.
Senator Heinrich. I look forward very much to working with
you on that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sessions. Senator Graham?
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
What is the effect of sequestration on your ability to do
your job if it goes back into effect?
Dr. Klotz. Thank you, Senator. We think that it would be--
pick your adjective--devastating. It would certainly force us
to take a look at the programs and projects that we have laid
out. Clearly many of those programs and projects would have to
be delayed, which would drive costs even higher for those
programs, and in some cases might actually have to be
eliminated.
Anything that we did in terms of our weapons programs would
have to be something we would do collaboratively with DOD and
STRATCOM because we develop a warhead to go on one of their
delivery systems, and to the extent that that was impacted by
limits of the Budget Control Act, it would inform how we would
proceed with our own life extension programs and the scientific
programs that support those.
Senator Graham. Would you say it would seriously compromise
your ability to perform your duties for the country?
Dr. Klotz. It would have a serious impact, yes, sir.
Senator Graham. MOX.
Dr. Klotz. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Okay, our favorite subject. [Laughter.]
About 60-plus percent built. Do you agree with that?
Dr. Klotz. There are a number of ways in which you can say
``percent built.'' I will not argue with you over 60 percent.
Senator Graham. Some say 67. I say 60. It is over half
built.
Dr. Klotz. We agree with that, over half built.
Senator Graham. The treaty with Russia regarding the MOX
program takes 30-something tons of weapons-grade plutonium off
the market in Russia and the United States. That is a good
thing. Right?
Dr. Klotz. Absolutely.
Senator Graham. Maybe one of the best nonproliferation
agreements we have negotiated with anybody.
Dr. Klotz. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. We do not want to lose that.
Dr. Klotz. No, sir.
Senator Graham. In 2010 in the last update of the treaty,
the United States said that we would use MOX as the disposition
method. Is that correct?
Dr. Klotz. That is correct.
Senator Graham. So over half built, 60 percent. At the end
of the day, they are studying alternatives. I have been looking
at this since the 1990s. I do not see an alternative that is
workable, that saves money, but I guess we will wait and see.
From your point of view, to abandon the disposition of this
material, would that be wise?
Dr. Klotz. Senator, like you, we will be very interested in
the results of the reports, which were mandated by Congress.
The first one is due now and will be out within a matter of
days. It will look at two alternatives: the MOX alternative,
the one we have now, as well as an alternative that is referred
to as----
Senator Graham. Right. I guess my question is you would not
suggest that we just basically withdraw from the treaty.
Dr. Klotz. No, sir.
Senator Graham. So we are going to do something with this
material.
Dr. Klotz. We should do something with this material.
Senator Graham. If we do not, we are making a huge mistake.
Dr. Klotz. I would not disagree with that.
Senator Graham. The last thing you want to do right now
with the Russians is break a treaty with them over reducing the
amount of weapons-grade plutonium they possess.
Dr. Klotz. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. So all I ask of the NNSA is that when we
look at these alternatives, we understand that the goal is
still the same, which is to alleviate the material. We have
made a treaty with the Russians to go the MOX route. I have no
interest in going back to the Russians and saying, hey, would
you work with us to change this because I do not think that is
particularly smart right now. We will stay on top of the cost,
and when we get these reports, I look forward to talking to
you.
But at the end of the say, South Carolina, Mr. Chairman,
has agreed to accept this weapons-grade plutonium years ago, 34
tons, enough to build thousands of warheads. Is that fair to
say?
Dr. Klotz. Yes.
Senator Graham. How many would you say, Ms. Harrington?
Ms. Harrington. 34 tons divided by 8 kilograms per weapon.
Senator Graham. So what does that come out to? Thousands.
Ms. Harrington. Thousands.
Senator Graham. Okay. So we got thousands of warheads that
can be made from this material, 60 percent completion of the
disposition method. South Carolina signed up for this a long
time ago understanding certain things would happen. From the
Department's point of view, the last thing you want to do in my
view is to tell the State that you are going to do something,
get the State to sign up for a mission that is--you know, this
is pretty tough stuff, taking weapons-grade plutonium in your
own State--and bail out on them. You do not want to bail out on
the Russians. You do not want to bail out on South Carolina. So
please understand that how we deal with the MOX program is
going to affect a lot of things in the future.
Dr. Klotz. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
If the sequester remains in effect, which the budget we
passed does not--or at least provides more money for the
Defense Department, what percentage of reduction in your
numbers--was it $8.9 billion we are scoring you to have next
year? Can you give an exact figure or would you know what it
would be if the sequester stayed in place?
Dr. Klotz. Our overall budget request was for 12.6.
Senator Sessions. I have 8.9. What is the difference? What
are we talking about?
Dr. Klotz. So in the weapons activities, that is the 8
percent, that portion of it. Again, it would depend on how--
since we and the rest of the Defense Department all draw from
the 050 budget account, it would depend on how things were
allocated--
Senator Sessions. DOD would make some allocation choices.
Ms. Harrington, Mr. Trimble mentioned the Russians and the
ceasing of cooperation. We just have a few minutes, but can you
give us briefly where we are with cooperation with the Russians
on nonproliferation and what that means for us?
Ms. Harrington. Certainly, Mr. Chairman.
As you know, we have over 2 decades very close cooperation
with the Russians, and we are very disappointed to see that
Russia has chosen not to continue to work with us. We continue
to view Russia as still being one of the highest risk countries
in the world. They have huge stockpiles of highly enriched
uranium and plutonium, and despite the fact that we, in
partnership with our labs, have helped them improve their
practices, improve their security, develop training programs,
even helped them set up their own training center for security,
we still lack the confidence that they recognize the scope of
the problem, the issue of dealing with insider threats, and
quite frankly, the materials that we have seen being smuggled.
Real nuclear materials smuggled have all come out of the former
Soviet Union.
Senator Sessions. What kind of history can you share with
us of actual smuggling of nuclear materials out of Russia?
Ms. Harrington. We would be happy to come back in a
classified setting and share that detailed information with
you.
Senator Sessions. Okay.
Now, when you say they have ceased to cooperate, to what
extent does that create risk? Can you give specific examples in
this public setting?
Ms. Harrington. Well, for example, one of our primary
efforts in Russia--and it was a very unique opportunity--was to
work with them not just on stockpiles, but actually work with
them on the security of the facilities where they store their
warheads. So extremely important in terms of maintaining
control over the most single largest threat that could be posed
against us. So that kind of work we are no longer able to do
directly with them.
Senator Sessions. They said no longer can you come to our
facilities?
Ms. Harrington. Correct.
Senator Sessions. Did they explicitly state the reason for
that?
Ms. Harrington. They have stated that in the future they
will be able to fully support all of the security programs that
we had developed with them by themselves. They will support it
out of their budget, and because they will be funding it, they
do not see a need for us to be on site.
Senator Sessions. General Klotz, the January 15 STRATCOM
report on balance in nuclear weapons programs suggests that due
to the current funding emphasis on certifying the nuclear
stockpile and performing life extension programs on aging
weapons, there may be insufficient funding and science activity
to, ``prepare to respond to future uncertainties.'' And there
is concern about losing, quote, a full design and production
capability. Close quote.
What can you do to ensure our labs maintain a responsive
design capability to address future uncertainties?
Dr. Klotz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
That is also a concern we share. As Dr. Cook mentioned
earlier--I will let him amplify if he would like--striking a
balance between the production that we need to do today, which
depends an awful lot, obviously, on science and engineering,
and for the future is one that we have to pay attention to and
that we worry about, particularly with an aging workforce both
on the Federal and the laboratory and plant production sides.
But the work that our scientists, technicians, and engineers do
at the laboratories and in the production facility really is
leading edge physics, chemistry, materials science, computing
science, and I think that the skill that they developed in
terms of working with the existing systems and keeping them up
to date provides the basic necessary requirements they would
have to have for any future contingencies that would arise.
Dr. Cook. If I were to add to that----
Senator Sessions. Please, go ahead.
Dr. Cook. Briefly, in the 2 decades since we stopped
underground testing, it took about a decade to put the
facilities in place for stewardship. It took about another
decade to really get them under control, get the diagnostics
there, get the people trained. We have achieved that now. There
are still refinements to be made, but at all of the labs, they
each now have facilities that are driven to get uncertainties
down in the simulations that we have. And over the last 2
years, with stable budgets and your support, we have achieved
the level of experimental productivity in laser experiments and
accelerated experiments and hydrodynamic experiments, explosive
experiments that are really challenging the people and driving
the codes. That comes right to the issue of challenging people.
A lot of good training of people who have university
backgrounds, but they are not trained in the weapon program
until they get in the labs. All of that really is going on. And
that is a part of the program that is not often seen.
Senator Sessions. Thank you. I do think good, challenging
work that is important to America is a motivating factor and
keeping people busy is better than not being busy. Do you not
agree?
Mr. Trimble. Absolutely.
Senator Sessions. This is important work and we need to
make sure our people are properly challenged.
Senator Donnelly?
Senator Donnelly. I just have a couple of questions I would
like to follow up with, somewhat along the same line, Dr. Cook.
Much has been commented regarding balancing, overhauling the
aging stockpile, and keeping our scientists at the forefront to
hedge against uncertainty. So how do you work that nuance of
achieving the balance between the two?
Dr. Cook. The short answer is through appropriate
challenges. An immediate example right now is with the W80 Mod
4. In a modern way of looking at the alternatives we have, we
are really challenging the labs to use their best codes, their
best people, and get into some experimental data instead of
guessing about what the results are with regard to a materials
model, the behavior of materials, for example.
Another way is looking at all the concepts and the ways
that we could run the interoperable weapons for the Air Force
and the Navy. While that effort is delayed, we have got some
time to really go through in a more formal way challenging the
people to look at some things that would otherwise be
considered out-of-the-box and too risky. And so I am back to
the experiments again. Experiments are being done with
explosives driving both surrogate material and then in Nevada
now plutonium to determine whether some of the ideas for
improving things, including stuff like additive manufacturing
and less toxic materials, can actually pay off. That is the way
we get the balance. The engineering side very heavily taxed,
but as the chairman just said, we are absolutely keeping the
design side as challenged as we can.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
Mr. Trimble, follow up a little bit on MOX. What do you see
as the root causes of the large cost overruns that have
happened there?
Mr. Trimble. In I think it was 2014, we did a report
looking at MOX and the cost increases. We were trying to get at
that issue of what were the cost drivers. At the time, DOE had
not done a formal root cause analysis. They had identified some
areas that they believed are the reasons for their cost
increases such as unanticipated safety requirements from the
NRC and other things. As a result of that work we did, we
recommended they conduct a formal root cause analysis.
In January 2015, DOE came out with their root cause
analysis. They identified three key areas driving those cost
increases. One was the lack of experienced staff. One was the
lack of alignment of contract incentives with performance, and
one was the atrophy of the supply chain.
We have now gone back to look at that analysis that they
have done to see how thorough it was, or sometimes in the past,
we have had concerns that what have been identified as causes
are not really necessarily a reason, for example, if you had
lack of experienced staff. The real cause is what led you to
have inexperienced staff on that case. So those are the kind of
questions we would look at.
I think one of the things that was interesting was that out
of that root cause study, they came up with a number of
recommendations. 11 recommendations came out of DOE's root
cause study. I think that speaks to another recommendation we
had in that report, which was for DOE to establish a
requirement to always conduct a root cause analysis when your
cost increase or your schedule delayed by about 25 percent.
This is like on the DOD side. I think it is the Nunn-McCurdy
breach, if I am remembering correctly. We had a recommendation
for DOE to pursue the same thing when they had a similar kind
of overrun in their programs. Unfortunately, DOE disagreed with
that recommendation.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
Admiral, we would not want you to come all the way over
here without throwing a pitch your way. So you are building a
new spent fuel rod--a new spent fuel pond--I am sorry--at the
Idaho National Lab. It has gone backwards a little bit due to
the lack of appropriations. And I was wondering if you can
explain the importance of this effort and what the delay has
cost the program and what the cost will be if it continues this
way.
Admiral Richardson. Senator, thanks for the question, and
thank you very much to everybody on the committee for their
firm support of naval reactors.
As I begin to answer the question, I would just like to
compliment General Klotz and my colleagues in articulating the
challenges that they share. And naval reactors, by virtue of
managing the naval nuclear propulsion program from cradle to
grave, shares all of those challenges whether it has attracted
the right people, maintaining the right tools and equipment,
and the infrastructure. All of those challenges, including tech
transfer--we share those inside the naval nuclear propulsion
program.
Part of our challenge today is to recapitalize a spent fuel
handling facility. To call it a pond is really to oversimplify
it.
Senator Donnelly. That would be my specialty. [Laughter.]
Admiral Richardson. It is an absolutely critical node in
our management of our program. All of the naval nuclear spent
fuel goes to that facility for eventual processing and
transition into dry storage, awaiting shipment to a national
repository when ready. Without a facility that manages that
production line efficiently to meet fleet needs, we would
quickly become backed up and we would have to bring aircraft
carriers and submarines and leave them next to the pier rather
than underway.
By virtue of the delays, we have incurred some costs, and
before I describe those, I would like to say, though, that
particularly in the last year, we got a tremendous signal from
Congress to start funding of that facility in a serious manner,
and we have come out of the blocks at a sprint to reach
critical decision one. We are ready to publish our
environmental impact statement this year. And so we are moving
out briskly to move this down the track.
It has cost us some. We have been delayed about 5 years
from our original plan. That has resulted in about $400 million
in escalation and inefficiency costs just moving the facility,
as well as $500 million to buy temporary storage containers to
store aircraft carrier fuel until the new facility is built. So
we had a plan in place to recycle those containers. With the
delay in the facility, there is no place to recycle them
through, and we have to just store it and build temporary
facilities.
Going forward, we would see the same thing if it was
delayed further. But as I said, I think we are off and running
on that. We anticipate starting construction on that after
getting the design very mature in about 2019, bringing the
facility online in 2024, fully operational in 2025.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Admiral.
Senator Sessions. Senator Heinrich?
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Cook, I understand that there may be a need in the
future for a new source for tritium production. As you know,
that only has a 12-year half-life. To produce tritium in a
commercial power reactor and provide a new domestic facility to
enrich the uranium fuel could literally cost taxpayers several
billion dollars. In your view, could we secure enriched uranium
instead from our allies such as in the UK to be used for
tritium production instead of spending this very large amount
of money, which inevitably would come out of the weapons
budget?
Dr. Cook. I will answer the first part of this, and then I
will turn to Under Secretary Klotz for the second part.
The first part is for the current supply of unobligated
uranium, we are good for a period time. We know what the time
is. And we actually provide tritium to the entire stockpile. So
we know what the needs are.
With regard to other sources of uranium, we are doing an
in-depth study, but that might only get us down a period of
time. Eventually the country needs a domestic source of uranium
enrichment not only for tritium production, which we do with
low-enriched uranium, but also for naval propulsion, which
requires a higher level of enrichment. So we will not dodge
that bullet, but we might extend the time if we find some more
material. Nevertheless, we are adhering to the State Department
and its obligations, our obligations, under existing treaties.
Is there anything you wish to add?
Dr. Klotz. The only thing I would add is we have to ask
ourselves if we a major nuclear power--and we are--do we need
the capability to do some of the basic things associated with
being a major nuclear power, and that is providing low-enriched
uranium to produce our own tritium as opposed to relying upon
even our closest allies and friends, and over the longer term,
developing highly enriched uranium ultimately for the U.S.
Navy, which uses it in over 40 combatant ships.
So this is an issue which the Congress has asked us to
provide a report on in terms of what our tritium needs are,
what our low-enriched uranium needs are in order to produce
tritium, and that should be coming out very, very shortly.
But again, I think the fundamental question is what do we
as a Nation need in terms of capability in this regard.
Senator Heinrich. Well, I would certainly suggest we should
also look at the cost/benefit analysis there as well.
Thank you.
Let us see. One last question I guess for Administrator
Klotz. Can you speak to whether there are any plans for the
National labs to work with IAEA [International Atomic Energy
Agency] in order to make sure if there is potential for adding
additional trust and confidence to the inspections that are
planned under the recent framework that was announced with
Iran? Can you speak at all to whether or not there would be
opportunities there for adding additional levels of security to
that arrangement?
Dr. Klotz. Let me just say at this stage, Senator, that as
Secretary Moniz has said in his public statements and I believe
in his briefings to Members of both houses, that a lot of the
policy decisions that were part of the negotiation process were
informed by the technical knowledge, expertise, and analysis
that was done within our labs and within our production
facilities. And I would expect that that would be an important
part of further steps in bringing about an agreement and, if an
agreement, implementing that agreement.
Senator Heinrich. Well said. Thank you.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
We thank you all.
I would ask General Klotz. On the basis of money expended
and the estimated cost of the MOX lab, what percentage of the
money expended are we at at this point?
Dr. Klotz. Senator, that depends upon your assumption of
how long--what the annual appropriation will be, what we will
spend on that, and how long it would take to finish the
project. The longer we take to do it, the more the cost will
be, and therefore, our cost to go would vary. I do not know if
there is anything we would add to that.
Senator Sessions. So you do not have a percentage.
Dr. Klotz. I do not have a percentage. It depends on your
assumption of how much we are going to fund that. You know,
funding it at the current level, as Secretary Moniz has said,
is not optimal funding, if what you are trying to do is to
bring the project to closure. The less you spend, the longer it
takes to bring the project home and the more expensive that is.
So what we have spent to date would be a function of how long
we expect that we would take to complete the project.
Senator Sessions. The criticism at NNSA has been that you
have been unable to plan, manage, or oversee and hold
accountable a nuclear weapons expertise on time, within cost.
The Mies-Augustine congressional advisory panel on the
governance of the nuclear security enterprise found
mismanagement at DOE and NNSA to be largely to blame for these
flaws. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2015 directed you,
Administrator Klotz, to provide views on this panel's
recommendations. We have not received those yet I believe. Do
you expect to have your reviews on that?
Dr. Klotz. Yes. I hope that this will come up here very,
very soon. It is still in the coordination process within our
own Department.
Senator Sessions. So, Mr. Trimble, do you have anything to
add to that discussion of where we are and any ideas for
corrective action?
Mr. Trimble. Well, I think in my opening statement, my
general comment is I think there are some areas where we have
made specific recommendations where I think progress could be
made in terms of cost estimating and analysis of alternatives,
looking at programs. I think work we have ongoing that will be
out later this year looking at contract management and reliance
on contractor assurance systems will also dovetail nicely with
the Mies report.
Senator Sessions. With regard to, I think, Senator
Heinrich's question, maybe to follow up on that, General Klotz
what is NNSA's assessment concerning the ability of Iran to
mount a future nuclear weapon atop an ICBM or cruise missile?
And do the National labs have expertise that contributes to
that discussion and analysis?
Dr. Klotz. Well, in terms of specific capabilities of Iran
or any country, I think we would have to discuss that in a
smaller setting. But again, as responded to the Senator from
New Mexico, there is extraordinary capability within our
laboratories to do the types of research and analysis that can
help inform our policymakers as they deal with----
Senator Sessions. And they are doing that now? And there
are no prohibitions that you are aware of in that cooperative
effort--law or policy.
Dr. Klotz. In terms of informing policy, no.
Senator Sessions. Well, thank you all. It is an important
hearing. You have a very important role in the National
security. My impression, I will state again, is that some of
the complaints that have been outlined, GAO and others, are
being addressed effectively, and I have a sense that there is a
tighter control and a more focused operation ongoing under your
leadership, General Klotz. And we thank all of you for what you
do. We appreciate your cooperation and service.
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:46 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King, Jr.
ohio replacement program
1. Senator King. Admiral Richardson, can you explain how you are
synchronizing the development of the new reactor plant for the Ohio-
class replacement submarine, with the development of the submarine
itself?
Admiral Richardson. Naval Reactors is advancing the design of the
Ohio-class Replacement propulsion plant on the schedule laid out in
2010. The only change to the original schedule stems from the Navy's
decision to delay construction of the first ship from fiscal year 2019
to fiscal year 2021; Naval Reactors adjusted the propulsion plant
development timeline to maintain alignment with the Navy following the
schedule shift.
Naval Reactors' Departments of Energy and Navy efforts are directed
at supporting this schedule, including development of the propulsion
plant design to support procurement of long-lead components in fiscal
year 2019 to enable a construction start in fiscal year 2021 and ship
delivery in fiscal year 2028. After completing ship operational
testing, the first Ohio-class Replacement must be on strategic patrol
by 2031 to meet STRATCOM force level requirements. Given that the first
Ohio-class Replacement submarine, a ship twice the size of the
Virginia-class submarine, is planned to be constructed within the same
span of time, this schedule is aggressive and requires close coupling
of Department of Energy and Department of Navy activities to ensure on
time ship delivery.
To achieve this alignment, the design team has been in close
coordination with the Lead Design Yard (Electric Boat) and Navy
Leadership. The Chief of Naval Operations, in coordination with the
Joint Staff, sets the ship requirements that drive decisions on reactor
plant size and performance. The Navy's Program Executive Officer for
Submarines and Naval Sea Systems Command coordinate with the Ohio-class
Replacement Lead Design Yard, who is responsible for translating ship
capability requirements into the overall submarine design
specifications. As part of this overall coordination, Electric Boat
developed a detailed construction schedule that specifies the required-
in-yard dates for reactor heavy equipment, which is needed early in the
build period, to support the construction timeline. These required-in-
yard dates feed back into the design schedule to ensure that the design
and follow-on component fabrication schedules are also aligned.
In addition to the coordination between Naval Reactors and the
Navy's shipbuilders, the design and construction of Ohio-class
Replacement requires extensive coordination and alignment with the
Navy's Strategic Systems Programs that are responsible for the missile
systems and the British Navy, who will use the Common Missile
Compartment design in their upcoming fleet ballistic missile submarines
(SSBNs). Because they each depend so heavily on each other, these four
design efforts must all remain tightly aligned and in close
collaboration to retire risk early and minimize construction costs.
Given the criticality of Naval Reactors' Department of Energy
activities which are aligned to Navy priorities and mission, strong
support for Naval Reactors' Department of Energy budget is absolutely
critical to this facet of the nation's security.
2. Senator King. Admiral Richardson, are there any points of risk
that this subcommittee should be aware of as the Navy undertakes this
massive project?
Admiral Richardson. The Program remains on track to support reactor
plant heavy equipment procurement of long-lead components in fiscal
year 2019 enabling the lead ship construction start in fiscal year 2021
and ship delivery in fiscal year 2028. After completing ship
operational testing, the first Ohio-class Replacement must be on
strategic patrol by 2031 to meet STRATCOM force level requirements.
Within this aggressive program, two areas warrant special attention:
ensuring the integration of the electric drive components into a fully
functioning system meeting the Ohio-class Replacements' stealth
requirements; and the manufacturability of the new cladding material
for the life-of-the-ship reactor. My staff is focused on ensuring Naval
Reactors delivers both of these technologies to the Navy. The risks are
well known and a plan is in place to retire them, but it is a multi-
year plan that requires firm funding support. With that support,
combined with our past record and experience, these integration
challenges are manageable and currently support the construction of the
lead ship starting in f 2021.
nnsa management and modernization challenges
3. Senator King. Mr. Trimble, the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) has identified a number of challenges the National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA) faces in its plans to modernize the
nuclear security enterprise. How many of those challenges are a result
of unpredictable budgets versus structural problems?
Mr. Trimble.
GAO has not conducted work specifically focused on the extent to
which unpredictable budgets or structural problems present challenges
to NNSA's modernization plans.
Our work on budget estimates for modernization has shown that at
the top line, funding for NNSA modernization activities has been fairly
close to the levels originally planned in 2010 for budgets through
2019. However, there have been more significant changes from year to
year at the individual program level, including instability in the
schedules for major modernization efforts:
The schedules for life extension programs have changed
every year that GAO has evaluated them, which results in budgetary
shifts.
The schedules for construction of replacement plutonium
and uranium facilities have significantly shifted and the scopes of
these projects remain in flux.
Our work has also shown weaknesses in cost and budget estimation
processes that inform plans to modernize the nuclear security
enterprise.
GAO has made numerous recommendations to correct NNSA's
project management problems--for example, for improving cost estimating
capabilities and employing a rigorous analysis of alternatives to
ensure that key capital asset and program decisions will both meet
mission needs and be cost-effective. While NNSA has initiated some
actions and made some progress, the agency has not taken action on many
of these recommendations, which suggests a lack of urgency or
commitment on DOE's part to address identified challenges.
Also, as we noted in our high risk update (February 2015), NNSA
does not have the capacity (people and resources) to resolve contract
and project management problems. NNSA has taken some actions to address
capacity issues, but these actions have not yet ensured that the
department has the capacity to fully address its contract and project
management challenges.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
los alamos transuranic waste
4. Senator Heinrich. Dr. Klotz, my understanding is that the
Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Environmental Management is
taking over management of the cleanup and disposal of transuranic
wastes at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). Much of the waste to
be disposed of is legacy waste; however, how will the NNSA coordinate
with the Office of Environmental Management for disposal of plutonium
waste that is generated in future LANL operations?
Dr. Klotz. The Secretary of Energy has directed NNSA and EM to
transition the acquisition and management of EM-funded legacy cleanup
work at Los Alamos from NNSA to EM. EM will assume direct management of
prime contracts established for EM-funded cleanup work at Los Alamos.
The Secretary has further directed that the two organizations work
collaboratively to accomplish the transition so as to avoid gaps in
responsibilities and minimize to the extent practicable duplication of
effort or overlapping responsibilities. Since 2001, the National TRU
Waste Corporate Board serves as a consensus-building and advisory body
to the Assistant Secretary of Environmental Management to integrate DOE
TRU Waste Complex disposition activities. NNSA and EM have protocols to
facilitate coordination specifically on facilities and infrastructure
issues related to TRU waste management at LANL to supplement existing
coordination mechanisms. This includes legacy TRU waste and the newly
generated waste from future operations. EM and NNSA employees at LANL
and at Headquarters are in near-daily contact and participate on
integrated project teams, review committees, and working groups
together. NNSA and EM interact on a daily basis through our respective
staffs in the Field and Headquarters with the more-formal coordination
mechanisms discussed above, and in participation with integrated
project teams, review committees, and working groups. We will continue
with this approach as the contract transition activities progress over
the next 18-24 months.
replacement of the cmr building at los alamos
5. Senator Heinrich. Dr. Klotz, my understanding is that Los Alamos
is starting to transfer operations from the old Chemistry and
Metallurgy Research (CMR) building into PF-4 and the new Radiological
Laboratory, Utility and Office Building (RULOB). Once the transition is
complete, which office will assume responsibility for managing the
demolition and disposal of the old CMR building--the NNSA or the Office
of Environmental Management?
Dr. Klotz. Facilities transfer to the Office of Environmental
Management (EM) only after an EM review has confirmed the facilities
meet the transfer criteria in accordance with DOE Order 430.1B, Real
Property Asset Management. The program ultimately responsible for
demolition cannot be presumed until after EM has conducted its review.
The Department's management of excess facilities such as CMR is the
subject of an ongoing Department level review. Plans for CMR will be
finalized within the framework of the results of that review.
doe's emergency operations center
6. Senator Heinrich. Ms. Harrington, you are responsible for
maintaining the Department's Emergency Operations Center for nuclear
terrorist incidents as well as incidents such as fires and releases of
radiation at DOE facilities, such as the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
(WIPP) in New Mexico. Have you conducted an internal review of how well
the emergency operations center responded during the two incidents at
WIPP in February 2014 and were you satisfied with the performance?
Ms. Harrington. The NNSA Office of Emergency Operations manages the
Department of Energy's (DOE) Emergency Operations Center (EOC), which
maintains situational awareness of the DOE complex. In addition to
providing situational awareness, the DOE EOC provides headquarters
awareness and expertise for incidents requiring departmental decision,
including performing notifications, disseminating information, and
providing subject matter support. The emergency response to the
incident at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant was managed on the ground
by the Nuclear Waste Partnership LLC. A review of the incident found
there were delays in notification to the DOE EOC. In accordance with
DOE Order 151.1C, Comprehensive Emergency Management System, State and
local officials, the Cognizant Field Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
and the Headquarters Operations Center must be notified within 15
minutes and all other organizations within 30 minutes of the
declaration of an emergency. By design and in practice, the DOE EOC is
the first government official to be notified by the LLC. Once notified,
the DOE EOC responded in accordance with Departmental policies. While
the EOC acted in accordance with policy, there is room for improvement
in terms of coordination with the sites to ensure timely notifications.
DOE continues to work with all its Sites and Facilities to ensure
reporting requirements are fully understood; communications gaps are
identified and resolved; and enterprise-wide situational awareness and
emergency management are enhanced. To address gaps, DOE is currently
working to revise DOE Order 151.1C on emergency management to alleviate
inconsistent interpretation and implementation of requirements at some
DOE sites and incorporate lessons learned.
schedule to restart operations at wipp
7. Senator Heinrich. Mr. Trimble, I understand the GAO has been
reviewing the plans and schedule to restart limited operations at the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant as soon as fiscal year 2016. What are GAO's
observations about the current schedule to resume normal operations and
the planned restart process?
Mr. Trimble. As you noted, we are conducting an ongoing review for
this committee on DOE's plans to restart the WIPP facility. In
particular, we are assessing (1) actions DOE is taking to improve the
oversight of the contractor responsible for operating the WIPP
facility, (2) the extent to which DOE has reliable cost and schedule
estimates for restarting the facility, and (3) whether DOE used a
reliable process for selecting its proposed solution for upgrading the
WIPP ventilation system. We plan on briefing the committee within the
next several months on the results of our review.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2016 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 22, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
AIR FORCE AND NAVY NUCLEAR PROGRAMS AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NUCLEAR
ENTERPRISE REVIEW RECOMMENDATIONS
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:00 p.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jeff
Sessions (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Inhofe, Sessions,
Donnelly, King, and Heinrich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOE DONNELLY
Senator Donnelly [presiding]. I would like to thank all the
witnesses for being here, and you can take a seat.
Senator Sessions will be here in just a moment. He is on
his way over.
I will read my opening statement, and we will keep rolling
along until Senator Sessions gets here. Thank you all very
much.
I want to thank Senator Sessions for holding this important
hearing. Over a year ago, we had a failure in ethics for both
the Air Force and Navy nuclear missions. For the Air Force,
this involved cheating on Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
(ICBM) proficiency exams. For the Navy, it involved cheating on
naval reactors proficiency exams. While integrity of the Air
Force nuclear weapons was never compromised, it pointed to a
readiness and morale problem associated with the demanding
mission that Strategic Command requires and how the Department
of Defense (DOD) has paid a lesser amount of attention to its
nuclear mission.
One may have varying opinions of nuclear weapons, but as
long as they exist and other nations have them, it will remain,
as Secretary Carter termed, as the bedrock of our defense
posture. We cannot let this mission lapse.
I am gratified the Department has taken a head-on approach
to correcting these issues with the nuclear mission, and we are
anxious to help support the readiness of our deterrence posture
now and in the future.
Again, let me thank everyone for their attendance today. I
look forward to your testimony, and Senator Sessions should be
here with us in just a few minutes. And we will go left to
right. Ms. Creedon, thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. MADELYN CREEDON, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Ms. Creedon. Thank you, Senator.
I would also like to thank Chairman Sessions, obviously
when he gets here----
Senator Donnelly. He gets thanked more while he is not here
than when he is here.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Creedon.--as well as the other members of the
subcommittee.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to discuss with you
today the report of the Department of Defense internal nuclear
enterprise review team. My co-chairs on the review were Rear
Admiral Peter Fanta, former Deputy for Resources and
Acquisition, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Sergeant Major Patrick
Alston, the command's senior enlisted leader of the U.S.
Strategic Command.
Our internal review of the Department of Defense nuclear
enterprise started in February 2014 at the direction of former
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel. He started this after a
series of troubling events involving the Nation's deterrent
forces and their senior leadership when he directed both an
internal and an external review of the health of the nuclear
enterprise.
The external review was conducted by former Air Force Chief
of Staff and Commander of the Strategic Air Command, General
Larry Welch, and former Commander of Fleet Forces Command,
Admiral John Harvey. Their report, the Independent Review of
the Department of Defense Nuclear Enterprise, as well as the
report of the internal review team, were provided to Congress
this past November.
For the most part, the findings of both the internal and
the external reviews were very much in line. There were,
however, some differences in the recommendations. Our internal
team's report is a classified report. As such, I have attached
to my written statement an unclassified summary describing the
findings and the recommendations of the internal review team's
report. The fact sheet was also provided to Congress in
November, along with our report.
One of the key findings of our internal review team was
that in spite of the shortcomings in the enterprise--and there
were many--the men and women of the nuclear enterprise are
dedicated and committed to the mission and the work. And they
work exceedingly hard to ensure the safety and the security of
the U.S. deterrence forces. On balance, the forces, including
the civilians, were understaffed, under-supported, under-
appreciated, and in many instances were working with out-of-
date equipment, a shortage of parts, and inadequate facilities.
We also found that some of the fixes of the past had
actually made things worse. As a result, we stressed in our
report that an approach that simply checks the box and moves on
is not the correct approach. This sort of approach will fail to
recognize the interconnected nature of many of the problems and
that many of the solutions are often long-term, organizational,
and cultural.
We had a fairly long list of key findings in our report,
which are summarized, as I mentioned, in my written statement.
But I wanted to take the opportunity to highlight that the most
important of our recommendations are those that will help the
people who work in the nuclear enterprise every day get their
job done. These men and women are our most important asset in
the nuclear enterprise.
I want to close now by not only thanking the entire
internal review team for their work, but also former Secretary
Hagel for caring enough about the enterprise to bring his
personal attention and credibility to its problems. He got the
attention of the senior leaders in the DOD and the services.
Already, there are some good results and some good efforts, and
you will hear more about these from my colleagues on the panel
here today. The real challenge, however, is to maintain that
focus, energy, and attention for the long term.
Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Creedon follows:]
Prepared Statement by Honorable Madelyn Creedon
Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss with you today
the report of the Department of Defense Internal Nuclear Enterprise
Review team. My co-chairs on the review were Rear Admiral Peter Fanta,
former Deputy for Resources and Acquisition, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
Sergeant Major Patrick Alston, Command Senior Enlisted Leader, U.S.
Strategic Command.
Our internal review of the Department of Defense (DOD) nuclear
enterprise was undertaken beginning in February 2014 at the direction
of former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, after a series of troubling
events involving the nation's nuclear deterrent forces and their senior
leadership. In addition to the internal review team's report: Internal
Assessment of the Department of Defense Nuclear Enterprise, Secretary
Hagel also directed an external review and report. The external review
was conducted by former Air Force Chief of Staff and Commander of the
Strategic Air Command, General Larry Welch, and former Commander of
Fleet Forces Command, Admiral John Harvey. Their report: Independent
Review of the Department of Defense Nuclear Enterprise, and the report
of the Internal review team were provided to Congress this past
November.
Our internal team's report is a classified report. As such, I have
attached an unclassified summary describing the findings and
recommendations of the internal review team's report, as well as a fact
sheet developed by DOD that sets out a description of the
implementation plans for changing the nuclear enterprise. Both the fact
sheet and the summary were also provided to the Congress in November.
Over the course of three months, a team of 96 professionals, drawn
from the relevant components of the Office of the Secretary of
Defenses, the Joint Staff, Military Services, and the Defense Agencies,
visited all of the operational nuclear facilities and most of the
supporting facilities in CONUS, and a representative sampling of the
nuclear forces in Europe. We established three sub-teams: Personnel,
Performance, and Investment, to facilitate our review. We talked to
over 1,500 people--offices, enlisted, civilian, and contractors who
were directly involved in or provide training, education and support to
the DOD nuclear enterprise.
We talked with aircraft, missile, and warhead maintainers, shipyard
workers, civil engineers, submariners, missileers, pilots, teachers and
instructors, supply, sustainment and parts specialists, engineers,
personnel specialists, doctors, nurses and medical technicians,
security forces, financial managers and budget specialist, at all
levels and ranks. Conversations were held individually and in small
groups without supervisors present. These conversations were candid,
honest, and direct. In addition, the team received extensive briefings
from each of the services, reviewed hundreds of documents, and reviewed
the findings of the previous reviews and reports.
We also received extensive support from the historians of the Air
Force Global Strike and other Commands, who provided a wealth of
valuable historical documents dating back to the earliest days of the
Air Force Nuclear Enterprise.
We found that in spite of the various shortcomings in the
enterprise, the men and women of the nuclear enterprise are dedicated
and committed to the mission, and work exceedingly hard to ensure the
safety and security of the United States.
Our review focused on current operational issues of the DOD nuclear
enterprise and what is needed to sustain the force until the various
elements of the Triad are replaced. We did not evaluate any of the
replacement programs themselves other than to note that it will be
years before the new systems are fielded, and in the meantime, the
existing systems must be maintained. Similarly the internal team did
not review the nuclear warheads and the life extension programs being
developed by the National Nuclear Security Administration to sustain
them.
One of the most important findings of the internal review team was
the realization that the problems of the nuclear enterprise do not
exist in isolation. The problems are inextricably interrelated. One
problem begets another which begets another. This interdependence
between and among the shortfalls and deficiencies requires a
coordinated, holistic approach to resolving the issues. The
interdependent relationship of the problems identified within each
Service, but particularly the Air Force, led to our conclusion that in
many instances the ultimate solutions would have to be cultural and
structural, and sustained over the long term. In other words, although
money is needed to solve many of the problems, money is certainly not
the only solution to the problems. And while there are many things that
can and need to be fixed in the near term, the solutions in many
instances are long-term.
For the most part, the findings of both the internal and external
reviews were very much in line with one another. The external review
team placed greater emphasis on the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) while the internal review team focused primarily on the Services.
There were also some differences in the recommendations and approach to
addressing the problems, but in the end it is up to OSD and the
Services ultimately to identify appropriate changes and put them into
place.
The key recommendations contained in the internal review teams
report are:
Allow leaders to learn from mistakes;
Provide the necessary manning and skills and address
skill level gaps throughout the forces;
Develop nuclear professionals and the career management
to develop a broad nuclear career field;
Overhaul the nuclear inspections process and reinforce
distinctions between inspections, reviews, technical assistance, and
exercises;
Develop and use a rigorous self-assessment program to
highlight and fix problems at all levels of command;
Simplify administration of the personnel reliability
program;
Provide long-term sustainment and plan for parts
obsolescence;
Ensure future investments include Navy shipyard and shore
installations and new facilities needed by the Air Force, including
support and alert facilities;
Direct the Air Force to upgrade Air Force Global Strike
Command to a 4-star command
Increase Air Force Global Strike Command, Navy Strategic
Systems Programs, and Naval Reactors oversight and say in essential
support functions;
Direct the Air Force to upgrade Headquarters Air Force A-
10 position to a 3-star position
Create a senior position reporting to the Secretary for
oversight of the Nuclear Enterprise.
conclusion
Although not directly involved in the DOD's efforts to address the
conclusions of the review teams and to implement the recommendations to
address the problems in the enterprise, I am aware that much is being
done to bring change to the nuclear enterprise. I also want to thank
former Secretary of Defense Hagel for taking the initiative and
providing the support to identify and resolve the problems that have
been ongoing in the nuclear enterprise for many years. As one Air Force
NCO said to our team, ``There have been a lot of studies, but nothing
ever changes. We want this study to be worth it this time.''
summary of dod internal nuclear enterprise review
Earlier this year, after a series of missteps involving the
nation's nuclear deterrent forces and their senior leadership,
Secretary Hagel directed both an internal Department of Defense (DOD)
review and an external, independent review of the DOD nuclear
enterprise. This includes Air Force Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
(ICBMs), nuclear-capable bombers and tactical fighters, Navy ballistic
missile submarines, and the supporting infrastructure to build,
maintain, and control these assets. The internal review led by then-
Assistant Secretary of Defense Madelyn Creedon, Rear Admiral Peter
Fanta formerly from the Joint Staff, and Command Sergeant Major Patrick
Alston from U.S. Strategic Command. The external review was led by
former Air Force Chief of Staff and Commander of Strategic Air Command,
General Larry Welch (retired), and former Commander of Fleet Forces
Command, Admiral John Harvey (retired).
The review leaders and their staffs visited all of the operational
U.S. nuclear bases and key supporting facilities. They interviewed more
than a thousand officers, enlisted personnel, civilians, and
contractors from across the armed services. Both review teams found
participants that were open, candid, and eager to engage in dialogue
regarding their ability to perform their mission.
The internal review was specifically asked by the Secretary of
Defense to examine the nuclear mission regarding personnel, training,
testing, command oversight, mission performance, and investment. This
review also looked into mission readiness and other operational issues
and therefore remains classified. The internal report is consistent
with the findings and conclusions of the external review.
The internal review disclosed systemic problems across the nuclear
enterprise. In general, these problems can be divided into several
categories: longstanding, known problems that remained unaddressed and
so became, over time, under-reported; known problems that were
addressed but the corrective actions made the problem worse (or created
new problems); and problems that were common knowledge in the field but
which were never communicated to leadership. Significantly, the review
determined that many of these problems were inextricably interrelated,
with one problem begetting another. While many issues will need
additional investments, in many cases the necessary corrective actions
are cultural and structural. These measures will take time to
implement, and must also be sustained over the long-term.
The review provided a number of recommendations for both short- and
long-term action; some are service-specific, some are at the
departmental level and others are relevant to the entire enterprise.
The review team made clear that this essential mission requires
refocused attention and resources at all levels of the Department. The
review organized its inquiry, findings, and recommendations into four
categories: personnel, inspections, investment, and organization.
The review of personnel issues identified issues with
accountability, manning and skills mix, career development, morale and
recognition, the personnel reliability program, and security forces.
Within these areas, some issues manifested at the departmental level,
in both services, or in a specific service. Key findings include:
- A blurring of the lines between accountability and perfection
in the Air Force;
- Inadequate facilities and equipment, including IT systems, for
the civilian workforce;
- A rapidly aging civilian workforce in Navy shipyards, with a
significant mid-career gap;
- Lack of promotion opportunities generally in the nuclear
career field and lack of a defined, sustainable career path for nuclear
officers in Air Force, and career constraints resulting from nuclear
specialization for both officers and enlisted personnel;
- Stress on submarine crews created by shipyard shortfalls in
the Navy;
- Unduly burdensome, overly technical, and excessively risk-
averse implementation of the personnel reliability program.
The internal review's inquiry into inspections found that
the nuclear enterprise is subject to a culture of excessive
inspections. The problem is particularly acute in the Air Force, in
part owing to the relative scope of inspections (a submarine inspection
involves 180 sailors, a missile wing inspection involves 84,000 airmen)
and in part owing to important cultural differences between the
services; in particular, the demand for perfection and lack of a
meaningful self-assessment program.
Regarding investment, the review surveyed an aging
nuclear enterprise with a focus on sustainment, operations and
maintenance (O&M) funding, and infrastructure issues. The review
determined that as this infrastructure continues to age, sustainment
will become increasingly more difficult, time-consuming and expensive.
Findings included:
- The lack of ``weapon system'' approach to the ICBM force,
leading to disparate and inefficient sustainment and investment
decisions for different system components;
- Component issues resulting from an aging, unique, and
(relative to other weapons programs) small-sized, programs and systems;
- Serious shortfalls in basic O&M requirements; and
- Shipyard inefficiency caused by use of obsolete and/or
temporary facilities.
Finally, looking at the organization of the nuclear
enterprise, the internal review echoed the finding of the external
review regarding the absence, at the departmental level, of an
integrated ``nuclear enterprise.'' This absence led to reduced
awareness of issues in the nuclear field, particularly those issues
that cut across individual stovepipes.
Collectively, the internal and external reviews found a nuclear
workforce that was dedicated, capable, and performing well in spite of
challenges resulting from being understaffed, underresourced, and
reliant on an aging and fragile supporting infrastructure in an over-
inspected and overly risk-averse environment. Both reports identified
serious issues with potential real world consequences if not
addressed--some of which require long term and permanent cultural and
structural changes.
As a result of these reports, the Department is undertaking a
comprehensive effort to revitalize and integrate the nuclear
enterprise. As long as the need for effective U.S. nuclear deterrence
endures, the United States must operate its nuclear forces with world-
class professionalism, ensure its plans and capabilities are tailored
to emerging nuclear threats, and retain the human capital and
infrastructure to adapt as the strategic landscape changes. The
Department is using this opportunity to refocus attention and resources
to continue to ensure the safety, security and effectiveness of our
nuclear enterprise.
Senator Sessions [presiding]. Dr. Brumer?
STATEMENT OF DR. YISROEL E. BRUMER, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC,
DEFENSIVE AND SPACE PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE, COST ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM EVALUATION
Dr. Brumer. Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, and
distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to be here
today. I appreciate the opportunity to testify about how my
team is executing tasks resulting from these recent internal
and external nuclear enterprise reviews.
These reviews concluded that without intervention, issues
related to resourcing, personnel, organization, and culture put
the nuclear enterprise on a path to more frequent and greater
problems than we have previously witnessed.
Former Secretary Hagel directed the Department to place a
renewed emphasis on the nuclear force. He specifically charged
the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation to
track, monitor, and independently assess the implementation of
the reviews' recommendations with particular focus on assessing
the health of the nuclear enterprise. He also tasked us to
provide monthly updates to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and
regular updates to the Secretary.
Our eight-member team includes active duty ICBM and
ballistic missile submarine military officers, as well as
scientists and data experts to support technical assessments.
This team has shown unwavering dedication to improving the
enterprise by delivering the most honest and objective analysis
of data on assessment as possible. Senior leadership has been
keenly interested in comprehensive and sustainable solutions
rather than short-term efforts that merely check boxes without
placing the enterprise on a more solid footing.
This charge has proven to be both the most important and
the most difficult aspect of our task. It is easy to verify
that an instruction has been modified to relieve the force of
an unnecessary burden or that needed equipment and gear has
been delivered. It is much more difficult to measure changes in
culture or personal attitudes towards the mission. We believe
this kind of analysis is important to facilitate real change
while also remaining vigilant to identify unintended second-
and third-order effects.
Our team has made significant strides in a short time.
Since September, we have distilled every possible
recommendation from the reviews. We have held meetings with all
the stakeholders and formulated problem statements identifying
the root causes of each issue. We have worked with each
responsible organization to develop detailed approaches and
milestones. Finally, to go beyond box checking, we developed
metrics to determine whether we are achieving the desired
intent to improve the overall health of the enterprise.
Additionally, we are visiting key locations to become more
familiar with the unique mission and quality-of-life
challenges, as well as hold non-attributional discussions to
gather empirical data on knowing what issues are most pressing.
Assessing the overall health will prove challenging, and we
do recognize it will take years of dedicated efforts to restore
the risk margin that has been lost. We intend to provide
leadership with our best analysis and advice to help them guide
these efforts to completion. Our team has embraced this
challenge, and we are proud to have been entrusted with the
role of ensuring issues are addressed to provide the Nation
with a safe, secure, and effective strategic deterrent that is
so critical to our National security.
I will continue to report our progress to this committee on
a regular basis. You have my assurance that we will remain
vigilant and we will maintain our honesty and integrity for as
long as the Secretary of Defense and this committee deem our
services worthy and necessary.
I thank you for your time, and I do welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Brumer follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Yisroel Brumer
introduction
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am
honored to join you today. I appreciate the opportunity to testify
about how my team is executing the Secretary of Defense's direction to
track, monitor, and independently assess the implementation of
recommendations from recent internal and external reviews of the
Nuclear Enterprise and to support efforts to ensure the viability of
our Nation's strategic deterrence in the 21st century.
In February 2014, former Secretary Hagel directed both internal and
external reviews of the entire Nuclear Enterprise. These reviews were
conducted over the course of several months by highly esteemed nuclear
professionals, including civilians as well as active duty and retired
military. The review teams conducted hundreds of field interviews with
individuals whose experiences spanned the Nuclear Enterprise, from
first-term airmen, sailors, and marines to the most senior commanders.
Both reviews concluded that without intervention, issues related to
resourcing, personnel, organization, and culture have the Nuclear
Enterprise on a path to more frequent and greater problems than we have
previously witnessed.
As you are aware, these were not the first studies detailing the
shortfalls within the Nuclear Enterprise, and several had noted very
similar, if not identical, findings. With that in mind, the Secretary
of Defense directed that the Department must place a renewed emphasis
on improving the health of the nuclear force.
To enhance senior leader visibility and ensure effective
implementation that addresses root causes, Secretary Hagel directed the
Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), with the
support of the Joint Staff, Air Force, Navy, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, and U.S. Strategic Command, to:
(1) Track, monitor, and independently assess the implementation of
the reviews' recommendations.
(2) Conduct analysis to determine if corrective actions are having
the desired effect and yield long-term sustainable solutions.
(3) Assess the health of the nuclear enterprise.
(4) Provide monthly updates to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.
(5) Provide quarterly updates to the Secretary of Defense.
My division within CAPE is charged with this task because our
portfolio includes program assessment and evaluation of the Nuclear
Enterprise.
In his tasking letter to CAPE, Secretary Hagel directed the
Military Departments and other DOD components to provide CAPE
everything necessary to conduct robust, complete, rigorous, and timely
assessments. I am pleased to report we now have nuclear-specialized
representatives from the Air Force, Navy, and STRATCOM on our team.
Additionally, we have been granted access to the Joint Staff, STRATCOM,
and Service agencies to gather pertinent data to meet the Secretary's
charge of robust, complete, rigorous, and timely assessment.
Our eight-member team includes Active Duty military officers that
have served in the ICBM and ballistic missile submarine career fields,
as well as scientists and data experts to support technical
assessments. Additionally, we utilize a contractor team to conduct deep
dive data analyses and leverage subject matter expertise. The diversity
of the team, including expertise in nuclear operations, social science,
data analysis, and more, has provided a broad understanding of the
reviews' recommendations so we can properly assess the wide range of
subjects brought forward. I am extremely proud of the team, which has
been willing to put in the intensity and the hours necessary to do the
job right. They have shown unwavering dedication to improving the
Nuclear Enterprise by delivering the most honest and objective
analysis, data, and assessments possible.
beyond box checking
Department of Defense (DOD) senior leadership has been very clear
that the Secretary was keenly interested in comprehensive and
sustainable solutions, rather than short-term efforts that merely meet
recommendations by checking boxes without placing the enterprise on
more solid footing. The Secretary charged our team to go beyond
ensuring that tasks are completed and to answer questions like ``Are
DOD efforts having the intended effect?'', ``Are unanticipated risks
arising?'' and most critically, ``Is the Nuclear Enterprise getting
healthier?''
This charge has proven to be both the most important and most
difficult aspect of our task. It is comparatively easy to verify that
an instruction has been modified to relieve the nuclear force of an
unnecessary burden or that needed equipment and gear has been delivered
to the force. It is much more difficult to measure changes in culture
or personal attitudes toward the mission. For this reason, we added a
social scientist to the team and have leveraged the expertise of the
Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute, which conducts surveys
of the command climate in units across all the Services, to help us
gather the pertinent data for accurate assessments of the overall
health of the Nuclear Enterprise. Additionally, we remain vigilant to
identify unintended second- and third-order effects of changes driven
by the recommendations.
We have also initiated efforts to ensure that we are capable of
independently verifying the accuracy of the reports we are receiving,
without becoming another inspection agency that places an additional
burden on the force. We are gathering a broad array of data and are
creating relationships with key agencies to obtain on-the-ground data
from existing inspections to support our assessments. Lastly, we plan
to regularly interact with forces in the field at all ranks, on a non-
attribution basis, to better understand the challenges they are facing
and the changes they are seeing.
progress to date
I am proud to report to this Committee that our team has made
significant strides in a short time. Since September, we have combed
every possible recommendation from the two reviews, nearly 200 in all.
We held meetings with all stakeholders and formulated problem
statements in an effort to identify the root cause of each issue. We
worked with each responsible organization to develop detailed
approaches to correct the root problems. Finally, metrics and
milestones were developed to provide mechanisms for moving the various
efforts forward and for assessing their effects. In keeping with the
spirit of the task to go ``beyond box checking,'' the team developed
both process metrics to determine whether a particular task is
completed, as well as outcome metrics to assess whether the cumulative
effects of the tasks are achieving the desired intent of the
recommendations and improving the overall health of the Enterprise.
In line with the Secretary's charge for complete, rigorous, and
timely assessment, the CAPE Director and our team has visited and will
continue to visit key Nuclear Enterprise locations. During these
visits, the team becomes more familiar with the unique mission and
quality-of-life challenges of that particular location. Additionally,
the team holds individual and group non-attributional discussions to
gather empirical data to determine what issues are most pressing to
those individuals or groups, and solicits feedback on whether personnel
in the field think our metrics are appropriate for tracking the health
of the Enterprise.
As stated earlier, we recognize the outcome metrics will be the
most challenging to assess. We also recognize these are the most
challenging for those in the field to execute, and it will take years
of dedicated efforts to restore the risk margin that has been lost. We
intend to provide leadership with our best analysis and advice to help
them guide these efforts to completion.
conclusion
The DOD leadership, from Secretary Carter on down, has been clear
that the nuclear enterprise--and the deterrent effect it provides--is a
high priority and will remain so as long as nuclear weapons exist. My
team has embraced that challenge and they are proud to have been
entrusted with the role of ensuring appropriate resourcing, personnel,
organizational, and policy issues are addressed to provide the Nation
with the safe, secure, and effective strategic deterrent that is so
critical to our national security. The CAPE team will continue to
report our progress to this committee on a regular basis. You have our
assurance that we will remain vigilant and will maintain our reputation
for rigor, honesty, and integrity in this important mission.
Senator Sessions. Admiral Benedict?
STATEMENT OF VADM TERRY J. BENEDICT, USN, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC
SYSTEMS PROGRAMS
Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. Chairman Sessions, Ranking
Member Donnelly, distinguished members of the committee, thank
you for the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee on
Strategic Forces.
I represent the men and women of the Navy's Strategic
Systems Programs (SSP).
Your continued support of our deterrence mission is
appreciated, and I thank you for that.
My mission as the Director of Strategic Systems Programs is
to design, develop, produce, support, and ensure the safety and
security of our Navy's sea-based strategic deterrent
capability, the Trident III (D5) strategic weapon system.
My written statement, which I respectfully request be
submitted for the record, addresses all of my top priorities.
Due to time constraints, I would like to briefly address three:
nuclear weapons safety and security, the Trident II (D5) life
extension efforts, and the solid rocket motor industry.
First, my top priority is the safety and security of our
Navy's nuclear weapons. Custody and accountability of the
nuclear assets entrusted to the Navy are the cornerstone of
this program. Our approach to the nuclear weapons mission is to
maintain a culture of excellence and self-assessment that
produces the highest standards of performance and integrity.
Second, the Navy is proactively taking steps to address
aging and technology obsolescence. SSP is life-extending the
Trident II (D5) SWS strategic weapon system to match the Ohio-
class submarine service life and to serve as the initial
baseline mission payload for the Ohio replacement submarine
platform. This is being accomplished through a life extension
program for all of the Trident II (D5) subsystems, to include
launcher, navigation, fire control, guidance, missile, and
reentry.
Finally, I remain concerned with the decline in demand for
the solid rocket motor industry. While the Navy is maintaining
a continuous production of solid rocket motors, the demand for
both National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and
the Air Force has declined. This has put the entire specialized
industry at risk. While the efforts of our industry partners
and others have created short-term relief, a long-term support
of the solid rocket motor industry remains a national problem.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I am
pleased to answer any of your questions, sir.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Benedict follows:]
Prepared Statement by VADM Terry Benedict, USN
introduction
Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, distinguished members
of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the
Navy's strategic programs. It is an honor to testify before you this
afternoon representing the Navy's Strategic Systems Programs (SSP).
SSP's mission is to design, develop, produce, support, and ensure
the safety of our Navy's sea-based strategic deterrent, the Trident II
(D5) Strategic Weapons System (SWS). The men and women of SSP and our
industry partners remain dedicated to supporting the mission of our
Sailors on strategic deterrent patrol and our marines, sailors, and
coast guardsmen who are standing the watch, ensuring the security of
the weapons we are entrusted with by this nation.
The Navy provides the most survivable leg of the U.S. nuclear triad
with our ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and the Trident II (D5)
SWS. A number of factors have contributed to an increased reliance on
the sea-based leg of the triad. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review
reinforced the importance of SSBNs and the Submarine Launched Ballistic
Missiles (SLBMs) they carry. SLBMs will comprise a significant majority
of the Nation's operationally deployed nuclear warheads, thus
increasing the Nation's reliance on the sea-based leg of the nuclear
triad. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and Vice Chief of Naval
Operations have recently testified that the Navy's number one priority
is to maintain a credible, modern, and survivable sea-based strategic
deterrent. Maintaining our Nation's capability in this key mission area
includes the proper funding of the Ohio Replacement Program--along with
the propulsion and the SWS--it is ``The Navy's #1 acquisition
program.''
Ensuring sustainment of the sea-based strategic deterrent
capability is a vital national requirement today and into the
foreseeable future. Our PB-16 budget request provides required funding
to support the program of record in fiscal year 2016 for the Trident II
(D5) SWS. To sustain this capability, I am focusing on my top
priorities: Nuclear Weapons Safety and Security; the Trident II (D5)
SWS Life Extension Program; the Ohio Replacement Program; the Solid
Rocket Motor (SRM) Industrial Base; the implementation of the Nuclear
Enterprise Review recommendations; the newly codified Navy Nuclear
Regulatory responsibility; and Collaboration with the Air Force.
nuclear weapons safety and security
The first priority, and the most important, is the safety and
security of the Navy's nuclear weapons. Accordingly, Navy leadership
clearly delegated and defined SSP's role as the program manager and
technical authority for the Navy's nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons
security.
At its most basic level, this priority is the physical security of
one of our Nation's most valuable assets. Our Marines and Navy Masters
at Arms provide an effective and integrated elite security force at our
two Strategic Weapons Facilities and Waterfront Restricted Areas in
Kings Bay, GA, and Bangor, WA. U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Force
Protection Units have been commissioned at both facilities to protect
our submarines as they transit to and from their dive points. These
Coast Guardsmen and the vessels they man provide a security umbrella
for our Ohio-class submarines. Together, the Navy, Marine Corps, and
Coast Guard team form the foundation of our Nuclear Weapons Security
Program, and my headquarters staff ensures that our nuclear weapons
capable activities continuously meet or exceed security, safety, and
compliance criteria.
SSP's efforts to sustain the safety and improve the security of
these national assets continue at all levels of the organization. The
Navy's nuclear weapons enterprise maintains a culture of self-
assessment in order to sustain safety and security. This is
accomplished through biannual assessments by SSP headquarters staff,
periodic technical evaluations, formal inspections, and continuous on-
site monitoring and reporting at the Strategic Weapons Facilities.
Technical evaluations, formal inspections, and on-site monitoring at
the Strategic Weapons Facilities provide periodic and day-to-day
assessment and oversight. Biannual assessments evaluate the ability of
the organization to self-assess the execution of the assigned strategic
weapons mission and compliance with requirements. The assessments
leverage information gained from these oversight activities. The
results of these biannual assessments are critically and independently
reviewed through the Navy Nuclear Weapons Assessment and provided to
the Secretary of the Navy and the CNO.
We also strive to maintain a culture of excellence to achieve the
highest standards of performance and integrity for personnel supporting
the strategic deterrent mission. We continue to focus on the custody
and accountability of the nuclear assets that have been entrusted to
the Navy. SSP's number one priority is to maintain a safe, secure, and
effective strategic deterrent.
d5 life extension program
The next priority is SSP's life extension efforts to ensure the
Trident II (D5) SWS remains an effective and reliable sea-based
deterrent. The Trident II (D5) SWS continues to demonstrate itself as a
credible deterrent and exceeds the operational requirements established
for the system over 30 years ago. The submarine leg of the U.S.
strategic deterrent is ready, credible, and effective, thereby assuring
our allies and partners and deterring potential adversaries. However,
we must remain vigilant about age-related issues to ensure a continued
high level of reliability.
The Trident II (D5) SWS has been deployed on our Ohio-class
ballistic missile submarines for 25 years and is planned for a service
life of 50 years. This is well beyond its original design life of 25
years and more than double the historical service life of any previous
sea-based strategic deterrent system. As a result, effort will be
required to sustain credible SWS from now until the end of the current
Ohio-class SSBN in the 2040s, as well as the end of the service life of
the Ohio Replacement SSBN in the 2080s.
The Navy is proactively taking steps to address aging and
technology obsolescence. SSP is extending the life of the Trident II
(D5) SWS to match the Ohio-class submarine service life and to serve as
the initial baseline mission payload for the Ohio Replacement submarine
platform. This is being accomplished through an update to all the
Trident II (D5) SWS subsystems: launcher, navigation, fire control,
guidance, missile, and reentry. Our flight hardware--missile and
guidance--life extension efforts are designed to meet the same form,
fit, and function of the original system to keep the deployed system as
one homogeneous population, control costs, and sustain the demonstrated
performance of the system. We will remain in continuous production of
large energetic components such as solid rocket motors and Post Boost
Control System Gas Generators, and are starting an age management
replacement effort for missile small ordnance and control components.
We have also started initial planning on the timing of when a follow-on
to Trident II (D5) will be needed. These efforts will provide the Navy
with the missiles and guidance systems we need to meet operational
requirements through the introduction and deployment of the Ohio
Replacement SSBNs through the 2080s.
While budgetary pressures and impacts of sequestration have
resulted in some deferred or delayed efforts, strategic deterrence
remains the Navy's highest priority. As such, the Navy is committed to
minimizing, to the maximum extent possible, impacts to this program in
order to meet strategic requirements.
One impacted effort is the change to our flight test program. In
accordance with U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) requirements, the
Navy is required to flight test a minimum of four Trident II (D5)
missiles per year in a tactically-representative environment. The
purpose of flight testing is to detect any change in reliability or
accuracy. The fiscal year 2016 budget request reflects a reduction of
one planned flight test for affordability. The Navy has coordinated
with STRATCOM to determine that this temporary reduction is manageable
in the short-term, contingent upon our plan to ramp back up to four
flight tests per year later in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).
A prolonged reduction beyond what is planned in fiscal year 2016 would
impact our ability to detect changes in reliability and accuracy of an
aging system with the required degree of statistical confidence to meet
STRATCOM requirements. I am strongly committed to ensure our flight
testing returns to four flight tests per year.
Despite budgetary pressures, the Navy's D5 life extension program
remains on track. In June 2014, the USS West Virginia (SSBN 736)
successfully conducted her Demonstration and Shakedown Operation (DASO
25) by launching two missiles. One missile marked the third flight test
of the D5 life-extended (LE) guidance system and the second flight test
of the D5 LE Command Sequencer. The second missile was the first flight
of the D5 LE Flight Controls Electronics Assembly and Interlocks
packages. Additionally, the first flight test of the D5 LE guidance
system with the D5 LE Flight Controls Electronics Assembly and
Interlocks packages is scheduled for DASO 26 in fiscal year 2016. The
D5 LE Command Sequencer met its initial fleet introduction earlier this
year. The life extension efforts for the remaining electronics packages
are on budget and on schedule. The life-extended missiles will be
available for initial fleet introduction in fiscal year 2017.
Another major step to ensure the continued sustainment of our SWS
is the SSP Shipboard Integration (SSI) Programs, which address
obsolescence management and modernization of SWS shipboard systems
through the use of open architecture design and commercial off-the-
shelf hardware and software. The first increment of this update was
installed on the final U.S. SSBN in April of last year. This completed
installation on all 14 U.S. SSBNs, all 4 UK SSBNs and all U.S. and U.K.
land-based facilities. Subsequent increments of this program begin
installation this summer. The SSI Program includes refreshes of
shipboard electronics hardware and software upgrades, which will extend
service life, enable more efficient and affordable future maintenance
of the SWS and ensure we continue to provide the highest level of
nuclear weapons safety and security for our deployed SSBNs while
meeting STRATCOM requirements.
To sustain the Trident II (D5) SWS, SSP is extending the life of
the W76 reentry system through a refurbishment program known as the
W76-1. The W76-1 refurbishment maintains the military capability of the
original W76 for an additional 30 years. This program, which is being
executed in partnership with the Department of Energy, National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA), has completed over 50 percent of the
planned warhead production. The Navy will continue to work with NNSA to
closely monitor production and deliveries to ensure there are no
operational impacts.
In addition, the Navy continues the design work to refurbish the
aging electronics in the W88 reentry system. The Navy is collaborating
with the Air Force to reduce costs through shared subsystems suitable
for the W88/Mk5 and the W87/Mk21. Additionally, the Nuclear Weapons
Council (NWC) has approved the inclusion of conventional high explosive
refurbishment as part of this effort which will support deployment of
the W88/Mk5 into the early 2040s. As directed by the NWC, we have
submitted funding requests to support the initial concept studies (6.2/
6.2A) for an Interoperable Warhead (IW) to begin in 2020. The Navy
believes that the NWC is effective at managing and identifying
priorities for the nuclear weapons stockpile. Moreover, the Navy is
fully represented at the NWC and has every opportunity to raise any
issues directly with the NWC when necessary. Therefore, I do not
recommend a separate Service vote at the NWC.
ohio replacement program
The Navy's highest priority acquisition program is the Ohio
Replacement Program, which replaces the existing Ohio-class submarines.
The continued assurance of our sea-based strategic deterrent requires a
credible SWS, as well as the development of the next class of ballistic
missile submarines. The Navy is taking the necessary steps to ensure
the Ohio Replacement SSBN is designed, built, delivered, and tested on
time with the right capabilities at an affordable cost.
To lower development costs and leverage the proven reliability of
the Trident II (D5) SWS, the Ohio replacement SSBN will enter service
with the Trident II (D5) SWS and D5 LE missiles onboard. These D5 LE
missiles will be shared with the existing Ohio-class submarine until
the current Ohio-class retires. Maintaining one SWS during the
transition to the Ohio-class replacement is beneficial from a cost,
performance, and risk reduction standpoint. A program to support long-
term SWS requirements will have to be developed in the future to
support the Ohio-class replacement SSBN through its entire service
life.
The Navy continues to leverage from the Virginia-class program to
implement lessons-learned and ensure the Ohio Replacement Program
pursues affordability initiatives across design, construction, and life
cycle operations and support. Several critical milestones and decisions
were achieved by the SSBN design team as they progress the design of
the Ohio Replacement. Maintaining the pace of design and submarine
industrial capability is critical to the continued success of our sea-
based strategic deterrent now and well into the 2080s.
A critical component of the Ohio Replacement Program is the
development of a Common Missile Compartment (CMC) that will support
Trident II (D5) deployment on both the Ohio-class replacement and the
successor to the U.K. Vanguard-class. As the United Kingdom will be the
first to test, launch, and deploy the Trident II (D5) system in a CMC,
the U.S.-led design team is progressing at pace to support the U.K.
Successor lead ship construction timeline. In 2014, the United States
contracted for the first joint procurement of missile tubes to support
building the U.S. prototype Quad-pack module, the Strategic Weapons
System-Ashore (SWS Ashore) test site, and the U.K.'s first SSBN. The
joint CMC effort is shifting from design to construction that will
support production in both United States and United Kingdom build
yards. Any delay to the common missile compartment effort has the
potential to impact the U.K.'s ability to maintain a continuous at sea
deterrent posture.
To manage and mitigate technical risk to both the U.S. and U.K.
programs, SSP is leading the development of SWS Ashore integration test
site at Cape Canaveral, FL. This is a joint effort with the Navy and
the State of Florida investing in the redevelopment of a Polaris site
to conduct integration testing and verification for Ohio replacement
and U.K. Successor programs. Refurbishment of the Polaris site and
construction of the infrastructure and building is proceeding at a
rapid pace. Trident II (D5), Ohio-class, and Ohio replacement new
design hardware will be co-located and integrated to prove the
successful re-host and redeployment of the Trident II (D5) SWS on the
new submarines. To mitigate the restart of launch system production,
SSP recently broke ground on a surface launch facility at the Naval Air
Station, China Lake, CA. This facility will prove that the launcher
industrial base can replicate the performance of the Ohio-class Trident
II (D5) launch system. We will be launching the refurbished Trident II
(D5) test shapes we used in the 1980s starting in fiscal year 2017.
Launch performance is a critical factor we must understand at the
systems level to ensure we maintain high reliability as we transition
the weapon system to the next class of SSBNs.
The United States and the United Kingdom have maintained a shared
commitment to nuclear deterrence through the Polaris Sales Agreement
since April 1963. As the Director of SSP, I am the U.S. Project Officer
for the Polaris Sales Agreement. Our programs are tightly coupled both
programmatically and technically to ensure we are providing the most
cost effective, technically capable nuclear strategic deterrent for
both nations. Last year, marked the 51st anniversary of this agreement,
and I am pleased to report that our longstanding partnership with the
United Kingdom remains strong. The United States will continue to
maintain its strong strategic relationship with the United Kingdom as
we execute our Trident II (D5) LE Program and develop the common
missile compartment. Our continued stewardship of the Trident II (D5)
SWS is necessary to ensure a credible and reliable SWS is deployed
today on our Ohio-class submarines, the U.K. Vanguard-class, as well as
in the future on our respective follow-on platforms. This is of
particular importance as the New START treaty reductions are
implemented, increasing the reliance on the sea-based leg of the Triad.
The Ohio replacement will be a strategic, national asset whose
endurance and stealth will enable the Navy to provide continuous,
uninterrupted strategic deterrence well into the 2080s.
solid rocket motor (srm) industrial base
A priority is the importance of the defense and aerospace
industrial base, in particular, the solid rocket motor industry. I
remain concerned with the decline in demand for solid rocket motors.
While the Navy is maintaining a continuous production capability at a
minimum sustaining rate of 12 rocket motor sets per year, the demand
from both NASA and Air Force has precipitously declined. Not only did
this decline result in higher costs for the Navy, as practically a sole
customer, but it also put an entire specialized industry at risk for
extinction--or at least on the ``endangered species list.'' To allow
this puts our National security at risk. The Navy cannot afford to
singularly carry this cost, nor can our Nation afford to lose this
capability. While the efforts of our industry partners and others have
created short-term cost relief, the long-term support of the solid
rocket motor industry remains an issue that must be addressed at the
national level. To date, this has not happened. At SSP, we will
continue to work with our industry partners, DOD, senior NASA
leadership, Air Force and Congress to do everything we can to ensure
this vital national security industry asset is preserved.
nuclear enterprise review
The recent Secretary of Defense-directed Nuclear Enterprise Review
(NER) and the Program and Budget Review for the fiscal year 2016 budget
formulation focused significant attention on the recapitalization,
sustainment, and modernization of our nuclear deterrence systems and
infrastructure. The NER provided the Navy a thorough and unbiased look
at our nuclear forces. Overall, the report found that the nuclear
enterprise is safe, secure, and effective today but it also found
evidence of systemic problems that, if not addressed, could undermine
the safety, security, and effectiveness of elements of the force in the
future. Fortunately the Navy's internal Nuclear Weapons Assessment and
the SSP Comprehensive Self-Assessment identified most of the issues
underscored during the NER. In fact, the report validated numerous
efforts already underway.
The Navy has taken active steps to address the more than 68
recommendations with Navy equity contained in the report. Significant
action has been taken to implement each recommendation, generally
focused on a few key areas, including: oversight, investment, and
personnel and training improvements. These implementation actions have
been funded with an additional budget request of $407 million in fiscal
year 2016 and $2.2 billion across the FYDP. With respect to oversight,
the Navy is clarifying the nuclear deterrent enterprise leadership
structure and reducing administrative burdens imposed on the forces.
The Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise Group (NDERG), formed and led by the
Secretary of Defense will provide regular oversight of the nuclear
enterprise. The Navy Nuclear Weapons Oversight Council has become the
Navy's mechanism to ensure NDERG recommendations and guidance are
properly implemented and that investments achieve the intended effect.
Regarding training and personnel the Navy is planning a significant
investment to build a margin in the deterrence force and clear the SSBN
maintenance backlog. Some of the recommendations involve long-term
cultural or organizational changes, and the Navy has matched the right
responsibilities with the right leaders. There will be an emphasis on
the importance of the deterrence mission through updated vision
statements, revised campaign plans, and methods to eliminate obstacles
to enhance moral conduct and relieve the pressures on sailors,
training, and work-life balance. More specifically the Navy will apply
additional resources to Strategic Mission personnel with a planned $28
million and an increase of 44 Full-Time Equivalents (FTE) in fiscal
year 2016. In addition 160 FTEs were added for the Strategic Weapons
Facilities and Trident Training Facility to improve sustainment and
training of the ballistic missile submarine force.
The Navy has also planned a substantial increase in FTEs for the
four Naval Public Shipyards. With an eventual target of 33,500 direct
and reimbursable FTEs, the goal is to better match capacity with
workload. In addition, some submarine maintenance will be outsourced to
the private sector to ensure over capacity work does not result in
deferred maintenance into the FYDP. Both of these actions result in an
investment of $338 million with an overall planned FYDP investment of
$1.1 billion. There will be accelerated infrastructure improvements and
recapitalization plans to ensure long-term sustainment at Shipyards and
Strategic Weapons Facilities. The Navy accelerated investment in the
budget request for fiscal year 2016 from a 17 year plan to a 15 year
plan to improve the condition of the Shipyards by adding $350 million
across the FYDP. The Navy has also funded $324 million across the FYDP
to address infrastructure issues at the Strategic Weapons Facilities.
Navy is developing a 20 year investment plan to ensure the continued
reliability of critical infrastructure at these facilities to support
nuclear weapons movement and operations. While the Navy has made
significant progress through actions taken to date, we recognize much
work remains to be accomplished. The Navy is confident we have the
right emphasis, oversight, and processes in place to maintain a
credible, modern, and safe sea-based deterrent.
navy nuclear regulatory responsibility
As a result of the Nuclear Enterprise Review the Navy implemented a
centralized regulatory authority for nuclear force readiness. As the
Director, Strategic Systems Programs (DIRSSP), I now have
accountability, responsibility and authority to serve as the single
Flag Officer to monitor performance and conduct end-to-end assessment
of the Navy Nuclear Deterrence Mission (NNDM) elements. These
responsibilities are defined in Secretary of the Navy Instruction
8120.1B and Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 8120.1.
Nine Echelon 2 level commands directly contribute to the NNDM: U.S.
Fleet Forces Command, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Fleet Cyber Command, Navy
Supply Systems Command, Naval Sea Systems Command, Chief of Naval
Personnel, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Commander, Navy
Installations Command, and SSP.
DIRSSP will be the NNDM regulatory authority responsible for
assessing and reporting issues to the Navy Nuclear Weapons Council and
the CNO. SSP is tasked with developing, coordinating, and implementing
policies approved by the CNO, and conducting end-to-end assessments of
the Department of the Navy nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons systems
and personnel for safe, reliable, and effective execution of the NNDM.
SSP is engaged with the Echelon 2 commands defined above to
understand their current reporting and assessment processes and to
define the NNDM regulatory assessment policy. My next in-progress
review for the CNO, April 2015, will define the existing reporting and
engagement strategies, the status of our interaction with the commands,
and present the initial component assessment and reporting.
collaboration with the air force
The final priority is strategic collaboration between the Services.
The Navy and the Air Force are both addressing the challenges of
sustaining aging strategic weapon systems and have begun to work
collaboratively to ensure these capabilities are retained in the long-
term to meet our requirements. To do so, we are seeking opportunities
to leverage technologies and make the best use of scarce resources.
As I testified last year, the Navy and the Air Force established an
Executive Steering Group to identify and investigate potential
collaboration opportunities and oversee collaborative investments for
sustainment of our strategic systems. As a part of this effort,
technology area working groups are studying collaboration opportunities
in the areas of Reentry Systems, Guidance, Strategic Propulsion,
Command and Control, Radiation Hardened Electronics, Testing and
Surveillance, and Nuclear Weapons Surety.
The Navy was an active participant in the Air Force's Ground Based
Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) effort. Members of my staff were involved
with this effort, which began during the GBSD Analysis of Alternatives
(AoA). Navy subject matter experts supported each of the GBSD AoA
working groups and participated in an effort to evaluate the benefits
and potential risks of commonality and collaboration for each of the
GBSD AoA options. Since the completion of the AoA, the Navy has
continued to support the Air Force technical and programmatic efforts
on GBSD including technology identification and requirements
development.
The benefits of increased collaboration between the services are
many. However, commonality is required to actually save costs.
Commonality will help improve the affordability of the Nation's
strategic services by eliminating redundant efforts and by improving
economic order quantities of key constituents and components. In
addition to the benefits gained by improved economic order quantities,
the use of common constituents and components will make it easier for
the Navy and Air Force to sustain the critical skills and capabilities
needed by stabilizing demand signals to suppliers. Finally these
efforts allow the Navy and Air Force to leverage work already being
done by the other Service to avoid unnecessary duplication and costs.
Each leg of the Triad has unique attributes. Furthermore, a
sustained and ready Triad provides an effective hedge, allowing the
Nation to shift to another leg, if necessary due to unforeseen
technical problems or vulnerabilities. For this reason, the Department
is focused on cooperative efforts that maintain affordability and
reduces risk to both services while retaining essential diversity where
needed to ensure a credible and reliable deterrent. Many of the
industries and required engineering skills sets are unique to strategic
systems. Key to SSP's historical success has been our technical
applications programs, which in the past have provided a research and
development foundation. As we evaluate maintaining this strategic
capability until the 2080s to match the full service life of the Ohio
Replacement submarine, we will need to resume these critical efforts.
conclusion
SSP continues to maintain a safe, secure, and effective strategic
deterrent and focus on the custody and accountability of the nuclear
assets entrusted to the Navy. Our PB-16 budget request ensures that we
will sustain this capability in fiscal year 2016. However, we must
remain vigilant about unforeseen age-related issues to ensure the high
reliability required of our SWS. SSP must maintain the engineering
support and critical skills of our industry and government team to
address any future challenges with the current system as well as
prepare for the future of the program. Our Nation's sea-based deterrent
has been a critical component of our national security since the 1950s
and must continue to assure our allies and deter potential adversaries
well into the future. I am privileged to represent this unique
organization as we work to serve the best interests of our great
Nation.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
General Wilson?
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. STEPHEN W. WILSON, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR
FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND
General Wilson. Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for allowing
me to appear before you and represent the men and women of Air
Force Global Strike Command.
Let me first say that the airmen are doing an outstanding
job every single day, providing a safe, secure, and effective
nuclear force for our Nation while ensuring our conventional
mission continues to excel.
The last time I testified before the committee, we had just
experienced our unignorable moment when we discovered cheating
at Mahlstrom Air Force Base. We have instituted major changes
based on feedback from our airmen doing the mission and are
constantly assessing whether and where we still need to
improve.
One of the most important changes we have instituted is
empowering our people, not micro-managing them. Through their
innovation, hard work, and shared commitment, they are able to
truly create their own future and to write their own story.
These changes we are undertaking are completely in line
with both the internal and external nuclear enterprise reviews.
With the support of the senior leadership, we have restored the
nuclear focus and are starting to fund essential modernization
efforts.
Funding for the long-range strike bomber is critical to
extending our dominance against next generation capabilities.
The long-range standoff missile will improve our ability to
strike heavily at defended targets. The ground-based strategic
deterrent will provide the responsive capability and the
strategic stability on which this Nation has come to rely. We
are also continuing our efforts to upgrade the NC3 systems that
underpin our nuclear deterrent to ensure we receive
presidential orders. We are working with our Navy partners to
find areas of intelligent commonality where appropriate.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for the opportunity to
appear before the committee, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of General Wilson follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Stephen W. Wilson, USAF
introduction
Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, and distinguished
members of the subcommittee; thank you for allowing me to represent the
over 23,000 Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) airmen. I will use
this opportunity to update you on our mission, the status of our
forces, and the future of the command.
air force global strike command mission
In an effort to re-invigorate the nuclear enterprise, the Air Force
re-activated Strategic Air Command and re-designated the organization
as Air Force Global Strike Command. Last year AFGSC celebrated its
fifth anniversary. As you know, the command was created to provide a
focus on the stewardship and operation of two legs of our Nation's
nuclear triad while also accomplishing the conventional global strike
mission. Numerous Blue Ribbon panels, task forces, and other reviews
have reaffirmed that a triad should be maintained under the New START
agreement with the Russian Federation. Other nations' nuclear arsenal
advancements and modernization efforts are a national concern and
validate the fact that AFGSC's Nuclear Deterrence Operations mission
set remains critical in today's unstable geopolitical environment. We
live in a world that continues to rapidly change and until we have the
peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons we must never
forget the stabilizing influence the triad has on our allies, partners,
and adversaries. In order for us to be effective across the spectrum of
conflict from day-to-day deterrence and assurance operations to nuclear
engagement, our airmen must be ready and equipped with the right tools
to do the job. The world has not experienced a war between major super
powers for over 70 years; there are a number of reasons for this, one
of which is our Nation has provided credible deterrence for our
adversaries and assurance for allies and partners. Due to the special
trust and confidence the American people put in us every day, we can
never fail them in ensuring a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
arsenal. Continuing in the proud heritage of Strategic Air Command, yet
tailored for today's evolving world, AFGSC's mission is to: ``Develop
and provide combat-ready forces for nuclear deterrence and global
strike operations--Safe, Secure, and Effective--to support the
President of the United States and combatant commanders.''
Air Force Global Strike Command Nuclear Mission
At the core of our mission statement are three reinforcing, key
attributes: ``Safe-Secure-Effective.'' These were outlined in President
Obama's 2009 Prague speech where he said: ``Make no mistake: as long as
these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and
effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to
our allies.'' The attributes of ``safe, secure, effective'' serve to
underpin every nuclear-related activity in AFGSC, from the discipline
adhered to in the smallest task, to how we prioritize our planning and
programming for the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). The effects of
our nuclear force, as outlined in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, are
to ensure strategic stability, to support the regional deterrence
architecture, and to assure our allies and partners.
Air Force Global Strike Command Conventional Mission
The command's focus on nuclear operations cannot come at the cost
of our conventional mission. Our conventional bomber forces defend our
national interests by deterring or, should deterrence fail, defeating
an adversary. Two capabilities are fundamental to the success of our
bomber forces: our ability to hold heavily defended targets at risk and
our ability to apply persistent combat power across the spectrum of
conflict anywhere on the globe at any time. The United States' fleet of
heavy bombers provide the Nation a visible global warfighting
capability that is essential to the credibility of America's national
security strategy. These bombers carry our latest high-tech munitions
in quantities to ensure the Air Force can meet our Nation's global
responsibilities, and therefore are in high-demand by the regional
combatant commanders.
challenges answered
It is no secret our nuclear forces have recently gone through a
time of intense scrutiny, most notably with the cheating incident in
our intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) community. However, we
have turned this negative event into an opportunity for positive and
lasting change. Remember, the bulk of our airmen are doing great work
each and every day. They believe in the mission and are serving to the
best of their abilities. Their faith in us deserves action; we have
taken action to improve the two legs of the triad we operate. The
challenge before us is to follow through on these actions.
Force Improvement Program
As you know, the Force Improvement Program (FIP) was directed in
response to the aforementioned cheating incident. We knew we had to
make changes, but instead of doing it the same way we always had in the
past, we asked the airmen doing the job day in and day out what they
would improve. They responded openly and thoroughly. Our bottom-up
approach yielded 384 recommendations in the ICBM community and 215
recommendations in the bomber community. We approved action on 98
percent of the ICBM recommendations and 92 percent of the bomber
recommendations.
Some of the changes are significant paradigm shifts for our ICBM
community. We are completely changing ICBM crewmember progression to a
``3+3'' construct where our crewmembers can focus on becoming weapon
system experts during their first three years and then transition to
instructor, evaluator, or flight commander duties for the second three
years. We have also put assistant Operations Officers in place in all
of the operations squadrons to provide mid-career leadership so
desperately needed. Lastly, we changed the testing and evaluation
culture that was the root cause of many of the problems within the
operations community. Instead of studying to get a perfect score for an
exam, we have refocused our training and evaluation programs to reflect
the mission at hand.
These changes are not just for the operations community, either. We
are providing better tools and equipment to the maintainers. Our
security forces members are getting new uniforms, cold weather gear,
and weapons improvements--all commensurate with the important mission
they do in harsh conditions protecting our Nation's most important
assets. Another way we are showing our airmen the importance of the
mission they perform is through increased pay. We now provide select
officers Assignment Incentive Pay and critical enlisted members Special
Duty Assignment Pay.
As mentioned earlier, it is important to note that FIP is not just
an ICBM program. We applied the same construct to our bomber mission
areas and we have multiple efforts ongoing to address issues raised. We
are looking at our Continuous Bomber Presence (CBP) program to ensure
we are manning the mission appropriately while providing stability for
our airmen. Additionally, we are completely rewriting our qualification
training syllabi to ensure quality nuclear training without losing
focus on the conventional mission. With the Office of the Secretary of
Defense's (OSD) help, we are revamping our implementation of the
Personnel Reliability Program. We have refocused the program back to
its original intent--a commander's program with an ``up until down''
mentality.
In order to ensure we do not lose this momentum, we are
transitioning the idea of the Force Improvement Program to a continuous
Force Improvement Philosophy. We will internalize the much-needed
change we have gone through so that we can sustain these efforts to
improve our Air Force nuclear forces. These changes are examples of us
bridging the ``Say-Do'' gap that had become so pervasive in the nuclear
enterprise. We continue to grow and shape our upcoming nuclear experts
and leaders. We are focusing on developing a force of nuclear leaders
who understand nuclear strategy and policy, and are capable of
thoughtfully articulating what deterrence means in the 21st century.
AFGSC is leading the way by integrating education and training at
different points in a nuclear professional's career. We are utilizing
expertise both within the Air Force and in industry to develop airmen
with the skills necessary to lead and the knowledge necessary to
effectively shape deterrence theory and policy.
Nuclear Enterprise Review Reports
This past November, the Department of Defense (DOD) released two
different reports that analyzed the nuclear missions for areas of
concern and improvement. The internal and external reports were
extremely thorough, and I sincerely thank all those involved in helping
to make our nuclear forces better. I will also add that we had already
begun addressing almost all of the same issues. The reports' findings
overlapped a majority of our existing FIP recommendations; we look
forward to continuing the implementation of the recommended changes.
Senior Leader Support
There was a common thread throughout the last year with regard to
the nuclear enterprise--senior leader support. We had neglected our
nuclear forces for decades; our current leadership recognized this fact
and moved decisively to correct that shortcoming. Even as we move to
reduce the roles and missions of nuclear weapons in U.S. nuclear
policy, nuclear weapons must remain effective and reliable. Former
Secretary of Defense Hagel recognized this fact by saying, ``Our
nuclear deterrent plays a critical role in ensuring United States
national security, and it's DOD's highest priority mission. No
capability we have is more important.'' Secretary Carter said during
his confirmation, `` . . . with respect to the nuclear enterprise, I
have a long history in that regard and am a strong believer in a safe,
secure and reliable nuclear arsenal for the United States.'' Our most
senior leaders in both the DOD and Air Force have now made personal
visits to all of our bases, not only showing support but also following
up on the actions we are taking. Other ways we are seeing leaders take
positive and lasting action are the funding increases and the follow
through of the Nuclear Deterrence Enterprise Review Group chaired by
the Secretary of Defense. Senior leaders today recognize the importance
of what our nuclear deterrence offers this nation and are committed to
lasting, positive change.
air force global strike command forces
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Forces
Twentieth Air Force, one of two Numbered Air Forces (NAF) in AFGSC,
is responsible for the Minuteman III (MM III) ICBM and our UH-1N
helicopter forces. The 450 dispersed and hardened missile silos
maintain strategic stability by presenting any potential adversary a
near insurmountable obstacle should they consider a disarming attack on
the United States. No potential adversary can hope to destroy this
force without depleting their own arsenal. Every day over 900 airmen
deploy to our 3 missile fields, executing effective deterrence and
assurance operations. Accomplishing this vital mission demands we focus
on sustaining our current systems while modernizing for the future.
Minuteman III
We continue efforts to sustain the Minuteman III ICBM. This
includes upgrading the command, control, and communications systems and
support equipment.
One of these support systems is the Transporter Erector (TE)
Replacement Program (TERP). The TE is used to transport boosters and
emplace them at the Launch Facilities (LF). The current fleet averages
23 years old and has experienced significant structural fatigue due to
high mission tempo. We have completed the TERP design review and are
preparing to prototype and test a new TE. We expect the new equipment
to begin fielding in 2016.
We are also equipping ICBM launch control centers (LCC) with
modernized communications systems that will upgrade or replace other
aging and obsolete systems. The LCC Block Upgrade is an overall
modification effort that replaces multiple LCC components to include a
modern data storage replacement for floppy disks and new Voice Control
Panels to provide high quality voice communications. We expect a
contract to be awarded this year with production in 2018 and deployment
in 2019. The Minuteman Minimum Essential Emergency Communications
Network Program Upgrade will modernize and better secure the Emergency
Action Message network; this upgrade will begin fielding early next
year.
We conducted two MM III flight tests in fiscal year 2014 that,
along with two Simulated Electronic Launch Minuteman tests in the
operational environment of six LFs each, demonstrate the operational
credibility of the nuclear deterrent force and the command's commitment
to sustaining that capability. Operational flight testing is currently
funded and planned for four operational test launches per year to
satisfy requirements outlined by United States Strategic Command
(STRATCOM) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). In
fact, I am pleased to report that last month we successfully test
launched two ICBMs, both of which were the two longest MMIII flights in
history. These special extended range missions have allowed us to
gather important data and validate our global strike capability.
We continue to examine emerging technologies to ensure the MM III
weapon system remains reliable and ready through 2030. Additionally, we
are looking into how investments in these technologies can transfer to
and provide savings for the future Ground Based Strategic Deterrent
(GBSD) program.
Ground Based Strategic Deterrent
The Minuteman flight system, currently on its third model, has been
on continuous alert since the early 1960s, over 50 years ago, and has
proven its value in deterrence well beyond the platform's initial 10-
year lifespan. All parts of the triad are complementary; the ICBM
provides the most responsive portion of the triad. ICBM capability gaps
were identified and validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council (JROC), and subsequently approved in August 2012 by the Air
Force Chief of Staff, resulting in an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA).
The AoA completed in June 2014 and identified a replacement to the MM
III as the most cost-effective approach. Previously planned sustainment
programs (e.g., guidance and propulsion replacement programs) will be
leveraged into GBSD and serve as the foundation of the effort. Starting
this summer, the Air Force's second Enterprise Capability Collaboration
Team (ECCT) will assemble the resources, stakeholders, and expertise
across the Air Force to identify ICBM program needs and gaps to
determine the best command and control and other system requirements
for GBSD. Additionally, we are engaged with our naval partners to
further investigate areas for intelligent commonality between potential
GBSD systems and future Navy weapons. We hope to find areas of overlap
with the objective of reducing design, development, manufacturing,
logistics support, production, and testing costs for the Nation's
strategic systems while still acknowledging that the different weapon
systems will always have some requirements that necessitate unique
solutions.
Successful fielding of a follow-on ICBM will require the
acquisition team to design the entire system beginning now through
2019. This approach provides flexible deployment options in light of
budget constraints. Due to system age-out, the first priority is to
replace the missile itself. However, command and control (C2) and
infrastructure recapitalization is necessary to continue safe, secure,
and effective operations. It is no small task to upgrade the command
and control systems along with the underlying infrastructure that
supports the weapon system. For example, at our largest missile field
operated by the 341st Missile Wing, we must connect and support
hardened systems across almost 14,000 square miles. As a comparison,
this is larger than the entire state of Maryland; our nuclear command
and control is currently serviced by copper wire and equipment
installed in the 1960s. AFGSC is defining approaches to upgrade C2 and
modernize necessary facilities. GBSD cannot be viewed as just another
life extension to our existing MMIII; it is time to field a replacement
ground-based capability that will assure our allies and deter potential
adversaries well into the future. Thank you for your continued support
of GBSD as we move forward ensuring it will lead to a viable
replacement for the MM III ICBM.
UH-1N
AFGSC is the lead command for the Air Force's fleet of 62 UH-1N
helicopters. The majority of these aircraft support two critical
national missions: nuclear security in support of the ICBM force, and
the Continuity of Operations/Continuity of Government mission in the
National Capital Region. They also actively participate in the Defense
Support of Civil Authorities program often being called to help with
search and rescue activities.
Although the UH-1Ns are 45+ years old, we plan to fly them until
the mid-2020s. We must sustain the helicopter's current capabilities
while selectively upgrading the platform to address the most critical
safety and operational concerns. Safety improvements currently underway
include the procurement of crashworthy aircrew seats across the fleet
and night vision goggle-compatible cockpits that will be fully
integrated by 2016. In addition, the command is fielding the Helicopter
Terrain Avoidance and Warning System and Traffic Collision Avoidance
System to improve situational awareness and survivability. Finally, in
order to more effectively employ the UH-1N in its nuclear security
role, AFGSC stood up the 582d Helicopter Operations Group, the only
helicopter operations group in the Air Force, at F.E. Warren Air Force
Base (AFB), WY, to better support and focus our helicopter employment
at the three missile wings.
UH-1N Follow On
While we can, to some extent, mitigate the UH-1N's deficiencies in
range, speed, and payload, no amount of modification will close these
critical capability gaps entirely. This can only be accomplished by
fielding a replacement aircraft that meets validated mission
requirements. As such, a UH-1N Replacement Program is included in the
fiscal year 2016 budget submission. We are working with SAF/AQ and Air
Force Materiel Command to confirm and select the most cost-effective
way to procure a new platform. We look forward to identifying and
procuring a replacement helicopter that fully meets our nuclear mission
needs.
Dual-Capable Bomber Forces
Eighth Air Force is responsible for the B-52H Stratofortress (B-52)
and B-2A Spirit (B-2) bombers. This includes maintaining the
operational readiness of both the bombers' nuclear and conventional
missions. The B-52 serves as the Nation's most versatile and diverse
weapon system in Air Force Global Strike Command by providing precision
and timely long range strike capabilities. Meanwhile, the B-2 can
penetrate our adversary's most advanced Integrated Air Defenses Systems
to strike heavily defended targets. Our flexible dual-capable bomber
fleet is the most visible leg of the nuclear triad. They provide
decision makers the ability to demonstrate resolve through generation,
dispersal, or deployment, and the ability to quickly place bomber
sorties on alert thereby ensuring their continued survival in support
of the President and to meet combatant command requirements.
Global Assurance and Deterrence
CBP, initiated in 2003, increases regional stability and assures
our allies and partners in the U.S. Pacific Command area of
responsibility. CBP is an enduring requirement; therefore we have taken
steps to reduce the cost of squadron rotations. Specifically, over the
past year we worked closely with Pacific Air Forces on the requirement
to establish a detachment at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam. This
detachment will be made up of operations and maintenance experts and
will better enable us to support CBP operations. Through the Bomber
Assurance and Deterrence program, we exercise with every combatant
command and every joint partner annually. These exercises take place
all over the world and are another example of the versatility AFGSC can
provide in the conventional mission area.
B-52H
The B-52 may be the most universally recognized symbol of American
airpower . . . its contributions to our national security through the
Cold War, Vietnam, Desert Storm, Allied Force, Iraqi Freedom and
Enduring Freedom are well documented. Our airmen have worked tirelessly
to keep the venerable B-52 in the air. The B-52 is able to deliver a
wide variety of nuclear and conventional weapons. This past year, we
maintained complete coverage of our Nuclear Deterrence Operations
requirements while supporting overseas CBP commitments.
AFGSC continues work toward completing the Combat Network
Communications Technology (CONECT) upgrade. This upgrade resolves
sustainability issues with cockpit displays and communications while
also providing a ``digital backbone'' enabling integration into the
complex battlespace of the future. Specifically, CONECT replaces aging
displays, adds an additional radio, and provides beyond-line-of-sight
communications and situational awareness with machine-to-machine
retargeting. CONECT achieved approval for full rate production by 2016.
We have accepted our first B-52 CONECT jet, and expect to achieve
initial operational capability this July.
We are working on the 1760 Internal Weapons Bay Upgrade to the B-
52's bomb bay that greatly improves flexibility and precision weapon
capacity for all smart weapons. Configuring the aircraft to internally
carry these smart weapons and the pathway for integration of the Joint
Air to Surface Stand-Off Missile-Extended Range (JASSM-ER) will give
the warfighter additional advantages over an adversary and will provide
increased capability to our Joint Force Commanders. JASSM-ER, for
instance, will provide an increase in weapons employment range,
allowing our forces to posture themselves outside of threat areas
thereby increasing both the aircraft and weapon's survivability. This
upgrade improves the B-52's carrying capacity by 60 percent.
Our B-52s are still using 1960s radar technology. The radar is
unreliable and will be less effective operationally in a future threat
environment, especially if we expect this aircraft to operate for
another 25 years. Without an improved radar system on the B-52 we will
continue to increase risk of significant degradation in both
conventional and nuclear mission areas. We are still in the study phase
of the B-52 Radar Modernization Program. However, this is an important
program that is absolutely required to bring the B-52 into the modern
age; and is particularly vital when discussing B-52 viability through
2040.
B-2
For over 25 years, the B-2 has defended America as our most modern
strategic deterrent. In each of our Nation's last four armed conflicts,
the B-2 has led the way in combat. This is a direct result of the
outstanding airmen who work to operate, maintain, and secure the
aircraft. The B-2 is able to penetrate heavily defended enemy defenses
and deliver a wide variety of nuclear and conventional weapons due to
its long-range and stealth capability.
We will preserve and improve the B-2's capability to penetrate
hostile airspace and hold any target at risk without subjecting the
crew and aircraft to undetected threats. To do this, we secured JROC
validation of the Defensive Management System-Modernization (DMS-M)
Capabilities Development Document, which will allow the program to
enter into the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase to
acquire a new system. This upgrade provides the B-2 aircrew with
improved threat situational awareness and increased survivability by
replacing the current DMS Threat Emitter Locator System and display
system with modernized and sustainable systems capable of addressing
advanced threats. This program will keep the B-2 viable in future anti-
access environments. We also continue work on the Common Very Low
Frequency Receiver (CVR) to permit aircrews to better receive strategic
communication messages and the B-2 Flexible Strike Phase 1 that will
allow for future weapon capability upgrades.
AFGSC continues to evolve B-2 conventional combat capability by
fielding vital programs such as the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP).
Successful fielding of the 30,000-pound MOP bolstered our Nation's
ability to hold hardened, deeply buried targets at risk. Flight testing
of the MOP completed successfully and AFGSC will become the lead
command for MOP sustainment starting next fiscal year. Additionally, we
are still prototyping and testing the MOP dolly and rail system. Once
complete, we will move to production and the dolly and rail system will
increase storage capacity and create more efficient handling of the
MOP. We would like to thank Congress for your support on this critical
program.
We are striving to maintain the proper balance of fleet sustainment
efforts, testing, aircrew training, and combat readiness. The dynamics
of a small fleet continue to challenge our sustainment efforts
primarily due to vanishing vendors and diminishing sources of supply.
Air Force Materiel Command is working to ensure timely parts
availability; however, many manufacturers do not see a strong business
case in supplying parts for a small aircraft fleet. Problems with a
single part can have a significant readiness impact on a small fleet
that lacks the flexibility of a large force to absorb parts shortages
and logistics delays.
Long Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B)
The combat edge our B-2 provides will be challenged by next
generation air defenses and the proliferation of these advanced
systems. The LRS-B program will extend American air dominance against
next generation capabilities and advanced air defense environments. We
continue to work closely with partners throughout the Air Force to
develop the LRS-B and field a fleet of new dual-capable bombers;
scheduled to become operational in the mid-2020s. Make no mistake--the
LRS-B will be a nuclear bomber. However, the platform will not be
delayed for use in a conventional capacity while it undergoes final
nuclear certification. We request your support for this essential
program to ensure we maintain the ability to hold any target on the
globe at risk.
Air Launched Cruise Missile
The AGM-86B Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) is an air-to-ground,
winged, subsonic nuclear missile delivered by the B-52. It was fielded
in the 1980s and is well beyond its originally designed 10-year service
life. To ensure the B-52 remains a credible part of the triad, the ALCM
requires Service Life Extension Programs (SLEP). These SLEPs require
ongoing support and attention to ensure the ALCM will remain viable
through 2030. Despite its age, last year we successfully conducted six
flight test evaluations, and we plan seven this year to fully comply
with U.S. Strategic Command directives.
Long Range Stand-Off Missile
The LRSO is the replacement for the aging ALCM, which will have
significant capability gaps beginning late this decade and worsening
through the next. Replacement of the ALCM was identified by OSD in a
2007 Program Decision Memorandum and reiterated in the 2010 Nuclear
Posture Review, the Airborne Strategic Deterrence Capability Based
Assessment, and the Initial Capability Document. In a similar manner to
LRS-B, the LRSO is necessary to ensure we maintain a credible deterrent
in the future with the ability to strike at targets from beyond
contested airspace in anti-access and area denial environments. The
LRSO will be compatible with the B-52, B-2, and the LRS-B platforms.
The LRSO AoA is complete and JROC approved, and in February of last
year the Air Force Chief of Staff signed the Draft Capabilities
Development Document. LRSO was selected by SAF/AQ as a pilot program
for ``Bending the Cost Curve'' and ``Owning the Technical Baseline,''
which are new acquisition initiatives and is currently planned for
reaching Milestone A next fiscal year. We fully intend to develop a
conventional version of the LRSO as a future spiral to the nuclear
variant.
B61
The B61-12 Life Extension Program (LEP) will result in a smaller
stockpile, reduced special nuclear material in the inventory, and
improved B61 surety. AFGSC is the lead command for the B61-12 Tail Kit
Assembly program, which is needed to meet STRATCOM requirements. The
B61-12 Tail Kit Assembly program is in the Engineering and
Manufacturing Development Phase 1 and is synchronized with NNSA
efforts. The design and production processes are on schedule and within
budget to meet the planned fiscal year 2020 First Production Unit date
for the B61-12 Tail Kit Assembly, and support the lead time required
for the March 2020 B61-12 all-up round. This joint AFGSC/NNSA endeavor
allows for continued attainment of our strategic requirements and
regional commitments.
security
Nuclear security is a key function of the Command's mission. A
major AFGSC initiative to ensure security continues to be the new
Weapon Storage Facilities (WSF) which will consolidate nuclear
maintenance, inspection, and storage. We have put forward a $1.3
billion program ($521 million across the FYDP) to replace all deficient
buildings across our aging 1960's-era Weapon Storage Areas with a
single modern and secure facility at each of our bases. This initiative
eliminates security, design, and safety deficiencies and improves our
maintenance processes. We have included $95 million in funding for the
WSF at F.E. Warren AFB, WY, in this year's budget and the MILCON for
the remaining facilities in future years. These facilities are needed
to meet requirements for a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.
Through our continuing efforts to improve security and thanks to
your strong support, we have completed the fast rising B-Plug system
and the Remote Visual Assessment (RVA) system installation at all 450
LFs. These two programs better protect our nuclear weapons. The fast
rising B-Plug enables our teams to secure the LFs quickly ensuring the
weapons remain secure. RVA enables our security forces members to have
increased situational awareness as they determine response actions at a
given LF.
nuclear command, control, and communications
The ability to receive Presidential orders and convert those orders
into action for the required weapon system is both critical to
performing the nuclear mission and foundational to an effective
strategic deterrent. As the Air Force Nuclear Command, Control, and
Communications (NC3) Chief Architect, AFGSC plays a pivotal role in
providing reliable and survivable NC3 systems to support national
objectives. Cryptographic modernization upgrades allowed Air Force
nuclear operations to transition to more secure equipment and satellite
communications networks. These transitioned networks greatly improved
security of sensitive nuclear command and control message traffic. Our
weapon systems are only as good as the NC3 that underpins them and
therefore we have redoubled our efforts in this area. We recently held
the first-ever NC3 General Officer Steering Group to address top
sustainment and readiness concerns. Additionally, AFGSC has been named
the lead command for Air Force NC3 issues. Consolidating NC3 authority
within the Service will enable us to better advocate for, support, and
upgrade these critical systems. As the NC3 lead, AFGSC is participating
in an Office of Secretary of Defense led 45-day study to analyze NC3
systems and future capabilities across the Services. In addition, the
Chief of Staff of the Air Force directed AFGSC to stand up a task force
to develop an organizational construct to ensure AFGSC is resourced and
has the appropriate authorities and command relationships to execute
responsibilities as it assumes the newly designated role as the Air
Force lead for the NC3 mission area. Efforts like this study combined
with ongoing and future upgrades to the NC3 systems will improve
reliability and readiness of this critical capability across the DOD.
Global Aircrew Strategic Network Terminal
The Global Aircrew Strategic Network Terminal (ASNT) program will
provide a fixed and transportable system of survivable NC3 Command
Posts. These Command Posts support nuclear-tasked bomber, tanker,
National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC), Take Charge and Move Out
aircraft (TACAMO), reconnaissance forces, and nuclear reconstitution
teams. Global ASNT is one part of the ground element of the larger
Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network. Global ASNT
replaces degraded legacy NC3 systems in AFGSC, Air Combat Command, Air
Mobility Command, U.S. Air Forces Europe, Air National Guard, and Air
Force Reserve Command thereby providing redundant strategic
communications paths. Global ASNT recently moved into the Engineering
and Manufacturing Development phase of the acquisition process and full
operational capability is expected in 2020.
new strategic arms reduction treaty
New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) implementation
continues ahead of schedule. In the latest data exchange with the
Russians, the U.S. Government reported only 912 deployed and non-
deployed strategic delivery vehicles, down from the 1,124 reported at
entry into force in early 2011, and well on the way to the required 800
combined deployed and non-deployed strategic delivery vehicles. We
completed all of our planned silo eliminations which included 50
Peacekeeper LFs, 50 Minuteman III LFs, and 4 test LFs. With the last
Peacekeeper LF elimination, Peacekeeper is no longer accountable under
NST. We completed all de-MIRV (i.e., moving to a single reentry vehicle
configuration) actions in May of last year. AFGSC plans to remove 50 MM
III boosters from LFs across the missile fleet; the booster removals
are scheduled to begin next month with 9 boosters scheduled in fiscal
year 2015. Additionally, we will reduce the number of dual-capable B-
52H aircraft by converting 42 of them to a conventional-only
configuration. Importantly, our B-52 fleet will maintain all of its
conventional capability. The first B-52 conventional only conversion is
scheduled for August of this year with an exhibition for Russian
inspectors to immediately follow. All NST implementation actions are on
time and within budget.
nuclear deterrence operations core function
We continue to improve and strengthen the nuclear enterprise
through our long-range planning efforts. One of the methods we use to
inform our Nuclear Deterrence Operations long-range planning and
investment strategy efforts is wargaming. Strategic Vigilance, AFGSC's
biennial wargame, will be held this year and will build on previous
scenarios to strengthen command innovation and preparation. These
wargames help us anticipate future conventional and nuclear planning to
further improve our strategic deterrence and assurance mission areas.
Ultimately, this allows AFGSC to better organize, train, and equip our
forces. Additionally, we continue to observe other wargames and stay
engaged with our partners in the other services to learn from their
experiences.
2015 focus areas (our priorities)
Deter and Assure with a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Force
Nuclear weapons demand a culture where safety, security, and
effectiveness permeate all aspects of this critical national mission to
include our people who embody this special trust and responsibility
through all facets of their profession. As the greatest Air Force in
the world we will only remain dominant through their professionalism,
dedication, and commitment to service--and living our Air Force core
values. Although we will continue to be challenged with sustaining
aging weapon systems, we will leverage the innovation of our great
airmen to get the most out of our resources.
Win the Fight
Whether that fight is in overseas contingencies where we have over
1,000 airmen deployed, or with our over 900 member nuclear deterrent
force deployed to the missile fields conducting a combatant commander
assigned mission every day, we will forge ahead to keep both our
nuclear and conventional forces combat ready.
Strengthen and Empower the Team
We will continue to improve the quality of life for our airmen and
their families, aware of the unique demands of our mission and our
locations. We will continue to foster resiliency within a wingman
culture, and we will improve education, training, and development at
all levels. Furthermore, we will continue to strengthen, broaden, and
deepen our culture around our command values of:
- Individual responsibility for mission success
- Critical self-assessment of our performance
- Uncompromising adherence to all directives
- Superior technical and weapon system expertise
- Persistent innovation at all levels
- Pride in our nuclear heritage and our mission
- Respect for the worth and dignity of every airman
- Safety in all things large . . . and small
Shape the Future
We will stay focused on our human capital development and our
weapon system modernization initiatives. Our responsive and resilient
MM III, providing the foundation for strategic stability, must be
sustained to 2030 until we are able to fully implement the Ground Based
Strategic Deterrent weapon system. The B-52 will remain the Nation's
visible deterrent for the next 25 years at least, and will prove a
versatile platform with unmatched battlefield persistence. The B-2 will
be our strategic penetrating platform denying safe haven to any
adversary. The dual-capable Long Range Strike Bomber will ensure we can
continue to hold any target on the globe at risk. As our Air Launched
Cruise Missile becomes obsolete and unsupportable, we will field a
credible and flexible deterrent with the Long Range Stand-Off missile.
Uphold the Standard
We understand the importance of ensuring compliance at all levels
through critical self-assessment of our performance. We have undergone
a complete shift in our AF inspection system to continually assess and
fix problems; we refuse to walk by any problem area. One of the ways we
uphold our standards is through inspections. We continue to implement
the new Air Force Inspection System and integrate our nuclear
inspections with that system. The Commander's Inspection Program (CCIP)
is monitored virtually by our command IG and validated by a Unit
Effectiveness Inspection (UEI) Capstone event every two years. Going
forward, we will continue to utilize our rigorous inspection process to
ensure the highest of standards and determine areas of the mission that
require improvement.
conclusion
Thank you for your continued support of Air Force Global Strike
Command and our nuclear deterrent and global strike missions. The
President's 2015 National Security Strategy is clear: ``As long as
nuclear weapons exist, the United States must invest the resources
necessary to maintain--without testing--a safe, secure, and effective
nuclear deterrent that preserves strategic stability.'' To that end,
our enduring challenges in AFGSC are: first, to instill a culture where
every airman understands the special trust and responsibility of
nuclear weapons; second, to maintain excellence in our conventional
forces; third, to sustain the current force while modernizing for the
future; and fourth, to solidify and sustain a culture where our airmen
are proud to serve in and embrace the great importance of the deterrent
mission.
Fiscal constraints, while posing planning challenges, do not alter
the National security landscape or the intent of competitors and
adversaries, nor do they diminish the enduring value of long range,
strategic forces to our Nation. Although we account for less than one
percent of the DOD budget, AFGSC nuclear forces represent two-thirds of
the Nation's nuclear triad and play a critical role in ensuring U.S.
national security, while AFGSC conventional forces provide joint
commanders rapid global combat airpower. AFGSC will continue to seek
innovative, cost-saving measures to ensure our weapon systems are
operating as efficiently as possible. Modernization of the nuclear
enterprise, however, is mandatory. AFGSC is operating B-52s built in
the 1960s with equipment designed in the 1950s; our ICBMs are operating
with 1960s infrastructure; and utilizing 1960s era weapon storage
areas. We cannot afford to delay modernization initiatives across the
two legs of the Nation's nuclear triad.
It is my absolute privilege to lead this elite team empowered with
special trust and responsibility, and I can assure you that we at Air
Force Global Strike Command will meet our challenges head-on in order
to provide our Nation with safe, secure, and effective forces for
nuclear deterrence and global strike operations.
Senator Sessions. General Harencak?
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. GARRETT HARENCAK, USAF, ASSISTANT CHIEF
OF STAFF, STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR INTEGRATION
General Harencak. Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member
Donnelly, thank you for the opportunity to appear before the
subcommittee today to discuss Air Force nuclear policies and
programs. I respectfully request my written statement be
entered into the record and look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Harencak follows:]
Prepared Statement by Maj. Gen. Garrett Harencak, USAF
introduction
Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, and distinguished
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss
Air Force nuclear programs and policies.
As the Assistant Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and
Nuclear Integration, my team, on behalf of the Secretary and Chief of
Staff of the Air Force, leads planning, policy development, advocacy,
integration, and assessment for the airmen and weapon systems
performing Nuclear Deterrence Operations, a core function of the U.S.
Air Force. In today's increasingly complex, multi-polar environment,
the highly stabilizing deterrence and assurance effects provided by Air
Force nuclear forces--intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),
nuclear-capable bombers, and dual capable aircraft (DCA)--will continue
to play a critical role in ensuring the security of the United States
and assuring our allies and partners.
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, a confluence of forces
contributed to an erosion of the nuclear mission within the Air Force.
This period of decline was characterized by a loss of senior leader
focus, fragmentation of responsibility, and chronic underinvestment in
our personnel, weapon systems, and supporting infrastructure. While in
recent years we have reversed this downward trend and made substantial
progress towards addressing these deficiencies and the problems that
resulted from them, we recognize considerable work lies ahead. As
Secretary James has emphasized, restoring the health of the nuclear
enterprise is an undertaking that will require sustained, long-term
focus and effort.
Despite challenges, the dedicated airmen who accomplish the nuclear
mission every day continue to do so with remarkable professionalism,
pride, and determination. For these women and men and the Nation they
serve, the Air Force remains fully committed to identifying and
confronting systemic issues in our nuclear forces, and making the
investments necessary to ensure they remain credible and effective in
the decades ahead.
nuclear enterprise reviews
From the outset of the Internal and Independent Nuclear Enterprise
Reviews (NERs) directed by former Secretary of Defense Hagel in
February 2014, as well as the review led by the Commander, U.S.
Strategic Command (STRATCOM), the Air Force partnered closely with the
assessment teams to provide unfettered access to our operations,
personnel, and processes.
Combined, these assessments examined an extensive range of
personnel, management, oversight, mission performance, training,
testing, and investment areas across the nuclear enterprise. To date,
we have implemented a number of the Air Force-specific recommendations
produced by the NERs, and our work towards completing the remaining
ones continues at a steady pace.
Under the direction of our Secretary and Chief of Staff, and with
oversight and guidance from the Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise Review
Group (chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense) and the Senior
Oversight Group (chaired by the Director of Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation), we are approaching the implementation and tracking of NER
follow-on actions through a systematic and responsive process, one
intended to yield tangible and lasting improvements.
Following completion of the NERs in the fall of 2014, the Air
Force's immediate efforts were concentrated on addressing the most
exigent gaps identified in the reviews. As we gradually transition our
attention this year to implementing NER initiatives that require
longer-term action, we are placing renewed emphasis on strengthening
assessment processes and developing valid metrics to ensure that the
changes we institute are measurable and enduring. While continuous
improvement and rigorous self-assessment have been guiding precepts of
our efforts to strengthen the enterprise since our broad reorganization
of this mission area in 2008-2009, we recognize that the success of our
NER follow-on actions is critically dependent on how well this effort
is integrated into existing Air Force nuclear oversight structures and
processes, where our senior leadership can apply sustained focus,
provide accountability, and marshal necessary resources.
Consistent with that objective, NER findings have assumed a central
place in the agendas of our Nuclear Oversight Board, chaired by the
Secretary and Chief of Staff with participation from all ten of our
major command commanders, and the three-star level Nuclear Issues
Resolution and Integration board. Both of these bodies, which are
organized and managed by AF/A10 and meet quarterly to focus exclusively
on issues of importance to the nuclear mission, serve as vital cross-
functional forums where senior leaders can decisively prioritize,
resource, and direct the implementation of solutions across the Air
Force. We have determined that the Flight Plan for the Air Force
Nuclear Enterprise, a comprehensive roadmap that outlines a series of
strategic vectors for improving and monitoring the health of the
nuclear enterprise, is the best framework through which to orchestrate
our long-term NER response. Aligned in four focus areas--human capital,
governance, inspections and assessments, and resourcing, with an
understanding that culture and morale are impacted by all of them--
these vectors each have a corresponding action plan with execution and
follow-up responsibilities assigned to specific Air Force entities.
The NER process has fostered an unprecedented renewal of senior
level focus and collaborative engagement on the nuclear mission from
the highest levels of the Department of Defense (DOD), and is already
leading to positive outcomes that are visible throughout the force. We
are optimistic that the new mechanisms created by the NERs can serve as
a benchmark for future interagency collaboration as the Air Force
continues its efforts in the coming years to improve the nuclear
mission.
sustaining the effectiveness and credibility of our forces
As long as nuclear weapons exist, the consequences of their
potential use against the U.S. remains an existential threat that
demands our strategic forces be prepared to meet not only the most
likely contingencies, but also the most unlikely. President Obama has
established a clear mandate that the United States will maintain safe,
secure, and effective nuclear forces, even as we seek the peace and
security of a world without nuclear weapons and take concrete steps to
reduce our total number of weapons and the role they serve in national
security strategy.
Consistent with the President's imperative, the fiscal year 2016
budget request seeks key investments in the sustainment, modernization,
and recapitalization of Air Force nuclear weapon systems, supporting
infrastructure, and our nuclear command, control, and communications
capabilities (NC3). In addition, the budget provides strong support for
our most critical asset: the Airmen we entrust to perform nuclear
deterrence operations every day. Closely aligned with the priorities
established by the NERs, as well as in multiple internal Air Force
reviews of the nuclear enterprise, these investments in our air and
ground legs of the Triad make important headway towards ensuring these
systems remain effective and credible now and in the years ahead.
weapon system investment
The fiscal year 2016 budget supports an array of modernization
initiatives for our B-2A and B-52H bombers that will enable these
aircraft to remain capable of performing their assigned nuclear and
conventional missions. Despite these upgrades, both the B-52H
(delivered in 1961-1962) and the B-2A (delivered throughout the early/
mid-1990s) are becoming increasingly vulnerable to modern air defenses.
Accordingly, the fiscal year 2016 budget advances research and
development efforts for the Long Range Strike-Bomber (LRS-B) in order
to ensure the Nation retains a credible global strike and power
projection capability in the decades ahead. We are anticipating a
contract award for LRS-B in late spring of this year, with initial
operational capability (IOC) for the planned fleet of 80-100 aircraft
in the mid-2020s.
The budget funds life extension to 2030 of the AGM-86B air launched
cruise missile (ALCM)--the Nation's only air-delivered stand-off
strategic weapon, fielded by the Air Force in 1982 with a designed
service life of 10 years. When employed from B-52H bombers, ALCMs
provide an extremely valuable signaling capability and a degree of
versatility unmatched elsewhere in the Triad. For these and other
reasons, the fiscal year 2016 budget request restores funding to the
critical Long Range Stand-Off (LRSO) effort, a follow-on ALCM program
that will eventually replace the AGM-86B. The funding level requested
enables the program to meet STRATCOM's operationally required need date
and realigns Air Force integration efforts with the Department of
Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) life extension
program (LEP) to produce an LRSO warhead.
The life extension effort for the B61, the Air Force's primary
gravity nuclear weapon, is equally important to the continued
effectiveness of our deterrence and assurance capabilities. Both the
B61-12 LEP, which DOE/NNSA manages, and the associated Air Force
Tailkit Assembly program are supported in the fiscal year 2016 DOE/NNSA
and Air Force budgets. These efforts are synchronized and on schedule
to deliver the first production unit B61-12 in 2020. The fiscal year
2016 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) also supports risk reduction
activities for dual capable aircraft (DCA) integration for the F-35
Joint Strike Fighter. Our goal of reaching IOC for F-35 DCA with the
life-extended B61-12 by 2024 remains unchanged. This program remains an
important and highly tangible signal of the U.S.'s continued commitment
to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which has repeatedly
affirmed the role of nuclear deterrence in the collective security of
the Alliance.
Several sustainment programs for the Nation's fleet of Minuteman
III (MM III) ICBMs and supporting infrastructure are funded in the
fiscal year 2016 budget that will extend the effectiveness of this
system through 2030, consistent with Congressional mandates. For more
than 50 years, continuously on-alert ICBMs have been a foundational
pillar of America's strategic deterrent, providing a level of
responsiveness and stability not replicated by other legs of the Triad.
In order to preserve this capability for the Nation beyond the phase
out of MM III, the fiscal year 2016 budget supports continued
development and risk reduction for the follow-on Ground-Based Strategic
Deterrent (GBSD) program. Last summer, Air Force Global Strike Command
(AFGSC) completed the GBSD analysis of alternatives, and the program is
already leveraging synergies with MM III modernization efforts to meet
a target IOC in 2027.
For our major weapon system modernization and recapitalization
efforts, the Air Force's partnership with DOE/NNSA--responsible for
life extension of the nuclear explosive packages at the heart of our
gravity weapons, cruise missiles, and ICBM reentry vehicles--remains
productive and strong. Our ongoing cooperation with the Department of
the Navy on ballistic missile sustainment, intended to leverage
commonalities between the Air Force's MM III ICBM and the Navy's
Trident II (D5) submarine-launched ballistic missile, is helping both
Services reduce program risk and improve affordability. Through the
joint DOD-DOE Nuclear Weapons Council and other interagency channels,
we will continue to pursue new opportunities to strengthen integration
with our mission partners to ensure the success of our programs.
addressing other critical mission needs
The fiscal year 2016 budget addresses a host of other important
mission needs, particularly across the ICBM force. These investments
include the establishment of a program office to manage
recapitalization of the Vietnam-era fleet of UH-1N utility helicopters
performing the ICBM security mission, as well as the replacement of
aging ICBM payload transporters with updated models. Complementing the
longer-term modernization and recapitalization programs underway for
the missile force, this budget also advances multiple initiatives to
address immediate, near-term ICBM operations and maintenance needs.
Prior to the formal initiation of the NERs, in January 2014 AFGSC
acted decisively to uncover and address urgent shortfalls throughout
the missile wings through its Force Improvement Program (FIP). Guided
by actual feedback provided by Airmen in the field performing missile
operations, FIP yielded a diverse set of actionable recommendations,
many of which were implemented or initiated last year with fiscal year
2014 and fiscal year 2015 investments. Examples of improvements for the
ICBM force supported by FIP to date include incentive pays,
scholarships, fielding of important test and maintenance equipment,
refurbishment and deep cleaning of launch control centers and alert
facilities, new utility vehicles, and upgraded tactical equipment and
uniforms for our security forces. Most significantly, FIP is supporting
the addition of approximately 1,100 billets across AFGSC to strengthen
manning in key nuclear specialties, as well as 158 technical and
engineering billets at Air Force Materiel Command that will help
preserve specialized skillsets within the nuclear sustainment
enterprise and advance the GBSD program.
The fiscal year 2016 budget also makes important first steps
towards reversing the trend of decline in our critical nuclear mission
facilities, particularly our 1950s-1960s era Weapons Storage Areas
(WSAs) that support nuclear munitions storage and maintenance. The
fiscal year 2016 FYDP includes military construction funding to
initiate the first phases of a comprehensive plan--the Weapons Storage
Facility (WSF) Investment Strategy--that will replace existing WSAs
with modern WSFs at AFGSC installations in the coming years.
Additionally, the budget supports robust facilities sustainment,
restoration, and modernization levels that will allow AFGSC to begin
addressing a number of previously deferred infrastructure repairs
across its ICBM and bomber installations.
As the lead military service for approximately two-thirds of the
Nation's NC3 systems, the Air Force continues to work to improve focus
on and resourcing of this vital mission. Critical to the execution of
the nuclear mission, as well as Presidential and senior leader
communications, NC3 must be secure, redundant, and highly survivable to
ensure continuous connectivity in all environments. In order to
consolidate and strengthen the life cycle management process for NC3,
we continue to collaborate with mission partners to define key NC3
system elements, interdependencies, and authorities. In February of
this year, the Secretary and Chief of Staff designated AFGSC as the Air
force lead for this mission area. In this capacity, AFGSC is presently
leading an Air Force Task Force charged with assessing oversight and
organizational relationships related to NC3 acquisition and
sustainment, as well as participating in a comprehensive DOD led NC3
capabilities study.
strengthening policies to support the mission
We are effectively capitalizing on the NER process to address
longstanding inefficiencies in many administrative and policy areas
affecting the nuclear enterprise. In close partnership with AFGSC and
other Air Force, Joint, and DOD stakeholders, over the past 12 months
we have implemented a number of important revisions to key programs and
policies that are yielding substantial efficiencies. For example, we
have restructured our Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) to eliminate
redundancy and vastly reduce the number of individuals required to be
covered by the program. We anticipate these changes will result in
considerable reductions in the man-hours required to administer PRP,
while at the same maintaining the integrity and intent of the program.
Through the NERs we have accelerated previously initiated efforts
to refine the scope and methodology of our nuclear inspection process,
with the goal of reducing duplicative structures, providing wings with
critical ``white space'' to focus on successful performance of the
mission in lieu of constant preparation for inspections, and empowering
Airmen to innovate by removing unnecessary requirements that promote
micro-management and perfectionism. We continue to strengthen the ICBM
career field by creating new paths for professional development and
education, providing additional opportunities for leadership
experience, and offering incentives to our missileers who elect to
pursue higher levels of responsibility.
treaty compliance efforts
In accordance with the terms of the New Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty, Air Force activities to align our ICBM and heavy bomber forces
with the treaty-compliant force structure established by DOD last
spring by the deadline of February 2018 remain on track. In support of
this effort, modifications to treaty-accountable ICBM silos and bombers
will continue in 2015. Consistent with statutory mandates and STRATCOM
requirements, we continue to preserve the capability to reconfigure MM
III ICBM with multiple warheads.
conclusion
The realization of the benefits intended from these investments and
the Air Force's ability to continue supporting combatant command
nuclear requirements is critically dependent on the funding levels
requested in the President's budget. As the Secretary and Chief of
Staff have made clear, should the Air Force have to operate at
sequestration-level funding in fiscal year 2016, no mission area--
including nuclear deterrence operations--would be impervious to its
effects.
Thank you for the opportunity to update the subcommittee on Air
Force nuclear enterprise policies and programs and our actions to
implement NER recommendations. Our near- and long-term commitment to
continuous improvement of the nuclear mission--particularly through the
deliberate development of our airmen--will remain one of the Air
Force's top priorities.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS, CHAIRMAN
Senator Sessions. We are sorry to have this program
interrupted, but I think it is time for us to go ahead and move
forward, as Senator King and Donnelly reminded me.
So we got a lot going on, and I would just say in terms of
an opening statement, I do believe the Department of Defense,
Ms. Creedon, and others has responded to this problem. I think
Secretary Hagel deserves credit for insisting that we make an
honest and very serious review, which you have done and I thank
you for. Some of the findings are extremely troubling I
thought, some of which is classified, but I believe that you
folks are on that.
Secretary Hagel said that the reviews found evidence of
systemic problems that if not addressed could undermine the
safety, security, and effectiveness of the elements of the
force in the future. Close quote. I think that is a serious
comment, and we need to address it.
Admiral Benedict, I know your naval submarine crews and
others are on constant stress and alert and acting. Ships are
moving things. Plans are being executed. It perhaps is more
difficult, I think, for the Air Force where you are at bases
and missiles are in silos and not as much is happening. So I
can understand the difficulties that we might have in
maintaining the kind of alertness and morale that you need to
have.
Previous briefings I have had so far on this subject
indicate that the Air Force is taking aggressive action to
create the kind of morale and attention and evaluation that is
necessary. But we will have, I am sure, other questions that
would be asked.
Also, from what I can see from Secretary Hagel's
announcement, we may be talking about a 10 percent increase.
That could be as much as $8 billion, and you can buy a lot with
$8 billion. So I think we need to ask the question can we
achieve the kind of improvements we need with less cost than
that.
On this vote, Senator King, you have not voted. Is that
right? Did it just get called?
Senator King. This is the next one.
Senator Sessions. Well, there should not be much time left,
is that not right, for us to vote? 5 minutes, okay. We are in
better shape than I thought.
Ms. Creedon, the review found that, quote, significant
changes are required to ensure the safety and security and
effectiveness of the force in the future. Can you give us some
examples of where safety and security and effectiveness are at
risk and some examples of recommendations that you might make?
And what is meant by cultural and structural changes?
Ms. Creedon. Thank you, sir. So let me start probably on
the end of that.
On the cultural changes--and I will just use a couple of
examples to illustrate some of these. On the cultural side, we
found that particularly in the Air Force, there was not a good
culture of strong self-assessments that could provide up the
chain of command no-kidding assessments of what was going on in
the forces. So we found that what was happening was problems
were not raised to the next level of attention, and when
problems were raised, they were not treated with any
significant degree of credibility. So what we had was a
situation where the senior leaders for the most part did not
even know how bad some of the situations were at the working
level because they were simply not putting in place any sort of
a good self-assessment regime or having any good, candid
opportunities for conversation within the services.
On the organizational, again an illustrative example. We
found that particularly that the way the Air Force was
organized for maintenance of the ICBMs, that the Air Force did
not treat the entire universe of the ICBM as a single weapon
system. So you have the missile itself. You have the silo that
it is in, and the silos are covered by launch control centers.
And the launch control centers then talk within their missile
field. That whole missile field was not considered as a weapon
system. So as a result, you had different pieces of the Air
Force and different sources of money responsible for the long-
term maintenance of different parts and pieces. So there was no
holistic way to look at that ICBM system as a system of
systems. So you had some parts of the Air Force taking care of
other things, and then you had the base commanders taking care
of other things. And particularly when the base commanders were
using their money, we found that the base commanders were
forced with choices of, say, plowing the snow or fixing blast
doors on a large control facility. So they were not organized
structurally to fix this.
On the safety and security, for the most part, what we were
worried about was the safety and security of the forces as they
were operating. So we found in many instances that their
equipment just was not adequate. So at the missile fields, for
instance, these missile fields are all in the north. They have
terrible winters. They have lots of snow, lots of ice, and yet
the security forces were driving around in SUVs that were
front-wheel drive. So it was as minor as that that could fix
some of these no-kidding safety of life sorts of things.
Senator Sessions. And can you give an example of a specific
action such as the confused support system you just described
that have been done to improve that? Maybe, General Wilson, you
could comment on that. What steps do you think that you have
taken that would alleviate some of the problems that Ms.
Creedon just described?
General Wilson. Thank you, Chairman Sessions. Let me give
you three examples.
The first thing that she talked about is cultural. So the
big culture change that we have embarked upon is one of
empowerment, empowering our airmen. So we started a force
improvement program, and the force improvement was a different
look. So it is a bottom-up look and it was a multi-diverse team
of people who made up this individual--so in operations, it
would be operators from each of the ICBM wings with submarine
operators with airplane operators to give a different
perspective.
As part of the force improvement program, the ICBM alone
has brought forward over 350 recommendations from the airmen
doing the job on how to do it differently and better.
Senator Sessions. These recommendations were from the
ground up.
General Wilson. From the ground up, so from the people
doing the job. And I look at it as our job to remove the
barriers to their success. So as an example, as Secretary
Creedon just mentioned, the defenders out in the field did not
have the right uniforms and the right vehicles and the right
equipment. That has all been changed. Based on their
recommendations, we went out and said what is the best cold
weather gear and the best gear that we can get for the
environment that they are in. We have funded that. We have
delivered it to the field. It was no small task to do it. Just
for the defenders in the security force, it was over 250,000
individual line items that were delivered to the field.
But in addition to the uniforms, we provided new vehicles,
new radios, and we greatly improved the training of the
security forces that they get. We do that at Camp Guernsey in
Wyoming.
So we are building a model defender program and the model
defender is not just the outer gear. It is the whole human
weapon system with the goal of making our airmen--the place
that everybody wants to go to for the mission because they are
doing a vitally important mission for our Nation, and we are
equipping them properly with the right tools to do the mission.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, General Wilson.
Of course, this is a big deal. Errors cannot happen in the
area that you operate in. My impression, General Wilson, is the
Air Force has taken seriously the concerns and have responded
in a serious way. Without getting into too many details, would
you explain to us the role Secretary of Defense Hagel had in
moving this forward and what you can tell us--my time is
already over. No. I guess I did my opening statement in this.
But can you tell us what you have done that would convey to
the Congress and to the American people that you have seriously
evaluated the concerns in the report and from top down, actions
are being undertaken to fix it?
General Wilson. Yes, sir. If I were to describe it, first
of all, the change from the past. So what is different today is
we certainly have the attention and the focus of the senior
leadership, both of the Department, the Secretary of the Air
Force, and Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
Senator Sessions. They have been personally engaged.
General Wilson. They have been personally engaged in this.
As an example, the Secretary of the Air Force has visited
each of our missile wings three times in the last year. She
meets with our airmen. She gets their direct feedback. The
Chief of Staff has done the same. They have been personally
engaged. They both have talked about how do we put our money
where our mouth is. We have said this is the most important
mission. We need to put the resources behind it to do that. We
are on track to be able to provide those resources now.
We do not disagree with anything in the reviews. Both the
internal and the external reviews we are in complete agreement
with. What we found is that our bottom-up reviews and the top-
down reviews overlapped about 95 percent. Within that, we have
got a multitude of areas that we are addressing, everything
from ICBM training, recruiting, how do we evaluate, how do we
instruct them from the security forces, how do we provide the
right supplies and the maintenance. As Secretary Creedon talked
about, how do we define the ICBM weapon system that had not
been done before? There has been a multitude of efforts, but it
is not just the ICBM. We started with the ICBM.
The next place we went is to our bombers, and we did a
bomber force improvement program. And the bombers brought over
215 recommendations forward on how to do things better and more
efficiently.
So we are looking at this as a continuous improvement
cycle, but it is not something that is one time and done. We
will go back out to the field. We have been going out to the
field regularly listening to our airmen and saying are the
things that we are doing helping. If not, how do we readjust,
and what do we need to be doing differently? So we are taking
this as a holistic, systemic view of the enterprise with
persistent attention and focus, and now it is our job to make
sure that we follow through with all the things that we have
got underway.
Senator Donnelly. General Harencak, have you given your
opening statement yet?
General Harencak. Yes, sir, I have.
Senator Donnelly. Very good.
Let me ask you this question, General Wilson, and that
would be like a ?why,? which is somewhat speculative but in the
reports as well. Why did these things happen? Is it that the
type of mission that we have, being in a missile silo keeping
an eye on things there, that it is not a desirable mission? It
is not challenging enough, that members of the Air Force look
at it as it was kind of a sidetrack to their career? How does
this happen?
General Wilson. That may be part of it. It may be that we
lost focus on the importance of what strategic deterrence does
for our Nation. We got engaged in places around the world that
took our eye off this. And we either relayed in some form or
fashion that what the airmen were doing was not as important as
other things.
I think we are seeing a change in that today. I will give
you an example. We recently met a captain at Mahlstrom Air
Force Base. He is an academy grad. He has a 3.8 Grade Point
Average (GPA) in physics. He is finishing up his 4 years in the
ICBM community. He said I have noticed a change in the last
year. I have seen the differences in the empowerment and what
it can make, and I want to stay in this weapon system. This is
a once in a lifetime opportunity to be part of something bigger
and to make a difference. And so he is staying in the ICBM
community. That is not one person. You will see broadly across
the community now with this increased focus and attention and
people know the mission is important, that the airmen value
that. We just did not do a very good job.
Senator Donnelly. My perception is that it will be viewed
as important as the leadership of the Air Force makes it to be
in the public messaging you have and in the way you look at
promotions there and ways of a career path there.
General Wilson. Yes, sir. Well, a couple of specific
examples the Air Force has done--and you are well aware. We
have elevated this position for this command from a three-star
to a four-star. We have elevated the position of the A-10 on
the headquarters air staff from a two-star to a three-star.
Again, at all levels, we are seeing it. Before we would see not
a lot of--from the different accession sources who would
volunteer to go to missiles, they were seeing a complete
difference. This year alone 29 first choice and all 174 coming
in, it was in the top 6 choices. So it is making a difference.
Senator Donnelly. Admiral Benedict, as you know, Indiana is
home to the Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane. It provides a
lot of support to Strategic Systems Programs (SSP). As you look
at that, one of the things that we have worked on at Crane that
a lot of folks have put time and effort into is trying to
enhance collaboration or commonality among the Navy and the Air
Force nuclear programs. And Crane has been involved in that
work to ensure lessons learned and best practices are shared
between the Services. And I was wondering your view of how we
are doing at promoting collaboration and commonality on these
programs and how can we do better.
Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. Thank you.
We are working, I think, better today in a more
collaborative manner on the topic of commonality than I think
we have ever been between the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force.
I had the opportunity to host Air Force flags. In fact, Major
General Harencak visited me when we were out there as part of
the strategic forum seminar that Crane hosted so generously for
us. We showed them all of our capability at Crane, and of
course, Crane is the single largest warfare center provider for
strategic systems in the United States Navy, and they do an
exceptional job and they have for many, many years.
I think we continue to progress in this area. We have an
official structure set up now where we are looking at various
areas, one of them in particular being rad hard electronics, of
which Crane is intimately familiar with the way the Navy does
business. We have identified that to the Air Force for their
consideration as they move forward.
Another example of collaboration and commonality is on
Monday of next week, I am flying to Omaha. I will join Admiral
Haney in Omaha. I am flying up with Admiral Haney to be a part
of the ICBM flag officers forum up at Cheyenne, WY, with all
the ICBM flags. And I have the opportunity to pitch commonality
in that forum to the Air Force generals.
So I think we are making good progress in that area, sir.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
Ms. Creedon, I know that the internal report on the DOD
nuclear mission was classified. But in this unclassified forum
that we have here, what was your biggest surprise when you
looked in determining how serious the issues were?
Ms. Creedon. There were probably two. One was that although
we knew going in that the Air Force had significant problems
because there were many years of reports that had laid out a
lot of these problems, the problems that we found were worse
and they were much more systemic.
With the Navy, again the surprise was that although the
strategic systems programs were good and the naval reactors
programs were good, what we found was the part in the middle
that neither Admiral Benedict nor Admiral Richardson had really
much authority over--those were in worse shape than we had
expected. And what I mean by those, those are a lot of the
support facilities, particularly some of the shipyards. They
were pretty severely understaffed. There was a pretty big
bathtub in the mid-career sections, and the facilities needed a
lot of work.
And as a result of that, we understood why the submariners
were under as much stress as they were in their operational
capacities. So, for instance, a lot of the work that in the
past should have or would have been done by the shipyard once a
submarine was in port was being done by the crew. So there were
a lot of people and infrastructure things that we were
surprised to find in the Navy.
Senator Donnelly. Like how did we miss this or how did we
get in this spot in your opinion?
Ms. Creedon. That is probably one of those questions that
needs an hour or so to fully unpack.
Senator Donnelly. Actually I am on overtime right now, but
nobody else is here. So this is awesome.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Creedon. I will not take an hour.
But I would say it is a combination of things. I think
General Wilson touched on a few of them. I think over time
certainly at the Air Force, the mission had been sort of pushed
to the side. I do not think the leadership across the board
took much of the mission as seriously as possible, although I
want to caveat very quickly on this, that the morale in the
Navy was good where the morale in the Air Force was not good.
So for some complicated reasons, the Navy had managed to keep
the morale good.
There was just so much focus and attention over the course
of the various wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that that is where
you wanted to be. So from the Air Force perspective, a lot of
the folks found themselves--and these were their words. There
are sort of two things that have stuck with me. They felt
trapped. And there was another phrase that we ran into a lot,
that they would say, well, I have the nuclear stink on me, so I
do not have much of a future in the rest of the Air Force. So
they did not see themselves as having much of a career
progression.
All of this happened gradually. It happened over time. None
of it was very quick. And so it will take a lot of time to
rectify all these things. But it was very complicated, I think,
how all these things happened, but a lot of it was I just do
not think there was a lot of attention being paid at very
senior levels to certain aspects of this enterprise.
Senator Donnelly. General Wilson--and this goes back to
what we were talking about before. You are seeing and changing
and making sure that there is no stigma to being part of the
nuclear program, I would assume.
General Wilson. Yes, sir. The goal is we want this to be
something that people aspire to. And I am heartened today with
some of our airmen, you know, what I see and the ability--we
tell them you are going to be able to create your own future
here. You own this. You can make a difference. Every airman's
voice needs to be heard on how do we make this better. And then
we are trying to empower them, and we are trying to clear the
obstacles to their success at all levels. And once they start
seeing the fruits of the success, they start believing it. And
right now, I think they are just starting to see we have said
and you are doing this. We have said this, you are doing this.
They believe it. We are on a journey here but I think we are
making some important progress.
Senator Donnelly. I think that Senator Sessions should be
back in just a minute or 2. I am going to run over and vote
very quickly, and then I will come back. And if he is not back
by then, you will be tortured by me again as I return.
Thank you very much. We will put this in the hearing. We
will hold off until we get back from votes. Thank you very
much.
[Recess.]
Senator Heinrich [presiding]. Let me start out by thanking
all of you for your patience with our voting schedule this
afternoon. It has not been very conducive to these hearings.
But I sure appreciate the work that all of you do.
I want to start out, General Harencak. It is great to see
you. It has been too long. As you know as well as anyone, New
Mexico is home to the Nuclear Weapons Center and the thousands
of airmen who work very hard every day to ensure the safety and
the reliability of our nuclear enterprise.
The 2014 nuclear enterprise review noted that there was,
quote, a lack of promotion opportunities generally in the
nuclear career field and a lack of a defined, sustainable
career path for nuclear officers in the Air Force and career
constraints resulting from nuclear specialization for both
officers and enlisted personnel. Unquote.
What steps are you taking to fix these personnel issues to
ensure that our airmen have increased opportunities and
incentives to enter and stay in this incredibly important
field? General Wilson, do you want to take that?
General Wilson. Yes, Senator, absolutely. We have started
for an ICBM operator a completely different model than we have
done before. We are calling it the 3 Plus 3 model. So we give
them 3 years where they experience in a missile field becoming
a flight commander--excuse me--a deputy and then an aircraft
commander, missile crew commander. At the 3-year point, we are
going to PCS the majority of them to another base where they
are going to become an instructor or a flight commander. And so
we are going to develop a bench of expertise that they did not
have before. So they are going to stay longer in their career
field.
We also have a bunch of educational opportunities as we
move forward, education with all the National labs. We are
spending a lot of time working on what I call the human weapon
system. What are the things we can do to improve the deterrence
thinking of the 21st century? Locally we are starting a
leadership development center where we will have touch points
for our officers, our enlisted, and our civilians throughout
their career where we provide them leadership development
opportunities.
In addition to that, we are working with our Air Force
partners at Air University to build a structure throughout the
Air Force where we increase our deterrence thinking more
broadly throughout the Air Force so that all airmen understand
the importance of nuclear deterrence.
At the strategic level in the air staff, we are doing the
same thing. So how do we get the Air Force into the National
policy debates? So General Harencak and his team, working with
others at headquarters Air Force and STRATCOM, our Navy
partners to get into the debate at the National level.
And lastly we are working with academia throughout the
world. We stood up something we call the Center for Assurance
Deterrence, Escalation and Nonproliferation Science and
Education (CADENCE). And what that is doing is bringing in
academia from around the world to help improve how we do
business, and they are doing some phenomenal research but how
do we take advantage of that at the Air Force and more properly
help our airmen.
So I think we have laid out a broader, deeper structure for
airmen. They can see a path. And we tell people with the number
of airmen today coming into the career field, we have more that
want to stay in than we have room for. As they grow up, we are
going to provide them leadership development opportunities, and
we have a number of operational squadrons and ops officer
positions and group commander positions. There is a future that
you have to be an ICBM operator in the United States Air Force.
Senator Heinrich. Fantastic.
General Wilson. We got a bunch of efforts underway to
improve that.
And I will yield the remaining time to General Harencak
here.
General Harencak. The only thing I would add, Senator, is
the proof of this is truly in the pudding, and I am absolutely
confident that the leadership of the United States Air Force is
committed in the long term to the purposeful development of
nuclear officers and enlisted airmen that all work in this
field. So I believe that we made structural and institutional
changes to address your concern, and already we are seeing the
benefits of that in just the last few months or a year.
Senator Heinrich. And CADENCE. Where is that being stood
up?
General Wilson. Shreveport, LA.
Senator Heinrich. Fantastic.
And a related issue. As we know, nuclear missions require
perfection. However, the nuclear enterprise review found that
there is, quote, a blurring of lines between accountability and
perfection in the Air Force. I was hoping you could explain
what that means a little further. Either of you. General
Wilson?
General Wilson. What I am telling our airmen today is that
they own the future. We are not going to walk by any problems.
So when you see a problem, you need to identify it, so this
culture of self-assessment and being able to have someone hear
your voice and say this needs to be fixed, we can do this
better.
I recently had a conversation with a senior officer, and he
said--
Senator Heinrich. Basically you are saying accountability
and perfection were working against each other in some cases.
General Wilson. We did. We had a culture that was about
passing the next inspection, and the culture of inspections
became the mission. Today we are telling our airmen that is not
it at all. We need to understand the importance of our mission,
but you are empowered to make a difference.
A senior officer said to me, well, you do not really
believe a young airman has the wherewithal to--they just need
to be told what to do. And I said, no, you are completely
missing the boat. An example is a young airman at Barksdale Air
Force Base who is 20 years old who works in the medical group,
and he is a high school programmer. He was doing a job at that
entry and realized I can do this better. He made a difference.
He wrote a program that is now being used DOD-wide, and he is
20 years old. That is the type of empowerment we are talking
about, and it is going on throughout our enterprise where the
youngest airmen and our NCOs and our young officers are
speaking up because they see a way to make it better, and we
need to listen to them and then let them do their job.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you.
Senator Sessions [presiding]. Senator King?
Senator King. Thank you.
Ms. Creedon, I go to a lot of hearings around here, and
I am starting to think that instead of the U.S. Congress,
we should call ourselves ``Deficits are Us'' because I keep
encountering deficits and this is another one. Can you give me,
very briefly, just in a few seconds, top line, what is the size
of the nuclear enterprise deficit and what is the timeframe
that we have to address it? Is it $100 billion, $50 billion,
$20 billion? What is the number, and how much time do we have
to do this before national security is truly jeopardized?
Ms. Creedon. So I think first we need to understand exactly
what our review did. So our review looked at the people in DOD,
the systems in DOD that we have now and that we need to
maintain until such time as we have replacement systems.
Senator King. I understand that. I want a number.
Ms. Creedon. So our estimate was a range of between $9
billion and $25 billion. I do not know the time because how
those things get executed are up in the air. So we had said
possibly as many as 5 years, somewhere along those lines.
Senator King. That is the total number, though. $9 billion
to $25 billion is the total number.
Ms. Creedon. That is what we came up with. Not terribly
scientific, but that is what we came up with, $9 billion to $25
billion. And it will take years to fix.
Senator King. Thank you.
Second, I am concerned about command and control in this
system and particularly in the world of cyber crimes. How are
we doing on that front?
Ms. Creedon. We are doing better. Obviously, a good bit of
this needs to be taken to a classified session on this
particular topic, but when we did our review, because of some
work that had been done previously, one of the main areas of
attention that we found that it had increased attention was the
nuclear command and control. So although there is work to be
done, it at least had, I think, started to get better.
Senator King. It is being attended to.
Ms. Creedon. It is being attended to.
Senator King. General Wilson, the B-52 is reaching the end
of its life, and we are talking about the long-range strike
bomber, but that is still on the drawing boards. Is there a
capacity gap? Will the B-52 last until the long-range strike
fighter, bearing in mind that the last--the Defense Department
average for new aircraft procurement is 23 years? That is the
number that we saw in the full committee. Can we get from here
to there with the B-52?
General Wilson. We can. We are planning to fly the B-52 for
another 25 years. It has service life to go beyond that.
Senator King. So you are confident in that platform for
that period of time.
General Wilson. I am. We need to do some upgrades to it.
But I am also confident that we need a new penetrating bomber.
The B-52s that we have on our ramp are 1960 and 1961 models.
The B-2, our new bomber, is 25 years old. So we absolutely need
a new bomber. As technology improves around the world, the
ability to hold targets at risk wherever they are on the planet
is vitally important to our Nation and certainly to the United
States Air Force.
Senator King. I would like to follow up with you or whoever
is appropriate about the long-range strike bomber, what the
spec is, how it relates to the B-2 and the B-52. So that is a
discussion we can have.
General Wilson. We would be happy to have that with you.
The information referred to follows:
Senator King was briefed on the Long Range Strike Bomber, what the
spec is, and how it relates to the B-2 and the B-52 on May 7, 2015 by
RCO, SAPCO and SAF/AQP.
Senator King. If you could be in touch with my office
because I want to understand before we undertake a new--before
we get too far into a new vehicle, I want to have that
opportunity.
Another deficit is Research and Development (R&D). Are
there sufficient funds in the President's budget, if it were
enacted as it is today, to do the R&D that is necessary to keep
pace in a field which is essentially driven by technology?
General Wilson, do you want to tackle that? Or, Admiral, why do
you not give me a thought on that?
Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. Well, I will address that as it
relates to the Ohio replacement program, our new submarine. The
answer is yes. As requested in the President's budget, if that
is fully funded, then we will remain on track to do the design
development and leading into production of that vitally
important platform.
Senator King. How about R&D generally in the nuclear
enterprise?
Admiral Benedict. I would say from my position as Director
of SSP, there are four areas that I think my counterparts here
in the Air Force would agree if we are not investing in, no one
is investing in, and those would be reentry body science, rad
hard electronics to the levels that we have to, strategic
propulsion, which is vital to both us and the ICBM force, as
well as the guidance systems which are well beyond any
commercial case.
Senator King. Could a current ICBM be used to put a
satellite in orbit, the same rocket?
Admiral Benedict. I will defer to the Air Force on that,
sir.
General Wilson. I would think the answer would be yes. I
would have to get with the pros to be able to do that. But an
ICBM is going to fly a significant distance, halfway around the
world and go up into the hundreds of miles high. So the answer
would be yes.
Senator King. Well, I am just interested because we are
talking about satellite overhead architecture and vehicles, and
I just want to be sure we are not having a different vehicle
for every trip to the store. And I would like to follow up on
that as well in terms of the appropriateness of multiple use of
some of these vehicles that are being developed.
A final question. How is Russia doing in their compliance
with New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)? Anybody?
Answer quick. Nobody answering makes me nervous.
Ms. Creedon. They are fine. Right now, the New START--they
are full in compliance and we are full in compliance.
Senator King. They are fully complying?
Ms. Creedon. They are. It is one of the few bright spots in
the relationship.
Senator King. Good.
That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Sessions. A good question.
Admiral Benedict, with regard to the study and the Navy's
response, are there things that impacted the Navy that you have
undertaken to make our arsenal more safe?
Admiral Benedict. Mr. Chairman, both studies identified
primarily two deficiencies within the U.S. Navy's actions. We
are already in process. And we appreciate the confirmation that
the two reviews gave us. Those are the infrastructure and, as
Ms. Creedon stated, primarily in the shipyards. We were down in
our shipyard worker numbers as a result of the impacts of
sequestration. So those numbers were immediately authorized by
Secretary Work when he identified that. And so we are hiring
somewhere around 2,200 personnel for the shipyards and our
repair facilities. We are on track on that hiring process, and
that will certainly increase the throughput in our shipyards.
The second piece, again as Ms. Creedon identified, was the
infrastructure. We are now on a 15-year recapitalization plan
of the naval shipyards, as well as a 25-year recapitalization
program within the strategic weapons facilities that I am
accountable for. So, yes, sir, we are on track.
Senator Sessions. Well, your answer to Senator King I
guess, Ms. Creedon, was $9 billion to $25 billion. Now, this is
in addition to what our current expected expenditures are?
Ms. Creedon. Yes, sir. And it was to maintain the current
systems in DOD between now and whenever they are replaced by
the follow-on systems.
Senator Sessions. But you are not counting like the Ohio-
class replacement or the new bomber?
Ms. Creedon. That is correct.
Senator Sessions. That is not being counted. What does this
money go for? I mean, we have been operating here for a long
time, and we obviously are not at the level of safety and
reliability we need to be. That is a huge sum of money.
Ms. Creedon. And it is over a period of time. And I would
turn to my colleagues for their indications as to how much each
of them has begun to spend over the Future Years Defense
Program (FYDP), but it is a wide range of things. Some of it is
facilities. There are a lot of facilities that need to be
replaced. Some of it is new equipment. The Air Force needs new
helicopters for their missile fields. It is people. It is
parts. It is a whole range of things. It is a very large bill,
but a lot of it is facilities.
Senator Sessions. Well, $25 billion would buy a lot, a lot
of helicopters, a lot of automobiles with heaters in them. I am
just telling you.
I would think we need a specific request. So how would this
reflect itself in future budget requests? You would just ask
for more or are you talking about taking money out of existing
programs?
Ms. Creedon. Well, at that point, sir, I think I would like
to turn it over to my DOD colleagues who are implementing the
recommendations.
Senator Sessions. Gentlemen, do you have thoughts about
that? I mean, this is not a blank check. I mean, we have got to
honor the taxpayers? money, and we are worried about not being
able to maintain sufficient force levels and other matters too
in this Defense Department.
Admiral Benedict. Sir, if I may, I will go first.
Our fiscal year 2016 increase was $446 million. That is in
our budget within the Navy, and our FYDP increase across the 5-
year defense plan for the Navy totaled just slightly over $2
billion.
As Ms. Creedon said, the majority of that is personnel in
the shipyards, as I explained. We have self-funded--
Senator Sessions. How many do you have in a shipyard now?
Admiral Benedict. Across all four shipyards, sir? I would
have to get you the specific number.
Senator Sessions. 2,000 sounds like a big number.
Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. Remember, these are the four
naval nuclear shipyards. And so I do not have the exact number
of all four in total. The number that I gave you, slightly over
2,200, is the increase to the existing workforce in order to
ensure that we can maintain the throughput through that system.
I do not have the total number, sir.
Senator Sessions. General Wilson?
General Wilson. Mr. Chairman, we added $5.6 billion over
the FYDP for the nuclear enterprise. That covers a spectrum of
things from both people. It covers milcon.
Senator Sessions. Well, is it not the rule of thumb that
you can do--$1 billion is equal to 10,000 uniformed personnel?
General Wilson. I do not know the rule of thumb, Mr.
Chairman. We added 1,100 people to the nuclear enterprise this
last year to help us in every area from security forces to our
operators to supply specialists. 1,100 was the plus-up that we
got to the nuclear enterprise. Some of that is for procurement
going forward. We included the long-range standoff weapon
across this 5-year defense budget. We have about $700 million
of milcon to start getting after the weapons storage areas
across all of our bases. So we added $5.6 billion on this FYDP
to the nuclear enterprise.
Senator Sessions. Well, I think we should see that in more
detail. I think we should know more in detail about that and
exactly how many people and just to say $5 billion and we are
talking about $1 billion will produce about 10,000. So that is
a lot of people.
Anyway, I think we have to look at this hard. We have got
to create safety and reliability. We know you have been
undercut and have not had sufficient funding for that, and we
are going to have to find some more money. But doing it as
smartly as possible would be good.
Senator Donnelly, I believe you are next. Has a vote
started again or do you know?
Senator Donnelly. Where we are at is there are a number of
voice votes taking place right now, so about 10 to 15 minutes
before the final recorded vote. I already went through
questions, and so, Senator King or Senator Heinrich.
Senator Sessions. Please.
Senator Heinrich. One more round if we have got the time.
And I would just make the point that, unfortunately,
nuclear weapons have never sort of conformed to the sort of
ratios between personnel, obviously, and hardware that we see
in other parts of the DOD budget.
But I want to get back to a couple of issues with General
Harencak and also Admiral Benedict. And you guys can decide who
to answer first.
But the NNSA labs and plants through the current
refurbishment programs for the B61-12, the W88 Alt 370, and the
fuse for the W87 are leveraging rate, our technology across
these life extension programs now. And I wanted to ask you is
this sort of leverage beneficial to your programs. Is it cost-
effective? And is there a benefit for the U.S. deterrent as the
full-scale engineering and design of these programs starts to
level off over the next few years for Air Force, Navy, and NNSA
to think about some sort of joint engineering programs to
maintain the institutional knowledge of the labs? workforce?
General Harencak. I will start, Senator. First off, as you
are well aware, the tremendous work that the labs in New Mexico
and Lawrence Livermore labs are doing in this collaboration.
The short answer to your question is a resounding yes. We are
leveraging. We are making affordable smart decisions where we
collaborate with the United States Navy. And the B61 is a
perfect example. There are components--we are just using Navy
components in them, which has been obviously tremendously
helpful. We are also collaborating on future ways that we could
use joint common and adaptable materials, not just in hardware
but also in our processes and using our people. We talked a
little bit earlier about Navy Crane. The Navy is also using a
facility in Heath, Ohio that the United States Air Force runs
through a contractor, and it has also been enormously helpful.
I will say, though, I have been banging around this
particular aspect--business for the last 6 continuous years,
and I can tell you I have never seen better cooperation. Our
B61 program at the NNSA is working with us, and with
collaboration from the Navy is on time, on cost. And that is
just one example of where this collaboration and the great work
between the Department of Energy, the NNSA, the Navy, and the
Air Force has occurred.
Senator Heinrich. That is exactly what I was hoping to hear
because I think as you heard from Senator Sessions, the
chairman, while we all recognize that this enterprise is not
cheap, we have to get the most bang for the buck possible in
this environment.
I want to move on real quick to Kirtland Underground
Munitions Storage Complex (KUMSC). General Wilson, as I
understand it, the Global Strike Command now owns the Kirtland
underground munitions and maintenance storage complex. This is
a unique and strategic national asset. Do you have a long-term
plan for its upkeep? And if you do, can you share it with the
committee?
General Wilson. Senator, I completely agree that KUMSC is a
national treasure. We have not taken control of Kirtland KUMSC
yet. We will on 1 October. As we have talked in the past,
though, in the Air Force corporate structure, as we modernize
our weapons storage facility, KUMSC absolutely has to be part
of that plan. And so we will have that as part of the plan. I
do not have it today, but as we develop it, we will make sure
we share it with you.
Senator Heinrich. That was certainly the case when the
Nuclear Weapons Center was the lead, and we just need to make
sure that that does not fall by the wayside as we make this
incredibly important transition.
General Wilson. Absolutely.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, General.
Senator Sessions. Senator King?
Senator King. I just want to take a moment to thank all of
you, Ms. Creedon especially and Dr. Brumer, for the work on the
report, on the review. I think so often we sort of just keep
going, and to every now and then to stop and think and analyze
and review and have some strategy about where we are headed I
think is very valuable. And I commend former Secretary Hagel
for initiating it and for your carrying it out. And I can
assure you that it is going to help to guide our work and
consideration. So just a thank you for that important work.
Senator Donnelly. And I would just like to follow up what
Senator King said to say thank you as well and to also let you
know our goal is to simply make this all work the best possible
and to create the most confidence in the people who work in
this area, and that when we talk about these things, it is not
to try to pick out people or pick on people. It is simply to
say how can we do this better. What are the things we missed
on? Just like the next day in practice, how can we run this
better and make our team better? And so to all of you, thank
you and thank you for your work on this effort.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator Donnelly. And I agree
with those positive comments. I really believe that the Defense
Department took the challenge seriously. The report is a
serious report, and I believe that you are determined to
eliminate the dangers and problems that we had. I truly believe
that is so.
Admiral Benedict, General Harencak mentioned the joint work
that you have done. I understand there has been some real
savings of money in that. And do you see possibilities in the
future as we develop ICBM warheads and submarine-launched
warheads that we could also have interoperable systems as the
years go by?
Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. And I think there is a spectrum
of commonality. It goes from the simple constituents using the
same materials in the weapon system all the way up through--you
could envision at some point at least a discussion about how
common could we be. Could we be a common missile? I am not
certain we are at that far right side of the spectrum. But I
will tell you that we are engaged at the engineering level, at
the leadership level, and as I mentioned earlier, I am actually
briefing the Air Force ICBM flags on Tuesday of next week with
Admiral Haney on this very subject up in Cheyenne, Wyoming. And
they were very generous to invite me up there to have the
conversation on commonality.
So I think the conversation is ongoing. The recognition
that the bill that you very well recognize that is in front of
the two services is something that we have to think about
differently, and I think there is a commitment now within the
leadership teams to ensure that we provide you evidence that we
have thought about it differently and some different proposals
than the past.
I will turn it over to my colleagues.
General Harencak. I would say, Senator, that it is not a
possibility. It is a certainty that we are going to do it
because we just cannot do it any other way. People ask me all
the time, well, how can we afford to do all this
recapitalization and modernization. Well, one way we are going
to afford to do it is we are going to do it in a new way. We
are not going to do it the same way we did it in the 1960s and
the 1970s and the 1980s and the 1990s. We are going to do it in
a smarter, better, faster way. And that starts with making sure
wherever we can leverage another service or what the U.S. Navy
has done or vice versa, we are going to do it. So this is not a
possibility. This is a new way of doing things that we are
committed to, both our services. And it is probably the only
way we are actually going to be able to deliver the needed
systems for our Nation in an affordable manner.
Senator Sessions. Well, thank you. I think those are
encouraging comments.
Senator King?
Senator King. I was just going to say amen, General. You
got it right.
Senator Donnelly. I would third that and then also say to
General Wilson I understand you are moving to STRATCOM, And we
want to thank you on behalf of the committee for all the help
you have rendered to us and we hope to continue that
relationship as we look forward.
And, General Harencak, we understand there is a new
incoming A-10. During the ICBM cheating incident and
modernization of the Air Force's nuclear mission, you have been
proud to defend and advocate for the Air Force, and we
appreciate that very much and we wish you the very best in your
next position as well.
Senator Sessions. Dr. Brumer, this will be my final
question. Secretary Hagel talked about a 10 percent need
increase apparently. I believe Administrator Creedon has used
$9 billion to $25 billion. That depends on the years. That
might be even more.
First, does the 2016 request and the FYDP funding profile
reflect that increase? So let me ask you that.
Dr. Brumer. Yes. Thank you for that question, Chairman.
Indeed, as part of the PB 2016 build, we did bring the
senior leadership detailed assessments of all of the budget
options and how they addressed the review recommendations. The
PB 2016 did add $8 billion across the FYDP. Early on, there
were options to spend more money, but there were executability
problems and the ability to spend the money efficiently. By the
end of the FYDP, I believe it comes close to the 10 percent
number.
Senator Sessions. So that is a figure you can live with?
Dr. Brumer. Sir, it is an outcome of trying to balance a
good faith effort to address the recommendations of the
reviews, as well as trying to ensure that there is good use of
Government resources to ensure that the money is well spent. It
is something that I am comfortable with today, but we are very
early on in the efforts to address the issues. I believe that
this is something that will require years of sustained effort
and sustained attention, and we intend to comprehensively
review those decisions and the funding levels every year and if
changes are needed in future budget requests, we will recommend
them.
Senator Sessions. Well, I think that is the kind of answer
you can give at this time and maybe no more than that. But we
would like to see the Government do a little better than we
normally do. We go for years under-investing and then sometimes
we over-invest. And if we can get on a stable path that we can
be confident would put us into a safe, secure, and modernized
system that is reliable, then we want to do that. And we hope
you will look for every way possible to keep that cost as
reasonable as you can.
Anything else, gentlemen?
Thank you all. We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
modernization
1. Senator Inhofe. Major General Harencak, Lieutenant General
Wilson, Vice Admiral Benedict, Dr. Brumer, and Ms. Creedon, do each of
you believe our nuclear deterrence capability has been challenged by
inadequate modernization funding and continued modernization by other
nuclear powers?
Major General Harencak and Lieutenant General Wilson. As long as
deficit reduction remains a national priority, federal agencies will
continue to compete for diminishing resources. The modernization
requirements across the entire Air Force have certainly created
challenges, particularly for our efforts to simultaneously modernize
the ICBM force, the dual-capable bomber fleets, and the intricate NC3
infrastructure.
In the five years since Air Force Global Strike Command stood up as
a Major Command, both funding and manpower resources flowing to the
nuclear mission have improved. However, significant work remains to
correct 23 years of reduced nuclear focus and funding since standing
down Strategic Air Command.
We must continue to balance fleet recapitalization with continuous
operations and maintenance of a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
force, which is our number one priority. This nuclear capability is
foundational to US national security, acting as assurance to our allies
and a deterrent to those who might choose to harm us.
Vice Admiral Benedict. Prioritizing limited resources to meet
national strategic deterrence requirements among all our national
defense requirements is a challenge. Today's fiscal environment is a
concern as the Department of Defense (DOD) endeavors to sustain and
modernize many central components of our strategic nuclear deterrent
triad, the communications system that directs it and the underlying
support structure.
The Armed Services are implementing the President's guidance for
aligning U.S. security policies to the 21st century security
environment. Although our nuclear arsenal is the smallest it has been
since the late 1950s, today's nuclear forces are fully capable of
meeting current strategic defense needs and are expected to serve the
nation well into the middle of this century. However, the percentage of
defense department spending on our nuclear forces and infrastructure
has declined to only 2.5% of total DOD spending in 2013--an historic
low.
Today our nuclear weapons and weapons systems are safe, secure and
effective despite operating well beyond their originally designed life.
Today our triad of nuclear forces is formidable and stands as an
effective deterrent to strategic attack against the U.S. and our
allies. However, this readiness cannot be sustained indefinitely.
Recent reviews of our DOD nuclear weapons enterprise have revealed that
it no longer has the margin of safety and reliability it once had.
Consequently, the nation faces a substantive, multi-decade
recapitalization challenge in which we must continue to invest. Our
current and planned investments are significant compared to past
expenditures in our strategic deterrent programs since 1992 yet are
commensurate with the magnitude of the strategic deterrent mission
which is not expected to markedly change for the foreseeable future. If
we fail to sustain these investments we risk degrading the global
stabilizing effect of a diverse, strong, and capable nuclear force. It
is imperative we resource future sensor improvements; upgrades for
nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) capabilities;
strategic delivery system recapitalization efforts; weapon life-
extension programs and stockpile surveillance activities; and nuclear
complex infrastructure modernization. Together these exceptionally
important and necessary investments will ensure our triad of nuclear
forces remains viable and credible not only to our own defense but to
our allies defense as well.
Dr. Brumer. I believe that aging systems, coupled with competing
priorities and topline pressure, have put stress on the Department's
ability to maintain adequate risk margin in the nuclear enterprise. If
left unaddressed over a long period of time, this might have challenged
our deterrent capability in the future. However, the Department is
taking action to address these issues, and I do not believe that this
has undermined our nation's ability to provide a robust deterrent, even
in the face of modernization by other nuclear powers.
Ms. Creedon did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
2. Senator Inhofe. Major General Harencak, Lieutenant General
Wilson, Vice Admiral Benedict, Dr. Brumer, and Ms. Creedon, do you all
believe that the nuclear triad (strategic bombers, intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and submarine-launched ballistic missiles)
is an essential deterrent and that each must be modernized and
maintained?
Major General Harencak and Lieutenant General Wilson. Absolutely--
the nuclear triad is as important today as it has been throughout its
existence. In today's unpredictable world, our nuclear weapons provide
the ultimate protection for the United States and our allies and
partners. The three legs of the triad complement each other to provide
quick response, visible deterrence, and survivability. If you remove
any one of these capabilities, you risk increasing our vulnerability
against the only existential threat our nation faces.
With respect to modernization, we must continue to modernize our
existing systems while also developing new weapon systems. For decades
we have taken a procurement break with respect to our nuclear weapon
systems, but now that bill has come due. The Air Force is operating B-
52s that were produced in the 1960s, ICBMs that were deployed in the
1970s, and B-2s and cruise missiles that were produced in the 1980s. We
have upgraded these systems throughout the years; however, it becomes
more and more expensive every time we do this. It is similar to
maintaining an older car--there comes a point where it makes better
financial and operational sense to simply buy a new one.
Our adversaries are publicly developing new systems and modernizing
their existing ones--both offensive and defensive. This is not to say
we are engaging in a new arms race. But it does mean other countries
are developing systems that will eventually challenge our capability to
strike anywhere on the globe at any time. We cannot risk these
countries turning the Air Force into a regional force instead of a
global one.
Vice Admiral Benedict. Per the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR),
``retaining all three Triad legs will best maintain strategic stability
at reasonable cost, while hedging against potential technical problems
or vulnerabilities.'' The commitment to the triad was reinforced in the
U.S. Nuclear Weapons Employment Planning guidance the President issued
in June 2013. USSTRATCOM executes strategic deterrence and assurance
operations with Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Ballistic
Missile Submarines (SSBNs), and nuclear capable heavy bombers. Each
element of the nuclear triad provides unique and complimentary
attributes of strategic deterrence, and the whole is greater than the
sum of its parts.
Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs)
Recapitalizing our Sea-Based Strategic Deterrent (SBSD) is the Navy
and USSTRATCOM's top modernization priority. The Navy's Ohio-class SSBN
and Trident II D5 Strategic Weapons System (SWS) together are the
nuclear triad's most survivable leg and are the assured response that
is the core of our nuclear deterrent strategy. This stealthy and highly
capable force is composed of two major elements, the SWS and delivery
system. Both are undergoing needed modernization. With respect to the
SWS, we are extending the life of the D5 system to be capable until
after 2040. With respect to the submarine that delivers these missiles,
the Ohio-class SSBN has already been extended from 30 to 42 years of
service and no further extension is possible. Consequently, these
submarines will start leaving service at the rate of one per year in
2027. It cannot be emphasized enough that the OHIO Replacement Program
must stay on schedule. No further delay is possible. Continued and
stable funding for the OHIO Replacement SSBN also supports our
commitment to the United Kingdom to provide a Common Missile
Compartment design, ensuring both their and our new SSBNs achieve
operational capability on schedule.
Summary
The nuclear Triad is essential to the strategic defense of the
United States, and each of the legs therein plays a critical and
complementary role in supporting the other legs of the Triad. Removing
any of these essential legs would threaten the credibility of our
strategic deterrent capability the NPR directs the military to maintain
and would thereby increase the risk of nuclear war.
Dr. Brumer. The nuclear Triad is the basis for the nation's
deterrence capability and a key aspect of our national security
enterprise. Each leg brings unique characteristics, and the multi-
system nature of the Triad ensures that our deterrent is robust even in
the face of unexpected technical issues or advancements by other
nuclear powers.
Ms. Creedon did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
3. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Wilson and Vice Admiral
Benedict, if the Air Force and Navy are forced to accept the levels of
funding in the Budget Control Act, what will the Air Force and Navy
prioritize and what programs will be impacted?
Lieutenant General Wilson. Thank you for the question, but I must
defer to Air Force and DOD leadership on service priorities under
sequestration.
Vice Admiral Benedict. A return to sequestration in FY 2016 would
necessitate a revisit and revision of the defense strategy.
Sequestration would significantly reduce the Navy's ability to fully
implement the President's defense strategy. The required cuts would
force us to further delay critical warfighting capabilities, reduce
readiness of forces needed for contingency responses, further downsize
weapons capacity, and forego or stretch procurement of force structure
as a last resort. Because of funding shortfalls over the last three
years, our FY 2016 President's Budget represents the absolute minimum
funding levels needed to execute our defense strategy. We cannot
provide a responsible way to budget for the defense strategy at
sequester levels because there isn't one.
Today's world is more complex, more uncertain, and more turbulent,
and this trend around the world will likely continue. Our adversaries'
are modernizing and expanding their capabilities. It is vital that we
have an adequate, predictable, and timely budget to remain an effective
Navy. Put simply, sequestration will damage the national security of
this country.
personnel
4. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Wilson and Vice Admiral
Benedict, Ms. Creedon, what are we doing to ensure we can recruit and
retain the right professionals, both military and civilian, to operate
and sustain our nuclear forces?
Lieutenant General Wilson. The Air Force has launched several
initiatives and is leveraging existing programs aimed at recruiting and
retaining nuclear professionals. We are focusing on developing,
training, educating, and incentivizing personnel through deliberate
efforts.
In Air Force Global Strike Command, our education initiatives start
at the commissioning sources and initial skills training. We have begun
there so we can educate and inform current and future Airmen about the
importance of the nuclear enterprise and how they contribute to that
mission. We also send senior leaders to Reserve Officer Training Corps
(ROTC) detachments around the country to engage students and inform
them about the nuclear enterprise. We have done around 40 of these
visits thus far, and have received great feedback.
Additionally, the Air Force dedicated resources to developing
nuclear professionals through formal education and development programs
that enhance knowledge and build perspectives on leadership. These
courses educate and provide research on the nuclear enterprise, weapons
of mass destruction threats, and appropriate countermeasures to Air
Force and Department of Defense leaders.
One of these programs is the new School of Advanced Nuclear
Deterrence Studies, where we will build a cadre of nuclear deterrence
and assurance experts experienced in the concepts of leading,
operating, maintaining, defending, supporting, planning, and sustaining
the nuclear enterprise. The Air Force has also teamed with the Navy to
create an exchange program for nuclear professionals. Moreover, there
are Air Force sponsored fellowships and intern programs at the national
nuclear laboratories used to further enhance our nuclear professionals'
education, training, and development.
The Air Force has taken action to provide monetary and non-monetary
incentives for nuclear specialties currently performing nuclear related
duties to include support personnel. Monetary incentives include
Assignment Incentive Pay for ICBM operators, security forces and
maintenance officers, and Special Duty Assignment Pay for critical
enlisted nuclear career fields. Also, the Air Force is offering a
Selective Reenlistment Bonus for certain specialties unable to meet
retention goals. For civilians, the Air Force has requested and been
approved special salary rates and recruitment, retention, and
relocation incentives to attract personnel to some of our hard to fill
locations.
The intent of all these efforts is to meet the objective of
attracting, and retaining nuclear professionals through education,
training and developmental initiatives.
Vice Admiral Benedict. Navy recruits, and eventually commissions or
enlists, only highly-qualified and trusted candidates who possess the
emotional stability and physical capability, and who demonstrate the
reliability and professional competence, essential to maintaining the
most advanced and sophisticated weapons systems in the world. Our
future officers commission through the U.S. Naval Academy, Naval
Reserve Officer Training Corps units at some of the nation's premier
educational institutions, or through various other colleges and
universities under the Nuclear Propulsion Officer Candidate (NUPOC)
program. Enlisted personnel are selected from among Navy applicants who
achieve the highest scores on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude
Battery (ASVAB). The chosen few must maintain certification in, and be
continuously evaluated through, the Nuclear Weapons Personal
Reliability Program, and must remain eligible at all times for the
required levels of security clearance and access.
Navy uses various special and incentive pays and bonuses to attract
and retain intelligent, highly-motivated and uniquely-qualified
officers and enlisted personnel assigned to the nation's nuclear
deterrent mission, in submarines or in the Fleet Air Reconnaissance
Take Charge and Move Out (i.e., VQ (TACAMO)) mission. In addition to
competitive compensation, we invest substantial effort in educating
Sailors on the benefits of this unique service, which includes the
opportunity and honor of serving our nation in this unique arena, and
exposure to world-class training and challenging duty assignments,
eligibility for Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits and access to continuing
education, family support programs and world-class health care, while
qualifying for tax advantages and, potentially, a generous retirement
plan.
In the civilian workforce, the Strategic Systems Program (SSP)
office uses available hiring flexibilities, including Expedited Hiring
Authority to access highly-qualified acquisition employees, and various
Veterans' Recruitment Appointments (VRA) to quickly hire qualified
veterans into civilian jobs. We offer Tuition Assistance and Student
Loan Repayments to encourage employees to remain in SSP throughout
their careers. We also provide retention incentives to employees in
critical skills, and have been successful in hiring new employees to
fill job vacancies and in retaining the needed skills to do the
mission.
Last fall, CNO initiated a Nuclear Enterprise Manpower Review to
assess military and civilian manpower requirements across the nuclear
weapons and nuclear propulsion enterprises to identify gaps in mission
execution. The current phase of the review will provide gap analyses
across all force management domains late this summer. The next phase
will focus on competency management requirements for federal civilian
employees and recommend significant improvements in community
management and knowledge development practices.
Ms. Creedon did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Donnelly
naval surface warfare center crane value
5. Senator Donnelly. Vice Admiral Benedict, can you characterize
the role Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) Crane plays in support our
Navy nuclear forces?
Vice Admiral Benedict. For more than 50 years, NSWC Crane's Global
Deterrence and Defense Department has provided product engineering and
design capabilities for shipboard and flight electronics in support of
a vast array of missile systems for the Navy. Strategic Systems
Programs has relied on their expertise to ensure generations of Fleet
Ballistic Missile systems were developed and continue to be deployed in
support of our nation's strategic deterrence mission. NSWC Crane has
played a critical role in each of the missile subsystems, including the
system and platform integration of the Strategic Weapons System.
They are also active participants in the Commonality efforts, led
by the Navy and Air Force. NSWC Crane is currently leading the effort
to develop a radiation hardened parts library for use by the Navy, Air
Force, and other Defense Department customers. The database will serve
as a repository for all current radiation hardened parts including the
manufacturer, specifications, and test results.
radiation-hardened parts and hardware assurance
6. Senator Donnelly. Vice Admiral Benedict, as you know, NSWC Crane
is at the center of work on radiation-hardened electronics and hardware
assurance efforts. Their work on detecting and protecting against
counterfeit parts entering the Department of Defense (DOD) supply chain
is groundbreaking. What is the Navy doing to protect nuclear systems
against counterfeit parts and how can we better leverage expertise like
that at Crane to counter this threat, whether in the Navy or elsewhere?
Vice Admiral Benedict. SSP and our Prime Contractors relied on NSWC
Crane's expertise relative to detecting and protecting against
counterfeit parts entering the Navy's TRIDENT II (D5) life extension
program during the development phase and continuing into the production
phase. Specifically we utilized an approved DMEA Trusted foundry,
monitored the electronic parts' and printed circuit boards' supply
chain, made procurements through OEMs and only if an OEM would not sell
product directly did we procure through an OEM authorized distributor.
In addition, we utilized NSWC Crane as an independent test agent to
perform physical and functional verification of critical components.
NSWC Crane's expertise in this area was highlighted during the
recent Microelectronics Integrity Meeting hosted at NSWC Crane. The
meeting was attended by several key DOD claimants. Continuing this type
of engagement will help the DOD leverage NSWC Crane's expertise and
allow the best practices of all of DOD to be highlighted.
7. Senator Donnelly. Lieutenant General Wilson, I am aware that
NSWC Crane is working with the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA), the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Air Force on
efforts to better understand and protect against counterfeit parts
entering the DOD supply chain. Whether in relation to this partnership
or separately, can you explain how the Air Force is working to protect
its nuclear systems against counterfeit parts?
Lieutenant General Wilson. The Air Force is continuing work to
comply with current and past Congressional language in response to new
and emerging threats in the context of the supply chain. We continue to
protect the nuclear enterprise supply chain through a multi-tiered
approach of prevention, detection, and mitigation. This includes
policy, oversight, direction, and actions ranging from the Secretary of
the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQX); Headquarters, Air Force
Materiel Command (AFMC); the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center (AFNWC);
the specific weapons system program offices; and the Air Force Supply
Chain Manager (448th Supply Chain Management Wing). The Air Force is
also working in cooperation with other military services, offices,
laboratories, and partners in industry and academia. Through
coordination efforts between these various organizations, activities
involving the identification, threat assessment, planning,
surveillance, detection, and mitigation of counterfeit parts are
performed.
The Air Force controls weapon systems' parts from concept, design
and development, and operational fielding phases through final weapon
system disposal by developing and updating rigorous sets of technical
requirements, specifications, standards, and key suppliers and support
infrastructure. As systems move into sustainment and become more
mature, changes in requirements and suppliers drive Air Force and
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) reviews of technical data, supplier
qualification, and test parameters to ensure technical compliance of
parts. Many items require qualification, first article, and production
lot sampling and testing.
As older trusted sources go out of business, outsource,
consolidate/merge or opt to no longer produce the parts we need, there
is an increased threat of counterfeit parts entering our supply chain.
The Air Force and DLA are driven to require more surveillance including
such things as visual and physical inspection, x-ray analysis,
deconstruction, software, quarantine, and marking of parts.
Additionally, the Air Force uses their Discrepant Material Reporting
Office (DMR) and the Government-Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP)
to react to identified risks.
As a part of a weapon system's longer sustainment process, the Air
Force conducts a series of review processes to ensure parts are
compatible and pass rigorous testing requirements. Additionally, the
Air Force Supply Chain protects against counterfeit parts by developing
tools and capabilities to detect counterfeits, and ensuring contractors
have detection programs in place.
The Air Force Supply Chain office actively continues to coordinate
efforts with AFNWC, specific program offices, Air Force Office of
Special Investigations (AFOSI), Intelligence Offices, higher
headquarters, and the other military services and DOD agencies for
future planning and mitigation efforts, as well as holding
collaborative working groups.
Furthermore, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center (AFNWC) has
specific Supply Chain processes and efforts underway to identify
mission critical functions and critical components, and has developed
implementation strategies to reduce vulnerabilities through a systems
security engineering approach and by independently assessing
vulnerabilities of AF strategic systems across the lifecycle of the
weapon systems against current and emerging threats. AFNWC, in
coordination with the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA),
is also establishing a Joint US/UK Supply Chain Assurance Working Group
(JSCAWG). The purpose of the JSCAWG is to provide a joint US-UK
coordination and communication forum for supporting trust and
confidence in the respective US and UK nuclear weapon supply chains and
in Information Technology systems (to include hardware and software).
Finally, DLA employs an enhanced quality control program to protect
Air Force ICBM systems from counterfeit/nonconforming parts. Key
elements of the program include: tracking and managing ICBM parts
separately from other parts; procuring ICBM parts to the specifications
identified by the Air Force; employing high level quality assurance
standards and requirements when procuring AF ICBM parts; conducting
parts tests; and leveraging anti-counterfeiting technology to validate
the authenticity of all microcircuits purchased by DLA.
8. Senator Donnelly. Ms. Creedon, I am aware that NSWC Crane is
working with DARPA, NSA, and the Air Force on efforts to better
understand and protect against counterfeit parts entering the DOD
supply chain for both our nuclear and conventional systems. Whether in
relation to this partnership or separately, can you explain how NNSA is
working to protect our nuclear systems against counterfeit parts?
Ms. Creedon did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
navy-air force collaboration/commonality
9. Senator Donnelly. Vice Admiral Benedict, following up on my
question in the hearing, NSWC has been involved in efforts to enhance
collaboration and/or commonality among Navy and Air Force nuclear
programs. At one time, we heard talk of Air Force-Navy collaboration.
Today we hear more about commonality. How would you characterize each
of these aims?
Vice Admiral Benedict. As viewed by the Navy, Commonality and
Collaboration should cover and examine a large spectrum of potential
effort. This spectrum covers areas from Sustainment of Current Systems
(continuing MMIII and D5LE in their current forms) through
``Evolution'' (Air Force and Navy coordinated programs of joint
components and constituents) to ``Revolution'' (i.e. Joint Ballistic
Missile). The goal of the Commonality and Collaboration efforts between
the Navy and Air Force is not entirely focused at the one extreme of
building a common SLBM/ICBM, but more likely would utilize certain
elements of each system that have the potential for being common. The
full option space must be explored from a National perspective to
ensure the correct balance of commonality.
Although commonality and collaboration are often used
interchangeably as if they are a single effort, they are different.
Collaboration focuses on what each service is doing and trying to
coordinate and consolidate those efforts that are similar. Commonality
focuses on working efforts in the same manner, either by using the same
components or the same facilities. The radiation hardened electronic
parts library is a great example that addresses both collaboration and
commonality. The library itself is a collaborative effort used by both
services. In the future before developing or certifying a new part,
both sides will aim to use the parts already included in the library--a
commonality effort.
10. Senator Donnelly. Vice Admiral Benedict, you spoke briefly in
the hearing about the status of efforts to achieve commonality among
Navy and Air Force nuclear systems. I request that your staff brief
mine on the status of these efforts in detail, including current
efforts and opportunities for the future.
Vice Admiral Benedict. I have a brief ready and it can be scheduled
at your convenience. My POC CAPT Tyler Meador can be reached at 703-
697-2871 or [email protected] or Ms. Meghan Raftery at 202-433-
7105, meghan.raftery @ssp.navy.mil.
11. Senator Donnelly. General Harencak and Lieutenant General
Wilson, I request that your staff brief my office in detail on the
status of efforts to enhance collaboration and commonality across Air
Force and Navy nuclear programs, including current efforts and
opportunities for the future.
Major General Harencak and Lieutenant General Wilson. We look
forward to briefing you on different ways in which the Air Force and
Navy are working together to ensure commonality.
12. Senator Donnelly. Ms. Creedon, what is your assessment of
efforts to enhance collaboration and commonality across Navy and Air
Force nuclear programs? Do you see value in such efforts and what are
the challenges and opportunities now and in the future?
Ms. Creedon did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
long range stand off
13. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General Wilson, in your testimony,
you state that the Air Force ``fully intends to develop a conventional
version of the Long Range Stand Off (LRSO) Weapon as a future spiral to
the nuclear variant''. Does this mean that once the current program
becomes a program of record and achieves Milestone A it will have the
conventional version as part of its requirements for engineering past
Milestone B, or will the Air Force come back to it later after they
develop the nuclear version of LRSO?
Lieutenant General Wilson. We do, in fact, intend a conventional
variant of the Long Range Standoff weapon. However, currently, the main
focus for LRSO is to develop the nuclear variant while ensuring the
program is achieving the initial developmental guidelines. Upon
successful development of the nuclear LRSO variant, Air Force Global
Strike Command will pursue a conventional variant following the Joint
Capabilities Integration & Development System process by evaluating
alternatives and codifying any conventional variant requirements in a
JROC validated capabilities document.
[all]